Power and diplomacy: India's foreign policies during the Cold War 9780199489640, 0199489645, 9780199095339, 0199095337

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Power and Diplomacy

Power and Diplomacy India’s Foreign Policies during the Cold War

Zorawar Daulet Singh

1

1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries. Published in India by Oxford University Press 2/11 Ground Floor, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi 110 002, India © Zorawar Daulet Singh 2019 The moral rights of the author have been asserted. First Edition published in 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

ISBN-13 (print edition): 978-0-19-948964-0 ISBN-10 (print edition): 0-19-948964-5 ISBN-13 (eBook): 978-0-19-909533-9 ISBN-10 (eBook): 0-19-909533-7

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In memory of Captain Daljinder Singh, Deccan Horse, who laid down his life in the India–Pakistan war on 4 December 1971

Figures and Tables

Figures    I.1 Choice Paths during a Crisis

30

2.1 Choice Paths during the First East Bengal Crisis

92

3.1 Choice Paths during the 1954 Crisis

132

4.1 Choice Paths during the Formosa Crisis

174

6.1 Choice Paths during the Second Indochina Crisis

258

7.1 Choice Paths during the Second East Bengal Crisis

297

8.1 Choice Paths during the Sikkim Crisis

338

Tables 1.1 Nehru’s Peacemaker Role Conception 5.1 Indira Gandhi’s Security Seeker Role Conception

69 220

Abbreviations

BSF India’s Border Security Force CDA Chargé d’affaires CRO Commonwealth Relations Office DMZ Demilitarized zone (demarcation line separating North and South Vietnam at the 17th Parallel) DRVN Democratic Republic of Vietnam FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office FO Records of the Foreign Office, the National Archives, London FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States IB India’s Intelligence Bureau ICSC/ICC International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam IR International Relations J.N. Papers Unpublished Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, NMML JAC Joint Action Committee KMT Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party of China MEA Ministry of External Affairs NAI National Archives of India NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NMML Nehru Memorial Museum and Library NVA North Vietnamese Army P.N.H. Papers P.N. Haksar Papers, NMML PLA People’s Liberation Army PRC People’s Republic of China PREM Records of the Prime Minister’s Office, The National Archives, London

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Abbreviations

R&AW Research and Analysis Wing, India’s external intelligence agency SWJN-FS Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, First Series (pre-1946) SWJN-SS Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series (post-1946) UK United Kingdom UNSC United Nations Security Council USA United States of America USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Preface

The Cold War is often called the ‘Long Peace’ when two gladiators strode the planet as never before, bearing such destructive arms as had never been seen before in human history. We are familiar with this story, where the two superpowers discovered a shared interest in their mutual stability and survival, despite an unceasing ideological and geopolitical rivalry. On the periphery of that struggle lay a tumultuous and uncertain fate for the middle powers that had recently emerged from the thrall of colonialism. Like several of its peers, India found itself in the midst of these two colliding worlds, and was compelled to craft a policy and strategy. The preservation of an independent personality and sovereignty, that is, being non-aligned, was a basic impulse for India. However, crafting a foreign policy was about other ideas too. This book is about those wider sets of beliefs about how India defined its interests and goals and produced security in the context of the Cold War. And, it was in the neighbourhood where India confronted recurring crises and geopolitical challenges. How and why Indian policymakers responded to those regional events remains obscured or mired in competing interpretations. As analysts and historians, we are obligated to fulfil our main task and offer fresh vantage points to understand the past. However, my urge to examine Indian statecraft during the Cold War years was not merely to recover the past, which may be shrouded in the archives, or to engage in a conversation with other scholars. We

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are also returning to a world that, in some ways, resembles the one that we were confidently told had ended. How India ought to respond to this world of competing great powers where no one state or bloc holds sway over the international system is at the heart of contemporary debates on India’s role in the neighbourhood and beyond. It is, hence, an apt moment to return to those formative years of India’s foreign policy and understand how leaders and strategists navigated through a competitive and uncertain international environment. In doing so, we might draw some lessons or clues on how to craft a sustainable role, even if the future rhymes a little differently.

*** This work could not have been possible without the support, counsel, and friendship of many others. Sunil Khilnani has been a source of constant support from the very outset, and did not dissuade me from attempting such an ambitious project when he might have known better. I was also fortunate to have Srinath Raghavan’s counsel during my reclusive years of doctoral research. Most of the pre-writing phase was spent at the archives—briefly at the National Archives in London and then much of it in the Indian archives. The Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Delhi (NMML) is truly the gold standard as a repository for historical documents in India and their staff was a delight to work with. The National Archives of India is, in contrast, a more impersonal and larger institution, but I was still fortunate to access several relevant files and memoranda, sometimes by sheer happenstance! It cannot be gainsaid that a study such as this could only have profited from the collective memory of accomplished observers and practitioners. The late Inder Malhotra, the late B.S. Das, M.K. Rasgotra, K. Shankar Bajpai, Eric Gonsalves, Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, G.B.S. Sidhu, Kishan Rana, Shyam Saran, Shiv Shankar Menon, Prabhat Shukla, Ranjit Gupta, Sudhir Devare, Ashok Parthasarathi, and Rana Banerji were all generous with their time and reflections on past events. For these insightful conversations, I remain deeply indebted. I also remain appreciative of



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the thoughtful and perceptive comments by Jaspal Singh, Suman Mann, Rudra Chaudhuri, and Swapna Kona Naidu on various parts of this manuscript. Pratap Bhanu Mehta has been a source of encouragement for several years, as has David Malone, and Walter Anderson ever since I met him at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies in 2004. The Center for the Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania was kind enough to invite me to present some of my research in April 2015. As doctoral examiners, Vipin Narang and Paul McGarr were discerning and generous in their assessment on an earlier version of this manuscript. The Centre for Policy Research in Delhi has offered me an exceptionally conducive environment to remain engaged and to hone this study. Suneina has been a rock by my side. Fateh and Viir provided perspective and comic relief during the stressful phases. Without their affection, there would be no book.

Introduction

It is often argued that India’s foreign policy in the post-1991 period witnessed a dramatic break from past patterns, with fundamental changes in India’s conception of its interests and its international roles and behaviour.1 It is widely held that Indian leaders altered their international images, their ideas relating to national interest, the role of force and coercion in statecraft, and beliefs about how India ought to relate to its regional and global environment. But most of these notions of foreign policy change were not a new phenomenon at all. India’s statecraft during the Cold War period was infused by changing beliefs around precisely such themes. Mainstream historiography portrays India’s foreign policy as that of a postcolonial, non-aligned state standing apart from the Cold War struggle by resisting being drawn into the political–military embrace of one or other of the superpowers. Such a cursory and static interpretation of a key period of India’s foreign policy rests, it is argued in this book, on a neglect of more complex Indian worldviews that evolved to condition state action. Indeed, the dramatic shift in roles and behaviour from the Nehru period in the 1950s to the Indira Gandhi period in the late 1960s and 1970s suggests that the so-called ‘rubicon’ or seminal transformation in India’s strategic thought and action had in fact been crossed earlier.

1 C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Viking, 2004).

Power and Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policies during the Cold War. Zorawar Daulet Singh, Oxford University Press (2019). © Zorawar Daulet Singh. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199489640.003.0001

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If we seek to make informed assessments about India’s future foreign policy and possible contestations, we must revisit a much larger and earlier slice of its strategic past in order to discern prior policy patterns during times of inflexion and change. The Cold War period offers a rich and relatively untapped empirical reserve that can provide much needed depth to understanding Indian strategic thought and geopolitical practices. And, to truly understand Indian statecraft, one must go beyond the study of non-alignment and examine the more concrete ideas that have informed Indian geopolitics over the years. This book attempts to explicate some of these ideas and their application during some of the most significant events and crises in India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood over three decades during the Cold War.

The Argument India’s foreign policy during the Cold War period from the 1950s to the 1970s was not simply an exercise in the preservation of its strategic independence. Analytical focus on a largely unchanging self-image of non-alignment has led scholars to downplay what was in fact a dramatic evolution in Indian foreign policy during that period. Specifically, from projecting itself initially in an extra-regional peacemaker role during the Nehru period, where India intervened in several crises in Asian high politics, India’s role ­ dramatically contracted to that of a largely sub-continental s­ecurity seeker in the Indira Gandhi period, with narrower ­conceptions of order and security. Importantly, this shift was not simply one of a change in geopolitical scope but also a change in the modes of regional policy behaviour. The central argument of this book is that this change in Indian statecraft resulted from a change in regional role conceptions from the Nehru to the Indira Gandhi periods. Role conceptions emerge from policymakers’ beliefs and images relating to their state’s interaction with its external environment. As discussed later, these include the appropriate scale of regional activity and functional goals, orientation to this defined external environment, and the preferred modes of behaviour. The behavioural shift between the Nehru and



Introduction

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Indira Gandhi periods should, therefore, be seen as emerging from different ideas that defined India’s regional role in each period. The core question that drives this study—What explains the transformation in Indian geopolitics during the Cold War?—has certainly been acknowledged before. Michael Brecher, for instance, noted the shift from ‘an active, dynamic involvement in world politics’ under the ‘Nehru–Menon conception, to a more passive role, almost a withdrawal from conflicts external to India’s ­narrowly-conceived national interests’.2 Yet this dramatic shift in the scope and modes of India’s foreign policy behaviour between the two periods has not been examined in any depth, and is usually portrayed either in terms of a reductionist contrast between an idealistic and naive Nehru versus a hard-nosed and insecure Indira Gandhi, or in terms of the structural deterministic argument that a changing external environment made India’s foreign policy shift all but inevitable.3 These popular images juxtaposing the Nehru and Indira Gandhi periods have not received the detailed study they deserve—both conceptually and empirically. More broadly, there seem to be two basic weaknesses in how we study India’s foreign policy. First, much of the existing body of work is unable to confront the amorphous nature of non-alignment, and is thereby unable to account for the variations in India’s foreign policy during the Cold War period. Indeed, the focus on non-alignment has led to a prolonged neglect of the more complex worldviews and strands of ideas that also conditioned Indian geopolitics during the Cold War. Second is the dearth of archival-based work on India’s foreign policy more generally, and the absence of a detailed empirical examination of regional statecraft during the Nehru and Indira Gandhi 2 Michael Brecher, ‘Non-alignment Under Stress: The West and the India–China Border War’, Pacific Affairs 52, no. 4 (1979–1980): 629. 3  Sumit Ganguly, Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015); David M. Malone, Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012); J.N. Dixit, Makers of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2004); Surjit Mansingh, India’s Search for Power: Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Policy, 1966–1982 (New Delhi: SAGE, 1984); Raju Thomas, Indian Security Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

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periods within a single research frame.4 The result of these gaps in the literature appears sufficient enough to warrant a more extensive comparative foreign policy analysis of these two periods. Despite a recent wave of eclectic scholarship on India’s Cold War foreign policy, especially on the Nehru years, India’s regional policies have been relatively neglected. Not only is there a dearth of serious work on Nehru’s regional policy in the 1950s, the nature of interpretations of Nehru are either ‘hagiographic’ or polemical critiques that ‘have not delved deeply enough into the material, to explore the reasons behind his choices’.5 Typically, the periodic focus is either on the pre-1950 Dominion period on India’s norm shaping at multilateral settings such as the UN,6 pre-1950 statecraft and national consolidation,7 or on the outbreak of bilateral problems with China in the late 1950s and its escalation in the 1962 war.8 A study of Nehru’s foreign policy in geopolitical 4 

As Narang and Staniland suggest, ‘There is enormous room for further research on the making of India’s foreign policy’ both in terms of ‘deeper historical studies of the roots of strategic worldviews’ as well as ‘detailed studies of the inner workings of the Indian foreign policy apparatus’. Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland, ‘Institutions and Worldviews in Indian Foreign Security Policy’, India Review 11, no. 2 (2012): 91. In a similar vein, Raghavan observes that historians have mostly ‘ignored research’ on independent India’s foreign policy, ‘preferring to toil on the British and earlier periods’. Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2010), 3. 5  Jivanta Schottli, Vision and Strategy in Indian Politics: Jawaharlal Nehru’s Policy Choices and the Designing of Political Institutions (London: Routledge, 2012), 21. 6 Manu Bhagavan, The Peacemakers: India and the Quest for One World (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2012). 7 Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India; Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947–48 (New Delhi: SAGE, 2002). 8  Steven A. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990); S. Mahmud Ali, Cold War in the High Himalayas: The USA, China and South Asia in the 1950s (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999); Neville Maxwell, India’s China War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970); Steven A. Hoffmann, ‘Rethinking the Linkage Between Tibet and the China–India Border Conflict: A Realist Approach’, Journal of Cold War Studies 8, no. 3 (2006): 165–94; Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India.



Introduction

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terms—that is, in the realm of high politics and security—remains understudied. The year 1962 so dominates mainstream historiography that the decade of the 1950s is merely taken as a prelude and build-up to that climactic event. Much of the work into India’s foreign policy in the 1950s, hence, invariably tends to be overshadowed by the retrospective historical knowledge of an impending debacle.9 As a consequence, a whole interregnum, if it can be called that, has been left unexplored or perfunctorily treated in mainstream historiography. For the Indira Gandhi period, the lack of detailed historical work is even starker. That a 1984 study remains the only notable contribution on this subject exemplifies the point.10 Given the recent, if partial, accessibility of new archival material for the Nehru and Indira Gandhi years, it is now a fruitful moment to re-engage with that wider period. This book offers another lens to interpret and understand the shift in India’s foreign policy during the Cold War, in order to illuminate the continuity and change from the Nehru to the Indira Gandhi periods, which often gets obscured under the rubric of non-alignment or simplified in the binary of idealism versus realism. Why is focusing on non-alignment as the main explanatory framework for India’s foreign policy of limited analytical value? The idea of non-alignment is ‘entrenched in the vocabulary of India’s past, present and future’.11 Yet, even a cursory observation of India’s foreign policy practices reveals patterns of variation and change through the decades, despite a seeming continuity of non-alignment. For instance, Nehru himself observed that 9 S.

Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Volume 2, 1947–1956 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979). This is also exemplified in Wolpert’s biography, which chronicles the period from 1950 to 1956 in ten pages. Stanley Wolpert, Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Even memoirs by senior officials on this period are typically afflicted with the same problem. T.N. Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979); Subimal Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office (Calcutta: Minerva, 1977); C.S. Jha, From Bandung to Tashkent: Glimpses of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Sangam, 1983). 10 Mansingh, India’s Search for Power. 11 Rudra Chaudhuri, Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947 (Noida: HarperCollins, 2014), 253.

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non-alignment ‘in itself is not a policy; it is only part of a policy’.12 P.N. Haksar, a key advisor of Indira Gandhi, clarified, ‘nonalignment was not the essence and substance of India’s foreign policy. Non-alignment is not, in a Kantian sense, a thing in itself. Non-alignment was the means, at a particular time and in a particular place….’13 What such reflections suggest is that beyond the rubric of non-alignment there were additional beliefs and images that shaped the conduct of foreign policy in each of these periods. By itself, non-alignment is essentially an identity or a self-image with a ‘universe of possibilities for action’.14 But if non-alignment is deemed to include several broad forms of statecraft, then it arguably explains little.15 As this book examines, there was a fundamental distinction between the interpretations of non-alignment 12 Jawaharlal

Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946–April 1961 (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961), 79. Elsewhere Nehru observes, ‘strictly speaking’, non-alignment ‘represents only one aspect of our policy; we have other positive aims also….’ Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘Changing India,’ Foreign Affairs 41, no. 3 (April 1963): 456. 13  P.N. Haksar, India’s Foreign Policy and Its Problems (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1989), 32. 14  Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 8. 15  Note, for example, what the editors of a study on Indira Gandhi’s foreign policies have to say about the Cold War period: ‘India’s record of fidelity to past policy and practice is unusual.’ India is ‘sui generis, as far as foreign policy strategy and tactics are concerned. Successive leaders in the same party and different parties have found it difficult to depart from the Nehru line…. Against this general background of continuity, stability and decorum, India’s relations with the outside world can be appreciated as basically rational….’ It would be extraordinary if the authors were actually unaware of the different approaches in Nehru and Indira Gandhi’s statecraft. Rather, the problem here seems to be one of conceptualizing the variation in India’s foreign policy after the Nehru period despite continuity in India’s self-image in international politics. A.K. Damodaran and U.S. Bajpai, eds, Indian Foreign Policy: The Indira Gandhi Years (New Delhi: Radiant, 1990), ‘Introduction’: xiv–xv.



Introduction

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in the Nehru and Indira Gandhi periods. It is, therefore, a misunderstanding to assert the analytical primacy of one of these facets of non-alignment and hold that as the default one. Rather, it is necessary to identify the international images of policymakers and the roles they construct for their state if we seek to understand India’s foreign policy. To typologize India’s foreign policy in terms of the binary ‘idealism’/‘realism’ does not take us too far either.16 For instance, after contrasting an ‘idealistic’ Nehru with a ‘realistic’ Indira Gandhi, Mansingh observes: ‘Realism is most simply defined as the practice of accepting a situation as it is and being prepared to deal with it pragmatically.’ Indira Gandhi ‘responded to changes in the international environment in the 1970s and 1980s realistically’.17 But as others emphasize, the two categories of idealism and realism ‘are too vague, too broad, too open-ended, too normative … to be of much use as a guide to social scientific theory and research’.18 Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that policymakers during the Nehru period perceived themselves as unrealistic actors. Nehru perceived traditional realism as ‘the tactical small stuff’, and felt his role conception for India ‘was more strategic’. The ‘tactical’ approach had proven to cause more global problems and incessant conflict.19 Nehru actually viewed his philosophy and statecraft as highly pragmatic and based on a realistic appraisal of India’s external environment. ‘Idealism’, he argued, was ‘the realism of tomorrow. It is the capacity to know what is good for the day after tomorrow … and fashion yourself 16  Sumit

Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi, ‘Explaining Sixty Years of India’s Foreign Policy’, India Review 8, no. 1 (2009): 4. Also see, Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India, 3rd edition (New Delhi: Penguin, 2003), 104, 112; Dixit, Makers of India’s Foreign Policy. 17 Surjit Mansingh, ‘Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Policy: Hard Realism?’, in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, eds David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 112. 18  Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’, International Security 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 54. 19  Personal interview with Shiv Shankar Menon, New Delhi, 11 November 2014.

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accordingly … the realist, looks at the tip of his nose and sees little beyond.’20 Indira Gandhi, too, exhorted her own realism when she insisted that foreign policy ‘must be allied to an astute, hardheaded analysis of international affairs and events. At all times this analysis has to be devoid of emotion and sentiment.’21 Clearly, realism cannot be a useful explanatory theory if its meaning is so broad as to include diverse forms of choices, preferences, and actions.22 Indeed, it is for this reason that most ‘contemporary realists’, while continuing ‘to speak of international “power” … have subtly shifted the core emphasis from variation in objective power to variation in beliefs and preferences of power’.23 In recent years, a growing scholarship has made use of the vast published collection of Nehru’s papers and confidential correspondence, as well as unpublished documents and diplomatic cables of senior officials from the Indira Gandhi period.24 Although admittedly limited, such archival material does enable us to enter into the decision-making ‘black box’, and try to connect Indian interventions and foreign policy responses to the inner thinking and beliefs of the policymaking apex. This book hopes to add to this small but growing body of work on India’s foreign policy. By going beyond the idea of non-alignment and attempting to reconstruct 20 Nehru,

India’s Foreign Policy, 51. Gandhi, The Years of Endeavor: Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, August 1969–August 1972 (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1975), 685. 22 Indeed, neorealist assumptions, expressed by Kenneth Waltz and others, impose ‘almost no constraint on state behavior, because it subsumes the entire spectrum of possible motivations of states from pure harmony to zero-sum conflict…. Only outright self-abnegation is excluded.’ Legro and Moravcsik, ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’, 22. 23  Legro and Moravcsik, ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’, 34–5. 24 Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India; Srinath Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2013); Andrew B. Kennedy, The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Chaudhuri, Forged in Crisis; Priya Chacko, Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004 (New York: Routledge, 2012); Bhagavan, The Peacemakers. 21  Indira



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the foreign policy worldviews of two different national leaders and their close advisors, this book offers fresh insights into how policy­makers related to their region and neighbourhood during some of the most tumultuous events of their time. This book questions the notion of an unchanging Nehruvian image of power, which has entrenched itself deeply in mainstream historiography on India’s foreign policy and which continues to shape the nature of contemporary conversations and foreign policy debates. We have been living with many sweeping generalizations and interpretations of India’s regional statecraft during the Cold War. There is an interesting dichotomy between the interpretations of the first wave of scholarship, that is, contemporaneous of the Nehru and Indira Gandhi periods, and retrospective evaluations of Indian strategic thought and behaviour. Ironically, while the former could glean subtle aspects of Indian strategic thought despite the lack of confidential archives, the later generation of work has offered diverse accounts that are not always consistent with a careful study of the documentary evidence. Part of the reason for this is we seem more interested in abstract theorizing rather than paying careful attention to the empirical record. Chacko’s indictment that theorizing of ‘Indian thinking on international relations at a highly general level’ has usually not succeeded in being ‘analytically illuminating’ is, hence, largely accurate.25 This book builds upon and extends the first generation work by scholars such as Michael Brecher and A.P. Rana as well as more recent work by Andrew Kennedy.26 Yet, this is not just an esoteric historical study. All the six crises examined in this book will resonate with the present because they each also speak to contemporary dilemmas and debates regarding a specific facet of India’s foreign policy. Whether it is about crafting a sustainable set 25 Chacko,

Indian Foreign Policy, 3. Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968); A.P. Rana, ‘The Intellectual Dimensions of India’s Nonalignment’, Journal of Asian Studies 28, no. 2 (1969): 299–312; A.P. Rana, The Imperatives of Nonalignment: A Conceptual Study of India’s Foreign Policy Strategy in the Nehru Period (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1976); Kennedy, The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru. 26  Michael

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of equations with competing great powers, formulating an intelligent policy towards Pakistan, finding the appropriate approach in managing India’s special ties with its smaller neighbours, dealing with China’s rise and the attendant power flux in Asia, responding to a Sino-American crisis or their broader competition in Asia, or developing a sustainable Indian role in the extended neighbourhood, the chapters that follow will strike at the heart of today’s policy conversations.

Images and Roles A useful way to approach the Indian case is to attempt to conceptualize and categorize the hierarchy or levels of ideas that together shape foreign policy.27 Nearly all the attention in India’s foreign policy literature has been on the idea of non-alignment. But as alluded to earlier, focusing exclusively on this single idea is of limited analytical value because the linkage between non-alignment and behaviour is often indeterminate. To explicate this point, let us explore the notion of ‘national images’, as this helps to identify the appropriate level and types of ideas that will be engaged in this book. An ‘image’ is defined as the total cognitive, affective, and evaluate structure of the behaviour unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe … a decision involves the selection of the most preferred position in a contemplated field of choice. Both the field of choice and the ordering of this field by which the preferred position is identified lie in the image of the decision-maker…. The images which are important in international systems are those which a nation has of itself and of those other bodies in the system which constitute its international environment.28 27  It has been argued that ‘attitudes on specific foreign policy issues are constrained (or predicted) by, first, foreign policy postures, and those, in turn, by a set of core values’. See Jon Hurwitz, Mark Peffley, and Mitchell A. Seligson, ‘Foreign Policy Belief Systems in Comparative Perspective’, International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 3 (September 1993): 246. 28  Kenneth E. Boulding, ‘National Images and International Systems’, in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, ed. James N. Rosenau (London: Macmillan, 1969), 423. Emphasis added.



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As we can notice, a complete image has a ‘self-image’ as well as an ‘international image’ component. Both these components are related in the sense that a change in self-images might also change the images of the external environment. This distinction is helpful in explicating the two inter-linked levels of images in the case of India and it is where this book will focus its attention in the overall ideational explanation. The highest-level belief that underpins a state’s psychological setting is the self-image of a country’s leaders, that is, how national leaders view and identify their own state in the international system.29 For India, such a core selfimage during the Cold War was described as non-alignment. ‘It is through negative terms’ that Indians ‘have expressed positive and affirmative ideas of profound significance and critical importance for their social evolution’.30 Non-alignment is one of those ideas. Krishna Menon explained the origins of non-alignment: Even if nobody conceived it, non-alignment was more or less a residue of historical circumstances. In 1945, immediately before India got her independence, it was all ‘one world’; by 1947 it was ‘two worlds’, and we, for the first time, had to make up our minds on the issue…. We would not go back to the West with its colonialism; and there was no question of our going the Soviet way…. And with the attaining of our independence we desired not to get involved in foreign entanglements…. There were two blocs. Both the Prime Minister (Nehru) and I exclaimed or thought aloud simultaneously, ‘why should we be with anybody?’31

In essence, non-alignment was ‘merely independence in external affairs’. It was the ‘logical extension of nationalism’ and ‘the conflict between nationalism and military blocs, the fact that we had little in common with the raison d’être of the blocs’.32 An

29 Noel Kaplowitz, ‘National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies: Psychopolitical Dimensions of International Relations’, Political Psychology 11, no. 1 (1990): 39–82. 30  K.P. Misra and K.R. Narayanan, eds, Non-alignment in Contemporary International Relations (New Delhi: Vikas, 1981), 198–9. 31 Brecher, India and World Politics, 3. 32 Brecher, India and World Politics, 4.

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enduring self-image presumes shared representations of a state’s view of itself across generations. Since the mid-1940s, India’s leaders have espoused a consistent self-image of nonalignment, which also became part of the state’s discourse. In his first broadcast as head of the interim government on 7 September 1946, Nehru defined India’s core self-image: ‘We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale.’33 And, in March 1947, while inaugurating the Asian Relations Conference: ‘We propose to stand on our own legs and to co-operate with all others who are prepared to co-operate with us. We do not intend to be the playthings of others.’34 Given the incipient but palpable outbreak of the Cold War in Europe, Nehru was expressing an impulse shared by most Indian leaders and a large section of the assembled Asian leaders who were wary of losing their newfound autonomy in another great power struggle. This conviction in preserving India’s sovereignty was reinforced by the experience of an unexpected and tumultuous division of the subcontinent. In December 1947, four months after Partition, Nehru stated, ‘We have proclaimed during this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else’. Rather, at its core was that India ‘had an independent policy’.35 Non-attachment was desirable because ‘joining a bloc’ as Nehru explained in March 1948, could ‘only mean one thing: give up your view about a particular question, adopt the other party’s view on that question’.36 By the mid-1950s, India had witnessed twenty years of intense Asian inter-state conflicts involving all the major powers. The pressures to conform to bloc politics had become severe and these factors impelled Nehru to strengthen India’s core self-image. He now identified 33 Nehru,

India’s Foreign Policy, 2. India’s Foreign Policy, 251. 35 Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 24–5. 36 Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 36. 34 Nehru,



Introduction

13

India’s non-alignment as not simply a situational belief but something deeper: India has a very strong individuality for thousands of years. To consider that we have not a mind of our own, not a soul and spirit of our own and to consider that we can tie ourselves up with this or that group regardless of what we are, seems to be a complete misunderstanding of what India has been in the past, or what she is now and what she is going to be in the future.37

Clearly, non-alignment was being represented as a dominant identity rather than simply a transient posture towards a bipolar world. This is underscored by the persistence of this core idea into the 1960s. By this time, the rigidity of the blocs had loosened, with both superpowers contending with dissenting allies and new ideological cleavages. Aware of the evolving global structure, Krishna Menon reaffirmed the essence of India’s self-image when he observed in 1966, ‘the issue within a short time would not be between Communists and non-communists, Socialists and non-socialists, Left and Right, but it will be between nationalism and non-nationalism’.38 Clearly, for Indian leaders the concept of sovereignty and autonomy in international affairs was sacrosanct and remained unaffected by the ebbs and flows in the interactions among the great powers. Indira Gandhi, who in the post-Nehru years would re-define India’s foreign policy, continued to declare adherence to non-­ alignment. In 1970, Indira Gandhi underlined the essence of India’s self-image as the refusal to ‘mortgage our decisions in domestic and in international affairs to foreign dictates’.39 Non-alignment was ‘essentially a declaration not of indifference or n ­ eutrality 37 

The Hindu, 26 December 1955. Again, in a Lok Sabha debate in 1958, Nehru located the deeper roots of non-alignment as ‘inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom, and inherent in the circumstances of the world today’. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 80. 38  V.K. Krishna Menon, In Defence of National Policies: Speeches in Parliament (New Delhi: Mainstream, 1966), 12. 39 Gandhi, The Years of Endeavor, 693.

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but of independence in judgment’.40 Again, a robust self-image of autonomy animates the words of policymakers during this period. P.N. Haksar, Indira Gandhi’s main strategist, located non-alignment in India’s colonial experience. Leaders ‘who fail to take into account the feeling among the masses of our people against imperialist domination will sever India’s policy from its moorings’.41 For Haksar, non-alignment ‘was simply the refusal by a proud country to be managed by anybody, especially after it had been managed for a long time by the East India Company and its successor’.42 The persistence and depth of India’s self-image is apparent from these recurring representations over decades, and, ironically, even a voluntary alignment with one bloc after 1971 did not diminish India’s core ethos. Indira Gandhi affirmed the continuity of India’s self-image in her 1976 speech in Moscow: Non-alignment arose from a ‘determination to be ourselves and to preserve our identity…. Our independence marked the beginning of the end of the colonial epoch. How could we accept any new limitations on our freedom of decision or action?’43 In essence, non-alignment was the external manifestation of India’s sovereignty and represented the abiding belief in and preference for an independent foreign policy. Its primary behavioural implication is that all political leaders were conditioned to maintain India’s strategic autonomy by resisting being pulled into a great power-led treaty area. Beyond this, however, it is difficult to extract any further behavioural implications. As Holsti remarks, ‘the term non-alignment tells us only something, but not much, about the foreign policies or role conceptions of such states’.44 So why even highlight non-alignment at all if it tells us so little? Some argue, ‘roles largely originate’ in a ‘self-image’, which is ‘the

40 

Indira Gandhi: Selected Speeches and Writings, 1972–1977 (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1984), 675. 41  P.N. Haksar, Premonitions (Bombay: Interpress, 1980), 39. 42 V.D. Chopra, ed., Studies in Indo-Soviet Relations (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1986), 15–16. 43  Indira Gandhi: Selected Speeches and Writings, 1972–1977, 763. 44 K.J. Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’, International Studies Quarterly 14, no. 3 (September 1970): 253.



Introduction

15

ultimate source of motivation’.45 A core and robust self-image does have some constraining effects in that the policymakers who develop their other international images usually do so in ways that are consistent with the dominant self-image. In this sense, non-alignment structured the strategic cultural setting for Indian decision makers by making it difficult to imagine and internalize roles that violated India’s autonomy. But it still left open a range of possibilities or agency that requires closer attention if the aim is to understand the variation in India’s foreign policy during the Cold War.46 And so, we need to direct our attention to these other images and beliefs that might have had a more observable impact on choices and actions. Leaders often define and promote foreign policy roles for their state in different issue-areas that condition behaviour in those domains.47 In short, we need to identify and study the policymakers who constructed these roles for their state.

Whose Beliefs and Images? National roles can be seen to emerge from ‘the shared political system belief of authoritative decision makers about their ­country’s 45  Philippe

G. Le Prestre, ed., Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997), 8; Chih-yu Shih, ‘National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation: The Psychocultural Bases of Chinese Diplomacy’, Political Psychology 9, no. 4 (1988): 601. 46  Non-alignment’s indeterminacy is not unique to India. For a study on the wide variation in the types of non-alignment in the Arab world, see Fayez A. Sayegh, The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World: A Symposium (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing, 1964). On the wider eclecticism of non-alignment across states, see Peter Lyon, Neutralism (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1964). 47  A national role conception may be seen as ‘the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their “image” of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.’ Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’, 245–6.

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relationship to its external environment and the roles of government appropriate for pursuing the belief’. Put another way, ‘national foreign policy roles are determined by the beliefs of a regime’s authoritative decision makers’.48 India’s political system during the Cold War years was largely a one-party-dominant system led by the Indian National Congress. Within the Congress party, the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi during much of their tenures at the pinnacle of the state was largely uncontested,49 enabling these two national leaders to enjoy a high degree of authority and autonomy and producing a ‘centralized decision-making process’ at the state’s apex.50 And since typically, ‘the range of individual choice is greater higher up in the decisionmaking hierarchy’51 Nehru and Indira Gandhi can both be seen to possess a high degree of agency in the foreign policy realm, and the dominant ideas that shaped India’s external behaviour were embedded within the beliefs of these two political leaders and their advisors—rather than in organizations such as the Congress party or state institutions such as the Foreign Ministry.52 48 Stephen

G. Walker, ed., Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 220. 49  By 1952, Nehru had ‘increased even further his complete dominance’ over the Indian Government with no Congress leader possessing the status to challenge him when he had determined a course of action. ‘Taylor to State Department’, 26 May 1952, Foreign Relations of the United States (Vol. XI, Part 2). The Congress party split of 1969 is generally considered as a turning point that paved the way for Indira Gandhi’s political dominance. 50 N.K. Jha, ‘Coalition Governments and India’s Foreign Policy’, in Coalition Politics in India: Problems and Prospects, eds M.P. Singh and A. Mishra (New Delhi: Manohar, 2004), 308–19. 51  Katarina Brodin, ‘Belief Systems, Doctrines, and Foreign Policy: A Presentation of Two Alternative Models for the Analysis of Foreign Policy Decision-Making’, Cooperation and Conflict 7, no. 1 (March 1972): 101. 52 J. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 2003), 60–1. Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1959), 30, 71, 80, 564–5. Narang and Staniland, ‘Institutions and Worldviews in Indian Foreign Security Policy’, 82, 84–5. Nalini Kant Jha, ‘Nehru and Modern India: Impact of his Personality on Foreign Policy’, in Jawaharlal Nehru and



Introduction

17

Indeed, the fact that Nehru concurrently held the Foreign Minister’s post during his entire seventeen-year tenure as Prime Minister underscores this point. In the Indira Gandhi phase, the centralization of foreign policymaking is also widely recognized as she too kept a tight control over the Foreign Ministry by appointing close confidantes to critical positions so as to preserve influence and command over foreign policy.53 This is, of course, not to suggest that these national leaders were insensitive to public opinion or unaware of the advantages of legitimizing their preferences and choices.54 This is also not to discount the possibility of foreign policy contestations and pressures that Nehru and Indira Gandhi might have confronted, including from some of their most formidable political rivals. To maintain analytical rigour, I have consciously elected to also examine some of those periods or phases too where the foreign policy authority appears to have been contested at the apex. Nevertheless, these two national leaders were endowed with a position to profoundly shape the contours of India’s foreign policy, and as Holsti recommends, when ‘decisions are made at the pinnacle of the government hierarchy by leaders who are relatively free from organizational and other constraints’, it makes sense to focus on the beliefs of such leaders.55 An ideational approach that seeks to study India’s foreign policy during the Nehru and Indira Gandhi Modern India, ed. T.A. Nizami (Aligarh: Three Way Printers, 2003), 17–22. George K. Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica: Rand, 1992), 52. 53 Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India’s Foreign Policy, 265. Tanvi Madan, ‘Officialdom: South Block and Beyond’, in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, eds David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (New York: Oxford University Press), 234. 54 Rudra Chaudhuri, ‘The Limits of Executive Power: Domestic Politics and Alliance Behavior in Nehru’s India’, India Review 11, no. 2 (2012): 95–115. An example of Nehru’s approach to legitimizing his foreign policy through a posture of transparency is indicated by his unorthodox method of publishing select official but confidential exchanges between India and Pakistan, and India and China from the early 1950s. 55  Ole R. Holsti, ‘Cognitive Process Approaches to Decision-Making: Foreign Policy Actors Viewed Psychologically’, American Behavioral Scientist 20, no. 1 (1976): 18. Also see, Margaret G. Hermann, ‘Explaining

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periods can, therefore, with some reliability focus on the worldviews of these two national leaders and their close and trusted advisors. This may not hold in the same way for later periods, ­especially the post-Cold War era where fragmentation of India’s political system and the rise of more diverse groups of actors began shaping India’s interests and roles.56 In short, Nehru and his advisors, and Indira Gandhi and her advisors, are assumed to constitute the main unit of analysis—the ‘core policymakers’—who provided the ideational substance and agency to India’s foreign policy.

Which Beliefs and Images? As Nicholas Spykman once observed, ‘Every Foreign Office whatever may be the atlas it uses, operates mentally with a different map of the world.’57 This book, in many ways, is about searching for India’s mental maps during the Cold War. The idea of an inside-out image of regions challenges orthodox geopolitics where geographical spaces are deemed to possess objective facts both for states in those locales and for the international system. In classical geopolitics, states are typically assigned or prescribed geopolitical roles in the scholar’s or great power practitioner’s world image. Such claims emerge from a long-standing ‘geopolitical tradition, which from the beginning was opposed to the proposition that great leaders’ could ‘determine the course of history, politics and society’, but rather that ‘it was the natural environment and the geographical setting of a state which exercised the greatest influence on its destiny’. Classical geopolitics ‘is taken to be a domain of hard truths, material realities and irrepressible

Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders’, International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 1 (1980): 13. 56 Falguni Tewari and Harsh V. Pant, ‘Paradiplomacy and India: Growing Role of States in Foreign Policy’, Observer Research Foundation, 6 December 2016, accessed 27 March 2017, from http://www.orfonline. org/expert-speaks/paradiplomacy-and-india/. Rajiv Kumar, ‘Role of Business in India’s Foreign Policy’, India Review 15, no. 1 (2016): 98–111. 57  Jakub J. Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 25.



Introduction

19

natural facts’.58 There is a sense of ‘geodeterminism’ in this approach where ‘political actions are determined, as if inevitably, by geographic location or the environment’.59 Critical geopolitics, on the other hand, seeks to understand the assumptions and ideas that enter into the making of international politics and the relationship between a state and its physical environment.60 If classical geopolitics is about studying the impact of geography upon foreign policy, critical geopolitics is about identifying the policymakers’ meanings, images, and even strategies regarding the spatial environment around a state.61 The focus is on the ‘practice’ of decision-makers rather than an ‘international reality’, or ‘on the situated, contextual and embodied nature of all forms of geopolitical reasoning’.62 One of the fascinating features of the Cold War was that despite bipolarity there was extraordinary diversity in the role conceptions across the system among the middle powers. Much of the policymakers’ attention in these spaces between the interstices of the bipolar balance of power was aimed at regional and subregional issues since most of these new states had emerged from 58 

G. Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, ‘Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy’, Political Geography 11 (1992): 191–2. 59 Colin Flint, Introduction to Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 2011), 10. 60 Critical geopolitics also evokes ‘post-modern’ types of analysis where explanation is eschewed entirely altogether in favour of an openended discursive inquiry. This book does not engage the insights of critical geopolitics from that frame of reference. Rather, critical geopolitics as a broad approach allows focusing closer attention on the types of ideas and images that are necessary to identify and study national role conceptions. Kelly poses an excellent question that suggests a middle ground, to which I subscribe. Can critical geopolitics ‘be of utility toward clarifying and strengthening the contribution of geopolitics’ in foreign policy analysis? Phil Kelly, ‘A Critique of Critical Geopolitics’, Geopolitics 11, no. 1 (2006): 25. 61  Ó Tuathail and Agnew, ‘Geopolitics and Discourse’, 190. 62 G. Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, eds, Rethinking Geopolitics (London: Routledge 1998), 2, 6.

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the ravages of a colonial system and were materially deprived of the wherewithal and sinews to pursue global roles. Yet, the role diversity even across these postcolonial, non-aligned states suggests that geopolitical images were not simply reducible to material factors or circumstances. Nehru expressed this point well: ‘If you seek to understand us, you will understand us a little by discussing our economic, social and political problems … but you have to look a little deeper to understand the ferment in the mind and spirit of Asia. It takes different shapes in different countries.’63 Post-1947, Indian policymakers engaged in critical geopolitics in that they rejected the geopolitics of the British Raj and searched for alternative geopolitical images.64 For Indian policymakers, classical geopolitics evoked the spectre of the nineteenth century ‘Great Game’ and later imperial and Cold War geopolitical images, which were perceived to have also contributed to India’s partition.65 India’s leaders visualized new or adapted geopolitical images where the earlier British-Indian approach was deemed inappropriate for the new state. For instance, Nehru’s systemreforming beliefs were naturally consistent with his conceptualization of an Asian area of peace concept. And Indira Gandhi’s turn towards a more Indian ‘school’ of geopolitics, at first glance an echo of classical pre-1947 images, was actually an antithesis of the Cold War and great power geopolitical images of Southern Asia.66 63 ‘The

Destiny of Asia’, 3 October 1950, in Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, vol. 15 (Part 1), eds Sarvepalli Gopal Ravinder Kumar, H.Y. Sharda Prasad, A.K. Damodaran, Mushirul Hasan, and Madhavan K. Palat (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund 1993), 500. 64  For a fine historical survey into the geopolitical images of the Raj see, Parshotam Mehra, Essays in Frontier History: India, China, and the Disputed Border (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007). 65  Nehru’s letter to his Chief Ministers, 1 August 1951, Madhav Khosla, Letters for a Nation: From Jawaharlal Nehru to his Chief Ministers, 1947–1963 (Gurgaon: Penguin, 2014), 212–16. Also see, Narendra Singh Sarila, The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India’s Partition (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2006). 66 For a contribution to non-western forms of geopolitics see, Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson, eds, Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought (London: Routledge, 2000).



Introduction

21

In this wider sense, both Nehru and Indira Gandhi embodied a kind of critical geopolitics in that both sought a distinct, secure and disassociated space for a non-aligned India from the Cold War system, one that was consistent with their respective role conceptions. Yet, both these Indian leaders possessed worldviews that were different and even antithetical to each other. For Nehru, it was about developing an alternative regional philosophy of interstate relations where security dilemmas could be muted in both Asia and India’s immediate vicinity; whereas Indira Gandhi aimed to develop an Indo-centric sub-regional order where external involvement could be restrained and Indian leadership asserted. India’s centrality in Southern Asia and the geography did not change. Rather, the mediation of policymakers who gave their distinct meanings to the appropriate relationship between India and the regional environment changed. Clearly, the idea of agency is central to the framing of the regional environment that matters to a state and there is no ‘natural’ or rational geopolitical image that animates policymakers’ strategic attention. Since we are interested in the changes in regional statecraft from the Nehru to the Indira Gandhi periods, it is necessary to study a set of beliefs and images around a common set of themes in order to examine and bring out the ideational sources of the dominant role conception in each period and be able to locate the main shifts in these ideas. Following Boulding, Holsti, and Brecher’s conceptual insights,67 I contend that regional role conceptions can be analytically recovered via studying four inter-related beliefs relevant to the state’s interaction with its environment: 1. A spatial or geopolitical dimension. 2. A functional dimension or desired purpose for the state in the international system.

67 Boulding, ‘National Images and International Systems’; Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’; Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 251; Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein, ‘A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 13, no. 1 (1969): 87.

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3. A cognitive dimension, which includes orientations relating to how national leaders understand fundamental aspects of international politics such as security, war and peace, and the nature of world order. 4. An instrumental dimension or the preferred means and methods of statecraft that leaders believe are appropriate for their state. Collectively, these four beliefs and images constitute role conceptions. To ensure a consistency of analysis between the two periods, these four images can be distilled into a standard set of questions that will be posed for both the Nehru and Indira Gandhi periods: 1. What is the appropriate scale of regional activity and desired functions or goals? 2. What is the dominant image of the international order in terms of the balance of power and the conception of security? 3. What is the appropriate relationship between means and ends, and beliefs about the efficacy and legitimacy of the use of force and coercion? Since four interrelated terms (roles, beliefs, images, perceptions) will appear in the rest of this book, let us briefly clarify how these concepts are going to be used. A cognitive approach to foreign policy behaviour is based on its underlying beliefs. International images are akin to a snapshot of select aspects of the external environment and can be viewed as abridged versions of a policymaker’s reality.68 These images are typically formed by a deeper 68 

According to Holsti, ‘National images may be denoted as subparts of the belief system. Like the belief system itself, these are “models” which order for the observer what will otherwise be an unmanageable amount of information’. Ole R. Holsti, ‘The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 6, no. 3, Case Studies in Conflict (September 1962): 245. Also see Nitai Chakrabarti, ‘Beliefs, Perceptions and Foreign Policy’, The Indian Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (1988): 328–42.



Introduction

23

belief about some aspect of international order and are often based on formative political events and lessons in the policymakers’ historical experience. Perceptions are situational ideas relating to how external events or crises are interpreted (perceived) by the decisionmaker. Thus, decision makers are both ‘believers’ and ‘perceivers’.69 Perceptions of external events are shaped by the ‘cognitive prior’ or pre-existing beliefs of the policymaker.70 For this study, the dominant role conception serves as the overarching cognitive prism, which is constituted by the beliefs and images of the core policymakers in each period. In other words, ‘roles translate beliefs into expected behaviour patterns’.71

Scope of Study Given the extended era when Jawaharlal Nehru (seventeen years, 1947–64) and Indira Gandhi (fifteen years, 1966–77 and 1980–4) were at the helm of the policymaking apex, it was both necessary and pragmatic to study a smaller historical slice of both periods. While deliberating which parts to study, I have, however, remained conscious of retaining those phases where the core policymakers confronted political competition including over foreign policy. The choice of the selected time frame was also dictated by more mundane reasons like access to archival material. As alluded to earlier, the focus will be on the post-dominion phase (1950 onwards) up to 1955, a phase that is surprisingly understudied but crucial to understanding Nehru’s ideas on regional order and security. For the Indira Gandhi period, the focus will be on the major phase of her tenure (1966–75) given the importance of these years in understanding the post-Nehru

69 

Ole R. Holsti, ‘Cognitive Process Approaches to Decision-Making’, 24. defines a ‘cognitive prior’ as ‘an existing normative framework’, which includes ‘belief systems’. Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (London: Cornell University Press, 2009), 21–2. 71 Walker, Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, 227. 70 Acharya

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transformation in Indian geopolitics and because of the availability of archival material.72 Since we are attempting to address the question of two very different types of regional frameworks in the Nehru and Indira Gandhi periods, it requires focusing on common types of events where the policymakers’ worldviews can be probed for their effects on behaviour in two temporally distinct periods.73 All the selected cases in this book are a class of events that can be described as ‘regional crises’, that is, major events relating to war and peace or perceived to hold significant implications for regional order and stability.74 Each crisis typically had an identifiable outbreak and termination point, and was perceived by decision makers of that respective period as serious enough and with significant implications for defined national interests and regional stability to trigger a role response via a series of behavioural responses. Finally, recalling my proposition that the regional behavioural shift between the Nehru and Indira Gandhi periods involved a contraction from the Asian to the South Asian domain or from the extended to the immediate neighbourhood, it was necessary to evaluate the dominant regional role conception (beliefs and images) with the actual role performance (behaviour) in the two domains—Asia and South Asia—that witnessed the changes 72  In contrast, in the last phase of Indira Gandhi’s prime ministership (1980–4), empirical source material is still largely anecdotal or too limited at the present time to enable a meaningful enquiry into the decisionmaking process. 73  Holsti notes, ‘role and issue must be perceived to be linked before knowledge of role conceptions’ are used to test role performance (‘typical responses, decisions, and actions’). Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’, 298–9. 74 Brecher offers an acceptable definition of a foreign policy crisis: a situation where decision makers perceive the environment change as a challenge or threat to values, the awareness of a finite time for response, and the increased likelihood that military hostilities will erupt. Michael Brecher and J. Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (Ann Harbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977). Also, see Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 7.



Introduction

25

in India’s regional statecraft. In Nehru’s role conception, Asia was deemed as the primary domain or scope of regional activity with South Asia or the subcontinent subsumed within that larger defined image. In Indira Gandhi’s role conception, the primary domain of regional activity contracted to South Asia and Asia became a peripheral domain for policymakers or one that was viewed primarily through the sub-continental setting. The rationale for selecting crises in the two different domains takes us to one of the core themes of this book: namely, the change in the appropriate scope of regional activity between the two periods. We want to understand how Indian policymakers operated in diverse geopolitical contexts and spaces.75 Insofar as the specific crises in each period are concerned, events have been selected that are generally considered as the most significant ones for that period, and those that have received cursory attention in secondary accounts or where interpretations of Indian behaviour remain contested.

Crises Selection For the Nehru period, the 1950 East Bengal crisis is an underinvestigated episode and is also perhaps the only time during that decade where India came close to an armed confrontation with an immediate neighbour. What makes this crisis even more interesting is that Nehru’s foreign policy authority was contested by powerful political rivals led by Vallabhbhai Patel who fiercely competed with the Prime Minister in shaping India’s strategy towards Pakistani intransigence on the question of atrocities 75 

Such an approach has the added advantage in that it compensates for the classic ‘selection bias’, where my argument might have an inherent advantage over rival explanations. For example, an instance of selection bias would entail examining Nehru and Indira Gandhi’s regional behaviour only in their primary domains, that is, Asia and South Asia, respectively. By avoiding this bias, I open the analytical possibility to investigate crisis situations where alternative ideas or rival arguments are expected to have a substantial causal impact on policy choices and behaviour (that is, ‘toughest test case’). Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 121–2.

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against Hindus in East Bengal and the sudden exodus of refugees into India.76 More broadly, the events of 1950 also reflect a historical pattern in India’s Pakistan policy: the tussle between the idea of strategic restraint and the impulse to employ coercive means to persuade Pakistani leaders to take Indian interests seriously. In the Asian domain, Nehru’s ambitious geopolitics continued through the 1950s. For obvious reasons of space, it was necessary to select a smaller slice from a decade of intense diplomatic activity. The Indochina crisis and the Formosa crisis are both significant and understudied cases. The importance of 1954 is recognized but rarely dwelled upon by historians. That year was an important inflexion point in South Asian history, when the regional balance of power was radically altered by a US decision to craft a military alliance with Pakistan. During this same period, a crisis was also brewing in South East Asia where both blocs jostled to preserve their strategic positions on the Indochinese battlefield and through a great power conference at Geneva. For Nehru, these twin crises were indivisible fronts of a common threat to Asian security and it triggered an unorthodox but creative strategy that aimed to counter the expansion of the Cold War in the region. Although the lessons from these fascinating twin crises are perhaps too complex to be summarized, what India’s response did demonstrate was an approach to regional security that was inclusive and sustainable, an outcome shaped by India’s determined diplomacy to craft a zone or area in the extended neighbourhood where the great powers could limit their antagonisms and aggressive impulses. In short, Nehru sought to shape a new equilibrium for Asia. Similarly, the 1954–5 Formosa crisis, also known as the first offshore islands crisis, offers another forgotten event to examine Nehru’s regional policy and understand his geopolitical vision for a stable Asian order. So far, this episode has been studied from the perspectives of the principal protagonists with India’s extraordinary role in averting a major Sino-American conflict having largely 76 Such

a context allows us to evaluate Nehru’s choices and role performance under tough conditions: that is, when alternative theories or accounts might have an equal if not stronger possibility to explain Indian behaviour.



Introduction

27

been overlooked. India’s response to the possibility of a great power collision in East Asia may be seen as a logical extension of Nehru’s statecraft in the first Indochina crisis, namely, to stabilize the geopolitical status quo in the extended neighbourhood and arrest an escalating crisis between a rising China and a dominant America before it spiralled into wider regional instability or a hot war. In essence, Nehru sought to promote an inclusive order where both these great powers could preserve their vital interests in Asia’s future. With the US and China resuming their historical rivalry, the lessons for our time are easily apparent. Although their antagonism is unlikely to ever reach the extremes of the 1950s, the possibility of a future Sino-American collision in the Western Pacific cannot be ruled out, and India might again confront the dilemma of responding to a regional conflagration that could shatter Asia. For the Indira Gandhi period, the second Indochina crisis in 1965–6 is a natural choice for understanding her Asia policy. Even though the escalation of the Vietnam War was the most significant Asian crisis of that decade, we rarely ever think about Indian diplomacy during this conflict. But what makes this phase particularly interesting is the post-Nehruvian foreign policy shifts vividly reflected in the contestations and debates on India’s posture and strategy towards the Vietnam War. Hence, we will be able to evaluate Indira Gandhi’s foreign policy in the extended neighbourhood very early in her tenure when domestic rivals contested her leadership and authority at a time of significant flux in Indian politics and disruption in global great power relations. In many ways, the second Indochina crisis marks the final displacement of Nehru’s peacemaker role conception with an alternative security seeker role. In South Asia, the 1971 crisis in East Pakistan was one of the most destabilizing events in the subcontinent since India’s ­partition in 1947, and thus, is a seminal case for that period. While this case at first glance suggests an over-scrutinized event, in terms of careful archival-based foreign policy analysis it is actually less so. Our understanding of Indira Gandhi’s motives still remain obscure and revisiting the early and middle stages of the crisis might reveal some clues because the fundamental ingredients of India’s strategy were actually laid quite early on. Finally, the Sikkim crisis, by contrast, might appear

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­ nderwhelming compared to the explosive events of 1971. Yet, u it offers a vivid canvas to contrast Nehru and Indira Gandhi’s regional role conceptions and how they conditioned two distinct geopolitical approaches to managing India’s security interests on its periphery. In retrospect, the contestations over the Sikkim policy also exemplify a recurring and broader pattern in India’s approach to its immediate neighbourhood, and we will recognize the debates and disagreements of those years as reflective of contemporary India’s foreign policy.

Establishing the Argument Role conceptions should be viewed as ‘an analytical tool for explaining certain ranges or patterns of foreign policy decisions and actions’.77 And the stronger a role conception, ‘the more likely’ it ‘sets limits on perceived, or politically feasible, policy alternatives’.78 In each of the six case studies, the narrative will examine the link between beliefs and behaviour—that is trace to the extent that is empirically possible the link from the ‘cognitive prior’79 or preexisting beliefs and images to the ideas revealed through the communicative and deliberative record involving the key policymakers during the decision-making process.80 In other words, attention will ‘be directed to the linkages between beliefs and certain decisionmaking tasks that precede a decision—definition of the situation, analysis, prescription’.81 For it is only by establishing a congruence

77  Holsti,

‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’,

308. 78 

Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’, 298. defines a ‘cognitive prior’ as ‘an existing normative framework’, which includes ‘belief systems’. Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter?, 21–2. 80 Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices’, in Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool, eds Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 6–7. 81  Holsti, ‘Cognitive Process Approaches to Decision-Making’, 20. 79 Acharya



Introduction

29

between worldviews and practices that we can claim that a policymaker’s ideas influenced a course of actions.82 The presence of distinguishable ideas during the decisionmaking process can be quite useful while substantiating an ideational account. ‘To make the case for a causal connection between behaviour and frameworks, we must show how actor goals and understandings are the product of particular frames of reference. Ideally, we would like to demonstrate that the behaviour in question was inconsistent with other frames, or only consistent with those central to the actors in question’.83 Similarly, ‘is it possible to conceive of any credible policy options in the same situation that would not have been consistent with those same beliefs? If all the possible actions that the decision-maker might have taken’ are seen as consistent with the dominant role conception, ‘then the explanatory power of those (underlying) beliefs is negligible. Conversely, if other policy options were available which were not consistent with the decision-maker’s own beliefs, then the investigator has additional presumptive evidence of the explanatory power of his beliefs’.84 Figure I.1 depicts such an approach and allows us to critically examine the evidentiary record during each crisis. It depicts multiple potential behavioural responses in a given regional crisis and specifies the pathways that are congruent, consistent but unlikely, and incongruent, with the dominant beliefs of that period. At the end of each case study, this thematic framework will be given to show the policy options that were available and actually exercised by the decision makers.

82 

Alexander L. George, ‘The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behaviour: The “Operational Code” Belief System’, in Foreign Policy Analysis Volume 1, eds Walter Carlsnaes and Stefano Guzzini (New Delhi: SAGE, 2011), 282. Also see Alan M. Jacobs, ‘Process Tracing the Effects of Ideas’, in Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool, eds Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 49. 83  Richard Ned Lebow, Constructing Cause in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 75. 84  George, ‘The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and DecisionMaking Behaviour’, 287.

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Explanatory Variable

Dependent Variable: Regional behaviour Option A ur vio eha b t uen ngr

Role conception (Beliefs and images)

Co Consistent but unlikely behaviour Inc o Ceh ngrue n avi our t

Option B, C

Options G, H (credible in the decisional situation)

Figure I.185  Choice Paths during a Crisis

Sources A comment on the archival material in India’s case and on the various primary sources that went into the making of this study is appropriate here. Because of inflexible de-classification norms, the Government of India until recently did not adhere to the typical 30-year rule for releasing confidential archival material for public access.86 Despite recent transfer of diplomatic records to the National Archives of India (NAI),87 the volume and variety of 85 Figure I.1 is adapted from George, ‘The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behaviour’, 288. All choice path figures in this book are based on this source. 86  According to a January 1997 Government of India order on Public Records, official papers can be declassified after a 25-year period. But the MEA (Ministry of External Affairs) only began adhering to this norm by a change in its declassification process in 2011–12. See ‘MEA Files at the National Archives of India’, MEA press release, 4 June 2012, accessed 6 April 2017, from http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/19811/MEA+Fi les+at+the+National+Archives+of+India. 87 The NAI is the central repository for records produced by the Government of India.



Introduction

31

documents is still not even remotely comparable to that available in US and British archives. Archival limitations are, therefore, an inherent feature in India’s case, and, like most others, I have had access to an incomplete record of confidential communications on foreign policymaking. With that caveat out of the way, it must be emphasized that there has never been a more conducive time to engage with India’s diplomatic and strategic history. It is remarkable how much of the Indian decision-making setting can be recreated with equal portions of persistence and luck. For the Nehru period, the abundance of published documents from the Prime Minister’s personal papers88 offers a credible glimpse into his worldview and a partial glimpse into that of his advisors, colleagues and senior officials. This is further supplemented by the unpublished collection89 held at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Delhi (NMML),90 which has enabled a much richer enquiry into those years including providing access to numerous cables and memoranda authored by the Prime Minister’s closest advisors such as Krishna Menon and other senior officials and diplomats. For the Indira Gandhi period under inquiry, the archival constraints were, in contrast, formidable. The blanket lack of access to the Prime Minister’s papers is to a large extent compensated by a fortuitous public access, since the past decade, to the unpublished papers of her closest advisors, especially P.N. Haksar and T.N. Kaul. Haksar was Indira Gandhi’s 88  This includes both the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, First Series (SWJN-FS), 16 volumes, which cover the pre-1946 period as well as the Second Series (SWJN-SS), which include 73 volumes (as of this time) that cover the period 1946–60. This collection is envisaged to eventually include Nehru’s entire tenure until 1964. 89  Since around 2015, scholars have been provided the opportunity to apply to the Ministry of Culture, Government of India, to gain access to this restricted collection. Prior to this, the complete collection of Nehru’s papers had only been perused by the editors of the Selected Works series who published a selection of this vast archive. 90  The NMML archival collection consists of personal papers (including copies of official government files and memoranda) relating to several Indian statesmen, policymakers, and other public figures.

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most trusted advisor and her de facto foreign and political affairs strategist in the first major phase of her tenure, and Kaul was her most senior official and confidante at the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). In addition, recently declassified MEA records at the NAI also provide useful material relating to policymaking during the 1960s and 1970s. The MEA documents, primarily a collection of monthly reports from overseas missions, diplomatic cables, conversation transcripts involving foreign leaders or interlocutors, and policy memoranda authored by officials in Delhi and overseas embassies, offered an important glimpse into strategic thinking and decision-making during the post-Nehru years. The lack of access to parts of the Indian decision-making process makes international archives an invaluable addition to the documents accessible in India. The empirical gaps can be partially narrowed by relying on US and British archival ­material91 that record how Indian policymakers engaged with their western counterparts or western records and perceptions of Indian diplomacy and strategy in various situations. Finally, my interviews with fourteen former senior officials ranging from a National Security Advisor, Foreign Secretaries, Ambassadors, and intelligence officials also served as key source material.92 While oral recollections can rarely substitute the permanence of a recorded document, interviews can be a means to strengthen or contextualize the analysis from other documentary sources, and occasionally to ascertain new evidence with regard to a crisis where archival material is either insufficient or inaccessible for scrutiny.

91 These

include the digitized collection of US foreign policy documents (FRUS online), US National Archives (Washington DC), British foreign office records at the National Archives (Kew, London), and documents from the Cold War International History Project (Wilson Center, Digital online Archive). 92  The criteria selection for interviewees was two-fold: First, I identified former senior officials with experience, proximity, or knowledge of the policymaking apex in the Nehru and Indira Gandhi periods. Second, my interviews helped in corroborating interpretations or empirical facts drawn from other documentary material.



Introduction

33

Organization of the Book The book has been divided into two parts to enable the more hurried reader to engage such a long piece of work in an a-la-carte fashion. This also seemed an appropriate way to structure the book because although envisioned as a grand comparative study, each period has received sufficient historical attention to stand on its own. Part 1, or the Nehru period, is about India’s looking beyond the subcontinent to remap Asia’s international relations. Part 2, or the Indira Gandhi period, is about India’s inward turn and attempts to reorder the subcontinent’s affairs. Thus, depending on their interests, readers could engage with either period. Others might like to survey the comparative facets of India’s regional policy by tracing the evolution of statecraft towards a recurring crisis in the neighbourhood. Chapter 1 reconstructs Nehru’s role conception by engaging in an analysis of his public and private communication record as well as those of his core advisor Krishna Menon. Nehru’s regional role conception of India as a peacemaker, it is argued, was shaped by three core inter-related beliefs—internationalism centred on Asia, rejection of the balance of power concept, and the expression of an alternative concept of indivisible security called the peace area—as well as a mode of statecraft that favoured persuasion and accommodation rather than coercion or force in inter-state relations. Chapters 2–4 examine three major crises in the Nehru period—the 1950 East Bengal crisis, the 1954 Indochina crisis, and the 1955 Formosa or first offshore islands crisis. In each crisis, I ­ analyse Delhi’s behaviour to examine whether Nehru’s perceptions and policy choices were congruent with his beliefs and images, and peacemaker role conception. Collectively, the three cases tell us a story about the Nehru period and how India sought to shape the regional order at a time when an escalating Cold War contest seemed poised to unravel peace and security on India’s doorstep and across Asia. Chapter 5 reconstructs Indira Gandhi’s role conception by analysing the Prime Minister and her core advisors’ public and private communication record. Indira Gandhi’s regional role conception of India as a security seeker, it is contended, was shaped by three core

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inter-related beliefs: a definition of India’s interests in more narrow terms compared to Nehru’s beliefs and a regional image centred on the subcontinent rather than on an extended Asian space that lay at the heart of Nehru’s image; a divisible conception of security rather than an indivisible one and an inclination to leverage the balance of power for geopolitical advantage rather than to reform Asia’s interaction culture as per Nehru’s role conception; and an inclination to employ coercive means to solve disputes or to pursue geopolitical ends in South Asia rather than a preference for ethical statecraft and strategic restraint embodied in Nehru’s worldview. Chapters 6–8 examine three significant events in the Indira Gandhi period—the second Indochina crisis of 1965–6, the second East Bengal crisis of 1971, and the Sikkim crisis. Again, the three cases together reveal some common strands in Indira Gandhi’s regional statecraft and how policymakers navigated the growing uncertainty and geopolitical re-alignments in Asia to ultimately craft a commanding position in the subcontinent. The Conclusion returns to the central theme and examines whether changing role conceptions from a peacemaker to a security seeker is a persuasive interpretation for the dramatic shift in India’s foreign policy during the Cold War. It then situates this study in the broader historiography of India’s foreign policy and suggests why we might need to reconsider the mainstream depiction of India’s statecraft during the Cold War. Some of the implications for future research are also briefly discussed, and finally, the contemporary relevance of this study is underlined by showing that many of the recurring questions and debates about India’s future role can be engaged if we situate India’s foreign policy journey in a larger historical backdrop.

1 Nehru’s Role Conception

The sword, as ever, is a shift of fools To hide their folly. —Jawaharlal Nehru (November 1939) The self-interest of the ‘realist’ is far too limited by past myths and dogmas, and regards ideas and social forms, suited to one age, as immutable and as unchanging parts of human nature and society, forgetting that nothing is so changeable as human nature and society. —Jawaharlal Nehru (December 1945)

The central feature of India’s foreign policy executive in the 1950s was the leadership tandem of Nehru and Krishna Menon. There is now sufficient historical material from Nehru’s papers,1 biographies,

1 Although

direct archival access to Krishna Menon’s papers is not available by government rules, a scrutiny of Menon’s role, both as a strategist and practitioner, is now possible. Nehru’s published Selected Works include a large portion of Nehru’s correspondence to Krishna Menon as well as abridged information from select incoming cables authored by Menon to the Prime Minister and other senior officials. The unpublished collection of Nehru’s papers overcomes many of the weaknesses in the Selected Works series since it contains entire cables and policy notes drafted by Menon.

Power and Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policies during the Cold War. Zorawar Daulet Singh, Oxford University Press (2019). © Zorawar Daulet Singh. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199489640.003.0002

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memoirs, and oral histories2 to enable us to study the Nehru–Menon partnership and their collaborative effort in conceiving and implementing India’s foreign policy.3 Although portrayed as a devious ideologue by his detractors at home and abroad, Krishna Menon’s knowledge about international affairs and great power politics has been recognized by Indian strategists.4 Nehru’s ‘imagination’ and vision, one biographer notes, was complemented by Menon’s ‘practical approach, knowledge of international law and diplomatic skills’.5 Menon later reflected that his foreign policy approach had a more conceptual basis in contrast to Nehru’s intuitive mind.6 According to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Nehru’s sister and a former diplomat, the key link between Nehru and Menon was their shared ideological and political outlook.7 Both shared a ‘left-of-­ centre’ worldview and interpreted events through a similar ideational lens.8 For Nehru and Menon, a self-reliant democratic socialism represented a counterpoise to the pressures of ­neo-imperialism on 2 Menon’s

extensive interviews with Michael Brecher in 1964–5 are contained in Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968). 3 Paul M. McGarr, ‘“India’s Rasputin”?: V.K. Krishna Menon and Anglo-American Misperceptions of Indian Foreign Policymaking, 1947– 1964’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 22, no. 2 (2011): 239–60. 4  J.N. Dixit, Makers of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2004), 152. More recently, another former Foreign Secretary has offered another objective assessment of Menon’s role in the Nehru period. M.K. Rasgotra, A Life in Diplomacy (Gurgaon: Viking, 2016), 32–6, 170–4. 5  V.K. Madhavan Kutty, V.K. Krishna Menon (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1988), 122. 6  Nehru ‘would pick up something which by intuition appealed to him and make use of it … if I said something and he adopted and repeated it, that is all that the world would know about it’. Brecher, India and World Politics, 5. George argues that Nehru’s socialistic orientation was relatively more ‘emotional’ compared to Krishna Menon’s ‘rational’ outlook as a ‘scientific socialist’ trained under Professor Harold Laski at the London School of Economics. T.J.S. George, Krishna Menon (London: Jonathan Cape, 1964), 103. 7  Janaki Ram, V.K. Krishna Menon: A Personal Memoir (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 44. 8 George, Krishna Menon, 103.



Nehru’s Role Conception

39

post-colonial states as it offered a path to not only strengthen India’s strategic independence but also a move towards a progressive order. Yet, both were repelled by ‘communism’s totalitarian techniques’ as they had internalized constitutional principles,9 and it has been accurately observed that Menon’s ‘radicalism prevented him from embracing communism’ or totalitarian systems.10 It has been suggested that Nehru and Menon’s beliefs were influenced by West European and British political thought, which resulted ‘on the one hand in an overly enthusiastic participation in world affairs and in a broad socialistic fervour on the other’.11 Others too have drawn a link between Nehru’s strategic thinking and English liberals in the inter-War period.12 While it is correct to point to the liberal Western roots of many Indian leaders, Nehru’s foreign policy beliefs had more complex strands running through them. Menon’s worldview, for instance, was a ‘derivative of both English and Nehruvian ideas’.13 And, while both Nehru and Menon relied on a derivative Western discourse, they ‘arranged these beliefs and theories in ways that their European progenitors did not necessarily intend and put them to purposes that they did not endorse’.14

9 Iqbal

Singh, Between Two Fires: Towards an Understanding of Jawaharlal Nehru’s Foreign Policy, Volume 1 (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1992), 185. Nehru described himself as a non-dogmatic socialist because the very appeal of socialism was ‘that there can be no dogma about it’. ‘Capitalism, Imperialism and Socialism’, 7 November 1936, SWJN-FS, 7, 542. 10 Ian Hall, ‘“Mephistopheles in a Saville Row Suit”: V.K. Krishna Menon and the West’, in Radicals and Reactionaries in TwentiethCentury International Thought, ed. Ian Hall (US: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 207–8. S. Gopal, ‘The Formative Ideology of Jawaharlal Nehru’, in National and Left Movement in India, ed. K.N. Panikkar (New Delhi: Vikas, 1980), 8. 11 Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1964), 92. 12  A.P. Rana, ‘The Nature of India’s Foreign Policy: An Examination of the Relation of Indian Non-alignment to the Concept of the Balance of Power in the Nuclear Age’, India Quarterly 22, no. 1 (1966): 138–9. 13  Hall, ‘V.K. Krishna Menon and the West’, 193. 14  Hall, ‘V.K. Krishna Menon and the West’, 211–12.

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Krishna Menon first met Nehru in India during an India League delegation’s visit in the early 1930s and their rapport developed during Nehru’s visit in 1935 to England.15 Menon made a ‘lasting impression’16 on Nehru who was ‘struck by the broadness of Menon’s vision’.17 In 1935, the Congress Party selected Menon as its representative to the World Peace Conference at Geneva and to the International Peace Conference at Brussels. Menon also advised the Congress Party to set up a Foreign Department, which had begun to function by 1936.18 In the mid-1930s, Nehru and Krishna Menon began planning to spur the Congress into a more active international posture. Menon’s detailed reports about international affairs helped Nehru keep himself abreast of global developments.19 The post-1947 evolution of the duo was characterized by Nehru being the political backer of India’s international role, and Menon as his principal ­strategist-cum-practitioner. By the end of 1950, Menon had emerged as the Prime Minister’s ‘deputy for all practical purposes’ and his ‘chief foreign policy advisor’.20 Menon’s influence went beyond friendship since he had the capacity to operationalize Nehru’s foreign policies and the ability to grasp the latter’s ‘thoughts and objectives and to convey them accurately, always pungently, to the outside world’. But Menon was ‘more than roving ambassador and spokesman’. He was ‘consulted on all issues of foreign policy by the Prime Minister’. While Nehru was the principal architect of India’s foreign policy, Menon’s role had been to act upon these principles to ‘achieve specific goals’.21 While Menon rarely contradicted ‘the line laid down by Nehru’, his tactical influence was ‘considerable’.22 15 Ram,

V.K. Krishna Menon, 44; George, Krishna Menon, 94. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Volume 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1975), 202. 17 Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 202. George, Krishna Menon, 95. 18 Kutty, V.K. Krishna Menon, 47. 19 Kutty, V.K. Krishna Menon, 120. 20  Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1959), 567, 573. 21 Brecher, Nehru, 573–4. Similarly, Moraes notes that Menon’s position was based on his ‘ability to rationalize’ Nehru’s ‘instinctive, often emotional ideals’. Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography (New York: Macmillan, 1958), 331. 22 Brecher, Nehru, 574–5; McGarr, ‘India’s Rasputin’, 256. 16  Sarvepalli



Nehru’s Role Conception

41

Former ­officials concur with this assessment. ‘While Nehru was the architect … Menon should rightly be considered the analytical advisor and executor of Nehru’s foreign policy’.23 Another recalls that ‘Krishna Menon was for all practical purposes on many occasions the foreign minister of India’.24

The Role Conception Nehru’s conception of India as a peacemaker was shaped by three core beliefs—Asia-centric internationalism, rejection of the traditional balance of power imagery of international life, and the expression of an alternative concept of security called the peace area—and a preference for ethical statecraft relying on persuasion rather than coercion. As we will see, Nehru’s peacemaker role conception had an inner logic and coherence in its ensemble of beliefs and images.

Asia-Centric Internationalism The origins of Nehru’s beliefs inform us about his consistent concern for structural conditions in world politics and his subsequent role conception after 1947. While it has been averred that Nehru’s ideas emerged from a combination of Marxist instincts and an inherent ‘romanticism’,25 Nehru’s own description of the intellectual sources of his worldview as ‘a strange medley’ of ‘Buddha–Marx– Gandhi’ is perhaps a more accurate representation.26 For Nehru, Rabindranath Tagore and Gandhi were the embodiment of being ‘fully Indian’ with a ‘world outlook’. While Gandhi embodied the primacy of means and a commitment to ethical practice, Tagore was

23 Dixit,

Makers of India’s Foreign Policy, 155. Lall, United Nations Oral History Project, United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld Library, 27 June 1990, accessed 15 March 2014, http://www.unmultimedia.org/oralhistory/2011/10/lall-arthur-samuel/. 25  Gopal, ‘The Formative Ideology of Jawaharlal Nehru’, 2. 26  ‘Prison Diary’, 3 June 1935, SWJN-FS, 6, 367. Also see, Priya Chacko, Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004 (New York: Routledge, 2012), 37. 24  Arthur

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the exemplar for a reformed world order. Tagore had ‘broadened the bases of Indian nationalism’ and was ‘India’s internationalist par excellence, believing and working for international cooperation’.27 Nehru endorsed an interpretation of the past where events were all inter-related and when taken together, ‘some sorts of laws and causes’ emerged to enable an understanding of ‘the course and significance of world history’.28 To address India’s national problems, it was essential to ‘see them in relation to international affairs’. Most Congress leaders, including Gandhi, did not share this ‘outlook’.29 A recurring theme in Nehru’s discourse on world history and politics is his consistent representation of Indian nationalism as an outward-looking phenomenon. Major historical events like the Russian revolution, the European crisis of the 1930s, the Second World War, the outbreak of the Cold War, Partition, the rise of Mao’s China, and the expansion of the Cold War into Asia reinforced Nehru’s representation of Indian sovereignty—that of an outward bound state. He believed that the colonial experience had isolated Indians from Asia and the world and he went about correcting this ‘insular’ outlook. He sought to reverse India’s ‘introvert nationalism’ by making India aware of the problems of others.30 Nehru’s ideational canvas was dramatically broadened by the Russian revolution and the Western reaction to it. A two-year European sojourn in 1926–7, which included a short Russia visit, persuaded him to interpret India’s anti-colonial struggle in wider terms.31 This period instilled an appreciation for structures and larger historical currents. ‘Instead of merely condemning British imperialism as alien domination’, Nehru ‘gave new emphasis to the interlinking of economics and politics, of capitalism and

27 Jawaharlal

Nehru, The Discovery of India (New Delhi: Penguin, 2010), 372–3. For a useful historical survey on early Indian nationalist thinking on Asian problems, see Birendra Prasad, Indian Nationalism and Asia, 1900–1947 (New Delhi: B.R. Publishing, 1979). 28  ‘On the Understanding of History’, 8 October 1933, SWJN-FS, 6, 199. 29  ‘To Rajendra Prasad’, 11 November 1935, SWJN-FS, 7, 38. 30 Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru, 11–12. 31 Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography (Gurgaon: Penguin, 2004), 170–4; Nehru, Discovery of India, 459–62.



Nehru’s Role Conception

43

imperialism’ and he began to question not just the ‘foreign ruler’ but the ‘systems’ that enabled the process. He also located the ‘common element’ with other anti-imperial struggles, with China as a symbol of a shared colonial plight, and early revolutionary Russia of the 1920s, which had become the object of British containment.32 Nehru saw these other Asian and Eurasian areas as different facets of imperialism. ‘The idea of closer contact with Asiatic nations,’ Nehru wrote in 1927, was driven by ‘a common antagonism to European domination and exploitation.’ He forecasted that India would be ‘drawn towards her neighbouring countries’ and would ‘try to work in a large measure in concert with them’.33 At the Brussels Congress in that same year, Nehru protested British India’s military role to ‘coerce’ China and felt that China’s successful struggle was ‘the most hopeful sign of the future downfall of imperialism’.34 Nehru’s correspondence from Brussels reveals a firm anti-imperialist discourse but he argued against a narrow nationalism, which had ‘been the main pillar of capitalism and imperialism’ in the West. Political freedom in an oppressed country could even result in ‘driving nationalism into the imperialist and capitalist fold’.35 This concern for a reformed order—where the domestic and international were interlinked— would remain a core belief. Nehru defended his beliefs to Gandhi, who was not particularly enamoured with the former’s internationalist vision: ‘I do not think it is desirable nor indeed is it possible for India to plough a lonely furrow now or in the future…. I am afraid we are terribly narrow in our 32 Gopal,

‘The Formative Ideology of Jawaharlal Nehru’, 6. Brecher, Nehru, 119–20. 33  ‘The Psychology of Indian Nationalism’, January 1927, SWJN-FS, 2, 270. 34  ‘Statement to the Press at Brussels’, 9 February 1927, SWJN-FS, 2, 271. 35  ‘Report on the Brussels Congress’, 9 February 1927, SWJN-FS, 2, 287. In March 1927, Nehru added: ‘I do not want our country to be a victim of that narrow nationalism which is now to be found in almost all the countries of Europe and America. I hope that after gaining freedom we shall use our energy for extending peace in the world.’ See ‘On the Indian Situation’, 2 March 1927, SWJN-FS, 2, 297.

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outlook and the sooner we get rid of this narrowness the better.’36 A fuller expression of Nehru’s beliefs came in his Presidential address at the Lahore Congress in December 1929. He urged the majority conservative base of his Party to claim full independence but also argued that India would ‘welcome all attempts at world cooperation and federation’ and ‘even agree to give up part of her own independence to a larger group of which she is an equal member’.37 Crises during the 1930s such as the Great Depression, the collision of fascism and socialism in Europe, and the conflict between Japanese imperialism and Chinese nationalism combined to strengthen Nehru’s belief that India’s freedom struggle was ‘part of this universal confrontation’.38 This phase of his intellectual journey is reflected in Glimpses of World History, a series of letters written to Indira Gandhi from prison.39 Here, a dominant strand is Nehru’s quest to locate the roots and sources of inter-state conflict with the nineteenth century foreshadowing the contemporary world crisis. ‘A blind nationalism thus began to dominate Europe,’ and despite interdependence and connectivity bringing ‘countries closer to each other’, the ‘whole structure of society under the new industrial capitalism … bred friction between nation and nation’.40 Consequently, nationalism ‘became intenser and narrower’.41 For his own era, Nehru underscored the dichotomy between a world of material interdependence and a lagging ‘political structure’, which was ‘narrowly national’.42 Europe’s impending collision of rival ideologies in the late 1930s did not motivate Nehru to interpret this flux as merely an opportunity for India. The world order within which India gained its independence was central to his beliefs and Nehru saw India’s struggle on different geopolitical fronts—in Africa, in Europe, in Asia. India was a 36 

‘To Gandhi’, 22 April 1927, SWJN-FS, 2, 326. ‘Presidential Address’, 29 December 1929, SWJN-FS, 4, 189–90. 38  Gopal, ‘The Formative Ideology of Jawaharlal Nehru’, 7. 39 One of Nehru’s longest jail terms was from December 1931 to August 1933 and then from February 1934 to September 1935. 40 Jawaharlal Nehru, Glimpses of World History (Gurgaon: Penguin, 2004), 464–5. 41 Nehru, Glimpses of World History, 466. 42 Nehru, Glimpses of World History, 1015. 37 



Nehru’s Role Conception

45

‘world problem’ and ‘any breach in the imperialist front anywhere has its repercussions all over the world’.43 Nehru’s ideas were in sharp contrast to his Congress colleague and fellow modernizer, Subhas Chandra Bose, who developed a more instrumental outlook to global events where the clash of imperialism, fascism, and communism presented a unique opportunity to accelerate India’s liberation. This is underscored by Bose’s comment to Nehru in 1939: ‘Foreign Policy is a realistic affair to be determined largely from the point of view of a nation’s self-interest.’44 Bose critiqued Nehru’s beliefs as lacking an instrumental motive: ‘I feel that we should take international politics seriously and utilise the international situation for our benefit—or not talk about it at all. It is no use making a show, if we do not mean business.’45 Bose believed that India ‘should not be influenced by the internal politics of any country or the form of its state’ but ‘find in every country’ those ‘who will sympathise with Indian freedom, no matter what their own political views may be’.46 ‘The fundamental principle of our foreign policy,’ Bose declared in a 1945 speech, ‘has been and will be: Britain’s enemy is India’s friend.’ If Germany and Japan were viewed as a means to weaken British imperialism during the war, by mid-1945 Bose anticipated support from Soviet Russia in the nascent Cold War.47 Nehru, on the other hand, was reluctant to separate the national from the international or imbibe a cold balance-of-power philosophy. ‘The fact that a particular country is an enemy of Britain does not necessarily mean that that country is our friend.’48 It was, therefore, important to ‘consider the fundamental aspects’ 43 

‘India and the World’, 6 January 1936, SWJN-FS, 7, 53–4. Mukherjee, Nehru & Bose: Parallel Lives (Gurgaon: Penguin, 2014), 128–9. Also see, T.R. Sareen, ‘Subhas Chandra Bose, Japan and British Imperialism’, European Journal of East Asian Studies 3, no. 1 (2004): 69–97. 45 L. Ratnakar, Nehru: A Critical Assessment by Subhas Chandra Bose and Rammanohar Lohia (New Delhi: Hope India, 2003), 43. 46  Selected Speeches of Subhas Chandra Bose (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1962), 91. 47  Selected Speeches of Subhas Chandra Bose, 228–9. 48  ‘India and the European Crisis’, 5 September 1938, SWJN-FS, 9, 130. 44 Rudrangshu

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and not ‘be led away by opportunist motives of gaining a temporary advantage’.49 The structure had to change and an anti-fascist struggle that preserved imperialism would simply become a ‘contest for power between rival imperialisms’.50 In 1938, Nehru located India’s predicament in different crises, what has happened in Abyssinia, in Spain and in China, have now forced people to think in terms of internationalism … even though we were engrossed in our struggles, we began to think more and more of the social struggles in other parts of the world, and to feel more and more that they affected us because they affected the entire world.51

Hence, for Nehru, transcending nationalism was a rational response to reforming the environment within which nation states survived. Perceiving world order at a critical conjuncture, Nehru affirmed, ‘the independence that we seek has never been looked at as isolation or the mere addition of a new national State to a crowd of others. We have always realised and looked forward to the world gathering closer together.’ By 1940, he perceived ‘the end of an age’ and sensed an opportunity for a ‘vast transformation’ in ‘political forms, economic structures, social relationships’. While Nehru hoped for a ‘world federation of free countries’, he also acknowledged the possibility of ‘hostile groupings’ and a ‘continuation’ of the old structure of conflict. Should the latter scenario come to pass, India would welcome an ‘Eastern Federation’, including China and other postcolonial states, which is ‘self reliant’ and works for ‘world peace and world federation’.52 The Discovery of India, written during his last incarceration,53 marks a culmination of Nehru’s intellectual journey where he compiled lessons from Indian and world history. The tide of the world war had changed decisively and Nehru reflected on India’s unique liberation struggle with an eye on a future role: ‘It is ­surprising how 49 

‘India and the World’, 6 January 1936, SWJN-FS, 7, 54. Nehru, The Unity of India: Collected Writings, 1937– 1940 (London: Lindsay Drummond, 1941), 313. 51 Nehru, The Unity of India, 270. 52 Nehru, The Unity of India, 326–7. 53  August 1942 to June 1945. 50 Jawaharlal



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internationally minded we grew in spite of our intense nationalism … the general tendency in such other countries was to keep clear of international commitments.’54 He again underlined his dialectic between nationalism and internationalism: The nationalist ideal is deep and strong; it is not a thing of the past with no future significance. But other ideals, more based on the ineluctable facts of today, have arisen, the international ideal and the proletarian ideal, and there must be some kind of fusion between these various ideals if we are to have a world equilibrium and a lessening of conflict. The abiding appeal of nationalism to the spirit of man has to be recognised and provided for, but its sway limited to a narrower sphere.55

Although expecting continuity in the Westphalian system of sovereign states, Nehru tempered nationalist instincts both because of his belief in interdependence as a stabilizing factor in the emerging world order, and a fear that an introverted Indian leadership might hamper India’s development. The bloody great power struggle in Europe had convinced Nehru that an insular nationalism would be counterproductive for India. He highlighted Western Europe’s short-sighted response to Nazi Germany: They ‘sacrificed internationalism for what they considered, wrongly as events proved, their national interests’.56 Yet, Nehru also underscored that sovereignty was ­sacrosanct: ‘we are no supplicants for others’ favours and patronage. Thus we shall remain true Indians and Asiatics, and become at the same time good internationalists and world citizens.’57 This is an important facet of Nehru’s beliefs and consistent with India’s core self-image of non-alignment. Infringement on sovereignty could be validated for solving international problems only in a context devoid of pressure or dictation.58 Thus, ‘encroachments on s­ overeignty 54 Nehru,

Discovery of India, 465. Discovery of India, 45. 56 Nehru, Discovery of India, 462. 57  Cited in Chacko, Indian Foreign Policy, 51. 58 M.S. Rajan, ‘Indian Foreign Policy in Action, 1954–56’, India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 16, no. 3 (1960): 211. 55 Nehru,

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could be accepted voluntarily in an interdependent world in the interests of world order, but could not be surrendered to a stronger force’.59 In short, Nehru’s international images operated within a core self-image of a stubbornly independent personality for India.

Defining the National Interest It is an intuitive proposition that national interest underpins a state’s international role. But ‘merely to say that national interest determines foreign policy is singularly unenlightening’. National interests are ‘constructed’, that is, they are more about ideas and preferences than something ‘“out there” waiting to be discovered’.60 Put another way, the ‘exact definition of a “core” value or interest in any given country depends on the attitudes of those who make policy’.61 So how does Nehru define national interest? [It] can be seen in two ways, that is, rather narrow national interest, temporary national interest … or a long-term view of national interest, which may well lead one to the conclusion that a country’s national interests are served, let us say, by peace in the world, or by friendship with other nations, or by the well-being of neighbouring countries. So it becomes intelligent long-term interest … enlightened self-interest.62

The resilience of Nehru’s beliefs was tested during the partition of India, a shock of direct import. Nehru hosted the first conference of Asian countries in March 1947, when the national mood was unstable. Despite such a tumultuous backdrop, Nehru urged his Asian peers to craft an internationalist ethic: ‘We seek no narrow 59 P.N.

Haksar, ed., Nehru’s Vision of Peace and Security in the Nuclear Age (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1987), 64. 60 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 2. 61  K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1992), 145. Also see K.P. Misra, ed., Studies in Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Vikas, 1969), xv. 62 Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia: A Political Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 203–4.



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nationalism. Nationalism has a place in each country and should be fostered, but it must not be allowed to become aggressive and come in the way of international development.’63 By broadening ideational horizons, Nehru felt the conference had made the Indian people ‘Asia conscious’ and politicians ‘immersed in national affairs’, had ‘been forced to come out of their grooves of thought’.64 Both before and after the bloodletting of Partition, Nehru refused to shift to a narrow definition of national interest.65 An India–Pakistan military conflict and a dramatic setback on the Kashmir issue, where an appeal to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had yielded an unexpected entanglement, too did not weaken Nehru’s beliefs. In fact, his images became stronger. In early 1949, Nehru perceived wider events in Asia ‘compelling India to play an important role’.66 India’s interests, Nehru explained in a foreign policy debate in the Constituent Assembly a few months later, coincided ‘with wider interests’ related to ‘the maintenance and promotion of peace and the avoidance of war’. India’s policy was not one of ‘sitting on the hedge’ or a ‘middle of the road ­policy’. Rather, it was a ‘positive policy of peace’, that was ‘always seeking to do something’ to ‘lessen the tension of the moment’.67 A hardening bipolarity, impending victory of Mao’s forces in China, and the end of America’s nuclear monopoly formed the backdrop of Nehru’s first visit to the US in 1949. Outlining his role conception to the West, he said that India had ‘tried to combine 63 Nehru,

India’s Foreign Policy, 252–3. ‘To K.P.S. Menon’, 29 April 1947, SWJN-SS, 2, 523. 65 In December 1947, Nehru diffused his beliefs in the Constituent Assembly: ‘Some people may think of the interests of their country regardless of other consequences, or take a short-distance view. Others may think that in the long-term policy the interest of another country is as important to them as that of their own country. The interest of peace is more important, because if war comes everyone suffers … selfinterest may itself demand a policy of cooperation with other nations…. Therefore, we propose to look after India’s interests in the context of world cooperation and world peace.’ Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 28. 66  ‘Letters to CM’, 17 January 1949, SWJN-SS, 9, 291. 67  ‘A Constructive Foreign Policy’, 8 March 1949, SWJN-SS, 10, 458–9. 64 

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idealism with national interest’, and its main objective was ‘the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major power or group of powers but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue’. Moreover, this was a positive policy and India’s strategic independence or ‘detachment’ did not imply ‘isolationism’, ‘indifference’, or ‘neutrality’ if ‘peace or freedom’ was threatened.68 Nehru’s beliefs derived from his understanding of security as an indivisible process. ‘The interdependence of world problems’ implied that no country could ‘separate itself from others’ or ‘solve the problems of war and peace by itself’. India’s nationalism, Nehru asserted, had ‘always been based on this conception of a world order and international cooperation’.69 It is interesting that Nehru reaffirmed rather than questioned his worldview at each major inflexion point. Yet, one might still ask whether Nehru’s rhetoric was a deceptive veneer for realpolitik or espoused to buttress his authority within India. But there is no evidence for such an instrumental motivation. For one, Nehru did not engage in any balancing behaviour after Partition and the Kashmir conflict. There was no threat inflation, military build-up plans, or attempts to alter the status quo. Rather, Nehru sought to maintain the status quo that was being challenged externally. Further, Nehru’s construction of the national interest did little to extend his power and authority at home. If anything, these ideas defied the insularity of the mainstream Indian leadership. Nehru’s beliefs, hence, did not emerge because he found them ‘useful’ but because he believed they were ‘right’.70

Nehru’s Regional Image Consistent with Nehru’s wider definition of national interest were his beliefs regarding the geopolitical scale for India’s foreign policy. Contemplating the post-war order in Discovery, Nehru had 68 

‘Ends and Means’, 17 October 1949, SWJN-SS, 13, 317–18. ‘An Interdependent World’, 26 October 1949, SWJN-SS, 13, 346–7. 70  David Dessler and John Owen, ‘Constructivism and the Problem of Explanation: A Review Article’, Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 3 (2005): 597. 69 



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projected an expansive vision. Independent India, he argued, could not ‘carry on more or less as before’ or ‘play a secondary part in the world. She will either count for a great deal or not count at all. No middle position attracted me. Nor did I think any intermediate position feasible.’71 Such ambitious rhetoric despite modest material conditions suggests that Nehru’s thinking might have been influenced by India’s erstwhile centrality during British India’s primacy across Asia. Note, for example, a speech on Inter-Asian relations in August 1946, where he dwelt on India’s geopolitical location: Nowadays, one hears a great deal about regions. Well, whether one talks of the Middle East, or South East Asia, or China, they all impinge on India; all depend on India, economically, politically and for defence purposes. They cannot help looking at India and we cannot help looking at them…. So it seems in the modern world it is inevitable for India to be the centre of things … when this subject was being discussed at first, some people thought the conference might be confined to south eastern Asia…. Then some people were afraid that if we spread out too much we might get nowhere, but I think we should spread out.72

This expansive vision should not, however, be mistaken for western geopolitical images, as leading scholars like Raja Mohan and Bharat Karnad have suggested in their interpretations of Nehru’s regional statecraft.73 Nehru’s geopolitical image was the very antithesis of classical geopolitics. In Discovery’s chapter, ‘Realism and Geopolitics’, Nehru countered classical great power images that had been espoused by western strategists like Nicholas Spykman and H.J. Mackinder. Western geopolitics, ‘the 71 Nehru,

Discovery of India, 48. Between Two Fires, 344–6. 73 It is generally argued that despite Nehru’s internationalism, when it came to subcontinental affairs there was more continuity with British India’s or the Raj’s strategic tradition. See, for example, C. Raja Mohan, ‘Nehru @ 125’, Indian Express, 3 December 2014; C. Raja Mohan, ‘Modernizing the Raj Legacy’, Seminar, 1 January 2012; Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), 66–162. 72 Singh,

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anchor of the realist’, prescribed an incessant struggle to contain the Eurasian ‘heartland’. For Nehru, this was a sub-optimal feature of Western strategic thought that kept reproducing cycles of great power discord on more dangerous and grander scales. Nazi Germany had been the latest manifestation of this dynamic. The main flaw in classical geopolitics was the slide from national security to a drift towards ‘world domination’. Nehru pondered whether any lessons would ‘be learnt or will there be others, driven by ambition and pride of race and power, to try their fortunes on this fatal field? There really seems no alternative between world conquest and world association; there is no choice of a middle course’.74 If a heady anticipation of a free India and a changing world order had triggered Nehru’s geopolitical discourse, the late 1940s removed all uncertainty about India’s neighbourhood. Not only had the subcontinent been divided, leaving a festering India– Pakistan conflict, the Cold War had also broken out in Europe and was poised to spread to the east. Despite these changing circumstances, Nehru’s beliefs retained continuity. In 1949, Nehru noted, ‘our neighbours now are all the countries of the world so that we cannot relate our foreign policy just to a few countries around us….’ This strong belief in indivisible security explains his wider regional image. If ‘there is a conflict on a big scale anywhere in the world, it is apt to spread all over the world, that is, war had become indivisible and, therefore, peace is indivisible. Therefore, our foreign policy cannot limit itself to the nearby countries.’75 India was seen to be at the geopolitical crossroads of several sub-regions of Asia, and, although its material strength had been degraded, Nehru projected a role far beyond the subcontinent: We are just interested in building our country up and so naturally we try to avoid entanglements anywhere…. But anyhow, India is situated geographically in such a way that we just cannot escape anything that happens in Western Asia, in Central Asia, in Eastern Asia or South-East Asia. Whether it is in terms of war or in terms of

74 Nehru, 75 Nehru,

Discovery of India, 597–602. India’s Foreign Policy, 42.



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peace, we cannot escape it … we just cannot escape the burdens and responsibilities, which that position brings to us.76

As he disentangled India from the old order, Nehru simultaneously espoused a re-involvement with the Asian system. There was a positive aspect to his geopolitical image: Geography is a very important thing in politics…. It not only governs our life in many ways but also our contacts…. India in her long history has never been isolated. She had the closest contacts in olden times with all parts of Asia, with Western Asia … and the Greek and the Roman worlds. Even before that, with South East Asia we have exceedingly close contacts…. So we have these very close contacts which continued till the British came to India … our contacts with the rest of Asia were cut off … we saw the world through England, and if you like, through English spectacles.77

In effect, Nehru was shedding British India’s mental map that had cut off India from Asia and re-oriented its role as a logistical and resource hub for the imperial centre. British India’s geopolitics of an expansive Asian neighbourhood had envisioned several ‘ring’ fences around India’s extended periphery to deny access to other great powers.78 Consequently, British India’s regional policy was ‘by no means hemmed in by the geographical limits of the Himalayas to the north or the Indian Ocean to the south, for it extended far beyond’.79 In Discovery, Nehru had noted how ‘Indian troops had been used as mercenaries’ in ‘Burma, China, Iran … Middle East, and … Africa’, making them ‘symbols of British imperialism’ across Asia.80 In fact, this innate anti-militarism in Nehru’s beliefs can be traced in his writings and correspondence from the 1920s on India’s role in Asia: ‘Slaves ourselves, it has been our degrading 76 

‘The Futility of War’, 27 October 1949, SWJN-SS, 13, 364. ‘Ferment in Asia’, 18 October 1949, SWJN-SS, 13, 321–2. 78 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Securing the Barrack: The Logic, Structure, and Objectives of India’s Naval Expansion’, Naval War College Review, 43, no. 3 (1990): 79–97. 79  Parshotam Mehra, Essays in Frontier History: India, China, and the Disputed Border (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 7. 80 Nehru, Discovery of India, 467. 77 

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function to help in the enslavement of others for the benefit of a third party.’81 Nehru’s public critique of British India’s regional policy in 1937 is instructive to understand his geopolitics: [T]he frontier of India and the lands beyond are regarded by the government as a probable theatre of war, and all their policy is directed to strengthening themselves for war purposes … It is ultimately one of advancing and occupying more territory so as to remove the theatre of war a little further away from their base. The military mind, ignoring political and psychological factors, thinks only in terms of extending the bounds of an empire and thus making it safer from attack … this process often ends in weakening a country or an empire…. All this has led to the so-called ‘Forward Policy’ at the frontier.82

Nehru projected an alternative regional geopolitics: ‘Our approach to the frontier problem would be entirely different; it would be based on friendship and cooperation and respect for the freedom of others.’83 Thus, while Nehru had inherited a larger conception of spaces from the colonial era, he displaced British India’s geopolitical image with another equally expansive multi-directional vision: When ‘you think of the regions in Asia … whichever region you may think of, India comes into the picture, being centrally situated. If you think of South East Asia, obviously India comes in. If you think of the Far East, India comes in and if you think of the Middle East, India is there.’84 Nehru also provided a new meaning to this spatial environment. Central to his regional image was a psychologically shared postcolonial space, which despite ‘large differences’ possessed an overriding ‘Asian sentiment’. Prolonged colonial encounters with the West had created an Asian region consisting of states with similar self-images of nationalism and strategic ­autonomy.85 And Nehru believed that India was not only in a 81 

‘The Situation in China and India’s Duty’, April 1927, SWJN-FS, 2, 327. ‘Press Statement’, 22 June 1937, SWJN-FS, 8, 459–62. 83  ‘Press Statement’, 22 June 1937, SWJN-FS, 8, 459–62. 84 ‘Ferment in Asia’, 18 October 1949, SWJN-SS, 13, 322. Emphasis added. 85  ‘The Destiny of Asia’, 3 October 1950, SWJN-SS, 15 (Part 1), 500, 503. A similar outward-bound impulse is discernable in Discovery 82 



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position to understand this space, it was also a pathfinder obligated to assume an extra-regional role and responsibility. Interestingly, Brecher’s work appears to corroborate the above discussion. After his extensive conversations with Krishna Menon, Brecher had observed, ‘Southern Asia, as a distinctive area or system of international relations, is conspicuously absent from his [Menon’s] perception…. It is as if Southern Asia does not exist as a legitimate area for the pursuit of India’s foreign policy…. This striking lacuna was evident in Nehru’s View of the World as well.’86 This seeming absence of a subcontinental image in Nehru and Menon’s worldviews does not of course imply that there was no conception of a region. Nehru had a fairly clear image of the regional space that was appropriate for Indian policy. The South Asian dimension was subsumed in a wider definition of the neighbourhood. Despite his indifference to India’s ‘natural’ subordinate system, Menon did perceive an intermediate level of interaction, linked to the global and the bilateral. This was an ideology-oriented, intercontinental world of non-alignment, embracing most of Asia and Africa…. To him, as well as to Nehru, this was a far more important zone or theatre for foreign policy than Southern Asia.87

Rejection of the Balance of Power Concept and Expression of an Alternative Framework In his famous September 1946 radio broadcast, Nehru had declared that India would ‘keep away from the power politics of groups’.88 when Nehru quotes Tagore with admiration: ‘To know my country, one has to travel to that age, when she realized her soul and thus transcended her physical boundaries, when she revealed her being in a radiant magnanimity which illuminated the eastern horizon … and not now when she has withdrawn herself into a narrow barrier of obscurity, into a miserly pride of exclusiveness….’ Nehru, Discovery of India, 211. 86 Brecher, India and World Politics, 314–15. 87 Brecher, India and World Politics, 314–15. 88  ‘Free India’s Role in World Affairs’, 7 September 1946, SWJN-SS, 1, 405.

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Only six months previously, Winston Churchill had thrown down the gauntlet to the Soviet Union and announced the beginning of another great power struggle in his speech at Fulton, Missouri. By the year’s end, US–Soviet cooperation had broken down in Europe. In January 1947, Nehru instructed his diplomats ‘to avoid ­entanglement in power politics’ but ‘be friendly to both (blocs) and yet not join either’.89 But Nehru did not merely establish India’s non-aligned posture vis-à-vis the emerging Cold War. He contested the balance of power concept itself, a normative rejection shaped by a combination of two factors: Nehru’s perceived lessons from previous great power conflicts and the new military context brought about by the nuclear revolution. ‘The lesson of the two great world wars was obvious enough to anybody willing to give thought to it.’90 The functioning of the balance of power concept had shown it was an unstable and unproven regulator of world politics: As a basis of international policy, which would rid the world of war[,] its importance stands proven. For the last 300 years … nations have relied for survival or fulfilment on this process of mobilized antagonisms. All these years, the nations of the world have been engaged in wars with brief intervals during the greater part of which war clouds gathered on the horizon.91

In Nehru’s image, the balance of power idea produced an action– reaction dynamic that ‘inevitably leads to conflict and war’ because it precipitates ‘alliances and counter-alliances, expansion, and conquest’.92 Krishna Menon too expressed a rejection of the traditional geopolitical imagery of international life: We hear references to ideological conflicts. We have never taken the view that these conflicts are merely conflicts of ideology. They arise from what is, in our view, the fallacious idea that the peace of the world can rest on the balance of power. The balance of power is 89 

‘The Need to Avoid Power Politics’, 22 January 1947, SWJN-SS, 1, 576. India’s Foreign Policy, 52. 91 Misra, Studies in Indian Foreign Policy, xiii. 92 Nehru, Discovery of India, 602. 90 Nehru,



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merely an attempt to balance oneself; it is not an equilibrium. We must get over the idea of making military pacts all around and of piling up arms, one against the other.93

The onset of the nuclear age was another significant marker for Nehru’s beliefs. ‘The big shock was the bomb and this fear that we could actually destroy the world, destroy civilization as we knew it.’94 For Nehru, the ‘development of the thermonuclear bomb’ had brought about a profound change in the nature of interstate relations and ‘changed the whole picture of fighting’.95 The traditional logic of war as an extension of politics had become untenable. With ‘the coming of nuclear weapons … you know the result of the gamble. There is not even the slightest chance of attaining what you want through a war. Therefore, war is sheer folly.’96 Nehru’s beliefs about the nuclear revolution had created an image of a one-step escalation dynamic in international politics: ‘Every conflict, however small, has the shadow of a big conflict behind it, and the big conflict has the shadow of a world war behind it.’97 These images also emerged starkly in Nehru’s famous 1954 encounter with Mao Zedong. Nehru argued that the nature of force had undergone a radical shift in a nuclear world, and that the next war would be truly global in both scope and destruction. Mao, in contrast, responded that despite nuclear weapons, warfare basically had not changed except that the casualties would henceforth be higher. The role of force could not be ruled out.98 Instructively, Nehru’s conception of indivisible security ruled out the possibility of controlled bilateral military conflicts, which looked possible to Mao.

93 

E.S. Reddy and A.K. Damodaran, eds, Krishna Menon at the United Nations: India and the World (New Delhi: Sanchar Publishing House, 1994), 118–19. 94  Personal interview with Shiv Shankar Menon, New Delhi, 11 November 2014. 95 Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 66. 96 Brecher, The New States of Asia, 204–5. 97 Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 71. 98  ‘Nehru–Mao Conversation’, 23 October 1954, SWJN-SS, 27, 32–40.

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More broadly, the balance of power concept, in Nehru’s image, had been further exposed in the transformed military–technological environment, which now left no scope for miscalculation in interstate interactions. International politics could, hence, not be left to its own devices to preserve order, and actively preventing a frontal clash between great powers and reducing tensions was an integral part of regulating international relations. Were Nehru’s beliefs about world order merely a deceptive façade for the very geopolitical ideas he and Menon repudiated? As Menon later affirmed: ‘We are also part of the balance of power both because we are its victim and because we are seeking to create our own balance. We were not playing the game of Balance of Power.’ Menon also clarified that India’s policy was not a material power play, ‘non-alignment is not a kind of advantageous policy’.99 Nehru described his thinking in 1960: ‘It is not a question of balancing ourselves between groups or blocs of nations which have arisen. That kind of sitting on the fence or balancing has not occurred to us at all. We are adopting a positive policy....’100 The distinct normative basis underlying this worldview was underscored by Menon: ‘They (the superpowers) think they will get peace through security; we think in terms of security through peace.’101 Were Indian policymakers making a virtue out of a necessity that ruled out ceding Indian sovereignty and freedom of action to a larger hierarchical bloc led by one of the superpowers? Admittedly, India’s dominant self-image precluded aggregating material and moral capabilities with a great power. But it did not constrain a hiding strategy based upon passive neutrality. Nor did it constrain an advantageous realpolitik to exploit the global balance of power. However, such role conceptions were inconsistent with Nehru’s beliefs. There are multiple paths that are consistent with nonalignment, and the constraint of India’s core self-image does not by itself lead to a peacemaker role. Rather, Nehru’s role conception was a distinct agency-level response to the Cold War. By detaching 99 Brecher,

India and World Politics, 227. India’s Foreign Policy, 85. 101  ‘Non-alignment Policy: Menon Explains Basis’, The Times of India, 8 February 1962. Emphasis added 100 Nehru,



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itself from the balance of power process, India chose to help in the stability of the system. ‘If we can tilt the balance towards peace, it will be a great service to the world.’102 This belief was expressed in an important 1949 Foreign Affairs article approved by Nehru. The ‘forces driving to war can be checked only by the most persistent and patient effort to bring and hold all sides together—not by ­helping to bring up the preponderance of one side’, which would only result in ‘widening the cleavage, pulling down bridges and pushing the world nearer to the brink’.103 In Nehru’s images, there appeared to be a clear distinction between bipolarity or the distribution of material power, and the Cold War, which was a reflection of how the great powers related to each other. Bipolarity by itself was not necessarily dangerous, for Nehru perceived the Soviet-led bloc as a restraining factor to the imperial impulses of the Western bloc. What he feared was inter-bloc antagonism potentially threatening regional security. Nehru, thus, sought to modify the fiercely competitive Cold War culture to a more moderated self-help system without seeking to necessarily upend the Westphalian system of sovereign states. Or as Chacko observes, he ‘did not seek to rid international relations of power but rather, envisioned these policies as a means of exercising power in moral ways’.104 Nehru’s peacemaker role had sought this harmony between sovereignty and interdependence.

Area of Peace Concept Nehru’s images got sharper after Cold War dynamics intensified East–West tensions across Asia: ‘By the 1950s, the international situation had worsened. Everything seemed set for the escalation of the world to a third and devastating nuclear war.’105 Eschewing a conventional balancing approach, Menon and he formulated 102 Nehru,

India’s Foreign Policy, 56. Indian official, ‘India as a World Power’, Foreign Affairs 27, no. 4 (July 1949): 548. 104 Chacko, Indian Foreign Policy, 47. 105  Interview in R.K. Karanjia, The Philosophy of Mr. Nehru (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), 52. 103 An

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an alternative doctrine—the area of peace concept—to confront these new security threats and challenges in Asia. The Cold War’s binary choices were inconsistent with postcolonial Asia. ‘If we accept that there are only two ways, then we certainly have to join the Cold War—and if not an actual military bloc, at least a mental military bloc.’106 As Menon explained, ‘Participation of newly liberated countries in military alliances might result in the admission of colonialism by the back door … that is one of the reasons why India should follow an independent course….’107 The area of peace offered a third alternative to postcolonial states that sought strategic autonomy and security. It implied non-cooperation with the culture of the Cold War, or in Nehru’s words ‘a kind of buffer area’.108 The values that underpinned the peace area were ‘nationalism and anti-colonialism’, unlike the blocs, which were driven by communist and anti-communist value-systems.109 The conceptual logic of this idea was linked to the high sensitivity to changes in the balance of power. Both blocs were afraid ‘that if any of these States linked up with or was coerced into joining one group, it would be to the disadvantage of the other’. There were only two ways out: ‘Either you have to decide who is stronger’; this ultimately led to armed conflict. Alternatively, the contested states could be placed ‘outside the spheres of influence, outside the alignments, and outside the military pacts of the two groups, so that both could feel’ somewhat ‘secure in the knowledge that these’ neutralized states ‘were not going to be used against them’. And, ‘by enlarging the area of peace … the chance of war’, could be reduced.110 The genesis of this concept can be traced to Nehru’s thinking decades earlier. In a 1931 article titled, ‘The Defence of India’, Nehru made the case for India’s security without the umbrella 106 Nehru,

India’s Foreign Policy, 80. Karunakaran, ed., Outside the Contest: A Study of Nonalignment and the Foreign Policies of some Non-aligned Countries (New Delhi: People’s Publishing, 1963), 72. 108 ‘Preventing War: The Basic Aim’, 31 August 1954, SWJN-SS, 26, 313. 109 Karunakaran, Outside the Contest, 73. 110 Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 67. 107 K.P.



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of British power. Many materially weak countries including India could ‘retain their independence because of the rivalry of­ others…. If any power was covetous enough to make the attempt’ to threaten or dominate India, ‘all others would combine to prevent this…. This mutual rivalry would in itself be the surest guarantee against an attack on India.’ It was only by inheriting British rivalries that India’s security would be imperilled: ‘Our position thus, in a military sense, is better and stronger as an independent country than it would be if we continued to be involved in British imperial policy.’111 Nehru’s peace area concept was based on similar reasoning: membership in treaty areas in the Cold War attracted antagonism by heightening the insecurity of the other bloc. The peace area, however, did not imply the formation of a ‘Third Force’, which as Nehru clarified, simply meant ‘trying to create another force to counter the forces or as a balancing factor but you are thinking still in terms of force … this thinking in terms of force really puts you in that vicious circle of force’.112 He elaborated further: ‘… an area which—let us put it negatively first—does not want war, works for peace in a positive way and believes in cooperation. I should like my country to work for that.’113 The peace area was not intended as a security grouping to militarily resist superpower interference. Menon described it as ‘a policy of independence and peace; that is, materially speaking, a weak man’s policy … it is like Gandhi’s non-cooperation. In his weakness he invented an instrument which was stronger than anything else.’114 Nehru referred to this as an ‘Asian strength … in the negative sense of resisting. Not of attacking, but of creating conditions which may make things very difficult for the other country’.115 In practice, however, eschewing the instruments of material balancing implied a possible power vacuum that would not have kept out the Cold War dynamic. Successful o ­ perationalization 111 

‘The Defence of India’, 9 September 1931, SWJN-FS, 5, 555–9. The New States of Asia, 206. 113 Gupta, India and Regional Integration, 49. 114 Brecher, India and World Politics, 8. 115 Tibor Mende, Conversations with Mr. Nehru (London: Secker & Warburg, 1956), 63. 112 Brecher,

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of the concept, therefore, implied an element of great power selfrestraint. For this to occur, Nehru recognized that the area of peace must also be ‘an area of agreement between the great powers’.116 Nehru and Menon envisaged India’s role as a facilitator and bridgebuilder in this process of producing an area of agreement between the two rival blocs. And if a crisis should break out, then an ‘area of non-alignment outside the conflict could perhaps influence the return to peace’.117 Nehru underscored both the negative and positive impulse underlying the peace area concept: [it] not only helps to create a sort of no-war land between the military blocs by making their war-like confrontation difficult but also provides them with a common ground for cooperation.... As more and more nations keep joining this peace club as against the nuclear club, and the cold war club, we expect this unaligned grouping to grow and absorb other nations….118

In short, the area of peace concept was a frontal challenge to Cold War norms. It not only offered an alternative path to security for materially weaker states, it also sought to moderate great power competition in contested postcolonial areas. Nehru believed that if the balance of power dynamic was not strategically managed it could imperil Asian security and emasculate the vast region’s postcolonial states.

‘Means Are Always as Important as the Ends’ Nehru’s beliefs predisposed him towards a persuasion-based model of politics. While Nehru never fully internalized Gandhi’s unswerving commitment to non-use of force,119 neither did he

116 Karanjia,

The Philosophy, 53. Outside the Contest, 199. 118  K.P. Misra, and K.R. Narayanan, eds, Non-alignment in Contemporary International Relations (New Delhi: Vikas, 1981), 17–18. 119  As Nehru noted in the 1940s: ‘The Congress had long ago accepted the principle and practice of non-violence in its application to our struggle for freedom and in building up unity in the nation. At no time had it gone beyond that position or applied the principle to defence from external 117 Karunakaran,



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clearly articulate an alternative doctrine. Nehru recognized that by itself resistance by non-cooperation was unlikely to end British rule. Reflecting in 1936 on whether Gandhian methods would need to be complemented by ‘pressure or some kind of coercion’ to change the adversary’s calculus, Nehru found a contradiction in combining ‘persuasion and coercion’. Was it ‘possible to have that psychological approach and yet have the coercion’?120 He did not resolve this dilemma through searching for a sophisticated political–military strategy for resistance but rather reconciled the two approaches by focusing on both ‘persuasion and nonviolent coercion’,121 which in essence meant challenging the inconsistency between the opponent’s espoused norms and actual behaviour. Or as Rana describes it, ‘peaceful coercion’.122 This was in sharp contrast to his contemporary Subhas Chandra Bose who had a more assertive outlook, and espoused the overthrow of British colonialism via ‘an armed revolution’.123 Nehru’s 1929 Presidential address in Lahore is instructive. While admitting that ‘organized violence rules the world today’ and ‘we could profit from its use’, he argued that India had neither ‘the material’ nor ‘training for organised violence’. He also categorically ruled out a parallel coercive struggle as a supplement to the principal peaceful independence movement: ‘It is not possible to carry on at one and the same time the two movements side by side.’124 Although Nehru argued that force should be ruled out for practical rather than moral reasons, his beliefs would remain remarkably resilient despite changing circumstances in the ensuing decades. Later in 1939, when Bose

aggression or internal disorder.’ B.R. Nanda, Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 42. Nehru was never ‘convinced in terms of that perfect non-violence at any time’. ‘The Destiny of Asia’, 3 October 1950, SWJN-SS, 15 (Part 1), 502. 120  Cited in Andrew B. Kennedy, The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 153–5. 121 Kennedy, The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru. 122  A.P. Rana, ‘The Intellectual Dimensions of India’s Nonalignment,’ Journal of Asian Studies, 28, no. 2 (1969): 303. 123 Mukherjee, Nehru & Bose, 131. 124  ‘Presidential Address’, 29 December 1929, SWJN-FS, 4, 195.

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urged a coercive balance of power strategy to exploit the crisis in Europe to accelerate India’s freedom struggle, Nehru absolutely refused to endorse that path. Nehru’s interventions in these debates are, again, instructive. In November 1939, he noted: The old choice of a subject people—submission or violent revolt— no longer applied to us. We had a potent weapon, the value of which grew with our growing strength and understanding of it…. We must therefore stick, stoutly and wholeheartedly, to the method of non-violence and reject all substitutes that might be offered to us. We must remember that it is not possible to have a variety of methods functioning side by side, for each weakens and neutralizes the other…. Above all, we must realize that non-violence is non-violence.125

Nehru’s representation of quintessential realpolitik historical figures such as Chanakya (also known as Kautilya) is also useful in understanding his statecraft. Chanakya was ‘wise enough to know’ his ‘purpose might be defeated by means unsuited to the end’. As ‘unscrupulous and rigid as Chanakya was in the pursuit of his aim, he never forgot that it was better to win over an intelligent and high-minded enemy than crush him’. Through such a representation of Chanakya, Nehru went on to endorse the strategic advantages of restraint and reconciliation where winning over an adversary had a premium over coercive statecraft.126 Arguably, Nehru’s ruminations in Discovery appear to reflect more his own beliefs and preferences on the question of force than those of his subject. After 1947, Nehru projected his beliefs to the world. In a speech at Columbia University in October 1949, he argued: [T]here is always a close and intimate relationship between the end we aim at and the means. If the means are wrong, it will vitiate the end or divert us in the wrong direction. Means and ends are thus intimately and inextricably connected and cannot be separated…. (India’s) revolution demonstrated to us that physical force need not necessarily be the arbiter of man’s destiny and that the method of 125 Nehru, 126 Nehru,

The Unity of India, 353–6. Discovery of India, 124–5.



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waging a struggle and the way of its termination are of paramount importance. Past history shows us the important part that physical force has played. But it also shows us that no such force can ultimately ignore the moral forces of the world; and if it attempts to do, it does so at its own peril.127

But Nehru acknowledged that a unity between means and ends was a two-way street in international relations. A statesman could not ‘ignore realities and cannot act in terms of abstract truth. His activity is always limited by the degree of receptivity of the truth by his fellowmen. Nevertheless … as far as possible, it should guide our actions. Otherwise we get caught up in a vicious circle of evil when one evil action leads to another.’128 In Discovery, Nehru described his role as a ‘philosophical strategist’ who must confront the recurring tension between ‘opportunism’ and morality. ‘Expediency, or what appears to be immediately possible and desirable, can never be ignored, but is toned down by … a longer view of more distant consequences.’129 So, when it came to pure self-defence, Nehru was not necessarily opposed to force. Indeed, in his first policy note on Defence issues in 1947, Nehru advised, ‘India will follow a peaceful policy which means that it will not prepare for or think in terms of any aggression or domination over any other country. Defence thus becomes purely defence against external aggression or internal disorder.’130 As he later explained, the ‘principle of nonviolence had not been applicable in the cases of Hyderabad and Kashmir. Even Mahatma Gandhi had pointed out that people should resist aggression to the point of death.’131 Yet, military restraint and a low efficacy in the utility of force continued to shape Nehru’s beliefs. He ‘constantly recoiled at the prospect of war and sought to minimize the possibility of escalation to full-scale hostilities’.132 Even in a case of pure self-defence 127 

‘Ends and Means’, 17 October 1949, SWJN-SS, 13, 315–16. ‘Ends and Means’, 17 October 1949, SWJN-SS, 13, 315–16. 129 Nehru, Discovery of India, 493, 496. 130  ‘Defence Policy’, 3 February 1947, SWJN-SS, 2, 364. 131  ‘India’s Problems’, 1 November 1949, SWJN-SS, 13, 377. 132 Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2010), 19. 128 

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like the 1947–8 Kashmir war, Nehru’s restraint and ‘preference for a more conservative approach’ are apparent from historical record.133 Thus, although Nehru had never fully imbibed Gandhi’s notion that ‘ends were subservient to means’, he had sufficiently internalized the essential normative basis of India’s freedom ­ ­struggle.134 Nehru later explained the reasons for the continuity in his approach to force: We came into conflict with British domination in India and we challenged it; but we challenged it not on the military plane—we couldn’t—but we challenged it in a peaceful way…. Therefore, we are apt to attach less importance to the military approach to a problem than to the peaceful approach—apart from the fact that we have not got the military approach in our power…. So, both from the point of view of background and our habits, and of our way of thinking, we came to the conclusion that the military approach … is not the right approach under present circumstances.135

Nehru’s own explanation suggests his beliefs were shaped not only by a certain path dependence of ideas but were also a contextual response to material constraints. India’s strength lay in the normative realm and Nehru saw the conditions of military asymmetry as largely unchanged: India was still too weak to conceptualize an alternative method. Kennedy suggests that Nehru’s rejection of force as a practical proposition even after 1947 can be traced to his ‘materialist outlook’ and that he conceptualized warfare as a material contest rather than a contest of ‘strategy or wills’. And Nehru’s sensitivity to material balances continued from the colonial era acceptance of British material superiority to the post-1947 period as one dominated by the two superpowers. The nuclear revolution reinforced this outlook whereby it became illogical to seek to exploit conventional applications of force.136 Evidently, Nehru’s beliefs left little room for asymmetric strategies for a weak state to produce its own security in a world of 133 Kennedy,

The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru, 195. Nehru, 166, 188, 193. 135 Mende, Conversations, 75. 136 Kennedy, The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru, 160–1. 134 Brecher,



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superpowers. But the materialist explanation for Nehru’s preferred modes of behaviour falls short. Kennedy’s own case study on the Kashmir war shows that Nehru’s conservative beliefs on force were prevalent even in a situation of relative military advantage in the subcontinent. As Nehru later reflected on that war, ‘in the balance, the Indian army was stronger than the Pakistan army and we would win in the end’. But he was ‘anxious’ to end the war and did not want to impose India’s ‘will’ on Pakistan.137 In Goa too, where India could have overwhelmed the Portuguese regime easily, Nehru exercised considerable restraint. ‘One cannot have it both ways. Either one adopts military methods or police action or one keeps to peaceful methods. To mix them up is to fall between two policies.’138 It was just as decades earlier, and despite a change in circumstances, that Nehru rejected a coercive philosophy for Indian statecraft. Hence, material circumstances or the prevailing balance of power in the subcontinent do not adequately explain Nehru’s beliefs. In a confidential note to a senior official in October 1946, Nehru argued that India could ‘only protect’ its regional interests in ‘two ways’, with ‘goodwill’ or ‘with our own strength, or with both. We cannot have that goodwill if we claim something that gives us a privileged position over them [India’s neighbours]’. He added, ‘Any attempt to coerce them will in all likelihood not succeed’ and ‘it would be completely opposed to our wider policies’. Instead, Nehru urged that India must avoid alienating its neighbours and pursue a policy of ‘winning them over even though many irritating developments may take place’.139 It is also instructive that Nehru correlated his preference for accommodative statecraft in the subcontinent to his regional role conception (‘wider policies’). His Asian peacemaker role required, to the maximum extent possible, a reputation of conduct in South Asia that would minimize the contradiction between Indian behaviour in the immediate vicinity and in the extended neighbourhood. 137 Nehru’s

note on talks with Mohammed Ali, 14 May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 345. 138 Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 118. 139  ‘To Y.D. Gundevia’, 20 October 1946, SWJN-SS, 1, 527.

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Nehru’s beliefs concerning coercion and force must be understood in conjunction with his Asian role conception and expansive image of regional security. Sustainable security could only be attained by addressing the inter-bloc security dilemma and geopolitical competition in Asia before it spilled onto India’s periphery. And India could hope to modify the culture of superpower interactions only by persuasion. As Nehru explained, ‘means should always be peaceful, not merely in an external way in the non-use of armaments, but in the approach of the mind. That approach will create a climate of peace….’140 While no state could risk doing ‘away with the engines of organised violence’, this approach had its limits, and historically even the most capable military states had been unable to solve ‘their problems’. The ‘military method’ was akin to a vicious cycle that had ‘yet to solve any major problem in the world’.141 Although Nehru conceived India’s role through an ethical ethos drawn from Gandhi, his beliefs were not simply an act of faith inherited from Gandhi. Nehru’s images were far more complex where the nuclear superpower age made it futile for middle powers to attempt producing security and order in their narrower sub-regional realms.142 India’s security was intrinsically linked to security in the larger realm, particularly in Asia. Thus, for Nehru, a focus on systemic matters, such as shaping the ‘interaction culture’,143 which was being vitiated by the militarist outlooks and coercive impulses of the great powers, became logical, for that is where the fate of the world and region rested, and subsumed within that was India’s own security. 140 A.

Appadorai, Select Documents on India’s Foreign Policy and Relations, 1947–1972, Volume I (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 35. 141  ‘The Destiny of Asia’, 3 October 1950, SWJN-SS, 15 (Part 1), 502–3. 142  In his earliest note on Defence Policy, Nehru’s image is vivid: ‘[T] here are only two … first-rate military Powers’ and if ‘in spite of every effort to keep the peace’, war breaks out it will probably ‘become a world war’. ‘Defence Policy’, 3 February 1947, SWJN-SS, 2, 364. 143  Barry Buzan, ‘The Inaugural Kenneth N. Waltz Annual Lecture. A World Order Without Superpowers: Decentred Globalism’, International Relations 25, no. 3 (2011): 22.

Nuclear revolution has created an indivisible and interdependent security system

Image of extended neighbourhood and rejection of exclusive sphere of influence

Area of peace as ‘buffer area’ in the inter-bloc contest to produce regional security

Postcolonial Asia very vulnerable to Cold War dynamic

War is a one-step escalation dynamic from local to global

Balance of power concept is flawed regulator for order

Countering Cold War spillover in extended neighbourhood

Muting security dilemmas

Reforming regional interaction culture

Securing Asia’s geopolitical stability and stabilizing status quo

Interests, goals, functions

Functional

Eschewing coercion and promotion of strategic restraint

Conflict avoidance or ‘war avoidance’ posture in subcontinent

Diffusal of ‘area of peace’ ideas to other nonaligned states

Tension reduction and bridge-building by dialogue and persuasion

Active diplomatic intervention or assistance in stabilizing inter-bloc disputes

Modes of behaviour

Instrumental

144  Nehru himself first used the term ‘peacemakers’ in September 1946 when he was advising his delegation on India’s role in the UN. SWJN-SS, 1, 443.

Source: Author.

Two worlds in collision

Asia as primary domain, with South Asia subsumed within larger regional image

Peacemaker role144

Images about world order and security

Scope of region

Nehru’s images

Orientation

Spatial

Role conception

Table 1.1  Nehru’s Peacemaker Role Conception

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The following three chapters analyse India’s behaviour in the 1950 East Bengal crisis, the 1954 Indochina crisis, and the 1955 Formosa crisis, to examine whether Nehru’s perceptions and policy choices were congruent with his beliefs and images, and peacemaker role conception. Although these events are examined chronologically, the three crises extend outwards from the subcontinent to South East Asia to East Asia, reflecting Nehru’s ambitious quest to transcend subcontinental problems and stabilize the security order in the extended neighbourhood.

2 War or Peace in the Subcontinent? 1950

We must remember that it is not possible to have a variety of methods functioning side by side, for each weakens and neutralizes the other…. Above all, we must realize that non-violence is non-violence. —Jawaharlal Nehru (November 1939) It was true that circumstances had changed and new problems had arisen which could not easily be dealt with by our old methods. Nevertheless, an ideal or objective or a basic policy could not be made the plaything of circumstances…. —Jawaharlal Nehru to Vallabhbhai Patel (March 1950)

Nehru’s basic approach after the first India–Pakistan war over Kashmir in 1947–8 was to stabilize South Asia’s status quo. Although that conflict had revealed intractable security problems, Nehru persevered with a peacemaking approach, seeking coexistence with Pakistan. In June 1949, he outlined his Pakistan policy: India ‘should be able to make’ Pakistan ‘feel that we will not submit to anything that we consider wrong’, and yet make them ‘feel that we are not unfriendly’ or ‘wish them ill’.1 And it is not that 1 Avtar

Singh Bhasin, ed., India–Pakistan Relations 1947–2007: A Documentary Study, Volume I (New Delhi: Geetika Publishers, 2012), 133. Power and Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policies during the Cold War. Zorawar Daulet Singh, Oxford University Press (2019). © Zorawar Daulet Singh. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199489640.003.0003

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Nehru was unaware of ‘Pakistan’s hatred of India’ and ‘its reactionary policy based on religious passion’.2 As Nehru was fostering a conducive atmosphere for India–Pakistan relations, a new crisis broke out in the subcontinent in 1949. British India’s division in 1947 into two independent states of India and Pakistan had involved the largest population transfer in world history between any two states, with six million refugees flowing into a truncated India. Partition and the ensuing transfer of minorities from both sides had also witnessed large-scale massacres. India’s eastern flank had largely escaped the terrifying spectacle of human cost that had accompanied the Partition settlement in Punjab. From 1948, a general exodus of Hindus from Pakistan’s East Bengal province led to 1.6 million people entering India.3 The crisis erupted with attacks on minority Hindus in East Bengal in late December 1949 and January 1950. This precipitated riots and student protests in neighbouring West Bengal, followed by increasing violence and massacre of Hindus in East Bengal. By early February, 30,000 Hindu refugees had entered West Bengal, heightening threat perceptions in both Delhi and Calcutta. By mid-March, this crisis would see 150,000 moving into West Bengal and 100,000 Muslims moving into East Bengal.4 Indian leaders feared a repeat of Partition-style violence with possible cross-country repercussions. It would transform into the ‘most serious crisis’ since 1947, and the prospect of an India–Pakistan armed conflict became a distinct p ­ossibility.5 By end March, at its peak, the crisis was suddenly defused when Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali dashed to Delhi and reached an agreement with Nehru. The East Bengal case offers a little-known event to examine Nehru’s peacemaker role conception and his ­corresponding

2 ‘To

Girja Shankar Bajpai’, 4 December 1949, J.N. Papers, File 32 (Part 1). 3  Joya Chatterji, The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India, 1947–1967 (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 105–12. ‘Lok Sabha Speech’, 16 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 484. 4  SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 35, 37–8, 489. 5  ‘To General Cariappa’, 1 April 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 166.



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­ references on South Asian security.6 The 1950 crisis is also a p ‘hard case’ in international relations (IR) terminology because given the grave security challenge it posed to immediate Indian interests, we can test whether Nehru’s peacemaker role conception actually mattered in shaping the overall Indian strategy. This chapter explicates India’s response to the crisis and shows how despite formidable domestic and external constraints, Nehru’s choices remained largely consistent with his worldview with little deviation from his basic foreign policy approach. Nehru’s images will be contrasted with other prevailing frames of reference, particularly those of Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhbhai Patel who advocated a far more assertive strategy to influence Pakistan’s calculus. The intense contestations and the attendant pulls and pressures at each critical decision-making stage between Nehru and Patel reflect not merely a tussle between two formidable political leaders but a much deeper struggle over India’s foreign policy and role in the subcontinent. The conclusion will explore whether Nehru’s response to Pakistan’s irredentist behaviour might have actually been driven by a sophisticated coercive strategy or by a lack of faith in India’s secular stability.

Crisis Outbreak and Competing Images at the Apex In early December 1949, the crisis was just brewing and Nehru was deliberating the merits of his Pakistan peace proposal with his senior diplomat, Girja Shankar Bajpai. A ‘no war’ declaration with Pakistan, Nehru argued, would ‘ease the situation’ and ‘help in 6 

Raghavan’s is probably the only detailed account of this crisis, which is dealt with later in this chapter. Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2010), 149–87. A narrower historical account of India–Pakistan relations during this period can be found in Pallavi Raghavan, ‘The Making of the India–Pakistan Dynamic: Nehru, Liaquat, and the No War Pact Correspondence of 1950’, Modern Asian Studies 50, no. 5 (2016): 1645–78. A brief narrative of events is also provided in S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, Volume 2, 1947–1956 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), 82–8.

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creating an atmosphere favourable to the settlement of disputes’.7 The logic behind the proposal ‘was to reassure the public in both countries and also the outside world that we would in no case seek to resolve a dispute by resort to arms’.8 Since India was militarily the stronger actor, Nehru’s conflict avoidance approach was credible and not a sleight of hand to extract bargaining advantage. The proposal was formally articulated on 22 December and aimed to stabilize South Asia’s status quo.9 Nehru quickly followed up by instructing Commander-in-Chief General K.M. Cariappa to examine ways to reduce India’s defence budget, which was too high and adversely affected India’s ‘reputation’ abroad.10 Even with the outbreak of the crisis, Nehru remained firm on his basic approach to mute the security dilemma with Pakistan. From the outset, he sought to dampen the conflict by minimizing any scope for escalation. Externally, he demonstrated reassurance and strategic restraint towards Pakistan. Nehru’s principal colleague and the Deputy Prime Minister, Vallabhbhai Patel, in contrast, perceived events differently and in more ominous terms. He favoured an alternative approach. On 4 January, Patel publicly told a crowd of 30,000 people in Bombay that while India’s policy had been to win Pakistan’s friendship, the other side continued to talk of war. ‘If Pakistan wants war then naturally we have to face it.’ Patel pointed to continuing Pakistani propaganda in response to India’s ‘desire to avoid conflict’.11 While Nehru accepted that Pakistan’s attitude in East Bengal was ‘aggressive’, he felt there was ‘no question of war’ and the situation was ‘much easier than before’. He emphatically noted that there was ‘no change’ in India’s policy, despite Patel’s rhetoric.12 Nehru wrote to Patel and his senior cabinet colleagues on the need for lowering defence spending, which he reasoned was stretching 7 

‘To Bajpai’, 4 December 1949, J.N. Papers, File 32 (Part 1). ‘Bajpai to Nehru’, 4 December 1949, J.N. Papers, File 32 (Part 1). 9  ‘To Secretary General’, 4 December 1949, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 4. 10 ‘Nehru to General Cariappa’, 23 December 1949, J.N. Papers, File 33. 11  ‘Nehru to Bajpai’, 6 January 1950, J.N. Papers, File 34; ‘Dean Acheson to Bevan’, 6 January 1950, FRUS (Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa). 12  ‘Nehru to Bajpai’, 6 January 1950, J.N. Papers, File 34. 8 



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India’s resources and led ‘to the conclusion that we are sacrificing a great deal merely to be a military power’.13 By early February, reports from West Bengal revealed the refugee crisis to be more serious than an isolated communal flare-up. Nehru told Parliament that attacks on Hindus in East Bengal and its repercussions in West Bengal were causing ‘great concern’ and Delhi intended ‘to do everything to meet the situation’.14 He also cabled West Bengal Chief Minister Bidhan Chandra Roy expressing concern that the refugee exodus could spiral into a ‘major flow’ and sought more information on violence and insecurity.15 In Parliament, Nehru confronted pressure for the first time that he had been ‘too gentle’ with Pakistan and was ‘indulging in appeasement’. Nehru’s response to such criticism is instructive and underscored his core beliefs. He asserted that Indian statecraft would not stoop to Pakistan’s level. India ‘should not follow a crooked policy’, which was unacceptable even ‘from the narrowest grounds of the sheerest opportunism’. And while some military preparations were important, ‘our attitude should be restrained, moderate and friendly’. Nehru also sought to mute the security dilemma, an important function of India’s peacemaker role: ‘[L]et us not do things today which may lead to generations of rivalry and conflict.’ He dismissed the notion that his ‘no war’ offer to Pakistan was a ‘gesture of weakness’ or had tied India’s hands because coercion, he insisted, was not a part of his statecraft. ‘I can understand war in the context of defence. I don’t wish to understand war in the context of aggression.’16 Although Nehru recognized India’s military advantages, he sought to eschew coercive signalling. He publicly declared that despite Pakistan’s ‘negative attitude’, India was ‘prepared to say that we will not decide any question by war’. Clarifying his 3 February Parliamentary remarks, he added: ‘[W] hether Pakistan agrees to that [no war] declaration or not’, ‘we

13  ‘Nehru

to Patel, Defence Minister and Finance Minister’, 4 January 1950, J.N. Papers, File 34. 14  ‘Refugees from East Bengal’, 1 February 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 35. 15  ‘Nehru to B.C. Roy’, 3 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 36. 16 ‘Nehru Statement in Parliament’, 3 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 36.

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will not have war unless we are attacked’.17 Earlier when it was suggested ‘to bring pressure on Pakistan’ in separate ongoing economic disputes, Nehru had deemed it a ‘dangerous’ approach (‘threats are going to do us no good’).18 A week later, Nehru again publicly advocated restraint saying India’s policy response should be ‘calm’ and ‘based on right principles’.19 Thus far, Nehru’s perceptions and choices seem consistent with his prior images. The first jolt to Nehru’s peacemaking came with Liaquat Ali’s cable on 14 February. Pakistan’s Prime Minister made India’s ‘no war declaration’ proposal conditional to an upfront precise arbitration path to solve all outstanding disputes, essentially negating Nehru’s confidence-building exercise. The cable did not even make a reference to the East Bengal crisis.20 Nehru’s approach was the most restrained across the political spectrum, and most importantly conflicted with the Cabinet and Vallabhbhai Patel, the latter sceptical of the efficacy of peaceful overtures towards Pakistan. On South Asian affairs, especially when India’s strategic interests were at stake, Patel’s realpolitik is generally accepted as a competing worldview to Nehru’s beliefs. Described as ‘the realist par excellence’, Patel was ‘utterly indifferent to world affairs except insofar as he could relate them to the immediate national interests of India’.21 He ‘worked on a narrower plane than Nehru, with only India as his universe. But on that plane he was formidable….’22 On the Kashmir issue, and relations with Pakistan and China, Patel did not imbibe and rarely agreed with Nehru’s preferred approach in managing regional security problems.23 17 

‘Nehru’s Press Conference’, 6 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 36. ‘Nehru to Subimal Dutt’, 27 December 1949, J.N. Papers, File 33. 19  ‘Press Statement’, 10 February 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 37. 20  ‘Liaquat Ali to Nehru’, 14 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 36. 21  Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1959), 391. 22 Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography (New York: Macmillan, 1958), 403. 23 Despite the asymmetry in documentary material, which makes an exhaustive comparative enquiry challenging, the notion that Patel embodied a competing style and substance of subcontinental statecraft to Nehru’s is now difficult to refute. Patel’s contribution to integrating 18 



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On 14 February, Patel urged a vigilant posture to Nehru and suggested senior military officials should be consulted on appropriate countermeasures to Pakistan’s military preparations. Patel also suggested convening a Defence Committee meeting to discuss these security matters. While Nehru brushed off the suggestion for a formal meeting, he did separately meet military officials to discuss reports of Pakistani military preparations.24 Nehru’s posture was largely precautionary, to ensure that India was not caught off guard by a 1947-style surprise intrusion by the Pakistanis to deflect attention away from East Bengal. With most intelligence reports indicating ‘a mounting war fever and preparation’ across the West Pakistan border, Nehru sought to protect India’s western flank, particularly Kashmir, which was relatively vulnerable compared to other fronts.25 Anticipating pressure for a robust Pakistan policy, Nehru confidentially told his chief minsters that a ‘foreign intervention’ hundreds of princely states into the Indian union after 1947 is often seen to exemplify his realpolitik statecraft. V.P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of Indian States (London: Longmans Green, 1956). Also see, J.N. Dixit, Across Borders: Fifty Years of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Picus Books, 1998), 27; Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, ‘Nehru, Patel and China’, Strategic Analysis 38, no. 5 (2014): 717–24. One former senior official notes Patel ‘understood the balance of forces and placed little reliance on international understanding and institutions’. Shivshankar Menon, ‘Patel, India and the World’, South Asia Monitor 16 October 2013, accessed 31 October 2016, from http://southasiamonitor.org/ detail.php?type=emerging&nid=6220. Another former Foreign Secretary describes Patel as a ‘strategic pragmatist’. Jagat S. Mehta, The Tryst Betrayed: Reflections on Diplomacy and Development (Gurgaon: Penguin, 2015), 108–9. On the other hand, Kennedy, while concurring that Patel did not share Nehru’s enthusiasm for diplomacy or his internationalism curiously seems to equate both these leaders when it came to accepting the role of coercion in Delhi’s behaviour in India’s immediate vicinity. Andrew B. Kennedy, The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 171. 24  ‘Nehru to Patel’, 14 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 36. 25  ‘Nehru to Cariappa’, 14 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 36.

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meant a prolonged period without ‘any real progress’ in India. Thus, India’s policy was ‘firmness’ and an ‘avoidance of war’, and it was important to ‘avoid being dragged into the vicious circle of mutual retaliation’. Casting his gaze on Asian geopolitics, Nehru projected his image of indivisible security: the world was ‘drifting towards major conflicts and possibly war.... At best we can try not to do the wrong thing and not to encourage this tendency of war.’26 Privately, Nehru rejected the option of a military liberation of East Bengal to protect the minority Hindus.27 He hoped the crisis would gradually fade out with the onset of the monsoons, which would make refugee movements difficult: ‘If we pass the next seven or eight months’, the possibility of a ‘major conflict’ would have abated.28 To avoid sending a wrong public message, the announcement of the Government’s decision to reduce the size of the Army was postponed.29 Nehru’s preferred means to address the crisis was via an intensive communication with Liaquat Ali to persuade Pakistan to agree to confidence-building measures, and to establish basic norms to settle India–Pakistan disputes. This approach hit another roadblock when Liaquat Ali hardened his position in a series of telegrams between 19 February and 22 February. Ali suggested that each of the Bengals be responsible for their minorities, and refugee flows be arrested via a joint declaration discouraging the same. Repudiating Nehru’s assessment that the East Bengal government was unable to handle the crisis or was indifferent to insecurity among the Hindus, the Pakistani premier shifted the blame onto West Bengal and the plight of Muslims there.30 On 20 February, Nehru retorted that Joint Commissions followed by a joint visit of the two Prime Ministers to the affected areas in East and West Bengal might produce a ‘psychological effect’ and ‘infuse greater confidence’ among the minority communities.31 This was 26 

‘To Chief Minister’, 16 February 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 401–4. ‘To J.C. Paul’, 17 February 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 43. 28  ‘To B.C. Roy’, 17 February 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 42. 29  ‘Nehru to John Mathai’, 17 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 37. 30  ‘Liaquat Ali to Nehru’, 19 and 20 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 37. 31  ‘To Liaquat Ali’, 20 February 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 46–7. 27 



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essentially a persuasion strategy to alter both Pakistan’s posture and calm the outrage in West Bengal, which was clamouring for concrete measures to ensure security for Hindus in the east. But so far, the Pakistani leadership had refused to meet Nehru even halfway to manage the crisis.

Crafting a Response: Nehru’s Peacemaking Versus Patel’s Coercive Signalling Growing pressure on Nehru and his apprehension that the crisis might get out of hand made him seriously consider resigning at this stage. Acknowledging his deep policy differences with Patel on 20 February, Nehru said that the Congress was drifting ‘further and further’ from his own approach and he completely disagreed ‘with many of the criticisms’ and ‘could not possibly act against’ his ‘own convictions on vital issues’. The ‘negative approach’ of threats and retaliation would do more harm than good. Nehru then threatened to resign to pursue his ‘positive approach’ of peace building in the Bengals.32 Despite Liaquat Ali’s rebuffs, Nehru continued to urge strategic restraint in another telegram to Patel on 21 February. He assured Patel that while no decision would be taken without ‘full discussion’ with him, ‘time does not stop for us, nor do events stay their course’. Nehru exclaimed he had ‘largely exhausted’ his ‘utility in New Delhi’, and that he would draft a statement for Parliament to set the policy line on the ­crisis.33 He was obviously seeking to put Patel on the back foot and pre-empt a frontal challenge to his foreign policy. Patel, however, preferred a more assertive response. Growing more suspicious of Pakistan’s bonafides and deeply sceptical of Nehru’s approach, he questioned whether ‘we could really talk of peace with Pakistan when it is quite clear that it is thinking and preparing in terms of war and is doing everything possible to cast us on a burden which would break our back’. If Nehru’s unilateral attempts at conciliation could not extract ‘a simple declaration

32  33 

‘To Patel’, 20 February 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 47–9. ‘To Patel’, 21 February 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 49–51.

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of no war’,34 then it was better, Patel felt, to abandon that posture by pointing out the ‘fundamental difference in approach and indicating to Pakistan’ that its approach was ‘suggestive of their having mental reservations on this simple issue’.35 Patel, although the Home Minister and not directly involved with foreign affairs (which was under the Prime Minister’s direct charge), would henceforth compete with Nehru to shape India’s responses to the ­crisis.36 Nehru adjusted his approach after Patel’s intervention on 23 February.37 Nehru’s initial draft Parliamentary statement had equated the social disturbance in both the Bengals as part of a common problem of communalism. Since such a construction might have given ‘the impression that the trouble started with Calcutta’, Patel advised that the origins of the crisis across the border ought to be spelled out unequivocally. Nehru’s draft had also reflected his preferred modes of behaviour, namely a peacemaking mission to Bengal: ‘It may be that I can serve these causes better by some other method than is open to me at present or in some other capacity than I occupy. I am deeply troubled by recent events and my mind is constantly trying to find out how best I can discharge my duty and my obligation to my people.’ Nehru hoped that his 34 Pakistan had made acceptance of Nehru’s ‘no-war’ proposal conditional on first devising intricate mediation and arbitration mechanisms to resolve all outstanding India–Pakistan disputes. Nehru preferred creating a non-confrontational and conducive atmosphere before detailed negotiation processes could be established. 35  ‘Patel to Nehru’, 25 February 1950, MEA Archives, New Delhi cited in Pallavi Raghavan, ‘The Making of the India–Pakistan Dynamic’, 17. 36  As a matter of precedence and convention, Nehru consulted Patel on all matters relating to subcontinental security, and particularly on relations with Pakistan. This was not simply an expression of the consensual leadership culture that Gandhi had encouraged after 1947 but also recognition by Nehru of Patel’s institutional strength in the national Congress party machine and his stature in the government bureaucracy. 37 ‘Patel to Nehru’, 23 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 37. Patel probably met Nehru personally on 22 February to convey his policy advice, which manifested in this formal telegram to the Prime Minister. Patel’s 23 February telegram exemplifies the two competing images at the apex level on an appropriate response to Pakistani intransigence.



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implied threat of resignation might alter the domestic mood. But for Patel, the veiled hint at renouncing power ‘would make confusion worse confounded and create a sense of bewilderment and anxiety, which might lead to a mass hysteria or arouse disturbing speculations at a time when careful, calm and deep thinking is required’. Most importantly for Patel, the Prime Minister’s draft was devoid of any implied pressure on the external actor. A coercive signal, on the other hand, might alter Pakistani perceptions. Thus, on Patel’s advice, Nehru changed his draft with the delivered Parliamentary version also stating, ‘If the methods we have suggested are not agreed to, it may be that we shall have to adopt other methods.’38 Patel had steered India’s posture towards strategic ambiguity on Indian intentions. Liaquat Ali certainly perceived it, telling reporters that Pakistan’s policy was one of ‘live and let live’, ‘but if India wants war she will find us fully prepared.… I certainly think it is a threat’.39 By 23 February, Liaquat Ali’s latest rebuff had also reached Delhi. He noted that Nehru’s confidence-building suggestion of a joint Prime Ministers, tour would be futile, while also dismissing the claim that the crisis was making it difficult for Hindus to live peacefully in East Bengal.40 Bajpai, acutely aware of the policy contestations in the Cabinet, underscored Patel’s line in a note to Nehru. ‘Passion in India is mounting. Protests and argument will not, in my judgment, prevail with the Government of Pakistan.’ He advised that both London and Washington should be informed that if Pakistan’s intransigent attitude did not change, ‘then we might … be forced to go to the rescue of the minorities ourselves in East Bengal. This might mean war, but the war would not be of our seeking or making.’ This position was verbally conveyed to British and American envoys in Delhi.41 By end February, the continuing refugee influx into West Bengal had crossed 60,000 with ‘several thousands’ killed in East Bengal.42 Even as Patel sought to influence India’s policy, Nehru remained 38 

Patel to Nehru, 23 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 37. ‘To Liaquat Ali’, 27 February 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 73. 40  ‘Liaquat Ali to Nehru’, 23 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 37. 41  ‘Bajpai to Nehru’, 23 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 37. 42  ‘To Mountbatten’, 5 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 92. 39 

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averse to a punitive approach. Hoping to shape Whitehall’s opinion, Nehru instructed Krishna Menon, then High Commissioner to London, to convey how far Delhi had gone to attempt a peaceful resolution. Because of Pakistan’s inability to restore ‘confidence among the minorities’, the situation was approaching a red line that might force a military intervention in East Bengal and ‘conflict with Pakistan’.43 But the British did not play along because they did not take the signalled threat seriously,44 and instead attempted to assuage Nehru’s apprehensions by highlighting that the ‘scale of tragedy’ in East Bengal was being exaggerated in reports and the crisis was really one of insecurity among minorities in both the Bengals.45 Meanwhile, Nehru continued to extol a peacemaking approach to his Congress colleagues. Although disappointed with the lack of reciprocal gestures from Pakistan, he urged, ‘even one-sided effort goes some way and influences the other party’s behaviour. It influences third parties and that is to be considered also.’46 Nehru was alluding to British influence on Pakistani behaviour. Around this time, India quietly mobilized some forces on the West Pakistan–Punjab border.47 This mobilization, it appears, had a twofold rationale. The first one was purely defensive. Given India’s vulnerable lines of communication to the Kashmir valley, a deployment closer to the Punjab border was intended as an insurance against a repeat of the 1947–8 Pakistani offensive in Kashmir. The primary goal being deterrence against Pakistan’s potential advantages in the Kashmir area, and to stave off a scenario of Pakistan externalizing the East Bengal crisis by stirring trouble on the western frontiers. Indeed, Indian intelligence reports in the second week of February had reported on ­increasing ‘war ­preparations’ in West Pakistan.48 In addition, the Indian military mobilization was a logical expression of the highly contested 43 

‘Bajpai to Menon’, 25 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 37. War and Peace in Modern India, 165. 45  ‘Archibald Nye to Nehru’, 24 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 37. 46  ‘To Chief Minister’, 27 February 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 77. 47 Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India, 167–8. 48  ‘Nehru to Cariappa’, 14 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 36. 44 Raghavan,



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Nehru–Patel compromise decision to introduce an element of strategic ambiguity on Indian intentions, publicly signalled in Nehru’s 23 February Parliament speech that was also simultaneously endorsed in a Cabinet meeting. This decision was followed up by an instruction to Army Chief General Cariappa to prepare for a potential military intervention in East Pakistan. To be effective in East Bengal, Cariappa explained to the Prime Minister, ‘it was absolutely vital’ for India’s security to move Army formations ‘westwards’ in order to ‘be prepared to meet any counter action by Pakistan’. Cariappa elaborated that Pakistan’s much shorter lines of communication gave it a permanent advantage that could only be counteracted by a westward mobilization by India. Regarding the defensive objective of the mobilization, Nehru had also agreed with Cariappa that a resumption of Pakistani hostilities in Kashmir would compel India to carry out an ‘offensive into West Pakistan to protect the left flank of our lines of communications from Pathankot to Jammu and beyond’.49 Was Nehru now proceeding from a different outlook, where he was receptive to coercing an irredentist Pakistan?50 The available evidence suggests that while Nehru felt compelled to partially accommodate Patel’s policy prescription, he did not fully internalize it nor were his subsequent actions consistent with favouring a coercive strategy. What for Nehru was primarily a defensive military move was to Patel the first in a series of escalatory steps intended to compel Pakistan to alter its behaviour. This became evident as the crisis played out. For the moment, neither Pakistan nor western diplomats in Delhi perceived any credible Indian attempt at coercion. The consensus view in London was that since Nehru was averse to any escalation or war, India’s overall policy would hold.51 In a national radio broadcast on 3 March, Nehru

49 

‘General Cariappa to Nehru’, 31 March 1950, J.N. Papers, File 40. put, was Nehru proceeding from a ‘logic of consequences’ of the material situation or a ‘logic of appropriateness’ based on his prior beliefs? Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 912. 51 Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India, 171. 50  Conceptually

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reassured external actors and urged restraint at home: ‘I have been criticized for hinting at the possibility of war. Anyone who knows me should know that I hate war and all its works and will go to the farthest limit to avoid it.’ To his domestic audience, he appealed: ‘The strength of a nation consists in a capacity for restraint in crisis.’52 This was hardly a posture consistent with coercive diplomacy. Rather, it reflected Nehru’s attempt to preserve his basic policy amidst deep schisms over Pakistan policy. In early March, Nehru witnessed firsthand the ‘gravity and urgency of the situation’ in a four-day tour of West Bengal, where leading Muslims appealed to Nehru to take ‘drastic and effective steps’ to prevent the recurrence of the ‘gruesome atrocities’ in East Bengal. Nehru’s public message was India must ‘perform our duty in regard to minorities entrusted to us and then let us insist that others do likewise’.53 But the problem, as the Times of India reported, was primarily across the border: ‘... in the last ten days the spreading madness of communalism in East Bengal led to a heightening of feeling in this State’.54 As soon as he returned to Delhi, Nehru cabled Liaquat Ali urging that ‘some kind of psychological approach affecting people’s minds has to be made’. He repeated his earlier suggestion of a joint tour as well as expressing a willingness to resign from office to de-escalate the crisis.55 He also suggested a joint declaration by both governments to instil confidence in the minority communities in both Bengals.56 There were also ‘constant consultations’ with Patel and other members of the Cabinet.57 On 10 March, the Cabinet’s Defence Committee assembled to consider contingency plans. India’s mobilization on the West Pakistan border was primarily intended to signal ‘that India was ready to meet Pakistani moves in that

52  ‘Appeal

to the Indian People’, 3 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 84–7. 53  ‘Message on Leaving Calcutta for Delhi’, 9 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 96–7. 54  ‘Incident in Calcutta’, Times of India, 10 March 1950. 55  ‘To Liaquat Ali;’ 10 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 98–9. 56  ‘To Liaquat Ali’, 10 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 105–6. 57  ‘Frequent Cabinet Consultations’, Times of India, 13 March 1950.



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theatre’ and to ‘demonstrate India’s preparedness for all eventualities’ since ‘that alone would rein in extremists in Pakistan’. During the meeting, Nehru agreed with his Service Chiefs who noted that offensive military moves in East Bengal would unlikely remain localized and would escalate to a full-scale war.58 The next day, a distressed Nehru told President Rajendra Prasad, ‘We seem to be caught in a terrible circle of evil, from which it is difficult to extract oneself.’59 On 12 March, Patel lashed out at Pakistan for misrepresenting the East Bengal problem saying the Pakistani Government was ‘engineering excuses by tracing an imaginary origin of those atrocities’.60 Contestations between Nehru’s conflictavoidance posture and Patel’s coercive posture were now entering a decisive stage in the crisis.

His Back to the Wall: Nehru Versus the Hardliners Not receiving any positive move from Liaquat Ali to defuse the crisis, Nehru resumed his third-party diplomacy. He met the British and American envoys in Delhi and reassured them visà-vis Indian bonafides asserting that neither war nor a massive transfer of populations could solve the crisis. Rather, the ‘key lay in changing Pakistan’s attitude towards its minorities’. On 13 March, General Cariappa too reassured the British that India’s military preparations were purely defensive and to counteract a potential Pakistani attack.61 This was a curious move because it seemed to contradict the signalling effect of the mobilization that Patel had hoped would impress Pakistan and its benefactors. Yet, this reassurance was actually consistent with Nehru’s beliefs and his abiding fear of an unintended escalation spiralling into a subcontinental war.

58 Raghavan,

War and Peace in Modern India, 169. ‘To Rajendra Prasad’, 11 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 107. 60  ‘Sardar Patel Condemns Pakistan Press’, Times of India, 13 March 1950. 61 Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India, 170–1. 59 

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Nehru’s peacemaking approach produced ‘considerable apprehension’ in the rest of the Cabinet. His draft declaration to Liaquat Ali a few days earlier was viewed by Patel as too mild and lacking effective and credible steps to restore order, security, and justice to the minorities in East Bengal.62 But Nehru persisted with his approach in another flurry of telegrams to Liaquat Ali. ‘It is no small thing for me to see something happening which might well mean the ruin of all that one has lived for and worked for.’ Nehru was alluding to the potential displacement of his peacemaker role should armed conflict erupt in the subcontinent. For the ‘killings in East Bengal’ were probably ‘twenty times as much as in India’ and ‘patchwork remedies are of little use now’. Nehru offered to meet his counterpart ‘to discuss these matters in all seriousness before it becomes too late to discuss them’.63 Fearing a loss of control over his Pakistan policy, Nehru told Krishna Menon that there was ‘a concerted effort, backed by strong forces, to drive us into war with Pakistan’.64 Nehru felt he was being ‘pressed all around for what is called “action” … a euphemism for war’.65 He decided to take this battle of ideas into Parliament. In a 17 March speech, boldly titled ‘India’s friendly relations with her neighbours’, Nehru defended his foreign policy in the context of the East Bengal crisis. Providing the historical roots of his expansive regional image and the importance of Asia’s resurgence, Nehru declared that ‘nothing has happened in recent months to make us change the policy we have been pursuing…’. He also said that ultimately, the responsibility for the Hindu minorities lay in the hands of the Pakistani government. Arguing for restraint under these extraordinary circumstances, Nehru declared that India could not ‘fight evil by evil … barbarism by barbarism’ and ‘must always try to find ways and means which are civilized, which adhere to the ideals we have held … because otherwise we go to pieces’.66 This was a quintessential expression of 62 

‘Nehru to Bajpai’, 13 March 1950, J.N. Papers, File 38. ‘Nehru to Liaquat Ali’, 13 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 111–15. 64  ‘To Menon’, 16 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 125–6. 65  ‘To Rajagopalachari’, 16 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 126. 66  ‘Lok Sabha Speech and Debate’, 17 March 1950, J.N. Papers, File 39. 63 



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Nehru’s images. He was anxious to avoid a contraction in India’s regional role, which an outbreak of hostilities would probably have brought about. His modes of behaviour were also evident. Restraint and reconciliation were the preferred means to win over an adversary, even one as intransigent as Pakistan. This approach came under severe criticism from the Congress Party and the media. Patel was ‘very unhappy and distressed’ since Nehru had not consulted the Cabinet before his speech.67 Significantly, President Rajendra Prasad felt it necessary to wade into the issue. Prasad, who was in close touch with the Deputy Prime Minister, wrote a detailed policy note articulating an assertive line to Nehru. Invoking the tragic lessons of Partition, Prasad advocated a more durable solution to the Hindu minority problem backed by credible sanctions including, if necessary, a limited military intervention. This alone would prevent a potential ejection of Hindus from East Bengal that would be economically and politically unbearable for India.68 No longer able to control events, Nehru privately declared his intention to again resign from the Prime Minister’s post, confiding to Menon that an abdication would produce a ‘psychological shock’ and perhaps make a ‘little difference’.69 Nehru formally informed Rajendra Prasad that he had ‘practically exhausted’ his ‘utility’ in the ‘present high office’.70 He also appealed to British Prime Minister Attlee in a secret letter sent through Menon. After providing a genesis of the East Bengal problem, Nehru appealed that India sought ‘nothing more than to be left free to develop in our own way and to do so in friendship and peace with Pakistan…. But success in this extremely difficult task cannot be achieved by our efforts alone.’71

67 P.N.

Chopra, Inside Story of Sardar Patel: The Diary of Maniben Patel, 1936–1950 (New Delhi: Vision Books, 2001), 351. 68 ‘Rajendra Prasad to Nehru’, 18 March 1950, J.N. Papers, File 39. Nehru had already received a similar policy suggestion by West Bengal’s Chief Minister. ‘B.C. Roy to Nehru’, 15 March 1950, J.N. Papers, File 38. 69  ‘To Menon’, 20 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 129. 70  ‘To Prasad’, 20 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 130–2. 71  ‘To Attlee’, 20 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 137–8.

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Contestations reached their apogee on 22 March with an outburst by Nehru in a Congress Party meeting: ‘Cabinet or no cabinet. So long as I am the Prime Minister, I will carry on my policy—it will be my policy. I may consult them, but the policy will be mine.’ This had greatly distressed Patel and other Cabinet members.72 The same day Rajendra Prasad showed Nehru’s letter to Patel but they were ‘not clear’ about the leadership structure after Nehru’s resignation.73 Nehru, however, quickly gave up his gambit of abdicating power after he heard about intrigues ‘to push him out of office’.74 With a renewed resolve to defend his foreign policy, Nehru drafted a letter to the Cabinet on 23 March. Given the context and pressure of the moment, this note reveals Nehru’s images in a vivid fashion. Arguing, ‘we are almost at the dead end, so far as constructive thinking’ was concerned, Nehru drew a sharp contrast between his ‘constructive’ approach and Patel’s line. Rebutting the case against a coercive strategy, Nehru argued that war would have ‘disastrous consequences’ and leave India ‘completely isolated in the world’. Invoking lessons from the past, he noted, ‘even successful war’ had brought ‘no gain’ and tremendous ‘loss’. Nehru, however, accepted that India’s defence preparedness should be apparent, and cursorily acknowledged Patel’s logic that the threat of war brought ‘some advantages and some pressure and sanctions’. But he remained adamant. War had to be avoided and constructive means applied to the crisis. This meant, ‘having some kind of agreement with Pakistan’ even if the other side did not ‘honour’ it. For, there was ‘no other way of dealing with a country’. Nehru effectively ruled out a punitive response other than for something that was ‘forced upon’ India.75 However, unimpressed by Nehru’s arguments and troubled by the Prime Minister’s inability to project a tougher stance that Pakistan might take seriously, Patel summoned Bajpai on 24 March. Such a ‘delicate and dangerous’ situation, the Deputy Prime Minister argued, required ‘formulation of policy’ in the 72 Chopra,

Inside Story of Sardar Patel, 351. Inside Story of Sardar Patel, 351. 74 Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 2, 86. 75  ‘Cabinet Note’, 23 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 141–4. 73 Chopra,



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‘highest secrecy’ and by ‘preliminary discussion’ among a small group of the Cabinet. He highlighted the cases of Kashmir and Hyderabad where policy coordination had been fairly successful. Nehru’s note was ‘likely to give the impression that we are merely bluffing’. The same day, Patel also shared his concerns directly with Nehru.76 For the first time in this crisis, the shifting centre of gravity in the Indian Cabinet troubled external actors. The Indian Army movements to forward locations near the West Pakistan frontiers now began to be perceived differently. Unable to gauge Indian intentions and impressed by rumours in East Bengal about a likely war, on 23 March, Liaquat Ali approved an urgent message to the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson providing detailed intelligence of Indian troops movements, which appeared as ‘more offensive than defensive’.77 After a meeting with Liaquat Ali, the US envoy in Karachi recommended that his colleague Loy Henderson in Delhi follow up on Indian intentions.78 Having been admonished by Patel on India’s incoherent policy and the conflicting signals emanating from Delhi, Bajpai now sought to influence Anglo-American calculus. After inadvertently learning of Western anxiety on India’s military deployments,79 Bajpai met both Archibald Nye and Loy Henderson on 24 March. To Nye, he was explicit: ‘No government in this country could sit idle if there were a recrudescence in East Bengal of the recent killings and atrocities. Indian troops would have to move into East Pakistan....’ Signalling resolve, Bajpai emphasized, ‘Kashmir was no longer the cause of our military dispositions and movements. 76 

‘Bajpai to Nehru’, 25 March 1950, J.N. Papers, File 40. [CDA in Karachi] to Dean Acheson’, 23 March 1950, FRUS (Vol. V). 78 ‘Avra Warren to Acheson and Loy Henderson’, 24 March 1950, FRUS (Vol. V). 79  On 23 March, the British envoy in Delhi, Archibald Nye had contacted Bajpai to probe India’s military intentions and ascertain information on troops movements. Although Bajpai had been non-committal in his response, he did inform Nye about Nehru’s previous offer to meet Liaquat Ali to resolve the crisis. This conversation had prompted Nye to cable his Pakistani counterpart in Karachi to ensure that Liaquat Ali reciprocated Nehru’s overtures. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India, 177–8. 77 ‘Wolf

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These were dictated by what we felt to be our obligations to the non-Muslim minorities in East Bengal.’80 Later that afternoon, Bajpai conveyed a similar message to Henderson while also confidentially sharing Nehru’s 23 March Cabinet note where the Prime Minister had pushed back against a hawkish approach towards Pakistan.81 An anxious Liaquat Ali, who had not reciprocated Nehru’s conciliatory gestures for weeks, suddenly cabled Nehru on 26 March, inviting him to Pakistan to address bilateral questions. But the message only reached Nehru on 27 March.82 Meanwhile, fearing India was drifting towards war, Nehru wrote to both Patel and Liaquat Ali, his two biggest constraints during the East Bengal crisis. To Patel, Nehru brought matters to a head noting their ‘approaches’ to ‘vital problems were very different’. Nehru emphatically defended his foreign policy beliefs: Although ‘circumstances had changed … which could not easily be dealt with by our old methods’, a ‘basic policy could not be made the plaything of circumstances’. He challenged the idea of a punitive approach: ‘The belief that retaliation is a suitable method to deal with Pakistan … is growing. That is the surest way to ruin for India and Pakistan....’83 Nehru then urged Liaquat Ali that the ‘quickest and most effective way’ to arrive at a solution was for them to meet. The ‘urgency and gravity’ of the situation demanded this.84 On 27 March, Bajpai shared Nehru’s telegram to Liaquat Ali with the Americans.85 The same evening, a very anxious Dean Acheson cabled his envoy in Pakistan to instruct Liaquat Ali for an ‘immediate personal meeting with Nehru indicating we consider this of such prime importance that nothing

80  ‘Bajpai

to Nehru (on Conversation with Archibald Nye)’, 24 March 1950, J.N. Papers, File 40. 81  ‘Bajpai to Nehru (on Conversation with Loy Henderson)’, 24 March 1950, J.N. Papers, File 40. US archives corroborate the essence of Bajpai’s conversations with Nye and Henderson. See ‘Henderson to Dean Acheson’, 24 March 1950, FRUS (Vol. V). 82  ‘To Liaquat Ali’, 27 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 155. 83  ‘To Patel’, 26 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 146–50. 84  ‘To Liaquat Ali’, 26 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 151. 85  ‘Henderson to Acheson’, 27 March 1950, FRUS (Vol. V).



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should interfere’.86 On 28 March, Bajpai met Henderson again and disclosed the serious nature of Nehru–Patel contestations, which had nearly led to Nehru’s resignation the previous week. Henderson also provided Acheson with his own impression of a ‘grave cabinet crisis … in which Nehru found himself almost alone in face of hostile cabinet led by Patel’. Given the gravity of the situation in Delhi, Henderson felt it would be ‘extremely helpful’ for Liaquat Ali to travel to India.87 The Pakistani Prime Minister accepted Nehru’s invitation the same day and arrived in Delhi on 2 April, and after a week of talks, both leaders signed a declaration pledging security and equality of citizenship to minorities in both countries.

*** As we have seen, there were multiple credible responses available to the decision makers in the circumstances of the East Bengal crisis. Because of the presence of another powerful political actor, Vallabhbhai Patel, with clearly distinguishable and competing foreign policy beliefs, alternative policy options do not need to be conjectured as part of a counterfactual analysis (see Figure 2.1). The pulls and pressures between Nehru’s preference for a conflict-avoidance approach and Patel’s for a more assertive strategy was evident from the outset to the end of the crisis. This intense contestation produced an uncoordinated behavioural response where neither the Prime Minister nor his principal colleague believed in the efficacy of the other’s definition of the problem or the policy prescriptions to resolve the crisis. Nehru’s position as primus inter pares ensured that Patel’s preference for coercion was never fully adopted. Despite reluctantly and partially accommodating Patel, after the ­latter’s intervention at two important stages during the crisis—the 23 February Parliamentary speech with implied retaliation, and a Cabinet decision at the same time to instruct the Army to

86  87 

‘Acheson to Warren and Henderson’, 27 March 1950, FRUS (Vol. V). ‘Henderson to Acheson’, 28 March 1950, FRUS (Vol. V).

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Explanatory Variable

Role conception (Beliefs and images)

Dependent Variable: Regional behaviour

uent Congr iour v beha Consistent but unlikely behaviour

Incon gru behav ent iour

Nehru´s conflictavoidance and peacemaking diplomacy competing with Patel´s realpolitik

(Option actually chosen by the decision-maker)

`Hiding´, passive responses

(Option not chosen by the decision-maker)

Use of force, coercive diplomacy

(Option not chosen by the decision-maker but credible in the decisional situation)

Figure 2.1  Choice Paths during the First East Bengal Crisis

prepare for a limited military mobilization—Nehru resisted developing a calculated and sustained coercive strategy. Nehru’s beliefs constrained alternative policy choices that were fundamentally incongruent with his role conception for India as a peacemaker.

Alternative Explanations It has been argued88 that Nehru’s ‘admixture of liberal values and realist outlook’ predisposed him to ‘favour coercive’ strategies.89 A coercive strategy, according to Raghavan, a definition that I subscribe to, ‘involves the use of threats of force, or the limited use of force, to influence the opponent’s choices’.90 It is claimed that Nehru’s policy was shaped by a preference for gradual escalation: ‘a strategy of compellence’ for which the Prime Minister ‘lit upon a coercive strategy’.91 Is it possible that Nehru actually engaged 88 Raghavan,

War and Peace in Modern India, 149–87. War and Peace in Modern India, 19. 90 Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India, 6. 91 Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India, 162. 89 Raghavan,



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in complex coercive statecraft? It is only by opening the decisionmaking ‘black box’ that we can understand the contested nature of Delhi’s response. The East Bengal crisis was perceived, defined, and preferred strategies were identified through two distinct, if not competing, images: Nehru’s preference for an accommodative approach versus Patel’s preference for coercive diplomacy to address the refugee influx and influence Pakistan’s behaviour. As the crisis developed and Pakistani attitudes hardened, Nehru reluctantly, accepted some of Patel’s strategic arguments under immense pressure of the situation. Yet, despite a compromise decision to mobilize the Army in late February, Nehru displayed little subsequent inclination for an assertive strategy. He continued to view the military instrument as primarily for self-defence—to avoid being caught off guard by a diversionary Pakistani move in Kashmir, a possibility that Indian intelligence appreciations had indicated to the apex—and not for active defence, which is an integral aspect of coercion and compellence to re-orient an adversary’s behaviour. As Nehru later explained, ‘One deals with a foreign government … in two ways. One is the way of negotiation with such pressure as can be exercised through negotiation, whatever the pressure may be, political, economic, diplomatic; but fundamentally it is the way of negotiation. The other is the way of war. There is no third way.’92 ‘Our means must be as good as the end’, remarked Nehru after the crisis.93 As explored in Chapter 1, this core image—that military coercion and diplomacy are more antithetical than complementary—was entrenched in Nehru’s worldview.94 If Nehru had favoured a coercive approach or changed his preferences to favour such a strategy due to the circumstances of the East Bengal crisis, we would normally expect a trail of the communicative record. But there is little archival evidence available to suggest that Nehru decided to accept Patel’s strategy. The 23 February Parliamentary statement, which suggested 92  ‘Lok

Sabha Statement’, 7 August 1950, SWJN-SS, 15 (Part 1), 262. Emphasis added. 93  ‘A New Picture of Asia’, 24 June 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 2), 139–40. 94  Also see Kennedy, The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru, 153–5.

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a threat of sanction, was modified at the last minute primarily because of Patel’s intervention on the day of the announcement. Simultaneously, Nehru continued to resist punitive options dominating India’s crisis response. Indeed, the Army’s mobilization had defensive and punitive motivations, and thereby appealed to both Nehru and Patel’s policy preferences. For Patel, the initial defensive step of military mobilization was intended as a prelude to further escalatory moves together with sustained signalling that would suggest credible punishment would ensue if Pakistan did not alter its behaviour in East Bengal. But this is precisely where Nehru and Patel pulled apart. Given this backdrop, Nehru’s strategic choices cannot simply be inferred from the Cabinet decision to mobilize the Army. It needs to be correlated with other aspects of Nehru’s statecraft, confidential communications, and external signalling, none of which advocated coercion, and in many instances exuded a posture contradictory to such intentions. Both privately and publicly, Nehru urged strategic restraint and reassurance, while challenging a threat-based approach advocated by Patel and other senior leaders to address the crisis. Nothing underscores this more than Nehru’s 23 March arguments to the Cabinet. It is not s­urprising then that external actors until the last moment did not even perceive a credible coercive posture from Delhi. The pulls and pressures at the apex between the two images for dealing with Pakistan ensured that Nehru’s preference for accommodation and Patel’s for coercion were rarely bound together as a concerted strategy. On at least three occasions, Patel berated the lack of coordination and consultation at the apex level to formulate an appropriate signalling posture to the crisis.95 Ultimately, it was not the forward movement of the Indian Army by itself that impressed Western and Pakistani perceptions but the ­ prospect that Nehru might actually lose control of India’s foreign policy that proved to be the turning point in resolving the crisis. Patel’s reputation for resolve and firmer views on Pakistan policy were 95 ‘Bajpai to Nehru’, 25 March 1950, J.N. Papers, File 40. Also see ‘Patel to Nehru’, 23 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 37; Chopra, Inside Story of Sardar Patel, 351.



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well recognized by external actors at that time.96 On the other hand, Nehru’s external reputation as a peacemaker was so robust that only the prospect of Patel assuming greater influence on security policy produced the change in Western and Pakistani calculus. Actively encouraged by Washington, Liaquat Ali bailed Nehru and himself out of a scenario where the outbreak of hostilities was imminent. It could be argued that Nehru’s strategic restraint was shaped by what he described as ‘the communal aspect’: that is his determination to preserve India’s secular statehood, which he felt would be threatened by hostilities with Pakistan. Nehru also felt that intervention into Pakistan’s internal affairs (in East Bengal) would have called into question the integrity of the 1947 political settlement of India’s Partition, and would have transformed India’s role into a revisionist state. Stabilizing the regional geopolitical status quo thus had, in Nehru’s reasoning, an internal and external component.97 These assumptions were not accepted at face value by several other Congress leaders. Patel too ‘accepted the secular ideal’ but ‘attached more blame to Pakistan than Nehru did’.98 For Patel, the correlation between a commitment to secularism and an accommodative Pakistan policy was not axiomatic. If anything, appeasing communal mayhem and atrocities in East Bengal was a recipe for flaring of communal tensions in India and destabilizing West Bengal.99 A prominent Muslim socialist leader in Bengal, Mushtaq Ahmad, had made precisely such an argument when he warned Delhi ‘that appeasement of Pakistan will not only endanger the principles of secular democracy, but will also lead to chaos, anarchy and barbarism unknown in history’.100 On the whole, while Nehru did argue that conflict with Pakistan would impact India’s secular statehood, his prior beliefs were already

96 

‘Gross to Acheson’, 27 January 1950, FRUS (Vol. V). ‘To Patel’, 26 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 146–50. 98 Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 2, 86. 99  ‘B.C. Roy to Nehru’, 15 March 1950, J.N. Papers, File 38; ‘Rajendra Prasad to Nehru’, 18 March 1950, J.N. Papers, File 39. 100  ‘No Appeasement of Pakistan: Muslim Socialist’s Warning’, Times of India, 20 March 1950. 97 

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conditioned towards a conflict avoidance posture regardless of the external actor. Another reason that might explain Nehru’s posture could be linked to his hierarchy of national goals. Posed plainly, did Nehru sue for peace because his larger priority was economic development? In a number of confidential cables in December and January 1949, Nehru expressed concern about the ‘guns versus butter’ problem. With nearly 70 per cent of central government revenues allocated to defence, Nehru feared a resource crunch for other national programmes. His basic argument was that India could not afford a very large military in the near-term, and he sought a more long-term industrialization path as a more optimal way to generate resources and technologies for a more self-reliant ­military.101 While this is an intuitive explanation for Nehru’s strategic restraint during the crisis, it is interesting that Nehru also highlighted the adverse political and reputational effects of a high defence budget. ‘It affects our credit abroad and our bonafides’,102 and ‘leads to the conclusion’ that India sought ‘to be a military power’.103 This suggests not simply a material concern but also a concern about how India’s foreign policy was being viewed by the world. It is also worth adding that Nehru never put forward the ‘peace for economic development’ argument during internal deliberations or in key policy notes. Neither is it apparent how coercive diplomacy or threats of use of force in a single situation would undermine India’s development and investment plans, given that India already possessed an overall conventional military superiority vis-à-vis Pakistan, certainly for a limited conflict lasting several weeks, and one that provided credibility to a signalled threat to the adversary. Nehru was not unaware of this fact. But he still sought to dampen threat perceptions, and resist and moderate the urge for an assertive response from Patel and other political leaders. In short, Nehru sought to transcend the material situation and 101 

‘Nehru to Cariappa’, 23 December 1949, J.N. Papers, File 33. by Nehru on Defence Budget’, 30 December 1949, J.N. Papers, File 33. 103 ‘Note to Defence Minister and Deputy Prime Minister’, 1 April 1950, J.N. Papers, File 34. 102 ‘Note



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attempted to preserve India’s carefully cultivated reputation as a responsible regional actor. Ultimately, Nehru’s response can only be fully understood with reference to his image of Asian security. Since the outbreak of the Cold War, his quest to develop India’s peacemaker role in the Asian realm had shaped corresponding conflict avoidance modes of behaviour in the subcontinent. It was this basic conception of indivisible security, where the subcontinent was defined as part of a wider regional system of international relations, that also conditioned Nehru’s strategic choices in South Asia. Therefore, despite a situation where immediate Indian interests were involved and material conditions did not necessarily constrain a coercive option, Nehru did not substantially deviate from his basic approach. Nehru believed that Asia was a more consequential theatre for India’s foreign policy where a sustainable post-war regional order was still in flux. In addition, he hoped that if his preferred means of moderating the conflict with Pakistan succeeded it would ‘powerfully impress the world at a time when despair’ was ‘seizing it’.104 The area of peace idea also shaped Nehru’s perceptions of the East Bengal crisis, as underscored by his 16 February cable to his Chief Ministers105 and his controversial 17 March Parliamentary speech.106 This belief became more explicit with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Nehru’s speech on 24 June in Calcutta, the area most affected during the East Bengal crisis, is instructive for the dialectic between a narrow image of sub-regional security and Nehru’s image of a larger indivisible Asian system: Naturally, we wanted to settle our own affairs before we meddled in the affairs of others. But even then, owing to the interdependence of the modern world, we get involved in other people’s affairs, specially in those of the Asian countries, who are our neighbours…. Now returning to my own country, I have to devote my mind to our local affairs—our quarrels and troubles. But after viewing the big problems of the world, I felt that how nice it would have been 104 

‘To Liaquat Ali’, 8 October 1950, SWJN-SS, 15 (Part 1), 325. ‘To Chief Minister’, 16 February 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 401–4. 106  ‘Lok Sabha Speech and Debate’, 17 March 1950, J.N. Papers, File 39. 105 

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if we had no internal troubles…. It is, therefore, necessary that we keep away from petty quarrels and raise our country in the eyes of the world.107

A quest to transcend intramural disputes in the subcontinent is apparent from these words as it is from Nehru’s subsequent cables to B.C. Roy: The East Bengal crisis ‘seems to me to be a tragic part of a mighty drama that is taking place in Asia. What is happening in Korea will have far-reaching consequences all over Asia and the world.’108 Or Nehru’s letter to Liaquat Ali in October 1950, when bilateral frictions again resurfaced: A no-war declaration would not only affect ‘our two countries but it would also affect Asia and the world. For the scope of the proposal could, in time, be extended to other neighbouring countries. This would create a wide area where there would be some assurance of peace…. Last year, when I made my proposal … there was no immediate danger of a world war … that danger is [now] far greater.’109 It is noteworthy that even when Nehru was responding to issues that impinged upon India’s immediate periphery, the dominant role conception was in his mind.

107 

‘A New Picture of Asia’, 24 June 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 2), 139–40. ‘To B.C. Roy’, 8 July 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 2), 144. 109  ‘To Liaquat Ali’, 8 October 1950, SWJN-SS, 15 (Part 1), 325–6. 108 

3 Cold War on India’s Doorstep, 1954

‘ ... [the] forces driving to war can be checked only by the most persistent and patient effort to bring and hold all sides together—not by helping to bring up the preponderance of one side.’ —An Indian official (July 1949) ‘What happens in Asia concerns us much more and we are part of it.’ —Jawaharlal Nehru (July 1954)

November 1953 was a turning point in India’s external environment as the US chose to pursue a formal military alliance with Pakistan, thereby dramatically affecting the balance of power in the subcontinent. During this same period, a crisis was also brewing in South East Asia, where France supported by the US sought to preserve its strategic foothold in Indochina. For Nehru, these twin crises were perceived as indivisible fronts of a wider threat to Asian security and triggered a response that aimed to counteract the expansion of the Cold War via an alternative approach to regional geopolitical problems. The US–Pakistan pact was seen as another dangerous chapter in the Cold War in Asia that required a systemic response. By normalizing relations with China and proactively shaping the conflict in Indochina, Nehru sought to counteract the emergence of new military alliances by striving to enlarge the area of peace in India’s eastern neighbourhood.

Power and Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policies during the Cold War. Zorawar Daulet Singh, Oxford University Press (2019). © Zorawar Daulet Singh. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199489640.003.0004

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Despite the lasting significance of the year 1954 for India’s foreign policy, and indeed on the contemporary balance of power in the subcontinent, this phase remains curiously understudied. There are two main weaknesses in how we look back at that year.1 First, the US–Pakistan alliance and the first Indochina crisis are typically examined as distinct events that impacted India’s regional environment. Second, the mainstream historiography has located the 1954 Sino-Indian agreement over Tibet and Delhi’s normalization with Beijing in an entirely isolated context, obscuring both the wider changes in Cold War geopolitics as seen from Delhi, and the reasons and motivations underlying Nehru’s responses to these crises. In short, the deeper images that conditioned Indian behaviour during this period remain obscure. Structured chronologically, the combined crisis is divided into its two main phases. The first phase, from November 1953 to February 1954, witnessed internal policy debates regarding an appropriate response to the US–Pakistan military alliance. Rejecting the option of a balance of power strategy to deal with this regional development, Nehru set the line by largely accommodating the US–Pakistan pact. His prior image of indivisible Asian security led him to define the crisis on India’s immediate periphery as part of a wider security problem in Asia. The second phase began after February 1954 when Nehru and Menon positioned India into a peacemaker role to confront the heightening crisis in Indochina. This shift, it will be shown, was brought about by changing Indian perceptions regarding Asian geopolitics, and Nehru’s attempt to stabilize the escalating stalemate in the east.

1 D.R.

Sardesai, Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, 1947–1964 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 28–51; S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, Volume 2, 1947–1956 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), 176–81; Subimal Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office (Calcutta: Minerva, 1977), 60–3, 87–90; T.N. Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), 95–106; Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 144–9; Sumit Ganguly, Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 33–5.



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Countering the Cold War dynamic in South East Asia with the peace area concept, which also included a Sino-Indian normalization, was seen to offer a more durable means to produce regional security and offset the US–Pakistan alliance. The conclusion will explore whether Nehru’s accommodative response to the US– Pakistan alliance might have been driven by alternative reasons such as India’s economic dependence on the West or by domestic ideological and cultural reasons.

Crisis Outbreak: Shock to South Asia’s Balance of Power The turn of 1953 was a significant inflexion point for India’s foreign policy. The Cold War was no longer a distant prospect but a reality on India’s doorstep. For Nehru, until the US–Pakistan alliance, ‘there had always been some hope of a united neutrality by the entire Indian subcontinent. This hope [had] now been shattered….’2 The first public hint of secret negotiations between Washington and Karachi for a military pact was reported in early November 1953 after the US visits of Pakistan’s Commanderin-Chief, General Ayub Khan, and Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad.3 Most reports in the Western press advertised Pakistan’s political viability and strategic importance, giving the impression that a pact was imminent. A few tried to assuage misgivings that might arise in India. In Delhi, these reports were viewed with trepidation and as part of a systematic public relations exercise before concrete announcements were made.4 Internal communications reveal two images: some viewed the crisis in terms of subcontinental and Indian security; others saw it through the lens of the Cold War dynamic in Asia. These two somewhat competing ­perceptions shed further light on Nehru’s outlook as he navigated Delhi’s response

2 

‘Playing with Fire’, Times of India, 12 December 1953. New York Times, 2 November 1953. 4  ‘V.R. Bhatt to M.O. Mathai’, 12 November 1953, J.N. Papers, File 213 (Part 1). 3 

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to the crisis. One official, for example, noted that it was ‘bound to be interpreted as an external threat’, bringing demands on the Government to further strengthen ‘the defence apparatus of the country even at the cost of economic development’. The pact was also viewed as an attempt to ‘exert psychological pressure’ on India to alter its posture of non-alignment. Domestically, ‘there will be cries … for closer alliance with the West or USSR’ with the US ‘hoping that the ultimate choice may be alliance with the West’.5 Nehru’s earliest perceptions reveal he defined the event more in terms of its shock to Asian security than merely its impact on subcontinental geopolitics or narrow Indian interests. An alliance would mean ‘Pakistan enters definitely into the region of cold war’, posing a direct and serious challenge to India’s efforts to ‘build up an area of peace where there would be no war whatever happens elsewhere’.6 Nehru also alerted other Asian leaders from Egypt and Myanmar, who shared a non-aligned self-image, and urged them ‘to be wide awake and understand events as they take place’. American policy was ‘so governed by military factors’ that it excluded other approaches to conflict management. In Indochina, France was ‘being bled to death. But Americans will not allow any kind of settlement.’7 For Nehru, the implied loss of autonomy and freedom was the most significant impact of this emerging development. He told his close advisor Kavalam Madhava Panikkar that Pakistan had essentially become ‘a colony of the US’. But India was not going to succumb to this setback. ‘The US imagines that by this policy they have completely outflanked India’s so-called neutralism and will thus bring India to her knees. Whatever the future may hold, this is not going to happen.’8 Nehru was referring to India’s peacemaker role, which he felt was upsetting Western geostrategy. ‘There is resentment and even a little jealousy at the importance that circumstances are thrusting upon India.’ 5 

‘V.R. Bhatt to M.O. Mathai’, 12 November 1953, J.N. Papers, File 213 (Part 1). 6  ‘To Mohammad Ali’, 10 November 1953, SWJN-SS, 24, 416. 7  ‘To U Nu’, 11 November 1953, SWJN-SS, 24, 420–2. 8  ‘To K.M. Panikkar’, 12 November 1953, SWJN-SS, 24, 423–24.



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But India’s role had cast a ‘responsibility’, which she could not ‘refuse’.9 Interestingly, most Indian diplomats also perceived and assessed a potential US–Pakistan pact in its wider dimensions. India’s Ambassador to Washington, Gaganvihari Lallubhai Mehta, reported after his conversation with US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on America’s Cold War logic in developing a security system in West Asia and the Middle East, an area that was vulnerable to Russian attack. Mehta downplayed the impact on Indian security.10 Panikkar, stationed in Cairo, perceived the US systematically displacing British influence in West Asia and assuming primary security responsibility for the area. In such a context, US–Pakistan developments were ‘more against Britain than against Russia’. And with Pakistan ‘moving into the American orbit, the Commonwealth, in effect, is reduced to Britain, India and the French Canadians’. Panikkar wanted Delhi to explore how this ‘Anglo-American situation’ could be turned to India’s advantage.11 Senior officials in Delhi, by contrast, perceived events with an eye on subcontinental affairs. The Secretary General, Narayanan Raghavan Pillai, felt Panikkar was over-reading Anglo-American differences and noted that the US–Pakistan alliance was being driven by ‘military strategists in the Pentagon’.12 According to Ratan Kumar Nehru, the Foreign Secretary, ‘The idea seems to be to provide the Pakistan Army with modern weapons which would be superior to those possessed by us.’ It was ‘naïve to suggest’ that US military assistance would not imply a ‘complete change in the balance of forces’ in South Asia, and, if this balance was ‘upset in Pakistan’s favour, the temptation to use armed force for other purposes will increase’ regardless of a US assurance.13 Pillai too c­ oncurred that the

9 

‘To Chief Ministers’, 6 November 1953, SWJN-SS, 24, 663–4. Mehta to Nehru’, 17 November 1953, J.N. Papers, File 214 (Part 2). 11  ‘K.M. Panikkar to N.R. Pillai’, 21 November 1953, J.N. Papers, File 216 (Part 2). 12  ‘N.R. Pillai to Nehru’, 26 November 1953, J.N. Papers, File 216 (Part 2). 13 ‘R.K. Nehru to Nehru’, 19 November 1953, J.N. Papers, File 216 (Part 2). 10 ‘G.L.

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alliance would really impact the India–Pakistan balance rather than the US–Soviet balance.14

Crafting a Response: Nehru’s Expansive Images Faced with such assessments from his senior officials, Nehru chose to maintain his gaze on the systemic consequences of the impending US–Pakistan pact, especially on India’s extended neighbourhood. The pact foreshadowed an expansion of treaty areas across Asia. In late November, Nehru outlined his perceptions in a long note. Recent international developments indicated ‘a definite hardening on all sides’. Any thawing in the US–Soviet Cold War was being reversed by the US, which had rejected the moderate British approach in favour of a militarized one. Emphasizing Panikkar’s point, Nehru argued that there was an inner Anglo-American conflict, in spite of their general alliance. In the Middle East, America was displacing British influence and the US–Pakistan pact should also be viewed in that context. US ‘grand strategy’ sought ‘bases all over the globe’, and, while the UK ‘might have no particular objection to the military aspect of such a pact … it does not favour the US taking its place in the sun everywhere’. This development was not only ‘of the gravest concern to India’ but to ‘the whole of South East and South West Asia’ and India could not ‘remain a passive spectator....’ Nehru vowed that while there would be ‘no question’ of changing India’s foreign policy or basic international role, ‘we shall have to do something’.15 It is apparent that Nehru perceived the crisis primarily through his prior Asian images rather than a narrower subcontinental image shared by some senior officials. His response too would be crafted with an eye on that larger regional setting. An important element of Nehru’s response related to his China policy. There is now evidence that suggests he accelerated an important policy move of September 1953 to normalize the India–China relationship. A few months earlier, Nehru had cabled Zhou Enlai 14 

‘Pillai to Nehru’, 27 November 1953, J.N. Papers, File 217 (Part 1). ‘Nehru to Pillai, R.K. Nehru and Tyabji’, 27 November 1953, SWJNSS, 24, 428–33. 15 



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expressing India’s willingness to discuss ‘pending matters’ to arrive at a ‘satisfactory settlement’.16 Zhou later responded that given ­‘vestiges’ of the past, Sino-Indian relations regarding Tibet ‘should be built up anew through negotiation’. Both sides agreed that talks could commence at the end of the year in Beijing.17 With the US–Pakistan pact now an emerging possibility, Nehru decided to publicize the impending talks with China by a brief reference in Parliament on 16 November.18 He also instructed his officials to quickly provide an update on the ‘coming talks with China’.19 The timing of Nehru’s move was significant. It was a direct response to the possibility of a treaty area creeping closer to India’s frontiers. Although subsequently in Parliament Nehru rejected ‘some connection’ between talks with China and ‘proposals for US military aid to Pakistan’, the linkage in Nehru’s mind was unmistakable.20 Nehru even cabled Nedyam Raghavan, his envoy in Beijing, to ask Zhou Enlai to watch US–Pakistan developments, which would affect the ‘balance in Asia’.21 But this was not a balance of power move. Nehru categorically told his colleagues that ‘even though our frontiers may have to face a new threat’ India would not abandon her independent foreign policy.22 Rather than getting pushed into a counter-alignment, India’s response was actually conditioned by Nehru’s prior peace area image and aimed to contain the Cold War dynamic on India’s frontiers. The main idea being that by ‘settling issues promptly in a friendly spirit’, it would show the rest of the world ‘that two friendly Asian countries can solve their problems speedily and successfully’, unlike

16 

‘Nehru to Zhou Enlai’, 1 September 1953, SWJN-SS, 23, 485–6. ‘Nehru to Zhou Enlai’, 22 October 1953, SWJN-SS, 24, 595–6. 18 ‘Answer to Parliamentary Question for 16 November 1953’, 13 November 1953, J.N. Papers, File 214 (Part 1). 19  ‘Nehru to Pillai and R.K. Nehru’, 27 November 1953, J.N. Papers, File 217 (Part 1). 20  ‘A Realistic Approach to Problems’, 24 December 1953, SWJN-SS, 24, 577. 21 ‘Raghavan to Nehru’, 23 December 1954, J.N. Papers, File 223 (Part 1). 22  ‘To Chief Minister’, 1 December 1953, SWJN-SS, 24, 678. 17 

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the ‘interminable and inconclusive talks’ between the two blocs.23 Formal talks between Delhi and Beijing began on 31 December 1953 in Beijing over Tibet and related issues. Meanwhile events in the subcontinent were moving perilously against India. In early December, US Vice President Richard Nixon arrived in Karachi to discuss the ‘possibility of a military alliance’.24 Nixon categorically stated that ‘the US would defend Pakistan against those working for its destruction’.25 Reports soon reached Delhi that US–Pakistan negotiations were ‘nearing a conclusive stage awaiting Washington’s approval’.26 Baddrudin Tyabji, the Commonwealth Secretary, felt the pact would seriously disturb the military equilibrium between India and Pakistan and would compel India to adopt ‘a completely new approach’ and readjust ‘to the changed situation’. Given the possibility of an ‘arms race’ and the potential impact on India’s ‘strategic ­frontiers’, the pact ‘causes the greatest and gravest concern to India’.27 Although this assessment focused more on India’s immediate security environment than Nehru’s attention to the systemic implications across Asia, there was no attempt by Delhi to explore a balance of power move either to put pressure on Pakistan or send a signal to Washington. For one, India did not contemplate any coercive move to undermine the progress of the pact. For example, India could have initiated limited brinksmanship in East Bengal, where India’s military position was much stronger, in order to signal that America’s strategic involvement in the subcontinent would not be costless. Neither was there any attempt to upset the status quo on Pakistan’s western ­frontiers. R.K. Nehru instructed India’s envoy in Afghanistan not to initiate any ‘military consultations’ with the Afghan ­government after the envoy had sought guidance from Delhi on India’s regional response.28 23 ‘T.N.

Kaul to India Embassy in Beijing’, 7 December 1953, J.N. Papers, File 219. 24 Manzoorul Haque, ‘Mr. Nixon to Discuss Military Plan: Pakistan Anxious for Bilateral Agreement’, Times of India, 7 December 1953. 25  ‘M.O. Mathai to Nehru’, 18 December 1953, J.N. Papers, File 222. 26 ‘US-Pak Military Aid Talks Near Final Stages’, Times of India, 13 December 1953. 27  ‘B. Tyabji to Nehru and Pillai’, 11 December 1953, J.N. Papers, File 220. 28  ‘R.K. Nehru to Puri’, 17 December 1953, J.N. Papers, File 222.



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Unusually positive signals from Moscow were also not reciprocated from Delhi. On 30 November, Moscow had formally ­communicated its protest to Pakistan on the possibility of a military alliance ‘in an area near the frontiers of the USSR’. A Soviet official reached out to India’s envoy in Moscow, Kumar Padmanabha Sivasankara Menon, to share this protest note with an oral remark, ‘This pact is bad for you, but it is bad for us also’. Menon told the Soviet official that his Government’s ‘note was most timely’.29 In midDecember, Moscow’s Ambassador in Delhi had reportedly remarked that if America gave military aid to Pakistan, Russia was ‘also prepared to give arms and ammunition to India on easy c­ onditions’.30 In a subsequent conversation between K.P.S. Menon and Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister expressed ‘­complete sympathy’ with India’s attitude and concerns.31 An ‘unprecedentedly large number’ of senior Russian leaders and members of the diplomatic corps attended India’s 1954 Republic Day reception in Moscow.32 Although Nehru had earlier instructed major missions abroad, including those in Moscow and Beijing, to convey India’s ­concerns on the pact, he had no intention of signalling a tilt away from the West or in drawing military assistance from Moscow.33

Rejecting a Balance of Power Strategy On 18 December 1953 the Commonwealth Secretary advocated a balance of power strategy. As increased US military aid to Pakistan was bound to upset the India–Pakistan equilibrium, Tyabji argued that India must use ‘all means’ to ‘preserve the status quo’ and 29  ‘K.P.S.

Menon to R.K. Nehru’, 2 December 1953, J.N. Papers, File 218. Also see ‘Monthly Political Report for November 1953 from Indian Embassy, Moscow’, J.N. Papers, File 227 (Part 2). 30  ‘India Embassy in Tehran to R.K. Nehru’, 16 December 1953, J.N. Papers, File 221 (Part 2). 31  ‘K.P.S. Menon to R.K. Nehru’, 11 January 1954, J.N. Papers, File 228. 32  ‘India Embassy Moscow to Delhi’, 27 January 1954, J.N. Papers, File 232 (Part 1). 33 Nehru, however, was open to gradually developing economic ties with the Soviet Union as underscored by an Indo-Soviet trade agreement on 2 December 1953.

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safeguard national security. In the scenario of ‘direct hostility’ from the western powers, India ‘might even have to consider entering into non-aggression pacts with the Soviets and Chinese’ and actively ‘obtaining armaments’ and developing its defence capacity with Moscow’s assistance. Unconditional military assistance from the US could also be examined ‘on its merits’. Tyabji advised a detailed examination of his suggestions, which could then be presented to the Cabinet for its consideration.34 Nehru’s response to this note is instructive. He struck down Tyabji’s recommendation, disagreeing with the latter’s ‘analysis’ and ‘conclusions’. Nehru then affirmed his approach by rejecting ‘a military way’ to deal with the situation and ‘trying to keep pace with Pakistan’. He ‘entirely opposed’ taking military aid ‘from the US, or any other country’.35 Sensing competing views on the US– Pakistan pact across the strategic bureaucracy, Nehru explicitly ruled out a balance of power approach in a note to R.K. Nehru after another Indian diplomat argued for such a choice.36 The next day, Nehru again emphasized, ‘There is no question of our bargaining with any country or of our entering into an armament race.’37 He instructed his officials to formally contradict ‘fantastic’ rumours about India pursuing secret pacts with the Soviet Union or China and reassure the US Ambassador on India’s policy.38 K.P.S. Menon 34 

‘Tyabji to Nehru’, 18 December 1953, J.N. Papers, File 222. shot back saying, ‘There is no such thing as “no strings attached” when such aid is taken.’ ‘Nehru to Pillai, Tyabji, R.K. Nehru’, 19 December 1953, J.N. Papers, File 222. 36  ‘When I said that we will have to do something, I was certainly not thinking in terms of an armament race with Pakistan. We may tighten up our Defence Forces somewhat, but…. The “something” I had in mind had little to do with armaments … other suggestion of trying to frighten the Americans by mentioning the Soviets in this connection is also borne of loose thinking. It may be that more goodwill for the Soviets is created in India by American action, but we are just not going to enter into a competition in armaments’. ‘To Foreign Secretary’, 18 December 1953, SWJN-SS, 24, 443. 37  ‘Nehru to Pillai and R.K. Nehru’, 19 December 1953, J.N. Papers, File 222. 38 ‘Nehru to Pillai, R.K. Nehru and Tyabji’, 30 December 1953, SWJN-SS, 24, 448. 35 Nehru



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in Moscow too dispelled reports that India might seek Soviet military aid.39 A January 1954 Foreign Affairs article, probably approved by Nehru himself, is instructive for its silence on the US–Pakistan pact as the key issue of India–US discord. Instead, the commentary focused on a ‘major conflict on opinion’ between India and America on issues such as the nature of Asia’s order, the approach to the Communist bloc, and China policy. The absence of sub-regional issues in the article is stark despite the impending prospect of a changing balance of power in the subcontinent.40 Nehru, who so far had not commented in Parliament, diffused his expansive images to the national audience. He said that the US–Pakistan pact should not be looked at ‘in an alarmist way’ but rather considered ‘from a larger point of view’. Describing the pact as a neo-colonial moment, which revived Asia’s ‘history of colonial domination’, Nehru vowed that India would ‘survive by her own strength and self-confidence’. He also strongly rejected the pursuit of a regional sphere of influence or ‘third force’, and instead underscored his area of peace concept. The US–Pakistan pact would bring about a ‘breach in that peace area’.41 India’s peacemaker role, which was not without costs, had been prioritized because India was filling a vital ‘gap’ in Asian security, ‘which no other country could fill’.42 It is apparent that Nehru’s primary goal was securing Asia’s geopolitical stability, which he believed would also ensure India’s own security. So far, Indian assessments had arisen from imperfect information regarding military assistance to Pakistan. By February 1954, both the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and military intelligence agencies had acquired more details on the potential boost to Pakistan’s military capabilities. B.N. Mallik, the director of IB, noted that the Pakistan Army would be ‘modelled after the US Army’ and might include

39 ‘K.P.S.

Menon to Nehru’, 5 January 1954, J.N. Papers, File 226 (Part 2). 40  ‘Middle Ground between America and Russia’, Foreign Affairs 32, no. 2 (January 1954): 259–69. 41  ‘Nehru’s Foreign Policy Speech in Parliament’, 23 December 1953, SWJN-SS, 24, 558–66. 42  ‘Reply to a Parliamentary Debate’, 24 December 1953, SWJN-SS, 24, 574–5.

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up to ‘5 additional armoured divisions, two light armoured cavalry regiments and one air transportable division’ in West Pakistan and up to ‘three divisions’ in East Pakistan, enhancing the regular army strength by 60 per cent.43 By 10 February, US armour and air force equipment had already begun arriving in West Pakistan.44 An appreciation by Air Headquarters noted that US assistance could ‘assure the RPAF [Royal Pakistan Air Force] parity in numbers with the IAF [Indian Air Force]’.45 The additional Pakistani squadrons ‘would certainly constitute a threat’, which could only be countered by equipment from the ‘USA or the USSR’. While endorsing this assessment,46 Defence Secretary M.K. Vellodi had asked if India proposed ‘to look to either of these countries for reinforcing our Air Force? If not, the only other’ options were ‘the UK and France’. Interestingly, Vellodi also shared an important recent conversation between the Indian Air Advisor and the Soviet Air Attaché in London where the latter had indicated that Moscow ‘would most favourably consider India’s request for aid for all types of military stores’, adding, ‘with considerable emphasis’, that any ‘agreement or arrangement concerning supplies would be without any political strings attached to it’. This would include the latest Soviet fighter aircraft and ­bombers.47 Krishna Menon too cabled Nehru with a comprehensive assessment of the US–Pakistan pact. He argued that US–Pakistan collaboration was aimed at w ­ eakening British 43  ‘B.N. Mallik to Pillai and Nehru’, 1 February 1954, J.N. Papers, File 233 (Part 2). 44 ‘Deputy Director, Intelligence Bureau to Nehru and Pillai’, 19 February 1954, J.N. Papers, File 236 (Part 2). 45  Pakistani pilots had ‘already proceeded to America for training’ and ground reports indicated equipment was expected into Pakistan in the near future along with ‘150 US air technicians’ who would ‘be attached to the Pakistan Air Force’. 46  Earlier, Vellodi had urged Nehru that in the ‘present circumstances … it is a short-sighted policy not to build up at least adequate flying and ground personnel for a 15 squadron Air Force within a reasonable period of time’. ‘M.K. Vellodi to Nehru’, 27 December 1953, J.N. Papers, File 224 (Part 1). 47 ‘M.K. Vellodi to Nehru’, 18 February 1954, J.N. Papers, File 236 (Part 1). ‘B.N. Mallik to Pillai’, 23 February 1954, J.N. Papers, File 236 (Part 2).



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influence and creating ‘a balance against India in Asia’. Menon was particularly disturbed by the open-ended nature of the pact, with no fixed armament volume, terms, or time frame for military aid, and suggested an ambitious long-term internal military modernization effort: radar coverage along the entire India-Pakistan frontier, increasing interception fighters to counteract ‘attacking bombers’, a ‘qualitative’ transformation of land forces focused on ‘high speed and mobility’, and developing naval capabilities to deflect Pakistan’s attempts at ‘opening up a second front via East Bengal’.48 Nehru’s response to such policy recommendations underscored how his threat perceptions and choices were shaped by his images. He downplayed the growing security threat and possibility of tension in the subcontinent. In a Cabinet meeting, Nehru rejected public calls for the Army’s expansion, stating, ‘it was far more important to expedite the execution of existing Defence schemes’.49 There was ‘no need for reacting in an alarmist or panicky manner’, remarked Nehru in another note, seeking to cool off threat perceptions among his senior officials.50 He felt most officials had taken a ‘tragic’ view, and that it would not be easy for Pakistan to acquire the expertise and training to expand its air force and absorb modern American fighters. While accepting some short-term risk, India should focus on long-term industrial and indigenous development. Nehru also remarked that while US military imports should be avoided, shifting to Soviet aircraft could upset existing arrangements and India should ‘proceed very cautiously’. UK along with France and Sweden were more preferable.51 Nehru also deflected Menon’s advice for a qualitative transformation in India’s military modernization saying it was ‘completely beyond our capacity’ and it was ‘far wiser to depend on other factors for defence’.52

48  ‘Krishna

Menon to Nehru’, 27 February 1954, J.N. Papers, File 237 (Part 2). 49  ‘Minutes of Cabinet Meeting’, 28 January 1954, SWJN-SS, 24, 454–5. 50  ‘Nehru to Pillai and Tyabji’, 18 February 1954, J.N. Papers, File 235 (Part 2). 51  ‘Nehru to Defence Secretary’, 21 February 1954, J.N. Papers, File 236 (Part 2). 52  ‘To Krishna Menon’, 12 March 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 491–2.

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By the time the US–Pakistan and Turkey–Pakistan pacts were formally announced in late February 1954,53 Nehru had already rejected a geostrategy of exploiting cleavages between the blocs to secure India. He instructed Pillai to dispel rumours about an Indo-Soviet friendship pact and categorically reassure the US Ambassador ‘that no approach whatever would be made by India towards USSR’.54 He had also ruled out a structural shift in India’s defence system towards competitive armament and military modernization, a policy option ironically recommended by Nehru’s confidante Krishna Menon. In Parliament, Nehru stated that a competitive military build-up ‘would be an exceedingly wrong policy and would lead us … in the wrong direction’.55 He had also ruled out bandwagoning with America on regional geopolitics56 or a breach with the US. Nehru made a mild statement when the pact was announced, framing his objection on account of its impact on Asia’s freedom and security.57 Clearly, responding with a balance of power strategy was incongruent with Nehru’s beliefs and role conception. The pact was perceived and responded through Nehru’s image of indivisible security impelling him to frame developments in an extra-regional context rather than merely on its India-centric implications. Interestingly, the prospect of bases in the region was perceived as more ­significant than conventional military support to Pakistan. For Nehru, military bases symbolized the Cold War’s expansion into Asia, which could also emasculate postcolonial states.58 53 After

an interlude of public ambiguity, Pakistan made a formal request for US military assistance on 22 February 1954 and President Dwight D. Eisenhower granted the request on 25 February. 54  ‘Allen to State Department’, 20 March 1954, FRUS (Vol. XI-Part 2). 55  ‘Nehru’s Statement in Parliament’, 19 February 1954, J.N. Papers, File 235 (Part 2). 56  Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, for example, had suggested Nehru accommodate the US–Pakistan pact and draw closer to the US. ‘Pandit to Nehru’, 22 January 1954, J.N. Papers, File 231. 57  ‘Nehru’s Statement in Parliament’, 22 February 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 333–5. 58  ‘Nehru to Pillai and R.K. Nehru’, 12 December 1953, J.N. Papers, File 221 (Part 1).



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Military aid, on the other hand, was seen as relatively less threatening, partly because it stayed confined to a smaller area. Thus, the ‘quantum of military aid’ was not ‘so important’ in Nehru’s thinking. It was the underlying policy and ‘the inevitable consequences of it’ that were ‘dangerous from the point of view of peace and war as well as the freedom of Asia’.59 Nehru’s image of indivisible security and rejection of an exclusive subcontinental zone or third force area made him, ironically, less hostile to this development insofar as its local repercussions were concerned, and less receptive to policy options that advocated a counter-balancing geostrategy.60 For Nehru, the US–Pakistan pact was primarily part of the expansionary pattern of the Cold War, which could only be responded to effectively at the systemic and extra-regional level.

Looking East Having preserved his foreign policy through this crisis, Nehru now sought to demonstrate that a peacemaker role still had efficacy in the emerging geopolitical environment. Krishna Menon had cabled from New York advising the Prime Minister to consider actively responding to the escalating situation in South East Asia.61 The Indochina conflict had been raging for years. When French forces returned to Indochina after the defeat of imperial Japan, they found the northern part of the peninsula dominated by the Vietminh led by Ho Chi Minh. By December 1946, fighting had broken out between the Vietminh and French Union troops, with France expanding its military presence in the north. After 1950, Vietnamese rebels assisted by Communist China began to roll back the French from the northern regions precipitating a growing American involvement, and by 1953, 139,000 metric tons of US military equipment had been supplied to French forces to 59 

‘To Chief Minister’, 1 February 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 536. a ‘tough’ Pakistan policy, Nehru declared India’s posture towards Pakistan would continue to remain a ‘firm one’ and with the ‘aim of some peaceful way out’. ‘Nehru to Pillai, R.K. Nehru and Tyabji’, 3 March 1954, J.N. Papers, File 238 (Part 2). 61  ‘Menon to Nehru’, 19 February 1954, J.N. Papers, File 235 (Part 2). 60  Rejecting

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carry on the Cold War struggle. By 1954, French troops had suffered 100,000 casualties, with the US financing 80 per cent of the annual war cost of $1.7 billion.62 Against this tumultuous backdrop, on 18 February, the US, Soviet, British, and French Foreign Ministers met at Berlin, the first such meeting in five years. They agreed, the Americans reluctantly, to discuss the Indochina ­crisis at the forthcoming Geneva Conference scheduled for the end of April.63 Menon urged Nehru that India should avail this opening by appealing for a ceasefire in Indochina because neither of the involved parties would initiate that.64 The intervention was timely. Nehru made his statement on 22 February, the day the US–Pakistan pact was announced, appealing to all parties for a ceasefire without necessarily abandoning their existing ­positions.65 The overt reactions from the West were cool, fearing that a precipitate ceasefire would undermine France’s negotiating position and strengthen the Vietminh.66 London labelled Nehru’s proposal as the end of the non-alignment phase in India’s foreign policy.67 Behind the scenes, however, France was more interested. Their UN representative told Menon that while India’s good offices would be welcomed, the ceasefire suggestion was impractical because there were no proper frontiers. He also noted that while France largely favoured the end of hostilities 62 Fredrik Logevall, Embers of Wars: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2013), 343–4, 436–7. ‘The A.B.C.’s of Indochina,’ New York Times, 11 April 1954. Also see, Robert F. Randle, Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015 [1969]); Edgar O’Ballance, The Indochina War, 1945–1954 (London: Faber & Faber, 1964). 63  New York Times, 19 February 1954. 64  ‘Menon to Nehru’, 19 February 1954, J.N. Papers, File 235 (Part 2). 65 Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946–April 1961 (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961), 395. 66  Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 90–1. 67  ‘India High Commission, London to T.N. Kaul’, 26 February 1954, J.N. Papers, File 237 (Part 2).



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the US would not permit it, but added that Beijing’s support to Nehru’s appeal might yield some progress.68 On Menon’s advice, Nehru directed his envoys to obtain Chinese and Soviet reactions to the peace proposal.69 He also authorized Menon to promote the idea without making ­commitments.70 China’s response was evasive and Zhou Enlai also asked about Washington’s stance.71 To Delhi, uncertainty regarding the other side’s intentions was a recipe for an escalation. Even as Nehru was probing for a window to bridge East–West differences, Washington signalled its intentions dramatically by making public a testimony of a senior State Department official on 24 February. It held that US policy towards East Asia would maintain a long-term and ‘constant threat of military action vis-à-vis Red China in the hope that at some point there will be an internal breakdown’.72 The statement heightened threat perceptions in Delhi.73 Nehru’s previously mild remarks on the US–Pakistan pact, acquired a harder edge. He now told Parliament that Indian and US foreign policies were ‘wholly opposed to each other’. The latter was based on a quest to ‘dominate Asia for an indefinite period and pose a military threat against Communist China’, while India had ‘recognised this government in China and have friendly relations with it…. It is in this wider context that we must view these recent developments and more especially the military aid to Pakistan.’74

68  ‘Menon

to Nehru’, 22 and 25 February 1954, J.N. Papers, File 237

(Part 1). 69  ‘To Raghavan’, 25 February 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 438. 70  ‘Nehru to Menon’, 25 February 1954, J.N. Papers, File 237 (Part 1). 71  ‘Raghavan to Nehru’, 28 February 1954, J.N. Papers, File 237 (Part 2). 72  ‘G.L. Mehta to R.K. Nehru’, 28 February 1954, J.N. Papers, File 237 (Part 2). 73  India’s Ambassador in Washington was admonished for not promptly reporting such ‘an extremely important statement’. ‘R.K. Nehru to G.L. Mehta’, 28 February 1954, J.N. Papers, File 237 (Part 2). 74  ‘India and Military Aid’, 1 March 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 342. Also see Robert Trumbull, ‘Nehru Decries US Policy on Asia and the Cold War’, New York Times, 2 March 1954.

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Fearing Escalation in Indochina The Indochinese battlefield was also heating up. On 13 March 1954, the Vietminh launched an all-out offensive on Dien Bien Phu, a powerful French garrison in northwestern Vietnam, and subsequently intervened in Cambodia in April.75 Washington’s reaction was fierce. Declaring a new military doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’ to deter conventional military pressure from the eastern bloc, Dulles stated that communist expansion in Indochina constituted a ‘grave threat’ and ‘should be met by united action’. The signal was unambiguous: America could militarily intervene directly if necessary to secure Indochina from communist expansion. In early April, he told the Foreign Affairs Committee that the West and its allies should declare a resolution that ‘any further Chinese interference in the Indochinese war would be met with naval and air action against the Chinese coast and active intervention in Indochina itself’.76 The prospect of escalation worried Nehru. On 9 April, he told a Congress Party meeting that Dulles’ rhetoric seemed ‘to indicate that certain conditions for action by the USA are very near materialization’.77 The next day Dulles disclosed that he would travel to Europe to forge a united front with UK and France against the communist threat in Indochina, a threat that was no longer a limited one but extended across South East Asia and the Western Pacific.78 Cascading events prompted Menon to draft a wider policy assessment for the Prime Minister. Menon painted a sombre picture noting that a ‘turning point’ had been reached and the US was poised for an intervention. Although the British and French were ‘acting as checks’ on the Americans, they possessed little leverage. Menon speculated that Moscow and Beijing might just ‘outmanoeuvre the US’ by ignoring its threats and ‘proposing terms of settlement which may be difficult for the West to … treat 75 Logevall, 76 Logevall,

Embers of Wars, 445. Sardesai, Indian Foreign Policy, 36. Embers of Wars, 461–3. Sardesai, Indian Foreign Policy,

38. 77  78 

‘Statements of Dulles’, 9 April 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 438–9. ‘Dulles Statement’, 10 April 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 467.



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as a breaking point’. But it was the deeper and wider Asian geopolitical trends that were particularly troubling. ‘The US policy of the extension of a new Monroe doctrine’ over South East Asia was a direct challenge to many non-aligned Asian states such as India, Indonesia, Burma, and Sri Lanka. It ‘would be like a pincer action on this area, seeking to neutralise the area’s neutralism and to pull it or force it the other way’. The US–Pakistan pact was one manifestation of this geostrategy. India was faced with a possibility of a major war on its periphery, with huge disruptive consequences. Menon’s images are consistent with Nehru’s prior beliefs: that India’s security was interlinked and indivisible with the stability and balance in the larger Asian neighbourhood (it is an ‘Asian question’, ‘our security is intimately involved’).79 Menon advocated proactive diplomacy to arrest the escalating Cold War. Since the UK would be playing a leading part at Geneva, he urged that India should exert its influence to shape British attitudes and ‘render their own approach peaceful’. If the primary western fear was ‘to stop actual Chinese intervention’, the best way was ‘to seek to stop intervention from all sides’. Menon suggested several proposals including prioritizing a ceasefire, which might require the ‘Good Offices’ from outside the Geneva conference, recognizing the ‘complete independence’ of the Indochinese territories, direct negotiations between principal parties, and an agreement on non-intervention by the great powers.80 He argued that a balance of power process could not be passively relied upon to produce its own equilibrium, but rather it was necessary to shape the great power competition in Asia towards regional security. Menon’s note gave an impetus towards more activism on India’s part. Nehru was impressed.81 79 ‘Menon

Note on Indochina to Nehru’, 12 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 246 (Part 1). 80 ‘Menon Note on Indochina to Nehru’, 12 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 246 (Part 1). 81  The section on Indochina in Nehru’s confidential letter to his Chief Ministers drew upon Menon’s analysis and images. ‘To Chief Minister’, 14 April 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 553–4.

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The following day India denied a US request ‘for transit and refuelling facilities’ for seventy-two American planes carrying French troops to Indochina.82 Incoming reports on US policy reinforced fears of an escalation in the east. After a conversation with the US Assistant Secretary of State, G.L. Mehta cabled that Washington had decided that a communist expansion into Indochina ‘must be prevented’ and the US was ‘prepared to extend their interest in this region’ to stave off such a scenario.83 Nehru proactively responded on the China front. Raghavan had already been directed to finalize the negotiations with the Chinese over Tibet ‘as quickly as possible’.84 The SinoIndian talks had dragged on since January as the Chinese were ‘procrastinating’85 as well as being ‘unpredictable’.86 But Nehru was not interested in merely concluding a bilateral agreement or preserving minor advantages on India’s inherited position in Tibet.87 His main priority was regional security through his peace area concept, and an early agreement with China would have a ‘salutary effect’.88 Nehru also maintained close contact with the British, who were the only Western link to the Chinese regime. Humphrey Trevelyan, the British Charge d’Affaires (CDA) in Beijing, had told Raghavan that London would try an ‘independent line’ at Geneva. Indeed, Humphrey’s inclusion in the Geneva delegation

82 ‘MEA Headquarters to India High Commission in Sri Lanka’, 13 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 246 (Part 2). 83  ‘G.L. Mehta to Pillai’, 14 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 246 (Part 2). 84  ‘R.K. Nehru to Raghavan’, 2 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 244 (Part 1). 85  ‘Raghavan to R.K. Nehru’, 3 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 244 (Part 2). 86  ‘Raghavan to Pillai’, 14 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 246 (Part 2). 87  R.K. Nehru cabled Raghavan that minor issues could be overlooked to expedite an India–China agreement. ‘R.K. Nehru to Raghavan’, 9 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 245 (Part 2). 88  A ‘grave situation’ had ‘arisen’ because of Dulles’ new policy, and if ‘the Indo-Chinese agreement on Tibet is signed and announced soon, it will have salutary effect’. Postponing will have a ‘contrary effect’, especially since the Chinese delegation was leaving for Geneva soon. ‘Nehru to Raghavan’, 16 April 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 467–8.



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suggested London had some skin in the game.89 But Dulles’ latest pledge to craft a united front with London, Paris, and other Asian states deeply worried Delhi.90 Nehru promptly issued a Parliamentary statement decrying ‘negotiations under threats or by military activities … calculated to condition such negotiations’. In order to reassure Moscow and Beijing on Indian bonafides, Nehru also stated that Delhi had neither been consulted nor exchanged views with any of the parties before the Dulles–Eden communiqué.91 British Foreign Secretary Robert Anthony Eden quickly clarified that while London had ‘taken on no new commitments’ after Dulles’ visit, if Geneva failed and non-communist states did not unite against the surge of violent communist expansion in South East Asia then a situation of ‘grave danger’ may develop. Eden’s message to Nehru was both a reassurance and a veiled warning.92 As Menon had earlier cautioned, India could not rely solely on the British to moderate western policy, particularly in light of a belligerent USA. It only reinforced Nehru’s resolve for an independent peacemaker role.93 Delhi’s signalling had its effect on both Moscow and Beijing. Molotov told K.P.S. Menon that Moscow’s ‘views on recent developments tallied with those of India’. Although Dulles’ rhetoric had 89 

‘Raghavan to Nehru’, 3 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 244 (Part 2). 14 April, after two days of discussions in London, Dulles and Eden issued a joint communiqué declaring both the US and the UK were ‘ready to take part with other concerned countries’ to examine the possibility of ‘establishing a collective defence’ for South East Asia and the Western Pacific. Dulles issued a similar statement with the French Foreign Minister. SWJN-SS, 25, 441. 91  ‘Nehru Statement for 17 April 1954’, J.N. Papers, File 247. 92 ‘Eden to Nehru’, 16 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 247. While delivering Eden’s message, the British High Commissioner told Pillai that India should not come to a final view on the Indochina crisis and that the Dulles–Eden agreement in London left ‘more room for maneuvering for those working towards a negotiated settlement’. ‘Pillai to Nehru’, 18 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 247. 93  ‘Menon’s Draft for Pillai’s Oral Message to UK High Commissioner’, 16 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 247. 90 On

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made an Indochina settlement more challenging, Molotov hoped that the forthcoming meeting of the Colombo powers would witness ‘a firm agreement on matters of common concern’.94 Zhou also welcomed Nehru’s 17 April remarks on Indochina and his non-committal attitude had now changed to full support for Nehru’s ceasefire appeal. Calling for Asian unity to withstand the pressure of ‘American interventionism’, Zhou was keen to learn about Nehru’s views on regional security. He also warned that UK and France ‘would lose everything in Asia’ if they toed the American line and hoped India could warn the British. On the bilateral agreement with India, ‘differences now were very narrow’ and would be bridged soon. And, while it was a regional agreement, ‘it was symbolic’ and would ‘impress’ the ‘world at large’, Zhou had remarked.95 London, probably eager not to alienate Delhi and undermine the Commonwealth’s unity, called off a meeting with the US and ten South East Asian countries to explore a collective defence system for the region. Dulles ‘thought this was probably largely due to pressure from Nehru’.96 On 24 April, Nehru made his Parliamentary statement setting India on its peacemaker role. Foreign intervention, Nehru averred, had complicated an anti-colonial and nationalist struggle, and respect for independence from ‘external pressures can alone form the basis of a settlement and of peace’. US rhetoric gave ‘indications of impending direct intervention in Indo-China and the internationalisation of the war and its extension and intensification’. For India, these developments were of ‘grievous significance’. Nehru then dwelt on his notion of indivisible regional security: ‘We do not … champion any narrow and sectional Asian regionalism. We only seek to keep for ourselves and the adherence of others, particularly our neighbours, to a peace area and to a policy of non-alignment and non-commitment to world tensions and wars.’ Present developments, however, impinged ‘on our basic policies and they seek to contain us in alignments’. Because 94  ‘K.P.S.

Menon to Nehru, Pillai and R.K. Nehru’, 19 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 247. 95  ‘Raghavan to Nehru’, 20 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 247. 96  ‘Dulles–Eisenhower Conversation’, 19 April 1954, FRUS (Vol. XVI).



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‘Indochina is an Asian country and a ­proximate area’ India would promote trends that led to a settlement.97 Nehru concluded with a six-point proposal, drafted by Krishna Menon,98 as a suggested path for the Geneva Conference. These included promoting a ‘climate of peace and negotiation’; prioritizing a ceasefire on the Geneva agenda; affirmation of ‘complete independence of Indochina, that is, the termination of French sovereignty’; ‘[d]irect negotiations between the parties immediately and principally concerned’, that is, between France and the Vietminh; affirmation of the norm of non-intervention where the primary parties—US, USSR, UK, and China—would disavow intervention and ‘direct or indirect’ military aid to the combatants. Nehru further added that such a norm of non-intervention could be diffused widely through the UN and other states should be invited to adhere to it; finally, the Geneva powers should leverage the UN ‘for purposes of conciliation’.99 Nehru had initially been sceptical about rallying Asian countries on the crisis. As late as March he had not attached ‘much importance’ to the Colombo conference and was ‘not at all keen on going there’. He was also pessimistic about ‘Asian unity’ and saw ‘little in common’.100 His perceptions suddenly changed after Dulles’ enunciation of a more aggressive approach to Asia, and Nehru now feared that smaller states would get pulled in different directions. Washington was engaging with Pakistan and Sri Lanka closely on Indochina, with both countries offering transit facilities to reinforce US and French military supplies to the area.101 The Burmese Foreign Minister’s sudden visit to Moscow 97 

‘Proposals on Indo-China’, 24 April 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 439–42. 12 April note had outlined these six proposals, which Menon again drafted for Nehru’s Parliament speech. Also see Brecher, India and World Politics, 44. 99  ‘Proposals on Indo-China’, 24 April 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 443. 100  ‘Nehru to Commonwealth Secretary’, 28 March 1954, J.N. Papers, File 243 (Part 1). Nehru’s personal secretary, Mathai, even remarked that holding a Commonwealth Conference might be preferable to the upcoming Colombo Conference. ‘Mathai to Nehru’, 4 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 244 (Part 2). 101  ‘G.L. Mehta to Pillai’, 11 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 246 (Part 1). 98 Menon’s

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was also troubling and came as a surprise to Delhi.102 Nehru sensed that India could be sidelined at Colombo. Menon cautioned Nehru in his background brief before the conference. He pondered whether the meeting of five Asian states was ‘intended to serve as complementary’ to ‘notions of containment and collective action’. Menon also speculated whether the British were aiming ‘to parry both our approach and US pressures in another direction’ and advised Nehru to be ‘alert’. Menon’s note also revealed the challenge in operationalizing the peace area concept. A ‘multilateral agreement’ would look like a ‘bloc’, and, given the orientation of Pakistan and Sri Lanka, would import ideas ‘we would not accept’. Besides, any collective security approach would imply ‘an alignment of our own’, again contrary to Nehru’s beliefs that rejected a third force as a path to regional security. Yet, doing nothing ‘would leave a vacuum in regard to the peace area idea’. To be ‘realistic and effective, agreements should be bilateral’. South East Asian states, ‘each by their own decision and not by making themselves into a bloc, could thus become the nucleus which could attract others’.103 India’s role during the remainder of the crisis would essentially revolve around buttressing this core goal. The Colombo conference had assumed a new importance for Indian peacemaking efforts.104 After four days of heated debate, a communiqué was released on 2 May.105 It reflected India’s proposals, particularly the imperative for a ceasefire, keeping the conflict localized, complete sovereignty to Indochina, and the importance of the UN.106 The central idea of non-intervention by the great

102  ‘K.P.S.

Menon to R.K. Nehru’, 25 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 248 (Part 2). 103  ‘Menon to Nehru’, 27 April 1954, J.N. Papers, File 250. 104  The Colombo Conference was attended by the Prime Ministers of India, Sri Lanka, Burma, Indonesia, and Pakistan from 28 April to 2 May 1954. 105 Robert Trumbull, ‘Asian Chiefs Sign Peace Program’, New York Times, 2 May 1954. 106  ‘“Text of South Asian Prime Ministers” Communiqué’, New York Times, 2 May 1954.



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­ owers could not be endorsed because of Pakistan’s objections. But p by making the US and China among the primary parties along with the USSR and UK, the Colombo communiqué sought to ‘allay apprehensions about aid from either of them’.107 Nehru’s peace area received a significant impetus that very day when the India–China agreement was signed in Beijing. While Nehru chose to stabilize the eastern front after the US– Pakistan pact came into the open, at no stage was the Sino-Indian agreement envisaged as a balance of power countermove. Rather it was intended to ‘have a stabilising effect over this region’ and ‘to some extent, in Asian affairs’.108 As Menon reasoned, similar agreements between China and other South East Asian states such as Burma and Indonesia would ‘advance the sense of security in this area and strengthen their non-alignment policies. It would help us meet the situation created by Pakistan more effectively. It is the answer in terms of a policy of collective peace as counteracting the policy of collective war.’109 This was a classic exposition of Nehru’s geopolitics. India would resist the expansion of treaty areas in its neighbourhood not via a defensive alignment with another great power or by developing an independent third force, but by expanding the peace area. And maintaining a bridging role to stabilize the inter-bloc competition was the means to safeguard the peace area.

Shaping a Peace Area The battle of Dien Bien Phu, in northwestern Vietnam, marked the beginning of the end of an eight-year struggle between Ho Chi Minh’s Vietminh and France. The Vietminh assault, which began in March led to a decisive French defeat on 7 May 1954. Stunning events on the battlefield along with the reticence of London and Paris to form a united front with the US left Washington with few

107 

‘Nehru to Eden’, 4 May 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 436. ‘Nehru to Pillai and R.K. Nehru’, 2 May 1954, J.N. Papers, File 251 (Part 1). 109  ‘Menon to Nehru’, 6 May 1954, J.N. Papers, File 251 (Part 2). 108 

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­ alatable options to alter the course of the war.110 Dulles’ departure p from Geneva a few days earlier suggested a tide towards a truce. The Chinese were certainly ‘not surprised when France pushed for the talks on Indochina the day after Dien Bien Phu fell’.111 While the threat of immediate escalation had perhaps passed, the nature of a regional order remained unaddressed. While Nehru–Menon’s images on regional geopolitics were well defined, the prospect of a competing collective security system had not subsided. In early May, Eden enquired whether India would be willing to play a larger role to guarantee a settlement in Indochina.112 Although there were no concrete allied plans, the West still had to keep an eye on a post-Geneva order and on a scenario where both sides did not reach an agreement.113 Menon felt the British were ‘gently drawing’ India towards alignment with western geopolitical plans for South East Asia. While he recognized the advantages of consultation with London, he did not want India to lose its independent approach to Asia and China in the ­process.114 Meanwhile, Eden interpreted Nehru’s wait and watch approach as favouring an arrangement ‘similar to the Locarno Treaty’ where the guaranteeing powers would undertake to oppose violation of an agreement by any party. But Nehru was clear. A settlement sought to be protected at the expense of one power or bloc or a ‘guarantee by one side in the cold war’ could not ensure sustainable peace.115 Nehru’s directives to Menon before his departure to Geneva were precisely on these terms. India could not be a member 110 Menon

later remarked, ‘What really decided the issue was Dien Bien Phu and the defeat of the French.’ Brecher, India and World Politics, 45. 111  Shu Guang Zhang, ‘Constructing “Peaceful Coexistence”: China’s Diplomacy Toward the Geneva and Bandung Conferences, 1954–55’, Cold War History 7, no. 4 (2007): 516. 112  Nehru had responded that ‘within the limits’ of ‘non-alignment and our own resources’, India ‘would assist in promoting and maintaining a settlement in Indochina’. ‘Nehru to Eden’, 4 May 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 436. 113  ‘Eden to Nehru’, 7 May 1954, J.N. Papers, File 254 (Part 2). 114  ‘Menon to Nehru’, 9 May 1954, J.N. Papers, File 252 (Part 1). 115  ‘Pillai to Raghavan’, 21 May 1954, J.N. Papers, File 255 (Part 1).



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of a unilateral collective system, and although it was keen to be a party to peace, it could not commit itself ‘to any possible entanglement in war’.116 Put another way, India was not going to drift into a frontline role. Although it possessed no material leverage at Geneva, India’s regional status after the Colombo Conference and the announcement of the India–China agreement had become difficult to ignore. Indeed, Eden had expressed his ‘gratitude’ to Nehru ‘for the moderate and objective character of the comments made in Colombo on Indochina’.117 Eden’s remarks to Dulles on Nehru’s approach are also instructive. Recognizing that India embodied the core non-aligned space, the British Foreign Secretary emphasized India’s role in providing moral legitimacy to any settlement.118 Richard Casey, Australia’s Foreign Minister, was more forthright: ‘Nehru would violently challenge military intervention in Hanoi area as military colonialism and invasion. With Nehru’s influence in Burma and Indonesia we might find we had hostile forces all around us, quite unlike situation in Korea.’119 Menon sensed this soon after his arrival where the common impulse for an armistice was apparent in both blocs.120 Within three weeks, he ‘had about 200 interviews, each lasting nearly two hours, with various heads of delegations’.121 Menon assumed a bridging role, interpreting the postures of the other side and emphasizing areas of 116 

‘Nehru–Zhou Talks’, 27 June 1954, SWJN-SS, 26, 401–2. ‘Nehru to Eden’, 4 May 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 436. 118 ‘Communism cannot be checked by military means alone … it must enjoy the widest possible measure of Asian support…. If we cannot win the active support of all the Asian countries of the area … we should, at the very least, secure their benevolent neutrality…. Nehru’s latest statement shows that his ideas have moved closer to our own. With persistence we may even secure his endorsement of the kind of negotiated settlement in Indochina that would be acceptable to us.’ Eden to Dulles, 30 April 1954. Eden, Full Circle, 109–10. 119  ‘Dulles to Smith’, 8 June 1954, FRUS (Vol. XVI). 120 ‘Menon to Nehru’, 23 May 1954, J.N. Papers, File 255 (Part 2). ‘Mr. Eden calls for talks to end Indochina war’, Times of India, 13 May 1954. 121 Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 2, 191–2. 117 

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commonality to buttress the work of ‘active conciliators’ such as Eden and Molotov.122 Meanwhile in Delhi the focus remained on shaping a peace area. While at Geneva, Menon had attempted to reconcile competing negotiating postures between the two blocs, the peace area implied a similar bridging effort to mitigate the security dilemma between China and its neighbours. Incoming reports suggested that Burmese and Indonesian fears vis-à-vis China might lead to strategic choices in these countries that undermined Indian goals. The Burmese Foreign Minister’s sudden visit to Moscow had alerted Delhi. At Colombo, Thakin-Nu had shared his concerns with Nehru.123 India’s Ambassador in Rangoon too had cabled Delhi on ‘subversive movements’ on the Sino-Burmese frontier, which were being ‘deliberately encouraged’ to expand ‘Chinese influence’ in those areas.124 U Nu was particularly perturbed as he felt China would not cooperate with South East Asian states until their regimes had turned communist. He also feared that unless there was a ceasefire in Indochina, the US might escalate the conflict to mainland China, which would have ‘dire consequences’.125 Consistent with his prior images, Nehru tried to alleviate regional fears by influencing the interaction between Beijing and regional capitals. He initially did this through his envoys explaining why it was vital for the Chinese to create ‘a feeling of assurance and security and friendliness among the Burmese’ particularly regarding support to communist Kachin rebels on the Sino-Burmese frontier. For it ‘would be a great pity if circumstances compelled’ Burma to ‘align herself with any power bloc’.126 Nehru decided to invite Zhou Enlai to visit Delhi, instructing Menon to convey this invitation at Geneva.127 He also sought to moderate

122 

‘Menon to Nehru’, 31 May 1954, J.N. Papers, File 257. ‘Raghavan to Nehru’, 12 May 1954, J.N. Papers, File 252 (Part 2). 124  ‘Chettur to Nehru’, 14 May 1954, J.N. Papers, File 253 (Part 1). 125  ‘Chettur to Nehru’, 24 May 1954, J.N. Papers, File 255 (Part 2). 126  ‘Nehru to Raghavan’, 9 May 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 476–8. 127 The Chinese had expressed a desire to have Nehru visit China. ‘T.N. Kaul to Nehru’, 12 May 1954, J.N. Papers, File 252 (Part 2). ‘Nehru to R.K. Nehru’, 12 May 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 470. 123 



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U Nu’s threat perceptions arguing that it was in China’s interest in the ‘present circumstances’ to be friendly to India, Burma, and Indonesia and ‘to our advantage to be friendly to them’. Nehru told U Nu that non-aligned powers should also provide ‘moral support’ to the British who were working ‘for a real settlement’ at Geneva despite tremendous pressure from the Americans.128 He similarly sought to influence the Indonesian Prime Minister’s perceptions of China saying Beijing’s attitude although ‘rigid’ was not non-cooperative at Geneva.129 While senior Indian officials accepted the basic concept of Nehru’s geopolitics, there is evidence of competing images when it came to the implementation of the peace area. For example, Tyabji, now Ambassador in Indonesia, and Subimal Dutt, the new Commonwealth Secretary, felt that unless India took ‘special account of Indonesia’s difficulties’ and offered it military and material assistance, Djakarta would ‘not be able to maintain its policy of neutrality for long’. India’s policy could help in ‘joint procurement’ for ‘defense requirements’, ‘training facilities’ in Indian military institutions, and closer interactions with the Indonesian military.130 Nehru’s response is instructive and reflected his core images. He rejected any meaningful bilateral military assistance and training, arguing that it was ‘undesirable’ and might lead to India getting ‘hopelessly entangled’.131 He later emphasized, ‘we should not appear to push our help’ and ‘it would be particularly wrong to give free arms supplies’ or ‘[re-funnel]’ aid towards non-aligned states.132 Nehru also rejected the idea of a collective non-aggression pact between non-aligned countries and China because it would ‘appear as a kind of ganging up’.133 Tyabji had also suggested regional arrangements among the non-aligned states and had encouraged Indonesia to think of an association that also included the 128 

‘Nehru to U Nu’, 29 May 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 480–2. ‘Nehru to Ali Sastroamidjojo’, 12 June 1954, SWJN-SS, 26, 349. 130  ‘Subimal Dutt to Nehru’, 5 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 259 (Part 1). 131  ‘Nehru to Dutt’, 5 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 259 (Part 1). 132  ‘Nehru to Dutt’, 14 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 261 (Part 1). 133  ‘Nehru to Ali Sastroamidjojo’, 12 June 1954, SWJN-SS, 26, 351. 129 

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UK.134 Nehru struck it down: ‘I do not fancy any such agreements which include more than two countries.’135 Hence, for Nehru, the peace area could not be a militarily defended non-aligned bloc even with loose strategic linkages among the states. Nor could it be a collective confidence-building grouping with China. Such options would undermine Nehru’s notion of indivisible security, which was antithetical to the classical balance of power approach.136 For Nehru, a bilateral approach of reaching a normalization with China was the more optimal way to mute the security dilemma.137 But it is also apparent that the basic inner contradiction of a largely self-imposed power vacuum within Nehru’s peace area could, ultimately, only be resolved by strategic restraint among the great powers in their struggle for influence over contested areas. It was, thus, necessary to alleviate the fear of both blocs regarding states falling into the other side’s sphere of influence. Nehru believed that the peace area concept was viable because through deft diplomacy both blocs could be assured that neither could gain a relative advantage by absorbing non-aligned areas into their orbits. Put another way, Nehru rejected a narrow balance of power approach to security in favour of an ambitious quest to stabilize the geopolitical status quo by promoting an area of agreement in contested zones around India’s neighbourhood. Menon aimed to buttress these strategic objectives in Geneva. At one level, he helped in lowering the barriers between the Chinese and the British helping them get a ‘little closer’.138 At another level, Menon sought to avoid getting India entrapped in a 134 

‘Tyabji to Nehru’, 17 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 262 (Part 1). ‘Nehru to Pillai and Dutt’, 18 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 262 (Part 1). 136  Nehru’s beliefs, of course, were not new. When asked in 1950 if ‘a neutrality bloc’ or ‘a new kind of cordon sanitaire’ was possible between the two great powers, his response was instructive: A ‘cordon sanitaire tends to become an iron curtain’ bringing greater instability and ‘greater fear of what is happening behind the curtain’. The concept of security was indivisible: ‘when tension is worldwide, we can hardly have such a cordon all the way around the world’. ‘Interview to I.F. Stone’, 27 April 1950, SWJN-SS, 15 (Part 1), 448. 137  ‘Nehru to Ali Sastroamidjojo’, 12 June 1954, SWJN-SS, 26, 351. 138  ‘Menon to Nehru’, 22 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 262 (Part 2). 135 



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policeman’s role or tacitly endorse any collective security arrangements where India found itself undertaking responsibilities to balance the eastern bloc. Both Walter Bedell-Smith, the US envoy at Geneva, and Dulles had suggested such a role for India. Smith had even urged Menon that it would be good for India and Pakistan— ‘the lion and the lamb’—to ‘work together’ in securing South East Asia.139 Dulles wanted India to ‘take more active interest’ in the East where ‘Indian leadership’ could rally countries in defence of South East Asia.140 Unlike the US preference for an integrated hierarchical system of allies, the British approach was subtler: ‘Asian countries themselves should take the lead and formulate a scheme.’141 Nehru rejected both types of collective security roles. The only responsibility that India could assume to safeguard Asian security had to be the ‘result of agreement between rival parties’.142 By mid-June, both Molotov and Zhou Enlai had softened their positions. Presuming neither side was eager to resume hostilities, the progress, Menon reported, would hold.143 Eden too noticed the softening in Soviet and Chinese postures.144 Whether it was the result of the fall of the centre-right French regime that eased Soviet–Chinese postures or whether Menon had persuaded Molotov and Zhou to moderate their positions or a combination of both cannot be fully discerned without an enquiry into Chinese and Soviet archives. Recent evidence from Beijing does suggest that China’s desire for a reasonable settlement after Dien Bien Phu was based on similar assessments as Delhi’s, namely, that US’s European allies now sought a peaceful resolution at Geneva.145 China’s ‘apprehension’ at potential US military bases in Laos and 139 

‘Menon to Nehru’, 8 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 259 (Part 2). ‘G.L. Mehta to Nehru’, 16 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 261 (Part 2). 141  ‘G.L. Mehta to Nehru’, 21 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 262 (Part 2). 142  ‘Nehru to Menon’, 11 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 260 (Part 1). 143  ‘Menon to Nehru’, 16 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 261 (Part 2). 144  ‘Eden to Nehru’, 19 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 262 (Part 1). 145 Zhou Enlai had ‘calculated that the French would no longer hesitate to accept a peaceful solution to the Indochina problem, and the British would certainly lend their support. Without British and French cooperation, the US would eventually have to accept peace terms in Indochina.’ Zhang, ‘Constructing “Peaceful Coexistence”’, 516. 140 

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Cambodia also shaped Beijing’s negotiating strategy,146 for Menon noted that both Zhou and Molotov ‘came nearer and nearer to our middle of the way suggestions’.147 The Chinese probably felt that unsettled conditions would keep the window open for US treaty expansion in South East Asia. Menon confidently asserted that a ceasefire would now ensue.148 The entire crisis climaxed from India’s vantage point when Zhou Enlai suddenly accepted Nehru’s invitation to visit India at the end of June. This was a truly significant development for Nehru, which would ‘not be lost on others’.149 Zhou would go on to not only affirm India’s peacemaker role but also endorse the logic of the peace area where non-aligned states could co-exist with both blocs. He described such states as ‘States of the South East Asian type’ having a ‘neutral status’ thereby avoiding ‘internal conflict’ and ‘external pressure’.150 The core non-aligned states were ‘India, Burma, and Indonesia’ and efforts should be made to ‘enlarge this area of peace’ in South East Asia.151 Although both Zhou and Nehru were pursuing their independent security goals, they also discovered shared interests to ‘prevent US attempts to organize military blocs’ in their common neighbourhood. For China, neutralizing Indochina and preventing it from becoming a springboard for new US military activities was the dominant goal at Geneva. For Nehru, the idea of neutralizing even a portion of South East Asia was a step towards enlarging the peace area and stabilizing Asian security. Nehru suggested that China should ‘have bilateral declarations’ based on the India–China agreement

146  Menon

had noted there was an ‘apprehension’ in ‘Chinese mind’ that the West was seeking bases in Indochina. ‘Menon to Nehru’, 10 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 260 (Part 1). Eden and Bedell-Smith too reported the same observation after Zhou’s remarks in a closed session. ‘Eden to Foreign Office’, 16 June 1954, FO 371/112073; ‘Smith to State Department’, 17 June 1954, FRUS (Vol. XVI). 147  ‘Menon to Nehru’, 21 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 262 (Part 2). 148  ‘Menon to Nehru’, 21 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 262 (Part 2). 149  ‘Nehru to Menon’, 22 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 263 (Part 1). 150  ‘Nehru–Zhou Talks’, 25–27 June 1954, SWJN-SS, 26, 371. 151  ‘Nehru–Zhou Talks’, 25–27 June 1954, SWJN-SS, 26, 371, 376.



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with other non-aligned states like Burma and Indonesia to assuage fears around Chinese intentions.152 When the Geneva conference reconvened, the consensus around India’s post-conflict role was apparent. On 18 July, Zhou proposed that India, Canada, and Poland should constitute the commission to supervise a ceasefire. The next day, Eden conveyed this consensus to Nehru153 after France conceded Poland’s inclusion in the commission, and decisions would be based on majority in case of a stalemate giving India the swing vote.154 Eden had also said that a failure to reach an agreement at Geneva would lead to ‘the countries of the Commonwealth and of South and South-East Asia’ making ‘an early announcement of their agreement with the US and France’ on a collective defence arrangement.155 Ultimately, the general commitment to an armistice overrode other strategic considerations, and, on 21 July, separate ceasefire agreements were concluded for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos at Geneva. In Vietnam, the ceasefire line ran between the 17th and 18th parallels, producing a temporary partition until future elections, which were scheduled for July 1956. Three international commissions were also set up to supervise the implementation of these agreements.156 Importantly, Clause 12 of the Geneva Declaration committed both blocs to ‘respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity’ of the three Indochinese states, and, although the US declined to sign the Declaration, it unilaterally announced that it would ‘refrain from threat or the use of force to disturb’ the Geneva agreements.157

*** 152 

‘Nehru–Zhou Talks’, 25–27 June 1954, SWJN-SS, 26, 371, 380–1. Krishna Menon’, 20 July 1954, SWJN-SS, 26, 358. Also see ‘Eden Informs Nehru of Ceasefire Plans’, Times of India, 21 July 1954. 154 ‘Reds Insist on Early Elections in Indochina’, Times of India, 17 July 1954. 155  ‘To Krishna Menon’, 20 July 1954, SWJN-SS, 26, 359. 156 ‘Peace Comes at Last to War-Weary Indochina’, Times of India, 22 July 1954. 157 ‘Text of Declaration and Statements at Conference in Geneva’, New York Times, 22 July 1954. 153 ‘To

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There were multiple credible choices available to policymakers in the circumstances of the 1954 crises. Senior officials and advisors had advocated a variety of options to confront the US–Pakistan pact like balance of power strategies, building up a third force of non-aligned states, or even bandwagoning. Most of these options were credible in the circumstances and largely consistent with non-alignment. But Nehru’s core beliefs and images constrained these alternative policy choices, which were incongruent with his regional role conception of India as a peacemaker (See Figure 3.1). A non-interference posture was also a credible option. In fact, Nehru had assumed such a passive posture and publicly justified it till 1954. In March 1950, Nehru told Parliament that the policy towards Indochina had ‘been one of absolute non-interference’ and India intended ‘to continue this policy’. He even rationalized India’s detachment: ‘I do not think … any kind of interference in the affairs of a country struggling for freedom can do any good, because the countries which have been under colonial d ­ omination invariably resent foreign interference.’158 Nehru also refused to offer an opinion on South East Asian security ‘because it means taking part in an international dispute’.159 Three factors have been Explanatory Variable

Role conception (Beliefs and images)

Dependent Variable: Regional behaviour

ent Congru r iou v a h e b Consistent but unlikely behaviour

Incon gru behav ent iour

Tension-reduction; projection of peace area

(Option actually chosen by the decision-maker)

`Hiding´; passive responses

(Option not chosen by the decision-maker)

Bandwagoning; balance of power strategies; mobilize third force of non-aligned states

(Option not chosen by the decision-maker but credible in the decisional situation)

Figure 3.1  Choice Paths during the 1954 Crisis

158 Nehru, 159 

India’s Foreign Policy, 394–5. ‘Press Conference’, 17 June 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 2), 402.



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attributed to Nehru’s then ‘calculated circumspection’: The communist nature of the Indochinese anti-colonial struggle, the reality of French possessions in India, and the emergence of Mao’s China after 1949 sharing a border with Vietnam.160 But all these three factors had defined the context even in 1954. Yet, Nehru changed his earlier posture and chose activism. The real explanation for the policy shift lies in the US–Pakistan alliance that created a major crisis for India. In Nehru’s geopolitical image, subcontinental matters were not an isolated phenomenon but part of a larger defined regional picture, and in accordance with that prior image, the US–Pakistan pact was seen as an Asian crisis triggering a role response to counteract the threat to regional security in India’s neighbourhood.

Alternative Explanations Could an alternative conceptual approach better explain Nehru’s statecraft after the announcement of the US–Pakistan pact? Interpreting the historical evolution of India’s foreign policy on an idealist–realist axis, Nayar and Paul argue that ‘the balance between the two elements began to shift in favour of realism starting in 1954’.161 Describing 1954 as a ‘turning point’, they assert ‘India was shaken out of its idealism to come to terms with the threats to its immediate national security’.162 While the authors correctly observe that ‘Nehru essentially saw the US as diplomatically coercing India by promoting its encirclement through a ring of alliances’, they misinterpret India’s response as a ‘balance of power’ strategy.163 The decision-making record through this crisis reveals that rather than pursuing a power-based strategy, Delhi’s response was shaped by Nehru’s peace area concept. Although there were competing ­perceptions on the US–Pakistan pact, and some of them 160 Sardesai,

Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, 1947–1964, 15. 161  Nayar and Paul, India in the World Order, 144. 162  Nayar and Paul, India in the World Order, 151. 163  Nayar and Paul, India in the World Order, 148.

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unequivocally advocated an orthodox balance of power choice as Nayar and Paul would define it, such policy options were consistently overruled by the Prime Minister, who favoured an indivisible approach to regional security. For Nehru and Menon, the US–Pakistan alliance had disturbed not merely the subcontinent’s balance but Asia’s balance of power as well. The concurrent Indochina conflict was perceived to further exacerbate the Cold War dynamic and potentially entrench an alliance-based system of collective security, which would have undermined the autonomy of India and other non-aligned states. The Indian counter-response via the peace area concept sought to stave off a further expansion of US-sponsored treaty areas by neutralizing contested regions via a bridge-building strategy that sought to dampen Asian security dilemmas as well as East–West competition in India’s extended neighbourhood. Indochina, Burma, and Indonesia were seen as the prime locales for Cold War competition that might have increased US strategic involvement to a destabilizing level and tilted the Asian balance further away from non-aligned states. Nehru and Menon sought to stabilize Asia’s geopolitical status quo on terms that they believed would not be detrimental to the core strategic interests of either bloc. India’s foreign policy soon after the announcement of the US–Pakistan pact in late February was built around such images and goals. This chapter also allows us to question the orthodox view on India’s China and South East Asia policy during this phase. Nehru’s China policy has been typically deconstructed without focusing on his images of India’s larger security environment and his peacemaker role at a critical stage of the Cold War in Asia. The mainstream historiography has located the 1954 Tibet Agreement in an isolated context. Gopal, for instance, focuses primarily on the frontier issue. The context of 1953–4 and Nehru’s perceptions at the time are absent in his narrative.164 Although Sardesai’s 164 Gopal,

Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 2, 176–81. For a brief insider account of Nehru’s thinking during this period, see Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War, 95–106. For a rare exception to the mainstream historiography see Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, ‘A Brief History of Panchsheel’, Economic and Political Weekly 51, no. 1 (2016): 26–31.



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­ istory of India’s South East Asia policies has the advantage of corh rectly alluding to Nehru’s peace area aims, he too does not delve into the origins of the crisis and the situational context as perceived by Indian policymakers, and the holistic response crafted by Delhi after the US–Pakistan pact.165 Dutt too does not dwell on the larger picture and the perceived heightening of the Cold War around India’s periphery that shaped Delhi’s choices.166 It is often suggested that Nehru’s engagement with China was largely an outcome of his optimistic outlook on Asian unity and lack of understanding of regional security dynamics. The evidentiary record as brought out here, however, does not fully support such a claim. While it is true that Nehru’s images of China were shaped to some extent by his prior beliefs that post-colonial states in general did share a certain outlook on world politics, Nehru was neither misty-eyed about Mao’s China nor unaware of its different ideological and cultural characteristics. In an important note drafted after the April 1954 agreement, T.N. Kaul had revealed that the Chinese had thrown ‘informal feelers’ about ‘the desirability of a non-aggression pact’. Kaul had advised that it was ‘worth considering’ this question.167 Nehru, however, had categorically ruled it out: ‘The present agreement goes half way at least towards a nonaggression pact and that is quite enough.’ Nehru even ruled out the possibility of having ‘tripartite talks’ between India, China,

165 Sardesai, Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, 1947–1964, 28–51. 166 Dutt’s brief account of the Indochina crisis is isolated from its context and suggests that Menon was the sole initiator of India’s peacemaker role without any discussion on the reasons for Nehru’s response. The April 1954 India–China agreement too is presented purely in connection with the subsequent border dispute that flared up in the late 1950s. Until June 1954, Dutt was posted in West Germany, which might perhaps explain his interpretation of that period. But it is also probably part of the general historiography on Nehru’s foreign policy in the 1950s, which was alluded to in the Introduction chapter: 1962 casts a powerful shadow on most retrospective assessments of this period. Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office, 60–3, 87–90. 167  ‘T.N. Kaul to Nehru’, 12 May 1954, J.N. Papers, File 252 (Part 2).

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and Burma because that would have given Zhou Enlai’s June 1954 visit to India ‘a formal shape’.168 The present chapter has sought to locate the India–China agreement in its larger setting. Nehru’s strategy during the crisis, which included a normalization with China, was aimed at shaping Asia’s security order and containing the Cold War around India following the US–Pakistan pact. And yet, Nehru’s responses did not seek to undermine fundamental Western interests in the area. For example, Eden had appreciated Nehru’s ‘moderate and objective’ posture towards the Indochina question at the Colombo c­ onference.169 Eden’s remarks to Dulles are also instructive. Since India embodied the core non-aligned space, the British foreign secretary had emphasized the significance of India’s role in providing moral legitimacy to any settlement.170 Insofar as the correlation of military forces in Indochina was concerned, Nehru was aware ‘that the Vietminh forces were being assisted substantially by both the Chinese and the Russians’.171 America, on the other hand, had ‘got itself into a bad impasse’. Thus, a settlement in South East Asia ‘more or less acknowledging the present position and stabilising it’ would prevent ‘any expansion on either side’, which really meant ‘on the Chinese side’.172 Chinese strategic expansion, especially around India’s eastern neighbourhood, was likely if the conflict and security competition had continued unabated. Nehru, therefore, sought to encourage Chinese reassurance as a crucial ingredient to mitigating the fears of other regional states, and thus, pre-empting invitations to external security balancers.173 In short, a clear focus 168 ‘Nehru

to Pillai and R.K. Nehru’, 12 May 1954, J.N. Papers, File 252 (Part 2). 169  ‘Nehru to Eden’, 4 May 1954, SWJN-SS, 25, 436. 170  ‘Nehru’s latest statement shows that his ideas have moved closer to our own. With persistence we may even secure his endorsement of the kind of negotiated settlement in Indochina that would be acceptable to us.’ ‘Eden to Dulles’, 30 April 1954. Eden, Full Circle, 109–10. 171  ‘Chettur to Nehru’, 14 May 1954, J.N. Papers, File 253 (Part 1). 172  ‘Nehru to G.L. Mehta’, 29 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 264 (Part 2). 173 In their conversation on 26 June, Nehru had suggested to Zhou that reassurance to the smaller Asian countries was the key to greater



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on maintaining and expanding the peace area was driving Indian regional policy. India was not acceding to a Chinese sphere of influence other than acknowledging Beijing’s core interest in preventing the construction of an anti-Chinese bridgehead in South East Asia. It is from such a perspective that Nehru’s decision on the 1954 India–China agreement should be understood. The agreement was not merely to resolve bilateral issues but rather to stabilize the security dilemma in India’s extended neighbourhood and inculcate similar strategic choices in other non-aligned Asian states. Nehru envisioned the Sino-Indian agreement as an example of coexistence and an alternative to the alliance-based approach of the US–Pakistan pact.174 It was an approach of confidence-building between non-aligned states and China without exacerbating a fear of ganging up in the Western bloc, thus, in essence, an approach conditioned by Nehru’s image of indivisible security. Another explanation for Nehru’s choices during this crisis might be linked to material necessity. It could be argued that the decision to reject a balance of power strategy to counteract the US–Pakistan alliance was influenced by the fact that India was too materially dependent on the West to offend it by a military relationship with Moscow. An ‘important reason’ for Nehru’s restraint, it has been suggested, was ‘that India urgently needed the support of industrial nations and technical skill to build itself

regional security: ‘we have to create confidence among the people of these countries…. If we could get over that fear—first in our own area of South East Asia and then elsewhere—it would help solve the world’s problems.’ ‘Nehru–Zhou Talks’, 25–7 June 1954, SWJN-SS, 26, 391. 174  On the other side, the re-orientation in Chinese diplomacy towards more active engagement with its Asian neighbours can be traced to late 1952. In an important Ministry of Foreign Affairs report in 1953, Zhou Enlai had told his colleagues, ‘We call for the resolution of all international disputes through peaceful negotiations. Our opponents only insist on war to resolve them…. The basis of our policy is peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition between countries with different systems.’ Gregg A. Brazinsky, Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 77–8.

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up’.175 The imperative of increasing food imports from the US was a factor that Indian policymakers certainly recognized. In 1951, the US had supplied and financed under American loans 22 per cent of the total Indian imports of food grains of 4.75 million tons that year.176 In early 1954, India had requested Washington to consider a three-year programme ‘involving 4½ to 5 million tons of wheat’.177 Was the imperative of receiving American food aid the main reason for not opening strategic ties with Moscow? While there is some intuitive basis to this argument, evidence now clearly suggests that material options from the Soviet side were also available. Indeed, given that the US was unwilling to offer unconditional food assistance, the logic for a more complex bargaining game of extracting advantageous terms from both blocs was evident in the early 1950s. In March 1951, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, India’s Ambassador in Moscow, upon Nehru’s instruction178 extracted an ‘official offer of 500,000 tons of wheat’ in a barter exchange arrangement for Indian commodities such as raw jute and cotton fibre. Krishna Menon had advised Nehru that ‘Radhakrishnan’s hands be strengthened and avoidance of famine should have priority over prejudice.’ Yet, this potential opening was stalled by the ‘anti-Soviet’ food minister and senior bureaucrats such as Girja Shankar Bajpai in Delhi who were reluctant to expand economic relations with Moscow.179 In terms of qualitative military supplies too, a countervailing Soviet option was credible if Indian policymakers had chosen to proactively leverage that. As early as January 1950, Stalin had met 175 Rudra

Chaudhuri, ‘The Limits of Executive Power: Domestic Politics and Alliance Behaviour in Nehru’s India’, India Review 11, no. 2 (2012): 101. 176  Gilles Boquerat, No Strings Attached: India’s Policies and Foreign Aid 1947–1966 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2003), 139. 177 ‘Briefing Paper Prepared in the Office of South Asian Affairs’, 19 January 1955, FRUS (Vol. VIII-South Asia). 178 Nehru had told Radhakrishnan that Washington was demanding difficult terms for its food assistance programme to India. 179 S. Gopal, Radhakrishnan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 237–9. Also see Y.D. Gundevia, Outside the Archives (New Delhi: Sangam, 1984), 90–2.



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Radhakrishnan and welcomed a friendship pact. The record of this extraordinary meeting reveals a clear attempt by the Soviet side to engage India. Stalin’s changing attitude and strategic outreach towards Delhi while Mao was still present in Moscow for the SinoSoviet treaty negotiations was clearly noted by senior Indian officials. Nehru was impressed enough to have this cable forwarded to Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad.180 Radhakrishnan had repeatedly advised Nehru that a friendship pact with the Soviets made strategic sense given that India already had similar ties with the British in the form of a Commonwealth membership.181 But Nehru was disinclined to pursue such a course preferring to ‘go a little slow’ given the cooling of India’s relations with the US. ‘For the present it should be a safer policy not to undertake any additional step which might make our relations with the western powers worse.’182 In late 1953, the circumstances were more ominous from India’s security perspective. While Nehru did endorse a trade agreement with Russia in December 1953, he peremptorily ruled out a similar strategic opening. As we have seen, renewed Soviet offers for ‘no strings attached’ military assistance were recognized but again spurned by Nehru. The reasons for his choices appear to be influenced less by material factors and more by his beliefs because alternative options to buttress India’s strategic position and military capabilities without undermining India’s strategic autonomy were potentially available. In short, Nehru’s peacemaker role conception and a concomitant rejection of balance of power ideas to

180 

‘Radhakrishnan–Stalin Conversation’, 15 January 1950, J.N. Papers, File 34; ‘Rajeshwar Dayal to K.P.S. Menon’, 27 January 1954, J.N. Papers, File 35. 181  ‘Radhakrishnan to Nehru’, 24 February 1950, J.N. Papers, File 38. To be sure, Radhakrishnan was not probably envisaging a balance of power move at this stage. Rather, his ‘main anxiety’ was ‘about better relations between the great powers’. In addition, in order to promote such inter-bloc relations India first needed positive and stable ties with Moscow. Gopal, Radhakrishnan, 225. 182 ‘Nehru to Radhakrishnan’, 5 March 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 204–5.

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advance Indian security shaped how the US–Pakistan pact was perceived, defined and the Indian response constructed. Yet, one might still argue that this still does not adequately explain why even a limited strategic opening with Moscow was not pursued. Could factors such as ideology or domestic political culture have influenced Nehru’s choices? We now know that there was a strong anti-Soviet sentiment in India’s security establishment inherited from the British era that also resonated among conservative Congressman and among small but vocal right-wing groups. Subrahmanyam, for instance, suggests that ‘the decision to decline the Soviet offer was influenced by the western and anticommunist orientation’ of India’s bureaucracy. Thus, the ‘entire program of rearmament against Pakistan’ was ‘carried out by purchases from the UK, France, and the US’.183 K.P.S. Menon too reveals a prejudice in the mainstream bureaucracy, especially the Home Ministry, to forge a normal working partnership with the Soviet Union in the early 1950s.184 There were also hostile attitudes in the Commerce Ministry on economic relations with the Soviets. When Gundevia inquired about possible trade with the USSR, Commerce Secretary C.C. Desai had remarked, ‘He did not want any business relations with “these damned Communists”.’185 Gopal too argues based on his father’s experience in Moscow that Delhi’s anti-Soviet prejudice was a constraining factor in the early 1950s.186 Did these macro-factors make a balance of power move unfeasible domestically in 1954? While there is some merit in such a line of reasoning, ideology at best could be viewed as a necessary but not sufficient constraint on the Prime Minister’s choices. Nehru’s command over the political system after Patel’s death in December 1950 was nearly supreme by 1954. Few could have

183  K.

Subrahmanyam, ‘Nehru and the India–China Conflict of 1962’, in Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years, ed. B.R. Nanda (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976), 112. 184 K.P.S. Menon, ‘India and the Soviet Union’, in Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years, ed. B.R. Nanda (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976), 141. 185 Gundevia, Outside the Archives, 80. 186 Gopal, Radhakrishnan, 213–24.



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c­ hallenged what could easily have been presented as a precautionary strategic opening to Moscow in response to the provocative US–Pakistan pact. Indeed, even right-wing social and political groups like the Hindu Mahasabha and Jan Sangh had called for an alliance with Soviet Russia to contain Pakistan.187 In the final analysis, it was Nehru’s peacemaker role conception that shaped his choices. Nehru’s preferred modes of behaviour ruled out a competitive armament regardless of the source of the assistance. For Nehru, ‘peace as well as security’ could best be ‘maintained by efforts at collective peace and avoidance of war’. If this could not ‘be done in the world as a whole, then an attempt should be made to have areas where such peace can be maintained’.188 Finally, perhaps the most compelling explanation for Nehru’s reluctance to pursue a balance of power strategy could be India’s unique position within the Commonwealth in those years. We have seen clear evidence of Indian policymakers, particularly Nehru, Krishna Menon, and some senior officials, viewing India’s position in the Commonwealth and relationship with the British as a means to soften the impact of US policies in the region. Nehru and some of his advisors believed that the ‘inner conflict’ between a rising America and a declining Britain for Asian influence, ‘in spite of their general alliance’, could be exploited.189 Menon believed that if India could help preserve some of Britain’s prestige and influence in Asia despite its declining material position, London might have been amenable to shaping the West’s broader South Asia policies with Indian interests in mind. As Menon later recalled, the Commonwealth was useful because it represented a ‘moderate kind of westernism’ and a potential ‘antidote’ to the belligerent and uncompromising Dullesian Cold War images ­emanating from America. India’s Commonwealth connection was driven largely by ‘rational, pragmatic, and sensible 187 ‘V.R.

Bhatt to M.O. Mathai on Indian Press Reaction on US– Pakistan Pact’, 22 December 1953, J.N. Papers, File 223 (Part 1). 188 ‘Foreign Policy Statement to Congress Party’, 4 July 1954, J.N. Papers, File 265 (Part 2). 189 ‘Nehru to Pillai, R.K. Nehru and Tyabji’, 27 November 1953, SWJN-SS, 24, 428–33.

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­factors’.190 The British were a kind of buffer to greater hostility from the US and a potential partner in India’s role to bridge ties with the eastern bloc. Perhaps, for Nehru and Menon, this represented some kind of a balancing strategy. But it would be inaccurate to rely on simply a reductionist cultural explanation and assert that Nehru and Menon were emotionally too wedded to the British outlook to pursue an independent policy. Nehru–Menon images, as we have seen, were far more complex, and it is instructive that despite a special relationship with the British leadership, the essence of Nehru’s p ­ eacemaker role remained unaffected. Throughout the crisis, India had rejected alternative frontline role conceptions promoted by the British and Americans for India’s foreign policy in South East Asia. The British Chiefs of Staff had hoped that ‘India with her valuable forces’ could supervise and potentially guarantee an agreement on Indochina.191 Bedell-Smith and Dulles, belatedly recognizing Eden’s more astute approach towards Asia, also sought to cajole senior Indian officials to accept such a role in East Asia. Menon’s sober and sustained advice to supplement London’s moderate position within the Western bloc but without depending exclusively on it was a well-thought-out element of Nehru’s geopolitics.

190 Brecher, 191 

India and World Politics, 28–31. ‘Foreign Office to Eden’, 14 May 1954, FO 371/112064.

4 Preventing a Sino-American Clash, 1955

India, as she is situated geographically and politically, can be of some service in interpreting some countries to others and thus ­helping to remove misunderstandings. —Jawaharlal Nehru (November 1954) We were from the very beginning against the idea of building up continental compartmentalism if it meant detracting from world unity. —V.K. Krishna Menon (1968)

For Nehru, China was a key component in the emergence of an Asian peace area where non-aligned states could co-exist with a rising China and a dominant America. Such an Asian order was predicated on bringing China into the regional and international system. In September 1954, Nehru told Parliament that there could be ‘no settlement in the Far East or South East Asia’ until the PRC had been recognized. The best ‘assurance of security’ was recognition of China by regional countries and its acceptance into the UN rather than erecting military alliances.1 Such an approach 1 Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946–April 1961 (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961), 91.

Power and Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policies during the Cold War. Zorawar Daulet Singh, Oxford University Press (2019). © Zorawar Daulet Singh. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199489640.003.0005

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was antithetical to America’s Cold War in Asia. If Nehru favoured an indivisible and interdependent notion of regional security, the US sought to preserve its containment strategy and maintain robust military alliances and strategic control over maritime Asia. On its China policy, throughout the 1950s, ‘the Eisenhower administration sought ends so extreme as to defy any notion of calm moderation’.2 Although US–China tensions were not new to Nehru, the crisis in the Formosa Straits was perceived as particularly dangerous because it played out in an area where the prestige and interests of both sides were directly at stake. Also known as the first offshore islands crisis, the 1954–5 Formosa crisis offers another neglected phase to examine Nehru’s peacemaker role and understand his geopolitical vision for a stable Asian order. The crisis has so far been studied from the perspectives of the principal protagonists, with India’s role in averting a major Sino-American conflict having largely been overlooked.3 Considering that we now know that the Eisenhower administration did not possess the deftness or ability to fully control its brinksmanship and more aggressive impulses during this crisis including contemplating the use of nuclear weapons,4 the role of the most crucial third party—India—ought to be taken much more 2 Ronald

W. Pruessen, ‘Over the Volcano: United States and the Taiwan Straits Crisis, 1954–1955’, in Re-examining the Cold War: US– China Diplomacy, 1954–1973, eds Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001), 99. 3  Gordon H. Chang, and He Di, ‘The Absence of War in the U.S.–China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954–1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence’, The American Historical Review 98, no. 5 (December 1993): 1500–24; Bennett C. Rushkoff, ‘Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy–Matsu Crisis, 1954–1955’, Political Science Quarterly 96, no. 3 (Autumn 1981), 465–80; Pruessen, ‘Over the Volcano’, 77–105; Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, eds, Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006); Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese–American Confrontations, 1949–1958, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 4  Pruessen, ‘Over the Volcano’, 93–9.



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seriously for its impact on shaping the course of events. India’s strategy was a logical extension of its role in the first Indochina crisis, namely, to stabilize Asia’s geopolitical status quo and prevent an escalation of a regional crisis into wider instability or a hot war between two great powers or blocs. More broadly, the Formosa crisis is an exemplar case of bridge building and Indian peacemaking, which reflected Nehru’s quest to promote patterns of interaction in East Asia that could sustain a legitimate and stable equilibrium between America and China. Between the fall of 1954 and the summer of 1955, the Western Pacific was on the verge of a major power conflict. In the first phase of the crisis, between September 1954 and April 1955, the prospects of escalation in the Taiwan Straits was perceived by Delhi as a distinct possibility as Washington, Taipei, and Beijing engaged in a process of brinksmanship over several small islands spread across nearly 400 miles on China’s eastern seaboard. Nehru and Menon treaded cautiously but strategically, aware of both the complexity of the issues at stake and the risks of entanglement in an explosive Sino-American dispute. Indian diplomacy during this phase emerged not from a perceived threat to its own security interests—for Formosa was several thousand miles away from the subcontinent—but from Nehru’s peace area image and his approach to Asia’s security order, which was threatened by the prospect of an armed confrontation in the Western Pacific. In the second phase, after the Bandung Conference and Zhou Enlai’s dramatic offer of direct talks with Washington, a posture promoted by India, the crisis moved away from being a military flashpoint in the East China seas to a political and ideological question. Thus, the action shifted from the Taiwan Straits to private and informal diplomatic channels with India assuming a crucial bridging role between two mutually suspicious and antagonistic powers without any direct communication channels. India not only helped reduce regional tension, it also enabled the process, from Zhou Enlai’s 23 April offer to the simultaneous declaration of direct US–China ambassadorial talks in July 1955, to fructify without getting obstructed by either bureaucratic politics in Washington or by miscommunication or misperceptions of either side’s intentions. The c­ onclusion will explore whether Nehru’s

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choices and posture during this period might have been driven by alternative reasons such as extracting economic assistance from the US or by a geostrategy to weaken the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Outbreak of Crisis: Treading Cautiously The Kuomintang (KMT) had formally presented the US with a mutual defence treaty draft by the end of 1953. Ongoing air and naval skirmishes between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and KMT forces, however, had made Washington cautious in formalizing its security commitment. As these incidents subsided, US–KMT negotiations resumed in July 1954. In early August of that year, Chiang Kai-shek moved 58,000 troops to the Quemoy, an island in the Formosa Straits two miles off the PRC island of Amoy, and 12,000 troops to the Matsu islands off the Fujian coast.5 On 3 September, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) batteries opened a heavy artillery barrage on Quemoy. Further PLA bombardments on the next two days were followed by air attacks by the KMT on military targets in and around Amoy.6 The US responded immediately by strengthening its Seventh Fleet over thirty islands under Formosan possession. The situation was compounded by US reconnaissance and probing aerial missions over mainland China with several planes shot down and prisoners taken. In this early stage of the crisis, Delhi assumed a cautious posture gauging the facts and reactions of both sides. In October, the Chinese Foreign Ministry cabled UN Secretary General Hammarskjoeld outlining Beijing’s position on Taiwan and accusing the US of interference and aggressive action in China’s internal affairs. The cable was circulated to delegations in New York, from where Menon reported that India could not take any initiative without laying itself ‘open to great hostility’.7 He explained that voting against the item, which had been proposed by Moscow to be included in the UN Assembly agenda, would embarrass Nehru and antagonize China before the Prime Minister’s upcoming 5 

Swaine and Tuosheng, eds, Managing Sino-American Crises, 253–4. ‘The Broad Policies’, 29 September 1954, SWJN-SS, 26, 327. 7  ‘Menon to Nehru’, 15 October 1954, J.N. Papers, File 290 (Part 2). 6 



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­visit.8 The ‘only middle position’ India could take—of requesting non-interference by outside parties in the Chinese civil war— would be tantamount to ‘rendering inactive the American Fleet in the Formosan Straits’. Menon, hence, suggested a wait and watch posture.9 With Nehru’s upcoming visit to Beijing, a new crisis in the East China seas was hardly conducive to his ambitious peace area policy that had found expression in 1954. Statements by American and Chinese policymakers gave the impression of a warlike situation with Eisenhower himself stating that any attack on Formosa by Communist China would have to ‘run over’ the Seventh Fleet. Some Chinese officials called upon the Red Army to prepare for a ‘holy war’ to liberate Taiwan.10 Nehru’s China visit occurred in this backdrop of a heightening crisis. Mao and other leaders were full of the Taiwan issue in their talks with Nehru. Zhou Enlai was particularly animated and wanted to isolate the US to ‘see that she does not start a war’.11 But Nehru sensed that Beijing understood India’s intervention could not be the same as China’s if India was ‘to help in maintaining peace’.12 He did not, however, offer any advice to the Chinese leadership on tackling the crisis. Meanwhile America strengthened its commitment to Taiwan in the ensuing months. On 23 November, both sides agreed to the terms of their alliance although the US avoided an explicit commitment to the security of the offshore islands.13 The same day, Beijing announced that a Military Tribunal had sentenced thirteen US spies, including eleven airmen, to prison, with their sentence ranging from four years to life imprisonment on charges of ­espionage.14 Eisenhower felt that the timing of the Chinese ­revelation was ‘quite ­deliberate’. Both sides offered their versions

8 

Nehru visited China from 18 to 30 October 1954. to R.K. Nehru’, 17 October 1954, J.N. Papers, File 290 (Part 2). 10  ‘Nehru to R.K. Nehru’, 18 October 1954, SWJN-SS, 27, 206. 11  ‘Nehru–Zhou Enlai Talks’, 20 October 1954, SWJN-SS, 27, 14. 12  ‘Nehru to R.K. Nehru’, 21 October 1954, J.N. Papers, File 291. 13  Swaine and Tuosheng, Managing Sino-American Crises, 255. 14  ‘To Raghavan’, 27 November 1954, SWJN-SS, 27, 210. 9 ‘Menon

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of the facts. The US contended that a B-29 had been shot down over a legitimate combat zone in Korea in January 1953, and its airmen detained against the Korean Armistice Agreement. China stated that there was ‘concrete evidence of crimes’ and alleged that the US airmen were over mainland Manchuria in November 1952 and January 1953 while engaging in a Central Intelligence Agency operation to incite trouble inside China when they had been shot down. Nehru sought to find out the circumstances of the capture of the US airmen.15 The US–Taiwan treaty was finally signed on 3 December 1954, with Dulles declaring ‘any attack on Taiwan by communists would result in a declaration of state of war by the US’.16 The move was quickly denounced by the PRC as ‘open occupation of China’s territory’ by the US. The PLA resumed its artillery shelling on Quemoy.17 The crisis now had all the ingredients for a serious escalation. Nehru had also learnt of a ‘grave situation developing in the US’, where hardliners might weaken Eisenhower’s hands. He ensured that Beijing was made aware of the emotions on the other side.18 But Zhou Enlai’s attitude was ‘one of indifference to American indignation’, indicating that China would not be intimidated or pressured. Had there been a friendlier atmosphere, Zhou remarked, the prisoner issue could have been handled with leniency.19 Then on 6 December, the UN Political Committee took up a US and allied sponsored resolution condemning China’s detention of US airmen and sought the intervention of the UN Secretary General to resolve this issue. Nehru accepted Menon’s advice that India should abstain while showing ‘conciliation to both sides’.20 Although India’s One China

15 

‘To Raghavan’, 27 November 1954, SWJN-SS, 27, 210. ‘To Menon’, 9 December 1954, SWJN-SS, 27, 214. 17  Swaine and Tuosheng, Managing Sino-American Crises, 255. 18 ‘Nehru to Raghavan’, 6 December 1954, J.N. Papers, File 302 (Part 1). 19 ‘Raghavan to Nehru’, 9 December 1954, J.N. Papers, File 302 (Part 2). 20  ‘Menon to Nehru’, 7 December 1954, J.N. Papers, File 302 (Part 2). ‘To Menon’, 7 December 1954, SWJN-SS, 27, 213. 16 



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policy was no secret, Nehru was anxious to maintain India’s impartiality. After all, any evolving peacemaker role in this crisis would depend on the credibility of India’s reputation as a trusted conciliator. But the intensity of mutual Sino-American recriminations had so far provided little opening for a viable response on India’s part. Interestingly, there is no evidence of Nehru drifting into a role because of India’s recent bonhomie with China or tilting in a kneejerk fashion against the US. Nehru and Menon were adhering to the basic function that underlay India’s peacemaker role: to promote a stable geopolitical status quo in East Asia. Nehru’s peace area concept was intrinsically linked with and could only be sustained if there were stable patterns of interaction and a modicum of East–West stability in the extended neighbourhood. For this, India could be a credible bridge builder in the tension reduction process. Menon’s definition of the crisis reflected such images. The dispute was essentially one between two great powers and could only be resolved ‘on a plane of equality’. He also conjectured whether China’s underlying calculus on the prisoner crisis was linked to a general policy of seeking diplomatic relations with the US. But Menon also expressed little hope of the US according diplomatic recognition although ‘trade and unofficial relations’ were well ‘within the range of practicability’. And even this was ‘bound up with some ­solution of the prisoners question and some give and take on the issue’.21 Yet, given the strength of resolve and commitment to core interests and principles on both sides, Nehru’s main goal for the moment was to dissuade Beijing from overplaying its hand. Although India disagreed with a UN role in the Formosa crisis because of the biased nature of the initial 6 December appeal by the Western powers,22 it acceded to a request by Hammarskjoeld to use Indian influence with China without directly associating in 21 

‘Menon to Nehru’, 2 January 1955, J.N. Papers, File 308. irritable Nehru remarked, ‘I find it incomprehensible how the UN can condemn a nation in a one-sided way as they have done.’ ‘Nehru to Pillai’, 18 December 1954, J.N. Papers, File 305. 22  An

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that effort.23 Menon urged Delhi to avoid any peacemaking actions through the UN and instead retain its independent role, which may ‘be more effective at a later stage’.24 Zhou Enlai accepted Indian advice and kept the door open by receiving Hammarskjoeld.25 In the event, the latter’s mission to persuade Beijing to make concessions on the US airmen issue ended in a total failure. Meanwhile the situation in the East China seas appeared ominous. On 10 January 1955, Beijing resumed its artillery shelling of the Tachen islands, 200 miles north of Formosa, in their largest attack since the outbreak of the crisis. A week later, the Chinese also made dramatic territorial gains by suddenly capturing the Yijiangshan islands, just 10 miles north of Tachen, when a PLA force of 4,000 overran 1,000 KMT troops who had been positioned to defend the island.26 In response, US policymakers quickly increased their strategic commitment to the area. In order to signal resolve, on 24 January, Eisenhower sought a US Congressional authorization to back up the Taiwan Treaty should a scenario arise. Both houses of US Congress passed the ‘Formosa Resolution’ on 29 January, providing the White House with the option to use force in the defence of Formosa.27 This was also accompanied by a re-deployment and greater concentration of US naval assets in the Formosa area. The US meant business.

23 Menon had advised that the Chinese ‘should agree to receive Hammarskjoeld’ because a refusal ‘would only assist China’s enemies and embarrass her friends’. ‘Discussions on the International Situation’, 29 December 1954, SWJN-SS, 27, 116. The UN Secretary General also sought a collaborative mission by seeking to include an Indian official in his China visit. ‘Arthur Lall to Nehru’, 11 December 1954, J.N. Papers, File 303. 24  ‘Menon to Nehru’, 12 December 1954, J.N. Papers, File 303. 25  ‘To Zhou Enlai’, 12 December 1954, SWJN-SS, 27, 215–16. ‘Raghavan to Nehru’, 17 December 1954, J.N. Papers, File 305. 26 ‘Telephone conversation between Eisenhower and Dulles’, 18 January 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 167–9. Rushkoff, ‘Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy–Matsu Crisis, 1954–1955’, 469. 27  ‘To Indira Gandhi’, 1 February 1955, SWJN-SS, 28, 159.



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For the first time, Nehru perceived a grave danger to regional security. ‘[W]e are facing today a somewhat explosive situation’ where ‘the US and China have both officially and publicly adopted policies which are wholly opposed to each other’ and ‘there is not much room for any kind of a compromise’.28 While Nehru did not think that war was inevitable, the reluctance on the part of the British, Canadians, and Australians to break ranks with Washington seemed to offer little hope of a multilateral peacemaking venture. Nehru departed for London for a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting wary that crisis in the Western Pacific could gravely undermine the embryonic peace area that India had so zealously promoted over the preceding year.

Exploring a Peacemaking Role On 31 January 1955, the UNSC by a 9-to-1 vote decided to invite PRC officials to discuss a ceasefire in the Formosan Straits.29 But the Chinese quickly rejected this US-backed invitation.30 The ‘general feeling of shock and surprise’ at China’s rejection of the UN’s invitation was not shared by Nehru.31 After all, it was consistent with the PRC’s core principle to project itself as the sole legitimate regime that could represent the new China. With both Hammarskjoeld’s initiative and the latest UNSC attempt to invite a mainland Chinese representative to New York failing to attract Beijing’s attention, Nehru sensed an opening for India to defuse the crisis. 28 

‘To Chief Minister’, 26 January 1955, SWJN-SS, 27, 572–3. Invited to Attend Debate on Formosa’, Times of India, 2 February 1955. 30  Zhou blamed the US for ‘further aggravating the tensions in the Far East’, and stated that the UN resolution was an intervention in China’s ‘internal affairs’ and it was ‘intolerable’ that the PRC is ‘still deprived of its legitimate position and rights in the UN’, while the KMT continued to ‘usurp the position of representing China in the UN’. ‘China Rejects UN Intervention’, Times of India, 4 February 1955. 31  ‘Most Premiers Shocked by Peking Stand’, Times of India, 5 February 1955. 29 ‘China

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Incoming assessments from Indian envoys in Washington and Beijing convinced Nehru that peacemaking was, despite all the surrounding rhetoric, actually a viable prospect. G.L. Mehta, the envoy in Washington, argued that while the strength of American resolve on maintaining control over Formosa was quite strong, there was also a consensus that the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu lay beyond US responsibility and were probably being held as bargaining leverage to negotiate a ceasefire with Beijing. US debates on the crisis also revealed a deep fear of another Asian war. Eisenhower had reassured senators that the White House would retain the authority to use force in scenarios that went beyond the self-defence of Formosa. Mehta suggested that ‘advantage should be taken of this shift in US policy towards China’. On the offshore islands there was ‘every chance for a conciliatory attitude and satisfactory settlement’.32 A pragmatic modus vivendi that stabilized the status quo while deferring the question of Formosa’s international status would be acceptable to the US.33 Raghavan too felt that Beijing’s attitude was a combination of resolve and pragmatism. Zhou had remarked that if provoked with military conflict, China would ‘fight till the end. We mean what we say.’ But he also added that Washington should ‘directly negotiate with China’ since the US was the only legitimate interlocutor on the other side of the Formosa Straits. On the whole, there were ‘no war like preparations visible’ and Beijing still preferred a negotiated settlement to the crisis.34 Clearly, both sides sought some kind of stabilization of the status quo while preserving their basic rights, principles, and strategic interests. Such an outcome would be consistent with Nehru’s quest for a stable and sustainable Asian order. The priority for the moment was avoiding an unintended military

32  Mehta’s

assessment as it turns out was too optimistic. Dulles and Eisenhower, as we now know, had no intention of letting Communist China gain control over the major offshore islands like Quemoy and Matsu. ‘Dulles–Makins Conversation, 21 January 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). 33  ‘G.L. Mehta to Pillai’, 1 February 1955, J.N. Papers, File 318. 34  ‘Raghavan to Nehru’, 6 February 1955, J.N. Papers, File 318.



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e­ scalation. ‘Not to do anything’ would ‘allow matters to drift to war’. Neither was it practical, Nehru noted, to ask the US to withdraw completely. ‘No great power can act in that way.’ He wanted Zhou to suggest an approach that retained China’s rights and yet enabled ‘some progress to be made’.35 He also assured the US Ambassador to London that ‘he would do everything in his power to be helpful’.36 Since the offshore islands were the only potential flashpoint, Nehru encouraged a separation of military forces there. He informed Zhou that while India would try and exercise its influence both directly with the US and through Canada and Britain to encourage restraint near the coastal islands and to restrain Chiang Kai Shek, Beijing also had to support this process by avoiding provocative actions during the evacuation of the islands.37 This was consistent with Nehru’s prior images. As in the Indochina crisis, he did not passively rely on the balance of power mechanism to maintain peace and security. Rather, an active effort was necessary to prevent both parties from engaging in a tit-for-tat escalation that spiralled out of control because of a miscalculation. India strove to ensure that the US–China security dilemma remained as muted as possible. Indeed, the potential for a serious escalation became evident when US planes shot down two MiG jets over North Korea, incorrectly reported to be Chinese jets, on 6 February. The same day KMT’s evacuation of the Tachen islands, 200 miles north of Formosa, commenced with US assistance.38 Fortunately, Zhou had told Delhi that despite provocations by the Seventh Fleet, the Chinese would tacitly cooperate in this evacuation process.39 Nehru passed on this reassuring message to Eden for the benefit of the Americans.40 Although brinksmanship in

35 

‘To Raghavan’, 4 February 1955, SWJN-SS, 28, 162–3. to Department of State’, 3 February 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). 37  ‘To Raghavan’, 5 February 1955, SWJN-SS, 28, 164. 38  ‘The Word from Peiping: No Deal on Formosa’, New York Times, 13 February 1955. 39  ‘Raghavan to Nehru’, 8 February 1955, J.N. Papers, File 318. 40  ‘Nehru to Eden’, 8 February 1955, SWJN-SS, 28, 166. 36 ‘Aldrich

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the East China Sea continued, Beijing did not provoke an incident ­during the Tachen evacuation.41 Nehru now set his sights on more ambitious goals. In his last dispatch to Raghavan before departing from London, Nehru outlined a range of outcomes to resolve the East Asian crisis: ‘(a) secure coastal islands for China (about which there is less ­difficulty), (b) bring about … atleast first stages of negotiation, direct or indirect, (c) prevent United States from committing herself more and more, (d) press for recognition of Beijing as Government of China.’ On Formosa itself, Nehru argued for maintaining a de facto position without China sacrificing ‘any vital principle’. He hoped that China would assist Indian endeavours.42 These were clearly formidable peacemaking goals, ranging from the tactical to the political. But it was not apparent how such negotiations would even emerge. Any prospect of Geneva-style conference diplomacy was ruled out because of the irreconcilable East–West positions on Taiwan’s status. Both Moscow and Beijing had made it abundantly clear that Chiang Kai Shek’s presence on any conference table was simply not acceptable given the One China principle.43 For Washington and London, the position was diametrically opposite. London rejected a Soviet suggestion for a multilateral conference, which did not include representation of the KMT regime.44 Even if bridging such a divide was unrealistic, both Nehru and Menon sought to keep the ball rolling and East–West communication channels open. Keeping the British and Soviets ‘involved in ­conciliatory moves’ would prevent a vacuum from emerging, which Menon feared could be replaced by ‘non-cooperative approaches’. He also advocated reaching out to Washington, who should not be left out of Indian ‘endeavours of exercising influence’ for ‘it would be an error to think that we are totally ineffective in the exercise of such influence directly’.45 41 

‘Raghavan to Nehru’, 8 February 1955, J.N. Papers, File 318. ‘To Raghavan’, 10 February 1955, SWJN-SS, 28, 169–70. 43  ‘P.N. Kaul to Nehru’, 15 February 1955, J.N. Papers, File 319 (Part 1). 44 ‘British Foreign Office Cable to Molotov’, 10 February 1955, J.N. Papers, File 318. 45  ‘Menon to Nehru’, 11 February 1955, J.N. Papers, File 319 (Part 1). 42 



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Despite their optimism, both Nehru and Menon must have realized that neither London nor Moscow was able or willing to moderate the postures of their allies. For the Russians, it was not for want of leverage but reluctance to interfere on a deeply sensitive question that lay at the core of Beijing’s sovereignty and nationhood. London too could not break ranks with Washington on this issue.46 With little hope for an end to the deadlock, Nehru felt the upcoming Bandung Conference in April had acquired critical importance in the context of the Formosa crisis. But on a fundamental question, Nehru had no doubt: it was no longer possible to isolate or contain China.47 Getting the Americans, however, to see East Asia through Nehru’s image would stretch Menon’s persuasive capabilities to another level. On 21 February, Dulles toured the Far East to strengthen America’s allied commitments. The Secretary of State’s statements after his Asian tour revealed that the US approach to the crisis was still one dominated by aggressive brinksmanship. Publicly warning Beijing that the US was no ‘paper tiger’, Dulles even implied the use of tactical nuclear weapons to solve the Formosa crisis through ‘new and powerful weapons of precision, which can utterly destroy military targets without endangering unrelated civilian centers’.48 Eisenhower later recalled that at this stage there was ‘an even chance’ that the US might have to fight a war in the Formosa Straits.49 London immediately suggested a compromise after a period of tight coordination with Washington in the preceding months. Eden, who had just returned from Delhi as part of an East Asian tour, suggested a policy shift by stating that London would like to see the KMT ‘withdraw their armed forces from the other coastal islands (Quemoy and Matsu)’.50 Eden

46 

‘Middleton to Pillai’, 17 December 1954, J.N. Papers, File 305. ‘To Chief Minister’, 23 February 1955, SWJN-SS, 28, 567–9. 48  Elie Abel, ‘Dulles Warns Red China: Force will Meet Force’, New York Times, 9 March 1955. 49 Rushkoff, ‘Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy–Matsu Crisis, 1954–1955,’ 475. 50 ‘Kuomintang Asked to Quit Offshore Islands’, Times of India, 9 March 1955. 47 

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urged a settlement based on concessions from both sides, leading to discussions on China’s representation in the UN.51 It was in such a fluid context that Menon visited Washington in mid-March hoping to establish a direct rapport with the US leadership. Menon had been sceptical before his meeting with Eisenhower.52 Sure enough, neither Formosa nor the China question came up.53 On the same day, the new US posture was announced. While maintaining ambiguity on US commitment to the offshore islands, a major communist move aimed at the capture of Taiwan, Dulles declared, would involve a US intervention of ‘sea and air forces equipped with small and precise nuclear weapons’.54 Eisenhower repeated this threat in a press conference the following day: ‘In any combat where these things [tactical nuclear weapons] can be used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn’t be used just as you would use a bullet or anything else.’55 Clearly, deterring a PRC move against Formosa was at the top of America’s priority. But a limited nuclear war was a fallacy, and Menon feared a global conflagration.56 51 Drew

Middleton, ‘Eden Offers Compromise’, New York Times, 9 March 1955. 52 Menon had confided to Nehru, ‘The problem [with the Formosan issue] is today not so much the discovery of formulae, or even the prospects of final settlement, but of reaching, somehow, the basic peace sentiments…. To ignore American sentiment … is today unrealistic’. ‘To Menon’, 20 March 1955, SWJN-SS, 28, 176. 53 Eisenhower-Menon meeting, Washington, 16 March 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). 54 Elie Abel, ‘Dulles Says U.S. Pins Retaliation on Small A-Bomb’, New York Times, 16 March 1955. 55  Pruessen, ‘Over the Volcano’, 98–9. 56  One Op-Ed noted, ‘there are no really new missiles or other precision means of delivery available in the Far East’. And ‘many of the Chinese Communist military installations are close to large cities’. Hanson W. Baldwin, ‘The Dulles Report: An Analysis of 4 Major Points Made by the Secretary to Impress the Asians’, New York Times, 10 March 1955. Other commentators argued that the use of tactical nuclear warheads would escalate to the use of more powerful bombs with the distinction between such weapons collapsing with the outbreak of hostilities. ‘The World: The



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Dulles’s belligerence, endorsed by the President himself, sounded eerily reminiscent of US nuclear threats prior to the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in March 1954. Privately too, Dulles expressed his conviction that ‘atomic weapons were the only effective weapons, which the United States could use against a variety of mainland targets, particularly against Chinese Communist airfields which they would use against Formosa, against key railroad lines, and gun emplacements’. Dulles’s public statements advocating the virtues of tactical nuclear weapons were aimed at shaping domestic public opinion, which might inhibit ‘the use of these weapons’.57 Menon feared that ‘ideas of limited war and controlled atomic action’ had now ‘passed beyond the sphere of psychological warfare’.58 For Washington, the question of its Formosa alliance in the East China Sea was simply not open for bargaining. But Delhi was not advocating any de facto change in the regional status quo. What it sought was some kind of a modus vivendi between the two protagonists. And bridge building is precisely what Menon attempted in his encounter with the formidable Dulles. The White House, Dulles remarked, ‘had obtained a commitment from Chiang Kai-shek that the latter would not undertake military operations against the mainland without American concurrence’. But the US had also made it equally clear that communist Chinese military action against Taiwan ‘would be resisted’. The onus of ‘war or peace’ was on communist China, a country, Dulles described, as the greatest danger to the world at the moment. Menon retorted that while American public opinion was admittedly unprepared for an early solution to the Formosa problem, progress could only be made through direct if informal contact between Washington and Beijing. For this, a third party ‘might be useful’. Menon also referred to the issue of imprisoned US airmen and Chinese students in America who desired to return to the PRC. Despite Dulles’s rhetoric and fear of a communist expansion in the Taiwan Straits, Menon felt that Washington actually Tactical Bomb’, New York Times, 20 March 1955; Joseph Alsop, ‘Matter of Fact … Keeping them Guessing’, The Washington Post, 23 March 1955. 57  ‘NSC Meeting’, 10 March 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). 58  ‘Menon to Nehru’, 23 March 1955, J.N. Papers, File 328.

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desired a military de-escalation of the crisis. He certainly felt confident enough to tell Assistant Secretary Allen after the conversation that regional tensions would be relaxed if ‘people could be brought together and start talking’.59 American interest had been evoked, particularly on Menon’s hint on an implied reciprocity on the US prisoner issue. A few days later, Allen reached out to Menon disclosing that the Chinese nationals issue was being actively considered and an announcement could occur within a week to allow desirous Chinese residing in the US to return to the mainland.60 Encouraged by this small opening, Menon advised that Zhou Enlai be urged to release some US prisoners. It ‘would not only enhance Chinese prestige and emphasize her desires for peace’ but could ‘also open some way to further peace efforts’. Such a ‘unilateral act of grace’, would impact American public opinion, which was already apprehensive of war and looked ‘to face-saving devices for disentanglement’.61 But Raghavan assessed that the Chinese would not react sympathetically as the atmosphere was ‘one of silent anger’. There was also an impression that India had ‘more or less fallen in with Britain since Eden’s visit’.62 This was, of course, patently false. India’s independent posture was apparent to all, Nehru retorted, even if it ‘is not our habit to shout needlessly’.63 Ironically, although outwardly aggressive the Americans had thrown enough private hints to Menon that they were open to some kind of forward movement with Beijing, even if it was for tactical transactions like a de facto local ceasefire or repatriation of prisoners. But the Chinese were still locked in an intransigent position on Formosa, and it was not until the Bandung Conference that their posture would soften. India, again, would play a crucial role in influencing a constructive posture from Beijing. 59  ‘Dulles–Menon

Conversation, Washington’, 24 March 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). 60  ‘Dulles–Menon Conversation, Washington’, 24 March 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). 61  ‘Menon to Nehru’, 27 March 1955, J.N. Papers, File 329 (Part 2). 62  ‘To Raghavan’, 29 March 1955, SWJN-SS, 28, 178. 63  ‘To Raghavan’, 29 March 1955, SWJN-SS, 28, 178.



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Nehru’s Area of Peace Versus America’s Strategy of Containment The intersection of the Bandung Conference and the Formosa crisis, a link that was strategically leveraged by Nehru to advance his peace area concept, is typically severed from existing Indian ­narratives.64 But the fact is Nehru’s outlook leading up to the Bandung Conference was strongly shaped by the East Asian crisis. While India’s leverage on America’s Asia policy was limited, 64 Curiously,

even the editors of the Selected Works (SWJN-SS, 28, 179) have omitted both the backdrop and the complete minutes of Nehru’s conversation with Zhou where they discussed the Formosa crisis and Zhou accepted the logic of publicizing China’s offer for direct talks with America. Again, this perhaps goes to a point made in the Introduction: Indian historiography on this period is so deeply coloured by the subsequent Sino-Indian dispute and conflict that Nehru’s peacemaker role evokes an embarrassing interlude that is better forgotten than understood. Gopal too understates the Nehru–Menon role conception and instead retrospectively exaggerates the notion of India– China competition at Bandung. For example, Gopal notes that Zhou Enlai ‘was not influenced by such infantile notions as friendship or a sense of obligation. Convinced that each country was utterly alone in the world … he had no qualms about acting to weaken India’s position.’ Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Volume 2: 1947–1956 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1977), 241–4. Historians have picked up this rivalry thesis too. John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 119. For a rebuttal on Gopal’s retrospective narrative, see Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), 54–9. Recent archival work in China too suggests that Chinese images and interests in the mid-1950s were more complex than suggested by post-1962 Indian historiography of that period. Shu Guang Zhang, ‘Constructing “Peaceful Coexistence”: China’s Diplomacy toward the Geneva and Bandung Conferences, 1954–55’, Cold War History 7, no. 4 (2007): 509–28. Gregg A. Brazinsky, Winning the Third World: SinoAmerican Rivalry During the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 75–131.

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Nehru believed that India’s equation with the Chinese regime was not insignificant to influence the course of events. India’s role at the Bandung Conference in many ways exemplified Nehru’s image of indivisible security and his attempt to expand the peace area in Asia. Bandung was not only about enhancing engagement between China and non-aligned Asia but also about opening the door to China’s engagement with America. India’s strategy was predicated on simultaneously advancing both these goals. The opening to non-aligned states had made an important advance during the Indochina crisis. In order to contain the Formosa crisis, Nehru and Menon now attempted to address the second aspect of their peace area concept—the stabilization of Sino-American relations in East Asia. On the sidelines of Bandung, Menon engaged in two long talks with Zhou Enlai where they discussed the entire Formosa question, including Menon’s impressions from his US visit and the ‘conflicting forces of peace and conflict at work’, which were ‘both gaining momentum’. The priority, Menon argued, ‘was to bring about the beginnings of a contact’, even if there was ‘no rapprochement’. Zhou seemed to ‘welcome direct talks’. They also discussed the possible path to Sino-American contact, which would be based on preconditions that established a climate of trust. This could be created by a ‘disposition to negotiate’, tangible ‘acts which could lower tension’, and ‘use of avenues of conciliation by both sides, which would serve to bridge rather than widen gaps’. Menon also emphasized the importance of the prisoner issue and tried to ­convince Zhou ‘about rallying changing middle way opinion in the US and the world and of making disentanglement more and more the public desire’. He also discovered that Beijing recognized the impossibility of liberating Formosa. Zhou ‘did not hesitate to admit that 100 miles of water made all the difference’. Overall, Zhou was sufficiently enthused in keeping the ball rolling and invited Menon for further talks in Beijing.65 Even if the Chinese had approached the Bandung Conference with changing intentions, partly shaped by the result of a more cautious military

65 

‘Menon to Nehru’, 27 April 1955, J.N. Papers, File 340.



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posture from the US and Chiang Kai Shek in the Formosa area,66 Menon was cultivating this emerging position in a constructive direction rather than passively leaving events to settle in an unstable equilibrium or a deadlock. Nehru’s subsequent talks with Zhou Enlai on 23 April would build on this optimistic note. Nehru suggested that the release of US airmen would have a positive effect on American opinion and urged Zhou not to play into the hands of hardliners such as Dulles and Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by any further brinksmanship in the East China seas. US opinion was not so aggressive as earlier and Eisenhower had been restraining Chiang Kai Shek and the ‘hot-heads’ in his administration by preventing war on at least two occasions in the past few months. But there was also unanimity, Nehru noted, on the defence of Formosa and the military balance in the East China Sea was strongly in America’s favour.67 Nehru was seeking to dispel any misperceptions in the Chinese mind on US position and resolve in the Western Pacific. This is consistent with Nehru’s prior images and approach to muting security dilemmas. The balance of power process was unreliable because neither side could properly gauge the interests and intentions of the adversary and thus typically engaged in security-seeking behaviour that ran the risk of miscalculation. In Nehru’s images, the game was simply not worth the candle. In addition, India’s role was seen as ­crucial in nudging geopolitical choices in a direction that maintained regional stability and the basic strategic interests of opposing powers. The conversation also revealed Nehru preserving India’s unique bridging link and limiting any opening for Pakistan in the process. Pakistan’s Mohammad Ali had pounced on the opportunity

66  When

Nehru enquired about the extent of US and KMT naval and air activity around China’s coastal areas in recent weeks, Zhou observed that ‘[o]n the whole’, there ‘had been a lessening’ of ‘provocation’ in the East China seas. ‘Nehru to Menon and Subimal Dutt’, 23 April 1955, J.N. Papers, File 338. 67 ‘Nehru to Menon and Subimal Dutt’, 23 April 1955, J.N. Papers, File 338.

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when Zhou revealed that China was willing to engage in talks with the US directly or through an intermediary. Nehru, however, persuaded Zhou to make his posture known via a public statement at Bandung to avoid any misinterpretation. Thus followed Zhou’s famous 23 April statement.68 Was Nehru also thinking in balance of power terms? Certainly, he did not relish any kind of normalization between China and Pakistan.69 In fact, Nehru and Zhou had exchanged frank perspectives on Pakistan in their interaction the previous year and had expressed a shared attitude to US intrusion in their common neighbourhood.70 But insofar as widening the network of peacemakers was concerned, Nehru did not believe even other non-aligned states could seriously play such a role. Although Burma and Indonesia were important members of an Asian peace area, it was ultimately India that had the status, size, and geopolitical position to enact a credible bridging role between the two blocs without getting pulled or pushed in either direction. Nehru also sought to keep the UN at bay, suggesting to Zhou that 68 ‘Nehru

to Menon and Subimal Dutt’, 23 April 1955, J.N. Papers, File 338. 69  Zhou Enlai had invited Mohammad Ali to visit Beijing. Washington discouraged Ali from accepting the invitation. ‘Dulles to Embassy in Pakistan’, 30 April 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). 70  Note, for example the following October 1954 exchange in Beijing. Zhou: ‘America is trying to create a fear which does not exist … it is trying to encourage Pakistan to expand. I spoke many times to Pakistan Ambassador here…. I told them that they will suffer by allying themselves with Britain and the US. It is good for them if they unite with India. And I also told the same thing to our Indian friends…. Acceptance of American aid and opposition to an area of peace would have unfavourable effect on Asia as also on Indo-Pakistan relations. I explained this several times to them but it seems difficult to make them understand.’ Nehru: ‘Pakistan has become virtually a colony of the US. There are thousands of Americans in Pakistan today and it depends on America for everything.’ ‘Nehru–Zhou Enlai Conversation’, 20 October 1954, SWJN-SS, 27, 12–13. At Bandung too Nehru noted that ‘Pakistan and some others were creating every kind of difficulty’ for China during the conference discussions, which had ‘irritated’ Zhou. ‘Nehru to Edwina Mountbatten’, 30 April 1955, SWJN-SS, 28, 142.



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US strategy to use the UN in the Formosa crisis was to ensure the conformity of its western allies such as England and Canada. If there was any balance of power thinking it is not borne out by Nehru’s other choices. Zhou Enlai had proposed providing for some kind of organizational expression to the Afro-Asian powers in the form of a ‘Liaison Office’ or ‘Joint Secretariat’ for future conferences. But Nehru was not receptive to this idea of formalizing the Bandung structure,71 a choice again consistent with the peace area image that rejected any bloc or Third Force connotation to it. Indeed, he was pleased that the Bandung declaration was ‘receiving praise from the USA as well as the Soviet Union and China’72 and did not want to send a signal to the West that India was formally teaming up with China in an expanding nonaligned group of countries. The ‘New Asia’, as Menon explained, was ‘not animated by any continental compartmentalism’.73 India had ‘viewed world problems with a sense of responsibility and moderation’74 and its approach had ‘not been characterized by any race hatred or anti-West attitudes’. Nehru felt this was ‘true also of the Chinese delegation’.75 For Nehru, China’s participation at Bandung had enhanced Asian security by creating an atmosphere of coexistence in the region, which in itself was a powerful diplomatic response to the impulse for containment and treaty expansion from the US. Nehru’s approach during the previous Indochina crisis had also revealed such a pattern of behaviour. Bandung was

71 

‘Nehru to Menon and Dutt’, 23 April 1955, J.N. Papers, File 338. ‘Nehru to Edwina Mountbatten’, 30 April 1955, SWJN-SS, 28, 142. 73 ‘Menon’s Draft for Nehru’s Letter to Eden’, 29 April 1955, J.N. Papers, File 341. Even later, Menon would observe, ‘we were from the very beginning against the idea of building up continental compartmentalism if it meant detracting from world unity’. Brecher, India and World Politics, 52. 74  The Bandung Conference, Nehru told Lord Home, had ‘viewed world problems with a sense of responsibility and moderation, and with a view to finding a common approach to them despite the differences in ideology and national characteristics of those present’. ‘Nehru to Lord Home’, 29 April 1955, J.N. Papers, File 341. 75  ‘Nehru to Eden’, 29 April 1955, J.N. Papers, File 341. 72 

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perceived through his prior image of indivisible security and as a step towards softening the East–West fault line in Asia. Zhou Enlai’s dramatic public offer at Bandung for direct bilateral talks with the US to ‘discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East’ and especially in the Formosa area was in a large measure also a reflection of India’s constructive role from the outset of the crisis.76 Three days after Zhou’s statement, the State Department issued an official acceptance of Beijing’s offer. On 26 April, Dulles told reporters that although he was not sure of the sincerity of Beijing’s offer, Washington planned ‘to try to find out’.77 Eisenhower stated that the US would be willing ‘to talk with Red China about a Formosa cease-fire and anything else not affecting Nationalist China’s own affairs’.78 Back in Delhi, Nehru immediately signalled India’s commitment to the next phase. It was imperative, he told Parliament, to bridge the Sino-American gulf, and India had the ‘advantage of being friendly to both sides in this dispute’. Nehru confirmed that Menon would proceed to Beijing to continue talks on this issue after Zhou Enlai’s invitation.79 Before departing for China, Menon tried to shape US thinking. He told the US envoy that Beijing’s attitude was not new, and that he had previously told Dulles that the Chinese would negotiate. India was willing to offer its good offices but, regardless of a request, would continue its bridge-making efforts and explore the flexibility of Beijing’s position. As a first step, Menon suggested an initial two-month exploratory period to ascertain whether both parties would accept the idea of negotiations. This could be followed by reciprocal tension reduction actions by both sides, such as releasing each other’s nationals and restraining tactical military activities in the Formosa Straits. Reassuring the American official on India’s bonafides, Menon repeatedly asserted that India’s

76 ‘Zhou

Asks for US Talks on Easing Formosa Crisis’, New York Times, 24 April 1955. ‘Texts of Address and Statement by Zhou at the Bandung Conference’, New York Times, 25 April 1955. 77 Victor S. Kaufman, Confronting Communism: US and British Policies toward China (London: University of Missouri Press, 2001), 94. 78  ‘Murphy to Dulles’, 29 April 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). 79 Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 279.



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approach was unbiased and hoped the conversation would be brought to the personal attention of Eisenhower.80 Armed with his bridge-building ideas Menon proceeded to Beijing. Previously inaccessible, the transcript of Menon–Zhou conversations exemplifies all the underlying images upon which India’s peacemaker role was built.81 Menon interpreted India’s interests and goals in terms of the peace area and explained the dual aspect of the concept—the imperative of East–West geopolitical stability in Asia and the quest for ‘a greater unity of Asia’. He warned Zhou about Dulles’s focus on the Far East and ‘an attempt to create a rift between Chinese and Russians’. The main reason for India’s concern and peacemaking attempts was to counteract the expansion of the Cold War apparatus in Asia: ‘[I]f the whole of the diplomatic and such other strength of the US are concentrated in this direction and if we permit this concentration diplomatically, then the prospect of conflict is greater.’ Menon also reassured that India was a credible bridge.82 Menon then sought to persuade Zhou in exploring a method of negotiation that could juggle the complexity of the Formosa issue, an approach that could find common ground without sacrificing principles or prestige. He urged Zhou to imagine an adapted Chinese position that did not end in a deadlock for the other side. ‘We must try to seek an advance in the process of negotiations’, which compelled the Americans ‘to recede from their positions’. While lowering tension was a shared endeavour, Menon suggested that it sometimes needed ‘unilateral actions’ to initiate a process of tacit reciprocity. Given that the relative military balance in the Formosa area was in America’s favour, Menon advocated a realistic position where Chinese unity could be established by means

80 

‘Cooper to State Department’, 1 May 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). had six sessions of talks with Zhou in Beijing from 12 May to 20 May 1955. Menon also met Mao once during this visit. A detailed transcript of all the conversations is enclosed in J.N. Papers, File 347 (Part 2). 82  ‘Too many cooks in this, too many people round about, who all urge solution may create bad impression’. ‘Menon–Zhou Interview 1’, 12 May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 347 (Part 2). 81  Menon

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that excluded ‘military conquest’. When Zhou retorted that a stalemated status quo would not necessarily lead to escalation and war in the Formosa Straits, Menon’s response is instructive. He invoked the experience of Korea when Chinese signals to deter US intervention had failed. Washington ‘did not believe’ Indian warnings and escalated the bombing to the Yalu river. Even in Indochina, Menon argued, US adventurism could have produced a dangerous escalation despite the logic of an adverse military situation on the ground. Thus, ‘the forces of peace or no war by themselves are not sufficiently strong and we have got to win these forces by throwing an ounce of peace on this side’.83 As we have seen earlier, this was a quintessential part of Nehru’s image of order and security. The balance of power concept as a regulator for order was unreliable and required active peacemaking to swing the balance towards stability. The conversation probably shaped internal Chinese deliberations because the very next day, on 13 May, Beijing signalled a new moderate position when Zhou Enlai made an important policy statement during a meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress: ‘The Chinese people have two possible means of liberating Taiwan—namely, by war, or by peaceful means. The Chinese people are willing to strive for the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means as far as this is possible.’ The White House took immediate notice. Dulles was sufficiently enthused for he told Eisenhower, ‘This is, I think, significant.’84 Although Menon sought to preserve India’s unique bridging link, there is no evidence of him seeking to exploit a peacemaker role for narrow security or material advantages. For instance, when Zhou enquired whether India could play the role of looking after Chinese interests in America not merely for a particular issue but on a general basis, Menon’s response was instructive: ‘we should not interpose a third party in direct negotiations and build up indirect relationships’ because that would keep the two primary parties apart and a ‘certain separation is maintained’. He also kept the British in the picture: ‘it is better to have two governments which 83 ‘Menon–Zhou Interview 1’, 12 May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 347 (Part 2). 84  ‘Dulles to Eisenhower’, 18 May 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China).



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are related to the two sides, for example, the British and the Indian, one closely related to the US and the other to China. Instead of each one working for one side, it should be for them to work together so that there will not be so much of division.’85 Again, this was another manifestation of Nehru’s image of indivisible security. The end goal for Menon was a Sino-American rapprochement. But the first stage of the process had to address ‘the lowering of tensions’. For this, some ‘dramatic action’ was required on the US prisoner issue, a concession that Menon argued involved only a potential upside.86 Once an atmosphere for talks has been created, both the US and China could enter a kind of standstill period where the guns would be silenced. Menon urged China to take the initiative and bargain over steps to increase geopolitical stability without compromising its sovereign principles and rights to Formosa. But Zhou found it difficult to accept the logic of a ‘standstill period’, which had no assured linkage of being followed by Sino-American negotiations. He feared that stabilizing the situation would only strengthen the US position in the Formosa area without the prospect of reciprocal benefits for China. Nevertheless, for Menon, relaxation of tension was a necessary and preparatory step to exploring negotiations. Even if nothing concrete emerged, Menon asserted, it could not ‘weaken the Chinese position either psychologically or politically or militarily’. He insisted that SinoAmerican communication had a value in itself.87 Ultimately, Zhou Enlai accepted Menon’s suggestion to take an initial step towards de-escalation by abstaining from the use of force while this ‘first stage’ of the process was evolving. He also agreed to release four US airmen and endorsed Menon’s role as a ‘go-between’ during this peacemaking process.88 On the whole,

85 ‘Menon–Zhou

Interview 2’, 15 (Part 2). 86 ‘Menon–Zhou Interview 2’, 15 (Part 2). 87 ‘Menon–Zhou Interview 3’, 18 (Part 2). 88 ‘Menon–Zhou Interview 4’, 19 (Part 2).

May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 347 May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 347 May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 347 May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 347

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the Chinese had indicated they were prepared to meet the US halfway on East Asian security by making ‘substantial contributions’ for a peaceful approach. They would adjust their posture towards a peaceful liberation of Taiwan but without any compromise on their basic principle. The way forward, Menon felt, would depend ‘on attitude of other side and their recognition that progress made is of substance’.89 Satisfied with the visit, Nehru cabled Eisenhower and Dulles alluding to the progress that had been achieved of which the release of the four US airmen was ‘a first step’ and ‘a contribution to easing tension’. He hoped informal conversations could commence in Washington to continue the progress.90 Appreciating India’s ‘kind offices’, Eisenhower and Dulles expressed willingness to receive Menon in Washington for informal talks.91 On 31 May, China released four US airmen in Hong Kong, evoking a positive reaction from the US State Department.92

Persuading the Americans In a series of meetings with the US President and Secretary of State in mid-June, Menon could not make progress beyond tactical questions. For Eisenhower, the prisoner issue was a ‘primary matter’. Dulles felt the crisis was grave, with Eisenhower underscoring America’s ironclad commitment to Formosa.93 Menon’s more detailed conversations with Dulles could not break any ground 89 

‘Menon to Nehru’, 21 May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 348 (Part 1). to Menon’, 28 May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 350. ‘Mehta to Eisenhower’, 27 May 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). Nehru also requested Eden to recommend a meeting between Eisenhower and Menon, which the latter did. ‘Foreign Office to Washington’, 10 June 1955, FO 371/115053. 91 ‘Mehta to Nehru’, 29 May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 350. ‘Acting Secretary of State to Dulles’, 28 May 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). 92 ‘Mehta to Nehru’, 29 May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 350. ‘Acting Secretary of State to Dulles’, 28 May 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). 93 ‘Menon to Nehru’, 17 June 1955, J.N. Papers, File 355. A more detailed Indian record is ‘G.L. Mehta Minute on the Eisenhower, Dulles and Menon Conversation’, 14 June 1955, J.N. Papers, File 360 (Part 1). The US record of this conversation also reveals the inability of Menon 90 ‘Nehru



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either. He essentially sought to encourage and legitimize direct Sino-American contact. But for Dulles, the content of talks was crucial and matters had ‘not ripened to a point where some settlement’ could be envisaged. The prisoners’ issue was non-negotiable and Dulles rejected Menon’s framework to solve the question ‘in the larger context’. Despite his persistence, Menon was unable to extract even a magnanimous goodwill gesture from Dulles.94 In late June, Nehru undertook what he described was an ‘extraordinarily successful’ visit to the Soviet Union.95 Although the bilateral aspects lie beyond the scope of the present chapter, Nehru sought to advance India’s peacemaking goals in the Formosa crisis in Moscow with the Indo-Soviet joint statement calling for PRC’s admission into the United Nations.96 It would impact both Chinese and American attitudes even if this shift was accompanied by tough rhetoric. In their next meeting, although Dulles displayed an intransigent and hard-line posture, Menon felt that the US Secretary of State was partly bluffing and wanted to actually avoid a Sino-American conflict. Indeed, Dulles ‘did not turn down idea of negotiations or of talking’. But he categorically ruled out any evacuation of the coastal islands Quemoy and Matsu.97 In their final talk, Dulles told Menon that the low-level sporadic contacts being maintained between the US and mainland Chinese representatives might be raised to a higher level with the scope of

in finding common ground with the US President and Secretary of State. ‘Eisenhower–Menon Conversation’, 14 June 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). 94  ‘Dulles–Menon Conversation’, 14 June 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). ‘Dulles–Menon Conversation’, 15 June 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). 95  ‘Nehru to Menon’, 22 June 1955, J.N. Papers, File 356. 96  ‘Joint Statement between Bulganin and Nehru’, 22 June 1955, J.N. Papers, File 356. 97 Dulles’ main interest was to explore the first stage of ‘marginal problems’: what ‘either side could offer by way of lowering tensions’. ‘Menon to Nehru’, 3 July 1955, J.N. Papers, File 359. ‘G.L. Mehta Minute on Dulles–Menon Conversation’, 1 July 1955, J.N. Papers, File 360 (Part 1). Also, see ‘Dulles–Menon Conversation’, 1 July 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China).

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the talks expanded.98 Menon again pushed for a more ­serious level of contact between America and China, arguing that the content of talks mattered and ‘the question of general ­relations’ between the two sides ‘would have to be discussed sometime’. Dulles agreed but was in no hurry to pre-empt the scope and timing of the talks.99 Eisenhower also mentioned that the surest demonstration of Chinese good faith would be the release of the US airmen.100 On 7 July, Eisenhower clarified the new US position whereby Ambassador-level talks between the two sides could commence at Geneva ‘with a view to dealing in the first instance with the question of the citizens of each of our countries in the territory of the other who want to return’. These modest direct talks could progress into discussions on ‘matters of direct concern’ to the US and China but not at the cost of undermining the ‘rights of third parties’, an allusion that Washington would adhere to the idea of two Chinas.101 Although both Menon and Nehru were disappointed,102 the Chinese seemed satisfied with these modest results. Behind his tough rhetoric, Zhou’s actual posture now appeared much more cooperative. In his cable to Menon, he disclosed that the British had delivered the US offer and that China would agree to the proposal for ambassadorial talks at Geneva. In ‘order to facilitate further relaxation of tension and to strengthen position of majority of 98 Since

August 1954, US and Chinese consular officials had been engaged in low-level talks at Geneva. 99 ‘Dulles–Menon Conversation’, 6 July 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). ‘G.L. Mehta Minute of Dulles–Menon Conversation’, 6 July 1955, J.N. Papers, File 360 (Part 1). 100  ‘Dulles–Menon Conversation’, 6 July 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). 101  ‘Dulles to Embassy in Italy’, 7 July 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). 102 Nehru urged Eisenhower to consider more substantial SinoAmerican talks and expressed doubt whether a mere elevation of the status of representatives at Geneva would produce meaningful results. Nehru urged a ‘fuller consideration’ on the substance of the proposal for direct Sino-US talks beyond the issue of detained nationals. ‘To Eisenhower’, 11 July 1955, SWJN-SS, 29, 358. In his reply, Eisenhower left open the possibility for ‘further discussion and settlement of certain other practical matters’ once talks began. ‘Dulles to Embassy in India’, 12 July 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China).



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American people’, China was also prepared to release the eleven remaining US airmen.103 This somewhat unexpected moderation in Beijing’s posture impelled Nehru to exclaim, ‘I hope this does not lead UK or USA to think that we are stronger advocates of Chinese position than Chinese themselves.’104 It is interesting that Washington had used the British and not Indian channel to convey Eisenhower’s offer of talks. Publicly too, the US deliberately underplayed India’s role, instead emphasizing the British bridge to Beijing along with Hammarskjoeld’s role in resolving the crisis.105 Ironically, although Nehru and Menon believed they had fallen short of their ambitious attempt to bring about a SinoAmerican rapprochement and influence a decisive shift in Western policy towards China, the two principal parties— Washington and Beijing—actually discovered a new equilibrium and opportunity to moderate their mutual antagonism without making any substantial moves or transactions towards addressing deeper geopolitical questions in East Asia. The US decision to describe its interlocutor as the ‘Peoples Republic of China’, surprised Beijing who immediately agreed to the announcement of talks. On 25 July, both sides simultaneously announced the commencing of Ambassador level talks at Geneva from 1 August.106 Even though India’s peacemaker role may have produced a modest outcome, Nehru perceived the end of the crisis both as a vindication and strengthening of his peace area concept.107 Not only had military tension in the Formosa straits subsided, the prospect of a head-on Sino-American collision leading to a 103 

‘Zhou Enlai to Menon’, 16 July 1955, J.N. Papers, File 361. ‘Nehru to Menon’, 16 July 1955, SWJN-SS, 29, 362. 105 ‘Nehru to Menon’, 16 July 1955, SWJN-SS, 29, 362. ‘Menon to Raghavan’, 28 July 1955, J.N. Papers, File 365 (Part 2). 106  ‘Raghavan to Nehru’, 26 July 1955, J.N. Papers, File 365 (Part 1). 107  Nehru remarked, ‘It is my definite impression that Chinese have welcomed’ the Sino-American talks, ‘attaching perhaps more importance to them than they appear to merit. Molotov has also welcomed them apparently with some enthusiasm. Whatever Dulles might say in public, this development is likely to lead to further openings.’ ‘Nehru to Menon’, 28 July 1955, J.N. Papers, File 365 (Part 2). 104 

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­ossible US–Soviet escalation now seemed improbable. The p changing attitude of the Soviet regime, which Nehru had noticed and shared with western leaders, suggested a new thaw in the Cold War. Ultimately, both as a consequence of India’s sustained intervention that had diplomatically challenged American ­containment and isolation of China, and the global g­ eopolitical flux such as the moderation from Soviet ­ leaders, shaped the ­calculus of both Washington and Beijing to mute their bilateral differences.108 In addition, the central element of Nehru’s peace 108 The

impact of domestic opinion on Eisenhower’s final decision should also be noted. Mehta had reported that American press coverage had been very sympathetic to Menon’s peacemaking efforts. Leading Democrats too expressed a strong interest in Menon’s visit and issues around the Formosa crisis. ‘G.L. Mehta to Nehru’, 7 July 1955, J.N. Papers, File 360 (Part 1). Raghavan reported that Beijing was happy with the outcome of the Big Four Geneva talks and US attitude had ‘become decidedly more moderate’. ‘Raghavan to Nehru’, 1 August 1955, J.N. Papers, File 366 (Part 2). While an enquiry into China’s complex calculus and behaviour during this crisis is beyond the scope of the present chapter, Chinese policymakers, like their American counterparts, sought to cultivate deterrence through controlled brinksmanship. At a broad level, China sought to highlight America’s military presence in Asia. Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 168–9. Beijing was signalling that both tactical and regional stability was impossible without a modicum of American cooperation with Beijing. PLA’s local military actions around the offshore islands in 1954 and early 1955 were also aimed at disrupting US–Taiwan relations and preventing the US from signing a defence pact with Taiwan, which worried Mao. In fact, based on an instruction from Mao, Zhou Enlai had told Khrushchev in July 1954 that China should try and ‘defeat the US–Jiang [Chiang Kai Shek] attempt toward a military treaty’. Zhang, ‘Constructing “Peaceful Coexistence”’, 520. Also see Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture. Through its military signalling, China was probably also seeking to both probe and shape the strength and scope of America’s commitment to Formosa vis-àvis the coastal islands. Ultimately, Chinese actions were driven by both mainland security concerns and deep reluctance to let the US freeze the status quo and thereby negate Beijing’s sovereignty over Formosa. India’s bridging role certainly helped advance the core goal, namely of



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area concept, namely, India’s own ability to strategically sustain simultaneously stable relations with America, Russia, and China, seemed more viable than ever.109 Indeed, Nehru and Menon felt confident enough to invite Eisenhower to India.110 On 1 August, not coincidentally on the debut of Sino-American talks, the eleven US airmen were released, marking the end of the Formosa crisis.111

*** There was more than one credible response available to decision makers during this crisis. For example, a non-interference response was a credible option in the circumstances. Nehru could have simply decided to maintain a passive posture rather than engage in ambitious diplomacy that was neither costless nor without risk. Other strategic choices were also credible (See Figure 4.1). Nehru could have exploited the Formosa crisis far away from the Indian homeland to strengthen India’s own position in the subcontinent. With both US and China distracted in the Far East, India could have pursued a policy to strengthen its relative position vis-à-vis Pakistan. Given Pakistan’s domestic instability, this was a credible option in the decisional situation. Similarly, on Goa too, given reaching some kind of equilibrium with the US that involved a limited diplomatic recognition and opening. Swaine and Tuosheng, Managing Sino-American Crises, 300–4. 109  ‘Nehru a precious link between East & West’, Hindustan Times, 3 July 1955. 110  Menon had advised, ‘I think initiating at this stage [an invitation to Eisenhower], even if it materialises only much later, will help all around’ and ‘there may be substantial results in world politics. This is my considered view and strong feeling.’ ‘Menon to Nehru’, 28 July 1955, J.N. Papers, File 365 (Part 2). 111 For the next sixteen years, the US–China ambassadorial talks continued with a total of 136 meetings without making further progress until the Nixon administration’s dramatic opening to China in 1971. FRUS, accessed 15 April 2014, from http://history.state.gov/ milestones/1953-1960/china-talks.

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Explanatory Variable

Role conception (Beliefs and images)

Dependent Variable: Regional behaviour

ent Congru r u io v beha Consistent but unlikely behaviour

Incon gru behav ent iour

Tension-reduction; projection of peace area

(Option actually chosen by the decision-maker)

`Hiding´; passive responses

(Option not chosen by the decision-maker)

Transactional diplomacy; extracting sidepayments; balance of power strategies

(Option not chosen by the decision-maker but credible in the decisional situation)

Figure 4.1  Choice Paths during the Formosa Crisis

the intransigence of the Portuguese colonial regime and the disconcerting signals coming from the West regarding the potential applicability of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on this question, Nehru could have chosen to exploit the Formosa crisis as a potential window to quickly and decisively resolve the lingering issue. That a potential threat existed even during this period is clear. In March 1955, Nehru stated in Parliament that NATO’s extended deterrence to Goa had been clearly implied to Indian policymakers.112 Delhi was also aware of US naval assistance to Portuguese Goa with ‘American war material being offloaded’ into Portuguese ships in the Arabian Sea.113 Yet, despite such security issues in the subcontinent, coercive choices were neither entertained nor explored by Nehru. On Pakistan, Nehru perceived a lull: ‘the feeling in both countries is now devoid of

112 Nehru

remarked that Goa had been ‘mentioned’ on ‘the basis of the NATO alliance’. They ‘had no business to mention it to us … another fact came out, and that is the wide tentacles of the NATO alliance’ and one that ‘could be used for very wrong purposes’. ‘Nehru’s Speech in Parliament’, 31 March 1955, SWJN-SS, 28, 317. 113 ‘Intelligence Report from Goa to Prime Minister’, 26 April 1955, J.N. Papers, File 340.



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hostility because there is no basic conflict….’114 Nehru felt that the US–Pakistan alliance had ‘weakened’ Pakistan.115 On Goa too, even though the situation ‘was tense’, Nehru ruled out any ‘police or military action’ because ‘this would create difficulties and would also be in conflict with the principles of India’s international policy’.116 His main strategic attention remained on the wider regional system and his foreign policy was geared to advance Indian objectives in that larger Asian realm, which according to Nehru’s prior images was a more sustainable path to producing security. Nehru’s response to the Formosa crisis was consistent with his broader approach to security problems—discourage actions that heightened the security dilemma, leave the door open for dialogue, encourage reassurance, search for common points to anchor a conversation. In the case of US and China, the surrounding psychological and ideological climate was such that neither side was able to project a cooperative posture without compromising the resolve and credibility of their respective positions. India’s bridging role enabled conflict management options to emerge without incurring risk to either side’s prestige, core interests, or deterrence postures. The Indian response was not simply aimed to establish a mere communication link between Beijing and Washington, which London also served, and more briefly, the UNSG did serve. Hammarskjoeld had sought to intervene on Sino-American questions from a tactical and transactional vantage point—to address the US prisoner issue. India’s goals were, in contrast, far more ambitious and envisaged a series of small steps that could potentially transform East Asian security. Nehru and Menon sought, too ambitiously as it turned out, to proactively assist in reconciling opposing positions in a way that was consistent with Nehru’s geopolitical image of Asia: an indivisible and interdependent security system rather than a 114 ‘Conference

of Missions Heads in Europe’, 28–30 June 1955, SWJN-SS, 29, 256. 115  ‘Nehru to Subimal Dutt’, 7 November 1954, SWJN-SS, 27, 72. 116 ‘Conference of Missions Heads in Europe’, 28–30 June 1955, SWJN-SS, 29, 252.

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bloc-based divided order. India’s own security was deemed to exist upon advancing this larger peace area. Throughout the Formosa crisis, both Nehru and Menon were sensitive to these questions and sought to address both the surface and the roots of the Sino-American security dilemma in East Asia.

Alternative Explanations Was Nehru’s peacemaker role driven by a deeper transactional motive to extract material benefits from the US and China? Let us explore the India–China dyad first. Nehru’s attempt to assist in normalizing China’s relationship with the West and enable China’s ‘diplomatic outreach in Asia’ was also advantageous to Beijing, which was confronting American containment.117 If Beijing sought to open the door to the outside world, which as we now know was Mao and Zhou Enlai’s approach since the Geneva Conference in 1954, Nehru’s quest to expand the peace area in Asia had produced a natural convergence between Delhi and Beijing.118 Did Nehru expect any direct benefits for India–China relations or a quid pro quo from Beijing for India’s bridge-building efforts? There is no evidence that Indian policymakers were motivated by such considerations. Menon’s significant weeklong China visit in May 1955 with extensive conversations with Zhou Enlai and other senior officials included no discussion on bilateral Sino-Indian relations or matters of direct material significance to India such as subcontinental security or trade.119 Neither did Nehru’s guidance to Menon or his post-visit report include any reference to bilateral matters. Moreover, there are arguably good reasons for this.

117  That

Beijing sought to normalize Communist China’s position in Asian politics during the Bandung phase in the mid-1950s is also brought out by recent archival work in China. Zhang, ‘Constructing “Peaceful Coexistence”’, 510. 118  Zhang, ‘Constructing “Peaceful Coexistence”’, 518–19. 119  ‘Krishna Menon–Zhou Enlai Conversations’, 12–20 May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 347 (Part 2).



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For one, Nehru believed that the core potential security problem with China—the Himalayan frontiers—had been implicitly addressed by the 1954 agreement, even if that assessment was retrospectively a dubious one and ignored even China’s stated position at the time.120 Even during the Formosa crisis, Nehru had ruled out a suggestion by a senior official to discuss the northern frontiers with China. Interestingly, this internal communication was recorded as Menon was returning from his successful peacemaking mission to Beijing, which might have provided an apt opportunity to also engage the Chinese on bilateral matters.121 But Nehru ruled it out: ‘I am quite clear that we should not initiate any such talks about the frontier. So far as our frontier is concerned, it is clear, and no question of talks arises.’122 For another, Indian officials did not perceive any challenge from the Himalayan front. R.K. Nehru, for example, after a tour of the Himalayan frontiers in July 1955, noted that although the 1954 agreement was not ‘enough’ of a safeguard to frontier security, ‘at present we are in a stronger position in our border areas than the Chinese seem to be in Tibet’. The Foreign Secretary perceived that India had unique advantages over China in the frontier areas: ‘The Chinese are at present on 120  Zhou

Enlai had explicitly clarified to Indian negotiators that only those ‘outstanding questions between us which are ripe for settlement’ would be addressed by the 1954 Agreement. ‘Raghavan to Nehru’, 1 January 1954, J.N. Papers, File 226 (Part 1). This was repeated again when the Tibet agreement was finalized a few months later. Also, see Subimal Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office (Calcutta: Minerva, 1977), 88. T.N. Kaul, the deputy leader of the Indian delegation, also affirms this fact. Zhou Enlai made it abundantly clear to Indian negotiators that the larger frontier question was not under the purview of the 1954 agreement. T.N. Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), 100. Nehru, however, chose to ignore Chinese statements and continued to believe through the 1950s that the frontiers were more or less a settled matter. 121  Apa Pant, who was posted in the strategic Sikkim area, suggested that a section of that frontier should be dealt with: ‘I feel that we should initiate necessary discussions and finalise this important frontier once and for all.’ ‘Apa Pant to T.N. Kaul’, 23 May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 348 (Part 1). 122  ‘Nehru to R.K. Nehru’, 23 May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 348 (Part 1).

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the defensive and their main concern is to overcome Tibetan opposition and to break the nexus between India and Tibet.’123 There is no evidence of threat perceptions vis-à-vis China’s overall relationship with South Asia either. If anything, China was perceived as a lesser problem in the subcontinent compared to US meddling.124 To be sure, Zhou Enlai had indicated to Menon that even though the level of trust with India was higher, Pakistan too could potentially play the role of a bridge towards the West. At Bandung, Pakistan had sought to outflank India’s privileged link with China by offering to play peacemaker between the two blocs. Nehru and Menon had discouraged Zhou from encouraging such a role for Pakistan.125 Yet, there is no evidence of Indians worrying about potential China–Pakistan relations at this stage. Menon later reflected on this point: ‘There is no doubt that to Zhou Enlai, even at that time [Bandung Conference], it was quite clear and we were able to accept the fact that China was a large country and that if she was trying to play the role of Asia she was not going to put Pakistan outside it’.126 If there was no pre-defined security problem with China at this stage, it is difficult to surmise that Nehru’s choices during the Formosa crisis had an ulterior motive of resolving bilateral questions. Neither is there any evidence for Nehru attempting to tacitly or actively extract any material benefits from Moscow for India’s constructive role in Asia, which it could be argued relieved some of the burden on the Soviets who sought a pragmatic political and security posture from the Chinese in the Western Pacific lest Moscow got entrapped in a conflagration with Washington. 123  ‘Note

by R.K. Nehru after his Visit to Yatung and Bhutan’, 5 July 1955, J.N. Papers, File 359. 124 Nehru had been ‘more and more concerned with American activities in Nepal’. ‘Nehru to Pillai’, 24 October 1953, SWJN-SS, 24. In another important policy note, Nehru observed that while there ‘is danger in Nepal … the outside interference that is troubling us is American and not Chinese’. ‘Nehru to Pillai, R.K. Nehru and T.N. Kaul’, 25 October 1953, SWJN-SS, 597. 125 ‘Krishna Menon’s Conversation with Zhou Enlai’, 20 May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 347 (Part 2). 126 Brecher, India and World Politics, 58.



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But Nehru did not draw security benefits from Moscow during his 1955 visit in the backdrop of the Formosa crisis. He felt that any requests on military hardware should be made discreetly and it was better for India ‘to be a little careful’.127 For Nehru, it was not simply a question of upsetting the British but that military matters should not be discussed ‘when we are talking of peace’.128 He even rejected a Soviet offer to propose India’s candidature as a sixth member of the UN Security Council because it would detract from more ‘pressing problems’ in the Far East and elsewhere. He also rejected a Soviet suggestion to include in the Indo-Soviet joint statement a reference that neither side would ‘participate in any coalitions or actions directed against the other’ because such a reference would have been tantamount to a ‘negative alliance’.129 Finally, it is instructive that although Nehru and Menon valued and sought to preserve India’s bridge between Washington and Beijing, they did not attempt to make political capital out of it or seek to exclude other credible third parties such as Moscow and London. Although Chinese officials had voiced their distrust of London several times during the crisis, Indian policymakers continued to espouse the advantages of engaging the British, who were seen as more moderate and conducive to the overall peacemaking process.130 This posture can only be comprehensively 127 

‘Nehru to Defence Secretary’, 24 March 1955, J.N. Papers, File 328. ‘Nehru to R.K. Nehru’, 24 March 1955, J.N. Papers, File 328. 129  ‘K.P.S. Menon to Mathai’, 14 July 1955, J.N. Papers, File 362. 130  Menon and Nehru continued to legitimize the parallel British link between China and America. Menon had told Zhou that ‘it would be a mistake to think that the British attitude is one of hostility to China. We have not seen it. They are not hostile to China…. Their interests lie here….’ ‘Menon–Zhou Interview 2’, 15 May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 347 (Part 2). Also, see ‘Trevelyan to Foreign Office’, 21 May 1955, FO 371/115052. For a study on the parallel British peacemaking role in the Formosa crisis and on Sino-British ties during the 1950s see Steve Tsang, The Cold War’s Odd Couple: The Unintended Partnership between the Republic of China and the UK, 1950–1958 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006). Also see Michael Dockrill, ‘Britain and the First Chinese Offshore Islands Crisis, 1954–1955’, in British Foreign Policy, 1954–1956, eds M. Dockrill and J.W. Young (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989). 128 

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understood by Nehru’s quest to promote a polycentric world order where the hard security blocs would g­ radually soften in favour of coexistence between the superpowers and their respective allies. In a similar vein, let us now explore the possibility that Nehru’s choices might have been driven by a complex calculus where security and economic development goals intersected to produce a peacemaking response. The contextual backdrop of deteriorating Indo-US relations since late 1953 suggests an incentive to mend ties with America. Through constructive peacemaking that potentially opened new options for America’s Asia strategy, did Nehru expect a more generous supply of material assistance and food aid to buttress his domestic political economy goals? In terms of developmental requirements, India’s dependence on external sources of capital was increasing by the mid-1950s. India’s second five-year plan was aimed at doubling total expenditure in the economy, suggesting a substantial envisaged increase in external capital requirements.131 Indeed, Nehru’s decision to invite Eisenhower to visit India by the end of the Formosa crisis might lend credence to such an argument.132 While the logic of ensuring stable relations with America is an intuitive one, it is not axiomatic that Nehru’s reasoning during the Formosa crisis was conditioned by expectations of economic support from the US.133 Even in previous years, Nehru 131 While the first five-year plan (1951–5) had absorbed nearly $1 billion from all foreign sources in loans and grants, the second five-year plan was estimated to require over $2 billion from a variety of external financial sources. ‘Statement of Policy on US policy toward South Asia’, 10 January 1957, FRUS (Vol. VIII-South Asia). In fact, Nehru had sought to pursue ambitious plans to restructure the political economy after 1954 by focusing on a state-led industrialization model. Baldev Raj Nayar, India’s Mixed Economy: The Role of Ideology and Interest in its Development (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1989), 189–209. Also, see V.K.R.V. Rao and Dharam Narain, Foreign Aid and India’s Economic Development (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1963). 132  ‘Menon to Nehru’, 28 July 1955, J.N. Papers, File 365 (Part 2). 133  Maybe it was taken for granted because there is little evidentiary material on inner deliberations by Indian policymakers where the link between sustaining American aid is a factor in shaping Nehru’s choices during the Formosa crisis.



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had sought to separate his foreign and domestic policies from US aid policies towards India, striving to counteract any linkage with India’s freedom of action. Nehru had ‘remained unmoved by what might be considered the politics of leverage’.134 Arguably, a passive response to the Formosa crisis might have been more conducive to influencing the aid policies of the Eisenhower administration than Nehru’s bold diplomacy that sought to complicate US Cold War policies in Asia. What can be asserted is that Nehru’s choices in the Formosa crisis were not aimed at cultivating a favourable US economic attitude towards India’s developmental needs but largely conditioned by his core beliefs and images on Asian security. It will become more apparent when we further probe this from the American vantage point and Washington’s utter lack of enthusiasm for India’s concept of cooperative Asian security. For instance, although India played a critical role in persuading the Chinese to release the four US airmen in May, both the US and the UK played down this fact and played up Hammarskjoeld’s efforts in the process.135 The Indian bridge was not perceived as conducive to advancing US geostrategy in Asia even if American policymakers thought that India could be tactically useful in facilitating specific transactions such as securing the release of the US airmen or in shaping Chinese attitudes towards not challenging the US position in the Formosa area. As early as February 1954, US officials had recognized the potential benefits of an Indian mediator ‘role in dealing with the [Chinese] Communists’.136 Even later, US officials recommended making ‘use of Indian mediation or ­moderating

134 With

the backdrop of a food bill in the US Congress and India’s ongoing role in the Korean conflict, US envoy Loy Henderson told Washington that Nehru did not ‘express any hopes on the subject of food aid or any appreciation of the efforts on India’s behalf of the US’. Rudra Chaudhuri, Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947 (Noida: HarperCollins, 2014), 65–8. 135 ‘Conference of Missions Heads in Europe’, 28–30 June 1955, SWJN-SS, 29, 246. 136  ‘Draft Policy Statement by NSC on South Asia’, 19 February 1954, FRUS (NSC 5409).

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influence in international disputes’ when it was in US interests.137 Interestingly, Eisenhower sent a friendly letter to Nehru just a few days after the US prisoner issue became explosive in late November.138 This outreach was more driven by a US strategy to disrupt the Sino-Indian rapprochement and pull India into its orbit than leveraging Delhi’s bridging function in Asian geopolitics.139 Despite an appreciation of India’s equation with China, the fact is that Dulles was deeply suspicious of India’s approach to Asian security, which at its core sought to preclude the very basis for an extensive system of military alliances across the vast continent. Dulles’s outlook on the Bandung Conference is revealing. He feared that ‘if the nations invited to Bandung, acquired the habit of meeting from time to time without Western participation, India and China because of their vast populations will very certainly dominate the scene and that one by-product will be a very solid block of anti-Western votes in the United Nations’.140 137  ‘Statement

of Policy on US Policy toward South Asia’, 10 January 1957, FRUS (Vol. VIII-South Asia). 138 ‘Eisenhower to Nehru’, 30 November 1954, J.N. Papers, File 302 (Part 2). This was part of a strategic outreach to Nehru in order to ‘effect a profound change in the Prime Minister’s attitudes toward the United States’. Interestingly, a handwritten notation at the bottom of this document also noted: ‘Here is one case where the visitor [Nehru] would not come begging for aid!’ ‘Byroade to Dulles’, 4 November 1954, FRUS (Vol. XI, Part 2, South Asia). 139  Dulles had drafted Eisenhower’s letter to Nehru and he had advised: ‘I believe this might be a good time for a friendly and personal approach to Mr. Nehru …. Nehru’s [October 1954] visit to Peking may well turn out to be, on balance, advantageous to the West. We have considered that Nehru’s policy toward Communist China has been one based on considerations of admiration and fear in about equal proportions. Reports suggest that as a result of his visit Nehru is more than ever concerned by the implications for India of Chinese Communist policies and strength.’ ‘Dulles to Eisenhower’, 30 November 1954, FRUS (Vol. XI, Part 2, South Asia). 140  Matthew Jones, ‘A “Segregated” Asia?: Race, the Bandung Conference, and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1954–1955’, Diplomatic History 29, no. 5 (November 2005): 856.



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That Dulles feared the consequences of Nehru’s ideas and Asian policy is clear: ‘There were Asian elements that were pushing for a pan-Asian movement which would be by its very nature and concept anti-Western.’141 Although Dulles’s fear of an anti-western Asian bloc was exaggerated and based on an inaccurate understanding of Nehru’s peacemaker role and images of world order, Nehru’s geopolitics was undoubtedly a challenge to the Cold War. When he learnt about the ‘bad impression in the US’ that ‘China’s inclusion’ at Bandung would create, Nehru’s response is also ­instructive.142 The ‘world is somewhat larger than the US and the UK and we have to take into account what impressions we create in the rest of the world’.143 Nehru’s peace area concept sought to promote strategically autonomous or non-aligned areas in India’s extended neighbourhood, which would be beyond an American sphere of influence. The extension of this concept to East Asia during the Formosa crisis was deeply antithetical to the hard balance of power image underlying US foreign policy. US incentives to supply economic aid to India were driven by a rationale to preserve a distance between India and the eastern bloc, including China. A balance of power strategy whereby Nehru accelerated political and material linkages with Moscow and Beijing would probably have done far more to extract US material assistance than a peacemaking role could possibly have achieved. Indeed, most early Indian plans to extract US economic assistance had failed until the mid-1950s.144 In this sense, the prospect of expanding Indo-Soviet economic relations and the opening of qualitatively significant industrial assistance

141  ‘Dulles–Makins

Conversation’, 7 April 1955, FRUS (Vol. XXI-East Asian Security). 142  ‘Menon–Eden Conversation’, 18 December 1954, J.N. Papers, File 305. 143  ‘Nehru to Pillai’, 18 December 1954, J.N. Papers, File 305. 144  ‘Nehru to Bajpai’, 3 November 1950, SWJN-SS, 15, 524–30. Western envoys in India in the mid-1950s recall that prior to the opening of IndoSoviet political economic relations in 1955, Indian requests for Western aid had failed to yield a positive response from the Western powers. Escott Reid, Envoy to Nehru (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), 137.

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to India145 had a more palpable impact on US aid policies compared to India’s peacemaker role, which was primarily viewed as a challenge to the Dullesian approach to Asian and international security.146 Countering Soviet and Chinese influence by maintaining ‘a moderate, non-Communist government’ in India was the dominant factor for the shift in US aid policies towards India, despite its independent foreign policy.147 Nevertheless, it is still possible that Nehru tangentially discovered an opportunity to expand India’s strategic flexibility by stabilizing ties with America after the crisis of the 1954 US–Pakistan alliance. But if such a calculus existed in Nehru’s mind, it was more a spillover of India’s peacemaker role in the Formosa crisis and the positive

145 In

February 1955, Delhi and Moscow signed an in-principle agreement for a 1-million-ton steel plant at Bhilai, Madhya Pradesh. 146  This is one of the central themes of Boquerat’s No Strings Attached. It is only when India began developing credible economic relations with the Soviet Union that America adapted its outlook on aid assistance towards India. Between the period 1953 and 1966, India was the largest Third World recipient of US and Soviet financial assistance. Gilles Boquerat, No Strings Attached: India’s Policies and Foreign Aid 1947–1966 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2003), 395. Also see, E.I. Brodkin, ‘United States Aid to India and Pakistan: The Attitude of the 1950s’, International Affairs 43, no. 4 (October 1967): 664–77. 147  In November 1955, during an internal discussion to arrive at the extent of aid assistance to India, it was noted that ‘Loss of US economic support could well throw Indian leaders into dependence on Soviet aid for their [Second Five-Year] Plan’. ‘Memorandum on economic assistance to India’, 18 November 1955, FRUS (Vol. VIII-South Asia). This view would become stronger in the late 1950s. ‘The second five-year plan provides at present the best vehicle for action to promote U.S. interest in an independent and stable India. India must have external assistance to attain the goals of the plan….’ ‘Statement of Policy on US Policy toward South Asia’, 10 January 1957, FRUS (Vol. VIII-South Asia). This was, of course, interlinked with shaping the nature of India’s political economy structure where US aid policies were aimed at promoting a larger share of economic output to private enterprises and light industries in contrast to Soviet assistance, which was targeted to strengthen the state sector and strategic industries like steel, power and natural resource extraction.



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impact on India’s emerging position as a potential area of agreement between competing great powers rather than a premeditated geostrategy to exploit the international environment for material advantage.148 More broadly, in Nehru’s image, a world order built on a basis of coexistence between the great powers would be naturally more materially beneficial to non-aligned states than one where the blocs were pulling states into exclusive alignments and frontline foreign policy roles. Finally, let us explore the possibility that Nehru’s promotion of a direct Sino-American détente might have been driven by a deeper balance of power motive to assist the West in weakening the Sino-Soviet alliance. Despite their ideological and strategic policy of communist containment, Western policymakers did seek to drive wedges between Moscow and Beijing from the very outset of the Cold War. While the US favoured a policy of pressure on China to eventually break the Sino-Soviet alliance, the British favoured an approach based on greater contact and engagement with Beijing.149 One of the objectives underlying the British recognition of Communist China was to ‘encourage the PRC to distance itself from the Soviet camp and play a more independent role’.150 But even American policymakers including Eisenhower and Dulles had sought a direct channel of communication and some kind of an opening to Beijing, as we have seen during the Formosa crisis. Even before he was Secretary of State, Dulles had expressed the aim of splitting the Russians and the Chinese. In 1952, he had told Chester Bowles, ‘the best way to get a separation’ was ‘to keep pressure on Communist China and make its way difficult so long as it is in partnership with Soviet Russia’. In 1953, Dulles had confided in Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden that the incipient strain in the communist bloc ‘may eventually give us an opportunity for promoting division between the Soviet Union and Communist China in our common interest’.151 148  As

Menon later recalled, ‘We didn’t think back from economics to politics.’ Brecher, India and World Politics, 4. 149 Kaufman, Confronting Communism, 17. 150 Tsang, The Cold War’s Odd Couple, 23. 151  Pruessen, ‘Over the Volcano’, 81.

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Eisenhower’s New Look concept was actually based on impairing Soviet–Communist China relations.152 Behind his aggressive bluster, Dulles had evinced interest in China’s attitude to the US.153 Dulles’s approach to the Big Four meeting in July 1955 had no mention of East Asian issues on the envisaged agenda, again underscoring that US sought a direct US– China equation in managing security and stability in the Western Pacific. India’s US envoy G.L. Mehta too, after a conversation with the British Ambassador in Washington, cabled Delhi on Dulles’s ‘flexible’ attitude ‘towards negotiations with China’.154 Richard Nixon, then Vice President, had reportedly been ‘impressed’ by Menon’s observation that the Chinese people were basically friendly to the American people and expressed an interest in personally engaging Menon.155 All this is indicative of triangular balance of power thinking within the Eisenhower administration on a potential rapprochement with China. At first glance, Indian rhetoric might also suggest similar strategic motives. For example, before his big visit to Beijing in May 1955, Menon had told America’s Ambassador in Delhi that Communist China would ‘never be’ a ‘Russian satellite’ and that the possibility of a US–China settlement was ‘greater’ than a 152 

Mayers, for example, has also shown the complexity of Eisenhower and Dulles’s China policy, which was aimed at forcing a Sino-Soviet split. David Allan Mayers, Cracking the Monolith: U.S. Policy against the SinoSoviet Alliance, 1949–1955, (London: Louisiana State University Press, 1986). US thinking on China had demonstrated complexity even earlier. On 12 January 1950, Dulles’s predecessor, Dean Acheson had declared in an important speech while Mao Zedong was in Moscow negotiating a Sino-Soviet treaty, ‘We must take the position we have always taken— that anyone who violates the integrity of China is the enemy of China and is acting contrary to our own interest.’ He then added, ‘the relationship between east and west must now be in the Far East one of mutual respect and mutual helpfulness’. Dean Acheson, ‘Crisis in Asia—An Examination of US Policy’, Department of State Bulletin, 23 January 1950, 113. 153  Dulles had asked Menon, ‘Would the Chinese talk to us?’ ‘Conference of Missions Heads in Europe’, 28–30 June 1955, SWJN-SS, 29, 245. 154  ‘G.L. Mehta to Nehru’, 31 July 1955, J.N. Papers, File 366 (Part 2). 155  ‘Mehta to Nehru’, 7 July 1955, J.N. File 360, (Part 1).



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US–Soviet settlement.156 Dulles later described Nehru’s triangular thinking in fairly stark terms: ‘Nehru believes that the USSR and the Chinese Reds will fall apart eventually, and he wishes to help that process. Nehru thinks the US can also help by ceasing to oppose communism in the West Pacific. In that event the Chinese Communists would turn on Russia.’157 This is an interesting alternative explanation because in terms of envisaged outcomes, there is little doubt that Nehru sought a looser set of security blocs. And this basic outlook was applicable to both blocs. We have already seen how Nehru and Menon always sought to probe for any cleavages between the US and its European allies such as UK and France to advance India’s peacemaking goals. Nehru’s constructions of China consistently emphasized its postcolonial nationalist identity rather than its self-image as a communist and revolutionary ally of the Soviet Union. Such a perception was part of Nehru’s general belief in nationalism as the dominant ethos of most postcolonial states in Asia regardless of other ideological movements in these p ­ olities.158 This might give the impression

156 

‘Cooper to State Department’, 1 May 1955, FRUS (Vol. II-China). had visited Delhi in March 1956. He ‘had two interviews with Nehru, one of four hours and another the next day of two hours duration. Neither had been able to persuade the other to his point of view’. ‘Dulles–Chiang Kai Shek Conversation’, 16 March 1956, FRUS (Vol. IIIChina). The Indian archival record of these conversations has no reference to Nehru urging for a Sino-Soviet split. What is apparent is India’s bridging role where Nehru sought not only a détente between Washington and Beijing to temper the Cold War in Asia but also encouraged a stable US– Soviet relationship. ‘Nehru’s Note on Talks with Dulles’, 10 March 1956, SWJN-SS, 32, 375–81. ‘Nehru to Subimal Dutt’, 11 March 1956, SWJN-SS, 32, 386. 158  As early as 1950, Nehru had rejected the notion that China would be a Russian ‘satellite state’. ‘Nehru to Vijayalakshmi Pandit’, 30 August 1950, SWJN-SS, 15 (Part 1), 380–2. Again, in 1953, Nehru told Dulles, that ‘Almost assuredly Communist China will divorce itself from Soviet Russia within fifteen or twenty-five-years. Already the ties are weakened by the death of Stalin.’ ‘Nehru–Dulles Conversation’, 21 May 1953, FRUS (Vol. IX-Part 1). 157 Dulles

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that Nehru sought a b ­ alance of power in Eurasia, an outcome that was to the West’s geopolitical advantage. Yet, Nehru’s peacemaker role was not aimed at changing the balance of power in favour of the West or against the Soviet Union. Neither was Nehru seeking to create a wedge between Moscow and Beijing in order to pursue his own balance of power plans by making India a valuable Asian state in Soviet geostrategy. There is no evidence for such images or attendant tactics and strategies. It does appear that Indian policymakers couched the rationale for an American normalization with China in terms of attractive triangular balance of power reasoning, which they hoped would evoke a shift in US’s China policy.159 In practice, however, Nehru and his advisors were generally sensitive to not wanting either Moscow or Beijing to feel India was providing preference to either in its diplomacy.160 Instructively, during his extensive conversations with Zhou Enlai in May 1955, Menon had warned about Dulles’s ploy to divide Eurasia and the ‘attempt to create a rift between Chinese and Russians’.161 Similarly, in Nehru’s conversations with Austrian leaders he rejected the idea of a Sino-Soviet split, and noted that while there may be a ‘potential’ rivalry, for the present both Moscow and Beijing were ‘dependent on each other’. He was actually impressed with the economic interdependence and the massive scale of Soviet support and commitment to buttressing China’s developmental goals.162 Even in Nehru’s extensive talks with Soviet leaders in June 1955, there is no evidence or hint of reticence from either side on China’s position in the international system. Nehru openly expressed his peace area 159 For

example, Menon had told the American Consul General in Madras that ‘it was possible to separate the Chinese from the Russians and come to terms with the former without compromising themselves with the latter, whom they regarded as the real danger’. ‘UK Deputy High Commissioner (India) to CRO’, 6 May 1955, FO 371/115052. Similarly, Menon emphatically told the British High Commissioner that the ‘Chinese are not like the Russians; no one can do business with them’. ‘UK High Commissioner (India) to CRO’, 27 May 1955, FO 371/115052. 160  ‘Pillai to Nehru’, 2 June 1954, J.N. Papers, File 258 (Part 1). 161 ‘Krishna Menon–Zhou Enlai Conversation’, 12 May 1955, J.N. Papers, File 347 (Part 2). 162  ‘Nehru’s Talks with Austrian Leaders’, 27 June 1955, SWJN-SS, 29, 238–9.



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concept and Asia policy and the necessity of bringing China into the UN and Asian system. He remarked that India ‘had no problems with China’, while Soviet leaders for their part encouraged this belief and emphasized ‘good relations between Soviet Union, India and China’.163 The Indo-Soviet joint statement, drafted primarily by the Indians, explicitly advocated a One China policy and China’s entry into the UN. This is hardly reflective of an Indian strategy to divide Eurasia and shape a global balance in favour of the West. Nehru’s image of indivisible security and his quest to expand the peace area in Asia lay at the core of his response to the Formosa crisis. For Nehru, the post-war order was based on a sub-optimal equilibrium with two ideological worlds on a path to collision. The nuclear revolution had made such a global setting a dangerous one and prone to escalatory crises. And the balance of power concept built upon ‘an interlocking system of military alliances’ could not be relied upon to safeguard international and Asian security.164 So as part of stabilizing the status quo, Nehru sought to mute the security dilemma between the US and China, which had manifested with a severity during the Formosa crisis. India’s role was seen as crucial to reduce tensions and bridge the great divide between America and China. As Nehru told his diplomats during the crisis, ‘India’s importance had grown due to her intimate relations’ with China and the UK. These relationships were not developed merely for narrow material reasons of self-interest but primarily for bridging the two worlds that defined international politics at the time. It enabled India to ‘make approaches to them and to say things which many other nations could not’.165 Even as Nehru was engaging in peacemaking between China and America he was simultaneously also promoting a better understanding between Moscow and the West. In fact, Nehru made an unscheduled decision to travel to London (after Eden’s invitation) from Moscow to hold talks with British leaders on questions of Asian and international security and persuade them to respond to Soviet

163  ‘Nehru’s

Talks with Soviet Premier N.A. Bulganin’, 8 June 1955, SWJN-SS, 29, 208–9. 164  ‘Conference of Missions Heads in Europe’, 28–30 June 1955, SWJNSS, 29, 243. 165  ‘Conference of Missions Heads in Europe’, 28–30 June 1955, SWJNSS, 29, 242.

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peace overtures. Macmillan later remarked that Nehru’s ‘assessment of the Russian situation had been their guide throughout the talks’ with Soviet leaders and ‘was amazed to find how closely the Russian approach followed the line indicated by’ Nehru.166 Clearly, the idea that Nehru was adhering to some kind of Mackinder or Spykman’s vision of geopolitics is simply not borne out after a critical appraisal of his calculus during the Formosa crisis. Nehru’s geopolitics, did indeed seek to remap Asia and the world, but these images and the corresponding peacemaker role were primarily predicated on reforming Cold War geopolitics and stabilizing the patterns of interaction of its main protagonists. Ironically then, while both American officials and Nehru recognized India’s potential as a swing power, their conceptions of world order were built on competing images.167 In Nehru’s image, China was perceived as a vital pillar of the regional order and its isolation made a difficult situation even worse. Nehru drew historical parallels between the Western response to the Soviet Union after 1917 and towards contemporary China after 1949 and hoped that the West would ‘not commit the same mistake in regard to the Chinese revolution’.168 ‘If the West had gone slow against China it would have slowed down the revolution,’ argued Nehru.169 He believed that by bringing China into the international community and embedding it in the UN system, China could gradually be socialized into the post-war international order. More broadly, Nehru sought a multipolar polycentric world order where the great powers came to recognize the interdependence of their security interests and indeed survival, valued restraint, and moderated their coercive impulses. Such an order, in Nehru’s image, would also be one that would be most advantageous to non-aligned states such as India. 166  ‘Nehru’s Note on Visit to Soviet Union’, 1 August 1955, SWJN-SS, 29, 297. 167  As US envoy to India told Washington, ‘Through his influence on other countries’, Nehru ‘may control balance of power between free world and Soviet bloc’. ‘Allen to State Department’, 12 November 1954, FRUS (Vol. XI, Part 2, South Asia). 168  ‘International and National Situation’, 28 June 1955, SWJN-SS, 29, 247–9. 169  ‘International and National Situation’, 28 June 1955, SWJN-SS, 29, 247–9, 257.

5 Indira Gandhi’s Role Conception

We thought in terms of carrying the banner of peace everywhere and it has betrayed us…. Our efforts at peace and following the path of peace have been knocked on the head. —Jawaharlal Nehru (September 1963) Sheer power seemingly prevails over principle, seeking obedience and demanding respect instead of commanding it … those who have attempted to eschew the use of force have had to pay the price of restraint. —Indira Gandhi (1968)

Studying worldviews typically involves access to streams of the policymakers’ writings, deliberations, and confidential communications. Unlike Nehru, whose voluminous writings and large section of confidential papers are accessible for such a task, for the Indira Gandhi period, aside from her public speeches, similar historical material is largely inaccessible. Indira Gandhi also left a scant written record. ‘Unlike her father, she has never attempted to commit to paper her view of the world.’1 Her leadership style was very discreet and unlike Nehru’s approach, who shared his ideas widely among his colleagues, senior officials, and diplomats. 1 Zareer Masani, Indira Gandhi: A Biography (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1975), 274.

Power and Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policies during the Cold War. Zorawar Daulet Singh, Oxford University Press (2019). © Zorawar Daulet Singh. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199489640.003.0006

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She relied less on professing her ideas publicly or actively shaping the strategic discourse. This, however, is not to imply that Indira Gandhi lacked political skills. During her apprenticeship under Nehru, she had ‘effortlessly imbibed statecraft simply by watching her father at work’.2 She had witnessed and participated in major political developments both at home and abroad. Accompanying Nehru on his overseas tours, she was ‘exposed to post-Second World War international developments’ and even had ‘personal knowledge of behind-the-scene discussions and political initiatives’ of India’s foreign policy in the 1950s.3 Yet, despite this ‘privileged knowledge of international affairs’, it has been suggested that Indira Gandhi never ‘developed a structured view of the outside world’.4 A discreet leadership style was also shaped by her formative years, which had made her extremely shy and aloof: ‘She was unable to confide her thoughts and emotions to anyone except a very few and she guarded her privacy most zealously’, traits that would remain with her through her decade and a half as Prime Minister.5 This perhaps contributed to a political style whereby Indira Gandhi played ‘her cards close to her chest, only revealing them when the moment is ripe’.6 While she took an interest in ideas and the intellectuals who produced them, she herself was not one.7 Another observer notes, ‘She did not have the mental makeup for such intellectual wanderings, nor did she really believe that theoretical underpinnings were essential for political behaviour.’8 And yet, her ‘pragmatism and intuition enabled her to respond magnificently to political events’.9

2  Inder

Malhotra, Indira Gandhi: A Personal and Political Biography (New Delhi: Hay House, 2014), 61. 3 J.N. Dixit, Makers of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2004), 120–1. 4 Harish Kapur, Foreign Policies of India’s Prime Ministers (New Delhi: Lancer, 2009), 123. 5 Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, 38. 6 Masani, Indira Gandhi, 258. 7 Masani, Indira Gandhi, 274. 8 Kapur, Foreign Policies of India’s Prime Ministers, 123. 9 Masani, Indira Gandhi, 274.



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Indira Gandhi’s ‘mental resistance against following complicated arguments’ implied that ‘to get her considered reaction, a problem had to be presented to her in writing before one discussed it’.10 K. Shankar Bajpai, a former senior official, recalls that Indira Gandhi ‘had an acute sense of the role of power and of India’s interests’ but also relied on trusted confidantes.11 Indira Gandhi’s advisors both shaped and reflected her realpolitik instincts. The ‘core group’ or ‘quartet’12 consisted of Parmeshwar Narayan Haksar,13 Rameshwarnath Kao,14 Durga Prasad Dhar,15 and Triloki Nath Kaul.16 This group operated in a ‘highly informal manner’ although of course ‘within a formalized structure’. It was also ‘quite homogenous’ with ‘no major differences among its members on basic policy issues’.17 Haksar was the leading advisor in this group of strategists-cumpolicymakers, which later also included Prithvi Nath Dhar and Gopalaswami Parthasarathi, though none would attain the stature and authority that he had. 10 

P.N. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 120. Also see, Ashok Parthasarathi, Technology at the Core: Science and Technology with Indira Gandhi (New Delhi: Pearson, 2007), 312. 11  Personal interview with K. Shankar Bajpai, New Delhi, 6 May 2014. 12 Personal interview with Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, New Delhi, 3 July 2014. 13 A large collection of P.N. Haksar’s papers are available at the NMML. 14  Before his death, R.N. Kao placed restrictions regarding public access to his recorded memoirs, which are stored at the NMML. Shyam Bhatia, ‘Kao’s Memoirs—An Insight into RAW Roots’, The Tribune, 23 June 2014; Vappala Balachandran, ‘The Kao Files’, Indian Express, 23 January 2016. 15 Papers pertaining to D.P. Dhar are beyond the public’s purview as they are largely stored in the India Embassy in Moscow and at the MEA’s internal archives in Delhi. The Haksar and Kaul papers at NMML, however, do include important communications with Dhar. 16  A collection of T.N. Kaul’s papers are available at the NMML. 17 Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Succession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 141.

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Indira Gandhi’s distinct decision-making style, which relied on written arguments being put forward for her consideration appears to have led to an interesting equation between the advisor and the decision maker. For one, it suggests that although the Prime Minister’s own preferences during the decision-making process are not always discernable, it is reasonable to claim that her sanction was often, if not always, the final vote during deliberations. In practice, this probably meant Indira Gandhi endorsed or buttressed the line from one of her trusted advisors, which provided an impetus to a policy path that would shape subsequent choices. This was then a leader who, paradoxically, despite her seeming absence from the big ideas behind Indian statecraft, was still a crucial arbiter in the policy choices even if some ideas got initiated by one or more members of her core group. Further, this might explain some of the fascinating deliberations that played out at the apex level and those revealed partially in the accessible archival record are a structural outcome of the unique leader–advisor relationship. The context of Indira Gandhi’s ascent to power also made trusted strategists an invaluable asset. The post-Nehru period witnessed an ideational flux in India’s foreign policy as well as its political economy. While a deeper historical enquiry into this contested period is beyond the scope of the present book, it may suffice to note that Indira Gandhi’s rise to power, unlike Nehru’s planned succession to Gandhi in the 1940s, faced more intense ideological and political competition with conservatives from the Congress old guard. When she assumed power in January 1966, Indira Gandhi had considered bifurcating the Principal Secretary’s position, a post of enormous authority in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, into two distinct posts—a foreign policy and an economic policy advisor—and sought Haksar as her foreign policy advisor. But Haksar had turned down the offer indicating he was ready to serve as Principal Secretary even if that meant waiting it out.18 In May 1967, Indira Gandhi replaced L.K. Jha, an accomplished right-of-centre technocrat inherited from the 18  Personal interview with Inder Malhotra, New Delhi, 16 December 2014.



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Lal Bahadur Shastri administration, with P.N. Haksar as her Principal Secretary. For Indira Gandhi, Jha’s pro-World Bank leaning ‘had become a political liability’19 and she had lost trust in him.20 Haksar served as Indira Gandhi’s Principal Secretary from 1967 to 1973, and as a close advisor until the mid-1970s. His role in this formative phase of the Indira Gandhi period is extremely important because he embodied both the continuity and change in Indira Gandhi’s ideational framework. Haksar, who had been personally inducted by Nehru into the Foreign Service, embodied a principled yet realpolitik approach to foreign affairs and could ‘combine a capacity to think with the opportunity to act’.21 He had also been mentored by Krishna Menon during the latter’s years as High Commissioner to London.22 In some ways, the equation between Indira Gandhi as the political authority, and Haksar as one of her main strategists was similar to Nehru as the statesman and Krishna Menon as his most valued confidante and strategist. Both Haksar and Menon served as ideational anchors to their Prime Ministers. Haksar attempted not only to restore India’s core self-image of nonalignment but helped shape India’s post-Nehruvian role conception. His ability to implement ideas was crucial at a time of political flux. One former official says that it is difficult to imagine that Indira Gandhi’s foreign policy framework would have assumed the shape it did without Haksar.23 Indira Gandhi’s complete trust in Haksar’s intelligence and judgement ensured that between 1967 and 1973, he emerged as ‘the most influential and powerful person’ 19 Dhar, 20  T.N.

Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy, 106. Kaul, A Diplomat’s Diary (1947–99) (New Delhi: Macmillan,

2000), 106. 21 N.J. Nanporia, ‘Experiences of an Envoy’, Times of India, 1 June 1980. 22  Haksar later recalled his ‘apprenticeship’ under Menon: ‘What little I learnt about the art of science and diplomacy, it was at his feet…. I learnt from him that in diplomacy the most important thing was courage, a non-negotiable sense of dedication to the interests of one’s country.’ P.N. Haksar, Premonitions (Bombay: Interpress, 1980), 194. 23 Personal interview with Ashok Parthasarathi, New Delhi, 9 June 2014. Also see Bidyut Sarkar, ed., P.N. Haksar: Our Times and the Man (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1989), 196–7.

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in her ­government.24 It has been said that all major foreign policy ­initiatives taken by Indira Gandhi were based on Haksar’s advice.25

The Role Conception Indira Gandhi’s security seeker role conception embodied three core inter-related beliefs: First, a definition of India’s interests in more narrow terms, and a regional image centred on the subcontinent rather than on an extended Asian space that lay at the heart of Nehru’s image. Second, a divisible conception of security and an inclination to leverage the balance of power for geopolitical advantage rather than reform Asia’s ‘interaction culture’26 as per Nehru’s role conception. Third, an inclination to employ coercive means to solve disputes or to pursue geopolitical ends in South Asia rather than a preference for accommodation and strategic restraint embodied in Nehru’s worldview.

Contraction in India’s Regional Image In 1955, confronting domestic pressure for coercive action against the colonial regime in Goa, Nehru had vowed to oppose external involvement in the subcontinent: … any interference by any other power would also be an interference with the political system of India…. It may be that we are weak and we cannot prevent that interference. But the fact is that any attempt by a foreign power to interfere in any way with India is a thing which India cannot tolerate, and which, subject to her strength, she will oppose. That is the broad doctrine I lay down.27

24 Katherine

Frank, Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2012), 314. 25 Dixit, Makers of India’s Foreign Policy, 167. 26  Barry Buzan, ‘The Inaugural Kenneth N. Waltz Annual Lecture. A World Order Without Superpowers: Decentred Globalism’, International Relations 25, no. 3 (2011): 22. 27 Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946–April 1961 (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961), 114.



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Although the above exhortations were made in a context of growing Western interference, Nehru actually envisaged a much wider geopolitical canvas for India. Shortly after the 1954 Geneva Conference, he had told fellow Parliamentarians, ‘The world is too small now for a few countries, including the Asian countries, to say that nobody else can interfere with an area and that is their sole concern.’28 On another occasion, when the question of a British base in the Maldives was brought to Nehru’s attention in 1957, his response is instructive: ‘We have no Monroe doctrine for the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean or the Bay of Bengal. Nor can we develop such a doctrine in the present day world.’29 Nehru’s representation of India’s periphery in such non-­exclusivist terms underscored his rejection of a subcontinental sphere of influence. Nehru’s regional image can be better understood with reference to his belief in an indivisible Asian system. Former Foreign Secretary Maharaja Krishna Rasgotra recalls Nehru’s words from an early 1950s’ speech: What is foreign policy he said? To be friends with everybody and pursue your interest…. There was no next question, therefore, there was no answer. What are your interests? Are these just creating goodwill or acting to offer goodwill and receive goodwill if you can? At no stage, till about the early 1960s, did I come across security as your primary interest.30

This reflection is interesting because it reveals the changing meaning of security from the Nehru to the Indira Gandhi period. The definition of national interest in Nehru’s image was actually quite clear: ‘I have naturally looked to the interests of India, for that is my first duty. I have always conceived that duty in terms of the larger good of the world.’31 The main function of India’s interests and role was related to the ‘global system’, where the 28 Nehru,

India’s Foreign Policy, 90. ‘To Joachim Alva’, 23 January 1957, SWJN-SS, 36, 411. 30  Personal interview with M.K. Rasgotra, New Delhi, 12 September 2013. 31  Nehru’s broadcast, 10 May 1949, quoted in A.P. Rana, ‘The Nature of India’s Foreign Policy: An Examination of the Relation of Indian 29 

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issues ‘of war and peace’ were being decided.32 Such a meaning of indivisible security would lose most of its resonance in the post-Nehru years. Specifically, 1962 and 1965 are watershed events for India’s foreign policy. ‘External events are the primary source of learning about international politics.’33 One type of learning is ‘­ incremental change of beliefs over time as a result of the gradual cumulation of experience’.34 For example, a study of the Soviet Union’s transformation in the 1980s suggests that non-performance of an old belief system produced a change in worldviews. But there was no single dramatic event or crisis that produced this shift in Soviet thinking. Rather, it was the emergence of an innovative leadership in the Kremlin that initiated the change in the belief system.35 The second type of learning is based on the ‘traumatic’ learning model, which ‘insists that the magnitude of the negative experience is the most important factor’ in changing beliefs.36 Another study on the potential causes for ideational change found ‘substantial support for the importance of traumatic events in changing beliefs’.37 The change in Indian worldviews was of the latter type. The 1962 and 1965 conflicts produced a fundamental change in beliefs regarding the international and regional environment and India’s role in these spaces. Non-alignment to the Concept of the Balance of Power in the Nuclear Age’, India Quarterly 22, no. 2 (1966): 101. 32  Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), 316. 33  Jack S. Levy, ‘Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield’, International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994): 304. 34  Levy, ‘Learning and Foreign Policy’, 287. 35  Douglas W. Blum, ‘The Soviet Foreign Policy Belief System: Beliefs, Politics, and Foreign Policy Outcomes’, International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 (December 1993): 373–94. 36 Stephen G. Walker, Akan Malici, and Mark Schafer, Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioural International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011), 206. 37 Jonathan Renshon, ‘Stability and Change in Belief Systems: The Operational Code of George W. Bush’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 6 (December 2008): 841.



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Rasgotra emphasizes the impact of these events on Indira Gandhi’s thinking: ‘Two events shaped our policy. The pragmatic aspect, security aspect and so on. 1962—China’s attack and its consequences for India. And she said, “India should never be in that same position again.” The second event was Pakistan’s 1965 war.’38 History might teach lessons to states ‘about the need for caution, suspicion, and toughness’.39 The perceived lessons of 1962 and 1965 led to fundamentally altering the image of the regional environment. Nehru’s construction of a benign image despite an uncertain regional security environment was displaced by an image emphasizing ‘caution’ and ‘toughness’. The ‘trauma’ of the 1962 military defeat powerfully impacted the assumptions underlying Nehruvian beliefs. The presumption that because India did not have expansionist designs against any other country, it ‘would not face any threats’ stood exposed. The other premise that Cold War equations would not have any major negative impact for India because of its neutrality was also challenged.40 Further, the concept of indivisible security itself was dramatically exposed in 1962. For Nehru, the one-step escalation image had always presumed that a local South Asian conflict would inevitably involve other great powers, and that would dissuade external aggression. But the actual reaction of other countries to the Indian predicament in 1962 ‘was an education to all’.41 In a 1963 Foreign Affairs article, Nehru reflected on the impact of 1962 on his beliefs: … the nation as a whole is growing up. It is learning that in the world today it is not enough to be devoted to peace, or to mind one’s own affairs, but that it is also necessary to have adequate armed strength, to adjust our relations with friendly countries in the light 38  Personal

interview with M.K. Rasgotra, New Delhi, 12 September 2013. 39 Noel Kaplowitz, ‘National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies: Psychopolitical Dimensions of International Relations’, Political Psychology 11, no. 1 (1990): 57. 40 J.N. Dixit, Across Borders: Fifty Years of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Picus Books, 1998), 20. 41 Dixit, Across Borders, 55–56.

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of the changing actualities of the international situation and, above all, to preserve and consolidate national unity.42

The Nehru that emerges in this article is clearly more chastened, although the self-image of non-alignment remains resilient. While asserting that ‘we cannot let ourselves be panicked into abandoning either the goal or the methods of our policy’, Nehru no longer presented peacemaking as a key function of India’s foreign policy. But neither did he suggest another role for India, merely saying that ‘the basic policies’ of ‘earlier years should not be changed, but should only be adjusted in order to meet the new dangers that face us’.43 The strain between continuity and change, and a role flux seems all too evident from Nehru’s article, which concluded on a sombre note (‘Future is uncertain’) suggesting that domestic developments and frontier security (the ‘double burden’) would demand strategic attention of the Indian leadership.44 Nehruvian beliefs suffered a second shock in 1965. By August that year, India and Pakistan were engaged in a full-fledged clash with the war expanding to the international border between West Pakistan and India. India’s political leadership had never expected that Pakistan could engage in a frontal collision with

42  Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘Changing India’, Foreign Affairs 41, no. 3 (April 1963): 462–3. 43  Nehru, ‘Changing India’, 462. 44  Nehru, ‘Changing India’, 464. Other Indian reflections during this period were even more categorical in their search for an alternative role conception. See, for example, ‘Mr. Nehru’s Opportunity?’, Times of India, 2 September 1963. Girilal Jain, a noted intellectual and journalist of that period, argued for a redefinition of Nehru’s role conception: ‘For one thing, it should be taken out of the context of the problem of peace. It is nearly a decade since India was able to play a meaningful role’ as a peacemaker. ‘Now both America and Russia have decided to deal directly with one another…. The role of intermediaries between the superpowers is about played out. India should stay non-aligned not because it serves the cause of peace but because it serves her own interests.’ Girilal Jain, ‘India’s Two Voices’, Times of India, 27 July 1963.



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India.45 Although US military assistance to Pakistan had grown continuously since 1954,46 Indian perceptions to the relative power balance only changed after 1965. Until then, policymakers had largely accommodated themselves to the US–Pakistan pact perceiving the regional setting through Nehru’s image. In 1956, Nehru had rejected any serious military challenge from Pakistan saying Indian intelligence assessments had ‘taken too alarmist a view of the situation’ and that he could not ‘conceive of even a wild adventure in the shape of actual war against India without some kind of approval or acquiescence by the US’. The American presence in Pakistan, Nehru argued, would deter any hostile Pakistani move and make war ‘highly unlikely’.47 These beliefs were also influenced by Eisenhower’s 1954 assurance that the US would restrain Pakistan.48 In 1959, Eisenhower had again assured Nehru that ‘the US would never permit Pakistan to employ military equipment received from the US for aggres45 In

May 1965, Nehru’s successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri expressed India’s threat perceptions on its periphery, after military skirmishes with Pakistan had begun on the Kutch–Sindh border, to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev: ‘It is impossible for us to understand the reason for Pakistan to make this recent attack. I do not know if you have any idea of China’s objectives and intentions. They are very much on our border and they mass their troops and there is a constant threat to our security. Now Pakistan has also adopted a similar attitude.’ Avtar Singh Bhasin, ed., India–Pakistan Relations 1947–2007: A Documentary Study, Volume II (New Delhi: Geetika Publishers, 2012), 1020–1. 46 Bhasin, India–Pakistan Relations 1947–2007, Volume III, 1397. 47  The threat envisaged was of a sub-conventional kind ‘especially of the border raid type’. ‘To Foreign Secretary’, 9 December 1956, SWJN-SS, 36, 639–40. 48 Eisenhower had written to Nehru on 24 February 1954: ‘I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action, both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression.’ A. Appadorai, Select Documents on India’s Foreign Policy and Relations, 1947–1972 (Volume I) (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 262.

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sive purposes against India’.49 In 1965, India discovered that these assurances ‘were worthless’.50 That these were taken seriously is underscored by B.K. Nehru’s September 1965 remark to Lyndon Johnson that ‘India had based its whole defense policy on [those] US assurances….’51 In short, the lesson learnt was in ‘that an India–Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, Britain and the US will always side with Pakistan’.52 Perhaps nothing underscores the contraction of India’s role from the extended to the immediate neighbourhood than a comparison of beliefs between the two periods. In a March 1957 Lok Sabha debate, Krishna Menon had rejected a narrow definition of national interest and espoused an indivisible concept of security: ‘Our primary interest in this world is peace and cooperation. It so happens that in a condition like ours at present, there is no interest, which is incompatible with international interests. Therefore, our policy—it may be called idealistic—is probably the most common sense and practical policy that we could have followed.’53 Over a decade later, T.N. Kaul, Indira Gandhi’s foreign secretary for most of the period under study made a sharp distinction between the now peripheral Asian region and the core zone of the subcontinent: ‘India cannot just wait and watch as a silent spectator if aggression by a foreign power should take place’ in Southern Asia. ‘But, if a similar situation arises in a distant country where India’s own security is not directly involved, India may give only moral and political support … India need not jump into the fray and express any views.’54 Indira Gandhi expressed this 49 ‘Eisenhower–Nehru

Conversation’, 10 December 1959, FRUS

(Vol. XV). 50  Surjit Mansingh, India’s Search for Power: Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Policy, 1966–1982 (New Delhi: SAGE 1984), 78. 51 ‘Lyndon Johnson–B.K. Nehru Conversation’, 9 September 1965, FRUS (Vol. XXV). 52  M.K. Rasgotra, A Life in Diplomacy (Gurgaon: Viking, 2016), 191–2. 53 Appadorai, Select Documents on India’s Foreign Policy and Relations, 1947–1972 Volume I, 37–8. 54  Krishnan D. Mathur and P.M. Kamath, Conduct of India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1996), 135. Also see Kapur, Foreign Policies of India’s Prime Ministers, 124; Richard L. Park, ‘India’s Foreign Policy: 1964–1968’, Current History 54, no. 320 (April 1968): 205.



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image sharply when she noted in a 1972 Foreign Affairs article, ‘the situation on our subcontinent … is our special concern and has a significance beyond geographical frontiers’.55

Acceptance of Balance-of-Power Norm as a Regulator of International Politics and Security It has been argued that while India has historically recognized the importance of power in the international system, ‘it has no tradition of thought that thinks of power as an objective of foreign policy’.56 It is consequently claimed that ‘balance of power is not the default common sense of Indian strategic thinking’.57 While policymakers certainly began their ideational journey in such terms, Indira Gandhi’s beliefs were not a negation of balance of power politics. Nehru had rejected a power-centred approach to international affairs, or as Menon later reflected: India ‘was not playing the game of balance of power’ and non-alignment was ‘not a kind of advantageous policy’.58 This is not to suggest that Nehru and Menon were unaware of global geopolitics or the history of balance of power statecraft. Rather, drawing lessons from the major world conflicts of their era, they conceptualized a framework to soften the edges of what was perceived as a dangerous and expansionary Cold War struggle that appeared poised to also undermine India’s non-aligned identity and security. Leveraging the balance of power to produce national security was considered short-sighted and a reversion to forms of statecraft that had been exposed as historically destructive. World order, in Nehru’s own words, was not ‘merely a world where war is kept in check by a balancing of armed forces. It is much deeper than that. It is a world from which the major causes of war have been removed.’59 55 Indira

Gandhi, ‘India and the World’, Foreign Affairs 51, no. 1 (October 1972): 76. 56  Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘Still Under Nehru’s Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy Frameworks in India’, India Review 8, no. 3 (2009): 219. 57  Mehta, ‘Still Under Nehru’s Shadow?,’ 221. 58 Brecher, India and World Politics, 227. 59 Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 218–19.

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The fundamental shift from Nehru–Menon’s images is reflected in how policymakers began to view the international order. For the post-Nehru leadership, which coalesced around Indira Gandhi, images of world order and security were based on new assumptions and lessons drawn from the formative events of the 1960s. Instead of attempting to reform the interaction culture of the bipolar system to advance Asian and Indian security, leveraging the balance of power purely for instrumental purposes became a legitimate means to buttress India’s material capabilities or improve its immediate regional environment. In addition, the one-step escalation assumption, which was central to Nehru’s strategic thought, was no longer deemed valid. As one former senior official notes, ‘Until 1962, there was a belief that the international system’ would help Indian security.60 But the 1962 and 1965 conflicts had dramatically shown the possibility of limited war despite a stable bipolar system based on the norm of mutual assured destruction. For Indian policymakers, these traumatic events had demonstrated that the superpowers could not or would not prevent limited use of force on the periphery of their Cold War struggle. Three experiences in India’s interactions with the superpowers in the 1960s also shaped the evolution of strategic thinking after Nehru. The first was US attempts to leverage its food aid to influence India’s foreign policy. The perceived lesson was ‘salutary’ and self-reliance became a conscious strategy for Indira Gandhi and her advisors.61 The second lesson was regarding the perceived reliability of the West in advancing India’s core security interests after a very brief phase of strategic cooperation. In November 1962, during the second phase of the India–China war, Delhi and Washington had established a basis for formal military assistance to India, a high point of Indo-US cooperation during the Cold War. In July 1963, this was mutually expanded to include ‘US assistance in strengthening India’s air defenses’ in 60 Personal

interview with Shiv Shankar Menon, New Delhi, 11 November 2014. 61 A.K. Damodaran and U.S. Bajpai, eds, Indian Foreign Policy: The Indira Gandhi Years (New Delhi: Radiant, 1990), 26.



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the scenario of a Chinese ‘attack on India’.62 Interestingly, during discussions to establish the terms of implementation of the July 1963 agreement, John Kenneth Galbraith, the US envoy in Delhi, ‘was at great pains to stress that participation of the US Air Force in the joint training … would not, by itself, imply any commitment on the part of the US Government to the defence of India’. Galbraith ‘also made it quite clear that the agreement’ regarding US consultations with India ‘in the event of a Chinese Communist attack on India’ would ‘not commit the US to any particular action’. US response to a crisis would ‘depend upon the situation at that time’.63 The fragility of that agreement was revealed in 1965. During the September 1965 war with Pakistan, and after China had massed its troops in Ladakh and the Chumbi Valley, L.K. Jha, then advisor to Lal Bahadur Shastri, had asked for consultations under the Air Defence Agreement. ‘However, the Americans refused, and that put an end to any expectation in the Indian system of reaching any security-related understanding with the Americans.’64 US reluctance to commit to security cooperation with India during the 1965 conflict was based on a perception that Delhi might leverage such assistance to deter China and gain the upper hand against Pakistan, which Washington sought to avoid, ­preferring instead a stalemate and early ceasefire in the ­subcontinent.65 Indian archives also reveal the impact of 1965 on Indian images: ‘US intelligence had in all likelihood some knowledge of Pakistani intentions, but they either deliberately or 62 ‘Galbraith

to State Department’, 10 July 1963, FRUS (Vol. XIX). ‘Galbraith to Nehru’, 9 July 1963, S.F. 15, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). 63  ‘M.J. Desai, T.N. Kaul Conversation with John Kenneth Galbraith’, 9 July 1963, S.F. 15, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). Also see Paul McGarr, ‘The United States, Britain and the Sino-Indian Border War’, in The Sino-Indian War of 1962: New Perspectives, eds Amit Das Gupta and Lorenz M. Luthi (New York: Routledge, 2017), 117–19. 64 Email interview with Prabhat Shukla, New Delhi, 19 February 2015. India’s request was made to Chester Bowles. See ‘Bowles to State Department’, 18 September 1965, FRUS (Vol. XXV). 65  ‘Rusk to Bowles’, 17 and 19 September 1965, FRUS (Vol. XXV).

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otherwise were unable to stop Pakistan from taking this action. In our view, they perhaps decided to take the easy way out of letting developments take their own course….’ America’s diplomatic effort was aimed to dissuade India from escalating the 1965 war.66 This experience conditioned Indian perceptions of subsequent American involvement in the subcontinent and the expectation of strategic support that was possible given US patterns of behaviour and the complex formulation of its regional interests.67 The resumption and sustained flow of US military assistance to Pakistan after the 1965 war reinforced these Indian images.68 By 1970, Indian p ­ olicymakers were convinced of a repeating pattern in US–Pakistan relations.69 The third lesson was from the Soviet attempt to pursue a balanced policy vis-à-vis India and Pakistan and Moscow’s decision to supply arms to Pakistan in 1968. Indira Gandhi surmised that the Soviets thought India was weak and ‘that they could get away with this “policy of balance”’.70 A 1970 MEA policy review reflected these changing images towards the external environment when it observed that a growing degree of cooperation between the superpowers had necessitated a change in India’s role towards a ‘resistance to economic, military and other pressures from the superpowers’. The aspect of independence ‘has, therefore, become even more important than before’.71

66 ‘P.K. Banerjee to C.S. Jha’, 8 October 1965, WII/101/37/66, MEA, NAI. 67  For Indian officials, the contrast between the superpowers regarding their approach to India–Pakistan conflicts became sharper because ‘all through’ the 1965 conflict, ‘the Soviet Union supplied arms and military equipment to India’. ‘T.N. Kaul Talk on Indo-Soviet Relations at the MEA’, 28 September 1966, Speeches/Writings (S. No. 11, Part 1), T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). 68 ‘A.S. Chib to Delhi’, 7 March 1966, WII/101/37/66, MEA, NAI; ‘NSC South Asia Policy Review’, 22 November 1969, FRUS (Vol. E-7). 69  ‘Kissinger–Rogers Conversation’, 24 October 1970, FRUS (Vol. E-7). 70  Damodaran and Bajpai, Indian Foreign Policy, 31. 71 A Review of India’s Foreign Policy, No. D.4977/FS/70, July 1970, MEA, NAI.



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Emergence of a Balance-of-Power Outlook It could be argued that external factors rather than policymakers’ beliefs shaped the changes in India’s foreign policy in the postNehru period. Shiv Shankar Menon, a former National Security Advisor, offers an interesting contrast between the structural contexts of the Nehru and Indira Gandhi periods. Although India had a favourable power imbalance in South Asia in both periods, globally, however, the bipolar balance worked against India in the Nehru period. By the late 1960s, and, especially after 1969, the changing global balance of power and alignments ‘suddenly’ opened options for India ‘to do things … to use the imbalance of power in South Asia in your favour, and, therefore you start doing things in Sri Lanka, in Bangladesh, in Sikkim … because you have an international environment within which you can do this’. In the 1950s, if India had sought to exercise its relative power in the subcontinent, ‘they [the superpowers] would both sit on you’. So India’s power ‘imbalance in South Asia was unusable’. Post-1969 was one of those ‘moments when the international situation actually cracks open’, enabling India to exploit an inherent advantage in its region.72 This fascinating reflection is akin to a structural mode of analysis where changing international conditions produce efficient and logical responses from states. It presumes preferences are largely fixed and a state will respond when external conditions evolve. While changes in the external environment certainly do alter the cost-benefit calculus for states, it is the policymakers’ goal preferences and choices that ultimately matter. In short, policy and strategy are ‘shaped not by the environment or a structure, but by the way that environment is defined or interpreted by the actors....’73 Hence, the availability of systemic windows does not imply that different policymakers will perceive, exploit, and finally act upon windows of opportunity in a similar fashion.

72 Personal

interview with Shiv Shankar Menon, New Delhi, 11 November 2014. 73  David Dessler and John Owen, ‘Constructivism and the Problem of Explanation: A Review Article’, Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 3 (2005): 598.

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Nehru’s definition of the national interest and a pan-Asian role conception had constrained the pursuit of a self-centred balance of power policy. For example, the change in Pakistan’s capabilities after the 1954 US–Pakistan alliance did not invite a balance of power response. While aware of Pakistan’s ‘superiority in firepower and air force’,74 Nehru rejected ‘rushing round the world exploring alternative sources of supply’. This would have meant ‘going to the Soviet Union’, which he felt was ‘wholly undesirable’.75 And it is not that opportunities did not exist. Soviet Defence Minister Georgy Zhukov had told India’s Air Chief in 1955 ‘that they could supply’ India with a more economical ‘light bomber immediately in any numbers required’. However, through the 1950s, Nehru was reluctant to exercise such an option,76 and his choices were not simply shaped by material factors but conditioned by his peacemaker role conception that was the antithesis of orthodox balance of power ideas. In 1956, when Moscow offered Delhi a friendship treaty to elevate political and strategic ties, the overture was rejected because Nehru felt it would have ‘adverse reactions and create misunderstandings in some countries. India was anxious not only for friendship with the Soviet Union but also to help in removing barriers to peace and understanding in the world. Anything that might come in the way of India’s role in this respect would not be helpful.’77 It was only in October 1960 that an Indian Defence team was dispatched to Moscow to explore Soviet military equipment.78 For the Indira Gandhi period, a narrower definition of national interest and a sub-regional image had conditioned policymakers to perceive the changing dynamics of the Cold War in the 1960s

74  In

1955, the US supplied Pakistan a large number of F-86 Sabre jet aircraft. 75  ‘To Foreign Secretary’, 9 December 1956, SWJN-SS, 36, 640. 76  ‘To Secretary General’, 10 November 1955, SWJN-SS, 30, 351–3. 77  ‘Subimal Dutt to K.P.S. Menon’, 27 July 1956 in Avtar Singh Bhasin, ed., Nepal–India, Nepal–China Relations, Documents 1947–June 2005, Volume 1 (New Delhi: Geetika Publishers, 2005), 388–9. 78 ‘US JCS to Secretary of Defense’, 15 November 1960, FRUS (Vol. XV).



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primarily in terms of their direct impact on India and its periphery. Much before the Sino-American rapprochement, Indian policymakers had anticipated such a possibility and sought to leverage the relationship with the Soviet Union to hedge against it. As early as March 1966, Indian diplomats had noticed a more flexible American posture towards China driven largely by the deepening Sino-Soviet rift.79 In February 1967, M.C. Chagla, the Foreign Minister, had remarked that there was ‘a growing feeling in US business circles to have a share in the trade with China’, who for its part ‘now looked upon the USSR as its enemy number 1. This could also prove to be a motivation for her getting close to the USA.’80 After Nixon’s famous October 1967 article in Foreign Affairs, Indian officials had been alerted to the real possibility of a US–China rapprochement.81 The impact of these changing great power equations on South Asia was also becoming apparent to Delhi. In 1969, Henry Kissinger told Indira Gandhi’s advisors that an India–Pakistan conflict would confront Washington ‘with choices we prefer not to have to make’.82 In October 1970, Indian policymakers learnt that Nixon and his advisors believed that in certain circumstances, Pakistan could ‘serve as a middle-man to bring about rapprochement between America and China’.83 By the late 1960s, the prospect of uncertainty in the geopolitical environment motivated Indira Gandhi and her advisors to contemplate a balance of power strategy by tapping a window of convergence with Moscow. Dhar had argued, the ‘main reason why the Soviet Union was keen to come closer to India was the increasing tension in their relations with China, which posed a threat to them as well as 79 

‘A.S. Chib to Foreign Secretary’, 20 July 1966, WII/101/37/66, MEA, NAI. 80  ‘Minutes of MEA Meeting with Senior Officials’, 4 February 1967, S.F. 91, M.C. Chagla Papers. 81  Then posted in Washington, Rasgotra recalls: ‘There were enough hints in the Foreign Affairs article and in the later Presidential remarks on various occasions that serious moves were contemplated towards US– China reconciliation’. Rasgotra, A Life in Diplomacy, 230. 82  ‘India–US Talks in Delhi’, 31 July 1969, FRUS (Vol. E-7). 83  ‘L.K. Jha to Swaran Singh’, 11 October 1970, S.F. 48, P.N.H. Papers (I & II Instalment).

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to us’. He therefore advised that India ‘should identify the defence equipment we want from the Soviet Union urgently as we may not have a similar opportunity after a year’.84 Dhar noted the fast changing Sino–Soviet and Pakistan–Soviet relations and urged Delhi to take advantage of these changes.85 After Indira Gandhi’s conversation with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in May 1969, India was ‘assured that the Soviet Union would always come to her aid in case of necessity’. The basic framework for a security treaty had been established in 1969.86 In short, in Indira Gandhi’s image and conception of security, it became ‘rational’ to exploit the balance of power to increase India’s freedom of action in the subcontinent. Yet, such a worldview did not imply that Indira Gandhi and her advisors conceived India’s role as a ‘swing state’ that would compromise its independence. Even after the Sino-Soviet split had altered the rigidity of the blocs, Indira Gandhi asserted that India would operate within its core self-image that sought to establish an independent personality for India on the world stage: I do not want to fall into the trap of the pundits of tripolarity. These are as alien to the true interests of India as the theories of bipolarity. 84 ‘Note

by T.N. Kaul’, 7 April 1969, S.F. 203, P.N.H. Papers (IIIInstalment). 85 ‘D.P. Dhar to T.N. Kaul’, 9 October 1969, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II & III). 86  In her conversation with Soviet Premier Kosygin, Indira Gandhi had emphasized that ‘nothing should be done from which it could be inferred that the Soviet Union treated India at par with Pakistan … an equidistance between India and Pakistan tended to cause irritation in India’. She also raised the possibility of a military threat from China with Kosygin expressing a willingness to incorporate the idea of ‘mutual assistance’ in a treaty. ‘Indira Gandhi–Kosygin Conversation’, 6 May 1969, S.F. 140, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). Kaul later recorded Moscow’s calculus during 1969: ‘China is mending her fences with the West … it is necessary for India to strengthen itself politically, economically, and militarily. Soviet Union will be willing to help India in all these fields.’ Moscow and Delhi should ‘give serious thought to some kind of an arrangement … to meet any possible threats from China in this region’. ‘T.N. Kaul to Haksar’, June 1971, S.F. 258, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment).



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The fact is that the world does not consist merely of one or two or even Three Big Powers, however big they may be. There are also a very large number of nations, which are sensitive, assertive and proud of their individual personalities. We certainly want to be friends, but let us not be too exercised about where we stand with Russia, China and America. What is important is that we stand for ourselves.87

Therefore, leveraging the balance of power did not imply that India would help aggregate the moral or material capabilities or advance the collective interests of even a friendly bloc. Indira Gandhi explained: ‘Most of these superpowers would like to have spheres of interests. Although we are very friendly with them, we do not agree with this attitude of theirs and we are certainly not going to help them to have this kind of sphere of influence.’88 Similarly, Haksar evaluated India’s equation with a great power based on whether it helped to ‘protect and promote India’s independence, sovereignty, security and capacity….’89 Moreover, importantly, relations with the great powers were assessed not just in its bilateral dimensions but also in terms of ‘their attitudes to the subcontinent as a whole’.90 It is instructive to notice how Haksar and Indira Gandhi’s images were devoid of extra-regional concerns, which were so central to Nehru’s images, and instead focused entirely on an Indian sphere of interest. Although India had visibly shifted to a more Indo-centric approach, this belief was entirely consistent with non-­alignment. Thus, in continuity with the Nehru period, Indira Gandhi’s approach was incompatible with a great power seeking a transactional relationship with India. For example, the Johnson ­administration’s carrot-and-stick policy of linking economic aid 87 Masani,

Indira Gandhi, 255. Indira Gandhi, The Years of Endeavour: Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, August 1969–August 1972 (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1975), 686. 89 V.D. Chopra, ed., Studies in Indo-Soviet Relations (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1986), 13. 90  Gandhi, ‘India and the World’, 76. 88 

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to influence Indian policy was ineffective because it conflicted with India’s non-alignment, which was still preserved in Indira Gandhi’s worldview.91 Robert Horn’s study on Indo-Soviet relations for the period 1969 to the mid-1970s is also instructive.92 Despite a coincidence of interests, Delhi did not yield any substantial ground on forging common interests on issues that mattered most to Moscow such as policies on China, superpower relations, and Asian security norms. Rather, India gained relatively more from the Soviet Union despite a power asymmetry. As Indira Gandhi herself reflected, ‘When matters vitally concerning our national security and integrity, such as Goa, Kashmir and … Bangladesh, became subjects of international controversy, the Soviets’ assessment of the merits of the case coincided largely with our own.’93 On the other hand, when the Soviet Union sought to co-opt India into a collective security Asian role in 1969, Delhi resisted such overtures and maintained focus on its immediate security concerns regarding Pakistan and China. D.P. Dhar had told Kosygin in March 1971 that India would support ‘efforts for organizing some type of a collective security ­system … in which all Asian states would be fully represented’.94 Similarly, India did not endorse the ‘Brezhnev proposal’ in 1969 with Foreign Minister Swaran Singh informing Nixon that ‘India had not been asked to join any military pact and would not do so’.95 While in the Nehru period, great power relations were viewed from the perspective of Asian and systemic stability (within which India’s basic security was deemed to be inter-linked), in the Indira

91 

‘Johnson Conversation with US Secretary of Agriculture’, 2 February 1966, FRUS (Vol. XXV-South Asia). 92 Robert C. Horn, Soviet–Indian Relations: Issues and Influence (New York: Praeger, 1982), xvii. Also see Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland, ‘Institutions and Worldviews in Indian Foreign Security Policy’, India Review 11, no. 2 (2012): 85. 93  Gandhi, ‘India and the World’, 73. 94 Bhasin, India–Pakistan Relations, Volume III, 1357. 95 ‘Record of Foreign Minister’s Talk with Nixon on 10 and 19 July 1969’, S.F. 42, P.N.H. Papers (I & II Instalments).



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Gandhi period the image shifted to evaluating great power relations in terms of their impact on South Asian security. Correspondingly, Nehru’s conception of India’s role as a bridge-builder vis-à-vis the East–West divide in Asia was displaced by an alternative security seeker role that sought to leverage extra-regional conflicts to produce security in a narrower geopolitical realm.

Ends Shape the Means—We ‘Will Resist Force’ Military balancing was not the default outlook in Nehru’s beliefs. This is best illustrated by Menon’s 1957 statement: Today, the position is not what it was in 1947. Our neighbour is linked up in military alliances stretching from Istanbul to our frontiers, and supported by some of the very powerful countries of the world…. Therefore, when these pact systems, apart from the general world context, protrude, project the instrument of war and threats of aggression to our land and menace our security, it becomes absolutely necessary for us to [resist this trend].

Menon then elaborated the means of this resistance: ‘So, while we have only the method of persuasion, we have only the method of protest, we have only the method of disassociation from the pacts, as a Government, in the pursuit of our pacific foreign policy, it is necessary for us to use all constitutional procedures to international systems and to express our views in this way.’96 Such beliefs would lose much of their resonance in the 1960s. ‘The stalemate on the Jammu and Kashmir issue, India’s defeat at the hands of China … the more proximate experience of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war’ influenced Indira Gandhi’s thinking. She felt that Nehru’s approach ‘was not responsive to the chemistry of power, which remained a decisive factor in international ­politics’.97 One of Indira Gandhi’s earliest foreign policy speeches in 1966 revealed the shift in thinking. While ­asserting the virtues 96 Appadorai, Select Documents, Volume I, 39–40. Also, see Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 183. 97 Dixit, Makers of India’s Foreign Policy, 121–2.

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of co-existence, she noted that ‘some countries’ did not accept this philosophy. ‘They see the world as a stereotype moulded in their own image. This is a false and dangerous doctrine which we repudiate.’ She warned that India ‘will resist force’.98 In her first major UN speech in 1968, Indira Gandhi reflected on the declining salience of Nehru’s ideas. Nehru, she argued, believed in seeking areas of agreement and cooperation and ‘strove to bring about a new system’ of international relations. His concepts evoked ‘some response’ from nations but they also ‘received severe jolts’. Evoking an image of a tough external environment, Indira Gandhi exclaimed, ‘Economic and military power continue to dominate politics. The carving out of spheres of influence still motivates policies and actions…. Nations continue to place narrow national ends above the larger purpose of peace and universal security.’ In an atmosphere where sheer power prevails over principle, ‘those who have attempted to eschew the use of force have had to pay the price of restraint’.99 Not only was the inefficacy of Nehru’s approach laid bare, the idea that force was a normal aspect of international politics was explicitly recognized. The contrasting outlooks of Nehru and Indira Gandhi on the relationship between means and ends in statecraft can also be traced to their domestic political experiences. Unlike Nehru who had inherited the mantle of India’s leadership from Gandhi without challenge from his peers, Indira Gandhi’s ascent was fiercely contested within the Congress Party. For Nehru, sustaining a consensus was a trait acquired and encouraged by Gandhi through the decades long independence movement. Nehru himself testified that he ‘represented a link between various sets of ideas’, which ‘helped somewhat in toning down the differences and emphasizing the essential unity of our struggle’.100 In contrast, Indira Gandhi’s contested path to power had demonstrated the efficacy of entirely different means to shape politics, especially the instrumental use 98 

Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, January 1966–August 1969 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1971), 404. 99  Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, 356–8. 100  Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1959), 214.



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of ideology to outflank opponents. At the time of the Congress Party split in 1969, Haksar had advised Indira Gandhi ‘that the best way to vanquish the Syndicate (the Congress old guard) would be to convert the struggle for personal power into an ideological one’. She had ‘acted on it at once’.101 Both Indira Gandhi and Haksar were not averse to pursuing more radical means to advance change and held a preference for calculated risk taking.102 Indira Gandhi had a conscious self-image of an ‘amoral and ruthless’ politician, once famously remarking, ‘People call Gandhiji a saint, actually it was my father who was a saint.’103 T.N. Kaul elaborates on this trait. She sometimes ‘gave the impression of itching to create a crisis in order to test the strength or weakness of her opponents. She left her options open; if she found them too strong she was willing to compromise, and if she found them weak, she had no compunction in destroying them’.104 Externally too, both leaders had a different approach to statecraft. For Nehru, the reputation and credibility of India’s non-­alignment was important because of his peacemaker role conception and the attendant interaction culture that he was promoting to stabilize Asian geopolitics. In the post-Nehru period, such concern for external perception became less important because India’s role had been re-constructed to prioritize security on its immediate periphery. By the turn of the 1960s, with outright SinoSoviet conflict and growing signs of Sino-American reconciliation, Indira Gandhi argued for an instrumental outlook to the flux in the Cold War: No country is a permanent foe or a permanent friend ... we must try to increase our friendship, but all the time we have to be prepared for any other situation when … a country which is not our friend may decide for various reasons to become our friend. Our whole attitude must be flexible in these matters.105 When we are rigid,

101 Malhotra,

Indira Gandhi, 116–17. Indira Gandhi, 123. Sarkar, P.N. Haksar, 66. 103 Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 123. 104  T.N. Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), 172–3. 105 Gandhi, The Years of Endeavour, 680, 684. 102 Dhar,

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it helps those who are against us. They will have maneuverability and can move about, while we are stuck. We become a good target for anybody. Therefore, we must have a certain amount of flexibility and maneuverability, but … it must be consistent with national interests and honour.106

A puritanical concern for India’s reputation for equidistance became less important than pursuing concrete ends. As Swaran Singh, Foreign Minister under Indira Gandhi, explained: ‘... where our own national interests are involved, where our own security is involved, when we stand in need of any military equipment of a sophisticated nature … I shall have no hesitation in getting that equipment or that material from any source whatsoever’.107 Policymakers no longer had to confront the dilemma of seeking to avoid a potential dichotomy between norms guiding India’s statecraft in South Asia and norms guiding India’s actions elsewhere. For Indira Gandhi, ‘if path and goal were in conflict, it is the goal that would have priority’.108 Nehru, on the other hand, had sought to consciously minimize the dichotomy between norms that India was propagating to counteract the Cold War in Asia and norms that guided India’s subcontinental behaviour. As Dwarka Nath Chatterjee, a former diplomat close to Indira Gandhi, observes, ‘Nehru tended to avert his eyes from the positive and even liberating role of military might…. In Kashmir he was obliged to use force because he had no other option, but his ambivalent attitude to the Hyderabad operation and to the invasion of Goa reflected his instinctive aversion to even a mild form of necessary realpolitik.’109 In 1955, rejecting demands for ‘police action’ on Goa, Nehru had declared that India ‘must adhere to peaceful methods’.110 Goa had ‘become a test case…. But even more important than Goa is how we behave. 106 Gandhi,

The Years of Endeavour, 687–8. Bangladesh Documents, Volume 1 (New Delhi: Government of India, 1971), 706. 108 Baldev Raj Nayar, India’s Mixed Economy: The Role of Ideology and Interest in its Development (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1989), 256. 109 Sarkar, P.N. Haksar, 67. 110  ‘To Chief Minister’, 20 July 1955, SWJN-SS, 29, 438. 107 



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If we go to pieces, then everything else loses its significance and importance.’111 Deploring the Anglo-French military invasion of Egypt in 1956, Nehru juxtaposed it with India’s approach: ‘The Portuguese have to go…. But we are putting up with their actions because as far as possible we wish to avoid fighting and military action.’112 Nehru’s beliefs did not constrain the pursuit of core interests per se but they did constrain how these interests were to be defended. The peaceful method was linked to ‘the whole roots’ of India’s ‘policies and behaviour’.113 And deviation from that approach would expose India ‘as deceitful hypocrites’ who ‘say one thing and do another’.114 The ultimate adoption of an alternative power-based method in Goa was a reluctant last resort after repeated failures of a negotiations-based approach. As Menon later recalled, Nehru ‘didn’t like the vulgarity and the cruelty’ of the December 1961 Operation Vijay, ‘but at the same time he wanted the results—the liberation of Indian territory’.115 In contrast, the settlement with France over Pondicherry was the exemplar for Nehru, ‘a symbol of friendly solution by negotiated settlement between nations’.116 Nehru’s peacemaker role instilled a preference for restraint and ethical statecraft and ‘wished its image to remain unsullied’.117 Indira Gandhi’s instinctive approach to power politics was complemented by advisors such as Haksar and R.N. Kao, her intelligence chief, who sought to promote an advantageous realpolitik. It has been suggested that unlike Nehru, Haksar’s beliefs were not influenced by Gandhi. Consequently, Haksar differed from Nehru ‘in his greater understanding of the function of force in international relations’. As a student of Mao’s military tactics and well versed with

111 

‘To Chief Minister’, 26 August 1955, SWJN-SS, 29, 441. ‘Speech’, 1 November 1956, SWJN-SS, 35, 57. 113 Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 118. 114 Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 122. 115 Brecher, India and World Politics, 131. Also, see Arthur G. Rubinoff, India’s Use of Force in Goa (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1971). 116 Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, 107. 117  A.P. Rana, ‘The Intellectual Dimensions of India’s Nonalignment’, The Journal of Asian Studies 28, no. 2 (February 1969): 312. 112 

Source: Author.

High sensitivity to local balance of power and external involvement in the subcontinent

Extended Asian neighbourhood as a peripheral area

Bipolar world entrenched and superpowers do not need bridges

Regional system is intimidating and requires ‘toughness’

Subcontinent as the core domain and of ‘special concern’

Security Seeker role

Orientation Images about world order and security

Spatial

Indira Gandhi’s images Scope of region

Role conception

Table 5.1  Indira Gandhi’s Security Seeker Role Conception

Modes of behaviour

Instrumental

Avoid extra-regional responsibilities or involvement

Shaping subcontinental Leverage the balance of order is of paramount power importance Coercion is no longer Counter-Cold War eschewed spillover in sub­ continent India ‘will resist force’

Interests, goals, functions

Functional



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the notion of war as the extension of politics, Haksar embodied an Indian realpolitik approach in the post-Nehru era.118 He played an important part in encouraging institutional innovation to buttress India’s material capabilities. For example, Indira Gandhi’s decision to create a dedicated external intelligence arm, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), headed by one of her most trusted advisors, Kao, underscored an outlook that India needed to develop ‘the instruments of statecraft’ to pursue its strategic interests in South Asia. ‘The habits of using state power’ were part of Indira Gandhi’s core beliefs.119 By bifurcating the intelligence structure and empowering Kao, Indira Gandhi had an instrument that could see beyond the immediate and engage in strategic thinking.120 In sum, Nehru’s statecraft, where accommodation and strategic restraint was at the core of his beliefs relating to force, was displaced by a competing approach where the idea of force had been shorn of much of its moral and ethical injunctions. The severing of Nehru’s image of an indivisible Asian system, where India’s security was seen to be interlinked with the larger geopolitics of the great powers, in favour of a contracted and divisible image of security confined to the subcontinent further reinforced the growing importance of coercive power in Indira Gandhi’s preferred modes of behaviour. The following three chapters examine three significant events in the Indira Gandhi period—the second Indochina crisis of 1965–6, the second East Bengal crisis of 1971, and the Sikkim crisis. This phase reflects the post-Nehru contraction of India’s ‘region’ from an extended Asian neighbourhood to the subcontinent’s immediate vicinity, with the three cases together revealing some common strands in Indira Gandhi’s statecraft and how policymakers navigated the growing uncertainty and geopolitical re-­alignments in Asia to ultimately craft a commanding position in the subcontinent. 118 Sarkar,

P.N. Haksar, 67–8. Personal interview with Inder Malhotra, New Delhi, 16 December 2014. 119 Personal interview with Shiv Shankar Menon, New Delhi, 11 November 2014. 120  Personal interview with a former intelligence official, New Delhi, 19 November 2014.

6 Vietnam War and India, 1965–6

The interests of America, USSR and India have a common feature of being aimed at the prevention of Chinese expansion in this area. This provides an opportunity for India to reap the maximum possible advantage from both sides and strengthen herself for the future. —T.N. Kaul to Indira Gandhi (September 1965) To be active for peace in Vietnam is in our interest…. We will be deluding ourselves if we think … that we fulfill our role as a large Asian ex-colonial country. —V.K. Krishna Menon (April 1966)

Until the 1954 Geneva Agreement, Vietnam had been part of French Indochina. Although the first Indochina war finally ended Vietnam’s colonial status, it simultaneously introduced a Cold War complexion into the area because of the ideological and strategic affiliations of Vietnam’s anti-colonial struggle as well as America’s parallel involvement to influence Vietnam’s geopolitical course. The 1954 Agreements had sought to address both the roots and the effects of that conflict: to establish a truce before a final political settlement; to end the colonial status of the Indochinese states; and to alleviate Cold War pressures by insulating the region from great power military interference. Vietnam was the only Indochinese state where a ceasefire line was drawn at the 17th Parallel and forces led by Ho Chi Minh and their South Vietnamese rivals regrouped

Power and Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policies during the Cold War. Zorawar Daulet Singh, Oxford University Press (2019). © Zorawar Daulet Singh. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199489640.003.0007



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to the north and south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). During the Geneva discussions it was envisaged that both the Northern and Southern Vietnamese groups would consult in 1955, paving the way for nationwide elections and an eventual unification of the country. However, neither consultations nor the elections were held, largely because of a fear in the South and in the US that a national election would bring Vietnam under the complete sway of the communists. Hence, since 1955, the DMZ had become a de facto partition line, with Vietnam embroiled in a constant state of internal friction.1 This interregnum of a simmering conflict was finally broken in 1964. The Vietnam War would escalate through the 1960s witnessing a massive US military intervention to resist the North Vietnamese, aided by communist China, from unifying the entire country. Between October 1961 and January 1968, America’s direct military footprint in Vietnam increased from a few hundred military advisors to 579,000 ground troops.2 Why have historians largely overlooked India’s policy in the ­second Indochina crisis?3 One reason might be that Indian 1 

‘MEA Note on Vietnam Crisis’, 30 November 1964, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 1), MEA, NAI. 2 R.P. Kaushik and Susheela Kaushik, Back to the Front: The Unfinished Story in Vietnam (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1979), 31, 35–6. For a useful historical overview also see D.R. Sardesai, Vietnam: Trials and Tribulations of a Nation (New Delhi: Promilla & Co., 1988). 3  Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995); Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Sergey Radchenko, Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittinger, The Search for Peace in Vietnam, 1964–1968 (Texas A&M University Press, 2004); Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996); Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); David Kraslow and Stuart H. Loory, The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1968).

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peacemaking during the first Indochina crisis has overshadowed ­attention on India’s response to the Vietnam War.4 Another reason might be that the sheer inefficacy of Indian attempts to temper the latter conflict has discouraged research on this period. To be sure, ‘the reasons for India’s ineffectiveness in Vietnam’ and the international constraints that made peacemaking a futile endeavour have been explored.5 What has not been dwelt upon is that the worldview that had shaped India’s foreign policy in the 1950s had been displaced by a very different frame of reference for policymakers after Nehru.6 What remains largely obscured are the changing images and perceptions that conditioned India’s policy during the second Indochina conflict. Here, I address a question in line with my larger study: Had images regarding India’s legitimate space for regional activity, orientation to the external environment, and functional purpose changed in the 1960s? And if so, how did this ideational shift condition Indian motivations and responses to the escalation in Vietnam? These questions cannot be addressed merely by demonstrating the inefficacy of Indian actions. Rather, by critically examining confidential and public debates prior to and during the crisis we might discover the dominant reasons for Indira Gandhi’s choices. More broadly, this chapter 4 Sardesai’s

study, for example, stops in 1964. D.R. Sardesai, Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, 1947–1964 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). A brief historical survey is also contained in Ramesh Thakur, ‘India’s Vietnam Policy, 1946–1979’, Asian Survey 19, no. 10 (October 1979): 957–76. 5 Mark A. Lawrence, ‘The Limits of Peacemaking: India and the Vietnam War, 1962–1968’, in The Search for Peace in Vietnam, eds Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittinger (Texas: A&M University Press, 2004), 231–59. 6 To be clear, Lawrence’s main research question was different: ‘Why, despite a belief widely shared around the world that Vietnam should be neutralized and international tensions reduced in South East Asia, was there no peaceful solution of the conflict?’ Lawrence, ‘The Limits of Peacemaking’, 233. ‘India’s failures merit close attention because they illustrate the impediments woven deeply into the fabric of the international system that prohibited a peaceful resolution to the Indochina crisis during the 1960s.’ Lawrence, ‘The Limits of Peacemaking’, 256.



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examines India’s foreign policy flux after two traumatic security events in the subcontinent—the 1962 and 1965 wars—displaced Nehru’s peacemaker role conception with an alternative security seeker role. India’s response to the Vietnam war was underpinned by a combination of instrumental motives aimed at extracting economic and military assistance from the two superpowers, and balance-of-power motives aimed at arresting Chinese influence in South East Asia. If during the first Indochina crisis, Nehru had looked beyond South Asia to stabilize the Cold War in the extended neighbourhood, in the second Indochina crisis, Indira Gandhi re-oriented India’s foreign policy with an eye on cultivating and exploiting an Asian balance of power that could secure India’s position in its sub-regional setting. Structured chronologically, the crisis has been divided into two parts. The first section examines India’s changing perceptions on Vietnam after the India–China conflict, which, as I discussed in Chapter 5, was the first traumatic event that triggered a role flux away from Nehruvian beliefs on security. Examining this phase is important because many of the nascent beliefs and images on regional security would also manifest and evolve during the subsequent period. I then divide the Indira Gandhi section into two main phases. Between January and June 1966, policymakers perceived the renewed escalation in Vietnam as largely peripheral to more immediate material interests related to India’s domestic economic problems. Indira Gandhi adopted a largely passive posture on Vietnam but one that was still distinct from alternative roles like those of a classic peacemaker or a frontline state aligned with one of the superpowers. After July 1966, India suddenly assumed a more active posture backed by quiet diplomacy and sharper public pronouncements on the crisis. This shift was brought about by changing Indian perceptions regarding Asian geopolitics and Indira Gandhi’s attempt to re-position India to exploit the changing balance of power and alignments in Asia. The conclusion will explore whether Indira Gandhi’s fluctuating postures during this crisis reflected domestic ideological contestations over India’s foreign policy or an attempt to legitimize her fledgling regime at home.

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Crisis Outbreak: Declining Salience for a Peacemaker Role By the late 1950s, growing India–China hostility began to shape India’s Vietnam policy. Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) diplomats noticed these changes, especially among Indian officials posted at the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICSC), which had been established after the 1954 Geneva agreement to monitor the ceasefire in Vietnam. ‘Since 1958 the ICSC has not only not thwarted the US in their military aggression in the South and their breaking of the Geneva Accords, but with each day its activity deviates from the principal goals of the Geneva Accords, and in many cases goes beyond the framework of the accords.’ In recent years, India had ‘been getting closer to the West, especially the US, with each day’. The DRVN felt the Indian delegation was executing ‘the instructions of US policy in Southeast Asia’.7 The contrast with the previous years is stark: between 1954 and 1959, Indian delegation votes at the ICSC had favoured the North Vietnamese in 72 per cent of its decisions.8 The impact of 1962 can also be seen in this impression of a Polish diplomat in Delhi: ‘It does not seem that India has a clear policy’ in Vietnam. ‘Nehru himself … would be willing to pull India out of Vietnam in order to “leave the PRC and the US one on one”.’ A ‘great deal of the Indian apparatus shares sympathy for [South Vietnam’s leader] Diem due to ideological reasons which increased in light of the conflict with the PRC’.9

7 ‘Secret

Telegram from Chodorek (Hanoi) to Morski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 15053]’, 25 November 1963, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AMSZ, Warsaw; 6/77, w-96, t-1368, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska. Published in CWIHP Working Paper No. 45, available at http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118984. 8  Thakur, ‘India’s Vietnam Policy’, 961. 9  ‘Secret Telegram from Ogrodziński (New Delhi) to Wierna (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 3359]’, 15 March 1963, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, 1963: w-102, t-608, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska. Published in CWIHP Working Paper No. 45, available at http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/ 118946.



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Even if somewhat exaggerated, these cables nevertheless reflect the shift away from the peacemaker role that India had pursued in the 1950s towards defining the crisis more through the prism of India’s own sub-regional security problems. India’s changing posture was largely based on a belief that America was balancing Chinese power in East Asia.10 Nehru’s approach to Vietnam in his final years resembled the non-interference and passivity towards Indochina before 1954. But then he was never confronted with a major escalation and the outbreak of hostilities. Although the friction between North and South Vietnam had been rising since 1961, the outbreak of the war occurred during the tenure of Lal Bahadur Shastri, Nehru’s successor, after the latter’s death in May 1964. August 1964 witnessed the first major escalation with the Gulf of Tonkin incidents and a skirmish between the US Seventh Fleet and DRVN patrol boats. The US quickly escalated the situation by carrying out 64 bombing sorties over North Vietnamese coastal bases, oil dumps, and installations.11 After an emergency cabinet meeting, Delhi issued a largely anodyne statement expressing concern and hope that the ‘uneasy peace’ in the area would be ‘restored’. In view of the competing versions of the incident and India’s position as neutral Chairman of the ICSC, Delhi felt it was neither expedient nor desirable to lay blame on any one party.12 The year 1965 would witness further conflict in Vietnam with the Lyndon Johnson administration deepening America’s military footprint.13 On 7 February 1965, 49 US fighter jets 10 For example, during the India–China crisis, Y.D. Gundevia, India’s Commonwealth Secretary, had told the US envoy in Delhi that he disfavoured a US pullout from Vietnam. John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 273. Also see Lawrence, ‘The Limits of Peacemaking’, 238–9. 11  ‘The Tonkin Gulf Incidents’, 30 November 1964, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 1), MEA, NAI. 12  ‘India’s Statement on Gulf of Tonkin Incident’, 5 August 1964 and ‘MEA note on Vietnam Situation’, 10 August 1964 in NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 1), MEA, NAI. 13 US involvement rose dramatically: 38,400 troops by end April, 60,000 troops by June, 150,000 troops by October. Indian officials in Saigon estimated that the US could even double ‘their forces’. Reports

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bombed ­military barracks and staging camps in the southern portion of North Vietnam in a retaliation to a Vietcong attack on an American camp in Pleiku, 240 miles north of Saigon. In another retaliatory raid the following day, 34 US and 69 South Vietnamese fighter bombers attacked the Vinh Linh area immediately north of the 17th Parallel.14 These incidents prompted an immediate reaction from Delhi. In a 7 February interview, Shastri remarked that India firmly held that the 1954 Agreements were the sole means of finding a peaceful settlement, and it would support the idea of calling for a Geneva-type conference. A formal Indian statement was issued the following day expressing ‘grave concern’ and urging that for the sake of ‘peace in Asia and the world, a war must be avoided’. It called for the independence of regional countries ‘without interference from any quarter’. Delhi refused to apportion blame and called for suspending ‘all provocative action’ in South and North Vietnam.15 Shastri also appealed to US President Johnson and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin to do all that they could to ensure that peace was not disturbed and urged the two leaders to meet.16 International reactions to Indian pronouncements were mixed. The Americans reacted negatively. They felt ‘it was not an appropriate time to go to the Conference table’ until they had assurances that North Vietnamese ‘subversion, infiltration and sabotage’ had ceased. South Vietnam also opposed any diplomacy. The Soviets, on the other hand, welcomed India’s proposal and favoured an immediate ‘Geneva-type Conference provided American b ­ ombings on 17 North Vietnam is stopped’. Each side hoped India could bridge from Consul General of India, Saigon to MEA, Delhi for the year 1965, HI/1012(38)/65, MEA, NAI. By end of 1965, America had deployed 200,000 ground troops in Vietnam. Kaushik and Kaushik, Back to the Front, 35. 14 ‘MEA Note on Recent Developments in Vietnam’, 12 February 1965, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 1), MEA, NAI. 15 ‘Shastri Statements on Vietnam on 7 and 8 February 1965’, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 1), MEA, NAI. 16 ‘MEA Note on Recent Developments in Vietnam’, 12 February 1965, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 1), MEA, NAI. 17 ‘Commonwealth Secretary to Permanent Mission, New York’, 17 February 1965, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 1), MEA, NAI.



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this divide: the US preference for coercion through bombing versus the Soviet preference for an early political settlement through conference diplomacy.18 But Delhi pulled back from its proposal after gauging reluctance from the US and its allies. It was ‘difficult to contemplate a conference while fighting of such intensity and proportions’ was going on, Shastri admitted. India did ‘not wish to pronounce on the actions of either of the contestants or to apportion blame. Our sole concern is to deal with the present situation in a pragmatic way.’19 A further setback to the old Geneva agreement occurred on 13 February, when the DRVN asked the ICSC to withdraw their fixed monitoring teams from North Vietnam, stating that US bombing had imperilled their security. A week later, the fixed ICSC teams were withdrawn to Hanoi from North Vietnam.20 While we still know little about internal deliberations during this time, parliamentary debates are useful to gauge the different beliefs on Vietnam policy. Some opposition leaders like Bhupesh Gupta wondered why the Government had not done ‘something more than merely expressing concern’ and why the US had not been called upon ‘to respect the Geneva Agreement and withdraw their troops and military personnel’. Gupta also questioned why the Government had not addressed the US bombing escalation ‘instead of equating the parties as if all are equally guilty’. The political right, in contrast, advocated supporting America’s anti-communist struggle. C.D. Pande, for instance, argued ‘the whole trouble is not only due to the Americans but also due to the Chinese. The Chinese are at the borders.’ If America was 18 ‘MEA

Note on Recent Developments in Vietnam’, 12 February 1965, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 1), MEA, NAI. 19 ‘Shastri to Pearson’, 14 February 1965, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 1), MEA, NAI. 20 Under the 1954 Geneva Agreement, fixed and mobile teams composed of the three delegations (India, Canada, and Poland) constituting the ICSC were located in North and South Vietnam for supervising the ceasefire and monitoring other provisions of the agreement (that is, the introduction of unauthorized war material and equipment). These fixed teams were located at ports, frontier points, and other strategic locations. NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 1), MEA, NAI.

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s­upporting South East Asia from the Chinese challenge, ‘you ­cannot denounce that country … you should help them’. ‘If China will not or is not going to intrude on the liberties of the South East Asian countries, I say American soldiers should withdraw. If you are helpless in regard to China, then the US should do what they can.’ This concern of a potential power vacuum being filled by China after a US withdrawal from Indochina was expressed by other leaders too.21 Shastri’s ‘pragmatic’ role choice of benign neutrality leaning in favour of the US can be juxtaposed with alternative role conceptions: more active peacemaker and anti-colonial postures on the one hand, and more strident anti-communist and collective security postures on the other. Shastri’s approach can also be contrasted with worldviews below the apex level: another layer of more sophisticated balance of power images in the assessments from senior Indian diplomats posted in Moscow, Beijing, New York, and Vietnam. The crux of these assessments was that de-escalation of the crisis and attempting to shape its course held several geopolitical advantages for a more sustainable balance in South East Asia. This contrasted with the dominant belief that a largely passive response to America’s military escalation in Vietnam would accord natural advantages to India. Reduction of US bombing was seen as a key prerequisite to increasing Moscow’s ability to assume a more constructive role, and thus potentially arrive at a common ground with Washington on Vietnam. Given the parallel Sino-Soviet dispute and competition for influence among socialist and developing countries, relentless American bombing complicated Moscow’s role and impelled the Soviets to project a united front with the Vietnamese. T.N. Kaul had argued that US bombing had prevented the Soviets from exercising ‘a moderating influence with pro-Chinese elements in North Vietnam’.22 21 

‘Lok Sabha Debate on Vietnam’, 25 February 1965, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 1), MEA, NAI. 22 ‘C.S. Jha to T.N. Kaul’, 3 March 1965, S.F. 15, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). Later in the year, Apa Pant also reported along these lines. The Polish Ambassador had told Apa Pant in November 1965 that the US calculus for escalation seemed to be ‘that the Soviet–China



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The leader of the Indian delegation and the ICSC Chairman in Vietnam, M.A. Rahman, also appraised the escalating crisis in complex balance of power terms. The February 1965 Kosygin visit to Hanoi had the ‘political motive’ of weaning away DRVN from its total dependence on China. Rahman noted that the recently reported amelioration of US–Soviet relations suggested that a superpower modus vivendi in Vietnam was possible. An escalation would push the North Vietnamese closer to the Chinese, an outcome not particularly relished by the Vietnamese, who remained China’s ‘natural and historical enemy’. A major conflict that necessitated Chinese intervention would squeeze out the influence of independent North Vietnamese leaders such as Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong.23 From India’s perspective, ‘the maximum displacement of Chinese influence in the DRVN’ was desirable both for a moderate solution and for the initiation of a US–Soviet conversation ‘leading to eventual political settlement by the instrument of a Geneva or similar conference’.24 Bridgebuilding had acquired a realpolitik flavour: cultivating an area of agreement between the US and Soviets in Vietnam would roll back Chinese influence and improve the regional balance of power and alignments in India’s favour. The Indian CDA in Beijing, Jagat S. Mehta, analysed that US bombing was, paradoxically, intensifying the Sino-Soviet split since competition for tactical advantage between Moscow and China had not ceased even in the face of a common threat. Mehta dispelled Delhi’s fears of a Sino-Russian ­rapprochement: The Sino-Soviet rivalry within the communist movement was conflict gives them a chance to use the strong-arm-methods in Vietnam without any reserve’. US bombing also increased North Vietnamese dependence on the Chinese: ‘Though the North Vietnamese are willing to start exploring the possibility of negotiations for a ceasefire and peace, the US continue to force the pace of war and put the USSR in a most difficult situation.’ ‘Apa B. Pant to C.S. Jha’, 19 November 1965, S.F. 15, Apa B. Pant Papers (Instalment I). 23  ‘M.A. Rahman’s Report on the Situation in Vietnam’, 23 February 1965, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 1), MEA, NAI. 24  ‘M.A. Rahman’s Report on the Situation in Vietnam’, 23 February 1965, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 1), MEA, NAI.

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‘still at the core of their respective attitudes’ to the Vietnam conflict. He also highlighted Chinese–North Vietnamese cleavages and that Beijing did not trust the loyalty of Ho Chi Minh and the DRVN. Unlike the Soviets, the PRC had made no pledge for a ‘unified Vietnam under DRVN leadership’. The US, for its part, held a weak hand in terms of chronic instability in South Vietnam: ‘the eleventh hour of any purely non-communist dispensation in Vietnam seems at hand’. Given America’s deteriorating strategic position in Indochina, ‘the real problem is how can the end come without jeopardizing … the interests of those, like us, who do not relish the extension of Chinese philosophy or her dominion over South Asia. Such a stabilization cannot come through a military solution only.’ Mehta argued that China would obstruct any path that tempered the conflict in Vietnam and it was ‘ominous and significant’ that Beijing seemed ‘to be arguing against all those who counsel patience to the Vietcong’. India, thus, needed to counsel the West to encourage the Soviets, who were looking for common ground with the US, to preserve peace. One could only hope that the Americans had ‘a reasonable appreciation of the diversity of interest and incipient tensions’ in the communist world.25 Brajesh C. Mishra, from the Permanent Mission in New York, argued that given the great power cleavages and diversity of political objectives in Vietnam, India should directly engage the North Vietnamese for there was ‘some room for maneuver which may lead to rapprochement with North Vietnam’.26 But there is little evidence that such sophisticated assessments found traction with Shastri and his advisors. Delhi’s peacemaking postures continued to be shaped largely by the bilateral equation with Washington. This is brought out in a meeting between Shastri and Averell Harriman, Johnson’s special envoy, in March 1965. Harriman emphasized America’s ‘determination to stay with the job’ until North Vietnam ceased its interference in the South. He 25 

‘J.S. Mehta to C.S. Jha’, 22 February 1965, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 2), MEA, NAI. 26 ‘Brajesh Mishra to R.C. Arora’, 15 April 1965, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 2), MEA, NAI.



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also ruled out the idea of talks and dissuaded Shastri from pursuing any peacemaking proposals like the French or Soviet ones for a Geneva-type conference. Referring to such conciliatory approaches as ‘unhelpful’, Harriman persuaded Shastri in not joining the Soviets in their effort. Harriman’s meeting with Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, however, was less agreeable than the conversation with Shastri and his main advisor, L.K. Jha. The conversation with Singh, which included discussions on Southeast Asia, ‘was reported to have included a number of sharp exchanges’.27 Harriman’s subsequent record of his Delhi visit offers another window into the pre-Indira Gandhi period and the regional role flux that began after the 1962 war:28 I feel today quite a new attitude towards US and the world situation reflected by Indian officials as well as press. I almost felt I was in a different country. With one exception, discussions with Indian Ministers and officials were relaxed and frank with full agreement on such matters as aggressive intents of Red China, need to prevent Reds’ take-over in South Vietnam and SEA, willingness to consider objectively our policies and work with us for common objectives in other areas of world…. All in all, I am much more hopeful of India and feel we can expect her to play more effective role towards free world objectives.

Harriman also revealed the presence of competing beliefs on India’s Asian role. Described as ‘pragmatic’, the dominant belief was receptive to forging common ground with America in South East Asia, particularly on containing Chinese power. Simultaneously, Indians also valued their strategic relationship with the Soviet Union and worried that a US escalation in Vietnam might bring Moscow and Beijing ‘together again’.29 He 27  ‘Harriman

Conversation with Shastri and L.K. Jha’, 5 March 1965, FRUS (Vol. XXV-South Asia). 28  ‘Harriman to Johnson’, 7 March 1965, FRUS (Vol. XXV-South Asia). 29 ‘Indians still are over-hopeful of Soviet Union’s good intents, fear effects our tougher attitude toward Soviets, and are concerned that our policies toward Hanoi will bring Moscow and Peiping together again… They are, of course, still suspicious and fearful of some of our policies and

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also highlighted a role flux where change and continuity were apparent from his interactions with political leaders and senior officials: ‘They want to continue [to] play a non-aligned [peacemaker] role although they are considerably disillusioned with Sukarno and Nasser…. They show a more pragmatic and less doctrinaire approach to political and economic matters, but are somewhat held in check by loyalty to interpretations of Nehru’s principles and purposes.’30 Harriman’s sharp exchange with Swaran Singh on US foreign policies reflected deeper internal contestations where the then dominant belief in aligning with Western goals in Asia was constrained by a persisting strand of strategic independence. Instructively, Swaran Singh would be retained as Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Minister. Nevertheless, Jha assured American officials that the dominant belief at the apex under Shastri was to strive ‘for a more affirmative foreign policy role’ in cooperation with the US.31 Given this backdrop, the Vietnam crisis was proving to be a burden for Delhi. Faced with US pressure to shun the Geneva conference structure or pursue an opening to North Vietnam, Shastri subsequently dabbled in multilateral diplomacy with the Afro-Asian and non-aligned countries.32 These half-hearted multilateral peacemaking attempts were largely to cover up Delhi’s basic passivity. Anyhow, the attempts ended in failure.33 A September 1965 MEA cable said it all. Since the outbreak of the crisis in August 1964, India had been unable to sustain a credible methods ... although they don’t want us to leave South Vietnam before an effective agreement, they fear we may overly react against Hanoi and thereby bring Red China and Soviet Union into the conflict.’ 30  ‘Harriman to Johnson’, 7 March 1965, FRUS (Vol. XXV-South Asia). 31  ‘Bowles to State Department’, 21 April 1965, FRUS (Vol. XXV-South Asia). 32 ‘Delhi to Permanent Mission’, New York, 27 March 1965, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 1), MEA, NAI. ‘Delhi to Major Heads of Mission’, 27 April 1965, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 2), MEA, NAI. 33 ‘MEA Note for Lok Sabha Questions’, 19 April 1965, NY(PM)/ 152/2/64 (Vol. 2), MEA, NAI. ‘Delhi to Permanent Mission, New York’, 17 June 1965, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 2), MEA, NAI.



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peacemaking posture. A determined effort by both sides to continue the struggle for influence was producing an ‘escalating stalemate’ in Vietnam, with Indian appeals evoking little response. ‘Under the circumstances, it is doubtful whether any effort by us at this stage can make any impact at all on either side.’34 The September 1965 India–Pakistan war was the second traumatic event that altered Indian thinking about regional order and security in that decade. If the pre-1965 period saw the elevation of China in India’s strategic thinking, after the 1965 war, Indian policymakers began to perceive the regional environment through more complex images. Insofar as the Vietnam crisis was concerned, perhaps nothing underscored India’s role flux more than Shastri’s December 1965 remark to US envoy Chester Bowles that India was ‘embarrassed by its role’ as Chairman of the ICSC and wished it ‘could get out of it’.35 More broadly, India’s approach to the Vietnam crisis during the pre-Indira Gandhi period revealed a declining salience for a classic peacemaker role. This phase was marked by a recurring tension between defining and seeking security in narrower and immediate terms and a lingering peacemaker legacy from the Nehru period, the latter impelling India to respond to geopolitical developments in the extended neighbourhood. We also observed competing role conceptions vying for space created by the displacement of Nehru’s peacemaker role both from within India and externally by superpowers like the US promoting a frontline Cold War role. Finally, the presence of balance of power images was discernable in a variety of internal communications on the Vietnam crisis, where senior officials framed the complexity of the crisis and evaluated the potential repercussions on Asia’s balance of power with an eye on the most advantageous geopolitical setting for India. Indira Gandhi’s tenure would inherit this flux, and India’s role would shift from overt peacemaking, as measured 34 ‘Note to Heads of Missions on India’s Role in Vietnam Crisis’, 10 September 1965, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 2), MEA, NAI. 35  Bowles to State Department, 27 December 1965 cited in Lawrence, ‘The Limits of Peacemaking’, 232.

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by the frequency of pronouncements on Vietnam in Shastri’s tenure, towards a more strategic, circumspect, and carefully tailored posture based on realpolitik.

A Quid Pro Quo Indira Gandhi confronted the second major phase of escalation in the Vietnam war. After a 37-day pause between December 1965 and January 1966, the US resumed its bombing of North Vietnam on 31 January. This brief interlude of peace witnessed another fleeting attempt by India to influence the course of the crisis. In early January, Mehta, the CDA in Beijing, expounded on emerging geopolitical trends in South East Asia: ‘In the context of the Sino-Soviet feud’, Moscow’s policy towards the DRVN aimed to ‘enlarge their influence in Asia, maintain their claim to leadership of the socialist bloc by appearing to be steadfast anti-imperialists … and yet not allow a distant confrontation between the China–US to jeopardize the policy of peaceful coexistence with the USA’. Mehta noticed a shift in Moscow’s previous posture of disengagement from South East Asia in the early 1960s. The Russians had earlier hoped for the US to clear up to the 17th Parallel but the latter’s failure to do so and a widening rift with China had reoriented Soviet policy towards curbing Chinese influence by aiming for a neutral DRVN as well as supporting an American withdrawal from the South. US escalation over the previous year, Mehta emphasized, had aggravated Sino-Soviet differences, and only a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam would allow Vietnamese nationalists such as Ho Chi Minh to pursue a negotiated settlement with the US.36 In January, both sides tried to get Delhi to bridge the divide. Harriman had asked Shastri to persuade Kosygin at the Tashkent Conference to respond positively to Johnson’s efforts. While Kosygin had not closed the door, he told Shastri that Washington would have to ‘satisfy Hanoi’ on its peace effort and establish direct 36 ‘J.S. Mehta to Delhi and Major Heads of Missions Including Apa Pant, T.N. Kaul, and B.K. Nehru’, 4 January 1966, S.F. 15, Apa B. Pant Papers (Instalment I).



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communication with Hanoi.37 Ho Chi Minh too had contacted Radhakrishnan both as part of a larger outreach to several countries, and also specifically to urge Delhi to leverage its position on the ICSC to uphold the Geneva agreements.38 But neither the US nor the North Vietnamese had offered a viable path forward. While informing Delhi that the US ‘wanted to pull Hanoi away from Beijing’, Harriman also expressed reluctance to openly collaborate with Moscow in this game of isolating the Chinese.39 On the other side, Hanoi’s position remained firm.40 Indian attempts to offer its ‘good offices in trying to find common ground’ between the Americans and the North Vietnamese evoked ‘no response’ from the DRVN Consul General in Delhi.41 US–Soviet exchanges at the UN and in Delhi had also been ‘fruitless’. Given the Sino-­ Soviet rift, Moscow’s views, for the moment, had been ‘completely ­subordinated’ to Hanoi.42 Anyway, with the resumption of US bombing, the window for any opportunity again closed. With the war back in full swing, Washington sought to re-engage the new Indira Gandhi government hoping to extract ­support 37 

‘B.K. Kapur to Heads of Missions’, 22 February 1966, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 3), MEA, NAI. 38 ‘Ho Chi Minh to Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan’, 24 January 1966, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 3), MEA, NAI. 39  Radhakrishnan had told Harriman, ‘Moscow was not opposed to a settlement in Vietnam. It was only China that was coming in the way.’ ‘China was the main hurdle in finding a solution’ and they ‘wanted to widen the conflict’. ‘Record of Discussions between Averell Harriman and President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister’, 19 January 1966, WII/121/13/66, MEA, NAI. 40  Ho’s letter ‘in no sense constitutes a “peace feeler” … it contains the old hard line and there is no deviation from the DRVN point of view that US … must stop all bombing raids and other warlike acts against the DRVN unconditionally’. ‘C.S. Jha to B.K. Nehru’, 9 February 1966, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 3), MEA, NAI. Also see ‘Johnson–B.K. Nehru Conversation’, 2 February 1966, FRUS (Vol. XXV-South Asia). 41  ‘B.K. Kapur to Heads of Missions’, 22 February 1966, NY(PM)/152/ 2/64 (Vol. 3), MEA, NAI. 42  ‘Brajesh Mishra to T.N. Kaul’, 4 February 1966, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 3), MEA, NAI.

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for its renewed struggle in Indochina. To be clear, the basic approach was not new at all. In December 1963, Indian officials had been categorically told that continuing arms aid on a longterm basis would only be forthcoming if the ‘US was able to secure some informal understanding’ that India would cooperate with the US on Asian security and help to reduce the ‘effectiveness with which China could operate in various sectors’. This would include India taking ‘reasonable measures to make the Chinese less effective in Indo-China’. Chester Bowles had even used the phrase ‘a second front’.43 B.K. Nehru, the Ambassador in Washington, too had indicated that the possible ‘price’ for ‘long-term military aid’ from the US would be ‘an Indian undertaking to help the US psychologically and militarily in South East Asia’.44 Indian officials had consistently rejected this transactional approach and frontline role conception because it was inconsistent with India’s core self-image of non-alignment. M.J. Desai had explained this at the time: While we will be always willing and glad to exchange views with the US on the problems in South East Asia in the context of the Chinese threat, there can be no question of India undertaking any military commitments. The strength of the Indian defence position vis-à-vis China should by itself be an important stabilising factor in South East Asia…. We cannot similarly alter our stand vis-à-vis China to placate USSR or any other country. [US] pressures whether open or camouflaged will not make any impact on these basic positions.45

Nevertheless, the Johnson administration made another attempt to diffuse its collective security ideas. In early February, B.K. Nehru reported the mood in the White House. Johnson sought ‘a categorical statement’ on ‘domestic and foreign policy’ from Indira Gandhi: internally, India would need to loosen state controls and 43  ‘Y.D.

Gundevia to B.K. Nehru’, 14 December 1963, Subject File 17, B.K. Nehru Papers, NMML. 44  ‘B.K. Nehru to Gundevia’, 22 December 1963, Subject File 17, B.K. Nehru Papers, NMML. 45  ‘M.J. Desai to B.K. Nehru’, 22 December 1963, Subject File 17, B.K. Nehru Papers, NMML.



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increase food production, and externally, be prepared ‘to stand up to Chinese expansionism’ and pursue a rapprochement with Pakistan. What the US President wanted was ‘a meeting of two minds’.46 US Vice President Hubert Humphrey was dispatched on an Asia tour, including India, to pressurize more countries to contribute ‘in any form (including) if possible armed forces’ in the Vietnam war. This included attempts to ‘get even token assistance from India such as medical corps and supplies’. An Indian cable revealed the transactional mood in Washington: there was a strong sentiment that given the flow of food aid to India, the Johnson administration ‘should demand a quid pro quo in terms of helping USA efforts in Vietnam’.47 Bowles directly conveyed US preferences to L.K. Jha that Johnson hoped India would adopt a regional role focused on the threat ‘in regard to China’s activities further east’.48 Although Delhi did its best to downplay the content and tone of the conversation between Humphrey and Indira Gandhi,49 the fact is that the US had sought a shift in India’s regional policy. As Johnson had remarked to his Cabinet colleague, ‘I’m waiting to see what kind of a foreign policy we can have with your people [India]. It’s not going to be a one-way deal. I’m not going to just 46 

‘B.K. Nehru to L.K. Jha’, 4 February 1966, WII/104/18/66, MEA, NAI. ‘Banerjee to Kannampilly’, 9 February 1966, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 3), MEA, NAI. 48  Jha had responded that the US ‘view that India maintained neutrality vis-à-vis China is based on a narrow military approach to the problem. If the matter is viewed in the wider political context, then surely it will be evident that throughout Asia and Africa, we have been carrying on an antiChinese offensive, decrying the Chinese approach and aggressiveness….’ ‘L.K. Jha to Indira Gandhi and C.S. Jha’, 9 February 1966, WII/121(21)/66, MEA, NAI. 49  The Prime Minister and her advisors exchanged several communications to draft a statement for Parliament to stave off any domestic criticism on the Humphrey visit. See WII/121(21)/66, MEA, NAI for the documentary record on the Humphrey visit. Also see ‘Humphrey Blamed Indian Press for Attacks on US’, Patriot, 21 February 1966; ‘Humphrey Discusses Food and Vietnam with Prime Minister’, Hindu, 18 February 1966. 47 

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underwrite the perpetuation of the government of India…. What are they going to do for the United States?’50 Humphrey warned Delhi that if India decided to develop ‘closer relations’ with North Vietnam it ‘should not be surprised’ that this would have ‘the most adverse repercussions in the US in the matter of US aid’.51 He also asked Indira Gandhi to dampen India’s public posture and pronouncements on the crisis, a point that was made ‘strongly’. Humphrey also remarked that the White House would welcome India’s humanitarian assistance to South Vietnam (‘doctors and teachers’).52 The link between US economic assistance and India’s Vietnam policy had been blatantly put across to Delhi. As the foreign secretary remarked after the visit, Humphrey ‘did not seem to realize that if our public statements are less forthright’, India’s capacity to play a constructive role in Vietnam would be weakened. Although no concrete proposal on Vietnam was discussed and neither did Indira Gandhi provide any commitment, the fact that Humphrey announced a $100 million commodity loan at the end of his visit to overcome shortages in India’s industrial sector implied the transactional linkage was obvious to both sides.53 US officials must have felt confident because the Vice President’s visit was followed by a US Major General from Vietnam visiting Delhi in the second week of March to brief Army Chief J.N. Chaudhuri and senior military intelligence officers on the Vietnam conflict. Civilian officials and ministers from the MEA appeared surprised when they learnt of this development.54 50 

‘Johnson Conversation with US Secretary of Agriculture’, 2 February 1966, FRUS (Vol. XXV-South Asia). Also see ‘State Department to Humphrey’, 10 February 1966, FRUS (Vol. XXV-South Asia). 51 ‘C.S. Jha to B.K. Nehru’, 2 July 1966, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 3), MEA, NAI. 52  ‘C.S. Jha to B.K. Nehru’, 24 February 1966, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 3), MEA, NAI. 53  ‘C.S. Jha to B.K. Nehru’, 24 February 1966, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 3), MEA, NAI. 54 Swaran Singh noted he had no prior idea of this meeting. Dinesh Singh, the junior foreign minister, urged Indira Gandhi to ‘avoid such things’ because it would lead to ‘misunderstanding and embarrassment’.



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What is noteworthy are the competing images that are revealed from this interesting episode. It appears that a section of the Indian security establishment was receptive to a closer strategic partnership with the US in South East Asia, and Humphrey’s February visit, where the high-level interaction between US and Indian military and intelligence officials was agreed upon, perhaps opened the window for such a new role. But a quasi-allied frontline role in the Vietnam conflict was as incongruent with Indira Gandhi’s beliefs as it was with Nehru’s beliefs in 1954. The Prime Minister and her advisors continued to play a cautious game avoiding any public impression of external influence on India’s foreign policy. Eyeing her upcoming visit to Washington, Indira Gandhi assumed a passive posture largely motivated to increase US economic and food aid. It is instructive that the US was supplying significant quantities of food grains in 1966 in the backdrop of a massive Indian drought.55 Prior to the Prime Minister’s arrival in Washington, B.K. Nehru left a memo with Johnson on Indian aid requirements for its Fourth Five Year Plan, which called for gross consortium aid of $8.65 billion during the five-year period. Johnson on his part had told B.K. Nehru that he wanted ‘greater Indian ­understanding of our [US] problems’ in But the Defence Secretary clarified that the suggestion for the meeting had emerged during Humphrey’s discussions with the Defence Minister, while noting that the ‘necessary permission for the American General to visit India had been authorized by the Ministry of External Affairs itself’. File on ‘American Major General from Saigon deputed to brief senior officers in the Indian Armed Forces on the Vietnam War’, WII/121/37/66, MEA, NAI. 55 In 1965, the US shipped about 6 million tons of food grains to India. In the normal course, the US would have shipped about 6.5 million tons in 1966. But because of the massive drought-induced food crisis, India’s import needs expanded to an additional 6–7 million tons of food grains. After the meeting with Indira Gandhi, Johnson proposed that the US supply 3.5 million tons to meet India’s additional need (making an envisaged total of 10 million tons of exports from the US to India in 1966). ‘Congressional Record—Senate’, 6 April 1966, WII/104/18/66, MEA, NAI. Also see, B.K. Nehru, Nice Guys Finish Second (Gurgaon: Penguin, 2012), 482.

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Vietnam.56 While there is no overt hint of transactional diplomacy during the Indira Gandhi–Lyndon Johnson encounter,57 prior to her departure to the US, the Prime Minister had admitted that her ‘main mission is to get both food and foreign exchange without appearing to be asking for them’.58 This would reflect on India’s stance on Vietnam. B.G. Verghese, Indira Gandhi’s then press advisor, recalls the contestations on Vietnam. C.S. Jha, the Foreign Secretary, ‘advocated a middle line’, with T.N. Kaul ‘taking the “Soviet line”’, and B.K. Nehru ‘adopting the “US line”’. The Prime Minister ‘waffled, her heart leaning to the Left, her head cocked to the Right…. The debate raged fiercely and my drafts swung like a pendulum gone wild.’59 Ultimately, upon Haksar’s advice, Indira Gandhi’s official statement noted, ‘India understood America’s agony over Vietnam’.60 In a 1 April speech drafted to impress her American hosts, Indira Gandhi projected India’s own role vis-à-vis ‘the Chinese challenge’, which was being met by India ‘militarily holding a two thousand mile long Himalayan frontier’ and ‘also fighting this battle in the c­rucial forum of Afro-Asia … a contribution of high significance’.61

56 ‘Johnson–B.K.

Nehru Meeting’, 22 March 1966, FRUS (Vol. XXVSouth Asia). 57  Johnson later told his advisors that the conversation with Indira Gandhi had been ‘a rather limited and superficial discussion of problems.… Indira Gandhi had not made a strong case for U.S. assistance’. ‘Johnson–Indira Gandhi Conversation’, 28 March 1966, FRUS (Vol. XXVSouth Asia). 58  Inder Malhotra, Indira Gandhi: A Personal and Political Biography (New Delhi: Hay House, 2014), 95. 59  B.G. Verghese, First Draft: Witness to the Making of Modern India (New Delhi: Tranquebar, 2010), 89–90. 60  L.K. Jha and B.K. Nehru had ‘strongly advised’ the Prime Minister to use the phrase, ‘India shared America’s agony over Vietnam’. Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, 97. ‘Mrs. Gandhi sympathetic to US Stand in Vietnam’, New York Times, 30 March 1966. 61  Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, January 1966–August 1969 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1971), 400.



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Having received a promised quid pro quo from the White House to the tune of 3 million tons of wheat supply and $900 million as aid, Indira Gandhi felt her trip had gone well.62 On her return to India via Moscow, Indira Gandhi had even asked Kosygin, ‘How can you expect the Americans to pull out of Vietnam until they can find a way to save face?’63 The Prime Minister’s correspondence with T.N. Kaul, then Ambassador to Moscow, provides a rare glimpse into her calculus at the time. The US visit, Indira Gandhi exclaimed, had been a ‘success’ and it was ‘not pressure from outside’ that tied her hands but ‘the lack of loyalty and lack of help within’. On Vietnam, she assured Kaul that India’s policy had ‘not at all changed’, and instead argued that a passive posture was the need of the hour and equated her actions with Nehru’s quiet criticism of the Soviets during the 1957 Hungarian crisis. She was ‘fully conscious of the fault of the Americans’ and realized ‘that they must withdraw their forces’. However, this matter had ‘to be looked at realistically and just saying so is not going to help’.64 A month later, Kaul advised Indira Gandhi to increase India’s contacts with North Vietnam as well as attempt to persuade the Americans to stop the bombing ‘to test’ the sincerity of the North Vietnamese to move to the negotiating table.65 Indira Gandhi’s reply, again, revealed her instrumental motives: ‘Our economic situation is as bad as it can be. I do not see any way out except to follow some of the World Bank’s advice and to get as much aid as we can. If the Soviets could have given massive aid to help resurrect our economy66 we would not have to go to the US. 62 On

economic policy, Indira Gandhi had agreed to a substantial devaluation of the rupee along with endorsing a US proposal to increase its investible funds in India’s education sector. Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, 96–7. 63 Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, 98. 64 ‘Indira Gandhi to T.N. Kaul’, 27 April 1966, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). 65 ‘T.N. Kaul to Indira Gandhi’, 24 May 1966, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). 66 On the question of food aid, the Soviets had told the Indians that they did not have the surplus production capacity to meet Indian import requirements although they did gift 200,000 tons in 1966.

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But as things are, there is no other way.’67 She did not even engage in a discussion on Vietnam or respond to Kaul’s policy options. Clearly, Indira Gandhi had decided to adopt a passive posture for material reasons. Defining the Vietnam crisis primarily through a prism of immediate Indian interests, the Prime Minister had tailored her response to an Asian crisis to extract economic benefits from the US. Her approach can be distinguished with alternate foreign policy worldviews at the time. We have seen how the US sought to diffuse a frontline role and persuade India to assume more responsibilities in South East Asia. Influential right wing leaders at home too had urged for a similar role in the extended neighbourhood. For example, in early 1966, M.R. Masani of the Swatantra Party argued that the Vietnam crisis ‘should startle India into redefining its role in this highly strategic region’. The 1962 war had removed all ‘illusions concerning Chinese expansionist policy…. India’s role in South-East Asia should be characterized by its acceptance of the responsibilities of a major power in Asia.’ India cannot ‘survive only by being concerned with its [immediate] neighbours’. Defining the crisis through sharp Cold War images, Masani advocated that India should develop a ‘system of collective security’ to include South and South East Asia and ‘invite the Western democracies to underwrite that security’.68 C. Rajagopalachari expressed another variant of this belief, advocating open support for the US escalation in Indochina.69 But such role conceptions did not resonate with Indira Gandhi and her advisors because they did not buy into the underlying Cold War images. Collective security roles were also deemed as inconsistent with India’s non-alignment as underscored, for example, by

‘A.P. Venkateswaran to MEA’, New Delhi, 7 January 1967, HI/1012(57)/66, MEA, NAI. 67 ‘Indira Gandhi to T.N. Kaul’, 30 May 1966, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). 68 M.R. Masani, ‘The Role of India in South-East Asia’, in Vietnam: Seen from East and West, ed. Sibnarayan Ray (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1966), 144–51. 69  ‘C.R. Explains Support for US Policy in Vietnam’, Times of India, 5 July 1966.



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Swaran Singh’s Parliamentary remarks in March 1966: ‘we have always believed and we continue to believe that collective security pacts do not afford any protection and that they are in fact really something which derogates from the sovereignty of the country’.70 Also, Indira Gandhi did not buy into a classic peacemaker role espoused by Nehruvians such as Krishna Menon. In a Lok Sabha debate on 25 April, Menon mounted a blistering attack on Indira Gandhi’s foreign policy for abandoning India’s traditional Asian role as a bridge builder and advocate for a peace area: Even if as ‘Chairman of the Commission, we are disabled from bringing about negotiations … as a country, we are responsible. We have a duty to seek to bring about peace’. He argued that geopolitical circumstances in 1954 were also challenging prior to the final Geneva settlement. From ‘the diplomatic point of view it is no more impossible’ to search for a solution ‘than it was before. To be active for peace in Vietnam is in our interest….’71 Menon was disappointed that India was no longer adhering to its expansive Asian role: Afro-Asia is not a continent territorially. It is a continent in the sense of political geography as such, not geography of ground territory. Our allies are there…. That is to say, we have to play our part in the resistance against imperialism, reaction, racism and for unity and progress. It is not sufficient to say that we vote against colonial oppression and that kind of thing. We will be deluding ourselves if we think … that we fulfill our role as a large Asian ex-colonial country.72

But India’s role conception had changed with the displacement of Nehru’s beliefs and images after two dramatic military breaches in the subcontinent in 1962 and 1965. Since Menon still adhered to a peacemaker role conception, he found this flux most disconcerting.

70  ‘16–29

March 1966’, Lok Sabha Debates (Third Series), Volume LII (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat), 6677. 71  V.K. Krishna Menon, In Defence of National Policies: Speeches in Parliament (New Delhi: Mainstream, 1966), 13–14. 72 Menon, In Defence of National Policies, 16.

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Balance-of-Power Strategy On 1 July, Indira Gandhi dramatically adapted her Vietnam policy. US bombing raids in end June had produced another major escalation in Vietnam. On 6 July, it was reported that captured American pilots had been paraded through the streets of Hanoi. The incident was soon followed by US Marines and South Vietnamese troops launching the largest military operation till date against 10,000 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops in Quang Tri Province. In end July, for the first time, the US bombed NVA troops in the DMZ.73 Delhi’s new posture began with public criticism by Indira Gandhi and Swaran Singh on the latest round of intensive US bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, along with press reports suggesting India desired closer relations with North Vietnam. The US expressed regret for Delhi’s ‘one-sided’ comments, and reiterated Humphrey’s earlier warning on India–North Vietnamese relations. But the defensiveness of earlier occasions was absent in Indian responses. C.S. Jha confirmed that Delhi could not stay silent as the crisis escalated and sought to ‘re-establish some sort of a dialogue’ with Hanoi to have influence on the course of the crisis.74 After unofficially consulting Krishna Menon, the Foreign Office was instructed to draft a peace proposal, which was incorporated as part of a national radio broadcast by Indira Gandhi on 7 July.75 It called for the withdrawal of ‘all foreign forces’ to insulate Vietnam from ‘foreign interference’ for which a Geneva-type settlement might be a viable solution. The proposal ended categorically by calling for ‘an early and immediate turning away from war in Vietnam’.76 International reactions were mixed. Some of the western powers were ‘suspicious’. A ‘somewhat sore’ Bowles expressed ‘general 73 

‘Consulate General in Saigon to MEA, Delhi’, 19 July 1967, HI/1011 (59)/67, MEA, NAI. 74 ‘C.S. Jha to B.K. Nehru’, 2 July 1966, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 3), MEA, NAI. 75  Personal interview with Inder Malhotra, New Delhi, 16 December 2014. 76  ‘Indira Gandhi’s Statement on Vietnam’, 7 July 1966, NY(PM)/152/ 2/64 (Vol. 3), MEA, NAI.



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agreement’ with the principles. The Soviets appreciated the initiative. Importantly, for Delhi, the ‘cool’ relationship with Hanoi seemed to have been somewhat healed by the new posture.77 The statement had been issued on the eve of Indira Gandhi’s departure to the Soviet Union via Cairo and Belgrade. Indira Gandhi’s statements became sharper with the progression of her threenation tour. Notice, for example, the classic Nehruvian rhetoric in Yugoslavia on 10 July: ‘When the world has become one neighbourhood, Vietnam is no longer a far away country…. Peace is not the concern of great powers only, but of vital interest to all mankind.’ And on 14 July in Moscow: ‘India belongs to Asia. And it is of Asia that I should like to speak, and more especially of South East Asia…. We in India cannot afford to be bystanders especially when a part of Asia is ablaze.’78 Finally, on 16 July, in Moscow, an Indo-Soviet communiqué ‘condemned’ the ‘imperialist aggression’ in Vietnam. It called for the immediate cessation of bombings in North Vietnam and underscored the ‘existence of foreign military bases’ as an obstacle to regional stability.79 Indira Gandhi’s dramatic shift surprised Washington who expressed ‘unhappiness’ at these recent pronouncements.80 What explains this sudden shift in India’s Vietnam policy? Indira Gandhi’s calculus was shaped by a balance of power motive to increase India’s strategic flexibility at a time of uncertainty and flux in the international environment. The most apparent reason was the instrumental motive, which had been part of 77  ‘T.N.

Kaul to B.K. Nehru’, 7 July 1966, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 3),

MEA, NAI. 78  Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, January 1966–August 1969 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1971), 487, 474. 79  ‘Indo-Soviet Joint Communiqué in Moscow’, 16 July 1966, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 3), MEA, NAI; Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, 100. 80  US officials were particularly surprised at Indira Gandhi’s statement on ending the bombing on North Vietnam and withdrawal of foreign forces ‘on which they felt there had been no prior consultation’. The US felt the statements in Moscow were also ‘one-sided’ without any reference to subversion and infiltration by the Vietcong in South Vietnam. ‘A.S. Chib to Foreign Secretary’, 20 July 1966, WII/101/37/66, MEA, NAI.

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Indira Gandhi’s approach since the outset of the crisis. Just as her pronouncements in Washington were tailored to extract material benefits from the US, the July communiqué in Moscow too was envisaged to meet Soviet preferences. That the Soviets agreed to increase their contribution to India’s five-year economic plan during the visit lends credence to this argument.81 But the shift in India’s posture was also motivated by more complex geopolitical reasons. For one, not only had the initial expectation of enhanced aid from the US not materialized, the Johnson administration had also taken a decision to resume military aid to Pakistan, which had been terminated during the 1965 war.82 Apprehensively viewing this development, Indian officials feared a repeat of ‘the traditional pattern of aid under the 1954 Agreement’.83 In addition, and more ominously for India, US public debates also suggested a more flexible China policy. America’s containment of China had of course been central to Delhi’s balance of power thinking vis-à-vis the superpowers since the 1962 conflict. As early as March 1966, Indian diplomats in Washington were 81  Lawrence, ‘The Limits of Peacemaking’, 251. Paul F. Power, ‘India and Vietnam’, Asian Survey VII, no. 10 (October 1967): 750. Aside from military supplies, Indo-Soviet economic relations had also expanded by the late 1960s. For example, total volume of Indo-Soviet trade in 1967 was three times that of 1960. ‘Commercial Counselor to Ministry of Commerce, Delhi’, 22 December 1968, No. 6/Com/2/68, MEA, NAI. 82 Indira Gandhi later recalled, Lyndon Johnson ‘sat over the Indian request for immediate [food] assistance for quite sometime so as to pressurize India into modifying her policy of friendship with the Soviet Union’. A.K. Damodaran and U.S. Bajpai, eds, Indian Foreign Policy: The Indira Gandhi Years (New Delhi: Radiant, 1990), 26. Malhotra notes that the Americans had ‘let her down. The aid they had promised did not materialize.’ Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, 99. 83  On 2 March, a few weeks before Indira Gandhi’s visit to Washington, the US decided to resume the supply of non-lethal arms to Pakistan and India, which had been terminated during the 1965 war. ‘A.S. Chib to Delhi’, 7 March 1966, WII/101/37/66, MEA, NAI. Also, see Nehru, Nice Guys Finish Second, 479.



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s­ crutinizing the evolution of US’s China policy. Prominent political leaders and China scholars had begun to advise the White House to ‘open the door to China’s participation in the world scene’. Even erstwhile hardliners such as Hubert Humphrey had now ‘developed a new, more liberal posture’ and ‘supported the view that an attempt should be made to approach China….’ Indian diplomats noted that ‘the process of fresh thinking on relations with China has already commenced’ even if it would be gradual in its results on US policy.84 The fact that China policy came up during Indira Gandhi’s US visit suggests that she was clearly interested and concerned about such a trend. 85 Secretary of State Dean Rusk had even ‘raised the question of Beijing’s UN membership’, eliciting anxiety among Indian officials. C.S. Jha had retorted, that a veto-wielding PRC was ‘not a comfortable prospect’.86 In a publicized closed senate testimony on China in April 1966, Dean Rusk remarked, ‘we must keep firmly in our minds that there is nothing eternal about the policies and attitudes of Communist China. We must avoid assuming the existence of an unending and inevitable state of hostility between ourselves and the rulers of mainland China.’ Reporting this new posture, Indian cables also noted that the most significant factor shaping US thinking was ‘the continually deepening rift between China and the Soviet Union despite the opportunity afforded by the Vietnam conflict to close communist ranks…. There is little doubt … that the Administration is now more watchful of China and likely to be more responsive to change as necessitated by circumstance.’87 Delhi was also aware of Chinese reactions to these extraordinary domestic debates in America. Although the US signal of a more ‘flexible’ China policy had evoked suspicion, Indian diplomats noted that it was ‘interesting’ that the Chinese media highlighted

84 

‘A.S. Chib to Delhi’, 24 March 1966, WII/101/37/66, MEA, NAI. ‘A.S. Chib to Delhi’, 13 April 1966, WII/101/37/66, MEA, NAI. 86  ‘India–US Delegation Talks’, 29 March 29, 1966, FRUS (Vol. XXVSouth Asia). 87  ‘A.S. Chib to Delhi’, 13 April 1966, WII/101/37/66, MEA, NAI. 85 

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Taiwan as the ‘only bone of contention, with no reference being made of the Vietnam issue’.88 If, at the global and Asian level, the prospect of a Sino-American thaw was disconcerting, if still perhaps remote, the ripple effects on the subcontinent were already being felt. A rare, high-profile visit by Chinese leaders to Pakistan aroused Indian apprehensions and was closely tracked by Indian diplomats and officials.89 The ‘most important significance of this visit to us in India is the unequivocal and forthright announcement by the Chinese communist government of their decision to side themselves with Pakistan in any possible bilateral dispute that might take place between’ India and Pakistan. But the ‘comparatively unruffled reception in Washington’ to ‘the display of Chinese military hardware in the streets of Rawalpindi’ was particularly disconcerting to Indian officials.90 Indira Gandhi was certainly concerned about China–Pakistan relations and US and Soviet attitudes towards it.91 These anxieties also reflected in Indian parliamentary debates. In April, lawmakers questioned the government on these geopolitical trends. One Lok Sabha member could not fathom ‘how inspite of this link-up of Pakistan with China, USA is not clear in its mind regarding the resumption of military aid to Pakistan’.92 Another lawmaker expressed surprise that America ‘have not got one word to say about Pakistan, which is flirting with China. Pakistan has just now held a parade in which Chinese MIGs and tanks were demonstrated side by side with American Pattons and 88 

‘Monthly Political Report for March 1966 from Beijing’, 6 May 1966, WII/104/5/66, MEA, NAI. 89  On 26 March 1966 Liu Shao-chi and Chen Yi visited Pakistan. 90  ‘A.K. Damodaran to Heads of Missions’, 4 June 1966, WII/104/5/66, MEA, NAI. 91 Indira Gandhi wrote to Johnson highlighting threats from the emerging Sino-Pakistan relationship. ‘NSC Memorandum to Johnson’, 19 August 1966, FRUS (Vol. XXV-South Asia). She had also inquired about the Soviet attitude towards ‘a joint Sino-Pak attack on India’. ‘Indira Gandhi to T.N. Kaul’, 27 April 1966, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). 92  Lok Sabha Debates (Third Series), Volume LIV, 18–29 April 1966 (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat), 12568.



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Sabre jets.’ Indeed, during a US Senate Hearing, Robert McNamara, the Defence Secretary, had ‘repeatedly avoided putting Pakistan in an unfavourable light before the Committee’.93 Krishna Menon too captured the emerging triangle in sharp terms: ‘Bhutto [then Pakistan’s Foreign Minister] tells America and the world that their alliance with China has not in any way diminished their closeness to America. And, what is more, it has brought them closer! It looks as though there is some arrangement in this matter…. The Western alliance is thus on the frontiers of India. We may not forget this. We are not against Pakistan as she was at Partition, but we are up against Pakistan plus the West plus China. This is all one combination.’94 Privately, Indian diplomats alerted Delhi on reliable reports of Pakistan being roped in by the US to persuade the Chinese to cooperate on Vietnam. At a Central Treaty Organization meeting in Ankara, Dean Rusk had ‘sounded Bhutto on possibility of his visiting Beijing or Hanoi to act as go-between US and China’.95 US ambivalence to incidents on the India–China frontier was also noted.96 Private probing of US reaction to Chinese attempts to raise territorial claims on Indian North-East Frontier Agency (Arunachal Pradesh) did not produce any reassurance for Delhi. The US was focused on China’s internal politics and the possibility of a more accommodative communist ­ leadership.97 Then on 12 July, Lyndon Johnson made his first significant statement on China policy, a culmination of the internal debate in the 93 

Lok Sabha Debates (Third Series), Volume LIV, 18–29 April 1966, 12596–7. 94  Lok Sabha Debates (Third Series), Volume LIV, 18–29 April 1966, 13089. 95  ‘C.S. Jha to B.K. Nehru’, 27 May 1966, WII/104/5/66, MEA, NAI. 96 Along with Chinese transgressions and intrusions along the India–China border, since 3 July 1966 Beijing had engaged in propaganda broadcasts across the Nathu La (on the Sikkim–Tibet border) calling for an insurrection and revolution against the Government of India. ‘Note given by MEA to the Embassy of China in India’, 25 November 1966, WII/104/5/66, MEA, NAI. 97 ‘A.S. Chib to A.K. Damodaran’, 3 November 1966, WII/104/5/66, MEA, NAI.

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US ­establishment: ­‘lasting peace can never come to Asia as long as the 700 million people of mainland China are isolated by their rulers from the outside world’. Indian diplomats noted that while this did not portend an immediate change in US’s China policy, the statement held ‘out to communist China the prospect of ­eventual reconciliation. The President sought to look beyond the present conflict in Vietnam to a situation that would emerge in Asia after the war and in which, according to him, a peaceful communist China would have a major role to play.’98 Indeed, probably unknown to Delhi, Washington had already seriously considered raising its Ambassador-level talks with China then held at Warsaw to the Foreign Minister-level to ‘discuss means of lessening tensions in the Far East’.99 Johnson’s speech was followed by a u ­ nilateral US decision to lift the travel ban on journalists and ­doctors seeking to visit mainland China.100 By end July, US officials felt there had been ‘significant moves’ in America’s China strategy since March 1966 with the new rhetoric having moved towards ‘“containment without isolation” and now “ ­ reconciliation”—or a policy of “firmness and flexibility” (a phrase the President likes)’.101 In light of such shifting trends, the balance of power motive underlying Indira Gandhi’s July shift is a plausible and an overlooked explanation of the shift in India’s foreign policy. Delhi now seemed more concerned about the prolongation of the war, compared with earlier in the year. With Indian policymakers apprehending that the US could no longer be expected to maintain its geopolitical pressure on China for a prolonged period, a preference 98 

‘Prakash Shah to Delhi’, 14 July 1966, WII/104/5/66, MEA, NAI. In a posture of reassurance, McNamara later stated that the US had no desire to escalate the Vietnam war onto mainland China. ‘The US seeks no quarrel with the Chinese leaders.’ He also noted that China had a legitimate interest and obligation to exercise her influence for the common good for all Asians. ‘McNamara: US Has No Desire to Attack China’, Hindustan Times, 17 October 1966. 99  ‘Bundy to Rusk’, 13 May 1966, FRUS (Vol. XXX-China). 100 Gregg A. Brazinsky, Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 308. 101  ‘Thomson to Valenti’, 1 March 1966, FRUS (Vol. XXX-China).



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for de-escalation in Vietnam became a more logical strategic response. Delhi now sought to arrest the deterioration in US– Soviet relations and thereby outflank both the Chinese game in Indochina to increase friction between Washington and Moscow without precipitating a direct Sino-American confrontation,102 and the incipient US game to exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute to reorder East Asian geopolitics in a future bargain with China. Bandwagoning with the US or a passive posture held the danger of isolating India at a time of extraordinary flux. Kaul had been urging Indira Gandhi and the foreign office to correct the tilt towards America by pursuing closer strategic cooperation with the Soviets who realized that ‘India’s friendship is important to them against the growing threat from China’.103 Thus, after July 1966, Indian policymakers hoped to promote an Indochinese balance of power that could be based on an area of agreement between the US and Soviets, an outcome that would simultaneously buttress India’s own preferred geopolitical position as an area of agreement between the two superpowers.104 102  By

July, Indian assessments noted that while China was assisting Vietnam, she ‘herself is not anxious to send her troops and is only interested in keeping the war on, expanding military assistance and also the network of political control over more and more aspects of Vietnamese policies’, while ‘keeping the war still on the safe side of brinksmanship’. ‘K.R. Narayanan Note’, 19 July 1966, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 3), MEA, NAI. 103  In April, Kaul had noted, ‘I believe there is no basic clash between the national interests of USSR and India.’ ‘T.N. Kaul to FS, C.S. Jha’, 28 April 1966, HI/1012(57)/66, MEA, NAI. In June, he wrote directly to the Prime Minister, ‘The USA and USSR happen to be the two biggest powers today, and we should try to maintain friendly relations with both. Putting our eggs in one basket alone will not be in our national interest.’ ‘T.N. Kaul to Indira Gandhi’, 1 June 1966, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). 104 A T.N. Kaul–Chester Bowles conversation from November 1964 offers a fascinating insight into India’s balance of power images in the second Indochina crisis. ‘Talking of South East Asia, he [Bowles] said it would be a good thing if India could try to bring the Soviet and American points of view closer…. India’s friendship with both could act as a sort

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We now know that the Prime Minister was clearly aware of such geopolitical thinking through exchanges with one of her trusted advisors. In September 1965, Kaul had advised that since ‘the interests of America, USSR and India, have a common feature of being aimed at the prevention of Chinese expansion in this area’, it provided ‘an opportunity for India to reap the maximum possible advantage from both sides and strengthen herself for the future’.105 Nothing perhaps underscores this geopolitical approach more than Indira Gandhi’s speech in Moscow. While the July joint communiqué reference to ‘imperialist aggression’ was picked up by the western press, Indian policymakers were more interested in promoting a more sustainable Asian balance of power, and re-positioning India—of which pronouncements on Vietnam were also the means—to be in a credible position to exploit the global flux.106 On 14 July she had remarked: ‘The of bridge between them. He hoped that it would be possible for USA and USSR, with the help of India, to come to some kind of understanding about preventing Chinese expansionism and infiltration in South East Asia. America was fed up with the war in Vietnam and would be glad to get out if a political settlement could be arrived at with the concurrence of the Soviet Union, India and USA.’ Kaul’s response was instructive: ‘The North Vietnamese, who must themselves be tired of war, might welcome a political settlement if it was backed by both USA and USSR.’ Although India ‘had so many internal problems to deal with, and, on top of that, to tackle the menace from China and the threat from Pakistan. But … India would be glad to bring the US and Soviet points of view closer as far as lay within our ability. In fact this was our present policy.’ ‘T.N. Kaul Note on Conversation with Chester Bowles in Moscow’, 15 November 1964, S.F. 15, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). 105  ‘T.N. Kaul to Indira Gandhi’, 25 September 1965, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). 106 Indira Gandhi both privately and in Parliament clarified that the reference to imperialist and reactionary forces in the Indo-Soviet communiqué was a ‘general one’ and ‘not intended for any particular country, and that we had in mind China and her actions when drafting the communiqué’. This had ‘assuaged somewhat the ruffled feelings’ in the US. ‘A.S. Chib to C.S. Jha’, 8 August 1966, WII/101/37/66, MEA, NAI.



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world is changing fast … yet there are some in this world who would deny change or seek to reject it. They would cling to the past or some brand of orthodoxy and not move with the times…. Such an attitude is dangerous, for it is antagonistic to peaceful co-existence.’ In a thinly veiled allusion to China’s strategy to worsen US–Soviet relations in Vietnam, Indira Gandhi noted: ‘There are those who do not like the détente achieved by the great powers and who wish to undo it by aggravating tensions in Asia. They must not be allowed to endanger world peace … any country which flouts this world-wide demand does so at great risk to itself and peril to mankind.’107 The contrast of Indira Gandhi’s reference to Chinese revisionism and Lyndon Johnson’s 12 July olive branch suggesting a future Sino-American accommodation could not have been starker. Efficacy and ability to shape its preferred outcomes, of course, tested the Indians. The external limits of promoting a de-escalatory path whereby the North Vietnamese, the US, and the Soviets might save face was beyond India’s diplomatic ingenuity. But it is more important to emphasize here the realpolitik reasons that conditioned Indira Gandhi’s sudden behavioural shift on the Vietnam crisis. Previously circumspect and dissuaded by the US from deepening ties with Hanoi, Delhi now moved ahead on this front.108 By June 1966, the Soviets had ‘gained ground in North Vietnam’, which was perceived as more conducive for Delhi’s efforts to deepen ties with Hanoi, who had hitherto been over dependent on Beijing.109 Indian policymakers also attempted nudging the US towards substituting their bombing strategy with some kind of bargaining ploy to wean North Vietnam away from China. The cessation of US bombing of the north, Indira Gandhi told Lyndon Johnson, was a prerequisite for alternative paths

107 ‘K.R.

Narayanan to Heads of Mission’, 5 October 1966, WII/104/ 5/66, MEA, NAI. 108  ‘Report by Harriman’, 22 November 1966, FRUS (Vol. XXV-South Asia). 109 ‘S. Bikram Shah to Minister of State’, 5 July 1966, WII/104/5/66, MEA, NAI.

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to conflict resolution.110 Indian officials also encouraged their US counterparts to work with the Soviets,111 who ‘in particular would like to see an end of the conflict; in fact everyone except the Chinese seemed to want peace’.112 But the US showed no signs of softening its stance and appeared unwilling to explore an alternative to bombing. Interestingly, Rusk seemed to have little fear of an escalation. The Chinese were ‘very cautious’ and Washington had received indication that they ‘would leave the US alone if the US left China alone’. The Americans also seemed assured that the Russians ‘would not escalate the situation’. These exchanges further alerted Delhi to the complex Sino-American dynamics at play in Vietnam. The US, for its part, continued to promote a

110  On

8 August, Indira Gandhi wrote to Johnson informing him that Delhi was in touch with Hanoi and cessation of US bombing would strengthen her peace efforts. ‘NSC Memorandum to Johnson’, 19 August 1966, FRUS (Vol. XXV-South Asia). 111  We now know that there was a tacit convergence between Delhi and Moscow on this point. In a January 1967 memorandum, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stated that Moscow ‘should not avoid agreements’ with the US on Vietnam because that would help achieve the ‘objective’ of preventing a ‘situation where we have to fight on two fronts, that is against China and the US’. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), 649–50. In mid-1966, Moscow backed a Polish initiative to try and open talks between Washington and Hanoi in Warsaw. Ilya V. Gaiduk, ‘Peacemaking or Troubleshooting? The Soviet Role in Peace Initiatives during the Vietnam War’ in The Search for Peace in Vietnam, eds Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittinger (Texas: A&M University Press, 2004), 270–1. The Soviets, and presumably the Indians too, knew that the Chinese were using their aid to North Vietnam as leverage to prevent Ho Chi Minh from opening talks with the Americans. ‘Note on a Talk with the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade [Ilya] Shcherbakov, on October 28, 1966 in the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi’, 10 November 1966, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PAAA-MfAA, VS-Hauptstelle, Microfiche G-A 355, 11, accessed at http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter. org/document/117732. 112 ‘A.S. Chib to Foreign Secretary’, 8 August 1966, WII/101/37/66, MEA, NAI.



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collective security role for India in the east, while encouraging a ­rapprochement with Pakistan. Bowles had remarked that ‘a completely new picture of Asia could emerge if there could be some link up between India, Indonesia and Japan’.113 In sum, Indira Gandhi’s July policy shift was an attempt to craft an independent posture on the crisis, conditioned not by a classic peacemaker role conception but by an emerging security seeker role with an underlying functional purpose to shape and exploit a changing sub-regional and Asian environment for material and security advantages. Unlike Nehru, who had engaged in bridgebuilding to reform Asian geopolitics and stabilize great power relationships in the extended neighbourhood, Indira Gandhi viewed global and Asian geopolitics instrumentally and in terms of exploiting the friction and competition between the great powers. 1966 constituted the last major phase of Indian participation in the second Indochina crisis. By the turn of the decade, the spectre of a Sino-American rapprochement would permanently close the possibility of an area of agreement between the US and USSR regarding South Asia and South East Asia. An Indian briefing note from June 1967 reflected India’s basic retreat from South East Asia. Given the ‘background of military escalation and diplomatic rigidity, there seems now little scope for third party mediation, in particular when both sides seek to project an image of confidence in the justice of their cause and their ultimate victory’.114

*** There were multiple credible responses available to the decision makers in the circumstances of this crisis. For example, a military alignment with the US and adoption of a frontline role was espoused 113  ‘Swaran

Singh–Dean Rusk Conversation in New York’, 5 October 1966; ‘Swaran Singh, T.N. Kaul Conversation with Averell Harriman and Chester Bowles’, 31 October 1966. NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 3), MEA, NAI. Also see ‘T.N. Kaul Conversation with Chief Editor of Pravda (Zimyanin)’, 20 September 1966, S.F. 13, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). 114 ‘Note on Vietnam Sent from MEA Headquarters to Permanent Mission in New York’, 2 June 1967, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 3), MEA, NAI.

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by several political leaders from the right like M.R. Masani and C. Rajagopalachari.115 Recurring US attempts to promote such collective security thinking, however, failed to influence Indian policy. Although policymakers after 1962 and 1965 did perceive the Vietnam crisis through a transformed and antagonistic Sino-Indian relationship, they did not believe this new setting required forging a united front with the US against China in South East Asia (see Figure 6.1). There is, however, evidence of competing worldviews where a section of the security establishment appeared receptive to more active coordination with US security policies in East Asia. The Shastri period witnessed a brief ascendance of such beliefs held, for example, by senior officials such as L.K. Jha. But Indira Gandhi, despite a grave Indian food crisis and a promise of expected sidepayments by Washington, did not endorse such beliefs and resisted an extra-regional frontline role sought by the US in early 1966. Other strategic choices were also credible in the circumstances. India could have pursued a classic peacemaker role to stabilize Asian geopolitics and help narrow great power differences to promote a peace area in Indochina. While a lingering peacemaker legacy was apparent in the foreign policy establishment during Explanatory Variable

Role conception (Beliefs and images)

Dependent Variable: Regional behaviour

ent Congru r iou v a h e b Consistent but unlikely behaviour Inco n beh gruent avio ur

Extracting sidepayments; balance of power strategies

(Option actually chosen by the decision-maker)

Strategic ambivalence

(Option not chosen by the decision-maker)

Tension-reduction and projection of peace area; collective security behaviour

(Option not chosen by the decisionmaker but credible in the decisional situation)

Figure 6.1  Choice Paths during the Second Indochina Crisis

115  M.R. Masani, ‘The Role of India in South-East Asia’, 144–51. ‘C.R. Explains Support for US Policy in Vietnam’, Times of India, 5 July 1966.



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the pre-Indira Gandhi phase, the salience for such a regional role continued to decline especially after the 1965 subcontinental war. Krishna Menon, for example, had advocated such a policy course in an April 1966 debate that berated Indira Gandhi’s passive posture.116 Menon also rejected the idea that a balance of power approach was the appropriate response for India in the second Indochina crisis: ‘We took a different view’ of South East Asia after 1962 ‘because of our conflict with China … I think this is where we are wrong. Foreign policies cannot be pursued’ through the belief that ‘the enemy of your enemy is your friend…. Our policy in Indochina should be governed by the Geneva principles’ and by ‘our special position’ as an ‘Asian country’.117 But Indira Gandhi eschewed such a peacemaker role when confronted with the escalation in Vietnam because it was incongruent with her balance of power images. One might still question whether great power mediation and peacemaking was truly viable during the Vietnam war. Since the outbreak of the crisis, Indian diplomats had attested to the complex interaction dynamics among the various interested actors (that is, USA, China, USSR, and North Vietnam), which had complicated the pursuit of a Geneva-style bridging role. But then conditions during the first Indochina crisis had appeared equally daunting to Indian policymakers. US nuclear brinksmanship in the 1950s had hardly suggested conducive conditions for peacemaking. There is also no evidence to suggest Indira Gandhi spurned a peacemaker role because of the perceived unviability of promoting a peace area. Her choices were primarily shaped by instrumental reasons: in the first phase, she sought to extract US economic aid as a quid pro quo for India’s benign neutrality; in the second phase after July 1966, she adapted her posture to engage in complex balance of power diplomacy to isolate China and buttress India’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the superpowers. 116 Privately

too, Menon had engaged in heated foreign policy discussions with the Prime Minister. ‘Indira Gandhi to T.N. Kaul’, 30 May 1966, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). 117  Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), 183.

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Another way to analyse the change in Indian images is to probe for what was not being deliberated in the decision-making process. Indian policymakers did not frame the Vietnam crisis in Nehruvian terms of a one-step escalation scenario that could engulf the wider region. Even when the prospect of escalation was evoked, it was largely because of a fear that an unfavourable South East Asian balance might ensue from a prolonged conflict in Vietnam. In fact, the escalation dynamic was interpreted primarily through a balance of power image. During the Shastri period, and Indira Gandhi’s first phase, policymakers, for the most part, seemed content to let America’s escalation strategy balance Chinese power in the extended neighbourhood. And when espoused, peacemaking postures were never to impede America’s goal of Chinese containment in Vietnam. Indira Gandhi even attempted to leverage this tacit cooperative posture to extract side-payments such as greater food aid. Between June 1965 and September 1966, the US extended grants and loans to India totalling $1.1 billion (Rs 843 crore) with food exports dominating this figure. This was the largest inflow of US assistance compared to any other similar period since the US aid programme to India began in 1951.118 Yet, once policymakers began to perceive that US brinksmanship constituted a complex geostrategy to bargain a future reconciliation with China, whose spillover onto the subcontinent was already becoming apparent, more sophisticated balance of power motives prompted a shift in Indira Gandhi’s policy in July 1966. What at first glance might seem as continuity with Nehru’s approach, (where India’s reaction to Asian crises was to bring Cold War opponents closer,) is upon closer scrutiny a realpolitik response. A preference for de-escalating the Vietnam War had interlinked geopolitical goals: counterbalancing Chinese power, keeping the US and Soviets working together, and weaning North Vietnam slightly away from the PRC.119 Shaping such complex 118 

US loans, which were deemed as repayable—US AID Development loans ($385.3 million) and Public Law 480 food and fibre exports ($685.6 million)—dominated this figure ($1.07 billion). ‘Fact Sheet on US Economic Assistance to India’, WII/104/26/66, MEA, NAI. 119  India’s ‘main difference with US policy in Indochina arose out of the fact that in our judgment it was driving countries who would have



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outcomes required encouraging de-escalation in US bombing of North Vietnam in order to promote a more favourable balance of power in the wider region and countering the Cold War’s spillover into the sub-continent.120 Bilateral friction and instability between the two superpowers—an outcome sought by the Chinese in the Vietnam crisis—would have undermined India’s material goals to simultaneously extract economic, political, and military benefits from Washington and Moscow.121 Persisting US– Soviet friction was also perceived as accelerating the prospects of a future Sino-American normalization, an outcome that the Johnson administration and senior Congressional leaders had been signalling in their public statements since March 1966. In short, Indira Gandhi’s choices in the crisis after July 1966 were predicated on promoting a pattern of great power alignments that could sustainably contain the PRC’s influence in Indochina and preserve India’s preferred position as an area of agreement between the two superpowers. Such a policy choice was conditioned by balance of power images, which were incongruent with Nehruvian beliefs of the 1950s, and a corresponding strategy to exploit the prevailing cleavages in Asian geopolitics to secure India’s strategic position in the core domain of South Asia.

preferred to remain independent and non-aligned into the Chinese camp’. ‘L.K. Jha to T.N. Kaul’, 8 July 1970, S.F. 277, PNH, Instalment III. 120  For example, Kaul noted that while the Soviets were now ‘showing greater interest’ in South East Asia, they had ‘their difficulties because of strong Chinese influence in Vietnam. The Vietnamese war has also prevented a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and USA…. It would, I believe, be in our interest if we could encourage the Soviet Union to take a greater interest in South and South East Asia both as a deterrent to Chinese influence and western pressures.’ T.N. Kaul talk on Indo-Soviet relations at the MEA, 28 September 1966, Speeches/writings (S. No. 11, Part 1), T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II & III). 121 For example, Kaul had noted that negotiating a Soviet economic aid plan to India ‘would help us in our dealings with other countries with regard to their aid to our 4th Plan’. ‘T.N. Kaul to Indira Gandhi’, 1 June 1966, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III).

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Alternative Explanations Were Indira Gandhi’s fluctuating postures on Vietnam a reflection of domestic ideological contestations over India’s role in Asia? The intense Parliamentary debates attest that foreign policy was an important theme of political competition between rival parties and leaders. The acute sensitivity of Indira Gandhi and her advisors to foreign policy matters, particularly how overt pronouncements and rhetoric would be received by national audiences, has also been alluded to. Yet, it cannot be asserted that Indira Gandhi’s choices were driven by domestic contestations over foreign policy. The inner deliberations show that her strategic thinking on the Vietnam crisis emerged from a more complex calculus: A combination of instrumental motives to extract material benefits from the two superpowers, and balance of power motives to promote an area of agreement between the US and Soviets on South Asia and South East Asia to counter perceived Chinese revisionism. If domestic politics truly conditioned Indira Gandhi’s choices, we would expect her to have followed policy prescriptions exhorted in Parliament. The left and a few traditional Nehruvians had advocated a robust anti-colonial posture and pronouncements on Vietnam, which included condemnation of US bombing of North Vietnam. But Indira Gandhi did not re-orient her policy despite such critique from the left. She adopted a passive posture in the first phase and a more active one from July that was not underpinned by peace area or anti-colonial images but by realpolitik reasons. Similarly, the pressure from right-wing parties like the Jana Sangh and Swatantra Party to forge a military alignment with the US in South East Asia did not resonate either with the apex. While a collective security role was completely ruled out as incongruent with India’s self-image and a diversion from core security threats in the subcontinent, a prolonged passive posture condoning the US war in Vietnam was also not seen as advancing India’s regional interests in the long term. As discussed earlier, Indian policymakers were quick to perceive that the US escalation in Vietnam was strengthening China ideologically in the Sino-Soviet conflict and expanding its sphere of influence in Indochina. And a blanket endorsement of US policies would have inadvertently



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produced adverse regional outcomes and undermined Indian security interests. It is instructive that even during intense Lok Sabha debates, Swaran Singh was able to deflect criticism on India’s posture on the crisis from the two extremes espoused in Parliament from the right and left.122 This pattern of holding off pressure from the flanks—the left wing critique that India’s policy had ‘been a hesitant policy’ of not doing enough for espousing the interests of the anti-colonial world, and advocacy from the right ‘that we should keep quiet’ as Chinese expansionism was contained— would remain stable even in 1967.123 Was regime legitimization the prime motivation for Indira Gandhi’s fluctuating posture during the crisis? Malhotra alludes to domestic factors as an important driver for Indira Gandhi’s dramatic policy shift.124 Bold economic reforms, particularly the controversial rupee devaluation decision in early June 1966, had failed to yield the expected benefits and also produced a political backlash from within and outside the Congress party.125 Indira Gandhi ‘came to the conclusion that she had to destroy the Syndicate [the powerful conservative faction in the Congress party] before it destroyed her’. She felt ‘that her political survival depended on a reversion to Left-leaning policies and a revival of her mildly radical image so badly tarnished in recent months. It was on Vietnam that she first made the policy switch.’126 From this perspective, the foreign policy shift was part of a legitimacy enhancing strategy to secure Indira Gandhi’s political position at a time of intense political and ideological competition. Some US

122 

‘Swaran Singh Speech in Lok Sabha’, 1 April 1965, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 2), MEA, NAI; 18–29 April 1966, Lok Sabha Debates (Third Series), Volume LIV (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat), 13098–105. 123  ‘Lok Sabha Discussion on Vietnam’, 10 July 1967, NY(PM)/152/2/64 (Vol. 3), MEA, NAI. 124 Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, 99–101. Also, see Katherine Frank, Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2012), 298–9; Lawrence, ‘The Limits of Peacemaking’, 248–51. 125 ‘Devaluation Forced by Circumstances, Avers Indira Gandhi’, Times of India, 5 August 1966. 126 Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, 100.

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diplomats such as Bowles interpreted the July Vietnam move in a similar fashion.127 We now know that Indira Gandhi and her advisors could engage in instrumental actions and were aware of the advantages of using foreign policy to pursue multiple goals. In April 1966 Kaul had advised Indira Gandhi to hold a meeting of core nonaligned countries to ‘strengthen our position both internally and externally’. Since it was a pre-election year, ‘every effort should be made right now to project a proper image of the Government and the Party’.128 We also know that the Prime Minister was feeling the political heat from her rivals. In April, she observed, there was ‘a tremendous move in Parliament, or rather in the Party against me, the right and the left seem to be converging’.129 And again in early May: ‘for the last fortnight, I am a solitary tree in the midst of a dust storm. The “right” and the “left” are moving heaven and earth to mar my image in the Indian public…. Since the Right is so much more forceful, I needed time to consolidate my position, before making any worthwhile changes.’130 By 30 May, Indira Gandhi noted that ‘the situation vis-à-vis the socalled leftists—whether of the Congress or outside—has not eased. Their attitude is increasingly and openly hostile.’131 A few days later, Indira Gandhi accepted Kaul’s advice to travel to Moscow, a visit the latter argued would ‘strengthen our policy and our position both internally and externally’.132

127 

Lawrence, ‘The Limits of Peacemaking’, 250. Kaul to Indira Gandhi’, 30 April 1966, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). 129 ‘Indira Gandhi to T.N. Kaul’, 27 April 1966, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). 130 ‘Indira Gandhi to T.N. Kaul’, 2 May 1966, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). 131 ‘Indira Gandhi to T.N. Kaul’, 30 May 1966, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). 132  L.K. Jha had instead encouraged the Prime Minister to try and get Kosygin to travel to Delhi. ‘T.N. Kaul to Indira Gandhi’, 1 June 1966, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). ‘Indira Gandhi to T.N. Kaul’, 3 June 1966, T.N. Kaul Papers (Instalments I, II, & III). 128 ‘T.N.



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Given the diversity of evidence, including Indira Gandhi’s own confidential correspondence, the argument that regime legitimization might have also motivated Indira Gandhi’s Vietnam posture cannot be easily brushed aside. For now, the Prime Minister’s decision presumes an even more complex calculus aimed at securing multiple goals. As one biographer remarks, Indira Gandhi’s responses could be ‘flexible and well considered … conditioned by her instinct for self-preservation in an unstable and rapidly developing political situation’.133 A carefully revised posture on Vietnam was not only important for domestic reasons but also for India’s legitimacy around its foreign policy on the Asian and world stage. The latter point, however, has been largely obscured. A credible independent posture kept India in the game and prevented it from losing strategic support from either of the superpowers. The balance of power motive—particularly vis-à-vis changing trends in the US–China–Soviet triangle in 1966 and its perceived spillover in the subcontinent—underlying Indira Gandhi’s shift in India’s Vietnam policy remains plausible and reflected a security seeking response to a changing international environment while simultaneously alleviating domestic pressure against her government.

133 Masani,

Indira Gandhi, 166.

7 Pakistan’s Dien Bien Phu, 1971

Our main and only aim should be to ensure that the marshes and the quagmires of East Bengal swallow up the military potential which West Pakistan can muster. —D.P. Dhar to P.N. Haksar (April 1971) While we welcome the rapprochement between Beijing and Washington, we cannot look upon it with equanimity if it means the domination of the two powers over this region or a tacit agreement between them to this effect. —Swaran Singh (July 1971) Peace does not mean that we keep quiet while the people of a neighbouring country are being annihilated. That is not peace…. We want peace, and we shall have peace, even though we have at times to fight to secure peace. —Indira Gandhi (December 1971)

Since Pakistan’s inception, and especially since the 1960s, the East Bengalis had been seeking to acquire more political expression within an Islamic Pakistan. In March 1966, Mujibur Rahman, the leading voice of Bangla aspirations, had outlined his famous 6-Point Formula, which later became the Awami League’s election manifesto in 1970. It essentially sought more regional autonomy, especially on political economy and

Power and Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policies during the Cold War. Zorawar Daulet Singh, Oxford University Press (2019). © Zorawar Daulet Singh. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199489640.003.0008



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governance issues.1 The Awami League went on to sweep the December 1970 National Constitutional Assembly elections, winning 167 of the 169 seats that were allotted to East Pakistan.2 This dramatic result also gave the League a majority in the national chamber, a prospect that unsettled West Pakistan’s Punjabi-dominated elite, ‘who felt threatened by the emergence of a solid political phalanx from East Bengal aspiring for a place in the establishment’.3 Ironically, a genuine democratic expression had paved the way for a serious internal crisis between Pakistan’s two wings. In the ensuing weeks and months, West Pakistani leaders’ inability to reach an accommodation and offer greater autonomy to the Bengalis in East Pakistan took the situation to a breaking point. Pakistan’s political crisis quickly spilled over into Indian frontiers in the form of a massive exodus of refugees. Like its prequel two decades before, the second East Bengal crisis would heighten Indian threat perceptions and trigger a response by Delhi to counteract the grave impact on regional security. Twenty-four years after Pakistan’s formation, its largest and most populous province was torn away in December 1971. India played a crucial role in ensuring that this fractured bond was severed and finally broken in that year. This chapter explores Indian decision-making and geostrategy from the outbreak of the crisis to the point where India had readied itself for an open military intervention in East Pakistan. Over the decades, the 1971 crisis has attracted analytical attention from different vantage points. But it is only in recent years that the availability of limited but valuable access to Indian archival material has inspired another wave of scholarship. Yet, despite a large and eclectic body of interpretations, focus on Indian agency and decision-making in the crucial early stages of the crisis and enquiry into the reasons for Indira Gandhi’s choices, the main purpose of this chapter, has not been commensurately addressed in 1  Bangladesh

Documents, Volume 1 (New Delhi: Government of India, 1972), 23–33. 2  Bangladesh Documents, Volume 1, 13. 3  P.N. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 147.

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the overall historiography.4 Bass’s recent observation that ‘there has been no proper chronicle of India’s real motives’ exemplifies this point.5 Certainly, the window for continuing assessments and engagement with the available evidence, particularly on the early and middle stages of the crisis when the fundamental ingredients of Indira Gandhi’s crisis response were laid, has by no means been closed. This chapter reconstructs the significant stages in the Indian decision-making process prior to the use of force to examine how 4  For

example, most of the attention for years was on the final stages of the crisis—military history and the Indian use of force in December 1971—and largely authored by senior officials and military commanders. The most noteworthy are D.K. Palit, The Lightening Campaign: The Indo-Pakistan War 1971 (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1972); Mohammed Ayoob and K. Subrahmanyam, The Liberation War (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1972); S.M. Nanda, The Man who Bombed Karachi: A Memoir (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2004); J.F.R. Jacob, Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation (Dhaka: University Press, 1997); Pran Chopra, India’s Second Liberation (New Delhi: Vikas, 1974); S.N. Prasad, The India–Pakistan War of 1971 (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, 1992); Ashok Kalyan Verma, Bridge on the River Meghna: The Dash to Dhaka (New Delhi: Knowledge World Publishers, 2009); Lachhman Singh, Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979); H.S. Sodhi, ‘Operation Windfall’: Emergence of Bangladesh (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1979). Among the leading works on this crisis, which do dwell on Indian decision-making before the final military intervention, are Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Succession: Pakistan, India, and the creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Srinath Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2013); Gary J. Bass, The Blood Telegram: India’s Secret War in East Pakistan (Noida: Random House, 2013). Also see P.N. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy; J.N. Dixit, Liberation and Beyond: Indo-Bangladesh Relations (New Delhi: Konark, 1999); Priya Chacko, Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004 (New York: Routledge, 2012); Zaglul Haider, ‘A Revisit to the Indian Role in the Bangladesh Liberation War’, Journal of Asian and African Studies 44, no. 5 (2009): 537–51; Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, ‘The Decision to Intervene: First Steps in India’s Grand Strategy in the 1971 War’, Strategic Analysis 40, no. 4 (2016): 321–33. 5 Bass, The Blood Telegram, xvii.



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Indira Gandhi’s role conception of a security seeker conditioned, from the very outset, the choices underlying India’s response. The crisis played out over three main phases prior to the December 1971 war. The first phase, from December 1970 to end March 1971, witnessed internal policy contestations regarding the nature of this regional problem as well as the preferred policy response. Broadly, the debate was divided between those who felt that interference in Pakistan’s internal conflict was not a risk worth taking and those who advocated the virtues of a coercive strategy. This phase concluded with the Prime Minister and her closest advisors defining the East Bengal crisis as a strategic opportunity for India. The second phase began in end March, when Indira Gandhi and her strategists quickly positioned India into a covert role to buttress the internal insurrection against the East Pakistani regime. Indian policymakers also opened strategic conversations with the Soviet Union in order to shape a conducive global environment that could sustain India’s strategic preferences in the subcontinent, which were fundamentally aimed at changing the status quo on its eastern frontiers. The third and climactic phase began in the summer, when changing external conditions with respect to potential great power support on behalf of Pakistan culminated in the Indo-Soviet treaty, which not only restored India’s relative military advantages in the subcontinent but also buttressed Delhi’s freedom of action to escalate its involvement in the crisis in the ensuing months. The chapter concludes by engaging with some of the most influential accounts of the 1971 crisis and suggests why we might need to revise our understanding of Indian statecraft in light of what we now know.

Gathering Storm: Perceiving a Strategic Opportunity? One influential study has argued that policymakers were too preoccupied with India’s own domestic election to give any consideration to external matters. ‘They had neither the time nor the inclination to follow events in Pakistan in any depth.’6 The archives, however, now reveal a very different picture. Despite a

6 

Sisson and Rose, War and Succession, 135.

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domestic national election at home,7 Delhi was fully cognizant of the dramatic internal crisis in Pakistan’s body politic. There is also evidence to suggest that some of the ingredients of an interventionist strategy might have already been in place before events in East Pakistan exploded. Internal communications reveal two competing images. One image was represented by R.N. Kao, Chief of R&AW and Indira Gandhi’s trusted confidante, who perceived the crisis in more ominous terms and advocated an advantageous realpolitik to exploit Pakistan’s internal fissures. A second image was represented by sections in the MEA, who perceived the crisis in more benign terms and advocated a non-interventionist posture. Interestingly, as early as 1969 Kao had been arguing that East Pakistan was poised for deeper turmoil and possible secession and that India ‘should be prepared for it’. And his perceptions got stronger as the crisis came closer.8 In an April 1969 intelligence cable, he had foreseen an impending crisis across the border: The authorities would have to resort to large-scale use of the Army and other paramilitary forces in East Pakistan to curb a movement, which has already gained considerable strength. The use of force is likely, in turn, to lead to a situation where the people of East Pakistan, supported by elements of the East Bengal Rifles (who are known to be sympathetic towards the secessionist movement as evidenced from the recent East Pakistan Conspiracy Case), may rise in revolt against the Central Authority and even declare their independence … although this possibility may not be immediate at present, it would be desirable that the Government of India should think about the policy it should adopt in such an eventuality and keep its options open.9 7  India’s

Lok Sabha (National) elections were held during 1–10 March 1971 where Indira Gandhi’s Congress Party won a landslide victory securing 350 of 521 seats in the lower house of parliament. 8 Personal interview with Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, New Delhi, 3 July 2014. (Note: Dasgupta is a former diplomat and historian who has also served in Bangladesh in the 1970s. He has gained exclusive access to the MEA’s internal archives for events relating to the 1971 crisis, which makes his testimony an important addition to other accessible evidentiary material and documents.) 9  Cited in Dasgupta, ‘The Decision to Intervene’, 322.



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Kao’s implied advice to exploit a crisis should it arise seems to fit comfortably with Indira Gandhi’s security seeker role. In contrast, the higher levels of the MEA were taking a more conservative view. Senior officials argued that Pakistan’s unity was in India’s interest, and hoped that the Awami League would emerge as the dominant political voice of a unified Pakistan, which in turn would change Pakistan’s external behaviour towards India.10 A classic exposition of this view was reflected in India’s then high commissioner to Islamabad, Krishna Acharya, who cabled Delhi on 2 December 1970 shortly after elections had been held in Pakistan. Given the relentless hostility of a West Pakistani-dominated government, Acharya argued that majority control of the National Assembly by the Bengalis seemed ‘to be our only hope for achieving our policy objectives towards Pakistan and overcoming this stonewall resistance of West Pakistan’. And, ‘in order that this hope may become a reality, however, it is essential that Pakistan (with its East Pakistan majority) should remain one, so that we may pursue our policy objectives through the leaders of East Pakistan’.11 Not only did the Indian envoy espouse the virtues of Pakistani unity, albeit reformed under the influence of moderate Bengalis, he underscored the grave dangers and geopolitical risks of an independent Bangladesh, which might demand unity with India’s adjacent province of West Bengal, and that such a united Bengal was likely to come under the influence of pro-China Naxalites. Acharya warned that India’s ‘strategic and defence problems will be multiplied manifold’ by a breakup of Pakistan.12 Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul also felt ‘that India should do nothing to encourage the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan but he added that it did not lie in India’s hands to stop it’.13 Sections of the mainstream media too favoured non-interference. For example, Girilal Jain, a

10 Personal

interview with Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, New Delhi, 3 July 2014. Also see Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 149–51. 11  Cited in Dasgupta, ‘The Decision to Intervene’, 323. 12 Dasgupta, ‘The Decision to Intervene’, 323; Lecture by Chandra­ shekhar Dasgupta, 11 December 2015, NMML. 13 Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, ‘Was there an Indian Plot to Break up Pakistan in 1971?’, The Hindu, 17 December 2011.

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leading journalist, suggested that ‘two propositions—a declaration of interest in Pakistan’s unity and an attempt to persuade the two superpowers not to interfere in its affairs’ could serve as policy guidelines as they did for Nehru.14 The above belief from the MEA was a more passive and conservative outlook compared to Kao’s strategic activism, and arguably more consistent with Nehru’s conflict avoidance images. These two competing worldviews again reflected in a 6 January 1971 inter-agency meeting attended by senior MEA and R&AW officials. Kao argued that Bengali national aspirations had deep roots and were at a point of no return, with neither the Awami League nor West Pakistani leaders likely to find common ground after the League’s extraordinary electoral success. The Pakistan Army, moreover, would reject a fundamental change in Pakistani politics and would attempt to re-seize control of the situation. Kao defined the policy problem, as he had suggested in 1969: that India should prepare itself for the succession of East Bengal and develop a capacity to assist the liberation movement to achieve early success. Kao was supported in this assessment by an MEA official, Asoke Ray, who concurred that a secessionist movement would advance India’s interests.15 This policy option was challenged by Acharya and another senior diplomat, S.K. Banerji, who argued that succession was not a foregone conclusion, and the Pakistani system’s ability to find a rational arrangement that preserved a unified state could not be ruled out.16 Why is it that the same material situation was being perceived by two such contrasting perspectives? It appears that Nehru’s core images regarding conflict avoidance and a reluctance to disturb the geopolitical status

14 Girilal

Jain, ‘India’s Pakistan Policy: Stake in Neighbours Unity’, Times of India, 24 February 1971. 15  Apparently we now also know that as early as 1966, after launching the Awami League’s 6-point program me, Mujibur Rahman had confided to Asoke Ray, India’s Deputy High Commissioner, that he saw the 6-point demand as a bridge to independence. Lecture by Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, 11 December 2015, NMML. 16  Lecture by Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, 11 December 2015, NMML; Dasgupta, ‘The Decision to Intervene,’ 323–4.



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quo in the subcontinent were still strong in sections of the MEA. These officials perceived and defined events with an eye on stability and tension reduction as Nehru had done in the first East Bengal crisis in 1950. The competing images, embodied by Kao and Ray were more consistent with Indira Gandhi’s beliefs, where the impulse to reshape the subcontinent’s order, coercively if necessary, was a natural reaction to Pakistan’s domestic problems. By mid-January 1971, Kao’s perceptions were growing stronger and finding resonance with his colleagues at the apex.17 In a 14 January assessment, he noted that ‘hard liners’ in the military, the ‘privileged bureaucrats’, and ‘feudal interests’ might exert pressure on General Yahya Khan, the President and Army Chief, to try and reverse the trend towards the transfer of power to the Awami League. However, the Bengalis ‘and even some sections of the people in the Western Wing, would not be hoodwinked by such tactics’.18 Kao also highlighted the possibility of a diversionary military move by Pakistan in the form of ‘an infiltration campaign into J&K’ to deflect attention from its internal problems.19 P.N. Haksar too had recorded his uneasiness about Pakistan. The Awami League’s victory had complicated Pakistan’s internal problems and ‘the temptation’ for ‘external adventures’ had become greater. He advised the Prime Minister to instruct the Service Chiefs for an urgent military assessment including ‘recommendations of what the requirements of each of the Services are so that we can feel a sense of security’.20 Meanwhile, events on the ground were confirming Kao’s hypothesis. In mid-February, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan People’s Party ruled out negotiations with the Awami 17 Interestingly,

Indians had been reducing their diplomatic staff in Pakistan since 1 January. ‘Farland Conversation with Aftab Ahmad Khan’, 22 April 1971, US National Archives, Central Files 1970–73, State Department Record Group 59 Box 2362. 18  ‘Kao to Cabinet Secretary’, 14 January 1971, S.F. 220, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment), NMML. 19  ‘Kao to Cabinet Secretary’, 14 January 1971, S.F. 220, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment), NMML. 20 ‘P.N. Haksar to Indira Gandhi’, 5 January 1971, S.F. 163, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment), NMML.

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League to frame a new constitution and declared that his party would not attend the new National Assembly sessions. On 1 March, Yahya Khan announced a postponement of the National Assembly. Fearing a conspiracy, Mujibur Rahman responded with a call for a ‘peaceful non-cooperation’ movement, which galvanized people across East Pakistan.21 Indira Gandhi appears to have been persuaded by Kao’s definition of the problem because on 2 March the Prime Minister authorized the formation of a high level Committee consisting of the Cabinet Secretary, P.N. Haksar, R.N. Kao, T.N. Kaul, and the Home Secretary to examine the political, economic, and military implications of India assisting a Bangladesh liberation movement. The assessment included ‘the question whether West Pakistan would retaliate against India particularly in Kashmir’ and ‘whether there would be any military reaction on the part of China’.22 The R&AW Chief now sought to convince Haksar and the Prime Minister as to why India should initiate a sustained and speedy programme of assistance to the East Bengal liberation movement. While the Pakistan Army ‘may gain some temporary successes’, it would be ‘impossible for them anymore to completely crush the liberation movement’. The longer the struggle took, Kao argued, the greater were the prospects of the movement falling ‘into the hands of extremists and proChina communists, in Bangladesh’. Hence, ‘it would be in our own interest to give aid, adequate and quick enough, to ensure the early success of the liberation movement under the control and guidance of the Awami League and its leaders’.’23 It is apparent from her 2 March decision that Indira Gandhi was receptive to exploring the policy option of exploiting the crisis. This was a significant decision and is consistent with Indira

21 

Bangladesh Documents, Volume 1, 160, 188–193. For an insider account of the unfolding crisis in East Pakistan at this time, see Khadim Hussain Raja, A Stranger in My Own Country: East Pakistan, 1969–1971 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012), 46–63. 22 ‘PM’s Instructions about Assessment of East Pakistan Affairs’, 2 March 1971, S.F. 220, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 23  ‘R.N. Kao’s Message to Indira Gandhi via Haksar, Undated (probably shortly after 2 March)’, S.F. 220, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment).



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Gandhi’s security seeker role. To be sure, policymakers were also being prudent by preparing for a possible diversionary ploy by Pakistan to export its internal vulnerability onto Kashmir or even the Indian heartland, as R&AW’s 14 January appreciation had indicated. Nehru too had agreed to make defensive military preparations to counteract a potential Pakistani move in Kashmir during the 1950 East Bengal crisis. This time, however, Indian intentions are clear from the apex-level Committee’s terms of reference: to examine a role in supporting the Bengali resistance inside Pakistan. The policy option being considered was not just predicated on deterrence but aimed at changing the status quo. By mid-March, the crisis was out in the open. On 18 March, Delhi received a R&AW cable from Dhaka conveying Mujibur Rahman’s message, which repeated a ‘special appeal for help at this critical hour’. Expecting large reinforcements from West Pakistan, the Awami League leader sought Indian advice before deciding his next move. The telegram emphasized that ‘Mujib has no alternative but to fight for independence’.24 Haksar quickly reinforced R&AW’s recommendation and advised Indira Gandhi that India should not ‘say anything at all placatory, but be “tough” within reason’. This was ‘not the time to make gestures for friendship to Pakistan. Every such gesture will bring comfort to Yahya Khan and make the position of Mujib correspondingly more difficult … 2½ Divisions of Pak Army is poised to decimate East Bengal’.25

Crafting a Response On 25 March, at midnight, the Pakistan Army began a brutal crackdown ‘against units of the East Pakistan Rifles, the provincial police, and the people’.26 Although P.N. Dhar later said 24 ‘R&AW

to Delhi’, 14 March 1971, S.F. 90(a), P.N.H. Papers (IIIInstalment). 25  ‘Haksar to Indira Gandhi’, 19 March 1971, S.F. 164, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 26 Avtar Singh Bhasin, ed., India–Pakistan Relations 1947–2007: A Documentary Study, Volume III, 1366. Raja, A Stranger in My Own Country, 78–99.

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that Delhi was ‘taken by surprise’,27 Indira Gandhi could not have been shocked by the turn of events. After all, senior officials, particularly Kao, had expected a heightening of Pakistan’s internal crisis as well as a violent pushback by the Army. The main impact of the crackdown was it impelled Delhi to publicly articulate its posture to the crisis. It also ended the belief inside the establishment, particularly in the MEA, that Pakistan’s unity could somehow be salvaged.28 On 27 March, Swaran Singh, the Foreign Minister, expressed grave concern in Parliament while noting that over ‘two regular divisions of the Pakistan Army’ were deployed in suppressing the East Pakistanis.29 On the same day, referring significantly and for the first time, to East Pakistan as East Bengal,30 Indira Gandhi told Parliament, ‘Something new had happened in East Bengal—a democratic action where an entire people had spoken with almost one voice…. It is not merely the suppression of a movement, but it is meeting an unarmed people with tanks.’31 On 31 March, Indira Gandhi moved a resolution in Parliament: Situated as India is and bound as the people of the subcontinent are by centuries old ties of history, culture and tradition, this House cannot remain indifferent to the macabre tragedy being enacted so close to our border…. This House records its profound conviction that the historic upsurge of the 75 million people of East Bengal will triumph … that their struggle and sacrifices will receive the whole hearted sympathy and support of the people of India.32

27 Dhar,

Indira Gandhi, 151. quickly realized that the crackdown ‘was a well-thought-out operation planned not only to cow down the Bengali population through genocide but also to decapitate the Awami League leadership and terrorize intellectuals into silence’. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 152. 29 Bhasin, India–Pakistan Relations, Volume III, 1366. 30  Delhi soon instructed all its diplomatic missions to use East Bengal in their communications. Bhasin, India–Pakistan Relations, Volume III, 1372. 31 Bhasin, India–Pakistan Relations, Volume III, 1367. 32  Bangladesh Documents, Volume 1, 672. 28  Many



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While covertly India was already setting in place its assistance to the Awami League, morally it had now declared itself as committed to the natural culmination of the crisis. Indira Gandhi’s speech is also instructive for what it did not contain: unlike Nehru’s preference for stabilizing the status quo with Pakistan during the 1950 East Bengal crisis, Indira Gandhi exuded an ambitious image that extended India’s interests into the sovereign realm of another neighbour. Still, apex level preferences at this stage remained in favour of a gradual and covert involvement. On 1 April, R&AW noted that while there was ‘overwhelming’ and ‘spontaneous support’ for a liberation struggle, the Bengalis did ‘not yet have an organization to harness this meaningfully’. India would, therefore, not only have to provide ‘material assistance’, but also advice about organizational matters and ‘their channels of command and communication’. R&AW recommended that ‘our friends should first be advised to concentrate on establishing a liberated area near our border’. India’s Border Security Force (BSF) would be the primary vehicle for supporting the Awami League ‘at this stage’ but for ‘specialized needs’ the Army’s help might become necessary. It concluded that Delhi should ‘start with this nucleus of an organization, and then see how the demands develop and what extra constitutional support would be necessary’.33 The same day, Haksar wrote to Indira Gandhi supplementing Kao’s advice with an eye also on wider geopolitical factors. He argued that the break-up of a country was not an easy endeavour since it had wider international and local considerations. For one, national forces had to be in place and India could not give the impression that the Awami League could free ride off Indian support. Internationally too, conducive conditions had to be created diplomatically. Yet, the process could not drag on indefinitely as that would radicalize the insurgency, and potentially increase Chinese influence. Supporting Kao, Haksar advocated assisting the Bengalis in carving out ‘a liberated area near our border’, which would also enable India ‘to have some capability to influence the

33 ‘R&AW Note to Delhi’, 1 April 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment).

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turn of events’.34 Significantly, two days later, Mujib’s deputy and senior Awami leader Tajuddin Ahmad was flown to Delhi to meet directly with Indira Gandhi and Haksar in order to establish highlevel trust on the ensuing period of covert cooperation and assistance by India.35 Simultaneously, attempts were being made to cultivate great power support. On the eve of the 25 March crackdown, D.P. Dhar, the Ambassador in Moscow and another close confidante of the Prime Minister, probed the Soviets with an eye on crafting a convergence with India’s strategy to exploit the East Bengal crisis. Two days before the Pakistan army’s crackdown Dhar shared India’s threat perceptions with Soviet Premier Kosygin. India had ‘been bitten three times’ by Pakistan in the past, and therefore had ‘every reason to be worried about any accretion of military strength to Pakistan which she has secured from the countries of the western camp’. Dhar also did ‘not see much of a hope in reaching any friendly agreement with China in the near future’.36 On his part, Kosygin felt that India’s ‘most acute problem’ was with Pakistan and assured Dhar that ‘we shall take no step which does not meet with her [Indira Gandhi’s] approval or which is even remotely harmful to the interests of India’.37 The day after the crackdown began in East Pakistan, Haksar met Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Pegov to discuss the situation and also advised Indira Gandhi to meet with the Soviet envoy before he reported to Moscow.38 These interactions were followed by the first Soviet pronouncement on the crisis on 2 April. In a letter to Yahya Khan, which 34 

Haksar also noted that the political relationship with the liberation movement should be handled ‘only through the agency of R&AW’, while the BSF would be the ‘executive agency’, with ‘specialized needs’ also being drawn from the Army. ‘Haksar to Indira Gandhi’, 1 April 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 35 Raghavan, 1971, 63. 36  ‘D.P. Dhar–Kosygin Conversation’, 23 March 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 37  ‘D.P. Dhar–Kosygin Conversation’, 23 March 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 38  ‘Haksar to Indira Gandhi’, 26 March 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment).



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was made public, the Soviets expressed ‘great alarm’ at the ‘extreme measures’ and use of force ‘against the population of East Pakistan.’39 The American posture, in contrast, provided little comfort to Delhi. With the Pakistan Army cracking down in the east, T.N. Kaul probed Kenneth Keating, the American envoy in Delhi, on US policy only to be tersely told that ‘the present conflict was an internal matter that should be settled internally’.40 Nixon’s subsequent remark to L.K. Jha, India’s Ambassador in Washington, underscored Washington’s posture to the Indians. The US President noted that the Pentagon and his other experts ‘were dead sure that West Pakistani military forces could not overpower the people of East Bengal, but it seems they have done so. What options do we now have? We must be Machiavellian and accept what looks like a fait accompli—don’t you think?’41 Meanwhile, Dhar’s role in both shaping Soviet perceptions, and interpreting changes in Moscow’s thinking to Delhi would become crucial. He highlighted ‘the perceptible change in the Soviet press on the East Pakistani developments’.42 The Soviets believed, ‘the Bengalis would triumph and we would not allow it to knuckle under the brute West Pakistani force. This aspect of our responsibility I am very sure is fully realized.’43 Probably encouraged by these developments, on 4 April, Dhar argued for an unwavering Indian commitment to the East Bengal movement: Our main and only aim should be to ensure that the marshes and the quagmires of East Bengal swallow up the military potential which West Pakistan can muster. This may even open up perspectives of a long-drawn struggle. I have no doubt that in the end and 39 

Bangladesh Documents, Volume 1, 510–11. Interestingly, Kosygin had also consulted Dhar before drafting this letter. ‘Dhar to Kaul and Haksar’, 4 April 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 40  ‘Keating to State Department’, 27 March 1971, FRUS (Vol. XI). 41 ‘L.K. Jha to T.N. Kaul’, 18 April 1971, S.F. 277, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 42 ‘Dhar to Kaul and Haksar’, 4 April 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 43 ‘Dhar to Kaul’, 4 April 1971 (second telegram), S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment).

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that too in the not very distant future the West Pakistan elements will find their Dien Bien Phu in East Bengal. This will relieve us of the constant threat, which Pakistan has always posed to our security directly and also as a willing and pliable instrument of China…. This resistance must not be allowed to collapse.44

Dhar’s prescriptions appear to be congruent with Indira Gandhi’s images, both in terms of the regional functions of a security seeker and the modes of behaviour. He not only advocated re-shaping the subcontinent’s order, he also had no qualms about endorsing coercion and subterfuge as a means to advance those ends. This is in sharp contrast to Nehru’s preference for persuasion and diplomacy to influence Pakistani behaviour during the 1950 crisis. On 7 April, Indira Gandhi instructed Dhar to convey an oral message to the Soviet leadership aimed at leveraging the balance of power: ‘If we are to accede to the demands that are so naturally and legitimately being made on us, we shall be assuming a very heavy burden and will expose ourselves to serious risks. We cannot do this alone.’ Expressing deep concern about third party reactions, particularly from China in the north, Dhar was asked to probe how Moscow visualized ‘the course of evolution of this conflict and whether they are prepared, in any way, to share the burden of sustaining the struggle’.45 In their response, the Soviets commended Delhi’s prudent approach and underscored the importance of preventing a situation where the crisis might explode leading ‘to interference by third countries’. Interestingly, the message then concluded that ‘there are unused possibilities’ for the ‘further deepening and strengthening’ of Indo-Soviet relations.46 A few days later, Dhar again cabled Haksar saying India would ‘have to create the whole of East Bengal into a bottomless ditch which will suck the strength and the resources of West Pakistan’. To be sure, Dhar was thinking ‘in terms of a year or two, not in terms of a week or two’. While the Soviets were unlikely to explicitly endorse ‘an aggressive policy of intervention at this stage’, it

44 

‘Dhar to Haksar’, 4 April 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). ‘Haksar to Dhar’, 7 April 1971. S.F. 165, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 46  ‘Haksar to Dhar’, 15 April 1971. S.F. 165, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 45 



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was ‘important to read between the lines’ when interpreting their posture. Dhar felt that Moscow preferred Delhi to ‘proceed step by step only after consolidating our position’ with the Bengalis and by assessing international reactions. But he also stressed that ‘a departure from the present policy of restraint’ would be understood by Moscow.47 Soviet support was soon expressed by its decision to ‘meet the “special” requirements of “Ramji”’ (reference to R.N. Kao’s probable request for technical intelligence equipment for covert operations in East Pakistan)48 as well as ‘an absolutely sincere and a very detailed effort’ to completely bring India’s military ‘equipment up-to-date’.49 By early April, the dominant opinion in Indira Gandhi’s national security team was in favour of a covert and calibrated strategy as the preferred course of action. There were, however, competing voices that pressed for a more accelerated involvement in the crisis. Some opposition political parties saw India’s position as too cautious. M.C. Chagla, a former Foreign Minister, wanted the Prime Minister to spell out the expression ‘sympathy and support’ from her 31 March Parliamentary statement. Chagla also wanted India to ‘persuade Russia to counteract Chinese moves’ and felt that failure to ‘take immediate action may create internal problems particularly in West Bengal, and by the time’ India ‘decides to intervene it may be too late’.50 In a widely circulated policy paper, Krishnaswamy Subrahmanyam, then head of Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, the Defence Ministry’s prestigious think tank, argued that a covert proxy war would not succeed against a superior Pakistani army and would entail other costs on India’s credibility. He advocated a ‘decisive’ escalation in the form of a blitzkrieg operation ‘completed in 4 to 5 days’ in the east, which would accomplish Indian goals before the great powers could even have time to react. Subrahmanyam argued that in a scenario of a 47 

‘Dhar to Haksar’, 18 April 1971, S.F. 220, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). ‘Dhar to Haksar’, 29 April 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 49  A. K. Damodaran, Oral History Transcript, accession no. 728, NMML. 50 ‘Discussion with Mr. M.C. Chagla’, 3 April 1971, S.F. 244, J.P. Narayan Papers (III-Instalment). 48 

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Chinese intervention, the superpowers would support India, and ‘reconcile themselves’ to a swift Indian offensive.51 Such policy options were overruled by Indira Gandhi and her advisors as impetuous and with a low probability of strategic success.52 The broad direction of the military policy was set on 12 April. Entitled ‘Operation Jackpot’, the guidance seems to be consistent with Dhar’s 4 April prescription: to convert the East Bengal crisis into Pakistan’s Dien Bien Phu. India’s goal would be to ‘draw from West Pakistan to East Bengal increasing numbers of troops so that its economic strength and war potential is sapped’. And, simultaneously, ‘To build up the strength of Bangladesh Forces to keep West Pakistani forces tied down in a running struggle and to consolidate their hold on peripheral territories with a view to roll West Pak forces back and administer a crushing blow with such open assistance as may be needed eventually.’53 An Indian military intervention was apparently envisaged after Pakistan’s military potential and morale had been depleted through a proxy war. On 17 April, Indira Gandhi created a coordinating committee of the Government’s top secretaries headed by Kao. Its mandate—to oversee all ‘questions pertaining to the Bangladesh movement, including political, military, administrative, financial, civil supplies, health, food, etc’. The political liaison with Bangladeshi leaders was to ‘be centralized in a single place throughout’ and be ‘maintained by the clandestine agency and the secret channels of R&AW’.54 An early military intervention was explicitly ruled out in a 25 April Cabinet meeting.55 The 51  ‘K. Subrahmanyam’s Note, “Bangladesh and Our Policy Options”’, S.F. 276, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 52 ‘Dhar to Haksar’, 18 April 1971, S.F. 220, P.N.H. Papers (IIIInstalment). 53  Dasgupta, ‘The Decision to Intervene’, 329–30. 54  ‘Haksar to Cabinet Secretary’, 17 April 1971, S.F. 165, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 55 Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 157. General Jacob recalls a conversation with BSF Chief Rustamji in early April: ‘He told me that since the Eastern Command would not throw the Pakistanis out of East Pakistan, the Government had asked the BSF to do so.’ On 29 April, the Eastern Army



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plan was to organize and equip a guerrilla force of 20,000, which could be ‘enlarged to 100,000’ men under arms. It was a phased strategy of intensifying the Bangla struggle in stages.56 A combination of factors weighed India’s calculus to favour a phased strategy and reject an early direct intervention. The most significant constraint was the sub-regional military balance. While it has been suggested that West Pakistani military forces never acquired the deterrence capability to stave off Indian coercion and a military offensive into East Pakistan,57 assessments on the actual military balance at the time indicate policymakers did not perceive that India possessed the overwhelming conventional superiority to forge a quick military solution. For one, as per R&AW assessments in January 1971, Pakistani offensive capabilities in the western front were particularly potent, especially for a short-term war, with its stockpile of armament, fuel, and spares sufficient to ‘sustain a war with India of a duration of 90 to 150 days’.58 By 1969, Indian officials had assessed that Pakistan had ‘doubled’ its ‘military strength since 1965’ with its land forces increasing ‘from 6–11 divisions’.59 Importantly, in an early 1971 meeting with Indira Gandhi, ‘the Chiefs of Staff had given an assessment of the relative position of India vis-à-vis Pakistan in terms of men and material’. And Indian capabilities were found to be ‘deficient in a number of respects’.60 Another study noted that before contemplating any military actions in the east, India would have had ‘to induct atleast one more division to safeguard her lines of communication’ in Kashmir.61 Indira Gandhi herself admitted to a senior BSF official Command took over the covert assistance programme with the BSF under the command of the Eastern Army. Jacob, Surrender at Dacca, 37–8. 56 Prasad, The India–Pakistan War of 1971, 173–4. 57 Personal interview with Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, New Delhi, 3 July 2014. 58  ‘Kao to Cabinet Secretary’, 14 January 1971, S.F. 220, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 59  ‘India–US Talks in Delhi’, 31 July 1969, FRUS (Vol. E-7). 60 ‘Haksar to Indira Gandhi’, 9 March 1971, S.F. 164, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 61 Palit, The Lightening Campaign, 42–3.

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in August 1971 that her main concern had been ‘about our ability to hold the thrust from the western border’.62 Operational conditions in the east were also deemed as unsuitable for an early intervention.63 An Indian commander later reflected that a blitzkrieg strike in the spring ‘would have been catastrophic’. East Bengal’s ‘large tracts of low-lying areas, which get waterlogged during the monsoons’, implied that an intervention ‘even at a short notice of four weeks, that is in the middle of May, would have involved the risk of forces on various thrust lines getting stuck all over the countryside during the impending monsoon’.64 In short, material constraints made an early intervention a risky endeavour. Additionally, there was the possibility of Chinese tactical actions complicating an Indian intervention in East Pakistan. The contrast with Nehru’s perceptions in the 1950 crisis is pertinent to highlight here. The dominant reason for Nehru’s reluctance towards a coercive strategy in the first East Bengal crisis was not a material but an ideational one: a prior image of ‘war avoidance’ and a fear of heightening the regional security dilemma and creating an escalation dynamic even in circumstances of a favourable military balance. In 1971, Indira Gandhi and her advisors adopted restraint in the initial stages because of unfavourable material circumstances and not because of a prior belief in conflict avoidance or a fear of escalation. 62  K.F. Rustamji, The British, the Bandits and the Bordermen: From the Diaries of K.F. Rustamji, ed. P.V. Rajgopal (New Delhi: Wisdom Tree, 2009), 321–2. 63 Then Chief of Staff at the Eastern Army Command, Jacob recalls that ‘at the beginning of April’ Army Chief Manekshaw called him ‘to say that the Government required Eastern Command to move immediately into East Pakistan’. Jacob replied that this was ‘impractical’. The Eastern Command had only ‘[d]ivisions trained for mountain operations’, limited ‘bridging equipment’ and ‘transport capabilities’, and ‘tenuous communications’ to North East India. The coming monsoon would obstruct any deep thrust into East Pakistan. Jacob estimated that India ‘could be ready earliest by 15 November’. Jacob, Surrender at Dacca, 35–6. Also see, Sisson and Rose, War and Succession, 145. 64 Lt. Gen. A.M. Vohra (Retd.), ‘Delay was Justified in 1971 War’, Times of India, 1 December 1980.



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Delhi also hoped to garner international support and did not want to be the sole country to accept a new secessionist regime. Following the 25 March crackdown, Indian diplomacy drew international attention to the violation of democracy and human rights in East Bengal and mobilized global sympathy for the victims.65 Policymakers also aimed to delink the Bangladeshi liberation struggle from India–Pakistan relations. Dhar had argued that ‘the war of words’ between the two neighbours should cease because it presented the East Bengal crisis, ‘as the Pakistanis would wish it, as another facet of Indo-Pak conflict’.66 Indira Gandhi’s advisors, particularly Haksar, were also deeply interested in the credibility and resolve of the liberation leadership and its ability to inspire the common Bangladeshi.67 Indeed, strategic support to the Bengalis was predicated on the internal and external orientation of a postcrisis regime, and the Awami League needed to evoke confidence before India expended blood and treasure on a military intervention. This is underscored by a later testimony of a senior official, probably Haksar, who ‘maintained that a settlement that did not restore Mujib to leadership in the Bangladesh movement and government would not have been worthy of consideration by India’.68 Finally, India’s own position on Kashmir also shaped Delhi’s thinking. Haksar had counselled that nothing should be publicly said or done that ‘cast any shadow on the stand we have consistently taken in respect of Kashmir’, namely that India would never allow its secession or ‘tolerate any outside interference’.69 Therefore, local military factors, inability to gauge Chinese reactions, and a reluctance to prematurely convert the Bengali

65 

Lecture by Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, 11 December 2015, NMML. ‘Dhar to Haksar’, 29 April 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 67 ‘Haksar to Indira Gandhi’, 1 April 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). Haksar wanted the Awami League to ‘bring within their fold every live political element with the sole object of forging a unity amongst all those who are prepared to fight and die for a sovereign Bangladesh’. ‘Haksar to Indira Gandhi’, 4 June 1971, S.F. 168, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 68  Sisson and Rose, War and Succession, 301. 69  ‘Haksar to Indira Gandhi’, 26 March 1971, S.F. 164, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 66 

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resistance into an India–Pakistan conflict suggested a calibrated involvement combined with a discreet overt posture was deemed to be the most prudent response at this stage. In addition, Moscow’s preference for gradualism, which had also been gauged by Delhi, probably reinforced the virtues of a phased strategy to Indira Gandhi and her advisors, who were all too aware that the Soviets offered the only potential hedge at the great power level. By mid-April, it was apparent what Pakistan wanted to achieve by its military action. The crackdown was intended to not only produce a large refugee exodus that would destroy the demographic foundations of the Awami League in East Bengal but also ‘provoke Hindu–Muslim riots in India’.70 A massive refugee influx into India followed, rising from 100,000 to 3.5 million by 21 May, and shooting up to 6.5 million by end June,71 a dynamic strikingly similar to the first East Bengal crisis, even though the scale of refugee flows into India was of course much larger in 1971. Indira Gandhi’s response to this serious demographic predicament, however, stands in stark contrast to Nehru who had argued against punitive policy options because it could undermine regional and domestic stability. She went beyond just entertaining punitive options to change Pakistan’s behaviour and sought to restructure the entire political configuration of East Bengal. Indira Gandhi and her advisors ruled out any possibility of absorbing and resettling refugees from across the border.72 In the second week of April, a strategic decision was taken ‘to concentrate the refugees in camps close to the East Pakistani border rather than, as in the past, allowing them to move into India’ proper, signalling both the impermanence of the exodus and that India would not accommodate itself to the situation.73

70 Dhar,

Indira Gandhi, 153–4. to Indira Gandhi’, 6 May 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 72  Sisson and Rose, War and Succession, 4; Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 155. 73 Sisson and Rose, War and Succession, 295–6. For example, on 4 May, Indira Gandhi told newsmen ‘that her government had no intention of rehabilitating the refugees from East Pakistan on a permanent basis, an assertion of the basic policy’. 71 ‘Haksar



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Strategic Surprise: India’s Balance-of-Power Move On 13 May, Indira Gandhi adjusted the public posture by signalling that India now had a direct stake in the resolution of the crisis. She cabled several heads of government declaring for the first time that the ‘two problems—Pakistan’s war on the people of East Bengal and its impact on us in the form of millions of refugees— cannot be separated’.74 On 24 May, Indira Gandhi made a statement in Parliament reflecting this new posture. With assistance from Haksar, this speech spoke to the Indian people and the international community.75 For ‘twenty-three years’, Indira Gandhi declared, ‘we have never tried to interfere with the internal affairs of Pakistan, even though they have not exercised similar restraint’. But now the Bangladesh crisis had become ‘an internal problem for India’. The refugee crisis had created ‘an intolerable situation’. Speaking to her citizenry, she said that although ‘[o]ur nation, our people are dedicated to peace…. I should like to caution our people that we may be called upon to bear still heavier burdens’. To the great powers, Indira Gandhi expressed ‘disappointment at the unconscionably long time which the world is taking to react to this stark tragedy’. And then added, ‘If the world does not take heed, we shall be constrained to take all measures as may be necessary to ensure our own security and the preservation and development of the structure of our social and economic life.’76 Again, India had defined its national interests in a way where it would have a vital say in the resolution of the crisis. The Prime Minister raised the level of strategic commitment to the Bengali struggle along with a thinly veiled threat of use of force. Washington immediately began to counsel restraint. Nixon cabled Indira Gandhi to exercise ‘maximum restraint’, which troubled Haksar.77 Kissinger warned that any ‘unilateral military 74 S.F.

166, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). ‘Indira Gandhi to Nixon’, 13 May 1971, FRUS (Vol. XI). 75  S.F. 166, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 76  Bangladesh Documents, Volume 1, 673–4. 77  Haksar noted that ‘these exhortations’ for restraint ‘sound a little hollow and meaningless’. ‘Haksar to Indira Gandhi’, 1 June 1971, S.F. 168, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment).

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action’ by India ‘would have to mean the end of any [economic aid] assistance on our part’. It would also involve ‘other great powers, in which the Bengal problem would soon be submerged’.78 This had ‘distressed’ Indian officials.79 For Delhi, the contrast between superpower postures was now sharp. By early June, Moscow began to exude a stronger convergence with Indian goals than in the first stage of the crisis. In a farewell conversation before Dhar’s departure to Delhi, Marshal Andrei Grechko, the Soviet Defense Minister, remarked, ‘If I were you, I would not be worried by Pakistan. You should take into account the unpredictable enemy from the North.’ Grechko then assured that in a scenario of Chinese ‘aggression, the USSR would not hesitate to use its strength and force in repelling it’. The ‘Chinese were aware of the superiority of Soviet forces on the Eastern borders and this had “downed their tail”’ with even Zhou Enlai ‘repeatedly grumbling about it’. Grechko then proceeded to highlight the security benefits of a treaty, which ‘would demonstrate to China, Pakistan and any other potential aggressor’ Indo-Soviet solidarity and ‘would deter any one from embarking on an adventure against India’.80 Dhar expressed his satisfaction to learn ‘that there was an awareness of the mutuality of interest both in terms of security and defence’ with which Grechko concurred81 while again stressing that Soviet superiority on the Sino-Soviet borders was a direct security and strategic advantage for India.82 To be clear, while India might not have shared the same intensity of threat perceptions or the ideological antagonism vis-à-vis China as the Soviets did, cultivating Moscow as a security hedge was seen as crucial to advancing Indian goals in the crisis. Dhar’s motivation to leverage the global balance of power is consistent with a

78 

‘Kissinger–Jha Conversation’, 11 June 1971, FRUS (Vol. XI). ‘Farland to State Department’, 17 June 1971. ‘Rogers to US Embassy in Islamabad’, 14 Jun 1971, USNA. 80  ‘Dhar–Marshal A.A. Grechko Conversation’, 5 June 1971, S.F. 229, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 81  ‘I am in absolute agreement with your formulation.’ 82  ‘Dhar–Marshal A.A. Grechko Conversation’, 5 June 1971, S.F. 229, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 79 



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security seeker role. It was important to have an ‘understanding of what we expect the Soviet Union to do for us’ in a ‘conflict with Pakistan singly or along with her allies…. I am more interested in the military aspects of the aid and assistance which we will need and which we are bound to seek.’83 On 7 June, Foreign Minister Gromyko reiterated the Soviet intent to stand by India during the crisis while also indicating the ‘desirability of signing some sort of a Document’. Swaran Singh reciprocated that an ‘agreement’ would act as a ‘deterrent to China and Pakistan against embarking on any military adventure’.84 Both sides agreed to commence treaty discussions soon.85 Singh also met Kosygin who asserted that Moscow’s position ‘cannot be a fixed position for all time to come…. We shall heed your views as we have always done in the past.’86 Singh left no doubt in Moscow’s mind that India would under no circumstances allow a permanent presence of Bengali refugees on Indian soil, communicating, in essence, Delhi’s end game: a regime change in East Bengal as the only way to resolve the crisis.87 What is also apparent is that Moscow was reluctant to offer a carte blanche to India. Indira Gandhi might have preferred a tacit security understanding with the Soviets, one that offered great power balancing benefits without the baggage of a formal arrangement. Certainly, that is what Indian policymakers had been attempting to extract since Dhar’s conversations with the Soviets since March. But it had become clear to Delhi that the durability of Moscow’s commitment and the full extension of its strategic umbrella could only be realized though a formal arrangement.88 83 ‘Dhar

to Kaul and Haksar’, 5 June 1971, S.F. 229, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 84  ‘Swaran Singh–A.A. Gromyko Conversation’, 7 June 1971, S.F. 203, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 85  ‘Swaran Singh–A.A. Gromyko Conversation’, 8 June 1971, S.F. 203, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 86  ‘Swaran Singh–Kosygin Conversation’, 8 June 1971, S.F. 203, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 87  ‘Swaran Singh–Kosygin Conversation’, 8 June 1971, S.F. 203, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 88  Kaul had interpreted the Soviet position: It ‘appears that while the Soviet Union is ready and willing to come to our assistance, in case of an

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The intersection of Cold War geopolitics with the East Bengal crisis would tip the final balance on Delhi’s next move, the essence of which had already been deliberated at the highest levels. Sisson and Rose claim that Indian policymakers had concluded by midMay ‘that major external powers would be only peripheral factors in East Pakistan and would also not place any serious obstacle in the way of direct Indian intervention if this should become necessary’.89 This is patently inaccurate. From the outbreak of the crisis, Indian policymakers had been seeking to cultivate the support of a great power to counteract the possibility of third party interference in favour of Pakistan. Indira Gandhi’s choice of a calibrated escalatory involvement in the East Bengal crisis had also been influenced by the perceived constraints of the global environment with respect to India’s freedom of action in the subcontinent. Any residual ambiguity vis-à-vis the potential for a spillover of global geopolitics onto the subcontinent was finally removed after US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s visit to the subcontinent in July. In his discussions in Delhi, Kissinger had remarked that in the event of an India–Pakistan conflict, ‘China would certainly react and this would lead you to rely upon Soviet assistance. Such a development will cause complications for us in America.’ Haksar replied that while India would like ‘to avoid a conflict’, ‘if one is forced upon us’ and China reacted, ‘it is not unreasonable for us to expect and to hope that the US would take a sympathetic attitude towards our country’. Haksar expressed his surprise that a possible Chinese intervention would evoke a feeling of ‘some sort of discomfiture’ in the US.90 Kissinger’s motivations were attack by the Chinese, they would like some kind of a formal document to be signed’. Kaul urged giving serious consideration to a treaty and ‘entering into discussions with the Soviet Government at an early date’. ‘Kaul to Haksar’, 15 June 1971, S.F. 169, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 89  Sisson and Rose, War and Succession, 152. 90 ‘I am a bit puzzled by your saying that if we get involved in a conflict … and the Chinese intervene in one way or another, US, instead of assisting us, would feel some sort of discomfiture.’ ‘Haksar–Kissinger Talks’, 6 July 1971, S.F. 169, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). In Kissinger’s briefer account of this conversation, he felt Indian policymakers were ‘playing power politics with cold calculations’. ‘Kissinger–Haksar Conversation’, 6 July 1971, FRUS (Vol. XI).



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shaped by US goals, which sought to dissuade an Indian escalation. Interestingly, a May 1971 contingency paper on US options in an India–Pakistan war had observed, ‘[i]f India attacks Pakistan and China responds by causing border incidents only, avoid any support to India’. In the scenario of a more ‘extensive’ Chinese ‘attack on India’ after an Indian initiation of hostilities against Pakistan, the US could ‘[r]efrain from assisting India on the assumption that it could defend itself against China’.91 In 1965 too, US policymakers had adopted a similar posture of calculated ambiguity around US reactions to a potential Chinese response to a direct Indian intervention in Pakistan. The intent being to sway India’s cost-benefit analysis against a deeper offensive war. And the ploy had largely succeeded back then, prompting Indian policymakers to draw a lesson that the US–Pakistan alliance would inevitably shape Washington’s responses to a South Asian crisis.92 Given such prior images, Indian apprehensions were aroused by Kissinger’s remark and it triggered further probing into US intentions.93 Delhi even alerted the Soviet side.94 The real purpose of Kissinger’s rendezvous to the subcontinent soon became clear when, on 15 July, Nixon announced that he would visit China in 1972 to ‘seek normalization of relations 91 

‘Sisco to Johnson’, 26 May 1971, USNA. In July 1971, Jha had referred specifically to the ‘lack of [US] support in Indo-Pakistan conflict of “65”’ as example of US posture towards India’s position in the subcontinent. ‘Irwin–Jha Conversation.’ 16 July 1971, USNA. In his subsequent conversations with Soviet leaders, Dhar too reflected on the perceived lessons of US involvement in the subcontinent: ‘We have been bitten several times and there is no need to narrate the deception carried out by the USA when it gave us assurances … that US arms in Pakistan would not be used against India.’ ‘Dhar–Gromyko Conversation’, 4 August 1971, S. F. 280, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 93  Bhasin, ed., India–Pakistan Relations 1947–2007 Volume II, 1406, 1409–10. 94  Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to US, later asked Kissinger ‘whether it was correct what the Indians had told them, namely that we would look at a Chinese attack on India as a matter of extreme gravity and might even give them some support. He said that the Indians had been puzzled by my comment but had then put it all together after my trip to Peking.’ ‘Kissinger– Dobrynin Conversation’, 17 August 1971, FRUS (Vol. XI). 92 

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between the two countries’.95 Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing carefully coordinated by Pakistan also revealed the intense and trusted relationship between the US and Pakistani leaderships.96 A few days later, Kissinger told L.K. Jha that America could not stop Chinese intervention in South Asia if an Indo-Pakistan war broke out in the subcontinent.97 In ‘the case of a Chinese attack that was unprovoked’, Kissinger had remarked, ‘the United States’ interest in India would be very great; in the case of a Chinese attack produced by an Indian attack on Pakistan, it would be much harder for the United States to do something’.98 But coercion and a further escalation is precisely what Indira Gandhi and her advisors envisioned would resolve the crisis. Essentially, the White House was attempting to dissuade a more aggressive Indian strategy by creating ambiguity in Indian policymakers’ minds about US intentions. White House officials certainly interpreted Kissinger’s remark as an attempt ‘to unsettle any Indian planning for attacking Pakistan’.99 Hoping to draw out the Chinese, Indira Gandhi also wrote to Zhou Enlai, signalling India’s core stakes in the East Bengal ‘problem and in the effort to find a solution’ and sought Beijing’s ‘views on this problem’.100 Beijing did not respond to this letter. Both American and Chinese postures had indicated that great power re-alignments could henceforth seriously constrain India’s ability to impose a solution in East Bengal. Indira Gandhi immediately responded with a balance of power move by taking a decision in the third week of July to proceed with treaty discussions with Moscow and conclude them quickly.

95 

‘Nixon will Visit China before Next May to Seek a “Normalization of Relations”’, New York Times, 16 July 1971. 96  ‘A.S. Chib, High Commission, Islamabad to Delhi’, 5 August 1971, HI/1012(30)/71, MEA, NAI. 97 Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 163; Surjit Mansingh, India’s Search for Power: Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Policy, 1966–1982 (New Delhi: SAGE, 1984), 88–9. 98  ‘Kissinger–L.K. Jha Conversation’, 11 September 1971, FRUS (Vol. XI). 99  ‘Saunders to Kissinger’, 7 September 1971, FRUS (Vol. XI). 100  ‘Indira Gandhi to Zhou Enlai (Draft)’, 16 July, 1971, S.F. 169, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment).



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Curiously, influential Western accounts have imputed different motives to India’s geostrategy. Sisson and Rose insist that the ‘much publicized Pakistan–China–US “axis” was of no great concern to the key group in the Indian government’ and that the treaty was signed merely to end Soviet support to Pakistan and ‘bolster the morale of the Indian bureaucracy’.101 Bass too gives little credence to the early balance of power motives underlying Indian choices, and assigns primary importance to the ideological preferences of Indira Gandhi’s core advisors, with the Prime Minister as a reluctant actor, as the main reason for a treaty arrangement with Moscow. Neither is the final trigger for India’s balance of power decision contextualized.102 But the fact is that cultivating a re-alignment of the Soviet Union’s basic South Asia policy had already been achieved by India’s balance of power diplomacy prior to the 1971 crisis.103 A senior Pakistan official and former envoy to Moscow corroborates this. While in 1968 there had ‘been a significant breakthrough’ albeit ‘of a very limited supply of Soviet arms to Pakistan’, by late 1969 ‘what had been a trickle had now completely dried up’.104 The Indo-Soviet tango that commenced in 1969, as alluded to in Chapter 5, and sustained strategic conversations since the outbreak of the East Bengal crisis suggest that a balance of power motive was the dominant reason for Delhi’s cultivation of this great power relationship.105 During their conversations with 101 The authors categorically state that the ‘threat of external intervention in support of Pakistan was not critical to the Indian decision to seek a treaty with Moscow’. Sisson and Rose, War and Succession, 198–200. 102 Bass, The Blood Telegram, 134–44, 217–24. 103 Intriguingly, Sisson and Rose contradict their own interpretation when they note that all their Indian interviewees ‘agree that by mid-1970 Moscow had’ concluded its military aid relationship with Pakistan. Sisson and Rose, War and Succession, 302. Jamsheed Marker, Quiet Diplomacy: Memoirs of an Ambassador of Pakistan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 80. 104 Marker, Quiet Diplomacy, 80. 105  Also see M.S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly, Sisir Gupta: India and International System (New Delhi: Vikas, 1981), 21–23.

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the Soviets, Indira Gandhi’s advisors constantly worried about the potential for interference by Pakistan’s benefactors in the East Bengal crisis. The highly publicized prospect of a SinoAmerican rapprochement in July heightened a pre-existing image of hostile great power intentions towards India’s position in the subcontinent.106 On 20 July, Swaran Singh expressed Indian perceptions of changing global alignments in Parliament, and in doing so underscored central aspects of Indira Gandhi’s core images: While we welcome the rapprochement between Beijing and Washington, we cannot look upon it with equanimity if it means the domination of the two powers over this region or a tacit agreement between them to this effect…. We shall not allow any other country or combination of countries to dominate us or to interfere in our internal affairs. We shall, to our maximum ability, help other countries to maintain their freedom from outside domination, and their sovereignty. We have no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, but this does not mean that we shall look on as silent spectators if third countries come and interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, particularly our neighbours, as our own national interest could be adversely affected … Sino-American détente … can have repercussions on the situation in this subcontinent, as well as in this region. We have, therefore, for sometime been considering ways and means of preventing such a situation from arising, and meeting it if it should arise.107

This was a classic expression of a security seeker role: a subcontinental power with a clear construction of its national interests defined as inter linked with its periphery. India’s core functions in shaping the regional order and resisting external powers from influencing the outcome of a crisis in the subcontinent were also clearly espoused. 106 

Gupta, a scholar with access to Indira Gandhi’s apex, reveals threat perceptions at the time: ‘The lingering fear that Pakistan will not be alone in the case of an Indo-Pakistan confrontation, could not be removed except through’ the treaty. Rajan and Ganguly, Sisir Gupta, 375–6. 107  Bangladesh Documents, Volume 1, 708.



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Dhar, leading the Indian team during the 3 August discussions in Moscow, told the Soviets that India was ‘sitting on the top of a volcano which might explode any minute. We could not allow our country to be blown up into bits along with it.’ He added, if ‘a war was forced on India … India and Soviet Union should jointly assess how best the situation could be met’. Gromyko replied that Moscow ‘had also taken into full account all aspects of the matter’ and concluded that the ‘Treaty was necessary and extremely important’.108 Delhi had clearly suggested that a military escalation was possible and hinted that it would inevitably precipitate great power reactions, and Moscow for its part recognized the implications of extending its political–military support to India at the peak of the East Bengal crisis.109 On 10 August, Gromyko reassured Indira Gandhi ‘that the Pak military will not succeed in keeping down the people of East Bengal for long and their rule is doomed’. He also said that while it was not for Moscow to ‘prejudge’ the endgame, ‘you may be rest assured that in regard to the refugees we shall always support your position’.110 On 26 August, Indira Gandhi publicly provided the rationale for the treaty. She noted that ‘some countries’ were ‘taking advantage’ of the rapidly changing international environment ‘to embark upon opportunistic adventures. We are convinced that the present Treaty will discourage such adventurism on the part of countries, which have shown a pathological hostility towards us.’111 108 ‘Dhar–Gromyko

Conversation’, 4 August 1971, S. F. 280, P.N.H.

Papers (III-Instalment). 109 According to Kaul, the security related Articles had been drafted ‘with great care to safeguard our national interests’. Article 9 was ‘the most important article’ from India’s ‘point of view’ because it called for ‘appropriate effective measures even in the case of a threat of an attack’ and ‘would act as a deterrent on both’ Pakistan and China. ‘T.N. Kaul to Indira Gandhi and Swaran Singh’, 3 August 1971, S.F. 49, P.N.H. Papers (II-Instalment). 110 ‘Indira Gandhi–Gromyko Conversation’, 10 August 1971, S.F. 19 (Part 2), T.N. Kaul Papers, (Instalments I, II, III). 111  Indira Gandhi, The Years of Endeavor: Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, August 1969–August 1972 (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1975), 720.

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Indira Gandhi and her advisors, of course, had compellence rather than simply deterrence in mind. The treaty was intended to ensure that India retained its conventional power advantages vis-à-vis Pakistan in an ultimate showdown over East Bengal. In short, a political–military arrangement with Moscow was neither a kneejerk reaction nor an ideological move or a quest to move into the Soviet bloc. Rather, it was an outcome of an evolutionary balance of power strategy first conceived in the late 1960s in the backdrop of changing dynamics in the US–Russia–China triangle, and only executed when systemic pressures during the 1971 crisis presented formidable constraints on Indira Gandhi’s strategy. Unlike Nehru’s peacemaker role, which constrained balance of power strategies for fear of dividing Asia, Indira Gandhi’s security seeker role made it possible to exploit great power cleavages for narrow sub-regional advantage despite a self-image of a non-aligned state.

*** There was more than one credible response available to decision makers in the circumstances of this crisis. For example, a non-interference policy could have been pursued. Senior officials in the MEA had been advocating such a posture as early as December 1970: to let Pakistan’s internal crisis play out in the hope that the resurgent Awami League would find a voice in national politics. Even after Pakistan’s civil war began, Indira Gandhi could have maintained strategic restraint on the premise that the game was simply not worth the candle. Strategic activism put at risk the stability of India’s vulnerable eastern and northeastern provinces as well as potentially opening the door to greater external influence from China. Sections of the MEA had vividly described the dangers and potential blowback of attempting to break up Pakistan. In short, a policy of intervention could have been framed as a gamble with an uncertain payoff (see Figure 7.1). Other strategic choices were also credible. Like Nehru in 1950, Indira Gandhi could have pursued a bilateral approach with Pakistan where marginal reforms and assurances of the future



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Explanatory Variable

Role conception (Beliefs and images)

Dependent Variable: Regional behaviour

r iou hav e b ent gru Con Consistent but unlikely behaviour Inc o beh ngrue n avi our t

Coercion; balance of (Option actually power strategies chosen by the decision-maker)

Strategic restraint; non-interference

(Option not chosen by the decisionmaker)

Accommodation strategies; peacemaking diplomacy

(Option not chosen by the decisionmaker but credible in the decisional situation)

Figure 7.1  Choice Paths during the Second East Bengal Crisis

political structure in East Bengal might have de-escalated the crisis. India could have pursued a persuasion strategy by leveraging the mediation of third parties such as Washington and London to moderate Pakistani behaviour and thereby dampen the crisis. For example, the UN had attempted to moderate the 1971 crisis but Indira Gandhi and her advisors spurned these efforts.112 In their meetings with US officials, Jha and Kaul had objected to US support for a UN presence near the conflict zone.113 This contrasts 112 ‘[I]t

is not clear to us what contribution the UNSC can make … in solving what we regard as the root cause of the crisis in Pakistan, namely, the desire on the part of the overwhelming majority of the people in East Bengal to demand their democratic rights and liberties and their brutal suppression by the military junta.’ ‘Indira Gandhi to Kosygin’, 30 April 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). Another advisor put it bluntly: ‘United Nations as a body will tend to preserve the status quo.’ Therefore, in ‘the final analysis, India will have to take strong action’, a euphemism for the use of force. ‘D.N. Chatterjee to Joint Secretary (UN and Conferences)’, MEA, 6 July 1971, S.F. 171, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 113 ‘Sisco–L.K. Jha Conversation’, 27 July 1971. ‘Irwin–L.K. Jha Conversation’, 4 August 1971, USNA. Also, see Sisson and Rose, War and Succession, 189–90.

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sharply with the 1950 East Bengal crisis when options to stabilize the status quo were taken very seriously by Nehru. Indira Gandhi and her advisors could also have sought to extract ‘side payments’ from the great powers for India’s strategic restraint and focused on internal development and economic modernization instead of a costly and risky strategy to exploit the turmoil on its periphery for ambitious geopolitical goals.114 Delhi would later reject a US offer to provide ‘extensive humanitarian assistance’ to address the refugee influx. Indira Gandhi ‘displayed no interest’ to Nixon’s offer of aid in lieu of non-use of force by India in East Bengal.115 Finally, even in the middle stages of the crisis, Indira Gandhi could have chosen to pursue a different accommodative policy path after establishing a strategic understanding with Moscow. This was credible in the material circumstances. Indeed, some Western assessments at the time perceived the Indo-Soviet Treaty as indicative of India’s decision to avert war. After all, the perceived threat of a US–China–Pakistan collusion had been substantially neutralized by the treaty and its deterrent effects.116 Indira Gandhi could have chosen to preserve the balance of power not for further coercion and compellence but as a path towards a conflict resolution approach from a position of strength vis-à-vis Pakistan and her allies. Yet, none of these policy options were seriously entertained by Delhi. Indira Gandhi’s risk appetite and cost-benefit calculus 114 ‘This is not a situation which can be bought out. We will never be reconciled to the situation in which we would be prepared to absorb these people because other countries are prepared to make financial arrangements to look after them.’ Subject File 19, T.N. Kaul Papers (I, II, and III Instalments). The annual cost of ‘evacuees’ was estimated at Rs 60 crore, not an insignificant sum at the time. ‘Haksar to Indira Gandhi’, 6 May 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 115 ‘Nixon–Indira Gandhi Conversation’, 4 November 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). Also, see Sisson and Rose, War and Succession, 300. 116 For example, Kissinger felt ‘that the treaty will provide both reassurances to India and, at the same time, give them [Soviets] the influence to restrain India’. ‘Kissinger to Nixon’, 24 August 1971, FRUS (Vol. XI).



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were conditioned by her prior images. The various dimensions of her worldview—the subcontinent as a core zone, a highly sensitive and vigilant image of the regional environment, a regional function to shape an advantageous order, and preferred modes of behaviour that privileged power-based means—are reflected in the key decision choices during the 1971 crisis. The crisis was defined from the very outset as a strategic opportunity for India to undermine Pakistan, degrade its military strength, and re-order the geopolitical status quo in the subcontinent. Once this core decision was taken, various other ingredients and means of India’s crisis response—conventional military upgrades, cultivating the support of a great power, developing coercive proxy capabilities to bleed the Pakistan army,117 external diplomacy to create a conducive global opinion for regime change—were pursued and developed with an eye on the final end game: regime change in East Pakistan.

Alternative Explanations War and Succession and 1971 are still among the leading accounts that delve into Indian decision making: its underlying motives, intentions, and strategies.118 Since some of Sisson and Rose’s key interpretations have already been engaged with in previous pages, let us engage here with two fundamental aspects of Raghavan’s account. First, he finds that the ‘initial response to the crisis was stamped with circumspection’ and that Indira Gandhi ‘was more tentative and improvisational than is usually assumed’.119 Second, he underplays India’s geostrategy, an interpretation that appears closer to Sisson and Rose’s and Bass’s accounts in not fully capturing the early balance of power moves, and the basic strategic 117 By

November 1971, Pakistani intelligence estimated that there were ‘fifty-nine training camps in operation around the perimeter of East Pakistan’ with 70,000 men ‘under arms’ and another 30,000 ‘undergoing training’. Sisson and Rose, War and Succession, 184–5. These outcomes appear to be in line with Indian aims as set out at the end of April 1971. Prasad, The India–Pakistan War of 1971, 173–4. 118  Sisson and Rose, War and Succession. Raghavan, 1971. 119 Raghavan, 1971, 59.

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congruence between Delhi and Moscow before the crisis had even erupted in 1971. In short, is it possible that chance and conjunctures of events were bigger drivers of Indian behaviour than any grand strategic statecraft by Indira Gandhi and her advisors? For starters, we now know that the apex had a fairly clear definition of its strategic goals early on. We have seen that R.N. Kao’s intelligence assessments and advocacy for activism since 1969 had influenced strategic thinking and policy options at the apex level. Indira Gandhi’s early decision to seriously examine Kao’s policy options, despite competing beliefs advocating circumspection and non-involvement, is instructive. That the crisis was quickly perceived as a unique opportunity to radically transform India’s geostrategic environment and the regional balance of power is clear from the accessible evidentiary record. In addition to the crucial institutional and military guidance decisions taken in March and April, another critical decision underscoring Indira Gandhi’s intentions was the one regarding the refugee influx after 25 March. The April decision to refuse an integration of Bengali refugees signalled both the impermanence of the exodus and the unacceptability of the situation, a choice that reversed India’s previous response patterns to distress Hindu migration from East Pakistan since 1947. Had Indira Gandhi sought to keep her strategic options open, the decision on refugees would arguably have not been undertaken because any reversal of that commitment would have entailed extraordinary reputational costs both to the Prime Minister’s prestige and on the Indian state. A June MEA report was quite explicit on this point: ‘This is a very well thought out and a very clear cut objective and a great deal of our view and future action in the international field and elsewhere, and also if we are called upon to take harsher action, should be guided by this.’120 The decision to reject absorbing or negotiating the refugee influx through an agreement with Pakistan, such as the 1950 Nehru–Liaquat Ali pact, implied that an ultimate resolution to the crisis could only 120 

Subject File 19, T.N. Kaul Papers (I, II, and III Instalments). For Delhi ‘a removal of the refugees from areas adjacent to the struggle underway in East Pakistan’ would have constrained ‘subsequent action to resolve the problem’. Sisson and Rose, War and Succession, 178.



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unfold in two ways that were consistent with India’s definition of its national interests: either Pakistan would reverse its behaviour and reach a settlement with Mujib’s Awami League for a new democratic dispensation in East Bengal or India would be impelled to shape the final settlement by whatever means necessary. Again, the June MEA report was quite explicit: ... everybody understands what was in our mind when we said creation of conditions [for refugees to return]. What we meant was military action stopping, army should go back to the barracks and the Government should be entrusted to the real representatives, not to the civilians who are not responsible nor to the vague breakaway party but to the real leadership.121

Put plainly, Delhi had consciously set out a strategy of compellence. There is also no evidence to suggest that any of the core policymakers had normative apprehensions or objections to India’s use of coercion or force in the 1971 crisis. The role conception of a security seeker, for example, is vividly revealed in Haksar’s remarks to Kissinger, conveying India’s military assistance to Sri Lanka in resisting a local rebellion by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (a Marxist revolutionary party) in March 1971: ‘… you may not have regarded it as of any great significance India’s recent response to the request of the Government of Ceylon to send our troops and our Navy. It signifies the extent to which India can play a part in safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of friendly sovereign States in this part of the world.’122 It is true that Indira Gandhi chose a strategy of calibrated intervention into Pakistan’s affairs. But this choice was not shaped by indecisiveness or unwillingness to assume risks. Rather the perceived material conditions— in terms of the sub-regional military balance between India and Pakistan, the global environment in terms of great power postures towards the crisis, and the reluctance to prematurely convert Pakistan’s centrifugal crisis into an India–Pakistan confrontation before Bengali resistance and resolve for statehood had revealed 121 

Subject File 19, T.N. Kaul Papers (I, II, and III Instalments). Talks’, 6 July 1971, S.F. 169, P.N.H. Papers (III Instalment). 122 ‘Haksar–Kissinger

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itself—collectively weighed the apex decision to favour a phased strategy for regime change rather than an early blitzkrieg military operation. The broad direction of Indian military policy that was set on 12 April explicitly called for diverting West Pakistan’s formidable military machine into East Pakistan by provoking a proxy war and administering ‘a crushing blow’ with ‘open assistance as may be needed eventually’.123 Let us now explore the second point regarding Indira Gandhi’s balance of power strategy, which appears to have been understated by Raghavan, distorted by Sisson and Rose, and glossed over by Bass. It has been suggested that Dhar was too optimistic of Moscow’s intentions to assist India’s geopolitical goals and that Russian motives, including its treaty decision, were aimed at restraining Indian activism and a future escalation.124 For instance, citing Russian foreign ministry’s comments to Pakistan, Raghavan infers that the Treaty’s objectives ‘were not to encourage India but to restrain her’. He also refers to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin’s remark to Kissinger that Moscow wanted ‘peace in the subcontinent … their interest was stability’.125 Relying on Soviet public rhetoric whereby it ‘strove hard to take an even-handed stance’, Raghavan concludes ‘Moscow had been unwilling to fully support India’s stance on the crisis’.126 Although a detailed scrutiny of Soviet calculus is beyond the scope of the present chapter, the question of whether 123 

Lecture by Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, 11 December 2015, NMML. Also see, Sisson and Rose, War and Succession, 187. 124 In fact, this was the dominant impression among western diplomats. For example, British diplomats opined, ‘Russians’ main aim is to reduce the chances of war in the area and to increase their influence over India.’ ‘FCO note on Indo/Soviet Treaty to 10 Downing Street’, 12 August 1971, PREM 15/445, The National Archives. Similarly, another telegram argued, ‘The Treaty provides for “consultation” but the USSR will be the arbiter. In that it lessens the immediate threat of war it should be welcomed.’ ‘British High Commission, Delhi to FCO, London’, 16 August 1971, PREM 15/960. For Anglo-American interpretations of the treaty at the time, also see Rudra Chaudhuri, Forged in Crisis: India and the United States Since 1947 (Noida: HarperCollins, 2014), 166–8. 125 Raghavan, 1971, 223. 126 Raghavan, 1971, 223–4.



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a basic convergence between Delhi and Moscow existed cannot be deflected, for various other Indian decisions and military plans rested on the fundamental premise and expectation of great power support during later stages of the conflict. For Delhi, the treaty was an insurance measure and strategic instrument to limit the ability of Pakistan’s benefactors to arbitrate or interfere in the resolution of the East Bengal crisis. There was a clear dichotomy between Moscow’s diplomatically correct, and perhaps even deceptive, public pronouncements and its private signals to Indian and Pakistani policymakers. The latter are probably more useful to discern Soviet intentions. As early as 2 April, Moscow’s tone towards Pakistan had changed with the letter to Yahya Khan, a message drafted with prior consultation with Dhar. On 17 April, the day when Indira Gandhi created a high-level coordinating committee to oversee all ‘questions pertaining to the Bangladesh movement’,127 Kosygin wrote to Yahya in a ‘cold and formal’ message referring ‘for the first time’ to the ‘“lawful wishes of the parties” and to “the interest of the population of both West and East Pakistan”’.128 When Yahya sent a special envoy, Arshad Hussain, to Moscow on 17 April, he ‘was made to cool his heels for nearly seven days before he met Chairman Kosygin’ and given a ‘cold and rough reception’.129 On 24 June, Kosygin warned Yahya that ‘in no case’ would the Soviets allow the East Bengal refugee issue to ‘lie like a heavyweight’ on the subcontinent. ‘By July onwards, Soviet messages’ to Pakistan ‘became increasingly hostile’.130 Neither were the Russians unaware of India’s end game. Swaran Singh had informed Gromyko in June that India would ‘under no circumstances’ agree to a position where it would accept the refugees permanently on its soil.131 Moscow was under few illusions that 127 ‘Haksar to Cabinet Secretary’, 17 April 1971, S.F. 165, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 128 Marker, Quiet Diplomacy, 121–30. 129 ‘Dhar to Haksar’, 29 April 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (IIIInstalment). 130 Marker, Quiet Diplomacy, 121–30. 131  ‘Swaran Singh–A.A. Gromyko Conversation’, 7 June 1971, S.F. 203, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment).

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India could resort to force if its proxy war did not yield its desired goals. Note, for example, Kosygin’s comments to Dhar in August just before the formalization of the treaty: ‘It is obvious that nothing is a secret from your enemies…. You should be cautious, you should not allow your intentions or programs to become visible to everyone…. What you intend to do should remain known only to you. No one else should have evidence of your intentions.’132 This is not to suggest that the Soviets were driven by identical motives as the Indians. If Delhi sought to exploit the East Bengal crisis to reshape the subcontinental order with India at the helm, Moscow sought to balance China and the US in Asia, with India seen as an important partner in Moscow’s Asia strategy.133 But ‘Soviet policy was also driven by the USA–China–Pakistan nexus emerging at the same time, and this was of great concern to the entire Soviet leadership’.134 And therein lay the essence of IndoSoviet convergence in 1971. While Moscow was perhaps reluctant to give a clear green light to an Indian intervention, as Dhar had remarked in April, with the Soviets one also had ‘to read between the lines’.135 According to one former official, Dhar was ‘pivotal to the strategy that was unfolding in the wake of the crack-down by the Pakistan Army after March 1971’ and ‘was the one who manoeuvred between the different policy lines in Moscow in order 132 ‘Dhar–Kosygin Conversation’, 5 August 1971, S.F. 280, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 133  For example, on 5 June Marshal Grechko sought to impress D.P. Dhar on Russia’s credibility and how decisive Moscow could be in a scenario of Chinese brinksmanship. Grechko related Russia’s dramatic escalation and mobilization of forces to the 1969 Sino-Soviet border crisis provoked by Mao. ‘Dhar–Marshal Grechko Conversation’, 5 June 1971, S.F. 229, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). Also, see T.N. Kaul’s note on the geopolitical reasons for the Soviet Union’s changing policy towards India since 1969. ‘Kaul to Haksar’, June 1971, S.F. 258, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 134 Email interview with Prabhat Shukla, New Delhi, 19 February 2015. Also, see Vijay Sen Budhraj, ‘Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh’, Asian Survey, 3, no. 5 (1973); 482–95. 135  ‘Dhar to Haksar’, 18 April 1971, S.F. 169, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment).



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to ensure the outcome he wanted’.136 As the crisis evolved, private assurances to India also became unequivocal—Moscow began recognizing Indian strategic interests, and reassuring Delhi that it would do nothing to undermine the pursuit of these interests, should an escalation occur. More importantly, Moscow sought a formal treaty arrangement in lieu of extending its strategic umbrella over India during the peak of the crisis.137 What if liberal motives were the real reasons for Indira Gandhi’s choices during the 1971 crisis? Bass, for instance, without excluding strategic motives, says that his 1971 account extends the notion ‘that liberal states can be driven toward humanitarian intervention’, and adds that the presence of ‘humanitarian impulses in Indian domestic debates’ supports his ‘argument about the impact of liberal norms and institutions’.138 Chacko too finds that Indira Gandhi’s ‘invocation of humanitarianism was not simply an instrumental use of international normative language’ but part of a continuing strand of internationalism that Nehru had sought for India’s foreign policy. From this perspective, 1971 is advanced as a case of ‘significant’ continuity between the Nehru and Indira Gandhi periods.139 It is not unusual for policymakers to publicly couch their intentions and actions in a legitimating discourse to generate the widest possible appeal and sympathy from their audiences. Put simply, 136 ‘D.P. Dhar had a pretty clear idea, early in his first stint as Ambassador to the USSR, that there was scope for some bold power play.’ Email interview with Prabhat Shukla, New Delhi, 19 February 2015. 137  One former official notes, there was no question of the Russians not knowing that the Indian side was preparing to intervene. Personal interview with Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, New Delhi, 3 July 2014. The kinds of issues that were raised by the Indians to the Soviets revealed Indian motivations clearly as well as the ‘steps which might have to be taken in the military, economic and the political spheres in case an attack materialises’. Dhar also sought to narrow down ‘forms of [Indo-Soviet] consultations’ and the ‘various levels’ these would be operationalized at. ‘Dhar to Haksar’, 7 August 1971, S. F. 280, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 138 Bass, The Blood Telegram, 352. 139 Chacko, Indian Foreign Policy, 109, 117.

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‘[r]elying on what actors say can be misleading because of the strategic role of deception in public statements’.140 The methodological dilemma here seems to be one of deriving motives and beliefs from deliberations and pronouncements by policymakers and identifying those parts of the evidentiary record that approximate to the real images of the decision makers. The accessible private record strongly suggests that Indira Gandhi and her advisors were motivated primarily by realpolitik reasons. Indeed, the dearth of liberal arguments during confidential deliberations is stark. The public record at its face value—largely speeches by the Prime Minister141—suggests that Indian motives were a mix of security considerations, geopolitical ambition, the construction of India as a moral and responsible leader in its neighbourhood, and ethical humanitarian reasons. In contrast, an expression of liberal motives appears more evident in the beliefs of some opposition leaders such as Jayaprakash Narayan: Even as of today, can any one deny that every great power is actively interfering in the affairs of the weaker and less developed countries? The only difference is that while all the past and present interference has been from the most sordid motives, India would be interfering—if it can at all be justly characterized as such—in the interest of humanity, freedom, democracy and justice.142

One factor that shaped Indira Gandhi’s rhetorical construction of the crisis in the early stages was the long-standing India– Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. Basing the public case for an Indian intervention on human rights was seen as a double-edged sword for setting a future precedent for external involvement in 140  Peter

J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 484. 141 A concise source for Indira Gandhi’s statements during the 1971 crisis is Indira Gandhi, India and Bangladesh: Selected Speeches and Statements, March to December 1971 (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972). 142  ‘Press Statement by Jayaprakash Narayan’, 2 April 1971, S.F. 244, J.P. Narayan Papers (III-Instalment).



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Kashmir, an issue under the UN’s glare since 1948. The Prime Minister had, thus, been advised to choose her public statements carefully.143 Indian policymakers attempted to employ an internationalist discourse that could transcend the historical intramural conflict with Pakistan, and as the apex calibrated India’s strategic involvement in East Bengal, Indira Gandhi expanded the humanitarian rhetoric of earlier speeches to incorporate more orthodox reasons to justify intervention. For example, Indira Gandhi’s 13 May telegram to Nixon had developed the idea of refugee aggression: ‘As we see it, the rulers of Pakistan would wish the refugee problem in India to result in an aggravation of social tension and religious strife. They probably have a vested interest in this.’144 The representation of Pakistan’s refugee ‘aggression’ requiring Indian self-defence would become stronger in the closing stages of the crisis: ‘It is cynical use of helpless human beings as a weapon against a neighbour nation … our stability and security are gravely threatened. Indeed, we feel the threat is to the peace of the entire region.’145 While Nehru’s internationalism was usually projected in a voluntary spirit, for Indira Gandhi the envisaged intrusion into a neighbour’s sovereignty was presented in a posture of compellence alongside the terms of a political settlement (that is, regime change to an Awami League government led by Mujibur Rahman). Such a discourse appears consistent with her security seeker role conception and its core function to shape the subcontinental order. Confidential observations of policymakers are also instructive. As early as 30 April, Indira Gandhi had expressed serious concern on UN overtures to examine the refugee crisis first hand or in the UNSC.146 The posting of international observers in Indian refugee camps from the United Nations High Commission

143  ‘Haksar

to Indira Gandhi’, 26 March 1971, S.F. 164, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment); ‘Dhar to Haksar’, 29 April 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment). 144  ‘Indira Gandhi to Nixon’, 13 May 1971, FRUS (Vol. XI). 145  Indira Gandhi, India and Bangladesh, 50. 146  ‘Indira Gandhi to Kosygin’, 30 April 1971, S.F. 227, P.N.H. Papers (III-Instalment).

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for Refugees was also opposed because it would have constrained Indian options. Note, for example, Haksar’s advise to the Prime Minister: ‘[S]ome of the big powers, especially the US, are very keen that UN should be so involved largely to prevent activities of Bangladesh freedom fighters. We are resisting these attempts to involve the UN…. All our diplomatic efforts are directed towards ensuring that neither the Security Council nor the UN High Commission for Refugees become a brake on the struggle of the people of East Bengal.’147 When the confidential communicative record contradicts the public record and representations of the crisis, it might be prudent to rely on the former as more closely approximating policymakers’ beliefs and perceptions. This is because in private settings, decision makers are ‘more likely to candidly reveal their goals, their causal beliefs, and their lines of reasoning’.148 In order to make a persuasive case for the competing liberal argument, a modicum of linkage between reasons and specific decisions should be demonstrated. To illustrate this point, let us explore two critical decision points during the 1971 crisis. The date 25 March—the commencing of a brutal crackdown on the Bengalis by the Pakistan army—is typically represented as a major turning point in the crisis. The event provoked public statements in Parliament on 27 March and 31 March, the latter a resolution expressing ‘solidarity with the people of East Bengal 147  ‘Haksar to Indira Gandhi’, 26 July 1971, S.F. 280, P.N.H. Papers (IIIInstalment). Also, see ‘Sisco–L.K. Jha Conversation’, 27 July 1971, USNA. 148 ‘In more public settings’, as Jacobs notes, ‘political elites will, in general, have stronger incentives to justify predetermined decisions in socially acceptable terms. In private settings, on the other hand, decisionmakers can let down their guard. Especially where actors with similar goals are deliberating together, it is more likely that they will understand themselves to be engaged in the collective pursuit of optimal (from their shared perspectives) choices.’ In such core policymaking groups, ‘actors are more likely to candidly reveal their goals, their causal beliefs, and their lines of reasoning in order to maximise the effectiveness of deliberation’. Alan M. Jacobs, ‘Process Tracing the Effects of Ideas’, in Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool, eds Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 52.



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in their struggle for a democratic way of life’. Indian leaders also invoked their commitment to ‘uphold and defend human rights’ of the Bengalis and pledged the ‘sympathy and support of the people of India’. Yet, the origins of a series of decisions to exploit the crisis preceded the crackdown. India’s role performance was initiated on 2 March, when Indira Gandhi authorized her core advisors to examine the political, economic, and military implications of India assisting a Bangladesh liberation movement. And the images that conditioned and made such a choice even possible were arguably even older. As I suggested in Chapter 5, they can be traced to the 1960s when the post-Nehru leadership under Indira Gandhi drew abiding lessons from the traumatic events of that decade and redefined India’s relationship with its regional environment from one of a peacemaker to a security seeker. Another critical choice relates to India’s decision to reject an integration of Hindu refugees. P.N. Dhar inaccurately located the timing of this decision to Indira Gandhi’s mid-May tour of the refugee camps in eastern India, a visit that brought home the magnitude of the humanitarian costs of the crisis to the Prime Minister. Dhar recounts Indira Gandhi’s ‘grim and firm’ remark: ‘we cannot let Pakistan continue this holocaust’. It is claimed that this unsettling experience drove the Prime Minister to make a decision on 16 May whereby ‘India was not going to absorb the refugees’.149 But the timing of the refugee policy preceded Indira Gandhi’s tour of the camps in the east. The basic decision was taken sometime in mid-April if not earlier, primarily on strategic grounds, much before Indira Gandhi’s personal experience of this moving event. Again, the realpolitik rationale is apparent from the available evidence and preceded the emotional experience of the Prime Minister. Perhaps what is more plausible is to suggest that humanitarian reasons might have reinforced Indira Gandhi’s a priori decision and resolve to transform the East Bengal crisis into Pakistan’s Dien Ben Phu.150

149 Dhar,

Indira Gandhi, 158. see S.D. Muni, India’s Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 150 Also

8 Bringing Sikkim into the Fold, 1970–5

[The Chogyal] will not stop nibbling away at our authority here unless we are firm with him. Protesting, remonstrating, scolding, will at most slow him down for a brief while; to stop him we must let him feel that we still have teeth, and are prepared to use them. —K.S. Bajpai to MEA Headquarters, Delhi (November 1971) [O]nce that little neck between Assam and Bengal is no longer little you can at last get off our necks. —Chogyal to K.S. Bajpai (December 1971) Since my father’s days, the MEA has been dealing with our neighbours in the wrong manner. We have thought that simply by making concessions we will win trust, that by giving more and more we will guard our interests. That is not the case…. We cannot win friendship with our neighbours simply by making concessions. —Indira Gandhi (August 1974)

It is often assumed that India’s approach to its Himalayan region has been more or less a continuation of the pre-1947 era. While it is true that independent India drew upon the strategic legacies of British India, the policy pattern was not a uniform one. Nehru preferred an approach that relied on minimal coercion and interference in subcontinental affairs. Indira Gandhi, in contrast, was less constrained Power and Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policies during the Cold War. Zorawar Daulet Singh, Oxford University Press (2019). © Zorawar Daulet Singh. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199489640.003.0009



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by such beliefs regarding India’s display of its relative strength in South Asia. Sikkim offers a vivid example to contrast these two distinct geopolitical approaches to managing India’s security interests on its periphery. It is appropriate to begin with a brief overview of the Nehru period because contestations over Sikkim policy in the 1970s can actually be traced to older beliefs and images. Independent India had inherited a special position vis-à-vis Sikkim. Not only had the British treated Sikkim as a protectorate, unlike the other two Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan,1 the 1935 British Indian constitution had ranked Sikkim as an Indian princely state.2 The impact of Nehru’s beliefs can be gauged by his choices regarding Sikkim both after the transfer of power in 1947 and after the emergence of Mao’s China in 1949, two events that profoundly transformed India’s regional environment. In December 1947, the Sikkim State Congress sought accession of the state to India, a plea that apparently had Patel’s support but was rejected by Nehru.3 While the precise nature of Nehru– Patel contestations in this case remains somewhat obscure, it is clear that Nehru preferred not to disturb the status quo and viewed Sikkim more as a ‘buffer state’ rather than an area to expand Indian control.4 One reason for Nehru’s choice was that he did not want 1 In Sikkim, the British Political Officer had supervisory rights in internal administration. In contrast, according to a 1910 treaty, the British ‘undertook to exercise no interference’ in Bhutan’s internal administration. Dilip Mukherjee, ‘Difficult Task for New Delhi’, Times of India, 14 April 1973. Personal interview with B.S. Das, New Delhi, 6 August 2014. 2 Dilip Mukherjee, ‘Difficult Task for New Delhi’, Times of India, 14 April 1973. 3  P.N. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 282. 4  Bajpai claims that there were no differences between Nehru, Patel, and V.P. Menon on Sikkim. Delhi at the time did not find merit in accession because Sikkim ‘was too small to be a state of its own’ and ‘it had no affinity with any neighbouring state’. Nehru also visualized Sikkim through ‘the concept of buffer states’, and, since Tibet’s status in the 1940s had still not been challenged, the view taken was ‘let sleeping dogs lie’. Personal interview with K. Shankar Bajpai, New Delhi, 6 May and 31 October 2014.

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‘a small country to be swamped by a big one’.5 He had assured the Sikkim State Congress in December 1948 that the people’s will ‘would be regarded as the supreme authority in shaping the destiny of Sikkim’. Receiving ‘no positive reaction for more than a year’, the Sikkim Congress launched a grassroots campaign to agitate for their demands.6 After a breakdown of negotiations between the Sikkim Con­ gress and the Sikkim Maharaja, the palace was besieged on 1 May 1949 with the latter only escaping attack with the support of the Indian Army. The conflict continued with India sending ‘a company of troops’ to Gangtok from Darjeeling on 2 June to assist the Indian Political Officer in restoring order.7 The crisis prompted Nehru to proclaim that Sikkim’s future was ‘tied up completely with India’ and the ‘best course for Sikkim would be to accede to India, as other States have done. But, unwisely, the people there hesitate to accede.’8 But there is no evidence that Nehru actually sought accession. As he confidentially remarked during this time, there was ‘no question’ of ‘assuming immediate control over the administration of Sikkim. But if an officer is appointed by us, he would in fact take final orders from us, though he may be functioning under the Maharaja and the Ministry…. The question of our assuming direct control over the administration of Sikkim can only arise if other methods have failed.’9 The Sikkimese were ‘dissatisfied’ with India’s action. Tashi Tsering, the Sikkim State Congress President, retorted that there was ‘absolutely no state of emergency in Sikkim’ and it was ‘a bogey raised by the powers that be to have their own way’.10 Tsering alleged that Delhi had in effect colluded with the Maharaja and ignored the

5  Satyendra

R. Shukla, Sikkim: The Story of Integration (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1976), 179. 6 Dhar, Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy, 282–3. 7  ‘To Patel’, 2 June 1949, SWJN-SS, 11, 216. 8  ‘To Chief Minister’, 3 June 1949, SWJN-SS, 11, 277–8. 9 ‘To Foreign Secretary’, 3 June 1949, SWJN-SS, 11, 217. Also, see ‘Rajeshwar Dayal to Delhi’, 3 June 1949, J.N. Papers, File 24 (Part 1). 10  ‘Administration of Sikkim’, Times of India, 18 July 1949.



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public sentiment.11 Despite an opportunity and the presence of popular support for democracy, Nehru had chosen the status quo over accession. This was a choice consistent with his peacemaker role conception according to which India’s core regional functions were to stabilize the status quo and reassure weaker neighbours by adopting conflict avoidance modes of behaviour. The 1949 Communist victory in the Chinese civil war again impelled Delhi to revisit the Sikkim question. Expecting Mao’s China to quickly extend its influence over Tibet, Delhi began consultations with the Maharaja and the Sikkim State Congress and other political representatives. The discussions included the envisaged administrative structure, the role of political parties in Sikkim’s affairs, and, of course, India’s relationship with Sikkim.12 But Nehru stopped short of changing his earlier policy. The Sikkim State Congress, which had been agitating for greater rights, noticed the change. Unlike in December 1948, when Delhi’s attitude had been ‘quite cordial and receptive’, they were now told that Delhi’s ‘sole concern was to ensure a stable Government, and that no chaos and disorder will be tolerated’.13 Nehru chose to sanctify Sikkim’s equation with India via a new treaty in April 1950, which attempted to balance Sikkim’s internal autonomy and an enhanced status for the Maharaja with India’s strategic interests.14 Although India now confronted a less ambiguous geopolitical environment in the north compared to the preceding couple of years, why did Nehru not simply close the window in a highly strategic point on the Himalayan frontiers? After all, the foundation for a friendly democratic expression already existed. 11 

‘Sikkim Administration’, Times of India, 2 August 1949. Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy, 283. 13 Shukla, Sikkim, 53. 14 ‘To Chief Minister’, 1 April 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 419. Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Annual Report 1950–1951’, 10, accessed 15 August 2014, from http://mealib.nic.in/. Although the 1950 treaty opened the scope for future problems by enhancing the Maharaja’s status and domestic authority, from Delhi’s perspective ‘ultimate sovereignty vested in the Indian government which had chosen to delegate some powers to Sikkim’. Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim (New Delhi: Tranquebar, 2013), 75–8. 12 Dhar,

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Sikkim’s then population of 150,000 was composed of three ethnic groups: a Nepalese majority of 80 per cent; the Bhutias of Tibetan descent accounting for 15 per cent; the Lepchas, the original inhabitants of Sikkim before the colonization from Tibet, accounting for the remaining 5 per cent.15 The Sikkim Congress, founded in December 1947, represented the Nepali majority, and the Sikkim National Party represented the pro-Maharaja ethnic groups. But Nehru did not perceive the pro-Indian Sikkim Congress as an asset to be cultivated.16 Even later, in 1955 he rejected developing closer ties with the Sikkim Congress, advocating noninterference instead: ‘We should be rather careful in siding with any particular organization in Sikkim.’17 Delhi, of course, was aware that the key issue agitating the minds of the Nepalis in Sikkim was ‘the question of political representation and parity with the non-Nepalese’ minority.18 The main reason for Nehru’s choices was a worldview that was not predisposed to stamping India’s authority in the subcontinent. Nehru’s 1955 policy note on Bhutan exemplifies his broader approach towards the Himalayan kingdoms. India, he argued, should pursue a ‘positive policy of friendship’ and ‘must give no impression’ that it desired ‘to have political or other control’. Rejecting a policy of imposition, Nehru also declared, ‘it is only when they want any help that we should send it’.19 Again, in 1958, when signs of instability in India–China relations were apparent, Nehru was reluctant to alter his basic approach. He rejected the idea of ‘issuing directives and orders’ or imposing ‘our will on any of our neighbours’.20 Even at the peak of the Sino-Indian

15 

Harish Chandola, ‘Sikkim and Bhutan Drift Away from India: While We Stand By Watching Idly’, Times of India, 9 February 1958. 16 Sudhakar Bhat, ‘Political Ferment in Sikkim’, Times of India, 3 December 1950. 17 ‘Role of the Congress in Sikkim’, 21 March 1955, SWJN-SS, 28, 544–5. 18  ‘Apa Pant to MEA, Delhi’, 12 April 1956, File No. 52-R&I/56, NAI. 19  ‘To Foreign Secretary’, 17 July 1955, SWJN-SS, 29, 316. 20 ‘Position of Bhutan vis-à-vis India’, 28 September 1958, SWJN-SS, 44, 324–5.



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dispute in 1961, Nehru wanted Apa Pant, the Political Officer in Sikkim, to be more accommodating to the interests and prestige of the Palace.21 Nehru’s meeting with the Maharaja of Bhutan in February 1961 is also instructive of his general approach. While attempting to persuade the Maharaja to remain in India’s strategic orbit, Nehru remarked, ‘If despite this, Bhutan wanted to have the [future] right’ to external sovereignty, ‘he could not stop her, and he had no intention of limiting Bhutan’s sovereignty in any way’.22 In essence, this was a policy based on minimal interference, a preference for ethical statecraft, and a rejection of ‘spheres of influence’.23 And importantly, these modes of behaviour were also interlinked with Nehru’s larger Asian image. The peace area concept, as we will recall from previous chapters, was predicated on reforming patterns of interaction among the great powers and muting security dilemmas in the larger regional environment, with India’s role conceived to facilitate these goals. In October 1953, Nehru had rebuffed India’s Political Officer in Sikkim, who was advocating a more assertive posture: He ‘must clearly understand our policy not only in the region’ but also ‘in its wider aspect all over the world’.24 This inter-linkage between the sub-region of the subcontinent and the larger Asian system was central to Nehru’s beliefs and his corresponding peacemaker role conception. Perceiving Sikkim through these images, Nehru was reluctant to heighten threat perceptions vis-à-vis the northern frontiers. Sikkim was not deemed important enough to undertake an ‘imperialist venture’. It was simply ‘too small a proposition for any such venture’ and India’s only desire was stability.25 In short, Nehru’s geopolitical gaze was much wider

21 ‘Nehru

to Subimal Dutt’, 26 November 1960, S.F. 6, Apa B. Pant Papers (Instalment 1). 22 ‘N.M. Khilnani to K.R. Narayanan, Indo-Bhutan and Indo-Sikkim Relations: Legal and Other Matters’, 3 September 1969, PP(JS)3(1)/69, MEA-PP, 1969, NAI. 23 ‘Position of Bhutan vis-à-vis India’, 28 September 1958, SWJN-SS, 44, 324–5. 24  ‘To Foreign Secretary’, 25 October 1953, SWJN-SS, 24, 598. 25  ‘To Chief Minister’, 15 June 1949, SWJN-SS, 11, 290. ‘To Menon’, 15 June 1949, SWJN-SS, 11, 153.

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and the subcontinent was not defined as the core sphere for India’s regional policy. And a posture of reassurance and conflict avoidance in the South Asian realm were complementary to the larger peacemaker role. In contrast, Indira Gandhi’s security seeker role implied a different approach to managing India’s interests on its periphery. A striking aspect of the 1970s Sikkim crisis is the utter secrecy relating to Indian deliberations and transition to a new policy. The Haksar and Kaul Papers are silent on this crisis.26 R.N. Kao, a key player, has placed restrictions regarding public access to his recorded memoirs pertaining to this period.27 Former officials have so far been the main insight into Indira Gandhi’s Sikkim policy. Although P.N. Dhar recounts useful anecdotes and offers a glimpse into policy contestations, the role of senior officials outside the apex who prodded Delhi to confront its declining influence in a highly strategic area has been overlooked.28 To be fair, Dhar admitted that he ‘had no access to official records’ or his ‘own notes and memoranda’ that were ‘left behind in the prime minister’s secretariat’.29 B.S. Das, a former official who served in Gangtok during a key phase of the crisis, offers an informative insider account but is still constrained by limited access to apex level decision-making and the covert strategy that underlay Indian policy.30 Others too have offered lively narratives, although again few have tapped inner deliberations. Datta-Ray readily admits that his account relies ‘rather heavily on Sikkimese sources’, while pointing to the ‘absence of any credible Indian explanation’ in the existing literature.31 26  P.N.H. Papers (I, II, and III Instalments), NMML; T.N. Kaul Papers (I, II, and III Instalments), NMML. 27  Shyam Bhatia, ‘Kao’s Memoirs—An Insight into RAW Roots’, The Tribune, 23 June 2014; Vappala Balachandran, ‘The Kao Files’, Indian Express, 23 January 2016. 28 Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 269–99. 29 Dhar, Indira Gandhi, Preface-viii. 30  B.S. Das, The Sikkim Saga (New Delhi: Vikas, 1983). 31 Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, Preface-xxxiv. Also useful for insights and context on that period are: Andrew Duff, Sikkim: Requiem for a Himalayan Kingdom (Gurgaon: Random House, 2015); Shukla, Sikkim; H.G. Joshi, ed., Sikkim: Past and Present (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 2004).



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Personal testimonies of key former Indian officials combined with limited archival material now enable a richer reconstruction of Indira Gandhi’s response to the Sikkim crisis. This chapter will explore the significant stages in the Indian decision-making process prior to Sikkim’s integration with India in 1975 in order to examine how Indira Gandhi’s security seeker role conditioned the choices underlying India’s strategy. The crisis played out over three main phases. The first phase, between 1970 and 1972, witnessed intense policy contestations that were reflective of a deeper transition from Nehru’s peacemaker role to Indira Gandhi’s security seeker role. This internal debate concluded with Indira Gandhi endorsing a new line by deciding to intervene in the fall of 1972. The second phase played out between October 1972 and May 1973 when covert means were cultivated and employed to shape the political conditions for a new agreement with the Chogyal. This agreement not only restored India’s dominant position in Sikkim, it also altered the electoral system to favour representative democracy in that state. In the final post-May 1973 phase, India continued with its strategy of changing the status quo by completely displacing the old political structure in Sikkim with new democratic norms, which paved the way for a merger with the Indian Union in 1975. The chapter concludes by critically probing the reasons for Indira Gandhi’s choices during this crisis.

A Brewing Crisis and Competing Images The 1960s would witness Sikkim drifting out of the Indian orbit. After the 1962 India–China conflict, the Maharaja discovered an opening to enhance Sikkim’s autonomy and status. His marriage to a young American, Hope Cooke, in 1963 coincided with subtle attempts at changing Sikkim’s equation with India and with the world. Having ‘played his cards quite cleverly’, the Maharaja— now with the elevated title of Chogyal—‘began to nurse ambitions and take advantage’ of India–China relations. Delhi was not sure whether ‘the US was trying to fish in troubled waters’. The Chogyal began to look for opportunities to assert his own identity hoping to

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acquire a status something on the lines of Bhutan. In pursuant of this goal, he sought to construct some ‘attributes of sovereignty’.32 For instance, in 1964 a Sikkim Study Forum was established which sought to cultivate an anti-India discourse among the people. In 1965, the Chogyal created a national anthem, and in the following year made an open press statement seeking changes in the 1950 India–Sikkim Treaty. More emboldened by 1967, the Chogyal announced that his goal was political freedom and that ‘he awaited the convenience of the government of India’.33 In exchanges with journalists, he was even more explicit. What the Palace sought was not merely ‘some changes’ but a fundamental ‘review’ of the entire treaty ‘in the context of the changed situation’.34 The Chogyal boldly declared, ‘We want India to look after our defence and leave the rest to us.’35 According to the 1950 treaty, Sikkim’s administration was envisaged via an Indian appointed Dewan, nominally under the Chogyal. The Dewan ‘was meant to be a mutually acceptable bridge between New Delhi’s interest in supervising the administration and the ruler’s desire to remain head of state’. In practice, the Dewan’s authority was ‘allowed to be whittled down’ with the ‘consent or acquiescence’ of Delhi.36 In addition, the overall political guidance was to be undertaken by the Political Officer, usually a senior MEA official. Both these institutions were undermined over time, partly on account of Indian inaction and partly because the Chogyal was able to manipulate Indians to serve his own interests.37 Consequently, the Chogyal had acquired a large 32 Personal

Interview with Sudhir Devare, New Delhi, 4 October 2014 (Devare, then a junior official, worked under the Political Officer in Gangtok). 33 Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, 176. 34 Shukla, Sikkim, 196–8. 35 Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab, 176. 36  Ajit Bhattacharjea, ‘India and Sikkim’, Times of India, 27 April 1973. 37 Personal interview with B.S. Das, New Delhi, 6 August 2014. In contrast to the British era, where the Political Office was the ‘only seat of power’, India’s introduction of the institution of the Dewan ‘not only gave the Chogyal a stick to lean on, but brought two senior Indians into direct conflict’. Das, The Sikkim Saga, 65.



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measure of autonomy, contrary to the spirit of the 1950 treaty. By 1969, the Chogyal had acquired enough influence to appoint his own Dewan, I.S. Chopra, and designate him to the rank of ‘Sidlon’ (Tibetan for Prime Minister). He was ‘edging closer to his dream of a Tibeto-Sikkimese renaissance’.38 Under Chopra’s tenure, ‘the first ever anti-Indian demonstration’ took place on 15 August, India’s independence day, in front of the Political Office.39 When Chopra was finally relieved of his post in December 1972, his functions had been reduced ‘to being chairman of the Sikkim Mining Corporation and Sikkim Jewels Ltd., and chief commissioner of Sikkim Scouts and Guides!’40 Delhi’s largely passive reactions to these events reflected both the role flux from the Nehru to the Indira Gandhi period and the persistence of competing images regarding India’s appropriate strategy to resolve this brewing crisis. One image, embodied by some of Indira Gandhi’s core advisors such as R&AW Chief R.N. Kao and senior officials such as K. Shankar Bajpai, projected the crisis in more ominous terms and largely through a prism of a sensitive and vigilant outlook to India’s security interests and relative position in the subcontinent. Another image was reflected in sections of the MEA and articulated by some senior officials, especially the Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul, who perceived the crisis in relatively more benign terms and advocated a non-interventionist and accommodative posture. These policy contestations would play out between 1970 and 1972. While Bajpai, the Political Officer between 1970 and 1974, was alerting Delhi to changes in the local situation, the reaction from MEA headquarters was still one of a ‘wait and watch’ attitude and telling Gangtok ‘not to jump to conclusions’.41 For the most part, Bajpai’s cables had received ‘scant attention’ from Kaul.42 Soon after his selection as Political Officer in 1970, Bajpai had 38 Datta-Ray,

Smash and Grab, 97. The Sikkim Saga, 67. 40  Ajit Bhattacharjea, ‘India and Sikkim’, Times of India, 27 April 1973. 41  Personal Interview with Sudhir Devare, New Delhi, 4 October 2014. 42 Personal Interview with Avtar Singh Bhasin, New Delhi, 8 May 2014 (Former official in the MEA). 39 Das,

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been urged by Kaul to ‘start revising the Treaty’ in order to make ‘Sikkim on par with Bhutan’.43 The Foreign Secretary’s approach to securing India’s interests in the Himalayan kingdoms can be gauged by a policy note prepared under his tenure by the MEA’s Policy Planning division in 1969: ‘At present we have acquired, as a legacy of the former [British Indian] regime certain links’, which enabled India to safeguard its ‘security interests’ in Bhutan and Sikkim. ‘However, in modern times, those specific links … are not fully in consonance with current trends in international relations.’ India has ‘repeatedly condemned all forms of colonialism and of dependence of one people on another. If, therefore, our present relationship with Bhutan and Sikkim prove to be untenable in the face of world opinion, then it is necessary to try to reformulate these relations in a form more acceptable to the international community’, while preserving the ‘substance of the present arrangement’.44 Kaul later acknowledged that one of his last efforts as Foreign Secretary was to transform Sikkim towards an ‘autonomous’ status, ‘and remove the incongruous and ugly appellation of “protectorate” from the Treaty’.45 This was a classic exposition of Nehruvian beliefs. Policy contestations would manifest in a high-level meeting in the summer of 1970. Held in South Block, the participants included P.N. Haksar, R.N. Kao, T.N. Kaul, the Home Secretary, the Defence Secretary, Chief of IB,46 Army Chief, and the new appointee for Gangtok, K.S. Bajpai. In this meeting, Kaul went about suggesting ‘a clause-by-clause revision of the 1950 India–Sikkim

43 Personal

interview with K. Shankar Bajpai, New Delhi, 6 May 2014 (Bajpai was India’s Political Officer in Sikkim from August 1970 to August 1974.) 44 ‘N.M. Khilnani to K.R. Narayanan, Indo-Bhutan and Indo-Sikkim Relation: Legal and Other Matters’, 3 September 1969, PP(JS)3(1)/69, MEA-PP, 1969, NAI. 45 T.N. Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), 89. 46 In September 1968, India’s intelligence structure was bifurcated with R&AW assuming the mandate for external intelligence, and the IB dedicated to domestic intelligence.



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Treaty’.47 Bajpai, however, requested and was authorized to gain a first-hand account of the ground situation in Sikkim before a treaty revision was considered by Delhi. Not only did Bajpai’s initial assessment a few months later contradict Kaul’s proposal for a treaty revision, he found that ‘there was no real pressure from anywhere except the Palace’ to India’s interests. A decision was taken to hold Kaul’s proposal.48 Delhi’s perceptions on Sikkim were based on a multitude of intelligence and ground-level assessments from two parallel channels. For the diplomatic establishment, Bajpai was the eyes and ears in Sikkim. This was supplemented by R&AW officers ‘who had extensive contacts in Sikkim’49, providing Kao and thus the Prime Minister with a credible insight into Sikkim’s affairs. Bajpai’s assessments were unequivocal: the Chogyal was taking advantage of Delhi’s ‘inattention and inability to manage things on the ground and was moving towards independence’. He had been receiving ‘concession after concession’, and unless it was nipped in the bud, Delhi ‘may have a problem tomorrow’.50 These reports were mediated by Kaul, who, as alluded to earlier, had a different perceptual image and approach towards the Sikkim problem. The R&AW, in contrast, did not suffer from such internal contestations that could have distorted the incoming intelligence to the Prime Minister. Unlike sections of the MEA, which still imbibed Nehruvian ideas, the R&AW, an institution created by Indira Gandhi, was less immune to an accommodative approach when it came to questions regarding the immediate neighbourhood. Even so, Bajpai’s ability to get his point of view across to the apex level went beyond normal institutional channels. Being the son of Girja Shankar Bajpai, one of Nehru’s close advisors in the late 1940s and early 1950s, had provided Bajpai with high-level access and certainly beyond his official position.51 He 47 

Personal interview with K. Shankar Bajpai, New Delhi, 6 May 2014. interview with K. Shankar Bajpai, New Delhi, 31 October

48  Personal

2014. 49 Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 276. 50  Personal interview with K. Shankar Bajpai, New Delhi, 6 May 2014. 51  After assuming his assignment in Gangtok in August 1970, Bajpai

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had two personal interactions with the Prime Minister in 1971, and later also ‘developed very good relations’ with Kao, and they ‘became very close friends’.52 Soon after occupying India House in Gangtok, Bajpai began dispatching a flurry of telegrams to Delhi. These cables are instructive not only for an acute definition of the Sikkim problem and advocacy for assertive policy options but they also reveal competing worldviews in Delhi. ‘Our only policy in Sikkim has been to try and keep the Chogyal pleased’, noted Bajpai soon after India’s Lok Sabha elections in March 1971. ‘Far from making him grateful, this has left him more ambitious than ever to acquire more authority of sovereignty, while at the same time embittering against us the Nepali majority.’53 The Chogyal had ‘been using the limited urges of nationalism to suppress the intrinsically stronger urges towards democracy. In this process, India has been made to appear the oppressor, and has virtually ceased to influence the course of political development.’ Bajpai advised, ‘It is essential for us to start discreetly but definitively to give hope and leadership to the majority population. The problem is in politics rather than diplomacy.’54 In November 1971 Bajpai observed: There should not be any scrap of doubt in Delhi that he [Chogyal] is going to do his damnest to get independence … even the highest level talking-to will only have limited effect. We must also now be ready to, in effect, punish him … but unfortunately I do not seem to have been able to get Delhi to see the significance [of the entire picture in Sikkim].55

would ‘come to Delhi every two or three months’ and urge senior officials to ‘take a decision’ on arresting India’s declining influence in Sikkim. Personal interview with K. Shankar Bajpai, New Delhi, 6 May 2014. 52  Personal interview with K. Shankar Bajpai, New Delhi, 31 October 2014. 53  Approximately 70 per cent of Sikkim’s population at the time. 54 ‘Bajpai to MEA Headquarters, Delhi’, (undated, probably March 1971), K.S. Bajpai Papers. 55 ‘Bajpai to Joint Secretary (Northern Division)’, 2 November 1971, K.S. Bajpai Papers.



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A week later, Bajpai again warned: ‘Let there be no doubt that the Chogyal is out to undermine our influence in Sikkim by all the means at his disposal, first to strengthen his bargaining position with us and eventually to achieve full independence…. Our inactivity only feeds his success.’ Urging a policy review, Bajpai remarked that ‘we will still need friends in Sikkim’s political life: can we not immediately start reviving, in those who will keep the Chogyal at bay for us, the confidence that we will help them?’56 This was a euphemism for the Nepali majority, who since the late 1940s had presented a counterpoise to the authority of the Chogyal but had not been buttressed by Nehru for fear of disturbing the status quo and increasing India’s involvement in Sikkim. The Chogyal, Bajpai insisted: ‘will not stop nibbling away at our authority here unless we are firm with him. Protesting, remonstrating, scolding, will at most slow him down for a brief while; to stop him we must let him feel that we still have teeth, and are prepared to use them…. I believe an independent Bangladesh will make it more important than ever to retain our position here.

Expressing his frustration with Delhi’s divided outlook on Sikkim, Bajpai concluded that while he was prepared to exercise his authority unilaterally, ‘the Chogyal is so used to getting around us, and will appeal to Delhi against the measures I am advocating: if I embark on them and then have to pull back, the Sikkimese will lose all confidence in us’. Unless Delhi was ‘willing to stick to the course, it will do more harm than good’ to start a new approach. Bajpai feared that his prescribed coercive approach to alter the Chogyal’s calculus ‘will succeed only in making the Ministry [MEA] fed up with me’.57 With the Bangladesh crisis reaching its apogee, Delhi had little time for even a ‘preliminary review’ of its Sikkim policy.58 At the peak of the war, the Chogyal told Bajpai that an independent Bangladesh would imply India would have little reason for 56 

‘Bajpai to Secretary (West)’, 8 November 1971, K.S. Bajpai Papers. ‘Bajpai to Secretary (West)’, 8 November 1971, K.S. Bajpai Papers. 58  ‘Bajpai to Secretary (West)’, 8 November 1971, K.S. Bajpai Papers. 57 

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maintaining its position in Sikkim, ‘once that little neck between Assam and Bengal is no longer little you can at last get off our necks’.59 Bajpai still felt that while the situation was ‘perfectly remediable’, the ‘concessional approach … can only harm us’. He urged for a ‘consistent and comprehensive policy’.60 Having received no guidance from Delhi until June 1972, the exasperated Political Officer remarked, ‘I confess I am finding myself increasingly at a loss as to what exactly I am supposed to do here.’ The Chogyal had abruptly removed the Sidlon, I.S. Chopra, who ironically had never worked against the Darbar (Palace). Although Delhi too had wanted Chopra out, Bajpai objected to the Chogyal’s unilateral action: ‘It may appear a technicality but insistence on certain forms is a necessary part of maintaining one’s position in a feudal anachronism.’ The crux of the problem was that the Chogyal and his ‘mischief-makers’ could be handled by talking ‘sternly’ and threatening ‘financial punishments’. ‘I still feel that if our leaders were to tell the Chogyal to do what we want “or else”, he would knuckle under.’ However, if Delhi could not ‘follow that line’, then ‘we must start considering the more drastic remedies’. But one thing was ‘quite clear: either we put in our Sidlon, face the removal of the Darbar’s naughty boys, and start building up our own supporters, or else, we will have sooner or later to acquiesce in Sikkim’s independence’.61 Although Indira Gandhi’s own thinking had also undergone a further shift towards a more proactive Indian role in the subcontinent after 1971,62 contestations within the MEA constrained or at the very least delayed a policy adjustment on Sikkim.63 The

59  ‘Bajpai

to Joint Secretary (Northern Division)’, 10 December 1971, K.S. Bajpai Papers. 60  ‘Bajpai to Delhi’, undated, K.S. Bajpai Papers. 61 ‘Bajpai to Director (Northern Division)’, 29 June 1972, K.S. Bajpai Papers. 62 Personal interview with Ranjit Gupta, New Delhi, 29 July 2014 (Gupta was an MEA official who worked under the Political Officer in Gangtok). 63 There were ‘confusing and often conflicting reports’ reaching the apex ‘from the MEA and its diplomatic sources’. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 276.



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Prime Minister had been fed competing arguments that rationalized a softer approach.64 Bajpai was, thus, relying on Kao to get his messages across to the Prime Minister and get her to ‘take a political decision’. Since he was ‘absolutely trusted’, the Intelligence Chief’s views ‘were more likely to carry weight’ with Indira Gandhi than perhaps any other senior official.65 Even as assessments from below were reaching her, Indira Gandhi too perceived the Sikkim problem as a threat to India’s regional authority. She felt that the Chogyal had been further emboldened by the Sino–US détente after Nixon’s China visit in 1972.66 The Prime Minister ‘had presumed that in view of the coolness in Indo-American relations’ during and after the 1971 crisis, ‘the Chogyal would take care to be sensitive to Indian concerns’.67 She had been expressing her dissatisfaction with the Chogyal since 1970.68 For instance, when Indian President V.V. Giri visited Bhutan it was manoeuvred behind the scenes to exclude Sikkim from his itinerary in order to send a message to the Chogyal that Sikkim and Bhutan were not going to be equated—as was the MEA’s preference in the preceding years. Indira Gandhi also expressed her displeasure at the Chogyal through her own gestures by discontinuing to personally receive him at the airport during visits to Delhi.69 Perhaps, the Chogyal’s last attempt to salvage his position came during Indira Gandhi’s visit to Darjeeling in October 1972 when the Chogyal ‘missed the opportunity’ to reassure her on Delhi’s declining confidence with the Palace.70

Decision for Intervention In the last quarter of 1972 Indira Gandhi called Haksar and Kao, and asked the latter, ‘can we do anything about Sikkim?’ A 64 

Personal interview with K. Shankar Bajpai, New Delhi, 6 May 2014. interview with K. Shankar Bajpai, New Delhi, 31 October

65  Personal

2014. 66 Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 290. 67 Dhar, Indira Gandhi. 68 Das, The Sikkim Saga, Preface. 69  Personal interview with B.S. Das, New Delhi, 6 August 2014. 70  Personal interview with Sudhir Devare, New Delhi, 4 October 2014.

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fortnight later, Kao presented his operational plan to the Prime Minister.71 The substance of the new policy was to undermine the Chogyal’s authority and produce new conditions that would lead to a more durable arrangement between Delhi and Sikkim. The Prime Minister had decided to intervene covertly. This decision on Sikkim was only known to a select group: Indira Gandhi, Haksar, Kao, P.N. Banerjee, R&AW’s Joint Director for eastern India including Sikkim, and A.S. Syali, the field officer in Gangtok, and then his successor G.B.S. Sidhu. Other actors such as the Foreign Secretary and the Political Officer came into the policy loop gradually as the strategy was initiated and implemented in stages.72 In terms of the interagency division of labour, the ground level social engineering was to be executed by R&AW, and the diplomatic aspect to be handled by the Foreign Secretary in Delhi and the Political Officer in Gangtok. In December 1972, T.N. Kaul was succeeded by Kewal Singh. Although the change in MEA’s leadership occurred after the Sikkim policy had been decided, this appointment enabled the overt and covert aspects of policy implementation to evolve smoothly.73 ‘With the appointment of Kewal Singh the differences’ between MEA and R&AW ‘lost their operational significance’.74 He ‘also came to the view that there was no need to revise the Sikkim treaty’, thereby ending contestations within the MEA.75 71 Personal interview with G.B.S. Sidhu, New Delhi, 13 November 2014. (G.B.S. Sidhu is a former intelligence officer who was personally selected by R.N. Kao for the Sikkim assignment). 72  Personal interview with G.B.S. Sidhu, New Delhi, 14 August 2014. 73 Insofar as the MEA headquarters were concerned, the Northern Division had a very limited role in policy implementation. ‘The deeper aspects of Sikkim policy were handled almost directly by Kewal Singh’ in coordination with the Prime Minister, P.N. Dhar, and R.N. Kao. ‘Highly confidential’ matters were handled personally by Kewal Singh who ‘maintained exclusive, tightly restricted communication with the Political Officer in Gangtok’. Personal interview with Kishan S. Rana, New Delhi, 4 October 2014. 74 Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 276. 75  Personal interview with K. Shankar Bajpai, New Delhi, 31 October 2014.



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On 14 March 1973, senior policymakers assembled in South Block to discuss the new Sikkim policy. The meeting was attended by K.B. Lall, the Principal Defence Secretary, the Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh, R.N. Kao, P.N. Banerjee, and K.S. Bajpai.76 Bajpai began by describing the new policy, which sought ‘to start reversing the erosion of our position in Sikkim and to prepare to reassert it to safeguard our rights and interests against the encroachments of the Chogyal’. The ‘immediate aim was to install a reliable officer as Sidlon to serve these ends’. To attain this first step, Bajpai outlined a number of available options. The first was simply ‘to have the Chogyal told by P.M. and F.M. to look at IndoSikkim relations in a broader perspective and to appreciate India’s problem’. Another option was to ‘let the political opposition to the Chogyal take their agitation to so alarming a level’ that the Palace would be compelled to cooperate. A third option was to ‘make even a feeble agitation the pretext for telling the Chogyal that his domestic situation required us to give him a new Sidlon’.77 Since all three courses of action involved the possibility of the Chogyal resisting Indian pressure, it was ‘essential to take the basic decision whether or not we were prepared to follow through’ to the ‘ultimate end’—‘the replacement of the Chogyal if need be’. Bajpai stressed ‘once we started on any of these three courses, we could not afford to take no for an answer’. He also underlined the ‘serious risk of the agitation proving a damp squib’. While ‘one had to make use of whatever instruments were available’, ‘it was important to know the weaknesses and limitations. The significant point was that the agitation so far had not been impressive.’ Bajpai recommended that Delhi pursue the first option, namely, that ‘we should first call the Chogyal to Delhi and talk to him…. This would gain time for the agitation to grow.’ But Kao and Banerjee felt that ‘talking to the Chogyal might be fruitless and would give him warning of our intentions’. The assertive options were more viable. The ‘progress of the agitation so far had not 76 

‘Summary Record of Meeting to Consider Steps in Regard to Sikkim’, 14 March 1973, K.S. Bajpai Papers. 77  ‘Summary Record of Meeting to Consider Steps in Regard to Sikkim’, 14 March 1973, K.S. Bajpai Papers.

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been bad’ and despite its inadequate leadership, ‘the movement would grow’ over time. Kao felt the position should be judged after the performance of the opposition had been seen. Kewal Singh concurred with this calibrated approach: If the political opposition ‘built up enough pressure to make the Chogyal turn to us, well and good, otherwise the concerned authorities [R&AW] would in any case build up contacts for the next 3 or 4 months so as to be ready with alternatives’.78 In the event, R&AW’s social engineering would be felt much sooner.

The April 1973 ‘Agitation’ The Chogyal had no reason to fear a social backlash in Sikkim. After all, the electoral system had been framed to counteract the Nepali majority by denying a one-man one-vote. It was an unequal structure with privileges vested with the Bhutias and Lepchas.79 In 1947, the Nepalese had outnumbered the Bhutias and Lepchas by 9 to 1,80 a demographic structure that was largely irrelevant under the old political system. Indeed, in the February 1972 elections, the pro-Chogyal forces unsurprisingly won the elections. Besides, in every prior instance of a popular upsurge, Delhi had sided with the Chogyal to subdue the people’s will. Maintaining the status quo had trumped everything else. Indira Gandhi’s new policy transcended the old approach by seeking to create a higher degree of stability by permanently emasculating the Chogyal. Sikkim’s ethnic composition provided India a latent leverage that could have been exercised at any time.81 Kazi Lhendup Dorji, a senior leader of the Sikkim National Congress and ironically of Bhutia ethnicity, was the most legitimate candidate to mobilize the anti-Chogyal sentiment. The Kazi, who had the confidence of the Nepalis and to a limited extent with other ethnicities, had always felt a grievance against Delhi’s decision not to integrate Sikkim after 1947.82 78 

‘Summary Record of Meeting to Consider Steps in Regard to Sikkim’, 14 March 1973, K.S. Bajpai Papers. 79  Personal interview with G.B.S. Sidhu, New Delhi, 14 August 2014. 80  ‘Bhutan and Sikkim’, Times of India, 23 January 1947. 81  Personal interview with Ranjit Gupta, New Delhi, 29 July 2014. 82  Personal interview with G.B.S. Sidhu, New Delhi, 14 August 2014.



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In Gangtok, India’s new posture was felt by early 1973. R&AW played a pivotal role in the churning within Sikkim’s polity, handling political parties and shaping their strategy at each stage.83 The first step was aimed at testing the waters to assess the ground level support for a genuine democratic upsurge. In March 1973, the Nepali majority began to display the first signs of pressure on the Chogyal. By the end of the month, there were large-scale protests across Sikkim and ‘nearly 20,000 demonstrators collected in Gangtok’.84 On 4 April, which was also the Chogyal’s fiftieth birthday, the local agitation reached its peak.85 Delhi sent Avtar Singh, a former Political Officer in Sikkim, to assess the situation.86 All assessments confirmed that the ‘administration was about to collapse’, with the Chogyal ‘in a desperate state’. On 6 April, P.N. Dhar and Kewal Singh met Indira Gandhi ‘to brief her on the situation and seek her instructions’. But the Foreign Secretary was surprised to find that Indira Gandhi had already decided on the next course of action ‘before listening to what he had to say’, briefly stating ‘that she would accept the Chogyal’s request for help as soon as it came’.87 Indira Gandhi and Kao had apparently already established the strategy in a prior meeting. Totally ‘taken aback’ with the crisis, the Chogyal formally asked Bajpai for assistance to take over Sikkim’s administration on 7 April.88 The opposition Joint Action Committee (JAC) leaders also appealed to Indira Gandhi in a telegram to ‘intervene to save lives and secure democratic rights of the people of Sikkim’. Delhi responded swiftly. Within twenty-four hours, the Army had restored

83 

Personal interview with G.B.S. Sidhu, New Delhi, 14 August 2014. ‘Sikkim’s Interests Safe’, Times of India, 10 April 1973. 85  B.S. Das who replaced I.S. Chopra as the new Chief Administrator on 10 April, recalls a ‘grim’ situation and ‘a total collapse of the administration…. Gangtok gave the appearance of a ghost town with the most visible people being the Indian Army patrols…. The agitators against the Chogyal had been camping in Gangtok in thousands.’ Das, The Sikkim Saga, 13–14. 86  ‘Avtar Singh to Study Situation’, Times of India, 5 April 1973. 87 Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 277–8. 88  Personal interview with K. Shankar Bajpai, New Delhi, 31 October 2014. 84 

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order and on 9 April, B.S. Das, who had earlier served in Bhutan for four years, was appointed as Chief Administrator of Sikkim.89 Before Das’s departure for Gangtok, he was advised to ‘not allow the Chogyal to get on top again. We will never get a second opportunity like this. 1949 should not be repeated.’90 To buttress India’s low credibility among JAC leaders, the junior minister for External Affairs was instructed to make a parliamentary statement assuring that India would ‘make every effort to ensure that the interests of the people of Sikkim are safeguarded’.91 Satisfied with Delhi’s assurance, the Kazi quickly ‘announced the suspension of the mass movement’ and urged people to ‘go back to the villages and live peacefully’.92 On 13 April, Kewal Singh and Bajpai concluded the reconciliation talks with the Chogyal where they agreed to fulfil ‘most of the political demands’ of the opposition parties. Kazi was delighted that there had been no repetition of the 1949 events and that India had opened a process towards democratization.93 Existing accounts suggest that Delhi slowed down its intervention after the initial protests had been successfully demonstrated. Within a few days of Das’s arrival in Gangtok in early April, the Foreign Secretary was dispatched to soften the policy. ‘Kewal Singh’s new approach of a negotiated settlement with the Chogyal embarrassed us considerably vis-à-vis the political leaders. The new line was that the agitation had completed its task. We should now look forward for a tripartite alliance between Delhi, the Chogyal and the political parties.’94 The April protests were, however, never intended to produce a final settlement but was undertaken to ‘test the waters’ and restore India’s original rights that had been diluted over the years.95 Still, there were 89 

‘B.S. Das Named Administrator’, Times of India, 10 April 1973. The Sikkim Saga, 2–3. 91  ‘Sikkim’s Interests Safe’, Times of India, 10 April 1973. 92  Sivadas Banerjee, ‘Sikkim Agitation is Suspended’, Times of India, 9 April 1973. 93 ‘Kewal Singh’s Talks in Gangtok’, Times of India, 13 April 1973; ‘Accord on Political Issues in Sikkim’, Times of India, 14 April 1973; Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 278. 94 Das, The Sikkim Saga, 18. 95  Personal interview with G.B.S. Sidhu, New Delhi, 14 August 2014. 90 Das,



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apparently two factors that shaped India’s calculus. Kewal Singh had expressed concern after a ‘few signals’ that had been ‘received from abroad’.96 With Beijing publicly rebuking Indian moves at the time, Moscow had advised Delhi not to provoke the Chinese. Russia’s advice was that if India went beyond a point it would be portrayed as an outright grab of territory and invite international opprobrium. It was such an imperative to avoid an adverse external reaction that the intervention stretched out over the time it did.97 Bajpai too imputes similar motivations for Delhi’s gradualism.98 Another factor on Indian minds was a fear that the local rebellion might spiral out of control. A small minority of younger demonstrators, perhaps emboldened by their success in shocking the Chogyal, might have entertained plans of their own.99 But Delhi’s gradual approach was not because of any normative objections to Indian power projection or because of a lack of strategic purpose but rather to minimize the costs of an intervention. What Das perceived as a tactical adjustment might actually have been the execution of a phased strategy.

‘Democratization’ On 18 April, the Sikkim National Congress and the Sikkim Janata Congress decided to merge into a single party.100 During their visit to Delhi, the JAC leaders were assured that ‘all their 96 

‘Kewal Singh to Bajpai’, 2 May 1973, K.S. Bajpai Papers. interview with B.S. Das, New Delhi, 6 August 2014. Also see Das, The Sikkim Saga, 19; ‘China Attacks Indian Take-over in Sikkim’, Times of India, 13 April 1973. 98 After the new policy was in play there was high sensitivity to international and neighbourhood reactions, probably explaining the gradualism in the policy implementation. Personal interview with K. Shankar Bajpai, New Delhi, 6 May 2014. 99  Personal interview with G.B.S. Sidhu, New Delhi, 14 August 2014. Das, The Sikkim Saga, 15. 100 The Sikkim National Congress led by the Kazi and the Sikkim Janata Congress led by K.C. Pradhan merged into a single party—the Sikkim Congress. 97 Personal

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demands except the one for the abdication of the Chogyal would be accepted’.101 Kewal Singh returned to Gangtok with a draft agreement, which in essence sought to restore India’s authority, which had been diluted over the years. However, since the political system was still biased in favour of the pro-Chogyal minority, the core issue remained untouched.102 The Chogyal, however, had ‘misunderstood’ Delhi’s gradualism as a sign of ‘weakness’.103 Indira Gandhi was proceeding cautiously largely to legitimize Indian actions. Kewal Singh urged Bajpai to focus on the ‘parity formulation’ that would keep a balance between the majority Nepalis and the minority Lepcha–Bhutia communities, and play down the one-man one-vote concept.104 But this incremental approach was still too conservative for Sikkim’s political opposition, and, after pressure from the JAC parties, Kewal Singh returned with another draft. On 8 May, an agreement embodying Delhi’s essential objectives was finally reached with the ‘Machiavellian’ Chogyal.105 Although a parity formula was agreed whereby the Bhutia–Lepchas and Nepali communities were allotted fifteen seats each in a new legislative assembly, the oneman one-vote framework made it logical that the India-friendly majority would influence any electoral outcome.106 After a successful stint by A.S. Syali, G.B.S. Sidhu assumed local charge in Sikkim in August 1973 under P.N. Banerjee’s regional command from Calcutta.107 Before taking charge, Sidhu was briefed by Banerjee. The ‘ultimate goal was made clear that it will be a merger … 101 

‘Sikkimese Parties to Merge’, Times of India, 19 April 1973. The Sikkim Saga, 25. 103 Das, The Sikkim Saga, 24. 104  ‘This view is also shared by our leaders in Delhi’, ‘Kewal Singh to Bajpai’, 2 May 1973, K.S. Bajpai papers. 105  ‘Kewal Singh to Swaran Singh’, 8 May 1973, K.S. Bajpai papers. 106 Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 280; Das, The Sikkim Saga, 39; ‘Accord Reached in Sikkim’, Times of India, 9 May 1973. 107 This was an unusual appointment, recalls Sidhu. The IB post in Sikkim (prior to September 1968), and the R&AW post after the bifurcation of India’s intelligence structure, had always been held by senior level officers. Sidhu, however, was a relatively junior officer compared to his predecessors. 102 Das,



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how we were to proceed would be shaped by the evolution of events’.108 Reforming the basic electoral structure in Sikkim had not only restored India’s authority, it raised the stakes by deepening India’s involvement in local politics. Once the process towards populist politics had been initiated, it had become imperative to maintain a close watch over the newly empowered political parties. For officials on the ground, the next stage of the Sikkim intervention was to ensure a smooth path to the 1974 elections. During the interlude, the primary task fell upon Sidhu to ‘further the unity of anti-Chogyal political parties’, create a ‘commonly acceptable platform’ for the different parties to contest the elections, and oversee that the right candidates were selected for the 1974 elections. Sikkim, after all, had no experience of democracy.109 The Palace had not reconciled to a popular government displacing its authority. As Bajpai reported, ‘Chogyal and National Party do not want elections at all and will only agree if electoral system meets their insistence that outcome in Bhutia Lepcha reserved constituencies is not determined by Nepali voters’.110 Interestingly, one of the consequences of the asymmetry of information between the Political Officer and R&AW was that Bajpai’s assessments were also shaped by a sense of uncertainty regarding Delhi’s ultimate intentions111 and whether the democratization

108 Personal

interview with G.B.S. Sidhu, New Delhi, 13 November

2014. 109 Personal

interview with G.B.S. Sidhu, New Delhi, 13 November

2014. 110 

‘Bajpai to Kewal Singh’, 9 November 1973, K.S. Bajpai Papers. Das recounts, Delhi’s endgame was obscured in secrecy. Whenever Bajpai and Das ‘raised the issue of Delhi’s ultimate objectives with Kewal Singh, he would go into a shell…. “Merger” was then a dirty word for him.’ Das, The Sikkim Saga, 28. Das later recalled, ‘Never was it [merger] mentioned even once…. I think Mrs. Gandhi had her own style of foreign policy. She never wanted to give directions in specific terms, but left it for her senior bureaucrats to interpret her thought processes … she needed it, she wanted it but she didn’t want to give directions’, especially to officers on the ground. Personal interview with B.S. Das, New Delhi, 6 August 2014. 111 As

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process might get out of control.112 Sidhu, being closer to the operational side, felt relatively more assured that ‘most of the tools that were available to us would help us get out of any difficult situations’.113 Ultimately, the April 1974 elections exceeded even the expectations of Indian officials with the Sikkim Congress winning 31 of the 32 seats.114 Despite the Kazi’s dramatic victory, the Chogyal did not accept the writing on the wall.115 On 10 May 1974, Das was sworn in as the first President of the new Assembly followed by the Kazi moving a resolution in the Sikkim Assembly, which called for ‘Sikkim’s participation in the political and economic institutions of India’. The resolution underscored Delhi’s endgame because Sikkim’s participation with India’s political institutions could only occur ‘through membership of the highest legislative body of India’.116 On 4 June, Sidhu and Bajpai agreed that the Kazi should request Delhi to send a constitutional expert to Gangtok.117 Delhi responded swiftly. G.K. Rajagopalan, a constitutional expert, arrived with an acceptable constitutional bill draft, which was passed on 20 June, despite the Chogyal’s attempt to undermine the process by obstructing the Assembly meeting through a demonstration by his loyalists and members of the Sikkim Guards.118

112 Personal interview with former intelligence official, New Delhi, 19 November 2014. 113 Personal interview with G.B.S. Sidhu, New Delhi, 13 November 2014. 114 Personal interview with G.B.S. Sidhu, New Delhi, 13 November 2014. 115  As Das notes, ‘Over the years he had come to believe that Delhi lacked the tenacity ... and having experienced the contradictions in Delhi’s establishment at the [most senior] levels, he still hoped to sway a few to his side…. But, it was a different Delhi he was dealing with.’ Das, The Sikkim Saga, 42. 116 Das, The Sikkim Saga, 45–7. 117 Personal interview with G.B.S. Sidhu, New Delhi, 13 November 2014. 118 ‘Assembly in Sikkim Approves Move to Closer Tie with India’, New York Times, 22 June 1974.



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The Chogyal refused to throw in the towel by providing his assent to the Sikkim constitution bill. On 23 June, Bajpai warned the Palace that Sikkim’s legislators would ‘assert their rights with the support of the public’ and if the Chogyal did not give his assent they would ‘seek other peaceful means of ensuring that the people’s aspirations are fulfilled’.119 The Chogyal still attempted to exploit cleavages in the Kazi camp and create political instability. But the gambit failed.120 Then finally he rushed to Delhi to appeal to Indira Gandhi to reverse the political developments in his kingdom. The Chogyal initially met Swaran Singh who told him ‘to respect the wishes of the people’.121 By now, more than 10,000 Sikkimese demonstrators had assembled in Gangtok demanding immediate implementation of the Constitution.122 This was a ‘counter protest’, similar to the March 1973 events, with many demonstrators coming from South and West Sikkim.123 Back in Delhi, Kewal Singh repeated Swaran Singh’s message to the Chogyal on 27 June.124 The Kazi sent a telegram to Indira Gandhi requesting her Government to ‘take necessary steps under the provisions of May 1973 agreement if the Chogyal does not give his assent to Government of Sikkim bill within 48 hours’. He also wrote to Das requesting an emergency session of the Assembly to finalize the Bill. On 28 June, the Sikkim Assembly was convened and the Government of Sikkim Bill was adopted for the second time. The message was clear—Sikkim’s political evolution was now irreversible.125 With no cards to play, the Chogyal pleaded his case with Indira Gandhi.126 Complaining that recent developments were in 119 Datta-Ray, 120 Dilip

Smash and Grab, 290. Mukherjee, ‘End of a Chapter in Sikkim’, Times of India,

6 July 1974. 121  ‘India Cool to Sikkim King’s Plea, Tells Him to Take a Lesser Role’, New York Times, 27 June 1974. 122  ‘Chogyal Puts His Case’, The Guardian, 27 June 1974. 123 Personal interview with G.B.S. Sidhu, New Delhi, 13 November 2014. 124  ‘Chogyal Meets Kewal Singh’, Times of India, 28 June 1974. 125 Shukla, Sikkim, 91–3. 126  ‘Heed Voice of People’, Times of India, 30 June 1974.

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‘violation of the treaty’, he hinted that the situation in Sikkim might become adverse for Indian interests and argued that the Sikkimese politicians were ‘a bunch of unreliable people’, while describing himself ‘as the best friend of India in Sikkim’. Indira Gandhi, bemused at the ‘irony of the situation’, curtly told the Chogyal ‘the politicians he was running down were the chosen representatives of the people and advised him not to go against their wishes’. Thereafter, she ‘fell silent and looked aloof’. Dhar recalls, the Prime Minister ‘had perfected the use of silence as a negative response’.127 The door to any reversal of Indian policy had been firmly closed. Having exhausted all options, the Chogyal finally assented to the Sikkim bill on 4 July.128 The Kazi was sworn in as Chief Minister the next day. A few weeks later, Delhi was formally asked to operationalize Clause 30 of Sikkim’s constitution relating to Sikkim’s ‘association with Government of India’.129 Introducing the constitution amendment bill in Parliament, Swaran Singh candidly remarked that it was ‘a political matter and not a question of legal niceties’.130 On 4 September 1974, the Lok Sabha passed the 36th Amendment, which changed Sikkim’s status from an Indian protectorate to an Associate state status with political representation in the Indian Union. The Palace’s intransigence, however, continued to irk Indian officials. Since the Chogyal had still ‘not reconciled himself to the new arrangements’,131 the window had to be slammed shut in Sikkim. Arguing against strategic restraint, Bajpai noted that while in theory it seemed ideal to balance Palace and Janata against each other … events have taken us too far for this to be possible any longer…. The popular forces have turned to us twice; they will not turn to us a third time. Whatever settlement has to be made, must be made now … we cannot live with the present circumstances long or safely.132 127 Dhar,

Indira Gandhi, 291–2. ‘Chogyal Will Sign Bill: Crisis Ends’, Times of India, 4 July 1974. 129 Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 294. 130  ‘Issue is Political not Legal: Swaran’, Times of India, 3 September 1974. 131 Das, The Sikkim Saga, 59. 132  ‘Bajpai to Delhi’, 1 October 1974, K.S. Bajpai Papers. 128 



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The climax came in February 1975 with the Chogyal’s visit to Nepal ‘providing an opportunity’ to Delhi to finally settle the matter.133 In an act of defiance, the Chogyal met Pakistan’s Ambassador and the Chinese Vice Premier, Chin-hsi Liu.134 At a press conference in Kathmandu, the Chogyal declared that he would ‘leave no stone unturned to see that Sikkim preserves its separate identity and status’ and admitted meeting the Chinese who ‘were sympathetic to our cause’. He went on to declare that ‘because all powers have not been transferred, the Chogyal still has very much of an executive role to play in Sikkim’.135 The trigger for Delhi’s final act in this crisis had arrived. On 16 May, Sikkim merged with India after a constitutional amendment to include it as the twenty-second state in the Indian Union was ratified by the President of India.136

*** There was more than one credible response available to decision makers in the circumstances of this crisis. Early contestations vividly brought out two competing frames of reference with respect to an appropriate response to Sikkim. Policymakers were divided between the ‘gradualists’ who sought ‘half-measures’ to restore India’s treaty rights, and another section ‘who favoured a clean break with the past’.137 For T.N. Kaul, the Foreign Secretary, India’s security could be achieved by ‘an association of the Himalayan kingdoms with India, each retaining its own identity and independence’ but under India’s guidance, an approach more consistent with Nehru’s beliefs. For R.N. Kao, K.S. Bajpai, and Kewal Singh,

133 Personal

interview with G.B.S. Sidhu, New Delhi, 13 November

2014. 134 Dhar,

Indira Gandhi, 296. Kurve, ‘Chogyal to Fight for Free Sikkim’, Times of India, 2 March 1975. 136  Inder Malhotra, ‘Bill Joins Sikkim to India Union’, Times of India, 17 May 1975. 137 Dilip Mukerjee, ‘The Challenge in Sikkim: Time for Hard Decisions’, Times of India, 12 April 1975. 135  Mavin

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such a regional approach was anathema.138 Kaul had advocated a posture of accommodation to resolve the widening gulf between the Chogyal and Delhi. Specifically, he had sought to revise the 1950 treaty in favour of a relatively more equitable relationship between the Palace and Delhi, an equation closer to the one that India had historically established with Bhutan.139 Yet, Indira Gandhi and her advisors categorically ruled out such an option because it was incongruent with her security seeker role conception and its attendant image to produce a regional order with India at the helm (see Figure 8.1). Even after the decision to intervene in the fall of 1972, alternative policy paths were credible in the circumstances. Policymakers could have restored the 1950 Treaty in letter and spirit and ceased their activism thereafter. Indeed, the first phase of the intervention in April 1973 achieved precisely this. Delhi could have lived with a chastened and emasculated Chogyal where its core strategic

Explanatory Variable

Role conception (Beliefs and images)

Dependent Variable: Regional behaviour

r iou hav e b ent gru Con Consistent but unlikely behaviour Inc o beh ngrue n avi our t

Coercion; balance of (Option actually power strategies chosen by the decision-maker)

Strategic restraint; non-interference

(Option not chosen by the decisionmaker)

Accommodation strategies; peacemaking diplomacy

(Option not chosen by the decisionmaker but credible in the decisional situation)

Figure 8.1  Choice Paths during the Sikkim Crisis

138 For

Kewal Singh, ‘Nepal was an example of erosion of Indian interests. Bhutan’s entry into the UN was a blunder.’ Das, The Sikkim Saga, 62–3. 139  T.N. Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War, 88–9, 92.



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interests—freedom of access to northern Sikkim to safeguard the India-China border—were maintained. The contrast with Nehru’s approach is again pertinent here. After having imposed its will and stamped its authority in Sikkim, Delhi could have chosen to preserve the stabilized and improved status quo, as Nehru might have pursued in a similar situation. Indira Gandhi could have adapted her intervention on the premise that a deeper game was simply not worth the candle, and reasoned as Nehru had when he rejected policy options to expand India’s footprint in Sikkim. Yet, by choosing to restructure the political system and initiate the process towards populist politics via the 8 May 1973 agreement, Indira Gandhi increased India’s involvement and responsibilities in Sikkim. Even after the April 1974 elections and the emergence of a new democratized order in Sikkim, Indira Gandhi could have ceased further activism since India’s strategic interests had been largely secured with a dramatically weakened Chogyal. She could have also chosen to shift to a posture of strategic restraint in order to preserve India’s regional and international reputation as a responsible regional power. But, again, such a choice was not entertained and the apex continued with its strategy of an ultimate merger with India.140 To be sure, the Chogyal’s intransigence and unwillingness to accept a diminished position as a titular ruler also hardened Indira Gandhi’s responses. We cannot know what her choice would have been had the Chogyal accommodated himself to the new balance of power between Delhi and the Palace and acquiesced to a ceremonial role in Gangtok. Such a reaction from the Palace could have complicated the final phase of Indira Gandhi’s intervention and further raised the reputational costs of the choice for a merger with the Indian Union. What we now do know is that Indian intentions, from the outset of the decision to intervene, were aimed at fundamentally changing the status quo. And this choice went beyond the material requirements of the situation in Sikkim. Indira Gandhi and her advisors perceived Sikkim through 140 

Despite India’s now dominant position, Bajpai categorically argued against strategic restraint: ‘[We] cannot live with the present circumstances long or safely.’ ‘Bajpai to Delhi’, 1 October 1974, K.S. Bajpai Papers.

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a highly sensitive image of a deteriorating local balance and its consequent potential for external meddling in a highly strategic area. Defining regional security in such sharp subcontinental terms, an accommodative approach was deemed as insufficient to arrest India’s declining influence in Sikkim. And, while the new approach entailed risks and increased Indian responsibilities, these were deemed to be acceptable for Indira Gandhi’s strategy to produce a more advantageous geopolitical situation.

Alternative Explanations One might still ask whether Indira Gandhi’s actions were driven by an ineluctable reaction to external pressures. Put another way, was Delhi’s response to the Sikkim crisis more or less preordained by the security threats confronting India at the time regardless of the core policymakers’ worldviews? It is a fact that Sikkim ‘provides the shortest route from Tibet to the Gangetic plains’ and whose ‘passes can be crossed even in winter without much difficulty’.141 Nearly two divisions of the Indian Army were deployed in Sikkim during the 1970s. Army Chief Sam Manekshaw had told Bajpai that he could not ‘manage the frontier without full freedom of action in Sikkim’.142 But the 1950 treaty had already provided India full control over Sikkim’s defence, and none of these strategic interests were being challenged by a state or non-state actor. Bajpai admits, ‘we are not talking about some great power trying to run against us’.143 Indeed, there was no apparent external involvement in Sikkim either before Indira Gandhi’s decision to intervene in 1972 nor any overt strategic moves by Washington or Beijing during the various phases of India’s strategy to bring Sikkim into her fold. While the US avoided official comment by adopting a ‘hands-off policy’, the Chinese confined their reactions to public condemnation via their media and attempts to publicize the issue at the UN. Neither great power was ­willing

141 Dhar,

Indira Gandhi, 273. Personal interview with K. Shankar Bajpai, New Delhi, 6 May 2014. 143  Personal interview with K. Shankar Bajpai, New Delhi, 6 May 2014. 142 



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to raise the ante with Delhi during the Sikkim crisis.144 The India– China border in the area also remained quiet right through the Sikkim crisis with the previous military skirmish dating back to 1967.145 Clearly, Indira Gandhi’s choices in Sikkim were driven by a deeper quest to establish a new regional order with India at its helm. The Prime Minister’s beliefs and images were not only shaped by the lessons from the traumatic events of the 1960s but also the distinctive lessons drawn from India’s statecraft in the post-1947 period. Indira Gandhi felt that Nehru ‘had made a mistake by not heeding the Sikkimese demand for accession to India in 1947’ and admitted that in retrospect ‘Patel’s instinctive reaction seemed correct. The short point that emerged was that we should undo our earlier mistake.’146 A rare insight into Indira Gandhi’s worldview is also revealed in a fascinating exchange in an August 1974 meeting regarding the terms of an Indo-Bhutan Hydropower project.147 Indira Gandhi posed the question whether India had given away too much in the Indo-Bhutan agreement. N.B. Menon, MEA’s Joint Secretary for East Asia and the Northern Division, offered his perspective. He noted that the Himalayan kingdoms were run by Kings who 144 

‘Kissinger to State Department’, 16 April 1975, accessed 15 July 2014, from https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975STATE086460_b.html; Prashant Jha, ‘The Sikkim Saga, through an American Lens,’ Hindu, 15 April 2013; Duff, Sikkim, 237–45. 145  These were the September 1967 Nathu La incidents, which were of a ‘local character and never threatened to escalate to the level’ of 1962. The Chinese ‘could not achieve too much’ during this incident near the north Sikkim border. ‘Monthly Political report from Beijing to Delhi’, 10 November 1967, HI/1012(14)/67, MEA, NAI. 146 Dhar, Indira Gandhi, 289. 147 In the summer of 1974, D.P. Dhar negotiated the Chukha Agreement, which was the first Indo-Bhutan Hydropower project and it provided an extraordinarily fair share to Bhutan. The contrasting views on the Chukha Agreement came to exemplify two competing frames of reference relating to India’s approach to its Himalayan neighbours. This played out in an August 1974 Political Affairs Committee meeting to discuss that agreement. Personal Interview with Kishan S. Rana, New Delhi, 4 October 2014.

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were simple and not sophisticated in world affairs. India had to earn their trust and deal with them in a spirit of understanding and give in to their desires. This was a classic exposition of Nehruvian beliefs. N.B. Menon felt that India’s dealings with the Himalayan kingdoms should be ‘in a manner that was correct and respected the dignity’ of these smaller neighbours for this was the only way for India to manage the region’s affairs.148 Rasgotra too recalls that for Nehru ‘there was this liberal instinct … that we don’t want to dominate our periphery but we want them [India’s neighbours] to be friends’.149 After N.B. Menon finished, Indira Gandhi provided a rare glimpse of her neighbourhood policy: Since my father’s days, the MEA has been dealing with our neighbours in the wrong manner. We have thought that simply by making concessions we will win trust, that by giving more and more we will guard our interests. That is not the case. Look at the mess we have made in Sikkim…. Look at the mess we have made in Nepal … and, we will now be making that same mess in Bhutan. The way to deal with our neighbours is to safeguard our interests but in a fair manner. We cannot win friendship with our neighbours simply by making concessions.150

148 Personal

Interview with Kishan S. Rana, New Delhi, 4 October

2014. 149  Personal

interview with M.K. Rasgotra, New Delhi, 12 September

2013. 150 Personal

2014.

Interview with Kishan S. Rana, New Delhi, 4 October

Conclusion

Scholars and strategists continue to debate the nature of India’s rise and speculate on the purposes and strategies that policymakers might employ to navigate the emerging multipolar world. What has often been missing from these conversations is a historical perspective and a nuanced attention to past statecraft. Despite the importance of the region in India’s foreign policy, surprisingly little empirical work has been attempted to understand how India’s leaders and policymakers have related to the immediate and extended neighbourhood. Most studies have typically emanated from great power perspectives or ‘outside in’ approaches where Indian agency is treated rather perfunctorily. Even when Indian worldviews have been examined, they have provided only partial or highly generalized insights into the dominant foreign policy ideas of that time. By relying on the concept of role conceptions and going beyond the singular focus on non-alignment, this study has attempted to reconstruct the worldviews and strategies that underlay Indian geopolitics during three parlous decades of the Cold War. In doing so, this book has also shed light on the significant foreign policy shift between the Nehru and Indira Gandhi periods, as policymakers redefined some of their most fundamental precepts on India’s role in the subcontinent and extended Asian neighbourhood.

*** Power and Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policies during the Cold War. Zorawar Daulet Singh, Oxford University Press (2019). © Zorawar Daulet Singh. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199489640.003.0010

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Is it about ideas, circumstances, or power? Political scientists and historians have yet to agree on the causes of major foreign policy shifts. The most obvious alternative interpretation for the big shift in India’s foreign policy would be that a change in India’s external threat environment drove policymakers to adapt to new circumstances.1 Another variant of this argument could be that a change in the cost-benefit calculus vis-à-vis the international environment changed Indian leadership incentives. A second popular explanation could be that a rise in India’s power capabilities led to the re-orientation in regional statecraft. Let us now briefly explore each of these interpretations. For starters, structural pressures were present in both periods. For example, US involvement in calibrating South Asia’s balance of power had been a reality since the 1950s.2 From as early as 1950, US documents attest that shaping a ‘desirable balance of power in South Asia’ had been an objective of US regional policy.3 As Nehru himself remarked in 1957, ‘American military aid has completely changed the position of India vis-à-vis Pakistan, so far as defence is concerned.’4 Furthermore, the threat environment was hardly benign in the 1950s. It could be argued that a traumatic Partition and the creation of a new rival state within the subcontinent in 1947, the emergence of Mao’s China in 1949, and the related expansion of the Cold War to Asia in the early 1950s and on India’s immediate frontiers in 1954 had a more intense impact on the regional environment compared to the late 1960s when the patterns of alignment were more complex compared to the tight bipolarity of the 1950s. At a time when it was more conducive to engage in orthodox balancing or even simply ‘hiding’ from a tumultuous and uncertain environment, Nehru’s India responded

1 Conceptually,

the notion that a state’s threat environment shapes its strategic behaviour is generally accepted. See, for example, Stephen M. Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 2 Baldev Raj Nayar, American Geopolitics and India (New Delhi: Manohar, 1976). 3  ‘Policy of the United States with Respect to Pakistan’, 3 April 1950, FRUS (Vol. V). 4  ‘To G.D. Birla’, 2 April 1957, SWJN-SS, 37, 391–2.



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in ways that cannot be easily explained by materialist explanations. For instance, neorealism would typically expect balancing as the default response in both the Nehru and Indira Gandhi periods. But only the latter period supports such behaviour. Neo classical realists who explore the domestic sources of a state’s foreign policy too cannot adequately explain the expansive scope of regional activity nor the normative underpinnings of Nehru’s geopolitics.5 In the Indira Gandhi period, regional crises triggered a very different set of choices and responses. Leaders’ ‘beliefs may arise from the lessons they draw from a disproportionately formative historical experience’.6 As we have discussed in previous chapters, decision-makers in both the Nehru and Indira Gandhi periods had drawn distinct lessons from major historical events concerning world order and security. In the 1950s, Nehru’s India had barely recovered from a traumatic geopolitical division of the subcontinent that had imposed extraordinary costs in blood and treasure on the young nation state. Nehru’s beliefs were shaped by the two devastating world wars and its implications for the very meaning of security in the post-1945 international order. The prospect of another titanic great power struggle and one further complicated by the nuclear revolution profoundly influenced his images and subsequent peacemaker role conception for an independent India. In the mid-1960s, Indira Gandhi’s India was reeling from a recent full-scale India–Pakistan war, memory of the traumatic 1962 war, and internal economic crises. The beliefs and images of decision-makers in Indira Gandhi’s apex were deeply influenced by distinct lessons drawn from these events that shaped a new security seeker role conception for India. Although policymakers in both periods confronted an intimidating environment, they chose to react in very different ways to their material setting. Hence, the ‘images’ of decision makers ‘are no less “real” 5 Steven

E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds, Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 6 Alan M. Jacobs, ‘Process Tracing the Effects of Ideas’, in Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool, eds Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015), 43–5.

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than the reality of their environment and are much more relevant’ to the making and conduct of foreign policy.7 Another related explanation for India’s foreign policy shift could be changing leadership incentives brought about by a change in the cost-benefit calculus vis-à-vis different strategies towards the external environment.8 Put another way, states will exercise power or engage in balancing behaviour if opportunities exist. Hence, the Nehru period’s so-called under-balancing might be explained by fewer opportunities to leverage the balance of power. And in the Indira Gandhi period, opportunities to leverage the balance of power became less costly, and thus more ‘rational’. Such an interpretation, however, is both historically inaccurate and conceptually inadequate. As early as 1946, Nehru’s cables to his ambassadors in Moscow and Washington reveal that he was aware of balance of power options. India, he noted, was ‘in the best of bargaining positions’9 and held ‘plenty of good cards’10 in the context of the emerging US–Soviet global struggle. Again, in 1950, Nehru was aware of opportunities to deepen ties with Moscow as a countervailing strategy to the deterioration in ties with Washington, but chose to calibrate his engagement with the Eastern bloc to avoid a break with the West. He felt that while the idea of a friendship pact with the Soviets was worth exploring, it would ‘irritate and annoy’ the West. Nehru preferred ‘to go a little slow’.11 Through the 1950s, when opportunities presented themselves, Nehru ‘refused substantial Soviet military aid’.12 As we saw in the 1954 crisis, Nehru decided against a balance of power strategy to offset the US political-military tilt towards

7  Michael

Brecher, ‘Elite Images and Foreign Policy Choices: Krishna Menon’s View of the World’, Pacific Affairs 40, no. 1/2 (1967): 62. 8 Stephen van Evera, ‘Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War’, International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 5–43. 9  ‘To K.P.S. Menon’, 17 November 1946, SWJN-SS, 1, 543. 10  ‘To Asaf Ali’, 21 December 1946, SWJN-SS, 1, 556. 11  ‘To S. Radhakrishnan’, 6 February 1950, SWJN-SS, 14 (Part 1), 543. 12 ‘Chester Bowles to Lyndon Johnson’, 27 December 1963, FRUS (Vol. XIX). Y.D. Gundevia, Outside the Archives (New Delhi: Sangam, 1984), 347–51.



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Pakistan. Instead, an opening to the Eastern bloc was pursued in order to stabilize Asian geopolitics and advance Nehru’s peace area concept. The main focus of foreign policy was on developing an expansive regional role where India conceived of an alternative bridging function for itself in the East–West competition in Asia, and not to simply exploit the bipolar struggle for material advantage. Indian statecraft during the Formosa crisis further exemplified this quest to promote an Asian peace area where the two principal great powers could limit their antagonism and learn to co-exist in the Western Pacific. Structural theories cannot easily explain such complex behaviour. The Sino-Soviet split and the emergence of a tacit US–China area of agreement on South Asia reshaped India’s neighbourhood by the latter part of the 1960s. What for some structural realists might be a logical counter-balancing reaction was actually the outcome of a far more historically contingent set of choices, as we saw in India’s approach to the Vietnam war. The domestic and international political costs to exercising external balancing by developing a strategic partnership with one of the superpowers were no less than they were in the Nehru period. But in the Indira Gandhi period, such an option was leveraged despite risks to India’s non-aligned identity and reputation, and in pursuit of ambitious geopolitical goals as we saw in the 1971 and Sikkim crises. To understand policymakers’ choices we need to focus on the images and the roles they construct for their state. According to Nehru’s images, India’s external conditions were potentially dangerous and regional security could be imperilled at short notice via a great power escalation to any local Asian crisis. India’s security was deemed to be largely indivisible in this perceived dynamic. It was not that Nehru and his close advisors were insensitive to or uninterested in India’s immediate neighbourhood, but rather that prioritizing India’s role in the subcontinent was viewed by them as narrow, short-sighted, and ultimately irrelevant if broader systemic and regional order issues remained unaddressed. In such a cognitive context, Nehru framed his strategic responses to assuage the deep contradictions and mistrust between the two blocs in Asia. In Indira Gandhi’s images too, India’s external conditions were profoundly challenging and uncertain. But her dominant role conception was constructed primarily around the South Asian

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domain and India’s security could be managed without engaging in an ambitious extra-regional foreign policy. In fact, crises and policy choices in the latter Asian domain were evaluated with the primary domain in mind: to buttress India’s geopolitical position in the subcontinent. The idea of indivisible security and its manifestation in the peace area, a key concept for Nehru’s geopolitics, no longer found resonance with Indira Gandhi and her advisors. In short, policymakers’ role conceptions and the corresponding perceptions of the international environment are what ultimately account for the foreign policy variations in India’s case. Finally, is it possible that a positive accretion in India’s relative power brought about the changing modes of regional behaviour in the 1960s? Such an argument has been made to account for expanding US ambitions at the turn of the nineteenth century.13 But this does not take us too far in India’s case. First, India’s relative strength vis-à-vis her immediate neighbourhood was high in both periods. It has been argued that by 1945, India ‘had all the characteristics of big power—size, natural resources, a large sterling balance’ and ‘above all, military heft’. India ‘had the capacity to “project power”, which was exceeded only by the US, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and perhaps Turkey’.14 Nehru’s remarks to the Constituent Assembly in March 1948 are also instructive. Contrasting India with some of the smaller countries of Europe and Asia, he noted, ‘We are not citizens of a weak or mean country and I think it is foolish for us to get frightened, even from a military point of view, of the greatest of the powers today.’15 In 1949, Indian officials themselves 13  For

example, Zakaria argues that the dramatic shift from isolation to assertiveness in US foreign policy from the nineteenth to the twentieth century can be explained by a relative rise in US state capacity between the two periods. Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). 14  Paper presented by Bharat Karnad at the United Services Institute of India, New Delhi, 22 January 1999, and cited in Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 128. 15 Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946–April 1961 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961), 32.



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emphasized India’s relative position. ‘Underdeveloped as she is’, India’s ‘organized industrial and military capacity still exceeds that of any nation in the east’.16 Even if such assessments are challenged by contextual factors such as Partition and do not account for British maritime strength that had enabled Indian power projection, the fact is that under the Nehru period India materially towered over Southern Asia on every metric of capabilities. Yet, this relative strength was not employed to engage in substantive subcontinental statecraft that one observed in the Indira Gandhi period. Again, a focus on Nehru’s worldview explains this choice. For Nehru and Krishna Menon, a power-based subcontinental role was deemed as secondary to the dominant role conception of India as a peacemaker with a function to soften the power transition and Cold War in Asia. In the Indira Gandhi period, while India’s material capabilities expanded so did the power capacities of its subcontinental rivals. By the late 1950s, as a former Indian official observes, Pakistan ‘was equipped with an army which could easily match anything and everything that India could put into the field’.17 US internal assessments are also instructive. ‘The very nature of the highly sophisticated and mobile equipment which we have given Pakistan’, Chester Bowles records in 1963, underscored US assistance: ‘equipment which is much better adapted to fighting Indians on the north Indian plains than to fighting the Chinese and Russians in the Himalayas and Hindu Kush’.18 As another US official records in 1966: ‘we have built up Pakistan’s own independent position and sinews—to the tune of almost $5 billion in support. We’ve protected Pakistan against India.’19 Clearly, Pakistan’s military capabilities were growing at par with India, despite its relative size being less than half of the latter. Hence, the notion that a rise in Indian power produced assertive policies does not take us very far. Even if we assume India 16 An

Indian official, ‘India as a World Power’, Foreign Affairs 27, no. 4 (July 1949): 544–5. 17 Gundevia, Outside the Archives, 349. 18  ‘Bowles to Johnson’, 27 December 1963, FRUS (Vol. XIX). 19 ‘Robert W. Komer to Lyndon Johnson’, 26 April 1966, FRUS (Vol. XXV).

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retained a relative power advantage in South Asia, this reality does not by itself imply an assertive posture in the subcontinent. We cannot deduce a state’s strategic inclinations and preferences from material power balances alone. Only a focus on the policymakers’ formative experiences and beliefs can reveal their role conception, and the purposes and functions that they envision for their state’s foreign policy. For Indira Gandhi and her advisors, the traumatic events of 1962 and 1965 had demonstrated the inefficacy of Nehru’s peace area concept and posture of accommodation in the subcontinent. It was through these formative experiences that a narrower balance of power outlook gained ascendance over ambitious order-building diplomacy in the extended neighbourhood as a legitimate function for India’s regional role. In short, it is their beliefs and images that are the key variable in explaining policymakers’ choices vis-à-vis changes in the external environment. Change in the international environment is, at best, a necessary but not sufficient condition to understand foreign policy shifts. Material factors such as the distribution of capabilities, ‘composition’ of capabilities, and geography define ‘for all actors the outer limits of feasible activity and the relative costs of pursuing various options that require physical activity’. It is the interaction of these material forces with ideas, interests and cultures that ‘dispose social action and systems in certain directions and not others’.20 Or as Katzenstein puts it, ‘material power’ often derives its causal effects ‘from culture’.21 Kennedy’s observation is equally apt: it ‘is not that international structures are irrelevant to the making of foreign policy’ but ‘that the same constraint can mean different things to different leaders’22 in accordance with their beliefs and images.

*** 20  Alexander

Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 110–12. 21  Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 40. 22 Andrew B. Kennedy, The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 251.



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If there has been a glaring weakness of India’s IR literature, it is the dearth of historical work on India’s foreign policy. The few exceptions merely prove the rule.23 It might be one of the reasons for the wide range of competing accounts from a variety of historiographical and conceptual schools. The net result is that ‘more than half a century after his death, scholars continue to debate the meaning and significance’ of Nehru’s foreign policy.24 The peace area concept was central to Nehruvian geopolitics, and to re-appropriate Nehru either as a modern-day Kautilya or as a woolly headed idealist would be unjust to his vision for a sustainable post-war Asian order. The subsequent collapse of that vision by the end of the 1950s should not detract us from dispassionately engaging with the period when Nehru’s ideas found their full expression in Indian policy and strategy. The Nehru that emerges in this book does not resemble Karnad’s protagonist who engaged in Monroe-style statecraft,25 or the balance of power practitioner sketched by Subrahmanyam,26 or Raghavan’s ‘liberal-realist’ who favoured ‘coercive’ strategies in the 23 Kennedy,

The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru; Priya Chacko, Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004 (New York: Routledge, 2012); Rudra Chaudhuri, Forged in Crisis: India and the United States Since 1947 (Noida: HarperCollins, 2014); Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2010); Srinath Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2013); Avinash Paliwal, My Enemy’s Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal (London: Hurst, 2017); Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy, (Gurgaon: Allen Lane, 2016); Shyam Saran, How India Sees The World: Kautilya to the 21st Century, (New Delhi: Juggernaut, 2017). 24 Andrew Kennedy, ‘Nehru’s Foreign Policy: Realism and Idealism Conjoined’, in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, eds David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 92. 25  Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), 66–162. 26  K. Subrahmanyam, ‘Nehru and the India–China Conflict of 1962’, in Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years, ed. B.R. Nanda (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976), 113–14.

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subcontinent.27 In each of these accounts, Nehru’s core beliefs and peacemaker role conception appear to have been overlooked as the dominant reason for his geopolitics. Influential ideational explanations too can be challenged by this study. For example, Mohan’s judgment of the Cold War period, an interpretation widely shared among India’s strategic and academic community, has reduced Indian images to a so-called ‘Third Worldism’ and ‘idealism’ obscuring the roles and beliefs that conditioned regional statecraft during the Nehru and Indira Gandhi periods. Notice, for instance, the following assertion: ‘The country’s elite so internalized the moralism and idealism of India’s foreign policy that it had to unlearn a lot as it confronted a transformed world order at the turn of the 1990s. India has moved from its past emphasis on the power of the argument to a new stress on the argument of power.’28 This not only simplifies and obscures Nehru’s peacemaker role and its complex regional images, it curiously ignores the dramatic shift towards a balance of power-centred realpolitik under Indira Gandhi.29 Indian historiography on the Nehru years has been so deeply coloured by the Sino-Indian dispute and conflict that Nehru’s peacemaker role evokes an embarrassing interlude that is better forgotten than understood. The peace area concept and strategy, as comprehensively argued in this book, was far more complex than an ideological or principled rejection against power politics or a banner for ‘Third Worldism’ or pan-Asianism. And it most certainly was not anti-Western, for bridge-making between rival 27 Raghavan,

War and Peace in Modern India, 19. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), Introduction, xix–xxii. Also, see Sumit Ganguly, ‘India’s Foreign Policy Grows Up’, World Policy Journal 20, no. 4 (2003/2004): 41–6; Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 40. 29  To be sure, Mohan has elsewhere observed that a characterization of Nehru’s foreign policy as ‘idealist’ is a ‘simplistic assessment’ based on ‘utterly inadequate empirical work on Nehru’s engagement with the world’. Raja Mohan, ‘Nehru @ 125’, Indian Express, 3 December 2014. But more recently, he again asserts that India has historically ‘allowed ideological principles to trump the sensible pursuit of realpolitik’. C. Raja Mohan, ‘Power and Principle’, Indian Express, 18 October 2016. 28  C.



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great powers was integral to sustaining an area of peace. Nehru’s regional policy was an ambitious intervention to counteract the heightening of the Cold War in India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood with an alternative cooperative security framework that sought to promote an inclusive order where both the US and China could preserve their vital interests in Asia’s future. Finally, the displacement of Nehruvian geopolitics with a subcontinental-centred realpolitik during the Indira Gandhi period suggests the mainstream depiction of the past can be challenged. On the other side of the historiographical scale have been attempts to appropriate an Indian ‘exceptionalism’ during the Cold War period. Bhagavan, for example, deftly delves into aspects of Nehru’s internationalist thinking on human rights in the 1940s but deflects the most critical application of Nehru’s regional statecraft towards Asia in the 1950s.30 Chacko’s creative identity-based framework attempts to theorize Indian thinking on international relations but does not seek to demonstrate or test its behavioural implications in the Nehru period or explicate the significant foreign policy shifts in the 1960s.31 While such reflective accounts do counteract the tilt towards materialist interpretations that have informed recent scholarship, they might benefit from the findings of this book. More broadly, from Tanham’s biting critique on India’s strategic culture,32 to Khilnani’s famous remark that Indians lack an ‘instinct for power’,33 or Mehta’s observation that Indians have historically lacked balance-of-power thinking,34 or Hall’s more

30 Manu

Bhagavan, The Peacemakers: India and the Quest for One World (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2012). 31 Chacko, Indian Foreign Policy, 1–3. 32  George K. Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica: Rand, 1992). 33 Sunil Khilnani, ‘Hard, Soft and Bridging Power’, at the 2004 India Today Conclave session titled, ‘What it Takes to be a World Power’, accessed 18 March 2017, from http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/yashwant-sinhasunil-khilnani-on-india-power-capabilities/1/196258.html. 34  Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘Still Under Nehru’s Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy Frameworks in India’, India Review 8, no. 3 (2009): 219, 221.

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recent assertion of a persisting ‘Nehruvian strategic culture’,35 the notion of an unchanging image of power has entrenched itself deeply in mainstream historiography on India’s foreign policy.36 A careful study of the past shows these assertions might not necessarily be accurate. While an unorthodox framework undoubtedly informed Nehru’s geopolitics during the 1950s, it was neither devoid of logic nor did it lack efficacy until the India–China border crisis. The peace area strategy was, on balance, a strategically conceived intervention in India’s extended neighbourhood to stabilize a major power flux in Asian and sub-regional geopolitics. Further, Indira Gandhi’s security seeker role and record of balance of power practice in Southern Asia defies both the assertion of an unchanging Indian tradition of statecraft that suddenly matured or became ‘normal’ in the twenty-first century, and the persisting strand of exceptionalism in the overall literature.

*** One of the central themes of this book is that India’s foreign policy has always been about choices rather than just structural necessity. 35  According

to Hall, the 1962 war ‘did not lead to the displacement of the Nehruvian strategic culture that had emerged in the 1950s’. While acknowledging India’s assertive policies in South Asia during the 1970s and 1980s, Hall claims that the ‘essential elements of the Nehruvian strategic policy, underpinning a Nehruvian strategic culture, remained in place’. Ian Hall, ‘The Persistence of Nehruvianism in India’s Strategic Culture’, in Strategic Asia 2016–2017: Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific, eds Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016), 155–7. 36  Even Mansingh’s study of Indira Gandhi’s foreign policy concludes that ‘no Indian version of the Monroe doctrine has functioned in Southern Asia’. Surjit Mansingh, India’s Search for Power: Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Policy, 1966–1982 (New Delhi: SAGE, 1984), 292. This is contradicted by subsequent commentaries on Indira Gandhi’s statecraft, particularly on India’s foreign policy in the 1980s. Devin T. Hagerty, ‘India’s Regional Security Doctrine’, Asian Survey 31, no. 4 (April 1991): 351–63; Bhabani Sen Gupta, ‘The Indian Doctrine’, India Today, 31 August 1983.



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Within the broad and amorphous confines of non-alignment, Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi’s responses to regional crises were distinct agency-level responses to a tumultuous international environment. But their decisions were not the only options available to India. Policy was often contested, sometimes fiercely, from within India’s foreign policy apparatus. Close attention to the battle of ideas in the decision-making process brings to the surface the competing worldviews that animated deliberations during each crisis. In doing so, I hope to have made a plausible argument for the presence of the dominant beliefs and role conceptions in each period, and their impact on policy choices. This book opens the possibility of fruitful enquiries into the evolution of Indian strategic thought and practices during the Cold War. First, a focus on the key policymakers at the apex—the core decision-making unit—is necessary to avoid the reductionism that sometimes creeps into leadership or personality-based explanations. In both the Nehru and Indira Gandhi periods, we clearly discerned the operation of a leader–advisor dynamic in shaping worldviews, framing of crisis events, and conceiving and implementing geostrategies. It is unlikely that Indian responses to various crises would have played out in the fashion that they did—both in substance and in style—had it not been for the interventions of strategists such as Krishna Menon, P.N. Haksar, R.N. Kao, D.P. Dhar, and T.N. Kaul. Future scholarship should treat the decision-making setting as it actually existed rather than attempt to arbitrate between different personalities in a prejudiced fashion. Future access to Krishna Menon’s papers37 might shed further light on the Nehru period, and India’s approach to other crises during the 1950s. In the Indira Gandhi period, the distinct decision-making and deliberation style at the apex suggests direct observation into Indira Gandhi’s beliefs; her intellectual reasoning is rarely available for scrutiny from the evidentiary record. The Prime Minister’s discreet communication style suggests that even greater archival access might still obscure key stages of the decision-making process when different strategic options were 37 A large restricted collection is presently stored at the NMML in New Delhi.

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evaluated during crisis events. Improvisation by a careful probing for contestations, and examination of policy deliberations and perceptions of her advisors is often the only reliable clue to Indira Gandhi’s preferences and motives during the decision-making process. Additions to the Haksar and Kaul papers from the Cabinet Secretariat and MEA’s diplomatic records would certainly add more depth and empirical material to scrutinize a number of other regional crises in the 1970s and early 1980s. Second, an important thumb rule, one I followed, for producing plausible ideational accounts is greater attentiveness to alternative explanations. Because there could be in-built biases in the private and public evidentiary record, ‘we must be careful to distinguish between reasons for behaviour and reasons actors offer for their behaviour as they are not always the same’.38 In addition, focusing on contestations that might have animated a decisionmaking setting despite the presence of a dominant leader helps in enhancing our understanding of the foreign policymaking process. In fact, most of the six case-studies in this book reveal the presence of competing worldviews and preferences towards the same circumstance of regional events. Contestations were particularly stark during the 1950 East Bengal crisis, the outbreak and escalation of the Vietnam War, and the Sikkim crisis, often emerging from diametrically opposing beliefs on India’s foreign policy and its place in the world. Illuminating these contestations brought out the dominant role conception and its associated cognitive picture into sharper light, while also underscoring the strategic paths that were not taken.39 38 

Richard Ned Lebow, Constructing Cause in International Relations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014), 62. 39 Recent commentaries that espouse the advantages of examining India’s foreign policy with an eye on the diversity of beliefs include Rahul Sagar, ‘State of Mind: What Kind of Power Will India Become?’ International Affairs 85, no. 4 (2009): 801–16; Rahul Sagar and Ankit Panda, ‘Pledges and Pious Wishes: The Constituent Assembly Debates and the Myth of a ‘Nehruvian Consensus’, India Review 14, no. 2 (2015): 203–20; Kanti Bajpai, ‘Indian Strategic Culture’, in India’s Foreign Policy: A Reader, eds Kanti Bajpai and Harsh V. Pant (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 82–124.



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Finally, an interesting finding from my study is that Indian beliefs did not undergo a permanent shift in the post-Nehru period. Although the salience of Nehruvian beliefs vis-à-vis an accommodative and conflict avoidance approach to the periphery declined in the Indira Gandhi period, these ideas appear to have remained part of the strategic culture, albeit outweighed by Indira Gandhi’s beliefs and preference for assertive statecraft. Recall, for example, the intense Parliamentary debates during the Vietnam war or the perceptions of senior MEA officials during the outbreak of the 1971 East Bengal crisis, or the competing approaches over how to handle the problem of India’s diminishing authority in Sikkim. When those historical contestations are set against the post-Cold War ascendance of Nehruvian beliefs on subcontinental statecraft—particularly through methods of persuasion, reassurance, and strategic restraint—exemplified by the Gujral doctrine40 and its general adherence by several governments in the 2000s, the notion of foreign policy change assumes a more complex phenomenon.41 Steven Levine has alluded to this point in his study on Chinese foreign policy: that old beliefs may not necessarily die out altogether. New beliefs can sometimes fit themselves onto the earlier ideas, or, older beliefs can regain salience in 40 The

Gujral doctrine was a policy of unilaterally accommodating India’s neighbours to lower the levels of threat perception on India’s periphery. It was aimed at ‘building a conflict-free cooperative South Asia’ and ‘to resolve conflicts’ through ‘concepts of common security, equal security and cooperative security between and among the countries of South Asia, its neighbouring regions as well as their individual members’. Bhabani Sen Gupta, ‘Gujral Doctrine: Security Dimensions of the Gujral Doctrine’, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, accessed 2 August 1997, from www.ipcs.org; Yashwant Sinha, Seventh Dinesh Singh Memorial Lecture, 3 February 2004, accessed at http://indianembassy.ru/ cms/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=215&Itemid=626. 41  One of my interviewees concurred that there is a similarity between Nehruvian ideas in the 1950s and the Gujral doctrine of the 1990s. Personal interview with K. Shankar Bajpai, New Delhi, 6 May 2014. Also see, Christian Wagner, ‘From Hard Power to Soft Power? Ideas, Interaction, Institutions, and Images in India’s South Asia Policy’, Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, Working Paper No. 26, 2005, 3.

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different international and political contexts.42 Sagar too has alluded to this process whereby foreign policy ideas can ‘wax and wane with circumstances’, and thus, what matters ‘is their comparative influence in any given period’.43 Future scholarship, thus, might profit by engaging in comparative research across different periods to explicate the ideational and material contexts that might be associated with recurring patterns in Indian statecraft.

*** Many of the dilemmas and debates about India’s future role can be engaged with if we situate India’s foreign policy journey in a larger historical backdrop.44 First, and contrary to popular impression, India’s dominant self-image or identity as an autonomous actor in international politics has never constrained close strategic partnerships with the great powers. An overriding focus on Indian attitudes towards military alliances45 has produced a pre-occupation 42 

Steven I. Levine, ‘Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy’, in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, eds Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 43–5. 43  Rahul Sagar, ‘State of Mind’, 801–2. 44  Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Prakash Menon, et al., Nonalignment 2.0.: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2012), accessed 7 November 2016, http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/ NonAlignment%202.0_1.pdf; Sunila S. Kale, ‘Inside Out: India’s Global Reorientation’, India Review 8, no. 1 (2009): 43–62. Ian Hall, ed., The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014); Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘The Pragmatic Challenge to Indian Foreign Policy’, The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2011): 145–62; Rahul Sagar, ‘State of Mind: What Kind of Power Will India Become?’, 801–16; C. Raja Mohan, ‘India and the Balance of Power’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006; Sunil Khilnani, ‘India’s Rise: The Search for Wealth and Power in the TwentyFirst Century’, in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, eds David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 681–96. 45  Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland, ‘Institutions and Worldviews in Indian Foreign Security Policy’, India Review 11, no. 2 (2012): 76–94.



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to dissect this one abiding norm but at the cost of overlooking several more beliefs that have also informed India’s foreign policy. By limiting their interventions, scholars have typically obscured the complexity and variation of India’s foreign policy since the 1950s. Within the rubric of non-alignment, India has, from the very outset, tilted towards different great powers. For example, Nehru’s foreign policy almost throughout was tilted more towards the West than the East. In fact, for the first half of the 1950s, the UK was perceived as an important anchor for India’s foreign policy. By the mid-1960s, the Soviet equation became important, and continued to grow as global alignments became more unfavourable and even dangerous from Delhi’s frame of reference. The 1971 crisis exemplified this reordering of India’s equations with the great powers. Arguably, there is no ideational constraint per se to such a future re-ordering once again. What debates also ought to focus on more seriously are the dominant roles and functional goals that India seeks to prioritize in her interactions with the great powers. Nehru had focused on a wider conception of security where the Asian system rather than the sub-region was the main arena for order building. For Indira Gandhi, it was in a narrower subcontinental realm where Indian leadership was sought and asserted, and the balance of power was leveraged unabashedly for that principal purpose. Policymakers today should also remember that despite their contrasting approaches to world order, at no stage during the Cold War did Indian leaders contemplate aggregating India’s moral and material capacity towards the strengthening of any single bloc. Indira Gandhi explained it best: ‘Most of these superpowers would like to have spheres of interests. Although we are very friendly with them, we do not agree with this attitude of theirs and we are certainly not going to help them to have this kind of sphere of influence.’46 For such a choice would have been not only inconsistent with India’s non-aligned identity—or strategic autonomy as we prefer to call it today—but it would also have been outright dangerous given the intensity of great power competition in that era. 46  Indira Gandhi, The Years of Endeavor: Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, August 1969–August 1972 (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1975), 686.

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Second, questions such as dealing with China’s rise, accommodating the urges and interests of several, and often competing, regional stakeholders including the US, and shaping an Asian balance of power that can buttress India’s sub-regional position have hardly lost their resonance since the first Cold War. Indeed, whether explicitly or in the backdrop, each of these themes animate contemporary conversations on India’s foreign policy. Re-examining Nehru’s and Indira Gandhi’s beliefs and choices on such fundamental issues can enrich how we think about India’s Asian role and its quest to shape this vast region’s geopolitical landscape as well as help us appreciate the limits of Indian diplomacy. And similar to the Cold War period when the superpowers sought to promote alternative roles for India in the extended neighbourhood and East Asia, today too we can observe competing role conceptions vis-à-vis a sustainable role in the extended neighbourhood.47 Because the pulls and pressures of the past continue to manifest today, the Cold War period holds important policy-relevant insights for India’s broader Asia policy while also underscoring the virtues of an independent and far-sighted regional vision. Finally, the question of India’s role in the immediate vicinity of the subcontinent and how Delhi ought to secure its interests, 47  ‘U.S. Welcomes India’s Emergence in Southeast Asia and Beyond’, Press Trust of India, 19 July 2013; P.S. Suryanarayana, ‘US move to Mentor India in New East Asia’, The Hindu, 22 February 2011; Shivshankar Menon, ‘Towards a New Asian Order’, Indian Express, 22 February 2011; Harsh V. Pant, “Looking East: India’s Growing Leadership in Asian Security’, The National Bureau of Asian Research, September 2013, accessed 7 November 2016, from http://www.nbr.org/downloads/ pdfs/outreach/NBR_IndiaCaucus_Sept2013.pdf. Zorawar Daulet Singh, ‘Should India “Be East” or Be Eurasian?’, Strategic Analysis 36, no. 1 (2012): 1–5. Hugh White, ‘India’s Role in Asia May not Fit “Indo-Pacific” Agenda,’ 30 August 2015, accessed 7 November 2016, from http:// www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/08/30/indias-role-in-asia-may-not-fitindo-pacific-agenda/; David Brewster, India as a Pacific Power (New York: Routledge, 2012); David Scott, ‘India’s “Extended Neighborhood” Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power’, India Review 8, no. 2 (2009): 107–143.



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exercise leadership, and relate to its smaller neighbours as well as with Pakistan, has been a contested theme from the very outset of the republic. Both Nehru and Indira Gandhi formulated distinct approaches of sub-regional statecraft that were informed by preferences over the appropriate mix and application of persuasion and coercion. These images and choices, as we have seen in this book, were never simply a function of material constraints or relative power but emerged from how Indian leaders defined their overall regional roles and concepts of security and order. And these two competing regional philosophies—Nehru’s reluctance to impose India’s will on its periphery and Indira Gandhi’s willingness to do so—seem to keep recurring in contemporary debates over India’s statecraft in Southern Asia.48 While the contemporary context, of which China’s rise represents no small part, might have altered the efficacy of different approaches to the neighbourhood, the past still holds lessons that policymakers could draw upon while formulating their strategies to shape a friendly and stable periphery. Indian statecraft during the Cold War forms an essential part of its strategic culture and Indian security thinking and behaviour in the emerging multipolar world will more likely than not have elements of the past embedded in it.

48  For example, the Gujral doctrine resembles Nehru’s accommodative approach to the South Asian periphery. More recent discourse from Delhi, particularly the Modi government’s ‘neighbourhood first’ discourse, on the other hand, suggests an attempt in re-establishing a modicum of Indian authority in the subcontinent. Deep Pal, ‘Reorienting India’s Foreign Policy: Neighborhood First’, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 13 January 2016, accessed 14 November 2016, from http://nbr. org/downloads/pdfs/psa/sa15_essay_India_jan2016.pdf; Happymon Jacob, ‘Losing the Neighbourhood’, Hindu, 18 May 2016; Nitin A. Gokhale, ‘India: Modi’s Neighborhood Overtures’, The Diplomat, 8 June 2014, accessed 14 November 2016, from http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/ india-modis-neighborhood-overtures/; Sreeram Chaulia, Modi Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of India’s Prime Minister (New Delhi: Bloomsbury India, 2016).

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Index

Acharya, Krishna 271 Acheson, Dean 74n11, 89–91, 186n152 Afghanistan 106 agency 21 Ahmad, Mushtaq 95 Ahmad, Tajuddin 278 Ali, Liaquat 72, 76, 78–9, 81, 84–6, 89–90, 98 Ali, Mohammad 161–2 Anglo-French military, invasion of Egypt in 1956 219 anti-colonialism 60 Asia-centric internationalism 41–8 Asian Relations Conference 12 Awami League 271, 273–4, 276n28, 301 election manifesto in 1970 266 Mujibur’s 6-Point Formula 266, 272n15 sweep National Constitutional Assembly elections of 1970 267 Bajpai, Girja Shankar 72n2, 73, 74n7, n8, 81, 88–91, 138, 183n144

Bajpai, K. Shankar 195, 310, 311n4, 319–7, 328n78, 329–7, 339n140, 340, 356n39, 357n41 balance of power strategy, concept of 55–9, 62, 183 (see also Gandhi, Indira; Nehru, Jawaharlal) Indira Gandhi acceptance of 205–15 Nehru’s rejection of 107–13, 128, 346–7 South Asia 101–4 Bandung Conference 124n111, 145, 155, 158–60, 162, 163n74, 164, 176n117, 178, 182–3, Banerjee, P.N. 326–7, 332 Banerji, S.K. 272 Bangladesh 209, 271, 282, 323 liberation movement 285, 308–9 subject of international controversy 214 Bedell-Smith, Walter 129, 142 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali 273–4 Border Security Force (BSF) 277 Bose, Subhas Chandra 45, 63 Boulding, Kenneth E. 21



Index

Bowles, Chester 185, 235, 238, 264, 349 Brecher, Michael 3, 9, 21, 24n74, 55 Brezhnev proposal 214 British imperialism 42–3 Brussels Congress 43 Burma 53, 134 Nehru’s influence in 125 capitalism 43 Cariappa, K.M. 74, 83, 85 Casey, Richard 125 Central Treaty Organization 251 Chagla, M.C. 211, 281 Chanakya (Kautilya) 64 Chatterjee, Dwarka Nath 218 Chaudhuri, J.N. 240 China/Chinese 10, 27, 43, 53, 76, 135, 176n117 apprehension about US military base in Laos and Cambodia 129–30 Communist party victory in civil war 313 diplomacy towards engagement with Asian neighbours 137n174 Himalayan frontiers 177 and India agreement in 1954 100, 135n166, 137 bilateral problems between 4 choice paths during second crisis 258 formal talks in 1953 106 military alliances between 99 Nehru’s engagement with China 135, 143 war in 1962 4, 206, 317, 352

387

Mao’s rise in 42, 49, 311, 344 nationalism 44 and Pakistan, relations 178 Chogyal 310, 317–19, 322–3, 327–9, 332, 334–7 Chopra, I.S. 319, 324, 329n85 Chukha Agreement 341n147 Churchill, Winston 56 classical geopolitics 18–19 coercive strategy 92 cognitive approach, to foreign policy behaviour 22 cognitive prior, definition of 28n79 Cold War 1–3, 9, 12, 18, 42, 52, 56, 58–9, 97, 134, 172, 343, 359–61 geopolitics intersection with East Bengal 290 outbreak of 101–4 collective security 244–5 Colombo conference 122–3, 125, 136 communism 125n118 communism totalitarian techniques 39 Communist China 113 Communists 13 Congress Party 40, 87, 216, 263 split in 1969 217 victory in 1971 National elections 270n7 Constituent Assembly 49, 49n65, 348 Cooke, Hope 317 core policymakers 18 crisis (see also East Bengal crisis of 1950; East Bengal crisis of 1971; Vietnam War) choice paths during 30, 92, 132, 174, 258, 297, 338 definition of a crisis 24n74 selection 25–8

388

Index

Das, B.S. 311n1, 316, 318n37, 329n85, 330–1, 333n111, 334–5, 338n138 decision-maker(s) 10, 15, 19, 29 authoritative 16 as believers and perceivers 23 decision-making process 24n72 black box 8 centralized 16 distinguishable ideas presence during 29 hierarchy 16 policymakers involvement in 28 demilitarized zone (DMZ) 223, 246 Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) 226–7, 229, 231–2 democratic socialism 38–9 Desai, C.C. 140 Desai, M.J. 238 Dhar, Durga Prasad 195, 214, 266, 278–80, 285, 288, 295, 305n136, 309, 341n147, 355 Dhar, Prithvi Nath 195, 275–6, 316, 329 Dien Bien Phu battle 116, 123–4, 129 The Discovery of India (Jawaharlal Nehru) 46–7, 50–1, 53, 64 Dobrynin, Anatoly 256n111, 291n94, 302 dominant role conception 23 Dong, Pham Van 231 Dorji, Kazi Lhendup 328, 330, 335–6 Dulles, John Foster 103, 116, 118n88, 119, 119n92, 120–1, 124–5, 129, 136, 141–2, 144n3, 148, 150n26, 152n32, 155–8, 161, 162n69, 164–6, 168–70, 171n107, 182–8 Dutt, Subimal 127, 135n166

East Bengal crisis of 1950 25–7, 33, 70, 72, 79, 81, 84, 86–7, 89–91, 93–5, 356 choice paths during 92 hard case in international relations 73 and Jawaharlal Nehru 76, 273 military intervention in 82, 85, 275 preference for status quo with Pakistan 277, 280 reluctance towards coercive strategy 284 speech on 97–8 Pakistan externalizing 82 East Bengal crisis of 1971 27, 34, 221, 266, 269, 303, 357 choice paths during second 296–7 competing images of 270–2 and Indira Gandhi 278, 285 2 March decision 274–5 balance-of-power strategy, adoption of 287–96 constituted cabinet coordinating committee 282 refugee influx in India after 286–7, 289, 295, 298, 300, 307–9 Soviets letter to Yahya Khan 278–9 East India Company 14 East Pakistan 27, 83, 89, 110, 267, 270–1, 274–6, 281, 283–4, 286, 290, 299–300, 302 East Pakistan Rifles 275 Eden, Robert Anthony 119, 124–6, 129, 130n146, 131, 136, 142, 153, 155, 158, 163n73, 168n90, 185, 189



Index

Eisenhower, Dwight D. 112n53, 144, 147–8, 150, 152, 155–6, 161, 164–6, 168, 170, 170n102, 171, 172n108, 173, 180–2, 185–6, 203 ends as subservient to means, notion of 66 European crisis of 1930s 42 Foreign Affairs (journal) 109, 201, 211 foreign office 18 foreign policy crisis 24n74 foreign policy of India 16, 73, 354, 356 based on idea of non-alignment 10 binary idealism/realism 7 central feature in 1950s 37 during Cold war period 2, 4 dilemmas and debates about India’s future role 358–9 post-1991 period 1 weakness in 1954 100 Formosa crisis of 1954–5 26–7, 70, 144, 149, 159, 159n64, 173–4, 177–9, 189 France 99, 102, 110–11, 113–14, 116, 120–1, 123, 131 Galbraith, John Kenneth 207 Gandhi, Indira 1–5, 14, 16, 18, 22–4, 34, 44, 224, 266–8, 285–6, 310– 11, 343, 345–6, 350, 352, 359 advise to core advisors on Bangladesh liberation movement 309 aim to develop Indo-centric sub-regional order 21 approach towards sub-regional statecraft 361

389

archival constraints during period of 31 ascent to power 196 balance of power norm as regulator, acceptance of 205–15 centralization of foreign policymaking 17 confidential correspondence 265 decision-making style 196 decision to recreate R&AW 221, 321 displayed no interest to Nixon offer aid 298 distinct decision-making and deliberation style 355 early decision to examine Kao’s policy 300 exposed to post-Second World War international developments 194 external conditions during era of 347–8 foreign policies 6n15, 27 speeches on 215–16 Haksar’s role in formative phase of 197–8 instrumental outlook on Cold War 217–18 interest towards Indian school of geopolitics 20 invocation of humanitarianism 305 leadership style 193–4 letter to Lyndon Johnson on Delhi touch with Hanoi and US bombing cessation 256n110 on Sino-Pakistan relationship threat 250n91 material capabilities expansion during 349

390

mental resistance against complicated arguments 195 and Nehru, contrasting outlooks between 216 Nehru’s planned succession to 196 peacemaker role 259 political style 194 on realism 8 regional crises, response to 355 reliance on trusted confidantes 195 response to changes in international environment 7 risk appetite and cost-benefit calculus 298–9 role conception 25 rupee devaluation decision in 1966 263 security seeker role conception 220, 316–17, 354 contraction in regional image 198–205 speech in Moscow (1976) 14 strategy to calibrate intervention into Pakistan’s affairs 301 telegram to Nixon on refugee aggression 307 visit to Washington and resumption of non-lethal arms supply 248n83 Geneva Conference (1954) 121, 124–6, 176, 199, 222, 229 Geneva Declaration 131 geodeterminism 19 geopolitics/geopolitical 26, 190 classical 20 critical 19, 19n60, 20–1 natural or rational 21 scope 2

Index

tradition 18 western 51–2 Giri, V.V. 325 Glimpses of World History 44 Goa 173–5, 218 Great Depression of 1930s 44 Grechko, Andrei 288, 304n133 Gujral doctrine 357n40, 371n48 Haksar, Parmeshwar Narayan 6, 14, 31, 195–7, 213, 217, 219, 242, 266, 273–4, 277–8, 280, 285, 287, 301, 316, 320, 325, 355–6 Hammarskjöld, Dag 146, 149–51, 175, 181 Harriman, Averell 232–4, 237n39 Henderson, Loy 89–91, 181n134 Hindu Mahasabha 141 Hindu–Muslim riots, in India 286 Ho Chi Minh 113, 123, 222, 231–2, 236–7 Holsti, K.J. 14, 17, 21, 22n68, 24n73 Horn, Robert 214 Humphrey, Hubert 239–41, 246 Hussain, Arshad 303 idealism 7–8, 352 image definition of 10 international 11 self-image, concept of 11, 15 imperialism 43 imperialist aggression 254 Indian Air Force (IAF) 110 Indian National Congress 16 Indian North-East Frontier Agency 251 India–Pakistan relations conflict over Kashmir 204



Index

391

first war (1947-48) 71 military conflict 49 war in (1965) 215, 291 India–Sikkim Treaty (1950) 318, 320–1 Indo-Bhutan Hydropower project 341 Indochina crisis of 1954 26, 33, 70, 113-142 of 1965–6 26–7, 34, 70, 221–65 Indonesia 134 Indo-Soviet relations 169, 247, 280, 293, 298, 304 friendship pact 112, 210, 212, 269, 292–3, 295, 298, 302, 302n124, 303–5 Horn’s study on 214 trade agreement in 1953 107n33, 139 volume of trade in 1967 248n81 Indo-US relations assistance by US in air defenses during Chinese attack 206–7 deterioration of 180 military alignment 257–8 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses 281 Intelligence Bureau (IB) 109 inter-bloc security dilemma 68 International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICSC) 226, 229, 231, 237 international cooperation 50 international images 22–3 internationalism 47, 51n73 International Peace Conference, Brussels 40

Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (a Marxist revolutionary party) 301 Jan Sangh 141, 262 Japanese imperialism 44 Jha, C.S. 242, 246, 249 Jha, L.K. 196–7, 207, 233–4, 239, 239n48, 258, 264n132, 279, 292, 297 Johnson, Lyndon 204, 213–14, 227, 232, 238–9, 242n57, 248n82, 251–2, 255–6

Jain, Girilal 202n44, 271–2 Jammu and Kashmir 215, 218, 285

Lahore Congress (1929) 44 Lall, K.B. 327

Kao, Rameshwarnath 195, 219, 221, 270–4, 276–7, 281–2, 283n58, 300, 316, 319–22, 325–9, 337, 355 Karnad, Bharat 51, 351 Kashmir war (1947–8) 66 Kaul, Triloki Nath 31–2, 106n23, 135, 177n120, 195, 195n15, 204, 212n86, 217, 222, 230, 242–4, 253–4, 261n120, 261n120, n121, 264, 271, 274, 279, 289–90n88, 295n109, 297, 298n114, 304n133, 316, 319–21, 325–6, 337–8, 355–6 Keating, Kenneth 279 Kennedy, Andrew 9, 66–7, 350 Khan, Ayub 101 Khan, Yahya 273–4, 278–9, 303 Khilnani, Sunil 353, 353n33 Kissinger, Henry 211, 287–8, 290–2, 302 Korean Armistice Agreement 148 Korean War of 1950 97 Kosygin, Alexei 212, 212n86, 228, 236, 278, 289, 303–4 Kuomintang (KMT) 146, 150, 153, 155

392

Index

Lawrence, Mark A. 224n6 Levine, Steven 357 Liu, Chin-hsi 337 Mackinder, H.J. 51, 190 Mahatma Gandhi 65–6 Mallik, B.N. 109 Manekshaw, Sam 284n63, 340 Mansingh, Surjit 7 Mao Zedong 42, 49, 57, 133, 135, 139, 147, 165n81, 172, 176, 186n152, 219–20, 304n133, 311, 313, 344 Masani, M.R. 244, 258 massive retaliation, doctrine of 116 McNamara, Robert 251 Mehta, Gaganvihari Lallubhai 103, 118, 152, 186 Mehta, Jagat S. 231–2, 236 Menon, Krishna V.K. 11, 13, 33, 37, 37n1, 58, 82, 100, 114, 123, 128–9, 140–2, 145, 150, 167, 176, 186, 197, 204, 246, 349, 355 advise to Nehru on Soviet food offer in 1951 138 apprehension in Chinese mind 130n146 assistance to Nehru on international affairs 40 attack on Indira Gandhi foreign policy 245 British alignment with India 124 comprehensive assessment of US–Pakistan pact 110 first meet Nehru on India League delegation 40 foreign policy approach 38 on military balancing 215

proactive diplomacy to arrest Cold War 117 rejection of traditional geopolitical imagery of international life 56–7 relied on derivative Western discourse 39 six-point proposal for Geneva Conference 121 talks with Eisenhower and Dulles, 1955 156–8, 168–170 view of India’s position in the Commonwealth 141–2 Zhou Enlai talks in Beijing, May 1955 165–168 Menon, Kumar Padmanabha Sivasankara 106–9, 119 Menon, N.B. 341–2 Menon, Shiv Shankar 209 Middle East 53 military balancing 215 military conquest 166 military liberation, of East Bengal 78 Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) 32, 208, 271, 296, 300–1, 318–19, 323, 356 Mishra, Brajesh C. 232 Mohammad, Ghulam 101 Mohan, Raja C. 51, 352n29 Molotov, Vyacheslav 107, 126, 129–30 Monroe doctrine 117 Narayan, Jayaprakash 306 Nathu La 251n96 National Archives of India (NAI) 30, 30n87, 32 national consolidation 4 national interest 48–50 nationalism 13, 47, 60



Index

Indian 42 logical extension of 11 and military blocs, conflict between 11 need to foster 49 national roles, concept of 15, 15n47, 16 Nayar, Baldev Raj 133–4 Nazi Germany 47 Nehru, B.K. 204, 238, 241–2, 342 Nehru, Jawaharlal 1–3, 16, 18, 22–4, 40, 99, 193–4, 216, 219, 221, 224, 342–3, 345–6, 351 acknowledged unity between means and ends 65 on American military aid 344 approach during final year towards Vietnam 227 approach towards sub-regional statecraft 361 assessment of Russian situation 190 attention on British base in Maldives 199 beliefs about nuclear revolution 57 on China as a vital pillar of regional order 190 criticism of British India’s regional policy in 1937 54 coercive philosophy for Indian statecraft, rejection of 67 command over political system after Patel’s death 140 conception as a peacemaker Asia-centric internationalism 41–8 national interest, defining 48–50 core images on conflict avoidance 272–3

393

core self-image, definition of 12 dealing with foreign government 93 dominance over Indian government 16n49 engagement with China 135 escalation of battle between India and China 116–23 expansive images 104–7 favour for coercive approach 93 focus on systemic matters 68 foreign policy 4–5, 359 framing of strategic responses 347 geopolitical image of Asia 175–6 held foreign minister post 17 hierarchy of national goals 96 image of power 9 indivisible security, conception of 57, 348 internationalism of 51n73, 307 letter to Liaquat Ali 98 on non-alignment 5–6 non-attachment (lack of desirability to join a bloc) 12 non-interference with China, statement in Parliament 132 no war declaration proposal with Pakistan 73–4 Parliamentary statement 93–4 on peace and security maintenance 141 peacemaker role conception 69, 73, 79–85, 188, 352 external reputation as a 95 persuasion-based model of politics 62 policy note on Bhutan 314–15 defence issues 65

394

Index

Presidential address in Lahore 63 probing to bridge East-West differences 115 projected alternative regional geopolitics 54 regional crises, response to 355 regional image of 50–5 regional policy 4, 26, 353 rejection of balance of power strategy 55–9, 107–13 relied on derivative Western discourse 39 response to Formosa crisis 175 resumption of third-party diplomacy 85 rhetoric in Yugoslavia 247 role as a philosophical strategist 65 role conception 25 sensitivity to material balances 66 socialistic orientation 38n6 speech in Columbia University 64–5 strategic restraint 95 on subcontinental matters 133 system-reforming beliefs 20 traditional realism 7 vs hardliners 85–91 Nehru-Liaquat Ali pact (1950) 300–1 Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), Delhi 31, 31n90, 195n14 Nehru, Ratan Kumar 103, 106, 108, 177 neutralism 102 Nixon, Richard 106, 186, 211, 291, 325 non-alignment/non-aligned 1–3, 7–8, 10–11, 15n46, 21, 47, 55–6, 58, 62, 102, 114, 120, 123, 125,

127–8, 136, 160, 163, 183, 185, 197, 202, 205, 213–14, 217, 234, 238, 244, 264, 296, 343, 347, 355, 359 Asian states 117, 137 definition of 6, 14 as a dominant identity 13 external manifestation of sovereignty 14 independence in external affairs and judgement 11, 13–14 Indian leaders consistent selfimage of 12 Nehru’s view on 5–6, 124n112 origins of 11 self-image of leaders 12 states 20, 130–2, 134, 143, 162, 190 non-communists 13 non-cooperation 61, 63 non-nationalism 13 non-socialists 13 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 174 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 246 Nu, U 126–7 Nye, Archibald 89 Offshore islands crisis 26, 33, 144 (see also Formosa crisis of 1954–5) Operation Jackpot (1971) 282 Operation Vijay (1961 Goa operation) 219 organized violence 63, 68 orthodox geopolitics 18 Pakistan 10, 26, 140, 174–5 Army attack on East Pakistan Rifles 275–6



Index

brutal crackdown on Bengalis by 308 deployment to suppress East Pakistani 276 rejection of fundamental change in politics 272 civil war 296 East Bengalis seeking political expression within 266 inability to restore confidence among minorities 82 military capabilities, rise in 349 Mujibur’s 6-Point Formula 266 Nehru’s no-war proposal policy 71–8, 80n34, 98 pact with Turkey 112 refugee aggression 307 US military alliance with 99–105, 107–10, 133, 203, 248 changes in Pakistan capabilities after 210 and its impact on Indian policymakers 208 Moscow protest against 107 war preparations in west 82–3 West Pakistani leaders’ inability to accommodate Bengalis in 267 Pakistan People’s Party 273–4 Pande, C.D. 229 Pandit, Vijaya Lakshmi 38, 112n56 Panikkar, Kavalam Madhava 102–3 Pant, Apa 177n121, 315 Parthasarathi, Gopalaswami 195 Partition of India in 1947 12, 72, 95 Patel, Vallabhbhai 25, 71, 73, 76, 86–96, 139–40, 341 accepted secular ideal 95 coercive signalling 79–85

395

impact on livelihoods 72 policy towards Pakistan 74–7 support for Sikkim accession into India 311 Paul, T.V. 133–4 peace area, concept of 59–62, 128, 133, 315, 347–8, 350, 352 Pegov, Nikolai 278 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 146, 150 perceptions of external events 23 situational ideas 23 Pillai, Narayanan Raghavan 103, 104n14, n15, 105n19, 106n27, 108n35, 110n43, n44, 112, 113n60, 118n83, 119n92, 118, 121n101, 123n108, 128n135 Poland 131 policymakers, Indian 15, 19, 24, 28, 58 and classical geopolitics 20 engaged in critical geopolitics 20 political elites 308n148 political system of India, during Cold war 16 Prasad, Rajendra 85, 87–8, 139 Radford, Arthur W. 161 Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli 138–9, 237n39 Rahman, M.A. 231 Rahman, Mujibur 266, 272n15, 278, 285, 301 Rajagopalachari, C. 244, 258 Rajagopalan, G.K. 334 Rana, A.P. 9 Rasgotra, Maharaja Krishna xiv, 199, 201, 211, 342

396

Index

Ray, Asoke 272, 272n15 realism 7–8 regional behavioural shift 24 instability 27 policy behaviour 2 statecraft 9, 21 regional role conceptions 21–2, 24, 28 definition of role conception 15n47 Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) 221, 270, 272, 274–5, 282, 321, 328, 333 Royal Pakistan Air Force (RPAF) 110 Roy, Bidhan Chandra 75, 98 Rusk, Dean 249, 251, 256 Russian revolution 42–3 Second World War 42 security seeker, concept of 33–4 self-defence 65–6 Shastri, Lal Bahadur 194, 203n45, 207, 228, 230, 232–3, 235 Sidhu, G.B.S. 326, 332–3 Sikkim 209 breakdown of negotiations between Sikkim Congress and Maharaja 312–13 British Indian constitution on 311 British Political Officer supervisory rights in 311n1 choice paths during 338 crisis 27–8, 34, 316, 356 agitation in 1973 328–31 competing images of 317–25 Delhi’s response to 340 Indira Gandhi decision to intervene 325–8, 339–40

phases of 317 ethnic groups in 314 and Jawaharlal Nehru new treaty to balance Sikkim internal autonomy 313 merged with India in 1975 337 political scenario in 331–7 population of 314 Sikkim National Congress 328 Sikkim National Party 314 Sikkim State Congress 311–13 foundation of 314 represented Nepali majority 314 Sikkim Study Forum 318 Singh, Avtar 329 Singh, Dinesh 240n54 Singh, Kewal 326–7, 329–30, 332, 335, 337 Singh, Swaran 214, 218, 234, 240n54, 245–6, 263, 266, 276, 289, 294, 303, 335 Sino-American conflict 26–7, 144 and Nehru area of peace vs containment strategy of America 159–68 role of peacemaking 151–8 outbreak of 146–51 persuasion to US by India 168–73 Sino-Soviet rivalry/split 188, 231–2, 237 Socialists 13 South Asia/South East Asia 24–5, 51, 54, 70, 74, 76, 97, 99, 101, 122–4, 126, 129–30, 132, 134, 198, 209, 211, 221, 225, 233, 247, 257–61 (see also East



Bengal crisis of 1950; East Bengal crisis of 1971) Asia as primary domain of regional activity with 25 distinctive area or system of international relations 55 India’s centrality in 21 Monroe doctrine extension by US over 117 Moscow’s disengagement from 236 re-alignment of Soviet Union policy for 293 US–China area of agreement on 347 sovereignty 42 encroachments on 47–8 Soviet Union (USSR) 56, 108, 140, 163, 169, 184n146, 185 Spykman, Nicholas 18, 51, 190 Staniland, Paul 4n4 Subrahmanyam, Krishnaswamy 140, 268n4, 281–2, 351 sustainable security 68 Swatantra Party 244, 262 Syali, A.S. 332 Tagore, Rabindranath 41–2 Taiwan Straits crisis 145 (see also Formosa crisis of 1954–5) Third Force 61, 109, 113, 122–3, 132, 163 Third Worldism 352 Tibet Agreement (April 1954 India–China Agreement) 134, 135, 177, 248 Times of India 84

Index

397

Trevelyan, Humphrey 118 Tsering, Tashi 312–13 Tyabji, Baddrudin 106–8, 127 unilateral collective system 125 United Nations High Commission for Refugees 307–8 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 49, 179, 307 UNSG 175 US 26–7 alliance with Pakistan 99–105, 107–10, 133 Nehru and Menon perception about 134 extension of new Monroe doctrine over South East Asia 117 focus on China’s internal politics 251 involvement in South Asia’s balance of power 344 Nehru’s first visit in 1949 49–50 nuclear brinksmanship in 1950s 259 US-Soviet balance/cooperation 56, 104 US-Taiwan treaty (1954) 148 Vellodi, M.K. 110 Vietminh assault 123 Vietnam anti-colonial struggle 222 ceasefire line in 222–3 Vietnam War 27, 224, 356 escalation of 223 India’s response to 225, 347 and Indira Gandhi

398

Index

balance-of-power strategy 246–61 dealing with second phase of escalation 236–45 passive posture on 225 outbreak of and India’s peacemaker role 226–36 West Bengal 72, 79 refugee crisis in 75 West Pakistan–Punjab border, mobilization of forces by India 82

Westphalian system of sovereign states 47, 59 world order 50 World Peace Conference, Geneva 40 Zakaria, Fareed 348n13 Zhou Enlai 104–5, 115, 120, 126, 129–31, 136, 137n174, 145, 147–8, 150, 151n30, 159n64, 160–7, 170, 172, 176, 177n120, 178, 188, 288, 292 Zhukov, Georgy 210

About the Author

Zorawar Daulet Singh is a fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, India, and is associated with the Institute of Chinese Studies, New Delhi. For the past decade, he has been a regular commentator and columnist on India’s foreign policy and various dimensions of India–China relations. His co-authored books include India–China Relations: The Border Issue and Beyond and Chasing the Dragon: Will India Catch up with China? Daulet Singh holds a PhD in international relations from King’s College London, UK, and an MA in international relations from the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, USA.