Regeneration and Hegemony: Franco-Batavian Relations in the Revolutionary Era, 1795-1803 9789004185586, 9004185585

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Regeneration and Hegemony

Legal History Library VOLUME 3

Studies in the History of International Law Series Editor

Randall Lesaffer, Tilburg University, Catholic University of Leuven Editorial Board

Peter Haggenmacher, Institut de Hautes Études Internationales Genève

Emmannuelle Jouannet, Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne) Lauri Mälksoo, University of Tartu Amanda Perreau-Saussine, University of Cambridge Masaharu Yanagihara, Kyushu University

VOLUME 1

Regeneration and Hegemony Franco-Batavian Relations in the Revolutionary Era 1795–1803 By

Raymond Kubben

Leiden  • boston 2011

Cover illustration: Frontispiece of Hollandia Regenerata. D. Hess, London, 1797. Grateful acknowledgement is made to the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for the financial support that made this publication possible This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kubben, Raymond. Regeneration and hegemony : Franco-Batavian relations in the revolutionary era, 1795–1803 / by Raymond Kubben.    p. cm. — (Legal history library ; v. 3) (Studies in the history of international law ; v. 1)   Includes bibliographical references and index.   ISBN 978-90-04-18558-6 (hardback : alk. paper)  1.  France—Foreign relations— Netherlands.  2. Netherlands—Foreign relations—France.  3.  France—History— Revolution, 1789–1799—Influence.  4. Netherlands—History—1795–1815.  5.  International law—Europe—History—18th century.  6.  International law— Europe—History—19th century.  I.  Title.  DC59.8.N3K83 2011   944.04—dc22 2010044147

ISSN 1874-1793 ISBN 978 90 04 18558 6 EISBN 978 90 04 18951 5 Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

To My Grandparents During that twenty-year period an immense number of fields were left untilled, houses were burned, trade changed its direction, millions of men migrated, were impoverished or were enriched, and millions of Christian men professing the law of love of their fellows slew one another. What does all this mean? Why did it happen? What made those people burn houses and slay their fellow men? What were the causes of these events? What force made men act so? These are the instinctive, plain, and most legitimate questions humanity asks itself when it encounters the monuments and traditions of that period. [. . .] What force moves the nations? Leo Tolstoy (1868, p. 940 and p. 942)

CONTENTS Abbreviations  ...................................................................................... Introductory Note, by Randall Lesaffer  .......................................... Preface  .................................................................................................. Map  .......................................................................................................

ix xi xiii xvi

Part I.  Revolution sans frontières Introduction  ........................................................................................ 1.  Power and Law in International Order  . ................................... 2.  The French Revolution and the European Order  . ..................

3 23 79

Part II.  Icy Rivers, Chains of Gold: The Franco-Batavian Alliance 1 Gallicus amicus  .............................................................................. 2. Clapping Hands, Fraternal Style  . ............................................... 3. A Constitutive Treaty?  ................................................................. 4. War and Peace  . ............................................................................. 5. The Limits of Independence  . ...................................................... 6. The Alliance Renewed  ..................................................................

141 165 227 281 377 465

Part III.  The Batavian Republic and the Struggle for Peace 1. Revolutionary Peace  . .................................................................... 2. Peace at Last  . ................................................................................. 3. Negotiating with Britain  .............................................................. 4. A Gathering in Rastatt  ................................................................. 5. The Consul’s Peace  ....................................................................... 6. Bridging the Channel  ...................................................................

501 525 567 615 651 683

viii

contents Part IV.  The Revolutionary alliance  ................ 703

Appendix  . ............................................................................................ 743 Archivalia  ............................................................................................. Glossary  ................................................................................................ Bibliography  ........................................................................................ Index of Names  . .................................................................................

761 763 765 783

ABBREVIATIONS AAE AHRF AN AP ASMi BP CG1

Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Centre Paris Annales historiques de la Révolution française Archives Nationales Archives privées Archivio di Stato Milano Bases proposées Correspondance générale tome premier (Napoleon Bonaparte, Correspondance générale publiée par la Fondation Napoléon Tome premier Les apprentissages 1784–1797, Paris, 2004) CP Correspondance Politique CTS Consolidated Treaty Series (C. Parry (ed.), The Consolidated Treaty Series, Dobbs Ferry N.Y, 1961–1986) DAT Dutch-Anglo Treaty (1788) DPT Dutch-Prussian Treaty (1788) EJIL European Journal of International Law JHIL Journal of the History of International Law MD Mémoires et Documents NA Nationaal Archief PN Plan de négociation (French commissioners, 14 March 1795) SBA Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv S.M. Sa Majesté (His Majesty)

INTRODUCTORY NOTE Over the last two decades, scholarly interest in the history of international law has progressively increased. This turn to history, which follows upon a long period of neglect, can largely be explained as part of a wider process of fundamentally rethinking international law that has been going on since the end of the Cold War. The main constituents for this boom are to be found among international lawyers, although a growing number of legal and diplomatic historians have started to take an interest. There are historical antecedents for this turn to history in a time of great changes for international law. The years after World War I and II were marked too by a rise in historical discourse among international lawyers, but it was not sustained. Now, far more scholars are involved and the interest spreads over a wider spectrum, which gives rise to the hope that this time, it might prove sustainable. With this new book series, Studies in the History of International Law, the editors and the publisher, Brill/Martinus Nijhoff, want to make a contribution towards achieving this. The series takes a broad and inclusive view on the historiography of international law. First, it is not reductionist to what constitutes international law. The scope is not limited to the formation or the direct historical antecedents of ‘modern international law,’ roughly the evolution of the law of nations in Europe and its colonial empires as off the Late Middle Ages. There are no constraints of chronology or geography. ‘International law’ in the title of the book series stands for all systems of law regulating relations between autonomous political entities throughout human history. Second, the series wants to offer a platform for authors and readers from all disciplines involved with the historiography of international law. Apart from international lawyers and legal and diplomatic historians, contributions from the fields of political philosophy or international relations theory that are relevant to the history of international law will be included. Third, whereas the vast majority of historical writing on international law focuses on historical jurisprudence, the series editors strongly encourage studies on historical practice.

xii

introductory note

Raymond Kubben’s Regeneration and Hegemony: Franco-Batavian Relations in the Revolutionary Era, 1795–1803, the first volume to be published in the series, is certainly a good example of how the latter can be done. Kubben questions the political and legal structure of the Revolutionary and early Napoleonic order through the lens of France’s relations with one of its main satellites, the Batavian Republic. The theme of hegemony and equality is essential to the understanding of the upheaval and change the French Revolution brought to international law. It forms a kaleidoscope through which one can see the real workings of revolutionary and ‘classical’ 18th-century ideas about war and peace, diplomacy, territorial acquisition, State succession and the validity of treaties, the role of the executive and the legislature, and self-determination of peoples. Kubben’s book is based on the thorough perusal of a mass of archival materials that documents the complex diplomatic and internal political negotiations about the Franco-Batavian relationship. Through the study of some legal but mostly of diplomatic and political sources, such as minutes of meetings and diplomatic correspondence, Kubben has mapped out how legal arguments were operated and formed. In this sense, it is a study on ‘international law in action.’ But it is important to note that this action is certainly not limited to the level of inter-State relations. It includes the level of their preparation within the political institutions of each State. Kubben’s scope, which ranges from the internal decision making to the actual international negotiations, allows him to uncover the central importance of the informal French influence on the Batavian government in the articulation and workings of their formal international relations. This explains that many of the forms and substance of the classical law of nations, based on sovereignty and equality, could survive and be sustained in a relationship that was in reality unequal. At one and the same time, it indicates a main cause for the potential failure for any State-centric history of international law. Randall Lesaffer Series editor

PREFACE At the time I started research for the present volume, the United States, shocked by the 11 September attacks, had just invaded Afgha­ nistan and rumours went that they were to invade Iraq. A short while later George W. Bush did indeed sent his men and women into the Iraqi desert, allegedly, to defend the world against WMDs, to rid it of yet another tyrant, and to bring democracy to the people of Iraq. The interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were planned and executed in the context of uncertainty about what world order had risen after the end of the Cold War and the in­crease of religious fundamentalism. We live in an age of transition. We assume to know where we are coming from. What our destiny will be remains to be seen. Is it the world of Francis Fukuyama’s ‘Last Man’?1 Will it be Samual Huntington’s world of clashing civilizations?2 Will it be Philip Bobbitt’s society of market-states,3 or Amitai Etzioni’s ‘global community’?4 Will it be Ann-Marie Slaughter’s ‘networked world order’?5 Might it be Philip Allott’s ‘Eunomia’?6 Will it be something else, not envisioned yet? Only the future may provide us with the answer. This book is not about Iraq or Afghanistan. No one appearing in it is likely to have visited any of the two countries. In fact, they did not even exist yet in the period covered by this book. The present volume is about another period of transformation and great power proselytism. It is about a period former French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin especially refer­red to as an historical precedent as he stated the need to invent a new world order in his speech to the ICC.7 In both cases the world’s main great power or (alleged) superpower occupied other countries, brought down their governments and re­placed them   Fukuyama, 1992.   Huntington, 1997. 3   Bobbitt, 2003. 4   Etzioni, 2004. 5   Slaughter, 2004. 6   Allott, 1990. 7   11 March 2004, Dominique de Villepin, speech to the International Criminal Court;  http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Visit-to-the-Netherlands-Speech-by.html  last consulted 6 January 2009. 1 2

xiv

preface

with more friendly ones, assisted in writing constitutions as well as in the process of state-building at large and kept troops in the areas; all of this being legitimised by a mixture of an appeal to the right of selfdefence and a policy to spread liberty and democracy. Henry Kissinger once stated: ‘History teaches by analo­gy, not identity.’8 Of course, our world has changed from François Noël’s, Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand’s, Paul Barras’, Maarten van der Goes’, Rutger-Jan Schimmelpenninck’s, Jaco­bus Blauw’s, and Carel de Vos van Steenwijk’s. But are there analogies? Can the Bush administration be compared with the French Directoire and Bonapartist regime in terms of its position and actions in international politics? Did Paul Bremer’s role and position in Iraq9 or Pieter Feith’s in Kosovo differ from Noël’s, Delacroix’, or Semon­ville’s in The Hague? Can one generalise from either situation of political and military preponderance and make remarks on the foundations and features of an international political order dominated by one superpower and the juridical consequences thereof? Maybe, maybe not. For once I refuse to answer these questions in this book. The reader, if prepared to violate historical truth always necessary to generalise, is free to do so himself. Nor do I make any claims that the analysis in this book might be generalised into a theory of international politics. At least, I do not set out to take that step. Henceforth, this book offers a profound case study of Franco-Batavian relations during the period of the Revolutionary Wars. Its ambitions do not extend beyond that. In conclusion, I would like to express the sincere gratitude towards those whose aid has been indispensable throughout the process of writing this book. The present volume results from a research project I conducted at Tilburg Law School’s Department of Jurisprudence and Legal History. I wish to thank all (former) Tilburg colleagues and student assistants for their support. Special thanks are due to Randall Lesaffer and Trix van Erp-Jacobs for their supervision and to Marc Belissa, Anthony Carty, Willem van Genugten, Fred Stevens, and Klaas Dijkhoff for their useful comments. Mention has to be made, too, of all the employees of the archives in The Hague, Paris, Bern, and Milan that helped me find my way through diplomatic archives.

8 9

  Kissinger, 1974, p. 331.   Bremer, 2006.



preface

xv

Furthermore, thanks are due to NWO for co-financing my stays in Paris, Bern, and Milan, without which the writing of this book would not have been possible. Raymond Kubben Geleen 6 January 2010

The Republic of the United Provinces on the eve of the Revolutionary era

Part I

Revolution sans frontières Order is a lawyer’s paradise. Establishing and maintaining order is what law seems to be all about. —Paul Vinogradoff, 1923, p. 4—

Introduction ‘Don’t you realise I have power either to free you or to crucify you?’ exclaimed Pontius Pilate, according to the Gospel by St. John,1 in reac­ tion to the way the suspect brought before the Roman governor in Judea responded to the accusations raised against Him. In a brave attempt to say anything sensible from a legal point of view about what prob­ ably is the most famous ‘historical trial’ in Western civilization, Eltjo Schrage claims to see in this verse one of the most impressing expres­ sions of the precarious relation between power and law.2 If there was a trial altogether, Pilate here dropped the veil of justice to refer to his power. Law exists to bring and maintain order, to moderate power and prevent its arbitrary use and, at the same time, law needs power to be effective and power can make use of law. A sword can wound and kill and yet it has to be an attribute of justice, whereas the sword needs the scales and blindfold too. Neither positions to which the law is nothing more than the command of those in power, nor ones to which the law upholds moral standards independent of and most often against mere power can ignore this ambiguous relation between power and law that has dominated the domains of political philosophy and public law for centuries and will probably do so for as long as human society exists. At the national level—at least in theory—power and law have merged into authority: legitimised, institutio­nalised and channelled power embedded in a constitution and centred in a political organisa­ tion that acts as the commanding sovereign and has monopolised the legitimate use of force. Characteristically for the modern states system, this national level is sepa­rated from the supranational or international level, where the relation between power and law is more equivocal. Inter­national society, to use Hedley Bull’s characterisation, is anar­ chical.3 There the ‘struggle for power’ peculiar to all politics takes place in different ways and within the framework of different institutions.4 It lacks a supreme command centre that determines what the law is

  John 19:10.  Schrage, 2003, p. 363. 3   Bull, 2002. 4   Morgenthau, 2004, p. 52. 1 2

4

part i

and how the law is inter­preted, administered, and enforced. That is not a sign of international law’s immaturity—it not having developed into a real and complete legal system yet, as Edward H. Carr has it—,5 but of the very foundations international society is based upon: the co-exis­tence of territorially based, autonomous political communi­ties called sovereign states. In that anarchical society both power and law can exist separately and in relation to one another. At the centre of this study are the ways power relates to the international legal order. Is power translated into law, legal status and legal procedures? Is power recognised by the law of nations and incorporated within the international legal order? Does law contain power or is law an instru­ ment in the hands of the powerful? Unlike most studies in diplo­matic history,6 the argument is not on great powers, but on relations between great powers and minor powers providing a case study on Revolutionary France and one of its satellite republics. One is not led to believe that the kind of great power-minor power relations described and analysed throughout this volume is peculiar to the Revolutionary era. Asymmetri­ cal alliances and political dependence of formally independent entities, personal unions or entities united because of dynastic links between their respective rulers were not excep­tional in early modern Europe: e.g. Austria and its Italian dominions and secundogeni­tures, Britain and Portugal, Britain and the United Provinces, Prussia and northern Ger­many, Spain and Parma. Nevertheless, this study sets out to deliver a case study on one of those situations in which a minor power was brought under the political and mili­tary control of a neighbouring power within a very specific context. Franco-Batavian relations, no doubt, were contingent of the Revolution and Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802). This book covers a period in European history in which one power—the French Republic—got in a political and military position that enabled it to undermine the legal assumption of the equality of autonomous actors within the international system, or at least in Western Europe. This book sets out to survey whether France did and was allowed to do precisely this by offering a case study of relations between France as the prime great power and one of the neighbouring minor pow­ ers: the Batavian Republic, as the northern part of the Low Countries

5 6

 Carr, 2001, p. 159.   Black, 2002, p. 42.



introduction

5

came to be called. The Batavian Republic was the first (enduring) of the French Republic’s so-called sister republics; befriended republics along the Rhine and Alps, liberated and regenerated by French mili­ tary aid and bound to the French Republic by common social and political institutions.7 After the French inva­sion of 1795, it became part of the French sphere of influence for the remaining period of the Revolutionary Wars. Against the background of those wars and in the face of Revolutionary ideas on international relations and European order, Franco-Batavian relations of the years 1795–1803 offer an excel­ lent case to elucidate the interaction between power and law. The Revolutionary Wars, in addition to the crisis in Eastern Europe during the 1770s and 1780s,8 disrupted the European balance of power and the eighteenth-century politi­cal and legal order that had arisen after the great peace conferences of the late seven­teenth and early eighteenth centuries.9 For some years Revolutionary and Napo­ leonic France dominated Western Europe. Even in 1799–1800, when the joint effort of all other great powers save neutral Prussia gave the French a difficult time, the Revolutio­nary armies succeeded in turning the tide. From 1794 until the Battle of Leipzig (16–19 October 1813) there was an ever-increasing political and military imbalance within the European states system. The advance of the French Revolutionary armies caused the creation of allied republics in the Netherlands, Italy, and Switzerland. At the same time, the Revolutionary era witnessed an intensive debate on the European order and the law of nations due to a sense of a new world order arising or to be created. The Revolution introduced into politi­ cal practice some, more or less new political and legal ideas that had

7   The Batavian Republic (1795), the Cispadane Republic (1796) that later merged with Lombardy into the Cisalpine Republic (1797; from 1802 onwards the Italian Republic), the Ligurian Republic (1797), the Roman Republic (1798), the Helvetic Republic (1798), the Neapolitan or Parthenopean Republic (1799), the Republic of the Valais (1802) and some very small ones that existed only briefly before being incorpo­ rated into France or one of the larger and longer-lasting sister republics. Plans were also made for a Catalan Republic in Spain—which failed to be established because of the Franco-Spanish Peace of 1795 (Sorel, 1906IV, p. 91)—, a Cisrhenan Republic in Germany—which did not come into being as France annexed the left bank of the Rhine—and a sister republic in Ireland, which did not materialise as the invasion of the island failed. See e.g. Harouel, 1997b; Vovelle, 2000; Frijthoff, Santing, Van Sas and De Valk, 2002. 8  Schroeder, 1994, p. 23. 9   Kissinger, 1974, p. 4.

6

part i

potentially severe consequences for the international legal order. In the first place the influence of Enlightened idealism and cosmopolitanism was still felt, e.g. in the stress on pacifism, good faith in interstate rela­ tions and ‘federalism.’10 In the second place, the Revolutio­nary concept of popular sovereignty challenged or threatened to change some of the fundamentals of the European order: e.g. statehood, legal personality, sovereignty, recognition, the principle of (non-)intervention, the right of conquest, and the binding force of treaties. These ideas in combina­ tion with political and military developments both within and among states counterpoised the existing order and called for an intellec­tual exercise defined by Marc Belissa as ‘répenser l’ordre européen.’11 The Revolutionary period appears to be somewhat neglected in the historiography of the law of nations. Ever since diplomatic archives were disclosed in the mid-nineteenth century, specialists have worked on the period.12 Their accounts have hardly made their way into gen­ eral exposés on the history of the law of nations, though. Karl-Heinz Ziegler claims that Revolutionary ideas on the law of nations hardly influenced legal practice at the time.13 Stephan Verosta, while giving some, although rather succinct attention to the French Revolution and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, claims that the ‘Westphalian’ political order in Europe14 ended with the defeat of France, after which a new political order arose formulated at the Vienna Congress.15 How­ ever, the beginning of a new order does not necessarily coincide with the end of the old one. The European order that had arisen after the peace conferences of Westphalia and Utrecht was indeed disrupted and rejected some years earlier. Heinhard Steiger is closer to the his­ torical truth by talking about ‘the intermediate events of the French Revo­lution and the Napoleonic wars.’16 Likewise, Wilhelm Grewe calls the years after the French Revolution ‘a particular, transitory stage.’17   Hodé, 1921; Onuf and Onuf, 1993; Von Höffe. 1995a.   Belissa, 2006. 12  Laurent, 1867 and 1869; Dufraisse, 1867; Nye, 1896; Redslob, 1974; Basdevant, 1910; Mirkine-Guetzevitch, 1928 and 1950; Belissa 1995, 1998, 2006 and 2007. 13   Ziegler, 2007, p. 145. 14   That is to say the European order that emerged after the Peace of Westphalia (1648). What is not meant here is the kind of international (legal) order international lawyers tend to call ‘Westphalian,’ that came into being after the breakdown of the ‘concert de l’Europe’ in the mid-nineteenth century. 15  Verosta, 1995, p. 749. 16  Steiger, 2001, p. 183. 17   Grewe, 2000, p. 413. 10 11



introduction

7

The latter, although devoting a chapter to the Revolutionary period in his Epochs, argues that in the period of the French Revolution ‘the effectiveness of the legal order was more or less suspended.’18 This view that the Revolution caused a temporal break down of the international legal order is quite generally shared and can be traced back to con­ temporary conservative critics of the Revolution.19 Paul Vinogradoff does not get further than stating that the period of the French Revo­ lution—although he speaks of ‘the end of the century’—‘witnessed a titanic attempt to put these theories [Enlightenment ideas on inter­ national relations; RK] into practice.’20 However, the qualification of being ‘intermediate’ or ‘transitory’ does not justify glossing over the question whether the era left an heritage in that it contributed to the further development of the law of nations and if so, in what ways. Recently some scholars have paid attention to the Revolutionar­ ies’ views on international order from an ideological and conceptual point of view by analysing public and academic debate, primarily bas­ ing their research on parliamentary debates, newspapers, and pam­ phlets.21 Although there is an abundance of studies on diplomatic practice, studying matters of law from diploma­tic practice has still been neglected. Nonetheless, it would be interesting to have a look at diplomatic practice. In that case attention shifts from academic, politi­ cal, and public debate to the ‘living law’22 part of the law of nations, that is, how legal order is organised and conceived by practitioners, the concepts and rules of conduct that are recognised by relevant actors within the international legal order as legally binding or as sources providing legal claims and arguments. Moreover, attention shifts from public debates and writings to more official, secret or at least nonpublic documents. This study aims to do exactly this for the period of the Revolution­ ary Wars from the time that the French Revolutionary armies crossed their nations’ ‘natural borders’ to the start of the Napoleonic Wars (1795–1803). The Batavian Republic existed until 1806 as it was trans­ ferred into the Kingdom of Holland. This book will not cover the entire

  Grewe, 1999, p. 36.   Kissinger, 1974, p. 4; Armstrong, 1993, p. 85; Wendt, 1999, p. 270, p. 297 and p. 312. 20  Vinogradoff, 1923, p. 53. 21  E.g. Belissa, 1995 and 2006. 22  For the concept of ‘living law’ see below. 18 19

8

part i

period of the Batavian Republic’s existence, though. The discussion in this book will end with the renewed outbreak of war with Britain in 1803 and the resultant renewal of the Franco-Batavian alliance. A short while afterwards, Napoleon was made Emperor of the French23 and Franco-Batavian relations entered another period, that of Napo­ leonic imperialism. The rupture of the Peace of Amiens (27 March 1802) in 1803, hence, demarcated the start of a new period that would take yet another volume. Thus, this book focuses on a period usu­ ally lost between the journées of the early Revolutionary period— 14 July 1789, 10 August 1792, the 1792 September days, the Terror of 1793–1794—and the grandeur of the Empire, all more appealing to the imagination. This neglect is totally inapt, especially where inter­ national affairs are concerned, for while less exciting prima facie, this is the period that the Republican armies actually crossed the French borders and changed the maps of Western Europe, decisions were made that determined Napoleon’s possibilities and the groundwork was laid for him to build his Empire on; the Grand Empire was a path dependent enterprise and the path was chosen during the Directoire and Consulat periods. At the core of this study is the distinction between legal equality and hierarchy in international order. The egalitarian ideal did stand as a cornerstone of eighteenth-century thought on the law of nations and Revolutionary ideology. Le droit public de l’Europe that gradually arose after the Peaces of Westphalia (1648) and Utrecht (1713–1714), centred on the principles of equality and independence of nations.24 Peter Kooijmans traces back the origins of the idea of equality of states to the seventeenth century asserting that equality of states was intro­ duced by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and formed into a legal concept by Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694) after which the notion spread throughout the eighteenth century.25 Without assessing whether he is correct, it can be established here that juridical equality of states was widely accepted on the eve of the French Revolution. The idea of the

23   The imperial dignity was imposed on Napoleon on 18 May 1804 (http://www .conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/lesconstitutions-de-la-france/constitution-de-l-an-xii-empire-28–floreal-an-xii.5090. html ). The coronation took place on 2 December 1804. 24   Krisch, 2005, p. 377; Osiander, 2003, p. 87. 25   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 71.



introduction

9

equality of states might have been most strongly expressed by Emer de Vattel (1714–1767) in his 1758 Droit des gens: Un nain est aussi bien un homme qu’un géant. Une petite république n’est pas moins un État souverain que le plus puissant royaume.26

Georg Friedrich von Martens held brief for a legal equality of states as well: Entre les nations comme entre les individus il y a une egalité parfaite de droits naturels et absolus; c’est à dire qu’indépendamment de la diversité du territoire, de la population, des forces, de la religion, de la constitu­ tion, de l’ancienneté du gouverne­ment établi, tous ont un même droit d’entreprendre ce qui est compatible avec l’indépendance des autres, et que dans l’état absolu aucun n’est au droit de les forcer à un acte positif quelconque en sa faveur.27

Admittedly, eighteenth-century diplomatic practice did recognise some inequalities: guarantees of treaties and constitutional arrangements by Europe’s main powers often lacked reciprocity, and in diplomatic cer­ emony a set hierarchy reflecting differences in status was to be strictly respected. Moreover, in political terms, the European powers were distinguished from each other as powers of the first, second, or third rank.28 The ideal of legal equality, firmly based in natural law, was widely shared, though. For instance, after the French Revolution had started, it was voiced in Constantin-François Volney’s proposal for an article on the ius ad bellum in the French Constitution and the Abbé Henri de Grégoire’s drafts for a declaration of the law of nations. According to the preamble of Volney’s proposal, ‘les États [. . .] jouissent des mêmes droits naturels.’29 ‘Les peuples sont respectivement indépendants et souverains, quelque soit le nombre d’individus qui les composent et l’étendue du territoire qu’ils occupent,’ wrote Grégoire in his 1795 draft.30 To these Revolutionaries equality of nations was just a specification of the ‘egalité’ in the Revolution’s slogan. And yet, in the years after the thermidor coup d’état (27–28 July 1794) the French Republic reached  Vattel, 1758, p. 11 [Preliminaires § 11].   Martens, 1821, p. 232. 28  E.g. Mably, 1757, Chapters IV–VIII and introduction thereto by Belissa, pp. 19–21. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, the distinction is still being referred to in diplomatic sources from the Revolutionary era. See also Duchhardt, 1997, p. 95; Black, 2002, pp. 39–40. 29  Reiterated in: Nys, 1896, p. 361. 30  Nys, 1896, p. 395. 26 27

10

part i

and claimed a hegemonic position. Politically, at least, the sister repub­ lics’ regimes were dependent on the French government. However, the factual inequality in power and influence, does not give a conclusive indication of the sister republics’ legal position and their position within the international legal order. Vattel and Grégoire recognised the exis­ tence of factual inequalities, which did not stop them from claiming juridical equality. The question remains whether French hegemony, despite the ideological stress on equality, was transmitted into unequal juridical status and forms? Was there a legalised hegemony—defined by Gerry Simpson as ‘the realisation through legal forms of Great Power prerogatives’—,31 that is to say, was a special role—in terms of rights, obligations and responsibilities—within the international legal order attributed to the French Republic vis-à-vis the Batavian Republic? Did a legal hierarchy arise between them? Method The history of the law of nations tends to be studied on the basis of international legal doctrine.32 Focusing on actual relations between two states and their position in the international legal order at large, this book takes another approach. It turns to the treaties and conventions the two Republics used to settle their mutual relations and a range of diplomatic sources on the formation, implementation, and interpreta­ tion of those documents. The focus on treaties hardly needs any explanation. Treaties were already recogni­sed by contemporaries as the main sources of the law of nations.33 The great peace treaties of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries occupied a central place in the international legal order,34 for instance as a point of reference to rights, obligations, legal titles, and generally recognised rules of the law of nations. In the words of Gabriel de Mably (1709–1785): Tout le monde sçait que les Traités sont les archives des Nations, qu’ils renferment les titres de tous les peuples, les engagemens réciproques qui

 Simpson, 2004, p. x.  Lesaffer, 2005b, p. 32. 33   Mirkine-Guetzevitch, 1928, p. 302. 34   Ziegler, 2007, p. 150. 31 32



introduction

11

les lient, les loix qu’ils se sont imposées, les droits qu’ils ont acquis ou perdus.35

To be sure, looking at treaties seems to imply a positivist or voluntarist approach to the law of nations.36 Indeed, treaties are deliberately con­ cluded by states to settle their mutual relations, but an analysis of treaty practice does provide some cases in which references to a more objective law of nations were made or more general rules were reflected in treaty provisions. Central to diplomatic practice as treaties were at the time, diplomatic discourse leading to their formation or settling disputes on interpretation and implementation might prove to be informative on the law of nations in a wider sense. Diplomatic correspondence may be a less obvious source to answer questions on the law of nations and the international legal order. Nonetheless, it is exactly in the official intercourse between govern­ ments and diplomats that the applicable law and legal concepts are to be found. This book will search for legal relations at the place where international law and international politics meet, precisely from the assumption that the law of nations gains meaning and substance only within the context of inter­national politics. The instance law is con­ sidered to be man-made instead of conceived in natural law terms as transcendental and preordained, law is intrinsically connected with politics.37 The law of nations is not even ‘a by-product of politics.’38 Philip Allott is right in stressing that the law of nations results from a political struggle on the formulation of values and the power to make and enforce law,39 but this is just part of the story. The law of nations is part of international politics.40 It is that aspect of international politics that formulates binding rules to conduct politics.41 The law of nations is a living law, part of a political context in which its rules are formed and are given their meaning on the one hand, and, conversely, for which it provides institutionalised and binding rules of conduct by which the game of international politics has to be played.42 Henceforth,   Mably, 1764, I, p. iii.  Lesaffer, 1999a, p. xxii. 37   Georgiev, 1993, p. 3. 38  Allott, 1990, p. 46. 39  Allott, 2002, p. 153. 40  Scott, 1994, p. 317; Krisch, 2005, p. 408. 41   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 124. 42  On the innate connection between law and politics, see: Carr, 2001, p. 164 and p. 166. 35 36

12

part i

the law of nations is not primarily to be found in the writings of schol­ ars but in diplomatic practice itself and a historical period’s diplomatic practice has left its remnants in diplomatic archives. Formalistic legal positivists find it hard to deal with the law of nations, because they are solely capable of perceiving law in terms of emanating from a sove­reign power or of doctrinal systems.43 Dealing with actual relations between actual states, this study needs to set off from a different point of view. Within the purview of this study, the law of nations is not approached as, like Martti Koskenniemi does, ‘what lawyers [. . .] think,’44 ‘an effect of lawyers’ imagination,’45 ‘a tech­ nical craft,’46 or ‘something imagined and operated by lawyers.’47 For the actual law of nations is not to be found in legal doctrine. Legal doc­ trine cannot always be trusted to provide valid information on appli­ cable law.48 Sometimes it does reflect the law as it was; more often it was an academic exercise reflecting wishful legal thinking determined by political, moral, religious, economic, or cultural views and endea­ vouring to impose on law a scientifically ideal system and scholarly assumptions of what law is. Once it becomes an object of academic study law easily loses touch with society. Thus, private law jurists have appropriated private law to the extent that hardly any layman is even aware of the legal rules and concepts that become applicable the moment he puts his groceries on the conveyor belt at a super market’s checkout and the law comes into sight only once problems arise and the matter is referred to lawyers; hence being virtually irrelevant to most actors and transactions it is supposed to regulate. In other words, the moment law becomes recognisable as law to legal scholars lawyers deprive law of its social functions. Contrariwise, the law of nations has not lost its touch with the reality of social intercourse yet. The law of nations is not the kind of neat scientific system private law jurists have created for themselves; the kind of lawyers’ law no state with a proper sense of self-interest and the means to act upon it, would ever entirely and always adhere to.

  Hall, 2001, p. 271.   Koskenniemi, 2004, p. 7. 45   Koskenniemi, 2004, p. 361. 46   Koskenniemi, 2006, p. 7. 47   Koskenniemi, 2006, p. 10. 48  Lesaffer, 2006, p. 98. 43 44



introduction

13

Hence, for methodological reasons, instead of doctrine, a more socio­logical ap­proach to law in international relations is taken here. The law of nations works within a political system. The features of that system are determinative for the law. At the inter­national level, law is a law in action, the living law of international politics. The law of nations is not a law of scholars, but a law of statesmen, soldiers, and diplomats. The law in its essence is a social and inherently practical phenomenon; hence any true history of the law of nations should be a study of practice instead of doctrine. Most prominently, the Austrian legal sociologist, Eugen Ehrlich, has argued that law is a social fact and results from social intercourse.49 The phrase ‘living law’ is his.50 According to Ehrlich, law does not evolve or develop through legisla­ tion or the judiciary, but in society itself.51 He adheres to a practical concept of law according to which law is perceptible in social relations and interactions. Basically, legal norms are rules of conduct caught in a normative formula.52 Law is a living law because it is the formal expression of the internal order of a social group and functions as a reference for behaviour.53 Whereas internal perspectives might regard the legal order as legal because it has a ‘self-contained systematic coherence,’ a sociological approach regards an order as legal because it is an order that springs from social intercourse.54 In this approach, then, the origin and foundation of the law of nations are clear: it is the system of states itself. Rules of conduct and legal mechanisms for dis­ pute settlement, enforcement etc. have resulted from the very process of existing closely together and interacting with each other. Hence, law can be observed in social activities and interactions.55 Ehrlich’s concept of law is taken as the basis for this study’s methodology. Since law essentially is a social and practical phenomenon, practice will be studied here. Essentially a sociological approach deviates from structuralist think­ ing. Instead of conceptual sources of law and legal obligation linked to a specific political structure, one starts to think from social func­ tions. As Sanne Taekema has argued, a functionalist approach allows   Jones, 1969, p. 187 and p. 191; Ziegert, 1996, p. 634.  Ehrlich, 1911 and 1913, pp. 315–331. 51   Ziegert, 1996, p. 630. 52   Ziegert, 1996, p. 634; Tyler, 2007, p. 3. 53   Ziegert, 1996, pp. 635–637. 54   Ziegert, 1996, p. 637; Allott, 2002, p. 48 and p. 56. 55   Ziegert, 1996, p. 638. 49 50

14

part i

for recogni­sing rules as law without the state.56 Peter Kooijmans has refuted the denial of international law by radical positivists based on the non-existence of a sovereign lawgiver. He accepts that legal norms need to be ‘positivised,’ but it does not necessarily take a government to enact and enforce rules.57 Moreover, Kooijmans has stressed that enforcement, though relevant to law, cannot be part of the definition of law, because that would turn the definition of law into a tautology.58 One cannot enforce something that does not exist yet. Hence, the existence of behavioural rules precedes their enforcement. Therefore, enforcement has to be extraneous to defining law. One of the most authoritative expressions of a functionalist approach to law has been offered by Karl Llewellyn. He has identified several ‘law jobs’ independent of who or what kind of institutions is charged with these functions. In his view, law has various functions that are essen­ tial to the existence and functioning of society: 1) dispute settlement, 2) (re)channelling of conduct and expectations, 3) allocating author­ ity by establishing procedures and assigning powers for legal decision making, 4) organising society as a collective by formulating collective visions and interests as well as contributing to a sense of togetherness and solidarity, and 5) juristic method.59 These functions or ‘jobs’ are to be looked for in diplomatic practice to establish what international legal order was like. Likewise, Hedley Bull—regarding international order as a social order—60 distinguishes several functions law has within a society. In the first place, law identifies the principles of political organisation.61 That is to say, law identifies the members of a society,62 and attri­ butes basic political functions like making, communicating, admini­ stering, interpreting, enforcing, legitimising, and protecting rules of law.63 In the second place, law sets the ‘basic rules of coexistence among states.’ In the third place, law furthers the observance of those

 Taekema, 2008, p. 56.   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 15. 58   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 16. 59  Llewellyn, 1940, pp. 1373–1397; on Llewellyn’s notion of ‘law jobs’ see also: Taekema, 2008, pp. 57–60. 60   Keene, 2002, p. ix. 61   Bull, 2002, p. 135. 62   Bull, 2002, p. 65. 63   Bull, 2002, p. 54 and p. 59. 56 57



introduction

15

rules.64 In line with Herbert Hart’s distinction between primary and secondary rules,65 one would then be looking for 1) an accepted code of conduct or a sense of appropriate behaviour, and 2) forms of insti­ tutionalised co-existence from which the code of conduct emanates. As a ‘living law,’ the law of nations equals the concepts and rules of conduct that are recognised as ‘law,’ as legally binding or as sources providing legal claims and arguments by relevant actors within the inter­national legal order that arise while reading more official, secret or at least non public documents. A pattern of behaviour might be evi­ dence of law, but the law of nations in this sense is not just what states do or want. It is about what they conceive as law, what they think they can get away with,66 what kind of behaviour they accept from others and what kind of behaviour other states will accept. In short, the law of nations is about the rules of conduct states sense they and others should adapt their actions to, as well as the mechanisms a society has to identify, modify, interpret, and enforce these rules. The best way to discover these rules and mechanisms is by studying actions of states, the justifications states issue to sustain their actions, and the norma­ tive reactions by other states. Statements states make about their own behaviour or that of others are specifically instructive. Whether other states endorse actions or protest against them might be quite indicative, although one should preferably establish why they did or did not do so. It is in these state­ ments, actions and reactions that the law of nations is expressed in diplomatic practice. Legal arguments in such statements might be pri­ marily rhetorical, but they can only have the intended rhetorical effect if they refer to opinions, views, perceptions, political theoretical con­ cepts and so on that apparently were forceful and common enough to provide valid arguments. States may not state the true reasons of their action, but they do usually endeavour to justify what they do or do not do by legal or moral arguments.67 Hans Morgenthau appraises these references as (self-)deceit,68 but legitimating one’s own behaviour or denying legitimacy to behav­ iour of others by necessity refers to ‘normative beliefs’ in attempting   Bull, 2002, p. 135.   Hart, 1997, p. 79. 66  Lesaffer, 2006, p. 174. 67   Baehr, 1994, p. 210 and p. 214. 68   Morgenthau, 2004, pp. 101–103. 64 65

16

part i

to connect behaviour with accepted rules, moral or legal principles.69 Arguing in terms of justice or legitimacy while actions are actually driven by political reasons usually intends to persuade others to sup­ port or at least not to resist actions and thus will refer to views on acceptable behaviour.70 Since arguments will be adapted to the intended audience,71 depending on who one tries to convince and the public or private nature of the statements, they might inform us of what the author himself believes in and/or what he conceives to be the believes of the addressee(s) or third parties. States are expected to argue in terms of law and justice. Therefore, it is hard for states to refrain from legal and moral discourse. As Goldsmith and Posner have stressed, legal argumentation might be sincere or a disguise for self-interest and power, but not framing a justification of action in a legal and moral discourse is really telling. Because arguing in legal and moral terms, according to Goldsmith and Posner, is ‘cheap,’ not arguing in legal and moral terms will easily be taken as a contrario evidence that a state deems its action not to be lawful and just.72 Nevertheless, one might wonder whether Goldsmith and Posner are entirely right in claiming that references to the law of nations and justice are cheap. Although detrimental effects will be noticeable only in the long run, legal and moral arguments might backfire if a state’s behaviour turns out not to be consistent with the law of nations or previous statements. This sociological approach does not prejudice on the nature of legal relations between the two sister republics or the ways they were conceived. Leon Duguit has criticized sociological approaches to the law of nations arguing that recognition of the existence of social rules does not imply that these rules are actually law. He claims that rules’ social aspect merely explains the substance of legal norms, whereas it takes a formal aspect to explain their legal character.73 The latter aspect takes an internal perspective, whereas the sociological aspect takes an external perspective. Both approaches need to be clearly distinguished. For methodological reasons, an external view to the law of nations is adhered to here, whereas the law of nations from an internal perspec­ tive is under scrutiny throughout the present study. It is one thing to   Piirimäe, 2002, p. 501; Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, pp. 168–169.  Lesaffer, 2006, p. 100 and p. 162. 71   Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, p. 180. 72   Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, p. 174. 73   Gilson, 1984, pp. 278–279. 69 70



introduction

17

depart from the idea that the law of nations is a social and political phenomenon consisting of rules of conduct and concepts that enable people to understand the world they live in and that develop in social and political practice in order to study the law of nations within a specific historical context. It is an entirely different thing to ask if, how and why these rules and concepts were conceived as law from within by contemporaries. These exter­nal and internal approaches to the law of nations are distinct from each other. The latter can be an object of investigation, while the first is taken as the methodological basis of that investigation. In purporting to establish legal relations in political practice, this study deals with theory in practice. And practice is not the philos­ opher’s paradise. For practical reasons and because of the limited capability of abstraction and comprehension in most practitio­ners, philosophical jewels of conceptualisation and systematisation appear in vulgarised forms and deprived of profound substance and meaning. The reader will hardly meet any philosophers throughout this study and all the more politicians, bureaucrats, military officers, and trained or untrained diplomats. To be sure, most of them were lawyers or oth­ erwise educated men, but—with the possible exception of Emmanuel de Sieyes, on the scarce occasions he was willing to philosophise—none of them belongs to the Parnassus of political and legal philosophy. It is thus that we have to descend from the heights of the Platonic world of ideas to the shady world of the cave were legal concepts and rules are only to be observed in the vulgarised form of shadows of the logi­ cally consistent, and philosophically comprehensive ideas. John Dunn, writing about democracy, makes a distinction between the word and the idea, both having a separate existence and influence on political practice.74 The same is true for Revolutionary dis­course. Even without practitioners and addressees fully understanding the ideas of liber­ty, democracy, republic, nation, human rights, sovereignty, and so on, the use of these words had a political and rhetorical meaning and effect. It is more as words than as ideas that we come across them in diplomatic correspondence. Sporadically, philoso­phical notions will be referred to in an attempt to clarify positions taken, but, in general, the vulgar­ ised or even nominal form in which ideas and concepts functioned in political and diplomatic discourse will be respected throughout this  Dunn, 2005, p. 20.

74

18

part i

book. In addition, not all questions, no matter how interesting they might be, can be addressed. The questions one can put to historical sources are limited and determined by the sources themselves. Hence­ forth, the reader expecting profound conceptual elaborations through­ out this book or a consistent image of international legal order that came into being after the French Revolution or that was conceived by contemporaries will find himself disappointed at the end. The period of the Revolutionary Wars has left a vast number of dip­ lomatic sources. Covering all diplomatic correspondence between the French and Batavian Republics from early 1795 to the summer of 1803 is not feasible. Hence a selection had to be made. This was done on the basis of a case selection based on secondary literature and the themes this study focuses on as expounded in Chapter I.1. This case selection focused on the Alliance Treaty, subsequent conventions, peace nego­ tiations, and disputes as well as diplomatic initiatives to bring about modifications of the Alliance Treaty and conventions known from secondary literature. Most material used throughout this book has been harvested in diplomatic archives. Research has been conducted in the Dutch Nationaal Archief in The Hague (NA), and the French Archives Nationales (AN) and the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (AAE) in Paris. In addition, some sources were found in the Swiss Bundesarchiv in Bern (SBA) and the Archivio di Stato in Milan (ASMi). The archival research focused on the relations between France and the Batavian Republic. In the Dutch and French archives the cor­ respondence within the rhombus formed by the French and Batavian Foreign Secretaries,75 the Batavian envoy(s) in Paris, and the French envoy in The Hague was the main focus of research. Next, correspon­ dence between these Foreign Secretaries with their governments (the Directoire or Premier Consul in Paris, and the Uitvoerend Bewind or Staatsbewind in The Hague) and direct correspondence between Bata­ vian and French envoys with other government ministers in their place of residence have been gone through, too. Correspondence with French military commanders has been excluded. Although the military line of command formed an alternative line of communication with Paris,76  On the Batavian side, prior to the establishment of the Agentschap der Buiten­ landsche betrekkingen in March 1798, the Staten Generaal’s Secreet Besogne and the Nationale Vergadering’s Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken. 76   Woolf, 1991, p. 124. 75



introduction

19

this would have extended the number of sources beyond the range of possibility. In Swiss and Italian archives similar documents have been consulted in addition to the correspondence between Batavian authori­ ties and diplomats and their counterparts in the Helvetic and Cisalpine or Italian Republics. Remarks on the context of great power politics as well as introductory chapters and paragraphs are necessarily based on secondary sources. To avoid any chance of confusion the names of the various state institu­ tions are used in the various languages of the sister republics—Dutch for the Batavian Republic, German for the Helvetic Republic and Italian for the Cisalpine Republic—whereas French is reserved for the French Republic’s institutions. A list of translations of Dutch terms and names is to be found in the appendices on p. 763. Geographical locations, names of provinces, cities, rivers etc. are in English for as far as English translations of the names in the local vernacular exist. Denominators like ‘Belgium,’ ’Germany,’ and ‘Italy’ are used since they were used in contemporary sources as well. It has to be noted, however, that they refer to geographical areas instead of political entities. A lot of people appear throughout this book. The years of their birth and death are indicated if they lived prior to the Revolutionary period. All others were in some stage of their active political, military, or diplomatic careers at the time or concern writers from the late nineteenth century onwards. Unless indicated otherwise all translations of primary sources are the author’s. Most sources were dated according to the French Revolu­ tionary calendar. For the references in this book these dates have been converted to the Gregorian calendar. Content This book sets out to offer a case study to elucidate the interaction between power and law in international relations. Translated to the period under scrutiny, this theme raises the questions whether and if so, in what ways French political and military preponde­rance affected legal relations between France and one of its neighbours. This part of the book continues with two introductory chapters. Chapter 1.1 elaborates on international order and the relation between power and law in international relations from a theoretical point of view. It sets out to offer a typology of international order based on

20

part i

the major works of international relations theory. Furthermore, it will address the notion of equality of states as a crucial distinctive feature within the typology. What does equality mean from a legal point of view and when is inequality legally relevant? In addition, some remarks on interstate relations from a perspective of interaction between power and law will be made. This theoretical framework will allow for the main question to be elaborated and refined. Chapter I.2 will discuss the politico-historical and ideological context of the present case study. After a brief sketch of the eighteenth-century states system, the French Revolution, French domestic politics, and European politics of the period of the Revolutionary Wars will be addressed. This chap­ ter will go more deeply into Revolutionary visions on European order and the law of nations, as well as into eighteenth-century diplomatic practice these visions reacted against. The French Revolution posed a special situation to international relations due to the role of ideology and military events. The influence of Revolutionary thought on views on interstate relations will be addressed in interaction with traditions in French foreign policy since the French attitude towards the Bata­ vian Republic was determined both by the ideological and political background of the Revolution and by traditional views on France’s position and role within Europe and on the best ways to guarantee French security. French debates were dominated between the dialec­ tic between cosmopolitan fraternity and internationalism on the one hand and national interests and security on the other and the (partly corresponding) dialectic between the eighteenth-century federal vision and the Vattelian view of international order of independent states coexisting under natural law. It was within the purview of these dialectics that the French formulated, abandoned, and redefined their policy of sister republics. Franco-Batavian relations will be addressed along two lines. Both lines will confine Franco-Batavian relations to the international level. A wide range of literature has already been written on the Batavian Republic’s constitutions.77 Although it would be interesting to find out whether the Revolutionary alliance was already an imperial order years prior to the proclamation of the French Empire (18 May 1804) and  Verhagen, 1949; Geyl, 1959; Bauer, 1962; Van Hasselt, 1987; De Wit, 1983; De Gou, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1995; Schama, 1989; Harouel, 1997b; Moorman van Kappen, 2000; Moorman van Kappen and Coppens, 2001; Elias, 2001; Van Namen, 2002; Van Sas, 2004; Rosendaal, 2008. 77



introduction

21

the rise of the Great Empire after the Battle of Austerlitz (2 Decem­ ber 1805)—i.e. whether the French Republic intervened in domestic affairs, especially constitutional affairs, and in what ways and how these interventions were justified—, this book will focus on the Bata­ vian Republic’s external relations. Part II will elaborate on direct, bilateral relations between the two states setting of from the question whether de facto preponderance was legally translated. Part II sets out to find out how Franco-Batavian relations were perceived. On the one hand, discourse on mutual rela­ tions will be analysed. Thereto discourse will be contrasted to legal documents and arguments. The second Part starts with a chapter on Franco-Batavian relations prior to the Revolutionary Wars by way of introduction. The second chapter discusses the debate on what the relation between the French and Batavian Republics was to be set off by the French invasion of the United Provinces in January 1795 and the formation of the 1795 Treaty of The Hague. Diplomatic and political discourse not taken into consideration, Franco-Batavian relations were caught in and dominated by the Alliance Treaty. The Treaty of The Hague and additional conventions will be discussed in thematic chapters (3, 4, and 5). The treaty provisions can be divided in those addressing political, financial, military, and territorial issues. Chapter II.3 elaborates on political and financial issues like the Bata­ vian Republic’s recognition by France, the indemnity to be paid to France, and the political character of the alliance, that is, did ideology and the republican form of government matter and to what extent did the alliance express already existing, ‘natural’ bonds between the two Republics. Chapter II.4 addresses military issues like the military char­ acter (defensive and/or offensive) and duration of the alliance, obliga­ tions of mutual aid and contribution to each other’s war efforts, the presence of French troops on Batavian soil, the command of troops in case of joined action and supreme command of military forces within the Batavian Republic, and measures of economic warfare. This chapter focuses on the questions whether the Alliance Treaty was constitutive both for the Batavian Republic and for Franco-Batavian relations. In addition, attempts by the Batavian government to get rid of the (offen­ sive) alliance and return to a neutral status and French responses will be discussed. Chapter II.5 elaborates on territorial issues. The French had set their mind on attaining part of Dutch territory. Negotiations on the Franco-Batavian border and the final settlement in the Alli­ ance Treaty will be discussed. Further attention will be paid to the

22

part i

settlement with regard to the port of Flushing that would end up in the Treaty of The Hague. This settlement—either allowing the French navy to use the port or vesting a condominium—continuously caused disputes between the two Republics. Both disputes on Flushing and negotiations on the mutual border are quite illustrative for the inter­ action between power and law in Franco-Batavian relations and for the relation between state and territory in contemporary thought and practice. Part II will end with a chapter on the renewal of the FrancoBatavian alliance after the renewed outbreak of war with Britain in 1803. Throughout these chapters the focus will be on formal consent, reciprocity and (a)symmetry in rights, responsibilities, and obligations as features of equality. Part III will take the argument to the international level at large investigating the Batavian Republic’s freedom to determine its foreign policy and ability to play a role on the international scene. After some remarks on Batavian diplomatic relations, Part III will address the Batavian Republic’s involvement in peace negotiations and the Peace Treaties between the French Republic on the one hand and Britain and Austria or the Empire on the other. Throughout the eighteenth century fundamental questions regarding European order and the law of nations had been addressed especially at peace congresses ending major wars. Hence, great power peace negotiations offer an excellent opportunity to discuss whether equality or great power leadership ruled in international politics. Finally, Part IV attempts to bring the elaborate discussion of FrancoBatavian relations of the previous parts together into a synthetic exposé and conclusion addressing the question whether Franco-Batavian rela­ tions, both de facto and as they were envisioned by contemporaries, best befitted a pluralistic-egalitarian order of sovereign states or a hegemonic or federative order and the question what role and posi­ tion was attributed to law and power.

CHAPTER ONE

Power and Law in International Order This is a book on great powers and minor powers and on the interaction between power and law in interstate relations. The book attempts to characterise relations between one great power and one minor power—the French and Batavian Republics—and thus to provide some insight in the possible effects of a huge power imbalance on interstate legal relations. For, although diplomatic history commonly focuses on great powers, great powers-minor powers relations strike at the core of the political system underlying the international legal order and the notion of sovereign equality in particular. The difference between equality and hierarchy is made not within the great powers subsystem, but between great powers and minor powers. The present chapter sets out to provide a theoretical framework from which relevant questions can be derived and on the basis of which Franco-Batavian relations can be characterised. By no means does it claim to give a comprehensive exposé of international relations theory. Its introductory character prevents it to. Three issues will be addressed. First, the issue of international order and various forms it might be shaped in will be surveyed. In the second section, the meaning of equality and independence in international relations will be discussed further. Finally, attention will be paid to the effects various types of international order may have on state behaviour and the interaction between power and law. 1.1  International Order The law of nations operates within a political order. Relations between two states do not take place in a vacuum. The wider international order provides a framework for interstate relations in a political, legal, cultural, and mental sense. It has been argued that the features of the current international order are determinative for the law.1 In order to characterise the law of nations it would thus be relevant to identify   Grewe, 2000, p. 6; Kingsbury, 2002, p. 417.

1

24

part i, chapter one

various types of international order. The aim of this study is to find out whether a power difference, that is, a particular political order, did influence legal relations and the legal order in the case study under scrutiny. Hence, the aforementioned assumption can at best function as a hypothesis here. Nonetheless, it is relevant to elaborate on various forms international order may take. An international order has two distinct elements: 1) the units of which the order consists, and 2) the structure by which these units are integrated.2 To the structure of international order both the extent of integration between units and the institutionalised positions of units within the order are relevant. Andreas Osiander has pointed out four elements of the structure of an international order. Next to the number and kind of units, he points to ‘their relative status vis-à-vis one another,’ ‘the distribution of territories and populations,’ and the ‘various kinds of institutions or organisations that actors may share between them.’3 From a legal point of view, Wilhelm Grewe has distinguished elements of international order in a similar way.4 First, a structure is characterised by the features of the members of the international legal community. What kind(s) of units can claim international legal personality? Second, he refers to the ‘constitutional development’ of the international legal community. Does an organised community exist? How are powers divided within the community? How and by whom is law formed and enforced? Central to identifying distinct forms that international order might take, is the notion of a system of states. The modern notion of the state predominates thought on order in international relations theory. Bull defines a system of states or international system as ‘formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave [. . .] as parts of a whole.’5 Forming a system implies and demands some kind of order,6 but one can imagine order without and beyond a system of autonomous units. A system results from frequent—commercial, political, or socio-cultural—contacts or interaction and a certain extent of

 Waltz, 1979, p. 40.   Osiander, 2003, pp. 2–3. 4   Grewe, 2000, p. 31. 5   Bull, 2003, p. 9; Bull, introduction to Wight, 1977, p. 16; likewise, Watson, 1992, p. 13. 6   Armstrong, 1993, p. 12. 2 3



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interdependence from which a degree of cohesiveness of foreign policy and conduct derive. Frequent interaction allows mutual relations to institutionalise—either consciously or spontaneously—as well, e.g. by the rise of set rules of conduct, recurrent patterns of behaviour,7 and expectations or the development of shared concepts, established forms and procedures. These traditions and institutions—of which law can be one—have a disciplining effect on the units that form the system and make state behaviour somewhat predictable.8 States come to have expectations on how others will act and react and this predictability is best served with established rules of conduct.9 Furthermore, because of the element of frequency, possibly even permanency, the time aspect is crucial to forming a system. Interstate relations no longer are incidental, moment-by-moment occasions, but gain an element of repetition that links events in time. Thus states become part of an integrated whole both in space and in time. Nonetheless, a system can still be confined to co-existence. Relations between states can be taken a step further. To turn a states system into a society of states or international society, according to Bull’s definition, states need to attain common interests and common values, come to conceive of themselves as bound by a common set of rules for mutual relations, and establish common institutions.10 To the element of shared values and interests, Bull rightly adds a consciousness thereof. Henceforth, in a society, states not only share common interests and values, but also are aware that they do. Likewise, David Armstrong has defined a society as ‘an association based upon certain common interests which accepts and maintains agreed rules and practices to further those common interests.’11 A society is a social fact. It is a cognitive construction that absorbs the various parts, binds them together morally into a whole with an interest of its own, and makes them responsible to uphold the interests of the whole. Forming a society implies solidarity with other members and responsibility to the entire community as opposed to the individualism of a mere system. Andreas Paulus has argued, though, that a distinction should be made at the international level between society and   Bull, 2002, p. 7.   Schiera, 1995, p. 24.  9   Osiander, 2003, p. 6. 10   Bull, 2003, p. 13 and p. 225. Likewise, Osiander, 2003, p. 9. 11   Armstrong, 1993, p. 12.  7  8

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community based on Ferdinand Tönnies’ distinction in his famous 1887 book between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society). However, a Gesellschaft approximates what is meant by a mere system in Bull’s definition. According to Paulus, Tönnies distinction translated to the international level would mean that a society is confined to factual ‘interconnections and interrelations’ and a situation in which the autonomy, individuality and individual interests of states are put first,12 whereas a community is an organic and moral whole based on shared values, beliefs, and a sense of belonging.13 Likewise, Philip Selznick has defined a community in a way that stresses a shared framework of values and beliefs, the identification with others as well as with the whole, and a consciousness of interdependence, integration, and reciprocity.14 As opposed to a society, a community would have an intrinsic value of its own.15 Thus, Paulus’ distinction between society and community to a very large extent equals Bull’s distinction between system and society and the terms society and community will be taken as synonymous here. There is an influential trend in international relations theory contending that the law of nations implies or needs a society of states.16 To counterpoise ‘deniers’ who claim that there is no proper international law due to the absence of a superior authority with the power of command,17 various legal scholars in the Grotian or Lockean tradition18 have endeavoured to base the law of nations in the sociability of man deriving a transcendent legal order from the natural, spontaneous society among states.19 Edward Keene asserts that throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries lawyers developed a notion of international society to base the binding force of the law of nations on.20 That notion survived into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Martti Koskenniemi discusses, for instance, the nineteenth-century jurists Gustave Rolin and Emanuel Ullman that based jurisprudence on a common   Paulus, 2003, p. 61.   Paulus, 2003, pp. 59–61. 14   Selznick, 1994, pp. 358–364. 15   Selznick, 1994, pp. 365–367. 16   See e.g. Jones, 1969, p. 213. 17   E.g. Austin, 1832, p. 1 and pp. 9–14. 18   On the ‘Grotian tradition’ see Bull, 2002, pp. 25–36 and Lesaffer, 2003. Wendt, e.g., uses ‘Lockean’ for a quite similar position (Wendt, 1999, pp. 279–297). 19   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 71; Tuck, 2001, pp. 94–102; Boucher, 1998, pp. 211–217; Grewe, 2000, p. 7; Kwakwa, 2003, p. 33. 20   Keene, 2002, p. 13. 12 13



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legal consciousness21 and Antoine Pillet who regarded international society as a precondition to the law of nations.22 In an attempt to establish international law as a coherent system instead of the amalgam of particular rules, rights, and duties states have consented to, Hersch Lauterpacht used the notion of an international community as a Kelsenian Grundnorm to base the validity of international law on.23 Moreover, the trend to base the law of nations in a society of states is not merely a lawyer’s affairs. Edward H. Carr has contended that to exist law needs the presence of an international community that can conceive law as binding.24 Likewise, Martin Wight has argued that a ‘degree of cultural unity’ between states is necessary.25 The theoretical framework drawn in this chapter deviates from this trend. A system suffices for legal rules to exist from an external, sociological point of view. For, forming a system is all it takes to achieve a degree of regularity on the basis of which established rules of conduct and shared concepts can develop. Law as an instrument to perpetuate order is about regulating conduct, safeguarding stability, and reducing arbitrariness.26 The process of institutionalisation involved in becoming a system serves exactly these ends. Admittedly, the kind of law and the source of obligation may vary between society and a mere system. It might take a society for states within a system to conceive established rules of conduct as law, and a consciousness of legal bonds and obligation probably is stronger and gains a more ethical and moral dimension in a society as opposed to a mere system. This does not necessarily lead to denying binding force or the character of law to the concepts and rules of conduct regulating state behaviour in a states system. Of the two elements of international order, most typologies in international relations theory focus on the structural one distinguishing orders based on the number of and relation between units the order consists of. The first element, that is, the unit type explicitly or implicitly is taken to be a given. Kenneth Waltz, for instance, has claimed that international systems are to be distinguished according to the number

  Reiterated in: Koskenniemi, 2004, p. 53 and p. 225.   Koskenniemi, 2004, p. 282. 23   Lesaffer, 2001a, p. 70 and p. 73. 24   Carr, 2001, p. 165. 25  Wight, 1977, p. 33 and p. 175. 26   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 30. 21 22

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of great powers, because the type of units is a constant.27 Most typologies suffer from international relations theory’s state-centredness.28 The same is true for international law primarily recognising states as legal subjects and regulating interstate relations.29 Realism usually assumes that international order consists of states.30 Moreover, states are conceived as impermeable entities that relate to each other like billiard balls.31 From the outside the state is a closed and abstract entity that shields all individuals and organisations within from the international level and operates on the international level through representation by a single, centralised government. International relations theory thus rests on a ‘state-as-actor assumption’ by which states are regarded as units and all kinds of human qualities, characteristics, and sentiments are attributed to states.32 At the international level, states are treated as so many individuals according to, what Richard Tuck calls, ‘the model of the independent moral agent.’33 Hence, a state can have feelings, thoughts, interests, and intentions. The state is a social structure that is real in people’s minds and operates as a reference point to attribute collective interests to, thus determining peoples’ behaviour and the government’s foreign policies and action on the international scene. In at least one sense, this state-centredness is essential to defining the structure of international order. As Waltz has it, states are ‘functionally similar,’ that is, because states are all-alike and basically have to be preoccupied with the same task in an anarchical system—i.e. selfpreservation—, there hardly is any functional differentiation between the units that make up the states system. Contrariwise, in a hierarchical order differentiation (e.g. of tasks) between various units would occur like division of labour in a capitalist economy.34 This state-centred paradigm dominates international relations theory. Conversely, though, reductionists or individualists use to explain state behaviour by actions of and interactions between individual human beings and the interests of the groups in control of govern-

 Waltz, 1979, pp. 97–98.  Wendt, 1999, pp. 8–10; Battistella, 2003, p. 112. 29   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 36. 30   Mearsheimer, 2003, pp. 17–18; Van Staden, 1994, p. 11; Wendt, 1999, pp. 8–9. 31   Mearsheimer, 2003, pp. 10–11; Slaughter, 2004, p. 5. 32  Wendt, 1999, p. 195. 33   Tuck, 2001, pp. 195–196. 34  Waltz, 1979, p. 104; Wendt, 1999, p. 252. 27 28



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ment.35 In their view, the state is just a ‘theoretical construct’ that is instrumental to the understanding of international politics.36 In his study of late-seventeenth-century British foreign policy, Steven ­Pincus has already repudiated treating foreign policy as determined by the international situation and entirely distinct from what is going on within a state, showing that foreign and domestic policies were influenced by the same ideological conflicts, party politics etc.37 Thus the separation of domestic and international politics is criticized as well. Hence, two basic paradigms fundamentally oppose each other: one that regards states as separate and real agents thus adhering to a dualism of national and international spheres, and one that shifts the perspective to individuals and groups within a society that struggle for the control of the state apparatus, thus treating domestic and international politics as part of a more monistic context.38 These are not just ontological perspectives. As this study will reveal state-centredness and reductionism were actually competing trends in the international politics of the Revolutionary era. Buried under statecentred assumptions, references, and discourse, the relevance of the reductionist view to revolutionary situations is, admittedly, recognised by some. Bull, endorsing Raymond Aron’s argument that there is a relation between major wars and heterogeneity within the states system, contends that ideological conflicts cause war, and that wars stress ideological differences because ‘each warring state allies itself with domestic factions within the enemy state.’39 Wight, too, acknowledges that cross border factionalism arises at times the cultural unity of the states system is disrupted. Then groups within states might align with and feel to owe loyalty to likeminded people in other states rather than to their own countrymen and government. Ideological controversies and party interests, then, cross over state borders.40 Thus fundamental internal divisions in revolutionary times undermine the state-as-actor assumption. One of the arguments of the present volume is that a great power with hegemonic or imperial ambitions can make use of this factionalism to bring states into its sphere of influence without

 Wendt, 1999, p. 196; Waltz, 1979, p. 60; Battistella, 2003, p. 143 and p. 145.  Wendt, 1999, pp. 196–197. 37   Pincus, 2002, p. 441 and p. 452. 38  Wendt, 1999, pp. 200–202 and p. 215. 39   Bull, 2002, pp. 238–239. 40  Wight, 1977, p. 36. 35 36

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violating the legal forms and concepts of an egalitarian, pluralistic states system. The existence of multiple, more or less autonomous political entities is a precondition to speak of a system or society of states. In modern, post-Revolutionary times—at least in theory—the international order is exclusively made up of sovereign states:41 the nineteenth-century ideal of political communities as territorially organised and centrally governed entities in which a government has exclusive jurisdiction over a demarcated territory and is autonomous without, while the state is conceived as a unit with a corporate identity from the outside and the resident population is aligned to the state through a national identity. At the time of the Revolutionary Wars this unit type was still on the verge of its breakthrough, though. Hence, throughout this case study the concept of the modern state as unit type of international order cannot be taken as exogenous. The concept of the state was in transition. Thus, on various occasions throughout this study, it will be necessary to pay attention to the concept of the state underlying views under discussion. A second fallacy of most typologies is that they are power-centred. Types of international order are distinguished based on degrees of centralisation, integration, or hierarchy. In most typologies these are matters of power differences.42 Morton Kaplan, for instance, distinguishes six types of systems using the notion of polarity. Dependent on the division of power international order may be a balance of power system, loose bipolar, tight bipolar, a unit veto system, universal, or hierarchic.43 Houweling and Siccama—emulating Kaplan and Modelski—base their typology on the number of actors and the concentration of power resources.44 In a fragmented international order, power is divided evenly and hence, no one state can exercise sufficient influence to regulate the system at large.45 This is what Richard Haass would depict as a ‘nonpolar world.’46 Moving onwards along Houweling and Siccama’s spectrum power gets more concentrated in an everdiminishing number of states. In a multipolar order a distinction is

  Grewe, 2000, p. 7.   Van Staden, 1994, p. 28; Waltz, 1979, p. 144. 43  Waltz, 1979, p. 43. 44   Houweling and Siccama, 1994, pp. 127–128. 45   Houweling and Siccama, 1994, p. 132. 46   Haass, 2008, p. 44. 41 42



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made between great powers and minor powers and power is divided among the great powers. Once power is concentrated in only two powers or blocks of powers, international order has become bipolar. If virtually all power resources are concentrated in one state only, bipolarity has given way to unipolarity. All these orders are still systems made up off various more or less autonomous political entities. Finally, in an integrated international order, states have become that interdependent that they lose sovereignty.47 To John Mearsheimer, too, the power ratio between the various actors and the number of great powers in particular determine the type of international order.48 Establishing what kind of international order is in being, hence, amounts to ‘counting poles.’49 For practical reasons, he rules out the possibility of a unipolar order. Therefore, he distinguishes between bipolar and multipolar orders. In a bipolar system power is distributed about equally between two great powers. Multipolar orders might be balanced or unbalanced. In the latter case, one great power is more powerful than the others and a ‘potential hegemon.’50 Likewise, Robert Gilpin distinguishes between imperial or hegemonic systems (one great power), bipolar systems (two great powers), and system of power equilibrium (more than two great powers).51 Virtually all typologies are of a political-empirical nature. Distinctions are rarely legal. As Bull has contended international orders are usually distinguished on the basis of ‘mechanical factors’ like the number of states or the resources they control.52 Moreover, while international politic orders like pluralism, hegemony, and empire might be completed by fitting legal orders, political and legal orders might just as well deviate. This book is concerned with legal relations between states. The power difference between the French and Batavian Republics is evident. This volume aims to investigate the implications of this power difference on legal relations and positions. The remaining part of this section sets out to offer a typology of international orders. The typology elaborated here is not one of clear distinctions between various categories or of a dichotomy between

  Houweling and Siccama, 1994, p. 132.   Mearsheimer, 2003, pp. 269–270. 49  Waltz, 1979, p. 130. 50   Mearsheimer, 2003, pp. 269–270. 51   Leurdijk, 1994, p. 81. 52   Bull introduction to Wight; 1977, p. 17. 47 48

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anarchy and hierarchy but of a continuum.53 Michael Walzer, for instance, distinguishes various types of international order in terms of a continuum based on centralisation-decentralisation or unity­pluralism.54 Designating a situation as a particular kind of international order is not a matter of either/or, but of ‘more or less.’ Identifying international orders is a matter of degree.55 Thus the typology lacks absolute clarity, but is at the same time more apt to catch the variety and ambiguity of international practice. Moreover, an international order can subsist of various subsystems. Martin Wight distinguishes primary and secondary states systems; primary ones being composed of states, while secondary ones are formed by various states systems.56 A system of states thus needs not to encompass the entire globe,57 but can be geographically confined and multi-staged. A system of states is the starting point of most typologies of international order. At both ends of the spectrum deviating forms do occur, however. At the one end, one might conceive of the absence of any system, e.g. because there are no political entities capable of forming a system—just think of the imaginary state of nature—or because entities exist too autarkic and isolated from one another to maintain regular contacts or even to know of each other’s existence. Anarchy in this sense is a non-order. Whether law needs or implies order, or, as Bull has it, order needs law58—as rules that determine what kind of entities form the order and settling relations between these entities—59 in the absence of order or a system no law from an external, sociological perspective exists, that is to say, there are no institutionalised rules of conduct that can be perceived as law in any kind whatsoever from an internal perspective. At the other end, the world is conceived as a universal order. Autonomy of various entities is not recognised to the extent that a fundamental political and legal division of the world in distinct entities is rejected, either because there is a (centralised) world government or because an imperial power has subjected all other entities. Likewise, international order can be taken beyond a system if states are bound

 Watson, 1992, p. 13.  Walzer, 1999, p. 201 and p. 206. 55  Waltz, 1979, p. 114. 56   Bull introduction to Wight, 1977, p. 17; Wight, 1977, p. 24. 57   Likewise Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 40. 58   Hurrel on Bull, 2002, p. xxxiv. 59   Bull, 2002, p. 65. 53 54



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together forming a community that far-reaching and cohesive the order no longer is ‘international.’ Power and responsibilities, then, are divided among various layers of governance. This is a system of shared and overlapping power of partly co-existing and partly cooperating— in varying composition, according to variable procedures, spontaneous or institutionalised—agents and public bodies. The ‘state’ then does no longer hold a special, unique, and exclusive position. In between these two extremes is a wide range of systems of states distinguished from each other by various factors and characteristics. Establishing order out of true anarchy is a matter of system- and/or society-formation—a society basically being a more integrated, tighter, and value-laden system.60 By definition these are incremental and spontaneous or at least essentially non-intentional processes. In other words, forming a system or society of states does not result from some man or men waking up in the morning, taking a bath, and crying allout: ‘Eureka! Let’s form a system of states!’ It takes time for rules of conduct, common values and institutions to develop through frequent interaction and interdependence. Furthermore, the speed and direction of that development are to a large extent beyond human control. Now, one or some states might play a more significant role in the process of system- and society formation than others, but from a conceptual point of view the first stage on the continuum next to true anarchy is an egalitarian, pluralistic system of states. A system of states implies a pluralistic order.61 This kind of states system is anarchical in the sense Bull uses the word.62 In Bull’s view, a society of states is anarchical because no supranational power exists above them.63 Because states are autonomous the exclusiveness of their sovereignty causes anarchy in the sense of mere co-existence among them.64 The world is, then, ordered to some extent because states themselves have ordered a number of individuals each within larger frameworks. Even if states co-exist like fully autonomous ‘individuals,’65 the world is significantly more ordered than in the absence of any kind of political 60   The distinction between a mere system and a system-society is a cultural one and is thus hard to catch in a structuralist typology. 61   Grewe, 2000, p. 7; Bull, 2002, p. 225; Simpson, 2004, p. 27; Kooijmans, 1964, p. 44. 62   Bull, 2002, pp. 44–49. 63   Bull, 2002, p. 44. 64   Simpson, 2004, p. 63. 65   On the individual analogy, see Vattel, 1758, p. 2 [Preliminaires § 4]; Tuck, 2001, p. 1.

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­ rganisation. In the absence of any system, isolation or true anarchy o reign. The international order is built by absolutely independent, coexisting states, though. Vis-à-vis each other, they are in what Thomas Hobbes would call ‘a state of nature.’ There are no institutions for decision making or joint action on the international level.66 To international anarchy might be added some political, economic, and judicial institutions at the international level.67 While staying sovereign, states are thus more embedded in an organised and institutionalised international environment. By consequence, anarchy becomes ‘mitigated and controlled.’68 This appears to be a rather twentiethcentury characterisation and the danger of anachronism does indeed surface, but the notion of international or even supranational organisations was not unfamiliar to the eighteenth-century educated mind. States, at least from a legal point of view, are equal in a sheer pluralistic order. There are no supranational organisations, nor is there a hierarchy between the various entities. A political entity is free to decide both on its domestic policies and on its external actions.69 International order in a pluralistic stage is always highly decentralised. In the absence of a superior authority, states are integrated horizontally, e.g., by permanent diplomatic relations, durable alliance structures, intergovernmental conferences and organisations, and an international law. Once the system has evolved into a society, this horizontal integration is sustained by common interests and values and extended by a sense of responsibility and loyalty to other members and society at large. Whereas in a situation of co-existing, but interacting entities, the law of nations is a law of co-existence,70 in a society the law of nations becomes a law of community. The horizontal integration of states might be strengthened by formalising cooperation between states in an alliance. States formally align together, taking each other’s side in a specific conflict or future conflicts categorically. Formalising cooperation between states usually is a step taken when spontaneous aid and coherence of action cannot be relied on, for instance because cooperation between states is still in its infancy or in a political situation that alignments are rather  Walzer, 1999, p. 201.  Walzer, 1999, p. 208. 68  Walzer, 1999, p. 208. 69  Watson, 1992, p. 313. 70  W. Friedman, reiterated in: Paulus, 2003, p. 68. 66 67



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flexible. States then will feel the need to explicate and concretise their cooperation more.71 Alliances are entered into for a particular purpose. Most of the times, alliances are directed against others or at attaining defined goals, although the aims various allies intend to attain do not have to be the same. In fact, most of the times they are not and hence alliances often turn out to be compromises.72 To a realist as Hans Morgenthau a shared ideology could not serve as the basis of an alliance on its own. Ideology should always be supported by material interests.73 He identifies an alliance as the ‘legal codification’ of ‘a community of interests.’ Although a community of interests does not have to be codified, in his view, a community of interest always sustains an alliance.74 A community of interest might indeed be a strong stimulus to enter into an alliance. States easily align either because they face the same threat or because they share secondary interests; e.g. territorial or commercial ambitions. Alliances might augment a state’s security because of joining forces and preventing isolation. Morgenthau explicitly refers to alliances as part of balance of power politics. Changes in the pattern of alignments influence the power ratio.75 Likewise, Mearsheimer deems alliances to be a form of balancing.76 In all these cases, states share the same interest to enter into an alliance. Thereto, states might cooperate to attain aims without sharing equal interest in every aim. An alliance then results from an exchange by which states promise to help each other to attain their respective goals. In that case, of course, the incentive to aid an ally will decrease once one’s own goals have been attained and such an alliance probably will not last very long. Besides the time aspect, Morgenthau has enumerated several other features to distinguish alliances. In the first place, he points to the division of obligations and power among the allies and the question whether the alliance is beneficial mutually or just to one or some of the allies. In the second place, he points to the character and scope of the alliance. Alliances might be either general or limited in terms of potential enemies, contributions to be furnished, or geographical

  Morgenthau, 2004, p. 203.  Waltz, 1979, p. 166. 73   Morgenthau, 2004, p. 204. 74   Morgenthau, 2004, p. 202. 75   Morgenthau, 2004, p. 201. 76   Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 156. 71 72

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sphere. Furthermore, alliances might be ‘operative’ or ‘inoperative.’ In the latter case allies promise each other aid in the event of a future conflict.77 Finally, the number of allies is relevant; that is, is an alliance bilateral or multilateral? Since interests and states’ aims dictate alliances, they usually last for as long as necessary to attain or maintain the concerned aims or to further the concerned interests. Hence, alliances are inherently short term and flexible alignments. A potential ally might always choose to align with another party and current allies might always defect. States have to adapt their policies and attitude to this flexibility and transience.78 Alliances might be more enduring, though, expressing a sense of solidarity. History counts plenty examples of alliances that lasted for several decades. Moreover, throughout the eighteenth century, a notion of natural allies is to be found according to which states are or should be perpetually aligned either because of shared interests, shared ideology, religion or culture, or because of mutual commerce and interdependent economic activity, or because of their geographical location.79 Whatever the time an alliance lasts or is to last, this is a form of cooperation between states that is not institutionalised by permanent bodies or established procedures for joint decision making for that would turn the subsystem formed by the allies into a federation. Since alliances are directed at cooperation, they will influence and constrain state conduct.80 Allies will have to concert who does what, when, and how to make the alliance effective. The extent of influence and constraint might vary between the allies dependent on difference in power.81 For even in a pluralistic order, allies need not be each other’s equals in terms of power nor do allies necessarily be in equal need of allies. Moving onwards along the continuum, the typology of international orders bifurcates. Most typologies in international relations theory are that power-centred that they only acknowledge one trend. However, two distinct trends are possible: a trend of subjection or hierarchisation by one or more great powers and a trend of voluntary unifica-

  Morgenthau, 2004, p. 203.  Waltz, 1979, p. 165. 79   For the notion of natural allies, see e.g. Mably, 1757, pp. 90–92 and Belissa’s introduction thereto p. 22. 80  Watson, 1992, p. 14. 81   Bull, 2002, pp. 204–205. 77 78



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tion by several states on an equal footing. Political entities forming the international order become more and more unequal in the trend of subjection, while in both trends they lose independence. Hence, the notions of equality and independence are quintessential to this study and will be addressed more elaborately in the subsequent section. Moreover, in both trends a verticalisation of law occurs because law gains a character of command and becomes an instrument of control in the hands either of the hegemonic or imperial power or of the supranational, federal, or central institutions. On the one hand, international order might follow a trend of subjection. International order, then, remains a multi-unit order. Relations between units just become hierarchical. A first step might be the recognition of the existence and special rights and responsibilities of great powers. Formally, minor powers are not yet subjected to great powers, but a distinction with legal consequences is made between categories of states. In a hegemonic order, minor powers are subjugated to one or several great powers that dominate international relations—either de facto or de iure. Watson speaks of hegemony in case one or a limited number of powerful states dominates international politics in that they prescribe other states how to operate on the international level or how to manage their external relations.82 Martin Wight distinguishes between international states systems and suzerain-state systems. An international states system is composed of sovereign states that do not recognise a superior and accept each other’s claim of independence.83 A suzerain-state system is characterised by a clear hierarchy. One state is supreme over all others. The latter’s sovereignty is compromised. Wight does add that the suzerain’s special position is accepted by the other states.84 To John Mearsheimer, hegemony amounts to ‘domination of the system.’ In his view a hegemonic order, by definition, only has one great power.85 It does not suffice to be the most powerful state within the system, for being a hegemon calls for sufficient power to dominate all other states. The hegemonic power or powers control international politics and limit other states’ room of manoeuvre on the international level. The latter are no longer free to determine their foreign policy, diplomatic relations etc. This might be an empirical  Watson, 1992, pp. 14–16; Likewise Walzer, 1999, p. 204.   Bull introduction to Wight, 1977, p. 16; Wight, 1977, p. 23. 84   Bull, 2002, p. 10; Bull introduction to Wight, 1977, p. 17; Wight, 1977, p. 23. 85   Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 2. 82 83

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conclusion—most states not being powerful enough to take their own course—or a legal position—in which the hegemonic power’s dominance of the system is translated into special rights. A hegemonic power still formally accepts the domestic autonomy of other states, though.86 Satellite states are a political category. Their rights are not restricted and they preserve the ‘formal legal attributes’ of sovereign states.87 Peter Kooijmans treats hegemony as a purely political notion, but does acknowledge that political supremacy can be that far-­reaching that subordinated powers no longer can be deemed to be separate subjects of the law of nations.88 Conversely, Gerry Simpson has shown that hegemony can be ‘legalised’ by transmitting superior power into an exceptional legal position.89 In a political sense, subjected states become satellite or client states. This kind of subjugation might also be translated in a legal relation. Then a state becomes a vassal state— recognising the suzerainty of another state—or a protectorate. In both cases, the subjected state still is a separate political entity and autonomous with regard to internal affairs, but it can no longer act legally at the international level. The suzerain or protector takes care of the subjected state’s external relations.90 The next and final step brings the international order to the stage of empire. David Boucher defined an empire as ‘an aggregate of states owing allegiance to a common head.’91 Watson makes a distinction between domestic administration and a state’s foreign policy and external relations to distinguish hegemonic and imperial orders. In hegemony, dominant powers merely manage international politics. In case a dominant power interferes with internal administration of other political entities, too, the international order is imperial. In that case the communities under imperial rule either retain their identity as separate states with the imperial power exercising some control over their domestic affairs,92 or the ‘imperial centre’ administers various communities directly.93 Domination, according to Hans Morgenthau, is the essence of imperialism. To him, an empire might   Bull, 2002, p. 209.   Gilson, 1984, p. 63. 88   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 122. 89   Simpson, 2004, p. x. 90   Bogaert, 1982, pp. 88–90; Gilson, 1984, p. 384. 91   Boucher, 1998, p. 325. 92  In which case Watson speaks of ‘dominion’ instead of empire. 93  Watson, 1992, pp. 14–16. 86 87



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be global (‘world empire’) or limited in its geographical scope (‘continental empire’ or ‘localised imperialism’), but always is about one state subjecting others.94 Henceforth, an imperial power does not recognise the autonomy of other states. It not only controls their position and activity on the international level, but also exercises control over and interferes with their domestic politics, law, and administration. As Watson puts it—defining suzerainty—‘one state exercises political control over another.’95 Henceforth, a verticalisation of interstate law occurs. The law of nations becomes hierarchical. In the second trend, international order points towards unification. In this trend, international order develops towards an order consisting of one single unit. States become more and more integrated, not just by forming a society but also by more or less voluntarily transforming their co-existence, interdependence, and interaction into a political organisation. Increasingly, states lose independence and are subjected to supranational organisations and institutions in such a way that the equality of states is still upheld. First, states form a (con)federation, and ultimately a unified order without any distinct political entities. Contrary to the international orders of the other branch of the continuum, states in a federation are not subordinated to one state. Contrary to anarchical or truly pluralistic international orders, a federation is formally and intentionally organised and states have relinquished full sovereignty. There is indeed a federal government and power is divided between the federal and state level in a legally set manner.96 Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries various proposals for a federative order were formulated.97 More varieties may be conceived if one does not take the modern state as axiomatic to the typology at large, but elaborating further on this would go beyond the scope of the present study. Alliances are typical for pluralistic systems. In more hierarchical or integrated international orders, formal alliances are either unnecessary or make no sense. In a federation a defensive alliance basically is implied in the federative bond, whereas an empire does not need allies. To a hegemonic power allies might still be useful to tip the balance and extent resources, but an alliance that involves a hegemonic  Walzer, 1999, p. 201; Morgenthau, 2004, pp. 69–70.  Watson, 1992, p. 15. 96  Walzer, 1999, p. 206. 97   Several of these proposals will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. 94 95

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power will be intrinsically asymmetric. In case of asymmetry, an alliance consists of a leader and junior partners.98 Benefits and duties will probably be divided unequally, but most important the most powerful ally is likely to take upon itself the task of alliance management. The ‘alliance leader’ will (try to) take the initiative and determine goals and strategies, will extort contributions from its junior partners, and will try to prevent defection from the alliance.99 An alliance will then know a certain extent of centralised authority. The more unequal allies are, the easier it gets for the leading ally to manage the alliance.100 1.2  Equality and Independence The key notions to distinguish pluralistic systems of states from hegemonic-imperial or federative-unitarian ones are equality and independence. These notions will be addressed in the present section. Absolute equality is a mathematician’s hobby which climax is reached every time the symbol ‘=’ can be used.101 Peter Kooijmans has made a successful effort to show that the notion of equality that implies sameness taken to its ultimate consequences is not tenable for states by mere logic.102 States cannot be part of an equation. France and Luxemburg are not equal in this mathematical sense, nor are Germany and Malta, if only because they occupy different parts of the globe. They are not identical, for then we would not be able to distinguish between them. Hence, states are always different and thus unequal in some aspects. Equality does not imply sameness or identicality. To the contrary, equality implies comparison and hence rules out identicality, for in case of identity on all possible aspects there would not be two separate objects that can be compared. Equality is a relational concept. It is about correspondence between two or more entities.103 By consequence, equality implies a system of multiple entities,104 for claiming to be equal calls for a comparison with that one is said to be equal to and thus presupposes the existence of at least one other entity. Equality  Waltz, 1979, p. 168.  Waltz, 1979, pp. 168–169. 100  Waltz, 1979, p. 167. 101   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 11. 102   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 11. 103   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 8. 104   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 8 and p. 44.   98   99



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needs difference, because without diversity a comparison from which can be concluded that entities are equal is impossible.105 Equality can only be sustained by the grace of abstraction.106 States are deemed equal by singling out some aspects and ignoring other aspects that would indicate inequality. The latter aspects are simply declared irrelevant to the comparison.107 As Kenneth Waltz has argued, apples and oranges can be compared, since they are both fruits.108 Thus, a basis of comparison has to be singled out and equality means similarity on that aspect or those aspects that are considered to be relevant. States are politically unequal. They are not able to play similar roles at the international level, nor are they all capable of pursuing their foreign policies with the same effectiveness.109 Against this political or factual inequality, the law of nations sets legal equality of states.110 Regarding political inequality as given, the question is which differences between states are relevant and which ones irrelevant from a legal point of view. Equality essentially means that states are of the same rank. To be sure, this is a rather formal notion of equality. In the modern states system, sovereign states are equal because they all equally comply with the defining characteristics of a sovereign state; they are equally sovereign.111 States are equal, because the definition of ‘state’ applies to them all. This is what Vattel meant by stating that a dwarf and a giant, the tiniest republic and the most powerful monarchy are equal.112 Dwarf and giant both are human beings. Republic and monarchy both are states, since they both are political entities that qualify for membership of the same category: statehood. They are both entitled to the rights and obligations that go with being a state. These are the formal rights and obligations of sovereignty based in the objective international legal order and not the subjective rights and duties states might attain within that order.

  Kooijmans, 1964, p. 11 and p. 101.   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 7. 107   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 9 and p. 30. 108  Waltz, 1979, p. 96. 109   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 97. 110   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 101. 111   Gilson, 1984, p. 59; Luard, 1992, p. 108; Van Staden, 1994, p. 27. What Simpson calls ‘existential equality’ (2004, p. 53). 112   Vattel, 1758, p. 11. 105 106

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Equality in the law of nations is not so much the opposite of difference, but of hierarchy. In this sense, equality equals sovereignty or independence since both imply the absence or non-recognition of a superior authority with the power of command and the connected obligation to obey.113 Equality is the cornerstone of a pluralistic, decentralised order of horizontally integrated entities as opposed to an order characterised by verticality.114 In fact, the notion of equality of political powers rose throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries along with attempts to counteract claims to universal authority and the hierarchical medieval order.115 Furthermore, equality was closely connected to the rising notion of autonomy and individuality of the state breaking out of the all-encompassing, cosmic unity of Augustine, neo-Platonist philosophy.116 States are equal because they are distinct political entities that all are the supreme authority within their own demarcated territories, that is, states are at the same level because they exercise the same kind of authority each in its part of the globe. A pluralistic order indeed exists by the grace of the reciprocal recognition by every state of the exclusive jurisdiction of others.117 Henceforth, equality and independence are two sides of the same coin. In the first place, independence is the opposite of interdependence, that is to say mutual dependence on others e.g. for military protection, natural resources, or food supplies. Independence, then, means self-sufficiency. Independence as an element of equal sovereignty needs not to be absolute, though. Sovereignty does not call for autarky. Independence does not rule out interaction with others. Being part of an international community, entering into alliances, cooperating with other states does not compromise independence as long as a state is not subjected to another state, is free to choose, and its authority and rights are not formally restrained.118 This remark takes the argument to the other meaning of independence. In this second, more formalistic sense, independence opposes dependence in the form of subordination and hierarchy. Independent states are not subordi113   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 103 and p. 106; Grewe, 2000, p. 32; Keene, 2002, p. xi; Cosnard, 2003, pp. 118–119 and p. 121; Osiander, 2003, p. 87. 114  Waltz, 1979, p. 88; Simpson, 2004, p. xii. 115   Kooijmans, 1964, pp. 53–57. On the historical development of the notion of equality of states, see also Goebel, 1923. 116   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 80. 117   Barkin and Cronin, 2002, p. 63. 118   Monière, 1992, p. 44.



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nated, but self-determining both internally and externally. In the first place, an independent state is free to arrange its own political and legal order and to decide on its own law. In the second place, an independent state is free to organise its legal relations with other states— to enter into treaties, to dispatch and receive diplomatic envoys, to perform international legal acts—and to decide on its foreign policy within the limits set by the law of nations.119 Except for treaty obligations voluntarily entered into, no state has a right either to force another state to make or modify law, to enforce law, or a right to trample on another state’s territorial jurisdiction. No state is subordinated to another state, although all states are subordinated to the law of nations. In that sense, they are equals as well.120 Sovereign equality does not exclude this kind of subordination, because sovereignty is a legal concept and hence implies the international legal order.121 As Hans Morgenthau has pointed out sovereignty implies and needs the law of nations, because only the international legal order makes sovereignty as a legal concept possible.122 Without the law of nations, states would not even be sovereign. In this sense, sovereignty is always relative, because equality calls for the recognition of the sovereignty of others.123 After all, an appeal to sovereignty on one’s own behalf implies recognition of the concept and thus of the sovereignty of other states. The core of a state’s sovereignty is the exclusive jurisdiction over its territory. Since a state’s territory is demarcated, its (internal) sovereignty is confined too. A state’s authority may be supreme within, but it has no authority beyond its territorial borders. Hence, claiming (internal) sovereignty within one’s territory implies recognition of its territorial limits. From this internal sovereignty derives external sovereignty.124 States having supreme and exclusive authority within implies that they are not subordinated to a superior external authority competent to interfere in domestic affairs. Again this aspect of sovereignty presumes relativity since claiming external sovereignty is based on the absence of hierarchy within a group of

  Bogaert, 1982, pp. 143–144; Monière, 1992, p. 43; Morgenthau, 2004, p. 331.   Cosnard, 2003, p. 119; Morgenthau, 2004, p. 331. 121   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 137; Kratochwil, 1995, p. 25. 122   Morgenthau, 2004, p. 329. 123   Simpson, 2004, p. 41. 124   On the distinction between internal and external sovereignty, see: Lesaffer, 1999a, pp. 74–76; Beaulac, 2004 (chapters on Bodin and Vattel). 119 120

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states and thus equals the recognition of the freedom of action and non-subordination of the other states within the group. Because of the absence of a superior, states are only to be bound under positive law by their own consent. Hence, the principles of consent and unanimity derive from equality.125 As legal concept sovereignty is to be distinguished from the factual capability of a state to do as it thinks fit.126 Sovereignty is not compromised solely if a state cannot pursue policies entirely on its own because of political, military, economic, or technologic limitations. What is crucial is the supreme authority to make and enforce law.127 Sovereignty or independence are compromised once another state attains supremacy over the formation and/or enforcement of law or once another state de facto takes core governmental tasks in hand even if the first state’s government nominally remains into existence.128 Equality is an aspect of sovereignty essentially deriving from the notion that states have carved up supreme authority among each other territorially. Legal equality can be approached in various ways, though. A main distinction that can be made is the one between ‘equality before the law’ and ‘equality of rights.’ Equality of rights means that states have the same rights and obligations.129 Hence, reciprocity is crucial. This kind of material or substantial legal equality has to be distinguished from equality before the law.130 Substantial equality might result from the international legal order, but is not part of it as is the case with formal equality. The simple fact that states do not have the same rights and duties does not justify the denial of legal equality altogether. States may still very well be equal as to objective law, whereas their subjective rights and obligations differ.131 Formal legal equality amounts to equal treatment.132 States might not have the same rights and duties, but they should have equal means to exercise and enforce their rights.133 States are competent to attain   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 138; Simpson, 2004, p. 27 and p. 33.   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 137; Cosnard, 2003, p. 119. 127   Morgenthau, 2004, p. 333. 128   Morgenthau, 2004, p. 334. 129   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 101; Boucher, 1998, p. 261. 130   Gilson, 1984, p. 61. 131   Morgenthau, 2004, p. 333. 132   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 30; Bull, 2002, pp. 147–148. 133   Gilson, 1984, p. 61; Simpson, 2004, pp. 42–44. This is what Simpson calls ‘formal equality’ in distinction of ‘legislative equality’ and ‘existential equality.’ Formal equality, here, is used in a wider sense in opposition to material equality or equality of 125 126



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the same rights and obligations and no distinctions are made between states to which the same law applies. Differences and inequalities not recognised by law are to be ignored. Legal rules generalise. By consequence, they apply to all within the same category subject to them in the same way.134 Hence, formal equality is endemic to (objective) law. Material equality on its part depends on specific situations.135 Gilson has argued that in case of treaties equality mainly refers to free consent by all parties instead of to the treaty’s substance.136 This postulate is somewhat too extreme. States can establish, perpetuate, or formalise unequal regimes in treaties. Hence, it is relevant to have a look at the treaty’s provisions. Moreover, equal states have an equal say in the formation of the law of nations. This is what Gerry Simpson calls ‘legislative equality.’137 He gives two criteria for this form of equality. First, states are equally represented or participate on equal terms in the formation and application of customary and treaty law.138 Their position during conferences does not differ. States should be equally represented. They have an equal right to attend conferences, partake in deliberations, and submit to or exclude certain matters from discussion. Formally, they have the same influence in decision making.139 Procedural rules should respect the principles of consent and unanimity.140 Hence, the second criterion is that the principle of consent has to be universally recognised, that is to say, all states are bound only by those legal norms to which they have given their consent. In case of treaties, formal equality is reflected in the need for each state to consent.141 In an egalitarian order the autonomy of each state’s will prevails in interstate relations. States enter into treaty obligations voluntarily. Legally, they cannot be compelled to do so by other states.142 Even if the principle of consent is upheld, a treaty might reflect power differences, which leads some subjective rights. Thus the term ‘formal equality’ in the sense used here encompasses all three kinds of equality Simpson distinguishes. 134   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 33. 135   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 34. 136   Gilson, 1984, p. 243. 137   Simpson, 2004, p. 33 and pp. 47–53. Likewise, Krisch, 2005, p. 377. 138   On equality in the formation of customary law, see Byers, 1999. 139   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 145; Simpson, 2004, p. 49. 140   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 102. 141   Simpson, 2004, p. 33. 142   Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 118. This does not exclude the subordination to non-positive law.

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to deny the possibility of equality of states.143 However, that is a political and not a juridical judgement. Legislative equality is all about the formal role or, as Simpson put it: ‘formal reflections of the power differences in the international system.’144 This should not be confused with equality or unequal (political) influence or the capacity to shape the content of the rules. Legislative inequality then would mean having an unequal influence on a treaty because of a difference in formal status or because of procedural arrangements that give some parties a privileged and others an inferior position. In case of hierarchy, a hegemonic state or hegemonic states would be entitled to impose law on others without their consent, act on behalf of others, unilaterally decide on who is to be admitted to negotiations, the congress’ agenda and the procedures by which it is to be conducted.145 Inequality then would mean that some states are allowed to make rules, unilaterally or in cooperation with others, from which obligations for other states derive. Finally, Simpson distinguishes ‘existential equality.’ In this sense, states have an equal right to self-determination and autonomy with regard to internal affairs as well as an equal right to international legal personality.146 From this, Simpson derives political independence—the right to organise the domestic political and legal order to one’s own discretion—, the right to participate in international politics, and the ‘right to exist,’ which, according to Simpson, basically amounts to territorial integrity.147 In sum, each state has the right to exist and the right to exist in a way as it thinks suitable without the need of consent, recognition, or interference by others. Benedict Kingsbury has argued that the notion of sovereignty has functioned as an excuse for international lawyers not to theorise on legal implications of inequality.148 State sovereignty implies the equality of sovereign states and hence a particular form of equality has become part of the ways the international legal order is conceived. Furthermore, state sovereignty functions as a pillar of the legitimacy of   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 103 and p. 108.   Simpson, 2004, p. 50. 145   Simpson, 2004, p. 49 and p. 51. 146   Simpson, 2004, p. 29, p. 48, and p. 53. 147   Simpson, 2004, pp. 53–54. Territorial integrity as the core of a state’s existence might be a somewhat too modern notion. The Revolutionary Wars were exactly part of a period of transition throughout which territorial integrity substituted the survival of the dynasty. 148   Kingsbury, 1998, p. 600. 143 144



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the law of nations through the notion of consent in defining who is to consent and in what way. By basing the law of nations on the consent to be bound of sovereign states, positivism inspired international legal thinking has declared states equal in one aspect, thus ignoring inequality in other aspects.149 Only if inequalities lead to interunit relations in which one unit is subordinated in a manner that deprives that unit of one of the defining characteristics of a sovereign state does the law of nations recognise that inequality conceptually by excluding that unit from the elite list of sovereign states and henceforth from subjectivity under the law of nations.150 As stated above, from a conceptual point of view, political inequality and legal equality can coincide. Nevertheless, in practice, major power differences do put pressure on legal equality. Simpson has shown that inequality between states has been recognised at the international level at least in two ways.151 The application of norms may vary from state to state based on the position they take in the legal order. Some states— great powers—occupy a special position within the international legal order and hence have special rights or do not have to abide by certain rules (legalised hegemony). Other states—outlaw states—are excluded from the legal order e.g. because of the nature of their regimes or the nature of previous behaviour. Hence, they are deprived of the protection of rules of the law of nations.152 In Simpson’s view, ‘formal equality’153 is the core of state equality, whereas legislative and existential equality have been modified ever since 1815—the period covered by his book.154 Without creating a superior authority, a certain extent of hierarchy did occur because of differentiation in the status that was attributed to states, e.g. at the Vienna congress or in the UN Charter.155 Thus, inequality was recognised by and transmitted into law by establishing legalised hegemony, that is, ‘the realisation through legal forms of Great Power prerogatives.’156 The great powers’ preponderance is expressed within

  Kingsbury, 1998, p. 601.   Kingsbury, 1998, p. 602. 151   Simpson, 2004, p. 6. 152   Simpson, 2004, p. 10. 153   Simpson defines ‘formal equality’ in a stricter sense than it was defined in this section. 154   Simpson, 2004, p. 48. 155   Simpson, 2004, p. 64. 156   Simpson, 2004, p. x. A similar notion is to be found in: Kooijmans, 1964, p. 122. 149 150

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international institutions and law,157 for instance because other states recognise their special rights and obligations.158 Hegemony, then, is no longer based merely on superior power, but on a recognised and accepted role of leadership.159 Hedley Bull has argued that a stable international order needs differences in power. The presence of great powers and their leadership renders international order surveyable and contributes to the final settlement of particular disputes.160 In short, because of their preponderance, great powers are able to manage the system of states.161 Likewise, Kenneth Waltz has indicated that ‘extreme equality’ would turn out to be quite malign to the stability of the international order.162 The recognition of great power leadership and the privileges necessary to exercise it was the legal solution to factual, political inequality. In exchange for that recognition, great powers were given the responsibility to maintain international order.163 However, there is a limit to the extent that the law of nations can incorporate political inequality. As long as the law of nations is essentially based on sovereign equality, the possibilities for great powers to impose law on other states, to control other states by means of the law of nations are restricted. New rules can only be made within an essentially egalitarian order to which great power privileges are exceptions. Moreover, great powers will themselves be bound by the international legal norms they establish to control others.164 Henceforth, legalised hegemony within a framework of a law of nations tuned to a pluralistic international order will never fully suit great powers with management ambitions. Equality limits the extent great powers can ‘instrumentalise’ the law of nations and will, by consequence, force them to withdraw from the law of nations or to fundamentally reshape the international legal order in the end.165 For the latter strategies, the law of nations itself lacks any safeguards.

  Simpson, 2004, p. 67.   Simpson, 2004, p. 68. 159   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 95. 160   Bull, 2002, p. 199. 161   Bull, 2002, p. 200; Waltz, 1979, p. 199 and p. 205. 162  Waltz, 1979, pp. 132–133. 163   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 112; Osiander, 2003, p. 87 and p. 232. 164   Krisch, 2005, p. 378. 165   Krisch, 2005, p. 379. 157 158



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1.3  Power and Law The relation and interaction between power and law or between the political and legal orders at the international level are issues that cause great dispute in international relations theory. Realists, idealists, and constructivists disagree on the extent to which law is relevant to international politics as well as on why states comply or should comply with the law of nations. One thing they do seem to share: the assumption that law and power are to be separated and, basically, are opposites.166 International relations theory tends to treat power and law as two elements of a dichotomy. One either adheres to power-centred realism or law- and morality-centred idealism. Moreover, international relations theorists are inclined to conceive law as an instrument of the weak, whereas powerful states do not need law and are able to duck out of the legal order.167 Great powers are said to deem the law of nations as too constraining and to withdraw to politics. Simultaneously, the idea of sovereign equality as fundamental to the international legal order prevents the recognition of factual preponderance that is to be left to the sphere of politics.168 These assumptions are rather inaccurate.169 The present case study will reveal that this general understanding has some major flaws. In international politics, too, law can be used to exercise power. Dominant states can find ways to respect or circumvent the law of nations and legal forms while exercising preponderant power. By no means, this study is the first to question the dominant understanding of the relation between law and power in international relations, though. Wilhelm Grewe, an active diplomat in his days, has assessed the role of the law of nations in diplomatic practice.170 He acknowledges that ostensibly ‘diplomatic practice is full of legal terms, references and stipulations,’ but immediately claims that in diplomatic discourse one usually strives to avoid ‘open juridical controversies.’171 The latter does not mean that the law of nations is entirely ignored by diplomats and foreign policy makers, or that great powers will observe the law of

  Carr, 2001, p. 159; Berman, 2005, p. 94.   Krisch, 2005, p. 370. 168   Krisch, 2005, p. 370. 169   Likewise Koskenniemi, 2004, p. 514. 170   Grewe, 1999. 171   Grewe, 1999, p. 22. 166 167

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nations totally to their own discretion. For, according to Grewe, there are several reasons for all states to take the law of nations serious. He argues that the law of nations is indeed upheld most of the times, particularly with regard to technical matters, while scholars tend to focus almost exclusively on the exceptional, more spectacular events when it is not. Explicit deflection of rules of the law of nations seems to be limited to exceptional cases in which vital political interests are at stake. As Hedley Bull has argued, international law’s tendency to accommodate power is not a defect, but essential to its functions within the international order and the law of nations will be deprived of the significant role it has to play in practice once it loses contact with the reality of power politics.172 Law is a function of order and hence mimics or should mimic international order to a large extent.173 Mainly in realist theories, state behaviour is explained by the structure of international order.174 International anarchy is said to cause states to engage in a fear- and security-driven struggle for power in which states furthering their self-interest is paramount and overrides any considerations of law and morality. Kenneth Waltz has argued that in sum systemic approaches have the largest and most persistent explanatory force.175 The idea is that the structure, that is, the way states are interconnected socialises states and determines their behaviour.176 Realist-structuralist explanations are based on at least two presumptions. In the first place, state behaviour can be explained and even predicted on the basis of recurrent patterns and objective laws instead of the contingent historical context of each case.177 Hence, it is possible to generalise. In the second place, states are agents that behave rationally driven by interests.178 States are conscious of the environment they exist in, capable to assess their situation and capable to translate that assessment in a strategy of survival.179 However, legal relations are as much deter  Bull, 2002, pp. 88–89.   Morgenthau, 2004, pp. 293–295. 174   Van Staden, 1994, p. 28; Wendt, 1999, pp. 139–190; Mearsheimer, 2003, pp. 10– 11 and pp. 17–18; Wendt, 1999, pp. 11–12. 175  Waltz, 1979, p. 67. 176  Waltz, 1979, p. 76. 177   Morgenthau, 2004, pp. 4–13. Jeremy Black, for instance, fiercely opposes structuralist explanations and shifts attention to particular circumstances and the role of individuals. (Black, 2002, p. 1) 178   Van Staden, 1994, p. 18; Battistella, 2003, p. 112. 179   Mearsheimer, 2003, 31. 172 173



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mined by how actors cope with power and law and how they conceive law. This does not necessarily have to be a matter of structure solely or even in the first place. Thereto, law is not necessarily a reflection of the existant political order. The international political order and the international legal order are not necessarily entirely congruent. To be sure, the political and legal orders can be incongruent. In that case tensions between power and law are likely to rise, though. By consequence, international order is bound to be instable. Andreas Osiander has argued that the stability of a system depends on a consensus programme.180 States should share ‘basic assumptions on which the system is founded’ or at least these assumptions should not be conflicting. Stability depends on the ‘degree of consensus’ on the foundations of international order—that is the kind of units that form the system, their relative status, and the division of territory and people—as well as on the extent that this consensus corresponds to the structure that is in being. Besides this consensus, in Osiander’s view, stability depends on the extent that state conduct can be predicted, which on its turn depends on the existence of rules of conduct.181 Hence, the law of nations has a stabilising role to play. In addition, this consensus programme becomes most explicit in a treaty that results from a peace congress ending a major conflict, for that congress was in fact charged with ‘reconstructing’ or ‘reconsolidating’ the international system.182 According to Henry Kissinger, too, stability of the international order is served by a consensus on ‘common values’ that make power and legitimacy go together.183 Although he clearly assumes that international order is to further the security of individual states, he holds out that stability of the international order is based on acceptance by all or at least all major powers of the existing order as legitimate and thus on consensus on a principle of legitimacy. For only then, states will contain their security-seeking conduct and go along with the existing order.184 From a somewhat more realist perspective, Hans Morgenthau comes to similar conclusions. In his view, the consensus should be on   Osiander, 2003, pp. 5–6.   Osiander, 2003, pp. 6–7. 182   Osiander, 2003, p. 14. 183   Kissinger, 1994, p. 77, p. 138 and p. 145. 184   Kissinger, 1974, p. 138. 180 181

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the distribution of power and territory. In his view, the major peace treaties basically codify the distribution of power that resulted from the preceding war.185 As long as the new status quo in terms of the territorial settlement and power ratio is accepted, the international order will remain stable.186 Likewise, John Mearsheimer argues that stability depends on the division of power, more precisely on the number of great powers and their relative strength. The more balanced the system is, the more stable it will be.187 The more great powers there are the less stable it will be. According to Mearsheimer, balanced bipolar systems are the most stable. The more multipolar a system becomes, the more potential conflicts exist, the more likely it is that alliances will shift, and the greater the chance becomes that a state miscalculates its relative strength and starts a war.188 Osiander, Kissinger, as well as Ian Clark and others seem to think of a more idealist consensus consisting of an agreement on basic principles of the international order, criteria for membership, basic rules and legitimacy,189 but basically all authors discussed here agree that stability depends on the extent that states accept the existing order. They are also in agreement on the way international order is transformed. Although gradual, unnoticed change is not ruled out altogether, essential changes occur because of sudden disruptions through major wars. Whatever term is used to christen this kind of transformative conflict—great power war, epochal war,190 hegemonic war,191 systemtransforming wars,192 systemic war,193 or central war194—fundamental change is brought about by a disruptive conflict. The main question, then, is what provokes these conflicts. ­Robert Gilpin blames unresolved power unbalances or shifts in relative strength of states resulting in attempts by states that have become more powerful to change e.g. the division of territory.195 Mearsheimer and Morgenthau seem to agree that major conflicts are caused by   Morgenthau, 2004, pp. 53–54.   Morgenthau, 2004, p. 67. 187   Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 337. 188   Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 49, pp. 334–335, p. 338. 189   Osiander, 2003, pp. 5–6; Clark, 2007, p. 245. 190   Bobbitt, 2003, p. 8. 191   Gilpin, 2002, pp. 197–199. 192  Waltz, 1979, p. 199. 193   Schroeder, 1994, p. 51. 194   Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 349. 195   Gilpin, 2002, pp. 186–187. 185 186



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shifts in the balance of power. If wars are really on the legal and philosophical foundations of international order and legitimacy, as Osiander and Clark have it, revolution might play a significant role too. Henry Kissinger contends that diplomacy and the balance of power only function within a legitimate international order, that is, an order that is accepted by all major actors. As soon as a power becomes revolutionary in the sense that it rejects the existing order, international order is no longer able to settle and contain conflicts because conflicts are on the international order itself and powers do not trust each other anymore.196 In a revolutionary situation contending principles of legitimacy are explicated, whereas legitimacy can only truly work if it is taken as self-evident.197 Once a power wishes to change the existing order and in order to justify change refers to a principle of legitimacy that deviates from the one the existing order is based on, international order becomes ‘volatile.’198 Likewise, David Armstrong has argued that revolutionary states have the inherent urge to change the international system. They adhere to their own notions of justice.199 While states in a normal situation tend to violate the law of nations sporadically, a revolutionary state rejects the existing political and legal order altogether.200 Conversely, other states are forced to identify more with the existing order and become more sensitive to respect for the law of nations.201 As Armstrong formulates it: ‘Revolutionary states are by nature consensus breakers.’202 By consequence, international society is disrupted or breaks into two opposing camps.203 This study sets out to establish whether the legal order did indeed mimic political relations and whether revolution and war transformed the legal order in the case of the French and Batavian Republics. Hence, the proposition that law is contingent on the political order it has to function in204 merely serves as a hypothesis here. The remaining part of this chapter attempts to establish the relation between power and law within each of the stages of the typology of international orders.

  Kissinger, 1974, p. 2.   Kissinger, 1974, p. 3. 198   Kissinger, 1974, p. 146. 199   Armstrong, 1993, p. 205. 200   Armstrong, 1993, pp. 242–243; Osiander, 2003, p. 10. 201   Armstrong, 1993, pp. 242–243. 202   Armstrong, 1993, p. 302. 203   Osiander, 2003, p. 10. 204   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 195. 196 197

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What kind of law of nations fits each stage best and how are various powers expected to cope with law? Anarchy In the first stage of the typology of international order—true ­anarchy—law does not exist. Analysing interstate relations in the manner purported by this study does not make sense but on the assumption that relations are institutionalised, conform to a certain pattern, and are durable. Moreover, order is about regulating and stabilising behaviour, about imposing and enforcing certain conduct or to steer conduct in a certain direction.205 As Hedley Bull has it, international order means that interstate relations are taken beyond sporadic and haphazard intercourse and come to form a more or less stable pattern.206 Only then, interstate relations become sufficiently institutionalised for law to have emerged. No matter how rules of conduct are conceived from an internal perspective, the existence of such rules from an external perspective is a precondition for the existence of a legal order. Hence, true anarchy is the realm of unconstrained power. At the same time, in the absence of any political organisation or at least of political relations between autonomous entities, a political order does not exist either. Plurality Political and legal orders do arise when a system of states is formed. In a pluralistic order no one state is powerful enough to dominate the entire order and to impress its will on all others. In the absence of legal hierarchy, no state is entitled to set the law to others. By consequence, a pluralistic order calls for reciprocity to be observed and the principle of consent to be respected. To be sure, this does not mean that all states are evenly powerful. Hence, power differences do affect bilateral relations. Pluralistic orders do pose the most ambiguous relation between power and law. On the one hand, interstate relations are sufficiently frequent and dense for rules of conduct to emerge that can be conceived as law. On the other hand, a pluralistic order lacks common institutions or a dominant power (or dominant group of powers)

  Bull, 2002, p. 51; Wendt, 1999, p. 251.   Bull, 2002, pp. 3–4.

205 206



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to set and enforce the law, to settle disputes, or, in general, to make sure that power backs law and vice versa. The relation and interaction between power and law take place on a more or less level playing field of autonomous entities. The general view is that the more powerful a state is, the more likely it is to throw of legal constraints and to do as it wishes whereas less powerful states turn to law for their protection. Grewe opposes the customary claim that law is particularly an instrument of the weak. As a small nation is usually not in a position to enforce legal claims visà-vis a great power, whereas a great power can force a smaller power to observe the law of nations, small powers cannot ignore or evade the law of nations and great powers can. Hence, it is not always in the interest of a small power to refer to the law of nations and whether a state—either great or small—will use legal arguments entirely depends on the case at hand.207 Carr recognises the intermingling of power and law, too, by arguing that the great peace treaties that are commonly regarded as constitutive to the international order reflect power relations. Hence, powerful states have an incentive to uphold the treaties, whereas weak states will try to change or withdraw from legal norms as soon as the balance of power shifts. Contrary to the common view that weak states use the law of nations as a shield against power, Carr has thus established that weak states are exactly most likely to be reformist.208 Realism focuses on situations of anarchy,209 since, unlike other paradigms, realism regards anarchy as a constant.210 As Kenneth Waltz has it, anarchy makes that states are essentially left to their own devices. The first concern in such a ‘self-help system’ is security.211 The basic sentiment is fear since fear emanating from uncertainty is part and parcel of anarchy.212 This fear results in a ‘competition’ for security, which amounts to an all out and continuous struggle for power.213 Hence, according to realists, in a situation of anarchy, states are mainly driven   Grewe, 1999, pp. 23–25.   Carr, 2001, pp. 174–175. 209  In the sense of a pluralistic order of autonomous entities. 210   Battistella, 2003, p. 54. 211  Waltz, 1979, p. 105 and p. 126; Battistella, 2003, p. 434. 212   Mearsheimer, 2003, pp. 42–43; Boucher, 1998, p. 75; Tuck, 2001, p. 130; Van Staden, 1994, p. 16 and p. 20. 213   Mearsheimer, 2003, pp. 42–43; Morgenthau, 2004, p. 52. 207 208

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by a Nietzschian will to power.214 Ironically, by attempting to safeguard their self-preservation, states face a security dilemma.215 The ‘competition’ for security is a never-ending story since attempts made by one state to increase its security by augmenting its power are conceived as increased threats by others.216 In a hierarchical order, the power asymmetry necessitates that some states can do as they like, while others are forced to obey or follow the great, hegemonic, or imperial powers’ lead. Basically, only the great powers, hegemonic, or imperial powers are able to secure their existence on their own. The assumption that complying with the law of nations is a matter of power—a state either being able to turn to politics instead of law or not—is overly simplistic. There are various reasons why states might abide by the law or legal norms under normal circumstances that apply to powerful states as well.217 Realism focuses on power and interests. To a realist, the notion of interests is endemic to politics, but what these interests are depends on the specific context a state is in.218 All states share one basic interest, though: self-preservation. Hans Morgenthau stresses that realism is not blind to moral aspects of political action, but—ever since Machiavelli’s writings—to a realist, the survival of the state is a moral value in its own right and the success of politics henceforth prevails.219 Richard Tuck has argued that the notion of autonomous actors driven by self-preservation is central to modernity.220 Self-preservation amounts to preserving one’s territory and safeguarding one’s autonomy from external interference.221 By consequence, states observe the law of nations if it serves their interests. This implies that they would have acted in the same way in the absence of law and that conformity between political action and the law of nations is entirely coincidental.222 Alternatively, realists consider law to reflect state interests.223

  Nietzsche, 2004, p. 59.   Van Staden, 1994, p. 15; Battistella, 2003, p. 435. 216   Battistella, 2003, p. 435; Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 36. 217   Bull, 2002, p. 134. 218   Morgenthau, 2004, p. 5. 219   Morgenthau, 2004, pp. 6–7. 220   Tuck, 2001, p. 9. 221   Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 31. 222   Scott, 1994, p. 324. 223   Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, p. 13 and p. 195. 214 215



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Realists do not, however, agree on the precise strategy states will follow. According to Waltz, the struggle for power merely serves the pursuance of self-preservation. Hence, states are not necessarily aggressive, nor will they pursue augmented power at all cost or even beyond the point necessary to feel sufficiently secure.224 Morgenthau indicated that states will find it hard to estimate each other’s relative power and will, by consequence, prefer to augment their own power instead of settling for equilibrium.225 Nevertheless, he recognises that states can pursue various policies.226 If a state wants to maintain its power, it will pursue a ‘policy of the status quo.’ If a state wants to augment its power or to change the power ratio within a states system, it will pursue a ‘policy of imperialism.’ Finally, a state might pursue a ‘policy of prestige’ which amounts to demonstrating one’s power in order to influence the impression other states have of one’s power and hence to influence the estimation of the power ratio within the states system made by others.227 More than Morgenthau, Mearsheimer stresses the lack of capability to estimate the power of other states and the extent that states are forced to pursue fear driven policies because of the absence of a superior authority. Henceforth, he argues for ‘offensive realism,’ that is to say the idea that states will always try to maximise their power at least until they have reached a hegemonic position. States never feel powerful enough to be secure and hence will always try to augment their (relative) power.228 Hence, although the main aim always is security, states are compelled by the structure of the international system to be aggressive.229 Suffice to say that a state, in this view, does not accept any legal constraints to the pursuance of its self-preservation. From a realist point of view, anarchy dictates egoist behaviour and interstate relations are intrinsically discordant.230 To realism, power and interests prevail.231 Law is inferior and subservient to power and interests.232 States complying with the law of nations is merely coincidental and indicates

  Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 19.   Morgenthau, 2004, pp. 227–228. 226   Morgenthau, 2004, p. 53. 227   Morgenthau, 2004, p. 87 and pp. 94–95. 228   Mearsheimer, 2003, p. xi, p. 2, p. 5, p. 21 and p. 35. 229   Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 3. 230   Battistella, 2003, p. 59. 231   Scott, 1994, p. 313; Boucher, 1998, p. 30. 232   Scott, 1994, p. 314. 224 225

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that state interests coincide with the law.233 Hence, realists regard law as entirely instrumental and compliance as a matter of calculation. Law itself cannot constrain states; only power can. In a situation of hierarchy the great, hegemonic, or imperial powers will be able to use their or its power to constrain others, but their or its power will not be constrained. In a situation of anarchy, a realist will only acknowledge a balance of power as a way to maintain order.234 To a realist, obedience to the law is based on calculation. First, observing the law of nations makes sense because of the element of reciprocity.235 By the mere existence of general rules one can expect others to display rule-based behaviour as well. Hence, accepting certain limitations to one’s own behaviour entails that others are likewise limited. Thus obeying the law of nations has a high ‘do not do to others what you do not want others to do to you’—character. This reciprocity contributes to international order and thus reduces uncertainty and insecurity by increasing predictability and computability of others’ conduct. Hence, states have an incentive to abide by the law of nations even if contrary to short term interests, because on the long run states value order and stability more. Calculation, then, leads to the insight that complying with the law will cause reciprocal behaviour by other states. By obeying the law of nations, states are more or less sure that they can count on other states to obey the law of nations as well. Hence, in particular in the long run, complying with the law of nations is in the state’s interest. Thereto, effects on public opinion might be affected by observing law or not. Complying with the law of nations or at least the appearance thereof has a legitimising effect.236 Second, a state might fear coercion—either by the use of force, economic reprisals, or the exclusion from certain benefits or gatherings— that will follow non-compliance. The psychologist Tom Tyler has argued, though, that coercion probably is the least effective way to make people obey the law, since this way of ensuring compliance does indeed lead people to regard law-abidingness as entirely instrumental and thus

  Battistella, 2003, p. 113.   Battistella, 2003, p. 112. Although, Hans Morgenthau does seem to recognise international law as a device to maintain peace; Morgenthau, 2004, p. 27. 235   Morgenthau, 2004, p. 313. 236   See introduction. Baehr, 1994, p. 210 and p. 214; Grewe, 1999, pp. 35–36; Piirimäe, 2002, p. 501; Morgenthau, 2004, pp. 101–103; Lesaffer, 2006, p. 100 and p. 162; Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, pp. 168–169. 233 234



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actually undermines compliance and necessitates the creation of ever larger and more effective coercive instruments.237 Goldsmith and Posner have formulated a theory of why states (seem to) observe law based on the assumption that states mainly pursue their interests. They strongly oppose the view that states would act according to the law because of a ‘sense of legal obligation.’ Even if states would prefer to comply with the law of nations, the extent to which this preference would influence state conduct depends on the price of compliance and thus becomes part of the calculation.238 Reasoning on the basis of rational choice theory, Goldsmith and Posner claim that the pursuance of state interests resulting in calculative behaviour over time results in patterns of behaviour. Thus state conduct gains an element of regularity that appears to be law-abiding while states are actually still driven by calculations of what is to be gained or lost by behaving in a certain way.239 They explain ‘behavioral regularity’ by four distinct strategies.240 Each strategy results from a different decision making schedule caught in the form of a prisoner’s dilemma.241 A prisoner’s dilemma is a classic example in game theory of decision making in a situation of alternative options to choose between and limited information on what others will do. Imagine two suspects of a crime having been arrested by the police. They are interrogated separately. Each player has the choice between keeping silent and confessing. Neither of them knows what the other is going to do, but is aware that the other’s choice is going to affect the outcome for both. For, if they both keep silent, the police cannot prove the case and neither player will be punished. The police offer a deal in case of a confession. If player A confesses and player B does not, player A will have to go to prison only for three years. Player B will not proffer from a deal with the police, while the police can use player A’s confession to prove the case against player B. Hence, player B will go to prison for ten years. If both players confess, they will both go to prison for five years. The smartest thing to do for the two players is both to keep silent. However, by doing so, each

  Tyler, 2007, pp. 9–19.   Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, pp. 9–10. 239   Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, p. 26 and p. 39. 240   Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, p. 12. 241   See e.g. Parsons, 1995, pp. 299–303; Tromp, 1995, pp. 111–115; or http://plato. stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/, last consulted 28 December 2008. 237 238

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of them runs the risk of the maximum sentence not being sure that the other will keep silent too. If a player confesses, he is sure he will go to prison for only part of the maximum sentence. If keeping silent, the difference the other player’s choice makes is ten years. If confessing, the difference the other player’s choice makes is two years. The difference between keeping silent and confessing is three years if the other player keeps silent, five years if the other player confesses too, and ten years if only the other player confesses. Only if both players make the same choice, the outcome is equal for both of them. The outcome of this kind of games depends on the difference in costs and benefits between the various options—a player will be more likely to confess if the ‘deal’ offered to him gets better, for instance because the punishment of three years is decreased to one year thus decreasing the benefits of keeping silent or if the ratio between the punishment in case of a confession and the punishment in case the police can prove the case without a confession increases from 3:10 to 3:20 thus increasing the risk involved in keeping silent—, the extent to which a player is capable to predict the choice made by the other player and the extent to which a player has to take future cases into consideration. Because of the latter two reasons, the outcome varies if the decision making process is not a one-time event but part of a series of (repeated) prisoner’s dilemmas. According to Goldsmith and Posner, states decide on whether to comply with international law or not within the framework of similar decision making settings. In every case the calculation to base one’s conduct on depends on the costs or gains of the various alternatives— in the purview of this section, observing the law of nations or not— and the estimate of what other states will do.242 Knowledge of the

A

Option 1 (keep silent)

Option 2 (confess)

Option 1 (keep silent)

A: 0 years in prison B: 0 years in prison

A: 3 years in prison B: 10 years in prison

Option 2 (confess)

A: 10 years in prison B: 3 years in prison

A: 5 years in prison B: 5 years in prison

B

  Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, pp. 27–28.

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course of action other states are to take is always limited. In case of a multiparty situation—which international politics is most likely to amount to—calculation of conduct is even more complicated because the prisoner dilemma becomes a multiparty affair.243 The main questions are then: What conduct serves my interests best? What do I gain from violating or observing the law of nations? What are the risks of selfish behaviour? What are others anticipated to do? The answers to these questions will be highly influenced by the division of costs and benefits between states and by past experiences. In the first place, states may lack an incentive to defect from regular conduct because their interests coincide.244 There is nothing to be gained from abnormal behaviour.245 Hence, states will conduct in similar ways spontaneously. In the second place, states may coordinate their conduct. This strategy will occur in cases in which several alternatives are put forward, states are indifferent on which alternative will be picked, but conflicts are likely to arise if they do not reach an agreement. Hence, the costs of selfish behaviour exceed the advantages by far. A shared interest in avoiding conflicts and the awareness that one depends on the other to realise this then calls for coordination.246 In the third place, states may abstain from selfish conduct because benefits to be gained from cooperation in the long run outweigh short-term profits. This strategy does imply that players are sufficiently concerned with the future to have their present conduct determined by future benefits. Cooperation equals a repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Repetition reduces the uncertainty of another player’s action and hence the optimal outcome becomes more likely to materialise.247 Intercourse between states—‘talk’—also enhances the knowledge of what counts as cooperation and coordination.248 Unlike the prisoners in the classic example, states are able to concert. The law of nations, according to Goldsmith and Posner, is an instrument to codify and clarify the regularities that count as cooperation.249 In a situation of cooperation, entering into a treaty, for instance, makes sense to make each

  Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, p. 36.   Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, p. 11. 245   Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, pp. 27–28. 246   Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, pp. 32–34. 247   Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, pp. 29–32. 248   Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, p. 176. 249   Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, p. 13. 243 244

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other’s conduct more certain.250 Moreover, cooperation calls for an atmosphere in which states deny their selfishness and emphasise their loyalty vis-à-vis each other. Hence, ‘the language of cooperation is the language of obligation,’251 and ‘when states cooperate in their selfinterest, they naturally use the moralistic language of obligation rather than the strategic language of interest.’252 In the fourth place, coercion may lead states to act in accordance with behavioural regularities contrary to their interests.253 Coercion only works if the costs of coercion are not too high and the threat of coercion is thus sufficiently plausible.254 Player A will estimate the likeliness of player B actually turning to force to coerce law-abiding behaviour and weigh that risk against the gains of violating law. On the other hand, player B will weigh the costs of coercive action against the disadvantages caused by player A not complying with certain rules of conduct. Hence, coercion calls for one state to be powerful enough to dictate the conduct of others for only then will the threat of coercion be sufficiently plausible and the costs of coercive action low enough. This situation does not occur in a pluralistic order. In pluralistic and anarchic systems, states, according to realist theories, are deemed to ‘put safety first’ and to pursue security driven foreign policies. This study will indeed show that security was paramount to the French Republic’s foreign policy and its attitude vis-àvis its sister republics. Revolution provokes increased uncertainty and instability and by consequence increased fear and sense of insecurity. This, however, does not mean that law, ideology, ideals, and principles did not matter. Ideology was not as important as nineteenth-century French historians presenting the Revolutionary Wars as a quintessentially ideological conflict would have it,255 but it did play a major role during the Revolutionary Wars. Writing on English foreign policy in the second half of the seventeenth century, Steven Pincus has stressed the role of ideology and domestic politics in foreign policy.256 While realists are inclined to reason from the structure of international order and attach deterministic force to that structure, international politics

  Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, p. 225.   Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, p. 183. 252   Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, p. 184. 253   Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, p. 12. 254   Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, pp. 28–29. 255   Armstrong, 1993, pp. 79–82; Belissa, 2007, p. 35. 256   Pincus, 2002, p. 4. 250 251



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and foreign policy can be approached in a reductionist way as well. In that case, attention shifts from the structure of the international system to domestic politics, party interests, individuals’ views and ambitions, and other internal explanations of state behaviour.257 This shift, for instance, raises the question what exactly the ‘self’ to be preserved is: the state as a political entity or the regime in power? Because of its state-centredness and structuralism, realism is blind to this distinction as well as to the possibility of cross-border relations between factions and the intermingling of international and domestic politics. This is one reason that realism on its own is not sufficient to explain or assess international politics in the Revolutionary era.258 Realists focus on the structure of the international order and state interests as determinative for state action. A calculation of costs and benefits might lead to violation of law as much as to compliance with law. Obedience to the law can be explained in different ways, though. It might be a consequence of effective socialisation and internalisation of norms. As an individual—or a state—is integrated in a particular society, it acquires a sense of standards and behaving in conformity with legal and social norms. An individual—or a state—will thus abide by a norm even against his own interests. That will not solely be the case with legal norms that express moral values individuals or states share like the prohibition to kill other people,259 but with regard to purely instrumental norms too—halting before a red traffic light—, because acting in conformity with legal norms has became valuable in its own right. Belonging to a society socialises states and great powers are no exception to that process of socialisation. By consequence, certain ways of behaviour come to be regarded as ‘normal’ and deviating from the standards of normality by definition is exceptional and in need of explanation and justification. Moreover, acting ‘normal’ in the sense of in conformity with norms that are recognised as legally binding makes that state conduct is considered legitimate by others. The semblance of legitimacy adds to the likeliness that a great powers’ position is accepted. A great power can make use of this to fulfil a steering and stabilising role in the international order.260 257  Waltz, 1979, p. 18, p. 39, and pp. 64–65; Wendt, 1999, p. 196; Battistella, 2003, p. 164. 258   Marc Belissa has argued, for instance, that international politics in the Revolutionary era was primarily determined by domestic court politics. Belissa, 1995, p. 14. 259   Bull, 2002, p. 136. 260   Krisch, 2005, p. 374.

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This brings us to the relevance of the extent law is internalised within acting agents to the compliance with legal norms as opposed to external incentives to abide by the law.261 Alexander Wendt distinguishes three ‘degrees of internalisation of legal norms.’262 These degrees correspond to the transition from a mere system to a society of states. The first degree is one of non-internalisation. States, then, obey the law of nations, because they are forced to.263 In the second, conduct in conformity with legal norms has already become partly internalised since states no longer observe law because of coercion.264 Instead states think complying with the law of nations instrumental to their interests. They think obeying the law of nations to be advantageous. Hence, compliance is a result of ‘self-interested calculations.’265 For instance, states respect each other’s sovereignty because this causes a reduction of uncertainty.266 In the third degree, states comply with legal norms because they consider the norms to be legitimate. States have gained a ‘sense of obligation.’ They observe law because they have internalised conduct in conformity with legal norms and identify with the society from which these norms result.267 In short, they want to comply.268 These remarks show that compliance with international law is not simply a matter of power. Basically, realism glosses over the role of ideology and the power of ideas. Idealism in international relations usually amounts to a normative position that beliefs in law as the expression of higher, moral norms.269 This kind of idealism puts its trust in a legal order to contain states, even in anarchy. Moreover, idealism in this sense does not accept conflict as an inescapable consequence of human nature.270 Idealists deny that the state of nature in which states coexist intrinsically is a state of war and that the absence of a superior authority equals the absence of law or obligatory rules of conduct.271

 Wendt, 1999, p. 266.  Wendt, 1999, p. 250 and pp. 266–273. 263  Wendt, 1999, p. 250, and pp. 268–269. 264  Wendt, 1999, pp. 270–271. 265  Wendt, 1999, p. 250. 266  Wendt, 1999, p. 287. 267  Wendt, 1999, p. 250 and pp. 272–273. 268  Wendt, 1999, pp. 242–243 and pp. 288–289. 269   Boucher, 1998, pp. 32–33. 270   Boucher, 1998, p. 14. 271   Battistella, 2003, pp. 61–62. 261 262



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Next to this somewhat normative sense—idealism as referring to ideals—, idealism can be a metaphysical position—idealism as referring to ideas. In the latter sense idealism emphasises the power of ideas and shared assumptions. Realism is accused of unjustly ignoring the social role of ethics, values, and norms instead of or besides power and interests.272 This position shifts attention from political and social institutions and structures to mental and cognitive processes, both individual and collective. Hedley Bull criticizes realism for ignoring the role of rules and norms within international relations.273 Andreas Osiander argues that the international system is a ‘mental construct.’ Hence, state behaviour is influenced by the ways states perceive themselves and others and the assumptions on international order they share. Ian Clark, for instance, has pointed to the significance of notions of legitimacy to state conduct.274 Western culture is indeed law-based. Law and a tradition of law-boundedness of public authority are central to Western culture. The West has inherited this from ancient Rome, Judaism, and early Christianity; the Judeo-Christian God being a law-giving God.275 The idea of law—of order through the existence of general and abstract rules for behaviour—is too much incorporated into our minds for law to be irrelevant to international relations even with the international system being in want of a sovereign law-maker and law-enforcer. Hence, the existence and force of the law of nations appear as ontological axioms. The ‘idea of law’ is a major influence on international politics and in itself powerful. 276 While realists are inclined to explain state behaviour from the structure of the existing international order, Alexander Wendt has made an argument that culture counts and can lead to differences in behaviour despite similarity in structure. He argues for what he depicts as ‘structural idealism.’ He holds on to a structuralist approach to international politics, that is, international order and politics, in his view, cannot be reduced to the actions and views of individuals. He does, however, stress the importance of shared ideas to international politics and actors’ identities and interests instead of material forces.277 To the

  Bull, 2002, p. 14 and p. 87; Bull introduction to Wight, 1977, p. 17.   Hurrell, foreword to Bull, 2002, p. viii. 274   Clark, 2007, pp. 245–246. 275   Armstrong, 1993, p. 18; Boucher, 1998, p. 194. 276   Scott, 1994, pp. 317–318, p. 320, and p. 325. 277  Wendt, 1999, p. 1. 272 273

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s­ tructuralist analysis of state behaviour, Wendt adds a cultural one. Identities and interests are not given, but constructed by the culturally determined structure of international politics.278 Even within an anarchical states system, states can act in different ways because various ‘logics of anarchy’ might apply.279 Anarchy on its own does not tell us anything about interstate relations. What really matters is how states perceive themselves and others and that is a cultural matter.280 Wendt distinguishes three such logics: Hobbesian anarchy, Lockean anarchy, and Kantian anarchy.281 Hobbesian culture is characterised by a ‘sauve qui peut’-egoism, while a Lockean culture leads to a ‘more self-restrained egoism’ and Kantian culture brings about a system of collective security.282 In a Hobbesian culture states are fully isolated and entirely left to their own devices. In Lockean and Kantian cultures, states—while still clearly differentiated from each other—­conceive their relations with other states as part of a collective and include other states in their self-understanding.283 They move to become or have already become part of a society in the sense defined by Hedley Bull. In Wendt’s theory of state behaviour the element of a state’s identity plays a crucial role. In the first place, a state’s identity is ‘a subjective, unit-level quality rooted in an actor’s self-understandings.’284 Its identity is thus the way in which a state would portray itself. A state’s identity can take on various aspects. Primo, a state has a personal or corporate identity, that is to say the state has a sense of “I”. The state thinks of itself as a ‘separate locus of thought and activity.’285 What this “I” is depends on its fundamental institutional and functional features, that is its ‘unit type.’286 Secundo, a state has one or various type identities. It belongs to some social categories by sharing some features with other states.287 Since these identities are derived from features states have, they are ‘pre-social,’ that is to say that they are exogenous to the international system. In case of states, type identities amount to

 Wendt, 1999, p. 33 and p. 193.  Wendt, 1999, p. 13 and p. 18. 280  Wendt, 1999, p. 309. 281  Wendt, 1999, p. 18. 282  Wendt, 1999, p. 18 and p. 265. 283  Wendt, 1999, pp. 212–213. 284  Wendt, 1999, p. 224. 285  Wendt, 1999, pp. 224–225. 286  Wendt, 1999, p. 353. 287  Wendt, 1999, p. 225. 278 279



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regime types or ‘forms of state,’ that is, a state’s type identity depends on how its domestic political system is organised.288 Although presocial, type identity can be crucial since international society might employ criteria for membership based on what kinds of regimes are deemed legitimate or not.289 Tertio, states might have a collective identity. Attaining a collective identity is a cognitive process during which a state identifies with others to such an extent that the distinction between ‘self’ and ‘other’ becomes diffuse and is partly transcended.290 The ‘self’ comes to include others from which a sense of responsibility to others and an incentive to come to others’ aid result.291 Finally, states have role identities. This kind of identity is relational. A role identity depends on the position a state takes vis-à-vis others in the system.292 Role identities can be institutionalised in social structures,293 but they are mainly an element of political culture and the extent to which that culture is internalised in images states have of themselves and others.294 The way states treat each other then becomes a matter of intentions more than of power.295 Role identities are as much a matter of how states perceive others as of their self-image.296 By consequence, role identities are symmetric in that states’ role identities mirror each other.297 Each ‘logic of anarchy’ defines a separate category of role identity.298 In a Hobbesian culture, states perceive of each other as enemies. Between enemies there are no intrinsic limits to the use of violence, because enemies do not recognise each other’s basic right to exist. Hence, this is a culture of Waltz’ self-help and the realists’ struggle for survival by power maximalisation if necessary by eliminating others.299 In a Lockean culture, contrariwise, states see and treat each other as rivals. Rivals might still fight each other, but violence is limited since rivals do recognise each other’s right to exist. They are competitors  Wendt, 1999, p. 226 and p. 353.  Wendt, 1999, pp. 291–292; Simpson, 2004, pp. 76–86. 290  Wendt, 1999, p. 229. 291  Wendt, 1999, p. 293. 292  Wendt, 1999, p. 257. 293  Wendt, 1999, p. 227. 294  Wendt, 1999, p. 247, pp. 249–250 and p. 254. 295  Wendt, 1999, p. 265. 296  Wendt, 1999, p. 224 and p. 260. 297  Wendt, 1999, p. 263. 298  Wendt, 1999, p. 258. 299  Wendt, 1999, p. 258 and pp. 260–263. 288 289

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that aim to change each other’s behaviour or to gain, for instance, part of another state’s territory.300 This results in a degree of self-restraint by consequence of which states do no longer pose existential threats to each other.301 Thus, sovereign statehood changes from an entity’s quality into an institution of the international order and every state’s right to existence is formalised in the law of nations.302 According to Wendt, the Westphalian system was typically Lockean, with sporadic occasions of rebounding in a Hobbesian culture.303 Finally, in a Kantian culture, states consider each other as friends. Friends settle disputes without using violence and come to each other’s assistance in case of threats by third parties.304 Hence a relation of friendship is characterised by two rules: the rule of non-violence, and the rule of mutual aid.305 These rules translate into two elements of amicable bonds. In the first place, friends form a ‘pluralistic security community.’ Within the circle of friends, war no longer is a legitimate way to settle disputes. Relations between friends are intrinsically peaceful. In the second place, friends form a ‘collective security system.’ They aid each other based on what Wendt calls ‘generalised reciprocity,’ that is, there is no direct quid pro quo for helping each other.306 Wendt clearly distinguishes friends from allies. Although relations between friends and allies are quite similar, according to Wendt, there is a significant difference in that bonds of friendship are deemed perpetual, whereas an alliance is a temporal alignment based on reasons of expedience in a context of rivalry. Hence, allies are rivals who temporarily put their rivalry aside to cooperate against others.307 This kind of alignment results from self-interest and ends as soon as the reason why alignment is expedient has ceased to exist. Conversely, friends feel tied to each other irrespective of the kind of threats they face, when

 Wendt, 1999, p. 258 and pp. 279–280.  Wendt, 1999, p. 261 and pp. 280–282. 302  Wendt, 1999, p. 280. 303  Wendt, 1999, p. 270, p. 297 and p. 312. Wendt argues that the French Revolution caused a ‘temporary state of nature’ because one of the great powers underwent an internal revolution that subsequently rejected ‘Lockean norms’ at the international level. As will become clear throughout this book, Franco-Batavian relations do not entirely underline this assertion. 304  Wendt, 1999, p. 258 and pp. 298–300. 305  Wendt, 1999, pp. 298–299. 306  Wendt, 1999, pp. 299–300. 307  Wendt, 1999, p. 299. 300 301



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they face a threat, and who poses the threat.308 In a Kantian culture, states identify with each other by consequence of which each other’s security becomes an element of every single state’s security.309 What can be learned from Wendt’s theory is that a cultural aspect— the identities states attribute to themselves and others—is relevant to interstate relations. Moreover, Wendt argues that different attitudes to the law of nations follow from these role identities. Hence, it might be instructive to compare his typology to Franco-Batavian relations. This takes a discourse analysis. What do state officials refer to—­interests, power, law, principles? What does that tell us about how states perceive themselves and their relations with others? Furthermore, it has become clear that several factors have to be taken into consideration in examining interstate relations. Next to structural features of the international system, one might look at internal dynamics—public opinion, domestic politics—, and the power of ideas, assumptions, and traditions. Finally, the influence of individual actors, their views, characters, intentions and ambition cannot be ruled out. Federation and Union Federation is an institutionalised form of perpetual and exclusive cooperation. By entering into a federation, states subordinate their selfinterest to the common good. Bonds of cooperation between states are legally construed and federal institutions for dispute settlement, law formation, and enforcement are established. A federation externally acts as one. Accession to the federation takes place on the basis of equality. Ideally, participation in federal institutions and the relation to the federal level does not vary among the member states. Within a federation two legal spheres are distinguished. The federation’s and the member states’ jurisdictions will have to be clearly circumscribed and respected. As far as the federation’s jurisdiction reaches it will be superior to state law. Hence, it will either work directly within the member states or will have to be implemented by member states. Federal institutions enforce compliance with the law and respect for the division of authority and jurisdiction. Thereto, federation implies a degree of internalisation of law that makes states comply with the federation’s law beyond a calculation of interests.  Wendt, 1999, p. 301.  Wendt, 1999, p. 305.

308 309

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In case of a union the separation between two distinct jurisdictions has disappeared. There is no clear dualism between state law and ‘common’ law. The legal order has become truly universal. Law is unified and the unitary law is hierarchically superior to any other law. If based on the model of the modern state, the union is centralised with a cen nisms for law formation and enforcement. A unitary order does not need to confirm to the model of the modern state, though. A unitary order might be more diffuse consisting of overlapping jurisdictions and multilevel governance. Even then, hierarchy and a basic unity of law remain the characterising features of a unitary order, for, even if not centralised, international order essentially forms a unity and thus lacks a fundamental division between separate political entities or between domestic and international spheres. Hegemony and Empire In a situation of hegemony, the major difference in power allows for an effective legal hierarchy to be established. Legalised hegemony amounts to a differentiation in rights and duties in conformity to the difference in power.310 The hegemonic power’s leadership is legally acknowledged. Hence, it has the authority to command311 and direct international politics. Moreover, it is entitled and capable to coerce other states to act in certain ways, whereas coercion cannot be applied against it. Next to the legal recognition and transmittance of inequality, a major difference in power causes states to cope with the law of nations in different ways. As said before, the view that great powers will violate the law of nations if it suits them whereas weak states will turn to the law of nations for protection is overly simplistic. The difference in power will strongly influence calculation of alternative lines of conduct. Costs of non-conformity decrease for the hegemonic power, whereas the risk of having to face coercive action due to non-conformity increases for other powers. This would imply that a hegemonic power becomes ever more likely to disregard the law of nations, whereas other powers become more likely to observe the law of nations. Basically, the element of reciprocity that makes states observe law ceases. The same is not true for the cultural aspects. Great   Simpson, 2004, p. 64.   John Austin defined a ‘command’ as ‘an expressed wish that has to be abided because of fear of enforcement.’; Austin, 1832, pp. 13–14. 310 311



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powers might be able to influence culture more, but even they are subjected to the power of ideas and susceptible to internalisation of norms. Hence, the disagreement between realists and idealists on the affect of power on compliance with law becomes clear in a situation of hegemony. Both views assume a distinction or even opposition of power and law. Moreover, both views seem to regard the law of nations as given. Law and power do not need to be each other’s opposites. In addition, it is as relevant to ask whether power differences affect the formation of the law of nations, that is, whether a hegemonic power’s influence on setting or modifying the substance of law is greater or even exclusive, as it is to ask whether they influence the incentive for compliance with the law of nations. Nico Krisch has shown that great powers can use various strategies to deal with the law of nations in ways convenient to their interests and positions.312 The law of nations is both an instrument to resist and contain power, and an instrument to exercise power.313 Krisch distinguishes four ways in which great powers cope with the law of nations. In the first place a great power might use the law of nations to stabilise its dominance and to pacify and regulate the existing order. This is what Krisch calls ‘instrumentalisation.’314 Making use of and operating within the limits set by the law of nations to exercise its preponderance a great power profits from the law of nations’ legitimising effect.315 By consequence, it will succeed, to some extent, in legalising inequality.316 Nonetheless, in this strategy, a great power will only make use of the law of nations as far as it suits its interests and ambitions. Hence, a great power will opt for legal forms that allow for an optimal expression of its preponderance and provide the least constraints. For instance, Krisch has argued, a great power will prefer bilateral treaties over multilateral ones.317 With bilateral treaties, it is easier to circumvent ‘general rules’ or to impose legal regimes on a state without turning it into a general arrangement.318

  Krisch, 2005, p. 371.   Krisch, 2005, p. 408. 314   Krisch, 2005, p. 382. 315   Krisch, 2005, p. 375. 316   Krisch, 2005, pp. 389–390. 317   Krisch, 2005, p. 389. 318   Krisch, 2005, p. 390. 312 313

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Moreover, whether a great power can instrumentalise the law of nations depends on its ambitions. If a great power identifies with the existing order and claims a leading role in the general interest—that is, pursues a policy Lesaffer calls ‘hegemonic defense’319—it is likely to maintain the status quo and thus to make other powers to observe the law of nations. This will probably rule out open violation of the law of nations on the great power’s part too. The more revisionist a great power is, the more reluctant it will be to go along with existing law.320 Among others, Edward H. Carr has pointed out that law is innately conservative since it is an instrument to preserve order and further stability.321 Therefore, law is essentially linked to what Hans Morgenthau calls a policy of the status quo and the legal order is the expression of the existing power ratio.322 Any policy directed at fundamentally modifying international order, by consequence, lacks the legitimising support of the law of nations. In the second place, a great power might try to reshape the international legal order in a way that better reflects and accommodates its preponderance.323 The law of nations will then be modified in order to adopt elements of hierarchy and inequality by adopting ‘special rules for the powerful.’324 A great power might employ the procedures for change provided by the law of nations itself to reshape the legal order, but will not always be able to do so. If the concerned great power does wish to stay within a legal discourse, it, then, will probably turn to natural law arguments—notions of justice or a higher law—to justify the desired changes.325 The decisive question will be whether a modification of the law of nations is accepted. For, lacking an exclusive and clearly established procedure of law formation, any deviation from a rule of the law of nations might either be a violation or a modification of existing law and acceptance of change is what makes the difference between the two.326 This implies that reshaping the law of nations can   Lesaffer, 2006, p. 175.   Krisch, 2005, p. 375. 321   Carr, 2001, pp. 174–175. 322   Morgenthau, 2004, p. 105. 323   Krisch, 2005, p. 380. 324   Krisch, 2005, p. 396. 325   Morgenhau, 2004, p. 106. 326  D’Amato, 1988, p. 246; Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, pp. 198–199. Nathaniel Berman has pointed to another strategy—‘legitimacy through defiance’—in which actions are legitimated not as changes of existing law or by reference to higher norms, but exactly because they violate international law. In that case non-compliance is not 319 320



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either be abrupt by a clear and express statement or gradually through deviating conduct. Achilles Skordas has indeed argued that a hegemonic power is not likely to act unilaterally too openly to reshape the legal order since this most often turns out to be counterproductive. Instead, a great power will attempt to reshape the law of nations by gradual change and by influencing the opinio iuris.327 In the third and fourth place, a great power might withdraw from the international legal order. In that case, a great power turns either to (3) politics or to (4) domestic law since it considers both to be easier to control.328 Withdrawal is a kind of evasion strategy. A great power will attempt to minimalise the constraints of international legal norms and obligations. This does not necessarily amount to violations of the law of nations. A great power might, for instance, stipulate for an exceptional position. Or a great power might try to limit the scope of the law of nations by removing certain relations from the international sphere.329 The more the international legal order emphasises equality of states and endeavours to constrain preponderant power, the more likely it is that great powers will feel the urge to withdraw from the law of nations.330 The clearer and the denser the law of nations becomes, the more burdensome it becomes on power. In such cases, a great power will look for other ways to exercise their power. Nevertheless, by simply turning to politics, a great power has to disclaim the advantages of behaviour in conformity with law as well. An alternative strategy, then, would be to turn to domestic law.331 Thus, a state still stays within a discourse of legality, while being better able to control the law used to exercise power. Admittedly, domestic law will have to cross state borders to fulfil a regulating role within international ­relations and will

a matter of changing law but of an exception to existing law. On the other hand, precisely by stressing the violating character of its actions a state stays within a legal discourse. Mainly great powers will try to claim this position, because if they claim their actions to be exceptions to the existing law that law will stay in force for other states (Berman, 2005). The strategy resembles Raskolnikov’s theory of a division between ordinary and extraordinary people in Dostojevski’s Crime and Punishment (1866). Ordinary people have to subject to the law and obey authorities. Extraordinary people are entitled to commit crimes and injustices, because the law does not apply to them and they will improve the world by violating the law. 327   Skordas, 2003, p. 344. 328   Krisch, 2005, p. 370. 329   Krisch, 2005, p. 385. 330   Krisch, 2005, p. 387. 331   Krisch, 2005, p. 380.

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thus come into conflict with the separation of distinct jurisdictions. However, if a great power succeeds in ‘exporting’ parts of its domestic law to others it will be an effective way to control a wider range of the international system than its own territory.332 Since imposing laws on and enforcing laws within other states will cause problems, Krisch has shown that great powers usually develop strategies of what he calls ‘informal diffusion of rules.’333 A great power will, for instance, attempt to use political means to get other states to mimic its domestic law. Furthermore, great powers will turn to soft law. The more powerful a state is, the more it will appreciate the flexibility soft law offers.334 Krisch contends that the relation between power and the law of nations usually is a mixture of these four strategies—­instrumentalisation, reshaping, withdrawal to politics, and turning to domestic law—and hence is ‘complex and multifaceted.’335 These strategies are useful tools to examine the role played by law in relations between the French and Batavian Republics. In a political situation of hegemony, the international legal order will be under constant pressure. Sovereign equality will be challenged time over time and the law of nations will tend to become softer and more hierarchical. The equality of states contrasts with factual power relations and will be eroded by the special position awarded to great powers. Henceforth, the French Republic is expected to attempt to instrumentalise and reshape the law of nations. According to Krisch, the international legal order is resilient, though, and will counterpoise power in order to preserve stability and equality. By consequence, the French Republic as a great power, to some extent, is expected to be incited to withdraw from the law of nations by turning to politics and domestic law as well.336 In a situation of empire, as is the case with a unitary order, the legal order has become transcendental. However, in the case of an empire the imperial power clearly dominates the international order. It is in control of the transformation and modification of the law of nations and fully entitled and capable of enforcing the law of nations. Power and law do not deviate, because the law entirely is an instrument of the imperial power. Moreover, the imperial power dominates the domes  Krisch, 2005, p. 400.   Krisch, 2005, p. 404. 334   Krisch, 2005, pp. 390–392. 335   Krisch, 2005, p. 407. 336   Krisch, 2005, p. 407. 332 333



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tic legal orders of subjected states, too, either because the imperial power sets law directly applicable with those orders or because subjected states are obliged to implement the imperial powers directives within their domestic orders. Conclusion This chapter addressed international order from a theoretical perspective. It has been shown that the relation and interaction between power and law is affected both by the international order’s structure and by its culture. From a structuralist point of view, a typology of international order has been offered by which relations between states can be characterised. While basically of a political nature, this typology can be translated to one of legal orders. Thereto, this typology can be applied either to the world at large or to regional subsystems or categories of states (e.g. the great power subsystem or a subsystem of states with forms of government based on the same political ideology). In a situation of true anarchy no political entities exist or political entities are isolated with relations between them being at best sporadic. The main difference between this first stage and the second one—plurality—is that in the latter stage relations between political entities have become institutionalised and standardised through frequent interaction. By consequence, rules of conduct have developed that can be conceived as law. From this second stage onwards a distinction should be made between a mere system and a society. In a system, states merely co-exist. In a society, states have gained an idea of and internalised shared norms and values, common institutions and values. In either situation the ways states interact is determined not just by the structure of international order but also by cultural elements like the influence of the ‘idea of law,’ the role of legitimacy and the ways states perceive each other. Alexander Wendt, for instance, distinguishes between three role identities that determine interstate relations in a situation of plurality: enemy, rival, and friend. Furthermore, without changing the type of international order, states may institutionalise their cooperation in an alliance, which is distinguished from a federation by its limited scope and the absence of suprastate institutions. Equality and independence are crucial to distinguish between a pluralistic international order and the next stage: hegemony or ­federation.

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Since this typology focuses on legal orders, equality from a legal point of view is meant. In a pluralistic order power differences are declared irrelevant to the comparison between states. The essence of legal equality is the absence of hierarchy among states. States are of the same rank. There is no subordination of one state to another next to absence of a superior authority above states. States being sovereign means that they exercise the same kind of (supreme) authority within their territories in the sense of exclusive jurisdiction and the reciprocal recognition thereof. In a federative order suprastate institutions would be established to which states would have transferred part of their authority and rights. In a hegemonic order one or a few states would attain a privileged position in the legal order. A legal differentiation in role and status of states would occur expressed by the attribution of prerogatives and special rights to the hegemonic powers and the exclusion of the applicability of certain rules to them. In a hegemonic order this special position would be confined to accepted leadership in the international sphere. Hegemonic powers are entitled to direct international politics. Thereto various criteria to establish whether states are legally equal can be distinguished. In the first place, states equally conform to the definition of state and can henceforth equally claim the rights and duties connected to being a state. In other words, states can claim existential equality, that is, autonomy, self-determination, non-intervention, international legal personality, and the freedom to arrange their domestic orders. States have an equal claim to rights and duties attached to being states derived from the objective legal order. Equality does not call for states to have the exact same rights and duties. For, states can attain or agree to different subjective rights and duties within the legal order. Absolute reciprocity of rights and duties, hence, is not a criterion of equality. Reciprocity is a second criterion, though, in another sense. If, e.g. in an alliance treaty, rights and duties of the states involved deviate it is relevant to investigate whether this difference really reflects or results from a difference in power. A difference in rights and duties might after all still correspond to equilibrium in benefits and burdens or might be explained by an imbalance in the interest states pay to the conclusion of a treaty. In a market place exchanges take place because buyer and seller attach different values to various products. To the customer a loaf of bread is worth more that the money he pays for it, because otherwise he would not buy the bread. To the baker the



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money he gets is worth more than the loaf of bread, because otherwise he would not sell it. Yet the buyer gets the bread and loses money, whereas the baker gets money and loses a loaf of bread, that is, they attain different rights and obligations from the exchange. Likewise, with unequal rights and obligations deriving from a treaty, it is relevant to establish whether a party was really willing to pay the price— in obligations—to gain the benefits—rights derived from the treaty or the conclusion of the treaty itself—or whether a party was forced to consent to a difference in rights and obligations because of a difference in power. A third criterion of legal equality is equality before the law. Does the law of nations equally apply to all states? Do states have equal means to exercise and enforce their rights? Furthermore, it is relevant to have a look at the formation of the law of nations. Legislative equality serves as a fourth criterion. Do states have an equal say in the formation of customary and treaty law? As for customary law this would call for an equal part in the establishment of the opinio iuris sive necessitates that attaches a legally binding character to state practice. In case of a treaty both the procedure followed to form the treaty and the final consent are relevant. States are entitled to equal representation or participation in negotiations, and to partake in deliberations. Thereto, states are entitled to an equal share in determining the agenda ate formally consenting or withholding its consent suffices. It does not matter whether one state (ab)uses superior power to mould treaty law to its will because it is in a better political position to withhold its consent or to force other states to consent. The determinative feature is whether a state can be bound by another state without its consent because that other state is entitled to impose law on other states or to act on behalf of another state. Thereto, it has been shown that powerful states do not just observe the law of nations if they wish to or violate it because they can depending on whether the law corresponds with their interests or not. The ways powerful states cope with law and legal restraints is more complex. Nico Krisch has formulated four strategies powerful states use to cope with the law of nations. They either instrumentalise law to exercise hegemony, try to reshape it in order to make law more congruent to their preponderance, or they withdraw from the law of nations either to domestic law or to politics. Finally, hegemony and federation can be distinguished from the last stage—empire respectively union—by two features. In the first place,

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in a hegemonic or federative order of distinct political entities or separate, circumscribed jurisdictions can still be observed. In an empire distinct entities might still exist, by they are fully subjected and thus integrated in the imperial power’s empire. In the second place, in an imperial or unitary order, there is no autonomy in domestic affairs anymore. In an empire, the imperial order is entitled to directly interfere in the domestic order of subjected states or subjected states are obliged to implement or enforce imperial law, while in a union the legal order essentially is one.

CHAPTER TWO

The French Revolution and the European order As the eighteenth century started, Europe must have still been quite familiar to anyone living from the late fifteenth century onwards. France still opposed Habsburg and England. The Empire, although reformed at Münster-Osnabrück, was still alive and kicking. Spain, although in decline, was still ruled by a Habsburg King1 and still controlled a huge colonial empire in the Americas. Italy was still divided and the object of French-Habsburg rivalry. By the time the century ended, Europe had changed beyond imagination. This chapter sets out to describe the historical context of Franco-Batavian relations throughout the period of the Revolutionary Wars. The European political order prior to and during the period as well as eighteenth-century and Revolutionary thought on international order and the law of nations will be addressed. In addition, attention will be paid to the French Revolution and French domestic politics. 2.1  Great Power Equilibrium: Pre-Revolutionary Europe The European order in place on the eve of the French Revolution had arisen from the late fifteenth century onwards against the background of Franco-Habsburg rivalry. By 1500 both France and the Habsburg realm had become powers with a Europe-wide presence and the capacity to conduct a Europe-wide foreign policy. Throughout the reign of Francis I and Charles V they clashed over control of Italy.2 Against the background of the Wars of Religion their rivalry shifted to Germany and the Low Countries. Cardinal Richelieu (1585–1642) set out for breaking Habsburg encirclement of France by aligning with various powers in Germany and Italy.3 Habsburg Austria was to be balanced by alliances with Sweden, Poland, and the Ottoman Empire in order Charles II of Spain demised some months after the turn of the century.   Bély, 2005, p. 197. 3   Church, 1972; Elliott, 1984; Kennedy, 1988, p. 43 and p. 114; Bély, 2005, p. 266 and p. 286; Lesaffer, 2006, pp. 170–171. 1  2

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to pose a threat to the Empire in the east too.4 Moreover, Germany was to be kept weak and divided by acting as the champion of ‘German liberties’ against Habsburg centralisation schemes.5 Richelieu portrayed France as the defender of weak powers against its rival’s dominance.6 Weakened by decades of war the Austrian and Spanish Habsburg had to acknowledge their defeat in the Peaces of Westphalia (1648) and the Pyrenees (1659).7 Gradually Spain resigned its leading role leaving the role of being France’s main rival to Austria.8 France rose from the Wars of Religion as the primary European power. Once he had overcome domestic turmoil, Louis XIV (1638–1715) turned to international politics pursuing French preponderance in Western Europe,9 and French expansion by means of so-called ‘réunions,’ that is, annexation of territories that had allegedly been French originally.10 France reached the zenith of its power on the eve of the War for the Spanish Succession (1701–1714). A Europe-wide alliance with the partnership between Austria and the two maritime powers—Britain and the United Provinces—as its core managed to counterbalance French preponderance.11 After the Peace of Utrecht (1713) no power was sufficiently strong to dominate the entire states system.12 At the same time, rises in military expenses caused the growth of a distinction between great powers—still capable of major warfare—and minor powers.13 With the decline of Spain, the United Provinces, and Sweden in the second half of the seventeenth century, the class of great powers came to be formed by Britain, Prussia, and Russia next to France and Austria.14 Europe became a multipolar system dominated by this pentarchy of great powers.15 ‘Europe’ was also extended geographically to the north and the east by the rise of Prussia and Russia. Franco Luard, 1992, p. 259.  Deutsch, 1938, pp. 38–39.  6  Lesaffer, 2006, p. 172.  7   24 October 1648, Treaty of Münster; CTS vol. 1, pp. 27–356; 7 November 1659, Peace of the Pyrenees; CTS vol. 5, pp. 325–402; Grewe, 2000, p. 279.  8   Grewe, 2000, p. 280; Black, 2002, p. 106.  9   Grewe, 2000, p. 6. 10   Bély, 2005, pp. 361–362. 11   Watson, 1992, p. 168. 12   Kennedy, 1988, p. 116; Luard, 1992, p. 7; Schroeder, 1994, p. 3; Blanning, 2000, p. 196. 13  Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 390; Black, 2002, p. 137; Bobbitt, 2003, p. 140. 14   Kennedy, 1988, p. 139; Grewe, 2000, p. 282. 15   Kennedy, 1988, pp. 94–96; Luard, 1992, p. 6; Watson, 1992, p. 200; Duchhardt, 1997, p. 7; Clark, 2007, p. 74.  4  5



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British rivalry from the Ludovican Wars continued, although it shifted to the maritime-colonial sphere thus starting what has been called the ‘Second Hundred Years’ War.’16 Utrecht not only acknowledged a balance of power (between the great powers) in practice, it also vested the balance of power as a principle of international politics directed at preventing hegemony.17 If necessary, domination of Europe or a specific region by a single power was to be prevented by reverting to war.18 Based on a mechanistic worldview,19 Europe was perceived as a system in which equilibrium could be attained and preserved. Hence, every power had a specific role to play in the balance of power system. Secondary states functioned as valuable allies or buffers between the great powers.20 Hence, the European balance of power at large depended on the conservation of various crucial building stones and regional balances, e.g. in Germany or Italy.21 Moreover, the balance of power was dynamic. Equilibrium was attained by compensating power differences between states through alliances22 and maintaining the balance called for flexible alignments, for today’s ally might be the main threat to the balance tomorrow.23 The flexibility of alignments was mainly a matter for secondary states. Of the great powers only Russia continuously shifted its alliances. Between the other great powers more or less stable alliances and sets of rivals existed. France opposed Britain. Austria opposed Prussia. Because of traditional Franco-Austrian rivalry these pairs durably crossed into a Franco-Prussian partnership and an Anglo-Austrian alliance.24 With the exception of the Franco-Anglo rapprochement during the Orléans regency,25 this pattern of alliances changed only once prior to the Revolutionary Wars. In the 1756 ­‘Diplomatic ­Revolution’ 16   Presser, 1946, p. 168; Homan, 1971, p. 139; Grewe, 2000, p. 279; Blanning, 2000, p. 2. 17  Duchhardt, 1976, p. 3; Luard, 1992, p. 8 and pp. 12–13; Watson, 1992, p. 182; Duchhardt, 1997, pp. 18–19 and p. 260; Lesaffer, 1999a, pp. 327–328; Osiander, 2003, p. 80 and p. 133. 18   Gulick, 1982, p. 36. 19  Duchhardt, 1976, p. 69; Gulick, 1982, p. 24; Knutsen, 1997, p. 124. 20   Watson, 1992, pp. 198–201; Broers, 1996, p. 31; Morgenthau, 2005, p. 196. 21   Gulick, 1982, p. 76. 22   Gulick, 1982, p. 61; Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 328. 23  Luard, 1992, p. 25 and pp. 261–262; Schroeder, 1994, p. 6. 24  Luard, 1992, pp. 197–198 and p. 259; Shennan, 1995, p. 47. After the War of the Spanish Succession, France and Spain, too, became perpetual partners in the so-called Pacte de Famille; Luard, 1992, p. 260; Bély, 2005, p. 376. 25  Duchhardt, 1997, p. 263; Bély, 2005, p. 363.

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or ‘Renversement des alliances’26 Britain and Prussia became allies followed by France and Austria. Since, after the Wars of the Spanish and Polish Succession, the Habsburgs were no longer in possession of Spain and Lorraine,27 Austria was no longer an existential threat to France. At the same time, Austria needed allied support to withstand Prussia and to regain Silesia,28 while Britain was courting Prussia to take over Austria’s role of Britain’s Continental ally against France since an alliance with Prussia would cover Hanover better.29 Frederick the Great (1712–1786) decided to strengthen his bonds with Britain. On 16 January 1756, Britain and Prussia concluded the Convention of Westminster.30 In response, France approached Austria resulting in the Franco-Austrian Alliance Treaty of 1 May 1756.31 The balance of power had come to the fore against the background of Franco-Habsburg rivalry. Its logic after the War for the Spanish Succession was counterbalancing France. The tragedy of the principle was that its frame of reference neglected the rise of other powers and, eventually, allowed the great powers to justify enhancing their position at the expense of minor powers.32 The main powers the balance of power focused on—France and Austria—were actually in decline. Austria had gained territory as a result from the war against the Ottomans of 1682–1697 and the War for the Spanish Succession. Thereafter, Austrian territory stabilised, while possession of dominions in Italy, the Low Countries, and the Rhineland prevented Vienna to build a consolidated state with the capacity to concentrate its power in case of war.33 By consequence the Habsburg could not hide to bide their time in any situation of conflict. In the 1740s, Austria even lost Silesia to Prussia. In the course of the eighteenth century, the Hohenzollern

  Black, 2002, p. 170.  In 1738 (Treaty of Vienna), the Polish King Stanislas Leszczynski, Louis XV’s father in law, was given the Duchy of Lorraine as compensation for Poland, while Habsburg gained Tuscany. Pursuant to the Treaty of Vienna, France would attain Lorraine on Leszczynski’s demise, which occured in 1766; Duchhardt, 1997, p. 129; Black, 2002, p. 181; Blanning, 2007, p. 566. 28   Silesia was lost to Prussia during the Silesian War (1740–1742). 29   The King of Britain by then also being Elector of Hanover. Duchhardt, 1997, p. 325. 30   16 January 1756, Convention of Westminster; CTS vol. 40, pp. 431–436. 31   1 May 1756, Treaty of Alliance between France and Austria; CTS vol. 41, pp. 1–44. Blanning, 2000, p. 200; Bély, 2005, pp. 373–374; Petitfils, 2005, p. 42. 32  Luard, 1992, p. 17 and p. 203; Schroeder, 1994, p. 44; Blanning, 2000, p. 179. 33   Shennan, 1995, p. 30 and p. 33; Black, 2002, p. 106. 26 27



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managed to expand their dominions until they dominated northern Germany. Meanwhile, Russia turned west and gradually expanded its territory. Throughout the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763),34 Britain was victorious in the colonial sphere thus dealing a heavy blow to French power.35 By consequence, Europe’s centre became vulnerable, while the flanks dominated.36 Moreover, one element of maintaining the balance came to be that the great powers were to be compensated for territorial gains of another and indemnified for support rendered to an ally.37 The secondary, intermediary powers paid the price for compensation. Although Western Europe was spared this fate for the time being because of the Franco-Austrian alliance and the Franco-Spanish Pacte de Famille, these developments dislocated the balance.38 France’s main inheritance from the Sun King was moderation. He had exhausted his country. Plans for hegemony and expansion were dropped.39 French claims at eighteenth-century peace conferences were modest. Next to Lorraine, hardly any territory was added to the Kingdom throughout the century. The French government’s primary aim was to maintain the status quo and to prevent the rise of another Europe-wide anti-French coalition.40 The 1756 alliance with Austria ruled out any (chances of) expansion altogether.41 To be sure, Louis XV obstructed official pro-Austrian policy by conducting a parallel diplomacy of his own in secret—the so-called ‘secret du roi.’ Initially the ‘secret’ was initiated in order to influence the election of a new King of Poland. The policy was continued after the election, however, and its end was widened—returning to traditional foreign policy—to protecting the German princes and restoring the alliance with Sweden, Poland, and the Ottoman Empire—the so-called ‘barrière de l’est’—to counterbalance Austria and, from then on, Russia in Eastern Europe.42   On the Seven Years’ War see e.g. Szabo, 2008.   Black, 2002, p. 158. 36   Schroeder, 1994, p. 46. 37  Luard, 1992, p. 201; Blanning, 2000, p. 185. 38   Bély, 2005, p. 360 and p. 373. 39   Belissa, 1995, pp. 120–121. 40   Murphy, 1982, p. 418; Schroeder, 1994, p. 47; Black, 1999, p. 4 and p. 158; Petitfils, 2005, p. 41. 41   Black, 2002, p. 181; Blanning, 2007, p. 574. 42  Deutsch, 1938, pp. 38–39; Luard, 1992, p. 259; Duchhardt, 1997, pp. 35–36 and p. 299; Black, 2002, p. 183; Bély, 2005, p. 371; Petitfils, 2005, pp. 42–43; Savage, 2007, p. 307. 34 35

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The Seven Years’ War turned out to be a watershed in European politics at least in three ways. In the first place, this war differed from previous eighteenth-century major conflicts in not being a war for succession to a throne. Reason of state and territorial ambitions had finally gained precedence over dynastic ones. In the second place, this war caused or at least uncovered a fundamental split in European politics between the west where France and Britain were engaged in maritime-colonial rivalry and the east where Austrian, Prussian, and Russian territorial ambitions collided.43 The 1756 Diplomatic Revolution had shifted the main theatres of rivalry from the centre to the flanks of the Continent. In the third place, France left the war virtually bankrupt and deprived of the best part of its colonial dominions in America and India. The Seven Years’ War started the financial and political crisis in French government that would paralyse French foreign policy in the 1780s,44 and would eventually end in the Revolution. Preserving the status quo and trying to counterbalance British and Russian power was all the French government could afford to do.45 The French foreign secretary, Charles Gravier Comte de Vergennes (1717–1787) perceived Britain and Russia as the main threats. They were to be contained. He continued Louis XV’s ‘secret,’ while emphasising the significance of the alliance with Austria to prevent any Continental commitments.46 Opposition to Vergennes’ foreign policy did rise, though. Men like Favier believed that British dominance of the peace could only be counterbalanced by French dominance of the Continent. Hence, France was to strengthen its alliances with Europe’s secondary powers and expand its territory into the Low Countries and the Rhineland or satellising the United Provinces.47 Therefore, they opposed the Austrian alliance that merely prevented France from keeping up with its rivals.48 Yet another faction favoured yielding to British power and making common cause with London to divide the globe.49

43   Hüffer, 1878, p. 31; Kennedy, 1988, p. 148; Luard, 1992, p. 84; Shennan, 1995, p. 35; Kagan, 2006, pp. 2–4; Blanning, 2007, p. 590. 44   Godechot, 1983, p. 56. 45   Belissa, 1995, pp. 122–123 and p. 129; Bély, 2005, p. 381; Petitfils, 2005, p. 44. 46   Belissa, 1995, p. 126; Blanning, 2007, p. 593; Savage, 2007, p. 308. 47   Belissa, 1995, p. 130. 48   Blanning, 2007, p. 593. 49   Belissa, 1995, p. 131.



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If Louis XVI and Vergennes pursued a pacifist policy in accordance with the philosophical spirit of their time it was mainly because France could not afford war. To be sure, the rebellion of American colonists against Westminster was an opportunity that was not to be missed,50 but French intervention in the War of American Independence (1773– 1784) turned out to be the fatal blow to French state finances. By consequence, another of Vergennes’ attempts to contain British influence failed, Paris having to look idle how Prussian forces crushed the Dutch Patriot Movement in 1787. France’s impotence on the international scene had become clear.51 Meanwhile, the eastern great powers kept enhancing their positions thus gaining strength compared to France.52 French weakness gave them a free hand to undermine the European order.53 To diminish tensions between them, they had aggrandised themselves at the expense of Poland in 1772.54 As Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire in 1774 and again in 1787, another traditional French ally in the east seemed to be next.55 2.2.  Europe between Nations and Cosmopolis In the century that European politics was determined by a mixture of dynastic interests and reason of state thinking,56 cosmopolitanism and pacifism reached their zenith in political and legal thought.57 Philosophical considerations on politics and law and critical appreciation of political practice not only resulted in domestic reform schemes, but also in particular and partly new views on international political and legal order.58 Enlightenment ‘philosophes’ attributed a moral dimension to international politics. Politics should have both an ethical basis and   Schama, 2000, p. 65; Blanning, 2007, p. 593.   Black, 1999, p. 151; Savage, 2007, p. 311. 52   Kaiser, 1990, p. 209; Black, 1999, p. 4; Dufraisse and Kerautret, 1999, p. 23. 53   Schroeder, 1994, p. 11; Bély, 2005, p. 380. 54   Poland would entirely be partitioned between Russia, Prussia, and Austria in two additional phases in 1793 and 1795. Godechot, 1983, p. 56; Schroeder, 1994, pp. 18–19; Duchhardt, 1997, pp. 341–342; Grewe, 2000, p. 340; Steiger, 2001, p. 187. 55   The second Russian-Turkish War was ended in 1792. Schroeder, 1994, p. 51; Shennan, 1995, p. 67; Blanning, 2007, p. 592. 56  Nussbaum, 1947, p. 126; Armstrong, 1993, p. 37; Grewe, 2000, p. 367; Bobbitt, 2003, p. 522. 57   Bois, 2005, p. 55. 58   Bély, 2005, p. 396. 50 51

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an ethical purpose contributing to the pursuit of happiness.59 Hence, enlightened ‘philosophes’ like Mably emphasised the importance of openness, good faith, and fairness.60 As Marc Belissa has shown, two opposing appreciations of diplomacy went along with this basic attitude. On the one hand, diplomatic practice was criticized for serving the private interests of princes, for its secrecy and Machiavellianism, for the fetishist preoccupation with irrational rituals and forms, for the lying and manipulative conduct of diplomats.61 On the other hand, there were those who regarded diplomacy as a means to enhance the sociability of mankind and to preserve peace.62 Enlightenment humanism especially provoked a pacifist spirit in eighteenth-century thought. After the devastating wars of the seventeenth century, scholars took a great interest either in preventing war or in mitigating its effects.63 Europe’s princes and their power politics were blamed for an endless sequence of war and violence. Clearly, the current order was not able to keep men from the atrocities of war.64 While British thinkers held on to the balance of power as an instrument of stability and a guarantee against the despotism of universal monarchy,65 the principle was fiercely criticized especially in France. This might be due to the fact that the idea of a balance of power, although caught in general terms, was originally directed against France.66 Instead of preserving peace, the balance of power was reproached for causing rivalry.67 Enlightenment belief in progress led to the idea that mankind was developing towards perpetual peace.68 The solution lay either in reorganising the political order or in changing politicians’ ambitions and attitudes.69 Plans for a federative international system from St. Pierre to Kant had an enduring and universal peace as their main goal. ­Eighteenth-century ‘philosophes’ did not only point to the role of 59  Nussbaum, 1947, p. 129; Kaiser, 1990, p. 204; Hazard, 1993, p. 174; Belissa, 1995, p. 7. 60   Belissa, 1999b, pp. 314–315; Belissa, 2004, p. 244 and p. 248. 61   Belissa, 1995, pp. 141–142; Belissa, 1999b, pp. 300–307; Bély, 2005, p. 396. 62   Belissa, 1999b, pp. 291–293, p. 300 and p. 316. 63  Nys, 1896, pp. 327–344; Schlereth, 1977, p. 117. 64   Mably, 1757, p. 45 and p. 60 and Belissa’s introduction thereto, pp. 18–19; Schlereth, 1977, p. 113. 65   Belissa, 1995, pp. 85–86. 66   Watson, 1992, p. 200. 67  Introduction to Mably (1757) by Belissa, p. 23. 68   Onuf and Onuf, 1993, p. 93. 69   Belissa, 1998, pp. 215–217.



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the law of nations or the importance of some kind of international organisation,70 but also to the role of commerce. Commercial relations and free trade were said to further stability and peace since they enhanced the knowledge of foreign people and cultures and rendered war more disruptive.71 Furthermore, representative government was thought to contribute to peace since republics were said to be innately peaceful.72 On a more fundamental level, Hobbes’ proposition that war was the natural status and peace only an exception thereto was rejected and reverted.73 War as such was not outlawed, but the idea of a ‘just’ war was fully revived. War was only to be fought in individual or collective self-defence or in defence of ‘un droit juste.’74 This sense of pacifism was to be prominent, at least in public statements due to its rhetorical value, during the entire Revolutionary era. The Enlightenment’s criticism of absolutism had an international dimension as well. The ‘nation’ or ‘people’ as reference to an alternative basis of legitimacy was central both to political thought and to reactions against royal power in practice.75 The nation’s liberty was set against the ‘droit divin.’76 Liberty meant the recognition of the individual’s natural rights and popular sovereignty, the latter either being a guarantee to the former or the quintessence of freedom depending on whether a liberal-individualist or a republican interpretation of the nation dominated.77 At the start of the eighteenth century, international politics and foreign policy were still the exclusive domain of Europe’s princes and their ministers to such an extent that the European order was a ‘society of princes’ rather than an ‘international’ order.78 The Enlightenment questioned this role and position of royal government, too.79

  Eyffinger, 1991, p. 108; Hazard, 1993, p. 184.   Rudy, 1975, p. 49; Schlereth, 1977, pp. 102–103; Onuf and Onuf, 1993, p. 93; Belissa, 1995, pp. 61–62; Pangle and Ahrensdorf, 1999, p. 159. 72   Schlereth, 1977, p. 116; Belissa, 1995, p. 142. 73   Belissa, 1998, p. 215. 74   Proposal by Volney for an amendment to the project for a (French) Constitution, May 1790. 75   Schama, 2000, p. 272; Englund, 2004, p. 71. 76  Laurent, 1867, p. 490. 77  Laurent, 1867, p. 57, pp. 482–483 and p. 502; Lousse, 1951, p. 24; Palmer, 1959, p. 448. 78  Introduction to Mably (1757) by Belissa, p. 24; Belissa, 1995, p. 89; Duchhardt, 2001, p. 188; Osiander, 2003, p. 109; Bély, 2005, p. 386. 79  Duchhardt, 2001, p. 188. 70 71

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In the first place, from a constitutional point of view, John Locke (1632–1704) introduced the ‘federative power,’ that is, the power to decide on matters of foreign affairs in constitutional discourse.80 At the time, this power virtually everywhere accrued to the monarch without any constitutional checks. According to Enlightenment political thought, this power on the one hand had to be subjected to reason and natural law and on the other hand had to be embedded in a system of checks and balances or to be brought under the nation’s (or its representatives’) control in order to prevent it being used despotically.81 By consequence, for instance, territory was not to be ceded without the consent of its population.82 In the second place, the ‘private sphere of princes’ was opposed to the ‘public sphere of nations.’83 The patrimonial character of international politics and the connected exclusion of the populations was said to prevent the creation of a truly public sphere of the ‘société civile des nations.’84 By replacing the prince by the nation as actor at the European level and subject of the law of nations, the international order was to be changed from ‘l’Europe des rois’ into ‘l’Europe des nations.’85 Hence, the nation instead of the prince was to maintain diplomatic relations, wage war, and conclude treaties.86 To the most radical defenders of this transfer, the nation as the political community of citizens even was the sole legitimate member of the international order,87 and the popular will the sole source of both civil and international law.88 Within this society, nations were ideally equal. The autonomy and consequent equality of every sovereign power had been recognised in theory since the Peaces of Westphalia and Utrecht as the basis of the ‘droit public de l’Europe.’89 Nevertheless, diplomatic practice still abounded with remnants of hierarchical thinking,

 Locke, 1689, pp. 188–190.   Belissa, 1995, pp. 109–110, pp. 115–117, p. 119 and p. 144; Belissa, 1998, p. 232. 82   Palmer, 1964, p. 59. 83   Belissa, 1995, p. 91. 84  Introduction to Mably (1757) by Belissa, p. 19; Belissa, 1995, p. 90. 85   Mirkine-Guetzevitch, 1928, p. 308; Bély, 2005, p. 399. 86   Englund, 2004, p. 71. 87   Godechot, 1983, p. 67; Blanning, 2000, p. 252; Fetscher, 2006, p. 574. 88   Rao, 1994, p. 267; Schroeder, 1994, p. 71. 89   Kooijmans, 1964, p. 71; Belissa, 1995, p. 95; Osiander, 2003, p. 77, p. 114 and pp. 120–121; Krisch, 2005, p. 377. 80 81



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e.g. ceremonial precedence and guarantees.90 Hierarchy was at the core of every ancien régime society and this kept influencing international relations as well.91 Despite the rise of the ‘nation’ as a core concept in political discourse, enlightened political thought was essentially cosmopolitan. In the first place, despite Montesquieu’s stress on the need to adapt the frame of government to ‘l’esprit des lois,’ enlightened ideas on the organisation of state and society were thought to be universal.92 They could and should be applied everywhere. Thereto, the state was not seen as the alpha et omega of political, economic and social organisation. It was merely perceived as a man-made, rather arbitrary though necessary intermediate point on the continuum between man and mankind. Not the state, but the individual was the cornerstone of the political and social order.93 State and nation were one and the same. The nation or state as the political community of free citizens resulted from the rational and voluntary choice of individuals to leave the state of nature by concluding a social contract.94 Hence, the state or nation was defined in rational, voluntarist, and political terms. The nation appeared on the political scene to question royal power not to divide the world territorially among ethnic or historically grown communities, to ensure individual natural rights not to define and impose a national identity.95 The nation sustained popular sovereignty and thus the collectively exercised individual’s right of political and social selfdetermination.96 Beyond the guarantee of happiness, freedom, and liberties, there was no reason why there should be a special allegiance of man to his state. Men like Voltaire (1694–1778) and Lessing (1729–1781) condemned chauvinism as irrational and ‘a prejudice of ignorant and uncivilized men.’97 Rationalism thus ruled out particularistic sentiments. The state was to be tolerated, not to be admired. Seen from the   Armstrong, 1993, p. 33; Belissa, 1995, p. 96.   Osiander, 2003, p. 82. 92   Geyl, 1965, p. 11; Schlereth, 1977, p. xii; Onuf and Onuf, 1993, p. 2; Koskenniemi, comment on Paulus, 2003, p. 9. 93   Schlereth, 1977, pp. 104–105. 94   Mirkine-Guetzevitch, 1928, pp. 311–312; Redslob, 1974, p. 295. 95   Schlereth, 1977, p. 109; Schama, 1989, p. 30; Belissa, 1995, p. 50; Heuser, 2001, p. 198. 96   Heuser, 2001, p. 198. On the French Revolution and national self-determination see Keitner, 2000 and 2007. 97   Schlereth, 1977, p. xi and 107. [his translation] 90 91

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international level this meant that the world was not fundamentally divided in states or between a national and an international sphere. Mankind still formed one single society. To be sure, the references to a Christian community of believers had lost prominence because of the discovery of the Americas, the Reformation and the Religious Wars, but ‘Europe’ and ‘mankind’—the ‘societas humana’ or ‘société du genre humain’—had taken its place.98 Voltaire spoke of ‘une espèce de grande république,’99 Christian Wolff (1679–1754) expressed the notion in his concept of civitas maxima, and Vattel, too, spoke of the universal society of mankind instituted by nature.100 This cosmopolitanism implied that the happiness of each nation was connected to that of others.101 The Enlightenment ‘philosophes’ still saw ‘Europe’ as a transcendental, universal political and legal order above and among the coexisting nations or states.102 Above all, each member of that order was, to a certain extent, responsible for the enforcement of the law of nations, even if he was not involved. International politics, while creating international public law through treaties, had to take the general good as leading principle and natural law as a frame of reference. There was to be some kind of solidarity at the level of the entire human race: ‘une fraternité universelle.’103 Strikingly, this attitude was at its high tide throughout the reign of Louis XV and Louis XVI and during the American Revolution, i.e. prior to the French Revolution. It was, nonetheless, still very influential throughout the first years of the Revolutionary period. The rational notion of state and nation as a political community guaranteeing individuals the exercise of their natural rights did not exclude or oppose a cosmopolitan view to Europe or the world.104 Eighteenth-century nationalism was state patriotism, a political virtue connected to respect for a country’s laws and an orientation to the

  98   Barraclough, 1963, p. 35; Schlereth, 1977, p. xii; Belissa, 1995, p. 7 and p. 21; Grewe, 2000, p. 287.   99   Watson, 1992, p. 206. 100  Vattel, 1758, pp. 7–8; Watson, 1992, p. 207; Onuf and Onuf, 1993, p. 4. 101   Belissa, 1995, p. 137. 102   Osiander, 2003, pp. 110–111. 103   Belissa, 1995, p. 132. 104   Belissa, 1995, p. 15; Heuser, 2001, p. 198; Belissa and Leclercq, 2001, p. 203; Van Sas, 2004, p. 126.



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general interest.105 Enlightenment thought was inclined to consider an individual primarily as man. Hence, patriotism was subordinated to one’s obligations to humanity and universal moral values. The allegiance between the citizens of one state did not totally substitute or even exclude the natural allegiance between men; nor did the positive law of one state substitute or exclude the universal morality of man’s nature.106 Rousseau opposed this view. He abandoned cosmopolitanism, turning patriotism into an autonomous value and demanded exclusive loyalty of the citizen to his country, claiming that the best way to preserve freedom and peace was to leave every people as isolated as possible. Society had corrupted man and introduced war. The best way to prevent war was for nations to exist as isolated as possible.107 His was a minority position among the ‘philosophes,’ though.108 Nonetheless, patriotism was on the rise in the second half of the eighteenth century at the expense of purely cosmopolitan views.109 It formed the core of a political movement—Patriotism—that, as Robert Palmer has argued, became an Atlantic democratic one.110 Indeed, Patriots were to be found all over Europe and in (former) British colonies on the American east coast. This did not mean that all Patriots thought alike. Patriotism actually was an amalgam of nationally coloured opposition movements that shared the rhetoric of popular sovereignty and natural rights.111 Each national group of Patriots transmitted universal enlightened ideas to its country’s contexts in a different way.112 Thereto, Patriot movements shared the same positive aim that nevertheless was to undermine a purely cosmopolitan spirit: national regeneration.113 Regeneration amounted to the rebirth of the nation once it would be saved from prejudice, privilege, and despotism. In the French and Dutch cases this meant that ancient greatness and affluence was to be restored by vesting popular sovereignty and political reform. Regeneration would either spontaneously result from

  Schlereth, 1977, p. 109; Hobsbawm, 1994, pp. 107–131; Belissa, 1995, p. 52.   Belissa, 1995, p. 51 and p. 61. 107   Knutsen, 1997, pp. 130–137; Boucher, 1998, p. 262. 108   Redslob, 1912, pp. 26–27; Belissa, 1995, p. 56 and p. 61. 109   Belissa, 1995, p. 54. 110   Palmer, 1959, p. 4. 111   Blanning, 1996, p. 170. 112  Van Sas, 2002, p. 13 and p. 134. 113   Schama, 1989, p. 26. 105 106

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regaining liberty—perceived as a ‘youth elixir’, as Schama put it114—or brought about by a process of political and social reform.115 The discourse of regeneration was an ambiguous mixture of backward- and forward-looking switching from restoration of ancient democratic practices to reform based on ‘new’ ideas. Enlightenment’s rationalism, repudiation of traditions, and believe in the capacity of the human will to bring about change, at least, opened the door to radical reform.116 The universal society of mankind was to be a legal order.117 Views on how that legal order was to be structured differed, though. A moral dualism between men and sovereigns, between the national and international sphere was repudiated.118 Most Enlightenment ‘philosophes’ did adhere to the idea of a transcendent law ruling the conduct of states in an international arena, that is, to the rule of law at the international level;119 although at the same time the idea of an international law, the term being introduced in English by Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832),120 came to the fore. Emphasis was laid on the role of treaties in creating a legal and public order in Europe. The Treaties of Münster (1648), Osna­brück (1648), Ryswijck (1697), Utrecht (1713), Rastatt (1714), and Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) might have been ‘private’ agreements between rulers, but they were deemed to create public law, a ‘droit public de l’Europe.’121 As such they were or were to be the juridical base for a more civilised society of nations. Abraham de Wicquefort (1606–1682) had already referred to treaties as ‘the digest of terms under which states were willing, or forced, to coexist.’122 By concluding treaties a legal bond was created between states directed by good faith from which a ‘public sphere of reciprocity’ derived.123 The great peace treaties had codified general principles of the states system, functioned as precedents and inspiration for future treaties. They were seen as being part of a cumulative process of law making by which Europe would   Schama, 1989, p. 11.   Baker, 2006, p. 654. 116  Vinogradoff, 1923, p. 64; Hall, 2001, p. 273; Hunt, 2003, pp. 8–9. 117  Nys, 1896, pp. 327–344. 118   Belissa, 1995, p. 41. 119  Duchhardt, 1976, p. 26; Belissa, 1995, p. 132; Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 88; Rabkin, 2007, pp. 71–73. 120   Bentham, 1781, p. 326; See e.g. Belissa, 1995, p. 38. 121  Introduction to Mably (1757) by Belissa, pp. 28–29; Belissa, 1995, p. 92; Grewe, 2000, p. 28. 122   Keens-Soper, 2001, p. 92. [his translation] 123   Belissa, 1995, p. 93; Belissa, 1999b, pp. 311–312; Belissa, 2004, p. 244. 114 115



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in the end leave the Hobbesian state of nature. Gabriel de Mably even spoke of a ‘constitution de l’Europe.’124 In a way, this evolution was recognised in diplomatic practice through the customary renewal of previous treaties in a new peace treaty.125 In the seventeenth century the existence of a positive law of nations had been denied e.g. by Thomas Hobbes and Samuel von Pufendorf. The former denied the character of positive law to any rules not deriving from a sovereign’s command; the latter attempted to link the law of nations to a natural law based on divine will in order to establish a legal order beyond the will of sovereign princes.126 Two countermovements opposed this denial of a positive law of nations. The first line redefined the state of nature in a more benign, not innately bellicose status. Scholars in the tradition of Grotius and Locke advocated the existence of a positive law of nations grounded in the natural sociability of man despite the existence of independent political entities.127 In spite of a great variety of disagreements on detail, they all agreed that the international order consisted of independent states and that interstate relations were governed by positive law originating from the will of states but, most of the times, based in natural law.128 The most influential statement of this line of thought from the second half of the eighteenth century was Vattel’s Droit des gens (1758). Vattel’s world is a non-hierarchical one of co-existing sovereign states.129 He transferred the natural ‘freedom and independence’ of the individual to the state.130 Like Hobbes he portrayed states as individuals in a state of nature.131 He repudiated Hobbes’ image of the state of nature as a state of war, though. A world of sovereign states could be an ordered one because interstate relations are subordinated to natural law compelling states to respect each other’s rights and to uphold their promises.132 The law of nations is a positive-voluntarist law, but it is based in

  Belissa, 1995, p. 86 and p. 93; Belissa, 1999b, pp. 308–309.  Lesaffer, 1999, pp. 424–426; Belissa, 2004, p. 242 and p. 252. 126   Jouannet, 1998, pp. 39–53. On natural law theories in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see also Haakonssen, 1996, pp. 15–62. 127   Rudy, 1975, p. 42; Jouannet, 1998, p. 58. 128   Belissa, 1995, p. 48; Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 78; Koskenniemi, 2006, p. 6. 129   Jouannet, 1998, p. 9. 130  Vattel, 1758, p. 2 [Preliminaires § 4]; Rudy, 1975, p. 78 and p. 81; Monière, 1992, p. 23; Allott, 2002, p. 390. 131   Rudy, 1975, p. 77; Belissa, 1995, p. 30. 132   Onuf and Onuf, 1993, p. 16; Knutsen, 1997, p. 120; Rabkin, 2007, p. 81. 124 125

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natural law that assures the coherence of the legal order.133 Natural law suffices to provide for order, for international order resulted from a natural tendency to order.134 Vattel repudiated Wolff’s civitas maxima or other notions of a political community encompassing sovereign states.135 In his view, states could not nor needed to surpass the state of nature by entering into an interstate social contract.136 The second line of thought counteracting the denial of a positive international legal order disagreed with Vattel on this latter point. Instead of redefining the state of nature in a non-Hobbesian way, this line was at its core Hobbesian in the sense that states should leave the state of nature in order to establish a legal order. Contrary to Hobbes,137 authors of this line of thought did think a social contract between states feasible. Rousseau, for instance, argued that a law of nations would not be possible but in a federative order of free peoples.138 He rejected a law of nations based in natural law because of his vision of the state of nature and the denial of man’s natural sociability.139 Hence, according to this line of thought there was no real law of nations yet.140 According to Voltaire the international legal order did not exist yet, but would be reached as one of the results of the process of enlightenment.141 Kant also saw perpetual peace as a benign state that was to be reached in the fullness of time through enlightenment. His 1795 pamphlet Zum ewigen Frieden is deliberately called Towards Perpetual Peace and not On Perpetual Peace.142 Basically, in the eighteenth century the Hobbesian argument was taken beyond Hobbes. The nations or states of Europe would eventually feel the need to join together to secure their security and self-preservation, just as individuals had done through the social contract.143 All kinds of plans for perpetual peace,

  Jouannet, 1998, p. 34.   Onuf and Onuf, 1993, p. 4. 135   Rudy, 1975, p. 73; Belissa, 1995, p. 32. 136   Pangle and Ahrensdorf, 1999, p. 179. 137   Tuck, 2001, p. 140. 138   Belissa, 1995, p. 48. 139   Belissa, 1995, p. 34. 140   Schlereth, 1977, pp. 119–120. 141   Schlereth, 1977, pp. 116–117. 142   Kant, 1795; Belissa & Gauthier, 1999, p. 497. 143   Hodé, 1921, pp. 100–102; Bogaert, 1982, p. 38; Truyol y Serra, 1995, p. 93; Cartou, 1996, p. 33. 133 134



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that is, an enduring peaceful order in Europe were devised.144 The balance of power system was to be replaced by a federative order with mechanisms for peaceful dispute settlement by means of arbitration. Most schemes also provided for a federal assembly.145 However, the intensity of the cooperation between the nations in most plans was way less than that between the citizens of a state. Europe’s powers were to join together in order to maintain peace. They were not to form a federal state, though.146 Throughout the seventeenth century, schemes for a European federation were already to be found in the works of Maximilien de Sully (1560–1641),147 Emeric Crucé (1590–1648),148 and William Penn (1644–1718).149 Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) proposed to turn Europe into a federation in the image of the Holy Roman Empire.150 François de Fénelon (1651–1715), too, stressed the benefits of arbitration and need for states to form a federation.151 Charles Irénée Castel, abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658–1743), who had been a member of the French delegation to the Utrecht peace congress, revived Sully’s scheme in his Projet de traité pour rendre la paix perpétuelle entre les souverains chrétiens (1713). St. Pierre proposed a permanent alliance between the sovereigns headed by a European Senate that would decide based on a majority principle. Every sovereign would be subordinated to the Senate’s decisions and sovereigns would act collectively against all violations of the contract between them.152 Rousseau was asked by St. Pierre’s family to edit the Projet. In the 1761 Extrait du

144  Nussbaum, 1947, pp. 94–95 and pp. 140–141; Barraclough, 1963, p. 27; Belissa, 1995, pp. 42–48. 145   Barraclough, 1963, p. 29; Rudy, 1975, p. 48; Belissa, 1995, p. 132; Introduction to Mably (1757) by Belissa, p. 22; Grewe, 2000, p. 365; Rabkin, 2007, p. 86. 146   Belissa, 1995, p. 224. 147   Mémoires des sages et royales oeconomies d’estat domestiques, politiques et militaires de Henri le Grand (1638). Sully proposed to divide Europe in fifteen states of about equal size with a suprastate Conseil très Chrétien composed of representatives of the fifteen princes and charged with dispute settlement by means of arbitration. The Council would have the disposal of a European army. Hodé, 1921, pp. 73–77; Bogaert, 1982, p. 38; Cartou, 1996, p. 33. 148   Le nouveau Cynée (1623). Hodé, 1921, pp. 79–82; Cartou, 1996, p. 32. 149   Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe (1693). Hodé, 1921, pp. 100–102; Bogaert, 1982, p. 38; Truyol y Serra, 1995, p. 93; Cartou, 1996, p. 33. 150   Rudy, 1975, p. 31; Cartou, 1996, p. 33; Rabkin, 2007, p. 84. 151   Hodé, 1921, p. 90; Belissa, 1995, p. 85. 152   Hodé, 1921, pp. 105–123; Bogaert, 1982, p. 38; Belissa, 1995, pp. 42–48; Truyol y Serra, 1995, p. 93; Cartou, 1996, pp. 33–34; Knutsen, 1997, p. 129; Boucher, 1998, p. 301; Tuck, 2001, p. 141; Brown, Nardin, and Rengger, 2007, pp. 394–398.

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projet de paix perpétuelle de M. l’abbé de Saint-Pierre153 he copied St. Pierre’s scheme, but he did claim, too, that Europe’s sovereign princes were too selfish and short-sighted to see the benefit of establishing a federation until a devastating war would force them to.154 Rousseau’s scepticism did not stop Bentham and Kant from advocating a European federation once more. Bentham urged France and Britain to take the lead in vesting a court of arbitration and codifying the law of nations.155 Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden156 closed the series of schemes for a federative order. It appeared as the Revolutionary Wars were already well on their way. In his view, one of the preconditions of perpetual peace was that all states should be republican, that is, should be ruled by representative governments for unlike princes nations were peace loving by nature the ones deciding on war not being able to pass on the costs of war to others.157 Kant copied the Hobbesian image of the state of nature, but claimed that nations would also decide to leave the state of nature by a social contract eventually recognising this to be the sole way to vest enduring peace and a real legal order.158 The federation was not to be a unitary order, though, but a federation of free nations, since a unitary order would pose too great a threat to liberty.159 By the time Kant wrote his pamphlet, an attempt to bring the federal vision into practice had already been made across the Atlantic Ocean. American federalists criticized the Vattelian image of an order of independent states and his proposition that order would evolve spontaneously.160 The transformation of the America of the Articles of Confederation (1781) into ‘a more perfect union’ was inspired by previous schemes for a federative order.161 The American states were to form an improved and more institutionalised version of the European states system.162 Thus, according to Peter and Nicholas Onuf, the tradition of   Hodé, 1921, pp. 125–132; Bogaert, 1982, p. 39.   Redslob, 1974, pp. 292–295; Boucher, 1998, p. 302; Pangle and Ahrensdorf, 1999, pp. 188–189. 155   Hodé, 1921, pp. 141–142; Bogaert, 1982, p. 39. 156   Kant, 1795. 157  Laurent, 1869, p. 76. 158   Pangle and Ahrensdorf, 1999, p. 5 and p. 198; Tuck, 2001, p. 215 and p. 218. 159   Hodé, 1921, p. 162; Boucher, 1998, p. 278; Pangle and Ahrensdorf, 1999, p. 200. 160   Onuf and Onuf, 1993, p. 96, p. 124, p. 129 and p. 138. 161   Onuf and Onuf, 1993, p. 95 and pp. 125–126. 162   Onuf and Onuf, 1993, p. 113. 153 154



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schemes for perpetual peace culminated in the American Constitution that established a real legal order between the American states.163 In Europe, the American example provoked a debate on whether a federation could also be the basis for a new European order.164 These two lines in political and legal thought diverged on the nature of the European legal order; the main point of difference being the possibility of positive law of nations in an order of independent states. If the Revolutionary era is a period of transformation in the history of the law of nations, it most definitely is a passage from natural law predominance to the reign of positivism.165 Throughout the eighteenth century the existence of natural law had been virtually unquestioned by mainstream political and legal thought. Positivism considering law as man-made and voluntary had been on the rise for several decades, though.166 The introduction of the nominator ‘international law’ by Jeremy Bentham in 1789, according to Belissa, indicates the transition from a transcendent law of humanity to a law among nations or states. Exactly during the Revolutionary era positivism was to outshine natural law, but not after the two had clashed once again in public and academic debate.167 On the one side, Revolutionaries based their concept of the law of nations on enlightened belief in (natural) law to establish and preserve peaceful relations. Profiting from the momentum created by the Revolution, they wanted to force a total break with the past and introduce a genuine law of nations based on natural law.168 On the other side, the right wing in French politics supported by Counter-revolutionary publicists elsewhere in Europe argued that the Revolution had destroyed the old ‘droit public de l’Europe’ and created a lawless situated in which power reigned.169 The Revolutionaries’ natural law references were put aside as mere sophisms to justify dominance and France forcing its views on the rest of Europe. Kant’s   Onuf and Onuf, 1993, pp. 135–136.   Schlereth, 1977, p. 123; Pangle and Ahrensdorf, 1999, pp. 200–201. 165   Belissa, 2006, pp. 371–388. 166  Nys, 1896, p. 343; Onuf and Onuf, 1993, p. 2; Belissa, 1995, p. 37. For a general overview of natural law and positive law in eighteenth-century legal doctrine, see Grewe, 2000, pp. 349–360. It has to be noted here, that positivism did not exclude the notion of divine law. John Austin, for instance, still divided between human law and divine law. In his case, divine law originated from God’s commands, though. (Austin, 1832, pp. 10–11). 167   Belissa, 2006, pp. 371–388. 168   Belissa, 2006, p. 373; Belissa, 2007, p. 44. 169  Lentz, 2005c, p. 453. 163 164

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project for a ­perpetual peace shared the fate of natural law and was fiercely criticized e.g. by Friedrich von Gentz. Exactly because natural law was identified with the Revolution, conservative publicists like Georg Friedrich von Martens170 stressed the role of positive law, a kind of law that gradually developed based on the consent of nations through contractual forms. ‘Les publicistes conservateurs comme Martens se débarrassent des fondements jusnaturalistes du droit entre les nations et défendent une conception exclusivement positive de la régulation internationale.’171 During the Consulate, as Bonaparte initiated the return of France into the ‘famille européenne,’172 the French government thought it necessary to stress its respect for the ‘droit public’ and natural law disappeared to the background. 2.3  Meanwhile in Paris As the French Revolution started in 1787 hardly anyone in Europe paid attention to it. Prussian intervention had just made an end to the political power of the Patriot regime in the United Provinces. France having to refrain from any military commitment due to the government’s financial situation had prevented the conflict from developing into major war.173 The situation made it painfully clear that France was no longer able to play the international role expected from a great power.174 Nothing significant seemed about to happen in the West.175 Instead, all eyes were directed to the East,176 where Russia had declared war on the Ottoman Empire—thus starting the period of system disrupting wars referred to as ‘the Revolutionary Wars’177—and where great power politics was manifested in partitioning Poland.178 Thereto, there was a lot of political unrest all over Europe due to agitation by Patriot opposition and reform movements.179

170   For the ideas on international law and European order of Georg Friedrich von Martens, see also Koskenniemi, 2006 and Van Blom, 2008. 171   Belissa, 2006, p. 420; see also Nussbaum, 1947, p. 223. 172   Belissa, 2006, p. 387. 173   Murphy, 1982, p. 472; Schama, 1989, p. 166; Schama, 2000, p. 263; Blanning, 2007, p. 613. 174   Potiemkine, 1946, p. 317. 175   Kennedy, 1988, pp. 155–156. 176   Potiemkine, 1946, p. 317. 177   Schroeder, 1994, p. 23. 178   Blanning, 1996, p. 42; Kagan, 2006, p. 5; Blanning, 2007, p. 616. 179   Palmer, 1964, p. 4.



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In the West, France had not recovered from the long sequence of eighteenth-century wars. The War for the Austrian Succession (1740– 1748) and the Seven Years’ War had thrown the Crown into a huge financial crisis that even deteriorated by the intervention on behalf of the American rebels. The need to finance the war effort had left the French government with a deficit that large its annual income hardly sufficed to pay the interest.180 In this moment of weakness, the nobility grasped its chance to end royal absolutism and reclaim what it conceived as its traditional and just role in governing the Kingdom. With the ‘Parlements’ as bulwarks of resistance, the conservative nobility succeeded in frustrating the government’s reform plans.181 The combination of a financial crisis with a political one soon forced the government to yield to the call for the États généraux.182 Revolutionaries inherited this financial crisis from the royal government. By consequence, the French government was and would be in constant and dire need of money, despite the regime in place. Kingdom

–1792

  King Louis XVI   États généraux

1774–1792 1789

  Assemblée nationale

1789–1791

  Constitution 1791   Assemblée legislative

1791–1792

First Republic

1792–1804

  Convention nationale   Comité de Salut public

1792–1795 1793–1794

  Constitution 1795  Directoire, Conseil des 500,   Conseil des Anciens

1795–1799

  Constitution 1799   Consulat, Sénat, Tribunat,   Corps législatif

1799–1804

180  Literature on the causes of the French Revolution is almost indefinite. For the role of the financial crisis and the political crisis caused by it, see e.g. Schama, 2000; Ertman, 1999, pp. 139–153. 181   Ertman, 1999, p. 142 and p. 150; Schama, 2000, p. 265 and p. 270. 182   Schama, 2000, pp. 78–79.

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The convocation of the États généraux created a political momentum for various political factions and ideological groups to push for reform.183 In order to force a breakthrough, pro-reform members formed the Assemblée nationale on 17 June 1789 that adopted the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen on 26 August and set itself the task of making a constitution. After the minor incident of 14 July the government lost control of Paris, while at the same time unrest broke out in large parts of the countryside peasants being driven by fear of vagabonds and noble conspiracies (the so-called ‘Great Fear’). By then, the French Revolution had evolved in a tumultuous political situation beyond anyone’s control causing the Revolution’s course being essentially determined by circumstances.184 At first, Revolutionaries were primarily concerned with internal affairs.185 They tried to realise a set of reforms concerning both government and society aiming at the ‘régénération de la France.’ To be sure, this regeneration would restore France’s international and military standing and capacity, too.186 At the same time the developments in Paris did not arouse the various courts of Europe yet.187 In London Louis XVI was the laughing stock of the more conservative elements in British politics: that is what you get from helping rebels in the colonies.188 Moreover, French Revolutionaries at first were pro-British, taking the British constitution as one of their main examples, while the Revolution had many sympathisers among more liberal elements in England. The other great powers—Russia, Prussia and Austria—were totally involved in their affairs in Eastern Europe: waging war against the Ottoman Empire and/or partitioning Poland. Moreover, Revolutionary France was initially heading in the direction of reforms the Emperor had been an advocate of himself189 and Austria would soon be troubled by a revolt in Belgium.190 Moreover, the domestic crisis was expected to weaken France even more thus preventing it from posing any threat or taking an active part in international politics.191

  Ertman, 1999, p. 139; Schama, 2000, p. 96 and p. 132.   Sutherland, pp. 14–15. 185   Godechot, 1983, pp. 61–63; Belissa, 1995, pp. 166–167; Blanning, 1997, p. 47. 186   Broers, 1996, p. 13. 187   Mansel, 1999, p. 2; Kagan, 2006, p. 5. 188  Laurent, 1869, p. 10. 189   Blanning, 2000, p. 49; Kagan, 2006, p. 7. 190   Schroeder, 1994, p. 61. 191  Luard, 1992, p. 90; Broers, 1996, p. 13; Kagan, 2006, p. 4. 183 184



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The French Revolutionaries were gradually forced to form an opinion on foreign policy and the European order as well.192 The announcement of a Spanish request for aid to the King of France in the Anglo-Spanish conflict over the Nootka Soond193 provoked a debate in the Assemblée nationale on the ius ad bellum.194 This first effort towards writing an international chapter to the Revolutionary handbook was still premised on internal political concerns. The King’s monopoly on matters of war and peace, or foreign policy in general was to be broken in order to transfer control over these matters to the Assemblée.195 Limiting the court’s influence on foreign policy was inspired both by ideology and by practical policy reasons. In the first place, the Assemblée reasoned on the basis of the alleged bellicosity of kings. The Assemblée was to preserve peace in the current crisis because the King could not be trusted to do so.196 More in general, constitutional guarantees were to be designed to make foreign policy serve the nation’s interests in the future.197 From a practical point of view the ‘pro-Austrian clique’ at court was to be eliminated. French Patriots opposed the 1756 alliance because they blamed it for France’s failure to keep up with the other great powers.198 In the course of the debate on the constitution the Assemblée adopted the famous 22 May 1790 decree that has later been christened ‘declaration of peace to the world.’199 In the first place, the Assemblée declared that the King needed its approval to declare war and that the Assemblée was to ratify treaties, since declaring war and concluding treaties were acts of sovereignty. In the second place, the Assemblée renounced war for the sake of conquest thus establishing just war and

  See e.g. Chastain Howe, pp. 367–368.   Spain still claimed exclusive right to the American west coast up to where the Russian claim started. The Nootka Soond is situated west of Vancouver Island. In May 1789, Spanish men-of-war captured a British vessel involved in fur trade there. This incident caused a threat of war between Spain and Britain resulting in a Spanish request for aid to its French ally. Schroeder, 1994, p. 70; Blanning, 2007, p. 616. 194   Belissa, 1995, p. 180. 195   Belissa, 1995, p. 179; Black, 2002, p. 38; Blanning, 2007, p. 617. 196   Godechot, 1983, p. 65. 197   Belissa, 1995, p. 213. 198   Potiemkine, 1946, pp. 310–312; Schama, 2000, pp. 593–594; Belissa, 2007, p. 48; Blanning, 2007, p. 587; Savage, 2007, p. 311, p. 316 and p. 321. 199  Laurent, 1869, p. 80; Nys, 1896, p. 362; Godechot, 1964, pp. 119–121; Godechot, 1983, p. 66; Belissa, 1995, p. 183 and p. 192; Black, 1999, p. 155 and p. 158; Dwyer and McPhee, 2002, pp. 60–61. 192 193

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self-defence as the basis of the ius ad bellum.200 It has been argued in historiography that this decree outlawed war201 and conquest as title to sovereignty.202 These interpretations of the 22 May decree miss the point. The decree clearly manifested pacifist intentions. However, the Assemblée declared one intention for war, not war itself illegal; nor did the Assembée rule out conquest through a just war.203 Basically, the Revolutionary Assemblée continued Vergennes’ peace-oriented policy realizing that France due to its current weakness had everything to gain from preserving peace.204 To be sure, the Revolution should be spread over Europe, but France was merely to lead by example.205 Besides to their domestic reform programme the French Revolutionaries adhered to ideas on the law of nations based on Enlightenment cosmopolitanism and popular sovereignty. Throughout the debate that would lead to the 22 May decree, Constantin-François de Volney summarised Revolutionary views on international relations in a draft decree.206 The draft stated that mankind was considered one society with peace and the well-being of all its members as its aim. Nations and states—‘considérés comme individus’—enjoyed the same natural rights in that society and were subjected to the same rules of justice as individuals in civil societies.207 By consequence, no nation was entitled to deprive other nations of their possessions and liberty. Hence, every war waged for another reason than the defence of a ‘droit juste,’ was an act of oppression that called for a reaction from the society of mankind at large. It has to be noted, however, that the Revolutionaries did not form a homogeneous group. There were huge ideological differences among Revolutionaries and those differences influenced French foreign policy and the Revolution’s attitude vis-à-vis the law of nations during the entire period. Generally speaking the majority of Revolutionaries resisted the influence of reason of state thinking, the almost perma-

  Grewe, 2000, p. 422.   Mirkine-Guetzevitch, 1928, p. 310. 202   Korman, 1996, pp. 120–121. 203   Belissa, 1995, p. 184. 204   Godechot, 1983, p. 64; Black, 1999, p. 158; Droz, 2005, p. 177; Lentz, 2005c, p. 407. 205   Godechot, 1983, p. 64; Belissa, 1995, p. 247 and 251. 206   Submitted to the Assemblée nationale on 20 May 1790. Laurent, 1869, p. 73; Nys, 1896, p. 361; Belissa, 1995, p. 170 and pp. 189–190. 207   ‘sociétés partielles.’ 200 201



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nent state of war, the role of power and inequality within the European system of states, dynastic orientated foreign policy and the dominance of the executive in formulating foreign policy. They wanted an international order less based on power and more based on law and reason.208 Justice was considered the base of the society between men and nations and peace was seen as natural, whereas war was an invention of men. In the era that saw the rise of modern constitutionalism with its emphasis on the limitation of state power by (subjection to) law, it should not be that much of a surprise that one saw the need to limit the state by subjection to law or morality in its international relations too. A claim to representing the nation served to legitimate the Assemblée nationale’s position and reforms. That claim was destined to influence views on international relations. The concept of the nation and the volonté general as the source of law determined the Revolutionaries’ thought on the relations within the European order to a large extent.209 In their view, popular sovereignty was the sole source of legitimacy. Hence, the Revolution was bound to conflict with Europe’s monarchs.210 The idea of popular sovereignty strengthened the idea of positive or voluntary law due to the central place of the popular will in law-making. The nation was to be bound only by its will. As to domestic constitutional law the influence of the theory of the popular will has been widely recognised. On the international level the link between positive law and voluntarism on the one side and the concept of popular sovereignty still deserves more research. The Revolutionary Era, however, still had a rather ambiguous view on the question whether the source of international law is to be found in nature, the will of nations or in both. In this regard the period of the French Revolution certainly was an ‘intermediate’ age. There were a lot of natural law references. The Déclaration of 1789 claimed to recognise ‘droits naturels.’ France’s borders were regarded to be ordained by nature and the Revolutionaries claimed that treaties should be in conformity with the law of nature. For instance, the closure of the river Scheldt for navigation as agreed on in the Treaties of Münster and Utrecht was regarded to be void since free navigation was a rule of natural law.

  Mirkine-Guetzevitch, 1928, p. 307; Belissa, 2005, p. 92; Belissa, 2007, p. 39.   Grewe, 2000, p. 416. 210   Mirkine-Guetzevitch, 1928, p. 312; Redslob, 1974, p. 287; Armstrong, 1993, p. 89. 208 209

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In the second place the concept of the nation influenced the Revolutionaries’ views on the entities that were to form part of the international system. Europe should become a society of nations instead of a family of princes. Revolutionaries applied Vattel’s individual analogy to the nations in the international sphere. In the new order the nations would enjoy the international counterparts of the Revolutionary ‘liberté et egalité’: among other things independence, respect for a nation’s natural rights, equal sovereignty and self-government.211 The Revolutionaries disagreed, however, on the nature of the relations between those nations. Points of view diverged along the lines set by the two countermovements against the Hobbesian denial of positive law of nations in eighteenth-century legal doctrine identified above. The adherents of Rousseau’s democratic isolationism212 or of the Vattelian world view tended towards a peaceful co-existence of equal and sovereign communities of citizens. Those communities merely had to recognise and respect each other’s existence and rights. A second group was in favour of a more cosmopolitan and idealistic approach and that group came to the fore as the Revolution radicalised. For them Europe was a transcendent political and legal order between and above the co-existing nations or states. Within that order each member had a responsibility to uphold the order and certain universal principles on which the order was based.213 Men like Grégoire, Barère, and Eschassériaux held brief for a unilateral proclamation of a new law of nations. In fact, Grégoire did indeed propose a ‘Declaration du droit des gens’ based on freedom and independence, good faith and the rights of man.214 Throughout the initial stages of the French Revolution, the concept of the nation and patriotism were still compatible with notions of mankind and international fraternity.215 Maximilien de Robespierre expressly considered popular sovereignty from a cosmopolitan point of view. In his view, all nations shared in the ‘souveraineté universelle du genre humain.’ Hence, each sovereign nation was obliged to respect

 Nys, 1896, p. 358; Grewe, 2000, p. 415.  Doyle, 1995, pp. 225–230. 213   Grewe, 2000, pp. 416–419. 214   18 June 1793. Grégoire would repeat his proposal in April 1795. Nys, 1896, p. 394; Sorel, 1906IV, pp. 299–300; Truyol y Serra, 1995, p. 68; Belissa, 1995, p. 365. 215   Belissa, 1995, p. 248. 211 212



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other nations’ rights, thus excluding conquest or annexation.216 Next to the left in France, foreign Patriots especially supported this point of view. A majority of French politicians did not contemplate committing themselves to a programme this radical. Hence, Grégoire’s proposal was rejected and a move towards respect for positive law to be agreed upon at the general peace was made.217 According to Article 15 of De Grégoire’s draft for a declaration of the law of nations ‘les entreprises contre la liberté d’un peuple sont un attentat contre tous les autres.’218 This order did not exist yet, however, but could be reached through a process of enlightenment219 and republicanisation and these Revolutionaries considered themselves to be the avant-garde in that process. Soon after the Treaty of Basel (5 April 1795), Immanuel Kant would express these ideas in his world-famous essay. Despite these philosophical inspirations, debate on a new, more benign law of nations was highly dominated by political events.220 The first disputes with foreign powers caused by implementing Revolutionary ideas rose over feudal rights in Alsace and the status of the papal enclaves in the south. The better part of Alsace had been ‘reunited’ with France throughout the reign of Louis XIV.221 Article 90 of the Franco-German Treaty of Münster (1648)222 obliged France to respect any rights and titles of German princes in Alsace, though.223 The Assemblée nationale had abolished feudal and seigniorial rights on 4 August 1789. Its decree did not exclude rights of German princes in Alsace. The Electors of Mainz and Cologne accused France of violating the Münster Treaty and called on the imperial Diet and Russia for help.224 In the Assemblée, the lawyer Merlin de Douai repudiated the invocation of the Treaty of Münster.225 He argued that the Assemblée had been in its rights when abolishing feudal and seigniorial rights because it was the representative of the sovereign French nation.   Belissa, 1995, p. 222; Gauthier, 2002, no page numbers indicated (online publication). 217   Belissa, 2006, p. 374. 218  Draft presented to the Convention nationale on 18 June 1793. See: Nys, 1896, pp. 395–396. 219   Schlereth, 1977, pp. 120–125. 220   Armstrong, 1993, pp. 85–89; Belissa, 1995, p. 165. 221  Luard, 1992, p. 63; Grewe, 2000, p. 321; Black, 2002, p. 93. 222   24 October 1648, Treaty of Münster; CTS vol. 1, pp. 271–356. 223   Armstrong, 1993, p. 87; Belissa, 1995, p. 220. 224  Laurent, 1869, p. 117. 225   Godechot, 1964, pp. 121–122; Blanning, 1996, p. 50. 216

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­ opular sovereignty based in natural law gave the French nation the P right to make and alter laws applicable within French territory without any foreign intervention.226 Moreover, Merlin argued that the Treaty of Münster did not bind the French nation since it had been concluded by the King in his own right. Although inciting the King to enter into negotiations on indemnity for the German princes,227 the Assemblée confirmed Merlin’s argument.228 The Alsace case brought the Revolutionary notion of a new law of nations as truly ‘inter-national’ and based on respect for each nation’s sovereignty as exclusive authority within its territory to the fore.229 Thus Revolutionary views clashed with the significant role played by the respect for traditional rights and privileges in upholding order within Europe and within the Holy Roman Empire in particular.230 Merlin’s argument was in conformity with Revolutionary thought and based on a claim to sovereignty as necessary to consolidate the Revolution within France as it was subversive and disastrous for the existing European order.231 Popular sovereignty clashed with traditional rights in the case of Avignon and other papal enclaves in the south of France, too. Avignon had been under papal rule ever since the late Middle Ages. In the summer of 1790, inhabitants of Avignon requested their town to be integrated in France. At first, the Assemblée repudiated the request.232 After riots in Avignon had forced France to intervene militarily, the request was repeated. This time, the Assemblée agreed to Avignon becoming French provided that the people of Avignon really wished to become French.233 On the one hand, it was argued that Avignon had always been an inalienable part of the French realm and that the Pope could not claim possession because of prescription. On the other hand, the annexation of Avignon was presented as the voluntary and collective accession of a separate people to the French nation like some kind of

  Armstrong, 1993, p. 87; Belissa, 1995, p. 222.  Indemnity for the German princes was not an exception, for the abolition of feudal and seigniorial right in August 1789 had reckoned with a general indemnity. 228  Nys, 1896, p. 360. 229   Armstrong, 1993, p. 87. 230   Schroeder, 1994, p. 73; Black, 2002, p. 210. 231   Schroeder, 1994, p. 72. 232   Godechot, 1983, p. 69; Belissa, 1995, p. 234. 233   Belissa, 1995, p. 234. 226 227



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merger. Hence, there was no case of annexation or conquest but of a reunion based on the expressed will of the people of Avignon.234 Alsace and Avignon pitted the popular will or popular sovereignty as a natural law principle against traditional rights and treaty obligations.235 Hence, they fundamentally challenged the existing order that was exactly based on legal titles and treaties.236 The rejection of binding force of treaties vis-à-vis the French nation was not confined to the Article in the 1648 Münster Treaty with regard to German rights in Alsace. After the 22 May 1790 decree, the left would endeavour to have all treaties tested on their compatibility with the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen.237 Revolutionaries would invoke the same argument against virtually every treaty concluded prior to the Revolution. The pre-1789 treaties were in their essence rejected because they were treaties between kings and tyrants. Normally treaties had to be observed in good faith. Pacta sunt servanda might be a rule of the law of nations, but these ones were concluded by kings and partly violated the law of nature. Hence, according to the Revolutionaries, they did not bind the nation after it had liberated itself. For the king before, in the absence of a constitution, was not entitled to represent the nation. This constitutional matter was a defect in the conclusion of treaties that made them void. The Convention nationale would later on (1 March 1793) declare that the French nation was not bound by earlier treaties, with the exception of the treaties concluded with other free nations: the Swiss confederation and the United States (by then the only powers the French Republic had diplomatic relations with).238 So they clearly argued that a nation as a matter of natural law was only to be bound out of its own free will.239 By consequence, for the first time since 1648 the main treaties of the Revolutionary Era contained no explicit references to earlier treaties. Edmund Burke argued that natural law was mainly invoked to get rid of treaties that

234  Laurent, 1869, pp. 225–229; Nys, 1896, pp. 363–369; Gilson, 1984, pp. 122–123; Belissa, 1995, p. 224. 235   Wahnich, 1994, p. 166 and p. 169; Blanning, 2000, p. 252. 236   Schroeder, 1994, p. 71; Black, 1999, p. 169; Allott, 2002, p. 387; Black, 2002, p. 38. 237   Belissa, 1995, p. 198. 238   Ballot, 1910, p. 169; Guyot, 1907, p. 401. 239  Nys, 1896, p. 345; Armstrong, 1993, p. 209; Rao, 1994, p. 267; Belissa, 1995, p. 171, p. 221, and p. 219; Blanning, 1996, p. 51; Grewe, 2000, p. 412.

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stood in the way of the Revolutionaries’ ambitions.240 Burke was partly right, that is, natural law arguments basically only touched treaties the Revolutionaries disliked for more practical reasons. The 1786 Eden Treaty241 in particular was a monster in their eyes. Vergennes had signed the Treaty hoping that making commercial concessions to Britain would preserve peace and that free trade would increase state revenue.242 French merchants and manufacturers blamed the Treaty for the economic crisis of the late 1780s though.243 Declaring among others the Eden Treaty void opened the way for protectionism. Alsace and Avignon, although manifesting tensions between Revolutionary thought and the existing European order, had been minor, manageable diplomatic incidents. France had deliberately decided not to risk war by rendering aid to the rebels in Liège and the Austrian Netherlands.244 On the other hand, Paris had refused to support Austria, formally still its ally at the time, in suppressing that revolt. From the summer of 1791, tension between France and the two German great powers increased. Having abandoned its Spanish and Austrian allies, France became ever more isolated. Louis XVI’s flight to Montmédy that stranded in Varennes (21 June 1791) alarmed foreign powers and caused them to consider intervention.245 Nevertheless, the single one prince to urge for intervention was Gustavus III of Sweden.246 All great powers had refused to support French émigrés. 247 The French King’s private diplomacy to provoke foreign intervention did not meet much sympathy either.248 The 1791 Constitution, vesting a constitutional monarchy in France, was still not adverse to views of enlightened monarchy.249 The King’s arrest at Varennes—even though Louis XVI saved his crown by accepting the Constitution on his return in Paris—changed their attitude to the Revolution.250 Enduring political instability in France started to worry France’s neighbours.   Armstrong, 1993, p. 206.   26 September 1786, Eden Treaty; CTS vol. 50, pp. 71–92. 242   Ballot, 1910, p. 169; Guyot, 1907, p. 401; Murphy, 1982, pp. 432–433; Schroeder, 1994, p. 40. 243   Murphy, 1982, p. 443. 244   Belissa, 1995, pp. 171–178 and pp. 205–208. On the revolution in Liège see e.g. Nève, 2008. 245  Lentz, 2005c, p. 421. 246   Schroeder, 1994, p. 70. 247   Blanning, 1996, p. 42; Blanning, 2007, p. 616. 248   Price, 1999, p. 436, pp. 446–447 and p. 452. 249   Price, 1999, p. 453. 250   Kagan, 2006, p. 7. 240 241



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2.4  Propaganda and War Within France, the flight to Varennes spurred opposition against the monarchy itself. Lafayette crushed a rising in Paris, thus allowing the 1791 Constitution to be put into force. To many Revolutionaries the King had become suspect. For his part, the King had not really reconciled with his new constitutional position.251 By consequence, both the right and the left started contemplating constitutional change right from the start and both regarded war as a means to obtain their domestic political goals. Girondins hoped war would end internal disputes by uniting the French against a foreign enemy and would simultaneously unmask the court’s disloyalty and treason or at least oblige the king to cooperate.252 Royalists regarded war as the sole means to restore the King’s position because either the monarch would command a victorious army or defeat would bring the Revolution down.253 Robespierre was among the very few to oppose war fearing that war would indeed strengthen the executive.254 The debate on war was thus preoccupied with domestic political considerations.255 Various factions expected that war would enhance their position.256 By consequence, no one envisaged a major European war.257 Royalists contemplated a limited war against those German princes who allowed French émigrés to form an army on their soil,258 whereas Girondins wished to limit the war to Austria. Another consequence was that there were no real war aims.259 The Girondins, led by Jacques-Pierre Brissot, dominated French politics during the best part of 1792 and the first half of 1793.260 In the spring of 1792, despite the declaration of peace to the world, France started the Revolutionary Wars by declaring war on Austria.

  Price, 1999, p. 447.  Laurent, 1869, p. 96; Godechot, 1983, p. 70; Schroeder, 1994, pp. 94–95; Belissa, 1995, pp. 269–270; Blanning, 1996, pp. 55–56; Black, 1999, p. 160; Black, 2002, p. 211; Lentz, 2005c, p. 424. 253   Palmer, 1964, p. 13; Godechot, 1983, p. 70; Schroeder, 1994, pp. 94–95; Schama, 2000, pp. 588–589; Lentz, 2005c, p. 424. 254   Godechot, 1983, p. 70; Schroeder, 1994, pp. 126–127; Belissa, 1995, pp. 293–298; Vovelle, 2000, p. 14; Droz, 2005, p. 182; Lentz, 2005c, p. 424. 255   Armstrong, 1993, p. 94. 256   Palmer, 1964, p. 12; Belissa, 1995, p. 266; Sutherland, 2003, p. 126. 257   Schroeder, 1994, p. 101. 258   Schama, 2000, p. 589. 259   Blanning, 2007, p. 626. 260   Godechot, 1983, p. 72; Belissa, 1995, p. 268. 251 252

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In reaction, Prussia and the Empire joined Austria and declared war on France.261 A year later France was at war with almost the whole of Europe. Since in the pacifist spirit of Enlightenment and Revolutionary thought peace was natural, war needed a specific and clear justification. At first the war was justified as the free French nation’s self-defence against the despotic princes of Europe, who were thought to be preparing an intervention in France to restore absolutist Bourbon rule and take some of France’s territory as an indemnity.262 French refugees were indeed forming armies at the borders of France, for instance in Piedmont and the Electorate of Trier. They were short of money, however, and their efforts to gain the support of other sovereigns were still fruitless. As said before, the monarchs of Europe had other things on their minds. The Emperor’s Padua Circular (6 July 1791) and the joint declaration of the Emperor and the King of Prussia at Pillnitz (27 August 1791) indeed seemed to prospect military intervention or at least joint action by Europe’s sovereigns on behalf of the French King, but it is widely agreed in historiography that this was only meant as deterrence. They probably were not seriously planning an intervention, but hoped that threatening to intervene would suffice.263 The war party among French Revolutionaries was, however, able to convince a majority in the Assemblée that an attack was imminent and war was declared on the King of Bohemia and Hungary on 20 April 1792. The declaration of war pointed out the hostility of the yet to be elected Emperor Francis II264 to the Revolution. The Assemblée repeated the promise not to wage war for the sake of conquest. In this case, war was declared in ‘rightful defence of a free people against the unjust aggression of a king,’ because Francis II had conspired with other monarchs against the French nation’s sovereignty and he tolerated the preparations for an armed intervention from the soil of the German Empire by French refugees.265 The declaration of war on Aus-

  Prussia declared war to France on 21 May 1792.   Belissa, 1995, p. 285 and p. 300; Mansel, 1999, p. 4; Belissa and Leclercq, 2001, p. 205. 263  Laurent, 1869, p. 102 and pp. 106–111; Palmer, 1964, p. 12; Schroeder, 1994, p. 96; Blanning, 1996, p. 58; Black, 1999, p. 159; Schama, 2000, pp. 591–592; Black, 2002, p. 210; Sutherland, 2003, p. 124. 264   His successor, Leopold II, had demised on 1 March 1792. 265  Nys, 1896, p. 373; Dwyer and McPhee, 2002, pp. 62–63 [their translation]; Lentz, 2005c, p. 428. 261 262



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tria was not contemplated as the start of all out ideological war with Europe’s monarchs. In fact, the French government was prone to isolate Austria by assuring the neutrality of the other powers of Western Europe. With the exception of Prussia, for the time being, it succeeded in this policy.266 France was expected not being able to offer any serious resistance because of the domestic crisis.267 Whatever there might have been of plans to strike first, the French army was not sufficiently trained and equipped to materialise a ‘pre-emptive strike.’ It could do little more than take a stand at the line of fortifications in north-eastern France and await the Austrian-Prussian attack.268 The first battles indeed turned out to be mere disasters for the French. After the King of Prussia had joined Austria and declared war on France, the Prussian army marched into France on 19 August 1792269 and took the main fortifications in the north-east within weeks. The Prussian commander, the Duke of Brunswick, had published a manifesto (25 July 1792) in which he stated that the population of Paris would be held responsible for the safety of the royal family and Paris would be levelled if the royal family was harmed.270 So the French Revolutionaries did have something to fight for. They feared a total restoration or worse in case of defeat. As the French armed forces were disorganised, the Assemblée nationale realised that the situation was rather precarious. So it declared the ‘patrie en danger’ (11 July 1792) and called for volunteers.271 The king was the main victim of the panic caused by the Prussian advance. After the royal palace had been stormed by angry mobs (10 August 1792), the Assemblée suspended him and ordered elections for a Convention nationale to be held. One of the first acts by the Convention was abolishing the monarchy and proclaiming the French Republic (21 September 1792). Probably unintentional, this effectuated an almost complete break off of diplomatic relations, since all envoys had been accredited to Louis XVI.272 Even most neutral powers did not renew their envoys’ credentials. By consequence, France would

  Chastain Howe, 1986, p. 387.   Sorel, 1906IV, p. 1; Palmer, 1964, p. 12; Blanning, 1996, p. 64. 268   Chastain Howe, 1986, p. 388. 269   Schama, 2000, p. 626. 270   Schama, 2000, p. 613; Dwyer and McPhee, 2002, pp. 68–69. 271  Dwyer and McPhee, 2002, pp. 63–64. 272   Black, 1999, p. 165. 266 267

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only maintain formal relations with Switzerland, Genoa, the United States, and the Ottoman Empire in 1793–1794.273 One day before the abolition of the French monarchy the Prussian advance was stopped at Valmy. The Battle of Valmy was more of a cannonade than a real battle, but it was the first serious resistance and the Prussian army turned and marched back to Germany. Since the Revolution had been saved and French armies subsequently invaded the Austrian Netherlands, the Rhineland, and Savoy, self-defence was not a credible justification for war anymore. The French war party had to find a new justification and, moreover, had to find a new one that was equally effective in enthusing Revolutionary volunteers. It did so by reformulating war aims. From now on the war was also or even mostly justified as the struggle of democracy against despotism or, as Brissot had it, a ‘crusade’ for liberty.274 The Girondins adhered to a ‘democratic theory of war.’275 The Revolutionary Wars were not presented as an armed struggle between states, but as a battle between the nations of Europe against their despots. By distinguishing between nations and monarchs oppressing them and claiming to fight the latter on the former’s behalf, the French ‘denationalised’ the war.276 ‘Paix aux chaumières! Guerre aux palais!,’277 was the maxim of the early phase of the Revolutionary Wars thus reformulating traditional rivalry with Austria in ideological terms.278 To the domestic revolutionism was added an international one of spreading the Revolution.279 Some even spoke of a ‘worldwide civil war.’280 It was a ‘war on tyranny’ and the Revolution had internal enemies as well as friends abroad.281 The lines of division in Europe were not territorial or ethnic; they were ideological. Indeed, there was a civil war going on in France as well. Both sides tried to mobilise sympathisers within enemy territory.282 Whereas the Vendée rose against the Revolution, the republican government in Paris was able to exploit   Masson, 1877, p. 344; Godechot, 1983, p. 134.  Laurent, 1869, p. 77 and p. 173; Droz, 2005, p. 181; Lentz, 2005c, p. 426. 275   Palmer, 1964, p. 14; Belissa and Leclercq, 2001, p. 205. 276   Belissa, 1995, p. 357 and p. 359. 277  Laurent, 1869, p. 166; Nys, 1896, p. 386. 278  Laurent, 1869, p. 51; Palmer, 1964, p. 16; Belissa, 1995, p. 269, p. 281 and p. 306; Black, 1999, p. 162; Grewe, 2000, p. 423; Savage, 2007, pp. 318–320. 279   Palmer, 1964, pp. 35–36 and p. 54; Belissa, 1995, p. 259. 280   Grewe, 2000, p. 423. 281   Belissa and Leclercq, 2001, p. 204. 282   Palmer, 1964, p. 5 and p. 14; Black, 2002, p. 200. 273 274



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the sympathy of Patriots in the urbanised regions of Western Europe; a zone stretching from the Low Countries through the Rhineland and eastern France into Switzerland and northern Italy Michael Broers has named the ‘Lotharingian isthmus.’283 In the Revolutionary Wars two systems both with their own ideas on the legitimacy of power were said to oppose each other: the Revolutionary Europe of popular sovereignty and the Counter-revolutionary Europe of the ‘droit divin’ and aristocracy or, to paraphrase the Revolutionaries, a total war between democracy and despotism. In this struggle the French Revolutionaries stood for popular sovereignty. This principle, which at a first glance seems to be all about a government’s internal base of legitimacy, was raised to the status of a principle of the law of nations. The political principles, expressed in the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, were thought to be of a universal character.284 The Déclaration did not contain the rights of the French citizen but of all people and all citizens of every free state. Each state had to be organised according to these principles to guarantee the natural rights of every man. But put to its consequences this line of thought would mean that only states based on popular sovereignty could be full members of the new European order. Strikingly this image was strengthened by rhetoric from both sides. Even more than the Revolutionaries the adherents of the Counterrevolution, like the Count de Provence, the Count d’Artois,285 and Edmund Burke, spoke in terms of ‘a crusade.’ The Coalition powers claimed to defend order, public law, and the treaties upholding both against anarchy.286 Peace between republics, that is, states based on representative government on the one hand and monarchies on the other was considered by some to be impossible. The monarchs, acting on their spirit of conquest, would always renew the war and the republics would never be sure of their safety and freedom.287 In this view, the Revolutionary Wars indeed remained to be wars out of self-defence, as the French Republic was never to be sure of its freedom and independence with

  Broers, 2001, p. 137, p. 139 and p. 141; likewise Dwyer, 2001, p. 9.  Laurent, 1869, p. 6 and p. 15; Godechot, 1970, p. 25 and p. 27; Burleigh, 2006, p. 101; Fontana, 2006, p. 121. 285   Mansel, 1999, p. 1. 286   Belissa and Leclercq, 2001, p. 209. 287   Belissa, 2006, p. 47 and p. 83. 283 284

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absolute monarchs as its neighbours. So the war had to be won and the war was only won once all tyrants had been brought down and popular sovereignty would have been vested everywhere. In order to win the war, France had to bring the other nations of Europe into its own system by spreading the Revolutionary program of political and social reform. Occupied territories, unless they lay within France’s natural boundaries and were annexed, were to become France’s sister republics: befriended republics along the Rhine and Alps, regenerated by French military aid and bound to the French Republic by common social and political institutions.288 Despite the pacific spirit of the Enlightenment, the Revolutionaries did realise that war had to be waged to create perpetual peace. As democracies do not wage war unless they have to defend themselves and after this war all states would be democracies, in a way this would also be the war to end all wars.289 In his commentary on the ideas of St. Pierre Rousseau had argued that the princes of Europe would never enter into a federation and give up part of their autonomy because they did not know their true interests. So Europe had to be forced ‘d’être libre,’ to paraphrase one of Rousseau’s best known sentences.290 The Revolutionary Wars formed a transitional phase between the feudal order of the eighteenth century and the imagined enlightened era of the society of free, equal and sovereign nations. During this phase France had a special role to play. The cosmopolitan spirit mainly dominated in the years 1791–1792. On 19 November 1792, after a request for intervention from Zweibrücken, the Convention nationale adopted the decree of ‘fraternité et secours,’ promising to aid and protect as good brothers all nations that would revolt against their despots to regain their liberty. Exporting the Revolution through foreign intervention under the guise of enabling other nations to exercise their sovereignty had been adopted as a principle of French foreign policy.291 Intervention was presented as a moral obligation of the French people. In order not to worry neutral powers the governments in Bern and London were assured that aid was only to be

  Harouel, 1997b, p. 3.  Laurent, 1869, p. 83; Rao, 1994, p. 269. 290   Rousseau, 1762, p. 60. 291  Laurent, 1869, pp. 168–169; Mirkine-Guetzevitch, 1928, p. 313; Godechot, 1964, pp. 160–161; Belissa, 1995, p. 322; Harouel, 1997b, p. 9. 288 289



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provided against princes France was already at war with.292 Nevertheless, the Convention soon received requests for aid from Dutch, Swiss, Italian, German and even Irish Patriots. The decree of ‘fraternité et secours’ was one of the so-called propaganda decrees, the other one being adopted on 15 December of the same year stating how French generals had to act in occupied territories. They were to reform the administration, confiscate Church and noble estates and convene primary assemblies to elect a constitutive assembly.293 First and foremost, they had to keep in mind that the French Republic was waging war ‘against the palaces’ and not ‘against the cottages.’ The French Revolutionaries conceived of themselves as the avantgarde in the liberation and republicanisation of Europe. Revolutionary France saw itself as superior to the rest of Europe. It was la Grande Nation, although that term was not introduced for another few years. France was the centre of the new Europe, the Europe of the civilised nations, whereas the rest of Europe was still in the feudal era and was yet to be liberated. This exceptionalism originated from a sense of cultural superiority. In the eighteenth century France was the centre of Western culture. French was spoken by the political, economic and intellectual elites all over Europe and had substituted Latin as the language of diplomacy. French preponderance in Europe after the Revolution was built on this cultural imperialism. The cultivated bourgeoisie in the urbanised areas of Western Europe rallied to the Revolutionaries’ ideas and welcomed the French troops as they entered their ­cities. These elites took over power under the aegis of French arms and started to reform their own countries. The French sense of its own greatness was strengthened by the success of the Revolution and the Revolutionary Wars. The French knew their country was the centre of Western culture, but they also regarded themselves as the first people that had liberated itself without the help of others. Of course the Americans had gained their freedom several years before, but well they had needed French support to do so. The Dutch had tried to in the early 1780s, but they had failed. The French had succeeded and had done so all by themselves. As a free

 Laurent, 1869, pp. 179–180.   Godechot, 1964, pp. 161–164; Schama, 1989, p. 34; Belissa, 1995, p. 333; Droz, 2005, p. 190. 292 293

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and ­enlightened nation the French were entitled and obligated to be the protector and the guide of other nations towards a new order.294 As a free nation, with the military and political power to do so—so as a great power—, France was said to have a moral and fraternal obligation to liberate other nations and to spread or export its political and social concepts. As these concepts were regarded to be universal, they could indeed be exported. France had a civilizing mission, which justified interventions in domestic affairs and temporary hegemony.295 This mission was to be put into practice. After occupying a country the generals had to convene popular assemblies in order to enable the people to exercise their rights. Thus the leading Revolutionaries in these years took a positive stand in respect of international revolutionism and were in favour of ‘républicaniser l’Europe.’ Initially, the notion of sister republics had been applied to Switzerland and the United States simply because they, like France, recognised human rights and popular sovereignty.296 By the end of 1792, the notion had come to play a role in answering the question what to do with occupied territories. The propaganda decrees pointed out the path to take. Nevertheless, for the time being, it seemed that France would continue the line of ‘réunions’ initiated in Avignon. On 27 November 1792, Savoy was annexed.297 After the initial defeats, French forces were on the advance. Because of the Revolution, France managed to overcome the problems by which it had almost slipped to second rank status after the Seven Years’ War. It regained force and contemplated hegemony of Western Europe again.298 The end of the Austrian alliance terminated the territorial stability this part of the Continent had enjoyed for several decades. France had to cash in arrears resulting from the other great powers’ expansion since mid-century.299 Since Austria was no longer an ally and France’s traditional allies in the east had been marginalised, France had to redefine its security policy. In 1791, an alliance with Britain—throughout the first years of the Revolution considered to be ‘the other free nation’—had been consid294  Laurent, 1869, p. 37; Redslob, 1974, p. 285; Woolf, 1991, pp. 8–10; Blanning, 1996, p. 170; Belissa, 1995, p. 319; Belissa, 1999a, p. 14; Grewe, 2000, p. 415; Fontana, 2006, p. 120. 295  Laurent, 1869, p. 38; Englund, 2004, p. 139; Lentz, 2005c, p. 407. 296   Belissa, 2005, p. 92. 297   Belissa, 1995, p. 316. 298   Blanning, 2000, p. 204. 299   Kaiser, 1990, p. 237.



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ered.300 Unable to balance Russia and Austria in the east, Paris now set out for preponderance in the west by expelling Austria—the erstwhile enemy—out of Western Europe and thus away from France’s borders. Since historiography is dominated by what France would do from 1795 onwards, it is hard to establish to what extent this was already an underlying aim of internationalist discourse in 1792–1793 or, in other words, to what extent the notion of sister republics was already connected to Revolutionary expansion.301 The 19 November decree had expressed, at least, fraternal bonds between the nations of Europe. The notion of sister republics came to the fore against the background of the cosmopolitan spirit of the society of mankind.302 The most extreme territorial scheme that took cosmopolitanism to its utmost consequences, was formulated by Anacharsis Cloots. He proposed creating a universal republic unifying the world by ever further annexations.303 The idea of a universal republic held brief for by Cloots was not taken seriously by most of his contemporaries even among Revolutionary politicians. Unitary cosmopolitan projects soon gave way to, at the most, images of a federal order in the spirit of St. Pierre.304 To be sure, federal visions still did not regard nations as isolated entities but as members of an encompassing order.305 A federative order was an alternative both for Cloots’ unitary order and for the moderate vision of co-existing independent nations after some limited annexations to aggrandise French territory.306 Part of the Girondins thus embraced eighteenth-century schemes for federation, although the federative order would not be institutionalised by establishing suprastate institutions. Basically, the federate states were to form a collective security system in that they would guarantee each other’s rights.307 The ideological basis of the federate states constitutions was paramount to Girondin views on federation at least in three ways. For those three reasons, the federate states had 300  Laurent, 1869, pp. 129–133 and p. 138; Nys, 1896, p. 392; Belissa, 1995, p. 168, p. 201, and pp. 226–227. 301   Woolf, 1991, p. 15; Lentz, 2005c, p. 437. 302   Wahnich, 1994, pp.166–167; Belissa, 2008, p. 117. 303  Laurent, 1869, p. 186 and p. 189; Rao, 1994, p. 268; Belissa, 1995, p. 224 and p. 282. 304   Rao, 1994, p. 268; Belissa, 1995, p. 282 and p. 318; Belissa and Leclercq, 2001, p. 210. 305   Belissa, 1995, p. 222. 306   Godechot, 1983, p. 74; Belissa, 1995, p. 252 and p. 324. 307   Redslob, 1974, p. 285; Belissa, 1995, p. 219 and p. 225; Grewe, 2000, p. 418.

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to be ‘sister republics.’ In the first place, since popular sovereignty was the sole basis of legitimacy accepted by French Revolutionaries, France could only align with states based on the same principle.308 France’s new alliance system, hence, was to form a union of free nations.309 In the second place, the federate states’ governments had to be pro-French and peace-loving. Since monarchs were deemed bellicose by nature and enemies of the republican regime in France, being pro-French and peaceable equalled being republican.310 In the third place, establishing French control over Western Europe by means of a federation would be far easier if France could draw on the assistance of local Patriots.311 In fact, the Girondin policy of sister republics and liberation of other nations had to a large extent been inspired and pushed for by foreign, especially Dutch Patriots staying in Paris as exiles.312 Some Girondins might have been sincere in their intention to set other nations free. Although caught in a discourse of fraternity and cosmopolitanism, the policy of creating sister republics in general, however, was part of the redefinition of French security policy and directed at practical ends. The sister republics were to form a buffer along France’s borders;313 a ‘glacis de sécurité,’314 ‘glacis protecteur,’315 or ‘zone tampon.’316 Thus, the notion of sister republics fitted in ­eighteenth-century emphasis on intermediate powers, that is, the buffer role secondary powers had played in the balance of power. This time, however, France desired exclusive control of the buffer317 in order to institutionalise its dominance in Western Europe as compensation for British preponderance on the seas and the rise of Russia in the east.318 By consequence, France would occupy a special, leading place in the federation of sister republics.319 Thereto, the sister republics were to

  Redslob, 1974, pp. 287–288; Grewe, 2000, p. 419.   Belissa, 1995, p. 277. 310  Dufraisse and Kerautret, 1999, p. 24. 311   Blanning, 1996, p. 169. 312   Palmer, 1964, p. 53, p. 364 and p. 367; Godechot, 1983, p. 74; Armstrong, 1993, p. 81; Harouel, 1997a, p. 36; Harouel, 1997b, p. 3. On Batavian refugees in France throughout 1790–1793, see Rosendaal, 2003, pp. 273–442. 313   Potiemkine, 1946, p. 331; Godechot, 1983, p. 74; Belissa, 1995, p. 316; Belissa, 2005, p. 92. 314  Droz, 2005, p. 219. 315   Boudon, 2005, p. 79. 316   Belissa, 1995, p. 325. 317   Schroeder, 1994, p. 168. 318   Potiemkinge, 1946, p. 349; Thombs and Thombs, 2007, p. 227. 319   Wahnich, 1994, p. 176; Belissa, 1995, p. 326; Harouel, 1997b, p. 11. 308 309



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serve as means in solving France’s financial problems, foreign Patriots having roused French interest for ‘l’or d’Amsterdam, de Bern, et de Milan.’320 Finally, the notion of sister republics was embraced by French generals contemplating to use them as personal power basis. Dumouriez pushed for a sister republic in Belgium.321 Later on Hoche would be suspected of intending to create a sister republic in Germany for that purpose, as would Bonaparte be in Italy.322 Thus, the policy of sister republics was dominated by the paradox of French security and other interests on the one hand and the rhetoric of liberty and fraternity on the other,323 or, as Marc Belissa has it, between instrumentalisation and alliance.324 For the time being, the course of the war prevented France from implementing the policy. As the propaganda decrees were adopted by the Convention nationale, France was still only at war with Austria and Prussia. The proclamation of the republic had caused some agitation in London, but Britain still stayed neutral.325 The British government was, however, soon disturbed by French actions. French forces occupied Belgium. Thereto, in an attempt to gain support of Belgian merchants, the French declared the river Scheldt open for navigation on 16 November 1792, arguing that the closure of the river by the Treaty of Münster (1648) was adverse to natural law.326 For William Pitt this was the last straw to break the camel’s back; France was threatening the balance of power again.327 After the execution of the former king, the Convention acknowledged that war with Britain and the United Provinces was inevitable.328 On 1 February 1793, France declared war on the King of Britain and the Dutch Stadhouder. On 7 March, war was declared on the King of Spain.329 In July, Naples entered the war, followed by Portugal in September and by Tuscany in October;330 France was surrounded by enemies.   Godechot, 1983, p. 76; Harouel, 1997a, p. 37; Harouel, 1997b, p. 10.   Chastain Howe, 1986, pp. 370–373. 322  Legrand, 1895, p. 33; Schama, 1989, p. 38; Droz, 2005, p. 191. 323   Woolf, 1991, p. 14. 324   Belissa, 2005, p. 103; Belissa, 2006, p. 308; Belissa, 2008, p. 120. 325  Laurent, 1869, p. 139; Schama, 2000, p. 682. 326   Palmer, 1964, p. 76; Belissa, 1995, p. 333; Black, 1999, p. 166; Schama, 2000, p. 684. 327  Laurent, 1869, pp. 140–142; Schroeder, 1994, pp. 115–116; Belissa, 1995, p. 350; Schama, 2000, p. 682. 328   Palmer, 1964, p. 82. 329   Black, 1999, p. 167. 330  Lentz, 2005c, p. 436. 320 321

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In the course of 1793 ‘Realpolitik’ re-merged. The Revolutionaries barely had succeeded in halting the Prussian army at Valmy, but ‘la patrie’ and the Revolution were still in great danger, for the subsequent French advance was halted and reverted at Neerwinden (18 March 1793). Soon, France faced the threat of foreign invasion again. The external threat not only radicalised the Revolution, but also led to an increase in xenophobic feeling in Paris. Moreover, with the atrocities of the Terror accelerating Revolutionary élan decreased rapidly. Robespierre, who had been an adversary of the war from the beginning claiming that people do not fancy armed missionaries and the war could only lead to an enforcement of the executive and eventually even to military dictatorship,331 was mainly concerned with finishing the Revolution within France and to conserve its achievements. The Girondins had plunged France into war convinced that a regenerated France could take on the entire world.332 After the military defeats and domestic opposition to the Revolution of 1793, such optimism disappeared. French Revolutionaries became highly suspicious and somewhat xenophobic. Since Brissot had convinced the French that a free people was invincible, defeats must have been caused by treason.333 Not unwarrantedly a siege mentality took control of the French making them feel entirely isolated and attacked by a hostile outside world supported by traitors and a fifth column inside France.334 The need of organising a popular army of volunteers and conscripts in combi­nation with an enduring fear for foreign, Counter-revolutionary forces increased xenophobia and appeals to national sentiments and the national interest in France.335 The Great Fear went international. Initial sympathy towards Britain veered round into intense hatred.336 Under the influence of fear and conspiracy theories, French security became paramount at the expense of cosmopolitanism and interna-

331   Godechot, 1983, p. 70; Schroeder, 1994, pp. 126–127; Belissa, 1995, pp. 293–298; Vovelle, 2000, p. 14; Droz, 2005, p. 182; Lentz, 2005c, p. 424. 332   Broers, 1996, p. 13. 333   Sutherland, 2003, p. 126. 334   Palmer, 1959, p. 483; Schama, 1989, p. 35; Armstrong, 1993, pp. 92–93; Black, 1999, p. 164 and p. 170; Schama, 2000, p. 441; Vovelle, 2000, p. 16; Sutherland, 2003, p. 54. 335   Schama, 1989, p. 200; Belissa, 1995, p. 324. 336  Laurent, 1869, p. 144; Belissa, 1995, p. 390. The British Prime Minister, William Pitt, was even declared to be an ‘enemy of mankind’ on 7 August 1793; Nys, 1896, p. 397; Grewe, 2000, p. 423.



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tional fraternity.337 In 1793–1794, French policy and popular opinion became more pragmatic and nationalistic in its orientation.338 Policy was increasingly determined by France’s national interest and security. This rise of selfish motives coincided with increasing adherence to a Vattelian worldview of co-existing nations respecting each other’s sovereignty instead of cosmopolitanism or internationalism and, by consequence, a return to Vergennes’ policy of moderation.339 Because of enduring pressure, both from within and from without, more radical Revolutionaries gained ground.340 In the course of 1793, the Jacobins took over control of the Convention from the Girondins.341 They terminated the propaganda war. Throughout the first months of 1793, the army engineer Lazare Carnot and the radical lawyer Georges Jacques Danton fiercely criticized the Girondin foreign policy. In a report to the Convention of 14 February 1793, Carnot gave precedence to French interests but he did so within the framework of views on international relations that bear witness of a Vattelian view on European order.342 Self-defence legitimised virtually every action, but other nations’ interests were not to be harmed either. International relations were directed by natural law and based on independence and reciprocal respect for each other’s rights.343 Danton argued against intervention. He strongly resisted the decree of fraternité et secours, as, taken seriously, it would take the French armies all the way to China.344 Instead, France was to take a moderate course, partly returning to traditional diplomatic practice and seeking a compromise peace with most Coalition powers—Britain included—in order to save France and enabling French forces to be concentrated against Austria.345 On 14 April 1793, he managed to have the Convention nationale revoke the propaganda decrees.346 Moreover, the Convention renounced intervention abroad

  Schama, 1989, p. 31 and pp. 35–36.   Palmer, 1964, p. 116 and p. 123; Armstrong, 1993, pp. 215–216; Belissa, 1995, p. 370; Lentz, 2005c, p. 430. 339   Belissa and Leclercq, 2001, p. 211. 340   Sutherland, 2003, pp. 127–128. 341   Palmer, 1964, p. 56. 342   Bois, 2005, p. 63. 343   Armstrong, 1993, pp. 213–214; Belissa, 1995, p. 345; Lentz, 2005c, p. 438. 344  Nys, 1896, p. 393; Armstrong, 1993, p. 106; Gauthier, 2002, no page numbers indicated (online publication). 345  Laurent, 1869, p. 184; Nys, 1896, p. 393; Potiemkine, 1946, p. 340; Schama, 2000, p. 747; Black, 2002, p. 213; Sutherland, 2003, p. 173; Droz, 2005, p. 196. 346   Armstrong, 1993, p. 106; Black, 1999, p. 166. 337 338

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and declared a return to the traditional ius in bello as France’s enemies did not conduct the war according to the more enlightened laws of war yet either.347 The French Republic was not to be ‘more Catholic than the Pope,’ the latter one actually being among its rivals. Because of the need of defending France’s borders, the project of creating sisters along the eastern border had already been lost out of side. Military setbacks had deprived it of any practical relevance.348 Moreover, in the Jacobins’ view, foreign Patriots were suspected, too, because of their connections with the Girondins.349 In the end, Danton’s anti-interventionist, anti-expansionist speeches to the Convention would backfire. He introduced the notion of natural borders in Revolutionary discourse,350 in which Carnot followed him.351 In their speeches, the natural borders served as limits to expansion. The notion had, in fact, been developed, for instance by François de Callières (1645–1717), in the second half of the seventeenth century both to justify and to confine French expansionism.352 Each nation was said to have its fixed territory demarcated by borders dictated by nature itself. In the case of France, these were the borders of ancient Gaul: the Ocean, the Pyrenees, the Mediterranean, the Alps, and the Rhine. Thus, the nations of Europe were marked off vis-à-vis each other in a way that was rational and excluded any rivalry over territory or expansion thus ruling out war for the sake of territorial ambitions.353 Rousseau adhered to the notion,354 as did Montesquieu.355 The majority of ‘philosophes’ had ignored the notion, though. As cosmopolitans, they were concerned more with aligning nations than with separating them by clear and fixed borders.356 Albert Sorel has argued that the natural borders were at the core of the Revolution’s policy of expansion. Hence, in his view, the Revolution merely continued traditional French ambitions with the natural borders determining French   Redslob, 1974, p. 280; Belissa, 1995, p. 363.   Harouel, 1997a, p. 37; Harouel, 1997b, pp. 14–15. 349   Godechot, 1983, p. 77. 350  Nys, 1896, p. 381; Godechot, 1983, p. 72; Grewe, 2000, p. 323; Droz, 2005, p. 191; Lentz, 2005c, p. 438. 351   Godechot, 1983, p. 73; Droz, 2005, p. 192. 352   Grewe, 2000, p. 322; Keens-Soper, 2001, p. 111. 353  Laurent, 1869, p. 237; Grewe, 2000, p. 322; Englund, 2004, p. 197; Lentz, 2005c, p. 439; Savage, 2007, p. 318. 354   Belissa, 1995, p. 100; Droz, 2005, p. 191. 355   Grewe, 2000, p. 323; Fontana, 2006, p. 118. 356   Belissa, 1995, p. 100. 347 348



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foreign policy, the course of war, and peace negotiations throughout the Revolutionary Wars.357 In his spirit, the ideal of natural borders has been reproached of having been an excuse for expansion.358 Until the Revolution the notion of natural borders had, however, intended to limit or rule out territorial expansion and that was the purpose ­Danton had by mentioning them, too. However, the natural borders, the Rhine in particular, would become a dogma of Revolutionary foreign policy in years to come.359 In the summer and autumn of 1793, the French could not yet afford dreaming of expansion. Defending France’s present territory took all energy the French had left. Organising the national defence was the Convention’s first concern. It established the Comité de Salut public charged with the direction of diplomacy and military administration.360 ‘Représentants en mission’ were sent to the armies and various departments to vest and maintain the Convention’s authority.361 On 23 August 1793, the Convention proclaimed the ‘levée en masse.’362 The entire natural and human resources of the French nation were to be mobilised for the war effort.363 In November, Robespierre explicitly renounced the policy of sister republics.364 France was to maintain amicable relations with other free nations and France’s traditional allies and to abstain from conquest and liberation by force.365 2.5  Securing the Revolution After Robespierre’s fall during the thermidor coup d’état (27–28 July 1794) French foreign policy was more and more determined by French self-interest and security.366 As Simon Schama put it: ‘The priorities of the Thermidorians were altogether less subtle. They had inherited all the chauvinism of their predecessors with none of their cumbersome

357   Sorel, 1906IV, pp. 456–469; Geyl, 1965, p. 283, p. 285 and p. 327; Belissa, 1995, p. 17. 358   Geyl, 1959, p. 282; Dwyer, 2001, p. 121. 359   Belissa, 1995, p. 347; Grewe, 2000, p. 323; Savage, 2007, p. 318. 360   Sorel, 1906IV, p. 125. 361   Godechot, 1983, pp. 128–129; Schama, 2000, p. 702. 362   Sutherland, 2003, p. 182. 363   Wright, 1984, p. 5. 364   Palmer, 1964, pp. 35–36; Harouel, 1997b, pp. 14–15. 365   Godechot, 1983, p. 77. 366   Sorel, 1906IV, p. 167 and p. 259; Geyl, 1959, p. 283.

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ideological baggage. The diplomatic section of the Committee of Public Safety comprised men of serpentine pragmatism like Sieyes, Reubell and Carnot, all concerned that the first interest of the French Republic should be its security, the second its power, and who were convinced that both were better served by judicious exploitation of military success rather than liberal sacrifices which at a later date France might repent.’367 The Thermidorians ended the revolutionary dictatorship. For the time being, the Convention and the Comité de Salut public remained in charge of French politics. By October 1795, a new constitution was established with a bilateral legislature and an executive council of five members: the Directoire. At the same time, military success brought expansion and the republicanisation of Europe within the realm of reality again. The Battle of Fleurus (26 June 1794) reopened Belgium to French armies thus reviving prospects of expansion and the creation of sister republics.368 Whether to pursue the 1792–policy or to opt for a more moderate course became the issue of fierce debate.369 At the core of this debate stood the question whether republican France could (re)gain a place within a European order mainly formed by hereditary, more or less absolutist monarchs.370 Military victory decreased the willingness to compromise.371 Some wanted to continue the ideological battle, claiming that co-existence of the two ideological systems was impossible.372 However, from 1795 to the summer of 1797 more moderate factions among the Revolutionaries dominated French politics. After the Terror and almost three years of war, Thermidorians desired peace and domestic order. To guarantee the domestic gains of the Revolution they needed to stabilise the situation both internally and externally.373 These sentiments strengthened as Thermidorians had to face social unrest all over France in the spring of 1795. The Convention was even stormed by angry mobs on 1 April and 20 May.374 In the autumn (vendemiaire), new uprisings in Paris were put down

  Schama, 1989, [quote taken from English edition: 1977, p. 200].   Harouel, 1997b, p. 16. 369   Sorel, 1906IV, p. 220. 370   See Belissa, 2006. 371   Black, 2002, p. 213. 372   Belissa, 2006, p. 83. 373  Lucas, 1977, p. 231; Belissa, 1999a, p. 7; Sutherland, 2003, p. 260. 374   Sutherland, 2003, pp. 247–255. 367 368



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before they could get out of hand.375 This left the men in power with a disposition against disorder and a fear for anarchy and hoi polloi, dreaming of a ‘republic without revolution.’376 By consequence, they were very reluctant in lending an ear to foreign ‘radicals’ pushing for liberation of their countries now that France was doing well again.377 In the international sphere, they strove towards a compromise. As far as diplomatic traditions were not entirely at odds with republican values, France was to return to customary diplomacy and to be reintegrated in Europe.378 For instance, Grégoire’s draft for a declaration of the law of nations, submitted to the Convention again on 23 April 1795, was rejected.379 At least in public, the Directoire would initially manifest a respect for the rule of law.380 Waging a total and ideological war was replaced by a policy of peace, although that peace had to be ‘juste et durable.’381 Above all, France’s republican constitution had to be a precondition of peace. In a declaration issued at Verona after the death of the Dauphin, the Count de Provence (or: Louis XVIII) held on to absolute royal sovereignty and excluded all regicides382 from amnesty. Hence, the Revolution and its leaders could only be saved by preserving the Republic.383 The rest of Europe had to accept that one of the major powers was ruled by men who had a king’s blood on their hands. By moderating its ambitions the French Republic managed to conclude peace treaties with the Grand Duke of Tuscany,384 the King of Prussia and the King of Spain in the spring and summer of 1795. Sweden, too, restored diplomatic relations.385 France re-entered the

  Sorel, 1906IV, p. 440; Church, 1970, p. 512; Droz, 2005, pp. 204–205.   Belissa, 2005, p. 96; Belissa, 2008, p. 121. 377   Palmer, 1964, p. 177. 378   Guyot, 1907, pp. 89–91; Baillou, 1984, p. 281 and p. 344; Armstrong, 1993, p. 104; Belissa, 2005, p. 96. 379   Mirkine-Guetzevitch, 1928, p. 309; Armstrong, 1993, p. 107. 380  Lucas, 1977, pp. 232–233 and p. 236. 381   Sorel, 1906IV, pp. 130–132; Homan, 1971, p. 113; Belissa, 2005, p. 96; Lentz, 2005c, p. 446; Thomas, 2005, p. 183. Discourse of Boissy d’Anglais in the Convention nationale on 30 January 1795; reiterated in: Sorel, 1906 IV, pp. 230–231. 382   Members of the Convention nationale that had voted for the execution of Louis XVI. 383   Sorel, 1906IV, pp. 370–371; Palmer, 1964, pp. 247–248; Guyot, 1907, p. 108; Sutherland, 2003, p. 256. 384  Laurent, 1869, p. 202. 385   Masson, 1877, p. 352. On 14 September 1795, France and Sweden even concluded a Secret Treaty of Alliance by which the King of Sweden was obliged to put a 375 376

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­ iplomatic arena.386 From now on peace could be concluded with every d prince willing to accept and recognise the new order in France no matter to what extent that prince suppressed his own subjects. Thus the ideological conflict that had been the base of the Revolutionary Wars disintegrated in a mainly commercial struggle with Britain and traditional competition with Habsburg Austria for domination of Germany and Italy.387 Unfortunately, Frenchmen disagreed on whether Austria or Britain was the primary enemy,388 causing the focus in French foreign policy to shift from a Continental perspective to a maritime­colonial perspective and back frequently.389 A second priority for the Thermidorians’ foreign policy—besides peace that is—was to create international guarantees for French security. The French Republic had (temporarily) abandoned its attempts to republicanise Europe. To the Revolutionaries that meant that France would be free within a permanent hostile environment. Eighteenthcentury experience after all taught that every peace with the princes of Europe would be of an ephemeral nature. It would just be a matter of time until one of its neighbours would take up arms again.390 The members of the Comité de Salut public and later of the Directoire disagreed on the way France could best protect itself against that threat.391 Henceforth, one should be careful to speak of ‘the’ foreign policy of ‘the’ French government in the period between thermidor and the Consulat or even Napoleon’s imperial coronation. Various politicians with different views and priorities alternated in dominating foreign policy in which what was a highly instable domestic and international context anyhow. The adherents of the ‘anciennes limites’ claimed that France should confine to its 1792 borders, thus providing the least provocation for war. Lazare Carnot, although he applauded the creation of the ­Batavian squandron to sea with the purpose of protecting neutral rights. The Batavian Republic was kept outside of this alignment with the exception of Article 7: ‘Le Roi de Suède promet d’employer tous ses efforts et de se réunir à la France et à la Hollande [author’s underlinement] pour engager le Roi de Danemark à un concert d’opérations communes qui puissent assures la liberté des mers et la réparation des atteintes qui lui ont été ou pourraient lui être portées par l’Angleterre.’ (CTS vol. 52, pp. 477–480) 386   Belissa, 2007, p. 39. 387   Broers, 1996, p. 14. 388   Sorel, 1906IV, p. 176; Homan, 1971, p. 131. 389   Schroeder, 1994, pp. 160–161. 390   Sorel, 1906V, p. 282; Belissa, 2006, pp. 67–68. 391  Vovelle, 2000, p. 19.



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Republic, advocated mitigating territorial ambitions, that is, abandoning the natural borders in order to establish peace swiftly, which was necessary to normalise the domestic situation and restore state finances.392 Once a Director he would hold on to this view in which his colleague Charles Letourneur would support him.393 However, they formed a minority within the Directoire as did the protagonists of the ‘anciennes limites’ in general.394 A second group shared the preference for an isolationistic policy, but did think it wise to create the best possible military-strategic position for the French Republic by getting well-tenable borders. A majority of Thermidorians regarded the natural borders as the best guarantee for French security.395 Thus the notion of rational borders dictated by nature served as justification for limited expansion.396 Moreover by the aggrandisement that went along with stretching the Republic up to the river Rhine the French Republic would be fully compensated for the increase of territory Russia, Prussia and Austria had gained from partitioning Poland397 and for the growth of the British colonial empire.398 Right at the very end of its existence, the Convention nationale explicitly adopted the principle of natural borders on the occasion of the annexation of Belgium (1 October 1795).399 Since the Belgian departments were mentioned in the 1795 Constitution, adopted a short while afterwards, the natural borders were partly embedded in French constitutional law.400 In the Directoire, Reubell was a fervent advocate of annexation of the Rhineland since that would drastically

392   Reinhard, 1952, p. 160; Godechot, 1983, pp. 79–83; Schama, 1989, p. 332; Vovelle, 2000, p. 17. 393  Vovelle, 2002, p. 25. 394   Godechot, 1983, p. 83. 395   Sorel, 1906IV, p. 174, p. 230 and p. 233; Homan, 1971, pp. 88–89; Godechot, 1983, pp. 81–82; Vovelle, 2000, p. 17; Droz, 2005, pp. 201–202. 396   Englund, 2004, p. 71; Lentz, 2005c, p. 430. 397   The three great powers partitioned the old Kingdom of Poland amongst themselves in three phases: 1772, 1793 and 1795. 398   Guyot, 1907, p. 295; Kaiser, 1990, p. 219; Schroeder, 1994, p. 161; Black, 2002, p. 215. 399   The Rhineland was not unilaterally annexed yet since that would have been a direct violation of the peace treaty with Prussia. Sorel, 1906IV, p. 387, p. 429 and p. 448; Guyot, 1907, p. 109; Ross, 1981, p. 113; Godechot, 1983, p. 80; Stevens, 1994, p. 13. 400   Sorel, 1906IV, p. 213, p. 260 and p. 431.

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increase the safety of his birth ground—the Alsace.401 Reubell realised that ­Prussian support was necessary to have the Rhine frontier accepted. Hence, relations with Prussia were to be improved or at least ­Berlin was not to be offended.402 This would influence Reubell’s and, by consequence during his dominance, the Directoire’s attitude towards the Batavian Republic. The Director Paul Barras, although in favour of a swift peace, supported Reubell against Carnot for political and personal reasons.403 Although they gave precedence to expansion of French territory to realise the natural borders, Reubell and Barras did oppose creating sister republics because they deemed the policy to be rather expensive and hard to put into practice.404 As Barras would argue in his memoirs, creating sister republics would render France responsible for ­supporting and maintaining them.405 France would be better of sticking within its new and secure borders in the context of an order of independent states. A third group was convinced that France would only be safe once preponderant in Western Europe and thus did continue the old Girondin policy of creating sister republics to cover the natural borders.406 Due to the war situation plans to create sister republics had remained ‘a policy’ throughout 1792–1793. In April 1795, Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes, supported by Merlin de Douai, at the time members of the Comité de Salut public, dusted off the Girondin notion of sister republics. Those sister republics would be linked to France by a common system of government and a common interest in maintaining liberty. Thereto, the sister republics would take the first blow in case of an attack by another great power serving as an intermediate buffer, and could contribute their financial and human resources to the protection of liberty.407 Surrounded by ‘sisters,’ (or ‘daughters,’ France sometimes being referred to as the ‘République-Mère’408) France with its natural

401   Homan, 1971, p. 89; Guyot, 1907, pp. 117–118 and p. 673; Godechot, 1983, pp. 81–82; Vovelle, 2002, p. 26; Lentz, 2005c, p. 456. 402  Van Deusen, 1932, p. 66; Bastid, 1970, p. 159; Homan, 1971, p. 95 and p. 131. 403  Vovelle, 2000, p. 19. 404   Guyot, 1907, p. 119; Vovelle, 2000, pp. 17–18. 405   Thomas, 2005, p. 276. 406  Van Deusen, 1932, p. 106; Koung, 1934, p. 112; Bastid, 1970, pp. 157–158; Hafen, 1994, p. 87; Englund, 2004, p. 71 and p. 112. 407   Sorel, 1906IV, p. 357; Homan, 1971, p. 89; Guyot, 1907, p. 119; Godechot, 1983, p. 83; Armstrong, 1993, p. 287; Vovelle, 2000, pp. 17–18; Vovelle, 2002, p. 25. 408   At the time itself, for instance by Georg Friedrich von Martens (1807, p. 382).



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borders would be safe in the middle.409 Moreover, the French hegemony over Western Europe would create a new balance of power, now between the Revolutionary, republican Europe of nation-states and the feudal Europe of the despotic princes.410 Neither Sieyes nor Merlin would be a member of the Directoire initially though.411 Within the first Directoire, only the Director La Revellière endorsed a system of sister republics unconditionally at the time.412 Unfortunately for Batavian, Italian, and Swiss Patriots—and even more for German and Irish ones—not the idealists of 1792 but the realists of 1795 were enabled to actually conduct a policy of sister republics.413 At the time French soldiers marched across the river Rhine into the United Provinces and negotiations with the Dutch on a treaty of peace and alliance started the discussion in Paris on what foreign policy to pursue was still going on, though. Sieyes en Reubell negotiated a treaty of peace and alliance with the United Provinces that were renamed ‘Batavian Republic,’ the first actual sister republic.414 However, the Netherlands had been a republic—to be sure, not yet in the image of the French Republic—for two centuries, Dutch Patriots had been in power before, and the United Provinces had been France’s ally then since Vergennes had valued Dutch support against Britain. Hence, it did not take a policy of sister republic to come up with the idea of reforming the Dutch Republic and forming an alliance between the French and Dutch Republics. Moreover, for the time being the French did not really—not even behind the scenes—interfere in bringing about constitutional change.415 Manifesting French influence too openly would have alienated Prussia and would have made Britain even more reluctant to return Dutch colonies that had been occupied after the French invasion.416 Moreover, it would not have been acceptable to a considerable part of the Convention nationale and the legislative councils. In 1799, the then former Directors Reubell, Merlin,  Van Sas, 2002, p. 12.   Belissa, 1999a, pp. 12–13. 411   Merlin became a member after the 1797 fructidor coup and Sieyes after the 1799 prairial coup. 412   Harouel, 1997a, p. 38; Vovelle, 2002, p. 26. 413   Harouel, 1997a, p. 37; Harouel, 1997b, p. 3. 414   Harouel, 1997b, p. 23. For a short while there had been a ‘sister republic’ already in 1792 as the territory of the Bishopric of Basel west of the Rhine was transformed into the Rauracian Republic before being annexed by France; Harouel, 1997b, p. 22. 415   Harouel, 1997b, p. 26; Van Sas, 2002, p. 11. 416  De Gou, 1988, pp. x-xi. 409 410

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La Revellière, and Treilhard would even be indicted by the Conseil des Cinq-Cents for having violated the sovereignty and independence of other nations because of their involvement in supporting coup d’états in the sister republics and interference with their constitutions.417 It took the Dutch Staten Generaal several months to agree on the convocation of a national assembly by the way. The Batavian Nationale Vergadering would meet for the first time on 1 March 1796. Another year later, a draft constitution was submitted to a popular referendum and rejected. A second Nationale Vergadering altered the draft constitution. After a coup d’état in January 1798, endorsed by Paris, radical Unitarians were able to draw a constitution and have it accepted by the Batavian people in a referendum by mid-April. The constitution—the Bataafse Staatsregeling—entered into force in May 1798 with, according to the French example, an executive council of five members heading the executive: the Uitvoerend Bewind.418 In search of a compromise peace with Austria and Great Britain the Directoire during its first year of existence rejected the creation of other sister republics. Mainly after the conquest of Italy in 1796, however, the Directoire lost control of its generals.419 Its incapability to control military events, commanders in the field, and associates abroad in combination with domestic political instability, prevented Batavian Republic Staten Generaal

1795–1806 –1796

Nationale Vergadering

1796–1798

Staatsregeling 1798 Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam and Uitvoerend Bewind

1798–1801

Staatsregeling 1801 Wetgevend Lichaam and Staatsbewind

1801–1805

Staatsregeling 1805 Wetgevend Lichaam and Raadpensionaris

1805–1806

 De Gou, 1988, p. xxviii.   Guyot, 1907, p. 578 and p. 732. For the text of the 1798 Bataafse Staatsregeling see Van Hasselt, 1987, pp. 17–27. 419   Palmer, 1964, p. 330; Harouel, 1997a, pp. 37–38; Harouel, 1997b, p. 17; Vovelle, 2002, p. 23. 417 418



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the Directoire from formulating and conducting a consistent and stable foreign policy.420 General Bonaparte erected several republics in northern Italy: the Cispadane Republic (consisting of Modena and the former papal territories around Bologna and Ferrara; December 1796), the Ligurian Republic (Genova; June 1797), and the Cisalpine (later Italian) Republic (Lombardy, with some parts of Piedmont, Veneto, the Valtelline and the Cispadane Republic added to it; July 1797).421 The Directoire initially intended to continue the Thermidorians’ policy of moderation.422 In the end the third group prevailed, though, because military events decided for the politicians in Paris.423 The concept of the natural borders and the idea of a barrier of sister republics became the pillars of the Directoire’s foreign policy.424 Forced by internal—from more radical or idealistic elements in French politics—or external— from foreign Patriots desperate to keep to the expectations raised by Girondin public statements425—pressure the members of the French government opposing such an expansionist move gave in. While doing so, they decided that in that case foreign Patriots were to be made useful to French interests in that the French government would be able to control the occupied territories across the Rhine and the Alps and make them to contribute their countries’ financial and material resources to the war effort;426 a strategy Marc Belissa has called the ‘instrumentalisation des patriotes européens.’427 The Revolution had started as a crisis in public finances and that crisis was not over yet. For years to come the French government was in huge financial problems, only being able to balance the budget by and thus becoming more and more dependent on the sister republics’ financial contributions and having them pay for the French troops ‘defending’ their

  Woolf, 1991, p. 16.   On the creation of sister republics in Italy and Italian Patriotism see: Pingaud, 1914a and 1914b; Storia di Milano, 1959; Connelly, 1966; Guyot, 1907, p. 567; Godechot, 1983, p. 191 and p. 194; Ferrero, 1994; Leonardi, 1994; Blanning, 1996, p. 174 and p. 178; Harouel, 1997b, pp. 35–46 and pp. 103–116; Vovelle, 2000; Del Bianco, 2002; Francesco, 2002; Zaghi, 2004; Migliorini, 2005; Pillepich, 2005; Rao, 2008. 422   Homan, 1971, p. 113. 423   Palmer, 1964, p. 330; Harouel, 1997b, p. 17; Englund, 2004, p. 112; Belissa, 2005, p. 106. 424   See Godechot, 1983, pp. 79–85. 425   Belissa, 2006, pp. 82–83. 426   Sorel, 1906IV, p. 467; Schama, 1989, p. 27 and pp. 36–37. 427   Belissa, 2005, p. 103. Belissa, 2006, p. 308; Belissa, 2008, p. 120. 420 421

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territories directly.428 Financial needs would dominate the treatment of the sister republics to a large extent.429 It would be too easy to sustain continuity between the 1792 Girondins and the way the notion of sister republics was used from 1795 onwards. Basically, France entirely returned to a policy of a simple alliance structure consisting of minor powers,430 this time clearly with a hegemonic purpose, though. Besides a radical minority, the sister republics no longer were part of a discourse of a federative order based on reciprocal respect for each other’s rights.431 The cosmopolitan undertone had disappeared. To be sure, a discourse of liberty would be present throughout the Directoire and Consulat periods, but liberty and liberation did not necessarily equal equality and fraternity.432­ Liberating other nations was a good thing for sure, but as Merlin argued, the sister republics’ independence was to be compatible with French security, which called for some kind of French control.433 The sister republics were to serve French hegemony,434 thus forming what Marc Belissa has called ‘une sorte d’hégémonie fédérative.’435 At least, the sister republics were to be placed under temporary tutelage,436 since experience of the past years had shown that other nations were not worthy of freedom yet or not capable of attaining freedom without French support and leadership.437 In sum, Harouel had a point when he called the sister republics’ independence ‘theoretical,’438 as did Laurent by calling them ‘république[s] filiale[s].’439 Not all people were expected to be able to handle full sovereignty from the start. For the time being those peoples that were not, were placed under the tutelage of the French nation. The treatment of the liberated people did vary according to French views on the extent of their maturity to be able to be independent and free in domestic

428   Godechot, 1983, p. 126; Kaiser, 1990, p. 219; Blanning, 1996, p. 160; Schama, 2000, p. 705. 429   Schama, 2000, p. 704. 430   Sorel, 1906IV, pp. 179–180; Belissa, 2006, p. 66. 431   Belissa and Leclercq, 2001, p. 211; Belissa, 2005, p. 94; Belissa, 2008, p. 121. 432   Belissa, 2005, p. 95; Belissa, 2008, p. 119. 433  De Gou, 1988, p. x; Belissa, 2005, pp. 93–94; Belissa, 2008, p. 119. 434   Belissa, 2005, p. 97. 435   Belissa, 2005, p. 106; Belissa, 2008, p. 124. 436   Belissa, 2005, p. 95. 437   Blanning, 1996, p. 246; Belissa, 2005, pp. 93–94; Belissa, 2008, p. 118. 438   Harouel, 1997a, pp. 37–38. 439  Laurent, 1869, p. 254.



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­ atters and with regard to their external relations. That view varied m from country to country and depended on which faction dominated French national politics. As said before, the Batavian Patriots were allowed to make their own constitution in 1795–1796, whereas the French government decided to intervene in the winter of 1797–1798, that is after the fructidor coup in Paris, after the project for a constitution had been rejected by the Batavian electorate in a referendum, and after the Batavian fleet had been defeated by the British at Camperdown (11 October 1797).440 Italian Patriots were given a constitution by General Bonaparte in 1797 as they were still thought of as superstitious sheep led by Catholic priests.441 The Helvetic Constitution was written by one of the leading Swiss Patriots and adopted by a Swiss Assembly, but a draft had been approved a priori and drastically changed by the French Directoire.442 Needless to say, foreign Patriots did not share this vision of instrumentalisation and tutelage. To them, the creation of a sister republic in their country was indeed a step towards independence and regeneration of a sovereign nation.443 Although most of them accepted French leadership and selfishness to a certain extent, they had no intentions of being administers of French policy.444 Furthermore, whereas cosmopolitan fraternity had become a marginalised minority position within France, some ardent advocates of international revolutionism were still to be found elsewhere. In 1795, Kant still envisioned France as the nation that would unite all peoples in a federation thus bringing perpetual peace.445 The Italian Patriot, Matteo Galdi, would argue in favour of a federative order of republics to be built and expanded from the basis of a French-Italian-Batavian union throughout the period of the Revolutionary Wars.446 All sister republics originated from French military occupation and rested on regimes in need of French support to survive.447 This made it very hard for foreign Patriots to resist   Guyot, 1907, p. 578 and p. 732.   Godechot, 1983, p. 333 and p. 347. 442   Harouel, 1997b, pp. 121–123. See also Strickler, 1886–1903; Strickler, 1898; Strickler, 1899; Oechsli, 1899; Oechsli, 1903; Nabholz, 1921; Zaeslin, 1960; Bauer, 1962; Aubert, 1974; Rufer, 1974; Böning, 1985; Fankhauser, 1986; Vovelle, 2000; Fankhauser, 2002; Lerner, 2004. 443   Schama, 1989, p. 39; Woolf, 1991, p. 47. 444   Belissa, 2005, p. 97; Belissa, 2008, p. 121. 445  Vinogradoff, 1923, pp. 67–68. 446  Van Sas, 2002, p. 12; Belissa, 2005, p. 101; Rao, 2008, p. 105. 447   Harouel, 1997b, p. 22. 440 441

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French intentions. Although more and more disillusioned, they would essentially stay loyal to France because they had no other options.448 In the autumn of 1797 more democratic or radical elements in the French political spectrum took over power during the fructidor coup d’état. The 1797 elections had been won by moderates and supporters of peace at any price. They had elected the moderate Barthélémy to the Directoire and had forced a ministerial change. Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand replaced Charles Delacroix as head of the foreign office on 16 July.449 To turn the tide, three Directors staged a coup.450 During a short period of little less then one year international revolutionism that is to say, spreading the Revolution and republicanising Europe came to the fore again.451 Merlin, who replaced Carnot as Director, was an ardent supporter of the policy of sister republics.452 During this new climax of democratic revolutionism several coups were initiated in the existing sister republics,453 the French government military intervened in political struggles in the Swiss Confederation and—although not in public—interfered in the formation of the Batavian Constitution. The French government first supported a coup by radical Batavian Patriots on 22 January 1798 that allowed them to force through a democratic and unitary constitution.454 A few weeks after the Bataafse Staatsregeling had entered into force, radicals were forced out of office again and replaced by more moderate Patriots during a new coup that was once more supported by Paris (12 June 1798).455 The intervention in Switzerland led to the creation of the Helvetic Republic, the third of the major and long-lasting sister republics.456 Plans were also made for

  Broers, 1996, p. 121 and p. 124.   Waresquiel, 2003, p. 209. 450   Bruun, 1965, p. 8; Homan, 1971, p. 122; Godechot, 1983, p. 194; Waresquiel, 2003, p. 208. 451  Laurent, 1869, p. 252; Palmer, 1964, p. 330; Godechot, 1983, p. 85 and pp. 197– 198. 452   Harouel, 1997b, p. 49. 453   Godechot, 1983, pp. 357–359; Harouel, 1997b, pp. 103–116 and pp. 121–123. 454   Guyot, 1907, p. 578 and p. 732. For the text of the 1798 Bataafse Staatsregeling see Van Hasselt, 1987, pp. 17–27. 455   Guyot, 1907, pp. 736–737. 456   Harouel, 1997b, pp. 50–57 and pp. 121–123. On the Helvetic Republic, see also: Strickler, 1886–1903; Strickler, 1898; Strickler, 1899; Oechsli, 1899; Oechsli, 1903; Nabholz, 1921; Chapuisat, 1945; Zaeslin, 1960; Bauer, 1962; Aubert, 1974; Rufer, 1974; Böning, 1985; Fankhauser, 1986; Vovelle, 2000; Fankhauser, 2002; Moos, 2002; Lerner, 2004. 448 449



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sister republics in Germany (Cisrhenan or Swabian)457 and Ireland, but these plans did not materialise due to strategic considerations and the coming into power of a more moderate government in France again in the summer of 1798. At the start of the War of the Second Coalition (1795–1801) that broke out after the French invasion of Egypt458 French armies marched into the Papal State and Naples, which led to the formation of the ephemeral Roman and Parthenopean Republics.459 As Russian and Austrian forces advanced the French soon had to evacuate Italy. The sister republics absorbed the first blows thus allowing France to organise the counterattack.460 The Roman, Parthenopean and Cisalpine Republics were destroyed and the Helvetic Republic was invaded. Anglo-Russian troops landed in Holland. After a while the French Republic’s and its allies’ armies were able to drive the allied forces back. The Cisalpine Republic was re-erected, although its territory was kept under French military occupation until a new constitution was made. The military events of the years 1799–1800 confirmed and strengthened the sense of dependence on French support with the new Patriotic regimes. By consequence, they became even more docile, although enthusiasm decreased. By the end of 1799, part of the political and economic elite had become fed up with political instability. The Directoire had been paralysed by a continuous need to balance various factions and a series of coup d’états that prevented it from stabilising the Revolution.461 Constitutional change was needed. By consequence, General Bonaparte came to power through the brumaire coup d’état (8–9 November 1799) as Premier Consul, officially being part of a triumvirate that headed the executive. Brumaire promised domestic stability and external peace in order to secure the achievements of the Revolution.462 Bonaparte, partly supported by and partly in concert with Talleyrand,463 took

  Palmer, 1964, p. 332.   France declared war on Austria and Tuscany on 12 March 1799; Martens, 1807, p. 366. 459   See e.g. Guyot, 1907, p. 593; Woolf, 1991, p. 16. 460   Boudon, 2005, p. 90. 461   Godechot, 1983, pp. 357–359; Sutherland, 2003, pp. 291–293. 462  Deutsch, 1938, p. 5; Dufraisse and Kerautret, 1999, p. 45. 463   Talleyrand had resigned the office of Ministre des Rélations extérieures on 20 July. He had been replaced by Charles Reinhard. After brumaire, Talleyrand became foreign secretary again. Waresquiel, 2003, p. 256 and p. 267. 457 458

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c­ ontrol of foreign affairs. Thus French foreign policy gained more consistency during his reign, whilst it became more opportunistic and pragmatic as well.464 Moreover, even with domestic instability solved, the war situation still brought short-term goals to the fore and caused a continuous change of policy orientations and priorities. After the Battle of Marengo (14 June 1800) France had re-occupied its dominant position in Western Europe, but it still did not dominate Europe at large and the war continued.465 For the time being, the Consulat set out to establish peace in order to put things right at home. The French government, Talleyrand in particular, held on to balance of power thinking.466 Alexandre d’Hauterive’s De l’état de France à la fin de l’an VIII (1800)—that can be taken as a statement of official government policy although the head of the foreign office’s first division published the booklet in a personal capacity—blamed the other great powers for having upset the balance of power, justified French expansion as compensation for the dismemberment of Poland, and argued that peace and equilibrium in Europe depended on respect for the law of nations.467 The Premier Consul dropped the liberal and democratic aspects of Revolutionary thought to a large extent, holding on to the aspects of rational administration.468 He sought to widen the support of the republican regime in France and in the sister republics by a policy of ‘ralliement,’ that is, reconciling elites with the new situation by turning back most radical reforms or reforms most adverse to tradition.469 This was one reason why he provoked a coup d’état to change the Constitution in the Batavian Republic. In October 1801, the Uitvoerend Bewind was replaced by an executive council of twelve members, the Staatsbewind, and the unitary and centralised character of the Batavian Republic was mitigated.470

  Masson, 1877, p. 497; Woolf, 1991, pp. 21–22.   Broers, 1996, p. 26. 466   Blanning, 2000, p. 207; Waresquiel, 2003, p. 276; Waresquiel, 2005, pp. 134– 137. 467   Hauterive, 1800. The booklet has been discussed e.g. in Masson, 1877, p. 483 and Waresquiel, 2003, pp. 273–275. 468   Kaiser, 1990, p. 239. 469   Broers, 1996, p. 138. 470  Vreede, 1864, p. 200; Van Hasselt, 1987, p. 104; Schama, 1989, pp. 480–489; De Gou, 1995. 464 465



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Initially, brumaire was welcomed in the sister republics in the hope the Consulat would abandon the Directoire’s policy of instrumentalisation.471 This hope turned out to be idle. Increasingly, short-term war goals came to dominate and even more stress was laid on the usefulness of the alliance with the sister republics, that is, on their contributions to the war effort. The sister republics’ governments lost their idealistic hopes and became primarily occupied with satisfying Napoleon in order to maintain at least their nominal independence. Moreover, the collapse of the Italian sister republics in 1799 had convinced the French that local Patriots could not be relied on to bring about their country’s regeneration. This increased France’s sense of mission and willingness to interfere actively.472 On the other hand, the sister republics like France itself increasingly fell in the firm grasp of one man who regarded the sister republics not as buffers but as military annexes.473 The period between the brumaire coup d’état and the battle of Austerlitz (2 December 1802) showed a gradual transition towards the Napoleonic Empire with the growth of the personal cult around Napoleon himself instead of the adoration for the French Republic, the rise of his ‘supranational’ role and increasing interventions in the sister republics’ domestic affaires. Thus the Revolutionary alliance of la Grande Nation and its sister republics in the end changed into the Napoleonic Empire of France with its satellites and forced allies.

  Belissa, 2005, p. 104; Belissa, 2008, p. 123.   Broers, 2005, p. 15 and p. 41. 473   Schama, 1989, p. 481; Harouel, 1997b, p. 74. 471 472

Part II

Icy rivers, chains of gold: the Franco-Batavian Alliance Nolum sanctum dare gratis. Quod promittunt sub ingressu Sanctae mentis in excessu Postquam sedent iam securi Contradictunt sancto iuri. —Carmina Burana—

chapter one

Gallicus amicus France’s first chance to give birth to a sister—the ephemeral Rauracian Republic not counting—occurred as Pichegru’s Army of the North crossed the river Rhine in January 1795. Strikingly, the first move towards the ‘liberation’ of the peoples of Europe (without making them French) did not aim at unsettling a true monarchy. The lands, out of which the Batavian Republic was to be created, did have a long republican tradition of their own.1 Republicanisation as such did not have to be initiated and hence French republican views and ideals could not be fully enforced on the Netherlands. They had to compete with endemic political traditions and ancient factional interests. France’s first sister was rather adopted instead of given birth to. This would turn out to cause difficulties for the French to reconcile their political, financial, and military purposes with their search for legitimacy. This part deals with bilateral relations between the French and Batavian Republics. The main questions are how mutual relations were shaped and, more specifically, whether these relations were egalitarian or hierarchical from a legal point of view and whether the principles of reciprocity and consent were upheld. Hence, Part II deals with the relation between a great power and one of the minor powers within its sphere of influence. It sets out to derive from these relations features of the international legal order that was envisioned, existed, or was in the making. The objective law of nations appears from the background. It was referred to in disputes on the interpretation and implementation of treaties. This volume does not intend exploring various doctrines of the law of nations. Mutual legal relations between the two sisters, as will become clear, would turn around the Alliance Treaty concluded at The Hague on 16 May 1795. This would be the reference point for future conventions and the juridical source one would fall back on next to the general law of nations every time disputes arose. It was within the scope of the

 Schama, 1989, p. 40.

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alliance that references to shared principles and interests were being made. Therefore, this part will focus on the 1795 Alliance Treaty in order to analyse the relation between the French and Batavian Republics. What kind of relationship did the Hague Treaty perpetuate? How was the alliance portrayed? What were the treaty parties’ mutual rights and obligations? In Chapter 2 the Treaty’s formation process will be analysed. How did the Treaty come about? What options to shape future relations were considered? Who initiated negotiations on an alliance? What was the role and position of either party during negotiations? Were the parties free, from a legal point of view, to consent or not to the conclusion and ratification of the Treaty? In subsequent chapters several substantial issues will be addressed. Treaty provisions can be divided in three main subjects: political and financial matters, military matters, and territorial matters. Chapter 3 pays attention to political and financial matters. In particular, attention will be paid to the French demands with regard to indemnity in combination with the formal recognition of the Batavian Republic. What was the political and legal character of the Treaty? What influence did the topical war situation have? Were there any political criteria for membership of the alliance? In what way were the war and the alliance presented? Does the notion of an ideological struggle still appear? How was the alliance structured? What was the position of either Republic within the alliance? Did the alliance amount to a (perpetual) republican subsystem within the European order? Chapter 4 focuses on the military aspects of the alliance. It is in the sphere of military cooperation that disputes arose and additional conventions were concluded. What were the character and intended duration of the alliance? What was the Batavian Republic’s status in wars waged by France, that is, was the Batavian Republic to be a full belligerent, an auxiliary, or neutral? What were the rights and duties of either party and to what extent were these rights and obligations equal and reciprocal? To what extent were parties free to decide on matters of war and peace, that is, were they free to unilaterally declare war on a third power, to conclude a separate peace, or to remain neutral? Was a position of leadership and special responsibilities attributed to France? In what way were military operations coordinated and in what way did the alliance influence command structures? Chapter 5 discusses territorial issues involved in the Treaty of The Hague. It elaborates on French claims to Batavian territory and the

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Batavian reaction to those claims. The discussion on territorial matters during negotiations on the Treaty offers an excellent opportunity to study the interaction between geopolitical considerations, (popular) sovereignty, and good faith. Special attention will be paid to legal disputes arising from the settlement with regard to the port of Flushing and disputes over jurisdiction, mainly with regard to privateer activity and measures against British goods. Part II will end with a discussion of the 1803 debate on whether the alliance would be renewed or whether the Batavian Republic would stay neutral as war with Britain broke out again. Before the Alliance Treaty will be scrutinised, a short review of Franco-Dutch relations prior to the 1795 invasion will be offered in the present chapter. 1.1  Multiple Contacts In the late sixteenth century, several more or less autonomous territories in possession of Philip II of Habsburg (1527–1598) and nominally belonging to the Holy Roman Empire2 rebelled against their overlord. In 1579 they allied in the Unie van Utrecht3 and two years later they abjured Philip of his titles in the Netherlands. After some unsuccessful attempts to find a new lord, they—Guelders, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Overijssel, Frisia, and Groningen—came to form the Republic of the United Provinces. The United Provinces’ independence from the Spanish Crown was recognised in the Treaty of Münster (30 January 1648).4 Next to the territory of the Provinces represented in the Staten Generaal, the Republic of the United Provinces consisted of the autonomous district of Drenthe and the Lands of the Generality, that is to say territory mostly south of the rivers Rhine and Scheldt that had been conquered from Spain during the Eighty Years’ War (1568– 1648) and that were administered by the Staten Generaal directly. The most important among these were the northern part of the Duchy of Brabant (Staats/Dutch Brabant), part of the County of Flanders covering the southern bank of the Scheldt estuary (Staats Vlaanderen/

  With the exception of Flanders.   29 January 1579. For the text of the Unie van Utrecht, see Blécourt and Japikse, 1919, pp. 120–125. 4   The first of the three treaties forming the illustrious Peace of Westphalia. 2 3

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Dutch Flanders), and the strongly fortified city of Maastricht on the river Meuse with some surrounding territories (Staatse Landen van Overmaze/Dutch Limburg). In 1715, the fortified city of Venlo, farther north on the river Meuse, was added. Finally, it needs to be stated that the United Provinces did not form a consolidated territory. Districts that had never or only indirectly belonged to one of the Provinces stayed autonomous. They formed enclaves belonging mostly to German princes, to chivalry orders, or to the House of Orange.5 The United Provinces formed a confederation in which the Provinciale Staten held sovereignty. The Provinciale Staten sent representatives to the assembly of ‘Their Lords the Staten Generaal’ in The Hague charged with foreign affairs and defence. They had the power to declare war, conclude peace, enter into treaties, and maintain diplomatic relations. Most decisions in the Staten Generaal had to be taken by unanimity. The provincial delegations were given strict mandates. By consequence, they frequently had to consult their principals. The composition of the Staten varied from Province to Province according to the Provinces’ traditions. In Holland, the Staten were dominated by the main cities, whereas in other Provinces the influence of the gentry was larger. Hence, an aristocracy of town magistrates and petty noblemen ruled the United Provinces. With the exception of two periods of some decades (1650–1672 and 1702–1747), each Province had a Stadhouder. He, formally as an official of the Staten, was charged with military command. In addition, the Stadhouder of Holland was Kapitein-generaal and Admiraal-generaal, that is, commander in chief of the entire Republic. The Stadhouders, all the time descendants of William of Orange (1533–1584)—the leader of the Dutch Revolt during its initial phase—or one of his brothers,6 came to represent a monarchical element within the Republic’s constitution that grew stronger after the French invasions of 1672 and 1748. In 1748 the Stadholderate of all Provinces was concentrated in one person and the position became hereditary. Moreover, the Stadhouder’s rights to nominate local magistrates, especially in the Provinces

 On these enclaves, see Smit, 1975 and Van Weel, 1977.  During the first three decades of the Dutch Republic’s existence some Provinces had Stadhouders not belonging to the family Orange-Nassau, but they were in the service of Philip II. 5 6



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occupied by Louis XIV’s army in 1672, were significantly expanded. By consequence, he was able to control several Provinciale Staten.7 Ever since the Dutch had rebelled against their common overlord in the second half of the sixteenth century, the United Provinces’ foreign policy had shifted between pro-French and pro-British sentiments. At first, both England and France had come to the Dutch rebels’ aid. Both the French and the English monarchs recognised Dutch independence by the tripartite alliance of 1596. In the decades afterwards several political factions arose in the United Provinces mainly inspired by religious disputes and opposing views on the extent of centralisation within the new Republic. The confederalist ‘Statist’ party under the leadership of the Raadpensionaris of Holland,8 Johan van Oldenbarneveldt (1547–1619), set out for a pro-French course regarding France as an essential ally against Habsburg Spain, whereas the other party made up of orthodox Calvinists in alliance with Prince Maurits van Nassau (1567–1625) and his followers preferred close relations with protestant England and despised Van Oldenbarneveldt for abandoning the cause of the French Huguenots.9 The defeat of the Statist party and the execution of Van Oldenbarneveldt in 1618—after rivalry between the two factions had gotten out of hand during the truce of 1609–1621—caused a temporary flagging of Dutch-French relations. As long as the war with Spain went on neither power was to be alienated, however, and, with France getting involved in the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), the Franco-Dutch alliance was restored in 1635.10 The Spanish-Dutch Treaty of Münster (1648), concluded by the Staten Generaal in spite of the Franco-Dutch Alliance Treaty that explicitly ruled out a separate peace, changed the political situation

 7  On the Republic of the United Provinces and its political system see: Fruin, 1980; Israel, 1996, pp. 305–335; Leenknegt, Kubben and Jacobs, 2008, pp. 47–85; and Osiander, 2008, pp. 491–492. 8   The Raadpensionaris was the highest civil official in the service of the Provinciale Staten. He headed the Staten’s secretariat. His position was permanent and usually a very influential politician was nominated for this post. In addition, he headed the Holland delegation to the Staten Generaal. Hence, the Raadpensionaris grew out to be the de facto leader of the Republic’s foreign affairs; albeit, most of the times, in competition with the Prince of Orange. 9   Berridge, 2001, p. 50; Van Deursen, 2005, pp. 173–174; Nellen, 2007, p. 93, p. 140, pp. 213–214, and p. 263. 10  See Israel, 1982; Stradling, 1986; Lesaffer, 2006. On French-Dutch relations prior to 1795 see also the various contributions in Frijhoff and Moorman van Kappen, 1993.

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drastically. Controlling a significant part of the North Sea coast, especially the Scheldt, Meuse, and Rhine estuaries, and participating in both the colonial struggle and European maritime commerce, the Dutch Republic11 nolens volens played a substantial—either active or passive—role in Western European geopolitics and was doomed to be involved in Anglo-French rivalry once both powers had restored their internal stability and became preponderant over Dutch commercial and military power in the second half of the seventeenth century.12 On the one hand, France was Holland’s largest trading partner, while England—or from 1707 onwards Britain13—became the most important competitor at sea, both commercially and military. On the other hand, France soon posed the most imminent landside military threat to the Dutch Republic and, in general, became the focus of a Europe wide counterbalancing alliance system after Spain had recognised its defeat in the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659) and Louis XIV unfolded his expansionist ambitions. Furthermore, in the course of the seventeenth century dynastic relations between the Houses of Orange and Stuart closely linked the Dutch Republic to England. In addition, France was Catholic, while England and the United Provinces shared the protestant denomination. Commercial interests, naval and military considerations, religious and dynastic loyalties interfered with each other, pointing either at the one or the other of both great powers depending on which element concerned Dutch politicians most at a certain time, and on the extent to which either the Statist or the Orangist faction dominated politics. From the start, both France and England made use of this faction struggle to gain covert control of the United Provinces, its commercial wealth, naval power, and colonial possessions.

11   In this work ‘Dutch Republic’ is used to refer to the political entity covering the Northern Netherlands throughout the entire period. It can refer both to the Republic of the United Provinces and to the Batavian Republic. Prior to 1795, of the two, only the nominator ‘United Provinces’ was used. After March 1796, with some sporadic exceptions, only ‘Batavian Republic’ was used. In the intermediate period (January 1795–March 1796) some already used ‘Batavian Republic’, while others held on to ‘United Provinces.’ In the sections covering this period ‘Batavian Republic’ and ‘United Provinces’ are only used if used in the relevant primary source as well. ‘Dutch Republic’ is used as a more neutral term, for as will become clear in chapter 3 the use of either one of the two names had significant political and legal consequences. 12  On British geopolitics and the strategic position of the Netherlands see e.g. Simms, 2007. 13   The 1707 Act of Union united the Kingdoms of England and Scotland in the Kingdom of Great Britain.

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On one occasion, a short while after the Treaty of Münster (1648), Raadpensionaris Johan de Witt (1625–1672), formulated the Dutch approach to France in stating that the United Provinces valued France as a friend but would not like it being a neighbour: ‘Gallicus amicus sed non vicinus.’14 De Witt still endeavoured to maintain a balance between France and England and in particular to maintain the ­Southern Netherlands as a buffer between France and the United Provinces.15 Having fought three maritime wars with England in the 1650s, 1660s, and 1670s, the Dutch Republic joined the English during the Ludovican Wars. After the invasion of 1672—in Dutch historiography still known as ‘the year of disaster’16—France was considered the main threat. The new Stadhouder, William III (1650–1702)—after the 1689 Glorious Revolution combining the Stadholderate of Holland and several other Provinces with the English kingship—set out for building a great anti-French coalition around the union of both maritime powers.17 That union was perpetuated by the Treaty of Westminster (3 March 1678)18 and was to last until the War of American Independence (1773–1784). Thus, for almost a century, French aggression was to be curtailed and deterred by embedding the United Provinces in a structure of alliances.19 Unlike territorially expansionist powers, the United Provinces confined themselves to defending their existing territories. As a commercial republic, foreign policy was to further security and trade interests instead of dynastic grandism.20 During the entire eighteenth century, Dutch security policy focused on defending the southern frontiers. At first its main aim was to maintain the Southern Netherlands as a buffer physically separating France and the United Provinces.21 Huge fortifications were erected in Dutch Brabant and Dutch Flanders. During the Ludovican Wars another idea arose. Dutch security was to be guaranteed by a barrier system,22 that is to say, by military control of   Blanning, 2007, p. 537; Carter, 1975, p. 8.  Carter, 1975, p. 7; Hellema, 2001, p. 25. 16  Het Rampjaar. 17  Hellema, 2001, p. 25. 18   3 March 1678, Treaty of Defensive Alliance between England and the United Provinces; CTS vol. 14, pp. 311–314. 19  Carter, 1975, p. 16. 20  Duchhardt, 1997, p. 181; Hellema, 2001, p. 18. 21  Carter, 1975, p. 7; Hellema, 2001, p. 25. 22  Carter, 1975, p. 11 and p. 17; Hellema, 2001, p. 28; Van Nimwegen, 2002, pp. 11–35. 14 15

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strongholds in the Southern Netherlands by means of Dutch garrisons in order to stop a French advance before the United Provinces’ territory was invaded. This idea was realised through the Barrier Treaties (1709–1715)23 and was one of the main pillars of ‘the Old system,’24 id est the anti-French alliance between Britain, the United Provinces and Austria, the latter having gained the Southern Netherlands at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. In the east, the United Provinces bordered on various petty German powers. With the exception of some regular fortified border towns, no special military measures were needed in the east. Dutch security could be safeguarded by diplomacy. In the course of the eighteenth century this changed because of the rise of Prussia; especially after Prussia acquired East Frisia, Cleves, and Upper Guelders. Now the United Provinces faced a great power neighbour in the east, too.25 Politically, Prussia was no real threat, though, due to family connections between the Houses of Orange and Hohenzollern. Thus the southern border was secured by military means and the eastern border by political and diplomatic ones, while the Dutch navy in combination with the maritime union with Britain secured the coasts and sea routes. For decades, this security policy worked perfectly. Even in 1748, French forces did not get any further than Bergen op Zoom before peace was concluded. Nevertheless, in combination with a severe political crisis, the shock of the French capturing Bergen op Zoom was so great that the Dutch Republic retreated into a state of permanent neutrality after the War of the Austrian Succession. In the second half of the seventeenth century, the United Provinces’ great power status was based on economic power that allowed them to dominate the seas while maintaining a sufficiently large land force to defend their territory.26 With the costs of building a fleet ever rising, armies becoming ever larger, and the rise of economic competitors, the United Provinces gradually lost the capability to maintain both pillars of its military power. They just could not afford to play along any 23   29 October 1709, First Barrier Treaty; CTS vol. 26 pp. 425–436; 29/30 January 1713, Second Barrier Treaty; CTS vol. 27, pp. 373–396; 15 November 1715, Third Barrier Treaty; CTS vol. 29, pp. 333–368; On the barrier system, see Carter, 1975, p. 30 and p. 32; Hellema, 2001, p. 28; Van Nimwegen, 2002, pp. 25–31; Blanning, 2007, p. 555. 24   Black, 2002, p. 168. 25  Carter, 1975, p. 36. 26   Kennedy, 1988, p. 85.

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more. Hence, the United Provinces dropped from the rank of the great powers into the one of the second rank powers. According to Duco Hellema, the Peace of Utrecht was the decisive moment of demotion.27 Olaf van Nimwegen has asserted that the United Provinces remained a great power until the War of the Austrian Succession.28 Even then, the barrier system was not abandoned. Dutch garrisons stayed in the Austrian Netherlands for decades to come, although the 1756 diplomatic revolution de facto ended the ratio of the barrier system.29 Austria having allied with France, the Austrian Netherlands no longer formed a buffer that would take the first blows of a French attack. The United Provinces’ territory was thus directly exposed. In that politicomilitary situation, neutrality was the most prudent policy to conduct. ­Moreover, neutrality served trade interests best.30 Throughout the Seven Years War (1756–1763), Dutch merchantmen took over shipping from French ones to a rather large extent. 1.2  Patriotism with a Hollandaise Sauce The Dutch Republic suffered from factional struggles almost the entire period of its existence. To the old Orangist and Statist parties a new, more democratic faction was added in the course of the War of the Austrian Succession. Although Prince William IV (1711–1751) at first allied with this new faction to be appointed Stadhouder of all Provinces, he defected their cause once in office.31 In the decades to come, these democratic elements, stimulated by Dutch national ­history32 and— predominantly Anglo-Scottish and German33—enlightened political ideas on popular sovereignty grew stronger and were organised in all kind of associations and societies.34 Alienated by the Stadhouder, envying Britain for having surpassed the United Provinces as economic power,35 and supporting the American rebels’ cause, they allied with the old, anti-British Statist faction. Together they formed the key  Hellema, 2001, p. 28.  Van Nimwegen, 2002, p. 9. 29  Carter, 1975, p. 82; Duchhardt, 1997, p. 183 and p. 331; Black, 2002, p. 168. 30  Carter, 1975, p. 61; Schama, 1989, p. 86. 31  Geyl, 1947, p. 17; Schama, 1989, p. 82; Israel, 2001, p. 1215. 32  Schama, 1989, p. 100 and p. 128. 33  Schama, 1989, p. 100. 34  Van Sas, 2004, p. 54. 35  Geyl, 1947, p. 42. 27 28

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e­ lements of the Dutch Patriot movement. Although the more democratic elements favoured reforms the Statist regents were not keen on, this Patriot movement was at least the heir of the old Statist party with regard to its pro-French sentiments. Dutch Patriotism was strongly influenced by the Dutch Republic’s situation at the time. The decline of the Republic’s economic prosperity and standing on the international scene was widely experienced.36 Glossing over structural changes in warfare and Europe’s economic and geopolitical system, the decline was attributed to a deterioration of morals and public virtue, especially of the regent class. The Dutch Patriot movement set out to reverse this decline through national regeneration.37 At first, Patriots in the United Provinces did not call into question the existing constitutional order. Regeneration was entirely expected from a change of attitude of those in power. In the spirit of classical republicanism, Patriots expected regeneration from restoring true republican liberty and a moral republic in which magistrates were directed by public virtue.38 Strengthening republican values and patriotic spirit were to bring about the restoration of the United Provinces to their erstwhile greatness. The ‘Golden Age’ of the seventeenth century functioned as an ideal to which the United Provinces should return.39 The Patriots’ ambition was, thus, essentially backward looking. Reforms, too, were portrayed as restorations of ancient practices or the ancient constitution.40 One demanded more popular influence on the composition of municipal councils as a first step back to local self-government.41 In the Patriots’ view this would be a restoration of former administrative practices that had been put aside by aristocratic usurpation and the regulations made after the 1672 French invasion that had substantially shifted appointment rights in most Provinces to the Stadhouder. Unsurprisingly, the Patriot movement was particularly strong in the landward provinces where many were excluded from local government due to the Stadhouder’s appointment policy.42 36  Geyl, 1947, p. 42; Schama, 1989, p. 56 and pp. 67–69; Velema, 2002, p. 72; Van Sas, 2004, p. 105 and p. 316. 37  Schama, 1989, p. 11 and p. 106. 38   Blanning, 2000, p. 48; Velema, 2002, p. 72. 39  Schama, 1989, p. 99; Velema, 2002, p. 72; Van Sas, 2004, p. 316. 40  Schama, 1989, p. 100; Rosendaal, 2002, p. 85. 41  Schama, 1989, p. 112. 42  Schama, 1989, p. 108.

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Basically, the Dutch Patriots in the 1770s and early 1780s did not envisage revolution yet. They desired to bring about a revival of the existing order.43 Henceforth, the United Provinces confederalist structure was not questioned.44 Looking backwards to the ideal of small, self-governing communities meant that the existing lose and particularist state structure had to be respected.45 While the Patriot movement in its organisations and through the contacts between its leaders soon became a truly national movement, Patriots still focused on the local level. By consequence, victories would have to be gained in every single city and province. Dutch Patriots did not have a Bastille to assail.46 Nevertheless, Dutch Patriotism was not entirely backward looking. To be sure, it was mainly oriented towards the national past. Dutch Patriots did, however, adopt some of the ‘new’ ideas—mainly the people in its political dimension—, and combined them with their historical discourse of self-government.47 Throughout the 1780s, Patriots more and more abandoned their historical discourse and moved towards more modern and radical democratic ideas of popular sovereignty and representative government.48 As Sieyes would do in France some years later, the Dutch Patriot movement came to claim being the true representative of the people.49 The regeneration movement became more political due to the American Revolution and the fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784) that resulted from it. In the 1770s neither the pro-French Statist faction aligning with the Patriot movement nor the pro-British Orangist faction were able to dominate the Staten Generaal, whereas they championed diametrically opposed foreign policies.50 For the Statists, concentrated in the Holland merchant towns, France was the main trading partner, whereas Britain was the main competitor at sea and the Holland merchants were fed up with the Royal Navy’s vexations on the high seas. Hence, they had advocated a naval build-up and strengthening sea defences. Patriots shared the pro-French orientation with the Statists. By aligning with France instead of Britain, the  Schama, 1989, p. 139; Van Sas, 2004, p. 55 and p. 193.  Schama, 1989, p. 138. 45  Schama, 1989, p. 138; Van Sas, 2004, p. 193. 46  Geyl, 1947, p. 137; Schama, 1989, p. 140. 47   Palmer, 1959, p. 331; Schama, 1989, pp. 99–100; Israel, 2001, p. 1212. 48  Schama, 1989, p. 128. 49  Van Sas, 2004, p. 221. 50  Hellema, 2001, p. 29. 43 44

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United Provinces would be able to focus on the navy and enter in an all-out competition with British trade. Once Britain had been brought down, regenerating the United Provinces would be a piece of cake.51 The Orangists, holding on to the ‘Old System,’ supported by the Staten of the landward Provinces, to the contrary, held brief for reinforcing the army, since after the 1672 and 1748 invasions, France was seen as the main military threat.52 Dutch state finances had not allowed for both programmes to be financed at the same time. Henceforth, due to the division within the Staten Generaal, neither of them had been set into motion and the United Provinces were terribly ill-prepared on the eve of war with Britain. 1.3  Switching Sides The United Provinces had been allied to Britain since 1678 when American colonists decided to have a tea party in Boston. The American rebellion turned out to be the final push needed to provoke alienation between the maritime powers. By 1780, their union had ceased to exist. By consequence, the United Provinces were isolated. For the next fifteen years, at least, France and Britain entered into a struggle to gain control over Dutch foreign policy.53 As a result, the United Provinces would be forced to abandon their neutrality policy. As John Adams would have it, the United Provinces were like a frog trapped between the hoofs of two fighting bulls.54 Faced with a rebellion in the colonies, the British government requested the Staten Generaal to put the Scottish brigades in Dutch service at its disposal.55 Since Dutch Patriots supported the Americans’ cause, they opposed honouring this request. London, contemplating to restore the ‘Old System’ with Prussia in Austria’s role,56 invoked the 167457 and 167858 treaties; to no avail. The Staten Generaal shirked its duties. Subsequently, not insisting on military support  Van Sas, 2004, p. 316.  Geyl, 1947, p. 17 and pp. 28–29; Schama, 1989, pp. 86–88; Hellema, 2001, p. 29. 53  Carter, 1975, p. 106. 54  Schama, 1989, p. 26. 55  Geyl, 1947, p. 26. 56  Carter, 1975, p. 85. 57   9 February 1674, Treaty of Peace (Westminster); CTS vol. 13, pp. 123–140. 58   3 March 1678, Treaty of Defensive Alliance (Westminster); CTS vol. 14, pp. 311–314. 51 52

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anymore, the British government demanded that the Dutch would stop supplying American rebels and would no longer supply timber to France.59 In November 1778, the Staten Generaal decided not to convoy any vessels carrying naval supplies. Amsterdam, dominated by the pro-French Statist faction, protested and demanded unlimited convoy against British privateers. The French government reacted by declaring the Staten Generaal’s decision a violation of neutrality and increased import duties on Dutch goods. The French decree of 18 January 1779 exempted Amsterdam, though, because that city had objected to the Staten Generaal’s decision. One by one the Holland cities joined Amsterdam in its pro-French course. By March 1779 the Holland Staten had turned pro-French. In the meantime, Britain had intensified measures against merchantmen carrying contraband. The Staten Generaal were trapped.60 Encouraged by Vergennes, they made a final attempt to maintain their neutrality by applying for ­membership of Catherine the Great’s Russian-Swedish-Danish League of Armed Neutrality.61 In reaction, Britain initially suspended all treaties with the United Provinces.62 Just before the United Provinces could join that league, the British government declared war on them (20 December 1780) because a draft treaty between the United States and Amsterdam had been intercepted on an American vessel.63 The war was calamitous to the Stadhouder’s credibility as commander-in-chief. Having conducted a pro-British course thus far, he was soon blamed for Dutch defeats at sea. The 1780s would turn out to be a continuous sequence of attempts by Statists-Patriots to exploit his weakness.64 With the war going badly for the Dutch and William V resisting democratic reform, Patriotism turned against him. His loyalty and more importantly constitutional position were questioned. Patriots started to form local militias and took over government in several towns by force or at least by threatening to use force. As town representatives for a considerable part formed the Provinciale Staten, Patriots soon controlled the Staten of Holland, Groningen, and Overijssel. A conflict with the Stadhouder was provoked as the Holland

 Van Hamel, 1918, p. 270.  Van Hamel, 1918, p. 271; Geyl, 1947, pp. 30–31. 61   Murphy, 1982, pp. 280–281; Neff, 2000, pp. 71–72. 62   Murphy, 1982, p. 405. 63  Geyl, 1947, pp. 33–34; Murphy, 1982, p. 284 and p. 287. 64  Geyl, 1947, p. 53; Schama, 1989, p. 89 and p. 99. 59 60

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Staten decided to deprive him of the command of the garrison in The Hague in September 1785.65 In reaction, William V left for Nijmegen.66 The Staten of Zeeland, Frisia, and Guelders remained loyal to the Prince of Orange. Utrecht was divided. Henceforth, the United Provinces were on the brink of a civil war. Both sides controlled part of the army. There even were some skirmishes, but neither side could force a breakthrough. As the Utrecht delegation to the Staten Generaal turned Patriotic, Patriots controlled a majority and were able to push through an alliance with France. In the meantime, Joseph II tried to take advantage of the political crisis in the United Provinces and of their isolation to further the interests of the Austrian Netherlands.67 Already in 1780, the Emperor decided to evict Dutch garrisons from the barrier fortresses south of Dutch Flanders, suggested to open the Scheldt, and claimed the cession of Maastricht to Austria. Two years later he unilaterally terminated the Barrier Treaties.68 In order to strengthen their domestic position, Patriot leaders persuaded the Staten Generaal to take a stand on the Scheldt issue and to repudiate all Austrian demands. In reaction, the Emperor threatened to have a vessel sail towards Antwerp. While proposing to evacuate some of the barrier fortresses, the Staten Generaal still turned down flat the opening of the Scheldt. They dispatched reinforcements to Maastricht and had men-of-war patrolling the Scheldt estuary. Joseph was not to yield. In April 1784 an Austrian merchantman sailing under the Emperor’s colours did make an attempt to sail to Antwerp. It was fired upon by Dutch batteries and, finally, stopped by a Dutch man-ofwar. The Dutch had taken the bait. Joseph II immediately recalled his envoy in The Hague.69 In August he issued an ultimatum demanding the opening of the Scheldt.70 By then, the Staten Generaal were already negotiating an alliance with France. In the course of negotiations the Dutch requested the French government to take on the commitment to defend the United Provinces. Joseph II, still France’s ally, requested the French King to

 Schama, 1989, p. 141.  Schama, 1989, p. 142. 67  Carter, 1975, p. 108; Murphy, 1982, p. 405. 68  Van Hamel, 1918, p. 286 and p. 302; Murphy, 1982, p. 406; Black, 2002, p. 201. 69   Murphy, 1982, p. 407. 70  Van Hamel, 1918, p. 303. 65 66

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mediate, too. This was exactly the kind of dispute that might provoke a major war on the Continent and with the overseas war against Britain finally going well for once, the last thing the French government could use was a Continental war. Vergennes, decided to prevent the Scheldt dispute from escalating.71 The French King decided to back the United Provinces in order not to undermine his traditional role of protector of minor powers. It had to be made sure to the Staten Generaal, though, that war was not an option.72 The Emperor, in his turn, was told that the closure of the Scheldt was established by treaties and that the Dutch were henceforth entitled to maintain that closure. Under French pressure, Joseph backed down.73 The Scheldt remained closed. Austrian claims to Maastricht were bought off. The Staten Generaal did evacuate the barrier fortresses. 74 After the break with Britain, the Staten Generaal tried to get out of their diplomatic isolation. Once Britain had declared war and the membership of the League of Armed Neutrality had been refused, they had no other choice than to align with France.75 From the start, Patriot leaders contemplated a Franco-Dutch alliance.76 Vergennes hesitated.77 On the one hand, the French government was in a victorious mood after the Peace of Versailles (1783). Political developments in the United Provinces provided the chance to humiliate and isolate Britain even more.78 On the other hand, Prussia was not to be provoked and the King did not really fancy supporting rebels that close to home. Basically, Vergennes had no choice but to support Dutch Patriots. A pro-French regime in The Hague ensured French access to the Amsterdam credit market. Above all, the United Provinces, because of their fleet and colonial possessions, would be a crucial element in an anti-British alliance system. Hence, Patriot success in the domestic political conflict was crucial to Vergennes’ foreign policy.79 Therefore, the French minister eventually yielded. He just awaited the compromise in the Scheldt dispute. As soon as the risk of a war between

  Murphy, 1982, p. 406.   Murphy, 1982, p. 410. 73   Black, 2002, p. 201 74   Murphy, 1982, pp. 412–414; Black, 2002, p. 201. 75   Murphy, 1982, pp. 460–461; Neff, 2000, p. 72. 76  Van Hamel, 1918, p. 287; Murphy, 1982, p. 463. 77   Murphy, 1982, p. 463. 78   Murphy, 1982, p. 459. 79  Geyl, 1947, p.127; Palmer, 1959, p. 336; Schama, 2000, p. 262. 71 72

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Austria and the United Provinces had disappeared, Paris aligned with the Dutch Patriots.80 On 10 November 1785 a Treaty of Defensive Alliance was concluded at Fontainebleau.81 The Treaty of Fontainebleau established a defensive alliance between France and the United Provinces. On various joints in the text it was made clear that the alliance was intended to prevent war. Both the preamble and Article XII expressly stressed that the aim of the Treaty was to safeguard the security and tranquillity of the treaty parties and to maintain the ‘general peace.’ The two parties promised to contribute to each other’s security and guaranteed each other’s possessions. Among others the 1648 Treaty of Münster—that is, the closure of the Scheldt— was included in the guarantee on the King’s side.82 They were to work together to preserve peace. In case one of them would be threatened by attack, the other was to extent its good offices to prevent hostilities.83 In case hostilities could not be prevented, the King of France and the Staten Generaal engaged to come to each other’s aid both by land and by sea. In principle, each party’s contribution was clearly fixed in numbers of troops and men-of-war to furnish. The United Provinces were to furnish less ships and men than France, though. Moreover, the United Provinces unilaterally had the right to substitute their aid in case of an attack by land by a subsidy.84 Otherwise, provisions on military aid were by and large reciprocal. The one that furnished the troops or vessels was to pay for them.85 The auxiliary forces were to be under the command of its own commanding general who was to be consulted before forces were employed. During operations they were under the command of the supreme commander of the power that had requested aid.86 If the fixed number of troops or vessels did not suffice

  Murphy, 1982, p. 464 and p. 467.   10 November 1785, Defensive Alliance between France and the United Provinces (Fontainebleau); CTS vol. 49, pp. 381–390; Geyl, 1947, p. 97; Murphy, 1982, p. 467; Schroeder, 1994, pp. 40–41; Hellema, 2001, p. 33. 82  Article 2 Treaty of Fontainebleau. 83  Article 3 Treaty of Fontainebleau. 84   The King of France was to furnish 10,000 men infantry, 2,000 men cavalry, twelve ships of the line and six frigates. The Staten Generaal were to furnish six ships of the lin and three frigates. In case France would be attacked by land, the Staten Generaal was to pay a subsidy equal to 5,000 men infantry and 1,000 men cavalry; Article 4 Treaty of Fontainebleau. 85  Article 5 Treaty of Fontainebleau. 86  Article 5 Treaty of Fontainebleau. 80 81



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to defend the requesting power, auxiliary forces would be augmented; if necessary until the ally would deploy all his forces. A maximum was set to the Staten Generaal’s contingent, though.87 If both powers were involved in a war, they would concert operations and were not to conclude peace or enter into peace negotiations without the other.88 In case of a war at sea neither power would partake in, they guaranteed each other the freedom of the sea according to the principle of free ship, free good.89 Furthermore, neither party was to enter in any future alliance or engagement contrary to the present Treaty,90 nor to conclude any treaty that would harm the other power.91 The faction struggle in the United Provinces provided the great powers with an opportunity to interfere in Dutch affairs.92 In the end, French support of the Dutch Patriots was all about driving back British influence. War was to be avoided, though. Hence, Vergennes tried to curtail the Patriots as well.93 Nevertheless, French support encouraged the Patriots to push forward.94 They swiftly radicalised. Vergennes was forced to support them more and more.95 The British, in their turn, were desperate to prevent the United Provinces from becoming part of the French sphere of influence.96 Deprived of access to Dutch colonies, Britain would have no naval bases between St. Helens and India whereas France would be able to control the sea routes to India and the Far East. Hence, the Dutch crisis was partly about world domination as well as about the European balance of power.97 Whether France or Britain would gain the upper hand depended on the outcome of the domestic politic struggle. The French government was able to follow the Patriot flow. The British had to counteract that flow actively.98 The

  87   20,000 men infantry and 4,000 men cavalry. Moreover, in this case as well, the Staten Generaal would be entitled to pay a subsidy instead; Article 7 Treaty of Fontainebleau.   88  Article 9 Treaty of Fontainebleau.   89   ‘Pavillon ami sauve marchandise ennemie’; Article 8 Treaty of Fontainebleau.   90  Article 11 Treaty of Fontainebleau.   91  Article 3 séparé Treaty of Fontainebleau.   92   Murphy, 1982, p. 466.   93   Murphy, 1982, p. 463.   94  Schama, 1989, p. 163; Schama, 2000, pp. 262–263.   95   Murphy, 1982, p. 470.   96  Van Hamel, 1918, p. 291; Schama, 1989, p. 142; Black, 2002, p. 207.   97   Blanning, 2007, p. 612. 98  Geyl, 1947, p. 130.

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British envoy in The Hague, more than anyone else, became the pivot of the Orangist reaction.99 Frederick the Great still opposed military intervention. He even advised the Stadhouder to agree to reforms.100 The British government, however, decided that the competition for control of the United Provinces was to be brought to a head.101 While the Patriots were in control of the Staten Generaal and the major cities of Holland, the Orangists planned to regain power. Their cause was supported by the British envoy, James Harris. While the Stadhouder himself was in Nijmegen, Harris intrigued in The Hague for an Orangist restoration that would bring a pro-British regime into office again.102 Initially, he did not seem to be very successful, though. For France and Prussia adopted a more moderate stance in the conflict. Not willing to intervene directly, they decided to mediate a compromise solution. After the demise of Frederick the Great and Vergennes, Harris was able to let the conflict escalate.103 Both in Paris and Berlin the main obstacles to a military solution suddenly disappeared. The new Prussian King, Frederick William II, was more inclined to support his sister, the Stadhouder’s wife, Wilhelmina of Prussia.104 Still, neither Prussia, nor France wanted a war, though. On the other hand, neither of them wanted to see the United Provinces fall into the other’s sphere of influence.105 The French government stationed an observation army on the border, but it did not intend to actually interfere.106 With the political and financial crisis in Paris escalating and Russia and Austria being involved in a war against the Ottomans, Berlin had its hands free to support the Stadhouder more actively.107 After a minor incident on 28 June 1787 in which Patriot militia near Gouda arrested the Stadhouder’s wife, the situation developed rapidly. Because of the injury done to a member of his family, Frederick William II decided to intervene after all.108 In Paris, Vergennes’ successor, Loménie de   Murphy, 1982, p. 465; Schama, 1989, p. 142.  Schama, 1989, p. 143. 101   Murphy, 1982, p. 472. 102  Schama, 1989, p. 142. 103   Murphy, 1982, p. 469; Schama, 1989, p. 164; Bély, 2005, p. 385; Blanning, 2007, p. 612. 104   Murphy, 1982, p. 469. 105  Schama, 1989, p. 162. 106  Geyl, 1947, pp. 170–171. 107   Blanning, 1996, p. 38; Blanning, 2007, pp. 611–612. 108  Geyl, 1947, p. 172, p. 180, p. 188, and p. 193. 99

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Brienne, made clear that France simply could not afford to come to the Patriots’ aid.109 France had played high and lost.110 The Staten Generaal failed to react to the Prussian ultimatum in a satisfying manner and on 13 September 1787 a Prussian army invaded Dutch territory. Patriot defences rapidly crumbled. Because the eastern frontier fortresses were in Orangists hands, the United Provinces’ gates were open to Prussian forces.111 Within a month the Prussian army was in The Hague and Amsterdam. Several thousands of Patriots fled their homes. Some of them even went abroad, mainly to France, and stayed there for some years.112 The Orangist regime was restored. Prussia was generously indemnified for its aid. Britain had safeguarded its control of the sea routes to India.113 James Harris was made Baron Malmesbury.114 The ancient union between the two maritime powers was re-established.115 Prussia and Britain strengthened their dominance in the United Provinces. Their de facto protectorate116 was institutionalised by a defensive alliance. The Dutch-Anglo Treaty contended that the alliance was based on His Britannic Majesty’s concern for the preservation of the Dutch Republic’s independence and its legitimate constitution.117 The DutchPrussian Treaty referred to the Prussian King’s services rendered to re-establish internal tranquillity as a cause for the reciprocal desire to renew and strengthen the ancient bonds between the two powers. According to the preamble, the aim of the alliance was to maintain tranquillity in Europe.118 Both Britain and Prussia guaranteed the hereditary Stadholderate in the hands of the House of Orange as an essential element of the United Provinces’ constitution. They promised to maintain that constitution against every attack or undertakings ‘of any nature whatsoever,’ that is,

109   Potiemkine, 1946, p. 311; Murphy, 1982, p. 472; Schama, 1989, p. 166; Schama, 2000, p. 263; Blanning, 2007, p. 613. 110  Schroeder, 1994, pp. 40–41; Schama, 2000, p. 263; Blanning, 2007, p. 614. 111  Geyl, 1947, p. 140. 112  On Dutch Patriot refugees in France, see Rosendaal, 2003. 113   Blanning, 2007, p. 613. 114   Palmer, 1959, p. 338. 115  Van Hamel, 1918, p. 296. 116  Hellema, 2001, p. 33. 117   15 April 1788, Defensive alliance between Great Britain and the Netherlands (The Hague) (Dutch-Anglo Treaty, hereafter: DAT]; CTS vol. 50, pp. 305–312. 118   15 April 1788, Defensive alliance between the Netherlands and Prussia (Berlin) (Dutch-Prussian Treaty, hereafter: DPT); CTS vol. 50, pp. 313–318.

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both internally and externally.119 Strikingly, in the Dutch-Anglo Treaty this guarantee is quite at the top of the Treaty, while in the DutchPrussian Treaty it is in one of the final articles. Britain and the United Provinces promised each other mutual assistance in case of an attack by any European power anywhere in the world and guaranteed each other’s possessions.120 Within two months after a request made by the attacked power, the other had to furnish a set number of auxiliary troops and naval forces for the entire duration of the war. In case the auxiliary forces did not suffice, they were to be augmented in conformity with the ally’s needs, although (solely) the Staten Generaal’s contingent was set on an absolute maximum.121 Both powers would mutually defend each other’s colonial possessions.122 In case both powers were equally involved in a war against a common enemy, they were not to disarm unless by common consent and they were to inform each other on peace or truce proposals.123 The same stipulation is to be found in the Dutch-Prussian Treaty.124 The Prussian obligations to come to the United Provinces’ aid were more conditioned, though. Both powers engaged in doing everything in their power to mutually conserve and defend peace and tranquillity,125 but there was no automatic obligation to come to each other’s support militarily. At first, the other power was only obliged to offer its good offices to prevent hostilities.126 Only after these attempts had failed, did either power have to come to the other’s aid once attacked by any European power. The number of forces either power had to furnish was clearly set and limited to land forces only,127 although the number might be augmented in case the auxiliary force did not suffice.128 The Dutch-Prussian alliance was limited to a period of twenty years.129 The Dutch-Anglo alliance was not explicitly limited in time. So, Britain clearly had the lead in this ‘protectorate.’ It had more strategic, commercial and political reasons to be fully committed to the preservation of the Orangist  Article II DAT; Article IX DPT.  Article II DAT. 121  Articles IV and V DAT. 122  Article VI DAT. 123  Article VII DAT. 124  Article VI DPT. 125  Article I DPT. 126  Article II DPT. 127  Article III DPT. 128  Article V DPT. 129  Article X DPT. 119 120



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regime, whereas at the same time it was less entangled in Continental politics and less vulnerable for imminent attack than Prussia was. The triangular relation within the defensive alliance was finalised by a treaty between Britain and Prussia in which both powers engaged to act together in order to maintain the security, independence, and constitution of the United Provinces and mutually promised to uphold their obligations under the Alliance Treaties with the Staten Generaal.130 In addition, the Provinciale Staten of the seven Provinces concluded an act of mutual guarantee.131 They attributed the recent troubles to the ‘wrong and highly dangerous ideas of some people with regard to the constitution and form of government of these countries’132 and stressed the importance of the office of Stadhouder and the incorporation of that dignity in the Prince of Orange for the Union. Hence, the ‘allies,’ as the Provinces still referred to each other, proclaimed to consider the hereditary Stadholderate an essential element of the United Provinces’ constitution and a fundamental law. They engaged not to allow any Province infringing on this fundamental law, since the Stadholderate was a vital condition for the tranquillity, security, and prosperity of the State. 1.4  Revolution and War As the French Revolution started, Dutch Patriots were still in France.133 They welcomed the Revolution as the beginning of the end of their seemingly dead-end exile. The Revolution caused some agitation in the United Provinces as well, but there Patriots had learned the lesson that any action on their part would be unsuccessful without foreign support.134 In Paris, Dutch Patriots made attempts to influence French foreign policy. In May 1791, a delegation of Batavians addressed the Jacobin Club requesting active support. At the time, most French 130   13 June 1788, Provisional Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Prussia (het Loo, Guelders), 13 August 1788, Definitive Treaty; CTS vol. 50, pp. 333–338. 131   3 July 1788, Act of Mutual Guarantee between the United Provinces of the Netherlands; CTS vol. 50, pp. 339–344. 132   ‘de verkeerde en hoogstgevaarlyke denkbeelden by zommige menschen, het zy wesentlick, of in schyn opgevat, en aan andere minkundige Ingezeetenen ingeboezemd, aangaande de Constitutie en Regeeringsform dezer Landen.’ 133  Rosendaal, 2003. 134  Godechot, 1983, p. 148.

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Revolutionaries had no intentions to provoke enmity with Britain, Prussia, and the Stadhouder. The Batavians request was repudiated.135 The British and Dutch governments, too, wished to prevent war with France. Even as France had declared war on Austria and Prussia had joined Austria, London and The Hague endeavoured to stay neutral.136 The maritime powers could not tolerate the opening of the Scheldt, though. After the French decree that declared the Scheldt open for navigation, war was imminent. Republican France declared war on the King of Britain and the Stadhouder in February 1793. Dumouriez contemplated invading the United Provinces to crush British influence and force the United Provinces to align with France.137 With French forces approaching, Patriots in the Dutch Republic became active again preparing a revolt in secret.138 Since Dutch Patriots had put their hopes on French assistance to bring about a revolution in their country, it does not come as a surprise that they concurred in the Girondin rhetoric of cosmopolitanism, fraternity, and liberation. In October 1792, they established a Batavian revolutionary committee.139 In addition, this committee, after several requests, was allowed to form a Batavian legion under the command of Lieutenant-general Herman Willem Daendels.140 The Batavian legion formed part of the forces that invaded the Austrian Netherlands in 1793. The Batavian committee considered itself to be a government in exile to take control of the United Provinces and lead the Revolution as soon as the French had driven out the British and Orangists. The Convention nationale thought otherwise. On 2 March 1793, the Convention adopted a decree that specified the 15 December 1792 decree in order to make it applicable to the situation in the United Provinces.141 The Batavian Revolution was to be set into motion by French generals who would administer the United Provinces until the primary assemblies had been assembled and organised a provisional government. Next to convening primary assemblies as soon as possible, French gen Schama, 1989, p. 189; Belissa, 1995, p. 246.  Van Hamel, 1918, p. 308; Smit, 1950, p. 110. 137  Schroeder, 1994, p. 113. 138   Palmer, 1959, p. 340. 139  Schama, 1989, p. 193; Rosendaal and Van de Sande, 1993, pp. 23–45; Rosendaal, 2003, pp. 343–345. 140  Godechot, 1983, pp. 481–482. 141  Sorel, 1906IV, p. 273; Colenbrander, 1908, p. 26. 135 136

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erals were to proclaim the abolition of feudalism, privileges, seigniorial duties and rights, tithes, Provinciale Staten, the Staten Generaal, the Raad van State, the admiralties, and the Stadholderate. Thereto, they were to confiscate all ecclesiastical and emigré possessions as well as the Stadhouder’s possessions.142 Soon, the French forces that had conquered the Austrian Netherlands invaded the Lands of the Generality.143 After the Battle of Neerwinden (18 March 1793) and the defection of General Dumouriez they had to retreat again. Since Batavian Patriots advocated military intervention, they were inevitably associated with the Girondins. Hence, they got involved in political factionalism in Paris.144 After Neerwinden, the Batavian legion was disbanded.145 The rise of the Jacobins and the simultaneous fall of the Girondins caused the abolition of the Batavian revolutionary committee, too.146 Moreover, the 2 March 1793 decree was modified. All non-military officials were to stay in office in occupied territory under supervision of French representatives.147 Because of the French ‘aggression,’ the defensive alliance between Britain, Prussia, and the United Provinces was extended by a Treaty of Subsidy in April 1794.148 In order ‘to stop the progress of the system of anarchy and crime’ and based on the wish to act in concert during ‘the unjust and cruel war’ started by ‘those who exercise the powers of the government in France,’ the King of Prussia was to receive a subsidy paid by Britain and the United Provinces in return for land forces. As the Prussian government shifted its focus to Poland, where recent gains had to be digested and new gains were in store, and hence desired peace with France, this Treaty was, however, already revoked by Berlin in October of the same year.149 The time from the start of the Patriot revolt to the Batavian Revolution is one of those periods in the Dutch Republic’s history that great powers made use of factionalism to gain covert control over Dutch

 Van Weel, 1977, pp. 83–84.  On French presence in Dutch Brabant in 1793 see Rosendaal and Van de Sande, 1993. 144  Schama, 1989, p. 191. 145  Godechot, 1983, pp. 481–482. 146   Palmer, 1964, p. 121. 147  Van Weel, 1977, p. 84. 148   19 April 1794, Treaty of Subsidy (Great Britain, the Netherlands and Prussia; The Hague); CTS vol. 52, pp. 199–207. 149  Sorel, 1906IV, p. 143. 142 143

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politics. The revival of the great power struggle to gain influence in the United Provinces through well-disposed factions was caused by the break-up of the union of the maritime powers because of the American Revolution. Its traditional alliance broken and facing diplomatic isolation in the wake of the fourth Anglo-Dutch War, the Dutch Republic turned to France and, to a lesser extent, Prussia. Since France, Britain, and Prussia balanced each other, neither was able to gain full control, though. It was more due to domestic political events causing changes in the balance between the factions that great power influence shifted from Britain to France. The latter gained the upper hand as the Patriots rose. Britain and Prussia took over control in 1787 manu militari as did the French eight years later. In 1795, the French Republic continued this tradition of influence through supporting factions. The French-supported Batavian Revolution brought the Patriots into office again. By means of this internal regime change, albeit in the slipstream of French military invasion, the United Provinces were brought back into the French sphere of influence. This move was perpetuated by an alliance treaty and prolonged French military presence. This Alliance Treaty is the main object of discussion throughout the subsequent chapters.

chapter two

Clapping hands, fraternal style 2.1  Entering the Land of Milk and Money By the fall of 1794, French revolutionary armies had occupied Dutch Brabant for the second time since the start of the war.1 Again they faced the problem John Mearsheimer calls ‘the stopping power of water.’2 Although the rivers Rhine and Meuse are not as wide as the English Channel, let alone as the Atlantic Ocean, crossing them in war is not without risk or difficulty. Somewhat over a year earlier the French had been forced to retreat. This time Austrian forces were more remote, but supplies were running out. General Pichegru was about to move his troops further south where they could be better furnished, but then nature decided to intervene. For two centuries the Dutch had depended on water as their last line of defence against invading forces. Inundations had halted Louis XIV’s army in 1672. Now an extreme cold opened almost the entire Dutch Republic to the French army as the rivers were frozen over. Hence, the question how to shape relations between France and the United Provinces once liberated and regenerated became of practical importance. This chapter will address the various answers to this question that were considered. Were the United Provinces to become a sister republic? If so, were relations between sister republics still conceived in terms of a federal union? Furthermore, the genesis of the Treaty of The Hague that would settle mutual relations will be discussed from a procedural point of view. By the time French forces retook control of the Austrian Netherlands, the Staten Generaal had already decided to initiate peace talks.3 Willem Six had been sent to Paris after the Comité de Salut public had granted passports exactly on the day of Robespierre’s fall from

 See e.g. Van der Ree-Scholtens, 1993, pp. 240–241.   Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 44. 3   Vreede, 1863, pp. 28–29; Schama, 1989, p. 228. 1 2

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power in the summer of 1794.4 Some months later, Gerard Brantsen and Ocker Repelaer were sent to join him.5 They were still in Paris at the time French forces entered the United Provinces. From Paris, Brantsen and Repelaer informed Raadpensionaris Van de Spiegel and the Stadhouder’s son that the French nation desired peace and that the moderate view was gaining the upper hand. They expected the war against Britain to be continued, though, and urged for swift action since they suspected an invasion to be forthcoming.6 By the time these warnings reached The Hague, French troops were already in ­Amsterdam. On the eve of the French invasion, Dutch Patriots had become active again. Organised in reading societies and awaiting the arrival of French forces, they prepared their revolution.7 Partly, these were the same people that had partaken in the Patriot movement of the 1780s. Hence, the Batavian Revolution was a continuation of the 1780s movement and rooted in the national past. The Batavian Revolution was to provoke change, but not a total break with that past.8 However, the Dutch Patriots had learned from their previous experience. Both the failure of 1787 and the French Revolution had made them modify their programme of reform and their political style. Although the Dutch Patriots in 1794–1795 were not the French pets Colenbrander held them for, he was not entirely mistaken in calling Paris the ‘high school of revolution.’9 By the end of July 1794, as the French had reached Antwerp, Patriot clubs from all over the country met in Amsterdam. This assembly send Isaac Gogel and Willem Irhoven van Dam to French headquarters. They were to find out France’s terms for not treating the United Provinces as conquered territory. The French reply was that the Dutch would be treated as allies provided they would start their revolution before the arrival of French troops.10 The Batavian general in French service Herman Willem Daendels urged the Dutch Patriots to have the

  27 July 1794, decree of the Comité de Salut public; AN AF II* 49.   Vreede, 1863, p. 41; Sorel, 1906IV, p. 198.  6   11 January 1795, Brantsen and Repelaer to Van der Spiegel; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 568–569 no. 438; 13 January 1795, Brantsen and Repelaer to the Erfprins; Colenbrander, 1905, p. 576 no. 446.  7  Palmer, 1964, p. 184; Schama, 1989, p. 215; Rosendaal, 2002, p. 92.  8  Palmer, 1964, p. 180; Israel, 2001, p. 1235.  9  Colenbrander, 1908; Schama, 1989, p. 46. 10   Vreede, 1863, p. 20; Palmer, 1964, p. 184.  4  5



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various cities and provinces set themselves free to avoid the appearance of conquest.11 After ‘s-Hertogenbosch had fallen into French hands on 10 October 1794, a revolutionary committee was set up in that city to coordinate actions with the French and to act as a provisional revolutionary government.12 The committee immediately sent Jacob Blauw, prior to 1787 pensionary of the city of Leyden, and Willem Irhoven van Dam, to Paris. They arrived in Paris on 31 December. Blauw later restated the ends of their mission as: ‘to have ourselves recognised as deputies by the French National Convention, and thus to negotiate a convention on behalf of our principals based on the country’s independence, its territorial integrity, and the removal from government offices of all belonging to the Orangist faction.’13 Hence, the Bosch Comité’s intentions were clear: being recognised by France as the representatives of the Batavian people instead of the Orangist regime in The Hague while preserving (or restoring) the country’s independence and territorial integrity. Within the United Provinces, however, the Patriots acted prematurely. Somewhat overconfident, Amsterdam Patriots handed in a petition to the municipality in October 1794.14 Far from resigning power as the petition called them to do, the magistrates were able to nip a Patriot rising in the bud, to arrest Patriots leaders save the ones who had managed to flee the city in time, and confiscate their secret stores of weapons, all thanks to the petition which had revealed the names of virtually all leading Patriots. Reluctant to share the fate of their Amsterdam friends, Patriots elsewhere decided to bide their time and await the arrival of the French.15 Even with the rivers frozen, Pichegru hesitated to move on, since his army would be stuck with its back to the river Rhine once the thaw   Van Sas, 2004, p. 315.   The committee was not fully assembled until 4 December 1794; Vreede, 1863, p. 21; Legrand, 1895, p. 55; Schama, 1989, p. 222; Rosendaal, 2003, pp. 449–450. 13   ‘ons in onze qualiteiten als gedeputeerdens bij de Nationale Conventie van Frankrijk te doen erkennen, en aldus in naam van onze committenten deze of gene conventie te arrangeeren, waarvan de basis behoorde te zijn ‘s lands independentie, de integriteit van zijn territoir, de expulsie uit de regering van alle zoodanigen als tot de Oranjepartij behoorden.’; Jacob Blauw, Memorie van instructie en tot meerdere bijlichting van de volumnineuse bijlagen; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 425–432 no. 327 and 650–657 no. 500. 14  Schama, 1989, p. 220. 15  Palmer, 1964, p. 184. 11 12

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set in.16 According to Colenbrander, the French thought it too risky to cross the great rivers without a popular rising in the north.17 This consideration might have played a role. However, it is more likely that Pichegru was more concerned with his strategic position vis-à-vis the Anglo-Prussian forces. Moreover, Schama has it that the generals were waiting to see who was to gain control of politics in Paris after thermidor.18 General Daendels, fiercely urged to march on. Daendels held out the prospect of an ‘alliée opulente’ once the Dutch Republic would have been liberated.19 Possibly under his influence, the ‘représentants en mission’ in Brussels emphasised the military advantages of an advance. The enemy would be dealt a heavy blow and new possibilities to supply French troops would be opened. Since there was a considerable chance of local revolutions, the weather had provided an exquisite opportunity that was not to be missed. Moreover, in a public proclamation of 21 October, Daendels called upon his country to rise.20 Daendels provoked an assault on Nijmegen. The city fell on 3 Novem­ ber. By the end of December 1794 Pichegru did order his troops to march on. First, the Bommelerwaard was seized, from where the French proceeded towards Utrecht and Holland. Coalition forces hardly put up a fight. Anglo-Prussian forces plundered their way back north to regroup in Hanover. The Staten Generaal decided to cease hostilities and ordered the Dutch army to lay down arms once the river Lek had been crossed.21 In various cities the Batavian Revolution occurred even before the French advance guard had reached the gates. The Utrecht Staten offered to capitulate on 13 January. Five days later, Cornelis Krayenhoff took command of Amsterdam, where a revolutionary committee replaced the city magistrate.22 The same day, Stadhouder William V decided to start a family tradition by embarking on an England-bound boat.23 All over the country Patriots took over

 Sorel, 1906IV, p. 198.  Colenbrander, 1905, p. 572. 18  Schama, 1989, p. 216. 19   3 January 1795, Daendels to Bellegarde; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 553–555 no. 424. 20  Schama, 1989, p. 223. 21  Schama, 1989, p. 231. 22  Schama, 1989, pp. 232–234. 23  Admittedly, Stadhouder William III had sailed to England, too, somewhat over a century earlier. 16 17



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municipal governments. By consequence, the Provinciale Staten and the Staten Generaal, too, were packed by the Patriots soon. On the occasion of their arrival in Amsterdam, the ‘représentants en mission’ travelling with the Armies of the North and the Sambre et Meuse, issued a proclamation that would play an important role in the Franco-Batavian peace talks. Their proclamation entirely fitted into the discourse of a war of suppressed peoples against their despots to gain freedom. They expressed that the French nation had never stopped considering the Batavian people as its friend and ally and had come not to conquer but to liberate. The Stadhouder was blamed for the war. The Batavian people’s independence would be respected and its customs and usages maintained. Finally, they stressed that only the sovereign Batavian people was entitled to alter its form of ­government.24 In the meantime, the invasion and resultant revolution had spread doubt on who was to represent the United Provinces in Paris. The Comité de Salut public had received Blauw and Van Irhoven, but refused to negotiate with them since they had been sent by ‘une réunion d’individus formée à Bois-le-Duc.’ On the other hand, Brantsen and Repelaer, still the Staten Generaal’s official envoys, had

24   20 January 1795, LES REPRÉSENTANS DU PEUPLE FRANÇAIS AU PEUPLE BATAVE, Amsterdam. Le despotisme ligué contre la liberté des peuples nous déclara la guerre, et entreprit de nous asservir. Un Stadhouder rebelle s’était emparé de votre gouvernement; il entra dans la coalition impie des despotes, et forma avec eux le projet insensé de subjuguer un grand peuple. Votre sang, vos trésors furent prodigués pour cette criminelle entreprise. Le sort des armes à répondu à la justice de notre cause, nous avons vaincu et nos armées victorieuses sont entrées sur votre territoire. Bataves! nous ne vous crûmes point complices de cet horrible attentat. Nos ennemis sont aussi les vôtres; le sang des fondateurs de la République des Provinces Unies coule encore dans vos veines, et au milieu des horreurs de la guerre nous ne cessâmes de vous considérer comme nos amis et nos alliés. C’est à ce titre que nous sommes au milieu de vous. Nous n’apportons point la terreur, mais la confiance. Il y a peu d’années, un vainqueur insolent vous dicta des loix; nous vous rendons à la liberté. Nous n’entrons point chez vous pour vous asservir. La nation française respectera votre indépendance. Les armées de la République observeront la plus exacte discipline. Toute voie de fait, tout excès contre les habitans, seront sévèrement réprimés. Le sûreté des personnes et des propriétés sera garantie. Il ne sera porté aucune atteinte au libre exercice des cultes. Les loix, coutumes et usages des Provinces-Unies seront provisoirement maintenus. Le peuple batave usant de sa souveraineté pourra seul changer ou modifier la forme de son Gouvernement; Colenbrander, 1905, p. 592 no. 461.

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proposed terms that were considered to be ‘illusoires’ by the French government.25 Moreover, the ‘représentants en mission’ in the United Provinces urged Paris not to negotiate with Brantsen and Repelaer.26 French troops, they argued, had scored a ‘brillante conquête’ that offered various political and strategic advantages, next to the treasures and resources the French army had gained control of. The advantages of the latest victory, they stressed, could not even be imagined: surtout dans les affaires politiques et commerciales de l’Europe une prépondérance, dont il est impossible de calculer les effets et les suites.

Henceforth, they dissuaded from negotiating with Brantsen and Repelaer any longer, who were, after all, ‘agens d’un gouvernement essentiellement notre ennemi.’ Recognising them would jeopardise the possibility of concluding a ‘traité de peuple à peuple,’ since the Batavian nation would be put out. The Comité de Salut public was granted the choice between making use of the victory to give the Batavian people a new constitution based on liberty or to yield to the envoys who desired to keep the regime ‘que le despotisme créa.’ To opt for the latter would mean that ‘elle transigeait avec les stadhoudériens, ses ennemies naturels, ainsi que de la liberté des Bataves.’ To underscore that the first option was best, they stressed that ‘une sorte d’insurrection a précédé notre entrée dans Amsterdam.’ Thus, the ‘représentants en mission,’ yet again, clearly distinguished between the United Provinces’ former government, despotic and France’s natural enemy, and a new situation in which two free nations were by themselves. In the end, the Staten Generaal solved the matter. Brantsen, Repelaer, and Six were recalled on 6 February and the Patriot envoys were given proper letters of credence. The ‘Orangist’ envoys left Paris on 20 February. By then, the United Provinces’ territory was entirely occupied by French forces. The Zeeland islands had provided a strategic problem. For, unlike the inland rivers, the Scheldt was not frozen. Moreover, floes drifted from the rivers and moving toward the sea made crossing the Scheldt even more dangerous. Therefore, General Michaud, in command of French troops occupying Dutch Flanders, addressed the

25  Rapport de la section des relations extérieures au Comité de Salut public; AAE MD France 655. 26  Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 589–591 no. 461.



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Zeeland Staten with offers to negotiate a capitulation. They sent a delegation27 to the general’s head quarters in Breskens with conditions. The Zeeland Staten insisted on the free practice of religion, maintenance of the existing form of government, and the safety of people and property. Referring to the proclamation issued by the ‘représentants en mission’ in Amsterdam, Michaud granted these conditions. Michaud likewise allowed the return of refugees and the restoration of their possessions; although, on this point, he exempted French ‘émigrés.’ The Staten offered to have Dutch troops taking the oath not to fight against the French Republic anymore. They hoped to prevent French garrisons being left in their Province, but realised that this would be difficult to attain. Hence, their delegation was to make sure that, in case Michaud would insist on French military presence in Zeeland, the number of French troops would be as limited as possibly and be fixed by mutual agreement. Michaud promised that no more French troops would enter the Province than necessary. For the time being, only half a battalion would be sent amounting to approximately six or seven thousand men. The town magistrates were to take measures to lodge those troops. Furthermore, he replied that Dutch troops were to keep their arms after having taken the proposed oath and were to police the Zeeland towns. Michaud added a provision on the Dutch navy. The crews of Dutch men-of-war had to take an oath as well. In case French guards would be placed aboard other Dutch vessels, he required men-of-war on Zeeland waters to allow this, too. On these conditions the sovereign Staten of Zeeland allowed French troops to enter their Province’s territory. The capitulation was signed in Breskens on 3 February and ratified by the Zeeland Staten the day afterwards.28 Within two days time, French troops occupied the Zeeland islands. On 7 February, Dutch troops in the Province of Zeeland took the oath not to serve against the French Republic anymore and yet another three days later the magistrate of Middelburg was replaced. After, in the north, Groningen had surrendered on 16 February, the French troops and Patriots were in control of the United Provinces entirely.

 Consisting of Huyssen De Kattendyke, Schorer, and Van Doorn.   3 February 1795, Articles of Capitulation between France and the Netherlands, signed at Breskens; CTS vol. 52, pp. 305–310. 27 28

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part ii, chapter two 2.2  The Imbroglio of Thermidorian Politics

The Batavian Revolution has been studied extensively in the past years. Most studies focus on constitutional reform and French interference in the process of constitution making. Most of the time only some general remarks are to be found with regard to the Alliance Treaty (Treaty of The Hague, 16 May 1795) and Franco-Batavian relations from an international point of view. However, after the Batavian Revolution Dutch Patriots not only were able to deal—with French assistance and advise—with the ‘abhorrent’ institutions of the old Republic, the position of the United Provinces within Europe and especially visà-vis the French Republic had to be reconsidered as well. By the end of January 1795, Pieter Paulus declared the union with Britain and Prussia broken. Since the Stadhouder had abandoned his post, the treaties guaranteeing the Stadholderate were declared terminated.29 The Dutch Republic changed from a member of the Counter-revolutionary Coalition under British and Prussian aegis into a participant in the French-led Revolutionary alliance. This change in the Dutch Republic’s international position cannot be put aside as a mere consequence of French preponderance. In France Franco-Batavian relations were part of an extensive debate on foreign policy, whereas relations with France were a key issue to a more or less autonomously formulated foreign policy in the United Provinces. Once French forces had crossed the Rhine and reached Amsterdam, the question what to do with the United Provinces proved not to be that easy to answer. French forces had entered the Low Countries at a time that the debate on what was to be the foreign policy of the postthermidor Republic was still going on. It was not until October 1795 that the French would decide on annexing the Austrian Netherlands and the Prince-Bishopric of Liège.30 Girondins had come to the fore again after Robespierre’s fall. In 1792, they had formulated the policy of sister republics. To some this policy was to carry out the promise of enlightened cosmopolitanism and the ‘federal vision’ to be endorsed by Immanuel Kant from distant Prussia in the spring to come.31 Anachar  Vreede, 1863, p. 58.  From here on: Belgium. The term ‘Belgium’/‘la Belgique’ was actually used in contemporary sources, at least to depict the geographic area. On the annexation of Belgium, see: Stevens, 1994, pp. 11–18; Belissa, 1997, pp. 426–432. 31  See chapter I.2. 29 30



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sis Cloots had argued for a ‘république universelle,’ which might have implied an annexation of the United Provinces. Some wanted to continue the ideological struggle and propaganda. This was not the dominant spirit in Paris in the winter of 1794– 1795, though.32 Brantsen and Repelaer had been right that the majority of the French people desired peace and urged for a moderate foreign policy in order to stabilise the international and domestic situation and assure French security. The ‘partie des anciennes limites’ was at the height of its influence. Hence, another option was to leave the Batavians on their own and set out for the co-existence of two free and independent nations without formalising or institutionalising mutual relations. The invasion of the United Provinces had occurred in the middle of this debate and, moreover, its swift success had taken French politicians somewhat by surprise. They had not managed to set their minds on a general foreign policy yet. Suddenly the question what to do with conquered territory beyond France’s natural borders had become imminent. Were the United Provinces to be regarded as ‘pays conquis’ or not; were they to become neutral or aligned to the French Republic in one way or another and on what terms? In contributions to this debate at least three basic positions can be distinguished. These positions differed fundamentally on how to treat the United Provinces. They do, however, all share the aim of gaining the most from the Dutch conquest. They mainly differed on their estimate of Dutch power and from what treatment France was to benefit most. Thereto, the presented options were more limited than during the 1792 debate on the relations between nations. The main questions were whether to enter into an alliance with the United Provinces and if so, on what terms and when. Primo, there were the French isolationists who desired to re-­establish peace as soon as possible and were prone to be satisfied by some minor advantages. According to the proposents of this position, no permanent bonds were to be established between the two Republics. The lawyer Anfrye, for instance, took this position.33 He formulated some terms on the basis of which an honourable and useful peace could be established. Most of these terms provided for one-time

 See chapter I.2.   17 January 1795, Principes de droit public applicables aux negotiations par le citoyen Anfrye; AAE MD France 524. 32 33

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­ bligations. The United Provinces should recognise the French Repubo lic. Their constitution should be restored to the situation prior to the Prussian invasion of 1787. In addition, Dutch Brabant should be ceded and the United Provinces should guarantee the cession of Belgium, which Anfrye apparently already took for granted. Moreover, the Barrier Treaties, the Peace of Utrecht, and all subsequent treaties ‘entravait la liberté du port d’Ostende et celle de navigation de l’Escaut, qui sera libre et ouvert dans tout son cours’ should be revoked. Within a period of six months, twenty ships of the line with sixty to a hundred guns each should be built, equipped and sailed to Brest. The United Provinces should pay an indemnity to cover the costs of the war and should accept assignats. Finally, commercial relations should be settled in a separate treaty. Besides this Treaty of commerce and the guarantee of Belgium, his proposal did not contain any provisions for the longer term. A memoire sur la Hollande written by an anonymous of which a copy is to be found in Sieyes’ private archives, pushed for Dutch neutrality since the French Republic would profit more from neutrality than from an alliance.34 It was argued that as an ally, the United Provinces would be utterly useless to France because of the political turmoil: ‘La Hollande est en pleine revolution.’ Moreover, Dutch state finances were a mess, the Dutch army was not organised, a considerable part of Dutch vessels was in British hands, and most of Dutch resources were abroad. Furthermore, an alliance would turn the United Provinces into Britain’s enemy. Hence, Britain would not only be relieved of supporting its former ally, but also be provided with a pretext to confiscate Dutch vessels in British ports, to disrupt Dutch trade, and to occupy Dutch colonies, which would prove to be sitting ducks. Finally, France would be obliged to take Dutch interests into consideration during future peace negotiations. In contrast, in case of Dutch neutrality, the French Republic would be able to take advantage of its commerce. Britain might be persuaded to respect Dutch neutrality and be convinced of the United Provinces not being under French control. It was to be stressed that France had not declared war on the Dutch people, that France had only entered Dutch territory to chase off its enemies and punish the Stadhouder and his government, and that it was one

34   27 February 1795, Memoire sur la Hollande considérée comme neutre ou alliée; AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10.



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of the French Republic’s principles never to meddle in the internal affairs of other nations. The French Republic was to be satisfied with having brought the Batavians their liberty—an argument of which it is hard to perceive that the British might have agreed—, would allow the Batavian people to establish the form of government they were to choose based on their imprescriptible right, would respect their neutrality, and would pull back its troops. This way the Batavian nation’s right to determine its own constitution would best be done justice to. Hence, isolationism was deemed to be the most in conformity with the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen. Moreover, if neutral, the Batavian government was more likely to be swiftly recognised by other neutral powers. Behind the scenes, France was to press for a new league of armed neutrality between the neutral powers in which the Dutch Republic (‘la Hollande’) could be involved to have its colours respected and to safeguard the freedom of the seas. France was thus to return to the Vergennes policy of allying the Dutch Republic with the northern powers. Denmark and Sweden might be persuaded to enter into an alliance with the Batavian Republic. Hence, Britain would be isolated in the North Sea area. Britain, then, would face the choice between respecting the neutral flag or to violate neutrals’ rights as it was used to do. In the latter case, France might offer to join the neutral powers to defend the freedom of the seas and put an end to the ‘odieuse tyrannie de l’Angleterre.’ Batavian neutrality would thus amount to a win-win-situation. Secundo, and totally opposite to the first position in terms of its moderation, some advocated optimising the profit France was to make from its military successes. This position might be christened the hardline ‘France first’-position or straightforward non-altruistic position. Paul Bastid characterised it as striking a ‘tonalité annexionniste.’35 For instance, General Joseph Alexandre Sauviac vehemently protested against what he deemed to be too generous a treatment of the Dutch.36 Sauviac claimed that the land had been conquered because of the weather, the courage of French soldiers, and the talents and bravery of their generals, whereas the Dutch had made no contribution at all. He argued that the French Republic was fully entitled to dispose of

  Bastid, 1970, p. 161.   8 February 1795, General Sauviac, Coup d’oeil politique et militaire sur la Hollande; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 595–598 no. 463. 35 36

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Dutch resources now that there had not been a revolution prior to the French invasion, the form of government had not been altered, and diplomatic representatives and military commanders had not been replaced. Hence, the United Provinces’ immense resources were not to be let gone for the sake of a ‘simple alliance.’ Keeping a hold on Holland, he argued, would render the French Republic the disposal of the Dutch fleet and its naval ports, which would be of great use in any actions against Britain; as would Dutch gold be to sustain French paper money. Otherwise, it would be necessary to continuously negotiate, consult, and, coordinate operations. Moreover, in a state of occupation, the United Provinces might be used as change during peace talks. Reaching a peace settlement with the enemy powers might be facilitated by promising to relinquish the Dutch conquest. L’unique parti qui reste à prendre, soit qu’on veuille abandonner la Hollande, après avoir fait refluer en France toutes ses richesses, soit qu’on veuille la conserver. A titre d’alliée ou de conquête, est de la regarder provisoirement comme pays conquis, sans y permettre l’armement d’aucun parti, ni aucune modification ou renversement dans son régime actuel. Nous pourrons par ce moyen lui donner à notre gré et sans obstacle la forme de gouvernement que la Convention et le Comité adopteront. [. . .] Tous ces considérations font sentir la nécessité de traiter la Hollande comme pays conquis pendant quelque tems, quand bien même on serait dans la ferme intention de la regarder par la suite comme puissance indépendante et alliée, ce qu’on sera toujours à tems de faire à la paix, où elle sera d’un grand poids en notre faveur dans la balance politique des intérêts de l’Europe: cet ajournement d’alliance nous mettrait à même de tirer de ce pays-ci les plus grandes ressources et nous rendrait surtout maîtres de diriger à notre gré les forces des Provinces Unies contre l’Angleterre, sans éprouver ces difficultés sans cesse renaissantes et si préjudiciables au concert nécessaire dans les opérations militaires qu’on doit nécessairement attendre d’une puissance alliée. [. . .] ou bien nous la regardons comme conquise, et dans ce cas nous devons lui défendre provisoirement tout acte de souveraineté, et la soumettre en tout au gouvernement français, jusqu’à ce qu’on l’ait organisée d’après la pureté et la loyauté de nos principes républicains.37 

For the time being, henceforth, the United Provinces were to be treated as conquered territory. Only after France had indemnified itself and

37   8 February 1795, General Sauviac, Coup d’oeil politique et militaire sur la Hollande; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 595–598 no. 463.



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had carried through political changes, would there be a ‘puissance indépendante et alliée.’ In particular, the general proposed to extend French borders to the Rhine and IJssel. Dans tout état de cause nous ne devons je pense regarder comme alliée que la partie de la Hollande au-delà du Lek, ou au moins du Waal: la nature elle-même a fixé nos limites à l’un ou à l’autre de ces fleuves.38

General Sauviac clearly sketched the image of a transitory period between conquest and independence in which a country’s territory is under military control and the occupying power can virtually do as it wishes. To be sure, he did not rule out the option of an alliance with the United Provinces after that period. With regard to the Batavian Republic, this strand of thought only ephemerally reared its head. As will be discussed later on, Sieyes used this image as an argument to justify French territorial claims. With regard to other sister republics— which the French were more prepared (in both meanings of the word) to dominate—this image of a transitory period would actually be the main pillar under the justification of French interference and tutelage. Mainly in the first and second Cisalpine Republics, French interference was legally styled as measures taken by the commanding general of the occupying army, on the French government’s orders and instructions or not. For instance, General Bonaparte would introduce the constitution of the first Cisalpine Republic and organise the government of the second. In 1795, Sauviac was too late, though, since the ‘représentants en mission’ had already officially proclaimed the Batavian Republic’s independence, and General Pichegru had kept far from interfering in civil administration. Hence, this line of argument could not be used; at least not without contravening previous statements. Yet, Sauviac’s plea is exemplary for a more widely shared opinion that France should profit from its victories. This became clear once the Convention gained cognizance of the Zeeland capitulation. Although the ‘représentants en mission’ had stressed the military necessity of the capitulation—and hence of giving in to the Zeeland Estates’ terms—,39 in the course of a debate in the Convention on the matter, the ‘représentant’ Mathieu among others severely criticized the   8 February 1795, General Sauviac, Coup d’oeil politique et militaire sur la Hollande; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 595–598 no. 463. 39   10 February 1795, representants en mission to the Comité de Salut public; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 599–600 no. 464. 38

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­Capitulation.40 On the one hand, he argued that more advantages to the French Republic should have been secured. On the other hand, in his eyes, the capitulation did not bear sufficient witness of the Batavians’ volition to become a true and loyal ally: que le peuple batave ne doit concevoir aucune inquiétude. Nous ne voulons pas que de vieux ennemis opposent des obstacles à sa régénération; nous voulons que l’épée française assure sa liberté et la nôtre. Qu’il ne s’étonne point de notre sévérité: la sévérité a quelque chose de mâle et de rassurant. Mais il faut que nous sachions si les Hollandais seront vraiment nos alliés; que nous sachions s’ils ont voulu signer une capitulation ou une neutralité.41

With great difficulty, Carnot succeeded in convincing the Convention that the capitulation was not that bad at all.42 He started by reiterating the rhetoric of the discourse of liberty by emphasising that the war had been waged on the Stadhouder and not on the Batavian people. Ces principes étaient conformes à ceux que nous leur avions manifestés nous-mêmes, et que vous aviez consacrés par votre décret du 1er février 1793, portant déclaration de guerre contre le Stathouder nominativement. Nous dûmes distinguer la masse du peuple batave, qui ne peut vouloir que la liberté, du parti stathoudérien, qui ne peut vouloir que le despotisme. Nous dûmes regarder le peuple comme notre allié, et le gouvernement comme notre ennemi.43

With reference to this distinction, Carnot concluded that the French Republic was in possession of all goods belonging to the Dutch government, fortified places, armouries, the navy, and public buildings included, because of the ‘droit du vainqueur.’ The people and their belongings were to be left unharmed, though.44 For, ‘rien ne nous lie donc à cet égard que le droit de la nature, celui qu’a tout individu, tout peuple, de rester libre lorsqu’il n’attaque point la liberté des autres; et tel doit être celui de la nation batave, affranchie de ses oppresseurs.’ Subsequently, Carnot stressed the military advantage of the Zeeland capitulation as opposed to taking the Zeeland islands by force. 40   16 February 1795, minutes of the debate in the Convention nationale on the Zeeland Capitulation; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 600–601 no. 465. 41   16 February 1795, minutes of the debate in the Convention nationale on the Zeeland Capitulation; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 600–601 no. 465. 42   Vreede, 1863, p. 83. 43   20 February 1795, Carnot to the Convention nationale; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 601–605 no. 466. 44   Vreede, 1863, p. 83.



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Furthermore, he contended that France would profit from the occupation of the United Provinces. To profit optimally, however, it would be ill advised to kill the goose that laid the golden eggs. If the Batavian Revolution would be allowed to take place, the new regime in the United Provinces would prove to be highly beneficial to France. Britain would lose its influence and be deprived of its main lines of communication with the Continent. The Revolution would steal a march on Orangist agents. The ‘représentants en mission’ would succeed in having the ‘assignats’ accepted. The Coalition’s core would be destroyed. France would be released from isolation and encirclement. Dutch ports would be opened to its privateers to operate on the North Sea and ruin British trade. The three great rivers would be opened for navigation. A considerable navy would be at France’s disposal. All these strategic and long-term benefits would be lost, though, if the French Republic would refrain from moderation and abuse its current military dominance: ‘il faut que les Bataves et nous gagnions également à leur révolution, et que nos avantages ne soient pas éphémères.’ Tertio, there were those who favoured an alliance with the Dutch as a middle way between isolationism and disposing of Dutch resources singlehandedly. Part of the Comité and Convention had set their mind on an alliance with the Dutch Republic directed against Britain by the time French forces were in ‘s-Hertogenbosch.45 Antoine Bernard Caillard,46 for instance, pointed out the importance of an alliance.47 Having the Dutch fleet on the revolutionary side would shift the balance of power. If France and the United Provinces would unite their forces and direct them to their common cause, the British government would be soon forced to accept peace on French terms. Caillard did stress that the alliance was connected to the Dutch form of government. Au reste une alliance avec la Hollande tant que cette république eût été gouvernée par son stathouder, n’eût jamais été qu’une alliance illusoire, et une des fautes capitales de l’ancien régime est de n’avoir pas voulu  Sorel, 1906IV, p. 389; Schama, 1989, p. 228; Harouel, 1997b, p. 25.  Caillard had been chargé d’affaires in The Hague in 1785. He would become French envoy in Berlin, where he would be well-disposed towards the Batavian Republic. See chapter III.1. 47   1795 (the document is not dated more specifically), Quelques idées sur les rapports actuels de la France avec les principales puissances de l’Europe soumisses aux Représentants du Peuple membres du Comité de Salut public par Antoine Bernard Caillard; AAE MD France 655. 45 46

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part ii, chapter two comprendre cette vérité. Il en est tout différemment de la Hollande sous le gouvernement patriotique comme le stathouder fondait toutes ses espérances sur l’Angleterre, le gouvernement patriotique ne peut fonder les siennes que sur la France; il est essentiellement l’ami de la France, il est essentiellement l’ennemi de l’Angleterre; il est tel par la nature même et la force des choses que rien ne peut changer; ainsi lorsque le gouvernement stathoudérien ne pour ait mériter la moindre confiance de notre part, nous la devons toute entière au nouveau gouvernement d’une l’intérêt est absolument inséparable du nôtre.

With the pro-British Stadhouder gone, the French and Dutch Republics were natural allies; their perpetual common interests would now come to the fore. In particular, they shared an interest in bringing Britain down. Terminating British tyranny of the seas would favour both French and Batavian trade. However, the Dutch Republic was mainly presented as a useful ally from a military point of view throughout the current war and possibly with an eye to a more lasting rivalry with Britain. Hence, Caillard did not need a ’policy of sister republics’ to hold brief for a Franco-Dutch alliance. From a strategic point of view, Caillard endorsed what would later, in a different historical context, be called an ‘Atlantic Wall.’ Ainsi depuis le Tage jusqu’à l’Elbe il n’est aucun point sur le continent où les anglais puissent aborder. Que nous reste-t-il donc à faire? La réponse se présente d’elle-même; les exclure de ce point même, garder l’embouchure et l’Elbe [. . .] qui par sa position géographique donne un avantage décidé dans la mer du nord.

Once united with the United Provinces, France would gain an edge over the British and would have the chance of bringing British trade with Germany to a standstill. Subsequently, British merchants would force their government to enter peace negotiations. If France might refrain from aligning with the Dutch, the British would most certainly seize the opportunity to regain their influence. Caillard stressed that the French government had made that mistake before and expressly referred to the Prussian intervention in 1787 that had annulled the 1785 Franco-Dutch alliance. Once the British were pulling the strings in The Hague again, they would be able to cut of the French navy from German supplies. Despite some references to the United Provinces’ form of government and British tyranny of the seas, Caillard was remote from giving the alliance he envisioned an ideological substance. He basically endorsed an alliance with the United Provinces based on balance of power reasoning. Furthermore, he did approve of



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making some demands on the Dutch with regard to their contribution to the maritime war as well of certain, moderate territorial demands; Maastricht, Venlo, possibly some other places within the Lands of the Generality, and maybe part of Zeeland might be claimed in his view. The French ‘représentants en mission’ with the Army of the North in Holland, thought of an alliance between the two nations as well. They informed the Comité de Salut public that all over the United Provinces municipal regeneration was taking place, that is to say that magistrates ‘qui le despotisme prussien y établit contre la volonté nationale et par la force des armes’ were forced to resign and replaced by ‘patriotes énergiques et prudens.’ By consequence, the compound of the Provinciale Staten was altered, too. Furthermore, playing thermidorian preference for order, they emphasised that all of this had proceeded in a legitimate way: ‘selon l’ordre légal de leur vraie constitution.’ The Batavian Revolution was even presented as a reversal of illegitimate changes carried through after the Prussian invasion. Because of this situation, they asserted that the Batavians were willing to unite forces with France and could be trusted: la République française pourra jeter les premiers fondemens d’une Union solide et inaltérable avec la nation hollandaise. [. . .] Ils veulent réunir leurs forces maritimes et territoriales aux nôtres contre l’Angleterre.48

The ‘représentants en mission’ urged Paris for moderation and expected recognition of the Batavian Republic to be a mere formality. They clearly adhered to the third option discussed above. In his Memoire sur la Hollande, the representant Ramel stressed that Dutch affluence mainly was in private hands.49 Public trust was absolutely vital to enable the Dutch government to draw on that wealth, because most possessions were movable. He asserted that there was hardly anything to be seized by force and Dutch territory produced virtually nothing. Thereupon, he enumerated the advantages the French Republic had gained just by occupying the United Provinces. From a military point of view, the Dutch army consisting of about 25,000 men had changed sides, thus shifting the balance of power by 50,000 men in favour of the revolutionary side. The Dutch fleet having turned sides as well,   28 January 1795, representants en mission to Comité de Salut public; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 592–595 no. 462. 49   20 February 1795, Ramel to Comité de Salut public, Memoire sur la Hollande; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 612–617, no. 472. 48

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the British were forced to halt trade with the Baltic or to commit part of the Royal Navy to convoy British merchantmen sailing to and from that region. Communication between Britain and the remaining Coalition forces was cut short and the Coalition was deprived of Dutch transport capacity. Henceforth, ‘l’entrée des troupes françaises dans la Hollande donnera la paix à l’Europe.’ From a political point of view, a tyrant had been chased off. To France, this was a reward in its own right, for une nation qui a voté la liberté du monde et le bonheur de l’humanité doit attacher un grand prix aux moyens qui la mettent à portée de voir ses vœux accomplis; pour qu’ils le soient il suffit d’être sage et de ne pas sacrifier l’avenir au présent.

In a way, the French Republic had thus already attained its primary goal. Subsequently, benefits on the longer run were not to be jeopardised for quick advantages. Again, a French official warned not to kill the goose that laid the golden eggs. Ramel emphasised that Dutch Patriots had indicated to desire aligning their country to France. The United Provinces could, however, only be of any use, because of its trade. ‘Le commerce repose sur le crédit; le crédit dépend de la confiance.’ As a ‘natural ally,’50 the benefits France would gain from that trade would be greater than anything that could be obtained in the short run by coercion. If the Comité de Salut public would consent to a Treaty of Alliance based on reciprocal advantages, some demands could be made from which France would financially profit. Ramel proposed to require the Dutch to maintain a French army of 40,000 men and to pay ten or twenty million livres either in cash or in supplies for the Army of the Sambre et Meuse. He assured Paris that town magistrates would make an effort to get the money to pay this ‘offrande à la liberté;’ ‘si on l’exige militairement, le sacrifice n’en sera pas fait.’ In short, treating the United Provinces with a light touch would ensure local cooperation best. Likewise, the representant en mission Cochon admonished that Dutch riches could be easily transported abroad.51 Dutchmen had to

 For the notion of natural allies, see e.g. Mably, 1757, pp. 90–92 and Belissa’s introduction thereto p. 22. 51   3 March 1795, Cochon to the Comité de Salut public; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 617–622 no. 473. 50



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be reassured of their private possessions or they were likely to leave their country.52 Demanding too much at once would destroy Dutch trade and, thus, Britain would even be done a service, since the British would then entirely dominate European trade. He capitalised on the Dutch custom of swinging between Britain and France as an ally. On the one hand, he explained, Britain could protect Dutch navigation and overseas dominions better. On the other hand, France could provide direct protection of or pose a direct threat to Dutch territory itself now that it was in possession of Belgium. Moreover, whereas British protection would always be compensated by economic rivalry, while France was not a competitor. An alliance with the French Republic was, henceforth, in the interest of the United Provinces. Subsequently, he emphasised that such an alliance would be in the interest of France as well. However, the importance of the United Provinces as an ally was in their credit and commerce. It was because of Dutch financial resources that they themselves might provide military assistance to France as well as means to borrow money. Moreover, a Dutch alliance would enhance the stream of naval supplies such as wood and rope to France. He argued in favour of an offensive and defensive alliance, but stressed that it should be voluntary and based on reciprocal interests. A lopsided alliance would only provoke resistance and hindrance. The Dutch were anticipated to cooperate under duress, but their heart would not be in it and they would seize every opportunity to wriggle themselves out of the French yoke. Territorial demands should be moderate, that is to say all territory should be restored with the exception of Maastricht and some places to form a barrier along the river Meuse. Thereto, although the United Provinces should be given possession of the rest of the Lands of the Generality, all fortifications there should either be demolished or occupied by French garrisons. Likewise, French troops should be stationed in Gorinchem and some other places in the United Provinces themselves in order to ‘assurer à nos troupes l’entrée de la Hollande, à l’effet de la défendre contre les ennemis intérieurs et extérieurs.’ Besides these measures to ensure both French security and allow the French to intervene military in the United Provinces once necessary, a financial levy might be raised and a loan of 100 million should be  Godechot, 1983, p. 84.

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extorted at an ludicrously low three or four percent interest. Reiterating the amount to be taken from the Batavians mentioned by Robespierre and foreshadowing the amount the Comité de Salut public would claim as indemnity, Cochon, thus, couched the 100 million in terms of a repayable and interest carrying loan. Moreover, the number of ships of the line and frigates the United Provinces was to deploy in the course of the ongoing war should be fixed. Finally, it should be determined that no peace was to be concluded without the consent of the other party and even then on the condition of the restitution of both Republics’ colonies. Ramel’s and Cochon’s advices foreshadowed the issues at stake during the negotiations: French territorial and financial demands, the French army of occupation, and the terms of military cooperation. Dutch Patriots, on their part, had great expectations of their country’s revival. They envisioned an independent, affluent republic that would prosper from its commerce. The federal vision had virtually disappeared from Patriot discourse. They did realise, however, that they needed French support and protection to bring about its ‘regeneration’ and to stay in power.53 Internally, their power base was rather small. Without French military presence they would probably not be able to bring about the desired institutional reforms nor would they be able to hold grip on power. Externally, remembering the events of 1787 very well, some Patriots feared a new Prussian intervention more than French dominance. Besides the topical military situation, Batavian Patriots, in terms of foreign policy, were the heirs of the Holland regent tradition that had given preference to a French alliance above close links with Britain ever since the early seventeenth century because of mercantile reasons. By consequence, an alliance with France was the cornerstone of their foreign policy, although their willingness to give in to French preponderance and the kind of alliance they envisaged would both vary based on the military, as well as (domestic and international) political situation. An alliance had to be negotiated the sooner the better.54 Hence, while the French still doubted what course to take, Batavian Patriots had already fully committed themselves to an alliance with the French Republic. Batavian Patriots did hope the

53  Sorel, 1906IV, p. 237 and p. 269; Van Deusen, 1932, p. 107; Schama, 1989, p. 246; Grijzenhout, 2002, p. 46. 54  Sorel, 1906IV, p. 163.



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alliance would be advantageous for both sides.55 Moreover, they hoped their expectations of French moderation and their appeals to France’s justice and revolutionary principles would not go unwarranted. 56 2.3  The Formation of a Treaty For the time being, Dutch Patriots were still in a great state of suspense over the amount of altruism their French brothers would be able and willing to show. The ancient maxim of having France as a friend, but not as a neighbour seemed obsolescent for sure. The French Republic had by then annexed previous conquests or, as with regard to Belgium, annexation was plausible. Although a full annexation of the United Provinces was highly unlikely, the future relation between the two Republics was still quite uncertain. At first, Dutch Patriots expected to negotiate with the French in a sincerely fraternal spirit. As mentioned above, in January, the Batavian revolutionary committee sent Blauw and Irhoven van Dam to Paris. They were to talk with the Comité de Salut public in order to establish ‘between the two people as between two equal and independent republics a close union and an alliance on reasonable and for both states equally beneficial terms.’57 Hence, before the French had established what to do with the United Provinces, Batavian Patriots seized the initiative by proposing an alliance. It became clear soon that French fraternity had its limits. Whereas Repelaer and Brantsen’s peace offer was rejected, the Comité de Salut public, too, refused to accept the committee’s envoys’ credentials.58 As Schama has it, for as long as the river Rhine was not crossed, the option of attaining Dutch neutrality by diplomatic means had to be left open.59 The French government, somewhat taken by surprise by the sudden success in the north, had simply not yet established what it was going to do and wished to keep all options open. If the French

 Godechot, 1983, p. 186.  Sorel, 1906IV, p. 199. 57   ‘tusschen de beide volken, als tusschen twee gelijke en onafhankelijke republieken, een vast verbond te sluiten, en eene alliantie aan te gaan op redelijke en voor beide Staten even voordeelige voorwaarden.’; 14 February 1795, Pieter Paulus; reiterated in Legrand, 1895, pp. 91–92. See also: Sorel, 1906IV, p. 239 and Smit, 1950, p. 112. 58  Schama, 1989, p. 236. 59  Schama, 1989, p. 241. 55 56

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government in 1795 really had pursued a policy of sister republics, one would have expected the French to take the initiative as they would indeed do two to three years later in the cases of the Italian sister republics and the Helvetic Republic. Because French politicians had not set their mind yet, the Batavians were the first to propose an alliance. Blauw even nearly had himself expelled from France after an attempt to get negotiations going. According to Blauw’s account written after the conclusion of the Treaty,60 Bernardus Blok, a Patriot refugee in Paris, had addressed him. Blok told the Batavian envoy that he had connections that might get him a meeting with Courtois, one of the members of the Comité de Sûreté Générale. Apparently, Courtois had indicated he was willing to take the Batavian Patriots’ cause at hand and to have the Orangists envoys expelled, but to need some kind of overture to do so. Afterwards, Blauw contended to have agreed to a one-on-one meeting with Courtois but not to have expected to be actually received. As he was lead into the Comité de Sûreté Générale’s building, he soon found himself introduced to the fully assembled committee. Thus, Blauw would later claim to have been tricked in a meeting with the committee at large. The true course of action cannot be retrieved, but Blauw did have reason to excuse himself. For, the committee had asked him to communicate Batavian proposals. Blauw claimed to have answered that he had not intended to address the committee. Thereto, he argued that he was sent by the Batavian Patriots—together with Irhoven who had been too ill to join him that evening—as their envoys to further the Batavian Republic’s interests with the French government. One of the committee’s members, Legendre, assured Blauw that the committee had high esteem for the Batavian Patriots. Entirely reassured, Blauw entered into an ‘intimate conversation’ and gave an extensive account of affairs in the United Provinces. On the committee’s request, Blauw wrote a letter stating that Brantsen and Repelaer were Orangists after which he left. In the middle of the night Blauw was woken by a dismayed Johan Valckenaer, shouting: ‘My God, what did you do?’61 Carnot had

60   Jacob Blauw, Memorie van instructie en tot meerdere bijlichting van de volumnineuse bijlagen; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 425–432 no. 327 and pp. 650–657 no. 500. 61   ‘Mijn God, wat hebt gij gedaan?’



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summoned Valckenaer and accused Blauw of having caused discord between the two supreme committees. After Blauw had left, the Comité de Sûreté Générale had gone to the Comité de Salut public and had called it to account on the policy pursued with regard to the Dutch Republic.62 Carnot demanded Blauw and Irhoven to leave Paris the very next morning. In the nick of time, Valckenaer and Blauw managed to save the day by writing the Comité de Salut public a letter. The Batavian envoys were allowed to stay. Blauw would later on even claim that this incident had caused the Comité de Salut public to order Pichegru to advance. The Batavian initiative in combination with the pleas by the ‘représentants en mission’ had tipped the balance in favour of the advocates of an alliance in French politics. By the end of February 1795—on the same day the ‘Orangist’ envoys bade their farewell—, the Comité de Salut public decided for an alliance and the ‘représentants en mission’ were instructed to clear the ground.63 In response to Ramel’s advice, the Comité de Salut public contended to be seriously out to conclude a treaty with the Batavian people and was even discussing its foundations.64 Nonetheless, a majority in Paris was adamant to be adequately compensated for the tour de force that had led to the liberation of the Batavian people. The alliance had to be peddled at least to these non-altruists not only to counterpoise isolationists and to have the Treaty ratified, but also to be able to use it as an instrument to boost the Comité’s popularity at home. In particular, this implied that the natural frontiers would be secured and they included part of Batavian territory. This course was clearly expressed in a French internal report on what to do with the lands occupied by the Armies of the North and the Sambre et Meuse. While repudiating the annexation of the entire United Provinces and stressing that they were to be considered as a free and independent power, it was stated that the Batavians would have to pay a price for their freedom and independence.65 Hence, recognition of the Batavian Republic was made dependent on an agreement   Vreede, 1863, pp. 64–67.   20 February 1795, Comité de Salut public to representants en mission en Hollande; Colenbrander 1905 pp. 605–607 no. 467. 64   26 February 1795, Comité de Salut public to representants en mission en Hollande; Colenbrander 1905 pp. 607–608 no. 468. 65   6 May 1795, Observations sur l’administration générale des pays conquis par les armées du Nord et de Sambre et Meuse; AAE MD France 335. 62 63

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on indemnity and the mutual borders, that is, on France’s financial and territorial gains.66 Until that agreement was reached, the Batavians were to be considered as ‘une compagnie de marchands que comme une puissance politique.’67 Hence, whereas both parties by then agreed that their mutual relation had to be formalised in an alliance treaty, the truly relevant question was on what terms the alliance would be concluded. Moreover, entering into an alliance with Batavian Patriots was only prudent provided that their hold on Dutch politics was likely to last. The impecunious Comité had no use for another wave of refugee allies that had to be taken care of and who would be able to refer to a formal treaty to exact military support from the French government. Henceforth, not until Franco-Prussian negotiations in Basel had reached a stage that the Comité de Salut public was sufficiently sure about the endurance of Patriot rule in The Hague, negotiations got a move on. By then, Caspar Meyer had replaced Irhoven van Dam. Blauw had already enumerated seven points that were to form the basis of negotiations.68 In the first place, the Batavian Republic’s political relations with Coalition powers had to be discussed. Was the Batavian Republic to stay neutral or did The Hague have to declare war and recall its envoys? In the second place, agreement had to be reached on the fate of the Lands of the Generality and the conquered border towns. Would they be restored or was part of the country to be dismembered? In the latter case, the Batavian Republic was to be indemnified for its loss. Note that Blauw did not mention any territories that formed constituent parts of any of the Provinces save towns that had actually been conquered. In the third place, the French were to inform the Batavian government of ongoing peace negotiations. Furthermore, Paris was to promise to inform and consult the Batavian government and to admit Batavian envoys in case of future peace negotiations. Blauw recalled the way the Dutch had been treated throughout the 1783 peace negotiations with Britain and desired to claim a more substantial role for his country in the next ones. In the fourth place, military operations 66  Schama, 1989, p. 248; 13 March 1795, Reubell, Sieyes, and Merlin de Doaui to Blauw and Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 600; AN 284 AP Papiers Sieyes 10; 25 March 1795, Comité de Salut public to Alquier and Cochon; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 631–632 no. 482. 67   15 March 1795, Comité de Salut public to the representants en mission in Holland; Colenbrander, 1905, p. 625 no. 476. 68   Vreede, 1863, pp. 70–71.



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for the next campaign were to be concerted and arrangements had to be made for the Batavian Republic to contribute to lasting peace. Furthermore, the matters of the (5) assignats, (6) Dutch refugees in Paris, and (7) prisoners of war had to be addressed. Blauw did, thus, foresee French territorial claims and an alliance with the Batavian Republic contributing to the war effort actively. Most remarkably, recognition of the Batavian Republic was absent. The existence of the Batavian Republic was clearly considered as self-evident and was not a point of negotiation. The Staten Generaal had officially passed Blauw and Meyer’s instructions for negotiations on a treaty of alliance and commerce on 2 March.69 They began with stating to be devoted to the new order. The Staten Generaal asserted that they had declared the rights of man and the citizen, had destroyed all privileged orders and hereditary positions including the Stadholderate as soon as they had been composed of members ‘with a true republican spirit.’70 Thereto, the assembly added to have sent two envoys to Paris immediately afterwards. They were to declare that the Staten Generaal of the United Provinces recognised the Convention nationale as legitimate and as the representation of the entire French people. Moreover, the envoys were to stress the Staten Generaal’s gratitude for France’s effort to liberate the Batavian people and provide it with the opportunity to become once again felicitous. To improve the prosperity of the Batavian people even further, the Staten Generaal now desired a ‘tight and enduring Treaty of Alliance and Commerce.’71 The Treaty had to be founded on the true interests of both nations and should refrain from all kinds of political reserves typical for the old diplomacy. Good faith and candour were said to befit two nations ‘whose constitutions from now on are based on the same principles of equality, liberty, and fraternity, who from now on have but one and the same interest as well as the same enemies to fight or to contain.’72 Friendship with the French nation and a ‘sincere and real fraternity’73 should be promoted in any possible way. 69   26 February 1795, concept; NA 3.02.01 no. 461; 2 March 1795, Colenbrander 1905 pp. 657–666 no. 501. 70   ‘met eenen waren republikeinsehen geest.’ 71   ‘een nauw en bestendig tractaat van alliantie en commercie.’ 72   ‘wier constitutien voortaan op dezelvde gronden van gelijkheid, vrijheid en broederschap zullen gevestigd zijn, die voortaan maar een en het zelvde belang en ook dezelvde vijanden te bestrijden of in bedwang te houden zullen hebben.’ 73   ‘opregt en wezendlijkst broederschap.’

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The alliance, while being based partly on ideological aspects, was thus basically presented as a community of interests between ideologically kindred states.74 The Staten Generaal went on by elaborating on the content of the Treaty. In essence, they argued that the Batavian Republic would only be a useful ally to France if its trade would be restored, that is, if it would be in a position to compete with Britain and serve as a supplier to France. Everything had to be done that might promote mercantile regeneration; everything that might impede this should be refrained from. The economic argument was quite similar to the one made by Cochon in his advice to the French government.75 The Staten Generaal went even further in emphasising the coherence between commerce and the alliance. The instructions for the Batavian envoys in Paris mostly were about commercial relations. Basically, they proposed to form a zone of free movement of goods and capital. The Staten Generaal proposed a defensive alliance. Since Britain was deemed the main enemy, they held out the prospect of deploying a considerable fleet to gain control of the North Sea and the Baltic. In addition, an army would be formed that could operate along French forces in Germany. French troops, on their turn, should leave the Batavian Republic. Finally, the Staten Generaal stressed the necessity of a full restitution of Dutch territory. They even put forward some claims to extent their territory to the south. The Staten Generaal must have expected that the Dutch contribution to the war effort of which they had held out the prospect would not suffice to persuade the French government to enter into an alliance on the terms desired by the Staten Generaal. Therefore, they allowed Blauw and Meyer to offer ‘a certain amount of money’ as a ‘token of its [the Dutch Republic’s; RK] appreciation.’76 Taking France’s financial situation into mind, the Staten Generaal probably contemplated that the alliance and an extension of Dutch territory might be bought from the French.

74   The Staten Generaal addressed the Convention nationale in similar terms, that is to say the first Articles of the instructions were translated into French and communicated to the French assembly directly. 3 March 1795, Les Representans de la Nation Batave aux Representans de la Nation Française; AN AF II 64. 75   3 March 1795, Cochon to the Comité de Salut public; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 617–622 no. 473. 76   ‘een zeekere bepaalde som [. . .] tot een blijk van haare erkentelijkheid.’



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The End of a Parisian Winter In early March negotiations commenced.77 The day after Meyer’s arrival in Paris (9 March), the Batavian envoys informed the Comité de Salut public that they had been ordered by the Staten Generaal to propose a ‘tight alliance’ between the two Republics and requested the Comité to appoint commissioners to negotiate with.78 The French government responded immediately. The same night, the Comité de Salut public received the Batavian envoys.79 The Comité de Salut public appointed three of its members—the former clergyman Sieyes and the lawyers Merlin de Douai and Reubell—to have conferences with the Batavian envoys. Merlin drew some bases proposées.80 After Sieyes had commented the bases these were transferred to a plan de négociation that was adopted on 14 March 1795.81 Basically, the three commissioners, all leading members of the Comité, did thus write their own instructions. The choice of commissioners was not a neutral one. Sieyes, Reubell, and Merlin all wished to preserve French influence in the Dutch Republic, to attain a large indemnity, to expand France’s borders to the north, and to have the Batavian Republic partake in the war against Britain and Austria as an ally,82 although Reubell did not champion the policy of sister republics.83 According to Schama, they were as chauvinistic as their revolutionary predecessors, but had dropped their ideological baggage and no ‘angel like altruism’ was to be expected from them.84 In Belissa’s view, the leading Thermidorians, to the contrary, were just involved in a bid to (re)integrate the French Republic in the European

77  On the course of negotiations in Paris in March 1795 see e.g. Sorel, 1906IV, pp. 270–277. 78   10 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 79   10 March 1795, Comité de Salut public to Blauw and Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 608. 13 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 593. 80  Prior to 6 March 1795, Bases proposées pour le traité à faire avec les ProvincesUnies (hereafter : BP); Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 622–623 no. 474. 81   14 March 1795, Plan de négociation sur lequel les membres du Comité de Salut public attachées aux relations extérieures veulent traiter avec les envoyés bataves (hereafter: PN); Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 623–625 no. 475; Vreede, 1863, p. 123; Sorel, 1906IV, p. 270; Bastid, 1970, p. 162. 82   Van Deusen, 1932, pp. 108–109; Smit, 1950, p. 113; Homan, 1971, p. 91 and p. 130; Godechot, 1983, p. 186; Schama, 1989, p. 247. 83  Guyot, 1907, p. 119; Vovelle, 2000, p. 17–18. 84  Schama, 1989, p. 246.

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states system by fixing France’s borders and restoring a (territorial) balance of power.85 Lazare Carnot clearly came off worst. Although he shared his colleagues’ position that French security was paramount, he, by then, was in favour of a swift peace without annexations and indemnities.86 France was to confine itself to assuring some strategic and economic advantages. There was to be no Batavian Republic. At the most, a defensive alliance with the United Provinces was to be considered.87 Sieyes and Reubell had taken control of foreign policy decisions, though. Hence the first of the three options discussed earlier was dropped. In order to widen the support basis for their course, the second and third options were to be brought together; that is, a long-term alliance was to be combined with immediate territorial and financial concessions to France. Blauw and Meyer addressed their French colleagues on 12 March with some réflexions provisoires.88 Basically, these reflections were a translation of Batavian desires from their instructions, but Blauw and Meyer had radicalised the Staten Generaal’s terms somewhat. In particular, they advocated an offensive alliance and tighter military cooperation. The Staten Generaal’s territorial scheme was not transmitted to the French commissioners. Especially Jacobus Blauw belonged to the more radical faction among the Batavian Patriots less scrupulous to make use of French arms to get rid of political enemies. A year later Blauw would be expelled from France because of alleged involvement with Gracchus Babeuf.89 Next to his political background, the Batavian envoys might have deemed it necessary to show more dedication to the Revolution’s cause to attain the goals set by their principals in The Hague. Negotiations soon reached a deadlock as Blauw and Meyer insisted on immediate recognition of the Batavian Republic and the French commissioners refused to talk about recognition or to negotiate on any substantial matter before the issues of indemnity and the Franco-

  Belissa, 1995, pp. 409–417.  Reinhard, 1952, p. 160; Godechot, 1983, pp. 79–83; Schama, 1989, p. 332; Vovelle, 2000, p. 17. 87  Schama, 1989, p. 243. 88   12 March 1795, Réflexions provisoires pour les citoyens Sieyes et autres commissaires du Comité de Salut public, nommés pour entrer en conférence avec les ministres plenipotentiaires Bataves; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 89  Laurent, 1867, pp. 152–155; Guyot, 1907, p. 165; Godechot, 1983, p. 227 and p. 230; Schama, 1989, pp. 305–307; Blanning, 1996, p. 172; Harouel, 1997a, p. 40. 85 86



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Batavian frontier had been settled. In their plan de négociation Sieyes, Merlin, and Reubell had established that a premature recognition of Batavian independence would deteriorate the French negotiating position. Hence, the French were to ‘reprendre le ton d’un conquérant envers un peuple qu’on aurait déjà reconnue et traité en allié.’90 With regard to the armouries, the ‘représentants en mission’ were instructed by the Comité de Salut public not to do anything irrevocable or anything that might prejudice in any way the political fate of the United Provinces before the Convention had pronounced itself on the matter. For the time being, the United Provinces had to be kept in a position that the decrees of the Convention could be executed whatever they might be. En conséquence et sur la question particulière dont il s’agit, nous vous prions de considérer les Bataves pétitionnaires [. . .] plutôt comme une compagnie de marchands que comme une puissance politique.91

In the course of March several conferences were held, but failed to end the stalemate. On 17 March, the Batavian envoys once again insisted on recognition of their people’s independence; and, once again, to no avail. Des Républicains, des vrais amis de la Liberté savent le sacrifier pour elle et toute humiliation personnelle disparait devant les grands intérêts de la patrie mais ils le répètent sans cette indépendance et sans la jouissance de tout ce qui s’en suit la nation Batave ne peut qu’être nulle et de nulle valeur tant pour elle que pour la France.92

From the French side, Sieyes had merely remarked that the Prussian army was already approaching Wezel. Sieyes attempted to play on Batavian fear for a repetition of the 1787 invasion failed.93 The Batavian envoys seem to have understood the message. On the same day, Blauw and Meyer requested new instructions from the Staten Generaal.94 Six days later they repeated their request stressing that they feared the French to turn to violent means if ­negotiations

  14 March 1795, Plan de négociation; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 623–625 no. 475.   15 March 1795, Comité de Salut public to the representants; Colenbrander, 1905, p. 625 no. 476. 92   17 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Sieyes, Reubell, and Merlin; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 93   17 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; NA 1.02.14 no. 596. 94   17 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; NA 1.02.14 no. 596. 90 91

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would not start making headway soon.95 In the event, initial French proposals had a sobering effect on Batavian Patriots. In his account of the negotiations, Blauw would later on state that the French were mainly concerned with territory instead of ‘arguments’ and were in fact preparing to take the former by force.96 From then on, Blauw and Meyer, backed by their principals in The Hague, took a firm stand against what they regarded to be excessive French terms. In contrast, the ‘représentants’ Alquier and Cochon warned the Comité de Salut public from The Hague that the way in which the Batavian envoys had been received had caused turmoil in the United Provinces and played into the Orangists’ hands as well as hindered supplying French troops.97 On 24 March, the French commissioners repeated their demands. The issue of the mutual borders was presented as a conditio sine qua non. The commissioners contended that a majority of the Convention nationale tended towards concluding an alliance with the Dutch Republic and recognising its independence, but that this recognition had to be accompanied by great sacrifices on the Dutch side. As to the settlement of the border, they stressed that the Convention had set its mind on extending French territory to the Rhine. The Comité was said to expose itself gravely in case it would present a less profitable settlement to the Convention.98 The Batavian envoys replied that ‘no Dutchman would ever sign a treaty by which he voluntary consented to the cession of lands, cities, or villages belonging to the United Provinces.’99 In their account of the 23 and 24 March conferences to the registrar of the Staten Generaal, they blamed the French position on the Comité’s fear to lose popularity in France. In their view, the French government was driven by considerations of domestic politics instead of founding negotiations on the interests of both nations.100   23 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; NA 1.02.14 no. 596.   Jacob Blauw, Memorie van instructie en tot meerdere bijlichting van de volumnineuse bijlagen; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 425–432 no. 327 and pp. 650–657 no. 500.   97   19 March 1795, Alquier and Cochon to the Comité de Salut public; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 626–627 no. 478.   98   24 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to the registrar Quarles; NA 1.02.14 no. 596.   99   ‘dat geen Hollander immer een tractaat zou teekenen, waar bij hij vrijwillig consenteerde tot de overgifte van landen, steden of dorpen, die tot de vereenigde Nederlanden behoorden.’ 24 March 1794, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; NA 1.02.14 no. 596. 100   24 March 1794, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; NA 1.02.14 no. 596.   95   96



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The 24 March conference seems to have turned around positions in negotiations. The Batavian envoys refused to sign a Treaty proposed by the French. Blauw and Meyer’s statement does, however, not indicate that the Batavians did no longer desire an alliance. They just refuted the territorial terms proposed by the French. On the other hand, the way the French commissioners expressed themselves seems to suggest that the alliance was regarded as mainly a Batavian desire the French Republic was willing to grant if made sufficiently alluring to sell it to the French people and people’s representatives. To force a breakthrough the Batavian envoys handed in a new draft for preliminaries the next day.101 They stuck to an immediate recognition of the Batavian Republic and their admittance as envoys. The very same day that Blauw and Meyer put the 25 March draft on the table, the Staten Generaal in The Hague decided that indemnity was not to be discussed before the Batavian Republic’s frontiers had been recognised, nor were Blauw and Meyer to enter negotiations on any issue whatsoever prior to being officially recognised and admitted as envoys.102 The Staten Generaal accused the French government of foul play. They suspected the Comité to make unconscionable demands with a view to provoking a refusal, which it subsequently would be able to use as a pretext to treat the United Provinces as it had treated Belgium, that is, as conquered territory. Their Lords stated that they would never allow the French to do so unless they would be forced to by the law of the jungle and to put their trust in the Convention nationale not to allow solemn assurances of Dutch independence to be ignored and violated.103 Before the Staten Generaal´s instructions reached Paris, the French commissioners had dropped their masks. In the 26 March conference, Sieyes had consigned all Batavian arguments based on good faith and popular sovereignty to the wastepaper basket. As restated by Blauw and Meyer afterwards: One of the commissioners and just the one to be least expected to do so [in the margin: Sieyes; RK] [. . .] had the impudence to mock the

101   25 March 1795, Projet d’articles preliminaries entre la République française et la République batave; NA 1.02.14 no. 600; Vreede, 1863, bijlagen pp. 56–59; 25 March 1795, Comité de Salut public to Alquier and Cochon; Colenbrander 1905 pp. 631–632 no. 482. 102  Schama, 1989, p. 251. 103   25 March 1795, Staten Generaal to Blauw and Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 604.

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part ii, chapter two ­ roclamations issued in Holland with regard to sovereignty, overtly prop fessing his Machiavellian principles by stating that in his view principles are to be thought to youngsters in an academy, but should never serve as the guide to a statesman’s actions.104

According to their account of the conference, the Batavian envoys reply had been as vigorous as Sieyes’ statement: We were so outraged about this infamous point of view that we did not hesitate to declare that no matter how the Empress of Russia had been able to find cowardly Polish to endorse the partition of their country, we did not think all of France’s power to be sufficient to force us to a disgraceful consent to dismember our country.105

Thus, by the start of April, negotiations were stuck. The Batavian authorities threatened to stop supplying the French troops on Batavian soil. In combination with domestic events, this forced the Comité to be more conciliatory with regard to the substance of the Treaty.106 The Comité was already discussing a new draft107 when an uprising in Paris on 1 April, during which the Convention nationale was stormed, roused it to action.108 The strong winter that had provided strategic advantages in the north had worsened living conditions in Paris as well. Hoi polloi had taken to the streets again.109 The Comité was in dire need of money and diplomatic successes.110 A new alliance would be very welcome to

104   ‘een der commissarissen en juist die waarvan dat het minst verwacht kon worden [. . .] zelfs de onbeschaamdheid heeft gehad om als ’t ware den spot te steeken met de proclamatien, die in Holland, relatif de souverainiteit, gedaan zijn, en openlijk zijne machiavellistische grondbeginselen ten aanhoren van ons allen in zo verre beleed, dat volgens zijn oordeel en gevoelens, de principes door een professor op eene academie aan jonge lieden konden worden gedoceerd, maar dat dezelve nimmer ot een richtsnoer voor de handelingen eens staatsmans konden dienen.’; 31 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; NA 1.02.14 no. 596; also reiterated in: Sorel, 1906IV, p. 275. 105   ‘Wij waren dermate verontwaardigd over dit schandelijk aveu, dat wij ons niet ontzagen om te kennen te geeven, dat hoezeer de keizerin van Rusland lafhartige Poolen had kunnen vinden om de partage van hun eigen land te onderschrijven, wij al de macht van Frankrijk niet genoegzaam oordeelden om ons te dwingen of te noodzaaken tot eene schandelijke toestemming om ons land te verdeelen’; 31 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; NA 1.02.14 no. 596. 106  Schama, 1989, pp. 252–253. 107  A copy of the draft that would be presented to Blauw and Meyer on 5 April dated 30 March is to be found in Sieyes’ private archive. AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 1. 108  Sorel, 1906IV, p. 276. 109   Vreede, 1863, p. 159. 110   Vreede, 1863, pp. 161–162; Homan, 1971, p. 92.



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increase the regime’s standing.111 Hence, the French government suddenly was in a hurry. Already on the evening before things got out of hand in Paris, the Comité wrote to Alquier and Cochon that they were to threaten evacuating the United Provinces to extort consent to the Treaty drafted by the French commissioners. French forces were to retreat behind the river Lek and take strategic positions directed both against Prussia and the Dutch. Whereas France could not preserve the entire United Provinces it would thus extend its territory and gain a defensible border. The fortified and strategically important cities of Flushing, Gorinchem, Dordrecht, Arnhem, Rheenen, and Nijmegen were explicitly mentioned as to be included in French territory. If Batavian Patriots wanted to prevent a new Prussian invasion and Orangist restoration, the French government asserted, they were to say yes to the preliminary terms without delay. If they would do so, the Comité assured the ‘représentants en mission’ a treaty of alliance and commerce would be presently concluded to both republics’ satisfaction. Batavian Patriots would become ‘chez eux les maîtres de faire tout ce qu’ils voudront,’ the French would assist them with all their forces, and the French and Batavians would march against the common enemy together.112 On their part, the Batavian envoys tried to get the negotiations afloat as well. On 1 April, by means of a ‘ouverture non officielle,’ they requested the French commissioners to communicate ‘l’ultimatum des demandes que le Comité de Salut public croit juste et possible d’exiger de la nation Batave.’ Of the record, they promised that a statement like that would provoke a ‘détermination finale’ swiftly. Furthermore, they demanded to be recognised as envoys.113 This was a private action by Blauw and Meyer. They might have contemplated to provoke more indulgence on the Staten Generaal’s part. More likely, they asked for an ultimatum in the sense that the French would make clear what their true intentions were. Their request was rather a step in a negotiation process than the provocation of a one-sided demand to be agreed to within a fixed period of time.

 Schama, 1989, p. 253.   31 March 1795, Comité de Salut public to Alquier and Cochon; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 634–635 no. 485. 113   1 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Sieyes, Reubell, and Merlin; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 111 112

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Simultaneously, Blauw and Meyer addressed the Comité de Salut public directly.114 They set off by stating the end of their mission: ‘une alliance également nécéssaire au bonheur des deux Républiques,’ ‘d’offrir au peuple français la juste tribut de réconnaissance d’une nation qui confesse lui devoir sa liberté et qui désire le dédommager des généreux sacrifices qu’il a fait en épousant sa cause,’ and ‘s’unir à lui pour terrasser ses ennemis.’ They stressed that a swift recognition of Batavian independence was indispensable to preparations for the following campaign to proceed as well as to establish the mutual trust necessary to make a lasting alliance work. The French government was said to be too enlightened to make recognition depend on an indemnity and cession of territory. For French demands, if consented to, would turn out to be disastrous. The United Provinces would be ruined, its capacity to defend itself deteriorated, and all people of subsistence would most definitely emigrate. In short, instead of a fraternal alignment the alliance would amount to fratricide. The Batavian envoys made clear that they would never be authorised to sign a treaty as proposed by the French commissioners. They took a firm stand not to yield to any terms that would be disgraceful to their country: Que les habitans du pays Batave convaincus que leur Patrie ne peut pas exister sans la liberté et que sans des éfforts et des sacrifices énormes, desquels l’homme libre seul est capable; les digues et les écluses ne resisteroient pas longtems à la violence des eaux; considérent cette liberté comme le bien suprême, pour le quel ils veulent faire le sacrifice de tout ce qu’ils ont de plus cher; mais ils regardent en même tems comme le premier caractère d’un vrai Républicain de braver tous les dangers et de se soumettre à son sort plutôt que de déshonorer la dignité d’hommes libres à la face de l’Europe et de la postérité, et qu’ils sont persuadés qu’une telle déclaration ne peut qu’être applaudie des mandataires d’un grand peuple.115

Subsequently, Blauw and Meyer enumerated a number of reasons why France could not postpone recognition of Batavian independence. First and foremost, Blauw and Meyer appealed to revolutionary principles: C’est sur ces principes de la souveraineté des Peuples d’unité, d’indépendance et surtout de loyauté que la République française a été

  1 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600 and AAE CP Hollande 587. 115   1 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600 and AAE CP Hollande 587. 114



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fondée par des législateurs humains et éclairés. Quel augure favorable puisque ce sont ces mêmes législateurs ces hommes de génie amis de la justice qui sont appelés à cimenter l’alliance du peuple français avec une Nation qui, de l’aurore de sa liberté a adopté et consacré ces mêmes principes.116

Thereupon, Blauw and Meyer retorted by claiming that the present liberation would not have been necessary if France had upheld its treaty obligations in 1787. Prussian forces had, after all, been able to crush the Patriot Revolt of the 1780s mainly because the French government had abandoned its allies. Moreover, French forces had met with almost no resistance while occupying the United Provinces: ‘l’insurrection des Patriotes leur a ouvert les portes de toutes les villes de la Province de Hollande.’ In Frisia, Overijssel, and Groningen, Patriots were said to have seized power even before the French had arrived, whereas the Province of Zeeland had voluntarily allowed French troops to enter after the ‘représentants en mission’ had recognised the Batavian people’s independence. Patriots all over the country had paved the way for French troops relying on France to stick to its solemn promises. By consequence, the French had hardly had to fight to advance: ‘que partout les français ont été reçus comme amis et frêres, que la conquête du pays Batave a été faite plutôt moralement.’ Finally, they referred to French interests. On the short run, the French position was said to undermine the support for and hinder cooperation with supplying French troops. They emphasised that the Staten Generaal would be unable to furnish the French army any longer if the stagnation in negotiations would not come to an end soon. Conversely, they held out the prospect of countless advantages of an ‘étroite alliance’ on the long run. Surely, they claimed, the French government would not eschew these advantages for the sake of some prompt benefit. In the direct address to the Comité de Salut public, too, the Batavian envoys declared that they were ordered not to enter into negotiations unless they had been recognised as envoys and the Staten Generaal had been recognised as ‘une assemblée légale de représentants d’un peuple libre.’ In a meeting with the ‘représentants en mission,’ the ad hoc committee from the Staten Generaal charged with supervising negotiations

116   1 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600 and AAE CP Hollande 587.

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with France made clear that French demands were just too excessive. Appealing to good faith and revolutionary principles like the renunciation of war for the sake of conquest, it stressed that the Batavian government, although grateful to the French people, could not accept the claims and expected them to be mitigated.117 There are no indications that the ‘représentants’ really advocated the Dutch cause with the Comité. Only three days after the meeting, the ‘représentant’ Richard notified his government that all was ready to pull back French troops behind the river Waal as ordered.118 Sieyes’ indignation over the Batavian repudiation of French terms was virtually intolerable for him. He contemplated drastic measures.119 By consequence, the ‘représentants en mission’ were instructed to make preparations for evacuating the country.120 Hence, the French, at the time, seriously reckoned with abandoning the lands north of the great rivers. Admittedly, Richard still anticipated a Prussian counterattack that might force them to do so. Some days later, Richard warned the Comité, though, that pulling back French forces behind the Waal while taking the resources necessary for the Army of the North with them manu militari was not without risk.121 In case of uprisings, the Dutch army might still prove to be quite dangerous.122 Henceforth, he suggested the Comité to give orders to postpone the reorganisation of the Batavian army. Until the conclusion of a treaty, Batavians were not to have the means of armed resistance.123 Nevertheless, Alquier and Cochon were informed that Prussia in purview of the Treaty recently concluded with France, no longer posed a threat to the United Provinces. The ‘représentants,’ who were provided with a copy of the Treaty of Basel (5 April 1795), were urged to keep the Prussian promise not to undertake any hostilities towards the United Provinces secret in order to keep the pressure on the Staten

117   2 April 1795, Mémoire adressé par les Etats généraux aux Représentans du people français à Amsterdam; AAE CP Hollande 587. 118   5 April 1795, Richard to Comité de Salut public; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 635– 636 no. 487; Legrand, 1895, p. 100. 119  Schama, 1989, p. 251. 120  Legrand, 1895, p. 100. 121   9 April 1795, Richard to Comité de Salut public; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 636– 638 no. 488; Legrand, 1895, p. 101. 122  Legrand, 1895, p. 101; Schama, 1989, p. 252. 123   Vreede, 1863, p. 90; Sorel, 1906IV, p. 318.



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Generaal to yield and sign the proposed preliminaries.124 Batavian fear for Prussia enabled the commissioners in Paris to threaten with evacuating the United Provinces.125 The French Ultimatum On 5 April, the French commissioners transmitted a new draft to Blauw and Meyer.126 This time the draft was accompanied by an ultimatum.127 The Staten Generaal were given ten days to respond. The Comité de Salut public reckoned with the possibility of a refusal. It warned the ‘représentants en mission’ that a refusal would cause great difficulties and even dangers to the French. In case the draft would be refuted, France was to change its role vis-à-vis the Dutch into that of a victor. The ‘représentants’ were to secure at least the French hold on Bergen op Zoom, Antwerp, Flushing, and the strongholds controlling the Scheldt.128 With this draft in his pocket, Blauw immediately left for The Hague.129 On the one hand his journey was to convince the Comité that the Batavians were indeed hurrying. On the other hand, it allowed Blauw to discuss matters directly with leading Batavian Patriots.130 Upon arrival in The Hague on 11 April, he informed the Secreet Besogne—the Staten Generaal’s committee on foreign affairs—of French demands. Soon afterwards, Ramel—one of the ‘représentants en mission’ with the Army of the North—was addressed by the deputies Lestevenon and Ysselmonde declaring that the Staten Generaal were obliged by the United Provinces’ constitution to procure the Provincial Staten’ consent and were therefore unable to respond within the set time. The ‘représentants en mission’ promised to bring the request for a 124   10 April 1795, Comité de Salut public to Alquier and Cochon; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 638–639 no. 489; Vreede, 1863, p. 105; Sorel, Legrand, 1895, p. 98; 1906IV, p. 245 and p. 315. 125   Vreede, 1863, pp. 114–115. 126   5 April 1795, Articles preliminaries et bases sur lesquelles le Comité de Salut public propose de faire un Traité d’Alliance entre la République Française et la République Batave; NA 1.02.14 no. 600; Vreede, 1863, bijlagen pp. 59–60. 127   5 April 1795, Comité de Salut public to Blauw and Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 4 April 1795, Comité de Salut public to Richard; Colenbrander, 1905, p. 635 no. 486; Sorel, 1906IV, p. 282. 128   14 April 1795, Comité de Salut public to Richard; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 640– 641 no. 490. 129   Vreede, 1863, p. 119. 130   6 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 593.

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deferment to his government’s attention. They kept their promise. The Comité de Salut public was indeed informed that the United Provinces’ constitution did not allow coming up with a response on such a short notice.131 Blauw personally discussed the draft with the Holland Committé van Buitenlandsche Zaken—established to assume the diplomatic tasks of the Raadpensionaris—on 11 and 12 April as well.132 The committee’s initial reaction was that the allies—in which terms they still referred to the other Provinces—had to be consulted and henceforth it was impossible to answer by 16 April. Even before having received an official notification from the Staten Generaal, Holland established that the draft, and especially French territorial demands it contained, was to be turned down flat. The Holland committee did, however, propose to buy off the French by offering a considerable sum of money ‘as token of gratitude to the French people.’ On the other hand, they contended that recognition of the Batavian Republic was superfluous; although it added that in case recognition was deemed a condition to become independent a guarantee of ‘all possessions in all parts of the world’ should be inserted. The Staten Generaal sent the draft treaty to the provisional representatives in the various provinces.133 Until then, information on negotiations in Paris had been kept within the Secreet Besogne. Nevertheless, as the United Provinces, for the time being, had preserved their constitution, the Provinces were still sovereign and the delegations to the Staten Generaal needed their principals’ authorisation to conclude and ratify a treaty. The Staten Generaal set off by declaring that they had been convinced that the Dutch people’s freedom and independence would be the basis of negotiations. Now, the Comité de Salut public seemed to regard the United Provinces as conquered territory and the solemn proclamations and capitulations of the previous months as mere ‘strat-

131   13 April 1795, Représentants du peuple près les Armées du Nord & de Sambre et Meuse dans les Provinces Unies to Comité de Salut public; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 683–684 no. 509. 132   11 and 12 April 1795, minutes Hollandsch Committé van Buitenlandsche Zaken; NA 3.02.01 no. 440. 133   12 April 1795, Staten Generaal to the Provinces; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 683–684 no 509. 12 April 1795, Staten Generaal to Provinciale Staten of Provisionele Representanten; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556; 12 April 1795, Staten Generaal to Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland; NA 3.02.01 no. 461.



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agems’ to halt resistance. Subsequently, they informed the Provinciale Staten of the ultimatum and the innuendos that had been made on the consequences of not bringing negotiations to a positive outcome within the set time. The Provinciale Staten were urged to hurry since it was feared that the French might soon start to act as conquerors. Hence, ‘an immediate and final conclusion’134 was deemed inevitable. The Staten Generaal referred to negotiations between France and Prussia that appeared to be advanced; that the Treaty of Basel had already been concluded was still unbeknown to the Staten Generaal. Since Blauw and Meyer had failed in having those negotiations adjourned until the ultimatum to The Hague would have expired, no time was to be lost. Any delay or shilly-shallying, the Staten Generaal warned, might have ‘incalculable consequences for our country’s political interests.’135 The Hague thought negotiations on an alliance with France clearly connected to Franco-Prussian relations. By consequence, they requested the Provinciale Staten mandating their delegations to conclude under the best possible conditions, and if this proved really unavoidable, on the terms put forward by the French government. The Staten Generaal pondered that preliminaries would only be provisional and promised to do the utmost to mitigate the terms later on, whereas it was important to conclude at least the preliminaries before France had concluded peace with Prussia in order to commit France to an alliance before Prussia’s position had become clear. Moreover, they emphasised that the Stadhouder and his regime were to be blamed for the present situation, for they had involved the Dutch Republic in a war entirely adverse to its interests. Probably, the Staten Generaal feared that yielding to French demands would undermine the support for Patriot rule in the United Provinces and decided to start passing the buck to others. For the last time, the Provinciale Staten showed that the United Provinces’ system of governance was not necessarily as slow in times of need as it has often been upbraided for. The Provinces’ reactions will be discussed here one after the other. The provisional representatives of the people of Zeeland replied within the day.136 It does not come   ‘eene oogenblikkelijke en finaale afdoening.’   ‘voor de staatkundige belangens van ons land onberekenbaare gevolgen.’ 136   13 April (received 14 April) 1795, Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Zeeland to Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 604. 13 April 1795, decree Provisionele 134 135

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as a surprise that they insisted on a full rejection. In general, French demands were considered inordinate. The claim to retain Walcheren and Zuid Beveland—‘two significant islands belonging to this unfortunate Province’137—was absolutely unacceptable. They, as ‘representatives of a free and independent people,’ declared never to consent to ‘preliminaries that unjust and impious.’138 At any rate, we rather await everything bravely than endorse a condition this intolerable. [. . .] No, fellow citizens, that sooner the sea may destroy our costly dikes and forces us to seek another residence by her waves; that sooner violence and dominance terminate our existence, than that we support such horrors!139

Moreover, referring to the 1579 Unie van Utrecht, they expected their allies—that is, the other Provinces—to adhere to the same point of view. Consenting to the preliminaries would amount to high treason. The Zeeland representatives threatened not to contribute to the Generality’s expenses anymore if part of their Province’s territory would be ceded. In case the other Provinces did not want to make negotiations strand on the issue of the Zeeland islands, at the most a military occupation of those islands until the end of the war against Britain was to be allowed. They did recognise, though, that Franco-Prussian negotiations might render the United Provinces in a position in which French demands, how much disgraceful they might be, would have to be agreed to. That would turn out to be ruinous to Zeeland as well. Even if Walcheren and Zuid Beveland might be saved, the Province’s military position would become sticky because of the cession of Dutch Flanders and Bergen op Zoom. Deprived of these buffers, Zeeland would be henceforth open to direct attack. Therefore, in the current situation at least, the French draft was unacceptable. In their reply to the Staten Generaal, the Zeeland people representatives did not even discuss the articles of the draft separately. In a more Representanten van het Volk van Zeeland; NA 1.02.14 no. 780 and NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 137   ‘twee notabele eilanden deeser ongelukkige provincie.’ 138   ‘vertegenwoordigers van een vrij en onafhangelijk volk’ and ‘sulke onrechtvaardige en godloose praeliminaire vreedes articulen.’ 139   ‘Wij zullen althans liever alles kloekmoedig afwagten dan sulk eene onverdraaglijke voorwaarde te onderschrijven. [. . .] Neen medeburgers dat eer de zee onse kostbaare dijken verwoeste en door haare golven ons noodsaake een ander verblijf op te zoeken; dat eer het geweld en overheersching een eijnde maake aan ons bestaan, dan dat wij tot sulke gruwelen de hand leenen!’



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substantial resolution of the same day, the Zeeland delegation to the Staten Generaal was authorised to conclude a treaty in concert with the other Provinces’ delegations—with the exception of the territorial provisions that had to be rejected point blank—provided that Zeeland was to be treated equal to the other Provinces and the Treaty would not contain any stipulations that might turn out more unfavourably for Zeeland in comparison to the other Provinces. They did emphasise, though, that it would prove to be very hard to actually equip the menof-war and to produce the amount of money promised to the French in the draft. Finally, the Zeeland Staten requested passports for envoys of its own to be sent to Paris to further Zeeland interests directly. Utrecht140 was more inclined to accept the French draft as basis for further negotiations. The Utrecht representatives proceeded to a discussion of the draft’s articles one after the other. They explicitly sanctioned the cession of the Lands of the Generality, because those had been occupied by France for some time now, France had already acted as sovereign and it would, henceforth, be very hard to get them back anyway. The Zeeland islands were not to be ceded, though; if only, they stressed, because Utrecht was merely united with Zeeland as an ally and was not to dispose ‘arbitrarily’ of ‘an ally’s possessions.’ 141 They emphasised that Utrecht would not have accepted the other Provinces doing so in 1674—as Utrecht was occupied by Louis XIV’s army—either. Preventing the cession of Walcheren and Zuid Beveland was, in their own words, a torrid desire of the Utrecht representatives. Nevertheless, the independence of the United Provinces and of Utrecht in particular, was not to be put into jeopardy by attempting to save the Zeeland islands from being ceded to France. As to the indemnity, they stated that, although the Stadhouder was to be blamed for the war and he had exhausted the treasury, Utrecht would not back out of contributing to the costs of the war since the war had been waged to liberate the Batavian people. The envoys were to haggle over the sum and the financial sacrifice was to be eased by a beneficial treaty of commerce. Although lodged in the same buildings as the Staten Generaal and having been informed by Blauw earlier on, it took the Holland Staten

140   13 April 1795, Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Utrecht to Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 141   ‘over dispossessien van eene onzer bondgenooten willekeurig te beschikken.’

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three days to reply officially.142 The Holland representatives expressed their feelings that the situation was rather grave. In their view, the country’s situation had not been this ‘extraordinary’ since ‘the times of the Spanish tyrant.’143 The Dutch patria was deeply humiliated and had to be saved. Whatever the sacrifices to be made, it came down to retaining the means to allow the country to recover its prosperity by benefiting from its freedom and independence. Their reaction suffused with the spirit of a wolf jammed in a trap that decides to bite of its leg to survive. The message was clear, put up with it for now, grin and bear it, but with the prospect of recovery in the long run. Even then, French demands, especially with regard to territorial matters, went too far. Henceforth, the 5 April draft had to be rejected. By no means a treaty that compromised Dutch independence or territorial integrity was to be consented to. But no! My Lords! May God prevent that the people’s representatives of the seven united provinces ever decide to take such a step! A step, that will make us detestable in the eyes of Europe and irresponsible to our own Nation that has confided its trust in us: however, a step as well, that, thank God, we are not authorised to take! Honest souls, if compelled by need, can suffer everything the strongest’s arbitrariness has come over them, but even under the greatest wrong and in the deepest humiliation, will keep sufficient courage to persist in refusing to consent to whomever it may be who abuses his physical force to demand things that are not to be demanded; and that, if demanded, are by no means to be granted.144

They impressed on Their Lords’ minds that: ‘One can take from the weak whatever one desires, but one cannot force him to give anything 142   16 April 1795, Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland to Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 604. Resolution of the Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 143   ‘den tijd des Spaanschen dwingelands.’ 144   ‘Maar neen! Hoog Mogende Heeren! God verhoede, dat de volksrepresentanten der zeeven vereenigde gewesten immer tot zulk een stap besluiten! Een stap, die ons voor het oog van Europa veragtelijk, die ons bij onze eigene Natie welke haar vertrouwen in ons gesteld heeft, onverantwoordelijk maken zou: Dog ook een stap, waartoe wij, Gode zij dank onbekwaam zijn! Edelmoedige zielen kunnen, wen de nood het vorderd, alles lijden wat de willekeur van den sterksten haar doedt overkomen, maar ook onder het grootste ongelyk en in de diepste verneedering behoudende moeds genoeg om de toestemming te blijven weigeren, aan wie het ook zij, die zijne physique magt misbruikt om zaken te vorderen, die niet behoorden geeischt te worden; en die, wanneer zij gevergd worden, met geene mogelijkheid kunnen worden toegestaan. Men kan den zwakkeren alles ontneemen, wat men wil, dog men kan, indien hij niet wil, hem niet dwingen het te geeven.’ 16 April 1795, Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland to Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 604.



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against his will.’145 Blauw and Meyer were to put all available means to use to dissuade the Comité de Salut public from its claims. The Holland representatives did propose to buy French demands off, though, by offering a large sum of money ‘by way of gratitude or indemnity’146 in order to save the United Provinces ‘from the tricky and dangerous circumstances’147 they were in. Great attention was paid to the country’s financial situation. Thereto, the Holland representatives stressed that ‘everyone’ was ‘iure natura’ obliged to contribute to the financial means necessary to buy off the French. Moreover, they appealed to all Dutchmen’s patriotism and the unity of the Batavian people. That is to say, Holland tried to keep the indemnity (or thanks-offering) out of the traditional quota system of taxation by which the expenses of the Generality were distributed among the Provinces according to fixed percentages (Holland’s percentage being 58%). The Holland Staten mandated the Staten Generaal to provide Blauw with instructions based on these considerations and assured that Holland would contribute to carrying out the Treaty if their reasonable desires would be complied with. Blauw would afterwards assert that some of the Holland committee’s members were inclined to consent to any French demands out of fear for Prussia, whereas he, the Holland Patriot leader Pieter Paulus, and the Zeeland delegate Leonard Constantijn van Sonsbeeck had kept their nerves and had persuaded the assembly to repudiate the French draft.148 Hence, Holland as well turned French (territorial) demands down flat, while suggesting a way by which the French government might be brought to drop its excessive claims. Like Utrecht, Guelders149 expressed the desire to mitigate the treaty terms especially with regard to the territories to be ceded to the French Republic (to be limited to the Lands of the Generality) and

145   ‘Men kan den zwakkeren alles ontneemen, wat men wil, dog men kan, indien hij niet wil, hem niet dwingen het te geeven’; 16 April 1795, Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland to Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 604. 146   ‘bij wijze van reconnaissance of indemniteit.’ 147   ‘de netelige en gevaarlijke omstandigheden.’ 148   Jacob Blauw, Memorie van instructie en tot meerdere bijlichting van de volumnineuse bijlagen; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 425–432 no. 327 and pp. 650–657 no. 500. 149   13 April (received 17 April) 1795, Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Guelders to Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556.

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the ­indemnity (the term of payment was to be prolonged, half of the amount was to be paid in assignats, and the supplies furnished to the French armies were to be deducted from the war expenses). In the end, Guelders did, however, comply with the Staten Generaal’s request verbatim by authorising its delegation to conclude on the best possible terms. Frisia150 fiercely protested against not having been informed earlier. The Frisian representatives subsequently expressed their great indignation over the Comité de Salut public’s attitude. Treating the United Provinces as conquered territory was said to be not only adverse to good faith, but also a humiliation of ‘noble souls who are no accomplices to the late Stadhouder, but have the same enemies as the French nation.’151 French territorial demands were to be repudiated. The Staten Generaal were to contend that ‘they had to declare with the utmost sorrow and heart-rendering feeling, rather to receive a conqueror’s dictate than to consent to the proposed terms by which people were treated as commercial property of others.’152 On the other hand, they were still bent on an alliance ‘based on the rights of man and suitable to the common defence and promotion of commerce.’153 Such an alliance was desirable for both Republics and negotiations were hence to be resumed. Already within a few days time the reactions from the Provinces could be discussed in the Secreet Besogne. In general, the reactions reveal a great extent of surprise and indignation as well as a proper sense of reality. The message was clear: no cession of territory—at least not of constituent parts of any of the Provinces—and attempts had to be made to modify the Comité’s terms. Basically, the Provinciale Staten expected the French Republic to live up to its own ideals. Having received replies from a majority of the Provinces, the Staten Generaal ordered the deputy Zuylen van Nyvelt together with the

150   14 April 1795, Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Frisia to Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 151   ‘eedelaartige zielen die geen complices zijn van hunnen geweezen stadhouder, maar die dezelfde vijanden hebben als de Fransche natie.’ 152   ‘dat het niet dan met het uitterst leedwezen en hartgrievend gevoel is, dat H.H. Mog moeten verklaaren, liever de wet van een overwinnaar te zullen ontvangen, dan toe te stemmen in de voorgeslagene artikelen waarbij menschen tot een commercieele eigendom van menschen zouden worden gesteld.’ 153   ‘gegrond op de rechten van den mensch en geschikt tot onderlinge verdediging en aanmoediging der commercie.’



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other deputies to foreign affairs to scrutinise the reactions.154 Zuylen van Nyvelt reported the day afterwards.155 Blauw and Meyer were to be instructed to inform the Comité de Salut public that the Staten Generaal were ‘extremely surprised and upset’156 by its course of action. Consenting to the draft was deemed to amount to high treason. The Staten Generaal copied the phrase from the Frisian reply that they would rather subject to the dictate of a victor than to consent to provisions by which men would be treated as property of others. Furthermore, the Batavian envoys were to make an effort to dissuade the Comité de Salut public from its demands. In line with the Province’s reactions received thus far, the Staten Generaal stressed that the United Provinces’ independence and territorial integrity were to be preserved and that the draft rested on the false presumption that the United Provinces were conquered territory. They expected the Comité to waive its territorial claims and instructed Blauw and Meyer to offer money to do so. Emulating the Holland reaction, the Staten Generaal now really opted for the route of trying to buy off the French. Hence, suggestions to haggle the amount of indemnity were ignored. Although, the Staten Generaal met in secret, word of its reply to the Comité’s ultimatum must have spread swiftly. On the very same day, Richard already notified Paris that it would be hard to get the Staten Generaal and the Holland Staten to accept the proposed peace terms.157 The Overijssel and Groningen reactions that arrived in The Hague on 19 April did not alter a thing. Of all seven Provinces, Overijssel was the only one to grant the requested authorization unconditionally.158 The Overijssel Staten explicitly stated that even the Comité’s proposal was to be accepted if endeavours to improve and extenuate them would fail. Groningen’s reply was more in line with the other ­Provinces.159 French territorial demands were unacceptable to the Groningen Staten. Otherwise, the Groningen representatives

  17 April 1795, decree Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556.   18 April 1795, minutes Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 156   ‘ten uitersten gesurpreneerd en getroffen.’ 157   18 April 1795, Richard to Comité de Salut public; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 644– 645 no. 494. 158   16 April 1795, Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Overijssel to Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 159   17 April 1795, Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Groningen to Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 154 155

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confined to expressing their indignation in more general and ideological terms: we could never have imagined or dared to conceive that the French nation after having sacrificed that much treasures and human blood to regain and establish on solid ground its liberty and independence racked and treaded on for so many centuries, after the proclamation issued by the représentants issued on 6 pluviose that the French had not come to lay down the law to us but to restore our liberty, that they would respect our independence and deemed us to be friends and allies, would treat our country like one that had to undergo the fate of a dismemberment.160

On the very day that the final two provincial reactions reached The Hague, the Secreet Besogne set out to discuss the official reply to the Comité de Salut public. Next to new instructions for Blauw and Meyer, it drafted a letter to the Comité as well as a treaty of commerce.161 The Staten Generaal stated that the Comité’s ultimatum had been received with surprise and consternation. They admonished that they had put their hopes in the French Republic, had received the French as liberators and had carried through the Revolution on their arrival. Yet, ‘il leur est moralement impossible d’accepter le traité proposé dans sa forme actuelle.’ The Staten Generaal’s members even declared that they would rather tender their resignation than sign the treaty proposed by the Comité de Salut public. Not only did the draft go beyond the interests of both Republics as mainly the cessions of territory would render the alliance useless, consenting to the 5 April draft would amount to a clear break of the 1579 Unie van Utrecht that still was the basis of the union between the Provinces. In short, the terms had to be modified. Notwithstanding the indignation over French demands, Batavian Patriots still favoured an alliance with the French Republic and disliked any further delay. By consequence, the Staten Generaal decided   ‘Dat met relatie tot den staat der negociatien zelve, zij zig nimmer kunnen verbeelden of durven voorstellen, dat de Fransche natie na zo veel schatten en menschen bloed te koste te hebben gelegd, om deszelfs vrijheid en onafhangelijkheid, die zedert zo veel eeuwen zo deerlijk is geteistert, en vertrapt, te verkrijgen, en zo mogelijk op vaste gronden te stellen dat na de verklaringe door deszelfs repraesentanten op den 6 pluviose laatstleden gedaan, dat zij niet kwamen om ons de wet voor te schrijven maar om ons de vrijheid weer te geeven, dat zij onze onafhangelijkheid zouden respecteren en ons beschouwende etc als vrienden en bondgenoten, althans onze geheele repu­ bliek als een [. . .] land zoude kunnen of willen aanzien zodanig dat het zelve als mede het fatale lot van eene verdeeling zoude ondergaan of daar aan sescesibel worden gemaakt.’ 161   19 April 1795, secret minutes Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 160



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to submit a counterproposal.162 According to Blauw, the Batavian draft was the result of conferences between Pieter Paulus and the representant Ramel.163 Although it seems very unlikely that Ramel would have actually partaken in drafting a treaty that was to replace the one proposed by his own colleagues in Paris, he might indeed have been consulted. The draft was discussed in the Staten Generaal on 19 April and soon afterwards Blauw left for Paris again. A delegation on behalf of the provisional representatives of the people of Zeeland, that was to take care of Zeeland’s interests during the Paris negotiations, had travelled ahead of Blauw, but the Comité de Salut public would refuse to grant the Zeeland envoy, François Ermerins, an audience.164 So the Zeeland envoy was forced to restrict his work to discussing matters with Blauw and Meyer. Guelders requested passports for envoys of its own as well,165 but no Guelder envoy did actually travel to Paris. As he notified the Comité de Salut public of Ermerins’ arrival in Paris on 22 April, Meyer had already prepared the French government for the Staten Generaal’s reply.166 Two days later, Blauw arrived in Paris. The Comité de Salut public was immediately informed of his arrival.167 The French government did not waste any time either. At once, the Batavian envoys were called to meet with the Comité within a few hours time.168 Blauw and Meyer needed some time to prepare their answer, though, and asked for respite.169 The Comité refused to wait any longer. Respite was refuted arguing that the answer could be confined to a simple yes or no.170 According to Blauw, Sieyes intended to prevent renewed negotiations:

162   19 April 1795, secret minutes Staten Generaal—Articles Préliminaires et Bases sur lesquelles on propose un Traité d’Aliance entre la République française et la République Batave; NA 1.02.14, 600. 163   Jacob Blauw, Memorie van instructie en tot meerdere bijlichting van de volumnineuse bijlagen; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 425–432 no. 327 and pp. 650–657 no. 500. 164   22 April 1795, Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600; Bijleveld, 1865, p. 39. 165   1 May 1795, Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Guelders to Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 166   22 April 1795, Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 167   24 April 1795, Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 168   24 April 1795, Comité de Salut public to Blauw and Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 169   25 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 170   25 April 1795, Comité de Salut public to Blauw and Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 600.

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part ii, chapter two We did not need to be stimulated to bring matters to an end. We desired the conclusion of a treaty greatly, but Mr. abbot understood quite well that we prepared for new discussions and wished to prevent us to do so if possible. He experienced, however, as he had experienced many times before, that threats or commands did not have the slightest influence on us. This made Mr. abbot grumpy and rancorous, but one let it pass unnoticed.171

Blauw and Meyer did manage to postpone the conference by two days. They argued that a matter this important to the fate of an entire nation could impossibly be expected to be answered simply either in the affirmative or in the negative. The three commissioners had been overruled by the Comité de Salut public at large, most of which members seemed to regard the request for respite as reasonable.172 On 26 April, Blauw and Meyer met with the Comité. Ermerins, who had joined them to the Tuileries, was told to wait outside.173 The Batavian envoys were ushered into the Comité meeting hall where the fully assembled Comité was already seated. Ramel, who had travelled to Paris too, was present as well. They were welcomed by the Comité’s President, Cambacérès, who, after what according to Blauw’s account must have been a ‘deep silence,’174 asked them whether they were willing to comply with the Comité’s wish to disclose their principals’ instructions.175 Subsequently, Meyer read an elaborate statement. He expounded the Staten Generaal’s objections and presented the counter draft. He hammered away at the need to base the alliance on reciprocal benefits and exclaimed that ‘le Peuple français est incapable de cet

171   ‘Wij hadden niet noodig gestimuleerd te worden om een afkomst van zaken te maken. Wij verlangden er te veel na, maar mijnheer de abt begreep wel, dat wij ons prepareerden nieuwe dingtaal te spreken, en dat wilde hij voorkomen, als het mogelijk was, maar hij ondervond, gelijk hij al meermalen ondervonden had, dat dreigementen of bevelen geen de minste invloed op ons hadden, en dat maakte mijnheer den abt wel knorrig en wrevelig, maar men liet dat ongemerkt passeeren.’; Jacob Blauw, Memorie van instructie en tot meerdere bijlichting van de volumnineuse bijlagen; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 425–432 no. 327 and pp. 650–657 no. 500. 172   30 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 687–691 no. 512 and NA 1.02.14 no. 596. 173   Jacob Blauw, Memorie van instructie en tot meerdere bijlichting van de volumnineuse bijlagen; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 425–432 no. 327 and pp. 650–657 no. 500. 174   ‘eene diepe stilte.’ 175   Jacob Blauw, Memorie van instructie en tot meerdere bijlichting van de volumnineuse bijlagen; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 425–432 no. 327 and pp. 650–657 no. 500.



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excès de cruauté.’176 Thereto, Meyer presented a draft treaty of commerce. Neither Sieyes nor Reubell were able to hide their peevishness. In the course of Meyer’s exposé, they left the table and went to the fireplace ‘as if they wanted to warm themselves.’177 Finally, Meyer officially notified the Comité of the arrival of the Zeeland delegation and requested them to be received. Blauw sensed that a majority of the Comité was susceptible to the Batavian arguments and actually quite pleased about the draft commercial treaty.178 This confirmed the envoys’ previous impression that the three commissioners were less favourable to the United Provinces than some of their colleagues who were of the opinion that Batavian independence and territorial integrity had to be respected.179 Blauw’s joy was Sieyes’ fear, however, and the former abbé intervened before any of the Comité’s members could reply. Reubell and Sieyes exclaimed that they would leave at once if the Zeeland delegation would be admitted. Moreover, they repudiated Meyer for having referred to himself and Blauw as ministers plenipotentiary. After all, the Batavian envoys had not been recognised in an official capacity yet. Meyer rebutted and offered to leave the room for a while to allow the Comité to discuss the matter. Once out of the room, Blauw and Meyer were able to hear through the door that a ‘very heated debate’180 was going on. After about an hour they were called back in. Sieyes announced that the Comité would invite the Zeeland delegation as soon as it would deem its presence necessary. By that announcement the meeting was ended.181 Blauw and Meyer blamed Sieyes for the failure to get the negotiations going again

176   26 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public (read to the Comité by Meyer in the course of the 26 April conference); NA 1.02.14 no. 600. For the 25 April Dutch counter draft, see Vreede, 1863, bijlagen pp. 62–68. 177   Jacob Blauw, Memorie van instructie en tot meerdere bijlichting van de volumnineuse bijlagen; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 425–432 no. 327 and pp. 650–657 no. 500. 178   Jacob Blauw, Memorie van instructie en tot meerdere bijlichting van de volumnineuse bijlagen; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 425–432 no. 327 and pp. 650–657 no. 500. 179   30 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 687–691 no. 512 and NA 1.02.14 no. 596. 180   ‘zeer geanimeerde discussie.’ 181   30 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; Colenbrander 1905 pp. 687–691 no. 512 and NA 1.02.14 no. 596.

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and assumed that the Convention nationale would have revolutionary principles preponderate. We appreciated too much our dignity of free people and deputies of a nation, that, God be praised, looks upon us with love and esteem to the present day; for us to allow the new Mazarin to dictate the law to us that loftily; and we thought to take this stand the more because several members of the Comité were as much indignant over the little regard with which we had been treated thus far [. . .] As nowadays sentiments to respect the rights of man and citizen are of the order of the day in the Convention nationale, [. . .] we hope that if the Dutch cause is discussed in the Convention, claims to the holy rights of an entire nation will affect the Convention’s members more than the Machiavellian views of an abbot and his following, who, as one assures us, has already lost a considerable part of his credit with the people lately, the people finding it hard to endure that a man who hided throughout the most significant period of the great revolution, now appears on the stage to set the tone in such an imperative way.182

By then, it had become clear to the still divided Comité de Salut public that no agreement in line with the hardliners’ view could be reached with Blauw and Meyer. With the pretext that the Batavian envoys lacked the powers to conclude a treaty, Reubell and Sieyes were sent to The Hague to negotiate with the Staten Generaal directly.183 The French commissioners were provided with yet another draft.184 They

182   ‘Wij gevoelden te veel onze waardigheid van vrije menschen en afgezondenen van een volk, dat, God zij dank, ons tot heden met liefde en achting beschouwt; dan dat wij ons op zulk een hoogen toon door dezen nieuwen Mazarin de wet zouden laaten voorschrijven; en wij vermeenden te meer deeze contenance te moeten aanneemen, omdat verscheiden leden van het comité even zo als wij geindigneerd waren over de weinige éguards, die men ons tot heden toe heeft gelieven te bewijzen [. . .] Gelijk thans in de Nationale Conventie die gevoelens om de rechten van den mensch en burger te eerbiedigen, aan de orde van den dag zijn, [. . .], zo leeven wij op hoop, dat, als de Nederlandsche zaak in de Nationale Conventie gediscuteerd wordt, de reclames van de heilige rechten van een gansch volk op de gemoederen der leden meer en zwaarder zullen weegen dan de politieke machiavellistische vues van een abt en zijnen aanhang, welke eerst, zoals verzekerd wordt, reeds aanmerkelijk zedert enige tijd van zijn crediet bij het volk verloren heeft, kunnende het volk kwalijk verdragen dat een man, die in de gewichtigste tijdvakken der groote revolutie zich altoos schuil heeft gehouden, thans voor den dag zou komen om een zo imperative toon aan te nemen.’; 30 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; Colenbrander 1905 pp. 687–691 no. 512 and NA 1.02.14 no. 596. 183   3 May 1795, arrête Comité de Salut public; AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10; AAE CP Hollande 587; 8 May 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; NA 1.01.03 no. 3862. 184   3 May 1795, Bases arrêtées par le Comité de Salut public pour servir au Traité d’alliance entre les deux Républiques française et batave; AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10.



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were instructed to follow a course of action in conformity with the dignity of the Republic and the Comité’s desire to ‘se donner un allié fidèle.’ The draft was to be regarded to be an ultimatum ‘plutôt dans l’esprit des articles qu’il renferme que dans la rédaction.’ As long as essential objects—above all the cession of Dutch Flanders, military occupation of Flushing, and the indemnity—were not deviated from, the Comité allowed Sieyes and Reubell to modify the text. Immediately after their arrival in The Hague, they were to inform the Staten Generaal of their mission and request for commissioners to be designated to negotiate. In case negotiations might not lead to a treaty, they were to impose a war contribution of 100 million—to be enforced militarily— and French generals were to take possession of Batavian armouries and all war materials,185 that is to say if not agreed on by mutual consent, the French were to take what they wanted. Strikingly, the Comité stressed in its decree by which Reubell and Sieyes were appointed that negotiations had been initiated by the Batavians: Le Comité de Salut public de la Convention Nationale, chargé par la loi du sept fructidor de l’an deuxième de la République, de la direction des relations extérieures, prenant en considération le désir manifesté au nom des Provinces Unies de traiter avec la République française, tant pour la reconnaissance et la garantie de leur indépendance, que pour une alliance entre les deux nations.186

In sum, if the Batavians would not agree to an alliance on French terms, the Comité de Salut public would drop an alliance altogether and set out for the non-altruistic option discussed before. On 6 May, Blauw and Meyer were called to meet with the Comité’s diplomatic section. They were informed of the decision to transfer negotiations to The Hague.187 Some days later, they informed the Staten Generaal that Reubell and Sieyes apparently were instructed to follow a moderate course and were actually loosing influence in Paris. The Comité’s new members were deemed to be more moderate and the Batavian envoys even sensed that the idea of ceding part of

185   4 May 1795, instructions pour les représentants du peuple membres du Comité de Salut public envoyés dans les Provinces Unies; AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10; AAE CP Hollande 587; Legrand, 1895, p. 106. 186   3 May 1795, decree of the Comité de Salut public; AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10; AAE CP Hollande 587. 187   8 May 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; NA 1.01.03 no. 3862.

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the Duchy of Brabant188 to the Batavian Republic was gaining ground. They had, in fact, been assured by some members of the Comité de Salut public that rumours about evacuating the United Provinces and allowing Prussian forces to enter the country again were false and had only been abused by some ‘to lay down the law for us in a master’s fashion as if we possessed that little republican virtue, that we, carried away by panic, would be more inclined to sell part of our countrymen like cattle just to further our personal security.’189 By then, Reubell and Sieyes had already arrived in The Hague. On 9 May, they were welcomed by the President of the Staten Generaal, Carel Gerard Hultman, as ‘membres de la première nation de l’univers.’ Hultman praised the French nation not only for having thrown off the yoke of despotism and repelled attacks by tyrants but for wanting to bring liberty to other nations as well. The Batavian Republic was said to owe its liberty to France and to desire to induct its liberty and the assurance thereof—referring to the ‘représentants en mission’‘s proclamation of 20 January—by an alliance based on solid and lasting foundations and beneficial to both nations. Reubell replied that the French Republic adhered to two principles—‘générosité envers ses ennemis, loyauté envers ses amis’—and that they had come to treat on those terms.190 Subsequently, Sieyes and Reubell handed a copy of the Comité’s 3 May decree to the Staten Generaal.191 In Paris, the Comité de Salut public awaited news from The Hague with great impatience. The French treasury was empty and Paris still in

188  Probably in conformity with the Staten Generaal’s initial scheme to partition the Austrian Netherlands, according to which scheme the land north of the line AntwerpMaastricht would become Dutch. 189   ‘om ons op een meesterachtige toon de wet voor te schrijven, als of wij zo weinig republiceinsche Deugd bezaaten, dat wij door een terreur panicque weggesleept zo veel te gereeder zoude weezen om tot onze personeele zeekerheid een gedeelte van onze landgenooten als lastdieren te verkoopen.’; 11 May 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; Colenbrander 1905 pp. 693–694 no. 515; 11 May 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 593. The comparison to animals can be found with eighteenth-century critics of the European order. Mably, for instance, spoke of ‘troupeaux de mouton’; Introduction to Mably (1757) by Belissa, p. 19. Rousseau had expressed himself in similar terms; see Korman, 1996, p. 37. 190   9 May 1795, minutes Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 3862; Vreede, 1863, p. 167 and bijlage VI, pp. 25–26; on the Hague negotiations, see also Van Deusen, 1932, p. 62 and pp. 107–111; Koung, 1934, pp. 113–114; Bastid, 1970, pp. 164–165; Bredin, 1988, pp. 351–353. 191   9 May 1795, minutes Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556.



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turmoil.192 On 20 May, the Convention nationale was stormed again. A financial injection from The Hague was of the essence. Moreover, the French government feared news from the political situation in Paris would strengthen the Batavians resistance.193 Indeed Blauw and Valckenaer advised The Hague to hold its ground because the Comité de Salut public was internally divided and its power dwindled.194 In The Hague, conferences with a committee from the Staten Generaal consisting of Pieter Paulus and Willem Anne Lestevenon from Holland, Matthias Pous from Zeeland, and Johannes Lambertus Huber from Frisia started on 11 May. Reubell and Sieyes were assisted by the ‘représentants en mission’ in the United Provinces, Alquier, Cochon, Richard, and the recently returned Ramel.195 Consensus was soon reached. On 15 May, in the evening, the treaty text (the secret articles included) was presented to the Staten Generaal. On the ­condition that some minor alterations would be made, the Staten Generaal authorised the commission to conclude.196 In the course of 16 May some modifications to the final draft were negotiated, after which the Treaty was signed. Together with the Treaty, regulations for the use of Flushing’s port were agreed upon. The following day, the Staten Generaal informed the Provinces of the Treaty.197 Likewise, Reubell and Sieyes wrote to the Comité de Salut public.198 The conclusion of the Treaty was celebrated exuberantly. Official visits were paid by the French envoys to the Staten Generaal and vice versa,199 and the Staten Generaal offered the French envoys and generals a banquet.200 Moreover, the Staten Generaal ordered a commemorative medal to be struck.201 In Paris, Blauw and Meyer were

 Sorel, 1906IV, p. 332 and pp. 335–337; Homan, 1971, p. 92.  Sorel, 1906IV, p. 335. 194   Van Hamel, 1918, p. 320. 195   13 May 1795, Matthias Pous and Leonard Constantijn van Sonsbeek, extraordinary deputies to the Staten Generaal, to De Beveren, secretary of the Zeeland People’s Representatives; NA 1.02.14 no. 780; Sorel, 1906IV, p. 333. 196   15 May 1795, minutes Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 197   17 May 1795, Staten Generaal to Provincial Staten; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 198   17 May 1795, Reubell and Sieyes to Comité de Salut public; AAE CP Hollande 587. 199  NA 1.02.14 no. 604; NA 1.01.03 no. 1723. 200  NA 1.01.03 no. 1723. 201  Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 604. 192 193

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to celebrate a small diplomatic victory of their own since they were the first to present a copy of the Treaty to the Comité de Salut public.202 The Treaty was to be ratified within twenty days.203 The Convention nationale ratified the Treaty on 27 May, according to Blauw and Meyer, ‘without any debate.’204 Having already consented to the Treaty on 15 May, the Staten Generaal had already decided to ratify by then. In an extraordinary meeting on 17 May they decided to provide the Provinciale Staten with copies of the Treaty and to urge them to send the ratifications to The Hague as soon as possible.205 Even the Zeeland Staten accepted the Treaty. They expressed still to have some objections, but to be pleased by the mitigation of terms. Although reluctantly, they agreed to ratification, that is, they declared ‘not to be in a position to resist ratification.’206 After word of the ratification by the Convention had reached The Hague, the Staten Generaal immediately designated two extraordinary ambassadors—Carel Hendrik van Grasveld and Albert Johan de Sitter—to go to Paris and exchange ratifications. They were to insist on Blauw and Meyer being admitted as envoys and were to urge the French government to give orders for Dutch prisoners of war in France to be released and sent back to the Dutch Republic to assist in reorganising the Batavian army and navy.207 Blauw and Meyer had, in fact, already requested to be admitted as envoys now that the Treaty had been concluded on 24 May.208 It took some time for their credentials to arrive, but by the end of June they were at last introduced to the Convention nationale.209 The Treaty of The Hague had been bought at great cost and negotiations had not been as amicable as the Batavian Patriots had hoped 202   21 May 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. The Comité’s reaction of the same day is to be found in: NA 1.02.14 no. 600 and no. 608. 203  Article 23 Treaty of The Hague. 204   ‘zonder eenige discussie.’ 27 May 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 593 and 596. 205   17 May 1795, extraordinaris vergadering Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 206   ‘ons niet absolutelijk te kunnen verzetten tegen de ratificatie.’; 23 May 1795, Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Zeeland to Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 780. 207   29 May 1795, instructions for Van Grasveld and De Sitter; NA 1.02.14 no. 604. For Van Grasveld’s speech in the Convention nationale on 5 June 1795, see: Vreede, 1863, bijlage VI, pp. 26–27. 208   24 May 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 209   Vreede, 1863, bijlage VII, pp. 28–29.



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them to be. Even though e.g. the Zeeland Staten seem to have regarded the Treaty as the lesser of two evils, the conclusion and ratification of the Treaty were accompanied by official festivities in The Hague. Most Patriots were quite pleased that the Treaty had been concluded, whatever its terms, and hoped that the newly gained liberty was worth the price. In a letter to Johan Valckenaer, Pieter Paulus stressed his relieve, assuring the former law professor that Prussia had been ready to invade the Dutch Republic again and would have done so if France had decided not to ratify the Treaty.210 On the French part, Sieyes waxed lyrically about the Treaty. While Reubell remained in The Hague to await the Province’s ratifications, Sieyes had hurried to Paris to play the role of messenger of good news to the fullest.211 As he presented the Treaty to the Convention nationale, he stated: Le traité de paix et d’alliance que nous venons vous présenter, offre à la République française tous les avantages raisonnablement possibles qu’elle avait droit d’attendre, sans nuire à la bonne existence et à la dignité d’une nation devenue votre fidèle alliée; de nouveaux moyens, de nouvelles sources de prospérité s’ouvrent devant vous: vous acquérez ce qui en fait le gage et la garantie solide, une nouvelle puissance militaire et navale dans une partie des plus importance du globe, dans les mers d’Allemagne et du Nord. La Tamise doit voir avec inquiétude les futures destinées de l’Escaut. [. . .] La réunion des deux Républiques française et batave annonce déjà au monde, que la tyrannie britannique va bientôt faire place à la liberté des mers [. . .].212

Finally, he had gained the diplomatic victory he had set out for in March. While referring to anti-British sentiments and French interests to make the Treaty appealing to his fellow representatives, he did, notably, point to the necessity of the Treaty not harming the well-being and dignity of the Batavian people. By doing so he indicated to reckon with Batavian interests as well. On the other hand, his statement is a clear token of a far from fraternal mentality of wanting to have one’s cake and eat it too.   3 June 1795, Paulus to Valckenaer; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 699–700 no. 523.  Homan, 1971, p. 93. 212   May 1795, Rapport du répresentant du peuple Sieyes sur le traite de paix et d’alliance entre la République française et la République des Provinces-Unies; AAE CP Hollande 587. 210 211

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Sieyes’ positive appreciation of the Treaty was not shared by all in Paris, though. His colleague Cambacérès, for instance, was rather critical.213 In his view, the Treaty was a missed opportunity. None of the principal French aims—according to him: compensation for at least part of war expenses, an augmentation of land and naval forces, the revival of Belgian commerce and especially the port of Antwerp by opening the Scheldt, safeguarding the United Provinces’ independence perpetually—had been met satisfactorily. In Dutch and Anglo-American historiography, the Treaty of The Hague is usually presented as an imposed alliance, an obtruded killer deal that obstructed Batavian regeneration and made the Batavian Republic’s independence illusive.214 Nineteenth-century historiography shows a clear distinction along national lines. The French historian, Adolphe Thiers called the, admittedly ‘imposed,’ conditions reasonable and evidence of France’s generosity.215 The French historian Legrand asserted that the Treaty was received with content by both sides. The terms were said to be quite acceptable. The United Provinces had only been deprived of territories not being constituent parts of any of the sovereign Provinces. A huge financial sacrifice had been agreed upon, but even that sacrifice did not cover war expenses. The military obligations were to be considered as a means to enable France to defend the United Provinces.216 Contrariwise, the French Sieyes connoisseur Paul Bastid called the Treaty ‘léonin.’217 In his three-volume work on Batavian diplomacy, the Utrecht professor of constitutional law, George Willem Vreede clearly looked at the Franco-Batavian period inspired by the Netherlands’ OrangistCalvinist conception of national history that would influence Colenbrander’s description of the Batavian Republic as well.218 Vreede called the Treaty of The Hague ‘an extorted lion’s treaty.’219 Vreede praised   27 May 1795, Cambacérès, Sommaire des Observations politique sur le Traité d’Alliance Offensive et Défensive, conclu à la Haye le 27 floréal an 3 entre la république française et celle des Sept Provinces Unies; AAE CP Hollande 587. 214  E.g. Van Hamel, 1918, p. 323; Van Deusen, 1932, p. 62Geyl, 1959, p. 343; Schama, 1989, p. 326 and p. 329; Blanning, Blanning, 1996, p. 171. 215   Vreede, 1863, p. 187. 216  Legard, 1895, p. 109. 217   Bastid, 1970, p. 165. 218  On the changing appreciation of the Batavian Republic in Dutch historiography throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, see Rosendaal, 2008. 219   ‘afgeperst leeuwenverdrag’; Vreede, 1863, p. 327. 213



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Blauw and Meyer for their perseverance and, conversely, blamed Paulus and co. for having been too compliant in The Hague.220 Instead of awaiting political change in Paris, the Staten Generaal had succumbed within four days fearing French and Prussian arms.221 The Republic had humiliated itself.222 To be sure, Vreede admitted, the worst had been averted.223 By the end of the nineteenth century, some Francophone historians were more critical on French policy. Laurent contended that the Batavian Republic was placed under tutelage by the Treaty224 and its independence was merely nominal.225 Albert Sorel portrayed the Batavian Republic as a defeated, weak, and necessarily dependent power that was treated as a vassal by the Comité de Salut public.226 Le Comité transigeait avec les rois selon le droit public de la vieille Europe, celui des partages; il stipulait avec les républiques selon le droit public des Romains, celui de la suprématie romaine.227

This appreciation has dominated historiography for a fairly long time. Van Hamel asserted that the Dutch Republic after the Treaty of The Hague ceased to be independent territory.228 The Batavian Republic tried to uphold the appearance of independence, but the factual situation differed.229 The Treaty was said to have turned out better than might have been feared, but it did sow the seeds for the Netherlands to merge into a Continental imperialism.230 According to Glyndon van Deusen, the Hague Treaty ‘put Holland under French control, making it a tool to be used in the war against England.’231 Pieter Geyl contended that Franco-Batavian relations had been disturbed by the French commissioners’ attitude to an extent the Treaty, whatever its terms, could not undo. Batavians were said to have felt betrayed by its

  Vreede, 1863, p. 157.   Vreede, 1863, p. 164, pp. 172–173 and pp. 196–197. 222   Vreede, 1863, pp. 201–202 and p. 210. 223   Vreede, 1863, p. 193. 224  Laurent, 1895, p. 235. 225  Laurent, 1869, p. 253 and p. 331. 226  Sorel, 1906IV, p. 270. 227  Sorel, 1906IV, p. 270. 228   Van Hamel, 1918, p. 321. 229   Van Hamel, 1918, p. 324. 230   Van Hamel, 1918, p. 323. 231   Van Deusen, 1932, p. 111. Likewise Hafen, 1994, p. 88. 220 221

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brothers and liberators. Moreover, the humiliating and burdensome provisions had affected the new regime’s prestige. 232 Robert R. Palmer claimed that many Patriots were disappointed once the Treaty was known. Their disappointment was not sufficiently large to distance themselves from France. Basically, they realised that French support was needed to keep the British and the Stadhouder out and to get the occupied colonies back.233 The alliance was not a ‘love match,’ but it was no ‘rape’ either. It was a ‘marriage of convenience’;234 a coalition of those forced—by France and by circumstances—to be willing. Simon Schama has it that the Hague Treaty was a milestone in the recognition of the French Republic within Europe.235 On the Dutch side, relief was said to dominate.236 The alliance was a forced marriage with a huge dowry237 and initiating direct subordination.238 According to Jean-Denis Bredin ‘le traité qu’il [Sieyes; RK] imposait à la jeune République batave était draconian . . . Le rêve de fraternité semblait avoir cede la place aux exigencies du nationalism français.’239 Tim Blanning asserted that the Treaty had been imposed on the Batavian Republic. Its terms were said to be ‘brutal;’ it saddled the Batavian Republic with a huge debt. From the start, according to Blanning, it was clear the alliance was to serve the French war effort.240 On the other hand, Jean-Louis Harouel claimed that of all sister republics the Batavian Republic was treated best.241 The republican regime in The Hague indeed desired an alliance as much as, and probably even more, than its counterpart in Paris. The French government seriously took other options into account. Admittedly, by the end of February 1795, the Comité de Salut public had decided upon an alliance, but the French had other wishes as well. Abandoning the United Provinces, taking their resources by force and assuring France a strategic border along the river Rhine by annexing

 Geyl, 1959, p. 343.  Palmer, 1964, p. 186 and p. 190. 234  Palmer, 1964, p. 187. 235  Schama, 1989, p. 254. 236  Schama, 1989, p. 258. 237  Schama, 1989, p. 329. 238  Schama, 1989, p. 326. 239   Bredin, 1988, p. 352. 240   Blanning, 1996, p. 171. 241  Harouel, 1997b, p. 75. 232 233



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desired territories unilaterally were not just threats. They were sincerely considered; by some as the primary option, by others as an alternative if the Batavians would not consent to French demands. Abstaining from an alliance while procuring some territorial and financial gains, was an option many French would have settled for. From the outset of negotiations, the Batavians were the greatest protagonists of an alliance. The Batavian Patriots wanted an alliance almost by any means. Although, initially, they urged for the French troops to leave, they needed French support—and even French military presence—both for protection against Prussia and against domestic opposition, that is for the survival of their regime. The Batavians had no other option but to enter into an alliance with France, all the more since they were unaware of Berlin’s peaceful intentions. They desperately wanted an alliance. They just disliked the one proposed by the Comité de Salut public, but accepted it because the alternative was worse and they had managed bargaining down on the most extreme conditions. In the end, they were discontent more about the procedure that had led to the Treaty and French attitude than about the actual terms. Batavian Patriots did not accept a humiliating Treaty without a struggle just to get into office, as Tim Blanning has it.242 Compromising their country’s territory by consenting to the cession of constituent parts of one of the seven Provinces was just a bridge too far. They did drive a hard bargain. They had, in fact, bargained remarkably well and stubbornly taking into consideration that the entire Batavian territory was occupied by French troops at the time. To whet French appetites for an alliance and to curtail French territorial demands, excessive financial obligations were indeed undertaken. But the Batavian Republic might just have been able to bear those obligations and at least they were temporary and non-recurrent. In the end they succeeded in getting the roughest edges of the Comité de Salut public’s initial demands, as well as to procure some beneficial provisions like a French guarantee of Batavian colonial possessions. What those provisions would be worth was for the future to tell. In sum, the Treaty of The Hague, how harsh its terms might have been, was not a cruel victor’s dictate to the defeated.

  Blanning, 1996, p. 171.

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This chapter discussed the formation of the Treaty of The Hague from a procedural point of view. From the start, basically, only two options were considered: friendly co-existence or an alliance. No mention of a federation beyond an alliance was made anymore. In a way an alliance was a via media between the federalist and cosmopolitan schemes of 1792 and pacifist-isolationist positions. An alliance was in keeping with eighteenth-century practice. The subsequent chapter will elaborate on the extent to which the alliance was ideologically coloured by the revolutionary discourse of liberty. It has become clear, that while a debate on future relations with the Dutch Republic was still going on in France, Batavian Patriots had already decided for an alliance. The Batavians took the initiative thus pushing the Comité de Salut public to negotiate an alliance. Hence, the assumption that France impressed an alliance on the Batavian Republic has to be rejected. To the contrary, the French had and considered other options. Although the Batavians’ consent to the cession of territory and cooperation was convenient to Paris to dwell on Dutch richness, the Batavians were indeed the requesting party. Batavians simply attached more significance to an alliance. In combination with the military situation and a knowledge deprivation on what Prussia was to do, this put them in a less favourable position throughout the negotiations. Negotiations were conducted in conformity with what might be expected from negotiations between two independent powers. Both parties had the chance to table their demands and conditions. Both parties presented drafts and these were discussed in due manner. Either party, every now and then, used pressure to force the other to yield or to force a breakthrough. To be sure, the French were more consistent in permanently fostering fear for Prussia and implying the possibility of an evacuation, but the Batavians threatened to stop furnishing French troops as well. Although negotiations were not conducted in a true fraternal atmosphere, these threats probably are quite regular to any negotiations and do not affect the legal equality of the parties involved. Thus, the Batavian Republic fully participated in the process of treaty formation. From a formal point of view, the only nuance that has to be made is that the Batavian envoys were not formally recognised. This did not, however, prevent the French from negotiating. Another point to be noticed is that the French Republic was



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represented by members of its government from the start, whereas diplomatic envoys initially represented the United Provinces. In the end, the Treaty was concluded and ratified in due form and constitutional procedures for ratification were upheld both in France and in the United Provinces. The principle of consent was upheld as well. On several occasions, Batavian authorities indicated not to let the French lay down the law for them. Manifold references to the nation’s dignity or shame, indicate that Batavian independence was cherished too much to yield to any terms the French were to set. If one takes into consideration that the United Provinces were occupied by French troops at the time, Batavians even took a surprisingly independent stand. In sum, from a formal procedural point of view, the French Republic and the United Provinces negotiated as equals, although a de facto difference in power was evident. Legislative equality, to a very great extent, was respected.

CHAPTER THREE

A constitutive treaty? As a treaty of peace and alliance, the Hague Treaty seems to be concerned primarily with military matters; ending a war and settling future military cooperation. Nevertheless, the Franco-Batavian Alliance Treaty of 1795 touched upon some essential political issues that will be discussed in this chapter. First and foremost, recognition of the Batavian Republic as an independent state dominated negotiations. Whilst Batavian independence was initially proclaimed, in the course of negotiations the Batavians turned out having to require recognition of their regenerated republic. Since the United Provinces had been entirely conquered, the questions whether French recognition was constitutive for the Batavian Republic and whether the Treaty truly was or needed to be a peace treaty is worth discussing. How does France, as a conqueror, setting conditions to recognition relate to existential equality? Thereto, since recognition was made dependent on financial indemnity, this chapter will discuss the price Batavians were to pay for their liberty, too. Moreover, attention will be paid to the constitutional guarantee in the Treaty. Furthermore, the nature of the alliance will be addressed from a political point of view in the present chapter. Was the alliance based purely on interests or did ideology matter? This will take a succinct discourse analysis and the discussion of some political provisions, e.g. the one with regard to ‘émigrés.’ With regard to Franco-Batavian relations one may ask whether the Treaty was constitutive as well. Did the Treaty of The Hague bring about the alliance or did it merely perpetuate existing, possibly even natural bonds between the two nations? Finally, was the alliance bilateral or was it the first step towards a multilateral, republican union? 3.1  Towards Independent Existence as a Nation The Batavian Revolution, occurring simultaneously with the French invasion, transformed the United Provinces into the Batavian Republic; although it would take until April 1798 for a constitution to be

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adopted. For the time being, the Staten Generaal remained in session. Thus, it was unclear whether there was a clear break with the past, the Batavians temporarily being in a stage of transition, or whether the old Republic was just being renamed and reformed. Nonetheless, with French troops occupying the entire territory and facing latent domestic opposition, Batavian Patriots were keen on securing French recognition of the Batavian Republic. In an attempt to turn recognition reciprocal, the Batavian envoys had offered the Staten Generaal’s recognition of the French Republic as soon as they had arrived in Paris. Foreshadowing Bonaparte’s famous statement in the course of the Campoformio negotiations that the French Republic did not need to be recognised,1 the Comité de Salut public ignored that offer. Thereupon, there was only talk of a French recognition of the Dutch Republic. The French plan de négociation contemplated a recognition and solemn declaration of Batavian independence, albeit on the condition of agreement on the issues of indemnity and the mutual border.2 The members of the Comité were well aware that their colleagues in Holland had already recognised Batavian independence in their 20 January 1795 proclamation.3 The French ‘représentants en mission’ seem actually to have thought that the French invasion had ended a period of dependency. In a letter to the Comité de Salut public they referred to the Dutch government as having been ‘rendu à son indépendance.’4 Later on, the French government would keep claiming that the Treaty of The Hague had ‘fixé la nouvelle indépendance de ce pays’5 and that the enslaved Batavian people had recovered its liberty by it.6 As it turned out to be convenient to ignore the 20 January Proclamation, the French government decided to do so. The Comité set out to regard the Batavians as a ‘compagnie des marchands’ instead of a political entity and the Batavian envoys as delegates of a political

  16 April 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 pp. 914–915 no. 1514.   Articles 2 and 4 PN; See also Guyot, 1907, p. 106. 3   Colenbrander, 1905, p. 592 no. 461. 4   21 January 1795, Representants en mission to Comité de Salut public; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 589–591 no. 461. 5   29 August 1797, Rapport sur la République batave; AAE CP Hollande 596. 6   2 December 1797, Memoire pour servir d’instructions au citoyen Charles Delacroix ministre plénipotentiaire de la République française près la République batave; AAE CP Hollande Supplément 22. 1 2



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faction instead of representatives of an independent state.7 Thus, the Comité thought to be able to force a huge indemnity on the Batavians and to get away with demanding part of the United Provinces’ territory.8 The ‘représentants en mission’ Alquier and Cochon’s warning that not recognising the Batavians as a political power would be a flagrant violation of their proclamation and would cause great turmoil was of no avail.9 In short, the French government assumed a clear discontinuity between the pre-invasion United Provinces and the new republic for strategic reasons. Initially, the French commissioners had spoken of recognition of the new government in return for consenting to French financial and territorial demands.10 Throughout the following stages of the negotiation process, recognition of the Batavian Republic itself—that is the state instead of the government—was at stake, although the distinction was not that strictly made yet at the time. In general diplomatic practice, the abstract notion of the state did not hold sway yet and the sovereign (usually the monarch) was regarded as the subject of the law of nations in his capacity of personification of the body politic.11 As the difference between state and government was still a bit blurred, the distinction between recognising a government and recognising a state was not as clear yet either. The distinction became only clear with the Revolutionary republics and their ‘nation-talk’ as Steven Englund calls it.12 The distinction between prince and people which became fashionable during the propaganda phase of the war was a clear sign of distinguishing the prince from the political community he ruled. However, Revolutionary rhetoric had not influenced French diplomatic practice sufficiently yet to root out the discourse French diplomats were used to. Thereto, the ground for recognition was in transition, too, changing from monarchical legitimacy of rights and titles to effective power and independence.13   17 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; NA 1.02.14 no. 596.  See chapter 5; 24 March 1795, Comité de Salut public to Alquier and Cochon; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 629–631 no. 481.  9   19 March 1795, Alquier and Cochon to Comité de Salut public; Colenbrander, 1905, p. 629 no. 480. 10   13 March 1795, Reubell, Sieyes, and Merlin de Douai to Blauw and Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 600; AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10. 11   Lesaffer, 1999a, pp. 131–148 and pp. 396–406; Grewe, 2000, p. 196 and p. 361; Lesaffer, 2004, pp. 17–22; Steiger, 2004, pp. 73–76. 12   Englund, 2004, p. 71. 13   Grewe, 2000, pp. 344–346.  7  8

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The Batavian 25 March draft contained the recognition of the Batavian Republic’s sovereignty and independence by the French Republic.14 Moreover, France was to protect Batavian sovereignty, freedom, and independence with its land and naval forces.15 From the French 5 April draft onwards, all drafts contained the recognition of the Batavian Republic as a free and independent republic.16 From the French 4 May draft onwards, Batavian freedom and independence were guaranteed by France as well17 while at the very last moment (added in the margin to the final draft) that guarantee was extended to the abolition of the Stadholderate.18 In reaction to the French position that Batavian independence would not be recognised before financial and territorial matters had been settled, Blauw and Meyer explicitly lamented that the French would act contrary to good faith if the United Province’s independence would not immediately be acknowledged.19 Que l’accomplissement de ces promesses et la reconnaissance de l’indépendance nationale sont conformes à la bonne foy, qui fait la base de la constitution de la République française et également conformes à la dignité du peuple français.20

They had expected Batavian independence to be beyond all dispute. For the honest Dutchman is fully incapable of imagining that so-called Republicans who have sworn the Rights of Man and Citizen would commit to any perfidy with regard to this; just doubting this would be an insult to the sincere Batavian! However, this does seem to occur in this perverted eighteenth century and we are obliged to inform you in blunt Dutch words that neither our national independence nor the Staten Generaal’s envoys are being recognised; and the latter are regarded as mere deputies of a certain faction that one does do the honour of calling Patriots; there is no talk of the Staten Generaal nor of Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland.21

  Article 9 25 March draft.   Article 14 25 March draft. 16   Article 1 5 April draft; Article 1 25 April draft; Article 1 4 May draft; Article 1 16 May draft; Article 1 Treaty of The Hague. 17   Article 1 4 May draft; Article 1 16 May draft; Article 1 Treaty of The Hague. 18   Article 1 16 May draft and Article 1 Treaty of The Hague. 19   1 april 1795, Blauw en Meyer aan het Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 20   1 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 21   ‘Het kan toch in het hart van den eerlijken Nederlander niet opkomen, dat zogenaamde Republikeinen, die de Rechten van den Mensch en Burger bezworen hebben 14 15



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Nevertheless, by the end of March, Blauw and Meyer yielded and requested the Staten Generaal’s permission not to insist on recognition as a precondition for negotiating any longer.22 The Hague was more tenacious, though. Even at the time that Reubell and Sieyes were already on their way, the Holland people representatives requested the ‘représentants en mission’ to recognise Batavian independence. On 5 May 1795, in response to this request, the ‘représentants en mission’ had made it clear that they were not allowed to anticipate the Convention’s or Comité’s decisions. While emphasising yet again that the French had come as friends and liberators, they stressed that the terms proposed to the Batavian envoys by the Comité de Salut public were the ‘seul moyen d’assurer la tranquillité et l’indépendance de votre pays.’23 From the Batavian perspective, the Batavian Republic was a continuation of the United Provinces. After all, the Staten Generaal still existed. They had just been packed by Patriots. Moreover, instructions for Batavian envoys would refer to regulations, for instance with regard to accepting gifts, issued by the Staten Generaal as far back as the midseventeenth century24 and Batavian envoys were instructed to maintain the rank in the diplomatic order of precedence directly after the Venetian envoy, that is, the traditional place of the United Provinces.25 Furthermore, the Dutch Republic being renamed was not as much a break with the past as it seems to be either. The adjective ‘Batavian’ had been used ever since the Dutch Revolt, especially in Latin texts; e.g. Hugo Grotius’ De antiquitate reipublicae Batavicae.26 It referred to a Germanic people living in the Rhine delta in Roman times. From the early sixteenth century they were portrayed as the founders of zich aan eenige perfidie ten dien reguarde zouden schuldig maaken: daaraan te willen twijffelen zou in de oogen van den oprechten Bataaf reeds eene belediging zijn! Dit evenement echter schijnt bewaard te weezen voor deeze verdorven achttiende eeuwen en wij vinden ons verplicht U met ronde Hollandsche woorden te zeggen dat noch de nationale independentie, noch de ministers van Hun Hoog Mog in die qualiteit worden geavoueerd en erkend; en de laatste niet anders worden aangezien en gehouden, dan als gedeputeerden van zekere partij, die men wel de eer wil geeven van patriotten te noemen; zijnde er noch questie van Hun Hoog Mog noch van Provisioneele Representanten van het volk van Holland.’; 17 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; NA 1.02.14 no. 596. 22   25 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; NA 1.02.14 no. 596. 23   5 May 1795, Representants en mission to Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland; AAE CP Hollande 587. 24   Resolutions of the Staten Generaal of 10 August 1651 and 29 April 1675. 25  See Part III section 1.3. 26   Grotius, 1610. Van Sas, 2004, p. 50.

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the national tradition of liberty.27 On no occasion, however, did the Batavian envoys refute the necessity of recognising a republic that had existed since the late sixteenth century again. Blauw and Meyer were the first to use the nominator ‘Batavian Republic’ in official correspondence with the French commissioners on 17 March 1795.28 On 3 March, the Staten Generaal had addressed the Convention nationale still as ‘Etats Generaux des Provinces Unies des Païs-Bas.’29 In their instructions, the Staten Generaal had still used ‘Holland’ (draft version) or ‘this Republic’ (final version).30 ‘Batavian people,’ ‘Batavian nation,’ or ‘Batavian government’ had been used from the start. Initially, the French copied ‘Batavian Republic.’ The French commissioners, for instance, used it in the plan de négociation.31 But, as has been discussed before, they soon decided that it was more prudent for their position in negotiations not to treat the Batavians as an independent political entity yet. Hence, they vehemently refused to use the term ‘Batavian Republic’ at least until after the ratification of the Treaty. Instead, they kept using ‘United Provinces’ or ‘Holland.’ The Comité de Salut public at large used ‘République Batave’ in the 4 May draft, though. Nevertheless, by the end of negotiations, the French commissioners consistently struck through ‘Batavian Republic’ and replaced it by ‘Republic of the United Provinces’ every single time it was used in a draft drawn by Batavians.32 By consequence, the Treaty of The Hague was concluded between the French Republic and the Republic of the United Provinces. Even after the Treaty had been ratified, the French reluctantly changed the way they called their first ‘sister republic.’ Admittedly, Sieyes spoke of ‘Batavian Republic’ as he presented the Treaty of The

 Van Sas, 2004, pp. 50–51.   17 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Reubell, Sieyes, and Merlin de Douai; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 29   3 March 1795, les Representans de la Nation Batave aux Representans de la Nation Française; AN AF II 64. 30   26 February 1795, draft instructions for Blauw and Meyer; NA 3.02.01 no. 461; 2 March 1795, instructions for Blauw and Meyer; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 657–666 no. 501. 31   14 March 1795, Plan de négociation Merlin, Reubell, Sieyes; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 623–625 no. 475; Vreede, 1863, p. 123. 32   16 May 1795, Minutes de la négociation à la Haye and Dernier projet de traité; AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10. 27 28



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Hague to the Convention.33 Only in 1796—as the Staten Generaal were replaced by the Nationale Vergadering—did the French use the nominator ‘Batavian Republic’ again in official documents.34 Some French politicians and diplomats would refuse to use ‘Batavian Republic’ even until the Batavian Constitution was adopted. The use of ‘United Provinces’ until 1796 seems to suggest that the general view, for instance stated by Colenbrander, that French recognition was necessary for the Batavians to enjoy statehood does not tell the entire story.35 To be sure, recognition was deemed necessary. As the Treaty was signed, even the Staten Generaal emphasised the Treaty, and the recognition and guarantee of Batavian independence in particular, being an element of national regeneration. The Treaty inaugurated a new beginning from which the recovery of the Dutch Republic could start.36 A constitution or at least commencing the constitution-making process was as relevant though. The Revolutionary notion of the state was indebted to the naturalist social contract theory according to which the state is a voluntary association of individuals. The contractual tradition can be traced back at least to sixteenth-century Protestant thinkers who developed the idea of a contractual relation between people and prince in their controversy with royalists throughout the French Wars of Religion, and possibly even further back to medieval conciliarism.37 As sixteenthcentury resistance theories heavily influenced the justification of the Dutch Revolt,38 it does not come as a surprise that a contractual

33   21 May 1795, Rapport du répresentant du peuple Sieyes sur le traite de paix et d’alliance entre la République française et la République des Provinces-Unies; AAE CP Hollande 587. 34  In his report on Dutch affairs to the Directoire of October 1795 the Ministre des Relations extérieures still used United Provinces: Rapport particulier sur la situation de la République des Provinces-Unies; AAE CP Hollande Supplément 22. See for instance the two 1796 agreements on the payment of the indemnity to be discussed in a subsequent section. The first one of 5 January uses ‘United Provinces,’ whereas the second one of 3 May 1796 uses ‘Batavian Republic.’ 35   Colenbrander, 1905, p. 589. 36   17 May 1795, minutes Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 37   Redslob, 1912, p. 18; De Jong, 1914, pp. 106–107; Jones, 1969, p. 86; Saage, 1989; Lessnoff, 1990; Kerkmeester, 1993; Pennington, 1993; Boucher and Kelly, 1994; Biersteker and Weber, 1996; Lloyd, 1996, pp. 288–289; Skyrms, 1996; Kelly, 1997, pp. 169–171; Bosman, 1998; Morris, 1999; Riley, 1999; Davis, 2002; Van Namen, 2002; Vallentyne, 2003; Holt, 2005, pp. 78–79 and pp. 100–102; Riley, 2006. 38  On sixteenth-century resistance theories see e.g. Kingdon, 1996 and Salmon 1996.

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definition of the political community can be found in the work of Hugo Grotius in which it had already developed into a notion of horizontal contractual relations between citizens.39 After Grotius, the notion of the social contract as metaphysical origin of the state became one of the hallmarks of the school of natural law.40 From Thomas Hobbes and John Locke to Emer de Vattel and Jean Jacques Rousseau—one of the great inspirations of the French Revolution—generations of political and legal theorists defined the state in contractual terms as a voluntary association of citizens. Among French Revolutionaries, Sieyes himself reproduced this notion of the state in his Qu’est-ce que le tiers état? 41 In the run-up to the meeting of the États Generaux in 1789, Sieyes was one of the leaders of a reform movement that wanted to prevent noble dominance of the assembly. His pamphlet is usually reiterated because of this aim and he did indeed argue that the Third Estate was the true and sole representative of the French nation, whereas the Second Estate had distanced itself from the nation. He defined the nation as ‘un corps d’associés vivant sous une loi commune et représentés par la même législature.’ Hence, he departed from a political and rational notion of the nation in which nation and state were identical and both terms referred to the political community or body politic. But Sieyes set out to establish another point as well. Not only was the nobility to be cut out, the King was to be excluded from the process of constitution-making as well. In order to carry through his faction’s plans of political reform, Sieyes needed to substantiate the changeability of the constitution and deny the King a say in the process of constitution-making. Making use of social contract theory, he slightly, but significantly modified French constitutionalism as it had been developed by the sovereign law courts—the Parlements42—throughout the preceding century. Sieyes reproduced the Parlement de Paris’ distinction between fundamental laws of the Kingdom—‘ordonnances du

39   ‘A state [civitas; RK] is a perfect body of free men, united together in order to enjoy common rights and advantages.’; Grotius, 1625, book I, chapter I no. xiv [p. 25]. 40   Redslob 1912 41  Sieyes, Qu’est-ce que le tiers état?, 1789. The text can be found in: Godechot, 1964, pp. 73–89. See also Palmer, 1959, pp. 489–496; Riklin, 2001, pp. 24–27. On Sieyes’ thought in general, see Van Deusen, 1932; Koung, 1934; Collofong, 1964; Bastid, 1970; Forsyth, 1987; Bredin, 1988; Hafen, 1994; Sewell, 1994; Guilhaumou, 2002. 42  See e.g. Palmer, 1959, pp. 450–456; Wijffels, 2003; Baker, 2006, pp. 626–627.



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Royaume’—and the King’s laws—‘ordonnances des rois.’43 The Parlement had argued that the King could make, alter, and revoke laws as he wished, but could not alter the Kingdom’s fundamental laws on which his authority was based. In addition, the Parlement had claimed the authority to test the King’s laws against the fundamental laws and refuse to register the former if they could not stand the test. Sieyes used this distinction to prove that the Constitution was not a contract between King and people the King had to concur with, but preceded the King.44 Since he contemplated sweeping political reforms this did not suffice, though. In addition, he had to establish that the fundamental laws could be changed; albeit not by the King. Hence, he introduced the notion of the pouvoir constituant and attributed this power to the nation. To underpin this step, he used social contract theory. Sieyes’ pamphlet contains a comprehensive exposition of a process of state formation that consists of three stages. In the first stage, a number of isolated individuals voice the will to unite and form a ‘political society.’ The nation (or state) comes into existence because of this expression of will solely based on natural law. ‘La nation se forme par le seul droit naturel.’ In the second stage, the associates act together to ‘donner de la consistance à leur union.’ To take care of public needs, they establish a government (in the widest possible sense, so the legislature and judiciary included) that acts as the nation’s agent. This stage sees the birth of the constitution. The citizens institutionalise their union by organising the state in such a way that a unity of will is established. What is more relevant to the present analysis, though, is that the constitution is deliberately made by the nation. Moreover, the nation exists before and stands above the constitution: ‘La nation existe avant tout, elle est l’origine de tout. Sa volonté est toujours légale, elle est la loi elle-même.’ Nevertheless, the process of state formation is only complete once the constitution has been made. Only then, one enters into the third stage in which the nation acts through its representatives to further the public good. Emulating the Parlement de Paris,45 Sieyes made a distinction between ‘lois positives’ and ‘lois constitutionnelles.’ The latter are fundamental

  24 June 1763, Parlement de Paris; reiterated in: Wijffels, 2003, pp. 102–103.   Godechot, 1970, p. 28. 45   24 June 1763, Parlement de Paris; reiterated in: Wijffels, 2003, pp. 102–103. 43 44

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laws in the sense that the public institutions that exist because of them cannot change them. Power is delegated to these institutions by the nation and they cannot singlehandedly change the conditions of that delegation. Fundamental laws, Sieyes argues, are not independent of the national will, though. The government (the ‘pouvoir constitué’) is bound by the constitutional laws, the nation (the ‘pouvoir constituant’) is not. Likewise, the French Constitutions of 1791, 1793, and 1795 contained definitions of the nation and the relation between nation, constitution, and government based on social contract theory.46 In fact, the Constitution was taken as constitutive for being a well-established political community or even as the manifest form of the social contract itself. Although initially formulated for domestic political purposes, this notion of the state had repercussions for international relations as well. After the Batavian Staatsregeling was adopted in 1798, the head of the Batavian Foreign Office—Maarten van der Goes—would state that the establishment of a ‘constitutional government’ had placed the Batavian Republic among the European powers.47 Henceforth, in Revolutionary thought, a state had to be deliberately constituted. It had no natural existence. Conversely, establishing a state was a purely bottom-up process. It took solely the expressed will of a number of individuals to form a nation. Strictly speaking, this would have made recognition by other states redundant. According to this line of thought, the Batavian Constitution that would enter into force in 1798 would have been the constitutive act of the Batavian Republic, or alternatively—reasoning within Sieyes’ scheme—the decision of Batavians to form a state together and start the process of constitutionmaking by electing a national assembly. Indeed, some French would refuse to use the nominator ‘Batavian Republic’ until 1798. The official line of the French government, however, was that the Treaty of The Hague—and especially the recognition of Batavian inde-

46   1791 Constitution (Titre III, Article 2): ‘La Nation, de qui seule émanent tous les Pouvoirs, ne peut les exercer que par délégation. La Constitution française est représentative: les représentants sont le Corps législatif et le roi.’ 1793 Constitution (Article 7 Acte Constitutionnel): ‘Le peuple souverain est l’universalité des citoyens français.’ 1795 Constitution (Article 17 Déclaration des droits et des devoirs de l’homme et du citoyen): ‘La souveraineté réside essentiellement dans l’universalité des citoyens.’ For the texts of these constitutions, see http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr. 47   28 February 1799, Van der Goes, Rapport over den Staat der Buitenlandse Zaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 120. See also Vreede, 1863, pp. 216–217.



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pendence it contained—was an essential step towards establishing the Batavian Republic. In Parisian political circles, the Treaty was regarded as the basis of Batavian independence.48 Blauw and Meyer, too, presented the alliance as a means to ‘fixant son [the Batavian Republic’s; RK] état politique.’49 Little argumentation to substantiate this position can be found in contemporary resources. It seems most plausibly to assume that the French government reasoned that France had conquered the entire United Provinces, by right of conquest was entitled to dispose of its territory, and hence was the one to decide whether their would be a Batavian Republic or at least that the Batavian nation was to be given possession of (most of ) the United Provinces’ territory. In that case, it is a bit odd, though, that recognition was part and parcel of the Treaty. Logically, it should have preceded the Treaty, since one cannot conclude a Treaty with a state that does not exist yet. Since the Batavians assumed continuity between the United Provinces and the Batavian Republic such a clear expression of discontinuity was, however, probably not acceptable to them. In the end, the French Republic did not only recognise Batavian independence, it guaranteed that independence and the abolition of the Stadholderate, too.50 Needless to say, that this constitutional guarantee was unilateral. Added at the very last moment, Batavian Patriots might have favoured it as an assurance of their own regime. The guarantee was a tricky provision, though. In the first place, it hampered peace negotiations or the re-establishment of relations with Britain and Prussia. Both powers had, after all, guaranteed the Stadholderate in the 1788 Treaties. Although at peace with France from April 1795 onwards, Prussia would refuse to recognise the Batavian Republic for years to come unless at first, the Stadhouder was reinstated or, after some years, he was compensated for his losses.51 Cambacérès, for instance, heavily criticized this part of the Treaty because it endangered relations with Prussia and it alienated Orangists from France, thus

48   2 July 1798, Rapport au Directoire sur la situation de la République Française considérées dans ses rapports extérieures avec les autres puissances; AAE MD France 652 and 656. 49   22 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut Public; NA 1.02.14 600. 50   Article 1 Treaty of The Hague. 51  See section III.1.2.

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limiting the support base for an alignment with the French Republic within the United Provinces.52 In the second place, the guarantee would allow French interference in Batavian internal affairs. Although the guarantee was primarily directed against foreign interventions to restore the Stadhouder’s regime, the Treaty did not limit the French guarantee to foreign interventions. Moreover, the guarantee of Batavian independence was to be given a very specific meaning as well. To the French independence and freedom meant the free exercise of popular sovereignty. Hence, in the build-up to the Batavian Staatsregeling, the French government used the guarantee of independence as a justification to mingle in the constitution-making process and ‘ne [. . .] pas rester indifférente sur le plan de nos ennemis communs, dont le but est de fomenter les troubles et les dissentions entre les différens membres de l’union et de rétablir le stathoudérat.’53 In François Noël’s instructions, the Directoire stressed not to intend meddling in internal affairs, but declared never to recognise a regime in Holland that was not founded on the general will. Article 1 of the Hague Treaty was interpreted to stipulate a guarantee of the Batavian people’s right to change its constitution and form of government: que l’intention du Directoire exécutif, en reconnaissant la République des provinces unies, comme puissance libre et indépendante, a été d’en garantir les effets qui sont incontestablement la faculté de changer et sa constitution et son gouvernement intérieur; que cette garantie est littéralement exprimée dans l’article 1er du traité de paix.54

This was exactly what it meant to be independent and hence this right of internal self-determination was deemed to be covered by the guarantee of independence.55 Not interfering with the constitution’s substance—at least not in public and even behind the scenes not until after the fructidor coup 52   27 May 1795, Cambacérès, Sommaire des Observations politique sur le Traité d’Alliance Offensive et Défensive, conclu à la Haye le 27 floréal an 3 entre la république française et celle des Sept Provinces Unies; AAE CP Hollande 587. 53   30 December 1795, Instructions adressées pour le Directoire exécutive au citoyen Noël, ministre plénipotentiaire de la République française à la Haye; AAE CP Hollande 589. 54   30 December 1795, Instructions adressées pour le Directoire exécutive au citoyen Noël, ministre plénipotentiaire de la République française à la Haye; AAE CP Hollande 589. 55   Cassese, 1995, p. 5.



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d’état in France (4 September 1797) and a first draft constitution had been rejected in a national referendum on 8 August 1797—56 it did regard itself entitled to ensure the process running smoothly. Hence, it acted through the French envoy in The Hague and the general in command of French troops in the Batavian Republic in order to enable the Batavian people to give itself a constitution.57 For instance, François Noël endorsed a rising in Frisia to force the Provinciale Staten to agree to the regulations and hence convocation of the Nationale Vergadering; although active French interference was confined to pulling French troops out of the Province on that occasion.58 As after the fructidor coup Charles Delacroix was sent to The Hague to replace Noël, his instructions mainly covered the necessity of the Batavian people being properly constituted.59 Simultaneously, the Directoire clearly emphasised the importance of a constitution for the Batavian Republic’s international standing.60 Only a constitution would re-establish the Dutch Republic as a power within the European states system. The Directoire did urge Delacroix, though, to respect Batavian feelings with regard to their independence. Le premier point de la mission importante qui est confie au citoyen Charles Delacroix sera donc de concourir à accélérer la discussion de cet acte constitutionnel et à faire qu’il soit approuvé par la convention nationale. Pour y réussir il employera de préférence des voies de persuasion afin de ne point effaroucher une peuple aussi jaloux de son indépendance qu’il se montre lent à l’affermir mais comme il existe malheureusement en Hollande et jusqu’au sein de la convention batave des hommes qui n’écoutent qui leurs intérêts particuliers ou qui peuvent être soupçonnés d’obéir a des impulsions étrangères il sera bon de leur faire comprendre que le gouvernement jamais est déterminé à mettre la république batave

56  Schama, 1989, p. 323. This is not the place to go into French interference in the process of writing the Batavian Staatsregeling of 1798. An abundance of literature on that issue has been written in the past years. See: Legrand, 1895; Colenbrander, 1908; Verhagen, 1949; Palmer, 1959 and 1964; Bauer, 1962; Godechot, 1983; De Gou, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1995, 1999; Schama, 1989; Moorman van Kappen, 2000; Moorman van Kappen and Coppens, 2001; Elias, 2001; Van Namen, 2002; Velema, 2002; Rosendaal, 2002 and 2005. 57   29 August 1797, rapport sur la République batave; AAE CP Hollande 596. 58   Legrand, 1895, p. 128; Schama, 1989, p. 290 and pp. 293–294. 59   2 December 1797, Memoire pour servir d’instructions au citoyen Charles Delacroix ministre plénipotentiaire de la République française près la République batave; AAE CP Hollande Supplément 22. 60  See also Van Sas, 2004, p. 316.

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part ii, chapter three en état d’intervention utilement dans l’alliance qui a été contractée avec elle; [. . .] Le préférable sera celui qui ne laissera aucun doute sur l’établissement d’une constitution libre d’un gouvernement fixe dont la force on soit point illusoire et qui puisse replacer la Hollande au rang qui lui convient dans le système de l’Europe comme premier auxiliaire de la république française.61

On the occasion of the Anglo-Russian invasion of 1799, the Directoire confirmed the guarantee of Batavian independence, while stressing that the French Republic had always respected Batavian independence in reaction to British statements that the invasion intended to save the Batavian nation from its French yoke.62 Moreover, the postbrumaire French government made an effort to stress its commitment to and respect for the independence and equality of other nations. In the Exposé de la situation de la république of November 180063—that contained one of the first general statements of the Consulat’s foreign policy—the Consuls emphasised that: la nation française ne veut ni privilège exclusif, ni faveur partiale; elle ne demande aux peuples amis que les droits de l’égalité. Qu’aucune nation ne soit plus favorisée, qu’elle même ne soit pas plus favorisée qu’une autre nation; telles sont ses prétentions, et l’intérêt de tous les peuples qui contractèrent avec elle.

A year later, the Consuls stressed that loyalty to France’s allies and respect for their independence was one of the basic principles of French foreign policy.64 With all talk about an alliance, one would, however, almost forget that the Treaty ended up to be a peace treaty as well. From the outset, confusion entered the negotiations because they were about peace and alliance at one and the same time. On the one hand, the war had to

61   2 December 1797, Memoire pour servir d’instructions au citoyen Charles Delacroix ministre plénipotentiaire de la République française près la République batave; AAE CP Hollande Supplément 22. 62   24 August 1799, Florent Guyot to Reinhard; NA 2.01.08 no. 233; 29 August 1799, Directoire to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 1.02.14 no. 694 and AN AF III* 178. 63   22 November 1800, Exposé de la situation de la république; AAE MD France 1414. The Exposé was a general account of governmental policy issued to the Corps législatif frequently throughout the Consulat period. 64   22 November 1801, Exposé de la situation de la république; AAE MD France 652.



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be ended in a formal way. France had declared war on the Stadhouder in 1793 in accordance with the revolutionary motto of waging war on despots. The Stadhouder was no sovereign, though, and the United Provinces had waged the war. On the other hand, now that the Patriots had seized power, the Dutch government no longer was hostile to France. To the contrary, it was devoted to the revolutionary cause and determined to consecrate its reign by an alliance with the French Republic. Since French troops had occupied the United Provinces’ territory entirely and as Patriots had taken over government this peace was indeed little more than a formality. Apparently, the alliance with the new or regenerated Batavian Republic was integrated in the peace treaty. However, actually, it was the other way around. From the first draft onwards, the Treaty had been a treaty of alliance and the alliance made up the best part of the Treaty in the end. Only at the very last moment, a peace clause was inserted in the Treaty. That is to say, prior to 16 May 1795, the drafts did not contain a peace clause.65 It is not clear why the peace clause was inserted and who initiated that insertion. Since by the end of the eighteenth century, the state or sovereign was not yet fully identified with the state’s territory66 a treaty could still be concluded with the United Provinces even though France occupied its entire territory. Even if it was not a monarch, a sovereign did not cease to exist once he had lost control of the territory over which he exercised his sovereign power. Henceforth, there would have been nothing odd about a peace treaty between the French Republic and the United Provinces. More likely, the absence of a peace clause in the earlier drafts seems to indicate that the war was deemed to have been terminated by a total victory.67 The United Provinces would then have ceased to exist and the Batavians would have entered a stage of transition towards renewed statehood. Hence, a negotiated peace was superfluous and a peace clause would have been yet another sign of continuity between the United Provinces and the Batavian Republic. The next step would than have been the recognition of the new Republic by the conqueror and subsequently entering into an alliance.

  16 May 1795, Minutes de la négociation à la Haye; AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10.  See chapter 5. 67   Korman, 1996, p. 9. 65 66

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Strikingly, though, the recognition clause preceded the peace clause. Article 1 contained the recognition of the Republic of the United Provinces as a ‘free and independent power.’ According to eighteenth-century practice, a peace treaty would have started with the general peace clause. In the Treaty of The Hague the unilateral recognition of the Dutch Republic by the French Republic came first and only then peace was established. Since the French had insisted on using the old name instead of the new nominator ‘Batavian Republic’ the Treaty created the odd situation that a republic that existed for less than three years recognised a republic that had existed for over two hundred years and on which it had declared war two years before—although (renewed) recognition of the old Republic might have been deemed necessary because of the French occupation of its territory—and then made peace with the republic it had only just recognised. Thus the integration of the Peace Treaty and the Treaty of Alliance in one single text caused confusion. It would even have made more sense to leave the peace clause out altogether. Compared to eighteenth-century peace treaties, the peace clause (Article 2) was strikingly regular establishing perpetual peace, friendship, and good terms between the two Republics. Next to this general peace clause, the Treaty of The Hague hardly contained any Articles one might expect in a peace treaty. The restitution of territory (Article 11) and military equipment (Article 10), the cession of possessions of the House of Orange (Article 19), and possibly the indemnity (Article 20) might be taken for provisions common to peace treaties, but they might just as well be taken for grants of the victor to the new states established on conquered territory. Besides these ones, one does not come across any provisions usually in a peace treaty to terminate the war situation.68 The Treaty lacked a provision with regard to prisoners of war. There was no provision proclaiming amnesty for acts conducted throughout the war. The Treaty was silent on confiscated private property.69 It was simply more relevant to fix the future relationship, that is, the terms of the alliance. The retrospective aspect of the peace clause—ending the war—was rather superfluous since the war had already ended by 68  On pre-Revolutionary peace treaties, see Duchhardt, 2004; Lesaffer, 2004; Lesaffer, 2005a; Lesaffer, 2008b. 69   With regard to private property, Carnot had already indicated at the start of negotiations that the French Republic was not entitled to appropriate any private property. See section II.2.2.



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French victory, the peace clause’s contribution to establishing future relations—the amicitia—was surpassed in significance by that other aspect of future relations: the alliance. 3.2  The Price of Liberty French financial and territorial demands in return for recognition had been at the core of negotiations. The French commissioners’ plan de négociation inextricably linked the issues of indemnity and the mutual border to recognition of the Batavian Republic and the admittance of the Batavian envoys.70 As discussed above, the French would stick to this position throughout the negotiation process. French territorial demands will be addressed in Chapter 5 of this part. It will become clear that Batavian negotiators managed to restrict the extent of territory to be ceded to France drastically. The indemnity is an entirely different story. The Batavians were expected to pay a large sum of money to indemnify France for the costs of the war. From the start of negotiations, the Comité de Salut public—above all in desperate need of money— had set its mind on financial gains from the alliance.71 Indemnities were common to eighteenth-century warfare. The King of Prussia, for instance, had received an indemnity of 500,000 guilders for his 1787 intervention on behalf of the Stadhouder, officially called a ‘free gift.’72 Furthermore, Batavian Patriots in Paris had held out a twenty-fourcarat golden carrot to persuade the French to intervene in the United Provinces.73 Basically, the French Republic’s entitlement to an indemnity was not questioned. From the start, the Batavian Patriots would recog­ nise France’s right to be indemnified for war expenses74 although the precise legal foundation of that entitlement—indemnifying an, albeit not yet official ally for its support or buying off a former enemy—is not quite clear. The Batavians were appalled, though, by the sum the   Article 4 PN.   20 February 1795, Comité de Salut public to representants en mission; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 605–607 no. 467. 72   Palmer, 1959, p. 339. 73  Schama, 1989, p. 195. 74   E.g 1 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Reubell, Sieyes, and Merlin de Douai; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 70 71

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French requested. Ever since Robespierre had spoken of 100 million guilders in one of his speeches in 1792,75 this absurd amount—equal to about three times the annual public revenue of the United Provinces76— had gained a hold over people’s minds. In Batavian sources the indemnity, most of the times, was presented as a token of gratitude and a just compensation for sacrifices made by France to liberate the Batavian people instead of just an obligation on the loser’s side.77 La Nation Batave reconnait avoir au Gouvernement français les obligations les plus étendues. Ce sont les Français qui l’ont aidé à reconquérir les droits inaliénables de Liberté et de Souveraineté. Elle doit donc procurer à la France pour ce service éminent un dédommagement.78

Even those French politicians and diplomats urging for moderation, endorsed an extensive indemnity. Antoine Caillard, for instance, while arguing for an alliance, stressed that the French Republic needed money to destroy Britain and was thus entitled to demand part of Dutch capital. Dutch trade was not to be ruined and the new regime’s position not to be undermined by asking too much, though, but he thought 100 million guilders to be feasible.79 There was some discussion within the French government whether the indemnity should consist of a sum paid in full at once or should be spread out by imposing a payment for the maintenance of an occupation army on the Batavians. Not being able to choose and having been presented both options, the French government decided not to choose at all. In the bases proposées, the Comité de Salut public had set the indemnity on 100 million guilders to be paid within two months after ratification of the Treaty. Contributions levied by the French armies in the United Provinces were not to be deducted from this sum. Moreover, a loan was to be granted to the French Republic of

 Schama, 1989, p. 196.  Schama, 1989, p. 452. 77   E.g. 1 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Reubell, Sieyes, and Merlin de Douai; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 12 April 1795, minutes Hollandsch Committé van Buitenlandse Zaken; NA 3.02.01 no. 440. 16 April 1795, Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland to Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 604. 78   17 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Reubell, Sieyes, and Merlin de Douai; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 79   Antoine Bernard Caillard, Quelques idées sur les rapports actuels de la France avec les principales puissances de l’Europe soumisses aux Représentants du Peuple membres du Comité de Salut public; AAE MD France 655. 75 76



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yet another 100 million at three per cent interest and to be repaid by the French Republic within four years after the general peace.80 The French commissioners’ plan de negociation added that the loan had to be guaranteed by the Staten Generaal and that the French Republic was entitled to the possessions of the Stadhouder, enemy powers, and French ‘émigrés’ because of the right of conquest.81 The Batavians had no intentions to pay that much. Their 25 March draft does contain an Article on indemnity, but left the exact amount blank. The term of payment was extended and the indemnity was made payable in instalments.82 The French 5 April draft left the exact amount of the indemnity open for further negotiations, too. It did state, though, that the indemnity had to equal the costs of the war. Moreover, the Batavian Republic had to pay a first term of at least 20 million guilders immediately after ratification of the Treaty.83 The French government was, after all, still in desperate need of money. The additional loan was dropped, though, and would not be mentioned anymore. As the option of buying off French territorial demands gained ground in the United Provinces, the Staten Generaal moved into the direction of the sum established by the Comité de Salut public. As discussed before, various provincial assemblies—the Holland Staten in particular— had urged the Staten Generaal to offer the French government large amounts of money. The Dutch counter draft copied the provision from the French draft. It was added, however, that the indemnity was not to exceed the Batavian Republic’s means. The first payment of 20 million guilders was accepted, but the Staten Generaal indicated that it would be paid within four months time after the conclusion of the Treaty. The remainder would be paid in instalments every six months.84 The Staten Generaal emphasised that the best part of Batavian wealth was tied, partly in loans to various European powers that had ceased interest payments because of the French invasion. Therefore, the sum demanded by France was about twice as much as available in coin in the United Provinces.85 Moreover, contributions levied by the French   Articles 9 and 12 BP.   Article 6 PN. 82   Article 1 25 March draft. 83   Article 11 5 April draft. 84   Article 12 25 April draft. 85   26 April 1795, Eclaircissemens sur le projet de traité remis au nom du Gouvernement Batave par les ministres plenipotentiaires soussignés; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 80 81

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armies were to be deducted and Blauw and Meyer were instructed not to go beyond the sum of 60 million guilders.86 While holding on to the amount of 100 million guilders, the Comité de Salut public accepted the idea of payment in instalments. In addition, all estates (including the seigniories of Culemborg and Buren that had not belonged to the United Provinces prior to the Batavian Revolution87) and most movable possessions of the House of Orange would be ceded to the Batavian Republic.88 The time of payment was more restricted in the 4 May draft, though. The first 20 million was to be paid within a month and the remainder in monthly terms of 5 million.89 The 15 May draft stipulated that the Batavian Republic would pay 100 million guilders ‘à titre d’indemnité et de dedommagement des frais de la guerre’ to the French Republic.90 The indemnity would be paid in monthly instalments of 10 million (first three months) and subsequently 5 million.91 The requisitions levied by the French ‘représentants en mission’ were not to be deducted from the indemnity.92 Both in the 4 May and 15 May drafts, the indemnity would, hence, have to be paid within seventeen months. On 16 May 1795 the scheme of payment was transposed to the secret articles and altered yet again. Outstanding foreign debts of the French Republic to the amount of 50 million guilders would be transferred to the United Provinces. The remaining 50 million would have to be paid in kind or bills of exchange. The instalments were set on 10 million in prairial, messidor, and fructidor (that is the first, second, and fourth month after the conclusion of the Treaty), 5 million in pluviose of the next year (that is five months after the third payment), and, finally, 15 million in floréal (another three months later). Thus, the 50 million guilders would have to been paid within twelve months time.

86   Jacob Blauw, Memorie van instructie en tot meerdere bijlichting van de volumnineuse bijlagen; Colenbrander 1905 pp. 425–432 and 650–657 no. 327 and no. 500. 87  Van Weel, 1977, p. 31. 88   Article 13 4 May draft. 89   Article 14 4 May draft. Sieyes and Reubell were expressis verbis instructed not to give in on the point of payment of 20 million within a month after the conclusion of the Treaty (4 May 1795, Instructions pour les Représentans du Peuple membres du Comité de Salut public envoyés dans les Provinces Unies; AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10; AAE CP Hollande 587). 90   Article 18 15 May draft. 91   Article 19 15 May draft. 92   Article 7 secret 15 May draft.



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The French commissioners finally agreed to repay requisitions. The amount was set on 10 million to be deducted from the final payments of the indemnity.93 Hence, the United Provinces would only have to pay another 40 million guilders. Although their public debt would be augmented with 50 million, at least they were not obliged to produce that kind of money in the short run. Whereas France retained the possessions of French ‘émigrés’ confiscated after the invasion of the United Provinces,94 the House of Orange’s possessions were ceded to the United Provinces as stipulated in the 4 May draft.95 Hence, the United Provinces would actually gain some territory. In return for the grants to France—both financial and territorial— the Batavian negotiators had managed to gain two further concessions: the French Republic promised to extend its good offices with foreign powers to have them pay debts and interests owed to Batavian citizens,96 and to guarantee pre-war Batavian colonial possessions in the Indies and on the African coasts. The colonial guarantee was, however, reciprocal; although France was most likely to get in a position where this guarantee had to be upheld.97 Moreover, French ships were granted right of access to the ports of the Cape of Good Hope, Colombo and Trincomalee on Ceylon.98 Thereto, the colonial guarantee was part of the secret articles. This did not change anything to the obligatory character of the clause, but it did mean that the colonial guarantee was concealed to the public and even to the Convention nationale. The colonial guarantee would play a significant role in peace negotiations with Britain and will, hence, be discussed further in Part III. Yet another nuance has to be made with regard to the indemnity. How excessive it might have been, the notorious 100 million guilders seems never to have been fully paid. Even with the best part being changed into transfer of debts the Batavian Republic seems to have been unable to produce the remaining sum. According to Harouel only 75 million was paid by 1801 and even then only ten to twelve

  Article 5 16 May draft.   Article 7 secret Treaty of The Hague. 95   Article 19 Treaty of The Hague. 96   Article 21 16 May draft and Treaty of The Hague. 97   The 25 March draft had already contained a provision pursuant to which the French Republic would not conclude peace before all Batavian colonial possessions would have been restored. 98   Article 6 16 May draft and Treaty of The Hague. Ceylon is presently called Sri Lanka. 93 94

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million in kind.99 Further research in the Batavian Republic’s accounts would have to be done to prove this hypothesis, but it has become clear that the Batavian government was behind virtually from the start and the French government was still insisting on payment of arrears in 1800, so four years after the final instalment was due.100 Assuring that the Batavian government would uphold its financial obligations in purview of the Treaty of The Hague was one of the major aims of François Noël’s mission in The Hague.101 In his report to the Directoire on the United Provinces at the start of the Revolutionary year iv,102 the French Foreign Secretary—Charles Delacroix— reproached the Batavians for not keeping up with instalments due in purview of the Treaty of The Hague, although it was an ‘indemnité légitime’ the French Republic was entitled to because of the liberation of the Batavian people. By then, only 12 of the 30 million guilders due had been paid which, according to Delacroix, amounted to a flagrant violation of the Treaty in times that the French Republic was in great need of money.103 On 15 December 1795, the Directoire decided to propose a convention with regard to a scheme of payment. The time of payment was to be extended, that is, the Batavian Republic would have to pay 4 million guilders per annum as long as the war went on and twice as much in peace time. The amount still due would carry interest.104 On 5 January 1796, an agreement with regard to payment of the sums due to France was indeed signed.105 The Batavian Republic would do the utmost to pay arrears in the course of January, whereas a new scheme of payment was established for future instalments. This agreement was,   Harouel, 1997b, p. 75.   26 March 1800, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 233. 101   11 July 1795, Mémoire pour servir d’instructions au Citoyen François Noël, ministre plenipotentiaire de la République française près la République de Hollande; AAE CP Hollande 588. 102  Not dated, Rapport particulier sur la situation de la République des ProvincesUnies, présenté par le ministre des relations extérieurs au Directoire, an 4; AAE CP Hollande Supplément 22. 103  Not dated, Rapport particulier sur la situation de la République des ProvincesUnies, présenté par le ministre des relations extérieurs au Directoire, an 4; AAE CP Hollande Supplément 22. 104   Arrête tenant à modifier l’application du traité de paix et d’alliance; AN AF III 1. 105   5 January 1796, Acte d’accord pour le payement de tout ce qui est dû par la République des Provinces-Unies à la République Française aux termes du traité de paix et d’alliance entre la République Française et celle des provinces-Unies; CTS vol. 53, pp. 45–48.   99 100



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however, probably never ratified. On 3 May 1796, another agreement was signed in The Hague.106 This one stipulated that even more debts from the French Republic would be transferred to the Batavian Republic. This agreement did not alter Batavian payment difficulties much. By March 1800, the French ambassador in The Hague, Charles-Louis Huguet de Semonville, had to officially remind the Batavian government that part of the indemnity was still due to be paid.107 Van der Goes referred Semonville’s letter to his colleague at the Department of Finance108 and advised the Uitvoerend Bewind to propose to the French government appointing commissioners to examine what the Batavian Republic still owed the French Republic.109 The Uitvoerend Bewind must have adopted his proposal, for five days later Van der Goes posed it to Semonville.110 Shortly afterwards two commissioners were appointed. 3.3  Treaty Partners or Natural Allies? Due to the character of the French recogition the Treaty of The Hague might, in the French view, have been constitutive to the Batavian Republic, but first and foremost, the Treaty established relations between the two Republics. Ignoring previous plans for a federative order, the Batavian and French governments had opted for casting relations between their Republics in the juridical mould of a simple alliance. In the remaining part of this chapter the character of this alliance will be discussed from a political point of view. Supra, it has been established that the French deemed the Treaty of The Hague and their recognition of Batavian independence in particular, constitutive for the Batavian Republic’s political existence. The first question to be addressed here is whether the Treaty was considered constitutive for relations between the two Republics as well or whether the alliance was thought to embody, sanctify, and institutionalise already existing and lasting bonds. 106   3 May 1796, Agreement between France and the Batavian Republic with regard to payment of the second half of the one hundred million; CTS vol. 53, pp. 87–89; Vreede, 1863, bijlage XXXIX, pp. 142–143. 107   26 March 1800, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 233. 108   29 March 1800, Van der Goes to Gogel; NA 2.01.08 no.122. 109   21 April 1800, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 110   26 April 1800, Van der Goes to Semonville; NA 2.01.08 no. 107.

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As he paid his formal visit to the French commissioners to celebrate the conclusion of the Treaty, the President of the Staten Generaal—at the time Albert Johan de Sitter—expressed the hope that the Treaty would be the basis for an abiding harmony between the two nations.111 Throughout the entire duration of the Batavian Republic’s existence, the Treaty of The Hague was referred to as the legal basis of FrancoBatavian relations.112 On the other hand, some sources seem to indicate that the Treaty confirmed rather than constituted a special bond between the two Republics. In a letter sent to the French ‘représentants en mission’ in order to protest against requisitions, the Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland envisioned the alliance as a means to firmly unite the two nations and to ‘cimenter’ their fraternal relations.113 A similar phrase is to be found in the Nationale Vergadering’s manifesto in which it declared war on Britain. There the Batavian assembly stated that the Hague Treaty ‘cemented the union of mutual protection.’114 This suggests that fraternal relations between the French and Batavian nations preceded any treaty bonds and that the alliance merely confirmed, formalised, and strengthened already existing bonds. The instructions for the first regular French envoy to the Batavian Republic—François Noël—are quite elucidating on this matter.115 France and the Batavian Patriots—note the alternating occurrence of a state and a political faction—were deemed to be drawn together by common interests for a long time already, whereas the House of Orange tended towards Britain and had sought protection across the Channel to the detriment of the Dutch navy and by consequence the East India Company. ‘Les rapports politiques de la Hollande ont entièrement changé depuis le traité qui l’unit à la France.’ The Treaty had broken

 NA 1.02.14 no. 604.   E.g. 25 January 1803, Van der Goes to Semonville; NA 2.01.08 no. 124: ‘Une premiere considération, c’est que dans le fait ces mesures n’ont pas apporté la moindre alteration au traité de la Haye du 16 mai 1795 qui forme la base des rélations entre les deux Républiques et celle des obligations de leurs Gouvernements respectifs.’ 113   4 May 1795, Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland to representants en mission; NA 1.02.14 no. 604. 114   2 May 1796, Dagverhaal der handelingen van de Nationale Vergadering representeerende het Volk van Nederland (Manifest), p. 31; http://192.87.107.12:8080/ decreten. 115   11 July 1795, Mémoire pour servir d’instructions au Citoyen François Noël, ministre plenipotentiaire de la République française près la République de Hollande; AAE CP Hollande 588. 111 112



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out the alignment with Britain and Prussia that had subordinated ‘les grands intérêts des nations’ to dynastic bonds. Dutch decline was thus traced back to the semi-official personal union between England and the United Provinces resulting from the Glorious Revolution. Under French protection, the Dutch Republic would now be enabled to return to its pre-1689 power status, to recover its independence, commerce, and industry: elle peut, sous la protection de la France, reprendre une importance dont la diminuation progressive a pour première époque l’usurpation du trône anglais par le prince Guillaume . . .116

Admittedly, curtailing British influence on the Continent was said to be beneficial to France as well. Moreover, the Comité de Salut public must have been rather content with the Treaty of The Hague, for it was presented as a model ‘à tous les traités à venir.’ Nevertheless, the new alignment with the French Republic was clearly a condition for regeneration. Thus, regeneration of the Dutch Republic and France’s preponderance (possibly even hegemony) were thought to be connected. The Comité de Salut public stressed that the Dutch Republic’s ‘importance politique’ was dependent on its commerce. The erstwhile alliance with Britain was said to have paralysed Dutch trade and industry. The new political situation opened the possibilities to revival not only of the Dutch economy but of the French one as well since France could now make use of Dutch credit. The union between the two Republics posed a threat to the British colonial empire since the republican allies were in control of both the Cape of Good Hope and the island of Réunion (and hence of the course of navigation to the Indian subcontinent and the Far East). Furthermore, Britain could now be cut off from the Continent both with regard to its trade and in times of war. Thus, the Franco-Batavian alliance was presented mainly in anti-British terms. Conversely, Noël was to stress that France was a ‘natural ally’ to the Dutch Republic and ‘que ne pouvant avoir avec elle aucune sorte de rivalité.’ The underlying message is clear, the union of the maritime powers, although it lasted for about a century, was unnatural, whereas France and the Dutch Republic shared interests and could make each other prosper. 116   11 July 1795, Mémoire pour servir d’instructions au Citoyen François Noël, ministre plenipotentiaire de la République française près la République de Hollande; AAE CP Hollande 588.

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Thereto, the Comité emphasised that the Dutch Republic was divided in three parties: Orangists (‘le parti anglais’), Patriots, and Jacobins. In line with thermidorian loathing for radicalism, the Jacobins were said to be too radical. They were expected to plunge the Dutch Republic into the chaos France had just managed to overcome. The Patriots ‘ont des nuances.’ Some, like Pieter Paulus, were said to be attached to France, whereas others were less inclined to alignment with France but did value their country’s liberty. Although Noël was instructed to take an impartial position, the Comité clearly thought in terms of factions and favoured one of the three because of a similarity in ideological programme and attitude. To the more natural alignment between the two states was, thus, added a natural union between political factions; the latter strengthening the former. Thus, the French and Batavian Republics were said to be ‘natural allies’ in which case a voluntary act like a treaty would be superfluous to bring their mutual bonds into being. The two Republics were tied together by common interests, common enemies, their vicinity, and a similar political system. These natural bonds were specified in the Treaty of Alliance. For similar reasons, the alliance was deemed to be lasting. The Treaty of The Hague did not just create an alliance between two states that happened to oppose the same enemy during a particular war. The alliance was even integrated into the Batavian Staatsregeling of 1798. Pursuant to Article 68 of the General Principles, the Batavian people would never conclude a treaty adverse to the political interest of either of the two united Republics.117 By the end of December 1796, the Directoire received a memorandum on France’s alliance system by J.M. Bertrand.118 Anticipating peace to be established soon, he stressed that the current alliance system was ‘l’ouvrage des circonstances’ and would not survive the end of the war. Instead alliances, to be lasting, had to be based on common interests; ‘dictées par l’intérêt national combiné avec les intérêts

117   1798 Bataafse Staatsregeling (Article 68 Burgerlijke en Staatkundige Grondregels): ‘Het Bataafsche Volk, overtuigd, dat de belangen der vereenigde Fransche en Bataafsche republieken, door derzelver onderlinge zamenstemming, altijd het gelukkigst zullen bevorderd worden, wil, van zijne zijde, nimmer eenige afzonderlijke verbindtenis met die Volken, wier staatkundig belang in tweestrijd is met den voorspoed der beide Natiën.’; Van Hasselt, 1987, p. 26; Rosendaal, 2005b, p. 70. 118   Memoire sur les alliances qui conviennent à la République française présenté au Directoire au commencement de nivose de l’an iv par J.M. Bertrand; AAE MD France 652 and 655.



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respectifs de nos futurs alliés.’ Throughout the current war France had been deprived of a great power ally. That was to be compensated by alliances with powers of the second and third rank, e.g. the Dutch Republic. France had to choose its allies from ‘les puissances dont les vrais intérêts, soit politique et topographiques, soit commerciaux et maritimes s’allient tous ensemble comme par le vœu et l’accord de la nature et de la raison, avec les vrais intérêts de la France.’ Bertrand made a triple distinction between foreign powers. First, there were three major enemies. He did not name them, but probably Britain, Austria, and Russia were meant. Second, there was a category of powers with whom only peace treaties were to be concluded ensuring the exercise of ‘natural and civil rights’ and promoting mutual good relations. Finally, there was a category of powers with whom the Republic should unite by establishing ‘les liens les plus intimes’ through treaties of offensive and defensive alliance. Adding an offensive element to the alliance was thus primarily a way to express an intimate relationship, rather than a token of offensive schemes. Thus, France was to attain a hegemonic position by diplomatic means: C’est par cette influence ministérielle auprès des puissances étrangères que la République française pourra acquérir dans les cabinets de l’Europe cette prépondérance qui est due à ses grands moyens naturels et qui deviendra aussi utile dans ses conséquences à la tranquillité générale qu’au maintien de sa propre grandeur.

First and foremost, Bertrand argued, France was to assure itself of maritime allies. Notably, their form of government was not relevant. Besides the United States, Venice (although an aristocratic republic), and the Dutch Republic, Sweden, Denmark, and Spain were mentioned; the latter three being monarchies. The alliance with the Dutch Republic was valued most in maritime, and by consequence anti-British terms. The Batavian government was to be urged to restore Dutch naval power. Yet, its government was to be convinced, as well, to appreciate the alignment with the French Republic more: ‘elle saura mieux apprécies le lien qui l’unit au système de nos alliances.’ Clearly, Bertrand regarded the Franco-Batavian alliance as one branch of a wider, French alliance system. Admittedly, he stressed, ‘la loi du vainqueur que nous avons imposée’ had made a bad impression, but ‘sa renaissance sous nos auspices’ would render the Batavians favourable to France. French foreign policy discourse frequently referred to the notion of natural allies. The notion is to be found, for instance, in an elaborate

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memorandum on French foreign policy of Fructidor an II.119 Foreign policy is said to be based sur les rapports constant qui existent entre les différens états, déduits de leur position géographique, de leurs productions, de leur population et étendue, de leur constitution, enfin de leur intérêts naturels ou biens sur le droit positifs, les traités, le rélations, les intérêts existant.

As to France’s external relations, the French Republic was said to be a natural friend of the northern nations, the Ottoman Porte, the Unites States, and Spain (‘sous le point de vue de sa position géographique’), of weak states, that is, Switzerland, and the minor powers of Germany and Italy (‘sous le point de vue de sa puissance’), of the less industrious nations (‘sous le point de vue de ses productions et de son industrie’), and, finally, of free states (‘sous le point de vue de sa constitution’). Hence, next to the reiteration of France’s traditional self-image of protector of small powers, natural friendship could be based on geopolitical, economic, or political-ideological grounds. Conversely, the current war was said to be provoked by France’s natural enemies. The notion of natural allies appeared, as well, in an October 1800 memorandum.120 In this memorandum the notion is coloured by a discourse of liberty. Les principes du peuple français consistent à être l’allié naturel des peuples libres l’ami des nations et des puissances animées des sentimens de justice, et d’humanité.

Natural allies and natural enemies were distinguished on ideological grounds. Next to geopolitical schemes, the opposing great powers were said to be driven by the desire to repress the Revolution. In the case of Britain, even geopolitical considerations—the control of the seas—was couched in a discourse of liberty: the freedom of the sea.   August/September 1794, Apperçu des rapports de la République Française avec les Puissances de l’Europe; the memorandum is to be found in Sieyes’ private archives (AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10). It is not clear whether Sieyes himself wrote the memorandum or whether it was written by someone else. In the margin comments are made, which might indicate that the latter is the case. 120  October 1800, Idées sur la conduite que la République française soit tenir, en considérant sa constitution, son gouvernement, ses principes, ses lois, son régime, sa position, ses sacrifices, ses ressources, ses victoires, ses conquêtes, sa situation et les moyens de ses ennemis, celle des peuples neutres, amis ou alliés les motifs qui ont fait entreprendre la guerre ceux qui l’ont déterminé à la continuer, et les raisons ou prétextes qui ont porté les puissances coalisées à la faire, et à la prolonger; AAE MD France 656. 119



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The notion of natural alliances appeared on the Batavian side as well. After the June 1798 coup, the Batavian government set out for a modification of the alliance.121 Van der Goes substantiated the necessity of this modification in an advice to the Uitvoerend Bewind of 18 February 1801.122 He presented the 1795 Treaty as ‘an iron chain [. . .] forged by the mistaken policy of the then government of France to the disadvantage of France itself.’123 Van der Goes continued by an exposé on types of alliances and alignments between nations. In his view, political bonds uniting nations are either natural or coincidental. The former are based on lasting and steady interests. The latter result from ever changing circumstances. These bonds diminish and eventually disappear together with the cause they emanate from. Subsequently, the Treaty of The Hague was presented as one of those coincidental unions. The interests of both nations as well as the ‘changed guise of Europe’ called for the current alliance to be transferred into one better geared to the enduring well-being of the ‘united governments.’ For experience teaches that the sole unions one can rely on are those in which interest takes the place of good faith, in which benefits are reciprocal, and in which nations are tied together by the dangers and losses one risks by defecting.124

Van der Goes held on to a lasting, even perpetual alignment between the French and Batavian Republics, but a different alliance treaty was needed to embody that alignment. The changed political situation in Europe had turned the Batavian Republic into a natural friend and ally of France. If the United Provinces sometimes have been neutral, rarely allied and often enemies to France, the Batavian Republic can have no different interests than the ones in common with France in the future and these interests are confirmed by constant fear of Britain.

 See chapter II.4.   18 February 1801, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 123 and NA 2.01.01.04 no. 485. 123   ‘eene ijzere keten [. . .] die de verkeerde staatkunde van het toenmalig Fransche gouvernement tot nadeel van Frankrijk zelve gesmeed heeft.’ 124   ‘De ondervinding van alle tijden heeft immers geleerd dat de eenige verbonden waar op men staat kan maken, de zo danige zijn waar bij het eigenbelang de plaats der goede trouw bekleedt, waar bij de voordeelen zich wederzijdsch vergoeden, en waarbij de banden ten nauwsten vastgeknoopt zijn door de gevaaren en verliezen, aan welke het zig blootstelt met dezelve te verbreken.’ 121 122

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part ii, chapter three Everything the French Republic will do for its ally in avail of the common defence will serve mutual prosperity since the Batavian people always is France’s most loyal friend due to its hopes, due to its fears, due to its geographical position and due to its political system.125

Thus bonds with France were partly based of the Batavian Republic’s geographical location, that is, it being a neighbour of France and partly based on its political system and its shared interests in fighting Britain. However, to be a useful ally, the Batavian Republic should be preserved as a fully free and independent power and be enabled to restore its commerce and naval power. The Batavian Republic preserved as a fully free and independent power and allowed to reinstate its navy and trade, may be a very useful ally in France’s federative maritime system while her pettiness or humiliation will entirely tip the balance in favour of Britain.126

Here, Van der Goes acknowledged the asymmetry in Franco-Batavian relations. For he clearly presented the Batavian Republic as an ally that joined the French alliance system. This clarifies another aspect of the alliance’s character, that is, the French Republic’s central position and leading role. Once, the Batavian Republic was even presented as ‘le premier auxiliaire de la République française.’127 This will be discussed further in the chapter on military aspects. The safest conclusion seems to be that the Hague Treaty was indeed seen as the legal basis of Franco-Batavian relations, a reference point for further conventions or legal disputes and to determine mutual rights and obligations throughout the entire period of the Batavian

125   ‘Zo de vereenigde Nederlanden zomtijds neutraal, zeldzaam geallieerd en dikwijls de vijanden van Frankrijk geweest zijn, de Bataafsche Republiek kan in het toekomende geene andere belangen hebben dan die met Frankrijk gemeen zijn en deze belangens zelfs worden door de geduurige vrees voor Engeland bevestigd. Het Bataafsche Volk door zijne hoop, door zijne vrees, door zijne geographische legging en door zijn politiek stelzel steeds de getrouwste vriend van Frankrijk zijnde, zo moet alles wat de Fransche Republiek voor haare Bondgenoote doen zal ten nutte der algemeenen verdediging tot wederzijdschen voorspoed strekken.’ 126   ‘De Bataafsche Republiek als eene volkomen vrijen en onafhankelijke mogendheid gehandhaaft en in staat gesteld om haare marine en commercie weder op te beuren, kan eene zeer nuttige bondgenoote worden in het federatif maritiem systhema van Frankrijk terwijl haare nulliteit of vernedering de balans geheel ten voordeele van Engeland zoude doen overslaan.’ ‘Federative’ is used here in the sense of ‘alliance.’ 127   2 December 1797, Memoire pour servir d’instructions au citoyen Charles Delacroix ministre plénipotentiaire de la République française près la République batave; AAE CP Hollande Supplément 22.



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Republic’s existence. Nevertheless, bonds between the two Republics were not confined to the Treaty. Bonds of friendship, good terms or even fraternity existed before, besides, and beyond the actual Treaty. 3.5  The Common Cause Central to the alliance between the Batavian and French Republics was furthering or even fighting for the ‘cause commune,’ a phrase that appears frequently in diplomatic sources dating from the entire period of the Batavian Republic’s existence. The two nations were said to be ‘closely united and defending the same cause.’128 Hence, to characterise the alliance it is relevant to establish what this meant. More specifically, was the common cause coloured by material interests like commerce, security, and control of territory and courses of navigation or was the common cause basically ideological? Did the alliance embody a republican union or just fix the military cooperation of two neighbouring states fighting the same enemy? At first sight, diplomatic correspondence and part of public statements were dominated by a discourse of interests. In an address to the Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland, the ‘représentants en mission’ spoke of an ‘union durable, fondée sur leurs interêt réciproque.’129 Likewise, the Staten Generaal contended that the alliance had to be based on ‘the true interests of both nations’130 and that the aim of negotiations was to ‘établir les intérêts des deux nations sur des bases justes et solides.’131 The Treaty’s preamble stated that the two Republics desired to establish ‘une alliance fondée sur les vrais intérêts des deux peuples.’ In its decree ordering a commemorative medal to be struck, the Staten Generaal asserted that the Treaty closely united two nations whose interests were ‘reciprocal.’132 As the French government requested an embargo on vessels in Flushing because of risings in the Belgian departments in the fall of 1798,133 Maarten van der Goes

  10 February 1798, Delacroix to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 232.   5 May 1795, representants en mission to Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland; AAE CP Hollande 587. 130   ‘de waare belangen der beide naties’; 6 May 1795, Staten Generaal to Blauw and Meyer; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 131   13 May 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 132   20 May 1795, decree Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 604. 133  Schama, 1989, p. 459. 128 129

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stressed the solidarity and community of interests between the Batavian and French Republics. He advised his government to render its aid since the interests of the French Republic were closely linked to the Batavian Republic’s.134 In letters insisting on enforcing the economic blockade of Britain, French envoys argued on the basis of a community of interests as well. In February 1798, Delacroix stated that ‘the Batavian and French peoples do not have but the same interests.’ Some months later, Champigny Aubin urged the head of the Batavian Department of Finance—Isaac Gogel—to take measures against smuggling and illicit trade ‘lorsque l’intérêt mutuel des deux Républiques Française et Batave a déterminé la réunion de leurs efforts contre la domination britannique.’135 The discourse of interests was constantly present. It was accompanied by a discourse of liberty with references to liberty and republicanism, though. Mutual bonds were based on the liberation of the Batavians by the French Republic and a similarity of regime type and political principles. States’ roles vis-à-vis each other—friend, rival, or enemy—were fleshed out ideologically; at least partly or in (quasi-) public rhetoric. Hence the Republics’ role identities—allies—depended on their type identities—republics—, to use Alexander Wendt’s terminology.136 The latter discourse was more subject to fashions. It surfaced at times when more radical revolutionary factions dominated politics in Paris and/or The Hague, or in case the political or military situation urged for a more positive presentation of mutual bonds between the Republics. The discourse of liberty was especially strong in the wake of coups d’états both in France (the September 1797 fructidor and November 1799 brumaire coups in particular) and the Batavian Republic (the January 1798 coup in particular). Even before Paris had decided to enter into an alliance, the French ‘représentants en mission’ in Holland emphasised the ideological basis of the future alliance. As early as 21 January 1795, the ‘représentants’ characterised the French invasion of the United Provinces as an ‘entrée fraternelle et amicale’ that had provoked a ‘revolution en faveur de la liberté.’ They stressed that the United Provinces’ role within the European order had changed. Because of the French invasion and resultant revo-

  29 October 1798, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 105.   30 September 1798, Champigny Aubin to Gogel; NA 2.01.08 no. 232. 136   Wendt, 1999, p. 225. 134 135



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lution, of necessity, Britain had become the United Provinces’ enemy. Hence, enmity was—at least partly—caused by an ideological distinction. Strikingly, that ideological distinction only caused enmity with Britain—the ‘common enemy’—and not with monarchs in general. In a letter to the Comité de Salut public, the ‘représentants’ contended that the United Provinces would be a useful ally, not only because of its naval forces, but because of ideological aspects as well. For, the United Provinces would be an excellent ally ‘par le génie de la liberté,’ once their government was based on ‘nos principes’ and to the Patriots’ satisfaction, and because the armed forces had been purged of suspect officers who would be replaced by ‘amis de la liberté.’137 Likewise, the Batavian 25 March draft stipulated that in all political and commercial transactions between the two Republics ‘le plus grande fraternité et l’égalité’ would be observed.138 Blauw and Meyer requested the Comité de Salut public to dismiss Batavian generals in French armies and allow them to enter into Batavian service.139 This letter is full of a discourse of liberty. Coalition forces were said to be ‘toujours prêts à tourner contre la liberté’ and to bring down ‘l’empire de la liberté.’ The United Provinces’ alignment with France was based on liberty as well: ‘la Hollande régénérée tient par trop de liens à la mêre patrie des hommes libres.’ France was presented as ‘le protecteur de l’homme et de ces droits’ against the ‘génie liberticide’ of ‘la perfide Albion.’ They emphasised that the Batavian generals had fought in the ‘invincible French armies’ driven by true republican virtues. Moreover, the request to transfer them to the Batavian army was said to come from ‘un peuple ami, une nation qui va s’unir avec la nation française par une alliance indéstructible et nécessaire, et dont les intérêts vont conséquemment devenir inséparables.’ Notably, the notion of interest appeared in this letter as well. Clearly the two discourses partly intermingled, that is to say the community of interest partly emanated from a shared ideology and the translation thereof in their political systems. Once the Treaty had been concluded, the Staten Generaal called it the ‘foundation of a kind of liberty that has been mentioned in

  21 January 1795, representants en mission to Comité de Salut public; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 589–591 no. 461. 138   Article 11 25 March draft. 139   12 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 137

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the country’s chronicles but has never been actually present.’ 140 The ‘friendship of the most mighty republic in Europe’ was said to be invaluable to the Batavian Republic and the Treaty to mark a new beginning from which the recovery of the Dutch Republic could set off.141 Blauw and Meyer referred to Franco-Batavian relations as based on ideological similarity between the two nations as well. To them, the Treaty was to result in both nations’ enduring tranquillity, peace, prosperity, and affluence. The alliance was a major step in perpetuating the Batavian Republic’s external relations advantageously, and was hence an element of national regeneration. More explicitly, the Treaty was to be the foundation to base further relations with the French government on ‘the perpetual principles of liberty, equality, and universal fraternity.’142 The Batavian declaration of war to Britain clearly presented the war as directed against British maritime preponderance.143 The Batavian people, struck by the spirit of liberty, was said to justly defend its independence, liberty, and prosperity against British domination. The struggle with Britain was framed in a discourse of liberty. Britain was depicted as an oppressor and its King as a tyrant.144 Moreover, as Blauw and Meyer informed Delacroix of the Nationale Vergadering’s manifesto, they stressed that Britain was an enemy to the Batavian Republic if only because it was an enemy to France: L’anglais est l’ennemi du peuple français; à ce titre seul il serait l’ennemi du peuple Batave; et ce peuple pour lequel la liberté est un besoin n’en

140   ‘grondsteen [. . .] eener vrijheid die in de jaarboeken van ‘s lands geschiedenis wel is genoemd dog nooit zulk een weezentlijk aanweezen heeft gehad’; 17 May 1795, minutes Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 141   ‘het voormelde tractaat met de machtigste republicq van Europa wiens vriendschap voor de republicq onwaardeerbaar is’; 17 May 1795, minutes Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 142   ‘gegrond op de eeuwige grondbeginselen van vrijheid, gelijkheid en algemeene broederschap’; 22 May 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 593 and 596 (in no. 596 the letter is dated 18 May 1795, but news of the Treaty could not have reached Paris by that day because the travel took at least three days even for the fastest couriers). 143   2 May 1796, Dagverhaal der handelingen van de Nationale Vergadering representeerende het Volk van Nederland (Manifest), p. 31; http://192.87.107.12:8080/ decreten. 144   17 May 1796, Blauw and Meyer to Delacroix (giving the French minister notice of the declaration of war by the Nationale Vergadering to the King of Britian); AAE CP Hollande 591.



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serait pas moins ardent à poursuivre l’ennemi d’un peuple qui lui a prêté ses forces pour la recouvrir.145

In a letter with regard to coverage of the fructidor coup d’état (4 September 1797) in the Gazette de Leyden, the French envoy in The Hague—François Noël—clearly saw the fates of the French and Batavian Republics as connected.146 While protesting against the way in which the coup had been presented, he stated that the fructidor coup (4 September 1797) had saved not only the French Republic, but all republican states in suppressing royalist plots. The Batavian government—as ‘un gouvernement ami et allie du gouvernement français’—was urged not to tolerate such news coverage. Those who had staged the coup deserved better, for ‘les acteurs de cette mémorable journée du 18 fructidor [. . .] sont les sauveurs de la République Française, et par conséquent de la République Batave.’ Delacroix’ instructions stated that ‘une alliance la plus étroite’ was necessary to conserve the liberty France had given to the Batavian nation.147 After the January 1798 coup, the Batavian government was more ardent as to the alliance with France. The Uitvoerend Bewind was more combative and adhered to a more active view of the alliance. It assured the Directoire the French government could trust on its ‘amour pour la liberté, pour la patrie et pour la cause commune’ and was not to doubt ‘le zèle et de l’activité avec lesquels le peuple batave secondera les vues de son allié.’ The Uitvoerend Bewind placed the Batavian Republic unconditionally on the French side in the war against Britain, but it did so within the frame of a discourse of liberty. To prove to the world, that the Batavian people was worthy of its liberty, it would fight the ‘Tiran des Mers’ and ‘l’ennemi de l’humanité’ side by side with the French Republic: ‘nos vaisseaux, nos équipages, nos trésors sont à vous disposez.’ Contributing to the war effort was presented as the price paid in return for French sacrifices to give the Batavian people its freedom and independence.148 145   17 May 1796, Blauw and Meyer to Delacroix (giving the French minister notice of the declaration of war by the Nationale Vergadering to the King of Britian); AAE CP Hollande 591. 146   13 September 1797, Noël to Commission des relations extérieures de l’Assemblée nationale representant le peuple batave; NA 2.01.08 no. 231. 147   2 December 1797, Memoire pour servir d’instructions au citoyen Charles Delacroix ministre plénipotentiaire de la République Française près la République Batave; AAE CP Hollande Supplément 22. 148   27 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Directoire; NA 2.01.08 no. 104.

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Schimmelpenninck’s first official audience as Batavian envoy in Paris in which he was presented as the Batavian minister plenipotentiary to the Directoire—by its very nature likely to entail propaganda—was dominated by a discourse of liberty on both sides.149 Talleyrand presented Schimmelpenninck to the Directoire as an ‘envoyé d’un peuple libre.’ Schimmelpenninck stressed that his government’s friendship and devotion to France were based on ‘les rapports intimes et multiples’ between two republics that were both distinguished by their equal love for liberty and an equal hate for oppression and for a dreadful enemy. Their combined means were said to rapidly elevate the two nations ‘au dernier degree de la puissance et du bonheur.’ Furthermore, the Batavian envoy appealed to the Directoire’s grandeur: ‘il ne la sera pas moins d’assurer l’existence, l’indépendance et la prospérité d’un peuple auquel il est uni par la foi des traités et les nœuds de l’amitié.’ Schimmelpenninck’s correspondence likewise bears witness of ideological views on the war and alliance, although he appears to have been more of a realist. It has to be noted, though, that this concerns correspondence with The Hague, whereas the best examples of references to ideological bonds are to be found in public statements or letters to French authorities. Non-public discussion within Batavian government circles thus seems to have been somewhat at odds with the discourse of liberty in public or semi-public statements. After his arrival in Paris in October 1798, he addressed Van der Goes with an elaborate memorandum on European affairs.150 He presented the war as a struggle between a royalist party and a republican one. Furthermore, in his views, Europe was in a crisis ‘not merely of the physical force of despotism against the physical force of republicanism’151 but of ‘a struggle of true principles against the immorality of mankind in general.’152 The system of political and civil liberty had broken through and was there to last.

  31 October 1798, proces-verbal Directoire; AN AF III 12.   13 October 2798, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no 639. Van der Goes endorsed Schimmelpenninck’s point of view; 16 October 1798, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 119. 151   ‘niet alleen van de physique magt van het despotismus tegen de physique magt van het republikanismus.’ 152   ‘een strijd van waare beginselen met de immoraliteit van het menschdom in ’t algemeen.’ 149 150



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If one looks philosophically at the course of events, one is on the one hand to look at the sudden break through of a system of political and civil liberty based on the true principles [. . .] One is inclined to convince oneself that this light has not broken through to die out after an ephemeral appearance and to be exiled from the earth. One is inclined to believe that no force will be able to check the progress and expansion of the system of popular liberty and that the happiness of mankind will be increased and safeguarded after a battle of interests and numerous disasters.153

He warned, though, that republican principles had been dishonoured or ill-applied. Hence, the wrong application of ‘essentially undeniable truths’154 had provided despotism the means to arouse an aversion to the system of popular government. Clearly, these statements were highly critical to France’s behaviour and attitude. Schimmelpenninck did realise that the Batavian Republic was in ‘a state of political dependence,’155 not as much from France but from ‘the great and general course of events in Europe.’156 We are mainly dragged along by the force of the stream that has broken through. Confusion is complete. Political storms rage everywhere. The sea is completely incensed and never, for sure, was our ship of state left more to the mercy of the waves’ fury than in the present moment.157

Accordingly, the primary aim of Batavian foreign policy should be to preserve the Batavian Republic’s political existence.

153   ‘Wanneer men den loop van zaaken wijsgerig beschouwd, vestigd men dan den eenen kant het oog op de plotselinge doorbreking van een systhema van staatkundige en burgerlijke vrijheid gebouwd op beginselen [. . .]. Men vind zich gereed om zich te overtuigen dat dit licht niet doorgebroken is om na eene kortstondige verschijning weer uitgedoofd en van de aarde verbannen te worden. Men is gereed om te gelooven dat geen magt bestand zal zijn om den voortgang en uitbreiding van het stelzel van volksvrijheid te stuiten en dat na een belangenstrijd en na talloose rampen eindelijk het geluk van het meschdom zal vergroot en verzekerd worden.’ 154   ‘op zich zelve onlochenbare waarheden.’ 155   ‘een staat van politique afhankelijkheid.’ 156   ‘den grooten en algemeenen loop van zaaken in Europa.’ 157   ‘Wij worden grootendeels door het geweld van den stroom; welke doorgebroken is, medegesleept. De verwarring is algemeen. De staatsorkaanen loejen overal. De zee is geheel verbolgen en nimmer voorzeker was de hulk van onzen staat meer aan de woede der baaren overgegeeven dan in dit ogenblik.’

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part ii, chapter three In present circumstances, the overall policy should, in my opinion, be to save the ship of state from the present surf Europe is in if possible by dexterity and seaman skill.158

Schimmelpenninck stressed that it was of the utmost importance to show the Directoire on which side the Batavian Republic really stood by fully cooperating to military operations directed against Britain because the French government suspected its Batavian counterpart tending to Anglomania. Indeed Batavians were regularly suspected of or accused of Anglomania, that is, virtually every time Frenchmen wished to justify interference or were enraged by what they experienced as a lack of cooperation. The factions’ loyalty was thus clearly linked to the war and alliance. Some weeks later, Schimmelpenninck stressed the importance of a perfect trust between the Batavian and French governments for Batavian independence.159 He proposed to send the Directoire a memorandum stating the four key points of the Uitvoerend Bewind’s policy. In his view, these were: 1) a loyal adherence to republican principles and conservation of the adopted Constitution, 2) to augment the Batavian Republic’s naval and land forces to the limits of its strength, 3) loyal observance of all provisions of the Treaty of Alliance, and 4) to deploy Batavian armed forces against the common enemy in concert with the French government ‘in a manner that one will show the respect for that government’s views to which its superior force and present state of affairs necessarily gives it a natural claim.’160 Hence, the Directoire’s trust was to be assured by stressing Batavian commitment to the war effort, the Batavian government’s adherence to the principles both Republics shared, and by recognising France’s leading role within the alliance. In return, Schimmelpenninck deemed the Batavian Republic entitled to claim that the French government would respect Batavian independence and treat the Batavian Republic as an independent state with which the French Republic was ‘united by the sanctity of treaties and bonds of friendship.’161 158   ‘De groote Politique moet mijns oordeels in de tegenwoordige ogenblikken daarop neerkomen om het schip van staat maar uit de tegenwoordige branding waarin Europa zich bevind zo mogelijk door behendigheid en zeemanschap te redden.’ 159   16 November 1798, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 639. 160   ‘zodanig dat men voor de vues van dat gouvernement die deference zal hebben waarop desselfs meerdere kracht en tegenwoordige positie van zaaken hetzelve een natuurlijke aanspraak moet geven.’ 161   ‘door de trouw van tractaaten en banden van vriendschap verbonden is.’



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Moreover, the French Republic would be urged not to interfere in domestic administration and was to order its subordinates to threaten and address the Uitvoerend Bewind in a way appropriate to the government of an independent nation. Schimmelpenninck contemplated that by this memorandum the Directoire would be forced to nail its colours to the mast; either it was satisfied with the Batavian government’s stance or it was to profess publicly ‘that it does not desire to let the small republics exist other than as tributary nations or as governments that factually are mere administrations, and that really are independent powers in name alone.’162 Clearly, Schimmelpenninck was unhappy with French behaviour thus far. On the other hand, he did consider adherence to republican principles to be one of the conditions to persuade the French to respect Batavian independence. Hence, he emphasised the relevance of the ideological aspect for FrancoBatavian relations. Schimmelpenninck’s expectations were never tested. The Hague postponed sending a memorandum because of the start of the War of the Second Coalition. Van der Goes disapproved of promising to deploy Batavian armed forces at France’s service unconditionally. He favoured a more general statement that the Batavian Republic’s interest prescribed an alignment with France and drifting from Britain. The French government was to be told it was mistaken if it suspected of Anglomania a nation that had always considered Britain its fiercest rival and the killjoy of its commerce.163 Nevertheless, Schimmelpenninck would not drop his realist tendency. In June 1801, for instance, he informed The Hague that in his opinion the French government was exclusively induced by military considerations: that the entire policy here is exclusively military. That one considers and desires to maintain this great country as a menacing military camp and its allied republics as outposts. I have already noticed that with the First Consul all other considerations are subordinated to this policy.164

162   ‘dat het de kleine republieken niets anders wil existeren dan alleen op den voet van tributaire volken of van gouvernementen welke in effect administraties zijn, en welke inderdaad niets meer dan den blooten naam van eene mogendheid behouden hebben.’ 163   4 July 1799, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 120. 164   ‘dat het geheele systema alhier exclusief militair is. Dat men dit groote land als een dreigend militair camp en de geallieerde republiques als deszelfs voorposten beschouwd en houden wil. Ik heb steeds opgemerkt bij den Eersten Consul dat alle

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On the eve of the Anglo-Russian invasion the Directoire, by means of its envoy in The Hague—Florent Guyot—assured the Uitvoerend Bewind ‘à réunir ses efforts aux vôtres pour maintenir l’indépendance et la liberté du peuple batave.’ Not only the aim of military operations was presented in ideological terms, the same went for the enemy. The British government (the Russian contribution to the pending invasion being glossed over) was depicted as ‘perfidious,’ was said to ‘base sa félicité sur le malheur des autres nations’ and was accused of not being able to endure a single nation to be truly free.165 After the brumaire coup d’état (9 November 1799), the French envoy in The Hague—Chemin Deforgues—assured Van der Goes that the coup did not alter political relations between the French people and other nations. Furthermore, he declared that popular sovereignty, a representative form of government, separation of powers, liberty, equality, and the security of private property would remain to be the foundations on which the French Republic was built.166 In sum, the French envoy assured that his country’s government would remain republican. Van der Goes expressed the Batavian government’s joy on the coup in similar terms: Selfless patriotism is pleased with the return of the principles of justice and sane politics, which are so openly professed by the consuls, and that are alone capable of assuring liberty and republicanism in combination with the allied nations’ independence.167

In line with the Consuls’ claim to have ended the Revolution,168 the Batavian minister portrayed the current Batavian regime as the guarantee for liberty, republicanism, and the constitutional order as well as the guardian of order and stability in the middle of the Orangists on

andere consideratien aan dit systhema gesubordineerd zijn.’; 9 June 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 633. 165   2 August 1799, Florent Guyot to Uitvoerend Bewind; AAE CP Hollande 602. 166   20 November 1799, Deforgues to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 233. 167   ‘heeft het belangloos patriotismus zich verheugd over het retour van de principes van rechtvaardigheid, en eener gezonde staatkunde, welke door de consuls zo openlijk als plechtig geprofesseerd worden, en die alleen de vrijheid en het republicanismus met de onafhanglijkheid der geallieerde volken verzekeren kunnen.’ 26 November 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 121. 168   ‘Citoyens, la Révolution est fixée ax principes qui l’ont commencée: elle est finie.’; 15 December 1799, Proclamation des Consuls de la République; http://www .conseil-constitutionnel.fr/textes/constitution/c1799.htm.



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the right and radical democrats—‘the faction that intents nothing but disorder and anarchy’—on the left.169 Besides the discourse of liberty in various public statements and diplomatic documents, some provisions and phrases in the Treaty of The Hague indicate political-ideological bonds. In the first place, the Treaty was supposed to be a treaty between two nations—‘peuple à peuple’170 or ‘nation à nation’171—instead of one between sovereign princes. Hence, the French and Batavian Republics (albeit still called the Republic of the United Provinces) themselves appear in the preamble as parties to the Treaty, whereas previously preambles to treaties named the sovereign princes as incarnations of their States.172 In the case of republics the prince was then substituted by the most appropriate official or council; in the case of the United Provinces, the Staten Generaal.173 Treaty practice was not to adapt to the breakthrough of the abstract notion of the state until the late-nineteenth century.174 Treaties between the sister republics or at least with one of the sister republics as a party were an ephemeral exception. Secondly, the constitutional guarantee of Article 1—that is the guarantee of Batavian independence and especially of the abolition of the Stadholderate—clearly is based on revolutionary political thought. The abolition of the hereditary function of the Stadhouder was, after all, an essential element in turning the United Provinces into the truly republican—in the French Revolutionary sense of the word—Batavian Republic. The importance of the Batavian constitution to the alliance— both with regard to its substance and to its mere existence—has been remarked upon. Admittedly, the constitution was mostly deemed a condition for the Batavian Republic to be a useful ally, because it brought stability and assured effective administration necessary to mobilise national resources for the war effort.175

169   ‘De party, die niet dan wanorder en regeringsloosheid beoogd’; 26 November 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 121. 170   Legrand, 1895, p. 91. 171   6 May 1795, Observations sur l’administration générale des pays conquis par les armées du Nord et de Sambre et Meuse; AAE MD France 335. 172   Lesaffer, 1999a, pp. 131–148 and pp. 396–406; Grewe, 2000, p. 196 and p. 361; Lesaffer, 2004, pp. 17–22; Steiger, 2004, pp. 73–76. 173  See e.g. the 1788 Treaties with Britain and Prussia (chapter II.1); Grewe, 2000, pp. 183–186; Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 401. 174  Steiger, 2004, p. 75. 175   2 December 1797, Memoire pour servir d’instructions au citoyen Charles

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In the third place, the Treaty stipulated that political refugees from either Republic would not be welcome in the other.176 The 4 May draft for the first time contained a stipulation pursuant to which French ‘émigrés’ would not be tolerated on Batavian soil.177 In subsequent drafts, this provision was reproduced and made reciprocal; that is to say, Orangist refugees would not be permitted to stay in France as well. Admittedly, Orangists were less likely to have fled to France, than Frenchmen had been the other way around prior to 1795. Nevertheless, the Batavian government was as keen on thwarting Orangist refugees as the French government was towards ‘émigrés.’ Orangists were actively preparing a Counter-revolution in their country as well. Significant concentrations of (armed) Orangist refugees were to be found in Prussian enclaves or Prussian territory near the Batavian border.178 The 1798 Staatsregeling declared all public supporters of the former regime emigrated after 1 January 1795 perpetually exiled.179 What to do with political opponents within the Batavian Republic was a question less easy to answer. Numerous Orangists, Federalists and even moderate Patriots had been arrested—‘par mésure de sureté générale’—180 as the 22 January 1798 coup d’état was staged. While arresting several radical Patriots, in the wake of the June 1798 coup the moderate regime decided to release those arrested in January again. The French chargé d’affaires—Louis Champigny Aubin—subsequently protested against the release of antagonists of the ‘l’etablissement d’une constitution libre [. . . ; et; RK] le sistème de liberté et d’egalité.’181 Conversely, Champigny Aubin’s successor, Vincent Lombard de Langres invited the Uitvoerend Bewind to exercise ‘noble oblivion of all revolutionary errors and crimes.’182 Paris desired the release of radicals arrested in June out of fear they would blow the whistle on

Delacroix ministre plénipotentiaire de la République Française près la République Batave; AAE CP Hollande Supplément 22. 176   Article 22 Treaty of The Hague. 177   Article 15 4 May draft; A Europe-wide network of French royalists who had fled their country was involved in counter-revolutionary activity centred either on the émigré government of the Count of Provence/Louis XVIII or the rival émigré government of his brother, the Comte d’Artois. See: Mansel, 1999. 178   Legrand, 1895, p. 209. 179   Article 35 Algemene beginselen Bataafse Staatsregeling 1798; Van Hasselt, 1987, pp. 17–27. 180   12 July 1798, Champigny-Aubin to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458B. 181   12 July 1798, Champigny-Aubin to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458B. 182   ‘edelmoedige vergetelheid van alle revolutionaire misslaagen en misdaden.’



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French interferences with the constitution-making process and French pressure to yield with regard to Flushing and other matters of dispute. The Uitvoerend Bewind hesitated, though, being worried that radicals would unite again and resume their endeavours to initiate ‘terror or anarchy.’183 Notwithstanding the fear that their release would be premature, the Batavian government yielded to the French request reassuring itself more than others by stating that the radicals ‘attempts to deceive the people are too well known to be dangerous.’184 Two weeks later, Van der Goes urged Lombard, however, to make sure his government would expel several Batavians from Paris. It concerned some radicals who wanted to undo the moderate coup d’état. Van der Goes depicted them as ‘ennemis de tout ordre social,’ conspirators, and agitators.185 On the eve of the 1799 Anglo-Russian invasion, the French envoy, Florent Guyot insisted on strict implementation of measures taken against French ‘émigrés.’ While emphasising that the French government did not tolerate Orangist refugees staying on French soil, he reproached the Batavian government for still letting French émigrés sojourning in the Batavian Republic and thus, flagrantly and manifold violating the Treaty of Alliance. The ‘émigrés’ were portrayed as a fifth column—spies, traitors, and ‘les ennemis irréconciliables de la liberté et de l’egalité’ whose presence could not be tolerated especially because of the threat of an invasion.186 Likewise, on 3 September 1799, Florent protested against the presence of ‘émigrés’ in the city of Breda. Again they were said to be dangerous; ‘suspects par leurs principes, par les motifs de leur émigration’ and paid by the British government to cause civil war and counter-revolution.187 Conversely, once Bonaparte was in power, a spirit of reconciliation came to the fore. Bonaparte wished to widen the support base of the republican regimes by partly returning to the countries’ political tradition and accommodating old elites with the new order. Hence, Semonville requested the Uitvoerend Bewind to grant amnesty to all who had resisted the Batavian Revolution in a non violent manner. Moreover,   ‘schrikbewind of regeringsloosheid.’   ‘aanslaagen om het volk te misleiden zijn dus te bekend dan dat zij nog gevaarlijk zouden kunnen zijn.’; 15 November 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Eerste Kamer van het Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 528. 185   14 November 1798, Van der Goes to Lombard de Langres; NA 2.01.08 no. 119. 186   23 August 1799, Florent Guyot to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 233. 187   3 September 1799, Florent Guyot to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 233. 183 184

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the loathing for the Stadholderate had to be removed from the oath to the Batavian Constitution.188 The main question that arises from all these statements is, obviously, whether this discourse of liberty was taken seriously or whether either one or both sides did merely pay lip service to alleged ideological foundations to the alliance. Partly, the discourse of liberty was indeed sincere; both on the Batavian and on the French side. Partly, the discourse of liberty was used because the other side or the public was supposed to be sensitive to it. For sure, part of this discourse was mere window-dressing to justify and gain support for an alliance basically entered into for more realist considerations. Its justifying force was highly significant, though. The discourse of liberty underscored the Batavian Republics lasting bonds with France. Its main function was to express that the two republics were not just temporary partners. While the survival of the Batavian Patriot regime—the Batavian Republic’s current existence, its constitution included—depended on an alignment with republican France, at least until a general peace had been established, ideological references made sure that the union would last and thus contributed to Batavian feelings of security. Moreover, the discourse of liberty infused the alliance with a positive overtone. In sum, the alliance was indeed presented as a union within the framework of a struggle between republicanism and despotism, between revolution and counter-revolution. With regard to various aspects of the alliance, an ideological foundation to the union between the two Republics is envisaged. On the other hand, the discourse of interest dominated. Both Republics’ interests rather than revolutionary ideology were emphasised. Those interests were mainly of a military and economic nature: to win the current war, to assure security, to revive trade. Above all, the Franco-Batavian alliance was predominantly antiBritish rather than anti-monarchical. Admittedly, the common interest was partly coloured in ideological terms. Interest and ideology could go hand in hand. Security also implied security from Counterrevolutionary endeavours to restore the ‘Ancien Régime.’ Fighting Britain equaled fighting for the ‘freedom of the sea’ and Britain was portrayed as the driving force behind the Counter-revolutionary alliance.

  De Gou, 1995, p. x and p. xvi.

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3.6  Bilateral Alliance or Republican Union? A final matter to be addressed with regard to the political nature of the alliance, is whether the Hague Treaty installed a purely bilateral alliance between France and the Batavian Republic or whether it was the first step in creating a multilateral alliance or even a wider republican community formed by all sister republics. Neither the French nor the Batavian Republic seem to have contemplated extending their alliance. The French government favoured bilateral relations with each single sister republic. Likewise, the Batavian government was predominantly interested in an alliance with the Revolutionary headquarters in Paris. To complete a maritime alliance, the Batavian Republic would be invited to accede to the 1796 Franco-Spanish alliance and decided to do so.189 The maritime alliance was thus multilateral. A similar multilateral alliance with the Helvetic and Italian Republics was never realised, though. Needless to say that, Spain being a monarchy, the tripartite maritime alliance was not based on republican ideology. Although Spain might have adhered to fighting for ‘the freedom of the sea,’ commercial and colonial interests as well as military expediency were paramount. In his draft for a general report on foreign affairs of 28 February 1799,190 Van der Goes stressed that the Batavian government had cultivated relations with the French Republic. Clearly, the alliance with France was deemed to be central to Batavian foreign policy. Van der Goes even reproduced Schimmelpenninck’s qualification of the Batavian Republic being in a state of political dependence. However, Van der Goes’ following exposé does not underpin the idea of a republican camp opposite a monarchical one. Unsurprisingly, the King of Spain was said to be united to the Batavian and French Republics by the same interests against British dominion of the sea. Entering into an alliance with the King of Spain already indicated that the rhetoric of a republican camp opposing a monarchical one was not to be translated in a formal republican union. The anti-British alliance was thus not purely republican.

 See chapter II.4.   28 February 1799, Rapport over den Staat der Buitenlandse Zaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 120. 189 190

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Other monarchies, too, were referred to as powers the Batavian Republic had or would restore bonds of friendship with. The Batavian government stated to have maintained a ‘bond of friendship’ with the courts of Denmark and Sweden—neutral throughout the War of the Second Coalition. The ‘sustained friendship’191 with the Ottoman Porte was said to have been undermined, though. Formal relations had indeed been suspended, according to Van der Goes elicited by the British government as a result of the ‘peculiar Egyptian expedition.’192 Even restoring relations with Russia and Austria was not ruled out. The Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam was just informed that this could not yet be the case because those powers were at war with France. On the other hand, the Helvetic Republic, although already constituted by then, was not mentioned and with regard to the Italian sister republics the Batavian minister mainly stressed mercantile opportunities. In his view, once the latter had been established, they would turn out to be a source of new commercial relations. To be sure, in general, Batavian foreign policy was dominated by commercial interests, but in case of the Italian sister republics political bonds based on republican solidarity were entirely glossed over. Of all republics—besides the French one—, only the United States were said to be an ally. The Batavian government did not actively welcome the Italian and Swiss sister republics. In case of the Helvetic Republic, it did not even bother to dispatch an envoy to reside with its government. It did intend to establish diplomatic relations with the Cisalpine Republic, but the Cisalpine government seems to have taken the initiative. Moreover, while Matteo Galdi was sent to The Hague, no Batavian envoy ever actually arrived in Milan. A short while after the Cisalpine Republic had been given a constitution by General Bonaparte, the Cisalpine Foreign Secretary—Carlo Testi—addressed the President of the Nationale Vergadering.193 Testi did not propose to enter into an alliance, but he did express his government’s view that the Batavian and Cisalpine Republics were united by ideologically based bonds of friendship:

  ‘onafgebroken vriendschap.’   ‘de zonderlinge egyptische expeditie.’ 193   29 July 1797 (received 15 September 1797), Carlo Testi to Président de la Convention batave; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 189. 191 192



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Le vœu du Peuple cisalpin pour son indépendance & pour le libre exercice de ses droits, ne saurait être ni plus unanime, ni plus fortement prononcé. Son cri de ralliement est comme le vôtre Liberté ! [. . .], à la brave Nation Hollandaise, qui par l’analogie de ses principes, a des ennemis communs à combattre & à vaincre & dont les intérêts réciproques se confondent & se prêtent un mutuel appui. Le Peuple Cisalpin Libre sous les auspices & par le puissant appui de la République Française notre alliée & amie, ouvre des riches canaux au commerce & à l’industrie réciproque des trois Nations & deviendra en peu de temps le plus sûr boulevard de notre Liberté & de notre bonheur. [. . .] La nature & l’unité des sentiments que nous professons, établissent entre nos Nations des rapports, dont le lien mutuel doit être la confiance & le sentiment profond de la félicité générale.

The Cisalpine envoy in Paris—Francesco Visconti—likewise spoke of establishing a ‘relation de fraternité.’194 The government of the Helvetic Republic, while giving notice of its country’s ‘regeneration,’ even proposed to ‘renouvelez avec les enfants de l’Helvétie régénérée l’alliance que la Suisse et la Hollande avaient jadis contractée et qui désormais établie sur des bases plus augustes et plus solides, doit être plus inviolable encore.’195 The Batavian government was, hence, not keen on extending the Revolutionary alliance into a republican subsystem upheld by multilateral alliances, thus ignoring pleas for a republican federation of all sister republics that were heard in the Batavian Republic too. While reiterating anti-British sentiments, it did not adhere to the image of a divided Europe and set out for a foreign policy primarily based on maintaining Batavian independence, assuring the Batavian Republic’s security, gaining Prussia’s recognition, and advancing Batavian commercial interests. From that perspective, the Batavian Republic had little to gain by alliances with the Helvetic and Italian Republics. Conversely, The Hague could well do without any more commitments to fight Austria in case of war. The Batavian Republic, above all, needed stability and peace on the Continent. Henceforth, the Batavian Republic was quite happy with a bilateral alliance with the French Republic solely extended by a maritime alliance with Spain. At least, Spain could assist in defending Surinam and balancing the Royal Navy. Therefore,   10 September 1797, Visconti to Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 612.   26 May 1798, Directoire Exécutif de la République Helvétique au Directoire de la République Batave; NA 2.01.08 no. 229. 194 195

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the Batavian government replied guardedly to Cisalpine and Helvetic advances. It did not really fall in with a Revolutionary or republican union. While reproducing Revolutionary rhetoric, it did not agree to anything concrete: Cette démarche de la part d’un des plus anciens amis du peuple Batave ne pouvoit manquer d’être accueillie, avec une vive sensibilité par le Directoire & il vous offre en retour, avec loyauté, union intime & confiance réciproque. Deux Nations célébrées par leur attachement inviolable à la Liberté & qui ont la gloire d’en avoir donné les premières le spectacle à l’Europe dans un tems où tous les autres peuples ne sçavoient encore qu’obéir servilement. Deux nations célèbres par la simplicité de leurs mœurs & par la conformité de leurs vertus doivent rester unies par inclination & par estime mutuelle.196

The Cisalpine government received a similar reply.197 Van der Goes informed his Cisalpine colleague that the Uitvoerend Bewind appreciated the Cisalpine initiative to establish diplomatic relations by sending Matteo Galdi to The Hague and intended to dispatch a Batavian envoy to Milan. He even acknowledged that there was a community of interest between the two Republics based on kindred political systems. Liée par les mêmes intérêts, animée des mêmes vues, gouvernée par les mêmes principes, elle offre donc avec loyauté à la République Cisalpine union intime et confiance réciproque.198

Apparently, the Batavian government hesitated to publicly dissociate from a discourse of liberty and republican union. Carel Hendrik van Grasveld was indeed appointed envoy to the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics. His credentials for the Ligurian government expressed the desire to preserve the ‘relations d’amitié’ that had existed between the two Republics for a very long time.199 Van Grasveld left but did not get any further than Paris because a short while after his appointment Austro-Russian forces overran the Cisalpine Republic and besieged Genoa.

196   16 April 1799, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind (draft reply to Helvetic government); NA 2.01.08 106. 197   19 February 1799, Van der Goes to Ambrogio Birago; NA 2.01.08 no. 106. See also Rao, 2008, p. 111. 198   19 February 1799, Van der Goes to Birago; NA 2.01.08 no. 106. 199   23 April 1799, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind (draft credentials); NA 2.01.08 no. 106.



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The Batavian government kept its distance even more as both the Cisalpine and Helvetic governments stressed ideological bonds between the sister republics after the tide of Counter-revolutionary success of the War of the Second Coalition had been turned. The Cisalpine government sent its Batavian counterpart some of the commemorative medals struck to celebrate the Battle of Marengo (14 June 1800) stressing the solidarity between republics: Chaque République qui s’éléve est un rempart de plus contre la tyrannie. Les états libres ne peuvent pas être isolés; l’uniformité des principes les unit entre eux par des liens indissolubles. C’est ainsi que la multiplication des républiques intéresse tous les amis de la liberté.200

As the Cisalpine government notified the Uitvoerend Bewind of the re-establishment of the Cisalpine Republic,201 it stressed that the Batavian and Cisalpine Republics—despite the geographical distance—were united by the principles on which their constitutions were based.202 The union between the sister republics was said to contribute to Europe’s stability and guarantee the existence of each and every one of them.203 In reply, Van der Goes did acknowledge that the Batavian and Cisalpine peoples shared a cause and endorsed the idea of ‘une union étroite entre toutes les Nations amies de la Liberté,’ but swiftly added that the Batavian government awaited the definitive organisation of the Cisalpine Republic.204 Not until 1803, long after the Italian Republic

  3 March 1801, le Comité du Gouvernement de la République Cisalpine au Directoire Exécutif de la République Batave; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 223. 201   15 August 1800, la Commissione straordinaria di Governo al’Direttorio Esecutivo della repubblica Batava; NA 2.01.08 342. The Cisalpine Republic had been entirely overrun by Russian forces and Austrian rule was restored in Lombardy. The Battle of Marengo had put France in control of northern Italy again. Bonaparte re-established his earlier creation. Until the Lyon consulta of January 1802 the government of the ‘second’ Cisalpine Republic was still provisional and formed by a committee established by Napoleon Bonaparte but consisting of Italians (17 June 1800, decree Premier Consul; AAE CP Milanais 57 and AAE CP Milanais Supplément 5). The government was headed, though, by a French commissioner—Claude-Louis Petiet (23 June 1800, decree Premier Consul; AAE CP Milanais 57). 202   ‘che malgrado la distanza, che separa le due Repubbliche Batava e Cisalpina gli stessi principi che le constituiscono sono sacri egami che le rendono unite.’ 203   ‘Cittadini Direttori, l’indissolubile unione delle Repubbliche Francese, Batava, Elvetica e Cisalpina puó solo stabilire la bilancia coi Governi di differente natura, che esistono in Europa, e questa unione é la base del loro vero sistema politico e della loro esistenza.’ 204   10 September 1800, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind (draft reply); NA 2.01.08 no. 107. 200

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had been constituted in Lyon (January 1802), would the Batavian Republic enter into an alliance with the French and the Italian Republic.205 But that Treaty can hardly be called multilateral, since by then a personal union had been established between the French and Italian Republics.206 The Helvetic envoy in Paris—Philipp Albert Stapfer—addressed Schimmelpenninck with the proposal to re-establish direct diplomatic relations between the two Republics in July 1802 stressing the bonds of ‘amitié et bienveillance’ between them and the ‘identity of their principles and interests.’207 The proposal did not lead to the desired end, though. Whatever republican solidarity there might have been, the Helvetic and Italian sister republics were located on a theatre of the war the Batavian Republic took no interest in. Relations with the Cisalpine Republic could interest the government in The Hague because of Mediterranean trade, but otherwise it was just too much occupied by the war against Britain, the stance Prussia was to take, and domestic matters to pay any attention to its younger siblings in the south. Conclusion This chapter addressed various political aspects of Franco-Batavian relations and the Treaty of The Hague in particular. The main political issue was recognition of the regenerated Dutch Republic by its French sister. Recognition of the Batavian Republic as an independent state dominated negotiations. Conversely, the Batavian offer to recognise  See chapter II.5.  Napoleon Bonaparte was made President of the Italian Republic in January 1802 (26 January 1802, conclusum La Rappresentanza Nationale della Repubblica cisalpina reunita in Lione; AAE CP Milanais 60). Consequently the Italian Foreign Office was divided between two ministers. Ferdinando Marescalchi was to stay in Paris on the President’s side, whereas his colleague Carlo Testi would be located in Milan to take care of relations with the Italian Republic’s direct neighbours. Major foreign policy decisions were taken by the President, who held virtually all formal competences in purview of the Constitution of the Italian Republic. (for the Italian Constitution of 1801, see http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/legislation/c_italian .html, last consulted 6 January 2009) In fact, the Italian government lead by the VicePresident Francesco Melzi d’Eril (appointed by the President on 27 January 1802; ASMi Autografi Principi e sovrani 71) was not informed of the tripartite Treaty between the French, Italian, and Batavian Republics of 25 June 1803 (see chapter II.5) until after it had been concluded and countersigned by Marescalchi on behalf of their Republic (6 July 1803, Rapporto al Presidente della Repubblica italiana; ASMi Marescalchi 21). 207   30 July 1802, Stapfer to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 694. 205 206



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the French Republic had been repudiated. Both this asymmetry and the central place of recognition are quite elucidatory. At least, they raise the question whether recognition was constitutive to the Batavian Republic’s existence. On the French side, a clear discontinuity between the United Provinces and the Batavian Republic seems to have been assumed. At least, this line of thinking increasingly dominated the minds of the French negotiators in the course of negotiations. French forces had conquered the United Provinces’ territory entirely. The Staten Generaal were still in session and France’s official negotiating partner, but according to the French they did not yet represent the Batavian Republic. In line with social contract theory, as used by Sieyes to develop a theory of the state in his 1789 pamphlet, the Batavian Republic was to be deliberately constituted. Due to the right of conquest, France was to dispose of Dutch territory. The Batavian Republic had to be recognised by France as conqueror. Subsequently, France would turn over jurisdiction over the best part of Dutch territory to the new Batavian Republic. This will be discussed in Chapter 5. In the meantime, the Batavian people were in an intermediate stage throughout which they did not form an independent, political entity with sovereignty over Dutch territory. Hence, the French refusal to use the denominator ‘Batavian Republic,’ although they did not hold on to this refusal consistently. This would make the Batavian Republic’s existential equality dependent on French recognition; a clear sign of hierarchy and asymmetry. The Batavian Republic would only exist as an independent political entity by the mercy of the victor. French recognition was, then, constitutive to the Batavian Republic’s existence. Probably this would have been a onceonly event. Once the Treaty had been concluded, this hierarchy and asymmetry would disappear. On the Batavian side, to the contrary, continuity between the United Provinces and the Batavian Republic was assumed. The Dutch Republic had been merely renamed and its political institutions were in a process of reform. Hence, the Batavian Republic did already exist, was independent and sovereign; a status that had been recognised by the ‘représentants en mission’ in January 1795. Recognition, although expedient, was thus not constitutive. The Batavian Republic’s existential equality had to be respected from the start. Even if no continuity between the United Provinces and the Batavian Republic is to be assumed, the Batavian conclusion would be more compatible to Sieyes’ own theory of the state. Since a state was

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constituted by the expressed will of a number of individuals to form a political association, state formation would be an entirely bottom up process rendering international recognition not necessary to exist as an independent state. To be sure, this would not imply that a new state would also have jurisdiction over territory, for Sieyes or social contract theory in general defined the state in political and not in territorial terms. Nevertheless, the 1789 pamphlet must have slipped the ‘ci-devant abbé’-negotiator’s mind for a while. The issue of continuity-discontinuity raises another question: did the Treaty of The Hague need to be a peace treaty? The war had, after all, already ended by total conquest, many cities and provinces had capitulated, the Staten Generaal had ordered the Dutch army to cease fighting; a de facto capitulation. A peace clause was indeed not inserted in the Treaty until the very end of negotiations. The Treaty hardly contained any provisions common to a peace treaty in order to end the state of war. The peace clause itself was quite regular but it was preceded by the recognition clause. It would have made more sense to dispense with a peace clause altogether. Such a break with treaty practice appears to have been regarded as a bridge too far, though. The peace clause did introduce an element of equality in the Treaty that somewhat altered the asymmetric and hierarchical relation between the conqueror and the nation that received its independence and territory from his hands. This is already the case because not only peace, but recognition, indemnity and restitution of territory too were integrated in the Alliance Treaty. At first, these three points were to be preliminaries to the alliance treaty. By ending up in the Alliance Treaty itself, they became part of a bilateral instead of a unilateral act and were based on the United Provinces’ consent. Again, parties turned to customary forms of diplomatic practice. In combination with the United Provinces’ consent this probably had a legitimating effect and France thus cleverly instrumentalised customary legal forms for its own devices. Nonetheless, this does not alter the fact that a treaty is a device of an egalitarian, pluralistic order more than of an hierarchical one. The indemnity was the price for recognition, independence, and liberty. Its legal foundation was kept ambiguous. Both the argument of indemnity as the conqueror’s right or indemnity as the bill to cover war expenses made on behalf of the Batavian people were used. Especially the second foundation was perfectly compatible with independence. France’s right to an indemnity was not questioned by the Batavians. Negotiations were on the exact form, amount, and term of payment.



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In the end, the United Provinces consented to the indemnity settlement. Indemnity, too, was a once-off obligation that resulted from the temporary asymmetric, hierarchical relation caused by French victory. The principle of consent was upheld, though, and the Batavians managed to get some guarantees in return. The colonial guarantee was reciprocal, the constitutional guarantee was not. Both guarantees were concessions to Batavian Patriots. The constitutional guarantee gave them the right to claim French assistance in case of Orangist restoration attempts. At the same time, the constitutional guarantee left the door open for French interference in Batavian constitution-making. Next to the political issues deriving from French victory and the Batavian Revolution, some political questions can be asked with regard to the alliance as well. At the time an alliance system was sometimes denoted as federative. Both in terms of the kind of interstate relations and in terms of degree of institutionalisation this ‘federative system’ did not even come close to the federal vision that is to be found with political thinkers throughout the eighteenth century from St. Pierre to the American federalists, nor did it live up to the ideas expressed by Girondins in 1792–1793. As to Franco-Batavian relations one may ask whether the Treaty was constitutive as well. Did the Treaty of The Hague bring about the alliance or did it merely perpetuate existing, possibly even natural bonds between the two nations? The Hague Treaty was indeed conceived as the legal basis of Franco-Batavian relations, a reference point throughout the entire period of the Batavian Republic’s existence for further conventions or legal disputes and to determine mutual rights and obligations. The rising spirit of positivism determined the Treaty’s core position. Nevertheless, bonds between the two Republics were not confined to the Treaty. Bonds of friendship, good terms or even fraternity existed before, besides, and beyond the actual Treaty. On several occasions, the two Republics were depicted as natural allies. The Treaty, then, confirmed fraternal, pre-existing, and perpetual relations. The union between the two Republics was based on shared interests mixed with a discourse of liberty. The alliance was directed at the ‘cause commun.’ What this cause really meant, was never fully explicated and its meaning changed over time. At the one time, the pragmatic discourse of interest dominated, on other times the ideological discourse of liberty determined its interpretation. The alliance basically was a community of interest. Material interests were consistent: security, commerce, shipping, colonies. Next to and partly corresponding

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with this discourse of interests, bonds between the two Republics were designated as ideological. At least this indicates that relations between the French and Batavian Republics tended towards society instead of a mere system. The freedom of the sea and the existence of political systems based on the same principles were frequently referred to. These references are most often to be found in public statements in which the discourse of liberty probably was merely window-dressing; although, as indicated in the introduction to this book, this kind of window-dressing is only efficacious when it refers to ideas that are regarded as important or valuable. Moreover, the discourse of liberty was not entirely insincere and it was strengthened by various treaty provisions like the constitutional guarantee and the provision with regard to ‘émigrés.’ Finally, the alliance was clearly intended to be bilateral instead of the first step towards a multilateral, republican union. France preferred a network of bilateral bonds with the sister republics over a multilateral federal union. To be sure, the alliance with Spain was tripartite, but this clearly concerned a short-term military union. Moreover, Spain was a monarchy and this ipso facto excludes the tripartite maritime alliance to be the core of a republican subsystem. Batavians regarded it to be a maritime, anti-British union and a safeguard for their security in the north. They had no intentions to extend the alliance—and thus their military and financial commitments—to other parts of the Continent. The Batavian Republic did not discriminate between monarchies and republics in its foreign policy decisions. Although lip service was paid to a shared ideology, The Batavian Republic kept its distance vis-à-vis its Swiss and Italian siblings. There are no signs that, after the Batavian Revolution, Batavians envisioned a republican federation. Once in power, Batavian Patriots held brief for an independent Batavian Republic within the European system at large.

chapter four

War and Peace The Revolutionary Wars were no ‘normal’ wars. No matter to what degree reason of state thinking and political, economic, and strategic interests might have taken over actual policies, the rhetoric of freedom, war on despotism, and a republican order in Europe as the basis of peace and prosperity was never abandoned. In the case of the Batavian Republic, the alliance clearly focused on Britain. Britain posed the main threat to Batavian maritime trade. Britain posed the main threat to Batavian colonies. Britain had backed the Orangist regime from the 1780s Patriot revolt onwards. The Batavian Republic was to contribute its fleet to the maritime war. This aspect could be presented quite pragmatically in terms of economic and geopolitical interests. It might be presented in ideological terms as well: fighting the tyrant of the seas. Having addressed political aspects of the Franco-Batavian alliance in the previous chapter, this part will continue by discussing military aspects of the alliance. Attention will be paid to the military aspect of the alliance, provisions on war and peace, as well as to issues like the contribution the Batavian Republic was to make to the common war effort, the presence of French troops on Batavian soil, supreme command over joint forces, and measures of economic warfare directed against British goods. Was the alliance to be purely defensive or was it to be offensive as well? When did the obligation of mutual aid become operative? What was to be the alliance’s duration? Were the treaty parties still at liberty to declare war and to conclude peace separately? What (kind of) contributions were the treaty parties to make during the current war or in case of a future war? How were operations coordinated and troops commanded in case of joint action?1 With regard

1   See Luard, 1992, pp. 266–267 for aspects of an alliance to look at. For the distinction between offensive and defensive alliances, see Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 220. Vattel distinguished between offensive and defensive alliances in the following way: ‘Sous cette rélations, les Alliances faites pour la Guerre se divisent en général en Alliance Défensives & Alliances Offensives. Dans les prémières, on s’engage seulement à défendre son Allié, au cas qu’il soit attaqué : Dans les sécondes, on se joint à lui pour attaquer, pour porter ensemble la Guerre chez une autre Nation.’ (Vattel, 1758, p. 261)

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to every issue, the focus will be on the extent of equality and reciprocity. This chapter will end with a section on the Batavian ‘quest for neutrality,’ that is, attempts to get rid of the offensive part of the alliance. 4.1  Offence, Defence Although not everyone in Paris agreed, an alliance between the two Republics was taken for granted from the start of negotiations. Peace still had to be made with the United Provinces, but the Batavian Patriots already regarded the French as their friends and allies and vice versa. At least on this occasion, a majority of French Revolutionary politicians took the distinction between prince and people serious. Views on the exact military character varied: was it to be a defensive alliance or was it to be offensive too? Was the alliance an expression of a full and perpetual union between the two Republics committing them to mutual aid in all future conflicts? In other words, was the Alliance Treaty to establish a permanent system of collective security? Or was the Alliance Treaty to establish merely military cooperation for the duration of the current war? The Staten Generaal, the first to actually propose an alliance, held brief for a defensive one.2 This alliance was based on a discourse of liberty. The two Republics would assist each other ‘against all who would intend to infringe their freedom and popular sovereignty.’3 It has been noted before, that Blauw and Meyer advocated tighter military cooperation as they addressed the Comité de Salut public.4 Most remarkably, while the Staten Generaal had envisaged a defensive alliance, their envoys proposed a defensive and offensive alliance. Une alliance offensive et défensive est dans les principes et dans la vœu du peuple Batave; dont le sort nous le répétons dépend entièrement de la France; il sçait que les mêmes principes de liberté et de politiques doivent le diriger et que les ennemis de la France sont les siens.

2   26 February 1795, draft instructions for Blauw and Meyer; NA 3.02.01 no. 461; 2 March 1795, instructions for Blauw and Meyer; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 657–666 no. 501. 3   ‘tegen allen, die op haare vrijheid en de souverainiteit van het volk eenge inbreuk zoude willen maaken.’ 4   12 March 1795, Réflexions provisoires pour les citoyens Sieyes et autres commissaires du Comité de Salut public, nommés pour entrer en conférence avec les ministres plenipotentiaires Bataves; NA 1.02.14 no. 600.



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The French plan de négociation—that was to serve as instructions for the members of the Comité de Salut public entering into negotiations with the Batavian envoys—stated that the Batavian Republic was to be treated as an ally and not as conquered territory.5 Halfway the negotiations some in Paris wondered whether an alliance with the Dutch was really expedient.6 By April, however, some rejected an alliance altogether. If the Batavians were allowed to start reinforcing their fleet and the next campaign would go wrong, the French Republic would lose control of the United Provinces again. That would cause a new revolution and deliver the Batavian fleet to the British. Instead, it was proposed to recognise Dutch neutrality. In that case, the United Provinces would probably enter into an alliance of armed neutrality with Sweden and Denmark. In due time they might engage in war against Britain. Bringing this alliance into existence might be more beneficial to France than a direct alliance with the Batavians. Nevertheless the 25 March draft stipulated that the Batavian Republic engaged to unite all its military forces both naval and by land to assist the French Republic in the course of the current war against all enemies and to regard those enemies as its own.7 In all but name this settlement looks like a full alliance, although it was limited in time and lopsided in that it focused on France’s enemies solely. The nature of the current war being taken into consideration, it does not come as a surprise that the alliance between the two sister republics was not to be solely defensive. The strong union between the two Republics envisaged by those in control of French foreign policy at the time brought with it that the sister republics were to come to each other’s aid both in case of a foreign attack and in case the ally would take the offensive. From the first French draft onwards, the alliance was to be defensive as well as offensive.8 In itself the offensive part of the alliance was essentially at odds with the Revolutionary ius ad bellum as it had been formulated e.g. by Volney in the earliest phase of the French Revolution.9 After all, only defensive wars were deemed legitimate. In the meantime, the French government had of course left the best

 Article 3 PN.   3 April 1795, Article 3 bases arrêtées par le Comité de Salut public et proposées pour servir au Traité d’alliance entre les deux Républiques française et batave; AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10. 7  Article 2 25 March draft. 8  Article 1 BP; Article 2 5 April draft and 25 April counter draft. 9   See chapter I.2. 5 6

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part of its ideological baggage behind and had returned to established diplomatic practice. Nonetheless, making the alliance offensive as well not necessarily indicates offensive intentions. Nor does it necessarily indicate that the Batavian Republic was to be involved in a total war. Primarily, the alliance’s offensive character intensified bonds between the two Republics. At no time during the negotiations it was proposed to give the alliance a substantive element in the Treaty itself. Hence, the offensive and defensive alliance was presented in general terms. The cause of hostilities or the nature and purpose of the war were left out. In respect to Britain the alliance was reciprocal. The same went for other powers, but since the alliance to their respect was limited to the current war and France was at war with almost every power in Europe, the Batavian Republic de facto joined the French Republic. Neither the bases proposées, nor the 5 April draft or the 25 April Dutch counter draft contained any indication with regard to the duration of the alliance. This might mean that the alliance was intended to be perpetual. For the first time, the 4 May draft did contain such an indication. The offensive en defensive alliance was explicitly confined to the current war.10 However, Britain was mentioned separately, that is, the alliance would be invoked every time that either power was at war with Britain.11 Hence, the alliance against Britain was to be perpetual. The preamble of the 16 May draft asserted that the alliance would be perpetual and based on the ‘true interests’ of both peoples.12 The actual text of the alliance clauses was equal to the 4 May draft with one small addition. The alliance was directed ‘contre tous leurs ennemis sans distinction.’ This added to the reciprocity of the alliance. It even more added to the lack of substance of the alliance. For, it did not matter who the enemy was. Once either of the two Republics was at war with a random third power, the other had to follow whether that power was a despotic monarch or a state with a republican form of government. Of course, by the time of the 1795 negotiations there were no other republics in the Revolutionary sense of the word in Europe. Venice, Genoa, and the Swiss Confederation were republican, but they were quintessentially aristocratic. The United States were the

 Article 2 4 May draft.  Article 3 4 May draft. 12  Preamble 16 May draft. 10 11



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only true republican power that was a potential enemy in purview of the Alliance Treaty. So, at the time, in practice the general terms of the Alliance Treaty—‘sans distinction’—might have affected powers ideologically distinguished from the two sister republics only. This does, however, not alter the fact that the alliance was not confined to enmity towards non-republican powers. To be sure, according to prevailing views, republics would not wage war with each other and the alliance was not to be invoked to fight other republics. But, again, if republics were innately peace loving, why did the alliance need to be offensive? By 16 May both sides had already agreed on the alliance. Only the exact wordings had to be agreed upon and the price for the alliance was to be fixed. Hence, the alliance clauses from the 4 May draft appear unaltered in the final draft and the Treaty. The Treaty of The Hague brought into being a bilateral alliance that was limited in time in respect to most powers. Only in respect to Britain the alliance was perpetual. Furthermore, the alliance was both offensive and defensive and directed at all enemies without any distinctions. Moreover, the sole fact of war between one of both allies and a third power brought the alliance into effect. No additional actions or requirements were necessary. Nonetheless, the Zeeland Staten, for instance, deemed the alliance terms too vague, especially with regard to the assistance to be expected from France in case of a Prussian attack. Moreover, they wished to see the defensive part of the alliance extended to the period after the current war.13 Until the end of the war, the alliance would thus be invoked in a war of either ally against any power ‘sans distinction.’ No limits were set on the faculty of either ally to declare war. The alliance was both offensive and defensive and directed against ‘all enemies.’ Hence, if either ally deemed it necessary or useful to wage war on another power, the other ally was involved in the war. De iure this settlement was entirely reciprocal. From a practical point of view, the alliance clauses favoured the French Republic more. The Batavian Republic was not sufficiently powerful to freely wage war on any random power. Moreover, the Batavian Republic tended towards neutrality, both based on its traditional foreign policy and on commercial interests. The 1798 Batavian Staatsregeling indeed put neutrality at the core of the Batavian

13   23 May 1795, Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Zeeland to Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 780.

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Republic’s foreign policy.14 The remarks on international relations in the first Batavian Constitution are very much in line with the more idealistic views of the French Revolutionaries, for instance De Gregoire’s draft for a declaration of the law of nations.15 It was stipulated that the Batavian people would only take up arms to maintain its freedom, to conserve its territory, or to defend its allies. The drafters of the Constitution were sufficiently level-headed to immediately add that the Batavian government had to keep the armed forces in good shape for that purpose. However, the Batavian government was charged to maintain peace with all peoples as much as possible and to uphold its obligations towards them ‘sacredly.’ In case war could not be avoided, the malign effects of the war—‘humanity’s disasters’—should be eased as much as possible.16 One clearly recognised peace and good faith as the pillars of Revolutionary international relations. France, at the time, was more bellicose and actually able to wage a system-wide war. Hence, France was more likely to engage in war and thus to involve the Batavian Republic in a war. Therefore, especially the offensive part of the alliance amounted to the French Republic deciding on matters of war for the Batavian Republic. The Franco-Batavian alliance, according to the terms of the Treaty, was comprehensive in that both Republics would be joined in any war either of them was to wage. It soon turned out that things were not as black as they seemed to be. Although the Alliance Treaty stipulated that all of France’s enemies would be enemies to the Batavian Republic as well, the latter would never be at war with all coalition powers. For instance in respect to Austria, the Batavian Republic was only an auxiliary to France. Despite the wordings of the Alliance Treaty, the Batavian Republic would not be at war with Austria. It just, on some occasions, provided troops to be deployed against Austrian forces.  Article 67 Burgerlijke en Staatkundige Grondregels 1798 Bataafse Staatsregeling: ‘Het Bataafsche Volk vat nimmer de waapenen op, dan ter handhaving zijner vrijheid, ter bewaaringe van zijn grondgebied, en ter verdediging zijner Bondgenooten. Het beveelt, tot dat einde, eene zorgvuldige inrigting zijner Krijgsmagt, bovenal ter Zee, als het bolwerk van den nationaalen voorspoed. Het gelast de stipste onzijdigheid van het Bestuur ten aanzien der Mogendheden. Het bewaart, zooveel mooglijk, den vrede met alle Volken, en koomt zijne verbindtenissen met denzelven heiliglijk na. Het eerbiedigt derzelver regten, en wil, dat, in tijd van Oorlog, de rampen der menschheid, bij wederzijdsch verdrag, zoo veel doenlijk, verzagt worden.’; Van Hasselt, 1987, pp. 17–27; Rosendaal, 2005b, p. 70. 15  Nys, 1896, p. 395. 16  Article 67 Burgerlijke en Staatkundige Grondregels 1798 Bataafse Staatsregeling. 14



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According to contemporary law, financial support or supplying troops to a belligerent ally was not an act of war and the auxiliary power was not considered an enemy.17 Official diplomatic relations between The Hague and most capitals of the coalition powers were disrupted though. The Batavian Republic would be directly at war with Britain. By the start of negotiations, there was some confusion on whether the Batavian Republic was already at war with Britain. Allegedly the Batavians themselves deemed their country to be at war with perfidious Albion. However, initially, the Batavian government had sent some envoys to London in order to prevent war and to make the British to release Dutch ships that had been in British ports at the time of the French invasion of the United Provinces or had entered those ports afterwards.18 The mission was not a success, though. The argument that Dutch vessels no longer had to be chained up, because the Batavian Republic’s independence had been recognised by France and it was, hence, no longer occupied by France, was unscrupulously put aside. Some months after the conclusion of the Treaty of The Hague, the British government declared war on the Batavian Republic.19 Hence, it was the British that turned the formal alliance between the French and Batavian Republics in an actual war between the two maritime powers. One of the first acts of the Nationale Vergadering was to respond to the British declaration of war by a manifesto of its own.20 It has to be noted here that the Nationale Vergadering did not (just) refer to the Alliance Treaty to justify war with Britain. It decided for a more substantial argument in just war terminology. This is not surprising, since the manifesto was to be published and a substantial argument might do the trick of getting the population to support the war better than a formal reference to the Alliance Treaty.

17   Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 451; Neff, 2005, pp. 121–122. In the words of Vattel: ‘Lorsqu’un Souverain, sans prendre part directement à la Guerre que fait un autre Souverain, lui envoye seulement un sécours de Troupes, ou de Vaisseaux de Guerre; ces Troupes, ou ces Vaisseaux s’appellent Auxiliaires.’ (Vattel, 1758, p. 261) Vattel did, however, contend that powers engaged to an enemy by means of an offensive alliance may be treated as enemies (Vattel, 1758, p. 265). 18  Asser, 1860, p. 47; Van Hamel, 1918, p. 331. 19   19 September 1797; Asser, 1860, p. 47; Smit, 1940, p. 114. 20   2 May 1796, Dagverhaal der handelingen van de Nationale Vergadering representeerende het Volk van Nederland (Manifest), p. 31; http://192.87.107.12:8080/ decreten.

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First, it was argued that Britain had unjustly attacked the Batavian nation. The Batavian people that had been oppressed and ransacked under the guise of friendship and was now inspired and inflamed by liberty would no longer allow its wicked neighbour to undermine its prosperity. The Batavian people would defend its rights, maintain its independence, and save the fatherland from ruin. Hence, the Batavian Republic was forced to legitimate self-defence. With France’s help, the Batavian Republic would succeed in fending off British domination and consolidate its freedom. Can Europe doubt that the reformed Batavian Republic will, with the support of its glorious ally, vigorously fend off the proud dominance of the British government and thus establish its freedom that has been obtained in such an expensive and precarious way at the cost of everything that is dear?21

The necessity of war was substantiated by a litany of grievances and violations of the laws of the sea. In the first place, one referred to the British capturing Dutch ships during the American War of Independence that had amounted to piracy. Hence, the United Provinces had eventually been forced to defend themselves in order to maintain their rights and independence and to protect their commerce and dominions. Furthermore, one referred to the British domination and super ordination after the 1787 Orangist restoration since the Stadhouder was ‘a supporter of England.’22 The Batavian nation was said to have been involved in the current war against its will due to British domination. As soon as the French had liberated the Batavian people and restored its ancient rights, the British government had set out to ruin Dutch commerce and to seize Dutch colonies treacherously.23 Moreover, schemes to attack the Batavian Republic were being made. Because of the Treaty of The Hague, the free Batavian nation would be able, with the aid of its mighty neighbour and no longer bound by any foreign government, to oppose British vexations in the future. Clearly,

21   ‘Kan Europa nog twyfelen of het hervormd Bataafsch Gemeenebest zal, met hulp van zynen glorieryken bondgenoot, de trotsche overheersching van het Engelsch Kabinet kragtdaadid afweeren en de zoo duur en zoo hachlyk verkregen vryheid, zelfs ten kosten van alles wat het dierbaar is, bevestigen?’ 22   ‘een aanhangling van Engeland.’ 23   The former Stadhouder had issued letters to the governors of the Dutch colonies to turn the colonies over to the British; the so-called Kew letters of 7 February 1795; Legrand, 1895, pp. 112–113; Israel, 2001, p. 1243.



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the war against Britain was presented as a defence by the Batavian nation against British attacks and infringements on its independence, rights, and possessions. The free Batavian people, by means of its legitimate representatives, solemnly declares [. . .] that, forced to defend itself by the most wicked and taunting mistreatments by the neighbouring realm of Great Britain, it will ward off any attacks on its liberty, independence, lawful rights and possessions24

Blauw and Meyer referred to this manifesto as a declaration of war against the tyrant of the British Isles provoked by a perfidious government. The Batavian envoys did link the war against Britain with the Franco-Batavian alliance: L’anglois est l’ennemi du peuple français; à ce titre seul il seroit l’ennemi du peuple Batave; et ce peuple pour lequel la liberté est un besoin n’en seroit pas moins ardent à poursuivre l’ennemi d’un peuple qui lui a preté ses forces pour la récouvrir.25

The same day that the war manifesto was published, the Nationale Vergadering issued letters of marque and reprisal against ships and goods from Great Britain in order to maintain the Republic’s dignity and to get reparation and satisfaction for damage already suffered.26 Whereas the Alliance Treaty set no limits on declaring war by either ally, it did contain provisions with regard to concluding peace. Provisions that allies would not make peace with the common enemy separately were as common to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century alliance treaties as was the habit of them being ignored in the end. Thus parties voluntary restricted their power to conclude treaties.27 The French bases proposées already stated that the Treaty was to contain

24   ‘Dat het vry Bataafsche Volk, door zyne wettige vertegenwoordigers [. . .] plegtig verklaart dat het, door de snoodste en tergendste mishandelingen van het nabuurig Ryk van groot Brittannie, tot zyne verdediging gedrongen, alle aanvallen op zyne vryheid, onafhanglykheid, wettige rechten en bezittingen zal afweeren.’ 25   17 May 1796, Blauw and Meyer to Delacroix; AAE CP Hollande 591. 26   2 May 1796, Dagverhaal der handelingen van de Nationale Vergadering representeerende het Volk van Nederland (Manifest), p. 31; http://192.87.107.12:8080/ decreten. 27   Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 211; Lesaffer, 2005a, pp. 36–37.

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a reciprocal engagement not to conclude a peace treaty without the other’s cooperation.28 In the 25 March draft this engagement was split. According to Article 7 of this draft, the Batavian Republic was not to enter into peace negotiations without the cooperation of the French Republic and would not lay down arms before the French Republic had agreed to peace with all its enemies. The French Republic, on its part, was not to take part in peace talks without the cooperation of the Batavian Republic as well. The French Republic was to stipulate for common interests, however, and would be obliged not to enter into any engagement that might harm the Batavian people’s sovereignty. Moreover, the French Republic would not cease hostilities until the Batavian people’s sovereignty and independence had been recognised and it would have secured the return of all Batavian possessions occupied or to be occupied by the common enemy due to the Batavian Revolution.29 Firstly, it has to be noted that the 25 March draft extended the prohibition of unilateral action of either ally towards peace to the negotiating phase as well. Secondly, it seems that in these provisions a dominant role in the peace negotiations was reserved for the French Republic, whereas the French Republic gave unilateral guarantees. Both the 5 April draft and the Dutch counter draft more succinctly stated that neither ally was allowed to conclude peace without the other’s cooperation. In the 4 May draft, the clause that ruled out a separate peace was suddenly split in another way. The French and Batavian Republics were to act together in concluding peace or any other act with Britain.30 Furthermore, the French Republic was only allowed to conclude peace with other Coalition powers if the Batavian Republic would be included.31 Apparently, the situation that the Batavian Republic would be directly at war with Britain and would act solely as an auxiliary in respect to the other Coalition powers was anticipated here. In peace treaties with the latter powers the Batavian Republic was to be included as an auxiliary to the French Republic. The 16 May draft held to this division. The mutual obligation not to act unilaterally vis-à-vis Britain was reinforced. The prohibition was (again) extended in that separate negotiations were ruled out as well.  Article 2 BP.  Article 15 25 March draft. 30  Article 4 4 May draft. 31  Article 5 4 May draft. 28 29



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It was expressly added that the two governments’ consent was needed both to enter into negotiations and to conclude peace.32 The provision with regard to peace with other Coalition powers was not altered.33 This is how the provision with regard to peace negotiations ended up in the Treaty of The Hague. Whether these provisions would be upheld once peace was actually concluded, especially with Britain and Austria, will be explored in Part III. Two years after the ratification of the Hague Treaty, the alliance was extended to Spain. On 19 August 1796, the French Republic and Spain had concluded a treaty of alliance in San Ildefonso.34 This alliance was perpetual and of an offensive and defensive nature as well.35 The two powers guaranteed each other’s territory and promised to come to each other’s aid in case of a threat or an attack. The alliance did not enter into force automatically after an attack, though. At first, the other power was to offer its good offices to bring an end to hostilities and the attacked ally had to request assistance. With the Treaty of San Ildefonso, the offensive character of the alliance did not mean that one ally would be involved in wars initiated by the other as a belligerent in its own right. The Franco-Spanish alliance contained the possibility that the allies would act as auxiliaries to the prime belligerent solely.36 In case interests of both allies were affected or hostilities were directed at both allies, they might declare war by mutual agreement. Only then would both allies be obliged to fully take part in the war and there would be no limitations to each one’s contribution.37 The Treaty of San Ildefonso also stipulated that, in case ‘both’ powers were at war, they would not enter into peace negotiations without mutual agreement.38 The Franco-Spanish alliance was clearly directed against Britain. Spain was the other power France had contemplated to align with in order to balance British maritime preponderance. During the current war the alliance only called on Spain to wage war on Britain. Spain

 Article 5 16 May draft.  Article 6 16 May draft. 34   19 August 1796, Treaty of Offensive and Defensive Alliance between France and Spain signed at San Ildefonso; CTS vol. 53, pp. 257–264. 35  Article 1 Treaty of San Ildefonso. 36  Article 12 Treaty of San Ildefonso. 37  Article 13 Treaty of San Ildefonso. 38  Article 13 Treaty of San Ildefonso. 32 33

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would remain neutral vis-à-vis other powers.39 Moreover, the contribution to be furnished in case of war mainly consisted in men-of-war. Some troops were to be provided as well, but the Treaty stipulated that they were only to be deployed in Europe or to defend the dominions in the Gulf of Mexico.40 In addition, it has to be noted here that the Franco-Spanish alliance was naturally not of an ideological nature. The French Republic entered into an alliance with one king to fight another. The only ‘ideological’ interest Paris and Madrid shared was the freedom of the sea to be protected against British preponderance. France and Spain had agreed that the Batavian Republic would take part in this alliance as soon as possible.41 Before a year had passed, the Batavian Republic did indeed adhere to the Treaty of San Ildefonso. As François Noël notified the Batavian government of the Treaty and the desire for the Batavians to adhere to it, it was expressly presented as an anti-British alliance. A Batavian delegation, consisting of Willem Anne Lestevenon and Jan David Pasteur—both members of the Nationale Vergadering—was sent to Paris to formally take knowledge of the Treaty and settle the accession.42 By early October, they addressed Delacroix with some minor proposal to alter the Treaty, stressing that the Nationale Vergadering was willing to accede to the entire Treaty. At the time, a draft for an act of accession was already prepared.43 It took over half a year for the formal accession of the Batavian Republic to the Treaty of San Ildefonso to take place in Aranjuez, though.44 By adhering to the Treaty of San Ildefonso the Franco-Spanish alliance was essentially extended to a trilateral union that superseded the Treaty of The Hague. On the one hand, San Ildefonso was, however, much more limited in its extent compared to the Hague alliance. Not only was San Ildefonso de facto exclusively directed at Britain, the act of accession limited the mutual obligations to the current war with Britain specifically. Spain and the Batavian Republic engaged in committing all possible forces to the war against Britain. Furthermore, on

 Article 18 Treaty of San Ildefonso.  Articles 3 and 5 Treaty of San Ildefonso. 41  Article 1 secret Treaty of San Ildefonso. 42   23 July 1796, Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to Directoire; NA 2.01.08 no. 102. 43   9 October 1796, Lestevenon and Pasteur to Delacroix; AAE CP Hollande 593. 44   28 June 1797, Acte signé à Aranjuez pour consacrer l’accession de la République Batave au traité d’alliance offensive et defensive, conclu le 19 août 1796 entre la France et l’Espagne, ratifications exchanged on 29 August 1797; CTS vol. 53, pp. 265–266. 39 40



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31 March 1797, the Batavian Republic and Spain had concluded a convention by which the King of Spain was obliged to send auxiliary forces to defend the Batavian colony of Surinam.45 Of course, by the time the Batavian Republic adhered to the Franco-Spanish alliance, both powers were already at war with Britain. On the other hand, the Batavian Republic joined the Franco-Spanish alliance entirely. Only Article 17 of the San Ildefonso Treaty was excluded, but this Article concerned fixing the Franco-Spanish border and was, therefore, of no interest to the Batavian Republic that itself had no common border with Spain. Nonetheless, in Franco-Batavian relations one still exclusively referred to the Treaty of The Hague, both for practical matters and as the basis of the union of and bonds between the two Republics. In fact, in a letter to Talleyrand, Meyer stated that the Batavian government regarded the accession to the Franco-Spanish Treaty as yet another link to the fraternal intimacy that united the two Republics.46 4.2  Levée en masse exported Forming an alliance called for arrangements on military cooperation. What was the role of the Batavian Republic to be in the alliance? What contribution in terms of troops, naval forces, and money would the Batavian Republic have to furnish? What aid would the French Republic have to provide to its new ally? Who was to decide on and command during joint actions? An analysis of both the role to be played in the alliance and the mutual obligations in terms of military forces has a lot to offer in order to fully contemplate the relation between the two Republics in terms of equality and reciprocity. Compared to the issues of recognition, indemnity, and territory, actual military cooperation between the allies was a minor point in the negotiations. Hence, hardly any remark on this aspect is to be found in diplomatic sources and one mostly has to rely on draft treaties and instructions. The Treaty does, however, settle the contribution the Batavian Republic was to provide to the common war effort.

  31 March 1797, Agreement between the Batavian Republic and Spain for the provision of an auxiliary corps for the defence of Surinam signed at Aranjuez; CTS vol. 54, pp. 39–43. 46   29 July 1797, Meyer to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 601. 45

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The Staten Generaal did not hesitate to hold out the prospect of a considerable contribution. In their instructions for Blauw and Meyer,47 the Staten Generaal construed that to further the interests the alliance was to uphold, the Dutch Republic had to be enabled to organise a navy sufficiently strong to act against the British and to control the sea routes to the Baltic. To gain control of the North Sea and the Baltic and to convoy merchantmen returning from the East Indies, the Staten Generaal conjured up visions of bringing into action during the ongoing campaign ten ships of the line and twelve to twenty frigates provided that the Dutch would immediately be allowed to dispose of their armouries and naval storehouses. Moreover, they indicated that they would be able to form an army of 32,000 men if allowed access to military stores. Dutch officers in French service were to be allowed to enter into Dutch service as soon as possible to contribute to the reorganisation of the Dutch army. Although these promises seem to have been somewhat ambitious, they were even accompanied by a joint plan of campaign. The Dutch army was to serve at the centre of a line of defence against Prussia and Austria between the French troops that had driven the enemy from Groningen and East Frisia and French troops stationed south of Wezel along the Rhine. Hence, allied troops would form a crescent covering the Dutch Republic in the east. This crescent was to advance into Germany in order to force enemy troops to retreat behind the river Elbe. In this way, the front would be removed from the Dutch Republic. This would further Dutch trade, relieve the Dutch of supplying the troops—the French and Dutch armies being able to live of the land in the parts of Germany they would occupy—, deprive the enemy armies of the East Frisian and Münster supplies and cut of enemy armies from any communication with Britain. The French government was to be urged to give orders to the generals of the Army of the North and the Ambry of Sambre et Meuse to implement this plan in concert with the Dutch government. If successful, it was argued, it would bring the French Republic into the position to give peace to Europe as it would judge to be in conformity with ‘the interests of humanity at large.’48

  26 February 1795, draft instructions for Blauw and Meyer; NA 3.02.01 no. 461; 2 March 1795, instructions for Blauw and Meyer; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 657–666 no. 501. 48   ‘de belangens van het geheele menschdom.’ 47



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The Staten Generaal, thus, sketched a military strategy, but it was one directed at a swift peace. In their réflexions provisoires to the French commissioners,49 Blauw and Meyer advocated tighter military cooperation. The Batavian envoys contended that both the Batavian government and all Batavian Patriots were convinced of the French being entitled to enjoy the greatest advantages from the alliance because of the great pains taken to liberate oppressed peoples. However, to ensure that the alliance would be lasting, advantages should not be monopolised by one side. In the long run, the alliance should be more or less reciprocal; although, as the Batavian envoys hastened to stress, this reciprocity did not diminish the Batavian government’s will and intention to assemble all its military, naval, and commercial resources and use its credit to furnish the French army and support France’s efforts against the common enemy. In conformity with the Staten Generaal’s instructions, Blauw and Meyer offered ten ships of the line and, more specific than the instructions, fourteen frigates as well as an army of 32,000 men to be deployed in concert. In order to advance the naval build-up, they not only insisted on the French to restore the armouries and store houses to Batavian authorities at once, but they also stressed the need for a swift recognition of the Batavian nation’s independence and sovereignty. They emphasised that the new regime in the United Provinces was truly Patriotic and could be trusted. Due to the French government’s financial situation and its lack of allies, the Dutch Republic’s contribution to the alliance’s war effort was to be procured. Especially the Dutch fleet was a welcome supplement to French maritime power in fighting the Royal Navy. In the bases arrêtées, it was considered that France might take advantage of the Batavian navy. The navy was exactly France’s weak point and the Batavian Republic’s strong one. Although a considerable part of the Dutch navy had been lost, the Dutch would be able to build and equip men-of-war rather rapidly. Hence, an alliance was ‘indispensable.’ It was even considered that the contribution to be expected from the Batavians in the war at sea influenced the ‘théorie de l’indemnité.’

49   12 March 1795, Réflexions provisoires pour les citoyens Sieyes et autres commissaires du Comité de Salut public, nommés pour entrer en conférence avec les ministres plenipotentiaires Bataves; NA 1.02.14 no. 600.

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According to the author of the bases arrêtées, indemnity for French sacrifices to set the Batavians free was to be found in their efforts for the common cause. The Batavians had to be enabled to reinforce their fleet. Alternatively, the French Republic might simply confiscate Dutch men-of-war, but that course of action was assessed to be imprudent. For, in that case, the French would not be able to make use of Dutch sailors and experience. Unfortunately for the Batavians, all advantages contemplated by various people and factions with a voice in French foreign policy would not be regarded as alternatives. Instead, they were added and Batavians were both to pay a large indemnity and to contribute to the war effort in the end. Neglecting the financial problems the Batavian government had as well, Paris demanded the Batavian Republic to take part both in the war at sea and in the war on land. Undoubtedly, the French Republic did not hesitate to gain as much material advantage of its influence in the Batavian Republic as it deemed possible, but it has to be taken into regard that the French Republic asked little more of its ally than it had asked of itself: a full mobilisation of national resources to win the war. To the contrary, the Dutch contribution to the war effort would still be fixed. In this way, assuming that the agreed contribution was considered to be the maximum the Batavian Republic could bear, the Comité de Salut public exported the levée en masse to its extended sphere of influence. As to the war at sea, the Batavian Republic initially was to provide at least eight ships of the line and twelve frigates during the 1795 campaign.50 However, this was not a one-sided demand the Batavians had to give in to. As said before and as pointed out by Sieyes in a comment to Merlin’s draft,51 the Batavians had already promised to contribute ten to fourteen ships by May and to build even more ships afterwards. Taking the difference between a ship of the line and a frigate into consideration, Paris thus demanded of its Batavian allies about what they had already promised or even less. It does not come as a surprise that the Dutch Patriots were willing to come to France’s aid on the sea. They regarded Britain as the main threat to Dutch trade, the source of their country’s prosperity. Thereto, William V had ordered the governors of Dutch colonies to surrender

 Article 6 BP.  Article 6 BP.

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to the British in the Kew Letters on 7 February 1795.52 Finally, Dutch Patriots had traditionally set out for a focus on the navy. Hence, there was not much debate on the naval contribution the Batavian Republic was to provide. Moreover, the Batavians themselves urged for joint action against British corsairs and men-of-war that were frustrating Batavian and French mercantile navigation.53 According to the first draft,54 the Batavian Republic had to immediately put to sea a squadron consisting of ships of the line and frigates under the command of Batavian officers. The squadron was to operate according to a plan of action to be drawn by the two governments in concert. They were either to intercept enemy trade with the Baltic region, to occupy part of enemy naval forces, or to protect French and Batavian merchantmen.55 By the time of the 5 April draft, the number of vessels the Batavians was to contribute had been increased. Twelve ships of the line and eighteen frigates had to be put at the alliance’s disposal ‘pour la défense commune’ during the 1795 campaign, whereas the number of vessels had to be augmented for the next campaign.56 This draft did not say anything anymore on how, where, and for what purpose these vessels would be put into action. The Dutch counter draft did not alter the number of vessels. The Staten Generaal did add that Batavian ships were to be employed primarily on the North Sea or in the Baltic region.57 In its 4 May draft, the Comité de Salut public adopted the article from the Dutch counter draft. In the draft that functioned as Reubell’s and Sieyes’ instructions it even added that the vessels, store houses and armouries captured or confiscated on the invasion of the United Provinces, as well as the part of the artillery France did not need for itself were to be restored to the Batavian Republic.58 In the 16 May draft59 the provisions with regard to the Batavian fleet remained unchanged. In the secret articles a provision was included, however, that the Batavian Republic was to furnish more vessels to the French Republic on demand. These vessels were to be equipped and   Legrand, 1895, pp. 112–113; Israel, 2001, p. 1243.   22 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 54   25 March 1795; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 55  Article 3 25 March draft. 56  Article 4 5 April draft. 57  Article 4 25 April counter draft. 58  Article 6 4 May draft. 59   16 May 1795, Minutes de la négociation à la Haye; AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10. 52 53

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manned by the French Republic itself and were to be commanded by French officers. In addition, they were to operate on the North Sea and in the Baltic region solely.60 During the day the number of vessels to be equipped and manned by France was set at three ships of the line and four frigates. Moreover, it was added that France would return these vessels after the war and that, in case these ships would operate with the Batavian squadron, they would be under the command of the Dutch admiral.61 Whereas the French from the start needed Dutch naval force to reinforce their forces in the maritime war against Britain, a Dutch contribution to the war on the Continent was less obvious. The Staten Generaal had already offered 32,000 men. However, the bases proposées only stipulated that the United Provinces would keep Swiss regiments in their service after they had taken an oath not to take up arms against the French Republic again.62 The 25 March draft stipulated that the Batavian Republic had to get its army organised as soon as possible up to an effective size of 32,000 men to be deployed against the common enemy at agreed spots.63 The subsequent drafts contained no provisions on the Batavian army. One option is that this omission indicates that the Batavian Republic was to contribute all its forces. This would be entirely at odds with contemporary treaty practice, though. More likely, the drafts’ silence was connected to the French government’s intent not to allow the Batavian Republic a large military force of its own. By early March, the Staten Generaal had adopted a scheme to reorganise the Batavian army.64 Some weeks later Meyer requested the Comité de Salut public to permit the Generals Daendels, Van Damme, and Dumonceau to enter into Batavian service, since the Batavian Republic was said to need officers known for their heroism and republican virtues to command its army.65 The Batavian army that had ceased hostilities on the command of the Staten Generaal in January still amounted to a considerable force. However, most officers had

 Article 1 secret 16 May draft.  Article 1 secret 16 May draft; Articles 7 and 1 secret Treaty of The Hague. 62  Article 7 BP. 63  Article 4 25 March draft. 64   19 March 1795, Alquier and Cochon to the Comité de Salut public; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 626–627 no. 478. 65   12 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 60 61



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handed in their resignation.66 Hence, the Batavian government was in great haste to appoint new officers and restore military hierarchy. Immediately after having received this request—almost at the same time the ultimatum linked to the 5 April draft expired—, the French government ordered the reorganisation of the Batavian army to be suspended until the end of negotiations between the two Republics. It even ordered the disarmament of Batavian troops to be executed where and when such a measure might be thought necessary as a precaution. Until the conclusion of the Alliance Treaty, the French Republic should maintain its ‘superiorité militaire et politique’ in the United Provinces and Belgium.67 While assuring that the French Republic would render aid and protection to its friends, it bluntly informed Meyer of this decision.68 In the United Provinces, the reorganisation of the Batavian army was in fact suspended on the Comité’s orders.69 At the same time, the ‘représentants en mission’ did, however, question the Comité’s decision. Firstly, Paris had been informed of the Batavian army’s reorganisation weeks ago. Secondly, since France did not have to fear Prussia anymore, France’s military position in the United Provinces was already secured. Their sole worries were with regard to the nourishment of the troops, since food supplies in the United Provinces were running out.70 The 16 May draft71 only extended the restitution of armouries and artillery to the land forces.72 It was not until the final draft that a provision with regard to the Batavian army’s contribution to the war on the Continent appeared again. It stated that the United Provinces had to furnish at least half of its land forces on a French request.73 This arrangement made it into the Treaty as well.74 In addition, the Treaty stated that there would be combined military operations to be agreed upon by the two governments.75 In order to concert operations, a Batavian agent was

  4 May 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600.   15 April 1795, decree Comité de Salut public; AAE CP Hollande 587. 68   17 April 1795, Comité de Salut public to Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 608. 69   20 April 1795, Richard to the Comité de Salut public; AAE CP Hollande 587. 70   20 April 1795, représentans to the Comité de Salut public; AAE CP Hollande 587. 71   16 May 1795, minutes de la négociation à la Haye; AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10. 72  Article 8 16 May draft. 73  Article 7 16 May draft. 74  Article 7 Treaty of The Hague. 75  Article 9 Treaty of The Hague. 66 67

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to attend the French committee charged with the direction of military operations. Only after the Treaty had been concluded, the Batavians were allowed to reform their army. Immediately after having received news of the Alliance Treaty, the Comité de Salut public ordered the release of all prisoners of war in the service of the United Provinces.76 At the same time it authorised the ‘représentants en mission’ with the Army of the North to release all Batavian officers in French service from their duties if they desired to serve in the new Batavian army. On the Staten Generaal’s special request, the Generals Daendels and Dumonceau as well as Admiral De Winter were explicitly authorised to transfer into Batavian service.77 The main contribution expected from the Batavian Republic was of a maritime nature, though. The Batavian fleet was to augment French naval forces in the war against Britain. From the start, the French envoy, François Noël, stressed the necessity of the Batavian government concentrating on the fleet. He assured authorities in The Hague that the French armies would cover the landward borders.78 In itself, Noël’s advice was not unreasonable. The Batavian Republic could simply not afford building a large fleet and raising a strong land force next to paying for the French corps. At the same time if the Batavian government would focus on its fleet, there would not be an armed force on France’s northern frontier not under Paris’ direct control. The Batavians failed to get their fleet ready in time. The best part of the Batavian fleet had been lost in an attempt to recapture the Cape of Good Hope.79 Once a new squadron was ready, the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken hesitated to put the ships to sea. After the rupture of the Lille negotiations, the French government got somewhat impatient.80 Paris thought of invading Ireland again and the Batavian Republic was to play a prominent part in that invasion.81 The Batavian fleet was to transport French troops from Texel to Ireland.82 Preparations for the Irish expedition were indeed made from the spring of 1797   25 May 1795, decree Comité de Salut public; AN AF II* 50; NA 1.02.14 no. 593.   25 May 1795, decree Comité de Salut public; AN AF II 64. 78   Vreede, 1863, pp. 226–227. 79   Legrand, 1895, p. 139. On 16 August 1796 a squadron of 8 men-of-war was captured by the British in the Bay of Saldanha. 80  Palmer, 1964, p. 200. 81   Vreede, 1863, p. 304; Schama, 1989, p. 335. 82   Schama, 1989, p. 333. 76 77



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onwards. General Daendels considered the Irish invasion scheme as an excellent opportunity to restore Batavian prestige in a single stroke.83 By the time negotiations in Lille were finally broken off, the best season to transport troops by sea had passed, though. Moreover, the wind prevented the expedition to sail from Texel for some weeks.84 In the meantime, the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken yielded to increasing political pressure to actually use the fleet that had taken so much money to be built. The men-of-war that were to accompany the troop transports were ordered to sea. On 11 October 1797 the Batavian fleet engaged with a British squadron near Camperdown. The battle was not lost, but it was no success either and the Batavian fleet was heavily damaged. By consequence, the battered Batavian fleet returned to its base and was forced to stay there until the Anglo-Russian invasion of 1799. The fleet was not fit for action for some time.85 Some months later, plans of invading the British Isles were dropped in favour of Bonaparte’s Egyptian expedition. Consequently, the Batavian maritime contribution became less important.86 Every time the plan of invading the British Isles came to the fore, the French turned their eyes to the Batavian Republic. By consequence, they became more disposed to listen to Batavian complaints and demands and more inclined to control Batavian politics at the same time. On the occasion of the 1799 Anglo-Russian invasion, the Batavian fleet surrendered to the British fleet that accompanied the invasion force and had orange pennants fluttering aloft.87 Hence, the Batavian government had to restart fitting out a fleet. From a military point of view, the Batavian Republic turned out to be a less useful ally than the Thermidorian regime,88 dreaming of ‘Amsterdam’s gold,’ had expected. 4.3  Full Board by Sea As negotiations on the Treaty of The Hague started, a considerable number of French forces occupied the Batavian territory. The main   Van Sas, 2004, p. 317.   Vreede, 1863, p. 305; Van Sas, 2004, p. 318. 85   Vreede, 1863, p. 326; Van Sas, 2004, p. 319. 86  Palmer, 1964, p. 204. 87   Legrand, 1895, pp. 212–219. 88   21 November 1796, Memoire sur la situation actuelle de la Hollande relativement à la France; AAE CP Hollande 590. 83 84

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question with regard to military matters was whether French troops were to stay in the Dutch Republic and, if so, who was to pay for their maintenance. From the moment French armies had entered foreign territory they had been forced to live of the land in order to relieve the government in Paris of a financial burden it could not bear: ‘La guerre nourrira la guerre.’89 To be sure, occupied territories were not to be plundered. French generals actually made an effort to maintain discipline. Living of the land was more sophisticated and institutionalised in the form of official requisitions, confiscation of public, noble, and ecclesiastical estates, or payment with assignats. Was this policy to be continued once a treaty with the first sister republic had been concluded? The Alliance Treaty would fix a prolonged French military presence in the Batavian Republic. Vreede has depicted the presence of French troops as humiliating and burdensome as well as adverse to the ‘political existence of a free people.’90 He wrote in the heydays of nineteenth-century nationalism, but some contemporaries agreed with him. As will be discussed below, some years after the conclusion of the Hague Treaty, Schimmelpenninck would assert that the presence of French troops was contradictory to Batavian independence.91 In itself, though, the presence of foreign troops on one’s territory, if based on governmental consent, does not automatically imply an infringement on a country’s independence. There have been American troops in the Netherlands ever since the Second World War and no one questions Dutch independence because of their presence. Nonetheless, a considerable military force can provoke infringements on a country’s independence, as it can be a means of direct or indirect control by a foreign government. Moreover, foreign officers might show disrespect for or act autonomous from civil authorities or might be tempted to intervene in internal affairs. Despite the solemn promises made by the ‘représentants en mission,’ it did indeed not take long for complaints on the conduct of French officers and soldiers to come in and those complaints were to prolong. Requisitions were presented as clear violations of the law of nations and Batavian independence, as well as of the

  Schama, 1989, p. 37.   Vreede, 1863, pp. 170–171. 91   21 March 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 631. 89 90



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guarantee of private property in the representatives’ proclamations.92 Again, these might turn out to be infringements in practice that do not say anything about legal inequalities or subordination. Hence, what is of interest to us, is the formal relation between the Batavian and French governments and the French troops on Batavian territory. With regard to the prolonged French military presence, the draft treaties show that both sides had to give in to reach an agreement. At first, Dutch Patriots wanted French forces to leave their country. Blauw and Meyer’s instructions93 stipulated that French troops were to leave the Dutch Republic at once, since it became harder and harder to supply them and their presence obstructed economic activity. Because the Dutch army would soon be reorganised and the Dutch nation valued the friendship of the French people, the presence of a French army would serve no end but to exhaust the country. However, if the Batavian envoys would notice that the French government desired to maintain French military presence in the Dutch Republic, they had to demonstrate that French troops were to be stationed in the border towns that were used to the presence of garrisons and were fit to lodge large numbers of soldiers and officers. Their presence would have the least effect on the population and its economic activity that way. Thereto, the French troops remaining were to be transferred into the pay of the Dutch Republic, mainly because they would not have to be paid in assignats then. In short, the Staten Generaal rather paid for the French troops stationed on its territory than have French paper money destroy the Dutch economy. Whereas the Staten Generaal had suggested offering the French to occupy border fortresses as a concession, Blauw and Meyer presented the option as their government’s desire.94 Moreover, while the Staten Generaal had urged for a full retreat of French troops, the Batavian envoys only emphasised the necessity of a retreat of ‘la très grande

92  E.g. complaints by the municipalities of Leiden and Zevenbergen about requisitions were still discussed with the French representatives in early May; 4 May 1795, Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland to répresentants en mission; NA 1.02.14 no. 604. 93   26 February 1795, draft instructions for Blauw and Meyer; NA 3.02.01 no. 461; 2 March 1795, instructions for Blauw and Meyer; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 657–666 no. 501. 94   12 March 1795, Réflexions provisoires pour les citoyens Sieyes et autres commissaires du Comité de Salut public, nommés pour entrer en conférence avec les ministres plenipotentiaires Bataves; NA 1.02.14 no. 600.

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majorité des troupes françaises’ and allowed for exceptions as security measures to be agreed upon in concert between the French ‘représentants’ and the government in The Hague. It soon dawned on a majority of Batavian Patriots, however, that without a French military presence the Batavian Republic would be vulnerable to a new Prussian invasion. Fear of Prussia increased after the initial enthusiasm of the Batavian Revolution had flagged and was actually fostered by the French. For instance, as the French commissioners urged the Staten Generaal and the Provincial Staten, by means of Blauw and Meyer, to take measures to supply the French troops, they explicitly referred to the Prussians taking post along the border up to the Ems estuary.95 Furthermore, the provision in the FrancoPrussian Treaty of Basel (5 April 1795) stipulating that Prussia would not attack the United Provinces, was deliberately kept secret. By the time negotiations started The Hague was convinced of the necessity of French troops protecting the country. Even in early May, Meyer and Blauw fiercely refuted rumours that part of the Batavian Republic would be evacuated by the French and occupied by the Prussians, arguing that thus the Counter-revolution would be established within Batavian borders.96 For the French government, an occupation of the entire Batavian Republic was not that essential. As discussed earlier, a considerable number of French politicians opposed further expansion. Paris did want to cover France’s northern border, though. At the start of negotiations, a prolonged French military presence in the Batavian Republic was not contemplated. Hence, the bases proposées that functioned as the starting point for the negotiations on the French side settled for the sole faculty to occupy some fortifications and fortified cities along the rivers Meuse and Rhine—Gorinchem and Arnhem—and in Zeeland—Flushing, Briel, and Rammekens—as well as some further ones convenient to the French Republic and the country’s defence.97 The 25 March draft made a move in the direction of a more extended military presence. No specific towns were mentioned anymore. It just provided for the occupation of fortified border towns on Batavian territory—not stating what border was meant—, while French generals   13 March 1795, Sieyes, Reubell, and Merlin to Baluw and Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 600; AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10. 96   4 May 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 97  Article 4 BP. 95



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were to decide on which towns would actually be occupied. French occupation was to be limited in time to the ongoing war. In addition the first draft stipulated that the Batavian government was to pay an annual indemnity to the French Republic to cover the costs of these French garrisons,98 and that the military commanders of those towns were to be nominated by the French Republic or its generals.99 In the 5 April draft no specific places were named either and military occupation was still to last until the peace. ‘Batavian territory’ was replaced by ‘restored territories’ and the restriction to border towns had disappeared in this draft. The only condition for occupation was to be that French military presence in a town was advantageous to the defence of the country.100 The Dutch 25 April counter draft shows that the Staten Generaal, although not opposing the presence of French forces on Batavian soil after the ratification of the treaty, were adamant not to give the French carte blanche. The terms of the treaty had to be more explicit on where French troops were to be placed.101 French military occupation was to be limited to fortified towns situated on the right bank of the rivers Rhine and Waal. In addition, the following towns were listed expressly: Arnhem, Doesburg, Zutphen, and other places forming the lines of the IJssel and Groningen. Hence, French forces were to cover the eastern border from which Dutch Patriots expected a new Prussian invasion. In addition, there was to be a French garrison in Utrecht and French garrisons were to be placed in some Holland towns to be agreed upon between the two governments.102 The fortified places of Zeeland, Flushing included, and Dutch Brabant were thus excluded, although the Staten Generaal had repudiated their annexation by France. Their exclusion can therefore not be taken for recognition on the part of the Staten Generaal that they were no longer part of Batavian territory. A sounder explanation would be that these places were so remote from Prussian territory that their occupation by French troops would not be necessary from a military point of view, while their occupation by Batavian troops solely would create a buffer between French territory and the French troops present in the

 Article 5 25 March draft.  Article 6 25 March draft. 100  Article 9 5 April draft. 101   26 April 1795, Eclaircissemens sur le projet de traité remis au nom du Gouvernement Batave par les ministres plenipotentiaires soussignés; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 102  Article 10 25 April draft.   98   99

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Batavian Republic. The French troops occupying various places in the Batavian Republic were to stay there until the peace and they would be paid by the Batavian Republic. Further agreements had to be made on their payment, maintenance, and especially on their numbers.103 Although both governments agreed on the necessity of some French troops to stay in the Batavian Republic, no one had yet raised the question of how many troops were to remain there exactly. The Dutch 25 April counter draft explicitly stipulated that the surplus of the French troops would leave Batavian soil for instance within two or three weeks after the ratification of the Treaty104 and that civil administration in the occupied towns would rest with Batavian authorities exclusively.105 By the time Reubell and Sieyes were sent to The Hague, the Comité de Salut public had reconciled itself to the fact that the islands of Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland would not become French. Therefore, the draft they carried with them106 only stated that the French Republic was to occupy the town and port of Flushing and the fortress of Ramekens perpetually.107 Next to that, this draft provided for the military occupation during the war of all fortified places and military positions that the French Republic would find convenient to guard, both in the Lands of the Generality and in the United Provinces themselves.108 French military presence was thus extended to the entire territory, and not to be limited to the eastern border and some places to be agreed upon later. On the other hand, this draft stipulated that the French army on Batavian territory would be reduced to 30,000 men—paid, equipped, and billeted by the Batavian Republic—as soon as the first 20 million guilders of the indemnity would have been paid;109 a clear sign that prolonged military presence was a means to ensure that the Batavians would pay the agreed price for their liberty. The 15 May draft even increased the part of the indemnity to be paid before the troops would leave to 30 million. Moreover, the remaining 30,000 men were to stay in the Batavian Republic in peacetime, too, or to enter Batavian territory again if they had been ordered out of the country.110  Article 1 secret 25 April draft.  Article 2 secret 25 April draft. 105  Article 3 secret 25 April draft. 106   4 May draft. 107  Article 10 4 May draft. 108  Article 11 4 May draft. 109  Article 14 4 May draft. 110  Article 6 secret 15 May draft. 103 104



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These conditions strongly influenced the draft that was discussed on 16 May.111 In Flushing—the main naval base in Zeeland—, Bergen op Zoom, and ‘s-Hertogenbosch—the two main fortified cities south of the river Meuse—, French garrisons were to be stationed until the two nations would stipulate otherwise.112 Clearly, although France waived annexation of all Dutch territory south of the river Meuse, French military control of the itinerary to Antwerp and the fortifications covering what was to be its new northern frontier was not to depend on the duration of the ongoing war. Occupation of other parts of the Batavian Republic was an entirely different story. Although, the French still held to a general provision on where their troops were to be stationed—‘places et positions qu’il paraitra utile de garder pour la défense du pays’—their presence was limited to the ongoing war. In addition, this draft stated that the exact number of French troops was to be determined in concert.113 The final draft that resulted from the negotiations on 16 May,114 hardly differed from the draft that was submitted by the French commissioners that morning with regard to the presence of French troops on Batavian soil.115 The main difference concerned the fortified places in Brabant. In the course of the negotiations, the Dutch had succeeded in getting the provision with regard to these towns altered. There was not to be a permanent French military presence in Bergen op Zoom and ‘s-Hertogenbosch, as had been demanded earlier that day. Instead, these two towns as well as the town of Grave were to be occupied by French garrisons in case of hostilities on the part of any power attacking either the United Provinces or the French Republic from the Rhine or in Zeeland.116 The exact number of troops was still to be agreed upon. In the course of the Hague negotiations the number of 20,000 to 25,000 had come up.117 Pursuant to the 16 May draft, the French army in the United Provinces had to be reduced to 25,000 men within a month after the Treaty’s ratification, that is to say, the remaining French troops were to form the garrisons of the fortified places agreed upon. The number   Minutes de la négociation à la Haye 16 mei 1795; AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10.  Article 11 and 13 16 May draft. 113  Article 15 16 May draft. 114  Dernier projet de traité; AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10. 115  Article 17 final draft. 116  Article 15 final draft. 117   15 May 1795, minutes Staten Generaal; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 111 112

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of 25,000 must have come up in the course of the day. These troops were to be paid and equipped by the Batavian Republic en pied de guerre. The two governments would specify the payment and maintenance of the French troops in a separate convention. Finally, it was provided that these troops, either entirely or partly, would be placed at the disposal of the United Provinces any time it desired them after the peace.118 These arrangements ended up in the Treaty.119 Pursuant to Article 17, all places the French Republic would deem useful to guard were to remain occupied by French troops throughout the current war. Except for Flushing, no town was named explicitly. The number of French troops was to be settled between the two governments. However, the secret articles stipulated that within a month after ratification French troops would be reduced to 25,000 men. As in the 16 May draft, these troops were to be paid, equipped, and housed by the United Provinces. Only one substantial adjustment was made. That is to say in the Article on the French garrison in Flushing the word ‘exclusively’ was added, thus providing that there would be no Batavian troops in that town.120 Hence, at no point during the negotiations, either party questioned a prolonged French military presence in the Batavian Republic. A compromise had to be reached between the French desire to keep a free hand and the Batavian desire for clarity. French troops were to stay in the Batavian Republic. It can be derived from the Treaty that French troops officially stayed to defend the United Provinces. Although the Treaty did not say anything about it explicitly and the convention and further regulations seemed to be contradictory, later sources show that they were regarded to be auxiliary forces in Batavian pay. For instance, the Convention concluded in The Hague on 12 May 1798 called the French force auxiliary.121 Unlike the stipulations of one of the earliest drafts, the Treaty did no longer stress that these troops formed part of the French army. They had actually been put at the disposal of the Batavian Republic. However, the French corps was in the pay of the Batavian Republic, but not in its service. French troops did not have to take an oath of  Article 3 secret final draft.  Article 15, 17, and 3 secret Treaty of The Hague. 120  Article 13 Treaty of The Hague. 121   12 May 1798, Article 3 Treaty between the Batavian Republic and France, The Hague; CTS vol. 54, pp. 233–238; AAE CP Hollande Supplément 22. 118 119



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loyalty to the Staten Generaal. The French commanding general was still subordinated to Paris, whatever his relation to The Hague. Furthermore, the French government felt free to order part of the corps out of the Batavian Republic if they were needed elsewhere. By inserting Articles 17 and 3 secret in the Treaty, the Batavian Republic had consented to the presence of French troops in due form. Nominally, Batavian independence was fully respected in this way. Whether that independence was infringed on in practice depended on the actual behaviour of French commanders and their respect for their obligations towards the Batavian government. This settlement was the result of various aims French military presence in the Batavian Republic was to serve. First, French troops were to protect the Batavian Republic from military threats. For this aim French troops had to be of sufficient numbers to prevent Berlin from contemplating a new invasion as well as the domestic opposition from rising against the Patriot regime. Hence, Dutch Patriots, not knowing that Prussia had promised not to attack the United Provinces in Basel, were anticipated to agree to a considerable number of troops. In addition, having French troops occupying the fortified towns in the east, the Batavian government itself would be able to focus on the fleet.122 On the other hand, Dutch Patriots were willing to pay a certain price for their power, but they had to cope with the miserable state of Dutch state finances as well. Payment for the French force, in combination with the Batavian army and fleet soon exceeded the annual budget by far. Occupation of Bergen op Zoom and ‘s-Hertogenbosch clearly shows that French military presence was not solely for the Batavian Republic’s defence, though. For these towns were at the French-Batavian border and could only be attacked by Prussian or Austrian forces after they had broken through other lines of defence. French military presence in the Batavian Republic was to serve French strategic goals as well. The French troops would cover France’s northern and eastern border, since the demarcation line of the part of Germany to be declared neutral was not yet set and for instance Nijmegen closed the line of fortifications preventing Austrian forces to cross the Meuse, whereas

122   11 July 1795, Memoire pour servir d’Instructions au Citoyen François Noël, ministre plenipotentiaire de la République françoise près la République de Hollande; AAE CP Hollande 588.

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French troops in Zeeland were needed to protect Antwerp and the banks of the Scheldt estuary against a British invasion. However, the major aim on the French side was of a financial nature. Due to the French government’s financial situation an arrangement that would relieve France of paying for part of its army was very welcome. Hence, the Batavian government is charged both with payment of the troops and with their maintenance, clothing, equipment, and housing. The paramount nature of the financial aspect of the arrangement, in part, was adverse to the Batavian’s strategic aims. For, although the French were in desperate need of the Batavian Republic financing their troops, they were less willing to commit a considerable part of their army to the Batavian Republic, especially if those troops would be of more use elsewhere. Therefore, the French army in the service of the Batavian Republic would never meet the full number of 25,000 men, while the Batavian government refused to pay for troops not actually on Batavian soil. Finally, one might expect the French Republic to desire military presence in order to be able to exercise political control. Although, the 1795 revolution in Frisia was made possible by retreating French forces from the Province and French troops would actually be deployed at the occasions of the 1798 coups d’état, there is no evidence that at the time of the negotiations a prolonged military presence was to serve this end in the eyes of the Comité de Salut public. In fact, Paris gave Batavian Patriots a free hand in establishing a constitution until late-1797. Soon after the ratification of the Treaty further arrangements were made for the presence of French troops in the Batavian Republic. On 27 July 1795 a convention was concluded in The Hague.123 The Convention expressly stated that the 25,000 men formed a corps separated from the Army of the North and would be in the United Provinces’ pay. This would suggest that they still formed part of the French armed forces. The troops could only be replaced on the demand of the French or the Batavian government.124 The French troops would be under the exclusive command of the French commander in chief and were

123   27 July 1795, Preliminary Convention between France and the Netherlands for the support of the French Auxiliary Corps in Dutch Pay; CTS vol. 52, pp. 419–436. 124  Article 1 Preliminary Convention.



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subordinated to additional regulations to be agreed on by the two governments.125 To the Convention were added some regulations with respect to the formation, maintenance, and administration of the French corps.126 These regulations fixed in great detail how the corps would be composed. In addition, they settled that the Batavian government was responsible for supplying the troops127 and for paying them according to set tariffs, either directly to the officers and soldiers or to the corps’ administrative employees in which case a Batavian agent would be allowed to supervise the actual payment.128 The troops were to be housed,129 clothed and equipped by the Batavian government, whereas the Regulations explicitly stated that the Staten Generaal were assured of not having to furnish more than the troops really needed.130 In case the defence of the country would call for the troops to campaign or camp in the countryside, their wants would be filled in concert between the two governments.131 The Batavian government was to appoint agents both to the corps’ headquarters and to each division. Those agents would be charged with providing the funds necessary for the maintenance of the army.132 The French corps would have an administration of its own subordinated to commissaires de guerre. French employees would be punished for malfeasance according to French law, whereas Dutch employees in such cases would be handed over to the agent appointed by the Staten Generaal or local tribunals.133 In the barracks order would be maintained according to rules of behaviour set by French laws.134 A French tribunal organised according to the laws of the French Republic would have jurisdiction over military crimes committed by soldiers or officers belonging to the French corps.135

 Article 2 Preliminary Convention.   27 July 1795, Réglement pour la formation, la subsistance et l’administration du corps de 25,000 hommes de troupes françaises, détachées de l’armée du Nord, pour demeurer en Hollande; CTS vol. 52, pp. 419–436. 127  Articles 1 and 3 Réglement. 128  Article 2 Réglement. 129  Article 4 Réglement. 130  Article 5 Réglement. 131  Article 4 Réglement. 132  Article 9 Réglement. 133  Article 10 Réglement. 134  Article 4 Réglement. 135  Article 11 Réglement. 125 126

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The presence of French troops in the Batavian Republic was to cause some tensions in the years after the conclusion of the Treaty. From the start both sides complained vehemently. According to the French, their troops were ill supplied and ill treated by local authorities.136 Fed up with ongoing complaints, the Directoire instructed Charles Delacroix—as he was sent to The Hague as French envoy—to get the Batavian government to put the necessary funds at his disposal so the French army could buy supplies itself.137 The Batavian government claimed to be unable to supply the troops, because the English had stripped the land of its stores on their retreat and that the behaviour and presence of French troops had caused the fall of Dutch credit and had paralysed Dutch industry and commerce. The financial burden of the French troops was higher than the Batavian government could bear.138 The costs turned out to be even higher than expected, because the French frequently replaced the troops in the Batavian Republic. Allegedly this was done because French soldiers could not stand the climate, but as a practical consequence the Batavian government time over time had to cover the costs of clothing and equipping other but not so fresh troops.139 Complaints were of no avail. At the same time, Prussia’s guarantee of northern German neutrality could not be kept secret. In combination with the reorganisation of the Batavian army taking place and the Orangists staying rather quiet, this apparently decreased the need of a considerable French military presence for Batavian safety; or at least, it seemed to be that way for some years. Hence, benefits were no longer considered to outweigh costs. Finally, the Batavian government took offence at the headstrong actions of the French generals. Mainly the moving of troops without giving cognisance to the government in The Hague was a stumbling block.140 This had always been a matter of some sensitivity in Dutch politics. Throughout the United Provinces’ history, the Provinciale

136   13 October 1795, Sieyes, Reubell, and Merlin to Blauw and Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 600; AN 284AP Papiers Sieyes 10. 137   2 December 1797, Memoire pour servir d’instructions au citoyen Charles Delacroix ministre plénipotentiaire de la République française près la République batave; AAE CP Hollande Supplément 22. 138   21 November 1796, Memoire sur la situation actuelle de la Hollande relativement à la France; AAE CP Hollande 590. 139   20 February 1798, Instructions for Eijkenbroek; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 509. 140   10 January 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 120.



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Staten had frequently struggled with the Stadhouders over troop movements claiming that the Stadhouder needed the Staten’s permission to move troops.141 The Stadhouder ignoring this claim had been one of the major accusations against him. The arrival of Charles Delacroix in The Hague set various plans in motion. He cooperated with radical democratic Patriots to bring about a coup d’état on 22 January 1798 in order to purge the Nationale Vergadering from federalists and other opponents to a Unitarist constitution. Once the radical democratic regime was in power, not only the process of constitution-making accelerated, the disputes arising from the Alliance Treaty were set about as well. In general, the radicals were inclined to focus on the French alliance more than their more moderate counterparts among Batavian Patriots. Moreover, theirs was a minority regime that was more dependent on French support to stay in office. Hence, it adopted a more compliant stance vis-à-vis the French Republic. On 14 February, the Uitvoerend Bewind held an extraordinary meeting together with Charles Delacroix, the Generals Joubert and Daendels, Vice Admiral De Winter, and the Secretary for War, Gerrit Jan Pijman in order to establish measures to accelerate preparations for war against Britain. It was decided to organise a navy department as soon as possible.142 At the same time, the Uitvoerend Bewind had to deal with the miserable state of Batavian state finances, and, because of the Treaty of Campoformio (17 October 1797), external-military reasons to spend a lot of money on land forces had disappeared. The new regime sent Jan Eijkenbroek and the Baron Eberstein on a secret mission to Paris.143 One of the objectives they were to strive for was a reduction of troops in Batavian pay. Recognising that one of the Directoire’s main objectives was not having to pay for part of the French army itself, Eijkenbroek had to propose transferring the French auxiliary forces into Batavian service entirely. That way, the Batavian Republic would still finance them, but they would take the place of regular Batavian troops. Hence, the sum total of land forces to be paid

  Geyl, 1947, p. 75.   14 February 1798, minutes Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 458A and NA 2.01.08 no. 50. 143  De Gou, 1988, p. xiv; Schama, 1989, pp. 339–342. 141 142

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out of the Batavian treasury would diminish and the Batavian government would be able to shift funds to the navy.144 The Eijkenbroek-Eberstein mission failed,145 but that did not mean that the need to revise military arrangements was not felt in Paris as well. Delacroix managed to induce the new regime to negotiating and signing a new convention that had to complement the Treaty of The Hague and earlier conventions. These remained in force as far as they did not contradict the latest convention. Together with Pijman, the French envoy drew up a convention that was communicated to the Uitvoerend Bewind on 12 May 1798.146 On that occasion Delacroix claimed that the Convention had already been agreed upon by the Directoire and insisted on a swift ratification.147 The Uitvoerend Bewind approved the text and granted Pijman authority to sign the Convention. However, according to the records of the Directoire, the Convention was not discussed in Paris before 12 June.148 Delacroix really was in a hurry. He wanted the Convention to come into effect on 20 April 1798 and hence it was predated on 12 April. 149 The French forces in the Batavian Republic would not be reduced and the Batavian Republic remained charged with paying, equipping, clothing, housing, and maintaining the full number of 25,000 men.150 The Convention explicitly stated that clothing and equipment would be furnished to the troops in conformity with French laws.151 Now, the officers would even be allowed to choose their own lodgings.152 The French government did enter into the obligation not to add more officers to the French corps in the Batavian Republic than French laws allowed for corps stationed in France itself.153 Each year a quarter of   20 February 1798, instructions for Eijkenbroek; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 509.   Schama, 1989, p. 403. Due to a personal dispute with Eijkenbroek, the official Batavian envoy Meyer had Eijkenbroek arrested on 18 March 1798. Eberstein managed to get out of Paris before he could be arrested as well. In result, Meyer was recalled by the Uitvoerend Bewind. 146   12 May 1798, Treaty between the Batavian Republic and France, The Hague; CTS vol. 54, pp. 233–238 (predated 12 April 1798 which date was adopted by Parry in the CTS); AAE CP Hollande Supplément 22; NA 1.01.08 no. 12597.283. 147   12 May 1798 Delacroix to the Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458C. 148   12 June 1798, procés verbaux du Directoire exécutif; AN AF III 10. 149   12 May 1798, Extract uit het register der besluiten van het Uitvoerend Bewind der Bataafsche Republiek; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458B. 150  Article 1 12 May 1798 Treaty. 151  Article 9 12 May 1798 Treaty. 152  Article 3 12 May 1798 Treaty. 153  Article 14 12 May 1798 Treaty. 144 145



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the troops would be replaced.154 The Convention stipulated that three quarters of the French auxiliary troops could be deployed in Germany or on the British Isles.155 If French forces in the Batavian Republic would not actually meet the number of 25,000, the Batavian government was obliged to pay the money saved on pay and maintenance costs into the chest of the French army.156 In addition, the Batavian Republic would pay 1.2 million francs annually for recruitment costs.157 Thus, the 12 May 1798 Convention emphasised the financial background of French military presence in the Batavian Republic. At the same time, Batavian financial obligation were specified and clearly limited. The direction this Convention was heading is clear: the Batavian government had to pay more, whereas it had less control over how the money was spent or on how the troops in its pay would be deployed. The French Republic wanted its troops to be clothed, equipped, and maintained by the Batavian Republic, while it wished to be able to use them as well. By this Convention, the radical regime paid off its 22 January debt. None of the Batavian objections was given into, whereas French complaints were met all the more: more money, even troops not actually on Batavian soil would be funded, a greater French say over and control of the care of French troops, frequent replacement of the troops, more freedom for French officers to choose their own lodgings, and a wider faculty to deploy the troops in Batavian pay elsewhere. In this Convention, France’s governments financial needs distinctly surpassed the initial aim of French military presence in the Batavian Republic, that is the defence of that particular country. Although any French governmental official in response to that assertion would have remonstrated that Batavian security would not be better served than by defeating Austria and Britain. With the 12 June 1798 coup d’état most grounds for compliance towards France expired. The Intermediary Uitvoerend Bewind tried to wriggle out of the Convention. Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, sent on a mission to Paris to inform the Directoire of the 12 June coup d’état ‘correctly,’ was instructed to attempt preventing the presentation of

 Article 8 12 May 1798 Treaty.  Article 10 12 May 1798 Treaty. 156  Article 7 12 May 1798 Treaty. 157  Article 2 12 May 1798 Treaty. 154 155

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the Convention to the Directoire.158 Since the French government had already discussed and approved the Convention on 12 June, it was too late for that. Nevertheless, the new Batavian government decided not to recognise the 12 May Convention.159 It had hesitated to do so, however, evidence of which is to be found in the fact that the Secretaries of War and of Finance by then had already paid some of the funds due according to the Convention out of their private accounts. Formally, it was able not to recognise the Convention, since it had never been officially ratified. To the contrary, the Convention had been kept secret by the former government. The Convention was considered to be a secret treaty the Uitvoerend Bewind was entitled to conclude pursuant to Article 141 of the Batavian Staatsregeling. The Intermediair Uitvoerend Bewind knew of the Convention, if only because Pijman was still in office and had even become a director after the coup d’état. It now asserted, though, that it was in the impossibility to carry out the treaty without presenting it to the Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam, for the commissioners in charge of the treasury were not allowed to endorse expenses that were not based on an explicit law, which would make the treaty public. Moreover, the faculty to conclude secret treaties was conditioned. Secret articles were not to be adverse to the public articles or other treaties, nor were they to cede any part of the Republic’s territory. Since, according to the Intermediary Uitvoerend Bewind, the Convention was at variance with the Treaty of The Hague, the Uitvoerend Bewind had acted unconstitutionally. Therefore, the Uitvoerend Bewind was unable to carry out the Convention, as it declared to the French envoy Lombard some months later.160 The French seem to have accepted this argument. They did, at least, never insist on payment of the additional financial obligations. On very few occasions, French officials invoked the 12 May 1798 Convention, which was, of course, secret anyhow.

158   15 June 1798, Article VIII instructions for Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 119. 159   11 July 1798, consideratien van het Interm Uitvoerend Bewind over zekere secrete conventie gesloten tussen het Directoire Executif van de fransche en het vernietigd inconstitutioneel Uitvoerend Bewind, betreffende de Fransche troepen in soldij dezer Republicq; NA 2.01.08 no. 119. 160   20 November 1798, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 119.



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Mutual complaints continued and the Batavian government’s financial want only increased. Not until 1805/1806 it would succeed in introducing a new tax system that would increase public funds. The Uitvoerend Bewind did present Lombard with the need to come to an agreement in order to put an end to ongoing complaints and especially the situation in which both governments gave contradictory orders to Batavian and French officers. This did not lead to a revision of the Convention though. The February 1799 general report on foreign affairs to the Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam still stated the necessity due to the Batavian Republic’s financial situation to reduce the costs of the French troops in Batavian pay by amicable settlements and promised that the Uitvoerend Bewind would try it’s hardest to persuade the French government of the need of such a reduction.161 As Anglo-Russian forces landed on the Holland beaches, French forces were suddenly essential to the survival of Patriot rule again. At the time, less than 10,000 French troops were actually present in the Batavian Republic. The best part of the French corps was deployed in Germany. Legrand estimated that, besides the garrison in Flushing, only 6,000 French soldiers were in the Batavian Republic to aid the Batavian army of 25,000 men.162 Vreede spoke of 8,000 French soldiers in total.163 The French government was requested to send more troops to Holland. The French envoy, Florent Guyot, immediately promised that the French auxiliary corps was to be completed in order to comply with treaty obligations to guarantee Batavian independence.164 The Directoire was resolved to prevent the Batavian Republic becoming part of the British sphere of influence.165 Shortwhile after Florent Guyot’s promise, French troops did indeed arrive and, together with Franco-Batavian forces already in the field, pinned down Anglo-Russian forces in the Holland swamps. According to Legrand, 15,000 men were sent to Holland.166 Needless to say, the Batavian government was supposed to pay for them.

161   28 February 1799, Rapport over den Staat der Buitenlandsche Zaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 120. 162   Legrand, 1895, pp. 210–211. 163   Vreede, 1864, p. 51. 164   24 August 1799, Florent Guyot to Reinhard; NA 2.01.08 no. 233. 165   Legrand, 1895, p. 224. 166   Legrand, 1895, p. 227.

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After the failed attempt to become neutral,167 the Uitvoerend Bewind resumed its attempts to have the number of French troops reduced. It contemplated a reduction to 10,000 men. In addition, French auxiliary forces had to be better and entirely subordinated to the Batavian government. Again, this was presented as a financial necessity. In combination with more freedom for Batavian trade, this would relieve the exhausted Batavian treasury of which the French Republic was said to profit as well.168 Schimmelpenninck, by then the Batavian envoy in Paris, was to initiate talks on the French troops in Batavian pay. For the first time in official correspondence, a Batavian official—the Foreign Secretary Maarten van der Goes—, expressed his concerns on the effect the presence of French troops had on the domestic political situation. He contended that the Batavian Republic had experienced detrimental effects of ‘the power by which French general arbitrarily move troops and place them into garrisons.’ Especially, posting French troops in The Hague was a thorn in its flesh. Their presence and behaviour caused anxiety and subverted public support for the Uitvoerend Bewind.169 After the brumaire coup d’état in Paris (9 November 1799), the new French regime was in dire need of money. General Bonaparte had to establish his rule in France as well as to procure the means to drive back the Austrians. In this light, Schimmelpenninck urged the Batavian government not to refuse a once-off payment right away. He suggested making use of the Consulat’s financial situation to settle the disputes with regard to the French troops in Batavian pay. If one would succeed in reducing those troops in return for a certain sum of money that might turn out to be a retrenchment in the long term.170 Negotiations were indeed initiated, but French concessions would be on territorial matters. In the course of the negotiations the Secretary for War was informed of the Consuls’ intention to complete the French troops to the full number of 25,000 men. Van der Goes protested against this unilateral decision taken while negotiations were going on.171 Hence, the Consulat had set for continuing the course in which the financial burden of the war to the French Republic was relieved   In 1799 a secret mission was sent to Berlin. See section 4.6.   1 November 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 121. 169   1 November 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 121. 170   30 November 1798 Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 640. 171   17 January 1800, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 167 168



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by having its allies pay for part of the troops. Additional troops send to the Batavian Republic to counter the Anglo-Russian invasion were even withdrawn quite slowly. Batavian complaints on the number of French troops caused some irritation with the new French envoy, Semonville. He contended that the French Republic had come to the Batavian Republic’s aid once it was attacked. It had sent troops to relieve its ally that was not sufficiently able to defend itself, while it needed those troops itself just as much. Il oublia ses intérêts directs pour prêter à la Batavie toute l’assistance de la coopération la plus entière et la plus désintéressée.

Now that the enemy had retreated, troops would be reduced again to the number fixed in the Conventions that united both Republics. That would take some time, though. Since the additional troops had come to liberate the Batavians from the English, the Batavian government was in no position to whine that it would not pay for them, especially since French troops before the invasion had not met the number of 25,000 and the Batavian Republic henceforth had not had to support the full number of troops it was obliged to.172 After brumaire, Bonaparte was, however, short of troops. He was scraping together forces creating an army to campaign in Italy. Hence, whilst financial considerations called for the Batavian Republic to fund the full number of troops, he could not afford to commit 25,000 men to that remote corner of the Continental theatres of war for military reasons. The 25,000 men were to stay in Batavian pay, but he wished to send part of them to Germany where they could be deployed most effectively for the common defence. Semonville stressed that the troops would be used in the best way to the Batavian Republic’s defence and to further the cause of peace in this way. In Germany they were wanted more, since that was where the enemy actually had concentrated his forces. He proposed that the Batavian Republic would deposit the funds needed for their pay in the chest of the French war ministry.173 The Uitvoerend Bewind was not to be persuaded. Innate Dutch frugality was complemented by its lack of money. In addition, the AngloRussian invasion, as said before, had roused the Batavian Patriots from their dream of safety and renewed or strengthened their appreciation

  23 January 1800, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 233.   25 January 1800, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 233.

172 173

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of some French troops being directly at hand for their protection. Taking the strength of the Counter-revolutionary movement and especially the possibility of a new invasion from the side of the sea into consideration, they did not want to see their means of protection go for the sole chance of them tipping the balance towards a French victory over Austria. Recent events had shown what the absence of auxiliary forces sufficient for the defence of the country might lead to.174 Hence, the Uitvoerend Bewind vehemently refused to pay for troops sent abroad. For the time being, a reduction of French auxiliary forces in the Batavian Republic was out of the question. Fear and insecurity did not give financial worries the go-by entirely, though. The Batavian government did insist on a better, that is a more economic administration of the French corps.175 The Premier Consul did express his willingness to make terms, since conflicting interpretations had arisen on the Treaty of The Hague and the 12 May 1798 Convention was not carried out. He explicitly referred to the maintenance of the French troops in Batavian pay and the ‘co-propriété’ of Flushing.176 His willingness did depend, however, on paying a sum of 50 million francs, since the French Republic would renounce ‘avantages réels.’ The requested sum would procure the means to carry on the war against the Coalition and would be a new pledge of devotion to the common cause. The restoration of peace, according to Bonaparte, was the precondition for the recovery of Batavian power and commerce and, hence, it was in the Batavian Republic’s interest to provide him with the means to win the war or at least to force Austria and Britain to the negotiating table. The Premier Consul proposed reducing French troops in the Batavian Republic to 10,000 men. The troops would only be replaced with the Batavian government’s consent and would stay in the Batavian Republic for at least one year. To soothe Batavian security concerns, France would promise to put more troops at the Batavian government’s disposal at its request. In addition, the French commanding general would be subordinated to the Uitvoerend Bewind.

  31 January 1800, Van der Goes to Semonville; NA 2.01.08 no. 122.   27 January 1800, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 176  To be discussed in chapter II.5. 174 175



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Talleyrand informed Van der Goes of Bonaparte’s proposal and informed him that Semonville was ready to confer. The French minister observed that by consenting to this settlement the Batavian government would actually save money if the war would go on for another two years.177 So, Bonaparte really was in dire need of cash at the time or expected peace to be concluded soon. Nevertheless, the Uitvoerend Bewind cautiously rejected the proposal. In the first place, it did not have that kind of money at its disposal. The banks of Amsterdam probably did, but they were not likely to lend it to a virtually bankrupt government. In fact, as Bonaparte sent Marmont to Amsterdam to negotiate loans with bankers directly after the Uitvoerend Bewind’s rejection, he was to return empty-handed as well.178 It has been asserted that this double rejection caused Bonaparte to initiate a regime change in the Batavian Republic in 1801 in order to bring into office a government that was more able, or docile, in mobilising Batavian resources for the war effort.179 Probably those assertions approach the truth quite accurately, but in 1800 Bonaparte still had to deal with the Uitvoerend Bewind. In the second place and rather exceptionally, it was adamant to deter any reduction of French troops at the time because of rumours on new attacks against the Batavian Republic. Batavian defences were not to be weakened.180 Again, the Uitvoerend Bewind did underscore the need to make new arrangements on ‘the administration’ of the troops. They should be less costly and more subordinate to the Batavian government.181 Rumours of military threats were indeed stirred up by the French themselves. To the great surprise of Van der Goes, French officials emitted discrepant signals.182 While the one warned for a new invasion, the other wanted to withdraw troops from the Batavian Republic to be deployed as auxiliary forces in Germany.183 In an attempt to scrape together as much forces as possible for his campaign against Austria, Bonaparte did thus invoke the Batavian Republic’s obligation to provide troops in purview of Article 7 of the Treaty of The Hague next to reducing French troops in the Batavian Republic. It does not come as   6 February 1800, Talleyrand to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 231.   Legrand, 1895, p. 258; Schama, 1989, p. 478. 179   Legrand, 1895, p. 250; Schama, 1989, pp. 483–488. 180   11 February 1800, Van der Goes aan Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 181   7 February 1800, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 182   19 June 1800, Van der Goes to Semonville; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 183   25 February 1800, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 233. 177 178

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a surprise that the Uitvoerend Bewind did not even contemplate giving in to these more extensive demands. It held for the completion of the French corps in Batavian pay to its full strength in the light of a new British invasion to be expected on Walcheren,184 and fiercely complained of unremitting replacement of French troops.185 Semonville’s request to settle the overdue pay of a French demi-brigade infantry met a clear refusal by the Uitvoerend Bewind arguing that those troops had left the Batavian Republic.186 Paris was not to give in that easily, though. In June, Talleyrand repeated the request to send a brigade to Germany. Since the Premier Consul was forced to commit a considerable part of French forces to Italy, it was absolutely necessary that auxiliary Batavian forces joined the French army in Germany. General Augereau had to ask the Batavian government for 7,000 men. Talleyrand invoked the existing treaties and the common cause and asserted that the Premier Consul had not even reckoned with the possibility of a refusal.187 In The Hague Semonville likewise repeated the request for troops. Van der Goes suggested staying on the course adopted before. His draft response expressed the Uitvoerend Bewind’s surprise that the request had been repeated and stuck to the refusal to diminish armed forces in the Batavian Republic at the time that its territory was again endangered by the enemy. Although the Uitvoerend Bewind was to express not to desire interfering with the Premier Consul’s plan of campaign, it needed the troops for the defence of the Batavian Republic.188 This response was never sent, though, because the Uitvoerend Bewind deemed it prudent to give in to the French requests. The Batavian government expressed its willingness to cooperate according to its means to ‘la continuité des succès de son allié.’ Therefore: Au milieu de cette incertitude pénible la crainte de l’ennemi a dû céder à des considérations plus graves et le Directoire n’a pas hésité à sacrifier momentanément la défense de la République Batave à un plan de campagne dont une paix honorable pour la France et ses alliés, doit être le résultat.

  7 March 1800, Van der Goes to Bordeaux; NA 2.01.08 no. 107.   e.g. 13 May and 30 May 1800, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 107. 186   2 April 1800, Van der Goes to Semonville; NA 2.01.08 no. 107. 187   11 June 1800, Talleyrand to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 694. 188   31 May 1800, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 184 185



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Part of the Batavian army—three to four infantry battalions and some cavalry—, was to be put at Augereau’s disposal to be deployed abroad. These troops were to be assembled near Nijmegen. This compliance was presented as a great sacrifice by which Batavian security was subordinated to the general war effort. In return, the Uitvoerend Bewind expected the Premier Consul to make sure that at the peace settlements the Batavian Republic’s entitlement to a complete execution of the Alliance Treaty would be honoured, that is to say, mainly the colonial guarantee and the prospect of territorial compensation for the Lands of the Generality ceded to France. Moreover, the Batavian Republic should receive compensation equivalent to its sacrifices.189 In the actual response to Semonville, the interest the Uitvoerend Bewind took in to the Premier Consul’s plans were stressed, but it was also indicated that the Batavian government could not turn a bird eye to the dangers a reduction of troops present on its soil would lead to in case of an attack. Hence, it put part of the Batavian army—the planned number of troops having been increased to six battalions infantry, twice as many cavalry and a division of mounted artillery, about 8,000 men altogether—at Augereau’s disposal on the express condition that the security of Batavian territory would be guaranteed. As the Uitvoerend Bewind would do the common cause a good turn, it expected the French government to take appropriate measures to prevent the Batavian Republic being recklessly exposed. Semonville would be held personally responsible for the absence of the troops. Moreover, the French government would have to take care of the troops’ maintenance. After having crossed the border, Batavian administrators would only be able to take care of the troops’ pay.190 If the Uitvoerend Bewind had hoped to secure a profit from biding its time before finally mobilising some troops, it had waited too long. Before the troops could actually be deployed, Bonaparte had won a great victory at Marengo (14 June 1800). The Batavian government could do little more than congratulate him.191 In a great hurry, Semonville’s request to augment the Batavian auxiliary core was now

  17 June 1800, Van der Goes to Semonville; NA 2.01.08 no. 122.   19 June 1800, Van der Goes to Semonville; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 191   1 Juy 1800, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 107. 189 190

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complied with ‘to expressly show the Premier Consul once more the benevolent cooperation of his [author’s italic; RK] loyal ally.’192 Of course, the crushing defeat of the Austrians at Marengo had changed the military situation in Western Europe completely. The threat to Batavian territory diminished substantially, since Britain would not risk a new invasion without the best part of French forces committed to fight Austria. Furthermore, Marengo had created the possibility to enforce a rapid break, and, anticipating the gains to be won at the peace settlement, The Hague did fancy joining in the success. Finally, the Premier Consul had secured his political position in France. Hence, the Batavian government had become more dependent of his personal appreciation and being obstructive had become a greater risk. It soon would be shown that the Consulat had gained confidence and, by consequence, was to treat its allies with less circumspection. On 26 July the French Consuls unilaterally decided that the Batavian auxiliary troops would be fed at the expense of the Batavian Republic. The Uitvoerend Bewind instructed Admiral De Winter—deputizing for Schimmelpenninck as the envoy was on a leave of absence—, to protest against this decision. It was argued that the French Consuls were not at liberty to take this decision as it belonged to the faculty of the Batavian government and was adverse to the explicit conditions under which the troops had been put at Augereau’s disposal to which the French general and Semonville had consented. The Batavian government expected that the Consuls, once having been informed of the agreements entered into, would make sure that the French would supply the Batavian troops.193 The financial aspects of their military cooperation would keep playing tricks on the two allied Republics. While the Premier Consul proposed to negotiate a convention on the proportional distribution of the contributions levied by the ‘Gallo-Batavian army’ to make the advantages of the alliance reciprocal, the French insisted once more that the pay for the part of the French auxiliary force of 25,000 men that was not actually in the Batavian Republic would be deposited in the French treasury. Again, the Uitvoerend Bewind refused to pay   ‘den Eersten Consul nogmaals een blijk te geven van de welwillende medewerking van zijn getrouwen geallieerde’; 8 July 1800, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 193   29 August 1800, Van der Goes to De Winter; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 192



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for troops not used to its immediate defence. It was stressed that the Batavian Republic had observed its obligations to maintain the French troops loyally, but it would not pay for troops other than the ones on Batavian soil or the ones temporarily deployed abroad on its admission. Moreover, the Batavian government contented not to be obliged to do so in purview of the Alliance Treaty.194 The conclusion of the Peace of Lunéville (9 February 1801) between France and the Emperor caused the Batavian foreign policy makers to reconsider the Franco-Batavian alliance. That is not to say that they wanted or at least proposed to dispose of the alliance entirely. The Continental peace had changed the military situation, though, in a way that, in their view, made the provisions of the Treaty of The Hague with regard to military cooperation unreasonable in the light of the Batavian Republic’s financial situation. Needless to say that that situation had not improved yet. The pay of the French auxiliary troops amounted to about one third of the annual budget or ten million guilders average a year. Van der Goes saw a window of opportunity to decrease the financial burden.195 He suggested proposing to the French that French troops would leave the Batavian Republic after the general peace, whereas until that moment the French auxiliary corps would be reduced to 6,000 men stationed in the border towns.196 Towards Semonville, he emphasised that the Batavian Republic was no longer able to carry the financial burden the French auxiliary corps posed. The financial situation desperately called for budget cuts for the duration of the present war and the retreat of the entire French corps after the general peace.197 In addition, Van der Goes argued that a reduction of the costs of the land forces would allow the Batavian government to shift funds to the navy and, hence, to fully concentrate on the war effort against Britain.198

194   31 October 1800, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind (draft reply to Semonville); NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 195   19 March 1801, Van der Goes to Semonville, Apperçu sur les rapports respectifs des deux Républiques; NA 2.21.073 no. 51 and AAE CP Hollande 605. 196   18 February 1801, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 123 and NA 2.01.01.04 no. 485. 197   19 March 1801, Van der Goes to Semonville, Apperçu sur les rapports respectifs des deux Républiques; NA 2.21.073 no. 51 and AAE CP Hollande 605. 198   18 February 1801, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 123 and NA 2.01.01.04 no. 485.

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Van der Goes stressed the financial reasons to reconsider the arrangements with regard to military cooperation. Schimmelpenninck, next to underscoring the possibility to focus on the fleet once the financial means needed to maintain the French corps would become available, took a more political stance as well. The Batavian envoy regarded the mere presence of a French army as fixed in the Treaty of The Hague contrary to national independence. It had proved to be a source of interference and suppression. Therefore, he held brief for a complete and immediate retreat of French troops from the Batavian Republic. In his point of view, only a complete retreat would amount to a sincere recognition of the Batavian Republic’s ‘national dignity.’ In addition, only after the presence of French troops in the Batavian Republic had ended, the latter could be truly convinced of the sincerity of the Batavian allegiance to France, that is to say that the devotion and loyalty to the alliance evolved out of a ‘voluntary affection’ instead of French military presence.199 A complete retreat of French troops or, ‘the substitution of military influence by a powerful ally’s amicable influence,’ according to Schimmelpenninck, was essential for relations between the two Republics and called for by ‘sound statecraft’ based on reciprocal interests.200 Of course, Van der Goes and Schimmelpenninck were both moderates among Batavian Patriots. They were less inclined to cling to the French alliance and more apt to think ‘nationally.’ So their position does not come as a surprise. Lunéville provided the opportunity to get rid of a settlement they had disliked from the start or had at least tolerated as a necessity while the Batavian Republic had to take into account the possibility of being attacked directly. What should strike us, maybe, is that pro-French elements in Dutch politics had traditionally held for investing in the navy instead of the land forces but were forced to support huge payments to the land forces out of factional interests once an alliance with France was concluded. There are no signs that the French government seriously considered pulling back its forces from the Batavian Republic at this point. It was prepared to give in to some of the Batavians demands, though. After the Continental peace had been signed at Lunéville and secret negotia  21 March 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 631.   ‘de amicale invloed van een magtigen bondgenoot in de plaats treeden van eene ondragelijke militaire influentie [. . .] gezonde staatskunde’; 21 March 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 631. 199 200



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tions on a preliminary peace with Britain had commenced in London, negotiations on a new military convention between the French and Batavian Republics were initiated in The Hague. By 29 August 1801, Augereau and the Batavian Navy Secretary, Jacobus Spoors, completed the text.201 The preamble clearly stated that the convention aimed at reducing the ‘excessive’ costs involved with the maintenance of the French troops. The Batavian wishes were met to a remarkably large extent. The French auxiliary troops ‘in the service of the Batavian Republic’ were reduced to five demi-brigades of infantry and five companies of artillery. Taken together that amounted to somewhat over 10,000 men. The troops were not to be replaced without the consent of both governments.202 In case of necessity, the troops might be augmented, but that would only be done at the request of the Batavian government and by mutual agreement.203 Moreover, Article 4 stated that, since the French troops were stationed in the Batavian Republic as auxiliaries, they were subordinated to the Batavian government’s command like Batavian troops. It was explicitly stipulated that the auxiliary force would stay in the Batavian Republic until the peace with Britain would have become definitive.204 When the Convention was presented for ratification to the Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam sub rosa, the Uitvoerend Bewind stressed that the presence of French troops did not contradict Batavian independence. In the past, the Uitvoerend Bewind recorded, it had happened that French officials had disrespected Batavian independence. Now, the Batavian government argued that next to a cut back in expenses, the Convention was expressly intended to clarify the position of the French forces in the Batavian Republic and hence to reduce the risk of infringements on Batavian independence.205   29 August 1801, Convention between the Batavian Republic and France; CTS vol. 56, pp. 189–194; in Dutch translation: 3 September 1801, Uitvoerend Bewind to Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 533. 202  Article 1. 203  Article 3. 204  Article 2. 205   ‘Hoe zeer, toch, het aanwezen dezer troepen binnen dit gemeenebest, even min als de betrekking waar in zij tot het zelve stonden, iets strijdigs hadt tegen zijne erkende onafhanhlijkheid, heeft te meermalen, echter, hare inrichting gelegenheid gegeven, dat, hoe zeer buiten of tegen de intentie van het Fransch gouvernement, ondergeschikte magten en personen, die onafhanglijkheid minder gerespecteerd, en door hun gedrag daar aan minder beandwoord hebben, dan wel hadt behoren te geschieden, 201

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The 29 August 1801 Convention had confirmed the settlement somewhat more implicitly present in the Alliance Treaty, that French troops would leave the Batavian Republic at the end of the war. Hence, the Peace of Amiens (27 March 1802), that terminated the war with Britain, was expected to mean the end of French military presence in the Batavian Republic as well. Some weeks before the Peace Treaty was concluded, Van der Goes had indicated to Schimmelpenninck that the Batavian government did not favour French troops staying on Batavian territory longer than stipulated by the Convention.206 In French governmental circles some assumed likewise that French forces would be pulled back. For instance, Flassan, former chef de division at the Foreign Office, presented the pull back of the troops as a natural consequence of peace.207 No wonder that Schimmelpenninck was quite surprised when Bonaparte asked him during his 10 April 1802 audience whether the Batavian government desired the French troops to leave immediately. The Batavian envoy answered that he thought that ‘l’époque des ratifications doit être celle de l’évacuation.’208 According to Schimmelpenninck’s own account of this audience, the Premier Consul agreed to that principle, but he asked whether the Batavian government might not appreciate the troops to stay somewhat longer in connection with military expeditions to the colonies. France planned to send troops to Louisiana, which had just been ceded to the French Republic by Spain.209 Apparently, Bonaparte did not fancy evacuating the Batavian Republic that soon. For financial reasons, the Premier Consul still needed to keep a significant number of French troops abroad.210 He seems to have realised that a prolonged stay needed the Batavian government’s consent to give it an aura of legitimacy at a time the long-desired peace needed to be stabilised. Bonaparte’s attempt to persuade the Staatsbeen in veele aangelegene opzichten ten hoogsten wenschelijk ware geweest; ja zelfs, dat dezerzijds wel eens tot eene onaangename en onvoordeelige inschikkelijkheid, om grootere zwarigheden te praevenieren, heeft moeten worden besloten.’; 3 September 1801, Uitvoerend Bewind to Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 533. 206   3 March 1802, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.021.073 no. 18. 207   27 August 1800, Pacification de l’Europe fondée sur la principe des indemnités et de l’équilibre continental et maritime; AAE MD France 652. 208   10 April 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 636. 209   1 October 1800, Traité préliminaire et secret de Saint-Ildefonse entre la France et l’Espagne; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 159–162; see also Deutsch, 1938, p. 87. 210  Deutsch, 1938, p. 88.



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wind—that had replaced the Uitvoerend Bewind after the 1801 coup d’état—to give its consent, failed though. Convinced of his government’s stance in respect to the French troops, Schimmelpenninck at once responded that the Batavian army was perfectly able to defend the country itself.211 Meanwhile, Batavian authorities had gained confidence by the peace to stand up against French officials and soldiers. For instance, a Batavian border patrol near Nijmegen refused to allow some units of French artillery that had been transferred from Dusseldorf to Venlo passage over Batavian territory without the approval of their superiors in The Hague and without the payment of toll. The French troops concerned had actually halted at the border and Semonville neatly requested free passage. As it suited an ally, this permission was granted and the officials near Nijmegen were instructed to let the French units pass immediately.212 Even before Schimmelpenninck’s account of his audience with the Premier Consul could have possibly reached The Hague, the Batavian Raad van Oorlog213 addressed the French Secretary for War, LouisAlexandre Berthier, with the request to indicate when the French troops would leave in order to be able to take measures for the Batavian army to replace the French garrisons.214 He answered that no ‘positive’ decision had been taken to that regard.215 Having taken cognizance of that response, it dawned on the Staatsbewind that the French government might actually be delaying the evacuation of the Batavian Republic deliberately. Schimmelpenninck was instructed to urge the French government to set a date for the French auxiliary troops to march home.216 Again, Paris avoided the issue. By August, the Staatsbewind was fed up with the French government’s stalling tactics. The Raad van Oorlog was charged not to conclude any contracts for the maintenance of the French troops ‘relying on the French government already having given orders to the

  10 April 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 636.   12 April 1802, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234; 14 April 1802, Van der Goes to Semonville; NA 2.01.08 no. 110. 213  According to the 1801 Batavian Constitution, with the exception of the department of Foreign Affairs, all departments were headed by a council. 214   15 April 1802, Raad van Oorlog to Berthier; NA 1.02.14 no. 686. 215   10 May 1802, Berthier to Raad van Oorlog; copy enclosed with 18 May 1802, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 686. 216   17 May 1802, resolution Staatsbewind; NA 1.02.14 no. 686. 211 212

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marching off.’217 In addition, it instructed Schimmelpenninck to inform the French government that supplying French troops would cease on 23 September,218 which he did on the occasion of an audience with the Premier Consul on 15 August.219 The only French response was that the permission granted to the Batavian Republic to recruit troops on French territory was revoked.220 The Batavian government was persistent to persevere. On 2 September, Schimmelpenninck gave the French three more weeks to evacuate the country. After 23 September, the troops would no longer be supplied since the budget did not allow their prolonged presence. The Staatsbewind urged the French government to respect the independence and rights of neighbouring peoples, and hence to order the evacuation of Batavian territory.221 The ultimatum expired. On 31 October 1802, Schimmelpenninck repeated his call for an evacuation of Batavian territory. This time, he explicitly invoked the Treaty and conventions, as well as the Batavian Republic’s independence. Moreover, he emphasised that the Wetgevend Lichaam no longer granted funds for the troops’ maintenance.222 In a letter to Van der Goes, the evacuation failing to occur was ascribed by Schimmelpenninck to the political situation Europe was in, especially the rupture of the power equilibrium. As Schimmelpenninck had it, Batavian independence could only be truly established once the balance of power had been restored. As long as the policy not to make light of agreements between the strong and the less strong continues; as long as it is taken as sound politics not to carry through solemnly pledged promises and officially agreed commitments if they contradict specific views; as long as, in a single word, Europe has not returned to a balance of power from which a kind of law

217   ‘vertrouwende [. . .] dat het Fransch Gouvernement reeds de nodige bevelen tot het vertrek van gemelde troepen uit de Bataafse Republiek [. . .] zal hebben gegeven’; 2 August 1802, resolution Staatsbewind; 6 August 1802, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 686. 218   10 August 1802, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 686. 219   16 August 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 638. 220   21 August 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 660. 221   2 September 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 660. 222   31 October 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 660; 1 November 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 638.



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of nations and respect for small and great powers is reborn, so long I do not see any hope for this Republic to any real independence.223

The French government refused to evacuate the Batavian Republic, because it was in a position to do so. Schimmelpenninck especially referred to the deteriorating relation between the French and British governments in the past weeks. It seemed to the Batavian envoy that the Premier Consul had set for the preservation of a military influence in the Batavian Republic at least until Franco-Anglo relations would improve again in order to be sure of ‘the policy of the Batavian Republic’224 in case of a rupture. Nonetheless, Talleyrand had recently indicated that the Premier Consul had not changed his previously expressed intention to have the French troops leave the Batavian Republic instantaneously. The French minister substantiated the postponement by referring to delay with preparations for the Louisiana expedition to which the better part of the French troops in the Batavian Republic was destined. Schimmelpenninck indicated that this argument was confirmed by information he had received from the Secretary for War.225 Preparations to ship the French troops to America were indeed made. Large supplies were transported to Hellevoetsluys, a naval port near Rotterdam.226 Along the entire coasts transports were being requisitioned and moved to Hellevoetsluys.227 Hence, the Louisiana expedition seems not to have been a mere pretext. At the same time, preparations for that expedition meant that France sent even more troops to the Batavian

223   ‘Zo lange het systhema blijft voortduuren om geen het minst gewigt aan verbintenissen tusschen sterkere en minder sterke te hegten; zo lange het voor eene groote staatkunde gehouden wordt om aan plegtige gegevenen beloften en officieele gecontracteerde engagementen, geen de minste executie te geven, wanneer de praesentie daar van met bijzondere vues niet overeenkomen, zo lange met een woord, Europa niet wederkere tot zodanige zoort van equiliber van magt, waar uit weder een soort van recht der volken en egards voor kleinere en grootere mogendheden gebooren worde, ook zo lange zie ik voor onze Republiek geen schijn van gegronde hoop op eenige wezenlijk independente [. . .].’; 5 November 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 638. 224   ‘de staatkunde der Bataafsche Republicq.’ 225   5 November 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 638. 226   9 November 1802, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234. 227   3 December 1802, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234.

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Republic, even without the Batavian government’s prior knowledge. Protests against these movements of troops228 were simply ignored.229 On 19 November 1802, Semonville requested permission for the replacement of the French garrison in Middelburg and to augment the garrison in Flushing as in both places French forces suffered from fevers due to the local climate. In reaction, the Staatsbewind, seeing its way clear, decided to replace the French garrisons by Batavian troops entirely. This was not quite the result Semonville had intended. Therefore, the replacement of French by Batavian troops to form the Middelburg and Flushing garrisons was not implemented. At the same occasion, the Batavian government once again insisted on a swift pull of French troops from Batavian territory. The Staatsbewind asserted that funds were no longer available for the troops’ maintenance. It considered itself being unable to propose the Wetgevend Lichaam to grant funds based on the financial situation of the Batavian Republic and the fact that expenses for the French troops were clearly at odds with treaty provisions now that the Peace of Amiens (27 March 1802) had been ratified.230 Whether the Staatsbewind only menaced no longer supplying the French troops or whether it had actually dared depriving a force of several thousands of armed men of the necessities of life, can only be established by an exploration of the archives of the administration of these troops. What is to be noted here, though, is that the Batavian government, invoking the Treaty and conventions, no longer considered itself obliged to support French troops now that the war had ended and that it was not as docile not to stand up against the government in Paris. Mutual rights and obligations were clearly fixed by mutual consent and the treaties and conventions had to be obeyed by both allies. In the Batavian argument reference to good faith in the execution of treaties and conventions more and more took precedence over the financial grounds that had been invoked initially. In early December the arrival of a new commander in chief of the French troops, General Montrichard, was seized as an opportunity 228   28 November 1802, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 713. De Vos van Steenwijk replaced Schimmelpenninck as Batavian envoy in Paris after the latter had left for London. 229   27 and 29 December 1802, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234. 230   19 November 1802, Semonville to Van der Goes; 30 November 1802, Resolution of the Staatsbewind and Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709; Likewise: 17 December 1802, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709.



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for a new offensive to induce the French evacuating their troops and relieving the Batavian Republic of this financial burden.231 The Staatsbewind now decided not to make payments to the new general or his staff.232 Van der Goes informed De Vos van Steenwijk, who had replaced Schimmelpenninck as Batavian envoy in Paris that the Staatsbewind expected his march orders to be given as soon as possible and that in the meantime no orders would be given adverse to Batavian independence and the 29 August 1801 Convention.233 In Paris, a less amicable tone was taken. Whereas until then, the prolonged stay of French troops in the Batavian Republic after Amiens had been presented as temporary, by the end of the year the French government changed its line of argument. As De Vos van Steenwijk protested to further encumber the Batavian Republic with French troops instead of an evacuation, Talleyrand responded that ‘ce ne sont pas les amis de la Batavie’ who desired evacuation of French forces. The Batavian envoy objected that the request to evacuate came from the Batavian government itself, that it had always been loyal, and that deciding what was and what was not in the interest of the Batavian Republic was up to the Staatsbewind. Moreover, he argued that the request to evacuate was based on conventions. Finally, Talleyrand was reminded of the fact that Batavian state finances were exhausted and, after the peace, no funds could be released for the maintenance of the French troops. The French minister gave De Vos the brush-off by promising to discuss the matter with the Premier Consul. In his account of this discussion to Van der Goes, De Vos van Steenwijk ascribed the French attitude to the difference in power. Meanwhile, I flatter myself that you approve of my efforts. It is unsure what their effect will be, for as long as one seems to consider it a maxim that agreements with small powers do not have the same effect as those with powerful ones, because the former’s physical power do not allow them to enforce agreements by arms.234

231   6 December 1802, De Vos van Steenwijk to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 707; 7 December 1802, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709. 232   7 December 1802, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709. 233   10 December 1802, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709. 234   ‘Ik vleye mij intusschen dat deze mijne pogingen uwe goedkeuring zullen wegdragen, dan met welk effect dezelve zullen bekroond worden, is onzeker, zo lang men voor een stelregel schijnt te houden dat stipulatien en transactiën voor klijndere mogendheden niet dezelfde uitwerking hebben, als voor magtiger, om dat de physique

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By the start of the new year (according to the Gregorian calendar) the French even openly expressed their intentions to keep some troops in the Batavian Republic. References to the Louisiana expedition as a pretext for not evacuating the troops were pushed into the background. Semonville contended that the Batavian Republic owed its independence to France. The Premier Consul was prepared to give in to the Batavian call for execution of the treaties and conventions, but: ‘Toutes ont pour but la prospérité de la République Batave et la stabilité de l’alliance des deux nations.’ The prosperity of a commercial nation like the Batavian Republic depended on ‘son repos,’ he asserted, and exactly that tranquillity was still unstable until the Constitution had been fully carried through and the Peace of Amiens, especially with regard to the restitution of the Batavian colonies, had been entirely executed. Once those conditions would have been met, the Premier Consul would indeed be obliged to evacuate French troops. However, for the time being, there were still intrigues and at the international level peace had not stabilised international relations yet. For those reasons, the French government wanted to keep troops in the Batavian Republic. Semonville pointed to the example of the Helvetic Republic, where political turmoil had been rekindled after the evacuation of French troops. In the Swiss case, the French government had been forced to send back troops almost immediately. ‘Le soussigné est expressément chargé en outre de présenter au gouvernement les inconvéniens resultans de l’évacuation entière de la Batavie, relativement à la politique générale.’235 Here, the idea of French tutelage and France’s responsibility beyond its border came to the fore. References to that idea are even more clearly present in a letter Semonville wrote some weeks later. There he asserted that the Premier Consul was accountable to Europe for the tranquillity of the Batavian Republic and that he had recognised that that tranquillity depended on a prolonged stay of French troops ‘non suspectibles d’être influencées par les tentatives de factions mal éteintes.’ Troops were to stay due to Bonaparte’s ‘intentions protectrices.’ Simultaneously, Semonville assured Van der Goes that part of the French troops in the Batavian Republic were still destined for kragten der eerstgemelde niet toelaten dezelve met geweld van wapenen te kunnen doen executeren.’; 17 December 1802, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 702. 235   1 January 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234.



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Louisiana and that plans for the evacuation of the remaining troops had already been made and would be executed once the Louisiana expedition had sailed.236 Finally, evacuation of the French troops was conditioned on Britain carrying out its obligations pursuant to the Peace of Amiens, especially the evacuation of Malta and Egypt. De Vos van Steenwijk’s protests that this line of conduct was adverse to the Treaty and convention, as well as to promises made to Schimmelpenninck that French troops would leave the Batavian Republic as soon as possible, were countered by Talleyrand simply denying that those promises had been made.237 Van der Goes was on the verge of despair: We would not be short of arguments, if arguments derived from the law of nations would be of avail, to repudiate in a victorious way the twisted interpretation given by the French government to the Convention with regard to the auxiliary forces present here. If our erstwhile enemies would pursue the same logic as our allies, the Republic would reclaim its colonies from Great Britain fruitlessly.238

The only thing that rested him to do was instructing De Vos van Steenwijk to insist on a written communication next time.239 The Staatsbewind yielded to a prolonged stay of a limited number of French troops. However, it did do so reluctantly. The Batavian government implicitly rejected the argument that a prolonged stay of French troops was in the interest of the Batavian Republic. The resolution in which it agreed to keep two demi-brigades in Batavian pay considered that the Premier Consul deemed some French troops staying in the Batavian Republic for a while necessary ‘in the interests of the French Republic.’240 Furthermore, the Staatsbewind contended that all means to make the French troops leave had been exhausted and resisting their

  30 January 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234.   19 January 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 702. 238   ‘Het zoude ons aan geene argumenten ontbreken, indien argumenten uit het recht der Volken ontleend hier baten konden, om op een victorieuse manier te weerleggen de zo tardire als gewrongene interpretatie, welke het Fransch Gouvernement thans geeft aan de Conventie betrekkelijk de auxiliaire troupen alhier. Indien onze gewezen vijanden de logica onzer bondgenoten in de uitlegging der tractaten volgden zoude de Republiek nog heden haare colonien vrugteloos van Groot Britannien reclameren.’; 29 January 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 239   29 January 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 240   ‘voor de belangen van de Fransche Republiek.’ 236 237

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prolonged stay was not prudent.241 Moreover, it did persist in a reduction of the financial burden to the Batavian treasury. Hence, it made the conditions that French forces above the agreed number would not be put at the charge of the Batavian Republic, that the 29 August 1801 Convention would remain in force, and that the French commanding general would not establish his headquarters in The Hague. The regulations in respect of the troops’ maintenance were renewed with slight changes due to the diminished number of the troops.242 Thus, French troops were still present in the Batavian Republic by the time deteriorated Anglo-French relations subsided into a rupture of the Amiens Peace. 4.4  Commanding the Troops It is one thing to have French troops present on one’s soil or to deploy Batavian forces to fight along with French ones, but this immediately raises the question who was to command military forces in the Batavian Republic as well as Batavian forces acting along French armies abroad. Since this study focuses on legal relations, the issue of ‘commanding the troops’ will be explored here from a formal point of view solely. Questions that arise, are: To whom was the French general subordinated? What was his formal relation with the Batavian government? Where there any formal limitations to his actions? Did he have any authority over Batavian troops as well? Were French troops in the Batavian Republic subjected to the Batavian government’s control and/or jurisdiction? Who had the final say if French and Batavian troops acted together or simply were in the same place? Were Batavian troops intregated in allied forces? What was the command structure? Who decided on operations? This study focuses on diplomatic relations, but the presence of French troops in the Batavian Republic did, of course, have political consequences as well. The position and behaviour of the French commanding general are highly relevant to political relations. In competi-

241  Attached to a letter from Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk of 4 February 1803; NA 1.02.14 no. 709. 242   1 February 1803, Van der Goes to Semonville; NA 2.01.08 no. 124. And 4 February 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 2.01.08 no. 124 and NA 1.02.14 no. 709.



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tion with the French envoy, he represented the French government. Especially after General Bonaparte entered into office, the commanding general was an alternative channel of communication to which political factions not in control of the Batavian government and by consequence of the official diplomatic route might turn to gain support for their course or make sure that certain information would reach the government in Paris.243 Indeed, the commanding general of the French troops was involved in both 1798 coups d’état. In practice, a lot depended on the personality and behaviour of the French general. The relation between the Batavian government and generals like Joubert and Victor was fairly amicable. With others, e.g. Brune and Augereau, the Batavian government would soon have enough of their arrogance and headstrong conduct. Hence, they became persona non grata and would be refused command of Batavian troops. In sum, to fully grasp the political relations between the French and Batavian Republics, the French general cannot be ignored. He was at least as influential as the French envoy. In their instructions for Blauw and Meyer,244 the Staten Generaal did not say anything about the command of troops within the Batavian Republics. After all, French troops were to leave the country. The Staten Generaal did propose a plan of campaign and promised troops and vessels. As they transmitted the Staten Generaal’s demands and proposals to the French commissioners,245 the Batavian envoys added some phrases on the command of land and naval forces. The Batavian government would be happy, they asserted, to allow the French oversight over Dutch military operations and desired the French government to send some men to determine the joint plan of operations. They did, however, stress that it would be imprudent to put the supreme command of Batavian armed forces, especially with regard to the navy, in the hands of foreigners or someone not commissioned by the Batavian government. From the start, the French government envisaged a situation in which Batavian forces would be partially integrated in the French war

  Woolf, 1991, p. 124.   26 February 1795, draft instructions; NA 3.02.01 no. 461; 2 March 1795, instructions; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 657–666 no. 501. 245   12 March 1795, Réflexions provisoires pour les citoyens Sieyes et autres commissaires du Comité de Salut public, nommés pour entrer en conférence avec les ministres plenipotentiaires Bataves; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 243 244

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machinery. In the bases proposées, Merlin planned for Dutch naval and land forces assigned to act in the common defence during the war to be under the command of French generals.246 Sieyes remarked that this would cause problems and would not be just with regard to Dutch naval forces. However, the 5 April draft247 still contained the clause as proposed by Merlin, with the slight change that ‘pour la défense commune’ was substituted by ‘contre l’ennemi.’ In this way, the clause more clearly covered offensive action as well. The Staten Generaal, conversely, did not speak in terms of a centralised command structure and wanted to keep Dutch forces clearly separate from French forces. Their 25 April counter draft established that, during the war, naval and land forces were to act according to a plan of campaign concerted between the two governments. The eclaircissemens248 that accompanied the counter draft argued that at least the Dutch navy should stay under the command of Dutch officers because of linguistic reasons. Most Dutch sailors simply would not understand their French officers. In case of joint action, the Staten Generaal were prepared to allow the French commanding general, commodore or admiral supreme command, though. Since Batavian independence depended on the success of the forthcoming campaign and that success depended on the choice of officers, the Staten Generaal contended that command over Batavian troops had to be handed over to officers trusted by the Batavian nation. Frenchmen would not be excluded, but French officers commanding Batavian troops had to be in the Batavian Republic’s service and would have to take an oath to the sovereignty of the Batavian people. By early May, as Reubell and Sieyes were sent to The Hague, the Comité de Salut public held brief for a settlement in which the French government would decide on military operations in the presence of a Batavian delegate. The latter was to attend the meetings of the Comité where he was to have a voice. He would not be allowed to vote.249 Of course, if he had been he would always have been outnumbered unless his vote would count as one against all votes by the Comité taken

 Article 5 BP.  Article 5 5 April draft. 248   26 April 1795, Eclaircissemens sur le projet de traité remis au nom du Gouvernement Batave par les ministres plenipotentiaires soussignés; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 249   4 May 1795, Comité de Salut public (remarks on draft treaty); AAE CP Hollande 587. 246 247



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together or unless votes were equally divided in the Comité. In the 16 May draft, this proposal250 was combined with the earlier provision that during the war naval and land forces to act together and against the enemy would be under the command of French generals.251 With some changes the latter is to be found in the final draft and Treaty.252 First, the phrase ‘pendant la guerre’ was suddenly dropped. Second, the provision was made less general. Instead of ‘les forces de terre et de mer destinées à agir la ensemble et contre l’ennemi,’ the final text stated that ‘Les forces de terre et de mer des Provinces Unies qui seront expressement destinées à agir avec celles de la République française’ would be under the command of French generals. On the other hand, these forces now had to be expressement destined to act with French forces thus setting a somewhat stricter condition on the application of the provision. The Batavian negotiators managed to get the provision on decision making about military operations altered in the final hours of the negotiating process. According to the final draft, both governments would decide upon combined military operations. Practically, the situation would be the same, though, as decision making would still take place in Paris in the presence of a Batavian deputy.253 This provision ended up in the Treaty.254 However, there are no signs that a liaison officer at the governmental level actually ever arrived in the French capital and attended meetings of the Comité de Salut public or the Directoire. The settlement was bemoaned in the Batavian Republic at once. The Provisional Representatives of the Zeeland people, for instance, assessed that the Batavian government’s influence on combined military operations would be very scant.255 In general, the alliance was lead by the French Republic. Despite the stipulation that both governments were to decide on military operations, even this formal arrangement makes clear that, in the end, Paris was to decide. But the Batavian Republic was not formally subordinated to France. It simply took the place of an auxiliary to a great power. Batavian armed forces were not fully integrated in the French army,  Article 2 secret 16 May draft.  Article 3 secret 16 May draft. 252  Article 1 secret final draft; Article 8 Treaty of The Hague. 253  Article 2 secret final draft. 254  Article 9 Treaty of The Hague. 255   23 May 1795, Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Zeeland to Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 780. 250 251

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were not fully at the disposal of the French, and were not subordinated to French officers in general. Batavian forces might be expressly destined to act together with French forces and only then would they be subordinated to French generals. The Batavian government would anxiously hold on to this arrangement in the years to come. The 27 July 1795 Convention256 fixed the position, rights, and obligations of the French commanding general in more detail. He was obliged to inform the Batavian government of all movements he deemed necessary to counter hostile aggression that might take place.257 In case French and Batavian troops would form a garrison together, the officer of the highest rank, whatever Republic he was in the service of, would be in command. In case of equal rank, the French officer would have precedence.258 Although in this pragmatic arrangement the French Republic was given a privileged position, it did actually open the possibility of French soldiers and officers being subordinated to a Batavian officer. To keep hierarchical lines clear and to prevent tensions it was rather prudent to settle the matter of preference and based on the position of both Republics in the Revolutionary alliance as well as on France’s power, it made sense to give the French officer preference. On the other hand, it might be argued that the Dutch officer should have preference, since the troops were on Dutch territory. Furthermore, French troops were not to intervene in public affairs.259 The French general in command of those troops did have to render military aid in order to preserve public order or protect civilians and their properties once requested by civil authorities.260 Only if local authorities were unable to assemble or to make the conditional request, he was allowed to act on his own accord. He was compelled to give the Batavian government notice of his actions, though.261 These articles show that there were some concerns about public disorder within the Batavian Republic, next to the concerns about a foreign threat. Clearly, Dutch Patriots did see the French troops as a guarantee against internal opposition as well, whereas the risk of unwanted interference of

 CTS vol. 52, pp. 419–436.  Article 3 27 July 1795 Convention. 258  Article 4 27 July 1795 Convention. 259  Article 7 27 July 1795 Convention. 260  Article 5 27 July 1795 Convention. 261  Article 6 27 July 1795 Convention. 256 257



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those troops in domestic affairs was at least formally ruled out by demanding a formal request by Batavian authorities. As would be the case with other provisions as well, Article 8 of the Treaty of The Hague was not clear enough to prevent discussions about the command of the armed forces in the Batavian Republic. That is to say, the French did not resign to the limited powers of their general. In the spring of 1796, General Beurnonville requested the Nationale Vergadering to charge him with the command of all troops within the Batavian Republic. The request provoked a lengthy debate in the National Vergadering.262 Some members observed that the general’s request seemed to imply that the army would be mobilised, whereas others contended that this had already taken place. After some investigations, it appeared that the Batavian army had not been mobilised yet. One had only decided to purchase supplies for a campaign. At the time French forces were indeed campaigning in southern Germany as part of the same military plan, designed by Carnot, in the context of which General Bonaparte had been sent into Italy. The assembly’s president, Jan Bernd Bicker, proposed considering to proclaim the mobilisation before a decree on the joint command would be adopted. He stressed that there was no imminent danger, but that it was prudent to bring the borders in a state of defence, both because of the current military situation and to convince the French Republic that the Batavians were deserving of its alliance.263 On the one hand, this debate shows that the Nationale Vergadering did not resist to assigning the command over Batavian troops to the French general if the military situation called for such measures. On the other hand, it does indeed show that the representatives almost automatically linked the joint command to the Batavian army being mobilised in order to act together with French forces. The French general was not to command Batavian troops in ordinary circumstances. This should not come as a surprise, if one takes into consideration that Batavian Patriots had just got rid of their most prominent domestic enemy; a man whose ancestors, in their view, had started to command

262   12 May 1796, Dagverhaal der handelingen van de Nationale Vergadering representeerende het Volk van Nederland; http://192.87.107.12:8080/decreten. 263   17 May 1796, Dagverhaal, p. 486.

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Dutch armed forces as subordinates of the Staten, but, had used their military position to usurp political power and to oppress the people.264 The Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken proposed a decree that stated that General Beurnonville would be commanding general of the Batavian army and that he did not need permission to move troops. He would solely be obliged to inform the Comité te Lande—that is, the committee of the Nationale Vergadering in charge of the administration of military affairs—of troop movements. The Hague garrison, amounting to about 3,000 men or one third of the Batavian army, would be excluded from his command, though. The armed forces in the seat of government would remain under the direct control of the Nationale Vergadering. The command of the Hague garrison had been a tricky business for Dutch Patriots for over a decade. It has to be remembered that the conflict between Patriots and Orangists of the 1780s had gotten out of hand exactly because the Stadhouder had been discharged of that command.265 Schimmelpenninck emphasised the danger of the lawful for solemnly constituted assembly, trustee of the entire citizenry, being attacked by few, and hence of the people’s ‘noblest right’—exercising its sovereignty by means of representation— being violated, if the assembly as a whole would not control the garrison.266 The Frisian law professor, Johan Valckenaer—member of the Nationale Vergadering for the short period he stayed in the Batavian Republic between his period of exile in France and his diplomatic mission to Spain—asserted that the Hague garrison could not be moved, deployed for other purposes, augmented or diminished, without the assembly’s consent. The people’s representatives, after all, should be beyond all suspicion of being under military pressure.267 In response to a question by the representative Jan Hendrik Stoffenberg whether Beurnonville would have the authority to lead the Batavian army abroad, Bicker answered that the draft decree remained deliberately silent as to that regard. Some members expressed their objections to that and wished that faculty to be ruled out. Others contended that the general would be too much restricted in that way and the representative Brands in particular stressed that such a limitation 264   This picture of the Stadholderate had already been drawn by Van der Capellen in his 1781 pamphlet. 265   Schama, 1989, p. 360. 266   12 May 1796, Dagverhaal, p. 475. 267   12 May 1796, Dagverhaal, p. 475.



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would be adverse to the Treaty of Alliance, for acting both defensively and offensively together with French forces would be impossible if Batavian troops were not to leave Batavian territory.268 Beurnonville’s request with regard to a joint command was merely taken note of for quite a time,269 but in the end he was charged with supreme command of the Batavian army. General Beurnonville was replaced almost at the same time as François Noël, that is, by the end of 1797. A week before the radical coup d’état was to take place, Charles Delacroix urged the Nationale Vergadering to recognise the new general, Barthélemy Joubert, as commander of the combined forces. The Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken must have smelled a rat, for it bluntly refused to do so.270 The command of the Batavian army should remain separate from that of the French auxiliary troops. The committee referred to the Nationale Vergadering’s 17 May 1796 decree. At present, there was no reason for a combined command. L’état politique et militaire exigeaient alors la réunion du commandement dans la même chef, mais la nature de la chose et les termes mêmes du décret assurément, que la disposition n’était que temporaire or le traité d’Udine,271 que l’Europe doit à la profonde de sagesse du Directoire Exécutif et à la valeur Française, en nous donnant la paix continentale fit éclore le moment, ou l’Assemblée Nationale Batave put par son décret du 16 Novembre dernier272 remettre les choses sur le pied ordinaire et rendre comme de droit du comité pour les affaires de l’Union de terre, le commandement de l’Armée batave. [. . .] mais jusqu’ici il n’y a point de forces réunies expressément destinées à agir, et ce sont la les termes de l’article. Toute fois il est juste, il est utile; il sera même parfaitement nécessaire, que le concert le plus intime existe entre le général français et le comité de l’union, tant à l’égard des mouvemens, que par rapport à l’administration des troupes.   17 May 1796, Dagverhaal, p. 490.   17 May 1796, Decreet der Nationale Vergadering; http://192.87.107.12:8080/ decreten. 270   17 January 1798, Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to Delacroix; NA 2.01.08 no. 103. 271  Treaty of Campoformio (17 October 1797). 272   17 November 1797, Decreet der Nationale Vergadering; http://192.87.107.12:8080/ decreten; In anticipation of his leave from the Batavian Republic, General Beurnonville had requested information on whom to transfer supreme command of the Batavian army to. The Nationale Vergadering considered that the reasons to charge the French General with supreme command of the Batavian army had ceased because of the Campoformio Peace and that command of the Batavian army would be normalized after Beurnonville’s leave. 268 269

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Delacroix was furious. De Gou even asserted that his support to the January 1798 coup d’état was partly due to the refusal with regard to the supreme command.273 More likely his anger was caused by the committee’s refusal obstructing his plans to gain control over the military prior to the coup being staged. Departing from the assembly’s course, the Batavian radicals who profited from the 22 January coup d’état, showed their gratitude to the French general. On 30 January 1798, the secretary of the Uitvoerend Bewind informed Joubert that the Constituerende Vergadering had assigned him the command over Batavian armed forces.274 Delacroix applauded that decision as being in conformity with the Alliance Treaty.275 The assembly had set some conditions, though. Supreme command was to be temporary. The French general had to give account to the Batavian government and the latter’s consent was needed to deploy troops abroad.276 The secret Convention of 12 May 1798 institutionalised the combined command. The convention stated that a French general appointed by the French government would command the French and Batavian troops on the condition that he would be subjected to the Uitvoerend Bewind.277 As to officers of lower rank, the Convention did not change the previous settlement that in case of combined forces the highest ranking officer would be in charge and that in case of equal rank French officers had precedence.278 It has to be remembered here that the 12 May 1798 Convention was not ratified and put aside as void by the Batavian government after the 12 June coup d’état. Joubert, who had aided the Batavian General Daendels in the military side of the latest coup, was to the Batavian government’s liking, though. Hence, the combined command was left as it was, at least for as long as he was not replaced. The Batavian government did indeed attempt to prevent Joubert being redeployed to the French armies at the Rhine. Furthermore, due to the war situation—the War of the Second Coalition having started by then—a combined command was expedient again. The Uitvoerend  De Gou, 1988, pp. xli–xlii; Schama, 1989, p. 360.   30 January 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Joubert; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458C. 275   7 March 1798, Delacroix to Président de la Convention Nationale; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 189. 276  De Gou, 1988, p. liii. 277  Article 12 12 May 1795 Convention. 278  Article 13 12 May 1795 Convention. 273 274



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Bewind even put its hope in Joubert commanding the combined troops in the Batavian Republic to cause the campaign to go well enough for the Batavian Republic to obtain a ‘splendid border.’279 Joubert was replaced though, and would perish at the Battle of Novi some months later; depriving Sieyes of his first choice to act as a sword during what was to be the brumaire coup. Van der Goes instructed Schimmelpenninck to find out what the French government’s intention in respect of the command of Batavian troops was.280 The French envoy in The Hague, Lombard, addressed the Uitvoerend Bewind on the matter twice, but he did not get an answer.281 In his advice to the Uitvoerend Bewind, Van der Goes returned to the position that legally, that is according to the Alliance Treaty, the French general could only make claims to command of Batavian troops if they were destined to act together with French troops. Otherwise, the command of the Batavian army and the French auxiliary corps should stay separate. Hence, from a legal point of view, the combined command for the new general as requested by Lombard should be rejected. Van der Goes did raise the question, though, whether a rejection would be politically prudent as well. Domestic order and the country’s defence might call for a combined command. As it suited a true civil servant, he left that harsh decision to his superiors. He did bring to the fore though, that putting its armed forces under the command of a foreign general always was quite risky to an independent state, whatever provisions might be made to secure his subordination to the Batavian government. For it was rather likely that ‘conflicts of jurisdiction’282 between the orders of both governments would arise. On the other hand, Van der Goes wondered whether it would be prudent to oppose the mighty ally’s desire in the present tricky circumstances if the French government would keep insisting on a combined command. ‘Is one sufficiently strong and in control of domestic intrigues to allow oneself a refusal?’283 Therefore, he proposed to settle the issue amicably.284 Somewhat later, Van

279   ‘brillante limiete’; 1798 (no specific date indicated; after 12 June), Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 509. 280   5 April 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 120. 281   28 May 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 120; 11 June 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 120. 282   ‘conflict van jurisdictie.’ 283   ‘Is men van binnenlandsche intrigues meester en sterk genoeg om een weigerend antwoord te kunnen souteneeren?’ 284   3 July 1799, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 120.

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der Goes did indeed inform Schimmelpenninck that negotiations with General Brune on the combined command had been initiated.285 And then British and Russian forces invaded Holland. Without any hesitation, Brune was given the command of all forces in the Batavian Republic.286 The threat was too imminent to consider any conditions. However, the combined command was still of a temporary nature in the Batavian government’s view. Once the enemy forces had evacuated the Holland swamps they had been driven into by the Franco-Batavian army, the Uitvoerend Bewind decided to cancel the combined command again. Although initially he just accepted the Bewind’s decision, Brune’s substitute, General Kellerman protested. He argued that the combined command should be prolonged, since Batavian troops were still integrated in French forces and it was necessary to cover the left flank and observe Prussian movements.287 So, whereas in the eyes of the Batavian government the country had been saved and one could pass on to the order of the day, in the French point of view the war continued in other theatres. Brune seems to have been on a short leave. In Paris, Schimmelpenninck had to hint that the Uitvoerend Bewind would not appreciate his return, because of the discontent and distrust caused by his behaviour.288  Deforgues, sent to the Batavian Republic as an extraordinary envoy, invoked the 12 May 1798 Convention to keep the command of Batavian and French troops combined. As before, the appeal to this Convention failed, though. In line with the stance adopted earlier, Van der Goes objected that the Convention had not been ratified by the Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam and had never been recognised as valid by a ‘Gouvernement légitime du Peuple Batave.’ Because of the lack of formal consent, the convention lacked validity.289 In response, Deforgues formally protested against abolishing the supreme command and on behalf of the French government urged for a ‘suitable person’290 to be sent to Paris to settle operations of Batavian and French troops. Moreover, he protested against furlough having been granted to part of the Batavian army.291   5 July 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 120.   Legrand, 1895, p. 207. 287   6 December 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 121. 288   21 November 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.10.08 no. 121. 289   12 December 1799, Van der Goes to Deforgues; NA 2.01.08 no. 121. 290   ‘een geschikt persoon.’ 291   13 December 1799, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 121. 285 286



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Van der Goes persisted in rejecting the combined command, but he did assure Deforgues that the Batavian army had been reinforced and would now be able to counter an invasion. Moreover, he guaranteed that the Batavian government was always prepared to confer with its French counterpart on military measures, since the two Republics were united by the same interests, the same views, and the same threats. However, before sending a representative to Paris, the Uitvoerend Bewind wished to clarify the purpose of the proposed deliberations. Schimmelpenninck was instructed to find out what the Directoire intended.292 But before those instructions had even reached Schimmelpenninck, the Directoire had ceased to exist. As Brune was officially replaced by General Augereau—one of Bonaparte’s subordinates in Italy in 1796–1797; the one who had been sent with troops to Paris to support the fructidor coup d’état—the discussion on the combined command started all over again; much to the chagrin of Van der Goes:293 The General Augereau had only just arrived when the pretensions with regard to the command of the combined Batavian and French armies revived in a manner that is hard to reconcile with the respect the First Consul has officially professed towards the Batavian Government for the allied nations’ independence.294

According to the Batavian minister, Augereau’s pretentions contradicted the respect the French Republic had to pay to the sovereignty and rights of allied nations. If alliances are to be sincere, stable, and useful, the French government will have to stop placating its allies by idle words. It should show by its deed to respect the sovereignty and rights of allied nations (and its employees of whatever rank have to give clear evidence of this).295 292   13 December 1799 (two letters), Van der Goes to Deforgues; NA 2.01.08 no. 121; 13 December 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 121. 293   27 January 1800, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 294   ‘Naauwlijks is de Generaal Augereau aan gekomen of de pretensien op het commando overde gecombineerde Bataafsche en Fransche armee zijn verlevendigd op eene manier, welke moeilijk overeen te brengen is met den eerbied die de Eerste Consul voor de onafhankelijkheid van de geallieerde natien officieel aan het Bataafse Gouvernement betuigd heeft.’ 295   ‘Welk geene alliantien oprecht veel min duurzaam of nuttig kunnen zijn, dan moet het zelve ophouden zijne bondgenoten met ijdele klanken te paaien. Het moet door daaden (en zijne zo hooge als laage geëmployeerden moeten hier van de spreekendste bewijzen geven) de souverainiteit en rechten der geallieerden de volken respecteren.’

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Schimmelpenninck was informed that the Uitvoerend Bewind expected the Premier Consul to provide his envoy and general with instructions that would soon settle the issue to the Batavian government’s pleasure. Van der Goes did stress once more, that in case hostilities would make the combined command useful and necessary, France’s ‘loyal ally’ would of course be willing to settle the combined command with the French government in conformity with the Alliance Treaty. At the same time, Bonaparte, as discussed before, being in need of money at the start of his rule, proposed to settle the disputes with regard to the French troops and Flushing in return for cash. As the offer was officially made, Talleyrand explained that he had not addressed the issue of the combined command, since the Premier Consul did not hesitate to believe that the Batavian government would assign supreme command to General Augereau, because the circumstances that had caused the decision to approve the combined command in the hands of General Brune seemed to be about to reappear, and the first British expedition could not be considered to be terminated entirely. Thus, the possible continuation of the threat of a British invasion was used as a justification to maintain the combined command of French and Batavian troops.296 The Uitvoerend Bewind held to its previous position on the command.297 On 11 February 1800 Van der Goes informed Schimmelpenninck that the Batavian government considered the issue of the joint command closed.298 That did not stop the new French envoy, Semonville, to keep insisting on a combined command. He informed the Uitvoerend Bewind, that the Premier Consul insisted on the Batavian troops being put at Augereau’s disposal; especially in the light of British preparations. Semonville extended the meaning of Article 8 of the Alliance Treaty. He argued that the Treaty did call for a combined command even before Batavian troops had to act together with French force, because they could only do so effectively if the French general had been able to train and prepare them in advance.299 Clearly, over and over again, disputes on the command arose because both sides interpreted the provision in the Alliance Treaty in different ways; the Batavian government wanting to keep the period of a combined com  6 February 1800, Talleyrand to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 231.   7 February 1800, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 298   11 February 1800, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 299   25 February 1800, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 233. 296 297



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mand as short as possible, whereas the French government wished to extend that period as much as possible. Somewhat later, the Uitvoerend Bewind must have decided to give in, for on 7 March 1800 Van der Goes informed the Batavian chargé d’affaires in Berlin—Bordeaux—that arrangements had been made with Augereau on the combined command of Batavian and French forces.300 Augereau stayed in the Batavian Republic rather long, and it must be assumed that he was in command of the Batavian army all that time. His conduct did annoy the Batavian government, however, and it probably did not come as a surprise that by March 1801, Schimmelpenninck was again instructed to protest against the return of a French general to the Batavian Republic after a short leave.301 Bonaparte did stand by his former brother-in-arms though. Talleyrand responded long-windedly by stating that new arrangements with regard to the troops in Batavian pay would be made once the French army would have been pulled back over the Rhine—peace with Austria having been concluded in the meantime—and that then Augereau’s command would lapse automatically. Schimmelpenninck ascribed that laboriousness to Bonaparte’s way of treating his generals. Apparently he wished to gain their allegiance to his person and hence to avoid doing anything that might indispose them.302 Highly exceptional, Bonaparte addressed the President of the Uitvoerend Bewind directly on the issue. He reproached the Batavian government to be ungrateful. A soldier who had contributed to Batavian independence to such an extent should be honoured instead of being deprived of his command. The Premier Consul even dared to make a comparison with the House of Orange to which the Batavian’s ancestors had assigned the ‘première magistrature’ due to its military services.303 Nonetheless, the less presumptuous General Victor soon replaced Augereau. As discussed above, the 29 August 1801 Convention304 gave in to Batavian wishes to a larger extent than witnessed before. It explicitly 300   7 March 1800, Van der Goes to Bourdeaux; NA 2.01.08 no. 107; see also Legrand, 1895, p. 248. 301   14 March 1801, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 684. 302   21 maart 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 631. 303   30 March 1801, Bonaparte to President of the Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 479. 304   29 August 1801, Convention between the Batavian Republic and France, signed at The Hague; CTS vol. 56, pp. 189–194.

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stated that the French auxiliary troops were under the command of the Batavian government, like Batavian troops, within the framework of the Convention.305 The Convention did not change the arrangement with regard to conflicts between French and Batavian officers on who was to command, but it did contain a new provision that implicitly recognised the possibility of the French general being subordinated to Batavian generals. Because of the reduction of the French corps, it would no longer be commanded by a divisional general, but by a brigadier general. Hence, for the first time, Batavian divisional generals might outrank the French general. Article 5 stipulated that he would only be under their command if they were properly authorised. That settled the issue of the combined command. General Victor complied with the position as it was deemed right by the Batavian government. Soon after the 1801 coup d’état, the Staatsbewind declared that no general—neither Batavian nor French—was to set up his headquarters in The Hague, nor were any troops—Batavian or French—to be allowed entering the Batavian seat of government. Victor had respected the Batavian government’s orders and had settled in ‘s-Hertogenbosch.306 Moreover, the issue of the combined command would automatically disappear, as the French troops would leave the country after peace with Britain would have been concluded. Or so it was thought. While the Staatsbewind vehemently insisted on French troops to leave, Paris even sent a new commanding general. Montrichard arrived in December 1802. There is no evidence that indicates that he claimed a combined command of all forces in the Batavian Republic. Based on the Alliance Treaty, he is not likely to have done so, for in clear peacetime joint action of French and Batavian troops being precluded, even the French government could not interpret the Treaty’s provisions in a way to substantiate that claim. Montrichard did, however, have orders from the French Secretary for War to set up his headquarters in The Hague. In a letter to De Vos van Steenwijk, Van der Goes argued that those orders were a clear breach of the 29 August 1801 Convention, since it stipulated that the French auxiliary forces were under the command of the Batavian government—as the Batavian minister had it, although that is not in

 Article 4 29 August 1801 Convention.   10 December 1802, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709.

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the provision explicitly—exclusively.307 As the Staatsbewind agreed to the prolonged stay of the French troops somewhat later, as mentioned above, it did so under the conditions that the 29 August 1801 Convention would remain in force, and that the French commanding general would not establish his headquarters in The Hague.308 4.5  British Goods War was not confined to military or naval engagements. Britain was fought by economic measures, too. Napoleon’s Continental System309 has become so famous over time that one tends to forget that he just took one step further in a policy of economic blockade already initiated by the Comité de Salut public. Britain depended on foreign trade for its food supplies and to provide it with enough wood and other materials necessary to build and maintain its navy. In addition, British wealth—from which the subsidies to Britain’s Continental allies were being paid—depended on the sale of colonial and industrial products to the Continent. By prohibiting trade with Britain, France’s arch-enemy would be deprived both of the means to put a strong naval force to the sea and of the financial means to ‘buy’ the assistance of another power to fight the war against France by land. In addition, Britain’s food supply would be interrupted. The French government had recognised the strategic necessity of a blockade even before Europe had ever heard of Napoleon Bonaparte. On 1 March 1793, a month after the declaration of war to King George III, the Convention nationale had prohibited the import of all manufactured goods from enemy territory. On 21 September 1793, French ports had been closed for all non-French vessels or vessels with another nationality than the origin of the cargo. On 9 October 1793, all products manufactured on British soil were prohibited.310 The Directoire continued this policy. On 31 October 1796,

  10 December 1802, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709.   1 February 1803, Van der Goes to Semonville; NA 2.01.08 no. 124. And 4 February 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 2.01.08 no. 124 and NA 1.02.14 no. 709. 309   Berlin decrees 21 November 1806; Dwyer and McPhee, 2002, pp. 161–163; Milan decree 17 December 1807; Dwyer and McPhee, 2002, pp. 164–165; Bertin, 1901; Melvin, 1919; Heckscher, 1922; Neff, 2000, pp. 76–77. 310  Fugier, 1954, p. 109. 307 308

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a bill was passed prohibiting the import of British goods.311 In 1798, that is, after the rupture of the Lille negotiations, measures against British goods were renewed. A law of 1798 not only repeated the prohibition of the import of British goods, the law also declared a vessel carrying British goods a good prize.312 The blockade would, of course, only be efficacious if trade from other countries, too, could be prevented or considerably lessened. The Batavian Republic was vital to this economic blockade. Not only did the Batavians still own a considerable part of Europe’s commercial fleets and were intensely involved in trade with Britain, they also controlled most of the ports closest to the British Isles. In addition, Batavian ports would be of great use to French corsairs active on the North Sea to prevent smuggling. The Batavian Nationale Vergadering voluntarily followed the French example. On 3 September 1796 the British government had proclaimed that trade with Holland, Brabant, and Italy was allowed with the exception of military goods and ship supplies and on the condition that goods would be transported by ships sailing under neutral colours. Trade with France was generically prohibited. The Nationale Vergadering reacted to this proclamation by means of a decree on 16 September 1796.313 The Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken smelled a rat. The British proclamation was deemed to be infused by the intention to divide the Revolutionary allies. The Committee proposed to prohibit the import of British goods. It referred to the confiscation of Dutch vessels by the British, the occupation of Dutch colonies, and the support rendered by the British government to Orangists. Furthermore, the committee argued that British trade was detrimental to the Batavian Republic—‘is the British government not the sworn enemy of Dutch prosperity?’314— and that the measures taken by the British government would delay peace and obstruct ‘the mighty ally’s wise and great scheme.’315 The general interest, according to the committee, called for measures to

 Fugier, 1954, p. 110; Grewe, 2000, p. 387.   Legrand, 1895, p. 191; Fugier, 1954, p. 110; Homan, 1971, p. 139; Grewe, 2000, p. 387. The provision on ‘enemy good, enemy ship’ was soon deemed too extreme, though, and revoked on 20 December 1799. 313   16 September 1796, decree Nationale Vergadering; http://192.87.107.12:8080/ decreten. 314   ‘is het Britsche Ministerie niet de gezworen Vyand van Nederlands Welvaren [. . .]?’ 315   ‘het wys en groot ontwerp van haaren magtigen Bondgenoot.’ 311 312



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accelerate the end of the war and to prevent provoking the French Republic’s indignation. The Nationale Vergadering adopted the commission’s proposal. Importing British goods, either directly or indirectly, was categorically prohibited.316 If British goods were imported, they had to be confiscated at once. Even after confiscation, those goods were not to be brought onto the market. Instead, they were to be stored in warehouses.317 People involved in importing British good in violation of the current decree were to be prosecuted for high treason.318 The same went for those accepting bills of exchange from Great Britain.319 The Committé tot de zaaken van de marine as well as provincial and local authorities were explicitly charged with surveillance of the compliance with the decree.320 According to Vreede, the Batavian government acted partly out of a desire to show its attachment to the alliance with France in this manner and partly from fear to displease the French.321 Legrand linked the Batavian decree against British goods to the defeat of the Batavian squadron sent to recapture the Cape of Good Hope in the Bay of Saldanha on 16 August 1796.322 It appears that the decree was indeed enforced for a certain period. After complaints by the Senate of Hamburg, the prohibitions were de facto moderated. While the Nationale Vergadering held to the prohibition of the import of British goods, a ship sailing under a neutral flag was to be left alone if its captain could show a certificate issued by the local authorities of the port were the cargo had been loaded stating that it did not contain any goods within the reach of the 16 September decree or similar French laws.323 The 12 December decree reopened the gates for British goods being brought into Batavian ports. Trade with Britain continued by means of neutral ships. For instance American ships suddenly sailed from Amsterdam to New York and back miraculously fast. Frequently, French envoys would complain about ‘infamous’ import of British

 Article 1 16 September 1796 decree.  Article 2 16 September 1796 decree. 318  Article 3 16 September 1796 decree. 319  Article 4 16 September 1796 decree. 320  Article 5, 6, and 7 16 September 1796 decree. 321   Vreede, 1863, p. 239. 322   Legrand, 1895, pp. 139–140. 323   12 December 1796, decree of the Nationale Vergadering; http://192.87.107.12:8080/ decreten. 316 317

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goods by means of neutral ships and urged for stricter measures. In 1798, for instance, Delacroix stated these complaints vehemently.324 He bemoaned illicit trading to take place on such an extent that even French privateering could not counter it. The French envoy insisted on the economic blockade being enforced. He suggested the revocation of the 12 December decree. The Uitvoerend Bewind referred Delacroix’ request to the Nationale Vergadering and urged for swift consideration.325 Illicit trading was not stopped. Some months later, the new French envoy Champigny Aubin still urged for stronger measures to be taken.326 The Batavian government, although loath to enforce the trade prohibition decree to its fullest consequences, did not wish to offend the French government as well. In a letter to Schimmelpenninck, Van der Goes stressed that British goods still entering the Batavian Republic were not to be taken for Anglomania on its government’s part.327 According to the Batavian minister, illicit trading was a clear and outrageous violation of the laws of the land and took place without the Uitvoerend Bewind’s knowing and volition. As soon as the Uitvoerend Bewind had taken knowledge of illicit trade, he argued, it had immediately proposed stricter measures, based on the French laws, but a new law did, of course, not stop trade. What is to be noted here is that French envoys in The Hague only urged for measures to be taken and ‘suggested’ some in particular instead of demanding certain measures to be taken. Furthermore, they called for separate measures taken by the Batavian government instead of direct application of French laws. At the same time, it was clear that French laws had to be respected. In Flushing a French customs office was established, but this is linked to quarrels over sovereignty over Flushing to be discussed in the subsequent chapter. Moreover, the French government would act more unilaterally with regard to other measures against British navigation. In order to weaken the Royal Navy wherever it could, the Directoire took measures to prevent the pressing of sailors. The Royal Navy was not only in desperate need of all kinds of material necessary to build, repair, and equip its vessels. It was in need of men to sail them as well. Hence, foreign   10 February 1798, Delacroix to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 232.   16 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind secret minutes foreign affairs (secreet verbaal Buitenlandsche Zaaken); NA 2.01.08 no. 50. 326   30 September 1798, Champigny Aubin to Gogel; NA 2.01.08 no. 232. 327   16 October 1798, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 119. 324 325



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merchantmen were often stopped at sea in order to press sailors. The Directoire denounced this practice as a violation of the law of nations and the liberty of Europe. In order to repress it, two decrees were adopted. According to the first decree every person born or originating from friendly, allied, or neutral countries with a commission from one of France’s enemies or being part of the crew of an enemy manof-war or merchantman was regarded as a pirate for that sole reason.328 Piracy had been recognised as one of the few cases of universal jurisdiction since time immemorial.329 France, thus, claimed jurisdiction over allies’ citizens. The second decree called for friendly and allied powers to be invited to take measures necessary to recall their countrymen sailing on British vessels.330 The Batavian government was—as were the governments of the Cisalpine, Ligurian, and Roman Republics—notified of the decrees.331 Here, the Directoire acted beyond its own jurisdiction. On the one hand, the allied Republics were merely invited to take measures. On the other hand, if they failed to do so their citizens would be considered pirates. The French government unilaterally proclaimed these measures, although they were directed nor against French citizens, nor against French vessels, nor against vessels present in French waters or ports. Despite the ‘invitation’ and the fact that nothing was said about the allied republics enforcing its decrees, the Directoire, in this matter, did force certain measures on its allies without having consulted them or having procured their consent in advance. After the Anglo-Russian invasion and the brumaire coup d’état (9 November 1799), the Uitvoerend Bewind turned around. Suddenly, the Batavian government—wondering whether France was capable of military operations necessary to force the Coalition powers to the negotiating table and considering that the British government was in great need of certain supplies while, at the same time, colonial goods were piling in British storehouses—urged for a stricter economic blockade. Britain was to be ‘brought into Tantalus’ position as much as possible.’332 The Batavian government itself had renewed

  28 November 1798, Lombard to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 232.   See e.g. Tuck, 2001, p. 103. 330   28 November 1798, Lombard to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 232. 331   28 November 1798, Lombard to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 232. 332   ‘Het systhema van Frankrijk en deszelfs geallieerden moet derhalven zijn om Engeland zo veel mogelijk in de situatie van Tantalus te brengen.’ 328 329

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previous decrees and had prohibited the export of grain altogether. It now insisted that the Revolutionary allies would gear their economic measures to prevent export to Britain entirely. This was the sole way in which the British government could be brought to concluding a ‘reasonable peace.’333 Because of the blockade, trade with Britain had been taken over by American ships. Thus, Britain was not harmed by the trade prohibition decrees. The decrees only benefited American merchants. Not able to prevent illicit trade, the Uitvoerend Bewind must have contemplated that American merchants were to be denied the benefits that their Batavian colleagues had been denied for years now. Next to hopes for pushing Britain to conclude peace by an intensification of economic measures, the modification of Batavian policy essentially intended to counter unfair competition. Therefore, Schimmelpenninck was to propose to the French government to cut off trade with Britain entirely.334 In addition, the Uitvoerend Bewind wanted to compensate the drop in trade with Britain by increasing trade on the Continent, especially with France. It suggested a free trade zone. This would assure Batavian prosperity and hence, the Batavian Republic’s ability to contribute to the war effort. Moreover, it would render the alliance advantages more reciprocally.335 4.6  The Quest for Neutrality Batavian Patriots had favoured an alliance with France mainly because of the need to assure great power protection for their own regime. Although they had not opposed the offensive character of the alliance, the alliance was essentially defensive in their view. Even with regard to the war against Britain, in which the Patriot regime did envisage an offensive role for the Batavian Republic, the reason behind the offensive alliance was to protect Dutch navigation and to regain Dutch colonies. Soon the more moderate Patriots could not stand the offensive character of the alliance any longer.336 In 1795, the war had not been

333   ‘raisonnable vredes voorwaarden’; 7 January 1800, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 334   7 April 1801, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 684. 335   20 May 1800, Van der Goes to Semonville; NA 2.01.08 no. 107. 336   Van Hamel, 1918, p. 335.



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expected to last very long. They had hoped for peace in 1797. But negotiations with Britain in Lille337 had failed and the Campoformio Peace (17 October 1797) with Austria proved not to be stable. Hence, there were no prospects of the Batavian Republic soon being relieved of the huge financial burden the alliance had imposed. Moreover, after the 1798 Coalition had been established and the 12 June coup d’état had secured their regime, moderate Patriots had gained self-confidence. Even in the midst of the imbroglio Europe was in due to the War of the Second Coalition, they felt secure enough to contemplate a less intimate union with the French Republic. Basically, they wanted to return to the old policy of neutrality. The personification of the Dutch diplomatic tradition of neutrality, Maarten van der Goes, even headed the Foreign Office.338 It has to be noted here, that according to contemporary doctrine and practice, a defensive alliance was compatible with neutrality. A neutral power was to remain impartial, but complying with treaty obligations to an ally was not considered as a breach of neutrality.339 Providing an ally with financial and military support fixed in a treaty concluded prior to the war was not regarded as an act of war.340 Acting as an auxiliary, an ally was not to be treated as an enemy.341 Hence, for instance, its merchantmen were not to be harassed. By the summer of 1799 rumours went that Britain and Prussia were working together on a scheme that would declare the Batavian Republic neutral.342 With Coalition forces advancing in Italy and Switzerland, and France having to cope with a rebellion in the Belgian departments, the political and military situation of Europe was highly insecure at the time. One of the major questions bothering great power capitals was: What will Prussia—the sole great power not involved in the war—do? In addition, the French government—most of its available forces committed to fend off the Austrian-Russian attack in the south—wondered where Anglo-Russian forces would strike. Intelligence showed that Russian troops had already been shipped to Britain. Behind the scenes, Britain and Russia endeavoured to persuade Prussia to join their side.

  See Part III.   Van Hamel, 1918, p. 335; Smit, 1950, p. 118; Schama, 1989, pp. 466–467. 339   Grewe, 2000, pp. 371–376. 340   Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 451. 341  Neff, 2005, pp. 121–122. 342   20 July 1799, Otto to Talleyrand; AAE CP Prusse 225. 337 338

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In the end, Berlin would refuse to do so, forcing the Anglo-Russian expedition to invade the Batavian Republic from the seaside. But in July, the Prussian government had not made up its mind yet. The French chargé d’affaires in Berlin, Louis-Guillaume Otto, had to find out what truth there was in rumours about plans to declare the Batavian Republic neutral. In response, the Prussian Foreign Secretary, Count Haugwitz, initiated French-Prussian talks on Batavian neutrality.343 According to Otto’s account of his conference with Haugwitz, the Prussian minister had indicated that his government was not indifferent about the Batavian Republic’s fate: ‘nous ne voulons pas qu’elle reste sous une influence étrangère.’344 Haugwitz immediately referred to French overtures to enter into an alliance. The Directoire was indeed out for aligning with Prussia. Berlin had kept off an alliance for three years by then and was only prepared to renew its pre-1756 alliance with France after the current war, but even then an alliance would only be considered if the Dutch Republic was restored to its former independence. Haugwitz made sure that Prussia would not become a French ally as long as France held to its influence in the Batavian Republic. Haugwitz stressed that France would gain more from a Prussian alliance than from continuing its influence in the Batavian Republic. Due to that alliance and Batavian neutrality, the French Republic would be perfectly able to ‘renonçant à toute prétention sur la Hollande.’ For in that case, France’s northern border would be covered by a neutral power instead of committing a French army to that region. It has to be noted, though, that even under these conditions it would have been highly unlikely for Prussia to have given up its cherished neutrality. The French diplomat had been manoeuvred into a painful situation. At the time, France certainly wished to keep its influence in the Batavian Republic. On the other hand, Prussia was not to be alienated, especially at a time that Anglo-Prussian relations seemed to be rather close and part of the Prussian government tended to joining the Coalition. Hence, Otto did neither adopt nor reject the neutralisation scheme straightforwardly. He did pose that a restoration of the old constitution and the Stadholderate was not to be contemplated. Similarity of constitutions of France’s neighbours, even if they would be

  20 July 1799, Otto to Talleyrand; AAE CP Prusse 225.   20 July 1799, Otto to Talleyrand; AAE CP Prusse 225.

343 344



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truly independent, was still regarded by many French as a guarantee against foreign attack. Haugwitz reproached that a people’s independence was all-embracing. Therefore, if the Dutch would want to restore the Stadhouder, ‘le roi [. . .] ne pourra pas décemment s’y opposer.’ In addition, he stressed that the family bonds between the King of Prussia and the Stadhouder would add to the benefits France would gain from a Prussian alliance, since those bonds guaranteed the Stadhouder’s amicable attitude vis-à-vis France. Otto argued against neutrality in a letter to Talleyrand.345 Batavian neutrality was put aside as part of British military schemes. Either Anglo-Russian forces would attack the Belgian departments, or they planned to strike the Batavian Republic directly. In the first case, Batavian neutrality would prevent those troops to face counter attacks from two sides, while the Batavian Republic would be under the Coalition’s control once the Belgian departments had been occupied. The Batavian Constitution would, then, undoubtedly be changed again. In the latter case, Batavian neutrality would save the Coalition the trouble of an attack and allow Anglo-Russian forces to strike in the Belgian departments. Otto assessed that the British minister Grenville did intend exactly this and that Haugwitz was of the same mind. Hence, the Coalition would only gain from Batavian neutrality. However, he also reported that the Prussian King and some of his closest advisors opposed British advances. Mostly for commercial reasons, they were as keen on a restoration of British influence in the Batavian Republic as the French Republic was. Despite Otto’s analysis, Paris decided to keep talks with Prussia on Batavian neutrality going, probably in order not to alienate Berlin. There are no indications that the Batavian government was officially informed of these talks. If the French government did indeed not sincerely contemplate Batavian neutrality, a notification would, of course, not have made any sense. On the other hand, the French envoy in The Hague—at the time, Florent Guyot—was informed. According to Florent, Prussian endeavours to bring about Batavian neutrality were inspired by the Batavian government.346 There are no written documents in Dutch diplomatic archives to substantiate this

  20 July 1799, Otto to Talleyrand; AAE CP Prusse 225.   4 August 1799, Florent to Reinhard; AAE CP Hollande 602.

345 346

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assertion, but, taking the moderate Patriots’ stance towards the offensive alliance into consideration it is not unlikely that they indeed were in contact with the Prussian envoy—Baron Bielfeld—in The Hague on the matter. Moreover, the Batavian government did favour neutrality. Van der Goes’ private archives contain an advice on how to persuade France to agree to Batavian neutrality written in the summer of 1799.347 The author was aware of the necessity to play on French interests. By consequence, he weighed the advantages and disadvantages both of an alliance and of Batavian neutrality. The alliance was said to have been advantageous to France. The Batavian Republic had been of great use to balance British power and might serve as a basis from which Britain could be attacked. France had not let the Batavian Republic play an active part in the war on the Continent, but the Batavian Republic had equipped and paid for a great number of French troops partly deployed elsewhere. Control of Batavian fortified towns might be used to defend Belgium in case of a forced retreat. In fact, Batavian fortifications had prevented Coalition forces to march towards Belgium and support the rebbels, while troops stationed in the Batavian Republic had crushed the revolt. Unfortunately expenses due to the maintenance of French troops had obstructed the naval build-up. Moreover, French privateering activity hindered Dutch trade. Therefore, the advice stressed, a repetition of previous advantages was not to be expected. The Batavian Republic had lost its fleet, obliging the French navy to protect Batavian shipping. The Batavian Republic could not afford to pay for French troops anymore. In case of any further defeats in Germany, French armies would be forced to retreat towards the French borders lacking any funds. Furthermore, unpaid Batavian troops were likely to desert. This would encourage Austria to march towards Belgium, provoking another revolt there. In the end, all of this might lead to political turmoil in Paris. Thus, Batavian neutrality was made almost a matter of political life or death for the Directoire. Conversely, it was argued, the French Republic was only to benefit from Batavian neutrality. France no longer would be obliged to defend the Batavian Republic, French forces could be deployed else Not dated, headed ‘38 Quaritur’; NA 2.21.073 no. 35. Paying extensive attention to military matters, the advice mentionned the repression of the revolt in the Belgian departments, whereas it did not mention the Anglo-Russian invasion yet. Hence, the advice has probably been written in the second half of the summer of 1799. 347



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where, France would be covered by neutral territory in the north. The Batavian Republic would preserve a government willing to hamper Coalition forces by other, mainly commercial means. Finally, Batavian commerce being able to revive, the Batavian government would be able to continue paying for part of the French troops in its pay.348 The Batavian government must have considered its chances to convince the Directoire to drop the alliance very poor. No serious attempts to renegotiate the Treaty with France directly were undertaken. Meanwhile, the Uitvoerend Bewind was unaware of what was actually going on in Berlin. By the end of August 1799, rumours reached The Hague that the Prussian government had proposed to the French government to declare the Batavian Republic neutral and that the French government had taken the proposal into consideration, not wanting to take a decision too hastily on such an important matter.349 The Uitvoerend Bewind decided on taking a more active stance. By early September it set out for a secret mission to Berlin to gain Prussian mediation between the belligerent powers in order to attain Batavian neutrality.350 The French government had just decided to break off negotiations on Batavian neutrality with Berlin because of the AngloRussian invasion in Holland. It was too late to discuss neutrality, now that French forces had to be sent to the Batavian Republic to protect its independence. The French Foreign Secretary, Reinhard, contended that the Batavian Republic could never be independent under a British yoke and the Stadhouder, if restored, would always turn out to be a British vassal.351 The same day that Reinhard wrote to Otto in this sense, Van der Goes urged the Batavian charge d’affaires in Berlin, Pierre Etienne Bourdeaux, to bring about a Prussian intervention to prevent a ‘total destruction’352 of the Batavian Republic.353 The next day, Joan Arend de Vos van Steenwijk354 was charged with the secret mission. He arrived in Berlin on 22 September. Legrand has put the 348   This would, in fact, have been compatible with contemporary notions of neutrality. 349   27 August 1799, Van der Goes to Van Grasveld; NA 2.01.08 no. 121. 350   8 September 1799, extract uit register der besluiten van het Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.21.073 no. 47. See also, Godechot, 1983, pp. 372–373; Schama, 1989, pp. 466– 467; De Gou, 1995, p. XI. 351   13 September 1799, Reinhard to Otto; AAE CP Prusse 225. 352   ‘totaale destructie.’ 353   13 September 1799, Van der Goes to Bourdeaux; NA 2.01.08 no. 121. 354  Not to be confused with the later Batavian ambassador to Paris, Carel de Vos van Steenwijk.

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De Vos mission aside as clear evidence of the Uitvoerend Bewind’s desire to defect the common cause.355 According to Simon Schama, the De Vos misson was not just rash; it verged on sheer madness.356 De Vos did not achieve much. He was received by Haugwitz, but the Prussian government insisted on the restoration of the Prince of Orange or at least of his son, if William V was unwanted.357 Because of his bonds with the House of Orange, the King of Prussia was said to be unable to recognise the present government in the Batavian Republic. The Prussian minister did assure De Vos that his government had urged both the British government and the French Directoire to declare the Batavian Republic neutral once it had gained knowledge of the AngloRussian expedition, and, Haugwitz asserted, negotiations on Batavian neutrality had not been broken off yet.358 In more general terms, the Prussian government promised to take care in the Batavian Republic’s fate and to look forward to a full recovery of its independence. Haugwitz promised to enter into negotiations with London and Paris to that purpose.359 Indeed, he would keep on addressing Otto on the matter of Batavian neutrality. He emphasised the military advantages of Batavian neutrality to the French Republic. France’s northern flank would be covered, whereas French troops could be deployed elsewhere and the Batavian fleet had been lost anyway. Unfortunately for the Batavian moderates, Otto got wind of the De Vos mission. He reported to Paris the arrival in Berlin of ‘un personnage très mystérieus’ who seemed to be charged with a secret mission by the moderate faction among Batavian Patriots.360 Otto was not aware yet that De Vos had already spoken with Haugwitz, but that did not last long. He notified Paris that Haugwitz had responded quite ambiguously to De Vos’ proposals. Haugwitz seemed to contemplate the possibility of maintaining the present Batavian constitution, but adding a restored Stadholderate to it in due time. For the time being, the Prussian minister was deemed to acknowledge that the French

  Legrand, 1895, p. 232.   Schama, 1989, pp. 466–467. 357   28 September 1799, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 2 21.073 no. 47. 358   28 September 1799, De Vos van Steenwijk to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.21.073 no. 47. 359   13 October 1799, De Vos van Steenwijk to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.21.073 no. 47. 360   28 September 1799, Otto to Reinhard; AAE CP Prusse 226. 355 356



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government was adamant to keep the Stadhouder out even by force, whereas the British were not prepared to alter their schemes. Otto wondered whether the De Vos mission was initiated by the Uitvoerend Bewind and Van der Goes or by a faction in the Batavian Republic more remote from the government that was willing to come to a compromise with the Orangists. The Batavian charge d’affairs in Berlin was, at least, not involved.361 Otto assessed that the De Vos mission had been the result of intrigues by Haugwitz. He accused the Prussian minister of having provoked the moderate faction in The Hague to send an agent to Berlin by means of Bielfeld in order to break through the King’s alleged disinterest in the Batavian Republic.362 The De Vos mission could neither be kept secret within the Batavian Republic. Fouscuberte, the French commissioner for navigation and trade in Amsterdam, notified Reinhard of rumours that the Uitvoerend Bewind had sent a secret mission to Berlin. Allegedly the mission’s purpose was to invite the Prussian King to intervene in order to make Britain and France evacuate Batavian soil and to include the Batavian Republic within the line of demarcation set for the neutrality of northern Germany. Any other aim, Fouscuberte argued, would be evidently contrary to the Alliance Treaty without prior consultation of the French government. He accused the Uitvoerend Bewind—not totally without cause—of trying to get out of its obligations towards the French Republic.363 The Uitvoerend Bewind was fortunate enough for the French not being sure about who was behind the overtures towards the Prussian government. Van der Goes was well aware of the danger to its and his position once the French would find out about the De Vos mission. De Vos was instructed that his communication with The Hague had to be of the utmost secrecy. He was certainly not to address the Uitvoerend Bewind directly. Moreover, one of the reasons he had been chosen for the mission was that he stayed in Zwolle, a town about 130 kilometres from The Hague in the direction of Berlin. So, French representatives in The Hague would not note his absence. Van der Goes stressed, too, that he was not to treat with the Prussian government officially and that the purpose of his mission did not go beyond persuading the

  1 October 1799, Otto to Reinhard; AAE CP Prusse 226.   4 October 1799, Otto to Reinhard; AAE CP Prusse 226. 363   14 October, Fouscuberte to Reinhard; AAE CP Hollande 603. 361 362

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Prussian government to take an interest in Batavian affairs and intervene to prevent the Batavian Republic from destruction.364 On 4 October 1799, Otto reported to Paris that De Vos, after a long conference with Haugwitz, had left for The Hague.365 By that time, Florent Guyot had demanded an explanation from the government in The Hague on the De Vos mission. In response, he was informed that the Uitvoerend Bewind had sent De Vos to Berlin. There was no use in denying it anymore. The purpose of his mission was somewhat disguised, though. It was stated that De Vos had been sent to Berlin because rumour had it that Berlin and Vienna had proposed to London and Paris to declare the Batavian Republic neutral, and the Batavian government wanted to find out about these proposals. Since the French government had not informed The Hague of these proposals, the Uitvoerend Bewind had decided to send a secret agent to Berlin. It was claimed that Schimmelpenninck had been instructed to notify the Directoire of the De Vos mission confidentially. The Uitvoerend Bewind might have hoped that the Directoire would blame that notification failing to occur on miscommunication. Florent Guyot does seem to have been content with the explanation given. In his account of it to Paris, he even contended that Batavian neutrality—which would imply recognition of the Batavian Republic by Britain and Prussia—might not be unfavourable to France.366 Florent Guyot blamed the neutralisation scheme to a small intrigue in which the Swedish and Danish envoys had been involved. He assured Paris that the Uitvoerend Bewind had not been. After his return, De Vos van Steenwijk was introduced to Florent by one of the Directors. Yet again, Florent was assured that De Vos had been sent for the sole purpose of finding out what Berlin had proposed to the other great powers without any authority to negotiate. Neutrality was out of the question, since the Batavian Republic would go down due to intrigues and Pitt’s ‘l’or corrupteus.’ In addition, Florent Guyot urged not to wait until the general peace to conclude a commerce treaty with the Batavian Republic.367 The De Vos mission had turned out to be a great failure. Instead of achieving its purpose, its sole effect was a deterioration of the relation  1 October 1799, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 2.21.073 no. 47.   4 October 1799, Otto to Reinhard; AAE CP Prusse 226. 366   5 October 1799, Florent Guyot to Reinhard; AAE CP Hollande 603. 367   21 October 1799, Florent Guyot to Reinhard; AAE CP Hollande 603. 364 365



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ship with the French government. The Anglo-Russian invasion caused the moderate Patriots to drop their neutralisation scheme. According to Legrand, Van der Goes even handed in his resignation, which was rejected.368 Van der Goes did still urge Bourdeaux to get the Prussian government to recognise the Batavian Republic. Because of the failure of the Anglo-Russian expedition, the Stadhouder’s attempts to be restored had been thwarted, and the present constitution had been consolidated. The Batavian minister contended that the Batavian government had earned its claim to be considered an independent power and to be treated as such. At the same time, he emphasised that neutrality was only to be contemplated in concert with the French Republic. On the other hand, the Uitvoerend Bewind did insist on being involved in negotiations on Batavian neutrality between the great powers.369 Nevertheless, the French government was very put out over the Batavians’ course of action. Wild plans were considered in Paris. Provoking a new revolution in the Batavian Republic was seriously taken into consideration.370 Some even proposed annexing the country to France altogether. The Directoire demanded the dismissal of the Secretaries for Finance, War, the Navy, and Foreign Affairs next to the dismissal of all Orangists from public functions in general.371 By early October, Deforgues was sent to the Batavian Republic. Even before he had reached the Batavian Republic, rumours went that he was to initiate a new coup d’état or was even to install a military administration together with General Guillaume Brune and to declare martial law. Strikingly, Deforgues did go directly to Brune’s headquarters instead of The Hague. Van der Goes implicitly informed Schimmelpenninck that his government was highly worried about the situation. The Batavian minister stressed that the Uitvoerend Bewind trusted the Directoire not having decided for an intervention in the Batavian Republic’s internal affairs since that would be contrary to its ‘professed’ respect for its allies’ independence and the alleged military measures would deprive the Batavian Republic of all means to be a useful ally due to their effects on commerce.372 Some days later, Van der Goes was already reassured.   Legrand, 1895, p. 235.   15 November 1799, Van der Goes to Bourdeaux; NA 2.01.08 no. 121. 370   Godechot, 1983, pp. 372–373. 371   Legrand, 1895, pp. 245–246; Schama, 1989, p. 468. 372   11 October 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 121. 368 369

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Deforgues seemed to be sent to the Batavian Republic mainly to find out what was going on since Florent Guyot and Brune had sent contradictory reports.373 However, the Batavian minister’s peace of mind was unfounded. For Paris did plan a change of government in the Batavian Republic. The sole reason this did not occur was that the Directoire itself was overthrown first. Hence, the De Vos mission affaire blew over and the Uitvoerend Bewind, for the time being, was saved by the brumaire coup d’état in Paris (9 November 1799).374 After brumaire, Schimmelpenninck made an attempt to persuade the new French government of the importance of Batavian neutrality. Bonaparte responded, though, that he counted on a true alliance until the end of the war with Britain.375 An attempt by Amsterdam merchants to buy off the alliance was of no avail either. Bonaparte refused their offer claiming that France needed Batavian ports and docks.376 As soon as peace with Austria was concluded at Lunéville (9 February 1801), the quest to alter the Alliance Treaty was undertaken again. With the exception of Britain, the alliance was limited to the current war. In regard to the Peace of Campoformio (17 October 1797) it could still be asserted that peace was not made will all Coalition powers since the Rastatt conference failed to bring about peace between France and the Empire. Lunéville did, however, end the war with almost all Continental powers. Unless a completely general peace was considered the determinative moment, the alliance had automatically expired. Only the offensive and defensive alliance against Britain would continue. Nevertheless, there are no signs that this distinction was actually made in the 1801 endeavours to modify the alliance. Hence, it might be safe to conclude that ‘la fin de la guerre’ mentioned in Article 3 of the Hague Treaty had not arrived yet because Britain kept on fighting. One might contend that the Batavians had regarded the alliance as mainly an anti-British alliance from the start. But by 1801 the Batavian government does not seem to have regarded the alliance towards other powers to have expired due to the Lunéville Peace. It did attempt to persuade Paris of the necessity to modify the alliance into a purely defensive one in general terms, even excluding the war against Britain for the time being.   18 October 1799, Van der Goes to Valckenaer; NA 2.01.08 no. 121.   Legrand, 1895, pp. 245–246; Schama, 1989, p. 468. 375  Plemp van Duiveland, pp. 48–49. 376  Plemp van Duiveland, 1971, p. 53. 373 374



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This time, the French government was addressed directly and a more fundamental stance vis-à-vis the 1795 Treaty was taken. In a letter to the Uitvoerend Bewind, Van der Goes expounded his views on the future of the alliance.377 According to the Batavian minister, the 1795 Treaty was ‘an iron chain’378 inspired by the bad policy pursued by the French government at the time even contrary to France’s interests. The Alliance Treaty had to be altered to make the union between the two Republics more durable, more based on good faith, and more to the advantage of both Republics. The political bonds that unite nations are of a twofold nature. They are either natural or totally coincidental. The former are based on the durable and steady interest of the states that engage in them. The latter are the product of ever-changing circumstances. They weaken gradually and are ultimately destroyed entirely with the cause that brought them about. Most stipulations in the 1795 Treaty are to be regarded from the latter point of view. Europe’s transformation, the interests of both Nations call for us to improve an accidental settlement by an alliance more suited to the enduring happiness of both united governments.379

Furthermore, he stressed that the victories of the French armies had altered Europe’s political system. New relations had been born which had broken off all relations with Britain and had connected the Batavian Republic’s fate to France’s forever. In the future it could not have any interests beyond those in common with the French Republic, which interests were consolidated by the ongoing fear for Britain.

377   18 February 1801, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 123 and NA 2.01.01.04 no. 485. 378   ‘eene ijzere keten.’ 379   ‘De politique banden welke de volken verenigen zijn van twederleien aart, dezelve zijn of natuurlijk of geheel toevallig. De eerste zijn gegrond op het duurzaam en bestendig belang der staaten, welke dezelven contracteren; de andere zijn het voortbrengzel van dagelijks veranderende omstandigheden, zij verzwakken allengs en worden eindelijk geheel vernietigd met de oorzaak die ze te weeg bragt. Uit het laatste oogpunt moeten wij de meeste stipulatien van het Tractaat van 1795 beschouwen. De geheel veranderde gedaante van Europa, de belangens der beide Natien vorderen thans dat wij eene accidentale verbindtnis verbeteren door eene nadere alliantie meer berekend op het duurzaam geluk der verenigde gouvernementen.’; 18 February 1801, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 123 and NA 2.01.01.04 no. 485.

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Van der Goes based this solidarity with France on ‘the Batavian people’s hope, fear, geographic location, and political system.’380 On the other hand, because of that solidarity, anything the French Republic would do for its ally should be useful for the general defence and be to the benefit of both Republics. He repeated the common argument that the Batavian Republic could be a useful ally ‘in France’s federative maritime system’381 provided that it would be maintained as a free and independent power and would be enabled to restore its navy and commerce. Hence, trade relations between the two Republics had to be settled and a long-lasting period of peace was necessary. Therefore, even France’s interest called for a solemn assurance of Batavian neutrality for times to come. He did emphasise that the Batavian Republic would not withdraw from the war against Britain before a check had been put on British ‘usurpation.’ As soon as peace with Britain would be concluded, the Batavian Republic would, however, be justified in claiming neutrality.382 A month later, Van der Goes conveyed to the French envoy, Semonville, the desire to transform the Franco-Batavian alliance in a defensive one—strikingly, referring to the example of the 1788 defensive alliances with Britain and Prussia. On that occasion, he stressed even more the importance of Batavian commerce to the union between the two Republics.383 The French government was not keen on the proposed modification of the Alliance Treaty. Although it could get up some sympathy for the Batavians’ desire to maintain their independence and to restrict their role in future wars to that of an auxiliary without compromising the benefits of neutrality to their commerce, it rejected an exclusively defensive alliance. Le terme d’alliance simplement défensive est presque insignifiant dans la politique, surtout lorsqu’une alliance de ce genre est contractée entre le puissant et le foible. Il est évident qu’alors tous les avantages de cette restriction sont pour le premier qui refuse, s’il lui plait, ses secours à

380   ‘Het Bataafsche Volk door zijne hoop, door zijne vrees, door zijne geographische legging en door zijn politiek stelzel.’ 381   ‘in het federatif maritiem systhema van Frankrijk.’ 382   18 February 1801, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 123 and NA 2.01.01.04 no. 485. 383   19 March 1801, Van der Goes to Semonville, Apperçu sur les rapports respectifs des deux Républiques; NA 2.21.073 no. 51 and AAE CP Hollande 605.



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l’offensé, en soutenant qu’il a été offenseur et exige les siens dans le cas contraire.384

It was asserted that a purely defensive alliance was disadvantageous to France. On the one hand, it would no longer have the benefit of being able to count on Batavian support if it took the offence. On the other hand, the French Republic ran a greater risk in getting involved in a war due to the defensive alliance than the Batavian Republic did. For, a single gunshot in the Indies fired at a Dutch frigate might provoke the British to take violent measures against French vessels. A purely defensive alliance was thus said to be lopsidedly favourable to the ally that was not strong enough to take the offensive. In Paris, Schimmelpenninck spoke with Talleyrand on ‘finally establishing the mutual political relations on worthy and solid grounds.’385 Talleyrand stressed that the Premier Consul was well disposed towards the Batavian Republic. Quite sceptically, the Batavian envoy wrote to Van der Goes that he might be persuaded of that disposition if the French government would actually show any signs of really establishing Batavian independence instead of confining itself to solemn proclamations to that respect. In his view, that called for ending France’s military influence in the Batavian Republic.386 Nonetheless, Schimmelpenninck sensed that Europe was in a period of transition in which ‘everything was uncertain, everything turbulent, everything in despair.’387 Nothing had been done yet to carry out the Peace of Lunéville (9 February 1801) and the powers of the first rank distrusted each other. The Batavian envoy deemed that relations between France and the other great powers were rather unfavourable. They still did not trust the French government and were highly discontent with its conduct. Hence, the French government’s intend seemed to be to keep France ‘in the most favourable military position’388 by maintaining its military influence everywhere.389

384  Observations sur le mémoire de la Batavie et ses diverses demandes; AAE CP Hollande 605. 385   ‘het eindelijk etablisseren der wederzijdsche politique betrekkingen op waardige en solide gronden.’ 386   21 March 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 631. 387   ‘alles onzeker, alles onrustig, alles in een staat van vertwijfeling’; 9 June 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 633. 388   ‘in de formidabelste militaire positie.’ 389   9 June 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 633.

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By December 1801, as peace negotiations with Britain had been initiated, there was again some talk of negotiations on a new alliance treaty. The Staatsbewind had plainly opted for a return to its country’s tradition of neutrality. The Foreign Secretary’s new instructions stated that the Batavian Republic was to remain neutral and to preserve peace with all nations as far as possible.390 The Batavian nation was only to take up arms to maintain its independence, to protect its territory, and to defend its allies. Moreover, all rights of other nations were to be respected; the rights of the neutral flag in times of war— ‘in conformity to the true principles of the law of nations.’391 On the other hand, all agreements with other nations were to be honoured. These instructions clearly envisage an order of independent, co-existing nations respecting each other’s rights and the Batavian Republic sticking to its neutrality. France’s ‘l’autorité ephémere’ due to its military presence was to be substituted by the enduring influence based on an alliance and commerce treaty that was ‘bien cimenté’ and ‘conciliant les avantages respectifs des deux états.’ It was proposed to send an extraordinary ambassador to The Hague to negotiate a new treaty.392 Schimmelpenninck made an effort to do business in Amiens. He proposed to the French negotiator, Joseph Bonaparte, to modify the alliance clause in the Hague Treaty.393 The offensive alliance was said be the ‘résultat forcé’ of extraordinary circumstances long passed. Neutrality, conversely, was presented as the only sane policy to restore and preserve the Batavian Republic’s prosperity. The Batavian nation’s commercial character in combination with the size of its territory and population rendered it expedient not to partake in great powers wars. Elle n’a point la prétention de jouer un rôle dans les grandes affaires de l’Europe. Elle ne veut ni s’agrandir ni s’enrichir aux dépends de qui que ce soit.

390   6 December 1801, instructions to the Secretaris van Staat van de Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.21.073 no. 7. 391   ‘overeenkomstig de ware beginzels van het regt der volkeren.’ 392   11 December 1801, Note envoyé au ministre des relations exterieurs, Paris; AAE CP Hollande 605. 393   4 February 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Joseph Bonaparte; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 206–215; A copy of this letter was enclosed with: 5 December 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 363A.



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Ten days later, Schimmelpenninck addressed the Premier Consul directly demanding the renunciation of the offensive alliance.394 The matter was not to be discussed though as long as peace with Britain was not concluded. For, Bonaparte wanted to prevent the Batavians making the desired modifications of the Alliance Treaty—mainly, its offensive character, the presence of French troops, and the quarrels over Flushing—conditions of consenting to the cession of Ceylon.395 After Amiens (27 March 1802), Schimmelpenninck brought up the matter of crossing out the offensive character of the alliance again.396 The fate of the Franco-Batavian alliance after the general peace will be discussed in Chapter 6. Conclusion Throughout the entire period of the Batavian Republic’s existence, Europe was at peace for about eleven months. Henceforth, war dominated its existence as it had dominated its creation. It was the war that set the context for Franco-Batavian relations. Besides the one-off agreements within the scope of recognition and peace between the two Republics, virtually all rights and obligations in purview of the 1795 Hague Treaty were related to the war. It was in that sphere, too, that later conventions setting more detailed agreements were concluded. Rights and obligations were thus agreed upon in treaties and conventions, that is, in juridical forms typical for horizontal relations. Whatever burdensome, harsh, or lopsided military obligations might have been to the Batavian Republic, initially the Batavian government had consented to every single one of them. To be sure, in the course of the war force was exercised or threatened with to gain the Batavian government’s consent or to get the Batavian government to make certain decisions. Again, from a formal point of view, however, the principle of consent was upheld in those cases. On some occasions, French military authorities acted contrary to the wishes of the Batavian government or without its consent or permission. In those cases, Batavian independence and sovereignty were violated. Most of the times, the French government did, however, apologise once protests were lodged   14 February 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Premier Consul; NA 2.01.08 no. 363A.   See Part III. 396   Schama, 1989, p. 509. 394 395

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and promised it would not happen again. Although the latter promises were of no avail, the French government did thus uphold the image of the Batavian Republic as an independent state. Not until well into the Consulat period, would the French government itself disregard Batavian independence by acting in military matters on Batavian soil or with regard to Batavian forces without the consent and cooperation of the government in The Hague. The Batavian Republic played the apparent role of auxiliary which contribution was precisely determined in advance, whereas the French Republic was the prime belligerent that was fully committed. Contrary to the letter of the Treaty, the Batavian Republic would only be at war with Britain in its own right. With regard to all other enemies of France, it acted as an auxiliary. The Treaty was fully tailored to France being the sole one to take the offensive. Paris was the alliance’s headquarter where operations were to be decided upon, although, in purview of the Treaty, the Batavian government would have a say in the plans for combined action. Both the Batavian fleet and the Batavian army had a secondary and, in the case of the fleet, specific role to play. This asymmetry was due to the division of roles within the present conflict, the Batavian Republic being an auxiliary to France as primary belligerent. Defending the French Republic self-evidently meant defending its sister republics, which does not imply that France did not put its own security first. For even François Noël—probably the most benevolent to the Batavians of all French diplomats during the era397—realised that the security and perseverance of the Batavian Republic depended on France’s. If external or internal Counter-revolutionary forces would defeat the French Republic, all hope for the Batavian Patriots would be lost, whereas the Batavian Republic would be entitled to count on French protection as long as republican government held sway in Paris.398 This is a line of reasoning on relations between unequal allies that might be called ‘the lifeguard-principle.’ A lifeguard who is trying to bring a drowning person to shore and who approaches for example some rocks will have to let the drowning person take the hit if collision with the rocks cannot be avoided. That might harm the drown François Noël had been chargé d’affaires in The Hague in 1793 and married into one of the Holland regent families; Guyot, 1907, p. 83. 398   13 September 1797, Noël to Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 231. 397



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ing person, but if the lifeguard himself takes the blow and loses his consciousness, both will be lost. Likewise, in the Batavian Republic’s interest, the survival of the French Republic had to be secured above everything else. Initially the Batavian government wished the alliance to be solely defensive. It soon yielded to French demands to make the alliance offensive as well. From a formal point of view, this military character of the alliance was entirely reciprocal. De facto France was more likely to engage in offensive war, though. Hence, adding the offensive element favoured the French Republic more; especially since the Treaty kept silent on the faculty to make war. The exclusion of a separate peace was reciprocal as well. Clearly, the provisions in the Treaty of The Hague with regard to the war contribution were not of a reciprocal nature. The Treaty settled the Batavian contribution unilaterally. If compared with e.g. the Dutch-Anglo and Dutch-Prussian 1788 Alliance Treaties, the first thing that strikes the reader is that the 1795 Treaty of The Hague did not fix the assistance the French Republic was to provide in case the Batavian Republic would be attacked. The French corps in the Batavian Republic served the purpose of defending the Batavian Republic against Counter-revolutionary threats. So, in a way, the auxiliary forces usually promised in an alliance treaty, were furnished in advance. The Treaty did, however, not stipulate that the Batavian government was entitled to use these troops to act abroad. French troops were in the pay, not in the service of the Batavian Republic. The Batavian contingent, to the contrary, was to act jointly with French forces abroad. The French government did indeed move troops as it wished and felt free to decrease the number of French troops in the Batavian Republic while expecting the Batavian government to pay for the full number. Moreover, the Treaty did not stipulate anything about the payment of Batavian troops coming to France’s aid, whereas the Batavian government was to pay for the French auxiliary corps. In result, the Batavian government had to pay for both. France’s financial needs clearly dominated this part of the settlement and rendered military contributions highly non-reciprocal. The provisions on military cooperation were clearly part of what Marc Belissa calls the ‘instrumentalisation’ of the sister republics.399 Furthermore, the French corps was not pulled back after Amiens, this in flagrant violation of the Hague Treaty and the   Belissa, 2005, p. 97; Belissa, 2006, p. 308; Belissa, 2008, p. 120.

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29 August 1801 Convention. At first, the French government evaded the obligation to evacuate the Batavian Republic by referring to the Louisiana expedition. By the end of the year, Paris explicitly and openly disregarded the Treaty and Convention. Finally, within the sphere of economic warfare, a clear example is to be found of a great power withdrawing to domestic law to get what it wants. Ostensibly voluntarily, the Batavian government more or less copied French measures against British goods. Batavian armed forces were not integrated in the French army and navy. Only in case of joint action would Batavian forces be under the command of French generals. Batavian forces were not entirely subordinated to French ones. Batavian officers could outrank French ones. Only in case of equal rank, French precedence was agreed upon; a practical solution that matched France’s leading role in military affairs. Since the Batavian Republic furnished troops to the French Republic as an auxiliary, it made sense that French officers would have supreme command and precedence in case of equal rank. Even in case of joint action Batavian forces were, thus, to operate under the command of Batavian officers who, however, would be subordinated to the orders of the generals in command of French armies.400 Hence, the Batavian army was to operate rather autonomously. It only was to be fitted in the allies’, that is, France’s plans of campaign. Military actions were to be geared to one another, but Batavian forces would not be fully integrated in the French army and the French officers Batavian forces would be subordinated to officers quite at the top of the French hierarchy. The matter of command did cause some problems with regard to troops in the Batavian Republic. The French did attempt to have their general in command of the auxiliary corps charged with the supreme command over all forces in the Batavian Republic. The Batavian government managed to keep off a combined command with the exception of some periods during which the military or political situation demanded yielding to French insistence on a combined command. In general, there should only be question of a temporal combined command in case of joint action and the French general should be subordinated to the Batavian government. If these conditions would have been respected, a French general being in command of the Batavian army would not have been problematic from a point of view of equal Articl 4 25 March draft.

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ity and independence. Throughout the eighteenth century, it was not unusual to have a foreigner commanding the Dutch army. In this case, the French general remained part of the French chain of command, though, and even if they had only been subordinated to the Batavian government none of the generals sent to the Batavian Republic throughout the period were likely to forget that they were French and their loyalty was with the French Republic first and foremost. Batavians had agreed to the offensive part of the alliance in the conviction that peace with all Coalition powers would be concluded soon. Despite some bellicose rhetoric, nobody in The Hague intended long-term involvement in a major war. Hence, as the war seemed to last longer than expected, the Batavian government made an effort to attain a neutral status. This called for terminating or at least modifying the Hague Treaty. The Batavian government upheld the sanctity of treaties by not invoking changed circumstances to get out of the alliance without French consent. To be sure, due to the difference in power between the two Republics, it was not able to unilaterally terminate the Alliance Treaty. The quest for neutrality, with the exception of a single diplomatic attempt sub rosa, was directed at persuading the French government to concur with Batavian neutrality. The French government, on its turn, handily used the necessity of mutual consent to keep the Batavian Republic in the war.

chapter five

The limits of independence The Treaty of The Hague established an alliance between the French and Batavian Republics settling various matters to establish peace and fixing reciprocal rights and obligations in times of war. The most press­ ing matters to the French government by the time negotiations with the Batavian Patriots started were, however, of a territorial nature. In this chapter the territorial settlement in the Treaty of The Hague will be discussed. Attention will be paid both to French territorial demands throughout negotiations on the Treaty of The Hague and to disputes arising after the conclusion of the Treaty on territorial jurisdiction and the community of Flushing. In fixing the mutual border geopolitical considerations, the Revolutionary dogma of natural borders, the ideal of good faith, popular sovereignty and independent statehood con­ verged. The discussion on the territorial settlement in the Alliance Treaty provides an excellent source of views on statehood, indepen­ dence, and legal order. In addition, in the years after the conclusion of the Treaty, various questions of (exclusive) jurisdiction, independence, and sovereignty arose mainly concerning French presence in Flushing, the naval base at the Scheldt estuary, and French privateer activity. 5.1  Setting Borders Trying to stabilise their regime, while still having to cope with huge financial problems and security issues, the leading Thermidorians had not only set their mind on a financial indemnity but on territorial aggrandisement to the north and the northeast as well.1 They were, of course, not alone in having territorial ambitions. Compared to the annexations by Russia, Prussia, and Austria at the expense of Poland, French ambitions might even be regarded as modest and as just com­ pensation to maintain the balance of power.2 Moreover, the Batavian

1 2

 Sorel, 1906IV, p. 242.  Deutsch, 1938, p. xviii.

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Patriots, too, desired expansion. For the first time since the 1640s, a Dutch government contemplated significant expansion of its ­territory.3 Johan Valckenaer unfolded plans of uniting the Belgian provinces with the Northern Netherlands.4 The Patriot Staten Generaal casted covet­ ous eyes upon East Frisia—owned by the King of Prussia since 17445—, the County of Bentheim, and the Bishopric of Münster; ambitions that would stay alive even with the Uitvoerend Bewind and the Staatsbe­ wind. Schemes were designed to partition the Austrian Netherlands or to extend the Batavian border to the east. The preoccupation with territory, borders, and aggrandisement was not exceptional. Philip Bobbitt has described the eighteenth century as the age of the territorial state, that is, a state—and states system—to which a consolidated territory and borders became paramount.6 In the first place, in the spirit of reason, messy frontier zones full of enclaves were gradually replaced by clear borders to demarcate exclusive spheres of jurisdiction.7 The natural borders were in part an attempt to further rationalise state territory.8 The ‘Kleinstaterei’ had to be cleaned up and replaced by consistent ‘états massifs,’ large states with consolidated territories capable to defend themselves and thus adding to the stabil­ ity of Europe.9 Thereto, territorial expansion became an end in its own right and an element of defensibility.10 Borders were emphasised by lines of fortifications. Territorial integrity became an object of defence policies; territory a weight in the balance of power. Bobbitt took the notion of the territorial state a step further arguing that the state was identified with its territory. It is argued that territory came to define the state instead of being part of the sovereign’s patrimony while not yet demarcating the moral community of the nation and separating the nation from others.11 The eighteenth century seems to have been more of a transitory stage than a stage in its own right, though. To be sure, the United Provinces, lacking a monarch, had come to define

 Carter, 1975, pp. 3–4.  Vreede, 1863, p. 71 and bijlage III pp. 8–14.  5  Duchhardt, 1997, p. 164.  6   Bobbitt, 2003, p. 120 and pp. 139–140.  7   Godechot, 1983, p 62; Belissa, 1995, p. 99; Grewe, 2000, p. 321; Bobbitt, 2003, p. 522 and p. 527; Belissa, 2006, pp. 207–237.  8   Grewe, 2000, p. 322.  9   Belissa, 1995, p. 97 and p. 101. 10   Beaulac, 2003. p. 277. 11   Boulvert, 1984, p. 202; Belissa, 1995, p. 99; Bobbitt, 2003, p. 120.  3  4



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themselves territorially as countries. That is not the same, though, from identifying the state with its territory. In diplomatic sources from the period of the Revolutionary Wars, as will become clear throughout this chapter, the relation of a government to the state’s territory was still conceived as a relation of ownership next to one of public authority, thus holding on to the twofold relation of property and jurisdiction.12 This being the spirit of the age, it does not come as a surprise that negotiations and relations between the two Republics were dominated by fixing borders, schemes for aggrandisement, maintaining territo­ rial integrity, and having territorially defined jurisdiction respected. In their instructions for Blauw and Meyer,13 the Staten Generaal first and foremost established that the United Provinces’ territorial integrity was to be preserved. To sustain Dutch state finances the taxes levied in the Lands of the Generality were said to be absolutely necessary. From reading the Staten Generaal’s argument one might get the impression that the United Provinces would be flooded with water if deprived of these incomes. Not a square mile of territory could be spared. All conquered territories should be fully restored to the Staten Generaal. The Staten Generaal ignored French territorial ambitions even more. They proposed a territorial aggrandisement of the Dutch Republic on its southern frontier, which basically boiled down to partitioning the Austrian Netherlands. The Staten Generaal did anticipate the French to annex Belgium. It was argued that, without decreasing France’s affluence, Dutch capac­ ity to act against Britain would be significantly increased if the terri­ tory west of the river Scheldt, Antwerp as well as the maritime towns of Ostend and Nieuport included14 and the land north of the line from Antwerp to Maastricht would be added to its territory. Not only would this aggrandisement increase the economic base of Dutch state finances, it would enhance the capability to check the British as well. The Dutch navy would thus be able to cover all North Sea harbours, whereas the French navy could concentrate on the coastline south of Cherbourg. 12   Jones, 1969, p. 155. This distinction originates from the late Middle Ages. It is, for instance, already to be found in Francisco de Vitoria’s De Indis (1539, p. 258): dominium per proprietatem and dominium per iurisdictionem. 13   26 February 1795, draft instructions; NA 3.02.01 no. 461; 2 March 1795, instruc­ tions; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 657–666 no. 501. 14  To be precise: at the coast towards Ostend and Nieuport from there to Ypres, Kortrijk, Ghent, Dendermonde, and Antwerp.

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The Staten Generaal showed to have an eye for French security con­ siderations by stressing that the French Republic would have noth­ ing to fear in the north after this partitioning. For, not only would the Dutch desire nothing at all in those parts besides that necessitated by the interest of both nations, they would not be capable of doing anything harmful to French interest because of the immense differ­ ence in power either. Moreover, since the Scheldt would be the border river, French ships would be allowed to navigate the Scheldt and enter Antwerp. In addition, Blauw and Meyer were to insist on the annexation by the Dutch Republic of Prussian Guelders and neighbouring Prussian territory up to Emmerik and Wezel—at the time occupied by French troops—as well; a typical case of the pot calling the kettle black. These territories were of no great economic use, but they were essential to Dutch security, because it would deprive Prussia—and thus the ­Orangists—of places on the Dutch territory to concentrate troops from where the Dutch Republic could be attacked (as it had been in 1787). Because of these measures, the Dutch Republic would gain suffi­ cient strength to be a ‘bulwark [. . .] of liberty and a place of refuge for those persecuted and oppressed by tyranny.’15 The cause of freedom, they argued, could not be furthered more than by allowing the Dutch Republic to become a real partner to France: That, as the Dutch defenders of liberty have taken refuge in France for some years, Holland might once, in case of unforeseen coincidences, have to become a shelter for champions of liberty if they have to go into exile for some time; that, since the other inhabitants of Europe still, the one more than the other, suffer from the yoke of despotism, nothing can be more appropriate to crush that than to show to everyone that the mightiest of the free republics allows another worthy of freedom suf­ ficient power to prosper in order to withstand its enemies and to help further and defend the holy cause of liberty.16 15   ‘een bolwerk [. . .] voor de vrijheid der volken en eene schuilplaats voor vervolg­ den en verdrukten van tiranny.’ 16   ‘Dat, zoo als de hollandsche verdediger der vrijheid jaarenlang in Vrankrijk zijn geretireerd geweest, Holland zomtijds ook bij onvoorziene toevallen de schuilplaats zoude behooren te worden voor voorstanders der vrijheid, indien deze eens voor eeni­ gen tijd moesten wijken; dat, daar de andere ingezeetenen van Europa nog, de eene meer, de anderen minder, onder het juk van despotismus zuchten, niet geschikter zijn kan, omdat te verbrijzelen, dan aan allen te doen zien dat de magtigste der vrije repu­ blieken, aan eene andere, die der vrijheid waerdig was, genoegzaame magt heeft willen



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However, Blauw and Meyer kept the Staten Generaal’s territorial desid­ erata from the French commissioners. Instead, they urged the French government to explicate itself on the foundations of the alliance and ‘la fixation éventuelle des limites.’17 For the time being, Batavian Patriots, despite all their hopes and expectations, were still unsure as to the extent of altruism their French brothers might be able to muster. Territories previously conquered by the Revolutionary armies had already been reunited by the French Republic or were about to be annexed. ‘Liberty trees planted in Brus­ sels and Aachen had not protected their inhabitants from coming to enjoy the rights and duties of French citizenship,’ as Simon Schama put it.18 A full annexation of the United Provinces was highly unlikely. Ideas of France’s natural frontiers did, however, bring about claims on part of their territory. Nor did Batavian Patriots consider ceding substantial parts of their territory. The discussion on these territorial matters—in combination with the recognition of the Batavian Repub­ lic, as discussed above—dominated the negotiations. Initially, the Comité de Salut public contemplated to annex all Lands of the Generality. In the bases proposées, Merlin entered provisions in confirmation with the policy of natural frontiers. Already bearing in mind the Austrian Netherlands being annexed, the frontier would be formed by the Scheldt, the coast of Brabant opposite to the Zeeland islands, the river Waal and, finally, the river Rhine. This would even have included some parts of the sovereign Province of Guelders next to the Lands of the Generality. In addition, the Treaty was to contain the prohibition to erect fortifications on the island of Zuid-Beveland.19 Furthermore, navigation on the rivers Rhine, Scheldt, and Meuse should be free.20 In his comments to the bases proposées, Sieyes, one of the most vehement advocates of an extended French presence on the North Sea coasts, stressed that the French Republic needed Flushing, situ­ ated on the island of Walcheren, as seaport and proposed having the vergunnen, om te bloeijen, om tegen haare vijanden bestand te zijn, en de geheiligde zaak der vrijheid te helpen bevorderen en staande houden.’ 17   12 March 1795, Réflexions provisoires pour les citoyens Sieyes et autres commis­ saires du Comité de Salut public, nommés pour entrer en conférence avec les minis­ tres plenipotentiaires Bataves; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 18  Schama, 1989, p. 240. 19  Article 3 BP. 20  Article 8 BP.

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Convention nationale giving its opinion on the frontier settlement in advance.21 He especially wanted to make clear whether the Conven­ tion desired to control all mouths of the river Rhine or whether just one sufficed. Moreover, he emphasised that to make free navigation of the rivers reciprocal, the French Republic should be in control of at least one of the shores. Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland should stay in French hands. He even proposed France holding on to all islands in the Scheldt-Meuse-Rhine delta, if not to all territory west of the river IJssel; after all, a branch of the Rhine. Finally, Sieyes proposed an additional article pursuant to which the ports of Trincomalee and Colombo on Ceylon would be occupied by French troops and the Cape of Good Hope would be ‘libre aux deux nations,’ thus extending French strategic advantages to the Batavians’ colonial dominions. The plan de négociation—while stressing that the Batavian Republic was not to be conceived as conquered territory but as an ally—22 was less outspoken on the future territorial settlement. Since the fate of the Austrian Netherlands was still doubtful, the territorial settlement in the Franco-Batavian Treaty was made dependent on the Convention’s decision with regard to those lands. Three options were considered for the Dutch lands west of Cleves (that is, Dutch Brabant and part of Guelders): holding on to the old frontier line, drawing a new one over land, or following the Rhine/Waal as frontier Until the Convention had determined what to do with the conquests in the north—or, in the words of the plan de négociation: ‘après la fixation générale des lim­ ites de la République française, qui n’appartient qu’à la Convention’—, Dutch Brabant was to remain occupied both militarily and with regard to civil administration. Claims to Batavian territory from Bergen op Zoom to the sea were clearer. The French claimed the fortified city of Bergen op Zoom and its surrounding territory up to fort Lillo north of Antwerp and the Scheldt with both its shores, that is to say Dutch Flanders and the islands of Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland. By this acquisition the French Republic would gain control of the entrance to Antwerp, for ‘il est instant de raviver la Belgique et de porter un coup mortel à l’Angleterre en s’opposant l’Escaut à la Tamise, Anvers à Lon­ dres’ and the French would make use of Flushing to assemble a fleet

 Part of this Chapter has been previously published in Dutch (Kubben, 2006).  Article 3 PN.

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to counter British naval dominance on the North Sea and the Baltic.23 Thus, at least, Sieyes’ ideas of annexing the entire Province of Zeeland were dropped. Nor did his colleagues adopt his plans with respect to the Batavians colonies. Conversely, the Batavian envoys were instructed to insist on French forces evacuating Batavian soil as soon as possible and to feel out whether the French would be willing, in return for money, to agree to an extension of Batavian borders on ‘the Flemish, Brabant, and Guelders side.’24 In addition, the Staten Generaal urged their envoys to examine whether the French Republic would be prepared to cooperate in the Batavian Republic annexing East Frisia. In the course of the 24 March conference, French demands were repeated and the French commissioners presented the matter of the frontier settlement as a conditio sine qua non.25 Above all they wished to prevent offending the Convention that had set its mind on the Rhine frontier.26 Blauw and Meyer, however, adamantly rejected any cession of territory. The draft preliminary articles, presented to the Comité de Salut public by the Batavian envoys on 25 March, men­ tion a French guarantee of the integrity, ‘one and indivisible’-ty of the Batavian Republic on the basis of its territory ‘qu’elle a existée et été reconnue par tous les Peuples de la terre avant la déclaration de guerre contre le Stadhouder et ces adherens.’27 On the same day, the Staten Generaal decided not to negotiate an indemnity before the Batavian Republic’s borders had been recog­ nised.28 Hence, Batavian Patriots assumed that the French Republic would respect Batavian territory and would even be willing to coop­ erate in aggrandisement. Finally, the Batavians extended the provi­ sions on free navigation. They proposed creating a free trade zone with equal rights for citizens of both states.29 Despite the Batavian rejection, the French persisted in their territo­ rial schemes. According to the 5 April draft, the French Republic would

 Article 5 PN.   ‘aan de Vlaamsche, Brabandsche en Geldersche kanten’; 2 March 1795, Instruc­ tions for Blauw and Meyer; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 657–666. 25   24 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; NA. 1.02.14 no. 596. 26   24 March 1795, Comité de Salut public to Alquier and Cochon; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 629–631 no. 481. 27  Article 10 25 March draft. 28  Schama, 1989, p. 251. 29  Article 8 25 March draft. 23 24

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‘restitute’30 all occupied territories ‘au de la du Rhin et du Whaal’ to the Batavian Republic.31 For the time being, the lands south of the rivers Rhine and Waal would remain occupied militarily.32 However, Dutch Flanders, Walcheren, Zuid-Beveland, Maastricht, Venlo, Breda, Bergen op Zoom, and all land between the latter city and the March­ graviate of Antwerp would stay in French possession until they would follow the fate of Belgium;33 that is, the probable annexation by France. Again, navigation on the rivers Rhine, Scheldt, and Meuse was to be free for both nations.34 By then negotiations had come to resemble a conversation among the deaf in which each party basically repeated its demands over and over again without making any substantial concessions that would have allowed a compromise. The Dutch counter draft by which the Staten Generaal responded to the French 5 April ultimatum, naturally assumed full restitution of all occupied parts of Batavian territory. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Provinces had vehemently opposed a ces­ sion of Zeeland territory. The part of the Article in the French draft that limited the restitution of territory to lands ‘qui sont situés au-delà du Rhin et du Whaal’ was simply omitted.35 The Zeeland Staten even still reckoned with the retention of Dutch Flanders.36 The sole concessions the Staten Generaal were willing to make were the cession of Maastricht and Venlo and French military presence in the lands on the left bank of the Rhine and Waal, especially Breda, Bergen op Zoom, Walcheren, and Zuid-Beveland, until the end of the war. The French would occupy Dutch Flanders ‘jusqu’à ce que son sort suive définitivement celui de la Belgique.’ Hence, the Staten Generaal basically agreed to the cession of Dutch Flanders as well. The secret articles explicitly stipulated that French forces would not interfere with civil administration.37 In addition, neither Breda nor Bergen op Zoom would be ‘villes de guerre’ after the war. No garrisons would be stationed there without the consent of the French Republic. On

  ‘La République française restitue [. . .]’  Article 6 5 April draft. 32  Article 7 5 April draft. 33  Article 8 5 April draft. 34  Article 10 5 April draft. 35  Article 6 25 April counter draft. 36   16 April 1795, Article 3 Instructions for Emerins; 1 May 1795, minutes Secreet Besogne; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 37  Article 3 secret 25 April counter draft. 30 31



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the other hand, the French Republic would not station any troops in Antwerp and other places within the same distance from Breda and Bergen op Zoom without the Batavian Republic’s consent.38 Thus, the Staten Generaal reckoned with French security considerations. With­ out giving in to a cession of their possessions south of the Rhine, they proposed creating a kind of demilitarised frontier zone between the two Republics. French claims to stationing garrisons in Batavian towns were dis­ missed as gratuitous. The Staten Generaal asserted that these could only be based on suspicion with respect to the Batavian government’s good faith. For stationing French troops even behind the border for­ tifications made only sense from a point of view of French security if either the Dutch would recall the Stadhouder—‘l’ennemi naturel de la France’—or if the Batavian Republic would again become depen­ dent of Britain. Both fears were put aside as unwarranted. The Staten Generaal assured the Comité de Salut public that Batavian Patriots, having been suppressed by the House of Orange and having been lib­ erated by the French, would not make the mistake of compromising with a House ‘si justement abhorrée.’ Nor would they re-establish rela­ tions with the British who supported the Stadhouder and had always attempted to devastate Dutch affluence.39 Moreover, the offer not to station troops in Breda and Bergen op Zoom was ample evidence of the Batavian government’s loyalty and good faith not to make any security measures on the Franco-Batavian border necessary.40 Furthermore, the Staten Generaal introduced a territorial compen­ sation for cessions made to France. The Staten Generaal indicated to relinquish Maastricht, Venlo, and Dutch Flanders only reluctantly and that the integrity of Batavian territory was the true interest of the French Republic. However, if they really had to part from those ter­ ritories, they hoped the Batavian Republic would be indemnified ‘juste et équitable.’41 If Dutch Flanders would be incorporated in the French Republic in the end, France would be obliged to provide the Batavian Republic with a ‘cession égale’ consisting of Prussian Guelders, that  Articles 7 and 8 25 April counter draft.   26 April 1795, Eclaircissemens sur le projet de traité remis au nom du Gouverne­ ment Batave par les ministres plenipotentiaires soussignés; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 40   26 April 1795, Eclaircissemens sur le projet de traité remis au nom du Gouverne­ ment Batave par les ministres plenipotentiaires soussignés; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 41   26 April 1795, Eclaircissemens sur le projet de traité remis au nom du Gouverne­ ment Batave par les ministres plenipotentiaires soussignés; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 38 39

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is to say the lands between ‘s-Hertogenbosch and Roermond—Venlo, would thus be restored—and all lands to the north of that zone up to the Rhine.42 As they were sent to The Hague, Reubell and Sieyes were instructed not to yield on the matters of Dutch Flanders and Flushing.43 In the draft they carried to The Hague, again, Dutch Flanders, Maastricht and its dependencies—that is, the so-called Staatse Landen van Over­ maze (Dutch Limburg)—, Venlo and all Dutch dominions south of the latter city, Bergen op Zoom and the lands between that city and Antwerp were excluded from the restitution. The Comité de Salut pub­ lic did assert that the excluded territories were intended for the French Republic solely. In addition, the French copied the territorial compensation from the Dutch counter draft, without copying the specific lands that com­ pensation was to consist of, though. It was only stipulated that the compensation had to be equal to the ceded territories.44 Having cut back on its territorial demands, the French government did want to ensure its military dominance of the territories it could not get. Hence, there was, at least, to be military occupation of other places at the French Republic’s discretion. Contrary to former drafts, military pres­ ence was not to be restricted to the Lands of the Generality. The French Republic would be allowed to occupy places in the United Provinces themselves—that is to say, north of the river Rhine—as well.45 The 4 May draft is the first to mention Flushing expressis verbis. Port and city of Flushing would be perpetually occupied by French troops. Furthermore, the use of the port of Flushing and the Ram­ mekens roads would be ‘commun en toute franchise entre les deux républiques.’46 Apparently, the French had resigned themselves to the impossibility of gaining the island of Walcheren entirely. With that regard a rather small textual matter that would become more signif­ icant in the years to come should be mentioned here. Thus far all drafts, in respect to the territorial settlement, had contained a gen­  Article 9 25 April counter draft.   ‘Ils ne pourront modifier en lieu la cession de la Flandre hollandaise et l’occupation militaire de Flesingue à perpétuité par les troupes françaises.’; 4 May 1795, instruc­ tions pour les représentans du peuple membres du Comité du Salut public envoyés dans les Provinces Unies; AAE CP Hollande 587; Legrand, 1895, p. 106. 44  Article 9 4 May draft. 45  Article 11 4 May draft. 46  Article 10 4 May draft. 42 43



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eral article pursuant to which the French Republic would restore all occupied territories, and another one containing the exceptions to that restitution. The first Article ended with ‘sauf les exceptions portées en l’article suivant.’ Although in the 4 May draft an article on Flush­ ing was included47 after the Article containing the exceptions to the restitution,48 the Article stipulating the general restitution still spoke of ‘l’article suivant’ (singular).49 Hence, in the 4 May draft, the settle­ ment regarding Flushing was not included in the exceptions to the restitution. In the course of the Hague negotiations only minor changes were made to the Articles containing the territorial settlement. At first sight, the most significant alteration in the 16 May draft was the exceptions to the general restitution for the first time explicitly being presented as a ‘une juste indemnité.’50 However, suddenly, the restitution clause spoke of exceptions ‘dans les articles suivants’ (plural), thus including the Flushing settlement in the exceptions to the territorial restitution. Thereto, the Article with regard to Flushing no longer just said that the use of the port would be common to both nations. Whereas, it stated that the port would be ‘commun aux deux nations en toute franchise,’ it was added that the use of the port would be subject to regulations yet to be fixed.51 These apparently minor changes would prove to be of great importance in the years to come. During the final day of negotiations (16 May 1795) it was added that the French right to station a garrison in Flushing would be exclusive.52 The settlement of the territorial compensation in return for the ceded territories was extended and specified. In the first place, the compen­ sation would be equal ‘en surface’ and in such a way that the shared border would be fixed in the best possible way.53 In the second place, the French Republic would cede all real estates previously belonging to the House of Orange to the Batavian Republic.54 In the third place, the Batavian negotiators managed to extort a French guarantee of the Batavian colonial possessions. The British had already captured some  Article 10 4 May draft.  Article 9 4 May draft. 49  Article 8 4 May draft. 50  Article 10 16 May draft. 51  Article 12 16 May draft. 52  Article 13 final draft. 53  Article 14 16 May draft. 54  Article 17 16 May draft. 47 48

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Batavian colonies. What this guarantee was worth compared to the loss of territory was for the future to tell. Finally, all estates, posses­ sions, and rights within Batavian territory belonging to princes or powers the French Republic was at war with at the time of the inva­ sion would remain at the disposal of the French Republic and might be ceded to the Batavian Republic in case the territories ceded to the Batavian Republic at the peace as compensation would turn out to be insufficient.55 In sum, the following provisions finally ended up in the Treaty: Article 11 of the Hague Treaty stipulated that the French Republic would return all territories, cities, and villages having been constitu­ ent parts or dependencies of the United Provinces with some excep­ tions provided by in the following articles. Article 12 contained the cession of Dutch Flanders, Maastricht, Venlo, and Dutch Limburg as well as all other dominions of the United Provinces along the river Meuse south of Venlo ‘comme une juste indemnité.’ The second of the secret articles stated that these territories and towns were only to be annexed by France and not to be handed on to other powers. Article 16 obliged the French Republic to ensure territorial compensation for the Batavian Republic for the territories ceded to France at the time of the general peace. The secret articles stipulated that the two Republics guaranteed each other’s colonial dominions.56 In addition, the French Republic ceded all immovables and part of the movables previously owned by the House of Orange within Batavian borders to the Bata­ vian Republic.57 Article 18 made navigation of the rivers Rhine, Meuse, Scheldt, and all their branches free to both nations. Articles 13 and 14, ultimately, contained the compromise on Flushing. Formally, the Batavian Republic had preserved the islands of Walcheren and ZuidBeveland, and even Flushing itself, thus it seemed. But the French Republic had also held on to the military occupation of Flushing. A French garrison was to be stationed there to the exclusion of all other troops—‘soit en paix, soit en guerre, jusqu’à ce qu’il en soit stipulé autrement entre les deux nations.’ Flushing’s port was made common to both nations ‘en toute franchise.’

 Article 5 secret 16 May draft.  Article 6 secret Treaty of The Hague. 57  Article 19 Treaty of The Hague. 55 56



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The joint use of the harbour would be arranged in separate regula­ tions.58 These regulations were agreed upon simultaneously with the Treaty itself. In the first place, they stipulated that both nations were entitled to use the port and docks of Flushing on equal terms to build, repair, and equip ships.59 Each Republic would have arsenals, store­ houses, and dockyards of its own.60 To allow the French Republic equal advantages, several building owned by the East India Company were ceded to it and it was assigned terrain to build shipyards and arse­ nals.61 Each Republic would bear the costs to maintain and extend the arsenals, store houses etc. of its own,62 whereas maintenance expenses with respect to the port, docks, and wharfs would be split.63 Neither nation was to place a flagship or men-of-war in the port.64 In case of any disputes that could not be settled by mutual consent, the issue would be referred to five arbiters; two of which would be nominated by the French government, two by the Batavian government and the fifth being decided by lot after each government would have desig­ nated a neutral person.65 Whatever might be true of the Revolution having introduced a new concept of the state as nation-state, international politics was still to a large extent determined by the rationale of the territorial state. Hence, both the French and the Batavian governments were prone on their territorial schemes. Flushing was to be the main point of conflict between both Republics for as long as the Batavian Republic existed. Before these conflicts and the legal arguments exchanged because of them will be addressed, the various positions taken during the negotia­ tions will be elaborated on substantially. 5.2  Flessingue nous est nécessaire Although French Revolutionaries, in an earlier phase of the Revolu­ tion, had outlawed war for the sake of conquest, the post-thermidor 58   16 May 1795, Règlement pour déterminer l’usage du port de Flessingue [Here­ after: Flushing regulations]; M. Kerautret, 2002, pp. 32–33. 59  Article 1 Flushing regulations. 60  Article 2 Flushing regulations. 61  Article 3 Flushing regulations. 62  Article 4 Flushing regulations. 63  Article 5 Flushing regulations. 64  Article 6 Flushing regulations. 65  Article 7 Flushing regulations.

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Comité de Salut public had set its mind on extending France’s borders at least to the country’s natural borders. An elaborate argument was made that the French Republic was entitled to hold on to territories its armies had occupied throughout the war. The elaborateness of the argument might be taken as a sign that the justice of French territorial claims was not self-evident. It is a matter of fact that war caused the transfer of territory throughout the eighteenth century; for instance Prussia gained Silesia and France Lorraine;66 not to mention Russia’s move to the west. However, this proposition does not establish yet that the right of conquest was recognised. Grewe has argued that conquest was indeed an acknowledged title of acquiring territory in the eigh­ teenth century.67 Nevertheless, eighteenth-century diplomatic prac­ tice was still attached to a sovereign’s legitimate rights and titles and dominated by a desire for stability.68 Hence, practice did not recognise the right of conquest. The former sovereign’s consent incorporated in the peace treaty was needed for the legal transfer of territory to the ­conqueror.69 Whereas diplomatic practice repudiated the right of conquest, legal doctrine took a slightly different stand.70 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate on seventeenth- and eighteenth legal doctrine with regard to the right of conquest. Just to give an impression, two authors from the start of the seventeenth century—Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius—and one from the second half of the eighteenth century—Emer de Vattel—will be discussed succinctly. With regard to the voluntary law of nations they did not derive from practice that much. With regard to natural law, especially in just wars, conquest was recognised as a title to territory. Sharon Korman has established that two ways of acquiring territory through war were recognised: 1) the cession of territory in the peace treaty, 2) total victory leading to the extinction of the enemy as a political entity.71 66  Admittedly the legal title of the transfer of territory differed between these two examples. Prussia gained Silesia directly by conquest. Conversely, the king of France, Louis XV, ‘inherited’ Lorraine in 1766, but this inheritance was made possible because Lorraine was transferred to his father-in-law, Stanislaus Leszczynski (1677–1766) by the 1738 Treaty of Vienna that ended the War of the Polish Succession. The Treaty already stipulated that Lorraine would become French on Stanislaus’ demise. 67   Grewe, 2000, p. 396. 68  Osiander, 2003, p. 51. 69  Suquet, 1903, p. 105; Belissa, 1999a, p. 4; Bobbitt, 2003, p. 531. 70  Osiander, 2003, p. 49. 71   Korman, 1996, pp. 8–9.



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According to Gentili, victory in a just war entitled the victor to take possession of his conquests. Although war for the sake of conquest was inevitably unjust, conquest in a just war was a lawful title to territory.72 The victor had to observe ‘justice and equity’ though. 73 In general, ter­ ritory occupied at the time of the peace treaty was not restored to the former owner unless the treaty explicitly stipulated otherwise provided that the conqueror had actually taken effective and permanent posses­ sion of the lands.74 Grotius, too, recognised the right of conquest. 75 Under natural law, territory could be acquired in a just war by means of indemnity. Under the voluntary law of nations a belligerent waging a legal war76 became owner of everything he snatched from his enemy, with the exception of territory, though. Military occupation rendered a conqueror only in temporal possession. The transfer of sovereignty and ownership had to be confirmed in the peace treaty.77 In case of a just war, sovereignty and all the rights and powers attached to it could pass to the con­ queror.78 Grotius acknowledged the possibility that a people is subju­ gated through conquest and subjugation as a basis of public authority.79 Hence, sovereignty could be acquired by ‘lawful conquest,’80 because under natural law the ius victoriae still applied in case an enemy was entirely defeated.81 About a century and a half later, more or less the same ideas are to be found in Vattel’s Droit des gens. Vattel acknowledged that a nation or sovereign ruler could alienate state property. In case of territory the power to alienate was limited, though, by the ‘duty of self-­preservation’ and the duties against all members of a nation as association based 72   ‘Although the lust for dominion is condemned, and wars made for the sake of extending one’s power were thought by Augustine to be brigandage on a large scale, and although the seizure of property which was formerly lawful ceased to be lawful after a division of property was made; yet it is beyond doubt that lands and other possessions may be acquired under the title of war not less than by any other title whatsoever.’; Gentili, 1612, p. 304. 73   Gentili, 1612, p. 305. 74   Gentili, 1612, p. 381. 75   Korman, 1996, p. 29. 76  For the rise of the distinction between just war and legal war or war in due form, see Neff, 2005, pp. 95–102. 77   Grotius, 1625, pp. 334–336. 78   Grotius, 1625, p. 348. 79   Grotius, 1625, p. 65. 80   Grotius, 1625, pp. 71–72. 81  Neff, 2005, p. 116.

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on a social contract. A state could not just expel members from that association by alienating the territory they inhabited. Hence, terri­ tory was to be alienated only in case of ‘extreme necessity’ to safe­ guard the security of the state at large. Even then, the inhabitants of the ceded territories were not obliged to acknowledge the authority of the obtainer. Basically, they returned to the state of nature and had to consent to entering into another political association.82 War was a special case, though. Vattel argued that in case of a just war a belliger­ ent was entitled to take possession of enemy property to weaken or punish the enemy or as indemnity for expenses made and harm done provided the principle of proportionality was observed.83 Under the voluntary law of nations, although the right to take possession then was unlimited, transfer of conquered territory did require confirma­ tion in the peace treaty unless an enemy was completely subjugated and had ceased to exist.84 Vattel did thus recognise conquest, but he acknowledged, too, that conquest was a moral difficulty.85 Enlightenment philosophes took issue with the right of conquest, as they did with war in general. They set out to mitigate the laws of war, suppress the spirit of conquest and limit the rights of the victor in war.86 The right of conquest was essentially at odds with the notion that legitimate power had to be based on a social contract. Since under natural law only consent of the governed could be the basis of authority, conquest could not establish sovereignty.87 Korman has argued that, hence, in doctrine the self-determination of people became paramount, whereas in practice populations still did not have a say in the transfer of territory.88 John Locke was one the first to repudiate the right of conquest on these grounds.89 Vattel followed Locke’s example. He repudiated pat­ rimonialism. His insistence on the inalienability of territory without the inhabitants’ consent or the necessity of the explicit or tacit consent of the population to the new owner’s public authority clearly was a

 Vattel, 1758, pp. 100–101.  Vattel, 1758, p. 307. 84  Vattel, 1758, p. 308. 85   Korman, 1996, p. 10. 86  Laurent, 1869, pp. 68–69. 87   Belissa, 1995, pp. 79–84. 88   Korman, 1996, p. 37. 89  Locke, 1689, pp. 205–215; See also Gilson, 1984, pp. 120–121. 82 83



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counterpart of the attack on domestic absolutism and patrimonialism.90 Vattel reprimanded Grotius (and Pufendorf) for allowing a sovereign to transfer authority as if he were the owner instead of the agent of his people.91 Rousseau, too, repudiated conquest and alienation of terri­ tory because a sovereign was not entitled to pass people on to another master like herds of cattle.92 Moreover, since Rousseau conceived war as a conflict purely between states, he established that private property was not to be touched.93 The connection between social contract theory and the repudiation of the right of conquest becomes even clearer if one takes a look at Montesquieu.94 Suquet has argued that Montesquieu repudiated the right of conquest, too.95 At least in De l’esprit des lois, he did not do such a thing though. He clearly recognised the right of conquest as a right deriving from the right to wage war in self-defence. He did express the wish to mitigate and making more humane the conquer­ or’s conduct. Hence, he loathed the Romans’ practice to slaughter a conquered territory’s population. Wiping out a state did not mean that all inhabitants of its territory had to be killed. It meant that the political bonds between the citizens had to be destroyed. Nonetheless, he did say that bringing a conquered territory under one’s authority while maintaining its laws was consonant with the law of nations of his days.96 Revolutionary thought seconded the enlightened postulate that a population’s consent was needed for territory to be alienated.97 This postulate was introduced into practice on the occasion of the annexa­ tion of Avignon by France in 1792. The population’s consent did substitute the traditionally required consent of the former sovereign.98 French Revolutionaries did, however, also refer to the just war argu­ mentation in legal doctrine that justified conquests. As Marc Belissa has shown, Garran de Coulon, for instance, argued that the annexa­ tion of Belgium was not only justified because of the people’s consent,

  Korman, 1996, p. 36.  Rabkin, 2007, p. 79. 92   Korman, 1996, p. 37. 93  Rousseau, 1762, book I, chapter 4, pp. 52–53; Korman, 1996, p. 31. 94  Montesquieu, 1748, Book I, Chapter 2, pp. 43–45; Tuck, 2001, p. 185. 95  Suquet, 1903, pp. 111–112. 96  Montesquieu, 1748, Book X, Chapter 3, pp, 199–200. 97  Suquet, 1903, p. 113. 98   Belissa, 1999a, p. 553. 90 91

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but as a ‘juste indemnité’ as well. Unilateral annexation was deemed a just counteract in response to aggression.99 In addition, Joseph Eschas­ sériaux argued that annexation would remove a traditional source of conflict and would thus be justified because of its contribution to European peace and stability.100 Eventually, the population’s consent was thus put aside.101 Although the French had not determined their foreign policy yet by the time negotiations on the Treaty of The Hague started,102 French territorial demands already fitted into the policy that was to be pur­ sued by the Directoire. A majority in the Convention nationale was committed to the scheme of the natural borders.103 Hence, that scheme was brought to the fore as the French negotiators aimed at the Rhine and Waal rivers as frontier. The French Republic’s natural borders appear in the diplomatic sources as self-evident. However, one seems to have sensed that a mere reference to those frontiers would not suffice. Therefore, the natural frontiers are presented as one of the conditions to gain the best pos­ sible strategic position for France. General Sauviac, who thought the Dutch were treated too generously, wrote to the Comité de Salut pub­ lic that a strong French presence in the Low Countries was necessary to cover the left flank during military operations on the Continent. In addition, the French Republic would be able to use ports indispensable to the French navy in the war against Britain.104 Sauviac did not hold an isolated position in stating that the Northern Netherlands were of huge strategic importance. Some years earlier, Danton had exclaimed: ‘Prenons la Hollande, et Carthage est à nous.’105 Both in a military and in an economic sense—Antwerp’s mercantile revival—possession of both banks of the Scheldt was necessary to bring Britain down. For that reason, the French needed the Dutch ports, since, in the words of General Sauviac,

  Belissa, 1999a, p. 553.   Belissa, 1999a, p. 554 and p. 556. 101   Belissa, 1999a, pp. 559–560. 102  Colenbrander, 1905, p. 589. 103  See chapter I.2. 104  Colenbrander, 1905, p. 595 no. 463. 105  Sorel, 1906IV, pp. 240–241. In this quote Carthage, evidently, refers to Britain or London in particular.   99 100



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ils facilitent nos projets sur l’Angleterre et nous permettent de déboucher sur plusieurs points pour aller châtier cette île altière et la corriger pour longtems de son monstrueux machiavélisme.106

It was made clear in blunt terms to the Batavian negotiators that France did not intend to abandon the Zeeland islands, because state interest called for their retention: The Coalition to which your people belonged [. . .] planned to crumble France. Had it succeeded, you would have carried off with your part of the loot. Henceforth, you cannot be surprised that the French Republic desires to preserve in the occupied territories that what the interests of the state call for to be united with our territory. [. . .] Above all, it is imperative not to overlook both banks of the Scheldt, namely Dutch Flanders on the left, the islands of Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland on the right, and furthermore Bergen op Zoom and Sandvliet up to Lillo. This small expanse of land, in our view, is of the utmost importance to revive Belgium and to commit the Belgians to us, in due time to oppose the Scheldt against the Thames, Antwerp against London, and our fleets at Flushing against English hegemony of the German seas, the North Sea and the Baltic. These are our political opinions, since this is paramount to the French Republic.107

Later on, Sieyes explicitly pointed to the importance of the Zeeland islands to the French Republic vis-à-vis the ‘représentants en mission’: Certainly, those islands, above all Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland should be put in a proper state of defence against the English. Be sure, that power is aware of the high value of the Scheldt and Flushing. Yes, it is a small piece of land, that will remain to us pursuant to the draft alliance; but it is of more value to France than the acquisition of vast

106   8 February 1795, General Sauviac, Coup d’oeil politique et militaire sur la Hol­ lande; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 595–598 no. 463. 107   ‘De coalitie, waarvan uw volk deel uitmaakte [. . .] wilde Frankrijk verbrokkelen; was zij daarin geslaagd, dan zoudt gij uw deel genomen hebben van den buit. Gij kun het daarom niet vreemd vinden, dat de Fransche Republiek in de veroverde landen datgene wil behouden, wat het staatsbelang meebrengt met ons gebied te vereenigen [. . .] Het is bovenal noodzakelijk de beide oevers van de Wester-Schelde niet voorbij te zien, te weten links Staats-Vlaanderen en rechts het eiland Walcheren, dat van ZuidBeveland, voorts Bergen op Zoom, Sandvliet tot aan Lillo. Deze kleine uitgestrektheid gronds achten wij van het allerhoogste gewicht, om aan België nieuw leven te geven en de Belgen aan ons te verbinden, om te eeniger tijd de Schelde te stellen tegenover de Theems, Antwerpen tegenover Londen, en onze vloten van Vlissingen tegenover de Engelsche heerschappij over de zeeën van Duitschland, de Noord- en de Oostzee. Dit zijn onze staatkundige inzichten, omdat dit is een overwegend belang voor de Fransche Republiek.’; Legrand, 1895, p. 96.

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part ii, chapter five plains. Ce n’est pas la terre qui nous manquoit: c’est un port dans la mer d’Allemagne.108

Furthermore, the idea was widely shared that, due to the large expenses and sacrifices it had cost the French nation to set the Batavians free, France was entitled to lay claim to an indemnity in the form of an extension of its territory. France had earned its claim to the natural frontiers that would ensure its security. The Comité de Salut public wrote to ‘représentants en mission,’ in reaction to a letter in which they urged for mildness with regard to the Batavians: Nous n’avons pas cherché la guerre et nous ne l’avons pas faite pour agrandir notre territoire; mais puisqu’on nous a forcé de prendre les armes, nous ne devons les déposer qu’après nous être assurés d’empêcher qu’on ne vienne encore ensuite attaquer notre liberté, et en nous faisant indemniser au moins en partie des énormes dépenses de trois ans de combats.109

Hence, despite the earlier renunciation of war for the sake of con­ quest, the French thought to be entitled to lay claim to conquered territories. That claim is less contradictory as it might seem to be. For the Assemblée nationale’s decree did not revoke conquest as such, but merely war for the sake of conquest. Senso stricto the decree did not say anything about conquests made during wars waged for other rea­ sons. In the phrases reiterated above, Merlin clearly stated that France had not waged war to enlarge its territory. But, during the war, France had actually conquered certain territories and at the present they were at France’s disposal. In the Comité de Salut public’s point of view the French Republic could dispose of Batavian territory all the more, because the United Provinces had been conquered entirely and had thus, in French eyes, ceased to exist. The reader will recall that this was indeed one of the grounds for acquisition by conquest recognised in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century legal doctrine. As indicated before, prior to 16 May 108   ‘Gewis moeten die Eilanden, maar bovenal Walcheren en Zuid-Beveland in goeden staat van tegenweer tegen de aanslagen van Engeland gesteld worden. Houdt u overtuigd, dat die Mogendheid zoowel als wij, de hoge waarde van de Schelde en van Vlissingen beseft. Wel is het een kleine strook grond, die ons volgens het ontwerp der Alliantie overblijft; maar toch is zij voor Frankrijk van grooter nut dan de aanwinst van een uitgestrekt Land. Ce n’est pas la terre qui nous manquoit: c’est un port dans la mer d’Allemagne.’; 10 April 1795, Comité de Salut public to Alquier and Cochon; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 638–639; Vreede, 1863, pp. 102–103. 109  Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 605–607 no. 467; Legrand, 1895, p. 94.



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1795, the French considered the Batavians to be ‘une compagnie des marchands’ instead of a political entity. They were not yet a ‘people’ in the political sense of the word. Exactly for this reason, Sieyes set store by fixing the mutual borders before Batavian independence was recog­ nised. For, after a formal recognition, the Batavian Republic would have to be deemed being a political entity to which sovereignty accrued. ‘En effet, à quoi resemblerait alors la demande d’un démembrement de territoire, peut-être considérable, fait par une puissance indépendante à une puissance indépendante ?’ the former priest wondered.110 Then, French demands might fall through owing to the Batavians’ (popular) sovereignty, if they would refuse to cede the claimed territory volun­ tarily. Agreement on the mutual border had to be reached prior to recognition, since: Demander à une nation indépendante déjà reconnue qu’elle consente à un démembrement de son terrain, tel que pourra le vouloir la Con­ vention, n’est-ce que pas se présenter de nouveau à titre de conquérant envers un peuple dont on vient de faire un allié? Ces deux objets doivent donc être traités d’avance et convenus et signés le même jour que l’acte de reconnaissance qui nous est demandé.111

At the start of negotiations the Comité de Salut public, thus, did not esteem the Batavian Republic to be an independent power yet. As long as it was not yet recognised, the French Republic could unilaterally claim part of the conquered territory. For the Batavian nation did not yet exist as a political entity and France was entitled to reserve every­ thing it wanted to. Fixing the mutual borders was exactly about what territory was to belong to the new Batavian nation. In his oral report to the Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland, Blauw explicitly stated, that: the Comité de Salut public did not contemplate insisting on any cession of territory by this Republic, but, contrariwise, it regarded the entire ter­ ritory as conquered and only part of it will be restored.112

 Article 9 PN; Legrand, 1895, p. 94.   24 March 1795, Comité de Salut public to Alquier and Cochon; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 629–631 no. 481. 112   ‘dat het de gedachten van het Committe de Salut public niet waren om van deze Republicq enige cessie van territoir te pretenderen, maar dat integendeel het geheel land als geconquesteerd wierd beschouwd en alleen een gedeelte wierd teruggegeven’; 12 April 1795, minutes Hollandsch Committé van Buitenlandse Zaken; NA 3.02.01 no. 440. 110 111

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From this point of view, there was no question of a cession of terri­ tory by the Batavians. The French Republic simply did not return the entire territory of the old Republic to the new Batavian Republic.113 ‘Il posait en principe que les pays mentionnés au traité étaient conquis; par suite, la Hollande ne cédait rien; c’etait la France, au contraire, qui restituait ce qu’elle jugeait inopportun de conserver,’ as Sieyes put it.114 The drafts and in the end the Treaty itself thus used the word ‘restitue.’ That the regulations on the use of the Flushing’s port did use ‘cedera’ does not alter this, since that cession did not concern territory but some buildings and terrains in Flushing that formerly belonged to the East India Company. Of course, the use of the word ’restore’ implies that those territories had belonged to the United Provinces before, or at least, that the regenerated republic—whatever its name—existed prior to it gaining possession of part of its territory again and loosing the remaining part to France. Not even the more moderate ‘représentants en mission’ in the United Provinces apparently doubted France’s right to regard the United Provinces as conquered territory. They only asserted that it would be expedient to France to be a mild conqueror, since harsh measures would ruin the Republic, would incite its inhabitants to shift their mostly moveable properties abroad, and would hence turn a potentially useful ally absolutely useless. ‘La France peut sans doute, si la force est un droit, traiter la Hollande en pays conquis,’115 wrote Ramel in his Mémoire sur la Hollande; although the phrase ‘if force equals right’ does seem to indicate that Ramel might not have agreed with his colleagues in the Comité on this point. The Batavian Republic would only be an independent state that could claim the integrity and inviolability of its territory, after it had been formally recognised. Until that moment Batavian territory was at the French Republic’s full disposal. Henceforth, it indicated to reserve some territories, the Zeeland islands included, for itself, because of military-strategic considerations.

 Sorel, 1906IV, p. 314.  Sorel, 1906IV, p. 313. 115   20 February 1795, Mémoire sur la Hollande considérée sous le rapport de la fortune publique et privée à l’époque de l’entrée de l’armée française sur son territoire (Ramel); Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 612–617 no. 472. 113 114



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Moreover, those territories were within France’s natural borders and territorial gain was part of the indemnity for war expenses.116 France would not act as a conqueror. The French did think themselves hav­ ing been attacked without cause and having justice on their side. Add to that the siege mentality that dominated Frenchs minds, and France did deem itself entitled to expanding its borders because of the suc­ cessful defence against an unjust attack. Elle ne veut pas faire des conquêtes, seulement elle veut s’indemniser des sacrifices, et des dépenses qu’une coalition injuste et des attaques contre sa liberté, l’ont obligée de faire, elle veut avoir et poser des limites qui la garantissent des projets et de l’invasion de ses ennemis et assurent son repos et sa tranquillité [. . .] elle se donne les limites naturelles, pour lesquelles en défendant sa liberté et en repoussant des attaques injustes, elle a dû prendre les armes; et ses succès et ses victoires lui ont bien donné le droit de les conserver.117

5.3  The Batavian Refusal The Batavian negotiators were quite appalled by French demands. They did acknowledge that the French Republic was entitled to an indemnity for the liberation of their patria, but held to their firm refusal to consent to the cession of part of Batavian territory. As argued before, Dutch Patriots were too aware of the vulnerability of their new regime and their dependence on French protection against Counter-­revolutionary forces (both domestically—the Orangist faction that could still count on a huge support among the lower classes and in the landward provinces—and externally—the danger of a British or Prussian invasion) to offend the French too much. On the other hand, they did not fancy making the consent to the cession of a constituent part of the old Union one of the first deeds of their regime. In those circumstances, above all it mattered to prove the unreasonableness

116   20 February 1795, Comité de Salut public to representants en mission; Colen­ brander, 1905, pp. 605–607 no. 467. 117  October 1800, Idées sur la conduite que la République française soit tenir, en considérant sa constitution, son gouvernement, ses principes, ses lois, son régime, sa position, ses sacrifices, ses ressources, ses victoires, ses conquêtes, sa situation et les moyens de ses ennemis, celle des peuples neutres, amis ou alliés les motifs qui ont fait entreprendre la guerre ceux qui l’ont déterminé à la continuer, et les raisons ou prétextes qui ont porté les puissances coalisées à la faire, et à la prolonger; AAE MD France 656.

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and impossibility118 of French territorial demands and to persist in the refusal to accept them for as long as possible in the hope that time or changing political or military circumstances would make the French more obliging. To establish that French demands were not reasonable, a number of military-political and economic arguments were brought to the fore. A cession of the Zeeland islands would deprive the Dutch Republic of the means to play a role of any significance in the international arena and to be a useful ally. The possession of Flushing’s port was vital for Dutch trade to flourish. Without this ‘source of richness’119 trade would decline. By consequence, the United Provinces would not even be in the position to keep the sea defences in good order, let alone that it would be able to maintain a French army, build a fleet, and settle the fixed financial indemnity.120 Although French interests were directly affected by these arguments, they did not play the first fiddle in the Batavian contribution to the debate on a treaty of peace and alliance. Above all, the Batavian negotiators and their superiors mainly used legal arguments that focused on two propositions. First, the Batavians invoked the French Republic’s good faith and the sanctity of treaties. French territorial demands were said to be at variance with previous promises and proclamations and the justified expectations based on them.121 Batavian Patriots had based their sup­ port to the French troops invading their country on those expectations and without that support the French army would have had a much harder job to conquer the United Provinces. Good faith was to be central to the relation between the two Republics. In a memorandum to the Comité de Salut public, Blauw and Meyer formulated that argu­ ment as follows: La France qui triomphe de l’Europe entière, ne pourra t’elle pas toujours tenant nos places fortes et les clefs de nos frontières, se venger d’une manière terrible; s’il était possible que le Gouvernement Batave s’abaissât à une perfidie quelconque? Non! la bonne foy qui a présidé constam­ 118   The Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Zeeland called the demands wrongful; 16 April 1795, instructions for Ermerins; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556. 119   ‘bron van ’s lands welvaart’ 120   18 April 1795, secret resolution Staten Generaal; Colenbrander, 1905, p. 685 no. 511; 15 May 1795, resolution Provisioneele Representanten van het Volk van Zee­ land; NA 1.02.14 no. 780. 121  E.g. 26 April 1795, Eclaircissemens sur le projet de traité remis au nom du Gou­ vernement Batave par les ministres plenipotentiaires soussignés; NA 1.02.14 no. 600.



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ment aux transactions commerciales de cette Nation, sera aussi la base de sa conduite politique.122

The Provisional Representatives of the People of Zeeland invoked the French Republic’s good faith as well. They expressed their indignation over French demands in a resolution in reaction to the French 5 April draft and ultimatum in the following terms: the great unjustness of claims so dishonouring to the French name. Adverse to the most solemn proclamations, adverse to a capitulation vol­ untary concluded and not breakable without violating the law of nations and all good faith, adverse to the incessantly repeated expressions of peacefulness and fraternity to a nation sincere in character and all its actions that received them as friends, adverse, finally, to the fame and glory of the French people which has proclaimed in the most solemn manner to wage war to tyrants alone and to recognise all free nations as its brothers manifold in the face of Europe at large.123

In their instructions for Ermerins, who was to go further Zeeland’s interests in Paris, the representatives of the Zeeland people asserted that ‘the system of liberty, equality and fraternity would become a mockery in the eyes of nations,’124 if the French would keep to their demands. In their letter to the Staten Generaal to inform them of their thoughts on the French proposals, they expressed themselves even more extensive: We would never have imagined that the French government’s good faith would have forgotten itself like this as becomes too piteously apparent from your poignant missive of the 12th of this month. How could we, fellow citizens!, have dared to doubt that the Dutch nation’s liberty and unconditional independence would be the basis of peace negotiations,

122   Blauw and Meyer to Sieyes, Reubell, and Merlin; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. The mem­ orandum was not dated but was probably sent on 17, 18, or 19 March 1795. 123   ‘de groote onrechtvaardigheid van zodanigen den Franschen naam onteerende vorderingen. Strijdig met de plegtigste proclamatien, strijdig met eene niet zonder vertreeding van het regt der volkeren en alle goede trouw verbreekbaare en vrijwillig geslotene capitulatie, strijdig met de gedurig herhaalde betuigingen van vreedelievend­ heid en broederschap, aan eene in den aart en aller derzelver handelingen oprechte Natie die hen als vrienden ontfangen heeft, strijdig eindelijk met den roem en luister des Franschen Volks het welk op de solemneelste wijze zoo meenig malen voor het oog van gansch Europa verklaard heeft, den oorlog alleen te voeren tegen tyrannen, maar alle vrije volkeren voor hunne broeders te erkennen.’; 13 April 1795, resolution Provisioneele Representanten van het Volk van Zeeland; NA 1.02.14 no. 780. 124   ‘het sistema van vrijheid, gelijkheid en broederschap [. . .] een bespotting worden zou in het oog der volkeren’; 16 April 1795, minutes Secreet Besogne Staten Generaal (communication of instructions for Ermerins by the Zeeland delegate); NA 1.01.03 no. 4556.

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part ii, chapter five reassured by the public proclamations voluntarily issued by the French nation’s representatives solemnly declaring in the face of Europe at large to have waged war on the Stadhouder alone, and to have regarded the Batavian nation as its friends and allies in the midst of the disasters of war; not to have come to enslave them, but that the French nation would respect their independence; reassured by the capitulation con­ cluded with this Province, resting on the French nation’s magnanimity that called our people brothers, that promised to restore them to the undisturbed use of the rights of man and the citizen, and had established in the Convention nationale as a fundamental law of government that the French nation did not intend to enlarge its territory by conquest?125

The frequent references to good faith befitted the spirit of the age. As Marc Belissa puts it, good faith was quintessential to enlightened and Revolutionary thought on international relations.126 It was one of the principles central to the international order as a legal order. The enlightened philosophes regarded justice to be the foundation of human society. Henceforth, observing a word given was a natural obli­ gation, from which sovereigns were not exempted.127 In first instance, that was all about the loyal observance of treaties, but it had conse­ quences for diplomatic intercourse in a wider sense as well. Belissa refers, for instance, to Mably’s critique of eighteenth-century, Machia­ vellian diplomacy. According to Mably, negotiations had to be ruled by reason and good faith as well.128 125   ‘maar nimmer hadden wij ons voorgesteld dat de goede trouw van het fransche gouvernement zig zoo ver zou hebben vergeeten als ons uit uwe ontroerende missive van den 12 deeser te jammerlijk is gebleken. Hoe, zouden wij, gerust gesteld door de openbaare vrijwillige proclamatie van de Repraesentanten der fransche natie, waar bij zij voor het oog van gantsch Europa plegtig verklaaren, dat zij alleen den oorlog teegen den stadhouder gevoerd, en het Bataafsch volk in ’t midden van de rampen des oorlogs, als hunne vrienden en bondge­ nooten beschouwd hadden; dat zij niet kwaamen om hun tot slaaven te maaken, maar dat de fransche natie hunne onafhangelijkheid zoude eerbiedigen zouden wij, gerust gesteld door de capitulatie met deese Provincie geslooten, zouden wij, steunende op de Edelmoedigheid der fransche natie, die ons Volk Broeders noemde, die het selve in het ongestoord genot der rechten van den Mensch en van den Burger beloofde te herstel­ len, en in de Nationaale Conventie als een Grond wet der Regeering had vastgesteld, dat het Fransche volk niet bedoelde zijn Territoir uit te breiden door het maaken van conquesten; zouden wij Meede-burgers! hebben durven in twijffel trekken dat de vrijheid en ongelimiteerde onafhangelijkheid van het Nederlandsche volk niet zoude geweest de basis der Vreedesonderhandelingen?’; 13 April 1795, Provisioneele Repre­ sentanten van het Volk van Zeeland to Staten-Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 780. 126   Belissa, 2004, pp. 241–253. 127   Belissa, 2004, p. 243. 128  Mably, 1757, pp. 123–128; Introduction by Belissa to Mably, 1757, p. 16; Belissa, 2004, pp. 248–249.



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Batavian authorities seem to have agreed with Mably in this regard. In the spring of 1795, there was no treaty yet setting Franco-Batavian relations to be observed by the French Republic; with the possible exception of the Capitulation concluded between General Michaud and the Zeeland Staten on 4 February 1795.129 Hence, the Batavians had to refer to legally less solid sources than a ratified treaty to estab­ lish that French demands and the accompanying refusal to recognise the Batavian Republic’s independence and the integrity of its territory would amount to a breach of good faith, while at the same time, those sources had to be of such a nature that Batavians had in fairness been entitled to rely on them. In the first place, a substantiation of their postulate was found in the aforementioned Capitulation. Indeed, that Capitulation contained some provisions from which it can be deduced that, in this case, Zee­ land’s independence had been recognised. Michaud consented to the maintenance of the existing constitution. Whereas the Zeeland Staten had requested that their Province would not be occupied by French troops at all, he did promise that the number of French troops on Walcheren would be as small as possible. Next to its provisions, the Batavians deemed that the mere conclusion of the Capitulation amounted to a recognition of the sovereignty and independence of Zeeland or the United Provinces. For, by concluding the Capitulation, the French had not entered Zeeland as conquerors. They had asked and received permission of the legitimate authorities. The argument of ruling out conquest because of capitulations was made with regard to Breda and Bergen op Zoom as well.130 Both cities had capitulated before they could have been taken by storm. In the second place, the Batavians referred to some proclamations of and promises made by the members of the Convention nation­ ale travelling with the French armies right before or while French troops entered the Dutch Republic. A short while before French sol­ diers crossed the frozen rivers, one of them, Lacombe St.-Michel, had informed the former secretary to the magistrate of ‘s-Hertogenbosch— Caspar van Breugel—that France desired peace with the Dutch Repub­ lic, would renounce any conquests, and would not interfere with the   4 February 1795, Articles of Capitulation signed at Breskens between General Michaud and the Zeeland Estates; CTS vol. 52, pp. 305–310. 130   26 April 1795, Eclaircissemens sur le projet de traité remis au nom du Gou­ vernement Batave par les ministres plenipotentiaires soussignés; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 129

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Republic’s administration provided that the United Provinces would abandon the anti-French Coalition.131 At their arrival in Amsterdam on 20 January 1795 those promises had been repeated in a public proc­ lamation to the Batavian people. The next day the Staten Generaal had been solemnly notified of that proclamation. Entirely consistent with the spirit of Revolutionary propaganda the liberation of the Batavian people from tyranny was presented as the supreme aim of the war waged by the French Republic. The French representatives pledged that the French nation would respect the Batavians’ independence.132 At other occasions during the 1794–1795 winter campaign similar proclamations had been published.133 Due to those proclamations, the Staten Generaal and the Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Zeeland deemed themselves to be justified in relying on the French indeed having come to set their Batavian brothers free and to restore their natural rights as well as that the French Republic would renounce any possible rights to conquered territory and would regard the Dutch Republic’s independence as point of departure for the peace negotia­ tions between the two nations. As has become clear from the exploration of the Paris negotiations above, the commissioners from the Comité de Salut public initially assumed as well that the United Provinces were not to be treated as conquered territory. In the course of the negotiations they changed their minds. Subsequently, their colleagues’ proclamations were posed against their change of course, to establish that considering the United Provinces as a conquered country of which only a part should be restored was out of the question. Instead, the United Provinces still were an independent power that had to agree to the cession of the requested territories to make their annexation by France legitimate. Hence, the question of continuity or discontinuity between the United Provinces and the Batavian Republic was not merely an academic one by far. Some wondered whether the appeal to the Capitulation and proc­ lamations was effective. Was the Convention nationale bound by the 131   1 and 7 November 1794, Van de Spiegel’s account of his meetings with Van Breugel; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 497–501 no. 377. On the contacts between Lacombe St-Michel and Van Breugel see also: Schama, 1989, pp. 226–229. 132   20 January 1795, Proclamation to the Batavian people by the French represen­ tatives with the Armies of the North and the Sambre et Meuse; Colenbrander, 1905, p. 592 no. 461. 133  Schama, 1989, p. 240.



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Capitulation? Had the Staten Generaal been right in putting their reli­ ance in the proclamations? According to Sieyes, both questions had to be answered in the negative since the Convention had ratified nei­ ther the Capitulation nor the proclamations. They were nothing more than an agreement with a general in the field and private statements of some of the Convention’s members.134 Needless to say that in the Staten Generaal’s opinion the Capitula­ tion was valid and that they had been entitled to rely on the statements by the ‘représentants en mission’. The Capitulation concluded with the Zeeland Staten did not need to be ratified to be valid, the Staten Gen­ eraal contended. With regard to the proclamations the Staten Gen­ eraal put the ball back into the French court. The representatives of the French nation, speaking on behalf of the Convention itself, had notified them of the 20 January proclamation legally. The Conven­ tion would have had reason to be insulted if the Staten Generaal had doubted the proclamation’s authenticity.135 Hence, the Staten Gener­ aal had rightly relied on the proclamations as they ordered the Dutch army not to resist French forces any longer. The same went for provin­ cial and local authorities that had allowed French troops to enter their territories without a struggle. Therefore, the Staten Generaal would not allow the French Republic deviating from the proclamations and considering and treating the Batavian Republic as conquered territory, unless they would be forced to do so by ‘the right of the strongest.’136 In the third place, the Batavians invoked a number of French con­ stitutional texts and decrees. Primo, they referred to the 22 May 1790 decree on the ius ad bellum.137 In that decree, the Assemblée nationale had declared that the French people renounced wars of conquests and would never deploy its military power against the freedom of other peoples. The relevant passage from the decree had been incorporated in Title VI of the French Constitution of 1791.138 By doing so, the

 Legrand, 1895, p. 102.   18 April 1795, secret resolution Staten-Generaal; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 685– 687 no. 511. 136   ‘het [. . .] recht van den sterksten’; 25 March 1795, resolution Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 604. 137  Dwyer and McPhee, 2002, pp. 60–61; 26 April 1795, Eclaircissemens sur le pro­ jet de traité remis au nom du Gouvernement Batave par les ministres plenipotentiaires soussignés; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 138   http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-­ constitution/les-constitutions-de-la-france/constitution-de-1791.5082.html. 134 135

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Staten Generaal asserted, the French had made the renunciation of war for the sake of conquest ‘a fundamental law of their government.’139 However, the 1791 Constitution had been revoked already in 1792 and the text had not reappeared in the 1793 Constitution.140 The latter Constitution, which did not enter into force due to the Revolutionary dictatorship by the way, did stipulate that the French people was the friend and ally of all free peoples141 and that it would never intervene in the government of other nations.142 Hence, the Batavians still esteemed that the French Republic did not intend making conquests. Secundo, the propaganda decrees were referred to: the 19 November 1792 decree of fraternité et secours and the 15 December 1792 decree.143 The latter decree stipulated how French generals were to act in occu­ pied territories.144 Inter alia, they were to proclaim popular sovereignty and enable the territory’s inhabitants to actually exercise their sover­ eignty. This decree had been rescinded by the Convention nationale on 14 April 1793, though. Tertio, the declaration of war of 1 February 1793 was mentioned. The Convention had declared war on the Stadhouder and the King of Great Britain. The Stadhouder had been explicitly distinguished from the Batavian nation that was considered to be an ally. The Convention had meant to express that the Revolutionary Wars were not fought between states or nations, but between peoples on the one hand and monarchs on the other.145 In late February, Carnot had recalled that principle in his report to the Convention on the occupation of the United Provinces and the Zeeland capitulation: Nous dûmes distinguer la masse du peuple batave, qui ne peut vouloir que la liberté, du parti stathoudérien, qui ne peut vouloir que le despo­ tisme. Nous dûmes regarder le peuple comme notre allié, et le gouverne­ ment comme notre ennemi.146

  ‘een grond wet der regeering’   http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/laconstitution/les-constitutions-de-la-france/constitution-du-24–juin-1793.5084.html. 141  Article 118. 142  Article 119. 143  See chapter I.2. 144  See: Nys, 1896, pp. 386–389; Belissa, 1995, pp. 333–337. 145   Belissa, 1995, pp. 356–360; Schama, 1989, p. 193. 146   20 February 1795, Carnot to Convention nationale; Colenbrander, 1905, p. 603 no. 466. 139

140



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Thereto, Blauw and Meyer explicitly referred to the 2 March 1793 decree.147 By that decree, the Convention altered the 15 Decem­ ber 1792 decree to make it applicable to the specific situation of the United Provinces. Because there were hardly any ecclesiastical estates in the United Provinces and the position of the nobility was less domi­ nant, the former decree was not suitable. In the Cambon draft that was adopted in the end, the Batavians were supposed to pay for their liberation and independence. Liberation and independence were the starting point, however. Moreover, the distinction between the Stad­ houder and the Batavian people was repeated. The Convention did assign itself the right to impose a unitary constitution on the Dutch Republic, but a draft by Barère that contained a more detailed reform programme was rejected. The Batavians thought to deduce from this that the further elaboration of the frame of government would be left for them to decide. The aforementioned proclamations were based on these decrees and expressed the same principles for the French Repub­ lic’s actions and intentions. Hence, they formed both directly and indi­ rectly an essential basis to substantiate that the Batavians’ trust in the French Republic respecting the Dutch Republic’s independence and integrity had been justified; a trust that was not to be violated accord­ ing to the principle of good faith. Finally, in order to substantiate their appeal to good faith, the Bata­ vians did not just refer to documents and public statements, that is to ‘hard facts.’ They encapsulated their appeal in a more sentimental sphere. The rational references to decrees, proclamations, etc. were accompanied by an appeal to the French nation’s ‘fame and glory,’ ‘magnanimity,’ ‘dignity,’ and ‘good reputation’ and the threat that the breaking of the French word would face the indignation of Europe at large. As indicated before, the importance attributed to good faith by enlightened thinkers and the French Revolutionaries in their retinue sprang from the idea that interstate and international relations were ruled by the precepts of natural law and morality. In the new order— to be brought into existence by the Revolution—moral behaviour by states would be obligatory. Herewith, the Batavians capitalised on the French nation’s self-image as the people that had started the Revo­ lution, had liberated itself and had made it its business to establish freedom in Europe. Moral behaviour befitted the grandeur of the new  Sorel, 1906IV, p. 273; Belissa, 1995, pp. 360–361; Rosendaal, 2002, p. 91.

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France. Exactly because of that self-image, the Batavians had been entitled to rely on the Convention’s decrees and the ‘représentants en mission’’s proclamations. Both sides seem to have valued good faith. The French did not deny that promises and arrangements had to be kept or that a justified reliance with the Batavians did have to be respected. They did make attempts to keep appearances by repeatedly denying that good faith was breached or that the Batavians were justified in their reliance. A second legal argument the Batavian envoys, the Staten Generaal, and the Zeeland Staten invoked was their lack of authority to consent to the demanded cession of territory.148 By early May 1795 the Comité de Salut public informed Blauw and Meyer that Reubell and Sieyes had been sent to The Hague, because they themselves had not been prop­ erly authorised to conclude a treaty. The Batavian envoys responded that they had indeed been authorised to do so. However, that did not go for a treaty that would contain provisions as desired by the Comité, since the Staten Generaal: would never have expected the Comité de Salut public’s commissioners in name of the French government [. . .] to make cession and handing over of part of our territory, even cities and towns that as members of the Alliance149 took place in the high Assembly of Their Lords, a precon­ dition of negotiations; that we certainly did not have powers to conclude on such disgraceful terms and that, finally, we as ministers of the entire Alliance and not of one or some Provinces as honest peoples desiring to be loyal to our oath, never would consent to the cession or handing over of cities or towns belonging to the Alliance against the Eternal principles of the People’s Sovereignty.150

148  E.g. 26 April 1795, Eclaircissemens sur le projet de traité remis au nom du Gou­ vernement Batave par les ministres plenipotentiaires soussignés; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 149   The Unie van Utrecht that established confederal relations between the seven Provinces. Hence, the Provinces formally were “allies” and they were still referred to as such. 150   ‘nimmer hadden kunnen verwachten dat de commissarissen van het Comité de Salut public in naam van het fransche Gouvernement [. . .] tot een basis van derzelver onderhandelingen zouden leggen de cessie en overgifte van een gedeelte van ons terri­ toir en zelfs van zodanige steeden en plaatsen die als leeden van het Bondtgenootschap sessie ter hooge Vergadering van Hun Hoog Mog hadden, dat wij zeker geene pouvoirs hadden om op zulk eene deshonorante voet de zaaken tot conclusie te brengen en dat eindelijk wij als ministers van het gantsche Bondtgenootschap en niet van een of meer Provincien als eerlijke lieden aan onzen Eed getrouw willende zijn, nimmer teegen de Eeuwige principes van de Souverainiteit des Volcks aan in eenige cessie of overgifte van Steeden of plaatsen tot het Bondtgenootschap behoorende konden of zoude koomen’; 11 May 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 593.



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Somewhat earlier, Blauw and Meyer had already stated in response to French demands that they could not be assented to, since they were contrary to the principle of popular sovereignty. Older notions of the inalienability of territory151 merged with French Revolutionary ideas of legitimate power of authority consented to. to the most grievous indignation, we have taken cognizance of your desire to add to the French Republic part of our territory, which the Batavian Republic is unable to cede according to your own principles without the freely expressed consent of the inhabitants of that part of the Republic.152

Even if the Staten Generaal would endorse cession of the requested territories in the peace treaty, the concerned stipulations would be void anyhow due to the violation of popular sovereignty.153 Hence, the French rhetoric of popular sovereignty, employed to justify previ­ ous annexations, backfired, although the Batavian envoys did not go as far as to deny the possibility of a cession of a constituent part of the Dutch Republic altogether along the line of argument as the French had adhered to in the cases of the Alsace and Avignon. In a letter to the Staten Generaal’s registrar they gave an account of their response to the Comité and formulated the argument of their lack of mandate to cede parts of the Republic’s territory without their populations’ consent in the following way: that act would as such be always void and illegal because due to our principles we lack the faculty to sell our fellow countrymen as if they were beasts of burden.154

The Holland Committé van Buitenlandsche Zaken, which had been informed of the French draft and ultimatum orally by Blauw during his April stay in The Hague, was likewise of the opinion that no ces­ sion could be assented to without the population’s consent. 151  From the late Middle Ages onwards subjects of various Kingdoms or other enti­ ties had insisted on guarantees that their territory would not be partitioned e.g. in case of succession. 152   26 March 1795, Meyer to Comité de Salut public; reiterated in: Schama, 1989, p. 250 (Schama’s translation). 153  No date indicated, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; aangehaald in: Legrand, 1895, p. 97. 154   ‘dat die daad op zich zelf altoos nul en onwettig zou weezen, omdat wij volgens onze principes, de faculteit niet hadden om onze medeingezetenen en compatriotten als lastdieren te verkoopen.’; 24 March 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Quarles; NA 1.02.14 no. 596.

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part ii, chapter five All Committee members present unanimously took the view that it would never be permitted to hand over one’s fellow men without their approval like irrational animals and, hence, that French demands could never be met by mutual agreement.155

Based on that lack of authority, the Batavian envoys announced to the Comité de Salut public that the Staten Generaal were in the ‘morale­ ment impossible’ to accept the French 5 April draft. Not only would the Staten Generaal betray their people’s trust by accepting the draft, it was argued. They would violate the solemn pact concluded in Utrecht in 1579 as well. The Staten Generaal had invoked the Unie van Utrecht in their 18 April resolution, in which they also appealed to popular sovereignty referring expressis verbis to the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen. It is fully beyond Their Lords’ power to give up part of the Nation, since this act going directly against the principles set down in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which the French Nation itself has solemnly pro­ claimed in the presence of the Supreme Being, could not be undertaken by any human authority, as long as one holds on to human beings not being commercial properties of others. [. . .] finally, contrary to the Unie van Utrecht of the year 1579 that still is the foundation of the confeder­ ate association of the seven Provinces, and by which they have solemnly guaranteed to protect each other against all violence and troubles with goods and blood.156

The Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Zeeland based the Staten Generaal’s—and their own for that matter—lack of authority to assent to a cession of territory on similar grounds in Ermerins’ instruc­ 155   ‘Alle de presente leden van het committe waren eenparig van begrip dat het nooit geoorloofd zijn kan zijne medemenschen zonder hunne toestemming af te staan, even als redenlose dieren en dat men dus nimmer bij een wederzijdsch contract de eischen der franschen kon inwilligen.’; 12 April 1795, minutes Holland Committé van Buitenlandse Zaken; NA 3.02.01 no. 440; 26 April 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 596. 156   ‘Dat het volstrekt buiten de macht is van H.H.M. om een gedeelte der Natie af te staan, daar deze daad als regtstreeks inloopende tegen alle gronden, gelegd in de verklaring der Rechten van den Mensch, welke de Fransche Natie zelve, in tegen­ woordigheid van het Opperwezen, plechtig heeft afgekondigd, door geen menschelijk gezag zoude kunnen geschieden, zoolang men vasthoudt, dat menschen geen com­ mercieele eigendommen van andere menschen kunnen zijn. [. . .] strijdig eindelijk aan de Unie van Utrecht van den jaare 1579, die tot nog toe de basis is der bondge­ meenschappelijke vereeniging der Zeven Provinciën, en waarbij de een den anderen plechtig geguarandeert heeft met goed en bloed te zullen beschermen tegen alle geweld en overlast.’; 18 April 1795, secret resolution Staten Generaal; Colenbrander, 1905, pp. 685–687 no. 511.



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tion. According to the Unie van Utrecht—that still was the base of the political association between the United Provinces—Zeeland was a free and sovereign Province, which the other Provinces could not dispose of, whereas even the Provisionele Representanten were only allowed to take such a decision with the consent of the sovereign Zeeland people itself.157 Furthermore, the Zeeland people’s representatives referred to the historical bonds between Zeeland and the other Provinces, Hol­ land in particular, that stood in the way of a cession of Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland. How could we consent to the cession of our Province’s two most impor­ tant and fertile regions, the Netherlands’ best sea port and dockyard, that soil that has often been perfused with the blood of our brave ancestors, the cradle and birthplace of our most courageous sailors, that soil where Dutch liberty was established for the first time. How could we consent to surrender them to the fate that will befall the unfortunate Austrian Netherlands! [. . .] Thou will, hence we trust, adhere to these feelings with us and make sure that the freedom and independence of the seven United Provinces will not be harmed and that Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland will not be dismembered from the other members of this Province and from the alli­ ance by providing the envoys in Paris with the necessary ­instructions. We implore thee by the sacred bonds of the Unie van Utregt, by our brave ancestors’ blood, by the religion we profess, we implore those of Holland, our most ancient allies, whose liberties and independence would never have burgeoned and been established without the valour of the old Zeeland people, we implore them by the Unie by which our Provinces are united felicitously for over two centuries, not to leave any­ thing undone, if only by addressing the entire Convention nationale in France, to repudiate and prevent the conclusion of this draft.158

  16 April 1795, instructions for Ermerins; NA 1.01.03 no. 4556.   ‘Hoe zouden wij instemmen om de twee aansienlijkste en vrugtbaarste land­ streeken onser Provincie, de beste zeehaven en dok van Nederland, dien grond, die vaak besproeyt is met het bloed onser dappere voorouderen, de wieg en bakermat der wakkerste zeelieden, die grond daar Nederlandsch vrijheid zig het eerst vestigde af te staan en over te geeven aan het noodlot voor de ongelukkige oostenrijksche Need­ erlanden beschooren! . . . Gij zult ook, dit vertrouwen wij, met ons in dese gevoelens instemmen en door het geeven der nodige instructien aan de ministers te Parijs zor­ gen, dat de vrijheid en onafhangelijkheid der zeeven vereenigde gewesten ongeschon­ den blijven, dat Walcheren en Zuydbeeveland niet worden gedemembreerd van de overige leden deeser Provincie en van het bondgenootschap. Wij besweeren u bij de heylige banden der Unie van Utregt, bij het bloed onser brave voorouders, bij den godsdienst die wij belijden, wij besweeren, die van Holland, onsen oudsten bondgenoot wier vrijheden en onafhangelijkheid zonder den helden­ moed der oude Zeeuwen nimmer ontloken en gevestigd ware, wij besweeren deselve 157 158

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By embedding their line of argument in national history, the Zeeland representatives seemed to have intended to indicate that the entire Province of Zeeland belonged to the one and indivisible Batavian nation due to the shared past and Zeeland’s role in that past, in par­ ticular the Dutch Revolt. It does not come as a surprise that the Zeeland peoples resisted the cession of Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland most vehemently. The same might go for them being the most persistent. Even during the Hague negotiations they stuck to their guns. On 15 May, as the treaty’s text had been well-nigh fixed, they informed the Staten Generaal that Flushing could not be dismembered by allowing condominium. At the very most the French could be allowed to use the port.159 Hence, Batavian authorities based their lack of authority to assent to a cession of territory both on the Unie van Utrecht and on the principle of popular sovereignty; expressly or by references to ‘the inalienable rights of man’160 or ‘your own principles.’ According to the Union, Zeeland was a sovereign Province and, therefore, the Generality was not to decide on the cession of Zeeland territory; especially, since the Union’s main aim had been to procure the Province’s sovereignty and the integrity of its territory. According to the principle of popular sovereignty, it was up to the inhabitants of the Zeeland islands them­ selves to decide whether they wanted to belong to France. For, they were free citizens instead of subjects that could be handed over from one government to another like cattle. This line of reasoning turned against ‘ancien régime’ practices of princes considering the territories and people subject to their authority as their patrimony of which they could dispose freely.161 Such practices did not befit the new image of the state as a voluntary association—the nation—of which the govern­

bij de Unie, die onse beyde Provincien meer dan twee Eeuwen gelukkig verbind, om tog niets onbeproefd te laaten; al waare het door een addres of espresse commissie aan de geheele nationale Conventie in Frankrijk, ten eynde de conclusie van dit voorstel met alle magt af te wijsen en te verhinderen’; 13 April 1795, Provisionele Represen­ tanten van het Volk van Zeeland to Staten Generaal; NA 1.02.14 no. 604. 159   15 May 1795, resolution Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Zeeland; NA 1.02.14 no. 780. In the resulting letter to the Staten Generaal, they threatened that Zeeland would consider itself relieved of all contributions to common expenses if the Staten Generaal would consent to the cession of the islands. NA 1.02.14 no. 780. 160  E.g. ‘uit hoofde der onvervreemdbare rechten van den Mensch en van den Burger’; 12 April 1795, minutes Hollandsch Committé van Buitenlandse Zaken; NA 3.02.01 no. 440. 161  Van Creveld, 2004, p. 173.



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ment was the deputy and legitimate power was based on the consent of the governed.162 The Staten Generaal clearly indicated that conquer­ ing a people against its will was ‘surtout contraire au principe de la souveraineté du peuple.’ Any provision in contradiction with popular sovereignty would be void.163 It has to be mentioned here, though, that cession of the requested territories was not ruled out altogether. The Batavian line of argument did leave open the possibility of those territories being annexed by France with the consent of their inhabitants. It did, thus, resemble the line of argument the French had followed in annexing Avignon. For, the French Assemblée nationale, too, had asserted that annexation had to be based on the will of the papal enclaves’ population. The French might have taken the same line of argument with regard to the Zeeland islands; although it would have been quite hard to sustain the popula­ tion’s consent. It might even have been contended that the Province of Zeeland was a sufficiently autonomous region to deny the annexation being a secession of a constituent part from a larger entity. French negotiators did not reason along these lines on this occasion, however. They did not address the issue of the lack of authority to assent to a cession of territory due to popular sovereignty at all. Hence, at this junction, it cannot be established whether the French still held to the necessity of popular consent to cession of territory or ­annexation. Furthermore, strikingly, the Staten Generaal and the Batavian envoys only referred to popular sovereignty to refuse the cession of ‘cities and towns belonging to the alliance.’ Although the Staten Gen­ eraal reluctantly handed over Dutch Flanders and Dutch Limburg, popular sovereignty apparently did not stand in the way of the ces­ sion of these subjected territories. For, with regard to those territories, the argument was not brought to the fore. Nor did the Staten Generaal seem to have had any scruples with respect to the planned extension of Dutch territory to the east at the cost of East Frisia, Bentheim, and Münster without the consent of those territories’ inhabitants. As the rhetoric of popular sovereignty had suited French Revolutionaries in previous years, Batavian Patriots made use of it to procure at least the Provinces’ territorial integrity.

  Korman, 1996, p. 36.   26 April 1795, Eclaircissemens sur le projet de traité remis au nom du Gou­ vernement Batave par les ministres plenipotentiaires soussignés; NA 1.02.14 no. 600. 162 163

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Finally, although the idea of popular sovereignty seems to have influenced both the French and the Batavian line of argumentation— respectively implicitly and explicitly—the interpretation of the prin­ ciple seems to have differed. The French adhered to a rational and civic notion of the nation. In the French line of reasoning, the Batavian people did not exist prior to 16 May 1795.164 The Batavian Republic was a new state, which borders still had to be established by mutual agreement or which borders had been established by nature. State and nation are identical and both result from a voluntary association of a number of individuals. In this line of reasoning a ‘prepolitical nation’165 did not exist. In French Revolutionary political thought, the nation did not precede the state, but was identical to it. Chimène Keitner struggles with this equation, since the right of selfdetermination, in the sense that each nation is entitled to a state of its own, hence becomes meaningless or at least a tautology.166 The presentday definition of self-determination does indeed assume the existence of a ‘prepolitical’ nation, but Keitner seems to pass over the possibility that self-determination might have had a different meaning during the Revolutionary Era. It is more likely that to the French Revolutionaries self-determination entailed the principle of non-interference and the right of every existing nation to freely decide on the form of govern­ ment it desired within the framework of the existing state as a political community; or, in other words, the collectively exercised individual’s right of political self-determination. This interpretation of national self-determination (the internal version),167 derived from popular sovereignty translated to the international level, was expressed by the French ‘représentants en mission’’s proclamation to the Batavian Peo­ ple, in imitation of several decrees adopted by the Assemblée nationale and Convention. Moreover, this interpretation was to be found later on for example in the Treaty of Lunéville (9 February 1801) between France and the Empire pursuant to which the French sister republics had the right to choose their own form of government.168

164  And even then, as discussed before, only adopting a Constitution was seen as the true constitutive act. 165   Keitner, 2000, p. 5. 166   Keitner, 2000, p. 5. 167  Cassese, 1995, p. 5. 168  Article 11 Treaty of Lunéville; to be discussed in part III.



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Assuming a discontinuity between the United Provinces and the new Batavian Republic and a rational and civic notion of the nation, French demands were not adverse to the Batavian people’s sover­ eignty. For, at the time, a Batavian people did not exist yet. The Bata­ vian appeal to popular sovereignty, therefore, departed from another interpretation of the fact of the matter. In the first place, the Batavians did assume continuity between the two Republics. After all, the main institutions of the Republic of the United Provinces were still in place. The Revolution had solely caused a change of members, Orangists and other adherents of the former regime having been replaced by Patri­ ots. Due to that continuity, in the Batavians’ view, a Batavian people entitled to its sovereignty being respected did already exist. Emphasising the need of the involved population’s consent to cede territory still pointed to a rather rational definition of the Batavian people. A different kind of nationalism, too, did occur in the Bata­ vian line of argument; albeit still against the background of the old corporative state. Especially in the Zeeland contribution to the discus­ sion, the members of the old alliance were considered to be insepa­ rable. Whereas the Batavian people was not defined in ethnical terms, the image of a historically grown community did come to the fore. Particularly the Zeeland representatives adhered to a historical line of argumentation to sustain the Zeeland islands’ bonds with the other parts of the Republic. An appeal to a shared past to express the union of the people—in the Batavian case, at the time, still the seven peoples of the Dutch ­Republic—is to be found more in the Netherlands than in France dur­ ing the Revolutionary era.169 French Patriots precisely opposed French history that was a history of Kings, the Church, and the nobility. Instead, their endeavours were to define the French nation primar­ ily from political principles. Charlemagne and Henry IV, who could stand the test of Revolutionary criticism, might be referred to, as well as ancient Gaul with regard to the ‘natural borders.’ For the rest, the importance of French history of the past few centuries was denied to found a ‘new’ and reborn France. Conversely, Batavian Patriots were able to fall back on a republican tradition of urban democracy. Hence, in the United Provinces, Patriot writings were full of references to Dutch history: the ancient Batavians, the liberty and independence of  Van Sas, 2004, pp. 71–73.

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medieval townsmen, the heroism of the Dutch Revolt, the republican virtue and spirit of enterprise of the ‘Golden Age.’170 5.4  Joint Sovereignty? At first, the Batavian negotiators seemed to have gained their great­ est success on the territorial aspects of the Treaty. Against all odds, the ‘weak’ Batavians had been able to keep the ‘strong’ French from annexing Dutch Brabant and parts of Zeeland. Initial French demands with regard to the islands Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland had been countered. They had even been able to keep Flushing, at least partly, in Dutch hands. The regulations fixed the use of the harbour. Neither the Treaty, nor the regulations contained a settlement of shared sov­ ereignty expressis verbis. But neither did they rule out that the clause on Flushing being common to both nations meant exactly that. In return for the territories that had been lost to France, the Batavians had at least gained the promise of being compensated at the time of the general peace and a guarantee of their colonies. These promises would play a large role in the Batavian positioning in the peace nego­ tiations with Britain and Austria. Hence, their implementation will be discussed in Part III. In general, the Batavian government turned out to be extremely prone to maintain its country’s territorial integrity. This will become evident from the disputes arising from French privateering that, according to Batavian officials, stretched into Batavian territorial waters. More inland, the border was minded as well. For instance, by the end of 1798 French customs officers confiscated a cart with grain on Batavian territory, albeit just over the border. In that case, Schim­ melpenninck, after having been ordered to object to this line of action, did not think it opportune to complain with the French government. He did not consider the matter as sufficiently important to jeopar­ dise good relations with the French government in times that more crucial issues were at hand.171 Nonetheless, French customs officers and police forces kept crossing the border to confiscate alleged Brit­

170   e.g. Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Poll, Aan het Volk van Nederland, 1781. 171   18 January 1799, Schimmelpenninck to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 1.02.14 no. 628.



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ish goods or arrest people.172 Sometimes this went hand in hand with ‘open hostilities.’173 By December 1801, the Batavian government was so fed up with this sequence of incidents that after yet another occa­ sion in which French officials had entered Batavian territory cavalry was transferred to the Franco-Batavian border to protect Batavian citi­ zens against French customs officers and police forces.174 Complaints were politely passed over by Talleyrand by referring the matter to the Secretary for Finance.175 The core of all territorial quarrels,176 and by consequence legal argument on sovereignty, independence, and ter­ ritorial integrity, focused on Flushing, though. As Schama has it, the Flushing settlement was ingenious to attain an agreement at the time but soon turned out to be disastrous in practice.177 The remaining part of this chapter will address the disputes arising from Articles 13 and 14 (and Article 18) of the Hague Treaty. In his work on Franco-Batavian disputes over Flushing, Van Bijleveld writes off Flushing as a pawn.178 He asserts that French presence in the Zeeland port was a guarantee for the execution of the Treaty, which implied only limited rights for France as well as a subjection to local laws and taxes. Whatever the parties might have intended, this inter­ pretation of the Flushing settlement seems to be unwarranted. Article 14 of the Hague Treaty does not set a time limit, nor is there any indication that this provision was of a subordinate nature, nor was Flushing chosen at random. The use of Flushing’s port was an essential element of the peace settlement and alliance. Both parties would turn out not to agree on what was actually meant by the port being common. At the end of the negotiations the phrase ‘sera commun aux deux nations’ appeared to be sufficiently vague to suit both governments and, hence, to enable the negotiators to achieve con­ sensus on the text. Behind the vagueness of the Treaty’s text were hidden still diametrically opposed views and intentions, however. The Flushing

172   6 and 14 March 1801, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 684; 29 September 1801, Van der Goes to Smits; NA 1.02.14 no. 685. 173   ‘openlijke vijandelijkheden’; 14 April 1801, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 684. 174   18 December 1801, Van der Goes to Smits; NA 1.02.14 no. 685. 175   8 February 1802, Talleyrand to Smits; NA 1.02.14 no. 694. 176  Vreede, 1863, p. 175. 177  Schama, 1989, p. 254. 178   Bijleveld, 1865, pp. 1–2.

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settlement soon proved to be the major cause of Franco-­Batavian con­ tention in the years to come. According to the Batavians, the Treaty of The Hague only stipulated France having the right to use Flushing’s port and the French did not claim anything more than the use of the port for the French navy at first, thus strengthening the Batavians in their opinion that Flushing had been saved. For instance, the French government did not claim the right of appointing part of the local magistrates nor did it claim a share in local taxes. In contrast, the French had not given up their desire to control the Scheldt estuary permanently and to have a naval base on the North Sea coast. To them, the port being common to both nations equalled a true condominium.179 Shared sovereignty over Flushing was as far as Sieyes and his kindred spirits had been willing to go to placate the Batavians. It seems that they contemplated to do so by making use of a legal construction that was not uncommon during the ancien régime: joint lordship over a city or region. For instance, the city of Maastricht owed allegiance to two lords: the Duke of Brabant (in 1632 replaced by the Staten Generaal) and the Prince Bishop of Liège. Both lords nomi­ nated part of the local magistrates.180 Several seigniories in Germany owed allegiance to several lords as well. Another example is the prin­ cipality of Andorra in the Pyrenees that was held by the Bishop of Seu d’Urgell and the King of France.181 So, a condominium was a solution totally compatible with eighteenth-century diplomatic and political practice, albeit a remnant of feudalism. On the other hand, joint lord­ ship was entirely adverse to the new concept of (popular) sovereignty. Feudalism in all its aspect was rejected by Revolutionary rhetoric. In diplomatic practice feudal diffusion had not been fully replaced by the new concept of sovereignty as exclusive and unequivocal author­ ity over a demarcated territory. Nor had the concept of the nation replaced rights to territory as the starting point of political organisa­ tion. Moreover, the Batavians, in particular the Zeeland delegates, had made it absolutely clear that the French were only to be granted the

179   This is how the Flushing settlement is called sometimes in secundary literature as well: Schama, 1989, p. 336; Eyffinger, 1991, p. 128. 180   Ubachs, 2000, pp. 94–95 and pp. 190–191; Munier, 1987, pp. 50–52. 181  Initially the Count of Foix, who’s County passed to the King of Navarra. Henry IV integrated the County and hence the Count’s share in the joint lordship to the French Crown. See Osiander, 2008, p. 479.



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right to use the port. While signing the Treaty, the Batavians had no intentions to cede even part of their sovereignty over Flushing to the French Republic. Of course, this disagreement was bound to cause conflicts in the near future. Soon incidents occurred that raised questions on what the French position in Flushing actually was and what rights and obliga­ tions the French had. Right after the ratification of the Hague Treaty, the French commander in Flushing claimed possession of the keys to the city gates. The Flushing magistrate refused to hand them over, though, and French soldiers seized the keys by force. Protests were of no avail.182 By the summer of 1796 the need to substitute the 1795 regulations by new ones was felt. In the archives of the French For­ eign Office a projet règlement additionnel dated 26 August 1796 is to be found.183 However, it took some more months for negotiations on new regulations to begin. The first step in the chess game on the communauté was taken in the spring of 1797 as French officials in Flushing refused to pay local taxes. The Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Zeeland had exempted all purchases on behalf of the French Republic in June 1795.184 This time, it concerned a mill tax and duties on firewood. In Paris, Meyer protested against this refusal.185 He stated that the French pretentions were contrary to the Treaty’s spirit and the interests of Batavian public finances. As neither the Treaty nor the regulations excluded the French from local taxes, they were obliged to pay as Bata­ vian citizens were. The French were granted the right to use the port. They had not been given any other privileges. Hence, the Batavian envoy asked Delacroix to order French officials in Zeeland to abide by local laws and taxes. Meyer’s request seems to have caused some confusion within the French government. It did, at least, not meet with a prompt negative answer. Delacroix referred the matter to his colleague for the navy. The latter, Laurent Truguet, instructed French officials to pay local taxes since the Treaty of The Hague ‘en stipulant la communauté de

  Bijleveld, 1865, pp. 64–66.   26 August 1796, projet de règlement additionnel à celui du 27 floréal qui deter­ miné l’usage du port de Flessingue, en conséquence du traité de paix et d’alliance entre la République française et la République des Provinces-Unies; AAE CP Hollande 592. 184   Bijleveld, 1865, p. 71. 185   9 May 1797, Meyer to Delacroix; NA 1.02.14 no. 601. 182 183

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ce Port’ had not relieved them from personal taxes. Truguet explicitly argued that the Treaty of The Hague made the use of the port com­ mon, whereas the French were submitted to the same laws, customs, and contributions as the Batavians.186 Truguet’s opinion must have been to the Directoire’s disliking. Delacroix was charged to examine the status of Flushing. While claim­ ing that Flushing had belonged to the French Republic due to the right of conquest, he, too, concluded that sovereignty and jurisdiction over Flushing had been restored entirely to the Batavian Republic. The only reservations and exceptions to the restitution clause with regard to Flushing were in Articles 13 and 14. According to Delacroix, in nei­ ther Article sovereignty or jurisdiction were entirely or partly reserved. The French Republic had only reserved the right to use the port and to lay garrison there. All Articles in the regulations were about the use of the port. Hence, the Batavian Republic had full sovereignty and jurisdiction. Moreover, the Batavian Republic had exercised the rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction in Flushing for two years, without any objections from the French side. Hence, French citizens should be treated in the same way as Batavian ones and they were, for instance, not exempted from any taxes.187 The issue seemed to be settled by this reply. The Directoire did not fancy the limited position attributed to the French Republic in Flush­ ing in this view, though. At least, it was to be made clear that the French navy itself was exempted from any duties to be paid to the Batavian Republic. The French government ordered Delacroix once more to examine to whom sovereignty in Flushing fell to and on what terms the French were in the Zeeland city. Delacroix came up with a line of argument that fitted the Directoire’s desires.188 Contrary to his earlier analysis, he established that Article 14 of the Hague Treaty was an exception to Article 12. Hence, the community of Flushing was an exception to the general restitution of territory. He did remark, how­ ever, that the Treaty was quite vague on which of the two nations was 186   26 May 1797, Truguet to Delacroix; NA 1.02.14 no. 601; 1 June 1797, Delacroix to Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 780; 16 May 1797, Delacroix to Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 601 and no. 610. 187   30 June 1797, Rapport to Directoire; AAE CP Hollande 595; 2 July 1797, Dela­ croix to Reubell; AAE CP Hollande 596. 188   9 July 1797, Rapport au ministre sur des deux questions: à qui appartient la souveraineté à Flessingue; sur quel pied sommes nous à Flessingue; AAE CP Hol­ lande 596.



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sovereign. Despite the drafters’ omission to make an express stipula­ tion, one might deduce the answer from the structure and spirit of the treaty, and the coherence between the various provisions. Batavian sovereignty might not be recognised by any treaty provision explic­ itly, but it followed from the Treaty at large. According to Delacroix, the exception to the general restitution with regard to Flushing was directed at the goal of repairing, constructing, and equipping ships. Hence, the use of the port was made common. The use of the port, Delacroix stressed, was not necessarily linked to the issue of sovereignty. That the French Republic expressis verbis had to reserve the right of garrison proved that the French did not have a general right of sovereignty. Moreover, joint sovereignty would have had consequences for municipal administration that had not even been considered. Hence, the French minister concluded that the Batavian Republic was sovereign in Flushing. The opposite conclu­ sion would even be ‘absurde.’ Therefore, French civilians were to be treated as nationals, that is to say, they were subject to Batavian laws and jurisdiction. However, from the fact that the use of the port had been made com­ mon ‘en toute franchise’ it followed that the same did not go for the French Republic, its navy and officials. For all activities connected to the use of the port, the French were exempted from Batavian jurisdic­ tion. Delacroix compared the situation to the Dutch Barrier Treaties pursuant to which army officers were excluded from the local mag­ istrates’ jurisdiction. While making an argument based on which the French Republic would not be obliged to pay a single dime, Delacroix did, thus, recognise full Batavian sovereignty with only a minor excep­ tion linked to the use of Flushing’s port and docks by the French navy. He proposed to negotiate new regulations that stated rights and obli­ gations of the French navy more clearly. At the time, Jan David Pasteur and Willem Anne Lestevon were, in fact, already in Paris to treat with Delacroix and Truguet on new regu­ lations with regard to the use and communauté of Flushing’s port.189 Somewhat over a month later an agreement was reached. The text in large measure matched the draft that had been entered by Pasteur at the start of the negotiations and mainly contained provisions with regard

189   12 April 1797, pièces du controle et matériaux des procès verbaux Directoire exécutif; AN AF III 6.

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to ships, import duties on naval supplies, and captured vessels.190 The Directoire disapproved of the new regulations, however. The Batavian envoys were recalled and negotiations suspended.191 When Charles Delacroix was sent to The Hague as minister plenipotentiary he was inter alia instructed to negotiate new regulations, based on a ‘veri­ table coproprieté et co-souveraineté’ and both Republics having ‘droits absolument égaux.’192 He was to put an end to all disputes which had risen after the conclusion of the Alliance Treaty with regard to the Flushing settlement. The post-fructidor Directoire, desperate to continue and win the war against Britain, went beyond the limited privileges for the French navy. From this time onwards, the French government would claim that the Treaty of The Hague constituted not only common use of the port, but joint sovereignty as well. Hence, both Republics were to exer­ cise sovereign rights together. In the first place, this meant that French citizens and navy personnel in Flushing having to pay taxes to the Bat­ avian Republic was inacceptable. Secondly, the Directoire claimed the right to have French officials attend the inspection of merchantmen entering the port and the application of French customs laws espe­ cially those with regard to confiscation of British goods. In the spring of 1798, the Directoire had indeed confirmed decrees against British goods.193 It might not be a coincidence that a wish to tighten control in Flushing coincided with this confirmation. Customs fees would be split between both nations and if necessary a French customs office was to be established in Flushing. The new French Navy Secretary, by then Pleville le Pelley, sent an agent, Percheron, to Flushing to come to an arrangement to partition the port.194 Before Delacroix or Percheron had been able to come to terms or even start negotiating with the Batavians, the Directoire made a move   24 May 1797, draft for additional regulations with regard to the use of Flushing port; AAE CP Hollande 595; NA 2.01.08 no. 26. 191  Not dated (September-December 1798), Rapport au Directoire; AAE CP Hol­ lande 600. 192   2 December 1797, Memoire pour servir d’instructions au citoyen Charles Dela­ croix ministre plénipotentiaire de la République française près la République batave; AAE CP Hollande Supplément 22; Not dated (September-December 1798), Rapport au Directoire; AAE CP Hollande 600. 193  Legrand, 1895, p. 191; Fugier, 1954, p. 110; Homan, 1971, p. 139; Grewe, 2000, p. 387. 194   7 January 1798, Delacroix to Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA, 2.01.08 no. 232. 190



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that could not have been more provocative. On 5 February 1798 it uni­ laterally decided to establish a customs office in Flushing.195 The neces­ sity of this course of action was substantiated by the claim that the French Republic would ‘exercer en commun avec la République ­Batave tous les droits de souverainêté dans le port et bassin de Flessingue.’ According to the Directoire’s decree there would not only be a French collector in Flushing, the French government wanted a share of the revenues as well. Both Republics were to collect customs duties by turn every three months. Furthermore, French laws with respect to British goods would apply in Flushing and ships would be inspected concertedly; although French customs officers were only to act if their Batavian colleagues refused to cooperate. Customs duties were to be charged based on Dutch tariffs, though, and disputes concerning cus­ toms duties were to be brought before Batavian courts. Conversely, all conflicts with regard to the prohibition of British goods fell under the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the Departement des Deux Nethes, that is, of French courts. Finally, the Directoire ordered the commander of the French garrison in Flushing to render assistance to French cus­ toms officers once requested. Clearly, the Directoire had moved beyond the idea of a joint and free use of Flushing’s port towards the claim of joint sovereignty. Its unilateral act put the matter on the edge. The Uitvoerend Bewind regarded the decree to be a clear violation of Article 14 of the Hague Treaty and instructed Meyer to protest vehemently and to maintain the Batavian Republic’s rights and independence with ‘the force of reason in which we are equal to our French brothers.’196 The Batavian government based its argument explicitly on the Hague Treaty and the regulations with regard to Flushing. The regulations were said to be meant to construe and unfold the community of Flushing fixed in Article 14 of the Treaty. Hence, the Uitvoerend Bewind concluded, all rights the French Republic had been given to that port had to be found in those regulations and they did not contain any rights beyond the 195   5 February 1798, extrait des registre des délibérations du Directoire exécutif; AAE CP Hollande 597. See also Bijleveld, 1865, pp. 100–102; Schama, 1989, p. 407 and p. 473. 196   ‘die moreele kragt, waarin wy met onze Fransche broeders gelyk staan, de kragt namelyk der rede’; 20 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Blauw and Meyer; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458A; 14 February 1798, secret minutes Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458A and NA 2.01.08 no. 50; 22 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Delacroix; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458A and NA 2.01.08 no. 104.

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use of the port to construct, arm, and equip men-of-war. No mention was being made of customs duties. In case sovereignty of Flushing had been made common between the two Republics, the regulations would have had to contain various provisions with regard to exercising sov­ ereign rights and they remained absolutely silent in this respect. More­ over, it was added, the Batavian Republic had collected customs duties in Flushing on its own for three years without any protests from the French government. All that time, the French government had failed to protest.197 The Batavian government stressed that it would not contest the French Republic enjoying its rights derived from the Treaty. Even more the Batavians had always been quite concessively aware of their obligations towards the French nation for rendered services. Thereto, the Uitvoerend Bewind emphasised its willingness to cooperate with the French in fighting against common enemies, Britain in particu­ lar. However, even if the Treaty and regulations were ambiguous and, hence, the Batavian government mistaken as to the joint sovereignty, any disputes were to be settled by arbiters and not unilaterally by the French government without even consulting its alleged co-sovereign. As in any case of ‘joint ownership’198 both owners were to consent to actions as taken by the Directoire. Any other way of action was esteemed to compromise Batavian independence. In a letter to Talleyrand, Meyer called the considerations in the decree’s preamble an ‘erreur de principe et erreur de fait.’ In the first place, sovereignty could not be shared as it was indivisible and, hence, could not be exercised by two nations within the same place. In the second place, sovereignty could only be alienated by a formal cession and the Hague Treaty did not contain a single provision common to seventeenth- or eighteenth-century treaties indicating that the Bata­ vian Republic had ceded part of its sovereignty over Flushing to the French Republic. Meyer repeated that the French Republic had only been given a right to use the port and contended that the French Republic was only to consider Flushing as a military position to pro­ tect the Belgian coasts and the Scheldt estuary against the British navy. 197   This argument might be akin to the doctrine of estoppel in present-day interna­ tional law; see Malanczuk, 2001, pp. 154–155. 198   The Uitvoerend Bewind clearly thought of sovereignty as the complex of rights a state has vis-à-vis a certain territory. The relation between state and territory was still deemed to be some kind of ownership relation (dominium) from which authority and jurisdiction (imperium) derived. For the distinction between property and jurisdiction with Grotius, see Tuck, 2001, pp. 106–107.



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He compared the Flushing settlement to the former Barrier system under which Dutch garrisons had been stationed in fortifications in the Austrian Netherlands. The Dutch government, he stressed, had never claimed (part of) sovereignty over those places.199 Meanwhile, in The Hague, Delacroix, while officially informing the Batavian government of its French counterpart’s decision, dared to invite the Uitvoerend Bewind to instruct its subordinates to allow the Directoire’s decree to be implemented.200 In response to the Uitvoer­ end Bewind’s objections, he emphasised that there could be no doubt that the community of Flushing’s port referred to sovereignty. Since the present settlement did not cease to cause conflicts, he stated that it would be prudent to divide the harbour between the two Republics ‘basé sur des principes d’egalité.’201 A division would, of course, have created a situation more in conformity with modern notions of sov­ ereignty since each Republic would have exclusive right to its part. At the same time, a division would have amounted to recognition on the Batavian side of French rights to Flushing beyond the mere right to use the port. The Uitvoerend Bewind explicitly indicated in reply that the estab­ lishment of a French customs office in Flushing and its detrimen­ tal effect on Batavian trade might compromise the Patriot regime’s popularity. It manifested its astonishment about the way the Batavian Republic was treated by the French government: il ne peut avoir voulu maltraiter ou humilier, aux yeux de l’Europe, une alliée reconnaissante, prête à tout sacrificier pour la puissance magna­ nime qui lui a aidé à recouvrer sa liberté, mais à qui son indépendance et son honneur sont également chers.202

In response, Delacroix ensured the Batavian government that the Direc­ toire did not intend to humiliate the Batavian nation or to undermine the Batavian government. According to the French envoy, complaints about the French customs officers’ behaviour were highly overdone though and the French government had merely taken ­measures to

 Not dated, Talleyrand to Directoire; AAE CP Hollande 597.   16 February 1798, Delacroix to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 232. 201   10 March 1798, Delacroix to Uitvoerend Bewind; AAE CP Hollande 597. 202   9 March 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind secret minutes foreign affairs (secreet verbaal Buitenlandsche Zaaken); NA 2.01.08 no. 50. 199 200

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make sure the French Republic could enjoy the rights it could claim in purview of the Treaty.203 The French envoy was a loyal spokesman for his government’s views. Behind the scenes, however, Delacroix for once supported the Batavian government. In his correspondence with Paris, he tried to persuade his government to reconsider its decision. He expected the Uitvoerend Bewind to cooperate, but stressed that the Batavian government was rather surprised that a decision with regard to the ‘co-souveraineté’ of Flushing had been taken without its involvement. Establishing a customs office in Flushing was an act of sovereignty that was not to be ‘exercer isolément.’ The French envoy asserted that it was only natu­ ral that the Uitvoerend Bewind wanted to be involved in such deci­ sions. Moreover, the Uitvoerend Bewind’s, and by consequence the French Republic’s, popularity among the Batavian population heavily depended on it defending the Batavian Republic’s independence and territorial integrity. Hence, Delacroix urged the Directoire not to act unilaterally with regard to Flushing.204 Delacroix’ plea was of no avail. The Directoire had set its mind on joint sovereignty and would not shift its ground. The French envoy was instructed to make sure the Uitvoerend Bewind would recognise the joint sovereignty and to draw up, in concert with the Batavian government, regulations for the exercise of sovereign rights in Flush­ ing.205 Talleyrand did, however, signify that Batavian rights had to be respected as well. He approved of Delacroix’ reprimand given to the French navy commander in Flushing who had laid a general embargo in all Zeeland ports in reaction to British actions against French fisher­ men. Delacroix had pointed out that this line of action was a clear vio­ lation of Batavian independence. Even with regard to Flushing’s port, French officials were not entitled to lay an embargo unilaterally. Since sovereignty over Flushing was not divided between the two nations, they had to act together in exercising sovereign rights. Having been informed of the French commander’s actions, the Uitvoerend Bewind had sent an agent to Flushing to concert with him. Talleyrand took this as recognition of joint sovereignty and concluded that agreeing on new regulations would not encounter any problems.

  10 March 1798, Delacroix to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 232.   16 February 1798, Delacroix to Talleyrand; AAE CP Hollande 597. 205  Not dated, Talleyrand to Directoire; AAE CP Hollande 597. 203 204



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By early May, Delacroix presented new draft regulations to the Uitvoerend Bewind based on partitioning Flushing between the two Republics. He repeated the French claim that the Hague Treaty had established joint sovereignty. The Directoire’s decree establishing a customs office had been initiated and prepared by Ramel and the Director Reubell, both of whom had participated in the Hague nego­ tiations. They would have never done so, Delacroix argued, if the French Republic had ceased to be ‘coproprietaire de la souveraineté du port de Flessingue.’ Again he set out the argument that the French Republic had gained full sovereignty due to the right of conquest that Batavian territory had been restored to the Batavian Republic with some parts excepted and that Article 14 of the Treaty was among those exceptions. Hence, both Republics shared sovereignty in Flushing and community supposed ‘egalité des droits.’ Because of that community the French Republic was entitled to claim part of the customs duties collected. To bring an end to the ‘inconveniences’ ensuing from the present settlement, the French envoy presented a draft convention to replace the 1795 Regulations.206 Since the community had caused dis­ putes over and over again, the port was to be split in two equal parts instead—although the French ‘equal’ part was to consist of the naval docks, whereas the Batavian Republic would get the commercial port. Each Republic was to be fully sovereign in its own part, whereas the French Republic would waive all rights it might claim on the other part pursuant to the Treaty. Customs duties would be split. The French navy would be duty-free, while French private individuals would be obliged to pay taxes and duties. Vessels entering the French part of the harbour were only to be inspected in view of customs duties with the consent of the French commander or ‘commissaire de la marine.’ Both Republics would be allowed to carry out maintenance works and struc­ tural alterations to the docks. The Batavian Republic would, however, solely be responsible for the maintenance of the fortifications. Both Republics engaged to avoid anything that would jeopardise Flush­ ing’s security. It was explicitly stated that enemy subjects would be expelled from the city. French authorities would attend to prizes taken in by French privateers according to French laws. Finally, importing British goods into Flushing would be prohibited under penalty of

  17 May 1798, Delacroix to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 232.

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confiscation.207 Thus, the Directoire tried to introduce French legisla­ tion in part of the Batavian Republic by means of the Regulations. Needless to say, the Batavian government opposed this scheme. Whatever the political and military dependency on France, not even the radical regime that owed its existence to French support to the 22 January coup, cooperated with Delacroix behind the scenes in the con­ stitution-making process, and adhered to the Franco-Batavian alliance as the basic means of its survival, was willing to allow the French pub­ licly compromising Batavian territorial integrity and independence. It did not even consider consenting to the draft regulations presented by Delacroix and stuck to its objections against the establishment of a customs office. Moreover, it contended that the Batavian Constitu­ tion prevented it from consenting to a cession of territory;208 mirroring the French notion of constitutional borders. To be sure, according to Delacroix, this argument missed the point, because a new cession of territory was not proposed and the French only wanted to partition a ‘propriété restée commune.’209 In secondary literature mention is made of a convention adhered to by the Uitvoerend Bewind in 1798 in a desperate attempt to remain in power in which (part of) Flushing would have been ceded.210 The 12 May Convention does, however, contain no provision on Flushing. The Uitvoerend Bewind might have signed the new Regulations with regard to Flushing as presented to it by Delacroix. No signs of such an act of despair are to be found in diplomatic sources from the period itself, though. It was only some months after the second coup that the French claimed that part of Flushing had been ceded by the radical Uitvoerend Bewind.211 Whatever there might have been going on behind the scenes, the post-12 June coup d’état Uitvoerend Bewind did not recognise the alleged cession and continued the policy of getting the Directoire to eschew Article 14 of the Hague Treaty altogether or at least to estab­

207   5 May 1798, Agent der marine to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.05 no. 458C. The draft is also to be found in: NA 2.01.08 no. 232. 208  Article 1 of the Bataafse Staatsregeling declared the Batavian Republic indivis­ ible; Van Hasselt, 1987, p. 27. 209   17 May 1798, Delacroix to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 232. 210  Schama, 1989, p. 470. 211   e.g. Not dated (September-December 1798), Rapport au Directoire; AAE CP Hollande 600.



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lish in concert the limits of French power in Flushing.212 Isaac Gogel, intermediary Agent der buitenlandsche betrekkingen and member of the Uitvoerend Bewind, instructed Schimmelpenninck never to yield to French claims. Gogel emphasised that even the radical Uitvoerend Bewind had objected to the Directoire’s decision to establish a customs office in Flushing and took this as a clear sign that the French govern­ ment’s line of action was an obvious violation of the Treaty: Which was that contrary to the sanctity of treaties that even the destroyed Uitvoerend Bewind, which sometimes was complaisant to France to the detriment of this Republic, vehemently protested against it. [. . .] Not­ withstanding Charles Delacroix’ attempt to impress this decree despoti­ cally, I have been unable to find any trace that the government has ever recognised it or granted France the right it assumes this arbitrarily by this decree.213

It must be noted here, that in Paris, too, voices were raised in order to ease off a bit with regard to Flushing. It was questioned whether the interest in conserving an ally as useful as the Batavian Republic did not call for removing the main sources of conflict between the two Republics: the community of Flushing, the disputes over prizes, and the prohibition of British goods.214 At the same time that the Directoire’s decree establishing a cus­ toms office triggered diplomatic dispute over the status of Flushing, the endeavours of French privateers increasingly caused irritation with Batavian authorities. Henceforth, enduring disputes between the two Republics about the respect due to the Batavian Republic’s sovereignty in its territorial waters and the jurisdiction of prize courts arose.215 The Nationale Vergadering’s Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken had already adopted the view that prizes taken in to Flushing had to be dealt with according to Batavian instead of French law since the

  14 August 1798, Gogel to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 119.   ‘’t welke zo zeer tegen de heilige trouw der tractaaten aanlopende was, dat zelvs het vernietigd inconstitutioneel Uitvoerend Bewind, ’t welk de complaisance voor Vrankrijk wel eens ten koste van deze republiek pousseerde, daar tegen ten sterksten geprotesteerd heeft. [. . .] Niettegenstaande Charles de la Croix dit arrêté met veel des­ potisme heeft willen doordringen, heb ik echter geen spoor kunnen ontdekken dat ooit het gouvernement alhier het zelve geavoueerd, of aan Vrankrijk het recht hebben toegekend ’t welk het zelve zich zo willekeurig bij dat arrêté had aangematigd.’; 14 August 1798, Gogel to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 119. 214  Not dated (summer 1798), Rapport au Directoire; AAE MD France 656. 215  See e.g. Schama, 1989, pp. 473–474. 212 213

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Hague Treaty had not ceded sovereignty over Flushing to the French Republic.216 The case of the Danish vessel Fortuna was taken up to the highest diplomatic levels. A French privateer captured Fortuna near Middel­ burg in January 1798. In Paris, Meyer lodged an objection with the French Naval Secretary claiming the vessel had been seized in Batavian territorial waters. The latter referred the letter to the Foreign Secre­ tary since all matters ‘qui intéressent le droit des gens’ belonged to his portfolio. Truguet did, however, ensure the Batavian envoy that in case Batavian territory had been violated the vessel would be returned to its owner. According to him, Fortuna seemed to have been captured on the high sea and the case really pertained to the jurisdiction of the tribunals in which a government minister was not to interfere. The vessel’s owner had to address the proper prize court.217 In this way, Meyer’s complaints were passed over. At times, the separation of pow­ ers comes in handy. In addition to the activities of French privateers, the French navy gave cause for complaints as well. Already in the summer of 1797, Meyer was instructed to protest against French men-of-war being sta­ tioned just outside Flushing’s port halting and inspecting merchant­ men in what according to the Batavian government still were Batavian territorial waters.218 These protests did not seem very effective either. The Batavian government could not reconcile itself to the disruption of its commerce by French privateers and men-of-war, though. One of the major objects of the secret Eijkenbroek mission to Paris had already been to put a stop to the seizing of neutral vessels by French privateers in Batavian waters or on their way to Batavian ports.219 The fate of the Eijkenbroek mission has been addressed above. Here, it suffices to say that it did not contribute to a solution of the maritime quarrels. 216   23 October 1797, minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 28. 217   25 January 1798, Ministre de la Marine et des Colonies to Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 611. 218   29 July 1797, Meyer to ministre de la Marine et des Colonies; NA 1.02.14 no. 601. It has to be recalled here that the 1795 regulations (Article 6) prohibited placing men-of-war in the port. Technically, the French did thus not violate the regulations by stationing vessels just outside the port. 219   20 February 1798, instructions for Eijkenbroek; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 509. On the treatment of neutral shipping in times of war by the end of the eighteenth-century, see e.g. Neff, 2000, 63–76.



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5.5  Turning Deaf Ears By the autumn of 1798 disputes over Flushing, the Scheldt, and activi­ ties of French privateers had reached a stage in which friendly relations between the allies ran the risk of being jeopardised. Both governments thought it useful to settle the matters, although they envisioned dia­ metrically opposed solutions. On 21 September 1798, the Directoire, taking the view that French rights were disowned,220 designated Jacques Lequoy to terminate the disputes over the status of Flushing and the administration of prizes taken in by French privateers.221 Somewhat over a month later he arrived in Flushing. He had to ensure French claims on joint sovereignty and to labour for partitioning Flushing. The substance of the French government’s position had not been altered. From a procedural point of view, after the unilateral decree of last spring, Paris returned to bilateral concert, though. On its part, the Uitvoerend Bewind appointed Abraham van Doorn and Cornelis Gerrit Bijleveld to negotiate with Lequoy. Their instruc­ tions222 ordered them to await what Lequoy would come up with and scrutinise his powers after which it would be decided whether the ­Batavian government really wanted to enter into negotiations. At least, all formal possibilities to offer resistance had to be exploited. In any case, the main objective would be to assure the integrity of Batavian territory. As to Flushing, the Uitvoerend Bewind persisted in its argument that the French Republic had only been granted a right to use the port, which did not extend to rights of sovereignty. By consequence, the Directoire’s decision to establish a customs office in Flushing was adverse to the Hague Treaty and should be revoked. If the Batavian commissioners would notice that the French might be willing to renounce their right to use the port, which—in the view of the Bata­ vian government—after all had been of little use to them, they were authorised to persuade them doing so by offering a considerable sum

  31 October 1799, Boudon to Directoire; AN AF III 70.   21 September 1798, decree Directoire; AAE CP Hollande 597; 28 October 1798, copie de la note remise au Directoire Batave; AAE CP Hollande 597. See also Bijleveld, 1865, p. 118. 222   27 October 1798, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 119; 28 October 1798, Van der Goes to Lombard; NA 2.01.08 no. 105. 220 221

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of money. So, once again, the Batavian government set for buying off French territorial claims. As to navigation, Van Doorn and Bijleveld were to demonstrate that the French government was not authorised to have French men-of-war inspect vessels leaving or entering Batavian ports on Batavian territo­ rial waters. Furthermore, the Batavian commissioners received clear input for negotiations vis-à-vis privateering. According to the Uitvoe­ rend Bewind, ‘pursuant to recognised and established principles,’223 privateers were not entitled to seize neutral vessels in Batavian waters. Whether a vessel had been on Batavian territory at the time of its capture was up to the Batavian government or its officials to judge. In order to avoid any more disputes, the commissioners were to come to fixed and precise stipulations as to what was to count as Batavian ter­ ritory ‘in accordance with the principles of the law of nations.’224 Prizes seized on the high sea and taken in to Batavian ports by French pri­ vateers would be under the jurisdiction of the French consuls present in the concerned port. In case Van Doorn and Bijleveld would meet difficulties ‘in applying the law of nations’225 to the fixation of Batavian territory,226 they would have to provoke Lequoy to propose a separate convention between the two governments stipulating that no vessels would be seized by either French or Dutch privateers on the Scheldt stretching on to the sea beyond Flushing. In reaction to the Uitvoerend Bewind’s request to send all docu­ ments available with regard to the alliance and the Flushing settle­ ment, the Intermediair Administratief Bestuur of the former Province of Zeeland provided an input to the negotiations of its own.227 The Zeeland authorities reiterated that Zeeland had capitulated and that, by consequence, the right of conquest did not apply in respect to Flushing. Moreover, Zeeland had only agreed to an occupation of the Zeeland islands until the final peace settlement and to grant France a   ‘naar de erkende en ontwijffelbaare beginsels.’   ‘volgens de beginsleen van het recht der volken’ 225   ‘in de toepassing van het recht der volken’ 226  In the field of the laws of the sea—one of the fields in which international law had evolved into a complex system of detailed rules already—the ‘law of nations’ was referred to. There are no signs that these rules were deemed to be no longer valid. In diplomatic practice the notion of a lawless stage of transition was thus not ­underlined. 227  After the January coup d’état, the Zeeland Staten or Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Zeeland had been replaced by an intermediary administration subor­ dinated to the Uitvoerend Bewind in anticipation of the unitary constitution. 223 224



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right to use Flushing’s port. Joint ownership had been fiercely opposed as adverse to Batavian freedom and independence. Hence, there had not been a shared intention of both treaty parties to make possession of Flushing common. Finally, the Zeeland Intermediair Administra­ tief Bestuur noted that the Flushing garrison had always consisted of troops belonging to the French corps in Batavian pay, that is, of troops temporarily present on Batavian soil in purview of Article 17 of the Hague Treaty. Negotiations did not start at once. First, the Batavian government wanted to deal with measures taken by Generaal François Osten. The commander of French troops in Zeeland had put an embargo on ves­ sels in Flushing because of a rebellion in the Belgian departments.228 At The Hague, Lombard had requested the Uitvoerend Bewind to take similar measures, in addition to allowing house searches in order to track and arrest fled Belgian rebels. Van der Goes had already advised his government to fully cooperate since the French Republic’s inter­ est—‘to which our Republic is closely united’229—called for allied sup­ port in times of emergency caused by rebellious events. Sane politics offered opportunity to the Batavian government to demonstrate to the French the importance of the Franco-Batavian alliance, which might cause them to recognise the friendship of ‘a loyal ally’230 by reciprocal services.231 However, Osten had not awaited the Batavian government’s deci­ sion. Through Van der Goes, the Uitvoerend Bewind manifested its surprise about the General taking the liberty to take such measures on his own authority. In accordance with Van der Goes’ advice, the Batavian government did not contradict the necessity of the measures being taken, but fidèle aux engagemens, qu’il a contractés avec la Nation Batave par l’acte constitutionnel, il ne peut pas permettre qu’un Général Français s’attribue une autorité, que la constitution n’a réservée qu’au Gouverne­ ment Batave. Il négligerait ses devoirs envers le peuple Batave, s’il ne révoquait pas les ordres du Général Osten.232

  The so-called Boerenkrijg; see e.g. Schama, 1989, p. 459; Broers, 1996, p. 101.   ‘waar aan het onze zo nauw verbonden is.’ 230   ‘eene getrouwen Bondgenoote’ 231   29 October 1798, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 105 and NA 2.01.01.04 no. 221. 232   29 October 1798, Van der Goes to Lombard de Langres; NA 2.01.08 no. 105. 228 229

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Therefore, the Uitvoerend Bewind revoked Osten’s embargo. How­ ever, it simultaneously gave orders to place an embargo on all vessels in Flushing as soon as possible.233 Clearly the Batavian government considered this a procedural issue. Not opposing measures to be taken, it did insist on taking them itself. In Flushing, Lequoy powers to negotiate were questioned by the Batavian commissioners, however. Although Lequoy considered him­ self to be sufficiently authorised,234 Van Doorn and Bijleveld refused to commence negotiations. It was not until 9 November that Van der Goes instructed them to start negotiating with Lequoy despite him not having proper powers. The Batavian government decided to regard the Directoire’s decree in which he was nominated as sufficient.235 Nonetheless, French representatives in the Batavian Republic were quite positive on the prospects of coming to an understanding. Lom­ bard requested copies of the Regulations and previous conventions236 with regard to the use of Flushing’s port for the benefit of Lequoy from the Uitvoerend Bewind in order to prevent delaying negotiations any further.237 Lequoy himself notified Paris of his conviction that the Batavian government was prepared to solve the disputes, even though the commissioners in Flushing turned out to be obstructive.238 The French were clearly in a hurry. After the rupture of the Lille negotia­ tions, they whished to continue the war against Britain actively. The Batavians desired to slow negotiations down. They expected peace to be concluded soon and did not want to commit themselves. The French commissioner had stated to Van Doorn and Bijleveld that the Directoire was keen to respect ‘the sovereignty of the peo­ ple that had been given their freedom and territory by the French Republic.’239 However, his government desired to do so without injur­ ing France’s ‘justes droits.’240 He firmly stated to consider Article 14 of the Hague Treaty stipulating a formal community of Flushing’s port

  31 October 1798, Van der Goes to Lombard de Langres; NA 2.01.08 no. 105.   28 October 1798; AAE CP Hollande 597. 235   9 November 1798, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 119. 236  Against the background of the fourth Anglo-Dutch War a convention was con­ cluded between France and the United Provinces: 1 May 1781, Convention between France and the United Provinces signed in Versailles; CTS vol. 47, pp. 457–462. 237   31 October 1798, Lombard de Langres to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 232. 238   15 November 1798, Lequoy to Ministre de la Marine; AAE CP Hollande 597. 239   ‘pour la souveraineté des peuples auxquels il avait rendu le territoire et la liberté.’ 240   15 November 1798, Lequoy to Ministre de la Marine; AAE CP Hollande 597. 233 234



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itself since it contained an exception to the general restitution of ter­ ritory to the Batavian Republic. The sole thing that had not been done yet, was to divide the port.241 That is to say, Lequoy simply reiterated the point of view the French government had taken ever since the summer of 1797. In response, the Batavians did not change their views either. While emphasising that their government clang to the sanctity of treaties, Van Doorn and Bijleveld objected that it had always dismissed the community and pretended joint ownership of Flushing and had indi­ cated on every possible occasion to regard the French claims in con­ tradiction to the letter and spirit of the Treaty. Once again, it was expressed that the Batavian Republic had only granted the right to use the port to her French sister and that the French had never been in the position to return Flushing to the Batavian Republic since it had never been in possession of the city.242 Henceforth, negotiations in Flushing would not overcome the dead­ lock they had been supposed to overcome. Lequoy was adamant to absolve his country from any duties or limitations to its freedom of action in Flushing. He vehemently argued that the French navy was not to be subjected to the local mill tax. He reproached the Batavians for even wanting to levy that tax since the French were in Flushing for the benefit and security of the Batavian Republic. What were the Batavians thinking by imposing taxes on their protectors? Moreover, paying taxes was a sign of subjecting oneself to a sovereign, which the French Republic, as co-owner and co-sovereign of Flushing, would never do.243 Van Doorn and Bijleveld even rejected the request to exempt the French navy from local taxes because of the Batavian Republic’s finan­ cial situation. They referred to the French Secretary for the Navy’s recognition of Frenchmen being subjected to the same customs, laws, and duties in Flushing as Batavians were. They denied that the minis­ ter had only spoken about French private persons and personal taxes. Furthermore, they disavowed, as had been argued by Lequoy, that this had only been a ministerial assertion not ratified by the Directoire. Clearly, the Batavian commissioners contended, an official answer by

  24 November 1798, Lequoy to Van Doorn and Bijleveld; NA 1.02.14 no. 780.   27 November 1798, Van Doorn and Bijleveld to Lequoy; NA 1.02.14 no. 780. 243   29 November 1798, Lequoy to Van Doorn and Bijleveld; NA 1.02.14 no. 780. 241 242

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a minister to complaints by a foreign power communicated by the French envoy to that power’s government might, in good faith, be taken for the point of view of the French government. Finally, they appealed to the French government’s generosity and asserted that the amount of money involved with the mill tax was not worth the quar­ rel.244 The latter argument made Lequoy to state that in that case the French navy could easily be exempted from the mill tax without hav­ ing a detrimental effect on Batavian state finances, whereas the French government could use every dime for the war effort: Sans doute la nation française, toujours grande, toujours juste, toujours heureuse de la prospérité des républiques ses alliées, fera les sacrifices les plus pénibles pour leur bonheur: mais son Gouvernement doit être juste avant que d’être généreux; et malheureusement les circonstances ne lui permettent pas de négliger la plus légère oeconomie.245

As Van Doorn and Bijleveld confronted him with the February 1795 Capitulation to demonstrate that Zeeland had not been conquered, Lequoy simply responded that he did not know of any capitulation. He promised to ask Paris for information. His initial reaction must have astonished the Batavian commissioners, though. He claimed that a capitulation equalled conquest. Furthermore, the Capitulation had been replaced by the Hague Treaty and could not be invoked after the Treaty had been signed. For both reasons the Capitulation did not matter.246 In general, he emphasised that the Directoire would not give in with regard to the ‘co-propriété et co-souveraineté.’ The Batavian commissioners responded in a threefold manner. In the first place they appealed to moral standards. Van Doorn and Bijleveld told their French counterpart that negotiating would be use­ less if this truly was the French government’s position and that the Directoire’s attitude did not suit the present relations between the two Republics and the loyalty of the French nation. que les Magistrats de cette grande Nation seroient en état de former des prétensions et s’approprier irrévocablement par le droit du plus fort et 244   21 December 1798, Van Doorn and Bijleveld to Lequoy; copy attached to 27 December 1798, Van Doorn and Bijleveld to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 780. 245   21 December 1798, Lequoy to Van Doorn and Bijleveld; copy attached to 27 December 1798, Van Doorn and Bijleveld to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 780. 246   3 December 1798, Lequoy to Ministre de la Marine; AAE CP Hollande 597.



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d’après des principes erronés, et des bases qui sont en opposition avec tout ce qui est équitable et droit, une possession, que le traité de la Haye n’accorde aucunement à la République française; une conduite pareille ne serviroit, selon nous, qu’à obscurcir ces hautes idées247

In the second place, factual-juridical arguments on the applicable law and the circumstances of the case were used. Once again, the Batavian commissioners disavowed the reference to the right of conquest as factually unwarranted. The Dutch Republic, and the Province of Zee­ land in particular, had not been conquered as was evident from the French declaration of war to the Stadhouder, the proclamations issued at the time French troops entered Dutch territory, and the Zeeland Capitulation. Hence, they invoked the French nation’s good faith and reputation: Mais, supposons pour un instant que le Peuple français [. . .] voulut changer le beau nom de Restaurateur de la Liberté Batave, qu’elle s’est acquis à si juste titre, contre celui de Conquérant d’une Nation, qui se réposant sur ses belles promesses, le reçuit et l’accueillit en frere, même alors disons nous, l’argument emprunté des circonstances qui auroient precedés le traité de Paix n’opérerait en rien par rapport à la Province de Zeelande en particulier; cette Province étoit a l’entrée des français en Hollande, un Etat libre et indépendant, l’armée française n’avoit point pénétré sur son territoire, et défendue non seulement par sa position naturelle et par une armée suffisante de terre et de mer, mais surtout en ce tems la, par des monceaux de glaces, qui rendoient ses rivages inac­ cessibles et inabordables, sa conquête etoit par cela même impossible;248

Furthermore, they claimed that a cession of part of Batavian terri­ tory would be a manifest violation of the Batavian Constitution which stipulated the Batavian Republic to be ‘one and indivisible.’ Finally, the Batavian commissioners turned to a conceptual argu­ ment concerning the theoretical meaning of sovereignty. They argued that joint sovereignty was a conceptual fallacy that could not exist. They acknowledged Lequoy’s argument that community meant equal­ ity of rights. The question was, though, what had actually been made common and the Batavian commissioners stuck to their initial posi­ tion that the community only comprised the use of the port. The Bata­ vian Republic was sovereign ‘privatement.’ Van Doorn and Bijleveld adhered to the modern concept of sovereignty to which exclusivity is   10 December 1798, Van Doorn and Bijleveld to Lequoy; NA 1.02.14 no. 780.   10 December 1798, Van Doorn and Bijleveld to Lequoy; NA 1.02.14 no. 780.

247 248

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quintessential. Lequoy’s claim that, since the Batavian Republic was sovereign in Flushing and community meant equality of rights, the French Republic was co-sovereign: est manifestement en contradiction avec toutes les règles d’une saine logique pour ne pas dire que cette prétendue co-souveraineté est un monstre en politique, dont on ne trouve pas d’exemple une chose, qui ne peut exister, et qui est contraire à toute idée de souveraineté qui par sa nature doit être une et indivisible.

In conclusion, Van Doorn and Bijleveld assured Lequoy that the ­Batavian government would never drop the principle that sovereignty accrued to the Batavian Republic alone. They insisted that the French government would abstain from any acts of sovereignty in Flushing and would revoke the decree by which it had established a customs office. In case the Directoire would persist in claiming co-sovereignty, they would be forced to invoke Article 7 of the 1795 Regulations pur­ suant to which arbiters would settle disputes arising from the com­ munity of Flushing.249 After weeks of negotiating nothing had been reached but the clarifi­ cation of both parties’ positions. The commissioners were flatly opposed to each other. Van Doorn and Bijleveld’s conceptual dismissal of joint sovereignty did not make any difference. Lequoy held on to the sov­ ereignty being common due to the Treaty, considering Article 14 as an exception to the restitution of territory, from which philosophical arguments could not detract. As the French commissioner had it: Montrueuse ou non, cette co-souveraineté existe et c’est pour rendre à chacun des deux républiques l’unité et l’indivisibilité de puissance et de souveraineté, que la République française m’a chargé d’effectuer un partage égal250

5.6  Playing for Time Within less than two months time, negotiations had reached a total deadlock. All parties involved started to think about exit strategies. Batavian officials thought of various ways either to reach a desired solution or to prevent having to give in to French claims. As said,

  10 December 1798, Van Doorn and Bijleveld to Lequoy; NA 1.02.14 no. 780.   13 December 1798, Lequoy to Ministre de la Marine; AAE CP Hollande 597.

249 250



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Van Doorn and Bijleveld proposed referring the matter to arbitrators; an option foreseen by the 1795 Regulations. Lequoy, fearing to lose control of the process, ruled out arbitration categorically, however. He demurred: La France n’aura jamais besoin d’arbitres, pour régler ce qu’elle regarde comme une affaire de famille entre elle et la République Batave. Si d’un côté elle a le sentiment de sa force, elle tient encore plus à celui de l’amitié qui la lie aux Bataves. Elle tient encore d’avantage à ces principes de justice qu’elle manifeste même envers ses ennemis. Si la République française eut voulu user de sa force, son Directoire n’aurait pas envoyé un commissaire pour traiter à l’amiable, mes fonctions ai-je ajouté, ne sont point de vous signifier les volontés de la grande nation; mais de vous persuader que ce qu’elle réclame est juste, ne soit point des bornes des droits acquis par les traités.251

Moreover, the arbitration clause only pertained to disputes about the execution of the Regulations and not for the joint ownership and sov­ ereignty of Flushing, which was fixed by the Treaty.252 How insolent it might have been, Lequoy did thus make an attempt to reconcile the refusal of arbitration with the agreements formally made between the two Republics; next to the more general remark that true sister repub­ lics do not need others to settle their disputes. From Paris, Schimmelpenninck proposed to buy off French claims to Flushing during negotiations on a treaty of commerce.253 For a long time to come, no such negotiations would, however, reach a stage in which an agreement seemed to be imminent. Schimmelpenninck notified the Uitvoerend Bewind of rumours in the French capital that quarrels over Flushing might best be solved by a full cession of the city to France. He also informed his superiors that to his great surprise those rumours were in fact founded. Nevertheless he urged for settling the issue either by persuading the French government to eschew any rights of joint ownership or joint sovereignty, by clarifying the rights the French Republic was entitled to exercise in Flushing, or, ultimately, by referring the matter to arbitrators. He approved of Van Doorn and Bijleveld’s path to invoke arbitration now that the matter could not be settled by agreement. Probably unaware of Lequoy’s rejection, he himself had proposed the option to the Directoire:   3 December 1798, Lequoy to Ministre de la Marine; AAE CP Hollande 597.   13 December 1798, Lequoy to Ministre de la Marine; AAE CP Hollande 597. 253   30 November 1798, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 640. 251 252

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part ii, chapter five I have contended our undeniable right thereto here with the members of the Government and the minister in a most vigorous manner and stressed that the extent of power of two independent peoples should not render the slightest advantage or disadvantage to any party to assert its alleged right vis-à-vis points of difference existing between them and that henceforth parties need to be perfectly equal in arguing and set­ tling the dispute over the city and port of Flushing; and finally that the Batavian Government, the Nation, and the world at large will regard a deviation from these manifest truths as oppression and usurpation.254

Van der Goes set out for delay tactics. The Batavian government held on to its desire for the French Republic to eschew Article 14 of the Hague Treaty.255 However, the Batavian minister realised that as long as peace with Britain was not concluded, the French would not abstain from Flushing that easily. Therefore, prudent politics called for dragging negotiations until the peace—‘until the chaos Europe is in ­unravels’256—, for instance by insisting on arbitration.257 In the mean­ time, the Batavian government was on its toes with regard to the issue of sovereignty over Flushing. It did, for instance, instruct Schimmel­ penninck to investigate whether planting a liberty tree in front of the French naval commissioner’s lodgings in Flushing by orders of the naval secretary in Paris implied a claim to sovereignty now that the French envoy and consuls had not done likewise.258 Van Doorn and Bijleveld were instructed to split negotiations. Since there seemed to be no prospect of working out an agreement on the status of Flushing, one should attempt entering into separate agree­ 254   ‘Ik heb ons indisputabel recht daartoe hier bij de leden van het Gouvernement en den minister op de fermste wijze beweerd en met nadruk voorgehouden dat de meerdere of mindere grootheid en magt van twee independente volken geen het min­ ste voor of nadeel aan de eene of andere partij te hoort te geeven om zijn vermeend goed recht te doen gelden ten opzigte van poincten van differenten, welke tusschen hen existeerden en dat mitsdien in de bepleiting en beslissing van het geschil omtrent de stad en haven van Vlissingen partijen volmaakt gelijk behoorden te zijn; en ein­ delijk dat eene afwijking van deeze manifeste waarheden bij het Bataafsch Gouverne­ ment, bij de Natie en de geheele waereld als oppressie en usurpatie beschouwd zoude worden.’; 4 January 1799, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 640. 255   22 March 1799, Van der Goes to Van Doorn and Bijleveld; NA 2.01.08 no. 120. 256   ‘tot dat de cahos van Europa zich debrouilleert.’ 257   10 January 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 120; 22 January 1799, Van der Goes to Van Doorn and Bijleveld; NA 2.01.08 no. 120; 3 May 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 120; 21 November 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 121. 258   1 February 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 120. See also Bijleveld, 1865, p. 122.



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ments with regard to privateering.259 Lequoy foiled separating the two issues, however.260 But even if he had consented to separate discus­ sions, it would have mattered very little since both Republics were as divided on the matter of privateering as they were on the issue of Flushing’s status. Lequoy had invoked the 1781 Convention;261 from the start of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, pursuant to which prizes taken in by French privateers would be judged according to French laws—yet another sign that post-thermidor French politicians did not feel embarrassed to refer to pre-Revolutionary treaties if it suited best. Even as France had moaned ‘sous les poids d’un trone et le Batave sous le fauteuil de Stadhouderat,’ the rightfulness had been determined by French tri­ bunals, the French commissioner argued. Why would that be any dif­ ferent now that relations between the two nations were in fact more intimate?262 The Batavians, on their part, wished to bring an end to French privateering in their waters. Therefore, negotiations on the issue of privateering were stuck as well, while new incidents frustrated negotiations over and over again.263 In December 1798, two ships— Jason and Calypso—were captured. Lequoy refused to intervene to prevent the Jason being sold arguing that it was a judicial matter.264 Complaints about privateering focused on the Batavian Republic’s territorial integrity and independence. It was contended that French privateers sailing on Batavian waters were subject to Batavian laws. Jurisdiction over prizes seized in Batavian waters accrued to Batavian judges.265 Furthermore, since other powers were not to exercise sover­ eign rights on Batavian territory, French men-of-war were not to act in Batavian waters, for instance by halting merchantmen and inspecting their cargo, as well: ‘ce précepte du droit des gens est immuable, et par

259   10 January 1799, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 120; 22 January 1799, Van der Goes to Van Doorn and Bijleveld; NA 2.01.08 no. 120. 260   16 January 1799, Van Doorn to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 1.02.14 no. 780. 261   1 May 1781, Convention between France and the United Provinces; CTS vol. 47, pp. 457–462. 262   28 November 1798, Lequoy to Van Doorn and Bijleveld; NA 1.02.14 no. 780. 263   e.g. 25 December 1798, Lequoy to Van Doorn and Bijleveld; NA 1.02.14 no. 780. 264   27 December 1798, Van Doorn and Bijleveld to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 780; 25 December 1798, Lequoy to Van Doorn and Bijleveld; NA 1.02.14 no. 780; 27 December 1798, Van Doorn and Bijleveld to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 780. 265   11 January 1799, Van Doorn and Bijleveld to Lequoy; NA 1.02.14 no. 780.

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cela même si universellement reconnu et avoué par tous les peuples du monde, qu’il serait inutile de nous arrêter à le prouver.’266 Finally, navi­ gation on the Scheldt, according to the Batavian commissioners, was still limited. The 1648 Treaty of Münster had closed the Scheldt. Since the Treaty of The Hague, the Scheldt was open for navigation by vessels of both Republics. Now, the Batavians argued, however, that vessels from other countries still were not allowed to sail to Antwerp.267 Batavian men-of-war did indeed try to prevent foreign—that is non-Batavian or non-French—vessels to sail the Scheldt.268 This did, of course, obstruct French plans of reviving Antwerp as a commercial centre. Lequoy, at last, wanted to force a breakthrough out of the stuck talks in Flushing as well. He proposed to shift negotiations to The Hague so he would at least get rid of Van Doorn and Bijleveld, who, after all, were from Zeeland.269 In The Hague, he expected to come across less affected and hence saner politicians. Negotiations in Flush­ ing were indeed broken off and Lequoy went to The Hague, where, however, Van der Goes succeeded in stretching negotiations until they smothered during the turmoil of the Anglo-Russian invasion in Hol­ land in August 1799. After a nine months’ stay in the Batavian Repub­ lic, Lequoy returned to Paris empty-handed.270 The French Secretary for the Navy, Marc-Antoine Bourdon de Vatry, blamed his failure on negotiations being paralysed by ‘la seule force d’inertie.’271 The French increasingly thought of gaining full possession of Flush­ ing.272 Their persistence on (joint) sovereignty was disposed of by Van der Goes as outrageous. After the brumaire coup (9 November 1799), the Batavian minister put his hopes in the Consulat. His tactics of stretching negotiations until better times turned out to have been not entirely in vain. As discussed before, prior to Marengo, Bonaparte was in desperate need of funds. Hence, he proposed several concessions to Batavian claims and complaints in return for a sum of 50 million francs. One of these concessions was relinquishing any rights the French Republic might have to Flushing. In case the Batavian Republic   12 January 1799, Van Doorn and Bijleveld to Lequoy; NA 1.02.14 no. 780.   2 January 1799, Van Doorn and Bijleveld to Lequoy; NA 1.02.14 no. 780. 268   31 October 1799, Boudon to Directoire; AN AF III 70. 269   23 December 1798, Lequoy to Ministre de la Marine; AAE CP Hollande 597. Bindoff, 1945; Bovard, 1950; Baudez, 1996; Enthoven, 2005; Ebben, 2007. 270   31 October 1799, Boudon to Directoire; AN AF III 70. 271   31 October 1799, Boudon to Directoire; AN AF III 70. 272   31 October 1799, Boudon to Directoire; AN AF III 70. 266 267



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would provide the Premier Consul with the means to continue the war against the Coalition forces ‘tous les droits de la République française sur Flessingue, consacrés par le traité de la Haye, seront cédés à la République batave.’273 The Hague steadily dragged the issue of Flush­ ing until the peace as set out by Van der Goes earlier on, though, since it was expected that Britain would never allow France to stay in Flushing.274 Moreover, the Uitvoerend Bewind did not have the kind of money Bonaparte was requesting.275 In the end, the Batavian Repub­ lic only paid a sum of 6 million francs in return for the cession of all rights and possessions within or enclaved in Batavian territory previ­ ously owned by German princes, the Maltese and Teutonic Orders, or inhabitants of the former Austrian Netherlands276 and the promise that France would have that cession confirmed at the final peace with the Empire. The French government promised as well to endeavour to have the King of Prussia cede Zevenaar to the Batavian Republic at the time of peace with the Empire. It was stated expressis verbis that by this arrangement the French Republic partly performed its obligations under Article 16 of the Hague Treaty to provide the Batavian Republic with territorial compensation for the territories ceded to France.277 At the diplomatic level attempts to settle the issue of Flushing had failed. On the spot, things did not change either. French officials and privateers kept on doing what they thought they were entitled to but what the Batavians considered violations of the Treaty and their independence. For instance, to the surprise of the government in The Hague, the French naval secretary ordered the disarmament of fishing crafts in Flushing in the fall of 1800. Those crafts had, however, been armed for the defence of Flushing against the British by orders of the Batavian government, albeit at the request of its French counterpart. Hence, Van der Goes objected that only the Batavian government was entitled to give orders of disarmament and that the French minister had arrogated authority contrary to the Batavian Republic’s honour and independence.278   6 February 1800, Talleyrand to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 231.   7 February 1800, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 275   14 February 1800, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 276  Ravenstein, Megen, Boxmeer, Anhalt (near Zutphen), and Hussen being men­ tioned explicitly. 277   5 January 1800, Convention between the French Republic and the Batavian Republic; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 133–138; CTS vol. 55, pp. 111–116. 278   10 oktober 1800, Van der Goes to De Winter; NA 1.02.14 no. 683. 273 274

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The dispute over Flushing and French privateers even nearly led to actual hostilities between French and Batavian forces as the French continued to take or inspect merchantmen in what the Batavians regarded to be their territorial waters. Despite fierce objections by Talleyrand, the Uitvoerend Bewind stationed and kept armed ves­ sels on the Zeeland rivers to protect merchantmen being captured by French men-of-war or privateers.279 Talleyrand claimed that French privateers violating the law should be punished, but doing this was reserved to the French government.280 In response, Van der Goes called this postulate a clear contradiction of the law of nations and Batavian ­independence. For sure, it is the French government’s duty to curtail its privateers’ ferocities; however, that the French government were entitled to punish crimes committed by its privateers on neutral or allied powers’ territory with the exclusion of the territorial sovereign, is a new doctrine that I have looked for in the general codex of nations in vain. To whatever extent authors disagree on other matters of the law of nations, there is but one voice on the territorial sovereign’s jurisdiction over his waters. Aliens sailing on our seas are in the same position as those travelling along our public roads. Both are subjected to the laws of the territorial government.281

Van der Goes even explicitly referred to international legal doctrine— this being one of the very rare occasions this was done in diplomatic

  3 April 1800, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 122.   ‘Si quelques corsaires français s’ecartent des règles qui leur sont prescrites, la jus­ tice et la loyauté dont le gouvernement français a donné des preuves si multipliées sont garants qu’il s’empressera de les reprimer, s’ils commettent des délits il s’empressera de les punir. Mais ce qui est à-cet-egard son devoir, est en même tems son droit, et jamais il ne verront avec indifférence des gouvernemens neutres, et à plus forte raison des gouvernemens alliés prendre sur ce point une initiative, que les droits des gens, et les dispositions formelles des traités subsistants entre la République Française et ces gouvernemens lui reservent exclusivement.’ 281   ‘Dat de plicht van het Fransch gouvernement medebrengt om de geweldenarijen zijner kapers te beteugelen is buiten tegenspraak; doch dat het Fransch gouvernement het recht zoude hebben om de misdaden, die door des zelfs kapers op het grondgebied van neutrale of geallieerde mogendheden gepleegd worden, met uitsluiting van den territorialen souverain alleen te straffen, is eene nieuwe leer die ik te vergeefsch in het algemeen wetboek der volken gezogt heb. Hoe verschillend ook de schrijvers over andere onderwerpen van het volkenrecht mogen denken, is er maar eene stem over de jurisdictie die aan den territorialen souverain competeert op zijne eigen wateren. De vreemdelingen die op onze zeeën vaaren bevinden zich in het zelvde geval als die geene welke langs onze publieke wegen reizen. Beiden zijn aan de wetten van het ter­ ritoriaal gouvernement onderworpen.’ 279 280



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correspondence. He mentioned Grotius’ De Iure Belli ac Pacis in par­ ticular282 and reiterated comments by two authors not mentioned by name on Grotius. In sum, and based on these legal references, the Batavian government did not doubt its right to take measures ‘to curb privateers’ ferocities by the force of law,’283 which right had not been renounced in any treaty.284 Escalation was bound to occur once, in May 1801, the Maximiliaan Frans, a merchantman sailing under the flag of Papenburg285 that, according to French officials, was actually British or was at least car­ rying large amounts of British merchandise,286 entered Flushing’s port to drop anchor. The vessel had sailed from Altona, had called in at Emden under way, and was now destined for Middelburg. Van Doorn and Bijleveld—by then commissioner and highest clerk of customs287 in Flushing—were soon informed of the vessel’s arrival as well as of the French customs officers’ intention to inspect the vessel’s cargo. The Batavian commissioners, being fed up by French encroach­ ments with regard to Flushing, decided to turn the matter into one of principle. They ordered the placement of a halberdier on the vessel with explicit instruction to prevent the vessel’s cargo being inspect­ ed.288 Even if ‘the French customs office in this town had the slight­ est legality,’289 they would thus be able to save the Maximiliaan Frans from French arbitrariness. The French customs officers got wind of the Batavian commissioners’ actions and persuaded the commander of the French garrison to station a guard in the harbour to prevent the vessel from leaving Flushing uninspected.

  Grotius, 1625, book 2 chapter 3, p. 104.   ‘Dat het Bataafsch Bestuur nimmer aan zyn recht om de geweldenaryen der commissie-vaarders en andere gewapende vaartuigen door de straf der wetten te kun­ nen beteugelen getwyffeld heeft.’ 284   31 May 1800, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 122; 24 June 1800, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 285  A small territory in nothern Germany that had Landeshoheit at the time. 286  Autumn 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 659; not dated, Wezelier, French customs official in Flushing, to Van Doorn, copy attached to 5 June 1801, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 685. 287  Commissaris and commies generaal voor de convoyen en licenten. 288   30 May 1801, Van Doorn and Bijleveld to Gogel; NA 1.02.14 no. 685; 8 June 1801, Osten to Divisional General Dessardin (Osten’s direct superior); copy attached to 12 June 1801, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 685. 289   ‘het etablissement der Fransche douanes binnen deeze stad [. . .] al eens eenige de minste legaliteit hadde’; 30 May 1801, Van Doorn and Bijleveld to Gogel; NA 1.02.14 no. 685. 282 283

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By then, Van Doorn and Bijleveld had received a letter from the director of French customs stating that he intended to have the vessel inspected since he suspected the Maximiliaan Frans to carry forbidden British goods. Van Doorn and Bijleveld had left this letter unanswered, since it was sent by ‘a body present in this town without the least rec­ ognition and by mere usurpation.’290 Their request to the commander of French troops in Zeeland—Brigadier General Osten, who stayed in Middelburg—to provide military assistance in order to prevent French customs officers to inspect the vessel and to allow the Maximiliaan Frans to sail to Middelburg, initially met with an evasive answer.291 In the meantime, the director of French customs had asked for military assistance as well.292 Osten took up the matter; probably in an attempt to prevent escalation. The general gave notice that the vessel was not to be inspected or to leave Flushing without his authorisation.293 Soon after the vessel had entered Flushing, rumours went that authorities in Antwerp had ordered the Maximiliaan Frans to be taken to that French port, Van Doorn took measures to prevent the vessel being carried away. For instance, the vessel had to be kept within range of the batteries.294 In a letter of 30 May 1801 to their direct superior, the Agent der Finantien, the Batavian commissioners gave an exten­ sive account of the course of events and expressed their displeasure over the impotence with which they were forced to bemoan French actions over and over again. The two Zeeland officials even threatened to resign if they would not be provided with the means to add force to their complaints. Meanwhile, the Maximiliaan Frans was kept under chain and the situation in Flushing must have been quite tense. The matter of the Maximilaan Frans was discussed at the highest governmental and dip­ lomatic levels. The Uitvoerend Bewind referred the issue to Schim­ melpenninck in Paris, instructing him to ‘once more lodge objections 290   ‘een lighaam, dat zonder eenige het minst adveu en bij loutere usurpatie in deeze stad aanwezig blijft.’; 30 May 1801, Van Doorn and Bijleveld to Gogel; NA 1.02.14 no. 685. 291   29 May 1801, Van Doorn to Osten; 30 May 1801, Osten to Van Doorn; attached to 5 June 1801, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck van 5 juni 1801; NA 1.02.14 no. 685. 292   8 June 1801, Osten to Dessardin, attached to 12 June 1801, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 685. 293   8 June 1801, Osten to Dessardin, attached to 12 June 1801, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 685. 294   3 June 1801, Van Doorn to Gogel; NA 1.02.14 no. 685.



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to the entirely illegal actions of French customs officers in Flushing.’295 The Uitvoerend Bewind expressed its hopes that the Premier Consul would be able to find a reasonable solution. In a letter to Talleyrand, Schimmelpenninck inveighed strongly against French claims on inspecting vessels in Flushing. Inspecting ships entering Flushing’s port was reserved to the Batavian Republic as sovereign. Hence, French customs were not entitled to exercise a ‘droit de police’ in Flushing. The establishment of a French customs office in Flushing rested on a ‘fausse interprétation de notre pacte d’alliance’ and ‘cette fausse idée de souveraineté commune.’296 Schim­ melpenninck, once again, set out to explain why the Hague Treaty had not established joint sovereignty in great detail. Article 13, pursu­ ant to which a French garrison was to be stationed in Flushing, was solely meant as a security measure against maritime enemies and as a guarantee of free navigation on the Scheldt. In no way it provided a pretext to render legitimate what was going on in Flushing. The Bata­ vian envoy compared French military presence to the former barrier towns in the Austrian Netherlands, where the United Provinces had never taken part in sovereignty nor had they claimed to do so because of their troops stationed there. Article 14, while making the use of Flushing’s port common to both nations, did not contain a renun­ ciation of sovereignty by the Batavian Republic, nor was the French Republic assigned the right to exercise sovereign powers. Joint sov­ ereignty clearly would ‘dénaturer le sens grammatical’ of the Treaty provisions. Moreover, joint sovereignty could not be conceived since it was essentially adverse to the principle of sovereignty, that is, the unity and indivisibility of power. Finally, Schimmelpenninck empha­ sised that sovereignty could only be transferred by a formal cession, which had never taken place. As ordered by his government, he urged for the French customs office—‘dont l’existence si peu compatible avec l’intégrité territoriale de la République Batave et avec son indépen­ dance politique si solemnellement proclamée’—to be abolished.297 Somewhat later, Schimmelpenninck proposed invoking the option of

295   ‘op nieuw de dringendste repraesentatien te doen omtrent het geheel en al onwettige der handelingen van de Fransche Douaniers te Vlissingen.’; 4 June 1801, decree of the Uitvoerend Bewind; attached to 5 June 1801, Van der Goes to Schim­ melpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 685. 296   10 March 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 659. 297   10 March 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 659.

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referring disputes to arbitration if the French would persist in claim­ ing the right to police Flushing’s port298 and the Uitvoerend Bewind adopted that suggestion.299 Attempts to settle the matter with the French head of state were caught up by events. Already on 1 June, the director of customs in Antwerp had urged the local magistrate of Flushing to allow the Maximiliaan Frans being inspected, claiming that the presence of French customs officers in Flushing and their right to inspect vessels was based on the Hague Treaty and calling the impediment of them doing their work an ‘excès.’ He blamed Van Doorn and Bijleveld of ‘troubler la bonne harmonie qui existe entre elles [the two Republics; RK]’ and called for actions taken against them.300 On the evening of 23 July 1801, about eleven o’clock, French cus­ toms officers took the vessel by force and started to make sail. Bata­ vian officials were fully taken by surprise and failed to react prompt enough. In the dismay that followed, the commander of the docks— Zoeteman—did send a jollyboat with an officer into the harbour to find out what was going on. Upon his return, the officer was sent to Van Doorn and Bijleveld to inform whether the orders to prevent the ship from leaving Flushing if the French would try to move it to Antwerp were still in force. As that officer went to his jollyboat again with the commissioners’ orders, a French guard stopped him. By then the Maximiliaan Frans had left the harbour already. Since the vessel could not make great speed having to sail against the tide, Zoeteman did send a gunboat in pursuit to surpass and recapture the vessel.301 Before the gunboat was able to come into range, the French had man­ aged to reach Antwerp, where the vessel was declared a good prize by a French prize court. Notwithstanding this fait accompli, Schimmelpenninck still consid­ ered arbitration. He suspected foul play on the French side; that is he thought French officials might have abused the case of the Maximiliaan Frans to torment the Batavian government and would keep on doing so until the Batavians would yield to French claims on Flushing.

  19 June 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 633.   26 June 1801, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 685. 300   1 June 1801, le directeur des douanes (Anvers) to l’administration municipal de la ville de Flesingue; NA 1.02.14 no. 685. 301   24 July 1801, Speeleveld and Nozeman, commissioners in Flushing, to Agent der Marine; NA 1.02.14 no. 668. 298 299



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Probably, the French government would reject arbitration. By propos­ ing it the Uitvoerend Bewind would, however, be able to answer to the Batavian people and maybe, the demand of referring the matter to arbitrators might provoke the French government to terminate the existing status of Flushing by a ‘fair transaction.’302 This case does show that by the summer of 1801 disputes over Flush­ ing not only had not ceased, but tensions and exasperation had risen to such a level that the Batavian navy would have actually fired at its French allies if it would have been possible. Neither Republic’s posi­ tion with regard to Flushing had changed even an inch. The Batavians considered Flushing to be Dutch and wanted the French out as soon as possible. The French wanted to preserve Flushing as a naval base on the North Sea coast, as a means to control navigation to Antwerp, and as a station to ruin British trade. 5.7  The Prospect of Peace Van der Goes’ tactics were based on expectations that the French would be more complaisant once the war had ended in combination with the conviction that the British would not allow the French to stay in Flushing. As the long-desired moment of peace seemed to be approaching in the course of 1801, the leading Batavian diplomats started thinking of picking up the matter of Flushing at the govern­ mental level again. Already after the Treaty of Lunéville (9 Febru­ ary 1801), the Franco-Batavian alliance was being reconsidered. Van der Goes stressed that the presence of French troops in the Batavian Republic, Flushing included, was irreconcilable with Batavian indepen­ dence. Flushing being garrisoned by the French was a clear ‘token of distrust’303 and a ‘humiliating condition that could only be justified by the most pressing necessity of the war against England.’304 Hence, the Batavian Republic’s dignity called for terminating French presence in Flushing after the peace. He even proposed to the Uitvoerend Bewind

302   ‘eene billyke transactie’; 17 August 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 633. 303   ‘blyk van wantrouwen’ 304   ‘deze vernederende voorwaarde door de dringendste noodzakelykheid van den tegenwoordigen oorlog met Engeland niet meer geëxcuseerd kan worden [. . .]’

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to attempt persuading the French to recede former Dutch Flanders.305 To Semonville, Van der Goes stressed that it was necessary to alter the wartime alliance between the two Republics in more durable and useful bonds to which ‘les plaintes et les abus nombreux’ in Flushing stood in the way. He contended that France did not gain anything by Article 14 of the Hague Treaty it would not enjoy due to the friendship and loyalty of the Batavian people.306 Van der Goes’ scheme met with a formal answer by Semonville that the Hague Treaty did not limit the presence of a French garrison in Flushing to the current war. The Treaty explicitly stated that both Republics had to agree on terminat­ ing the situation stipulated by Article 13. The French envoy emphasised in an advice to his government that the Batavians did not oppose the French navy’s use of Flushing’s port, but solely took issue with the claim of joint sovereignty. He suggested going part of the way to meet the Batavians by making the Flushing garrison mixed, that is to say having half of it consisting of Batavian troops. This might soothe the Batavians, while ‘nous laisserait une garantie égale.’307 In general, he endorsed the necessity of reconsider­ ing the alliance. It was time to substitute the ‘influence des bayonettes’ and ‘autorité ephémere de la France’ by an influence durable d’un traité d’alliance, de navigation et de commerce bien cimenté, conciliant les avantages respectifs des deux états et main­ tenu par un ambassadeur français.

A special envoy should be sent to The Hague to negotiate a new treaty. As to the treaty of commerce, Semonville suggested a lot of specific measures that, taken together, would basically create a free trade zone between the two Republics. He especially stressed that the new treaty should assure the advantages of the Scheldt navigation and possession of Antwerp to France. Control of the Scheldt, and hence French influ­ ence or presence in Flushing, was essential to this. He realised that Flushing was quite a ‘delicate’ matter.308 By, finally, negotiating a treaty of commerce and navigation with the Batavians as well, something the 305   18 February 1801, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 123; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 485. 306   19 March 1801, Van der Goes to Semonville; NA 2.21.073 no. 52; AAE CP Hol­ lande 605. 307   19 March 1801, Observation sur le mémoire de la batavie et ses diverses demandes; AAE CP Hollande 605. 308   11 December 1801; AAE CP Hollande 605.



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Batavian government had urged for for years, Semonville might have hoped they could be persuaded to give in with regard to Flushing. It was not until the peace negotiations with Britain that Van der Goes and Schimmelpenninck got seriously involved in bringing an end to the French presence in Flushing. This was the moment they had waited for and initially they seemed to have been right as to Brit­ ish views. In the course of the London negotiations on preliminar­ ies, the British did indeed insist on a full evacuation of the Batavian Republic by French forces.309 Hawkesbury was told not to interfere with the relations between France and its allies, though. Otto stressed that French troops were in the Batavian Republic to protect it against the common enemy and stated that he assumed the troops would leave after peace had been signed.310 The British minister, in response, emphasised that the British government had no intention of interfer­ ing in Franco-­Batavian relations, but was prone on guarantees of the Batavian Republic being truly independent before returning its colo­ nies.311 Thus, nothing on French (military) presence in any part of the Batavian Republic ended up in the Preliminaries. Prior to leaving for Amiens, Schimmelpenninck addressed Lord Cornwallis’ secretary—Merry—on the matter. He informed whether the Preliminaries contained any secret articles relevant to ‘the parts of the Hague Treaty that could not be pleasant to the British government.’312 Merry answered that he did not know of any provisions of the sort. By then, the British had copied the French response to their initial attempt to discuss the Batavian Republic’s independence. Merry assured Schimmelpenninck that his government fancied the Batavian Republic enjoying ‘the best possible integrity and independence,’313 but was not to mingle in relations between two allies. Nevertheless, Schimmelpenninck urged for Britain making Batavian independence an essential point of the peace ‘out of its own interest.’314

  27 August 1801, Otto to Talleyrand; AAE CP Angleterre 595.   30 August 1801, Talleyrand to Otto; AAE CP Angleterre 595. 311   27 August 1801, Otto to Talleyrand; AAE CP Angleterre 595. 312   ‘dat er by het tractaat van vreede en alliantie [. . .] eenige artikuls gestipuleerd zyn, welke ik supponeere dat aan het Britsch gouvernement niet aangenaam kunnen zyn.’ 313   ‘de meest mogelijke integriteit en independentie.’ 314   ‘vanuit het eigen rechtstreeksch belang’; 7 November 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 635. 309 310

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In contrast, Joseph Bonaparte was instructed to keep navigation of the Scheldt outside the negotiations and treaty.315 Talleyrand stressed that the Stadhouder and everything concerning ‘les affaires intérieures’ of the Batavian Republic were not to be discussed. Those issues were ‘absolument étrangers à nos discussions avec l’Angleterre.’316 Almost simultaneously, though, the French government publicly stated to respect its allies’ independence.317 In any case, French reluctance to widen the scope of negotiations did not stop Schimmelpenninck from pursuing the policy of forcing an agreement in the course of peace negotiations with Britain. Early December 1801, he presented a draft treaty between the French and Batavian Republics terminating the offensive alliance and containing evacuation of Flushing, negotiating a treaty of commerce, and territorial aggrandisement to the east, as well as France giving in to Batavian irredentist desires with regard to Dutch Flanders.318 Moreover, Schimmelpenninck emphasised that he would never consent to proposals comprising any cession of ter­ ritory or the continuation of French military influence in the Bata­ vian Republic after the peace.319 Having arrived in Amiens, he asked Joseph to request his brother to consent to the suppression of Articles 4 (offensive alliance), 13 (French garrison in Flushing), and 14 (com­ munity of Flushing) of the 1795 Hague Treaty. Ces articles ne sont que le résultat forcé de circonstances extraordinaires et passagères et ils doivent disparaître au moment ou le motif qui les dicta n’existe plus.320

However burdensome the Hague Treaty might have been to the Bata­ vian Republic, this was as close to the clausula rebus sic stantibus—a rule accepted in legal doctrine321—as any Batavian official came dur­ ing the entire period. Even here, while Schimmelpenninck pointed to

 Du Casse, 1855, pp. 8–19.   20 November 1801, Talleyrand to Joseph; Du Casse, 1855, p. 23. 317   ‘Fidelité pour nos alliés, respect pour leur indépendance, franchise et loyauté avec nos ennemis: telle a été sa politique.’ 22 November 1801, Exposé de la situation de la République; AAE MD France 652. 318   5 December 1801, Projet de traité entre les Républiques Batave et Français; AAE CP Angleterre 598. 319  Copy enclosed with 5 December 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 363A. 320   5 December 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 363A. 321  Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 362; Grewe, 2000, p. 351. 315 316



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changed circumstances, the Treaty was only to be altered by mutual agreement. As will be discussed in Part III, the first phase of negotiations was dominated by the question whether Schimmelpenninck was to be admitted to the conferences unconditionally or on the condition of accepting the Preliminaries as basis of negotiations. The Batavian envoy wanted to widen the scope of negotiations by addressing the alterations to be made to the Franco-Batavian alliance and territorial compensation pursuant to Article 16 of the Hague Treaty as well. Tal­ leyrand kept hammering that the Amiens congress was limited and Flushing was not to be discussed there. Schimmelpenninck was to be prevented from succeeding in extorting concessions on Flushing in return for consenting to the cession of Ceylon to Britain.322 Joseph declared to Schimmelpenninck that he was not authorised to talk about Flushing. Only peace with Britain was on the table. All other matters had to be settled between the allies at a later time. The Batavian envoy replied that the arrangements with regard to Flushing did not have to be included in the peace treaty, but he did insist that the matter would be settled separately prior to or, ultimately, simultaneously with the peace. The French envoy acknowledged the possibility of that option. He immediately added, though, that he did not understand why the Batavian Republic would be entitled to it. Schimmelpenninck’s reply that all matters of dispute should be settled at the general peace was of no avail.323 As Schimmelpenninck was admitted to the conferences, Joseph was instructed that any time Batavian demands vis-à-vis the French Repub­ lic would be brought up, he would have to respond that those were ‘étrangers au congrès.’324 Talleyrand made very clear that Schimmel­ penninck was to be told that the Hague Treaty would not be altered at Amiens: Quant aux arrangements particuliers à faire entre la France et la Bata­ vie, dites bien au citoyen Schimmelpenninck que rien à cet égard n’est oublié ici: que le traité de La Haye est toujours regardé comme la base de

322   12 December 1801, Talleyrand to Joseph; AAE CP Angleterre 598, Du Casse, 1855, pp. 45–47. 323   19 December 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 363A. 324   6 January 1802, Hauterive to Joseph; AAE CP Angleterre 598; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 138–142.

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part ii, chapter five l’alliance entre les deux républiques, et que son exécution aura lieu dans toute son étendue après que les affaires d’Angleterre seront arrangées.325

Nevertheless, the Batavian envoy continued to insist on settling the matters with regard to the alliance and demanded the revocation of Articles 13 and 14.326 The Staatsbewind even more clearly made the renunciation of French claims on Flushing a condition of agreeing to the cession of Ceylon.327 Talleyrand’s refusal to give in to Batavian demands was likewise resilient. ce n’est pas dans les discussions d’Amiens qu’il peut être question des arrangements particuliers entre la France et la Batavie; mais que l’intention du gouvernement français est toujours de poursuivre l’entière exécution du traité de La Haye328

Schimmelpenninck repeated the option of negotiating on Flushing simultaneously, while separately from the conferences with Cornwal­ lis; acknowledging that points of mutual dispute were indeed not to be discussed in the presence of the British envoy.329 This would, of course, have forced the French government to make a plain deal to the Bata­ vian Republic’s liking, which was precisely what it had endeavoured to avoid ever since 1795. By early March, Schimmelpenninck declared to refuse signing the Treaty of Amiens before, among others, the matter of Flushing would be settled.330 Apparently afraid this would prolong negotiations, Talley­ rand decided to give in a bit. He promised to see to arrangements to be made between the French and Batavian Republics as soon as peace was concluded and assured Schimmelpenninck that the Premier Consul est sincèrement porté à faire tout ce qui est possible pour rehausser la force et la considération d’un pays dont il apprécie l’alliance, d’une nation dont il estime le caractère.331

  2 February 1802, Talleyrand to Joseph; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 199–201.   4 February 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Joseph; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 206–215; 14 February 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Premier Consul; NA 2.01.08 no. 363A. 327   6 Februay 1802, minutes committee from the Staatsbewind; NA 2.21.073 no. 51. 328   17 February 1802, Talleyrand to Joseph; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 238–242. 329   ‘onder de ogen van de Britse gezant.’; 23 February 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Talleyrand; NA 2.01.08 no. 363A. Dated by Du Casse (1855, pp. 195–198) on 28 December 1801. 330   4 March 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 363A. 331   24 February 1802, Talleyrand to Joseph; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 277–281; communi­ cated to Schimmelpenninck by Joseph Bonaparte on 25 February 1802; NA 2.01.08 no. 363A; 27 February 1802, Talleyrand to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 363A. 325 326



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Subsequently, the Batavian envoy recognised that nothing more was to be attained before the peace.332 From its safe distance from Paris and Amiens, the Staatsbewind, although considering to yield and be satisfied with Talleyrand’s vague promises, held to the condition of renouncing Articles 13 and 14 of the Hague Treaty as compensation for the cession of Ceylon. Schim­ melpenninck was only to sign if he had obtained a ‘written and suf­ ficient declaration from the French with that regard.’333 The French government, however, only repeated its ‘vague assurances.’334 After Schimmelpenninck had informed Joseph of his government’s orders to refuse signing the Treaty, some concessions must have been made on the French side, for Schimmelpenninck notified the Staatsbewind of having received a document that served as sufficient evidence of French promises.335 If the French government would later on deny that promises to settle Franco-Batavian disputes had been made ‘one would also, with the fullest certainty, have to draw the sad conclusion that one desires to persist in adhering to a determined and permanent system of oppression and manifest domination of this Republic.’336 As negotiations seemed to result in agreement on a Treaty soon, Schim­ melpenninck suggested to the Staatsbewind to settle for the promises made and indeed shortly afterwards the Treaty of Amiens (27 March 1802) was signed by Schimmelpenninck on behalf of the Batavian Republic without any concession with regard to Flushing having been made. Once Schimmelpenninck had returned to Paris from Amiens, he perseveringly endeavoured to get the Premier Consul to live up to his promise to settle the matter of Flushing. The Batavians put great hope in Bonaparte to really yield to Batavian desires. In their eyes, this

  4 March 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 363A.   ‘schriftelijke en voldoende verklaring van de fransche zijde deswegens.’; 8 March 1802, minutes committee from the Staatsbewind; NA 2.21.073 no. 51; 10 March 1802, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 52 and NA 2.21.073 no. 51. 334   ‘vague beloften.’ 335   ‘geeft toch dit schriftelijke en solemnel declaratoir [. . .] eene zodanige graad van zekerheid van eene satisfactoire afdoening van dat point, dat men het in den gewonen geest en toon waarop eene mogendheid tot de andere spreekt als eene vereffende zaak zoude moeten beschouwen.’ 336   ‘dan zou men tevens met volkomen zekerheid, de treurige conclusie moeten opmaken dat men een gedecideerd en permanent systhema van oppressie en van een manifeste overheersing van onze republiek wil blijven aankleven.’ 332 333

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would amount to French troops leaving Batavian territory entirely.337 Schimmelpenninck, who was nominated Batavian envoy in London postponed his departure from Paris to settle the matter himself.338 Soon after the Treaty of Amiens had been ratified, an internal report on the consequences of the Peace for the Franco-Batavian alliance was composed that would have crushed all Batavian hopes if they would have taken knowledge of it.339 It was acknowledged that peace called for evacuation of Batavian territory—Articles 15 and 17 limiting French military presence to respectively cases of hostilities and the current war—, the conclusion of a treaty of commerce, and provid­ ing the Batavian Republic with territorial compensation for territories ceded to France (Article 16). Flushing (Articles 13 and 14) was a spe­ cial case, though. The Batavians now demanded ‘que le port et la place de Flessingue soient restitues en totalité à la République batave.’ The report clearly ruled out such restitution: il est impossible de songer à faire une restitution entière à la Batavie. Ce serait livrer la navigation de l’Escaut et la destinée d’Anvers aux combi­ naisons jalouses des Hollandais.340

A continuation of French presence in Flushing—including a garrison, maritime administration, and customs office—was absolutely neces­ sary because of navigation on the Scheldt. Batavian demands with this regard were, thus, to be declined. The report went even further; partly returning to the 1795 scheme of attaining both banks of the Scheldt. In proposing a scheme for territorial compensation pursuant to Article 16 of the Hague Treaty, based on military considerations and mainly consisting of corrections made to the mutual border, the southern part of Zuid-Beveland and Flushing would be French in order to ensure control of the Scheldt.341 Unaware of this report, Schimmelpenninck remained optimistic dur­ ing the spring. He regarded the chance of the French renouncing the ‘joint right on Flushing and the French garrison leaving’ real, although

  9 April 1802, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.21.073 no. 18.   3 March 1802, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.21.073 no. 18. 339  March/April 1802, Rapport sur l’exécution du traité de la Haye; AAE CP Hollande 606. 340  March/April 1802, Rapport sur l’exécution du traité de la Haye; AAE CP Hollande 606. 341  March/April 1802, Rapport sur l’exécution du traité de la Haye; AAE CP Hol­ lande 606. 337 338



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he anticipated the French to lay down conditions, for instance to allow French forces to stay in Batavian pay for some more months. By the end of April, he expected Joseph Bonaparte being mandated soon to negotiate with him.342 In the course of virtually every audience he had with the Premier Consul, he reminded him of the promise to settle the matter of Flushing immediately after the peace. Time and again, Bonaparte repeated his vague promise without committing himself.343 The Batavian envoy blamed the delay on the Premier Consul being occupied with other matters or contemplating to combine the matter of Flushing with carrying out Article 16 of the Hague Treaty.344 Schimmelpenninck still could not believe that Bonaparte would want to continue the current situation in Flushing.345 In fact, the Pre­ mier Consul indicated on one occasion in August 1802 that he agreed with Schimmelpenninck that the existing situation in Flushing was abhorrent and had to be settled, which would be done as soon as Tal­ leyrand had returned to Paris. Bonaparte had, however, added that he thought it wise to keep French troops in the Batavian Republic some­ what longer. Schimmelpenninck rejected that suggestion, stating that foreign troops, whatever well-behaved they might be, and whatever beloved the power to which they belong, always become unbearable in the long run to a Nation perfectly apt to govern itself and considering itself to be entitled to be independent.346

That reply had caused an abrupt end to the conversation and left the Batavian envoy somewhat confused. On the one hand, as he wrote to Van der Goes, keeping French troops in the Batavian Republic was incompatible with the Premier Consul’s repeatedly expressed

342   10 April 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 636; 20 April 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 637; 30 April 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 637. 343   20 April 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 637; 25 June 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 637; 16 July 1802, Schim­ melpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 637; 9 August 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 638. 344   25 June 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 637; 9 August 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 638. 345   16 July 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 637. 346   ‘vreemde troepen, hoe braaf ook, en hoe bemind ook de mogendheid mochte zijn tot welke ze behooren, op den duur altoos ondraaggelijk wierden voor eene Natie welke volkomen in staat was zich zelve te bestuuren en welke een groot gevoel had dat zij verdiende geheel independent te zijn’; 9 August 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 638.

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i­ ntentions ‘to allow full independence to other countries and nations.’347 On the other hand, Bonaparte always brought up the usefulness of a prolonged presence of French troops in the Batavian Republic once he was addressed on Flushing.348 Soon afterwards, Talleyrand returned. Schimmelpenninck con­ tacted him immediately and was given the assurance that the matter of Flushing would be settled before his departure.349 His leave for London approaching nothing was settled yet, though, and Schimmelpenninck started to give up hope.350 Although Talleyrand insisted on him staying in Paris somewhat longer to settle the matter of Flushing, Schimmel­ penninck got convinced that Bonaparte did not intend to terminate the matter, but keep to vague promises instead.351 In the meantime, new incidents occurred in Flushing. Although both the French and Batavian Republics were at peace with Britain now, French customs officers in Flushing could not help harassing a British vessel—the Nancy—that had entered the harbour. The British government demanded reparation from The Hague and indicated to deem the French customs officers’ conduct a hostile act.352 In Flushing, the capture of the Nancy led to a brawl between French soldiers and local civilians.353 In Paris, the case of the Nancy induced Schimmelpen­ ninck to emphasise the necessity of rendering political and mercantile relations between the two Republics more permanent and reciprocally advantageous.354 Another matter, which might be christened the ‘grass-incident,’ got down to the very root of the Flushing settlement. Flushing’s bell-ringer had been given the right to mow the grass on the dockyards for his own benefit. In May 1802, the commander of the French garrison, General Jeannin, had deprived the bell-ringer of the right to do so and ordered his men to prevent the grass being mowed. The commissioner of the navy in Flushing addressed his superiors in The Hague on the matter, because he thought terrains were concerned on which only the Batavian government was entitled to decide and he was unable   ‘eene volkomen independentie aan andere landen en volkeren te laten.’   9 August 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 638. 349   9 August 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 638. 350   5 November 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 638. 351   5 November 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 638. 352   5 November 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 638. 353  Spaans, 2005, p. 43. 354   16 July 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 637. 347 348



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to maintain the Batavian navy’s rights: ‘Being incapable to withstand force, I am unable to maintain the Navy’s right in this case if one is deaf to the voice of reason.’355 On its turn, the Raad der Marine referred the matter to the Staatsbewind itself as yet another example of the arbitrary actions of French officials in Flushing.356 Probably, this incident was the first time that a pile of grass led to diplomatic quarrels between France and the Netherlands. Needless to say, official com­ plaints did not lead anywhere. The same was true for a more substantial issue. After the Directoire had established a customs office already in 1798, the French Navy Sec­ retary now decided to establish a pilot service in Flushing in order to allow ships to sail to Antwerp more safely.357 The new Batavian envoy in Paris, De Vos van Steenwijk, had to read word of this decision in a newspaper.358 Once more, a Batavian representative argued that the French government was not entitled to exercise sovereign rights— which, according to De Vos, included establishing a pilot service—in Flushing and thus insisted on closing the pilot service. Jamais la France n’a pu exercer légitimement sur Flessingue des droits de souveraineté. L’acte contre lequel je suis chargé de réclamer porte une atteinte manifeste à l’indépendance de mon pays.359

There are no indications that the French government gave in to Bata­ vian protests. Nonetheless, the Staatsbewind still expected the matter of Flushing to be terminated soon. At least, the Batavian government hoped that its indulgence with regard to a prolonged presence of French troops in the Batavian Republic would make Bonaparte more complaisant with regard to Flushing.360 This was not the case. As will be discussed in the next chapter, increasing tensions between France 355   ‘Tegen geweld niets vermogende kan ik ook het recht der Marine, in dezen niet maintineren te meer wanneer men doof is voor de stem der reden.’; 9 May 1802, Com­ missaris der Marine te Vlissingen (Nozeman) to de Raad der Marine; reiterated in: 21 May 1802, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 686. 356   12 mei 1802, Raad der Marine to Staatsbewind; copy enclosed with 21 May 1802, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 686. 357  According to De Vos van Steenwijk the Journal du Commerce reported that the Navy Secretary had approved the regulations on 14 October 1802; 10 December 1802, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 702. See also Bijleveld, 1865, p. 153. 358   10 December 1802, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 702. 359   23 December 1802, De Vos van Steenwijk to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 707. 360   4 February 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709.

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and Britain rendered all prospects of the French leaving the Batavian Republic vain. In the build-up to the rupture with Britain, French offi­ cers would single-handedly proclaim a state of siege in Flushing, with­ out even bothering to inform the government in The Hague. The dispute over Flushing was not to be resolved during the Bata­ vian Republic’s time of existence. Finally, in 1807, Louis Napoleon was forced to cede Flushing to his brother in exchange for East Frisia.361 Conclusion By the time the French entered Dutch territory, it had become cus­ tomary for great powers to aggrandise themselves impertinently. In the past decades, Russia, Prussia, and Austria had expanded at the cost of Poland and the Ottoman Empire, whereas Britain had expanded overseas. Western Europe had escaped the escalation of balance-ofpower-politics until the start of the Revolutionary Wars because of the long-term territorial stability in Western Europe brought by the 1756 Franco-Austrian alliance. Now, it was France’s turn to extend its borders. Including part of Dutch territory in the French Republic was the major aim of negotiations on the French part. In the end, Batavian negotiators managed to cut down on initial French demands, but some territory was indeed lost. Nevertheless, the territorial settlement really was a negotiated one in which legal arguments played a significant role. Again, because the territorial settlement was incorporated in the Hague Treaty, the United Provinces’ formal consent was attained. In the French argument, hierarchy and the right to take unilateral decisions were clearly conceived, that is, during the transitory stage between invasion and recognition the Dutch Republic was not to be treated as an equal and independent partner. It did not even exist. Until the new Batavian Republic was constituted, France was entitled to dispose of Dutch territory. Conquest and extinction of the United Provinces were the main justification for conduct adverse to relations 361   11 November 1807, Article 6 Treaty of Fontainebleau between the Emperor of the French, King of Italy and Protector of the Rhine Confederation and the King of Holland; Kerautret, 2004, pp. 330–334; CTS vol. 59 pp. 389–394. In the same treaty the King of Holland was given possession of Zevenaar, Huissen and Malburg (Article 2). After Prussia had lost East Frisia at Tilsit (Article 7 Franco-Prussian Treaty of Tilsit, 9 July 1807; Kerautret, 2004, pp. 291–300; CTS vol. 59, pp. 265–272).



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between independent powers. According to the French, there was no independent Batavian nation in possession of Dutch territory yet. Ref­ erences to the necessity of popular consent were put aside or ignored. In general, territory would be restored to the Batavian Republic by France with some parts exempted instead of the Batavian Republic ceding part of its territory to France. More substantially, the acquisi­ tion of part of Dutch territory was justified as a just indemnity for war expenses, and based on the right of conquest and the concept of natural borders. Moreover, military necessity, that is, the strategic and economic importance of the territory involved, was brought to the fore. After the Batavian Republic would be recognised as an indepen­ dent power, relations between the two Republics would be directed by the rules of conduct of an order of equal and independent powers. On the Batavian side, the discontinuity between the United Prov­ inces and the Batavian Republic was denied. Moreover, the proposi­ tion that the United Provinces had been conquered was repudiated. Batavians argued that territory was not to be ceded without the con­ sent of the inhabitants. The inalienability of territory was connected to notions of popular sovereignty like Locke, Vattel, and Rousseau had done. A great interest was attached to the United Provinces’/Batavian Republic’s territorial integrity and exclusive jurisdiction as the core element of independence. Despite the position of political and mil­ itary dependence the Batavian government was in, it turned out to be very stiff throughout negotiations on the Hague Treaty and resil­ ient in years to come with regard to its country’s territorial integrity. Time and again, the Batavian government refused to yield to French demands that would compromise Batavian independence in the ter­ ritorial sphere and lodged protests against violations of Batavian ter­ ritory by French officials. Thereto, Batavians invoked good faith as a cornerstone of international relations. Flushing was a distinct matter. Neither Republic wished to give up the Zeeland naval base controlling the Scheldt estuary. Eventually, they did not really reach an agreement. They just managed to formulate a provision in the treaty each government could interpret according to its point of view. The French conceived joint sovereignty as a windfall to remain in control of Flushing without the Batavians having to yield to cession. Conversely, Batavians were convinced only to have agreed to a right to use the port and some other rights deriving therefrom. The difference in the ways Articles 13 and 14 were interpreted would not cease to cause disputes and conflicts both in Flushing and at the

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governmental level.362 The Batavian government would adhere to the modern notion of sovereignty as indivisible and exclusive jurisdiction. To this were added the recurrent (jurisdictional) disputes over priva­ teer activity. It has to be noted, though, that the state was not identified with its territory. The state was still conceived as being in possession of and sovereign over its territory. The old notions of imperium and dominium were still referred to. In a way, the nation as an association of citizens had taken the place of the sovereign prince in this regard. The French did have an exclusive right to lay garrison in Flushing. Hence, from a military point of view, they were in control of the city; although the Batavian navy was present in Flushing, too. The garri­ son was not to interfere with municipal administration, though. After a while, disputes over taxes did arise. Moreover, the French would establish a customs office and pilot service in Flushing, thus acting as the city’s (co-)sovereign. In financial matters and with regard to the prohibition of British goods, the French were to profit from their dominance. The case of the prohibition of British goods and French attempts to enforce them in Flushing is a clear example of a withdrawal to domestic law on a great power’s side; as was the claim that jurisdic­ tion over Frenchmen and prizes taken in by French privateers accrued to French courts. Batavian governments did, however, not cease to lodge protests against what they perceived as violations of Batavian independence. Neither party was to yield to the other’s argument. But the Batavian Republic proved unable to enforce its alleged rights, that is, to prevent the French from doing as they wished either. The establishment of the customs office was a unilateral decision on the Directoire’s part. On other occasions, both governments tried to settle disputes in concert. To be sure, in Amiens, conferring on Bata­ vian demands was refused. In horizontal relations it does take two to tango, though. The French government was entitled to refuse discuss­ ing a modification of the Treaty if it did not wish to. Only Article 16 of the Hague Treaty—promising territorial compensations for lands ceded to or not restored by France at the general peace—provided the Batavians with a legal ground to claim action from the French govern­ ment. For tactical reasons, Paris refused to discuss even that matter during negotiations with Britain. Whether the Amiens negotiations equalled ‘the general peace’ might be debated. The refusal of arbitra­  Schama, 1989, p. 472.

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tion once Batavians invoked Article 7 of the 1795 regulations was a flagrant violation of an express agreement and a clear example of a withdrawal from law to politics. A final remark to be made here is that despite all disputes and disagreement, the Hague Treaty did play a major role in arguments from either side. Admittedly, Article 13 was interpreted in different ways, but both the French and the Batavians invoked the Treaty as the source of legal claims and rights time and again, whereas the opposite party was reproached for misinterpreting the treaty text or attempting to extent its meaning.

chapter six

The alliance renewed 6.1  The Prospect of War The Treaties of Lunéville (9 February 1801) and Amiens (27 March 1802) had restored peace in Europe. Under the terms of the 1795 Treaty of The Hague the alliance but for the anti-British union had expired. French troops were to leave the Batavian Republic. As discussed before, the French government hesitated to abandon military control of the Low Countries. In spite of repetitive Batavian demands and requests and subsequent French promises, French troops were still present a year after the Treaty of Amiens had been concluded. Initially, French troops were said to leave once the expedition for Louisiana was ready to depart.1 The Staatsbewind was adamant to get rid of the burden to its country caused by the presence of French troops, though, and had ceased paying and furnishing them. In November 1802, Schimmelpenninck finally left for London without having settled any of the issues the Batavian Republic wanted to terminate. At least Britain restored the colonies it was to abandon to the Batavian Republic. The Cape of Good Hope, in particular, was not evacuated as speedily as Bonaparte desired, but the Batavian government had actually asked the British to wait until a Batavian garrison had reached the Cape. By the end of the year, Batavian troops arrived and measures were taken to fix the presence of both Batavian and British troops until the Cape would be finally handed over shortly afterwards.2 By then, Franco-British relations had already deteriorated significantly. Since France had returned to mercantilist policies and was in control of the North Sea coasts, peace had not brought the commercial benefits the London City had anticipated.3 Bonaparte was right in accusing London of disregarding treaty obligations by not

 Deutsch, 1938, p. 87.   2 January 1803, Articles of agreement between the Batavian Republic and Great Britain (Cape of Good Hope); CTS vol. 56, pp. 449–455 3  Droz, 2005, pp. 226–227; Deutsch, 1938, pp. 98–99. 1 2

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e­ vacuating Malta. On the other hand, the British government could not be expected to reconcile itself with French domination of Western Europe and the Low Countries in particular, even though the Treaty had kept silent with regard to continental matters.4 The tragedy of the Amiens Peace was that Bonaparte could extend his hegemony over Western Europe and interfere in neighbouring states without violating the Treaty,5 while Britain had to violate the Amiens Treaty to respond to challenges to its security and commercial interests.6 British discontent was augmented by the French annexation of Piedmont (2 September 1802) and Bonaparte’s interference in Swiss politics (resulting in the Mediationsakte of 19 February 1803).7 Moreover, the British government did not trust the government in Paris to abandon its Egyptian schemes. A report by Colonel Sebastiani, who had travelled throughout the eastern Mediterranean during the fall of 1802, published in the Moniteur aroused British distrust even more. In response, London refused to evacuate Malta.8 Hence, by March 1803, the peace that was greeted as the restoration of tranquillity and stability in Europe in March 1802, turned out to be the ephemeral truce it has been taken for by most historians ever since. In those circumstances, Bonaparte bluntly refused to evacuate the Batavian Republic as long as Britain held on to Malta. In February 1803, Paris objected to the British not having left Malta yet.9 The British government answered that Malta was considered to be compensation for French extension on the Continent.10 Bonaparte was not a man to tolerate someone else to disregard an agreement. This is not the place to discuss whether or not the Peace of Amiens was bound to fail from the start. Schimmelpenninck, at least, had his doubts. Only a month after having placed his signature, he wrote to Van der Goes stating that in his opinion Europe was still ‘very far  Englund, 2004, p. 261.  Deutsch, 1938, pp. 92–93; Kagan, 2006, p. 38 and p. 41.  6  Englund, 2004, p. 259.  7  Laurent, 1867, pp. 313–314; Geyl, 1965, p. 55; Kagan, 2006, p. 42. On the Mediation in the Helvetic Republic, see: Oechsli 1899 and 1903; Strickler 1898, 1899, 1902, and 1903; Dunant 1901; Böning, 1905; Zaeslin, 1960; Rufer, 1974; Aubert, 1974; Nabholz, 1921; AN 29AP Roederer 21, 22, and 23 (Médiation Suisse an XI); The Act of Médiation can be found, e.g., in: AAE CP Suisse 480 and Strickler, 1866–1903 (1903 IX), no. 160 pp. 941–981.  8  Deutsch, 1938, pp. 109–110 and p. 121.  9  Deutsch, 1938, p. 116 and p. 118. 10  Deutsch, 1938, pp. 126–127.  4  5



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from being at rest.’11 Britain being entirely isolated and France being omnipotent and directing European affairs virtually on its own, the political situation of Europe was not sufficiently balanced for the peace to last long.12 Just before his departure from Paris, the Batavian ambassador repeated his prophecy. That time, he added that he suspected the French government to contemplate keeping control of the Batavian Republic in case of ‘an unlikely rupture with Britain.’13 In early March a point of no return was reached. On 8 March 1803, King George III requested Parliament to grant funds for military measures to defend the British Isles in a ‘speech from the Throne’ because of preparations made in French and Dutch ports.14 Bonaparte was furious.15 The Staatsbewind was scared stiff. The Batavian government’s initial response to the royal message was to deny that preparations for hostile action were being made in the Batavian Republic. Schimmelpenninck was to assure the British government that troops concentrated in Batavian harbours were destined for Louisiana.16 The Staatsbewind desperately wanted to keep the Batavian Republic out of the impending war between France and Britain. Nevertheless, it was aware that the Batavian Republic was likely to be obliged to take part in the war because of treaty obligations towards the French Republic.17 Hence, governors of Batavian colonies were warned and instructed to put the colonies in a state of defence without provoking the British and Vice-Admiral De Winter—commanding a Batavian squadron sailing to the East Indies—was instructed to leave Lisbon as soon as possible.18 In Paris, the Batavian envoy—Carel de Vos van Steenwijk—had a conference with Talleyrand on the threat of war. He indicated that it was in France’s interest that the Batavian Republic would remain neutral.

  ‘Nog verre van desselfs rustpunt verwijdert.’   30 April 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes (Paris); NA 1.02.14 no. 637. 13   ‘Eene onverhoopte rupture met Engeland.’; 5 November 1802, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 638. 14  Deutsch, 1938, p. 127; Dufraisse and Kerautret, 1999, p. 77. 15  Deutsch, 1938, p. 128. 16   15 March 1803, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck (London); NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 17   ‘Waar in dan ook hoogstwaarschijnlijk deze republiek hoe zeer wij dit ook door alle mogelijke middelen en wegen zouden wenschen te voorkomen uit hoofde van haare betrekkingen tot Vrankrijk zoude kunnen betrokken worden.’ 18   15 March 1803, Van der Goes to Vice-Admiral De Winter, commanding the Batavian squadron in the Mediterranean; NA 2.01.08 no. 217. 11 12

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According to De Vos’ impression, the French minister was not receptive with regard to Batavian neutrality.19 A rupture between France and Britain was indeed imminent. On 13 March, the British envoy, Lord Whitworth, was the object of ongoing ranting and raving by the Premier Consul in a public audience.20 Once cooled down, Bonaparte did take a more conciliatory tone. Whitworth was convinced that the Premier Consul did not desire war.21 Some weeks later, the British government explicitly claimed Malta and demanded the evacuation of the Batavian Republic and Switzerland.22 This was an ultimatum Bonaparte was not to comply with. If war was unavoidable, France was to be prepared. Schemes to invade the British Isles were taken up again and the Continent was once more to be closed for British trade. Hence, control of the sister republics was to be strengthened.23 The French government did not await Batavian action or even consent to do what it deemed necessary to defend the Batavian Republic. Since news of British frigates cruising before Hellevoetsluys to prevent vessels with French troops from leaving and rumours of British orders to recapture the Cape of Good Hope had reached Paris and the Premier Consul feared an invasion, he had ordered French troops to occupy the island of Walcheren and the city of Breda and to put Walcheren in a state of defence. Semonville was to convince the Batavian government of the necessity of these measures taken for the common defence.24 It has to be remembered that the major fortresses along the Franco-Batavian border were still on the Batavian side. They had been built to defend the United Provinces against France, but could now be used to cover the new French northern frontier as well. Hence, evacuating the Batavian Republic would expose the new French northern border. The Batavian government was merely notified that French forces had entered its territory, whereas Semonville even requested it to take measures to furnish those troops. As a minor relief, the French ambassador assured that the troops would leave again as soon as the   18 March 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 703.  Deutsch, 1938, p. 129. 21  Deutsch, 1938, p. 130. 22   British demands were officially passed on 3 and 26 April. Deutsch, 1938, pp. 132–133; Dufraisse and Kerautret, 1999, p. 77; Lentz, 2005c, p. 462. 23  Deutsch, 1938, p. 148 and p. 158; Dufraisse and Kerautret, 1999, p. 68. 24   25 March 1803, Talleyrand to Semonville; NA 2.21.073 no. 35; 26 March 1803, Talleyrand to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 711 and NA 1.02.14 no. 713. 19 20



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British threat had diminished; ‘à l’heure même ou les circonstances douloureuses qui en ont déterminé l’envoi auront fait place à un Etat paix solide.’25 There was some confusion on how many troops were dispatched to the Batavian Republic. Semonville mentioned six battalions of infantry, six squadrons of cavalry, and a train of artillery.26 De Vos reported that four battalions would be sent to begin with.27 By 1 April two battalions of infantry had already arrived at Breda.28 In the meantime, the French government made it appear that it desired to keep the peace.29 The Staatsbewind faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the Batavian government was well aware of not being in a position to withstand French pressure, both military-politically as legally. It believed in the sanctity of treaties and the Treaty of The Hague clearly stated that the two Republics would fight together every time either one of them was at war with Britain. On the other hand, the Staatsbewind realised that the Batavian Republic could not afford another war and was henceforth adamant to keep its country neutral. The arrival of additional French troops did therefore pose a problem. In case the Batavian Republic would be involved in a war against Britain they might actually be needed. Conversely, their presence might provoke Britain and the Batavian government just could not afford to pay for them. Moreover, the Staatsbewind was highly disturbed by French actions. Nothing less than Batavian independence was at stake. The Premier Consul had dispatched additional troops to Batavian territory without consulting any Batavian authorities. Furthermore, General Monnet had been sent to Flushing to put the city in a state of defence and to take command of all troops on the island of Walcheren under direct supervision of the Secretary for War in Paris.30 Monnet had carried out his orders accurately. Not only had he seized command of all forces on Walcheren and declared martial law in Flushing, he had ordered the Batavian garrison out of the city of Veere as well. Needless to say all of this was done without the consent of the government in The Hague. 25   28 March 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234; idem 29 March 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234. 26   28 March 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234; idem 29 March 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234. 27   28 March 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 703. 28   1 April 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709. 29   25 March 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 703. 30  Premier Consul’s decree of 5 April 1803; Bijleveld, 1865, p. 154.

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Likewise, General Montrichard had dispatched troops to Nijmegen and Grave of his own accord and without notifying the Batavian government. Being informed of his actions, the Staatsbewind denounced French conduct for having compromised the honour and independence of the Batavian Republic and having increased the risk of a rupture with Britain. Sending troops would be considered hostile conduct in London and accelerate war. Putting Flushing in a state of defence in peacetime was said to be as dangerous as it was needless. In the present circumstances, it was argued, augmenting the garrison would have sufficed. The Staatsbewind especially expressed its indignation over all these actions having been taken without its consent. Monnet had acted without any treaties providing him with the authority to do so. It was stressed that the French exclusive right to lay garrison in Flushing did not extend to the entire island.31 Montrichard was even officially subordinated to the government in The Hague and had thus ignored his nominal superiors. Montrichard’s action was adverse to Dutch practice that military commanders were not allowed to move troops without special instructions from the government. Moreover, occupying Grave and Nijmegen was entirely gratuitous in case of a British attack. Hence the French Generals’ behaviour ‘had no other tenor than to dispel even the appearance of independence.’32 The Batavian government did state to assume that the Premier Consul had not given orders for these actions and ascribed Montrichard’s arbitrary conduct to revenge for being denied any money he had requested.33 In sum, the Staatsbewind felt entirely left out of military operations taking place on territory over which it nominally was the sovereign power. French military measures were considered to be clear and flagrant violations of Batavian independence and territorial integrity. The Staatsbewind still blamed the arrogance of French officers at the grass roots level instead of the government in Paris, though. Furthermore, the Batavian government continuously feared to provoke Brit-

31   5 May 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk (letter to Semonville in the spirit of the Staatsbewind’s minutes enclosed); NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 32   ‘Geene andere strekking hebbende, dan om zelfs den schijn van onafhangelijk­ heid dezer republiek weg te nemen.’; 8 April 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.01.05 no. 445; a French translation can be found in Van der Goes’ private archives: 8 April 1803; NA 2.21.073 no. 35. 33   12 April 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709 and NA 2.01.08 no. 124; 12 April 1803, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck (private letter); NA 2.21.073 no. 18.



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ain or Britain being provoked by the conduct of French generals on Batavian soil and thus to be dragged down in war. Semonville had merely informed the Staatsbewind of the additional troops’ coming. The French ambassador had even refused to put the notification in writing. Consequently, the Staatsbewind refused to take the matter into deliberation.34 Nevertheless, by then the Batavian government had given orders to make preparations to lodge and furnish the additional French troops. It had indicated to assume that troops would not be sent unless a rupture with Britain could not be prevented35 and on the condition that they would indeed be withdrawn as soon as possible.36 In any case, the Batavian government declined to pay the troops, because no funds were available and there was no legal ground to demand payment.37 In addition, the Staatsbewind wanted to keep preparations against Britain silent. A lot of merchantmen, especially the ones from the East Indies and China, were still at sea or in foreign ports. In order not to jeopardise them and their cargo, they had to be given time to sail to Batavian ports. The Premier Consul was asked to drop his demand of payment at least for the time being. For to pay the troops, the Staatsbewind needed funds and the Wetgevend Lichaam had to be involved. Since the exact number of troops was unknown, the requested funds could not be specified as well and hence the request would amount to ‘une déclaration plus ou moins patente d’hostilités imminentes.’38 In response to De Vos van Steenwijk’s official objections to Montrichard’s and Monnet’s behaviour,39 Talleyrand tried to reassure the Batavians, without having to undo anything. The French minister emphasised that troops had only been sent because of a British

34   4 April 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53; 5 April 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709 and NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 35   28 March 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk (communicating the decree of the Staatsbewind of the same day); NA 1.02.14 no. 709 and no. 713; 1 April 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 707. 36   4 April 1803, minuut secrete notulen Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53. 37   ‘Op welke gronden van billijkheid men zelfs de soldij dezer troepen van ons vordert bekenne ik [Van der Goes; RK] niet te beseffen’; 1 April 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 2.01.08 no. 124 and NA 1.02.14 no. 709; 4 April 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53. 38   5 April 1803, Semonville to Talleyrand; AAE CP Hollande 607. 39   9 April 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709 and NA 2.01.08 no. 124; 12 April 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 707.

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squadron cruising off the Batavian coast and rumours of British troops recapturing the Cape of Good Hope and Batavian possessions along the African coast. He emphasised, too, that the Premier Consul made the utmost effort to prevent hostilities and that French troops would leave the Batavian Republic as soon as the Treaty of Amiens had been carried out.40 Nevertheless, the French government insisted on the Batavian Republic paying for the additional French troops. Since the Royal Navy was already quasi-blockading Batavian ports, those troops were really defending the Batavian Republic and hence the ward had to foot the bill.41 De Vos must have communicated the Staatsbewind’s position without an abundance of diplomatic care and courtesy. In a letter to Semonville, Talleyrand called him incapable for his position and suggested the French ambassador would propose to the Staatsbewind sending a committee consisting of three of its members to Paris to coordinate measures against Britain.42 By mid-April 1803, as Van der Goes had come to the conclusion that war was inevitable,43 Semonville requested a conference with some members of the Staatsbewind. On the evening of 17 April, he met with a delegation from the Staatsbewind that was assisted by Carel Gerard Hultman, the Staatsbewind’s General Secretary, and Maarten van der Goes. Semonville officially communicated his government’s reply to the Staatsbewind’s objections and requested the pay of French troops. Moreover, he informed the Staatsbewind of Talleyrand’s opinion of De Vos and passed the proposal to send a committee to Paris. Semonville’s announcements and the question whether to recall De Vos van Steenwijk were referred to a committee to be scrutinised.44 Semonville had been told, however, that the Staatsbewind expected the Premier Consul not to insist on payment of French troops any longer since the Batavian Republic was unable to do so.45 Moreover, the Staatsbewind decided not to take a stance for the French government’s response with regard to putting Flushing in a state of defence

  15 April 1803, Talleyrand to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 711.   13 April 1803, Talleyrand to Semonville; AAE CP Hollande 607. 42   13 April 1803, Talleyrand to Semonville; AAE CP Hollande 607. 43   15 and 26 April 1803, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck (private letter); NA 2.21.073 no. 18. 44   18 April 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53. 45   19 April 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709 and NA 2.01.08 no. 124; 25 April 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 703. 40 41



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and Montrichard’s and Monnet’s conduct. In the Batavian government’s view, its French counterpart had insufficiently shown its intent to conserve peace and was unjustly dissatisfied with regard to the Cape and the British squadron on the North Sea. The Staatsbewind stressed to have taken adequate precautionary measures. It had reinforced the colonial garrisons and measures to put the port of Hellevoetsluys in a state of defence had been taken swiftly. All of this had been done, though, with the care to prevent open hostility against Britain. Semonville was assured that the Batavian government would be loyal to its treaty obligations and would suffer all sacrifices that might reasonably be expected from it to defend the common cause and Batavian independence. Therefore, the Staatsbewind expressed to be very much put out over the French generals’ behaviour ‘which [. . .] denotes a violation of this Republic’s independence [. . .] as if they considered their government’s ally as conquered territory.’46 By then, General Victor, commanding the troops destined for Louisiana, had joined his colleagues. He had occupied the citadel of Hellevoetsluys, put the storehouses and armouries under his control and levied requisitions; all without the knowledge and consent of the Staatsbewind.47 Again, these actions were said to compromise Batavian independence.48 As he requested the French troops to be paid yet again, Semonville pointed out that the Premier Consul desired peace, but that the British had provided cause for caution and guaranteeing security in pressing circumstances did not always allow for proper forms to be observed. ‘Le premier devoir, peut-être le seul de la France dans cette circonstance étoit d’assurer la paix à elle et à ses alliés.’ Since the Premier Consul’s sole intention was to assure Batavian liberty, he expected ‘confiance et coopération franche’ from the Staatsbewind.49

46   ‘welke [. . .] eene onmiddellijke infractie van de onafhangelijkheid van den staat denoteren [. . .] alsof zij den bondgenoot van hun gouvernement als een geconquesteerd land considereerden.’ 47   29 April 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53; 5 May 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 2.01.08 no. 124; 8 May 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 707. 48   5 May 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 49   1 May 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234 and NA 2.21.073 no. 56; 3 May 1803, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck (private letter); NA 2.21.073 no. 18; 2 May 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53.

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Consequently, the Staatsbewind yielded to French pressure somewhat. As Van der Goes put it: ‘in order to preserve a political existence one needs to know when to give and when to take.’50 On 9 May, the Staatsbewind addressed the Wetgevend Lichaam informing the legislature that Britain had violated the Treaty of Amiens by not evacuating Malta and the French government had taken measures to defend the Batavian Republic. In a long exposé, the Wetgevend Lichaam was told that the Batavian government would strain every nerve to keep the peace, but had already taking measures in case it would fail to do so. Although the people’s representatives were assured that the Premier Consul only intended to protect the Batavian Republic, the Staatsbewind emphasised that other, less far reaching measures might have been taken and that the French had acted without the Batavian government’s consent, thus unnecessarily violating Batavian independence. French troops had been lodged and furnished ‘to prevent any further calamities and confusion,’51 but paying them had been refused. Nevertheless, the French had kept insisting on payment and the Staatsbewind underlined that the Batavian Republic was obliged by the Treaty of The Hague to partake in the war.52 Hence, the Staatsbewind proposed to the Wetgevend Lichaam to take French troops in Batavian pay as soon as the war had commenced.53 As the Batavian government shifted from hoping for peace to preparing for the worst, negotiations in Paris between the British envoy, Lord Whitsworth, and the French government failed.54 Whitworth had issued an ultimatum among other things demanding French troops to evacuate the Batavian Republic and allowing British troops to occupy Malta for another ten years. On behalf of his government, Talleyrand had replied that French troops would leave the Batavian Republic as soon as the Treaty of Amiens had been carried out and that the British not evacuating Malta was a violation of that Treaty which the French government could not allow without consulting the other parties to the Treaty (Spain and the Batavian Republic) and the powers that had 50   ‘Dat om eene politique existentie te behouden men op zijn tijd moet weeten te geeven en te neemen.’; 13 May 1803, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck (private letter); NA 2.21.073 no. 18. 51  Ter voorkoming van nog grotere onheilen en verwarringen.’ 52   ‘Eene eventueele vredebreuk waar in wij uit hoofde van onze met de Fransche republiek subsisterende alliantie waarschijnlijk stonden te deelen.’ 53   9 May 1803, Staatsbewind to Wetgevend Lichaam; NA 2.01.01.05 no. 445. 54  Deutsch, 1938, p. 134.



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guaranteed the provision with regard to Malta (the Emperor, Russia, and Prussia). By consequence, Lord Whitworth had requested and been given his passports and the French envoy in ­London—General Andréossy—had been recalled.55 At the final moment, the French government had offered to accept military occupation of Malta by the British. Whitsworth had stayed in Paris for some days to await his government’s response to French concessions, but London had decided not to tolerate French hegemony of Western Europe any longer and had set its mind on war.56 On 10 May, the Premier Consul decided to repudiate the British ultimatum.57 Two days later, the British envoy left Paris. Talleyrand informed De Vos van Steenwijk of breaking off diplomatic relations between France and Britain almost immediately. The French minister stressed that nothing was left to the two Republics but to fight together for their just cause and to repel British aggression.58 The rupture was known in The Hague on 6 May already. That day, Van der Goes informed the Batavian envoys abroad.59 In a letter to Schimmelpenninck of the same day, he stated his fear that war probably could not be avoided.60 The following day, Semonville officially notified the Staatsbewind of the rupture, simultaneously requesting an embargo to be placed in all Batavian ports.61 The Staatsbewind decided to leave Semonville’s request unanswered for the time being and subsequently to prove the malign effects of an embargo, while stressing that the Batavian Republic would not dodge its obligations.62 De Vos was called to The Hague for consultation. Apparently, The Hague wanted to rule out the risk that animosity between Talleyrand and De Vos would impair the Batavian Republic without officially recalling the Batavian envoy. During his absence, Anthony van Dedem van Gelder,

55   3 May 1803, Talleyrand to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 711. Talleyrand’s letter included a copy of the official French response of 2 May 1803 given to Lord Whitsworth’s ultimatum. See also Deutsch, 1938, p. 136. 56  Deutsch, 1938, p. 135 and pp. 137–138. 57  Waresquiel, 2003, p. 314. 58   3 May 1803, Talleyrand to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 711. Talleyrand’s letter included a copy of the official French response of 2 May 1803 given to Lord Whitsworth’s ultimatum. 59   6 May 1803, Van der Goes to T.G. van Dedem van Gelder, Van Raet, Bourdeaux, Van Spaen, and Buys; NA 2.01.08 no. 111. 60   6 May 1803, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 61   7 May 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.21.073 no. 35. 62   17 May 1803, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck (private letter); NA 2.21.073 no. 18.

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the Batavian envoy in Stuttgart, was to act as envoy in Paris.63 Van Dedem soon arrived in Paris, but De Vos did not leave. Therefore, Van Dedem could not officially treat with French authorities.64 By then, it had become clear that Whitworth was still in Paris and rumours had it that a congress would be convened.65 Moreover, diplomatic relations between Britain and the Batavian Republic were not broken off. The British envoy in The Hague, Robert Liston, remained on his post; as did Schimmelpenninck in London. Hence, according to Van der Goes, there was still some hope.66 Britain declared war on France on 17 May 1803.67 Semonville repeated the request to place a general embargo on Batavian ports.68 While stressing once more that the Batavian government would turn out to be a loyal ally once it became involved in the war, the Staatsbewind urged France again not to take or demand any measures that might provoke the British until the merchantmen from the East Indies had reached Batavian ports and the Batavian naval squadron sent to the East Indies had reached its post.69 As long as the British did not hinder Batavian navigation, an embargo would be imprudent and would do more harm to the Batavian Republic than to Britain.70 Nonetheless, Semonville kept insisting on an embargo, as well as on paying French troops reproaching the Staatsbewind for doubting British enmity.71 For the time being, however, Talleyrand seemed to have supported Batavian insistence on a delay. Although plans had been made, an embargo had not been laid in French ports yet and Semonville seemed to have acted too hasty on orders from the Secretary for the Navy.72

  11 May 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 2.01.08 no. 111.   21 may 1803, A. van Dedem van Gelder to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 217. 65   6 May 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 2.21.073 no. 19. 66   10 May 1803, Van der Goes to T.G. van Dedem van Gelder, Van Raet, Bourdeaux, Van Spaen, and Buys; NA 2.01.08 no. 111. 67  Dufraisse and Kerautret, 1999, p. 77. 68   17 May 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234. 69   17 May 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53. 70   19 May 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53; 19 May 1803, Van der Goes to Semonville; NA 2.01.08 no. 111 and NA 2.21.073 no. 35; 20 May 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709; 20 May 1803, Van der Goes to Anthony van Dedem van Gelder (Paris); NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 71   22 May 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; AAE CP Hollande 607, NA 2.01.08 no. 234; 24 May 1803, minuut secrete notulen Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53. 72   26 May 1803, Anthony van Dedem van Gelder to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 707 and NA 2.01.08 no. 217; 21 May 1803, Anthony van Dedem van Gelder to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 217. 63 64



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Semonville complained of Liston staying in The Hague as well. He suspected the British envoy to incite the Staatsbewind to inertia.73 Likewise, he disapproved of the presence of British commissioners in Hellevoetsluys. Stationed there to take care of the packet service based on a convention of 30 August 1677, he accused them of abusing their position to inform Liston of French troop movements.74 6.2  Another Quest for Neutrality From the start of the 1803 crisis, the Staatsbewind had refused to pay for French troops ‘which have entered this Republic contrary to the explicit text of treaties and adverse to the will and without consent and knowledge of the government.’75 By early May, the Batavian government started to have second thoughts. A renewed request to pay for the troops by Semonville did meet with refusal again, but the Staatsbewind’s response was put in more guarded terms since war had become more likely. The Staatsbewind stressed that French troops had been lodged and furnished as a token of benevolence towards the Premier Consul, that other military measures had been taken, and that a direct attack on the Batavian Republic called for preparations that were not on their way yet in Britain. Furthermore, it was once more emphasised that avoiding the appearance of a hostile attitude was absolutely necessary since peace was a precondition for national recovery. Subsequently, the Staatsbewind declared that the Batavian Republic was by no means obliged to pay the French troops that had entered its territory contrary to existing treaties and violating Batavian independence. Finally, however, the Batavian government indicated that the troops would be taken into Batavian pay once the war had started and that it would then confer with the French government to make arrangements for them.76 While peace or neutrality remained the primary goal, the Staatsbewind did recognise its country’s dependence on France once

  17 May 1803, Semonville to Talleyrand; AAE CP Hollande 607.   18 May 1803, Semonville to Talleyrand; AAE CP Hollande 607. 75   ‘welke tegen den uitgedrukten letter der tractaeten [in the French version: ‘conventions’; RK], tegen den wil en zonder toestemming zelvs zonder medeweten van het gouvernement binnen deze Republicq waeren ingerukt.’ 8 May 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53. 76   8 May 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53; 9 May 1803, Note du Département des affaires etrangères à la Haye; NA 2.21.073 no. 56. 73 74

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the Batavian Republic would be involved in the war. In addition, it reckoned with the possible threat to its political existence by France if the French government did not get what it desired. Thus, The Hague thought it politically prudent not to alienate the French government too much in attempting to prevent war with Britain. At war with Britain, France needed its maritime allies again. Paris did not question the Batavian Republic partaking in the war on the French side. Semonville and De Vos received a 2do-list with various military measures to be taken. The French commanding general was to be given command of the Batavian army. French forces in Batavian pay were to be increased to 25,000 men again. The naval squadrons of Texel and at the Meuse embouchure had to be made ready for action. The Batavian fleet was to be augmented. A Batavian liaison officer had to be sent to Paris.77 Talleyrand proposed concluding a new convention to settle military cooperation. As De Vos bluntly refused to do so, the French minister requested him to ask The Hague for powers to conclude a convention. As he passed the latter request to his government, De Vos called French demands excessive and indicated to see some room for haggling.78 Conversely, the Staatsbewind endeavoured to keep the Batavian Republic neutral. As soon as King George III had addressed Parliament an all out diplomatic campaign to have Batavian neutrality recognised started. Van der Goes assured Schimmelpenninck that everything that could be done was being done: ‘all the stops have been and are still being pulled out every day in Europe for us to enjoy neutrality.’79 A secret mission was sent to Paris that addressed the Premier Consul directly with the request to allow the Batavian Republic to stay neutral in a war with Britain—‘notre ennemi naturel’—in order not to jeopardise Batavian colonies and harm Batavian trade.80 The new Batavian envoy in Saint Petersburg—Dirk van Hogendorp—81 was instructed to persuade the Tsar to mediate between the soon to be belligerent pow-

  19 May 1803, Talleyrand to Semonville; AAE CP Hollande 607.   19 May 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 704. 79   ‘Alle zeilen zijn en worden nog dagelijks in Europa bijgezet om ons Neutraliteit te doen genieten.’; 24 May 1803, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck (private letter); NA 2.21.073 no. 18. 80   12 April 1803, Pontoy to Premier Consul; NA 2.01.08 no. 217 and NA 2.21.073 no. 35. 81   Brother to Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp, the Orangist who would play a leading role in the restoration of the Prince of Orange and the establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1813–1814; see De Beaufort, 1963. 77 78



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ers to have Batavian neutrality respected.82 The Russian government was in fact already mediating between France and Britain to prevent war. Word of Batavian diplomatic efforts in Saint Petersburg and Berlin reached Paris, where De Vos could honestly tell Talleyrand that he did not know of any request for mediation.83 Schimmelpenninck was pessimistic about the situation. Aware of the dangers of political division, he urged for unity within the Batavian Republic, for, in his opinion, nothing less but the country’s mere political existence was at risk. He admitted that independence was already ‘merely appearances,’84 but the Batavian Republic was still on the map of Europe. Yet, what really mattered in the current circumstances was ‘that we do not lose our political existence as a nation for ever and irreparably.’85 The realist he was, Schimmelpenninck was worried about the prospect of war. He suspected that as soon as war had started not Malta but the violation of Dutch and Swiss independence would be presented as the casus belli. It would then become almost impossible to end the war by compromise.86 Not until stability within the European states system would be restored would the minor nations of Europe escape their awkward situation: It is my sole hope that from all these pitiful wanderings once a system will arise which will put everyone on his place and provide small nations a more tolerable existence.87

Schimmelpenninck impressed on Van der Goes that Liston should be kept from leaving The Hague as long as possible and to do the utmost to assure a neutral status.88 Meanwhile, in London, the British Foreign Secretary assured Schimmelpenninck that Liston was commissioned 82   7 April 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind: instructions for Dirk van Hogendorp as extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary of the Batavian Republic to the Russian Emperor; NA 2.01.08 no. 53. 83   6 May 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 2.21.073 no. 19. 84   ‘Louter schijn.’ 85   ‘Dat wij onze politique existentie als natie niet voor altoos en onherstelbaar verliezen.’; 10 May 1803, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes (private letter); NA 2.21.073 no. 18. 86   13 May 1803, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes (private letter); NA 2.21.073 no. 18. 87   ‘Mijn eenige hoop bestaat daarin dat er uit alle deeze jammerlijke wandelingen eens weer een systhema zal gebooren worden het welk ieder op zijn plaats zal ­brengen en aan kleinere natien een meer draaglijke existentie zal besorgen’; 17 May 1803, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes (private letter); NA 2.21.073 no. 18. 88   17 May 1803, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes (private letter); NA 2.21.073 no. 18.

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to inform the Batavian government of his British Majesty’s intent to continue good relations with the Batavian Republic ‘if it was in a position to maintain a completely neutral status.’89 London was prepared not to wage war on France’s ally provided that the Batavian Republic would stay neutral, French troops would leave Batavian territory and the Batavian Republic was relieved of its obligations to furnish military aid.90 On the British part, this, of course, was a masterstroke. Batavian neutrality was made dependent on undoing French influence, thus driving a wedge between the two Republics. If successful, France would be deprived of a useful maritime ally and would lose control of the Scheldt estuary. If unsuccessful—which was more likely—waging war on the Batavian Republic could be justified by French domination and the Premier Consul could be blamed for dragging the Batavian Republic into the war. To put even more pressure on The Hague, the Royal Navy and British privateers started to harass Batavian shipping. Desperate to stay out of the war, the Batavian government took the bait. On 24 May 1803, Liston officially communicated his sovereign’s offer to the Staatsbewind: Le Roi est animé du plus vif désir de pouvoir empêcher que la nouvelle guerre qui vient d’éclater ne s’étende aux pais qui ont eu des liaisons avec la France et qu’elle n’enveloppe dans ses calamités des nations qui n’ont eu aucune part aux événements qui y ont donné lieu. Sa Majesté ne peut cependant tenir envers la République Batave la conduite que lui dicteroient de pareils sentiments à moins que le Gouvernement Français ne soit disposé à adopter un système analogue.91

Britain would respect Batavian neutrality on several conditions. Primo, France had to pull its troops back from Batavian territory. Secundo, France had to relieve the Batavian Republic of its obligation to assist France militarily both by land and by sea, that is, to terminate the alliance. Tertio, France had to allow the Batavian Republic observing ‘une sincère et parfaite neutralité’ during the war. If these conditions were complied with, Britain would let go Batavian vessels that

89   ‘Ingevalle dezelve zich in de mogelijkheid bevond van zich in een staat van complete neutraliteit te mainteneren.’; 17 May 1803, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; copied in secret minutes Staatsbewind of 23 May 1803; NA 2.01.08 no. 53. 90   24 May 1803, British memorandum offering neutrality to the Batavian Republic; Legrand, 1895, p. 293. 91   24 May 1803, Liston to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 217.



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had been ‘provisionally’ captured. Liston professed as well, though, that ‘si malheureusement le premier Consul persistait à occuper le territoire Batave’ and using Batavian resources to attack Britain the King would be forced to take measures to frustrate his enemy’s schemes.92 In sum, the British demanded nothing less than the revocation of the 1795 Hague Treaty. The Staatsbewind replied that efforts to maintain neutrality had been made.93 The conditions were more for Paris to adopt than for The Hague, though. In the meantime, the Staatsbewind left the French 2do-list gaining dust. Taking the measures commissioned by Paris would most certainly mean getting involved in the war. The Batavian government did not contemplate deciding on ‘the future destiny of this commonwealth’94 until everything possible had been attempted to stay neutral.95 Semonville was getting impatient. To his annoyance, he had to acknowledge that Liston had succeeded in keeping the Staatsbewind ‘inactive’ by holding out the prospect of neutrality: ‘l’Angleterre n’avait cessé de flatter la Hollande d’une espérance de neutralité dans la supposition d’une guerre prochaine.’ In his view, Batavian neutrality was inconceivable and, henceforth, the Staatsbewind was just wasting time. Car comment supposer, d’une part que la France souffre la neutralité de la Hollande après les traités formels et la force dont ils sont appuyés. Et de l’autre, si par impossible, le Premier Consul consentait cette neutralité, comme il ne le ferait qu’en considération d’avantages supérieurs à ceux qu’il pourrait attendre de la coopération directe de la Batavie à la guerre, comment l’Angleterre différerait elle à s’emparer des vaisseaux et des colonies de cette République?96

Needless to say that Batavian authorities still thought neutrality to be feasible; although the wish probably was father to the thought. Van der Goes impressed on Liston and Schimmelpenninck that the British had to stop seizing Batavian vessels in order not to compromise the chance of Paris allowing the Batavian Republic to stay neutral.97 The Staatsbewind had already felt compelled to take countermeasures.   24 May 1803, Liston to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 217.   25 May 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53. 94   ‘het toekomstig lot van dit gemenebest.’ 95   24 May 1803 and 27 May 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53. 96   24 May 1803, Semonville to Talleyrand; AAE CP Hollande 607. 97   26 May 1803, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck (private letter); NA 2.21.073 no. 18. 92 93

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With the exception of packets, an embargo had been put on all British vessels and Britain bound vessels sailing under Batavian colours. Schimmelpenninck was instructed to assure the British government that the Staatsbewind sill desired neutrality and to stay in London for the time being.98 In line with Talleyrand’s previous proposal, the Staatsbewind decided to send a committee to Paris. Willem Six—member of the Commissie tot de Oost Indische Zaken—, Gerrit Jan Jacobson—­ member of the Raad der Marine—, and Jan Blanken—director of maritime defences—were appointed as commissioners. They left for Paris on 28 May 1803.99 To reassure Semonville, the French ambassador was told that the committee had been sent to discuss ‘all that will be demanded by present circumstances according to the treaties’100 directly with the French government.101 Likewise, De Vos van Steenwijk was to inform Talleyrand that the Batavian government would loyally respect its treaty obligations and had appointed a committee to consult with the French government on joint operations and make arrangements necessary in purview of the 1795 Treaty.102 This had, of course, been the purpose of the committee that Talleyrand had had in mind from the start. The committee’s primary goal, however, was to communicate the British offer of neutrality to the Premier Consul and to persuade him of the necessity of neutrality.103 The committee was to emphasise that war would be disastrous to Batavian commerce and hence deprive the Batavian Republic of all means by which it might successfully wage war.104 The Staatsbewind even suggested buying neutrality. The committee was to offer the Premier Consul the payment of ‘a considerable sum’105 every month for as long as the war would last if he would consent to

  24 May 1803, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 124.   27 May 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 100   ‘Al hetgeen de tegenwoordige omstandigheden overeenkomstig de tractaten vereischen zullen.’ 101   24 May 1803, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 102   25 May 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 2.01.08 no. 124 and NA 1.02.14 no. 709. 103   24 May 1803 and 27 May 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53; 24 May 1803, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 124; 24 May 1803, Van der Goes to Van Spaen, Bourdeaux, and Buys; NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 104   24 May 1803 and 27 May 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53. 105   ‘Eene aenzienlyke somma’.   98   99



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Batavian neutrality.106 De Vos van Steenwijk was explicitly instructed to leave Talleyrand ignorant of the committee’s main goal.107 Nonetheless, Semonville had gained cognizance of the committee’s real purpose—‘obtenir cette chimérique neutralité’—and informed Talleyrand.108 In case the French government would refuse, the committee was to declare that the Batavian government would observe its treaty obligation to assist the French Republic and partake in the war. It was to demand, though, that the Batavian Republic would not ‘be burdened beyond the treaties’109 and a convention should be negotiated fixing the precise contribution to the war effort the Batavian Republic was to make ‘in accordance with her capacities and obligation.’110 Even before the committee had left, Semonville addressed the Staatsbewind with a new request to take measures against Britain. In France, all British subjects over eighteen years old had been arrested and taken into custody. The Batavian government was invited to follow the French example.111 The Staatsbewind bluntly refused to do so. The French ambassador was told that as long as the result of talks with the Premier Consul on Batavian neutrality were unknown and the Batavian and British envoys had not been recalled, the Batavian Republic was not at war with Britain112 and the proposed measure was incompatible with the law of nations. Semonville was assured once again that as soon as the Batavian Republic would be directly involved in the war—‘dont la désespoir de toute la Nation Batave atteste les suites désastreuses’—the Batavian government would be willing to concert with the French government on measures called for by the common interest and would loyally carry out those measures.113 Subsequently, the French got the Batavian government by the short hairs. For, ignoring the Staatsbewind’s rejection, French troops started

106   24 May 1803 and 27 May 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53. 107   25 May 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 2.01.08 no. 124 and NA 1.02.14 no. 709. 108   28 May 1803, Semonville to Talleyrand; AAE CP Hollande 607. 109   ‘Boven de tractaten wierd bezwaerd.’ 110   ‘Overeenkomstig haere vermogens en verpligting’; 24 May 1803 and 27 May 1803, minuut secrete notulen Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53. 111   25 May 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234 and NA 2.01.08 no. 217. 112   ‘Ne se trouve pas encore formellement dans un etat direct de guerre’. 113   26 May 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53; 26 May 1803, Van der Goes to Semonville; NA 2.01.08 no. 124 and no. 217.

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to arrest British subjects anyway.114 In Hellevoetsluys—the naval base where the Louisiana expedition was assembling—, British packets, their crews and passengers, as well as the employees of the packet service were arrested. Never before had French officers ignored the wishes of the Batavian government this openly. The Staatsbewind vehemently protested against this ‘public violence’115 and violation of Batavian sovereignty and independence.116 De Vos was instructed to object to this ‘arbitrary action’ with the French government and insist on reparation.117 French activity in Hellevoetsluys naturally called for a British response. Liston protested with the Staatsbewind. He demanded the immediate release of those taken prisoner. Furthermore, the embargo on British vessels had to be lifted. The Staatsbewind replied that De Vos had already been instructed to protest and insist on reparation in Paris and that it had not had any prior knowledge of the action against British subjects in Hellevoetsluys.118 The Batavian government did realise that it had given Liston an evasive reply. According to Van der Goes, the Staatsbewind had been reluctant to acknowledge that it was not in the position to order the release of people arrested on its own territory.119 The French went on ignoring the Staatsbewind’s attempts for neutrality. As the committee was still travelling to Paris, Semonville stressed that the British had seized French and Batavian vessels even before the declaration of war. Whereas the Premier Consul had tried to keep the peace, British aggression had forced him into war, the French ambassador argued. Subsequently he notified the Staatsbewind that the Premier Consul had ordered the formation of an army ‘sur les frontières de la Batavie’ to threaten King George’s Continental dominions.120 Hanover might have been yet another reason why Paris could not tolerate Batavian independence, for Hanover could be reached solely either through Batavian territory or through territory covered

  28 May 1803, Semonville to Talleyrand; AAE CP Hollande 607.   ‘Openbaar geweld’. 116   ‘Schending der soevereiniteit en independentie van de Bataafse Republiek’; 28 May 1803, minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53. 117   28 May 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709 and NA 2.01.08 no. 124; 28 May 1803, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 118   31 May 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53. 119   3 June 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 120   29 May 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234. 114 115



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by the Prussian guarantee of neutrality. At the time, France was still not strong enough to risk a war with both German powers. That army was not to enter into action for as long as negotiations in Paris lasted, but the French government did expect the Batavian government to cooperate.121 Semonville claimed 6,000 men from the Batavian army to reinforce the corps to invade Hanover commanded by General ­Mortier and assembling near Deventer.122 Once more, the Batavian government refused to take any military measures until the British offer of neutrality would have been officially repudiated in Paris.123 Meanwhile, yet another step towards French military control of the Batavian Republic was taken. On Walcheren, General Monnet had requested to inspect the Middelburg citizen militia. This request was declined as well, since the Staatsbewind deemed subjecting the militia to the command of a French general who was not subordinated to the Batavian government to have far-reaching consequences for ‘the independence and tranquillity of the Republic.’124 On 1 June 1803, the committee finally arrived in Paris.125 It spent its first full day in the French capital to discuss matters with De Vos van Steenwijk. On 3 June, the committee was presented to Talleyrand. The French minister resolutely dismissed the offer of neutrality, insisted on measures to be taken against British vessels and subjects within the Batavian Republic, and demanded Liston’s immediate departure from The Hague. the interests of the two Republics are that inseparably related, that the general cause against the common enemy had to be pressed with vigour that, henceforth, the First Consul is convinced that one should not think of remaining neutral126

  29 May 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234.   29 May 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234; 1 June 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234. 123   2 June 1803, Van der Goes to Semonville; NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 124   ‘De onafhankelykheid en rust der Republiek.’; 3 June 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709. 125   3 June 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk, Six, Jacobson and Blanken to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 217; 15 July 1803, minutes of the extraordinary committee to Paris; NA 2.01.08 no. 217. 126   ‘Dat het belang der twee gemeenebesten zo onscheidelijk aan elkander was verknogt, dat de algemene zaak met vigueur tegen den gemenen vijand moest doorgezet worden dat hij Eerste Consul derhalven overtuigd was, dat men aan het neutraal blij­ ven niet behoorde te denken.’ 121 122

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Neutrality was no longer an issue. For the time being, the commissioners were denied access to the public audience for the diplomatic corps. The French minister indicated that he was prepared to enter into negotiations with the Batavian commissioners on the joint defence the following week,127 but first Liston had to be expelled from the Batavian Republic.128 On 5 June, Bonaparte told De Vos van Steenwijk that Liston’s continuing presence in The Hague was ‘unbefitting.’129 Talleyrand insisted that the British envoy would leave: Le Premier Consul ayant eu sous les yeux vos derniers dépêches a été fort surpris d’apprendre que M. Liston fut encore à la Haye. Sa présence sur le territoire batave est absolument incompatible avec la déclaration de guerre faite aux deux Républiques par le roi d’Angleterre.

The French minister warned that otherwise Liston would lose his diplomatic status and might be arrested. The British commissioner in Hellevoetsluys would be held for a spy. Moreover, he repeated the demand to arrest all British subjects on Batavian soil. He did not leave a shadow of doubt on what would be in store for the Staatsbewind in case of any further refusal to cooperate: Si le Gouvernement batave si refusait à votre demande [ce qu’on ne peut penser] on s’y verrait forcé de considérer le Gouvernement comme trahisant les intérêts [. . .] comme de mettant en état de Guerre contre la France, et si le pays, lui même pouvant appuyer le Gouvernement il s’exposerait à une seconde conquête le Premier Consul étant résolu à tout faire plutôt que se soucier que les hollandais manquent à leurs engagements, à leur honneur, et aux intérêts les plus chers de la France.130

By then, Liston had already asked for his passports because of reparation for the arrests made in Hellevoetsluys failed to occur. He left The Hague on 8 June. Subsequently, Schimmelpenninck was instructed to leave London as soon as possible,131 and all British subjects between 127   4 June 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 704; Vreede, 1865, p. 7. 128   4 June 1803, Six, Jacobson and Blanken to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 217; 6 June 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 704; 15 July 1803, minutes of the extraordinary committee to Paris; NA 2.01.08 no. 217. 129   ‘Onvoeglijk’; 6 June 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 704. 130   4 June 1803, Talleyrand to Semonville; AAE CP Hollande 607. 131   7 June 1803, secret minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 53; 7 June 1803, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 124; 7 June 1803, Van der Goes to Liston; NA 2.01.08 no. 111; 8 June 1803, Semonville to Talleyrand; AAE CP Hollande 607.



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eighteen and sixty years old ‘qui engagé au service de terre ou de mer’ present on Batavian soil were arrested.132 Van der Goes reconciled himself with the failure of his policy of neutrality, sighing that ‘the sanctity of treaties does not allow remaining aloof from a war we have not desired.’133 6.3  Yielding to the Inevitable Liston having left, the Staatsbewind expressed to assume negotiations on ‘common interest and means of defence’134 with the Batavian commissioners would be initiated without delay. Furthermore, the Batavian Republic partaking in the war, the Batavian government declared to observe the duties of a loyal ally while expecting being entitled to claim the benefits of the alliance and being burdened proportionally and in a way still bearable.135 Finally, the French government was expected to treat the Batavian Republic as an ‘independent and loyal ally’136 in coordinating operations.137 The discourse of liberty that had infused the war with a higher purpose and enthusing spirit prior to 1802 had entirely disappeared. Taking part in the war against Britain was merely a matter of defence against aggression and above all observing treaty obligations towards France. By 11 June, news reached Paris that Liston had left and soon afterwards negotiations began.138 In the meantime, measures to extend French military control had not been postponed. The Premier Consul had appointed General Victor as commandant en chef of all forces

132   10 June 1803, Van der Goes to Six, Jacobson, and Blanken; NA 2.01.08 no. 124; 10 June 1803, Van der Goes to Semonville; NA 2.01.08 no. 111. 133   ‘Dat de trouw der tractaaten die aan deezer Republiek steeds heilig zal zijn, niet gedoogt dat wij buiten een oorlog blijven welke onze wenschen & behoeften zo lange mogelijk verwijderd hebben’. 14 June 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709 and NA 2.01.08 no. 111; 14 June 1803, Van der Goes to Reinhold, Bangeman Huygens, Van Westrenen, Bourdeaux, Van Spaen, Van Raet, T.G. van Dedem van de Gelder, A.B.G. van Dedem van Gelder, Buys, Meyer, Van Grasveld; NA 2.01.08 no. 111. 134   ‘Gemeenschappelijke belangen en middelen van defensie.’ 135   8 June 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 709 and NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 136   ‘onafhankelijke en getrouwe bondgenote’. 137   10 June 1803, Van der Goes to Six, Jacobson, and Blanken; NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 138   13 June 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 704; 15 July 1803, minutes of the extraordinary committee to Paris; NA 2.01.08 no. 217.

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in the Batavian Republic. The French ambassador had communicated his appointment to the Staatsbewind. He had stressed that the French government expected its Batavian counterpart to instruct all Batavian officers and troops to obey Victor’s orders and provide Victor with the means to have his orders carried out. The Staatsbewind refused to respond to that notification for as long as negotiations in Paris were still going.139 On 12 June, Semonville insisted that all Batavian land forces would be put under Victor’s command.140 The French ambassador complained that not all Batavian troops recognised the authority of the French commanding general. He even planned to station a French garrison in The Hague.141 The prospect of French troops in The Hague—which might just portend a new coup d’état—was too much pressure for the Batavian government.142 As French soldiers entered its seat, the Staatsbewind commissioned Victor with the supreme command of the Batavian army. Subsequently, General Victor was as courteous to vest his headquarters not in The Hague, but in nearby Delft.143 The Batavian commissioners were presented to the Premier Consul at Saint Cloud on 15 June. Needless to say that neutrality was not mentioned. The Premier Consul emphasised 1) not to intend interfering in the Batavian Republic’s internal affair, and 2) the necessity of loyal cooperation in military operations. He further stated that Batavian interests, especially with regard to the colonies, would be heeded during future peace negotiations if the Batavian Republic would properly cooperate. Subsequently, he referred the commissioners to Talleyrand to negotiate with.144 Throughout the 18 June conference, Talleyrand urged to make haste in order to make sure the Premier Consul would not abandon his well-disposedness towards the Batavian Republic.145 Hence, the com  9 June 1803, minutes Staatsbewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 40; 9 June 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 217; 9 June 1803, extract uit het register der besluiten van het StaatsBewind der Bataafsche Republiek; NA 2.01.08 no. 217; 9 June 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234. 140   12 June 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234. 141   8 June 1803, Semonville to Talleyrand; AAE CP Hollande 607. 142  Legrand, 1895, p. 295. 143   14 June 1803, Van der Goes to Six, Jacobson, and Blanken; NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 144   15 June 1803, Six, Jacobson, and Blanken to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 217; 15 July 1803, minutes of the extraordinary committee to Paris; NA 2.01.08 no. 217. 145   ‘Deeze inleiding werd opgevolgd door de herhaalde verzekeringen dat, wilde men de jegenswoordige welwilendheid en goede gezinningen van den eersten consul 139



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missioners were told to consent straightaway to the draft convention the French minister presented to them. To the dislike of the commissioners, according to the draft, the Convention would be concluded by the Italian Republic as well. They considered objecting to the extension of the Convention to three parties, but the Premier Consul seemed to insist on concluding in his capacity of President of the Italian Republic too. The adding of the capacity of President of the Italian Republic and concluding with a plenipotentiary of the First Consul in this capacity appeared to us as a novelty; so far we have been unable to understand what the reason behind it is; however, Mr. Talleyrand has talked to us about this that clearly that we establish as a certainty that we will have to conclude with a plenipotentiary of the First Consul both in that capacity and with one in the capacity of President of the Italian Republic.146

Why Bonaparte suddenly wanted to include the Italian Republic in a convention with the Batavian Republic has not become clear. There was no reason why military arrangements between France and the two sister republics should be part of one convention, nor would the Convention contain any obligations of the Batavian Republic towards the Italian Republic or vice versa. The government in Milan was in fact not aware of its Republic being party to the Convention until after it had been concluded.147 Probably, Bonaparte just desired to stress the personal union of the French and Italian Republics.148 jegens de republiek, niet verminderen of te voor het toekomende in de waagschaal stellen, eene spoedige toetreding tot deszelfs inzichten van onze zijde geheel noodzakelijk was.’; 18 June 1803, Six, Jacobson, and Blanken to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 217. 146   ‘De bijvoeging van de qualiteit van president der Italiansche republiek en het sluijten met een gevolmachtigde van den 1e consul in deeze qualiteit is ons als eene nieuwigheid voorgekomen; welke het inzicht daarvan is hebben wij voor als noch niet kunnen penetreeren; doch de heer de Talleyrand heeft ons hieromtrend zoo duijdelijk gesprooken, dat wij als zeker stellen, ingeval van te sluijten met een gevolmachtigde van den 1e consul, zoo wel in die hoedanigheid, als met een ander in zijne hoedanigheid van president der Italiaansche republiek te tekenen te zullen hebben.’ 147   6 July 1803, Rapporto al Presidente della Repubblica italiana; ASMi Marescalchi 21. 148  Nevertheless, for the time being, the Franco-Batavian-Italian Convention was an exception. No other treaty or convention was concluded by Bonaparte both in the capacity of Premier Consul of the French Republic and in the capacity of President of the Italian Republic, not even the new Alliance Treaty with the other sister republic—the Helvetic Republic—of 27 September 1803 (Kerautret, 2002, pp. 293– 300). It was not until after the creation of the Empire and the Kingdom of Italy that both titles—Emperor of the French and King of Italy—appear in preambles (e.g. the

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More importantly, the Batavian commissioners were sure that their country’s political existence was at stake. Talleyrand’s warning was taken seriously. It is hard having to say this; however, the conversation with the First Consul clearly shows that, if it would turn out impossible to satisfy his desire, this Republic will await the ultimate and will no longer be found among Europe’s powers soon.149

Their concern was not without cause. In April, Semonville had already assured Talleyrand that the Staatsbewind as it was composed at the time was not strong enough to take care of the maintenance of French troops,150 which essentially was tantamount to proposing a coup. By mid-June, he even proposed altering the Batavian Republic’s political statute because of what in his view was an obstinacy to cooperate caused by a ‘force d’inaction’ or a ‘force d’inertie.’ Ever since French troops in the Batavian Republic had been decreased, he argued, intrigues had started and France’s influence had diminished. He did account for numerous Batavian citizens standing on France’s side, but observance of the Treaties might need to be enforced by increasing and formalising French influence. He suggested four options on which he unfortunately did not elaborate very much: 1) ‘faire de la Hollande une puissance alliée dépendante’; 2) ‘en faire une province tributaire’; 3) ‘la déclarer province réunie’; and 4) ‘n’en réunir qu’une partie celle qui couvre nos frontières.’ All options would limit the Batavian Republic’s room for independent action drastically. He did discuss the feasibility of the various options. The first one, which in his view was the present situation, was not anticipated to be lasting and called for a new government. In his view, the second option would be best, but the Batavian Republic’s political relations could not be restricted to France solely because of its geographic location. Britain and Prussia were just too close by. While 24 August 1805 Treaty with Bavaria, the 5 September 1805 Treaty with Baden, the 5 October 1805 Treaty with Wurtemberg; Kerautret, 2004, pp. 85–93 and pp. 98–102). But Napoleon was represented by one envoy then. 149   ‘Het valt hard zulks te moeten zeggen; doch niet minder duidelijk is ons uit de conversatie met den eersten consul gebleeken, dat, word het onmogelijk bevonden aan deszelfs verlangen te wille te zijn, het uiterste voor de Republiek te verwachten is, en zij binnen kort niet langer onder de mogendheden van Europa zal gevonden worden.’; 18 June 1803, Six, Jacobson, and Blanken to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 217; 15 July 1803, verbaal van de extraordinaris commisie naar Parijs; NA 2.01.08 no. 217. 150   6 April 1803, Semonville to Talleyrand; AAE CP Hollande 607.



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the Batavian Republic would have its own constitution, laws, and magistrates, Batavian forces would be reduced to the number necessary to police the country and France would be responsible for the country’s defence. The third option, in Semonville’s view, was the sole one by which France would be able to make use of the ‘hommes énergiques’ among the Batavians.151 The Hague did not hesitate any longer either. The Staatsbewind, too, had come to the conclusion that cooperating and yielding to the Premier Consul’s demands was the only option left to the Batavian Republic. The commissioners were informed that their powers authorised them to ‘agree to all conditions that occur as acceptable or necessary to you.’152 On 21 June, the Batavian commissioners presented an altered draft to Talleyrand, who seemed to be pleased with it.153 The 21 June draft154 stipulated that French troops in Batavian pay would be augmented to 18,000 during the war,155 and that the Batavian Republic would deploy 16,000 men to form part of a corps of 34,000 men in total under the command of a French lieutenant general.156 Contrary to Talleyrand’s draft, this draft explicitly stated that the French general’s headquarters would not be vested in The Hague. In addition, the Batavian Republic would deploy six ships of the line and six frigates as well as transports apt for 34,000 men, a hundred gunboats and additional supply ships to take part in the planned invasion of Britain.157 The Staatsbewind was to send a commissioner to stay with the Premier Consul to collaborate on joint operations of which the Premier Consul would have supreme command.158 Finally, the French Republic would guarantee the Batavian Republic’s territorial integrity as well as its colonial possessions.159 Within a day, Talleyrand came back to the commissioners with yet another draft. The main point of dispute now was the precise   16 June 1803, Semonville to Talleyrand; AAE CP Hollande 607.   ‘In alle conditien treden die U aanneemlijk of noodzakelijk voorkomen’; 21 June 1803, Van der Goes to Six, Jacobson, and Blanken; NA 2.01.08 no. 217. 153   26 June 1803, Six, Jacobson, and Blanken to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 217; 15 July 1803, verbaal van de extraordinaris commisie naar Parijs; NA 2.01.08 no. 217. 154   21 June 1803, draft convention; NA 2.01.08 no. 217; 26 June 1803, Six, Jacobson, and Blanken to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 217. 155  Article 1 21 June draft. 156  Article 2 21 June draft. 157  Article 3 21 June draft. 158  Article 4 21 June draft. 159  Article 5 21 June draft. 151 152

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a­ rrangements with regard to the pay and maintenance of French troops as well as the exact number and kind of ships the Batavian Republic was to supply for the expedition against Britain. To the commissioner’s utter dismay, the French had augmented the amount of ships to be supplied and wanted to copy the 1795 arrangements with regard to the French troops, while everything had to be ready for the invasion of Britain on 1 October of the present year.160 The committee was, so to speak, stuck between the First Consul’s displeasure and the incalculable calamities for the fatherland resulting therefrom, which one foresaw as certain, if one refused to comply with those demands; whereas, on the other hand, in their eyes, the impossibility to fulfil these demands as they were had been fully demonstrated.161

They objected to the additional demands during a conference on 23 June. Talleyrand must have been amenable to their plea that the Batavian Republic could impossibly be expected to produce that much. He took the draft back and promised to discuss the commissioners’ objections with the Premier Consul. Two days later, the French minister presented a new draft to Six, Jacobson, and Blanken. In addition, he indicated that he would leave Paris the very same night and hence that this would be the last conference. The commissioners were able to negotiate some minor changes. For instance the expedition should be ready to embark on 1 November instead of 1 October, giving Batavian authorities another month to assemble all necessary vessels. Just before Talleyrand left, the commissioners undertook a final attempt to narrow down French demands significantly. In response, Talleyrand reprimanded them for serving their country badly and assured them that a refusal to sign the Convention would ‘alter the present state of relations between the two Republics.’162 In result, the commissioners immediately yielded and signed the Convention.163

160   26 June 1803, Six, Jacobson, and Blanken to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 217; 15 July 1803, verbaal van de extraordinaris commisie naar Parijs; NA 2.01.08 no. 217. 161   ‘De commissie bevond zig, als ’t waare, tusschen het ongenoegen van de eersten consul, en de daaruit voortvloeijende onberekenbaare onheilen voor het vaderland, welke men als gewis voorzag, indien men weigerde aan die eisschen te voldoen; terwijl aan eene andere zijde de onmogelijkheid om deeze vorderingen gelijk zij waaren liggende, te volbrengen, volkoomen in hunne oogen daar was gesteld.’ 162   ‘Dat hierdoor de tegenwoordige staat der betrekkingen tusschen de beide republieken zouden komen te veranderen.’ 163   25 June 1803, Convention between the French, Italian, and Batavian Republics signed in Paris; CTS vol. 57, pp. 59–62; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 290–292; NA 2.01.08 no. 217; http://pcombal.club.fr/convention3.html; See also Vreede, 1865, pp. 5–9.



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Compared to the 21 June draft, arrangements for the pay and maintenance of French troops were left to be fixed in additional regulations and troops were not to be moved without the Batavian government’s consent.164 Furthermore, French troops were not to be stationed in The Hague but on the request of the Batavian government.165 The Batavian Republic was only to deploy five ships of the line and five frigates. Instead of 16,000 men, only 9,000 men of Batavian troops would take part in the invasion of Britain. The number of transport and supply ships was fixed more precisely and spread over two landings. Furthermore, the Batavian Republic only had to supply transports sufficient for 25,000 men and 2,500 horses.166 According to the Batavian commissioners, the British expedition had even been made less expensive by arrangements made with the Secretary for the Navy on the modus of embarking troops.167 Article 5 was altered the most. If military successes would allow for it, the French Republic promised to use its influence to have the British restore Ceylon next to the guarantee of Batavian colonies. Having been ceded in Amiens, Ceylon was, of course, no longer covered by a guarantee of Batavian colonial possessions in 1803. Finally, Article 5 now stipulated as well that neither Republic would make peace with Britain separately.168 On reflection, the commissioners were rather content on what they had managed to achieve. Above all, they anticipated the possibility of the Batavian Republic not needing to perform because peace negotiations might already have started before 1 November. The danger of foreign administration, the greatest that might fall to our lot, has been averted; one has been given time until the end of the year to prepare oneself and in the meantime one has the chances of events, amongst which is the possibility of peace or negotiations, in its favour.169

 Article 1 Convention.  Article 2 Convention. 166  Article 3 Convention. 167   26 June 1803, Six, Jacobson, and Blanken to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 217; 15 July 1803, verbaal van de extraordinaris commisie naar Parijs; NA 2.01.08 no. 217. 168  Article 5 Convention. 169   ‘Het gevaar van vreemde administratien, het grootste dat ons konde te beurt vallen, is afgewend geworden; men heeft tot het einde van dit jaar tijd gekregen om zig volkomen gereed te maken en in dien tusschentijd heeft men de kanssen der gebeurdtenissen, in daaronder die van eene mogelijke vrede of negociatien, ten zijnen voordeele.’ 164 165

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They were mistaken in their estimate of the duration of the war by about eleven years,170 but they were right in that the British expedition was never to sail. Three days after the Convention had been signed by Talleyrand and the Batavian commissioners, the Italian Foreign Secretary in Paris, Ferdinando Marescalchi, had prepared another copy and invited the Batavian commissioners to come and sign it.171 The Staatsbewind decided to ratify the Convention on 30 June, so almost immediately after having received it.172 Rear Admiral Carel Hendrik Verhuell was appointed to the post of Batavian commissioner stipulated in Article 4 of the Convention.173 On 20 September 1803, Semonville was recalled and replaced by Schimmelpenninck.174 Schimmelpenninck negotiated the additional Convention on payment of French troops on which agreement was reached in November of the same year.175 Thus all arrangements had been made to fight Britain side by side with France. Nonetheless, the Batavian government felt having been dragged into a war contrary to the Batavian Republic’s interests.176 Schama would even call the 20 June Convention a prime example of lack of mercy.177 In the meantime, the Premier Consul increasingly started to behave like the leader of the alliance, ignoring the distinction between states.178 For instance, on 24 June, Semonville requested the Staatsbewind to halt all navigation between Batavian and British harbours, to re-introduce prohibitions of British goods, and to forbid the export of comestibles by sea.179 This was still cast in the form of a request, but basically the French ambassador passed Bonaparte’s orders to the Batavian government. Furthermore, the French treated Flushing as part of French 170   France and Britain would stay at war throughout the entire period of the Napoleonic Wars that was ended by the Treaty of Fontainebleau of 11 April 1814. 171   28 June 1803, Marescalchi to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 711; 28 June 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 704. 172   30 June 1803, Van der Goes to Six, Jacobson, and Blanken; NA 1.02.14 no. 709 and NA 2.01.08 no. 124. 173   16 August 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 2.01.08 no. 124. See also Legrand, 1895, p. 300; Vreede, 1865, p. 13. 174   20 September 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 713. 175   19 August 1803, De Vos van Steenwijk to Talleyrand; NA 2.01.08 no. 124; 9 November 1803, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 727. 176   5 July 1803, Van der Goes to Dirk van Hogendorp; NA 2.01.08 no. 111. 177  Schama, 1989, p. 516. 178   On Bonaparte’s treatment of the sister republics after the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens, see e.g. Chatel de Brancion, 1999, p.574. 179   24 June 1803, Semonville to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 234.



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territory again. French officers shirked local taxes and French custom officers had the French coat of arms attached to their office building.180 The Batavian ratification of the 20 June Convention was brought to Bonaparte—in Brussels at the time—by a special deputation on behalf of the Staatsbewind consisting of Brantsen, Bicker, and Van der Goes. The deputation met with the Premier Consul on 29 July. The latter indicated to be displeased that the Batavian government had hesitated to join France in the war against Britain that long and counselled the deputation to do everything possible to harm the common enemy. Bonaparte, too, stated that he desired Batavian independence, but then went on elaborating on Franco-Batavian relations in a way suitable to be used as a textbook definition of hegemony: Vous n’aves pas d’indépendance politique; si longtemps que je possèderai la Belgique. Vous pouvés pretendre une indépendance civile, municipale, commerciale, mais le reste est une chimère vous étiés autrefois tous la dependance de l’Angleterre. Vous devés considerer votre constitution, votre état, comme un état commercant, municipal, votre sort si intimement liée à celui de la France, comme un satellite l’eut à sa planète comme une comette, que le tourbillon de la France entraine.181

Comparing the 400,000 men French army with the 20,000 men Batavian one, he insisted that the Batavian government would follow his lead. He even suggested that France would take care of policing and defending the Batavian Republic altogether and hence reducing the Batavian army to some battalions in The Hague. To these suggestions, the deputation dared to object arguing that a small Batavian army would be cheaper than paying for French forces and that a Batavian army was necessary to employ young gentlemen from the landward provinces. He rebutted that the latter should be sent to the Indies and then went on by expressing his discontent on having sent De Winter to the Indies with a naval squadron and stating that he held dear to Flushing.182 In sum, the Premier Consul did not leave any doubt about who was in charge. Thus, the deputation’s audience in Brussels most clearly indicates the gradual transfer to the image of quasi-formalised hegemony that would characterise Franco-Batavian relations until the annexation of the Kingdom of Holland in 1810.   24 June 1803, Van der Goes to De Vos van Steenwijk; NA 1.02.14 no. 713.   29 July 1803, minutes deputation to Brussels; NA 2.21.073 no. 55. 182   29 July 1803, minutes deputation to Brussels; NA 2.21.073 no. 55. 180 181

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The Batavian Republic’s somewhat forced entry in the Franco-­British war inaugurated a new stage in relations between the two Republics. Prior to the new rupture with Britain, basically, the forms of a pluralistic states system based on independent states had been upheld. Despite the power difference, the Directoire and the early Consulat had cherished the image of independent nations allied together and bound together by a common cause; at least in public statements and appearance. From the summer of 1803 onwards, the French government set out for more direct influence and publicly adhered to an image of hegemonic relations. Simultaneously, there was less talk about France, and more about Bonaparte. References to the grandeur of France made way for references to the genius of the Premier Consul; thus foreshadowing the supranational character of Napoleon’s emperorship. Napoleon took the lead and did not take no for an answer. Before taking a decision there was room for consultation and everyone who had something sensible to say was heard just like during a council of war, but as soon as he had decided he was to be obeyed. That was Bonaparte’s governance style within France. That was how he treated the allied Republics from then on as well. In the years after the renewal of the alliance in 1803, the Batavian Republic kept being treated as a provisions store. Although it was spared actual hostilities, French troops stayed on Batavian soil and had to be supplied and paid, Batavian colonies were lost again, and the Batavian Republic was expected to contribute to the war effort both at sea and, from 1805 onwards, on the Continent. In February 1805, the Batavian Republic’s burden was a bit mitigated, but the new convention that replaced the 1803 one did not alter anything with regard to the most essential points.183 As before, all of this was officially based on treaties and conventions that had been concluded in due form. So formally, the Batavian Republic was not obliged to do anything it had not consented to. Remarkably, the Batavian Republic was not invited to accede to a new convention with the King of Spain, although that Convention did mention the British expedition that would be assembled near Texel.184

  12 February 1805, Convention between the Emperor of the French and the Batavian Republic; Kerautret, 2004, pp. 57–58. 184   4 January 1805, Convention between the Emperor of the French and the King of Spain; Kerautret, 2004, pp. 49–53. 183



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The Battle of Trafalgar (21 October 1805) crushed all hopes Bonaparte nursed to invade the British Isles. Plans for the British expedition for which the Batavian Republic was to supply troops and vessels were dropped. Instead French forces assembled in Boulogne were directed to the east to fight Austria. French troops stationed in the Batavian Republic, together with some Batavian troops, were ordered east as well. They joined the main force near Ulm, thus managing to encircle and forcing to surrender an Austrian army and then moved forward to meet Austrian and Russian forces at Austerlitz. However, the Staatsbewind failed to meet Bonaparte’s increasing demands with regard to mobilising national resources for the war effort. In line with the trend towards a stronger and monarchical executive in France, the Batavian constitution was changed again. In April 1805, Schimmelpenninck was made Raadpensionaris; judging from his constitutional powers becoming the most powerful man who has ever ruled the Netherlands.185 His government did indeed turn out to be quite energetic. Lots of legislative programmes, prepared and debated from 1795 onwards, resulted in actual laws within months. Isaac Gogel’s186 tax reforms, for instance, finally succeeded in increasing state revenue significantly. The era of the sister republics was over, though. After the creation of the Empire in France (18 May 1804) and the Battle of Austerlitz (2 December 1805), Napoleonic imperial schemes called for the substitution of the Batavian Republic by a vassal kingdom ruled by one of the Emperor’s siblings.187 In March 1806, Verhuell was sent to The Hague to procure a Crown for Louis Bonaparte. Schimmelpenninck wanted to take a stand, but he was overruled by his ministers. Given the choice between accepting a Bonaparte king and full annexation, an ad hoc assembly of the country’s political elite (the Groot Besogne) chose the first option.188 Schimmelpenninck resigned on 4 May 1806. Twenty days later, a treaty establishing the Kingdom of Holland was

185  See Van Hasselt, 1987, pp. 128–142; De Gou, 1997; Schama, 1989, p. 545. However, Bonaparte did wish to conceal Schimmelpenninck’s power. He explicitly objected to the title ‘President.’ See Jacobs, 2008, p. 23. 186  Schimmelpenninck’s Secretary of State for Finance. 187  Deutsch, 1938, p. xxi. 188  De Gou, 1997, pp. xx–xxx; Colenbrander, 1911, pp. 69–84; Schama, 1989, pp. 561–571.

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concluded in Paris.189 Even in ending the existence of the Batavian Republic the principle of consent was formally upheld, although the shift from the Revolutionary alliance to the Napoleonic Empire becomes clear from the fact that the Emperor in Paris was actually a formal partner in this process of constitutional change by means of an international treaty. Anyhow, the Batavian Republic did no longer exist and Louis was proclaimed King of Holland.

189   24 May 1806, Treaty between Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy and the Groot Besogne representing the Batavian Republic; Kerautret, 2004, pp. 191–195.

part IIi

THE BATAVIAN REPUBLIC AND THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE Omne bellum sumi facile, ceterum aegerrime desinere. —Sallust, Bellum Iugurthinum—

CHAPTER ONE

Revolutionary Peace 1.1  A Tradition of Great Peace Settlements The distinctive character of sovereign equality—and thus the major line dividing egalitarian, pluralistic states systems from hegemonic or federative ones—is that each state is free to conduct and determine a foreign policy of its own, participate equally in the formation of law, direct its own external relations without being subjected to the command of others, that is, to be bound solely by those rules freely consented to, with the possible exception of transcendent divine law or the law of nature to which all states are equally subjected if accepted as part of the law of nations. As Andreas Osiander has pointed out in his analysis of the Westphalian and Utrecht peace congresses, the equality of states was a logical result of the acknowledgment of their autonomy.1 Thus, the next major theme that has to be looked into to analyse the Batavian Republic’s legal position and status is the position it held and the role it played on the European level. The faculty to freely and independently decide on matters of war and military cooperation has been discussed in the previous part. As has been shown there, the Batavian Republic as a member of the Revolutionary alliance was to a large extent forced to follow the French lead. By signing and ratifying the Alliance Treaty the Batavian government was obliged to participate in the ongoing wars or any future wars against Britain initiated by France either as a belligerent in its own right or as an auxiliary. Besides the solidarity towards France due to the offensive alliance, the Batavian Republic’s right to declare war on other powers was, however, not limited by the alliance treaty. In this part, an additional issue is being discussed. Attention shifts from bilateral Franco-Batavian relations to the Batavian Republic’s position within the European order at large. Part III sets off with a

  Osiander, 2003, p. 87.

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general overview of the Batavian Republic’s diplomatic relations.2 With which states did the Batavian Republic have formal and more or less stable diplomatic relations, that is, to which states did it dispatch permanent envoys and which states sent permanent envoys to be accredited to the Batavian government? Was the Batavian government free to decide on these matters? Did the allies coordinate their diplomatic relations? Did the French Republic intervene in decisions on this matter and if so, how was interference justified? The main focus of this part will be on various attempts to restore peace in Europe. Attention will be paid to negotiations between the three great powers that were the main rivals in the Revolutionary Wars—the French Republic, Great Britain and Austria—and the Batavian Republic’s involvement in these peace settlements. Was the Batavian Republic allowed to partake in the formation of peace settlements to further its interests on the European level? Thus, Part III focuses on exactly the kind of negotiations that had established the framework of the European order throughout the past century and a half. From Westphalia onwards, a tradition of great peace congresses ending great wars—the kind of war that threatens the foundations of the existing international order—had developed in Europe:3 Münster-Osnabrück (1648),4 Nijmegen (1678–1679),5 Ryswyck (1697),6 Utrecht-Rastatt-Baden (1713–1714),7 Vienna (1738),8 ­Aix-la-Chapelle (1748),9 Paris-Hubertusburg (1763),10 Teschen (1779),11 and Paris (1783);12 all of them being occasions were the powers of Europe met to draw a treaty and set the principles for post-war order. These congresses resulted in more or less system-wide and system-oriented arrangements. Europe was reorganised both territorially—codifying a consensus on a new territorial division—and legally—adopting new

  Section III.1.2.   Duchhardt, 1976, p. 4; Duchhardt, 1997, p. 58; Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 330; Bois, 2003, p. 325.  4   Ending the Eighty and Thirty Years’ Wars (resp. 1568–1648 and 1618–1648).  5   Ending the Dutch War (1672–1678).  6   Ending the Nine Years’ War (1688–1697).  7   Ending the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714).  8   Ending the War of the Polish Succession (1733–1735).  9   Ending the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748). 10   Ending the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763). 11   Ending the War of the Bavarian Succession (1778–1779). 12   Ending the War of American Independence (1775–1783).  2  3



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general principles of European order.13 Gradually, it became accepted that no sovereign power involved in the preceding war or affected by it was to be excluded from a congress.14 Heinz Duchhardt distinguishes between three types of congresses. The first type characterises the congresses of Westphalia, Nijmegen, Ryswyck, and Aix-la-Chapelle. At these congresses all belligerents were present, mediators were involved by extending their good offices, and other, non-belligerent powers were admitted to the congress. The second type—of which Utrecht, Vienna, Paris-Hubertusburg, and Versailles (1783) are exemplary—differs from the first in that the peace settlement’s substance had been negotiated prior to the congress through secret diplomacy, that no mediators were involved, and that the access of non-belligerents to the congress was limited. The 1779 Teschen negotiations provide a third type that is almost identical to the second with this difference that mediators were involved and guaranteed the peace.15 Despite assembling general congresses, throughout the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth century, wars were ended by a cluster of bilateral treaties. Aix-la-Chapelle was the first congress to result in a single, multilateral treaty.16 Duchhardt contends that after the Utrecht congress a trend to negotiate peace bilaterally is to be witnessed.17 This proposition goes somewhat too far. In the first place, most wars of the first half of the eighteenth century were not ‘epochal wars.’ Hence, they did not equal the kind of conflict that needed to be terminated by a Europe-wide congress. In the second place, congresses involving multiple parties did assemble throughout the eighteenth century on several junctures (e.g. Aix-la-Chapelle). To be sure, they did not involve all powers, but neither did the Westphalian congress. The main exception, probably, is the peace that ended the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763). In that case France successfully pursued separate peace settlements for the Continental and colonial spheres, the former being negotiated and ­concluded in Hubertusburg, the latter in Paris.18

13   Duchhardt, 1976, p. 4; Eyffinger, 1991, p. 47; Bois, 2003, p. 235; Osiander, 2003, p. 14. 14   Duchhardt, 2004, p. 51. 15   Duchhardt, 2004, p. 52. 16   Duchhardt, 1976, p. 78; Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 420. 17   Duchhardt, 1997, p. 58. 18   Duchhardt, 1976, p. 90 and p. 96; Blanning, 2007, p. 653.

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Moreover, it did become customary in the course of the eighteenth century to conclude bilateral preliminaries prior to a congress where the definitive peace treaty was negotiated and concluded.19 These preliminaries might be either the basis or the starting point for negotiations on a definitive treaty. This is one of those subtleties of eighteenth-­century diplomacy that was to play a major role in the ­Batavian Republic’s involvement in the Amiens congress. If preliminaries were accepted as the basis of negotiations, they set limits on negotiations. The preliminaries were not to be altered and they fixed the issues to be discussed. Preliminaries, then, were a true agreement and part and parcel of peace negotiations. If preliminaries were accepted as the starting point of negotiations, they merely provided a document to set off from. In this case, the preliminaries could be altered and issues absent from the preliminaries could be added. Preliminaries than merely cleared the ground for actual negotiations assuring the belligerents that their opponents were sincere and peace negotiations had a reasonable chance of being successful. Since the sixteenth century the supposedly innate bond between peace and justice had been broken in diplomatic practice. As Stephen Neff has it, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were an ‘era of negotiated peace agreements.’20 Increasingly, wars ended because belligerents were exhausted and not because one of them walked away the winner. Peace treaties, by necessity, became non-discriminatory compromises lacking any judgement on the justice of and responsibility for the preceding war.21 Basically, at a certain point, belligerents had come to the conclusion that the war between them had to be ended. The quintessence of a peace treaty was not to punish or to judge, but to cease hostilities, terminate the armed conflict and remove the source of disputes that had caused it.22 On the other hand, a treaty of peace did not merely end armed conflict, it restored the so-called amicitia-relationship between the contracting powers, too. The opening clauses of peace treaties would stipulate that there was to be peace and friendship between them. The amicitia gave peace a positive element next to the negative one of ending a status of war. Contracting parties acknowledged that their mutual peacetime relations were   Duchhardt, 1976, p. 76.   Neff, 2005, p. 116. 21   Lesaffer, 1999b, p. 10 and p. 19. 22   Duchhardt, 1997, p. 58. 19 20



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g­ overned by law. Thereto, they engaged not to harm each other and to settle disputes without the use of force.23 Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century peace treaties were essentially ‘legal transactions’ ending particular conflicts and stipulating specific rights and obligations. They were not—at least primarily—supposed to establish general rules of the law of nations.24 First and foremost, congresses like the Westphalian and Utrechtian ones created momentums for stabilising international relations again.25 Hence, it might be even questioned whether the treaty’s/treaties’ substance really was that significant or whether the congress’ and treaty’s significance for European order was essentially symbolical manifesting the restoration of order and stability. However, in the course of the eighteenth century, the major peace treaties did come to be seen as establishing a ‘constitution’ for the European order or the positive base of the ius publicum Europaeum.26 The Westphalian peace settlement came to be conceived as fundamental. The texts of the Osnabrück and Münster Treaties were used as starting point for future treaties and the Westphalian congress served as a precedent for procedures and forms.27 Thereto, it became customary to refer to previous treaties in new ones. Thus, the treaties of the Westphalian peace settlement, as well as the Treaties of Nijmegen, Ryswyck, Utrecht etc. were confirmed.28 This practice of referring to and back on previous treaties allowed for standard provisions to develop. Thus, general rules of the law of nations did develop by means of specific agreements.29 Finally, some fundamental decisions on the law of nations and general principles of the European order were made throughout peace congresses and ended up in peace treaties. The Utrecht peace settlement, for instance, explicitly incorporated the balance of power as a general principle in peace treaties.30

  Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 237 and p. 269; Lesaffer, 1999b, p. 14; Lesaffer, 2001b, p. 107.   Grewe, 2000, p. 360. 25   Grewe, 2000, p. 282. 26   Duchhardt, 1976, p.1, p. 80 and p. 85; Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 334; Grewe, 2000, p. 282; Belissa, introduction to Mably, 1757, p. 29; Belissa, 1999b, p. 309; Bobbitt, 2003, p. 479. 27   Duchhardt, 1976, p. 1 and p. 84; Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 425. 28   Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 424; Ziegler, 2007, p. 151. 29   Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 425; Steiger, 2001, p. 186. 30   Grewe, 2000, p. 282; Duchhardt, 2004, p. 53. 23 24

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Alliance treaties from the two centuries preceding the French Revolution generally contained a clause that the allies were not to enter into peace negotiations and/or conclude peace separately. These provisions were frequently violated.31 This does not mean that allies were entirely ignored in peace settlements. From the fifteenth century onwards it was customary to mention allies and friends in a peace treaty. Thus allies were included in the treaty. Their consent to inclusion was necessary.32 It is not clear whether the allies became parties to the treaty due to the inclusion. Johan Verzijl claims that inclusion amounted to full accession to the treaty.33 This point of view has been questioned. ­Lesaffer clearly distinguishes inclusion from accession.34 He objects that treaties rarely were fully relevant and applicable to included powers without separate negotiations. Moreover, since more and more powers were included, inclusion would have turned every single treaty into a pan-European settlement if its legal consequences equaled those of accession.35 In order to become a party to a treaty in one’s own right, one should accede.36 Only then a direct bond between the acceding partner and the initial treaty partners was established. An acceding power had to ratify the treaty, while an included power merely needed to confirm the nomination for inclusion.37 By the second half of the eighteenth century, powers were no longer formally nominated for inclusion, by the way.38 Lesaffer claims that inclusion primarily served a political function. Inclusion was a way to observe alliance treaties while concluding a separate peace treaty. 39 Allies were assured that the peace treaty was not to their disadvantage, that the unity of the alliance was not disrupted, and—in case allies were involved in the war either as belligerents or as auxiliaries—that they did not have to fight on on their own.40 Hence, included powers did not become parties to the treaty. Duchhardt endorses this point of view.41 What inclusion did bring about, from a legal point of view, was an extension of the   Luard, 1992, p. 275.   Duchhardt, 2004, p. 55; Lesaffer, 2004, p. 34. 33   Verzijl, 1968–1992, vol. VI, p. 203. 34   Lesaffer, 1999a, pp. 194–195. 35   Lesaffer, 2004, p. 35. 36   Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 205. 37   Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 207. 38   Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 430. 39   Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 203. 40   Lesaffer, 2004, pp. 35–36. 41   Duchhardt, 2004, p. 55. 31 32



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amicitia-relationship. Included powers became part of the status of peace and friendship established by the treaty.42 Inclusion did not turn peace universal. If more was intended than the extension of amicitia, third powers needed to ratify (the relevant part of) the treaty,43 or the treaty would explicitly indicate the consequences of inclusion.44 Although the Revolutionary Wars had disrupted order in the West and order in the East had already been undermined by partitioning Poland and the Russian-Ottoman Wars (1768–1774 and 1787–1792), the Revolutionary era—in retrospect—lacked a general congress.45 Yet, there were many conferences and negotiations initiated to re-establish a stable and durable peace by land and by sea and to redraw the map of Europe. Because of the Directoire’s policy to evade a general congress, only separate peace treaties were concluded.46 The Directoire succeeded in dividing the Europe-wide Coalition and subsequently—as the French government had done in 1763—it set out to keep negotiations on the Continental and maritime peaces separate in order to prevent Austria from profiting from British dominance of the sea and colonial sphere and to prevent Britain from interfering with Continental affairs in return for colonial concessions. Moreover, the French Revolutionary regime had declared treaties concluded prior to the Revolution invalid thus disenabling previous treaties to play their role as legal and historical framework to new peace settlements.47 Hence, peace treaties turned out to be truly ad hoc, bilateral compromises adapted to the power peace was concluded with and acceptable at the time of conclusion due to political, financial, and military ­circumstances.48 Peace with Prussia and Spain was negotiated and concluded in Basel in 1795 as the Batavian Republic was still in statu nascendi. France and Austria first agreed upon preliminaries in Leoben in April 1797, after which a peace treaty was concluded in Campoformio in October of the same year. Subsequently, a congress was convened in Rastatt to extend the Franco-Austrian peace to the Empire at large. Almost simultaneously, unsuccessful peace talks between France and Britain were held   Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 202 and p. 270; Lesaffer, 2004, p. 36.   Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 431. 44   Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 201; Lesaffer, 2008b. 45   Bois, 2003, p. 325. 46   See e.g. Schroeder, 1994, pp. 210–211; Bois, 2005, p. 65; Droz, 2005, p. 206; Belissa, 2006, pp. 348–355. 47   See chapter I.2. 48   Black, 1999, p. 171. 42 43

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in Lille. As France had gained the upper hand in the War of the Second Coalition, peace was made with Austria in Lunéville in February 1801, and with Britain in Amiens in March 1802. These are the negotiations and peace treaties Part III will elaborate on. All negotiations failed to re-establish lasting peace and order; maybe because of the absence of a general congress and a new consensus, maybe because of a lack of trust and a sense of insecurity, maybe because peace was just not yet meant to be. Although after 1794 virtually everyone wanted and needed the war to end, everyone had his own kind of peace in mind too. Peace was particularly difficult as the map of western Europe in terms of territory military dominated by France or the leading German powers had been dramatically altered due to the military events of 1795–1797. As provided for in the 1795 Hague Treaty, the Batavian Republic was not allowed to conclude separate peaces with any of the members of the Counter-revolutionary Coalition; nor was the French Republic for that matter.49 The provision prohibiting separate peaces in an alliance treaty was not uncommon to eighteenth-century diplomatic practice.50 What is of interest to us in this part is the involvement of the Batavian Republic in the eventual peace settlements, especially with regard to the great peace congresses. Did the Batavian Republic have a say in the endeavours to restore peace and to re-establish a stable order in Europe or were the principles of that ‘new’ order set by the great powers on their own? At what time and in what way was the Batavian government informed of the initiation of negotiations? How did the Batavian government respond to that information? What role in negotiations was attributed to the Batavian government and what role did it wish to play? How were the Batavian Republic’s role and position conceived and sustained? Who decided on the procedure by which negotiations were conducted? Was the Batavian government allowed direct involvement by its own envoys or did France represent the Batavian Republic? Were there any conditions to participate? Was the Batavian government to partake in negotiations on matters that concerned the Batavian Republic and was its consent needed in the end? To what extent did the Batavian Republic have the ­opportunity to enter issues into discussion, to enforce or achieve

 Articles 5 and 6 Treaty of the Hague.   Luard, 1992, p. 275.

49 50



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rights and ­policy aims? Was ‘legislative equality’ respected?51 In case the Batavian Republic was included in a treaty concluded by France, how was this inclusion conceived? Did the Batavian government need to consent to inclusion, and what were its legal consequences? To what extent did negotiations and the treaty resulting therefrom concern the Batavian Republic? How did the Batavian Republic appear in the text of the treaty? 1.2  Citizens Envoys A general discussion of Batavian diplomatic relations and foreign policy directed at establishing the Batavian Republic’s position and role within the European order would be beyond the scope of a single volume. Instead, this part focuses on peace negotiations. Those were the moments that decisions on European order would have been taken. Moreover, the Batavian government strove for achieving the paramount aims of its foreign policy—territorial compensation and aggrandisement, the restitution of colonies, and recognition of the new constitutional order—within the framework of peace negotiations with Britain and Austria. It is elucidating, though, to cast at least a glance at the diplomatic network the Batavian Republic maintained. With what states did The Hague maintain direct diplomatic relations? To what capitals did the Batavian government dispatch envoys and which powers sent envoys to The Hague? Equality and independence on these aspects all depended on the extent and manner of French intermingling. In addition, if the sister republics formed or were to form a closed, republican subsystem, the Batavian Republic’s diplomatic relations are likely to have been more limited and Paris is more likely to have been a diplomatic centre for relations with non-republican powers than a situation in which all sister republics were directly part of a wider European order. The 1795 Batavian Revolution caused significant changes in the United Provinces’ diplomatic relations. To be sure, the institutions in The Hague that were officially charged with the administration of foreign affairs were not replaced for another year. The continuation of the Staten Generaal was particularly important in order not to disrupt

 As defined by Gerry Simpson and discussed in chapter I.1.

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diplomatic relations.52 Only the offices of Stadhouder and Holland Raadpensionaris were immediately abolished. The latter’s diplomatic tasks were transferred to the President of the Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland.53 Envoys abroad from then on corresponded with the Staten Generaal’s registrar. In diplomatic relations the idea of continuity between the United Provinces and the Batavian Republic was consistently upheld. In instructions for diplomatic representatives references to regulations e.g. with regard to gifts or payment for secretaries dating as far back as the mid-seventeenth century regularly occured. Most remarkably, though, envoys were instructed to maintain the rank of the Batavian Republic claiming the place immediately after the Republic of Venice the Staten Generaal of the United Provinces had held in the customary ceremonial diplomatic order.54 This was the case with the instructions for Van Grasveld and  Pennings and Thomassen, 1994, p. 52.   Vreede, 1863, p. 56. 54   It is not quite clear what ceremonial order was customary by the end of the eighteenth century. Custom varied from court to court. In his Précis du droit des gens moderne, Georg Friedrich von Martens based the discussion of ceremonial precedence on regulations issued by Pope Julius II (1443–1513) in 1504: 1) Roman Emperor, 2) Roman King, 3) King of France, 4) King of Spain, 5) King of Aragon, 6) King of Portugal, 7) King of England, 8) King of Sicily, 9) King of Scotland, 10) King of Hungary, 11) King of Navarra, 12) King of Cyprus, 13) King of Bohemia, 14) King of Poland, 15) King of Denmark, 16) Republic of Venice, 17) Duke of Brittany, 18) Duke of Burgundy, 19) Elector Palatine, 20) Elector of Saxony, 21) Elector of Brandenburg, 22) Archduke of Austria, 23) Duke of Savoye, 24) Grandduke of Florence, 25) Duke of Milan, 26) Duke of Bavaria, 27) Duke of Lorraine, etc. (Martens, 1821, pp. 243–244). Catholic powers recognised the Pope having superior rank (Martens, 1821, p. 245). In general, the order was determined by title and seniority, whereas Kings preceded Republics (Martens, 1821, p. 243 and p. 247). Needless to say, by the end of the eighteenth century this list was not fully appropriate anymore. Russia had entered the European scene, did not recognise the Emperor’s precedence (Martens, 1821, p. 246) and claimed rank before the Kings (Martens, 1821, p. 248). The Ottoman Porte claimed equal rank to the Emperor as well (Martens, 1821, p. 246). In his discussion of diplomatic rank, Martens did not inform us of the position Prussia was attributed after the Elector had become King. In the 1788 Alliance Treaty with the United Provinces the King of Prussia is mentioned first, though. Nor did Martens mention any change caused by the union of England and Scotland. He did say that Sweden, Denmark, and Britain disputed each other’s positions (Martens, 1821, p. 249). The Electors claimed rank directly after the Kings. That position was accorded to them at the Imperial Court, but most other powers allowed the major republics precedence. After 1648, the United Provinces held rank directly after Venice and the Helvetic League directly after the United Provinces. Genoa claimed equal rank to Venice, probably unsuccessful (Martens, 1821, p. 250). Contrary to the general rule of precedence of kings over republics, according to Martens, the French Republic succeeded in maintaining France’s customary rank (Martens, 1821, p. 247). On ceremonial rank also see Mattingly, 1955, p. 240. 52 53



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De Sitter—sent to Paris to exchange ratifications of the 1795 Hague Treaty—as the Staten Generaal still existed.55 Similar Articles are still to be found in diplomatic instructions after the abolition of the Staten Generaal. Christiaan Bangeman Huygens was instructed to maintain the rank and dignity of the Nationale Vergadering and the ‘Dutch Nation’ as envoy to Copenhagen.56 He was to hold rank after the Venetian envoy. Strikingly, his instructions contained permission to allow the French envoy precedence. Apparently, the Batavian government assumed that France, having become a republic, had dropped a few places from second to the category of mighty republics just behind Emperor and Kings in which category the United Provinces according to customary rules had precedence because of seniority. As he was sent to Italy as minister plenipotentiary to the Cisalpine Republic and other Italian powers, Anthony van Dedem was to hold ‘that rank among the various Nations of Europe, which the Republic has always had.’57 Likewise, Willem Buys was to maintain the Batavian People’s rank and dignity on his mission to Paris and as minister plenipotentiary to the King of Sweden.58 As the Nationale Vergadering replaced the Staten Generaal, a committee from the new assembly was charged with the administration

55  Article 12 ‘Zij zullen de hoogheid en rang van Haar Hoog Mogende allenthalven conserveeren, zo in concurrentie met andere ministers, als overal daar het te pas zoude mogen komen, rang houdende na de ministers van de koningen, en van de Republicq van Venetien.’; 29 May 1795, instructie voor C.H. van Grasveld en A.J. de Sitter extraordinaris ambassadeur van Haar Hog. Mogende te Parijs tot het uitwisselen der ratificatie van het tractaat van vreede en vriendschap tusschen de Fransche Republicq en die der Vereenige Provincien; NA 1.02.14 no. 604. 56   23 November 1796, instructions for Christiaan Bangeman Huygens as envoy in Copenhagen; NA 2.01.08 no. 390. 57   ‘Houdende dien rang onder de verschillende Natien van Europa, welken deze Republick altoos gehad heeft’ (Article 5); 14 April 1798, draft instructions for Van Dedem as minister plenipotentiary to the Cisalpine Republic; NA 2.01.08 no. 104A. 58   ‘Hij zal voorts de Hoogheid en den rang van het Bataafsche Volk allenthalven conserveeren zo in concurrentie met andere Ministers Plenipotentiarissen als anderzints en overal daar het te pas zoude mogen komen houdende dienvolgens den rang na de Ministers Plenipotentiarissen der Koningen.’ (Article 15); 14 April 1798, draft instructions for W. Buys as extraordinary minister to the French Republic; NA 2.01.08 no. 104A. 16 April 1798, draft letter from the Uitvoerend Bewind to the Directoire; NA 2.01.08 no. 104A; ‘Hij zal de rang en waardigheid van de Bataafsche Natie allenthalven conserveeren, zo in de concurentie met ministers van andere mogentheeden, als anderzints denzelfden rang houden welke aan zijn predecesseur is toegekend geworden.’ (Article 21); 11 July 1798, instructions for Buys as minister plenipotentiary with the King of Sweden; NA 2.01.08 no. 105.

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of foreign affairs: the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken.59 Any member of the Nationale Vergadering desiring to discuss a matter of foreign affairs was to submit the matter to the committee first.60 Diplomatic correspondence, from then on, was taken care of by the committee’s scribe, Frederik van Leyden. After the January 1798 coup d’état, finally, a department for foreign affairs was established headed by the Agent der buitenlandsche betrekkingen subordinated to the Uitvoerend Bewind and replacing Van Leyden as contact to the envoys abroad. Initially, Willem Buys occupied the office of Agent, but Maarten Van der Goes soon replaced him and held the office until 1808. All decisions, e.g. the appointment of envoys, formally had to be taken by the government. The 1798 Staatsregeling confirmed this situation.61 The new Constitution stipulated as well that decisions to declare war and the ratification of treaties were reserved to the Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam.62 The 1801 Staatsregeling hardly changed anything about the organisation of the administration of foreign affairs. The title of the department’s head was changed in ‘Secretaris van Staat voor de Buitenlandsche zaken.’ The division of competences with regard to foreign affairs between the executive and legislature basically remained the same.63 Ever since the early seventeenth century, the United Provinces had maintained direct diplomatic relations with powers all over Europe. Dutch envoys had been dispatched to all major capitals, as well as to various German and Italian princes and cities. Once in power, Batavian Patriots had no intention to break with their country’s tradition of a wide diplomatic network. By the end of January 1795, Paulus proposed to enter into negotiations with London and Berlin since the 1788 treaties had become obsolete,64 and to instruct the envoys abroad to inform the governments they were accredited to of the Staten Generaal’s intention to maintain peaceful and amicable relations with all 59   25 March, decree of the Nationale Vergadering; http://192.87.107.12:8080/decreten, p. 505; 26 March 1796, circulaire aan de ministers van den Staat buijten ’s Lands resideerende; NA 2.01.08 no. 102. See also De Gou, 1983, p. xvi; Asser, 1860, p. 50. 60  Article 15 Reglement van Orde voor de Nationale Vergadering; 25 March 1796, http://192.87.107.12:8080/decreten, p. 478. 61  Article 92 Acte van Staatsregeling; Van Hasselt, 1987, p. 44. See Asser, 1860; De Brauw, 1864; Beth, 1907. 62  Article 50 b and c Acte van Staatsregeling; Van Hasselt, 1987, p. 37. 63  Articles 32 and 39 Staatsregeling des Bataafschen Volks 1801; Van Hasselt, 1987, p. 109 and p. 111. 64   Vreede, 1863, p. 58.



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nations and powers.65 The Holland Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken, according to Vreede in order to exhibit Dutch independence, almost immediately after its constitution appointed new envoys to Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, and Hamburg.66 On the other hand, the Staten Generaal did discharge all envoys who were suspected of Orangist sentiments. In addition, some other envoys resigned. For instance, J.W. Hogguer, envoy in Saint Petersburg, informed the Staten Generaal that he regretted not having been included among his discharged colleagues and resigned.67 Besides Reinier van Haeften in Vienna, only the chargés d’affaires in Poland and with the Ottoman Porte stayed at their posts.68 This caused a temporal interruption of relations with almost all powers except the ones that had a representative in The Hague. The main changes occurred in the relations with the great powers France was at war with or that were aligned with the House of Orange. The United Provinces’ change of side resulted not only in re-establishing relations with France, but also in a rupture of relations with the other great powers. After the French invasion, Britain had put an embargo on Dutch vessels. Furthermore, William V had issued letters from Kew to the governors of Dutch colonies instructing them to let British troops in. Most governors refused to do so, but among others the Cape of Good Hope fell in British hands this way.69 The Staten Generaal sent commissioners to London to persuade the British government to lift the embargo, but the commissioners had to return without having accomplished anything.70 Basically the British government considered the United Provinces to be occupied territory. The commissioners’ argument that the United Provinces were in fact an independent power met with William Pitt’s remonstrance that it was at most a ‘dependent independence.’71 Great Britain soon declared war on the Batavian Republic. Britain was not to be expected ever accepting French dominance in the Low Countries, whereas Batavian Patriots had stressed their anti-British sentiments ever since the Anglo-Dutch war of the 1780s and even more in Paris to persuade the Convention to interfere   Vreede, 1863, pp. 58–59.   Decree of 6 April 1795; Vreede, 1863, p. 132. 67   Vreede, 1863, bijlagen, pp. 5–6. 68  Pennings and Thomassen, 1994, p. 21. 69   Vreede, 1863, p. 88. 70   Vreede, 1863, p. 87 and p. 95. 71   Vreede, 1863, p. 88. 65 66

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in the Dutch Republic.72 Henceforth, a rupture of relations with Britain might have been anticipated. Although the Batavian Republic would not be officially at war with the other great powers, Prussia, Russia, and Austria did not recognise the new Republic c.q. the new government at once.73 Although the Dutch envoy in Vienna, Van Haeften, did stay on his post, formal relations were suspended.74 The Emperor had not been represented by an envoy in The Hague since 1793 and the Austrian chargé d’affaires had left The Hague for London before French troops entered Holland. Soon after the ratification of the Treaty of Campoformio, the Uitvoerend Bewind designated Blauw to the post of Batavian envoy in Vienna. Blauw was to go and stay in Paris first, though, and assist Meyer in negotiations with the French government on territorial compensation for the Batavian Republic.75 Thus, his appointment basically seems to have been an excuse to send Blauw back to Paris76 and possibly to procure diplomatic immunity for him. By the time the War of the Second Coalition began, he had still not left for Vienna. In the 1799 general report on foreign affairs, the Uitvoerend Bewind stressed that the Batavian Republic was not to maintain direct relations with Austria until France had concluded peace with the Emperor.77 The Batavian government, thus, did feel constrained by the alliance to freely decide on diplomatic relations. Indeed, no new Austrian envoy was dispatched to The Hague and vice versa until 1802, although the Batavian Republic had a chargé d’affaires in Vienna from 1800 onwards.78 As said before, the Dutch envoy in Saint Petersburg resigned thus causing the absence of a diplomatic representative in Russia. Dutch consuls were still in Russia, though. The Russian chargé d’affaires in The Hague, Michail Novikov, stayed on his post for some months and did still communicate with the Staten Generaal in an official manner.79

  Vreede, 1863, pp. 79–81.   Vreede, 1863, p. 214. 74   Vreede, 1863, p. 283. 75   15 February 1798, instructions for Blauw as envoy to Vienna; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458A. 76   Blauw was recalled after the discovery of the Babeuf conspiracy. See below. 77   28 February 1799, Rapport over den Staat der Buitenlandsche Zaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 120. 78   Schutte, 1983, p. 171. 79   Vreede, 1863, p. 133. 72 73



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After his departure in the summer of 1795, official relations between the Batavian Republic and Russia were suspended until 1801. The Dutch envoy in Berlin, Arend Willem van Reede, was recalled a short while after the Batavian Revolution because the King’s enmity to the Patriots made his presence intolerable.80 Van Reede appointed his secretary, Pierre Etienne Bourdeaux, chargé d’affaires in Berlin,81 but the Prussian government refused to recognise Bourdeaux in that capacity until July 1797. The Prussian chargé d’affaires, the Baron von Bielfeld, in The Hague stayed, though. Thus, official relations with the Counter-revolutionary great powers were suspended. However, the Batavian government intended to re-establish relations with them. The ruptures were deemed to be of a temporary nature due to the war or refusal to recognise the new constitution. The instruction for the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken of the second Nationale Vergadering82 already reckoned with the renewal of relations with Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia.83 Contrary to relations with the great powers, diplomatic relations with Spain, Portugal, the Ottoman Porte, the United States, Sweden, Denmark and various minor German and Italian powers were maintained.84 Relations with the Porte were temporarily broken off after the outbreak of the War of the Second Coalition. As the Porte declared war on France after the 1798 invasion of Egypt, the Ottoman government did break off relations with the Batavian Republic as well. The Batavian envoy, Frederik van Dedem, moved his residence to Bulgaria in order to be as close as possible to Istanbul once the Porte desired to restore relations. The Batavian government was more or less forced by France to break off official relations with Portugal in 1796, as will be discussed below, and political changes in Germany and Italy caused the abolition of some diplomatic posts.85 Hence, the creation of the   Vreede, 1863, pp. 255–256.   It was customary to eighteenth-century diplomacy for the secretary of the legation to become chargé d’affaires ad interim in the absence of an envoy. Whereas an envoy was accredited to the sovereign, a chargé d’affaires was accredited to the foreign secretary; Whitcombe, 1979, p. 5. 82  After the rejection of the draft constitution in a referendum in August 1797, a new Nationale Vergadering was elected. 83   25 October 1797, instruction for the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken (Article 38); NA 2.01.08 no. 390. 84   Lists of foreign diplomats in the Batavian Republic and Batavian diplomats are to be found in the appendices. 85  Pennings and Thomassen, 1994, p. 21. 80 81

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Batavian Republic did not cause a ‘revolution’ in Dutch diplomatic relations. In general, the Batavian Republic did hold on to the traditionally wide diplomatic network that had been maintained by the United Provinces and, above all, did not intend to limit its diplomatic relations to republican governments. The latter should not come as a surprise, since Dutch foreign policy was and remained essentially concerned with commercial interests. However, there are some indications that the alliance structure affected the importance The Hague attached to various diplomatic posts. Relations with Paris were, unsurprisingly, deemed of the utmost importance. Hence, as Meyer was suddenly recalled in 1798,86 the Agent der buitenlandsche betrekkingen Willem Buys himself was sent to Paris in order to prevent not having a representative in Paris until a new envoy had been appointed.87 Furthermore, the alliance seems to have influenced the rank of diplomats.88 Besides the Ottoman Porte, Paris and Madrid were the only diplomatic posts to be occupied by an ambassador.89 With all other powers, the Batavian Republic was represented by ministers plenipotentiary, residents, chargés d’affaires, or extraordinary envoys.

86   Meyer was recalled because he had the post-January coup d’état, radical Uitvoe­ rend Bewind’s secret agent arrested. 87   16 April 1798, draft letter from the Uitvoerend Bewind to the Directoire; NA 2.01.08 no. 104A. 88   Throughout the eighteenth century, diplomatic representatives still held different ranks; in order of precedence: ordinary ambassadors, extraordinary ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary, residents, and agents. In addition, a post could be occupied, mostly temporarily, by a chargé d’affaires. Representatives e.g. to negotiations or ceremonies might just be called commissioners. Next to the diplomatic representatives, consuls represented their government abroad, most of the times in commercial matters, but in the absence of a diplomatic representative a consul might take on diplomatic tasks as well (Schutte, 1983, pp. xi–xiii; Schutte places the rank of ‘envoy’ were it says ‘minister plenipotentiary’ in the enumeration above and has it that a minister did not have an explicit rank. Admittedly, ministers plenipotentiary were called ‘extraordinary envoy’ as well. In accordance with diplomatic practice of the Revolutionary period, ‘minister plenipotentiary’ is used in the enumeration of diplomatic ranks here, though. This allows for the term ‘envoy’ to be used to refer to diplomatic representatives of all ranks). 89   Schimmelpenninck was made ambassador as soon as it became clear that he would stay in Paris for a longer period than the few months originally intended. (19 December 1798, credentials for Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck as ambassador to the French Republic; NA 2.01.08 no. 105) Previously, Batavian envoys in Paris had been minister plenipotentiary. From 1799 to 1801, the Batavian Republic was represented by an ambassador in Madrid. The envoy at the Ottamon Porte had traditionally been an ambassador and Van Dedem had not been recalled after the Batavian Revolution, which explains why he kept his rank.



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­ onversely, France was the sole power to dispatch a representative C with ambassadorial rank to The Hague throughout the entire ­period.90 Most powers of the first and second rank sent ministers plenipotentiary to The Hague, while other powers had agents, residents, or chargés d’affaires there. Thereto, the envoys’ payments are quite instructive. The Departement van Buitenlandsche Zaaken’s budget for 1799, for instance, exhibits a clear preference for France and Spain (see table 1). The differences in payment can partly be attributed to diplomatic rank, but not entirely. Table 1:  Stipends of Batavian diplomats in the 1799 budget91 Diplomatic post (and rank)

Stipend (in guilders)

Paris (ambassador) Madrid (minister plenipotentiary)

f. 40,000

Vienna (minister plenipotentiary) Berlin (minister plenipotentiary) London (minister plenipotentiary) Saint Petersburg (minister plenipotentiary) Rastatt congress (minister plenipotentiary)

f. 25,400

Ottoman Porte (ambassador)

f. 16,500

Italian powers (minister plenipotentiary)

f. 15,000

Saint Petersburg (resident)

f. 13,760

Stockholm (minister plenipotentiary) Copenhagen (minister plenipotentiary) Lisbon (minister plenipotentiary)

f. 13,500

America (resident)

f. 12,000

Stuttgart (minister plenipotentiary) Cassel (minister plenipotentiary)

f. 10,500

Hamburg (minister plenipotentiary)

f. 8,000

Berlin (chargé d’affaires)

f. 6,380

Mainz (chargé d’affaires)

f. 5,880

Madrid (chargé d’affaires)

f. 5,580

  In 1802, Semonville’s rank was changed into ambassador. Previously, French envoys were ministers plenipotentiary as well. 91   24 September 1798, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 221. It has to be noted that the budget reckoned with diplomatic posts that were not actually effectuated. 90

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The special bond with France was expressed in Batavian diplomatic instructions as well. In addition to a provision that stipulated that the envoy was to be in good contact with envoys from powers the Batavian Republic stood in relations of neutrality, friendship, or alliance to, all instructions from the period contained a clause that the envoy was to have a good rapport with the French envoy in his place of residence in particular and concert with him on all occasions that the joint interests of the two Republics might be furthered. In some instructions, it was added, however, that the Batavian envoy was to uphold Batavian independence and avoid being lured into actions that might be detrimental to the Batavian Republic by the French envoy.92 The French Republic does not seem to have interfered in the Batavian government’s decisions on what powers to maintain diplomatic relations with and the choice of diplomats. There are only two main exceptions to this non-interference and these either concern direct diplomatic relations with France or can be traced back to the Alliance Treaty. In the first place, the French government was to evict Jacobus Blauw and Johan Valckenaer from French territory after the discovery of 92   E.g. 23 November 1796, instructions for Christiaan Bangeman Huygens as envoy to Copenhagen (NA 2.01.08 no. 390): ‘Om te beter geinformeerd te worden van hetgeen komt te passeren [ . . . ] zal hij allezints goede correspondentie houden met de ministers van andere Mogendheden, met welke deze Republicq in vrienschap, alliantie of neutraliteit is en die zich aan het Hof van Denemarken bevinden. Hij zal in het bijzonder goede correspondentie houden met den minister van de Republicq van Vrankrijk en in alle zaken, waarin de beide Republiquen eenigzints geinteresseert zijn met hem communicatif handelen, ten einde gezamentlijk bij alle voorkomende geleegenheden het belang der beide Republicquen te bevorderen, zo echter, dat hij steeds de onafhankelijkheid dezer Republicq in het oog houden en zich niet laten verleiden tot stappen ter contemplatie van den franschen minister die of nadeelig voor onze Republicq zoude zijn of met derzelves krachten niet evenredig.’; 14 April 1798, Instructions Van Dedem as minister plenipotentiary to the Cisalpine Republic (Article 4) (NA 2.01.08 no. 104A): ‘Hij zal in het bijzonder goede correspondentie houden en in de beste verstandhouding verkeeren met den Minister van de Republick ­Frankrijk ten einde gezaamentlijk bij alle voorkomende geleegenheden het belang der beide Republieken te bevorderen.’ (Article 12); 11 juli 1798, instruction for Willem Buys as minister plenipotentiary to the King of Sweden (Article 12) (NA 2.01.08 no. 105): ‘Hij zal in het bijzonder goede correspondentie houden en in de beste verstandhouding verkeeren, met den Minister van de Republick Frankrijk en einde gezaamentlijk bij alle voorkoomende geleegenheden het belang der beide Republieken te bevorderen.’; 30 March 1801, instruction for Carel Gerard Hultman as minister plenipotentiary to the King of Prussia (Article 18) (NA 2.01.08 no. 123); ‘Hij zal bijzonder in goede verstandhouding leven met den Gezant der Fransche Republicq te Berlijn en zich met denzelven concerteren bij alle zodanige gelegenheden en voorvallen, waar in de belangens van den staat door dit concert kunnen bevorderd worden.’



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Gracchus Babeuf’s ‘Conspiracy of Equals’ (May 1796).93 Both Batavian Patriots were suspected of having connections with Babeuf and the Directoire’s suspicion was increased by riots in Amsterdam in May 1796.94 At the time, Blauw was still Batavian envoy in Paris next to Meyer, though, whereas Valckenaer had just been appointed Batavian envoy in Spain. Noël was thus instructed to inform the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken that one envoy in Paris sufficed and that Blauw was ‘ne peut plus y être utile.’ Furthermore, the Directoire stressed that Valckenaer did not seem to be proper to function as diplomatic representative in Madrid.95 This was the sole occasion during the period discussed in this book that the French government directly interfered in the choice of Batavian diplomats. As to Blauw, the Directoire was the receiving government and its insistence on him being recalled is fully compatible to interstate relations of an egalitarian order. Blauw was recalled, but he was immediately appointed Batavian envoy with various Italian powers.96 The Directoire interfering with the choice of the Batavian envoy in Spain is somewhat more problematic. However, diplomatic relations with Spain were still within the sphere of the alliance and, technically, the Directoire merely expressed its opinion. In fact, Valckenaer’s appointment was not revoked. He went to Madrid and stayed there as Batavian envoy for two years. In the second place, France insisted on breaking off relations with Portugal. France was at war with Portugal, Lisbon being allied to ­Britain. However, diplomatic relations between The Hague and Lisbon were not broken off.97 It took the French over a year to make an issue of diplomatic relations between the Batavian Republic and Portugal. The presence of a Portuguese envoy in The Hague as well as of envoys of other powers France was at war with occured in Noël’s instructions as a matter of fact.98 The Portuguese envoy had even attended, next to François Noël, the Nationale Vergadering’s first session on 93   Laurent, 1867, pp. 152–155; Palmer, 1964, p. 233; Guyot, 1907, p. 165; Blanning, 1996, p. 172; Harouel, 1997a, p. 40. 94  Palmer, 1964, p. 196; Godechot, 1983, p. 230; Schama, 1989, pp. 305–307. 95   12 June 1796, decree Directoire; AN AF III* 20; Legrand, 1895, p. 142. 96  To be precise: the King of Sardinia, the Republic of Genoa, the Grandduke of Tuscany, the Republic of Venice, and the King of the Two Sicilies; 29 July 1796, Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaken to Blauw; NA 2.01.08 no. 102. 97   Vreede, 1863, p. 245. 98   11 July 1795, Memoire pour servir d’Instructions au Citoyen François Noël, ministre plenipotentiaire de la République françoise près la République de Hollande; AAE CP Hollande 588.

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1 March 1796 in his official capacity.99 Antonio d’Araujo’s presence did not become an issue until he officially objected to the confiscation of Portuguese vessels. In reply to his objections, Noël suddenly protested against diplomatic relations between the Batavian Republic and Portugal arguing that the Batavian government violated Article 3 of the 1795 Hague Treaty.100 The Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken, although stressing the importance of good relations with Portugal for Batavian commerce and shipping as well as pointing to French silence so far, informed the French envoy that official relations with Portugal would be suspended until France and Portugal were no longer at war. Although it was perfectly in conformity to eighteenth-century custom to fulfil one’s obligations as an ally in the capacity of auxiliary, pursuant to the Alliance Treaty, Paris might have even been entitled to insist on the Batavian Republic declaring war to Portugal. The Batavians did, however, refuse to declare war on Portugal because of commercial interests.101 At the same time, d’Araujo was informed that the French government had invoked Article 3 of the Alliance Treaty and that the Commissie was obliged by the sanctity of treaties to suspend relations with Portugal.102 Portugal immediately responded by taking measures against Batavian vessels.103 D’Araujo stayed in The Hague, though, and relations were restored as soon as Portugal had concluded peace with France. In December 1801, the Staatsbewind dispatched a new envoy to Lisbon.104 Next to these two exceptions to French non-interference, relations with the United States are worth pointing to. Throughout the war, Danish and American merchantmen comprised the best part of neutral vessels still calling in at Batavian ports. Good relations with the United States were, henceforth, crucial to what was left of Dutch commerce. Suffice to say, that The Hague was perturbed by a deterioration of FrancoAmerican relations. By the summer of 1798, French privateer activity in combination with measures against British goods had caused what   De Gou, 1983, p. x.   20 June 1796, Rapport au Directoire exécutive; AAE CP Hollande 592; 25 June 1796, Delacroix to Noël; AAE CP Hollande 592. 101   13 June 1796, Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to Noël; NA 2.01.08 no. 102; 30 June 1796, Noël to Delacroix; AAE CP Hollande 592. 102   13 June 1796, Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to Noël; NA 2.01.08 no. 102; 30 June 1796, Noël to Delacroix; AAE CP Hollande 592. 103   15 August 1796, Noël to Delacroix; AAE CP Hollande 592. 104   24 December 1801, Van der Goes to Dohrman, deputy consul-general in Lisbon; NA 2.01.08 no. 109.   99 100



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might best be described as a de facto war situation between France and the United States.105 In order to prevent a repetition with regard to the United States of the French demand breaking off relations with Portugal, the Batavian government decided to act proactively.106 The Uitvoerend Bewind urged its representative in Paris, by then Schimmelpenninck, to find out whether the Directoire would appreciate Batavian mediation.107 The following week, Schimmelpen­ninck was even instructed to officially offer mediation as soon as he would be sufficiently sure that the French government would consent. In fact, the Directoire accepted the Batavian offer, but contended that the French and American governments probably were still capable to come to terms on their own. At the same time, the Batavian resident in America, Rogier van Polaanen, was charged to inform the American government that the Uitvoerend Bewind hoped that France and the United States drifting apart would be ephemeral and otherwise offered its mediation. Polaanen, too, had to find out whether the American government would appreciate the mediation offer before making a formal offer.108 Hence, both the French and American governments were treated with kindred caution. It is notable, though, that the Directoire was asked first. Whereas France, thus, hardly interfered with Batavian diplomatic relations, the Batavian government was not reluctant to profit from its alliance with France. French mediation was invoked to attain Prussian recognition of the Batavian Republic.109 Initially, it was not certain to what extent Berlin would further the cause of the House of Orange.110 Soon it became clear, however, that Prussia desired peace with France more and no support from Prussia to sustain the integrity of the Empire or to restore Orangist rule in the Netherlands was to be expected.111 Moreover, Prussia actually embraced indemnity for William V in Germany, since this would shift the German balance

  Brown Scott, 1917, pp. 15–21.   28 February 1799, Rapport over den Staat der Buitenlandsche Zaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 120. 107   27 July 1798, Gogel to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 119. 108   25 August 1798, Gogel to Polaanen; NA 2.01.08 no. 119. 109   There are no signs in the consulted sources that the Batavian government also tried to have France tender its good offices in order to have the Batavian Republic recognised by other powers even though Bavaria for instance refused to recognise the Batavian Republic until 1801 (Spaans, 2005, pp. 30–31). Recognition of the Batavian Republic would be part of the peace treaties with Austria. 110   Vreede, 1863, p. 96. 111   Vreede, 1863, pp. 97–99. 105 106

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of power in favour of Berlin.112 Hence, the Batavian Republic did not have to fear Prussia actively endorsing Orangist attempts to restoration. That did not mean that relations with Prussia were entirely restored and normalised, though.113 As said before, the Dutch envoy in Berlin was recalled and the Batavian chargé d’affaires not officially recognised. Batavian agents did report that the King had refused to meet William V’s son as well.114 Batavian Patriots, still not reassured about Prussia’s intentions, desperately desired formal recognition of their regime and requested Paris to mediate. The French envoy in Berlin, Caillard, did indeed further Batavian interests. The Prussian minister Hardenberg informed Caillard that as far as Prussia was concerned an indemnity for ­William V would do.115 On 5 August 1796 Caillard concluded a secret convention with the Prussian government on indemnity for Prussia in case the left bank of the Rhine would be ceded to France.116 Strikingly, the Batavian government was not informed of this convention until 22 April 1797.117 By then, Caillard had extorted a commitment from the Prussian government to recognise the Batavian Republic on the condition of indemnity for the House of Orange that was to consist of the secularised Bishoprics of Würtzburg and Bamberg in addition to promotion to electoral rank.118 Probably unaware of what Caillard had already achieved, the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken instructed Bourdeaux to urge Caillard to make Berlin recognise the Batavian Republic.119 Bourdeaux’ request led Caillard to negotiate with Hardenberg once more. This time, talks resulted in what Vreede depicts as a ‘tacit recognition.’120 Berlin settled for a French official declaration that the House of Orange would be indemnified at the peace settlement with the Empire. A short while afterwards, diplomatic relations at the level of chargés d’affaires were restored and Caillard presented Bourdeaux to the King.121   Vreede, 1863, p. 100.   Vreede, 1863, p. 255. 114   Vreede, 1863, p. 257. 115   Vreede, 1863, p. 260. 116   5 August 1796, Secret Convention between France and Prussia signed at Berlin; CTS vol. 53 pp. 237–241. 117   Vreede, 1863, p. 258. 118   Vreede, 1863, p. 278. 119   Vreede, 1863, p. 278. 120   ‘Stilzwijgende erkenning’; Vreede, 1863, p. 282. 121   Vreede, 1863, pp. 281–282. 112 113



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A year afterwards, as the Uitvoerend Bewind was worried about Prussia’s view on the Bataafse Staatsregeling,122 the Batavian government pushed the Directoire to tender its good offices to have a ­Batavian envoy recognised in Berlin.123 This was still a bridge too far. It was not until after an agreement on indemnity for the House of Orange had been reached between France and Prussia in May 1802,124 that the Batavian government was allowed to dispatch an envoy to Berlin. Batavian reliance on France to mediate was not an entirely oneway favour. France had already restored relations with Prussia at the time that the Batavian government desired recognition from Berlin. With regard to Saint Petersburg, the situation seems to have been reverse. In 1797, the Batavian envoy in Stockholm was to find out whether ­Sweden was willing to mediate between France and Russia.125 At the end of the War of the Second Coalition, while France was already contemplating restoring relations with Russia, the Batavian government was ahead of its ally. Since trade with the Baltic region was the main source of Dutch wealth, it does not come as a surprise that The Hague was eager to restore relations with Russia. In Stockholm, by means of the Swedish government, the Batavian envoy Willem Buys had contacted his Russian counterpart with a proposal to restore political and commercial relations by exchanging envoys.126 Buys had been instructed as well to emphasise the Uitvoerend Bewind’s desire to contain Britain’s commercial despotism127 in concert with France, apparently in an attempt to work on Russian anti-British sentiments128 that had caused Saint Petersburg to take the lead in creating a League of Armed Neutrality in the past. In response, the Russian government had asserted its desire to attain a general peace.129 In Paris, Schimmelpenninck was to inform Talleyrand of the Batavian-Russian ­rapprochement.130 Shortwhile after these overtures, Buys was transfered from Stockholm to   Vreede, 1863, pp. 331–332.   19 June 1798, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 105. 124   23 May 1802, Treaty for the Cession of the Left Bank of the Rhine etc. between France and Prussia, signed at Paris; CTS vol. 56, pp. 323–329. 125   Vreede, 1863, pp. 268–269. 126   21 January 1801 and 30 January 1801, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 684. 127   ‘het Engelsch mercantiel despotismus.’ 128   20 January 1801, Van der Goes to Bourdeaux; NA 2.01.08 no. 123. 129   17 April 1801, Van der Goes to Bourdeaux; NA 2.01.08 no. 108. 130   21 January 1801 and 30 January 1801, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 684. 122 123

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Saint ­Petersburg.131 By consequence, the Batavian Republic restored relations with Russia in advance of France and Van der Goes offered to keep the French government abreast of what was going on in Saint Petersburg for as long as France was not itself represented there.132 Hence, the Batavian government did display diplomatic initiatives of its own instead of following France slavishly. To be sure, on this occasion, the French government was informed of Batavian diplomatic actions and the Uitvoerend Bewind pretended to act as a loyal ally by passing on information. On the other hand, the significance of the Batavian favour to France must not be exaggerated, for there were in fact already diplomatic contacts between France and Russia. In sum, the Batavian Republic maintained a Europe-wide network of diplomatic representatives. Except for some minor posts in ­Germany, no structural alterations were introduced. In the short run, the Batavian Revolution did cause a purge of the diplomatic service and the suspension of diplomatic relations with Britain, Prussia, Austria, Russia, and eventually Portugal. The suspension of relations being the result of a change of side in the war and of the provisional non-recognition, this break-off was of a temporal nature, though. Hence, the Batavian Republic’s diplomatic relations were not limited to a ‘republican subsystem.’ Furthermore, France hardly interfered with decisions on what powers to maintain direct relations with or the choice of envoys. The main exceptions concerned direct Franco-Batavian relations or were directly related to the Alliance Treaty. The Hague did take initiatives and on some occasions was even ahead of Paris. The Batavian government, thus, was essentially left free to decide for itself. The Batavian Republic was dependent on French mediation to attain Prussia’s recognition. On the other hand, the Batavian government did offer its mediation between France and the United States and this offer was accepted in principle. Finally, there are some indications that the Batavian government deemed the Parisian legation most important, but this would have been a logical consequence of the alliance and the Batavian Republic’s political position and, on its own regard, is not a sign of inequality or dependence.

  On his mission in Saint Petersburg see Van Koningsbrugge, 2002.   21 April 1801, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 123.

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Peace at last 2.1  The Genesis of Peace By 1795, the most radical phase of the French Revolution was over. After three years of fighting the desire to end the war grew at Europe’s capitals. France had accomplished its main war aims—natural borders—and it had become clear to the rival great powers that the French Republic was not the easy target they had expected it to be in 1792. The Directoire, installed in October 1795, tried to attain peace with the major powers France was at war with and to reintegrate the French Republic into the European order.1 French victories in the Low Countries caused the prospect of a swift peace. By consequence, a profound debate started on what the conditions of peace were to be.2 Historiography has been extensively occupied by the question whether peace was feasible at the time. On the one hand, mainly Anglo-American historians perceive the Revolutionary Wars and thus the possibility of peace in geopolitical and realist terms: did powers feel sufficiently secure to lay down arms and did all of them accept a new territorial division of Europe? On the other hand, French historians are more inclined to stress the importance of ideology: was peace truly possible before the total victory of republicanism, did a heterogeneous order have a chance of being stable?3 Marc Belissa, for instance, has comprehensively analysed the foreign policy debate throughout the Directoire and Consulat periods from an ideological point of view focusing on the question whether peace was thought possible within a heterogeneous European order.4 The Directoire desired peace.5 Above all, the Thermidorians wished to secure the Revolution’s gain by stabilising the political and social situation. A compromise in the international sphere was needed to   Belissa, 2006, pp. 66–70.   Belissa, 1999a, p. 2; Belissa, 2006, pp. 65–88. 3   Belissa, 2007, pp. 35–36. 4   Belissa, 2006. 5   Kaiser, 1990, p. 218. 1 2

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focus on domestic problems. This did not equal a blank check, though.6 Peace had to be in accordance with the Republic’s honour and create or safeguard the conditions for French security by attaining advantageous borders. Moreover, peace had to confirm the Revolution’s gains. Albert Sorel has argued that the Directoire continued the war because of economic and political reasons.7 The French government was said to need financial contributions from occupied territories as well as military victories to boost its prestige, whereas it wished to keep the generals away from Paris and thought it unwise to demobilise the armies considering the already high unemployment levels. To be sure, French state finances had not improved, yet, and the economic situation was indeed terrible. Conversely, it was exactly the war that caused the need for money, prevented economic improvement and provided thes generals with a stage to make a name. Homan has rightly repudiated Sorel’s view, arguing that the Directoire would never have continued the war any longer than necessary to attain a favourable peace since it—already being unpopular—had to face domestic hostility and peace sentiments.8 Henceforth, it is safe to establish that the Directoire sincerely pursued peace in 1795–1796. However, the Convention was divided on the matter of French borders and the Directors disagreed on the ­conditions of peace.9 A majority of the Directors wanted to keep all territory within France’s ‘natural borders,’ especially the Rhine border. In their view, establishing peace by returning to the 1789 or 1792 borders basically amounted to Counter-revolutionary thought.10 Reubell was adamant to secure the Rhine frontier. Austria was to be persuaded to conclude peace by offering compensation in Germany or Italy. ­Britain, isolated after peace with the Continental powers had been concluded, would be easily forced to accept the status quo post bellum. In any case, the policy of propaganda had to be dropped.11 Tragically, the French security policy pursued by Reubell was unacceptable to the other great powers. To them, a France aggrandised up to the natural borders and extended with a sphere of influence beyond those borders

  Blanning, 1996, p. 149; Lentz, 2005c, p. 446.  Sorel, 1906IV, p. 131; Bruun, 1965, p. 8; Homan, 1971, p. 95.  8   Homan, 1971, p. 132.  9   Belissa, 1999a, p. 2; Belissa, 2006, pp. 66–69. 10   Englund, 2004, pp. 120–121. 11  Laurent, 1869, p. 200; Droz, 2005, p. 206.  6  7



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posed a major security threat.12 Hence, peace was difficult to attain because Europe faced an archetypal security dilemma. The Directors Carnot and Letourneur acknowledged this dilemma and proposed to circumvent it by eschewing any territorial expansion. They belonged to the ‘partie des anciennes limites’ and desired an immediate peace to be reached by showing France’s moderation through abandoning virtually all conquests and annexations since the start of the war.13 The natural borders and the French desire for security to be gained by expansion had become too much of a dogma, though, for the latter position to have even the slightest chance of success. Whatever their disagreements, the French 1795 peace party did think a heterogeneous order in Europe feasible. Apparently, the other great powers seemed to think alike. Prussia already concluded peace with France in 1795 (Treaty of Basel) and Austria in 1797 (Treaty of Campoformio), whereas Britain initiated peace negotiations on several occasions in 1796–1797 leading to actual negotiations in Paris and Lille, though not to the conclusion of a peace treaty. Probably the only monarch sincerely opposing France on ideological grounds, at the time, was Tsar Paul.14 All other powers were primarily concerned with the balance of power, territorial gains for themselves, and fear for French hegemony in the West.15 Domestic instability in France had kept them from negotiating with the Convention nationale thus far.16 Jeremy Black has argued that the other great powers were willing to come to terms with a republican France, but that the French, time over time, failed to accept limits to territorial expansion.17 The latter postulate is somewhat exaggerated. Thereto, ideological differences were taken into considerations on various occasions and by counter­revolutionary factions at all courts. In 1795–1796, ideological differences did not stand in the way of a compromise, though.18 As Luard has it, the flexibility of the eighteenth-century balance-of-power was not broken by ideological heterogeneity.19

  Homan, 1971, p. 130.   Bruun, 1965, p. 36; Homan, 1971, p. 132 ; Belissa, 2006, p. 67. 14   Kaiser, 1990, p. 235. 15   Presser, 1946, p. 165. 16   Guyot, 1907, p. 93. 17   Black, 2002, p. 215. 18   Bruun, 1965, p. 36. 19  Luard, 1992, p. 26. 12 13

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Both from the left and from the right in France—the French left being aided by Italian Patriots, who counted on French aid to republicanise and unify Italy—and Britain came strong opposition against this direction towards a compromise peace.20 In addition, in Germany the publication of Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden (1795) initiated a ‘guerre de plumes’ in which e.g. Friedrich von Gentz21 strongly counterpoised Kant’s argument. Counter-revolutionaries and crypto-royalists at the right wing of French politics as well as French emigrés abroad, some German publicists, and the British opposition against Pitt’s peace policy led by Edmund Burke22 argued that the French Revolution had made a stable order impossible and that the Revolutionary principles were incompatible with the ‘societé civilisée de l’Europe.’ The ­Revolution had disrupted the old, traditional order that was gradually developing on the basis of civilised and pacifist elements infused by history. Hence, Europe had fallen into a state of lawlessness in which the Revolutionaries had undermined that development by an illusory, chimerical, and naive belief in abstract principles. In their view, Europe had to return to the pre-Revolutionary situation in order to let tradition do progressive work and that basically called for the restoration of the monarchy in France. Without that restoration true peace could never be achieved.23 On the opposite side of the political spectrum, ‘democrates’ or ‘republicains’ rejected the old order as ruled by power, arbitrariness and dynastic ambitions permanently deteriorating into war. To them, the continuation of the war was necessary to preserve the republic against the monarchical, Counter-revolutionary threat. Peace was only to result from total victory by the republican order, whereas a heterogeneous order was necessarily unstable.24 Kant’s provision in Zum ewigen Frieden that the constitution of every state should be representative, expressed the widely shared view that only republics were truly peaceful.25 To ensure French security, at least a balance of power had to be created between the republican and monarchical orders.26 Hence, both extremes agreed on the impossibility of a heterogeneous order and shared the image of a bipolar Europe separated along   Belissa, 2006, pp. 67–88.   E.g. Von Gentz, 1801a and 1801b. 22   Burke, 1796. 23   Belissa, 2006, p. 99. 24   Belissa, 2006, pp. 67–68. 25   Rao, 1994, p. 269. 26   Belissa, 1999a, pp. 12–13. 20 21



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ideological lines. Furthermore, both held the idea of permanent war in a heterogeneous situation. They expressed doubt on the peaceability of the monarchs (Republicans) or republics (Counter-revolutionaries) and thought that peace could only be re-established if France again became monarchical (right) or if France would have republicanised all of Europe (left). French victories in Italy undermined Paris’ willingness to compromise. Nonetheless, peace was made with Austria, France negotiated with Britain in Lille, and negotiations started with the Empire in ­Rastatt, whereas separate peace treaties were concluded with minor powers of Germany and Italy. Although there were vehement reactions in Paris against the ‘traditional’ character of the Treaty of ­Campoformio—mainly because of the treatment of Venice, that had to pay the price for French-Austrian reconciliation by being ­partitioned—, Continental peace seemed to be at hand. At the last minute the Directoire’s policy of integration was shattered by the start of the War of the Second Coalition, however. After the assassination of the French envoys at Rastatt (28 April 1799), neo-Jacobins dominated French politics. Again, propaganda replaced moderation and French policy was directed towards the creation of a republican order. The war was regarded to be a ‘lutte à mort’ between two incompatible orders that had to be battled out to the bitter end. In Counter-revolutionary circles the debate whether peace with France was feasible without a Bourbon restoration revived.27 It has to be remarked that this debate on peace and heterogeneity, as it has for instance been analysed by Belissa,28 was a debate among public intellectuals and politicians contributing to a public debate which was to a large extent directed at domestic audiences. The reality of foreign policies actually pursued was a different story. The extent to which this ideological debate determined foreign policies and decision on entering into peace negotiations in particular depended on the success of various factions within domestic politics or at court. Both in London and in Vienna bellicose and pacifist factions strove to gain the upper hand. French foreign policy varied from coup d’état to coup d’état. It was not until the brumaire coup d’état, rendering the tandem

  Black, 2002, pp. 214–215.   Belissa, 2006.

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Bonaparte-Talleyrand in control for a prolonged period of time, that French foreign policy would gain a certain extent of stability. Despite the political and public debate on the feasibility of peace, the period of the first Directoire abounded with peace treaties. The debate was outrun by diplomatic and military events. Throughout 1795–1796, the less enthusiastic or more vulnerable members of the Counter-revolutionary Coalition one by one abandoned its cause.29 As discussed in the previous part the United Provinces changed sides after the French invasion and Batavian Revolution of early 1795. Diplomatic relations with Sweden were restored in April 1795. Peace Treaties were also signed with the Grand Duke of Tuscany,30 the King of Sardinia31 the King of Spain,32 the Landgrave of Hessen-Cassel,33 the Duke of Wurtemberg,34 the Margrave of Baden,35 the King of the Two Sicilies,36 and the Duke of Parma37 in 1795 and 1796, whereas Saxony acceded to the Franco-Prussian Treaty of Neutrality38 and peace with the Holy See was concluded by General Bonaparte in Tolentino on 19 February 1797.39 Peace with Portugal was concluded in August 1797.40 Not that enthusiastic for the cause of legitimacy from the start anyhow, and totally occupied by consolidating his rule in the territories to be gained by the upcoming third and final partitioning of Poland, the King of Prussia was the first great power to conclude peace with

  Godechot, 1983, pp. 185–186. 9 February 1795, Treaty of Peace between France and Tuscany; CTS vol. 52, pp. 311–313. 31   15 May 1796, Traité de Paix entre la France et la Sardaigne; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 34–42. 32   22 July 1795, Treaty of Basel (Spain); CTS 52 pp. 411–417. 33   28 August 1795, Treaty of Peace between France and Hesse-Cassel; CTS vol. 52 pp. 447–451. 34   7 August 1796, Treaty of Peace between France and Wurtemberg; CTS vol. 53, pp. 243–249. 35   22 August 1796, Treaty of Peace between France and Baden; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 59–69. 36   10 October 1796, Traité de Paix entre la France et Naples; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 70–74. 37   5 November 1796, Treaty of Peace between France and Parma; CTS vol. 53, pp. 331–341. 38   29 November 1796, Accession de la Saxe au Traité de Neutralité Franco-Prussien; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 75–77. 39   19 February 1797, Traité de Paix de Tolentino; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 78–84. 40   10 August 1797, Treaty of Peace between France and Portugal; CTS vol. 54, pp. 141–149. 29

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the French Republic.41 Moreover, a considerable part of the Prussian political and military elite still regarded Austria as the main enemy and wished to stick to the traditional, that is pre-1756, alignment with France against Austria.42 The Prussian and Spanish Kings as well as the powers of lesser rank, apparently, had no or at least no insurmountable objections to treating with a republican government in France. This does not come as a surprise. Although just before the French Revolution all great powers had monarchical regimes, pluralism of form of government was one of the characteristic features of the European order during the lateseventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with monarchs of all possible ranks—Emperors, Kings, Electors, Dukes, Counts etc.—and types— hereditary or elective, absolutist or constitutional—, aristocratic or democratic republics, city-states, leagues and confederations, orders of knighthood, ecclesiastical princes and orders.43 The legitimacy of the various forms was not questioned.44 Indeed, balance of power politics called for a disinterested stand vis-à-vis other powers’ domestic situation.45 It was only with the debate that started after the Revolution that regime type began to matter again and ‘legitimacy’ gradually became a principle of the European order, codified as such in Vienna in 1815.46 Of all great powers, Prussia was the least inclined to abandon ­eighteenth-century diplomatic logic at the time. Compared to Britain and Austria—France’s more traditional rivals/enemies—Prussia was the least endangered by the Revolution. Preventing French control of the Low Countries had been a cornerstone of British foreign policy for over a century and the British government faced an opposition inspired by the Revolution in France. Habsburg Austria had to keep a multinational empire together. Revolutionary nation-talk threatened the very existence of the Habsburg realm. Moreover, French expansion mainly concerned Habsburg dominions or territories in the Austrian sphere of influence. Prussia was more remote and did not see any of its vital interests affected besides general balance of power notions and 41   5 April 1795, Treaty of Basel, 5 August 1796, Berlin neutrality treaties; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 43–50; Palmer, 1964, p. 12; Bruun, 1965, p. 37; Godechot, 1983, pp. 185–186. 42   Palmer, 1964, p. 12; Godechot, 1983, pp. 185–186. 43   Wight, 1977, p. 41; Osiander, 2003, pp. 102–109 and pp. 207–210. 44   Eyffinger, 1991, p. 111. 45  Luard, 1992, p. 26. 46   Kissinger, 1974, pp. 1–2; Eyffinger, 1991, p. 130; Osiander, 2003, pp. 207–210.

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dynastic ties with the Stadhouder. Conversely, Berlin contemplated profiting from Austrian weakness to extent its control in Germany. In sum, Berlin concluded peace with the French Republic since it needed its resources elsewhere and still feared Austria more as its main competitor in Germany. At the time the Treaty of Basel with Prussia (5 April 1795) was concluded, the Batavian Republic did not formally exist yet, although the territory of the United Provinces had already been occupied for some months and negotiations between the country’s provisional government and the Comité de Salut public on a treaty of peace and alliance had already started. The first of the articles séparés et secrets of the Franco-Prussian Treaty of Basel therefore already provided for a Prussian pledge to refrain from any hostile acts towards the United Provinces (or any other territories occupied by French troops).47 The promise not to attack the United Provinces was repeated in the Franco-Prussian Treaty of 5 August 1796 that set the line of demarcation for the part of northern Germany declared neutral.48 Now, the King of Prussia even guaranteed that none of the states within the neutral zone would cross the line to attack French troops or to undertake hostilities against the United Provinces. The Franco-Spanish Treaty of Basel contained an Article providing that ‘la même paix, amitié et bonne intelligence, stipulés par le present traité entre la France et le Roi ­d’Espagne, auront lieu entre le Roi d’Espagne et la République des Provinces-Unies, alliée de la République Française.’49 The Batavian Republic was not at war with Spain, nor was the time between the conclusion of the Treaty of The Hague and the Franco-Spanish Peace long enough for the Batavian Republic to have contributed to the French war effort as an auxiliary. Therefore, there was no substantial reason to include the Batavian Republic—note that the French Republic is still determined not to use the name ‘Batavian Republic’ yet in July 1795—in the Treaty. So, a general reference sufficed as inclusion. The Batavians were curious about provisions with regard to their country in the Franco-Batavian Peace settlement. On 4 May 1795,   Article 1 separate and secret Treaty of Basel (Prussia); Kerautret, 2002, p. 21.   Article 6 Traité de Berlin relatif à la ligne de démarcation (5 August 1796); Kerautret, 2002, p. 46. 49   ‘La même paix, amitié et bonne intelligence stipulées par le présent traité entre la France et la Roi d’Espagne, auront lieu entre le Roi d’Espagne et la République des Provinces-Unies, alliée de la République Française.’; 22 July 1795, Article 14 Treaty of Basel (Spain); CTS vol. 52, pp. 411–417. 47 48



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Blauw and Meyer requested access to the secret articles of the Treaty of Basel.50 Carel Hendrik van Grasveld and Albert Johan de Sitter, sent to Paris to exchange ratifications of the Treaty of The Hague (16 May 1795), were instructed to insist on being informed of the state of negotiations between France and the Coalition powers in order to be able to further the Republic’s interests.51 In a peace settlement with Spain free navigation to the Spanish West Indian dominions was to be procured,52 whereas in a settlement with Portugal equal rights and benefits as the British enjoyed had to be procured for the French and Batavian Republics.53 Thereto, Van Grasveld and De Sitter were to find out whether any negotiations were initiated outside of Paris to allow the Batavian government to send an envoy to those negotiations and to insist on the French delegation negotiating in concert with that envoy.54 The Treaty of Peace with Spain came too soon for the Batavian government to specifically request involvement in negotiations with Spain. Van Grasveld and De Sitter’s instructions do show, however, that the Batavian government from the start wished and expected to directly partake in peace negotiations. The Batavian Republic was included in the peace treaties with Sardinia, Baden, Wurtemberg, Parma, Naples, and Portugal under explicit reference to Article 6 of the Treaty of The Hague. Thus, the French Republic intended to uphold its treaty obligation not to conclude peace without its Batavian ally.55 The Commissie van ­Buitenlandsche Zaaken   4 May 1795, Blauw and Meyer to Comité de Salut public; NA 1.02.14 no. 600.   29 May 1795, Istructions for Van Grasveld and De Sitter; NA 1.02.14 no. 604. 52   Article 5 Instructions for Van Grasveld and De Sitter. 53   Article 6 Instructions for Van Grasveld and De Sitter. 54   Article 7 Instructions for Van Grasveld and De Sitter. 55   Article 19 Traité de Paix entre la France et la Sardaigne: ‘Conformément à l’article 6 du traité conclu à La Haye, le 27 floréal de l’an III, la République Batave est comprise dans le present traité. Il y aura paix et amitié entre elle et le Roi de Sardaigne. Toutes choses seront rétablies entre elles sur le pied où elles étaient avant la présente guerre.’ (Kerautret, 2002, p. 39). Article 18 of the Treaty of Peace between the French Republic and the Margrave of Baden: ‘Conformément à l’article 6 du traité conclu à La Haye le 27 floréal de l’an III, le present traité de paix et d’amitié est declaré commun avec la République Batave.’ (Kerautret, 2002, p. 64) Article 9 of the Treaty of Peace between the French Republic and Wurtemberg: ‘Conformément à l’article 6 du traité conclu à la Haye le 27 floréal de l’an III [16 mai 1795] le présent traité de paix et d’amitié est déclaré commun avec la République Batave.’ (CTS vol. 53 pp. 243–249) Article 15 of the Treaty of Peace between the French Republic and Parma: ‘En exécution de l’article 6 du traité conclu à la Haye le 22 floréal de l’an 3, la paix conclu par le présent traité est déclarée commune avec la république batave.’ (CTS vol. 53 pp. 331–341) Article 12 of the Treaty of Peace between the French Republic and the King of the Two ­Sicilies: 50 51

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did indeed accept the inclusion as an observance by the French Republic of its treaty engagements.56 The Batavian Republic was included in the Treaty of Tolentino, by which peace was made between the French Republic and His Holiness the Pope, as well.57 Again, Article 6 of the Treaty of The Hague was referred to as the reason for this inclusion. The similarity between the Articles with regard to the Batavian Republic in the various treaties clearly shows that at the time the French government regarded inclusion of its ally as an accepted and standard practice. It also shows that General Bonaparte either was in possession of the text of at least one of the earlier peace treaties while negotiating in Tolentino and copied it or that he had been instructed by Paris to include the Batavian Republic in the Treaty. The considerable time between the treaties suggests that the Batavian government accepted or at least did not protest strongly to the practice of the Batavian Republic being included into the separate peace treaties between France and the minor powers of Italy and southern Germany. 2.2  An Entr’acte in Italy With the Counter-revolutionary Coalition collapsing in the course of 1795 and 1796 and the situation in France stabilising, maybe even normalizing, after the creation of the Directoire, peace came within reach for the main rivals as well. Negotiations with Austria started after the ‘Conformément à l’article 6 du traité conclu à La Haye le 27 floréal de l’an III, la même paix, amitié et bonne intelligence stipulée par le présent traité entre la République Française et S.M. le Roi des Deux-Siciles aura lieu entre Sa dite Majesté et la République Batave.’ (Kerautret, 2002, p. 73) Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace between France and Portugal: ‘La paix et la bonne amitié rétablies par le présent traité, entre la République Française et S.M.T.F., sont déclarées communes à la République Batave. (CTS vol. 54, pp. 141–149) The Batavian Republic was not included in the Treaty of Peace with Hesse-Cassel (CTS vol. 52, pp. 447–451). 56   13 June 1796, Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to Noël: ‘Le maintien de la foi des traités a toujours été une des qualités distinctives de la nation batave. Ce ne sera pas au prejudice de son auguste alliée, qu’elle s’en departir, au moment que la République francaise vient de lui donner des preuves de bienveillance et de sa fidelité a l’observance de ses engagemens, en la comprenant dans le traité de paix glorieux, qui vient d’etre conclu avec le Roi de Sardaigne.’; NA 2.01.08 no. 102. 57   Article 22 Treaty of Tolentino: ‘Conformément à l’article 6 du Traité conclu à La Haye le 27 floréal de l’an III, la paix conclue par le present traité entre la République Française et Sa Sainteté, est declarée commune à la République Batave.’ (Kerautret, 2002, p. 83)



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successful 1796 campaign of the French Army of Italy under the command of General Bonaparte. These negotiations led to the short-lived peace established by the Preliminaries of Leoben58 and, eventually, the Treaty of Campoformio between the French Republic and Austria and to the peace conference in Rastatt aiming for a peace settlement with the German Empire at large. With the benefit of hindsight, this peace settlement is regularly characterised as ‘a truce’ in historiography.59 At the time, however, one did aim at a permanent peace settlement; forasmuch as eighteenth-century peace settlements were permanent.60 Virtually everyone sincerely wanted to end the war, but everyone wanted his own kind of peace as well and basically was not willing to put his trust in international order to safeguard security. This made a stable and durable settlement severely difficult to establish. The imperial Diet had invited the Emperor to enter into peace negotiations—on the condition of the Empire’s territorial integrity— already on 9 July 1795, which invitation was repeated on 22 December of the same year.61 The Directoire had set its mind on peace, too, but, to a majority of the Directors, it had to be a peace that ensured France of its ‘natural’ or ‘constitutional’ borders.62 The main strategy was to divide Austria and Britain. After a compromise peace with Austria, Britain would be isolated and forced to accept the new situation on the Continent.63 Especially after the rupture of the first negotiations with Britain in Paris in November-December 1796, the Directoire’s peace policy focussed on Vienna.64 The Austrian government had refused to deal with France separately, though.65 Bonaparte’s first Italian campaign crushed all Austrian hopes of a swift victory,66 although the military situation in southern Germany was still in a deadlock or even more favourable to Austria after defeats suffered by Jourdan and Moreau. In spite of Napoleon’s plans for a joint action of the French armies   18 April 1797, Preliminaries of London; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 85–91.   E.g. Guyot, 1907, p. 540. 60  Lesaffer has shown that at the time ‘permanent’ with regard to a peace treaty meant that waging war for the same reasons was excluded. Hence, a ‘permanent peace’ amounted to the acceptance of nebis in idem and not in the exclusion of future war altogether. Lesaffer, 2008b, pp. 22–23. 61   Hüffer, 1878, p. 3. 62   Ballot, 1910, p. 75; Guyot, 1907, p. 668. 63   Ballot, 1910, p. 58. 64   Ballot, 1910, p. 75. 65  Sorel, 1906IV, p. 197, p. 394 and p. 432. 66   Bruun, 1965, p. 37. 58 59

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directed against Vienna, the situation had become totally desperate by the end of the winter of 1796–1797: Austria having been forced to evacuate Italy entirely, but the French armies both at the Rhine and in Italy unable to advance any further without risking to overstretch their lines of communication or becoming totally isolated in enemy territory. Hence, the Directoire opted for peace. On 15 November, it designated General Clarke, head of the Directoire’s bureau militaire, to travel to Vienna and propose a general armistice.67 Almost simultaneously Vienna decided for overtures by means of the Austrian envoy in Switzerland, Ignace Degelmann. General Clarke was to travel through Italy in order to consult General Bonaparte, especially concerning the situation in Italy.68 From the start, the French intended it to be a separate peace with Austria. Il nous a paru que l’on ne pouvait pas à la fois entamer une négociation de paix séparée avec Vienne et prêter l’oreille à une proposition qui serait faite à l’ouverture d’un congrès. Tant que la cour de Vienne aura l’espoir de pouvoir obtenir de nous l’ouverture d’un congrès, elle n’entendra jamais à des propositions de paix séparée. Nous ne porterons jamais la cour de Vienne à entrer en négociation avec nous qu’en nous prononçant décidément contre l’ouverture d’un congrès qui, par la lenteur des formes, ne pourrait pas éviter la campagne qui va s’ouvrir et qu’un esprit d’humanité et de philosophie, qui malheureusement n’est pas partagé par l’Empereur, vous fait désirer d’éviter.69

Even in French diplomatic circles, however, the influence of the ­eighteenth-century tradition of great peace conferences drawing ‘basic treaties’ was felt. For instance, Darneville, second secretary at the French legation in Geneva, suggested involving Russia in the peace as a guarantee. Russian involvement would have turned the Treaty, ‘qui par ses resultants doit avoir la même importance que celui de

  Guyot, 1907, p. 260.   6 March 1797, Directoire to Bonaparte; AN AF III* 20. ‘Il sert concerté avec vous sur tout ce qui concerne cette négociation conformement aux ordres du Directoire. [. . .] Le Directoire desire, général, que vous en prenies connaissance, que vous-les rapprochiés des précédentes de notre position à l’egard des differents peuples d’Italie, et que vous lui fassies parvenir votre opinion raisonnée sur l’effet du traité que le général Clarke est chargé de proposer à l’Autriche, rélativement au salut de l’armée, aux intérêts et à l’honneur de la république.’ 69   6 March 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 pp. 868–869 no. 1440. See also Ballot, 1910, p. 58; Guyot, 1907, p. 485. 67 68



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­ estphalie,’ into a system-wide arrangement.70 Darneville’s feeling of W the need of creating a new fundamental treaty for Europe was more widely felt, but would come to the fore neither during the negotiations nor in the Treaty with Austria. For the time being, the Austrians were not that keen on negotiating at all. Austrian forces in Italy were forced to retreat, but victories had been won in Germany. Moreover, Catherine the Great had promised to send Russian troops. Above all, Vienna faced a terrible dilemma. The British had their island, the Russian their vast land masses on the eastern flank of Europe, Prussia could sustain its position in northern Germany; with Habsburg dominions spread all over Europe and directly bordering on France, Austria had no place to hide. Austria was in the middle of Europe, involved in every region, and had to hold together a potpourri of people and territories. Given the military situation, any compromise peace with France would deteriorate the Austrian position. Thereto, on the one hand negotiations were not to be started too early because Austria needed British subsidies and ­Russian military support.71 On the other hand, starting negotiations too late would jeopardise even more territory and, in the end, ­Austria’s great power status. Catherine soon died, though, and news of British peace proposals to France reached Vienna.72 After the Battle of Rivoli (14 January 1797) and the capitulation of Mantua (2 February 1797), the government in Vienna gave a sincerely affirmative response to French overtures.73 In early March the first talks that were to lead to preliminaries began.74 Due to the military situation negotiations proper were not to commence but for another month. Revolts in Bergamo and Brescia provided Bonaparte with a chance to bring his troops within gunshot of the Austrian hereditary lands as it provided him with an excuse to invade the Venetian terra firma and create a pass way towards ­Carinthia. On the very same day that he marched into ­Brescia, Bonaparte wrote to the Directoire and expressed his hopes that, if the Army of the Rhine would march ahead as well, the Emperor would 70   15 February 1797, Mémoire sur les relations de l’Autriche et de la France en 1797 et sur un projet d’intervention de paix avec l’Autriche; AAE MD Autriche 70. 71  Schroeder, 1996, p. 174. 72   Blanning, 1996, p. 174. 73   Blanning, 1996, pp. 174–175. 74   4 March 1797, Bonaparte to Jacob, secretary to the French legation in Turin; CG1 p. 864 no. 1430.

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be lost and complete victory would be the French Republic’s.75 To the General’s great disappointment,76 the Army of the Rhine did not cross the river, though, thus preventing him from marching on as this would leave his left flank and, possibly, even his rear open to attack. Therefore, after French troops had occupied Klagenfurt—about 300 kilometres from Vienna—he proposed in what he himself called ‘une lettre très philosophique’77 to the Austrian commander in chief, the Archduke Charles, to start negotiations. L’Europe, qui avait pris les armes contre la République française, les a posées. Votre nation reste seule, et cependant le sang va couler encore plus que jamais. [. . .] Le Directoire exécutif de la République française avait fait connaître à S.M. l’Empereur le désir de mettre fin à la guerre qui désole les deux peuples: l’intervention de la cour de Londres s’y est opposée.78

Although Bonaparte was not content with the Archduke’s response and still hoped that the Army of the Rhine would join forces with the troops under his command to crush the Austrians,79 negotiations were not long under way. By then, French forces had reached Leoben. Only a few days afterwards did the Austrian plenipotentiary, the Count Maximilien Merveldt, arrive in the Austrian field headquarter with full powers to conclude a separate peace. With the Army of Italy running the risk of facing the Austrian main force by itself since Moreau and Hoche did not move an inch on the Rhine, Bonaparte was keen on ending hostilities soon.80 He met Merveldt in Leoben on the morning of 13 April.81 Both negotiators must have had faith in the possibilities of peace at the time as after the examination of Merveldt’s full powers they decided to prolong the armistice concluded earlier between Bonaparte and the Archduke Charles. Negotiations on preliminaries were somewhat delayed by Bonaparte’s initial refusal to

  17 March 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 pp. 877–878 no. 1455.   22 March 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 pp. 883–884 no. 1466; 25 March 1797, Bonaparte to Carnot; CG1 p. 889 no. 1475. 77   4 April 1797, Bonaparte to Clarke; CG1 p. 897 no. 1488. 78   31 March 1797, Bonaparte to Archduke Charles; CG1 p. 894 no. 1484. 79   4 April 1797, Bonaparte to Clarke; CG1 p. 897 no. 1488: ‘il m’a répondu comme un enfant qui a peur d’être grondé par Thugut ou plutôt comme tous ces gens-là qui sont d’autant plus esclaves qu’ils approchent plus près du trône.’ 80   8 April 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; AAE CP Autriche 366 and CG1 p. 901 no. 1495; Guyot, 1907, p. 357. 81   For the mid-April conferences see also Guyot, 1907, p. 361. 75 76



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r­ ecognise the second Austrian plenipotentiary, since the Marquis de Gallo was also the Sicilian envoy in Vienna and the French general thought the capacity of ambassador of one friendly power incompatible with that of another.82 After all, it might seem that indirectly Naples would be allowed to take part in the negotiations contrary to the policy of separate peaces. The Batavian Republic was interested in Franco-Austrian negotiations, but kept some distance for the time being. The Hague bided its time preparing for attempts of realising its plans of territorial aggrandisement within the margins of the negotiations proper and awaiting the general congress to really intervene and expectedly to play a direct part. Although aware that the French and Austrian governments should start talking within due time, the Preliminaries of Leoben must have taken the Batavian government by surprise. With little over a week between Merveldt’s arrival at the front and the conclusion of the Preliminaries there would not even have been time to send a courier to The Hague directly from Leoben and him returning with the Batavian government’s remarks, let alone that the news was to reach The Hague through Paris in time. Thus, it should be no surprise that the Batavian government did not even have a chance to get involved, even if it had expressed its desire to do so. This does not mean that The Hague took no interest at all in what was going on between France and Austria. The Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken regarded Franco­German peace talks as an excellent occasion to get the Batavian Republic a piece of the pie, whereas it had some minor issues to settle with Vienna as well. To be sure, the Batavian Republic was not at war with Austria directly, but only involved in hostilities as an auxiliary to France and peace between the Batavian Republic and Austria did hence not have to be established. Blauw, by then Batavian envoy in Sardinia, contended in an elaborate report that the Batavian Republic was not in a position to play a significant role in negotiations. He proposed making an attempt to act as mediator between France and Austria at a conference in Basel.83 Military events resulted in a situation of clear French dominance, though, and the Batavian Republic could no longer afford not to stand by its French sister.84 In the

  16 April 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 pp. 914–915 no. 1514.   Vreede, 1863, pp. 270–271. 84   Vreede, 1863, pp. 274–275. 82 83

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s­ ummer of 1796, with the French being in control of the best part of Italy and on a winning stroke in Germany, the Batavian Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken, considered the stance it was to take and the demands to be made on behalf of the Batavian Republic throughout peace negotiations. The committee directed Lestevenon and Pasteur—the commissioners send to Paris to settle the Batavian adherence to the Franco-­Spanish Alliance Treaty—to find out the French government’s intentions with regard to either continuing the war or establishing peace and especially to find out whether there were already peace talks going on. When they would address the members of the Directoire confidentially, they were also to stress the necessity of peace for the Batavian Republic— exhausted by the war effort and until the moment of peace deprived of its sources of affluence and thus unable to pay the remaining part of indemnity agreed upon in the Treaty of The Hague—, provided it would be a stable and profitable one.85 In Paris, the Batavian envoy, Caspar Meyer, declared to Delacroix that the French and ­Batavian Republics had a shared interest in securing future prosperity by a glorious and solid peace, attributing to France the right to settle the future European order: Les incroyables succès des armées françaises en rapprochent tous les jours l’heureux époque et donnent à la France triomphante le droit flatteur d’en dicter les conditions pour le bonheur et le repos de l’Europe.86

The Batavian government’s main concern and hope was of a territorial nature. According to Article 16 of the 1795 Treaty of The Hague, the Batavian Republic was entitled to compensation for the territories ceded to France ‘à la pacification générale.’ That time seemed to be approaching. As early as the first days of May 1796, the Batavian envoys in Paris, Blauw and Meyer, were instructed to take the matter into hand.87 The Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken wanted to propose to the Directoire ‘the way best suited to comply with the Treaty of 1795.’88

85   12 July 1796, Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to Lestevenon and Pasteur; NA 2.01.08 no. 102. 86   17 August 1796, Meyer to Delacroix; NA 1.02.14 no. 599. 87   9 May 1796, Instructions for Blauw and Meyer with respect to territorial indemnity; NA 2.01.08 no. 390. 88   ‘om aan het Fransch gouvernement op te geeven, welke de meest geschikte wijze zoude zijn om aan het Tractaat van 1795 te voldoen.’; 9 May 1796, instructions for Blauw and Meyer; NA 2.01.08 no. 390.



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Two goals were to be attained by the modification of the Batavian Republic’s borders. First, the Batavian Republic was to be given a frontier for her to be able to defend herself against enemy attacks with an army as small as possible. Thus, the Batavian Republic could spend all its attention and resources to building a respectable fleet and be a useful ally to France. Second, the territorial aggrandisement should be a suitable compensation for the loss of the fertile lands of Dutch ­Flanders. Both aims point at the dominance of the ratio of the eighteenth-century territorial state in which territory was regarded in terms of its military-strategic importance and of its value as an economic base for state finances.89 Disregarding all strategic innovations adopted during the Revolutionary Wars thus far rendering the idea of fortifications to halt entire armies somewhat outdated,90 Dutch Patriots simply transferred the logic of the old barrier system from the south to the east, even though military innovations had rendered fortifications an increasingly less obstacle to troop movements. As due to the close alliance with the French Republic the southern border was no ­longer in any danger, attention should be spend to provide the Batavian Republic with a defensible border in the east; the direction from which the Batavian Patriots had been attacked in 1787.91 The committee then proposed two projects for aggrandisement in the east. The first one, and the one it preferred, included the County of Bentheim and all other territories west of a line from the Ems estuary towards Rhenen, further onwards towards Wezel including that city and then up to the river Meuse, preferably including the city of Venlo. If this project could not be realised, the Batavian Republic would be content with a much smaller extension of its eastern border pointed out in detail by the committee by which the frontier would be formed by rivers, swamp areas and some fortified places, in combination with the annexation of autonomous territories enclaved within Batavian territory; Zevenaar, Huijssen, and Ravenstein in particular. In addition, the committee stressed the importance of not compensating Prussia for any losses due to this aggrandisement of the Batavian Republic at the other side of the border. The fate of these enclaves and various other places or seigniories belonging to the German Empire or   Bobbitt, 2003, p. 118 and pp. 138–139.   Parker, 2004, pp. 151–152. 91   On the effect of fear for Prussia on Batavian territorial schemes, see e.g. Smit, 1975, p. 18. 89 90

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at least to German princes or chivalry orders such as Bergen op Zoom and Gemert within the Batavian territory92 would remain uncertain for the best part of the Batavian Republic’s existence, though. Only in 1802, an arrangement regarding these territories was reached through French mediation. For the time being, henceforth, their future was sufficient reason for the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to take interest in the peace talks between France and the Duke of Bavaria and Elector Palatine. The Batavian government requested the Directoire to further the Batavian Republic’s interests throughout negotiations too and expressed its wish that no prince would conserve any rights or titles within the Batavian Republic’s territory.93 Finally, in instructions for Blauw and Meyer, the committee expressed some concern regarding the Southern Netherlands. Apparently the committee was not absolutely sure that France would never return those territories to Austria, since it expressed that shifting the attention in Dutch foreign and defence policy towards the eastern border was totally dependent on France being in possession of the territories south of the Batavian Republic and reminded its envoys in Paris that France was under treaty obligation not to cede Maastricht and former Dutch Flanders to any other power, whereas if there was any chance of the Batavian Republic attaining some land on the other side of the river Scheldt or even the city of Antwerp, they should make an attempt towards such an acquisition. In a letter to Delacroix, Lestevenon expressed the Batavian interests and territorial demands to be taken into regard during the peace negotiations. He stressed their significance—both in the Batavian interest and in France’s own interest—since fulfilling these demands was necessary for the Batavian Republic to be a useful ally. Thereto, he made

92   In a letter to Delacroix, François Noël enumerated the following places and territories enclaved and in possession of foreign lords: the Marquisat of Bergen op Zoom, Ravenstein, and the Seigniory of Michel Gestel et Gemonde belonging to the Elector Palatine, the Baronet of Boxmeer, the Seigniory Baronet of Wisch and the County of s’Heerenberg belonging to the House of Hohenzollern, the village of Ooffelt belonging to the King of Prussia, the County of Megen belonging to the Count of Schall, the free Seigniory of Gemert belonging to the Teutonic Order, the Seigniory of Boekhoven belonging to the French emigré Montmorencin Robecq, Batenburg belonging to the Count of Bentheim Steinfurt, and the Seigniory of Borkelo belonging to the Count of Flemming; 22 September 1796, Noël to Delacroix; AAE CP Hollande 592. On the concerned dominions situated in present-day Noord-Brabant, see Van der Ree-Scholtens, 1993, pp. 240–245; Bos-Rops, Sanders and Van Vliet, 2002, pp. 15–28. 93   3 October 1796, Meyer to Delacroix; NA 1.02.14 no. 599.



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an even much clearer reference both to the security as to the economic aspect of the desired aggrandisement.94 Lestevenon stressed to Delacroix that the Batavian Republic had a security problem caused by its regime change and its alliance with France that had to be taken care of. Rendue à la liberté par les exploits des armes républicaines, elle ne saurait se résigner qu’elle renferme dans son sein beaucoup d’ennemis de l’ordre établi, et qui des voisins puissances ne jettent des regards irrités et avides, sur un pays soustrait à leur dépendance pour contracter une alliance intime avec sa libératrice, cette grande et puissante nation, qui est flattée par plusieurs, crainte par tous, mais dont les vrais amis ne se trouvent pas sur le trône, ni dans les palais des souverains.95

The alliance with France did take away some danger as the French backing discouraged other powers to hazard intervening in the ­Batavian Republic, but exactly the experience of the 1787 Prussian invasion that crushed the Dutch Patriot Revolution caused some unrest. In the Batavian government’s view, increasing the Batavian Republic’s security depended on two main issues. First, the House of Orange-Nassau had to be indemnified since that would cut down any hopes of a new restoration. In that respect, it was of great importance that the Prince of Orange’s new estates would be as far away from the Batavian frontier as possible. Second, to prevent another Prussian invasion and keeping the Prussian guarantee of the Stadholderate in mind, it was necessary to get the King of Prussia to recognise the Batavian Republic and to establish permanent diplomatic relations between his court and the Batavian government by receiving a Batavian envoy in Berlin and dispatching an envoy to The Hague. Since that would still not be sufficient for the Batavian Republic to be secure, Lestevenon stressed the importance of a well defensible eastern border in order for the Batavians to be able to counter an attack from the east, showing yet again that the Batavian’s defence policy was to a large extent determined by the horror of the 1787 invasion. As the traditional line of defence in the south had become obsolete, the Batavian Republic now had to shift its attention to the east and to build a line of defence at the side of Westphalia. For that the Batavian Republic had to be ceded some more territory for the frontier to exist of rivers, swamps and some fortified places. In addition, Lestevenon explicitly

  23 September 1796, Lestevenon to Delacroix; AAE CP Angleterre 590.   23 September 1796, Lestevenon to Delacroix; AAE CP Angleterre 590.

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stated that these minor territorial gains did not suffice for the Batavian Republic to be compensated for the loss of Maastricht and Dutch Flanders pursuant to Article 16 of the Alliance Treaty since the territories gained were economically of significantly less value. Although the Treaty of The Hague spoke of compensation ‘égales en surface,’ Lestevenon insisted that the territories by which the Batavian Republic would be compensated were to be of equal economic value and he expressed his conviction that France would be willing to provide her ally with exactly that. From an economic point of view the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken showed some interest in an extension of Batavian territory with the Prussian territories west of the river Rhine, inter alia the Duchy of Cleves and Upper Guelders, of which rumours went that they were to be ceded to France.96 There are no signs that the French negotiators claimed any territories on behalf of the Batavian Republic in Leoben or that they were ordered to do so by the Directoire. Then again, none of the territories claimed by the Batavian Republic were the Emperor’s to give. This territorial aggrandisement had to wait for the peace settlement with the Empire. Nonetheless, Clarke was instructed to make sure that William V of Orange was compensated by acquisitions in Germany east of the river Rhine, though. If the Emperor would promise to work with the French Republic to obtain territories for the Prince of Orange, this promise was to be kept secret until the definitive peace.97 The Leoben negotiations were dominated by Italian and German affairs. In Italy, Lombard Patriots were pushing for republicanisation. The Directoire wished to secure the Rhine frontier. Vienna did not oppose a new territorial settlement. Austria had to be properly compensated, though. Moreover, Prussia’s position in Germany was not to be strengthened by compensation east of the Rhine for dominions in the Rhineland.98 Hence, having been spared the risk of dismemberment that had occurred in Eastern Europe by the escalation of great power rivalry and balance of power politics thus far due to the 1756 diplomatic revolution and the resulting Franco-Austrian alliance, this was the time for the minor powers of western Europe to start worrying about any plans of partitioning to reach a great power compro  12 July 1796, Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaken to Lestevenon and Pasteur; NA 2.01.08 no. 102. 97   19 January 1797, instructions for Clarke; AAE CP Autriche 366. 98   Guyot, 1907, p. 98; Schroeder, 1994, p. 168. 96



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mise at their expense. The interdependent territorial arrangements for Germany and Italy were central to the Leoben negotiations. With one stroke, France could win everything it had desired from the reign of Francis I onwards; for Austria nothing less than great power status and the capacity to play a major role in European politics were at stake. Waving aside the issue of the Austrian recognition of the French Republic—since according to him no recognition was necessary as the French Republic ‘est en Europe ce qu’est le soleil sur l’horizon’99— General Bonaparte went straight at the territorial issues. The general wished to safeguard his Italian conquests. With Frenchmen born in north-eastern France dominating the Foreign Office and even the Directoire itself, France’s foreign and defence policies took more interest in the Rhine frontier, one of the main cornerstones of Revolutionary foreign policy due to the dogma of the natural frontiers anyhow, than in Mediterranean affairs. For Reubell, the Director in command of foreign policy, the Rhine frontier was the alpha et omega of his political programme as that frontier would free his own native soil from the danger of sudden attack.100 Moreover, that frontier would almost double the distance from Paris to any place from where the German monarchs might start a new run on the French capital to destroy the Republican government. Thus, the Directoire hesitated between allowing Italian Patriots and Bonaparte to vest a republic in Lombardy and returning Lombardy to the Emperor in return for the cession of the left bank of the Rhine.101 In the end, the Directoire would back the creation of the ­Cisalpine Republic. To really exclude any German influence in Italy the centuries-old connection with the Empire had to be broken since the Empire’s suzerainty over the imperial fiefs in northern-Italy102 was an ‘instrument d’oppression’ in the Emperor’s hands.103 This is the stance taken by the Directoire in the build-up to the negotiations. Whereas French troops were to evacuate the Emperor’s estates in Italy,104 Clarke

  16 April 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 pp. 914–915 no. 1514.   Homan, 1971, p. 89; Homan, 1971, p. 131; Guyot, 1907, pp. 117–118 and p. 673; Lentz, 2005c, p. 456. 101   Guyot, 1907, p. 259  and p. 359; Ross, 1981, p. 127; Godechot, 1983, p. 245; Kaiser, 1990, p. 225; Blanning, 1996, p. 173; Droz, 2005, p. 208; Lentz, 2005c, p. 449. 102   On ‘Reichsitalien’ see Von Aretin, 1992; Lesaffer, 1999a, p. 384. 103   25 juli 1796, Rapport au Directoire exécutif; AAE MD Italie 12; AAE CP Autriche 366. 104   19 January 1797, instructions for Clarke; AAE CP Autriche 366.   99 100

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was instructed to insist on the independence of the former Austrian dominions in Italy and the cession of the Empire’s suzerainty since the House of Austria had abused that feudal relation to its own profit, whereas he was to promise French assistance in getting compensation both for the Emperor and for the Duke of Modena in Germany. The Austrian negotiators almost immediately offered the cession of the Belgian departments on the condition of compensation in Italy, for instance part of Venice or the Papal Legations that had been transmitted into the Cispadane Republic in December 1796. The easiness with which the Austrians gave in on the cession of Belgium should not cause any surprise as those territories had been occupied by France for several years already and mainly because the court of Vienna itself had tried to exchange the Austrian Netherlands for territories closer to home in Germany (Bavaria) on various occasions throughout the second half of the eighteenth century; a plan that had been blocked by Prussia every time to prevent further Austrian preponderance in Germany.105 Before reaching a final agreement several drafts were drawn simultaneously and sent to Vienna.106 The first draft put forward the cession of Belgium and the constitutional frontiers of the French Republic. The Austrians did demand the restoration of Lombardy, though, whereas Bonaparte insisted on a republic in northern Italy. These drafts were sent to Vienna to be scrutinised. After the Emperor’s response was received in Leoben, the Preliminaries were signed on 18 April. The Preliminaries of Leoben were mainly a territorial settlement between the French Republic and the Emperor foreshadowing a general congress. The Preliminaries linked internal stability to the international sphere. With the Revolutionary’s propaganda and the Counter-revolutionary support for ‘émigrés’ and royalist resistance within the French Republic in mind, Article 3 stated that both parties would do everything within their power to contribute to the internal tranquillity of the two powers.107 It was also agreed that a general congress was to take place in the Swiss City of Bern as soon as possible. To that congress, plenipotentiaries of both parties’ allies would be admit-

105   Geyl, 1959, p. 273; Guyot, 1907, p. 98; Murphy, 1982, p. 411; Schroeder, 1994, pp. 26–27 and p. 161; Blanning, 2007, p. 595. 106   16 April 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 pp. 914–915 no. 1514. 107   ‘La République Française et Sa Majesté l’Empereur s’engagent à faire tout ce qui sera en leur pouvoir pour contribuer à la tranquillité intérieure des deux États.’



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ted, ‘s’ils accident à l’invitation qui leur en sera faite.’108 Moreover, hostilities between France and the Empire were ended immediately and there was to be a congress to conclude definitive peace between France and the German Empire on the base of the latter’s integrity.109 The best part of the Preliminaries is occupied by the return or cession of territory. The Emperor abstained from all his rights and titles to the Belgian provinces and recognised France’s borders as decreed by the laws of the French Republic. France was to return all other territories belonging to the hereditary estates of the House of Austria and at the time of the definitive peace the Emperor was to be compensated for the loss of the Belgian provinces to France.110 The secret Articles went much further. In these, the Emperor ceded all his dominions in Italy across the rivers Oglio and Po as well on the condition of being compensated by considerable parts of the territory of the Republic of Venice.111 This opened the way to the establishment of sister republics in Italy. No provision was made with regard to compensation for the Prince of Orange in Germany. To the Directoire’s annoyance the Preliminaries did not only fail to attain the left bank of the river Rhine,112 but did actually recognise the Empire’s territorial integrity. Reubell’s much desired extension of the French north-eastern border to cover Paris and his native soil in the Alsace was thus secluded from the peace settlement, as was aggrandisement for the Batavian Republic towards the east for that matter. Nevertheless, in the light of public opinion, the Directoire had to accept the Preliminaries.113 Since Bonaparte had already leaked the Preliminaries to play on the French public’s desire for peace, the 108   Article 4: ‘Les deux Puissances Contractantes enverront au plus tôt des plénipotentiaires dans la ville de Berne, pour y traiter et conclure dans l’espace de trois mois, ou plus tôt si faire se peut, la paix définitive entre les deux puissances. À ce congrès seront admis les plénipotentiaires des alliés respectifs, s’ils accèdent à l’invitation qui leur en sera faite.’ 109   Article 5: ‘Sa Majesté l’Empereur ayant à cœur que la paix se rétablisse entre l’Empire Germanique et la France, et le Directoire exécutif de la République Française voulant également témoigner à Sa Majesté Impériale sont désir d’asseoir ladite paix sur des bases solides et équitables, conviennent d’une cessation des hostilités entre l’Empire Germanique et la France, à commencer d’aujourd’hui. Il sera tenu un congrès formé de plénipotentiaires respectifs, pour y traiter et conclure la paix définitive entre les deux Puissances, sur la base de l’intégrité de l’Empire Germanique.’ 110   Articles 6 and 7. 111   Article 1 secret. 112   Guyot, 1907, p. 360; Blanning, 1996, p. 177; Black, 2002, p. 216. 113  Sutherland, 2003, p. 279.

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Directoire was forced to ratify the Preliminaries.114 Only Reubell, disagreeing with the Preliminaries since they did not contain the cession of the left bank of the Rhine, voted against ratification.115 Soon after news of the Preliminaries reached Paris, Noël was instructed by Delacroix to inform the Batavian government of their conclusion.116 He must have taken some time to do so or his notification must have been quite succinct, as on 10 May Meyer was told by the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to try to find out more about the Preliminaries and to send a copy to The Hague.117 In the notification of the Preliminaries the expectation of a sudden re-establishment of the Continental peace was linked to the need for the Batavian Republic to organise its government within due time since the Constitution was thought to be a guarantee for domestic tranquillity­ that, next to external peace, was necessary for a stabile political order. entrevoir à la République Batave, les brillantes destinées qui l’attendent, si fidèle a suivre l’exemple qui lui a été tracé par son alliée, elle se hâte d’organiser son gouvernement, et de comprimer sans retour toutes les factions, par l’établissement d’une constitution libre.118

2.3  A General’s Peace After the Preliminaries had been signed, Gallo left for Austria to present them to his government and return with its ratification. Bonaparte wrote to the Directoire that the Emperor desired opening the ‘suite les négociations pour la paix définitive [. . .] sans y appeler les alliés; qu’on pourrait seulement les appeler à la paix de l’Empire’ and requested new powers for General Clarke, who had arrived in Leoben twentyfour hours after the Preliminaries had been signed, since negotiations would now be for a definitive Peace treaty.119 The nature of the congresses to be held following the Preliminaries of Leoben turned out to be a major point of disagreement between the two belligerents. The reader will recall that Leoben foresaw two congresses: one in Bern to   Guyot, 1907, pp. 365–366; Blanning, 1996, pp. 177–178.   Homan, 1971, p. 136; Guyot, 1907, pp. 365–366. 116   26 April 1797, Delacroix to Noël; AAE CP Hollande 595. 117   10 May 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B. 118   26 April 1797, Delacroix to Noël; AAE CP Hollande 595. 119   22 April 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 p. 919 no. 1517. 114 115



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negotiate and conclude a definitive peace between France and Austria in which the respective allies would be invited to partake and one for peace with the Empire. The question whether the provisions on these two congresses entailed a general congress in Bern or the prospect of a separate peace between France and Austria would divide the two powers nearly until the end of negotiations in mid-October. Vienna thought a general congress to be in the pocket. The Directoire was still determined to conclude a separate peace with Austria. There was to be no congress.120 If a congress could not be avoided, the peace settlement’s substance should be agreed upon in advance turning the congress in merely a ‘chambre d’enregistrement,’ to use Guyot’s words.121 On his return from Vienna with the Emperor’s ratification, according to Bonaparte, Gallo had proposed to treat for a ‘paix particulière’ between the Emperor and the French Republic somewhere in Italy as soon as possible. The allies would be called upon to take part in the peace with the Empire solely and not in the Franco-Austrian peace.122 This would at least exclude the possibility that Britain would oppose Austrian gains in the Adriatic.123 In early May, Bonaparte must not have been confident that a definitive peace with Austria would be realised since he still reckoned with the possibility that hostilities would start again. He was even designing plans to march into the Habsburg mainland, drive the Emperor from Vienna and dictate peace, by which the French Republic would be in the position to ‘tenir la balance dans l’Europe.’124 Nevertheless, some weeks later negotiations started in Mombello, Bonaparte’s residence near Milan. On 24 May 1797, a convention was concluded in Mombello.125 Gallo abstained from the Bern congress. This Convention stipulated that no foreign power would be admitted to the peace talks between France and the Empire. Instead, the Emperor promised his mediation, accepted by France, for the conclusion of peace treaties with his allies. So, there were to be separate peace treaties with the Emperor’s allies, inter alia Britain and Russia. The Austrian envoys were thus tended to move   Ballot, 1910, p. 101; Guyot, 1907, p. 363.   Guyot, 1907, p. 486. 122   30 April 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 pp. 920–921 no. 1518. 123   Guyot, 1907, p. 488. 124   30 April 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 pp. 921–922 no. 1519. 125   25 May 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire (Articles convenus dans la séance du 24 mai 1797 enclosed); CG1 p. 956 no. 1577; Ballot, 1910, p. 101; Guyot, 1907, p. 486 and p. 489 120 121

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away from the idea of a general congress, but they did leave the matter for Vienna to decide. For the Convention contains a clause stating that if the Emperor would want his allies to be able to take part in the congress, he and the Directoire had to invite their respective allies and provide them with passports for their envoys. The Austrian envoys had not been mistaken in their doubts for ­Thugut disapproved.126 After the reaction from Vienna had been received, Gallo had to inform Bonaparte that his government did after all still opt for a general congress.127 That position collided with the Directoire’s instructions for Bonaparte and Clarke in which it was made very clear that the French government’s intention was to conclude a separate peace with the Emperor as King of Hungary and Bohemia and afterwards to have a peace congress for the Empire ‘auquel appelés tous les paires de l’Allemagne.’128 Gallo and Merveldt claimed not to have any powers other than the ones for the Preliminaries, let alone to conclude a separate peace. Bonaparte and Clarke, getting impatient, resisted the idea of a general congress. They made it very clear that it was the Directoire’s intention to conclude a definitive and separate peace with the Emperor ‘sur-le-champ.’ In an interesting letter to Gallo of 21 June, they made an extensive argument to that very end.129 First of all, they pointed to the time schedule. According to the Preliminaries, the definitive treaty had to be concluded by 18 July. If a general congress had to be convened instead of a congress only attended by French and Austrian plenipotentiaries, it would still take several months before the congress could commence. By then the truces would have expired. The French envoys bluntly accused the Austrians of stalling. They disagreed with their Austrian colleagues on the meaning of Article 4 of the ­Preliminaries: Il est évident par le texte de l’article qu’on cite, par la nature et l’esprit des préliminaires et par la discussion qui a eu lieu, lors de leur rédaction, que le congrès ne devoit être composé que des plénipotentiaires des deux puissances, puisque elles seules devoient y traiter et conclure leur paix définitive et qu’il reste alors à déterminer ce que doivent y faire

  Guyot, 1907, p. 488.   11 June 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 p. 997 no. 1659; Guyot, 1907, p. 502. 128   14 June 1797, instructions for Bonaparte and Clarke; AAE MD Autriche 8. 129   21 June 1797, Bonaparte and Clarke to Gallo; AAE CP Autriche 366. 126 127



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les plénipotentiaires des alliés respectifs. En effet, si ces alliés faisoient cause commune avec S.M. Imperiale et Royale. Elle ne feroit plus sa paix séparée avec la République française et c’est pour cela que dans l’article cité on a organisé le congrès pour cette paix separée avant de faire mention de ses alliés. Il a été d’ailleurs naturel lors de la redaction des préliminaires d’y insérer tout ce qui pouvoit être agréable à S.M. l’Empereur et Roi et adoucir l’abandon que les circonstances demandoient qu’elle fût de ses alliés.

Furthermore, Britain was already negotiating separately with the French Republic in Lille. Was Austria trying to hinder those negotiations and delay peace in Europe? Remarkably, in stating the importance of concluding peace promptly, Bonaparte and Clarke did express the idea of a peace that would (re-)establish a European order.130 The major question would then have been who exactly was to decide what that order would be like: France, France and Austria, or those powers in concert with a more extended number of states. The French exclusion of any of the allies from the congress points at the first or second option depending on the influence Austria was expected to have on the outcome. Therefore, Clarke and Bonaparte demanded that negotiations started on 24 May would continue and the definitive peace treaty would be concluded before 18 July. Austria desperately tried to avoid a separate peace. Vienna must have had felt to be in a difficult position. Consenting to a separate peace would alienate its allies and thus amounted to running the risk of having to fight on its own and without any foreign subsidies if negotiations with France would fail. That Vienna was concerned about Britain’s and Russia’s reaction was sensed but ignored by Bonaparte.131 Throughout May and June, most of the time was usurped by waiting for couriers to arrive. By the end of June, negotiations were transferred to Udine, closer to Vienna, in order to accelerate the peace process.132 The Austrian envoys immediately went to Udine. Clarke arrived in Udine some days later.133 Pro tempore, Bonaparte stayed in Milan until

  ‘une paix qui doit établir sur des bases solides le systême politique de l’Europe.’   30 April 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 pp. 920–921 no. 1518. Gallo had told Bonaparte that the Court of St James suspected the Emperor of illfaith; 22 June 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 p. 1025 no. 1714. 132   30 June 1797, note des plenipotentiaries français et autrichiens à l’Empereur; CG1 p. 1036 no. 1740. 133   Guyot, 1907, p. 511. 130 131

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the Austrians would have received their powers,134 which they did not until early August.135 Gallo travelled further to Vienna to consult with Thugut. The Austrian government held out for the immediate convocation of the two congresses pursuant to Articles 4 and 5 of the Preliminaries. Thugut insisted on the Preliminaries being strictly upheld. For the time being the Austrian envoys were to stay in Italy in anticipation of the Bern congress and deal with Clarke and Bonaparte in order to ‘prepare’ that congress substantively and, secondly, to settle the most recent developments in Italy without changing the fundamental basis of the peace agreed in Leoben. The Emperor insisted on the Bern congress to assemble as soon as possible. Britain was not anticipated to send representatives because of the Lille negotiations. Russia was to be informed of the congress though and, moreover, was to be expected to make use of the right granted to Austria’s allies in Article 4 of the Preliminaries.136 It dawned on Thugut that peace could not be avoided. Austria’s international and domestic positions left him no choice. In an attempt to circumvent Bonaparte, he sent Gallo’s scribe, Baptiste to Paris. Talleyrand was to be addressed directly, as where the Directors Carnot and Barthélemy. Because of this mission, negotiations in Udine were to be protracted. Meanwhile, Gallo stayed in Vienna.137 The Baptiste mission was a failure, though, since the Directoire held on to the Rhine frontier as a condition for peace.138 As time passed, Bonaparte became more impatient because of pragmatic military reasons. He suspected the Emperor of protracting negotiations as long as necessary for winter to make campaigning impossible. Hence, he suggested to his colleague to respond to the Emperor’s envoys that if negotiations would not be finished by 18 August the Preliminaries would be considered as void; immediately rejecting that suggestion himself, however, as he did not think it to be in France’s interest. In the present circumstances, the political turmoil in Paris and the negotiations in Lille stopped him from putting his army on the move and march to Vienna at once.139 Bonaparte con134   2 July and 11 July 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 pp. 1038–1039 no. 1745 and pp. 1052–1053 no. 1774. 135   Gallo’s powers dated 4 August; see Martens, 1801, pp. 222–223. 136   1 July 1797, Thugut to Delacroix; AAE CP Autriche 367. 137   Guyot, 1907, p. 521. 138   Guyot, 1907, pp. 513–518. 139   23 July 1797, Bonaparte to Clarke; CG1 pp. 1070–1071 no. 1810.



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sidered the Emperor’s refutation to negotiate ‘qu’en commun avec ses anciens alliés’ to be a clear violation of the Preliminaries.140 Clarke and Bonaparte wrote to Gallo demanding that the Emperor would conclude a separate peace as, according to the French representatives, he had agreed to do at Leoben. Thereto, they expressed their suspicions that Austria was prolonging the negotiations for a moment more suitable to restart hostilities to arrive and ex contrario stressed the need and benefit for both powers of a durable peace.141 General Bonaparte did not depart for Udine until 22 August when he was given notice of Gallo’s arrival.142 Powers were exchanged on 3 ­September 1797 and in the following weeks negotiations were conducted alternatively in Udine and Passariano. Clarke and Bonaparte held out for a separate peace to be negotiated in Italy instead of Bern. Les assertions avancées par la cour de Vienne, qui ont bouleversé le principe fondamental des préliminaires, qui était la paix séparée, les obstacles que, depuis, on a apportés à la négociation, ont fait perdre à la République française le seul avantage qu’elle avait dans la conclusion des préliminaires, et auquel elle avait tout sacrifié.

Hence, they warned the Austrian envoys that if peace was not concluded on 1 October, the Preliminaries would be held for null and void and the basis of peace had to be negotiated anew.143 That was the deadlock to which negotiations had arrived by the time Reubell, Barras, and La Révellière Lépeaux staged the fructidor coup d’état against their two colleagues and the royalists faction in the Councils. The immediate result of the new political situation in Paris was a change of French foreign policy away from compromise. Rumours went that if the Emperor would not have concluded peace already or was to do so soon, Bonaparte was to receive orders to attack.144 Fructidor had the opposite effect on the Austrian government as all hopes in Vienna that the royalist electoral victory would bring the adherents of the ‘anciennes limites’ to power evaporated. Thugut recognised that it

  26 July 1797, Bonaparte to Clarke; CG1 pp. 1074–1076 no. 1815.   28 July 1797, Clarke and Bonaparte to Gallo; AAE CP Autriche 367 and CG1 pp. 1077–1079 no. 1818. 142   22 August 1797, Bonaparte to Talleyrand; CG1 p. 1129 no. 1933. 143   3 September 1797, Bonaparte to Talleyrand; CG1 pp. 1142–1143 no. 1965. 144   4 September 1797, Meyer to Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 1.02.14 no. 598. 140 141

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was more prudent to take negotiations seriously.145 That did not mean that Austria stopped its endeavours to avoid consenting to a separate treaty. Now Gallo proposed that the congress for peace with the Empire to be held at Rastatt was to take place simultaneously with the Udine negotiations.146 Notwithstanding Bonaparte’s protests, General Clarke, being closely connected to Carnot, was recalled,147 leaving the former in charge of negotiations on his own. The General rejected even to consider Gallo’s proposal, as then the Rastatt congress would be Bern renamed. Bonaparte warned Gallo that if the Emperor would assemble the congress for the Empire before an agreement with France had been reached the princes of the Empire would be notified that the convocation had been issued without French consent.148 The warning came too late. As Merveldt returned from Vienna in the company of Louis Cobenzl, Bonaparte was informed that the Rastatt congress had already been convened. A furious general immediately declared the convocation void stating that France had to agree to that convocation in advance, ‘le plénipotentiaire français avait demandé que ce congrès se tînt après que la paix serait conclue avec S.M. l’Empereur et la République française’ and, furthermore, that in agreeing to a separate peace, as Bonaparte once again claimed the Emperor had done in the Preliminaries, Vienna was obliged to ignore its allies’ interests, which apparently it was not willing to do. Les préliminaires étaient fondés sur la renonciation de S.M. l’Empereur à la coalition; cependant le cabinet de Vienne a paru, dans tout le cours des négociations subséquentes, ne pas pouvoir oublier la cause de ses anciens alliés149

145   Kerautret, 2002, p. 92; Guyot, 1907, pp. 523–524; Blanning, 1996, p. 178; Black, 2002, p. 216. 146   19 September 1797, Bonaparte to Talleyrand; CG1 pp. 1188–1189 no. 2047. 147   18 September 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 p. 1182 no. 2039; Later, Bonaparte would ask for new powers or for the appointment of new plenipotentiaries instead, since his present ones were also for Clarke; 21 September 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 p. 1195 no. 2061. He repeated this request once more; 1 October 1797, Bonaparte to Talleyrand; CG1 p. 1229 no. 2116; Guyot, 1907, p. 524; Droz, 2005, p. 208. 148   19 September 1797, Bonaparte to Talleyrand; pp. 1188–1189 no. 2047. 149   28 September 1797, Bonaparte to Gallo, Cobenzl, Merveldt, and Degelmann; CG1 pp. 1219–1220 no. 2102 and pp. 1220–1221 no. 2103.



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The Austrians rejected any suggestion that the Emperor was to be blamed for the delay since he was fully entitled to insist on the faithful implementation of the Preliminaries with respect to the congress in Bern. If the French Republic would not have refused that congress, peace might have been concluded already.150 Meanwhile negotiations reached a critical point. On 6 October, Bonaparte, pessimistic on a positive outcome, regarded the negotiations as nearly broken down.151 Already a day later, he was much more positive. A confidential draft handed over by Cobenzl that day might in his opinion lead to a treaty. Within a few days negotiations would be terminated resulting either in peace or in the continuation of war. Anyhow, he attributed to France and France alone the position to keep the balance in Europe: Le caractère distinctif de notre nation est d’être beaucoup trop vive dans la prospérité. Si l’on prend pour base de toutes les opérations la vraie politique, qui n’est autre chose que le calcul des combinaisons et des chances, nous serons pour longtemps la grande nation et l’arbitre de l’Europe. Je dis plus: nous tenons la balance de l’Europe.152

Ten days later a peace treaty was signed in Campoformio, a hamlet near Udine considered being neutral ground. The Campoformio Peace called for a short excursion to Italy, for the political and military context of negotiations in the field more than any matter of principle determined the Batavian Republic’s (non-) involvement. Peace negotiations in Italy were strictly a French and Austrian pas de deux. None of the other great powers was involved, let alone any of the minor powers, including the sister republics. One might assert that the sister republics were not directly, or even indirectly, involved in the peace negotiations with Austria because of the speed and the solitude with which general Bonaparte conducted them. The view that Bonaparte negotiated the peace fully on his own and with disregard of the Directoire’s wishes has been widely accepted.153 Digging into this matter would not fit in the range of this book. However,

150   29 September 1797, Gallo, Cobenzl, Merveldt, and Degelmann to Bonaparte; AN AF III 59. 151   6 October 1797, Bonaparte to Haller, administrateur des finances de l’armée d’Italie; CG1 p 1243 no. 2146. 152   7 October 1797, Bonaparte to Talleyrand; CG1 pp. 1244–1246 no. 2149. 153   Guyot, 1907, p. 164, p. 361, and p. 491; Droz, 2005, p. 208.

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it seems to be highly exaggerated and likewise influenced by the image of the man he was yet to become. The young General Bonaparte of the first Italian campaign—only 27 years old at the time the negotiations with Austria started—seems to be acting from the enthusiasm of his youth, the local knowledge of the commander in chief in the field and a significant displeasure with the Directoire’s failure to set its mind on a consistent foreign policy swiftly.154 Bonaparte knew a compromise peace was inevitable, because the Emperor could not really be forced to conclude peace by force. Bonaparte also knew his army’s position was quite precarious.155 Furthermore, considering contemporary means of communication, extensive discretion for negotiators was not exceptional.156 This was not yet the man to openly and wilfully defy his government’s order, unless he felt forced to do so. The process of heroisation had just started and was still in the phase that the cheers in Paris’ streets resembled the ways that is talked about a football player who scored the winning goal in last week’s cup final. He did realise that he was not authorised to negotiate a peace treaty with Austria and asked the Directoire on various occasions for full powers to negotiate or to send new envoys.157 He did actually receive powers to that end.158 On the other hand, from the start, General Clarke was explicitly ordered by the Directoire to consult with Bonaparte,159 so the commanding general of the Army of Italy was meant to have some influence on negotiations. Reading their mutual correspondence, there are no clear signs that he did not accept Clarke as the prime or at least as an equal negotiator. For a young man, who had been trained at France’s best military academies, even if he had just won huge victories at Lodi,

  Woolf, 1991, p. 16.   Presser, 1946, p. 37; Englund, 2004, p. 116. 156   Presser, 1946, p. 38. 157   21 September 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 p. 1195 no. 2061; 1 October 1797, Bonaparte to Talleyrand; CG1 p. 1229 no. 2116. 158   ‘Le citoyen Bonaparte, Général en Chef de l’Armée d’Italie, est autorisé à négocier, conclure et signer avec les Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté l’Empereur, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, un traité de paix définitif entre la République Française et sa dite Majesté. Le Directoire lui donne à set effet, les pleins pouvoirs nécessaires. Il se conformera aux instructions qui lui ont été donnés, et rendra compte des progrès et de l’issue des négociations.’ (Martens does not indicate a date); Martens, 1801, p. 225. 159   6 March 1797, Directoire to Bonaparte; AN AF III* 20. Bonaparte informed Merveldt that the Directoire had issued full powers for ‘le général Clarke et moi.’; 14 May 1797, Bonaparte to Merveldt; CG1 p. 944 no. 1552. 154 155



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Arcola and Rivoli and had thereby ‘conquered Italy,’ it would have been very strange to show the disrespect for a senior officer that Bonaparte was alleged to have shown to Clarke according to most historians.160 Napoleon Bonaparte was not yet the great man he would become. Moreover, he strongly objected to Clarke’s recall, praising the part his colleague had played in the negotiations thus far.161 As to his point of view and his estimation of the military situation in Italy, the French Republic was in desperate need of peace, he was agitated by the Directoire’s lingering and saw himself forced to act in its place. It is certain that Bonaparte played a major role in the formation of the Treaty of Campoformio. It is even true, that, to a large extent, his personal policy oriented towards Italy superseded the Directoire’s policy focused on Germany. The Directoire was, however, too well aware and in command of what was going on in Italy to rule out the option that the failure of involving the sister republics in the negotiations was due to Bonaparte’s alleged sudden solo tour that caught the governments of the Revolutionary allies by surprise. Besides that, the time between the notification of the Preliminaries of Leoben and negotiation on the definitive treaty getting serious was not that short. If the Patriot government in The Hague had really wanted to, it would have had sufficient time to demand being involved or protest against any explicit refutation. As to the real reason, the Batavian Republic simply did not try to get involved. The Batavian government just awaited the general congress. At the time, almost everyone in Europe was convinced that one would be held. In the spring of 1797, hardly anyone even considered the mere possibility of the Directoire wanting to deviate from the tradition of general congresses. The prospect of a ‘general peace’ is often referred to in diplomatic correspondence, as well as in separate treaties, although it is not clear whether that really meant one great treaty resulting from a congress where all the major powers were present or merely a separate treaty between the last left belligerents still fighting. That the government in The Hague took a more active stance vis-àvis the simultaneous Franco-British negotiations in Lille, as will be discussed in the next chapter, where Malmesbury as well anticipated a general congress to assemble soon, had to do with the fact that in those negotiations crucial Batavian interests were directly involved.

  Clarke was a Divisionary General, whereas Bonaparte was a Brigadier General.   26 September 1797, Bonaparte to Talleyrand; CG1 p. 1217 no. 2099.

160 161

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Within Batavian governmental circles, some doubts were expressed on whether the Batavian Republic was actually in a position to take a significant role in the peace negotiations at large:162 That this Republic presently is far remote from being able to play a primary role at the general peace and, therefore, has to observe all care not to do anything that might insult another Power, whereas it is evenly certain that this Republic’s interest and hence its rulers’ duties call for using all its resources and endeavouring to restore the sources of affluence that have been lost; that among these sources of affluence first and foremost is the restoration of the State’s possessions in the East and West Indies [. . .] and that the committee regards of the utmost importance to establish at the general peace that the French Republic relinquishes the common use of Flushing’s port, since this may easily cause disputes between the two Republics as well as infringe on our independence, which is required by France’s true interests163

What becomes clear from this quote is that the government in The Hague concentrated on issues of a maritime character. Those issues were to be taken care of in negotiations with Britain. Nevertheless, ‘a worthy member of the Directoire’164 assured Meyer that Batavian interests were reckoned with in the instructions for Clarke and Bonaparte. He urged for the swift finalisation of the Batavian Constitution ‘so we will be able to play our due role in settling the general interests of nations.’165

  13 April 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B. 163   ‘dat deze Republicq vooral tegenwoordig verre af is van zich te kunnen vleyen bij den algemeenen vreede eenen eersten rol te kunnen spelen, en dat dezelve mitsdien alle zorgvuldigheid moet in het oog houden, om niets te doen, dat eenige andere Mogendheid zoude kunnen beleedigen, dan dat het even zeker is, dat het belang van dit Gemeenebest en dus de plicht van desselvs bestuurders medebrengen om van alle de ressources van hetzelve gebruik te maken en te trachten die bronnen van welvaart, welke verloren zijn geraakt, terug te bezorgen; dat onder deze bronnen van welvaart eene eerste plaats bekleed het terugverkrijgen der aangeleegene bezittingen van den staat zo in de Oost als in de Westindien [. . .] dan dat de commissie er het hoogste belang bij stelt om bij den algemeenen vreede uit te werken, dat de Fransche Republicq afziet van het gemeenschappelijk gebruik der haven van Vlissingen, als kunnende steeds gemakkelijk aanleiding geven tot alteratien tusschen beide Republicquen en tot vermindering onzer independentie, welke het waar belang van Vrankrijk zelvs vorderd.’ 164   ‘een waardig lid van het Directoire’ 165   ‘op dat wij ook, bij het regelen van de algemeene belangens der volken de rol die ons toekomt mogen speelen.’; 27 April 1797, Meyer to Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 1.02.14 no. 598. 162



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Meanwhile, it dawned on The Hague that the Directoire opposed a general congress, at least for the time being. In May Meyer reported to The Hague that the French government planned to come to an agreement with Austria, in particular about Italy, before the ‘general interests’166 would be settled at a congress in concert with the allies.167 Nevertheless, the Batavian Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken still expected a general congress to be convened to which it was to send representatives.168 Meyer soon informed his government, though, that he had become acquainted with the Directoire’s intention to avoid a general congress altogether.169 The Batavian government raised only two minor substantive matters to be taken care of in Udine. First, it invoked France’s promise to extend its good offices to ensure the payment of interests owed to Batavian citizens on outstanding loans, especially in the former Austrian Netherlands, in conformity with Article 21 of the Treaty of The Hague.170 Second, French intervention was asked in the matter of the secretary to the Batavian legation in Wurtemberg, who had been arrested and imprisoned. The committee requested the Directoire to insist on his release by means of the French plenipotentiaries negotiating with Austria in Italy. The French government indeed instructed Bonaparte and Clarke to do so.171 The Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken did not provide any further input for negotiations with ­Austria and awaited the congress with the Empire. At the very end of the negotiations mention was made of indemnity for the former Stadhouder. In his enumeration of the ‘conditions principales’ Bonaparte enclosed the provision that the Prince of Orange was to be indemnified in purview of the ‘secret treaty’ concluded with Prussia.172

  ‘de algemeene belangens’   8 May 1797, Meyer to Van Leyden; NA 1.02.14 no. 598; 17 May 1797, Meyer to Van Leyden; NA 1.02.14 no. 598. 168   26 May 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B. 169   5 June 1797, Meyer to Van Leyden; NA 1.02.14 no. 598. 170   12 May 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B. 6 June 1797, Delacroix to Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 610. 171   1 June 1797, Meyer to Delacroix; NA 1.02.14 no. 601. 21 June 1797, Bonaparte and Clarke to Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; CG1 p. 1021 no. 1705. 172   10 October 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 pp. 1248–1249 no. 2153. At the end of May Bonaparte had requested copies of the Franco-Prussian treaties; 27 May 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 pp. 962–964 no. 1587. 166 167

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While the procedural point of convening a general congress or not was disputed, negotiations on a substantial settlement went along. Negotiations were dominated by territorial arrangements in Germany and Italy that were closely linked to each other and are thus to be considered a package deal. Either party would try to break the Preliminaries open to its benefit. Bonaparte had assured the Directoire that it was still possible to modify the Preliminaries throughout negotiations and that, henceforth, the Rhine frontier could still be attained.173 Initially, Bonaparte and Clarke were instructed not to insist on the Rhine, since the Directors were still divided over the question whether the Rhineland was worth jeopardizing peace with Austria.174 It did not take Reubell long to have a majority endorse his policy. Thugut contemplated gaining more compensation for Austria and wished to transfer compensation to Italy as much as possible.175 At the same time, the necessity of compensating Prussia in Germany was to be prevented. Add to this, Bonaparte’s proclamation of the Cisalpine Republic before the Treaty with Austria was concluded and his attempts to aggrandise that Republic with the Papal Legations—promised to Venice in the Preliminaries—and Mantua in order procure a strong frontier needed to fulfil the buffer role the Italian sister republic was to play in the balance of power between Austria and France in the region, and the Gordian knot was in place.176 The defeat of the royalists in Paris with the fructidor coup d’état raised expectations towards more parts of Italy being ‘republicanised’ if the Emperor would not accept the latest proposals to come to a ‘reasonable’ peace.177 Events in Paris did not change anything in Udine, though. The territorial arrangement started to crystallise: Venice to   Guyot, 1907, p. 368 and p. 485; Blanning, 1996, p. 177.   Guyot, 1907, p. 487. 175   Ballot, 1910, pp. 102–103; Guyot, 1907, p. 487. 176   On negotiations on the territorial settlement and Austrian objections to the creation of the Cisalpine Republic, see e.g.: 27 May 1797, Bonaparte to Directoire; CG1 pp. 962–964 no. 1587; 16 July 1797, Sopransi to Directoire; AAE CP Milanais 55; 18 July 1797, Gallo to Clarke and Bonaparte; AAE CP Autriche 366; 28 July 1797, Clarke and Bonaparte to Gallo; AAE CP Autriche 367; CG1 pp. 1077–1079 no. 1818; 16 August 1797, Bonaparte to Talleyrand; CG1 pp. 1119–1120 no. 1911; 13 October 1797, Plan raisonne de négociation entre la France and l’Autriche; AAE MD Autriche 8 ; 23 December 1797, compte rendu au ministre des rélations extérieures par le général de division Clarke; AAE MD Autriche 8. 177   4 September 1797, Meyer to Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 1.02.14 no. 598; 20 September 1797, Meyer to Commissie van Buitenlandsche ­Zaaken; NA 1.02.14 no. 598. 173 174



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Austria, Lombardy formed into an independent republic and the Adige as the frontier. The exact border—who was to get Mantua?—was still under discussion, so was the fate of the Papal Legations.178 By midOctober, an agreement was reached. 2.4  Absens carens? The Treaty of Campoformio, that was officially presented to the Directoire on 31 October,179 turned out to be a treaty in the eighteenth­century tradition of great power turf wars. Following the Preliminaries, the Emperor abstained from all of his rights and titles to the former Belgian provinces, recognising that those territories belonged to the French Republic perpetually and in full sovereignty and ownership.180 In Italy, he likewise abstained on behalf of the Cisalpine Republic from all rights and titles to territories now being constituent parts of that republic181 and recognised the Cisalpine Republic as an independent power.182 The Duke of Modena would be compensated by Breisgau,183 and the Archduke Ferdinand was to be compensated for the loss of his dominions in the Cisalpine Republic. Venice paid the price. The Emperor was to take possession of the best part of the Republic of Venice, including Dalmatia, Istria, the terra firma up to the river Adige and the city of Venice while the French Republic was to keep the Venetian dominions in Albania, the Adriatic, and the Eastern Mediterranean.184 The secret Articles explicitly stated that the Venetian territories to be occupied by Austria were meant to be a compensation for the territories ceded in Belgium and Italy.185 Much to Reubell’s displeasure, the Rhine frontier was not secured, though. In the secret Articles the Emperor merely promised to provide his good offices at the peace talks with the Empire to obtain for France

178   9 September 1797, 7e séance des conferences d’Udine; AAE CP Autriche 366; 6 September 1797, Bonaparte to Talleyrand; CG1 pp. 1147–1148 no. 1973; 12 September 1797, Bonaparte to Talleyrand; CG1 p. 1166 no. 2009. 179     31 October 1797, procés verbaux Directoire; AN AF III 8. 180   Article 3. It has to be noted that this did not amount to recognition by or on behalf of the Empire. 181   Article 7. 182   Article 8. 183   Article 18. 184   Articles 5 and 6. 185   Article 4 secret.

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almost the entire left bank of the river Rhine.186 The French-German frontier stipulated in the first of the secret Articles would render the French Republic in possession of the strategic cities of Mannheim and Mainz. Only more to the north the frontier would derivate from the Rhine and follow the rivers Nette and Ruhr, thus excluding the Prussian possessions in Cleves and Upper Guelders—the Batavian government had set its sights on—from French annexation and hence avoiding the necessity of compensating the King of Prussia in Germany which would upset the Austrian-Prussian balance. The French Republic was to return to the King of Prussia his dominions on the left bank of the river Rhine.187 The Emperor promised to work with France to get the German Empire to renounce any rights of suzerainty that it had in Italy in particular concerning territories now forming part of the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics.188 Princes who would lose any territories due to this treaty were to be compensated in Germany as well and France would have a say in that compensation.189 Imperial fiefs enclaved in the Batavian Republic or possessions of German princes within the Batavian Republic were hardly mentioned. The secret Articles merely reckoned with some minor cessions by the King of Prussia to the French and Batavian Republics concerning territories left of the rivers Meuse or IJssel, the enclave of Zevenaar being mentioned in particular. The Emperor promised to provide his good offices to have these cessions adopted by the Empire.190 In addition, the Emperor promised to tender his good offices to have the free navigation on the river Rhine until it entered the Batavian Republic for the French Republic and the riparian states belonging to the Empire included in the peace settlement with the Empire.191 Hence, free navigation of the Rhine was not extended to the Batavian Republic.

  Article 1 secret.   Article 9 secret. 188   Article 11 secret. 189   Article 12 secret. 190   Article 10 secret: ‘Si le Roi de Prusse consent à céder à la République et à la République Batave de petites portions de son territoire qui se trouve sur la rive gauche de la Meuse, aunsi que l’enclave de Sevenaer et autres possessions vers l’IJssel, Sa Majesté l’Empereur et Roi de Hongrie et de Bohème emploiera ses bons offices pour rendre practicables lesdites cessions et les faire adopter par l’Empire Germanique.’ 191   Article 2 secret. 186 187



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Contrary to the Preliminaries, the Treaty of Campoformio did contain a provision with regard to the House of Orange. The ‘Prince of Nassau-Dietz’—the former Stadhouder of the United Provinces, ­William V of Orange being thus referred to, because the French Republic did not recognise the title Prince of Orange, the latter being a former principality now incorporated in the south of France—was to get a territorial indemnity in Germany that was to border neither on the Batavian Republic’s territory nor on any Austrian territories.192 Hence, the Treaty of Campoformio did contain provisions relevant for the Batavian Republic, but these only concerned benefits and no obligations. In general terms and without enumerating any Articles in particular, the Treaty was declared to be common to the Batavian Republic.193 No mention was made of an extensive aggrandisement of the Batavian Republic along its eastern border, but, as said before, that was more of a matter to be discussed at the congress for peace with the Empire. The inclusion of the Batavian Republic in the Treaty of Campoformio has later on been criticized. Asser, for instance, claimed that the inclusion showed that the Batavian Republic had become an ‘appendix’ to France and that France had assumed the right to negotiate and conclude on behalf of its sister.194 Asser is right in asserting that the Batavian Republic’s consent was not called for, but he misjudged the legal character of inclusion. Within a month the congress in Rastatt for the peace settlement between the French Republic and the Empire was to commence. Of the two congresses provided for by the Preliminaries only one had survived the Udine negotiations. The congress was to be composed solely of French and imperial plenipotentiaries, thus excluding any other power from the congress.195 Bonaparte defended the outcome of his manoeuvring at the negotiating table as zealously as he would have given account of a ­hard-won 192   Article 8 secret: ‘Il sera donné une indemnité territoriale au Prince de NassauDietz, ci-devant Stathouder de Hollande; cette indemnité territoriale ne pourra être prise dans le voisinage des possessions autrichienned ni dans celui de la République Batave.’ 193   Article 24: ‘Le présent traité de paix est déclaré commun à la République Batave.’ 194   Asser, 1860, p. 63. 195   Article 20: ‘Il sera tenu à Rastadt un congrès uniquement composé des plenipotentiaries de l’Empire Germanique et de ceux de la République française, pour la pacification entre ces deux puissances. Ce congrès sera ouvert un mois après la signature du présent traité, ou plus tôt s’il est possible.’

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victory on the battlefield. He anticipated the Treaty to be heavily criticized and argued that in purview of the military situation the settlement was a good deal and France would now be able to focus on Britain.196 Despite his argument opposition to the Treaty arose. The Directoire and Reubell in particular opposed this settlement, but considering the enthusiasm for the peace in French public opinion, and the possibility of new gains at Rastatt, the Directoire and the Councils decided to swallow the lot.197 At least based upon its public statements, the government in The Hague received the peace with much greater enthusiasm. The Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken in The Hague, being officially informed of the peace and the (non-secret part of the) treaty text by Meyer who had been notified by Talleyrand, spoke of a ‘joyful restoration of political relations with Austria.’198 The committee instructed Reinier Van Haeften, who had stayed in Vienna during the war without an official capacity, to attend the Emperor as envoy of the Batavian Republic as soon as the news of the exchange of ratifications had reached Vienna. He was to express the pleasure the Batavian government had taken in the restoration of peace, the anxiety with which the Batavian government had yearned for this happy moment, and that the Batavian Republic merrimently acknowledged the French Republic’s faithfulness to the Alliance Treaty by which she now shared in the Treaty with the Emperor.199 Publicly, the inclusion was thus appreciated as an expression of the sanctity of treaties. Conclusion Negotiations leading to the Treaty of Campoformio were a FrenchAustrian pas de deux. The Treaty mainly codified a territorial settlement that focused on Italy and to a lesser extent Germany. Campoformio truly was no more than a bilateral peace treaty; ending the war between

  18 October 1797, Bonaparte to Talleyrand; CG1 pp. 1256–1257 no. 2170.   Kerautret, 2002, p. 93; On 26 October 1797, the Directoire decided to sign the treaty. Eight days later both Councils adopted the bill containing the ratification. The Council of 500 considered the peace to be more as a dictate of necessity than a joyful event in itself. The text can be found in: Martens, 1801, pp. 220–221. 198   ‘de politieke betrekkingen met Oostenrijk gelukkig hersteld ziet.’ 199   1 November 1797, minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 28. 196 197



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France and Austria but not laying down principles for a new order. As soon as the Preliminaries had been concluded, the Batavian government was informed. The Hague did not make an attempt to partake in the Franco-Austrian negotiations in Italy. The Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken awaited the convocation of a general congress to step in. The Batavian Republic had participated in the war merely as an auxiliary. Hence, peace between the Batavian Republic and Austria did not need to be restored separately. The Batavian government acted like an auxiliary, too, leaving France to play a primary role in negotiations with Austria. The Batavian government did wish to further Batavian interests in the peace settlement with the Empire, especially with regard to territorial aggrandisement for the Batavian Republic in the east. The Batavian Republic was said to be entitled to aggrandisement because of Article 16 of the 1795 Hague Treaty. Thereto, an extension of Batavian borders to the east was deemed necessary because of strategic and economic reasons. The Preliminaries had held out the prospect of a general congress to which the Batavian Republic among others would have been invited. Anxiously upholding the policy of separate peace treaties, the French had managed to have plans for a Europe-wide congress dropped by the time the Treaty of Campoformio was concluded. There would only be a congress for peace with the Empire participation in which would be restricted to French and imperial delegations. The Batavian Republic would thus be excluded from that congress. Although, the Batavian government did not make an attempt to partake in negotiations prior to the anticipated congress, on the French side participation of the French Republic’s allies was ruled out from the start in order not to create a precedent for either Britain or Austria to demand admittance of its great power ally. Hence, the Directoire’s policy of separate peace treaties was essential for the matter of Batavian (non-)involvement. The Batavian Republic was, in quite general terms, included in the Treaty of Campoformio. The Batavian government did not consent to this inclusion prior to the conclusion or ratification of the Treaty, nor did it ratify or confirm the inclusion afterwards. The Batavian government did show to consider the inclusion as an observance of the sanctity of treaties. As was the case with peace treaties with various minor powers, inclusion was regarded as compliance with Article 6 of the 1795 Hague Treaty, stipulating that the Republic of the United

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Provinces was to be included in a peace with any of the Coalition powers (save Britain). The Preliminaries recognised the Empire’s territorial integrity as a principle for negotiations on peace with the Empire at large. In the Treaty of Campoformio, the Emperor accepted cession of the best part of the Rhineland to France, that is, he would try to have that cession incorporated in the peace treaty with the Empire. Both territorial settlements with regard to Germany, excluded any territorial aggrandisement for the Batavian Republic. Contrary to the Preliminaries, the Treaty of Campoformio did contain a provision on indemnity for the former Stadhouder and did reckon with the possibility of the King of Prussia ceding his dominions enclaved in Batavian territory to the Batavian Republic. Besides these, there were no further provisions of specific interest to the Batavian Republic. Thus, the Treaty’s substance was relevant to the Batavian Republic, but the Treaty of Campoformio did not impose any obligations on the Batavian Republic.

chapter three

Negotiating with Britain 3.1  Attempts for an Impossible Peace As the Coalition fell apart, France and Britain started to move towards peace as well. Mere geography caused the Batavian Republic to be one of the major issues throughout negotiations. Once more, a diplomatic struggle was initiated between France and Britain over the control of the Low Countries. The Low Countries, guarding the eastern access to the Channel and a considerable part of the North Sea coasts on the Continental side, were of huge strategic significance to Britain. Hence, French control of the Dutch Republic and Belgium was intolerable to many in London. To safeguard British security, the Franco-Batavian alliance had to be broken, the French had to leave the Low Countries, and a pro-British, hence Orangist regime restored in The Hague. Moreover, Dutch colonial dominions were of great significance, too, because they controlled the sea routes to India. The French, in their turn, wished to safeguard French security by annexing Belgium and including the Dutch Republic in the French sphere of influence. Restoring the Prince of Orange was out of the question, as was abandoning the Low Countries militarily. Henceforth, French and British geopolitical considerations were entirely incompatible. A Franco-Anglo peace was not to be merely a compromise between two states. By necessity, it had to be a compromise between bellicose and pacifist factions in either capital, too. In Britain, the bellicose faction with Edmund Burke as its intellectual leader held brief for victory in the Continental war. War waged on France was an ideological crusade that had to be won to restore peace and safeguard security abroad and to check ‘Jacobin’ elements within Britain. Burke opposed peace because ending the war would give revolutionaries a chance to perpetuate and spread the Revolution.1 Others did not oppose peace,

1  E. Burke, Letters on a Regicide Peace, 1796–1797, in: Brown, Nardin & Rengger (2007), pp. 292–300; see e.g. Fugier, 1954, p. 107.

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but argued that first British resources had to be fully directed at ­conquering colonies to attain the best possible geopolitical position to start negotiating.2 William Pitt stood somewhere in between. He did not sympathise with Burke’s idea of a crusade. Instead he focused on the political and socio-economical costs of the war.3 Peace with Revolutionary France was acceptable as soon as a stabile republican regime had been put into place. Even Pitt could not tolerate French control of the Dutch Republic, though.4 On the opposite side of the Channel, peace with Britain did not take priority. Admittedly, the Directoire did not oppose peace with Britain altogether, but affairs on the Continent took precedence. French security policy focused on the Continent. Peace with Prussia and Austria was much more important to safeguard French borders and territorial gains than peace with Britain. The Directoire was adamant to preserve the French Republic’s territorial integrity and hence to defend the ‘constitutional borders’ that included Belgium.5 Moreover, deprived of any Continental allies, Britain would be quite harmless.6 Opposition to peace with Britain in France was mainly inspired by economic reasons. The war had made an end to the 1786 Eden Treaty and cleared the ground for renewed protectionism. Many feared peace with Britain because French industry was not yet deemed being able to compete with Britain.7 Thereto, French Revolutionaries were annoyed by ­British support of the Royalists.8 Political considerations were, however, to prevail over economic ones. An attempt for—an acceptable—peace with Britain was to be made, too, because of the need to stabilise the republican regime in France.9 Not even the Revolution turned out having been to break through the traditional preoccupation with (geo)political considerations in French foreign policy over commercial interests. Peace overtures were already exchanged in December 1795 as the pragmatic Pitt anticipated the Directoire to become a stable regime

  Thombs and Thombs, 2007, p. 228.   Thombs and Thombs, 2007, p. 228. 4   Sorel, 1906IV, p. 206; Thombs and Thombs, 2007, p. 217. 5  Guyot, 1907, p. 113. 6   Sutherland, 2003, p. 289. 7   Fugier, 1954, pp. 108–109; Homan, 1971, p. 139. 8   Sutherland, 2003, p. 289; Homan, 1971, p. 139. 9   Fugier, 1954, p. 111. 2 3



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with which peace could be made.10 In response to a call for peace in British public opinion in the summer of 1795, the British envoy in Switzerland, William Wickham, approached Barthélemy in Basel.11 However, respective conditions were still unacceptable. The French envoy in The Hague, François Noël, was informed of these overtures in a letter of 2 March 1796.12 No official communication of negotiations with Britain to the Batavian government is to be found. Blauw and Meyer were well up on approach between London and Paris, though. As they informed about relations with Britain, the Directoire assured the Batavian envoys that the French Republic would observe the Alliance Treaty.13 In March 1796, Pitt informed the Directoire that the British government was willing to negotiate. Again, French conditions were unacceptable.14 In the course of 1796, the British position deteriorated, though. Austria was likely to conclude peace because of French victories in Italy. Attempts to have Prussia and Russia take active parts in the war again failed. Moreover, the Franco-Spanish alliance increased the threat of invasion.15 Thereto, the British government got caught in a financial crisis due to huge subsidy payments to its Continental allies and had to cope with unrest in Ireland.16 Nevertheless, both King George III and Lord Grenville opposed peace.17 Grenville stuck to the French evacuating Belgium; the King set out for a restoration of the French monarchy.18 Pitt managed to get a majority of the Cabinet behind his peace proposal. By the end of September 1796, the British government issued new preludes to peace.19 The King and Grenville had yielded expecting the Directoire to turn down flat the peace ­offering, thus being able to blame the French for the continuation of the war. On 24 September 1796, Lord Grenville requested passports for a British negotiator from the Directoire.20 Somewhat later, he stated  Tombs and Tombs, 2007, p. 217.  Guyot, 1907, p. 97; Lentz, 2005c, p. 449. 12   2 March 1796, Delacroix to Noël; AAE CP Hollande 591. 13   Vreede, 1863, p. 223. 14   Ballot, 1910, p. 37; Droz, 2005, p. 207. 15   Schroeder, 1994, pp. 162–163. 16  Guyot, 1907, p. 296; Ross, 1981, p. 132. 17  Guyot, 1907, p. 378. 18  Guyot, 1907, p. 94; Schroeder, 1994, p. 164. 19  Guyot, 1907, p. 276 and p. 280; Schroeder, 1994, p. 163. 20   24 September 1796, Grenville to Directoire; AAE CP Angleterre 590. 10 11

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that negotiations were to aim at a ‘paix juste et equitable, propres à rendre le repos à l’Europe.’21 The Directoire decided to take the British overtures seriously. The French government granted the requested passports for a British envoy to travel to Paris on the condition that he would have powers to conclude a definitive peace.22 Shortwhile after it granted the passports, it decided to inform its allies of Grenville’s letter.23 Delacroix informed Noël in The Hague that the British agent would be empowered to conclude a definite peace and directed him to do everything in his power to persuade the Batavian Nationale Vergadering to fully cooperate ‘au grand but d’une paix honorable.’24 James Harris Lord Malmesbury—an old and not that pleasant acquaintance of the Dutch Patriots since he had been the British envoy in The Hague, who helped repressing the Dutch Patriot movement on behalf of the Stadhouder25—arrived in Paris on 22 October. Thereupon, Malmesbury and Charles Delacroix conducted unsuccessful negotiations in Paris throughout October and November 1796.26 From the start, there was not even a basic agreement on the character of negotiations. Malmesbury was to attain the Directoire’s consent to a general congress. He was not to conclude a separate peace. Although the British government had taken a unilateral step to enter into negotiations with France, Austria was to be involved as soon as possible.27 By consequence, Malmesbury was to oppose the admittance of ­Spanish and Dutch envoys to the present negotiations.28 Pitt had misjudged the Austrian position, though, for Austria refused to negotiate at that time.29 Only after Malmesbury had arrived in Paris and negotiations had already started was Meyer officially informed of the British overtures and the Directoire’s response by Delacroix.30 This did not mean, however, that the authorities in The Hague were still ignorant of negotia  13 October 1796, Grenville to Delacroix; AAE CP Angleterre 590.   30 September 1796, decree Directoire; AN AF III* 20; Guyot, 1907, pp. 282–283. 23  7 October 1796, Procés-verbaux des séances du Directoire; AN AF III 4. 24  End of September 1796 (probably 30 September), Delacroix to Noël; AAE CP Angleterre 590. 25  Palmer, 1959, p. 338. 26   29 October 1796, full powers; AAE CP Angleterre 590; AN AF III* 176; Ross, 1981, p. 132; Fugier, 1954, p. 111. 27   Ballot, 1910, p. 38; Guyot, 1907, pp. 290–293; Schroeder, 1994, p. 164. 28  Guyot, 1907, p. 288. 29   Ballot, 1910, p. 38; Schroeder, 1994, p. 164. 30   26 October 1796, Delacroix to Meyer; AAE CP Hollande 593. 21 22



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tions taking place. Already on 18 October, the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken wrote to Lestevenon and Pasteur that it wanted to be kept informed of the course of French negotiations with Britain. Therefore, the committee considered whether it should request that one or more Batavian commissioners would be admitted to the conferences. Although the committee said to be sure that the Directoire would not make any problems in that respect due to the clear provisions of the Treaty of The Hague, it still had doubts on whether such a request would be prudent. Thus, it directed the commissioners to sound the Directoire on this matter.31 In early November, by means of a note by François Noël, the Batavian Republic was actually invited by the French government to send representatives who were to assist in the negotiations.32 The same invitation must have been issued earlier in Paris, as by then Lestevenon, Pasteur, and Meyer had already been commissioned to contribute to the termination of the war by a ‘paix sur des conditions justes et equitables’ and to assist in the conferences between Delacroix and Malmesbury.33 The committee referred to a French invitation to send representatives.34 Meyer had not made clear, though, whether the Batavian commissioners would actually be admitted, so the committee abstained from any reference to the invitation in the credentials. In response to Noël’s invitation to designate an agent to assist in the negotiations between the French Republic and Great Britain, therefore, the committee stated that it had already appointed the commissioners as it had foreseen the Directoire’s wish for a Batavian representative to partake in the negotiations ‘persuadée de la loyauté française, et de son attachement inviolable à observer la foi des traites.’35 As to the substance of the 1796 Paris peace talks, negotiations started with a memorandum by Malmesbury.36 To come to ‘conditions de paix justes, honorables et solides’ he proposed to start with 31   18 October 1796, Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to Lestevenon and Pasteyr; NA 2.01.08 no. 102. 32   2 November 1796, Noël to the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; 4 November 1796, Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to Noël; NA 2.01.08 no. 102. 33   Their credentials were prepared on 31 October 1796 and send to Paris a day later; NA 2.01.08 no. 102. 34   1 November 1796, Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to Lestevenon, Pasteur and Meijer; NA 2.01.08 no. 102. 35   4 November 1796, Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to Noël; NA 2.01.08 no. 102. 36   24 October 1796, memorandum Malmesbury; AAE CP Angleterre 590.

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­ etermining a ‘principe général’ especially with regard to the restitud tions and cessions demanded by the parties due to war events. Malmesbury brought to the fore that, whereas Great Britain did not have any territorial demands vis-à-vis France, the Royal Navy had conquered some important French colonies and the French Republic had made considerable conquests on the European Continent to which His Britannic Majesty could not remain indifferent. Both based on the ‘justes demandes des alliés du Roi’ and ‘pour conserver la balance politique de l’Europe’ Malmesbury insisted on the French to return most of their conquests. Totally compatible with the good old British policy to keep the balance of power between the Continental great powers he stated that negotiations should lead to ‘conditions de paix justes et équitables pour toutes les parties belligérantes et propres à assurer pour l’avenir la tranquillité générale,’ not realising that this policy had worked in the past only because France had not been victorious on all traditional theatres of war—the Austrian Netherlands, the Rhineland and northern Italy37—and that the balance had been changed to the disadvantage of France by the partitioning of Poland and the decline of the Ottoman Empire on the Balkans. Therefore he offered to compensate France for abandoning her conquests in Europe by a proportional restitution of captured colonies, although he did not make clear yet what territories he had in mind. Basically, France was given a choice between abandoning its territorial gains and sphere of influence on the Continent and getting its colonies back on the one hand and preserving its territorial gains and sphere of influence on the Continent and loosing its colonies.38 Moreover, he did not mention occupied Dutch and Spanish colonial dominions at all. Thus, one might assert that they were not to be part of the ‘restitutions proportionelles’ agreed upon with France at all. It is quite certain that London wished to hold on to the Cape, Ceylon, and Dutch dominions in Cochin.39 Suffice to say the Directoire did not contemplate agreeing to Malmesbury’s proposal, as it wished not to link the maritime and Continental peace settlements exactly to avoid bringing the British into a

  Blanning, 2007, p. 653.  Guyot, 1907, p. 277. According to Guyot, Malmesbury proposed to negotiate either on the basis of the status quo ante bellum or of the principle of uti possidetis, but clearly stated that the same principle had to apply both to the Continental sphere and to the colonial one. 39  Guyot, 1907, p. 277. 37 38



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position to make these demands as preconditions for the restitution of colonial dominions. Hence, the Directoire instructed Delacroix to get a declaration from Malmesbury that he was prepared to treat separately with France. He was to point to some very pragmatic reasons that made separate negotiations and a separate peace more desirable as otherwise establishing the peace would be considerably delayed. For, trying to reach a general peace at once would: multiplier les combinaisons, compliquer les difficultés tend à la formation d’un congrès dont on sait que les formes sont toujours lentes, et exige l’accession des puissances qui jusqu’ici n’ont témoigné aucun désir du rapprochement et n’ont donné au lord Malmesbury lui-même, d’après sa déclaration, aucun pouvoir de stipuler pour elles.40

Malmesbury refused to agree to a separate peace.41 He declared to have explicit instructions from his King not to disconnect His Majesty’s interests from those of his allies and that the Directoire was mistaken in suggesting that he was authorised to conclude a separate peace. According to Malmesbury there could only be negotiations in which ‘les intérêts et prétentions de toutes les puissances qui font cause commune avec le roi dans la présente guerre’ would be taken into account and ‘dans le cours d’une pareille négociation l’intervention ou du moins la participation de ces puissances deviendra sans doute absolument nécessaire.’ The best way to show Europe the mutual desire to establish peace would be ‘de convenir sans délai d’une base de négociation combinée, en invitant dès lors leurs alliés à y concourir.’ Thereto, Malmesbury emphasised that only His Britannic Majesty’s generosity had made him to offer proportional restitutions to France as a compensation for the restitutions by the French necessary to satisfy the just claims of his allies and to ensure the preservation of the balance of power in Europe. After having been in Paris for almost two months, at a time the negotiations had not gotten that much further and seemed to become rather tedious, Malmesbury raised the position of France’s maritime allies.42 Some weeks before, he had proposed to his government to drop demands with regard to the Low Countries in order to save

  26 October 1796, Directoire to Malmesbury; AN AF III* 176.   12 November 1796, Malmesbury to Delacroix; AAE CP Angleterre 590. 42   17 December 1796, Memoire confidentiel sur la paix avec l’Espagne et la Hollande; AAE CP Angleterre 590; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 189. 40 41

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­ egotiations.43 Pitt, supported by the Secretary for War, Henry Dundas, n had been inclined to yield, but in the end the Cabinet decided to stick to previous demands.44 As soon as the Cabinet’s decision had reached Paris, Malmesbury addressed Delacroix.45 He started by expressing, with some signs of surprise, that France’s allies did not show the desire to treat with His Britannic Majesty yet. Apparently Malmesbury was not aware of the appointment of the Batavian commissioners or, at least, expected them to take a direct part in the negotiations. In respect to the United Provinces, as Malmesbury still called the Dutch Republic, the British took a fierce stand: sa majesté Britannique et ses alliés se trouvent trop directement intéressés à la situation politique de ces provinces, pour pouvoir consentir à rétablir à leur egard le status ante bellum territorial, à moins que la France ne pût également les remettre à tous égards dans la même position politique ou elles se trouvoient avant la guerre.46

The re-establishment of the status quo ante bellum mainly called for the restoration of the ancient constitution and form of government, which, according to Malmesbury, was also in confirmation with the wish of the great majority of the Provinces’ inhabitants. Thus, the restitution of the Dutch colonial dominions occupied by the British depended on the restoration of the pre-war Orangist and Anglophile regime and full independence for the Dutch Republic. Malmesbury did state that His Britannic Majesty was willing to reestablish peace with ‘la République hollandaise dans son état actuel’ though, but only under some strict conditions. First and foremost, ‘elles [His Britannic Majesty and His Imperial Majesty; RK] se verront obligées de chercher dans des requisitions territoriales la compensation [. . .] que cet état des choses leur rendroit indispensables.’ Based on balance of power logic, with Holland—although nominally independent—in the French camp, Britain and Austria had to be compensated. Therefore, Malmesbury demanded the cession of Dutch Flanders—controlling the Scheldt estuary and the access to the port of Antwerp—, and the city of Maastricht—one of the most impor Guyot, 1907, p. 296.  Guyot, 1907, p. 296. 45   17 December 1796, Memoire confidentiel sur la paix avec l’Espagne et la Hollande; AAE CP Angleterre 590; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 189; Guyot, 1907, p. 298. 46   17 December 1796, Memoire confidentiel sur la paix avec l’Espagne et la Hollande; AAE CP Angleterre 590; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 189. 43 44



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tant fortifications along the river Meuse—, both having been ceded to France by the Batavian Republic in the Treaty of The Hague to Austria. Possession of those territories by the French Republic was said to be entirely incompatible with the security of the Austrian Netherlands of which Malmesbury apparently still implied that they would be restored to Francis II. By which means Britain would be compensated he did not state, but it can be asserted without much risk that that compensation would be the non-restitution of the Dutch colonies that were of great interest to Britain, above all since the control of the Cape and much of Ceylon by a Francophile government in The Hague would leave all naval bases between Saint Helena and India and thus control of the sea routes to India in French hands.47 Second, the interests and rights of the House of Orange had to be considered in such a settlement. Upon reading this memorandum, Delacroix became furious. Only at the last minute, could the Directoire stop him from sending a letter to the British envoy stating the rupture of negotiations. In that (draft) letter Delacroix declared the conditions proposed by Malmesbury to be dishonourable and treacherous vis-à-vis the French allies, nations that had united themselves with the French Republic and counted on its loyalty and its force. Moreover, by agreeing to such conditions the French Republic would violate the Constitution on which its liberty was based.48 The Directoire did, however, decide to issue an ultimatum to Malmesbury. On 19 December 1796, Delacroix wrote to Malmesbury that ‘le Directoire Exécutif n’écoutera aucunes propositions contraires à la constitution, aux lois et aux traités qui lient la République.’49 The Batavian Nationale Vergadering was informed by François Noël of Malmesbury’s demands with regard to the Batavian Republic and of the Directoire’s response.50 That notification posed a dilemma to the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken. On the one hand it did not want to delay the peace, as the Batavian Republic was in desperate need of peace to restore its commerce. On the other hand it regarded the full restitution of the Dutch dominions in the East and West Indies as

  Blanning, 2007, p. 612.   19 December 1796, Delacroix to Malmesbury (draft, not send); AAE CP Angleterre 590. 49   19 December 1796, Delacroix to Malmesbury; AAE CP Angleterre 590. Guyot, 1907, pp. 298–301. 50   3 January 1797, Noël to Nationale Vergadering; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 189. 47 48

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absolutely necessary and thus directed Lestevenon, Pasteur and Meyer to strengthen French intentions to insist on that restitution.51 Somewhat later Noël assured the Nationale Vergadering that the French Republic would stay to its promises: Certes, c’étoit ne pas vouloir la paix que de la vouloir flétrissante pour la nation française et la proposition qu’on a cru faire au Directoire exécutif de trahir ses engagemens ne pouvoit attirer d’autre réponse que la déclaration formelle de n’écouter aucunes propositions contraires aux traités qui lient la république. Si la confiance du peuple batave dans la loyauté française avoit pu, dans certaines circonstances, être affoiblie par des perfides insinuations, la conduite du gouvernement français doit aujourd’hui la raffermir et la vendre pour jamais inébranlable.52

In response, the Nationale Vergadering praised the Directoire for its loyalty, its peacelovingness and greatness: L’Assemblée nationale a reconnu dans la marche loyale que le Directoire exécutif a tenu dans cette négociation la dignité d’un grand peuple qui sçait vaincre ses ennemis mais qui désire faire cesser les malheurs de la guerre d’une manière convenable à sa gloire et à ses veritables intérêts et ces négociations en offrant le premier exemple d’une publicité si propre à inspirer de la confiance pour le gouvernement, qui sent que ses démarches n’ont pas besoin d’être couvertes du voile du mystère, donnent aussi à l’Europe un exemple frappant de grandeur et d’amour pour la paix. L’Assemblée Nationale a vu avec une vive satisfaction, mais sans étonnement la fidélité du gouvernement français au traité, qui subsiste si heureusement entre les deux Républiques.53

Notwithstanding these words of praise, peace was not yet to be. By then the Directoire’s ultimatum had led to the rupture of the peace talks and Malmesbury had already left Paris.54 By consequence, plans to invade Ireland revived55 and the Directoire paid more attention to the Batavian Republic. On the one hand, this caused more interference and higher demands for military cooperation. On the other hand, this meant that the Batavian government was treated less curtly and 51   23 December 1796, Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to Lestevenon, Pasteur, and Meyer; NA 2.01.08 no. 102. 52   3 January 1797, Noël to Nationale Vergadering; AAE CP Hollande 595; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 189. 53   6 January 1797, Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to Noël; NA 2.01.08 no. 396. 54  Guyot, 1907, p. 301. 55  Ross, 1981, p. 133.



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Batavian desires were, at least in appearance, taken more seriously. In response to the rupture of negotiations, the Directoire did issue a decree stating that the British government had tried to have the French Republic violate its promise to the Batavian Republic to restore its colonies and to crush the liberty of a befriended nation. This had been unacceptable, since: ‘la République, en accédant à ces conditions déshonorantes, trahirait ses alliés, répudierait des peuples qui se sont unis à elle et ont compté sur sa loyauté et sur sa force’56 3.2  Getting Involved in Lille Some months after the rupture of the Malmesbury-Delacroix peace talks in Paris, negotiations between France and Britain resumed at Lille.57 Leoben had left Britain isolated,58 especially since attempts to gain Russian support or to prevent Franco-Austrian peace negotiations by provoking Prussian mediation of a general peace failed.59 Moreover, domestic problems forced London to conclude peace. The financial situation had worsened.60 Thereto, British defences were virtually paralysed by mutinies of the fleet at Spithead and Sheerness,61 and Ireland was about to rise in rebellion.62 Given the circumstances, Pitt succeeded again in eliminating the King’s and Grenville’s resistance and got a Cabinet majority endorsing his peace plan.63 The Prime Minister did still have hopes that a Royalist victory in French elections would turn the French government more concessive.64 On 1 June, Lord Grenville—referring to the Preliminaries of Leoben—addressed the Directoire with new overtures to start discussions on a preliminary

  Ballot, 1910, p. 39.   Negotiations took place from 4 July to 16 October 1797. 58   Ballot, 1910, p. 92. 59   Ballot, 1910, pp. 78–79 and p. 104; Ross, 1981, p. 134; Schroeder, 1994, p. 173; Droz, 2005, p. 210. 60   Ballot, 1910, pp. 117–118; Ross, 1981, p. 134; Schroeder, 1994, p. 173; Droz, 2005, p. 210. 61   Ballot, 1910, pp. 117–118; Guyot, 1907, pp. 381–382; Ross, 1981, p. 134; Schroeder, 1994, p. 173; Droz, 2005, p. 210. 62   Ballot, 1910, pp. 117–118; Schroeder, 1994, p. 173; Droz, 2005, p. 210. 63   Vreede, 1863, p. 288; Ballot, 1910, p. 130 and p. 137; Guyot, 1907, p. 389 and p. 474; Schroeder, 1994, p. 173; Droz, 2005, p. 210. 64  Ross, 1981, pp. 134–135. 56 57

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peace in preparation for the future general congress in Bern.65 While Austria and Britain were basically acting to save their own skins, the Coalition powers still held out the prospect of a general congress to each other.66 The Directoire responded approvingly to Grenville’s preludes, proposed the French city of Lille—not that far from Calais and with a telegraph connection to Paris—as the place were the delegations were to meet and almost immediately appointed three representatives: Charles Letourneur, Hugues Maret, and Admiral Pléville-Le Pelley. In order to prevent a repetition of the winter negotiations and due to fear that the British government was merely playing for time, the French government did immediately demand that negotiations would be on a separate and definitive peace.67 On 17 June, the British government accepted a separate peace68 and the congress could be assembled. Letourneur and the delegation’s scribe, Victor Colchen, left for Lille on 25 June. Pléville followed them the next day.69 Maret stayed in Paris for another four days awaiting the final text of the delegation’s instructions.70 By 4 July, Malmesbury arrived in Lille.71 Three days later conferences started.72 The French delegation was directed not only to further French interests, but to negotiate the restitutions and retrocessions to be claimed on behalf of the Republic’s allies as well. The Directoire stressed that uniting their interests with those of France was a condition for the peace talks to take place, since, according to the French government, the Republic’s allies had taken part in the war only for its cause and had entered the war after the French Republic. Therefore, the French Republic had to include its allies in the present peace talks and negotiate on their behalf on the same conditions as it negotiated for itself.73

65   ‘pour regler les préliminaires d’une paix, que l’on arrangerait définitivement au congrès futur’; AAE CP Angleterre 590; NA 2.01.08 no. 601 and no. 610; Ballot, 1910, p. 123; Guyot, 1907, p. 385. 66   Ballot, 1910, pp. 96–97; Guyot, 1907, p. 385. 67   Ballot, 1910, p. 127 and p. 166; Guyot, 1907, p. 387 and p. 398. 68  Guyot, 1907, p. 399. 69   Ballot, 1910, p. 178. 70  Guyot, 1907, p. 397. 71   Ballot, 1910, p. 179. 72   Ballot, 1910, p. 180; Guyot, 1907, p. 412. 73   Ballot, 1910, p. 223.



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Les alliés de la République française ayant pris part à la guerre uniquement à cause d’Elle, et y étant entrés postérieurement à Elle; la dite République comprendra ses alliés dans la présente négociation pour la paix, et pourra traiter pour l’une sur les mêmes termes des conditions quelle traitera pour elle-même.74

The French envoys foresaw some problems in getting Malmesbury to concur with the French Republic negotiating for her allies since Britain probably wished to negotiate with Spain and ‘Holland’ separately to attain a more profitable result. Hence, they asked the Directoire to make a clear statement on what they were to demand on the allies’ behalf and that these demands were a conditio sine qua non. Moreover, they urged the Directors to insert the inclusion of the allies in their full powers as otherwise Malmesbury would have a formal ground to refuse the extension of negotiations. They feared Malmesbury would argue that the French Republic had not been officially authorised to act on behalf of its allies by their governments. In addition, they wanted to know what to do if Malmesbury would claim stipulating for Portugal in response.75 The French envoys’ fears both that Malmesbury wanted to involve Portugal in the peace talks and that he wished to exclude the Batavian Republic were not unwarranted. Malmesbury’s draft treaty, presented to them on 8 July, stipulates that the King of Portugal and the King of Spain would be invited to accede to the Peace Treaty under some conditions still to be agreed upon in the Treaty and that if either of them did not accede within two months after the ratifications would have been exchanged he would no longer receive any aid from his respective ally for the further duration of the war.76 Portugal and Spain were thus given the free choice either to accede to the Treaty or to stay at war without any help from their mighty allies. Neither of them being strong enough to continue the fight with the opposing great power, the choice to be made and hence the peace were de facto dictated to them.77 With regard to the Batavian Republic, however, the draft provided for an Article in which His Britannic Majesty declared his intention to

74   19 June 1797, Arrangemens preliminaries pour entrer en négociation (Article 2); AAE CP Angleterre 591. 75   25 June 1797, Notes remises sur les stipulations à faire en faveur des alliés de la République; AAE CP Angleterre 591. 76  Guyot, 1907, p. 404. 77  Article XII.

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conclude a definitive peace treaty with that Republic on the principle of the status ante bellum.78 In the formal instructions for the French delegation, adopted on 26 June 1797, the Directoire stuck to the inclusion of Spain and the Batavian Republic in the peace talks, while stating its intention to come to a separate maritime peace with Britain. As that peace was solely to end the maritime war, the Emperor and Russia were not affected, whereas the French allies were directly involved in that war and, moreover, only at war with Britain.79 Having been notified of Lord Grenville’s preludes to peace by Delacroix three days later,80 the Batavian Republic sent a delegation to take part in the Lille negotiations. The Nationale Vergadering appointed Willem Anne Lestevenon and Theodore van Marselis. Seven days later a third plenipotentiary—Joan Arend de Vos van Steenwijk— was appointed; the delay being caused by the Assembly’s refusal to appoint Willem Aernout de Beveren who was nominated by the committee.81 The commissioners received their instructions on 25 July, after which Lestevenon and De Vos van Steenwijk immediately left for Paris.82 On 3 August, Lestevenon was already replaced by Maarten van der Goes.83 From the start, the government in The Hague knew the Directoire opposed the convocation of a general peace conference at least for as long as the French Republic did not have concluded separate peace treaties with all its enemies,84 but presumed that the Batavian delegates

 Article XIV; AAE CP Angleterre 591.   26 June 1797, Instructions pour la paix conclure entre la République Française et Sa Majesté Brittanique aux citoyens Le Tourneur, Pleville le Pelley et Maret; AAE CP Angleterre 590. 80   5 June 1797, Meyer to Van Leyden; NA 1.02.14 no. 598. The official communication with a copy of Lord Grenville’s letter was sent by Delacroix to Meyer on 9 June 1797 (NA 2.01.08 no. 601) and by Noël to the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken on 15 June 1797 (NA 2.01.08 no. 231). 81   16 June 1797, minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 26; 28 June 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B; 28 July 1797, decree by Nationale Vergadering in French by which the three commissioners are appointed and designated to take part in the conferences and treat and conclude with the King of Great Britain’s plenipotentiaries; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 82   25 July 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaeken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B. 83   3 August 1797, secret minutes and decree Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 360 and no. 55B. 84   5 June 1797, Meyer to Van Leyden; NA 1.02.14 no. 598. 78 79



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would be allowed to partake in separate negotiations with Britain. In Paris, Meyer communicated that expectation, although using the more docile ‘hope,’ to Delacroix already on 26 June: Cependant le gouvernement batave auroit vu avec la plus vive satisfaction, qu’en conformité de ce qui s’est passé en brumaire de l’année dernière, à l’occasion des premières conférences, il eut été admis à envoyer un représentant à Lille, non qu’il se permette aucune inquiétude sur la manière dont ses interêts seront menagés par les agens du Directoire exécutif. Mais telle est pour lui la gravité des circonstances et l’importance extrême des objets en réclamation, qu’il lui est bien permis de désirer que tout soit presenté avec cette énergie cette vérité et cette précision qu’une partie interessée peut seule posséder. Un commissaire batave apporteroit d’ailleurs dans ces conférences, des notions de localité, des vues commerciales et maritimes, qui pourroient seconder puissamment la politique des plénipotentiaires français, et rien de si naturel que de voir deux républiques coalisées dans les plus nobles efforts pour le maintien de leur liberté, contre son plus dangereux ennemi, se montrer encore indivisibles, quand il s’agit de se ménager la prix de leur perséverance, pour une paix honorable et solide. Dirigée par ces considérations la commission des relations extérieures batave exécutif l’espoir bien fondé qu’en conformité de l’article 5 du traité qui lie les deux nations, elle sera invitée à désigner un commissaire pour assister aux conférences qui vont s’ouvrir à Lille et traiter de la paix de concert avec les plénipotentiaires français.85

However, the delegation that arrived in Paris by the end of July 1797 was not admitted to the conferences. The French government claimed to negotiate for the Batavian Republic ‘avec le même zêle,’86 and promised the restitution of the conquered Dutch colonies, on various occasions indicating that a peace with Britain would only be concluded if consonant with the French Constitution and the treaties between the French Republic and its allies and that the French Republic would take the Batavian interests in regard.87 This French stand was never   26 June 1797, Meyer to Delacroix; NA 2.01.08 no. 601.   10 June 1797, Delacroix to Noël; AAE CP Angleterre 590. The message was communicated to the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken by Noël on 18 June; NA 2.01.08 no. 231. 87   5 June 1797, Meyer to Van Leyden; NA 1.02.14 no. 598. The same condition was specified in the preliminary instructions to the French delegation in Lille of 13 June 1797: ‘S’il a des propositions à faire qui ne soyent pus contraire à la constitution, aux lois et aux traités qui liens la République, bâse établie pour la suite des négociations’;  AAE CP Angleterre 591. In a letter formally communicating Grenville’s overtures Delacroix declared that ‘la République française n’a jamais oublié sa première et fidèle alliée.’ The promise to take good care of the Batavian interests was repeated 85 86

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accepted by The Hague. In the Nationale Vergadering, the representative Vonck, for instance, asserted that the Batavian Republic was to act as a free and independent people and an autonomous power, that is, to take an active part in negotiations with Britain.88 Until the very end of the negotiations, the Batavian government did adamantly insist on its representatives being admitted to the conferences.89 Hardly a letter was sent to Paris in which the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken did not instruct the delegation and the Batavian envoy, Caspar Meyer, to vigorously demand the admittance from the French government.90 By August, the instruction to insist on the Batavian commissioners to be admitted to the conferences had become such a common element to the final part of a letter send to Meyer or the commissioners in Paris, that the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken came to resemble Cato the Elder in his endurance. The committee regarded admittance as the Batavian Republic’s ‘undeniable right,’91 especially as the Batavian Republic itself was at war with Great Britain. In the first place, reference was made to the benefit or even necessity of this admittance, as Batavian representatives could best defend Batavian interests and would be eminently knowledgeable about the geographical and commercial situation in Asia.92 In the second place, the committee pointed out the Batavian Republic’s right of having its representatives admitted on the basis of Article 5 of the Treaty of The Hague since it stipulated that neither of both Republics would make peace nor negotiate with Britain without the cooperation of the other.93

by Letourneur in a conversation with Meyer on 21 June (Meyer to Van Leyden; NA 1.02.14 no. 598). 88  Asser, 1860, p. 64; Vreede, 1863, pp. 307–309. 89   13 July 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B. 90  E.g. 5, 13, 24 and 25 July, and 14 August 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B; 11 and 14 August 1797, Van Leyden to the Batavian commissioners in Paris; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 91   ‘een onbetwistbaar recht dezer republicq’; 5 July 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B. 92   5 July 1797, French internal memorandum on Batavian request for admittance; AAE CP Hollande 596. 93   26 June 1797, Meyer to Delacroix; NA 2.01.08 no. 601. 29 July 1797, Meyer to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 599; 3 August 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 360 and no. 55B; 14 August 1797, draft letter to Talleyrand sent to Paris on behalf of the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken by Van Leyden; NA 2.01.08 no. 360; 13 July 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B.



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In response to a notification by Delacroix of the British terms, Meyer immediately insisted on the Batavian Republic being allowed to take a ‘partie directe’ in the negotiations, while informing Delacroix that Lestevenon, De Vos van Steenwijk and Marselis had been designated to take part in the conferences in Lille. He referred to the previous invitation to send representatives, regarding it ‘une suite naturelle de votre respect pour le contrât qui lie les deux republiques’ and taking it for granted that this time the Batavian commissioners would be admitted as the situation was quite similar. Le passé nous offre donc un garant assuré, que ce contrat sacré ne reçevra jamais; la plus legère atteinte et que l’amitié entre les deux républiques demeurera inviolable. Or, l’article 5 de ce traité stipule textuellement, qu’aucune des deux républiques pourra faire la paix avec l’Angleterre ou traiter avec cette puissance sans le concours et le consentement de l’autre république.94

That response was not to the liking of the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken in The Hague, though. He was reprimanded for not having asserted that the Batavian Republic did not abstain from its ‘lawful right’95 to be represented in Lille by commissioners of its own.96 In a letter to the new French Foreign Secretary, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, Meyer, after demanding yet another time the ‘fraternal’ admittance of the Batavian commissioners, argued that taking a direct and active part in the negotiations through its own representatives was a right of each nation ‘dont le sort est intimement lié à l’issue de ces négociations’ and that this right was guaranteed by the Treaty that united the French and Batavian Republics.97 It seems that in his opinion admittance of the Batavian representatives could not be refused, even without Article 5 of the Treaty of The Hague, since an interested state had a more general right to take a direct part through representatives of its own in negotiations where its interests were at stake, especially as in this case the demanded compensations would need the Batavian Republic’s consent—an argument that was repeated by De Vos van Steenwijk on the occasion of his presentation to Talleyrand on 8 August, where he declared that ‘the nature of the matter called   17 July 1797, Meyer to Delacroix; NA 1.02.14 no. 599.   ‘wettig recht.’ 96   24 July 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B. 97   29 July 1797, Meyer to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 599. 94 95

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for negotiations to be conducted by Batavian commissioners.’98 That line of reasoning being legally less solid, Meyer did however base his claim to admittance of the commissioners first and foremost on ‘la foi du Traité qui lie les deux républiques,’99 thus explicitly referring to the principle of good faith that was, as has been discussed before, one of the cornerstones of enlightened and Revolutionary thought on treaty law. Within French diplomatic circles a debate was going on whether the admittance could be refused and whether that would actually be the most prudent thing to do. On 5 July, an internal memo was sent to Delacroix by some of his civil servants arguing that the Batavian envoys should be allowed to take part in the negotiations. In the first place it was asserted that traditionally the Batavians were used to directly participating in peace negotiations, especially with Britain since in those negotiations their interests were particularly involved. They had done so during the entire course of the eighteenth century and were to be expected to want getting involved this time as well. A French refusal to let them in would cause serious discontent thus giving France’s enemies a chance to divide the two allies. It was in the French interest not to alienate the Batavian government from the common cause. Secondly, a Batavian representative would provide the Revolutionary alliance with specific knowledge of the geographic and commercial situation in Asia that would be very useful in negotiations as the 1783 negotiations had shown. Finally, the Batavian government had been invited to send plenipotentiaries to Paris during Malmesbury’s first mission. Following a different course of action this time would be impossible ‘sans provoquer des comparaisons fâcheuses entre les deux négociations.’100 On the other hand, there was a strong tendency to restrict the actual negotiations to France and Britain alone. Be it in a later stage of the negotiations, the French delegation in Lille advised against admittance of Batavian representatives since the French Republic was not in the position to raise the matter to Lord Malmesbury. For allowing the Batavian representatives to participate

  98   ‘de natuur van de zaak zelve, vorderde dat de negociatien niet wel anders dan door de Bataafsche commissarissen konden worden behandeld.’; 9 August 1797, De Vos van Steenwijk to Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 360.   99   29 July 1797, Meyer to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 599. 100   5 July 1797 Note: Relations Extérieures 1e division politique; AAE CP Hollande 596.



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in the conferences in Lille would have conflicted with the refusal to admit Austria’s allies, including Great Britain, to the nearly simultaneous conferences in Udine.101 At first, the Directoire and its Ministre des Rélations extérieures did not refuse admittance explicitly in their communications with the Batavian envoy and commissioners and seemed to generally acknowledge the Batavian Republic’s right of having its representatives admitted to the conferences.102 Their responses mainly bear witness to stalling tactics in order not to have its ‘système des paix partielles’103 subverted by admitting the Batavians. Meyer assured Van Leyden on 27 July that both the members of the Directoire and Delacroix had responded to his demands for admittance time and again that it was in the interest of both France and its allies that first an agreement should be reached with Malmesbury on the fundamentals before admittance of France’s allies could be insisted upon, since Malmesbury on his part would request the admittance of the British allies and negotiations would certainly get protracted. The Batavian and Spanish representatives would be called to the negotiating table as soon as France and Britain consented upon the main points of discussion.104 Once Talleyrand replaced Delacroix things changed. Talleyrand wanted peace and he wanted peace quickly.105 For the matter of admittance that actually seemed to mean that the French government was giving in to its allies’ demands. In the aforementioned conversation with De Vos van Steenwijk, Talleyrand said that if the Batavian government kept insisting on its representatives to be admitted, that would certainly happen.106 He did bring to the fore, though, that negotiations would be expedited if France was to negotiate on behalf of its allies. Having separate delegations would only slow things down, mainly because the Spanish delegation107 and probably even the Russian and   23 August 1797, ministres plenipotentiaries de la République française charges de traiter de la paix avec l’Angleterre to Talleyrand; AAE CP Angleterre 591 and AAE CP Angleterre Supplément 30. 102   27 July 1797, Meyer to Van Leyden; NA 1.02.14 no. 598. 103   Belissa, 2006, p. 348. 104   27 July 1797, Meyer to Van Leyden; NA 1.02.14 no. 598. 105   See Schroeder, 1994, p. 173. 106   ‘dat zo zulks van onze zijde gepresseerd wierd, dit ook zoude geschieden’ and ‘dat hij gene zwarigheid ter waereld zag om de bataafsche negociateurs dadelijk tot de conferentien te admitteeren.’ 107   Spain had been putting pressure on the French government to get involved in the peace talks as well. See e.g. a letter send by the Batavian envoy to the Court of 101

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Portuguese representatives had to be admitted as well if the Batavians were allowed to take part, and, so he feared, the Spanish would deliberate­ly prolong the negotiations. In order not to let the present momentum to establish a profitable peace pass, he proposed that the Batavian delegation would stay in Paris and act through the intervention of the French ministry and he promised that France would take the Batavian Republic’s true interests in mind.108 At one point, Talleyrand seems to have argued that the non­admittance of the Batavian representa­tives was also related to the Batavian Republic’s domestic situation. Talleyrand wrote to the Batavian representa­tives on 10 August 1797—only two days after the referendum rejecting the Batavian Constitution, which might not have been a coincidence although the mail usually took about three to four days to be delivered from The Hague to Paris—that ‘au milieu du mouvement de vos circonstances intérieures, d’une sorte d’agitation révolutionnaire, la stipulation de vos droits est plus sûrement et plus heureusement confiée à la France, puissante et constituée.’109 Based upon the combination of ‘vos circonstances intérieures’ and ‘France (. . .) constituée,’ he might have meant that the Batavian Republic did not have a constitution yet and, hence, had not yet been constituted as a free and independent nation ready to be subject to the law of nations and to play a role in international politics. This conclusion, however, is based on a line of reasoning that is, at most, implicitly referred to in the letter. Meyer seems to have understood Talley­rand’s mentioning of the internal circum­stances of the Batavian Republic mostly as a reference to its financial situation.110 Even if Talley­rand did mean that the Batavian Constitution was in statu nascendi this argument was forwarded only once. All other letters exchanged between the French minister and the Batavian representatives clearly show that the non-admittance of the Batavian delegation to the conferences was a matter of time and especially of

Spain, Johan Valckenaer, from Aranjuez on 16 July in which he reported a conversation with Godoy in which the Spanish minister proposed to undertake concerted action to have Spanish and Batavian representatives admitted to the conferences in Lille; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 108   9 August 1797, De Vos van Steenwijk to Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 109   10 August 1797, Talleyrand to the Batavian representatives in Paris; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. See also, Belissa, 2008, p. 120. 110   10 August 1797, Meyer to Van Leyden; NA 1.02.14 no. 598.



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maintaining the French policy of separate peace treaties. Somewhat later Talleyrand, in a conference with Maarten van der Goes, did refer to the Batavian Republic’s internal political situation again, but on that occasion he did so to underline the Batavian Republic’s interest in peace and not to refuse admittance of its representatives to the peace negotia­tions.111 From the Batavian side, the argument of not having a constitution yet was not accepted. One of the members of the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken, Jacob Hahn, asserted in a private letter to Van der Goes of 29 August 1797: ‘the reproach that we do not have a constitution, grieves me, too, and should stop.’112 Expressing his regret for the rejection of the draft constitution, Hahn did bring to the fore that ‘Paris’ should see the difference between the Batavian Republic’s ‘intermediary stage’ and the one France had experienced. In France, that stage had been dominated by the arbitrariness and hegemony of the unbridled Convention, whereas the Batavian intermediary government was indeed constitutional since the Unie van Utrecht was still in force and both the Nationale Vergadering and the provincial administrations were based on and tied by regulations ratified by the people. There was no clear reason why the Batavian Republic, though still lacking a written constitution, could not play its part on the international scene, for: We are far remote from being in a state of anarchy and with regard to external relations the same certainty, order, grip, skill, and secrecy occur as under the rule of Their Lords from 1581113 until March 1796.114

By the time of the rupture of the Lille negotiations soon after the anti-Royalist fructidor coup d’état (4 September 1797), the issue of the admittance of the Batavian commissioners was still not resolved.

111   21 August 1797, account of a meeting of Talleyrand and Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 112   ‘het verwijt dat wij gene constitutie hebben, verdriet mij ook en behoort op te houden’; NA 2.21.073 no. 17. 113   The year of the Akte van Verlatinghe/Act of Abjuration by which Philip II was deposed as Lord of the Netherlands, that is, as Duke of Guelders, Count of Holland and Zeeland, Lord of Utrecht, Friesland, Overijssel, Drenthe, and Groningen, while the cities of Gent, Antwerp, Lier, Venlo, and Ieper and the Brugse Vrije declared not to recognise him as their Lord anymore as well. 114   ‘Het is [. . .] hemelsbreed af, dat wij in ene staat van verwarring zoude zijn en ten aanzien der buitenlandse betrekkingen is er althans niet minder zekerheid, orde, klem, vaardigheid en geheimhouding dan er sedert 1581 tot maart 1796 onder het rijk van H.H. Mog. geweest is.’

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Malmesbury left Lille on the evening of 17 September and set sail for England from Calais a day later.115 On 20 September, Talleyrand confirmed to the Batavian commissioners, already informed through the rumours in the French capital, that Malmesbury had left Lille. ‘Le fait est vrai. Les négociations sont rompues. Lord Malmesbury est parti.’116 The same day he sent a rather short letter to Meyer stating the same facts: ‘L’amitié qui unit les Républiques française et batave et la considération de leurs communs intérêts me font un devoir de vous prévenir que le Lord Malmesbury est parti de Lille pour retourner en Angleterre.’117 On 27 September, the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken in The Hague, in response to Talleyrand’s rather ‘enigmatic’ letter, instructed the Batavian commissioners in Paris to ask officially whether negotiations had definitively come to an end.118 The commissioners put the question forward in a letter to Talleyrand of 2 October,119 but had to wait three days for a reply. Even then, Talleyrand only asserted that the fact that the French representatives had not left Lille was sufficient proof of the French government still not considering the peace talks terminated.120 Over a fortnight later, the Batavian commissioners reported to The Hague that the French delegation had returned from Lille and that there was no more hope for negotiations to restart.121 Before leaving Paris, De Vos van Steenwijk had a last meeting with the Director Reubell in which he complained that the Batavian commissioners had not been officially informed of the rupture.122 An irritated Director responded that the commissioners had no right of being officially informed as they were not accredited to the French

115   20 September 1797, Commander of Calais to his superior officer; AAE CP Angleterre 591. 116   20 September 1797, Batavian commissioners to Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 117     20 September 1797, Talleyrand to Meyer; NA 2.01.08 no. 360 and NA 1.02.14 no. 610. 118   27 September 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B. 119   2 October 1797, Batavian commissioners to Talleyrand; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 120     5 October 1797, Talleyrand to Batavian commissioners; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 121   22 October 1797, Batavian commissioners to Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 122   26 October 1797, Batavian commissioners to Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 360.



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government.123 Nonetheless, Talleyrand officially communicated the negotiations’ rupture to the Batavian commissioners two days later.124 A month later, De Vos van Steenwijk en Van Marselis were instructed to return to The Hague, while Van der Goes had already left Paris by then as he had been appointed scribe to the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken.125 3.3  A Solemn Pledge Upheld? The resiliency with which the Batavian government kept insisting on admittance of its commissioners to the Lille congress was not merely due to a general notion of a right to participate as an independent power. Some of the Batavian Republic’s vital interests were at stake. In the first place, Britain had occupied a great number of Dutch colonies, among which the Cape of Good Hope and Dutch dominions on Ceylon. In the second place, Britain had not recognised the Batavian Republic yet and was likely to take an interest in the fate of the House of Orange. In this section the substance of the Lille negotiations will be discussed with a focus on matters relevant to the Batavian Republic. As said before, the Directoire wished to prevent a repetition of the winter negotiations. Hence, apart from demanding consent to a separate peace, Malmesbury was to promise not to make any proposals contrary to the French Constitution, laws or treaties the French Republic was bound by.126 This clause implied inter alia full restitution of the Batavian Republic’s colonies.127 The Directoire determined what matters were to be discussed in the instructions for the French delegation of 26 June. Next to the inclusion of its interests in the negotiations, with regard to the Batavian Republic the instructions stated, first, that Britain should recognise the new Republic,128 second, that Dutch vessels captured at sea or arrested in British ports on behalf of the Stadhouder should be restored, and

123   26 October 1797, Batavian commissioners to Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 124   28 October 1797, Talleyrand to Batavian commissioners; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 125   27 November 1797, decree Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 126   Ballot, 1910, p. 166; Guyot, 1907, p. 398. 127  Guyot, 1907, p. 399. 128  Guyot, 1907, pp. 391–392.

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finally, that all Dutch dominions conquered in Asia and America as well as the Cape of Good Hope and its surroundings should be restored. Especially the last provision was said to be of particular interest to both the Batavian and the French Republic, since control of the Cape would turn Britain into the ‘absolute master’129 of commerce in India, China and Japan and the French, Spanish and Dutch establishments in the Indian Ocean. The French envoys were forcibly instructed not to give in to this demand without the explicit approval of the Directoire. The French government saw no reason to oppose an eventual British demand of renewal by the Batavian Republic of the promise made by the Staten Generaal in the Treaty of Paris (1783) not to trouble British navigation in the Indian Ocean. Finally, the Directoire suggested that the provisions with regard to Spain and the Batavian Republic would be included in the separate and secret articles of the Treaty.130 On 8 July, Lord Malmesbury presented a draft treaty to his French colleagues.131 Whilst Grenville had spoken of ‘préliminaires d’une paix, que l’on arrangerait définitivement au congrès futur’ in his 1 June letter,132 Malmesbury’s draft was headed ‘traité de paix définitif ’ and stipulated to establish a ‘paix universelle et perpétuelle [. . .] entre les deux parties contractantes.’ Even with a republic established in Paris, ‘Roi de France’ was still among George III’s titles in the preamble and Malmesbury stuck to the tradition of renewing and confirming former treaties. This renewal was unacceptable to the French government since the French Republic did not acknowledge the treaties’ binding character and they had been revoked by law.133 Hence, the French plenipotentiaries objected to this Article. Afterwards no provision like this appeared in a draft for an Anglo-French treaty. If accepted, several treaties relevant to the Batavian Republic as well, for instance the 1783 Treaty of Versailles, would have been renewed. In the fifth Article, Malmesbury proposed the status quo ante bellum as the leading principle with regard to each party’s dominions and

129   ‘rendroit les anglais les maitres absolus du commerce de l’Inde, de la Chine et du Japon’ 130   26 June 1797, Instructions pour la paix aux citoyens Le Tourneur, Pleville le Pelley et Maret; AAE CP Angleterre 590; Guyot, 1907, pp. 400–401. 131   8 July 1797, draft treaty (Malmesbury); AAE CP Angleterre 591. 132   1 June 1797, Grenville to Delacroix, copy enclosed with 9 July 1797, Delacroix to Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 601 and NA 1.02.14 no. 610. 133   Ballot, 1910, pp. 147–148; Guyot, 1907, pp. 400–401; see further chapter I.2.



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rights with the possibility of some exceptions yet to be determined.134 As said, Britain was to negotiate separately with the Batavian Republic. In those negotiations the same principle would be applied again with the exception of some dominions that were to remain in His Britannic Majesty’s possession and thus would be ceded to him by the Batavian Republic. Forced by Austria’s consent, the British government had by then reconciled with the French annexation of Belgium.135 London was determined, though, to preserve the Cape, Cochin, Ceylon, and the Spanish colony of Trinidad.136 To gain public support for peace and marginalise the King’s opposition, Pitt needed to secure colonial gains.137 Not even the slightest ground was to be provided to the King and Grenville to undermine peace negotiations.138 Basically, George III would only have settled for a restoration of the Orangist regime in The Hague. Pitt rightly sensed this to be illusory at the time. A Francophile, Patriot regime in The Hague in addition to French military presence did mean that Dutch colonies, once restored, would de facto be in French hands. Henceforth, the British government argued that preserving the Cape and Ceylon were essential to British security due to the changed political situation in the Netherlands.139 In addition, Malmesbury demanded the evacuation of Flushing by French forces.140 Finally, Britain implicitly recognised the abolition of the Stadholderate. Malmesbury would treat with the Batavians on the condition that all the properties and estates belonging to the Prince of Orange in December 1794 and confiscated afterwards would be returned to him or that he would receive a financial compensation for his losses, whereas the French Republic would promise to obtain him a compensation equal to the loss of his dignities in the United Provinces at the general peace. Moreover, the persons imprisoned or exiled due to their attachment to the House of Orange or the former government had to be released or to be allowed to return to their country and had to be allowed to enjoy their properties.141

  Ballot, 1910, p. 87.   Ballot, 1910, p. 41, p. 82 and pp. 100–101; Ross, 1981, p. 135. 136  Guyot, 1907, p. 409 and p. 416. 137  Ross, 1981, p. 135. 138  Guyot, 1907, p. 430. 139   Ballot, 1910, p. 80, p. 83, p. 86, p. 90, and p. 145. 140   Ballot, 1910, p. 146. 141   Ballot, 1910, p. 146. 134 135

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The majority of French Directors had no intention to infringe on promises made to Spain and the Batavian Republic. This was as much a matter of principle as it was given in by economic and geopolitical considerations. Britain’s fears with regard to the Cape and Ceylon were France’s wishes and vice versa.142 Neither of the two western great powers desired the other to control the sea routes to India. Hence, the pre-war colonial situation had to be restored.143 Although the French delegation did not invoke treaty obligations on the French part withstanding non-restitution of Batavian colonies,144 the colonial issue, thus, soon became the hot potato of the Lille negotiations. Pitt did not fancy a rupture, but he could not afford to yield, too. Because Austria had already consented to the loss of Belgium, a return to the status quo ante bellum on the Continent as well was not possible. Hence, gains in the colonial sphere were to compensate Britain for French expansion.145 After having studied this draft treaty, the French delegation sent for further instructions from Paris on how to react, especially with regard to the demands to be made on behalf of the Republic’s allies. They foresaw that Malmesbury would strongly oppose the restitutions demanded on behalf of Spain and the Batavian Republic, since he had already stated that France had gained a considerable territorial aggrandisement on the Continent due to her victories and it would thus be just fair that Britain would keep some of the colonial dominions captured from France’s allies. Therefore, Le Tourneur, Pléville and Maret expected Malmesbury to insist with force on Trinidad, the Cape and Ceylon to stay in British hands. They expressed some serious doubts on whether the restitution of the allies’ dominions was actually worth jeopardizing peace. Dans cette position et la résistance des anglais sur ce point étant invincible, devions-nous regarder comme non avenues les stipulations qui aurait été arrêtées relativement à la France, rompre la négociation et nous abstenir d’entendre les tempéramens qui nous seraient proposés?146

 Guyot, 1907, p. 122 and p. 403.  Guyot, 1907, p. 404; Ross, 1981, p. 136. 144  Guyot, 1907, p. 417. 145  Guyot, 1907, pp. 425–426. 146   10 July 1797, French delegation to Delacroix; AAE CP Angleterre 591. 142 143



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On 12 July, the Directoire decided to inform the Spanish and Batavian envoys in Paris of British demands.147 The next day the French government instructed its representatives in Lille to inform Malmesbury that the treaties between the French Republic and its allies contained mutual guarantees of each other’s pre-war possessions and that the Directoire could not depart from these commitments. They had to ask Malmesbury for a ‘reponse cathégorique’ in which Britain consented to a full restitution of all colonial dominions taken from France’s allies since the Directoire was forced by the Republic’s laws and by treaty obligations to regard that restitution as a ‘base effective’ and ‘le préliminaire indispensable de la négociation.’148 A more outspoken letter by Delacroix accompanied the Directoire’s instructions. The minister urged the envoys not to give in. Britain had attacked the French and Batavian Republics unjustly and hence, France and its ally were entitled to indemnities. Moreover, Britain had taken the Batavian dominions by treason on behalf of the Stadhouder, who had ordered the governors and commanders to surrender to the Royal Navy from Kew.149 Since Britain had recognised the Batavian Republic by stating its intend to conclude a peace treaty with it, the Batavian Republic was entitled to take over the colonial dominions instead of its former commander in chief. Finally, Delacroix, by sending a copy of the relevant secret provisions, informed the French delegation that the treaties that united France with Spain and the Batavian Republic contained the strongest and most solemn guarantee of each other’s territories. Henceforth, the restitution to France’s allies of their colonial dominions was ‘une consequence du principe’ for the negotiations. Britain had to adhere to that principle as a ‘condition préliminaire’ in order for further negotiations to take place as the French Republic could and would not agree to any provisions contrary to the Constitution,150 the laws and treaties that bound the French government.151

  13 July 1797, Procès verbaux Directoire exécutif; AN AF III 7.   13 July 1797, Directoire to French delegation; NA 2.01.08 no. 360; AAE CP Angleterre 591. 149   Legrand, 1895, pp. 112–113; Israel, 2001, p. 1243. 150  As to the French Constitution the First Title: Division du territoire is relevant in particular. Article 3 listed all departments including the Belgian ones. Hence all wartime annexations were declared constituent parts of the French Republic. Article 6 and 7 stated that the French colonies were constituent parts of the Republic, too, and that they formed departments. 151   13 July 1797, Delacroix to French delegation in Lille; AAE CP Angleterre 591. 147 148

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After having received the 13 July letters, the French delegation in Lille communicated the Directoire’s point of view to the British envoy.152 Malmesbury responded immediately that his instructions did not allow him to consent to the proposed ‘principe préliminaire’ and that he would send a courier to London to get his government’s opinion on the French terms.153 Exact copies of the notification to Malmesbury and his response can be found in Batavian archives. Hence, the Batavian government must have been informed of the Directoire’s reaction to Malmesbury’s draft.154 Le Tourneur, Pléville and Maret replied to the Directoire’s new instructions somewhat embarrassed on 16 July. They assured their principals that they had impressed Malmesbury that they were not to consent to any arrangements that were contrary to the Constitution, the laws and treaties binding the French Republic, but they had not informed Malmesbury that there were secret treaties prohibiting the French Republic to negotiate with Britain without the latter having accepted full restitution of the Spanish and Batavian colonial dominions in advance, since they had no knowledge of their existence.155 With respect to the Batavian Republic, the colonial guarantee was indeed part of the secret provisions of the 1795 Hague Treaty. However, Colchen was a civil servant at the Ministère des Rélations extérieures in May 1795 and Letourneur was a former member of the Comité de Salut public and the Directoire. Hence, even if Maret and Pléville had not been informally informed of the colonial guarantee, Colchen and Letourneur were likely to have had knowledge of it.156 The French delegation acknowledged having made a mistake, but insisted not to have violated the instructions and asked for new directions.157 Eight days later, Malmesbury, in a letter to the French delegation, refused to accept complete restitution at forehand since accepting the principle of restoring all dominions occupied by Britain, both the French ones and those belonging to Spain and the Batavian Republic, as a preliminary point excluded all reciprocity, would withhold any compensation to the King, and would not leave any room for negotia  15 July 1797, French delegation to Malmesbury; AAE CP Angleterre 591.   15 July 1797, Malmesbury to French delegation; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 154   9 July 1797, Delacroix to Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 601 and NA 1.02.14 no. 610. 155   16 July 1797, French delegation to Directoire; AAE CP Angleterre 591; Guyot, 1907, p. 407. 156  Guyot, 1907, pp. 413–414. 157   16 July 1797, French delegation to Directoire; AAE CP Angleterre 591. 152 153



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tion. Malmesbury had accepted the French condition that the peace would not contradict the French Constitution, existing laws and treaties. He had excluded secret provisions, though.158 He objected that the treaty obligations did not stand in the way to a peace treaty without complete restitution, if only those provisions would be modified; provided that Spain and the Batavian Republic were equally animated to conclude peace as the French Republic was. que la République francaise autorisée par ses alliés à négocier en leur nom et conjointement les articles de la paix, ne saurait opposer ses traités partiels avec eux à des propositions raisonnables, puisqu’il est reconnu que les parties contractantes conservent toujours le pouvoir de modifier, d’un consentement mutuel, les conditions auxquelles elles se seront respectivement engagées, toutes les fois que leur interêts communs pourront l’exiger.159 

Britain insisted on keeping some of the occupied colonies and settlements as compensation for the sacrifices it had made. Either that compensation might consist of dominions belonging to France’s allies or, alternatively, the French Republic could compensate Britain out of her own dominions, ‘or le refus absolu de cette alternative parait ecarter le seul moyen possible de concilier tous les intérêts et d’arriver à une paix juste, honorable et permanente.’160 On 16 July Delacroix, requested Meyer to provide a list of all dominions which restitution had to be demanded on behalf of the Batavian Republic.161 The Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken, though reluctantly as it rather had its own envoys to negotiate with Malmesbury, listed the Batavian demands and directed Lestevenon to communicate them to Reubell in a confidential letter. Next to the restitution of the colonies, the committee thought it reasonable to claim 30.5 million guilders as indemnity for the merchantmen and their cargo seized on their way from the East Indies and another six million for the captured men-of-war.162 By then Delacroix had already informed Meyer that Britain demanded to retain the Cape, Cochin, and Ceylon and had  Guyot, 1907, pp. 414–415; Ross, 1981, p. 136.   24 July 1797, Malmesbury to French delegation; AAE CP Angleterre 591; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 160   24 July 1797, Malmesbury to French delegation; AAE CP Angleterre 591; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 161   16 July 1797, Delacroix to Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 610. 162   24 July 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B. 158 159

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assured him that the French government had refused to consent to this demand and would do so in the future as well. c’est surtout dans cette circonstance où l’Angleterre demande à s’enrichir des plus belles possessions de la République batave, que le Gouvernement de la République française donne à tous ses alliés et principalement au peuple batave un témoignage signalé de franchise et de dévouement. Dans le cours des conférences tenue à Lille, le plénipotentiaire anglais a demandé la cession de la Trinité, du Cap de Bonne Espérance, de Cochin et des possessions hollandaises dans l’isle de Ceylon; et les plénipotentiaires de la République française ont ordre d’annoncer que fidèle à ses engagement, le Directoire exécutif se refuse d’accéder à une demande si contraire aux intérêts de nos alliés.163

In the instructions for the Batavian commissioners, dated 25 July 1797,164 the full restitution of the Batavian Republic’s East and West Indian dominions was first mentioned and labelled a conditio sine qua non: This Republic cannot agree to any peace unless all its dominions in the East and West Indies conquered by the British either by force or by treason are restored and will not enter into any negotiations that do not have that restoration as basis and in order to operate in this successfully, they will invoke to the French Republic’s plenipotentiaries the sixth of the Treaty’s secret articles.165

They were to remind the French Republic of its promise to restore its dominions to the Batavian Republic and that such a restitution would be in the French interest as well. As part of the restitution, the Batavian commissioners also had to make sure that the treaty provision would be formulated in a way that the occupied dominions would be returned in the condition they had been in at the time of occupation, whereas all improvements made by the British were to remain intact, and to insist on Britain to pledge preventing any destructions, especially to the plantations on the Moluccas and the cinnamon trees

  17 July 1797, Delacroix to Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 610.   25 July 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B. 165   ‘dat in geene vreede van den zijde dezer Republicq kan worden bewilligd, ten ware aan dezelve volledig worden gerestitueert alle de bezittingen, in de oost- of westindien, welke door de Engelschen, het zij door geweld, het zij door verraad zijn veroverd, en zullen zich in geene onderhandeling inlaten, welke die teruggave niet ten grondslage hebbe en, ten einde in deze met vrucht te kunnen werkzaam zijn, zullen zij bij de gevolmachtigden der Fransche Republicq inroepen het zesde der secrete articulen van het tractaat.’ 163 164



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on Ceylon. Without a formulation like that and without that promise, they were not to conclude. In sum, at a time the map of Europe was redrawn, the Batavian government was worried most about cinnamon trees. All other points in the instructions were negotiable. The Batavian Republic showed itself to be the true commercial nation it was. The committee started with what seemed to be rather trivial demands. The paper money that had been brought into circulation was to be exchanged, and the Dutch East India Company was to be granted the right to buy amphion and saltpetre from its British counterpart in Bengal at cost price in order to supply its trading stations in those parts. The better part of the instructions concerned the laws of the sea. First, there should be indemnity for the merchantmen arrested or captured ‘against the law nature and the law of nations’166 and the losses caused by those acts. This demand concerned dominions in the Dutch colonies that had been treacherously occupied by the British, the ships that had sailed to British ports as a safe haven or had been seized on the high sea before the British declaration of war to the Batavian Republic. The Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken must have foreseen British objections referring to vessels captured by the French and declared good prize in Batavian ports, for it already provided the counterargument that the French had seized those ships throughout the course of the war and the decisions had been taken by French prize courts and thus did not affect the rights of Batavian citizens. Indemnity was also demanded for Batavian men-of-war captured in violation of the law of nations, that is, before the declaration of war was issued. For the future, the Treaty was to contain a provision stipulating that in case of a new war, ships present in one of the belligerents’ ports would be allowed to leave freely. Thereto, indemnity had to be demanded for the prohibition by the British to transfer interest on loans to the Batavian Republic, which must have concerned huge amounts of money as Dutchmen had invested considerably in British stocks and the British public debt. More in general, the committee wanted to settle in the Treaty the general recognition, so also by the British, of the principle ‘based on the laws of nature and of nations’ of ‘free ship, free good’ and the   ‘in strijd met het recht der natuur en dat der volken.’

166

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limitation of the definition of contraband goods to what essentially were armaments.167 The commissioners were to deter the French from adopting an ‘Act of Navigation,’ since that would be detrimental to the Batavian Republic and hence to France, since the Batavian Republic’s usefulness as an ally depended on its affluence. In the interest of trade with Russia and Portugal, an attempt should be made to include those powers in the peace, whereas an effort should be made getting Portugal to grant the inhabitants of both Republics equal rights as the British. The committee decided to tackle one of the oldest disputes with the Britain as well. Arguing that ‘the glorious victories of the French should put an end to the prejudice that gave kingdoms preference to republics,’168 it wanted the Treaty to proclaim the equality of the salute at sea. Already aware that it was overplaying its hands, the committee also suggested persuading the British to abstain from their right of navigation on the ‘eastern seas.’169 The Batavian Republic wanted to maintain or regain its exclusive navigation with the Moluccas as that was necessary due to the high productions costs of the spices grown on that archipelago. Last but not least, the commissioners were to get the British to revoke their 1788 guarantee of the Stadholderate. Of course, at least according to the committee, that guarantee had become void and meaningless since the Stadholderate had already been abolished, but it did think the formal revocation necessary to the Batavian Republic’s domestic tranquillity and to stabilising the new form of government as it would dash the Orangist hope of restoration. As said all these points, with the exception of the colonial restitution and added demands that were to be considered a conditio sine qua non, were open for negotiation and could thus be used as compensation for that restitution. If there would really not be the slightest prospect of attaining any of the advantages in the negotiable part of the instructions without any compensation on the part of the Batavian Republic, the commissioners were allowed to offer the cession of the Dutch dominions on the coast of Malabar with the exception of Cochin trading station and at a further stage of the negotiations they were to regard Paleacatta and Bimilipatnam on the   ‘hetgeen wezentlijk oorlogstuig is.’   ‘de glorierijke overwinningen der franschen volkomen moeten doen vervallen het vooroordeel, dat aan koningrijken den rang boven republicquen werde gegeeven.’ 169   ‘de vaart door de Oostzeën’ 167 168



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coast of Coromandel in south-east India as objects of compensation albeit under the condition of the restitution of two other stations on the same coast. If the British would insist on the cession of Cochin,170 they were allowed to consent, but only in exchange of some men-ofwar captured after the start of the war. Whatever might have become of these demands, the Batavian Republic did not get a chance to put most of these issues on the congress’ agenda. What these instructions do show, is that the Batavian committee was prepared to cede some of the Batavian dominions in Asia, but only in the course of negotiations in return for the British yielding to other demands and under the condition that the dominions to be offered were among the least important. From a procedural point of view, these instructions show that the Batavian government expected to be able to really negotiate. During the time the admittance of Batavian representatives to the conferences was stalled, the Directoire did insist that the British would fully restore the conquered colonies of the French allies as a preliminary condition for peace. That was mostly done for geopolitical reasons, though, as the French government clearly recognised the importance of the Cape for communication with the trade posts and commercial cities along the coasts of the Indian Ocean and in China.171 According to the ‘arrangemens préliminaires’ the Cape was to be restored to the Dutch and its habitants would live under the laws of the Batavian Republic. The colony would remain under the protection ‘des trois puissances’172 with the Batavian Republic to be allowed to occupy the colony’s forts, villages and dominions with a garrison just sufficient of size to police the colony, whereas Frenchmen and British subjects would be allowed to settle there as farmers or merchants and both France and Britain would be allowed to establish storehouses there to supply their merchantmen and men-of-war. If the British would refuse to consent to this settlement with regard to the Cape the ‘arrangemens’ stated that it would be proposed that its garrison would be alternatively

170   For a map of Dutch dominions in India and on Ceylon see: http://www .vockenniscentrum.nl/kaart-voorindie.html. 171   26 June 1797, instructions pour la paix conclure entre la République française et Sa Majesté Britannique, aux citoyens Le Tourneur, Pleville le Pelley et Maret; AAE CP Angleterre 590. 172   The French Republic, Britain, and the Batavian Republic.

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composed of French, British or Batavian soldiers.173 Thus, the main French concern was to keep the Cape from exclusive British control and to retain it as a naval base and commercial port for French vessels, albeit shared with Britain and the Batavian Republic. Thereto, the Batavian Republic and Spain, both from a military and a financial point of view, were too valuable as allies to alienate them or, in the case of the Batavian Republic, to feed Orangist opposition to the Patriot regime.174 At least these geopolitical considerations strengthened the Directoire’s intention to remain faithful to its treaty obligations. On 29 July, the Directoire yet again decided to inform France’s allies of its determination to let Malmesbury know that peace could be concluded swiftly if the British government accepted the restitution and that otherwise there was no reason to continue negotiating. That notification was to be considered an ultimatum.175 A day later Talleyrand wrote in the same spirit to the French delegation in Lille, ensuring them that the Directoire was adamant to sincerely uphold its treaty obligations and defend France’s allies’ interests.176 In response, the Batavian committee considered that the Batavian Republic could not abstain from complete restitution, but could neither afford to cause a rupture. It stated its appreciation of the Directoire’s intention to uphold its promises, making sure at the same time that the Batavian Republic could not accept any other principle than that of full restitution to be adopted since she had been attacked unjustly and was fully entitled to exclude its colonies from any compensation to the British. To show its willingness to contribute to the desired peace, the committee did, however, assert its willingness to negotiate compensation.177 All of this does not mean that everyone in French governmental circles agreed to the Directoire’s adamant course. In a letter to the Ministre des Rélations extérieures of 16 July the French envoys in Lille expressed their doubts on the Directoire’s harsh terms as they would render peace impossible or would force the French Republic to yield on all demands it was to make for itself. They feared that Brit173   19 June 1797, arrangemens préliminaires pour entrer en négociation; AAE CP Angleterre 591. 174   Ballot, 1910, pp. 221–222; Palmer, 1964, p. 256; Ross, 1981, p. 136; Guyot, 1907, p. 421. 175   29 July 1797, decree Directoire; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 176   30 July 1797, Talleyrand to French delegation; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 177   3 August 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 360; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B.



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ain, considering that France had attained a considerable aggrandisement within the Continental balance of power due to its conquests, would never agree to a complete restitution without serious counter demands.178 Not surprisingly, those actually present at the negotiating table were thus more prepared to give in. And they were not alone. Secret parallel negotiations were going on in Lille between Malmesbury and Maret, instructed by the Directors Carnot and Barthélemy.179 They, although outnumbered within the Directoire, but supported by the new Ministre des Rélations extérieures, Talleyrand,180 wished to conclude a peace treaty swiftly even if this meant sacrificing France’s allies’ colonies. This ‘secret des directeurs contestaires’ strengthened the British in their conviction not to yield and thus undermined official diplomacy.181 The—due to the stubbornness of the Directoire and the quite andante state of negotiations—by early August rather cantankerous envoys wrote to Talleyrand from Lille that they had not communicated their government’s 13 July ultimatum to Malmesbury yet. They tried to persuade their principals to be more compromising and make a sacrifice at the expense of Spain and the Batavian Republic. La République batave de son coté se dira qu’au lieu de l’anéantir après l’avoir conquise, nous l’avons recrée. Que c’est à nous qu’elle doit son existence politique, qu’après être parvenue par nos soins et nos efforts à se constituer un gouvernement libre, son unique but doit être désormais de consolider le nouvel ordre de choses, que la paix seule peut le conso­ lider, que les chances de la guerre jusqu’ici heureuses pour nous peuvent cesser de l’être; qu’elle ne peut se dissimuler qu’une partie de la nation hollandaise incline pour le régime stathoudérien, et qu’il ne faudroit peut être pas une crise bien-forte pour y ramener la majorité de la nation, que si faute pour la Hollande de consentir à quelques sacrifices dont la paix et le tems la compenseroient amplement, la guerre se continue, elle ne doit pas oublier que jusqu’à présent ses efforts contre l’ennemi commun ont été infructueux; que la République française seroit donc forcée d’exiger d’elle qu’elle déployât des moyens plus étendus et auxquels ses ressources actuelles pour ne pas suffire. Qu’ainsi son intérêt, celui de

178

591.

  16 July 1797, French delegation to French Foreign Secretary; AAE CP Angleterre

  Ballot, 1910, p. 175; Guyot, 1907, p. 408 and p. 435; Schroeder, 1994, p. 173.   Ballot, 1910, p. 208; Homan, 1971, p. 141. 181  Ross, 1981, p. 138. 179 180

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part iii, chapter three l’humanité entière la sollicitent de délier le gouvernement français de la garantie dont il a pris avec elle le généreux engagement.182

Some in the diplomatic service tried to persuade the Directoire to adopt a more lenient policy. In a rather elaborate analysis of the peace talks with Britain, Baptiste Flassan—former chef de la première division politique at the Foreign Office—183 argued that the initial harsh terms did not fit anymore as the situation in Britain had changed. At the start of the peace talks, the British government had to cope with a rebellion in Ireland, the mutiny of the fleet, and financial problems. By the summer of 1797, Britain had overcome its problems, whereas France’s position, both internationally and domesticly, had deteriorated. The political situation in Paris, where the Directoire and the councils increasingly were on a collision course, did undeniably play a major role in part of the governing elites desire to conclude peace swiftly. He called to mind that negotiations with Britain and Austria might appear to be separate, but that there were of course diplomatic contacts between both powers and that thus both negotiations were linked, that is to say that making excessive demands to one would delay the peace with both. As a great power, Britain was fully entitled to some kind of compensation: Il est sans doute convaincu qu’il peut dicter de lois absolus à des petits cabinets; mais qu’avec les grandes puissances; fussent elles vaincues sans retour, il faut composer sur une partir de leurs désirs. Le ton impérieux de la victoire éterniserait la guerre et ses mille dangers. Pour réaliser vis-à-vis de l’Angleterre, le mot tant répété de caton, il nous faudrait le concours d’une revolution en Irlande, ou une marine égale.184

Therefore, the French government should back down in Lille. Flassan thought it to be impossible getting the British to restore all occupied conquests to France’s allies. Cette puissance est sur mer que nous avons été sur terre. Nos armées ont envahi un territoire, et ses flottes de riches établissemens insulaires. Le cours naturel des négociation lui permet d’espérer quelque acquisitions coloniales comme il nous a valu de belles cessions continentales et le principe des indemnités si heureusement appliquée par nous, lui en

  5 August 1797, French delegation to Talleyrand; AAE CP Angleterre 591.   See Masson, 1877, p. 342. 184   31 July 1797, Flassan to Talleyrand; AAE CP Angleterre 591. 182 183



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assure d’étendues, puisque cette guerre est la plus chère qu’elle ait jamais faite. C’est d’ailleurs par quelque indemnité importante que le ministère anglais espère se justifier à ceux de la nation de la guerre ruineuse qu’il nous a faite. Par amour de la paix, laissons lui cette faible compensation de tant de faux calculs et d’irréparables démarches.185

Consequently, he proposed to use the Dutch and Spanish colonies— the Cape, Ceylon, and Trinidad to be precise—to lure the British into concluding peace. En vain nous leurs aurions prématurément assurés dans des traités, l’intégrité de leurs possessions, pareil engagement essentiellement hypothétique ne peut lier le garant, car les hollandais et les espagnols étaient au moins tenus de faire des efforts pour leur défense.186

Hence, as Flassan’s analysis shows, part of France’s leading politicians and diplomats were willing to sacrifice the Batavian and Spanish colonial dominions to gain a peace agreement, whereas the majority of the Directors refused to do so. The ambiguity in French policy between emphasizing France’s political and military interests and using the Spanish and Batavian colonies to attain the connected aims on the one hand and the loyalty to its allies on the other is typical of what Belissa calls the dialectic between the republican alliance and the ‘instrumentalisation’ of the sister republics.187 After some time, the French and Spanish governments were prepared to compromise on the colonial matter. On 5 August, the French representatives in Lille urged the French government to persuade the Batavian Republic to be amenable to compromise.188 The peace party within and around the French government was prepared to make full concessions.189 An initial request by Talleyrand to make an attempt to have the Batavian government consent to concessions was, however, repudiated.190 By the end of July, the Directoire did grant Talleyrand permission to contact the Batavian government.191 Carnot and Reubell

  31 July 1797, Flassan to Talleyrand; AAE CP Angleterre 591.   31 July 1797, Flassan to Talleyrand; AAE CP Angleterre 591. 187   Belissa, 2008, p. 120. 188   5 August 1797, French delegation to Talleyrand; AAE CP Angleterre 591; Ballot, 1910, p. 214. 189   9 August 1797, De Vos van Steenwijk to Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 190  Guyot, 1907, p. 440. 191  Homan, 1971, p. 142; Guyot, 1907, p. 441. 185 186

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had come to a compromise.192 Talleyrand was to pass the request to consent to the cession of the colonies to The Hague. There was not to be a formal mission to the Batavian Republic, though. To persuade the Batavian government of the necessity to accept the principle of compensation and thus allowing the French to continue negotiating, the Count Cabarrus—designated to partake in the Lille conferences on behalf of Spain—even went to The Hague. On 9 August, he had a conference with the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken in the presence of the French and Spanish envoys in The Hague, Noël and Anduaga.193 His mission was a failure, as the committee made it very clear that: no way, we could consent to the principle of compensation unless the Republic’s colonies would expressly be excluded, which full restitution has been guaranteed by the French Republic in the 16 May 1795 Treaty, and which restitution is the sole means of reviving our trade and render us a useful ally to France.194

Despite the pressure and persuasive efforts, the committee in The Hague persisted in its claim to full restitution in conformity with the status quo ante bellum. Again, it referred to the French guarantee of the Batavian colonial dominions as laid down in the secret Articles of the Treaty of Alliance—a guarantee that had been bought at very high costs, as the committee expressly noted. The Batavian Republic could not miss any of her colonial dominions as they were mutually interconnected and, moreover, those possessions were absolutely necessary to restore commerce. Therefore, the committee could concur with a policy of compensation provided that the Batavian colonial dominions were excluded. That would not mean—as argued by Cabarrus and Anduaga—that compensation would be fully at the expense of France and Spain since the Batavian Republic had lots of other claims to renounce cumulating up to about fifty million guilders. The Batavian  Guyot, 1907, p. 442.   9 August 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B; 11 August 1797, Van Leyden to the Batavian commissioners in Paris; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 194   ‘geenzints door ons kon worden geadmitteerd het principe van compensatien, ten ware daarvan uitdrukkelijk wierden afgezonderd de colonien van den Staat, welken restitutie in hunne volkomen integriteit door de Fransche Republicq bij het Tractaat van 16 mey 1795 was geguarandeert geworden, en welken terugbekoming het eenig middel was, om onze handel te doen herleven en ons tot eenen nuttigen bondgenood voor Vrankrijk te maken.’ 192 193



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Republic, in its view, did offer compensation and could henceforth not be held responsible for a rupture.195 In his 8 August meeting196 with De Vos van Steenwijk, Talleyrand expressed that it was up to the Batavian Republic to decide whether the peace negotiations would continue or not, for if The Hague would insist on complete restitution in confirmation with Article 6 of the secret part of the Alliance Treaty, the French Republic would be faithful to its commitments and break off peace talks. In that case the responsibility for the rupture and its consequences would totally rest with its allies, though. However, if the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken would give way, the minister could assure the commissioners that peace would be concluded very soon. Although Talleyrand stuck to sincere compliance with the Alliance Treaty, he did thus try to persuade the Batavians to yield. At the same time, rumours went that a compromise with regard to the Cape was in the making. It was proposed to declare the Cape neutral and thus open to ships of all powers even in case of war.197 De Vos van Steenwijk replied that the Batavian government would consent to almost everything necessary to promote peace provided that peace would not be gained at the cost of ‘the Batavian Republic’s total destruction’198 which would inevitably result from permanently losing any of its dominions presently occupied by the British. The Batavian government’s persistence of insisting on complete restitution did, however, not exclude the principle of compensation, thus the commissioner assured the French minister, for the Batavian Republic had sufficient claims to make concessions besides the colonial restitution. Compensation would then mainly have to be found in the Batavian renunciation of part of its indemnity for ships that had been seized by the British. At the end of the meeting, Talleyrand studied the commissioners’ response to the Directoire’s communication of its 13 and 29 July decrees. Their response again stressed the necessity and the Batavian Republic’s entitlement to complete restitution and its willingness to

195   11 August 1797, Van Leyden to the Batavian commissioners in Paris; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 196   9 August 1797, De Vos van Steenwijk to Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 197   9 August 1797, De Vos van Steenwijk to Van Leyden; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 198   ‘totaale ruine van de Bataafsche Republiek.’

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cooperate with the French Republic in providing compensation for the British with the exclusion of her colonial dominions. However, the argument was not solely made based on a discourse of interests. Next to the Batavian and French Republics’ interests and the solemn guarantee in the Alliance Treaty, De Vos referred to the injustice of the British attacks and occupation.199 Talleyrand was not satisfied by the alternative sources of compensation. He stated that the Batavian note was deficient to resume negotiations and insisted that a sentence would be added expressing that the Batavian Republic inflamed by a desire to end the war by a solid peace by allowing other nations a share in de benefits from the dominions which it would regain at the peace, might be able to find the means to reconcile sufficient to persuade Europe at large that one desires peace ardently on our side.200

Meanwhile, some of the Batavians involved in the negotiations started to doubt whether the committee’s stubbornness was really prudent. On 10 August, referring to the ‘internal state’ of the two Republics and especially their finances, Meyer wrote to Van Leyden that ‘not making some minor sacrifices would be highly imprudent,’201 even though the French Republic was willing to break off negotiations if its Batavian sister kept insisting on complete restitution.202 Deaf to all the nuances and hints pointing at Talleyrand’s real intentions, the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken in response only expressed its delight with the Directoire’s commitment to uphold its promises.203 Van Leyden communicated the outcome of the committee’s deliberations to the commissioners. He argued that, since the French Republic had gained a considerable aggrandisement due to the peace treaties already concluded with continental powers and the Batavian Republic had only   9 August 1797, De Vos van Steenwijk to Talleyrand; NA 2.01.08 no. 360.   ‘de Bataafsche republiek aangevuurd door eene begeerte om een einde te maaken aan den oorlog door een solide vreede met eenige meededeeling te vergunnen aan andere natien van de voordeelen der bezittingen welke dezelve bij de vreede zoude terug ontvangen, mogelijk een middel zoude kunnen vinden tot hereeniging welke genoegzaam zouden zijn om geheel Europa te overtuigen dat men van onze zijde de vreede vurig verlangde.’ [Talleyrand’s statement was paraphrased by De Vos van Steenwijk in his account of the meeting; 9 August 1797, De Vos van Steenwijk to Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 360] 201   ‘het niet doen van geringe opofferingen zou zeer onstaatkundig zijn.’ 202   10 August 1797, Meyer to Van Leyden; NA 1.02.14 no. 598. 203   14 August 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B. 199 200



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lost territory, it would not be reasonable to demand any sacrifices from the Batavian Republic. In the unlikely event the guarantee would not be observed, justice called for the French Republic to provide it with a proportional indemnity.204 This was the main line of the response to Talleyrand as well. The committee primarily expressed its sensitivity to the respect for the inviolability of the treaty manifested by the Directoire and the necessity of the colonial restitution to restore the Batavian Republic’s wealth and thus to make it a useful ally. Alternatively, the committee left an opening to a non-complete restitution to be agreed upon in the course of negotiations making that concession dependent, though, on the admittance of its commissioners to the conferences and compensation equivalent to the ceded dominions to be provided for by France and Spain.205 On 21 August, Van der Goes met with Talleyrand to discuss the committee’s response. The French minister, somewhat bad-tempered, urged for more indulgence pointing at the present chance to conclude a favourable peace and the Batavian Republic’s need of peace to establish a stable constitution.206 The very same day, Talleyrand wrote an extensive letter to the Batavian commissioners reprimanding the Batavian government for its intransigency. He reproached that France could have gained everything it wanted if it had allowed Britain to be indemnified at the cost of the Batavian Republic and Spain. Instead, the French government had kept its allies fully informed and had, in conformity with the ‘politique nouvelle,’ made the Batavian Republic’s interest its own. vous avez vu dans tout le cours de cette négociation dont toutes les pièces vous ont été scrupuleusement communiquées, le développement de la conduite la plus franche, la plus amicale, et j’ose le dire, la plus magnanime. Jamais peut-être un allié victorieux et fidèle n’eut plus d’empressement à mettre en commun les droits de la victoire. notre loyauté a du recevoir tout ensemble, et l’hommage de la reconnaissance de nos alliés, et celui de l’étonnement de nos ennemis. La plénipotentiaire anglois a cru qu’il pourroit nous trouver accessibles à la s’duction d’un interet purement personnel: il a cru que d’un mot il pourroit lever les seuls obstacles par lesquels il imaginoit que la négociation devoit etre entravée : il a cru enfin qu’il nous isoleroit en nous desinteressant, et dès l’époque des premieres conferences il a offert de tout rendre à la France

  14 August 1797, Van Leyden to the Batavian commissioners; NA 2.01.08 no.

204

360.

  19 August 1797, Batavian commissioners to Talleyrand; NA 2.01.08 no. 360.   21 August 1797, Talleyrand to Batavian commissioners; NA 2.01.08 no. 360.

205 206

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part iii, chapter three pouron qu’elle consentit à ce que l’Angleterre s’indemnisat aux depens de la Hollande et de l’Espagne: [. . .] quel retour le gouvernement français étoit-il en droit d’attendre d’une suite de démarches si loyales et si franches ? C’était sans doute une preuve de la même franchise et de la même loyauté. Sont ce là, j’ose à présent vous le demander les carateres de la note officielle à la quelle je suis chargé de répondre ? Le gouvernement françois devoit il etre forcé d’y remarquer cette obscurité cette indécision, ces paroles équivoques, ces arriere-pensées, tout ce qui doit etre efin si étranger à la diplomatie des gouvernements libres, tout ce que la république francoise a so solemnellement exclus de la sienne? Et à quelle époque encre le gouvernement batave paroit il renir ce lanage? c’est lorsqu’il vous est démontré que la France auroit déjà couronné la plus glorieuse guerre par la plus brillante paix, si elle n’avoit fait de l’intérêt de ses alliés le sien propre; c’est aujourd’hui enfin que vous ne pavoisiez pas avoir encore après pose ces graves considérations. Vous dites dans l’un des paragraphes de votre lettre qui a le plus frappé le Directoire exécutif que l’intérêt mutuel des deux républiques demande que la puissance la plus faible ne soit pas celle sur la quelle tombent les sacrifices. Il est difficile qu’il n’y ait pas ici une erreur de mots: car il seroit trop impossible que ce langage de la gloire et de la magnanimité qu’il étoit digne de la République française de tenir à l’Angleterre en parlant de ses alliés, ses alliés le lui adressassent à elle-même! Cette franchise dont nous nous plaignons de n’avoir pas reçu une preuve, ce ne serait peut être pas en donner l’exemple que de vous dissimuler qu’il est difficile de concilier l’amour de la paix que vous professez avec l’embarras et les réticences de votre réponse.207

In his aforementioned private letter to Van der Goes, Jacob Hahn expressed the outrage caused by Talleyrand’s letter. The terms proposed by Malmesbury on 8 July, of which the Batavian government had been kept unaware all this time, equalled a ‘national suicide’ on the part of the Batavian Republic. The French guarantee of the Batavian colonial dominions, bought at the price of a hundred million guilders, was to be upheld. I say, my friend! The French government, if it stood firm, would have been able to bring an honest and good peace to its three allies [. . .] and Talleyrand, angry because we refuse to dance to his tune, now tries to make things hot for us to make us choose [. . .] I, for sure, will never lend a hand to the like.208

  21 August 1797, Talleyrand to the Batavian commissioners; NA 2.01.08 no. 360.   ‘Ik zeg mijn vriend! Dat het Fransch gouvernement, zo het vast stond in zijne schoenen, aan de drie bondgenoten enen eerlijke en goeden vrede had kunnen bezor207

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In its immediate response to Talleyrand’s letter, the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken stubbornly insisted on complete restitution being part of the Preliminaries.209 By the end of August, the committee did, however, seem to be aware of the need to abandon some of the colonial dominions taken by the British as it began to move a bit. For, as the committee according to its instructions was not authorised to conclude a treaty in which any cession of territory was consented to and since it was necessary to keep the strictest secrecy, it proposed to the Nationale Vergadering to nominate a committee of five members to consult with the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken on what further orders were to be given to the commissioners in Paris. The ad hoc committee would be fully informed of the course of negotiations thus far and would be authorised, together with the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to seriously consider the points and provisions the Directoire of the French Republic will state to be the foundation of a possible treaty of peace with Britain, and take those decisions thereupon (with at least a 2/3 majority of the twelve votes) they will regard most proper and useful for the Republic; even if this will not be as advantageous in all respects as one might wish and desire, all, nonetheless, provided that the final ratification will be decided on by the Nationale Vergadering.210

Thus, the committee would ensure political coverage for any concessions within the Batavian government at large. The Nationale Vergadering complied with this request and appointed Jan David Pasteur, Pieter Vreede, Gerard Willem van Marle, Daniël Cornelis de Leeuw, and Joannes van Hooff as members of the proposed committee.211 The gen, [. . .] en Talleyrand boos dat wij niet naar zijne pijpen willen danssen, zoekt ons nu het vuur zo na aan de schenen te leggen, dat wij moeten kiezen of delen. [. . .] ik voor mij zal tot iets dergelijks de handen nooit in eeuwigheid lenen.’; 29 August 1797, Hahn to Van der Goes (private); NA 2.21.073 no. 17. 209   22 August 1797, secret minutes Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 55B; Ballot, 1910, p. 277; Guyot, 1907, p. 447. 210   ‘om die pointen en artikelen, welke het Directoire der Fransche Republiek opgeeft, dat als grondslagen tot een eventueel tractaat van vrede met Engeland zullen moeten gelegt worden, rijplijk te overwegen en daar omtrent (met een meerderheid van ten minsten tweederde der twaalf stemmen) zoodanig besluit te nemen, als zij in goede conscientie het oorbaarst en nuttigste voor den lande zullen oordeelen; schoon zulks ook niet in alle opzichten zoo voordeelig ware, als men zoude wenschen en verlangen alles nogthans met dien verstande, dat de finale ratificatie door de Nationale Vergadering zelve, alleenlijk geschieden kan.’; 28 August 1797, Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to Nationale Vergadering; NA 2.01.08 no. 397. 211   28 Augustus 1797, decree Nationale Vergadering; NA 2.01.08 no. 360.

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very same day, they had a meeting with the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken. Stating the familiar arguments of the guarantee in the treaty, the necessity of the restitution for the Batavian Republic’s affluence and it being a useful ally, as well as the danger of giving full control to the British, they persisted in their conviction that the Batavian Republic could not consent to the cession of Ceylon and the Cape. The committee, in order to give new prove of its willingness to cooperate to the conclusion of the so much desired peace did, however, offer to cede the city and fortifications of Cochin with its surroundings212—minus a trading station guaranteed by the British—and Paleacatta and Binilipatnam on the coast of Coromandel to Britain, provided that the British would return two trading stations on the Cochin coast, abstaining from the cession of Negapatnam that had already been offered by Lord Malmesbury. In addition, the committee expressed its preparedness to negotiate on the indemnity for the ships seized by the British.213 The commissioners in Paris communicated the committee’s official response ‘franche et positive’ to the 21 August letter by presenting to Talleyrand the sacrifices the Batavian government was willing to make, emphasizing, however, that this was generously done to reach a ‘paix juste et durable’ and that the Batavian Republic was fully entitled to demand complete restitution both from Britain and from France. le Gouvernement Batave a su apprécier la conduite loyale d’une nation triomphante qui fait valoir les droits de la victoire pour appuyer la cause de ses alliés et il nous a chargé de vous offrir les hommages de sa reconnaissance. La franchise et la bonne foi qui font la base de la diplomatie des gouvernemens libres, ont toujours rassuré la République Batave; forte de la fidèlité francaise, elle s’est toujours persuadée que la république puissante, dont les armes victorieuses ont déjà forcé tant de puissances à une paix glorieuse et avantageuse à la France se serviroit de ces mêmes triomphes pour faire restituer à son allié dans toute son intégrité ses possessions dans les Indes orientales et occidentales, d’autant plus que cette restitution a été solemnellement promise, et spécialement garantie par le traité du 16 mai 1795.214

 A settlement at the south-west coast of the Indian peninsula.   28 August 1797, decree Commissie tot de Buitenlandsche Zaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 360 and NA 2.01.08 no. 55B; 2 September 1797, Batavian commissioners to Talleyrand; NA. 2.01.08 no. 360. 214   2 September 1797, Batavian commissioners to Talleyrand; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 212 213



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The French plenipotentiaries in Lille, however, did not regard the Batavian proposal conducive to achieving peace, as Britain would probably not recognise any Batavian right on indemnity for the ships captured on behalf of the Stadhouder. They expressed their hopes that the Batavian government would soon come to its senses and be prepared to make a greater sacrifice.215 After the anti-Royalist fructidor coup d’état (4 September 1797) had caused the peace party to be banished from the French government, the British refusal to return the colonies was used as an argument to break off negotiations. Released from their obstinate colleagues, Carnot and Barthélemy, the remaining Directors decided to return to the firm stance of the start of the negotiations.216 The momentum for peace had passed.217 Reubell assured De Vos van Steenwijk that the Batavian Republic did not have to fear losing the Cape or the Bay of Trincomalee (Ceylon);218 according to Tim Blanning the only harbour in the region that could be used throughout the monsoon.219 Le Tourneur, Pléville, and Maret were ordered to return to Paris and replaced by Jean-Baptiste Treilhard and Bonnier.220 The Directoire instructed the new French delegation in Lille to ask Malmesbury whether he was authorised to consent to a full restitution of all dominions taken from the French Republic and its allies in the course of the war. If Malmesbury either did not reply within the day or denied the authority to consent, he was to be told to return to London within twenty-four hours.221 Malmesbury left Lille on the evening of 17 September.222 After this break-down, the Batavian government was convinced that the French government would accept nothing short of full restitution of the occupied colonies in the future, especially as Talleyrand notified the Batavian delegation that the negotiations had been

215   23 August 1797, French delegation to Talleyrand; 23 August, AAE CP Angleterre 591; AAE CP Angleterre Supplément 30. 216   Ballot, 1910, p. 283. 217  Guyot, 1907, p. 472. 218   See e.g. 5 September 1797, De Vos van Steenwijk to Jan Bernd Bicker; NA 2.01.08 no. 360. 219   Blanning, 2007, p. 633. 220   9 September 1797, Talleyrand to French delegation; AAE CP Angleterre 591. 221   11 September 1797, decree Directoire; AAE CP Angleterre 591. The decree was published in Le Redacteur on 1 October 1797. A copy of that newspaper reached the Batavian Departement van Buitenlandsche Zaaken; NA 2.01.08 no. 360; Guyot, 1907, p. 459. 222  Guyot, 1907, p. 462.

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suspended because the Directoire did not want to separate the French Republic’s interests from those of its allies.223 For the time being the war with Britain continued and it would do so for another four and a half years. Conclusion The 1795 Hague Treaty had made the Batavian Republic an ally to France and enemy to Britain. George III had declared war on the Batavians. British forces had occupied Dutch colonial dominions all over the world. Article 5 of the Alliance Treaty stipulated that neither of the two allies was to conclude peace nor to negotiate with Britain without the concert and consent of the other. Both Paris and London started to contemplate peace at the very same time the Batavian Republic was involved in the war. Peace talks became serious when Malmesbury was sent to Paris in the autumn of 1796. The Batavian envoy, Meyer, was not officially informed of the Franco-Anglo rapprochement until Malmesbury was in Paris. Word of the British negotiator’s voyage had already reached The Hague though. The Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken considered a request for the admittance of Batavian commissioners to the conferences. By the start of November, the Batavian government was even invited to send envoys. It is not entirely sure whether they would have actually been allowed to participate in negotiations directly. Malmesbury had left Paris too soon to tell. At least there was reasonable hope for the ­Batavian Republic to be treated as formally equal. Conversely, the British wished to keep negotiations restricted to a purely bilateral intercourse in anticipation of a general congress. This did not mean, negotiations did not affect the Batavian Republic from a substantial point of view. Control of the Low Countries, the fate of occupied Dutch colonies and the fate of the House of Orange were paramount to discussions between Malmesbury and Delacroix. As peace negotiations resumed in Lille, the Batavian government was almost immediatelly informed. It appointed commissioners to partake in negotiations at once. The commissioners travelled to Paris expecting to be admitted to the conferences. They never left Paris for

  5 October 1797, Talleyrand to the Batavian commissioners; NA 2.01.08 no. 360.

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Lille. This time, the French government had set its mind on denying its allies direct participation in negotiations to uphold its policy of separate peace treaties. While Bonaparte and Clarke were endeavouring to persuade Austria to conclude a separate peace in Udine, the government in Paris wished to prevent precedent for the admittance of any other power to negotiations with Britain. Hence, the French delegation was to treat for the Batavian Republic, too, furthering Batavian interests and, at best, consulting with the Batavian commissioners. Eventually, the Batavian Republic was to be included in the peace treaty resulting from the Lille congress. By consequence, the Batavian Republic had at most an indirect say in the endeavours to restore peace. Initially admittance was not explicitly refused, though. The French stalled and brought practical objections to the fore. After the changeover at the Ministère des Rélations extérieures admittance of the Batavian ­commissioners was rejected explicitly. The British opposed participation of Batavian commissioners, too. The congress was either to be widened into a general one or had to be confined to a purely French-Anglo affair. In the war against Britain, the Batavian Republic was a formal belligerent. Contrary to the peace settlement with Austria, the Batavian Republic did, by consequence, need to restore peace with Britain in its own right. Nevertheless, there are indications that the French government regarded its allies as auxiliaries in the fight against Britain despite their legal status. The Batavian government resiliently insisted on admittance of the Batavian commissioners. On no occassion did it accept French representation. Direct participation in the conferences to further Batavian interests was portrayed as an ‘undeniable’ or ‘lawful’ right both because of the general principle that an independent power was to further its interests directly and because of the sanctity of treaties referring to Article 5 of the 1795 Hague Treaty. Nonetheless, ‘legislative equality’ was not respected in Lille since the Batavian Republic was not allowed equal participation in negotiations. Basically France and Britain denied the Batavian Republic access to the ­conferences. In Lille, the British government persisted in preserving occupied Dutch colonies. Hence, the Batavian Republic was affected by the Lille peace talks. On the one hand this turned the colonial guarantee from the Hague Treaty operative. On the other hand this implied that, if British demands were granted, the peace treaty would contain the cession of Dutch colonial dominions. According to contemporary law of

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nations, a cession of dominions would have called for explicit consent by the Batavian government. Malmesbury did indeed indicate that separate negotiations with the Batavian Republic were necessary. Paris held brief for full restoration of colonial dominions occupied by the British. While Britain was not to interfere in Continental affairs and was to accept the status quo post bellum in Europe—that is, French aggrandisement—, in the colonial sphere the status quo ante bellum was to be restored. To be sure, partly for geopolitical reasons, the French government was adamant to observe its treaty obligation to restore Dutch colonies to the Batavian Republic. The more the British persisted in their resolution to hold on to the Cape and Ceylon, the more the French delegation in Lille backed by part of the French government wished to conclude peace by sacrificing France’s allies’ colonies. The compromise reached within the Directoire by the end of July did, however, aim for attaining Batavian consent to a sacrifice. As The Hague refused to, the colonial guarantee was to be upheld. After the fructidor coup d’état, the British refusal to restore Batavian (and Spanish) colonies was seized as a pretext to break off negotiations. Next to the restitution of colonial dominions, the French delegation was also to attain the restoration of Dutch vessels and the recognition of the Batavian Republic and the abolition of the Stadholderate. Hence, although the Batavian Republic was refused direct participation, Batavian interests were furthered in Lille.224 As a result of the Lille congress, the Batavian government was convinced to be right in relying on France to uphold its treaty obligations.225 The Lille negotiations did not result in a peace treaty. Thus, it is hard to establish whether Batavian consent would really have been ignored and in what way the Batavian Republic would have been involved in the peace settlement. Probably, the French government would have included its ally in the treaty. Although Malmesbury had held out the prospect of separate negotiations with the Batavian Republic, British consent to inclusion of the Batavian Republic in the peace treaty was likely to depend on whether the French would have yielded to the preservation of the Cape, Ceylon, and Trinidad.

  Legrand, 1895, p. 152.   Legrand, 1895, p. 150.

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A Gathering in Rastatt 4.1  A German Snake Pit While Malmesbury left Lille, peace with Austria was concluded in Campoformio. The Franco-Austrian Peace called for a congress in Rastatt to extent the peace to the Empire at large. As said before, the Batavian government had awaited the ‘general congress’ to settle its own affairs and to make the French Republic abide by Article 16 of the Treaty of The Hague. The limitation of the Rastatt congress to French and imperial envoys pursuant to Article 20 of the Treaty of Campoformio must have caused some disappointment in The Hague. Nonetheless, the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken held on to its commitment to territorial aggrandisement, determined to regard the Rastatt congress as the kind that had settled European affairs for the past one and a half century.1 So, now, with French and imperial delegations assembling in Rastatt, the moment every Batavian Patriot had waited for to enter the Continental diplomatic arena—or at least the occasion as close to the ‘paix générale’ mentioned in Article 16 of the Treaty of The Hague as it could get—had arrived. If the Batavian Republic wanted any of its territorial ambitions to materialise, this was the time to do business. For once peace would have been made, no serious adjustment of the map of Europe or of the Empire for that matter, could be expected anymore. The French and Austrians did not let the grass grow under their feet.2 Within two weeks after the Treaty of Campoformio was signed, Paris had appointed a delegation to the Rastatt congress3 and the Emperor had convened the imperial Deputation.4 By the start of December all envoys had arrived in Rastatt and ratifications of the Treaty of

 Hüffer, 1878, p. 57.   Guyot, 1907, p. 565. 3  Next to General Bonaparte, Treilhard, and Bonnier were to go to Rastatt; 2 November 1797, Bonaparte to Cobenzl; CG1 pp. 1265–1266 no. 2187. 4  Hüffer, 1878, p. 3. 1 2

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­Campoformio were exchanged.5 The congress started by squabbling over formalities.6 By consequence, powers were not exchanged until 14 January 1798.7 In the meantime, Austrian forces had evacuated the left bank of the river Rhine, allowing the French to take possession of the Rhineland and Mainz8 while Austria occupied Venice.9 By then, Bonaparte had left Rastatt leaving Treilhard and Bonnier behind.10 The exact composition of the French delegation would change throughout the course of negotiations. The French envoys were to negotiate with a Deputation from the imperial Diet. Next to Austria11 and Prussia,12 Saxony, Bavaria, Bremen, Darmstadt, Baden, Augsburg, and Frankfurt were represented in the Deputation. Finally, the ecclesiastical Estates were represented by the tenth envoy.13 The Emperor was represented by Count Franz Georg Karl von Metternich-Winneburg.14 Negotiations were to take place between the French delegation and the imperial Deputation solely.15 Even then, the Rastatt congress was not to be a true conference. The French delegation did not confer with the Deputation directly. The Deputation solely deliberated internally and communicated with the French by written statements.16 Whereas the Rastatt congress was officially confined to the French delegation and the imperial Deputation, Rastatt had become a gathering of envoys and agents from all over Europe.17 A number of Estates of the Empire had dispatched ‘Partikulargesandten’ that were accredited to the Deputation. These special envoys were not to take part in the Deputation’s deliberations, but they were allowed to submit requests and objections.18 Thereto, various powers not (primarily) being members

 Hüffer, 1878, pp. 6–16.  Hüffer, 1878, p. 17, p. 22, pp. 39–40, and p. 56.  7   Guyot, 1907, p. 571.  8  Hüffer, 1878, p. 20. pp. 28–29, and p. 63.  9  Hüffer, 1878, p. 64. 10  Hüffer, 1878, pp. 48–49. 11   The Emperor was represented in his capacities of Archduke of Austria and King of Bohemia and Hungary by Louis Cobenzl and Count Lehrbach; Hüffer, 1878, pp. 41–42. 12   The King of Prussia was represented by Graf Görtz and Freiherr von JacobiKlöst; Hüffer, 1878, p. 25. 13  Hüffer, 1878, p. 44; Guyot, 1907, p. 569. 14  Father to Clemens von Metternich. 15  Hüffer, 1878, p. 3; Vreede, 1863, p. 320; Guyot, 1907, p. 670. 16  Hüffer, 1878, p. 55; Guyot, 1907, p. 669; Baillou, 1984, p. 349. 17  Hüffer, 1878, p. 54. 18  Hüffer, 1878, p. 45.  5  6



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of the Empire sent or wished to send envoys to partake in the congress or agents to be kept informed. The Batavian government would not be the only one to dispatch an envoy. The King of Denmark claimed the right to participate in his capacity of Duke of Holstein-Glückstadt. The Cisalpine Republic, the Ligurian Republic, the Holy See, Lucca, and the Order of Malta sent envoys, too.19 Sweden made the most serious attempt to take a direct part. Stockholm claimed to be entitled to send a delegation because the King as Duke of Pommeria was a member of the Empire and had guaranteed the Empire’s constitution at the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Because of the latter argument, letting Sweden in would create precedence for Russia to claim admittance as well.20 Neither France nor Austria fancied any other power to mingle in German affairs and Russia the least of all. Henceforth, Sweden was refused participation in the Rastatt congress.21 Behind the scenes, France, Austria, and Prussia discussed matters separately in order to by-pass the Deputation.22 The three great powers dominated the German settlement. The French tried to divide the two German powers. Vienna did not trust Berlin. Prussia did indeed shift between loyalty to the Empire on the one hand and a rapprochement with France in combination with modifying the balance of power within the Empire to its advantage on the other.23 In 1798, the Directoire still hoped to restore the pre-1756 alliance with Prussia.24 At least Prussian neutrality had to be maintained to cover the northern flank. The desire to remain at good terms with Berlin would to a large extent determine France’s treatment of the Batavian Republic. On the one hand, French influence had to be concealed. On the other hand, Prussia’s attempts to further the Prince of Orange’s interests were to be taken seriously and Prussia was not to be alienated by making excessive territorial demands on behalf of the Batavian Republic, although Talleyrand informed Meyer that the French delegation was to attain territory for the Batavian Republic.25

 Hüffer, 1878, pp. 51–52.  Russia had guaranteed the Empire’s constitution in the Treaty of Teschen (1779); Blanning, 2007, p. 591. 21  Hüffer, 1878, pp. 8–9; 30 November 1797, Bonaparte to Talleyrand; CG1 p. 1313 no. 2274. 22   Guyot, 1907, p. 670; Baillou, 1984, p. 349. 23  Hüffer, 1878, p. 79; Homan, 1971, p. 138; Guyot, 1907, pp. 673–675. 24  Homann, 1971, p. 138. 25  Smit, 1975, p. 21. 19 20

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In Rastatt, France entered the maze of German politics. Round three in the diplomatic boxing match to attain the Rhineland began.26 Austria still opposed an extension of French borders that would involve Prussian dominions in Cleves and Upper Guelders. Above all an improvement of Prussia’s position within the Empire through compensations had to be prevented.27 Prussia had set its mind on strengthening its hold on northern Germany.28 The prime issue in Rastatt was the Rhine and compensation for German princes on the right bank. France had proposed to secularise ecclesiastical estates. Prussia and several other secular princes endorsed the French proposal.29 Austria opposed secularisation, though, well aware that Habsburg would thus be deprived of its mainstays in the Empire and the electoral college in particular.30 In the course of the spring of 1798, the best part of the Deputation came to consent to cession of the Rhineland under the condition of compensation.31 On 11 March 1798, the Deputation agreed to cession of the Rhineland to France32 and on 4 April it adopted the principle of secularisation.33 Agreement on a peace settlement was still not reached, however, because Austria obstructed peace talks, France now demanded the islands in the Rhine and some bridgeheads on the right bank,34 and a detailed scheme of compensation still had to be drawn.35 Moreover, France and Prussia disagreed on what exactly counted as the Rhine. Prussia held brief for the Waal as frontier, whereas France considered the northern branch of the river as frontier. This dispute made a great difference for the Batavian Republic, because in the latter case Prussian dominions enclaved in or bordering on the Batavian Republic would be included in the territory ceded to France.36 By the time the Deputation consented to all French demands and a detailed scheme of compensation was drawn, Austria had already

 Hüffer, 1878, p. 88; Guyot, 1907, p. 673; Schroeder, 1994, p. 189.  Hüffer, 1878, pp. 11–12 and pp. 88–89. 28  Hüffer, 1878, p. 110. 29  Hüffer, 1878, p. 196. 30   Laurent, 1867, p. 208; Hüffer, 1878, pp. 195–196. 31  Hüffer, 1878, pp. 95–98, p. 110 and p. 204. 32  Hüffer, 1878, p. 207. 33  Hüffer, 1878, pp. 210–214. 34  Hüffer, 1879, p. 163. 35  Hüffer, 1879, p. 162. 36  Hüffer, 1879, pp. 171–172; Smit, 1975, pp. 21–22. 26 27



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decided to restart the war.37 Russian forces were marching towards the Empire. Paris threatened to break off negotiations once these forces had entered the Empire’s territory.38 In response, Vienna demanded the evacuation of the left bank of the Rhine.39 On 1 April 1799, Metternich was recalled. On his departure he indicated that decisions made by the Deputation had not been ratified by the Emperor and were thus not valid.40 4.2  Acting Behind the Scenes The Treaty of Campoformio had declared the Rastatt congress a purely Franco-German affair. Although the Batavian Republic had awaited the Rastatt congress to step in, it did not take the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken long to reconcile with the prospect that there was not to be a truly general congress. Therefore, it did not try to get plenipotentiaries admitted. Instead it decided to send a private person, Charles Louis Buch, to Rastatt to keep the committee informed. Moreover, he ‘was not to leave a stone unturned to realise the important aims that are, God forbid, either lost to the Batavian Republic or are to be attained at the Rastatt Peace,’41 and he was to provide the French delegation with ‘les renseignemens de détail et localité qu’elle pourrait desirer.’42 The French government was to be informed of his mission, whereas it had to be kept secret to everyone else.43 Van der Goes wrote to Bonaparte that although Article 20 of the ‘glorieux’ Treaty of Campoformio (17 October 1797) excluded a ‘mission en titre de la République Batave,’ the Batavian government was convinced that its secret agent would be welcomed in Rastatt and could count on French

 Hüffer, 1879, p. 219, pp. 223–224, pp. 227–230.  Hüffer, 1879, p. 233. 39  Hüffer, 1879, p. 279. 40  Hüffer, 1879, pp. 297–298. 41     ‘vooral niets onbeproefd laaten ter bewerking van de belangrijke oogmerken die voor de Bataafsche republicq of verloren zijn dat God verhoeden of die de vrede van Rastadt aan dezelve moet bezorgen.’; 25 December 1797; instructie voor Charles Louis Buch, als geheimen zendeling der Bataafsche Republicq op ’t congres te Rastadt; NA 2.01.08 no. 390; Smit, 1975, p. 21. 42   20 December 1797, Van der Goes to Bonaparte; NA 2.01.08 no. 103. 43   24 November 1797, Van der Goes to Meyer; NA 2.01.08 no. 103; 28 November 1797, Van der Goes to French envoys in Rastatt; NA 2.01.08 no. 103. 37 38

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protection if necessary since this was the occasion for France to complete the job she had started in 1795: La paix de Rastadt décidera le sort de notre Patrie. La France va mettre le sceau à la Liberté, à l’indépendance & au bien être que nous nous ferons gloire à jamais de lui devoir.44

Once arrived in Rastatt, Buch presented himself to the French envoys. Treilhard welcomed him quite cordially, but did inform him that they had not received any communication from Paris yet that there would be a Batavian agent in Rastatt to enlighten the French delegation with regard to the territorial settlements and border demarcations the Batavian Republic desired. Meyer was instructed by The Hague to make sure that the Directoire would send that communication at once.45 In the course of February it dawned on The Hague that it was necessary to play a more active and visible role in Rastatt for the Batavian Republic to attain its aims. The Director Van Langen was assigned to consult General Joubert, the commander in chief of French forces in the Batavian Republic at the time and allegedly a close friend of Bonaparte’s, on what means could best be used to persuade the latter to recognise and have recognised Buch or another capable person as Batavian envoy or agent at the Rastatt congress.46 At the same time, Buch was instructed, however, to confine to contacts with the French envoys.47 Parallel to Buch’s efforts in Rastatt, the Batavian government had its representative in Paris work on the Directoire in order to attain territorial indemnity. In that respect, Meyer was to be assisted by Jacob Blauw, who was designated as extraordinary envoy to Vienna, but instructed to travel over Paris and stay there for some time.48 On 1 June 1798, Anthony van Dedem was appointed by the Uitvoe­ rend Bewind that had replaced the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken after the 22 January coup d’état as envoy to negotiate the fron-

  20 December 1797, Van der Goes to Bonaparte; NA 2.01.08 no. 103.   22 december 1797, Van der Goes to Meyer; NA 2.01.08 no. 103. 46   2 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind secret minutes foreign affairs (secreet verbaal Buitenlandsche Zaaken); NA 2.01.08 no. 50 and NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458A. 47   ‘Voorts verzoeken wij u te onthouden van alles wat eenige ombrage zoude kunnen geeven aan de fransche plenipotentiarissen en wel in agt te neemen, om door geene zijdelingsche canaalen te negotieeren,’; 5 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Buch;  NA 2.01.08 no. 104 and NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458A. 48   2 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind secret minutes foreign affairs (secreet verbaal Buitenlandsche Zaaken); NA 2.01.08 no. 50 and NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458A. 44 45



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tier demarcation and indemnity in Paris.49 There are no signs that he actually went to the French capital, though. The new Batavian envoy in Paris, Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, was instructed to find out the Directoire’s views on territorial indemnity for his country and whether the French government would appreciate an official Batavian envoy being sent to Rastatt.50 The point of the demarcation was regarded to be one of the most important subjects of his mission.51 Meanwhile, Buch was told to continue his negotiations ‘with the utmost care.’52 Mid-July, the Batavian government did indeed designate a plenipotentiary, Carel Hendrik van Grasveld, both to the congress in Rastatt and to the Court of Berlin. He was to travel to Rastatt first with the main goal of ‘ensuring that the issue of the border settlement would be dealt with at the congress consonant with the nature of the matter [. . .] in concert with the Batavian envoy to the French Republic.’53 The presence of an envoy with knowledge of the geography and the Republic’s commercial interests at the place where peace with the Empire was negotiated was said to be essential.54 He was recommended to the Directoire and the French delegation in Rastatt. While referring to Article 16 of the Treaty of The Hague to substantiate the Batavian claim of a more suitable frontier, the Batavian government stated that he was to take part in the conferences for the general peace or treat separately with the Empire and the interested German princes in concert with and under auspice of the French delegation.55 Van Grasveld was not anticipated to obtain his government’s aims in Rastatt. In a letter to Schimmelpenninck in Paris, Isaac Gogel, at the time acting Agent der Buitenlandsche betrekkingen and acting President of the Intermediair Uitvoerend Bewind, assured him that the

  1 June 1798, secret minutes Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458B.   22 Juni 1798, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 105. 51   20 July 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Intermediary Wetgevend Lichaam; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458A. 52   ‘met alle voorzichtigheid.’; 2 July 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind secret minutes foreign affairs (secreet verbaal Buitenlandsche Zaaken); NA 2.01.08 no. 50. 53   ‘om te zorgen dat punt van limietscheiding op het congres zodanige wordt behandeld als met den aart der zake overeenkomstig zij [. . .] de concert met den minister der Bataafsche bij de Fransche republiek.’; 20 July 1798, secret minutes Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458B; Smit, 1975, p. 23. 54   20 July 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to the Intermediary Wetgevend Lichaam; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458A. 55   23 July 1798, Intermediary Uitvoerend Bewind to Directoire and Intermediary Uitvoerend Bewind to French delegation in Rastatt; NA 2.01.08 no. 119. 49 50

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envoy to Rastatt was only charged with informing the French delegation of Batavian interests and making sure that those interests would be properly observed, whereas the major issue would be dealt with ‘in the Parisian head office.’56 Van Grasveld would, in fact, undertake an intensive correspondence with Schimmelpenninck for his entire stay in Rastatt. Van Grasveld arrived in Rastatt on 2 August 1798. He was not received by the head of the French delegation, Antoine Bonnier, until 4 August and even then only met with a vague response.57 He was invited to pay a visit to the French envoys on 9 August to present his credentials. They made some remarks on a passage stating ‘pour traiter soit separément avec les ministres de la République française, soit conjointement avec les ministres des autres Puissances,’ but he was able to satisfy them by assuring that this could mean nothing else than settling some details and minor points after the French government had obtained the major points for the Batavian Republic. They also agreed that Van Grasveld would not pay any visits to other envoys ‘before the state of affairs has taken a turn for the better and become more solid.’58 As Jean de Bry put it: ‘les petites Républiques doivent se reposer sur la loyauté de la grande nation!’59 Hence, the Batavian Republic accepted French mediation; either because of its auxiliary status or because of resignation to its fate. At first, Van Grasveld was to cooperate with Buch as well,60 but by mid-August the latter was recalled61 due to French complaints about his behaviour towards other envoys in Rastatt to which he had acted as if he was an official envoy.62 It was not until the very end of August that Van Grasveld was allowed to present himself to the other envoys to the congress.63 As time passed, it dawned on the Batavian envoy that he would not attain anything substantial. Convinced that even the details of Batavian interests had to be dealt with in Paris and his presence in Rastatt was of no 56   ‘op het groot comptoir te Parijs.’; 8 August 1798, Gogel to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 119. 57   4 August 1798, Van Grasveld to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 361. 58   ‘voor en al eer de zaaken eene beetere wending genomen en meer soliditeit bekoomen hebben.’; 9 August 1798, Van Grasveld to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 361. 59   Vreede, 1863, p. vii. 60   ‘die gemeenschappelijk met u de belangens dezer Republiek behartigen zal’; 23 July 1798, Gogel to Buch; NA 2.01.08 no. 119. 61   14 August 1798, secret minutes Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458B. 62   4 August 1798, Van Grasveld to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 361. 63   31 August 1798, Van Grasveld to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 361.



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use, he suggested to his principals in The Hague that the only way left to promote their country’s interests at the peace with the Empire was to persuade the Directoire to have the phrase ‘La République Batave est comprise dans le présent traité; Elle jouira également de tous les droits et avantages stipulés dans les Articles tel et tel’ inserted into the Treaty.64 He had given up on playing an active part in negotiations. Nevertheless, Jean de Bry and Roberjot did not welcome Van Grasveld leaving since his departure could be interpreted as a sign that the Batavian Republic had given up on peace altogether and expected the topical situation to develop in full out war which would be especially imprudent as Franco-Prussian relations were chilled at the time and thus might negatively affect the congress at large. The Batavian envoy replied that the Batavian government had deemed that Batavian interests had to be taken care of in Paris, that there was little hope of attaining a convenient demarcation in the east, and that thus he was not worth his salt as an envoy in Rastatt. As his French colleagues kept protesting, he suggested a pragmatic solution. He proposed not paying any farewell visits and travel over Paris. That way his leave from Rastatt could be presented as simply motivated by the wish to consult consulting Schimmelpenninck. Once gone, no one would notice him not returning.65 Soon afterwards, Van Grasveld left Rastatt. 4.3  Hunger for Land As to the substantial matters the Batavian Republic wanted to take or to be taken care of during the Rastatt negotiations, its government’s scheme was dominated by the territorial indemnity and demarcation of its eastern border. Besides that, arrangements had to be made for possessions of German princes and orders within the Batavian Republic. Furthermore, the Batavian government took an interest in the compensation for the Prince of Orange and, finally, in the free navigation of the river Rhine. The issue of territorial indemnity and frontier demarcation was paramount to the Batavian Republic. As early as August 1796, Blauw and Meyer had proposed to the Directoire to aggrandise the Batavian Republic with the County of Bentheim and contiguous lands. On   5 October 1798, Van Grasveld to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 361.   5 November 1798, Van Grasveld to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 361.

64 65

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that occasion, the French government had purported that negotiations with Prussia on the matter had been undertaken, but that it would probably be very hard to have the King of Prussia consent, especially since Wezel would pass into Batavian hands.66 It took the best part of Buch’s instructions for the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken to elaborate on this matter.67 In conformity with earlier communications the importance of settling the Batavian border on the German side in relation with Article 16 of the Treaty of The Hague—the one that promised the Batavian Republic territorial compensation for the territories lost to France—was stressed. The Committee also expressly stated that the Peace of Rastatt was to be considered the ‘general peace’ meant in Article 16, since France had divided the Coalition and Continental peace would be re-established in Rastatt. Hence, this was the time to procure the promised compensation to the Batavian Republic. Buch was provided with a detailed scheme of what territorial extension along the eastern border the government in The Hague desired. That scheme resembled the earlier ones68 to a large extent and will therefore not be discussed in detail here. It is interesting though to elaborate somewhat more on the committee’s argumentation. The committee placed the military importance of the frontier demarcation up front, stating that it was in France’s interest, too, that the ­Batavian Republic would not have any immediate neighbours in the east but powers of the third and fourth rank and would thus be enabled to concentrate on her maritime commerce and naval power. It expected the Batavian agent to ‘set forth the grounds of political and military interest.’69 Yet again, we come across an explicit reference to the Prussian invasion since the quintessence of these ‘military grounds’ was the shared interest of the French and Batavian Republics that the Batavian Republic would be freed from the permanent threat of invasion from the east as had materialised in 1787. Clearly, the Patriot regime in The Hague did not trust Berlin and was adamant to ‘take away the desire to

66   21 February 1801, extraordinary secret minutes Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 482; Smit, 1975, pp. 20–21. 67  Not dated [later referred to as instructions of 25 December 1797 or of 28 December 1797], instructions for Charles Louis Buch as secret agent to the Rastatt congress; NA 2.01.08 no. 390. 68  See section III.2.2. 69   ‘de gronden van militair en politicq belang zal ontwikkelen.’



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repeat the 1787 invasion’70 and remove Prussia as far as possible from the Batavian borders. Who can vouch that with the present king, William Frederic, the affection of the heart and family interests will not get the upper hand again? Who does not see that the August 1787 guarantee of the monstrous form of government will always produce a splendid pretext?71

Moreover, the proximity of Prussian territory enabled Orangist ‘emigrés’ to loiter just across the border, keep in contact with sympathisers within the Batavian Republic, and ‘incite resistance in the country and to raise wrong hope.’72 The committee, in addition, anticipated it to be quite easy to convince the Emperor of the geopolitical importance of removing Prussia from the Batavian borders. It is imaginable that the Emperor, now being enlightened, will be easily persuaded of the incomprehensible folly of having his eternal enemy acting as master in the important Netherlands in 1787; hence, it is imaginable that he will also see that [. . .] Prussia is to be removed from our borders and to be deprived of the means to increase Austria’s enemy’s power immensely by dominating the Netherlands arbitrarily.73

Besides the military argumentation focused on the anticipated Prussian threat, the committee developed some other arguments. First, a reference to the discourse of liberty can be found in Buch’s instructions. As to the inhabitants of Upper Guelders and Cleves the committee asserted that the reunion of those territories with the Batavian Republic would make them free men.74 Second—and which might

  ‘Berlijn lust ontnemen om invasie 1787 te herhalen.’   ‘want wie kan er voor instaan dat even als bij den tegenwoordigen kooning, Willem Frederic, de genegenheid van het hart en de belangens van famille de overhand niet eens wederom zullen neemen? Wie ziet niet, dat de guarantie van den wandrochtelijken regeringsvorm in augustus 1788 altijd een heerlijk voorwendsel zou kunnen opleveren?’ 72   ‘het aanstoken van onrusten in ’t land en het opwekken van verkeerde hoop.’ 73   ‘Het is dus te denken dat de Keizer nu verlicht zijnde zeer gemakkelijk zal te overtuigen zijn van de onbegrijpelijke dwaasheid dat hij in 1787 zijnen eeuwigen vijand den baes heeft laaten speelen in het belangrijk Nederland; het is te denken dat hij tevens in zal zien, [. . .], dat Pruissen van onze grenzen verwijdert en aan hetzelve de mooglijkheid benomen worden, om door Nederland naar willekeur te bemeesteren de macht des vijands van Oostenrijk ontzachlijk te vermeerderen.’ 74   ‘de ingezetenen van alle die in een lopenden en veelhandige landjes zouden langs dien weg van haaven tot vrijmannen verheven worden en van duizens knevelarijen bevrijd waaronder zij nu zuchten, die de gouvernement van Berlijn, Hanover, [. . .] uit haaren aart niet kunnen voorkomen.’ 70 71

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come somewhat as a surprise, the first time brought to the fore by a Dutch government—the committee pointed at matters of water management. Since these matters had given occasion for various conflicts with the government of Cleves in the past, it was absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the dikes that the Batavian Republic would be placed in control of all rivers up to Emmerich. Thirdly, posing what might be called a ‘réunion’-argument, the committee claimed that most territories it required had belonged to the Dutch Republic or the Duchy of Guelders before but had been taken from it by force in previous wars.75 Thereto, the Batavian Republic could claim the rivers and swamp areas that were to form the line of demarcation to form its natural frontiers like France had done before. All that was necessary to give the Batavian Republic the indispensable and natural borders was for France to take the issue at hand: Let the great Republic which happy fate it is to alter the miserable state of Gothic Europe [. . .] speak and the Batavian Republic, too, will have boundary markers called for by indispensable security, the interest of both states, and nature.76

The committee must have anticipated the French to argue that Article 16 of the Treaty of The Hague did not give the Batavian Republic any right but to territories held by France and that the best part of the desired territories was not. At least, it provided Buch with a counterargument at forehand. Bentheim was pawned to Hanover and the Count was childless. The County of Bentheim would go to the King of Britain on the Count’s demise. France could not be indifferent to that,

75   18 February 1801, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 123; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 485; Smit, 1975, p. 18. In the late Middle Ages the Count of Cleves had tried to expand his territories to the west at the expense of the Duchy of Guelders. He had gained various territories but failed to consolidate them because Nijmegen became part of the Duchy of Guelders in 1247. Ever since Cleves had had some enclaves in Guelders territory. In 1666 Cleves and hence the enclaves had become Prussian. Guelders had tried to regain the enclaves in the seventeenth century, but they had not been disputed anymore in the eighteenth. French forces had occupied Cleves and the enclaves in January 1795, but had evacuated them again after the Treaty of Basel (5 April 1795). On 30 July the Guelders Estates had urged the Staten Generaal to insist on the cession of the enclaves at the general peace since they had been Guelders of yore. Smit, 1975, pp. 9–18. 76   ‘zo de groote republicq wier gelukkig lot het is den elendigen gedaante van het Gotische Europa te veranderen [. . .] spreeke en ook de Bataavschen Republicq krijgt zodanige eindpalen als onontbeerlijken zekerheid, het belang der beide staaten en de natuur vorderen.’



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whereas it would not be hard in this situation to reach an agreement on financial compensation with the Count. The French Republic had occupied the Palatine and was thus able to give the Batavian Republic everything belonging to Upper Guelders and Liège. Although it is not quite clear, this might seem amounting to recognition of the right of conquest on the Batavian part. It has to be recalled that the Batavian authorities had rejected this right in 1795 when France claimed part of Batavian territory. The present situation did differ from the FrancoDutch negotiations of 1795, however. This time, the Batavian Republic wished to gain territory. As to the popular sovereignty argument, that was turned around. As said before, the inhabitants of these territories would, on the contrary, become free and hence be enabled to exercise popular sovereignty through annexation, whereas presently they were merely subjects. Prussian protests were to be expected, but ‘the happy union of the German, French, and Austrian Omnipotents’ interest and capacity can and will remove all difficulties with ease.’77 Notwithstanding the force of these arguments and contrary to the interest of both Republics, as well as of Austria, The Hague realised it might turn out that the extensive extension of Batavian territory could not be put into action. Therefore, as before, the committee anticipated a more limited aggrandisement as well. Again, a scheme for this aggrandisement was expounded in detail. The committee did impress on Buch ‘not to speak of this unless in the utmost need.’78 The military aspect dominated the schemes for extension in the east. Partly this was because military concerns were paramount to the Patriot regime that was long away from feeling secure. On the other hand, the committee hoped for economic compensation of the ceded territories in the south. That is to say, the committee had still not given up hope of France returning the best part of Dutch territory gained in 1795 and would even agree to a cession of part of the Belgian departments to the Batavian Republic.79 It is clear that both with regard to the first and to the second presumption the value of the desired territory is less determined by their population and revenues than by their political-military significance, for the essential 77   ‘kan en zal te dezen den gelukkige vereeniging van ’t belang en vermogen der Al beschikkers van Duitschland, Frankrijk en Oostenrijk, alle zwarigheid zeer gemakkelijk uit de weg ruimen.’ 78   ‘van zodanig iets niet behoort gerept te worden dan in den uitersten nood.’ 79   This part of Buch’s instructions can also be found in: NA 2.21.073 no. 103.

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To be more specific, the committee expressed to desire, first, the southern bank of the river Scheldt from Hulst up to Sluis, that is, former Dutch Flanders. Furthermore, it showed to have some hopes of Antwerp becoming Batavian. Thereto, the committee hoped to justly rely on French generosity in order to have the provisions with regard to Flushing in the Alliance Treaty changed. Batavian control of the Scheldt and Antwerp would be of great help in restoring the Republic’s affluence. Whereas French and Batavian commerce differed so much from each other that competition was not to be anticipated, France was said to have great interest in allowing the Batavian Republic attaining the economic position ‘it is amenable to as a maritime power and, if God wishes, destined for to the benefit of its allies.’81 Moreover, Antwerp would still be open to French merchantmen, whereas the port of Ostend sufficed and was more appropriate for France as a naval base in those parts. The French Republic, it was argued, did not need Antwerp from a military point of view and no more did France need to control the Scheldt by means of keeping a garrison in Flushing, whereas French presence in Flushing was a permanent source of conflict between the two allied Republics.82 The committee pointed out that these desires vis-à-vis Belgian territory were not new. Even in 1795, the Staten Generaal had insisted on an extensive aggrandisement towards the south or at least to preserve the integrity of Dutch territory.83 At that time, ‘France’s magistrates had not been susceptible to such a grand role [for the Batavian Republic; RK]’ and the uncertain state of affairs might have rendered French control of the Scheldt necessary. Now that things had changed, the committee hoped that, alongside Upper Guelders and Venlo, Dutch Flanders would be   ‘Het valt in ’t oog dat zowel in de eerste als in deeze tweede vooronderstelling de waarde van den begeerden grond de volkrijkheid en inkomsten minder in aanmerking komen dan het politicq-militair belang, want den wezentlijke schadeloosstelling waarop de Bataavsche Republicq van de grootheid en welmoedigheid van Frankrijk zou kunnen hoopen is eigentlijk te zoeken en te bevinden aan de zuidzijde.’ 81   ‘waarvoor zij als zee-mogendheid vatbaar en zo God wil! ten nutte van haare bondgenooten bestemd is.’ 82  See chapter II.5. 83   ‘de limieten aan den zeekant verlangt tot Ostende en Nieuwpoort en van daar door Yperen, Kortrijk, Dendermonde en Antwerpen zodanig dat de Schelde den Republicq zou begrensd hebben en vervolgens van Antwerpen af eenen lijn getrokken zijn tot Maastricht en van daar over Venlo, Wezel en Emmerick ingesloten.’ 80



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returned to the Batavian Republic as well. For, from an economic point of view, Dutch Flanders was asserted to be of little interest to France and of great value to Zeeland and Holland. Not being totally detached from reality, the committee did, however, realise that the Batavian Republic was not in the position to actually claim territory in the south. Buch was instructed—and this was repeated to him as, once in Rastatt, he seemed to work for expansion to the south overenthusiastically—that Franco-Batavian relations were too precarious to make any demands and that the issue of aggrandisement in the south was only to be brought up if there was an occasion in which the French envoys seemed to be sufficiently receptive to such a scheme.84 A final aspect of Buch’s instructions that is quite interesting as a sign of the tendencies in Batavian foreign policy is that, strikingly, the committee seemed to intend keeping some distance from the French Republic within the peacetime European order. It actually attributed a role to the Batavian Republic in keeping the European balance of power against France. At least, such a role was proposed as an argument to persuade Prussia and Austria to consent to aggrandisement of Batavian territory: One might even, with skill, provoke the desire of other powers to that end, the Emperor’s in particular. The House of Austria [. . .] will in no case have an interest in the destruction of our political influence in Europe.85 84   ‘Het spreekt van zelven dat men dit alles niet kan eijsschen, maar een labiel negociateur moet de ogenblikken bespieden en de manieren waarop hij zijne committenten kan dienen, hij moet de eijgenliefde der Fransche legatie weeten op te wekken en voor al aan den held van Italien trachten te doen beduiden dat den vader der cis-alpijnsche vrijheid ook bestendig is om den roemrijke hersteller der Bataavschen welvaart te worden.’; ‘[. . .] De intentie van de commissie is nooit geweest, blijkens den geest en letter uwer instructie dat de bataafsche Republiek pretensien zou laten gelden aan hare zuidzijde of op den mond der Schelde, zonder volkomene goedvinding van hare grote, trouwe en nauwe bondgenoot; maar slechts om het belang der republiek aan u te doen kennen, en hetzelve bij gelegenheid als uit zelven en confidentieel voor te stellen, daar gij menen zoudt dat het van nut konde zijn.’; 9 January 1798, Van der Goes to Buch; NA 2.01.08 no. 103. 85   ‘men zou zelfs met kunst kunnen uitlokken het verlangen van andere mogendheeden tot dat eijnde en bijzonder van den keizer. Het Huis van Oostenrijk [. . .] kan in geenen gevalle belang hebben bij de vernietiging van onzen politiquen invloed in Europa. Het heeft integendeel belang dat de Bataafsche Republicq iets vermag in den tegenstand aan Frankrijk. [. . .] om ons te doen meester worden van de mond der Schelde, dat is Antwerpen en den linkeroever van den Hond aan den Bataavsche Republicq doen afstaan. Nederland heeft wel eer zijnen schatten en bloed veil gehad

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Even Prussia’s interests, according to the committee, called for the Batavian Republic not to be an ‘inconsequential power,’86 but to be sufficiently powerful to make sure that ‘the rash France can no longer arbitrarily reach Germany and the rich lands of Prussia over Batavian territory.’87 Of course, France should not get wind of this argument. More in general, Buch was instructed to be very careful for ‘this State’s interest vis-à-vis France are that tender that one can not sufficiently spare them.’88 Earlier, Talleyrand had assured Meyer that the French delegation in Rastatt had been instructed to permanently take Batavian interests into consideration and especially to take concern in stipulating the territorial extension that, in combination with the enclaves within the Batavian Republic, was to serve as the equivalent France was engaged to provide in return for territories ceded in 1795.89 Hence, there were some reasons for the committee to regard its hopes as not being too utopian. The 22 January coup d’etat, although primarily directed at domestic and especially constitutional affairs, provoked a considerable change in Batavian foreign policy. The new, radical-unitarist regime claimed to pursue a very plain policy.90 Domestically, its first premise was to give the nation a republican constitution based on the liberty and rights of man and citizen. Buch was directed to emphasise vis-à-vis all foreign ministers that the regime change in The Hague would not detrimentally affect the Batavian Republic’s external relations. To the contrary, the coup d’état was expected to accelerate the formation of a stable constitution.91 Externally, alongside attaining profitable commerce treaties, persuading the French government of the need to provide the Batavian Republic with a solid foundation of its freedom and independence and by consequence its mere political existence at the general peace was voor Oostenrijk en zodanige wederdiensten zou ongetwijfeld groot zijn en het cabinet van Weenen met staatkundigen roem overladen.’ 86   ‘onbeduidende mogendheid.’ 87   ‘het ligtvaardig Frankrijk niet maar na willekeur over het Bataavsche territoir na Duitschland en het vette land van Pruissen kan trekken.’ 88   ‘de belangens van dezen staat ten aanzien van Frankrijk zijn zo teder dat men ze niet genoeg ontzien kan.’ 89   16 November 1797, Talleyrand to Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 610. 90   ‘Ons politiek staetssysthema is zeer eenvoudig!’ 91   5 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Buch; NA 2.01.08 no. 104 and NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458A.



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paramount.92 More concretely, that was deemed to mean the full restitution of all East and West Indian colonies and territorial compensation for the cession of ‘Flanders’ and Maastricht. The Uitvoerend Bewind asserted that the Batavian Republic was entitled to claim the latter.93 The new regime did not differ from the old one in emphasizing the need of territorial aggrandisement. Pro tempore, Buch was hence instructed to follow the former committee’s instructions.94 The focus on which that aggrandisement had to be based changed. From a peculiar mixture of a realistic appreciation of the Batavian Republic’s position within the European states system and Revolutionary zeal, the Uitvoe­ rend Bewind placed the French alliance in the centre of its foreign and defence policies.95 Instead of a more independent course focused on directing the Batavian Republic into a position in which it could defend itself, it was realised that it depended on the French Republic for its security and henceforth needed to strengthen the bonds with its ally. The French alliance, especially now that France was in possession of the former Austrian Netherlands, was deemed to be a better precaution against a Prussian attack than a line of fortifications.96 The alliance 92   ‘Van buiten verlangen wij, dat gij onze magtige Bondgenoot door de reeden en door allerleij middelen van persuasie, want anderen hebben wij niet, gestaadig zult onder het oog brengen, dat dit kunst gewrocht der natuur weldra tot zijne voorige moerassen zal moeten wederkeeren, indien bij eene eventueele algemeene vreede desselfs vrijheid en onafhankelijkheid, en als een gevolg van dien, desselfs politieke existentie niet op eene onwrikbare voet gevestigd is.’ 93   26 January 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Meyer; NA 1.02.14 no. 607. 94   2 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind secret minutes foreign affairs (secreet verbaal Buitenlandsche Zaaken); NA 2.01.08 no. 50 and NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458A. 95   3 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Meyer; NA 2.01.08 no. 104. Meyer brought the Batavian scheme to Talleyrand’s attention in a long letter: 26 March 1798, Meyer to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 599 and NA 2.21.073 no. 35. 96   ‘Het is ons uit die instructie gebleeken, dat het principe van dedommagement voor de gecedeerde landen volgens het tractaat met Vrankrijk geslooten door de geweeze commissie van buytenlandsche zaaken gemanifesteerd daarheen loopt om eene zeekere barrière teegen Pruijssen te bekoomen in cas van eene onverhoedse aanval: wij begrijpen voor ons, dat alle zwakke barrières aan die kant in het militair stelzel van Europa ons van zeer weinig belang voor den staat toeschijnen, immers zoo lang wij ten naauwste zullen vereenigd zijn met onze fransche bondgenoot. Zoo een mogendheid zig vijandelijke oogmerken heeft, ontdekt de staatkunde deselve spoedig, en onverhoedse aanvallen kunnen ons voor een gevreesd als gerealiseert kunnen worden. De Fransche republicq door de plegtigste tractaten in het wettig bezit der geweese oostenrijksche Neederlanden gesteld, in welker sterke steeden zij voor eerst genoodsaakt zal weesen groote garnisoenen te houden, zal altoos in staat weesen bij de minste dreigende houding van Pruissen haare getrouwen bondgenoote kragtdadige hulp en bijstand te bieden en het is op deese gronden dat wij liever uit een ander principe de

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was, however, not presented as merely or even primarily based on a shared ideology. The French and Batavian Republics were asserted to be ‘natural allies’ due to their geographical position vis-à-vis each other that was the main source of reciprocal interests. Therefore, the Batavian Republic’s policy should be directed at strongly allying with France, whereas the opposite course of rivalry would be highly imprudent. That was the only way for the Batavian Republic to remain a free and independent power ‘in the midst of political storms threatening all states.’97 The temporary change in Batavian foreign policy from an emphasis on the Batavian Republic’s own capacity of self-defence to the French alliance had its impact on the Ducth agenda for Rastatt. The Batavian Republic was now less in need of an eastern border beneficial from a military point of view than of the acquisition of territories with great economic value, which would turn it into a more useful ally.98 One of the consequences of the new Batavian government’s endeavours to treat France more cautiously was that it did not work out a detailed scheme of aggrandisement itself, but directed Meyer to find out what kind of compensation the Directoire was thinking of since the realization of any scheme totally depended on France’s good will.99

negotiatien tot schavergoeding zoude willen aanleggen’; 3 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Meyer; NA 2.01.08 no. 104. 97   ‘De topografische ligging der staaten is de eerste bron van hunne wederzijdsche belangens ende fondamenteele basis van hunnen vereeniging of van hunne rivaliteijt: dit is een waarheid, die niemand kan loochenen, en als een gevolg van diesen waarheid, kan het niet anders zijn, of het systema van de Bataafsche republicq behoort te weesen, om zig ten naauwsten te verbinden en te vereenigen met de Fransche Repu­ blicq terwijl een tegenovergesteld systema namentlijk van te willen rivaliseeren teegen de Fransche natie het uiterste resultat van dwaasheid zoude zijn bij het Bataafsche gouvernement. Ten tijde van den onstervelijke Jan de Wit, kan het staatkundig zijn alliantien tegen Vrakrijk te ontwerpen; thans is het staatkundig de banden van vereeniging hoe langer hoe nauwer toe te halen, opdat de Bataafsche natie in het midden der geweldige staats­ orkaanen, die alle staaten bedreigen, eene vrije en onafhankelijke mogentheid blijve.’; 3 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Meyer; NA 2.01.08 no. 104. 98   3 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Meyer; NA 2.01.08 no. 104; ‘Wij willen u wel bekennen dat dit principe niet geheel analogue met het onze is en wij veel minder zoude zien op eene barriere die in het militair stelsel van Europa toch zeer weinig beduid, dan op zodanig een dedommagement, waarbij ons meer vrugtbaarder ladstreeken te beurt vielen, die zij met groter regt zouden kunnen beschouwen als een aequivalent voor het geen wij in het zuyden verlooren hebben’; 5 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Buch; NA 2.01.08 no. 104 and NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458A. 99   ‘Namentlijk of het niet raadsamer was het Fransche gouvernement onder de hand uit te lokken om op te geven, wat sij eijgentlijk tot eene billijke schavergoeding



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The Directoire remained as deaf to Batavian demands as it had been before the coup d’état. Nevertheless, the Batavian government was supported in its claims by Delacroix, who deemed it to be in the French interest as well to attempt reaching the annexation of East Frisia and some other territories in these parts since that would render the Batavian Republic in control of the embouchure of the river Ems, alongside a considerable increase of population and maritime possibilities.100 In Paris, Meyer put the Batavian demands in line with the new policy to the Directoire’s attention on 26 March in order for Franco-Batavian negotiations on the execution of Batavian schemes for aggrandisement to commence.101 Again the Leitmotiv of Meyer’s argument was the rivalry with Britain. il [le Directoire exécutif; RK] sait aussi que l’unique moyen de rendre aux mers la liberté que ses victoires assurent au continent, c’est de donner l’existence la plus solide et l’impulsion la plus active à la République batave, dans la marine et l’industrie sont nécessairement rivales de celles du Peuple anglais;

In opposition to that rivalry the relation between France and the Batavian Republic was presented as a natural alliance, the two Republics being ‘unis [. . .] par l’amour et l’usage de la Liberté.’ So the origin of the ‘naturalness’ of the alliance was no longer deemed to be of a topographical position but deriving from a shared ideology. Meyer referred aan desselfs bondgenoot had toegedagt, want wij begrijpen, dat wij in het cabinet wel allerley plans kunnen maken, maar dat het van onsen hoogen bondgenoot, en van desselfs welwillendheid afhangd om ons tot realiseering derzelve de behulpsaame hand te bieden.’; 3 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Meyer; NA 2.01.08 no. 104; ‘daar wij geene andere wapenen hebben als de reeden, de overtuyging en het mutueel belang van onze hogere bontgenoot; die bij de vrijheid en independentie en aldus bij de politieke existentie van dit land ten naauwste geinteresseert is, het ons in dit ogenblik het allergeschikst voorkomt om op eene loyaale en broederlijke wijze af te vraagen wat onze bondgenoot in desselfd edelmoedigheid voor ons politiek bestaan en ons zoude kunnen en willen toedenken. [. . .] wij kunnen ons wel afslooven om allerley projecten en plans in ons cabinet te ontwerpen maar derzelver realiseering zal toch altoos afhangen van de politieke omstandigheeden niet alleen, maar ook bijzonder van de goede en welmeenende intentien van onze bondgenoot van welker staatkunde wij vermeenen te kunnen veronderstellen dat zij met ons zullen begrijpen dat dit kleyne hoekje lands bij derselver vrijheid en onafhankelijkheid bewaard in het foederatief militair en maritiem systema van de Fransche republicq steets van het hoogste gewigt moet worden vervult en gehouden.’ 5 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Buch; NA 2.01.08 no. 104 and NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458A. 100   5 February 1798, Delacroix to Talleyrand; AAE CP Hollande 598. 101   26 March 1798, Meyer to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 599 and NA 2.21.073 no. 35.

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to the French generosity towards the Cisalpine Republic and asked for his country to be treated likewise. Since Britain was much more dangerous to France than the Italian powers he stated that there was even more reason to take the Batavian Republic’s interests at hand. Ainsi le gouvernement Batave ne peut se promettre une existence durable; il ne peut reprendre son rang parmi les puissances; il ne peut devenir un allié vraiment utile pour la France, un ennemi vraiment redoutable pour les Anglais, qu’après avoir jetté, sur le continent de l’Europe, des racines plus vastes et plus profondes. Il lui faut réparer, tout-à-la fois les maux de la guerre et les injures du tems; ranimer son crédit, rélever sa marine, rendre à son commerce et à ses manufactures, l’aliment et les bras dont ils ont besoin; Il lui faut compenser la perte d’un territoire fertile [. . .]

Henceforth, France had to play an active role in the demarcation of the Batavian-German border instead of leaving that matter to be settled by the German powers alone. In addition, Meyer reminded the Directoire yet again of France’s obligation to provide the Batavian Republic with a territorial indemnification promised in the Hague Treaty. The acquisition of part of Westphalia was indispensable to compensate the loss of Maastricht and Dutch Flanders and by consequence to ‘donnant à son indépendance politique, des fondemens qui la fassent respecter de ses ennemis et de ses rivaux.’ Without any compensation the Batavian Republic would never be able to regain its former economic and naval strength. Meyer presented two possible, partly complementary schemes for what that treaty was to contain. First, he suggested the cession to the Batavian Republic of some territory on the left bank of the river Rhine ‘réunis à la République française.’ Second, one comes across the familiar plans concerning ‘les provinces isolées qui composent le cercle de Westphalie; et sur les bords de l’océan Germanique, dans les pays situés entre l’Ems et le Weser.’ The choice was up to the Directoire, but Meyer did allow himself manifesting some reflections to be reckoned with. Il suffira de quelques réflexions, sur la nature même de ces lieux, pour déterminer le choix de la France; et pour prouver, que sa politique, à cet égard doit être la même que celle du gouvernement batave, puisqu’elle est fondée sur les mêmes principes et sur les mêmes intérêts.

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Republic—, but he might have thought proposing it was expedient since that might direct the Directoire’s attention to the second option with somewhat more zeal. The Batavian envoy did make an effort to persuade the French government that giving up some of the newly acquired territory would not mean loss of face for France. sans doute le Directoire éxécutif ne peut ajouter à la gloire de ses conquêtes et à la solidité de la puissance, qu’en permettant à la justice de limites de l’empire qu’elles lui donnent; mais une modération trop généreuse ne fermera point ses yeux sur les moyens et l’époque décisive, d’amures irrivocablemens la grandeur de la France vérifier et la destinée de ses alliés. Il a résolu, dans sa sagesse, que la république auroit pour limite le cours du Rhin jusqu’au de nous de Cologne; les considérations les plus fortes doivent lui rendre précieuse l’éxécution littérale de ce plan, qui ramène la politique aux élémens les plus simples, en la fondant sur les loix mêmes de la nature; il importe donc à ses alliés, nos sentemens de n’apporter aucun obstacle à ce grand projet, mais encore d’en faciliter le développement par leurs sacrifices, en cherchant ailleurs le dédommagement de leurs pertes, et la récompense de leur fidélité.

There were some dominions south of the river Rhine not yet belonging to the French Republic that hence could be annexed to the Batavian Republic without violating the French Constitution—parts of Cleves and Upper Guelders—, but those territories were deemed to be too small to form a sufficient indemnity. Hence, il faut donc absolument que le peuple Batave cherche une indemnité suffisante, telle que l’intérêt commun de son pays et de la France la lui rende nécessaire, telle que la foi des traités le lui garantit, dans les pro­ vinces situées sur la rive droite du Rhin.

Besides the discourse of interest, Meyer here clearly bases his country’s claims on the sanctity of treaties. Next came a more elaborate enumeration of the territories that might form a sufficient compensation alongside the eastern border.102 By annexing those dominions and adjusting their borders in such a way to provide the Batavian Republic with a neat frontier, she would be separated from the Empire by a line of rivers that would form ‘barrières naturelles entre les préjugés politiques et les lumières, entre

102   ‘1o Le pays situé entre l’Ems et le Weser, contenant l’Oost-Frise, la petite principauté de Jever, le Bas-évêché de Munster et le comté d’Oldenburg; 2o Le comté de Bentheim-Steinfurt, le Haut-évêché de Munster et les pays de Clêves.’

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l’asservissement des Peuples et leur liberté.’ The desired territorial aggrandisement did see to a strip of land that surpassed the ceded territories in surface, but the latter territories were asserted to be more fertile, populous, and industrious. Although the compensation scheme was drawn from an economic point of view, the aggrandisement of the Batavian Republic was thus also justified from a discourse of liberty and the concept of natural frontiers. Moreover, the military aspect was not entirely absent. Especially with regard to the acquisition of the German coastal region along the North Sea and of the city of Wezel, the military advantage was stressed. The first woud give the Revolutionary alliance control of the entire North Sea coast and hence the means to fight British preponderance at sea. The latter was of huge strategic importance to the alliance as well since Wezel controlled Westphalia and Batavian control of that town would open the road into Hanover and lower Germany to French forces in time of war with the Empire. Meyer emphasised that the French could rely on their ally if necessary: Un peuple qui ne peut avoir d’autre systeme politique et d’autres ennemis que les siens! Un gouvernement qui porte exclusivement le génie et l’activité de ses concitoyens vers la marine; qui livre ses frontièrs en ses places fortes, aux guerriers français; et qui, se mettant ainsi, sous la protection militaire de la France [. . .]

Finally, Meyer made an effort to show that the second scheme was indeed feasible by countering all objections he could think of in advance. First, he anticipated Russia to object to the annexation of the County of Oldenburg since the Count was a relative by marriage of the Archduke Alexander. Since Oldenburg was far away from the Russian border and of little economic and military value, the Court of St. Petersburg was expected, though, to give way in return for a financial compensation sub rosa. Prussian opposition against the cession of the King’s dominions on the Rhine and in East Frisia was deemed to be more serious, but that should not be a real problem either, for Berlin was asserted to be much to faible to resist the joint effort of France and Austria. Moreover, Prussia would be prepared to accept ‘échanges favorables’ in return for the loss of its dominions scattered throughout Westphalia if France really made an effort. Meyer seems to have ignored—or was ignorant of—the fact that an acquisition of any territory in central Germany by Prussia was exactly what Austria wished to prevent in Rastatt. As to Münster, that Bishopric was not



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of great importance and its cession to the Batavian Republic was thus deemed to fit perfectly in the general plans of secularisation of the Empire. Finally, the other substantial territories of which the Batavian aggrandisement scheme consisted—Jever and Bentheim—were heavily mortgaged and their cession would hence free their present possessors of huge financial burdens. The moderate regime that took control of the Batavian Republic after the 12 June coup d’état, again tried to conduct a more independent policy. The Intermediair Uitvoerend Bewind returned to the territorial scheme and starting points for Batavian foreign policy of the late Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken.103 At the time, however, it dawned on Buch that the Directoire wished to separate the matter of territorial compensation for the Batavian Republic from peace negotiations,104 and he reported to The Hague that rumours went that compensation would be settled at negotiations to be opened in ­Berlin.105 Rastatt was but a gathering of envoys. Real decisions were to be made in the great powers’ capitals. German territory was to be attained not in Rastatt but in Paris. One of the ends the secret Eijkenbroek mission to the French capital was to serve had exactly been getting the French government to endorse and procure an extension of Batavian territory to the east. His mission was of no avail, though.106 Willem Buys, who temporarily replaced Meyer as envoy, was to find out the Directoire’s views on the matter.107 From May 1798 onwards, official attempts to gain French support were resumed.108 Schimmelpenninck, the new Batavian envoy in Paris was instructed to stress France’s treaty obligation vis-à-vis the Batavian territorial demands with more vigour again. The familiar line of reasoning to argue the necessity of aggrandisement of Batavian territory was repeated in his instructions.109

103   26 June 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind secret minutes foreign affairs (secreet verbaal Buitenlandsche Zaaken); NA 2.01.08 no. 50. 104   6 July 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind secret minutes foreign affairs (secreet verbaal Buitenlandsche Zaaken); NA 2. 01.08 no. 50. 105   11 July 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind secret minutes foreign affairs (secreet verbaal Buitenlandsche Zaaken); NA 2.01.08 no. 50. 106   20 February 1798, instructions for Eijkenbroek; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 509; 28 July 1798, Buys to Intermediair Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458B. 107   14 April 1798, instructions for Buys; NA 2.01.08 no. 104A. 108   28 July 1798, Buys to Intermediair Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458B. 109   24 July 1798, secret minutes Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458B.

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The aforementioned scheme was presented as highly feasible and just. More emphasis was laid on the military aspect again, however, stressing the need of the Batavian Republic being able to defend itself. La France, en associant la République batave à la conquête de la liberté, n’a pas voulu la laisser à la merci de toutes les puissances monarchiques qui l’avoisinent et qui de tous tems ont été les soutiens du despotisme stadhoudérien, qui, plus que jamais, vont être les ennemis naturels de notre nation et des principes de notre gouvernement. Notre frontière est entièrement ouverte du côté de l’Allemagne, l’ancien gouvernement n’a jamais songé à y établir un système de défense, il est même impossible d’en créer un, si nous restons bornés à l’Ijssel. Dans deux fois 24 heures une armée ennemie pourra toujours parvenir au centre de nos provinces et quand la Prusse voudra, elle répètera en Hollande la contrerévolution de 1787.

In the Batavian government’s view, an extension of the Batavian border in the east was absolutely necessary to maintain the Batavians’ political existence and regain the rank among the maritime powers formerly held by the Dutch Republic. First, because this would give the Batavian Republic better defensible borders as was argued before. Second, because such an extension would bring with it an increase of population. After all, France could not keep troops in the Batavian Republic to defend it perpetually and the present population was too small to form a sufficiently strong national army, whereas a mercenary army was incompatible with the new ‘democratic’ constitution. In particular, control of the entire North Sea coast would make the Batavian Republic preponderant on that sea and the master of commerce with the Baltic Sea of which France could profit as well, especially with respect to the equipment of her navy. Schimmelpenninck’s instructions do, in addition, contain a new, this time military argument for the acquisition of East Frisia. Since the ports in Holland, Enkhuizen, and Hellevoetsluys being mentioned in particular, were less accessible for ships due to the formation of sand banks, the Batavian Republic only had Flushing to assemble and equip her fleet. With that port being in immediate reach of the Royal Navy’s home ports and the island of Walcheren being exposed to the imminent threat of invasion in case of war, the Batavian fleet was hence in permanent danger of being destroyed or conquered by a single strike. Therefore, the Batavian Republic was in need of a new naval base more remote from Britain. If it would be in control of the Ems estuary, Delfzijl could be developed into this port.



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Again an elaborate territorial scheme was presented with rivers and fortified places forming the Batavian border—including the city of Venlo to be returned by France as that place was an essential part of the Batavian system of defense. The latest aggrandisement scheme was predominantly military again in at least three aspects. First, the eastern frontier was again basically drawn to prevent a Prussian invasion. Second, the new borders would enable the Batavian government to concentrate more on the Batavian Republic’s position as a maritime power. And finally, the aggrandisement would cause an increase of population and thus of the basis from which a national army could be recruited. In Rastatt, Van Grasveld came to realise that the Batavian Republic would not attain what it desired. General Joubert informed him that the Directoire was persuaded of the justice of the Batavian claims, but could not afford to alienate Prussia.110 Thereto, the General had reproached that the Batavian government was not working hard enough on the preparation of the Batavian fleet and had not given orders yet for the ships at Texel to leave for Ireland. Van Grasveld reported to The Hague that he suspected the French not making any effort to provide the Batavian Republic with a territorial aggrandisement because of alleged pro-English sentiments and thus the prospect of a more anglophile government in The Hague.111 One does not cease agitating against the established order in our Fatherland and portraying the present constitutional Government and its principles most maliciously to the French Government; [. . .] The Batavian Republic is presented as presently being in a huge crisis, the British and pro-Stadhouder faction becoming more influential by the day and threatening with a reaction not only against 22 January, but against the 1795 Revolution, and favouring trade with Britain underhandedly in all possible ways.112

  16 September 1798, Joubert to Van Grasveld; NA 2.01.08 no. 361.   24 September 1798, Van Grasveld to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 361. 112   ‘Men houdt niet op in ons Vaderland tegen de gevestigde order van zaaken te woelen, en het tegenwoordig constitutioneel Gouvernement en desselfs principes met de haatelijkste verwen bij het fransche gouvernement en ook hier af te schilderen; [. . .] De Bataafsche Republiek wierdt in dezelve voor gedaan als in het moment van eene geweldige crisis, de Engelsche en stadhouderschgezinde factie dagelijks in invloed toenemende en met eene geheele reactie niet tegen den 22 January slegts, maar tegen de Revolutie van 1795 drijgende, en de handel met Engeland op alle wijzen onderhands begunstigd’; 17 September 1798, Van Grasveld to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 361. 110 111

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This idea of alleged pro-English sentiments was typical of the general lack of trust within the European states system, even among allies, during the Revolutionary Wars; a lack of trust that led to what Frederick Kagan calls the ‘atomization of Europe’ in which every great power was on its own and had no relations with any one of the others to coordinate foreign policies.113 This lack of trust made states fall back on an autarkic defense policy and formed one of the major obstacles to the establishment of a stable peace. Hence, the Directoire was reluctant to render the Batavian Republic more powerful and preferred, in general, to keep the sister republics faible to prevent them becoming too powerful as neighbours. As Roberjot told the Batavian envoy that there was not going to be a general secularisation of the Empire, Van Grasveld lost every hope still left of gaining more territory for his country.114 At the same time, whilst Prussia seemed to be more willing not to oppose a cession of territory to the Batavian Republic, Van Grasveld did not trust Berlin’s intentions.115 In the end, negotiations on territorial aggrandisement for the Batavian Republic were entirely transferred to Paris, where Schimmelpenninck persisted in endeavouring to get anything done from the Directoire; referring to Article 16 of the Treaty of The Hague time over time.116 He failed to be successful since, after the outbreak of the War of the Second Coalition, the Directoire had lost any interest in the Batavian schemes whatsoever. Aside to the extensive aggrandisement schemes along the eastern border, the Batavian government wished to attain the renunciation of any rights and titles of German princes within the Batavian Republic as well as the cession of various imperial fiefs enclaved within her territory. The desire to abolish and annex imperial fiefs was one the Batavian Republic had in common with the other sister republics neighbouring the Empire. If the congress had led to any enduring results on this matter, Rastatt—in replacing the frontier zone that had characterised the Empire’s limits for centuries with straight border lines—would have been the summit of the territorial state’s endeavours to establish clear borders. But it did not do so.

  Kagan, 2006, p. 31 and p. 36.   5 October 1798, Van Grasveld to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 361. 115   5 October 1798, Van Grasveld to Meyer; NA 2.01.08 no. 361. 116   25 November 1798, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 657. 113 114



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On the one hand, for the Batavian Republic, this was a matter concerning some particular territories. The ending of the first Revolutionary War would have brought with it the creation of the ‘états massifs’ in western Europe.117 This ideal had been worked upon already in the Batavian Republic with the annexation of independent seigniories belonging to the Prince of Orange—Culemborg and Buren—,118 but the Batavian government had not dared to do the same with the dominions of German princes. At least the appearance of consent was thought necessary. Buch was thus instructed to attain the reunion of Zevenaar and Huissen—belonging to the King of Prussia—and Ravenstein—belonging to the Elector Palatine—as well as the renunciation of its rights119 to Gemert by the Teutonic Order120 since the Order’s sovereignty over that commandery could not be tolerated notwithstanding anything stipulated in previous treaties. On the other hand, the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken wanted the peace treaty to confirm the principle it claimed to have been set in Article 43 of the Treaty of Münster (31 January 1648),121 and repeated in the Treaties of Ryswyck (1697) and Utrecht (1713) that foreign ecclesiatical corporations only could have usufruct of estates within the Dutch Republic and following that line of reasoning to establish the rule that estates owned by a foreign ecclesiatical corporation fall to the state in which they are situated in case of the corporation’s abolishment.122 The recognition of this rule would render the Batavian Republic in possession of the estates within her borders belonging to any German or Belgian monastries already abolished or

  Belissa, 1995, p. 97.  On the incorporation of Culemborg in the Batavian Republic see Van Weel, 1977. 119   ‘allen recht van oppergebied.’ 120   The Teutonic Order was not abolished until 1809. 121   ‘Quant aux Biens d’Eglises, Colleges & autres Lieux pieux assis dans les Provinces-Unies, lesquels estoient Membres dependans d’Eglises, Benefices & Colleges qui font de l’obeissance dudit Seigneur Roy, ce qui n’a esté vendu avant la Conclusion du present Traité, leur sera rendu & restitué, & y rentreront aussi de leur authorité privée, & sans aide de Justice pour en jouïr, & sans en pouvoir disposer, selon ce qui a esté dit cy-dessus; Mais pour ceux qui seront vendus avant ledit temps, ou donnez en payement par les Estats d’aucunes des Provinces, la Rente du prix leur sera payée chacun an à raison du Denier seize par la Province qui aura fait ladite vente, ou donné lesdits Biens en payement, & assignée aussi en forte qu’ils en puissent estre asseurez, le semblable sera fait & observé du coste dudit Seigneur Roy.’; Article 43 Spanish-Dutch Treaty of Münster; CTS vol. 1, p. 84. 122   25 December 1797, instructions for Buch; NA 2.01.08 no. 390. 117 118

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threatened with abolishment due to the anticipated secularisation of the Empire. The issue of German possessions within the Batavian Republic must have been discussed in Rastatt, at least between Buch and the French delegation, from the start. Early February 1798, the Batavian agent requested from his principals a list stating the exact territories enclaved within the Batavian Republic and belonging to foreign powers.123 He was probably not succesful, though, for the matter does not appear again in diplomatic correspondence between Rastatt, Paris, and The Hague until the end of July. Schimmelpenninck was instructed to insist on the cession to the Batavian Republic of the ‘seigneuries enclavées’ belonging to the King of Prussia and some other German princes, and on the renunciation of any rights of Belgian or German religious orders to estates in the Batavian Republic in conformity with Article 43 of the Treaty of Münster. This time the annexation’s necessity was based on the safety risk for the Batavian Republic if the enclaves would remain in existence. To put it short, political heterogenity was posed as a security risk here. le Directoire sentira de quelle importance il est pour la sureté de notre gouvernement de ne pas laisser dans notre intérieur des sujets du roi de Prusse ou d’autres puissances aristocratiques [. . .]124

In addition, their continued existence was deemed to be incompatible with established Batavian liberty: ‘dans le nouvel ordre de choses il est impossible que les taches de la servitude souillent le sol de la liberté.’125 In Rastatt, the French delegation refused to discuss the matter with the imperial Deputation hiding behind its instructions. Van Grasveld suggested to Roberjot that in that case the issue had to be settled in detail in Paris.126 He did, however, express some hope that the Directoire would instruct its envoys to take the matter at hand.127 The French delegation did indeed receive orders to that end.128 It has to be noted, that French willingness to adhere to Batavian demands with regard to imperial fiefs and sovereign dominions of German princes enclaved 123   6 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind secret minutes foreign affairs (secreet verbaal Buitenlandsche Zaaken); NA 2.01.08 no. 50. 124   24 July 1798, secret minutes Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458B. 125   25 November 1798, Schimmelpenninck to Talleyrand; NA 1.02.14 no. 657. 126   5 October 1798, Van Grasveld to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 361. 127   19 October 1798, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 119. 128   22 October 1798, Van Grasveld to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 361.



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within the Batavian Republic’s territory should not come as a surprise, for the cession of these territories to the Batavian Republic was entirely compatible with the general cession of the left bank of the river Rhine to the French Republic. The rupture of the Rastatt congress did, however, prevent the formal cession of the enclaves to occur. Due to political expediency the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken, although reluctantly, took an interest in indemnity for the former Stadhouder as well. In Buch’s instruction the committee stated that indemnity for ‘an illegal office’129 truly was not suited. Furthermore, it was stressed that William V formally abdicating was absolutely unnecessary since the dignity of Stadhouder had been abolished by the nation itself and this had been guaranteed by the French Republic. Politics and the Prince of Orange’s familiy relations, especially with the Prussian Hohenzollern—yet another sign that the Batavian position and chances of success totally depended on Prussia and the state of Franco-Prussian relations—were to be taken into consideration, though. Hence, formal abdication might be prudent. In fact, both Prussia and France contemplated indemnifying the Prince of Orange in Germany. The French delegation was explicitly instructed to attain a compensation for the former Stadhouder.130 Indemnity for Orange had thus to take place within the context of Prussian-Austrian relations and interests within the Empire. To Austria, compensation for the Prince of Orange, being a Prussian client, was out of the question.131 Vienna no longer felt obliged to comply with the promise in the Treaty of Campoformio that the House of Orange would be indemnified.132 On the other hand, Prussia insisted on compensation for Orange or alternatively, demanded restoration of the Stadhouder if he would not be indemnified.133 Apparently the government in The Hague was aware of Prussian demands on this matter. The Batavian envoy in Paris was to ensure that the ‘Prince of Nassau’ be compensated far remote from the Batavian border. The secularisation of Germany would provide the means to do so. Meyer was to stress the insalientcy of compensating him with

  ‘een onwettig ambt.’   9 December 1797, instructions for Bonnier and Treilhard; CG1 pp. 1314–1315 no. 2276; Guyot, 1907, p. 674. 131  Hüffer, 1878, p. 115, pp. 221–222 and p. 219. 132  Hüffer, 1878, pp. 229–230. 133   Guyot, 1907, p. 333; Hüffer, 1878, pp. 231–232 and p. 238. 129 130

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territories in the proximity of the Batavian Republic since that would be a permanent cause for internal turmoil.134 The radical regime coming into power after the 22 January coup d’état took a stricter stance. Although still sensible to Prussian claims, it made very clear that the Uitvoerend Bewind was determined not to consent to any indemnity for William V since this would be entirely adverse to the Revolution’s principles.135 In its instructions to Meyer the Uitvoerend Bewind was even more explicit: We think it necessary to declare that, according to our principles, according to the principles of our revolution and the Batavian nation’s publicly manifested will, we are not entitled to consent to any indemnity in kind for the House of Nassau in return for the former Stadhouder’s goods ceded to the Batavian Republic by the French Republic; [. . .] it is impossible due to our principles to give away Batavian treasures ­gathered with that much sweat and blood to a public and disloyal traitor of his fatherland for his maintenance.136

The Batavian government was still willing to consent to compensation for the former Stadhouder consisting of territorial possessions if prudency, and especially considering Prussia, would call for that, provided that those possessions would be far remote from Batavian territory. No honest Batavian republican, it was argued, could, however, ever agree to hand over his country’s treasures to that ‘perfidious traitor.’ The Uitvoerend Bewind would loose all its credit with the Batavian people leading to public unrest and instability. The Batavian government made it clear it was not being stingy—ensuring the Republic’s stable political existence was worth some financial sacrifices—; no, principles were involved: A principle is concerned here that will make or break the entire revolution, the Batavian people’s honour is concerned here, whereas a people

  25 December 1797, instructions for Buch; NA 2.01.08 no. 390.   2 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind secret minutes foreign affairs (secreet verbaal Buitenlandsche Zaaken); NA 2.01.08 no. 50 and NA 2.01.01.04 no. 458A. 136   ‘wij nog vermeenen u nu voorals dan te moeten verklaaren, dat wij volgens onze principes, volgens de principes onser revolutie en den wil der Bataafsche natie openlijk gemanifesteerd niet kunnen bestemmen eenige indemniteijt in geld aan het huis van Nassau voor de door de Fransche Republicq aan de Baatfsche Republicq gecedeerde goederen van den geweese stadhouder: [. . .] het onmogelijke, dat in onze principes geleegen is, om aan eene openbaare en trouwlooze verrader zijns vaderlandsch bataafsche schatten, die met zoo veel sweet en bloed worden opgebragt tot zijn onderhoud weg te schenken.’ 134 135



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can never appear as a free and independent people in the face of Europe at large without honour: the free Batavian can indemnify the former Stadhouder in the face of Europe no more than the French republican can indemnify the House of Bourbon.137

Although not as central to Batavian foreign policy as the territorial scheme, the free navigation of the Rhine, ultimately, was an important issue as well; the Batavian Republic being the commercial nation it was. Indeed, aspects linked to the river trade were the second point Van Grasveld was instructed to keep an eye on. With regard to this matter the Batavian government and envoy referred to Article 18 of the Treaty of The Hague that stipulated the free navigation of among others the Rhine to both the French and Batavian nations. The free navigation of the river Rhine stipulated by the Treaty of Campoformio had to be extended to the Batavian Republic in the Treaty with the Empire.138 Nevertheless, Van Grasveld was no more succesfull on this point than he was on any other one. The draft treaties did not contain provisions granting the Batavian Republic the right of free navigation and Roberjot made clear to Van Grasveld that this was because of deliberate French policy. Apparently, the Directoire had instructed its envoys in Rastatt from the start not to claim such a right for the Batavians to prevent any counterclaims on free navigation of the lower Rhine through Batavian territory. Article 18 of the Alliance Treaty was to be abided by through a clause in the Treaty that every member of the Empire was free to ‘enter into obligations, exchanges of territory, or any other agreements they might find benefitial to their interests without special consent of the Empire’139 thus clearing the way for the Batavian Republic to conclude seperate conventions with the riparian states. Van Grasveld protested to no avail that domestic tolls could and should not be confused with outgoing maritime duties and that only 137   ‘het gelt hier een principe, waarmede de gansche revolutie staan of vallen moet, het geld hier de eer van het Bataafschen volk, terwijl een volk zonder eer nimmer als een vrij, en een independent volk voor het oog van gansch Europa kan verschijnen: even zoo min als de Fransche republicain het huis van Bourbon kan schadeloos stellen, even kan den vrijen Bataaf voor het oog van Europa den geweese stadhouder indemniseeren.’; 3 February 1798, Uitvoerend Bewind to Meyer; NA 2.01.08 no. 104. 138   18 February 1801, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 123 and NA 2.01.01.04 no. 485; Hüffer, 1879, p. 193. 139   ‘zonder bizonder consent van het Rijk, zodanige verbintenissen, verwisselingen van territoir, of andere overeenkomsten aan te gaan als zij voor hunne belangen dienstig zullen oordeelen.’

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the abolition of the latter would be highly damaging to the Batavian Republic.140 He had little confidence in Prussia agreeing to a separate convention and expressed his incapacity to comprehend why one would prefer separate arrangements if it was in one’s power to gain general consent with one stroke of a pen. Despite these protests the French envoys held to the prudency of the aforementioned French policy vis-à-vis the free navigation of the Rhine for Batavian citizens and hided behind the lack on instructions on this matter.141 Van Grasveld did still try to change their mind. By the end of October, he asked Roberjot to take into consideration Prussian demands with respect to the Pannerden Channel—a waterway just after the Rhine entered Batavian territory where the main stream was not navigable. Vous serez convaincu, citoyen ministre, de la haute importance que la République batave doit attacher à la libre navigation du Rhin, et cela m’engage à vous soumettre de nouveau, s’il ne seroit pas entièrement conforme à l’article 18 du traité de la Haye, qui dit formellement, que la nation française et batave jouiront également de la libre navigation du Rhin, de la Meuse et de l’Escaut, que la légation française repondit dans ce sens. La République françoise consent à ce que la République batave jouisse de la libre navigation du Rhin, pour autant qu’elle voudra renoncer également à la perception des mêmes droits établis sur le cours de cette rivière dans l’interieur de cette république.

As it was highly unlikely that Berlin would give up these rights in a separate convention, it was essential to have the Prussian government consent to this arrangement in Rastatt.142 His request had no effect whatsoever and with Van Grasveld having left Rastatt Schimmelpenninck in Paris was left with the task of repeating the same mantra that free navigation of the Rhine was of huge commercial importance to his country, France could not deny to her ally what she had gained for herself, the Batavian Republic was entitled to free navigation according to Article 18 of the Treaty of The Hague, the loss of tolls on the Batavian part of the Rhine would be fully compensated by the increase in trade, and that thus the Batavian Republic had to be included in

  5 October 1798, Van Grasveld to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 361.   22 October 1798, Van Grasveld to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 361. 142   22 October 1798, Van Grasveld to Roberjot (copy enclosed with a letter from Van Grasveld to Van der Goes); NA 2.01.08 no. 361. 140 141



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the treaty with the Empire.143 Note that the Batavians derived a right to navigate the Rhine from an inclusion in the anticipated FrenchGerman Treaty. Conclusion After an almost infinite sequence of bilateral peace negotiations between France on the one hand and virtually all European powers on the other, a congress was to assemble again. Many expected Rastatt to be the new ‘Westphalia’ or the new ‘Utrecht.’ Since France desired the Rhineland and Austria had promised to tender its good offices to have the Empire cede the best part of the Rhineland to France, the anticipated ‘Peace of Rastatt’ did indeed call for a fundamental reorganisation of the Empire. Although primarily concerned with territory, compensation for German princes was to be attained by secularising the Empire, which would have considerable constitutional and political effects. By consequence, the ‘Peace of Rastatt’ would be more than a mere restoration of peace and would equal former occassions of re-establishing a stable order in Europe. The Rastatt congress was provided for in Article 20 of the Treaty of Campoformio. Hence, the Batavian government was informed of negotiations with the Empire at the time the Treaty of Campoformio was communicated. France and Austria had already determined the character of the congress. The Rastatt congress had to be confined to France and the Empire. All other powers were excluded from partaking in negotiations. Hence, the Batavian Republic was denied direct participation, too. Clearly, legislative equality was not respected. Admittedly, the Batavian Republic was not at war with the Empire and did thus not need to conclude peace. The Hague had awaited this congress, though, to step in in order to realise substantial ends of Batavian foreign and security policies. Batavian interests were indeed affected by negotiations with the Empire. Hence, according to eighteenth-century practice the Batavian Republic should have been allowed participation in the congress. Once more, the French policy of avoiding a general congress prevailed.

  25 November 1798, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 657.

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The Batavian government recognised that demanding admittance of Batavian representatives would be of no avail. It did send a secret agent to Rastatt, who was later on replaced by an official envoy. They had to keep the Batavian government informed of what was going on in Rastatt and had to confer with the French delegation. Buch was explicitly instructed not to seek contact with other delegations. To the French delegation’s dismay, he did not observe this part of his instructions. Conversely, Van Grasveld was meant either to partake in the congress or to negotiate with the imperial Deputation separately under auspice of the French delegation. The French envoys objected to Van Grasveld taking an active part in negotiations, though, and the Batavian envoy accepted French mediation. The Batavian Republic thus resigned to a secondary and informal role at the Rastatt congress. Although it was not the official line of the French government, Jean de Bry’s proposition regarding the role of minor powers within great power negotiations probably indicates subdued sentiments of many Frenchmen. The Batavian government was not mistaken in its wish to stay informed of what was going on in Rastatt. Several issues central to negotiations between France and the Empire or between France and the two German great powers did concern the Batavian Republic. Indemnifying the Oranges within Germany was a major point to Prussia. Paris and The Hague, too, wished to see the matter dealt with. Compensation for the former Stadhouder and his family was entirely linked to the general scheme of compensation and secularisation within the Empire and to considerations regarding the Prussian-Austrian balance in Germany. In general, no contribution to indemnifying William V was expected from the Batavian Republic, but recognition of the abolition of the Stadholderate by Prussia and the House of Orange by accepting compensation was, of course, of high political significance to the Patriot regime in The Hague. Furthermore, the Batavian government desired to see the free navigation of the Rhine extended to the Batavian Republic. In the course of negotiations, Van Grasveld contended that being included in the peace treaty would be the best attainable option. This would imply that the Batavian Republic would have derived substantive rights from inclusion. Finally, the Batavian Republic was or wished to be affected by the territorial reorganisation of the Empire. Cession of the entire Rhineland to France would have rendered the French Republic in possession of the Prussian enclaves the Batavian Republic wished to attain. Both



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Austria as a matter of political expediency and Prussia—considering the Waal as the branch of the river Rhine forming the border—initially wished to exclude Prussian enclaves, though. Paris had promised The Hague to take the issue of the Prussian enclaves in hand. Thereto, the Batavian government had additional territorial desires to be fulfilled in Rastatt. Schemes of Batavian aggrandisement had been drawn and presented to the French government before, but this was the time to realise them. In the first place, Batavians referred to Article 16 of the 1795 Hague Treaty that promised the Batavian Republic compensation for territories ceded to France to be attained at the general peace. Respect for the sanctity of treaties was invoked to get France attaining territory for the Batavian Republic. Basically, the French ignored this reference. Initially, the French government asserted that the French delegation was to attain compensation for the Batavian Republic, but once a compromise with Prussia and Austria on compensation turned out to be difficult to reach compensation for the Batavian Republic was lost out of sight. Article 16 of the Hague Treaty was to be observed by initiating separate negotiations after the Rastatt congress. In other words, the Batavian Republic would get its territorial compensation when hell would freeze over since no substantial tranfer of territory was to be expected in peacetime. One might question whether the French Republic was actually obliged to live up to the promise made in Article 16, since war with Britain continued and the Rastatt congress was, hence, not considering a general peace. On the other hand, the Rastatt congress did aim to conclude peace with the Empire to which the territories desired by the Batavian Republic belonged. Batavian territorial demands along the eastern border exceeded mere compensation for territories ceded to France. The necessity of aggrandisement in the east was substantiated by economical and military arguments and presented as ‘réunion’ or attaining the Batavian Republic’s natural borders. The French ignoring Article 16 of the Alliance Treaty taken into consideration, it is clear that a more extensive extension did not stand a chance at all. Attempts to realise Batavian schemes for territorial aggrandisement at the congress failed. The Batavians needed the French government to submit these schemes to the congress and Paris never did. Direct diplomatic attempts to have Paris endorse Batavian territorial schemes failed. These attempts did show that the Batavian government was aware of its de facto dependence of French support to attain its policy aims in a situation that the Batavian Republic was excluded from the formal forum where it might have

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furthered its interests and plans directly. France needed Prussia too much to neutralise Austria in Germany to claim territory for the Batavian Republic that either belonged to the King of Prussia or was part of the Prussian sphere of influence. Throughout the entire period of the Revolutionary Wars (after April 1795 that is), the French government made an utmost effort to keep at good terms with Berlin. During the Rastatt congress, Paris needed Prussian support even more. Prussian influence on the imperial Deputation was deemed vital to attaining the cession of the Rhineland. Conversely, because of the 1787 invasion and geographical positions, the Batavian Republic feared Prussia most and contemplated gaining Austrian support for Batavian aggrandisement since this would reduce Prussian power and influence. Clearly, the two allied Republics still reasoned in terms of traditional alliance structures from the period of the ‘Old System’ that made either of them trust another German great power most. The entire period of the Rastatt congress clearly shows Batavian fear to offend the French government. Diplomatic actions to attain Batavian policy ends were to be conducted with great care and circumspection. At the same time, the influence of Batavian domestic politics on the way the Batavian position vis-à-vis the French Republic was conceived is remarkable. The coups d’état led to changes in Batavian territorial schemes and the arguments used to justify them. Whereas moderate factions stressed the military significance of a new eastern border in order to enable the Batavian Republic to defend itself, radical factions stressed the French alliance as core of Batavian security policy and advocated aggrandisement because of economical reasons. The Rastatt conference did not result in a treaty. By consequence, no remarks can be made on the way the Batavian Republic appeared in the peace treaty or was affected by it. Van Grasveld had set out for an inclusion. Since the Batavian Republic had been included in most peace treaties concluded thus far, that might have been the likely outcome. It would, in fact, have been the outcome the Batavians themselves had advocated.

chapter five

The Consul’s peace 5.1  The Interpax of the Second Coalition The Peace of Campoformio was not to last long. War on the Continent broke out as early as December 1798, with negotiations at Rastatt still going on. The French expedition to Egypt alarmed Russia, traditionally very sensitive about control of the eastern part of the Mediterranean for economical reasons. Moreover, on his way to Egypt, Bonaparte had attacked and occupied Malta, whereas Tsar Paul had just become Grandmaster of the Order of the Knights of Saint John. Since the Tsar was already annoyed by France because of French interference in the German Empire, especially while Russia had been excluded from the Rastatt congress and whilst the Tsar had family ties with various German princes whose interests were involved, this was sufficient reason to go to war.1 Austria, somewhat recovered from the previous war, was angered by French interventions in Switzerland and Italy. On 11 February 1798, French forces had occupied Rome after riots had broken out and the French General Duphot was assassinated.2 En passant, they destroyed Papal government and created the Roman Republic.3 Since the Rastatt congress had not resulted in a peace treaty, the Empire was still at war with France; as was Britain. The Sublime Porte—nominally sovereign in Egypt—was the first to declare war on France,4 which on its part declared war to Naples and Sardinia on 6 December. Austria declared war on 12 March 1799. Soon afterwards, Russia joined the Second Coalition. The sister republics, although officially not at war with any Continental power, were in the middle of the imbroglio Europe had become. They were to take the first blow of the Coalition’s attack on France, thus perfectly fulfilling their task of

 Hüffer, 1879, p. 25; Blanning, 1996, p. 228; Kagan, 2006, pp. 13–15.   28 December 1797; General Duphot was affiliated to the French legation. 3   21 April 1798. 4   9 September 1798. 1 2

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­ uffer attributed to them in French security policy. All sister republics b saw their territory invaded and until the final phase of the War of the Second Coalition—General Moreau’s campaign in southern Germany—the war was fought on their soils. Officially, the sister republics stayed out of the renewed war with Austria. War between them and the Emperor was not declared. They did, however, partake in the war as French auxiliaries, that is to say they provided troops that fought under the supreme command of French generals. Thereto, the Batavian Republic was, of course, still at war with Britain. The King of the Two Sicilies kicked of hostilities by having his army attack French forces occupying Rome.5 His troops were, however, no match for the French army and defeat was imminent, the Sicilian attack having started too early to be backed by an AustroRussian advance in the north of Italy. The French occupied Naples on 23 January 1799 and three days later the Neapolitan or Parthenopean Republic was proclaimed. In February 1799, Piedmont was annexed to the French Republic. The Austro-Russian advance also came too late for Belgian rebels, who had risen against France. With its foes’ armies still marching westward, the French government was able to deploy enough troops in the Belgian departments to crush the revolt. Once on the move, combined Austrian and Russian forces initially made a considerable advance. They drove the French almost entirely out of Italy—causing the end of the Cisalpine, Roman, and Parthenopean Republics—and well into Switzerland, where Zurich was conquered in early June.6 Russian forces occupied Milan on 29 April and the Cisalpine government went into exile.7 In the Battle of Novi (15 August 1799) combined French, Cisalpine, and Ligurian forces were defeated by a Austro-Russian army under the command of Field Marshal Alexander Suvorov leading to the end of any serious resistance to Coalition forces in Italy. The Batavian Republic was not spared hos-

  18 december 1798 France declares war on Kings of Piedmont and Naples.  First battle of Zurich (4 June 1799). 7  After some time, the Cisalpine government settled in Grenoble, where it stayed until the reconquest of Lombardy by the French in the summer of 1800. The government in exile was dissolved as Bonaparte—using his authority as commander of the occupying forces—established a new, provisional government in Milan under the supervision of a French commissioner—Claude-Louis Petiet—who functioned as the French envoy to the (Second) Cisalpine Republic as well (17 June 1800, decree Premier Consul; AAE CP Milanais 57 and AAE CP Milanais Supplément 5; 23 June 1800, decree Premier Consul; AAE CP Milanais 57). 5 6



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tilities either. In August 1799, British and Russian forces landed in Holland at which occasion the better part of the Batavian navy was captured.8 Franco-Batavian forces did not respond sufficiently swift to prevent the invading forces to form bridgeheads. French and Batavian troops under the command of General Brune had been able to prevent the Anglo-Russian invasion force from advancing towards Amsterdam. British and Russian forces were pinned down in the Holland swamps failing to break through during the Battles of Bergen (19 September 1799) and Castricum (6 October 1799). After some weeks, the Duke of York capitulated and Holland was evacuated again (18 October 1799). The tide had turned by the time Bonaparte returned from Egypt.9 General Masséna had halted the Austro-Russian advance at Zurich (25–27 September 1799) and had secured Switzerland. The AngloRussian invasion in the north had failed. The Counter-revolutionary allies still held Italy with the exception of Genoa, where a French army was besieged. Because of disagreement on strategy and war aims between Russia and Austria, they failed to blow a decisive stroke to the French.10 Military success did, however, come too late to save the Directoire. The brumaire coup d’état (9–10 November 1799) brought Napoleon to power as first of three Consuls. One of the first things the new ruler of France did was to offer peace to the Emperor and the King of Britain.11 George III refused, as did Francis II. Whether Bonaparte’s offer was sincere can be questioned, but he did sense the vox populi right. ‘Le cri unanime est la paix,’ to use Thierry Lentz’ words,12 and the victorious general of 1796–1797 and negotiator of the Treaty of Campoformio was publicly applauded as the great pacifier, the bringer of peace. However, Bonaparte knew he needed military victory to stabilise his rule and to re-erect his earlier creations in Italy.13 The peace offer’s main goal probably was to satisfy public opinion on the short term and as a means by which the

 Schama, 1989, pp. 461–462.   Bonaparte landed near Fréjus on 9 October 1799 and arrived in Paris seven days later. 10   Blanning, 1996, p. 249; Kagan, 2006, p. 12 and p. 15. 11   25 December 1799, Bonaparte to the Emperor; AAE CP Autriche 370. 12  Lentz, 2005b, p. 458. 13  Schroeder, 1994, p. 208.  8  9

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blame for a possible cataclysmic outcome of the next campaign could be waved.14 By the turn of the century, Europe was not ripe for peace yet. None of the belligerents had won a decisive victory on the battlefield or was forced by the international or its domestic situation to be compromising. Nor was there sufficient ground for a European order accepted by all major powers.15 Bonaparte’s address to the Emperor did, however, pave the way for peace negotiations as it initiated an ongoing correspondence between Thugut and Talleyrand in which both parties at least paid lip service to pacifism and their benign intentions.16 In response to Bonaparte’s overtures, Thugut emphasised the Emperor’s desire to establish a stable peace. However, at the same time, he expressed doubts on whether peace with the French Republic was possible. He blamed the Directoire’s ‘fausse politique’ for the war. For peace to be feasible the new French government first had to show through signs of its moderation and fairness that the causes for war had disappeared and France would honour the law of nations in the future. In the Austrian view, a stable government in France that would take and accept its proper place within the European order again was an essential precondition for peace. eut-il [Bonaparte; RK] la volonté la plus ferme de les réparer en ramenant les esprits aux principes universels du droit des gens qui forment le lieu des nations et qui leur prescrivent de respecter mutuellement leur repos et leur indépendance, auroit-il la puissance nécessaire pour lenter avec succès cette heureuse et dernière révolution [the brumaire coup d’état; RK]?17

For the time being, Vienna wanted to wait and see which way the cat would jump;18 its attitude being yet another sign of the lack of trust within the European states system that in its turn undermined that very system by working as a self-fulfilling prophecy. It does not come as a surprise that the French government did not concur with the Emperor’s doubts. Talleyrand stated that Bonaparte 14  Rosenthal, 1905, pp. 14–15; Deutsch, 1938, pp. 6–7; Whitcomb, 1979, p. 109; Ross, 1981, p. 216; Dufraisse and Kerautret, 1999, p. 18; Black, 2002, p. 224; Englund, 2004, p. 173. 15   Boudon, 2005, p. 83. 16   The letters exchanged between the French and Austrian Foreign Ministers can be found in: AAE CP Autriche 370. 17   25 January 1800, Thugut to Talleyrand; AAE CP Autriche 370. 18   Du Casse, 1855, p. 8.



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had always regarded the Treaty of Campoformio to be proper to conciliate the interests of the two powers. Now that he was in charge of the French government, he was equally determined to work on an honourable peace ‘qui ne compromettre pas l’equilibre de l’Europe’ as he had been in 1797. Hence, the French minister proposed to take the Treaty of Campoformio as basis for negotiations. The best way to obtain a prompt peace was to confirm the 1797 Treaty and determine the necessary modifications in an additional treaty. In addition, he offered to allow the Emperor compensation in Italy and suggested to établi pour les petits états de l’Europe un systême de garanties, propre à rétablir dans toute sa force ce droit des gens sur lequel reposent essentiellement la sureté et le bonheur des nations.19

Talleyrand’s suggestions provoked a debate on the character of the peace that would occupy French and Austrian negotiators almost to the very end of negotiations. For, Thugut explicitly refused to conclude a separate peace and rejected Campoformio as basis for the peace talks.20 In response to the Austrian minister’s claim that Campoformio had proven not to be suitable to serve as a solid peace and a separate peace eo ipso could not be stable as fighting would go on elsewhere.21 Talleyrand argued that nothing had changed in Europe since the Udine negotiations leading to Campoformio—thus, ignoring that Austria was in control of Italy at the time—and referred expressly to the custom établi depuis le traité de Westpalie parmi les nations européennes chez qui le traité qui termine une guerre se trouve le plus ordinairement basé sur celui qui, entre les mêmes Etats a terminé la guerre précédente.22

Only after the Premier Consul had marched an army into Italy and won a close but decisive victory at Marengo (14 June 1800) did peace talks between France and Austria become serious. Nevertheless, the sister republics came to reckon with the possibility of peace soon. Even before Bonaparte had addressed the Emperor and George III, had the

19   1 March 1800, Talleyrand to Thugut; AAE CP Autriche 370; Du Casse, 1855, p. 6 (DuCasse dated the letter on 28 February). 20   24 March 1800, Thugut to Talleyrand; AAE CP Autriche 370; Du Casse, 1855, p. 10. 21   24 March 1800, Thugut to Talleyrand; AAE CP Autriche 370; 2 May 1800, Talleyrand to Thugut; DuCasse, 1855, pp. 15–16. 22   9 April 1800, Talleyrand to Thugut; AAE CP Autriche 370.

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Helvetic envoy in Paris, Amedée Jenner, written to his government that the French government intended to make peace and was even willing to cede Milan and Venice to Austria to do so.23 The Batavian government was more sceptical. Van der Goes foresaw that serious military operations were needed to bring the Coalition to peace and still doubted whether France was up to that challenge. As always, The Hague focused on Britain and insisted on the Revolutionary allies to come to concerted economic sanctions—in particular, a stop of any grain exports to the British Isles—forcing London to negotiate. Nonetheless, the Batavian foreign minister did express the desire that the French Republic would keep her allies better informed of negotiations.24 Despite the previous Rastatt experience, a general congress was still seen as the best way to achieve to a stable peace. The Batavian government showed its conviction that a new consensus programme was necessary in an extensive report on the state of the Republic that was presented to the Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam on 30 December 1800.25 The Uitvoerend Bewind stressed the Batavian Republic’s need for peace in order to restore her affluence and ensure her internal tranquillity. The Batavian government did, however, think peace very hard to obtain. The spread of Revolutionary principles was not deemed to be the greatest obstacle.26 Instead, it saw major difficulties in re-establishing a European order that was acceptable to all great powers. According to the Uitvoerend Bewind, the war was not on whether France or Austria would ‘rule the world.’ To reconvene all great powers Europe was in need of ‘a new system of equilibrium and a new code of public law.’27 The Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück had functioned as ‘the foundation on which all unions between Continental powers have been concluded’28 and had been ‘the codex of public law in which   22 December 1799, Jenner to Begos; SBA Hauptabteilung B 3339.   7 January 1800, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 25   16 December 1800, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 533. 26   ‘De wezentlijke of gewaande vrees voor de uitbreiding van te lang miskende en te dikwils misbruikte politique denkbeelden is niet de grootste hinderpaal.’ 27   ‘De twist is niet alleen tusschen Frankrijk en Oostenrijk, wie of de wereld regeren zal. De overige groote mogendheden moeten ook tevreden zijn en om die reden moet de vreede die zoo veel mogelijk aan Europa de rust zal wedergeven elke vordering op een nieuw stelzel van evenwigt toepassen en een nieuw wetboek van het publiek regt daar stellen.’ 28   ‘de grondslag [. . .] waarop alle de verbonden tusschen de mogendheden van het vasteland gesloten zijn’ 23 24



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every state, every power finds expressed if not the security of its rights at least the way in which it possesses them.’29 The Peace of Westphalia had become obsolete, though, since the 1648 peace settlement was no longer applicable to the (political) situation in Europe. According to the Batavian government, that would even have been the case without the occurrence of the French Revolution. The main reason why the European order had changed was the rise of Russia to first rank power status. That fact alone called for a new foundation of the European states system. That is not to say that the French Revolution was asserted to be irrelevant. The Revolution had caused some serious changes in the map of Europe. Moreover, in the wake of the Revolution a stable order in Europe had been entirely undermined because the Counterrevolutionary Coalition had not accepted the new order in France and by consequence, had tried to destroy the new French government and had broken off all ‘previous bonds between France and other states.’ However, the Revolution had just accelerated the effects of changed geopolitical circumstances on the European states system and legal order. These changed circumstances in combination with the changes in the map of Europe caused by the Revolutionary Wars called for ‘new principles by which future conflicts can be settled,’ for ‘a new foundation for peace,’ for ‘a universal constitution,’ and for ‘new charters and titles for those who had lost their old ones in the fire they themselves had ignited.’ What those new principles had to be does not become clear from this text. The latter quote seems to point to an agreement basically on territorial divisions and possessions. Reading between the lines, the Uitvoerend Bewind seems to have had in mind, though, that stability could only be established by a new political and legal system in which every power had an attributed and set place and role to play in conformity with his ‘power and greatness.’ That system would work as a framework for the European powers to settle their bilateral relations in treaties with each other. After the initial feats of arms of the new war, the desire for peace soon became general. The War of the Second Coalition did indeed appear to be a short period of open hostility between two peace

29   ‘het wetboek van het publiek regt waar in ieder staat, elke mogendheid zo niet de zekerheid haren regten ten minsten de wijze waarop zij die bezaten vonden ­uitgedrukt.’

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s­ ettlements. Austria was forced to the negotiating table by military means and made its peace with France in Lunéville—a small French town near Strasbourg—in February 1801. The last man standing— Britain, entirely isolated among great powers after the Peace of Lunéville—made peace with France and her maritime allies in Amiens. The formation and substance of the Treaty of Lunéville is addressed in this chapter, whereas the Treaty of Amiens will be discussed in the subsequent one. As negotiations with Vienna and London continued, France also made peace with the other great power involved—Russia—and with various minor powers. The almost general practice of the sister republics’ inclusion in the peace treaties of 1795–1797 is not to be found in the ones from this period. Neither the Treaty of Mortefontaine (30 September 1800) between France and the United States,30 the FrenchBavarian Treaty of 24 August 1801,31 nor the Treaty between France and Württemberg of 20 May 1802 or the Preliminaries of Peace with the Sublime Porte32 contained any references to the sister republics. The Elector Palatine did confirm the cession of rights to any dominions on the left bank of the Rhine as stipulated by the Emperor in Article 6 of the Treaty of Lunéville.33 This concerned some estates in Batavian territory, too. The final peace treaty between France and the Porte34 did not contain such a provision either, but the Porte did accept all ‘relevant’ Articles in the Treaty of Amiens.35 The FrenchPortuguese Treaty of 6 June 1801 signed at Badajoz did not include the Batavian Republic either.36 Because this one was annulled, a new treaty was concluded on 29 September 1801 stipulating that the Portuguese ports were open to both merchantmen and men-of-war from the French Republic and her allies, thus making the Treaty relevant for

  30 September 1800, Treaty of Mortefortaine; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 143–158.   24 August 1801, Traité de paix avec la Bavière ; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 195–200. 32   9 October 1801, Préliminaires de paix avec la Porte Ottomane; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 219–221. 33  Article 2 Traité de paix avec la Bavière. 34   25 June 1802, Traité de paix avec la Porte Ottomane; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 252– 255. 35   The Sublime Porte accepted the Treaty of Amiens as far as it was relevant. Article 4 Traité de paix avec la Porte Ottomane: ‘Tous les articles de ce Traité qui sont relatifs à la Sublime Porte, sont formellement renouvelés dans le present Traité.’ 36   6 June 1801, Traité de paix franco-portugais de Badajoz; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 184–188. 30 31



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the Batavian Republic too.37 Only the French-Sicilian Treaty of Florence38 and the French-Russian Treaty of Paris39 included respectively the Batavian, Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics and solely the Batavian Republic.40 The Treaty of Florence declared ports in the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily open to France and its allies.41 This was done expressis verbis. Hence, inclusion would probably not have suffied for the Batavien Republic to automatically derive access to these ports from the Treaty. Neither the Treaty of Florence nor the Franco-Russian Treaty of Paris contained any provisions that would have called for inclusion from a substantive point of view. 5.2  Peace Between Whom? Once again, France had succeeded in breaking a Europe-wide coalition. Austria had to witness its allies defect one after the other. Nevertheless, since it was still in control of northern Italy, Vienna had little reason to compromise. The French victory at Marengo (14 June 1800) that drove the Austrians out of Italy west of the river Mincio forced the Austrian government to take negotiations more seriously. After the battle, the Premier Consul issued peace offers to the Emperor.42 Bonaparte suggested once more to take Campoformio as the basis for renewed peace, with some adjustments and ‘un système de garantie pour les petites puissances’ to be negotiated somewhere in north-eastern Italy. The Emperor accepted the offer for a general armistice, but rejected the peace offer it being a mere adjustment of the Campoformio settlement.43 The imperial ratification of the armistice was taken to Paris by the Count de Saint-Julien, who was to convince the French 37   29 September 1801, Treaty of Peace between France and Portugal (Article 2); CTS vol. 56, pp. 205–209. 38   28 March 1801, Traité de paix de Florence entre la France et Naples; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 179–183. 39   8 October 1801, Traité de paix de Paris avec la Russie; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 212– 214. 40  Article 9 Franco-Sicilian Treaty: ‘Le present Traité est déclaré commun aux Républiques Batave, Cisalpine et Ligurienne.’ Article 6 Franco-Russian Treaty: ‘Le present Traité est declare commun à la République Batave.’ 41  Article 3 Franco-Sicilian Treaty. 42   16 June 1800, Premier Consul to the Emperor; AAE CP Autriche 370; Fugier, 1954, p. 124. 43   5 July 1800, Emperor to Premier Consul; AAE CP Autriche 370; Du Casse, 1855, p. 10.

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government that it was essential not to enter into public and separate negotiations.44 Although forced to cease hostilities by the military situation, the Austrian government was thus still not apt to conclude peace. Vienna was adamant to force through territorial compensation in Italy before it defected the alliance with Britain well aware that Austria needed strategic aggrandisement to hold on to great power status.45 However, Talleyrand lured St. Julien into concluding a preliminary peace treaty.46 The Preliminaries took the Treaty of Campoformio as point of departure for the new peace settlement, as well as the concessions made in Rastatt with regard to the left bank of the Rhine. Strikingly, indemnity for the Emperor was transferred from Germany to Italy. The Preliminaries had to be ratified by Vienna before 15 August, after which negotiations for the definitive peace would immediately commence. Apparently, Bonaparte did not contemplate wasting any time for the Austrians to recover from their defeat. Thugut, at the time still negotiating with Britain on a new treaty of subsidy, was not to yield that easy, though. St. Julien was received frigidly in Vienna. Duroc, who travelled with St. Julien to carry the French ratification of the Preliminaries to Vienna and bring the Austrian ratification back with him, was not even allowed to enter Austrian territory. The Austrian government resolutely refused to ratify the Preliminaries claiming, not entirely baseless, that St. Julien had not been authorised to conclude them.47 At the same time, Thugut informed Talleyrand that the British envoy in Vienna, Lord Minto, had requested that his government take part in peace negotiations. Minto was assured that Vienna would not negotiate with Paris separately.48 The Austrians still hoped and intended to treat with France in concert with their British allies and they would stick to that intention until a new military defeat forced them to conclude a separate peace. For the time being, the belligerents could, however, not even agree on the character of the peace, the

  Du Casse, 1855, p. 24 and p. 36.  Fugier, 1954, p. 127; Schroeder, 1994, p. 209. 46   22 July–28 July 1800, verbatim Talleyrand-St. Julien conferences Paris; AAE CP Autriche 370; 28 July 1800, Articles préliminaires du traité de paix; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 429–431; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 139–142; CTS vol. 55, pp. 261–264. 47   not dated (early August 1801, according to Du Casse 11 August), Thugut to Talleyrand; AAE CP Autriche 370; Du Casse, 1855, p. 31 Schroeder, 1994, p. 210. 48  Hermann, 1912, pp. 508–509. 44 45



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French government, as previously, wanting to treat with each great power enemy separately. St. Julien’s mission to Paris set off French-Austrian negotiations on a false start. Paris was rather annoyed by the Austrian refusal to ratify the Preliminaries. Bonaparte and Talleyrand must have been quite certain that the Preliminaries would hold, for they had not even awaited Vienna’s response before communicating the Preliminaries to France’s allies.49 Immediately after news of the Austrian refusal had reached Paris, the armistice was revoked. Nevertheless, peace talks were not ruptured, that is to say Talleyrand and Thugut kept corresponding on assembling a peace congress. Soon, the armistice was prolonged again, but not after Vienna had promised to insist with the British government on the conclusion of a maritime armistice and, most importantly, French troops were allowed to occupy the German fortresses of Ulm, Ingalstad, and Philipsburg.50 Although the French government refused to allow a British representative taking part in the negotiations, Thugut did agree to French and Austrian delegations to assemble in Lunéville.51 In Vienna, Thugut was outmanoeuvred by the peace party led by Archduke Charles.52 Put out over the armistice conditions, Thugut resigned on 25 September. He stayed at court, though, and soon regained his influence on foreign policy behind the scenes.53 Thugut was replaced by Louis Cobenzl. The Austrian government was divided about the conditions of peace. The Emperor wished to save his hereditary lands and the army as the main support of his rule. Thugut set out to preserve Austria’s great power status by attaining territorial compensations in Italy. Cobenzl planned to sell a separate peace to France for the best price (in terms of territory in Italy) Austria could get.54 Stuck in the middle of Europe, Austria had no choice but to   5 August 1800, Van der Goes to Abbema, Buys, Bangeman Huygens, Van Dedem, Strick van Linschooten, Van Raet, Valckenaer, Silleman, and Lucius; NA 2.01.08 no. 107. 50  See 24 September 1800, Talleyrand to Reinhard; Dunant 1901, p. 377; and 27 September 1800, Van der Goes to Abbema, Buys, and Bangeman Huygens; NA 2.01.08 no. 107 [Van der Goes paraphrased a speech held in public by the French Minister for the Interior on the occasion of the anniverary of the proclamation of the French Republic]. 51   24 August 1800, Talleyrand to Thugut; AAE CP Autriche 370. 52  Schroeder, 1994, p. 212; Broers, 1996, p. 28; Kagan, 2006, p. 16. 53  Ross, 1981, p. 226; Schroeder, 1994, pp. 210–211. 54  Schroeder, 1994, p. 212. 49

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participate in the great powers’ ‘eat-or-be-eaten’-logic. In 1801, the pentarchy was essentially still in place. Austria still had to cope with Prussian and Russian rivalry, too. Hence, both from a geopolitical and from a diplomatic point of view Austria had to secure the best possible position it could in negotiations with France. Cobenzl, who had also been present during the final part of the Udine negotiations, was sent to France.55 It took some time for negotiations to actually start. First, the Austrian envoy went to Paris.56 Only by early November did the delegations depart for Lunéville.57 Although the French envoy, Joseph Bonaparte, went to Lunéville with full powers and instructions58 to conclude a separate peace with Austria and the Empire—expressly stating that Britain was not to be involved—,59 even that did not mean that negotiations would start officially soon. According to the Batavian Agent der Buitenlandsche betrekkingen, Maarten van der Goes, Cobenzl only had travelled to Lunéville to await new orders from Vienna.60 In Cobenzl’s absence from Vienna, Thugut’s sympathisers had managed to regain control of the Reichshofrat. Hence, the Austrian government stiffened its stand with respect to Italy and resumed preparations for war.61 Cobenzl’s instructions indeed abound with excessive demands to strengthen Austria’s position in Italy and Germany.62 While stating to the French government that a separate peace would depend on what France had to offer, the Austrian government seems to have kept negotiations going to play for time necessary for war preparations.63 The main controversy and thus obstacle to negotiations becoming sincere was still the question whether Britain would be admitted to the conferences. The French Republic persisted in conducting her policy of separate peace treaties. In particular, the French government feared

 Schroeder, 1994, pp. 210–211.  Hermann, 1912, pp. 516–517. 57  Hermann, 1912, p. 523 and p. 532. 58   23 October 1800, powers Joseph; AAE MD France 1811 [also to be found in Du Casse, 1855, p. 432. Du Casse dates the powers on 25 October]. 25 October 1800, instructions for Joseph; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 45–48. 59   ‘Article 1 [. . .] Si dans les pouvoirs de M. de Cobenzl il est exprimé qu’il ne doit traiter que de concert avec les alliés de l’Autriche, le plénipoteniaire français observera qu’il n’a des pouvoirs que pour traiter avec la maison d’Autriche.’ 60   13 November 1800, Van der Goes to Valckenaer; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 61  Ross, 1981, p. 226. 62  Hermann, 1912, pp. 511–513. 63  Hermann, 1912, p. 515; Deutsch, 1938, p. 9; Ross, 1981, p. 225. 55 56



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that British involvement would prolong the peace talks and would set a precedent for other powers, especially Russia,64 to claim admittance as well. Moreover, it was anticipated that Britain would demand the evacuation of the Belgian departments, whereas Austria was willing to confirm their cession. On the other side, Austria was adamant not to defect from its alliance with Britain.65 That was even more the case than during the Udine negotiations since then Britain was at least already negotiating in Lille, whereas now the British had indicated the desire to take part in the Lunéville peace talks.66 The last thing Thugut wanted to do in the present political and military situation was to alienate Britain. Without British support and subsidies, Austria would not only be totally isolated, but would not even be able to finance the war effort. Moreover, Austria was committed not to negotiate without Britain at least until the end of February 1801 due to treaty obligations. Thus Cobenzl’s powers took the presence of British representatives for granted.67 The entire month of November as well as the first part of December correspondence between Joseph and Cobenzl on whether a separate peace without Britain would be concluded or not continued with Austria holding on to the refusal to negotiate without its ally.68 The only concession the French Republic was willing to make was to start negotiating with Britain on a maritime armistice.69 George III’s speech at the opening of Parliament in which the British monarch claimed that there was ‘un concert parfait entre l’Angleterre et

  22 November 1800, Joseph to Cobenzl; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 117–129.  Hermann, 1912, pp. 508–509. 66   29 August 1800, memorandum Grenville; AAE MD Angleterre 105bis. 67   ‘Nos, qui salutari a deo seopo assequendo unice intenti cum summo rerum et commodorum Nostrorum dispendio in irritum ad hunc usque diem ad laboravimus, nullam interponere moram volumus idoneam Lunevillam ablegandi extraordinarium nostrum plenipotentiarium, qui cum praelandatae Reipublicae Ministro vel Ministris plena agendi facultate instructis, in consortio praesentis ibidem Serenissimi Magnae Brittanica Regis Ministri [my underlinement; RK] vel Ministrorum desuper consilia conferat, disquirat, agat et concludat’; 13 October 1800, powers Cobenzl; AAE CP Autriche 370; With thanks to Tessa Leesen for her help in reading the Latin text of Cobenzl’s powers. 68  See Du Casse, 1855, from p. 96 onwards; specifically interesting letters with regard to this debate are: 9 November 1800, Cobenzl to Joseph; AAE CP Autriche 370; 18 November 1800, Joseph to Talleyrand; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 102–110; 22 November 1800, Joseph to Cobenzl; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 117–129.  69   24 September 1800, Talleyrand to Semonville; AAE CP Hollande 604; Ross, 1981, p. 226.On the maritime armistice see the subsequent chapter. 64 65

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le ­cabinet de Vienne,’70 was reason for the Premier Consul to order French commanders to join their troops. In the annual Exposé de la situation de la République he publicly reproached Austria for not defecting Britain. ‘L’Autriche cessera de sacrifier le repos et l’intérêt du continent à l’ambition des dominateurs des mers.’71 Meanwhile, the armistice was about to expire and France declared not to be willing to prolong the armistice but on the condition that negotiations for a definitive peace would begin at once.72 Austria was desperately searching for a middle course. The Austrian government realised that due to military circumstances it was forced to make peace with France, but hesitated to alienate Britain before a stable peace had been established. Henceforth, Cobenzl proposed to start negotiating in secret.73 While he waited for the French response, hostilities had already restarted. In Germany, Moreau crushed an Austrian army at Hohenlinden on 3 December and immediately marched on. French armies 70   The Kings’s speech is referred to in: 21 November 1800, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 654. 71   22 November 1800, Exposé de la situation de la République; AAE MD France 1414. 72   ‘Le premier Consul n’attendait pour conclure sur-le-champ l’armistice proposé par M. le comte de Cobenzl, que l’assurance que S. Exc. Etait autorisée à entrer en négociation directe pour la paix définitive. C’est sur le refus réitéré de M. le comte de Cobenzl, que l’ordre a été donné de recommencer les hostilités à l’expiration de l’armistice.’; 20 November 1800, Joseph to Talleyrand; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 110–112. 73   ‘[Cobenzl:] que cependant la foi d’un traité patent qui la lie jusqu’au mois de février, obligeait l’Autriche à insister sur l’admission d’un plénipotentiaire anglais; [. . .] que non-seulement l’obligation patente que l’Autriche avait contracté aux yeux de l’Europe, la forçait à insister sur l’admission du plénipotentiaire anglais, mais que cette admission était nécessaire pour marquer la véritable négociation et détruire dès leur naissance les soupçons qui pourraient se former dans les autres cabinets, en voyant la prolongation du séjour du ministre autrichien à Lunéville, s’il y était encore très long-temps seul avec le ministre français et qu’il n’y eût aucun résultat de leurs négociations. [. . .] Il a répondu qu’il préférait un traité séparé, définitif, à des préliminaires; que, cependant, si la déclaration de garder le secret avait précédé, il paraît qu’il serait possible de signer des préliminaires s’ils reposaient sur des bases équitables, telles que serait l’équivalent accordé à l’Autriche, en Italie, de ce qu’elle devait avoir en Allemagne. [. . .] Que le gouvernement français ne peut plus admettre, avec quelque modification que ce soit, les plénipotentiaire anglais aux conférences de Lunéville. Qu’il ne peut consentir à une nouvelle suspension d’armes, qu’autant que la paix définitive serait conclue et signée, sinon publiquement, au moins secrètement. [. . .] Que, dans ce cas, la paix étant ratifiée par l’Empereur et la France, les ratifications échangées dans l’espace de vingt jours, le traité pourrait demeurer secret jusqu’à la fin de février, et que les hostilités seraient immédiatement suspendues au moyen d’un armistice simulé.’; 3 December 1800, Joseph to Talleyrand; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 145–150.



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had reached and even invaded the Austrian homeland. Vienna itself was threatened and the Austrian government was left no choice but to conclude peace with the French Republic as soon as possible.74 News of the battle reached Lunéville on 7 December.75 Four days later, Cobenzl urged for a British envoy to be admitted for the final time.76 After the Steyer armistice, signed on 25 December, the ­Austrian government yielded. Cobenzl was authorised by his government to negotiate with France separately, albeit sub rosa.77 As for secrecy, Bonaparte announced the start of the peace talks in a public statement to the Corps legislatif on the day the first conference in Lunéville took place.78 In Lunéville, the protocol was opened. Cobenzl and Joseph met officially for the first time on 2 January.79 Meanwhile, the peace party had definitely gained the upper hand in Vienna. The peace party had gained a strong grip on Austrian government and negotiations were to be conducted sincerely.80 Thugut was banned from court which meant the end of his ardent territorial policies.81 Moreover, French forces under the command of General Brune had crossed the Mincio and besieged Mantua in Italy in the first weeks of January, thus threatening Austria with an invasion of the hereditary lands on the southern front as well. After some nagging on territorial issues82 and the matter of whether the treaty would establish peace between France and the Empire too, the representatives in Lunéville reached an agreement within little over   Deutsch, 1938, p. 9; Fugier, 1954, p. 127.  Hermann, 1912, p. 544. 76   11 December 1800, Joseph to Talleyrand; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 169–173. ‘j’ai exigé qu’auparavant il me communiquât ses pouvoirs pour une négociation séparée. Il m’a répondu: 1. qu’il n’avait pas de pouvoirs pour traiter sans la présence des Anglais; 2. que la suspension des hostilités doit nécessairement accompagner l’ouverture des négociations.’; 10 December 1800, Joseph to Talleyrand; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 164–167. 77   ‘Il [l’Empereur; RK] autorise son ministre à interpréter ses pouvoirs comme le gouvernement les avait interprétés, et à conclure et signer des préliminaires sous le secret’;26 December 1800, Joseph to Talleyrand; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 185–190. ‘qu’il avait cependant à m’annoncer qu’il était autorisé à traiter, conclure et signer des préliminaires, un traité définitif, public, secret, comme je voudrais, avec ou sans les Anglais.’; 31 December 1800, Joseph to Talleyrand; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 198–203; Hermann, 1912, p. 553, p. 557, and p. 559. 78   Dutch translation in a letter from Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes of 2 January 1801; NA 1.02.14 no. 630. 79     2 January 1801, protocol first conference; AAE CP Autriche 370. 80  Hermann, 1912, pp. 695–696; Blanning, 1996, p. 259. 81  On Thugut’s dismission and its consequences, see Herrmann, 1912, pp. 695–697. 82  Hermann, 1912, p. 553. 74 75

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four weeks’ time. The French insisted that the Emperor would conclude for the Empire in Lunéville since the Premier Consul wished to avoid a repetition of Rastatt. This was not a conditio sine qua non for peace talks to commence, though.83 At first, Cobenzl refused to consent. Joseph argued that there were no obstacles for the Empire to be represented by the imperial envoy since the Emperor was not to sacrifice anything the imperial Deputation in Rastatt had not already agreed to. Furthermore, he referred to earlier treaties as precedents. Whether the Emperor was allowed to conclude treaties on behalf of the Empire was indeed not quite clear. In the 1679 Treaty of Nijmegen the Emperor had acted for the Empire.84 After Nijmegen it had become customary for the Emperor to represent the Empire. The Reichstag had objected on the occassion of the 1697 Treaty of Ryswyck, but in Rastatt in 1714 the Emperor had again acted without consent of the Reichstag.85 Joseph referred to these treaties as precedents. On the election of the Emperor Charles VII, the Reichstag had established, though, that the Emperor was not to conclude preliminaries or treaties of peace without consent and that a deputation from the Diet had to be admitted to peace negotiations.86 After the French had made some additional promises, Cobenzl gave in and it was agreed that the Treaty of Lunéville was to be not only between the French Republic and the Emperor as King of Bohemia and Hungary but between France and the Empire as well.87 The Austrian envoy was the first to submit a draft treaty. Despite instructions from Vienna to conclude peace as fast as possible, the Austrian envoy claimed compensation in Italy and repudiated secularisation of the Empire.88 Joseph responded with a French counterproposal on 29 January.89 Both claims were repudiated. Cobenzl’s reaction of 2 February

  ‘Article 2 [. . .] Le desir du Gouvernement français seroit que l’Empereur stipulait comme Empereur d’Allemagne et pour le corps germanique. Cependant si l’intention de Sa Majesté n’est de traiter que comme Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, Archiduc d’Autriche la négociation sera ouverte.’ 25 October 1800, instructions for Joseph; AAE MD France 1811 and Du Casse, 1855, pp. 45–48. 84   Duchhardt, 1976, p. 36 and p. 125. 85   Duchhardt, 1976, p. 37. 86   Duchhardt, 1976, p. 39. 87   26 January 1801, protocol sixth conference; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 258–270; Hermann, 1912, p. 683 and p. 685. 88  Hermann, 1912, pp. 689–690. 89  Hermann, 1912, p. 702. 83



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was followed two days later by a French draft presented as ‘ultimatum définitif.’90 Several days afterwards, the peace treaty was concluded.91 Once more, the Lunéville negotiations show that the involvement of the sister republics with the great peace settlement of the Revolutionary era was highly connected with the French policy of separate peace treaties. Since France’s allies were not themselves at war with Austria, they were not even mentioned once as powers to be involved in the peace talks. Nevertheless, the Batavian Republic did make attempts to have representatives admitted in Lunéville; as did the Cisalpine and Helvetic Republics. Their efforts to have commissioners admitted to the conferences failed mainly because the French government wanted to exclude Britain, and to a lesser degree Russia, from the peace talks and, by consequence, because negotiations were in the end conducted in relative secrecy. The latter did not mean that the sister republics’ governments were entirely ignorant of the ongoing negotiations. They were officially informed of the Preliminaries and the Treaty. In general, they kept abreast of the peace talks to a reasonably large extent through public statements and rumours circulating in Paris.92 This changed once the French and Austrian delegations had left for Lunéville and negotiations were thus more hidden from their envoys’ views. The Helvetic Republic turned out to be the most energetic and proactive. Already by the end of June the Vollziehungsausschuß93 requested participation in the peace talks and appointed an envoy.94 The Batavian government was less swift in reacting to the peace overtures. At first, it seemed to be satisfied with being kept informed accurately of the negotiations.95 Only by the end of September did The Hague indicate

 For the various drafts, see Herrmann, 1912, pp. 702–713.   9 February 1801, Treaty of Lunéville; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 163–171; CTS vol. 55, pp. 475–482; For the ratifications by the Emperor, the Empire, and the French Republic see CTS vol. 55, pp. 483–495. 92  E.g. 27 September 1800, Van der Goes to Abbema, Buys, Bangeman Huygens; NA 2.01.08 no. 107; 16 December 1800, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind [the report was presented to the Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam on 30 December 1800]; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 533. 93   The Helvetic Executive Directory. 94   30 Juni 1800, Vollziehungsausschuss to Helvetic foreign secretary; SBA Hauptabteilung B 3324; 29 September 1800, Reinhard to Talleyrand; AAE CP Suisse 473 and Dunant 1901, pp. xxix–xxx and p. 377; 7 October 1800, Reinhard to Talleyrand; AAE CP Suisse 473. 95   27 June, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 90 91

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its desire for Batavian commissioners to participate in the peace congress. Vice-admiral De Winter, who replaced the temporarily absent Schimmelpenninck, was instructed to insist on their admission in case of a congress to take place.96 Maarten van der Goes anticipated no obstacles to the Batavian Republic taking an active part in negotiations. He did, however, expect the Premier Consul to contemplate obtaining peace without a congress in order to quicken the peace process.97 After Joseph had left for Lunéville for the first time, Schimmelpenninck confirmed the latter expectation. He assumed that first France and Austria would try to reach consent on the main points of discussion before convening a general congress, where representatives of other powers would be admitted.98 Nevertheless, the Uitvoerend Bewind held on to admission of Batavian commissioners, even if Britain would be excluded from the congress. Although the Batavian Republic was not at war with Austria, the Batavian government did think it necessary to take a direct part in negotiations because of the indemnification for the territories ceded to France in 1795.99 Unfortunately, no French response to the Batavian request with this regard is known. After Cobenzl had arrived in Paris, Schimmel­penninck became more active. He expected that the general congress would soon commence and that there would be no opposition to a Batavian plenipotentiary taking part in that congress. Therefore, he insisted with his government on a swift designation of Batavian commissioners.100 The matter was elaborately discussed in The Hague on 4 and 5 November.101 Schimmelpenninck himself was designated Batavian plenipotentiary and Van der Goes was instructed to prepare his powers and instructions. The powers were written and approved by the Uitvoerend Bewind within some hours’ time.102 Although Schimmelpenninck was   29 September 1800, secret minutes Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 664; 1 October 1800, secret minutes foreign affairs; NA 2.01.08 no. 51; 3 October 1800, Van der Goes to De Winter; NA 1.02.14 no. 683.   97   14 October 1800, secret minutes foreign affairs; NA 2.01.08 no. 51.   98   27 October 1800, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 654.   99   28 October 1800, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 100   31 October 1800, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 654. 101   31 October 1800, secret minutes foreign affairs; NA 2.01.08 no. 51. 102   5 November 1800, secret minutes Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 665; ‘Le Directoire Exécutif de la République Batave désirant de contribuer au rétablissement de la Paix et informé que des conférences seront entamées à Luneville pour atteindre ce bût salutaire, a nommé le citoyen R.J. Schimmelpenninck son ambas  96



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almost immediately informed of his appointment,103 the instructions were never sent to Paris, nor did he leave for Lunéville on any occasion. Both Schimmelpenninck and Van der Goes soon lost hope of peace to be made soon. They did not anticipate negotiations to reach a stage in which France’s allies would be to play a part within due time.104 Hence, once hostilities recommenced, setting down Schimmelpenninck’s instructions was postponed.105 Subsequently, the conclusion of the Treaty of Lunéville took the Batavians by surprise. The lack of a Batavian commissioner to the peace congress being officially present at least in Paris, was thus partly due to a major misjudgement on the part of the Batavian government. The Uitvoerend Bewind being more alert would not have made any difference, though. Schimmelpenninck would not have been admitted to the Lunéville congress even with proper powers and instructions. It has to be reminded, that the Helvetic Republic did send an official representative and he did not leave Paris for Lunéville either. Hence, no representative of the Batavian Republic took part in the Lunéville negotiations. This does not mean the Batavian Republic was not involved in the peace. Several substantive matters discussed by Joseph and Cobenzl affected it. Moreover, the Batavian Republic would bring some matters to the fore to be discussed. More in general, the sister republics were included in the Treaty. From the start, their inclusion was part of every draft that was exchanged, whether the draft was prepared by Joseph or by Cobenzl.106 Article 11 of the Treaty of Lunéville declared the Treaty to be ‘common’ to the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian Republics.107 That Article referred to some provisions in particular, that had to do with mortgages and other sadeur extraordinair auprès de la République Française pour assister de sa part aux dites conférences et pour traiter et conclure avec les Plénips des Puissances, qui s’y trouveront,’ 5 November 1800, draft powers presented to the Uitvoerend Bewind by Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 103   6 November 1800, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 122. 104   10 November 1800, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 654; 13 November 1800, Van der Goes to Valckenaer; NA 2.01.08 no. 122; 7 November 1800, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 654; 1 December 1800, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 654. 105   11 March 1801, secret minutes Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 482. 106   2 February 1801, Austrian counter draft; AAE CP Autriche 370. 4 February 1801, French ultimatum; AAE CP Autriche 370. 107   ‘Le présent traité de paix, notamment les articles 8, 9, 10 et 15 ci-après, est déclaré commun aux républiques Batave, Helvétique, Cisalpine et Ligurienne. (. . .)’ ; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 163–171; CTS vol. 55, pp. 475–482.

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debts taken out as well as the adjournment of seizures on private possessions and revenues during the war in territories that due to the Treaty were to belong to another state,108 the adjournment of seizures on property, rights, and revenues of French or Austrian subjects on Austrian respectively French territory,109 and, finally, the provision with regard to the prisoners of war.110 Clearly, in this case, the main objective of the inclusion was to take care of the consequences of territorial adjustments that affected the Helvetic and Cisalpine Republics, and of the war, in which the sister republics had taken part as auxiliaries, for instance providing troops to the French. Furthermore, the Treaty of Lunéville turned out to be of huge political importance for the sister republics. It contained the formal recognition not only of their independence, but also of their ‘right of self-constitution.’ The Vollziehungsrath111 had indeed requested France to insert the recognition of the Helvetic Republic’s independence and of the constitution ‘qu’elle se sera donnée’ in the Treaty.112 Swiss independence was one of the conditions for peace communicated to Joseph by Talleyrand on 7 December.113 By the time of the first conference, France insisted on the recognition and guarantee of the independence of the Batavian Republic as well.114 To the French government, recognition of their independence alone did not suffice, though. Both Republics had to be recognised ‘suivant l’organisation constitutionelle que l’une et l’autre vont recevoir.’115 The Emperor was not only to recognise the existence of the sister republics as independent states, but also their new political orders and, hence, the Treaty was to be a guarantee against the restoration of the former system of government and the old principles as well. Thus, the Treaty was to contain the recognition of the right of internal self-determination. Nevertheless, the Emperor’s recognition of the sister republics including their new constitutional orders, was highly expedient, according  Articles 8 and 9.  Article 10. 110  Article 15. 111  Helvetic Executive Council. 112   25 September 1800, Conseil Exécutif provisoire de la Republique Helvétique au citoyen Bonaparte Premier Consul de la République Française; AAE CP Suisse 473. 113   7 December 1800, Talleyrand to Joseph; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 158–161. 114   2 January 1801, protocol first conference; AAE CP Autriche 370; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 209–210. 115  Not dated [based on dates of preceding and subsequent pieces mid-January 1801], draft instructions for Joseph [by Talleyrand; not adopted]; AAE CP Autriche 370. 108 109



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to Talleyrand, for through the Treaty the constitutions would receive ‘une sorte de sanction solennelle qui leur donnera sur le champ une grande force dans le pays même.’ In other words, imperial recognition would steal a march on Counter-revolutionary forces within. On the matter of the sister republic’s recognition agreement between France and Austria could easily be reached; at least it appeared that way. The first, Austrian draft already contained the mutual guarantee of Swiss independence and of the ‘faculté aux peuples qui l’habitent d’adopter telle forme de gouvernement qu’ils croiront convenable, sans aucune influence étrangere quelconque puisse y contribuer.’116 In addition, the Cisalpine Republic was recognised by both contracting parties and its independence guaranteed. The Batavian Republic was merely included in the Treaty. Recognition of the Batavian Republic might be deemed superfluous since that Republic had already existed for about six years and had already been recognised at Campoformio. A guarantee of Batavian independence would still have made sense, though. Probably, Austria was more concerned with the Helvetic and Cisalpine Republics, since they were neighbours and formed part of areas Vienna at least still considered to be its sphere of influence. Nevertheless, Cobenzl would later on show interest in Batavian independence. The French drafts adopted the provision with regard to the Helvetic Republic. The inclusion, guarantee of independence, and recognition of the right of internal self-determination were extended to comprise all sister republics. That is how the provision ended up in the Treaty of Lunéville.117

  16 January 1801, Austrian draft; AAE CP Autriche 370.   16 January 1801, Austrian draft; AAE CP Autriche 370: ‘Art. S.M. l’Empereur et Roi et la République française garantissent mutuellement l’entiere indépendance de la Suisse, et la faculté aux peuples qui l’habitent d’adopter telle forme de gouvernement qu’ils croiront convenable, sans qu’aucune influence étrangere quelconque puisse y contribuer. Art. Le présent traité de paix est déclaré commun à la République batave. Art. S.M. l’Empereur et Roi et la République française reconnoissent la République cisalpine et se garantissent mutuellement sa parfaite indépendance.’; 18 January 1801, first French draft ; AAE CP Autriche 370: ‘Le présent traité de paix est declaré commun aux République batave, helvétique, cisalpine et ligurienne. Les parties contractantes se garantissent mutuellement l’indépendance des dites Republiques et la faculté aux peuples qui les habitens d’adopter telle forme de gouvernement qu’ils croiront convenable.’; 29 January 1801, Article 10 premier ultimatum; Hermann, 1912, pp. 702–712: ‘Le présent traité de paix sera déclaré commun aux République Batave, Cisalpine, Helvétique et Ligurienne. Les parties contractantes se garantissent mutuellement l’indépendance desdites Republiques, et la faculté aux peuples qui les habitent d’adopter telle forme de gouvernement qu’ils jugeront convenable.’ In the Treaty of 116 117

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Independence was one of the cornerstones of generally shared ideas on the European order at the time. Even France, with all her endeavours to remain in control of western Europe military and politically, publicly expressed her adherence to the independence and equality of all nations: La nation française ne veut ni privilège exclusif, ni faveur partiale; elle ne demande aux peuples amis que les droits de l’égalité. Qu’aucune nation ne soit plus favorisée qu’elle, qu’elle-même ne soit pas plus favorisée qu’une autre nation; telles sont ses prétentions, et l’intérêts de tous les peuples qui contracteront avec elle. Tous les peuples qui connaissent leurs droits se rallieront à ces principes.118 Dans nos relations extérieures, le Gouvernement ne craindra point de dévoiler ses principes et ses maximes. Fidélité pour nos alliés, respect pour leur indépendance, [. . .]: telle a été sa politique.119

In the official communication of the Treaty of Lunéville to the Sénat and the legislative councils, the Consuls expressly mentioned the guarantee of the sister republics’ independence as one of the major achievements of the peace,120 thus exhibiting the importance they attached to that guarantee; or at least the desire that others would think they did so. Austria, as well, was strongly devoted to the sister republics’ independence.121 From a geopolitical point of view, independence meant the exclusion of great power influence; the exclusion of the influence of other great powers in particular. There probably was a fundamental difference between Austria and France on how this recognition had to be understood, though. For the French Republic, it meant that her sister republics were formally recognised. For Austria, it meant that they were no ‘sister republics’ closely aligned to France at all. Independence did indeed mean that the Batavian, Helvetic, and Cisalpine Republics would take their place in the European order as more or less neutral buffers; the function occupied by the secondary states throughout the eighteenth century. Austria still regarded the smaller

Lunéville (Article 11) only ‘notamment les articles 8, 9, 10 et 15 ci-après’ would be added. 118   22 November 1800, Exposé de la situation de la République; AAE MD France 1414.  119   22 November 1801, Exposé de la situation de la République; AAE MD France 652. 120   13 February 1801, procès-verbal du séances des Consuls; AN AF IV 912. 121   7 February 1801, Joseph to Talleyrand; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 316–319.



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powers of the Lotharingian isthmus122 from the paradigm of a European order directed by the balance of power. In a letter to Talleyrand, Joseph reiterated a remark made by Cobenzl with respect to the Batavian Republic: En passant en revue l’état actuel de la République, dont nous stipulons de part et d’autre l’indépendance, M. de Cobenzl a surtout pensé sur la République Batave, dont la prospérité tient bien plus essentiellement au grand système de l’Europe, et où les conséquences d’un mode vicieux de gouvernement ont une importance toute particulière. Il pense qu’il devient urgent d’y substituer un définitif au provisoire, pour ne pas laisser en Europe ce nouveau germe de troubles lorsque la paix générale serait faite.123

The specific reference to Batavian independence shows that Vienna had not yet adapted its views on Europe’s political division. The Batavian Republic, that is, her predecessor the United Provinces had had its place in the traditional alliance systems and hence, its importance could be grasped. On the other hand, even in France some seem to have regarded the minor states’ function within the European order along eighteenth-century lines of reasoning. Probably, the ‘systême des garanties’ to be established for the ‘petits états de l’Europe,’ as proposed by Talleyrand in March 1800, has to be understood in this way. That the Batavian Republic was not enabled to participate in the peace congress does not mean that the Batavian government was not interested in what was being discussed between France and Austria, nor that it was not affected by the peace talks. The Treaty of Lunéville turned out to be ‘one great partition scheme.’124 The main points of discussion were yet again all of a territorial nature. France held out for the left bank of the Rhine thus resuming the old discussion of secularisation and indemnity for the injured German princes. At first, Austria tried to gain more territory in Italy. So the territorial division of Italy was open to discussion again as well. Diplomats generally reckoned with the possibility that the sister republics in Italy would not be restored.125   Broers, 2001, p. 141.   7 February 1801, Joseph to Talleyrand; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 316–319. 124  Tim Blanning depicts the Treaty of Campoformio in these terms; Blanning, 1996, p. 179; Blanning, 2007, p. 635. 125   31 October 1800, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 654; 22 July 1800, Note au ministre des relations extérieures; SBA Hauptabteilung B 3324; 28 September 1800, Stapfer to Begos; SBA Hauptabteilung B 3360. 122 123

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Suffice to say that this means that there was a lot at stake for the Helvetic and Cisalpine Republics, both of them straight in the line of fire with respect to Austrian and French territorial demands. Hence, they were at the core of debate in Lunéville and tried to influence negotiations from the sideline. Conversely, the Batavian Republic, more remote from the main theatres of Franco-Austrian competition, paid hardly any attention to the substance of the peace talks between France and the Emperor. Schimmelpenninck kept The Hague informed of what was going on, but his government was already more concerned with the peace to be concluded with Britain and the effects of a general peace on the Franco-Batavian alliance. The main reason for the Batavian Republic to desire the admittance of Batavian representatives in Lunéville had been the hope that it would finally be indemnified for territories ceded to France in 1795. No substantial efforts with this respect were made, however, until after the conclusion of the Treaty of Lunéville. Schimmelpenninck had brought the matter of territorial compensation for the Batavian Republic to the Premier Consul’s attention just after brumaire. In the Convention of 5 January 1800, France had in fact ceded Huissen to the Batavian Republic and promised the cession of Zevenaar at the general peace.126 The Lunéville negotiatons caused The Hague to blow off the dust from Batavian aggrandisement schemes. Drawing instructions for Schimmelpenninck with that regard was postponed, though, because hostilities resumed.127 After the Treaty of Lunéville had been concluded, Van der Goes drew up an extensive report on matters to be submitted to the territorial reshuffling of the Empire.128 The French government had to be reminded of Article 16 of the 1795 Hague Treaty. Van der Goes did not deem expedient to draw up extensive plans for aggrandisement this time. He realised that schemes would be of no use if France was not willing to endorse them. He did enumerate a number of more specific demands, though. In the first place, France was to return Dutch Flanders and to evacuate Flushing. Thereto, the Batavian Republic was to gain part of Upper Guelders and Cleves, and, in accordance with the 5 January 1800 Convention, Zevenaar and Huis126   5 January 1800, Convention between the French Republic and the Batavian Republic; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 133–138; CTS vol. 55, pp. 111–116; Smit, 1975, p. 25. 127   11 March 1801, secret minutes Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 482. 128   18 February 1801, Van der Goes to Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 123; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 485.



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sen.129 Furthermore, France had to make sure that German princes, orders of chivalry, and ecclesiastical corporations would relinquish all seigniories and other possessions within Batavian territory to the Batavian Republic. Moreover, Van der Goes still held out the prospect of the river Ems as border this territorial aggrandisement being based not only on Article 16 of the Hague Treaty but on a right to compensation for the Batavian contribution to the war effort as well. Thereto, the Rhine tolls had to be abolished for Batavian shipping130 and the House of Orange had to be indemnified far remote from Batavian borders. The Uitvoerend Bewind adopted Van der Goes’ proposal,131 and the latter communicated them to Semonville.132 Thereafter, the French government kept its Batavian counterpart dangling. The Uitvoerend Bewind did request information on French plans for Batavian indemnification,133 the issues of German enclaves within the Batavian Republic and indemnity for the House of Orange were not to be handled until after the Peace of Amiens (27 March 1802) though, connected as they were to the secularisation of the Empire and agreement with Prussia on compensation.134 The only other concerns Schimmelpenninck expressed—that is, next to the territorial ones—, was, first, that Britain, if admitted, would demand the evacuation of the Batavian Republic and Switzerland and the restoration of their independence, and, second, the fear that Austria would demand the restoration of the House of Orange to its position in the Netherlands. Schimmelpenninck was convinced that Cobenzl had already demanded the latter.135 Although there are no signs for this in consulted primary sources, the demand would make sense since that would prevent the Prince of Orange, a Prussian client, gaining territory in Germany by way of indemnification.

  5 January 1800, Convention between the French Republic and the Batavian Republic; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 133–138; CTS vol. 55, pp. 111–116; Smit, 1975, p. 25. 130  On the wider issue of navigation on the Rhine within the orbit of the Lunéville negotiations, see Vec, 2008. 131   21 February 1801, extraordinary secret minutes Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 482. 132   19 March 1801, Apperçu sur les rapports respectifs des deux Républiques (Van der Goes to Semonville); NA 2.21.073, no. 51. 133   10 March 1801, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 123; 11 March 1801, secret minutes Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 482. 134  Vreede, 1864, pp. 144–145. 135   7 November 1800, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 654. 129

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The Treaty of Lunéville provided the basis for a new territorial division of Western Europe. Finally, France—officially—gained the highly desired Rhine frontier. The map of northern Italy was reordered; the map of Germany was yet to be redrawn with France and Russia to act as mediators between the German princes. Austria was re-established to the borders set by Campoformio. The sister republics—with the exception of the Roman and Neapolitan ones—were restored and/ or recognised, their independence guaranteed, but besides that vague guarantee nothing was arranged to limit or even end French military presence and political influence. Judging from the benefits gained by the territorial settlement, Lunéville was not yet a Carthaginian peace as the post-Austerlitz Treaty of Pressburg (26 December 1805)137 would be, but it can hardly be said to have been a reciprocally advantageous compromise. France walked away the winner. The Emperor ratified the Treaty of Lunéville not because he truly approved it, not because it satisfied Austrian foreign policy aims, not because he thought it to be a solid base for the peace of Europe, but because he had no other option. For, at the time, the Austrian government, internally, had to cope with a deteriorating economic situation and an even worse record of state finances. In addition, Austria, defeated on both fronts, had become almost totally isolated on the international scene after Russia had defected from the Second Coalition.138 Peace was welcomed with great joy in The Hague.139 The Uitvoerend Bewind regarded the Treaty as the new basis for the European order, although much had still to be done for that order to be really stable. Moreover, the freedom of the seas was yet to be reclaimed from British dominance. After the tremendous tremors that have afflicted the various parts of the world, concluding a durable peace will always be accompanied with 136   30 April 1801, Sulla Pace Orazione per ordine del Governo Cisalpino detta nelle feste solenni al Foro Bonaparte; AAE CP Milanais 59. 137   By this treaty Austria was forced to cede the portion of Venice gained at Campoformio and Lunéville to the Kingdom of Italy, as well as certain territories in Germany to the Kings of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, and the Elector of Baden, and to recognise the personal union between France and the Kingdom of Italy for Napoleon’s lifetime. 138  Hermann, 1912, p. 528; Deutsch, 1938, p. 11; Ross, 1981, p. 230; Kagan, 2006, pp. 16–17. 139  Schama, 1977, p. 481.



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manifold difficulties. Ten years of destructive war, unknown in history, have entirely demolished the ancient political construction of Europe. A large and fully new building has to be constructed, which should be founded on grounds so solid that the attacks of violence and thirst for power can not easily destroy it. The Treaty of Lunéville merely laid down this building’s contours and every Power’s interest calls for contributing some building materials.—In order to establish a system in accordance with the honour and dignity of the various nations and at the same time founded on the political equilibrium, the freedom of the seas had to be secured from a preponderant monopoly, too.140

It will not come as a surprise, that the recognition of the sister republics’ independence and the right of their people to choose a form of government freely was exactly what surfaced in all statements on the peace by authorities in the sister republics. Especially in the Helvetic and Cisalpine Republics, where a constitution was still in the making, the peace was directly linked to the Republic’s constitution.141 Although geopolitical and mainly territorial aims had gained the upper hand, the Revolutionary Wars were in their core still also ideological conflicts. Ideology might have become a side issue; the sister republics’ systems of government did depend on who would walk away the 140   ‘Na de geweldige schokken die de onderscheidene deele der wereld geteisterd hebben, zal het treffen van een duurzame vrede steeds met talloze zwarigheden vergezeld gaan. Tien jaren van een verwoestenden oorlog, die geen weerga in de geschiedenis heeft, hebben het oud staatkundig gebouw van Europa geheel gesloopt. Er moet een groot en gansch nieuw gebouw worden opgerigt, ‘t welk op zodanige vaste gronden behoort te rusten, dat de aanvallen van heerszucht en geweld het zelve niet dadelijk om ver kunnen stooten.—Het tractaat van Luneville geeft slegts de omtrekken van dit gebouw en het belang van elke Mogendheid vordert om daartoe eenige bouwstoffen te leveren.—Om een systhema overeenkomstig de eer en waardigheid der onderscheiden volken en tevens gegrond op het staatkundig evenwigt daar te stellen, moet ook de vrijheid der zeën tegen een overheerschend monopolie beveiligd worden’; 8 July 1801, Rapport over den Staat der Buitenlandsche Zaaken uitgebracht aan het Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.08 no. 123. 141  For the Helvetic Republic, see: 21 February 1801, Conseil executif aux préfets nationales; SBA Hauptabteilung B 792; 21 February 1801, Vollziehungsrath to Gesetzgebender Rath; Strickler, 1866–1903, VI, pp. 623–624: ‘wird die Grundlage der künftigen Ruhe und des politischen Systems von Europa festgesetzt, das manigfaltige Interesse der mit Frankreich verbundenen Freistaaten bestimmt und deren gröβter Gewinn hauptsächlich dadurch gesichert, dass ihre Unabhängigkeit garantirt und ihren Völkern die Freiheit zugesprochen wird, sich jene Regierungsform selbst zu geben, die ihnen zuträglich sein mag’; and 28 February 1801, Der RegierungsStatthalter des Kantons Linth an die Bewohner desselben; SBA Hauptabteilung B 792. For the Cisalpine Republic, see: 13 February 1801, Marescalchi to Comitato di Governo; ASMi Testi 323; 9 March 1801, rapport; AAE CP Milanais 59; 30 April 1801, Programme de la fête qui doit avoir lieu le 10 floréal an 9 pour célébrer la paix et pour poser la premiere Pierre du Forum Bonaparte; ASMi Trattati 112.

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­ inner. French victory had ensured not only the political existence of w the sister republics, but allowed them to vest or maintain republican constitutions as well. Although the Batavian Republic already had a constitution, joy over the recognition of the Republic’s independence was no less than in the other sister republics. In a letter to Semonville, ordering him to give confidential communication of the Treaty to the Batavian government, Talleyrand had called the Treaty of Lunéville ‘une acte, solemnel de l’indépendance de la Batavie et le droit qu’elle a de se donner un Gouvernement qui lui convienne.’142 Of course, the Batavian Republic already had a constitution, but in The Hague the phrase was deemed to be a guarantee of the existing one and a guarantee against the restoration of the Stadholderate.143 In general, Batavian authorities heralded the Continental peace, especially since ‘our patria has not been forgotten.’144 Behold, the generosity of the French government, that desired Peace— amidst its Heroes’ triumphs it hands the olive branch to abdicated Princes—and teaches them the first lesson of Governance—salus populi!—Faithful to the compacts with free Neighbours, it furthers their interests, guards their Freedom and Independence.—Thus, Citizens Representatives! the wishes of mankind are fulfilled—Peace has been concluded.145

In the Batavian Republic the only known reference to this provision is by Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp. In a letter to Semonville he asserted that the Treaty of Lunéville granted the Batavian Republic the right to choose its own government and expressed the hope that the peace   13 February 1801, Talleyrand to Semonville.   20 February 1801, secret minutes Uitvoerend Bewind; NA 2.01.01.04 no. 667; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 533. 144   ‘ons vaderland niet is vergeten’; 17 February 1801, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 684. The same day, Van der Goes communicated the conclusion of the treaty to the Batavian envoys abroad: 17 February 1801, Van der Goes to Reinhold, Bangeman Huygens, Buys, Strick van Linschoten, Van Raet, Van Dedem van de Gelder, Bourdeaux; NA 2.01.08 no. 108. 145   16 February 1801, President of the First Chamber of the Vertegenwoordigend Ligchaam; 17 februari 1801, Van der Goes to Schimmelpenninck; NA 1.02.14 no. 684. ‘zie daer, de edelmoedigheid van het Fransche Gouvernement, dat den Vrede wilde— te midden van de triumfen zyner Helden, reikt het den olyftak aan de afgetreden Vorsten—en leert hen de eerste les van alle Bestuur—het geluk des Volks!—Getrouw aan de verbindtenissen, met vrye Naburen, behartigt het derzelver belangen—waekt voor hunne Vryheid en Onafhanglykheid.—Zoo, Burgers Vertegenwoordigers! zyn dan de wenschen der menschheid vervuld—de Vrede is gesloten’ 142 143



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treaty with Britain would confirm that right.146 The sole more concrete statement on what the right of self-constitution guaranteed by the Treaty of Lunéville might mean is to be found in a letter by the Helvetic envoy appointed to take part in the Lunéville negotiations, Pierre Maurice Glayre: Le traité de Lunéville proclame l’indépendance des quatre Républiques, et le droit de leurs peuples de se donner une constitution. Si une constitution, quelle qu’elle soit, est acceptée par le peuple helvétique, les Puissances garantes n’ont ni le droit ni le prétexte de s’y opposer. Le cas unique réservé à leur intervention, seroit celui où une faction voudroit établir par la force une constitution que le peuple auroit refusée.147

Hence, in general, each people was free to adopt a constitution and decide on the organisation of its government without interference by other powers. The guarantee did, however, contain the right of interference for the guaranteeing powers in case a minority might enforce a constitution against the national will. In the Swiss political context characterised by a sequence of coup d’états by various factions and consequently a series of various constitutional drafts varying between radical unitarian and federal ones,148 the guarantee of the right of self-constitution might, thus, easily provide France (and Austria) with grounds to intervene, as France would do in the winter of 1802–1803.149 Conclusion The War of the Second Coalition ended up in a repetition of the 1797 negotiations. Again Austria was forced to the negotiating table by military defeat in Italy. Again France and Austria squabbled over the character of the peace. Vienna hesitated to defect from its alliance with

 Vreede, 1864, p. 203.   1801, Lettres sur l’Helvétie, par citoyen Glayre (Zurich); SBA Hauptabteilung B 433b. 148  On the political situation in the Helvetic Republic, see Strickler, 1886–1903; Strickler, 1898; Strickler, 1899; Oechsli, 1899; Oechsli, 1903; Nabholz, 1921; Chapuisat, 1945; Zaeslin, 1960; Bauer, 1962; Aubert, 1974; Rufer, 1974; Böning, 1985; Fankhauser, 1986; Vovelle, 2000; Fankhauser, 2002; Moos, 2002; Lerner, 2004. 149   The so-called Mediation; see Strickler, 1886–1903; Strickler, 1898; Strickler, 1899; Oechsli, 1899; Oechsli, 1903; Nabholz, 1921; Böning, 1985. 146 147

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Britain. France stuck to its policy of separate peace treaties. Although peace talks began after the Battle of Marengo (14 June 1800), negotiations did not become serious until after the Battle of Hohenlinden (3 December 1800) and had been conducted in relative secrecy thus far. The St. Julien Preliminaries had been communicated to the Batavian government. Hence, The Hague knew negotiations were initiated. Initially, the Batavian government put up with merely being kept informed. Only in September did it request participation in peace negotiations. The Uitvoerend Bewind did actually expect that a Batavian envoy would be allowed to attend conferences at a general congress. At the same time, it was aware that Bonaparte was likely to contemplate concluding peace with Austria separately (first). In November, Schimmelpenninck was appointed as Batavian plenipotentiary to the peace congress. His powers were never sent, though, and Schimmelpenninck stayed in Paris, since the Batavian government did not anticipate peace to be concluded due to resumed hostilities. The Treaty of Lunéville took The Hague by surprise. This misjudgement did not really matter. If the Uitvoerend Bewind had been more alert, admittance of a Batavian envoy would have been rejected anyhow. Basically, the Batavian government’s desire to participate was ignored. Once more, the French policy of separate peace treaties obstructed Batavian participation in peace negotiations. Negotiations in Lunéville concentrated on Italian and German affairs. The Batavian Republic focused on the sea instead, and the Batavian Republic was not officially at war with Austria or the Empire. This did not mean the Batavian government was indifferent to FrancoAustrian negotiations. Batavian territorial schemes and the matter of indemnity for the House of Orange would be affected by peace with the Empire. The Hague resumed its attempts to attain territorial compensation and aggrandisement for the Batavian Republic. This matter was not discussed in Lunéville, though, and would not be attended to by France until the territorial reorganisation of the Empire in 1802. Moreover, if Britian would be admitted to the congress, it might be possible to attain British and Austrian support for demanding the French to evacuate the Batavian Republic and relinquish the offensive alliance. All Batavian hopes with this regard turned out to have been in vain. The Batavian Republic was not enabled to further its interests in the peace settlement with the Empire. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Lunéville did concern the Batavian Republic. In the first place, the Batavian Republic was included in the



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Treaty. As to the Batavian Republic, the reason of inclusion basically seems to have been the traditional ratio of expressing the bonds of alliance. Thereto, the Treaty ended a war in which the Batavian Republic had been involved as an auxiliary to France. Since Batavian troops had taken an active part in hostilities, the provision with regard to prisoners of war, e.g., was relevant to the Batavian Republic. Furthermore, Batavian independence and the Batavian people’s right to internal self-determination were guaranteed by France and Austria. To Austria independence of the sister republics amounted to the exclusion of French influence. To France this independence established its sisters’ right to a republican form of government. Whatever right of intervention the guarantee might have implied, the sister republics derived rights from the guarantee and thus from the Treaty of Lunéville. They did not consent to or confirm the inclusion and guarantee. Conversely, the Treaty did not contain any obligations for the sister republics. Hence, there was no substantial reason that necessitated their explicit consent unless one would argue the sister republics had had to consent to the guarantee as well.

chapter six

Bridging the Channel1 6.1  Where the Land Meets the Sea With the Austrians defeated at Marengo and Hohenlinden, the French Republic dominated Western Europe. Most of its ports were, however, blockaded. Deprived of its Continental allies, Britain ruled the waves and nothing but the waves. For neither of the great powers still at war there was much political and military use in prolonging the war, whereas peace seemed to promise economic benefits as markets would again be opened and communication with Asia and the Americas restored. Hence, peace between France and Britain was called for not because either of the combatants was at the brink of collapse or had actually won the war, but because the war had reached a dead-end impasse and France and Britain had no choice but to recognise each other’s hegemony respectively on land and on sea.2 London had formally declined Bonaparte’s post-brumaire peace offer.3 At the time, Counter-revolutionary sentiments prevailed within the British government, which demanded restoration of the French monarchy, whereas Pitt bided his time to see whether the new French government would turn out to be stable.4 Military events on the Continent threatened to leave Britain in an isolated position though. Moreover, public opinion on the Continent was more anti-British than anti-French.5 Tsar Paul had revived the League of Armed Neutrality and had sent troops to India. The British bombardment of Copenhagen and the demise of the Tsar prevented a disaster, but Britain’s position was far from favourable.6 Paris was out for peace, too.7 In August

  This chapter has been published separately (Kubben, 2008).   Blanning, 1996, p. 260. 3   26 December 1799, Bonaparte to George III; AAE MD Angleterre 105bis. 4   Vreede, 1864, pp. 115–116. 5  Deutsch, 1938, p. 25. 6  Deutsch, 1938, p. 21; Lousse, 1951, p. 35. 7  See e.g. Chatel de Brancion, 1999, p. 572. 1 2

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1800, Louis-Guillaume Otto,8 a civil servant at the French Ministère des Rélations extérieures, was sent to London, officially as a commissioner to negotiate with regard to prisoners of war. He had, however, been given secret instructions to prepare peace negotiations. After William Pitt had resigned his office because of the issue of Catholic emancipation, the new Addington Cabinet decided to enter into negotiations with France.9 The British proposed to conclude peace on the conditions of, among others, the French evacuating Egypt, a partial restitution of occupied colonies, and the Batavian Republic indemnifying the House of Orange.10 Eventually, Otto’s efforts resulted in the Preliminaries of London (1 October 1801).11 No representative of the Batavian Republic took part in these Preliminaries. Moreover, the first reference to the London negotiations, indicating that the Batavian government was aware of these negotiations, can be found in a letter of Schimmelpenninck to the Batavian Agent der buitenlandsche betrekkingen, Maarten van der Goes, of 10 July 1801.12 To be sure, by March 1801, The Hague was aware of rumours that peace talks between France and Britain were being initiated,13 but Schimmelpenninck had assured his government that peace would not be concluded before the fate of Egypt would be decided.14 Strikingly, even then, the Batavian government did not try to become involved in the London negotiations. Based on Article 5 of the Treaty of The Hague, it did, however, expect to be invited to take part in the nego-

 8   The date of issue of his full powers is 20 August 1800; AAE MD Angleterre 105bis.  9  Deutsch, 1938, pp. 27–28; Fugier, 1954, p. 145; Bruun, 1965, p. 50; Schroeder, 1994, p. 225; Lentz, 2005c, p. 461; Droz, 2005, p. 225; Thombs and Thombs, 2007, p. 230. In reaction to the 1798 risings in Ireland, William Pitt the Younger had introduced a bill to unify Ireland with Britain. Pitt had succeeded in having the Irish Parlement adopt the Act of Union by holding out the prospect of Catholic emancipation. After the two Kingdoms had been merged, the King opposed equal rights for Catholics, though. Thereupon, Pitt resigned on 16 February 1801. 10   4 April 1801, Aperçu écrit de la main du Lord Hawkesbury; AAE CP Angleterre 105bis. Britain would return: Pondichéry, Chandernagor, Mahé, Négapatnam, Malaca, Amboine, Banda, Cochin, Gorée, Surinam, Curaçao, Sainte-Lucie, Les Saintes, SaintPierre et Miquelon, Saint-Marcou, Minorque, and the Cape of Good Hope on the condition that the latter would be a free port. 11   1 October 1801, Preliminaries of London; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 205–211. 12   10 July 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 633. 13   17 April 1801, Van der Goes to Bourdeaux; NA 2.01.08 no. 108. 14   1 May 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 632.



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tiations leading to a definitive peace treaty once the Preliminaries had been agreed upon.15 The French government wished to copy the procedure of the Lille negotiations and act on behalf of its allies, the Batavian Republic and Spain in particular. The British government, however, refused to assent to the representation of the French allies by France. In early September 1800, Otto and Lord Grenville negotiated a maritime armistice. A peace treaty between France and Britain was not discussed yet, as the British still hoped to be admitted to the negotiations in Lunéville between France and Austria. Article 7 of the first draft for such an armistice, presented at the conferences by Otto, provided: ‘Sa Majesté Catholique, la République batave et la République ligurienne, sont comprises dans le présent armistice.’16 In other words, those of France’s allies who had naval interests were to be included in the armistice. The British negotiator objected to this part of the French draft. The British reluctance to include the French allies without their consent is stated clearly in a letter written by Lord Grenville to his permanent under-secretary, Lord Hammond, on 14 September 1800. In that letter, Grenville wrote that France was not entitled to act on behalf of its allies, as there was ‘d’aucun acte officiel, que le gouvernement français soit autorisé à traiter au nom de l’Espagne et de la Hollande.’17 Grenville continued: Si la France considère ses alliés comme des puissances indépendantes, et se propose de traiter sous ces rapports leurs intérêts dans les négociations futures, il est nécessaire que ce principe soit également adopté dans les arrangements préliminaires dont il s’agit. Sa Majesté n’a vu, par la communication d’y accéder, s’ils le jugent à propos. Sous cette forme, Sa Majesté est prête à admettre l’article qui concerne les alliés de la France; et sous cette forme aussi, elle peut comprendre ses propres alliés dans cet arrangement. Si l’article était conclu dans les termes actuellement proposés par la France, Sa Majesté serait obligée de l’observer de bonne foi envers l’Espagne et la Hollande, tandis que, de son côté, elle n’aurait pas le droit d’exiger la réciprocité de la part de ces puissances. Elle ne pourrait pas même demander la restitution d’un seul navire marchand capturé par les Espagnols ou par les Hollandais.

  6 October 1801, Van der Goes to Smits; NA 2.01.08 no. 109.   4 September 1800, projet d’armistice naval (Otto); AAE MD Angleterre 105bis. 17   14 September 1800, Grenville to Hammond; AAE MD Angleterre 105bis. 15 16

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part iii, chapter six Ces puissances, si elles sont regardées comme indépendantes par la France, ne peuvent être liées par un acte isolé de son gouvernement; elles doivent être admises comme parties contractantes par une trans­action régulière et diplomatique, avant de pouvoir être considérées comme comprises dans le traité.18

In the British view, then, the French allies’ explicit consent was needed for them to be included in the Treaty or for the French government to negotiate on their behalf, because they were independent powers. In the British counterproposal the Article with regard to France’s allies— now also encompassing Britain’s allies—was modified to the effect that they would have the opportunity to voluntarily accede, in which way the principle of consent would be formally upheld: ‘Les alliés des deux puissances contractantes seront respectivement en liberté d’accéder à cet armistice.’19 Eventually, the French government complied. In early September 1801,—so after the Treaty of Lunéville had been concluded and ratified, and while Otto was negotiating a peace agreement between France and Britain—new French draft preliminaries provided that the French allies would be admitted to the peace talks, whereas the Preliminaries would only involve France and Britain.20 On 7 September 1801, Otto and Lord Hawkesbury discussed the French draft. They addressed the position of the allies with regard to the restitution of the colonies that had been occupied by British forces. The protocol included the following remarks made by Otto: Le plénipotentiaire français a insisté sur l’énumération des conquêtes que le gouvernement britannique s’engage à restituer, en omettant celles qui, par le traité définitif éventuel, sont censées devoir rester à la GrandeBretagne: il a observé qu’il n’était pas au pouvoir du gouvernement français de disposer d’aucune colonie appartenant à ses alliés.21

Hawkesbury protested that in such a case the Premier Consul should at least stipulate the compensation to be given to Britain in return for the restitution. In addition he observed:

18   14 September 1800, Grenville to Hammond [French translation]; AAE MD Angleterre 105bis. 19   4 September 1800, contre-projet (Grenville); AAE MD Angleterre 105bis. 20   7 September 1801, minutes of a conference between Otto and Hawkesbury; AAE MD Angleterre 105bis. 21   7 September 1801, minutes of a conference between Otto and Hawkesbury; AAE MD Angleterre 105bis.



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que les engagements quelconques de la France avec ses alliés ne sauraient lier le gouvernement britannique; et que, si la France n’est point autorisée à stipuler complètement au nom de ses alliés, il faudrait bien, ou que la France fit elle seule tous les sacrifices que sa Majesté pouvait exiger, ou qu’elle eût des pouvoirs spéciaux de chacune des puissances alliées, ou bien que la paix se fit séparément avec chacune d’elles; ce qui serait contraire à l’esprit et au but de la négociation actuelle pour une paix générale.22

So, now the French representative referred to the French government being incompetent to act on behalf of its allies while Lord Hawkesbury demanded that Otto would get a sufficient qualification and threatened that Britain would otherwise have to negotiate with Spain and the Batavian Republic separately. After all, the restitution of the colonies had been the major breaking point in Lille in 1797. Britain now wanted to settle the matter to secure its gains. In London, Britain and France did eventually reach an agreement on the matter of the restitution of the colonies. The Dutch settlements on Ceylon and the Spanish colony of Trinidad were sacrificed in order to reach a compromise peace, and a special agreement was made with regard to the Cape colony. Article 2 Sa Majesté Britannique restituera à la République française et à ses alliés nommément à Sa Majesté Catholique et à la République batave, toutes les possessions et colonies occupées ou conquises par les forces anglaises dans le cours de la guerre actuelle, à l’exception de l’île de la Trinité et des possessions hollandaises dans l’île de Ceylan, desquelles îles et possessions Sa Majesté Britannique se réserve la pleine et entière souveraineté. Article 3 Le port du Cap de Bonne-Espérance sera ouvert au commerce et à la navigation des deux Parties Contractantes, qui y jouiront des mêmes avantages.23

The formal cession of some of the occupied colonies—not covered in the Preliminaries, but provided for in the Treaty of Amiens—was the key to the involvement of the Batavian Republic and Spain in the negotiations following these Preliminaries to be held in the French city

22   7 September 1801, minutes of a conference between Otto and Hawkesbury; AAE MD Angleterre 105bis. 23   1 October 1801, Preliminaries of London; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 205–211.

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of Amiens.24 According to the late eighteenth-century law of nations, these powers’ explicit consent was needed for Ceylon and Trinidad to formally become British. At the time, the occupation of territory by a belligerent’s troops did not transfer sovereignty definitively.25 In times of war all rights between the belligerents were suspended. It was only when peace was made that legal relations were restored. As a result, conquests had to be confirmed in a peace treaty, in which the former owner recognised the transfer of sovereignty.26 This required the direct involvement of the Batavian Republic and Spain in the conferences at Amiens in order to ensure that the legitimacy of the British possession could not be challenged. Another reason for their involvement might have been that they themselves were at war with Britain, unlike other allies of the French Republic. The main difference with the negotiations in Lille, then, is that peace had already been concluded with Austria. France wished to conclude separate peace agreements with Britain and Austria, to prevent having to face the other great powers as a block. There was to be no general peace or general conference27—a major breach with the eighteenth-century practice of great peace conferences. Instead, the great powers were to conclude bilateral treaties. In 1797 and 1801, France wanted to keep Britain out of the negotiations with Austria, although Austria wanted its ally to be admitted. In consequence, the French allies were secluded as well to avoid creating a precedent. Now, with the Treaty of Lunéville already concluded and ratified, the French allies could be admitted without the danger of provoking a general conference. Thus it was agreed in Article 15 of the Preliminaries that the French and British plenipotentiaries would meet in Amiens to proceed with editing the definitive treaty ‘de concert avec les alliés.’28 Basically, the latter were confronted with a fait accompli, though. The Batavian government, fully occupied by establishing a new constitution,29

24  In this aspect at least Spain and the Batavian Republic differed from the Ligurian Republic, of which no colonies were to be ceded and that was not to be involved. 25   Basdevant, 1910, pp. 177–178. See chapter II.5. 26   Basdevant, 1910, pp. 188–189; Verosta, 1995, p. 755. 27  See e.g. Belissa, 2006, pp. 348–355; Bois, 2005, p. 65; Droz, 2005, p. 206; Schroeder, 1994, pp. 210–211. 28  Article 15 Preliminaries of London. 29   Vreede, 1864, p. 200; De Gou, 1995.



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was taken by surprise.30 On the other hand, the French government informed its allies of the Preliminaries without any delay.31 6.2  We Want in! Schimmelpenninck was to represent the Batavian Republic at the peace congress. After he had arrived in Amiens, he was not immediately admitted to the conferences between the French representative Joseph Bonaparte, the Premier Consul’s brother, and the British representative Charles Lord Cornwallis. A delicate compromise had been reached in London, especially regarding the colonial dominions. It was the common wish of both Britain and France not to discuss the matter again in Amiens.32 For that reason, Lord Cornwallis insisted on an ‘accession pleine et entière,’33 and Talleyrand sent Joseph Bonaparte instructions to demand a declaration ‘par un acte formel’ from Schimmelpenninck that his government would accede to the Preliminaries.34 He told Schimmelpenninck that he would be admitted to the conferences if the Batavian Republic first accepted the Preliminaries ‘pure et simple.’ This was a conditio sine qua non, as, in Talleyrand’s words, ‘ces négociations ne sont qu’un résultat desdits préliminaires.’35 France and Britain wished to stick to the Preliminaries as closely as possible. In Joseph Bonaparte’s words: ‘Le but du congrès étant d’expliquer, de développer et de rédiger d’une manière définitive et solennelle les articles arrêtés à Londres et ratifiés par les gouvernements français et anglais.’36 So, to take part in the negotiations the Batavian government had to ratify the Preliminaries of London, that is to say, consent to the cession of Ceylon and the settlement regarding the Cape even before the negotiations proper had started. 37

  Vreede, 1864, pp. 214–215; Schama, 1977, p. 510.  Already on 6 October 1801, Van der Goes passed news of the Preliminaries on to Batavian envoys abroad. 6 October 1801, Van der Goes to Bangeman Huygens, Loofs, Reinhold, Buys, Hultman, Bourdeaux, Anthony van Dedem, Van Raet, Frederik van Dedem, Silliman, Nieuwerkerke; NA 2.01.08 no. 109. 32  Schama, 1977, p. 510. 33   6 December 1801, Cornwallis to Joseph; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 32–33. 34   7 December 1801, Talleyrand to Joseph; AAE CP Angleterre 598. 35   12 December 1801, Talleyrand to Joseph; AAE CP Angleterre 598. 36   1 January 1802, Joseph to Schimmelpenninck; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 110–111; Vreede, 1864, pp. 217–218. 37   Vreede, 1864, pp. 216–217. 30 31

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The Staatsbewind refused to do this. The instructions given to Schimmelpenninck were very clear: there was to be no pure and simple adoption of the Preliminaries until the French government had recognised the principle of fair compensation.38 On 19 December 1801, Schimmelpenninck had informed the French negotiator that he was prepared to accept the Preliminaries as the basis of the negotiations if that meant that the provisions of the Preliminaries would be confirmed in the final peace agreement, but not if it meant that the peace treaty would only be an extended version of the Preliminaries.39 Schimmel­penninck wanted to retain the option of negotiating issues that were not covered by the Preliminaries, but were of interest to the Batavian Republic, and he wished to manifestly contribute to the substance of the Treaty. A formal sanction of the Preliminaries could only take place after the negotiations. This is a clear reference to the principle of consent. The Batavian Republic was not willing to accept the Preliminaries unreservedly, which would be tantamount to allowing France and Britain to dictate the treaty terms. The Treaty had to be the result of negotiations in which the Batavian representative would have taken part. The Batavian reluctance to comply should be seen in the light of the Batavian wish that some conflicts with France be settled at Amiens in return for accepting the cession of Ceylon.40 Schimmelpenninck appealed to the secret provisions of the 1795 Treaty of The Hague with their solemn guarantee of its colonial dominions. If the conclusion of peace required the cession of Ceylon, the Batavian Republic would have to be compensated, and Schimmelpenninck would have to negotiate fair compensation with Joseph Bonaparte. Schimmelpenninck brought up several points for discussion between the French and Batavian Republics for the time after a general peace would have been concluded: suspension of the offensive alliance; restitution of Dutch Flanders or a territorial aggrandisement towards the east; an end to the French presence in Flushing; and a profitable treaty of commerce. The French government, however, wanted to avoid a situation where the Batavian Republic would be able to use its consent to the cession of Ceylon as a lever to secure French concessions with   10 December 1801, Protocol of the meeting of the commissie from the Staatsbewind; NA 2.21.073 no. 51. 39   19 December 1801, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 2.01.08 no. 363A. 40  Plemp van Duiveland, 1971, p. 73. 38



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regard to these points. Hence, the Batavian demands were declared ‘étranger au congrès’ and Joseph Bonaparte was told not to discuss them with Schimmelpenninck outside the conferences. He also had to inform Schimmelpenninck that he did not have the powers to conclude a deal with the Batavian Republic.41 On 11 January 1802, Schimmelpenninck was formally introduced to Lord Cornwallis at a conference where full powers were exchanged. At this conference he declared ‘au nom de son gouvernement qu’il est autorisé à concourir avec les plénipotentiaires au congrès à la négociation du traité définitif, en accédant aux bases posées dans les articles préliminaires signés à Londres.’42 Thus, in the end, Schimmelpenninck did not accede to the Preliminaries by means of a formal ratification. He only formally accepted them as the foundation of the negotiations, thus leaving room for interpretations of his declaration of acceptance, that is, that the Preliminaries would either be the base of or the starting point for negotiations. 6.3  Secondary but Equal After Schimmelpenninck had been admitted, negotiations between Joseph Bonaparte and Lord Cornwallis continued. For the time being the matter of the colonies could not be discussed as the Spanish representative, Don Joseph-Nicolas d’Azara had not yet arrived. Schimmel­ penninck did have some separate meetings with Cornwallis and was admitted to some of the conferences between the French and British ministers. On Azara’s arrival the matters regarding the French allies could finally be discussed. Even then, however, most conferences would only be attended by Joseph Bonaparte and Cornwallis, as negotiations were dominated by discussions about the future state of Malta.43 First, the procedure followed should be mentioned. By the time Schimmelpenninck was admitted, a draft treaty had already been prepared. He received a copy of the Articles relevant to the Batavian Republic—so not of the entire draft—only after having asked for it explicitly. Schimmelpenninck only participated in conferences if matters of interest to the Batavian Republic were to be discussed, whereas   6 January 1802, D’Hauterive to Joseph; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 138–142.  Du Casse, 1855, p. 149; Vreede, 1864, pp. 220–221. 43  Schroeder, 1994, p. 226. 41 42

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Joseph Bonaparte and Cornwallis were virtually always present. As said before, Schimmelpenninck did have some separate conferences with Lord Cornwallis to discuss issues involving the Batavian Republic and Britain like indemnity for the Prince of Orange and the restitution of Batavian ships seized before the British declaration of war. As far as these conferences had any influence on the drafts or the final treaty, they were of a preparatory nature, providing input for conferences where Joseph Bonaparte was present.44 The Batavian representative clearly played a secondary role. The second relevant aspect of the negotiations concerns the character of the conference and the Treaty. According to the French government the conference was not a general one. Lord Hawkesbury had used the term ‘paix générale’ in London, probably meaning that all parties involved in the war as belligerents were to be represented.45 Actually, the French did not intend the Treaty of Amiens to be a multilateral treaty though. According to Joseph’s instructions, there were to be three simultaneous series of bilateral negotiations, resulting in one text, of which the French-British section was to be the nucleus and to which were to be added some specific Articles concerning the Batavian Republic and/or Spain. The treaty/treaties had to be negotiated at the same time, so France could influence the Batavian-British and the Spanish-British peace.46 This bilateral character is shown by, for instance, the issue of Joseph’s full powers. Mid-January 1802, Cornwallis demanded that Joseph Bonaparte receive new full powers as the present ones only authorised him to negotiate with Britain.47 According to Joseph Bonaparte, however, new powers were not needed, as France did not have to negotiate with Spain and the Batavian Republic. Instead, the three allies were to negotiate separately if simultaneously with His Britannic Majesty’s representative on the basis of the Preliminaries set by France and Britain.

44  Article 18 of the Amiens Treaty would provide that the House of Orange would be indemnified for the losses due to expropriations and the change in form of government. In a separate French-Batavian declaration issued on the day the Treaty of Amiens was signed by the Spanish and Batavian envoys the French government guaranteed this indemnity would not be at the expense or the charge of the Batavian Republic. 45   7 September 1801, minutes of a conference between Otto and Hawkesbury; AAE MD Angleterre 105bis. 46   23 January 1802, Talleyrand to Joseph; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 179–181. 47   19 January 1802, Cornwallis to Joseph; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 171–172.



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En envisageant le congrès d’Amiens sous son véritable point de vue, il est impossible de penser qu’il faille des pouvoirs au ministre français pour traiter avec le ministre espagnol, et à celui-ci pour traiter avec le ministre batave, puisqu’ils n’ont rien à discuter ensemble et que le seul but du congrès d’Amiens est de rédiger d’après les préliminaires convenus, un traité définitif entre la Grande-Bretagne, d’une part, et la France, l’Espagne et la Batavie, de l’autre; ces trois puissances traitant simultanément et d’après des bases données avec le plénipotentiaire de S.M. Britannique48

Some days later, Talleyrand persisted in this view on the character of the conference: Le congrès d’Amiens n’est pas un congrès entre quatre puissances distinctes ayant à traiter chacune l’une avec l’autre; c’est un congrès où la France, l’Espagne et la Hollande, réunies, négocient simulta­nément avec l’Angleterre. [. . .]; mais le plénipotentiaire français ne doit avoir de pouvoirs que pour traiter avec le ministre anglais, et il doit en être de même pour les ministres espagnol et batave.49

Thereto, negotiations were to be limited to the issues laid down in the Preliminaries. Joseph Bonaparte and Talleyrand repeatedly emphasised this point after Schimmelpenninck had been admitted. Tout ce qu’il y a de plus important dans la pacification entre la France et l’Angleterre se trouve réglé par les préliminaires; et, à la rigueur, il suffirait peut-être de changer le mot et de mettre au présent ce qui est au futur, pour en faire un traité définitif. [. . .] Les articles préliminaires de paix n’ont pas seulement stipulés à l’égard de la France: ils renferment les bases de la pacification entre l’Angleterre et l’Espagne, entre l’Angleterre et la Batavie. Il s’agit donc maintenant pour ces deux États, de procéder pareillement à la confection de leur traité définitif.50

Talleyrand, referring to the matters Schimmelpenninck wanted to discuss, dictated that cette rétrocession [of Flushing ; RK] [. . .] ne peut, sous aucun rapport, être traitée au congrès d’Amiens, où il ne peut être question que de ce qui est déjà dans les préliminaires. [. . .] Ce n’est point un congrès général qui vient d’être formé à Amiens et auquel toutes les puissances de l’Europe aient le droit d’intervenir par leurs plénipotentiaires: c’est un congrès de pacification entre la France et ses alliés non pacifiés, d’une

  19 January 1802, Joseph to Cornwallis; Du Casse, 1855, p. 172.   23 January 1802, Talleyrand to Joseph; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 179–181. 50  Not dated, Instructions for Joseph Bonaparte; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 8–19. 48 49

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part iii, chapter six part; l’Angleterre et ses alliés non pacifiés, de l’autre; [. . .] Il ne s’agit donc que de donner, par un traité définitif, une sanction solennelle aux points déjà arrêtés dans les préliminaires en tout ce qui regarde la France, l’Espagne, la Hollande et l’Angleterre; c’est à cela seulement que vous devez tenir, Citoyen; pour tout le reste, vous êtes sans instructions et sans pouvoir.51

A third issue to be discussed here is the provision with regard to the Cape. This was one of the few provisions in the Preliminaries and draft treaties that were of special interest to the Batavian Republic. Schimmelpenninck did manage to have the provision included in the Preliminaries and the first draft altered. It would therefore be fair to say that this matter was still open for negotiation and that the Batavian representative did actually have some influence on the outcome. Article 9 of the proposal communicated to Schimmelpenninck on 23 January provided: ‘Le Port du Cap de Bonne Espérance sera ouvert au commerce et à la navigation des parties contractantes qui y jouiront des mêmes avantages.’52 In other words, all treaty partners were given the same rights in the Cape Colony, which was and remained a Dutch possession. Five days later, a new Article on the Cape proposed by Schimmelpenninck was accepted: ‘Le Cap de Bonne Espérance reste à la République batave en toute souveraineté, comme cela avait lieu avant la guerre.’53 Explicitly stating that the Cape would stay in Dutch hands, this indicates that on substantive bilateral points open negotiations between the Batavian Republic and Britain were possible. A final aspect of the negotiations to be pointed at here concerns the Ottoman Empire, an ally of Britain in the war against France since the French invasion of Egypt in July 1798. France was negotiating separately with the Ottoman Empire. Britain, however, wanted to include the Ottoman Empire in the Treaty of Amiens or to have an Ottoman envoy admitted to the conferences. The discussion on this matter sheds some light on the role and position attributed to the Batavian Republic and Spain in the international order. For, according to Talleyrand, unlike these French allies, a power such as Turkey could not be included or join in as Britain’s junior partner just like that.

51   12 December 1801, Talleyrand to Joseph; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 45–47; AAE CP Angleterre 598. Underlining in the original letter. 52   23 January 1801, Cornwallis to Schimmelpenninck; NA 2.01.08 no. 363A. 53   27 January 1801, draft discussed during a conference between Joseph and Cornwallis; AAE MD Angleterre 105bis. Article 6 Treaty of Amiens.



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J’ai ajouté que le gouvernement britannique devait sentir facilement qu’une puissance telle que la Turquie, ne pouvait être traitée comme un État secondaire, et que la paix entre elle et la France ne pourrait être solidement établie que par un arrangement direct.54

What it meant to be a secondary power, was clearly stated by Alexandre d’Hauterive55 in a letter to Joseph Bonaparte of 6 January 1802: La Hollande est une puissance du second ordre; en affectant les droits et les prétentions d’une puissance du premier ordre, elle ne saurait donner aux uns et aux autres l’importance qu’ils n’ont pas. Dans la discussion des prétentions et des droits des États, on finit toujours par calculer les conséquences du dissentiment dans lequel l’une d’elles se met à l’égard de tous les autres. Or, si la France et l’Angleterre font la paix, que faire autre chose une puissance secondaire, comme la Hollande, que d’y adhérer.56

Secondary powers could only join in once great powers had set the negotiating table. Indeed, Paul Schroeder and Tim Blanning have argued that Amiens confirmed a division of Europe in three spheres of influence among the three true great powers—Britain, France, and Russia—with buffer zones in between.57 6.4  Equality in Form: The Treaty Text Finally, what about the treaty itself? Does its text show signs of inequality? The first part of the preamble states that the Premier Consul and His Britannic Majesty were the initiators of the negotiations. They had already laid the foundations (‘fondements’) for peace in the Preliminaries, had convoked the Amiens negotiations and had invited the allies to join in.58 Depending on the view of the status of the Preliminaries—the

  22 January 1802, Talleyrand to Joseph; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 178–179.  D’Hauterive, chef de division at the Ministère des Relations Extérieures, took over the correspondence with Joseph as Talleyrand was attending the consulta in Lyons on a new constitution for the Cisalpine Republic. 56   6 January 1802, D’Hauterive to Joseph Bonaparte; Du Casse, 1855, pp. 138–142. 57  Schroeder, 1994, p. 229; Blanning, 2000, pp. 208–209. Likewise, Englund, 2004, p. 254. 58   ‘Le Premier Consul de la République Française, au nom du Peuple Français, et Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume-Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d’Irlande, également animés du désir de faire cesser les calamités de la guerre, ont posé les fondements de la paix par les articles préliminaires signés à Londres le 9 vendémiaire an X (1er Octobre 1801). 54 55

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point of departure for the negotiations or the set framework predetermining the scope of further negotiations—this could be a sign of inequality. However, the Preliminaries were only referred to in the preamble. The meaning given to the word ‘fondements’ by the French (and the British) during the negotiations did not appear in the final treaty other than in the use of the word itself in the preamble, which, as argued above, could be and was interpreted differently by the Batavian government and ambassador. The second part of the preamble, in which the treaty parties were enumerated, showed no sign of inequality. Le Premier Consul de la République Française, au nom du Peuple Français, a nommé le Citoyen Joseph Bonaparte, conseiller d’État; Et Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume-Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d’Irlande, le marquis de Cornwallis, chevalier de l’ordre très illustre de la Jarretière, conseiller privé de Sa Majesté, général de ses armées; Sa Majesté le Roi d’Espagne et des Indes, et le gouvernement d’État de la République Batave, ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir: Sa Majesté Catholique, Don Joseph Nicolas d’Azara, son conseiller d’État, chevalier grand-croix de l’ordre de Charles III, ambassadeur extraordinaire de Sa Majesté près la République Française, etc.; et le Gouvernement d’État de la République Batave, Roger Jean Schimmelpenninck, son ambassadeur extraordinaire près la République Française

The order in which the treaty partners were mentioned could be considered significant, but it probably was a matter of mere ceremonial precedence, common to all treaties of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, rather then an indication of hierarchy of the treaty partners in this specific case. In the various provisions no clear signs of inequality can be found either. Article 1 contained a clear expression of the bilateral character of the Treaty. Il y aura paix, amitié et bonne intelligence entre la République Française, Sa Majesté le Roi d’Espagne [. . .] et la République Batave, d’une part; et Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande [. . .] d’autre part.

Et comme, par l’article 15 desdits préliminaires, il a été convenu qu’il serait nommé, de part et d’autre, des plénipotentiaires qui se rendraient à Amiens, pour y procéder à la rédaction du traité définitif, de concert avec les alliés des puissances contractantes’; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 230–241; CTS vol. 52, pp. 289–299.



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Furthermore, in Article 3, the King of Spain and the Batavian Republic were presented as allies of the French Republic, although they themselves were full parties to the Treaty. Being an ally, however, does not make a state inferior. It could be argued that this presentation is simply another way of expressing that France, the Batavian Republic, and Spain stood en block against the King of Great Britain. Sa Majesté Britannique restitue à la République Française et à ses alliés, savoir à Sa Majesté Catholique et à la République Batave, toutes les possessions et colonies [. . .] à l’exception de [. . .]

Articles 4 and 5 contained the explicit cession of Trinidad by His Catholic Majesty and of Ceylon by the Batavian Republic. In these Articles both treaty partners are presented as acting independently and so, formally at least, they voluntarily consented to the cession of their former colonial dominions. In the other provisions, the King of Spain and the Batavian Republic did not appear explicitly. The most substantial part of the Treaty is occupied by an extensive Article on the status of Malta—the major point of conflict between France and Britain that had dominated the negotiations in Amiens—to which, according to paragraph 13 of that Article, all the other great powers were to be invited to accede.59 The King of Spain and the Batavian Republic are not mentioned in this paragraph, although Spain did appear as a guaranteeing power in paragraph 6. There was, however, no need for Spain and the Batavian Republic to be mentioned, as both powers were parties to the entire Treaty. 6.5  The General Peace Concluded The Treaty of Amiens, although not resulting from a Europe-wide congress, had ended the Revolutionary Wars. Finally, the ‘general peace’ mentioned in Article 16 of the 1795 Hague Treaty had arrived. Moreover, the French government had promised to settle the issue Schimmelpenninck had tried to submit to the Amiens congress after the peace with Britain. Above all, territorial compensation for the Batavian Republic and indemnity for the House of Orange still had to be fixed. In the end, it took peace with Britain to deal with matters the Batavian government had tried to submit to negotiations with Austria.  Article 10 Treaty of Amiens.

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The Treaty of Lunéville called for a territorial reshuffling of the Empire. In Regensburg a Reichsdeputation was convened to discuss compensation for the German princes that had lost possessions due to the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France. Paris became the centre of German lobbyists attempting to gain as much as possible for their masters.60 However, the French government did not turn to German affairs but after the Treaty of Amiens had been ratified. The scheme for compensation within the Empire was prepared in Franco-Prussian negotiations. The Batavian envoy in Berlin, Hultman, was even lured to take part in deliberations on Batavian aggrandisement; entirely unprepared though. Throughout these negotiations Talleyrand brought up an extension of Batavian borders up to the river Ems. He actually submitted a detailed scheme for Batavian aggrandisement in the east. Bonaparte reminded his minister that in purview of the 1796 Convention Zevenaar, Huissen, and some other territories had to be attained for the Batavian Republic. Prussia accepted the cession of Zevenaar and Huissen, but rejected any cessions in the northeast.61 On 23 May 1802, France and Prussia concluded a treaty for the cession of the left bank of the Rhine and other territorial issues.62 On 14 November 1802, this Treaty was followed by an elaborative convention concluded between Prussia and the Batavian Republic.63 In the meantime, the Oranges had not been sitting around doing nothing either. William V’s eldest son had paid a visit to the Premier Consul in February 1802 to further his family’s interests.64 In the end, the Prussian envoy, Jerome Lucchesini, negotiating the 23 May 1802 Treaty had been authorised to treat on behalf of the Prince of Orange too.65 The 23 May 1802 Treaty mainly focused on indemnifying the House of Orange. In return, the King of Prussia consented to the cession of Zevenaar, Huissen, and Malburg to the French Republic.66 They formed part of a wider cession of all Prussian dominions on the left  Lousse, 1951, p. 35.  Smit, 1975, p. 26. 62   23 May 1802, Treaty for the Cession of the Left Bank of the Rhine etc. (France and Prussia); CTS vol. 56, pp. 323–329; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 245–251; Smit, 1975, p. 28. 63   14 November 1802, Convention of Berlijn (Prussia and Batavian Republic); CTS vol. 56, pp. 423–426; Smit, 1975, p. 28. 64  Legrand, 1895, p. 279. 65   23 May 1802, Treaty for the Cession of the Left Bank of the Rhine etc. (France and Prussia); CTS vol. 56, pp. 323–329; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 245–251; Legrand, 1895, p. 280. 66  Article 2 23 May 1802 Treaty. 60 61



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bank of the Rhine, that is, mainly Cleves and Upper Guelders to France.67 The King of Prussia was indemnified for this cession among other territories by the Bishopric of Münster.68 In purview of Article 18 of the Amiens Treaty, the Prince of Orange69 attained the Bishopric and Abbey of Fulda and some other secularised abbeys as well as the imperial cities of Dortmund, Isny, and Buchhorn all with their dependencies and in ‘souveraineté et propriété.’70 France and Prussia guaranteed the possession of these dominions to the House of Orange.71 In case there would be no direct heir, the King of Prussia would succeed the last Prince of Orange in his new dominions.72 In return for this indemnity, the Prince of Orange abdicated from the dignity of Stadhouder and all rights, titles, and privileges attached to it and renounced all possessions and dominions he had owned with Batavian territory.73 Moreover, the Prince of Orange and the King of Prussia, finally, recognised the Batavian Republic.74 The 14 November Prussian-Batavian Convention established that Zevenaar, Huissen, and Malburg were ceded ‘en toute souveraineté et proprieté’ to the Batavian Republic.75 After years of enduring efforts for aggrandisement at last the German enclaves within Batavian territory had become Batavian.76 The Franco-Prussian settlement on indemnity for the Prince of Orange was adopted in a Franco-Russian agreement of 3 June 1802 that was issued to the imperial Deputation on 18 August of the same year.77 On 5 January 1803, the Deputation formally decided on compensation for the cession of the left bank of the Rhine.78 By the end of the year, Batavian and Prussian commissioners met in Zevenaar to settle the transfer of authority.79

 Article 1 23 May 1802 Treaty.  Article 7 23 May 1802 Treaty. 69  Called ‘Prince of Nassau-Dillenburg-Dietz’ in the Franco-Prussian Treaty. 70  Article 10 23 May 1802 Treaty. 71  Article 12 23 May 1802 Treaty. Again called ‘Nassau-Dillenburg-Dietz.’ 72  Article 11 23 May 1802 Treaty. 73  Article 8 23 May 1802 Treaty. 74  Article 13 23 May 1802 Treaty. 75  Article 1 14 November convention. 76  Smit, 1975, p. 28. 77   5 January 1803, Regensburg Reichsdeputationshauptschluβ/Recès de Ratisbonne; Kerautret, 2001, pp. 256–266; Kagan, 2006, p. 36. 78  Lousse, 1951, p. 35; Lentz, 2005c, p. 462. 79  Smit, 1975, p. 42. 67 68

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After Amiens the custom to include the Batavian Republic in a peace treaty concluded by France was not continued consistently. No inclusion clauses are to be found in the peace treaties with the Duke of Wurtemberg80 or the Ottoman Empire.81 The latter ‘accepted’ the Treaty of Amiens. So indirectly, the Batavian Republic was involved in the peace with the Porte. Strikingly, however, the Treaty of Amiens was presented as a treaty between France and Britain.82 The Batavian Republic, together with France’s other allies, was included in the Treaty of Pressburg83 (26 December 1805) between Napoleon and Francis II. This treaty mainly concerned German (territorial) affairs. As to the Batavian Republic, the Emperor’s recognition of its independence was repeated.84 Thereto, the Treaty was mainly relevant for the Batavian Republic, as before, because it restored peace and friendship and fixed matters like the ones concerning prisoners of war between Austria and France ending a war in which the Batavians had participated as auxiliary to France. Conclusion In the winter of 1801–1802, French, British, Batavian, and Spanish delegations met in Amiens to end a maritime war that had been going on since 1793, while the Continental peace had already been concluded in February 1801. Both the King of Spain and the Batavian Republic were allied to the French Republic, Britain’s main rival and by then the dominant power in Western Europe. As to the Preliminaries and admittance to the negotiations, the Batavian Republic was not involved in the London negotiations. The 80   20 May 1802, Treaty of Paris between the French Republic and the Duke of Württemberg; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 242–244. 81   25 June 1802, Treaty of Paris between the French Republic and the Sublime Ottoman Porte; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 252–255. 82  Article 4: ‘La Sublime Porte accepte, en ce qui la concerne, le traité conclu à Amiens entre la France et l’Angleterre, le 6 germinal an X. Tous les articles de ce Traité qui sont relatifs à la Sublime Porte, sont formellement renouvelés dans le présent Traité.’ (Kerautret, 2002, p. 254) 83   26 December 1805, Treaty of Pressburg (presently: Bratislava) between the Emperor of the French and King of Italy on the one hand and the Emperor of Germany and Austria on the other; Kerautret, 2002, pp. 131–140. Article 6: ‘Le present traité de paix est déclaré commun [. . .] à la République Batave, alliés de S.M. l’Empereur des Français, Roi d’Italie dans la présente guerre.’ 84  Article 18 Treaty of Pressburg.



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Batavian government was not officially informed of negotiations in London until the Preliminaries were concluded. Although the Preliminaries contained provisions on Ceylon and the Cape, they did not hold any obligations for the Batavian Republic. That would have been the case if the Batavian Republic had ratified the Preliminaries, but it did not. Schimmelpenninck made clear that such obligations could only be agreed to after he had taken part in negotiations. In other words, the Preliminaries did not bind the Batavian Republic, which only accepted them as the point of departure for the negotiations it entered into. The French government did pose acceptance of the Preliminaries as a condition of admittance to the congress. Schimmelpenninck managed to have Paris consent to a vague declaration that did not expressis verbis amount to accepting the Preliminaries as basis of negotiations. The French policy of separate peace treaties no longer obstructed Batavian participation in negotiations, since peace with Austria had already been concluded. Contrary to the Lille negotiations, the participation of a Batavian envoy in the Amiens negotiations was not questioned, probably because both Paris and London wished to attain Batavian consent to the cession of Dutch colonies. Contrary to negotiations with Austria, the Batavian Republic could claim direct participation in negotiations with Britain, too, because the Batavian Republic was a belligerent in its own right. In the Amiens negotiations, Schimmelpenninck played a secondary role—not being allowed to attend all conferences. However, he did participate in negotiations on equal footing with regard to issues that directly concerned the Batavian Republic, and with regard to these issues he even influenced the outcome to some extent. Schimmelpenninck discussed indemnity for the Prince of Orange and the matter of restitution of captured vessels directly with Cornwallis. Thereto, he succeeded in modifying the provision with regard to the Cape. In the end, the principle of consent was honoured. On the other hand, France considered the Batavian Republic to be power of the secondary rank, which should be content with a subsidiary role in the peace process. The matters to be discussed at the conferences had to a great extent, been predetermined by Britain and France, and Schimmelpenninck was not allowed to submit points of discussion regarding the relation between the Batavian and French Republics. Moreover, the presence of Joseph Bonaparte at conferences where matters concerning the Batavian Republic were discussed, with Schimmelpenninck not being allowed to attend the other conferences,

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is a sign of unequal participation. France clearly dominated the peace conference in accordance with its leading role in the Revolutionary alliance. From a procedural point of view it would, thus, be hard to sustain that legislative equality was respected. Finally, in the Treaty itself there were no clear signs of inequality. The Batavian Republic was presented as one of the treaty partners, signed and ratified the Treaty in that capacity, and by doing so, formally consented to the rights and obligations it contained.

Part IV

The Revolutionary alliance That France hath kissed the mouth of Liberty, And found it sweeter than his honied bees, And that the giant wave Democracy Breaks on the shores where Kings lay couched at ease. —Oscar Wilde—

Morning mist still whirled above the Seine as coach wheels rattled over the bridge near the Palais Bourbon. The carriage’s doors were decorated with a painting of a lion lying besides a woman dressed in white and holding a lance with a hat on it; the coat of arms of the Batavian Republic, a union between the Dutch lion deprived of his crown and the Batavian virgin. Sitting inside the coach was a man of middle age. For hours he had been nodding away without really catching sleep. He had travelled enough in his lifetime to be accustomed to the jolts of a coach on French roads in spring. So the travel itself did not keep him awake. His mind was not at rest. Tired as he was, he kept staring at the object in his hands; a file covered with dark blue velvet and gold and silver embroidery and two thick cords attached to it. In this file was an authentic copy of the Treaty of Amiens. Just a few days ago a canon shot had announced the news of this Treaty and Paris had celebrated abundantly, but this morning rest had returned to the city. The man in the coach was Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, returning from Amiens. He was one of the four men who, by putting a signature on a piece of paper, had ended a war that had lasted for nine years, had cost thousands of men their lives, and had changed the map of Europe. If the Peace would last, he had contributed to a settlement equal to Westphalia or Utrecht; at least that was what the papers wrote. But had he really earned a place in history books, our traveller wondered. To be sure, the man who would receive the credits for the peace resided in the palace the carriage had just passed by. In fact, judging from the lights burning inside the Tuileries, the great man was already awake and at work. Peace had been concluded and the man in charge of French politics and military forces was still restless. Oh, he admired the man. Destined to spend his life as an anonymous artillery officer, the man had instead conquered Italy and Egypt, and now the hearts of the French people. He had a vision and the talent to shape the world according to it. But that was exactly Schimmelpenninck’s main worry. Weeks ago, he had reconciled with not being able to restore Ceylon to his country or to relieve it of the burdens posed by the alliance with France. Every time he thought it over, the question whether the price paid for French aid in throwing the Orangists out had not been too high came to the fore. But he was sure peace would be welcomed in The Hague and even more by his merchant friends in Amsterdam. No, Schimmelpenninck worried that the peace would not last, that the moment the Batavian Republic could divert all its energy and resources to national regeneration had not come yet. Indepen­dence and freedom were still a dream to be realised. How wonderful that dream had seemed just ten years ago at a time the French still spoke of brotherhood, of the unity of mankind, of spreading liberty. Austria and Britain had concluded peace because they were exhausted and isolated. Everyone could see that.

Bonaparte needed peace to put things right at home. Nothing prevented him from raising French ambitions once he had done that. Lunéville and Amiens had changed nothing in France’s position in Western Europe. France was still preponderant. Nothing could stop Bonaparte from maintaining control of the allied republics. Nothing but the sleeping giant of the east could stop him gaining control of central Europe as well once he would have resorted to arms again. The European order had not returned to equilibrium yet. Oh, had he served his country well, our traveller wondered, when the coach passed through the gate into the embassy’s courtyard. As the carriage halted, the embassy secretary was already in the doorway of the modest hôtel. He held a letter with a red seal. Schimmelpenninck could sort out that seal from any distance by then, even though his eyesight troubled him lately. It was a letter from Talleyrand informing the Batavian ambassador of official celebrations of the Amiens Peace he was to attend as one of the Premier Consul’s special guests together with his Spanish colleague. They would be taken to the palace by abundantly decorated coaches headed by cavalry escorts; so far for republican plainness. Ah well, at least in public appearances of Batavian independence were kept up. RK



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The Treaty of Amiens (27 March 1802) ended a war between France and Britain that had lasted for nine years. The Dutch Republic had entered the war as a British ally in 1793. Within two years, French forces had occupied its entire territory, enabling Dutch Patriots to take control of government and transform the United Provinces into the Batavian Republic. Dutch Patriots concluded a treaty of peace and alliance—the Treaty of The Hague (16 May 1795)—with France, thus changing sides in the course of the war. Against all odds, the Revolution, born out of the French government’s political and financial crisis of the 1780s, had allowed the French to overcome their country’s military impotence. British dominance of the sea and the rise of Russia in the east had caused a sense of French insecurity throughout Louis XVI’s reign. This sense was not dispelled by the new élan of the Revolution. To the contrary, the Revolution with its conspiracy theories and the siege mentality of the initial, rather disastrous stages of the Revolutionary Wars strengthened this sense and added an element of fundamental distrust. In a period of domestic and international turmoil, the new regime was built on a tottery basis. ‘La patrie’ was ‘en danger.’ The republican regime in Paris was increasingly driven by the need to secure the Revolution’s achievements and to stabilise and normalise the political situation both within and without. Moreover, the French government still faced a desperate financial position. The Revolution might have incited France with a new self-awareness and zeal, but it had not solved the financial crisis. Simultaneously, the French’s sense of cultural superiority clashed with the awareness that their country had missed the boat of economic growth, political reform, and territorial aggrandisement throughout the last decades of the ‘ancien régime.’ In the three decades prior to the Revolution, Western Europe had been at relative rest due to the Franco-Austrian Alliance of 1756. Due to the Revolution, great power rivalry burst out in Western Europe within the context of an ideological conflict. French Revolutionaries were obsessed with security in their foreign policy orientation. France’s traditional foreign and security policy had been upset some decades prior to the Revolution. Ever since the early seventeenth century, France had been balancing the German powers by intervening in the German Empire and through allying itself with eastern powers. Vergennes had realised that the rise of the two flank powers—Britain and Russia—posed the main threat to France. Mainly the latter’s rise undermined the position of France’s traditional allies in the east thus

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rendering the ‘barrière de l’est’—the cornerstone of France’s security policy throughout the eighteenth century—obsolete. The royal government had already conducted a policy of counterbalancing Britain, e.g. by supporting Dutch Patriots against the pro-British Stadhouder in the mid-1780s. The Revolutionary Wars had added the temporal union of Prussia and Austria against France to this undermining of traditional policy, although Prussia would return to neutrality in 1795. The republican regime continued Vergennes’ policy aims, but it also adhered to the views of the opposition against the royal government, that is, they broke with Vergennes’ preference for moderating French ambitions and opposed the 1756 alliance with Austria. Dominant factions among French Revolutionaries, especially by 1795, wished to enhance France’s position in the West, either by expanding French territory to decrease France’s vulnerability or by opting for all-out hegemony in Western Europe. Because of military events, the latter option gained the upper hand. France adopted dominance as a foreign policy aim because its successes on the battlefield made it a feasible option. War would indeed dominate Franco-Batavian relations throughout the Batavian Republic’s existence. In the Embrace of France The Enlightenment’s cosmopolitan spirit still dominated public discourse in the years 1790–1792. In those years, inspired by eighteenthcentury projects for ‘perpetual peace’ focusing on a federal order in combination with anti-monarchical sentiments, Girondins formulated a policy of forming a buffer of friendly republics along the Rhine and Alps, regenerated by French military aid and bound to the French Republic by common social and political institutions; the so-called ‘sister republics.’ In their view, in order to win the war, France had to bring the other nations of Europe into its own orbit by spreading the Revolutionary programme of political and social reform. Thus the leading Revolutionaries in these years contemplated ‘républicaniser l’Europe.’ For the time being these plans remained to be ‘a policy’ due to the war situation. Moreover, during the Terror, enduring fear for foreign, Counter-revolutionary forces in combination with the need to organise a popular army of volunteers and conscripts increased xenophobia and appeals to national sentiments and national interests. The Revolutionary attitude towards international relations turned



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from—to use Marc Belissa’s words—‘fraternité universelle’ to ‘intérêt national.’1 With the return of Girondins to a position of some political influence in Paris after the fall of Robespierre during the thermidor coup d’état and a change of tide in military success, the notion of sister republics returned. The relations between France and its ‘sisters’ were one aspect of Revolutionary international politics where Revolutio­nary ideas on European order and a shifting balance of power met. The Batavian Republic was the first of the sister republics to become part of the French sphere of influence being dependent on the French Republic both politically and militarily. By no means does did volume claim to sketch a representative image of the relation between France and all its sister republics. The present volume offers a case study focusing on Franco-Batavian relations. By the time French armies actually crossed France’s borders, idealist, cosmopolitan policies had become outdated. Due to the military experience of the years 1793–1794, French security and the interests of the French nation definitely came first. Even to Revolutionaries still adhering to a more cosmopolitan or international stand, French national interests were to be reconciled with international revolutionism. As a free and enlightened nation the French might be entitled and obliged to be the protector and the guide of other nations as well as to bring about a new European order. But, since the liberation and subsequently the freedom of other nations depended on French support and protection, ‘France first’ was in their interest as well. This is a position Randall Lesaffer—writing on the start of the war between France and Spain in 1635—calls ‘hegemonic defense,’ that is, a great power identifying its own interest and notion of justice with that of the international order at large—either to maintain the existing one or to reform it.2 The French Revolution had provoked the revival of Franco-Austrian and Franco-Anglo rivalry. Both conflicts encouraged the French Republic to bring the second and third rank powers of Western Europe within its sphere of influence. Since the ‘barrière de l’est’ had become obsolete because of Swedish and Ottoman hostility to the Revolution and French Republic as well as their relative decline, and above all   Belissa, 1995.  Lesaffer, 2006, p. 177.

1 2

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because of Poland’s partitioning, France was forced to reformulate its security policy. Unable to balance Russia and Austria in the East, Paris eventually set out for hegemony in the West by annexing the left bank of the Rhine and creating sister republics in the Low Countries, Italy, and Switzerland, hence expelling Austria—the erstwhile enemy—from Western Europe and thus away from France’s borders. In addition, because France had still not overcome the financial difficulties that had caused the Revolution, financial and material contributions—in the form of a financial indemnity, of putting troops and vessels at France’s disposal or of supplying and paying French troops—were to be drawn from the sister republics. In short, they were expected to contribute to the war effort in a way that might be best described as exporting the ‘levée en masse.’ It is worth noticing that factual dependence was, thus, reciprocal to a certain extent. The sister republics might have been dominated by France politically and militarily, but the French Republic depended on its sister republics financially and because of the necessity of controlling the buffer as a precondition for French security. The main priority of thermidorian foreign policy was to create international guarantees for French security. Thermidorians, however, profoundly disagreed on the ways France could best protect itself. Throughout the winter of 1794–1795, the French Convention nationale was divided. Protagonists of the ancient borders opposed Revolutionary zealots. Most Thermidorians stood in between being rather moderate, but still concerned about securing the gains of the Revolution especially by extending French territory towards the natural borders. In the light of that political situation in Paris, the creation of actual sister republics in 1795—the Batavian Republic—and 1797–1798—the Cispadane, Cisalpine, Ligurian, Helvetic, Roman, and Parthenopean Republics—resulted from military contingencies rather than from an intentionally and consistently implemented policy. Nonetheless, from a point of view of French national interest, the sister republics formed an excellent military buffer as well as a provision store and treasure chest. The kind of dominance or hegemony French policy makers thought necessary to establish and uphold was essentially political and militarily since it primarily was to serve French security against foreign threats. Political and military dominance or basically diffe­rences in power do not necessarily affect legal equality and inde­pendence, though. The question remains whether French domi­nance was translated into law and if so, how this was done and how this translation was justified. At



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the centre of this study are the ways power affects the international legal order. Was power translated into law, legal status and legal procedures? Was power relevant to and recognised by the law of nations and incorporated within the inter­national legal order? What kind of international legal order did con­temporaries envision? This volume set out to answer these questions based on a typology of international orders that distinguishes various types by the degree of hierarchy between units and the degree of integration and institutionalisation. This typology is essentially of a political nature, but it can be transmitted into different legal orders. Thereto, the typology is primarily structuralist. It has to be complemented by analysing various cultural aspects of international order. Six ideal types of international order are defined: 1) a stage of true anarchy without any politically organised entities or without sufficiently frequent contacts between entities for a system to develop, 2) a pluralistic-egalitarian stage of co-existing autonomous entities that do, nonetheless, form part of a system, 3) hegemony in which hierarchy and differentiation of tasks, rights, and duties between states in the sphere of inter­national politics arise, 4) within the same trend of subjection, empire in which an imperial power is also entitled to interfere in subjected states’ domestic spheres, 5) within a trend of unification, federation, in which entities are still equal but perpetually join together and establish federal institutions, 6) union in which the trend of unification has proceeded that far that the dualism of a fundamental distinction between distinct political and legal spheres is no longer preserved.

HEGEMONY EMPIRE ANARCHY PLURALIST EGALITARIAN ORDER FEDERATION UNION

Republican Units? Any international order has two elements: 1) the type of units the order consists of, and 2) the relation between these units. Hence, the first issue to elaborate on is the kind of entities that formed international order or an envisioned future order was to consist of.

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Both states under investigation here were republics. They appeared in treaties as ‘the French Republic’ and ‘the Batavian Republic,’ although on the French side treaty preambles changed after the establishment of the Consulat into ‘the First Consul in name of the French people.’ The 1798 Bataafse Staatsregeling declared that treaties were to be concluded ‘in the name of the Batavian people.’ After the French invasion and the Batavian Revolution the United Provinces changed their name and their constitution. A pro-French, Patriot regime replaced the former pro-British regime. Basically a republic already existed in the Netherlands before the French invasion. A sister republic did not need to be created. Despite Girondin rhetoric of sister republics being used, the Franco-Batavian alliance would have been concluded even without a policy of sister republics on the French part. The alliance fitted in the French foreign policy already pursued by Vergennes, while Batavian Patriots had made an alliance with France the core of their foreign policy in the early 1780s. The Revolutionary notion of republican government did contradict the constitutional fundamentals of the United Provinces. The Dutch Republic had been aristocratic and confederal. Revolutionary/Patriot programmes of state reform opposed another notion of sovereignty and a notion of a centralised unitary state to the traditional constitution. These would be the pillars under the 1798 Bataafse Staatsregeling. In part this was a matter of spontaneous imitating the French Republic, in part the French government had urged for reform along these lines. Above all, however, constitutional reform in 1796–1798 was a continuation of the 1780s Patriot programme with some major modifications due to the 1787 experience. The ‘people’ had been a catchword of Patriot discourse in the Netherlands long before the Revolution in France. References to popular sovereignty raised expectations on the nation-state—a state at the service of the people—but in the context of major war the French and Batavian Revolutions led to the state-nation, that is, a Revolutionary avant-garde took control of the state apparatus in favour of its particular political programme and to mobilise national resources for the war effort.3 The Patriot regimes in Paris and The Hague were as much political elites as any other regime, but they were political elites that created and redefined their states’ political

3  On the distinction between the nation-state as a state in the service of the people and the state-nation as a state that mobilises the nation, see Bobbit, 2003, p. 146.



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centres and defined their countries’ population as ‘people’ in order to legitimate their rule by making the claim of being representatives of the people. At this juncture, one might wonder whether a republic in the Revolutionary sense was meant to be the exclusive and only legitimate unit type of international order. In 1791–1792 this might have been the dream of many a Revolutionary and Patriot. In 1795, although Kant argued that every state should have a republican form of government in his Zum ewigen Frieden, the core of French policy makers had reconciled with heterogeneity of regime types. However, peace treaties were concluded with a whole range of princes and the French Republic even entered into an alliance with the King of Spain, whereas an alliance with the King of Prussia was contemplated. Despite the public and academic debate on the stability of a heterogeneous order, French diplomacy after thermidor did not discriminate between republics and monarchies. The Batavian Republic, too, maintained diplomatic relations with a great number of powers with forms of government at variance with popular sovereignty. Moreover, The Hague neglected its Swiss and Italian siblings in favour of its monarch-led trade partners. The sister republics’ form of government—their ‘type identity’4– might have been relevant to international relations because of their intended function as buffer along France’s eastern and north-eastern border, since it was thought to enhance France’s capacity to control the buffer, whereas the alliance with the King of Spain had an entirely different function. Moreover, a French-inspired constitution would ensure the stability and force necessary for the Batavian government to mobilise national resources. This expectation was, however, based on the rational element of a centralised and unified state rather than the democratic one of representative government. The Degree of Unification The second element of any international order is its structure, that is, the way units relate to each other. The Batavian Republic has been called a French satellite or vassal.5 These were politico-empirical appreciations though. This volume is concerned with interstate relations   Wendt, 1999, p. 226 and p. 353.  E.g. Smit, 1950, pp. 114–115.

4 5

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from a legal perspective. The typology of international orders that serves to characterise Franco-Batavian relations throughout this volume identifies two structural trends: a trend focusing on the degree of unification and a trend focusing on the degree of hierarchy. These trends uncover two distinct forms of integration. Both unification and hierarchy turn a system of states into a more cohesive and integrated one. Whereas in the trend of unification states only lose indepen­dence, in the second trend states also lose equality vis-à-vis each other. If clearly distinguished these trends allow for six ideal types of international order to be defined, but one should not rule out the possibility of aspects from the two trends to be combined. Throughout the entire period this study covers, France and the Batavian Republic existed as separate political entities within a European system of states. To whatever extent one might claim that the Revolution disrupted the existing legal and political order, the standardised and regulated character of interstate relations at the system-level is undeniable. Henceforth, true anarchy can be ruled out in advance. The same goes for union, since political entities and do­mestic and international spheres were clearly distinguished. Anachar­sis Cloots had advocated a ‘universal republic,’ but his schemes were hardly taken serious by his contemporaries. Establishing whether French dominance amounted to empire would have called for an addi­tional investigation of intermingling in the Batavian Republic’s domestic sphere. This investigation has not been undertaken. The present analysis is confined to the sphere of international politics and, hence, concentrates on the triangle formed by a pluralisticegalitarian order, a hegemonic order, and a federative order. The main question, then, is whether French dominance lead to establishing a federation, to ‘legalised hegemony,’6 or whether the forms of a pluralistic-egalitarian legal order were kept upright. The typology of international orders presented here is a continuum. The six orders are ideal types. One will not be able to indicate the dividing lines accurately in diplomatic practice. Characterising international orders, thus, is a matter of degree. Henceforth, it has to be determined whether FrancoBatavian relations tended more to a truly pluralistic-egalitarian system or to a hegemonic or federative order or, in other words, on what spot within the triangle Franco-Batavian relations or the international   Simpson, 2004, p. x.

6



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order they formed part of are to be situated. Consequently, equality and independence play a significant role as key features of a pluralistic-egalitarian order and counterparts of the key features of hegemonic and federative orders. The eighteenth century offered three conceptual traditions of international order to safeguard security. In the first place, the balance of power had come to be conceived of as a mechanism against foreign domination. It was part of a political discourse of rationality that emphasised reason of state as a determinant for foreign policy. Within the category of great powers the balance of power had evolved in a principle that justified annexation in the form of ‘compensation’ for other powers’ gains. Hence, this first position perceived aggran­disement as a means of security. However, this strategy called for ignoring legal rights and lacked any justification besides the interest of the obtaining state and the alleged contribution to the stability of the European order at large; poor comfort to the minor power at whose expense compensation was accomplished. The other two traditions were part of legal discourse both countering the Hobbesian denial of the possibility of a positive law of nations in a different way. In both traditions security of all entities forming the international order is basically safeguarded through law. The first of these envisio­ned a legal order of independent entities co-existing under a law of nations based in natural law but deriving from the will of nations, that is, a pluralisticegalitarian order but with a strong sense of legal and moral obligation at the international level. This position is called a Vattelian worldview here.7 The final tradition is that of cosmopolitan federalism. Instead of the autonomy of distinct political entities this tradition stresses the unity of mankind and the universality of political, legal, and moral principles. Establishing perpetual peace and a true legal order, the sole real conditions of security, called for nations to enter into a federative union with common institutions. The latter two traditions dominated the Revolutionary mindset. Moreover, equality and independence were among the core principles of eighteenth-century international political and legal discourse. Equality and independence originated from the anti-hegemonic struggle against universal monarchy that had dominated European politics

7  Although it has to be remarked that Vattel himself did attribute an essential role to the balance of power.

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from the early sixteenth century onwards. Because of this struggle, the idea of equality of autonomous political entities as being of the same rank, that is, as entities exercising the same kind of (supreme) authority within their territory, came to the fore. The image of international order that arose from the struggle against hegemony was that of a knotted cone with sovereign powers all being positioned on the section. Hence, despite some deviations and exceptions in the sphere of diplomatic ceremonial, and despite the factual rise of great powers as a distinct category, hegemony was suspect. Once the French Revolutionaries had to formulate views on international politics they were inspired by their concept of the nation and popular sovereignty and by enlightened cosmopolitanism. The ‘liberté et egalité’ of the Revolution’s slogan were translated into the equality of nations and their sovereignty and independence at the international level. Nations were to exercise popular sovereignty unhindered. Those Revolutiona­ries adhering to the federal vision in 1791–1792 based their federation of nations on equality and the reciprocal guarantee of rights, too. The Revolution that set out to implement the Enlightenment’s promise of a better state and society and an improved condition for man and mankind based on liberty, equality, reason, individual rights, and popular sovereignty, the Revolution that strongly opposed hierarchy among men was unlikely to provide the conceptual framework for hierarchy among nations, French traditional security policy and a sense of French mission, exceptionalism, and superiority notwith­ standing. France’s dominance was to fit in any of the two legal tradi­ tions: Vattelian independence or cosmopolitan federation. Explicating French dominance legally was inacceptable from a conceptual and cognitive point of view. Having explored the Revolutionaries’ and Patriots’ mindsets, the question this volume sets out to answer calls for investigating the way interstate relations were constructed and international politics was conducted in practice. Focusing on the degree of unification first, the main questions that arise are whether the federal vision did still influence legal practice at the expense of the independence of states and whether the sister republics were to form a republican subsystem. Federation is an institutionalised form of perpetual and exclusive cooperation. By entering into a federation, states subordinate their self-interest to the common good. Although primarily a structural category, a federation has a cultural core, since a federal order calls for international solidarity with other nations, a minimum degree of



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collective identity, and the acceptance of international responsibility towards others. In that sense, a federation is a structure with a strong cultural base. Bonds of cooperation between states are legally con­ strued and federal institutions for dispute settlement, law formation, and enforcement are established. A federation externally acts as one. From a structural point of view, the sister republics did not nor were to form a federation. No suprastate institutions were established or even contemplated. With the stress on national interest in France after the 1793 campaign, the federal vision had served its turn. Marc Belissa has argued that the French ‘conception centrale-hégémonique’ obstructed a federation of republican nations.8 Batavian Patriots, however, did not advocate a federative order either. On the Batavian side, an international order of independent nations completed by a legal and moral dimension of interstate relations served as the image of international order for times to come. Once in power, Batavian Patriots held brief for an independent and regenerated Batavian Republic within the European system at large. Batavian foreign policy was entirely directed at national security and affluence. To be sure, Batavian Patriots were in two minds about what policy to pursue in order to attain these ends—natural borders in the east to allow the Batavian Republic to defend itself or tightly aligning with France, peace and neutrality or actively contributing to bringing down British despotism of the seas—, but the orientation on national independence was clear. A Vattelian world­view was left as the sole conceptual basis available. The legal form chosen to set down mutual relations fitted this view. At the start of negotiations in 1795, leading French politicians considered either an alliance or friendly co-existence—with or without extensive annexa­tions. Batavian Patriots had set their mind on an alliance with France to be formalised by a treaty. By its very nature, a treaty is a legal instrument adapted to horizontal relations. One might, therefore, argue that the French Republic instrumentalised a legal form of a pluralistic-egalitarian order to style its hegemony. With regard to the Batavian Republic this is hard to maintain. If one of the two parties instrumentalised the Alliance Treaty for political purposes it was the Batavian Republic. To the Batavian Patriots, the Alliance Treaty was to be their life insurance policy. The Batavians initiated talks on an alliance. Subsequently, all kinds of concessions had to be made to sell the   Belissa, 2008, p. 122.

8

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alliance to the French. The French only used the Treaty to legalise their gains in the territorial sphere and procure military cooperation. France would conclude alliance treaties with the other sister republics, too. This greater ‘Revolutionary alliance’ did not form a republican subsystem within the European system of states. Neither the French government nor the Batavian championed a multilateral alliance. The Directoire and Consulat ruled out a multilateral alliance figuring that France would be better able to control a France-centred network of bilateral alliances.9 The Batavian Republic, too, wished to confine the alliance to a bilateral relation with France. To be sure, the bilateral alliance was extended by an alliance with Spain for the course of the present war. Spain was a monarchy, though. Thereto, the alliance with Spain was essentially anti-British and, by consequence, maritime. The Batavian Republic focused on the sea. The Swiss and Italian sister republics were situated on an entirely different theatre of the war; one where the Batavian Republic did not think to have any business. One might argue that Paris nevertheless was the central node of a republican subsystem charged with external relations. This rebuttal is unwarranted, though, for the Batavian Republic, while favouring relations with Paris and instructing its envoys to keep on good terms and preferably act in concert with French ones, main­tained diplomatic relations with powers all over Europe without discrimination. Hence, relations between the republics and the monarchical part of Europe were not centralised. The French and Batavian Republics each were directly integrated in the European system at large. The French and Batavian Republics did not form a federation from a structuralist point of view. This does not yet exclude the possi­bility of the two Republics referring to the alliance with a federative discourse or to conceive their mutual relations in terms of a culture befitting an alliance. Wendt’s ‘Kantian logic of anarchy’ with the friend role identity or,10 in general, a tightly integrated society of states in the Bullian sense11 would approach the culture underpinning a federation. A society implies shared values, identification and solidarity with others, and responsibilities to the whole. In a society or in Wendt’s ‘Kantian logic’ states feel tied to each other and they incor­porate others in their

  Belissa, 2008, p. 122; Krisch, 2005, p. 389.   Wendt, 1999, p. 18. 11   Bull, 2003, p. 13 and p. 225.  9 10



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self image.12 Friends are likely to form a collec­tive security system and abstain from violence to settle disputes among each other.13 Did the two sister republics under scrutiny here form (part of ) a society and did they conceive each other as friends? With the exception of Britain as adversary, the defensive and offensive alliance would only last for the course of the present war. In public rhetoric references to the ‘cause commun’ were manifold and the alliance was widened to a common fight for liberty against despotism, but the Hague Treaty did not really establish a perpetual collective security system. The alliance’s duration and geographical scope were just too specific. As to the other aspect, the two sister republics in general were not likely to use force against each other. This was not explicitly excluded, though. Moreover, on one occasion the government in The Hague did consider deploying cavalry units to the Franco-Batavian border to prevent French officials from violating Batavian territorial integrity. On the other hand, throughout the Lequoy negotiations on Flushing, the French commissioner argued that arbitration was superfluous since the two Republics should be able to come to an agreement in concert. This would amount to the proposition that the two sister republics were to settle disputes bilaterally by amicable diplomacy. As to the element of society, the alliance was mainly based in a community of interests. These interests were primarily defined in pragmatic terms, that is, security, commerce, colonial restoration, and other material interests dominated. These interests partly coincided, but although one frequently referred to shared interests it cannot be ignored here that the two governments viewed the war in different ways. Above all, the relation vis-à-vis Prussia and Austria was entirely different. The Batavian Patriots considered Prussia to be the main Continental threat, whereas Paris wished to obtain Prussia as a partner against Austria. The two Republics did share adversity against Britain. Even with regard to Britain, the two Republics were, however, mainly driven by their own security and economic interests. The additional, sporadically dominant discourse of liberty did refer to shared values and couched the alliance in terms of these values: fighting despotism, fighting for the freedom of the sea. The notion of natural allies that was occasionally applied to the French and Batavian Republics

  Wendt, 1999, pp. 212–213.   Wendt, 1999, p. 18 and p. 265.

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likewise points in the direction of societal bonds. According to the discourse surrounding Franco-Batavian relations, good terms and bonds of friendship and fraternity did exist prior to and beyond the scope of the Alliance Treaty. The Treaty confirmed and perpetu­ated these bonds, even though the Treaty itself was continuously re­ferred to as the legal basis for mutual rights, claims, and duties. The Degree of Hierarchy Whereas a federation in a structural sense amounts to closer and perpetually institutionalised alignment between equals, the second trend leads to a distinction between international orders based on the degree of hierarchy. In a pluralistic-egalitarian order political entities are equal. The counterpart of this equality is subordination. In a hege­monic order this subordination is restricted to the sphere of inter­national politics. Inequality then comes down to legally accepted dominance resulting in task differentiation with regard to the for­mation and enforcement of law and dispute settlement, special rights, exemption from legal obligations, and recognised leadership. By consequence, a hegemonic power is able and entitled to control inter­national politics. In the first place, Gerry Simpson has identified existential equality as one aspect of equality of entities forming an international order together.14 Existential equality amounts to an equal right to exist, that is, an equal right to international legal personality, territorial integri­ty, and internal self-determination. The Revolution’s theory of the state was based on social contract theory according to which the state (or nation) is the political community of citizens originating from their joint and expressed will to form a state. Once applied in practice, this rational-political notion of the state was reconciled with existing territories, but even then this turned the creation and legitimacy of the state into an entirely internal affair. Since the citizens’ will sufficed to form a state, recognition by other powers was not constitutive for the existence of the state. Nevertheless, recognition by other powers was not deemed irrelevant. To be sure, the Batavian sense of a need for recognition was inspired by political reasons. Especially in the case of Prussia, recog­nition added to the Batavian Republic’s secu-

  Simpson, 2004, p. 48 and p. 53.

14



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rity exactly because Prus­sia would recognise the new Republic’s right to exist. Moreover, recog­nition was constitutive in the sense that it was a condition for main­taining official diplomatic relations. The very moment Berlin recogni­sed the new regime in The Hague relations were restored. Hence, recognition of the Batavian Republic’s existence was constitutive for the faculty to participate in international politics—next to main­taining diplomatic relations that would see to concluding treaties and declaring war—or, in other words, the Batavian Republic’s interna­tional legal personality depended on the recognition by other powers. The requirement of recognition is not ipso facto a sign of inequality. However, recognition by the great powers seems to have been deemed more relevant. The Batavian government requested France to tender its good offices having the Batavian Republic recognised by Prussia. No indications have been come across that a similar effort was made with regard to e.g. Bavaria, even though the Elector did not recognise the Batavian Republic until 1801.15 Austria recognised the Batavian Republic in the Treaties of Campoformio and Lunéville. France made sure of that, while the Batavian Republic was merely included in peace treaties with other powers rendering recognition thus at the most implicit. Britain never recognised the Batavian Republic explicitly. The Batavian Republic was accepted as a treaty partner in Amiens and it was referred to as a potential treaty partner in the Paris and Lille negotiations of 1796–1797. The British declaration of war to the Bata­vian Republic of September 1795 might have already implied recogni­tion or might indicate that the British, too, acknowledged no discontinuity between the United Provinces and the Batavian Republic. Recognition of the Batavian Republic by France was a some­what different matter. A Batavian offer to recognise the French Republic was declined. Hence, the recognition of the Batavian Republic was unilateral. Moreover, the Comité de Salut public set conditions to recognition, thus even adding to the asymmetry. The Batavians attached great value to recognition by France, but they disagreed with their liberators on the character of that recognition. Despite the initial proclamation of Batavian independence by the ‘représentants en mission,’ the French commissioners held brief for discontinuity between the United Provinces and the Batavian Republic. The United Provinces had been   Spaans, 2005, pp. 30–31.

15

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abolished by the French conquest. Thereto, the French commissioners argued that the Batavian Republic did not exist yet. It was a new state. According to the version of social contract theory Sieyes adhered to in his 1789 pamphlet, the origin of a state was a deliberate act of con­stitution. Hence, the Batavians were deemed to be in an interme­ diate stage in which they did not form an independent political entity with sovereignty over Dutch territory yet. In line with social contract theory, the Batavian Republic would be constituted once a constitution went into force or, at the earliest, a constituent assembly convened. To emphasise this position, the French com­missioners refused to use the denominator ‘Batavian Republic’ in the Treaty of The Hague. By consequence, the French restored Dutch territory to the United Provinces and the recognition in the Treaty applied to the United Provinces instead of the Batavian Republic. Nonetheless, there are indications that the French deemed their recognition as conqueror constitutive for the Bata­vians political existence. After denying the Batavians a political character throughout the negotiations, the French Republic did after all conclude a treaty with them and transferred possession and jurisdiction over the best part of Dutch territory to the Dutch Republic in the end. In this line of reasoning, the Batavian Repu­blic’s existential equality did, thus, depend on French recognition. To be sure, this was a once-only event. Conversely, the Batavian Patriots, on their part, held out for continuity between the United Provinces and the Batavian Republic. Therefore, the Batavian Republic’s existential equality had to be respected from the start. It is worth elaborating somewhat more on the matter of territorial integrity here. A first thing to note is that the Batavian Republic—or in general ‘a state’—was not identified with its territory. The state— either a nation or a prince as incorporation of the public body—was a corporate entity with a dual relationship with territory. A state had possession of its territory and held sovereignty (or jurisdiction) over it. Therefore, the French Republic could restore Dutch territory—allegedly in the possession of France because of the right of conquest—to the Dutch Republic. In the Batavian line, this distinction between state and territory did indeed allow for maintaining the position of continuity despite the French occupation. The application of the right of conquest was repudiated. Furthermore, the cession of territory was connected to the notion of popular sovereignty, since the Batavians claimed that constituent parts of any of the sovereign Provinces were only to be ceded with the consent of their populations.



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In the French line of discontinuity, this restoration coincided with the recognition. References to the necessity of popular consent were put aside or ignored by the French. In their view, the faculty to consent to cession accrued to the people as a constituted communi­ty, which did not exist yet. Thereto, cession did not matter to indivi­duals because in either case they would be citizens of a state with a representative government, that is, they would be free and partaking in popular sovereignty whether they lived in the French or in the Batavian Republic. The distinction between state (or nation) and territory allowed for the argument that they were free to move if they did not want to become French. Only the territory would be transferred from the one state to another, not its inhabitants unless—by consequence of the practical identification of the French nation with the existing territory—they implicitly adhered to the social contract by not moving. Because of the alleged discontinuity, no independent Batavian nation in possession of Dutch territory existed yet prior to the Treaty of The Hague. In general, territory would be restored to the Dutch Republic by France with some parts exempted instead of the Dutch Republic ceding part of its territory to France. More substantially, the acquisition of part of Dutch territory was justified as a just indemnity for war expenses, and based on the right of conquest and the concept of natural borders next to military necessity. Whereas the French and Batavian negotiators differed on the situation prior to French recognition, they agreed that once the Batavian Republic would be recognised as an independent power, relations between the two Republics would be directed by the rules of conduct of an order of equal and independent powers, and Batavian territorial integrity would have to be respected. The Batavians seem to have considered territorial integrity and exclusive jurisdiction as the core elements of independence. They were continuously alert on violations of their territorial integrity and lodged protests on virtually every occasion whether it concerned privateer activity in their territo­rial waters, actions by French policemen or customs officers along the southern border, or French activity in Flushing. To be sure, the Zeeland port was an exception to the French respect for the Batavian Republic’s territorial integrity and exclusive jurisdiction, but this was concealed by the French stand that Flushing was held in condomi­nium. The French did indeed have the exclusive right to lay garrison there. On matters of customs, local taxes, prohibition of British goods, and jurisdiction over Frenchmen disputes arose. The Batavian govern­ment would adhere to

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the modern notion of sovereignty as indivisible and exclusive jurisdiction, whereas the French referred to the Flushing settlement in terms of the feudal notion of joint lordship. A final aspect of existential equality is a state’s internal self-determination. This volume has not addressed the questions whether the French interfered in Batavian domestic affairs, in what way and to what extent they did that. It has to be noted here, that France and Austria recognised the Batavian Republic’s right of internal self-determination in the Treaty of Lunéville. Thereto, at several instances the argument in this volume has come across indications that domes­tic affairs were deemed relevant to international politics, that is, inter­nal stability was considered a condition for external action and success at the international level. Simpson distinguishes two further aspects of legal equality—formal and legislative equality—that are more considered with rela­tions between states and a state’s actions at the international level.16 Moreover, one must consider the external element of independence—the freedom of action at the international level—and the element of reciprocity of rights and obligations, benefits and burdens. With regard to freedom of action at the international level, three aspects of international politics will be addressed here. In the first place, independent states are free to decide for themselves what states to maintain diplomatic relations with. The Batavian Republic continued the Dutch Republic’s traditional Europe­an network, although relations with various powers were interrupted because of their non-recognition of the new Republic or their enemy status vis-à-vis France. The French Republic does not seem to have interfered in the Batavian government’s decisions on what powers to maintain diplomatic relations with and the choice of diplomats. There are only two exceptions to this non-interference and these either concern direct diplomatic relations with France—Blauw’s recall in 1796—or can be traced back to the Alliance Treaty. The Hague Treaty stipulated that all enemies of either ally were enemies of the other too. This did not call for the Batavian Republic to declare war on all enemies of the French Republic. It did call for the Batavian Republic to break off diplomatic relations as was made explicit in the case of the Portuguese envoy. Moreover, this limitation derived from a treaty clause formally   Simpson, 2004, p. 33 and pp. 47–53.

16



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consented to. Besides this clause in the Alliance Treaty, there were no limitations to the Batavian government’s freedom to decide on its country’s diplomatic relations. In the second place, independent states are free to declare war or not. The Alliance Treaty did not affect the faculty to wage war with other powers. The offensive alliance called for each ally to consider the other’s enemies as one’s own, but this did not imply an obligation to declare war. In the third place, independent states are free to conclude treaties (of peace or otherwise) or not. The Hague Treaty prohibited entering into negotiations or concluding peace with Britain separately. This was a reciprocal prohibition and one freely consented to. Moreover, France was obliged to include the Batavian Republic in peace treaties with other powers. These stipulations were quite common to alliance treaties and did not curtail either ally’s equality or independence. Beyond the Alliance Treaty there were no formal limitations to the free exercise of the ius pactandi. To be sure, the Batavian Republic hardly concluded any treaties or conventions with another power than France. The Batavian Republic did adhere to the Franco-Spanish Alliance Treaty and subsequently concluded a military convention with Spain. The adherence to the Treaty of San Ildefonso (19 August 1796) was on French invitation. The Treaty of Amiens (27 March 1802) was not a bilateral treaty with a third power without French involvement either. Nevertheless, no formal limitations of the right to conclude treaties can be derived from this factual lack of treaties or conventions with other powers. The period under scrutiny was rather short and characterised by continuous war. The number of treaties powers entered into was not that high yet in the eighteenth century for rendering the lack of any treaties throughout this period exceptional. As said before, France opposed alliance treaties between the sister republics, but the Batavian government had no intention concluding any—it was even surprised when the Premier Consul suddenly did conclude the 1803 Convention on behalf of the Italian Republic too. Hence, a dispute over the right to conclude these treaties did not arise. Due to the war situation, it was not the time to conclude any treaties of commerce with third powers. The Batavian government did contemplate extending the Batavian border to the east, which would have called for a treaty with Prussia or the Empire at large. This scheme was obstructed in Rastatt, though. France did negotiate with Prussia on cession of the enclaves in Guelders to the Batavian Repu­blic on the

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latter’s behalf. Partly this was due to the fact that Berlin did not recognise the Batavian Republic yet. On the other hand, the cession would be part of a general territorial settlement in the Empire. France and Austria wished to exclude as many powers as possible from negotiations on this settlement. Hence, the Batavian Republic was kept outside of these negotiations. In general, France’s policy of separate peace treaties prevented Batavian involvement in any peace treaties save the Treaty of Amiens, even though the Batavian government expressed the desire to participate in the build-up to the Rastatt and Lunéville congresses. Thus, the Batavian Republic was deprived of the possibility to further its interests. In the case of negotiations with Austria or the Empire, The Hague did accept this exclusion because of the Batavian Republic’s auxiliary status. To return to Simpson’s classification, formal equality sees to the equal application of law and equal means to enforce one’s legal rights and claims. In a situation of two states with a considerable power difference between them, the most powerful of the two is more likely to back out of its obligations than the other because the means and costs of coercion are unequally divided. Given the state of the law of nations at the time, the clearest legal obligations were the ones in purview of the Hague Treaty. The Batavian Republic did indeed honour its obligations to the best of its capability, albeit not always wholeheartedly. This was the case with the supply of the French auxiliary corps, with not maintaining diplomatic relations with powers France was at war with, and it was the case with deploying a Batavian contingent to fight alongside French forces in Germany. The Batavian Republic did not manage to pay the indemnity or to put the squadron of men-of-war to sea in time. This was not a matter of withdrawal from legal obligations, however, but of factual incapacity to perform. The Batavian Republic did wish to back out of the offensive alliance soon, but it did not do so unilaterally. The clausula rebus sic stantibus was not invoked. Instead, the French government was to be persuaded to alter the Treaty in concert. This was refused time and again. Once the Alliance Treaty had been concluded, Paris made use of the necessity of mutual consent to prevent Batavian neutrality. The big question is, then, whether the French Republic did show the same respect for its treaty obligations. Despite the relative instability of Batavian politics, hardly any situation occurred in which the constitutional guarantee could have been invoked. Nevertheless, France refused to conclude any agreement with Britain on peace or with Prussia



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on recognition of the Batavian Republic and cession of the enclaves that left open the possibility of an Orangist restoration. Pursuant to the Hague Treaty the Batavian Republic, at the time of the general peace, had a right to territorial compensation for territories that had become French in 1795. The ‘at the general peace’ turned out to be the tricky part. For as long as the war with Britain continued, France was able to ignore Batavian urging for aggrandisement without actually violating this clause. After Amiens, France failed to live up to this obligation, however, since only the Prussian dominions enclaved in the Batavian Republic were procured as part of the territorial settlement of the Empire. By no means did these enclaves equal in surface Dutch Flanders, Venlo, and Maastricht with its surroundings. The guarantee of Batavian colonies is a hard one to crack. Ceylon was lost to the Batavians in Amiens. To be sure, the Batavian Republic consented to this loss by signing and ratifying the Treaty of Amiens, but France had already committed itself to the cession of Ceylon to Britain in the London Preliminaries (1 October 1801). In Lille, the French had honoured the colonial guarantee in the end. Britain’s refusal to restore all occupied Dutch colonies was used as the pretext to break off negotiations. In part, however, this was merely a pretext to Directors who did not wish to conclude peace altogether. Thereto, the French government had geopolitical reasons to oppose Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope becoming British. Most remarkably, though, is that the French government had been inclined to yield to British claims in the course of negotiations. Had the fructidor coup d’état been staged by another faction, France would probably have conclu­ded peace with Britain without honouring the colonial guarantee. Pur­suant to the Alliance Treaty no separate peace with Britain was con­cluded. France was close to do so in Lille, though. Furthermore, negotiations with Britain were commenced in 1800–1801 without the knowledge of the Batavian government. In sum, France was on the verge of flagrantly infringing on Article 5 of the Hague Treaty. Admittedly, this infringement was almost as common to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century state practice as the appearance of this clause in alliance treaties. France did back out of the arbitration clause in the Flushing regulations. Refusing to submit the disputes over Flushing to arbiters once the Batavians invoked the clause was a violation of the regulations. Lequoy argued that arbitration did not befit two states that related to each other in a way that corresponded to what Wendt would later

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describe as the friend role identity.17 However, this does not alter the fact that France did withdraw to politics; even though it was politics in the alleged form of amicable diplomacy. France clearly violated the obligation to pull back its forces from the Batavian Republic once the war had ended. Initially this violation was covered under stalling tactics and practical pretexts. In the end, pulling back French troops was openly refused and Batavian independence was even ignored as the French unilaterally took various military measures in the spring of 1803. In general, France did not straight­forwardly back out of its legal obligations. To be sure, the French government exploited every room the Alliance Treaty or the law of nations in general provided and any loophole they left. The bow of the law was bent to the very limits of what it could bear, but it was hardly ever broken. Because of the lack of legal mechanisms to enforce one’s rights and legal claims save war, the difference in power did influence the factual capacity to enforce legal rights and claims on the Batavian side. Despite continuous Batavian objections, the French got their way. Batavian objections do, however, indicate that these French claims and actions were deemed violations of the law of nations in the Batavian view. The Treaty of The Hague was often referred to as the legal basis of mutual relations. The French and Batavian governments frequently disagreed on what the Treaty or the law exactly called for. Disputes arose over the interpretation of the command clause, over the Flushing settlement, over deploying Batavian troops abroad, and over the laws regulating privateering. It has to be noted here that most of the times disputes were about the interpretation of treaty provisions. Hence, an international legal discourse was not avoided in these disputes. There were, however, some exceptions in which France did withdraw to politics or domestic law. The refusal to submit disputes over Flushing to arbiters has already been mentioned as an example of withdrawal to politics. Flushing was the side of examples of withdrawal to domestic law, too. The claim that Flushing was a Franco-Batavian condominium partly excluded this aspect of Franco-Batavian relations from the international sphere. It provided the French with a legal argument to enforce measures of economic war­fare against Britain, to establish a customs office and pilot service, and to duck out of local taxes. Like  Wendt, 1999, p. 258 and pp. 298–300.

17



the revolutionary alliance

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wise, misconduct by Frenchmen in Flushing or soldiers and officers of the French corps in pay of the Batavian Republic as well as privateer activity were withdrawn from the international sphere by claiming jurisdiction for French courts and the applicability of French laws. On a more general level, the notion of a legal order between and/ or above states was still influential. Especially the Batavians fre­quently referred to ‘the law of nations’ or to basic principles like good faith and the sanctity of treaties. Clearly, they adhered to the idea that interstate relations were governed by law. Negotiations on the territorial settlement in the Alliance Treaty, for instance, abounded with legal arguments. On no occasion did the French deny the validity of the rules of law or principles that were referred to. The proposition that the Revolution and Revolutionary Wars had caused a stage of lawlessness18 cannot be maintained as far as diplomatic practice is concerned. Treaties and conventions as well as the law of nations in general were recognised as legally binding. However, a distinction has to be made between French officials in the field who basically did as they wished and the French government. In reaction to Batavian objections, the latter did apologise and promise to mend its way most of the times; publicly manifesting respect for the law of nations and treaty obligations. Although French security and other interests were paramount, Paris was aloof to openly abandon legal discourse even if short-term French interests would be served by infringing on the law of nations or treaty obligations. In sum, there was no simple dialectic between power and law as far as the applicability of the law of nations or the respect for treaty bonds were concerned. Legislative equality, that is equal participation in the formation of law, hardly deviated from the general image sketched thus far. Tailored to law formation by means of treaties, this kind of equality has three aspects: 1) the right to participate in the formation of law by which one is going to be bound or by which one’s interests are affected, 2) equality in the procedures of negotiations, 3) formal consent to legal bonds as opposed to imposition of law by others e.g. in the form of a command. A distinction has to be made here between treaties and conventions between the two Republics and peace treaties with third powers. In mutual relations between the French and Batavian Republics the Treaty of The Hague stands out. Despite the fact that French  E.g. Belissa, 2006, p. 51.

18

730

part iv

troops had occupied the Dutch Republic’s territory, the Hague Treaty was a negotiated one. Negotiations were conducted in due form. Both sides were able to submit drafts and these were substantively discussed in conferen­ces. To be sure, the Batavians were placed in a somewhat disadvan­tageous position due to the French refusal to recognise the Bata­vian envoys in their formal capacity. Furthermore, the French unilaterally changed the rules of the game in the course of the process by transferring negotiations to The Hague. Moreover, the French dominated the agenda by keeping to the contemplated ex­change between recognition of the Batavian Republic on the one hand and indemnity and a border settlement on the other. Conver­sely, the Batavian envoys managed to cut down on French demands and time and again refused agreeing to provisions they deemed contrary to their country’s independence and dignity. Occasionally, both parties put pressure on negotiations. In the end, the loss of territory, the indemnity, and legal obligations under the alliance were formally consented to in accordance with constitutional procedures of ratification. Subsequent conventions and regulations, too, were negotiated and formally consented to. The main exception was the 1803 Convention. The Batavian commissioners were not really given a chance to negotiate. At the very end, the Batavian Republic was bullied into signing a convention, although formally the principle of consent was upheld. The Alliance Treaty with Spain might count as an exception as well. The Batavian Republic was invited to accede to this Treaty. There was nothing odd with this and formally the Batavian Republic was entitled to refuse doing so, but basically the Batavian Republic was withheld any influence on the Treaty’s substance. Legislative equality is a whole lot more difficult to maintain with regard to peace treaties with third powers. In general, the Batavian Republic was kept out of negotiations due to France’s policy of separate peace treaties. The French government did indeed succeed in preventing a general congress, which ipso facto can be regarded as a successful attempt to reshape treaty practice. Sporadically, French officials made statements that indicate views on differentiation between great powers and secondary powers with regard to treaty formation by consequence of which secondary rank powers should be content with a subsidiary role in the peace process. This was not, however, the official position of the French government, which was more subtle. The Batavian government had not requested participation in the Campoformio negotiations since it awaited a general congress to step



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in. In Rastatt, the Batavian Republic was denied the right to participate in order to further its interests and advocate its territorial schemes directly. The Hague reconciled with French mediation in negotiations with the Empire. In Lunéville, the Batavian Republic was not allowed to further its interests in the peace settlement with the Empire either, although a Batavian envoy had been appointed. Hence, the Batavian Republic was excluded from the formal forum where it might have furthered its interests and plans directly. The Batavian government was adamant not to be excluded from negotiations with Britain. The main difference between negotiations with Austria and with Britain was that the Batavian Republic was a belligerent in its own right in the war against Britain, while it operated as an auxiliary in the war against Austria. This difference in role is the primary explanation of a more active involvement on the Batavian part in negotiations with Britain; next to the British desired cession of Dutch colonies that is. The Batavian Republic’s right to participate was recognised in general, but in Lille the French did propose and even­tually insist on representing their allies. This attempt of reshaping treaty practice to accommodate French preponderance was not accep­ted, though. The Hague kept insisting on direct participation as its lawful right as an independent power and as a matter of the sanctity of treaties. In Amiens, the Batavian Republic was allowed to have a Batavian envoy partake in the peace congress. That time, the policy of separate peace treaties no longer obstructed participation since peace with Austria had already been concluded. In peace treaties with various powers of the second or third rank, the Batavian Republic was almost always included pursuant to Article 6 of the Hague Treaty. Finally, it has to be noted that none of the Treaties in which the Batavian Republic was merely included contained any legal obligations for the Batavian Republic. Since the Batavian Republic was only allowed to partake in the Amiens negotiations, the question whether equality in negotiation procedures was upheld arises with regard to Amiens alone. The Batavian envoy clearly played the second fiddle. France and Britain had set the agenda for negotiations in London and this agenda was not to be altered. Schimmelpenninck did not attend all conferences. If matters relevant to the Batavian Republic were discussed, he was present and he did manage to mitigate the settlement with regard to the Cape of Good Hope. The Batavian government did formally consent to the Treaty. In the text of the Treaty no traces of inequality are to be found.

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A final aspect of equality is the reciprocity of rights and obliga­tions, benefits and burdens. Formally, the offensive and defensive alliance was reciprocal. From a military point of view France benefited more from the offensive alliance since France was more likely to take the offensive. On the other hand, the defensive alliance was essential to the Batavian Patriots, whereas Batavian assistance was merely con­venient to the French. The obligation to expel political refugees and the colonial guarantee were reciprocal, too. French ‘émigrés’ were more likely still to be on Batavian soil than Orangists having fled to France, but this obligation was not really a burden to either of the two allies. The Batavian Republic was to benefit from the colonial guarantee more, because France would be in a better position to negotiate with Britain—the single power to threaten French or Dutch colonies. Free navigation of the Rhine, Meuse, and Scheldt was reciprocal, too, but France profited more from this provision because of Antwerp. With regard to military cooperation, rights and obliga­tions were not reciprocal. On the one hand, France was to provide an auxiliary force to defend the Batavian Republic paid by the defended power. On the other hand, the Batavian Republic was to provide a fixed contribution in terms of men-of-war and troops to fight abroad once requested and had to pay for them. The financial burden was entirely on the Batavian Republic’s shoulder. In theory, the benefit from a military point of view was larger to the Batavian Republic because it would not have been able to defend itself against a great power attack on its own. The main burdens the Hague Treaty contained rested on the Batavian Republic: the indemnity and the loss of territory. In exchange, the Batavians had obtained a unilateral constitutional guarantee, a promise of territorial compensation, the return of armouries, navy and army store houses, and the cession of the House of Orange’s possessions. As a concession for Dutch Brabant not becoming French, France attained the right to occupy fortifications in times of war. Furthermore, the Alliance Treaty in general counted as life insurance policy to the Batavian Patriot regime. The more secure the Patriot regime in The Hague felt the less paramount this general benefit was sensed and the heavier the financial and military burdens became. It was no coincidence that pleas for neutrality tailed off after the 1799 Anglo-Russian invasion, because that event made Batavian Patriots appreciate the alliance again. Moreover, the Batavian envoys had cut back on the indemnity and the loss of territory until a price for liberty that was just acceptable. France had precedence with regard to command of troops in case of joint



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action and with regard to coordinating operations. The prohibition of separate negotiations or a separate peace with Britain was reciprocal. The obligation to include the Batavian Republic in peace treaties with other powers was unilateral. Apparently the Batavian Republic was already expected to be at war with Britain only. The non-reciprocity with regard to command, coordinating operations and peace can be explained based on the present war situation. The present war was essentially one waged by France, whereas the Batavian Republic had a subordinate and more specific role to play. In the war on the Continent, the Batavian Republic was an auxiliary. The Batavian Republic was mainly concerned with its own security rather than winning the war. This difference in roles and aims partly explains differentiation and non-reciprocity next to or even instead of inequality in power. In sum, although rights and obligations did differ and the allocation of burdens and benefits was slightly asymmetric, it cannot be concluded that the Treaty of The Hague was essentially lop-sided. As a general typification the French and Batavian Republics did not form part of an international order nor envisioned one structural­ly based on functional differentiation, hierarchy, French leadership and French control of international politics. State practice did not deviate far from the dominant Vattelian worldview. The Alliance Treaty to a large extent contained legal forms, rights and obligations in conformity with a system of states based on indepen­dence and equality. The longterm perspective in all public statements clearly was independence and sovereignty. The legal forms of an international order based on state sovereignty and independence were wielded as well as avowed and respected en public. The Patriot regime in The Hague attached great value to its country’s independence. This should not come as a surprise. A time in which liberty and equality were the catchwords of the day did not allow for open foreign intervention despite Enlightenment cosmopolitanism and clear fac­tual preponderance. Republicanism and popular sovereignty stressed the freedom and independence of the nation. In fact, national ‘regene­ration’—that is recovery of the country’s economy and political standing by republican virtues, political and social reforms from what Patriots experienced as decline—was at the core of the Patriot programme. This sense was particularly influential in the French and Batavian Republics. Both countries endeavoured to overcome a period of weakness. Thereto, Batavian Patriots did not need to make a great effort convincing the French to intervene on their behalf in 1794–1795 by emphasising international revolution and

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fraternity. The ‘libera­tion’ of the Dutch Republic was a by-product of military events con­fronting French isolationists with an accomplished fact. Hence, co-existence and cooperation of independent and free nations was the logical consequence of Revolutionary Patriotism for international relations. The tragedy of Patriotism as an Atlantic movement in the sense Robert Palmer has described the phenomenon19 was not that French Revolutionaries did not share their foreign brothers’ urge for independence and national regeneration. The tragedy was that the definition of French regeneration called for safeguarding France’s security and restoring France’s role as great power by obtaining natural borders and vesting French hegemony in Western Europe. This definition collided with France’s neighbours’ pursuit of regene­ration. The clash was particularly strong in the case of the Batavian Republic, because the Batavian Patriot Movement built on a domestic republican tradition and the memory of the 1780s Patriot Revolt.20 There was a strong conceptual drive preventing the French government from legalising French preponderance. Even if the members of the French government had not internalised respect for other countries’ independence and equality, at least the Directoire still had to reckon with a considerable minority in the legislative councils and the electorate that took Vattelian values dead serious. Next to domestic political considerations, France was held back from making its dominance explicit in legal terms by considerations of European politics. In the first place, France was simply not strong enough to dominate the German great powers beyond the short-term aftermath of military victory and certainly not if Prussia and Austria would join forces. Hence, Prussia was to be kept neutral or was even to be persuaded to align with France. Thereto, Paris needed Berlin’s coope­ration to counter Austria during negotiations on a territorial settle­ment for the Empire that included the Rhine as France’s border. For both reasons, the French government was determined not to offend Prussia and the King of Prussia—while reluctantly abandoning his brother-in-law— was not expected being keen on French control of the entire Low Countries because of geopolitical and commercial reasons. The role attributed to Prussia in French foreign policy was a major determinant of how France treated the Batavian Republic in practice.21 In addi-

  Palmer, 1959, p. 4.   Schama, 1989, p. 40. 21   Van Hamel, 1918, pp. 339–340. 19 20



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tion, Britain was anticipated not to be willing to return Dutch colonies with great geopolitical value to the Batavian Republic if the latter’s independence would be questionable. Finally, the extent to which the French government showed respect for or at least paid lip service to Batavian independence was determined by the necessity of active Batavian cooperation in implementing plans to invade the British Isles. These plans occasionally came to the fore for a short period. Hence, the influence of this drive varied. The deviations from or exceptions to the general image of a pluralistic-egalitarian order are threefold. The first category consists of deviations and exceptions that were based on the idea of a transi­tory stage. Unilateral actions or hierarchical notions were confined to the period of military occupation between the French invasion and the Treaty of The Hague throughout which, the French claimed, the Batavians did not form an independent state yet. This allowed for the French to argue that their territorial claims were not adverse to the Batavians’ (popular) sovereignty. On the few occasions Frenchmen justified unilateral action or differentiation in terms of French tute­lage they referred to a transitory situation, too. After reforms had been implemented and after the French and Batavian Revolutions had been secured by winning the war, the Batavian Republic would be and be treated like an independent, free and equal republic. To be sure, once this moment seemed to have arrived in 1802–1803, the French government did find it hard to renounce its control. A second category of deviations and exceptions can be traced back to military leadership within the present war situation. Deprived of any great power allies, republican France endeavoured to compensate its isolated position by allying with a great number of second rank powers. By consequence, an entirely different kind of alliance structure evolved characterised by a network of bilateral relations and with clear military and political leadership concentrated in Paris. The Revolutionary alliance clearly had a centralised character. A great deal of French dominance came down to alliance management in a war situation. Even this military leadership was hardly formalised. The Alliance Treaty and subsequent conventions merely provided for French command in case of joint actions and liaison officers to be send to Paris. The French Republic was the primary and fully committed belligerent, whereas the Batavian Republic mainly acted as auxiliary. De facto, Paris did determine the major plans of campaign, but the Batavian Republic could decide on its own to deploy troops or men-of-war since its forces were never fully and permanently integra­ted in what might have

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been called ‘allied forces.’ This role differenti­ation also explains why the Batavian contribution to the war effort was fixed in the Alliance Treaty unlike the French one. The Batavian government also tried to curtail French military leadership as much as possible. The French general commanding the French corps was charged with supreme command of all forces on Batavian soil on several occasions, but it was stressed every time that this was a temporal measure. Thereto, The Hague did maintain its position that the French commander in chief was subordinated to Batavian civil authorities and needed permission, for instance, to move troops. Simultaneously, the short-term military and financial situation impelled the French government to ‘instrumentalise’ the Batavian Republic. The basis for this instrumentalisation was laid in the Hague Treaty and subsequent conventions, that is, in consensual agreements that France was able to fully exploit. This caused non-reciprocity and inequality more than any vision of a hierarchical order. Infringements on Batavian independence in the sphere of measures against British goods resulted from the present war situation, too. In general, the notion that French security was in the common interest—what has been called the ‘lifeguard principle’ in Chapter II.4—served as justification for France’s claim to privileges and the right to be spared nagging and fussing from its allies. It can be questioned whether in a future conflict with Britain in which the Batavian Republic would be the primary belligerent roles and by consequence rights and obliga­ tions would have been reversed. One can only speculate on an answer to this question. It is hard to image that France would have settled for the role of auxiliary and would have accepted Batavian leadership of the alliance in such a case. Basically, however, the entire period of the Batavian Republic’s and the Revolutionary alliance’s existence was dominated by a single war situation from which one cannot abstract. In any case, the Hague Treaty did not provide for military cooperation in future conflicts but for the general extension of the defensive and offensive alliance to all future wars against Britain. Finally, it has to be noted that deviations and exceptions from a pluralistic-egalitarian order did cause real friction once the war had ended. From 27 March 1802 onwards, the war did no longer serve as a justification for deviations and exceptions, which compelled the French government to openly ignore and disrespect Batavian independence and treaty provisions in order to keep and—in the spring of 1803—strengthen military control of the Batavian Republic.



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A final category of deviations and exceptions from a pluralisticegalitarian order concerned great power peace negotiations. France’s policy of separate peaces and the great powers inclination to reach agreements amongst one another at the expense of minor powers in general, excluded the Batavian Republic from congresses or attributed it a secondary role. On the other hand, the Batavian Republic’s backward position in negotiations with Austria and the Empire, too, can be explained from the role difference between France as bellige­rent and the Batavian Republic as auxiliary. France’s attempt to repre­sent the Batavian Republic in negotiations with Britain eventually failed, though. Thereto, in the end, Batavian consent to the cession of Ceylon was still considered necessary. Because of these deviations and exceptions Franco-Batavian relations did not entirely conform to the ideal type of a pluralisticegalitarian order. Their mutual relations are to be situated about on the spot where the X is in the triangle below. The long-term pulled in the direction of the top corner, public discourse in the direction of the right bottom corner, and short-term French domi­nance towards the left bottom corner. The dominant line and the majority vision of the future was based on a pluralistic-egalitarian order of co-existing, equal, free and independent states with a legal and moral dimension to interstate relations, but also with some (temporal) aspects of hegemony and traces of a culture of federa­tion.

PluralisticEgalitarian

Hegemony

X

Federation

738

part iv Beyond State-Centrism

If deviations from equality and independence were exceptional, the question remains how the French Republic exercised its dominan­ce within a framework of a pluralistic-egalitarian order. At the core of the answer to this question is a particular kind of withdrawal to politics state-centric international relations theory is blind to. The French government made use of factionalism, that is, internal political division and cross border ideological and political alignments. A great power with hegemonic or imperial ambitions can make use of this factionalism to bring states into its sphere of influence without violating the legal forms and concepts of an egalitarian, pluralistic states system. Particularly in times of revolution and fundamental political divisions within states, cross border alignments between factions tend to override state’s interests and national sentiments.22 As Robert Palmer has shown the ‘democratic revolution’ was an Atlantic phenomenon with Patriot movements all over Europe.23 Patriotism was concentrated in what Michael Broers calls the ‘Lotharingian isthmus’—the urbanised regions of Western Europe from the Low Countries to Lombardy—and he rightly claims that shared ideology and political interdependence made cross border bonds between these movements stronger than bonds with some fellow citizens within each country.24 The buffer of sister republics more or less coincided with this ‘isthmus.’ The French made use of this to establish control without fundamentally questioning sovereign equali­ty and independence. In fact, local Patriots even provoked French intervention. Admittedly, Dutch, German, Swiss, and Italian Patriots were not simply adhering to French ideas; nor were they going to follow the French lead like meek lambs. Each Patriot movement had its own local programme and the Patriot movements varied according to the local political situation and the local Patriots’ social back­ground, but the shared ideology was employed to gain cooperation from local Patriots. Thus, French dominance was mainly exercised through contacts between French diplomatic representatives and military commanders with governing Patriots behind the scenes. The French government exploited what

  Wight, 1977, p. 36; Bull, 2002, pp. 238–239.   Palmer, 1959, p. 4. 24   Broers, 2001, p. 137, p. 139, and p. 141. 22 23



the revolutionary alliance

739

Tim Blanning has referred to as ‘the joy of the satellite state.’ Cooperation of one domestic faction in control or taking control of government sufficed.25 Of course this strategy was not without disadvantages. French dominance depended on the stability of local Patriot regimes, power take-overs in Paris had to affect the sister republics’ governments and Paris had to be sure that those governments were manned by depen­ dable figures; men to be trusted, strong enough to control their own countries while not strong enough to act independently from Paris. By consequence, the French got involved in or even initiated a series of coups d’états in every sister republic. These coups were as much the core as a consequence of the strategy of controlling the sister republics from behind the scenes. Moreover, because of this strategy, France had an interest in the domestic constitutional order of the sister republics. Their constitutions not only had to confirm the ideological bonds between the Republics, they had to assure a sufficiently rational and strong administration as well, because this was what the strength of the buffer and the capacity to draw on the sister republics’ resour­ces depended on. Hence, one of the main features of interstate relations in Western Europe in the years after 1795 is exactly a clear intermingling of international and domestic politics. The strategy, while pursued in order to pay lip service to independence, called in fact for ongoing intervention. French influence had to be covert in order not to go against the notion of popular sovereignty. Furthermore, Paris had to act very carefully not to compromise the sister republics’ independence too openly. To form a stable buffer, Prussia and Austria had to accept the existence of the sister republics and until 1805–1806 France was not yet sufficiently strong to force their hand. In other words, one of the reasons that prevented France from formalising its hegemony—reckoning with the other Continental great powers—made that the French government still had to tread on eggs vis-à-vis the sister republics in exercising informal dominance, too. Nonetheless, as long as the government in Paris was able to control the sister republics by means of their own constitutional system through local Francophile factions, formal independence could still be respected and formal relations between France and its sister republics   Blanning, 1996, p. 171.

25

740

part iv

could be restricted to an alliance structure. This is, however, not just a plea for a reductionist approach—turning to domestic politics and replacing states by political factions—instead of a state-centred, structuralist one. The interstate dimension is not to be sneezed at entirely. In the first place, the Batavian Republic operated diplomatic relations of its own. It continued a Europe-wide network of resident envoys— with the temporal exclusion of the powers it or the French Republic was at war with. In the second place, the Batavian governments were very sensitive to maintain their countries territorial integrity and the exclusiveness of their jurisdiction; objecting to French violations of their territories tenaciously and opposing the ces­sion of territory to France vehemently. In the third place, the Batavian governments clearly repudiated the French ‘offer’ to negotiate on their behalf with Britain. They wanted to be involved in peace negotiations directly to take care of their countries’ interests. In the fourth place, and more in general, national interests and national dignity of the Batavian Republic did frequently appear in diplomatic correspon­dence and minutes of negotiations from the period. As national regeneration was the main promise of the Patriots to their own populations, references to one’s own national interests were crucial to gaining and maintaining the support for the Patriot regime at home. Overindulgence towards France might compromise the domestic power base. Moreover, the financial burdens of the alliance with France threatened to destroy state finances and the national economy, and to undermine the success of domestic reform plans. Conversely, local Patriots were well aware that the survival of their regimes—threatened both by domestic and foreign enemies—to a large extent depended on French support. The balance between national interest and the French alignment was determined then by the international and domestic political and military situation. While local Patriots became more conciliatory under military threat or domestic political turmoil, they tried to attain a more independent position or even to get out of the alliance in times of military success and relative calm. The more political stability, the more the state or national interest dimension dominated. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century international legal doctrine was full of ‘self-preservation,’26 but in the case of the Batavian Republic the ‘self ’ to be preserved changed. At first, Batavian Patriots were   See e.g. Tuck, 2001, p. 9.

26



the revolutionary alliance

741

concerned with the preservation of their rule and were willing to pay the price for French support. Once their regime was stabilised domestically, more or less accepted internationally, and they acknow­ledged French egocentrism, the Batavian Patriots became more con­cerned with preserving the Batavian Republic as an at least nominally independent state or, in the words of the Uitvoerend Bewind ‘our Republic’s political existence.’27 Henceforth, only a way of thought in terms of a matrix both taking interstate relations and cross border factionalism and domestic poli­tics into regard may provide us with full comprehension of great powerminor power relations in Western Europe throughout the Revolutionary era. Franco-Batavian relations were determined by the dialectic between regeneration and hegemony.

  ‘het staatkundig bestaan [. . .] dezer republiek’; 3 September 1801, Uitvoerend Bewind to Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 533. Likewise, 13 October 1798, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 639; 10 May 1803, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes (private letter); NA 2.21.073 no. 18. 27

APPENDIX French Authorities 1795–1803 • Executive • Comité de Salut public • Directoire exécutive • Consulat • Department of Foreign Affairs • Charles Delacroix • Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand • Charles-Frédéric Reinhard • Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand • Legislative council(s) • Convention nationale • Conseil des 500 & Conseil des Anciens • Tribunat, Conseil legislative & Sénat



–17951 1795–1799 1799–



–1797 1797–1799 1799 1800–



–1795 1795–1799 1799–

Batavian Authorities 1795–1803 • Executive • Uitvoerend Bewind2 • Staatsbewind • Department of Foreign Affairs • Willem Buys • Maarten van der Goes • Legislative council(s) • Staten Generaal3 Secreet Besogne • First Nationale Vergadering Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken • Second Nationale Vergadering • Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam • Wetgevend Lichaam



1798–1801 1801–



1798 1798–



–1796



1796–1797 1796–1798 1797–1798 1798–1801 1801–

1   If no year is indicated when the institution was established or abolished or the official was appointed or resigned, the year is not within the period covered by this book. 2   From the 22 January 1798 coup d’état to the Staatsregeling: Voorlopig Uitvoerend Bewind. After the 12 June coup d’état to the elections for the Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam: Intermediary Uitvoerend Bewind. 3   Prior to the 1798 Staatsregeling the distinction between executive and legislative power is not applicable.

744

appendix Foreign Diplomats in the Batavian Republic4

French Republic François Noël Charles Delacroix Claude Roberjot Louis Champigny Aubin Vincent Lombard de Langres Joseph Fouché N. Florent-Guyot Chemin Deforgues Charles-Louis Huguet de Semonville

minister plenipotentiary minister plenipotentiary minister plenipotentiary chargé d’affaires extraordinaris envoyé minister plenipotentiary minister plenipotentiary minister plenipotentiary minister plenipotentiary (from 1802 onwards ambassador)

1795–1797 1797–1798 1798 1798 1798–1799 1799 1799 1799–1800 1800–1805

extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary

1802–

minister plenipotentiary

1801–

chargé d’affaires minister resident

1798 1806

agent

1799–

extraordinary envoy chargé d’affaires chargé d’affaires extraordinary envoy chargé d’affaires extraordinary envoy

1789–1797 1797–1798 1798 1798–1801 1801–1803 1803–

Austria/Emperor Guillaume Antoine François Bavaria Martin Josef von George Bremen George François de Bosset Cisalpine/Italian Republic Matteo Angelo Galdi Denmark Herman Schubart Christian Levsen Willem Scholten Ferdinand Luckner Johan Theophilus Fursman François Xavier Joseph

  Schutte, 1983.

4



appendix

745

Great Britain Robert Liston

extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary

1802–1803

agent

1782–1806

agent

1772–1806

agent agent/resident/ minister resident minister plenipotentiary

1793–1804 1794–1797

Hamburg Lodewijk van Wijn Hessen-Homburg Hendrik Coenraad Slemp Hesse-Cassel Johan Gijsbert Heeneman George François de Bosset

1797–1804

Nassau-Usingen Johann Christoph Wilhelm von agent Daehne

1789–1803

Palts-Sulzbach Alexander van Kervel

agent

1780–1801

extraordinary envoy extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary

1790–1802 1802–

chargé d’affaires chargé d’affaires chargé d’affaires extraordinaris envoy and minister plenipotentiary

1795–1796 1796–1798 1798–1803 1803–

chargé d’affaires chargé d’affaires extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary

1795 1802–1803 1802–1805

Portugal Antonio d’Araujo e Azevedo Joao Paolo Bezerra de Seixas Prussia Freiherr von Bielfeld Heinrich Renfner Freiherr von Bielfeld Carl Heinrich von Caesar Russia Michail Semenovic Novikov Pavel Gugberg Gustav Ernst von Stackelberg

746

appendix

Saksen-Coburg Cornelis van der Kop

agent

1763–1805

agent agent

1793–1804 1804–

chargé d’affaires chargé d’affaires

1795–1798 1798

agent/chargé d’affaires

1781–1796

minister plenipotentiary chargé d’affaires minister plenipotentiary ad interim

1796–1803 1803 1803–1805

Saksen-Gotha Johan Gijsbert Heeneman Gerard Karel Koenraad Vatebender Sardinia De Plenti Carlo Aurelio Bossi Solms-Braunfels Johannes Franciscus van den Corput Spain José de Anduaga Francisco Ruiz Lorenzo José Eliodoro de Bouligny y Marconie Sweden Fredrik Adolf von Löwenhielm extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary

1789–1805

United States John Quincy Adams William Vans Murray

minister resident minister resident

1794–1797 1797–1801

agent

1793–1804

Waldeck Carel Christiaan Zanders Wurtemberg Philippe Gaspar de Penasse chargé d’affaires Johann Christian Friedrich von minister plenipotentiary Hügel

–1798 1798–

Würzburg and Bamberg Christiaan Frederik Meyer

agent

1760–1807



appendix

747

Batavian Diplomats5 French Republic Jacobus Blauw Caspar Meyer Willem Buys Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck

minister plenipotentiary minister plenipotentiary extraordinary minister extraordinary minister plenipotentiary extraordinary ambassador Carel de Vos van Steenwijk ambassador Anthony Boldewijn van extraordinary envoy and Dedem van Gelder minister plenipotentiary Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck ambassador Jan Matthijs Smits secretary

1795–1796 1795–1798 1798 1798–1800 1800–1802 1802–1803 18036 1803– 1798–

Austria/Emperor Reinier van Haeften heer van Ophemert en Zennewijnen Jacobus Blauw J.L. Silliman Gerrit Carel van Spaen van Voorstonden

extraordinary envoyé and minister plenipotentiary minister plenipotentiary chargé d’affaires extraordinary envoyé and minister plenipotentiary

–1797

minister plenipotentiary

–1797

17987 1800–1802 1802–

Bavaria Hendrik August baron Van Kinckel

Circles of Upper and Lower Rhine Hendrik August baron Van Kinckel C.A.A.M.N. de Raet heer van Bögelskamp

minister plenipotentiary

–1795

minister plenipotentiary

1797–1804

  Pennings and Thomassen, 1994; Schutte, 1976.   Not admitted. 7   Did not arrive in Vienna. 5 6

748

appendix

Cisalpine Republic Anthony Boldewijn Gijsbert van Dedem Charles Henri van Grasveld

minister plenipotentiary

17988

minister plenipotentiary

17999

minister plenipotentiary

–1796

minister plenipotentiary

–1795

chargé d’affaires extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary

1795 1795–1796

minister plenipotentiary chargé d’affaires

1797–1804 1804–

Cologne10 Jacob van Lansberge Denmark Jacob Fagel Christiaan Diederik Emerens Johan Bangeman Huygens Dirk Wolter baron Van Lynden Christiaan Diederik Emerens Johan Bangeman Huygens Johannes Gualterus Johnson Great Britain Anne Willem Carel van Nagell minister plenipotentiary heer van Rijnenburg Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary

–1795 1802–1803

Hesse-Cassel Clemens August Anton Maria Nepomuk heer van Bögelskamp en Berghorst

minister plenipotentiary

1797–1804

Lower Saxon Circle and Hanze towns (Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen) Jan Caspar Hartsinck Balthasar Elias Abbema Johan Godard Reinhold

minister plenipotentiary minister plenipotentiary chargé d’affaires

  Did not arrive in Milan.   Did not arrive in Milan. 10   Occupied and later annexed by the French Republic. 11   Not admitted.  8  9

–1795 1795–180011 1800–



appendix

749

Mainz Heinrich August baron von Kinkel Georg Ernst Lucius

minister plenipotentiary

–1795

chargé d’affaires

1796–1800

ambassador

1785–180812

chargé d’affaires

–1796

chargé d’affaires minister plenipotentiary

1794–1799 1801–1806

extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary chargé d’affaires minister plenipotentiary chargé d’affaires extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary

–1795

extraordinary envoy extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary extraordinary envoy

–1795 1801–1803

minister plenipotentiary

1797

Ottoman Porte Frederik Gijsbert van Dedem heer van Gelder Poland C.T.L. von Griesheim Portugal Daniel Gildemeester Charles Henri van Grasveld Prussia Arend Willem van Reede Pierre Etienne Bourdeaux Carel Gerard Hultman Pierre Etienne Bourdeaux Anthony Boldewijn Gijsbert baron van Dedem van Gelder

1795–1802 1802 1802–1803 1803–

Russia Jan Willem Hogguer Willem Buys Dirk van Hogendorp

1803–

Sardinia Jacobus Blauw

  Official relations suspended 1799–1802.

12

750

appendix

Spain Maarten van der Goes heer van Dirxland Jean Aubert Johan Valckenaer Leonard Stuck Willem Hendrik van Nieuwerkerke Johan Valckenaer Willem Hendrik van Nieuwerkerke

extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary chargé d’affaires extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary chargé d’affaires chargé d’affaires

1793–1795

extraordinary ambassador chargé d’affaires

1799–1801 1801–1802

extraordinary envoy

–1795

chargé d’affaires minister plenipotentiary

1795 1795–1797

chargé d’affaires minister plenipotentiary minister plenipotentiary

1797–1798 1798–1801 1802–

minister plenipotentiary

1795–1796

minister plenipotentiary

–1796

extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary

1802

1795–1796 1796–1798 1798–1799 1799

Sweden Jan Carel van der Bosch heer van Langendreir Anthony Abraham Loos Anthony Boldewijn Gijsbert baron van Dedem van Gelder Anthony Abraham Loofs Willem Buys Pieter Hieronymus van Westrenen heer van Themaat en Houdringen Switzerland Jan de Witt Trier13 Jacob van Lansberge Tuscany Anthony Boldewijn Gijsbert van Dedem

  Occupied and later annexed by the French Republic.

13



appendix

751

United States Franco Petrus van Berkckel Rogier Gerard van Polanen

resident minister resident

1789–1795 1796–1803

Wurtemberg Paulus Hubert Adriaan Strick minister plenipotentiary van Linschoten Anthony Boldewijn Gijsbert minister plenipotentiary baron van Dedem van Gelder Alexander Diederik van Spaen minister plenipotentiary van Hulshorst

1797–1801 1801–1803 1803–

752

appendix Treaty of The Hague, 16 May 1795

(Traité de paix et d’alliance du 27 Floréal an III de la République Française entre la République Française et celle des Provinces-Unies )14 La République Française et la République des Provinces-Unies, également animées du désir de mettre fin à la guerre qui les a divisées, d’en réparer les maux par une juste distribution de dédommagemens et d’avantages réciproques, et de s’unir à perpétuité par une alliance fondée sur les vrais intérêts des deux peuples, ont nommé pour traiter définitivement de ces grands objets, sous la ratification de la Convention nationale et des États-Généraux, savoir: La République Française, les citoyens Reubell et Sieyes, Représentans du Peuple, et la République des Provinces-Unies, les citoyens Paulus, Lestevenon, Mathias Pous et Huber, Membres des États-Généraux; lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins-pouvoirs, ont arrêté les articles suivants: Article 1 La République Française reconnaît la République des Provinces-Unies comme Puissance libre et indépendante, et lui garantit sa liberté, son indépendance, et l’abolition du Stathoudérat décrétée par les États-Généraux et par chaque province en particulier. Article 2 Il y aura à perpétuité, entre les deux Républiques Française et des ProvincesUnies, paix, amitié et bonne intelligence. Article 3 Il y aura entre les deux Républiques, jusqu’à la fin de la guerre, alliance offensive et défensive contre tous leurs ennemis sans distinction. Article 4 Cette alliance offensive et défensive aura toujours lieu contre l’Angleterre, dans tous les cas où l’une des deux Républiques sera en guerre avec elle. Article 5 Aucune des deux Républiques ne pourra faire la paix avec l’Angleterre, ni traiter avec elle sans le concours et le consentement de l’autre.   Traité de paix et d’alliance du 27 Floréal an III de la République Française entre la République Française et celle des Provinces-Unies, concluded at The Hague on 16 May 1795. The original text is to be found in: NA 1.01.08 no. 12597.281. Thereto, the text can be found in: Kerautret, 2002, pp. 24–33 ; CTS vol. 52, pp. 383– 391; and http://www.culture.gouv.fr/public/mistral/caran_fr?ACTION=RETROUVER _TITLE&LEVEL=1&GRP=0&REQ=%28%28trait%e9%20de%20paix%29% 20%3aTYPEDOC%20%29&USRNAME=nobody&USRPWD=4%24%2534P&REL _SPECIFIC=1&FIELD_98=TYPEDOC&VALUE_98=%20trait%e9%20de%20paix%20 &SYN=1&IMAGE_ONLY=&MAX1=1&MAX2=1&MAX3=100&DOM=All. 14



appendix

753

Article 6 La République Française ne pourra faire la paix avec aucune des autres Puissances coalisées, sans y faire comprendre la République des ProvincesUnies. Article 7 La République des Provinces-Unies fournira pour son contingent, pendant cette campagne, douze vaisseaux de ligne et dix-huit frégates, pour être employés principalement dans les mers d’Allemagne, du Nord et de la Baltique. Ces forces seront augmentées pour la campagne prochaine, s’il y a lieu. La République des Provinces-Unies fournira en outre, si elle en est requise, la moitié au moins des troupes de terre qu’elle aura sur pied. Article 8 Les forces de terre et de mer des Provinces-Unies, qui seront expressément destinées à agir avec celles de la République Française, seront sous les ordres des généraux français. Article 9 Les opérations militaires combinées, seront arrêtées par les deux Gouvernemens; pour cet effet, un député des Etats-Généraux aura séance et voix délibérative dans le Comité français chargé de cette direction. Article 10 La République des Provinces-Unies rentre, dès ce moment, en possession de sa marine, de ses arsenaux de terre et de mer, et de la partie de son artillerie dont la République Française n’a pas disposé. Article 11 La République Française restitue pareillement, et dès à présent, à la République des Provinces-Unies, tous les territoires, pays et villes faisant partie ou dépendant des Provinces-Unies, sauf les réserves et exceptions portées dans les articles suivans. Article 12 Sont réservés par la République Française, comme une juste indemnité des villes et pays conquis restitués par l’article précédent: 1. La Flandre Hollandaise, y compris tout le territoire qui est sur la rive gauche du Hondt; 2. Maëstricht, Venloo et leurs dépendances, ainsi que les autres enclaves et possessions des Provinces-Unies, situées au sud de Venloo, de l’un et de l’autre côté de la Meuse.

754

appendix

Article 13 Il y aura dans la place et le port de Flessingue, garnison française exclusivement, soit en paix, soit en guerre, jusqu’à ce qu’il en soit stipulé autrement entre les deux nations. Article 14 Le port de Flessingue sera commun aux deux nations, en toute franchise; son usage sera soumis à un réglement convenu entre les Parties Contractantes, lequel sera attaché comme supplément au présent traité. article 15 En cas d’hostilités de quelqu’une des puissances, qui peuvent attaquer, soit la République des Provinces-Unies, soit la République Française, du côté du Rhin ou de la Zélande, le Gouvernement Français pourra mettre garnison Française dans les places de Bois-le-Duc, Grave et Berg-op-Zoom. Article 16 A la pacification générale, la République Française cédera à la République des Provinces-Unies, sur les pays conquis et restés à la France, des portions de territoire égales en surface à celle réservées par l’article 12; lesquelles portions de territoire seront choisies dans le site le plus convenable pour la meilleure démarcation des limites réciproques. Article 17 La République Française continuera d’occuper militairement, mais par un nombre de troupes déterminé et convenu entre les deux nations, pendant la présente guerre seulement, les places et positions qu’il sera utile de garder pour la défense du pays. Article 18 La navigation du Rhin, de la Meuse, de l’Escaut, du Hondt, et de toutes leurs branches jusqu’à la mer, sera libre aux deux nations française et batave; les vaisseaux français et des Provinces-Unies y seront indistinctement reçus aux mêmes conditions. Article 19 La République Française abandonne à la République des Provinces-Unies tous les bien immeubles de la Maison d’Orange, ceux même des meubles et effets mobiliers dont la République Française ne jugera pas à propos de disposer. Article 20 La République des Provinces-Unies paiera à la République Française, à titre d’indemnité et de dédommagement des frais de la guerre, cent million de florins, argent courant de Hollande, soit en numéraire, soit en bonnes lettres de change sur l’étranger, conformément au mode de paiement convenu entre les deux Républiques.



appendix

755

Article 21 La République Française emploiera ses bons offices auprès des Puissances avec lesquelles elle sera dans le cas de traiter, pour faire payer aux habitants de la République Batave les sommes qui pourront leur être dues pour négociations directes, faites avec les gouvernements avant la présente guerre. Article 22 La République des Provinces-Unies s’engage à ne donner retraite à aucun émigré français; pareillement la République Française ne donnera point retraite aux émigrés Orangistes. Article 23 Le présent traité n’aura son effet qu’après avoir été ratifié par les Parties Contractantes; et les ratifications seront échangées à Paris, dans le terme de deux décades,15 ou plus tôt, s’il est possible, à compter de ce jour. En foi de quoi, nous soussignés Représentans du Peuple Français, et nous soussignés Membres des États-Généraux, en vertu de nos plein-pouvoirs respectifs, avons signé le présent Traité de paix, d’amitié et d’alliance, et y avons apposé nos sceaux respectifs. Fait à La Haye, le 27 Floréal, l’an IIIe de la République Française (16 mai 1795). Reubell Sieyes

P. Paulus W.A. Lestevenon B. Mathias Pous Huber

Articles séparés et secrets Article 1 La République des Provinces-Unies offre à la République Française en pur prêt et pour toute la durée de la guerre, 3 vaisseaux de ligne, 4 frégates pour agir, soit avec l’escadre des provinces-Unies, soit séparément, seulement dans les mers d’Allemagne, du Nord et de la Baltique. Ces vaisseaux et frégates seront prêtés tout gréés, armés et en état de tenir la mer pour cette campagne, en même tems que l’escadre des Provinces-Unies; le gouvernement français les approvisionnera et les fera monter en officiers et matelots. A la fin de la présente guerre ils seront rendus à la République des Provinces-Unies. Dans le cas où ces vaisseaux et frégates ne feront pas partie d’une escadre française et agiront de concert avec l’escadre ou partie de l’escadre des ProvincesUnies, le commandement de la flotte, en exception de l’art. 8 du Traité patent et pour ce cas seulement, sera dévolu à l’Amiral des Provinces-Unies.

  In the Revolutionary calendar a week had ten days and was called a ‘décade.’

15

756

appendix

Article 2 Les pays énoncés dans l’art. 12 du Traité patent ne sont réservés que pour être unis à la République Française et non à d’autres Puissances. Article 3 Un mois après l’échange des ratifications du présent traité, l’armée française dans les Provinces-Unies sera réduite, en exécution de l’art. 17 du traité patent, à 25,000 hommes, qui seront soldés en numéraire, équipés et habillés, tant sains que malades, par la République des Provinces-Unies, sur le pied de guerre conformément au réglement qui sera convenu entre les deux gouvernemens. Cette armée sera laissée, en tout ou en partie, après la paix à la République des Provinces-Unies tout le tems qu’elle le désirera et elle sera entretenue sur le pied qui sera réglé à cet effet. Article 4 En exécution de l’art. 18 du traité patent portant l’obligation de la part des Provinces-Unies de payer à la République française la somme de 100 millions de florins, argent courant de Hollande, soit en numéraire, soit en bonnes lettres de change sur pays neutres, ladite somme sera divisée en deux parties, dont la première de 50 millions de florins sera payée de suite à la décharge de la trésorerie nationale de France sur les places dans l’étranger qui seront désignées par elle. A cet effet, la trésorerie nationale fournira incessamment aux commissaires des États-Généraux nommés pour cette négociation, un tableau de ses dettes actuellement exigibles dans l’étranger pour une somme supérieure à celle de 50 millions de florins. A mesure que les obligations seront retirées des mains des créanciers acceptés par la Républiques des Provinces-Unies, elles seront rapportées à la trésorerie nationale de France pour décharge. Quelle que soit l’époque des payements convenus entre les Provinces-Unies et les susdits créanciers, les intérêts courans des créances acceptées seront à la charge de la République des Provinces-Unies à dater du jour de la présentation du susdit tableau par la trésorerie nationale. Et néanmoins la totalité des décharges des susdits 50 millions de florins sera rentrée en entier à la trésorerie nationale avant le terme de deux à compter de la ratification du présent traité; faute de quoi les sommes dont il n’aura pas été rapporté décharge, ainsi que celle des intérêts courans occasionnés par les retards des payements seront, sans autres délais, mises à la disposition de la trésorerie nationale de France sur telles places étrangères qui seront désignées par elle. Premier moitié, ci  .......................................................................... 50,000,000 f. Quant aux autres 50 millions de florins, il seront payés à la trésorerie nationale ou à ses ordres, savoir: en prairial prochain  . ..................................................................... 10,000,000



appendix

dont 9 millions en lettres de change et 1 en argent, en messidor prochain  ................................................................... dont 8 millions en lettres de change et 2 en argent, en fructidor prochain  . .................................................................. dont 7 millions en lettres de change et 3 en argent, en pluviose, 4e année rép.  . ........................................................... en floréal même année, pour fin de payement  . ....................... Total

757 10,000,000 10,000,000 5,000,000 15,000,000 100,000,000

Article 5 Les réquisitions faites directement aux États-Généraux par les Représentans du Peuple avant la signature du présent traité, seront remplies en totalité sans retard. Le remboursement de cette dépense prise dans sa totalité, est réduit et fixé à la somme de 10 millions de florins, lesquels ne pourront être imputés que sur les payements de floréal 4e année républicaine, dernier terme dont on est convenu par l’article précédent. Article 6 Les deux Républiques Contractantes se garantissent mutuellement les possessions qu’elles avaient avant cette guerre dans les deux Indes et sur les côtes d’Afrique. Les ports du Cap de Bonne-Espérance, de Colombo et Trinquemale seront ouverts aux vaisseaux français comme aux vaisseaux des Provinces-Unies et aux mêmes conditions. Article 7 La République Française se réserve sur les biens des émigrés français dans les Provinces-Unies et pays en dépendans, tous les droits qu’elle y avait à l’entrée de l’armée française. Les présens sept articles secrets font partie intégrante du traité arrêté ce jour entre les deux Républiques. Ils auront la même force et seront aussi ponctuellement exécutés par les deux nations que s’ils étaient formellement insérés dans le traité patent. Fait à La Haye, le 27 Floréal an III (16 mai 1795). Reubell Sieyes

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758

appendix

Réglement pour déterminer l’usage du port de Flessingue, en conséquence de l’article XIV du Traité de paix et d’alliance du 27 floréal an II de la République Française (16 mai 1795), entre la République Française et celle des Provinces-Unies Article 1 Les deux nations française et batave se serviront également du port et du bassin de Flessingue pour la construction, la réparation et l’équipement de leurs vaisseaux. Article 2 Chaque nation y aura, séparément et sans mélange, ses propres arsenaux, magasins, chantiers et ouvriers. Article 3 Pour faire entrer, dès à présent, la nation française en communauté d’avantages du port de Flessingue, la République des Provinces-Unies lui cédera, sur le bassin, le bâtiment qui sert de magasin à la compagnie des Indes occidentales; en outre, il lui sera assigné le terrain nécessaire pour y établir des chantiers et des arsenaux, et jusqu’à ce qu’elle puisse en jouir, elle aura l’usage des chantiers actuellement existans. Article 4 Quant aux acquisitions de nouveaux terrains et constructions de bâtimens que chaque nation voudrait faire dans les ports et bassin de Flessingue, pour agrandir ses propres magasins, arsenaux et chantiers, ou en créer de nouveaux, les frais de renouvellement ou de réparation desdits arsenaux, magasins et chantiers, et les frais qui regardent les constructions, réparations et équipement des vaisseaux respectifs, avec tout ce qui en dépend, resteront à la charge de chaque nation respectivement. Article 5 Les frais des réparations nécessaires au port, au bassin et aux quais, étant pour l’avantage commun des deux nations, seront à la charge des deux Gouvernemens. Ces réparations seront arrêtées, ordonnées et conduites par la direction des Provinces-Unies. La direction de la République Française sera seulement prévenue des réparations à faire, et se bornera, quand elles seront achevées, à en constater la confection, à en faire passer le procès-verbal à son Gouvernement, à y joindre l’état des frais, afin qu’il soit de suite pourvu au remboursement de la moitié desdits frais. Article 6 Ile st convenu qu’aucune des deux nations ne mettra dans le port ni vaisseau amiral, ni vaisseau de garde.



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Article 7 Dans tous les cas où il s’éleverait des contestations qui ne pourraient être terminées à l’amiable, sur l’exécution du présent Réglement, ces contestations seront décidées par cinq arbitres qui seront nommés, savoir: deux par la direction française, deux par la direction batave; pour le cinquième, chaque direction nommera un neutre, et le sort déterminera entre les deux neutres nommés celui qui remplira les fonctions de cinquième arbitre. Article 8 Le présent Réglement sera exécuté suivant sa forme et teneur, comme faisant partie de l’article 14 du Traité de paix et d’alliance de ce jour, entre la République Française et celle des Provinces-Unies. Fait à La Haye, le 27 Floréal, l’an IIIe de la République Française (16 mai 1795). Reubell Sieyes

P. Paulus W.A. Lestevenon B. Mathias Pous Huber

ARCHIVALIA A  AE, CP (Paris) •  Angleterre: 590, 591, 595, 598 •  Angleterre Supplément: 30 •  Autriche: 366, 367, 370 •  Milanais: 55, 57, 59, 60 •  Milanais Supplément: 5 •  Hollande: 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 595, 596, 597, 598, 600, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607 •  Hollande Supplément: 22 •  Prusse: 225, 226 •  Suisse: 473, 480

AAE, MD (Paris) •  Angleterre: 105 bis •  Autriche: 8, 70 •  France: 335, 524, 652, 655, 656, 1414, 1811 •  Italie: 12

AN (Paris) •  AF II Conseil exécutif provisoire et Convention, Comité de Salut Public, Cartons: 64 •  AF II* Conseil exécutif provisoire et Convention, Comité de Salut Public, Registres: 49, 50 •  AF III Directoire exécutif ans IV–VIII, Cartons: 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 59, 70 •  AF III* Directoire exécutif ans IV–VIII, Registres: 20, 176, 178 •  AF IV Secrétairerie d’État impériale; Consulat et Empire: 912 •  AP Roederer: 29AP 21, 22, 23 •  AP Sieyes: 284AP 10

ASMi (Milan) •  Trattati: 112 •  Autografi, Principi e sovrani: 71 •  Archivio della Prima Divisione del Ministero degli Esteri, residente a Parigi (Marescalchi): 21 •  Archivio della Seconda Divisione del Ministero degli Esteri, residente a Milano (Testi): 323

SBA (Bern) •  Hauptabteilung B, Das Zentralarchiv der Helvetischen Republik: 433b, 792, 3324, 3339, 3360

762

archivalia NA (The Hague)

•  1.01.03 Staten Generaal Resoluties 1576–1796: 1723, 3862, 4556 •  1.01.08 Inventaris van het archief van de Staten-Generaal Deel VI Vervolg Loketkast— Secrete kast Tractaten en Ratificaties, overgedragen archivalia: 12597.283 •  1.02.14 Legatiearchief Frankrijk: 593, 596, 598, 599, 600, 601, 604, 607, 608, 610, 611, 612, 628, 631, 633, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 654, 657, 659, 660, 668, 683, 684, 685, 686, 694, 702, 703, 704, 707, 709, 711, 713, 727, 780 •  2.01.01.01 Archieven van de wetgevende colleges 1796–1810: 189, 509, 528, 533 •  2.01.01.04 Archieven van het Uitvoerend Bewind 1798–1801: 221, 223, 458A, 458B, 458C, 479, 482, 485, 665, 667 •  2.01.01.05 Archieven van het Staatsbewind 1801–1805: 445 •  2.01.08 Archieven van het Departement van Buitenlandse Zaken 1796–1810: 26, 28, 40, 50, 52, 53, 55B, 102, 103, 104, 104A, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 217, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234, 342, 360, 361, 363A, 390, 396, 397 •  2.21.073 Collectie Maarten baron Van der Goes Heer van Dirxland 1751–1826: 7, 17, 18, 19, 35, 47, 51, 56, 103 •  3.02.01 Archief van de Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland 1795– 1796: 440, 461

glossary Agent der Buitenlandsche betrekkingen Agent der Finantien Agent der Marine Agentschap der Buitenlandsche betrekkingen Bataafs Commissie tot de Oost Indische Zaaken Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken Committé tot de zaken van de marine Departement van Buitenlandsche Zaaken Grondwet Intermediair Administratief Bestuur Legatiearchief Nationale Vergadering Provinciale Staten van . . . Provisionele Representanten Raad der Marine Raadpensionaris Raad van Oorlog Raad van State Secretaris van Staat Staatsbewind Staatsregeling Staats Brabant Staats Vlaanderen Staatse Landen van Overmaze Stadhouder Staten Generaal Uitvoerend Bewind Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam Volk Wetgevende colleges Wetgevend Lichaam

Foreign Secretary Finance Secretary Navy Secretary Department for Foreign Affairs Batavian Committee on East Indian Affairs Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee on the Navy Department for Foreign Affairs Constitution Intermediary Administration Embassy Archives National Assembly Provincial Estates of . . . Provisional Representatives Navy Council Grand Pensionary War Council Council of State Secretary of State State Regency Constitution Dutch Brabant Dutch Flanders Dutch Limburg Stadholder Estates General Executive Directory Representative Body People Legislative Councils Legislative Body

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Index of names Adams  152 Addington  684 Alexander, Archduke/Tsar  636 Allott  xiii, 11 Alquier  194, 200, 217, 229 Andréossy  475 Anduaga  604, 746 Anfrye  173–174 Araujo  520, 745 Armstrong  25, 53 Aron  29 Artois, Count of  113, 268 Asser  563 Augereau  322–323, 327, 337, 347–349 Augustine  391 Austin  97 Azara  691, 696 Babeuf  192, 514, 519 Bangeman Huygens  511, 748 Baptiste  552 Barère  104, 407 Barras  xiv, 128, 553 Barthélémy  134, 552, 569, 601, 611 Bastid  220 Belissa  6, 86, 97, 119, 131–132, 191, 373, 393, 402, 526, 529, 603, 717 Bentham  92, 96–97 Berthier  329 Bertrand  252–253 Beurnonville  341–343 Bicker  341–342, 495 Bielfeld  360, 515, 745 Bijleveld, Cornelis Gerrit  431–432, 434–440, 442, 445–446, 448 Black  527 Blanken  482, 492 Blanning  222–223, 611, 673, 695, 739 Blauw  xiv, 167, 169, 185–190, 192, 194–195, 197–198, 201–203, 205, 207, 209–215, 217–218, 221, 230–231, 237, 246, 259–260, 282, 289, 294–295, 303–304, 337, 379, 381, 383, 397, 400, 407–409, 514, 518–519, 533, 540, 542, 569, 620, 623, 724, 747, 749 Blok  186 Bobbitt  xiii, 378 Boissy d’Anglais  125

Bonaparte, Joseph  370, 452–453, 455, 457, 662–663, 665–666, 668–670, 673, 689–693, 695–696, 701 Bonaparte, Louis  460, 497–498 Bonaparte, Napoleon  8, 98, 119, 126, 131, 133, 135, 137, 177, 269, 272, 275–276, 318–321, 323, 328, 337, 341, 347–349, 351, 366, 371, 442–443, 457–459, 465–466, 468, 486, 489, 495–497, 530, 534–536, 538, 545, 547–560, 613, 615, 619–620, 651–654, 660–661, 680, 683, 698, 700, 706 Bonnier  611, 615–616, 622, 665, 676 Boucher  38 Bourdeaux  349, 361, 365, 515, 522, 749 Bourdon de Vatry  442 Brands  342 Brantsen  166, 169–170, 173, 185–186, 495 Bredin  222 Bremer  xiv Brienne  159 Brissot  109, 112, 120 Broers  113, 738 Brune  337, 346–348, 365–366, 653, 665 Brunswick, Duke of  111 Buch  619–621, 624–625, 627, 629–631, 643, 648 Bull  3, 14, 24–26, 29, 31–33, 48, 50, 54, 65–66 Burke  107–108, 113, 528, 567 Bush  xiii–xiv Buys  511–512, 516, 523, 637, 743, 747, 749–750 Cabarrus  604 Caillard  179–180, 244, 522 Callières  122 Cambacérès  212, 220, 237 Cambon  407 Carnot  121–122, 126, 128, 134, 178, 186–187, 192, 341, 527, 552, 554, 601, 603, 611 Carr  4, 27, 55, 72 Catherine the Great  537 Cato the Elder  582 Champigny Aubin  258, 268, 354, 744 Charlemagne  415

784

index of names

Charles II, King of Spain  79 Charles V, Emperor  79 Charles VII, Emperor  666 Charles, Archduke  538, 661 Clark  52–53, 65 Clarke  536, 544–545, 548, 550–554, 556–560, 613 Cloots  117, 173, 714 Cobenzl  554–555, 616, 661–666, 668–669, 671, 673, 675 Cochon  182, 184, 194, 217, 229, 300 Colchen  578, 594 Colenbrander  166, 168, 220, 233 Cornwallis  451, 689, 691–692, 696, 701 Courtois  186 Crucé  95 Daendels  162, 166, 168, 298, 300–301, 313, 344 Danton  121–123, 394 Darneville  536–537 De Beveren  580 De Bry  622–623, 648 Deforgues  266, 346–347, 365–366, 744 Degelmann  536 De Gou  344 De Kattendyke  171 Delacroix  xiv, 134, 239, 248, 258, 260–261, 292, 312–314, 343–344, 354, 419–422, 425–429, 540, 542–544, 548, 570–571, 573–575, 577, 580–581, 583–585, 593, 595, 612, 633, 743–744 De Leeuw  609 De Sitter  218, 250, 511, 533 De Villepin  xiii De Vos van Steenwijk, Carel  xiv, 333, 335, 350, 459, 467–469, 471–472, 475–476, 478–479, 482–486, 605–606, 611, 747 De Vos van Steenwijk, Joan Arend  361–364, 366, 580, 583, 585, 588–589 De Winter  300, 313, 324, 467, 495, 668 De Witt  147 Duchhardt  503, 506 Duguit  16 Dumonceau  298, 300 Dumouriez  119, 162, 163 Dundas  574 Dunn  17 Duphot  651 Duroc  660 Eberstein  313–314 Ehrlich  13

Eijkenbroek  313–314, 430, 637 Englund  229 Ermerins  211–212, 401, 410 Eschassériaux  104, 394 Etzioni  xiii Favier  84 Feith  xiv Fénelon  95 Flassan  328, 602–603 Florent Guyot  266, 269, 317, 359, 364, 366, 744 Fouscuberte  363 Francis I, King of France  79, 545 Francis II/I, Emperor  110, 575, 653, 700 Frederick the Great  82, 158 Frederick William II  625 Fukuyama  xiii Galdi  133, 272, 274, 744 Gallo  539, 548–554 Garran de Coulon  393 Gentilli  390–391 Gentz  98, 528 George III, King of Britain  351, 467, 478, 484, 569, 590–591, 612, 653, 655, 663 Geyl  221 Gilpin  31, 52 Gilson  45 Glayre  679 Godoy  586 Gogel  166, 258, 429, 497, 621 Goldsmith  16, 59–61 Görtz  616 Grégoire  9–10, 104–105, 125, 286 Grenville  359, 569–570, 577–578, 580–581, 590–591, 685 Grewe  6, 24, 49–50, 55, 390 Grotius  93, 231, 234, 390–391, 393, 424, 445 Gustavus III, King of Sweden  108 Guyot  549, 572 Haass  30 Hahn  587, 608 Hammond  685 Hardenberg  522 Harouel  132, 222 Harris: see Malmesbury Hart  15 Haugwitz  358–359, 362–364 Hauterive  136, 695



index of names

Hawkesbury  451, 686–687, 692 Hellema  149 Henry IV, King of France  415, 418 Hobbes  8, 34, 87, 93–94, 234 Hoche  119, 538 Hogguer  513, 749 Homan  526 Houweling  30 Huber  217 Hultman  216, 472, 698, 749 Huntington  xiii Huyssen  171 Irhoven van Dam  166–167, 169, 185–188 Jacobi-Klöst  616 Jacobson  482, 492 Jeannin  458 Jenner  656 Joseph II, Emperor  154–155 Joubert  313, 337, 343–345, 620, 639 Jourdan  535 Julius II, Pope  510 Kagan  640 Kant  86, 94, 96–97, 105, 133, 172, 528, 713 Kaplan  30 Keene  26 Keitner  414 Kellerman  346 Kingsbury  46 Kissinger  xiv, 51–53 Kooijmans  8, 14, 38, 40 Korman  390, 392 Koskenniemi  12, 26 Krayenhoff  168 Krisch  71, 74, 77 Lacombe St.-Michel  403–404 Lafayette  109 La Revellière Lépeaux  129–130, 553 Laurent  132, 221 Lauterpacht  27 Legendre  186 Legrand  220, 317, 361, 365 Lehrbach  616 Leibniz  95 Lentz  653 Leopold II  110 Lequoy  431–432, 434–439, 441–442, 719, 727 Lesaffer  72, 506, 535, 709

785

Lessing  89 Lestevenon  201, 217, 292, 421, 540, 542–543, 571, 576, 580, 583, 595 Leszcynski  82, 390 Letourneur  127, 527, 578, 592, 594, 611 Liston  476–477, 479–481, 484–487, 745 Llewellyn  14 Locke  88, 93, 234, 392, 461 Lombard de Langres  268–269, 345, 433, 744 Louis XIV  80, 105, 145–146, 165, 205 Louis XV  82–84, 90, 390 Louis XVI  85, 90, 99–100, 108, 111, 707 Louis XVIII  113, 125, 268 Luard  527 Lucchesini  698 Mably  10, 86, 93, 402–403 Machiavelli  56 Malmesbury  158–159, 557, 570–579, 584–585, 588–595, 600–601, 608, 610–612, 614–615 Marescalchi  276, 494 Maret  578, 592, 594, 601, 611 Marmont  321 Martens  9, 98, 128, 510 Masséna  653 Mathieu  177 Mazarin  214 Mearsheimer  31, 35, 37, 52, 57, 165 Melzi d’Eril  276 Merlin de Douai  105–106, 128–129, 132, 134, 191, 193, 296, 338, 381, 396 Merry  451 Merveldt  538–539, 550, 554 Metternich-Winneburg, Franz Georg Karl von  616, 619 Metternich, Clemens von  616 Meyer  188–192, 194–195, 197–198, 201, 203, 207, 209–215, 218, 221, 230–231, 237, 246, 259–260, 282, 289, 293–295, 298–299, 303–304, 314, 337, 379, 381, 383, 400, 514, 516, 519, 533, 540, 542, 548, 558–559, 564, 569–571, 576, 580–586, 588, 595, 606, 612, 617, 620, 623, 630, 632–637, 643–644, 747 Michaud  170–171, 403, 407–409, 419, 423–424, 429 Minto  660 Modelski  30 Monnet  469–470, 473, 485

786

index of names

Montesquieu  89, 122, 393 Montmorencin Robecq  542 Montrichard  332, 350, 470–471, 473 Moreau  535, 538, 652, 664 Morgenthau  15, 35, 38, 43, 51–52, 56–57, 72 Mortier  485 Napoleon: see Bonaparte, Napoleon Nassau, Maurits van  145 Neff  504 Noël  xiv, 238–239, 248, 250–252, 261, 292, 300, 343, 372, 519–520, 542, 548, 569–571, 575–576, 580–581, 604, 744 Novikov  514, 745 Nozeman  459 Onuf, Peter  96 Onuf, Nicholas  96 Osiander  24, 51–53, 65, 501 Osten  433, 446 Otto  358–359, 361–363, 451, 684–687 Palmer  91, 222, 734, 738 Pasteur  292, 421, 540, 571, 576, 609 Paul, Tsar  527, 651, 683 Paulus, Andreas  25, 26 Paulus, Pieter  172, 207, 211, 217, 219, 221, 252, 512 Penn  95 Percheron  422 Petiet  275, 652 Philip II, King of Spain  143–144, 587 Pichegru  141, 165, 167–168, 177, 187 Pijman  313–314, 316 Pilate  3 Pillet  27 Pincus  29, 62 Pitt  119–120, 513, 528, 568–570, 574, 577, 592, 683–684 Pléville-Le Pelley  422, 578, 592, 594, 611 Posner  16, 59–61 Pous  217 Provence, Comte de: see Louis XVIII Pufendorf  8, 93, 393 Ramel  181–182, 184, 187, 201, 211–212, 217, 398, 427 Reinhard  135, 361, 363, 743 Repelaer  166, 169–170, 173, 185–186 Reubell  127–128, 191–193, 213–217, 231, 246, 297, 306, 338, 386, 408, 427, 526, 545, 548, 553, 560–561, 564, 588, 595, 603, 611

Richard  200, 209, 217 Richelieu  79–80 Roberjot  623, 640, 642, 645–646, 744 Robespierre  104, 109, 120, 123, 165, 172, 184, 244, 709 Rolin  26 Rousseau  91, 94–96, 104, 114, 122, 234, 393, 461 Saint Julien  659–661, 680  Saint Pierre  86, 95–96, 114, 117, 279 Sauviac  175, 177, 394 Schama  92, 123, 168, 185, 191, 222, 362, 381, 417, 494 Schimmelpenninck  xiv, 262–265, 271, 276, 302, 315, 318, 324, 326, 328–331, 333, 335, 342, 345–349, 354, 356, 364–366, 369–371, 429, 439–440, 446–448, 451–458, 465–467, 475–476, 478–479, 481–482, 486, 494, 497, 516, 521, 523, 621–623, 637–638, 640, 642, 646, 668–669, 674–675, 680, 684, 689–694, 696–697, 701, 705–706, 731, 747–748 Schorer  171 Schrage  3 Schroeder  695 Schutte  516 Sebastiani  466 Selznick  26 Semonville  xiv, 249, 269, 319, 321–325, 329, 332, 334, 348, 368, 450–451, 469, 471–473, 475–478, 481–485, 488, 490–491, 494, 517, 675, 678, 744 Siccama  30 Sieyes  17, 128–129, 151, 174, 177, 191–193, 195–196, 200, 211, 213–217, 219–220, 222, 231–232, 234–236, 246, 254, 277–278, 296–297, 306, 338, 345, 381–383, 386, 395, 397–398, 405, 408, 722 Simpson  10, 38, 45–47, 720, 724, 726 Six  165, 170, 482, 492 Skordas  73 Slaughter  xiii Sorel  122, 221, 526 Spoors  327 Stapfer  276 Steiger  6 Stoffenberg  342 St. John  4 Sully  95 Suquet  393 Suvorov  652



index of names

Taekema  13 Talleyrand  xiv, 134–135, 262, 293, 321–322, 331, 333, 335, 348, 359, 369, 417, 424, 426, 444, 447, 452–455, 457–458, 467, 471–472, 474–476, 478–479, 482–483, 485–486, 488–492, 494, 523, 530, 552, 564, 583, 585–589, 600–601, 603–609, 611, 617, 630, 654–655, 660–661, 670, 673, 678, 689, 693–694, 698, 706, 743 Tantalus  355 Testi  272, 276 Thiers  220 Thugut  550, 552–553, 560, 654–655, 660–663, 665 Tolstoy  v Tönnies  26 Treilhard  130, 611, 615–616, 620 Truguet  419–420, 429 Tuck  28, 56 Tyler  58 Ullman  26 Valckenaer  186–187, 217, 219, 342, 378, 518–519, 586, 750 Van Breugel  403–404 Van Damme  298 Van Dedem van Gelder, Anthony  475–476, 511, 620, 747–750 Van Dedem van Gelder, Frederik  515–516, 749 Van der Capellen  342 Van der Goes  xiv, 236, 249, 255–257, 262, 265–266, 269, 271–272, 274–275, 318, 321–322, 325–326, 328, 330, 333–335, 345–350, 354, 357, 360–361, 363, 365, 367–369, 433–434, 440, 442–444, 449–451, 457, 472, 474–476, 478–479, 481, 484, 487, 495, 512, 524, 580, 587, 589, 607–608, 619, 656, 662, 668–669, 674–675, 678, 684, 689, 743, 750 Van de Spiegel  166 Van Deusen  221 Van Doorn  171, 431–432, 434–440, 442, 445–446, 448 Van Grasveld  218, 274, 510, 533, 621–623, 639–640, 642, 645–646, 648, 650, 748–749 Van Haeften  513–514, 564, 747 Van Hamel  221 Van Hogendorp, Dirk  478, 749

787

Van Hogendorp, Gijsbert Karel  478, 678 Van Hooff  609 Van Langen  620 Van Leyden  512, 585, 606 Van Marle  609 Van Marselis   580, 583, 589 Van Nimwegen  149 Van Oldenbarneveldt  145 Van Polaanen  521, 751 Van Reede  515, 749 Van Sonsbeeck  207 Vattel  9–10, 41, 90, 93–94, 104, 234, 281, 287, 390–393, 461, 715 Vergennes  84–85, 102, 108, 121, 129, 153, 155, 157–158, 175, 707–708, 712 Verhuell  494, 497 Verosta  6 Verzijl  506 Victor  337, 349–350, 473, 487–488 Vinogradoff  1, 7 Visconti  273 Vitoria  379 Volney  9, 87, 102, 283 Voltaire  89, 94 Vonck  582 Vreede, George Willem  220–221, 302, 317, 353, 513, 522 Vreede, Pieter  609 Waltz  27–28, 41, 48, 50, 55, 57, 67 Walzer  32 Watson  37, 39 Wendt  64–69, 75, 258, 718, 727 Whitworth  468, 474–476 Wickham  569 Wicquefort  92 Wight  27, 32, 37 Wilhelmina of Prussia  158 William (I) of Orange  144 William III  147, 168 William IV  149 William V  153–154, 296, 362, 513, 521–522, 544, 563, 643–644, 648, 698 Wolff  90, 94 York  653 Ysselmonde  201 Ziegler  6 Zoeteman  448 Zuylen van Nyvelt  208–209