Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition 9780773566415

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Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era Foreign Policies in Transition

Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era examines change in foreign policy through a comparative analysis of the Great Powers' reactions to transformations in international relations after the Cold War. Contributors describe and explain the efforts of the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, China, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada to redefine the role they play in foreign policy when faced with an environment that has become internally and externally more uncertain. A state's articulation of its national role betrays its preferences and image of the world, triggers expectations, and influences its definition of the situation and of available options. Extending Kal Holsti's early work on the usefulness of the concept of role, Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era examines the nature, evolution, and origins of role conceptions, key aspects of the concept that are largely ignored in a literature obsessed with the quest for immediate relevance. Contributors present the major foreign policy debate that took place in each country at the end of the Cold War and, through an analysis of major speeches, examine the relative weight of identity and international status in the definition of the national role. Uncovering the different roles that states claim for themselves increases the possibility of international cooperation in the maintenance of international order. This study helps assess the importance of identity in national role conceptions and the need to identify potential conflicts arising from the clash of roles masquerading as interests, and clarifies existing contradictions in prevailing roles. PHILIPPE G. LE PRESTRE is professor of political science, Universite du Quebec a Montreal.

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Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era Foreign Policies in Transition EDITED BY PHILIPPE G. LE PRESTRE

McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Buffalo

© McGill-Queen's University Press 1997 ISBN 0-7735-1532-1 (cloth) ISBN o-7735-i533-x (paper) Legal deposit first quarter 1997 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Humanities and Social Sciences Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. McGill-Queen's University Press is grateful to the Canada Council for support of its publishing program.

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Main entry under title: Role quests in the post-cold war era : foreign policies in transition Includes bibliographical references and index. I S B N 0-7735-1532.-! (bound). I S B N 0-7735-1533-x (pbk.) i. International relations, i. Le Prestre, Philippe G. J X I 3 9 5 . R 5 7 1997 32.7 C-97-900084-X

Typeset in Sabon 10/12 by Caractera inc., Quebec City

Contents

Figures vii Tables viii Acknowledgments

xiii

i Author! Author! Defining Foreign Policy Roles after the Cold War 3 P H I L I P P E G. LE PRESTRE

2, The Soviet Union/Russia: Which Past for Which Future? 15 J E A N - F R A N C O I S THIBAULT and JACQUES LEVESQUE

3 Articulating the New International Role of the United States during Previous Transitions, 1916-1919, 1943-1947 40 J E A N - R E N E CHOTARD

4 The United States: An Elusive Role Quest after the Cold War 65 PHILIPPE

G. LE PRESTRE

5 Japan: A Great Power Despite Itself ALEX

88

MACLEOD

6 Germany: To Be or Not to Be Normal?

in

PAUL L E T O U R N E A U a n d M A R I E - E L I S A B E T H R A K E L

vi

Contents

7 France: The Straitjacket of New Freedom

131

C H A R L E S T H U M E R E L L E a n d P H I L I P P E G . I.E P R E S T R E

8 Great Britain: Still Searching for Status?

161

ALEX MACLEOD

9 China: Role Conceptions after the Cold War ONNIG BEYLERIAN

187

with C H R 1 S T O P H E C A N I V E T

10 Canada: A Reassertion of Its Role as a Middle Power

2.25

A N D R E P. D O N N E U R and C A R O L I N E C. A L A I N

11 Change and Continuity in Foreign Policy Role Conceptions after the Cold War 251 P H I L I P P E G. LE PRESTRE

Notes 263 References Contributors Index

271 305

307

Centre d'etudes des politiques etrangeres et de securite, Universite du Quebec a Montreal 317

Figures

5.1 Comparison of the Evolution of the Yearly Relative Frequencies within the Categories of Peace-Loving Nation ( I D I ) , International Influence (5x3), and Contributor to World Peace ( D R 3 ) for Japan, 1989-93 109 8.1 Comparison of the Evolution of the Distribution of Relative Frequencies within the Categories of Contributor to the International System ( D R I ) , Bastion of Liberal Values ( I D I ) , and International Influence (STI) for Britain, 198993 184 8.2 Comparison of the Evolution of the Distribution of Relative Frequencies within the Categories of Regional Subsystem Collaborator ( D R 3 ) , Europe (IDZ), Membership of Organizations (STIB), and European Community (st2c) for Britain, 1989-93 r85 9.1 Role Occurrences in Speech Units 204 9.2 Speech Units per Role Assertions

206

9.3 Contingencies of Role Conceptions with D R 3

208

Tables

i.i Identity, System, and Role

10

2.1 Attributes of the U S S R and Russia Corpus, 1989-93

18

2.2 Duties and Responsibilities as Expressed in Soviet Speeches, 1989-91 23 2.3 Duties and Responsibilities as Expressed in Russian Speeches, 1992-93 27 2.4 References to Status in Soviet and Russian Speeches, 1989-93 31 2.5 Identity in Soviet and Russian Speeches, 1989-93

35

3.1 Cases Reference: White House Conference, 19 August 1919 52 3.2 Reference to Selected Terms: White House Conference, 19 August 1919 52 4.1 Speeches Selected for the Content Analysis of us Foreign Policy Roles, 1989-93 68 4.2 The us Prescriptive Role-Set, 1989-93 69 4.3 Number of DR Statements by Issue

73

4.4 Evolution of Lexical Categories in us Foreign Policy Speeches, 1989-93 74

ix Tables

4.5 Roles Expressed in the 1989-93 us Foreign Policy Speeches 75 4.6 Anti-isolationist Assertions in the Role Sample ( D R ) 4.7 Evolution of the Content of the Role Catalyst

75

77

4.8 Evolution of the Content of the Role Stabilizer

77

4.9 Evolution of the Content of the Role Tribune

78

4.10 us Role Matrix 78 4.11 Relative Importance of DR, ST, and ID Assertions in us Speeches, 1989-93 79 4.12 Identity Expressed in us Foreign Policy Speeches, 1989-93 80 4.13 Sources of Influence Expressed in us Foreign Policy Speeches, 1989-93 81 4.14 Evolution of Status Categories in us Foreign Policy Speeches, 1989-93 83 5.1 Number and Origin of Selected Speeches Made by Japan's Foreign Policy Makers, 1989-93 92. 5.2 Japan's Duties and Responsibilities, 1989-93

97

5.3 Distribution of Assertions of Japan's Duties and Responsibilities, Status, and National Identity, 1989-93 zoo 5.4 Main Components of Japan's National Identity, 1989-93 100 5.5 Japanese References to Asia-Pacific and Western Countries, 1989-93 102 5.6 Main Components of Japan's International Status, 1989-93 104 5.7 The Nature of Japan's External Relations (STI) 5.8 Japanese References to the Regions of the World 5.9 Japanese References to the Three Great Powers

104 105 105

5.10 Japanese Perceptions of Their Country's Rank in the World (ST2.)

IO6

5.11 Japan's International Influence (5x3)

106

x Tables 5.12 Japan's Internationa] Capabilities (8X4)

107

6.1 Germany's Duties and Responsibilities, 1989-93 6.2 Germany's Status, 1989-93

116

120

6.3 Germany's Identity, 1989-93

123

7.1 Assertions about Role, Status, and Identity in Mitterrand's Speeches, 1989-93 144 7.2 Role Conceptions in Mitterrand's Speeches, 1989-93

146

7.3 Evolution of the Contents of Roles Related to National Independence (DR6, DR7, DRCJ) 147 7.4 Contents and Evolution of DR3

148

7.5 Contents and Evolution of D R I

148

7.6 Contents and Evolution of DR2 149 7.7 Contents and Evolution of DR4

149

7.8 Representations of France's Status (ST) in Mitterrand's Speeches, 1989-93 151 7.9 Contents and Evolution of ST5

152

7.10 Contents and Evolution of STZ

152

7.11 Contents and Evolution of 8X3

153

7.12 Contents and Evolution of STI

153

7.13 Contents and Evolution of $74

154

7.14 Representations of National Identity ( I D ) in Mitterrand's Speeches, 1989-93 155 8.x Number and Origin of Selected Speeches Made by British Foreign Policy Makers under the Thatcher and Major Governments, 1989-93 164 8.2 Distribution of Assertions of Great Britain's National Identity, Status, and Duties and Responsibilities under the Thatcher and Major Governments, 1989-93 172 8.3 Britain's Duties and Responsibilities under the Thatcher and Major Governments, 1989-93 172 8.4 Main Components of Britain's National Identity under the Thatcher and Major Governments, 1989-93 176

xi Tables

8.5 Britain's Perceptions of Its Status under the Thatcher and Major Governments, 1989-93 179 8.6 Nature of Britain's International Relations (STI)

179

8.7 The Sources of Britain's International Influence under the Thatcher and Major Governments (5x2) 181 8.8 British References to the United States and Europe, 1989-93 182 9.1 Number and Sizes of Speeches by Chinese Policy Makers per Year, 1989-93 zoo 9.2 Distribution of China's Roles per Year, 1989-93

205

9.3 Distribution of China's Status Perceptions per Year, 1989-93 209 9.4 Subcategories of Relationships (STI) 9.5 Subcategories of Influence (5x5)

209

210

9.6 Subcategories of Relations with Major Powers (sx6) 210 9.7 Subcategories of Rank (s72)

211

9.8 Subcategories of Capability (5x4)

211

9.9 Subcategories of Threat Perceptions (5x3) 9.10 Distribution of Chinese Identity Issues

211

213

9.11 Absolute and Relative Frequencies of China's Roles, Status, and Identity per Year 215 9.12 Observed/Expected Frequencies per Year 9.13 Chi-square Values

215

216

9.14 Contingencies between Roles and Status 9.15 Contingencies between Roles and Identity

217 219

0o.i Canadian Speeches Selected for the Content Analysis, 1989-93 231 10.2 Role, Status, and Identity Distribution in Canadian Speeches, 1989-93 232 10.3 Role Distribution between 1989 and 1993 10.4 Distribution of Status Subcategories

240

234

xii

Tables

10.5 Subcategories of Relationships (STI) 10.6 Subcategories of Rank (STI)

241

243

10.7 Subcategories of Capabilities (5x3) 10.8 Subcategories of Influence (574) 10.9 Subcategories of Threats (515) 10.10 Distribution of Identity, 1989-93

243

244 245 246

11. i Dominant and Secondary Role-Sets of Eight Major Powers, 1989 and 1993 253 11.2 Role Movements of Eight Major Powers, 1989-93

254

11.3 Relative Importance of DR, ST, and ID Statements in the Foreign Policy Speeches of Eight Major Powers 256 11.4 Importance of Identity Assertions in the Foreign Policy Discourse of Eight Major Powers 257 11.5 Matrix of Identity, Status, and Roles for Eight Major Powers 257

Acknowledgments

This study was conducted under the auspices of the Centre d'etudes des politiques etrangeres et de securite ( C E P E S ) of the Universite du Quebec a Montreal. A team grant from the Fonds pour la formation de chercheurs et 1'aide a la recherche ( F C A R ) of Quebec provided most of the financing for this research. All of CEPES'S senior researchers contributed to this book. I am indebted to my colleagues for their readiness to mould their work and thinking into the demanding requirements of a common research design. Because of the time-consuming methodology, the assistance of younger researchers and graduates was invaluable in locating, compiling, and analysing speeches, and in generating the resulting data. Several of them appear as co-authors; others include Stephane Bujold, Guy Cote, Jean-Bernard Parenteau, and Louis Legrand. Onnig Beylerian deserves special mention for undertaking the study of a rising power (China) and for overseeing key aspects of the project, particularly the coordination and methodological support of the work of the research assistants. His timely intervention at various stages of the research process helped solve a number of crucial methodological, budgetary, and technical issues, and lent overall coherence to the treatment of key concepts. Finally, the keen eye and scrupulous editing of Judith Turnbull for McGill-Queen's University Press markedly improved the final manuscript. Philippe Le Prestre September 1996

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Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era

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i Author! Author! Defining Foreign Policy Roles after the Cold War PHILIPPE G. LE P R E S T R E

Foreign policy change revolves around the redefinition of states' roles in the international system. Since the late 19805, this task seems to have increasingly bedevilled the Great Powers. As President Bill Clinton asked the Russian people in January 1994: "How will you define your role in the world as a great power? Will you define it in yesterday's terms, or tomorrow's?" Indeed, as Kenneth Waltz (1990, 2.2.2.) pointed out at the start of this new international turbulence, "the old and the new great powers will have to learn new roles and figure out how to enact them on a shifting stage. New roles are hard to learn, and actors easily trip when playing on unfamiliar sets." After the USSR'S failed attempts to rewrite the play, Russia claimed a leading part in the new one; the United States had trouble reading the new script and at times appeared more eager to direct than act; neither Japan nor Germany wished to remain understudies but wondered what becoming a "normal" actor entailed; France and Great Britain relied on their old lines and on their "metier" to steady them through a shifting set; China spoke its lines louder and louder, while Canada wondered how it could justify remaining in the play at all. While assertions about national roles abound in the official discourse, their dynamics and impacts remain elusive. The concept of role itself, as it applies to foreign policy, is poorly understood, largely because "role" can assume at least six meanings: i. A contribution, or a function, as in "the role of the us in the conclusion of a peace settlement"; "the United States has a special role

4 Philippe G. Le Prestre

in this world, a special contribution to make" (Baker 19893); "international peace operations and America's role in them" (Albright 1993); "Turkey's important role in securing the southern flank of NATO during the Cold War." z. An influence or impact; "Our actions will, of course, play an important role in shaping the future of us-Soviet relations" (Baker 1989^; or, to paraphrase Grosser (1993): "if France were less concerned with rank, it would play a larger role in the construction of Europe." 3. Expected behaviour based on certain rules, written or unwritten, prescribed or achieved. This is the meaning closest to that used in the sociological literature. 4. A part in a larger script, a course of action: "CSCE must also play a more effective role in addressing the actual and potential ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union by monitoring respect for human rights and minority rights throughout the cis" (Eagleburger 1992). 5. Policy decisions: "The nature of the problem, the interests and values at stake, the capacity of our friends to act, and the relevance of available multilateral mechanisms will shape our role" (Baker 1992.). 6. Rank, as in Kissinger's (1994, 373) reference to one provision of the igzz Washington Treaty that reaffirmed "America's role as the dominant power in the Pacific alongside Japan. Great Britain's role in that theatre was henceforth secondary." In a seminal study, Kal Holsti adopted a definition closer to the traditional one found in the sociology literature, which emphasizes the normative aspects of the concept. According to Holsti (1970, Z45-6), roles refer to "the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system"; in short, who does what, when, and how. Policy makers define obligations and expectations that can be prescribed by external actors (role prescription) or self-generated by the policy makers' own definitions (role conceptions). Our own approach will follow Holsti's and concentrate on role conceptions or definitions. THE R E L E V A N C E OF N A T I O N A L R O L E S

Although doubts persist regarding the usefulness and appropriateness of the concept of national interest, the potential contribution of the alternative notion - the concept of role - to foreign policy analysis has

5

Defining Foreign Policy Roles

been largely neglected. While this latter concept has been widely used in sociology and anthropology, its application in political science has largely focused on attempts to understand the domestic behaviour of individuals (Davidson 1969; Chittick 1970). After Holsti's promising start, Stephen Walker (1979, 1987^ undertook sustained inquiry into the potentialities of the concept. Few others, except for Naomi Wish (1980) and Chih-yu Shih (1988), took more than a passing interest in it. This general neglect can be attributed to several factors, including the popularity of rival approaches (such as political economy, psychological theories, bureaucratic politics), the stable nature of the international system - which prevented fundamental policy shifts - and a concern for finding immediate theories that would help build a direct link between role and behaviour. The vague, inconclusive, or disappointing results prompted analysts to turn elsewhere. Yet, defining a role and having it accepted by other actors remain basic objectives of states. A role reflects a claim on the international system, a recognition by international actors, and a conception of national identity. Foreign policy change, therefore, must rest on a redefinition of a role and on the role's congruence with politics. Changes in role definitions can occur in two ways (Barrows in Magid 1980, 322,): in a holistic and unidirectional manner involving a direct clash between old and new role definitions, or in a synthetic manner that stresses the adaptability of societies and of traditional roles. In the latter case, change may be sectoral without involving a general unidirectional movement; greater flexibility of action may be accorded the individual; and instead of one substituting for the other, the old and the new become fused. Focusing on role definition means stepping away from the dominant emphasis on process and management. Role definition can help explain the general direction of foreign policy choices. The articulation of a national role betrays preferences, operationalizes an image of the world, triggers expectations, and influences the definition of the situation and of the available options. It imposes obligations and affects the definition of risks. Focusing on this concept, therefore, allows one to go beyond the traditional explanation of foreign policy, which is based on security or on the national interest defined as the prudent search for power. Roles help define national interests and divorce them from power. The concept of role helps explain apparent anomalies in the conduct of states. Why would Canada, for example, cancel nearly half of Poland's debt between 1992 and 1994 when its own external indebtedness relative to its gross domestic product (GDP) is twice that of Poland's? Why do states maintain military forces that are disproportionate to

6 Philippe G. Le Prestre

the perceived threats, as does France? The idea that Canada should define for itself a military niche in peacekeeping, or that France should be concerned with maintaining its overseas presence, illustrates the obligations that roles exert beyond mere considerations of the national interest. A role can even lead states to undertake actions that would contradict the national interest - as in the French and English support to Finland in 1939-40 or the extension of the American involvement in Vietnam. In an anarchic system, roles impose obligations on states and help shape their interests. Thus, contrary to what structural realists would assert, capacities alone do not define a role. Structural realism cannot explain why Japan and Germany have chosen not to shoulder greater responsibilities through a leadership role commensurate with their power (Mansbach 1994) or why France and Great Britain have differed so much in their foreign policies. This does not mean that role definition should replace geopolitical analyses as a basis for the identification of what states must avoid. Foreign policy, however, is not simply about preventing what is unacceptable; beyond that minimal imperative, role conceptions will matter. They expand the definition of the national interest beyond the more basic geopolitical factors that are linked to national survival. Further, the role concept interfaces with the individual, the society, and the system. It has the potential of reconciling different levels of analysis and provides a means of assessing the interplay between internal and external variables. It can make sense of positions or actions that observers, having found rational or interest-based explanations wanting, would likely impute to psychological phenomena or decisionmaking failures.1 Since roles define new value hierarchies, behaviour may remain essentially rational. Role definitions can also help explain foreign policy continuities. All the countries examined in this study faced the issue of redefining their priorities and responsibilities after the fall of the Soviet empire, and this when their internal techno-economic context was becoming more unstable. How did each state approach this issue? Did continuities lead to dysfunctional inertia? Finally, examining the evolution, origins, and content of these different roles allows us to reflect upon the possibility of cooperation among these countries in the maintenance of international order. Studies such as this one can help identify the risks of conflicts rooted in clashing role conceptions masquerading as interests, or in the contradictions between the internal conceptions and the external expectations of the role that a given state should play.

7 Defining Foreign Policy Roles Purpose of This Study The benign neglect of role conceptions, therefore, appears premature. Systemic and domestic changes force theorists to turn back to approaches that have been too quickly discarded. The absence of immediate research gratification - finding a clear and immediate correlation between role and behaviour, for example - does not preclude building foundations that will lead to progress in this area. These foundations - as Stephen Walker has pointed out - start with an examination of the nature, evolution, and origins of role conceptions. These antecedent questions, largely ignored in a literature obsessed with the quest for "relevance," constitute the analytical purpose of the book. A "robust" theory of roles, according to Walker (19873), would answer four questions: i. What is a role? z.What are its sources? 3.Under what conditions do various roles emerge? 4. Why are these conditions relevant? This book addresses these questions, paying particular attention to the second. The content of each role - or sets of roles - can be primarily influenced either by internal variables (as Shih [1988] argued about China) or by external factors. This corresponds to the distinction, in the sociological literature, between ascribed roles imposed by society (as a great power, for example) and achieved roles chosen by the actor (as a member of the United Nations [UN] or leader of an alliance [see Rosenau 1990, 2.12]). Both sources lead to specific norms (prescriptions arising from self-image and the expectations of the international system) and beliefs (referring to subjective probabilities about other actors' demands, for example) that translate into preferences.1 The sociology literature has largely emphasized the structural origins of roles as rooted in the expectations and behaviour of others, based on shared norms (Magid 1980; Biddle 1986). Likewise, structural realists believe that capacities and the distribution of threats largely define the national role. Thus, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, and the pre-eminence of Japan should have encouraged the assertion of new roles. Holsti (1970, 240), on the other hand, has emphasized agent sources: "Role performance (decisions and actions) of governments may be explained primarily by reference to the policymakers' own conceptions of their

8

Philippe G. Le Prestre

nation's role in the region or in the international system as a whole." Self-conceptions, however, encompassing both aspects, can have internal or external origins. Policy environments are psychological constructs. Thus, although Holsti's conclusion justifies - for this study at least - leaving out states' mutual conceptions of each other's roles, it does not free us from examining their perceptionsof the obligations attached to their own position in the system and of the expectations that other states may have of them. Whereas an analysis of international relations that focuses on policy outcomes would demand that we consider states' mutual role expectations, foreign policy analysis, concerned with outputs, will approach role expectations as they are mediated by the perceptions of the national decision makers. One can approach these external influences through the notion of perceived status. Some states, such as France under de Gaulle, have put heavy emphasis on rank as both an object and a determinant of foreign policy options. "Status" here refers to the subjective perception that leaders have of the position of their country rather than to a more objective assessment of the actual power position their country enjoys in the system, that is, to achieved status. The cases of France and Great Britain since the end of the Second World War illustrate this difference and suggest the importance of status perception as opposed to actual status in explaining the definition of interests. In contrast, the American rhetoric after the Gulf War reflected objective rather than subjective links between status and role. Wish (1980) saw a positive relationship between status and international engagement, although the latter did not entail a greater willingness to commit resources (Walker 19873, 273). Because the international society is weak and heterogeneous, we cannot assume that all states hold similar notions of the proper behaviour of a superpower or will interpret and respond to ambiguous external stimuli in the same way. After all, Melians and Athenians differed in their respective role expectations of each other. In this context, much weight has been given to self-conceptions of roles. Indeed, for some analysts, that is where roles largely originate. Selfimage, or identity, is "the ultimate source of motivation" (Alexander and Willey 1981, quoted in Shih 1988, 601). Sampson and Walker (1987) drew a parallel between internal political norms and national role conceptions. Likewise, Wish (1980, 549-50) found "greater similarities among role conceptions expressed by leaders from the same nations than from differing nations, even though they were in power at different times and therefore experienced different international arenas." Finally, in her studies of two small European powers, Breuning (1995, I 99 2 ) concluded that culture and institutional structures shape

9

Defining Foreign Policy Roles

role conceptions and the options decision makers define for their country. These self-conceptions are rooted in societies' understanding of themselves and of what they represent in the world, that is, in identity. The usefulness of this concept lies in its subsuming ideology, political history, culture, and experience, variables that have been variously examined in the context of foreign policy roles (e.g., Dallek 1983; Sampson and Walker 1987). The influence of identity in the definition of states' foreign relations is enjoying renewed interest, since many mirrors cracked in the wake of systemic turbulence. Uncertainties about self-identity are sometimes considered a major potential cause of international conflict (Friedman 1995; van Evera 1994). All the states under study have been experiencing identity crises that have shaped their approach to a redefinition of their roles (Parekh 1994). For some, the end of the Cold War triggered new reflections on their identity; for others, it accentuated a self-questioning previously induced by economic, social, and technological forces. Although status and identity are two poles of influence, the issue is not merely a matter of choosing one over the other. Although one may dominate at any one time, it is more fruitful to investigate their relative importance, the factors that condition them, and their mutual interactions. The distinction between the internal and external roots of role conceptions parallels that which Wolfers (1956) drew between the Continental approach to foreign policy, centred around the "necessity of state," and the Anglo-Saxon assumption that statesmen and nations enjoy considerable freedom to choose the right path in foreign affairs, as they do in the domestic realm. Thus, the system is either constraining or enabling. Likewise, in each situati , identity - including national ideology - may or may not impe the adoption of a specific role conception. Crossing the variables gives a matrix (Table i.i); the table uses examples drawn from the case of the United States (see chapter 4). The principal roles that decision makers define for their country can be located within these cells. What is important is not that each cell may determine a specific role (contradictory roles may actually occupy the same cell) but that each cell determines the direction of the relationship between role, identity, and status - for example, whether the system compels or enables dominant roles. A lack of social consensus about national roles, along with their dual origin, is likely to lead to conflicting norms, expectations, and preferences, and thus to national foreign policy dysfunctions, even to international conflicts. These role conflicts3 may be compounded by a rapid change of the system, which makes some behaviour - previously the solution to earlier conflicts - now obsolete or unacceptable. The

io Philippe G. Le Prestre Table i.i Identity, System, and Role (with examples drawn from chapter 4) Identity impels

condones

Tribune

Guardian

Catalyst

Stabilizer

interesting questions, therefore, become, how do such conflicts appear and how are they resolved (see Barnett 1993), and what happens when states do not hold consensual expectations about each other's behaviour (see Biddle 1986)? In conditions of systemic turbulence, role conflicts for individual policy makers may become increasingly common (Rosenau 1990, 2.13). These role conflicts may be reduced if, instead of being mapped out ahead of time according to status or identity considerations, roles are discovered through performance (Walker 1979). States would adopt certain roles on the basis of actions that have resulted in what leaders consider to be positive outcomes.'' Politics being the art of the possible, a role will rationalize immediate lessons. Pragmatically, it becomes whatever works. Thus, this study asks six basic questions: 1. Have the eight states mentioned experienced similar difficulties in identifying and articulating the roles they should play following the profound systemic changes of the late 19805 and early 19905? 2. How have their role conceptions evolved during the same period? 3. What is the content of the different roles that have emerged? 4. What factors explain the roles' evolution, inertia, content, and legitimation? 5. What role conflicts could emerge and how could they be solved? 6. How could one account for the differences and similarities observed among the eight states examined? This study contrasts an internal determinant - identity - with an external one - status - and identifies the most promising hypotheses for understanding the roots of foreign policy. Note that we focus on the decision makers' representations of the role that their country should

ii

Defining Foreign Policy Roles

play on the international scene, and not on foreign policy actions which might express these conceptions, nor on the links between role and behaviour. The variables that affect the evolution of roles will probably influence their content, although that cannot be assumed. For example, a state can have a number of role relationships (a role-set),s some of which may be actualized by certain internal or external variables. Thus, our various hypotheses can be complementary. Shih (1988), for example, locates the origins of the contents of roles in cultural variables, but he also suggests that other internal variables - such as a change in leadership - explain why a specific role will dominate at any given time, and systemic variables explain role stability (see also Vered 1994)Methodology To ascertain the nature, evolution, and origins of national roles, we examine eight major powers that represent different political cultures and civilizations, hold different power positions in the system, and confront various internal and regional uncertainties: the USSR/Russia, the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Great Britain, China, and Canada. All were deeply affected by the East-West conflict, and all experience profound internal economic and social changes that call into question the core of their identity. A complementary chapter (chapter 3) is devoted to the historical experience of the United States, which, twice before in this century, has faced the task of reconciling status and identity behind the redefinition of a new role in the international system. The general approach follows Alexander George's (1979) admonitions, in particular the need to specify what broader issue or process is illuminated by the cases, and to address in each case the same set of questions in order to make them comparable. Consequently, the following chapters will share a similar three-tiered structure. First, they examine national foreign policy debates since 1989 and identify the different role-sets that have been articulated outside the discourse of government officials. The second step involves a content analysis of selected speeches of the principal decision makers between 1989 and 1993. Two questions are asked: What is the content of the dominant roles? and, How has the distribution of roles evolved over time? The third step relates role definition to identity or status. Identity is found in the speaker's own image of his or her country - the values it represents, its history, the bases of its influence, or the nature of its polity. Status is identified by asking such questions as: Where does country X

iz Philippe G. Le Prestre

stand in the international system? How does it characterize its position in the system? What impact does the world have on country X? And, What threats does it face? Content analysis is used as a tool to identify changes in the definition of national roles and to explore the potential validity of hypotheses pertaining to their origins. Contrary to the focus of other research programs, ours is not on the foreign policy discourse per se; that is, we do not seek to characterize its nature and functions. Rather, we use speeches to identify the dominant conceptions of national roles. Now, what kind of indicators should one look for in the texts? Wish (1980), for example, examines status, motivation, and issue areas to ascertain the content of a role, whereas Shih (1988) identifies national mission, the representation of interstate relations, and stability over time. These efforts, however, seem to complicate the distinction between dependent and independent variables. Stability cannot help define a role; rather, it is a property of it. The representation of interstate relations is pertinent and useful to the study of roles, but as an independent variable acting directly or through ideological and cultural variables, not as an indicator of roles. Likewise, circularity problems arise when Holsti (1970) and Wish (1980) regard a role as the "interface between a role conception and the behaviour associated with it" (Walker i98ya, 274). 6 Testing the link between role and behaviour then becomes problematic. In the following analyses, roles will be identified by coding all the assertions that refer to the conceptions that decision makers hold of the duties and responsibilities of their state in the international system. The identification of the national roles will, therefore, be independent of each decision maker's definition of the concept itself. This approach is congruent with the definition of roles mentioned earlier. Now, content analysis itself is largely idiosyncratic. As Ole Holsti defined it, "Content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages" (Holsti 1969, 14). The emphasis is on imaginative procedures and new angles with which to probe a text, but also on objectivity and comprehensiveness. Content analysis relies on a series of judgments about the nature of the data, the choice of techniques, the categories used for coding, the coding itself, and the interpretation of what are often ambiguous results. This magnifies the risk of bias and the dangers of circularity and wishful thinking, thus putting a premium on the questions that are asked and on the rigour of the analysis. Within these limitations, our interpretation of the data will be limited to identifying trends (we will not speculate about the meaning of given numbers for a specific year or category) and ascertaining

13

Defining Foreign Policy Roles

which results are consistent with which hypothesis - without demonstrating a causal relationship. The data come from the foreign policy speeches of the principal decision makers. The number of speeches varies depending on availability, but at least eight speeches per year have been coded, and more often around ten. Thus, each case study draws from forty to sixty speeches.? The number and type of decision makers also vary according to each country's political system. The main players can be the president only (as in France), a prime minister and his minister of foreign affairs (as in Canada), or a host of golden advisers (as in the us). An effort was made to select only general foreign policy pronouncements, that is, those speeches that embraced a variety of issues. Some authors (e.g., Wish 1980) analysed the content of interviews and articles as well as speeches. Again, to minimize potential biases, we relied on speeches unless a dearth of material forced us to turn first to press conferences, then to interviews in rare cases. Finally, since only one coder was involved in each case, no question of internal coder reliability arose in any of the cases; however, there is an external reliability problem, since each analyst inductively constructed the categories used in the context of each country. This clearly limits the comparative analysis of the data, but an external template would have forced too many subjective choices, thereby rendering the results meaningless and impoverishing the national analyses. At this point, one encounters the usual objections to a focus on official speeches. These objections turn mainly around two observations: speeches are not written by the speaker, and their function is primarily instrumental. Accordingly, they could give no insight into the speaker's own mental representations of the problem he faces or of the norms that govern his or her reflection and actions. These observations, although accurate, do not invalidate the method. Not only do official speeches act as constraints on speakers through their impact on other actors' expectations, they also influence the speakers themselves (Snyder 1958, cited in Rosati 1987, 191-2). Further, no speaker can control the nature of his or her audience in an age of instant communication, when even obscure electoral speeches by Japanese politicians in a remote prefecture are given frontpage treatment in the American press. Thus, speeches cannot be tailored for a specific audience; this is especially true for the type of general policy speeches selected for this study. Moreover, speeches may be actually written by the speaker - think of Charles de Gaulle or Vaclav Havel, for example - or if not written by the speaker, compiled or revised by him or her. Thus, speech-writers do not put words in the speakers' mouth; rather, they express ideas and feelings better than the

14

Philippe G. Le Prestre

speakers would be able to articulate; they lend technical expertise rather than forge content. Finally, speeches seek to generate support, persuade citizens, and reinforce their beliefs, but they also can guide the government's actions. For example, Donald Regan, as Ronald Reagan's secretary of the Treasury, had to rely on a close reading of his president's speeches in order to infer the latter's preferred policy direction. Thus, even if speeches were crafted solely to manipulate opinion, they still could affect the government's actions significantly. Speeches may even loom a lot larger today in attempts to assess intentions and probabilities of actions "because the remaining ambiguities of the power balance are mostly in the area of will rather than capacity, and declaratory signals tend to determine the image of will ... [that] groups of adversary decision makers form of others" (Bell 1989, 23). As Abba Eban emphasized, "What statesmen and diplomats say is often as vital as what they do. It would not be far-fetched to go further and declare that speech is an incisive form of action" (Eban 1983, 393). And role conceptions shape it.

2. The Soviet Union/Russia: Which Past for Which Future? JEAN-FRANgOIS THIBAULT and J A C Q U E S L E V E S Q U E Russia and its empire have had different destinies - the end result of the Cold War was the defeat of the empire, which has, in turn, given way to the rebirth of Russia and of a new geopolitical round. - Malachenko 1990, 58

Throughout Eurasia, between 1989 and 1993, an entire universe collapsed and a new world came into existence. First came the peaceful dissolution of the Eastern European communist bloc in the fall of 1989, then the December 1991 breakup of the USSR. The aftermath of these events has been a state of great ambiguity closely linked to the redefinition of these new geopolitical spaces, to their identities, and to the status and specific role of each one against a profoundly modified international landscape. Admittedly, after Mikhail Gorbachev took power in March 1985, numerous significant changes were introduced. These bore witness to an in-depth revision of the priorities the USSR had assumed on the international scene and of the strategies which it would pursue. Noteworthy signals of a real desire for change were the unilateral 500,000troop reduction in its armed forces, withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the adoption of the double zero position on medium-range nuclear missiles - which all went beyond strictly practical considerations (Kartveli 1987, 568-9). Nevertheless, a turnaround in overall Western perception only came about with the surprising position taken by the USSR as the communist regimes of Eastern Europe collapsed in 1989. This position at once confirmed the demise of the Brezhnev doctrine. It also held out the perspective of a fundamental change in the strategies and objectives of Soviet international policy and in the role the USSR intended to assume on the international scene in the future. The breakup of the USSR itself in December 1991 shook the foundations of Eurasian international politics within a matter of months.

16 Jean-Francois Thibault and Jacques Levesque

In effect, although the Commonwealth of Independent States (cis) 1 had explicitly planned to maintain common foreign policy, defence, and economic structures, the main consequence of the breakup of the USSR has been to multiply the number of decision-making centres and to render the Eurasian political and strategic situation more confused than ever (Sheely 1992, 2,—3). In this light, there is little surprise in the crucial importance since 1992. of questions surrounding the role which Russia intends to assume both in this now-fragmented region and at the international level. After all, while the breakup of the Soviet empire posed significant challenges, dismantling the USSR in itself meant the supposed end of an era that had lasted several decades. In the attempt to determine the complex nature of these changes, several approaches were explored. Some scholars concentrated on outside factors to explain changes. Thus, according to Deudney and Ikenberry (1991-91), while the deep-seated causes behind the crisis experienced by the USSR may have originated domestically, the origins of Soviet responses were clearly external. These authors cite pressures exerted by the international environment as having constituted the main sources of change. In a similar perspective, other researchers focus more on the importance of the influence of liberal and democratic thought (Risse-Kappen 1991; Starr 1991; Snyder 1989) and on factors such as detente, the multiplication of transnational links between East and West, and the various processes surrounding the Helsinki Accords (Risse-Kappen 1991). The effects of certain internally originating or idiosyncratic factors were explored by other researchers. According to Stephen Meyer (1988, 127-8), for example, changes were not so much a result of personalities within the leadership (such as that of the secretarygeneral of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [cpsul), but rather a result of leaders' personal agendas, priorities, and views of what came before and what remained to be done. Jack Snyder (1987), for instance, defends the idea that the origins of fundamental doctrinal revisions (particularly with respect to security issues) must be sought in the significant growth of the intellectual class - which was generally insensitive to security issues - as well as in the gradual slide from an extensive to an intensive economy. Finally, beyond the more or less unavoidable dialectic of internal or external factors, the fundamental importance of the cognitive environment of the decision makers for understanding Soviet foreign policy (Kimberly Zisk 1990) and its mutations was also evaluated. Indeed, Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader since Lenin reputed to believe in the strength of ideas and in their great potential to transform (Bialer 1988, 82). Lynch (1989; 1991), for instance, maintains that the support

17 The Soviet Union/Russia

the Soviet elite lent to Gorbachev's re-evaluation of the role and international position of the USSR was critical to allowing change to take place. Blum (1993) defends the idea that both the content and structure of belief systems help us understand, to a significant extent, the changes brought about by Gorbachev. Finally, Stein (1994) illustrates how Gorbachev developed his representation of security issues inductively, through trial and error. Although each variable examined admittedly has elements to offer that are pertinent to the analysis of change in Soviet foreign policy, the truly subjective dimensions of an identity projected on the international scene are more difficult to discern, just as they would seem to be largely unavoidable. Thus, an approach based on roles should produce a partial explanation that takes into account such subjective comprehension. In this respect, public speeches allow the leadership to formulate political representations aimed at countering the uncertainty over identity that characterizes such periods of turbulence. After all, one of the goals of the state is to consolidate and legitimize its own identity at the international level. As one of the main instruments for the construction of reality, which is where interests are formed (Neumann 1994, 2), leaders' speeches on foreign policy play a functional role that is often neglected by researchers (Wendt 1992., 419-22). This, in turn, points to the undeniable heuristic interest that such an analysis of discourse offers as praxis. In this regard, the foreign policy discourse differs from those utterances that belong to the ideological discourse. More precisely, the foreign policy discourse is part of a broader type of discourse, which gives it a certain independence from the speaker. In this perspective, and within the context of the significant changes that have taken place on the Eurasian landscape since 1989, our purpose is to identify the evolution in the Soviet/Russian decision makers' perceptions of the role of their country. An exploratory attempt will also be made to identify the origins of this dynamic, that is, whether the operative factors are status or identity related. M E T H O D O L O GY

The corpus was composed of the unabridged content of thirty-seven speeches and interviews given by the presidents and ministers of foreign affairs of the USSR and Russia (see Table 2.1). It is the result of qualitatively selecting those documents deemed most significant.1 Since the objective of this study was not exclusively to detect regularities and recurrences in the discourse of the leadership, the effect of such a sampling strategy should be minimal. This sample was then divided into two sub-corpuses, covering the end of the USSR (January 1989-

18 Jean-Francois Thibault and Jacques Levesque Table z.i Attributes of the U S S R and Russia Corpus, 1989—93 Name

Speeches

Pages

Phrases

Mikhail Gorbachev Eduard Shevardnadze Boris Yeltsin Andrei Kozyrev

8 7 10 12

76 67 55 52

1,511 1,214 1,421 1,104

TOTAL

37

250

5,250

Words

Role

Status

Identity

34,541 27,812 26,803 23,808

120 113 84 111

40 10 21 37

105 47 102 46

112,964

428

110

298

December 1991) and the beginnings of Russia (January 1992,-December 1993) respectively. In light of the fundamental changes that took place in the USSR, the two sub-corpuses will be treated independently. The complete corpus totals over 250 pages of text, containing more than 110,000 words, and amounts to the equivalent of more than twentyfive hours of continuous oral expression. The identification of roles and the characterization of status and identity were carried out by manually coding sentences first isolated by their use of the following words: "we," "us," "our," "Soviet Union," "USSR," and "Russia." After the elimination of doubles and non-pertinent occurrences, 698 sentences (13 per cent of the total number) were retained, and the 836 assertions they contained (multiple assertions can be identified within the same sentence) were coded as role, status, or identity. On this empirical basis, the analysis attempts, first, to define the content of the main roles identified; second, to identify general trends; and, finally, to determine in a non-causal manner the effect of status and identity variables on both the definition and the evolution of these roles. In fact, what is important here is not so much the content in terms of the identity or status of the various roles, but rather the evolution of the relationship between roles, identity, and status. These status and identity variables were distinguished from each other by the use of internal/external criteria. While a definition of the identity category creates no real analytical problems, any definition of the status category raises the question of its relation to the affirmation of such an identity. Under the present analysis, the status assertions refer to the position of the country on the international scene, or to the relationship it maintains with any other state. Assertions about identity refer to the affirmation of an internal aspect of that great Eurasian power. Before proceeding with the analysis, however, it is important to review the main aspects of the international role played by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and the debate that followed it.

19

The Soviet Union/Russia

THE DEBATE OVER THE ROLE OF THE USSR AND RUSSIA

As the Soviet Union emerged victorious from the Second World War, the perils and setbacks it had encountered at different times since 1917 were relegated to the annals of history. The international successes experienced by the USSR at that time guaranteed it significant postwar political prestige (Levesque 1987). They translated into roles which Holsti (1970, 2.76) identified as anti-imperialist agent, defender of the faith, regional liberator, and guardian or example. These different roles continued to guide Soviet foreign policy into the early 19808. As that decade progressed, the two pillars on which the affirmation of these roles ultimately rested - ideology and military strength - started showing cracks and appeared ready to crumble (Adomeit 1995). With the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 to the position of secretary-general of the Communist Party of the USSR, a new international dynamic emerged, one based on interdependence and on the moral leadership of the Soviet Union. While the international position of the USSR was now a focal point in the process of change (to which various actions on the diplomatic front between 1987 and 1990 attest), debate over the new role that the USSR should assume only surfaced later and intensified starting in the summer of 1988. Within the government itself, discussion of the objectives and course of Soviet foreign policy took place during a conference of officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held in July 1988 (USSR 1990; Rahr 1989). Then, in 1989 the first signs of criticism of current Soviet foreign policy began to emerge (Bezroukov and Kortounov 1991). Until this point, criticism was essentially limited to events that had taken place under the former political regime, thus largely avoiding events that had occurred under Gorbachev (Roberts 1989). Observers now expressed the opinion that the Soviet leadership had taken its "new political thinking" too far (Kornienko 1989). One of the important catalysts for this new criticism was the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe - an event resented as a tangible loss for the USSR, which saw the military establishment unabashedly begin to join ranks with hard-line conservative critics (Romer 1991). According to one observer of the Soviet political scene, as events in Eastern Europe unfolded, "foreign policy, which had been the one realm of uninterrupted success under perestroika, [now] entered the sphere of political battle" (Jourkin 1990, 108). Noting the all-too-frequent tendency "to turn self-criticism into selfflagellation" and "to recognize errors while totally negating gains," some observers suggested that the USSR should continue to pursue the

2O Jean-Franc.ois Thibault and Jacques Levesque

role it had defended during the 19605, namely "countering the global imperialist offensive." In particular, they pointed out the need to abandon unconditional support for "unpopular regimes, movements and political parties," which could only limit Soviet leverage at the international level (Iziounov and Kortounov 1988, 45; Dashichev 1988). Others, however, believed that the foremost objective of the USSR should be to change the nature of its relationship with the West in order to participate more actively in the European security process (Kokochine 1990). Some even suggested that "outside the European context" the USSR needed "to align its positions with those of NATO member states" (Blagovoline 1991). After the abortive coup of August 1991, the USSR saw a succession of three different ministers of foreign affairs within weeks of each other,3 and by autumn 1991 Soviet foreign policy appeared to be on the verge of bankruptcy (Crow 1991; Adams 199ib). Indeed, it had become so ineffectual that Vitalii Churkin, chief spokesman for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, affirmed with little hesitation that "the time for a Union policy is past ... We are now crossing the boundary; we are going to have twelve states and twelve foreign policies" (UPI, i November 1991, quoted in Adams i99ib, 17). In the end, the tentative moves orchestrated by Russia to form a new union produced only a vague half-measure intended to fill in the resulting political vacuum left at the centre. From the very beginning, the course of Russian foreign policy showed a radical break with the agonizing policies of the USSR. This turnaround was, in fact, inspired by a strong dose of the idealism that characterizes revolutionary situations, itself reinforced by a consensus among supporters of Boris Yeltsin and by a decision-making system largely centralized around Yeltsin himself. This change was intended not only to free Russia from the historical constraints of a policy that was imperial in nature, but also to integrate the state into the so-called civilized world and reorient and consolidate what Andrei Kozyrev had only months earlier called Russia's "three concentric circles." This latter would involve three priorities: integration into the European economic and political space, establishment of friendly relations with the us, and normalization of bilateral relations with Japan. However, little time elapsed before criticism emerged over the objectives and orientations of this Westernist position, surely not a coincidence given Ukrainian independence and the rise of centrist groups in Parliament. Critics stressed that the expectations held by the leadership and their reliance on Western political and financial backing were unrealistic given the low probability of actual support and the strict

2i

The Soviet Union/Russia

conditions imposed by creditors. On a more fundamental level, they charged that an openly Westernist orientation would take place at the expense of Russian national interests. This would especially be the case with regard to Russia's relations with former Soviet republics and its status as a military superpower, already seriously compromised by nuclear arms control concessions. Consequently, three main groups have emerged. The radical liberals' position is close to Yeltsin's, and especially Kozyrev's; it will not be detailed here. The Eurasians form the second group. They are close to the centrists, take in three officially recognized political parties, and are particularly influential in Parliament. Their position - which runs counter to Kozyrev's - implicitly favours "enlightened" continuity with the Soviet past.4 It postulates the defence of Russian national interests independently of Western concerns. Accordingly, Russia would readjust its Westernist policies to suit the new Eurasian environment, and give priority to developing relations with cis member states, with the "near abroad," and with Eastern Europe. This would represent an about-face in priorities and is a thinly veiled critique of those who presided over the dismantling of the USSR and thus contributed to Russia's neglect of its geopolitical interests. In a document entitled Recommendations, for instance, the chairman of the Committee for International Affairs and External Economic Relations of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, Evgeni Ambartsumov, wrote that as the "internationally recognized inheritor of the USSR, the Russian Federation must be founded, in terms of foreign policy, on the doctrine which makes the entire geopolitical space of the former Soviet Union its vital sphere of interest (along the same lines as the us Monroe Doctrine in Latin America); [and] it must obtain recognition from the international community of its role as guarantor of political and military stability throughout the entire territory of the former USSR" (quoted in Eggert 1992., 6). Furthermore, the argument continues, Russian foreign policy must be aware of the secondary importance of the us in relation to Europe, and of the very relative importance of the West in relation to the East. The centrists maintain that the importance of the us in Russia's foreign policy will diminish in the long term, while that of Europe will increase proportionally. In addition, the openly Westernist position runs a strong risk of making Russia a mere junior partner of the us, as it bows to Western "recommendations."5 While the centrists do not question the importance of maintaining relations with the West, they hold that a sole Westernist option is simply not suited to the imperatives of the country's geographical

2,2, Jean-Frangois Thibault and Jacques Levesque

situation; by virtue of location, Russia is instead a Eurasian power with interests in both the West and the East. Thus, according to Sergei Stankevich (1992), "The mission of Russia in the world is to ... bring about and support a multilateral dialogue between cultures, civilizations and states ... Russia finds itself confronted with a new, historical challenge ... the resurgence of the Eastern question." Russia "includes the West, the East, the North and the South." Others respond that since Asia and Europe have already established significant links without Russian help, there is little real likelihood of Russia developing a role as an intermediary. In fact, Russia could only be a follower as relations between the West and the East develop. In the end, numerous arguments put forth in 1992. by centrist critics were eventually incorporated into the Russian foreign policy discourse of 1993. Yeltsin's parliamentary battles forced him both to modify his objectives in this area and to qualify the clearly pro-Western positions taken by Kozyrev. Finally, the third group takes in the neo-communists and an extremist, right-wing strain represented by such movements as Sobor and Pamyat or by the Liberal Democratic Party led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky. According to this group's position - whose importance was not felt until the final weeks of the period covered under study6 - Russia must take back the glory of the Slavic Empire (Varenik 1992, 2; Volodin 1992., 5). This imperialist and military current defends the idea of Russia not only consolidating but enlarging its sphere of influence at the expense both of minorities and of regional elites. For instance, supporters of this position have put forth the idea of leading a massive counter-intervention targeted at UN peacekeeping forces in the former Yugoslavia, in order to defend Russia's slavic brethren and comrades (Lynch and Lukie 1993). Still others have insisted on annexation of the Transdniestre Republic or intervention in the Baltic Republics in order to protect Russian national interests (Lebed 1993). Against this backdrop, we examine the hypothesis that whereas the duties and responsibilities of the Soviet Union would seem to originate in its international status as perceived by the leadership, those of Russia would originate primarily in identity about which Russia's leaders feel uncertain. The relationship between status and role where perception of status inspires the definition of duties and responsibilities - may have reversed since 1992., with the perception of identity now inspiring the definition of duties and responsibilities. Consequently, the scattering of roles since 1992 can be explained as a result of the identity deficit from which Russia now suffers.

13 The Soviet Union/Russia ANALYSIS OF THE ROLES EXPRESSED IN THE FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE

The USSR

Analysis of the roles of the USSR and Russia is based specifically on the references in the official discourse to the duties and responsibilities that the leaders invest in the state they represent at the international level. Six main roles emerge from the discourse of the Soviet leadership (see Table z.z). Table z.z Duties and Responsibilities as Expressed in Soviet Speeches, 1989-91 (absolute and relative [%] frequencies) Duties and responsibilities (roles) Promoter of arms control and disarmament International collaborator Reformer of the international order Reformer of the regional European order Defender of universal human values Supporter of international organizations Miscellaneous

1989

1990

1991

Total

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Ret.

Abs. Ret.

Abs. Rel.

32 22

29.9 20.6

17 12

23.9 16.9

20 11

36.4 20.0

69 45

29.6 19.3

22

20.6

9

12.7

9

16.4

40

17.2

12

11.2

17

23.9

4

7.3

33

14.2

9

8.4

4

5.7

6

10.9

19

8.1

4 6

3.7 5.6

11 I

15.5 1.4

1 4

1.8 7.2

16 11

6.9 4.7

Accounting for nearly 30 per cent of coded assertions, the role of promoter of arms control and disarmament assumed pre-eminence from 1989 onward, followed by the two other central roles that the Soviet leadership saw as its own, those of international collaborator and reformer of the international order. Together these three roles account for almost two-thirds of all assertions related to duties and responsibilities envisaged at the end of the Cold War, and illustrate both the cosmetic and fundamental change in Soviet politics and international diplomacy after the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev. The role of promoter of arms control and disarmament is referred to specifically by such statements as "The Soviet Union sees its aims as the strengthening of trust, the guaranteeing of predictability in military activity, and promotion of the arms limitation and disarmament

24 Jean-Francois Thibault and Jacques Levesque

process and of monitoring of compliance with obligations in this sphere" (Shevardnadze 19903). In essence, the logic behind this position is only partially attributable to the financial constraints faced by the USSR (Levesque 1995). On a fundamental level, it flows from a dynamic aimed at ending the East-West rivalry, the division of the European continent into antagonistic military blocs, and the legacy of the Cold War (Shevardnadze i99ob; Gorbachev 19893, i99ob). Thus, there is little doubt that this role was one manifestation of a desire by the USSR to change radically the nature of the international system, that is, that military and nuclear issues be taken out of the very conduct of international relations (Gorbachev i99ic; i99id) to leave behind what one observer aptly characterized as "strategic immobility" (Loumaye 1987, 486). Much along the same lines as arms control and disarmament efforts, the second most frequent role - international collaborator - signals the Soviet leadership's obvious wish to expand the international community and to master new forms of international cooperation. Thus, in the words of Shevardnadze (1989^, "Today we need a consensus, an international approach to global problems, not because it is a moral imperative, but for objective reasons, because the world is a single and interdependent whole, in which the so-called Third World is already playing and will continue to play an increasingly greater role." And he added, "This view of the situation in the world underlies our thinking as we propose to the international community a comprehensive program of global cooperation encompassing the totality of issues on its agenda." This desire for cooperation is little cause for surprise, given that, in Gorbachev's own words, "[we] ... want to be an integral part of modern civilization, to live in harmony with mankind's universal values, abide by the norms of international law, follow the 'rules of the game' in our economic relations with the outside world" (Gorbachev i99ib). Although ranking third in order of importance, with 17.2. per cent of all assertions under the USSR, the role of reformer of the international order would appear to follow logically from the two preceding roles. Indeed, promoter of arms control and disarmament and international collaborator in effect flow from a foreign policy strategy whose objective is specifically to build a "modern structure and a new machinery for managing relations among nations" (Shevardnadze 1989^. As Shevardnadze (i9$9b) pointed out before the United Nations: "In building new international relations our foreign policy looks ahead to a positive evolution of today's world and to its stability. The Soviet Union attaches fundamental importance to a transition from individual measures of confidence-building, openness and glasnost in international affairs to

2.5

The Soviet Union/Russia

a global policy of openness which would become an integral part of comprehensive security and international peace." Three other roles occur less frequently, making up less than 30 per cent of all assertions, yet remain significant: reformer of the regional European order, defender of universal human values, and supporter of international organizations. Pinpointing any priority or hierarchy in the political thinking of the leadership is indeed difficult when based solely on the frequency of themes related to roles and objectives as they appear in public discourse (Krasner 1978, 13-14). Although the role of reformer of the regional European order appears fourth in order of importance, with 33 assertions, it is indisputably linked to promoter of arms control and disarmament and to such themes as "a common European house" and "a revitalized CSCE." In particular, according to Gorbachev (19893): Within the framework of the new thinking we have started with a critical reinterpretation of our notion of military confrontation in Europe, the scale of the external threat, the importance of the factor of force, and the strengthening of security ... And our idea of a common European home serves this ... This idea is linked with our internal economic and political restructuring for which new relations were needed, above all in that part of the world in which we, the Soviet Union, belong, and with which we have been linked more than with any other in the course of centuries.

From this standpoint, the appearance of this role points to the importance for the USSR of institutionalizing security structures and of coming to terms with new formulae in the relations between states, which, in their own right, are a key element of Europe's political environment (Shevardnadze 19893; Gorbachev 199id). As Shevardnadze (i99ob) explained: "We are talking about setting up effective mechanisms for pan-European interaction which, taken as a whole, would allow the security of all peoples in Europe to be assuredly maintained ... History is granting [the USSR] a truly unique chance to construct the new European peaceful order in such a way that it becomes a model for the Europe of the zist century." At issue is the creation of a unified European space that would allow its various participants, in Gorbachev's (i99ic) words, to synchronize actions. Moreover, Gorbachev expresses a concrete desire to integrate the East European and Soviet economies into the European economic system and, incidentally, into the international economic system (Gorbachev 19893; 1989^. Fifth in order of importance, with 19 assertions, the role ofdefender of universal human values also appears to flow from the notion of

2.6 Jean-Frangois Thibault and Jacques Levesque

promoting a stable international order. Specifically, according to Shevardnadze (19893), this role attests to the difficulty in advancing "the real parameters of the human dimension far if we do not strictly observe in relations between states the principles of equality, freedom of choice, tolerance, mutual respect, and consideration of one another's interests." Finally, although last in order - with 16 assertions - the role of supporter of international organizations is nonetheless closely tied to the role of reformer of the international order, which specifically involves institutionalizing the importance of international organizations (Gorbachev i99ob). In spite of the relatively few references to this role, its presence points up the importance the USSR accorded international organizations in the context of peacekeeping and international security (Shevardnadze i99oc). In addition, this role points to the USSR'S desire to participate at a more active level in various international organizations in order to counterbalance the negative effects of Soviet disengagement and withdrawal from the international scene (Gorbachev i99ib) - the vacuum left by the Soviet Union having been filled in part by the us and by NATO. Russia In the wake of the various geopolitical changes that led to the December 1991 dismantling of the USSR, noticeable reversals inevitably took place in the role its successor now intended to assume. The duties and responsibilities of Russia (see Table 2.3) reflect an evident parcelling. Four roles seem to have defined the main directions of Russian foreign policy since 1992. and to illustrate aspects which at first glance might seem contradictory. On the one hand, the roles that rank first and second in order of importance are promoter of a regional geopolitical order and integrator of Russia into the Western world, while, on the other hand, those roles that rank third and fourth are promoter of international cooperation and protector of the Russian state and independant player. Together, these four roles account for almost 66 per cent of all assertions examined and constitute the bedrock of obligations and responsibilities for the Russian state according to its leadership. At the same time, implicit in this grouping are tensions faced by Russia during the first two years of its existence. In spite of Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's apparent lack of interest in the "near abroad" during the first months of the new Russia, the role of promoter of a geopolitical order quickly became central to the discourse of the Russian leaders. Indeed, as early as April 1992 Kozyrev (i992.b) stated to the Sixth Congress of the Russian Federation that "it

zy The Soviet Union/Russia Table 2.3 Duties and Responsibilities as Expressed in Russian Speeches, 1991-93 (absolute and relative [%] frequencies)

1993

1992

Total

Duties and responsibilities (roles)

Abs.

Rel.

Abs.

Rel.

Abs.

Rel.

Promoter of a regional geopolitical order Integrator of Russia into the Western world Promoter of international cooperation Protector of the Russian state and independent player Instrument for changing Russia Defender of democratic principles and human rights Supporter of international organization Supporter of arms control and disarmament Miscellaneous

22

16.3

12

20.0

34

17 A

23 20

17.0 14.8

9 11

15.0 18.3

32 31

16.4 15.9

23 12

17.0

8.9

8 8

13.3 13.3

31 20

15.9 10.3

12 12

8.9 8.9

6 1

10.0

1.7

18 13

9.2 6.7

6 5

4.5 3.7

4 1

6.7 1.7

10 6

5.1 3.1

is quite clear that we consider the preservation of friendly and fraternal relations between our states and peoples as one of the priorities of Russian international policy." More specifically, Kozyrev continued, this was a matter of transforming "the space the Commonwealth occupies into a region of good-neighbourliness and partnership, laying sound foundations of relations with the cis countries which could become a material factor ensuring the security of Russia in all spheres: military-political, economic, humanitarian, ecological, scientific-technical, and legal" (see also Yeltsin 19933). The clear objective here is to work towards the reconstruction of a common space under effective Russian military and strategic domination. In the same vein, this would necessarily include preserving the cis (Kozyrev 19923, i993d), which would be recognized as the main international organization responsible for security questions in the region, on the same footing as the United Nations or the CSCE (Yeltsin 19933). In this respect, the role of promoter of a regional geopolitical order became quickly indispensable to re-establishing Russia as a credible international power. Ambiguity results from the frequent juxtaposition of promoter of a regional geopolitical order with a second role, integrator of Russia into the Western world. From the very outset, Russia's leadership has not only accorded full priority to the latter, but given it heavy emphasis. Using an argument that has been qualified as pro-Atlantic (Stankevich 1992), during an April 1992 interview Kozyrev (19923) stated, "It

28 Jean-Francois Thibault and Jacques Levesque

seems obvious to me that Russia must join the club of the most dynamically developing democtatic states in order to occupy among them the fitting place that history and geography have ordained that we should hold." Also illustrating the importance of this role of integrator are the efforts at integrating Russia into the international economic system, as expressed by Yeltsin (1991): "We intend to enter the world economic system on an equal basis with all sovereign states. Hence our line of direct participation in international financial and trade organizations, agreements and conventions, and transforming our currency and foreign trade systems to bring them into line with international standards." The 1993 decrease in the number of assertions related to integrating Russia into the international system attests to a repositioning that Kozyrev started in the summer of 1992. in response to criticism of his blatantly Westernist policies. One apparent corollary to this repositioning was the 1993 increase of promoter of a regional geopolitical order, which may signal a concern for reaffirming Russia's traditional role in its historical zone of hegemony. In reality, these two roles manifest the very ambivalence of the Russian leadership in defining the priorities that are to guide Russia's new foreign policy. Other signs of obvious ambivalence are identifiable in the third and fourth roles Russia intends to assume at the international level. Promoter of international cooperation and protector of the Russian state and independent player, although not necessarily contradictory, both bear witness to upheavals in Russian foreign policy. In particular, they show a drift from 1993 onward between the notion of integration into the Western world and that of taking back the geopolitical space of the former USSR. Accordingly, while the ideas of partnership and cooperation defended by Yeltsin and, notably, by Kozyrev became more and more diluted, no longer serving as the backbone of Russian foreign policy, a new priority emerged. The necessity of politically reconstituting those regions traditionally within the spheres of influence of Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union now became a priority. Under these circumstances, and with the era of global confrontation having corne to an end (Yeltsin 1992^), the role of promoter of international cooperation gathers a total of 15.9 per cent of the assertions. This clearly signals the Russian leadership's desire to satisfy Russia's interests through cooperation, and supports the affirmation of the duties and responsibilities the Russian leadership has assumed in order to integrate Russia into the family of developed and democratic states (Kozyrev i993c). Thus, "Russia's place in the contemporary world is determined today not so much by its nuclear potential as by the fact

Z9 The Soviet Union/Russia

that it is carrying out a policy of confidence-building and cooperation" (Kozyrev 1992.!)). For its part, the role of protector of the Russian state and independent player - accounting for 15.9 per cent of all assertions - reveals the leadership's desire to preserve the individuality and identity of Russia while respecting its natural and historical characteristics (Yeltsin i99zb). Thus, "entering the world community, we wish to preserve our individuality, the particularities of our nature and our history, to develop our culture, and strengthen the moral bulwarks of the people" (Yeltsin 1992^). More specifically, the issue is one of eradicating "the remains of totalitarianism" (Yeltsin i993d) while preventing the breakup of Russia and the ensuing fragmentation into a handful of statelets at war with each other on the Yugoslav model (Yeltsin 1991; Kozyrev i99zb, 1992x5 Thibault and Levesque, 1996). Yeltsin (19923) presented the cis in that context, affirming that "in signing the Federal Treaty, every one of us is endorsing the will of the peoples to preserve Russia, its spiritual richness, and its unique place in the world community." The role ranking fifth in importance is instrument for changing Russia, at 10.3 per cent of all assertions. According to Kozyrev (19923), this role attests to the very essence of the concept of Russian foreign policy: "The essence of that concept can only be very simple. It consists of creating favourable conditions for the transformation of Russia." Days later, in a second address to the Sixth Congress of the Russian Federation, Kozyrev (i992c) continued: The priorities include the revival of Russia as a democratic and as a free country, ensuring suitable living standards for Russians, responsibility for maintaining the balance in global strategic stability, creating favourable external conditions for the strengthening of Russian statehood, the full and natural inclusion of the Russian Federation into the world community, ensuring the security of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, creating a dynamic market economy and democratic institutions, and protecting the rights of citizens especially of compatriots.

This role is a clear signal of a subordination of the imperatives of security to political and economic transformation. Yeltsin is especially clear in this respect when he asserts that "Russia's power is not measured against the number of its missiles but, rather, against the standard of living of its citizens" (quoted in Binette and Levesque 1993, 52.). The role ranking sixth - at 18 assertions, or 9.2 per cent - is defender of democratic principles and human rights. It points directly to the need for Russia to adopt a civilized standard of behaviour i

30 Jean-Francois Thibault and Jacques Levesque

accordance with efforts to establish and cultivate a partnership with the "civilized world." This role illustrates the desire to guarantee and defend human rights against various manifestations of aggravated nationalism (Kozyrev 1992!}). Although seventh in importance, the role of supporter of international organizations appears to be an indispensable corollary both to the emergence of a true new world order and to the desire expressed by Russia to give its full attention to multilateral institutions rather than to bilateral relations (Kozyrev 1992^. Accordingly, while addressing the United Nations General Assembly in September 1992, Kozyrev stated: "For the first time in history, there are unprecedented opportunities to put into effect the principles proclaimed by the United Nations. The postconfrontation, postcommunist world is no pax Sovietica, pax Americana, pax Islamica, or some other monopolized system. It is a multipolar unity in variety, as initially symbolized by the United Nations Organization ... Russia is aiming at acting in support of the UN efforts to achieve the twin goals of democratizing societies and renovating international relations." Under Russian foreign policy, the United Nations, NATO, the CSCE, and the cis become the focal points of a new world order (Kozyrev 19936). Last, compared with the prominence it held in the Soviet discourse, the role of supporter of arms control and disarmamentreceives limited attention and is clearly subordinate to internal considerations (Binette and Levesque 1993, 52,-^). This role shows the responsibility that Russia assumes for maintaining strategic stability. The agreements reached between the us and Russia, therefore, concerned "radical cuts in strategic nuclear weapons and on a global defense system signified a turn from playing 'nuclear roulette' towards cooperation in the interests of strategic stability for all and with the participation of all interested states" (Kozyrev i99id). Specifically, according to Yeltsin (i992c), "The quicker we eliminate the rudiments of confrontational thinking, the more effective our cooperation will become and the more reliable control over the nuclear and military technical potential will be." The dangers of horizontal proliferation resulting from the dismantling of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and expertise assumed renewed importance in this context. A N A L Y S I S OF STATUS AND

IDENTITY

The Status of the USSR Five categories for status were identified for both the USSR and Russia (see Table 2.4). The importance of new member of the international

Table 2.4 References to Status in Soviet and Russian Speeches, 1989-93 (absolute and relative [%] frequencies)

Status New member of the international community Collaborator/partner Independent and influential player Great power Excluded from the international system Miscellaneous

1989

1990

1991

Subtotal

1992

1993

Subtotal

Total

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Rel.

8 6 3

36.4 27.3 13.6

3 5 3

18.7 31.3 18.7

6 3 2

43.0 21.4 14.3

17 14 8

32.7 26.9 15.4

15 8 7

39.5 21.1 18.4

7 4 4

35.0 20.0 20.0

22 12 11

37.9 20.7 19.0

39 26 19

35.5 23.6 17.3

2 2

9.1 9.1

3 nil

18.7

1 1

7.1 7.1

6 3

11.5 5.8

5 2

13.1 5.3

3 2

15.0 10.0

8 4

13.8 6.9

14 7

12.7 6.4

1

4.5

2

12.6

1

7.1

4

7.7

1

2.6

1

1.7

5

4.5

nil

32. Jean-Francois Thibault and Jacques Levesque

community (it ranks first each year except in 1990) reflects the nature of the relations between the Soviet Union and the West, which acquired, in Gorbachev's (1989^ words, "both a new format and a new content." The shift visible here is from coexistence and confrontation to a state of relations based on interaction and cooperation, which evinces a clear change in the leaders' perception of the USSR'S new status as a collaborator on the international scene (Gorbachev 199ic). The Soviet leadership undoubtedly gave much importance to participating in the international system on an interactive and cooperative basis far removed from the mere coexistence characteric of the pre-Gorbachev era. Second in order of importance, the collaborator/partner category reinforces and gives tangibility to an expression of status as new participating member in the international system. It also underscores that normalizing and cultivating relations with countries beyond Europe effectively enable more extensive international cooperation, mutual comprehension, and even partnership.7 Thus, "for all the advancement of our relations with Europe, further normalization and improvement of USSR-US relations has a multifaceted, truly global significance" (Gorbachev 1989^. Third in importance, independent and influential player refers not only to the USSR'S unique position in the international system, but also to its resultant responsibility of maintaining international stability and security. Thus, according to Gorbachev (1989^, the position of the USSR as one of the world's most powerful states does not confer privilege but, instead, establishes its specific responsibility to maintain and reinforce peace. In addition, this claim reveals the positive perception of the external impact of perestroi'ka, as felt not only within the USSR but at the international level - especially in Eastern Europe where the Soviet Union now appears as an example (Gorbachev i989b). Consequently, while addressing the Forty-fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Shevardnadze (i99oc) stated: "That this process is accompanied by certain difficulties and even losses should be no reason for excessive alarm, because the Soviet people and the democratic forces that are assuming responsibility for the future of our union are aware of the Soviet Union's place in the world and of its responsibility for the maintenance of global security." While the affirmation of great power status appears only fourth in order of importance, at 11.5 per cent of the subtotal of assertions, it permeates the discourse of the leadership. According to Gorbachev (1989^, "It is a fact that the USSR and the us are two major and the most powerful states in the modern world." On another occasion he

33

The Soviet Union/Russia

exclaimed (19916), "Our state will remain great and [will] preserve its role and responsibility in world affairs." Last appears a perceived status based on rejection - that of excluded from the international system. While accounting for only three assertions, this status reveals a difficulty still experienced by the USSR in having its goodwill recognized, in spite of both a clear tendency to cooperate and the benefits it has derived from its initiatives. In addition, the uncertain results of internal changes associated with perestroika remain a source of concern (Gorbachev 19896). Consequently, according to Gorbachev (19893), on the basis of obsolete stereotypes, "some people continue, though to a lesser extent, to suspect the Soviet Union of hegemonistic plans and of intentions of tearing the United States away from Europe." The Status of Russia In a manner more dramatic than in the case of the USSR, the status category that emerges first in importance for Russia as a state is new member of the international community. This claim stems from the will of the Russian leadership to leave behind the historical conflicts with the United States. According to Kozyrev, "We have simply no insurmountable disagreements or conflicts of interests with this category of countries, indeed, we have every possibility of having friendly relations and in the long term even alliance relations with them" (Kozyrev 19913; see also Yeltsin I992C; Kozyrev 1992^). In particular, Kozyrev emphasizes that the new Russian foreign policy is, from this point on, in the hands of "people who are free of obligations or debts to the communist past" (Kozyrev I99zg; see also Binette and Levesque I993> 5*)The second status category, that of collaborator/partner, complements the preceding claim. Here the leadership presents Russia as an "honest and reliable partner" (Yeltsin 19933) with whom Western countries should cooperate out of their own economic and security interests on the basis of established international legal norms (Yeltsin 19933; Kozyrev 19936). Ranking third in order of importance, the independent and influential player category refers to the unique status Russia now holds at the international level. Such status would allow Russia to pursue and act according to "its national-state interests and not according to 3 pattern which was forced upon it" (Yeltsin 1991). At the end of his address to the Fifth Congress of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), Yeltsin (1991) exclaimed: "I appeal to the world community. Russi3 is carrying out reforms in its own interests and not

34 Jean-Frangois Thibault and Jacques Levesque

under pressure from outside. Help from the world community could substantially ease our progress along this path, and speed up reforms. Russia is not begging for handouts. What we want is cooperation and partnership." Reflecting to a certain extent an affirmation of Russia's status as an independent and influential player, the status category that ranks fourth is normal, non-aggressive great power - a great power that is at once conscious of its responsibilities and attentive to its own national interests (Kozyrev i99zd): "It is not all that easy to become a normal great power, and the world sees Russia precisely as a great power. Instead of being a superpower, the USSR, based on a military threat, we must become a normal power that is based not on threats but at the same time is able to live in a world in which there are conflicts" (Kozyrev 19923; see also Kozyrev 1993d). The last status category, excluded from the international system, is indicative of the fears held by Russia's leadership. In one interview, for instance, Kozyrev (19923) emphasized that the risk of exclusion from the international system remained the most significant danger Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to confront after the breakup of the Soviet Union. As in the case of the Soviet leadership, affirming such a status of exclusion reveals the still considerable difficulty in normalizing relations with the West. The Identity of the USSR References to identity are of unquestionable importance in the official discourse: 303 assertions were identified and coded into six categories (see Table 2.5). The affirmation of a democratic identity by Soviet and Russian leaders provides little cause for surprise - statements to this end account for 45 assertions, or nearly 30 per cent of the cumulative subtotal for the USSR, and 32 assertions, or 21.6 per cent of the cumulative subtotal, for Russia. Under either leadership, legitimacy is closely linked to shared democratic values and to the diversity of objects covered by this notion. In particular, as viewed by Shevardnadze (19893, 1989^ 1989^, the general behaviour of the Soviet Union reflects a new democratic essence that necessitates a transformation of the Soviet state into a new model, one based on the rule of law, allowing nations to unite on a fundamentally new basis. Accordingly, he would point to the revolutionary nature of changes under way and use this fact to underscore the irreversibility of democratic reforms underlying Soviet diplomacy (Shevardnadze 19893), now a clearly visible reality (Gorbachev 1989^.

Table 2..5 Identity in Soviet and Russian Speeches, 1989-93 (absolute and relative [%] frequencies) 2989

2990

2992

Subtotal

2992

2993

Subtotal

Total

Status

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Kg/.

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Re/.

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Rel.

Democratic essence Revolutionary period Openness to the outside world Bitter heritage Great potential General characteristics

16 23 12 6 3 4

22 24 14 17 16 13

10 10 8 4 4 6

32 34 22 21 20 19

77 75 53 35 29 34

25.0 35.9 18.8 9.4 4.7 6.2

6 5 8 2 5 3

20.7 17.2 27.6 6.9 17.2 10.4

23 13 11 6 1 8

37.1 21.0 17.7 9.7 1.6 12.9

45 41 31 14 9 15

29.0 26.5 20.0 9.0 5.8 9.7

20.8 22.6 13.2 16.0 15.1 12.3

23.8 23.8 19.1 9.5 9.5 14.3

21.6 23.0 14.9 14.2 13.5 12.8

25.4 24.0 17.5 11.5 9.6 11.2

36 Jean-Francois Thibault and Jacques Levesque

From this perspective, Shevardnadze would have spoken these remarkable words in an address to the United Nations General Assembly: "We in our country are not just repainting the facade but rebuilding the entire structure, in which the rules of living together must and will be based on the supremacy of law, people's power, openness to the outside world, inter-ethnic harmony, and friendship" (Shevardnadze I98t)b). Also marked among the Soviet leadership is the perception of living through a period characterized by transition - even revolutionary in nature - a perception closely related to the affirmation of a democratic identity. Thus, according to Shevardnadze: "This parliament ..., by the whole course and content of its work, attests to the revolutionary nature of the transformations taking place in our country ... Times are changing, and our priorities are changing; our view of problems is changing, too, our ideas about the challenges which are set for us, and about the possibilities for responding to these challenges" (Shevardnadze 19893). In addition, according to Gorbachev: "We have started and are moving along the path of perestroi'ka of society and new stages of economic, political, and legal reform, and the transformation of the Soviet federation lies ahead" (Gorbachev 1989^. Ranking third in order of importance is the affirmation of an identity characterized by openness to the outside world, which points to the importance accorded to the international system by a Soviet leadership anxious to see its efforts at reconstruction succeed. Consequently, such openness towards the outside world is cast in terms of the influence exercised by perestroi'ka on the development of the international system and of Eastern Europe in particular. Thus, "they proceed in the same mainstream as our perestroi'ka", according to Gorbachev (1989^, which points up a desire by the Soviet leadership to share their "historic optimism," in Shevardnadze's (1989^ words, "by all those who understand that the destinies of the world are inseparable from the future of our perestroi'ka." Of minor importance in the discourse is the burden of historical pessimism and of a bitter heritage. On the whole, the Soviet leadership simply sees these factors as another reason to carry on. Consequently, although the leadership is still confronted with this heritage, and in spite of the fact that society is particularly sensitive to such a historical reality, "in every sphere of the common life of our state and our people, the national economy, the political system and the people's intellectual endeavour, rejection of the ossified relics of the past goes hand in hand with the enthusiasm of new construction" (Shevardnadze 1985^). The burden of the past is clearly met with an enthusiasm for a new beginning; this mood is illustrated by the conviction

37 The Soviet Union/Russia

that the USSR has great potential - "Our country, while remaining great, has become different and will never again be the same" (Gorbachev i99oc). Russia's Identity In an apparent reflection of the parcelling of the duties and responsibilities assumed by the leadership, Russia's identity assertions clearly exhibit a greater variety than in the case of the USSR. The identity category ranking first in importance is that which places Russia in a revolutionary period characterized by considerable agitation as well as by a strong sense of dire necessity. Thus, any delay in strengthening freedom and democracy can throw society back ... We must carry through unprecedented reforms in an economy that over seven decades was stripped of all free market mechanisms, establish the foundations of democracy, and restore the law-governed state in a country that for decades was poisoned with social confrontation and political oppression ... We have no right to fail in this most difficult task; we do not have another chance like in sports. Our predecessors have used them all up. That is why the reforms must be carried through against all odds. (Yeltsin 1992^)

The reasons behind such sentiments are numerous. As Yeltsin remarked at a press conference: "There were many attempts in the past to carry out reforms in Russia. During its long history, there were more failures than successes. Such is the particular feature of our country, that reforms cannot just proceed along the highway but must move along a narrow, perilous, mountain path, fraught with the danger of slipping and falling into the abyss of revolution or troubles" (Yeltsin 1993^. Mirroring troubled sentiments of this sort, which are directly linked to a nightmare scenario according to Yeltsin (1992^), the affirmation of a democratic identity under construction emerges as the second most frequent identity category. By holding out new opportunities, it represents a crystalization of various hopes: "The present democratic Russian state was born in the victory over the Cold War. This is one of its most important results. To a certain extent this is a factor of the changeover of our world from confrontation to cooperation" (Yeltsin i993d). Hardly surprising is the importance accorded to a past often characterized negatively, since the task is "to regain possession of ourselves ... to revive Russian statehood virtually from scratch" (Yeltsin 1993^. This burden of the past came from a long totalitarian century which,

38 Jean-Frangois Thibault and Jacques Levesque

according to Kozyrev (i^^zd), at once "deprived Russia of its irreplaceable identity and of the opportunity to fulfil itself in contacts with other peoples. By locking itself away, the richest country in Eurasia has been turned into the sick man of Europe and Asia." By contrast, only openness to the world - the third theme in terms of identity - will allow Russia to discover and fully assume the unique role offered it by history. Thus, Yeltsin would postulate the matter as Russia returning "to its history and national identity" (195^) - of which totalitarianism had deprived it. Finally, ranking last among identity categories, is the idea of Russia developing its vast potential. In this respect, according to Yeltsin, "Russia has on more than one occasion in her rich history demonstrated that at periods of harsh trials she is capable of mobilizing her will, her vast energies, talents, and resources, and picking herself up and regaining her strength" (Yeltsin 1991). CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of the perceptions held by the Soviet and Russian leaderships of the duties and responsibilities, status, and identity of their respective powers between ^89 and 1993 has clarified the nature of the profound upheavals that beset the Eurasian geopolitical sphere during this period. The same upheavals subsequently exerted a substantial impact on the relationship between these new geopolitical spaces and the international environment. Thus, what clearly emerges from this analysis is that while the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 precipitated an important crisis over the status that the USSR intended to assume at the international level, the effective breakup of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 brought about an important identity crisis. This crisis will undeniably be reflected in the new Russian leadership's definition of its international duties and responsibilities. The present analysis suggests that the definition of roles will reflect interrogations about status in the case of the Soviet Union, and about identity in the case of Russia. Indeed, the foreign policy discourse is heavily dependent on the dialectical relation that exists between the status vested in a state and the identity that it assumes. A state's duties and responsibilities ond the international stage result from the friction inherent in the identity-status dialectic. Consequently, the significant status deficit from which the USSR suffered from 1989 onward - from which Russia's identity suffered directly starting in 1992. - is expressed in a significant dispersion of roles. The Russian foreign policy discourse clearly appears less uniform

39 The Soviet Union/Russia

than that of the Soviet Union, and takes in various contradictory aspects. This, no doubt, mirrors Russian society itself, in which tensions resulting from the rapid socio-political changes reflect uncertainties about national identity or status. Under these circumstances, the disappearance of the Soviet roles identified by K.J. Holsti (1970) is hardly surprising. In fact, the essence of the roles assumed by the Soviet Union and identified by Holsti was contingent on the reproduction of an identity and a status resulting from a situation of confrontation. This specific context, however, was shattered in 1989. In addition, the hypothesis put forth by Holsti (1970, 283) of a structuring of roles based to a certain extent on the external involvements of states makes sense under the present analysis. Effectively, the scattering of roles assumed by Russia in 1992-93 attests to a certain destructuring, which is a clear reflection of international disengagement.

3 Articulating the New International Role of the United States during Previous Transitions, 1916-1919, 1943-1947 JEAN-RENE CHOTARD

"Our isolation was ended twenty years ago," declared President Woodrow Wilson in 1919 in a speech meant to convince Congress of the need for the United States to accept both the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations (Wilson I9i9d, 436). By seizing Spain's last overseas possessions, the us had made its presence on the international scene an established fact. Under the Wilson presidency the first great period of us foreign involvement began, and by overcoming an aggressor, the Americans earned a great power status that equalled their economic might. At the same time, their engaging in conflict opened debate over the international role the us would assume. The president would attempt, unsuccessfully, to convince both Congress and the general public that the nation could not withdraw from the international scene and had to take on the mission of reorganizing the international system. Two decades later the us would be drawn onto the world stage by declarations of war, and Franklin Roosevelt and then Harry Truman would take on the same challenge as their predecessor, but now the United States would assume its role of superpower and undertake to restructure international relations. The present chapter examines the three presidents' efforts to win over policy makers and see the us assume its rank. Both from 1916 to 1918 and from 1939 to 1945, tne us widened the debate over its involvement in international affairs, although with differing emphases. The question of national identity would weigh heavily. Should the us actively promote the unique experience of the American nation as an

4i

The New International Role of the United States

example to the world, or would this very uniqueness prove so exceptional that maintaining isolationism would be justified? While persistent under Wilson, the debate would shift focus with each of his successors. A selection of presidential speeches for each period will clarify both the positions taken and how references to role, identity, and proposed reform of the international system were articulated. Both Wilson and Roosevelt used the us's status as a major power outside Europe to affirm a role of balancer, propose mediation, and dispatch collaborators of their own. From 1914 until 1916, Colonel Edward House carried out contact missions between the capitals of the warring parties. During the winter of 1939-1940, Sumner Welles successively visited London, Berlin, Paris, and Rome for the same reasons. In varying ways the United States found itself plagued by a state of dual uncertainty, both internal and systemic. While the influence of progressive forces caused concern from 1916 to 1918, worry over economic recovery persisted from 1939 to 1945. DEFINING A ROLE UNDER WILSON The Road to Versailles Before 1914 us policy makers held a certain image of their country but had not come to a consensus over the role it should assume. The famed idea of the end of the frontier refers to a mission that was to become known as Manifest Destiny, which drew justification from the ideology of social Darwinism. Pamphleteers called for us expansion the same year the Philippines were taken. Such notions remained vague, however, and the 1912 presidential election focused on internal issues. Thus, the United States was presented, as ever, as a source of inspiration, holding out to the world "the light which shall shine ... and guide the feet of mankind to the goal of justice and liberty and peace" (Knock 1992, 20). On an even more ethereal note, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan spoke of Christian pacifism. External factors did not immediately disturb Wilson's serenity, but his timely and mild reaction towards Mexico would reveal the profound differences that existed within the political class. Contrary to the caution shown by Wilson, a more activist-oriented concept was making inroads and would finally manifest itself as the preparedness option under Cabot Lodge and a wing of the Republican Party. While for two years Wilson attempted to preserve American neutrality during the First World War, the same period witnessed a widening

42. Jean-Rene Chotard

of the debate over two conceptions of the u s international role - that of the conservatives and that of the progressive internationalists. The conservative internationalists were subdivided into legalists, such as Elihu Root, and partisans of arbitration, such as William H. Taft, who, in the summer of 1915 in Philadelphia, founded the League to Enforce Peace, which called for American participation in an international league after the war. Nearly all of them, however, were confirmed imperialists who had supported the Anglo-American alliance since the 18905. The progressive internationalists, on the other hand, came from varied backgrounds. They included liberals such as Oswald G. Villard of the New York Evening Post, feminists such as Jane Addams, and socialists such as Eugene Debs. They combined internal social action with a program for constructive peace, calling for an immediate armistice, agreements to limit armaments, machinery for arbitration, selfdetermination, and a concert of nations. Obviously, at the beginning of 1916, the Americans viewed their identity in particularly high esteem and as being filled with advantage; still, the political class had not yet clearly defined a role for the us. On 6 January of the same year, Wilson announced a new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, one in the form of a Pan-American pact; thus, while the Monroe Doctrine had flourished under T. Roosevelt, mapping out a zone reserved for us imperialism, it would lose its aspect of domination. However, action carried out by an American detachment on Mexican territory, against Pancho Villa's forces, made clear that Washington intended to remain a regional leader. On xj May 1916, before the League to Enforce Peace, Wilson gave his first major speech pertaining to the international situation and to the postwar period. In effect, the spring 1916 context had presented the American leadership with a unique occasion to express itself: while tensions with Germany over submarine warfare had subsided, American public opinion regarding England had chilled following both the brutal repression in Ireland and inspections of neutral ships on the high seas by the Royal Navy. Against this backdrop, Wilson chose to outline an international role that would gather a consensus among American policy makers. The presence of former president Taft, and notably that of Senator H. Cabot Lodge, at the address underscored the importance of this first proclamation of a form of collective security to be sought at the end of the war. In that speech, Wilson stresses the image of quiet force that he calls "our moral and economic strength, even our physical strength." In essence, though, the text concentrates on the commitment that the us would have to make on the international scene, affirming the necessity of American involvement. The impossibility of Americans'

43

The New International Role of the United States

remaining "mere disconnected lookers on" and the fact that they were "participants in the life of the world" appear compelling arguments in favour of involvement. Thus, Wilson emphasizes that he "did not come here to discuss a program" - and continues - "fbut] only to avow a creed and give expression to the confidence I feel." This major statement sets the role of the us in terms of duties and responsibilities. For instance, according to Wilson, in the interest of civilization it is "our duty to speak very frankly." The war, he continues, would have in the end "at least disclosed a great moral necessity." Furthermore, he asserts that the establishment of a new set of international relations "constitutes a chief part of the passionate conviction of America." This essentially moral conviction, according to Wilson, is founded on a vision of the us serving as a reference for the rest of the world. Wilson does not urge his country to assume active leadership here; rather, he would seem to imply that the role of the us as tribune and agent of universal values would gain influence if "the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations." Reactions to the speech signalled that it was perceived as a major policy statement. Walter Lippmann called it "the most important diplomatic event that our generation has known" (Knock 1992., 77). While such unanimity would suggest the emergence of a common perception of the international situation, no such consensus had in fact formed. Election-year partisan antagonism eventually obscured foreign problems and focused attention on internal issues. When, at the beginning of 1916, Wilson gave a speech in Nebraska concerning a league of nations, he was actually attempting to firm up support for his candidacy among internationalists. Between a lack of interest in foreign affairs among a majority of his fellow citizens and accusations of weakness from conservative internationalists, he would nevertheless continue to focus on international mediation. Wilson's 18 December 1916 note - "Appeal for a Statement of War Aims" — does not indicate a marked evolution when compared to speeches he had given that had called for an end to the war and for the establishment of both a treaty and a "covenant." In this note, Wilson stresses that the us should retain its role of mediator. Once again he situates this role on a moral plane and speaks of duty. This text is noteworthy both for its content and for the reaction it elicited. The appearance of unanimity after the May speech fractured. Senators Cabot Lodge and Borah criticized the attempt at preserving a balance between the French-British entente and the central empires, and distanced themselves from the idea of the us belonging to a league of nations seemingly backed by the president.

44 Jean-Rene Chotard

Wilson's December note was followed by his crucial address to the Senate on 22 January 1917. In the speech, Wilson outlines under which conditions the us could enter a league of nations and defines a "peace without victory" that would recognize equality among nations. The speech is in keeping with that given in May before the League to Enforce Peace in that the president calls for an end to the war without there having been direct American involvement. However, it also signals a certain shift. Wilson associates the us identity with the role that it should assume at the international level: "The duty of our government to lay afresh a new plan," according to Wilson, was linked to the "principles and purposes of that policy since the day they set a new nation." Under such a peace, the Americans "cannot in honour withhold the service to which they are challenged ... That service is to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice." These statements, therefore, shed the role of arbitrator; the us could no longer remain a mere listener, but had to put solutions forward. In this case, the main components of the American identity constituted a model: "political faith and practical convictions which the people of America once embraced ... are the elements of that peace." The recognized strength of the American identity thus became the argument justifying a transformation from a role of arbitrator to that of source of inspiration, and even leadership. Re-election then allowed President Wilson to voice the aspect of this role that only the us could assume: "Perhaps I am the only person in high authority amongst all the peoples of the world who is at liberty to speak and hold nothing back ... I hope and believe that I am speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation" (Wilson 19173). At eight different points throughout this speech, American national identity is associated with the role the country could play. While presented as "a fulfilment of all that we have professed or striven for," the role is summarized as a collection of "American principles ... that are the principles of mankind and must prevail." While the press responded with enthusiasm, divisions among policy makers would become public knowledge. Borah, for instance, questioned the role favoured by the president by introducing an isolationist motion in the Senate. Both reactions such as this and the intensification of submarine warfare would radically modify the parameters of the debate over the international role the us was to assume. Wilson's 2 April 1917 address before Congress - which had gathered for an emergency sitting - marked a clear turning-point; the foreign factor had suddenly become dominant. By requesting that

45

The New International Role of the United States

Congress recognize the existence of a state of emergency between the us and the German Empire, Wilson speaks with a sense of urgency on a new aspect of the role that the us would have to hold, stating that "our object now [...] is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world." Entering the war would thus void the role of arbitrator and force the us to redefine its role as a source of inspiration and as a potential leader. Its new role in this conflict, "provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties and of little groups of ambitious men," would thus be that of catalyst and integrator in a new international system - "a steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations." Entering the war would mean participating in the founding of a league in the postwar period. At the end of a four-day debate, Congress voted overwhelmingly in favour of Wilson's declaration of war, although two dissident positions emerged. On the one hand, dissidence - or at least doubt - over participation in the war was raised by certain elected officials and by socialists; on the other hand, although still embryonic in April 1917, opposition was raised over making a league of nations a final objective of participation in the war. Wilson's 14 June 1917 Flag Day address complements his address to Congress six weeks earlier. Solemn yet moderate in tone, the speech announces "a people's war." Most remarkable is the fact that two aspects of the role presented here - defender and catalyst - had been suggested in April without direct reference to national identity. Effectively, however, the Flag Day address associates identity and role. "This flag is the emblem of our unity, our power, our thought and purpose as a nation ... The choices are ours." Still, the role presented by Wilson throughout the text relates to military involvement, "in defense of our rights as a free people and of honour as a sovereign government." As in the address before Congress, although Wilson stressed the military aspect of the role, the general public - which would read only fragments of the text - would see the role of the us summarized as a commitment to "bid thousands, hundreds of thousands, it may be millions of our men ... to go forth and die beneath [the flag] far away." While Wilson's 12 December 1917 State of the Union address and his subsequent i4-point speech also serve to justify us involvement, both role and identity again overlap. Thus, according to the president, through its role the us expressed American identity. In Wilson's own words, "We can do this with all the greater zeal and enthusiasm because we know that for us this war is a war of high principles ... [and] we

46 Jean-Rene Chotard

can fight, but for nothing less noble or less worthy of our traditions." The i4-point speech on 8 January 1918 was also immediately welcomed as being of crucial importance. It explores a number of specific solutions for bringing stability to Europe. It also provides a response to the volatile situation on the Eastern front, where the principles from which the new Bolshevism drew its power were in confrontation with the logic behind German military advantage. This first American plan for revising the practice of international relations put forth the role of catalyst. By disseminating its values at the international level, the us would remain faithful to its own identity while affirming its leadership position. The same speech also signals the reaffirmation of support for progressive internationalism, and both Democrats and Republicans expressed approval. A New York Times editorial titled "The President's Triumph" was one sign of the broad American consensus that had emerged. In the speeches taken from the latter half of 1918, Wilson leans resolutely towards a role of peace builder, or catalyst. The Independence Day speech at Mount Vernon points to the lessons the us held "for all mankind" and again shows identity and role overlapping. The address at the Metropolitan Opera House on 27 September focuses both on the postwar period and on the role of the us as a source of inspiration for the democratic principles that it endorsed. As a nation built without an upper class, the us could serve as a guide for establishing a new peace, of which "the instrumentality is a league of nations formed under covenants." When he visited Europe the president could appreciate firsthand the outpouring of admiration he had provoked. On 28 December 1918 he gave a brief yet critical speech at Guildhall in London. As a symbol of the American identity himself, Wilson lays out the fundamental principles that would have to guide the us in its role as negotiator. He had previously denounced traditional forms of diplomacy, having promised in a speech given 4 December 1917 that there would be no repeat of the Vienna conference. This time he reiterates emphatically that "there must now be not a balance of power, but a single powerful group of nations." This group, including the us, would assume a role as "trustee of the peace of the world." In fact, until the end of 1918 Wilson continued to stress ever increasingly in his speeches the necessity of the us assuming a role among the great powers. While his opinion on a covenant was not yet defined at this point, in spite of the i4-point speech, he conveyed the conviction that an international role as catalyst and integrator had become indelibly linked to the American identity.

47 The New International Role of the United States After Victory: Consensus-Building Failure Up to the peace negotiations in Europe, the course steered by Wilson rested on a fragile consensus that he attempted to consolidate internally by constantly drawing on the American identity, and particularly on the conviction that the American experience had a universal appeal. Wilson also followed the evolution of the foreign situation closely, watching events in Russia with interest. The October Revolution was difficult for American policy makers to comprehend fully, but the Bolshevik takeover seemed to announce a new kind of international relations. Both the 8 November decree of the Petrograd soviet calling for "immediate negotiations for a just and democratic peace" and the publication of secret agreements were quite unexpected. Alluding to these events in a speech given 14 December, Wilson exclaims, "All of these things have been true ... and if they had been made plain at the very outset, the sympathy and enthusiasm of the Russian people might have been once and for all enlisted on the side of the allies ... and a real and lasting union of purpose effected." Arno Mayer, William Appelman Williams, and revisionist historians have all stressed how much the contents of the i4-point speech may well have been formulated in response to the Russian Revolution. After all, Wilson points to "a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of purpose. It is the voice of the Russian people." One might ask whether such references to revolutionary situations indicate a recognition by Wilson of convergence, or whether the president referred to foreign elements in order to allay reservations expressed closer to home by the progressive internationalists over the us entering the war. However, the revolution of which Wilson speaks concerns the break with the traditional system of international relations. In order to put an end to the practices of traditional European policy makers, Wilson relied on the robust democratic values developed in the New World; thus, in his speech on 2.7 September 1918, he mentions "the thoughts of the mass of men ... that have grown more and more unclouded." He continues, "The councils of plain men have become more simple and straightforward ... than the councils of sophisticated men of affairs who still retain the impression that they are playing a game of power." In his speech at Guildhall he uses the same language as the revolutionaries, stating that "the soldiers ... fought to do away with an old order to establish a new one." Not only are such statements an echo of the positions held by American socialists, they are a reiteration of the privileged theme of American identity and of the unique character of democracy put forth

48 Jean-Rene Chotard

by the founding fathers. By contrasting New World democracy with Europe's social and political volatility, Wilson establishes a correlation between the American identity - over which there was a consensus among the political class - and events abroad, a correlation he would use to justify an American role at the international level. Thus, he links foreign problems to internal factors, to which the majority of his fellow citizens could relate, in order to rally the largest possible number of policy makers around the consensus he seeks. He attempts to prove that the volatile situation in 1917 and 1918 held an opportunity for the us to engage in an international role which, although not yet defined in terms of content, was tied to the American identity in its dynamics. At the beginning of 1919 Wilson went beyond statements of intent and participated in a conference meant to entrench a precise definition of the us role in a written text. Certain speeches from this period (24 February in Boston, 4 March at the Metropolitan Opera House, and 8 July at Carnegie Hall) indicate an evolution in the president's thinking and a change in his perception of the international environment following victory. This reorientation emphatically underscores the new status acquired by the us. Wilson states that by remaining faithful to its ideals "this country is trusted throughout the world." In even bolder terms, after negotiations had ended he would proclaim that the us "has convinced the world" and won the "universal confidence of the peoples of the world." According to Wilson, the foremost idea to emerge from these events was a recognition by the international community of the reliability of the us, the Americans being perceived as "friends of the human kind." This characteristic, he says, had been recognized by the world, guaranteeing the us a degree of moral authority that no other country could possess - hence his conviction that "the world believes and counts on us." In contrast to other countries, bent on dominating, "this great nation which we love ... was set up for the benefit of mankind. And the world of today believes that." This prestige was to alter the entire configuration of relationships among states. The pre-eminence of the us was making itself felt in a situation where, according to Wilson, the "uneasiness of the people of Europe runs deep." Thus, the status of great power befell the us not because its policy makers had sought it but because other international players had recognized it. According to Wilson, this new American status sanctions the recognition by the world of America's self-image and kindles his "pride" that "America had at last convinced the world of her true character." American servicemen "were free men under arms, not forgetting their ideals of duty ... They were recognized as crusaders." Thus, by attaining

49

The New International Role of the United States

victory and the status it brought, the us had been able to preserve its identity, and a change in role was now due. The us international role was now a function of the country's new status, and in his 10 July 1919 speech before the Senate, Wilson emphasized the degree of expectations "created in the minds of the people with whom we had associated." By entering the war, the us had converted part of its economic strength into an ability to intervene, modifying the balance of power at the international level. In his speech at the Metropolitan Opera House, Wilson said that this new reality guaranteed the us "might and moral power." Through its decision to participate in the war "for the realization of ideals," the us had taken on a responsibility, "a burden to carry" - hence the dual role as agent of values and catalyst-integrator. Upon returning home, Wilson focused heavily on the conditions created by the negotiations at Versailles, stating, "Politically, economically, socially, the world is on the operating table" (Wilson 19196, 211). Rebuilding the system of international relations would prove feasible because the characteristics of the constituent units had been altered profoundly. First, victory in 1918 had been gained against Germany, whose hegemonistic ambitions had presented dangers. Secondly, wartime destruction and the lasting consequences of the conflicts had reduced the influence of other units: European statesmen who were "so experienced ... have been subdued." Accordingly, at least in the short term, the character of each of the players at the international level had been changed, and the situation held all the more promise given the democratic awakening of different populations. Wilson points to "these restive peoples who ... now knew that they had been lied to." Thus, American leadership would be founded on both economic ability and lengthy democratic experience. Nonetheless, the president would stress that the situation still harboured risks. International relations remained centred around the European continent, where war had always been "at the heart of every arrangement that preceded this war." In his 10 July speech before the Senate, Wilson stressed the precarious nature of international relations: "Balance of power must not end in a mere victory of arms and a new balance." Only the establishment of a "common authority" and a "means of counsel," to be imposed on all, would prove effective at bringing all players under control, and prevent the conflict-based dynamics inherent in the "balance of power" system. Wilson aimed at no less than a restructuring of the international system. His contemporaries, along with numerous analysts since, emphasized his extreme idealism (Kennan 1951; Osgood 1959; Link 1957). Nonetheless, Wilson was careful to meet potential criticisms.

50 Jean-Rene Chotard

In his vision, by liberating oppressed peoples, "the great nations are now responsible as trustees," and the time had come for the us to participate actively in rebuilding international relations. Thus, in his speech on 2,4 February 1919 he states, "We have made this nation ... We will make the world." Professed in February 1919, although impressive, this vision received mixed reactions among American policy makers. The core of the political class that was antagonistic towards the president had regrouped in the beginning of 1919, and the passing of Theodore Roosevelt helped establish Senator Cabot Lodge as spokesman for the Republicans. While the senator from Boston favoured an active foreign policy, his approach belongs to traditional balance-of-power diplomacy. Thus, the return home of the president in February masked the beginning of a duel, the clash between two perceptions of the American role in the world. As Knock (1992.) pointed out, neither protagonist knew who had the advantage at that point. The president chose to gravitate towards the conservative internationalists in order to maintain support among the groups least hostile to his perception. In so doing, he distanced himself from the progressive internationalists, who saw the future of the League of Nations as dependent not so much on the details of the Covenant as on the domestic situation, which hampered action by liberals. Internal factors would eventually exert their own impact on the debate. In order to examine this debate, we focus on the minutes from the 19 August 1919 White House conference between the president and the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. In that meeting Wilson immediately called upon the committee to adopt the treaty, reminding members that "the Covenant is part of the treaty" and that the novelty of this legal document was found in its moral dimension. Addressing senators weary of an erosion of national sovereignty, Wilson emphasized that countries could indeed withdraw from the treaty, but added that "it was recognized that that question must be left to be resolved by the conscience of the nation proposing to withdraw." This appeal to conscience referred to that of the citizenry as a whole; the unique role of the us in this new system was to promote the dissemination of the democratic model, in which the conscience of the citizenry as a whole weighed on the decisions of those in power. According to Wilson, the American prescription for international relations was one founded on principles of law, and article 10 "constitutes the very backbone of the whole covenant." In response to those senators who feared that this article would limit Congress's power, the president affirmed "the right of our Congress, under the

51 The New International Role of the United States

Constitution, to exercise its independent judgement in all matters of peace and war." According to the president, under the new value system established by the Covenant, the role conferred upon the us "is a moral, not a legal obligation and leaves the Congress to put its own interpretation." Within the Senate committee, two attitudes emerged in opposition to what Kissinger (1994) calls "the tautology contained in Article 10." The first stressed the risks of the automatic involvement of the us in crises; the second - in contrast - singled out the possibility for member states to abstain, thus rendering the article illusory. Faced with both scepticism and opposition, the president proceeded to respond to each objection. According to Wilson, the new us role carried a very real meaning. While such an obligation could be binding, one had to distinguish between its legal and moral dimensions. Wilson placed the discussion on two distinct levels. The first pertained to foreseeable reactions, while the second involved differentiating between legal and moral evaluations. Elected representatives would retain full authority in the exercise of their mandate. In order to ease interpretation of articles 10 and u, which would commit League members to aid other members, Wilson introduced the notions of "territorial integrity ... invaded or impaired," "territorial aggression," and "territorial capture." Whereas the conferees raised many legal arguments, they left actual cases largely aside, as shown in Table 3.1. At this time debate over the us role in the world centred around the results of the Paris negotiations. Other avenues for the us to exercise a role in the world remain untouched, however; rather, numerous scenarios for binding involvement of member states were dissected (see Table 3.2.). In spite of differing role conceptions, the president and the committee members shared a similar perception of American identity. They recognized it as being at a level of dignity and respect superior to that of all other nations. While Senator Harding stated that the conscience of any nation in Europe might have been warped by its prejudices racial, geographical, and otherwise, Wilson chose to present America as a guide and reference: "It steadies the whole world that [this republic] will stand with other nations of similar judgment to maintain right in the world." The president's opinion verged on peremptoriness when he asserted that "this Republic does not need a suggestion from any quarter to fulfil its moral obligations," adding later, "in case Congress is right, I am indifferent to foreign criticism." Although the president made a few rhetorical concessions, these did not contradict his convictions.

52. Jean-Rene Chotard Table 3.1 Case Reference: White House Conference, 19 August 1919 Danzig Mandates Memel

1 1 1

Saar Silesia Shantung

3 1 16

Table 3.z Reference to Selected Terms: White House Conference, 19 August 1919 11 Binding Judgment of us 3 Judgment of the world 2 8 Legal obligations

Moral interest Moral obligation Reparations Secret treaties

1

12 4 5

Thus, the policy makers gathered at the White House on 19 August appeared to draw on similar images and representations of us identity. Emblematic of the nature of the debate, the discussions concerned Germany far less than the League Covenant. The new role of the us mattered more than the relationship with a vanquished state, and the German question was used as an occasion to challenge Wilson's vision. Senator Brandegee, for instance, suggested "just cutting the Gordian knot which ties us to the covenant. We establish peace with Germany just the same." He also resorted to a more indirect argument in order to undermine the Covenant. Not an isolationist suggestion, his proposition simply advised a return to the balance-of-power system, in which Germany would hold its place. Effectively, Wilson avoided the topic, since his goal was precisely to use us might to put an end to the balance-of-power system. This us power could now be projected, and this conferring status used, in turn, to convince policy makers of the necessity to accept an international role. The president had clearly borrowed from McKinder's geopolitical categories in order to advise Congress to enter the war. In his Flag Day address, he drew attention to the danger of German expansionism: "Their plan was to throw a broad belt of German military power and political control across the very centre of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia" (Wilson 19170). Reference to this same concept recurred in his annual address to Congress on 4 December 1917. In fact, the two references were an expression of the uniformity in the perceptions of the English-speaking nations. Early on Wilson had recognized the necessity of giving the us the necessary instruments of power, and the 1912. election raised the navy issue. While the progressives had recommended the construction of two

53

The New International Role of the United States

battleships per year, Wilson had initially ignored their request. In 1916, however, he felt a need to gain their backing and, at summer's end, committed himself to developing the navy. In his annual address to Congress on 2 December 1918, he endorsed the naval program put forward by Naval Secretary Daniels. This plan expressed the will to give the us the means to confirm its status as a great power and to ensure the credibility of its role of catalyst-integrator. In February and March 1919, Wilson stated that the us had become "the most famous and most powerful nation in the world." In fact, these two adjectives, signifying prestige and strength, recur at various points throughout the different speeches the president gave after returning from Europe in June. Revealingly, Wilson seemed to find the status argument so convincing that he used it to justify the role he was advocating. Still, his adversaries accepted this affirmation of new us status at the international level, and during the White House conference on 19 August members of the Senate committee did not debate it openly. Instead, the brief but heated exchange that took place concerning the allocation of the Chinese territory of Shantung revealed a conviction among Republicans that the us - by virtue of its status should have objected to such a concession to Japan. Conclusions The 1919 debate over the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations Covenant revealed in-depth contemplation over the us position in the world, raising the questions of which role the us should hold at the international level and whether it could change or reform the nature of international relations. Such questions had been rooted in the concept of American identity held by us policy makers, and they were founded on the status the us held the day after the end of the First World War. By closely linking the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant, Wilson aimed to associate the role of the us with the construction of a new system of international relations. Beginning with his May 1916 speech until his return from Europe when he clarified his arguments, he sought to convince American policy makers. From the outset, though, difficulty arose over changes Wilson wished to introduce in role content. Until his "peace without victory" speech, the president tried to limit the role of the us to that of arbitrator. Then he attempted to shift from a role of war ally, which he had recommended to Congress in April 1917, to a role of reorganizer of the international system. The American elites, however, had trouble following this evolution. On the one hand, the progressive internationalists found themselves in agreement

54 Jean-Rene Chotard

with the president, but their influence quickly diminished. On the other hand, the socialists, whose ideas were probably the closest to Wilson's, became divided over American entry into the war and were marginalized after 1918. The president then had to direct his efforts at the conservative internationalists in order to win over a majority of policy makers. The latter, however, along with the Republicans, were in no mood to accept for the us the role of military ally. Conflicting visions arose when Wilson sought to transform victory into a "vindication of rights" that would serve to establish new principles at the international level. According to the president, the us - by virtue of its exceptional history - could promote norms of self-government for other nations. At the same time, its moral authority would also allow it to assume a role as catalyst.for the development of "common standards of rights for all people." Wilson believed that the us should seek to create a "moral political universe" capable of ensuring collective security. Cabot Lodge's colleagues were satisfied with a balance-of-power role, facilitated by the new power of the United States. Policy makers associated with the Republicans found elements in Wilson's project that could be detrimental to the use of the potential recently gained through victory in the war. This fear led them to reject the principle of commitment associated with the Covenant. In an area where the president saw an opportunity to increase Washington's role at the international level, his opponents pointed out a risk of entanglement that would limit the exercise of this role at the very moment when the us could be more active. Therefore, they objected to anything that could limit the autonomy of decision makers. The concept of identity served as the platform for reconciling the diversity of American sensibilities. Unanimity over the image held by the us of itself guaranteed support for temporary roles, whether as arbitrator or ally, even in the absence of complete political unity. However, when the president attempted to obtain political support for a permanent role as a peace organizer on a radically different basis, the question of national identity ceased to provide unanimity. National identity serves as a refuge value; it is not a rallying point around which a role can be built. The question of status follows a similar path. Wilson never failed to use the argument of increased American might to justify the role he advocated. He and his opponents, however, draw different conclusions from it. Through their shared views on balance of power, a majority of senators rallied around the 1921 naval agreement that established America's new status, but they still rejected the Covenant and the Treaty of Versailles. While Wilson saw in America's specificity and in its new status the means of assuming an exceptional role at the

5 5 The New International Role of the United States

international level, the Senate chose to maintain America's specificity in the name of its exceptional character. The result of this exceptionalism was isolationism. ROOSEVELT AND THE ROLE OF THE US IN THE W O R L D

Pearl Harbor and the double declaration of war were to give full meaning to the warning administered by Wilson in early 1919 that "arrangements of the present peace cannot stand a generation unless they are guaranteed by the united forces of the civilized world" (Wilson I9i9a, 2,45), and events would render moot any debate concerning American involvement in the war. In the thirteen texts examined, beginning in 1943, Franklin Roosevelt clearly identified his priorities with respect to the conduct of the wars: "All our thinking about foreign policy in this war, must be conditioned by the fact that millions of our American boys are today fighting, many thousands of miles from home" (Roosevelt 19446, 343). His i January 1943 statement on the war defined the national duty - "our task" - in three steps: "First, to press on ... till the bandit assault ... is completely crushed; second so to organize relations among Nations that forces of barbarism can never again break loose; third, to cooperate to the end that mankind may enjoy in peace ... the blessings ... put within our reach." Whereas American policy makers were in ready agreement where the first two steps were concerned, they harboured latent doubts about the third one. Roosevelt's energy during this period was channelled towards both the content and the exercise of the two roles he ascribed to the us. While the first role concerned military commitment, the second - following the example set by Roosevelt's predecessor in 1919 - was a role of peace organizer. In order to bring the first role to fruition, Roosevelt chose to put all short-term issues aside in relations with the Allies. He also attempted to retain the capacity to implement the second role: putting together a "postwar security organization program." Referring to the First World War, the president judged that the us had "made mistakes of waiting until the end of the war to set up the machinery for peace." Accordingly, he pressed Washington to prepare plans for international organizations, which were to lead to the conferences of Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. Foremost, Roosevelt's texts prescribe the role that the us has adopted as a warring nation. The war, during 1943 and *944> was called a "total war," "a war of survival," "a global war," and "truly a world war." Drawing on the experience of the policy makers of his generation, he would declare that "wars grow in size, in death and

56 Jean-Rene Chotard

destruction." His perception converged with Wilson's in that he stressed the absence of "sharp distinctions between war and postwar policies." The role that the state assumes in a situation of hostilities will expand until all the forces that have made the outbreak of the conflict possible are eliminated. Roosevelt's formulation, however, added a Clausewitzian connotation in that he placed foreign policy and the pursuit of hostilities side by side. "In the field of foreign policy," he exclaimed on 6 January 1945, "we stand together with the United Nations, not for the war alone." When defining the United States's second role following the war, Roosevelt looked at the international environment from the perspective of an utter realist, stating on 2,0 January 1945, "We have learned lessons at a fearful cost." In raising the question of peace and war among nations, he presented international relations as a set of interactions from which no great nation can remain isolated. Depending on whether he was addressing Congress or the American public, Roosevelt used a different discourse concerning the role that the us would have to play in building a peace system. In his press conferences or his fireside chats, he gibed at those immature souls who presented the postwar period as "an immediate peace conference when the last shot is fired" (Roosevelt 1943^ 560). In discussing the First World War, he pointed to the "cheerful idiots in this country who believed there would be no more war for us" (ibid.). On the other hand, before Congress Roosevelt used more traditional language to emphasize "no secure" peace and spoke of "difficult processes of liberation and adjustment." This vision of peace obtained at a price was, therefore, in the realist mould. According to Roosevelt's fourth inaugural address at the beginning of 1945, the role of the us was to expend as much energy for a durable peace as was spent for total victory in war. He proposed that a new international system be established "on solid foundations of international political and economic cooperation." In his 7 January 1943 State of the Union address, he recalled the basic principles that he had mentioned two years before and that he regrouped under the title "Four Freedoms." The president thus adopted a perspective first developed by Wilson, that of principle-based international relations. While the wording may vary, the principles are always presented as a justification of national virtues and a recognition of the superiority of the American experience. In the words of the president, the us had the responsibility of being a tribune: "What we believe in for individuals, we believe also for Nations." The constant message was that American economic security depended on the economic stability of the world. Roosevelt warned against the "supreme irony for us to win a

57 The New International Role of the United States victory, and then to inherit world chaos." Possibly owing to his eloquence, but mainly as a result of the efforts of his administration, the Bretton Woods agreements committed the Allies to follow an American economic leadership that the Senate did not challenge. In Roosevelt's mind, the Allies would maintain the same organic cohesion that they had shown throughout military operations in order to counteract the effects of the postwar trauma. Like Wilson, he aspired to establish international relations capable of ensuring collective security. However, in contrast to his predecessor, who believed in the effectiveness of sanctions and even in denouncement by public opinion, Roosevelt clearly raised the question of whether force should be used as a guarantee of world order. In his Christmas 1943 fireside chat, where he explains the results of the Teheran conference, the president used the terms "force" and "peace" together four times, and his 15 June 1944 statement on the Postwar Security Organization Program made his intentions clear. The objectives were subdivided into the immediate attainment of peace and security, closely followed by a perspective of mid- to long-term "peaceful and friendly relations." The novelty lay in a mechanism for control and decision making that was attributed to the four major nations. The references to force turned into euphemisms, the word itself being used on only two occasions and qualified by the adjective "adequate." This cautious use of language appeared again in the informal, extemporaneous remarks made during the reception for delegates at the Dumbarton Oaks conference (Roosevelt i944c). Emphasis shifted to harmony for the "four of us," and Roosevelt reiterated the importance he attached to the spirit developed throughout the Allies' military cooperation. The word "force" disappeared in the brief statement which followed the conference, and the organization of the four powers, designated as "the keystone," was only associated with the terms peace and security. This concept of four policemen charged with maintaining world order thus appears as a service. This new role, previously suggested by Roosevelt, thus offered a form of international peacekeeping. Roosevelt associated this role with a change in international morals, which fits into the perspective held by Wilson. In his State of the Union address of January 1943, Roosevelt proclaimed that the stake in this conflict was "between those who believe in mankind and those who do not." Accordingly, the us surrounded itself with democratic leaders - after Teheran, even Stalin was characterized by the president as "truly representative of the heart and soul of Russia." The peace Roosevelt foresaw was inseparable from the dissemination of democratic practices, and his January 1945 State of the Union message pointed to the different types of peace that could ensue. Like Wilson

58 Jean-Rene Chotard

before him, the president criticized the concept of power politics that was prevalent in the approach used in the chanceries, qualifying this "misuse of power" as inadequate for the future world. Roosevelt reminded his audience that these principles had already been stated in the Atlantic Charter and in the statements of the United Nations of January 1942. He insisted, therefore, on Congress avoiding the mistakes that had brought about the disillusionment that had followed the First World War. The democratic foundation of America served as the reference that justified the promotion of democratic values and excluded passivity. Indeed, the president repeatedly associated the power of the us with the responsibilities it must exercise. Under these terms, the us could not be satisfied with merely being one of the four policemen. Roosevelt discussed American leadership openly, using his concluding remarks to Congress in January 1945 to proclaim his faith in America, "which has become the hope of all peoples in an anguished world." This leadership was presented as being exclusive in the field of economics where the time had come "to take the lead in establishing the principle of economic cooperation." The president was convinced that after victory "we must be ready to go forward rapidly on a wide front." Roosevelt maintained this approach until April as he attempted to convince Congress that the us faced the opportunity to accomplish "a service of historic importance." The role Roosevelt envisioned for the us developed incrementally, even though basic principles appeared as early as 1941 and 1942. It began to emerge in a more final form at the end of the Dumbarton Oaks conference. Identity, however, was characterized in similar terms throughout the speeches. Roosevelt insisted on projecting a strong image of America; as he emphasized in his 1943 State of the Union address, "The spirit of this Nation is strong, the people have gathered strength. They are moving in their might and power." He used similar language in his fourth inaugural address. The American people, he said, were possessed of "stout hearts and strong arms with which to strike mighty blows for freedom and truth." Industrial might and individual qualities formed the national self-image that the decision makers projected when the country had completed its full conversion to a wartime economy. Much more than Wilson was in 1919, the president was in a position to convince policy makers in 1945 that they had reached a "turning point in our history and therefore in the history of the world." At the time of Roosevelt's death, war still raged in two theatres, while the plan for a peace founded on a rebuilt system of international relations remained controversial. The president had left behind an ideal project for a system in which the us had a clear role both as a

59 The New International Role of the United States

leader and catalyst-integrator. Bringing the project to fruition was left in the hands of his successor. H.S. T R U M A NA N DT H E R O L E THE US IN THE W O R L D

OF

A total of thirty-six speeches by H.S. Truman were retained for the present analysis. They cover the period from 16 April 1945, when Truman made his first statement before Congress, up to June 1947, a time when preparations for the Marshall Plan represented a political choice that pitted the United States and the USSR against each other. While the new president assumed the decisions and the path laid out by his predecessor, he first had to complete the military task of the former "gallant warrior in the White House." He continued to demand unconditional surrender - as Roosevelt and Wilson had done previously. Apart from its justification in terms of strategic coherence and its importance in clarifying relations among the Allies, this position was a logical step towards a greater end. Since the ultimate goal was to build new relations among nations, it was justifiable to exclude all forms of compromise with the adversary. Although the total defeat of Germany had brought about military advantage, Truman would emphasize its political dimension. Thus, when speaking about the end of hostilities with Germany and the continuing war with Japan, he pointed not to the defeat of an enemy but to the downfall of tyrants and the end of their drive for world domination. The severity of the fighting inspired few semantic nuances; the president spoke of "Japs" just as the policy makers of 1917 and 1918 had talked of "Huns." In his mind, the world had to be cleansed. Notwithstanding the special circumstances, the very strength of the terms indicates an opposition not simply between adversaries, but between value systems. Truman (i945g, 2.04) contrasted the "evil spirit" with the "United Nations guiding spirit." He reiterated the position that Allied cooperation was instrumental in the defeat of the aggressors, but above all emphasized the value of the American identity as a source of domestic inspiration. The object was to maintain the spirit of mobilization both among policy makers and among his fellow citizens. By overthrowing "tyranny," us forces had accomplished their first mission as liberator. Truman then stressed, as had Wilson, a second role the us must assume in the postwar world. According to Henry Kissinger (1994), Roosevelt and Truman looked forward to a universal state of peace. The weeks following Truman's inauguration coincided with the end of the war in Europe and with

60 Jean-Rene Chotard

the conference held in San Francisco; these events may well have convinced the new president of the idea that an underlying and potential harmony existed, which policy makers had to discover for themselves. His speech at the closing ceremonies of the San Francisco conference evoked a new era where "reality to the ideal of W. Wilson" would finally be attained. Until spring 1946 he expressed the conviction that victory and the creation of an organized United Nations had "saved civilization" and that they represented "the greatest achievement in world history." On security issues, the immediate task of the Allied powers was to complete military operations and, as members of a new council, to prevent further conflicts. In his first address to Congress, Truman (19453) stated his refusal to believe that "wars are inevitable." He differed from Wilson, however, in that his conviction stemmed not from any beliefs about humanity, but from his understanding of the risks inherent in the new technologies. In his broadcast to the nation about the Potsdam conference, he explained the revolution brought about by atomic weapons, which he saw as a means of restraining all antagonists. This concept, however, evolved rapidly. In 1946 he saw nuclear deterrence as a means of imposing a resolution to international crises before they became uncontrollable. Thus, security could be guaranteed by consultative mechanisms and activated according to need. Prosperity, on the other hand, required a network of permanent cooperation. Regarding international cooperation, Truman relied on a model elaborated by his predecessor. He reaffirmed the four freedoms in his speeches before the UN. Faithful to Wilson's ideas, he believed that democratic nations exercise a moderating influence on the relations among nations. Thus, the dissemination of parliamentary institutions among UN members became a major component of us foreign policy. He also emphasized economic freedom, since memories of the Depression remained vivid in everybody's mind. The stability of the new international system as conceived by the president and policy makers in 1945 and 1946 drew, on the one hand, on a network of freedoms and their multiple effects and, on the other hand, on the security guaranteed by collaboration among the major powers. Throughout their speeches, both Truman and Roosevelt approached the reconstruction of international relations with confidence, on the basis of the adoption of the UN Charter and their conviction that the us could play a determining role in it. For Truman, the capacity of the us to take action was rooted in its identity. He picked up Wilson's image of the nation's development and exhorted his compatriots to "live up to this heritage." The moral fibre of the citizenry sustained the power of the us, allowing it to dominate the postwar situation.

61 The New International Role of the United States

While Truman's rhetoric largely followed his predecessor's, he used more superlatives. The words "strength" and "power," along with their derivatives, occurred frequently. At times, within the same paragraphs, the president seemed to hesitate between "most powerful nation in all history" and "most powerful nation in the world." He would use one, then the other, in two consecutive sentences. Repetition was often used intentionally - as in Truman's first address to Congress, where the word "America" was used six times on one page, or in the Army Day speech, where the expression "remain strong" was used five times. Tension emerged in the 1945 presidential speech in which Truman attempted to reconcile Wilson's concept of role as an expression of the American identity with the reality of the us's superpower status, which it inherited through the disappearance or weakening of all the other major players on the international stage. The difference with 1919, however, was that new congressional leaders did not need to be convinced of the necessity of assuming an international role. The United Nations Charter has already mapped out the institutional framework for such a role, although its specifics remained to be defined. From April 1945 to the beginning of summer 1947, references to the American identity mingle with references to the us's international role. Yet, while identity remained consistent - with an emphasis on serenity and strength - role definition followed a complex evolution. The only constant was the affirmation of American leadership. For the period ending in 1945, the us role was associated with the promotion of international principles that American policy makers claimed to be the only just ones. In San Francisco, Truman drew a parallel between the UN Charter and the American Constitution. Urging the Senate to ratify the Charter, he stated that a favourable vote was a vote for the very principle of the American nation, "pointing the way to the rest of the world" (Truman 1945^. Moral superiority was confirmed by military superiority, which, in addition to a leadership role, implied the responsibility to guarantee international security. Given the existence of technologies of mass destruction, the president emphasized that "we must constitute ourselves trustees of this new force." Moral superiority, as well as economic and military might, defined a unique status and carried new responsibilities. The formulation of the international role - along with the definition of the political means of assuming it - was completed in three phases in 1946. The first formulation occurred in February with George Kennan's famous long telegram and represented what Kissinger (1994, 447) refers to as "a philosophical and conceptual framework." The second one took place in April with F. Matthews's memorandum that

62. Jean-Rene Chotard

supplied the role's first operational approach. The "Top Secret" document prepared by Clark Clifford in September was the third formulation; it systematized Matthews's approach in favour of a policy of containment. The president's speeches followed this progressive definition, but the wording he used did not reflect these changes precisely. His speeches emphasized the close link between power and leadership and served to advertise the decision makers' conceptions of the new us role. At the beginning of 1947, this definition developed further, just as an American sphere of influence was taking its final shape. Wilson had earlier made geopolitical inferences, but he had stubbornly held on to preoccupations that the British had formulated. Roosevelt had also renewed this perspective; he was well aware that the "geography of the peace" had to be defined differently (Spykman 1944) and, in his congressional address after Yalta, declared that the us should concern itself with political events occurring thousands of miles away. Truman solemnly reiterated that the us was not interested in territorial growth, except for "military bases necessary for the protection of our interest." The expression "one world" gained popular appeal and was adopted by both political parties; the president, therefore, expressed the consensus among American policy makers when he stated to the press that "our responsibility extends to the nations of the world." As Roosevelt's successor, Truman also assumed the legacy of Wilson, for whom American identity defined the role that the United States should play in international relations. In the eighteen months following victory, however, two external factors weighed heavily on American decision makers. First, imbalances of power widened during 1946, ensuring a potential for American domination. Then the USSR, a former partner in military successes and second only to the us in terms of military might, started to define a new role for itself on the international stage, also linked to identity. The two major players set out to define their respective roles by asserting a founding mythology specifically, the Declaration of Independence and the Bolshevik Revolution - which each saw as representing a universal value. The Truman administration chose to define the us role by asserting the superiority of American values. Kennan's "long telegram" achieved such preeminence largely because it reflected conclusions that decision makers were about to make. Later, the vast resources of the United States appeared to be a means of garnering the adhesion of other players in the international system against the resistance offered by the USSR. The status that, according to Wilson, presented itself as a circumstantial factor in the exercise of the role, tended, under the Truman doctrine, to become a determining factor in confirming the value of identity,

63 The New International Role of the United States

which remained the founding element and the argument that validated the role. CONCLUSION

American presidents and their advisers shared the conviction that the us became involved in two world wars purely for legitimate legal reasons. For Roosevelt and Truman, as Wilson before them, the key values that defined the American identity were the only references pertinent to the elaboration of new international norms of behaviour. The context of 1945-46, however, was radically different from that of 1919. The economic capacity and the military strength gained through war imposed a new status of world power. References to "power" in Truman's speeches demonstrate that policy makers fully realized its magnitude; from that point on, their approach to an American role in international affairs differed from Wilson's. Like Wilson, they justified American involvement on the basis of the unique value of the American experience and relied on widely shared conceptions of identity, but unlike the president of 1919, they took into account the new us status as a world power. According to Wilson, the us role in the world was justified by the values that defined the United States, leading to a role of reformer, but in 1919 the president was to encounter internal obstacles. The restructuring of international relations was finally realized in 1945, and at that time Truman, speaking about China, expressed the intentions of his predecessor through his claim that the "peace and prosperity of the world in this new and unexplored era ahead, depend upon the ability of the sovereign nations to combine for collective security in the United Nations" (Truman 1945!!}. However, in 1945 Roosevelt and Truman faced a very different context. Identity remained a powerful argument, but decision makers were aware that the status held by the us implied a leadership role. The objective of 1919 was thus realized, but as of 1945 the two presidents - at least implicitly - added to the role of reformer of the international system that of stabilizer (or balancer). The deterioration in the relations between the two major players led to a gradual paralysis of the consultative mechanisms of the United Nations. Instead of a harmonious and efficient structure, what was to develop was a bipolar system plagued by conflict. In 1945 the United States' status and pursuit of its own interests were to render inconceivable its retreat into a new isolationism. The president's discourse continued to contain numerous references to identity but it found more and more of its arguments in the us status. Hence, Leffler (1992) rightly titles his review of the history of the Cold War A Preponderance of

64 Jean-Rene Chotard

Power. The international role of the us found its definition somewhere between references to identity, which guarantee its moral superiority as a nation exempt from colonialist and annexationist tendencies, and an attempt to establish the supremacy of the "Pax Americana" (Steel 1967). In the speeches he made in the first months after the war, Truman said that he did not foresee resorting to the capacities afforded by economic and military power because using them would confront policy makers with two unacceptable options: either they could use their superiority to confront the other power, but in so doing would initiate the end of the organization they had just founded (on the other hand, by using status, the us decision makers would realize their image of America as the inspiration behind a new international order), or they could accept the balance-of-power system emerging at the UN, a system that Wilson, Roosevelt, and Truman had all denounced. This latter choice, in turn, would mean abandoning the idea of us exceptionalism, inspirer of a new international system that had drawn its moral substance from the American example. It would signal a turn inward in order to preserve an independence of action that would benefit the us alone. Status would thus carry the risk of overdetermining an international role, just the opposite of what Wilson had envisioned. The decision ultimately crystallized in the Truman Doctrine, which allowed the decision makers to escape from this dilemma: the us retained the ability to deploy its military (as in the us Air Force intervention in the Greek civil war) and to use its economic resources (aid programs). But us policy makers sought primarily to call upon American values. In a statement such as "The free peoples look to us," Truman stressed both the us example and the duties that its values and power entail. Rather than putting up with the hurdles raised by an antagonistic player within the UN Security Council, Washington proposed a moral alternative. In effect, containment manifested both the conviction that American values and identity were linked to the new international organization and a willingness to use the capacities at the disposal of the us, given its status as a world power (Gaddis 1982.). The role elaborated by American decision makers after 1945 (Isaacson 1986) continued to root itself in the identity expressed by Wilson, but its features were defined as a function of us international status.

4 The United States: An Elusive Role Quest after the Cold War P H I L I P P E G. LE P R E S T R E Thus we find ourselves today confronting an increasingly uncertain international environment, increasingly aware that our role and purpose must change to meet that new environment, but unclear as to what those changes ought to be. - Eagleburger 1993 INTRODUCTION

For the fifth time in its history, the United States finds itself in the midst of a debate about its role in the world. This time, however, it came as a surprise. The implosion of the USSR destroyed familiar guideposts, undermined the traditional means of mobilizing support for foreign policy, and overthrew whatever bureaucratic consensus may have existed. To be sure, a re-examination of the us role in the world had started during the Vietnam War, well before the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it accelerated and acquired pre-eminence in the 19805, to culminate into an open discussion of stark options in the wake of the collapse of the erstwhile ideological and geopolitical foe. Such thinking does not take place in a political vacuum. Its tenor and direction, as well as the range of options entertained, have internal and external political ramifications. Moreover, the unstable international situation that followed the opening of the Berlin Wall made timely adjustments to unpredictable situations both more urgent and more difficult. This situation rendered the quest for the definition of a new role elusive, if not illusory. A new definition is nonetheless a necessity, for it will sustain adaptation to external and internal transformations of the policy context, articulate the fundamental interests of the country, clarify the expectations of the us's partners, and help mobilize public support behind a new consensus. George Bush's prudence and his successor's hesitations have triggered a lively debate since 198 8.T The literature is replete with

66

Philippe G. Le Prestre

recommendations and analyses that identify role redefinition as the central task of us foreign policy. Tucker and Hendrickson (1992) considered it the main task of foreign policy and deplored the military emphasis associated with the Gulf War. Former president Richard Nixon wrote in 1992: "We are at a watershed moment for America's world role." For Schlesinger (1993, 18), the great task of the postCold War period was to define a role that would help identify policy choices and avoid impulses or actions based on TV images. Roles define interests; yet the us debate also revolved around the trade-offs that must sometimes be made between roles and interests. At the heart of the possible answers to this kind of dilemma lie two contradictory hypotheses that link systemic change and the origins and nature of us foreign policy role. A similar debate regarding the relative importance of internal and structural variables took place early in this century between Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. For some observers (e.g., Ornstein 1992, 8), the disappearance of the communist threat gives the centrifugal forces of political culture and ideology greater impact in shaping foreign policy attitudes, allowing new role conceptions to emerge. The latter, in turn, assume various forms, from strict isolationism, to pragmatic guardianship of the national interest, to the promotion of the national ideology, to devotion to international welfare. Not only the absence of clear and present dangers, but the very uncertainty of the nature and dynamics of the international system, would encourage greater reliance on traditional ideals and on the aspects of American "exceptionalism" associated with them. This perspective parallels a renewed interest in the links between national identity and us foreign policy conceptions. Having examined the relationship between the popular consensus about us national identity and us foreign policy orientations, Citrin et al. (1994, 2.6) conclude that "the dwindling of consensus about America's international role follows the waning of agreement on what it means to be an American, on the very character of American nationalism." For Vlahos (1991, 70), "America's own sense of confidence" will determine the relative international engagement of the United States. Hixson (1989) and Stephanson (1989) showed that cultural beliefs, images, and traditions shaped Kennan's thinking far more than abstract notions of realism, power, and national interest. If identity is consonant with the national political philosophy, then ideological variables will play a large role in shaping role conceptions. Indeed, some believe that these factors, embedded in domestic debates, largely account for how states use their resources to adapt to the external environment (Doyle 1993). Others, convinced that external factors always dominate, argue that the change in the international system and the new position of the us

67

The United States

within it make external variables more important in the definition and enactment of the us role (Kissinger 1994, 19). Thrust into a novel balance-of-power system, the us loses rather than gains autonomy as it becomes more dependent on the policies of others. The nature of the international system, the clash of ideologies, moral legitimacy, as well as geopolitical realities will ensure the primacy of externally defined roles (Brzezinski 1994, xi). New threats will trigger new roles (Tucker and Hendrickson 1992, 2.6). Indeed, structural realists argue that changes in perceived status will lead to changes in role definition. In effect, as Teddy Roosevelt believed, power beckons. This belief leads to role definitions that emphasize stability and leadership, such as hegemon, balancer, integrator, developer, regional stabilizer, and regional leader. To be sure, one always finds a mix of internal and external variables at work. Even Kissinger acknowledges that both "American values and geopolitical necessities" will define us goals and frame the definition of its role (Kissinger 1994, 19). As Secretary James Baker put it in April 1992.: "The nature of the problem, the interests and values we have at stake, the capacity of our friends to act, and the relevance of available multilateral mechanisms will shape our role." Yet, questions remain as to what role, if any, is defined,* the relative dominance of either set of variables under specific conditions, and the implications of this dominance for the understanding of role enactment. Thus, in light of the dramatic evolution of the systems in which foreign policy is embedded, this research asks the following questions: T.To what extent has the decision makers' perception of their role evolved between 1989 and 1993? z. How have internal and external variables contributed to this evolution? That is, did the system allow internal variables to come to the fore, or, on the contrary, did it impose new constraints? METHODOLOGY

Contrary to other research programs, this one does not seek to characterize the nature and functions of the foreign policy discourse per se. Rather, the content analysis of speeches is used as a tool to identify changes in the definition of national roles and to explore the potential validity of hypotheses pertaining to their origins. The variables used to probe the hypotheses were, as stated in chapter i, duties and responsibilities (DR), identity (ID), and status (ST). The first step was to examine the foreign policy debate since 1989 and identify the different roles that have been articulated. On the basis

68

Philippe G. Le Prestre

Table 4.1 Speeches Selected for the Content Analysis of us Foreign Policy Roles, 1989-93

1989

2990

1991

TOTAL

5 4 9

11

_ 4 5 1 10

Size (# words)

27,771

28,279

27,917

M. Albright L. Aspin J. Baker G. Bush R. Cheney W. Christopher W. Clinton L. Eagleburger A. Lake T. Wirth

-

_ 4 6

1 _

1992*

_

1993

2 11

5 3 1 1 14

1 3 15 22 1 5 3 3 1 1 54

28,236

51,962

164,165

2 7 _-

1 3 _

Total

* The 1992 list includes two farewell speeches by G. Bush and L, Eagleburger given in early January I993-

of this list, we then identified a set of possible roles for the us in a post-Cold War world. The second step involved a content analysis of selected speeches of the principal decision makers of the Bush and Clinton administrations between 1989 and 1993. Between nine and fourteen general foreign policy speeches were selected for each year (see Table 4.1). To identify specific roles (DR) and discover the perceptions of status and identity, all assertions that included the following key words were selected and coded: "America," "American," "we," "our," "us," "United States," "us." The total number of sentences selected was 1,675, tnat is about 20 per cent of the total number of sentences present. After some cleanup, 1,488 assertions (some in the same sentence) were coded as DR, to, or ST. The third step was the analysis per se. Now, content analysis is a notorious auberge espagnole. Consequently, we will use the data only to (i) identify trends (rather than speculate about the meaning of given numbers for a specific year or category) and (z) identify which results are consistent with which hypothesis - without demonstrating a causal relationship. THE DEBATE AND THE US R O L E - S E T

For some observers, the end of the Cold War meant a return to old constraints; for others, new opportunities for pre-eminence and greater latitude. The role-set was identified on the basis of the general debate,

69

The United States

Table 4.2 The us Prescriptive Role-Set, 1989-93 H E G E M O N (Krauthammer 1991; DoD 1992; W.Y. Smith 1992) — world policeman; unilateral leadership — guarantor of the peace, of the existing security regimes BALANCER (Kissinger 1992; Coll 1992; Waynes 1993) - maintain a global balance and regional balances - support "benign" spheres of influence DEFENDER

OF THE P A C I F I C U N I O N (Holsti

1970)

- defender of the free world - help our friends in their own self-defence T R I B U N E AND A G E N T OF A M E R I C A N V A L U E S (Kober 1990; Diamond 1992; Halperin 1993; Muravchik 1991; T. Smith 1993, 1994a, 1994b) - promote democracy and freedom rather than seek equilibrium - promote human rights, American values and ideals C A T A L Y S T / I N T E G R A T O R (Gardner 1992; Nye 1990, 1993; Chace 1992; Pfaff 1991; Hoffmann 1990/91); Maynes 1990) - catalyst for cooperation; integrate Eastern Europe - strengthen multilateral institutions and regimes - promote cooperation in solving transnational issues R E G I O N A L L E A D E R (Holsti

1970)

— duties and responsibilities towards other states in the region REGIONAL

S T A B I L I Z E R (Holsti

1970)

- active role in settling regional conflicts D E V E L O P E R (Holsti 1970)

- economic aid to developing countries ( P R A G M A T I C ) G U A R D I A N OF NATIONAL INTERESTS (or limited isolationist) (Tonelson 1993; Kennan 1993; Hyland 1992; Goldberg 1992; Heritage Foundation 1992; Schlesinger 1993; Hendrickson 1992) - case-by-case (pragmatic) approach on issues not viral to the national interest; selective engagement - consolidate national power rather than shape the international environment. I N T E R N A L D E V E L O P E R (Holsti

1970)

- responsible for domestic welfare ISOLATE (Buchanan 1990; Carpenter 1991; Ravenat 1991a, 1991b) - retrenchment; abjure extended deterrence - protection of core values, not milieu goals - avoid interventions, alliances, and defence commitments — set a good example through the development of a us model

excluding that among government officials. The labels are not necessarily those used by the authors associated with each perspective and were chosen based on representative rhetoric or on Holsti's 1970 typology. Table 4.2 summarizes the positions in evidence. There is some overlap among these categories. Guardian and isolate, for example, have much in common; balancer and regional stabilizer

jo Philippe G. Le Prestre

differ in scope but not in nature. All role conceptions presented here were not always in evidence at the same time. Chronologically, one can discern two phases. The first phase concerns Gorbachev's era of perestroi'ka. While the Bush administration itself remained prudent, the public debate emphasized opportunities. For some authors, systemic changes meant the opportunity to return to some sort of neoisolationism; for others, they heralded a return to Wilsonian dreams. Then came the Gulf War and its aftermath, the rapid collapse of the Soviet state, the intractable character of regional conflicts, and the perceived futilities of intervention, which exemplified the constraints posed by the system. These constraints, in turn, were exacerbated by social and economic domestic problems and led to pessimistic references to traditional power politics that also lamented the constraints placed upon its exercise. A traditional perspective distinguishes between two basic attitudes, each containing different and often incompatible positions. The neoisolationist side would include strict isolationists of the Taft variety (isolate) and pragmatists who advocate a drastic limitation of us involvement in the world (guardian). These positions often rest on moral foundations or epitomize traditional conservative principles that criticize the internal political consequences of the Cold War engagement, namely the growth of government and the threats to individual liberties and to the moral order. Others, on the other hand, justify international engagement through the us democratic mission and, more generally, its ideological and moral imperatives (tribune), to balance regional rivalries (balancer) or to undertake a sustained engagement in the building and maintenance of a new order based either on us pre-eminence (hegemon) or interdependence and multilateralism (catalyst/integrator). At the same time, the us government has repeatedly identified the neoisolationist position as the most worrisome, and thus has constantly emphasized the need to remain engaged. Even the Clinton administration, although it ran on a domestic platform and defined foreign policy as economic security first, took up the mantra of engagement. The lessons of Vietnam have been traditionally associated with different attitudes towards the role of the us in the world.' In a sense, these lessons are the most visible variables, not only because of their pre-eminence in these studies, but also because policy makers repeatedly evoke them. In this context, their relevance lies essentially in the decision to intervene. Much of the differences among the prescribed roles rest on the aversion towards military intervention on the one hand (isolate, guardian, catalyst), whether unilateral or not, and resignation to its necessity (balancer, hegemon) on the other, with moralists falling in between. Thus, some isolationists and pragmatists will argue that the internal constraints are too great, that the world is less

yi

The United States

dangerous - with the reduction of the primary nuclear threat - or that interventions do not bring the expected results. In a sense, these authors hold an idealistic conception of intervention as an absolute remedy designed to make things abroad right once and for all while reinforcing the us polity. Others will promote intervention (hegemon, tribune) or resign themselves to it (catalyst, balancer). In their view, the world is more dangerous because it is more unstable, and since that instability can backfire, the us, as the lone superpower, cannot escape its duty to promote order. Proponents of engagement believe that the us cannot be strong at home unless it is strong abroad and prepared to lead; opponents would argue the reverse: to be strong abroad, the us must be strong at home. Despite Clinton's own pronouncements in support of the first proposition, the 1992. Clinton campaign revolved around the second. Thus, these role conceptions are also based on a premise about their internal or external origins. Catalysts, balancers, and hegemonists assume that roles are externally defined. The us is "bound to lead" because of the responsibilities incurred by its "large size" (Nye 1993, 88). It has a special responsibility to do so, arising not from its history and symbolism, but from its status. Only the us can do it; it has no choice. Nye (1993), Kelleher (1993), Russett (1985), and Strange (1987) argue that "transnational interdependence and the diffusion of power to small states and non-state actors place an even heavier burden on the one remaining superpower to take the lead by forming coalitions and developing institutions to foster international stability" (Haftendorn and Tuschhoff 1993, 14).-* Others consider that foreign policy is, in the final analysis, about choices. The us must define its role according to its own values and internal needs. Guardians, isolates, and internal developers will call upon the nature of America, upon its values and its society, to identify a role. In 1992., for example, Jerry Brown claimed that "that's what the election is about: Who are we and where are we going?" (Brown 1992). Moralists - whether zealot missionaries or more subdued preachers - will point out that the United States' international status rests on its moral standing, which must define its objectives (e.g., Diamond 1992). THE E V O L U T I O N OF THE ROLE OF THE US IN THE WORLD

Explicit References to the US Role Even though much of the foreign policy rhetoric of the post-Cold War period revolved around the proper definition of the us role, decision

72,

Philippe G. Le Prestre

makers do not often mention it by name. To be sure, George Bush centred his 1993 farewell address around this theme and used the term in its title, but he had used the term sparely before. Still, what do the few instances of its use suggest? In 1989 James Baker claimed that the us had a special role to play in the world because it still represented the "last, best hope of earth." In particular, he defined this traditional conception as a somewhat selfcontradictory triptych: "a tribune for democracy, a catalyst for international cooperation and the guardian of the American national interest" (Baker 1989^. George Bush, on the other hand, insisted on another role, that of stabilizer: "The United States is determined to take an active role in settling regional conflicts" (Bush 1989). This conception assumed greater importance in 1990 in the context of the Gulf War: "Our role then: to deter future aggression" and "help our friends in their own self-defense" (Bush 1990). Whether to choose the role of peacekeeper or that of peacemaker provoked intense debate within and outside the administration. Richard Cheney openly supported the stabilizing role and, as befitted his position as secretary of defence, insisted on strength as a definer of the us role. This strength, however, is linked as much to what the United States is - that is, to its identity and what it represents - as to its military status. The Gulf War continued to have a heavy influence on the context of the use of the term "role" in 1991. Thus, Bush insisted on the twin roles of leadership and stabilizer. He and Eagleburger increasingly emphasized engagement and warned against isolationist impulses, a theme that started in 1990 and would remain strong thereafter. At the end of the Bush administration, both the outgoing president and his second secretary of state insisted explicitly on external variables and on the special responsibilities of the United States as the only remaining superpower (Bush 1993). However, to assert the primacy of external variables - the idea that the us cannot escape its role because of the unique position it occupies - is not to specify which role should be adopted. George Bush himself would claim that power alone should not define the national interest. Rather, he introduced a Wilsonian theme that the Clinton administration would pick up: "helping forge a democratic peace" without becoming "the world's policeman," for which "there is no support abroad or at home" (Bush 1993). The Clinton administration reaffirmed the necessity, but not the specifics, of engagement. Like his two predecessors, Clinton equated "role" with America's "sense of purpose"; the task was to redefine America's role in the world. This task had important domestic and diplomatic dimensions, although policy makers also mentioned stability and leadership. The role of the us was chiefly articulated in terms

73

The United States

. Table 4.3 Number of DR Statements by Issue 1989

1990

Ideological/moral Political Military Economic Miscellaneous

15 112 30

9 3

11 89 39 6 1

TOTAL

169

146

1991

1992

1993

16 6 3

16 79 19 11 5

48 106 33 40 9

125

130

236

71

29

Total

106 457

150 72 21

806

of attitudes rather than commitments; the us would be more a matrix than a leader. Explicit references to the us role do not adequately describe its content, for the definition of the term shifts widely and its instrumental function may overwhelm its descriptive one. Role conceptions, however, also transpire through the way decision makers articulate the duties and responsibilities of their country. Thus, a more extensive coding of assertions that pertain to these aspects was undertaken. The Duties and Responsibilities of the United States Coded assertions referring to duties and responsibilities (DR), used to identify role conceptualizations, can refer to four main issues, as shown in Table 4.3: ideological/moral, political, military, and economic. The relative importance of political issues diminished steadily over the five-year period, while ideological and economic issues acquired more importance. This evolution appears especially pronounced when one contrasts the two administrations. Whereas the Bush administration consistently ranked political, military, and ideological issues in that order, the Clinton administration granted more importance to ideological (ranked second) and economic duties and responsibilities (ranked third). This trend towards the increased importance of economic obligations in fact predates the Clinton administration. Indeed, if one looks at the frequencies of certain dictionaries (lexical categories referring to the same semantic field, such as morality, economy, or ideology), the results in Table 4.4 obtain. Although the economic vocabulary increased over the period, the Clinton administration actually used economic terms less often than did its predecessor in its last year. Moreover, the Bush administration relied more often on an ideological rhetoric. We surmise, however, that the former tended to use these economic and ideological referents much more directly in the context of policy obligations.

74

Philippe G. Le Prestre

Table 4.4 Evolution of Lexical Categories in us Foreign Policy Speeches, 7989-93 (frequencies per thousand words, and rank)

Fr.

Categories *

Fr,

Cold War (15) Economic (20) Ideological (13) Outwardness (15) Moral (13) Patriotic (5) Security (35)

11.5 (3) 8.9 (5) 10.0 (4)

6.6 (4) 5.5 (6) 12.5 (3)

4.6 (6) 2.6 (7) 33.4 (t)

6.0 (5) 5.5 (6) 34.8 (1)

Rank

16.4 (2)

Rank

17.6 (2)

1992

1991

2990

1989

Fr.

Rank

7.8 (4) 6.1 (6) 10.2 (3) 13.5 (2) 6.3 (5) 4.0 (7) 31.1 (1)

Fr.

Kanfe

5..3 14..3 12..2 17..5 5,.1

(6) (3) (4) (2)

(7) 7 ,7 (5) 29..9 (1)

1993

Fr.

Rank

2.9 (7)

11.1 (3)

7.4 (4)

19.0 (2)

4.2 (6) 6.0 (5) 32.1 (1)

The number of lexical terms making up each category is in parentheses following name of category.

Table 4.5 gives the main results of the coding by role.5 Isolate, a major role expressed in the debate, does not appear here, which is hardly surprising, since both administrations have denied the existence of an isolationist mood at the same time as they were declaring their opposition to it by reaffirming the necessity of engagement and leadership (see Table 4.6). It should be noted, however, that the need for engagement and leadership remains more of the order of a state of mind: the number of geographical references steadily diminishes between 1989 and 1993, from 25.5 per thousand to 15.8 per thousand, a fall of about 62, per cent in five years. Other debated roles that do not appear are regional leader and balancer. Direct references to balancing were made only twice, in 1989 (and coded under stabilizer), which may indicate a lack of comfort with the idea or the belief that it is a role that is hard to sell. Hegemon, though present in the debate, does not appear as such with the characteristics mentioned in Table 4.2; rather we have chosen to create a category of leader (when these references could not be entered elsewhere). The lack of emphasis on the role of regional leader obtains despite pressing regional issues (NAFTA, Haiti) and James Baker's vow that "first on that agenda is our neighbourhood, the countries that border us, the countries of our continent and hemisphere" (Baker 19893). In fact, the Americas were mentioned less often than the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Western Europe, or the AsiaPacific region. The Bush administration emphasized two roles, stabilizer and catalyst, both accounting for nearly half of the role statements during these four years. The pre-eminence of stabilizer in 1990 and 1991 is easily

75

The United States

Table 4.5 Roles Expressed in the 1989-93 us Foreign Policy Speeches (absolute and relative [%] frequencies)

1989 Abs. Rel. Tribune & agent of Amer. values Defender of the Pacific Union Developer Guardian of the nat'l interest Catalyst Internal developer a Leader Stabilizer Miscellaneous15

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Rel.

1993

1992 Abs. Rel.

Abs. Rel.

14

8.3

16

11.0

15

12.0

16

12.3

39

16.5

9 4

5.3 2.4

12 1

8.2 0.7

5 1

4.0 0.8

4 1

3.1 0.8

9 13

3.8 5.5

29 55

17.2 32.5

25 26

17.1 17.8

16 26

12.8 20.0

14 39

10.8 30.0

30 62

12.7 26.3

7 9 37 5

4.1 5.3

8.2 3.4 6.2

8 12 32 10

6.4 9.6

3.0

12 5 40 9

8.0

4 21 19 12

3.1 21 16.2 . 9 14.6 28 9.2 25

8.9 3.8 11.9 10.6

100.0

146

100.0

125

100.0

130

100.0 236

100.0

169

TOTAL

1991

1990

21.9

27.4

25.6

a

Includes defence budget reforms. Includes "remaining engaged." Note: Sentences were selected around the following key words: American(s), United States, us, I, we, our, ours(elves), us. Moreover, it was decided to use a strict selection process and retain only sentences that contained a strong connotation of obligation ("must", etc.). Thus, sentences that only used "will" were left out; likewise statements such as "doing x is the best course." b

Table 4.6 Anti-isolationist Assertions in the Role Sample ( D R )

Engaged Lead TOTAL

1989

1990

1 9

9 5

10 (5.9%)

14 (9.6%)

1991

1992

1993

7 12

7 21

14 9

19 (15.2%)

28 (21.5%)

23 (9.7%)

explained by the Gulf crisis and war. Things start changing in 1992 when leader comes up second, on a par with stabilizer. The 1992 campaign year could account for that evolution, but more seems to be at work, such as the quest for the foundations of a new world order which the importance of catalyst would corroborate. And catalyst largely dominates in 1993, with tribune second and guardian third.

76

Philippe G. Le Prestre

Stabilizer comes in fourth, before internal developer, which assumes more importance but still lags far behind, and leader, which comes last. Over the whole period, catalyst dominates and guardian stabilizes, whereas the change in the relative frequency of stabilizer is dramatic. Thus, Tucker and Hendrickson's (1992, 27) identification (and subsequent criticism) of an emerging us role based on the experience of the Gulf War was premature. Further, the combined importance of stabilizer and catalyst diminishes, from a combined 54.4 per cent of assertions to 38.2 per cent. One also notes that the importance of tribune doubles to a significant level - a trend that started in the Bush administration - and that the sudden variation in leader correlates with the Gulf War and the 1992 presidential campaign. The sum of the relative frequencies of guardian and internal developer could be an indirect indicator of a trend towards a limited definition of the national role. But although this sum increases in 1993, it remains comparable to 1989 and is still behind catalyst. Another noteworthy evolution is the increase in the frequency of statements referring to ideological/moral issues, as well as to economic issues; the former jumping from around 9 per cent in 1989 to 12 per cent in 1992 and 20 per cent 1993, the latter from close to 5 per cent in 1989 to 8.5 per cent in 1992 and 16.9 per cent the following year (Table 4.3). Thus, although the trend was noticeable under the Bush administration (and is corroborated by the dictionaries), the difference is much more dramatic under the Clinton administration. The data also show an increase in the number of roles that it was considered important that the us assume. For example, three roles each accounted for more than 10 per cent of assertions in 1989, whereas this number becomes four in 1990 and 1991, and five in 1992, to fall back to four in 1993.6 Does the relative importance of stabilizer, catalyst, and tribune hide significant variations in the content of these roles between 1989 and 1993? Tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 break down these duties and responsibilities. In 1989 the importance of catalyst stemmed mainly from the need to support the Soviet transition, a role that was linked to general concerns for stabilization (see Table 4.7). Indeed, without this subcategory, catalyst falls behind stabilizer in 1989. Contrary to what one might have expected, that need diminished rapidly, and the Bush administration thereafter insisted on arms control, whereas its successor would emphasize economic and transnational regimes. Apart from a high importance given them in 1992, IGOS quickly faded away. The diminishing importance of the role of stabilizer corresponds largely to the abandonment of the idea of building a new order; however, conflict prevention assumes greater importance in 1993, especially if one adds to it the mandate to oppose aggressors (see Table 4.8).

77

The United States

Table 4.7 Evolution of the Content of the Role Catalyst (absolute and relative [%J frequencies) 19S9

1990

Abs. Rel.

Maintain multilat./ 2 reinforce IGOS Promote int'l cooperation 3 Strengthen transnat'l 10 regimes Arms control/ 12 conversion Support the FSU 22 transition Prosperity/ commerce 6 TOTAL

55

1991

Abs. Rel.

1992

Abs. Rel.

1993

Abs. Rel.

17

Abs. Rel.

3.6

1

3.8

6

23.1

5.5

1

3.8

-

-

1

2.6

1

1.6

18.2

7

26.9

1

3.8

1

2.6 15

24.2

21.8

9

34.6 10

38.5

6

15.4 11

17.7

40.0

6

23.1

5

19.2

5

12.8

6

9.7

10.9

2

7.7

4

15.4

9

23.1

19

30.6

100.0 26

100.0

39

100.0

62

100.0

100.0 26

43.6 10

16.1

Table 4.8 Evolution of the Content of the Role Stabilizer (absolute and relative [%] frequencies) 1989

1990

Abs. Rel.

Balancer Stop or prevent conflicts Promote peace Build new order Oppose aggressors TOTAL

2

14 4

17 37

5.4

Abs. Rel.

_

37.8 12 10.8 3 45.9 17

-

100.0

1991

_

Abs. Rel.

_

30.0 17

7.5

1992

8

42.5 20.0

4 7 4

40

100.0

32

Abs. Rel.

„

_

53. 1 12.,5 21,,9 12.,5

6 5 6 2

100.0

1993

19

Abs.

_ —

31.6 14 26.3 1 31.6 5 10.5 8 100.0

28

Rel.

_ 50.0

3.6

17.9 28.6

100.0

A stabilizer then is not a balancer or a builder of a new order; rather, it focuses on the direct prevention of conflicts. The new order that is absent here reappears under the promotion of a liberal economic regime and us values, as indicated by catalyst and tribune. Compared with the other role conceptions, the frequency of this role does not increase in the last year of the Bush administration; rather, the importance of stabilizer decreases dramatically, mostly because of a lesser emphasis on conflict prevention and control. Its importance

78

Philippe G. Le Prestre

Table 4.9 Evolution of the Content of the Role Tribune

(absolute and relative [%] frequencies) 1989 Abs. Rel.

Promote democracy Selfdetermination American values Liberty International law Democratic peace Human rights Better world TOTAL

1991

1990 Abs. Rel.

1992

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Rel.

1993 Abs. Rel.

4

28.6

9

56.3

4

26.7

6

37.5 26

66.7

2 1 3

14.3 7.1

1 2 1 1

6.3 12.5 6.3 6.3

1 4 -

_ 6.7 26.7

6.3 6.3 18.8 25.0 6.3

_ 2 4 3 4

_ 5.1 10.3

13.3 26.7

_ 1 1 3 4 1 -

100.0 39

100.0

21.4

3 1

21.4 7.1

2

12.5

2 4

14

100.0

16

100.0

15

100.0 16

7.7

10.3

Table 4.10 us Role Matrix impels

Identity condones

Tribune

Guardian

Catalyst

Stabilizer

increases significantly under the Clinton administration, primarily through the promotion of democracy as a pillar of world order - a notion that appears in the last year of the Bush administration as well. Finally, when one looks at the role matrix drawn up in Table 4.10, one notices that both tribune and catalyst increase in importance, while the other two decrease, which points up the potential importance of identity, to which we turn in the next section. THE CORRELATES

OF ROLES

In terms of relative importance, status (ST) and identity (ID) did not loom large in the minds of post-Cold War foreign policy speakers. The

79 The United States Table 4.11 Relative Importance of DR, ST, and ID Assertions in us Speeches, 1989-93 (per 1,000 words, an as percentage of total number of coded assertions)

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

DR

ST

6.1 52% 5.2 51 4.5 55 4.6 48 4.5 62

3.6 2.4 1.8 2.9 1.8

ID

30% 24 23 30 25

2.1 18% 2.4 24 1.7 21 2.2 23 1.0 13

latter were much more concerned with asserting duties and responsibilities than with claiming a specific status or promoting identity, which accounted respectively for 806, 391, and 291 assertions. Moreover, the Clinton administration de-emphasized all three types of statements: it put as much emphasis on DR as did the Bush administration, but considerably neglected both ST and, especially, ID (see Table 4.11). Identity If identity (ID) variables loom larger in the definition of the national role, references to it should increase within our total sample. Although they do after 1989 - from 18 per cent to 24 per cent in 1990 and to 23 per cent of all coded assertions in 1993 - they plummet to 13 per cent under Clinton (Table 4.11). Table 4.12 breaks down the elements of identity by category, showing that the speech makers' identification of the us with its political philosophy and values clearly dominates, although instead of increasing, assertions that equate the us with its values decrease (or at best remain level if one adds the "example/idea" category). (Notice, however, that although references to ideology diminish between 1989 and 1993, the role of tribune gains more prominence.) Both Bush and Clinton ranked values first. Beyond that, the situation becomes more confused. What is missing is more suggestive than what is present. The Bush administration viewed the us as a force for peace and order, a priority it ranked second or third - thus suggesting external variables might have been at work - whereas this category comes up only once in 1993. Neither administration tended to equate the us with its traditional image of prosperity, dynamism (except Bush in 1989), or generosity. Even leadership is hardly represented. Thus, the categories (including military power) that would be consistent with an increase

8o

Philippe G. Le Prestre

Table 4.12, Identity Expressed in us Foreign Policy Speeches, 1989-93 (absolute and relative [%] frequencies) 1989

Abs. Rel.

Hope Wealth/ prosperity Dynanism/ progress Courage/resolve3 Faces domestic problems Values/ideals'1 Social strength Example/idea Decline/ decadence Military power Peace/order Economic power Sc. & tech. power Winner' Generosity/ altruism Wisdom/ experience Leader Miscellaneous TOTAL

1991

1990

Abs. Rel.

1993

J992

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Rel.

Abs. Rel.

1

2.0

_

_

\

2.8

2

6.7

_

_

1

2.0

-

-

1

2.8

3

10.0

2

5.7

4 1

8.2 2.0

5

-

1 2

2.8 5.6

4

-

10.0

13.3

1

2.9

-

-

22.2

9 -

3 3 -

_ 8.3 8.3 -

1 4 -

24 1 _ 7 4 -

49.0 15

2.0 -

2 1 _

14.3 12

30.0

4.0 2.0 _

24.0 10.0

8 8

22.2

-

30.0

-

3.3

8 2 6 _ 5 1 1

22.9

5.7

17.4

14.3

8.2 -

5 -

-

3

6.1 -

7 -

14.0

-

3 1

8.3 2.8

2 3

10.0

6.7

-

_

_

_

_

2

5.6

_

_

2

5.7

3

6.1

3

6.0

1 1 1

2.8 2.8 2.8

2

6.7

1 1

2.9 2.9

49

100.0 50

-

100.0 36

100.0 30

13.3

-

2.9 2.9 _ -

5

14.3

100.0 35

100.0

' Includes steadfastness, ability to overcome obstacles, sacrifice. b Democracy, freedom, individual rights, limited government, liberal economy, etc.