The United States and Jordan: Middle East Diplomacy during the Cold War 9780755608126, 9781780764702

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people donated their time and talent to assist me with this project. I would like to thank the archive staffs at the Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential libraries, as well as the staff at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. In particular, Regina Greenwell at the LBJ Library encouraged me to request the review of several document collections that were essential to writing this book and retelling Jordanian history. Several academics have given me helpful feedback in the various phases of writing this book, including George Wallerstein, Joel Gordon, Doug Little, Salim Yaqub, Tore Petersen, Simon Smith, Noa Schonmann, Naguib Ghadbian, Randall Woods, and Mitchell Lerner. Grants from the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Libraries provided support for domestic research, and grants from the Middle East Studies program at the University of Arkansas in Little Rock provided funds for research in Jordan. I would like to thank Adnan and Paula Haydar for their persistence and patience in teaching Arabic to graduate students. In addition, I would like to thank Trki Al-Jabaa for his assistance with the nuances of translating Arabic into English.

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The American Center of Oriental Research provided a comfortable facility for my work in Jordan and a grant to support my research. I would like to thank the entire staff, and especially director Barbara Porter for her help. Jesse Karnes served as a fearless travel partner, spending more than a few hours with me on the Syrian border. I would like to thank Dr. Bakr Majali for giving me assistance with obtaining interviews in Jordan. Dr. Majali is an excellent historian in his own right and gave me invaluable help with understanding the complexity of Jordanian society and some of the controversies of Jordanian history. Hazem Nuseibeh, Adnan Abu Odeh, Amjad Majali, Fayyez Tarawneh, Samir Mutawi, and Zaid Rifai all graciously granted me interviews and talked about their personal recollections of King Hussein. On a personal note, I need to thank my children, Jordan and Ariel Bunch, for their tolerance during my absences and for their adventurous willingness to travel abroad, my sister, Melissa Blouin, for her editorial skills that I have exploited many times, and my mother, Julie Lutz, for inspiring me to become an academic. I am grateful to my husband, Bob Hupp, for giving me encouragement and inspiring me with his own creative work and to Dillon, Billy, and Spencer for enriching my world with their own intellectual pursuits. Lastly, I would like to thank the warm, welcoming people of Jordan. Peace be upon you.

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INTRODUCTION

“The greatest general is he who makes the fewest mistakes.” – Attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte As most researchers in academia, I find my subject unique and fascinating, rather like a parent who dotes over the special characteristics of his or her child. Explaining this fascination for a particular subject can be difficult for a researcher, because it stems from years of scrutinizing documents, interviewing diverse individuals, and becoming familiar with exotic locales. Academics often become so intimate with their subjects that it can be difficult to identify the original source of inquiry, yet I will make an attempt in my introduction to justify this book. I became interested in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan because it survived. If one surveys the numerous countries created by the mandate system after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, only one regime of significance survived the twentieth century relatively unaltered. The other major nations of the Middle East suffered from multiple coups, civil wars, foreign invasions, and in the case of Saudi Arabia, one monarchy substituted for another. Jordan is unique because it survived from its creation until the end of the twentieth century with relative continuity in its leadership. The Hashemites of Jordan displayed an almost uncanny ability to survive in the hostile region. This feat then begged the question “why?” with the important accompanying question of “how?” This second

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question drew me into my study of US-Jordanian relations, because it was fairly clear that Jordan needed the assistance of a powerful economic and military patron to survive. In addition, I chose to focus on the period 1948–1970 because at that time the relationship between Jordan and the United States was poorly defined and uncertain. Over several years, I learned about how the relationship evolved and how the Hashemites survived these few decades while most regimes in the Middle East failed. It should not be surprising to the reader that blind luck played an important part in this survival, but the determination and flexibility of specific Hashemite leaders also ensured the survival of the kingdom. In the end, by studying US-Jordanian relations, I learned much about the successes and failures of US policies in the Middle East. My study of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan exposes the flaws and misunderstandings that plagued US policy in Jordan from 1948 to 1970. Chief among those problems was that policymakers pursued competing goals: the ideological desire to promote self-determination and nationalism as an antidote to communist incursions, contrasted with the practical need to create stability in an area of geo-strategic importance. The qualities that the United States hoped to foster in the region – self-determination and stability – were inherently incompatible. Yet, because policy makers refused to acknowledge (or more likely did not recognize) this inherent incompatibility, they formulated ad hoc policies that lacked forethought and a true strategic vision, each administration creating a new approach to the region without a realistic picture of what had succeeded or failed in the past. In the end, due to the pressures of the Cold War, American leaders prized stability over self-determination and did not attempt to foster true change that might have led to long-term progress. Missing in the plans, in all the memoranda, position papers, and directives, was a realistic vision of outcome; that is, with

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all of the economic and military power available to the United States, how the region could be changed – through reasonable means – to suit American strategic exigencies. Stability, therefore, by default became the chief US strategic goal in the Middle East. In the quest for this regional stability, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan slowly evolved into a key component of US policy. The relationship with Jordan did not emerge as a part of a comprehensive strategic plan, but grew in a piecemeal fashion as a reaction to critical events during sequential administrations. Negative assessments of Jordan’s viability prevailed in the corridors of Washington from 1948 to 1970, and events in the Middle East appeared to confirm these views. During that time, one Jordanian monarch was assassinated, the next forced to abdicate after displaying signs of mental instability, and a third took the throne at the vulnerable age of seventeen. In neighboring Middle Eastern nations, dramatic revolutions led to a military coup in Egypt, regicide in Iraq and perennial government instability in Syria. Wars erupted, boundary disputes sapped vital resources and rival Arab governments assisted anti-Hashemite political factions. Yet through the poverty and turmoil, opposition and instability, the Hashemite monarchy persisted and its relationship with the United States expanded steadily. Jordanian-American ties progressed throughout the early Cold War period despite the commonly held American perception that the Jordanian monarchy was doomed to fail. From 1948–1970, the Hashemites of Jordan exploited their relationship with the United States in order to survive in spite of poor natural resources, domestic political strife, and constant border warfare. During this era, the Middle East was transformed from a region controlled almost entirely by foreign powers, into a group of independent nations. The Hashemites in Jordan represented one of the only Middle Eastern regimes to survive the twentieth century and continue into the twenty-first.

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Jordan’s rulers encountered a number of challenges to their monarchy as powers that surrounded this newly minted kingdom continually plotted to absorb Jordanian territory – through military aggression (Israel and Saudi Arabia), dynastic connections (Iraq), or pan-Arabism (Egypt and Syria). In addition, the exploitation of petroleum resources revolutionized the Middle East and caused vast inequities in society. Despite these daunting challenges, the rulers of Jordan sought to prevent social revolution, develop the nation, and expand Jordanian territory. Such lofty goals could not be accomplished without the assistance of a wealthy benefactor nation; but the Hashemite relationship with Britain represented a political liability in an area increasingly awash with anti-imperialism. As a result, Jordanian leaders sought to distance their regime from Britain while seeking economic assistance from other sources. The relationship between the United States and Jordan is critical to understanding how the Hashemites survived. Each administration from Truman to Nixon initially considered alternatives to supporting the Hashemite monarchy, but ultimately chose the stability of a conservative regime over the potential chaos of a nationalist movement. Several powerful historical factors shaped and influenced the JordanianAmerican relationship as it emerged. First, Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism affected the relationship between Jordan and the United States. American leaders viewed Jordan as an artificial imperial construct – an unviable state that would inevitably be transformed through self-determination – yet they also regarded Arab nationalism with deep suspicion. As historian Salim Yaqub explained in his book, Containing Arab Nationalism, American officials were caught between a desire to encourage self-determination as antidote to communist influence, while containing or controlling the influence of Arab nationalist leaders like Gamal Abdel Nasser. Fear of Arab nationalism and its unpredictable consequences forced

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American leaders to extend support to monarchies in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. American officials during this era tended to discount the significance of inter-Arab political alliances and rivalries. Regional competition, particularly for the chosen spot as “champion” of Arab nationalism, guided and influenced the political formation of the Arab states. American leaders, therefore, often miscalculated in their efforts to encourage or discourage pan-Arab cooperation. On the Jordanian side, Arab nationalism forced the Hashemites to pursue flexible (some would say erratic) policies, adopting some of the nationalist program while rejecting its more militant demands. Domestic political pressures, both in Jordan and the United States, had a significant influence on the foreign policy of both nations. In the United States, domestic political pressure tended to come from parties supporting the Israeli state. These groups often attempted to shape foreign policy – with mixed results. Although Israel’s supporters did not have exclusive influence on foreign policy (as some historians and political scientists contend), they limited the number of politically acceptable alternatives available to policy makers.1 To complicate matters, the United States had a very short history of contact with the Middle East and, thus, the press shaped popular opinions to a great extent. The five presidents whose terms are covered in this study – Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon – often limited or modified their policies based on public response, ignoring advice from the departments of state and defense. Domestic pressures in Jordan produced a similar effect; yet, the undemocratic structure of the Jordanian government allowed leaders to arrive at secret arrangements while projecting an acceptable public image. Thus, the government developed dual voices: one for public consumption and one for practical diplomatic purposes.2

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The Cold War represents a fourth, and arguably most significant factor influencing Jordanian-American relations. American leaders viewed the Middle East as a key battleground of the Cold War and became convinced that the Soviet Union represented a greater threat to the Middle East than regional disputes or the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a result, policy decisions from this era reflected the specific concerns of the Cold War, but did not address lasting problems of the region: economic disparity, refugees and the lack of democracy or individual rights and civil liberties. For Jordanian leaders, the Cold War presented an opportunity for a small nation to exploit the Soviet-American rivalry in order to gain financial aid and military appropriations. At first glance, the relationship between the United States and Jordan appears to follow a basic Cold War pattern of superpower/client nation. Deeper investigation, however, reveals significant departures from this simplistic characterization. Jordan’s rulers did not offer complete loyalty and obedience in exchange for economic and military assistance, nor did American leaders extend specific territorial guarantees along with large quantities of military items. American officials were typically frustrated by their inability to control events in Jordan, while Jordanian leaders lamented America’s perceived lack of commitment to the territorial integrity of the kingdom. Geographic considerations also had a powerful influence on the Jordanian-American friendship. Jordan’s geographic location afforded it an inflated degree of importance in the Middle East. Sitting at the continental crossroads and abutting Israel, Jordan resides at the center of both strategic significance and controversy. Jordan’s proximity to Israel proved to be a powerful factor in the formation of America’s policy. For Jordan’s rulers, this territorial propinquity proved to be both a blessing and a curse. The border represented a perennial source of conflict, but also forced American and Israeli leaders to actively pursue

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government stability in Amman. As a result, Jordan’s rulers attempted to occupy the political “center” of the region, serving as advocates of compromise and caution. During the period from 1948–1970, Jordan became an essential part of American policy in the Middle East, providing stability in the nexus of conflict and limiting the scope of Soviet influence. Nonetheless, despite Jordan’s critical position in the region, Jordanian-American relations are often viewed as tangential to the study of United States diplomacy. Scholars have generally focused on diplomatic contact between the United States and more powerful nations, such as Israel, Iraq or Egypt. Due to the controversial nature of the Arab-Israeli dispute, numerous studies of Jordan’s relationship with Israel have been published. Jordan’s interactions with the United States and with her Arab neighbors, both essential parts of the historical narrative, are seldom the subject of monographs. More recently, two excellent biographies of King Hussein have revealed new insights about him, but focus their attentions on his character and his secret communications.3 Initially viewed as a liability by US policy makers, Washington’s perception of Jordan evolved into a moderate, pro-Western state in an area fraught with tension, radicalism and revolution. American officials often depended on Jordan’s leaders to serve as voices of moderation and compromise; the kingdom became a de facto supporter of US policy in the Middle East. Yet Jordan’s key task of maintaining regional stability – particularly its secret cooperation with Israel – remained hidden from the public. This was, of course, primarily because of necessity: the Jordanian public would not accept leaders who cooperated with Israel and such a revelation would imperil the monarchy. Yet even beyond the secrecy involved, American leaders privately failed to acknowledge Jordan’s essential role in the region and neglected to give the Hashemite regime support during dangerous revolutionary events.

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Jordan provides an interesting study for historians of the Middle East and foreign policy, as well as those who seek to understand the subtler processes of diplomacy and the creation of national identity. Jordanian principles of nationalism and unity were entirely constructed by the state, not based on any form of historical legitimacy. American leaders successfully, sometimes unwittingly, assisted the monarchy with the process of creating a durable state in Jordan, despite substantial public opposition to Western influence. From 1948–1970, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan developed into a regional power of significance – not due to oil wealth or military might – but from the efforts of ambitious individuals.

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CHAPTER 1 A KINGDOM OF DR EA MS

It is difficult to conceive that the war-torn, politically and ideologically fragmented modern Middle East emerged from the grand dreams of generals, princes and politicians. Among them, Abdullah ibn Hussein of the Hijaz (Western Arabia) had high expectations for the future of his family and its ability to transform the Middle East. Abdullah belonged to an elite family and received his education in glittering, cosmopolitan Istanbul. During his youth in the capital of the Ottoman Empire, Abdullah became acquainted with European principles of nationalism; these same ideas inspired elite Arabs in Damascus, who planned to create a nation based on their common Arab heritage and identity. The outbreak of World War I in 1914, and the Ottoman government’s collusion with the Central Powers, provided an opportunity for these nationalist schemes to come to fruition. In 1915 Abdullah’s father, Hussein the sharif of Mecca, entered into a partnership with the British government and agreed to lead a rebellion against the Ottoman Sultan in exchange for a promise of sovereignty for the Arab people of the Levant and Arabia. Britain provided advice, weaponry, and financial support to what came to be known as the Arab Revolt. The philosophical motives behind

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the Arab Revolt came from Damascene notables, but it was the Bedouin of the Hijaz, led by Abdullah’s family, who provided the strength needed to defeat the Ottoman armies. Abdullah enthusiastically joined the rebellion; however, British advisors in Arabia judged Abdullah to be “too civilized” for the unpleasant business of warfare.1 While his younger brother Faisal gained accolades for his glamorous military triumphs, Abdullah led a few lackluster, unsuccessful campaigns. Following the war, the British government selected Faisal to represent the Hijaz at the Paris Peace Conference. Abdullah smarted at this slight and – in an attempt to replace Faisal – persuaded his father to recall his younger brother from Europe.2 Events in the Levant intervened in Abdullah’s plan to replace his brother. In 1920 the newly created Syrian congress selected Faisal as the king of a newly independent Syria, and a small group of Iraqi delegates to the same congress declared Abdullah the “King of Mesopotamia.” Finally, the elder brother believed he would emerge from Faisal’s shadow as the leader of a prosperous, strategically significant territory. Unfortunately for Abdullah, the declaration proved to be futile. French leaders had no intention of relinquishing Syria to an independent Arab government. French forces were sent to fight against a nascent Syrian resistance at the battle of Maysalun. Syria became a French Mandate and the nationalist movement was severely crippled. Abdullah’s title, “King of Mesopotamia” – merely ceremonial to begin with – became utterly meaningless. Abullah refused to abandon his grand dream of a Hashemite-led Arab Middle East. In September 1920, he set out from Mecca with one thousand men to join his brother (and possibly the Turkish commander, Mustapha Kemal) in Syria, hoping that a combined Hijazi-Turkish force might dislodge the French. He never arrived in Damascus.3

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A New Kingdom As Abdullah moved toward Syria, British officials struggled with the profound issues of a post-War settlement in the Middle East. Despite their earlier promises to Abdullah’s father, the strategic importance of the region coupled with the significance of its vast oil resources made the issue of Arab independence a low priority. Prior to the end of the war, Britain, France and Tsarist Russia secretly conspired to divide any conquered Ottoman territory; this covert plan, commonly known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, was revealed to the world by Vladimir Lenin in an effort to discredit the Allied powers during the Russian Civil War. When the war ended, Sykes-Picot became a British and French strategic blueprint for the Middle East. The League of Nations endorsed a mandate system that gave Britain and France free rein to occupy desirable territories in the former Ottoman lands. As had been outlined in SykesPicot, Britain gained control over a vast swath of territory that extended from the Nile to the Euphrates and beyond. Governing these extensive lands would necessitate cooperation from local elites. Britain decided to secure its access to Mesopotamian oil reserves by creating a kingdom in Iraq governed by the exiled Faisal, whose leadership skills were highly regarded by powerbrokers in Whitehall. By placing the Ottoman wilayat of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra under Hashemite rule, the British ensured that the Iraqi monarchy would remain loyal and, hopefully, pliable. Palestine, with its highly contested sacred spaces, proved to be a bigger problem. Several British politicians and generals supported the goals of Zionism, but found the nascent dream of a Jewish state, as outlined in the Balfour Declaration, an insufficient reason to expend lives and resources. Palestine could prove useful as a conduit for Iraqi oil; thus, Britain’s interests could potentially dovetail with Zionist goals if the coastline of Palestine

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remained open to British shipping. As the Palestine mandate had both strategic and economic significance, Britain chose to keep it under direct military rule. Between Palestine and Iraq lay an ecologically diverse, nearly uninhabited territory. It stretched from a hilly region of olive groves overlooking the Galilee in the north, to dramatic rock formations and flat plains at Wadi Rum in the south. In the west, near the Jordan River, the land was cultivable and welcoming; in the east, only a few dispersed Bedouin tribes ventured to live in the hostile desert. The land between Iraq and Palestine typically served as a highway for people traveling between more significant and developed locales; it had few alluring qualities. From this sparsely populated, somewhat untamed territory, British officials created the emirate of Transjordan. The purpose of “Transjordania” was quite simple: to serve the British strategic requirements in the Middle East. The newly appointed Secretary of the Colonies, Winston Churchill, shaped the states of the region to suit British plans. Transjordanian land provided a geographic link between Iraq and Palestine, while also serving as a buffer between independent Arab tribes in the south and the French in occupied Syria. Britain’s plans were evident in the shape of the odd eastern panhandle of Jordan – still known in some circles as “Winston’s hiccup” – which connected British territory from the Persian Gulf to the port of Haifa. The British government, however, did not intend to expend significant amounts of blood and treasure governing this resource-poor land; as such, Churchill sought an alternative plan to direct British control. Abdullah’s presence in the region of Transjordania provided a solution to governing this unwanted territory. British intelligence tracked Abdullah’s movements as his entourage slowly moved toward Syria to join Faisal’s fight against French forces.

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Sir Alec Kirkbride, who served as Britain’s official representative in the region, intercepted Abdullah’s entourage and invited him to meet with Churchill in Jerusalem on 28 March 1921. At that meeting, Churchill and Abdullah struck a deal that shaped the future of the region. British representatives convinced Abdullah to take responsibility for the governance of the territory between the Jordan River and Iraq, referred to as “Transjordania,” hinting that his successful stewardship might convince the French to expand his role in Damascus (a highly unlikely scenario – but one that capitalized on Abdullah’s sibling rivalry). As the ruler of Transjordania, he would be responsible for containing anti-British and antiZionist activities along the border of the Palestine mandate; in return, Britain would provide him with military and economic assistance. In exchange, however, Abdullah was required to relinquish all claims to the throne of Iraq, which the British offered to his brother, Faisal. Both parties considered the arrangement to be temporary. Abdullah agreed to take responsibility for the territory for a period of six months; ironically, he and his heirs would remain in power for the remainder of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.4 Abdullah returned from Jerusalem to a territory that lacked any of the basic characteristics of a nation state. The inhabitants of Transjordan consisted of a unique blend of Circassians, exiled Syrian nationalists and a large, fiercely independent nomadic population; forging a sense of cohesion in this infant state would prove to be an ongoing challenge during Abdullah’s reign.5 In addition, the small state of Transjordan remained in perpetual danger of being dismantled by its Arab neighbors, while Zionist leaders sought to include Transjordan in the Palestine mandate as land that could potentially become a Jewish nation. Abdullah faced the task of building a nation in a resource-poor territory: it lacked oil reserves, significant port facilities, and sufficient potable water and arable land.

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Few schools, roads, or government buildings existed in the 1940s and many Jordanians maintained a nomadic lifestyle that consisted of breeding goats, camels, sheep and horses in Jordan’s dry interior. Transjordan’s survival as a state, therefore, was largely dependent on the ingenuity and resourcefulness of its new leader. For over two decades, King Abdullah struggled with two competing impulses: his desire to create a strong, independent Arab kingdom and his need for external financial support.6 His vision of an independent Arab state was partially fulfilled when, following World War II, the British terminated their mandate and Jordanians celebrated their independence on 25 May 1946.7 But true independence, a secure and viable kingdom governed by the Hashemites, would remain a perpetual challenge for Abdullah and his heirs.

The Palestine Problem Prior to World War II, the United States had little interest in the Middle East; however, the critical need for oil and the geographic-strategic significance of the region revolutionized American attitudes.8 The transformation of the American economy and lifestyle – fueled primarily by oil – initiated a greater awareness of the Middle East. In addition, in the post-World War II era a more powerful force than the need for oil shaped American policy: the Cold War. Yet neither oil nor geo-strategic rivalry with the Soviet Union brought Transjordan to the attention of the United States, but rather the issue of Zionism. Zionist demands for a Jewish state in Palestine, which quieted during World War II, became much more vocal and urgent following the war. Palestine, therefore, provided a context for communication between Transjordan and the United States. Ever ambitious and proactive in his approach to regional affairs, King Abdullah wrote a letter to President Franklin

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Roosevelt on 10 March 1945, hoping to elucidate the Arab position on Palestine. Abdullah insisted that the land “. . . is not sufficient to hold any more people and can not admit an immigrant people whose intentions are not friendly and who ultimately aim at ousting the Arabs either partly or completely.” Abdullah’s words reflected the prevalent opinion in most Arab nations: the creation of a Jewish homeland would violate the right of self-determination for the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. Due to Roosevelt’s untimely death, the letter never reached him, but the State Department directed it to the newly inaugurated President Harry Truman for a response.9 Harry S. Truman entered the Oval Office at a time of tremendous geo-political upheaval. His administration experienced the satisfaction of victory over Germany and Japan, yet immediately confronted the complex challenges of the Cold War. The United States was at a distinct disadvantage in its relations with post-colonial nations due to its close ties to imperial powers like France and Great Britain. It was difficult to encourage social change in the Middle East when communists promoted their cause as a remedy to imperialism.10 Truman’s personal disdain for monarchies prejudiced his opinion of Transjordan; to the President and many other American officials, Transjordan was merely a British proxy state, a remnant of the decaying colonial world. Yet Truman’s desire to find a solution for the problems of Palestine eventually caused him to acknowledge Transjordan’s potential as an Arab partner for a Jewish state. The issue of Palestine proved to be a pressing dilemma for the President. He wanted to assist individuals who were displaced by the war – primarily Jews who had survived the Holocaust – and he encountered overwhelming domestic political pressure to facilitate the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Letters poured in to the White House, Congress passed resolutions supporting the establishment of a Jewish state, and

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noted Zionist leaders like Chaim Weizmann made personal appeals to the President. Truman could not ignore the political power of these groups, as his close advisors Clark Clifford and Samuel Rosen were quick to point out in private counsel. The pro-Israeli lobby was a powerful and well-organized political entity that kept the Palestine issue at the forefront of political debates throughout 1946 and 1947. In addition to the external pressure exerted on the President, Truman was personally troubled by the horrors of Hitler’s concentration camps and firmly believed that the world had a moral obligation to care for the survivors of the Holocaust.11 On the other side of the debate, the State Department continually reminded Truman that amicable relations with the Arab world would be essential in light of America’s energy needs and the emergent conflict with the Soviet Union. Yet the President’s lack of experience made him somewhat defensive on matters of foreign policy; he resented unsolicited advice from State Department officials and privately referred to them as “striped pants boys.” Rather than accept advice from diplomats, Truman preferred to rely on counsel from a close circle of trusted advisers and friends, as well as his personal notions about ethical policy. In addition, he tended to view the world in a simplistic set of paradigms: despite thousands of years of change in the Middle East, he tended to refer to Palestine in Biblical terms.12 When Abdullah’s letter arrived on Truman’s desk in the spring of 1945, acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew advised Truman to re-affirm President Roosevelt’s well-publicized assurance to King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia that “no decision should be taken respecting the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.” The President responded as Grew suggested, but soon advocated an approach to Palestine that State Department officials, British leaders, and Arab heads of state found problematic. In 1945 he

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publicly called for the admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine – a recommendation that directly contravened British policy. Truman’s initiative appeared to undermine his previous assurance, as Abdullah pointed out in a telegram dated from 29 September 1945: “. . . the admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants is so important a decision that the Arabs consider that they ought to be consulted.” Truman responded to the King by insisting that there had been no change in the basic US policy, but he struggled with the incongruity of honoring Roosevelt’s commitment while promoting Palestine as a solution to the refugee problem.13 Abdullah’s interest in Palestine was far from altruistic; he sought to expand his small realm by any means possible. Palestine represented a choice prize for the King as it contained superior agricultural land and could facilitate his plan for a “Greater Syria” encompassing Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan. Ruling the holy city of Jerusalem, with the Haram al-Sharif, would lend additional credibility to the Hashemite monarchy. In his quest to gain control over part of Palestine, Abdullah petitioned Western governments, but also negotiated secretly with prominent Jewish leaders and prepared for the opportunity to “liberate” Arab lands. As American policy on the Palestine issue continued to evolve, it became apparent that Truman would not implement Roosevelt’s promise of full consultation. Abdullah persisted in his attempt to lobby against an emergent Jewish state in Palestine and tried to appeal to Truman’s sense of fairness by arguing “. . . you will not be inclined to exterminate one community for the sake of providing happiness for another . . . you should be able to find a form of justice which will not, on the one hand, deprive the Arabs in Palestine of their home, their dignity and their supremacy and will not, on the other hand, deprive the other party of their happiness of peace and rest.” Truman, however, did not view the Palestinian question in

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terms of displacing Arabs, but rather as an issue of America’s strategic necessities, combined, of course, with his personal desire to find a safe haven for the displaced victims of Nazi persecutions. As other problems weighed heavily on Truman’s mind – primarily the disposition of the Soviet Union and the reconstruction of Europe – Palestine was of secondary importance. Thus, Truman had neither the time nor the motivation to fulfill Roosevelt’s promise of full consultation.14

Dividing the Land Despite Truman’s interest in the Palestine issue, events in that remote territory were, for the most part, beyond his control. An escalation of violence in the Palestine mandate convinced British officials that the time had come for an expedient (if not graceful) exit. In February 1947, the British government pledged to withdraw from the Palestine mandate and asked that the United Nations devise a solution for the territorial demands of both Jews and Arabs. The following summer, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine visited the region and recommended that the mandate be divided into two distinct states: one Jewish and one Arab. The UN General Assembly approved of the plan in November, and the region quickly degenerated into a state of civil war as the Arabs and Jews battled for territory, while Britain prepared to exit. Initially it appeared that partition would satisfy both Truman’s humanitarian concerns and America’s strategic interests. A CIA report dated 28 November 1947 outlined the repercussions of the partition plan. According to the report, the CIA believed that the Jews in Palestine would be able to create and defend a viable state – at least for a few years. The authors did not anticipate a threat to oil supplies in the event of a war in Palestine: “it appears unlikely that the Arab governments will cancel existing oil concessions.”15 Thus, in practical terms,

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the CIA predicted that the partition plan would not impede American or European access to oil. Truman’s rejection of the naysayers in the State Department appeared to be vindicated. As the date of British withdrawal approached and the lines of the Cold War calcified, Truman began to view the conflict in terms of global strategy. He became less concerned about the regional territorial conflict between Arabs and Jews and more troubled by the potential for Soviet intervention in Palestine. During 1947, Truman initiated a policy of containing the Soviet Union by launching the Marshall Plan and offering to replace British aid to Greece and Turkey. Soviet troops, after gaining footholds in Eastern Europe and Northern Iran, were seemingly impossible to dislodge. The CIA warned Truman that the rapidly deteriorating situation in Palestine would likely lead to UN military intervention, with the potential introduction of Soviet troops to the region. Intelligence analysts concluded that the Soviets would use this opportunity to penetrate and dominate the entire Middle East – eventually depriving the United States of its oil reserves. Truman’s advisors, fearing this outcome and hoping to stabilize Palestine, hurriedly attempted to find an acceptable alternative to partition. The State Department proposed the idea of a temporary UN trusteeship as a solution. The President approved this plan, perhaps believing that it would prevent Soviet military intervention in the event of a prolonged conflict between Arabs and Jews. The trusteeship proposal was widely denounced by Jewish leaders and immediately abandoned by Truman, who claimed that the State Department had undermined his official policy. In reality, the trusteeship plan was simply an ad hoc and ill-timed attempt to pre-empt Soviet incursions in Palestine.16 While Truman viewed the issue with a geo-strategic eye, Abdullah focused on his own specific territorial concerns and secretly tried to expand his state through negotiations

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with Jewish leaders in Palestine. American fears of Soviet intervention diminished somewhat when word of an agreement between Abdullah and Zionist leaders emerged. On 11 May 1948, prominent Democrat and Zionist advocate Max Lowenthal warned the Special Counsel to the President, Clark Clifford, “Please do not let anyone else read this dynamite.” He attached a copy of a memorandum of conversation between Secretary of State George Marshall and Moshe Shertok, head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency: Last Saturday, May 8, at a conference in his office with Mr. Shertok, the Secretary was given a cable received by Mr. Shertok from Palestine, reporting an offer from an Arab Legion colonel representing King Abdullah; the offer was for an agreement between Abdullah and the Jewish State, to enable Abdullah, without Jewish interference, to take over the Arab portion of Palestine, while leaving the Jewish area to the Jews. Indeed, on that same day Abdullah met with Jewish Agency representative Golda Meir to negotiate plans to minimize violence during the British withdrawal. Their agreement was informal and unwritten but later recorded by witnesses. Meir and Abdullah privately agreed that Abdullah should occupy the areas of Palestine designated by the United Nations as an Arab state. Both sides wanted to avoid military conflict and hoped that a private pact would prevent bloodshed. One point was never settled: Abdullah wanted the Jewish territory to be a part of a Transjordanian federation, while Meir insisted on full independence. Upon learning of these negotiations, Secretary Marshall expressed American approval, stating twice to Moshe Shertok, “there is nothing I would like more than such an agreement between Abdullah and the Jews.”17

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Truman enthusiasts often applaud his decision to recognize the nascent State of Israel on 14 May 1948, as a courageous and bold move. In reality, the President, despite his subsequent reputation as the “midwife” at the birth of the Israeli state, did very little to ensure its success. He relied on reports of Zionist military superiority and was unwilling to use American forces to secure the specific territorial provisions of the partition plan. Instead, his primary concern was the global Cold War and the possibility of Soviet intervention in Palestine and the greater Middle East. He briefly supported trusteeship as a means to stabilize the region and a barrier to Soviet penetration, yet reversed course due to vehement domestic opposition. Truman’s policy was inaction: by withdrawing the trusteeship proposal, he abandoned a proactive policy designed to preempt Soviet moves, and accepted a reactive one that permitted events in the Middle East to unfold with minimal interference from the United States. Far from acting as “midwife,” Truman more truthfully resembled a squeamish father who lingered in the waiting room until the announcement of the birth. The extent to which the secret arrangement between Abdullah and Jewish leaders influenced the field of battle is unknown. Both sides later claimed that the plan to divide the mandate was never truly implemented, that talks broke off before the 15 May deadline, and that the armies fought fiercely for territory in Palestine. The Jordanian army crossed into contested territory on 15 May 1948, the day after British withdrawal. Abdullah may have partially restrained his troops and kept them close to the boundaries of territory allotted to the Arabs by the United Nations; yet, he disappointed Jewish leaders by allowing Iraqi troops to cross Jordanian territory and join the fight. The Arab Legion occupied most of the territory designated by the United Nations for an Arab state, but later abandoned significant tracts of land as prolonged fighting diminished their supply of ammunition.

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The Search for Stability The land gained by Jordan in 1948 satisfied some of Abdullah’s territorial ambitions, as it included the holy cities of Hebron and Jerusalem and important urban areas in Nablus and Ramallah. To solidify his control of the West Bank, Abdullah convened a meeting of pro-Hashemite Palestinian notables at Jericho in December of 1948. The Palestinian delegates consented to Jordanian annexation of the West Bank, and Abdullah hoped that the Palestinians eventually would accept Jordanian citizenship, supporting his plan for a larger, panArab “Greater Syria.” Many Palestinian refugees, however, retained their exclusive identity and rejected assimilation with the Jordanians of the East Bank.18 Thus the acquisition of Palestine proved to be both an asset and a potential threat to the emergent identity of Jordan. Sir Alec Kirkbride, by then the British official resident in Jordan, noted this paradox when he observed: “Immediately after the termination of the mandate over Palestine, the Arab inhabitants of that country expressed fears of their being “colonized” by the Transjordanians. It is now possible to state that precisely the reverse has taken place and that it is the Palestinians who have, and still are, colonizing the east bank or the old Transjordan.” Indeed, the rulers of Jordan struggled with the problem of a competing Palestinian national identity for many decades after 1948.19 Aside from the difficulties of assimilating numerous refugees, Jordanian occupation of the West Bank also entailed the defense of an extensive, porous border with the new state of Israel. Not only did Israeli and Jordanian forces occasionally resume fighting along the ceasefire line, displaced Palestinians tried to return to their homes on a daily basis, causing conflict with the Israeli army. The United Nations General Assembly debated the merits of sending a peacekeeping force to monitor the border, hoping that the presence of UN soldiers might

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mitigate the violence. Once again, Cold War concerns dominated the Truman administration’s approach to the issue of security arrangements for the armistice line. In NSC 27, written in August 1948, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed introducing a United Nations force into Palestine, even for peacekeeping purposes. Forrestal argued that the Soviet government would use the UN military presence as a conduit to extend their power: The entry of Soviet forces into Palestine would have the most far-reaching strategic implications . . . there would be no limitation on the number of Soviet forces that might enter Palestine with or without justification by the developing situation. The way would thus be open for Soviet military domination of the Near and Middle East, which would exert tremendously harmful influence on and even jeopardize our global strategy and resources in the event of war with our most probable enemy.20 The presence of Soviet troops, Forrestal concluded, even under the banner of the UN, might facilitate Soviet penetration of the Middle East. Thus NSC 27 reflected a concern for the geo-strategic significance of Palestine, but failed to produce an alternative solution for the specific territorial and humanitarian issues of the border disputes.21 Similarly, the refugee problem in Arab countries reflected the administration’s preoccupation with the Cold War. Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote: “The Arab states presently represent a highly vulnerable area for Soviet exploitation, and the presence of over 700,000 destitute, idle refugees provides the likeliest channel for such exploitation.” Repatriation and resettlement of the refugees, although a costly endeavor, would prevent the Soviets from gaining a foothold in the desolate

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camps.22 In an effort to pressure Israel on territorial and refugee issues, James McDonald, the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv, delivered a note to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion stating that the United States government might be forced into “a revision of its attitude toward Israel” if Israel did not repatriate a significant number of refugees.23 During this critical time in Jordanian and Israeli history, fears of the Soviet Union’s potential exploitation of the Middle East shaped Truman’s policy. By resisting any form of military intervention, even under the banner of the United Nations, Truman precluded Soviet interference, but also diminished America’s ability to bring about an end to the violence. His strategy indicated, unconsciously, that a chaotic, unstable Middle East would be preferable to one dominated by the Soviet Union. Rather than pursuing a path of direct intervention, Truman chose to rely on proxy leaders to create a secure, pro-Western Middle East. He expected Israel to reciprocate his support and also viewed Jordan’s monarchy as Israel’s potential partner in economic growth and border security. Truman linked Israel’s fate to Jordan in a number of ways. First of all, he encouraged Abdullah to maintain communication with the Israeli government in an effort to prevent the escalation of border violence (which might necessitate international military intervention). While Jordanian and Israeli representatives met at Rhodes in 1949 to negotiate an armistice, simultaneous private exchanges took place in Jerusalem between Abdullah and Israeli representatives. Dean Acheson initially advised Truman to “give indirect encouragement” to Abdullah, knowing that the talks must remain secret, but the State Department later determined that the secret meetings were unproductive as Israeli officials used their superior military position to pressure Abdullah into ceding additional territory. The King’s prestige suffered greatly as a result of the loss; his willingness to parlay with the Israelis and surrender land branded him a

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traitor in the minds of many Palestinians. After this debacle, the State Department discouraged Abdullah from pursuing additional secret negotiations, but continued to advocate open diplomacy as a means to prevent border violence.24 Second, US officials expected Jordan (with the newly annexed Arab Palestine) to serve as a haven for Palestinian refugees – just as Israel became a home for Jewish European refugees. Although Truman advised, even coerced, the Israelis to accept some repatriation, documents from the State Department make it clear that American officials expected Jordan to absorb a large number of refugees. Since Jordan had annexed the Arab portions of Palestine at the Jericho Conference, American officials viewed it as a de facto Palestinian state; therefore, the kingdom could eventually eliminate the problem of displaced Palestinians.25 Third, American policymakers believed that Jordan and Israel could become economic partners – with sufficient incentives from the United States. The State Department advocated a program “To examine the developmental resources common to Israel and the expanded state of Transjordan, with special reference to their water resources, with a view to stimulating cooperative economic development projects, where feasible, for the mutual benefit of both states.” By encouraging Jordan and Israel to become economic partners, US officials hoped to create a capitalist, pro-Western bulwark against Soviet dominance in the region.26 In recognition of this potential partnership, the President linked the question of Jordanian and Israeli legitimacy by simultaneously extending de jure recognition to both states shortly after Israeli elections in early 1949. This move acknowledged the connection between Jordan’s fate and the future of the Israeli state. In doing so, however, officials assumed that Jordan would remain moderate, Hashemite, and pro-Western – but did nothing to assure the survival of the vulnerable kingdom.27

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Limited Arms Control In September 1949, the State Department declared the Middle East sufficiently stable and that arms sales to the region could be resumed, with the caveat that arms to Israel and the Arab states should be limited to those needed “for the purpose of providing for reasonable requirements of self defense.” Acknowledging the importance of arms control, the United States issued a tripartite declaration with France and the United Kingdom on 25 May 1950, stating that the three governments opposed an arms race in the Middle East and that arms provided by these three countries should not be used for acts of aggression against any state. Although subsequent presidents attempted to follow these guidelines, neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of State specifically defined what constituted either a defensive or offensive weapon.28 While the United States openly committed to arms control in the Tripartite Agreement, the National Security Council secretly recommended that the Near East should be strengthened militarily to guard against communist incursions, and that it would be preferable that the states of the Middle East receive their weapons from “friendly sources.” Truman abided by the principles of the Tripartite Agreement during his presidency, but the ambiguity over what constituted a defensive weapon would leave subsequent presidents plenty of room to maneuver around the restrictions. In addition, as the Cold War became increasingly dominant as a framework for crafting policy during the 1950s, providing weaponry to pro-Western regimes in the Middle East became an essential part of US strategy.29

Conclusion For the remainder of his presidency, Truman turned his attention to pressing matters such as the war in Korea and the

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spread of Soviet influence in Europe. The President received numerous accolades from the Jewish community for his role in the birth of the Jewish nation and virtually no criticism for the continued border violence and refugee crisis in Palestine. As time passed, Truman anticipated that the United Nations would implement a solution to the refugee issue; therefore, American officials paid scant attention to Jordan. Jordan, he assumed, could develop into a partner in Israel’s stability, a pro-Western entity that would sensibly choose economic prosperity over violence and radicalism, and serve as new home for Palestinian refugees. Satisfied with his territorial gains in Palestine, Abdullah abandoned the subject in his letters to President Truman, yet tales of his collusion with Israel continued to circulate in the Palestinian refugee camps. In July 1951, the American consul in Amman heard rumors of an assassination plot against Abdullah, and he advised the King to cancel a trip to attend Friday prayers at the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. Abdullah ignored the warning and drove to Jerusalem, accompanied by his grandson, Hussein. At noon, the tranquility of the Haram al-Sharif was broken when an assassin, concealed behind the door of the mosque, shot the King in the head at close range, killing him instantly.30 Abdullah’s reign had been dominated by the need to create a secure, viable state, and while he succeeded in adding valuable land to the Hashemite kingdom, he simultaneously passed a host of problems on to his heirs. Rejecting communism and advocating a pro-Western orientation in the Cold War, Abdullah established a precedent for the Jordanian monarchy. Jordan, however, still relied heavily on economic and military assistance from Great Britain, which came with the stigma of British imperialism. The Hashemites could not enjoy the respect of their subjects until they shed the onus of British interference. As such, Abdullah’s heirs

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would seek a new patron to provide economic and military assistance. The Truman administration’s approach to the Middle East and the conflict in Palestine reflected the prevalent concerns of the immediate post-World War II era. Focused on the Cold War, Truman officials positioned the Middle East within the global struggle for power and neglected to address the specific disputes that fractured the peace of the region. A pro-Western Israel would strengthen the United States and give it a foothold in the Middle East, as policy makers exposited in a National Security Council report from 1949: “Should Israel ally herself with the Western Democracies in the event of war with the USSR, full advantage could be taken of defensive positions in that country and of Israel’s forces for the defense of the CairoSuez area and for land operations to defend or to recapture the Middle East oil facilities.”31 Conversely, in the event of war, Soviet domination of Israel could interfere with oil pipelines and the supply of Turkey. The United States could not rest assured that Israel would align with the Western powers; the same report stated that Israeli leaders tended to favor alignment with the West, but openly professed neutrality due to public pressure.32 Despite this overt neutrality, the United States hoped to count on Israel as a friendly state. To reinforce the relationship, the United States extended de jure recognition to Israel, supported its application for an Export-Import Bank loan of $100 million, and endorsed its membership in the United Nations. These steps were not, however, enough to guarantee Israel’s security. In order to thrive in the region, Israel needed secure borders and economic partners. American policy makers hoped that the Arab countries surrounding Israel would eventually see the advantages of peace and form a pro-Western bloc in the Middle East, as a May 1949 NSC report on the Middle East stated, reconciling their differences to coordinate

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efforts against Soviet aggression.33 Yet a subsequent report in September belied the May report, and portrayed the Arab nations as resistant to accepting the state of Israel, stating: “their principal unity lies in their implacable animosity and common fear of Israel.”34 Thus, from the outset, US policymakers accepted certain inherent contradictions within their overall strategy: Israel, potentially a keystone of America’s position in the Middle East, required partners to endure – but no Arab leader could survive an overt partnership. During Truman’s tenure in office, policy makers failed to recognize that a stable, cooperative Jordan had inadvertently become an important factor in the security of the Israeli state. Israel needed Jordan as a haven for Palestinian refugees and to cooperate in creating a secure, stable border, but this cooperation depended on the leadership of King Abdullah and did not reflect the wishes of the majority of his subjects. Abdullah took a pragmatic approach and paid the ultimate price for his secret negotiations, a price that other Middle Eastern leaders would be reluctant to pay. Therefore, both Israeli and American interests in Jordan became tied to the fate of one individual, rather than a stable political system. After the creation of the State of Israel, Jordan became a de facto part of American regional policy, but one that was seldom acknowledged for its essential function as a buffer state between Israel and more aggressive nations. Due to its geographic position, Jordan played a part in American regional plans, a role that for political reasons could not be acknowledged. President Truman did not recognize that his plans for the Middle East were partially based on the maintenance of a secure, moderate Jordanian leadership. White House and State Department officials also failed to acknowledge that they pursued competing goals in the Middle East. Because its goals were by nature incompatible, the Truman administration could not pursue a rational policy in the Middle

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East. Rather than formulating a grand strategy for the region and taking proactive steps to achieve it, the administration became highly reactive – guided primarily by regional events and crises as necessary. This crisis/response pattern became a hallmark of American policy in the region; a tangible sign of policies constrained by their own inherent contradictions.

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CHAPTER 2 CONTAINMENT AND CONTR ADICTIONS

Abdullah’s death touched off a flurry of speculation about the future of Jordan and the Hashemite monarchy; the line of succession was far from certain. The assassination left Jordan seemingly moribund as a nation state. Sir John Troutbeck of the British Foreign Office gloomily concluded: “It is not merely ‘one ruler’ who has been eliminated, but the man who held his country together almost single-handed.”1 Leaderless and vulnerable, Jordan appeared to be on the verge of civil war as rioters attacked Palestinians in Jerusalem. The citizens of Jordan were unaware of the extent of the damage done by Abdullah’s death: unbeknownst to the public, the King’s eldest son and heir, Crown Prince Talal, was receiving treatment at a Swiss mental hospital when the assassination occurred. Talal suffered from schizophrenia; his volatile fits of rage, according to one British observer, had reached “carpet-biting proportions.” Some Jordanian and British officials considered installing Abdullah’s second son, Nayyef, as regent, but quickly concluded that Talal’s intermittent sanity was preferable to Nayyef’s rumored corruption and political scheming. Committed to the continuity of Hashemite leadership, a group of government-appointed physicians flew to Switzerland, examined Talal, and proclaimed him

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perfectly sane – cured from what they diagnosed as a prolonged bout of depression. Talal returned to Amman and took the oath of office on 6 September 1951. King Talal’s mental clarity lasted only a few months, and the severity of his illness soon became apparent to the Jordanian prime minister, Tawfiq Abul Huda. Determined to keep the monarchy intact, Abul Huda, along with other powerful Jordanian ministers, became indispensable to government operations during Talal’s eleven-month reign. The Prime Minister initiated a remarkable period of liberal reform by integrating the monarchy’s chief opponents into the government structure. The primary achievement of Talal’s reign was constitutional reform; the parliament approved a new constitution on 29 December 1951. Unfortunately, by the next spring Talal’s violence and erratic behavior became a source of public embarrassment and government insecurity, which was compounded when he refused treatment. While the King vacationed in Europe, Abul Huda convened a secret meeting of the Jordanian parliament and voted to depose the King. Significantly, Abul Huda did not seek to undermine the monarchy or to create a democracy; he supported Talal’s son, Hussein, to become the new leader of the kingdom.2 Although it is clear that the King’s mental illness ultimately led to his removal, many Jordanians suspected that the British orchestrated Talal’s exit because they disliked his independent character. Like his first cousin King Ghazi of Iraq, Talal was known to express anti-British sentiments – ideas that could potentially undermine the conservative base of the Jordanian-British partnership. In addition, his reign was punctuated by liberal reform: lifting restrictions on censorship and drafting a new constitution. Conspiracy theorists remain convinced that Talal’s mental illness was used by conservative, pro-British elements in the government to remove the King from office; however, the events of Talal’s reign do not fit

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neatly into this story. Many of the liberal reforms (including ones that curtailed the power of the monarchy and enhanced parliamentary power) were implemented by the same leaders who removed Talal from office, and these leaders continued to liberalize Jordan while Talal remained virtually ineffectual.3

The King and Ike Hussein first learned of his father’s removal when he received a message in Switzerland addressed to “His Majesty King Hussein.” The brief note represented an abrupt transition from his childhood to the weighty responsibility of monarchy. Hussein immediately traveled home for a brief meeting with government officials and then returned to Britain for an expedited course of training at Sandhurst military academy. On 2 May 1953, the seventeen-year-old Hussein rode in the back of a light blue convertible to the Jordanian parliament building in Amman for his formal coronation.4 The experience of ruling Jordan must have been jarring, a far cry from his youth spent at Harrow and boarding school in Cairo. His experience with leadership was quite limited; although King Abdullah took a personal interest in the training of his grandson – perhaps because he never warmed to Talal – Hussein’s time with his grandfather was largely limited to holidays. His classmate at school, Zaid Rifai, recalled that Hussein was not the model student, noting: “He was very mischievous; he didn’t take his studies very seriously.” Many British observers feared that he would become another “playboy” king who would enjoy the pleasures of the European social circuit more than the duties of ruling a country. Despite his youth and his penchant for reckless behavior, however, Hussein proved to be a serious, dedicated ruler and displayed remarkable political acumen.5 A few months before Hussein accepted the mantle of leadership, former general Dwight David Eisenhower took the oath

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of office in January 1953. In contrast to Hussein, Eisenhower entered the office of the presidency with extensive leadership experience, having tested his abilities in World War II and as the commander of NATO. Eisenhower was a consummate soldier, a man of firm opinions who esteemed qualities like personal courage and ambition. Like most American officials of his time, Eisenhower was preoccupied with containing the communist threat and assuring that the free world would remain out of the Soviet Union’s grasp.6 Recognizing the volatile potential of the Middle East, Eisenhower hoped to encourage stability in the region and improve relations between Israel and her Arab neighbors. The President believed that Arabs and Americans shared a common religious interest in containing communism, writing in correspondence: “belief in God should create between them and us the common purpose of opposing atheistic communism.”7 Eisenhower believed that Truman had unwisely catered to pro-Israeli sympathizers in Congress, and he sought to improve America’s image in Arab countries. Like his predecessor, Eisenhower received a significant amount of pressure from the American Jewish community to support Israel financially and militarily; he viewed this pressure with disdain and vowed to approach foreign policy impartially. The President also recognized that the United States must maintain access to Middle Eastern oil, if not for American consumption then to ensure a steady supply for Western Europe.8 Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, agreed that Truman’s administration had erred by allowing Middle East policy to be unduly influenced by domestic pressures. In Dulles’s view, Truman had supported Israel for purely political reasons, and the resulting antagonism in the Arab world could be exploited by the Soviet Union. In addition to disdaining Truman’s approach to the region, Dulles found Israeli political tactics distasteful, accusing them of “carrying on a very highly

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organized and high-powered campaign directed to force our hand irrespective of our judgment.” At one point in 1954, Dulles summoned the Israeli Ambassador to a secret meeting, and privately chastised him for going “beyond the bounds” of propriety by interfering in American domestic politics. Thus, in contrast to the pronounced divisions of the Truman administration, the State Department and the White House concurred on Middle East policy during the Eisenhower era.9

The Quest for Peace and Stability Eisenhower and Dulles hoped to transform the Middle East from a radical, unstable region to one where democracy and Western-style capitalism could take root, thus keeping its valuable oil resources out of Soviet clutches. Their plan consisted of several policy initiatives: supporting economic development in the region, promoting stable pro-Western regimes, assisting with peace negotiations between Arabs and Israelis, and encouraging democratic reform. Unwittingly, these goals embodied a conflict: the pro-Western regimes, which Eisenhower hoped to stabilize, were typically monarchies – inherently undemocratic. Thus, encouraging democratic reform in the Middle East could potentially destabilize key regimes that supported the United States in the Cold War. Eisenhower recognized that Israel and the related problem of the Palestinian refugees created widespread animosity that destabilized the Middle East. Yet, like Truman, he viewed the refugee issue as a part of the global Cold War rather than a regional humanitarian problem. His CIA director, Allen Dulles, warned the administration that Palestinian refugees were becoming “Communist stooges” while the United States paid the bill for refugee relief. To combat radicalism in the refugee camps and improve the American image, Eisenhower offered economic aid packages to Arab nations for

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the creation of work projects targeted to employ Palestinian refugees. Unfortunately, Arab leaders hesitated to use funding specifically for refugee projects when extreme poverty and unemployment were rampant in the Middle East. From 1954 on, Eisenhower worked with the British on what became known as Project Alpha, a series of secret peace negotiations between Arabs (primarily Egypt) and Israelis. This twin attack on the problems of the Middle East – through aid and secret diplomacy – displayed Eisenhower’s fervent desire to keep the Middle East out of the Soviet sphere of influence. Despite its connection to the refugee issue, Jordan, being neither rich in oil nor of obvious strategic relevance, was not a significant part of the President’s plan for change in the Middle East. Viewing the region from a global perspective, Eisenhower focused on the major power-broker nations of the region and overlooked Jordan’s role as a potential stabilizing partner for Israel.10

The Border Problem Of course, during the turbulent era of the early 1950s the situation along the border between Jordan and Israel remained volatile and was punctuated by violent events. The border between Israel and Jordan on the West Bank stretched for 650 kilometers; it was virtually impossible to monitor effectively. Samir Mutawi, a Jordanian historian, described the porous nature of the border, recalling: “I had a friend whose father was from that village (Qabala) and we used to go for weekend picnics to the West Bank. So he took me to this village and someone said, ‘Shall I feed you Israeli food tonight?’ He served a whole meal that he had just bought from the Israeli side.” In fact, residents of the West Bank often crossed the border on simple errands or to retrieve their former property. In the city of Ramallah, Palestinians established a market for selling items that were smuggled from abandoned Arab households

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in Israel to the West Bank. Monitoring illicit border traffic was a constant concern of both Jordanians and Israelis.11 Unfortunately, violence along the border was also common. Palestinian infiltrators sometimes sought retribution for their exile and attacked Israeli civilians. In October 1953, Palestinian guerillas infiltrated Israel and murdered an Israeli woman and her two children. In response, the Israeli army led a massive assault on the Jordanian border town of Qibya. Under the command of Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) destroyed 45 Jordanian homes as a punitive measure. Around 69 Jordanian civilians were killed as they hid from the Israeli army.12 The Israeli government’s policy of overwhelming retaliation, while popular with the Israeli public, risked destabilizing Hussein’s monarchy. The Qibya raid exposed the weakness of Jordanian defenses along the Israeli border and criticism quickly fell on the King. The aftermath of the events at Qibya also revealed internal dissent dividing the Jordanian population. Many Jordanians, particularly those of Palestinian heritage, believed that the British commanders of the Arab Legion had failed to make a concerted effort to stop the Israelis, and they called for a greater Palestinian presence in the army. Resentment against the continuing British presence in Jordan became palpable during the period following the attack. Rioting ensued on both the East and West Banks, along with demands that British officers be purged from the Arab Legion.13 Eisenhower responded to the attacks at Qibya by officially censuring Israel and withholding economic aid. This action did not have any long-term effect as congressional pressure forced Eisenhower to restore the aid; however, the President’s swift response underscored his desire to maintain an amicable relationship with the Arab world. The President discovered that he needed to tread lightly if his other initiatives for the Middle East were to be successful; he could not craft a Middle East policy without considering congressional response.

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Many members of Congress viewed all Arab countries as identical: bloodthirsty aggressors in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This paradigm made it more difficult for Eisenhower (and subsequent presidents) to support moderate regimes in the Middle East as Congress perceived any military aid to Arab countries as a threat to Israel. More specifically, the events after Qibya displayed to Eisenhower that although he favored a less conciliatory approach to Israel, it would be difficult to implement in light of domestic political considerations.14 Attacks along the border between Jordan and Israel erupted periodically throughout 1954, causing outrage in both Arab and Israeli communities. As a whole, Eisenhower maintained his role as an impartial broker and pressured both sides to cooperate to minimize violence. The border disputes fed a deeper concern within the administration: the possibility that this regional dispute would burgeon into a larger global conflict. White House officials believed that communism thrived in chaotic atmospheres; it was clear to the President that instability in the Middle East could be exploited by the Soviet Union to gain a foothold in the region.15

The Baghdad Pact To promote regional cooperation and insure a pro-Western orientation in the Middle East, Eisenhower encouraged the formation of a regional defensive pact. He initially envisioned this pact as a “Northern tier” of defense including Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The British, however, wanted the pact to include Iraq: a vital source of oil for Western Europe. The Baghdad Pact (also known as the Turko-Iraqi Pact), which eventually included Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, and Great Britain, formed in February 1955. Eisenhower lost his enthusiasm for the pact when Britain joined, recognizing that it had taken on an imperial stigma.16

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As a product of Western anti-Soviet strategy, the pact served to enhance national rivalries rather than promote regional stability. Gamal Abdel Nasser, a popular leader of the Egyptian Revolution, aggressively opposed the pact, arguing that it was simply a device of Western dominance. A former colonel who gained control of Egypt in 1954, Nasser was a man of great ambition and personal charisma. Nasser’s popularity stemmed from his bold political stance: he advocated a mixture of nationalism, pan-Arabism, and non-alignment. As the Baghdad Pact lent a degree of prestige to Iraq, and could potentially undermine his claim to leadership in the Arab world, Nasser sought to undermine the agreement.17 Hussein, anxious to display his anticommunist credentials and under severe pressure from Great Britain, entertained the idea of joining the pact in late 1955. Officials in Britain pressured the King to join by tying pact membership to the re-negotiation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, and sent Sir Gerald Templer to Amman for informal talks.18 Countering Britain’s move, Nasser sent his representatives, Egyptian revolutionary heroes Anwar al-Sadat and Abd al-Hakim Amr, to Amman. The Jordanian public and press received Amr and Sadat enthusiastically, while Templer’s inopportune visit appeared to embody the corrupt intrigues of imperial power. The Egyptian media, a popular source of information in Jordan, chastised Hussein for his cooperation with the British and encouraged domestic dissent. Prime Minister Said Mufti resigned on 13 December rather than consent to the pact and Hussein attempted to replace him with a pro-Western prime minister, Hazza Majali. But the Jordanian opposition would not accept such gross political manipulation by the King. From 15–17 December, violent anti-regime demonstrations broke out in Amman and cities throughout the West Bank, a general strike was called, and the French and Turkish consulates in Jerusalem were bombed. Hussein finally realized that

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the pact was a tremendous political liability and reversed course. To pacify the population, he sought to distance himself from his earlier actions by removing the prime minister and installing one who was known to be sympathetic to Nasser. The domestic dissent created by the issue of the Baghdad Pact may have represented one of the most dangerous political crises of Hussein’s reign. The public outcry forced the King to recognize that his relationship with Britain, although financially expedient, alienated the Jordanian population. The debate over joining the Baghdad Pact had the unintended consequence of forcing the King to put his politics on display, choosing between pan-Arab nationalism and a pro-Western alignment. It also allowed Nasser to flex his political muscles and win this initial battle of his personal war with Hussein.19 Sensing Hussein’s political weakness after the pact debacle, the Egyptian president pressed Hussein to abandon his defensive agreement with Great Britain and offered, along with Syria and Saudi Arabia, to replace the British military subsidy of £12 million, arguing that the funds would be used to provide defense against Israel. Hussein reluctantly agreed; Saudi Arabia, however, was the only nation to extend the promised funding and Jordan subsequently did not receive enough to replace the British subsidy.20 British officials understood Hussein’s need to distance his monarchy from the taint of imperialism; they also recognized that Hussein’s pro-Western leadership provided a modicum of stability in the Middle East. They hoped to find a way to maintain influence in Jordan – primarily through John “Glubb” Pasha’s commanding role in the army – while alleviating some of the unpleasant financial burden of subsidizing the kingdom. Unwilling to abandon Jordan utterly, the British sought financial and political assistance from the United States. To encourage American involvement, British officials capitalized on the Soviet-American rivalry and depicted

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the regional struggle in terms of a global conspiracy. Prime Minister Anthony Eden complained to Eisenhower that the Arab plan to replace the British subsidy was a part of Soviet strategy. “The Russians are behind this whole plan to subvert the country,” Eden wrote, “The Jordanian government also has information that the Russians have offered to pay five years subsidy in advance. In light of all this it becomes increasingly clear that the Saudis, the Russians, the Egyptians and the Syrians are working together. If we don’t want to see the whole of the Middle East fall into Communist hands we must first back the friends of the West in Jordan and Iraq.” British officials hoped that the United States would accept some of the financial burden for maintaining Jordan, while permitting Whitehall a significant voice in shaping policy.21 But the situation in Jordan had deteriorated far beyond the level anticipated by British officials. Nasser’s accusations forced King Hussein into a defensive posture; he had to substantiate his nationalist credentials. On 1 March 1956, he abruptly dismissed the British commander of the Arab Legion, Glubb Pasha, and requested that he leave the country within a few hours. Insulted, Glubb insisted that he be given more time, and the Jordanian military escorted him to the airport the following morning. Hussein justified his action by claiming that the Jordanian army needed to be under Arab leadership, stating that “Arabization” would improve the morale of his armed forces. In reality the dismissal was a response to overwhelming internal pressure to sever Jordanian ties with Great Britain. Glubb’s dismissal damaged the relationship between Hussein and the British irreparably, and US officials viewed the move with distinct apprehension. As a result of public pressure on Hussein and Glubb’s humiliating exit, Britain and Jordan began to negotiate the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and the £30 million British subsidy.22

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American officials believed that Glubb’s dismissal was a part of the inevitable demise of Hussein’s regime. At a meeting of the National Security Council on 8 March 1956, Secretary of State Dulles expressed his concern that without Glubb’s stabilizing influence Hussein would rapidly lose control of the army. Deputy Chief of Mission Richard Sanger agreed with Dulles and commented that Hussein had figuratively packed his crown jewels with Glubb’s baggage. Dulles did not believe that the kingdom could survive without a British presence and noted wryly that he “didn’t like to make predictions, but he believed that the young King of Jordan was on his way out.” This idea did not cause panic or inspire emergency plans in Washington. President Eisenhower and his advisors did not initially seemed concerned about the fall of Hussein’s regime, perhaps believing that Jordan could make a transition from monarchy to democracy with little domestic disruption. Both Dulles and Eisenhower thought that self-determination would strengthen the position of the United States in the Middle East by providing a counterfoil to the totalitarian regimes of the Soviet Union. Their opinions were transformed by the actions of Nasser.23 Eisenhower had supported the notion of Egyptian regional leadership during the early months of his administration; his attitude toward Nasser hardened as Egypt drew closer to the Soviet Union and seemed less cooperative in peace negotiations. In early March 1956, Eisenhower’s special Middle East envoy Robert Anderson returned to Washington from Cairo. Anderson reported that Nasser had obstructed his efforts to bring together the Egyptian and Israeli governments.24 While Nasser seemed to have a broad-based following in the Middle East, and touted himself as a leader of the nationalist movement, the Egyptian public appreciated his anti-Israeli pronouncements and policy of non-alignment in the Cold War. The Eisenhower administration did not understand the appeal

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of Nasser’s policies; in a telephone call with his brother John Foster Dulles, CIA director Allen Dulles stated, “Certainly we feel that the Egyptian people, if they could freely choose, would prefer to have close ties with the USA rather than the Soviet Union.” Yet Egyptians and Nasser supporters in other states of the Middle East did not view the world as a contest between communist and capitalist nations; rather, issues of decolonization dominated their perspectives.25 By March of 1956, Eisenhower’s hopes that Nasser might adopt an accommodating stance began to fade. In his daily diary, he expressed hope that isolating Nasser would make him more compliant: In any event, we have reached a point where it looks as if Egypt, under Nasser, is going to make no move whatsoever to meet the Israelites (sic) in an effort to settle outstanding differences . . . . It would begin to appear that our efforts should be directed toward separating the Saudi Arabians from the Egyptians and concentrating, for the moment at least, in making the former see that their best interest lie with us, not the Egyptians and with the Russians . . . I am certain of one thing. If Egypt finds herself thus isolated from the rest of the Arab world, and with no ally in sight except Soviet Russia, she would very quickly get sick of that prospect and would join us in the search for a just and decent peace in the region.26 In 1956, prior to the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower abandoned the notion of promoting Egyptian leadership in the Arab world, and began to focus on isolating Nasser from other Arab states. This effort to isolate and contain Nasser would become even more significant in the years after the Suez Crisis.27

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The Suez Effect The Suez Crisis is often viewed as a watershed in AngloAmerican politics, an event heralding the decline of British power in the Middle East. Less emphasized, yet still significant, is the role that Suez played in articulating inter-Arab rivalries and dividing Middle East nations into pro-Western and pro-Soviet Cold War camps. Many books have been written that detail the intricacies of the Suez Crisis, but a brief summary is necessary to clarify the issues that pertain to Jordanian-American relations. As mentioned previously, Nasser’s dedication to non-alignment and overtures toward the Soviet Union raised suspicions in the Eisenhower administration. One of Nasser’s pet projects was to provide electricity for rural Egyptians through the construction of a massive dam at Aswan on the Nile River; the State Department initially supported this project and offered a $250 million loan for its completion. As Nasser seemed less compliant with the peace process and more open to Soviet overtures, however, in July 1956, the US formally rescinded its funding pledge. Without funds to complete the project, Nasser took the dramatic step of nationalizing the Suez Canal. A French and English consortium known as the Suez Canal Company owned the waterway, and though it had been constructed using Egyptian labor and was a key Egyptian resource, the French and English governments believed that Nasser could not be trusted with the canal. Nasser wanted revenue from the Suez Canal to fund the construction of the Aswan Dam and replace the withdrawn American funds. To further display his independence from the Western powers and strengthen his popularity, Nasser closed the canal to Israeli shipping.28 Nasser’s move was not merely an economic problem for Great Britain and France; it threatened their access to a strategic waterway that was considered to be a keystone of Britain’s

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Middle East policy. In addition, the closure to Israeli shipping was an aggressive move that deprived Israel of an important strategic and commercial waterway. Israeli officials viewed this action as a step toward fulfilling Nasser’s plans to destroy the Jewish homeland. In response to Nasser’s action, Britain, France, and Israel secretly conspired to undertake a tripartite action that was code-named Operation Musketeer. Israel initiated the action with an attack in the Sinai. From 29 October to 6 November, Egyptian and Israeli forces fought in the Sinai, then Britain and France moved troops into the Canal Zone. Both the United States and the Soviet Union immediately protested the tripartite action and demanded the withdrawal of all forces. Facing economic and political penalties, the tripartite powers agreed to a ceasefire on 6 November and their forces were gradually replaced by troops supplied by the United Nations.29 The Suez Crisis might have forged a stronger bond between Egypt and the United States, yet it had the reverse effect. To American officials, the conflict exposed the vulnerability of the region, highlighted the strategic importance of the Middle East, and reinforced Nasser’s regional popularity. Suez forced President Eisenhower to reconsider his approach to the Middle East and redefine American commitments to the Arab world and Israel. The White House subsequently reconsidered arms restrictions to the region, abandoned notions of supporting Arab nationalism, and strengthened the American commitment to conservative Arab regimes. King Hussein benefited from Eisenhower’s new approach to the Middle East following Suez.30 Jordan’s place in America’s strategic Middle East policy underwent a distinct transformation, as Eisenhower became preoccupied by thoughts of communist penetration in the Middle East. The Suez crisis, by allowing Nasser to position himself as the champion of Arab nationalism, forced the Eisenhower administration to re-think policies designed to accommodate or contain the charismatic

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Egyptian leader.31 Though technically a military defeat for Nasser, Suez enhanced his nationalist credentials and, thus, his ability to chart an independent course in world politics. In 1958, Dulles still chafed from Nasser’s sense of ingratitude following the Suez Crisis, complaining, “Our actions (at Suez) had enabled Nasser to emerge as a great hero, who seemingly took on the great powers and came out with a victory.” In Dulles’s opinion, Nasser would eventually reveal himself as a self-serving autocrat who was willing to sell out to the Soviet Union. In the meantime, the United States could not dismiss the appeal of pan-Arabism which Dulles compared to an overflowing stream: “you cannot stand in front of it and oppose it frontally, but you must try to keep it in bounds.”32

The British Exit The Eisenhower Doctrine, announced by President Eisenhower on 5 January 1957, proclaimed that the United States would “use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of nations [in the Middle East] requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.” The doctrine was a reflection of both Eisenhower’s concerns about Soviet incursions in the Middle East and worries that Soviet influence might spread as a result of Nasser’s popularity. The legislation proposed by the President in 1957 also included provisions for aid to Middle East nations in attempt to send a warning to the Soviet Union that the United States would not countenance Soviet interference in the region.33 While Eisenhower increased his commitment to the Middle East, the British government concluded that its relationship with Jordan was both politically dangerous to Hussein and economically draining, yet it maintained an interest in the preservation of the Hashemite regime.34 In December 1956, the British Ambassador in Amman, Charles Johnston, admitted

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that “The Anglo-Jordanian connection . . . is unpopular at both ends, for different reasons: with us, these are economic; with the Jordanians, political.” In the immediate aftermath of the Suez Crisis, the strategic value of the relationship had diminished for both parties, but Britain had a special interest in preserving the Hashemite regime in Jordan to prevent it from falling into the Soviet camp or dissolving entirely and causing a regional power struggle. Ambassador Johnston expressed his regret, stating that the British connection to Jordan had a “romantic” element, yet the Jordanian public did not harbor such sentiments. Apparently members of the Jordanian government including the King, army commander Ali Abu Nuwar and Prime Minister Suleiman Nabulsi had already sought American assistance in replacing the British subsidy, according to Johnston. If the United States were willing to accept responsibility for Jordan, Johnston told the British Foreign Ministry, it was important for the transition in power to take place without Britain appearing to bow to Jordanian demands.35 Unwilling to abandon Jordan utterly, Johnston saw the value of Jordan obtaining financial and political assistance from the United States. Johnston made the following arguments in favor of American involvement: (a) the United States would then be deeply involved in this part of the world – development which would to some extent make up for its refusal to join the Baghdad Pact; (b) any Palestine settlement is bound to be bitterly unpopular with the Arabs. It would be just as well that by assuming direct responsibilities on this side of the frontier the United States government should be brought face to face with the Arab side of the case; (c) the Arabs normally hate their benefactors. It is all to our advantage to be relieved of this unpopular role provided Jordan is not lost to the West.

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Johnston concluded that the United States would not be interested in the preservation of the Hashemite monarchy, but could be convinced that the demise of the current regime would create a power vacuum that might disrupt the fragile balance of power in the Middle East. In the same month, the British First Secretary of the embassy in Washington, DC, William Morris, communicated to Donald Bergus, the State Department’s Israel-Jordan desk officer, that Britain’s tight budget would make it impossible to continue the same level of financial support for Jordan. Bergus responded that he hoped Iraq would eventually assume responsibility for Jordan; in the meantime the United States would work with Britain to share the financial burden.36 John Foster Dulles displayed a much more ambivalent attitude toward Jordan while speaking to the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Harold Caccia, in December 1956. Dulles met with Caccia to determine if any decision had been reached regarding the Jordanian subsidy. Ambassador Caccia expressed hope that the United States would accept the financial burden of the subsidy, but Dulles refused to make a commitment. Caccia later reported to his superiors in London, “In the event of our deciding to give up the subsidy, he did not know off-hand whether the United States would want to take on the commitment as it stood . . . before the United States Government took on any commitment, they would like to consider for a moment whether the investment was worthwhile.”37 Despite a fervent desire to prevent the spread of communism in the Middle East, Dulles did not view Hussein’s government as indispensible. A crisis in Jordan, and the specter of a pro-Nasser government seizing power, transformed attitudes in Washington. Following his unpopular actions regarding the Baghdad Pact and heeding the wave of pro-Nasser nationalist sentiment that swept the Middle East during the Suez Crisis, Hussein decided to placate the political opposition in Jordan

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by permitting fair elections to usher in a new government. The choice of the people in October 1956 was Suleiman Nabulsi, an Arab nationalist politician. Nabulsi announced his intention to improve ties with Nasser’s Egypt and the Soviet Union – actions that would jeopardize Hussein’s relationship with Western powers. During his tenure in office, Nabulsi enhanced his popularity by successfully negotiating the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of Alliance on 13 March 1957. According to British reports of the negotiations, the Jordanian delegation pressed for a quick termination of the treaty and a fixed date for the withdrawal of British forces, leaving more specific details to be settled at a future time. Ambassador Johnston reported that Nabulsi felt political pressure to produce quick results on the treaty because King Hussein had been expressing his displeasure for the prime minister by publicly denouncing the evils of communism – a not-so-subtle reference to Nabulsi’s Nasserist sympathies. In the midst of negotiations, British equipment and ammunition valued at £3.5 million went missing. Dismayed, Johnston averred that the theft was “an unpleasant reminder that, despite the urbane atmosphere in which our talks were held, we were really negotiating with a set of Bedouin gangsters.” Despite this substantial theft of British property, Johnston believed that he had successfully negotiated the termination as instructed, in a way that would prevent bitterness, and still permit Britain a voice of influence at the Jordanian court.38

The Zerqa Affair The termination of the treaty bolstered Nabulsi’s public popularity, but by April the relationship between the Prime Minister and King had deteriorated to the point that Hussein requested his resignation. That same week, an armed brigade surrounded the Palace, claiming to be on a security exercise;

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the maneuver naturally raised concern from the royal court. The orders for the troop movement came from the newly appointed army chief of staff Ali Abu Nuwar, one of the men who had advocated the removal of General Glubb. Hussein angrily ordered the brigade to remove itself from Amman and the tension temporarily abated.39 On the afternoon of 14 April, a junior officer came to the palace and insisted on a private meeting with Hussein. He informed the King that several officers in the Arab Legion were planning to surround the palace while keeping loyalist troops on desert maneuvers. That evening, during a meeting between the King and Ali Abu Nuwar, the chief of staff received a call from an army encampment at Zerqa, about 30 miles from Amman. Nuwar’s cousin Ma’an reported that the camp was in chaos; fighting had erupted between loyalist ground troops and the junior officers who were accused of plotting against the King. Apparently the troops were angered by rumors that the King had been assassinated. Hussein overheard the conversation and, accompanied by Nuwar, immediately drove to Zerqa to reassure and pacify the Bedouin forces. Nuwar became increasingly agitated as Hussein’s car passed rioting soldiers on the way to Zerqa, and he asked to return to Amman. Hussein left Nuwar behind and continued on to the camp, where he waded into a crowd of angry troops to disprove the rumors of his death. His actions were greeted with cheers and widespread support. The next day, Abu Nuwar and his family, along with other alleged plotters, fled across the Syrian border.40 The story of Zerqa is still controversial in Jordan. Some historians argue that the whole event was a calculated, antidemocratic move by Hussein. His critics claim that the King and the CIA manufactured the entire affair in order to remove pro-Nasser elements from the government. As proof of the conspirators’ innocence, they point to the fact that Hussein

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later permitted each one to return to Jordan and even participate in the government – one later rose to become the head of intelligence. Leniency, however, was a hallmark of Hussein’s reign; his forgiving nature reflected his understanding of the tribal structure of Jordan. Former Prime Minister Fayez Tarawneh, a close associate of Hussein, explained the efficacy of leniency in tribal society: “Looking at the tribal structure of Jordan – the whole tribe owes you a lot when you do this . . . . This is amazing when compared to hangings in the streets of Iraq. (The killings) create a grudge within the families for generations to come.” It is fairly clear that the group of pro-Nasser junior officers in the Jordanian army posed a threat – whether immediate or eventual – to Hussein’s conservative regime. Hazem Nuseibeh, a member of Hussein’s government, remembered the alleged conspirators as restless young men: “We were friends with all of the officers, because they all served in Palestine. They were patriotic, nationalistic, and sometimes unruly; they were dissatisfied with the status. We were all hoping we could do something to recover the lost land – let’s face it. We would go together every night and drink scotch. Some of them had nationalist feelings and felt we were not doing enough, even though (Jordan) did a great deal to save the West Bank.” The British Ambassador Charles Johnston characterized the coup and counter coup as “a confused triangular affair” and not the work of “two well-knit teams led respectively by masterminds.” Johnston believed that Hussein was genuinely shocked by Abu Nuwar’s betrayal: the man had been his protégé. In addition, Hussein tended to brag to the ambassador about his clever political maneuvers and yet said nothing of a pre-emptive move against Nuwar and Nabulsi.41 If the CIA manufactured this as a coup de palais, the US role was not reflected in the initial response of American officials. Realizing the King was still at risk, British officials sent

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Ambassador Harold Caccia to persuade Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter to take action in support of Hussein: I asked him whether in this situation the Eisenhower doctrine could be deemed to apply. He said in his view, not. The doctrine only applied in the case of external aggression. I asked whether any movement of Syrian troops into Jordan might make a difference. He said once again that he thought it would not, because the doctrine also required that the aggression should be international Communism. I asked whether it was necessary to interpret the doctrine so strictly. The doctrine served primarily as a warning against Soviet interference in the region, not as a mandate for military intervention. In fact, the doctrine limited the use of force to highly specific instances, if one interpreted it strictly, as Eisenhower chose to do. The President’s preferred diplomacy to military intervention, urging the Saudis to become Hussein’s political ally and requesting that the Israelis show restraint along the Jordanian border.42 After learning of the King’s actions at Zerqa, Allen Dulles reported to the National Security Council on 17 April 1957 that Hussein “had seized and had thus far held the initiative.” The events of Zerqa strengthened the King’s position both at home and abroad. Through his actions, he gained the respect of the Bedouin in his country, a population that formed the foundation of his army. The Bedouin cared little for the conflict with Israel and provided him with a base of support that was independent of the large Palestinian population. In addition, the coup attempt gave Hussein a perfect excuse to enact a number of undemocratic reforms without receiving criticism from the Western press. He imposed martial law for an eighteen-month period, outlawed political parties and imposed censorship on the Jordanian media.43

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The incident at Zerqa effected a transformation in Eisenhower’s attitude toward Hussein. When Hussein became the apparent victor, US officials brainstormed to produce strategies for supporting the King short of war. Allen Dulles suggested that Turkish or Iraqi troops could be deployed along the Syrian frontier. The President moved units of the Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean to show support and asked Iraq’s King Faisal to be ready to assist Hussein.44 Secretary of State Dulles telephoned the President on 25 April to report that the situation in Jordan seemed fairly stable and that any more support from the United States might have a negative effect. The President instructed Dulles to offer Hussein a little encouragement – a temporary pact or a few weapons. Dulles and Eisenhower both expressed admiration for Hussein, and the President suggested that he be invited for a visit. “Not if he can’t get back in,” Dulles ominously replied.45 The British Ambassador in Amman, William Morris, marveled at Eisenhower’s rapid change in attitude: Until the dismissal of Glubb, the Americans regarded Jordan as wholly our political bailiwick . . . . The abortive Nabulsi-Abu Nuwar coup of April 1957 brought about a dramatic change. From the golf course at Augusta, Georgia, the Presidential Press Secretary said, on April 25, 1957: “I have talked to the President and the Secretary of State, and they said that I could say this: that [they] regard the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital.” In addition, Eisenhower was determined to assist the King in promoting his version of the events. Dulles received information that Abu Nuwar and his associates had traveled to Cairo for a secret meeting with Nasser. Eisenhower seized on this story enthusiastically, telling the secretary, “We should get out the real story – even if you can’t prove every word.

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Picture these people and call them puppets of the Kremlin under secret orders . . .”46 As the victor in this power struggle, Hussein skillfully depicted the events in a way that accentuated his courage and intelligence. He gained an international reputation as the “brave young King” who willingly risked his life for his kingdom. Hussein’s personal courage and ability to inspire loyalty in his troops impressed Eisenhower, who placed a great deal of emphasis on personal character. The President expressed his admiration and support to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan at the end of April: Right now the young King of Jordan seems to be waging a gallant fight to eject subversive elements from his government and country. Of course whatever support he gets from the West must be carefully handled because he could be ruined if his enemies falsely spread abroad the charge that he is acting as a puppet. He seems to be a courageous young man and I am sure that if he succeeds in establishing a stable government in that country, completely independent of Communist domination, the position of the West will be immeasurably strengthened. Thus, after the events at Suez and Zerqa, Eisenhower and Dulles abandoned their prior debates about the legitimacy of monarchy, preferring to divide the Middle East into proWestern and pro-Soviet camps. To aid Hussein in his struggle against communism, the United States pledged to provide Jordan $10 million in financial assistance. The $10 million was eventually used to purchase 36 M-47 tanks, 40 British “Saracen” armored cars, 100 106mm recoilless anti-tank rifles, 18 155mm US guns, transport vehicles, communications equipment and ammunition. When

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Hussein thanked Eisenhower for his support, he depicted the coup attempt in terms of a communist conspiracy: Destructive elements and propagandists of sedition and international Communism have attempted to put an end both to the citadel of the state that we have built and to the pillars of government in order that the country might become the prey of the Communists and the opportunists. When their evil designs became known to us for certain and their bad intentions became clear, we hastened to set matters aright.47 Reinforcing the king’s military strength meant confronting another contradiction in American policy: the limitations of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. In August, Eisenhower wrote to John Foster Dulles, requesting a provision of tanks for Jordan. Officially classified as offensive weapons, modern tanks were on a list of items restricted by the State Department under the provisions of the Tripartite Agreement. Eisenhower, however, did not countenance the distinctions between defensive and offensive weapons that were often decided by Congress. “A weapon can probably not be classed as defensive or offensive except upon the basis of the identification of the original aggressor,” he wrote, “ . . . I certainly do not blame King Hussein for wanting some modern tanks.”48 1958 would prove to be a decisive year in the Middle East. On 1 February the weak and politically chaotic Syria joined Egypt to form the United Arab Republic.49 The virtual takeover of Syria by Egypt fueled western fears that Nasser intended to dominate the entire region and compelled Eisenhower to increase his support for Jordan. Eisenhower worried about Nasser’s insatiable ambition and his announced intention to dismember Israel. “To realize his ambitions he

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of course relies on Soviet help. As he gets deeper and deeper into debt to the Kremlin, the great danger is that he will set off an explosion of terrifying proportions,” Eisenhower wrote. In response to the creation of the UAR, Hussein agreed on a similar Iraqi-Jordanian Arab Union. On 12 June 1958, President Eisenhower approved a subsidy of $25 million to meet the entire Jordanian share of the Arab Union budget for the coming year, thus strengthening the American commitment to Jordan, yet simultaneously undermining Hussein as an independent leader. In a cable to Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, Eisenhower stated: “We hope, too, that you will regard this as a further demonstration of our continuing interest in the Arab Union and our determination to do what we can to ensure its success.” For a brief period of time, the Arab Union appeared to be the only bulwark against Nasserist domination of the entire region.50

Conclusion The events at Suez and Zerqa provided the impetus for a turning point in Jordanian-American relations. Jordan – initially perceived as an insignificant piece of territory with a disposable government – became known in the White House as a potential obstacle to Soviet penetration of the Middle East, and a pro-Western rival to Egypt. From 1953 to 1957, Hussein’s reputation developed from that of an inexperienced youth to a brave, anti-communist sovereign. As the threat of Nasser’s regional dominance intensified, President Eisenhower became increasingly interested in the fate of Jordan. Nasser’s continued animosity toward Hussein afforded the King additional credibility in Washington as suspicions of Egypt intensified. This paradox would sustain Hussein’s monarchy for years: as the largest moderate, anti-communist country bordering Israel, the stability of Jordan became

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increasingly important to the United States. When tensions intensified between Egypt and Israel, the presence of a moderate leader in Jordan became an essential part of American policy. Nasser thus played an important role in initiating the Jordanian-American friendship. Eisenhower’s progression, from being a detached observer of events in Jordan to providing economic and political assistance to Hussein, was actively encouraged by British policy makers who wanted to terminate their obligations without radically altering the political landscape of the Middle East. Despite the dismissal of Glubb Pasha and the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, the British attempted to maintain an active role in Jordan by maintaining close communication with Hussein. Meanwhile, US development assistance to Jordan increased dramatically and replaced the British subsidy, rising from $1.6 million in 1957 to approximately $20 million in 1958.51 The new attitude toward Jordan in the White House was also based upon personal admiration that developed between the President and the King. Hussein’s reported bravery during the Zerqa crisis won Eisenhower’s respect and support. When Eisenhower debated the merits of selling tanks to Jordan in August 1957, Dulles pointed out that supporters of Israel would strenuously object to the sale. The President responded by saying that he didn’t want to “put this fellow in a hole who has so far shown courage and was on our side.”52 The King gained Eisenhower’s favor by surviving Abu Nuwar’s attempted coup and taking definitive action to save his monarchy. By standing down the coup attempt, he established a reputation for bravery, intelligence, and, most importantly, viability.

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CHAPTER 3 “IT’S ALL PER SONAL”

On the evening of 13 July 1958, Iraqi officer Abd al-Salaam Arif secretly took control of the Iraqi 20th brigade outside of Baghdad. While the main body of the brigade surrounded the city, Arif led a smaller group to the royal palace, where they awoke the sleeping members of the royal family. The revolutionaries assembled the young King and his family in a courtyard and shot them. The end of Hashemite rule in Iraq was brutal and swift; the body of Faisal II was buried in a secret location, but the remains of his hated uncle and former regent, Abd al-Ilah, were dismembered and put on public display outside the palace. Prime Minister Nuri al-Said tried to flee Baghdad disguised as a woman, but an angry crowd eventually discovered his identity and killed him. Enraged Iraqis ran over his remains with a bus, dismembered his body, and kept the pieces as grisly trophies. Despite these gruesome displays of hatred toward the old regime in Baghdad, Iraqi society returned to normal fairly quickly. The public generally accepted the revolution as a fait accompli; in addition, many Iraqis viewed the coup positively, hoping that it would usher in a new era of prosperity.1 Intelligence analysts in Washington were caught off guard by the swiftness and brutality of the Iraqi revolution. President

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Eisenhower awoke to news of the coup in the early morning hours of 14 July. He took a grim view of the event; the Middle East appeared to be a lost cause. With Iraq potentially in the hands of a pro-Nasser government, it seemed that other nations could not possibly resist pan-Arab nationalism. Speaking with Secretary of State Dulles, Eisenhower lamented, “it looks now as if you have a solid Arab world against us because Jordan can’t stick. . .” Dulles tried to console the President by arguing that US relations with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan were more important; in addition, Dulles reflected, “we always felt we would lose the Arab world.” When the Secretary phoned his brother, CIA director Allen Dulles, to discuss the Iraqi revolution, he gloomily predicted that the revolution would spread to Jordan.2 Hussein later claimed that his intelligence services preempted a parallel revolutionary plot in Jordan, but details of that conspiracy remain obscure. Nonetheless, the King’s position remained volatile and uncertain. Word of Faisal’s fate did not initially reach Hussein, and he hoped that loyalists in Iraq would rally around his cousin. For a few days, Hussein claimed to be the legitimate leader of both Jordan and Iraq, but the revolutionary government of Iraq quickly responded by declaring the Arab Union dissolved. When news of Faisal’s execution finally reached the King, he felt a sense of personal loss; the two had been playmates as children and schoolmates as young men.3 But he had little time to grieve: the new Iraqi government refused to maintain shipments of petroleum to Jordan, leaving the government unable to supply water or electricity. Realizing the gravity of the situation, Hussein immediately called for assistance from Great Britain and the United States.4 In the early hours of 14 July, it seemed that the violence of the Iraqi revolution might spread through the entire Middle East like a virulent plague. Lebanese President Camille

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Chamoun sent a desperate message to the United States and Britain asking for troops to defend his government against “communist aggression.” Chamoun had angered his pro-Nasser opponents by considering an amendment to the Lebanese constitution to extend his term in office. Chamoun feared that the revolutionary atmosphere might spread from Baghdad into his own country, and he sought support from the United States. In a meeting with the President, Allen Dulles emphasized the importance of prompt action, arguing that the Lebanese president could not hold his position for long. Eisenhower quickly decided to assist Chamoun, believing that subversive communist elements (under the guise of Nasserism) threatened Chamoun’s pro-Western regime. After a brief discussion of the political repercussions of this military action Eisenhower decided to deploy the Marines in Lebanon and move the Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean.5

An Invitation to Intervene As fears of a broad regional conflict spread, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan called President Eisenhower to discuss possible British and American military operations in the Middle East. The conversation was very restrained due to security concerns, yet the two leaders attempted to communicate their intent. The President immediately informed Macmillan of his intention to implement “the plan” by sending troops into Lebanon. He told the Prime Minister that in view of the situation in Jordan, British troops did not need to immediately join the American operation, but could be held “a little bit in reserve.” Macmillan, by contrast, thought that the Iraqi coup presented an ideal opportunity for the United States and Britain to undertake comprehensive action in the Middle East. He pressed Eisenhower for an extensive commitment, arguing: “if we do this thing with the Lebanese it is

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only really part of a much larger operation, because we shall be driven to take the thing as a whole.” Eisenhower balked at anything but a limited action and countered Macmillan’s argument: “Now just a minute so that there is no misunderstanding. Are you of the belief that unless we have made up our minds in advance to carry this thing on through to the Persian Gulf, that we had better not go in the first place?” Macmillan responded: “I don’t think that, but I think that we have got to see it together, dear friend. There is no good in being in that place and sitting there a few months and the whole rest being in flames. As soon as we start we have to face it – we have probably got to do a lot of things.” Eisenhower explained to Macmillan that authorizing an extensive military operation encompassing Syria and Iraq would be overstepping his constitutional powers.6 After the phone call, the President turned to Secretary Dulles and said, “He talked about the destruction of oil lines, then we are really at war, then what do we do?” Eisenhower understood the British desire to stabilize the Middle East, but he did not want the region to be the flash point of a global conflict.7 While Eisenhower and Macmillan wrestled with the implications of military action, King Hussein lobbied for their support. He told the American chargé in Amman that he was counting on Washington to stand by Jordan as a “good and trusted friend.” Despite British pressure to support the King, Eisenhower limited his plans to honoring American commitments in Lebanon. The President viewed the situation in Jordan as very different from that in Lebanon, stating: “It is very questionable whether we should get into the position of supporting Kings against their people.” Eisenhower supported Lebanese President Chamoun as a democratically elected leader; the taint of monarchy continued to influence his opinion of Hussein. Secretary Dulles similarly had little enthusiasm for Hussein’s prospects – he believed that strong Arab nationalist

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sentiment in Jordan would inevitably cause Hussein to suffer his cousin’s fate. Jordan also represented a large financial liability. “We are hooked for 30–40 million a year to pay the budget deficit of Jordan,” Dulles told Eisenhower, “(I would) rather Nasser or the Soviets do that.” The secretary of state viewed the Lebanon operation as a face-saving move, one that would prevent other “friends” from losing faith in the United States and its ability to resist Soviet intervention.8 Thus, the President, despite his assurances to Hussein about Jordanian independence and integrity, did not intend to guarantee the security of the Hashemite regime. Eisenhower still viewed the integrity of the state and the security of the monarchy as separate matters and he did not fully anticipate the repercussions of Hussein’s fall.9 After Marine-landing operations began in Lebanon on 15 July, Eisenhower reconsidered the idea of pursuing a comprehensive plan for the Middle East, questioning whether the Iraqi revolution was another Soviet-inspired civil war. The President did not want to be guilty of standing by idly while an important region of the world fell to communism, yet he believed that military action should only be used for a great moral purpose. He told the commanders of the Lebanon operation, “If, however, our only argument is economic – saying that the life of the western world depends upon access to oil in the Middle East – this would be quite different, and quite inferior a purpose that rests on the right to govern by consent of the governed.” Eisenhower told his generals that he was “giving deep thought to finding a moral ground on which to stand if we have to go further.”10 Eisenhower privately worried that his original approach to the Middle East had been in error. Speaking to Vice President Richard Nixon, the President assessed: “The present incident comes about by the struggle of Nasser to get control of these (petroleum) supplies – to get the income and power to destroy the

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Western world. Somewhere along the line we have got to face up to the issue. It is too bad. You see the mistakes that were made.” The President wondered if his impartial policy had permitted Nasser to gain a monopoly on influence in the Middle East.11

The Enemy of My Enemy Meanwhile, the situation in Jordan continued to deteriorate. Saudi Arabia, in a pragmatic bid to curry favor with the United Arab Republic, refused to assist Jordan and prohibited British and American planes from using its airspace. King Hussein’s options for re-supply were moribund and rumors of an imminent coup circulated through Amman. On the evening of 16 July, Prime Minister Macmillan informed Secretary Dulles that Britain would land troops in Amman that night. He asked for confirmation that the United States would provide support – morally, logistically, and at the United Nations. The problem of supplying Jordan with fuel remained insoluble until Israel gave permission for supply planes to use its airspace. The Israeli government, fearful of the possibility of an extremist or pro-Nasser regime in Jordan, reluctantly agreed to support the king at this critical moment; in doing so, it tacitly acknowledged that Hussein’s regime was preferable to whatever might replace him. The moment of crisis also had a lasting effect on Hussein; he learned that Baghdad, Cairo, and Mecca could potentially be greater threats than Tel Aviv.12 With British assistance, the petroleum crisis in Jordan abated rapidly and the appointed hour of the purported coup passed. King Hussein informed the State Department that he no longer needed US troops but would like an American presence as a symbol of US interest. Although the immediate crisis appeared to be over, the White House continued to doubt the viability of the Hashemite monarchy.13 On 23 July, a group of key US officials met to discuss the outcome of

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the Iraqi revolution. In general, the administration viewed the revolution as a Nasser-inspired event; thus the focus of the meeting was containing Egyptian influence. John Foster Dulles compared Arab nationalism to a flood and stated, “We cannot successfully oppose it, but we can put up sand bags around positions we must protect – the first group being Israel and Lebanon and the second being oil positions around the Persian Gulf.” Eisenhower agreed, acknowledging that Israel was a key element of US policy. He compared the implementation of Western policies in the region to the imposition of prohibition in the United States: unpopular agendas inevitably failed. “If our policy is solely to maintain the Kings of Jordan and Saudi Arabia in their positions, the prospect is hopeless, even in the short term,” Ike ruefully admitted. Specifically referring to Jordan, the President wondered: . . . what kind of outcome we can foresee in the long run if the government is kept in power simply by outside troops. Mr. Dulles recalled that we had not wanted the British to go in. The President saw difficulty in continuing to back Hussein since we do not have as strong a legal basis as we do in Lebanon. Mr. Dulles said that in a sense Jordan lies in the main stream of the flood of which he has spoken. However, we cannot abandon them. Also, we must think of what Israel would do if Jordan goes down. It is clear they would act, and would win initially. The Soviets probably would aid the Arabs, however, and the war would widen, with great pressure on the United States to support Israel.14 The President confronted the prospect that the Arab-Israeli conflict might burgeon into a wider war involving the United States and the Soviet Union. Supporting Jordan seemed futile, abandoning it impossible.

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The Iraqi crisis revealed the complexity of relationships in the Middle East and displayed with clarity Jordan’s role in the center of the region. Within a week of the Iraqi revolution, the State Department informed the President that Israel welcomed American and British intervention in Jordan. In addition, Israeli sources informed John Foster Dulles that, in the event that Hussein’s regime fell, Israel intended to occupy the West Bank. It became clear that the preservation of Hashemite Jordan, however unpalatable, was an important element of maintaining stability and avoiding warfare in the Middle East. The Iraqi revolution furthermore convinced members of the administration, particularly John Foster Dulles, that Nasser was a dangerous ideologue. At a National Security Council meeting on 31 July, Dulles compared Nasser to Hitler – the main difference being that Nasser did not command great military power. The Secretary of State advocated a containment policy of trying to keep Egypt’s influence to a minimum: “We must try to prevent lasting damage to our interests in the Near East until events deflate the great Nasser hero myth.”15

In Search of a Plan In light of the dramatic changes that the Iraqi revolution produced, the President ordered a thorough review of Middle East policy in August of 1958. The discussion paper “Factors Affecting U.S. policy Toward the Near East” outlined several broad policy objectives in the region, but acknowledged that some of the goals were inherently incompatible. Therefore, the authors advised that the administration focus on two bedrock objectives of Near East policy: “first, denial of the area to Soviet domination and, second, availability of Near Eastern oil to Western Europe on reasonable terms.” Furthermore, the writers argued, “Attainment of these bedrock objectives in the

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longer run will require stable governments in the area, neutral or friendly to the United States, having the support of their peoples in maintaining their independence.” But with anti-American sentiment on the rise in the streets of Baghdad, Damascus, Amman, and Cairo, where would the United States find a popularly supported, friendly government? This question contained the essential problem of America’s Middle East policy.16 The contradictions in planning extended beyond general policy formulation and into the United States’ specific approach to Jordan. In the initial draft of NSC 5820/1 of January 1958, the council advocated strengthening Jordan with “necessary aid for economic development, defense support and, to the extent required to retain the loyalty of the Army to the King, military assistance.” But according to the next paper of August 1958, the continuance of Jordan’s current political status was “unrealistic” and the United States should work toward the “peaceful evolution” of Jordan’s political status. Therefore, the administration was torn between the desire for regional stability and the need to improve America’s image through support of democratic regimes.17 Regardless of these doubts in respect to the kingdom’s viability, Eisenhower decided to provide additional military assistance to Jordan. In October of 1958, a nine-man US military survey mission, headed by General Richard Risden, traveled to Jordan on a covert mission to improve the efficiency of the Jordanian army and pre-empt requests for increased assistance from King Hussein. The team recommended that Hussein should be offered a package of small arms and communication equipment priced at approximately $12.7 million.18 This preliminary offer did not satisfy the King, who hoped for a dramatic increase in weaponry from the United States. He recognized that in order to maintain key support within his public and military, he needed to publicly display a willingness

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and ability to defend the Israeli border; thus, sufficient arms and America’s willingness to provide them were important elements in maintaining support at home. With this in mind, King Hussein made his first official visit to the White House in March 1959.19 Eisenhower’s advisers warned him that King Hussein intended to request an estimated $70 million in economic and military aid. The President knew that this amount would be very difficult to obtain from Congress; members who were sympathetic to Israel opposed the idea of supplying additional arms to a nation that posed a potential threat. Due to this strong congressional opposition, the President knew he could only offer Hussein small increases in aid. He was prepared to augment military assistance based on the recommendations of General Risden, but the goal would be to make the army combat-ready and effective – not larger. As a substitute for American weapons, the President intended to encourage Hussein to seek security through Arab alliances.20 Vice President Richard Nixon greeted King Hussein when he arrived at Washington National Airport on 23 March. Two days later when the King met with Eisenhower for formal discussions, the President took the opportunity to express his frustration that all Arab leaders seemed preoccupied with the issue of Israel. The President insisted that the problem of Israel was a “local” one and should not overshadow the threat of international communism. He hoped that the current preoccupation with Israel would not interfere with the defense against communism and expressed surprise that the Soviets had been able to make any progress in the Middle East. In addition, Eisenhower found it difficult to understand how religious people like the Arabs could accept the communist doctrine with its inherent atheism.21 Hussein capitalized on Eisenhower’s preoccupation with communism to press his point about the need for arms.

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He insisted that he wanted to aid the entire region with the battle against communism, but could not stand firm with tanks that predated World War II when the “other side” had Joseph Stalin tanks at their disposal. The President expressed shock at the state of Hussein’s equipment and promised to look into the matter. To drive the point home, Prime Minister Samir Rifai played upon the Soviet-American rivalry to leverage additional aid, stating that “The people were observing what the communists were doing for those cooperating with them, and would naturally draw comparisons with Jordan . . . it would be unfortunate if the comparison should show that Jordan did not fare nearly so well.”22 The President, who had been prepared for this gambit, pointed out that the Soviets had the advantage of the offensive in this war for world domination. The communists could focus their efforts on one area at a time, while the United States had to defend freedom everywhere at once. Eisenhower insisted: “we of the free world have a common dedication to spiritual values and believe in a universe with one God. This is the great differentiation between our world and that of Godless Communism.” But the President sympathized with the Hashemite King; immediately following their meeting, Eisenhower pressed the Department of Defense to make some M-47 tanks available to Jordan for a nominal sum.23 Hussein, though heartened by the prospect of new arms, understood the need to form a workable relationship with Nasser, so upon his return to Amman, he accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Samir Rifai and replaced him with Hazza al-Majali. This was perhaps a strategic effort to isolate Rifai’s virulent anti-Nasserism or simply to placate the powerful Majali tribe. Despite the removal of Rifai, relations with the United Arab Republic continued to deteriorate and reached a nadir in 1960.24 In September, a bomb planted under the desk of Prime Minister al-Majali destroyed the office and

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killed him instantly. A second bomb exploded at the same location an hour later; Hussein theorized that the second blast was intended for him. Outraged, Hussein immediately blamed conspirators from Syria and, by implication, President Nasser. President Eisenhower quickly sent a message of condolence and cautioned the King against retaliation: “ . . . I am convinced that any aggressive action by either Jordan acting as a State or by individual Jordanians cannot but start a chain reaction in the Middle East the final repercussions of which could easily be disastrous not only for Jordan but for the area as a whole and indeed for the world.” Although State Department officials surmised that there was a great deal of pressure on the King to avenge Majali’s death, Hussein privately assured the American Ambassador that he would inform the United States well in advance of any planned an attack on Syria.25

Reconciling with Nasser While the bombing may have represented the nadir of relations between Hussein and Nasser, the State Department maintained hope that the two leaders could reconcile and panArab cooperation would stabilize the region. Due to the rise of socialist Iraq and the exit of John Foster Dulles in April 1959, officials at State revised their opinion of Nasser and hoped to restore the basis for a working relationship with the Egyptian president. Nasser, facing his own domestic problems and disappointment with the Soviet Union, agreed to meet personally with President Eisenhower on 26 September 1960. Most of their discussion centered on the sustained conflict with Israel, but at the close of the meeting, as Nasser rose to depart, the President stopped him with a direct question: “What is going to happen in Jordan?” In response, Nasser averred that Jordan, not the United Arab Republic, had gone on the offensive in the propaganda war. As Nasser saw it, Hussein hurled

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unsubstantiated accusations, insisting that Nasser was plotting to overthrow the monarchy. There were people in Jordan who supported Nasser’s policies – Arab unity and neutrality – but they were not his agents. Eisenhower retorted that he could not see why the weakest and poorest of the Arab states would attack the UAR – it did not make sense. Nasser replied: “It is all psychological. The people like Arab unity. Some of them put up my picture and some of them cry ‘Long live Nasser.’ He wants them to cry ‘Long live Hussein.’ It is all personal.”26 While Eisenhower and Nasser met, King Hussein traveled to New York to present his case against the UAR at the United Nations, seeking an international response to the assassination of Prime Minister Majali. Following his speech, Hussein proceeded to Washington where he met briefly with the President on the morning of 7 October. Eisenhower informed Hussein that his meeting with Nasser had been pleasant and that Nasser denied any complicity in the assassination plot, to which Hussein responded with a weak smile. Instead of continuing with his attempt to reconcile the two leaders, the President privately expressed his distrust of Nasser. Eisenhower contrasted his opinion of the Egyptian leader by praising Hussein for his open display of support for the West in his speech to the United Nations. He told Hussein that it was “a satisfaction to see small countries speak up for principle.” The President then expressed his distaste for countries that professed neutralism. To Eisenhower the issue was one of freedom versus communist slavery: How could anyone be neutral about such an important subject? By disavowing Nasser, Eisenhower displayed the vacillating nature of his approach to Jordan – he wanted Hussein to reconcile with the pan-Arab nationalists, and yet he clearly disdained the policy of nonalignment. Hussein left, confident that Eisenhower would reward his openly pro-Western stance, but knowing that he would soon have to negotiate with a new president.27

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Near the end of Eisenhower’s term in office, in June 1960, the National Security Council issued a report entitled “U.S. policy toward the Near East.” Significantly, the document outlined some of the contradictory impulses of American goals. While the NSC advocated arms limitations in the region, it also stated, “Nevertheless, if it is determined that U.S. objectives in the area would be advanced thereby . . . [the United States should] provide military aid in minimum amounts and of the type appropriate to meet the situation.” Essentially, the United States officially considered arms limitations important to stability in the Middle East, unless the United States would benefit from providing arms to specific nations – hardly a strong commitment to the principle of arms limitations. In regard to Jordan, the council still recommended that Hussein reconcile with his Arab neighbors (as a means to scaling back American financial support), yet, “the United States and its Free World allies have little choice but to continue support of Jordan lest without it the state collapse and the peace of the Near East be severely endangered in the ensuing scramble for Jordan’s territory among Jordan’s neighbors.” The United States was stuck with a finger in the proverbial dike, reluctant to make a firm commitment to Jordan, but unable to withdraw support.28

Conclusion Although America began to supplant Great Britain as the primary provider of the Jordanian budget during the 1950s, American officials still viewed Jordan as a temporary state that had a limited future in the region. Throughout this postwar period of emerging independent nations, Hussein’s monarchy appeared to be a remnant of an era that would soon end. Many American officials believed that nationalist forces would eventually overthrow Hussein’s regime – ideally in a bloodless manner.

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A number of factors caused this attitude to transform, and concrete actions began to contradict policy planning. Eisenhower’s concern about Soviet influence in the Middle East caused him to extend his support to Hussein, who presented himself as a champion of the West. The King successfully depicted the opponents of his regime as communist agitators and his own monarchy as an embattled ally of the United States. Soviet aid to Nasser became leverage that Hussein used to gain additional arms from the United States. Personal dislike for Nasser also motivated President Eisenhower to support Hussein’s regime. White House officials gradually recognized that Hussein represented a significant barrier to Nasser’s ambitions and provided a political buffer between Egypt and Israel. The creation of the United Arab Republic in 1958 fueled speculation that Nasser intended to encircle Israel, which could lead to a wider war in the Middle East. Nasser’s animosity toward Hussein, therefore, gave the King additional credibility in the White House. Hussein’s protestations against Nasser, while valid, masked a pragmatic political stance: while Nasser’s non-alignment angered and alienated members of the Eisenhower administration, Hussein skillfully manipulated his position to gain additional concessions from the United States. The crisis of 1958 forced American officials to recognize the repercussions of an end to the Hashemite monarchy. Through contacts with Israeli officials, the White House learned that Israel planned to invade the West Bank in the event that Hussein’s regime collapsed. A Nasser-controlled government in Jordan would most likely lead to a bloody confrontation between Israel and the United Arab Republic (which included Syria until 1961). Therefore, the fall of Hussein’s regime could rapidly escalate to a regional war or even a scenario where American and Soviet armies clashed in the Middle East. Eisenhower’s early resolve to divorce foreign policy from

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emotion did not preclude him from allowing personal feelings to influence his foreign agenda and, like Truman before him, Eisenhower discovered that it was impossible to completely detach foreign policy from domestic issues. At the very least, the President needed cooperation from Congress to proceed with an agenda for the Middle East. Eisenhower’s presidency marked the beginning of new era in Jordanian-American relations, yet it also heralded a disturbing trend: the pursuit of conflicting goals in the Middle East. It was impossible to shore up sympathetic regimes with arms and promote a policy of regional arms limitation. It was impossible to promote free societies and self-determination while achieving America’s strategic need for stability in the Middle East. It was impossible to encourage nationalist movements when conservative regimes provided protection against Soviet penetration. And, lastly, it was impossible to interpret the regional political landscape accurately when it was viewed through a lens of the global struggle for hegemony. Due to these organic policy conflicts, the United States could not pursue a grand strategy in the Middle East that envisioned realistic outcomes. US policies were highly reactive, responding to crises such as Suez, Zerqa, and the Iraqi Revolution, rather than steadily implementing a comprehensive plan that suited the strategic exigencies of the United States. A true vision of the future in the Middle East did not exist beyond the immediate desire to undermine Soviet power.

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CHAPTER 4 THE NEW FRONTIER IN JOR DAN

President John F. Kennedy, like his predecessors, believed that his administration should chart a new path in Middle East affairs. The new president argued that assisting poorer nations with their economic problems was a key weapon in fighting the Cold War. Kennedy’s charisma and youth created an expectation in the Middle East that he would bring a fresh approach to foreign affairs, and indeed, he planned to take a new direction in Middle East policy.1 What Kennedy and his advisors had in mind was not simply modifying Eisenhower’s approach to the Middle East, but radically changing America’s image in that volatile part of the world. Believing that Eisenhower had been too cautious to channel the powerful current of Arab nationalism, Kennedy’s top officials believed that the problems of the Middle East could be solved with firm American guidance, and they were determined to set a new trajectory for diplomacy. To do this, they planned to harness the power of Arab nationalism by improving relations with the most powerful symbol of that movement, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Acting Secretary of State Chester Bowles urged Kennedy to approach the Egyptian president early in his administration, stating that an official visit from Nasser might provide

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significant advantages. The State Department and White House intended to propose a quid pro quo: United States would provide essential economic aid to Egypt if President Nasser toned down his bellicose rhetoric regarding Israel.2 Certain key White House advisors also saw a need for realpolitik in America’s approach to the Middle East. Among them, Robert Komer of the National Security Council became a chief architect of Kennedy’s Middle East policy. With an abrasive nature that earned him the moniker “Blowtorch Bob,” Komer argued that domestic political considerations should not supersede US interests; therefore, he attempted to craft a policy that would create a rough parity between Israel and the Arab states.3 As a result, Kennedy abandoned Eisenhower’s policy of containment in the Middle East, which focused on discouraging Soviet intervention, and instead sought to improve America’s image throughout the region. The President’s goal, therefore, was not to contain revolutionary Arab nationalism, but to harness its energy and appeal. Under the new policy, conservative monarchies like Jordan would be encouraged to implement democratic reform and to reconcile with Nasser, leading to economic cooperation and prosperity for all.4 The new president also modified his approach to Israel. While Eisenhower gradually accepted that Israel provided a barrier against the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East, Kennedy focused on regional tensions and believed that Israel needed to reconcile with her neighbors. Kennedy did not perceive an existential threat to Israel from Nasser, but rather feared that hawkish officials in Israel would escalate tensions by introducing nuclear weapons to the region. In 1960, the CIA discovered that a “textile plant” in the Israeli desert at Dimona was in reality a nuclear facility. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion claimed that Israel was developing nuclear energy for peaceful uses, but Kennedy insisted that the Atomic Energy Commission should undertake full inspections. Bloated

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military budgets already sapped the scarce resources of Israel and her neighbors; the arms race was counter-productive and impeded development.5 Similarly, Kennedy did not accept the conservative regime in Jordan as a partner in containing Arab nationalism; rather, the President believed that the Jordanian monarchy should implement democratic reform and accept Nasser’s leadership in the nationalist movement. Kennedy viewed Nasser as a benign force in the region, not a potential threat to its stability. Thus King Hussein, who had begun to receive a modicum of support from Eisenhower, had to begin anew with the incoming president. The political environment of the Middle East shifted yet again as Kennedy entered his presidency. Following the humiliating airlift crisis of 1958, Hussein began to mend fences with Saudi Arabia; despite their belligerent past, both countries felt threatened by Nasser’s revolutionary nationalism and its widespread appeal. In addition, the new government of Iraq led by General Abd al-Karim al Qasim proved to be a political enigma, a fact that motivated Hussein to seek protection from his wealthy neighbor. The King’s willingness to forget past grievances – his great-grandfather’s exile from the Hijaz and Saud’s refusal to come to his aid in 1958 – exemplified his utilitarian approach to diplomacy.6 Lacking firm support from the United States, Hussein began to seek alternative sources of assistance and made accommodations with regional powers to shore up his regime.

New Approaches, Old Problems In the early days of Kennedy’s administration, Secretary of State Dean Rusk encouraged the President to explicate his ideas in a series of letters to Arab leaders in Iraq, the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. The State Department assisted the White House by carefully

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crafting addresses to Arab heads of state, which were sent in early May 1961. In the letters, Kennedy pledged to support development efforts in the Middle East; to seek solutions to the prolonged conflicts of the region which “dissipate the precious energies of Middle Eastern states”; and to encourage the progress of democratic movements.7 The letters were infused with democratic rhetoric and invoked the principles of Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt.8 Responses to the letters were less than positive. Each Arab leader replied with a personal lecture on Arab grievances – particularly the destitute state of the Palestinian refugees. For his part, King Hussein wrote a nine-page treatise on America’s unjust policy regarding Israel and the Palestinians. He argued that Kennedy should give ample economic support to nations aligned with the Free World (like Jordan), to display that the non-aligned movement was disadvantageous to poor nations. Frustrated by the negative reception to his letter, Kennedy sent a blistering note to Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy: “I want a report from the State Department . . . on whose idea it was for me to send the letters to the Middle Eastern Arab leaders. The reaction has been so sour I would like to know whose idea it was, what they hoped to accomplish and what they think we have now accomplished.” Kennedy was chastised by his initial unsuccessful foray into Middle East diplomacy.9 The Israeli response to Kennedy’s plans proved to be equally frustrating. When Kennedy met with Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion early in his presidency on 30 May 1961, he found the elder statesman disapproved of his new approach to Arab nationalism. The Israelis viewed Nasser as their bête noir, the single greatest threat to their nation; consequently, Ben-Gurion encouraged President Kennedy to support King Hussein’s leadership in Jordan. The United Arab Republic already controlled access to Israel from the north and south,

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thus a coup in Jordan could lead to hostile borders on all sides of the Jewish state. The security of Israel depended on King Hussein’s safety, Ben-Gurion argued. Despite this pressure, Kennedy exhibited a degree of resignation about the potential fall of the Hashemite regime and did not offer assurances that the United States would support Hussein. The President tried to prepare Ben-Gurion for the possibility that Hussein’s government might crumble and hoped that the Israelis would refrain from any aggressive response. Although Israel preferred Hashemite leadership to other potential neighbors, Kennedy believed that the outdated monarchies of the region would inevitably fail. Ben-Gurion pressed Kennedy to meet Israel’s need for more “defensive weapons,” asking the President to provide Hawk missiles. The President continued his holding pattern, promising to keep the issue under review.10 The first substantial test of Kennedy’s approach came on 28 September 1961, when a group of Syrian army officers seized power and declared Syria’s withdrawal from the United Arab Republic. The coup was instigated by a group of Syrian notables who had chafed during the three years while Egypt dominated the UAR government and foreign policy. In the end, they hastily loaded Nasser’s right-hand man, Abd al-Hakim Amr, onto a plane bound for Egypt with a message abrogating the United Arab Republic. Unable to acknowledge the flaws in the UAR structure, Nasser blamed wealthy, disgruntled, “reactionary” Syrians for the coup, claiming that they were attempting to re-establish the social structure of the imperialist era. The diplomatic upheaval surrounding the breakup of the United Arab Republic signified a distinct change in the politics of the Middle East. The failure of this initial experiment with Arab unity undermined those who viewed it as the first step to an Arab renaissance.11 Far from pleasing the Kennedy administration, the coup inspired insecurity and fear of Nasser’s potential response.

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The demise of the Arab unity experiment created another unpredictable element in the volatile Middle East. White House officials feared that the coup might prompt Nasser to attack Syria, or even Israel, in an effort to regain his prestige.12 King Hussein, delighted to see his nemesis fail, formally recognized the new Syrian government with a swiftness that infuriated Nasser. Hussein furthermore informed American Ambassador William Macomber that he intended to send troops to assist the new Syrian government if Nasser intervened. The King urged Kennedy to recognize the infant regime, asserting that recognition might preclude an Egyptian military strike. To this Macomber responded dryly, “When Nasser (is) down, I did not think it either wise or useful to give him (a) gratuitous extra kick.”13 Mustafa Kamel, the Ambassador of the United Arab Republic in Washington, affirmed Macomber’s statement when he urged State Department officials to withhold recognition from the Syrian regime. In Nasser’s opinion, the unification of Syria and Egypt had occurred through a legal referendum; the coup, therefore, was illegitimate. If the United States recognized the Syrian regime, it would put the UAR “in a most delicate situation.” The Kennedy administration determined that formal recognition would jeopardize any rapprochement with Nasser and instead privately assured the Syrian regime that recognition would be extended after a short interval. Kennedy sent a note to Nasser pledging that he, “Wishes continue(d) development of fruitful relations on both personal and official plane.”14 Kennedy viewed the coup an opportunity for dialogue and asked the State Department to conduct a thorough review of US policy toward Syria and Egypt. A few weeks following the dissolution of the UAR, Secretary of State Dean Rusk outlined a new policy initiative: “Our objective would be to encourage orderly economic development in the United Arab Republic

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with beneficial consequence for Near East area stability, and to provide significant Western alternatives to U.A.R. economic, and possibly political, dependence on the Soviet Bloc.”15 The coup appeared to provide an auspicious moment to prise Egypt away from the Soviet embrace.

Reducing Aid to Jordan While the White House hoped to harness Nasser’s appeal by extending funding to Egypt, State Department officials planned to wean Hussein off of the extensive economic aid that supported his kingdom. Ambassador Macomber balked at the prospect; he opposed any reduction in aid, arguing the cuts would bankrupt the Hashemite court in a matter of months. Secretary Rusk countered Macomber’s argument by pointing to Hussein’s recent extravagant expenditures: $1.7 million on personal aircraft and $1.6 million on Hawker-Hunter military planes. The White House and State Department agreed that the King needed to spend his money on internal development rather than flashy military hardware. They did not recognize that military appropriations had a deeper significance to the King than mere finances; the funding represented America’s commitment to his regime. By threatening to cut aid to Hussein while offering more to Nasser, Kennedy signified his willingness to blur the traditional lines of the Cold War in the Middle East.16 Responding in part to pressure from the State Department to implement democratic changes, Hussein appointed a new cabinet led by a young reformer named Wasfi Tal in early 1962. Tal exhibited great enthusiasm for the job, vowing to root out the corruption that seemed endemic in the Jordanian political system, and even requesting American assistance with the task of reorganizing the Jordanian government. Ambassador Macomber reported to the State Department that

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the atmosphere in the Prime Ministry resembled the enthusiasm of the New Frontiersmen of 1961.17 On 7 March 1962, President Kennedy met with Jordanian Ambassador Yusuf Haikal, who sought reassurance that the White House still supported Hussein’s regime. During their meeting, Haikal pressed Kennedy for additional aid, arguing that Jordan could serve as a model of the benefits of cooperating with the West. Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy did not display deep sympathy for the Brave Young King’s struggle against Soviet domination. The President resisted Haikal’s pressure, stating that one need only compare East Germany to West, or free China to Communist China, to witness the benefits of the free market.18 Although Kennedy sent messages to Hussein with assurances of his continued support, State Department documents clearly show a limited commitment to the Hashemite regime: Jordan is a weak, relatively small state, devoid of important resources, beset by internal divisions, and governed by a ruler who is suspect among his Arab neighbors because of his Western ties, his alleged softness toward Israel, and alleged territorial ambitions. Our interest in stability in the area demands that we either sustain Jordan’s existence or, should the opportunity arise, assist its orderly federation with or incorporation into a larger unit of an orientation and composition compatible with United States interests.19 Thus, while the President personally pledged his assistance to the King, the State Department envisioned the incorporation of Jordan into another state should the opportunity arise. The White House’s ambivalence toward Hussein became apparent when Haikal returned to Washington with a private message to deliver from the King to Kennedy. The President’s close

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advisors, Robert Komer and McGeorge Bundy balked at the prospect of giving the Jordanian Ambassador another audience with the President. “I think it’s an imposition . . . and that we ought to break this growing tendency. Let that be it. NO,” Komer scrawled on a note to Bundy.20 Kennedy’s lukewarm reception and his efforts to improve relations with the UAR made an impact on the King, and Hussein began to re-evaluate his relationship with the United States. He told Ambassador Macomber in August that he was, “increasingly troubled as to whether I am doing the right thing in following a policy of unilateral alignment with the West.” Adding to his dismay, Kennedy broke the United States’ longstanding tradition of limiting arms sales to the region by providing Israel with HAWK missiles. Jordan faced superior weaponry, in the form of missiles and aircraft, from opponents in both Israel and Egypt. Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy seemed unmoved by Hussein’s loyalty, and the King questioned whether Nasser had taken the proper approach to the Cold War by seeking Soviet patronage. The subsequent events in Yemen confirmed his fears.21

The Battle for Yemen Imam Ahmad al-Badr, the leader of Yemen, died on 19 September 1962, and in the following week the Yemeni military seized power and proclaimed the Yemeni Arab Republic. Ahmad’s heir, Imam Muhammad al-Badr, fled to the northeast to reorganize his forces and the country split into factions. External forces rapidly moved in to influence the outcome of the fighting. Nasser supported the revolutionary regime and quickly sent Egyptian troops to assist Yemen’s fledgling government. The leaders of Saudi Arabia, King Saud and Prime Minister Faisal, became advocates of the ousted monarchy and provided logistical support to the Imam’s forces. King Hussein

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pledged his country’s assistance, believing that Nasser had used his influence to overthrow another legitimate regime in the Middle East, in this case the Yemeni royal family. The war widened when UAR forces attacked troops inside Saudi Arabia who were providing logistical support for Yemeni royalists. King Saud called on Hussein for air support and the King sent his small air force as a token effort. Unfortunately, to Hussein’s great personal embarrassment, his air force commander and two pilots stole their planes and defected to Cairo.22 Both the State Department and the White House opposed Jordanian intervention in the civil war, believing it was fruitless, served to widen the war, and could potentially destabilize Hussein’s regime. “If King Hussein is so worried about Nasserism, his best defense against it is to strengthen Jordan’s own internal fabric, not try to lick Nasser in Yemen (a fight he can’t win),” Robert Komer wrote to Kennedy.23 Indeed, because of Hussein’s enthusiasm for the royalist cause, Wasfi Tal’s reformist government became highly unpopular with the Jordanian public. Hussein asserted to Ambassador Macomber that he had merely assisted in protecting Saudi sovereign territory, and he discouraged Kennedy from recognizing the revolutionary Yemeni government. The royal family in Yemen, Hussein averred, had the support of the majority of the people, and revolutionary forces would not survive without external support from Nasser.24 Yet Kennedy administration officials, seeking to identify the United States with regional independence movements, favored a cautious but supportive approach to the Yemeni Revolution. Initially, revolutionary forces appeared to be firmly in control and the situation in Yemen seemed stable. Robert Komer advised the President to extend recognition, arguing that the royalists were unlikely to win in Yemen, and that the end of the conflict would permit Jordan and Saudi Arabia to focus on internal reform. On assurances from Nasser that Egyptian

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troops would soon withdraw, the Kennedy administration recognized the Yemeni Republic on 19 December 1962. The State Department believed that Saudi Arabia and Jordan would quickly capitulate and cease their aid to royalist forces, instigating the withdrawal of Egyptian troops. Unfortunately for Kennedy, both Nasser and the revolutionary leaders in Yemen knew that the Republican government would fail without the support of Egyptian soldiers and the troops maintained their positions. Saudi Arabia, feeling threatened by the presence of Nasser’s troops on its back doorstep, refused to abandon the royalists. The fighting continued.25 The Yemeni Civil War widened the rift between the United States and Jordan. Although the administration tried to depict recognition as an action that was in the best interest of all parties, the royal families viewed it as a betrayal: Kennedy had taken Nasser’s side in the civil war. The President stumbled into the midst of a well-established feud between the leaders of the Middle East and managed to alienate America’s friends in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Kennedy’s approach to the Yemeni Civil War clarified the differences between his administration and that of his predecessor: while Eisenhower recoiled at any hint of socialism, Kennedy wanted to be identified with popular revolutionary regimes. Hussein felt deeply discouraged by Kennedy’s actions; he believed that Nasser was getting his way while Jordan suffered.26 In the midst of the crisis, Hussein bluntly informed a United Press International correspondent that Kennedy’s policy “shocks, hurts and weakens (the) United States friends in the Middle East.”27

A New UAR? As the civil war continued unabated, the political winds of the Middle East shifted once again. In February of 1963, a group of Ba‘thists in Iraq attacked the compound of General

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Abd al-Karim Qasim, and placed him under arrest. After a speedy trial, the new regime executed Qasim and established a government based on Ba‘thist precepts. Many countries welcomed the revolution, including the United States. The Ba‘th party, based on principles of socialism and Arab unity, favored Nasser’s pan-Arab ideology; yet the coup did not seem particularly hostile to Hussein and the Jordanian monarch formally recognized his new neighbor. One month later, however, a Ba‘thist regime seized power in Syria. The triumph of pan-Arab ideology seemed assured, and the Middle Eastern media immediately speculated on the possibility of a new union between Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. With revolution and pan-Arab sentiment in the air, Hussein appeared to be vulnerable and, confirming this suspicion, the CIA uncovered a plot to overthrow the Jordanian government on 22 March. A group of officers in the Jordanian military planned to assassinate Hussein’s uncle, Sharif Nasir, and force the King to make a choice between death and exile. The plot apparently stalled when the King took an unannounced trip to Aqaba, but the atmosphere around the royal court remained tense. Hussein spent the time from March to April strategizing to save his regime: he scaled back his verbal attacks on Nasser, replaced Prime Minister Wasfi Tal’s government with a group of conservative loyalists led by Samir Rifai, and attempted to restore formal diplomatic relations with Egypt.28 Syria, Iraq, and Egypt signed agreements to create a tripart United Arab Republic on 17 April 1963. When news of the prospective union reached Jordan, demonstrations and rioting erupted in several cities. Residents of the West Bank favored accession to the new union because they believed that Arab unity was the key to defeating Israel. Demonstrators in Nablus, Hebron, Jerusalem, and Amman waved specially created UAR flags with four stars symbolizing Jordan’s position as the fourth nation in the union. Middle Eastern airwaves

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were filled with attacks on the King directed by Baghdad and Cairo, calling for Jordanians to rise up and destroy the “traitor Hussein.” One particularly virulent attack from Radio Baghdad referred to the diminutive King as a “dwarf” and “the Rasputin of Basman.”29 The White House’s response to the Jordanian crisis was slow and temperate. When Kennedy failed to state his unequivocal support for Hussein immediately, his omission became a source of rumor and speculation in the Middle East. The Israeli newspaper, Haaretz, reported that the United States endorsed the Arab unification trend and that Kennedy might encourage Hussein to abdicate. The State Department immediately denied the account, but still avoided statements guaranteeing the integrity of Hussein’s kingdom. Secret contingency plans from the files of the April crisis specified that, in the event of Hussein’s fall, the United States should recognize the new regime “as quickly as possible, provided it satisfies our usual criteria for diplomatic recognition and agrees to proceed cautiously with respect to adhering to the UAR.” Furthermore, the plan stated, “it would adversely affect American interests to intervene militarily in Jordan.” The Kennedy administration had no intention of saving Hussein’s skin.30 Hussein responded forcefully to the protests and violence. He appointed his great-uncle to serve as prime minister, imposed martial law, and arrested several political opponents. While the internal situation in Jordan quieted after the establishment of a curfew, the regional political atmosphere continued to be of concern. But US officials did not fear the prospect of a Nasser-inspired coup; instead they worried that the Israeli government would use the unrest in the West Bank as a justification for invasion.31 Early on the morning of 27 April, Acting Secretary of State George Ball called Robert McNamara and told him that substantial evidence existed of an imminent coup in

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Jordan. According to US sources, the move against Hussein came with full knowledge from the UAR. Ball speculated, “The real problem is whether the Israelis will sit still.” Israeli intervention posed a very real threat, because the combined powers of Egypt, Syria and Iraq could use Israeli interference as an excuse to invade Israel through Jordan. To consider this crisis, Ball called an emergency meeting with the President and National Security Staff.32 When the President met with his Security Council later that day, his focus was not on saving the Hashemite regime, but instead on reconsidering the trajectory of his entire Middle East policy. While Acting Secretary Ball discussed plans to evacuate American citizens, the President questioned his advisors on the wisdom of working with Nasser.33 “He was obviously a coming force in the Middle East and we naturally wanted to stay on the right side of him, but what about the growing accusation that our support was helping him pursue expansionist policies?” Kennedy asked. The President wanted to know what had been gained by accommodating Nasser. The new UAR and a possible coup in Jordan indicated a domino effect, leaving Kennedy vulnerable to the accusation that he had appeased an expansionist dictator. “The President was concerned about the dangers of Israel building a case that our aid to Nasser made him play his hand far more boldly than otherwise and precipitate the current dangerous situation in the Middle East,” one record of the meeting revealed. Kennedy, who suddenly recognized the damaging political implications of drawing closer to Nasser, questioned the motives for trying to placate Nasser in the first place.34 James Grant, the deputy assistant for Near East Affairs, attempted to defend the State Department’s position by pointing out that Nasser had shown restraint on the Arab-Israeli issue. Despite Israeli concerns, Cairo had not actually behaved in a threatening manner. The meeting discussion shifted to

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the disposition of the West Bank, and Robert McNamara mused that Israel would never feel secure until it occupied the West Bank; it was the logical military frontier. Grant retorted, with remarkable prescience, that if Israel took the West Bank, “it would prolong the Arab-Israeli hostility for 15 years.” Members of the Security Council feared that in the event of a Jordanian coup, Israeli intervention might provoke a wider regional war.35 The President returned to the immediate problem of Jordan’s stability and acknowledged that Israel would probably be the first to move if Hussein’s regime fell. He agreed that the Israelis should be advised against precipitous action and urged to adopt a policy of restraint. In addition, he issued Nasser a friendly message, but warned him that Israel might pursue a pre-emptive war if the Jordanian monarchy collapsed. As a sign of support for Hussein, he moved the Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers to the eastern end of the Mediterranean.36 By late in the afternoon of 27 April, the anticipated coup had not taken place. Ambassador Macomber informed Hussein of the plot, but no one was certain that he could prevent its occurrence. Meanwhile, George Ball contacted Israel’s Ambassador in Washington, Avraham Harman, to notify him of the crisis and request that Israel show restraint. Harman immediately indicated that his government viewed the situation with extreme concern; the Israelis did not want to witness a regime change in Jordan – no matter who or what would replace Hussein – and would not stand by idly if a coup took place. “Hussein’s is the legitimate regime and he has the support of the people,” Harman stated, “Opposition elements are ‘plotters’ who do not express the free will of the Jordanians.” He encouraged the United States to extend support to Jordan and help Hussein maintain power. Harman insisted that the line must be held: “This goes to the heart of Israel’s security. There is no reason for a change. If Hussein goes, conversely the Ba‘th in

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Iraq and Syria will be weakened. Therefore, Jordan is decisive, not just for the security of Israel, but for the future of the area. It would be gratifying to be able to report to Jerusalem that the US will take very definite action to protect the situation.” Notably, the White House seemed willing to separate the issue of Jordanian stability from the security of the King, but the Israeli government did not.37 Despite Harman’s insistence that Hussein must be kept in power, Secretary Ball remained uncommitted. He responded to the ambassador with caution, “If the Ambassador is referring to military action, we cannot say now what we would do. Nothing at all may happen. The Middle East has heard of many coups which never took place. Even if there is a change, we do not see the threat in the same time frame as Israel.”38 Ball did not reveal his personal view of Jordan to Harman; he privately considered it “completely unviable” and “only useful as a buffer.”39 Ambassador Harman met with George Ball again on 28 April to discuss the UAR unity proclamation, which called for the liberation of Palestine. In light of this declaration, he argued, any regime change in Jordan would be extremely ominous. After the meeting, Secretary Ball called the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy. Ball informed Bundy that he thought the Israelis were seeking total freedom of action based on their argument that the federation declaration embodied a constitutional declaration of war. He added that the only thing restraining Nasser from overthrowing Hussein was the fear of a conflict with Israel. Bundy speculated, “I don’t see the President going to war with Israel to recover the West Bank. I wonder if anyone is in a position to say that to the Israelis.” Bundy’s scenario, with Israel fighting against the combined forces of several Arab states and ultimately occupying the West Bank in an effort to secure its eastern border, did not come to fruition in 1963, but re-emerged in 1967.40

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Other members of Kennedy’s staff questioned the advantages of the Jordanian position in the West Bank, even though the boundaries were guaranteed under the provisions of the Tripartite Agreement. Three days into the crisis, Robert Komer, who attempted to direct Kennedy’s Middle East policy, argued that the Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank was not a critical issue of Israeli security. While Robert McNamara believed that Israel’s natural frontier lay on the Jordan River, Komer disagreed. “The West Bank is such a cul-de-sac that Israel could pinch it off in 24 hours,” he noted, “Ergo, no sensible Arab commander is going to put many forces in such a noose (Jordanians don’t now). The real threat to Israel’s security lies in UAR acquisition of guided missiles and nuclear weapons over next several years.” Komer also questioned Israeli motives for supporting Hussein: “Israel’s patent attempt to embrace Hussein (and lead publicly that we too have done so) is so much a kiss of death to the brave young King as to raise suspicions Israelis want him to fall so they could take West Bank.”41 The events of April 1963 make it clear that members of the Kennedy administration were prepared to accept regime change in Jordan and/or a potential Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Not only did Kennedy and his advisors concede to the inevitable end of Hussein’s monarchy, they tried to prepare Israeli officials to do the same. Israeli leaders, conversely, were convinced that Hussein was essential to the security of Israel and should be assisted. The crisis also stimulated fears in Washington of the potential for aggressive Israeli action and a wider regional war.42

Back to Square One In the midst of the crisis, Kennedy turned his attention from the tension between Egypt and Israel, and instead focused on public criticism of his rapprochement with Nasser. Members

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of Congress, including Senators Jacob Javits (New York) and Hubert Humphrey (Minnesota) publicly stated that Kennedy’s foreign policy was pro-Nasser and pro-Arab. A record from the White House staff meeting of 1 May noted: “The President’s immediate concern, regardless of the merits of any long-term arguments about the rights and wrongs of the situation, is to take some of the domestic political cutting edge off these Congressional Zionist-inspired attacks. Everyone was wishing that there was some liberal Senator who felt differently and who could therefore defend the Administration, but even Arthur Schlesinger could think of no one in this category.” Kennedy wanted his staff to produce a strategy for deflecting this criticism and the potential negative publicity.43 When Robert Komer tried to move the conversation to a broader context by stating that the United States might consider providing guarantees to reassure the Israelis, McGeorge Bundy shut him down, stating, “This deep-draft thinking was well and good but the President’s concern was for the more immediate aspects as reflected on the domestic front.” Unfazed, Komer countered that the US should try to gain a nuclear weapons limitation agreement between Israel and Egypt. Bundy again expressed doubt, stating, “The President simply did not believe in laboriously and publicly marching up some steep hill in order to get pushed down.” Kennedy focused on controlling the bad publicity that his policies had produced; his foray into an ambitious Middle East policy was at an end.44 Within two months of the April crisis it became clear that the new UAR would never materialize. The 17 April unity document contained little more than a promise to negotiate, and talks between Syrian, Egyptian and Iraqi leaders were replete with distrust and unwillingness to compromise. The Nasser-Ba‘th rivalry disillusioned many Arab nationalists and alleviated some of the pressure on Hussein to join the cause of Arab unity. Despite the fact that the new union never took

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place, the potential threat posed by the crisis of April 1963 and overt public criticism motivated the Kennedy administration to reform its Middle East policy to focus on stability, rather than harnessing the power of Nasser’s charisma.45 A White House position paper written in June of 1963 suggests that the members of the policymaking establishment had begun to recognize the importance of Jordan as a geographic buffer in the Middle East: “Our support for Jordan is based on the conviction that collapse of the government or chaos there could set up severe tensions leading even to renewal of ArabIsraeli hostilities … Under these circumstances King Hussein and his regime appear to represent the best hope for stability in Jordan.” In October 1963, Dean Rusk asserted in a circular telegram, “Maintenance and internal stability and integrity of Jordan remains as a primary objective (of) U.S. government policy in Middle East.” Rusk issued orders that the American ambassadors in Damascus and Baghdad should make it clear that any attempt to overthrow Hussein would touch the “vital interests” of the United States government. Rusk’s words contrast sharply with Kennedy’s earlier willingness to cut aid to Hussein or concede to the downfall of his monarchy. Again, as during previous administrations, the possibility of war between Egypt and Israel clarified Hussein’s purpose in the minds of administration officials. In addition, the Israeli government continued to encourage the United States to support the Hashemite regime, preferring Hussein’s malleable leadership to other alternatives. When Syria and Iraq began negotiations for a union in fall of 1963, Ambassador Harman told Phillips Talbot of Near East Affairs, “Any change in the status quo in Jordan was of immediate and gravest concern to Israel.” Throughout Kennedy’s presidency, Israeli leaders found themselves in the odd position of serving as advocates for Hussein’s regime.46 Hussein’s approach to the United States evolved significantly during Kennedy’s presidency. The King quickly

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discovered that devout professions of anti-communism did not impress President Kennedy as they had Eisenhower. Kennedy displayed a desire to establish closer ties with Hussein’s chief adversary and appeared to favor Nasser in regional political contests for power. Consequently, in August of 1963 Hussein abandoned his overtly pro-Western approach and established formal relations with the Soviet Union. From Amman, Ambassador Macomber explained to the State Department that Hussein felt vulnerable to charges of being a puppet King, and harbored “growing anxiety that our policy towards Nasser is working against his regime.” Although he modified his anti-communist stance, the King continued to seek concessions from the United States by accentuating the rivalry of the Cold War. Hussein consistently professed his loyalty to the Western powers, yet in practice, he used the tools of a non-aligned power.47

Conclusion The policy initiatives prescribed by Kennedy’s advisers largely failed. The Kennedy administration’s vigorous pursuit of a settlement for the Palestinian refugee problem through the Palestine Conciliation Commission had little success. Arab leaders demanded an agreement to repatriate all refugees before negotiations began, while the Israelis insisted that a peace agreement must be signed before any repatriation took place. In the final weeks of his life, Kennedy abandoned his attempt to reconcile with Nasser and openly chastised him for failing to withdraw troops from Yemen. He wrote to Nasser, “Because of my personal role in the matter, I think you will understand why I feel involved when the US is criticized both at home and abroad.” The war in Yemen displayed both the complexity of Middle East politics and Nasser’s implacable nature. As the prospect of the 1964 presidential election neared, Kennedy

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recognized that his attempts to woo Nasser were unpopular on both domestic and foreign fronts, while they yielded few concessions from the Egyptian leader. Kennedy’s plan to improve America’s image in the Middle East by harnessing the power of nationalism came to naught.48 Under Kennedy’s leadership, the United States did not significantly improve its image in the Middle East, but unintentionally frustrated Jordanian and Saudi leaders who professed open friendship with the West. Kennedy’s plan did not succeed because it was based on the false premise that the United States could create better relations with the entire Arab world by befriending one charismatic leader. This approach failed to take into account well-established interArab rivalries. King Hussein and King Saud viewed Nasser as a direct threat to their personal safety and the stability of their regimes. By drawing closer to Nasser, Kennedy compromised some of the previously established trust between the United States and conservative Arab leaders. Kennedy did not anticipate the domestic political repercussions of his détente with Nasser. The President quickly discovered that he could not afford the public perception that he had abandoned Israel. He was unprepared for the political backlash from his policy; his astonishment indicated an uncharacteristic lack of political foresight. Kennedy did not fully comprehend the impact of his new approach to the Middle East and his advisors failed to fully explore the possible consequences of his actions. In addition, the White House was not prepared for the changing political landscape of the Middle East and scrambled to adapt to the varying circumstances on an ad hoc basis. Kennedy, even more than his predecessors, sought to befriend nationalist movements in the Middle East. He discovered, however, that his desire to identify the United States with this popular movement competed with America’s

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pragmatic need for regional stability. Despite his fervent wish to improve relations with the Arab world’s most popular leader, Kennedy discovered that predictable, cooperative kings were preferable to erratic presidents. The civil war in Yemen and the proposed expansion of the UAR revealed the weaknesses of Kennedy’s policies and the significance of Hussein’s regime, which provided hidden support for the vital interests of the United States. It is impossible to predict how Kennedy’s policies would have evolved had his life not been cut short on 22 November 1963. By all indications, he seemed to have rejected the core of his earlier policy and was poised to embrace a more conservative approach to the Middle East.

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CHAPTER 5 BAL ANCING ACTS

Lyndon Johnson entered the presidency at a moment of national crisis and he inherited numerous foreign policy headaches. From the moment that the new president took the oath of office aboard Air Force One, he attempted to build confidence in his ability to lead as well as maintain some continuity with the previous administration. Johnson did not lack ambition, and he viewed his sudden elevation to the presidency as a unique opportunity to transform the nation. Since domestic problems, not foreign policy, initially occupied the mind of the new president, Johnson chose to retain President Kennedy’s staff to run the foreign policy establishment. The same individuals who advised Kennedy kept their positions in the government, but Johnson’s response to advice proffered by Kennedy’s aides differed from his predecessor.1 Lyndon Johnson entered office with personal experience in the Middle East, having visited Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran as Vice President in 1962. During his brief tour of those nations he became convinced that it was imperative to reach out to the impoverished masses in the region. He viewed the Middle East as a key battleground of the Cold War, stating: “In those Middle Eastern countries which lie in the shadow of the Iron Curtain we are in a rugged contest for the trust and respect of the masses.” In contrast to Kennedy, who tried to align the

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United States with independence movements, Johnson believed that Communism was gaining ground in the Middle East under the thin guise of revolutionary nationalism. He did not believe that the flamboyant Egyptian nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser could be brought into line with American policy. Rather than seeking new partners in the Middle East, Johnson chose to focus on defending America’s traditional friends, particularly Israel.2 Years in the Senate had educated Johnson about the influence of the Israeli lobby and unlike Kennedy he recognized the domestic implications of his Middle East policy from the outset of his presidency. Johnson openly supported Israel and tolerated blatant leaking of information to the Israelis by presidential aide Myer “Mike” Feldman. Thus, Johnson did not attempt to improve America’s image in the Arab world (this had notably failed under Kennedy) and instead primarily sought to protect Israel. He attempted to de-escalate the Arab-Israeli conflict by limiting arms sales to the Middle East and preventing the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region. His new approach was popular with the public and caused Johnson to view the monarchies of the region with distinct pragmatism.3

Arab Détente Despite the recent failure of pan-Arab unity initiatives, 1964 witnessed a new level of cooperation between Arab leaders as they participated in several regional summits. At the request of President Nasser, Arab leaders met in Cairo during the month of January. This conference, which included Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, marked the onset of greater cooperation between Arab governments. The summit proved to be a windfall for King Hussein, whose inclusion gave him an air of legitimacy that he desperately coveted. Following the summit, Hussein adopted the role of moderator in regional

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disputes – a role that served him well in the coming years. He also acted as a conduit for information flowing between the United States and other Arab leaders. The price of inclusion as a legitimate Arab leader was that Hussein had to accept Nasser’s self-designated position of leadership and tolerate a certain amount of pan-Arab interference in West Bank affairs. Improved relations with other Arab leaders proved to be rather tricky: his regime benefitted from the status, but Hussein lost some of his freedom to act independently regarding Palestinians and the West Bank. During the first summit, Arab leaders agreed to several strategies that would directly affect Jordan; notably, plans for a United Arab Command (UAC) to counteract the Israeli threat. The initial purpose of the Command was to provide a coordinated response to the Israeli diversion of water from the Jordan River. The UAC did not immediately pose a challenge to Hussein until its military plans became more specific. The first summit also resulted in the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was placed under the leadership of Ahmad Shuqayri, an outspoken Palestinian lawyer who once served as the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United Nations. The choice of Shuqayri (an overt Nasser devotee) as leader of the PLO was problematic for Hussein. The formation of an independent Palestinian entity naturally had political implications for the King, but he initially cooperated with the PLO and permitted it to operate within the protection of the Jordanian government. The King’s support of Palestinian aspirations improved his image in other Arab nations and increased the opportunities for dialogue with Arab leaders. American Ambassador Charles Barnes summarized Hussein’s situation in a cable to the State Department: Jordan is no longer politically isolated and has, at least superficially, good relations with its former enemy, UAR.

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Public greatly pleased this development and King is given major credit for it . . . He is currently accepted member of “Arab Club” which is obviously source considerable satisfaction to him in view of his having been somewhat of an “Area Pariah” over past. However, membership involves, to large extent, keeping in step with other Arab leaders, primarily Nasser. This may force him take actions which in own good judgment he would other wise choose not take. Hussein still depended on the United States for arms and budgetary support, yet his newly forged relationship with the Arab League complicated Jordanian-American relations.4

A Royal Visit Driven by concern over the deterioration of US-Jordanian relations during the Kennedy administration, King Hussein made plans to visit the United States in 1964. In light of the distinct disinterest that President Kennedy displayed toward Jordan, Hussein sought assurances that the United States would continue its financial support. This assistance was critical to Hussein; the United States provided Jordan’s chief source of foreign aid, contributing $41 million in development aid and cash grants, or about a third of the kingdom’s total budget. Kennedy’s assassination did not alter Hussein’s plans, and at the January Arab summit he accepted the task of delivering a message to President Johnson on behalf of the attending nations. Arab leaders urged Hussein to impress upon Johnson their fears of Israeli aggression. Privately, the King intended to warn President Johnson that Israeli encroachments were forcing the Arabs into a stronger and more unified stance.5 Hussein, however, perpetually had to protect his monarchy from the charge that he was a Western puppet. Thus, before

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he departed, the government-controlled media reported that the King intended to present the Arab perspective on critical issues to the new president, especially informing him on the nature of the Palestine problem. Even American officials understood the delicacy of extending assistance to Jordan without making Hussein appear to be an American pawn. Robert Komer, who retained his position as National Security Staff advisor, acknowledged this fine balance when he wrote to the President about Hussein’s impending visit, warning that Hussein’s reputation with his fellow Arabs would suffer if he was closely identified with the United States.6 In anticipation of Hussein’s visit, the Defense Department projected that military aid to Jordan would be cut dramatically in the coming years from $5.8 million in 1963 to $2 million in the fiscal year 1965, but advised Johnson to conceal these figures from the King. Komer urged Johnson to be assertive in his talks with Hussein and to emphasize the extensive help that America had provided to Jordan in the past. Jordan could count on support from the United States only if it maintained a moderate, anti-Soviet position. Komer also noted: “There will be no Israeli kickback if you’re friendly to Hussein, because they’re even more anxious to keep him on the throne than we are. The last thing they want is another activist Syrian or Nasserite regime sitting right next to them.”7 On the morning of 14 April 1964, President Johnson met King Hussein for the first time on the lawn of the White House. The heads of state immediately retired to a substantive meeting. Initially, they discussed aid allocation, but the conversation quickly turned to the subject of Arab grievances. As expected, Hussein launched into a passionate plea on behalf of the United Arab Command. He enumerated the Israeli insults against Arab nations including Israeli water diversion schemes and territorial encroachment. Hussein referred to Israel as “the spoiled child at Arab expense and at the expense of the U.S.”8

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Hussein also insisted that Israel had designs on gaining additional Arab territory. The King believed that Israeli plans for diversion works and increased immigration indicated future territorial expansion. Israeli territorial aspirations, Hussein argued, were a threat to the Arab states and, consequently, Arab militaries must be sufficiently equipped to meet the threat. If Western sources failed to provide adequate quantities of arms, the King warned, Arab leaders might seek assistance from the Soviets to meet their arms requirements.9 President Johnson protested that he was attempting to treat Israel and Jordan equally. He stated that the United States had provided more than $40 million to Jordan in the past year. Hussein quickly countered that this was not comparable to the amount given to Israel. He expressed his satisfaction that they had reviewed the current problems and could move on to a discussion of mutual interests on the next day.10 Before Johnson met with King Hussein a second time, Robert Komer wrote to the President and urged him to put additional pressure on Hussein. “Now is time for some Dutch Uncle talk to Hussein,” Komer wrote, “US realizes Arabs may fear Israeli expansionism. We think they’re wrong. In any case US opposes Israeli expansionism just as strongly as an Arab attack on Israel.” The President must emphasize the United States’ history of supporting Jordan, Komer insisted, and tell Hussein that he could not expect to play both sides in the Cold War.11 A second meeting between President Johnson, King Hussein, and their chief advisors occurred the following day. This time the President took the initiative, asserting that the United States remained a close friend of the Arab world. However, the President warned there was an inverse relationship between aid that Jordan received from the Soviets and what the President could convince Congress to provide. He wanted to provide more assistance, but Congress was trying

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to cut foreign aid in order to balance the budget. Johnson told Hussein to deliver the message to Arab leaders that “Johnson is just as much their friend as Kennedy was.”12 Acting Secretary of State George Ball explained to the Jordanian delegation that the United States was trying to avoid an arms race: “New weapons produced a demand for more new weapons which led to a spiral of ever increasing armaments. Ideally we should have complete disarmament but this was not possible.” Hussein continued to insist that improved weapons were needed to protect Jordan’s exposed position along its extensive border. To this the Secretary of State replied that the United States’ commitments to Jordan and the presence of the Sixth Fleet ought to provide Jordanians with a sense of security. “Our power is Jordan’s assurance of protection,” Secretary Ball proclaimed.13 The meeting concluded without any dramatic concessions by either side, but both Hussein and Johnson seemed satisfied. Hussein had delivered his message and served as a representative of his fellow Arab leaders, a duty that gave him significant prestige and positive publicity back home. Johnson managed to convey his displeasure at Arab rapprochement with the Soviet Union and tried to counteract some of the negative publicity that he had received in the Middle East.14

The Hazards of Reconciliation Hussein’s concerns about Israeli expansionism, his need to placate pro-Nasser opposition in Jordan, and the urging of American officials caused him to seek better relationships with other Arab regimes. Improved relations came with a price, however; the King needed to display at least token participation in pan-Arab strategies against Israel. Jordan’s continued cooperation with UAC water diversion and arms escalation plans caused a stir in the Johnson administration.

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“Israelis are beginning to scream,” Komer wrote to McGeorge Bundy, “With the US election approaching, we may have to be mean to our Brave Young King.” Bundy agreed that it was time to chastise Hussein.15 Ambassador Barnes took a more sympathetic view, writing from Amman: “King Hussein has made clear in conversations here and in Washington that he cannot afford take decisions which appear to put him out of line with prevailing spirit of Arab unity. To this extent he has lost his freedom of action.” Barnes explained that as a part of the new United Arab Command, King Hussein could only reject Soviet offers of equipment by arguing that he could obtain arms of superior quality from the United States. Barnes believed that this was a part of a very clever Soviet move. Like other US officials, Barnes derived his view of the Middle East from the Cold War framework: as a region to be objectified and manipulated by the West or the Soviet Union.16 In reality, the creation of the United Arab Command gave President Nasser greater ability to manipulate and control Hussein. The political situation in Jordan necessitated that the King express his moderate stance behind the scenes, privately admitting that he believed that some form of arms control would work in the Middle East. Specifically, he sought limitations on new categories of sophisticated weaponry such as tactical nuclear arms. Hussein would not discuss an arms freeze because he believed that Israeli arms were significantly superior to those of the Arabs; therefore an arms freeze would crystalize Israeli military dominance. A strong, visible military represented more to the King than a means to defend his kingdom. Arms symbolized Western support and signified to the Jordanian populace that King Hussein stood ready to launch an attack against Israel – even if he had no intention of doing so. To rectify the Jordanian deficit in arms and stave off Nasser’s criticism, Hussein sent his trusted aide, General Amir Khammash, to obtain additional arms provisions from the Department of Defense.17

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While General Khammash negotiated in Washington in July 1964, Hussein summoned Ambassador Barnes in Amman and informed him that Khammash needed to produce something concrete by the next Arab summit, scheduled for 5 September in Alexandria. He asked Barnes to convey an urgent message: “If I cannot go to the Arab summit and demonstrate that people I call my friends will help me, than (sic) all is lost. I will not be able to resist pressure to take Soviet equipment and will have to face inevitable implications of what that means for my position, for US role in Middle East and for general posture of Arab world.”18 The controversial point in negotiations proved to be the issue of providing a squadron of F-104 Starfighter aircraft to Jordan. Nasser informed Hussein that a squadron of jet aircraft must be stationed in Jordan as part of the UAC plan, and that the Soviet Union was prepared to provide a squadron of MiG 21 fighters immediately. Hussein staved off this overture (and the attending threat of bringing Nasser’s pilots to Jordanian soil) by arguing that he could get better planes from the United States. As the discussions of arms with Khammash proceeded, Ambassador Barnes urged US officials to take a flexible stance regarding the planes, asking, “Would not pressures from Israel be about same whether squadron was MiG or 104? In many respects Israel would be much better off to have squadron under Jordanian control . . . rather than run risk that squadron might ‘temporarily’ be under UAR control. . .”19 The Department of Defense agreed with Barnes, but the State Department did not. The Secretary of State opposed providing the jets to Jordan because of the maintenance expense (which Jordan could not afford); because providing the planes would probably motivate the Israelis to make their own requests (just prior to elections); and because the UAC planned to use the planes to provide aerial protection for a diversion of the Jordan headwaters – a move that the American government did not support.20

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In August, Robert Komer addressed the matter directly to President Johnson, explaining that Hussein had requested twenty Starfighters. “Hussein is in a box,” he wrote. “Unless he acts the good Arab he endangers his own throne.” Komer advised the President to stall final commitments on the arms package, particularly on the matter of aircraft. Arms allocations would create public relations problems for Johnson, yet Komer did not discount the importance of Jordan to US regional goals. “We and Israel share a strong interest in a free Jordan under Hussein as insurance against another ArabIsraeli flareup,” he wrote to the President.21 Johnson decided to extend a minimal proposal to Hussein while he postponed decisions on the most controversial items, including jets. He sent the specifics of the package to Hussein with a message reiterating his warm friendship but stating: “We understand your present problem regarding arms for Jordan. We desire to help you face it – sensibly and realistically – in ways which will preserve our happy relationship and not jeopardize your interests or ours.”22 The State Department prepared Ambassador Barnes for a negative response from the King, advising him to remind Hussein of America’s longstanding support and the President’s reservations about a sudden arms buildup. In the President’s view, the United Arab Command proposals went too far, too fast – they removed the focus from economic development and put it on military strength. The costs of maintaining military equipment would subvert Hussein’s seven-year plan, and Congress would withdraw its support if Jordan appeared overtly militaristic. In early August, the State Department instructed Barnes to discourage Hussein from allowing Soviet weaponry into the kingdom under the United Arab Command armies. “Hussein cannot believe Soviets have any real regard for him,” Dean Rusk insisted, “For example, would he expect Soviet assistance if King were overthrown by internal coup or if Jordan attacked from outside?”23

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Ambassador Barnes presented Hussein with Johnson’s letter and the outline of a proposed arms deal, as well as the State Department’s talking points to soften Hussein’s inevitable disappointment. Nonetheless, the details of the proposed arms package did not please him. “King’s reaction can only be described as one of stunned surprise,” wrote Ambassador Barnes on 11 August, “Later in conversation he admitted he had frankly never expected this reply; that he thought he had sufficient rapport with US government that we would see (the) problem as he did . . . He said he was forever caught between his friends and his enemies and had to do (a) balancing act.” Hussein admitted to Barnes that he was concerned with the economic implications of an arms buildup and was currently studying ways to cut the long-term maintenance costs. Yet he asserted his need to acquire aircraft from western sources because a “squadron of MiG 21’s was sitting there waiting for him.”24 In this state of desperation, the King became increasingly frank with the ambassador about his needs and motives. He said that the Arab states were in a mess with regard to Palestine. Water diversion schemes, arms build-ups and the creation of the PLO were all indications of growing Arab frustration. Arab leaders could not currently accept Israel’s existence, yet Hussein realized that they must begin to deal with reality. He had hoped that as Jordan increased its influence in the Arab world that it could bring the other Arab nations around to a more reasonable point of view, and he expressed dismay that the United States did not wish to support him in this goal.25 Following the disappointing initial package, Hussein wrote to President Johnson asking for further consideration. Hussein’s request gave Johnson a pretext for delay while he avoided the issue until after the November elections. As Robert Komer explained to McGeorge Bundy: “After some arm-twisting, State has agreed to my gambit for attempting to stall final confrontation over jets for Jordan till after Arab Summit and

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if possible post US election . . . Gambit is to tell Hussein that in light his plea to LBJ we’ll take a new look at whole question but only if he gives us time to do so.” As a result, the specifics of an arms package to Jordan were not settled in detail before the November election. Lyndon Johnson succeeded in winning the election of 1964 and proceeded with overwhelming assurance that he had support from a large segment of the American public.26 The September Arab summit proved to be much less confrontational than Hussein had anticipated.27 The King later reported that Nasser’s behavior was quite moderate and conciliatory throughout the meeting. Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia, frustrated by Nasser’s actions in Yemen, vehemently opposed most UAR proposals, which allowed Hussein to adopt the role of a centrist. The change in Nasser’s demeanor gave Hussein hope that moderation might spread to other leaders in the region.28

A Policy Reversal? Early in 1965, Robert Komer revisited the issue of the Jordanian arms package in a memorandum to President Johnson. Komer argued that the United States had been supporting a “nonviable” Jordan with tacit Israeli approval because Hussein was among the most moderate of Arab leaders. The Israelis, however, did not support the United States supplying arms to Jordan, as they felt vulnerable to attack along the Jordanian border. “But the worst problem,” Komer noted, “will be US opinion. How do we explain that we’re selling arms (to a country already dependent on our subsidy) to Arabs for the specific purpose of interfering with a Jordan water diversion scheme we support? We might endanger our whole Jordan aid program at the very time when we need Hussein’s restraint most.” Komer again proposed that the President should avoid

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a decision, particularly on the matter of aircraft, for as long as possible.29 George Ball disagreed and expressed his fears to the President about the polarization of the Middle East. Ball believed that the Middle East was splitting into two camps, the Americans supporting the Israelis and the Soviets backing the Arabs. Ball did not favor delay but instead advised the President to provide Hussein with ground equipment and then arrange for him to purchase his aircraft from some other Western source. Israel could be forewarned of this plan so that any adverse reaction could be handled privately.30 Komer then rapidly changed his advice after he discovered that the President’s Deputy Special Counsel, Myer Feldman, who generally served as Israel’s strongest advocate in the Johnson administration, was pressuring the President to reduce his arms commitments to Jordan. Komer hastily wrote to the President arguing in favor of a substantial weapons package to Jordan. “We have no other major security interest in Jordan than to keep Israel from being surrounded,” Komer insisted, “Our whole half billion dollar subsidy during 1957– 1965 has primarily been for this purpose; it has actually been indirect aid to Israel.” Arms sales to Jordan were a worthwhile investment, Komer argued, if they prevented Hussein from being controlled by Nasser. He also asserted that the amounts and types of weaponry requested by Hussein would not substantially change the arms balance in the region if they were delivered gradually over a period of several years. Komer recognized, however, that the United States should continue to give Hussein the appearance of autonomy: “If it once got out that we were helping Hussein precisely because it helped Israel, he couldn’t play ball with us any longer.”31 The threat of the introduction of Soviet arms into Jordan, combined with pressure coming from domestic supporters of Israel, forced President Johnson to reconsider his policy of

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limiting arms sales to the Middle East. On 6 February Komer suggested a new strategy to the President: The United States should fulfill Hussein’s requests for weaponry and simultaneously arrange to provide additional arms for Israel. Komer reasoned that the United Arab Command arms buildup would soon stimulate requests for more sophisticated weaponry from the Israelis. He wrote to the President: A sale of arms to Jordan could give us the excuse for selling to Israel too . . . We could justify this publicly as a response to Soviet moves. Moreover, to the extent that our arms sales to Jordan kept the Soviets and UAR out, this would minimize the threat to Israel too. Komer advised President Johnson to negotiate a deal whereby the Israelis would keep quiet on the issue of Jordanian arms in exchange for an arms package of their own. He suggested that some high-level government officials should travel to Tel Aviv and present this proposal to the Israelis.32 This strategy represented a departure from the traditional policy of advocating arms limitation. Although previous administrations had enjoyed limited success in their attempts to avoid an arms race, they generally supported the idea that arms limitations prevented regional war in the Middle East. Johnson departed from this policy because White House advisors argued that new weaponry in the region – whether provided by the United States or the Soviet Union – was inevitable. In addition, Israeli supporters placed President Johnson in a difficult position; they wanted Jordan to remain viable, but balked at support for its military. Increased arms appropriations to Israel had the dual purpose of placating Israeli supporters in Congress and (hopefully) preventing the Israelis from feeling the need to develop an atomic bomb.33 This new approach, which Komer deemed a “policy reversal,” did not occur overnight, but gradually as arms allocations to

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Jordan and Israel increased over the course of the next year. In the meantime, Phillips Talbot traveled to Amman to discuss the terms of the arms deal with King Hussein. The King again used the Soviet threat to pressure Talbot, stating that choices made by the United States would determine whether Soviet equipment would appear in Jordan. The Jordanian population was disgruntled by reports in the press that the United States had arranged German arms sales to Israel. The perception that the Israelis were acquiring superior weaponry, weaponry that the United States refused to provide to Jordan, caused members of the army to question Hussein’s leadership.34 Talbot reached an impasse with Hussein on the details of the agreement: specific timing of the deliveries, the quality of tanks that would be provided, and the provision of supersonic aircraft. Ambassador Barnes advised the State Department to modify its position in order to avoid the “Sovietization and possible Nasserization of Jordan.” Barnes and Talbot pressed the State Department to offer a squadron of Starfighter jets to Jordan, arguing that Hussein had few other palatable options. The State Department responded that Barnes could offer an increased amount of credit and expedited delivery of ground equipment, but could not make new offers on tanks or supersonic aircraft. King Hussein finally accepted a proposal whereby the Jordanians would receive an allotment of 150 M-48 A-1 tanks in 1965 and then one hundred tanks of superior quality in 1967 and 1968. In addition, the timetable for the delivery of most of the weaponry was shortened from five to two years.35 The Israelis learned of these arrangements almost immediately, via a leak from an administration insider. A frustrated Robert Komer wrote to McGeorge Bundy: We can’t believe the Israelis have gotten this word. But Mike Feldman was present at Friday night meeting when Ball got LBJ’s go-ahead on above, and I’m convinced

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Mike leaked it to the Israelis . . . If he also leaked that all present seemed to buy my pitch for balancing aid to Israel we may have lost a lot of room for maneuver. Leaks in the Johnson administration further complicated attempts to provide arms to both Israel and Jordan. Furthermore, Hussein did not abandon the issue of aircraft and threatened that he would be forced to accept Russian MiGs unless the United States government offered to sell American planes. The CIA Office of National Estimates explained the situation: “If and when Hussain is forced to make a definite choice, we think the odds are close, but at least even, that he would reject the MiGS, though this is far from certain. Either decision involves risks for Hussain.” The State Department predicted that the presence of Russian jets in Jordan would lead to further Soviet influence and eventually the radicalization of the population.36 President Johnson decided to implement Komer’s proposal by simultaneously arranging arms deals with both Jordan and Israel. In a meeting on 12 February 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara explained that the Israelis wanted to purchase 48 A-6 Intruder aircraft. The Department of Defense found this proposal unacceptable because the Intruder was designed to carry nuclear weapons. The President asked McNamara to deal with the Israelis personally and instructed him exactly how to approach the Israelis: McNamara should call Eban back here and tell him we couldn’t possibly sell A-6s, for the reasons McNamara had given. McNamara should find out if Israel was willing to have us sell to Jordan. He should tell the Israelis that we would sell them “X” aircraft and give “X” dollars in aid if they would sew up everyone in Congress to keep quiet about our Jordan and Israeli sales.

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Johnson had already listened to Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban and twelve Congressmen on the matter of arms sales and no longer wanted to be personally involved in the negotiations.37 As Hussein’s requests had been deferred for over a year, Robert Komer recommended that the President send a “handholding message” to the King until the negotiations with Israel concluded. Johnson’s message did not specifically mention the Soviet MiGs, but made a blatant reference to them: “In the meantime, I earnestly hope you will be able to hold off any decision on your aircraft needs that would put strains on our ability to maintain the closest ties with you and your country.”38 On 26 February 1966, Hussein finally received notice that the United States would provide twenty Starfighter jets to Jordan. President Johnson sent a message through Ambassador Barnes to Hussein stating: “After full and careful consideration of the problems you face, I have decided we should make a special effort on a one time basis to meet your request for supersonic defensive aircraft.” Ambassador Barnes informed King Hussein that the supersonics would only be made available if Jordan met a few conditions. First, Hussein would promise not to make additional arms purchases from the Soviet bloc. Second, Jordan should continue to scale down the operating costs of its military. Third, the UAC would have to pay for the supersonics – no credit for the purchases would be provided by the United States. In addition, Barnes warned, this agreement should be kept quiet. Publicity on the details of the arrangement would produce pressures (presumably in Congress) to prevent the consummation of the deal. Plans were soon made for Department of Defense officials to travel to Amman in secret and work out the final details. The tentative delivery date of the new aircraft was set for December of 1967. Hussein displayed his gratitude by writing a warm thank-you note to the President for the new arms deal.39

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Conclusion During Lyndon Johnson’s presidency the United States abandoned its traditional pursuit of arms limitation in the Middle East and embarked on a plan to achieve a balance of arms between the two friends of the United States, albeit one that decisively favored Israel. Walt Rostow, Johnson’s NSC adviser, described the justification for this shift in a memo to Johnson: As you told Foreign Minister Eban in February, we would rather not subsidize Jordan, nor sell tanks and jets to Arabs. But after painful consideration, we see no other way to keep Soviet-backed radical Arabs off Israel’s softest flank . . . Few other events would be as likely to tempt a pre-emptive Israeli attack and trigger a major Mid-East fracas as the threat of a Nasserist takeover in Jordan. We cannot afford to get caught in a mess like that, especially while we are pushing ahead in Vietnam.40 In private, some members of the Israeli government approved of the new tactic. In June of 1966, Rostow reported to the President: “you will be interested in a talk I had this morning with Shimon Peres, former Israeli Defense Minister, whom Abe Feinberg brought in. He spoke with great respect of Hussein and cited the unspoken ‘agreement’ between Israel and Jordan to dampen border troubles. He made clear that Israel prizes Hussein’s independence of Cairo to which our aid to Jordan is decisive.”41 King Hussein, however, remained convinced that the Israelis intended to take over the West Bank. Hussein recognized that the additional weapons provided by the United States would not be sufficient to deter the Israeli army. Thus, he continued his efforts to prevent unplanned military incidents by secretly negotiating with the Israelis to control

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border incursions and keeping the West Bank de-militarized. War, he knew, would spell disaster for Jordan, as his army was incapable of defending the vast West Bank border. The new approach reflected the Johnson administration’s preoccupation with global Soviet hegemony and its marginalization of regional conflict. In addition, it emerged from Johnson’s desire to placate Israel’s supporters in Congress at a time when the President sought Congressional backing on Vietnam and his domestic agenda. Until the fall of 1966, the Johnson administration appeared to have solved the predicament caused by Nasser’s offer to station Soviet weapons in Jordan. The new policy of providing arms to the Israelis and Jordanians garnered favor from both sides and subverted any anticipated Soviet interference. The arms agreement thwarted Nasser’s plans and provided King Hussein with tangible evidence that the United States would support his kingdom. Unfortunately, the success of this new policy depended on a fragile, covert agreement between King Hussein and Israeli leaders. By arming both sides of a volatile border, US leaders implicitly accepted both Jordan and Israel as trusted friends who would not incite violence in the region. In addition, with the provision of additional arms to Jordan, they recognized the value of maintaining the Hashemite monarchy as a buffer state in the volatile Middle East. Lastly, they reinforced the commonly held belief that the front lines of the Cold War, lightly concealed by Nasser’s revolutionary nationalism, were drawn in the sands between Cairo and Amman. But the new policy embodied some organic contradictions. The provision of arms did nothing to address Hussein’s key problem: Nasser maintained the power to manipulate and pressure Hussein’s regime in a way that could destabilize the region. By providing weapons to Jordan, the United States undermined its own strategic need to keep the region peaceful

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and stable. In order to create durable security, weaponry would have to be tied to a more comprehensive plan – which Johnson lacked. Focused on global themes and ignoring the volatility of the regional conflict, the Johnson administration repeated the mistakes of previous administrations and assumed that American goals could be met simply by keeping the Soviets at bay.

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CHAPTER 6 THE FLIGHT TO CAIRO

The fragile balance established by the United States easily degenerated into open conflict. Early on the morning of 13 November 1966, a force of 400 Israeli soldiers crossed the border into Jordan and attacked Samu’a, a Jordanian village which gave aid and comfort to Fatah guerrilla forces. The soldiers ordered the village inhabitants to evacuate and began to systematically demolish homes with explosives.1 The Israeli government planned the action at Samu’a as a quick, surgical strike, aimed at punishing Palestinian infiltrators who had planted a mine in Israel on 10 November. The government hoped that the attack would motivate King Hussein of Jordan to redouble his efforts to prevent Fatah guerrilla activity. By sheer happenstance, however, a force of one hundred Jordanian regulars stumbled into the action at Samu’a. A lengthy battle ensued, and when the gunfire died down, fifteen Jordanian soldiers, ten Israelis, and the Israeli commander lay dead. The raid devastated the village of Samu’a – over one hundred homes were reduced to rubble, three villagers were killed and ninety-six wounded.2 The Israeli strike at Samu’a severely damaged King Hussein’s confidence in the Israeli government. The attack reinforced Hussein’s lingering suspicion, harbored for many years, that

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Israel had designs on the West Bank. Following the incursion, Hussein also re-evaluated the extent of American support for his regime. Despite repeated verbal commitments from American officials, the King began to doubt that the United States would act decisively to protect the territorial integrity of his kingdom. As a result of this decline in confidence, Hussein began to seek alternative solutions to his political troubles with both Israel and the Palestinians. The Israeli raid motivated a shift in King Hussein’s foreign policy: a brief, yet distinct reorientation favoring Egypt at a critical moment prior to the June War.

Secret Contacts The West Bank boundary – the most extensive border between Israel and any Arab neighbor – provided a small opportunity for Jordanian-Israeli communication. One area of common interest was the need to contain hostile Syrian and Egyptian regimes’ unauthorized border crossings. The Syrian government provided funding and support for raids from Jordan into Israel, thus undermining Jordanian authority. The Israeli government generally recognized the origin of such raids, but faced overwhelming domestic pressure to retaliate in a concrete, meaningful manner. Thus, Jordanians often suffered the consequences of actions that – although sanctioned by many Jordanian Palestinians – the government felt powerless to control. The need to prevent violence along the border led to the exchange of information through representatives of the Israeli/ Jordanian Mixed Armistice Commission (I/JMAC), which also served as a vehicle for informal communication.3 The government of the United States gradually became a second conduit for secret Israeli-Jordanian communiqués. The United States government recognized that, despite public hostility between Israel and Jordan, the two powers were willing

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to cooperate privately. Secret communications between Jordan and Israel continued to pass through American ambassadors during the Johnson administration. In one such exchange, the American Ambassador stationed in Amman, Charles Barnes, informed the State Department in August 1965, “For political reasons they must cease utilize I/JMAC channel for exchange messages with Israel . . . Government of Jordan terrified of political implications such exchange and even fear that Israel may be planning to publish letters . . . They wish continue exchange valid information in effort track down Fatah but request that United States Government serve as intermediary in any future exchanges.” A third, top-secret channel of communication was established in 1963. In addition to funneling messages via the United States, King Hussein took a great political and personal risk by secretly meeting with Levi Eshkol’s representative at the London home of the King’s doctor in September 1963. This encounter marked the beginning of personal communication between the King and Israeli leaders that continued up until the very day of the Samu’a raid.4 When he learned of the Israeli action at Samu’a, King Hussein initially believed that the Israeli attack was the vanguard of an invasion aimed at conquering the West Bank. He briefly considered ordering a return strike – an act that would have precipitated regional war – but instead chose restraint. The psychological damage caused by Samu’a proved to be even greater than the physical toll. The attack destroyed the spirit of détente that existed between Israeli officials and Hussein. In light of his secret contacts with the Israelis, and the catastrophic consequences to Hussein should they become public, the King assumed that the attack on Samu’a heralded a sinister shift in Israeli policy. Immediately following the raid, Hussein admitted to the American Ambassador in Amman, Findley Burns, that he

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had been in secret contact with Israeli leaders since 1963. The King told Burns that he felt betrayed by Israeli leaders: “For the past three years,” the King said, “I have been meeting secretly with Golda Meier, [Foreign Minister Abba] Eban and others. We have discussed these problems at length and agreed on all aspects of them. I told them, among other things, that I could not absorb or tolerate a serious retaliatory riad (sic). They accepted the logic of this and promised there would never be one. Moreover, in addition to these secret personal meetings, I have maintained a personal and confidential correspondence with the Israeli leaders. These exchanges have served to underscore and reinforce our understandings.”5 Following the border incident of 10 November, Hussein sent an apology through the American Ambassador to Israel, Walworth Barbour. Michael Oren, in his popular account of the Six Day War, argued that Ambassador Barbour’s failure to deliver this message in a timely manner resulted in the Israeli attack at Samu’a. Oren wrote: “Questions could later be raised whether Eshkol would have made the same decision had he received Hussein’s apology in time, whether all subsequent events might have been averted had not Barbour so tragically procrastinated.” Yet Hussein told Burns that he had communicated with the Israelis and received a positive response: “The last message I received from the Israelis was further to reassure me that they had no intention of attacking Jordan. I received the message on Nov. 13, the very day the Israeli troops attacked at Samu’a.” According to Hussein’s account, the Israelis independently assured the King that they would not attack, just prior to their strike. In this context, the transmission through Barbour was probably a duplicate, and, thus, the ambassador’s clumsy delay was irrelevant. If indeed the

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Israeli government deliberately misinformed Hussein prior to the Samu’a raid, this communication is critical to understanding the dissolution of trust that subsequently occurred.6 The strike at Samu’a fueled the King’s suspicion and anger. Hussein raged at Ambassador Burns: “As far as I am concerned this attack was a complete betrayal by them of everything I had tried to do for the past three years in the interests of peace, stability and moderation at high personal political risk. Strangely, despite our secret discussions and correspondence, despite secret agreements, understandings and assurances, I never fully trusted their intentions toward me or toward Jordan, in assessing Israeli intentions I ask you to put my experiences with them into your equation.”7 The attack at Samu’a had a devastating effect on Hussein’s confidence that Israeli leaders supported his moderate regime. His bitter diatribe to Ambassador Burns reflected a complete dissolution of trust. “You will excuse me,” he told Burns, “if I find it ironic that the same Eban who expressed to me such understanding of the problems here and gave such firm assurances is now on his way to Washington to tell you, I am sure, that Jordan’s needs should not be met.” From Hussein’s perspective, his attempts to nourish a peaceful relationship – undertaken at great personal risk – now appeared to be an immense miscalculation. The Samu’a raid even caused Hussein to question his own leadership and competence, saying: “This is what one gets for trying to be a moderate, or perhaps for being stupid.”8 Ambassador Burns detailed this conversation in its entirety to the State Department, but warned that it should remain confidential, as Hussein’s grandfather, King Abdullah, had been assassinated for pursuing similar negotiations with the Israelis. Burns observed that it would no longer be possible for the United States to pressure Hussein to keep his armies out of the West Bank. National Security Advisor Walt Rostow then relayed the substance of the conversation to President

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Johnson. Rostow reported that experts doubted the veracity of Hussein’s account, but he acknowledged, “it could be that the contacts existed in a very narrow circle and were not known to the whole government or to the Israeli military.”9 In addition to regretting his secret contacts with the Israelis, Hussein also began to question the extent of American support for his regime. The raid made it abundantly clear that Israel could easily take Jordanian territory. In the wake of Samu’a, Hussein sought tangible signs that the United States would use its military might and economic influence to ensure the territorial integrity of his kingdom. In response to the attack, the State Department briefly considered suspending or delaying arms shipments to Israel as a palliative measure to help bolster Hussein. Secretary of State Dean Rusk successfully argued against taking such action because it might harm other arms deals in the region. In fact, such a measure might cause the public to question all arms shipments to Western allies in the Middle East, including those to Jordan. As a substitute, President Johnson, hoping to placate Hussein, sent a letter of consolation to the King. “My disapproval of this action has been made known to the Government of Israel in the strongest terms,” the President asserted. In an attempt to reassure Hussein that he was not in imminent danger of losing the West Bank, Johnson continued: “Finally Ambassador Burns has informed me of Your Majesty’s concern that Israel’s policies have changed and that Israel now intends to occupy territory on the West Bank of the Jordan River. While I can understand the reason for this concern, we have good reason to believe it highly unlikely that the events you fear will in fact occur.”10

Growing Distrust Johnson’s words doubtlessly gave small comfort to Hussein. Vulnerable to charges of collusion with the Israelis, he no

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longer trusted assurances of Israeli goodwill when faced with conflicting evidence. Johnson concluded his letter by asserting, “In this connection my government’s opposition to the use of force to alter armistice lines or borders in the Near East has been made unmistakably clear to all parties concerned.” Hussein responded favorably to this note, but it did not restore his faith in either Israel or the United States. To the King, Johnson’s note lacked specificity: it did not include a promise of military intervention to preserve Jordanian territory.11 Hussein typically pursued a pragmatic path in his relationship with Israel. His moderate stance, however, masked a deep suspicion – as indicated by conversations dating back to his visit with President Eisenhower – that the Israelis would eventually seize the West Bank. He based his concerns primarily on Israeli immigration figures, noting that the burgeoning Israeli population would eventually require more agricultural land. Now, the events at Samu’a confirmed his fears and appeared to herald the onset of aggressive Israeli intent. “King Hussein and his government believe that Israel’s attack into Jordan November 13 indicates a new Israeli policy: the toppling of his regime to reduce U.S. support for the Arabs and, possibly, make easier an Israeli expansion into the West Bank,” William Handley of the State Department’s Near East Administration reported to the White House Policy Planning Council, in early December 1966. But American officials roundly dismissed Hussein’s supposition, not willing to accept the likelihood of an Israeli attack. “Jordan’s problem, as we see it, is psychological,” Handly asserted.12 Although American officials refused to acknowledge the possibility of Israeli aggression, they recognized that the encounter at Samu’a caused Hussein a great deal of political damage. Jordan’s Palestinian population expressed outrage at the boldness of the Israeli army and the Jordanian army’s perceived inability to defend the border. They clamored for

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retaliation, and riots ensued in major West Bank towns and Amman. Many Jordanians held Hussein responsible for the Jordanian army’s poor performance and believed that he could have done more to prevent Israeli attacks. The King attempted to deflect criticism by lashing out at President Nasser of Egypt. On the evening of 2 December, King Hussein broadcast an emotional speech over the Jordanian airwaves in which he implicated Nasser for his current woes. Hussein did not mention the Egyptian leader by name, stating that “some Arab factions” were trying to destroy Jordan. Yet he taunted Nasser, asserting: “These regimes had boasted they had sufficient aircraft to eclipse the sun from the enemy’s skies,” but in reality, Hussein argued, they did not have enough planes to defend their own territory.13 Analysts at the CIA predicted that Hussein would not recover from the Samu’a incident: “Even if the Jordanian regime gets through the immediate crisis, Hussain’s (sic) position appears to have been damaged to an extent we cannot yet fully assess . . . Failure of the regime to respond militarily to incidents occurring in the near future would almost certainly stimulate more determined plotting within the Armed Forces as well as widespread public disorder.” Officials anticipated that the Israeli incursion would spur Hussein into further demands for arms and force him to seek better relations with the more radical Arab states. Another CIA cable from Jordan judged the long-term probability of an army coup as either inevitable or “extremely high.”14 The passage of time did not quell the burgeoning anger in Jordan, but rather fed discontent as civilian and military funerals took place. Many Jordanians demanded that foreign Arab troops should be brought in to protect the West Bank. Army officers felt humiliated by these demands and by the fact, as one lamented, that they were “slaughtered like sheep at Samu’a.” Army leaders waited for Hussein’s response and secretly plotted

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to remove him in the event that he stalled. American officials in Amman coolly observed the plots and prepared to make a timely exit in the event of the King’s demise.15 In response to the domestic strife, Hussein sought to increase the size and quality of his armed forces, a move that he hoped would assure army loyalty and pacify his subjects. He communicated his needs to various Washington contacts, but the State Department discouraged him from augmenting his arsenal. US officials felt that a larger Jordanian military would place a tremendous financial burden on the economically weak kingdom. In addition, one official posited: “A buildup cannot be justified on military grounds . . . Jordan could never engage Israel or its Arab enemies successfully in major hostilities.” Hussein continued to press the United States for arms and insisted to Ambassador Burns that he would prefer to “go down fighting his enemies rather than his own people.” To Hussein, weaponry from the United States represented a tangible show of support and also served to deflect Nasser’s criticism that the King coddled Israel.16 President Johnson, recognizing Hussein’s precarious position and accepting the advice of officials in the Departments of State and Defense, quickly approved an “emergency” delivery to Jordan of several military items on 24 November 1966, including six 105 mm howitzers, fifteen quarter-ton utility trucks and fifteen 106mm recoilless rifles. In addition, the delivery timetable for previously promised Starfighter aircraft accelerated with the first two aircraft due to arrive on 15 July 1967. The expedited plans for arms shipments did not satisfy Hussein, however, so he sent a top aide, General Amir Khammash, to plead his case with Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Khammash emphasized the United States’ role as protector of Hussein’s regime, noting, “Public opinion in Jordan was convinced Israel attacked Jordan because Syria, which Israel had earlier held responsible for terrorism, was strong militarily

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and protected by USSR.” Recognizing current Cold War sensitivities (and certain inevitable comparisons to Vietnam), Khammash attempted to exploit the Soviet-American rivalry to gain military concessions. When Rusk inquired about the King’s personal safety, Khammash responded that the armed forces were still loyal, but warned, “If nothing done . . . Nov 13 [the date of Samu’a] might in time become Jordan’s new national day.” Khammash also informed the Secretary that internal pressures would doubtlessly force the King to deploy tanks in West Bank, regardless of American disapproval.17 One obstacle to Jordanian-American understanding in late 1966 and early 1967 was that the two sides approached arms negotiations from very different perspectives: the Johnson administration believed that Hussein’s requests only served propaganda purposes, while the King firmly believed that the arms were necessary to defend the West Bank and deter subversive internal movements. The American officials dismissed Hussein’s fear – that the Israelis intended to invade and occupy the West Bank – as unfounded. “Our main difference with Hussein is that we do not see this as a military problem,” Harold Saunders and Howard Wriggins wrote to Walt Rostow during negotiations, “We want to persuade him that his government is misreading the external threat.”18

Desperate Measures Failing to get a satisfactory commitment on the matter of arms, Hussein continued to seek alternative solutions to secure his regime and reduce the volatility of the West Bank. On 11 December the King summoned Ambassador Burns to a meeting at his private residence. Burns described the meeting as emotional; at times, he reported, Hussein had tears in his eyes. The King admitted to the ambassador that although the demonstrations and riots had abated, the pressures against his

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regime continued to build. The army, Hussein argued, was over-extended and morale was low. His control of the army grew weaker on a daily basis. He pressured Burns for a quick response from Washington on the matter of arms.19 Hussein then embarked on a series of startling revelations. He informed Burns that he had sent instructions to his Arab League delegates to accede to the stationing of Saudi and Iraqi troops in Jordan. Despite the dramatic nature of this move, Hussein believed that he would be forced to take additional severe measures if the US was not responsive to his request for arms. The King explained that he had three alternatives. The first would be to seek help from the Soviet Union, an option that he would not choose: “I will not try to mislead you, nor to blackmail you, by telling you I will turn to the east. . . . If in the end Jordan feels she must turn to the east, it would have to be under someone else, not with me.” The second alternative, Hussein stated, would be to wage battle against Syria and Egypt, but again the King would not choose this option because it would “commit those who have been loyal to me to a course which would likely mean their doom.”20 The third alternative – most palatable to Hussein – would be to transform the West Bank into a military directorate and call on all Arab states and the PLO to defend it. Hussein believed that this action would subdue the Palestinian population and quiet the criticism of other Arab states. Although the transfer of territory might also prompt an attack by Israel, it was a chance that he and the other Arab states would have to take.21 At first glance this proposal appeared to be one of Hussein’s masterful bluffs to prod the American administration into action. It is difficult to believe that he seriously entertained the option of relinquishing the West Bank. Yet in doing so, he would rid himself of a tremendous military burden and stifle the complaints of other Arab leaders in one masterful stroke. Perhaps the King planned to save his regime by placing the

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West Bank under pan-Arab authority. Hussein’s conversation with Ambassador Burns indicated that he had become extremely desperate and distrustful of American and Israeli motives. Ambassador Burns told the State Department that the slow response to Khammash provoked Hussein’s suspicions. The Palestinian response to the Israeli raid at Samu’a may have caused Hussein to re-evaluate his position in the West Bank and entertain options that appeared rash and illconceived. While Hussein never made good on his threat, his proposal indicated that he believed his situation now called for desperate measures. A few months later, a similar sentiment would motivate Hussein as he sought an alliance with Nasser.22 Hussein doubtlessly understood that a Palestinian entity on the West Bank – one defended by numerous Arab States – would represent an unpleasant scenario for both Israel and the United States. Indeed, Hussein’s statements immediately inspired a flurry of speculation and contingency planning in Washington. Sherman Kent of the CIA noted in an official memorandum entitled “The Jordan Regime: Its Prospects and the Consequences of its Demise”: “Hussein obviously fears that the US may not come through with military aid in the magnitude he wants . . . . He is therefore examining the possibility of recommending to his brother Arab leaders that they collectively take over the defense of the West Bank.” Kent calculated that the end of Hussein’s regime might lead to a radical Palestinian leadership in Jordan, which would probably seek Soviet assistance. Such a presence could potentially prompt an Israeli attack and provoke an international crisis. The prospect of a regional war in the Middle East, one that could engulf the United States and the Soviet Union, loomed large.23 Hussein’s revelation elicited a rapid response from Washington. President Johnson quickly communicated a response to King Hussein’s proposal to station Saudi and Iraqi

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troops on Jordanian soil. “We have reviewed carefully the request carried to us by your distinguished Chief of Staff and have concluded that we should act quickly in providing additional military assistance,” Johnson assured the King, “I have instructed Secretary McNamara to discuss the details of our response with General Khammash.” Johnson promised that the negotiated items would reach Jordan quickly and that a “substantial portion” would be airlifted. In addition, Johnson prodded the King for reassurance that the arms would change his plans. “I trust, also,” he added, “that this will enable you to resist the stationing of non-Jordanian troops in Jordan.”24 The additional provision of arms persuaded Hussein to avoid immediate action in regard to the West Bank; however, he continued to repeat his suspicions of an imminent Israeli attack to American officials. Nonetheless, the King reiterated his pledge to prevent border infiltrations into Israel and to try to maintain peace between the two countries. By early 1967, the Jordanian political crisis caused by the strike at Samu’a appeared to have abated. The long-term consequences of the Israeli military action, however, proved critical to the misunderstandings that led to regional war in June.25 The series of events following the Israeli raid at Samu’a revealed the tremendous inadequacies of Middle East diplomacy in late 1966. The attack shattered the delicate confidence that existed between Israel and Jordan. In addition, the action changed Hussein’s political strategies in a number of ways. First of all, Samu’a forced Hussein to acknowledge the vulnerability of the West Bank, recognizing from a concrete military perspective that Jordan’s occupation of the West Bank depended upon Israeli restraint. When the Israeli army entered Jordanian territory, they not only defeated Jordanian forces, but also stimulated anti-government rioting. As a result of the strike at Samu’a, Hussein began to isolate the defense of the West Bank from his regime and seek creative means to

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transform the province into a pan-Arab responsibility. While the evidence of his change in attitude appeared in the form of an unfulfilled threat, Hussein’s new strategy for defending the West Bank became evident in subsequent months leading up to the war. He ultimately turned to Arab leaders for assistance despite the fact that he believed they were corrupt and unreasonable. Secondly, Hussein abandoned his expectation of direct military intervention from the United States in the event of an attack on the West Bank. Washington’s glacial response to Hussein’s woes following Samu’a served as a warning that – despite official rhetoric – very little would be done to protect the monarchy. Lastly, Samu’a eroded Hussein’s personal confidence in relationships established through back-channel negotiations; relationships that proved critical to maintaining a fragile détente along the Jordanian-Israeli border.26 Samu’a also initiated a change in Washington. Although American government officials did not substantially alter their opinions of Israel, they began to recognize the potential volatility of the West Bank. Typically focused on minimizing Soviet involvement in the Middle East, US policy makers often underestimated the indigenous political pressures that plagued the region. Hussein’s suggestion, that he might station foreign Arab troops on the West Bank or transform the region into an autonomous entity, startled Washington officials. The possibility of war, heretofore a distant specter, began to concern officials in the State Department and White House in the winter of 1966. American officials recognized that Hussein’s regime provided a significant, albeit weak, barrier between Israel and more radical Arab regimes. By assisting Hussein in 1966, US government officials made a concerted effort to maintain the balance of power in the Middle East. However, in the absence of Israeli-Jordanian trust, Hussein preferred war to the potential risks of further negotiations. Facing severe economic problems in the spring of 1967, Nasser increased his verbal attacks on Israel and Jordan to

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deflect domestic criticism away from his regime. Hussein responded by chiding Nasser for his inaction against the Israelis, following Samu’a, and later after an Israeli aerial attack on Syria in early 1967. The two leaders sparred in an escalating verbal war that pandered to hawkish elements in both societies. Hussein’s attacks only deepened Nasser’s sense of domestic political insecurity. Secretly, Nasser – despite his outspoken attacks on Zionism – realized that the Egyptian army could not defeat the Israelis in a war.27 In early May, the Egyptian and Syrian governments received Soviet intelligence that Israeli regiments were deployed and ready to strike along the Syrian border, and Nasser decided to move his forces into the Sinai. He believed that the troop presence would serve as an effective deterrent to Israel and additionally deflect criticism from his regime. Egyptian forces began to mobilize in the Sinai on Sunday, 14 May. Three days later in a show of solidarity with Syria, Nasser, arguing that the United Nations Emergency Force no longer had legal grounds to occupy the Straits of Tiran and Sharm al-Shaykh, demanded that they depart from the Sinai.28 While ministers in Egypt, Israel and the United States struggled to find a compromise on the issue of the Straits, King Hussein, facing the possibility of war, prepared to make an important strategic move. The Jordanian Prime Minister Saad Jumaa told Ambassador Burns that Hussein desperately wanted to avoid being pulled into a war, but might not have a choice if the conflict lasted more than a short time. On 26 May King Hussein made a bid for support from the United States. He informed the State Department that the United States was seriously risking its relationship with the Arab world and compromising the position of Arab moderates by siding with Israel on the Straits of Tiran issue. Hussein argued that Nasser’s ultimate goal was to foment a publicity battle between the United States and the Arab world. “Once Nasser has succeeded in identifying the United States Government with Israel in

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this crisis, the United States government will be fully compromised,” Hussein insisted, “Nasser is clearly striving for this objective and is very close to achieving it. If he succeeds in this entrapment, Nasser can successfully call other Arabs to impose any sanctions of his choosing on the United States government, from oil nationalization to severance of diplomatic relations.” The United States would be better served, Hussein suggested, if they treated the matter as an isolated conflict between the UAR and Israel. Four days later, however, King Hussein shocked the United States by flying to Cairo and signing a five-year joint defensive agreement with his nemesis. His decision was widely supported in Jordan and cheering crowds greeted the King upon his return to Amman.29 It is inconceivable that Hussein’s opinion of Nasser underwent any dramatic changes in four short days. Nasser’s verbal abuse constantly undermined the King and he blamed the Egyptian leader for several attempts on his life. He also held Nasser responsible for the death of Jordanian Prime Minister Hazza al-Majali in a 1960 bombing. Hussein did not trust Nasser; rather, he abandoned hope of maintaining the status quo and attempted to shift the blame for the impending debacle to the Egyptian president. A State Department briefing memorandum, drafted after the June 1967 war, detailed Hussein’s motives: “By the second week of UAR occupation of Sharm al-Shaykh Hussein concluded that Jordan could not escape the coming conflict, no matter how much the Government of Jordan might wish to do so. Hussein also concluded in the coming conflict Israel would pursue what he considered to be her objectives of taking the West Bank. He was in fact fearful that Israel might not attack Nasser or Syria at all but would instead attack Jordan with the objective of taking over the West Bank.” As the King’s trust in Israel had evaporated following Samu’a, he suspected that Israel would use any military action as an excuse to take Jordanian territory.30

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Often overlooked in historical accounts is the fact that – prior to embarking on his dramatic reconciliation with Nasser – Hussein made one last attempt to seek a substantial military commitment from the United States. During the period of tension prior to the war, the King summoned the American Ambassador to the palace and asked if the United States would commit to sending forces to support Jordan within six hours of an Israeli military strike. Ambassador Burns, however, could issue no such assurance: “Our guarantee of the territorial integrity of Jordan meant exactly what it said but the details of how it would be implemented would have to be decided at the time in light of circumstances then existing.” The King told the ambassador, “unless there were American military intervention within hours of an Israeli attack, the Israelis would be able to exact . . . an intolerable price for withdrawal.”31 Hussein did not trust the Israelis and he could not rely on the United States. The King turned to Cairo. He later admitted that he hoped his alliance with Nasser might deter the Israelis from attacking the West Bank. In addition, the King “told the American Ambassador that he agreed to put Jordanian forces under Egyptian control so that, in the event of a military reverse, Nasser and not he would have to take the blame.” In one calculated move, Hussein placated his bellicose population and put the burden of victory on his old enemy, Nasser. It was not an easy pill to swallow. In speeches celebrating the new alliance, Hussein spoke of meeting the current challenge as “one nation, one hand, and one heart,” while Nasser condescended to the King by speaking “in the name of the Arab Nation.” Nasser sent Egyptian General Abd al-Munim Riyad to command the Jordanian military effort.32 Despite Hussein’s dramatic gambit, Johnson’s emissary to Egypt, Robert Anderson, continued his attempts to de-escalate the conflict. Nasser informed Anderson that Egypt’s actions were motivated by fear of the Israelis. His intelligence showed

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that Israeli troops were mobilizing and he did not want to be caught off-guard as he had been in 1956. When Anderson pointedly asked Nasser if he intended to start a war, Nasser responded that he planned to wait for the Israelis to move. He asked Anderson to inform President Johnson that he did not want to start a conflict, but he was not entirely sure of what the Syrians had planned. Jordanian troops, Nasser confidently reassured Anderson, were now entirely under the control of the UAR. Yet his public statements were far more bellicose, referring to the conflict as a “battle of destiny for the whole Arab nation” and even declaring that the Arabs faced the combined challenge of Israel, the United States and Britain.33

The Survivor In Israel, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol faced overwhelming pressure to strike pre-emptively at Egypt as many civilian and military officials argued that attacking with overwhelming force could prevent a cataclysmic disaster. The Israeli public prepared for war by digging trenches and graves, and stockpiling antidote for poison gas attacks, their fears fueled by press reports that morbidly predicted another Holocaust. Israeli officials later claimed that Hussein’s momentous decision to ally with Nasser forced them to mobilize for war. Yet Hussein’s distrust for both Israel and the United States, following the raid at Samu’a, steered him into a personally distasteful alliance with Nasser. Thus, in November of 1966, the Israelis initiated an action that would ultimately draw their military into a decisive regional battle.34 In the early hours of 5 June 1967, the Israelis launched Operation Focus, an aerial attack on Egyptian air force bases. Within 30 minutes, Israeli planes destroyed half of the Egyptian Air Force – about 204 planes – the majority never having left the ground. Despite this resounding defeat, Nasser reported to Hussein that the Israeli attack had been repelled

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and that Egyptian planes had begun a counterattack. Radar stations at Ajlun confirmed that several planes had crossed into Israeli airspace (they were, it turned out, Israeli planes). King Hussein, believing that the Egyptian Air Force would support his troops, permitted Egyptian General Abd al-Munim Riyad to launch an offensive from the West Bank. Riyad abandoned the traditional Jordanian defensive posture and launched an offensive attack on Israel. Nasser continued to assert that his air force would cover Jordanian positions.35 Nasser clearly hoped that Hussein’s attack would draw off the full force of the Israeli Air Force and give his military time to re-group. The Israeli government, still hoping that Hussein would shun the battle, sent a message to the King through Odd Bull, the chief of staff of the United Nations’ Truce Supervision Organization: “Israel will not, repeat not, attack Jordan if Jordan remains quiet. But if Jordan opens hostilities, Israel will respond with all of its might.” Hussein did not reverse his course. The Jordanian army began shelling Israeli positions at 10:00 a.m. Shortly thereafter, Israeli planes destroyed Jordanian airfields in Mafraq and Amman. Jordanian forces, under the command of Riyad, proceeded with an offensive around Jerusalem. Riyad’s unfamiliarity with Jordanian terrain and defensive strategy proved to be devastating to the Arab armies. As Jordanian forces withdrew from defensive positions in Jenin to participate in the offensive, Israeli forces discovered the gap and streamed through it. The Jordanian army continued fighting, with little air cover or communication, and it quickly became clear that Hussein might lose the entire West Bank. Hussein appealed to Nasser and Abd al-Rahman Arif in Iraq for help, warning that he was losing a tank every ten minutes and was in danger of losing Jerusalem. No help arrived.36 Within two days, by the end of 6 June, Israeli forces had easily defeated the Jordanian army. Jordanian brigades lost about 80 percent of their strength and almost all of their tanks and other vehicles lay abandoned or destroyed. Hussein

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communicated his options to Nasser through Riyad: Jordan must accept a ceasefire and evacuate the West Bank or face complete annihilation. The troops retreated on foot under heavy artillery fire. King Hussein agreed to a UN-negotiated ceasefire on 7 June. The State Department later informed President Johnson: “Hussein had no idea that a military reverse would be of the proportions that actually occurred, nor did he envisage that the signing of the defense pact with Nasser would not have the result of deterring the Israelis, but rather the reverse.” Throughout the conflict, Nasser withheld information about his losses from Hussein, and insisted that Egyptian forces were holding up against the Israelis. Hussein did not learn the details of the devastating Israeli air attack until after the war.37 The Jordanian army remained in a highly vulnerable position and continued to suffer losses in spite of the ceasefire. The Jordanian Prime Minister urged the United States to intervene. “Where,” he asked, “is the President’s guarantee of the territorial integrity of all states in the Middle East?” Hussein was particularly bitter about the loss of Jerusalem. Despite the fact that he had anticipated much of the outcome of the war, he expressed dismay at Nasser’s betrayal and Johnson’s lack of assistance. At the end of the war, an estimated 600,000 to one million Arabs remained isolated under Israeli control in the West Bank. In just a few days of fighting, the Jordanian army suffered around 6,700 casualties and lost half of its tanks and aircraft. Israeli armed forces occupied over half of Jordanian agricultural lands and productive olive groves. The King had risked much, lost more and gained little in the fight against Israel.38

Conclusion Despite this military debacle, Hussein emerged from the war in a surprisingly good political position, having effectively

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undercut his critics by participating in the war. After the war, the general perception in the Arab world was that Jordanian forces had fought bravely and sustained the greatest casualties in battle. Nasser’s forces, by contrast, were derided for their inaction; the Syrians and other armies had hardly been engaged. Had Hussein refused to become involved, Nasser could have blamed his loss to Israel on the lack of support from conservative Arab regimes. Instead, Nasser volunteered his resignation while Hussein urged him to stay in power. By coming to Cairo and signing the treaty, Hussein ceded control to Nasser and consequently shifted responsibility to his enemy. Although Hussein lost a great deal in the Six Day War, he managed to salvage his regime from a seemingly impossible situation.39 Thus, the Six Day War initially shifted the balance of power in the Middle East away from Arab firebrands such as Nasser. This outcome delighted American and Israeli officials, as it provided the additional benefit of diminishing the regional influence of a Soviet client state. Recognizing the opportunity to bolster moderate regimes, the State Department supported Hussein’s goal of regaining territory, arguing that annexation of the West Bank by the Israelis, would “create a difficult problem for Israel in maintaining internal security among the hostile West Bank Arab population.” Jordanian-American relations reached a nadir, however, having suffered from American inaction and an incident that came to be known as “The Big Lie.” During the early stages of the war, Nasser and Hussein publicly claimed that United States planes were aiding the Israelis. The plan unraveled when Israeli intelligence intercepted their telephone conversation and published the dialogue; however, the King’s deception damaged his reputation in Washington.40 The fact that the United States found itself in such a paralyzed position prior to the Six Day War reveals the inherent

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weakness of its position. American leaders had pursued policies that were tightly bound by their organic contradictions, until the strands of policy wove an inescapable web. The only thing that Johnson could do was to sit and wait for the end result. The war was mercifully short, but a longer conflict or more casualties might have initiated a wider war encompassing the United States and the Soviet Union. The poverty of the US position was displayed with clarity by its inability to prevent war between two powers that were supplied with substantial American aid and were both on friendly terms with the United States. The war created a host of new problems: refugees, new territorial issues, and increased intransigence, all of which undermined the United States’ attempt to create a stable Middle East.

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CHAPTER 7 THE BITTER PILL

The psychological and political consequences of the Six Day War proved much more profound and far-reaching than the physical losses of battle. The war had a detrimental effect on the peace process as it forced politicians into less flexible negotiating positions on all sides of the conflict. The war confirmed the Israeli conviction that enemies who were bent on its annihilation surrounded the Jewish homeland. Emboldened by dramatic military victory, Israeli political leaders hesitated to concede territory gained in the war and moved swiftly to consolidate vital parts of the West Bank. The war similarly convinced another generation of Arabs that Israel was an aggressive neo-colonial power, determined to conquer and occupy Arab land. The leaders of the defeated states, already humiliated by their poor military performance, were reluctant to make additional sacrifices to achieve permanent peace; in addition, Arab leaders feared that their citizens would revolt if they made concessions to Israel. Relations between Jordan and the United States deteriorated significantly as a result of the war. Israel’s overwhelming show of strength reinforced the perception that the United States had unfairly favored Israel with superior weaponry. The “Big Lie,” propagated by Hussein and Nasser, appealed to this

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concept: Israel could not and would not defeat her enemies without external support. Although the Johnson administration immediately sought to restore open dialogues with Egypt and Jordan, many Arabs implicated the United States in their disgrace. The mood in Washington at the end of the war was a mixture of irritation and pragmatism. Despite a measure of annoyance that Jordan had participated in the war, officials in Johnson’s administration maintained an interest in preserving his regime. Hussein’s relative youth and history of moderation enhanced the perception that he was a naïve participant who had been easily manipulated by the elder, devious Nasser. The State Department and CIA both noted that Hussein remained in a highly vulnerable position due to his loss of territory and arms. Both offices investigated the possible consequences of regime change; they independently concluded that Jordan should be preserved as a buffer between Israel and her more aggressive neighbors. Notwithstanding Hussein’s loss of favor in the halls of Washington, US officials remained convinced that he was an essential partner in negotiating peace. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank, while a substantial blow to Hussein’s regime, changed his status from that of a minor leader in the Middle East to an essential partner in the formation of a new settlement as Hussein’s tiny kingdom became a central part of peace negotiations.1 It remained uncertain, however, whether Hussein could successfully maneuver through the numerous challenges created by the war. His army, hitherto his greatest source of support, was devastated by the conflict and suffered approximately 7,000 casualties. Hussein confronted yet another refugee crisis as the East Bank of Jordan swelled with around 300,000 West Bank evacuees. Added to the large Palestinian population that previously resided in the East Bank, Palestinians constituted over 50 percent of the Jordanian population. Their destitute

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state compounded the social and economic problems that already plagued Jordan and the refugee penchant for independent guerilla action also concerned Hussein.2 Despite his loss of equipment, land and men, within his own kingdom Hussein emerged from the war with an improved public image. The Jordanian army appeared to have put up a better resistance than the Syrians or Egyptians. The war discredited Nasser and other Arab “firebrands,” whose positions in hindsight appeared rash and impetuous, while moderate leaders like Hussein gained distinction. Hussein’s most vocal opponents, who tended to support Nasser, were silenced by Egypt’s poor performance in the war. American Ambassador Findley Burns reported that, immediately following the cease-fire, the Jordanian population appeared to be in shock and expected Hussein to rectify the disaster through diplomacy or military action.3

Peace Plans American officials, recognizing the potential volatility of the refugee situation, immediately sought answers from the Israelis as to their intent toward the occupied territories and the refugees. Israeli officials initially indicated that they intended to establish an autonomous province of Jordan on the West Bank in which all Palestinian refugees could be settled. Actions on the ground, however, belied this proposition. The Israelis quickly moved to tear down the vast concrete wall that divided East and West Jerusalem. Within a week the Israelis seemed fully entrenched: the occupied territories became a part of the Israeli daily weather forecasts and several Arab towns were re-named in Hebrew. The CIA noted that although official Israeli policy encouraged Palestinians to remain in the West Bank, they were often intimidated and harassed by Israeli soldiers, or escorted to the Jordan River. Despite these telling

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moves, CIA officials firmly believed that the Israelis would eventually relinquish the West Bank because incorporating the large Arab populations in the West Bank and Gaza would substantially change Israeli demographics.4 Eleven days after the war, in a meeting with American representative to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban outlined Israeli intentions for the occupied territories. Eban assured Goldberg that Israel planned to return the Golan and Sinai, on condition of their demilitarization and guaranteed passage through the Suez Canal. Israeli plans for the West Bank were “less crystallized,” Eban explained. Some politicians believed that the West Bank should return to Jordan, others argued that it should become an autonomous state with economic links to Israel.5 Hussein knew that his military options were moribund and only a diplomatic solution could convince the Israelis to return his territory. Although he toyed with the idea of relinquishing the West Bank prior to the war, ceding the territory after an ignoble defeat was not a palatable option. The loss of Jerusalem was particularly objectionable for the King: administrating the Haram al-Sharif – the Muslim holy site that included the Dome of the Rock – endowed him with significant religious prestige. Hussein sought a quick resolution of the conflict, knowing that the Israelis were rapidly taking steps to reinforce their authority over the West Bank. In addition, the numerous refugees from the war posed both an economic and a political threat to his regime. The failure of military action gave Hussein the rationale to resist calls to arms by his fellow Arab leaders, but he had little leverage to use in negotiations with the Israelis. Hussein therefore decided to make a personal appeal to President Johnson on 28 June 1967, hoping that the United States could pressure the Israelis into complete withdrawal. The State Department prepared President Johnson for Hussein’s visit by briefing him on the critical issues, in

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particular, the disposition of the West Bank. A return of the West Bank to Jordan, the State Department argued, would enhance the stability of the Middle East. Annexation of the West Bank by the Israelis, on the other hand, would represent the worst possible scenario. This action would “create a difficult problem for Israel in maintaining internal security among the hostile West Bank Arab population” and would alter the Jewish character of the Israeli state. The President’s task, as envisaged by the State Department, was to encourage Hussein to open negotiations with the Israelis. However, officials at State warned Johnson that this might be difficult in view of Hussein’s present mood: Hussein today is very bitter – bitter against the United States; bitter against the Soviet Union; bitter against Nasser; bitter against the other Arabs; and, above all, bitter against himself. He evidently had no military staff in Cairo – at least he had no method of checking on Nasser’s statement of Monday, June 5 that the UAR was invading Israel and that the UAR was in a position to provide air cover to the Jordan Army. When Hussein speaks, as he does in private, of the irresponsibility of Arab leaders, he includes himself, not for signing the pact with Nasser, which he still feels that in the circumstances he had no other choice but to do, but for his failure to ascertain Nasser’s military position when Nasser ordered the Jordanian offensive. Hussein regretted that he had trusted Nasser with the safety of his army and security of his land. Despite a long history of suspicion and hostility between the two leaders, he had failed to verify Nasser’s assertions during critical moments of battle. He did not express remorse for participating in the conflict – continuing to insist that it was the only viable option – but

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lamented losing men and territory due to Nasser’s false reports. Another cause for Hussein’s “bitterness” was that his predictions of Israeli expansion into the West Bank had finally come to fruition. He had warned the United States several times that Israel could not absorb further immigrants without seeking additional land, but his admonitions had generally been dismissed by American officials as groundless.6 The State Department’s proposed peace plan, as presented to Johnson, included elements of reciprocity and economic incentives. The West Bank would return to Jordan’s sovereignty with minor border modifications and would be specified as a demilitarized zone. Jerusalem would be given a special status, perhaps international, and the two countries would improve their economic ties. Acting Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach recommended that Johnson speak to Hussein privately, and try to persuade him to enter into secret negotiations with the Israelis. “You should know that the King has negotiated secretly with the Israelis in the past, e.g., meeting Eban on the Riviera,” Katzenbach wrote, noting that this information was of the greatest sensitivity. Katzenbach asserted that Johnson’s talks with Hussein were “crucial” to the peace process. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy agreed with the State plan, but favored a more detached approach to Hussein. “Our main purpose must be to let him down as gently as we can from his present conviction that you must pull his chestnuts out of the fire for him,” Bundy told the President.7 When Hussein met with President Johnson at the White House, Katzenbach and Bundy both lectured him on the necessity of making peace with Israel without assistance from the United States. No third party, they told Hussein, could impose a peace plan on the region and the Arab states had overestimated American influence on Israel, which was now at an all-time low due to Israel’s uncontested victory. In addition,

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Katzenbach and Bundy warned that Congress would not be willing to continue funding projects that led to belligerency.8 Hussein insisted that he needed to obtain the return of the West Bank, but revealed little information on his negotiating position. He explained that he would have to consult with other Arab leaders before committing to any plan of action. The President and the King then exited the room and spent about twenty minutes in private conversation. The records of this discussion remain classified; however, British documents reveal that King Hussein expressed his intention to call a summit meeting to confront Nasser and gain support for a moderate path in the Middle East. Hussein believed that he was now in a strong moral position as the Jordanian army had fought courageously and suffered the greatest losses in the recent conflict.9 As Hussein and Johnson conversed, the Jordanian Chief of Staff, General Amir Khammash, seized the opportunity to petition McGeorge Bundy for additional arms. Khammash told Bundy that the army desperately needed basic defensive equipment – not for the purpose of fighting a war – but once again to assure the loyalty of the King’s army. The General understood that Congress would not want to appear to be re-arming the combatants, but he required something to shore up the King’s position. The Soviets had already started to re-supply other Arab states, Khammash asserted, and the Jordanian army looked to the United States for similar support. Bundy declined to make any commitment and replied that Khammash should stay in close contact with him.10 On the same day that President Johnson and King Hussein met at the White House, the Israeli Knesset voted to annex East Jerusalem. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Eugene Rostow, reported to the British Ambassador that Hussein had been “concerned, but not violently upset,” by the news. Nonetheless, the King returned to Amman with little

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assurance that the United States would be of assistance in the negotiation process.11 Near the end of June, Israeli officials privately informed the United States that they would entertain secret negotiations with King Hussein, despite the fact that Israeli leadership was divided on the issue of “preserving” him. Most Israeli officials believed that Hussein still represented a better neighbor than a regime sympathetic to Syria or Egypt. Certain points, however, were no longer flexible: Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol stated that a unified Jerusalem under Israeli control was a sine qua non and would not be an item of negotiation. As a gesture to Hussein, Israel intended to offer him the role of protector of the Islamic Holy Places in East Jerusalem.12 Hussein proved to be similarly anxious for a speedy resolution to the conflict. The incoming American Ambassador, Harrison Symmes, met with Hussein on 13 July and described him as “on a razor’s edge.” “(He) told me that he had not averaged more than two hours’ sleep out of every 24 hours during the past five weeks, despite the use of sleeping pills and other sedatives,” Symmes reported. “He was now prepared to make a unilateral settlement with Israel,” but the King needed to know what the Israelis might be willing to give up in exchange for peace. He sought reassurance from the ambassador that Jordan would regain all of the territory lost in the war. “Israel must recognize that (my) regime could not possibly survive to make the agreement stick unless Israel’s terms were generous,” Hussein contended. The King told Symmes that he would be willing to fly anywhere in the world for a peace settlement and, in typical dramatic fashion, avowed that he would abdicate rather than go to war again. Hussein’s message was quickly transmitted to the Israelis and Findley Burns flew to Amman to inform Hussein that they had responded positively.13

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Realizing that he needed more regional support for any peace plan, Hussein traveled to Cairo to seek Nasser’s cooperation. Nasser, plagued by domestic problems, argued that it was unwise to negotiate without some initial concessions by the Israelis. Heeding Nasser’s advice, Hussein concluded that this was not the appropriate time to enter into bilateral negotiations and instead sought to build a coalition of moderate Arab leaders to support his agenda at the upcoming Khartoum summit.14

Three Nos At the Khartoum Conference of 2 September 1967, moderate leaders finally had the opportunity to confront radical opinions with the unpleasant realities of the war. The tactics of bluster, showmanship and exaggeration, staples of past meetings, were generally dismissed. According to White House internal memos, President Nasser was a changed man: “King Faysal agrees he had never seen Nasir so frank, humble, sincere or courageous.” Nasser laid aside some of his exuberant rhetoric and spoke more realistically about the situation with Israel. Several Arab nations blamed Syria, Fatah and the PLO for provoking the hostilities. PLO Chairman Ahmad Shuqayri was unanimously repudiated and all of his statements expunged from the record. Hussein, who had for years been maligned as a puppet of the West, suddenly became a prominent leader in the negotiations process. Arab leaders authorized him to present the “moderate Arab case” to the United States and the United Nations in October. In addition, Algeria and Morocco requested that he mediate a dispute between their countries. Although Hussein believed that Khartoum represented a victory for the moderates, he did not leave the conference without severe constraints on his efforts to negotiate. The Khartoum Resolutions, signed on 1 September 1967, included an agreement that the Arab

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states would work together to regain the territory lost in the Six Day War: The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of June 5. This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab States abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country. These restrictions were widely ignored by Nasser and Hussein, who engaged the Israelis in secret or back-channel communication, but the statement signified the Arab League’s unwillingness to abandon extreme and unrealistic rhetoric. The Khartoum Resolution was justifiably cited as an example of Arab obstinacy and the futility of negotiations.15 Encouraged by the support of other Arab leaders, Hussein now embarked on a campaign to convince President Johnson to apply pressure to the Israelis. He sent a letter to Johnson imploring him to change his position on the Arab-Israeli conflict. “Sir, Israel seems to have benefited beyond reason from the assistance, help and pampering of many countries and the United States in particular,” Hussein wrote, “The United States would appear at present to have chosen to forsake her friendship and friends amongst us Arabs and to mainly concern herself with attempting to enforce on them what Israel might or might not wish.” Hussein entreated President Johnson to use his influence and compel the Israeli government to withdraw from the occupied territories.16 President Johnson, however, did not wish to damage his favorable relationship with the American Jewish community

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by alienating the Israelis. Johnson fervently desired to push forward his domestic agenda and the problems of Vietnam already drained time and energy from this task. Taking another controversial stance in foreign policy would simply not serve his presidency; there were no political incentives to improve relations with the Arab states or jeopardize his friendship with the Israelis. When Johnson met with Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban in October 1967 his tone was amiable, not coercive. The President told Eban that the Jewish people in the country gave him much comfort, noting that Jewish voters in New York favored him 81 to 7. “That proves you are still the smartest people in the world,” he said. Furthermore, Johnson told Eban that their nations shared similar goals. “You know our problems and we understand yours,” Johnson assured the Israeli diplomat, “Our objectives are about the same.” The President, however, still worried about Soviet intentions: “We must maintain policies that will keep the USSR from fastening its tentacles on the countries in the Middle East.”17 The President complained that there was a general resistance in the United States against foreign commitments and some Senators opposed providing weapons to both Israel and South Vietnam. As for the June war, Johnson expressed his disappointment that Israel had attacked despite his entreaties not to begin hostilities. He tempered this rebuke with the comment, “But I must say, that you did what you did do very well.” Thus, Johnson’s response to Israel’s pre-emptive move was tepid and included a compliment embedded in a mild reprimand.18 In addition to meeting with Johnson, Abba Eban discussed the status of Israeli-Jordanian negotiations with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Speaking bluntly, Eban informed McNamara that the Israelis no longer viewed Hussein as an asset. The Israeli public opposed America’s re-arming of any country that had attacked Israel in the Six Day War. In response, McNamara pointedly asked Eban if it was in Israel’s interest to have Jordan in the Soviet camp. For the past eight

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years, Israeli leaders had secretly supported the Hashemite King; now they displayed ambivalence.19

Business as Usual Of course, the decline of Israeli approval meant that it would be much more difficult to provide weaponry to King Hussein. Resumption of military aid to the Middle East became a topic for debate in the US government only a few weeks after the ceasefire. Although government officials took a somewhat sympathetic view of King Hussein – believing that Nasser had manipulated him – Congress would not support the full resumption of arms deliveries. The United States announced in October that it would resume shipments of arms to Israel and Morocco, Libya, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, but continue to prohibit shipments to Jordan. This decision was based primarily on Jordan’s participation in the war: the other chief belligerents – Syria and Egypt – received their arms from the Soviet Union. Members of Congress argued that Jordan had violated the conditions of its arms agreements by attacking Israel and they would not approve new allocations.20 Hussein already planned to address the United Nations in November; news of the continued arms embargo now prompted him to request another meeting with President Johnson. Johnson, however, was not anxious to see Hussein and had to be persuaded. Walt Rostow encouraged the President to speak with the monarch. “Your relationship with him will be our main, if not our only important tie with him in the weeks ahead. We have just announced releasing military shipments to all the friendly Arabs except Jordan,” Rostow argued “Despite the Israelis’ bitter feelings about him, he’s still the best bet to work out a settlement with Israel. He may not settle alone, but for the moment he seems to be carrying Nasser’s proxy.” Rostow suggested that Johnson meet with Hussein for

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a working meal, but the President declined. In fact, Johnson responded that he would prefer not to see Hussein at all, but might accept an office meeting.21 State Department officials agreed with Rostow that the President should make time to see Hussein. The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Lucius Battle, argued that Hussein now played an essential role – he was perhaps the only party willing to open and sustain negotiations with the Israelis. “We have made a new calculation of what the Jordanian connection is worth,” Battle wrote to Johnson: In essence Hussein is valuable to us because of the – possibly indispensable – role he can play in starting and sustaining negotiations for a general political settlement between Israel and its neighbors. Beyond that, Hussein has been known for ten years as a US protégé. If he fails to survive, or turns away from us towards Moscow, our prestige in the area – and the confidence of other moderate regimes in us – will suffer. Implied, but not explicitly outlined in Battle’s statement was the connection between events in the Middle East and Vietnam. By asserting that other moderate regimes would lose confidence in the United States if Hussein failed to survive, Battle linked Hussein’s continued existence to Johnson’s primary area of concern.22 Johnson finally consented to a meeting with the King. After arriving in Washington on 6 November, Hussein first met with Dean Rusk, Nick Katzenbach, Lucius Battle and Harrison Symmes. Rusk praised an apparent change in Arab attitudes, noting, “Since Khartoum it seemed there was a new air of moderation.” Hussein agreed, but warned, “Palestine is still at the root of our troubles and we must solve that problem.” Hussein not only wanted to present the Arab case

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as articulated at Khartoum, he also sought the resumption of arms shipments to Jordan. The King expressed concern about the imbalance of conventional weapons and rumors that within a year the Israelis would have an atomic bomb. Rusk assured Hussein that the United States would not permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East: “We do not play games. It would be disastrous for nuclear weapons to be introduced into the Middle East.” Yet, despite Hussein’s insistence, Rusk would not set a date for the resumption of arms shipments.23 Two days later, Hussein met with Rusk and President Johnson, who now affirmed his commitment to assist Jordan with negotiations. Johnson tried to gain Hussein’s support for the American version of a United Nations resolution regarding the peace negotiations, stating that a “workable” United Nations resolution would have to precede more substantial talks. Hussein did not trust the resolution, noting that it lacked precision, most notably in regard to specifications for Israeli withdrawal. In response, Johnson assured Hussein that if Jordan supported the resolution, the United States would “use its leverage to bring about a settlement.”24 After considerable debate over language, on 22 November 1967 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 242, which called for “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” The Secretary General appointed Gunnar Jarring special representative to negotiate the terms of a peace agreement between Israel and her neighbors. Jarring’s efforts were immediately complicated by the fact that the belligerent parties assigned different meanings to the somewhat ambiguous language of the resolution. Leaders of the Arab nations assumed that the resolution advocated a complete withdrawal from all territories occupied during the war. Nonetheless, Israeli politicians argued that the lack of specifics (notably the omission of the article “the”

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before the word territories) indicated that a complete withdrawal was negotiable. The White House, however, did not initially recognize this divergence in perceptions and heralded the resolution as a victory.25 Hussein returned to Amman quite pleased with his visit to the United States. In addition to meeting with the President and Secretary of State, he spoke with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and made an appearance on the television program “Face the Nation.” Upon his return to Jordan, rumors circulated that he had obtained a guarantee of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank while in the United States. This story doubtlessly stemmed from the assurances of Secretary Rusk, who without Johnson’s foreknowledge informed Hussein that the United States did not “envisage a Jordan which consists of only the East Bank.”26 In addition, Harrison Symmes reported to the State Department that Hussein “expects a positive response (regarding arms shipments to Jordan) now that the UK (withdrawal) resolution has been passed by the Security Council.” He desperately needed weapons to placate the army, which currently defended Jordanian territory without spare parts and working vehicles. Ambassador Symmes warned the State Department, “Right now our problem is how to help the King buy time and avoid a direct confrontation with his army on whether or not to opt for Soviet weapons. We are seriously concerned that if Jordan does go to Moscow for arms, this will only serve further to strengthen those elements in the area who are opposed to a peaceful solution of the crisis.”27 Fears that Hussein would seek Soviet assistance before American arms shipments resumed became more palpable in early December. The State Department became aware of a Soviet economic survey mission, including military officials, that was scheduled to visit Amman at the beginning of the year. Ambassador Symmes met with Hussein

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and warned him that the presence of the Soviet military in Jordan might prejudice Congress against resuming arms shipments. Symmes expressed his hope – to both the King and the State Department – that arms shipments would be rapidly resumed.28 Hussein attempted to dismiss the significance of the Soviet visit and assured Symmes that the Soviet military officials would not be publicly identified. He also insisted that he did not intend to inform the Soviets of Jordan’s specific military requirements. Symmes told the King that top US officials were urgently reviewing his requests and that he hoped for a favorable word before Christmas.29 News that the Soviets might use this route into Jordan, however, caused the CIA and State Department to review the embargo policy more urgently. The CIA recommended that arms shipments to Jordan should be resumed as soon as possible. A review of Jordanian policy stated, “Failure to get arms would give rise to severe domestic dissidence – particularly from the officer corps on whose support Hussain (sic) depends.” Syria and the UAR had already been restocked by the Soviets; now other third-world nations might view the United States as a poor and ungenerous ally if they failed to supply Jordan. Richard Helms of the CIA sent a memo to the President pleading on Hussein’s behalf: “Hussein is caught in the middle between the radical Arab forces centered in Syria which support an escalation of terrorism and resistance and an insistent Israeli position that Jordan can and must assume the responsibility for these hostile acts. Each incident – particularly those which lead to an Israeli punitive retaliatory move involving Israeli aircraft against a Jordan that has no air defense – further undermines Hussein’s position.” Helms argued that an arms package for Jordan was essential to the small country’s survival.30 To discourage Hussein from accepting Soviet assistance, Johnson sent the King a brief note promising to make a decision on arms requests by the beginning of the new year.

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Walt Rostow recommended a package totaling $6.5 million including spare parts, automotive and communication gear, some anti-tank guns and ammunition. “We all know the Israelis won’t like this but we have been interested to note in the last few weeks a much more relaxed Israeli attitude toward Hussein. In any case, this equipment will not affect the IsraeliJordanian arms balance,” Rostow informed the President “I should think we could sell it to the Israelis who will not want to jeopardize their aircraft requests by making a fuss over such an inconsequential package for Jordan.”31 Rostow referred to Israeli requests for technologically advanced F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers. Hussein received news of these negotiations and suspected that the resumption of arms shipments to Jordan would be followed by reports of a new agreement with Israel. Any connection between the two deals, he worried, would provide radical Arabs with ammunition against him. Jordanian officials and Ambassador Symmes both voiced their disapproval of any additional arms allocations to Israel, especially while Gunnar Jarring continued peace talks.32 Despite his efforts to mend fences with Johnson, Hussein remained disappointed that Jordan had been pointedly excluded when the arms embargo to other Arab states had been lifted. “The King’s reception in the United States in November, particularly in contrast to the later reception of Eshkol, had been a serious psychological blow,” Symmes explained. The King’s private secretary, Zaid Rifai, explained that Jordanians did not believe that they could trust Johnson’s word: “The United States Government had spoken a great deal about human and legal rights in Vietnam. What about Arab rights? What about villages that had been leveled on the West Bank by Israel?”33 On 3 January 1968, President Johnson informed Hussein that the United States would welcome a visit by General

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Khammash to negotiate the details of a new arms agreement. Walt Rostow told Johnson, “This is a painful decision, but I don’t see any other way to keep the Soviets out at this point.” Khammash returned to Washington and presented Hussein’s requests: 200 M-48 A-3 tanks with 105 mm guns and 36 multipurpose aircraft estimated to cost $117 million in total. While Khammash waited for a response, he continued to emphasize that the Soviets were ready to meet Jordan’s needs, informing Harold Saunders that Hussein had turned away a Soviet delegation that included several two-star generals. When Robert McNamara met with Khammash on 10 February he detailed a list of equipment that could be quickly provided. His proposal included a resumption of shipment of the previously suspended arms package, including eighteen Starfighter aircraft, 88 M-48 A-1 tanks, 23 howitzers, 43 armored personnel carriers and other small arms and ammunition. The agreement included a clause barring Hussein from accepting Soviet assistance. President Johnson wrote to Hussein that the arms represented “a strong reaffirmation of our support.”34 Despite Johnson’s assertion, Hussein viewed the package as insufficient. In particular, the King was distressed by what he considered an insufficient number of tanks and by the proposed delivery dates, which extended into fiscal year 1970. Once more Hussein told Ambassador Symmes that he would have to consider “other sources” if the United States was unable to meet his needs. As a result of Hussein’s pressure, Johnson authorized the delivery of twelve additional tanks and 111 additional anti-aircraft guns.35 With the assurance that his army would be adequately resupplied, King Hussein renewed his attempt to negotiate with the Israelis by sending his trusted aide, Colonel Muhammad Daoud, to meet with an Israeli counterpart. Because of Israel’s overwhelming military superiority, Hussein doubted that they

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would enter into serious negotiations. The King was convinced that Israel would seek to hold onto the occupied territories for religious and cultural reasons. He nonetheless continued to hope that the United States would use its influence to persuade the Israelis to withdraw from the West Bank.36

Karameh While the peace process foundered, Palestinian guerillas fighters became increasingly organized and active in Jordan. On 18 March 1968 a mine destroyed an Israeli bus near the Jordanian border, killing several settlers. President Johnson immediately wrote to King Hussein urging him to control terrorist activities along the border area: “I appeal to you for a maximum effort to bring such incidents under firm control and to indicate by words and actions your determination to maintain an environment in which such violence cannot occur.”37 The President’s message arrived at Hussein’s palace three hours after the Israelis launched a punitive strike on Jordan. The Israelis invaded Jordanian territory with a fighting force of 1,500 and attacked fedayeen bases at the village of Karameh and on the southern Dead Sea. The Israelis targeted Karameh because it had been abandoned by most civilians and was now considered to be a fedayeen stronghold. Although accurate figures are difficult to obtain, at least 620 Jordanians and fedayeen were wounded, captured or killed during the fighting. In light of this action, the timing of Johnson’s note proved exceptionally poor. Hussein was outraged by Johnson’s implication that he had not been vigorous enough in his attempts to control terrorism. He shot back a hasty and somewhat blunt message to the President: We are now fighting again, defending – in the face of a blatant and premeditated Israeli aggression – our land,

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our homes, the shabby tents of the victims of civilization, and our honor. If the battle should go the way it well might do, then Jordan, its head of state: its leaders, its armed forces and its people would all become the victims of American weapons, and their own faith in the United States and its president, as well as the friendship which they valued to the point of refusing to accept any other option to bolster their defence in the face of a history of continued aggression. I am not, and shall never hold myself or my government and armed force, responsible for the safety and security of the Israeli forces of occupation in the west bank of Jordan and the rest of the occupied Arab territories. Nor do I expect to be held responsible for this. Ambassador Symmes believed that Hussein’s regime could not survive another incident like Karameh and he urged the State Department to heavily censure the Israelis. The Secretary of State replied that the Israeli government could not resist internal pressures to retaliate against terrorism. “It is imperative that Jordanians demonstrate (a) significant measure of control over terrorist activity,” Secretary Rusk responded. Harold Saunders informed the President that the State Department intended to issue a statement of “concern and dismay” at the military action. “We can hardly remain silent, and we would be as careful as possible about domestic Jewish opinion,” Saunders promised. But the State Department privately accepted the action at Karameh, which, Prime Minister Eshkol assured, was a limited raid for the purpose of discovering and disarming terrorists.38 Karameh proved to be damaging to the long-term interests of the Israelis because it significantly bolstered the status of the PLO. Within the fedayeen camps, the battle was portrayed

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as a Palestinian victory and recruitment swelled. Palestinian guerilla groups that had previously concentrated their bases along the border with Israel now moved inland and became a more visible part of the Jordanian landscape. They posed an increasing threat to Hussein as they demanded freedom of operation within the kingdom.39 Despite the continued bloodshed, King Hussein continued in his efforts to persuade the Egyptians to participate in direct negotiations with the Israelis. In a meeting on 6 April Nasser insisted that only a military conflict could bring about a favorable end for the Arabs. Hussein asked Nasser how he intended to use his military to assist Jordan in regaining the West Bank, pointing out that in the present situation Israel dictated the time and place of military action. He continued to press for a diplomatic solution and Nasser finally consented to a meeting between Arab and Israeli representatives in New York.40 The meeting was delayed, however, when UN special envoy Gunnar Jarring explained to the Egyptian and Jordanian ministers that Israel’s acceptance of UN Resolution 242 did not guarantee Israeli acceptance of its implementation. The Israelis, Jarring reported, apparently viewed the resolution as merely a framework for negotiations. King Hussein immediately asked President Johnson to provide a written guarantee that Israel would accept the implementation of Resolution 242. Without such a document, he argued, Egypt would not negotiate and he would not proceed alone. Johnson, however, refused to guarantee Israeli withdrawal and the peace talks reached an impasse.41 Hussein continued to fear the possibility of another attack after he received reports in May of an imminent Israeli plan to seize territory on the East Bank in northern Jordan. The King anxiously requested that President Johnson confirm the United States’ commitment to Jordan’s territorial integrity. Johnson responded with a message relayed by Ambassador Symmes, affirming his

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support: “We would strongly oppose any occupation of territory beyond the present cease-fire lines.” Johnson’s promise surely provided small comfort to Hussein as it implied a tacit acceptance of occupation within the present cease-fire lines.42 Regardless of the stalemate in formal negotiations, King Hussein informed Ambassador Symmes that he would undertake secret talks with the Israelis. But he continued to urge the United States to pressure the Israelis into making concessions. “The failure of the US to take an active role to influence a settlement only encourages the extremists in Israel,” Hussein insisted. The King believed that an upcoming General Assembly session in New York represented a last chance for peace in the region and he told his foreign minister to take any opportunity to talk to the Israelis – including secret meetings. The talks in New York, however, proved fruitless. The Jordanian government wanted a commitment to the principle of withdrawal from the occupied territories prior to more substantial negotiations, but the Israelis would not accept pre-conditions.43 Hussein’s frustration at the lack of progress on the diplomatic front culminated in October of 1968, when President Johnson signed a Foreign Assistance Act that contained provisions for the sale of Phantom aircraft to Israel. Congress viewed the planes as an essential defensive procurement for Israel, counterbalancing Soviet MiGs stationed in Egypt. With State Department prompting, the President sent a “hand-holding” message to Hussein explaining the aircraft sale: I trust that you will understand the circumstances that led me to take this action, which in no way diminishes our full and unequivocal support for Ambassador Jarring’s efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israel crisis . . . I would also like to assure you that our commitment to and support for your wise leadership . . . remain undiminished.

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This message did little to lessen Hussein’s outrage upon hearing news of the sale. From the outset of negotiations, Hussein argued that Israeli military superiority made them inflexible, and he still feared that the Israelis would attempt to seize additional Jordanian territory. Another factor fueled Hussein’s ire: he had been covertly meeting with the Israelis to negotiate peace (the next meeting was apparently scheduled for 23 November). The Johnson administration knew that these negotiations were taking place and that subsequent weapons deals might alter the balance of power. The Phantom aircraft also reinforced Israeli air superiority, which had become a symbol of Israeli military dominance in the Arab world.44 Hussein’s assertion that the Israelis would be emboldened by their military superiority was reinforced when Abba Eban publicly stated that certain “unpopulated areas” of the West Bank might be placed under Israeli jurisdiction. Ambassador Symmes anxiously wrote to the State Department: “The territorial assurances that we have given Hussein are manifestly inconsistent with any proposal that would place ‘certain unpopulated areas of the West Bank’ under Israeli sovereignty.” Symmes expressed his hope that the American government would “be very firm in letting the Israelis know (1) We intend to stand by the territorial assurances we have given to Jordan and (2) Our expectation that they will proceed as soon as possible to give the Jordanians acceptable territorial specifics as part of a peaceful settlement.” Symmes’ pleas went unheeded; with Johnson’s presidency in its final weeks there was no tangible benefit to reversing course.45 Hussein responded to Johnson’s letter with unveiled sarcasm and anger: If we have been unable to make any substantial progress toward peace, it is because of Israel’s intransigence and failure to make any substantial contributions and

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concessions toward that end, as well as Israel’s obvious territorial ambitions which she often shrouds under the guise of “National Security.” I strongly believe that the supply of Phantoms to Israel, if it does not increase her belligerent ambitions, then it certainly does not contribute towards curtailing them. The continuous flow of arms into Israel may only encourage her intransigent attitude, and thus, I fail to see how the decision on the Phantoms would not in any way diminish your support for Ambassador Jarring’s efforts. Jordan has been the only country to bear the fury of the new American aircraft that have been supplied to Israel since the war . . . . As for your commitment regarding the territorial integrity of Jordan, may I please remind you, Mr. President, that this integrity has been violated for over a year and a half. President Johnson did not initially respond to Hussein’s letter. After three weeks the Department of State informed Johnson that Hussein expected a reply and the President sent a brief, terse note. “I appreciate the frank exposition of your concerns and problems regarding the general area situation and that of Jordan in particular as contained in your letter of November 30,” Johnson wrote “I believe it is indicative of close and friendly US-Jordanian ties and of your personal confidence in me that you feel free to express your views in such a direct manner.” Missing from Johnson’s note was any mention of the Phantom aircraft.46

Conclusion In a conversation with Harrison Symmes at the end of 1968, King Hussein admitted that covert talks with the Israelis had been in progress for “some long time” but had proven

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completely futile. The Israelis wanted to keep Gaza, a twelvekilometer wide strip of land along the Jordan River, and another leading to Hebron. They were unyielding on Jerusalem and would only permit Jordanians to have access to the Holy Places. The Israelis wanted to form a bilateral committee to discuss the refugee problem while Hussein wanted UN resolutions applied. Hussein knew that his public would view any concession of territory as adding to the disgrace of military defeat. He believed that he could not progress further without additional Israeli concessions and despaired that a peace agreement would ever emerge.47 By the time that President Johnson left office in January 1969, Jordanian-American relations had become distinctly cold. Although the United States continued to provide economic and military assistance to Jordan, Hussein felt abandoned and betrayed. The personal candor that had developed between Hussein and American leaders since the Eisenhower years dissolved. Part of the problem amounted to personality and style differences: Johnson’s lack of empathy and responsiveness insulted Hussein and underscored his feelings of isolation. While State Department officials wanted to keep Hussein in the American camp, they also believed that he harbored unrealistic expectations of what the United States could accomplish on behalf of Jordan.48 Simultaneously, the Johnson administration held unrealistic expectations about Hussein’s ability to deliver peace. The President did not recognize that only narrow options were left to Hussein following the war and did not provide sufficient support for his demand that Israel return the West Bank. While officials in the Johnson administration could not anticipate that the dispute over the West Bank would become an intractable conflict, they could surely foresee that the large Palestinian refugee population would potentially destabilize Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. By underestimating the human

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toll of this disaster, they ensured that the region would become even more volatile. In light of Hussein’s evident desire to cooperate with Israel and the United States during the immediate postwar period, there appeared to be a fleeting chance to settle territorial disputes, stabilize the border region and reinforce the Hashemite regime. By December of 1968, Harrison Symmes, the American Ambassador stationed in Jordan, told his superiors at Foggy Bottom that they had missed a small window of opportunity to negotiate with the Arabs subsequent to the June war. Symmes, along with Hussein, displayed remarkable prescience on the future of the conflict. “More and more Israeli spokesmen seem to define Israeli security concerns in terms of the acquisition of territory,” he reported. “We may well drift further into the situation that Hussein foresees: An increase in incidents, tensions, and extremism (which Hussein was careful to explain would occur ‘on both sides’). Unfortunately, the fact that this tragedy has already played to a full house for twenty-one years does not mean it may not have an even longer run.” Indeed, Jordan’s retreat from the West Bank was a mere prelude to an increasingly complex and insoluble problem.49

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CHAPTER 8 CIVIL WAR

Richard Nixon came to the White House with an impressive record of leadership that extended back to 1947, serving in the House of Representatives, the Senate and the Vice Presidency. While in office, he sought to strengthen America’s allies in the Persian Gulf, especially the Shah of Iran. President Nixon’s administration treated King Hussein with the same wavering support of many previous presidencies. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger explained the administration’s position during the first months of the administration in April 1969. “We do have an interest in keeping him on the throne as a moderate leader on one of the key Arab-Israeli fronts,” Kissinger wrote, “Above all, we believe Hussein offers greater hope than any other leader for a breakthrough on a settlement with Israel.” Yet Kissinger doubted that the United States could provide significant military support in the event that Hussein’s regime was threatened by the opposition. The Vietnam War, now extremely unpopular in the United States, instructed Nixon and Kissinger on the perils of foreign intervention. The United States had to walk a fine line in its support of Hussein to avoid charges of imperialism being leveled by other Arab leaders. Therefore, Kissinger recommended that Nixon keep Hussein in a “holding position” by offering

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him moderate increases of military aid and by encouraging the King to negotiate with the Israelis – even though a realistic settlement appeared to be moribund.1 Nixon faced a greater problem with Johnson’s promise to provide supersonic aircraft to Israel. Members of the State Department and the NSC believed that Israel had developed a nuclear bomb, and they hesitated to provide the Israeli government with superior delivery technology. Extensive debates about Israel’s capabilities and the US commitment to Israel ensued during the early months of the administration. As such, further provisions of arms to Israel were in question.2 This holding position was doomed to fail, because the Hashemite monarchy already faced an existential crisis. The Palestinian resistance adroitly took credit for the battle of Karameh in 1968 and public support for guerilla resistance against Israel had increased substantially in the kingdom – it was seemingly the only viable option after traditional military action failed to achieve results in 1967. The former prime minister of Jordan, Wasfi Tal, explained to a CIA operative that negotiations alone would not eliminate Arab humiliation or heal the wounds of the defeat. In Tal’s view, Arab honor was at stake and redemption would be achieved by sustaining a guerilla war that the Israelis could never win; keeping Israel harassed along the border; and straining its economy by discouraging immigration, tourism, and foreign investment. According to Tal, Hussein had no option but to “pick up the rifle of Arab liberation” in order to expiate the sins of the war and to save his regime. Therefore, while Hussein privately opposed fedayeen action, he could do little publicly to restrain the militants within his own society.3 At the same time, King Hussein struggled to maintain calm along the border with Israel and worked covertly to undermine fedayeen leadership. Chief of the Royal Cabinet Zaid Rifai discussed the fedayeen situation with the Near

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East Administration’s Joseph Sisco while the King visited Washington in April 1969. He reported that the fedayeen were popular in refugee camps and well financed by other Arab states; however, their leadership was splintered into around 50 organizations. Rifai noted that the Jordanian government had successfully penetrated the fedayeen groups and worked to incite internal division. The monarchy favored Yasser Arafat’s leadership and hoped to form a partnership with Fatah in order to diminish the power of the other militias.4 Hussein had already requested US assistance with controlling the border and restraining guerilla activities. Early in 1968, Major-General Muhammad Rasil Kilani, Chief of the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate, asked for the latest technology that could be applied to monitoring the border. The King sought to accomplish two things: to stem the flow of terrorists through Jordan and break up their organizations in a way that would not incite the public. Hussein understood that the numerous anti-Israeli militias organizing in Jordan could easily turn against the monarchy. He wanted to keep his own anti-terrorist campaign under cover by publicly promoting border security as a protective measure taken against Israel.5

Jordan or Palestine? The problem of the fedayeen was not limited to the areas along the border. As the impatience of the fedayeen grew, various Palestinian groups challenged King Hussein for sovereignty of the kingdom. Israeli raids pushed the militants away from the border areas and they set up independent enclaves in the most populous cities deep within Jordan, including Amman. Palestinian groups began to wear distinctive militia uniforms, set up roadblocks, harass Jordanian citizens, carry arms openly, and fly Palestinian flags. Their actions undermined Hussein’s

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authority and eventually diminished his sense of hospitality. Due to the fractured nature of these groups, it was impossible for the Jordanian government to negotiate with a single entity in order to restrain their behavior. Meanwhile, as the power of the fedayeen rose, the Nixon administration tried to keep all options open by making contact with Palestinian leaders.6 As the power of the fedayeen rose, the authority of the Jordanian government declined. Open displays of fedayeen power were common and by early 1969 the government had little control of the areas north of Amman. On Eid al-Adha, one of the holiest days of Islam, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a Marxist fedayeen movement led by George Habash, used armed teenage boys and girls to raise money in the streets of Amman. Other fedayeen groups established bases around the popular tourist sites of Gerasa and Petra, even firing on tourist helicopters. In March 1969, the German Ambassador stationed in Jordan declared, “Tourism in Jordan is dead.”7 Recognizing the threat to his regime and his sovereignty, Hussein began preparations to confront the fedayeen in early 1970. He sent a message to the Israeli government through American channels requesting that the Israelis show restraint while he brought the militias under control. “In order to do this, he will have to thin out troops from front-line positions facing Israel,” American Ambassador Symmes communicated to the State Department prior to his dismissal that summer, “King further requested specifically that the (United States Government) . . . urge the maximum cooperation possible from the Israelis.”8 The summer of 1970 witnessed a steady decline into chaos within Jordan. In June, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) seized 40 foreign hostages and held them at the Philadelphia Intercontinental Hotel in Amman. Unlike Yasser Arafat’s Fatah, the Marxist PFLP posited that regime

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change in Jordan was an essential step in the liberation of Palestine. The government cut the power to the hotel, and the PLFP held a dramatic, candlelit press conference for reporters in the hotel lobby. To gain the freedom of the hostages, the King agreed to dismiss his cabinet – especially his adamantly anti-fedayeen uncle, Nasser bin Jamil – and accepted one with a Palestinian majority. With a flair for drama, PFLP leader George Habash gave a grand farewell speech as he released the hostages, telling them, “We are very pleased that we did not have to blow up the hotel over your heads . . . . I offer my personal apologies. Our men are excellent fighters, but I am not sure that they are very good at running a hotel.”9 By successfully forcing the monarchy to capitulate, Habash served his overall goal of destabilizing Hussein’s moderate regime. Thus, the authority of the regime was compromised well before September of 1970. Former Chief of the Royal Cabinet Zaid Rifai recalled: We opened the country to the Palestinian resistance movement, the fedayeen and that situation ran out of hand. We ended up having fifty-two of those organizations in the country – some of them we knew, and some we didn’t know – and we found they were importing all kinds of non-Palestinians: the Red Brigades, the Japanese, everybody. These organizations started interfering in the internal affairs of the country; they had armed militias and they felt that they were strong enough to take over part of the country . . . . They set up roadblocks in the city – the army was not in the city – they killed, kidnapped and used extortion; there were machine guns all over the place. I remember that I used to go to the palace – Amman was much smaller than it is now and there was only one road to the palace – we had to go through Jebel Hussein refugee camp and the PFLP had set up a

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road block. When they saw my car coming, they would fire machine guns and we would fire back, like cowboys, and fight our way through the roadblock. In the evening we would have to fight our way back again. Another worker at the Royal Court, Amjad Majali, confirmed Rifai’s account: “It was hell. It wasn’t an easy task for us to go to the Royal Court. The Palestinian mortars were in front of the Palace, not so far. They used to fire at us daily as we came and went. Many times we couldn’t leave. It was really hell.” Other Jordanian cities suffered from the same problems as Amman. Palestinians set up their own courts in Jordanian cities and refused to abide by Jordanian law throughout the kingdom. For all practical purposes, Hussein had lost control of the kingdom.10 Members of Nixon’s administration expressed a degree of frustration that Hussein still refused to confront the fedayeen forcefully in the late summer. They viewed his hesitance as a sign of weakness that might ultimately lead to the King’s downfall. The US may have continued its traditional “wait and see” approach to Hussein’s viability had it not been for the hijacking of several airplanes by the PFLP. On 6 September, militants representing the PFLP seized three planes – one Swiss and two American – and made an attempt to take an Israeli El Al jet. Hijackers flew two of the planes to Dawson’s Field about 20 miles from Amman.11 While the majority of the passengers were released, the hijackers continued to hold about 50 American and Israeli citizens. The hostage crisis transfixed the Western media and meanwhile the collapse of Hussein’s government seemed imminent; the American embassy reported that the environment “borders on anarchy in most areas of Amman” and the chaos had spread to Ma’an and Karak.12 The hostage situation forced the Nixon administration to abandon its “holding position.” In response to the crisis,

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Kissinger convened meetings of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) on a daily basis. The group immediately considered options for intervention and concluded that a military force might be necessary to gain the release of the hostages, given the present ineffectiveness of the Jordanian government. They also reviewed alternatives for providing support to Hussein’s regime in his struggle with the fedayeen and eventually surmised that external help could be provided best by the Israelis.13 Fedayeen actions in the northern industrial city of Irbid supplied the ultimate catalyst that ended Hussein’s inertia. On 15 September fedayeen forces took over the town and declared it to be a part of “The Republic of Palestine.” As a result of this direct challenge to his sovereignty, the King declared a state of emergency and formed a new military government controlled by seven men: Zaid Rifai, Nazir Rasheed, Zaid bin Shaker, Wasfi Tal, Adnan Abu Odeh, Muhammad Daoud, and Habis Majali. Armored personnel carriers transported the men from their homes to the palace. Adnan Abu Odeh recalled the grim mood at their initial meeting: “We did not know where we were going. All looked to be against us. Coming from intelligence I knew how dark the situation was. I knew nothing about what would happen the next day. Would we be standing before a firing squad?”14 In Washington, members of Nixon’s administration questioned whether the King had allowed the situation to decline beyond repair.15 King Hussein notified the new American Ambassador Dean Brown of his plan to wrest back his country from the fedayeen. Henry Kissinger reported the crisis to President Nixon on 15 September and told him that Hussein planned to establish a military government on the next day. At the same time, the King once again used the American embassy as a channel to convey a sensitive message to the Israelis: “King Hussein urgently requested that the U.S. take steps to assure that the

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Israelis do nothing to prejudice or aggravate the situation. He also stressed that, depending on fedayeen reactions, he may need to call for U.S. and Israeli assistance.” Kissinger called an emergency meeting of the WSAG to consider possible US action to support the King.16 The next day, Kissinger sent a memo to Nixon outlining the unpalatable contingencies. If a radical Palestinian faction seized control in Jordan, the prospect of a peace settlement would drop to “almost zero.” Israel might seize Jordanian territory in response (in particular, the northern region around Um Qais known as the Jordanian Golan), an action that would undermine peace negotiations with Egypt. The WSAG estimated that the King would prevail in the conflict, but “the U.S. should not intervene if the King is too weak to win this battle with the fedayeen with his own forces. In that situation, however, Israel would probably move. If so, the group felt the U.S. should stand aside.” Another possibility was that Iraqi forces – some 17,000 stationed in the eastern Jordanian desert – might intervene on behalf of the fedayeen. In that case, the WSAG recommended that Israel begin “any air attacks necessary.” Nixon responded to this sentence with an emphatic “no,” scrawling on the report “We shall not support Israel in any way if they attack Jordan on their own.”17 Nixon seemed to be more enthusiastic about direct military action against the fedayeen than Israeli intervention. In a conversation with Kissinger, he advocated a dramatic show of force: Nixon: I wish we could do something publicly in support of the King. Kissinger: I do not think that he is eager for too much publicity. He knows that we have planes available. Nixon: For strikes? Kissinger: To carry in weapons if he needs them.

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Nixon: We also have airplanes to strike. I want Europe mobilized in readiness. If we do I want to hit massively. Not just little pinpricks. I want them to know we are hell bent for election.18 Unlike previous administrations, Nixon’s plans included immediate support for the King rather than waiting to observe the outcome of the crisis. Indeed, all members of the WSAG, including Kissinger, concurred, “victory for Hussein is essential from our point of view.”19 The question was not whether the administration should assist Hussein, but how that assistance could best be provided without attendant political embarrassment for the King. The WSAG debated whether the US should provide air support to the King or if for logistical reasons it would be better to request Israeli intervention. Either option would subject the King to significant embarrassment and the United States to charges of imperialism. Both Hussein and US leaders also feared outside intervention; Syria might invade to help the fedayeen or Iraqi troops stationed in east Jordan could join forces with the PFLP. Nixon responded aggressively to that prospect, telling Kissinger, “If they move, my strong feeling at this time is that we should use American air and knock the bejesus out of them.”20 The shadow of Vietnam loomed large and Nixon feared the prospect of losing another small country; any military involvement must be swift, successful, and demonstrate the superiority of US forces. The military made full preparations to provide air support: two carriers were already on hand near Crete, and a third, the Kennedy, was ordered to proceed to the eastern end of the Mediterranean. In the event of an extended operation, the WSAG considered options for use of air bases in Turkey or Greece.21 While Jordanian forces engaged the Palestinian militias in full-scale urban warfare, other Arab leaders attempted to intercede and pressure Hussein to negotiate a ceasefire. Nasser,

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who supported Fatah and Yasser Arafat’s leadership, chided Hussein, saying that the Israelis were the true beneficiaries of this civil conflict. He urged Hussein to end the fighting, even claiming that the movement of the Sixth Fleet was a “conspiracy trying to exploit the tragedy in Jordan which will give them a chance to get involved.” As reports of Palestinian casualties continued to pour into Cairo, Nasser repeatedly warned of “dangerous results” if Hussein did not implement a ceasefire. Hussein defended his actions by saying his military had been “stabbed in the back” by the Palestinians. “The Jordanian army which fought honorably in the Palestine War is being targeted by those who did not attend that war, those who made us go to war and then gave their land to the enemy without joining the battle,” Hussein wrote to Nasser. In response to the crisis, the Arab League convened in Cairo and sent a delegation to Amman to broker a ceasefire.22

Help “From Any Quarter” By 20 September, communication between the palace and the American embassy began to break down: the batteries on the embassy’s portable radio system were almost spent. The State Department requested assistance from the nearby British embassy to maintain communication with the palace.23 Meanwhile, a greater threat to Jordanian sovereignty emerged when over 200 Syrian tanks, thinly disguised as Palestinian units, rolled into northern Jordan and moved toward the city of Irbid, in an effort to reinforce the fedayeen. Zaid Rifai recalled that he received news of the Syrian invasion by telephone in Raghadan Palace. At the time, a group of local villagers were at the palace providing food for the besieged King. When Rifai replaced the telephone receiver, he hesitated to deliver the bad news in front of the King’s subjects, so he reported to the King in English, knowing the locals would

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not understand. Despite the gravity of the situation, Hussein cracked a joke and the two laughed, convincing the locals that the telephone conversation had brought good news. A true leader under pressure, the King had a sense of humor and calm demeanor that motivated other members of his besieged government.24 The Jordanian military quickly engaged the invading Syrian columns, but suffered from a numerical disadvantage. Both sides sustained casualties as the battle ensued for over five hours. Hussein rushed his military cabinet to a secret meeting in order to make a special request. Adnan Abu Odeh recalled: We were on a sort of open veranda and the sun was going down. As we stood around, he told us that the Syrians had made an incursion into the north. Our troops were fighting back, but the Syrians were making progress. He said he had ordered all the troops we had to protect Amman and defend the capital. He said, “We will fight, but we might need some friends to come and help us. I want you to give me a mandate to invite such friends.” The answer to his request was not prompt. He realized that we were hesitant to give him a mandate. So he said to us, “I will leave you now to debate what I have asked you, and once you reach a decision please call me.” So we began to discuss it amongst ourselves, and we decided to give him the mandate. Abu Odeh and the other members of the government realized that Hussein might be referring to Israeli help, but Abu Odeh considered it a significant gesture that the King chose to consult his advisors at such a desperate hour.25 Following the meeting, Zaid Rifai quickly contacted Dean Brown and said that the King requested an immediate air

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strike. Brown attempted to clarify: Did he mean an air strike “from any quarter?” The answer was yes. Brown responded, “He would know who was in the position to make the strike?” Rifai replied, “The King’s first preference is a US strike, but as the situation seems to be coming to the worst, the most important thing is to hit the Syrians now.”26 Of course, Nixon’s staff had to plan for numerous contingencies in the event that the Israelis launched an air attack on the Syrians, with or without Jordanian assent. Would the Soviets intervene to support their client state Syria? Would the Jordanian military, in their hatred of the Israelis, desert Hussein and join the fedayeen? Would such an action ineluctably lead to the fall of Hussein’s regime? The WSAG prepared for numerous scenarios, including a Soviet attack on Israel. On 20 September 1970, the prospect of a full-scale regional or even global war loomed large.27 Joseph Sisco of the State Department’s Near East Administration conveyed the King’s request for assistance to Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin demurred, stating, “Israel must take into account that it might bring unpleasant developments.” Rabin also took the opportunity to chastise Sisco for what Israel perceived as Nixon’s ungenerous arms appropriations.28 While the Israeli government considered the request, the WSAG prepared plans for attacking Syrian forces and put the US Airborne Brigade on alert in Germany; it could reach Jordan within eight hours.29 Rabin soon called Kissinger with the Israeli response, which included a number of questions: 1) Will the US agree to approach Israel formally on this matter? 2) Will the King agree to request our assistance and undertake methods of communication and coordination between us?

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3) How will the US act to prevent Soviet participation or involvement? 4) Is it understood that the U.S will side with us in the international political arena including U.N. veto on grounds that the Syrian invasion of Jordan not only violates Jordan’s integrity but also threatens Israel’s security and therefore entitles Israel to take action in her defense? 5) Is it clear that Israel will not be held responsible for the state of the hostages resulting from Israeli action against Syrian forces in Jordan? 6) Is it understood that US public statements on all matters pertaining to above questions shall be made on the highest levels and not lower than Secretary of State? 6) Answers to the above questions should be in the form of a secret memorandum of understanding.30 Rabin met with Kissinger and Alexander Haig on the afternoon of 22 September in the White House Map Room and told them that the Israeli government agreed to provide air strikes on Syrian positions and – if needed – ground operations. Kissinger resisted this point, stating that the Israelis must receive American permission before proceeding with a ground attack. Nixon proved to be particularly insightful on this point, telling Kissinger that ground action presented “a much more difficult reaction point . . . the idea of Israel invading Jordan – that’s the point, see.” But by the next morning, the President agreed to an Israeli ground operation as a last resort and only if limited to Jordan – Israeli troops in Syria had the potential to expand the conflict exponentially.31 Later the President considered an option in which Israel would invade Syria, as he became concerned that if Israeli troops entered Jordan, they would be difficult to dislodge.32

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The debates over Israeli intervention proved moot. By noon the next day, the Jordanian army had repelled the Syrian invasion in what the CIA Director Richard Helms called “wellcoordinated tank, artillery and air operation.” The Syrians lost around 120 tanks in the fighting while the Jordanian army reinforced its position around Irbid.33 Ambassador Brown at the embassy managed to contact the palace on 23 September to discuss the possibility of an Israeli ground action. Zaid Rifai, reluctant to speak about the matter candidly, said that the King “prefers action from up high.” On that same day, Syrian forces began to withdraw from Jordan.34

Conclusion The crisis caused by the Syrian invasion revealed the interdependent relationship that had developed between Israel, the United States, and Jordan. After the Syrian withdrawal, Rabin praised the Jordanian army’s performance on the battlefield. Within a few days the Jordanian army managed to eliminate the fedayeen presence in the cities and push them into more remote parts of the country. While the ceasefire still afforded autonomy to fedayeen groups, they had been significantly weakened by the fighting; estimates of Palestinian casualties were approximately 3,000 dead and 11,000 wounded. Gamal Abdel Nasser brokered a ceasefire between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat in Cairo on 25 September. According to the Cairo Agreement, the fedayeen would leave the cities and be permitted zones of operation in specified areas. Once out of the cities, the Palestinian militias lost their audience for overt displays of strength and easy recruitment; their power in rural areas dwindled and the Jordanian government forced them into obscurity and, eventually, exile in Lebanon.35 At the conclusion of the crisis, Kissinger wrote to Nixon and summarized the military situation in Jordan. Nixon

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responded with some scribbled notes: “K-We must step up our aid to Hussein particularly now when he does not appear to be in deep trouble – keep pouring in aid” (underline in original). Kissinger also reported to the President that Hussein wanted to thank Golda Meir for the effective “spooking operation” which he believed was “a major contribution to the Syrian withdrawal.” According to Israeli sources, Israeli Phantom jets flew low over Syrian units during the conflict, creating little more than sonic booms, but perhaps giving the impression of potential intervention.36 In a departure from the hesitance of previous administrations, the White House made substantial plans to intervene during the September crisis to save Hussein’s regime. In the aftermath Kissinger concluded, “Our firm action helped to defuse a potentially very dangerous situation and to keep in power an Arab leader whose policies are moderate. This may well result in improving the chances for a lasting peace in the Near East.”37 After the crisis, the Nixon administration continued its support by pouring in military and economic aid, including an extra $15 million for the Jordanian budget. Thus, Nixon recognized that Hussein’s regime provided muchneeded stability to the volatile Middle East.38 Yet as US support for Jordan became a recognized part of policy, Israeli support for the Hashemite King waned. The events of September revealed Israel’s new approach to King Hussein and the issue of Palestinian nationalism within Jordan. During the September crisis, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban told American Ambassador to the United Nations, Charles Yost, “the world would not come to an end if he (Hussein) departed the scene.” Furthermore, Eban noted that “the Palestinians would become more responsible when saddled with the day-to-day burden of government, and the long-term trend in Jordan was toward greater recognition of the fact that Jordan was 70 percent Palestinian.” This attitude

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represented a departure in Israeli policy: instead of working to preserve Hussein’s regime, the Israeli government attempted to re-define Jordan as a Palestinian state that would provide a permanent home for the refugees.39 The United States not only relied on the presence of a moderate regime in Jordan, it had come to depend on Israeli support for the Hashemite monarchy. When Israeli enthusiasm for Hussein waned, US officials scrambled to find ways to strengthen the King. To be fair, Richard Nixon inherited a Middle East policy that had suffered from over twenty years of confused and contradictory plans. The events of September 1970 revealed the poverty of that policy: Jordan, a kingdom of “vital interest” to the United States, remained in a shockingly vulnerable position. In spite of its superpower status and the millions in aid lavished on Jordan, US policy makers once again faced the prospect of a global conflict initiated in the Middle East. This time, however, the President took more defined steps to support Hussein and his regime, including plans for US military intervention. Unlike his predecessors, Nixon fully understood the consequences if Hussein’s government failed. He wrote in his memoirs that a Jordanian coup might have ignited a global conflict, reflecting, “. . . the entire Middle East might erupt in war . . . It was like a ghastly game of dominoes, with a nuclear war waiting at the end.”40

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CONCLUSION

The history of US-Middle East relations is not merely a story of the pursuit of oil or Soviet containment or a safe haven for the Jewish people. The most consistent theme in America’s Middle East policy during the period studied from 1948–1970 was the pursuit of stability. Despite this sustained effort, most governments of the Middle East remained highly unstable. Of course, it is important to acknowledge that modern nations in the Middle East were fairly new constructs. Artificial boundaries dividing ethnic and social groups in the region created an intense interdependency of state power. Under those circumstances, each state, not simply a few powerful axes, became critical to maintaining stability. Over time, key officials in the State Department, Department of Defense, and the White House recognized that the presence of a moderate, anti-communist ruler in Jordan was critical to peace and stability in the Middle East. American officials relied on Jordan’s position as a moderate buffer state bordering Israel at times when its role remained widely unacknowledged, such as during the Kennedy administration when the President sought to establish ties to Nasser. The Hashemites’ unique willingness to work with both Israeli and Arab leaders, and Jordan’s key geographic position at the nexus of conflict, gave Jordanian leaders an expanded role in brokering Middle East peace. As a result, American officials increasingly depended on the Jordanian monarchy and consequently augmented its military and economic support.

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Harry Truman initiated formal contact with Jordan and established the foundations of American policy in the postwar Middle East. He extended financial and political support to Israel and expected that Arab nations would quickly accept the presence of a Jewish state in the Middle East as they experienced the economic benefits of peace. Although Truman extended recognition to Jordan, he assumed that the Hashemite monarchy would eventually fall to regional nationalist movements. Truman underestimated the degree of animosity that was engendered by the Arab-Israeli conflict and he believed that the refugee problem would be rapidly resolved through economic means. He assumed that the establishment of a Jewish state in the Middle East would bring an end to the conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. Once the Palestine issue appeared to be settled, Truman concluded that Soviet domination posed the greatest threat to the stability of the Middle East and, thus, he failed to vigorously pursue a settlement for Palestinian refugees. While Truman left office with the belief that he had created a more stable Middle East and settled the dispute between warring factions, he had actually contributed to the overall instability of the area. Dwight Eisenhower based his policy primarily on concerns about the Soviet Union, worries that were exacerbated by the actions and rhetoric of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Eisenhower planned to counteract Nasser’s influence in the region by promoting another Arab ruler as a source of leadership. Although this plan never came to fruition, Nasser’s profession of nonalignment motivated Eisenhower to increase his support for Hussein. Hussein successfully exploited Eisenhower’s distaste for communism by depicting opponents of his regime as agents of Soviet power. Despite the improved ties between the United States and Jordan, the President never intended to intervene to save Hussein’s regime in the event of a coup. Eisenhower did not assist Hussein militarily – despite his bold Doctrine and

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British pleas for US intervention – at two critical moments during his administration: the Abu Nuwar coup attempt and the Iraqi revolution of 1958. These events, however, forced American officials to consider the possible repercussions of the end of the Hashemite monarchy. The envisioned scenario of war between Israel and Egypt ultimately motivated Eisenhower to increase his support for the Jordanian monarchy. In addition, Hussein’s behavior at Zerqa substantially improved his image in the Eisenhower White House and enhanced his personal rapport with the President. As a result, Jordanian-American relations improved substantially during the 1950s. Jordanian-American relations foundered during John F. Kennedy’s administration as the new president pursued a policy of reconciliation with Nasser. Kennedy believed that he could improve the United States’ image in the Arab world by reconciling with the leader of revolutionary Arab nationalism, but he failed to comprehend how his actions would affect his relationship with other Arab leaders. At the same time, Hussein discovered that his devout professions of anticommunism did not carry the same weight in the Kennedy administration, and he lost the advantage of his congenial relationship with Eisenhower. Although Hussein intended to visit Kennedy and strengthen his bond with the United States, he hedged his bets by establishing relations with the Soviet Union and attempting to reconcile with Nasser. In 1963 the possibility of war in the region (in anticipation of a SyrianEgyptian-Iraqi alliance) forced the White House to recalculate Hussein’s value, but the King lost faith that the United States would intervene to support his regime in the event of a coup or external attack. Lyndon Johnson abandoned Kennedy’s effort to placate Nasser and promised additional support to Israel from the outset of his administration. Johnson tried to balance concerns about Soviet interference in the region with the need

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to mollify Israel’s supporters in Congress. As a result, he eventually endorsed a policy of providing substantial quantities of arms to both Israel and Jordan. Israel covertly acquiesced to American military provisions for Jordan and privately maintained that Hussein represented their best option as a neighbor. At the same time, Johnson dismissed Hussein’s concerns – which he had been voicing for years – that the Israelis intended to seize the West Bank. As tensions grew prior to the Six Day War, the President displayed his support for Israel without specifically condoning an Israeli first strike. When Israel launched attacks against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, the President privately expressed his admiration of the Israeli army’s efficiency and vehemently opposed Soviet intervention on behalf of Syria. After the war, Johnson gave his tacit consent to the Israeli occupation of Jordanian land when he did not reinforce previous statements guaranteeing the territorial integrity of all states in the Middle East. The belligerent Arab states showed a willingness to explore settlement options by giving Hussein their proxy to negotiate. Johnson failed to seize this opportunity and instead urged Hussein to support United Nations Resolution 242, arguing that the passage of the resolution must precede the return of the West Bank to Jordan. Johnson subsequently disrupted the peace process by providing new weaponry to Israel, which had an effect on both public and secret negotiations. By the end of Johnson’s administration, Jordanian-American relations had become significantly strained. Richard Nixon’s policies represented a departure from the US government’s previous approach to Hussein. When the September 1970 crisis emerged in Jordan, Nixon was prepared to provide military support for the King. Direct military intervention was an option considered by the WSAG – to rescue hostages, assist Hussein against the fedayeen, or attack invading Syrian columns. Nixon recognized the importance of

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Jordan as both a moderate power in the region and a partner to restrain militant Palestinians. Unfortunately, by the time Nixon offered a more substantial commitment to Jordan, attitudes within the Israeli government had shifted away from supporting the King. Nixon faced the unpleasant possibility that Israel might exploit the volatile Jordanian crisis to gain additional territory. Once more, the US government failed to control a situation that had potential to escalate into a broader regional or even global war. For the most part, American leaders failed to attain their objectives in the Middle East. Despite extensive strategies for limiting Soviet influence in the region, the Soviet Union became a substantial provider of weapons to several key Arab countries including Egypt and Syria. United States officials failed to avert a Middle East arms race or prevent Israel from developing nuclear weapons. Regardless of numerous economic schemes and plans, American programs did not create prosperous economies that might alleviate the friction of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and furthermore they failed to substantially improve the status of Palestinian refugees. Liberal applications of money and arms did not fundamentally solve the problems of the region, or even inspire cooperation from the beneficiaries. Peace was elusive and war, or the threat of war, stalked each administration. Coups and plots constantly plagued the land, which remained as volatile in 1970 as in 1948. Why did the concentrated efforts of five successive presidents fail? As can be seen throughout this book, each president deliberately departed from the actions of his predecessor and took a unique approach to Jordan and the region as a whole. Through this brief study of Jordanian-American relations, one can derive key information on the nature of American power in the Middle East. By studying the efforts of these administrations, one can see notable patterns in their attempts at policymaking.

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First of all, as noted by Peter Hahn and other respected historians, the Cold War created an atmosphere in Washington, DC that substantially influenced American foreign policy in the Middle East as in other areas of the world. The threat of Soviet global domination preoccupied the minds of most American administrators who viewed power as a bilateral struggle, thus dismissing regional conflict as secondary in significance. As evidenced by the history of US policy in Jordan, the Cold War mindset caused American officials to ignore or discount pressing problems that significantly undermined stability, such as the Palestinian refugee issue or the porous border between Jordan and Israel. By focusing on the global Soviet threat, officials tended to underestimate the long-term implications of regional disputes like the conflict between Israel and Arab states. Public perceptions and pressure on elected officials further distorted the American approach to the Middle East as leaders attempted to formulate policy that would not damage their public image. As a result of these factors, American officials often failed in their attempts to improve the stability of this vital part of the world. Another secondary repercussion of the “Cold War mentality” was that presidents tended to overestimate American power. They did not see limitations on their ability to influence a region that resided in another hemisphere or to reshape societies that they neither studied nor understood. American power was deemed sufficient to solve any problem, ameliorate any dispute or reform any society. Yet it is clear that US power was not merely limited: at times rulers of smaller states manipulated American power to suit their own needs. Nonetheless, successive presidents smugly believed that their approach to the Middle East would succeed where others had failed. US leaders also assumed that concepts like sovereignty, legitimacy and nationalism were similar in all parts of the world; yet, these concepts were not readily transposed into

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radically different societies without undergoing significant changes. Nationalism in the Middle East was an infant construct that did not have the same organic roots from whence it emerged in Europe. Nationalism in the Middle East emerged with a tribal-rooted, pan-Arab component that did not easily fit in the Western template imposed on the region. Legitimate leadership, similarly, was based in ethical concepts of honor and consensus; its heritage was neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic. Sovereignty, therefore, developed as a multilayered process of constantly negotiating with the governed in order to maintain legitimacy. Under those circumstances, it was difficult for successive US presidents to understand the subtler power exchanges between Middle Eastern leaders and those they governed. The lack of understanding of Middle Eastern societies allowed American leaders to advocate policies that embodied organic conflicts: chief among these was the conflict between the United States’ pragmatic need for stability and the idealistic belief that self-determination was an antidote to communism. The problem ran deeper than simply being caught between unpalatable options. By failing to recognize the inherent conflict between democracy and stability, US leaders could only devise policies that would serve one aim or the other; therefore an ad hoc, unsystematic and ineffective approach reigned. Without a clear vision of a realistic outcome, each president tried to reinvent Middle East policy, but failed to achieve significant progress toward the primary goal of stabilizing the region. Over time, officials in the United States began to recognize the Hashemite Kingdom’s contribution to regional stability. Although historians tend to focus on the powerful states such as Syria and Egypt, Jordan’s location made it a pivotal state in the Middle East and afforded it an importance far beyond its size or economic power. Without the Jordanian state, and

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moderate leaders at the helm, US policy makers faced a complex host of unpredictable scenarios, some of which ended in global nuclear war. By strengthening the undemocratic Hashemite regime, American policy makers underscored the need to create stability at the geographic nexus of conflict.

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A NOTE ON SOURCES

This work is based primarily on documents. Where possible, I have attempted to tell the story of Jordanian-American relations from multiple points of view. Jordanian archives, though available, are very limited and interviews with Jordanian officials provided better material for this study. Controversy is ubiquitous to the study of the Middle East and the lack of open access to materials can be a daunting hurdle. Some documents pertaining to this work are classified in one or more countries. Where possible, I tried to explain some of the controversies that exist and justify my approach to the subject.

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NOTES

Introduction 1. The most notable recent example would be The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). 2. Some general histories of US-Middle East relations during this period include Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Zachary Lockman, Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Lawrence Davidson, America’s Palestine: Popular and Official Perceptions from Balfour to Statehood (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2001); Ray Takeyh, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain, and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953–1957 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); Bonnie F. Saunders, The United States and Arab Nationalism: The Syrian Case, 1953–1960 (Westport: Praeger, 1996); David W. Lesch, Syria and the United States: Eisenhower’s Cold War in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); Jon B. Alterman, Egypt and American Foreign Assistance, 1952–1956: Hopes Dashed (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Matthew Holland, America and Egypt: from Roosevelt to Eisenhower (Westport: Praeger, 1996); Peter L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, 1945–1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Steven Z. Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power in

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the Middle East, 1953–1957 (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1992); Diane Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); George W. Ball and Douglas B. Ball, The Passionate Attachment: America’s Involvement with Israel, 1947 to Present (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1992); Nigel John Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955–1959 (London: Macmillan Press, 1996). 3. Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (New York: Knopf, 2006), Collusion Across the Jordan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) and The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine, 1921–1951 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Nigel Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Adam Garfinkle, Israel and Jordan in the Shadow of War: Functional Ties and Futile Diplomacy in a Small Place (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); Ephraim Karsh, Israel, the Hashemites and the Palestinians: the Fateful Triangle (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Adnan Abu Odeh, The Jordanian-Israeli War, 1948–1951: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2002).

Chapter 1 A Kingdom of Dreams 1. Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 25–59; Sulayman Mousa, Cameos: Jordan, Arab Nationalism, Sharif Hussein, King Abdullah, T.E. Lawrence (Amman: Ministry of Culture, 1997), 96–102; Abdullah King of Jordan, Al-Takmilah: My Memoirs Completed (New York: Longman, 1978); John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957); Uriel Dann, Studies in the History of Transjordan, 1920–1949: The Making of a State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984); Wm Roger Louis and Robert W. Stookey eds, The End of the Palestine Mandate (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986). 2. “Extracts from Arab Bulletin,” Cairo in Records of the Hashemite Dynasties: A Twentieth Century Documentary History v. 6, Alan de L. Rush, ed. (Wiltshire, UK: Antony Row Ltd., 1995). 3. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, 44.

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4. For more information on this early period of Jordanian history see Shaul Mishal, West Bank/East Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan, 1949–1967 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978); Joseph Nevo, Jordan in the Middle East: The Making of a Pivotal State, 1948–1988 (Essex, England: Frank Cass, 1994); Avi Plascov, The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 1948–1957 (London: Frank Cass, 1981); Ron Pundik, The Struggle For Sovereignty: Relations between Great Britain and Jordan, 1946–1951 (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1994); Philip Robins, A History of Jordan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Eugene L. Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850–1921 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941– 1947: The Road to the Cold War (London: Frank Cass, 1980); Alan de Lacy Rush, ed., Ruling Families of Arabia, Volume 1, Jordan: The Royal Family of Al-Hashim (London: Redwood Press, 1991); Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (London: I.B.Tauris, 1993); Robert B.Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, eds, The Cold War and the Middle East (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Laurie A. Brand, Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 170. 5. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, 60–84; Mousa, Cameos, 118. 6. Peter Gubser, Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 5, 7; Mousa, Cameos, 89; Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, 52. 7. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, 129–150; William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945– 1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 345–379. 8. Studies on this early period of US-Middle East relations can be found in Michael Jansen, The United States and the Palestinian People (Beirut: Institute for Palestinian Studies, 1970); Burton I. Kaufman, The Arab Middle East and the United States: Inter-Arab Rivalry and Superpower Diplomacy (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996); John Keay, Sowing the Wind: The Managing of the Middle East, 1900–1960 (London: John Murray, 2004); David W. Lesch,

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9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

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ed., The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); Zachary Lockman, Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1945–1951 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); Avi Shlaim, The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine, 1921–1951 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Martin Sicker, The Middle East in the Twentieth Century (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001); Michael Suleiman, ed., US Policy on Palestine from Wilson to Clinton (Normal, IL: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1995); P.J. Vatikiotis, The Middle East: From the end of Empire to the end of the Cold War (London: Routledge, 1997). Letter from Abdullah ibn Hussein to President Franklin Roosevelt, 10 March 1945, Official File 204, 1945–April 1946, Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL). David G. McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Barton J. Bernstein, Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974); Ann Rice Pierce, Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman: Mission and Power in American Foreign Policy (Westport: Praeger, 2003); Arnold Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945–1953 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). The Palestine “B file” at the Harry S. Truman Library contains most of the significant documents relating to this issue. Additional documents can be found in the NSC country files: Israel and Jordan. Michael Cohen, Truman and Israel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). Harry S. Truman to Martha and Mary Jane Truman, 19 January 1947, Harry S. Truman papers, Memoirs File, Harry S. Truman Library; Hamby, Man of the People, 404–407. Memo from Joseph Grew to Harry Truman, 14 May 1945, Official File 204, HSTL. President Roosevelt’s statement to Abdul Aziz al-Saud is contained in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, viii, 2–3; Telegram from Abdullah ibn Hussein to Harry S. Truman, 29 September 1945, Official File 204, HSTL; Telegram

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15. 16.

17.

18.

19. 20.

21. 22. 23.

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from President Truman to Abdullah ibn Hussein, 17 November 1945, Official File 204, HSTL. Abdullah ibn Hussein to Harry Truman, 16 August 1946, Official File 204, May 1946–1953, HSTL; Harry S. Truman to Abdullah ibn Hussein, 3 September 1946, Official File 204, May 1946– 1953, HSTL. Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 55, 28 November 1947, President’s Secretary’s File: Intelligence File, HSTL. Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 7–48, 28 February 1948, President’s Secretary’s File: Intelligence File, HSTL; Hanby, Man of the People, 411–413. Lowenthal to Clark Clifford, 11 May 1948, Clark Clifford Papers, HSTL; Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, 169; Records of the meetings between Meir and Abdullah indicate that the King underestimated the Jewish military capability. He hinted that the Jews would need or desire Jordanian protection in the future. Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, 111–114. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the making of Jordan, 178–9; Gubser, Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events, 15; Laurie Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for a State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 4, 154. Sir Alex Kirkbride to Clement Atlee, 25 October 1950, Foreign Office File 437/2, TNA, Kew, UK. “Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on U.S. Military Point of View for the Eventuality of United Nations Decision to Introduce Military Forces into Palestine,” (NSC 27) 23 August 1948, President’s Secretary’s Files, NSC Files: Meeting 19, HSTL. NSC 27/1, 3 September 1948, President’s Secretary’s Files: Meeting 19, HSTL. Memorandum from Dean Acheson to Harry Truman, 9 May 1949, Papers of John W. Snyder, HSTL. Note delivered by the United States Ambassador in Tel Aviv to the Prime Minister of the Government of Israel, 29 May 1949, President’s Secretary’s Files, HSTL; Speech by Edwin A. Locke, Jr., Special Representative of the US Secretary of State to the Near East and US Representative on the Advisory Commission of the United

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24.

25. 26. 27.

28.

29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34.

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Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine Refugees, 5 December 1952, Papers of Edwin A. Locke, HSTL. Memorandum from Dean Acheson to Harry Truman, 29 December 1949, Confidential File, HSTL; State Department message to Transjordan concerning separate negotiations with Israel, Confidential File, HSTL. One participant in these secret negotiations, Colonel Abdullah al-Tal, was later charged with plotting Abdullah’s assassination. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, 31; Clinton Bailey, Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge, 1948–1983: A Political History (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), 8–9. State Department Memorandum for the President (page 20), 9 May 1949, Papers of John W. Snyder, HSTL. Ibid, 20–21. Letter from Abdullah ibn Hussein to Harry Truman, 18 December 1948, President’s Secretary’s Files, HSTL; Letter from Harry S. Truman to Abdullah ibn Hussein, 14 January 1949, President’s Secretary’s Files, HSTL; Memorandum from Dean Acheson to Harry Truman, 27 January 1949, Official File 48Q (Trans-Jordan), HSTL. Memorandum from Dean Acheson to Harry Truman, 1 September 1949, Confidential File, HSTL; National Security Council progress report by the Under Secretary of State, 25 August 1950, President’s Secretary’s Files: NSC File, HSTL. NSC 65/3, 17 May 1950, NSC Meetings Box 207, HSTL. Letter from Abdullah bin Hussein to Harry Truman, 28 December 1950, President’s Secretary’s Files: Subject File, Jordan, HSTL; Mousa, Cameos, 133. NSC 47, 17 May 1949, President’s Secretary’s Files, HSTL. Ibid. Ibid. NSC 47/1, 1 September 1949, President’s Secretary’s files, HSTL.

Chapter 2 Containment and Contradictions 1. Wm Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 631; Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, 17, 42–57. 2. General political histories of this period include: Nigel John Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955–1959 (London: Macmillan

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Press, 1996); George W. Ball and Douglas B. Ball, The Passionate Attachment: America’s Involvement with Israel, 1947 to Present (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1992); Ray Takeyh, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain, and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953– 1957 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); Jon B. Alterman, Egypt and American Foreign Assistance, 1952–1956: Hopes Dashed (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Matthew Holland, America and Egypt: from Roosevelt to Eisenhower (Westport: Praeger, 1996); Peter L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, 1945–1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Steven Z. Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953–1957 (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1992); Diane Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Adam Garfinkle, Israel and Jordan in the Shadow of War: Functional Ties and Futile Diplomacy in a Small Place (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); Ephraim Karsh, Israel, the Hashemites and the Palestinians: the Fateful Triangle (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Adnan Abu Odeh, The Jordanian-Israeli War, 1948–1951: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2002). For a synopsis of Jordanian-American ties see Douglas Little’s “A Puppet in Search of a Puppeteer? The United States, King Hussein, and Jordan, 1953–1970,” International History Review, 1995, 17(3), 512–544. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, 42–47. Several Jordanian historians ascribe to the theory that Talal was not incompetent and was removed because he was a nationalist. Similarly, they believe that King Ghazi of Iraq was assassinated by British agents and replaced with his young son Faisal and the pro-British regent Abd al-Ilah. Hussein was eighteen according to the Islamic hijria calendar. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, 73–4; Bailey, Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge, 11. Interview with Zaid Rifai, 27 May 2008, Amman, Jordan. Hussein ibn Talal, Uneasy Lies the Head (New York: Bernard Geis Associates, 1962); Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, 73–77. Chester Pach, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1991); Alonzo Hamby, Liberalism and it Challengers: From FDR to Bush (New York: Oxford

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7.

8.

9.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

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University Press, 1992); Steven Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990); Tom Wicker, Dwight D. Eisenhower (New York: Times Books, 2002). Letter From President Eisenhower to Dr. Elson, 31 July 1958, DDE Diary, DDE Dictation, July 1958, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL). Diary, 13 March 1956, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, DDE Diary Series: March 1956 Diary, DDEL; Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Dillon Anderson, 30 July 1957, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, DDE Diaries: July 1957, DDE Dictation, DDEL; Memorandum of Conversation between John Foster Dulles and Abba Eban, 26 October 1954, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower: Dulles Series, October 1954, DDEL. Memorandum of Conversation between John Foster Dulles, the Vice President, Secretary Wilson, Mr. Hoover, Jr., Secretary Humphrey, and Attorney General Brownell, 18 October 1955, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Dulles Series: Israeli Relations, 1951–1957, DDEL; Letter from John Foster Dulles to the Honorable Arthur Dean, 27 March 1956, Papers of John Foster Dulles: Israeli Relations 1951–1957; Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Eban of Israel, 26 October 1954, Dulles Series: October 1954, DDEL. Memorandum for the Secretary of State from President Eisenhower, 23 April 1953, Papers of Dwight Eisenhower: Dulles Series, April 1953, DDEL; Telephone call from John Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles, 24 April 1957, Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls Series: General, March 1957–30; April 1957, DDEL. Interview with Samir Mutawi, 22 May 2008, Amman, Jordan. Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (London: Allen Lane, 2007), 70–72. Plascov, The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 90, 94; Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, 81–86. David W. Lesch, “Syria and the United States,” in The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment, David Lesch, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 37. Letter from Ronald Bailey to J.F. Brewis, 9 September 1954. Foreign Office File 371:111105, TNA, Kew, UK.

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16. Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser, 37–60. 17. Elie Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact (New York: E.J. Brill, 1995), 185–194; Joel Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement: Egypt’s Free Officers and the July Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 170–74; Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser, 26–27. 18. Telegram from Amman to the Foreign Office, 10 December 1955, Foreign Office File 371/115533, TNA, Kew, UK; Richard B.Parker, “The United States and King Hussein,” in The Middle East and the United States, Lesch, ed., 105. 19. Author Elie Podeh argued that Jordan played a pivotal role in the Baghdad Pact: after the debacle in Jordan, no other Arab leader felt free to join. Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan, 183–187. 20. Brand, Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations, 87; Parker, “The United States and King Hussein,” in The Middle East and the United States, Lesch, ed., 109; Bailey, Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge, 13. 21. Letter from Prime Minister Anthony Eden to Dwight Eisenhower, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Dulles Series, January 1956, DDEL. 22. Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 100–105. 23. Record of the 279th meeting of the NSC, 8 March 1956, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, NSC Series: 279th meeting, DDEL; Parker, “The United States and King Hussein,” in The Middle East and the United States, David W. Lesch, ed., 108. 24. DDE Diary, 13 March 1956, Box 13, DDEL. 25. Telephone call from Allen Dulles to John Foster Dulles, 26 March 1957, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Telephone Call Series: Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, General, March 1957 to 30 April 1957, DDEL. 26. DDE Diary, 8 March 1956, Box 13, DDEL. 27. For monographs on the crisis, see Steven Z. Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953–1957 (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1992); Diane Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). 28. Kylie Baxter and Shahram Akbarzadeh, US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Roots of Anti-Americanism (New York: Routledge, 2008), 47–49.

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29. Ibid. 30. For a detailed narrative of President Eisenhower’s Middle East policy see Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). 31. Ibid. 32. Memorandum of Conference with Dwight Eisenhower, 23 July 1958, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, DDE Diary: Staff Memos, July 1958 (1), DDEL; the substantive problems with Eisenhower and Dulles’ strident anti-communist rhetoric are described in Chris Tudda’s work, The Truth is Our Weapon: The Rhetorical Diplomacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2007). 33. Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser, 107–8. 34. Telegram from Charles Johnston in Amman to the Foreign Office, 10 December 1956, British Foreign Office Files: 371/121525, TNA, Kew, UK. 35. Telegram from Charles Johnston in Amman to the Foreign Office, 10 December 1956, British Foreign Office Files: 371/121525/11345/3, TNA, Kew, UK. 36. Telegram from Charles Johnston in Amman to the Foreign Office, 10 December 1956, British Foreign Office Files: 371/121525/11345/3, TNA, Kew, UK; Letter from William Morris to Mr. R. Hadow of the Levant Department, British Foreign Office, 22 December 1956, Foreign Office File: 371/121482/10345/2, TNA, Kew, UK. 37. Telegram from Sir Harold Caccia to the Foreign Office, 24 December 1956, British Foreign Office Files: 371/121525, TNA, Kew, UK. 38. Charles Johnston to Selwyn Lloyd, 20 March 1957, AIR 812079/1051/136, TNA, Kew, UK. 39. The exact reason why this operation took place is unknown, but it certainly alerted Hussein to the coming danger. Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955–1967 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 55–60. 40. Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, 165–183; Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, 166–9; Saunders, The United States and Arab Nationalism, 58; Bailey, Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge, 13.

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41. Interview with Fayez Tarawneh, 17 May 2008, Amman, Jordan; interview with Hazem Nuseibeh, 21 May 2008, Amman, Jordan; Report from Charles Johnston to the British Foreign Office, 14 May 1957, Records of Jordan, 1919–1965 v.10, Jane Priestland, ed., (Chippenham, UK: Antony Rowe, Ltd., 1996). 42. Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office, 14 April 1957, Foreign Office Files: 371/127896, TNA, KEW, UK. 43. Memorandum of discussion at the 320th meeting of the NSC, 17 April 1957, Ann Whitman file, NSC Series: 320th meeting of the NSC, DDEL; Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World, 167. 44. Letter from Dwight Eisenhower to Camille Chamoun, 25 April 1957, DDE Diary: April 1957, DDEL. 45. Telephone call from John Foster Dulles to President Eisenhower, 25 April 1957, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Telephone Call Series: Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, White House, March 1957 to 30 August 1957, DDEL. 46. Letter from the British Embassy, Washington, DC to R.M. Hadow, Foreign Office, 13 October 1958, Foreign Office Files: 371/134021, TNA, KEW, UK; Telephone call from Allen Dulles, 26 April 1957, Telephone call to Mr. Murphy, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Telephone Call Series: Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, White House, March 1957 to 30 August 1957, DDEL. 47. In late 1958 the US provided an additional $4.5 million for 12 British Hawker-Hunter jet fighter aircraft. Letter from Dwight Eisenhower to Harold Macmillan, 28 April 1957, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, DDE Diary: April 1957, DDEL; Letter from King Hussein to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 12 May 1957, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, International Series: Jordan (4), DDEL; Briefing Items, 14 August 1957, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, DDE Diaries: August 1957, Memos on Appointments (2), DDEL; Lesch, “Syria and the United States,” in The Middle East and the United States, Lesch, ed., 113, 114; Bailey, Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge, 17; Parker, “The United States and King Hussein,” in The Middle East and the United States, Lesch, ed., 112. 48. Letter from Dwight Eisenhower to John Foster Dulles, 7 August 1957, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Dulles-Herter Series: August 1957 (2), DDEL.

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49. Bailey, Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge, 14; Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser, 143. 50. Letter from Dwight Eisenhower to Dr. Elson, DDE Diaries Box 34, DDE Dictation, July 1958, DDEL; Cable from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Nuri Said, 12 June 1958, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, International File: Jordan (3), DDEL. 51. MAP sales to Saudi Arabia, another conservative regime, also increased dramatically during the same time period of the Eisenhower Administration, from 1.5 million to 52 million. Financial Annex to Progress Report on the Near East, 7 July 1957, Disaster File: Near East (9) Box 64, DDEL. 52. Telephone call from John Foster Dulles to President Eisenhower, 7 August 1957, Papers of John Foster Dulles: Dulles Memcons, Telephone call series, White House March 1957–August 1957, DDEL.

Chapter 3 “It’s All Personal” 1. Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 88; Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (London: KPI Limited, 1987), 47–52; Said K. Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 38. 2. Telephone call from John Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles, 14 July 1958, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Telephone Call Series: Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, White House, 1 April 1958–1 August 1958, DDEL. 3. Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 88. 4. Mousa, Cameos, 229. 5. Kaufman, The Arab Middle East and the United States, 27–30; Memorandum of Conference with the President, 14 July 1958, DDE Diary, Box 35, Staff Memos, July 1958 (2), DDEL. 6. “The plan” may have been a joint British-American contingency plan for the Middle East, the details of which remain classified. One can find folders pertaining to this joint contingency plan (but few documents) in the British National Archives. Report of Telephone Call Between the President and Prime Minister

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9.

10.

11. 12.

13. 14. 15.

16.

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Macmillan, 14 July 1958, DDE Diary Box 34, Telephone Calls – July 1958, DDEL. Ibid. Synopsis – Intelligence and State Department Items Reported to the President, 23 July 1958, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, DDE Diary: Goodpaster Briefings, July 1958, DDEL; Telephone call from John Foster Dulles to the President, 15 July 1958, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, DDE Diary: Telephone Calls-July 1958, DDEL; Memorandum of Conference with the President, 16 July 1958, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, DDE Diary: Staff Memos, July 1958 (2), DDEL; Telephone call to the President, 19 July 1958, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Telephone Call Series: Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, White House–1 April 1958–1 August 1958, DDEL. Memorandum of Conference with the President, 20 July 1958, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, DDE Diary: Staff Memos, July 1958 (1), DDEL. Memorandum of Conference with the President, 15 July 1958, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, DDE Diary: Staff Memos, July 1958 (2), DDEL. Staff Notes, 15 July 1958, DDE Diary: Staff Memos, July 1958 (2), DDEL. Memorandum of telephone conversation, 16 July 1958, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Telephone conversation Series: Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, General, 2 June 1958–31 July 1958 (3), DDEL. 373rd Meeting of the National Security Council, 24 July 1958, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, NSC Series, DDEL. Memorandum of Conference with the President, 23 July 1958, DDE Diary Box 35: Staff Memos, July 1958 (1), DDEL. Intelligence and State Department Synopsis, 23 July 1958, DDE Diary Box 34, Goodpaster Briefings-July 1958; Telephone Call to Mr. Berry, 23 July 1958, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Telephone Call Series Box 8: Memorandum of Telephone Conversations – General, 2 June 1958–31 July 1958; 374th Meeting of the NSC, 31 July 1958, NSC Series Box 10, DDEL. 377th Meeting of the National Security Council, 21 August 1958, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, NSC Series, DDEL.

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17. “Factors Affecting U.S. Policy Toward the Near East,” 4 November 1958, Disaster File: Near East (II); NSC 5801/1, 24 January 1958, Disaster File: Near East (9), DDEL. 18. Position Paper, “United States Military Assistance to Jordan Pursuant to the Risden Report,” Files of the Staff Secretary, International Series: Jordan (1), Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, DDEL. 19. Letter from William Morris, British Embassy, Washington, DC, to Alan Rothnie, Levant Department, Foreign Office, London, 19 March 1959, Foreign Office File: 371/142117, TNA, Kew, UK. 20. Memorandum from Douglas Dillon to Dwight Eisenhower, 21 March 1959, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, International Series: Jordan (3), Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas; King Hussein of Jordan Visit Position Paper, Files of the Staff Secretary, International Series: Jordan (1), DDEL; Background Memorandum: Visit of King Hussein – 23–26 March, Files of the Staff Secretary, International Series: Jordan (3), DDEL; Position Paper, “United States Military Assistance to Jordan Pursuant to the Risden Report,” Files of the Staff Secretary, International Series: Jordan (1), Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, DDEL; John S.D. Eisenhower, Memorandum for Record, 24 March 1959, Files of the Staff Secretary, International Series: Jordan (1), Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, DDEL. 21. Ibid. 22. Memorandum of Conversation by William Rountree, Department of State, 25 March 1959, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, Jordan (2), DDEL. 23. Memorandum of Conference with the President, 25 March 1959, White House Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series: Jordan (1), DDEL; Memorandum of Conversation by William Rountree, Department of State, 25 March 1959, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series: Jordan (2), DDEL. The visit to the United States by King Hussein included an interesting dynamic with one of the members of his entourage. Dulles and Eisenhower had hesitated to invite the King as they were concerned that a coup might take place while the King was away from the country. Indeed, the King discovered a revolutionary plot just before he embarked upon his journey. Hussein devised a remarkable solution: he did not reveal his knowledge of the plot, but insisted that

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24. 25.

26.

27.

28.

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the chief conspirator – Major General Sadiq Shara – join his entourage on the trip to America. Upon returning to Jordan, General Shara was immediately tried and imprisoned. Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 106–7. Telegram from Dwight D. Eisenhower to King Hussein, 10 September 1960, White House Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series: Jordan (2), DDEL; Department of State Telegram to Amman, 9 September 1960, White House Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series: Jordan (2), DDEL; Telegram from Amman to the Secretary of State, 9 September 1960, White House Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series: Jordan (2), DDEL; Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the President, 30 August 1960, DDE Diary: Briefings, August 1960, DDEL. Confidential briefing memo, “Gamal Abd al-Nasser,” DDE Diaries, Staff Notes, September 1960 (2), DDEL; Memorandum of Conversation, 26 September 1960, DDE Diaries, Staff Notes: September 1960 (2), DDEL. Telegram from Amman to the Secretary of State, 26 September 1960, White House Files of the Staff Secretary, International Series: Jordan (2), DDEL; Memorandum for the President: Meeting with King Hussein of Jordan, Douglas Dillon, 6 October 1960, White House Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series: Jordan (2), DDEL; Memorandum of Conference with the President by A.J. Goodpaster, 11 October 1960; Memorandum of Conversation: King Hussein’s Call on the President by Parker T. Hart, 7 October 1960, White House Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series: Jordan (2), DDEL; Schedule of the Informal Visit of His Majesty Hussein I, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 7 October 1960, White House Official File, Jordan, DDEL. NSC 6011, 19 July 1960, Disaster File: Near East (12), DDEL.

Chapter 4 The New Frontier in Jordan 1. Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917–1963 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 2003); Doris Kearns Goodwin, The Fitzgeralds and the Kennedys: An American Saga (New York: Harper and Row, 1965); Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khruschev, 1960–1963 (New York: Harper Collins, 1991).

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2. Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy, 16 May 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, xvii, 114–115. 3. Memorandum from Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, 9 August 1962, National Security File, Papers of Robert Komer, Box 407: “Arab-Israeli Relations,” John F. Kennedy Library (JFKL). 4. Kimber Charles Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001); Mark White, Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited (New York: New York University Press, 1998). 5. State Department Briefing Paper for Eshkol-Johnson talks, “Israel: The Nuclear Issue and Sophisticated Weapons,” 31 December 1967, Secret/Exdis, accessed on 24 August 2011, http://www.gwu. edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/index.htm. For a detailed exposition of Kennedy’s relationship with Israel, see Warren Bass, Support any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the U.S.–Israel Alliance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 6. Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958–1967: A Study of Ideology and Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 21–27. 7. Letter from John Kennedy to King Hussein, 11 May 1961, National Security File, Papers of Robert Komer, Box 429: “Jordan,” JFKL. 8. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic, 11 May 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, xvii, 110–113. This letter was copied to several Arab leaders with a few changes to the fourth and penultimate paragraphs. 9. Letter from King Hussein to John Kennedy, 12 June 1961, President’s Office Files: Jordan Security 1961–1963, JFKL. Memorandum from President Kennedy to Dean Rusk, 10 July 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, xvii, 183; Memorandum from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to President Kennedy, 13 July 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, xvii, 187–193. King Hussein married Toni Gardner, the daughter of a British military officer, in 1961. Many officials believed that this marriage damaged Hussein’s popularity. 10. Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, 2 June 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, xvii, 150– 151; Memorandum of conversation between President Kennedy and Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, 30 May 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, xvii, 134–141; Memorandum from Mike Feldman to President Kennedy, 26 May 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, xvii, 132.

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11. Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 28–30; James Jankowski, Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 164–8. 12. Memorandum from Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow, 30 September 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, xvii, 272–273; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan, 3 April 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, xvii, 573–575; Memorandum for the Record, 28 September 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, xvii, 259–261; Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, 28 September 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, xvii, 261–262; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan, 28 September 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, xvii, 262–264. 13. Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, 1 October 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, xvii, 273–276. 14. Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, 1 October 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, xvii, 273–276; Circular Telegram from the Department of State to Certain Near Eastern and European Posts, 2 October 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, xvii, 276–279; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic, 3 October 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, xvii, 281. 15. National Security Action Memorandum 105 “Policy Toward Egypt and Syria,” 16 October 1961, National Security File Meetings and Memoranda, Box 332, LBJL. 16. Telegram from Dean Rusk to Jordanian Embassy, 4 December 1961, National Security File, Country File, Box 125: Jordan, JFKL. 17. Telegram from William Macomber to Secretary of State, 28 January 1962 and 1 February 1962, National Security File, Country File, Box 125: Jordan, JFKL. 18. Memorandum of Conversation between John Kennedy and Yusuf Haikal, 7 March 1962, National Security File, Country File Box 125: Jordan, JFKL. 19. Background Paper, 7 March 1962, National Security File, Country File Box 125: Jordan; “Jordan: Department of State Guidelines for Policy and Operations,” March 1962, National Security Files, Papers of Robert Komer, Box 429: “Jordan,” JFKL.

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20. One can only speculate as to which Arab state might be an acceptable partner for Jordan in 1962. Handwritten note attached to Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, 3 May 1962, National Security File, Country File Box 125a: Jordan, JFKL. 21. Department of State Airgram, 15 August 1962, National Security File, Country File Box 125a: Jordan, JFKL; Warren Bass, Support any Friend, 144–185. 22. Telegram from Amman to Secretary of State, 7 November 1962, National Security File, Country File Box 125a: Jordan; Confidential Supplementary Briefing Memorandum, “Jordan,” National Security File, Country File Box 125a: “Jordan,” JFKL; Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 125–127; Kaufman, The Arab Middle East and the United States, 34–39. 23. Telegram from State Department to Amman, 7 November 1962, National Security File, Country File Box 125a: Jordan; Memorandum from Robert Komer to John Kennedy, 9 November 1962, President’s Office File Box 120: Jordan Security 1961–1963, JFKL. 24. Letter from King Hussein to President Kennedy, 19 November 1962, President’s Office Files Box 120: Jordan Security 1961–1963, JFKL. 25. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk, 9 October 1962, FRUS 1961–1963, xviii, 172–3; Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, 12 November 1962, FRUS 1961–1963, xviii, 218–220; Memoranda from Robert Komer to President Kennedy, 5 and 6 December 1962, National Security File, Country File Box 125a: Jordan; Kaufman, The Arab Middle East and the United States, 34–39. 26. Telegram from Amman to State Department, 5 December 1962, National Security File, Country File Box 125a: Jordan, JFKL. 27. Telegram from Amman to State Department, 4 January 1963, National Security File, Country File Box 125a: Jordan, JFKL. 28. CIA telegram, 22 March 1963, National Security File, Country File Box 125a: Jordan; National Security File, Country File: Jordan 4/63, JFKL. 29. “Basman” refers to the name of Hussein’s royal palace in Amman. Telegram from State Department to Amman, 21 April 1963,

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30.

31.

32.

33.

34. 35. 36.

37.

38. 39.

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Telegram from Amman to State Department 21 April 1963, Telegram from Amman to State Department, 29 April 1963, National Security File, Country File: Jordan, 4/63, JFKL; Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 127–130. Telegram from State Department to Tel Aviv, 21 April 1963, National Security File, Country File: Jordan 4/63; “Contingencies for Jordan,” undated, National Security File, Files of Robert Komer: Jordan, JFKL; Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 131–2. Telegram from Amman to State Department, 25 April 1963, Telegram from New York to State Department, 25 April 1963, Telegram from Tel Aviv to Amman, 25 April 1963, all in National Security File, Country File: Jordan 4/63, JFKL. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and Secretary of Defense (McNamara), 27 April 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, xviii, 483–484. McNamara indicated that it would be fairly simple to evacuate American citizens from Jordan as there were only approximately 500 in the country. Memorandum for the Record, 27 April 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, xviii, 484–486. Ibid. Ibid. On 27 April 1963, the USS Saratoga and Enterprise task groups were ordered to sail to the Eastern Mediterranean. Memorandum for the Record, 27 April 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, xviii, 484–486. Presumably Harman meant that Nasser’s agents would take over from a weakened Ba‘th in Syria and Iraq. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, 27 April 1963, FRUS 1961–63, xviii, 486–7; Memorandum of Conversation: Situation in Jordan, 27 April 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, xviii, 489–492; Memorandum of Conversation, 27 April 1963, National Security File, Files of Robert Komer Box 407: Arab-Israeli Conflict, JFKL. Ibid. Telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and George Ball, 29 April 1963, Telephone conversation between Ambassador Stevenson and George Ball, 29 April 1963, Papers of George Ball Box 5: Jordan, JFKL.

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40. Memorandum of Conversation, 28 April 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, xviii, 494–6; Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Acting Secretary of State Ball, 29 April 1963, FRUS 1961–63, xviii, 496–9. 41. Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 30 April 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, xviii, 503–505. 42. Letter from William Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, 6 May 1963, “Contingency Plan: Jordan,” undated, National Security File, Country File Box 125a: Jordan, JFKL. 43. Memorandum for the Record, 1 May 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, xviii, 505–6. 44. Ibid. 45. Telegram from Amman to State Department, 1 August 1963, National Security File, Country File Box 125a: Jordan, JFKL; Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 99–103. 46. Memorandum of Conversation, 28 October 1963, National Security File, Papers of Robert Komer Box 408: Arab Unity, JFKL; President’s Office Files, “Jordan,” Box 120, 28 June 1963, Kennedy Library; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria, 19 October 1963, FRUS 1961–63, xviii, 748–749. 47. Telegram from Amman to State Department, 23 August 1963, National Security File, Country File Box 125a: Jordan, JFKL; Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 138. 48. Memorandum of Conversation between Johnson, Harlan Cleveland and Phillips Talbot, 29 September 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, xvii, 264–266; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic, 19 October 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, xviii, 752–3.

Chapter 5 Balancing Acts 1. Randall Bennett Woods, LBJ: Architect of American Ambition (New York: Free Press, 2006); Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961–1973 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, eds,

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3.

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Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963– 1968 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Doris Kearns Goodwin, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Harper and Row, 1976); Robert A. Caro, Master of the Senate (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002). Draft of Article, “Freedom’s Challenges in the Middle East” by Lyndon Johnson, 14 September 1962, Statements of LBJ: 9/14/62 article, Box 70, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library; Douglas Little. “Chosing Sides: Lyndon Johnson and the Middle East” The Johnson Years, Volume 3: LBJ at Home and Abroad, Robert Divine ed., (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1994). Douglas Little, “A Fool’s Errand: America and the Middle East, 1961–1969,” The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade, Diane Kunz, ed., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 295. Little refers to American foreign policy in the Middle East as a “Fool’s Errand” because it was largely unsuccessful: the area became increasingly unstable and Israel developed nuclear weapons. Telegram from Ambassador Barnes to the Department of State, 10 April 1964, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, Box 148, Johnson Presidential Library; Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 137, 140–41; Clinton Bailey, Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge, 1948–1983: A Political History (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 22–24; Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958–1967: A Study of Ideology in Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 153–154. Telegram from Ambassador Barnes to the Secretary of State, 21 March, 1964, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, Box 148; Background Paper: Jordan’s Economic Situation, 8 April 1964, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, Box 148, Johnson Presidential Library. Telegram from Secretary Brook Wramplemeir to the Department of State, 11 March 1964, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein; Memorandum for the President from Robert Komer, 11 April 1964, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, Box 148, Johnson Presidential Library. Background Paper: Military Assistance to Jordan, 8 April 1964, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, Box 148; Memorandum for the President from the State Department, 10

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8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

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April 1964, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, Box 148; Memorandum for the President from Robert Komer, 13 April 1964, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, Box 148, Johnson Presidential Library. “Administrative Arrangements for the Arrival at Washington of His Majesty King Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, Box 148; President’s Participation in King Hussein Visit, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, Box 148; Memorandum of Conversation, 14 April 1964, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, Box 148; Department of State Telegram, 16 April 1964, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, Box 148, Johnson Presidential Library. Memorandum of Conversation, 14 April 1964, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein; Department of State Telegram, 16 April 1964, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, Box 148, Johnson Presidential Library. Aid to Jordan totaled about $40 million annually from 1958 to 1963. Support for Israel varied during the same period of time: $85 million in 1958, $54 million in 1959, $55.7 million in 1960, $80 million in 1961, $83.9 million in 1962, and $104 in 1963. Sources: “U.S. Assistance to Israel: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, Millions of Dollars,” 18 July 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos (iii), Box 146; Memorandum of Conversation, 14 April 1964, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, Box 148, Johnson Presidential Library. Memorandum from Robert Komer to the President, 15 April 1964, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, Box 148, Johnson Presidential Library. King Hussein delivered a speech on the previous night that implied that President Johnson gave preferential treatment to the Israelis. Memorandum of Conversation, 15 April 1964, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, Box 148, Johnson Presidential Library. Ibid. Despite Ball’s assertion, United States officials decided that they would not intervene in the event of a conflict between Jordan and Israel. British officials proposed that in light of the newly

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created United Arab Command, the joint Anglo-American contingency plans for Jordan should be reviewed. According to the new plans, the United States and Britain would call for UN sanctions in the event of an Israeli attack; the use of force was no longer considered feasible. “Proposed joint Anglo/US action in the event of a major act of war by Israel against an Arab state,” January 1965, Foreign Office File 371/180653, TNA, Kew, UK. President’s Participation in King Hussein Visit, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, Box 148, Johnson Presidential Library. Memorandum from Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, 20 July 1964, NSF Country File: Middle East, Memos (i), Johnson Presidential Library. CIA Intelligence Information Cable, 21 July 1964, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (i), Box 146; Telegram from Ambassador Barnes to the Secretary of State, 21 July 1964, NSF Country Files: Jordan, Cables (i), Box 146, Johnson Presidential Library. Ibid. Telegram from Ambassador Barnes to the Secretary of State, 23 July 1964, NSF Country Files: Jordan, Cables (i), Box 146, Johnson Presidential Library. MiG 21s and F-104s were both widely used fighter aircraft during the 1960s. The MiG 21 was the most advanced Soviet plane to date. John W.R. Taylor, ed. Combat Aircraft of the World (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1969), 517–518, 588–9; Telegram from Ambassador Barnes to the Secretary of State, 24 July, 1964, NSF Country Files: Middle East, Cables (i); Telegram from Ambassador Barnes to the Secretary of State, 27 July, 1964, NSF Country Files: Middle East, Cables (i), Johnson Presidential Library. The State Department advocated the Johnston plan, which was not generally accepted in the Middle East. Israel and Jordan instead diverted major tributaries to the Jordan River within their own borders. In Jordan, this consisted of an extensive diversion project along the Yarmouk River which is the largest tributary of the Jordan River. Memorandum from Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, 28 July 1964, NSF Name File: Komer, Memos (i), Box 6, Johnson Presidential Library.

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21. Memorandum from Robert Komer to the President, 6 August 1964, NSF Country Files: Middle East, Memos (i) Johnson Presidential Library. 22. Telegram from the State Department to Amman, 8 August 1964, NSF Country Files: Middle East, Cables (i), Johnson Presidential Library. 23. Ibid. 24. Presumably provided by Egypt. Telegram from Ambassador Barnes to Secretary of State, 11 August 1964, NSF Country File: Middle East Cables (i), Johnson Presidential Library. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. King Hussein obviously had a flair for drama and it is difficult to assess the degree to which he believed his own pronouncements to US officials. It seems fairly clear that he exaggerated certain threats to enhance his cause and he was not above being coercive to improve his position. Despite these tendencies, he was remarkably open with US officials about his desire for peace with Israel and his communications with Israeli officials. 28. CIA Intelligence Information Cable, 16 September 1964, NSF Country File: Middle East Cables (i), Johnson Presidential Library. 29. Memorandum from Robert Komer to Lyndon Johnson, 26 January 1965, NSF Country File: Middle East Memos (i), Johnson Presidential Library. 30. Memorandum from George Ball to Lyndon Johnson, 1 February 1965, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos (i), Box 146, Johnson Presidential Library. 31. Robert Komer to Lyndon Johnson, 3 February 1965, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos (i), Box 146, Johnson Presidential Library. 32. Memorandum from Robert Komer to Lyndon Johnson, 6 February 1965, NSF Country File: Jordan Memos (i), Box 146, Johnson Presidential Library. 33. Ibid. 34. Phillips Talbot to Secretary of State, 7 February 1965, NSF Country File: Jordan Cables (i), Box 146, Johnson Presidential Library. 35. Telegram from Ambassador Barnes to the State Department, 9 February 1965, NSF Country File, Jordan, Cables (i), Box 146;

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37.

38.

39.

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Phillips Talbot to Secretary of State, 9 February 1965, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (i), Box 146; Acting Secretary of State Ball to Phillips Talbot, 9 February 1965, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (i), Box 146, Johnson Presidential Library. By this time, Hussein was aware of an American plan to provide powerful M-48 Patton tanks to Germany with the stipulation that Germany would sell its own Pattons to Israel. The deal fell through, but it had an impact on Hussein’s requests. Burton I. Kaufman, The Arab Middle East and the United States: Inter-Arab Rivalry and Superpower Diplomacy (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996), 48–49; Telegram from Ambassador Barnes to the Secretary of State, 10 February 1965, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (i), Box 146; Airgram from Robert Barnes to Department of State, 20 February 1965, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (i), Box 146, Johnson Presidential Library. Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, 20 February 1965, NSF Country File: Jordan Memos (i), Box 146; Central Intelligence Agency Special Memorandum No. 1–66, 6 January 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos (iii), Box 146, Johnson Presidential Library. The Intruder aircraft was originally designed by the Navy as a carrier-based jet. John Taylor, Combat Aircraft of the World, 508; Memorandum for the Record, Subject: President’s Meeting on Israel/Jordan Matters, 12 February 1966, NSF Name File: Komer, Memos (ii), Box 6, Johnson Presidential Library. Memorandum from Robert Komer to Lyndon Johnson, 14 February 1966, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: Jordan, King Hussein Correspondence, Box 31; Telegram from Lyndon Johnson to King Hussein, 14 February 1966, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: Jordan, Presidential Correspondence, Box 31, Johnson Presidential Library. Telegram from Dean Rusk to Amman, 26 February 1966, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: Jordan, King Hussein Correspondence, Box 31; Telegram from Dean Rusk to Amman, 4 March 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables; Memorandum from Walt Rostow to the President, 3 May 1966, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: Jordan, King Hussein, Box 31, Johnson Presidential Library.

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40. Memorandum from 1966, NSF Country Presidential Library. 41. Memorandum from 1966, NSF Country Presidential Library.

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Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, 16 June File: Jordan, Memos (ii), Box 146, Johnson Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, 21 June File: Jordan, Memos (ii), Box 146, Johnson

Chapter 6 The Flight to Cairo 1. Michael Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 34–35. 2. Ibid. 3. Information on the origins of I/JMAC can be found in Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, 442. 4. For more details of Hussein’s communication with Israelis see Zaki Shalom, The Superpowers, Israel and the Future of Jordan (Brighton: Sussex, 1999) and Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein at War and at Peace (London: Allen Lane, 2007). Telegram from Ambassador Barnes to the State Department, 8 August 1965, NSF Country File: Jordan (ii), Box 146, LBJL. 5. Telegram from Ambassador Burns to the Secretary of State, 11 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos (iii), Box 146, LBJL. 6. Oren, Six Days of War, 32; Telegram from Dean Rusk to Amman, 29 November 1966, NSF Country File: Middle East, Cables (ii), LBJL; Telegram from Ambassador Burns to the Secretary of State, 11 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos (iii), Box 146, LBJL. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Telegram from Amman to the Department of State, 15 November 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan (ii), Box 146; Memorandum from Walt Rostow to President Johnson, 12 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos (iii), Box 146, LBJL. 10. Department of State Telegram (circular), 22 November 1966, NSF Country File: Middle East Cables (ii), Box 146; Telegram

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12. 13.

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from Lyndon Johnson to King Hussein, 23 November 1966, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: 1 October 1966–31 July 1967, Box 31, LBJL. From 1964 to 1966, the Johnson administration attempted to provide military support to Israel while ensuring that Jordan maintained an anti-Soviet alignment. The result was an agreement to sell arms to both countries, providing superior technology to the Israelis. Details of Johnson’s carefully crafted policy can be found in my article “Balancing Acts: Jordan and the United States during the Johnson Administration,” Canadian Journal of History, winter 2006, 517–536. Telegram from Lyndon Johnson to King Hussein, 23 November 1966, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: 1 October 1966–31 July 1967, Box 31; Memorandum from White House Situation Room to Lyndon Johnson, 24 November 1966, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: 1 October 1966–31 July 1967, Box 31, LBJL. Telegram from Howard Wriggins to Walt Rostow, 3 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan (iii), Box 146, LBJL. Telegram from Ambassador Burns to the State Department, 6 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan (iii), Box 146; Cable Summary for the President, 17 November 1966, NSF Country File: Israel (vi), Box 140, LBJL; Telegram from Ambassador Burns to the Secretary of State, 4 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (iii), Box 146, LBJL; Oren, Six Days of War, 46–47, 56–7; Kaufman, The United States and the Arab Middle East, 52–53. CIA Memorandum No. 19–66, Office of National Estimates, 18 November 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos (ii), Box 146; CIA Intelligence Information Cable, 18 November 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (ii), Box 146, LBJL. Arab citizens typically celebrated the “araba’een” forty days after a funeral. The “araba’een” was often an occasion for protest against perceived government abuses. Telegram from Ambassador Burns to the Secretary of State, 26 November 1966, NSF Country Files: Middle East Cables (ii); Department of State Intelligence Memorandum, 23 November 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan (ii), Box 146, LBJL. A plan to overthrow Hussein soon came to light. On 23 November, CIA officials became aware of an organized plot

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16.

17.

18.

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20. 21.

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by Palestinian army officers to topple the regime. Interestingly enough, word of the conspiracy came from a group of Nasserist “East-Bankers” who also plotted Hussein’s demise. The East Bank group did not want to join the Palestinian “West-Bankers” in their coup attempt, speculating that if the Palestinians took over the government, they would treat East Bank officers as second-class citizens. The East Bank group, therefore, refused to cooperate and leaked word of the scheme. An intelligence assessment of the situation to Washington concluded: “There is a basic distrust and suspicion within the Jordanian Arab Army between Palestinian and East bank officers which prevents close cooperation and trust between the two factions.” The plan was judged to have little chance for success without the assistance of East Bank officers. Thus, the divided nature of Jordanian society may have saved Hussein in November 1966. CIA Intelligence Information Cable, 23 November 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (ii), Box 146, LBJL. Telegram from Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, 17 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (iii), Box 146, LBJL; Memorandum from Howard Wriggins to Lyndon Johnson, 23 November 1966, FRUS 1964–1968, xviii. Department of State Telegram to Amman, 24 November 1966, NSF Country File: Middle East Cables (ii); Telegram from Ambassador Burns to the Secretary of State, 27 November 1966, NSF Country File: Middle East Cables (ii); Telegram from Dean Rusk to Ambassador Burns, 29 November 1966, NSF Country File: Middle East Cables (ii), LBJL. Memorandum from Harold Saunders and Howard Wriggins to Walt Rostow, 1 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos (iii), Box 146; CIA Intelligence Memorandum, 2 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos (iii), Box 146, LBJL. Telegram from Ambassador Burns to the Secretary of State, 11 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos (iii), Box 146, LBJL. Ibid. For details of Jordan’s previous arms deals with the United States see Abraham Ben-Zvi, Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel: In the Shadow of the Hawk (Portland, Oregon: Frank

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Cass, 2004) and Zach Levey “United States Arms Sales to Jordan, 1963–1968,” Journal of Contemporary History, 41(3), 2006. 22. Telegram from Ambassador Burns to the Secretary of State, 11 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos (iii), Box 146, LBJL. 23. Memorandum for the Director from Sherman Kent, 13 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos (iii), Box 146, LBJL. Ambassador Burns predicted the upcoming conflict with some accuracy: “It seems to me that the UAR, Syria, and Israel, at least, could be less worried about the consequences of an Arab-Israeli war and the end of Jordan than we might think, and certainly less worried than we are.” He postulated that an Arab-Israeli war would inevitably be short because the United Nations and the superpowers would not allow it to progress for more than a few days. He argued, “For Israel there would be the neutralization of the West Bank in some form or other. And for Cairo and Damascus there would be a Jordan Arab Republic on the East Bank, or perhaps the dismemberment of the East Bank.” Burns believed that the Israeli incursion at Samu’a and the “vitriol” of Radio Cairo indicated that forces on each side were anxious for war. Cable from Findley Burns to the State Department, 13 December 1966, Jordan Memos (iii), Box 146, LBJL. 24. The new list included an advanced loan of six Starfighter aircraft, with a projected delivery date in January or February of 1967. Johnson also dispatched his special emissary, former ambassador William Macomber, on a secret mission to negotiate the finer points of the arms agreement with the King. State Department spokesmen concealed Macomber’s mission by stating that his trip to Jordan was a part of his responsibilities as AID Assistant Administrator for the Near East and South Asia. The White House attempted to keep publicity of his visit at an absolute minimum. Lyndon Johnson to King Hussein, undated, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos, volume III, LBJL; Memorandum From Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, 22 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (iii), Box 146; Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to Amman, 15 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (iii), Box 146, LBJL.

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25. Memorandum from Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, 22 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (iii), Box 146, LBJL. After the President committed to these terms, he sent Walt Rostow and Nicholas Katzenbach to New York to explain the need for the Jordanian arms deal to Israeli supporters Arthur Krim, Abe Feinberg and David Ginsburg. Arthur Krim was chairman of the Democratic Party, while Abe Feinberg served as a liaison with the New York Jewish community. In exchange for their cooperation on the Jordanian arms deal, Israeli officials submitted new requests for arms. Early in 1967, the Israeli government petitioned Washington for 200 armored personnel carriers, $2 million worth of tank spare parts, and an additional $14 million for Hawk aircraft. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara opposed this request, and told the President, “The present military balance in the Middle East strongly favors Israel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently confirmed their view that Israel will be militarily unchallengeable by any combination of Arab states at least during the next five years.” Despite McNamara’s opposition, Johnson approved an arms package that included 100 armed personnel carriers, $2 million in tank spare parts, $14 million in military credit, and an agreement to establish missile maintenance facilities. “Suggested Talking Points Briefing Israel’s Friends on the Jordan Package,” author unknown, 14 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan Memos (iii), Box 146; Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, 13 December 1966, NSF Country File: Israel, volume VI; Dean Rusk to William Macomber, 20 December 1966, NSF Country File: Jordan Cables (iii), Box 146; Memorandum from Robert McNamara to Lyndon Johnson, 17 April 1967, NSF Country File: Israel (vi), Box 140; Memorandum from Walt Rostow to the President, 18 April 1967, NSF Country File: Israel, Volume 6, LBJL; Memorandum from Robert McNamara to Lyndon Johnson, 17 April 1967, NSF Country File: Israel (vi), 12/66–7/67, Box 140, LBJL; Memorandum from Walt Rostow to President Johnson, 8 May 1967, FRUS 1964–1968, xviii, 817–818. 26. Telegram 2566 from Amman, 19 March 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, xviii, 779. 27. Oren, Six Days of War, 14–22, 46–47, 56–57; FRUS 1964–1968, xviii, 738–740, 743–745, 763–765, 767, 780–782; Kaufman, The United States and the Arab Middle East, 52–53.

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28. Hal Saunders, NSF Histories: Middle East Crisis, 12 May–19 June 1967, volume I Box 17, LBJL, 1; Oren, Six Days of War, 45–50, 58–59, 81–83. 29. Arab-Israeli Crisis: Situation Report, 21 May 1967, NSF NSC Histories: Middle East Crisis, 12 May–19 June 1967 (xiii), Appendix S, Box 22, LBJL; Telegram from Ambassador Burns to the Secretary of State, 26 May 1967, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: Jordan, 1 October 1966–31 July 1967; Memorandum from George Christian to Lyndon Johnson, 30 May 1967, NSF NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis (x), Appendix Q, Box 21 LBJL. 30. For a discussion of inter-Arab rivalries see Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958–1967: A Study of Ideology and Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 21–27. 31. “King Hussein of Jordan, Informal Working Visit, 28 June 1967: King Hussein’s Attitude Towards Israel Prior to the Hostilities of June 5 and His Actions Thereafter Vis-à-vis Israel,” NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 6–28–67, Box 148; Text of Cable From Amman, Jordan to Lyndon Johnson, 1 June 1967, NSF, NSC Histories: Middle East Crisis (iii), Tabs 81–95, LBJL. 32. Speeches by Gamal abd al-Nasser and Hussein bin Talal, 30 May 1967, Al-Watha ‘iq Al-Urduniya, 1967 (Amman: Da’irat al-Matbu’at wal-Nashr, 1967); ibid. 33. Telegram from Robert Anderson to Lyndon Johnson, 2 June 1967, NSF, NSC Histories: Middle East Crisis (iii), Tabs 96–110, LBJL; Message from Gamal abd al-Nasser to Lyndon Johnson, 2 June 1967, NSF, NSC Histories: Middle East Crisis (iii), Tabs 96–110, LBJL; “King Hussein of Jordan, Informal Working Visit, June 28, 1967,” NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 6–28–67, Box 148, LBJL; Speech by Gamal abd al-Nasser, 30 May 1967, Al-Watha ‘iq Al-Urduniya, 1967 (Amman: Da’irat al-Matbu’at walNashr, 1967). 34. Oren, Six Days of War, 172–177, 209–243. 35. Ibid. 36. Telegram from Hussein bin Talal to Gamal abd al-Nasser and Abd al-Rahman Arif, 6 June 1967, Al-Watha ‘iq Al-Urduniya, 1967 (Amman: Da’irat al-Matbu’at wal-Nashr, 1967); Oren, Six Days of War, 182–189; Martin Van Creveld, The Olive and the Sword: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 183.

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37. Telegram from Abd al-Munim Riyad to Gamal abd al-Nasser, 6 June 1967, Al-Watha ‘iq Al-Urduniya, 1967 (Amman: Da’irat alMatbu’at wal-Nashr, 1967); “King Hussein of Jordan, Informal Working Visit, June 28, 1967: King Hussein’s Attitude Towards Israel Prior to the Hostilities of June 5 and His Actions Thereafter Vis-à-vis Israel” NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 6–28–67, Box 148, LBJL. 38. Oren, Six Days of War, 305; Telegram from Ambassador Burns to the Secretary of State, 7 June 1967, NSF, NSC Histories: Middle East Crisis, 12 May-19 June 1967 (viii), Appendix K, Box 20; CIA Intelligence Memorandum, 10 June 1967, NSF, NSC Histories: Middle East Crisis (xi), Appendix Q, Box 21, LBJL; Bailey, Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge, 1948–1983, 28. 39. The rift between Hussein and Nasser grew as he became aware of the depth of Nasser’s deception. Following the conflict, Nasser told Hussein that he had not known about the complete destruction of his air force on the first day of the war when he requested a Jordanian offensive move. When Hussein met with Algerian President Mouari Boumedienne in October, however, Boumedienne reported that President Nasser called on the first day of the war and reported that his air force had been destroyed on the ground. The statement apparently hit Hussein “like a small bombshell” because Nasser had assured Hussein that Arabs were gaining ground during the first two days of the conflict. Telegram (sanitized), 23 October 1967, NSC Country File: Jordan (iv), Box 147, LBJL Telegram from Ambassador Goldberg to the State Department, 8 June 1967, NSF Country File: Middle East Crisis, Cables, Box 107, LBJL; Telegram from Hussein to Nasser, 10 June 1967, Al-Watha ‘iq Al-Urduniya, 1967 (Amman: Da’irat al-Matbu’at wal-Nashr, 1967). 40. Scholars speculate that Nasser concocted the “Big Lie” to obtain Soviet support in the war; no documents have emerged that explain Hussein’s cooperation with the “Big Lie.”

Chapter 7 The Bitter Pill 1. Benjamin Read to McGeorge Bundy, 8 June 1967, NSF, NSC Histories: Middle East Crisis (vii), Appendix I-J, Box 19, LBJL.

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2. Jordanian casualties during the Six Day War were approximately 14 per cent of the Jordanian Arab Army; Telegram from Amman to the State Department, 21 June 1967, NSF Country File: Middle East Cables, Box 109, LBJL; Telegram from Amman to the State Department, 22 June 1967, NSF Country File: Middle East Cables, Box 109, LBJL; Bailey, Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge, 28. 3. Telegram from Amman to the Department of State, 10 July 1967, NSF Country File: Middle East Crisis Cables (vii), Box 109, LBJL. 4. Daily Briefing, 9 June 1967, NSF, NSC Histories: Middle East Crisis (vi), Appendix A-D, Box 19, LBJL; CIA Intelligence Memorandum, 12 June 1967, NSF, NSC Histories: Middle East Crisis (ii), Appendix Q, Box 21, LBJL; CIA Intelligence Memorandum, 13 June 1967, NSF, NSC Histories: Middle East Crisis (ii), Appendix Q, Box 21, LBJL. 5. Telegram from US Mission to the UN to the Department of State, 22 June 1967, NSF Country File: Middle East, Cables, Box 109, LBJL. 6. Background Paper: Jordan’s West Bank, 25 June 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 6–28–67, Box 148, LBJL; “King Hussein of Jordan, Informal Working Visit, June 28, 1967,” NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 6–28–67, Box 148, LBJL. 7. Memorandum from Nick Katzenbach to Lyndon Johnson, 27 June 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 6–28–67, Box 148, LBJL; Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Lyndon Johnson, 27 June 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 6–28–67, Box 148, LBJL. 8. Telegram from the State Department to Amman, 30 June 1967, NSF Country Files: Middle East Crisis Cables (vii), Box 109, LBJL; Telegram from the British embassy in Washington to the Foreign Office, 29 June 1967, PREM 13/1622, TNA, Kew, UK. 9. Presidential advisors insisted that Johnson should speak with Hussein privately. They knew that Hussein’s conversation would be constrained by the presence of others, even his closest advisors. Telegram from the British embassy in Washington to the Foreign Office, 29 June 1967 PREM 13/1622, TNA, Kew, UK. 10. Telegram from the State Department to Amman, 30 June 1967, NSF Country Files: Middle East Crisis Cables (vii), Box 109, LBJL.

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11. Bailey, Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge, 30; Telegram from the British embassy in Washington to the Foreign Office, 29 June 1967, PREM 13/1622, TNA, Kew, UK. 12. Telegram from Washington, DC to the Foreign Office, 30 June 1967, PREM 13/1622, TNA, Kew, UK. 13. Amman Cable 4941, 13 July 1967, NSF Country File, “Jordan, Filed by LBJ Library,” Box 148, LBJL. 14. Telegram from Amman to the Department of State, 10 July 1967, NSF Country File: Middle East Crisis Cables (vii), Box 109, LBJL; Telegram from Foreign Office to Washington, 28 July 1967, PREM 13/1622, TNA, Kew, UK. 15. Memorandum, undated, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos and Misc. (iv), Box 147, LBJL; Michael Oren stated that Arab leaders lacked introspection following the war (Six Days of War, 310) Hussein, however, characterized Khartoum as a “turning point”; that the Arab states were undergoing some much needed self-criticism. Historians tend to characterize Khartoum as a retrenchment of radicalism, but Arab and American leaders viewed it as a victory for the moderates and an opportunity for peace. In addition, Walt Rostow stated that Hussein “developed a deep sense of guilt about the events of June.” Memorandum from Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, 9 January 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (iv) Box 147, LBJL; Memorandum from Rostow to the President, 8 November 1967, NSF Agency File, Box 69, United Nations (viii), LBJL; Memorandum of Conversation, 6 November 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan, Informal Working Visit of King Hussein, Box 148, LBJL; Bernard Reich, ed., An Historical Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996), 514; Bailey, Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge, 29. 16. Cable from King Hussein to Lyndon Johnson, 9 October 1967, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: Jordan, 1 August 1967–31 July 1968, Box 31, LBJL. 17. Substantial portions of this conversation remain classified. 24 October 1967 Meeting with Abba Eban, 24 October 1967, Meeting Notes, Box 2, LBJL. 18. Johnson referred to the post-World War I public accusation that greedy arms manufacturers had incited and profited from the war.

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19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25. 26.

TO

PAGES 150–153

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24 October 1967 Meeting With Abba Eban, 24 October 1967, Meeting Notes, Box 2, LBJL. Memorandum of Conversation between Robert McNamara and Abba Eban, 14 October 1967, NSF Country File: Israel (vii) 8/67– 12/67, Box 140, LBJL. Members of Congress were responsive to constituents who tended to blame the Arab states for the Six Day War. The Departments of State and Defense often focused on the Cold War and the repercussions of allowing Soviet influence into Jordan or other Arab states. Memorandum from Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, 27 June 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 28 June 1967, Box 148, LBJL; Memorandum for the Special Committee, 21 June 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 28 June 1967, Box 148, LBJL; Telegram from the State Department to US embassy in Amman, 24 October 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (iv), Box 147, LBJL. Memorandum from Walter Rostow to the President, 26 October 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan, Informal Working Visit of King Hussein, 6–9 November 1967, Box 148, LBJL. Talking Points from Luke Battle, Undated, NSF Country File: Jordan, Informal Working Visit of King Hussein, 6–9 November 1967, Box 148, LBJL. By this time, the United States suspected that the Israelis intended to develop a nuclear weapon at a scientific site located at Dimona. Experts generally concur that Israel secretly developed a nuclear weapon, but Israel does not acknowledge owning nuclear weapons. Memorandum of Conversation between King Hussein and the Secretary of State, 6 November 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan, Informal Working Visit of King Hussein, 6–9 November 1967, Box 148, LBJL. Memorandum for the Files, 8 November 1967, NSF Country File, Jordan (iv); Memorandum for the President from Walt Rostow, 8 November 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan, Informal Working Visit of King Hussein, Box 148, LBJL. Reich, ed., Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation, 101. There is no evidence that Johnson approved or disapproved of Rusk’s statement, but it does not appear that he gave Hussein the same assurance. Telegram from Ambassador Symmes in Amman

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27.

28.

29.

30.

31. 32.

NOTES

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PAGES 153–155

to the Secretary of State, 27 November 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan, Informal Working Visit of King Hussein, 6–9 November 1967, Box 148, LBJL; Memorandum from Dean Rusk to Lyndon Johnson, 8 November 1967, LBJ Diary, Box 82, LBJL. Telegram from Ambassador Symmes to the Secretary of State, 27 November 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (iv), Box 147, LBJL. Telegram from Ambassador Symmes to the Secretary of State, 6 December 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (iv), Box 147, LBJL. In addition to showing interest in Hussein, there is evidence that the Soviet enthusiasm for Nasser may have cooled. CIA reports show that Tass representative Boris Uronov stated, in regard to the possibility of a coup in Egypt, “There is no way to tell whether a coup group is good or bad until it succeeds. If it is properly revolutionary, it is good, if it is against the people, it is bad.” Uronov asserted that Nasser, “Talks too much. One day he says one thing, the next day he says another” (CIA intelligence information cable, 15 March 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (v), Box 147, LBJL). Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko later praised Jordan for displaying moderation and maintaining good relations with the UAR (Memorandum from Walt Rostow to the President, 29 December 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan, Filed by LBJ Library, Box 148, LBJL). Telegram from Ambassador Symmes to the Secretary of State, 6 December 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (iv), Box 147, LBJL. Sherman Kent, CIA Office of National Estimates, 5 December 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos and Misc. (iv), Box 147, LBJL. This document was prepared for the CIA director, Richard Helms, who gave it to Walt Rostow who then forwarded it to Lyndon Johnson; Memorandum from Richard Helms to Lyndon Johnson, 25 January 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan Memos (v), Box 148, LBJL. Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, 28 December 1967, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: Jordan, Box 31, LBJL. Telegram from Ambassador Symmes to the Secretary of State, 24 December 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan Cables (iv), Box 147, LBJL.

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33. Telegram from Ambassador Symmes to the State Department, 3 February 1968, Meeting Notes, “Briefings for Tuesday Luncheon,” Box 2, LBJL. 34. The agreement specified the provision of the following: 88 M48A1 tanks, 23 105 mm Howitzers, 43 armored personnel carriers, 4 40 mm SP AAA guns, (138) 106 mm Jeep mounted recoilless rifles, (40) H35A2 2½ ton trucks and unspecified small arms, ammunition, spare parts, communication and engineer equipment. In addition, Jordan would receive (18) F104 aircraft and ground control radar system for aircraft guidance. Telegram from Lyndon Johnson to King Hussein, 11 February 1968, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: Jordan 1 August 1967–31 July 1968, Box 31; Memorandum from Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, 3 January 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (iv), Box 147, LBJL; Memorandum from Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, 25 January 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan Cables (iv), Box 147; Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Amman, 25 January 1968, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: Jordan 1 August 1967–31 July 1968, Box 31; Memorandum of Conversation between General Amer Khammash, Ambassador Sharaf and Harold Saunders, 29 January 1968, NSF Country File, “Jordan (iv), 5/67–2/68,” Box 147; Memorandum of Conversation between Robert McNamara and General Khammash, 10 February 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (v), Box 147; Cable to Amman, 2 February 1968, NSF Country File, “Jordan (iv), 5/67–2/68,” Box 147, LBJL. 35. Telegram from Ambassador Symmes, Amman to the Secretary of State, 14 February 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan Cables (iv), Box 147; Telegram from the Secretary of State to the American Embassy, Amman, 12 March 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan Cables (v), Box 147, LBJL. 36. Telegram from Ambassador Symmes, Amman to the Secretary of State, 19 March 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (v), Box 147, LBJL. 37. Bailey, Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge, 33, 36; Telegram from Ambassador Symmes, Amman to the Secretary of State, 20 March 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (v), Box 147; Telegram from Lyndon Johnson to King Hussein, 21 March 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (v), Box 147, LBJL; Jillian Becker,

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38.

39. 40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

NOTES

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PAGES 158–161

The PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestine Liberation Organization (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), 62–64. Telegram from Ambassador Symmes, Amman to the Secretary of State, 21 March 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (v), Box 147; Telegram from Ambassador Symmes, Amman to the Secretary of State, 26 March 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (v), Box 147; Telegram from Dean Rusk to Ambassador Symmes, 28 March 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan Cables (v), Box 147; Memorandum from Hal Saunders to Lyndon Johnson, 21 March 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan Memos (v), Box 148, LBJL. Becker, The PLO, 62–64; Reich, An Historical Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 292–293. Telegram from Ambassador Symmes, Amman to the Secretary of State, 8 April 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (v), Box 147, LBJL. Telegram from Ambassador Symmes, Amman to the Secretary of State, 10 April 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (v), Box 147; Telegram from Ambassador Symmes, Amman to the Secretary of State, 29 April 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan, Cables (v), Box 147, LBJL. The prospect of an Israeli invasion was not entirely implausible. A memorandum from Harold Saunders to Walt Rostow dated 9 April 1968 stated, “We know they [the Israelis] are considering such things as seizing part of the East Bank.” NSF Country File, Jordan Cables (v), Box 147, LBJ Library; Telegram from Walt Rostow to President Johnson, 31 May 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos (v), Box 148; Telegram from the Secretary of State to Ambassador Symmes in Amman, 4 June 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan Cables (v), Box 147, LBJL. Telegram from Ambassador Symmes to the Secretary of State, 5 August 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan Cables (v), Box 147; Telegram from Ambassador Symmes to the Secretary of State, 17 September 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan Cables (v), Box 148, LBJL. A telegram from the US mission at the UN, dated 18 November, reads: “Egerton (UK) told Misoff today that King Hussein due in London again Nov. 23 for medical treatment. According to Egerton, ‘medical’ to be read inside quotation marks: UK expects Hussein will have further contacts with Israel. Hussein is expected to stay a number of days, and Egerton expressed

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45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

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PAGES 161–166

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hope that Jarring would hang on through Dec since results from Jordan/Israel contacts would probably not be apparent by Nov. 30.” USUN 7882, NSF Country File: Jordan, Filed by LBJ Library, Box 148; Message from Lyndon Johnson to King Hussein, undated, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: Jordan 1 August 1968–20 January 1969, Box 32; Telegram from the State Department to Amman, 8 October 1968, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: Jordan 1 August 1968–20 January 1969, Box 32, LBJL. Telegram from Ambassador Symmes to the State Department, 20 November 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos (v), Box 148, LBJL. Letter from King Hussein to President Johnson, 30 November 1968, NSF, Special Heads of State Correspondence: Jordan, 1 August 1968–20 January 1969, Box 32; Telegram from the Department of State to the American Embassy in Amman, 24 December 1968, NSF, NSC Special Heads of State Correspondence: Jordan, 1 August 1968–20 January 1969, Box 32, LBJL. Telegram from Ambassador Symmes to the Secretary of State, 31 December 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan Memos and Miscellaneous (iv), Box 147, LBJL. A letter from the Jordanian embassy in Washington to Amman reflected the ambassador’s hope that Nixon would be a more sympathetic president. Letter dated 3 September 1969, United States, Nixon File, Royal Hashemite Archives; letter from Lyndon Johnson to King Hussein, 18 January 1969, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: Jordan, 1 August 1968–20 January 1969, Box 32, LBJL. Ambassador Symmes described the progress of secret peace talks in a telegram from Amman dated 31 December 1968. Telegram from Ambassador Symmes to the State Department, 20 December 1968 and 31 December 1968, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos and Miscellaneous (iv), Box 147, LBJL.

Chapter 8. Civil War 1. Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, 5 April 1969, NSC Country File: Middle East-Jordan, Box 613, Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA.

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2. “Israel Crosses the Threshold” The National Security Archive, accessed 24 August 2011, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/index.htm. 3. Wasfi Tal was assassinated by members of the Black September group in 1971 while attending an Arab summit in Cairo. CIA intelligence information Cable, 13 September 1967, NSF Country File: Jordan, Memos and Misc. (iv), Box 147, LBJL. 4. State Department Telegram, 11 April 1969, NSC Country File: Middle East-Jordan, Box 613, Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA. 5. Ambassador Symmes to the Secretary of State, 18 January, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: Jordan 1 August 1967–31 July 1968, Box 31, LBJL; Telegram from Ambassador Symmes to the Secretary of State, 19 January 1968, NSF Special Heads of State Correspondence: Jordan 1 August 1967–31 July 1968, Box 31, LBJL. 6. A few Jordanian scholars claim that Ambassador Harrison Symmes was dismissed in the summer of 1970 because the royal court believed that he had been in secret communication with fedayeen leaders. The allegation against Symmes was made in documents pertaining to the September 1970 crisis that are held in the Royal Court Archives in Amman. The accusation against Symmes was outlined in hand-written correspondence that passed between the Royal Court and the Jordanian embassy in Washington, DC. 7. Harrison Symmes to State Department, 4 March 1969, NSC Country Files: Middle East-Jordan, Box 613, Papers of Richard M. Nixon, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (NARA). 8. Telegram from Harrison Symmes to the State Department, 16 February 1970, NSC Country Files: Middle East-Jordan, 1 July 1970-30 September 1970, Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA. 9. “Speech by Secretary General George Habash of the PFLP” in International Documents on Palestine: 1970 (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970). 10. Interviews with Zaid Rifai and Amjad Majali, 27 May 2008, Amman, Jordan. 11. Memorandum from the National Military Command Center, 6 September 1970, NSC Subject File: Hijackings, Box 330, Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA.

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12. Among the hostages, the PFLP took 120 women, children and elderly to the Intercontinental Hotel near the second circle in Amman. The hotel was used as a base by the fedayeen because it was an ideal location for lobbing mortars at the American embassy. The evacuated hostages were in graver danger than those who remained at Dawson’s Field because of the domestic crisis in Jordan. Telegram from Amman to State Department, 7 September 1970, NSC Country Files: Middle East – Jordan, 1 July 1970–30 September 1970, Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA. 13. See Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1969–1976, Volume 24 “Jordan, September 1970.” 14. Interview with Adnan Abu Odeh, 24 May 2008, Amman, Jordan. 15. Interview with Zaid Rifai, 27 May 2008, Amman, Jordan. 16. Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, 15 September 1970, NSC Subject files: Hijackings (II), Box 331, Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA. 17. Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, 16 September 1970, NSC Country Files: Middle East-Jordan, 1 July 1970–30 September 1970, Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA. 18. Telephone Conversation between Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon, 17 September 1970, HAK Telcons: Jordan, Box 30, 5 September 1970–25 September 1970, Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA. 19. Minutes of the WSAG, September 17, 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Volume 24 “Jordan, September 1970.” 20. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), 17 September 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Volume 24 “Jordan, September 1970.” 21. Minutes of WSAG, 18 September 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Volume 24 “Jordan, September 1970.” 22. Telegrams from Nasser to Hussein, 17, 19 and 20 September 1970, Telegram from Hussein to Nasser, 20 September 1970, Al-Watha ‘iq Al-Urduniya, 1970 (Amman: Da’irat al-Matbu’at wal-Nashr, 1970). 23. The British position was not much better; both embassies were in the region of Jebel Amman and a steep valley separated them from

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24. 25. 26.

27. 28.

29.

30.

31.

32. 33.

NOTES

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PAGES 175–178

the palace on Jebel Lweibdeh. Telegram from State Department to American Embassy in London, 20 September 1970, NSC Country Files Box 619, “Jordan Situation,” Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA. Interview with Zaid Rifai, 27 May 2008, Amman, Jordan. Interview with Adnan Abu Odeh, 24 May 2008, Amman, Jordan. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, 20 September 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Volume 24 “Jordan, September 1970”; Telegram from Secretary of State Rogers to the White House, 21 September 1970, NSC Country Files Box 619, “Jordan Situation,” Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA. Minutes of a WSAG Meeting, 20–21 September 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Volume 24 “Jordan, September 1970.” Telegram from William Rogers to the White House, 21 September 1970, NSC Country Files Box 619, “Jordan Situation,” Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA. Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, 22 September 1970, NSC Institutional Meetings, NSC Meeting “Jordan 9–23–1970,” Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin), 21 September 1970; Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Jordan and Israel, 22 September 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Volume 24 “Jordan, September 1970.” Transcript of Telephone Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), 21 September 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Volume 24 “Jordan, September 1970”; Memorandum of Conversation, 22 September 1970, NSC Files: HAK Office Files – Country Files, Middle East, Rabin-Kissinger, Box 134, Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA. Minutes of a WSAG Meeting, 21 September 1970, FRUS 1969– 1976, Volume 24 “Jordan, September 1970.” Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, 22 September 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Volume 24 “Jordan, September 1970.”

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34. The Syrian air force commander, Hafez al-Assad, withheld support from the Syrian ground forces in what is widely interpreted as a political move against the Syrian ground force commander. Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 333; Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, 23 September 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Volume 24 “Jordan, September 1970.” 35. Tel Aviv to Amman, 23 September 1970, HAK Telcons Box 30, 5 September 1970-25 September 1970, Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA. 36. Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, 25 September 1970, NSC Country Files: Middle East-Jordan, 1 July 1970-30 September 1970, Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 333. 37. Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, 7 October 1970, NSC Country Files: Middle East-Jordan, Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA. 38. In December of 1970, the Nixon administration provided Hussein with 14 new M60A1 tanks, 16,000 M-16 rifles, 500 grenade launchers, 57 APCs, 42 106 mm recoilless rifles, 103 50-caliber machine guns, 87 30-caliber machine guns, and ammunition. Most items were available for delivery within 60 days. Letter from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to King Hussein, 10 December 1970, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle East-Jordan (VI), Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA; Letter from Richard Nixon to Hussein ibn Talal, 12 January 1972, NSC Files, Presidential Correspondence: Jordan, Box 757, Papers of Richard Nixon, NARA. 39. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, 24 September 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Volume 24 “Jordan, September 1970.” 40. Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978), 483.

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INDEX

Abdullah bin al-Hussein, 9–17, 19, 29, 33 Annexation of West Bank, 22 Arab revolt and, 10 Assassination, 27, 31, 121 Creation of Jordan, 11–13 Letters to Truman, 15, 16, 17 Meeting with Churchill, 13 Meetings with Israelis, 20, 21, 24, 25 Relationship with son, Talal, 33 Abu Nuwar, Ali, 47 Coup attempt, 50–53, 57, 183 Abu Odeh, Adnan, 171, 175 Abul Huda, Tawfiq, 32 Acheson, Dean, 23, 24 Amr, Abd al-Hakim, 39, 79 Anderson, Robert, 42, 133 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, 39, 41, 49, 57 Arab League, 100, 127, 148, 174 Arab Legion, (see Jordanian Arab Army) Arab nationalism, 9, 39, 40, 45, 65, 75–78, 95, 98, 115 Arab Revolt, 9–10 Arab Union, 56 Arafat, Yasser, 167, 168, 174, 178

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Arif, Abd al-Rahman, 135 Arif, Abd al-Salaam, 59 Aswan High Dam, 44 Al-Badr, Imam Ahmad, 83 Al-Badr, Imam Muhammad, 83 Baghdad Pact, 38–40, 47, 48 Ball, George, 87, 89, 90, 103, 109, 111 Barbour, Walworth, 120 Barnes, Charles, 99, 104–107, 111, 113, 119 Battle, Lucius, 151 Ben-Gurion, David, 24, 76, 78, 79 Biblical imagery, 17 Bowles, Chester, 75 Brown, Dean, 171, 175 Bull, Odd, 135 Bundy, McGeorge, 78, 83, 90, 92, 104, 107, 111, 144, 145 Burns, Findley, 119–122, 125, 126–128, 131, 133, 141, 146 Caccia, Harold, 48, 52 Cairo Agreement, 178 Chamoun, Camille, 61, 62 Churchill, Winston, 12, 13 Clifford, Clark, 16, 20

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252

THE UNITED STATES

Daoud, Muhammad, 156, 171 Dawson’s Field, 170 Dimona Nuclear Reactor, 76 Dulles, Allen, 35, 43, 52, 53, 60, 61 Dulles, John Foster, 34–35, 42–43, 46, 48, 53–55, 57, 60, 62–66, 70

AND

JORDAN

Grant, James, 88, 89 Greater Syria plan, 17, 22 Grew, Joseph, 16

Faisal I (brother of Abdullah I and King of Iraq), 10–13 Faisal II (cousin of Hussein and King of Iraq), 53, 59, 60 Feldman, Myer, 98, 109, 111 Fatah, 117, 119, 147, 167, 168, 174 Fedayeen, Palestinian, 157–158, 166–174, 176, 178, 184 Forrestal, James, 23

Habash, George, 168, 169 Hahn, Peter, 186 Haig, Alexander, 177 Haikal, Yusuf, 82 Haram al-Sharif, 17, 27, 142 Harman, Avraham, 89, 90, 93 Hostages, 168–171, 177, 184 Helms, Richard, 154, 178 Hijackings, 170 Holocaust survivors (displaced persons), 15, 16, 18 Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca, 9 Hussein bin Talal, and Arab Summits, 98–99 and the Baghdad Pact, 39–42 and “Black September” 1970, 165–180 Coronation of, 33 Defensive Pact with Egypt, 133, 135 and the Iraqi Revolution, 60–66 Secret meetings with Israel, 118–120, 161, 179 and the Six Day War, 120–146 and the Suez Crisis, 48 and the tripartite UAR, 86–88 US arms sales to, 54–57, 69, 109–113 Visits to the US, 68–70, 100–103 and the Yemeni Civil War, 83–85 Youth, 33–34 and the Zerqa Crisis, 49–57

Gaza, 142, 163 Ghazi I of Iraq, 32 Glubb, John Bagot (Glubb Pasha), 40–42, 50, 53, 57 Goldberg, Arthur, 142

Iraq, 77, 85 and the Arab Union, 56 and the Baghdad Pact, 38–41 Creation of, 11 Revolution of 1958, 59–63

Eban, Abba, 112, 113, 114, 120, 121, 142, 144, 149, 161, 179 Eden, Anthony, 41 Egypt, 36, 39–46 and Arab Nationalism, 65, 66 and the Baghdad Pact, 39–41 Defensive pact with Jordan, 133, 135 Rivalry with Jordan, 55–57, 131–134 and the Suez Crisis, 44–46 and the tripartite UAR, 86 and the UAR, 55, 79, 80 US aid to, 76 and the Yemeni Civil War, 84–85 Eisenhower Doctrine, 46, 52 Eisenhower, Dwight David, 33–74 Eshkol, Levi, 119–120, 134, 146, 155, 158

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INDEX and the Six Day War, 135 and the tripartite UAR, 86, 88, 92 Troops stationed in Jordan, 172, 173 Irbid, 171, 174, 178 Israel (see also Jerusalem), American Jewish support for, 16, 34, 98, 149 and “Black September” 1970, 167–185 Border with Jordan, 22, 24, 36–38, 89, 166 Independence from Britain, 21 and King Hussein, 64, 66, 73, 79, 101–105, 118, 146, 161 and Palestinian Refugees, 25, 27, 29 and the Six Day War, 117–143 and the Suez Crisis, 44, 45 and the tripartite UAR, 82–92 US arms sales to, 26, 83, 110–114, 161, 162 Israeli Air Force, 131, 134–135, 161, 177–178 Israeli/Jordanian Mixed Armistice Commission (I/JMAC), 118, 119 Jarring, Gunnar, 152, 155, 159, 160, 162 Jericho Conference, 22 Jerusalem, 13, 17, 24, 27, 31, 39, 86, 135, 136, 141, 142, 144–146 Jewish Agency, 20 Jewish Community, American, 27, 34, 148 Johnson, Lyndon, 97–163 Johnston, Charles, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51 Jordanian Arab Army (Arab Legion), 21, 22, 37, 40, 41, 123–125, 135–136, 140–141, 143, 145, 174 Jumaa Saad, 131

Bunch_Index.indd 253

253

Kamel, Mustafa, 80 Karak, 170 Karameh, Battle of, 157, 158 in PLO propaganda, 166 Katzenbach, Nicholas, 144, 145, 151 Kennedy, John F., 75–96 Kent, Sherman, 128 Khammash, Amir, 104, 105, 125, 126, 128, 129, 145, 156 Khartoum Conference, 147–148, 151–152 Khartoum Resolutions, 148 Kissinger, Henry, 165, 171–173, 176–179 Kirkbride, Alec, 13, 22 Komer, Robert, 76, 83, 84, 91 92, 101–102, 104, 106–133 Lebanon intervention, 60–65 Lowenthal, Max, 20 Macmillan, Harold, 54, 61, 62, 64 Macomber, William, 80–81, 83, 84, 89, 94 Majali, Amjad, 170 Majali, Hazza, 39, 69, 70, 71, 132 Marshall, George, 20 Marshall Plan, 19 McDonald, James, 24 McNamara, Robert, 87, 89, 91, 112, 129, 149, 156 Meir, Golda, 20, 179 MiG 21 aircraft, 105, 107, 112, 113, 160 Morris, William, 48, 53 Mufti, Said, 39 Mutawi, Samir, 36 Nabulsi, Suleiman, 47, 49, 51, 53 Nasser, Gamal Abdel and Arab Nationalism, 39, 43, 64, 78

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254

THE UNITED STATES

Nasser, Gamal Abdel – continued and Arab Summits, 99–100, 104, 108 and the Baghdad Pact, 39–41 and the death of Hazza Majali, 70 and Fatah, 173–174 and the Six Day War, 124, 130–137, 139–141 and the Soviet Union, 44, 83, 105, 115 and the Suez Crisis, 44–46 and the United Arab Republic, 55, 79, 80 and the Yemeni Civil War, 84, 85 Nayyef bin Abdullah (Brother of Talal), 31 Nixon, Richard M., 63, 68, 165–180 Nuseibeh, Hazem, 51 Operation Focus, 134 Operation Musketeer, 45 Oren, Michael, 120 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 99, 107, 127, 147, 158 Palestine mandate, 11–23, 25, 27–28 Palestinian refugees, after the 1948 War, 22, 25, 36–37 after the Six Day War, 139–141 In September 1970 Revolt, 169–179 Peres, Shimon, 114 Phantom Aircraft, 155, 160–162 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 168–170, 173 Project Alpha, 36 Qasim, Abd al-Karim, 77, 86 Qibya, Israeli attack on, 37–38 Rabin, Yitzhak, 176–178 Rhodes Armistice negotiations, 24

Bunch_Index.indd 254

AND

JORDAN

Rifai, Samir, 69, 86 Rifai, Zaid, 33, 155, 166, 169, 171, 174–175, 178 Risden, Richard, 67, 68 Riyad, Abd al-Munim, 133, 135 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 14–15, 16, 17, 18, 78 Rostow, Eugene, 145 Rostow, Walt, 114, 121, 122, 126, 150, 151, 155, 156 Rusk, Dean, 77, 80, 81, 93, 106, 122, 125, 126, 151–153, 158 Al-Said, Nuri, 56, 59 Samu’a, 117, 119–124, 126, 128–132, 134 Ibn Saud, Abd Al-Aziz, 16 Saudi Arabia, Aid to Jordan, 40, 43 and Arab Summits, 98, 108 Reconciliation with Jordan, 77 and the Yemeni Civil War, 83, 84, 85 Saunders, Harold, 126, 156, 158, Sharm al-Shaykh, 131–132 Shertok, Moshe, 20 Shuqairi, Ahmad, 99, 147 Sinai Peninsula, 45, 131, 142 Sisco, Joseph, 167, 176 Six Day War, 120, 126–138, 139, 148 Sixth Fleet (United States), 53, 61, 89, 103, 174 Soviet Union, and Egypt 43–46, 70, 105, 150 and Jordan, 49, 56, 94, 104, 110, 127, 143 and the Palestine Mandate, 16, 19, 24 and the Six Day War 131 Starfighter aircraft, 105, 106, 111, 113, 125, 156 Straits of Tiran, 131

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INDEX

255

Suez Crisis, 43–48 Sykes-Picot Agreement, 11 Symmes, Harrison, 146, 151, 153–156, 158–162, 164, 168 Syria, Aid to Jordan, 40, 41 Arab summits, 98, 108 and September 1970 revolt, 173–179 and the Six Day War, 131, 132, 134, 137 Support of the Fedayeen, 118, 125 and the UAR, 55, 79, 80 and the tripartite UAR, 86, 92, 93 Syrian National Congress, 10

Creation of, 55, 73 Plan for a second UAR, 86–87, 90, 92, 96 and the Six Day War, 132–138 Syrian defection from, 79–80 and the Yemeni Civil War, 83–85 United Nations, 22, 23, 24, 27, 71, 142, 147, 150, 179 Partition Plan, 18, 20, 21 Resolution 242, 152, 153, 159, 184 United Nations Emergency Force, 45, 131, 135 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), 18

Tal, Wasfi, 81, 84, 86, 166, 171 Talal bin Abdullah, Abdication of, 32–33 Coronation of, 31–32 and the Creation of the Jordanian constitution, 32 Mental illness, 31–32 Talbot, Phillips, 93, 111 Tarawneh, Fayez, 51 Templer, Gerald, 39 Three Nos, The, 148 Transjordan, emirate of, 12–15, 17, 20, 22, 25 Tripartite Agreement, 26, 55, 91 Truman, Harry S., 15–29 Trusteeship plan, 19, 21

Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), 171–173, 176, 184 Weizmann, Chaim, 16 West Bank, 39, 51, 66, 73, 86–87, 89, 90, 91, 99, 114, 122–124, 126–130 Border with Israel, 36, 37 Fatah raids from, 117, 119, 157 Israeli attacks in, 37–38, 115, 118–119 Israeli occupation of, 137–145, 153, 155, 157, 158, 159, 161 Jordan’s annexation of, 22 and the Six Day War, 132, 133, 135–145

United Arab Command, 99, 101, 104, 106, 110 United Arab Republic (UAR), 56, 64, 69, 70, 71, 78, 87, 88, 91, 99, 105, 154

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Yaqub, Salim, 4 Yemen, 77, 83–85, 94, 96, 108 Yost, Charles, 179 Zerqa coup attempt, 49–57, 74, 183 Zionism, 11, 14, 131

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