Politics and the Slavic Languages 2020057861, 2020057862, 9780367569846, 9781003100188, 9780367569853

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Politics and the Slavic Languages

During the past two centuries, ethnolinguistic nationalism has been the norm of nation building and state building in Central Europe. The number of recognized Slavic languages (in line with the normative political formula of language = nation = state) gradually tallied with the number of the Slavic nationstates, especially after the breakups of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. But in the current age of borderless cyberspace, regional and minority Slavic languages are freely standardized and used, even when state authorities disapprove. As a result, since the turn of the 19th century, the number of Slavic languages has varied widely, from a single Slavic language to as many as 40. Through the story of Slavic languages, this timely book illustrates that decisions on what counts as a language are neither permanent nor stable, arguing that the politics of language is the politics in Central Europe. The monograph will prove to be an essential resource for scholars of linguistics and politics in Central Europe. Tomasz Kamusella is a reader in modern history at the University of St. Andrews, United Kingdom.

Routledge Histories of Central and Eastern Europe

The nations of Central and Eastern Europe experienced a time of momentous change in the period following the Second World War. The vast majority were subject to communism and central planning, while events such as the Hungarian uprising and Prague Spring stood out as key watershed moments against a distinct social, cultural and political backdrop. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, German reunification and the breakup of the Soviet Union, changes from the 1990s onwards have also been momentous, in which countries have adjusted to various capitalist realities. The volumes in this series will help shine a light on the experiences of this key geopolitical zone and offer many lessons to be learned for the future. Communism, Science and the University Towards a Theory of Detotalitarianisation Edited by Ivaylo Znepolski A Nation Divided by History and Memory Hungary in the Twentieth Century and Beyond Gábor Gyáni Historicizing Roma in Central Europe Between Critical Whiteness and Epistemic Injustice Victoria Shmidt and Bernadette Nadya Jaworsky The Macedonian Question and the Macedonians A History Alexis Heraclides Milan Rastislav Štefánik The Slovak National Hero and Co-founder of Czechoslovakia Michal Kšiňan Politics and the Slavic Languages Tomasz Kamusella For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/RoutledgeHistories-of-Central-and-Eastern-Europe/book-series/

Politics and the Slavic Languages Tomasz Kamusella

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Tomasz Kamusella The right of Tomasz Kamusella to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Kamusella, Tomasz, author. Title: Politics and the Slavic languages / Tomasz Kamusella. Description: London ; New York : Routledge, 2021. | Series: Routledge histories of Central and Eastern Europe | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020057861 (print) | LCCN 2020057862 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367569846 (hardback) | ISBN 9781003100188 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Slavic languages—Europe, Central—Political aspects. | Europe, Central—Languages—Political aspects. Classification: LCC P119.32.C36 K38 2021 (print) | LCC P119.32.C36 (ebook) | DDC 491.8—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020057861 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020057862 ISBN: 978-0-367-56984-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-56985-3 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-10018-8 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

To the new generation of scholars from Central Europe, so that they may dare to peer beyond the dogma of the nation and the black box of Einzelsprache

Contents

List of figuresix Prefacexiii Acknowledgmentsxv Introduction

1

1

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe What is a language?  4 A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  6 One Slavic language or three Slavic state languages (and counting)?  9 Vanishings and metamorphoses  13 Breakups 17 Classifying Slavic languages  23

4

2

Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages The dilemma of ethnolinguistic nationalism  79

59

3

The internet: a new frontier

87

4

The politics of script The future: human will is fickle  115

104

5

Pluricentric or monocentric

119

6

Russian as a pluricentric language

144

7

Conclusion: the dilemma of numbers

173

viii  Contents 8

Addendum: the Declaration on the Common Language The Declaration on the Common Language  179 Deklaracija o Zajedničkom Jeziku  181

179

9

Postscript on methodology: people see what they want

183

Bibliography 267 Index323

Figures

1. 1a

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe 4 From uncountable and continuous Sprache to discrete and countable Einzelsprachen 7 1b The single Slavic language and its ‘literary dialects’ in the mid 19th century 10 1c The Slavic languages in 1914 11 1d The Slavic languages in 1930 (View I) 13 1e The Slavic languages in 1930 (View II) 13 1f The Slavic languages in 1943 14 1g The Slavic languages in 1945 16 1h The Slavic languages during the Cold War 17 1i The Slavic languages used as languages of command in state armies during the Cold War 18 1j The Slavic languages in 2017: An etic, or outside, perspective – as seen by institutional and academic observers outside Central Europe19 1k The Slavic languages in 2017: An emic perspective 20 1.l The South Slavic dialect continuum 26 1m Emic efforts and dialectology, or the South Slavic dialect continuum mainly divided along dialects and Einzelsprachen during the past two centuries 27 1n The North Slavic dialect continuum 28 1o Emic efforts and dialectology, or the North Slavic dialect continuum divided mainly along dialects and Einzelsprachen, during the past two centuries 29 1p The historic All-Slavic dialect continuum, circa 6th century 31 1q The historic single All-Slavic dialect continuum and Einzelsprachen 31 1r The manner of the production of Einzelsprachen, especially in the historical context of Central Europe 33 1s How people and their groups (organized in states) engage with the linguistic 35 1t Production of units of the linguistic 37

x  Figures 1u

Influence of other languages on today’s Slavic state languages during the past two centuries 1v Deterritorialized and dialect-based Slavic state languages today 1w Correspondence between the written and the spoken in the Slavic state languages 2. Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages 2a The status of the Slavic ‘microlanguages’ in 2017 2b The localization and scripts of the Slavic ‘microlanguages’ in 2017, alongside the corresponding speech communities’ religions 2c Examples of Russian (Slavic)-based pidgins (trade languages), 18th–20th centuries 2d Examples of Russian-based pidgins and mixed (macaronic) languages, 20th–21st centuries 2e Jewish and Roma Slavic-based ethnolects 2f Other Slavic-based ethnolect registers 2g The influence of non-Slavic imperial and dominant languages (i.e., official, state, national or imperial) on Slavic Einzelsprachen 2h The influence of non-Slavic imperial and dominant (i.e., official, state and national) languages on Slavic microlanguages 3. The internet: A new frontier 3a The recognized Slavic ‘cyberspace languages’ in 2017 3b The Slavophone Wikipedias ranked in accordance with each’s number of articles 3c The Wikipedias in the North and South Slavic languages ranked in accordance with each’s number of articles 3d Slavic languages in various online services (2017) 3e Slavic languages with ISO 639 codes and Unicode keyboards (2017) 3f From Serbo-Croatian to Serbo-Croatian: Serbo-Croatian and the post-Serbo-Croatian languages, as seen through the lens of the changing ISO 639 standard 4. The politics of script 4a The three alphabets of the recognized Slavic ‘cyberspace languages’ and of Montenegrin in 2017 4b The two alphabets of the Slavic state languages in 2017 4c The two alphabets and populations of the Slavic states in 2017 4d The two alphabets and book production in the Slavic states 4e The ranked annual volumes of book production in the Slavic languages in the mid 2010s 4f The annual number of book titles by the two Slavic language groups in the mid 2010s 4g The annual number of book titles published in the North Slavic language group’s two socio-political subgroups of Slavic languages in the mid 2010s 4h The narcissism of small graphic (grapheme) differences

38 51 52 59 60 61 63 65 68 72 73 75 87 88 91 92 94 99 101 104 105 105 106 107 108 109 109 112

Figures xi 4i 4j 5. 5a 5b 5c 5d 5e 5f 6. 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 6g 6h 7. C 8. 9. Pa Pb Pc Pd Pe Pf Pg

The actual and heritage alphabets of the Slavic state languages in 2017 114 The number of actual and heritage scripts employed for writing a given Slavic state language in 2017 114 Pluricentric or monocentric 119 The monocentric Slavic Einzelsprachen of 2017 reinterpreted as ‘literary dialects’ of notional pluricentric languages 121 Monocentric or pluricentric Slavic languages 123 Even larger Slavic pluricentric languages? 124 A single Slavic language pluricentric at multiple levels 134 All-Slavic languages and the politics of script 135 Languages of broader (interethnic) communication for Central and Eastern Europe’s Slavs 138 Russian as a pluricentric language 144 Number of speakers of the world’s pluricentric (‘big’) languages, as contrasted with Russian and the Common Language 146 Common Language, Russian and selected ‘world languages’ as states’ official or national languages 147 Comparison of the semantic fields of selected Soviet, Russian and English political terms 149 Linguonym Rus(s)ki(i) and Rossiiskii between Rus’, PolandLithuania, Muscovy, Russian Empire, Austria-Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union, Ukraine and the Russian Federation (thus far) 153 Use of Russian worldwide 154 Screenshot of a computer menu indicating different countryspecific Englishes as input languages 156 Screenshot of a computer menu indicating that Russian is treated as a single monocentric input language with no country-specific variants 157 Potential state-specific, territorial and ethnic varieties of Russian as a pluricentric language 161 Conclusion: The dilemma of numbers  173 Sociolinguistic knowledges and the West: linguistic imperialism 174 Addendum: The Declaration on the Common Language 179 Postscript on methodology: People see what they want 183 Social reality ≈ imagined community ≈ legal fiction(s) 184 The ideal socio-spatial stratification in the nation-state: full homogeneity191 What the British administrators saw: Group identities in the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (schematically represented) 192 Society of estates: A socio-spatial diagram 202 An old, nonnational polity in which several ethnolinguistically defined nations emerged 203 A newly created ethnolinguistic nation imagined to be divided among several much older, nonnational polities 204 Estate or colonial society at the verge of the nationalizing change 206

xii  Figures Ph Pi

Society in flux: En route from estate or colonial society to the nation (national homogeneity) 208 Devices for creating and delimiting the concept of Einzelsprache and its actualizations – that is, languages (Einzelsprachen)209

Preface

I used to work in the Institute of East Slavonic Philology (Instytut Filologii Wschodniosłowiańskiej) at Opole University in Opole, Upper Silesia, Poland. At the turn of the 21st century, I was idling in the institute’s general office (sekretariat), waiting for the deputy director to discuss an administrative matter regarding my teaching groups. It so happened that a master’s student was also waiting to speak with the deputy director. Taking care not to bother the secretary, who was diligently entering some data on her computer, I struck up a conversation with the student. It turned out that she was completing her thesis on the East Slavic language of Rusyn. This student told me that she was a bit apprehensive about the research seminar for the Chair of Belarusian and Ukrainian Studies (Zakład Białorutenistyki i Ukrainistyki), to whom she was expected to present her research later that day. To ease her into the flow of the required scholarly discourse, I was interested to hear her opinion on the salient differences between the categories of language (Einzelsprache) and dialect. Soon we came to the conclusion that there is no linguistic basis for distinguishing between these two terms. Extralinguistic factors – such as political decisions – are responsible for according one speech variety the status of a language and another that of a dialect (cf Maxwell 2018b). From the perspective of linguistics, such decisions are arbitrary and reflect mainly the power relations in the human groups concerned. Usually, in the West, a polity’s dominant group (typically, with its power center located in a polity’s capital) poses its speech as a language, which subsequently is standardized through writing and is often declared the sole legal medium of written and oral communication in public. In turn, speech varieties of nondominant (‘regional’) groups residing across this polity are classified as dialects of the dominant group’s language. Political domination is translated into sociolinguistic and conceptual domination of the top group over subordinate ones, though members of the latter can try to renegotiate their subaltern status by situationally switching between the dominant group’s state language and their own ‘dialects’ (or ‘non-languages’) We had a really good conversation that cleared up a lot of methodological confusion. At least it appeared so. When I met the master’s student a week later, I asked her how the seminar went. Her mood was a bit subdued. She explained that ‘for the sake of objectivity,’ her supervisor had asked her to refrain from using

xiv  Preface the term ‘language’ to refer to Rusyn. The student was coaxed into speaking about Rusyn as a dialect, a dialect of the Ukrainian language.1 She was pragmatic and followed the supervisor’s suggestion. It was time for the student to graduate and get a financially rewarding job in this economically difficult period of postcommunist transition. There was nothing to gain from arguing about the ‘obscure methodological point’; otherwise, the defense of the student’s thesis could have been delayed or even not permitted. Few in her shoes would risk such problems over a mere question of terminology. In this way, as required by ethnolinguistic nationalism typical of Central Europe, universities in this region make sure that the unpacked black box of language and the unquestioned dogma of the nation pass swiftly from one generation to another. A thinly veiled threat of ‘problems’ or the inability to graduate is usually sufficient to bring any intellectually adventurous students back into line. Afterward, such reeducated students, alongside their intellectually obedient colleagues, quickly ‘get it’ that a speech variety is a language only when it is recognized as the official language of a nation-state. Hence, Rusyn cannot be a language, because the Rusyns do not have their own nation-state. Consequently, in a Central Europe already tightly divided among ethnolinguistic nation-states, the Rusyns do not and cannot constitute a nation. However, the ideological strictures of ethnolinguistic nationalism also require that no free-wheeling human groups remain unmoored in this or that nation and that their ‘dialects’ (speech varieties) be not tied to a ‘proper’ national language. As a result, bowing to the powers that be, my interlocutor successfully defended her thesis in which the Rusyns were presented as an ‘ethnographic group’ of the Ukrainian nation and the Rusyn language as a dialect of the Ukrainian language. Because her master’s thesis was actually devoted to Lemkian, or the ‘subspecies’ of Rusyn used in Poland, a further leap of methodological faith was required. I asked her why Lemkian could not then be considered a dialect of Polish rather than of Ukrainian. She rolled her eyes at my silliness. Was it not obvious to me that any language or dialect written down in Cyrillic cannot be part of the Latin alphabet–based Polish language? I disagreed and pointed out that writing is not part of language but rather a technology of the graphic recording of speech. In a similar way, a portrait or photograph of a person is not considered part of the person. It was a bit too much. The conversation exasperated her. I was so unrealistic, and in her opinion, I must have now become a real nuisance. Certain things are best left as they are. Halfheartedly the master’s student added that this difference in script ‘proves’ that Polish belongs to the West Slavic languages written in Latin letters, while Rusyn belongs to the East Slavic languages jotted down in Cyrillic. Again, I begged to disagree: it could not be, because she used a non-linguistic feature of writing for proposing a classificatory conclusion on the linguistic. Should a proper linguistic classificatory scheme not be based on any extralinguistic elements? At this point, the master’s student excused herself and left. I did not have much time to spare either, because a group of my students were already waiting for their class to begin. Then I understood why I was never invited to research seminars held in the Institute of East Slavonic Philology. Discussing such methodological questions was not expected, let alone appreciated.

Acknowledgments

I thank Filip Tomić (Ivo Pilar Institute of Social Sciences, Zagreb, Croatia), who in May 2017 introduced me to the Deklaracija o zajedničkom jeziku (the Declaration on the Common Language). This document constituted a decisive impulse for writing this book. Rok Stergar (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) kindly commented on two earlier drafts, thus encouraging me to develop the initially intended article into a full-fledged monograph. As usual, my words of thanks go to Catherine Gibson (European University Institute, Florence, Italy), who twice commented in detail on the entire manuscript. Krzysztof Jaskułowski (SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw, Poland) advised me on some theoretical questions, especially regarding the postscript on methodology. I appreciate the encouragement and care extended by Routledge, first by Robert Langham and subsequently by Zoe Thomson, Tanushree Baijal and Christopher Matthews. Of course, I alone bear responsibility for any remaining infelicities. Last but not least, Beata patiently supported me through this endeavor (as in the case of my earlier monographs) but rightly insisted that there is life beyond research.

Also by Tomasz Kamusella Eurasian Empires as Blueprints for Ethiopia: From Ethnolinguistic Nation-State to Multiethnic Federation Limits – Styknie Ethnic Cleansing During the Cold War: The Forgotten 1989 Expulsion of Turks from Communist Bulgaria The Un-Polish Poland, 1989 and the Illusion of Regained Historical Continuity Codzienność komunikacyjno-językowa na obszarze historycznego Górnego Śląska [The Everyday Language Use in Historical Upper Silesia] Creating Languages in Central Europe During the Last Millennium The Upper Silesian Creole Warszawa wie lepiej, Ślązaków nie ma. O dyskryminacji i języku śląskim [Warsaw Knows Better – the Silesians Don’t Exist: On Discrimination and the Silesian Language] Ślōnska godka [The Silesian Language] The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe

xvi  Acknowledgments The Szlonzoks and Their Language: Between Germany, Poland and Szlonzokian Nationalism O Schlonzsku i nacjonalizmie [On Upper Silesia and Nationalism] Maski i twarze nacjonalizmu [Masks and Facets of Nationalism] Silesia and Central European Nationalisms: The Emergence of National and Ethnic Groups in Prussian Silesia and Austrian Silesia, 1848–1918 Uwag kilka o dyskryminacji Ślązaków i Niemców górnośląskich w postkomunistycznej Polsce [A Few Remarks on the Discrimination of the Silesians and Upper Silesia’s Germans in Postcommunist Poland] Schlonzsko: Horní Slezsko, Oberschlesien, Górny Śląsk. Esej o regionie i jego mieszkańcach [Schlonzsko: Upper Silesia. An Essay on the Region and Its Inhabitants] W bżuhu vieloryba [In a Whale’s Belly: Essays on Nationalism and Language Politics] The Polish-English-German Regional Glossary Schlonzska mowa. Język, Górny Śląsk i nacjonalizm [Silesia and Language: Language, Upper Silesia and Nationalism] The Triple Division of the Slavic Languages: A Linguistic Finding, a Product of Politics, or an Accident? The Polish-English-German Glossary of the Regional Terminology of the Opole Voivodeship The Dynamics of the Policies of Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia During the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries A Dictionary of English Homophones with Explanations in Polish ‘Living in the Borderland:’ Colonialism and the Clash of Cultures in the Fiction of J.M. Coetzee

Coedited volumes Central Europe Through the Lens of Language and Politics: On the Sample Maps from the Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe The Social and Political History of Southern Africa’s Languages Creating Nationality in Central Europe, 1880–1950: Modernity, Violence and (Be) Longing in Upper Silesia The Palgrave Handbook of Slavic Languages, Identities and Borders Nationalisms Today Nationalisms Across the Globe: An Overview of Nationalisms in State-Endowed and Stateless Nations

Coedited book series Nationalisms Across the Globe

Note 1 Ironically, in 2004, Opole University published an extensive edited volume on Rusyn as a language in its own right in the well-regarded book series on the post-1945 history of the Slavic languages (Magocsi 2004).

Introduction

The monograph’s initial title was Between Pluricentrism and the Multiplicity of Slavic Languages. Over the course of researching and writing this book, when I fully realized how widely the number of Slavic languages fluctuated during the past two centuries, I added to the title the following subtitle: Or the Question of (for Now) About 40 Slavic Languages. These changes in opinion on whether a given speech form is, or should be, recognized as a language in its own right stem from the typically Central European politicization of language, as observed during the past two centuries. In this region of Europe, scholars, who probe into matters linguistic, tend to inform politics and thus often double as politicians. In turn, a retired politician, or one voted out of power, may well become a distinguished linguist. In Central Europe, scholarship and politics are two sides of the same coin of ethnolinguistic nationalism. In this region, the ideology constitutes the sole, or at least main, basis for legitimate statehood construction and maintenance. Language is power, and power is language in present-day Central Europe. Tellingly, in Central Europe, the sobriquet ‘philologist’ is commonly preferred to that of ‘linguist’ in the region’s national languages. To a Central European, the Greek in its origin term φιλολογία philología (love of words) sounds more appropriate than the down-to-earth early-19th-century Latinate neologism ‘linguistics,’ coined for denoting the ‘scholarly discipline devoted to the research of language’ – that is, lingua in Latin. To be a good patriot, one needs to love one’s country and nation. Patriotism stands for the love of one’s patria – that is, fatherland – and in this emotive meaning closely corresponds to philology. In Central Europe, the love of one’s country and the love of one’s language are inseparable. Both entities must be adored and worshiped with equal ardor, as required by the political logic of ethnolinguistic nationalism. Unsurprisingly, the modus operandi of philologists is dictated by the related Greek adjective φιλόλογος philólogos, meaning ‘argumentative, fond of discussion.’ The alluded debate is conducted for the purpose of lauding and defending one’s national language. A philologist cannot be a respected patriot if they remain a dispassionate linguist. A good philologist must be a patriot, who is none other than a nationalist enamored of their nation and language. What is more, each Central European nationalist, to a degree, needs to become a philologist, by diligently studying and promoting their national language. This Central European difference in perceiving the role of languages, and

2  Introduction the tendency for making them into the foundation of political projects, convinced me to add yet another subtitle – namely Exercises in Sociolinguistic (Philological) Imagination. As a result, the book’s overall title with its two subtitles became rather unwieldy and quite opaque. When talking to colleagues about my new research project, I told them that I was writing a book on ‘the politics of the changing number of Slavic languages during the past two centuries.’ Having heard my doubts about the complicated and longish title, Rob Langham, history editor at Routledge, hit the nail on the head by proposing to pare the title to its bare thematic core – namely Politics and the Slavic Languages. With this timely intervention, he saved my ‘internal linguist’ from becoming overcome by the philological background of my university education, which I obtained three decades ago in Central Europe. In the opening of Chapter One, ‘A brief and unnatural history of languages in Europe,’ first I propose that languages are artifacts, products of human ingenuity and labor. This methodological insight is followed by a panorama of language making and destruction, as increasingly demanded by the political logic of ethnolinguistic nationalism across Central Europe during the past two centuries. Obviously, the focus remains mainly on the Slavic (state) languages, but in close rapport and with references to the region’s non-Slavic languages, cultures, nations and states. The subsequent Chapter Two, ‘Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages’ gazes at these Slavic speech communities that, thus far, have not managed to establish their own nation-states or do not strive for such a political end. The survey of the Slavic languages of various kinds and their speech communities completed, the narrative turns to recent technological developments that generate novel political challenges, as discussed in Chapter Three, ‘The internet: A new frontier.’ Chapter Four, ‘The politics of script’, surveys the use of writing systems, spelling conventions and diacritics for creating and maintaining required differences among the Slavic languages. These differences are often metaphorically referred to as language frontiers or lines of separation, which keep languages away from one another. These territorializing metaphors are a reflex of the main purpose for which languages are employed in today’s Central Europe – that is, for constructing, legitimizing and maintaining ethnolinguistic nation-states. Because languages are artifacts, humans as their creators may split or merge them at will, as they also do in the case of states. In Central Europe, none is innocent; splitting or merging languages is as political as splitting or merging states. Due to the logic of ethnolinguistic nationalism, each split or merger of states should be followed by a corresponding split or merger of their national (official) languages. And likewise, every split or merger of national languages should be reflected in a corresponding split or merger of states. These closely interconnected and highly ideologized processes give rise to the question whether a language can come in two or more written standards (pluricentricity), employed in several nation-states, or if it must consist of a single standard of this kind (monocentricity), employed in (or at least controlled by) a single nation-state. Chapter Five, ‘Pluricentric or monocentric,’ is devoted to these issues. In addition, it also offers

Introduction 3 a survey of constructed (planned) Slavic languages, the existence of which may influence the number of Slavic languages in some unexpected ways. Chapter Six, ‘Russian as pluricentric language,’ focuses on the little-noticed and rarely commented fact that in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian became a sole world (‘big’) language, which is officially proposed to consist of a single standard only. Other world languages – like English, French, Spanish or Portuguese – employed in official capacity in numerous countries, are pluricentric in their character. Each nation-state where one of these languages is official remains free to shape its country-specific standard as needed. State sovereignty ensures full language sovereignty. However, in the case of today’s monocentric Russian, the Russian Federation usurps for itself the exclusive right to control this language, even if Russian is employed as an official language in another nation-state. The Conclusion, ‘The dilemma of numbers,’ is followed by the original and my English translation of the Declaration on the Common Language. This declaration, issued in 2017, inspired me to research and write this monograph in the first place. I also decided to add the rather lengthy ‘Postscript on methodology: People see what they want’ at the book’s end. Originally, I intended the text to fulfill the role of a methodological chapter that would open this monograph. Yet it kept growing beyond the typical discussion of key terms of analysis. In the end, I shifted this discussion to the beginning of Chapter One and relegated the rest of the material to the Postscript. I trust that the methodological insights offered in the Postscript are best perused in conjunction with the preceding survey and analysis of the politics of the Slavic languages, especially because the latter are still fresh in the reader’s memory.

1 A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe

What is a language? Language (Sprache in German)1 in its oral nature, or speech, is a continuous phenomenon. Any differences in this continuous stream of intra-human (intraspecies) interaction are a mere reflection of the division of humankind into groups. But people do flow from one group to another, and they cross group boundaries on a regular basis. Hence, any difference in Humanese (or the all-human language – that is, biological capacity for speech) is negotiable and bridgeable, even if rhetorically posed as ‘huge’ and ‘insurmountable.’ People can acclimatize to such differences (or ways of talking) and even switch between them at will. Language, understood as humankind’s biological propensity for speech, developed by way of evolution as this species’ basic instrument of group formation and maintenance. Language’s primary (evolutionary) function is the production of social cohesion, bonding people into groups (and by the same token the creation of boundaries between groups). It is a mesh of everyday face-to-face interactions that underpins a cohesive group of this kind. Uniquely, in comparison to other species of animals, language allows human beings to exercise such individualized (unmediated) interactions with two or even three people at once, which allows for more time-effective group building and maintenance. Other species are compelled to build and maintain cohesive groups more laboriously, exclusively by one-on-one interactions (e.g., through grooming) (Dunbar 1993). In contrast to language (Sprache) as the biological capacity for speech, the concept of a language (Einzelsprache in German), or one of many languages, is a construct, a product of human ingenuity (culture), which emerged in the GraecoRoman world, between the 2nd century bce and the 2nd century ce. In the West, the coalescence of this concept of Einzelsprache is intimately connected to the rise of the technology of writing, or graphic representation of language on stone, wooden tablets, papyrus, parchment or paper.2 Differences in speech (‘oral language’) were construed as ‘dialects,’3 and those in writing as ‘languages.’ Writing allowed for shaping arbitrarily selected chunks of Humanese (Sprache) into discrete languages (Einzelsprachen). First, different scripts produced separate languages, as in the case of the Greek alphabet for the Greek language or the Latin letters for the Latin language. Due to the rise of Christianity as the official religion

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  5 of the Roman Empire, the Hebrew script of the Hebrew original of the Old Testament was added to the other two scripts, thus reinforcing the novel norm of languages as discrete entities (Einzelsprachen), each connected to its own specific system of writing (Kamusella 2016a; Makoni and Pennycook 2007). The now widely accepted biologizing view of languages must be addressed. According to this view, languages are like ‘organisms’ that ‘are born,’ ‘live,’ ‘propagate’ and finally ‘die.’ It is another ‘just-so story’ of anthropomorphization and myth making. Languages are produced, shaped and decided upon by humans and their groups. Without humans, there are no languages. The sole agent in the story of languages is the human being, though nowadays this story tends to be retold, especially in Central Europe, as if languages were autonomous living creatures endowed with agency. As though languages out of their own volition created human groups and boss them around (cf Schleicher 1869). This is the cherished foundational myth of ethnolinguistic nationalism, or as such, an error of thinking. In reality, humans alone invented the concept of ‘a language’ (Einzelsprache) and the technology of writing. With the use of both, humans in Europe created countable and discrete languages as artifacts, not that much different from the wheel or the steam engine. In the late 19th century, humans (or rather some influential scholars, whose ideas gained popularity, especially those of Charles Darwin and August Schleicher [cf Schleicher 1869]) cast such languages in the role of biological organisms that ‘naturally’ divided humans into groups. Depending on which language one was heard (or believed) to be speaking, a human was seen as ‘naturally’ belonging to this or that group, since that time dubbed ‘nations’ (Böckh 1866). Ethnolinguistic nationalism was created, and its popularity spread rapidly in the role of a new political faith in this modern Europe, at which point religion was gradually dethroned as the main instrument of group building and maintenance. The ideology of (ethnolinguistic) nationalism, like religion previously, is employed for statehood construction, legitimization and maintenance. Nationalism continues to pull proverbial wool over people’s eyes (Cornish 1936; Dominian 1917). And mind you, in the previous statement, I have just erred. Languages, ideologies or any elements of culture are products of human ingenuity alone. I stand corrected: humans, with the use of this ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism, pull wool over their own eyes and choose (mistakenly) to see languages as ‘real’ agents of nation and state building (Göderle 2016). Languages are not asteroids that fell down to earth or devices implanted in human heads by some extraterrestrials. Neither are languages gifts from gods in the heavens, though the Judeo-Christian-Muslim (Abrahamic) tradition has often maintained that the language of this or that holy book – be it Hebrew, Latin or Arabic – is god’s own speech, a ‘holy language.’ These aforementioned gods and heavens are also human creations, elements of culture, and as such, they are dependent solely on human will. All elements of social reality are generated and maintained through language (Sprache) use by humans alone, including languages (Einzelsprachen) (Searle 1995).

6  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe With the spread of the technology of writing in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, during the late Roman antiquity and the Middle Ages, the genres of writing, known as ‘grammar’ and ‘dictionary,’ were invented. Greek and Latin grammars and dictionaries as actualizations of these genres became the model of how to apply writing for creating languages (Einzelsprachen), seen as selfcontained discrete entities, and were soon adopted by enterprising Jewish and Muslim literati for delimiting the Einzelsprachen of Hebrew and Arabic, respectively. In a highly normative (‘authoritative’) manner, grammars and dictionaries proclaim what ‘properly’ belongs to a language and what is (or should be kept as) extraneous to it. This kind of written mental policing – in the course of formal education – teaches children (or future literati) to see the continuous and unwritten phenomenon of speech as composed of separate Einzelsprachen. Grammars and dictionaries as meta-artifacts of culture allow for imagining and maintaining through writing a boundary between languages. These potent metaartifacts make languages into ‘clearly tangible’4 objects with ‘established norms’ of writing, spelling, coining words, forming phrases and sentences or rhyming. Schools and examinations institutionalize and enforce such norms as ‘correct,’ while students comply because observing these norms offers access to a variety of sought-after professional jobs, by default earmarked for literati versed in this or that Einzelsprache (cf Considine 2014; Illich 1981: 5–34). In the age of full literacy, children speaking different varieties (‘dialects’) of an official language or an altogether different Einzelsprache at home have no choice but to acquire this prescribed official language in school. Teachers assess such children’s everyday speech as ‘incorrect’ or even ‘foreign’ against the benchmark of the written form of the official Einzelsprache (cf Kosi 2018: 96, 101–102). In contradiction with the facts, the oral is posed as secondary to the written, while the latter is conferred with the role of the gold standard to which the oral must conform. As a result, the discrete character of ‘written languages,’ though initially highly counterintuitive, becomes ‘normal,’ solidifies and spreads. Another step in this process, which in spatial terms was initially limited to Europe’s ‘Western Christian’ sphere, came with the Reformation and the CounterReformation. Both seemingly opposed ideological trends underwritten by religion provided for the translation of the Bible into vernaculars. These translations cut out new ‘dialects’ (‘oral languages’) from the seamless commonality of Humanese (Sprache) and made them into discrete ‘written languages’ (Einzelsprachen).5 In turn, as soon as a new language was accepted as official in a territory (polity or administrative region), those with an ‘imperfect’ command of the Einzelsprache’s written standard were declared as speakers of ‘dialects’ that ‘belong’ to this official language (cf Burke 2004; Kamusella 2015). Afterward, Europe’s maritime and continental empires imposed the idea of Einzelsprache and ‘its’ (usually cognate) dialects on the rest of the world, for better or worse, making each into a seemingly universal concept, quite unreflectively accepted as the ‘natural norm’ of ordering or sorting the linguistic in today’s world. During the 20th century, the Einzelsprache became the sole legitimate unit of the linguistic, like the nationstate in the case of the political (Kamusella 2012a).

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  7 Biological (evolutionary = natural) capacity for speech (Sprache, Humanese), in spatial terms also known as dialect continuum Technology of writing (grammars, dictionaries) & concept (mental technology) of Einzelsprache

Einzelsprache BB

Einzelsprache BC

Dialect Dialect 1.1 1.2

Dialect 2.1

Dialect 2.2

Dialect 1.1

Dialect 1.2

Dialect Dialect 2.1 2.2

Einzelsprache ACA

Subdialect

Einzelsprache BBA

Einzelsprache BCA

Subdialect

Einzelsprache AC

Subdialect

Einzelsprache AB

Subdialect

Dialect 2

Subdialect

Dialect 1

Subdialect

Dialect 2

Subdialect

Dialect 1

Subdialect

Einzelsprache B

Einzelsprache ABA

Einzelsprache A

Figure 1a From uncountable and continuous Sprache to discrete and countable Einzelsprachen

That is why the number of languages (Einzelsprachen) is nowadays posed as finite; and languages are commonly believed to be countable objects, construed as selfcontained separate entities. Obviously, the actual number of languages fluctuates – that is, it increases when new Einzelsprachen are created or decreases when people stop speaking (and writing) this or that Einzelsprache. This seemingly countable character of languages is a product of the implementation of the European (Western) concept of Einzelsprache with the use of the technology of writing. In the modern age, this fact was most visible when imperial administrators and missionaries searched in vain across colonies for Einzelsprachen as they knew them from Europe. When they did not find such ‘real languages,’ they set out on the self-imposed task of creating languages in the likeness of the European model of Einzelsprache, mainly through translating the Bible into such colonial languages-in-making. Although colonial languages created in this manner were intended for colonized populations (Indigenous peoples, disparaged as ‘natives’ in colonial terminology), no Western missionary or administrator cared to consult the target population on whether they would be interested in such a project, on how such a language should be built or on the basis of which section (‘dialect’) of a given dialect continuum. These choices were made ‘for them’ and imposed from above. In critiques of Western colonialism and imperialism, language making is rarely noticed and commented on, though this process was part and parcel of the Western mission civilisatrice (cf Errington 2008; Mülhäusler 1996; Stoll 1982). Furthermore, Einzelsprachen are often – though entirely erroneously – seen as agents in their own right, with the capacity to decide about the fate of humans

8  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe and their groups. But languages are not destinies. This anthropomorphization of languages is a mask yielded by an elite to better control nondominant groups. In other words, they are technologies of power relations (also referred to as ‘language ideologies’). Members of an elite communicate to the others what a language ‘wants’ or ‘compels’ ‘us’ to do, to wash their hands of the decision, leaving the odium of forcing it through on the totem of a language. The most typical decision of this kind is proposing that in a state the ruling elite’s dialect (speech) is ‘a language,’ or the polity’s ‘official language,’ while the speech of nondominant groups is a ‘mere dialect,’ seen as ‘speaking incorrectly’ the state language. In a direct reflection of the social and political power relations, such dialects are seen as ‘belonging to’ this language. The dialects are perceived as ‘lower’ or ‘worse’ than the language. This means that speakers of these dialects need first to learn ‘how to speak correctly,’ or to acquire the language, before they can become eligible for joining the elite. As a result, the dialects are ostracized, marginalized and slated for liquidation (cf Heinrich 2012: 68–69). People can and do play even with such a seemingly restrictive concept as Einzelsprache and its actualizations, which commonly lead most to think that no language is beyond the Einzelsprachen, as construed and practiced in the West. But all concepts and their actualizations are products of humans and their groups, of their individual and collective imagination and effort. Both concepts and their actualizations are created, invented, imagined into being by humans alone. Consequently, these are part of social reality (fictive reality) that is generated and maintained by humankind and is dependent solely on human will, in stark contrast to the material reality that is independent of human will. In a nutshell, a human, an animal or an extraterrestrial can see or touch a rock, which constitutes part of the material reality. However, it is not so in the case of social reality, which is not accessible to any senses, be it hearing, sight, touch, taste or smell. Social reality is accessible only to those ‘in the know.’ Humans, animals and extraterrestrials can hear or detect speech (language, Humanese), because sound waves are part of the material reality. But only humans can ‘see’ Einzelsprachen or discrete written languages with their ‘mind’s eye.’ Likewise, only humans can ‘see’ other elements of social reality, such as universities, states, nations, sovereignty, loyalty and the like (cf Harari 2014: 24–25, 31–32, 37–39, 44–45). Humans can shape social reality at their own discretion, because all of it is stored in their brains. They can do whatever they want with social reality and its elements – the only limit being the group and individual human imagination. In other words, this limit corresponds to the retrieval capacity of the brain and the body’s biological capacity for interacting with other humans. Not surprisingly, at times, humans transform the eminently countable concept of Einzelsprache into an uncountable or a highly negotiable one. There is nothing to stop them from playing in such a manner with this element of social reality. The recent history of the Slavic languages (i.e., Einzelsprachen) during the past two and a half centuries is a clear case in point.

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  9

One Slavic language or three Slavic state languages (and counting)? In the first half of the 19th century, scholars such as Josef Dobrowsky (Dobrovský), from Bohemia (today’s western Czech Republic); Ludwig Gay (Ljudevit Gaj), from present-day northwestern Croatia; Bartholomäus (Jernej) Kopitar, from today’s Slovenia; and Jan Herkel (Ján Herkeľ), Jan (Ján) Kollár, Pavel Josef Šafařík (Pavol Jozef Šafárik) and Lajos Stur (Ľudovít Štúr), all four from today’s Slovakia, proposed that there is just one Slavic language with multiple ‘literary dialects.’ Among others, this belief became the central idea of panslavism. However, in line with the then coalescing ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism (cf Sundhaußen 1973), some of these scholars also maintained that the speech communities of the Slavic language’s literary dialects should be classified as ‘tribes’ (or ethnic groups in the present-day academese) of a single Slavic nation (people) (cf Maxwell 2018a). Tellingly, all the scholars-cum-activists came from the Austrian Empire and flourished almost exclusively within its boundaries. They saw the Habsburg Monarchy as unduly dominated by German and Hungarian speakers, while Slavophones constituted clear-cut majorities in many regions of this empire and arguably a plurality among the inhabitants of Central Europe, at that time shared by Austria, Prussia, the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire (cf Šafařík and Merklas 1842). The aforementioned ‘literary dialects’ of the Slavic language were usually identified as Czechoslovak (present-day Czech and Slovak), Illyrian (present-day Bulgarian, Slovenian and Serbo-Croatian – or rather, Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian), Polish and Russian (present-day Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian) (Greenberg 2011; Maxwell 2009). Before the outbreak of the Great War, only Bulgarian, Russian and Serbian were fully recognized state languages, respectively in Bulgaria, the Russian Empire and in Serbia and Montenegro in the last case.6 Other Slavic languages used regularly in administration, and the press and book publishing were employed in different autonomous regions (crownlands) of AustriaHungary: broadly speaking and without going into details, Bosnian (Croatian, Serbo-Croatian) in Bosnia; Croatian (Serbo-Croatian) in Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia; Czech (Bohemian) in Bohemia; Moravian in Moravia (though it was common to see Czech and Moravian as the same language); Polish and Ruthenian (Ukrainian) in Galicia, Serbian in Slavonia; and Slovenian in the Austrian Littoral, Carniola, Carinthia and Styria.7 The Austro-Hungarian banknotes, besides the main information in German and Hungarian, also provided some information in Czech (into which Moravian was typically collapsed, for practical uses), Polish, Croatian (at times referred to also as Bosnian and Serbo-Croatian), Slovenian, Serbian, Italian, Ruthenian (Ukrainian) and Romanian. The same was true of the Reichsgesetzblatt (Imperial Gazette) and provincial gazettes (Amtsblatten) (Ivić 2014: 256–305; Judson 2016; Kamusella 2015; Rindler Schjerve 2003). The concept of a single Slavic language composed of several literary dialects never gained popularity. The brief attraction of supraethnic and

10  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe Type of Language

Names

Number

Language Literary Dialects

Slavic Czechoslovak (present-day Czech and Slovak), Illyrian (present-day Bulgarian, Slovenian and Serbo-Croatian), Polish, ‘Russian’ (present-day Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian)

1 4

Total

5

Figure 1b The single Slavic language and its ‘literary dialects’ in the mid 19th century

supraconfessional panslavism waned rapidly after the All-Slav Congress8 held at the Bohemian capital of Prague in the revolutionary year of 1848. In hierarchically organized imperial (estates) societies, the top group posed their language as ‘the best’ or, more neutrally, as the empire’s ‘natural’ lingua franca. In the Austrian Empire, it was German, later joined by Hungarian, when in 1867 this empire was overhauled into the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Russian functioned as such an imperial lingua franca in the Russian Empire (especially after the 1880s), German in the German Empire and Osmanlıca (Ottoman Turkish) in the Ottoman Empire. No Slavic language served the role of some All-Slavic lingua franca for all the Slavic speakers using a variety of Slavic ‘literary dialects’ across these empires. In 1871, the Russian scholar Aleksandr Gilferding (Alexander Hilferding) published a book that proposed a single unified Cyrillic alphabet for all the Slavic ‘dialects’ (narechiia) (Gilferding 1871). This proposal arrived in the wake of St. Petersburg’s official bans on the use of the Latin alphabet for writing and publishing in Latvian, Lithuanian, Little Russian (Ukrainian) and White Russian (Belarusian). In addition, there was an eventually failed attempt undertaken to use Cyrillic for writing and publishing in Polish in the Russian Empire. The then popular idea was that Russian might yet become such an All-Slavic lingua franca, while the other Slavic languages (Einzelsprachen) would be redefined as Russian dialects, additionally united with this imperial language through the single shared alphabet of Cyrillic. However, that was not to be. There was not much taste for downgrading other Slavic Einzelsprachen to the position of Russian dialects, let alone to adopt the ‘Orthodox’ Cyrillic for writing Slavic languages, typically committed to paper in ‘Catholic and Protestant’ Latin letters. Furthermore, Slavophones’ choosing Russian as their All-Slavic language could be suspected of disloyalty and even treason in their home countries outside Russia. Hence, the second edition of Gilferding’s book in 1892, at the height of the tsarist policy of Russification, did not evoke much interest, either. The brief flowering of pro-Russian Neo-Slavism in Austria-Hungary at the turn of the 20th century came to an end around 1910, while the outbreak of the Great War sounded the ideology’s final death knell (Vyšný 1977).

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  11 Meanwhile, Slavic nation-states were established in the Balkans, namely Serbia in 1804–1815 and Bulgaria in 1878, while the de facto independence of Montenegro was internationally recognized in 1878. Although they began as ethnoreligious polities, the influence of the successful model of ethnolinguistic nationalism, as exemplified by the Kingdom of Italy and the German Empire, led to the (gradual) adoption of this ideology in these three Slavophone Balkan nation-states (cf Bozeva-Abazi 2007; Malešević 2017). Bulgarian became the sole official and national language in Bulgaria,9 while the same role was played by Serbian in Montenegro and Serbia.10 In Austria-Hungary, the official, coofficial or auxiliary use of numerous Slavic languages in the Dual Monarchy’s regions became a norm that went hand in hand with the rise and spread of national movements as defined by these languages (cf Hroch 1985) and administratively and statistically accepted (and even encouraged) by the Habsburg administration (Stergar and Scheer 2018). These day-to-day practices of language use made the earlier popular concept of the single All-Slavic Einzelsprache obsolete. Without any overt reflection given to this process, the technology of writing and the mental technology of Einzelsprache had been applied for dividing the Slavic dialect continua into languages. Scholars and compilers of encyclopedias deemed the end products of this process – or the progressively increasing number of Slavic languages – as a reflection of the ‘centuries-old’ linguistic reality on the ground. Their monographs and such authoritative encyclopedias convinced the educated public to accept this interpretation, despite the fact that this or that Slavic language had been established and codified within readers’ lifetimes (cf Maxwell 2015b). In 1914, three Slavic languages (Bulgarian, Russian and Serbian) were in statelevel official use, while six (Croatian, Czech, Polish, Serbian,11 Slovenian and Ruthenian) were in sub-state-level official employment  – in total eight Slavic Einzelsprachen, because Serbian occurred in both groups. After the Great War, all these aforementioned languages became state languages, with the qualified exception of Ruthenian (Ukrainian), which was official in the short-lived independent Ukraine (1917–1921) (Moser 2016a: 482–485). In addition, the even more short-lived Belarusian People’s Republic (1918–1919) briefly catapulted the then biscriptal (Cyrillic and Latin alphabet–based) Belarusian to the status of state language (cf Michaluk 2010). Paradoxically, the total number of official Slavic languages simultaneously plummeted and increased.

Type of Language

Names

Number

State Languages Sub-state Languages

Bulgarian, Russian and Serbian Croatian, Czech (along with Moravian), Polish, Serbian, Slovenian, Ruthenian (Ukrainian)

3 6 (or 6.5?)

Total

Figure 1c The Slavic languages in 1914

8 (or 8.5?)

12  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe In Czechoslovakia, the binomial Czechoslovak was proclaimed the new nationstate’s official language. In practice, this language was construed as consisting of two varieties, namely Czech and Slovak (Kamusella 2007) (though in the interwar period some failed efforts were undertaken to meld Slovak with Czech in order to produce a ‘unified’ Czechoslovak language [cf Frinta 1950; Frinta 2019 (1922)]). It was then a well-known solution to the situation when proponents of two closely related languages competed for the official status for their pet choice. When Norway gained independence as a nation-state in 1905, Swedish was removed from official use, while Norwegian continued in this function, construed since 1885 as consisting of two equal varieties, namely Landsmål (Nynorsk, ‘New Norwegian’) and Riksmål (Bokmål ‘Book language’) (Hoel 2016: 331). Yugoslavia (or until 1929 the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians)12 followed this model as employed in Czechoslovakia, by adopting the trinomial Serbocroatoslovenian (‘Yugoslavian’) as its official language. In actual administrative practice, Serbocroatoslovenian was understood as comprising two varieties – that is, SerboCroatian and Slovenian.13 In turn, on account of the different scripts, Cyrillicbased Serbo-Croatian was commonly seen as ‘Serbian,’ while the Serbo-Croatian written down with the use of Latin letters was seen as ‘Croatian’ (Kamusella 2009: 217–239).14 Bulgarian remained the official language of Bulgaria, Polish became the official language of Poland, and Russian continued as the leading official language (of ‘interethnic communication’ [cf Kondakov 1976]) in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in the last polity, Ruthenian, firmly renamed as ‘Ukrainian,’ became the official language of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Cyrillic-based White Russian (Belarusian) of the White Russian (Belarusian) Soviet Socialist Republic15 (Martin 2001). These changes were to a degree contested in interwar Poland, where the five million Ukrainians constituted the largest minority, while, in addition, Belarusians numbered one million. Warsaw officially continued referring to the former and their language as ‘Ruthenian.’ Furthermore, 700,000 Belarusians and Ukrainians were classified as ‘Locals’ (Tutejsi), or ‘people with no national identity’ (cf Horak 1961; Labbé 2019a). From the purely legalistic point of view in 1930 there were five Slavic statelevel official languages (Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Polish, Serbocroatoslovenian, Russian) and two Slavic sub-state-level official languages (Ukrainian and White Russian), or in total seven Slavic Einzelsprachen. However, if all the sub-language varieties were taken into account (Czech, Slovak, Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian), the total number of the Slavic Einzelsprachen would go up to 11 or even 13. In the latter case, Serbo-Croatian is also seen as consisting of two separate sub-varieties, namely Croatian and Serbian. Obviously, those who saw Serbo-Croatian to be a single language did not see it as composed from Croatian and Serbian. However, in interwar Yugoslavia, all these views coexisted, championed by different scholars and political parties. Depending on which number of the Slavic Einzelsprachen in 1930 was adopted as valid, the number either went down by one in comparison to the eight Slavic Einzelsprachen in 1914 or went up by two. Humans and their groups can play with social reality, which, as a result, is made inconsistent or even illogical. But

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  13 Type of Language

Names

Number

State Languages

Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Polish, Serbocroatoslovenian, Russian Ukrainian, White Russian

5

Sub-state Languages Total

2 7

Figure 1d The Slavic languages in 1930 (View I) Type of Language

Names

State Languages

Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Polish, Serbocroatoslovenian, Russian Croatian, Czech, Serbian, Serbo-Croatian, Slovak, Slovenian, Ukrainian, White Russian

Sub-state Languages & Sub-language Varieties Total

Number 5 8 13

Figure 1e The Slavic languages in 1930 (View II)

obviously, humans and their groups again decide what counts as ‘logical’ or ‘consistent’ in social reality. There are no material (physical) curbs on defining and redefining concepts of this kind or on their actual application. The proverbial sky is the limit, or for that matter, human imagination and the brain’s biologically determined cognitive limits.

Vanishings and metamorphoses In 1943, during World War II, there were four (somewhat) independent Slavic states, namely Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia and the Soviet Union. Obviously, it is a bit of shorthand to dub all these four states as ‘Slavic.’ Substantial non-Slavic minorities resided in wartime Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovakia, be they Turks in the first country, Italians in the second or Germans and Hungarians in the last one. On the ideological plane, each of these three polities was defined, in agreement with ethnolinguistic nationalism, as a nation-state of this or that Slavic nation. However, from the ideological perspective of wartime Croatian nationalism, in order to draw a ‘racialized’ line of separation between the Croats and the Serbs, the former were proposed to stem from non-Slavic Iranic warriors and only the latter from Slavs (Bartulin 2014: 110–118). A similar story underpins the Bulgarian national master narrative, which to this day emphasizes the fact that the ancient Bulgars founded Bulgaria in the 7th century. However, for over a century, Bulgarian ideologues have also consistently chosen to gloss over the actually Turkic ethnicity and language of these ancient Bulgars for the sake of seamlessly conflating them with the Slavophone Bulgarians. Although, the Soviet Union was never defined in national terms, before the outbreak of World War II, Slavophones

14  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe (i.e., Russians, Ukrainians and White Russians) constituted almost four-fifths of the communist polity’s inhabitants (Perepis’ naseleniia SSSR (1939) 2019). In comparison to 1930, by 1943, the number of the Slavic state-level official languages had gone down from five (Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Polish, Serbocroatoslovenian and Russian) to four (Bulgarian, Croatian, Russian and Slovak). We could say that the number remained unchanged if the Soviet effort to separate Moldavian (Moldovan) from Romanian is taken into consideration. The 1938 replacement of the Latin alphabet with Cyrillic for writing and publishing in Moldavian was followed by the infusion of this language with numerous lexical and syntactical borrowings from Slavic (mainly Russian and Ukrainian).16 As a result, an official Soviet theory appeared that classified Moldavian as a Slavic, or at least Slavic-Romance, language. This theory was in use until the mid 1950s (Bruchis 1982: 71–116). However, only two Slavic languages survived from the interwar tally (Bulgarian and Russian), while two were abolished (Czechoslovak and Serbocroatoslovenian), one demoted to an auxiliary status (Polish), and two (re-)created (Croatian and Slovak). On the other hand, the number of Slavic substate-level official languages increased from two to five (Czech, Polish, Serbian, Ukrainian and White Russian). All of them were either employed alongside German in semi-autonomous territories directly incorporated into Germany or organized into occupation administrative units. In the former case, it was Czech in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and Polish and Ukrainian in the Generalgouvernement,17 while in the latter case, White Ruthenian (White Russian, Belarusian) in the Reichskommisariat Ostland, Ukrainian in the Reichskommisariat Ukraine, and Serbian in rump Serbia occupied by Germany (officially referred to as the Gebiet des Militärbefehlshabers in Serbien). In the Reichskommissariat Ostland, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish were also employed in a similar capacity, whereas Crimean Tatar and Polish were employed in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Across all these wartime units, Yiddish was used for publishing and administrative ends in thousands of Jewish ghettos (Megargee 2009-). All in all, in comparison with the interwar period, the total number of the statelevel Slavic Einzelsprachen remained ‘largely’ unchanged at four during the war, though the number of sub-state languages (and varieties) decreased from eight to five. But the seemingly bland picture of little or no change, as offered by pure statistics, conceals momentous upheavals in the field of language politics in German-dominated and -occupied Central Europe. The composite (pluricentric, composite, multi-variety) languages of Czechoslovak and Serbocroatoslovenian

Type of Language

Names

State Languages Sub-state Languages

Bulgarian, Croatian, Russian, Slovak Czech, Moldavian (Moldovan) Polish, Serbian, Ukrainian, White Russian

Total

Figure 1f The Slavic languages in 1943

Number 4 6 10

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  15 vanished from official use. The former was replaced by Czech and Slovak and the latter with Croatian and Serbian (during the war, Slovenian was not much employed in official use).18 In the wake of World War II, Czech and Slovak remained separate languages, interwar Czechoslovakism marked only in the constitutional concept of the Czechoslovak people, consisting of the Czech and Slovak ‘fraternal nations’ (Prohlášení 1948). On the other hand, Croatian and Serbian were melded back into Serbo-Croatian, though Slovenian was not compelled to rejoin the semire-created official language of postwar Yugoslavia; the concept of Serbocroatoslovenian was discarded. Czech and Polish regained their state-level official status in the refounded polities of Czechoslovakia and Poland, respectively. In addition, in 1944, a brand-new official Slavic language, Macedonian, was created from the ‘south Serbian dialect’ of interwar Yugoslavia’s official language Serbocroatoslovenian (Yugoslavian) for the postwar Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. During the war, Bulgaria annexed this Yugoslav region and proclaimed Bulgarian as its official language, because in Sofia’s view, the region’s population spoke none other than a ‘western dialect’ of the Bulgarian language. Hence, the creation of Macedonian, on the one hand, acknowledged the ethnolinguistic difference of this region vis-à-vis the rest of postwar Yugoslavia and on the other hand decisively distanced it from Bulgaria19 (Ahrens 2007: 386; Kamusella 2009: 246–254). During the Cold War period, the number of the Slavic state-level official languages went up by two, from four (Bulgarian, Croatian, Russian and Slovak) in 1943 to six (Bulgarian, Czech, Polish, Serbo-Croatian, Slovak and Russian) in 1945. Interestingly, the position of Slovak remained weaker vis-à-vis Czech. Before 1969, the latter language was employed in official capacity across the entirety of Czechoslovakia, while the use of Slovak was largely limited to Slovakia. Following the subsequent genuine federalization of the country, both languages were used equitably across all of Czechoslovakia in all spheres of public life.20 The number of the Slavic sub-state-level official languages was reduced from five (Czech, Polish, Serbian, Ukrainian and White Russian) in 1943 to four (Macedonian, Ukrainian, White Russian and Slovenian) in 1945, or remained unchanged if the Soviet theory that Moldavian is a Slavic language is accepted. Czech and Polish regained their status as state languages, while Slovenian was acknowledged as official in communist Yugoslavia’s Republic of Slovenia. Again, despite all the political and language changes, the total number of the Slavic Einzelsprachen in the postwar period remained ‘largely’ unchanged at ten. Significantly, a single pluricentric language of Serbo-Croatian was reintroduced to the tally. The re-establishment of Soviet control over the western parts of the Soviet Union occupied during the war by Germany seemingly reinstated there these areas’ pre-1941 administrative shape. Hence, from the observation vantage point of language politics, Russian was the communist polity’s official language, alongside White Russian (Belarusian) and Ukrainian as official languages in the White Russian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, respectively. However, when the United Nations Organization was founded in

16  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe Type of Language

Names

State Languages

Bulgarian, Czech, Polish, SerboCroatian, Slovak, Russian Macedonian, Moldavian (Moldovan), Slovenian, Ukrainian, White Russian

Sub-state Languages Total

Number 6 5 11

Figure 1g The Slavic languages in 1945

1945, not only the Soviet Union but also the White Russian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR signed the organization’s founding charter (Charter 2017). This tacit recognition of both Soviet republics as bona fide states was completely tactical, since it gave the Kremlin three seats in the UN General Assembly. Obviously, all administrative business, as conducted by the three Soviet representatives, was done invariably in Russian. But from a formal point of view, though not in actual use at the UN, White Russian and Ukrainian became almost state languages, as both union republics were semi-recognized as almost states at the UN (Permanent 2017; Subtelny 2000: 487). Another complication was the language policy of communist Yugoslavia. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was the Balkan country’s initial model, in Yugoslavia all the languages of the country’s union republics were employed at the state-level (including diplomacy), namely Macedonian, Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian (Constitution 1946: Art 65). These languages of state-wide administration were explicitly enumerated in the 1963 Yugoslav Constitution, including the two alternative names for Serbo-Croatian – that is, Croato-Serbian and SerboCroatian (Constitution 1963: Art 131). The tacit understanding was that the former label referred to the Latin alphabet–based Serbo-Croatian (or ‘Croatian’) and the latter to the Serbo-Croatian written in Cyrillic (or ‘Serbian’). However, the same constitution stressed that Serbo-Croatian was the sole language of command in the country’s army (Constitution 1963: Art 42). The 1974 Constitution reconfirmed this arrangement, but with some qualifications and with the addition of Albanian and Hungarian to the list of Yugoslavia’s state languages (Ustav 1974: Art 269). The matter of the army’s language of command was made less equivocal by adding that one of the country’s languages would be used. In practice, it meant none other than Serbo-Croatian, though some limited use of other languages for training purposes was finally allowed (Gabrič 2016: 228; Ustav 1974: Art 243). In addition, this document explicitly confirmed that all Yugoslavia’s state languages are equal in diplomatic use (Ustav 1974: 271). In the wake of the 1974 Constitution, the synonymous monikers for Serbo-Croatian proliferated, including the most multi-variant and inclusive quadrinomial name of ‘Serbocroatian/Croatoserbian, Croatian or Serbian.’ At the level of the four union republics where Serbo-Croatian was official (Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia) politicians and linguists developed additional ‘scientific’ names for

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  17 this language as employed in these four republics, taking care not to exclude Bosnia and Montenegro from having a stake in this multi-name (polynomial) Serbo-Croatian. Hence, speaking of the Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian ‘standard language varieties’ (standardnojezički izraz) became popular. Obviously, some saw these varieties as separate languages. This unofficial view coexisted with the official legislation on federal Yugoslavia’s languages (Alexander 2013: 403; Brozović and Ivić 1988; Jahić 1999: 37; Jaroszewicz 2006: 78–128; Spagińska-Pruszak 1997: 59). From the perspective of the White Russian and Ukrainian Soviet republics’ enjoying their own state seats in the UN, alongside the Soviet Union, and given that Macedonian and Slovenian were constitutionally equal state languages vis-à-vis Serbo-Croatian in Yugoslavia, during the Cold War the number of (somewhat) acknowledged Slavic state languages arguably grew to ten (Bulgarian, Czech, Macedonian, Polish, Serbo-Croatian, Slovak, Slovenian, Russian, Ukrainian and White Russian [Belarusian]). Formally all the recognized Slavic languages achieved equal status of official state languages, though in reality in Yugoslavia, Serbo-Croatian was always a bit more ‘official’ than Macedonian or Slovenian, while the use of Ukrainian and White Russian was actively limited so that Russian, as the Soviet people’s ‘communist and internationalist language’ could eventually replace all other languages across the Soviet Union (cf Beloded 1962, Beloded et al. 1976; Dzyuba 1974; Grenoble 2003: 87–88). On the other hand, in Yugoslavia, the multiplication of alternative names for Serbo-Croatian, coupled with the development of the new category of standard language variety, introduced the republican versions of Serbo-Croatian. Atypically, these de facto sub-state languages could be employed, at any user’s discretion, as ‘Serbo-Croatian’ across Yugoslavia and in international use. Given these varieties, the overall number of the de facto Slavic languages arguably grew to 14 (cf Figure 1h).

Breakups After the fall of communism in 1989, followed by the breakups of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the number of the actual (i.e.,

Type of Language

Names

Number

State Languages

Bulgarian, Czech, Macedonian Polish, SerboCroatian (Serbocroatian/Croatoserbian, Croatian or Serbian), Slovak, Slovenian, Russian, Ukrainian, White Russian

10

Sub-state Languages Standard Language Varieties Total

Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, Serbian

Figure 1h The Slavic languages during the Cold War

0 4 14

18  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe Type of Language

Names

State Languages

Bulgarian, Czech, Polish, Serbo-Croatian (Serbocroatian/Croatoserbian, Croatian or Serbian), Slovak, Russian

Sub-state Languages Standard Language Varieties Total

Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, Serbian

Number 6 0 4 10

Figure 1i The Slavic languages used as languages of command in state armies during the Cold War

employed in a given state’s army [cf Figure 1i and Figure 1j]) Slavic state-level official languages doubled from six (Bulgarian, Czech, Polish, Serbo-Croatian, Slovak and Russian) during the communist times to 13 (Belarusian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian) at the present moment (2017). Apparently, to a degree, Macedonian and Slovenian were employed in Yugoslavia’s army, as were Slovak in the Czechoslovak army and White Russian (Belarusian) and Ukrainian in the Soviet Army. But the use of these then ‘regional’ or ‘republican’ languages was limited to respective subdivisions of these armies, and they had no place at the top level of the army staff. Hence, if the formal recognition of Ukrainian and White Russian (Belarusian) vis-à-vis Russian in the Soviet Union is taken into consideration, alongside the actual state-level employment of Macedonian and Slovenian in Yugoslavia, side by side with Serbo-Croatian (Figure 1h), then nothing really changed. All the Slavic sub-state-level official languages of the communist period (Macedonian, Slovenian, Ukrainian and White Russian) became official ones in independent states (Belarus, Macedonia, Slovenia and Ukraine). Independent Belarus demanded that its official language be known as Belarusian, rather than translated or semi-transliterated from the Russian name of this language Belorusskii into English, as ‘White Russian’ or ‘B(y)elorussian,’ respectively (Silitski and Zaprudnik 2010: 31). However, an added complication in postcommunist Belarus is the 1995 adoption of Russian as an equal co-official language. As a result, in reality, Russian was and continues to be the language of command in the Belarusian army21 (Viačorka 2017). Last but not least, Yugoslavia’s multi-name pluricentric official language of Serbo-Croatian was replaced by the ‘monocentric’ languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian (Bugarski 2018; Greenberg 2004). Vantages of observation and assumptions adopted result in radically different interpretations of what happened. This clearly shows that languages are part and parcel of social reality solely created and maintained by humans and their groups. Social reality fully depends on human will alone. Unsurprisingly, different individuals and human groups vary in their views on how the linguistic should be apportioned among languages and what constitutes a ‘proper language’ (Einzelsprache).

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  19 Type of Language

Names

Number

State Languages

Belarusian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Polish, Serbian, Russian, Slovak, Slovenian, Ukrainian None

13

Sub-state Languages Total

0 13

Figure 1j The Slavic languages in 2017: An etic, or outside, perspective – as seen by institutional and academic observers outside Central Europe

From the perspective of the political aspirations of ethnolinguistic nationalism, this ideology’s holy grail was finally achieved. Each recognized Slavic nation received its own nation-state. Similarly, each Slavic nation-state was conferred with its own specific and unshared Slavic language. By the same token, each Slavic language with an official status to ‘its soul’ – be it at the level of state or in some sub-state unit – gained ‘its own’ nation, complete with the nation-state.22 In line with the hardly ever commented-on formula that equates language (Einzelsprache) with nation and state (language = nation = state), the radical reordering of the political (and social) shape of Central Europe was at last finished (cf Kamusella 2017a). Or was it? A trouble is that this completed order of ethnolinguistic nation-states looks different from the emic perspective, meaning that of the actors concerned, or the aforementioned ethnolinguistic nation-states.23 For instance, Bulgaria recognizes Macedonia as a state, but not the Macedonian language or nation. In this view, Macedonian is another literary standard of the Bulgarian language, which contains two ‘standard (literary) varieties’ (Bulgarian and Macedonian) (Edinstvoto 1978: 4; Kamusella 2009: 246–254; Mahon 1998; Stamatoski 2001: 149–156). In the case of restive Russia in the early 21st century, an old imperial opinion has been revived: Belarusian and Ukrainian are not ‘real languages’ but ‘rural’ or ‘artificial’ varieties of the (Great) Russian language (Farmer 1978: 126; Kamusella 2009: 158–179). Although at present most Ukrainians disagree with this opinion, many Belarusians seem to concur (Viačorka 2017). The application of the labels ‘language’ and ‘dialect (variety)’ to the linguistic reality on the ground is arbitrary, dictated not by linguistic research and findings but by users’ and outside observers’ needs, beliefs and perceptions.24 From the Serbian perspective, Montenegrin is a variety of Serbian, and this view is quite widespread among the speakers of the post-Serbo-Croatian languages, including quite a few Montenegrins (Lakić 2013: 152). Also, some Croatians see Bosnian as a variety of Croatian, while some Serbs see it as a variety of Serbian – especially those Serbs who live in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska.25 However, the majority of Croatians and Serbs do not dispute the split of Yugoslavia’s pluricentric official

20  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe language of Serbo-Croatian. This split suits their shared vision of the ‘normal’ polity as an ethnolinguistic nation-state, or a state for the speakers of a single, unique and unshared language (Einzelsprache), who in turn are seen to constitute a ‘proper’ (or, even more strongly, ‘real’ – i.e., ethnolinguistic) nation (cf Požgaj Hadži 2013). From this normative perspective of ethnolinguistic nationalism, a polity with a people speaking a language that is official in another state cannot be a ‘proper (real) nation-state,’ and this people cannot be a ‘proper (real) nation.’ Ethnolinguistic nationalism, encapsulated in the formula language = nation = state (also known as the normative isomorphism, or the tight spatial-cum-ideological overlapping of these three elements [Kamusella 2017a]), continues to be the norm of statehood construction, legitimization and maintenance across Central Europe. Hence, many Central Europeans traveling abroad encounter an epistemic problem when faced with the dilemma of the Austrian or US nation, which is not defined through any national language (cf Reginek 1950: 82). Usually, such inquisitive Central European travelers opine that the former state’s inhabitants ‘in reality’ must be Germans (part of the German nation) (cf Wątor 1993: 187), and they waver whether anyone can at all to talk of ‘proper’ (i.e., ethnolinguistic) nations outside Europe (cf Przegląd 2003: 95). As a result, the normative employment of ethnolinguistic nationalism for nation and state building in Central Europe is also steeped in strongly normative Eurocentrism. This Eurocentrism is geared toward Central European political views, thus allowing for dismissing some Western European nation-states as ‘artificial,’ be it Austria and its sharing its nationalcum-official language with Germany or the officially multilingual nation-states of Belgium, Luxembourg or Switzerland (cf Nowak 1985: 135). With time, when accepted and maintained for several generations, scholarly conceptualizations and assumptions on the linguistic appear to be ‘reality.’ Observers often mistakenly see this reality as a product of nature, whereas it is a result of human creativity and ingenuity. Thus, such a ‘linguistic reality’ is part of social reality, generated and maintained by humans and their groups (cf Maxwell 2006; Preston 1989). The scholarly units for analyzing the linguistic happen to be Einzelsprachen in Europe (or, more broadly, in the West). As in the case of other elements of social reality, there are no detectors or measuring instruments that would allow humans to see, touch, smell, taste, taste or otherwise perceive

Type of Language

Names

‘Real Languages’

Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian Belarusian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Ukrainian

Sub-language Varieties Total

Figure 1k The Slavic languages in 2017: An emic perspective26

Number 8 5 13

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  21 and record Einzelsprachen as phenomena in their own right.27 The social reality is inaccessible to senses. Only some can ‘see’ (or ‘get’) it – those who are in the know. They perceive social reality (Einzelsprachen included) in their ‘mind’s eye,’ meaning that the entirety of social reality is stored in the brain (in neural configurations responsible for memory and information retrieval). An element of social reality can exist ‘more’ or ‘less,’ depending on how many people share the idea of this element in their brains and act as if this element had existed in the material reality (Kamusella 2017c). Einzelsprachen have been made and remade with the technique of writing into seemingly ‘tangible objects,’ their tangibility ‘proven’ with the help of such props as dictionaries and grammars and ‘proven’ more mundanely by shop signs and mass-produced printed matter (books, newspapers, or advertizing leaflets). States that by definition gather a large number of people under the rule of a single government have employed writing for administration since the emergence of the first polities thousands of years ago. In Europe, states adopted as official languages those that were ‘appropriately’ developed in line with the scholarly concept of Einzelsprache. And, as mentioned earlier, the ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism, beginning after the Great War, made the Einzelsprache – construed as the unshared and unique national language – into the basis of statehood across Central Europe. The actual linking of the population (‘nation’) to ‘its’ state through the national Einzelsprache was effected through compulsory universal elementary education, its paramount goal to make all the target population uniformly (homogenously) literate in ‘its own’ national Einzelsprache. Should such a policy be successfully maintained for a couple of generations, it is quick to yield an actual overlapping of the state frontier with the rapidly coalescing language boundary (cf Judson 2006). Obviously, the process of building a language boundary alongside a pre-existing administrative or political frontier is as arbitrary as the destruction of such political frontiers and putting new ones where – according to national activists – a true language boundary is ‘really’ located (cf Maxwell 2006; Zajc 2006). This phenomenon of ‘fitting’ political frontiers to language boundaries, when successful, ‘proves’ the normative belief (in ethnolinguistic nationalism), in which children are indoctrinated at school, that abroad people ‘naturally’ speak and write other (‘foreign’) languages, while in ‘our homeland’ (nation-state) ‘all of us’ (members of the nation) speak and write the same unique and unshared national Einzelsprache – ‘our mother tongue.’ The problem is that in different regions (administrative units) of a given nationstate, these regions’ inhabitants may speak and (even) write the national Einzelsprache differently. Or are these variants separate Einzelsprachen? Scholars had to come to politicians’ succor in order to deal with this nagging problem. And they have resolved it in an ‘appropriately national manner,’ having been educated by and remaining in the employ of national universities run and financed by their nation-state. To transcend Central Europe’s social reality of nations, nation-states and unique and unshared national Einzelsprachen is difficult (if not entirely impossible) if one was born to and raised in such a social reality. For this purpose, one

22  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe needs significant exposure to a radically different sort of social reality, where an Einzelsprache does not determine people’s nationality; otherwise, the linguistic may be rationalized (construed) through a different concept (or a set of concepts) than that of Einzelsprache. Usually, such an opportunity arises when one attends university or finds employment outside Central Europe. Many regions in European states used to be polities in their own right in the past. Their frontiers and administrative institutions encouraged and facilitated a higher level of interaction among a given region’s inhabitants than with the populations living in the neighboring regions. Even after the founding of larger (‘modern’) states, regions (now demoted to the rank of administrative units or even officially erased) continued to function in a similar manner, wider social and spatial mobility largely limited to the narrow economic and political elite. Because of the institution of serfdom, in Central Europe this situation of generalized immobility lasted until the mid 19th century in the Austrian Empire and Prussia and until World War I in the European section of the Russian Empire (cf Gellner 1983: 10). Nationally minded scholars ‘explained away’ region-based linguistic differentiation by proposing that such regional language varieties were nothing more than ‘dialects’ that ‘naturally belonged to’ the national Einzelsprache (cf Selver 1919: x). The temporal illogicity of this assumption hardly disturbed anyone: more often than not, any regional dialect predates a given national Einzelsprache. The national language – as standardized through dictionaries, grammars and rulebooks of correct spelling – is a recent invention; the majority of Central Europe’s standard Einzelsprachen were created only during the past two centuries. However, the national normative principle of equating language with nation and state tends to quell any doubts regarding why dialects have to belong to a language (and not the other way around). In this line of thinking, recognizing dialects as Einzelsprachen in their own right would be tantamount to national treason, because ethnolinguistic nationalism equates languages with nations (cf Kublik 2011; Mirak 1983; Skobrtal 2010; Suleiman 2004: 80). Ergo, according to this ideology, any dialect officially elevated to the status of Einzelsprache would confer on its speakers the political status of nation, complete with the right to independence (i.e., the wilsonian principle of national self-determination). To meet some vocal groups’ demands for the officially recognized ‘status of language (Einzelsprache)’ for their ‘languages’ (from these groups’ emic perspective) or ‘dialects’ (from the etic perspective of their states of residence), legislators constantly come up with novel labels, such as ‘lesser-used language,’ ‘regional language,’ ‘minority language’ or ‘historical variety of the national language.’ These labels always fall short of the simple term language, which in Central Europe entails certain political rights and privileges, as the term nation does elsewhere. Nationalism, like many other ideologies, is a modern civic religion without a god. Within the framework of social reality, which solely depends on human will, a widely shared belief (‘faith’) counts for more than the observable reality on the ground, or logical thinking. This belief is (social) reality (cf Andreski 1972).

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  23

Classifying Slavic languages For the sake of this book, such an observable ‘primary sociolinguistic reality on the ground’ is defined in the terms of ‘dialect continua.’ And yes, the term dialect continuum is a scholarly concept. However, in contrast to the normative concept of Einzelsprache, dialect continuum is a descriptive term. Scholars use descriptive concepts to describe the (social) reality as it is (or appears to be) in the moment of observation, while normative terms are employed for changing social reality – as ‘it should be’ – in accordance with this or that assumption, ideology or goal (i.e., ‘norm’) (cf Brubaker 2013). The usual definition of dialect continuum is a chain of language varieties (‘dialects,’ ‘sub-dialects’) changing gradually from village to village, from town to town, from region to region across an extensive swath of territory, with a good degree of mutual comprehensibility preserved from one end of this continuum to the other28 (cf Dialect Continuum 2019; Dixon 1997: 15–27; Finkelberg 1994; Hamed 2005; Heeringa and Nerbonne 2002; Lundberg 2003; Nábělková 2016; Pavić 2011; Trudgill 2003: 35–36; Zaborski 1991). From the perspective of the Slavic Einzelsprachen, linguists broadly agree that nowadays there are two Slavic dialect continua, namely North and South (cf Kamusella, Nomachi and Gibson 2016). However, the earlier widespread view of the triple division of Slavic languages not moored in the two extant Slavic dialect continua still persists in popular use, while a variety of widely differing classifying schemes for Slavic Einzelsprachen were proposed during the long 19th century, before the Great War (cf Kamusella 2005). The North Slavic dialect continuum extends from eastern Germany (Lusatia) to easternmost Russia (Vladivostok), whereas the South Slavic dialect continuum cuts across the Balkan Peninsula from the Adriatic port of Trieste in the northeasternmost Italy to the Black Sea port of Varna in eastern Bulgaria. These two Slavic dialect continua used to be a single continuum a millennium ago. At the turn of the 10th century, the Kingdom of Hungary was established by the Finno-Ugric-speaking Magyars (Hungarians). At the end of the same century, the Germanicphone Bavarians established an Eastern March (or today’s Austria). Later, during the 14th and 15th centuries, in the steppe territories between the rivers Tisza and Dniester, previously dominated by Turkic-speaking nomads (Cumans and Pechenegs), the Romancephone principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia (today’s Romania and Moldova) were founded. They brushed sides with Hungary’s Transylvania with its Germanic, Finno-Ugric and Romance speakers. In this way, the eastward extension of the Germanic dialect continuum, the introduction of the Finno-Ugric dialect continuum in Pannonia, and the emergence of the East Romance dialect continuum ‘cut across’ the previously single Slavic dialect continuum, thus producing the present-day two separate North and South Slavic dialect continua. Obviously, to a degree, this is a simplification of much-more-complicated political, demographic and linguistic processes. For the sake of brevity and clarity, this story disregards the phenomena of multilingualism, polyglossia, multiscriptalism, lingua francas and the like, which prevailed in Central Europe until the mid 20th century (cf Curta 2004; Liszka 1996), when the use of nationalism for state and

24  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe nation building stringently enforced the norm of monolingualism in the national Einzelsprache within a given nation-state. As a result, large chunks of Central Europe’s various dialect continua were entirely replaced by large national blocks of homogenous monolingualism, which now radically terminate at the state frontier, doubling as an equally ‘thin and exact’ language boundary. Such a language boundary and state frontier bundled together provide the traveler with the earlier unheard-of experience of a ‘quantum leap’ from the area of one national Einzelsprache to another, when walking or driving through a border crossing. This is the ideal (‘normal’) state of social reality in Central Europe as sought in accordance with the tenets of ethnolinguistic nationalism. This ideal was achieved most perfectly there, where ethnically and linguistically ‘incorrect’ populations were wholesale expelled or exterminated. But within a dialect continuum, when the state frontier is porous, the tendency is to recreate a dialect chain through sustained everyday commercial and eventually personal contacts conducted across the state border. Hence, the tight shutting of the frontiers among the Soviet bloc’s states and between this bloc and the rest of the world preserved and deepened homogenous national monolingualism, so much desired by ethnolinguistic nationalists (then known as national communists). Totalitarianism turned out to be the only way to achieve these onerous socio-political goals of the ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism. Perhaps that is an explanation of the current nationalist backlash in Central European nation-states against the European Union (cf Rovny 2016; Zgut and Przybylski 2017). The liquidation of physical frontiers and border checks among the member states allows for the free flow of people, goods, services and capital. The ‘antinational menace’ of multilingualism, lingua francas and ‘dreadful’ dialect chains is back. The imagining and actual demographic reshaping of the primary sociolinguistic reality on the ground divided the aforementioned two Slavic dialect continua into discrete dialects (cf Maxwell 2006) and into even-more-discrete national Einzelsprachen (cf Kamusella 2009). Scholars were tasked with the former and politicians (national activists) with the latter. Both have worked hand in hand, scholars employed at state universities are under politicians’ control. And both elite groups were largely united in the shared conviction that their ‘national duty’ was to further a given ethnolinguistic nationalism’s goals. What is more, in Central Europe scholars and politicians often change places, their qualification for both research and governance being their ‘patriotic’ espousal of the ‘scientific’ belief that languages are a product of nature and thus ‘naturally’ spawn nations that are ‘true,’ not ‘artificial (like those in Western Europe)’ (cf Kamusella 2008). The process of splitting the two Slavic dialect continua into dialects and (standard) languages intensified during the past two centuries.29 It coincided with the emergence of ethnolinguistic nationalism in the 19th century across Central Europe and the post-1918 acceptance of it as the sole accepted ideology of statehood building and legitimization. And finally, this splitting of the Slavic dialect continua was sealed by the replacement of Central Europe’s nonnational polities with ethnolinguistically defined nation-states, especially from 1918 through the early 21st century.

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  25 Cutting the North and South Slavic dialect continua into dialects and standard (national) languages (Einzelsprachen) (Kamusella 2001, 2004a) has been a messy process. First of all, making millions believe that they constitute a nation speaking the same national language takes two or three generations and requires substantial financial outlays for instruments of enforcement of this idea, be it compulsory universal education, ubiquitous bureaucracy or heavily subsidized mass publishing (cf Hroch 1994). Second, until 1918 nonnational, anational and antinational politicians and scholars time and again successfully opposed national projects pursued by their national-minded colleagues. Third, scholars and politicians supporting one national project quite frequently came into conflict with their counterparts in support of another. Fourth, the destruction of successfully established nation-states required their replacement with another set of ethnolinguistic national polities, entailing the rewriting of national histories and refitting new nation-states to equally new Einzelsprachen and dialects. Fifth, observers from outside Central Europe (scholars and politicians) may differently reinterpret emic Central European views and opinions on the region’s nations, nation-states and Einzelsprachen. Obviously, such etic views of outside observers could be disregarded, but not that easily if a given external politician or scholar came from a ‘great power’ that happened to (co-)decide on the political shape of Central Europe. Alexander Maxwell (2015b) presented a detailed mixture of etic views and emic views on the existence (or not) of Central Europe’s 20-odd most important Slavic Einzelsprachen, taken from over 130 authoritative sources, published between 1765 and 2000. (The alluded ‘importance’ of these Einzelsprachen derives alone from the fact that these authoritative publications from the past two and a half centuries decided to include these languages and disregard others.) Building on this methodology, though in a more schematic and heuristic fashion, I next present a table showing how scholars split the two Slavic dialect continua into dialects and how, on this basis, politicians and scholars came up with varying sets of Einzelsprachen correlated with this or that dialect (Figure 1m). Obviously, to a degree, it is a simplification that arbitrarily – though for the sake of analytical clarity – isolates these two Slavic dialect continua from the neighboring non-Slavic continua, thus disregarding language forms that straddle noncognate dialect continua, thus constituting ‘linguistic areas’ (Sprachbunden) (cf Dahl and Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2001; Décsy 1973; Gibson 2016: 59–63; Kamusella 2014b). Both tables (or rather tables-cum-diagrams) focus mainly on the past two centuries, with some limited forays into the more distant past for illustrative and comparative purposes. The size of a given cell in the table roughly reflects the relative geographical location of a given dialect or Einzelsprache within a given dialect continuum. For this purpose, some rows with Einzelsprachen in a given period feature vertical or horizontal sub-cells. In addition, a couple of rows are given with italicized information on religions and scripts. This illustrates how the formation of some dialects and Einzelsprachen highly depended on pre-existing confessional and scriptal divisions. First, the table on the South Slavic dialect continuum is given (Figure 1m), followed by another on the North Slavic dialect

26  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe continuum (Figure 1o). I reversed the usual order of giving information on both Slavic dialect continua, to show how equally arbitrary is the tacit norm of ordering information in the terms of geographic cardinal directions or from North to South and from West to East. This rarely commented-upon norm emulates the act of reading in European culture (e.g., in Greek, Latin or Cyrillic letters) – that is, from left to right and from the top of the page down. Sorting and ordering conventions, as accepted nowadays in the West, follow this norm, which in addition was spatialized. In European cartography, since the early modern period, the convention emerged to associate the cardinal directions of north and south with the top and bottom of a page (map), respectively, and those of west and east with the page’s left and right sides, also respectively. But what can be said about the pre-10th-century single Slavic dialect continuum? I decided to develop a highly schematic table (Figure 2q) on this pre-divided single continuum, because so many of Central Europe’s national and Einzelsprache projects claim direct descent from this distant and poorly documented past, including its polities and languages. Interestingly, apparently the only time when the Slavic dialect continuum coincided with a single polity was in the non-Slavic Avar Khanate between the 6th and the 8th centuries. Non-Slavic Avar steppe nomads (of an uncertain ethnicity) ruled over the predominantly Slavophone population. The Avar elite probably instituted Slavic as the Khaganate’s lingua franca, which led to the spread of this language wherever the Avars managed to expand their rule (Curta 2004). After the downfall of the Avar Khaganate, the Slavic polity of Greater Moravia was established in its place. In the 860s, the Moravians accepted Christianity from the (East) Roman Empire (Byzantium), which came in package with the technology of writing. (Common) Slavic committed to parchment

Figure 1.l The South Slavic dialect continuum (Južnoslovenski 2018)

Štokavian Macedonian/Western Bulgarian dialects

(Common) Slavic: Lingua Franca of the Avar Khaganate (Old Church) Slavonic Glagolitic and Cyrillic Christianity Emperor Charles IV’s and Tsar Emperor Dušan’s ‘Our Slavic language’ Illyrian (Ljudevit Gaj’s project of an All-South Slavic language) Slovenian Serbo-Croatian Serbian Slovenian Serbo-Croatian Bosnian Serbian Slovenian Serbo-Croatian Serbian Catholicism and Protestantism Catholicism, Islam and Orthodoxy Orthodoxy Latin Latin, Arabic and Cyrillic Cyrillic Slovenian Croatian Serbian Serbocroatoslovenian (‘Yugoslav’) Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism, Orthodoxy Cyrillic, Latin, and some Arabic Slovenian Croatian Serbian Slovenian Serbo-Croatian Macedonian Slovenian Croatian Bosnian Serbian Macedonian Montenegrin Latin Cyrillic and Cyrillic Latin

Čakavian

Eastern Bulgarian dialects

Bulgarian Bulgarian Bulgarian Orthodoxy and Islam Cyrillic Bulgarian Bulgarian Orthodoxy and Islam Cyrillic Bulgarian Bulgarian Bulgarian

Eastern South Slavic Transitional Torlakian

Figure 1m Emic efforts and dialectology, or the South Slavic dialect continuum mainly divided along dialects and Einzelsprachen during the past two centuries

Script

7th c. 10th c. Script Religion 1355 1835 1880 1890 1910 Religion Script 1915 1921 Religion Script 1942 1944 2007

Slovenian dialects

Dialectology Western South Slavic 19th–21st c. Kajkavian

South Slavic Dialect Continuum

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  27

28  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe

Figure 1n The North Slavic dialect continuum (North 2017)

yielded the Einzelsprache of (Old Church) Slavonic initially written in Glagolitic, though it was soon to be replaced with Cyrillic. Although the number of polities created and governed by Slavic elites increased, Slavonic remained the sole (All-) Slavic Einzelsprache until the emergence of Cyrillic-based Ruthenian and Latin script–based Bohemian (Czech), during the 14th and 15th centuries. The following table (Figure 1q) on the single Slavic dialect continuum, from the historic perspective, connects the two previous tables on the present-day two Slavic dialect continua. Figures 1m, 1p and 1q show how scholars and politicians divided the Slavic dialect continua into dialects and Einzelsprachen in conjunction with the less or more responsive target populations (cf Haugen 1966b; Kloss 1967; Preston 1989). The question then arises how this division was effected. What were the means

Kashubian Polish dialects Silesian

Belarusian dialects Ukrainian Northern dialects

East Slavic

(Church) Slavonic Russian Cyrillic

(Church) Slavonic Orthodoxy

(Church) Slavonic

(Church) Slavonic

Southern

Russian Northern dialects Central

Figure 1o Emic efforts and dialectology, or the North Slavic dialect continuum divided mainly along dialects and Einzelsprachen, during the past two centuries

Script 18th c. 1810 Script 1835 1869

7th c. 10th c. Religion Script 13th c. Script 1355 15th c. Religion Script 16th c. Religion

West Slavic

Czech-Slovak Czech dialects

Lechitic

Slovak Southwestern dialects Southeastern (Common) Slavic: Lingua Franca of the Avar Khaganate (Old Church) Slavonic Christianity and Indigenous (Non-Scriptural) Religions Glagolitic (Church) Slavonic Ruthenian Cyrillic (and some Glagolitic and Latin) Emperor Charles IV’s and Tsar Emperor Dušan’s ‘Our Slavic language’ Bohemian (Czech) Ruthenian Catholicism Orthodoxy Latin Cyrillic Bohemian (Czech) Polish Ruthenian Catholicism and Protestantism Uniatism (Greek Catholicism) and Protestantism Latin Cyrillic Polish Polish Latin Czechoslovak Polish Russian Lower Kashubian Mazurian Polish Russian Sorbian Upper Czech Moravian Slovak Sorbian

Dialectology 19th–21st c. Sorbian

North Slavic Dialect Continuum

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  29

Lower Sorbian

1923

Latin

Figure 1o (Continued)

Catholicism, Protestantism and Atheism

Script

Silesian

Religion

Upper Sorbian

Kashubian Czech

Polish

Czech

Lower Sorbian

Upper Sorbian

1991

Lower Sorbian

Polish

Latin

Script

Czech

Catholicism, Protestantism and Atheism

Upper Sorbian

Religion

Polish

Lower Sorbian

Slovak

1950

2001

Slovak

Mazurian

Moravian

Rusyn

Czechoslovak

Czech

Polish

Moravian

Czech

Kashubian Wasserpolnisch (Silesian)

1941

Upper Sorbian

Latin

Upper Sorbian

Lower Sorbian

North Slavic Dialect Continuum

Script

1905

Slovak

Slovak

Slovak

Polish

Polish

Cyrillic

Orthodoxy, Greek Catholicism (Uniatism) and Atheism

Ukrainian

Belarusian

Ukrainian

Belarusian

Cyrillic

Atheism and Orthodoxy

Ukrainian

White Russian (Belarusian)

Ukrainian

White Ruthenian (Belarusian)

Russian

Russian

Russian

Russian

Little Russian (Ukrainian)

Rusyn

White Russian (Belarusian) Russian

Ruthenian (Ukrainian)

Cyrillic

White Russian (Belarusian) Russian Little Russian (Ukrainian)

White Ruthenian (Belarusian)

Cyrillic and Latin

Little Ruthenian (Ukrainian) Rusyn

30  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  31

Figure 1p The historic All-Slavic dialect continuum, circa 6th century (Slavic Distribution 2017)

Period

Single Slavic dialect continuum

7th–8th c. (Common) Slavic Samo’s State, 623–658 (NB: oral) Avar Khaganate, 567–796 Bulgarian Khanate (Empire), 681–1018 9th c. (Common) Slavic Greater Moravia, 831–906 Rus’ Khaganate, 860s–988 (NB: oral) Bulgarian Khanate (Empire) 9th c. (Old Church) Glagolitic 863–885 Greater Moravia Slavonic (NB: Cyrillic 893–1018 Bulgarian Empire written) 988–1240 (Kyivan) Rus’ Figure 1q The historic single All-Slavic dialect continuum and Einzelsprachen

employed to achieve this goal of altering the perception, uses and actual functioning of the primary sociolinguistic reality on the ground so that it would conform with subsequent sets of normative ideas on how ‘proper’ social reality should look. In Figure 1r, I dub these means ‘filters-cum-shapers.’ When they are in the filtering mode, the function is to pre-select these elements of a dialect continuum that best suit the purpose of molding an Einzelsprache in the socio-political

32  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe context of a given polity at a certain time. On the other hand, the ‘shaping’ function comes to the fore when a means is employed to actively overhaul a piece of a dialect continuum, such as by ‘leveling dialectal differences’, so that a chain of dialects is replaced with homogenous monolingualism in an Einzelsprache (cf International 2009). These ‘filters-cum-shapers’ can come in the form of Technological developments and Scholarly concepts, which become a basis for formulating Ideologically justified norms, which then are implemented by a Political decision. Writing was a fundamental Technology that enabled the emergence of Einzelsprachen, but they would have never come about without Scholars’ defining what the Einzelsprache is about. Soon it turned out that the Technology of writing encased in the Scholarly unit of Einzelsprache allowed for the rise of vast polities and empires (Political developments). Religion provided Ideological rationalization of why people who happen to be rulers should have the right to govern. And during the past two centuries, mass publishing (Technology, again) in an Einzelsprache convinced tens of millions in Central Europe that they should flock around the totem of ‘their’ national Einzelsprache (or the Ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism): all the speakers of a language constitute a nation, which should be housed in its own nation-state (i.e., the Political goal sought by nationalists). In today’s Central Europe, ethnolinguistic nationalism became the norm of statehood and nationhood building, legitimization and maintenance. Figure 1r presents a panoramic overview of the ongoing interplay of the ‘filters-cum-shapers,’ focusing on Central Europe during modern times but against a broader canvass of the globe and with some forays into the more distant past. None of these ‘filters-cum-shapers’ is an actor in its own right. Rather People and their groups always invent and deploy such ‘filters-cum-shapers,’ aiming at achieving this or that goal. The story of creating and remaking Einzelpsrachen, told in Figure 1r, can be summarized in a heuristic description of the four ‘filters-cum-shapers,’ alongside their functions in this process, as done in Figure 1s. Finally, the process of creating Einzelsprachen can be schematically reduced to three steps, as presented in Figure 1t. First, a Politically, Scholarly or Ideologically suitable section of the primary (unmediated) sociolinguistic reality on the ground (a dialect continuum) is identified. Second, the ‘filters-cum-shapers’ are applied to this section of the primary (unmediated) sociolinguistic reality on the ground. Finally, as a result of this intervention an Einzelsprache (or dialect) has been produced (cf Hroch 1994; Maxwell 2011). The concerned section of the sociolinguistic reality loses its primary (unmediated) character, having been altered and reshaped with the use of Technology and Scholarly concepts in line with a Political decision, as justified by an Ideology. Now, because of this conscious intervention, such a section begins to be removed from the primary sociolinguistic reality. The section in question becomes ‘mediated’ (radically changed) by these four ‘filterscum-shapers.’ Hence, while dialectal chains are part of the primary sociolinguistic reality on the ground, Einzelsprachen are Not. Perhaps Einzelsprachen constitute a mediated or secondary sociolinguistic reality. They are like a forest planted by people on the spot where a primeval forest used to grow but subsequently was

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  33 Filters-cum-shapers

Technological (1) Scholarly (1)

Political (1)

Ideological (1)

Technological (2)

Ideological (2) Technological (3)

Political (2)

Political (3)

Ideological (3)

Primary (i.e., still unmediated by Technology, Scholarly conceptualizations, state-related Politics or Ideological ‘rationalizations’) sociolinguistic reality on the ground – since the emergence of the modern human (300,000– 200,000 years ago) Writing (4000–3000 bce): speaking is not enough, in its Political and economic importance the written increasingly takes over the oral (i.e., primary sociolinguistic reality) On the basis of Technology (1) the concept of Einzelsprache is formulated (Antiquity: Greece, Rome): a potent conviction that the linguistic ‘naturally’ comes pre-divided into ‘natural’ (‘given by a god,’ ‘not made by men’) languages Statehood (circa 4000–3000 bce): land and population divided among states, including their internal administrative units; state bureaucracy run with the Technology (1) of writing; writing done in a unit of the linguistic as defined by Scholars (1) Religions for statehood legitimization (circa 4000–3000 bce): states (Political [1]) and their populations divided among religions (Christianization, Islamization, Jewish and Armenian diasporas) Numerous writing systems (Arabic, Cyrillic, Greek, Hebrew and Glagolitic): connected to specific religions (Ideology [1]) and by extension to given states (sometimes also administrative units within a state; Political [1]) and populations Idea that all should be able to read a given holy book (Ideology [1]) in their own Einzelsprachen (Scholarly [1]) (Reformation and Counter-Reformation, 16th–17th c.) Printing press (15th c., Europe): the mass production of books and other printed matter; Einzelsprachen (Scholarly [1]) made ‘tangible’ through dictionaries, grammars and prayer books (Ideology [2]), printed in a writing system (Technology [2]), connected to a given religion (Ideology [1]) and espoused and supported by a given state (Political [1]) Confessionally homogenous territorial state (cuius regio, eius religio): polities and boundaries (Political [1]) rearranged through warfare in line with Ideology (2), as popularized by the use of Technology (3) (religious wars in Europe, 15th–17th c.) New imperial order: empire (Political [1] &[2]) = religion = writing system (Technology [1], [2] & [3]) = imperial Einzelsprache (Scholarly [1]) (the age of ‘high imperialism’ in the long 19th century) Compulsory universal elementary education (18th–20th c.): all should be literate in the imperial Einzelsprache (Political [3]); initial education in other (regional, religious, peasant, etc.) Einzelsprachen (Scholarly [1]) permitted as a stepping stone to the required imperial Einzelsprache

Figure 1r The manner of the production of Einzelsprachen, especially in the historical context of Central Europe

34  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe Technological (4)

Scholarly (2)

Ideological (4)

Scholarly (3)

Scholarly (3.1) Ideological (5)

Technological (5)

Political (4)

Figure 1r (Continued)

Ideology (3) communicated to thoroughly literate (Ideology [2]) population at large through the mass production of cheap books and newspapers and especially school textbooks written in line with state curricula, as required by the ‘modernizing’ changes (Political [3]) The ‘scientific’ codification of the dichotomy of Einzelsprache and dialect (long 19th c.): language is a state’s official (dominant, written) Einzelsprache (Scholarly [1], Political [2] & [3], Ideological [3]), other Einzelsprachen present on the state’s territory (ideally) are (written, oral, kitchen, etc.) dialects of the state’s language; first rankings and classificatory schemes of Einzelsprachen proposed Social darwinist–cum-religious ranking of ‘civilizations’: (long 19th c.), proposed in the interest of the European (Western) empires (Political [3]) on the basis of the Bible seen as ‘god’s truth revealed’ (Ideology [1]): Western (‘Japhetic’), ‘Asiatic’ (Semitic), and (sub-Saharan) African (‘Hamitic’) Scripts (and Einzelsprachen) (Scholarly [1], Technology [2]) ranked in line with Ideology (4) as ‘modern’ or ‘backward’: alphabet (‘Japhetic’), abjad, syllabary and ‘Chinese picture writing’ (‘Semitic’); no writing (‘Hamitic’) (long 19th c.) (Central) Europe’s Scripts (and Einzelsprachen) ranked in line with Ideology (4), as ‘modern’ or ‘backward:’ Latin, Greek, Cyrillic, Arabic, Hebrew (Armenian) (long 19th c.) Ethnolinguistic nationalism (19th–20th c., Europe): language (religion, church, writing system) = nation = nation-state (normative isomorphism; cuius regio, eius lingua) – that is, Scholarly (1) & (2) (as justified by Ideology [1], [2] & [3]) = Political (2) (as fortified by the example of Political [3], enforced by Ideology [3] and mass communicated by Technology [4]) Ideology (4) and Ideology (5) mass communicated to population at large through cheap books and newspapers, especially school textbooks written in line with state curricula and in a correct modern Einzelsprache (Scholarly [2] & [3]), as required by the Political (4)’s ‘nationalizing’ changes; the message is exponentially magnified by the novel mass media of cinema, radio and television Empires and nonnational polities are destroyed or rearranged in order to be replaced by ethnolinguistic nation-states (especially in Central Europe). Populations speaking ‘incorrect’ languages (Scholarly [2] & [3]) or professing ‘foreign’ religions (Ideology [1]) are assimilated by force, expelled or exterminated. All that mostly executed in line with Ideology (5) (two world wars, breakups of Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire and Russian Empire in 1918; Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia in 1938–1941; Greater German Empire [Third Reich] in 1945; Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia between 1991 and 2008)

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  35 Scholarly (4)

Scholarly (4.1)

Technological (5)

Political (5)

In line with Ideology (5), scholars strive to fit each new nation-state with a unique and unshared ‘national’ Einzelsprache (19th–21st c., Europe); as a result, for instance, interwar Czechoslovakia’s official and national Einzelsprache of Czechoslovak was abolished in 1939 and replaced by separate national Einzelsprachen of Czech and Slovak New classificatory schemes of Einzelsprachen (20th c.) in line with Ideology (4) and Ideology (5), implemented as prescribed by the political (4) principle. (For instance, the classificatory scheme of East and West Slavic languages is tacitly based on the post-1945 western boundary of the Soviet Union, which due to political decisions on language use also doubles as the line of division between the employment of Cyrillic and the Latin alphabet among the North Slavic languages) Desktop computing and the development of the internet (since the mid 1990s) allowed for real-time faithful emulation of the obtaining power relations – that is, Political (4), Ideology (5), Scholarly (4) and Scholarly (4.1) – in cyberspace Tensions between nation-states and nonstate actors played out more freely on the web than ‘in the (extracyberspace) real world,’ and it will continue as long as cyberspace is not brought under the full control of the extant states (e.g., cyberwarfare and hybrid war, since the mid 2000s). Hence, for example, the unrecognized Einzelsprache of Silesian or the recently ‘unmade’ Einzelsprache of Serbo-Croatian can be more widely used online than outside cyberspace

Figure 1r (Continued)

Filters-cumshapers Technological Scholarly Political Ideological

Primary (i.e., still unmediated by Technology, Scholarly conceptualizations, state-related Politics and Ideological ‘rationalizations’) sociolinguistic reality on the ground Methods and devices for recording and manipulating units of the linguistic, as defined by Scholars in the interest of the Political elite, who build and maintain states, following a given Ideology Reasoning about the linguistic through concepts (in line with a given Political need, as justified by an Ideology), thus yielding units that Technology can identify and manipulate Employing units of the linguistic – as shaped by Scholars and Technology and justified by an Ideology – for the needs of a state Justifying this or that Political employment of units of the linguistic, as defined by Scholars and made manipulable (operationalizable) by Technology

Figure 1s How people and their groups (organized in states) engage with the linguistic

36  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe felled in the heat of the Industrial Revolution. However, such a production and reshaping of Einzelsprachen with the use of new sets of Technologies and Scholarly units has been repeated time and again. Ergo, the mediated sociolinguistic reality of the present-day Slavic Einzelsprachen is hardly secondary in its character but rather quaternary, quinary, senary, septenary or octonary, depending on the actual number of Technological, Scholarly, Political and Ideological interventions. This sociolinguistic reality of the Slavic Einzelsprachen is now multiple times removed from the primary level of ‘unregulated’ dialect continua (primary sociolinguistic reality). Importantly, the process of shaping and reshaping a piece of a dialect continuum into a (Scholarly defined) unit of the linguistic is not unidirectional or deterministic. A successfully turned-out Einzelsprache employed in writing for administrative and literary purposes in a polity may be abandoned and disappear, which in the context of the Slavic was, for instance, the case of Ruthenian in Poland-Lithuania. Otherwise, as Mülhäusler (1996) shows in the case of Oceania and Stoll (1982) in the case of South America, over the course of colonization, local (non-European, non-Western) units and uses of the linguistic may be wiped out and replaced by European counterparts imposed form outside and above. Finally, when the use of writing disappears altogether in a territory, alongside any form of statehood that existed there before (cf Baines, Bennet and Houston 2008), which, for instance, was the case of Maya city-states in the wake of the Spanish conquest in the 16th century, the self-conscious Scholarly definitions of this or that unit of the linguistic are likely lost as well (cf Burke 2012: 139–159). As a result, a population living in the territory is primed for a recreation of the primary sociolinguistic reality on the ground. In place of the disappeared writing systems, statehoods and units of the linguistic (e.g., Einzelsprachen), a dialect continuum (re-)emerges, to be conceptualized and divided into new units of the linguistic. In the case of the Mayans, it was the Latin script and the concept of Einzelsprache as imposed by Western conquerors and colonizers (cf Stoll 1982: 257–258). What happens and how it happens with regard to any changes in social reality entirely depend on human will. The primary sociolinguistic reality on the ground continues or is reintroduced when a concerned population leaves alone the linguistic, meaning when they use it in an oral manner and do not reflect on it, let alone aspire to shape or control the linguistic. On the contrary, when a population led by their scholarly-cum-political elite take a conscious note of the linguistic, analyze it with the use of concepts, and aspire to control and mold it in the name of a polity, ideology or some other collectively agreed-on need, a given primary dialect continuum is split and replaced by predefined units – for instance, Einzelsprachen in the context of Europe. Such a self-conscious remolding of the primary sociolinguistic reality on the ground is possible seemingly only when there is a state and the technology of writing at hand. Figure 1u presents brief socio-political sketches on the history of today’s Slavic state languages. Their histories are given in the framework of polities in which a given Slavic Einzelsprache emerged, was employed and finally became a national language – that is, in a nation-state where usually no other language may be used

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  37 Primary (unmediated) sociolinguistic ⇨ reality

Mediating filters ⇨ Technological Scholarly Political Ideological

Einzelsprachen or other (mediated) units of the linguistic

Figure 1t Production of units of the linguistic

in the same ‘distinguished’ capacity. Also, abbreviated information is provided on earlier or alternative names (linguonyms) used to refer to a present-day Slavic state language. Naming a language is part and parcel of the process of producing an Einzeslprache. More often than not, it is a highly Politicized act, conforming with this or that Ideology (religion) (cf Maxwell 2015b). Last but not least, before becoming the sole national-cum-official language of a nation-state, a given Slavic Einzelsprache was (and sometimes still is) employed alongside other languages that enjoyed a more elevated political (administrative) status in the context of generalized multilingualism or polyglossia during the pre-national period. Hence, also the influence is noted of other languages on the speech community of a given Slavic state language under discussion. This listing, however, is not exhaustive, and most attention is given to official languages commonly employed in administration, education and publishing. Interestingly, not all Slavic Einzelsprachen are tied to a specific piece of this or that dialect continuum (Figure 1v). The usual practice of creating standard languages as developed in early modern Europe entails basing a language on a territorially delimited piece of a dialect continuum. In social terms, this piece tends to be the dialect of a political power center, usually the capital of a polity. Dictionaries, grammars and translations of the Bible were employed (not always consciously) for codifying and standardizing the capital’s dialect as spoken and written by the (ruling) elite (first nobility, clergy and burghers, then civil servants and their families) (cf Čadež 2013; Considine 2014). Because of changes in the location of the power (or cultural) center or because of the multiplicity of such centers, some standard languages are based on a compromise mixture of elements drawn from several dialects, such as Rusyn (Magoci 2004) or Irish (Mac Giolla Chríost 2013: 122–123). In other instances, several territorial (dialectal) varieties of a coalescing Einzelsprache compete with one another before their respective users settle on a single one as preferred or dominant, for political or ideological (religious) reasons, which was (and to a degree still is) the case of German (Szulc 1999) and Croatian30 (Moguš 1995). Obviously, other configurations are possible too. For example, Polish is a continuation of the deterritorialized Slavophone sociolect of the nobility of Poland-Lithuania; hence, ascertaining which part of the (North) Slavic continuum was this language’s original launching pad is impossible (Kamusella 2018a). On the other hand, Russian began as a mixture of the North Slavic dialect of Moscow with the defunct South Slavic language of Church Slavonic (Kamusella 2009: 161). Hence, Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian (formerly Serbo-Croatian) are steeped in the Štokavian dialect, located amid the South Slavic dialect

38  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe Language

Period

State

Influence

Belarusian (formerly known as Slavic, Prostaia Mova [‘Plain Language’], B(y)elorussian, White Russian, White Ruthenian)

Long 19th century

Russian Empire

World War I

Ober Ost, Germany

Interwar

Poland

Polish, French, Russian and Yiddish (Esperanto, Hebrew and Romani) Polish, German, Latvian, Lithuanian and Yiddish (French, Hebrew, Romani and Ukrainian) Polish (Esperanto, Hebrew, Lithuanian, Romani, Ukrainian and Yiddish) Polish, Russian, Ukrainian and Yiddish (Esperanto and Romani) German and Polish (Latvian, Lithuanian, Romani and Yiddish) Russian, Polish and Yiddish (Lithuanian, Romani and Ukrainian) Russian (Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Romani, Ukrainian and Yiddish) English and Polish (Hebrew, Latvian, Lithuanian, Romani, Russian and Yiddish) Russian and English (Hebrew, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish and Ukrainian) Osmanlıca (Arabic and Persian, alongside Ladino [Spanyol]) German, Hungarian and Serbo-Croatian (Croatian) (Ladino [Spanyol]) Nondominant part of Serbocroatoslovenian (Croatian, Ladino [Spanyol] and Serbian) Croatian (Italian and German) Nondominant part of SerboCroatian; German, Italian and Slovenian (Romani) Arabic, Croatian, English, Russian, Serbian, Turkish Arabic, Croatian, English, Serbian, Turkish (Romani)

Soviet Union World War II

Bosnian (formerly known as Slavic, Illyrian, SerbocroatoSlovenian, SerboCroatian, Bosnian variety of SerboCroatian)

Ostland, Germany

Postwar

Soviet annexation of eastern Poland Soviet Union

1991–1995

Belarus

1995–Today

Until 1877

Belarus, Union State of Russia and Belarus (since 2000) Ottoman Empire

1877–1918

Austria-Hungary

Interwar

Yugoslavia

World War II

Croatia

Postwar

Yugoslavia

Bosnian War

Divided Bosnia

1995–Today

Bosnia

Figure 1u Influence of other languages on today’s Slavic state languages during the past two centuries

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  39 Language

Period

Until 1878 Bulgarian (formerly known as: Slavic, Prost 1878–1918 Ezik [‘Plain Language’], New Bulgarian)

Croatian (formerly known as Slavic, Illyrian, Slavonian, SerbocroatoSlovenian, Serbo-Croatian/ Croato-Serbian, Croatian variety of SerboCroatian)

Czech (formerly known as Slavic, Bohemian, Czechoslovak)

State

Greek, Osmanlıca and (Church) Slavonic (Ladino [Spanyol], Lingua Franca [Sabir], Romani and Romanian) Bulgaria French, Greek, Russian and Osmanlıca (Aromanian, Ladino [Spanyol] and Romani) Interwar French, German, Greek World War II Osmanlıca (Turkish) (Aromanian, Ladino [Spanyol] and Romani) Postwar Bulgaria, Soviet French, Romani, Russian and bloc Turkish (Aromanian) Postcommunist Bulgaria, EU English, Greek, Romani and Turkish (Aromanian) Until 1848 Austrian Empire Latin (Dalmatian, German, Istro-Romanian, Italian, Hungarian, Lingua Franca [Sabir], Romani Yiddish) Illyrian Provinces, French and Slovenian French Empire (German) (1809–1816) 1848–1918 Austrian Empire/ Hungarian and German Austria-Hungary (Italian); at times Croatian as part of Serbo-Croatian, hence some Serbian influence (Romani, Yiddish) Interwar Yugoslavia Codominant part of Serbocroatoslovenian, French, Italian World War II Croatia German and Italian Postwar Yugoslavia Codominant part of SerboCroatian; German, Italian, Slovenian and Romani (German and Italian) Croatian War Divided Croatia English and Serbian 1995–Today Croatia, EU English and Italian (Bosnian, Montenegrin, Romani and Serbian) Long 19th century, Austrian Empire/ German and Polish (French until 1918 Austria-Hungary and Latin) Interwar Czechoslovakia Dominant part of Czechoslovak (German and French) World War II Protectorate German of Bohemia and Moravia, Germany

Figure 1u (Continued)

Ottoman Empire

Influence

40  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe Language

Period

State

Influence

Postwar

Czechoslovakia, Soviet bloc Czech Republic, EU Ottoman Empire

Slovak and Russian (Romani) English and German (Romani and Slovak) Albanian, Aromanian, Greek, Osmanlıca and (Church) Slavonic (Ladino [Spanyol], Italian, Lingua Franca [Sabir] and Romani) Serbocroatoslovenian: mainly Serbian (Albanian, Aromanian, French, Greek, Ladino [Spanyol], Romani, Turkish) Bulgarian (Albanian, Aromanian, German, Ladino [Spanyol], Osmanlıca [Turkish] and Romani) Serbo-Croatian (mainly, Serbian), Aromanian, and Albanian (Bulgarian, Romani, Turkish) Albanian, English, Greek and Serbian Bosnian, Croatian), (Aromanian, Bulgarian, Turkish and Romani) French, Italian, Serbian, (Church) Slavonic, Russian and Osmanlıca (Albanian, Bulgarian and Ladino [Spanyol]) Croatian and German (Albanian, Bulgarian and Ladino [Spanyol]) Nondominant part of Serbocroatoslovenian (Albanian, Ladino [Spanyol] and Romani)

Postcommunist Macedonian (formerly known as Slavic, Prost Ezik [‘Plain Language’])

Montenegrin (formerly known as Slavic, Serbian, Serbocroatoslovenian, Serbocroatian, SerboMontenegrin/ MontenegroSerbian)

Long 19th century, until the Balkan Wars

Interwar

Yugoslavia

World War II

Bulgaria

Postwar

Yugoslavia

Postcommunist

Macedonia

Long 19th century

Montenegro

World War I

Austro-Hungarian occupation

Interwar

Yugoslavia

Figure 1u (Continued)

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  41 Language

Period

State

Influence

World War II

Italy (Germany)

Postwar

Yugoslavia

Postcommunist until 2006

Rump Yugoslavia/State Union of Serbia and Montenegro Montenegro

Italian and German (Albanian and Ladino [Spanyol]) Nondominant part of SerboCroatian (Albanian, Italian, German and Romani) Nondominant part of Serbian (Albanian, English, Italian and German) Albanian, English and Italian (Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian) French, Latin and Ruthenian (German and Yiddish) German and French (Yiddish)

2006–Today Polish (formerly known as Slavic, Lechitic)

17th–18th centuries Long 19th century

World War I

Poland-Lithuania Austrian Empire/ Austria-Hungary Prussia/Germany Russian Empire Austria-Hungary Germany Ober Ost

Interwar

World War II, 1939–1941

Regency Kingdom of Poland (AustriaHungary and Germany) Poland

East Prussia, Upper Silesia, Wartheland and West Prussia (Germany) Generalgouvernement Soviet Byelorussia, Soviet Lithuania, Soviet Ukraine

World War II, 1941–1945

Figure 1u (Continued)

East Prussia, Upper Silesia, Wartheland and West Prussia (Germany)

Russian and French (Yiddish) German and Little Ruthenian [Ukrainian] (Romani and Yiddish) German German, Lithuanian, White Ruthenian [Belarusian] and Yiddish (Latvian) German (Yiddish)

French, German and Yiddish (Hebrew) (Belarusian, Lithuanian, Romani, Russian, and Ruthenian [Ukrainian]) German (Hebrew, Romani and Yiddish) German, Ukrainian and Yiddish (Hebrew and Romani) Lithuanian, Russian, Ukrainian, White Russian (Belarusian) and Yiddish (Hebrew and Romani) German

42  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe Language

Period

Postwar

Russian (formerly known as Slavic, Muscovian, Prostoi Slavianskii Iazyk [‘Plain Slavic Language’], Prostoi Iazyk [‘Plain Language’], SlavenoRossiiskii [‘SlavicRussian’]) (In Russian known as Rossiiskii until the 1830s, then Russkii; also known as ‘Great Russian’ [Velikorusskii] between the 1850s and 1917)

State

Influence

Generalgouvernement Generalgouvernement Reichskommissariaten Ostland and Ukraina Poland, Soviet bloc

German, Ukrainian and Yiddish (Hebrew and Romani) Lithuanian, Ukrainian, White Russian (Belarusian) and Yiddish (Hebrew, Romani and Russian)

Postcommunism 17th century

Muscovy

18th century

Russian Empire

Long 19th century

Russian Empire

World War I

Russia (Empire, Republic, Bolshevik Russia)

Interwar

Soviet Union

Figure 1u (Continued)

Poland, EU

Russian (Belarusian, English, French, German, Lithuanian, Romani, Ukrainian and Yiddish) English (German) Greek, Ruthenian, Polish, (Church) Slavonic (Arabic, Tatar) Dutch, French, German (Low German), Latin, Polish, (Church) Slavonic and Swedish (Arabic, Osmanlıca, Romani, Persian, Tatar, Yiddish) Chinese, French, German, Japanese, Latin, Polish and Swedish (Arabic, Armenian, Esperanto, Finnish, Georgian, Italian, Moldavian [Romanian], Osmanlıca, Persian, Tatar and Yiddish) Esperanto, Estonian, German, French, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Little Russian (Ukrainian), Moldavian (Romanian), Osmanlıca, Polish, Tatar, White Russian (Belarusian) and Yiddish Over 150 languages, but mainly Armenian, Azeri (Azerbaijani), Byelorussian (Belarusian), Esperanto, German, Georgian, Japanese, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Korean, Moldavian (Moldovan, Romanian), Mongolian, Polish, Tajik, Tatar, Turkmen, Tuvan, Uzbek and Yiddish

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  43 Language

Period

State

Influence

World War II, 1939–1941

Soviet annexations of Estonia, parts of Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, eastern Poland, easternmost Romania Finnish occupation German occupation Romanian occupation Soviet annexation of Tuva Soviet Union, Soviet bloc

Estonian, Finnish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Romani, Romanian (Moldavian, Moldovan) and Yiddish

World War II, 1941–1945

Postwar

Postcommunist Russian Federation

Figure 1u (Continued)

Finnish German Romanian Tuvan New influences from across the Soviet bloc and the Soviet sphere of influence: Albanian, Arabic, Bulgarian, Chinese, Czech, Finnish, German, Greek, Hungarian, Korean, Macedonian, Mongolian, Polish, Romanian, SerboCroatian, Slovak, Spanish, Portuguese and Vietnamese Chinese, English, Korean and Mongolian Continued influence of the aforementioned official languages from all the postSoviet states, because of either their large Russophone diaspora or because of massive immigration from these states to Russia Hebrew (Ivrit), due to the massive emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel Languages of some of Russia’s autonomous republics, especially Abhaz, Adyghe, Altai, Avar, Bashkir, Buryatt, Chechen, Chuvash, Dargwa,

44  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe Language

Period

Long 19th Serbian century (formerly known as Slavic, SlavoSerbian, Illyrian, Serbo-Croatian, SerbocroatoSlovenian, Serbian variety of Serbo-Croatian) World War I Interwar

World War II

Postwar

State

Ingush, Kalmyk, KarachayBalkar, Khakas, Komi, Lezgian, Mari, Ossetian, Sakha (Yakut), Tatar, Tuvan and Udmurt Ottoman Greek, Osmanlıca, (Church) Empire/Serbia Slavonic and Russian (French, German, Ladino [Spanyol], Romani and Yiddish)

AustroHungarian occupation Yugoslavia

Bulgarian occupation Croatian occupation German occupation Italian occupation Yugoslavia

Postcommunist Rump until 2006 Yugoslavia/ State Union of Serbia and Montenegro 2006–Today 1804–1867 Slovak (formerly known as Slavic, SlavoBohemian, Biblical Language Figure 1u (Continued)

Influence

German (Greek, Italian) Dominant part of Serbocroatoslovenian; (Croatian, German, Italian, French, Ladini [Spanyol], Slovenian, Romani, Turkish and Yiddish) Bulgarian Croatian German Albanian and Italian Dominant part of SerboCroatian, Albanian and Turkish (German and Romani) Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and English

English (Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin) Austrian Empire Latin (Czech, French, German, Hungarian, Polish, Romani and Yiddish)

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  45 Language [Bohemian], Old Slovak [Bohemian], Czecho-Slovak, Czechoslovak)

Period

State

Influence

1867–1918

Kingdom of Hungary, AustriaHungary

Hungarian and German (Czech, French, Romani and Yiddish)

Interwar

Czechoslovakia

Nondominant part of Czechoslovak; German and Hungarian (Czech, French, Romani, Ruthenian [Rusyn, Ukrainian] and Yiddish) German and Hungarian Czech and Russian (Romani)

World War II Postwar

Slovakia Czechoslovakia, Soviet bloc Postcommunist Slovakia, EU

Slovenian (formerly known as Slavic, Illyrian, Carniolan, Carinthian, Styrian)

Czech, English, Hungarian, Romani and German Until 1848 Austrian Empire German and Italian (French, Hungarian, Latin, Romani and Yiddish) Illyrian Croatian and French (German Provinces, and Italian) French Empire (1809–1816) 1848–1918 Austrian German and Italian (French, Empire/ Hungarian, Romani and AustriaYiddish) Hungary Interwar Yugoslavia Nondominant part of Serbocroatoslovenian, German, Hungarian and Italian (French, Romani and Yiddish) World War II German German occupation Hungarian Hungarian occupation Italian Italian occupation Postwar Yugoslavia Serbo-Croatian, (Albanian, German, Hungarian, Italian, Macedonian and Romani) Postcommunist Slovenia, EU English, Croatian, German and Italian (Albanian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian and Romani)

Figure 1u (Continued)

46  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe Language

Period

Long 19th Ukrainian century (formerly known as Slavic, Prostaia Mova [‘Plain Language’] Little Russian, Little Ruthenian, Ruthenian) World War I

Interwar

World War II

Postwar

1991–2014

Figure 1u (Continued)

State Russian Empire

Influence

Polish, Russian, (Armenian, Church Slavonic, Crimean Tatar, French, Greek, Romani and Yiddish) Austrian Empire/ German, Polish, Austria-Hungary (Church) Slavonic and Yiddish (Armenian, French, Romani and Romanian) Austro-Hungarian and German, Polish and German occupation Yiddish Austria-Hungary Polish and Yiddish (French, German, Romani and Romanian) Poland Polish and Yiddish Soviet Union Russian (Armenian, Belarusian, Crimean Tatar, Esperanto, German, Greek, Moldavian [Romanian], Polish and Yiddish) Generalgouvernement, German, Polish and Germany Yiddish (Romani) German annexation of German (Crimean Tatar) Soviet Ukraine and Crimea Romanian annexation Romanian (Moldavian [Moldovan], Romani of Bessarabia and and Yiddish) Transnistria Soviet annexation of Russian, Polish and eastern Poland Yiddish (Belarusian, Romani) Russian, Romanian Soviet annexation (Moldavian, of Romania’s Moldovan) Bessarabia and northern Bukovina Soviet Union Russian Soviet Union Russian (Czech, Gagauz, Greek, Hungarian, Moldavian [Moldovan, Romanian], Polish, Romani, Rusyn and Yiddish) Ukraine Russian (Crimean Tatar, English, Hebrew, Hungarian, Moldovan [Romanian], Polish and Yiddish)

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  47 Language

Period

State

Influence

2014–Today

Ukraine

English and Polish (Hebrew, Hungarian, Moldovan [Romanian], Romani, Russian and Yiddish) Russian (Crimean Tatar and English)

Crimea and eastern Ukraine illegally annexed by Russia Figure 1u (Continued)

continuum. Similarly, Bulgarian and Macedonian compete for almost the same base (or overlapping bases) of the eastern Macedonian/western Bulgarian dialect. Slovenian is steeped mainly in the dialect of the historical region of Carniola, having Ljubljana at its center. In terms of the South Slavic dialect continuum standard, Slovenian’s dialectal base can be identified as Kajkavian with some elements of the Čakavian dialect.31 Although neither of these two dialects constitutes the basis for standard Croatian, they are claimed for the Croatian language as its ‘traditional written’ dialects. In the case of the North Slavic dialect continuum, standard Czech is twice based on the dialect of Prague. The official register of Czech (spisovná čeština ‘written Czech’) was developed in the mid 19th century on the model of the 16th-century Bohemian (Czech) Protestant translation of the Bible, with a handful of lexical borrowings from standard Polish. In addition, some Polish elements were added to ‘written Czech’ because Polish – standardized with the aid of a multivolume authoritative dictionary in the early 19th century – served as a model for the 1840s standardization of the Czech language (Orłoś 1993: 42–58). Next to no one speaks this standard ‘written’ register of Czech at home, meaning that children need to acquire it in school. As the name of this register indicates, it is employed mainly for written purposes. Its oral counterpart is ‘common (vernacular) Czech’ (obecná čeština), which is the present-day dialect of Prague (and the vicinity) accepted all over Bohemia (the western half of the Czech Republic) and continuously spoken to this day. This ‘dual’ or ‘repeated’ grafting of standard Czech on the temporally quite removed variants of the dialect of Prague entails the diglossic relation, within standard Czech, of the 16th century and today’s versions of the Prague dialect. Initially, standard Slovak was steeped in the western Slovak dialect, before its dialectal base was consciously shifted to the central Slovak dialect in order to make this budding Einzelsprache more distinctive from Czech. The submergence of Slovak into the Czechoslovak language in interwar Czechoslovakia that could have pushed Slovak out of official use was followed by increasingly equitable Czech-Slovak official bilingualism in postwar communist Czechoslovakia. The Czecho-Slovak triglossia (at the time informally and incorrectly dubbed ‘Czechoslovak language’) was composed of Slovak, alongside the two registers (written

48  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe and vernacular) of Czech. To a degree, this triglossia continues among the Slovak intelligentsia, though it is increasingly limited to the diglossia of Slovak and written Czech (Nábělková 2016). Standard Belarusian and Ukrainian – mainly for ideological reasons – were retroactively identified with the Ruthenian language as written in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania’s chanceries at Wilno (Vilnius) and Kijów (Kyiv), respectively. In Belarusian and Ukrainian literatures, the Vilnius variety of Ruthenian is dubbed ‘Old Belarusian’ and the Kyiv variety ‘Old Ukrainian’ (Aničenka 1969; Martel 1938: 38–47). However, in terms of the de facto standardization, Belarusian was based on the dialects of Vilnius and Miensk. The former constituted the basis for the development of standard Belarusian in interwar Poland and the latter in Soviet Belarus. After all of the Belarusian lands were united within postwar Soviet Belarus, the Miensk dialectal base became predominant, allowing for making standard Belarusian closer to Russian (Mayo 1978: 26–27). The anti-Soviet and non-Soviet Belarusian diaspora cultivated the Vilnius-based standard Belarusian, striving to make it more distinctive from Russian (and Ukrainian). Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, this ideological tension expressed in linguistic terms yielded traditionalist Classical Belarusian and pro-Russian (Russifying) Official Belarusian (Gimpelevich 2005: 211). A similar development unfolded in the case of standard Ukrainian. Initially, it was codified in Austria-Hungary on the basis of the Galician (western) dialect, and this codification continued in interwar Poland. The hindered standardization of Ukrainian in the late Russian Empire was steeped in the Poltava (central or southeastern) dialect, which became the basis for the development of standard Ukrainian in Soviet Ukraine (Lieber 2016: 35–36; Shevelov 1989). After World War II, the pro-Russian (Russifying) Soviet Ukrainian became dominant, while the Galician Ukrainian was preserved among the diaspora (Moser 2016a). After 1991, in independent Ukraine, Galician elements were reintroduced in standard Ukrainian to offset the Russifying tendencies (Moser 2016b). The unequal bilingualism or diglossia in favor of Belarusian and Ukrainian in Soviet Belarus and Soviet Ukraine during the early interwar period of korenizatsiia (nativization) gave way to the increasing domination of Russian during the 1930s. After World War II, this tendency led to a clear diglossia that was socially and spatially defined. Belarusian and Ukrainian, seen as ‘peasant languages’ by Russian speakers, were to be spoken (and sometimes written) in the countryside; and they could also serve as a medium and subject of ethnographic studies. On the other hand, Russian as the ‘interethnic’ language of Soviet-style communist modernity was to be used in cities, science and economy across Belarus and Ukraine. This tendency was briefly reverted in favor of Belarusian in post-Soviet Belarus until 1995, when Russian became the country’s co-official – though de facto main – language (Pastuchoŭ 2000; Rostikov 2004). Vacillation regarding whether Ukrainian or Russian should be the dominant language in independent Ukraine continued until the turn of 2014. Afterward, in the wake of the success of the Revolution of Dignity (Euromaidan), the official and national status of Ukrainian was reconfirmed, while Russian – at least officially – became just another foreign language in this country (Kudriavtseva 2019; Why Ukraine’s 2019).

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  49 Unlike in Czechoslovakia, where in school children were painstakingly taught to distinguish between and not to mix Czech and Slovak, in the Soviet Union the old Russian imperial theory persevered that Belarusian and Ukrainian are mere dialects of (Great) Russian. Hence, at school, only a minority acquired the skill of distinguishing between and not mixing Belarusian and Ukrainian with Russian. This minority were those who chose, and at times strove, for attending predominantly Belarusian- and Ukrainian-medium schools. As a result, in today’s Belarus and Ukraine – apart from Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian – the ad hoc mixed forms of Belarusian and Russian (or, at times, Polish) (Trasianka) and of Ukrainian and Russian (Surzhyk) are spoken (cf Danylenko 2016) but not written (though this changes rapidly, thanks to cyberspace, where no educational or state authorities can prohibit people from writing in Trasianka32 and Surzhyk if they choose so [cf Luk’ianchuk 2008]). The situation is similar to Czechoslovakia’s triglossia. In Belarus, such triglossia entails writing mainly in Russian and rarely in Belarusian while talking mainly in Trasianka and Russian and sometimes in Belarusian. Ukraine features several patterns of such triglossia, depending on region and period, but nowadays in central Ukraine, it means conducting official business solely through the written medium of Ukrainian, reading in Ukrainian and Russian, and talking in Ukrainian, Surzhyk and Russian. Unlike in Belarus, such situational language use is highly politicized in Ukraine, due to the Orange Revolution (2004–2005), the Revolution of Dignity (2013–2014) and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War (since 2014) (cf Klichko 2013; Minich 2018). Likewise, an off-the-cuff noncommittal remark by the Ukrainian foreign minister in March 2018 that maybe Ukrainian should be written in the Latin script triggered a heated wave of controversy33 (Durnytsia 2018; Shchur 2018). The 1995 introduction of Russian as a co-official language in Belarus increasingly sidelines Belarusian in public and private life, but in some urban areas, young professionals and liberals make a consistent effort to speak this language (cf Budźma 2019; GenerationBy 2018), while the regime’s veering between Russia and the European Union from time to time gives a boost to the official use of Belarusian (Barushka 2015; Komorovskaya 2016; Lashuk 2011). On the other hand, unlike in Ukraine, most Belarusians agree that Belarusian has two national scripts, namely the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets. The latter was cultivated by Belarusian emigration until 2000, when the Belarusian Latin alphabet was (almost)34 accepted for official romanization in today’s Belarus, where in public spaces both scripts brush sides on signage (Instruction 2018; Latsinka 2018). Furthermore, thanks to grassroots efforts and ingenious software solutions (cf Lacinka 2018; Latsinizatar 2018), much of Belarusian classical literature has been made available online both in Cyrillic and in the Latin alphabet (cf Rodnyja 2018). However, Belarusian, Russian, Surzhyk, Trasianka and Ukrainian being quite close to one another, in real-life oral communication, boundaries among them are blurry, to say the least. This blurriness is fortified by the perceived linguistic boundaries’ being social or socio-ethnic in character, not spatial. Unlike the case of the post-Serbo-Croatian languages, no state or administrative border serves as a metonymical instrument of separation among Belarusian, Russian and

50  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe Trasianka in Belarus or among Ukrainian, Russian and Surzhyk in Ukraine.35 The same language variety may be perceived differently by various speakers and listeners (cf Krause et al. 2003; Preston 1989). In contrast to aforementioned Slavic standard state languages based on this or that territorially delimited dialect, Polish does not have such a dialectal base. This language emerged from the sociolect of Poland-Lithuania’s nobility, who ranged across the length and the breadth of this realm, overlapping with the northwestern and central half of the North Slavic dialect continuum. Dialectal influences from all this segment of this dialect continuum fed into Polish, so it is impossible to unequivocally identify this language with this or that territorially delimited dialect (cf Dziedzictwo 2018). This characteristic deterritorialization of Polish had to take place before the emergence of this Einzelsprache as a written language in the 16th century. Before that, the political center of the Polish/PolishLithuanian polity moved from Wielkopolska (Great[er] Poland) with the subsequent capitals at Gniezno and Poznań to Małopolska (Lesser/Little Poland, also known as western Galicia), whose capital was at Cracow. Meanwhile, in the late Middle Ages, political power centers (princely capitals) proliferated, at Ostrów Lednicki, Kalisz, Giecz, Kruszwica, Sandomierz, Wiślica, Przemyśl, Wrocław, Płock, Włocławek and Gdańsk, among others. In the wake of the 1386 dynastic union and subsequently the real union of 1569 between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, more power centers (capitals) were added: at Vilnius (Wilno), Kyiv (Kijów), Lviv (Lwów), Hrodna (Grodno) and Piotrków Trybunalski. The deterritorialized Polish language and Cyrillic-based Ruthenian with its two centers at Vilnius and Kyiv were the first early modern conduits for the flow of knowledge and ideas from Western and Central Europe to Muscovy (Garbul’ 2009, 2014; Kochman 1975). The Petrine modernization and transformation of Muscovy into a Western-style Russian Empire entailed a reaction against official Church Slavonic for the sake of curbing the influence of the Orthodox Church on the state. In language terms, this meant the replacement of Church (Old) Cyrillic with Grazhdanka (Modern Cyrillic), on the basis of the Antiqua type of the Latin alphabet. Subsequently, Grazhdanka was employed to produce military (secular) books and Church Cyrillic for religious ones. This politics of script did not affect language use much until the mid 18th century. However, the Slavic dialect of Moscow employed with deterritorialized Church Slavonic allowed for a gradual increase in the vernacular elements employed in writing on the model of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania’s Ruthenian. On top of that, Latin was made the leading medium of secular education in the 18th century (Vronkov, Poniaeva and Popova 2002), while the empire’s multiethnic noble elite preferred to speak and write in German and then in French until the Napoleonic wars. French linguistic borrowings and calques significantly affected the turn-of-the-19th-century tacit agreement to shape standard Russian from this mixed bag of elements combined with Church Slavonic (Offord et  al. 2015; Smith 2006). This ‘mix’ was none other than Mikhail Lomonosov’s ‘middle style’ of the dialect of Moscow and Church Slavonic (Kamusella 2009: 161). However, following the construction of

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  51 St. Petersburg and moving the Russian capital there, this original dialectal base was transplanted 700 kilometers northwest, de-ethnicized and infused with a variety of non-Russian and non-Slavic elements. As a result, standard Russian became almost as deterritorialized as standard Polish. No South Slavic Einzelsprachen shares this characteristic. In this salient feature, both Polish and Russian are different from all other Slavic state languages, including the Slavic microlanguages. By definition, the latter arose by the use of a regional dialect for the purpose of writing. The sole example of a partly deterritorialized Slavic microlanguage is Rusyn. Within the Habsburg lands, Rusyn-speaking settlers moved from their Carpathian homeland (today, Ukraine’s region of Transcarpathia) to Vojvodina in the south. The Habsburgs regained control of this land in 1699, after the end of the protracted war against the Ottomans (1683–1699). The military conflict laid to waste and depopulated this land. So Vienna actively supported settlers who decided to move to Vojvodina. Nowadays, autonomous Vojvodina is located in northern Serbia. Rusyn is one of the autonomous province’s official languages, alongside Croatian, Hungarian, Serbian, Slovak and Romanian. Obviously, some other Slavic microlanguages were created in a similar fashion, when refugees took along their pieces of the South Slavic dialect continuum to the Habsburg lands (Burgenland Croatian and, Paulician) or Italy (Molisean). But they fashioned these aforesaid pieces into Einzelsprachen in their own right, unlike Vojvodina Rusyns, who maintained a unity of their shared Rusyn language with other Rusyns who stayed in their ethnic territory, now split among Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine (Magoci 2004). Another conceptual (or policy) dimension across which standard Slavic Einzelsprachen range is how their spelling systems (orthographies) map out the linguistic. Famously, in the case of Serbo-Croatian and the post-Serbo-Croatian languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian, one is sternly admonished to write as one speaks or hears. Hence, the written form of these languages quite faithfully reflects whatever tiny differences occur across the territorial length and breadth of Štokavian. This approach to writing is employed – though apparently not in such a radical fashion – by other South Slavic languages, namely Bulgarian, Macedonian and Slovenian.36 However, this principle is limited to the dialect on which a given standard is based. One can speak these Einzelsprachen with the use of a variety of dialects that are believed to ‘belong to’ the standard language, but ‘correct writing’ is possible only within the base dialect of the standard language. The same

Deterritorialized Languages

Dialect-based Languages

Polish, Russian [2]

Belarusian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian, Ukrainian [11]

Figure 1v Deterritorialized and dialect-based Slavic state languages today

52  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe normative approach applies to the Croatian dialects of Čakavian and Kajkavian; one is barred from using them as an oral prompt for writing if aspiring to write in standard – that is, Štokavian-based – Croatian. Among the North Slavic languages, we can observe the other extreme of the aforementioned dimension in the case of written Czech, which does not have a speech community, being a language form of four centuries ago, ‘resurrected’ by nationally minded philologists in the mid 19th century. Hence, a speaker of ‘vernacular Czech’ is required to make a conscious effort not to write as they speak and to instead acquire the 16th-century standard of written Czech as defined and codified by ‘renowned linguists’ from the state-sponsored Czech Academy of Sciences. Polish as formed in the early modern period employs etymological spelling, which in quite a few corners is at variance with actual pronunciation. The same is true, though to a lesser degree, in the case of Russian. The post-1917 spelling reform as introduced by the Bolshevik government sought to limit the discrepancy between spelling and pronunciation, which was wider in the Russian Empire (Greenberg 2018; Sakulin 1917). Slovak orthography quite faithfully reflects in writing the base central dialect of this standard Einzelsprache. The same is true in the case of standard Belarusian and Ukrainian in relation to their dialectal bases. Obviously, the situation is complicated by triglossia with Russian on the one hand and, respectively, with Trasianka or Surzhyk on the other. One strives not to write Trasianka or Surzhyk, commonly considered as ‘incorrect,’ and most know how to write Russian well, though quite a few Belarusian and fewer Ukrainian speakers have a poorer written command of their native or national language than that of Russian. Hence, their attempts at writing Belarusian or Ukrainian are to a degree Trasiankaized or Surzhykized. In this, quite unintentionally, they follow the South Slavic principle of writing as you speak or hear. Last but not least, in the case of the Slavic Einzelsprachen with etymological spelling or orthographies otherwise distanced from pronunciation, the late19th-century German invention of recurring spelling reform (cf Michaelis 1876; Nerius 2002) was adopted for bridging the gap between the spoken and the written when it is deemed too broad or otherwise troublesome by ‘renowned linguists’ in the state academy of sciences. Across continental Europe, especially in Central Europe, where ethnolinguistic nationalism is the basis of statehood construction, legitimization and maintenance, each nation-state supports its own national academy of sciences. The scholars’ work, initially (or even predominantly) focused on the national language, is conducted under the government’s

Close (pronunciation-driven)

Medium (mixed)

Distant (etymological)

Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, Serbian [4]

Belarusian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Slovak, Slovenian, Ukrainian [6]

Czech, Polish, Russian [3]

Figure 1w Correspondence between the written and the spoken in the Slavic state languages

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  53 watchful gaze. In this way, the state tightly controls the national Einzelsprache as the font of its own legitimacy and the ideological basis of its existence (cf Gladkova and Vačkova 2013).

Notes 1 I use the German terms Sprache and Einzelsprache (see more later) to distinguish between two distinct meanings, which are confusingly denoted by the same English word, ‘language.’ Furthermore, I introduce the term Humanese as a synonym for Sprache to emphasize the difference between the article-less ‘language’ (biological capacity for speech) and ‘a language’ (Einzelsprache) – that is, the Western normative concept of how to ‘extract a piece of the linguistic’ and its particular actualization. 2 Thus far, I have not found any reliable comparative information on whether a similar concept of Einzelsprache might emerge outside of the West, in the areas where writing was in intensive use before the modern period. Non-Western literati did construe by using their own home-grown concepts about writing or on the graphic recording of speech, but seemingly not much reflection on such non-Western conceptualizations has been recorded and analyzed in available literature (cf Mülhäusler 1996: 144–145, 147). As a result of the Western political domination of the world (now continuing in the form of economic and cultural imperialism), the rampant ‘naturalization’ of the Western concept of Einzelsprache seems to blind both Western and non-Western scholars and commentators to other ways of construing the linguistic (cf Errington 2008; Phillipson 1992). 3 From an etymological perspective, the term dialect stems from the Greek word διάλεκτος (diálektos), as mediated by the Latin form dialect(us). Many widely – yet wrongly – accept that the Latin term was developed in antiquity. But Van Rooy (2019) proved through his recent meticulous textual search and analysis that this Latin term is actually a 16th-century Neo-Latin coinage. 4 Before the construction of such ‘written languages,’ people took note of differences in speech, especially when it hampered and even prevented communication. But they did not construe these differences as ‘languages’ (Einzelsprachen) and simply sought a variety of creative ways to get an intended message to interlocutors (cf Liszka 1996). Nowadays, in the modern West, before two people can talk, first they need to negotiate a shared language. Simply speaking is not sufficient; one needs to speak a specific language (Einzelsprache) (Billig 1995: 31). 5 The concept of discrete dialect is as much an arbitrary invention for construing the linguistic as the concept of Einzelsprache is. Proposing that writing with the use of the speech typical for a region produces a dialect is a scholarly rationalization, an imposition of a definition on an essentially unruly (continuous, variable) social reality. As Rok Stergar rightly points out, some speak of ‘written dialects’ (cf Mattheier 2003: 214), the assumption being that the act of writing may not sever the presumed ‘natural’ links of ‘belonging’ of a newly written dialect to an earlier written and already-wellestablished language.   In reality, this Western-in-origin dichotomy of language (Einzelsprache) versus dialect is nothing but a reflection of actual social and political power relations in the linguistic. A group who dominates over other groups (typically in a shared polity) construes of their own speech as a language (Einzelsprache) and of the speech of the subaltern groups as mere ‘dialects.’ That is why, even those who saw Slavic Einzelsprachen to be dialects of a common Slavic language did not construe this notional All-Slavic language as a common written standard, which should supersede the extant Slavic Einzelsprachen. Throughout history, not a single polity controlled all the Slavicpopulated territories. In the Western tradition of language making, only a polity of such

54  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe a kind could have introduced (or imposed) a unitary standard Slavic language for all Slavophones. 6 Unofficially, but in popular use, beginning at least in the 19th century, Montenegro’s inhabitants referred to their speech as ‘Montenegrin’ (Popiołek 2011: 196). 7 In the Dual Monarchy’s Kingdom of Hungary, Hungarian was the sole official language, with the exception of Croatia and Slavonia, where Croatian shared this distinction. However, in publishing, education and, increasingly less so, administration, Romanian (Walachian), Slovak and Ruthenian (Rusyn) remained in some use. As Rok Stergar points out, Austria-Hungary’s imperial royal army employed all these languages for training and communicating with soldiers (Green 2013: 86; Scheer 2014). 8 This congress was officially referred to in German as Slavenkongreß (‘Slavic Congress’) and in Czech as Slovanský sjezd (‘Slavic Meeting’), respectively. 9 However, Greek (Katharevousa) and Osmanlıca remained co-official languages in Bulgaria (especially its southern half, or Eastern Rumelia) until 1908, when this country gained formal independence from the Ottoman Empire (cf Briefmarke 1881; Dimitrov 1985: 37). On top of that, because it was the Russian armies who defeated the Ottomans and established Bulgaria in 1878, Russian remained the Bulgarian army’s official language until 1887 (Cholopanov and Georgiev 1981: 243). 10 From the mid 18th to the mid 19th century, the linguonym Serbian actually referred to the written form, nowadays dubbed by scholars ‘Slaveno-Serbian.’ It was an unstandardized mixture of vernacular Serbian with words and syntactical elements drawn from the high-prestige Einzelsprachen of Church Slavonic and Russian. Actually, the use of standardized vernacular Serbian in writing was repeatedly banned in Serbia as late as 1868 (Milanović 2010: 132), even though it had been three decades earlier accepted in Montenegro (Greenberg 2004: 96; Kamusella 2009: 224; Ostojić 1989: 11–13; Šístek 2017: 192). 11 The matter of the use of Croatian and Serbian was further complicated in AustriaHungary by the fact that since the turn of the 20th century, both languages (including short-lived Bosnian) were collectively referred to as ‘Serbo-Croatian.’ The difference between Croatian and Serbian (or the Croatian and Serbian varieties of Serbo-Croatian) was signaled only by script – the Latin alphabet for the former and Cyrillic for the latter. When World War I broke out, Cyrillic was banned for the use of Serbo-Croatian in Austria-Hungary, and in 1916, the same restriction was extended to Serbian in Montenegro and Serbia under Austro-Hungarian occupation (Ivić 2014: 275, 304). From the perspective of script, between 1916 and 1918, only the Latin alphabet–based Serbo-Croatian was employed for official purposes and publishing across all the Serbo-Croatian-speaking lands. Many would see this ‘unified’ language as ‘Croatian.’ Serbia’s government, parliament and state offices fled to the safe haven of Greece’s Corfu island. Between 1916 and 1918, it was the only place where Cyrillic-based Serbian continued in official use. (I thank Rok Stergar for pushing me to explain these complications in a greater detail.) 12 From the legal perspective, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was defined as the nation-state of its ‘single nation consisting of three “tribes” ’ (jedan troplemeni narod) (Čulinović 1963: 190; Jaroszewicz 2006: 130). 13 In interwar Yugoslavia, several newspapers experimented with content written in Cyrillic script–based and Latin script–based Serbo-Croatian and in Slovenian. There was no blending of these varieties in a single article, but their parallel use in a single periodical lent credence to the claim that Serbocroatoslovenian was a single language with several equal standards in official use (Newman 2019; Stergar 2018). 14 Another telltale difference between Croatian and Serbian is the use of foreign personal and geographic names. In Croatian, the spelling typical for the original language is retained – hence, Leonard Bloomfield, Johann Wolfgang Goethe, William Shakespeare and Paul Verlain. In Serbian, such names are phonetically written down with the use of Cyrillic. When a Serbian-language book happens to be published in Latin letters,

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  55 this Cyrillicization (Cyrilification) serves as the normative basis for spelling foreign names, not the original spelling in the source language. Hence, Leonard Blumfild, Johan Volfgang Gete, Vilijam Šekspir and Pol Verlen. (I thank Rok Stergar for alerting me to this important aspect of language construction.) 15 Throughout the text, I use the designation ‘White Russian’ for the Belarusians and their language until the founding of independent Belarus in 1991, because that is the literal meaning of the Russian term Belorusskii. In the interwar period, this Russian term for the Belarusian nation and language tended to be translated into English as ‘White Russian,’ while during the Cold War, the half-translated hybrid form ‘B(y)elorussian’ became standard. In both cases, as among Russian speakers, the Belarusians and their language were seen as ‘basically Russian.’ After 1991, Miensk requested that the names of the state and language be rendered into other languages phonetically from Belarusian – for instance, as ‘Belarus’ and ‘Belarusian’ in English. However, in Russian, the pre-1991 Soviet and Russian imperial forms remain in regular use. Although sometimes Belarus is referred to in Russian as Belarus’ rather than Belorussiia, this concession does not extend to the Belarusian language, which in Russian only rarely is referred to as Belaruskii in some obscure publications (cf Strel’nikova 2011; Taras 2010: 480, 541). 16 This Soviet theory on the Slavic character of Moldavian (Moldovan) drew on the fact that the Romanian language was written in Cyrillic until the mid 1860s in Romania and as late as the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) in the Russian province (guberniia) of Bessarabia that is largely coterminous with today’s Moldova (cf Bolocan 1981; Ivănescu 2000: 686–692). In 1918, Bessarabia became part of interwar Romania. In 1940, Bucharest was compelled to hand over Bessarabia to the Soviet Union. The territory was fashioned into a Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (Djuvara 2017: 305–308, 325–328). After 1955, the Kremlin insisted that Moldavian (Moldovan) was a language in its own right, separate from Romanian, but dropped the claim that Moldavian (Moldovan) was one of the Slavic languages (Bruchis 1982: 149–275). However, Moldavian (Moldovan) continued to be written in Cyrillic until 1989, when the Latin alphabet superseded it (Zakon 1989). Upon the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Soviet Moldavia became independent Moldova. Yet Moldavian continues to be written in Cyrillic letters as an official language of the de facto state of Transnistria that split from Moldova in 1990–1992 (Moldavskii 2011). 17 In 1940, the German authorities decided that the Slavophone population practicing transhumant economy in the Carpathian county of Nowy Targ/Neumarkt belong to the ‘German(ic) race’ and must be separated from the Poles. Part of this process was a halfhearted attempt at creating a Goralian language. In German, the population was officially referred to as the Goralenvolk; in Polish, they are dubbed Górale; and in Slovak, they are known as Gorali or Horali (Kamusella 2009: 615; Szatkowski 2012). A revival of this language came after the fall of communism, with the publication of the Goralian translation of the New Testament (Ewangelie 2002; Nowy Testament 2005) and of the Goralian-Polish dictionary (Hodorowicz 2005). But the state authorities disapproved (Uwagi 2005), and in 2011, the ecclesiastical authorities prohibited the use of the Goralian New Testament in liturgy (Kuraś 2011). 18 The Italian occupation authorities introduced Italo-Slovenian bilingualism within their somewhat-autonomous Province of Ljubljana (Caccamo and Monzali 2009: 222, 244). Paradoxically, under the subsequent German occupation, the use of Slovenian was even extended to schools and offices in Trieste and its vicinity, where this language had been banned by the Italians during the interwar period (Collotti 1998: 99). 19 Ironically, the late-19th-century heydays of South Slav unity (‘Yugoslavism’) featured proposals to create an All-South Slavic language, including Bulgarian. But the Bulgarian elite was not ready to accept Serbian as such a hypothetical language’s written standard (Ivić 2014: 300). 20 I thank Rok Stergar for this reminder on the changing de facto status of Slovak in communist Czechoslovakia.

56  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe 21 Interestingly, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense’s website is also available in Belarusian, besides the site’s Russian- and English-language versions (Ministry of Defence 2018). 22 As Rok Stergar rightly points out, the achievement of this situation was not without some complications. For instance, the 1992 Constitution for the rump Yugoslavia (composed of Montenegro and Serbia), declared Cyrillic-based Serbian as the state’s official language, though the auxiliary use of the Latin script was also allowed (Constitution 1992: Art 15). Montenegro gained independence in 2006, and the following year, Montenegrin was made the state’s official language in the 2007 Constitution. However, until today, almost half of Montenegro’s inhabitants define their language as Serbian and only a third as Montenegrin (Lakić 2013: 134, 152). In addition, when the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro existed between 2003 and 2006, a never-accepted proposal appeared to rename the official language of Serbian, emulating the multi-variant name of defunct Serbo-Croatian, as srpskocrnogorski (srpsko-crnogorski)/crngorskosrpski (crnogorsko-srpski) – that is, Serbomontenegrin (Serbo-Montenegrin)/Montenegroserbian (Montenegro-Serbian). The form Serbomontenegrin (Serbo-Montenegrin) was to be official in Serbia and Montenegroserbian (Montenegro-Serbian) in Montenegro (Popiołek 2011: 197). 23 Certainly, there have been more alternative views on the classification of Slavic languages, espoused at different times in different countries or by different scholars and academic centers in Central Europe and outside the region. Likewise, a variety of factors and approaches have been used to justify this or that preferred classification. Officially accepted classifications, be they in academia or by a state administration, have often coexisted with alternative ones, the latter given a modicum of support by a minority group of scholars or a political party. Importantly, there have always been emic (folk, vernacular) classifications held by (typically unschooled or with no formal education) Slavophones at the local level of their town, village or region in the form of unanalyzed ‘common knowledge,’ passed from generation to generation via the medium of just-so stories. Oftentimes, within the framework of such ‘folk classifications,’ people have not accorded any specific linguonym to their own language (‘speech’), terming it ‘simply’ našinski (‘ours’) naš je(a)zik (‘our language’), po naschy(i)mu/po naszymu (‘[speaking] in our own [specific] manner’), or prosta(ia) mova (‘simple, common language’) (cf Danylenko 2006; Glasnik 1940: 73; Gościniak 2012: 323; Peti-Stantić 2008). If all the alternative and folk views were taken into account, then the number of Slavic languages would be potentially huge and rather innumerable. On the other hand, panslavists tend to interpret the widespread folk use of such terms as ‘our language’ or ‘simple language’ as ‘the proof’ of the existence of a single All-Slavic language. (I thank Rok Stergar for drawing my attention to this important insight.) 24 I thank Catherine Gibson for reminding me about the necessity of making this point more explicit. 25 Interestingly, the Republika Srpska is the only Serbian ethnic polity where the use of the Serbian language in public and private is conducted almost exclusively with the employment of Cyrillic. This insistence on scriptally emphasized ‘ethnic purity’ is even more clearly visible in the retaining of the polity’s Serbian-language official name in international use. It is never translated into English (‘Serbian Republic’) or into any other language. On the other hand, the Constitution of the Republika Srpska allows for the use of all Bosnia’s official languages (Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian) in scripts that are typical for them (namely Cyrillic and Latin) (Ustav 1992/1995: Art 7). This arrangement is as if a mirror reflection of the situation in Serbia, where the Constitution provides that Cyrillic is the sole official script (Constitution 2006: Art 10), whereas in reality, both Cyrillic script and Latin script are employed in equal measure. But only the Latin alphabet is employed in Bosnia’s Bosnian-Croatian Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the fact that its constitution provides for official use

A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe  57 of all Bosnia’s three official languages in their two alphabets (Constitution 1994–2003: Art 6). 26 It is one of a variety of possible emic (insider) views on the situation. This emic view presents the situation of ‘real’ Slavic languages as seen through the lens of the Bulgarian, Russian and Serbo/Croatian national master narratives. This perspective is unacceptable to most patriotic Belarusians, Bosniaks (Bosnians), Macedonians, Montenegrins and Ukrainians. Their emic view of the Slavic Einzelsprachen tends to overlap with the etic (or ‘outside, scholarly’) perspective (cf Figure 5a). 27 Since the 19th century, philologists or linguists have aspired to make Einzelsprachen and dialects ‘visible’ and ‘detectable’ through linguistic maps and atlases; ethnographic and folklore studies; and sound recordings. These studies are then presented as ‘tangible proof’ of the primordial existence of Einzelsprachen, though in reality, such research rather creates than describes languages. Finally, after all this staggering effort, no detector has been developed with the use of which a scholar could go into the field and ‘discover’ Einzelsprachen where they have not been created yet. And even in Europe, where Einzelsprachen have been created and maintained for hundreds of years, there is no way to detect them in the same unambiguous manner as one can weigh a kilogram of flour. What to someone is Serbo-Croatian another person sees as Montenegrin or Bosnian. In Germany, books translated from English are annotated with the note that they were translated from the American language (aus dem Amerikanischen) or from the Canadian language (aus dem Kanadischen) if the author happens to be a citizen of the United States or of Canada (cf Joffe 2003).   Einzelsprachen as part of social reality are a figment of human imagination. They can be ‘seen’ only in a mind’s eye, because languages do not exist independently of humans and their groups. Like the rest of social reality, Einzelsprachen are stored in people’s brains. This social reality does not have any physical (‘tangible’) existence beyond people’s and their groups’ readiness to act and behave in line with some preselected ideas. (I thank Catherine Gibson for urging me to explain this point in detail.) 28 The concept of ‘dialect continuum’ describes well sociolinguistic situations before the 20th century, when the majority of people stayed near their birthplace. Subsequently, it becomes less useful as an analytical tool in later periods in light of the increasing mobility and exposure to different parts of the continuum through mass media and universal education that both valorize Einzelsprachen at the expense of these swaths of a given continuum that did not become a basis for codifying any recognized Einzelsprache. On the other hand, this change clearly shows how the ‘primary sociolinguistic reality on the ground’ (i.e., dialect continua) is replaced by Einzelsprachen or is a conscious product of humans and their groups fleshed out with the employment of the technology of writing and the mental technology (concept) of Einzelsprache. The process of replacing dialect continua with Einzelsprachen can be likened to the replacement of ‘continuous’ primeval forests with ‘discrete and homogenous’ forests planted by humans. (I thank Catherine Gibson for coaxing me to explain this point in detail.) 29 Earlier, before the age of nationalisms, such splitting of dialect continua was largely unplanned and not geared towards any ethnolinguistic nationalism. The process’s main cause was the long-lasting isolation of groups of population, mainly due to geographical barriers and the enforced immobility of peasantry under the centuries-long system of serfdom. In addition, destructive warfare tended to displace entire groups of people and replaced them with other ones, often speaking in varieties from altogether different dialect continua. With the onset of modernity, as heralded by the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in Central Europe, the effort to translate the Bible into vernaculars elevated some dialects at the expense of others. Subsequently, if a given translation was approved and came to be widely used, enterprising printers produced even more religious books and even more secular books in the new Einzelsprache of such a translation.

58  A brief unnatural history of languages in Europe 30 In the 1830s, Ljudevit Gaj (Ludwig Gay), from Croatia’s Kajkavian hinterland, opted for ‘foreign’ Štokavian as a preferred dialectal basis for the postulated All-South Slavic language of Illyrian. In this manner, he wanted to claim the prestigious Slavophone literary tradition of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) for Illyrian. The tradition of this Illyrian language and national (Yugoslav) movement brushed off onto today’s standard of Croatian. As a result, standard Croatian is steeped in Štokavian, instead of Kajkavian, which is the vernacular of the Croatian capital of Zagreb (Bellamy 2003: 44; Miller 1997: 26–27). 31 On today’s ‘linguistic’ maps of the Slovenian and Croatian (Serbo-Croatian) dialects, these two groups of dialects are proposed to be separate and meet discretely only on the state frontier that separates Slovenia from Croatia. This example shows how the perception of and research on the linguistic is rather arbitrarily subjected to given political needs and considerations. In reality, within the South Slavic dialect continuum, change is gradual, with no sharp ‘linguistic cliff’ that would coincide with a political or administrative boundary. The ideologized, and as such highly arbitrary, conflating of the political and the linguistic, so characteristic of ethnolinguistic nationalism, is presented and analyzed in detail by Marko Zajc (2006) in his monograph on the oftentimesarbitrary establishment of the Croatian-Slovenian administrative border at the turn of the 20th century. Purportedly, this border followed the ‘clearly discernible’ linguistic boundary (that never was [Lundberg 2003]) between Slovenian and Croatian. But in reality, local bureaucrats and leaders established this border by taking into account economic, topographic, agricultural, personal and other considerations. However, nowadays, philologists use this earlier administrative and now-political Slovenian-Croatian frontier to ‘naturally’ separate Slovenia’s dialects from Croatia’s. 32 The first novel written in Trasianka was published in 2018 (Cień 2018). 33 Yet in line with the subsequent regulations of 1995, 2000 and 2010, an official English-based Latin script transliteration was adopted for the Ukrainian language (cf Ukrains’ka latynka 2018). Software solutions exist for converting Ukrainian texts from Cyrillic to Latin letters (Ukrainian Translit 2018), while a couple of Latin script– based Ukrainian-language online news portals employ unofficial Czech-style Latin alphabets (Na chasi 2018; UkrajinaTak.Today 2018). Unlike the case of Belarusian, Ukrainian has no national Latin alphabet. Officially, Cyrillic remains this language’s sole script. 34 Officially, this adoption of the Belarusian Latin alphabet is presented as a ‘transliteration’ system. Differences between it and the Belarusian Latin alphabet are few; for instance, the Cyrillic digraph [ль] is rendered as [ĺ] in this system, instead of the Belarusian Latin letter [ł] (Instruction 2018). 35 However, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and tacit annexation of eastern Ukraine in 2014, a spatial political border rapidly coalesces for separating Ukrainian from Russian. 36 However, on the way to standardizing modern Croatian and Slovenian, in the former case, linguists included some elements from 17th- and 18th-century Slavophone classics of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) and Dalmatia and from 16th-century ‘Slovenian’ Protestant literature in the latter. This distanced both Einzelsprachen from everyday speech and thus also made standard Croatian somewhat different from standard Serbian (Greenberg 2004: 48; Kosi 2013: 43–46, 152; Stergar 2018). The apparent model for this antiquization was the standard Czech language, radically based on the 16th-century Bohemian (Czech) of the translation of the Protestant (Hussite) Bible of Kralice.

2 Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages

Now I have a synoptic look at Slavic nonstate languages officially recognized as minority or regional ones (European 1992), often without tying them up with a specific autonomous administrative unit or republic. The languages are Bunjevac (i.e., the fifth post-Serbo-Croatian language) in Serbia’s Vojvodina; Burgenland Croatian in Austria; Low Sorbian and Upper Sorbian in Germany;1 Kashubian and Lemkian in Poland; Molise Slavic (‘Croatian’) and Resian (‘Slovenian’) in Italy; Paulician (Banat ‘Bulgarian’) in Romania; and (Carpatho-)Rusyn in Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia’s Vojvodina and Ukraine. In total, I look at ten languages. In addition, the unrecognized minority and regional Slavic ‘microlanguages’ (alongside ‘language projects’) include Aegean Macedonian in Greece, East Slovak in Slovakia; Gorani in Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia; Lachian, Moravian and Prussian (Prajzština) in the Czech Republic; Mazurian and Silesian in Poland and Germany; Podlachian in Poland, Pomakian in Greece; Prekmurje Slovenian in Hungary and Slovenia;2 Venetian Slavic in Italy; and West Polesian in Belarus. These constitute another 13.3 Furthermore, the two ‘written dialects’ of Croatian, namely Čakavian and Kajkavian, should be mentioned.4 In the linguistic reality of the South Slavic dialect continuum, both differ more from standard Croatian than Serbian does, while from the same vantage point, Kajkavian is closer to Slovenian than to standard Croatian (Lund­berg 2003). On this account, as well as on the strength of publications brought out in these two ‘literate dialectal’ varieties of Croatian, I believe that Čakavian and Kajkavian should be added to the tally. Thus, all the three categories of the Slavic sub/ nonstate languages add up to 25 (see Figure 2a). In each case, the Einzelsprache character of these languages is confirmed at least by a dictionary (however basic) and some publications produced in these languages (cf Dulichenko 2011: 315–434; Kamusella 2017b; Moravština 2017; Návrhy 2017; Prajzština 2017; Slezské 2012; Šolaja 2007). The internet should not be overlooked, either, since the socio-political importance of cyberspace has grown by leaps and bounds during the past two decades. From all the post-Serbo-Croatian languages, the officially defunct language of Serbo-Croatian still enjoys the largest Wikipedia among all the postSerbo-Croatian languages (Serbo-Croatian Wikipedia 2017). Serbo-Croatian

60  Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages Type of Language

Names

Number

Recognized Languages (with some official status) Unrecognized Languages (with no official status)

Bunjevac, Burgenland Croatian, Kashubian, Lemkian, Low Sorbian, Molise Slavic, Paulician, Resian, Rusyn, Upper Sorbian Aegean Macedonian, East Slovak, Gorani, Lachian, Mazurian, Moravian, Podlachian, Pomakian, Prekmurje Slovenian, Prussian, Silesian, Venetian Slavic, West Polesian Čakavian, Kajkavian

10

Recognized Sublanguage Varieties Recognized Internet Languages Total

Classical Belarusian, Serbo-Croatian

13

2 2 27

Figure 2a The status of the Slavic ‘microlanguages’ in 2017

is doing rather well on the web, in contrast to some other post-Yugoslav languages. So if this now eminently internet language of Serbo-Croatian is included in the tally, the number of all the Slavic sub/nonstate languages in 2017 rises to 26. However, that is not all. To the tally, yet another ‘internet language’ needs to be added. After 1995, when alongside Belarusian, Russian was declared another official language of Belarus, the authorities decided to employ the Soviet Russifying 1933 orthography. The prodemocracy opposition see it as another step toward the final replacement of Belarusian with Russian as the main official language of this country. Thus, they side with the first (known as ‘classical’) orthography of this language as codified in 1918. In contrast to the Russifying orthography that emphasizes similarities between Russian and Belarusian, the classical orthography concentrates on making differences between these two languages clearer and more distinct5 (Belaruski 2017; Taraškievica 2017). The competition between the ‘pro-Russian’ (official) and ‘patriotic’ (unofficial) orthographies came to a head in 2004, when a Belarusian Wikipedia was founded. Two years later, the conflict was resolved by bifurcating this Wikipedia into two separate Belarusian Wikipedias, one in the official orthography and the other in the classical one (Belarusian Wikipedia 2017). As a result, two varieties of the Belarusian language function on an equal footing on the internet, often referred to as Official Belarusian and Classical Belarusian. The former is prescribed by the state authorities in Belarus, while the other is preferred by the Belarusian opposition and (pre- and anti-Soviet) diaspora. The orthographic difference between these two is not construed in the terms of different languages (Einzelsprachen), but for all practical reasons, Official Belarusian is more different from Classical Belarusian than Montenegrin is from Serbian. Hence, I propose to classify Classical Belarusian at least as an internet language, which increases the overall tally to 27.

Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages  61 State

Languages

Religion

Gorani (Našinski) Islam Burgenland Croatian Catholicism Classical Belarusian Orthodoxy and West Polesian Uniatism (Greek Catholicism) Bulgaria Pomakian Islam Croatia Čakavian Catholicism Kajkavian Czech Lachian Catholicism and Republic Moravian atheism Prussian Silesian Germany Lower Sorbian Protestantism Upper Sorbian Catholicism Greece Aegean Macedonian Orthodoxy Pomakian Islam Hungary Prekmurje Slovenian Catholicism and Protestantism Rusyn Greek Catholicism and Orthodoxy Italy Molise Slavic Catholicism Resian Venetian Slavic Kosovo Gorani (Našinski) Islam Poland Kashubian Catholicism Silesian Mazurian Protestantism Lemkian (Rusyn) Greek Catholicism Podlachian and Orthodoxy Romania Paulician (Banat Catholicism Bulgarian) Serbia Bunjevac Catholicism Paulician (Banat Bulgarian) Rusyn Greek Catholicism and Orthodoxy Slovakia East Slovak (Slovjak) Catholicism, Protestantism and Greek Catholicism Rusyn Greek Catholicism and Orthodoxy Slovenia Prekmurje Slovenian Catholicism and Protestantism Turkey Pomakian Islam Ukraine Rusyn Greek Catholicism and Orthodoxy (online) Serbo-Croatian Atheism, Catholicism, ‘Yugoslavia’ Islam and Orthodoxy Albania Austria Belarus

Script Latin Latin Cyrillic (sometimes Latin) Cyrillic Cyrillic (sometimes Latin) Latin Latin

Latin Greek (sometimes Cyrillic) Greek (sometimes Latin) Latin Cyrillic Latin Cyrillic Latin Cyrillic Latin Latin Cyrillic Latin Cyrillic Latin Latin Cyrillic Latin and Cyrillic

Figure 2b The localization and scripts of the Slavic ‘microlanguages’ in 2017, alongside the corresponding speech communities’ religions

62  Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages Another all-too-rarely noticed kind of Slavic languages is pidgins (creoles). These contact languages arise when traders (or, more broadly, communities) speaking radically different idioms meld elements of their Einzelsprachen into an ad hoc (trade) language, or pidgin (cf Dakhlia 2008). By definition, a pidgin is not the first language of any extant speech community. Should a speech community eventually acquire it as its first language, the pidgin is said to have become a creole. The best-known pidgins and creoles are connected to the expansion of Western empires during the modern period. In the context of Slavic languages, the expansion of the Russian Empire produced such Slavic-based pidgins. Muscovy’s early modern annexations of the multiethnic Volga region with peoples’ speaking Turkic and Finno-Ugric languages yielded Bashkir-Russian, Chuvash-Russian, Mari-Russian or Tatar-Russian pidgins. In the European part of Russia, during the long 19th century, pidgins of this kind used to be represented by Russonorsk (Norwegian-Russian) in the Kola Peninsula and Solombala English (EnglishRussian) in the vicinity of Arkhangelsk. Also, an ethnolinguistically unspecified Caucasian pidgin emerged in the wake of the extremely violent (at times even genocidal) Russian incursions across the Caucasus. This Caucasian pidgin incorporated varying elements from the region’s multiple languages, depending on an area. Hence, it was a group of Caucasian pidgins, plural, not a single one (Perekhval’skaia 2014: 78–79, 89–94, 98–100). A linguistic phenomenon closely related to the development of the Caucasian pidgin(s) is Balachka. The Russian expansion in the Caucasus was preceded by the seizure of Crimea and Kuban from the Ottoman Empire in the late 18th century. Little Russian (Ukrainian)-speaking Cossacks in the Russian imperial service were deployed for both conquering and settling the lands, especially Kuban. Cossacks remained St. Petersburg’s prime offensive and conquering forces until the end of the Russian Empire (cf Richmond 2013; Tsutsiev 2014: 9, 26, 49). Their originally Ukrainian speech changed through interaction with the Russian language of the empire’s administration and officer corps and finally yielded the Cossacks’ specific ethnolect Balachka, meaning ‘[our way of] talking.’ In many ways, Balachka is similar to present-day eastern Ukraine’s mixed UkrainianRussian idiom of Surzhyk. From the perspective of language politics, Russian linguists see Balachka as a dialect of Russian, while their Ukrainian colleagues see it as a Ukrainian dialect. On the other hand, the Cossacks – who have been recognized in Russia as an ethnic group in their own right since the mid 1990s (Foxall 2015: 88, 126) – consider Balachka to be their own national language6 (Balachka 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). Due to the interaction between traders from the Chinese and Russian empires, beginning in the 18th century, several Russo-Chinese pidgins emerged, namely the Kiakhta pidgin in the market town of Kiakhta (nowadays on the border with Mongolia), the Maima(t)chin pidgin near Kiakhta in another border trading town that later ceased to exist, the Ussurian pidgin (along the Ussuri river that doubles as the Russo-Chinese frontier), the Manchurian pidgin (in once-Russiandominated Manchuria), the Kukan pidgin in Birobidzhan and Khabarovsk region and the Primorian pidgin (in Russia’s Primorie, also known as Outer Manchuria).

Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages  63 The ethnically varied population of Primorie Region also spawned other pidgins – i.e., Negidal-Russian, Udege-Russian, Taz-Russian and ‘Local Russian(s)’ (Russian ethnolects) – with elements drawn from Chinese, Nanas, Taz and Udege. In some localities, this Local Russian was strongly influenced by Korean speakers. More Russian-based pidgins – namely Dolgan-Russian, Nganasan-Russian and Taymyr Russian (with Dolgan, Enets, Evenk, Nenets and Nganasan elements) in the Taymyr Peninsula, alongside Kamchatka’s Aleutian-Russian, Itelmen-Russian and Koryak-Russian – were recorded along Siberia’s northeastern coast. To this listing the Russian-based Alaskan pidgin should be added, given that Moscow sold Alaska to the United States only in 1867 (Perekhval’skaia 2014: 78–79, 89–94, 98–100). Interestingly, the so-called ‘European’ pidgin, which emerged in Harbin (or the capital of Russian-controlled Manchuria) at the turn of the 20th century among the staff of the Chinese Eastern Railway, apart from Chinese and Russian linguistic elements, also involved Polish ones, because the plurality of the line’s railway workers were of this ethnic origin (Perekhval’skaia 2014: 91). The Russian-based Siberian pidgin that developed over the course of the Russian colonization of Siberia from the 16th through the 19th centuries came in numerous local varieties, depending on the ethnic makeup of a given region or area – for instance, Evenki-Russian (Perekhval’skaia 2014: 98, 312–346). Most certainly, the number of unrecorded Slavic (Russian)-based pidgins was much higher. They emerged over the course of the long 16th- to 20th-century expansion of Muscovy and the Russian Empire into the Caucasus and the northern Black Sea littoral, across Siberia into Central Asia and across Alaska, alongside the western coast of Northern America into what is today the United States’ state of Oregon. Because of economic changes and especially because of strict border control, complete with militarized border fences, introduced in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, all the aforementioned 19th-century border trade pidgins seemingly disappeared (cf Ziemke 2004: 199). On the other hand, the imposition of Russian on schooling and administration after 1938, coupled with tightly enforced compulsory elementary education for all, rapidly limited the use of pidgins across the

European pidgins

Asian pidgins

Balachka, Bashkir-Russian, Caucasian, ChuvashRussian, Mari-Russian, Russonorsk, TatarRussian, Solombala English [8]

Afghan-Russian, Alaskan pidgin, Aleutian-Russian, Chechen-Russian, Dolgan-Russian, European pidgin, Evenki-Russian, Itelmen-Russian, Kiakhta pidgin, Korean-influenced Local Russian pidgin, KoryakRussian, Kukan pidgin, Local Russian pidgin, Maima(t)chin pidgin, Manchurian pidgin, NegidalRussian, Nganasan-Russian, Primorian pidgin, Siberian pidgin, Taymyr pidgin, Taz-Russian, UdegeRussian, Ussurian pidgin [23]

Figure 2c  Examples of Russian (Slavic)-based pidgins (trade languages), 18th–20th centuries

64  Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages Soviet Union’s largest union republic, or the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (i.e., today’s Russian Federation) (cf Smith 2013: 117). In their stead, either bilingualism emerged in Russian and a local language, or local languages were abandoned in favor of Russian. But during the Cold War, Soviet specialists were sent to numerous postcolonial countries across the world with the mission of enticing them to the Soviet bloc. When prolonged Soviet presence entailed intensive interaction with local populations, pidgins inevitably emerged for the sake of communication. Literature registers the Bauxite (Boksitskii) language, which was how Russian-speaking Soviet engineers and workers spoke local French in Guinea. Its name tells the language’s story: Soviet specialists helped the Guineans develop mines of bauxite (aluminum ore) (Perekhval’skaia 2014: 303–311). I also risk speculating that the decade-long Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979–1989) and the two recent Russo-Chechen wars (1994–1996, 1999–2000) must have produced Russian-based Afghan and Chechen pidgins, respectively (cf Liakhovskii 1995: 251; Starodymov 2009: 95). With the fall of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union, cross-border trade immediately picked up in postcommunist Russia, leading to the possibility of new, especially Chinese-Russian, pidgins (Stern 2016). At the turn of the 21st century, the number of ethnic Chinese migrants in Russia’s Far East was estimated at 200,000 to 400,000 (Gel’bras 2001: 4). Given the rapid growth of the Chinese economy and Russia’s tightening and multiplying links with Beijing, the number definitely crossed the threshold of half a million. However, the migration being temporary and on tourist visas, it is rarely acknowledged and mostly brushed aside as of ‘no actual consequence’ (Gulina 2015). The opening of the previously tightly sealed frontier of the Soviet Union (and after 1991 the opening of the Russian and most post-Soviet countries’ borders) led to the outflow of millions of Russian-speaking Soviet citizens. Where they constituted compact communities abroad, the interaction with the local population and their language brought about pidgin-style or macaronic (mixed) forms of Russian. A large number of such Russophones left for Germany, ostensibly as ethnic Germans. During World War II, Soviet Germans lost all their autonomous territories, where German used to be the language of everyday life and administration. Furthermore, they were forbidden to use German in public. As a result, the transmission of this language stopped both in communities and in families. The necessity to acquire the German language in Germany (as expected of each German citizen, including ethnic Germans from the post-Soviet states) brought about intensive interaction with their then native Russian language, leading to the rise of the German-Russian pidgin (Deutschrussisch in German or Nemrus in Russian), often dubbed Quelia by its users (Belentschikow and Handke 2018; GermanRussian 2018; Rosenberg 2001; Russischsprachige 2018). Certainly, the even bigger influx of Russian-speaking Soviet Jews to Israel in the 1990s must have resulted in a Ivrit (Modern Hebrew)-Russian pidgin (cf Novikov 2016). Such a pidgin is a result, on the one hand, of this large community’s self-conscious decision to retain Russian as the dominant language of their intra-group communication and, on the other, of the state’s determinedly coaxing them toward Hebrew

Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages  65 with the use of education, administrative methods and compulsory military service. However, the state administration’s efforts to this end tend to be frustrated by generalized prejudice shown by Israel’s (‘indigenous’) Jews to these ‘Russian newcomers,’ who after over two decades in the country are still seen as ‘insufficiently Jewish’ (Borschel-Dan 2016). After the breakup of the Soviet Union, numerous Russophones of Jewish and other ethnic origins settled in Anglophone states in more or less compact Russianspeaking communities. The prime example is Brighton Beach in New York City. On the other hand, with an eye to improved employment prospects, beginning in the 1990s, Russian speakers in post-Soviet countries began to acquire English quite rapidly. During the last decade of the 20th century, an imperfect command of English was coupled with the use of ad hoc Latin alphabet transliterations for writing online, because at that time, no standard coding was available for Cyrillic. Since the early 21st century, these phenomena have been collectively referred to as ‘Runglish,’ shorthand for ‘Russian English’ (Translit 2018). At the turn of the 21st century, the freedom of using languages on the web as one sees fit led to the development of an internet jocular variety of Russian with its own vocabulary and rules of spelling, known as Olbanian (Krongauz 2013; Padonkaffsky 2018). The phenomenon of imperfect bilingualism among Russia’s non-ethnic Russians, especially when reinforced by the revival of a given official language in some autonomous republic, may produce ‘interlanguages’ or ethnic varieties (ethnolects) of Russian (cf Arabski 1979; Majewicz 1989: 10). The Russian legislation recognizes 26 official languages in the federation’s autonomous republics. However, the matter is further complicated by the fact that some 30-odd languages of Dagestan could be added to this list as well, resulting in almost 50 Economic and military expansion

Migrant communities

Internet

Ethnolects of Russian in the Russian Federation’s autonomous republics

Afghan-Russian, Chechen-Russian, Bauxite [3]

Chinese-Russian, Ivrit-Russian, Quelia (GermanRussian) [3]

Olbanian, Runglish [2]

Abaza, Adyghe, Altai, Avar, Bashkir, Buryat, Chechen, Chukchi, Chuvash, Dargwa, Erzya, Eskimo7, Even, Evenk, Ingush, Kabardian, Kalmyk, Karelian, Khakas, Khanty, Komi, Komi-Permyak, Koryak, Kumyk, Lak, Lezgian, Mansi, Mari, Moksha, Nanai, Nenets, Nogai, Ossetian, Tabasaran, Tatar, Tuvan, Udmurt, Yakut [38]

Figure 2d Examples of Russian-based pidgins and mixed (macaronic) languages, 20th– 21st centuries

66  Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages languages (Languages of Russia 2017). Perhaps, in this regard, the best yardstick is the publication of books in non-Russian official (minority) languages of the Russian Federation. The most recent Russian statistics show that books are produced in the following 38 languages of the country’s autonomous republics: Abaza, Adyghe, Altai, Avar, Bashkir, Buryat, Chechen, Chukchi, Chuvash, Dargwa, Erzya, Eskimo (i.e., Eskimo-Aleut languages), Even, Evenk, Ingush, Kabardian, Kalmyk, Karelian, Khakas, Khanty, Komi, Komi-Permyak, Koryak, Kumyk, Lak, Lezgian, Mansi, Mari, Moksha, Nanai, Nenets, Nogai, Ossetian, Tabasaran, Tatar, Tuvan, Udmurt and Yakut (Vypusk 2018). Hence, around 38 ethnolects of Russian could exist in today’s Russian Federation. No books in Belarusian and Ukrainian have been (officially) published in the Russian Federation, though at two million and a half a million respectively, Ukrainians and Belarusians constitute the second and ninth biggest minority groups in this country, namely 1.4 percent and 0.38 percent of Russia’s population, according to the 2010 census (Demographics of Russia 2018b). For all practical reasons, either Belarusian and Ukrainian are treated as dialects of Russian in which no publications should be brought out, or the speakers of these two languages are expected (coaxed) to avail themselves of publications in Russian only (cf Barysheva 2018; Karlina 2017; Naumko 2015; Sokolov 2019). In multilingual and polyconfessional Central Europe before the age of nationalism, polyglossia and social exclusion also led to the emergence of ethnicityspecific or religion-specific forms of dominant Einzelsprachen, nowadays often dubbed ‘ethnolects’ (Kacprzak 2008; Kamusella 2004b; Majewicz 1989: 10; Verschik 2007). In these premodern times, Central Europe’s societies were composed from unequal estates (socio-politico-religious groups) into which one happened to be allocated by the accident of birth. The more such a group was marginalized and isolated from the rest of society by generalized prejudice, the higher the possibility of the emergence of such ethnolects, especially if the group concerned also adopted the tactics of self-isolation for the sake of protection and self-defense. The best-known examples of such commonly maligned and marginalized groups in Central Europe were Jews and Roma (Gypsies). Jewish ‘ethnolect languages’ emerged and developed on the basis of other Einzelsprachen by having been infused with Hebrew and Aramaic words and terms. Other forms of languages employed by Jews can be classified as Jewish ‘ethnolect registers’ of dominant Einzelsprachen, employed for official and everyday business by non-Jews in the states with substantial Jewish presence. The main difference between these two kinds of Jewish ethnolects is that the former (ethnolect languages) were adopted by Jewish communities as their own Einzelsprachen and were (and continue to be) written in the sole legitimate Jewish script – Hebrew letters. On the other hand, the latter sort of Jewish ethnolects (ethnolect registers) have been written in the dominant Einzelsprache’s writing system, but with a substantial admixture of specifically Jewish expressions derived from Hebrew, Aramaic and Hebrew script–based Jewish ethnolects languages (i.e., usually, from Yiddish and Spanyol [Ladino] and later from Ivrit [Modern Hebrew] as well).

Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages  67 Knaanic (Canaanic, Judeo-Czech, Judeo-Slavic) was a Slavic-based Jewish ethnolect language. It developed in medieval Bohemia and Moravia, and it was also employed in Poland and Lusatia in the 10th–12th centuries (cf Bláha, Dittmann and Uličná 2013). Some propose that the Judeo-Germanic ethnolect language of Yiddish (literally ‘Jewish German’) developed from a Slavic-based Jewish ethnolect language (namely Knaanic) that was gradually relexified with German(ic) vocabulary (Spolsky 2014: 178–187; Wexler 1987). By extension, Ivrit (Modern Hebrew) coalesced on the syntactical basis of Yiddish, whose lexicon was relexified with Hebrew and Aramaic words. In addition, initially, the vast majority of creators, promoters and users of Ivrit were Yiddish speakers, usually with an excellent command of Russian, Polish or both. This means that Ivrit could be credibly classified as a Slavic-based Jewish ethnolect language, though twice removed from its original Slavophone lexical basis but nevertheless with some Slavic syntactical patterns remaining intact or (unintentionally) reintroduced (Wexler 1990). Jewish ethnolect registers of dominant non-Jewish Einzelsprachen used to be represented by the Jewish ethnolects of Polish (Brzezina 1986; Ohrenstein 1905; Shmeruk 2011) and Russian (cf Russkii iazyk Odessy 2018). However, the Jewish Pale of Settlement was located mainly within what is today Belarus, the easternmost third of Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine (i.e., the historical polity of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania). Therefore, what is commonly referred to as Jewish ethnolects registers of Polish or Russian in many cases had to be Jewish ethnolect registers of Belarusian and Ukrainian (alongside Lithuanian) or basically of local Slavic and other dialects (cf Gintilos 2009). Such Jewish ethnolect registers initially emerged as trade pidgins for communication with the local non-Jewish population and became ethnolectized (creolized) when a Jewish community adopted one of them as the community’s language of everyday communication. In the case of Central Europe, this process of ethnolectization was connected to the assimilation of Jews. The Jewish assimilationist generation that was in the process of making a switch from Yiddish to the dominant Einzelsprache spoke and wrote a specifically Jewish (Yiddish-influenced) ethnolect register of this Einzelsprache. At the turn of the 20th century, when political antisemitism reached its initial acme marked by widespread pogroms, the non-Jewish elite using a given Einzelsprache often disparaged Jewish assimilationist aspirations and saw the Jewish ethnolect register of this national Einzelsprache as symbolic of a lack of education or even of an inherent inability of Jews to master a ‘Christian language’ (cf Davies 2012: 115). The second generation of determined assimilationist Jews already spoke and wrote a target Einzelsprache as well as gentiles did or even better (cf Papierkowski 1964; Polonsky 2005: 193; Sandauer 2005). On the other hand, traditionalist Jews who rejected assimilation (e.g., Hassidim), stuck to their Jewish language (usually Yiddish) and acquired a local gentile Einzelsprache just to the level of a trade pidgin (cf Brzezina 1986; Shanes 2012). Hence, Slavic-based Jewish ethnolect registers arguably appeared and swiftly disappeared, while their ‘pidgin-style’ counterparts stayed around before the Holocaust in all the Slavophone nation-states (including Soviet ‘national’ union

68  Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages republics) with a substantial Jewish presence. Even when counting conservatively, interwar Central Europe featured Jewish ethnolects registers (and related pidgins) of Belarusian, Czech, Polish, Russian, Rusyn, Slovak, Serbian (SerboCroatian) and Ukrainian. The case of Jews and their ethnolect languages and ethnolect registers of nonJewish Einzelsprachen in Central Europe is to a degree similar to that of the linguistic situation of the region’s Roma (‘Gypsies’) (cf Marushiakova and Popov 2016b: 1–9). As Jews were marginalized, because of antisemitism, Roma were and still are marginalized because of rife anti-Roma sentiment (anti-Tsiganism, Romophobia, anti-Gypsism). Wartime Germany planned and carried out genocides of Jews (Holocaust) and Roma (Porajmos). These were the only two peoples whom the Third Reich under the nazi government, aspired to exterminate in full (cf Rose 2003). After the war, the vast majority of Jewish survivors left Central Europe for Israel, the United States or Western Europe. This option was not available to Roma, because no Roma nation-state was founded after 1945. Until recently, there was almost no recognition for the Porajmos, meaning that

Jewish ethnolect languages

Jewish ethnolect registers (pidgins)

Roma ethnolect languages

Roma ethnolect registers (pidgins)

Ivrit (?), Knaanic, Yiddish (?) [3]

Belarusian, Czech, Polish, Russian, Rusyn, Slovak, Serbian (SerboCroatian), Ukrainian [8]

Bulgarian Romani, Czech Romani, Macedonian Romani, Slovak Romani, Soviet Romani, Yugoslav Romani [6]

Belarusian, Bulgarian, Bulgarian-Romanian, Bulgarian-Tatar, Bulgarian-Turkish, Croatian (SerboCroatian), CroatianRomanian, Czech, Czech-Romanian, CzechSlovak, Macedonian, Macedonian-Albanian, Macedonian-Turkish, Serbian (SerboCroatian), Polish, Polish-Russian, Russian, Russian-Ukrainian, Rusyn, Slovak, Slovak-Hungarian, Slovak-Romanian, Slovak-Rusyn, Silesian, Ukrainian, Ukrainian-Hungarian, Ukrainian-Romanian, Ukrainian-Russian, Ukrainian-Rusyn, Ukrainian-Tatar [31]

Figure 2e Jewish and Roma Slavic-based ethnolects

Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages  69 after World War II, neither Western Europe nor North America extended a preferential immigration path for Roma survivors of the Porajmos. Unlike Jews, Roma traditionally did not write or read, and even nowadays they are on average less literate than their non-Roma neighbors. It is another result of persisting anti-Roma sentiment that pushes Roma to the socio-economic margins in Central Europe’s states. However, in the 20th century, there were two state-supported programs for developing full-fledged modern-style (even national or nation-building-like in spirit) literacy in the Romani language, first in the interwar Soviet Union and then in postwar communist Yugoslavia. The end products of these efforts were a Soviet Romani language and a Yugoslav Romani language. Both Roma ethnolect languages were strongly influenced by Slavic idioms, specifically by Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian in the Soviet case and by Serbo-Croatian in the case of Yugoslavia. After the fall of communism, at least, Bulgarian, Czech, Macedonian and Slovak varieties of Romani were developed, alongside others in Central Europe’s non-Slavic national polities (Marushiakova and Popov 2016a). Unfortunately, as in the case of Jews before World War II, the continuing socioeconomic marginalization of Roma in present-day Central Europe prevents them from mastering the official (national) languages of the countries where they live. As a result, most Roma end up speaking Roma ethnolect registers of such nonRoma Einzelsprachen. Sometimes, Roma are identifiable to the non-Roma public in that they speak in either Romani or a Roma ethnolect register of the local official language (though most often non-Roma use cues other than linguistic ones for this purpose, namely Roma’s specific clothing and trades). Unlike the case of Jews, among Roma, assimilation and the switch to the standard version of an official language are seriously hindered by the aforementioned socio-economic marginalization of Roma, in addition to illiteracy, which is widespread among many Roma communities. Apparently, only exceptionally was a Jewish ethnolect register creolized and only exceptionally did it become a language of communication within a Jewish family or community, with the notable exception of Yiddish (Wexler 2002). On the contrary, it appears to be the norm among today’s Roma in the post-Porajmos Europe, where (even well-intended) state policies and rife discrimination cause Roma to cease using Romani for intergroup communication. The Roma ethnolect registers of Czech and Slovak are best known because of some research conducted on these varieties (Bořkovcová 2006). However, such Roma ethnolect registers of Belarusian, Bulgarian, Croatian (Serbo-Croatian), Macedonian, Serbian (Serbo-Croatian), Polish, Russian, Rusyn and Ukrainian also exist. But the matter is not this straightforward, because in a single nationstate, several distinct Roma communities may live side by side, each speaking a different communal language (cf Marushiakova and Popov 2016b: 1–8). For instance, in Bulgaria, some Roma speak Bulgarian, while others speak Romanian (or Aromanian? [cf Map 1886; Zandlová 2015]), Tatar or Turkish (the picture is even more complicated by religions that they follow, namely Islam, Protestantism and Orthodox Christianity). In Croatia, it may be Romanian (or Aromanian?) in addition to Croatian; in the Czech Republic, Romanian and Slovak in addition to Czech; in Macedonia, Turkish and Albanian in addition to Macedonian;

70  Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages in Poland, Russian in addition to Polish; in the Russian Federation, Ukrainian in addition to Russian; in Slovakia, Hungarian, Romanian and Rusyn in addition to Slovak; in Serbia, Hungarian and Romanian in addition to Serbian; and in Ukraine, Hungarian, Romanian, Rusyn and Tatar in addition to Ukrainian and Russian (Marushiakova and Popov 2016a; Matras 2013). In turn, all these nonRomani languages of intergroup communication that are different from a given state’s official (national) language may spawn more than one Roma ethnolect register of this official language. When growing up in communist Poland in the Upper Silesian town of Kędzierzyn-Koźle during the 1970s and 1980s, I  often witnessed Roma talking in Silesian with the use of Romani words, or vice versa in Romani heavily interlaced with Silesian expressions. Hence, at present, over 30 Roma ethnolect registers of Slavic languages may be in use. However, this is difficult to attest, because the normative hold of ethnolinguistic nationalism on Central Europe’s nation-states means that usually next to nothing is extended by the way of resources for researching nonstate Slavic languages (microlanguages), let alone Roma ethnolects of such languages (cf Baranja 2013; Bořkovcová 2006; Gačnik 2009; Marushiakova and Popov 2016a). German(ic)-speaking Royal Prussia and Ducal Prussia were an administrative unit and fief, respectively, in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Hence, in order for the two regions’ German(ic)-speaking nobles to participate in the polity’s social and political life, they had to acquire Polish. Their imperfect employment of this language led to the emergence of a German(ic) ethnolect of Polish (Brzezina 1989). A similar phenomenon arose in the Russian Empire’s Baltic provinces of Estland, Courland and Livland (Livonia) among the regions’ sociopolitically dominant German(ic)-speaking nobility (Pistohlkors 1994), alongside communities of German(ic)phone immigrants who in the 18th and 19th centuries settled down across the breadth and width of the Russian Empire (cf Stricker 2002). The same was true of German(ic) populations (variously named as Austrians, Germans, Gottscheers, Prussians, Sudetic Germans or Swabians), especially when after 1918 they found themselves in newly founded Slavophone nationstates. They needed to accommodate to such states’ official (national) languages, such as Serbo-Croatian in Yugoslavia (or rather Croatian and Slovenian, depending on a region) (Ferenc 1993; Suppan 1995), Polish in Poland (Rogall 1995), Czechoslovak in Czechoslovakia (or rather Czech, Slovak and Rusyn – depending on a region) (Cammann and Karasek 1981; Prinz 1993; Rychlík and Rychlíková 2016) or Belarusian and Ukrainian in the interwar Soviet Union. During and after World War II, German(ic)-speaking minorities were expelled westward to post-1945 Germany (Germanies) and Austria (Douglas 2014; Koehl 1957), while those retained in the Soviet bloc countries (with the exception of East Germany) more often than not were prevented from using their ethnic language and passing it on to subsequent generations (cf Kamusella 2014a; Tancer 2016: 135–163, 283–296). Hence, new German ethnolect registers of Czech, Polish and Russian arose. In turn, the German ethnolect register of Polish strongly contributed to the shaping of the Slavic microlanguages of Kashubian, Mazurian and Silesian and the German ethnolect register of Czech to the shaping of

Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages 71 the Slavic microlanguage of Prussian. Afterward, a rapid shift toward standard national languages of the Slavic polities occurred among such German(ic) communities, though again this process was partly reversed following the outflow of Slavic-speaking ethnic Germans to Germany, especially from the post-Soviet states and Poland. As a result, the German ethnolect registers of Russian and Polish reappeared in Germany at the turn of the 21st century (cf Rosenberg 2001; Russischsprachige 2018). Nowadays, following the eastward enlargement of the European Union (in 2004, 2007 and 2013), this tendency continues with the inflow of especially ethnic Poles, Czechs, Croats and Russophones from the Baltic states to Germany and Austria. Also, because of historical developments, the German language strongly influenced the lexical and syntactic shape of other Slavic microlanguages (Burgenland Croatian, Lower Sorbian and Upper Sorbian) and influenced almost all Slavic languages (due to panslavists’ and Slavic literati’s use of German as their lingua franca before 1918), but especially Croatian, Czech, Polish, Slovak and Slovenian. Amid the Napoleonic wars, in 1807, the Grand Duchy of Finland switched hands between the Kingdom of Sweden and the Russian Empire. Finland remained part of Russia until 1917, when this country gained independence after the Bolshevik Revolution. During the long 19th century in the Grand Duchy, a gradual shift took place in language use from official Swedish to official bilingualism in both Swedish and Finnish and to the largely failed imposition of Russian (1899–1904) as the region’s sole official language (Polvinen 1995; Sommer 2009). Many Russians and Russophones remained in Finland after the Bolshevik Revolution, while Russo-Finnish conflicts during World War II brought to Finland more Russianspeaking refugees of Finno-Ugric and other origins but invariably of anticommunist leanings. After the long period of the self-imposed postwar isolation of the Soviet Union from the ‘capitalist West’ during the Cold War, the breakup of this communist polity generated another wave of Russian-speaking immigrants to Finland. Subsequently, the eastward enlargement of the European Union opened many new opportunities for Russian-speaking seasonal workers. Subsequently, many often decided to settle permanently in Finland, especially when they came from the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia. As a result, the long-evolving Finnish ethnolect register of Russian was given another lease of life (Leinonen 2004; Protasova 2004). Similar ethnolect registers of the Russian language developed in most of the post-Soviet states outside Russia, alongside Israel, but this issue is discussed later, in Chapter 7, which is devoted to Russian as a global (pluricentric) language. Other non-Slavic languages that became a launch pad for ethnolect registers of Slavic Einzelsprachen include, above all, the imperial languages of the Habsburgs’ Kingdom of Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, namely Hungarian and Osmanlıca ([Ottoman] Turkish). The correlated waxing and waning of the aforementioned kingdom and the Ottomans’ realm between the 15th and the 19th centuries caught numerous Slavophone ethnic groups in the middle. The Habsburgs’ control over the Kingdom of Hungary and the involvement of the Republic of Venice in the wars against the Ottomans meant that until the late 18th century, Latin, German

Russian [1]

Macedonian, SerboCroatian (Serbian) [2]

Bulgarian, Czech, Polish, Slovak [4]

Greek Belarusian, Croatian (SerboCroatian), Czech, Polish, Russian, Rusyn, Slovenian, Ukrainian [8]

German

Figure 2f Other Slavic-based ethnolect registers

Finnish

Albanian

Turkish Bosnian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian [5]

Italian Croatian (SerboCroatian), Slovenian [2]

Hungarian Serbian (SerboCroatian), Slovak, Slovenian, Ukrainian (Rusyn) [4]

Vietnamese (Bulgaria), Vietnamese (Czech Republic), Vietnamese (Poland) [3]

New immigrant

72  Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages

Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages 73 and Italian (i.e., Dalmatian, Tuscan, Sabir and Venetian) were also added to the mixture of languages used for written and official oral communication across the Balkans, from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. In the wake of the Habsburg and Russian military victories over the Ottomans in the Balkans, a string of Orthodox Christian Slavophone nation-states were established during the entire 19th century. But usually, it took decades before their formal autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire was replaced by fully recognized independence. Before independence, a lot of official business and administration had to be conducted in Osmanlıca – for instance, as late as 1908 in the case of Bulgaria. Turkic-speaking Muslims and Muslims speaking other languages (including Slavic ones) remained a substantial segment of society in Austria-Hungary’s Bosnia, Bulgaria, Serbia’s Macedonia (‘South Serbia’), Montenegro and Serbia. Their presence was diminished in the short 20th century because of subsequent waves of population exchanges between these polities and the Ottoman Empire and later Turkey and also because of unilateral expulsions of Turks and Muslims to Turkey in the interwar period, during World War II and the Cold War, and over the course of the Yugoslav wars (cf Hirschon 2003; Kamusella 2019a; Kemaloğlu 2012; McCarthy 1995; Pekesen 2012; Toumarkine 1995; Zang 1989). However, to this day, Turkic or Turkish speakers and Muslims remain visible parts of society in the Slavophone nation-states of Bosnia,8 Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. The nationalistically motivated marginalization and identification of such Turks and Muslims as the ‘Other,’ combined with their continuing bilingualism (diglossia), as in the aforementioned cases of Jews and Roma, led to the emergence of the Osmanlıca/Turkic/Turkish-influenced ethnolect registers of Bosnian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Serbian (Koloğlu 2015: 38–61). In turn, all these Slavic Einzelsprachen became infused with numerous Turkic linguistic loans (Grannes, Rå Hauge and Memoğlu-Süleymanoğlu 2002; Ibrahimović 2012; Kančeski 2015; Krısteva 2013; Rollet 1996; Škaljić 1965). By extension, due to the century-and-half inclusion of Croatian in the commonality of the Serbo-Croatian language, some of such Turkic influences rubbed off on Croatian as well (Nosić 2005). In the early modern period, when the Ottoman Empire expanded far north of the Danube and the Black Sea, the Turkic-influenced ethnolect registers of Polish and Ruthenian (Belarusian and Ukrainian) also existed,

Albanian

Hungarian

German

Greek

Italian

Turkish

Bulgarian, Croatian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Croatian, Croatian, Macedonian Slovenian Bulgarian, Montenegrin, Serbian, Czech, Croatian, Serbian Slovak, Polish, Macedonian, Slovenian Slovak, Montenegrin, Slovenian Serbian [4] Figure 2g The influence of non-Slavic imperial and dominant languages (i.e., official, state, national or imperial) on Slavic Einzelsprachen

74  Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages while Turkic linguistic loans entered Belarusian, Polish, Russian and Ukrainian (cf Kołodziejczyk 2000; Turanly 2016). As in the case of the aforementioned Slavic microlanguages that developed along the zone of overlapping influences between the Germanic and Slavic dialect continua, a similar overlapping of these Slavic continua with the Turkic dialectal continuum spawned, or importantly impacted, the emergence of the following Slavic microlanguages: Balachka, Gorani, Paulician and Pomakian. In the Kingdom of Hungary, Latin was the main language of politics and administration until the mid 1840s. Acquiring Hungarian and converting to Catholicism (including Greek Catholicism) or Protestantism was important for people who wanted to become accepted members of the estate of nobles. But a multiplicity of ethnolinguistically defined elites of burghers gradually turned bourgeoisie existed in this realm, and one could enter them via the channel of other languages too, namely (especially) German, alongside Croatian and Italian (i.e., Tuscan and Venetian).9 Until the mid 19th century, the lack of command of this or that language could be easily scaled by talking and writing in Latin, Lingua Franca (Sabir) or French. However, after Austria-Hungary was founded in 1867, the predominantly Hungarian-speaking elites of the Kingdom of Hungary decided to turn this realm into an ethnolinguistically defined Hungarian nation-state, entailing the forced Magyarization (i.e., linguistic Hungarianization) of the kingdom’s nonHungarian speakers (Gal 2011; Scotus 1908). As a result, traditional polyglossia or renewed multilingualism (coaxed into existence by increasingly monolingual education and administrative services available only in Hungarian) gave way to a gradual switch to Hungarian among non-Hungarian speakers with ambitions of social and professional advancement within the kingdom (Berecz 2013; Liszka 1996). This phenomenon affected the lexicon and syntax of the Slavic Einzelsprachen of Croatian, Serbian, Slovak and Slovenian and significantly contributed to the emergence and subsequent maintenance of the Slavic microlanguages of Bunjevac, Burgenland Croatian, Kajkavian, Prekmurjan and Rusyn. In turn, when after the Great War large swaths of the former Kingdom of Hungary were passed to Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, ethnic Hungarians and Hungarian speakers who decided, or had no choice but, to remain in these nation-states needed to accommodate to using the dominant state (official, national) languages in the countries (cf Boia 2018). An initially imperfect command of such Slavic languages and later the maintenance of quite stable bilingualism (or rather diglossia) in the state language and Hungarian led to the emergence of the Hungarian ethnolect registers of at least Slovak in Czechoslovakia’s region of Slovakia, of Serbian (Serbo-Croatian) in Serbia’s Vojvodina (within Yugoslavia), and of Rusyn/Ukrainian in Soviet Ukraine’s Transcarpathia (cf Arday 1996; Gyurcsik, Iván and Satterwhite 1996; Šutaj et al. 2006: 66–67; Tancer 2016: 59–83). Within the Ottoman Empire, the Rum (‘Roman’) millet (nonterritorial autonomous ethnoreligious community) of Orthodox Christians tended to be dominated by Greek-speaking ecclesiasts administered from the seat of the ecumenical patriarch, who resided in Constantinople (Istanbul). The ecumenical patriarch might disagree on many issues with the Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church, founded in 1833

Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages 75 Albanian Hungarian Gorani

German

Greek

Italian

Romanian Turkish

Burgenland Pomakian Čakavian, Paulician Balachka, Bunjevac, Molisean, Gorani, Croatian, Burgenland Resian, Paulician, Kashubian, Croatian, Venetian Pomakian Mazurian, Kajkavian, Slavic Prekmurjan, Prussian, Silesian, Rusyn Sorbian (Lower), Sorbian (Upper)

Figure 2h The influence of non-Slavic imperial and dominant (i.e., official, state and national) languages on Slavic microlanguages

in the independent Greek nation-state (and recognized by the patriarch in 1850). For instance, as the preferred Greek ethnonym for the Greek nation Athens adopted the ancient and ‘pagan’ ethnonym ‘Hellenes.’ On the other hand, the ecumenical patriarch and his faithful within the Ottoman Empire stuck to the traditional and ‘Christian’ ethnonym ‘Romans’ (Romioi). What united some political strands in both churches was a view that equated all the members of the Rum millet with the Greek Orthodox nation, despite any linguistic differences (Kitromilides 1989: 158; Mackridge 2010: 52, 75). In this approach, the Grecizing course of Greek nationalism was similar to the Magyarizing program of defining all the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Hungary as members of the Hungarian nation in ethnolinguistic terms. Emerging Slavophone Orthodox merchant and intellectual elites disagreed and demanded more recognition for Cyrillic and Church Slavonic in liturgy, alongside administration and schools run by the Rum millet in the Ottoman Empire. These Slavic-speaking elites increasingly saw the use of Greek as an unwanted imposition. What is more, this perceived imposition could be portrayed as potentially anti-Ottoman, given that this was the official and national language of strenuously anti-Ottoman independent Greece, in turn supported by the great Western powers. Finally, the Ottomans noticed this tension and acted on it by founding, in 1872, a Slavophone Bulgarian Exarchate for Slavic-speaking Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Balkans. This exarchate, not recognized by the ecumenical patriarch until 1945,10 overlapped with what today is Bulgaria, Macedonia and northeastern Greece (Koleva and Avramova 2003; Mach 1906). Subsequently, the Greek linguistic and cultural influence, as visually symbolized by the Greek alphabet, was gradually curbed in this area. In the case of Bulgaria, this centuries-long influence of Greek language and culture largely ceased after the founding of this nationstate, with Russian help, in 1878. However, in the case of Macedonia, such Greek influence lasted until the Balkan Wars. As a result, Greek language and culture left an indelible imprint on both Bulgarian and Macedonian (Botu and Konečný 2005; Budziszewska 1969; Tahovski 1951).

76  Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages Some Greeks who stayed in Bulgaria until after World War II had to master the country’s official language, leading to the rise of a Greek ethnolect register of this language. In the wake of the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) lost by communists, Greek-speaking communist refugees found safe haven across the Soviet bloc, which on the other hand meant the coalescence of at least Greek ethnolect registers of Czech, Polish and Slovak, apart from a renewal of the Greek ethnolect register of Bulgarian (Danforth and Boeschoten 2012; Sturis 2017). In the southern part of historical Macedonia (known as Aegean Macedonia) gained by Greece after the Balkan Wars, the use of Slavic and the existence of Slavophones continued to be strenuously denied. The situation led to the emergence of the Greekinfluenced Slavic microlanguage of Pomakian, as employed by Slavic-speaking Muslims in Greece (Denying 1994; Steinke and Voss 2007). A variety of Romance tongues (e.g., Dalmatian, Istro-Romanian, Sabir and Veglian) were spoken along the entire Adriatic littoral. But during the early modern period, Venetian and standard Italian (Tuscan) became the preferred languages of interethnic communication in the area. The latter Einzelsprache dominated in written exchanges. Italian was the official language of Habsburg Dalmatia, and it brushed sides with German in the (Austrian) littoral (Gorizia, Istria and Trieste). Italian was also an important language of commerce in Hungary’s Croatian ports; alongside official Croatian and Hungarian, the latter was limited mostly to Fiume (Rijeka). However, the hinterland of the eastern Adriatic littoral was mostly Slavophone (with the notable exception of Albania). The founding of Yugoslavia put pressure on the remaining Italian speakers to acquire Serbo-Croatian. On the other hand, in the Adriatic territories gained by Italy from Austria-Hungary after the Great War (Cherso [Cres], Fiume [Rijeka], Gorizia, Istria, Lagosta [Lastovo], Lussino [Lošinj], Trieste and Zara [Zadar]), Slavophones had to master Italian (though most had already acquired it before the Great War, for the sake of employment and social advancement). Initially, the traditionally ‘high civilizational status’ of Italian was quite attractive to the areas’ Slavophones. Furthermore, in combination with the program of increasingly forced assimilation in fascist Italy, the resultant assimilationist pressure was stronger on Slavic speakers in Italy than the other way round (Burgwyn 2005). Not surprisingly, this Italian influence left a clear imprint on Croatian (Serbo-Croatian) and Slovenian, even leading to the rise of a Slavo-Romance creole in Istria (cf Cossutta 2002). Following World War II, many Italians and Italophones left the eastern Adriatic littoral or were expelled (Petacco 2015). Communist Yugoslavia gained all the previously Italian territories in the eastern Adriatic littoral, with the exception of the cities of Gorizia and Trieste. The Italian-speaking populations remaining in postwar Yugoslavia received the status of minorities11 and gradually acquired either Croatian (Serbo-Croatian) or Slovenian, depending on the region. This led to the emergence of diglossia and of the Italian ethnolect registers of Croatian (Serbo-Croatian) and Slovenian, both being part and parcel of the ethnoregional identity of Istria (Sluga 2001). Because of the centuries-long interaction of Slavicand Romance speakers in Dalmatia, Italian (Romance) strongly influenced the development of the Slavic microlanguages of Čakavian and Venetian Slavic. This

Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages 77 Italian (Romance) influence was even stronger in the case of the Slavic microlanguages of Molisean and Resian, both speech communities located amid the (West) Romance dialect continuum. Interestingly, the Molisean speakers originate from the Catholic refugees who in the 15th century left what is today Bosnia, before the advancing Ottoman armies (Resetar 1911). I now mention the Romanian (East Romance) influence on Paulician (Banat Bulgarian). Catholic and Orthodox Slavophones from what is nowadays the northwestern corner of Bulgaria migrated from the Ottoman Empire to the Banat of Temeswar, which the Habsburgs had gained from the Ottomans in 1718. After the breakup of Austria-Hungary, this region of Banat was split between Yugoslavia and Romania, opening Romania’s section of Paulician speakers to Romanian linguistic influences (Niagulov 1999). Similarly, the speech of the Goranis living in Albania was influenced by the country’s official language of Albanian. In turn, the Albanian-speaking minority in Yugoslavia had to acquire Serbo-Croatian (Serbian), entailing the emergence of an Albanian ethnolect register of this language. Until the mid 1970s rapprochement between stalinist Albania and proWestern Yugoslavia, this process had been spurred on by Belgrade’s policy of developing a separate standard Albanian (‘Kosovan’) language for Yugoslavia’s Albanian speakers (Kamusella 2016c). In the wake of the 1990s slow-motion breakup of federal Yugoslavia, the Albanian-speaking minority who found themselves in independent Macedonia has been pressed hard to acquire this newly independent country’s national and official language of Macedonian. Previously, Serbo-Croatian was sufficient, but nowadays the new generation of Albanians who attend Macedonian medium schools and need to do official business in this language contribute to the rise of an Albanian ethnolect register of Macedonian (cf Macedonian 2018). In turn, Albanian has left a lasting mark on both Macedonian and Serbo-Croatian (Serbian and Montenegrin). In the latter case, at present, this influence is even more strongly felt among the Serbian-speaking minority in officially bilingual (Albanian and Serbian) Kosovo, which gained independence in 2008 (cf Ostojic 2016). The de facto independence of Kosovo from Serbia had been effected a decade earlier, when in 1999 the United Nations had extended an international protectorate over the region for the sake of reversing the Serbian expulsion of Kosovo’s Albanians. However, Kosovo’s official language of Serbian is written almost exclusively in Latin letters, which makes it quite similar, or even identical, to Bosnian or Croatian. Importantly, in 2019, Albanian became Macedonia’s second official language (Albanian 2019). Furthermore, the country’s name was officially changed to North Macedonia, for the sake of rapprochement with Greece12 (Smith 2019), though both Skopje and Athens agreed that the language should continue to be referred to as Macedonian (Prespa 2018: Art 1.3.c). Consequently, officially bilingual Macedonia distances itself from Central Europe’s highly divisive model of ethnolinguistic nation-state. In the future, this decision will mean more Macedonian influence on Albanian and of Albanian on Macedonian, hopefully within the broader framework of full Macedonian and Albanian bilingualism.

78  Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages But the story is not over. During the Vietnam War, the Soviet bloc supported the victorious communist side, entailing long-lasting support for Vietnamese students and refugees that in many ways continues to this day. A sizable community of Vietnamese speakers remains in the Czech Republic, where a Vietnamese ethnolect register of Czech developed (Slówik and Tůmová 2016). A similar immigrant community of Vietnamese was expelled en masse from freshly postcommunist Bulgaria. They had possibly developed a similar ethnolect register of Bulgarian before their rarely noticed expulsion (Apostolova 2016; Borisova 2012; Terziev 2008). A considerable community of Vietnamese resides in the Polish capital of Warsaw. Their language, as in the case of the Czech Republic, displays a set of pronunciation and syntactic particularities that substantiates a separate Vietnamese ethnolect register of Polish (Vân Anh 2010). However, the national ideology of prescriptive correctness is so strong in Poland that most commentators focus on these Vietnamese and their children, who already speak ‘impeccable Polish’ (Ja już 2003). In the wake of the fall of communism, the systemic transition, coupled with globalization and alongside the rapid development of IT technologies and the web, meant that in the postcommunist, post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav states, English-language specialist vocabulary has continued to impact all official Slavic languages in the areas connected to economy, technology and governance. When Macedonian or Ukrainian economists or software engineers discuss a professional issue, their conversation conducted in this or that Slavic Einzelsprache becomes so much infused with English linguistic loans that it turns opaque to other Macedonian or Ukrainian speakers with no command of English and no knowledge of the field concerned (cf Blagoeva 2012; Miłkowski 2012; Tadić, BrozovićRončević and Kapetanović 2012). Hence, we can speak of a variety of EnglishSlavic professional jargons, which between the mid 19th and mid 20th centuries were preceded by similar German-Slavic jargons in the various fields of technology, industry and commerce.13 I now reflect on what communist China’s infrastructural initiative of One Belt and One Road, announced in 2016, may bring into the sphere of language relations in the near future (cf Kamusella 2018b). This vast project of building a multiple railway and road links across Eurasia from communist China to Western Europe entails that some entrepôts will be located in quite a few Slavic countries. The project’s influence on these Slavic countries will be even more fortified by the important side branch of One Belt and One Road leading from Belarus and Poland to the Greek port of Piraeus bought by China in 2016 (Horowitz and Alderman 2017; Kapczyńska 2017; One Belt 2018). If the project is realized, it will entail an influx of Chinese managers, engineers, professionals, entrepreneurs and workers, bringing about the founding of multiple Chinese communities across Central Europe. With time, some of such communities may develop specific Chinese ethnolects of Slavic Einzelsprachen in the tradition of the former and current Sino-Slavic pidgins from the borderlands, extending for 4,000 kilometers between Russia and China (cf Ivasita 2006; Stern 2016).

Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages 79

The dilemma of ethnolinguistic nationalism On the basis of the material presented in this chapter, as of 2017, the world has at least 40 extant Slavic Einzelsprachen. Almost each Slavic speech community – ethnically, religiously, regionally, politically or otherwise defined as ‘specific’ by its own members (from the emic perspective) or by outside observers (from the etic perspective) – seems to have been supplied with its own and unshared Einzelsprache. Quite a journey from a single Slavic language (with its four literary varieties) in the mid 19th century to the present-day 40 or so Slavic Einzelsprachen in which books, journals and internet texts are written and published in the early 21st century – a staggering 40-fold increase in the span of some 170 years. Or if the 19th-century four ‘literary varieties’ of Slavic (namely Czechoslovak, Illyrian, Polish and Russian) are to be seen as standalone languages in their own right, the rise in the overall number of Slavic Einzelsprachen was at least tenfold. This achievement sought after by proponents of ethnolinguistic nationalism has its costs that have rarely been addressed. Among others, they include a steep reduction in multilingualism and polyglossia that tends to limit the range of communication available to a speaker of a present-day Slavic state language to the Einzelsprache’s monolingual national (speech) community living in its polity (cf Escudero et al. 2016). Such state-endowed national speech communities may range from extensive, as in the case of some 140 million Russian speakers in the Russian Federation, to tiny, as in the cases of two million Slovenian speakers in Slovenia or just 1.2 million Macedonian speakers in Macedonia. Under certain circumstances, some L1 (‘native’) speakers of a national language may also consider as discriminatory the legally enshrined imposition of compulsory education in their own ethnic Einzelsprache. Simply, literacy in an L2 (second language), which is a global or continent-wide lingua franca, may be of more practical significance for them, when it comes to employment opportunities and social advancement (cf Beiter 2006: 435–436; Probyn 2005: 154). Another cost of implementing ethnolinguistic nationalism is the rapid marginalization and suppression of nonnational Einzelsprachen in the ethnolinguistic nation-state, as entailed by the policy of official monolingualization. This policy often leads to their disappearance of nonnational languages as media of everyday communication within a (minority) speech community. For instance, Moravian disappeared in interwar Czechoslovakia, as did Mazurian during the 1970s in communist Poland. At present, Silesian – though widely spoken in Poland – is not recognized as a language in this country, and the same fate has been shared by Rusyn in today’s Ukraine (cf SkutnabbKangas 2000).14 Hence, the success of building 40-odd Slavic Einzelsprachen should be observed in a wider perspective. Nevertheless, from the purely national point of view, this success was something of which proponents of Slavic languages and Slavic national activists could only dream, before the Great War. In many cases, this goal kept eluding them and was not achieved before the end of communism and the breakups of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

80  Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages In the early 1990s, as many as 12 official state-cum-national languages could be observed. It seemed that at long last each extant (ethnolinguistic) Slavic nation had received its own language and nation-state. But ‘of the making nationalities there is no end’ (cf Magocsi 1999); in other words, the production, reshaping and destruction of ethnic (i.e., human) groups never ceases, as long as humankind exists. Likewise, there is no end to making, changing and unmaking languages (Einzelsprachen) (cf Greenberg 2004). Hence, the current tally of 40 Slavic Einzelsprachen is the result not only of simple accruing but also of loss, so it is necessarily a net gain. Languages – like nations, states or universities – are imagined (fictive). Languages (Einzelsprachen) are part of social reality generated through the groupbonding language (Sprache) use by humans and their groups. The existence or disappearance of this or that language (Einzelsprache) does not depend on any law that governs the material reality. Unchangeable laws of matter (as discovered by physicists or chemists) do not apply to social reality, including languages (Einzelsprachen). Like everything in social reality, languages depend solely on human will. Social reality will come to an end when humankind disappears. But as long as humans and their groups exist, humans alone will decide what counts as a language (Einzelsprache) and whether construing the linguistic (language with no article preceding this word, Sprache – that is, the biological capacity for speech) as composed of discrete Einzelsprachen, in accordance with this Western concept of Graeco-Roman origins, makes any sense. However, for better or worse, the majority of the inhabitants in Central Europe, alongside political elites, believe that ethnolinguistic nationalism is the ‘normal,’ ‘proper’ (normative) way of organizing nationhood and statehood in this corner of the world. In 1914, there were fewer Slavic states than aspiring-to-statehood Slavic nations, complete with different Slavic languages (Einzelsprachen). After 1918, the majority of such Slavic nations were fitted with their own nation-states. But this fitting of languages to nations to states was time and again contested, especially during World War II and in the wake of the fall of communism. The process eventually seemed to peter out, reaching a plateau of stability at the turn of the 21st century. At that point, no stateless Slavic nations defined through language who might badly want to avail themselves of the wilsonian principle of national self-determination in the form of their own nation-state remained. But if languages (Einzelsprachen) are going to remain the foundational basis of nation and state building in Central Europe, the region will face a serious dilemma. At present (2017), 12 Slavic nation-states respectively have their own specific and unshared languages. However, at 27, the number of recognized and unrecognized Slavic languages, alongside the corresponding speech communities, is more than twice as big. Most of these communities may be uninterested in carving out states for themselves in this rather small continent of Europe already overcrowded with polities (when compared with the rest of the world). However, should even some of these stateless Slavic speech communities decide to redefine themselves as nations and start demanding the right of national self-determination, Europe could find itself in a similarly, or even more, difficult situation than it was in 1918 or in

Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages 81 1989. The current efforts by ethnolinguistic national activists to obtain independence for Catalonia is a clear example of what may come (cf Boyer 2004; Catalan Independence 2018; Frayer 2017; Miller and Miller 1996). For the time being, in Central Europe, ethnolinguistic efforts are limited to gaining an international scholarly and cyberspace recognition for officially still-unrecognized languages, especially by securing ISO 639 codes for them, as in the case of Croatia’s Kajkavian in 2015 (Kaikavian 2015; O Kajkavskemu 2019). The Central European political norm of perceiving speech communities as nations that ‘naturally’ need to have their own nation-states appears to be eminently not conducive to political stability. Before this norm began to be applied in a widespread manner after 1918 in Central Europe, the region’s polities had tended to exist for centuries, despite any changes in official religion or language. Afterward, when ethnolinguistic nationalism (language = nation = state – i.e., the normative isomorphism) won the day, state building and destruction in Central Europe, mostly conducted in the interest of fitting speech communities-cum-nations to their nation-states, radically (and tragically) reshaped the entire region in 1912– 1923, 1938–1945,15 1944–1955 and 1991–2008. Such changes ruined millions of people’s lives every 20-odd years – that is, in each generation. The principle of ethnolinguistically defined national selfdetermination was not applied in Western Europe or in the area west of the eastern frontiers of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Switzerland. (The sole exception to this rule of thumb is the case of Ireland, which became de facto independent in 1922 and de jure in 1949. Officially, the country is seen as the nation-state of the Irish-speaking nation.) Hence, apart from some minor variations in the borders, the states of Western Europe have remained largely unchanged since the early modern period, or the 16th century. The political shape of Western Europe looks almost exactly as it did in the 18th century or 19th century (with the brief interlude of the Napoleonic wars). On the contrary, the political shape of Central Europe, though quite stable from the 16th century until the early 19th century, began to change dramatically. First, during the course of the long 19th century, in the Balkans, ethnoreligious nationalism gradually morphed into an ethnolinguistic one. Initially, ethnoreligious national polities (be it Bulgaria, Greece or Serbia) reinvented themselves as ethnolinguistic nation-states. The norms of ethnolinguistic nationalism (i.e., the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state) became ‘codified’ with the founding of Italy and Germany as nation-states in 1861 and 1871, respectively. Although great power politics remained the main cause of military conflicts in Central Europe until the Great War, these ‘norms’ (i.e., the normative isomorphism), with languages (Einzelsprachen) at their respective cores, were deployed to rebuild the political shape of the region in the wake of successive wars after the mid 19th century. This rebuilding took place where imperial and other nonnational polities were unable to stop or contain national movements. Subsequently, after 1918, the widespread implementation of such norms of ethnolinguistic nationalism predominantly triggered successive waves of nation-state building and destruction in Central Europe during the 20th century.

82  Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages Ironically, the great Western powers (Allies), led by the United States, decided on the implementation of ethnolinguistically defined national self-determination in Central Europe after the Great War. A similar alliance with the all-important addition of the Soviet Union closely emulated this destructive model when restoring or overhauling the political shape of Central Europe in the wake of World War II. And yet again, after 1989, the West approved, if not actively supported, the postcommunist reshaping of the political shape of Central Europe in accordance with the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state. The West’s recent support for a partition of Kosovo along ethnolinguistic lines (Partition 2019) amply proves that politics remains in the old rut. The US and Western Europe prefer to apply ‘ethnolinguistic solutions’ in Central Europe, though they would not consider implementing them in their own countries. It is a political myopia of long standing, which to a Central European may appear to be a case of double standards. The application of such ethnolinguistically defined national self-determination has never been seriously considered in Western Europe. Several speech communities may successfully constitute a single nation housed in a single polity. This is the case of Belgium with its French-speaking Walloons, Dutch-speaking Flemings and the country’s German-speaking community. Likewise, in the UK, apart from the English-speaking nation of English in England, the Welsh- and Englishspeaking Welsh nation thrives in Wales, and in Scotland the nation of Scots speak English, Gaelic and Scots. The situation is even more complicated in Northern Ireland with its three official languages of English, Irish and Ulster Scots, where the two nations of Irish and Unionists (Britons) brush sides. However, all these speakers of various languages and members of different regionally defined nations are construed as members of the UK (supra-, political) nation, housed in its shared nation-state of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland. In Spain, where Spanish is the official language, Basque is a national and official language in the autonomous community of the Basque Country and Catalonian in the autonomous community of Catalonia. In Switzerland, as many as four languages are official and national – that is, French, German, Italian and Romansh. Their actual use is regulated at the level of the country’s cantons. However, both in Spain and in Switzerland, all these speech communities of various Einzelsprachen are invariably construed, respectively, as the Spanish nation and the Swiss nation. Therefore, breaking these nation-states up by splitting them along any linguistic boundaries is not necessary. On the other hand, in Western Europe, people speaking the same language see no problem in perceiving themselves as belonging to different nations, housed in separate nation-states. For instance, French speakers in Belgium, France and Luxembourg share the same Einzelsprache but do not think that they constitute the same nation, which should be housed in a single nation-state. That is also the case of German speakers in Austria, Belgium, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Switzerland. Obviously, the application of ethnolinguistic nationalism as the basis of state building and legitimization in Western Europe would result in similarly rapid, vast and frequent processes of state destruction and construction, as

Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages 83 suffered time and again in Central Europe during the past century. (The protracted civil war in Northern Ireland, between 1968 and 1998, is a clear-cut example and a warning about what kind of instability and conflict ethnolinguistic nationalism could generate if seriously employed in Western Europe.) In Western Europe, neither politicians nor population at large see as attractive and desirable ethnolinguistic nationalism’s ideal of homogeneity. Next to no one wishes to pay the price for the implementation of such a fickle ideal that would ‘naturally’ necessitate population exchanges, expulsions or even multiple genocides. Perhaps languages (Einzelsprachen) should be decoupled from state building and statehood legitimization in Central Europe. For instance, Western European states never really paid obeisance to this ethnolinguistic principle and for the sake of stability already decoupled religion from politics after the conclusion of the genocidal Thirty Years’ War, in 1648. So why then should Central Europeans stick to this ethnolinguistic principle? It is essentially a Western European imposition arbitrarily implemented (cf Cornish 1936; Dominian 1917) in the interest of this or that national movement in Central Europe, as long as it happened to be aligned with a great Western power’s needs. What is more, this imposition has failed to deliver on its (untested) promise of peace and stability from the moment it was introduced on a large scale for the first time during the late 1910s. Maybe each discernible speech community does not really need to have its own nation-state. Ever-changing speech communities, with their Einzelsprachen diverging and converging, could be more safely housed in pre-existing polities whose frontiers and institutions could remain stable, in spite of any alterations in the number of official and unofficial languages of state business, administration or school instruction (cf Gellner 1998: 108). If in social reality one element of the political construction remains stable – for instance, states (and their frontiers) in the function of a platform on which other ideas can be played out by human groups – then the resultant stability of political institutions usually prevents wholesale collapses of statehood, economy or society. Such repeated wholesale collapses plagued Central Europe during the past century (Snyder 2015: 320, Chapter 4). Explicitly acknowledging and following the solution of keeping states intact – out of a sudden, disappearance or emergence of this or that (typically ethnolinguistically defined) nation or language, a merger of languages or nations, or a splitting thereof – does not need to entail the destruction of the extant polities.16 Humans and their groups can ‘try on’ new linguistic, political or national garbs, without the danger that all the political structures around them would melt down and vanish into the thin air, leaving in the wake destruction, hunger, desperation, violence, ethnic cleansing and even genocide.

Notes 1 The debate still continues whether Lower Sorbian and Upper Sorbian are dialects of a single language or two separate languages (cf Spencer and Otoguro 2005: 131). On the other hand, already a century ago, Sorbian speakers and the Sorbian elite decided to produce grammars, dictionaries and other resources (now including the two separate Lower and Upper Sorbian Wikipedias) for these two varieties construed as separate

84  Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages languages in their own right. Hence, in actual day-to-day practice of writing, publishing and reading in Sorbian, one needs to choose whether one pursues these activities through Lower Sorbian or through Upper Sorbian. Normatively speaking, conflating both varieties (languages) is seen as an ‘error’ or a ‘proof’ of one’s insufficient education in how to use Sorbian ‘correctly.’ 2 As Rok Stergar rightly notices, at present, Prekmurje Slovenian comes in two varieties: the one preserved in Slovenia and the other encouraged in Hungary – that is, in the Porabje (i.e., Rábavidék in Hungarian). Arguably, Porabje Slovenian could be seen as separate from Prekmurje Slovenian, given the growing Magyarization of the former and the progressing Slovenization of the latter (Mukič 2005; Porabsko 2017). 3 I caution readers that this list may not be exhaustive, because the process of language making and unmaking does continue, so information on a new language project may not be readily available yet. 4 Some scholars consider Prekmurje Slovenian to be a ‘written dialect’ of the Slovenian language, but the prevailing consensus is that Prekmurjan should be considered a language in its own right (cf Narečna 2017; Novak 2006). 5 This inflexible approach to the ‘correct’ spelling of Belarusian stands in stark contrast to the relaxed (at least in this respect) attitude of users of Serbo-Croatian and the post-Serbo-Croatian languages to writing. The latter follow Vuk Karadžić’s advice – piši kao što govoriš (‘write, as you speak’) (Alexander 2013: 412) – whereas Belarusian intellectuals consider this tendency to be ‘incorrect’ and a danger to the continued existence of the Belarusian language (Rudkouski 2009: 124). This is a European quarrel of long standing. For instance, when in the mid 17th century written Swedish (alongside official Latin, for that matter) was far removed from everyday colloquial Swedish, poet and grammarian Samuel Columbus contended that Swedish should be written as it is spoken, not the other way round (Szulc 2009: 148). A century later, a leading lexicographer of German, Johann Christoph Adelung, consented but added that the written form of a language should follow the best pronunciation, obviously identified with that of the social elite, namely the nobility and literati (Szulc 1999: 179). However, in the second half of the 19th century, for the sake of the uniform and centralized standardization of Swedish and German, the principle ‘speak, as you write’ was officially adopted (Szulc 2009: 184). 6 The category of Język Tutejszy (Polish for ‘Local Tongue’) should be mentioned, though it never became a stable or widely accepted linguonym, neither by its speakers nor by outside observers. The term originated in the first half of the 19th century among Polish-Lithuanian noble observers for the ‘mixed’ Polish-Little Ruthenian (Ukrainian) speech of peasantry living in confessionally diverse (Orthodox and Catholic) villages. The ‘mixture’ revealed itself to these observers through the variegated use of Cyrillic and Latin letters by the few local literati, usually priests (Kraszewski 1840: 139). In the interwar Polish census of 1931, this linguistic category of Local Tongue and the corresponding national one of Tutejszy (Polish for a ‘Local Inhabitant’) were deployed to diminish the recorded numbers of Belarusian and Ukrainian speakers (Chałupczak and Browarek 1998: 20; Labbé 2019a). 7 In English the linguonym and ethnonym ‘Eskimo’ is rightly seen as a racist slur imposed by western colonizers on a variety of indigenous ethnic groups in the Arctic. Unfortunately, Russian official statistics still employs this term; hence, it appears across this book when this type of statistics is cited. However, neither the editors nor the author endorse the use of this term beyond this narrow scholarly context. 8 From the Central European perspective, wedded to ethnolinguistic nationalism, Bosnia may not look like a typical nation-state. The country’s eponymous language of Bosnian is not a state language, because this federal polity does not have any language designated as such (cf Constitution 1995: Art I.7.b). Actual language policy is decided at the level of Bosnia’s two constituent entities. Officially, they guarantee the use of

Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages 85 Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian and their two alphabets (Cyrillic and Latin) across the entire country (Constitution 1994–2003: Art 6; Ustav 1992/1995: Art 7). But the de facto practice is that Bosnian and Croatian in Latin letters are employed as official languages in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cyrillic-based Serbian in the Republika Srpska. Sovereignty mostly rests with these two entities, and in the case of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, sovereignty is further subdivided among this entity’s ten cantons, some seen as ethnically (ethnolinguistically) Bosniak and others as Croatian. The arrangement emulates Switzerland’s cantons. However, what makes all of Bosnia into a nation-state at the global level is the same Bosnian citizenship for the entire population (cf Constitution 1995: Art I.7). But civic nationalism is not the way of doing politics and building statehood in present-day Central Europe. It was imposed by the West in the Dayton Agreement of 1995, which concluded the Bosnian War (1992–1995). Unfortunately, this well-intentioned imposition is the source of continuing ethnolinguistic tensions. The country’s Croats and Serbs want ‘their’ parts of Bosnia to be ‘united’ with Croatia and Serbia, respectively, while Bosniaks tend to equate their own ethnolinguistic nationalism with the civic nationalism of Bosnia. However, these complications are rarely known outside Bosnia and the post-Yugoslav states. As a result, most Central Europeans tend to perceive Bosnia as a ‘normal’ ethnolinguistic nation-state, where Bosnian is its national and official language (I thank Rok Stergar [2018] for pushing me to reflect on this issue in some detail.) 9 Neither Orthodoxy nor the Romanian language did allow for inclusion in the noble or burgher elites of the Kingdom of Hungary. This was the main point of contention in Transylvania, which led to the emergence of an increasingly anti-Hungarian Romanian national movement in this region. Romanian speakers, thanks to their Romance language, were more adept at acquiring Latin or Italian. The main obstacle to their social advancement remained their Orthodox religion, used by the Hungarian administration for the widespread social, economic and political marginalization of Transylvania’s Orthodox Romanian speakers (Djuvara 2017: 182–188, 252–256). 10 In 1945, the ecumenical patriarch did not exactly recognize the Bulgarian Exarchate but the autocephaly of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, founded in 1895. In practice, this church institutionally overlapped with the exarchate, the exarch simultaneously heading the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. But the exarchate’s ecclesiastical territory was larger than that of the Church, limited to Bulgaria (Mach 1906). In the wake of the Balkan Wars, the exarch transferred his seat from Constantinople (Istanbul) to Sofia, in 1913. Following the Great War, the freedom of operation of the exarchate’s administration was effectively contained to the territory of Bulgaria. The neighboring nation-states of Greece, Turkey or Yugoslavia did not allow for the resumption of the Bulgarian Exarchate’s administration in their territories. They saw the exarchate as a form of Bulgarian irredentism. In 1948, the Bulgarian Exarchate was formally collapsed into the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Subsequently, in 1953, this church was elevated to the status of the Bulgarian patriarchate (Koleva and Avramova 2003). 11 In May 1971, Belgrade established the Italian-language television station TV KoperCapodistria in the Istrian town of Koper (Capodistria in Italian, nowadays in Slovenia) for the Italian minority in Yugoslavia. It was the first Italian-language television that broadcast in color. On top of that, TV Koper-Capodistria offered an attractive fare of US and UK cartoons and films. At that time in Italy, the monopoly of the black and white RAI state television was quite drab in comparison. The introduction of color in 1972 did not help much either. Until the 1980s, TV Koper-Capodistria (popularly known as TeleCapodistria), made available by private retransmitters across all of Italy, was one of the most popular television stations in this country – alongside Tele­ MonteCarlo, which began broadcasting from Monaco in 1974. The model of private popular television, exemplified by these two broadcasters, became a launchpad for Silvio Berlusconi’s future Italian media empire. He cooperated with the aforementioned

86  Nonstate (minority or regional) Slavic languages Yugoslav and Monaco TV stations and closely emulated their programs and technology until 1990. Later, there was no need to fall back on these two foreign TV stations’ expertise. This example proves that communist Yugoslavia’s influence on Italian culture was stronger than one might assume given the Cold War isolation between East and West (Bartolj 2006; Hofmann 1972; Noam 1987: 21). 12 When independent Macedonia emerged from crumbling Yugoslavia in 1991, Greece refused to recognize this newly independent nation-state under its preferred name. Instead, Athens employed the form ‘Republic of Skopje,’ while countries siding with Greece settled for the acronym FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) (Macedonia 2019). Likewise, until 2018, Athens refused to recognize the name of the Macedonian language as official (Macedonian Language 2019). 13 I thank Rok Stergar for the timely reminder about such German-Slavic specialist jargons. 14 I thank Catherine Gibson for reminding me to probe into the often-undiscussed normative idea that more languages and pluralism are necessarily and always desirable. 15 Yet this period of the domination of nazi Germany over Central Europe is a bit of an exception to the use of ethnolinguistic nationalism as the region’s sole ideology of statehood building, legitimation and maintenance. In Germany’s insistence on the (supposedly) biologically construed race, the nazis tended to refute the basic tenant of ethnolinguistic nationalism, namely that language equates nation, as most poignantly exemplified by the exclusion of German-speaking (and German-identifying) Jews from the commonality of the German nation. On the other hand, nazi Germany’s Rassenkunde (‘science of race’) underpinned the officially adopted classification of some groups of Slav speakers as ‘racially German’ (cf Hrabar 1960) – for instance, under the label eigensprachige Kulturdeutsche (‘non-German-speaking Germans united through culture with the German nation’) (cf Blanke 2001: 261). (I thank Rok Stargar for drawing my attention to this issue.) 16 Such a decoupling of religion, ethnicity and Einzelsprachen from the structures of statehood was practiced across Central Europe in the early modern period in the form of nonterritorial autonomies. For instance, Jews, Armenians and Roma enjoyed such nonterritorial autonomies in Poland-Lithuania. In the Ottoman Empire, the population was organized into nonterritorial autonomies, known as millets (ethnoreligious communities). In Austria-Hungary, Cisleithania’s crownlands (regions) often provided for individual ethnolinguistic needs, offering schools and other public institutions in ‘minority languages’ – that is, in those that were not official in a given crownland. Austro-marxists (Austria-Hungary’s social democrats) dabbled in the concept of individualized nonterritorial (personal) autonomy for the sake of decoupling language and culture from politics. A continuation of this trend underpins the project of ever-closer European integration. State and suprastate structures and institutions are there for serving individual citizens and their groups and people(s), especially by providing them with security and stability. (I thank Rok Stergar for drawing my attention to these historical examples.)

3 The internet A new frontier

In Ernest Gellner’s final work devoted to nationalism, he proposed that extant political stability  – as broadly exemplified by states, their structures and their institutions – should not be dismantled in the absence a strong cause (Gellner 1998: 108). In the field of language politics, his postulate may be interpreted to mean that an increase or a decrease in the number of languages should not entail any automatic change in the number (or frontiers) of existing states in a given area of the globe.1 This issue seems to be quite an urgent one given the rise of the multilingual and multiscriptal cyberspace during the past decade and a half. At present (2017),2 the internet remains outside states’ effective and direct control in Europe and across most of the world (with the notable exceptions of totalitarian China and North Korea or authoritarian3 Iran and Saudi Arabia). As a result, nowadays in Central Europe, the game of creating and recognizing Slavic languages in accordance with the ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism has switched to cyberspace, safely outside of governmental control. Human imagination never ceases to surprise, while in cyberspace it may be (so far) exercised quite widely and safely – that is, without the necessity of border changes, proclaiming new states or destroying existing ones. Perhaps, for the time being, the best (though not entirely sufficient) indicator of an official (state) language on the internet is whether a Wikipedia is available in it. As long as an Einzelsprache flourishes in cyberspace, it is usually a reflection of its official status in a nation-state outside the web. On the other hand, if a language with a strong presence on the internet is not recognized in the state(s) where it is typically spoken and written, its cyber presence may be a good indicator of the political aspirations of this Einzelsprache’s speech community (perhaps with the exception of constructed and defunct languages – that is, with no speech community of their own). At present (2017), separate Wikipedias are available in 20 Slavic languages, namely Bosnian, Bulgarian, Classical Belarusian, Croatian, Czech, Kashubian, Lower Sorbian, Macedonian, Official Belarusian, Old Church Slavonic, Polish, Russian, Rusyn, Serbo-Croatian, Silesian, Slovak, Slovenian, Ukrainian and Upper Sorbian (List of Wikipedias by Language 2017). Not surprisingly, most of these languages are official in the Slavophone nation-states. But this majority is quite narrow at 60 percent, or 12 languages connected to corresponding Slavic nation-states, namely Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Official

88  The internet Belarusian, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian. From this list of the Slavic state languages used on the internet, Montenegro’s official language of Montenegrin is conspicuously absent. In 2006–2008, the Wikipedialike Crnogorska Enciklopedija (Montenegrin Encyclopedia) functioned on the web (cf Glavna 2017). The hope was that in due course it would become recognized as a Montenegrin-language Wikipedia. However, because of persistent and numerous hacking attacks launched from Serbia, the resource had to be taken offline (Crnogorska 2017). Similarly, a strong opposition among Serbian and pro-Serbian Wikipedians toward the Montenegrin language has repeatedly thwarted its recognition as a distinctive medium (Einzelsprache) in which another Slavic Wikipedia could be created. At present, the fifth request to recognize Montenegrin as a cyberspace language is under discussion among Wikipedia editors (Requests 2017). From among the ten recognized regional and minority Slavic languages, speakers of four of them enjoy their own Wikipedias, namely Kashubian, Low Sorbian, Rusyn and Upper Sorbian. Perhaps the speech communities of Molise Slavic, Paulician and Resian are too small, disinterested (in any ethnolinguistically based project) or per capita too poor to develop Wikipedias in their own languages, even for fun if not for the sake of any political project. On the other hand, Resian and Molise Slavic speakers, on average more literate in Italian than in their ethnic languages, would typically consult the Italian Wikipedia (cf Sujoldžić 2004: 270). Those who are more engaged with or interested in their ethnolinguistic heritage may fall back on the Slovenian and Croatian Wikipedias, respectively. Similarly, Paulician speakers are more literate in their home countries’ official languages – Serbian in Serbia or Romanian in Romania – than in their own ethnic language.4 They would likely avail themselves either of the Serbian or of the Romanian Wikipedia. And those wishing to reconnect with their ethnolinguistic heritage may use the Bulgarian Wikipedia. However, the last option depends on whether a Paulician speaker is versed in Cyrillic, their religious background of Catholicism instead pushing them to stick with the Latin alphabet (cf Druzhestvo 2018).

Type of Language

Names

Number

State Languages

Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Official Belarusian, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian, Ukrainian Kashubian, Low Sorbian, Rusyn, Upper Sorbian Silesian

12

Classical Belarusian, Serbo-Croatian

2

Recognized Regional and Minority Languages Unrecognized Regional and Minority Language Recognized Internet Languages Defunct Language Total

Old Church Slavonic

Figure 3a The recognized Slavic ‘cyberspace languages’ in 2017

4 1

1 20

The internet 89 Burgenland Croatian, Resian and Lemkian speakers often perceive their languages as offshoots of Croatian, Slovenian and Rusyn, respectively. This perception reduces any urge to start Wikipedias in their own ethnic languages. In addition, all three communities are relatively small and dispersed, so the current generations are more literate in the official languages of their now home countries, namely German in the case of Burgenland Croatians living in eastern Austria, Italian in the case of Resians, or Polish in the case of Lemkos. As a result, when a need arises, they can consult the German, Italian and Polish Wikipedias, respectively. Last but not least, rather than through language, the Bunjevacs differentiate as an ethnic community in Serbia’s Vojvodina more thanks to their Catholicism vis-à-vis Orthodox Christianity, which is professed by the majority of the Serbs. On the other hand, Bunjevac, recognized as a language in its own right, seems to help this ethnic group retain its difference in relation to Croats, who are Catholics too (Pižurica and Kujundžić-Ostojić 2008; Vuković 2009). As a result, when looking for information on the web, a Bunjevac would refer to the Serbo-Croatian Wikipedia or a Wikipedia in one of the post-Serbo-Croatian languages. Interestingly, Silesian is the sole unrecognized Slavic minority or regional language in which a Wikipedia was successfully founded. This was possible, perhaps, thanks to the fact that at over half a million the Silesian speech community is the largest among all the 13 unrecognized Slavic languages’ speech communities (Raport 2012: 108). In addition, since the turn of the 20th century, around 20–30 books, brochures and publications are brought out in Silesian every year. Similarly, since the 2010s, hundreds of blogs, websites and pieces of audiovisual material have been posted online (Kamusella 2017b), and in 2018, the Silesian-language news portal was launched (Wachtyrz 2018). Moreover, Silesians live compactly in the historical region of Upper Silesia, nowadays mostly contained within the Polish boundaries. In contrast, the Mazurian speech community, expelled from communist Poland in the 1960s, is now dispersed and mostly forms a diaspora in Germany. As a result, at present, this speech community is moribund. Although the speech communities of East Slovak, Lachian, Moravian, Prussian, Podlachian and West Polesian are relatively sizable and compact, most of their members do not see their languages as Einzelsprachen in their own right. As a result, the number of language-cum-ethnic activists is not sufficient to commence Wikipedias in these languages. A critical mass of interest in and support for a Wikipedia project in these languages has not been achieved. Not that even the support of a friendly state would help, if opposition to a project of this kind is too stark, as has been proven by the aforementioned failed attempt at founding a Montenegrin Wikipedia. The Wikipedias in the unrecognized Slavic internet languages of Classical Belarusian and Serbo-Croatian are somewhat similar to the case of Silesian. Both speech communities are sizable and determined enough to press on with the Wikipedias in these two languages. In addition, the heritage of communist-cum-federal Yugoslavia that used to punch well beyond its weight as a leader of the NonAligned Movement continues to lend much legitimacy and symbolical support to the Serbo-Croatian Wikipedia. Hundreds of thousands who consider themselves

90  The internet to be Yugoslavs and do not fully accept the rise of the post-Serbo-Croatian languages (Srebotnjak 2016) use and contribute to the Serbo-Croatian Wikipedia. With regard to the Wikipedia in Classical Belarusian, what fuels this project is the ethnolinguistically defined opposition to the current authoritarian regime in Belarus. Another source of the continued popularity of Classical Belarusian is the preservation of this form of the Belarusian language among the anti-Soviet (and often anti-Russian and anti-Polish) Belarusian diaspora outside the Soviet Union. The present-day Belarusian regime continues to curb the use of Belarusian in favor of Russian in Belarus and sides with Official Belarusian, which the opposition and diaspora see as an unjustifiably Russified form of the Belarusian language (cf Belaruski 2017; Goujon 2009: 150–151). In today’s Belarus, in 2014, the majority of users consulted the Russian Wikipedia (84 percent) and the English Wikipedia (10.2 percent), meaning that less than 6 percent of users turned to one of the two Belarusian Wikipedias (Belarusian Wikipedia 2017). The Official Belarusian Wikipedia is clearly preferred by users in Belarus. A quarter of them stem from the country, and another quarter are Soviet and post-Soviet migrants from Belarus who now reside in Germany. On the other hand, the Belarusian diaspora in the United States favors the Classical Belarusian Wikipedia and thus account for 40  percent of its users; only one-fifth of this resource’s users stem from Belarus (Belaruskaia Vikipedyia 2018). Finally, the creation of a Wikipedia in the defunct language of Old Church Slavonic is quite a surprise. Some may even smirk at this project. The Latin Wikipedia, founded in 2002, started this trend of Wikipedias in defunct languages, which in the past were used for official written and other purposes (Lateinische 2017). The Anglo-Saxon (Old English) Wikipedia went online in 2005 (Stǣr 2017). This project probably coalesced, thanks to the worldwide popularity of JRR Tolkien’s book trilogy Lord of the Rings, which was made into a successful eponymous film trilogy in 2001–2003. Originally, these novels grew from the author’s deep scholarly and literary involvement in Anglo-Saxon literature and culture. The Wikipedia in Old Church Slavonic, commenced in 2006 (Istoriia 2017), is even of more symbolic importance for its creators. Like the cases of Latin and Anglo-Saxon (Old English), there is no speech community of Old Church Slavonic. Furthermore, unlike Latin, Old Church Slavonic remains the liturgical language of the Orthodox Church across the Slavic countries. Hence, in terms of actual use, Old Church Slavonic (often dubbed ‘Church Slavonic,’ ‘Slavonic’ or ‘our language’ by its users) is currently in much wider popular use than Latin is. In the purely numerical terms of the number of articles in the Slavic Wikipedias, the Russian Wikipedia is unsurprisingly the largest (1.4 million articles), because the corresponding Russian speech community is also the largest among all the Slavic speech communities. The second-largest Slavic Wikipedia is in Polish (1.24 million articles), though Ukraine’s population at 45 million is larger than that of Poland at 38 million. But unlike Poland, where the monopoly of Polish is not dented by any other language, Russian remains an important second language in Ukraine. Although most Ukrainians claim Ukrainian as their native language, practically all Ukrainian speakers are bilingual in Russian, which is much rarer

The internet 91 among Russian speakers with regard to Ukrainian. Hence, the total number of L1 and L2 speakers of Russian in Ukraine seems to be higher than the parallel statistics for Ukrainian (Languages of Ukraine 2018). Also, many Russophone Ukrainians seem to contribute to the Russian Wikipedia, but this courtesy is certainly not repaid by Russians from the Russian Federation, who do not contribute to the Ukrainian Wikipedia. Despite facing these adverse socio-political odds, the Ukrainian Wikipedia is the third largest (0.74 million articles) among the Slavophone Wikipedias, which is a laudable achievement. It is half the size of the Russian Wikipedia, in spite of the fact that the number of Ukraine’s inhabitants stands roughly at one-third of the Russian population of 144 million. The fourth largest Wikipedia is in the officially ‘defunct’ Serbo-Croatian (0.44 million articles). The largest Wikipedia in a post-Serbo-Croatian language is the Serbian Wikipedia (0.37 million articles). Nevertheless it is still 25 percent smaller than the SerboCroatian Wikipedia (List of Wikipedias by Language 2017). The largest Wikipedia in a recognized Slavic minority or regional language is the Upper Sorbian Wikipedia, with 12.3 thousand articles. It is followed by the Wikipedia in the unrecognized Slavic minority or regional language of Silesian at 6.3 thousand articles. All Wikipedias in the three other recognized Slavic minority or regional languages (Kashubian, Lower Sorbian and Rusyn) are smaller. The Old Church Slavonic Wikipedia with no speech community to fall back on is the smallest, at shy of 600 articles. It is dwarfed by the Anglo-Saxon

Wikipedia language

Number of articles

Russian Polish Ukrainian Serbo-Croatian Czech Serbian Bulgarian Slovak Croatian Slovenian Official Belarusian Macedonian Bosnian Classical Belarusian Upper Sorbian Silesian Rusyn Kashubian Lower Sorbian Old Church Slavonic (Slovenisku) Total: 20 Wikipedias

1,443,772 1,258,499 757,527 441,738 396,801 377,689 238,072 224,291 181,521 159,623 148,258 92,087 76,755 61,836 12,420 6,628 6,311 5,226 3,107 632 5,830,957

Figure 3b The Slavophone Wikipedias ranked in accordance with each’s number of articles (List of Wikipedias 2017)

92  The internet Wikipedia at 3,000 articles under its belt and by the comparatively huge Latin Wikipedia at 0.13 million articles. Interestingly, the Latin Wikipedia is larger than the Macedonian Wikipedia or Bosnian Wikipedia, at 91,000 and 75,000 articles, respectively. However, not a single Wikipedia in a Slavic state language is smaller than a Wikipedia in a Slavic regional or minority language (with the exception of the still-not-reaccepted Montenegrin Wikipedia with 3,000 articles when it was terminated in 2008 [Requests for New Languages 2017; Wp/cnr/ Crnogorska 2019]). Even the semi-official Wikipedia in Classical Belarusian, at 61,000 articles, is five times bigger than the largest Wikipedia in a Slavic regional or minority language (i.e., in Upper Sorbian) (List of Wikipedias by Language 2017). In Central Europe, where normatively language legitimizes national statehood (as prescribed by the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state), the very existence of an ethnolinguistic nation-state gives a kick-start to any projects with the use of the state language – even if the state authorities are somewhat dismissive of this language, as in the case of (especially Classical) Belarusian in Belarus. This principle is reconfirmed by another increasingly more important online resource: Google Translate. This service, which covers over 100 Einzelsprachen, is available in only 12 Slavic state official languages, namely Belarusian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian. As in the case of Slavophone Wikipedias, Montenegrin is not included. It is the only fully recognized Slavic state language that is not treated as an equal on the web. Furthermore, not a single nonstate Slavic language is represented among the Google Translate languages,

North Slavic Languages Number of Articles South Slavic Languages

Number of Articles

Russian Polish Ukrainian Czech Slovak Official Belarusian Classical Belarusian Upper Sorbian

441,738 377,689 181,521 76,755 238,072 92,087 159,623 632

Lower Sorbian Silesian Rusyn Kashubian Total: 12 Wikipedias

1,443,772 Serbo-Croatian 1,258,499 Serbian 757,527 Croatian 396,801 Bosnian 224,291 621,092 Bulgarian 148,258 Macedonian 61,836 210,094 Slovenian 12,420 Old Church Slavonic (Slavonisku) 3,107 15,527 Total: 8 Wikipedias 6,628 6,311 5,226 4,324,676

1,077,703

330,159

1,568,117

Figure 3c The Wikipedias in the North and South Slavic languages ranked in accordance with each’s number of articles (List of Wikipedias 2017)

The internet 93 which is a different case from that of Slavic-speaking Wikipedias. However, it is not a foolproof norm among Europe’s nonstate languages. For instance, users can enjoy the Google Translate service in Basque, Catalan, Corsican, Frisian, Galician, Scots Gaelic (i.e., Scotland’s Gaelic), Welsh or Yiddish. Usually, such languages are official in autonomous regions, but Yiddish is not (Google Translate 2017a, 2017b). The proliferation of online services is a wild card, because they are mostly driven by user demand rather than by government policies. However, apart from some rare exceptions, in the question of Einzelsprachen, these services are most tightly wed to states and their official (state) languages. The phenomenon is not that surprising, given that the web and its structure have been produced by today’s world of nation-states. In turn, cyberspace tends to faithfully reflect the power relations as obtaining in the ‘real world’ of politics, economy and social life. Facebook’s interface is available in 115 languages, including state varieties of languages (e.g., France’s French or Canadian French) and some facetious varieties (e.g., ‘Upside Down English’). As in the case of the languages in which Google Translate is available, the Facebook interface can be accessed in all the presentday Slavic state official languages, except for Montenegrin. However, quite unexpectedly, an interested user may access Facebook in the Slavic nonstate language of Silesian, which – to add insult to injury – is not recognized in the country where it is used most widely, namely Poland (Select 2017). This shows that the will of a speech community of half a million, combined with their economic and intellectual clout, may overcome the disabilities of statelessness and suppression. But when such a will of a speech community to make their speech into a full-fledged Einzelsprache in its own right is missing, no amount of state-directed efforts to this end can successfully replace this will. (Perhaps totalitarian rule could overcome this lack of will, as has been proven by the vast project of creating and destroying scores of languages in the interwar Soviet Union [Martin 2001].) This is the case of Montenegrin, which is Montenegro’s sole official language. But many Montenegrins do not believe that it is a language and instead prefer the linguonym ‘Serbian’ for referring to their speech and written texts in it. Speakers of the three other postSerbo-Croatian state languages (Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian) concur with this opinion on the status of Montenegrin – perhaps with a qualified exception of Croats, ideologically often pitted against Serbian opinions on such politicized issues of ethnolinguistic character that touch the lands and populations of former Yugoslavia. Twitter’s interface is available in 34 languages, but only one language is represented by two varieties, namely Chinese. And these varieties are entirely scriptal – that is, one being the Simplified Chinese spelling of communist China and the other the Traditional Chinese spelling of noncommunist Taiwan. Twitter allowed for sending brief messages up to 140 characters until this limit was doubled to 280 in 2017. Any scriptal, orthographic or diacritic complication impinges on this economy of brevity. Another point of the Twitter economy is to reach as

94  The internet Online Service

Languages

State Languages not Supported by the Online Service

Google Translate

Belarusian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian [12] Belarusian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Silesian*, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian [13] Czech, Polish, Russian and Ukrainian [4]

Montenegrin [1]

Facebook

Twitter

VKontakte

Skype

WhatsApp

Viber

TED

Belarusian (Classical), Belarusian (Official), Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Polish, Russian, Russian (pre-1917), Russian (Soviet), Rusyn, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian, Ukrainian and Ukrainian (Galician) [16] Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Polish, Russian, Serbian (Latin), Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian [9] Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian [10] Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Polish, Russian, Slovak and Ukrainian [7] Belarusian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Polish, Russian, Rusyn, Serbian, Silesian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian [15]

Figure 3d Slavic languages in various online services (2017) * Nonstate languages are underlined

Montenegrin [1]

Belarusian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian, Slovak and Slovenian [9] Macedonian and Montenegrin [2]

Belarusian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Serbian (Cyrillic) [5] Belarusian, Bosnian and Montenegrin [3] Belarusian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian and Slovenian [6] [0]

The internet 95 many other Twitter users as possible, meaning that the larger a language’s speech community, the better. Hence, only four Slavic languages feature on Twitter’s interface, namely Czech, Polish, Russian and Ukrainian. These Slavic languages are spoken and written by the largest Slavophone speech communities. Interestingly, all these Einzelsprachen belong to the North Slavic group of languages. Of course, making the ‘Common Language’ (or the ethnopolitically neutral designation for Serbo-Croatian) available on Twitter would make economic sense. But the political reality of the post-Yugoslav states draws so much legitimacy from their national and state languages – Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian – that these states could block access to Twitter if the company offered an interface in such a ‘Common Language.’ Other Slavic state languages missing from Twitter include, Belarusian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Slovak and Slovenian (Twitter 2017). This does not stop speakers of these missing languages from using Twitter. Speakers of Latin script–based languages may use English for tweeting ‘without diacritics’ or one of the available Slavic languages written in Latin letters (Czech or Polish) (cf HJ 2013). In the case of the Cyrillic-based Slavic languages that are not available on Twitter, their users may settle on using Russian or Ukrainian for writing in their languages (cf Borisov 2011). Otherwise, they may opt for English and write their languages with the use of Latin letters in an ad hoc English-style transliteration. This is nothing new: by the turn of the 21st century, when Cyrillic in standardized ASCII coding became widely available in computers and online, Bulgarian speakers or their Russian counterparts wrote in such ad hoc Latin alphabet–based transliterations (Paulsen 2014: 168).5 Making other scripts available on the internet led, among others, to the development of a vibrant and self-assured Cyrillic-based segment of cyberspace. Not surprisingly, Russia is the leader in this segment. The Russian counterpart of Facebook is the VKontakte service, whose interface is available in 85 languages and language varieties, 29 of them in Cyrillic. Which Einzelsprachen are on offer as much reflects what the users demand as what Russia is geostrategically interested in. Hence, Moldovan is offered alongside Romanian, though even in Moldova, the users of Moldovan prefer referring to it as ‘Romanian.’ However, the designation ‘Moldovan language’ is preferred by pro-Russian political forces in Moldova and is the only one allowed in the breakaway de facto polity of Transnistria, under Russian control. Not surprisingly, Montenegrin is not available. No Wikipedia is available either in Moldovan or in Montenegrin. A much bigger surprise is the lack of Macedonian on the VKontakte list of languages. This seems to be Moscow’s bow to Bulgaria, where Macedonian is considered to be just another (literary) standard of the Bulgarian language. There are even more surprises and novel developments. Facebook’s interface is available in one Slavic nonstate language, namely Silesian. The VKontakte interface is available in a similarly nonstate Slavic language, Rusyn. Unlike Silesian, Rusyn is recognized in Hungary, Serbia, Slovakia and Romania. However, most of its speakers live in westernmost Ukraine, where this language is not recognized, like Silesian in Poland. VKontakte pays a particular attention to Ukraine.

96  The internet Alongside standard Ukrainian, this service makes its interface available in the Galician variety of Ukrainian. Both the Galician and the Rusyn interfaces were released in the second year of the Russo-Ukrainian War, in 2016, ostensibly in recognition of the ‘dialectal richness’ of the Ukrainian language (“VKontakte” 2016). However, no similar interfaces for the regional dialects of Russian are on offer. Hence, the move appears to be part and parcel of the hybrid war that the Kremlin is now waging on Ukraine (JIT 2019; Magnitsky 2016; Shandra and Seely 2019; Suchanow 2019), aiming to encourage regional (ethnolinguistic) separatisms in this country (cf Rosiisʹka 2016; Tereshina 2018). In Russian propaganda, Galicia is presented as the source of presumably ‘aggressive’ Ukrainian nationalism and of the country’s ‘Russophobia,’ as though the Russian military intervention in eastern Ukraine could not be a better explanation of both phenomena (cf Grishin 2013; Starikov 2019). Not really surprisingly, in May 2017, VKontakte and other Russian online services and software solutions were banned in Ukraine, on the well-substantiated suspicion that they may give Russia strategic advantage in the ongoing hybrid (and hot) Russo-Ukrainian War (V Ukraini 2017). Despite paying lip service to the rhetoric of appreciating linguistic and dialectal richness, VKontakte does not offer an interface in Crimean Tatar, spoken in Ukraine’s region of Crimea, illegally annexed by Russia in 2014. This decision seems to be in breach of Russia’s 2014 republican constitution of Crimea, which designates Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian, alongside Russian, as the republic’s official languages (Konstitutsiia 2014: Art 10.1). Bowing to the now standard online use of two orthographic varieties of Belarusian, as in the case of the two respective Wikipedias in this language, the VKontakte interface is available both in Classical Belarusian and in Official Belarusian. Last but not least, the most interesting innovation is the introduction, in 2010, of the temporal varieties of the Russian language, namely PreRevolutionary (Imperial, pre-1917 Russian), Soviet (Russian) and (post-1991) Russian (Anni-Fannin 2010; Iazyk 2010). The discussion on Soviet (Russian) as a language in its own right began in the early 2000s (“Sovietskii iazyk” 2005). In practice, both Soviet and Pre-Revolutionary are employed for humorous purposes, like Facebook’s Upside Down English. In contrast to the offer of VKontakte’s interface in Rusyn and Galician, the temporal varieties of Russian are not intended to split the Russian speech community. On the contrary, the PreRevolutionary language coaxes the anticommunist (white) diaspora and heritage back into the mainstream of today’s Russian culture and society in the Russian Federation. On the other hand, the Soviet language fulfills the same function in relation to (the) ‘Soviet people’ in the post-Soviet states. At present, VKontakte is available in 16 Slavic languages and its varieties. Ten of them are available in Cyrillic (Belarusian [Classical], Belarusian [Official], Russian, Russian [pre1917], Russian [Soviet], Rusyn, Serbian, Ukrainian and Ukrainian [Galician]) and six in Latin script (Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Polish, Slovak and Slovenian). But if language varieties are excluded, the number of VKontakte’s Cyrillic-based Slavic languages drops to four (Russian, Rusyn, Serbian and Ukrainian) (VKontakte 2017).

The internet 97 The interface of the online communication service Skype is available in 44 languages and language varieties (such as Spain’s Spanish, Mexican Spanish and US Spanish), including nine Slavic languages, namely Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Polish, Russian, Serbian (Latin), Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian. Hence, four Slavic state languages are missing, namely Belarusian, Bosnian, Macedonian and Montenegrin. This means that speakers of Bosnian must avail themselves of the service in Croatian, of Montenegrin in Serbian, of Macedonian in Bulgarian and of Belarusian in Russian. Furthermore, Skype uses the informal Latin alphabet– based variety of Serbian, meaning that the official Cyrillic-based variety of this language is missing too (What Languages 2017). The cross-platform online messaging service WhatsApp is offered in 58 languages and language varieties (e.g., Portugal’s Portuguese and Brazilian Portuguese). The interface is available in ten Slavic state languages, namely Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian. The missing Slavic state languages are Belarusian, Bosnian and Montenegrin. The tacit assumption imported from the extra-internet reality is that speakers of Belarusian would avail themselves of this service in Belarus’s co-official language of Russian, whereas speakers of Bosnian and Montenegrin would avail themselves of this service in, respectively, Croatian and Serbian. Unlike Skype, WhatsApp offers the Serbianlanguage interface exclusively in Cyrillic, meaning that Serbian speakers who prefer the Latin script may use WhatsApp in Croatian (WhatsApp 2017). Viber, offered in 40 languages, is the direct competitor of WhatsApp in the post-Soviet states (Viber 2018). In 2016, the former messaging service surpassed the latter in the terms of users both in Russia and Belarus. Viber dominates threequarters of the messaging market in the latter country but tellingly does not offer an interface in Belarusian.6 It captures users through its focused employment of Russian, which shows that from the company’s perspective, Belarusian speakers have shown insufficient interest to justify the translation of the Viber interface into this language (Areshka 2016; Viber 2016). Yet apart from predictably having secured incorporation in Luxembourg, the company opened its main headquarters in the Belarusian capital of Miensk and in Tel Aviv (Viber: Kompaniia 2018). But Miensk is definitely where Viber plans how to corner more market in Russia and other post-Soviet states (Drozhzha 2017). Viber’s interface is offered only in the following seven Slavic state languages: Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Polish, Russian, Slovak and Ukrainian. Interestingly, such an important Cyrillic-based Slavic state language as Serbian is missing. Other missing Slavic state languages include Belarusian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Slovenian. The company, apparently, shrewdly fills in gaps in the market neglected by competitors and strives to keep down the use of state varieties of languages. It offers only a nonstate-specific interface in English, while its Spain’s Spanish counterpart is followed by two state-specific varieties, one for Argentina and one for Mexico. In addition, the Chinese and Portuguese interfaces are offered in state varieties of these languages, the former in the Taiwanese and communist China varieties of Chinese, while the latter in the Brazilian and Portuguese varieties of Portuguese (Viber 2018).

98  The internet The TED (technology, entertainment, design) service for hosting and offering free video clips with talks is quite an interesting case. In 2009, they commenced a program of subtitling mostly English-language talks in other languages. At present (2018), such subtitled talks are available in 116 languages. In contrast to the aforementioned online services, all the 12 Slavic state languages are represented (Belarusian, Bulgarian, Bosnian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian), in addition to the recognized nonstate language of Rusyn and the unrecognized nonstate language of Silesian (Our Languages 2018; TED Translators 2018). The online languages are connected with the world of Einzelsprachen outside the web through the device of language codes that were developed at the turn of the 1960s for the sake of machine recording and retrieval of data. In 1968, this effort yielded the international standard ISO 639 of alpha-2 codes for languages in which books and periodicals were commonly published after World War II. Nowadays this standard is known as ISO 639-1, and in 2017, under this standard, codes were available for 184 languages and groups of languages. Decolonization and the spread of compulsory elementary education worldwide has led to the explosive production of printed material in hundreds of further languages. To catch up with this development, in 1998 the ISO 639–2 standard of alpha-3 codes was developed. As of 2017, almost 600 languages have been covered by this standard. Nowadays the Library of Congress, with its seat in Washington, DC, maintains both ISO 693-1 and ISO 693-2 language lists, meaning that libraries across the world take a note of the language of publication only if it is duly registered on one of these two lists. Another gamechanger was desktop publishing and the internet, making texts available in almost all the world’s languages, numbering about 8,000. For the sake of managing this wealth of multilingual and polyscriptal information, in 2007, the Library of Congress developed the ISO 639-3 standard of alpha-3 codes for the comprehensive coverage of all the human languages. Almost immediately, the maintenance and management of this standard was outsourced to the Bible translation organization SIL International (at present the original Christianizing mission tends to be concealed on the dedicated website in order not to alienate non-Christian speech communities). Only those Einzelsprachen are ‘visible’ in cyberspace that enjoy their own ISO 639 codes. Among those, the tiny group of the languages with their own ISO 639–1 and ISO 639–2 codes, as ‘most visible,’ are on the top of this pyramid, accounting for approximately 7.5 percent of the world’s languages (ISO 639 2017; Kamusella 2012c). Before the splitting of the ISO 639 standard in 1998, the codes were available for Slavic state languages, namely Belarusian, Bulgarian, Czech, Macedonian, Polish, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian, and for the liturgical language of (Old) Church Slavonic. The state languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian were missing from this list of language codes, because the status quo of the post-Yugoslav states and their language policies had not been settled yet. Afterward Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian were added to the Slavic languages on the ISO 639-1 list of codes, and SerboCroatian was removed from it (Serbo-Croatian: Documentation 2017). Montenegrin is still missing from this list, but on 21 December 2017, it was officially

The internet 99 Standard

ISO 639 before 1998

Languages Covered

State languages: Belarusian, Bulgarian, Czech, Macedonian, Polish, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian [10] Nonstate languages: (Old) Church Slavonic [1] ISO 639-1 State languages: Belarusian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian [12] Nonstate languages: (Old) Church Slavonic [1] ISO 639-2 State languages: Belarusian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian [13] Nonstate languages: Kashubian, Lower Sorbian and Upper Sorbian [3] Group codes: Slavic languages and Sorbian languages [2] ISO 639-3 State languages: Belarusian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian [12] Nonstate macrolanguage (pluricentric language): Serbo-Croatian [1] Nonstate languages: Kashubian, Kajkavian, Lower Sorbian, Molise Slavic (Slavomolisano), Rusyn, Silesian, and Upper Sorbian [7] ‘Extinct’ languages (i.e., with no speech community): (Old) East Slavic (Old Russian), Polabian and (Church) Slavonic [3] Unicode State languages: Belarusian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Russian, Rusyn, Serbian (Cyrillic/Latin), Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian [12] Nonstate languages: Kashubian, Lower Sorbian, Rusyn, Silesian and Upper Sorbian [5] Liturgical languages: Church Slavic (Slavonic) [1] Standalone alphabet: Glagolitic [1]

State and Former State Languages not Covered Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian [4] Montenegrin, SerboCroatian [2]

Serbo-Croatian [1]

Montenegrin [1]

Montenegrin [1]

Figure 3e Slavic languages with ISO 639 codes and Unicode keyboards (2017)

100  The internet included on the ISO 639-2 list of codes (ISO 639–2/RA 2017; Montenegrin 2012; Odobren 2017), which features all the aforementioned Slavic languages, alongside some classificatory categories and nonstate languages with a degree of official (autonomous or regional) recognition, namely Kashubian, Lower Sorbian, Slavic languages, Sorbian languages and Upper Sorbian. Hence, for the time being, Montenegrin is treated as a recognized regional (minority) language rather than as a state one. ISO 639-2 also introduced a catch-all group code for Slavic languages to catalog books in (minority or regional) Slavic languages that do not enjoy their ISO 639-1 or ISO 639-2 codes. Volumes in Bunjevac, Paulician or Silesian are cataloged with the information on their languages of publication limited to the group code sla, for ‘Slavic languages.’ It is still popular – though in light of the ISO 693 recommendations incorrect  – to equate in catalogs the Bunjevac language with Serbian or Croatian; Paulician with Bulgarian or Macedonian; and Silesian with Polish or Czech. Last but not least, the wen group code for ‘Sorbian languages’ is used when a publication is in a historical or present-day Sorbian variety that is not unambiguously identifiable as standard Lower Sorbian or standard Upper Sorbian (Codes 2017). The aspiration for the ISO 639-3 standard is to cover all the world’s Einzelsprachen. Ironically, codes are provided for all the present-day Slavic state languages (Belarusian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian), except for Montenegrin. The coverage of Slavic nonstate languages is even spottier. Predictably, Kashubian, Lower Sorbian and Upper Sorbian are included, alongside Rusyn and Silesian. A space was also made for Serbo-Croatian as a nonstate ‘macrolanguage’ (i.e., pluricentric language) that embraces the state languages of Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian. Then, rather quite erratically, Croatia’s ‘literary language’ (dialect) of Kajkavian, but not Čakavian or Burgenland Croatian, is included on the ISO 639-3 list of language codes. An ISO 639-3 code was accorded to Italy’s Molise Slavic (Slavomolisano), which has only 1,000 speakers – but not to Kosovo’s Gorani, which has 60,000 speakers; Bulgaria’s Pomakian, which has some 20,000 speakers; Serbia’s Bunjevac, which has 15,000 speakers; and, for that matter, Italy’s Resian, which has 1,500 speakers. This shows how unpredictable and arbitrary is the process of making prospective nonstate Einzelsprachen into internationally recognized languages that can be used online. Success in this regard depends on grassroots activities of a prospective Einzelsprache’s speakers themselves, efforts of scholars interested in this Einzelsprache, and the good will of states interested in a given case. State administrations have a stake in making a speech variety into a recognized language when speakers of this language live within its territory or when their speech is claimed as a ‘diaspora dialect’ of a state’s official (national) language (Documentation 2015; Serbo-Croatian: Documentation 2017; Slavic 2017b). A similar arbitrariness is observed in the ISO 639-3 registration of disappeared (‘extinct’) languages. Not surprisingly, (Church) Slavonic is included, alongside Old East Slavic (Old Russian) and Polabian. If Polabian is included, why not Slovincian, which geographically was placed midway between Polabian and Kashubian? The case of Old East Slavic, or the unwritten language of (Kyivan)

The internet 101 ISO 639 (Till 1998) ISO 639-1 (2017) ISO 639-2 (2017) ISO 639-3 (2017)

Serbo-Croatian Bosnian Bosnian Bosnian

Croatian Croatian Montenegrin Serbo-Croatian Croatian Kajkavian Molise Slavic

Serbian Serbian Serbian

Figure 3f From Serbo-Croatian to Serbo-Croatian: Serbo-Croatian and the post-SerboCroatian languages, as seen through the lens of the changing ISO 639 standard

Rus’, is even more interesting, on account of its equation with today’s language of Russian. Given that the capital of Rus’ was at Kyiv, it would be more appropriately to call this language Old Ukrainian. However, Russia is a nuclear power, so Moscow’s voice and wishes are also better heard among the agencies maintaining the ISO 639 standards. Furthermore, the once widely used written language of Ruthenian does not enjoy an ISO 639-3 code, though it has a much better claim to this distinction than Old East Slavic. However, Ruthenian was the official language of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which for centuries fought numerous wars against Muscovy (Russia). Nowadays, Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine present a better claim to Ruthenian than does Russia, despite the fact that the Ruthenian name of the Ruthenian language, Ruski, decisively influenced the Russian name of today’s Russian language, Russkii. In a nutshell, at present remembering about Ruthenian does not fit resurgent Russia’s neoimperial ideology of Russkii Mir. Hence, Ruthenian will have no code on the ISO 639-3 list of languages unless Ukraine or Lithuania decide to request it in the future, having noticed the importance of such institutional gestures for furthering their ‘soft power.’ Because since 2000 Belarus has been formally united with Russia in a Union State, probably the former country’s government or academy of sciences will not be interested in initiating such a code request for Ruthenian (Kamusella 2012b; Old Russian 2017; Polabian 2017; Slavic 2017b). The nonprofit computer organization Unicode7 Consortium, established in 1991, ‘translates’ the ISO 639 and related standards into uniform software solutions that support characters (‘letters,’ graphemes) employed for writing and displaying texts on computer screens and online in a variety of languages (Unicode 2017). Without such uniformization, the seamless worldwide cyberspace would have been impossible. The core of Unicode’s activities is the development and maintenance of the standardized Universal Coded Character Set (Universal Character Chart) that commenced in 1990 (Universal 2017). This character set builds on the 1963 ASCII (American Standard Code for Information Interchange) standard of character coding, as originally developed by the United States of America Standards Institute (ASCII 2017). At present, in 2017, the Unicode standard supports 136,690 characters and 139 scripts. This is the basis for standardized sets of characters for almost 800 Einzelsprachen, for which standard Unicode keyboards

102  The internet are available. Such Unicode keyboards are available for 12 Slavic state languages (Belarusian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Russian, Rusyn, Serbian [Cyrillic/Latin], Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian), for five Slavic nonstate languages (Kashubian, Lower Sorbian, Rusyn, Silesian and Upper Sorbian), the liturgical language of Church Slavic (Slavonic), and the Glagolitic alphabet that formally is not related to any language but which commonly is employed for writing Church Slavonic. Montenegrin is the sole Slavic state language with no Unicode keyboard, while Serbian is uniquely endowed with two Unicode keyboards, one in Cyrillic and the other in the Latin alphabet. The same could be true of Church Slavic if Glagolitic would be formally linked up with this language. All the Slavic nonstate languages with Unicode keyboards are recognized in a state as a minority or regional language, with the sole exception of Silesian (Languages and Scripts 2017; Latest Version 2017; Supported Scripts 2017).

Notes 1 For instance, in independent India, almost three times more populous than the European Union, linguistic differences were accommodated in the state and without altering its frontiers (Schwartzberg 1985). On the other hand, the solely confessional legitimization of Pakistani statehood steeped in Islam, without any concessions to linguistic differences, eventually led to the 1971 genocidal civil war and the subsequent separation of East Pakistan. On the ethnolinguistic basis, it was remade into Bangladesh, or the nation-state of the Muslim Bengali speakers (Uddin 2006: 117–154). 2 Most of the spadework for this monograph regarding the use of Slavic languages in cyberspace was conducted in 2017. Hence, the latest data presented and analyzed in the book usually does not go beyond this year. 3 Authoritarian regimes aspire to control these aspects of public life that brush on a given state’s politics. In contrast, totalitarian regimes aspire to control all aspects of public life, alongside some aspects of private life. 4 This brings up the interesting issue of language competency and proficiency. Just because someone is a ‘native speaker’ of their ‘own ethnic language’ does not mean they are literate in it or comfortable using it in all communication situations. Writing is a technology of recording speech, not language, as it is popularly, but incorrectly, assumed. One acquires speech naturally at home and in community, while the formal skills of writing and reading (i.e., literacy) are acquired in school. Ergo, when no extensive schooling is provided in an ethnic language (ethnolect), its speakers can speak it but are unable to write and read in their Einzelsprache. There are no ‘native writers’ of languages (cf Paikeday 1985). (I thank Catherine Gibson for discussing this salient point.) 5 As mentioned earlier, before the turn of the 21st century, email and internet users of all Cyrillic-based Slavic languages (Belarusian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Russian and Ukrainian) had no choice but to write in Latin letters in an ad hoc transliteration. Because the French system of spelling was used for official romanization in the Soviet Union, initially Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian speakers tended to write their languages with the use of Latin letters in a French-style romanization (Romanization of Russian 2018). In the case of Macedonian and Serbian, their speakers turned to the Latin alphabet of Serbo-Croatian (Croatian and Bosnian). However, at that time, commercially available software usually did not allow for the use of ASCII-style non-Western diacritic Latin letters either, so [č] and [ć] became just [c] and [đ] became [d]. (Unicode, as the successor to ASCII, since its first version of characters released in 1991, has provided codes for all the Central and Eastern European Cyrillic, Greek and Latin alphabets. But the universal

The internet 103 adoption of this standard was slow in the 1990s [cf Unicode: History 2019].) In Bulgaria, the official romanization schemes favored differently the Soviet Union’s Frenchifying model or the Yugoslavian one of Serbo-Croatian’s Latin alphabet (Romanization of Bulgarian 2018). At present, English-style romanization is prevalent for Belarusian, Bulgarian, Russian and Ukrainian, whereas Serbo-Croatian’s Latin alphabet (now with all diacritics in place) is prevalent for Macedonian, Montenegrin and Serbian.   When it came to using the Latin script–based Slavic languages (Bosnian, Croatian, Czech, Polish, Slovak and Slovenian) in email and on the web before the 21st century, diacritics were also unavailable. Hence, one ended up writing these languages without using their specific diacritics – for instance, [r] instead of the Czech letter [ř], [o] instead of the Slovak [ô], and [z] instead of the Polish [ź].   Interestingly, to the best of my knowledge, no one noticed that this highly uniform diacritic-less use of the Latin alphabet for writing all the Slavic Einzelsprachen in the internet before 2000 almost fulfilled Bartholomäus (Jernej) Kopitar’s heartfelt dream that every Slavic language should be written in a single shared All-Slavic alphabet without diacritics and digraphs (multigraphs) (Kryzia 2008: 70). Digraphs do occur in French-style or English-style romanizations (e.g., [ch] for /ʃ/ in French and [zh] for /ʒ/ in English), but perhaps, in Kopitar’s eyes, it would be a minor price for seeing each Slavic Einzelsprache written in the same single diacritic-less Latin script. 6 Indignation felt and openly displayed by many Belarusians at the fact that Viber slighted their national language by not offering its interface in this Einzelsprache convinced the company to change its act. In April 2019, a competition was announced for a Belarusianlanguage Viber interface, which subsequently was released to users in June 2019 (U Viber 2019). 7 Unicode is short for ‘universal character encoding’ or ‘unique, universal and uniform character encoding.’ In a way, it is panslavists’ dreams fulfilled on a global scale, namely a single set of all letters (characters) necessary for writing all humankind’s Einzelsprachen. In other words, it is the unitary script (‘alphabet’) of Humanese.

4 The politics of script

Writing is a technology of the graphic representation of language. Writing is not part of language, just as a photograph with the image of a person on it is not part of that person. Nowadays, different forms of writing (or ‘scripts’) are employed on par with the concept of Einzelsprache for the production and maintenance of Einzelsprachen, or languages seen as discrete and countable entities. Another interesting aspect to which the aforementioned Old Church Slavonic Wikipedia directly contributes is the politics of script in the Slavophone world. Initially, its creators used the pre-Petrine Church (Old) Cyrillic. But soon, with this Wikipedia, they revived the use of the previously defunct Glagolitic alphabet. Now the Old Church Slavonic Wikipedia is written in two scripts: Church Cyrillic and Glagolitic. In the currently extant Slavic nation-states, all official (state) or Slavic nonstate languages employ exclusively two alphabets in writing and publishing, namely Cyrillic and Latin. In cyberspace, however, the Slavic languages are written in three alphabets, namely Cyrillic, Glagolitic and Latin. Although of much symbolic importance in Croatia, Glagolitic is not employed for producing any publications or even texts in Croatian. The employment of this script is limited to symbolic use on monuments or in design. However, apart from these three alphabets, there is another scriptal category of Slavic languages that officially employ both Cyrillic and Latin alphabet as these Einzelsprachen’s equally valid writing systems. This is the case of Montenegrin (Constitution 2007: Art 13) and Serbo-Croatian. (But, with no Wikipedia of its own in cyberspace, I decided to add Montenegrin to this listing for the sake of presenting a fuller picture of script employment among the Slavic languages nowadays.) Serbian also belongs to the category, though on an informal footing. Serbian’s official alphabet is Cyrillic (Constitution 2006: Art 10), but after a revival in Cyrillic-based publishing during the 1990s, because of the rapid rise in Serbian nationalism in the age of the wars of Yugoslav succession (cf Marojević 1991), nowadays half of books and journals published in Serbia in this language are printed in Latin letters (Vulićević 2015). Furthermore, all word processing software marketed in Serbia offers the default choice of both Cyrillic and Latin letters for writing Serbian (Kako 2015). At present, more people in Serbia prefer to read and write with the use of Latin letters (47  percent) than Cyrillic (36  percent), while 17 percent are equally at ease with reading in both scripts (Marušiak 2017:

The politics of script 105 Script

Names

Cyrillic

Bulgarian, Classical Belarusian, Macedonian, Official Belarusian, Russian, Rusyn, Ukrainian Bosnian, Croatian, Czech, Kashubian, Low Sorbian, Polish, Silesian, Slovak, Slovenian, Upper Sorbian Montenegrin, Serbian, Serbo-Croatian Old Church Slavonic

Latin Cyrillic and Latin Glagolitic (and Church Cyrillic) Total

Number 7 10 3 1 21

Figure 4a The three alphabets of the recognized Slavic ‘cyberspace languages’ and of Montenegrin in 2017

Script

Names

Cyrillic

Bulgarian, Macedonian, Official Belarusian, Russian, Ukrainian Bosnian, Croatian, Czech, Polish, Slovak, Slovenian Montenegrin, Serbian

Latin Cyrillic and Latin Total

Number 5 6 2 13

Figure 4b The two alphabets of the Slavic state languages in 2017

583; Živanović 2014). Nevertheless, this relaxed trend in the wake of the postYugoslav wars may be soon reverted, because many in Serbia believe that the use of Latin letters may lead to the ‘de-Serbianization of the Serbian nation’ (Marušiak 2017: 584). In June 2017, the Serbian government presented the first draft of a plan for changing this ‘Latinizing’ trend during the next decade. The goal in ten years’ time is that all Serbian-language governmental and official administrative business would have to be conducted in Cyrillic, while decisively more than half of all the Serbian-language printed and online material for public consumption should be in this script (Marušiak 2017: 586; Strategija 2017: 77–78). When disregarding the complication of Church Slavonic, the Cyrillic and the Latin alphabets are quite evenly distributed among the Slavic cyberspace languages, construed as Einzelsprachen. The distribution is even more even when only the Slavic state languages are taken into account. Five Slavic languages of this kind (Bulgarian, Macedonian, Official Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian) employ Cyrillic in writing, while six use the Latin alphabet (Bosnian, Croatian, Czech, Polish, Slovak and Slovenian). The fact that both scripts are de facto or de jure employed for publishing in two Slavic languages (Montenegrin and Serbian) does not alter the overall ratio. However, if the same statistics were reinterpreted through the lens of the populations of the Slavic nation-states, the situation would change quite dramatically. Mainly because of the sheer demographic

106  The politics of script sizes of Russia and Ukraine, as many as five times more Slavic speakers write and read their languages in Cyrillic (307.5 million) than in the Latin alphabet (63.5 million), while the phenomenon of biscriptality is limited to a mere 9.6 million Slavophones. Monoscriptality is the political and socio-cultural norm in the Slavophone world, while Cyrillic is the overwhelmingly dominant writing system among Slavic speakers. On the other hand, all three scriptal options are evenly distributed among the South Slavs, namely 9.0 million employ Cyrillic (Bulgaria and Macedonia) and 9.5 million the Latin alphabet (Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia), whereas 9.6 million use both alphabets (Montenegro and Serbia). A similar pattern in the statistics is also reflected in overall book production in the Slavic state languages, either in Cyrillic or in Latin letters. In the mid 2010s, per annum around 152,000 book titles were published in the former script and 77,000 in the latter. Obtaining reliable statistics on the script of books published in Montenegro and Serbia is difficult. The commonplace assumption is that out of about 12,000 books produced in these two countries annually, half are in Cyrillic and half in the Latin alphabet (Vulićević 2015). So this does not change the overall proportion that two-thirds of the annual output of some 241,000 book titles in the Slavic state languages are in Cyrillic and the remaining one-third in Latin letters. At 124,000 per year, the annual number of Russian-language book titles dwarfs the publishing in all the other Cyrillic-based Slavic languages. Russian-language publications constitute 78 percent of the annual total of book titles in the Cyrillicbased languages. Interestingly, Russian-language book production accounts for over one-fifth of the entire annual book output in Ukraine3 and for a staggering

Script

State

Population (in millions)

Cyrillic

Belarus Bulgaria Macedonia Russia Ukraine Total Bosnia Croatia Czech Republic Poland Slovakia Slovenia Total Montenegro Serbia Total

9.5 7 2 144 45 307.5 3.5 4 10.5 38 5.5 2 63.5 0.6 9 9.6 380.6

Latin

Cyrillic and Latin Overall Total

Figure 4c The two alphabets and populations of the Slavic states in 2017 (List of Countries 2017)

The politics of script 107 Script

State

Cyrillic

Belarus

11,613 (2014)

Bulgaria

8,530 (2016)

Macedonia

Latin

Cyrillic and Latin Overall Total

Book titles (Year)

924 (2014)

Russia

112,647 (2015)

Ukraine

18,119 (2015)

Total Bosnia Croatia Czech Republic Poland Slovakia

151,833 ~3,000 (2016) 6,500 (2014) 16,850 (2014) 32,480 (2015) 12,739 (2014)

Slovenia Total Montenegro Serbia Total

5,554 (2014) 77,123 1,200 (2014) 10,500 (2014) 11,700 240,656

1,105 in Belarusian 9,572 in Russian 8,035 in Bulgarian 310 in English 48 in Russian 10 in Turkish 78 in other languages 811 in Macedonian 27 in Albanian 14 in English 3 in Turkish 69 in other languages 110,158 in Russian 1,289 in Russia’s non-Russian languages1 and some foreign languages 1,200 in English 14,117 in Ukrainian 4,002 in Russian

12,291 in Slovak 104 in Czech 344 in Hungarian2

Figure 4d The two alphabets and book production in the Slavic states (Anadolija 2015; Annual 2014: 14; Arsenaŭ 2015; Biggins and Crayne 2000: 94; Ivashyna 2016; Izdadeni 2017; Kol’kasts’ 2015; Novotná 2016: 42; Pišek 2016; Prokhorova 2016; Publishing 2015: 14; Rynek 2015: 4; Tol’ki 2012; Voropaev 2016; Weiss 2015)

four-fifths of such output in Belarus.4 Belarusian-language book titles, at 1,105, amount to a mere 8 percent of all the book titles published in Belarus. However, in absolute numbers, still fewer book titles were published in Macedonian, specifically 811 in 2014. The language in which the second-largest number of book titles was published in the mid 2010s, after Russian as the first, is Polish. However, at 32,000 book titles, this Polish-language book production accounted for just one-quarter of the output Russian-language book publishing.

108  The politics of script Language

Russian Polish Common Language (former SerboCroatian) Czech Ukrainian Slovak Bulgarian Slovenian Belarusian Macedonian

in Russia in Belarus in Ukraine Serbian Croatian Bosnian Montenegrin

Number of book titles published

Book titles in Russian and in the other Slavic languages lumped together

110,158 9,572 4,002 c 32,000 10,500 6,500 3,000 1,200

123,732

123,732

21,200

110,559

Over 16,000 14,117 12,291 8,035 Over 5,000 1,105 811

Figure 4e The ranked annual volumes of book production in the Slavic languages in the mid 2010s

Observing the Slavophone book production through the lens of the North and South groups of Slavic languages yields yet another story. In the case of the former group Russian-language titles account for 66 percent of the book production in the North Slavic languages. In the South Slavic group, book publishing in Serbian dominates, accounting for one-third of all the book titles. However, neither publishers nor libraries tightly distinguish in which post-Serbo-Croatian language a given publication was brought out. Publishers do not want to limit their target market, while librarians do not have foolproof guidelines to apportion a book to this or that post-Serbo-Croatian language. As a result, in practice, book publishing in the four post-Serbo-Croatian state languages is treated as if it were all in one language, be it the Common Language or former Serbo-Croatian. From this perspective, the number of book titles published in this language account for two-thirds of the entire book production in the South Slavic languages. The South Slavic language, in which the second-largest number of book titles was published is Bulgarian, accounts for almost one-quarter of the book titles in the South Slavic languages. The North group of Slavic languages is commonly subdivided into the East and West Slavic subgroups.5 In the East group, book production in Russian is overwhelming at almost 90 per of the book titles produced annually in the East Slavic languages. The Polish-language book production in the West Slavic group is clearly dominant at over half of the annual output book titles but still far away from the Russian language’s near monopoly on book publishing among the East Slavic languages.

The politics of script 109 Language groups

Number of Book Titles Published

The Largest Production in a Contributing Language

North Slavic South Slavic

Over 187,000 Over 35,000 (or 19% of the book production in the North Slavic languages)

Russian Common Language (former SerboCroatian)

123,732 21,200 (or 17% of the book production in Russian)

Figure 4f The annual number of book titles by the two Slavic language groups in the mid 2010s Socio-political Subgroups

Number of Book Titles Published

The Largest Production in a Contributing Language

East Slavic West Slavic

139,000 60,000 (or 43% of the book production in the East Slavic languages)

Russian Polish

123,732 32,000 (or 26% of the book production in Russian)

Figure 4g The annual number of book titles published in the North Slavic language group’s two socio-political subgroups of Slavic languages in the mid 2010s

For better or worse, distinct scripts allow for graphic differentiation between languages that in speech are quite similar, and this similarity could carry over in writing if the same alphabet were employed. The phenomenon of using different writing systems for creating and pushing kindred Einzelsprachen further away from each other6 is nowadays most visible in the case of the post-Serbo-Croatian languages (cf Kordić 2009). The Latin alphabet most decisively differentiates Bosnian and Croatian from Montenegrin and Serbian. Likewise, the officially biscriptal Montenegrin should be thus differentiated from Serbian, but as mentioned earlier, the difference is nullified by the fact that in reality both alphabets are employed for publishing and writing in Serbian too. In the past, White Ruthenian (Belarusian) was also written in Latin letters, from the mid 19th century to the mid 20th century (Miller 2008: 80–82), and the same was true of the parallel use of Latin letters, alongside dominant Cyrillic, in the case of Ruthenian (Ukrainian), until the mid 19th century in Austria-Hungary’s Galicia (Magocsi 2002: 89–92). This script choice emphasized the similarity of both languages to Polish and their difference vis-à-vis Russian. Afterward, the situation changed, and nowadays the use of Cyrillic for writing Belarusian and Ukrainian emphasizes their graphic difference vis-à-vis Polish and in turn makes these two languages similar to Russian. Interestingly, in the 1860s the Russian authorities introduced some Polish-language school textbooks printed in Cyrillic (Cyrylica 2012; Strycharska-Brzezina 2006). On the other hand, when over 100

110  The politics of script languages were used for publishing with the use of Latin letters in the interwar Soviet Union (Khansuvarov 1932; Martin 2001), in 1930 a project of a Latin alphabet for Russian was proposed but was eventually abandoned (Aplatov 2006; Iakovlev 1930) Within a given script, only diacritical letters and orthographic conventions allow for maintaining difference or emphasizing similarity among closely related languages. For instance, for an uninitiated observer, the scriptal difference between Czech and Slovak is hard to discern. Three specific Czech letters [ě, ř, ů] and five specific Slovak letters [ä, ĺ, ľ, ô, ŕ] make possible establishing in which of these two languages a given text is written. Polish is also written in Latin letters, but it is much easier to distinguish it from Czech and Slovak. It is so because Polish spelling (historically, it is Old Czech, Catholic or pre-Hussite orthography) employs numerous digraphs [ch, cz, dz, dż, dź, rz, sz] that nowadays occur neither in Czech nor in Slovak. The sole digraph employed in these two languages (and also shared with Polish) is [ch]; otherwise, in Czech and Slovak, usually one grapheme (letter) corresponds to one phoneme (sound). In addition, Polish employs specific diacritical letters, not used in other Latin script–based Slavic languages – for instance, [ą, ę, ł, ń, ś, ż, ź]. The Polish grapheme [ć] is not employed in Czech or Slovak but is included in the Latin alphabet shared by Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian. On the other hand, Czech, Polish and Slovak share the graphemes [q, w] and the digraph [ch] (for the phoneme /x/), which do not occur in the four post-Serbo-Croatian languages’ shared Latin script. The same is true of the letter [ó], which, however, denotes different phonemes, namely /u/ in Polish and /o:/ in Czech and Slovak. Likewise, only diacritical letters and orthographic conventions allow for the clear-cut differentiation of the Cyrillic-based kindred languages of Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian. Cyrillic orthographic conventions are employed for the same purpose, to keep apart Bulgarian and Macedonian in the Balkans. In Ukrainian, the following graphemes (letters) are employed [ґ, є, і, ї], which do not occur in Russian. And in turn, these Russian letters [ё, ъ, ы, э] are not used in Ukrainian. Likewise, in the case of Belarusian, the language’s specific graphemes [i, ў] are not employed in Russian, while the latter language’s graphemes [и, щ, ъ] do not occur in Belarusian. The spelling differences between Belarusian and Ukrainian are much fewer, because only the specific Belarusian grapheme [ў] is not employed in Ukrainian, alongside some graphemes that Belarusian shares with Russian, namely [ё, ы, э]. In turn, the specifically Ukrainian graphemes [ґ, є, ї] are not employed in Belarusian. The orthographic similarity between Belarusian and Ukrainian is the legacy of their both stemming from the grand Duchy of Lithuania’s official Einzelsprache of Ruthenian. Given that there is Official Belarusian and Classical Belarusian, the latter in spelling differs from the former by the optional use of the grapheme [ґ] shared with Ukrainian. Furthermore, proponents of Classical Belarusian sometimes use the Classical Belarusian Latin alphabet (known as the Łacinka), which was employed outside the Soviet Union (mainly in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and among the Belarusian diaspora in Czechoslovakia) for book production side

The politics of script 111 by side with Cyrillic until the mid 1940s. Its use continued after World War II among the Belarusian diaspora in Northern America and Western Europe. Nowadays, since 2000, the Belarusian Latin alphabet has been employed in Belarus for official transliteration from the Belarusian Cyrillic into Latin letters (Instruction 2018). However, in some conventions, this transliteration differs from the Belarusian Latin alphabet, which may be interpreted as a way of keeping Official Belarusian apart from Classical Belarusian. Hence, when the name of independent Belarus’s first prime minister, Stanislau Stanislavavich Shushkevich, is transliterated from Cyrillic in today’s Belarus, it yields Stanislaŭ Stanislavavič Šuškievič, which slightly differs from how his name is written in the Belarusian Latin script, namely Stanisłaŭ Stanisłavavič Šuškievič. In the official transliteration, the Cyrillic letter [л] is rendered [l], while the Cyrillic digraphs [ль] and [ля] become [ĺ] and [lia], respectively. On the contrary, in the Belarusian Latin script, this Cyrillic letter and the two digraphs are rendered as follows: [ł], [l] and [la]. The Belarusian Latin script employs three Czech diacritical letters [č, š, ž], along with five Polish ones [ć, ł, ń, ś, ź], alongside the specifically Belarusian letter [ŭ]. However, the official transliteration shifts the balance away from Polish by ditching the letter [ł] and adopting the specifically Slovak grapheme [ĺ]. The orthographic differences between the North and South (Balkan) Slavic languages are minimal, and the main differentiator between these two groups of the Slavic Einzelsprachen is the geographical isolation afforded by the spatially intervening zone of the German, Hungarian and Romanian languages, extending from the Alps to the Black Sea. The Latin alphabet–based Balkan Slavic languages employ Czech-style orthography, however, emphatically eschewing the digraph [ch] and the distinction between short and long vowels. Slovenian orthography limited itself to just three Czech diacritical letters, namely [č, š, ž]. Its Croatian counterpart employs these three graphemes as well, but in addition the specific diacritical letter, [đ] was developed, instead of borrowing the Czech grapheme [ď]. Croatian [đ] and Czech [ď] denote the same phoneme /dʑ/. Furthermore, the Polish diacritical letter [ć] strayed into the Croatian alphabet, and the two specifically Croatian digraphs [lj, nj] were developed. The phonemes denoted by these two digraphs are expressed, respectively, with the diacritical letter [ľ] in Slovak and with the Czech diacritical letter [ň]. With time, the full grapheme (digraph) for grapheme (digraph) correspondence developed between the Croatian Latin alphabet and the Serbian Cyrillic. The latter employs mostly the basic Cyrillic letters shared with Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian, but with the exception of the following specifically Serbian (mostly) diacritical graphemes: [ђ, ј, љ, њ, ћ, џ]. Serbian Cyrillic and Croatian Latin alphabet share the same Latin letter: [j]. Serbo-Croatian’s two official scripts, Cyrillic and Latin, fully correspond to the Croatian and Serbian alphabets. In the wake of the breakup of Serbo-Croatian, the post-Serbo-Croatian languages of Croatian and Bosnian employ the same Serbo-Croatian Latin alphabet. In spelling, there is no difference between these two languages at the level of graphemes. The officially biscriptal Montenegrin and the de facto biscriptal Serbian employ this same Latin alphabet and the same Serbo-Croatian Cyrillic. However, Montenegrin as

112  The politics of script Language Belarusian (Classical)

Language-Specific Letters (Graphemes) Cyrillic Latin

Belarusian (Official)

Cyrillic Latin

Bulgarian Bosnian Croatian Montenegrin Serbian Czech Kashubian

Latin

Macedonian Montenegrin

Polish

Russian Rusyn Serbian (Cyrillic) Silesian Slovak Slovenian Ukrainian

Cyrillic Latin

Not shared with Official Belarusian: ґ Not shared with Russian: i, ў Not shared with Ukrainian: ў ŭ Not shared with Czech and Slovak: ć, ł, ń, ś, ź Not shared with Polish: č, š, ž Not shared with Russian: i, ў Not shared with Ukrainian: ў ŭ Not shared with Czech and Slovak: ć, ń, ś, ź Not shared with Polish: č, ĺ, š, ž ѝ Not shared with Macedonian, Montenegrin and Serbian: й, щ, ъ, ь, ю, я đ, lj, nj Not shared with Czech and Slovak: с́ Not shared with Polish: č, š, ž ě, ř, ů ò, ù Not shared with any other Slavic language but Silesian: ã ѓ, ќ Not shared with Bulgarian (and not with Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian): j, љ, њ, џ с́, з́ Not shared with other Cyrillic-based Slavic languages, with the exception of Serbian: ђ, ј, љ, њ, ћ, џ ś, ź ą, ę, ż Not shared with any other Latin alphabet–based Slavic languages, with the exception of Bosnian and Croatian: ć Not shared with any other Latin alphabet–based Slavic languages, with the exception of Belarusian’s Latin script: ł, ń, ś, ź Not shared with Belarusian: и, щ, ъ Not shared with Ukrainian: ё, ъ, ы, э Not shared with Belarusian: ґ, є, ї Not shared with Russian: ґ, є, і, ї Not shared with Ukrainian: ъ Not shared with other Cyrillic-based Slavic languages, with the exception of Montenegrin: ђ, ј, љ, њ, ћ, џ ō, ŏ Not shared with any other Slavic language but Kashubian: ã ä, ĺ, ľ, ô, ŕ Not shared with Polish: č, š, ž Not shared with Belarusian: ґ, є, ї Not shared with Russian: ґ, є, і, ї

Figure 4h The narcissism of small graphic (grapheme) differences

The politics of script 113 an Einzelsprache in its own right is differentiated at the level of graphemes by the introduction of the two Polish-style diacritical letters [ś, ź], alongside Cyrillic counterparts [с́, з́]. These two Cyrillic letters are solely specific to the Montenegrin language, though some may interpret the Montenegrin Cyrillic letter [с́] as the Polish-style Latin diacritical letter [ć]. However, they denote two phonemes – that is, /t͡ ɕ/ and /ɕ/, respectively. Bulgarian and Macedonian in speech are closer to one another than Czech and Slovak are, or as close as Croatian and Serbian. Because both, Bulgarian and Macedonian, are written in Cyrillic, orthography unsurprisingly affords the main instrument of differentiation between these two Einzelsprachen. As a result, Bulgarian employs the classical form of Cyrillic (shared with Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian), while Macedonian is written in a slightly modified form of the SerboCroatian (Serbian) Cyrillic. The sole specifically Bulgarian diacritical letter is [ѝ]. It is an allograph of [и]. Both graphemes [и, ѝ] denote the same phoneme /i/. The letter [ѝ] was introduced to make unambiguous the situation when [и] happens to denote the objective form of the female variant of the third person singular pronoun, or ‘her’ in English. On the other hand, Macedonian employs Serbo-Croatian Cyrillic graphemes [j, љ, њ, џ], which do not occur in Bulgarian or for that matter in Belarusian, Russian or Ukrainian. In addition, the two specifically Macedonian diacritical letters [ѓ, ќ] were introduced to replace the following Serbo-Croatian ones: [ђ, ћ]. (Significantly, the use of the acute accent [´] to produce a Cyrillic diacritical letter was first employed in the case of the Ukrainian grapheme [ґ] and recently for the creation of Montenegrin graphemes [с́, з́].) On the other hand, Bulgarian graphemes [й, щ, ъ, ь, ю, я] do not occur in Macedonian or Serbian, though they are shared with Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian. I also decided to add to this discussion on the writing systems the nonstate languages of Kashubian, Rusyn and Silesian, because they feature prominently online, among others, thanks to the Wikipedias in these three languages. The centers of the development of Kashubian and Silesian are located in Poland, and these two languages’ writing systems closely emulate Polish orthography. So the main challenge is to differentiate the Kashubian and Silesian spelling systems from their Polish counterpart. To write Kashubian, the two graphemes [ò, ù] are employed that are not shared with any other Slavic language. In the case of Silesian, such graphemes unique to this language are as follows: [ō, ŏ]. In addition, Kashubian and Silesian share the grapheme, [ã], which does not occur in any other Slavic language. Rusyn’s alphabet is practically identical to that of Ukrainian, except for the letter [ъ], which does not occur in Ukrainian. Some scripts are evoked symbolically for the sake of emphasizing the assumed historical separateness of this or that language from usually more-dominant kindred Einzelsprachen. This happens to (Classical) Belarusian, which faces overwhelming Russian. Proponents of Belarusian not only emphasize that this language is written in two scripts, Cyrillic and Latin, but also stress that in the past Belarusian (or rather the 16th-century Ruthenian) was also jotted down in Arabic letters by Muslim nobles in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Belarusian Arabic 2017). As a result, today’s Cyrillic-based (Classical) Belarusian enjoys

114  The politics of script the two additional heritage scripts of Arabic and Latin. The former, however, is never employed in practice but rather is rhetorically evoked only for symbolical purposes. A similar phenomenon occurred in the case of Bosnian and Croatian. Both languages face the domineering legacy of Serbo-Croatian, often identified with proSerbian Yugoslavism, or even with Serbian imperialism ‘in a Yugoslav disguise.’ Furthermore, there is an in tensely felt national need for differentiating Croatian from the de facto biscriptal Serbian and for differentiating nascent Bosnian from resurgent Croatian. National activists reaffirming or creating these two languages as separate Einzelsprachen in their own right emphasize that in the case of Croatian, Glagolitic was employed in northern Dalmatia for limited ecclesiastical uses until the turn of the 20th century (Glagolica 2017). Likewise, in today’s Bosnia, Slavophone books and journals continued to be printed with the use of Arabic characters before the destruction of interwar Yugoslavia in 1941, by the fascist coalition of Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary and Italy (Arebica 2017). What is more, Cyrillic was employed side by side with the Arabic script for writing Slavic (‘Bosnian’) in historical Bosnia throughout the 17th century (Bosnian Cyrillic 2017). Hence, Bosnian’s heritage scripts of Arabic and Cyrillic and Croatian’s heritage alphabet of Glagolitic allow for the symbolic (rhetorical) differentiation between

Script

Names

Cyrillic

Bulgarian, Macedonian, Official Belarusian, Russian, Ukrainian Czech, Polish, Slovak, Slovenian Montenegrin, Serbian Classical Belarusian

5

Bosnian

1

Croatian

1 14

Latin Cyrillic and Latin Cyrillic, alongside heritage Latin and Arabic Latin, alongside heritage Arabic (and sometimes Cyrillic) Latin, alongside heritage Glagolitic Total

Number

4 2 1

Figure 4i The actual and heritage alphabets of the Slavic state languages in 2017

Number of Scripts

Names

One

Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Official Belarusian, Polish, Russian, Slovak, Slovenian, Ukrainian Croatian, Montenegrin, Serbian Bosnian, Classical Belarusian

Two Three Total

Number 9 3 2 14

Figure 4j The number of actual and heritage scripts employed for writing a given Slavic state language in 2017

The politics of script 115 these two languages that at present are written with the same Serbo-Croatian-style version of the Latin alphabet. As of 2017, the majority of the Slavic state languages (i.e., nine) are written in a single script (Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Macedonian, Official Belarusian, Polish, Russian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian). If one were to disregard the distinction between actual and heritage scripts, at least three Slavic state languages would be biscriptal (Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian) and two would be even triscriptal (Bosnian and Classical Belarusian).

The future: Human will is fickle Undoubtedly in the future, the situation and number of the Slavic languages (Einzelsprachen) will continue developing in a variety of still-unknown and still-unexpected ways. People tend to get bored with the things as they are, and then they are ready for a new round of changes. In Central Europe, the preferred totem of the region’s human groups (or nations) continues to be language. That is why these groups invest so much energy and emotions into Einzelsprachen. They are these groups’ primary sources of political capital and the most important ‘glues’ with which they achieve, legitimize and maintain the social cohesion of their nations. In this thinking on human groups, unlike Western Europe (or across most of the world), nations are construed as separate from states. As a result, a lot of political and social complications result from the entailed need of fitting nations to states. While in the rest of the world, the population of a state is the nation, in Central Europe, states are seen as secondary to nations. If there occurs a perceived mismatch between the nation and its state, the latter must be overhauled to better accommodate the former, not the other way round. This political dogma (of the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state – also known as ethnolinguistic nationalism), widespread in today’s Central Europe, allows for (or even necessitates) vast border changes or even state destruction in the interest of ensuring an improved overlapping of state boundaries with a nation in question.7 The only case where this process has gone in the opposite manner was the creation of the Austrian nation-state in 1918, its international reaffirmation in 1943 (Moscow Declaration), its subsequent recreation in 1945, and the polity’s reunification in 1955.8 After the Great War, the Allies compelled Austria’s German speakers to redefine themselves as an Austrian nation that would not seek a union of their country with Germany. But this was exactly what happened in 1938, when Germany absorbed Austria, much to delight of the majority of Austrians, who preferred to see themselves as members of the German nation. For a while, the political logic of Central Europe’s ethnolinguistic nationalism was in ascendance, and it remained so until the defeat of nazi Germany. In the aftermath, the Allies instituted a decade-long occupation of Austria (1945–1955), to make sure that the country’s inhabitants would rather see themselves as a nation, despite their having the same language as Germany’s. Tellingly, this Austrian exception to the Central European norm of ethnolinguistically defined state building, legitimization and

116  The politics of script maintenance was possible thanks only to outside imposition, in turn enabled by the two world wars. Other, though in reality partial, examples of making – in the Western European manner – the population of a Central European state into a nation are interwar Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (until 1929 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians). However, both attempts were driven by the logic of ethnolinguistic nationalism, in that the Slavophone majority of inhabitants were redefined from above as the nations of Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs speaking the singular official languages of Czechoslovak and Serbocroatoslovenian, respectively. Then the traditional use of ethnolinguistic nationalism returned after World War II. Czechoslovakia became a state of the ‘Czechoslovak people’, consisting of the two ‘fraternal nations’ of Czechs and Slovaks, who in 1969 obtained their separate national republics in federalized Czechoslovakia. Similarly, postwar Yugoslavia was gradually federalized – where each republic was earmarked for its titular nation, defined in ethnoreligious (ethnocultural) and increasingly ethnolinguistic terms. Eventually, as mentioned earlier, ethnolinguistic nationalism won decisively in the wake of the fall of communism, when both nonnational (from the ethnolinguistic perspective) and federal Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia split into successor nation-states. To this day, these successor nation-states obediently toe the ethnolinguistic norm, or the ideological equation of language = nation = state.

Notes 1 In 2012, the following numbers of books and brochures were published in Russia’s non-Russian languages: 278 in Tatar, 205 in Yakut, 168 in Buryat, 80 in Chuvash, 40 in Komi, 39 in Kabardian (Kabardino-Cherkess), 29 in Mari, 28 in Udmurt, 24 in Ossetian, 24 in Tuvan, 21 in Avar, 21 in Dargwa, 20 in ‘Mordvin’ (i.e., in Erzya and Moksha), 18 in Chechen, 16 in Ingush, 15 in Tabasaran, 12 in Adyghe, 11 in Kumyk, 8 in Lezgian (Lezgic), 7 in Lak, 5 in Nogai, 4 in Karelian, 4 in Komi-Permyak, 3 in Altai, 3 in Bashkir, 3 in Nenets, 2 in Even, 2 in Khakas, 1 in Abaza, 1 in Evenk, 1 in Kalmyk, 1 in Khanty and none in Chukchi, Eskimo (i.e., Eskimo-Aleut languages), Koryak, Mansi and Nanai. This totals 1,090 book titles, or less than 1 percent of Russia’s annual book production, though ethnic non-Russians amount to a fifth (20  percent) of the country’s population (Demographics of Russia 2018a). Importantly, all books published in these 38 languages covered by Russia’s official statistics were printed exclusively in Cyrillic (Vypusk 2018). 2 The number of Hungarian-language book titles amount to 2.7 percent of Slovakia’s annual book production, even though the Hungarian minority accounts for 8.5 percent of the country’s inhabitants (Demographics of Slovakia 2018). 3 Ukraine’s aspirations to take a leave of the Russian sphere of influence (‘near abroad’) and the Kremlin’s attempted leverage in the form of the annexation of Crimea (2014) and of the ongoing Russian war on Ukraine employed to stop Kyiv are reflected in the annual totals of Russian-language book titles produced in Ukraine. Their number rose from 4,000 Russian-language book titles in 2005 to 7,200 in 2013, when the pro-Russian administration was in power in the country. After the Revolution of Dignity (2014), the book production in Russian plummeted and was effectively halved, to 3,200 book titles, in 2018 (Knyhovydannia 2018, 2019).   The annexation of Crimea also rubbed off on the book production in Crimean Tatar. In 2014, 15 book titles were published in Crimean Tatar, but none in 2015 (Zrostaie

The politics of script 117 2016). According to Russian sources, in 2015, two Crimean Tatar-language book titles were published in Crimea, followed by six in 2016 and about 20 in 2017–2018. However, half of the production are reprints of old Soviet children books and translations of Russian classics (Knigi 2019). 4 The proportion in favor of Russian-language book production is even higher, as in this overview I take into account Russian-language titles published in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. However, books in this language continue to be published in all the postSoviet countries, alongside Israel. For instance, in 2015, over 240 Russian-language titles were published in Israel (National 2016) and 110 in 2016 in Latvia (Latvijas 2017: 6). Interestingly, Israel’s annual output of Russian-language books roughly equates Russia’s book production in Tatar, or Russia’s most widely spoken non-Russian language (Vypusk 2018). 5 I propose that there is no linguistic basis for distinguishing between East and West Slavic languages. The actual yardsticks employed for bisecting the North Slavic languages in this manner are culture and politics – i.e., extralinguistic factors. It happens so that the spatial line of division between the East and West Slavic languages coincides with the western frontier of the former Soviet Union and tightly overlaps with the script boundary, Cyrillic employed east of this line, and the Latin alphabet west of it. In addition, Roman Catholicism and Protestantism dominate west of this scriptalcum-former political border, whereas Orthodoxy and Greek Catholicism (Uniatism) dominate east of it (Kamusella 2005). That is why in Figure 4g, I qualify these two languages groups with the label ‘socio-political,’ not linguistic. 6 This pushing apart of closely related Einzelsprachen with the use of spelling or other methods is known in sociolinguistic literature as the process of ‘constructing languages apart’ (or Ausbau in German). Einzelsprachen that are not related in a manner that would allow practical mutual comprehensibility for their speakers are seen as ‘standapart’ languages (or Abstand in German) (Kloss 1967). This is a highly relational (and to a degree subjective) connection, which applies to a given pair of languages when checking whether a substantial degree of mutual comprehensibility is possible for such two Einzelsprachen’s speakers. Hence, for instance, Czech and Slovak are Ausbau languages, but Czech and Arabic are Abstand ones. But comprehensibility between speakers of two languages is never symmetrical (cf Braunmüller 2002; Haugen 1966a). For instance, Portuguese speakers claim to better understand Spanish than Spanish speakers Portuguese. Rather than having to do with the languages in question, this phenomenon seems to be a reflection of the extralinguistic sociopolitical realities (cf Jensen 1989). There are more Spanish-speaking countries than Portuguese-speaking ones. As a result, when looking for employment, education or business opportunities, a Portuguese speaker is more highly motivated to understand Spanish than the other way round. Furthermore, the gap of incomprehensibility is often scaled thanks to multilingualism or a lingua franca.   Although by definition dialects of an Einzelsprache should be mutually comprehensible, they not always are. For instance, dialects of Arabic are often Abstand in their character, whereas dialects of Chinese are almost always Abstand. In the former case, mutual comprehensibility among speakers of different Arabic dialects is ensured by the lingua franca of standard (classical) Arabic (cf Kamusella 2017d). In the Chinese case, the same function is fulfilled by the lingua franca of standard (Mandarin) Chinese and by the shared morphemic writing system, which codes much word meaning in its characters (‘letters’), alongside phonemic (pronunciation) values (Rovira Esteva 2010: 227–239). 7 In 2018–2019, a discussion of this type reopened regarding the partition of Kosovo along the ethnolinguistic lines that purportedly separate territories populated by Muslim Albanian speakers (Albanians) and Orthodox Serbian speakers (Serbs). Some commentators proposed, in the eerily post-1918 fashion, that this line may have to be ‘rationalized’ through ‘population transfers’ (meaning ethnic cleansing) (Partition 2019; Rossi 2018; Rudic 2019).

118  The politics of script 8 As Rok Stergar rightly points out, Moldova and Montenegro are transitory cases between Austria and Central Europe’s unambiguously ethnolinguistic nation-states. But in the case of Austria, no Austrian language was ever proclaimed, though in the postwar school year of 1945/1946, in order to avoid the ideologically unsavory use of the word Deutsch (German), the school subject of German was renamed as Unterrichtsprache (‘Language of Instruction’) (Brix 1998: 458). The only Austrian linguistic difference vis-à-vis German that is legally enshrined is that of 23 Austrian agricultural terms, as enumerated in Protocol 10 of the Austrian Accession Treaty to the European Union (Documents 1994: 357–358). On the other hand, for better or worse, Moldovan and Montenegrin are official languages of Moldova and Montenegro, respectively (Constitution of the Republic of Moldova 1994: Art 13; Constitution 2007: Art 13). In reality, however, a considerable number of nominal Moldovan and Montenegrin speakers dispute this official decision and see their languages as none other than Romanian and Serbian, respectively.

5 Pluricentric or monocentric

A simple switch to ethnolinguistic nationalism was also expected when in 1991 the globe’s sole extensive polity that was studiously nonnational in ideological terms – the Soviet Union – broke up. Following the initial elation caused by independence in Belarus, in 1995 Russian was made into the country’s equal co-official language, alongside the national and state language of Belarusian. The 1989/1991–1995 period when the authorities of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and then of independent Belarus supported the development and use of Belarusian as the sole official language of the country is similar to the Soviet policy of korenizatsiia (nativization) in the 1920s. At that time, Belarusian had also been encouraged in a similar fashion at the expense of Russian, though interwar Soviet Belarus was uniquely quadrilingual – officially using Polish, Russian and Yiddish, besides the leading Einzelsprache of Belarusian (Kozhinova 2017). Afterward, this policy was rapidly reverted at the turn of the 1930s. Asymmetrical multilingualism replaced it, with Russian at the top, while the bottom place in the pyramid was accorded to Belarusian, Polish and Yiddish, the latter two languages finally suppressed after 1938 (Martin 2001). Likewise, in contemporary Belarus, co-official Russian became the country’s leading official language, to the detriment of the use of the co-official and national language of Belarusian. However, the majority of Belarusians consent to the situation, which indicates that the present-day Belarusian (ethnic) nationalism is more civic than ethnolinguistic in its character. Many Belarusians see Belarusian as a mere ‘village dialect’ of Russian, in which it is fine to speak, but they believe that written and official communication should be conducted in Russian.1 A similar attitude toward the Ukrainian language is displayed by numerous Russians in the Russian Federation, alongside quite a few bilingual and Russophone Ukrainians and self-declared Russians, especially in eastern Ukraine and Crimea (nowadays under Russian occupation) (Trubachev 2004: 366). In Ukraine the Rusyn language is perceived as a dialect of Ukrainian, while some Rusyns also see their language as a dialect of Russian (Fishman 1997: 267; Magocsi 2015: 126). Should these attitudes be taken into consideration, Belarusian, Lemkian, Rusyn, Russian, Ukrainian and West Polesian may appear to be ‘literate (literary) dialects’ of some common pluricentric language of Rus’an, if I am allowed to invoke the tradition of the medieval polity of (Kyivan) Rus’. In one way or another, the users of all these languages

120  Pluricentric or monocentric (‘literary dialects’) share this medieval polity’s cultural tradition of Cyrillic and Orthodox Christianity. Obviously, from the perspective of the Kremlin’s neoimperial ideology of Russian World (Russkii Mir), all the aforementioned languages are not dialects of any ‘Rus’an’ but ‘simply’ of the Russian language (cf Patriarch 2015; Vasserman 2017). On the other hand, to imperial Russia’s officialdom, the introduction of Catholicism and Uniatism (Greek Catholicism) – alongside the Latin alphabet and liturgical Latin, in the western half of the region as contained within Poland-Lithuania between the 14th and the late 18th centuries – appeared to be a ‘Polish conspiracy’ (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2006: 195). West of the aforementioned region, until recently most Polish linguists claimed Kashubian to be a dialect of Polish, and they still maintain that Silesian is a dialect of the Polish language. Although these days many more Slovaks read Czech publications as a matter of course, both Czechs and Slovaks see their languages as closer to each other than to any other Slavic languages.2 In addition, Czech and Polish linguists argue over whether Germany’s two Sorbian languages are closer to Czech or Polish. Slovaks do not have many problems with understanding Polish or reading books in this language, and nowadays many Poles also cross the political-cum-ethnolinguistic state frontier too and peruse Slovak-language publications. Hence, to a degree, the pluricentric language of Czechoslovak, or even Czechoslovak-Polish, may still exist in light of these actual practices of linguistic ‘transgression.’ The situation arguably substantiates the proposition that Czech, Kashubian, Lachian, Lower Sorbian, Mazurian, Polish, Silesian, Slovak and Upper Sorbian are ‘literary dialects’ of the aforementioned de facto composite language of Czechoslovak-Polish. The potential existence of such a composite Einzelsprache is underpinned by the fact that its speakers share such extralinguistic commonalities as the tradition of Western Christianity, Latin literacy and the Latin alphabet. But in this officially nonreligious age, is the boundary between Slavia Latina and Slavia Orthodoxa really so impenetrable, as delimited by script, faith and the western border of the former Soviet Union? In actual everyday practice, Belarusian and Ukrainian speakers do not experience any insurmountable difficulties in comprehending spoken Polish or reading texts in this language. This kind of relatively free (though not propped up by any formal language learning) communication is also possible between Slovak speakers and Ukrainian speakers. Hence, from such a broad and nationally unideologized perspective, we can construe all the aforementioned languages as literary dialects of some North Slavic Einzelsprache. Looking southward, at the turn of 2017, over 200 broad-minded linguists and scholars from Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia – alongside almost 9,000 other supporters  – signed the Deklaracija o zajedničkom jeziku (Declaration on the Common Language) (Deklaracija 2017; Lista 2017). Without uttering the name of the officially defunct Serbo-Croatian, they proposed that Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian were ‘standard (monocentric) varieties’ (or ‘literary dialects’) of the pluricentric Common Language. Hence, we can infer that the Common Language (Serbo-Croatian) continues

Pluricentric or monocentric 121 Notional Pluricentric Languages

Monocentric Einzelsprachen as Literary Dialects

Number of Literary Dialects

‘Rus’an’ (A)

Belarusian, Lemkian, Rusyn, Russian, Ukrainian, West Polesian Belarusian, Lemkian, Rusyn, Ukrainian, West Polesian Czech, Kashubian, Lachian, Lower Sorbian, Mazurian, Polish, Silesian, Slovak, Upper Sorbian Bosnian, Bunjevac, Croatian, Montenegrin, Serbian Bosnian, Bunjevac, Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian, Slovenian Bulgarian, Gorani, Macedonian, Paulician

6

Russian (B) ‘Czechoslovak-Polish’ ‘Common Language’ (SerboCroatian) (A) Serbocroatoslovenian (‘Yugoslavian’) (B) ‘Greater Bulgarian/ Macedonian’

5 9 5 7 4

Figure 5a The monocentric Slavic Einzelsprachen of 2017 reinterpreted as ‘literary dialects’ of notional pluricentric languages

to comprise all the post-Serbo-Croatian languages, namely Bosnian, Bunjevac, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian (cf Bugarski 2018). This Common Language (Serbo-Croatian) is a much more tangible sociolinguistic reality on the ground than the aforementioned potential pluricentric languages of Rus’an and Czechoslovak-Polish. What is more, there is not much difficulty in mutually comprehensible communication between Slovenian and Croatian speakers in the northern Balkans. But attitudes acquired in family, at school and from the mass media result in Croatians’ and Slovenians’ claiming that their languages are ‘radically different’ and not at all mutually comprehensible.3 A lot of mutual comprehensibility depends on context, and the will and desire of interlocutors to understand one another.4 Likewise, Macedonian and Serbian speakers converse as easily in the south of the region, which also encompasses Bulgarian speakers (cf Petrović 2015). This mutual comprehensibility is a lasting legacy of Yugoslavia’s pluricentric state language of Serbo-Croatian, alongside interwar Yugoslavia’s official and even more pluricentric language of Serbocroatoslovenian (‘Yugoslavian’). The former embraced the now post-Serbo-Croatian languages of Bosnian, Bunjevac, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian, while the latter used to embrace all these and what is today Slovenian and Macedonian. Not much is made of it in official Serbian political discourse, but the Torlakian ‘transitional’ dialects in southern Serbia, western Bulgaria and northern Macedonia afford a shared dialectal ground of mutual comprehensibility between Serbian (and Common Language for that matter) on the one hand and Bulgarian and Macedonian on the other (Friedman 2006: 107–108).

122  Pluricentric or monocentric The Slavic Einzelsprachen in the function of official state-cum-national languages are posed as necessarily monocentric, composed of a single (literary) standard; any other extant varieties must be defined as ‘dialects’ (‘substandard’ or even ‘incorrect’ or ‘corrupted’ idioms), which ‘naturally’ ‘belong to’ this single (national, official, state) monocentric standard. It is so because from the normative perspective of ethnolinguistic nationalism (normative isomorphism), a pluricentric language is a contradiction in terms and a threat to the ‘perfected purity’ (ethnolinguistic homogeneity) of the Slavophone nation-state. From the perspective of this ideology, such a pluricentric language points to the undesirable possibility that a Central European nation speaking it ‘in reality’ consists of several ‘nations-in-waiting.’ Such sub-nations would expect and be expected to struggle for their unshared nation-states, where their formerly sub-languages (‘dialects’) would be accorded the elevated status of the sole official-cum-national languages and finally become full-fledged Einzelsprachen in their own right, each entirely monocentric. Interestingly, Croatian remains a clear case of a pluricentric national Einzelsprache, though this fact is rarely emphasized or reflected on in light of ethnolinguistic nationalism. Standard Croatian is steeped in the Štokavian dialectal base, shared with Bosnian, Bunjevac, Montenegrin and Serbian. However, the official concept of the Croatian language comprises this Štokavian-based standard Croatian and the two ‘literary dialects’ of Čakavian and Kajkavian, to which the Čakavian-based Burgenland Croatian and the Štokavian-based Molise Slavic are often added. Čakavian and Kajkavian are dialects that are as distant from each other as both are from Štokavian.5 Furthermore, Kajkavian is shared with the (eastern) dialects of Slovenian. Many Slovenians, including linguists, propose that their language is highly dialectal, but without giving much importance to other ‘literary dialects,’ be it the Kajkavian-based Prekmurje Slovenian or the Čakavian-based Resian. Standard Slovenian is steeped in both Kajkavian and Čakavian, though Kajkavian elements predominate (Ivić 1972: 71; Lenček 1982: 66–72; Magner 1966: 3; Stankiewicz 1986: 39). Bulgaria famously recognizes the existence of Macedonia as a state, but this recognition is not extended to the Macedonian nation or language. From the Bulgarian perspective, Macedonian is just another literary standard of the Bulgarian language. The Macedonians disagree, but they have no problems with understanding spoken or written Bulgarian. Alongside Macedonian, Sofia also sees Gorani and Paulician as (literary) standards of the Bulgarian language (Albania 2017; Bulgarians 2017; Mahon 1998; Stoikov 2002: 137). This rather neoimperial thinking about language is reminiscent of Russia’s Russkii Mir ideology, in the framework of which Belarusian and Ukrainian are often construed as dialects (‘literary standards’) of the Russian language (cf Fatiuschenko 2009: 43; Moser 2014: 175). In a similar fashion, without much regard for the wishes of the concerned speech communities of Gorani, Macedonian and Paulician, Sofia ‘gathers’ all three Einzelsprachen, alongside standard Bulgarian, ‘under the roof’ of some still-not-fully postulated pluricentric ‘Greater Bulgarian’ language. For the time being, the Bulgarian authorities have an upper hand in this game, because

Pluricentric or monocentric 123 Pluricentric Official Languages

Monocentric Literary Dialects

Number

Belarusian (Greater) Bulgarian Croatian

Classical Belarusian, Official Belarusian Bulgarian, Gorani, Macedonian, Paulician Čakavian, Čakavian-based Burgenland Croatian, Kajkavian Štokavian-based standard Croatian, Štokavian-based Molise Slavic Prekmurje Slovenian, Resian, standard Slovenian

2 4 5

Slovenian

3

Figure 5b Monocentric or pluricentric Slavic languages

in exchange for the tacit acceptance of this ‘Great Bulgarian’ politics, Sofia may hand out Bulgarian EU passports to Macedonian and Gorani speakers eager to find better employment and living opportunities outside Macedonia and Albania, respectively (cf Neofotistos 2009). All the de facto pluricentric Slavic state languages belong to the South (Balkan) group of Slavic languages. This toying with the pluricentricity of languages, despite ethnolinguistic nationalism’s normative insistence that the ‘true’ national language be monocentric, seems to be a lasting and still-quite-influential legacy of Yugoslavia’s official languages of Serbo-Croatian and Serbocroatoslovenian. A similar legacy of interwar Czechoslovakia’s pluricentric language of Czechoslovak apparently dissipated without leaving a discernable trace among today’s North Slavic languages. The sole exception is Belarusian. This language, as discussed earlier, consists of Official Belarusian and Classical Belarusian. The difference between those is not dialectal but orthographic, alongside some differences in word formation. In addition, in vocabulary and syntax, the former variety is closer to Russian, while the latter is more distant, ‘more Belarusian in its own right,’ so to say (Rudkouski 2009). Following this unifying logic, as employed earlier in the case of the notional North Slavic language, a pluricentric common South Slavic Einzelsprache could also be proposed. A corresponding South Slavic state (‘Greater Yugoslavia’) that would embrace Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was seriously considered and lent support by the victorious Soviet Union in 1945 (Zubok 2007: 24). This never realized national polity’s official language could consist of Serbocroatoslovenian’s literary dialects (Bosnian, Bunjevac, Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian and Slovenian) and Greater Bulgarian/Macedonian’s literary dialects (Bulgarian, Gorani, Macedonian and Paulician). Such a notional South Slavic language of a pluricentric character has a better claim to existence than its North Slavic counterpart, among others, because historically, culturally and linguistically, South Slavic’s two literary dialects of Serbocroatoslovenian and Greater Bulgarian/Macedonian claim Macedonian as their (unwillingly shared) literary subdialect. Macedonian functions here as the linchpin that connects and binds together Serbocroatoslovenian and Greater Bulgarian/Macedonian, thus yielding a single South Slavic Einzelsprache. Furthermore, from the late Middle Ages

124  Pluricentric or monocentric until the mid 19th century, many Balkan Slavophone literati (usually Catholics and Protestants) were convinced that they all spoke and wrote the same single (South) Slavic language, often dubbed ‘Illyrian’6 (Blažević 2008; Fine 2006: 226, 284, 404; Greenberg 2004: 25; Stergar 2016; Wojan 2015: 109). Their Orthodox counterparts did not feel a need to embark on any language construction projects, their conviction about the existence of a shared common (South) Slavic language underwritten by the practice of using Church Slavonic (known simply as ‘Slav[on]ic’) for reading and writing. Human imagination knows no limits when inventing and playing with social reality. Einzelsprachen are part and parcel of social realities generated and maintained by humankind. As a result, human imagination is equally unpredictable and innovative with regard to construing and classifying the linguistic in accordance with political, social, economic and other needs of human groups and individuals – needs that frequently change through time and space. One could say that a single person’s unusual opinions are of no import in this respect. But according to the history of creating Einzelsprachen in Central Europe, especially during the age of nationalism, an individual’s odd idea may happen to gain popularity and in turn become a basis for the founding of yet another national Einzelsprache. As a Polish speaker born to a Silesian- and Polish-speaking family, with some command of Russian acquired formally during school education in communist Poland and with a limited knowledge of Czech and Slovak gained informally by reading publications and watching television in these languages, I face no insurmountable problems communicating in and reading South Slavic languages either. Verbal communication – speech (Sprache) – might not match one of the Einzelsprachen, standardized and codified in grammars. In practice, communication can be achieved without resorting to any specific Einzelsprache, but in the ‘murky All-Slavic’ dialect continuum that flows over (or under) these official languages.8 Knowledge of Czech and especially Slovak (as the spatially most central of all the Slavic languages), however imperfect my command, let me access Slovenian and the post-Serbo-Croatian languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and

Even Larger Pluricentric Languages ‘North Slavic’

Large Pluricentric Languages as Literary Dialects

Monocentric Einzelsprachen as Literary Sub-dialects

‘Rus’an’

Belarusian, Lemkian, Rusyn, Russian, Ukrainian, West Polesian Czech, Kashubian, Lachian, Lower Sorbian, Mazurian, Polish, Silesian, Slovak, Upper Sorbian Bosnian, Bunjevac, Croatian, Macedonian7, Montenegrin, Serbian, Slovenian Bulgarian, Gorani, Macedonian, Paulician

‘Czechoslovak-Polish’ ‘South Slavic’ (Illyrian)

Serbocroatoslovenian (‘Yugoslavian’) ‘Greater Bulgarian/ Macedonian’

Figure 5c Even larger Slavic pluricentric languages?

Pluricentric or monocentric 125 Serbian. Access means I can read texts in these Einzelsprachen and understand what is spoken in them, but in most cases, I am unable to speak or write (correctly) in the languages. Were I to attempt such a feat, the result would be a largely comprehensible but in essence ad hoc idiosyncratic form of All-Slavic. In turn, Russian comes in handy as a ladder into Bulgarian and Macedonian. This is thanks to the fact that standard Russian is a mixture of the North Slavic dialect of Moscow and the South Slavic in its origin liturgical language of Church Slavonic. (This unusual ‘mixture,’ known as the ‘middle style’ was invented in the mid 18th century by Russian polymath Mikhail Lomonosov [Kamusella 2009: 161], proving the point that odd ideas may become hugely influential.)9 The story indicates the possibility of a notional common pluricentric (composite) Slavic Einzelsprache with at least 40 literary dialects (i.e., ‘sub-sub-dialects’), or Einzelsprachen. But the idea of a single Slavic language is nothing new. Most probably, Slavic functioned and spread widely as the lingua franca of the Avar Khaganate during the 7th and 8th centuries and subsequently in Greater Moravia until the mid 9th century, half a century longer in the Bulgarian Empire, and until the late 10th century in Rus’ (Curta 2004). Later, across most of the region, from the mid 9th century until the 13th century, the first written Slavic language of (Old Church) Slavonic, known by its users as Slovenisku, was employed in this capacity. (East) Roman (‘Byzantine’) missionary saints Cyril and Methodius developed this written language on the basis of the Slavic dialect of the Theme (administrative region) of Thessaloniki. They endowed Slovenisku with a brand-new Glagolitic script and deployed it for the Christianization of the Slavophone polity of (Greater) Moravia in Central Europe. In 885, Pope Stephen V banned Slovenisku from liturgy in Moravia, replacing it with Latin. Monks and priests versed in Slovenisku left for the Bulgarian Empire, where they developed Cyrillic for writing this language. Cyrillic, as modeled on Greek, was better liked in Bulgaria, where earlier Greek had been used in writing for official state business. Like Moravia, Bulgaria adopted Christianity from Constantinople, in the 860s. However, at the turn of the 10th century, the Magyar (Hungarian) onslaught erased Moravia from the political map of Europe, and at the same time, the power of Bulgaria continued to burgeon. The Bulgarian tsar (emperor) welcomed the Slavophone literati expelled from Moravia, because in 893, the Cyrillic-based Slovenisku let him replace Greek with this language as an official language in the Bulgarian Empire in a bid to end Constantinople’s ecclesiastical control over the Bulgarian Church. This aim was successfully achieved after 918, when the Bulgarians defeated the (East) Romans (‘Byzantines’) in the course of one of their numerous wars. Finally, in 927, the Ecumenical Patriarch recognized the autocephalous status of the Bulgarian Church. Afterward, more autocephalous Orthodox Churches were founded in further medieval and early modern Slavophone polities, including the Orthodox Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, where Slovenisku was official, though the population was predominantly Romancephone (Romanian speaking). In the process, local Slavic dialects and other languages influenced Slovenisku, leading to the rise of its state-specific varieties, nowadays known among scholars as

126  Pluricentric or monocentric ‘recensions’ or ‘redactions.’ Ecclesiasts and scribes did not give separate names to these recensions, but as evident from their texts, they usually followed the variety of Slovenisku preferred in their specific church or state. Nowadays, researchers of Church Slavonic tend to distinguish the following recensions: Bosnian, Bulgarian(-Macedonian), Croatian, Lithuanian (Belaruso-Ukrainian), Moravian(-Czech, Bohemian, West Slavic, Pannonian, Slovak), Muscovian (Russian), Romanian(-Bulgarian) and Rus’an (East Slavic) (cf Staroslavenski 2017; Starotserkevnoslov’ians’ka 2017; Subject 2000). Some recensions are variously named in order to connect them to this or that modern-day polity. Obviously, the number of recensions can go up or down depending on a given author’s predilection either for elevating a set of some scribal practices to the rank of another recension or for apportioning a part of Slovenisku writings to some present-day polity. But the number of these recensions oscillates around ten. This means, among many other firsts, that Slovenisku was also the first pluricentric Slavic language. Interestingly, only the Croatian and Moravian recensions of Church Slavonic employ Glagolitic, whereas all the others use Cyrillic. This scriptal difference reflects the increasing confessional cleavage between Western (Catholic, Protestant) and Eastern (Orthodox) Christianity that still continues to cut across the Slavophones. Church Slavonic remained the main language of liturgy, literary pursuits and (local) administration among Orthodox Slavophones until the mid 19th century, especially in the Balkans. Because in the early modern period Muscovy/Russia was the sole independent Orthodox Slavophone polity,10 the printing of books in the Russian recension decisively brushed off on the scribal and writing practices across all the other Orthodox Slavophone areas. This led either to the modification of local recensions or actually to their replacement with the Russian recension. The application of the alphabet of Western Christianity’s Latin language to Slavic began in Bohemia (then part of the Holy Roman Empire), leading to the coalescence of a Czech language in the 13th century. A century later, it was used quite widely in writing across the Catholic Slavic-speaking areas of Central Europe, from Poland-Lithuania in the north to Hungary’s Croatia in the south. A boost to the development of this language was given by the Holy Roman emperor and Bohemian king, Charles IV, in his employment of Czech for written purposes and in the imperial administration. Famously, in his 1355 letter to the Serbian (and Roman [Greek]) tsar (emperor), Dušan, Charles IV intimated that they shared ‘the same noble Slavic language’ (Stankiewicz 1984: ix). Charles IV seems to have disregarded any scriptal difference between his realm’s Latin alphabet–based Slavic and the Cyrillic-based Slavic of Dušan’s Serbo-Roman (Greek) Empire. The former became widely known as a Bohemian (Czech) language only at the turn of the 15th century. The subjugation of Bohemia to the Habsburgs in 1526, especially the Habsburg emperor’s victory over the Protestant Slavophone nobility and burghers of Bohemia in 1620, led to the replacement of Czech with Latin and German. But since the mid 16th century, the Latin script–based Polish language had been on the rise, because of the territorial expansion of Poland-Lithuania from today’s

Pluricentric or monocentric 127 southern Estonia in the north to Moldavia, the northwestern Black Sea littoral in the south, and Smolensk (today in Russia) in the east. As a result, until the 18th century, Polish replaced Czech as a handy lingua franca in the Slavic-speaking areas, including Muscovy (Russia), Romancephone Moldavia and Wallachia, along with Poland-Lithuania’s Germanic-speaking fiefs of Prussia and Courland. Interestingly, the Old Czech (pre-Hussite – i.e., Catholic) spelling was adopted for writing Polish, and it remains in this role until now. In the age of the religious wars, which raged in Central Europe from the 15th century to the 17th century, the diacritical (‘Hussite’) spelling of Czech, as employed by Hussites (Protestants) in Bohemia, was perceived as ‘heretical’ by Catholics in the neighboring countries. The official language of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (or the eastern half of Poland-Lithuania) was the Cyrillic-based Ruthenian (Ruski). It emerged in the 14th century on the basis of the Slavic dialects of the Grand Duchy’s two most important urban centers, namely Wilno (Vilnius) in the north and Kijów (Kyiv) in the south. Ruthenian was readily comprehensible to the Grand Duchy’s Slavic speakers, unlike Slovenisku (Church Slavonic), the latter based on the 9th-century South Slavic dialect of Thessaloniki. Slovenisku was half a millennium removed from Ruthenian. Following the Grand Duchy’s 1386 and 1569 unions with Poland, alongside the 1596 ecclesiastical union of Poland-Lithuania’s Orthodox Church with the Catholic Church, users of Ruthenian became versed in Polish too, leading to numerous linguistic exchanges and interferences between these two languages. All Ruthenian literati could read and write both Cyrillic and Latin letters, while many of their Polish counterparts also had a working command of Cyrillic. Ruthenian, known in Moscow as Litovskii or Litvan (‘Lithuanian’– i.e., ‘Belarusian’ Ruthenian) or Volhynian (southern ‘Ukrainian’ Ruthenian), became the main conduit of modernity from Western Europe to Muscovy (Russia) until the late 17th century (Danylenko 2006: 101; Uspenskii 1987: 26–261). In 1697, Ruthenian was replaced by Polish as the Grand Duchy’s official language, leading to the former language’s rapid decline as a written medium11 (Davies 2005: 16). In 1583, Croatian Catholic priest and writer Piersimeone Budineo (Šime Budinić) published in Rome his translation of a religious book into the proposed All-Slavic language of Slouignisky (i.e., ‘Slavic’). To construct this language, Budineo employed Church Slavonic infused with Czech and Polish vocabulary (Wojan 2015; 109). At that time, Czech and Polish were the only Slavic languages widely used in writing and publishing across the Western Christian world. For the sake of facilitating an intended union between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, in 1641, the Polish-Lithuanian Dominican, Marianus de Jasliska (Marian z Jaślisk), based in Kijów (Kyiv), published a Slavic-Polish dictionary. His All-Slavic language, or Sclauica in Latin, was earmarked for missionary work among Orthodox Slavophones in the eastern half of Poland-Lithuania and in the Ottoman Balkans (Karaś and Karasiowa 1969). For a similarly confessional purpose, in 1666, Catholic priest and missionary Georgius Crisanius (Juraj Križanić) developed a Cyrillic-based All-Slavic language, dubbed ‘Ruski Jezik’ (or ‘Ruski Language’) when on an almost-two-decade-long mission in Tobolsk, Muscovy (Krizhanishch 1859). Ruski was an amalgam of Church Slavonic, the dialect of

128  Pluricentric or monocentric Moscow (‘Russian’) and Illyrian (‘Croatian’), but importantly diligently purged of Greek and Latin linguistic loans. Križanić hoped for a Russian Empire in an ecclesiastical union with Rome that would free the Orthodox and Catholic Balkans from Ottoman rule (Wojan 2015: 110). In the late 18th century, improved communication among speakers of various Slavic Einzelsprachen became a burning necessity in the wake of the Habsburg and Russian successful advances against the Ottomans across the entire width of the Balkans from the Adriatic to the Black Sea (Magocsi 1993: 72). In 1790, Slavic-speaking Carniolan (nowadays anachronistically dubbed ‘Slovenian’) Jesuit Georg Sapelj (Jurij Japelj) proposed a Carniolan (‘Slovenian’)-based AllSlavic language, earmarked for written communication (Meyer 2014: 116). Three years later, in 1793, his friend Carniolan Blasius Cumerdai (Blaž Kumerdej), a Slavophone, proposed a similar language, which he named the Opšteslovenski (‘All-Slavic’) language. In 1796, the discussion was joined by the Karlowitz (Sremski Karlovci) Metropolitan Stephan Stratimirowitsch (Stefan Stratimirović) who headed the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Habsburg lands. In 1796, he developed a Russian-based Opshti Slovenski (‘All-Slavic’) language written in Cyrillic (Wojan 2015: 111). The divergence in Orthodox areas between local Slavic vernaculars and Church Slavonic posed quite a challenge for Orthodox literati looking up to the Habsburg lands and France or Russia for appropriate models of modernization. In Russia, in the mid 18th century, cofounder of Moscow University Michail Lomonossow (Mikhail Lomonosov) proposed that the not-yet-created Russian language should consist of three ‘styles.’12 The high style, or Church Slavonic, was to be reserved for composing official documents and for writing tragedies or odes. The low style, coterminous with the Slavic dialect of Moscow, was earmarked for private letters, plays (especially comedies), dialogs, songs and fairytales. And last but not least, novels, poetry (especially, bucolics), ‘serious plays’ (but not comedies or tragedies) and correspondence among noble acquaintances were to be written in the middle style that mixed the Slavic dialect of Moscow and Church Slavonic. By the beginning of the 19th century, the middle style, or SlavenoMuscovian (Slaveno-Russian), had won the competition, thanks to the runaway popularity of Alexander Pushkin’s poetry and Nikolai Karamzin’s 12-volume history of the Russian state, both written in the middle style of Slaveno-Muscovian. Subsequently, this variety became what is now known as the Russian language (Kamusella 2009:161). The example of this Russian compromise middle style was an inspiration to a Serbian polymath based in the Habsburg lands, Zacharias Orphelin (Zaharija Orfelin). In 1768, in Venice, he began publishing the journal Slaveno-serbskii Magazin in a Cyrillic-based mixture of vernacular Serbian and Church Slavonic (of the Russian recension) (Wojan 2015: 111). The journal’s title yielded the name of Slaveno-Serbian for this language, which became widespread among Serbian literati during the 1780s and continued to be widely employed through the 1820s. Afterward Slaveno-Serbian was gradually replaced by vernacular-based Serbian, though the former remained in ceremonial official use and in ecclesiastical

Pluricentric or monocentric 129 writings and administration until the mid 19th century (Greenberg 2004: 25; Ivić 2014: 194–195; Kamusella 2009: 222). More or less at the same time, meaning from the 1760s to the 1830s, in the Ottoman Empire, a Slaveno-Bulgarian language developed as a blend of Church Slavonic and vernacular Bulgarian. However, by the mid 19th century, this vernacular had replaced Slaveno-Bulgarian in the function of the Bulgarian language (Kamusella: 279–281; Nikolova 2006: 163, 181, 186, 191–192). The discussion on the ‘proper language’ among Orthodox Slavophones, combined with the Western European fascination with ancient Greece and its classical language, strongly influenced Greek literati. Following the creation of independent Greece, in the 1830s they settled for the ad hoc ‘purifying language’ of Katharevousa, cleansed of ‘Turkish barbarities’ and infused with elements of Ancient Greek (Browning 1983: 104; Mackridge 2010: 160). Vernacular Greek, or Demotic, became official only in 1976, while ‘SlavenoRussian’ goes on strong and rather successfully under the widely known name of the Russian language. Between the 16th and the 18th centuries, Latin was gradually abandoned across Western and Central Europe as a language of administration and literary pursuits. It remained the language of Catholic liturgy only until the turn of the 1970s. The sole exception to this trend was the Kingdom of Hungary, where non-Hungarian (non-Magyar) speakers, especially Slavophones and Romanian speakers, put up stiff opposition to the replacement of Latin with Hungarian as the kingdom’s official language. As a result, this profoundly de-ethnicized language of the ancient Roman Empire became a kind of honorary All-Slavic lingua franca of Hungary’s Slavophones (and other non-Hungarian speakers) between 1790 and 1848. Afterward, Magyar (Hungarian) replaced Latin in this function, making it impossible to show loyalty to the kingdom through any medium other than the Hungarian language13 (Maxwell 2015a). Roughly at the same time, because of the Petrine reforms in Russia, the discussion about the language of research and university-level education was settled in favor of de-ethnicized Latin. Other proposed language options included Church Slavonic, German and Russian. Church Slavonic was seen as a symbol of the Orthodox Church’s opposition to such modernizing changes. Russian was deemed not to have developed up to the level of a Western European language yet, while German was perceived as too un-Russian and ethnically associated with some states that opposed Russia’s interests in Europe. Latin was the most neutral and pragmatic choice. It had remained the official language of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences since its inception from the mid 1720s to 1809. Subsequently, increasingly more scholarly contributions were published in French and German, alongside some in Latin, until 1862, when Russian was made this academy’s sole language of scholarship and administration (Cracraft 2004: 252–254; Offord et al. 2015). In the late 18th century, Bohemian (Czech) priest-turned-philologist Joseph Dobrowsky (Josef Dobrovský), in his scholarly works written in Latin, voiced the possibility of a single common Slavic language for all Slavophones (Kamusella 2009: 399–400). Shortly afterward, Polish-Lithuanian scholar Samuel

130  Pluricentric or monocentric Bogumił (Gottlieb) Linde also sketched a similar idea in the 1807 introduction to his multivolume dictionary of the Polish language. To this end, Linde commenced the compilation of a never completed comparative dictionary of the Slavic languages (Wojan 2015: 112–113). Dobrowsky’s younger colleague from the south of the Austrian Empire, imperial censor and philologist Bartolomäus (Jernej) Kopitar, based in Vienna and of Carniolan (Slovenian) origin, accepted in his writings about Slavs and their speech Dobrowsky’s idea of a single Slavic language (Butler 1970: 10). Finally, in the mid 19th century, Upper Hungarian (Slovak) teacher and philologist Pavel Josef Šafařík (Pavel Jozef Šafárik, Paul Joseph Schaffarik, Paulus Josephus Schaffarik, Pál József Saf[f] arik) wrote about the history of the Slavs and their culture through the lens of such a notional single Slavic Einzelsprache, as consisting of several ‘literary dialects’ (Milojković-Djurić 1994: 20). Finally, in 1826, another Upper Hungarian (Slovak) scholar, Joanne Herkel (Ján Herkeľ), improved on this concept by proposing a constructed (planned) single Slavic language for all Slavophones, namely Lingua Slavica Universalis/Vseslovanski Jazyk (Universal Slavic Language), written in Latin letters (Herkel 1826; Maxwell 2009: 79–100). Symptomatically, when the Pan-Slav Congress (actually, ‘Slavic’ – i.e., Slovanský sjezd in Czech or Slawenkongress in German) was convened in Prague in 1848, the delegates soon found out that the only language that they shared and in which they could effectively proceed was German (Talvi 1850: 210). German remained a largely neutral language of communication for Slavic literati writing and speaking a variety of Slavic Einzelsprachen until 1871. In this year, the German Empire was founded in the form of a nation-state for Germans only, invariably understood as German speakers. So the quest for an All-Slavic language had to continue, because German could not fulfill this function any longer. In 1853, Slovenian linguist and politician Matija Reich (Božidar Raič), from Styria, put forward a similar proposal of a Vseslavenski (All-Slavic) language. It was written both in Latin letters and in Cyrillic letters. And 11 years later, in 1864, another Slovenian activist, this time from Carinthia, Matija Majar (also known under the pseudonym Zilijski) presented a fully Cyrillic-based Uzajemni Slavjanski jezik (Mutual[ly comprehensible] Slavic Language [for speakers of the extant Slavic Einzelsprachen]) (Lewaszkiewicz 2014: 75; Majar-Ziljski 1864; Meyer 2014: 96–117). However, Majar’s main claim to fame is the fact that he was the first person to present the concept of the state of Slovenia as composed from all the territories deemed as inhabited by Slovenians – that is, speakers of the Slovenian language (Kosi 2013: 203–205, 338–359; Majer 2010 [1948]). In this nascent age of ethnolinguistic nationalism, the idea of an All-Slavic language seemed to point to the presumed ‘dormant’ existence of a single Slavic nation or to the need of creating such a nation. A single Slavic nation that should be rehoused in its own Slavic nation-state, dutifully carved out from the German Confederation, the Austrian Empire, the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire. With the convening of the All-Slav Congress in Prague in 1848, the concept of a single Slavic nation with its own unified single Slavic language became the founding basis of the ideology of panslavism. Its later pro-Russian offshoot even

Pluricentric or monocentric 131 identified the Russian Empire as the ‘proper’ Slavic nation-state, which should ‘gather’ the entire Slavophone world within its expanding boundaries (Kamusella 2009: 282, 294, 479, 489). Nowadays the idea is not so shyly back in the disguise of the Kremlin’s Russkii Mir (‘Russian World’) ideology, which nevertheless ‘limits itself’ largely to the territory of the former Soviet Union, though with some ‘feelers’ extended to the Kremlin’s potential close Balkan allies of Bulgaria, Macedonia and Serbia. All three share with Russia Cyrillic and the religious-cumcultural tradition of Orthodox Christianity underwritten by the liturgical language of Church Slavonic (Old Relations 2018; Roberts 2018; Velebit 2017). Another wave of planned (constructed) languages for all the Slavs took place when neo-(pan-)slavism was on the rise in the early 20th century, additionally encouraged by the runaway success of Esperanto (created in 1887). In 1907, the Czech dialectologist Ignác Hošek (Ignaz Hosek) proposed a New Slavic (Neuslavisch) language for the purpose of mutual communication among the Slavs of Austria-Hungary. New Slavic was to be written both in Cyrillic script and in Latin script, because both alphabets were employed by the Dual Monarchy’s Slavophones (Hošek 1907; Meyer 2014: 124–127). Two years later, in 1909, Hošek paired the Habsburg Empire’s Slavic languages in a dictionary, alongside his constructed language, which he renamed as ‘All-Slavic’ (Všeslovanský). But this time, he cut out Cyrillic, because this script was increasingly associated with Austria-Hungary’s ideological enemies, namely the Orthodox polities of Montenegro, Russia and Serbia (Hošek 1909). The year 1912 saw as many as two proposals of an All-Slavic language. Moravian linguist and esperantist Edmund Kolkop proposed the Mutually Comprehensible Slavic Language (dorozumívací jazyk slovanský) (Kolkop 1912; Meyer 2014: 128–132), and young Czech political activist of social democracy Josef Konečný put forward the proposal of Slavina, or a Slavic Esperanto for commerce and trade (Konečný 1912; Meyer 2014: 133–136). Under the influence of these projects, in 1920, Czech teacher Bohumil Holý proposed Slavski, a Slavic Esperanto, or a ‘mutually comprehensible and unifying All-Slavic language’ (Holý 1920). It was a ‘unifying’ language in that Holý aspired to include in Slavski elements from all the extant Slavic Einzelsprachen. In addition, 12 years later, in 1932, with a group of collaborators, he published a full-fledged textbook of the Slavski language (Holý and Holý 1932; Meyer 2014: 137–142). The breakup of Austria-Hungary in the wake of the Great War put a stop to new proposals for some All-Slavic languages that would ensure good mutual communication for Slavic speakers across the Dual Monarchy. Now such communication would be more important within the newly formed nation-states than across state boundaries. The purpose of this inner-national mutual communication for Slavs speaking and writing a variety of Einzelsprachen was ensured by the planned (or, rather, notional or constitutional) languages of Czechoslovak in Czechoslovakia and of Serbo-Croato-Slovenian/Serbocroatoslovenian (colloquially known as ‘Yugoslav’ among foreigners and as ‘our language’ [naš jezik] among its speakers [Bugarski 1986: 72]) in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians (or Yugoslavia since 1929). The same purpose was served by the already-well-established

132  Pluricentric or monocentric Einzelsprachen of Polish in Poland and of Russian in the Soviet Union. Speakers of other Slavic languages and vernaculars in these two countries were expected to master Polish and Russian, respectively – though until the mid 1930s, Belarusian and Ukrainian were encouraged in the Soviet Union too (Martin 2001). With the outbreak of World War II, the idea of an All-Slavic language was back. Many felt a need for Slavic speakers and their nations (i.e., the Slavic Einzelsprachen’s speech communities) to overcome the ‘tiny’ differences among their Einzelsprachen and nations for the sake of a unified front against the concentrated aggression of non-Slavs, namely the Germans, Hungarians and Italians. (The 1939 Soviet and German attack on Poland was conveniently ‘forgotten.’) In 1940, a year before the partition of Yugoslavia by the Axis Alliance, Yugoslav (Serbian) historian and communist Čedomir Đurđević proposed a Cyrillic-based All-Slavic language dubbed ‘Sveslav’ (All-Slav). Sveslav was to serve as an interSlavic auxiliary dialect of communication for all Slavophones. Đurđević reduced Sveslav’s inflection to a minimum, making it into an analytical language, similar to English or German in this respect. But why did he insist on Cyrillic? (Đurđević 1940; Meyer 2014: 143–147) After the dismantling of the Slavophone nationstates between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1938–1941, the USSR remained the sole independent (somewhat) Slavic polity. Russian was written in Cyrillic, and as of the turn of the 1940s, the Soviet Union’s all republican and other languages switched from the Latin alphabet to Cyrillic (only Armenian, Georgian and Yiddish were allowed to keep their specific ‘ancient’ writing scripts). In the same year, 1940, Czech immigrant Arnost Eman Zidek (Arnošt Eman Žídek), also in the context of World War II, which was then engulfing much of the world, proposed Slovan, a simplified Slavic language, for communicating with ‘a quarter billion’ of the world’s Slavophones. However, unlike Đurđević, Zidek settled for the Latin alphabet. At that time, the Soviet Union still remained in alliance with Germany, before Berlin attacked the USSR in 1941, which symbolically tarnished Cyrillic. Perhaps, in Zidek’s eyes, the Latin alphabet was symbolic of the free world, as exemplified by the United States, while the Gothic (Fraktur) type of this script was unmistakably associated with Hitler’s Germany (Meyer 2014: 148–153; Zidek 1940). Ironically, in 1941, the nazi government of wartime Germany banned Fraktur in the country and the occupied territories. Fraktur, resoundingly denigrated as ‘Judeo-Swabian’ letters, was replaced by the ‘normal alphabet’ of Antiqua, to be used by ‘Aryans’ (Bormann 1941). After World War II, popular interest in an All-Slavic language for mutually comprehensible communication among Slavophones disappeared. All the Slavicspeaking states found themselves within the confines of the Soviet bloc, with the partial exception of Yugoslavia. After the Tito–Stalin rift in 1948, Belgrade took an independent course veering between the West and the East, which contributed to the rise of the worldwide Non-Aligned Movement in the latter half of the 1950s. Moscow’s expectation was that all the ‘people’s democracies’ in Europe would adopt Russian as the communist world’s primary language of ‘interethnic communication’ (Brzezinski 1967: 115). From this official perspective, no competing planned All-Slavic language was needed, let alone desired. Russian was

Pluricentric or monocentric 133 the official language of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (‘Comecon’) – that is, also in Cuba, Ethiopia, Mongolia and Vietnam (cf Van-An 1978). Unsurprisingly, the authorities put many hurdles in the way of the limited postwar revival of the constructed language of Esperanto in the Soviet bloc’s countries (Lins 2017). In the mid 1930s, both Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union had liquidated the Esperanto organizations in both totalitarian states, entailing long prison terms or even death sentences for leading esperantists. In the eyes of the nazis, Esperanto had been a ‘language of Jews and communists,’ while Soviet ideologues had denigrated it as a language of ‘rootles cosmopolitans and petty bourgeois’ (Lins 2016). That is why Czech poet and esperantist Ladislav Podmele (better known under the pseudonym Jiří Karen) and his collaborators never managed to publish the brief grammar of their Mežduslavjanski jezik (Inter-Slavic) language, worked out in 1954–1958 (Meyer 2014: 154). They had no choice but to employ it mainly for private entertainment (Wojan 2015: 116). Belgian linguist Pierre Notaerts’s 1960 project of the constructed language of Slawsky in Polish-style spelling and West German scholar Bruno Owe Fahlke’s (who adopted pseudonym N A Zavtražnov) 1972 project of Meždislav (Inter-Slavic) remained obscure curiosities (Meyer 2014: 156–157). Only (Czecho)Slovak linguist Jozef Mistrík had more success with his 1981 Basic Slovak (Mistrík 1981). He smuggled the idea of an All-Slavic language in the guise of a simplified version of the national language of Slovak for Anglophone foreigners. Ostensibly, this project emulated British linguist Charles Kay Ogden’s 1930 constructed language of Basic English14 (Ogden 1930). Slovak, in spatial terms, is placed most centrally among all Slavic languages, affording easy access to (almost) all of them. Furthermore, the linguonyms ‘Slovak’ and ‘Slavic’ are even closer to each other in Slovak, namely Slovenčina and Slovančina. Mistrík’s textbook of Basic Slovak was republished twice in the latter half of the 1980s and three times more during the first postcommunist decade of the 1990s. Then an interest in the idea of Basic Slovak waned, though in 2007, a commemorative (seventh) edition of this textbook was published in memory of the author who had passed away in 2000 (Mistrík 2007). The project of Basic Slovak deftly serves as a transition to an outburst of constructed All-Slavic languages after the fall of communism in 1989. The end of the Soviet bloc in 1989, followed by the breakups of the Soviet Union (1991), Czechoslovakia (1993) and Yugoslavia (1991–2008), radically changed the situation. The international use of Russian was reduced to the post-Soviet states, while especially English became a new lingua franca of both Slavophones and non-Slavic speakers across Central and Eastern Europe. Simultaneously, the previously sub-state official Slavic languages became official languages in newly independent states. On the other hand, the Serbo-Croatian language was split to provide each post-Yugoslav Slavophone nation-state with its own unshared and unique language. The seemingly rapidly growing number of proliferating official Slavic languages could be interpreted as multiple new barriers to mutual communication among Slavophones. On the other hand, not all Slavic speakers

134

Pluricentric or monocentric

Only a single Even larger Large pluricentric Slavic languages as pluricentric language literary sub-dialects literary dialects Slavic ‘North Slavic’ ‘Rus’an’15 Language

‘South Slavic’

Monocentric Einzelsprachen as literary sub-sub-dialects

Belarusian, Lemkian, Rusyn, Russian, Ukrainian, West Polesian ‘Czechoslovak-Polish’ Czech, Kashubian, Lachian, Lower Sorbian, Mazurian, Polish, Silesian, Slovak, Upper Sorbian Serbocroatoslovenian Bosnian, Bunjevac, Croatian, (‘Yugoslavian’) Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian, Slovenian ‘Greater Bulgarian/ Bulgarian, Gorani, Macedonian’ Macedonian, Paulician

Figure 5d A single Slavic language pluricentric at multiple levels

(especially from the older generations) would hope to or want to acquire English for this purpose. The situation appeared to create a renewed demand for an AllSlavic language again. At present, some proponents of a single Slavic language, instead of construing such an Einzelsprache as consisting of 40 literary dialects, prefer to propose a new constructed (koine-style) Slavic language composed from a selection of the most frequent and shared elements that ideally are attested in all the extant Slavic languages. In this effort, they fall back on the internet as a resource-building space and the medium through which to popularize such new web-based languages. Not surprisingly, the idea emerged among émigré Slavophones. Apparently, a Slovak émigré linguist living in Switzerland, Mark Hučko, started this trend with his language of Slovio, created in 1999, for ‘400 million Slavic speakers.’ Two years later, in 2001, he made it available online. Slovio is written predominantly in Latin letters, but a parallel Cyrillic version also exists (Slavic 2017a; Steenbergen 2016: 1). Dutch linguist and journalist Jan van Steenbergen (which is a pseudonym of Johannes Hendrik Steenbergen [Wojan 2015: 117]) developed a Uralic-influenced North Slavic language Vuozgašchai (Vozgian) in 1996. In 2002, he pressed on with a Romance-influenced Polish, Wenedyk, followed two years later by a Romance-influenced Silesian, namely Šležan. In 2005, Steenbergen developed a Romance-based spelling for the Polish language, and three years later, he revived Hilferding’s 19th-century idea of a Cyrillic script for Polish (Multilingual 2017). Of course, none of these projects amounts to a genuine constructed language. This playful profligacy shows how the web allows for both amusement and easy language construction – not that it is the best way to spread the actual use of such languages. Steenbergen recognizes this problem, so he also contributed to a ‘serious’ language creation effort when Slovjenski was proposed in 2006 (InterSlavic 2017). Steeven Radzikowski, Andrej Moraczewski and Michal Borovička

Surzyk, Trasianka

Sveslav (1940) Russian, Surzyk, Trasianka

Middle Style (SlavenoRussian, 1750s), Opshti Slovenski (1796), Ruski Ezik (1666), Ruthenian (14th–17th c.), SlavenoBulgarian (1760s), Slaveno-Serbian (1760s), Slovenisku (for Orthodox Slavs and Romanian speakers) Uzajemni Slavjanski (1864)

Ruthenian (14th–17th c.)

Cyrillic

Figure 5e All-Slavic languages and the politics of script

Postcommunist/internet period

Interwar period World War II Communist period

Long 19th century

Slovenisku (2006)

Slovenisku (Old Church Slavonic, mid 9th c.)

Middle Ages

Early modern period

Glagolitic & Cyrillic

Period

Esperanto (1887), German (1848–1871), Latin (1790– 1848), Lingua Slavica Universalis (1826), AllSlavic (1909), Mutually Comprehensible Slavic (1912), Slavina (1912) Esperanto (1887), Slavski (1920) Slovan (1940) Basic Slovak (1981), Meždislav (1972), Mežduslavjanski (1954–1958), Slawski (1960) Basic Slovak (1981), English, Slovjenski (2006), Rozumio (2008), Slovianksi (2011), Slovioski (2009), Novoslovienskij (2009)

Opšteslovenski (1793), Polish (16th–18th c.), Sapelj’s AllSlavic (1790), Slouignisky (1583), Sclauica (1641)

Czech (15th–16th c.)

Latin Script

Slovio (1999), Medžuslovjansky (2011)

Vseslavenski (1853), New Slavic (1907)

Dušan & Charles IV’s (Common) Slavic (1355)

Cyrillic & Latin Script

Pluricentric or monocentric 135

136  Pluricentric or monocentric proposed Rozumio (literally ‘I understand’) in 2008 and Slovioski a year later (Short 2017; Wojan 2015: 117). In 2009, Czech software engineer Vojtěch Merunka published a proposal of the Novoslovienskij jazyk (New Slavic Language) (Merunka 2009, 2012). Two years later, in 2011, Igor Poliakov, Ondrej Rečnik, Steernbergen and Gabriel Svoboda developed Slovianski from elements shared by the majority of the extant Slavic Einzelsprachen (Wojan 2015: 117). This unprecedented proliferation of language projects did not translate into any practical use of these constructed languages, so on the basis of closer cooperation between Merunka and Steernbergen, in 2011, Slovianski, Slovioski and Novoslovienskij (renamed as Novoslověnsky) were merged into Medžuslovjansky (Inter-Slavic), written both in Latin letters and in Cyrillic letters (InterSlavic 2017). Medžuslovjansky is aimed at speakers of Slavic Einzelsprachen, but to not leave non-Slavic speakers empty-handed, also in 2011, Merunka and Steernbergen overhauled Slovianski and Slovioski into a Slavic Esperanto, known as Slovianto (Slovianto 2017). In total, between 1989 and 2011, over 30 projects of constructed All-Slavic languages were proposed (Steebergen 2011: 16). Symptomatically, none of these constructed Slavic languages has been used to create a Wikipedia. This clearly shows that few Slavic speakers and non-Slavophones are ready to use such languages. English appears to be a more pragmatic option, because this language became widely known in the postcommunist states during the past quarter of a century. In contrast, (Old) Church Slavonic, or Slovenisku (as this language was known by its speakers over a millennium ago), obtained its own Wikipedia in 2006, giving this Orthodox liturgical language a second lease on life. The Slovenisku Wikipedia is written both in Cyrillic and Glagolitic (Istoriia 2017). Hence, I suspect that there are more users of Slovenisku (Church Slavonic) among Slavophones (mainly students of Slavic philology and Orthodox theology, and aficionados of things Slavonic, I assume) than of the aforementioned constructed All-Slavic languages. In the case of Slovenisku, interested users can fall back on the extensive body of Church Slavonic literature, unlike users of constructed All-Slavic languages. And significantly, some political and cultural legitimacy and support is lent to Slovenisku by the Orthodox Church and the Greek Catholic Church, alongside some Slavic nation-states, which claim that their national languages stem directly from Church Slavonic. These countries are typically Orthodox in their culture or history (Belarus, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine), or their non-Orthodox ecclesiastical culture used to be strongly connected to Slovenisku at the earliest stage of its formation (Croatia, Slovakia and Slovenia) (Kamusella 2009: 34; Old Church 2017). The use of Glagolitic is a bow toward users from the non-Orthodox (i.e., Catholic and Protestant) Slavophone polities, while Cyrillic is seen as characteristic of Orthodox Slavic states. However, now­ adays, next to no one has a working command of Glagolitic. The ideologized character of script in Slavic ethnolinguistic nationalisms is yet another hurdle that prevents any wider acceptance of a constructed All-Slavic language. If it is written in Cyrillic, the language is almost automatically seen as ‘Orthodox,’ from the ideological vantage of observation. On the other hand, when

Pluricentric or monocentric 137 an All-Slavic constructed Einzelsprache is recorded in Latin letters, a language of this kind is viewed as ‘Catholic’ or ‘Protestant.’ Attempting to write it in both scripts is no winner either, because in such a case, a language in question appears not to belong to anyone at all. In this seemingly areligious (secular) modern age, religious-cum-cultural differences continue to block any attempts at a cultural (let alone political) unification of Slavophones, as it used to in the intensively religious early modern and premodern past. The ethnoconfessional character of the Slavic nation-states is rarely acknowledged in an explicit manner. But this character expressed through national culture and politics keeps these polities’ kindred (Ausbau) official languages apart. More than any linguistic difference, religion employed for the sake of nation-building most drives the post-Serbo-Croatian languages apart. Montenegrin and Serbian are perceived as ‘Orthodox languages’ and Bosnian and Croatian, as ‘Muslim’ and ‘Catholic,’ respectively. Hence, in the eyes of these languages’ state promotors, no Common Language (a SerboCroatian 2.0) is possible or desirable, because from an ideological perspective, it would be a confessional – Catholic-Muslim-Orthodox – hybrid. However, the ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism is normatively steeped in the concept of ‘purity’ (homogeneity). This entails that any linguistic or confessional hybridity (multiculturalism) automatically delegitimizes a given project of a national language, nation or nation-state. Although proposals for this or that All-Slavic language of interethnic communication are rarely commented on in Belarus, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Russia or Ukraine, a keen interest in them has been shown in the postYugoslav countries (cf Čeh 2017; Stiže 2017; Vurušić 2017). Perhaps the process of breaking up Serbo-Croatian into new, separate Einzelsprachen to a degree resembles the creation of constructed All-Slavic languages (especially à rebours). On the other hand, the desire to create a single language for all the Slavs may resonate with the intuition of many users of post-Serbo-Croatian languages that ‘in reality’ these are closely related varieties of a single language – that is, ‘our language.’ It may now be ‘politically incorrect’ to name it ‘Serbo-Croatian,’ yet the Wikipedia in this officially nonexistent language of Serbo-Croatian is the largest one among all the post-Serbo-Croatian Wikipedias and even among all the Wikipedias in South Slavic Einzelsprachen (List of Wikipedias by Language 2017). Symptomatically, in Belgrade, the now appropriately renamed Institute of the Serbian Language presses on with the publication of the multivolume dictionary of the Serbo-Croatian language (Bogutović 2018; Rečnik 1959-). The name of this institute changed, but not the title of this authoritative dictionary. A Latin script–based counterpart of the dictionary for this same language (though a bit differently named – ‘Croato-Serbian’) was planned to be produced in Zagreb, but it never commenced. It was an early sign of the unraveling of Serbo-Croatian as a single Einzelsprache.16 An akin phenomenon that characterizes some Slavic languages, or rather interlanguages, is that they are widely used, but no state or elite claims their ownership. This is the case of Surzhyk and Trasianka, the former spoken in Ukraine and the latter in Belarus. They are similar to Slaveno-Serbian, Slaveno-Bulgarian,

138  Pluricentric or monocentric Period

North Slavs

South Slavs

14th–15th c.

Catholic/ Orthodox Protestant Latin, Church Slavonic Bohemian (Czech) Latin, French, Church Slavonic, Polish, Latin, Polish, German French German, French, Russian (Latin)

Catholic/ Orthodox Protestant Latin, Bohemian Church Slavonic, (Czech) Greek

16th–18th c. Long 19th c.

Latin, German

Church Slavonic, Greek

German, French, Russian (Church Slavonic, Greek) Interwar period German, Russian (German, German, French, Serbo-Croatian/ French French, Yugoslavian (Esperanto) (Esperanto) Esperanto) Communist Russian (German, English, Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian, period French) Russian (German, French, English) Postcommunist English period Figure 5f Languages of broader (interethnic) communication for Central and Eastern Europe’s Slavs

Slaveno-Russian and Katharevousa. Both, Surzhyk and Trasianka, are uncodified, situationally shifting mixtures of elements drawn from two or more kindred Einzelsprachen. Hence, potentially, each user may to a degree interweave elements from the source Einzelsprachen as they see fit. This does not create any insurmountable communication problems, because the source Slavic Einzelsprachen are closely related, sharing most of their vocabulary and syntax. However, the difference is that although elites or state administrations created and cultivated the aforementioned Slaveno-languages and Katharevousa, Surzhyk and Trasianka are unplanned grassroots products, accidental creations of how millions happened to communicate in the 20th century. Millions who against their will were rapidly sent one way or another from the Belarusian- or Ukrainianspeaking countryside to Russophone cities by forced Soviet modernization or by the widely changing fronts during the two world wars. Speaking Surzhyk and Trasianka marks one as not belonging to an elite. However, a high-ranking official or a politician may choose to speak it for a folksy effect or to build rapport with their underlings or a target electorate (cf Ioffe 2014: 144; Maheshwari 2015). Until the breakup of the Soviet Union, Belarusian and Ukrainian were often seen (and at times still are perceived) as languages of low standing, characteristic of the countryside. In this context, the prestigious languages of social advancement were Polish and Russian during World War II and Russian alone after that. Hence, Surzhyk is a mixture of Ukrainian with Russian (or Polish) and Trasianka of Belarusian with Russian (or Polish) (Hentschel, Taranenko and Zaprudski 2014; Hentschel and Zaprudski 2008).

Pluricentric or monocentric 139 The story, to a degree, gets repeated in the case of Slavic microlanguages in Slavophone nation-states. Certain microlanguages enjoy a degree of recognition and are even supported by the state, like Rusyn in Serbia’s Vojvodina, Kajkavian in Croatia, or Kashubian in Poland. This recognition and support is usually more rhetorical than substantial. However, in the case of unrecognized microlanguages, the state does its utmost to suppress their use and claim them as ‘unimportant,’ ‘rustic,’ ‘substandard,’ ‘incorrect,’ ‘ugly’ or ‘kitchen’ dialects of the state’s national and official language, meaning that in the process of ‘modernization,’ such ‘dialects’ should eventually disappear (cf Dziewit-Meller 2018). This is the case of Silesian in Poland, Rusyn in Ukraine, or Slovjak (Eastern Slovak) in Slovakia. As a result, the social sphere of the use of microlanguages in Slavic-speaking nation-states is gradually but steadily limited. The erstwhile diglossia between a microlanguage and the state’s official and national language collapses. Initially, such a microlanguage was used at home with family, in the local community, and in some rudimentary institutions created for the microlanguage’s speech community, by co-ethnic activists or – more rarely – by the state. On the other hand, the official language functioned as the sole medium of administration, education, the mass media and the statewide culture. The unraveling of this diglossia under the ennationalizing pressure exerted by the ethnolinguistic nation-state in a quest for ever-deeper homogeneity (‘national purity’) means that the official language starts permeating a given microlanguage’s traditional spheres of employment. A pushback is possible but is rare and never successful at reversing language shift. Microlanguages in Slavophone national polities are inherently in the Ausbau (‘being built apart’ [cf Kloss 1967]) relation with the state’s official language. The similarity and a varying degree of mutual comprehension between both allows the state administration to claim that the microlanguage in question is ‘a mere dialect’ of the state language. Some activists working for the sake of this microlanguage react with horror at this imposition and make an effort to distance (‘build away’) their micro-Einzelsprache from the official language. Sometimes this effort works, but more often the microlanguage’s speech community gets alienated, all while the state administration accuses these activists of a lack of patriotism, treason, sedition or even accuses them of ‘linguistic terrorism.’ However, the close Ausbau relation between such a Slavic microlanguage and the Slavic official Einzelsprache entails that some persistent syntactical, pronunciation and idiomatic elements of the suppressed microlanguage remain in how the descendants of the microlanguage’s speech community end up speaking and writing the official Slavic language of the nation-state of their residence. Such ‘mixing’ is typical in Trasianka and Surzhyk: speakers of the (at-times) nondominant Einzelsprachen of Belarusian and Ukrainian, respectively, are pressed to or out of their volition adopt the prestigious and dominant language of Russian. However, ‘linguistic remnants’ of their abandoned heritage languages tend to linger on in how some Belarusians and Ukrainians speak – or attempt to speak – Russian. Similarly, for a time, ‘linguistic remnants’ influence how former microlanguage speakers pronounce and write the target official language of a Slavophone nation-state.

140  Pluricentric or monocentric Surzhyk-like or Trasianka-like ad hoc ‘mixed forms’ of a microlanguage and the state Einzelsprache are as many as there are Slavic microlanguages in the Slavic nation-states. Importantly, the aforementioned phenomenon does not arise in the case of Slavic microlanguages in non-Slavophone polities. In such a case, the relationship between a microlanguage and the non-Slavic state’s Einzelsprache is invariably of an Abstand (‘standing apart’) character. They are mutually incomprehensible, which effectively obstructs any free-wheeling ad hoc mixing between these two Einzelsprachen, which – on the other hand – is the norm in Slavophone polities between Slavic microlanguages and state languages. Hence, however few people speak Lower or Upper Sorbian in Germany, this Slavic microlanguage remains immediately distinguishable against the distinctively German-speaking (i.e., nonSlavophone) background. If the Sorbian speakers’ home region of Lusatia had been divided between Czechoslovakia and Poland, as was the plan after World War II, both Sorbian languages would have been already largely absorbed into the ethnolinguistically homogenous speech community of Czech- or Polish speakers. Czech and Polish speakers of a Sorbian origin would have initially been speaking Surzhyk-like ad hoc ‘mixtures’ of Sorbian with Czech or Polish, before switching to these states’ Einzelsprachen while retaining some typically Sorbian linguistic elements. The commonly and easily perceptible Abstand difference between a Slavic microlanguage and the non-Slavic state language does not allow for the unrealized or only half-conscious abandonment of the Slavic microlanguage, which is invariably the case in Slavophone polities, as explained earlier. The use of ethnolinguistic nationalism for imposing and justifying the sole official employment of a single national language generates an interesting dynamic in the case of attitudes toward Slavic microlanguages at the meeting point between Slavic and non-Slavic nation-states. Speakers of Slavic microlanguages in nonSlavic national polities are considered patriots from the point of view of neighboring Slavic nation-states.17 The alluded patriotism is believed to be for the sake of Slavdom and, perhaps, one of the neighboring Slavic national polities. Hence, in the black-and-white terms of ethnolinguistic nationalism, this assumed ‘patriotism’ of a Slavic microlanguage speaker must be against their non-Slavic nation-state of residence and citizenship. At times, this nationalist interpretation may lead to the suppression and persecution of the speech community of a Slavic microlanguage in non-Slavic nation-states. However, speakers of Slavic microlanguages, seen by neighboring Slavic nation-states as an instrument of preserving Slavdom or pushing back non-Slavdom in non-Slavic nation-states, do not have it easier in Slavic nation-states. The fact that they do not accommodate to the official national language of the Slavic nation-state and continue speaking their Slavic microlanguage is interpreted as a clear sign of (potential) treason and sedition.18 In terms of the ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism, this situation of the existence a stable speech community of a Slavic microlanguage is perceived as a threat to the Slavic nation-state – that is, to the normative requirement of deepening and maintaining the ethnolinguistic homogeneity (‘national purity’) of such a polity. In Poland all should speak

Pluricentric or monocentric 141 Polish, in Slovakia Slovak, and in Bulgaria Bulgarian. As a result, speakers and speech communities of Slavic microlanguages tend to be suppressed and persecuted as well. To a degree, their situation may be even worse than that in nonSlavic national polities, because in such a case, they could count on some material and political support from neighboring Slavic nation-states. When it comes to speech communities of Slavic microlanguages in a Slavic national polity, nonSlavic nation-states are not interested, while other Slavic nation-states, often facing a similar domestic problem of unwanted Slavic microlanguages, choose to stay away from any international quarrel on this account. This instrumental treatment of Slavic microlanguages and their speech communities also applies to other microlanguages, from different language groups (‘families’), when there is an ethnolinguistcially construed nation-state where the official language is a cognate of a microlanguage in question, both belonging to group A. In addition, the nation-state needs to border on a polity where the official language belongs to a radically different language group – let us say, B. Hence, the state border doubles as a boundary between the A dialect continuum and the B dialect continuum. If microlanguage A is located in the B-speaking state, it is lauded and supported by the nation-state with the cognate official language A. However, in the case of a microlanguage A spoken in the A-speaking nation-state, it is suppressed and assessed as a ‘danger to national integrity.’ This dynamic applies only to polities that were established on the basis of ethnolinguistic nationalism and that continue to be legitimized and maintained with the employment of this ideology married to the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state.

Notes 1 However, in contrast to Central Europe’s norm of ethnolinguistic nationalism, the widespread adoption of the Russian language among the Belarusians does not make them into Russians. Four-fifths of Belarusians speak and write Russian, but less than a fifth of the country’s population see themselves as not belonging to the Belarusian nation (Population 2019; Rudkouski 2017: 28–29). What is more, the monumental four-volume historical atlas of Belarus (in Belarusian), completed in 2018, covers the history of Belarus as a distinct and separate political and ethnic entity during the past three millennia (Vjaliki 2009–2018). In the same year, the publication commenced the five-volume history of Belarusian statehood (in Russian), which opens with the 1st millennium CE (Istoriia belorusskoi 2018–). 2 The specifically Czech-Slovak concept of suprastandard bilingualism (nadstandardní bilingvismus) describes the situation when a Czech speaker and a Slovak speaker enjoy a successful conversation despite speaking in their own languages. Neither does the Czech speaker switch to Slovak, nor the Slovak speaker to Czech (cf Bednaříková 2010: 15). 3 I thank Rok Stergar for drawing my attention to emic views of actual Croatian speakers and Slovenian speakers on this issue. 4 I thank Catherine Gibson for this insight. 5 Similarly, in Latvia, Latgalian is acknowledged as a historical written variety of the country’s official and national language of Latvian (Gibson 2017). 6 I thank Rok Stergar for drawing my attention to this fact. 7 Underlining indicates that Macedonian is mentioned in this table twice, as part of potential Serbocroatoslovenian and of Gretaer Bulgarian/Macedonian.

142  Pluricentric or monocentric 8 I thank Catherine Gibson for sharing with me this important insight. 9 Languages are artifacts, built by people, in line with this or that preconceived unit of the linguistic (e.g., the Western unit of Einzelsprache). An idea that may strike most in a certain region of the world nowadays as ‘odd’ might actually have looked quite sensible in the past. At present, no one would seriously propose that German is ‘too barbaric’ and must be ‘civilized’ by infusing it with as many French elements as possible. But that is what to a degree happened with the Slavic dialect of Moscow ‘civilized’ with extensive borrowings from the ‘holy tongue’ of Church Slavonic. However, when a certain idea is implemented and accepted in society, it is impossible to undo it without totalitarian measures, irrespective of how we may assess this original idea today. We have no choice but to live with the effects and ramifications of what was done in the past. 10 The tiny Orthodox Balkan polity of Montenegro gained de facto independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1688, thanks to equally informal protectorate extended over it by the Venetian Republic, at that time engaged in protracted warfare with the Ottomans. In the early 18th century, the Montenegrin Vladika (bishop-prince) established relations with Russia. Subsequently, St. Petersburg financed the founding of Montenegro’s first formal state institutions at the turn of the 19th century. In 1841, the Austrian Empire signed a border treaty with Montenegro, de facto recognizing its independence. And 11 years later, in 1852, Russia recognized the Vladika as a temporal prince. This event marked the transformation of Montenegro from theocracy to regular polity. Finally, at the 1878 Congress of Berlin, the great powers formally recognized Montenegro and compelled the Ottoman Empire to acknowledge the de facto ‘already-existing’ independence of Montenegro (Šístek 2017: 146, 157, 172–173, 188, 194, 215).   Following the two anti-Ottoman uprisings (1804–1813, 1815–1817), Serbia was established as an autonomous Orthodox principality in 1815. Later, another antiOttoman uprising in 1821–1829 led to the emergence of Greece as an Orthodox polity, whose independence was recognized in 1832. The independence of Serbia was formally recognized in 1878 at the Congress of Berlin. Following Russia’s success in the war against the Ottomans, in 1878, it established Bulgaria as an Orthodox polity. But Bulgaria became formally independent only in 1908. The Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 also brought to fruition St. Petersburg’s half-a-century-long military and administrative involvement in the Ottoman Empire’s Orthodox principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. In 1866, both united under the new name of Romania, and the aforementioned war led to the declaration of Romanian independence in 1878. At the turn of the 20th century, apart from Russia, there were five further Orthodox states in world, all of them located in the Balkans, namely Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia (Jelavich and Jelavich 1977). 11 It is a simplification expressed in terms of today’s language politics. First of all, the legal concept of official or state language did not exist then in Poland-Lithuania. Actually, what was forbidden in 1697 was the use of ‘Ruthenian letters’ (Cyrillic) in official documents. (The decision was issued a year earlier, in 1696, but it was formally confirmed in 1697.) The implementation of this recommendation lagged, and Cyrillic continued to be attested in regional and local documents, especially in the east of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (or the eastern half of today’s Belarus), until the mid 18th century. Ruthenian-speaking scribes did not actually switch from Ruthenian to Polish when producing documents but basically continued writing Ruthenian in Latin letters. With time, increasingly more Polish (and Latinate) influences entered such Ruthenian written in the Latin alphabet (Lisiejčykaŭ 2017). These scribes often did not perceive Ruthenian and Polish as discrete Einzelsprachen, unlike the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets. The difference between both scripts was ideologically emphasized by the quarrel between the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church, which has lasted since the Great Schism of 1054. 12 Lomonosov borrowed this term and concept from the German-language discourse on rhetoric and phonetically rendered the German word Stil in Cyrillic as shtil’. In today’s

Pluricentric or monocentric 143 Russian, the term is stil’ – that is, phonetically transcribed from the French word style. This clearly illustrates the story of ditching German in favor of French as the preferred language of international communication in the Russian Empire during the second half of the 18th century. 13 The situation was different in Croatia-Slavonia, where in 1848 the not specifically named Štokavian language was declared as official under the designation narodni jezik (‘people’s or national language’) (Markus 2000: 77, 310; Zahtijevanja 1848 [2019]). (I thank Rok Stergar for drawing my attention to this fact.) 14 Unlike, the projects of an All-Slavic language, the creator of Basic English did not aim to ensure mutually comprehensible communication among speakers of the Germanic Einzelsprachen. Basic English is intended as a stepping stone toward a working command of standard (‘normal’) English. The Simple English Wikipedia, mostly written in Basic English, commenced in 2001. Nowadays (2019) it boasts 148,000 articles. The Simple English Wikipedia is the eighth largest Wikipedia among the 29 Wikipedias in Germanic languages. It is twice and three times larger, respectively, than the Wikipedias in the state and national Einzelsprachen of Afrikaans and Icelandic. In comparison with the Slavic languages’ Wikipedias, the Simple English Wikipedia is on par with the Official Belarusian and Slovenian Wikipedias (Simple 2019). 15 All the underlined ‘supra-languages’ are hypthetical propositions, which have never been actualized, though Serborcroatoslovenian featured in interwar Yugoslavia’s legislation. Italicization, emboldening or the lack thereof in the case of such underlined ‘supra-languages’ indicates their ranking in the sense which of them could contain a larger chunk of a given Slavic dialect continuum. 16 Between 1967 and 1976, the Cyrillic-based ‘Serbian’ version of the six-volume Rečnik srpskohrvatskog književnoga jezika (Dictionary of the Standard Serbo-Croatian Language) was published. The Croats were to reciprocate with a Latin alphabet-based ‘Croatian’ version of this reference, titled Rječnik hrvatskosrpskoga književnog jezika (Dictionary of the Standard Croato-Serbian Language), but only the two initial volumes came off the press in 1967, before this edition was terminated (Hrvatski 1969). 17 However, the dynamics of mutual perceptions between a Slavophone community in a non-Slavic nation-state and a neighboring Slavic nation-state may be even more complicated. For instance, the Slavic nation-state in question may praise the minority’s patriotism, if this minority chooses to see its speech as a dialect of the Slavic nation-state’s official (national) language. However, if this minority decides to reaffirm its Slavic speech as a language in its own right (microlanguage), then the Slavic nation-state sees it as an ‘intrigue,’ supposedly instigated by the non-Slavic nation-state. By extension, the Slavic nation-state berates the Slavophone minority for falling for the ‘cheap lure of such machinations,’ which proves the minority’s ‘national immaturity.’ As a result, the Slavic nation-state labels the minority’s members ‘unpatriotic’ and ‘unenlightened’ or even ‘separatists’ and ‘renegades.’   The dynamics of this type is observed between today’s Slovenia and Resian speakers in Italy. Ljubljana’s official stance is that Resian is a dialect of Slovenian, not a language in its own right. (I thank Rok Stergar for this example and for pushing me to reflect more on this type of national love–hate relationship.) 18 A good illustration of this phenomenon is Slovenian nationalists’ contradictory attitudes toward Prekmurjan in the Porabje (in Hungary) and in the Prekmurje (in Slovenia). In the former case, Prekmurjan is lauded as a ‘barricade’ against ‘creeping Magyarization.’ However, in the latter case, loyalty to Prekmurjan is interpreted as a ‘clear sign of separatism’ and potential ‘sedition.’ In line with the Slovenian ethnolinguistic nationalism, Prekmurjan Slovenians should give up their ‘rustic dialect’ in favor of ‘real’ (i.e., standard) Slovenian. (I thank Rok Stergar for this revealing example.)

6 Russian as a pluricentric language

Rarely do scholars (let alone politicians) take note of the otherwise-quite-obvious fact that potentially (and in the sociopolitical reality, as observed nowadays) the most pluricentric of all the extant Slavic languages is Russian. The 2017 Declaration on the Common Language likens Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian (otherwise also referred to neutrally as ‘Common Language’ and historically as ‘Serbo-Croatian’) to such pluricentric languages of worldwide communication as Arabic, English, French, German, Spanish or Portuguese (Deklaracija 2017). However, when it comes to the actual number of speakers who use these languages and to the number of countries where such pluricentric languages are officially employed, Russian is a much better candidate for a de-ethnicized worldwide pluricentric Slavic langue than Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian (Common Language/Serbo-Croatian). All the globe’s ‘large’ (or ‘world’) languages are spoken and written by hundreds of millions of people. All these languages are largely de-ethnicized lingua francas of former or current empires – all these empires with their centers (metropolises) located exclusively in Eurasia. Russian was (and to a degree still is) such an imperial lingua franca, while the Common Language never played a role of this kind. Some would point the finger at Yugoslavia, accusing the state of having been a Serbian empire-in-disguise. However, by the same measure, Czech would have to be declared as an imperial language too, because it played a dominant role in the de facto tri-national (Czech, Rusyn and Slovak) interwar Czechoslovakia and in the officially binational and bilingual (Czech and Slovak) communist Czechoslovakia. This proposition does not make much historical or political sense. Neither Czech nor the Common Language was or is a language of (wide) international communication, and each one’s de-ethnicization is as minimal as the number of people using these Einzelsprachen as their second (‘nonnative’, L2) languages. Nowadays (according to the statistical figures of 2010) about 76 million people speak French as their first language, 92 million German, 215 million Portuguese, 295  million Arabic, 360  million English, 405  million Spanish and 955  million Chinese (i.e., Mandarin, standard Chinese). This ranking changes quite a bit when the cited numbers combine both speakers who use these Einzelsprachen as their first languages (L1) and as second languages (L2). All the speakers of German as their first and second language (L1 and L2) amount to 129 million, of French to

Russian as a pluricentric language 145 229 million, of Portuguese also to 229 million, of Arabic to 422 million, of Spanish to 527 million, of English to 983 million, and of Chinese to 1.09 billion. The rate of de-ethnicization measured by the ratio of L1 to L2 speakers is the highest for English and French, in the case of which, L1 speakers account only for onethird of all the speakers, and the lowest for Chinese and Portuguese, with their L1 speakers amounting to more than 90 percent of all the speakers of these two Einzelsprachen.1 Russian, with its 155 million L1 (‘native’) speakers – or 267 million L1 and L2 speakers – fits perfectly the category of the world’s ‘big’ (pluricentric) languages – its L1 speakers accounting for just over half of all the speakers of this Slavic Einzelsprache. This high rate of de-ethnicization in the case of Russian is not equaled by other aforementioned global languages, apart from English and French. In the case of Arabic, German or Spanish, L1 speakers account for more than two-thirds of all the speakers of these three Einzelsprachen. In light of these indicators, the Common Language (or Serbo-Croatian) cannot be reasonably classified as or compared with such languages of worldwide communication. With its 19 million L1 speakers and perhaps fewer than one million L2 speakers, the Common Language’s rate of de-ethnicization is negligible, the native speakers amounting to over 95 percent of this Einzelsprache’s all speakers (List of Languages by Number of Native Speakers 2017; List of Languages by Total 2018). The rate of de-ethnicization was bigger in Yugoslavia, where in 1991 around 19 million people were native Serbo-Croatian speakers out of the country’s total population of 23 million. However, until the breakup of Yugoslavia, the combined four million speakers of Macedonian and Slovenian, alongside minority speakers of Albanian, Hungarian, Romanian, Romani, Rusyn, Slovak and other languages, acquired a working command of Serbo-Croatian at school and in the army. Hence, at the turn of the 1990s, the de-ethnicization of Serbo-Croatian was more pronounced, where L1 speakers of this language accounted for 83 percent of all the (L1 and L2) speakers (Demographics of the Socialist 2018). Following the founding of independent Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia and Slovenia, the teaching of this once Yugoslav lingua franca of SerboCroatian ceased in these post-Yugoslav nation-states, because each post-Yugoslav state was built on the ideological foundation of ethnolinguistic nationalism. As a result, the normative compulsion for each of these national polities has been to develop its own unshared and unique national language in which all official state business and education must be conducted. Multilingualism and polyglossia are rapidly becoming a thing of the past, now unwanted and often denigrated as the ‘Yugoslav (imperial) past’ (cf Waldenberg 2005). A degree of this now officially abandoned Yugoslav diglossia and multilingualism remains among the older generations, who received education and came of age in Yugoslavia, especially if they emigrated to the West. Such self-declared national (or rather non-national) and linguistic Yugoslavs who speak Serbo-Croatian (Yugoslavian) live in Western Europe and Northern America number about a million (Srebotnjak 2016). German is an official or national language in six nation-states (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Switzerland), Arabic in 27 polities, and

146  Russian as a pluricentric language English in as many as 58 countries. In contrast, the Common Language is official or national only in five states (Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia). In this metric, Serbo-Croatian is quite similar to the German language. However, German has almost five times more L1 speakers and over six times more of all (L1 and L2) speakers than the Common Language does. Furthermore, German’s rate of de-ethnicization, standing at 71%, is much more pronounced than that of Serbo-Croatian. On the other hand, Russian is an official or national language in seven states (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and in five de facto states (Abkhazia, Donetsk People’s Republic, Lugansk People’s Republic, South Ossetia and Transnistria), while considerable Russophone speech communities exist in six nation-states (Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine). What is more, Russian remains an important foreign (second, L2) language of wider communication in at least four further states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Mongolia). Hence, Russian is widely employed in writing, speech, the mass media, administration, publishing and education in at least 22 polities, from the Far East to the Middle East and from Eastern Europe to Central Asia. This metric places the language close to Arabic and well ahead of German. Russian is a middling world language, in terms of its speakers: ‘bigger’ than German but ‘smaller’ than English or Spanish, roughly on par with Portuguese. However, Russian is much more de-ethnicized than German or Spanish, let alone Portuguese, is. Strangely, with the pronounced exception of Russian, all the aforementioned world languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, German, French, Portuguese and Spanish) are construed as comprising somewhat differing state-specific varieties. Nowadays, computer users can often choose their preferred (state) variety of a given world language from the software menu. Russian, however, is the sole world language that is construed as a homogenous and unitary entity, officially with no diverging state or ethnic varieties. The situation seems to be like that Language

L1 + L2 Speakers

L1 Speakers

De-ethnicization (L1 speakers as a percentage of all [L1 + L2] speakers; the smaller the percentage, the bigger de-ethnicization)

Chinese English Spanish Arabic Russian Portuguese French German Common Language

1.09 billion 983 million 527 million 422 million 267 million 229 million 229 million 129 million 20 million (?)

955 million 360 million 405 million 295 million 155 million 215 million 76 million 92 million 19 million

90% 37% 77% 70% 58% 94% 33% 71% 95%

Figure 6a Number of speakers of the world’s pluricentric (‘big’) languages, as contrasted with Russian and the Common Language

Russian as a pluricentric language 147 because Russia and other post-Soviet states concur with Moscow’s highly ideologized insistence that speaking Russian as a first language is the sure sign that a person belongs to the Russian nation, despite the fact that at present they might be a citizen of one of numerous countries other than Russia. This Moscow-led Russophone aspiration to national and linguistic unity and homogeneity – so typical of ethnolinguistic nation-states in Central Europe – is unheard of among states that employ other world languages for official and educational purposes. After the breakup of the Soviet Union (SU) in 1991, almost a seamless and rarely commented-on ideological transition took place between the Soviet (marxistleninist) theory of the pending merger (zblizhenie) and the eventual unification (sliianie) of all the Soviet peoples (nationalities) into a classless Soviet communist people or nation (narod), on the one hand, and the Russkii Mir ideology, on the other. The proposed unification of the multiethnic population into a ‘postethnic’ Soviet people, in the former case, was to be achieved through the adoption of Russian as their language of ‘interethnic communication’ by all the Soviet

Language

Nation-States Where Language Is Official or National

Number

Arabic

Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Sahrawi Republic (Western Sahara), Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania (Zanzibar), Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia

27

Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cook Islands, Dominica, Federated States of Micronesia, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, India, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Nigeria, Niue, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe Austria, Belgium, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Switzerland Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

58

Common Language (Serbo-Croatian) English

German Russian

5

6 7

Figure 6b Common Language, Russian and selected ‘world languages’ as states’ official or national languages

148  Russian as a pluricentric language peoples, who then would become a single, unified, classless Soviet communist narod (Beloded et al. 1976, Dzyuba 1974; Kondakov 1976; Kuzeev 1971). Similarly, the Russkii Mir ideology proposes that all communities of (‘native’) speakers of Russian (despite the different states of their residence or birth) constitute inalienable parts of the same borderless and homogenous (Pan- or Great) Russian nation, thus making Russian into the sole monocentric big language of ‘international communication’2 (Ivanov and Sergeev 2008: 42; Lobodanov 2015). Tellingly, in Russian, the Soviet term ‘interethnic communication’ is exactly the same as the Russkii Mir term ‘international communication,’ namely mezhnatsional’noe obshcheniie.3 The potential for multi-variant translations and interpretations of this concept for a variety of ideological purposes is heightened by the fact that in the Russian language the term Russian is expressed with two distinctive adjectives: Russkii and Rossiiskii. The former means ‘ethnically Russian and (at least in culture) Orthodox,’ while the latter means ‘Russian in the sense of being a citizen of Russia, despite any non-Russkii ethnic origin’4 (Kamusella 2012b). The Russkii Mir ideology expands the latter meaning (Rossiiskii) to all Russkii and non-Russkii (native) Russian speakers living outside today’s Russia. In 2014, this ideological claim was underwritten by the Duma (Russian Parliament), which passed an act that offers fast-track Russian citizenship to all (‘native’) Russian speakers (Gosduma 2014). In Russian, such a (‘native’) Russian speaker is often denoted with the collocation russkoiazychny sootechestvennik, literally ‘Russian-speaking compatriot.’ In the current legal sense, as employed in the Russian Federation, the term sootechestvennik (‘compatriot’) means ‘all former Soviet citizens and their descendants.’ Importantly, with the removal of the term ‘Soviet’ (Sovietskii) from present-day Russian law, it was firmly replaced with the adjective Rossiiskii rather than Russkii (Sootchestvenniki 2017). In the context of Russia’s continuing ideological and military attack on Ukraine since 2014, the discussion on the dichotomy of Russkii and Rossiiskii is not an internal Russian matter.6 The adjective Russkii is derived from the adjectival form of the name of the medieval polity of Rus’, nowadays usually known under the scholarly name of Kyivan Rus’, because its capital was located at Kyiv. At present, this city serves as the capital of Ukraine. In Greek, which was the official language of the (East) Roman Empire (‘Byzantine Empire’) after the 8th century, Rus’ was known as Ros. Because Constantinople was then the center of the Orthodox Christian world, Greek was seen as the language of the highest cultural and political prestige in Orthodox Muscovy. When in 1547 the Grand Duke of Muscovy adopted the title of tsar (‘king’ or ‘emperor’), the polity’s name was changed to Rosia in official (Church) Slavonic, in line with the prestigious Greek usage. Meanwhile, the original term Rus’ (or Ruś in Polish) was used to refer to the western half of the original Rus’ lands that found themselves in the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth. Likewise, the vernacular Slavic official language of the Commonwealth’s Grand Duchy of Lithuania (in four-fifths composed of the Rus’ lands) was named Ruski (Ruthenian in Latin) in this language and Polish and later also Rus’ki(i) in Ruthenian. This linguonym was derived directly from the name of Rus’. In 1721, Peter the Great changed his realm’s name to Rossiiskaia

Russian as a pluricentric language 149 Imperiia. In this collocation, the Greek in its origin Slavic term Rosia for Rus’ was  paired with the Latin (Western European) word Imperium for ‘empire,’ rendered in Cyrillic-based Slavic transcription as Imperiia. The codification of the Russian language on the Western European model commenced in the 18th century, aiming to remove (Church) Slavonic from the official  Soviet Term

Post-1991 Russian English Term Translation nation {group of people; not a state}

Natsiia natsionalnost’

{the state of an ethnic group,

belonging to nation}

nationality5 {the state of belonging to a nation [that is, group of people, not state]; {not citizenship}],

increasingly {developed, nationality {ethnic synonymous meaning group [not with narodnost’, ‘industrialized, nation] with bourgeois’ ethnic meaning an ethnic no right to group or nation group/nation in statehood} {with no right to the SU} statehood} increasingly nationality in the ‘citizenship’ by meaning of parallel with the citizenship English use of ‘nationality’ mezhnatsional’ny

interethnic {between ethnic groups}, Soviet period; international {between states, including postSoviet states}, after 1991

Organizatsiia Ob’’edinenykh Natsii

United Nations {an organization of states}

Narod

nation {group of people, not state} a people

Figure 6c   Comparison  of  the  semantic  fields  of  selected  Soviet,  Russian  and  English  political terms

150

Russian as a pluricentric language

Soviet Term narodnost’

Post-1991 Russian English Term Translation ethnic group,

nation {with no right nationality {group to statehood} of people [not {underdeveloped, meaning nation] with ‘agricultural, feudal’ ethnic no right to group/nation in the SU} statehood} mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia

international relations {between states}

Russkii {ethnic Russians, that is, [culturally] Orthodox Slavophones} Russian Rossiiskii = Sovietskii [Soviet] {all Soviet citizens, despite their different ethnic  [linguistic, confessional, racial and other] origins}

Rossiiskii = russkoiazychny sootechestvennik [Russian-speaking  compatriot] {all native Russian  speakers, former Soviet citizens and their descendants in all the post-Soviet states and Israel}

Gosudarstvo

state

Grazhdanstvo

citizenship [in English usually expressed by the  term ‘nationality’]

Figure 6c (Continued)

use  in  Russia’s  state  administration. This  new  language  in  the  making  became  known as Rossiiskii in Russian, the linguonym derived from the state’s name of  Rossiia. In the Rus’ lands in Poland-Lithuania, the employment of the terms Rus’  and Rus’kii in Ruthenian and Ruś and Ruski in Polish continued. After the partitions of Poland-Lithuania in the late 18th century, both terms were preserved in  the Rus’ lands that found themselves in the Austrian and Russian partition zones.  However, in the latter partition zone, following the 1830–1831 uprising of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility against the Tsar, Polish was replaced by Russian as the  region’s official language during the latter half of the 1830s. Ostensibly, the law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was employed to justify  this decision, because the polity’s 16th-century code of law, namely the Lithuanian Statute, specified Rus’kii as the Grand Duchy’s official language. Furthermore, in official Russian administrative practice, the Russian name of the Russian 

Russian as a pluricentric language 151 language gradually changed: in the mid 1830s, it was Rossiiskii, and in the mid 1840s, it gradually became Russkii. The aim of this onomastic change was to emphasize the ideologically sought equation between the Grand Duchy’s thenstill-prestigious Ruthenian language and Russia’s upcoming Rossiiskii language. The subsequent conflation of the linguonym Rus’kii with Rossiiskii yielded the form Russkii as the Russian name of the Russian language. In the process the palatalization, [‘] was dropped and the [s] in Rus’kii was doubled in line with Russian phonemic and spelling patterns. As a result, the correspondence between the name of the state and its language was decisively decoupled. To this day, Russia remains Rossiia in Russian, but the name of the country’s official language is Russkii. On the other hand, within the boundaries of the Russian Empire the speech of Ruthenian speakers in what today is Belarus, and central and eastern Ukraine became known in official Russian terminology as ‘dialects’ (narecha). The nareche of the area corresponding to present-day Belarus was dubbed Belorusskii (‘White Russian’) and that of Russia’s Ukrainian lands Maloros(s)iis’kii, Maloru(s)s’kii (‘Little Russian’) or even Ros(s)iis’kii. In reciprocation, Belarusian-speaking national activists sometimes referred to the Russian language as Maskalska (Muscovian) and their Ukrainian counterparts as Moskovs’ka (Muscovian). In presentday Belarusian, Russian is known as Rasiejskaja, and in present-day Ukrainian, it is known as Rosiis’ka. Hence, in the wake of the change of the Russian name of the Russian language from Rossiiskii to Russkii, the former linguonym was partly adopted for referring to (Little) Ruthenian (present-day Ukrainian) within the Russian Empire, while Ruthenian speakers and their present-day descendants (i.e., Belarusian and Ukrainian speakers) have consistently continued to refer to Russian by using the linguonym Rossiiskii, as modified in accordance with the phonemic and spelling standards of Belarusian and Ukrainian. The same is true of former Poland-Lithuania’s main official language, Polish, in which Russian was known as Rossyjski(j) in the 19th century, before the modern term Rosyjski was codified. The Rossiiskii-based correspondence between the names of Russia and the Russian language is maintained in Belarusian, Polish and Ukrainian, the country known, respectively, as Rasieja, Rosja and Rosiia. Hence, in the cultural memory preserved in the Slavic Einzelsprachen of former PolandLithuania, the name of Russia and its official language are still Rossiia and Rossiiskii, while the terms Rus’ and Rus’an (Ruski) are reserved for medieval Rus’ and former Poland-Lithuania’s Rus’ lands. Nowadays, the latter are located mostly in Belarus, eastern Poland and Ukraine. At the turn of the 20th century, Ukrainian national activists adopted the novel name of Ukrainian (Ukrains’ka in Ukrainian), to clearly distinguish it at the terminological level from Russian.7 Another reason for this change was that in Austria-Hungary’s Galicia Ukrainian was officially known as (Little) Ruthenian (Ruthenisch in German, Ruski or Rusiński in Polish and Rus’ ki(i) in Ukrainian) and as Little Russian (Malorossiis’kii) in Russia. Hence, the single linguonym of Ukrainian as designed for both varieties usefully emphasized that the variously named Ukrainian language was (to be) a single national Einzelsprache of the Ukrainian nation in making. The choice of the name of Ukrainian was set in

152  Russian as a pluricentric language stone in the Soviet Union, where the full correspondence was introduced between the name of the language (Ukrainian), the nation (Ukrainians) and their homeland (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic). The now-obsolete ethnonym Rusini for the Ukrainians and Rusiński for their language survived in interwar Poland against the Ukrainians’ ardent wishes. Warsaw used these names, first of all, for differentiating Ukrainians living in Poland from those living in the Soviet Union and, second, for the sake of forced Polonization of the country’s largest minority of five million. Nowadays, when the Russo-Ukrainian war continues, it is not uncommon to hear an opinion in Ukraine that the rulers of Russia (Rossiia) unilaterally appropriated the name Russkii for denoting their country’s language and nation (both formerly known as Rossiiskii). However, this ethnonym and linguonym had originally been the name of the Ukrainians (Rusini) and their language (Ruski)8 (Farion 2015: 185–200, 210–216; Historyia 2018; Kamusella 2009: 177; Kamusella 2012b; Nastoiashchii 2012; Nazva 2018). The entailed tacit threat of a steel fist of hard military power (i.e., the Russian army and the 1990s Russia’s ‘hard’ geopolitical concept of near abroad) in the kid glove of soft power of culture (as embodied by the Russkii Mir ideology) is that the Kremlin reserves for itself the right of intervention in areas and states where large Russophone communities exist. The Russian government will not hesitate to ‘help the oppressed Russian-speaking community’ should a ‘host country’ act, from Moscow’s perspective, against the interests of such a community or of Russia itself. These Russian-speaking communities are construed as inalienable parts of the single and indivisible speech community of the Russian language. Nowadays all the speakers of the Russian language are defined as the Russian nation in light of the neoimperial and ethnolinguistic ideology of Russkii Mir that builds on the earlier post-Soviet concept of Russia’s ‘near abroad’ (Il’inskii 2010: 36). All the members of the Russian speech community are imagined as speaking the very same monocentric (unitary) Russian language – despite the fact that they live in different states with their specific and often vastly different social, political, economic, ethnic, linguistic and other realities of everyday life. For now, this thinly veiled threat – cloaked in the veneer of the presumed soft power of the Russkii Mir ideology – works rather well. It keeps the cultural, linguistic, social and economic unity of the Kremlin-postulated ‘Russian World’ with Russia as its cultural, political, economic and decisional center. The sharp edge of this geopolitical threat posed by the Russkii Mir ideology is either sweetened with cheap oil and gas (as in the case of Belarus) or put to work when Russian troops are dispatched to attack a ‘misbehaving’ country, such as Moldova in 1992, Georgia in 2008 or currently (post-2014) Ukraine. From the perspective of the aforementioned ideology, such countries may appear to be ‘stranded’ or ‘unjustifiably secessionist’ regions of ‘real Russia,’ often equated with the Soviet Union or even with the Russian Empire (cf Baburin 2013; Panteleev 2008; Putin 2005). For better or worse, Russian is construed as a monocentric language, where the Russian Academy of Sciences in the Russian capital of Moscow is the language’s sole controlling institution. This insistence on the monocentric (unitary)

Russian as a pluricentric language 153 9th–14th c.

Rus’

Lingounyms 14th–18th c.

Rus’an in Slavic Grand Duchy of Lithuania, PolandLithuania

Linguonyms 1795–mid 1830s

Rus(’)ki(i) in Ruthenian, Ruski in Polish Galicia, Austrian Rossiiskaia Imperiia Empire Russian Partition zone Muscovian lands Rus(’)ki(i) in Rossiiskii in Russian, Ruthenisch in Ruthenian, Ruski in Rossyjski(j) in Polish German Polish

Linguonyms 1840s–1860s 1870s–1914

Great War

Linguonyms

1922–1939 Linguonyms World War II

Linguonyms 1945–1991 Linguonyms

1991–today Linguonyms

Ros in Greek Muscovy/Rosia (since 1574)/Rossiiskaia Imperiia (since 1721) Rossiiskii in Russian

Ruthenisch in Maloros(s)iis’kii, Russkii and German, Ruski Maloru(s)s’kii, Velikorusskii (Great or Rusiński Ros(s)iis’kii in Russian) in Russian in Polish, Russian Rus(’)ki(i) in Ukrainian Galicia, Austrian Austro-Hungarian and Rossiiskaia Empire/ German occupation/ Imperiia/Russian Ukraine Ukraine Republic (Rossiiskaia Respublika)/ Bolshevik Russia (Rossiia) Ukrainian (Ukrains’ka in Ukrainian; Russkii in Russian, mostly & increasingly) Maskalska in Belarusian, Rosyjski in Polish, Moskovs’ka in Ukrainian Poland Soviet Union Ukrainian SSR Rusiński in Polish Ukrainian (Ukrains’ka) German occupation Russkii in Russian (Rasiejskaja, in Belarusian, Rosiis’ka in Ukrainian) Ukrainian (Ukrains’ka) Soviet Union Ukrainian SSR Ukrainian (Ukrains’ka) Russkii in Russian (Rasiejskaja, in Belarusian, Rosiis’ka in Ukrainian) Ukraine Russian Federation Ukrainian (Ukrains’ka in Ukrainian, Russkii in Russian Ukraiński in Polish, Ukrainskii in Russian)

Figure 6d Linguonym Rus(s)ki(i) and Rossiiskii between Rus’, Poland-Lithuania, Muscovy, Russian Empire, Austria-Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union, Ukraine and the Russian Federation (thus far)

154  Russian as a pluricentric language Official/national language

Official/national language in de facto states

States with Language of wider considerable communication Russophone speech communities Estonia, Israel, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Abkhazia, Donetsk Latvia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, People’s Republic, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Ukraine Georgia, Lugansk People’s Russian, Tajikistan, [6] Mongolia* Republic, Turkmenistan, [4] South Ossetia, Uzbekistan Transnistria [7] [5] Figure 6e Use of Russian worldwide

* italicization denotes states that were never part of the Soviet Union

character of Russian is a direct legacy of Central Europe’s ethnolinguistic nationalism, which equates languages with nations and states (in accordance with the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state). To a degree, this ideology only appears to stand at variance with the present-day Russian Federation’s neoimperial program. But in reality, the Kremlin’s ‘Russian World’ has quite successfully married Moscow’s territorial ambitions of regaining some parts of the Soviet Union that – in Moscow’s view – post-Soviet Russia lost ‘unjustifiably’ (e.g., Crimea or Transnitria) with the idea of an ethnolinguistically defined Russian nation, which is spatially bigger than the territory of the present-day Russian Federation. And the Russian nation reimagined in such a manner keeps ‘growing’ in spatial terms, so that a ‘big chunk’ of it now resides in Israel, potentially giving the Kremlin an ‘ideologically justified’ foothold in the Middle East. Interestingly, not much attention seems to be paid – either in Russia or elsewhere – to the fact that this recent push for the ethnolinguistic definition of the Russian nation within the framework of the ideology of the ‘Russian World’ may be harmful to the social cohesion and eventually to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation itself (cf Marusenko 2015: 154–170). In the country’s autonomous republics, at least 26 languages are employed in official capacity (Abaza, Adyghe, Altai, Bashkir, Buryat, Chechen, Cherkess, Chuvash, Crimean Tatar, Erzya, Ingush, Kabardian, Kalmyk, Karachay-Balkar, Khakas, Komi, Hill Mari, Meadow Mari, Moksha, Nogai, Ossetic, Tatar, Tuvan, Udmurt, Ukrainian and Yakut) (Languages of Russia 2017). This fact is rarely commented on, because the multiplicity of Russia’s official languages has been given a semblance of scriptal homogeneity since the Duma’s 2002 decision that Russia’s all official languages native to the country’s territory must be written in Cyrillic (Faller 2011: 132–133). In turn, this script is popularly construed as the ‘Russian alphabet’ and often equated with the Russian language itself (Ponomareva 2002), Russia and nowadays the ‘Russian World’ (cf Bukarskii 2016: 610).

Russian as a pluricentric language 155 However, from the perspective of ethnolinguistic nationalism, each of these aforementioned 26 speech communities may potentially leave the Rossiiskii cultural-cum-political commonality, redefine itself as a nation in its own right, and even demand full independence for their republic, thus recast as a nation-state in its own right (cf Marusenko 2015: 171–201). Actually, that was exactly what the Chechens did during the 1990s. In reply to the Chechens’ demand of national selfdetermination for their nation and of independence for their national republic, the Kremlin visited on them the two horrific Russo-Chechen wars (1994–1996 and 1999–2000). This military conflict seriously destabilized Russia and its economy and cost the lives of one-fifth of Chechnia’s population. It was a clear act of genocide, which after 2001 was conveniently forgotten by the international community when Russia joined the United States’ campaign of ‘global war on terror’ (Abumuslimov 1995; Gilligan 2010; Zherebtsova 2014). When different countries use the same language of worldwide communication, they do not see their populations as constituting a single nation. Usually, the political boundaries of the states, their histories and the desires of these countries’ specific bodies politic decide what a nation is or should be, not the mere accident of a language. When the same word in states sharing a single (world) language is pronounced or spelled differently, the fact does not constitute any political or ideological scandal. Such an occurrence may not amount to a reason for diplomatic or – let alone – military intervention, unlike the case of ethnolinguistic nation-states. In the case of world (pluricentric) languages, the descriptive principle of usage-based (grassroots, generated from below) correctness is applied not at the level of the entire language, but on the spatially limited plane of the actual use which is typical for the speakers of this language in question in a given state (i.e., one of many polities). Again, on the contrary, Central Europe’s monocentric national languages are controlled and regulated from above in their entirety, following the prescriptive approach practiced in the region’s ethnolinguistically defined and legitimized nation-states. A world language regulated differently and independently in different countries is pluricentric in its character. In other words, there are many centers of its use, identified with different states where this language is employed in official capacity. A specific spelling or pronunciation may be correct in country A, incorrect in country B, or just second best in country C (Clyne 1992; Clyne and Kipp 1999; Muhr 2016a; Muhr 2016b; Muhr and Marley 2015). Arabic, English or German are examples of such pluricentric languages. ‘Flavor’ is generally correct in US English but incorrect in UK English, where the word is spelled ‘flavour.’ ‘Wee’ is a Scotticism in England’s English, but a typical synonym for the adjective ‘small’ in Scottish English. ‘You’ is the singular second person and plural second person pronoun in UK English, but only the former in Irish English, whereas the latter meaning is expressed in Irish English with the separate word of ‘yous.’ Pluricentric languages shared by many states are typically de-ethnicized, meaning that the language in question is not a marker of one’s belonging to a nation or being a citizen of state X. Atypically, Russian is the sole large language of worldwide communication shared by many states,

156  Russian as a pluricentric language which is (still?) considered not to be pluricentric or de-ethnicized. But having recognized the sociolinguistic dynamics of this plural reality of ‘world Russians’ on the ground, monocentric Russian can be reimagined as a pluricentric language. The English language continues to exist as a single Einzelsprache despite the widely accepted and well-established acknowledgment of the existence of ‘world Englishes’ (plural) (cf Hopkins, Decker and McKenny 2013). On the ideological grounds of the Russkii Mir ideology, Moscow may disagree to such a change in the perception of the Russian language. But in this modern world of sovereign nation-states, Russia’s consent in this regard is not essential. Countries where Russian is employed for official purposes or where substantial Russophone communities live may unilaterally recognize the territorial and cultural specificity of the countries’ respective Russians – that is, Russian languages (plural). At present, in computer menus, one can choose from many countryspecific varieties of English as an input language. The same is also true of Arabic and German, but not so in the case of Russian, which comes in these menus as a single option with no country-specific variants. Computers, software and computer menus are humanmade, products of human will and ingenuity, like nations, states and languages themselves. None of these foregoing enumerated artifacts exists in nature – that is, independently of human will. Thus, should people and governments in the countries where Russian is employed for official and other purposes decide so, they may commission

Figure 6f Screenshot of a computer menu indicating different country-specific Englishes as input languages

Russian as a pluricentric language 157

Figure 6g Screenshot of a computer menu indicating that Russian is treated as a single monocentric input language with no country-specific variants

dictionaries and grammars of their own state-specific Russian languages, be it Abkhazian Russian, Belarusian Russian, Estonian Russian, Kyrgyzstan Russian, Lithuanian Russian, Mongolian Russian, Turkmenistan Russian or Ukrainian Russian. The difference vis-à-vis Russia’s Russian does not have to be substantial. At best, it should reflect the actual differences in usage among the states where Russian is either widespread in everyday communication or employed in official use. Typically, this difference can be anything between 20 and 200-odd words and phrases pertaining to the cultural and institutional specificity of a given country, which is the case of Austrian German when contrasted with Germany’s German. If there is such a need, the difference may be acknowledged (cherished) more emphatically or even actively deepened by extending it to pronunciation, spelling or syntax, such as in the case of Indian English vis-à-vis US English. The decision, however, should belong alone to the population concerned in a given country where Russian is important, not to Russia. London never leans on Delhi or Washington to declare by fiat that users of Indian English or US English accept

158  Russian as a pluricentric language this or that ‘correct’ spelling of a word, as employed in British English (Rusiecki 1994). Such an intervention would be at best laughed at. But interventions of this kind happen in Russian, where in this age of the flourishing Russkii Mir ideology, Moscow may choose to address a ‘politically significant linguistic matter’ of this kind by exerting political or even economic pressure on a ‘culprit state’ guilty of ‘ruining our Russian language.’ Should Abkhazian Russian, Belarusian Russian, Estonian Russian, Kyrgyzstan Russian, Lithuanian Russian, Mongolian Russian, Turkmenistan Russian or Ukrainian Russian be seriously considered and introduced into educational and administrative use, alongside books and newspapers, certainly computer and software providers would swiftly reply in kind, in spite of any reservations that Moscow might raise in this regard. Drop-down menus with country-specific Russians would materialize in no time, such as the following: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Russian (Armenia) Russian (Azerbaijan) Russian (Belarus) Russian (Estonia) Russian (Finland) Russian (Georgia) Russian (Israel) Russian (Kazakhstan) Russian (Kyrgyzstan) Russian (Latvia) Russian (Lithuania) Russian (Lithuania) Russian (Moldova) Russian (Mongolia) Russian (Russian Federation) Russian (Turkmenistan) Russian (Ukraine) Russian (Uzbekistan)

And why not? Some would say ‘it’s impossible,’ because neither Russia nor Russophones outside the Russian Federation want such a development. But don’t they, or maybe it is the over-advertised neoimperial Russkii Mir discourse on the monolithic unity and homogeneity of Russian language, culture, statehood, geopolitics and even ‘destiny’ that effectively overshadows a vibrant discussion on world Russians (plural) that has developed since the turn of the 1980s? In the Soviet Union, the discussion on the use of Russian clearly distinguished two lines of research on the language’s areal differentiation. The traditional one focused on the dialects of the Russian language seen as coterminous with the historical ethnolinguistic territory of the (Great) Russian (i.e., Russkii) nation, extending from Pskov and Smolensk in the west (or Russia’s present-day western frontier with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus) to Nizhny Novgorod

Russian as a pluricentric language 159 and Voronezh in the east (or the former boundary between Rus’ and the Golden Horde) and from Karelia in the north (or the former northernmost reaches of the Novgorod Republic) to Belgorod in the south (or the present-day Russia–Ukraine border). Importantly, the region of St. Petersburg is not included in the traditional territory of the Russian dialects, because Muscovy seized from Sweden this UgroFinnic-speaking region of Ingria only at the turn of the 18th century. St. Petersburg began to be built there in 1703, and nine years later, the Muscovian (Russian) capital was moved from Moscow to this new city on the Baltic littoral (Avanesov and Orlova 1964; Map 2018 [1964]). In the Soviet thinking on Russian, Ingria and other parts of the former Russian Empire were seen through the prism of the discipline of philology9 (linguistics) as areas where the Russian language was brought only during the modern period. This process took place over the course of the imperial extension from the aforementioned traditional (Russkii) area of the Russian dialects. Hence, imperial and post-imperial forms of Russian in this imperial-cum-Soviet-cum–postSoviet space are seen rather as ‘territorial variants’ (territorial’nyi variant) – that is, varieties – of the language than its dialects. In contrast to the Russkii area of the Russian dialects, the imperial space of the Russian territorial variants is seen as Rossiiskii in its character. The imperial venture gradually detached the Russian language from its traditional Russkii ethnocultural territorial core, associated with Muscovy’s Orthodox Slavophone population, and imposed it on non-Russkii ethnically and religiously diversified population(s) of the Rossiiskii Empire. In a nutshell, that was how Russian was de-ethnicized and became a large language of international communication. The building of the Russian Empire also affected the change in the Russian name of the Russian language. It was known as Rossiiskii through the 1830s, and afterward, this linguonym was changed to Russkii. However, until the Bolshevik Revolution, the imperial character of the Russian language was emphasized by the official term Velikorusskii (‘Great Russian’) language. In addition, this concept retroactively extended the traditional dialectal area of the (Great) Russian language to the empire’s Slavophone western borderlands (okrainy [Kamusella 2018c]), nowadays largely coterminous with Belarus and Ukraine. In the past, the aforementioned Slavophone okrainy were included within the frontiers of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, or the eastern half of Poland-Lithuania. In the late 18th century, this early modern polity was erased from the political map of Europe over the course of three consecutive partitions, carried out jointly by Russia, Prussia and the Habsburgs (Dialektologicheskaia 1914; Kamusella 2012b) Research on the Rossiiskii (or then synonymously known as ‘Soviet’) territorial varieties of the Russian language had already begun in the Soviet Union (Ivanov 1980). An impetus came from among Soviet scholars who probed into the areal (territorial) differentiation of French and German as employed in numerous states. At the turn of the 1990s, (post-)Soviet researchers also transplanted the German term Regiolekt (‘regiolect,’ ‘regional lect’ or ‘regional language,’ which is synonymous with the German term Regionalsprache) into Russian academese as regiolekt (Regiolekt 2018; Turbinskii 1992). The new Russian neologism

160  Russian as a pluricentric language regiolekt is employed as a synonym for the aforementioned Russian term variant (Regionalnye 2018). When the Soviet Union split, its former union republics became nation-states in their own right. More often than not, the successor states copied the Central European model of ethnolinguistic national polity. As a result, some scholars proposed that in this situation it was high time to speak of ‘national varieties’ of the Russian language (Rudiakov 2010; Zhuravleva 2005), including their codification and standardization for official use in the post-Soviet states (cf Korngauz 2013: 10). However, other scholars disagreed and continued denying this possibility or necessity, claiming that so far no Russophone population living outside Russia has evolved into an ethnolinguistically defined nation that has become (ethnically or otherwise) separate from the ethnolinguistically defined Russian nation (Stepanov 2010). This strain of the discourse also dates back to the Soviet period, when the possibility of other state (national) varieties of the Russian language was a priori denied in favor of the ‘imminent coalescence’ (sliianie) of all the Soviet peoples (narody) into a single and unified Soviet communist classless nation (natsiia) or people (narod) (Mikhailov 1988: 47; Sinitsin 2018). Hence, especially in the Russian Federation during this current age of the Russkii Mir ideology, the old Soviet normative opinion that only one alwaysunified monocentric variety of the Russian language, namely the Russian one, or Russia’s Russian, be allowed remains rife. Many believe that the maintenance of the monocentric unity of the Russian language – so that it continues to consist of a single variant only – is a geopolitical necessity. Present-day Russia’s political and intellectual elite concur (Rudiakov 2010: 51, 70), including President Vladimir Putin (Putin 2016), who made this belief into the foundation of the Kremlin’s foreign politics during the past decade. This foundation is none other than the Russkii Mir ideology. Not surprisingly, the eponymous Russkii Mir Foundation is strongly opposed to acknowledging (let alone recognizing) different state varieties of the Russian language (Serov 2017). Such varieties are deemed to be mainly a symptom of the insufficient command of this language or a lack of appropriate care and correctness in usage, which must be mitigated by improved education (Lekant 2015). Others present a more objective approach to the subject, proposing that users and states concerned will decide in the future whether varieties of Russian should be seen as regional (territorial) or national (state specific) (cf Kamusella 2019b). The latter case is bound to necessitate official recognition and a given state’s support for such a variety, while in the former case, any emerging difference would not be recognized (let alone encouraged) in a formal manner (Terkulov 2012). The previous imperial discussion on the historical dialects and territorial varieties of the Great Russian language seems to underpin the current discourse on the national varieties of Russian (yet with no conscious reflection on how the former influences the latter). Hence, in the Russian Federation and among proRussian scholars is much normative opposition to recognizing as national the state varieties of Russian in the ‘traditional dialect area’ of Great Russian, namely the Belarusian, Estonian, Finnish, Kazakhstani, Latvian, Lithuanian, Moldovan and Ukrainian varieties of Russian. On the other end of the spectrum, one finds

Russian as a pluricentric language  161 territorial varieties of Russian inside Russia but outside the country’s historical dialectal area of this language – that is, in Siberia and the Far East. In literature, one can come across information on the Russian varieties of Siberia, the Far East and ‘Northern Russia’ (meaning, Russia’s section of Karelia) and of such cities as Ekaterinburg, Kursk, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Perm, Rostov, Saratov, St. Petersburg and Vologda (cf Bukrinskaia and Karamakova 2012; Oglezneva 2008; Regionalnye variant 2018). Yet little attention is paid to varieties of Russian within the Russian Federation, let alone to the clear possibility that with time each of the country’s current 22 autonomous republics could create and encourage their own specific respective ethnic (republican or even national) varieties of Russian (Republics 2018). Nowadays the discussion on the varieties of Russian – for better or worse – focuses on the possibility of the existence of the language’s state-specific variants, namely in the post-Soviet states. The developing discourse unfolds in conjunction or in opposition to the Russkii Mir ideology. As mentioned earlier, this ideology denies any state-specific varieties of Russian, sticking to the monocentric norm of the unitary Russian language. Scholars and some politicians outside Russia for one reason or another are more ready to acknowledge and even espouse the reality of state-specific differences in the use of Russian. The discussion is quite intensive on ‘Belarusian Russian’ (Dem’ianovich 2014; Norman 2010; Sloboda

National varieties inside the dialectal core of Great Russian

National varieties outside the dialectal core of Great Russian

Ethnic (potentially national) varieties inside Russia’s autonomous republics

Belarusian & Trasianka, Estonian, Finnish, Kazakh (Kazakhstani), Latvian, Lithuanian, Moldovan, Russian, Ukrainian & Surzhyk [10]

Armenian, Azeri (Azerbaijani), Georgian, Israeli, Kyrgyz (Kyrgyzstani), Russian, Tajik (Tajkistani), Uzbek (Uzbekistani) [8]

Adygea, Altai, Bashkortostan, Buryatia, Chechnia, Chuvashia, Crimea,10 Dagestan, Ingushetia, KabardinoBalkaria, Kalmykia, Karachay – Cherkessia, Karelia, Khakassia, Komi, Mari El, Mordovia, North Ossetia – Alania, Sakha, Tatarstan, Tuva, Udmurtia [22]

Territorial (nonethnic, regional) varieties inside Russia but outside the historical dialectal core of Great Russian Ekaterinburg, Far Eastern, Kursk, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Northern Russian, Novosibirsk, Perm, Rostov, Saratov, Siberian, St. Petersburg, or Vologda [13 & counting]

Figure 6h Potential state-specific, territorial and ethnic varieties of Russian as a pluricentric language

162  Russian as a pluricentric language 2009: 22; Zhvalevskii 2010), ‘Estonian Russian’ (Professor 2016; Strakov 2016; Zabrodskaja 2006), ‘Latvian Russian’ (Berdicevskis 2014; Bobrikova 2005; Nash 2005), ‘Lithuanian Russian’ (Avina 2006; Osipov 2014; Zverko 2014), ‘Kazakh (Kazakhstani) Russian’ (Dzhundubaeva 2016; Zhumabekova and Mirozoeva 2015: 51; Zhuravleva 2012), ‘Moldovan Russian’ (Lekant 2015; Serov 2017; Tudose 2006) and ‘Ukrainian Russian’ (Kazdobina 2017; Pugovskii 2014; Rudiakov 2008; Simferopol’ 2009; Stepanov 2013: 219) – in other words, on the statespecific varieties within the so-called ‘Great Russian’ dialectal area. The intensity of this discussion reflects Moscow’s increasingly heightened claim to this vast area for the ‘cultural’ core of the ‘Russian World.’ The post-Soviet countries concerned, with time, will loudly express their disagreement and opposition to such an unwanted outside imposition, as we might expect. The discussion is rounded up with a deepened reflection on ‘Russia’s own state-specific (that is, Russkii or Rossiiskii) Russian’ (Berdicevskis 2014; Mikhailov 1988: 47; Rudiakov 2010: 51, 70; Terkulov 2012) and the unexpected phenomenon of ‘Israeli Russian’ (Elenevskaia and Ovchinnikova 2015: 231; GS 2011; Nosonovskii 2017), alongside the sociolinguistic and political status of Surzhyk in Ukraine (Bilaniuk 2004; Hentschel and Zaprudski 2008; Hentschel, Taranenko and Zaprudski 2014) and of Trasianka in Belarus (Hentschel and Zaprudski 2008; Hentschel, Taranenko and Zaprudski 2014). Decisively less attention is paid to state-specific varieties in other post-Soviet states with relatively tiny native (L1) Russian-speaking communities who live there. Russian is employed in these polities predominantly as a de-ethnicized foreign (second, L2) language of wider communication, nowadays frequently in direct competition with English, which fulfills the same function. The Kremlin does not claim these countries for the cultural-cum-political core of the ‘Russian World,’ since their membership in the Russia-led Eurasian Union is deemed sufficient (only Georgia stays away). Hence, the populations and elites of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are less interested in discussing or developing their own respective varieties of Russian: ‘Armenian Russian’ (Grigorian 2006: 21; Lekant 2015), ‘Azeri (Azerbaijani) Russian’ (Kaushanskii and Mamedov 2009; Novyi 2007), ‘Georgian Russian’ (Chernorechenski 2012; Khramov 2016; Oteli 2017), ‘Kyrgyz (Kyrgyzstani) Russian’11 (Russkii iazyk 2013), ‘Tajik (Tajikistani) Russian’ (Logicheskuiu 2015), ‘Turkmen (Turkmenistani) Russian’ (Azymov, Ershova and Bailiev 1991) and ‘Uzbek (Uzbekistani) Russian’ (Avrukinesque 2007; Shafranskaia 2009; Tashkentskii 2017). In Russophone literature, these state-specific varieties of Russian are rarely referred in these terms, while the older imperial and Soviet usage is preferred, namely construing the aforesaid varieties as ‘Russian dialects’ of these polities’ capitals. Hence, some scholars and commentators refer to the Russian dialects of Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, Bishkek, Dushanbe, Ashghabat and Tashkent. The typical approach to the questions – whether Russian is a monocentric or pluricentric language, whether only Russia has the right to ‘own’ and control it, or whether maybe this privilege should be shared at least with all the interested postSoviet states and Israel – was initially quite lukewarm. This decisively changed in

Russian as a pluricentric language  163 the mid 2010s. The visible change in attitudes is directly connected to the failed 2012 referendum on the introduction of Russian as a co-official language in Latvia (Druviete and Ozolins 2016) and to the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych (Ianukovych) administration in Ukraine, which attempted to introduce Russian as a co-official language in this country. Many Ukrainians feared that the Belarusian scenario would be repeated (though some, of non-national or pro-Russian attitudes, would welcome it, especially in eastern Ukraine and Crimea). The 1995 introduction of Russian as ‘equal and co-official’ in Belarus marginalized this country’s national and state language of Belarusian. For instance, now under 10 percent of the book titles produced in this country are published in Belarusian (Moser 2014; Tol’ki 2012). Opponents of this policy proposed that instead of according such a status to Russian in Ukraine, a ‘Ukrainian Russian’ should be acknowledged and developed as different (Ausbau-ed) from Russia’s Russian. Scholarly research on the Ukrainian variety of the Russian language commenced in 2008 (Rudiakov 2008). At the turn of the 2010s, the emergence of Ukrainian Russian became widely recognized. In turn, proponents of monocentric Russian with its cultural center in Moscow and St. Petersburg disagree with and oppose the coalescence of Ukrainian Russian (Aleksandr 2010). The discussion on Ukrainian Russian grew even more polarized and divisive in the wake of the 2013–2014 (Euromaidan) Revolution of Dignity. This Revolution toppled President Yanukovych and thus reverted the process of making Russian into a co-official, but rather the de facto dominant, language in Ukraine. The balance of public opinion in favor of Ukrainian Russian was tipped decisively by Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the Russian attack, in the same year, on eastern Ukraine, which produced the de facto polities of the Donetsk (Donets’k) People’s Republic and of the Lugansk (Luhansk) People’s Republic. The RussoUkrainian War rages to this day (2021). Most consented that a Ukrainian standard of the Russian language must be adopted through law in Ukraine and should be developed separately from Russia’s Russian (Belokobil’skii 2016; Grabovskii 2016; Hrabovskii 2016; Koshman 2014; Neobkhodimo 2014). Already in 2015, a petition to this end was submitted to the Office of the President of Ukraine (Mel’nyk 2015). Many Russophones, despite their loyalty to the Ukrainian nation, began to fear that in a single generation, Russian would become a ‘kitchen language’ in Ukraine. Perhaps, in this manner, they tacitly acknowledge that this is the unenviable position of Ukrainian as a minority language in present-day Russia (Gusev 2017). The discourse on the status of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian Russian became politicized to the point of the ideological denigration of the Russian language. For instance, some proposed that the Ukrainian language is older than the Russian language (Ukrains’ka 2017), that Russian actually originated from Ukrainian (equated with Rus’an) (Ukrains’ke 2015), and that Russian is nothing more than a ‘distorted dialect’ of the Ukrainian language (Ptashka 2015). Finally, such emotional flare-ups gave way to more-balanced views. For example, some maintain – quite sensibly – that neither is Russian a dialect of Ukrainian nor is Ukrainian a dialect of Russian. The Ukrainians and the Russians are separate

164  Russian as a pluricentric language nations in their own right, and as such, they also have the inalienable right to their own separate languages of equal status as national and official Einzelsprachen, including Ukrainian Russian in Ukraine and Russian Russian in the Russian Federation (Lypchanskyi 2017). On a more worrying note, after so much heated discussion on the subject, no legislation on Ukrainian Russian has been adopted in Ukraine to this day (2019), nor has any grammar or dictionary of Ukrainian Russian been produced yet. Hence, all the intensive discourse seems to be back at square one. This retreat does not augur well for overhauling Russian as employed outside the territory of the Russian Federation into an officially acknowledged pluricentric language. If Ukraine, under Russia’s continuing military attack, does not dare  – or its officials have no sufficient foresight  – to press on with this sociolinguistic-cum-political change, none of the other post-Soviet states will likely be ready to follow this path either (cf Kamusella 2019c). The codifiers and official (academic and state) controllers of both Ukrainian and Russian draw at the same North Slavic dialect continuum, shared with other nationstates’ official languages – that is, Belarusian, Czech, Polish and Slovak. Ideologies, scholarly concepts and theories, alongside political decisions – in other words, the aforementioned ‘filters-cum-shapers’ (see Figure 1r) used for producing and shaping Einzelsprachen – may be employed for dissecting a given chunk of a dialect continuum in several ways. The limit is the very boundaries of human imagination. Divisions imposed on a section of a dialect continuum (usually overlapping with the territory of an extant polity) are not set in stone, let alone provided by nature or any god. Each of these divisions is a result of a human decision (conscious or not), as carried out and maintained by a concerned human group, nowadays usually construed as a state (or a nation in its own national polity). The application of a certain ‘filter-cum-shaper’ for delimiting a fragment of a dialect continuum for the sake of creating an Einzelsprache may be a neutral act, not contested by neighboring human groups (i.e., states or speech communities, the latter often equated with nations in Central Europe). However, under different circumstances, it can also amount to an ideologized attack. For instance, in Central Europe, where the political logic of ethnolinguistic nationalism rules supreme, such an onslaught may be launched for the purpose of ‘justifying’ why a given language ‘is not a language’ at all. The stern denial of this kind typically entails branding an aspiring Einzelsprache as ‘a mere dialect’ of the national and official language of this nation-state that has launched this attack of ‘linguistic’ character. An example of a continuing ‘epistemic’ attack of this type is the still-widespread and persistent Russian idea that Belarusian and Ukrainian are ‘dialects’ of the (Great) Russian language. In a (neo)imperial manner, feelings and opinions of those concerned – that is, Belarusian speakers and Ukrainian speakers – are not taken into consideration. This disregard in the realm of matter linguistics is a metonymy for the Kremlin’s lack of respect for the sovereignty of the independent post-Soviet nation-states of Belarus and Ukraine. Conventionally, language is considered an instrument of ‘soft power,’ meaning that it is used for products of culture (fiction, theater, film or the mass media) or in the function of a medium of education (Nye 2004). But as in Ukraine, the

Russian as a pluricentric language  165 Yanukovych regime’s arbitrary course of giving more berth to the official use of Russian in the country directly contributed to the growing grassroots opposition that culminated in bloody repressions. In turn, the 2013–2014 Revolution of Dignity broke out and subsequently toppled the rapidly delegitimized Yanukovych administration. The laws that, under Yanukovych’s rule, boosted the official status of Russian in Ukraine were rescinded. This example proves that language may also be employed as a weapon in the arsenal of ‘hard power,’ once again the only limit in this regard is the human mind’s capacity for imagining and generating social reality (cf Kowalski 2015). The well-established cultural organizations of former imperial powers, such as the British Council, Goethe Institut, Alliance Française or the Instituto Cervantes traditionally were seen as a rather benign expression of the respective countries’ soft power (Nye 2004: 108–109), though some saw them as instruments of cultural or linguistic imperialism (cf Phillipson 1992; Thierfelder 1940; Tomlinson 1991). Branches of these organizations spread out all over the world, ostensibly to teach the former imperial languages of power and imperialism, now recast as languages of culture, cooperation and worldwide communication. Until recently, insufficient attention has been paid to the political package of values and convictions that is tacitly transmitted in this process, while the former imperial countries (so-called great powers) usually refrained from overemphasizing this package or turning it into an element of hard power (cf Burns 2013). Beijing and Moscow seem to have no problems with this transition from soft power to hard power in this regard. The two countries’ newly established counterparts of the aforementioned Western institutes of language and culture, namely the Confucius Institute and Russkii Mir,12 respectively, are unabashedly deployed also for hard-power ends (cf Chernyshuk 2014; Pong and Feng 2017; Sukhankin 2017; Volodzko 2015). This ongoing weaponization of language (cf Rybin 2018), culture, the social sciences and – by extension – social reality itself gave rise to the novel phenomenon of cyber war. In other words, soft power turned ‘rogue.’ What is more, a clear recognition of the military value of soft power technologized and enhanced through cyberspace actually allowed for deploying it on the battlefield, alongside conventional troops, cannons and tanks. This novel development yielded what is now known by the name of hybrid war. Since 2014, the Kremlin has simultaneously tested and waged such a hybrid war in eastern Ukraine (Fitzpatrick 2017; Forensic Architecture 2019; Nye 2017; Walker 2019; Yashin 2016) and deployed its trialed elements for action further afield – for instance, in Britain, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Syria (Grozev 2017; Goldsmith 2016; Kaszeta 2019; Skripal 2018). With the realization that thinking about the linguistic, alongside scholarly rationalizations and conceptualizations regarding it, has a clear sociopolitical dimension, the question arises whether limiting the conflictual potential of how ‘filters-cum-shapers’ are applied to the linguistic is possible. Of course, this is possible, because languages and thinking about them are part and parcel of social reality, which is generated and controlled by humans and their groups alone, not by nature or some divine presence. All depends, in this respect, on human will alone. In the case of the politics of the Russian language and its dialects, as

166  Russian as a pluricentric language discussed earlier, elements of the highest conflictual potential are two. The first one is the normative insistence – recently reinforced (i.e., politicized) by Russia’s official ideology of the Russkii Mir – on the monocentric character of the Russian language (equated, whenever of convenience for the Kremlin, with the Russian nation). The other element is the continuing division of the Russian dialects into two conceptually and normatively (or politically) separate categories, namely the ‘dialects of the traditional or imperial historical core’ of Russia (Muscovy) and (new) ‘territorial varieties’ as employed outside this core, across the territory of the former Russian Empire (or the Soviet Union). These territorial varieties were produced by the Russian and Soviet imperial expansion during some two or three last centuries. This expansion both brought the (Great) Russian language and extended the North Slavic dialect continuum to geographically vast and ethnically non-Slavic areas, mostly in Asia, along the northern Black Sea littoral and across the Caucasus. At present, Moscow treats Russian as a genuine language of international communication only in the post-Soviet states located in Asia and in the southern Caucasus. These states’ overwhelmingly non-Slavic, non-Slavophone and nonOrthodox populations speak and write the aforementioned ‘territorial varieties’ of Russian. However, in these areas, a reasonable command of this language tends to be limited to rather-narrow intellectual, political and economic elites. Apart from a handful of Russian-speaking ethnic Slavs, such non-Slavic L2 speakers of Russian do not see Russian as a potentially native or national language. A commonality with the Rossiiskii – let alone, Russkii – narod is hardly attractive or of any serious social or political interest to these elites and the population at large. These post-Soviet nation-states’ non-Slavic national-cum-official languages successfully constitute an ideological foundation for these polities’ specific ethnolinguistic nationalisms. Russian is not any competitor in this regard. The Kremlin accepts this sociopolitical reality, which is impossible to change without an outright annexation and a mass settlement campaign. At present, the Russian army is capable of a military action of this kind, but the Russian Federation’s being in demographic decline with its population rapidly aging and shrinking (DaVanzo and Adamson 1997), the country has no pool of prospective settlers of ethnic Russkii or firmly Rossiiskii background to flood any ‘newly reconquered’ lands. However, Moscow’s perception of sociopolitical reality filtered through the lens of language politics starkly differs in the case of the historical imperial core of (Great) Russian dialects. This core is equated with medieval (Kyivan) Rus’, nowadays commonly seen as ‘early Russia’ in Russian historiography and textbooks. In this extensive area, at present split among quite a few nation-states (Belarus, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, western [or ‘European’] Russia and Ukraine), Russian is spoken and written by Slavophones or linguistically Slavicized non-Slavs. They constitute a territorially compact block of speakers of a variety of Einzelsprachen and dialects drawn from the North Slavic dialect continuum. On this linguistic (areal) basis, Moscow perceives these Slavophones (irrespective of their varying ethnic origins and loyalties) as members of the (Great) Russian – that is, the ideologically Russkii-ized Rossiiskii – nation.

Russian as a pluricentric language  167 The Kremlin hardly gives a second thought to what the concerned populations and their individual members may think about this neoimperial approach, in which the Russian government usurps the right to decide on their identities from above and abroad. Furthermore, in 2015, the Russian military intervention commenced in Syria for the sake of propping up the faltering regime of pro-Russian Bashar al-Assad (Russian Military 2018). Since that moment, the Kremlin has seemingly planned to establish a permanent Russian foothold in the Middle East (Malovany 2016; Winer 2015). In this fashion, the non-post-Soviet polity of Israel found itself in the sights of the Russkii Mir ideology and Russia’s current Middle Eastern policies (Iudovich 2017; Mironov 2015). Apparently, Israel falls in between the two aforementioned categories of the territorial subdivisions of the Russian language, namely the ‘historical dialects’ claimed as ethnically Russian (Russkii) and the ‘territorial varieties’ that are not immediately or necessarily of this ethnicity. However, Israel’s Russian speakers stem in their vast majority from the ‘historical imperial core of Russian’s dialects.’ Hence, in many ways, Israel’s 1.2 million Russophones are perceived (and many also choose to see themselves) as belonging to the broad church-style postimperial/neoimperial Russian nation – as long as, as in a Soviet-style manner, this nation remains a tad de-ethnicized, so as to leave its access open to those who define themselves as Russkii, but do not feel a commonality either with Orthodox Christianity or Orthodox-influenced culture. In other words, such a person has a Rossiiskii identity, a modernized lowest common national denominator limited to Russian as a ‘native’ (i.e., L1) language and to the persons’ ancestors who used to hold Soviet citizenship. The simplest way to defuse the conflictual nature of the current official Russian thinking on the Russian language would be to replace the traditional set of ‘filters-cum-shapers’ commonly applied for reshaping and managing the linguistic with another set of this kind. For instance, the territorial extent of the historical dialects of the Russian language could be reimagined in Europe as limited to the territory of the Russian Federation. On the other hand, in the Asian section of this federation, the territorial varieties of Russian could be rebranded as historical dialects. As a result, the area of the dialects of Russia’s Russian would overlap with the territory of the Russian Federation (but perhaps with the exclusion of the territories of the polity’s autonomous republics). To stabilize this overlapping, so that not a single Russian dialect would be ‘sticking outside’ Russia or so that a non-Russian one would not be ‘poking’ into Russia, the Russian terms Russkii and Rossiiskii would need to be firmly equated. Perhaps, for the sake of improved inclusivity, Russkii could be fully replaced by Rossiiskii in this political role of the official ethnonym and linguonym of the Russian nation and its national language (cf Demurin 2016; Gabdrafikov 2014; Granin 2007; Tishkov 2011; Vdovin 1995, 2007). On the other hand, the employment of the concept of territorial varieties of Russian would need to be extended to all the states with considerable Russianspeaking populations or where this language is employed in an official capacity. Next, the term territorial variety would need to be overhauled as state variety

168  Russian as a pluricentric language of Russian, entailing the recognition of the pluricentric character of the Russian language. In this way, Russia’s Russian would overlap with the territory of the Russian Federation, Ukrainian Russian with Ukraine, Israeli Russian with Israel, and Uzbek(istani) Russian with Uzbekistan. In turn, for the sake of research, we could speak of the dialects of Ukrainian Russian and of the dialects of Tajik(istani) Russian as much as of the dialects of Russia’s (Rossiiskii) Russian. However, to defuse the highly ‘conflictogenic’ potential of the current imaginings about the Russian language in the service of Russian politics, the Kremlin would need to resign from the offensive use of the Russkii Mir ideology, a development that is unlikely to occur in the near future. Hybrid war works, meaning that it can be fought on the cheap (cf SurkovLeaks 2016; Surkov Leaks 2019). Even the Kremlin, with its small – from the global perspective – economy, can pretend to be a superpower and effectively meddle in the politics of the United States, besides bossing around post-Soviet states that are not members of the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As mentioned earlier, potentially at least 20 states could develop their own country-specific varieties of Russian (or Russian languages) for official, administrative, educational and computer use. If such varieties are seen as equal to other Slavic Einzelsprachen, the potential transformation of Russian into a pluricentric language could boost the current number of 40 official (state, national) Slavic languages to about 60. Then the post-Serbo-Croatian languages (or varieties of the pluricentric Common Language) would brush sides with the post-imperial pluricentric Russian language, complete with its approximately 20 varieties. And because in essence humans are unpredictable, some of these varieties could be declared and made into languages in their own right. Then, a new category of post-Russian languages could emerge, not dissimilar to that of the post-SerboCroatian languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian. The most likely candidates for post-Russian languages are those varieties used in states that have Russophone populations, whom the proponents of the Russkii Mir ideology claim for the (Greater) Russian nation. As a result, Belarusian Russian, courtesy of its Belarusian-language name, could become a Rasjejan language and, likewise, Estonian Russian a Venean language, Israeli Russian a Rusit language, Latvian Russian a Krievu language, Lithuanian Russian a Rusu language, Moldovan Russian a Rusa language, Kazkhstani Russian an Orys language, and Ukrainian Russian a Rosiiska language. The redefinition of Russian as a pluricentric Einzelsprache would usefully decouple national identity and citizenship from language. As a result, Russophones in Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine would cease being treated – be it by their home countries or by the Kremlin – as hostages of the neoimperial ideology of the ‘Russian World’ (Russkii Mir). Because there are many world Russians, there may be equally numerous Russian worlds (plural), interpreted as country-specific Russophone cultures. In this novel situation of the decisively de-ethnicized Russian language, the Kremlin would not be able to (ab)use Russian-speaking populations in the neighboring countries to pursue territorial expansion. On the other hand, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine

Russian as a pluricentric language  169 would not have to be watchful and fearful of Moscow’s intentions when they think about their own Russian-speaking citizens and residents. The Russian language would stop functioning as ‘fate’ or ‘destiny,’ defined through the prism of ethnolinguistic nationalism in service of the neoimperial ideology of Russkii Mir. The accident of language would no longer condemn Russophones who live outside Russia to necessarily being members of the ethnolinguistically defined Russian nation, tied to ‘their ideological nation-state,’ as presumably embodied by the Russian Federation. At long last, Russian speakers who live outside Russia could see the countries of their residence and citizenship as theirs too, where no Russian autocrat is capable of credibly claiming these Russian speakers’ allegiance. In turn, the governments of these countries would not need to be ever cautious about their Russophone citizens and residents to the point of doubting these citizens’ loyalties and perceiving them as ‘potential agents’ of the Kremlin (cf Laitin 1998). A more peaceful and stable world is possible. A de-ethnicized pluricentric Russian language – thus transformed into a colorful multiethnic and multicultural multitude of world Russians – could be a versatile means to this end. The globe’s pluricentric Englishes and Spanishes are clear cases in point.

Notes 1 The rate of de-ethnicization calculated as the ratio of L1 to L2 speakers is not without its problems. For instance, there are no native speakers of standard Arabic, meaning Arab children acquire this standard language at school, not from their families and communities, where an unstandardized Arabic dialect is always the medium of everyday communication (Farghaly 2005: 32). From this perspective, the de-ethnicization rate of Arabic must be 100 percent. A similar phenomenon takes place in the case of about 382 million speakers of Chinese dialects, who account for over 32 percent of all the speakers of the Chinese language (Rovira Esteva 2010: 202–203). As a result, a simplistic interpretation might be reached that among people who consider themselves to be ethnic Chinese (Han), the de-ethnicization rate of their language stands at 32 percent; hence, 40 percent or more if ethnically non-Chinese L2 speakers are taken into consideration. But all these ethnically Arab and ethnically Chinese L2 learners of standard Arabic and standard Chinese, respectively, do not consider these standard languages as ‘foreign’ or somehow ‘not theirs.’ So for all practical reasons, they are L1 (or maybe L1.5) speakers, whose number does not contribute to the de-ethnicization of the two languages in question. If speakers of this or that Arabic or Chinese dialect decided to gain full-fledged literacy only in it without bothering to master the prescribed standard language, then they would have to be subtracted from the totals of L1 speakers of these two languages. As a result, such a dialect would become an ethnic language in its own right, which is the case of Maltese. This language is a standardized variety of the Maghrebi (Libyan and Tunisian) dialect of Arabic. However, the Maltese do not learn standard Arabic as their national (ethnic, standard) language. 2 This imperial in its ideological origins normative insistence on the unified and indivisible character of the Russian language is nothing new; instead, it stems from the 19th-century concept of the Great Russian language and nation (people). Within this politicized framework, St. Petersburg denied the right to existence to White Russian (Belarusian) and Little Russian (Ukrainian) as languages in their own right. Likewise, the existence of these two Einzelsprachen’s speech communities construed as separate White Russian and Little Russian nations was denied. Nowadays the Russkii Mir ideology follows the same well-trodden path of belittling or denying the existence of

170

3

4

5

6 7

Russian as a pluricentric language

both Belarusians and Ukrainians, alongside their languages of Belarusian and Ukrainian. Shortly after the Great War, famous Belarusian writer Janka Kupała poignantly criticized this Great Russian–cum–Russkii Mir ideology. In a play, he presents a Belarusian commoner pandering to the Great Russian sentiment by dreaming about the ‘single indivisible Russian language’ (adziny niepadziełji ruski jazyk) that would be in use ‘from Asia to Australia, from Africa to America and from Smolensk to Berlin’ (Kupała 1953 [1922]: Act 3, Scene 5). (I thank Catherine Gibson for drawing my attention to Kupała’s play Tutejšyja.) The semantic fields of the Russian terms narod (people) and natsia (nation) are further blurred by derived collocations, names of organizations and concepts of political science. The United Nations Organization is literally translated into Russian as the Organizatsiia Ob’’edinenykh Natsii. However, the collocation ‘international relations’ is denoted in Russian as mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia. Both English collocations share the same term nation as a synonym for the word state. Although in the Russian counterparts state is also intended, this meaning is variously denoted by two words – natsiia and narod – which in common usage denote ‘nation’ (i.e., a group of people united by a shared language) or ‘people,’ never ‘state.’ The compound noun mezhgosudarstvennyi (‘interstate’) with the word gosudarstvo (state) featuring in it is rare, appearing in the collocation mezhgosudarstvennyia organizatsiia (‘international organization’), though usually the term mezhdunarodnyia organizatsiia is preferred. Terminological confusion or polyvalence is quite useful for conferring a veneer of ideological coherence onto the necessarily mixed bag of (neo)imperial policies that apply different standards and seek different outcomes in the case of similar groups of population (nations, ethnic groups or nationalities), especially if such groups in question live in distant corners of a geographically vast empire and of its – even vaster – sphere of influence. A similar terminological distinction between the term for the citizen of a nation-state and the term for the member of a nation-state’s titular (ethnic, ethnolinguistic, ethnoconfessional) nation can be observed in other countries too. For instance, in Turkey, the Turkish-language terms of this kind are Türkiyeli and Türk. Like the case of the distinction between Rossiiskii and Russkii flattened in English just to ‘Russian,’ both Turkish-language terms are translated as ‘Turk(ish)’ (cf Beilinson 2019). (I thank Catherine Gibson for drawing my attention to this issue.) Underlining indicates around which core (basic) Russian concept (word) a given term (neologism) was developed, and which core English concept is employed in the English translation of such a term. The point is that in translations different or several different core concepts may be used. As a result, some aspects of the original meaning of a Russian term is lost or made oblique in translation. I thank Professor Leonid Zashkilnyak, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, for a timely reminder on the importance of this issue in my discussion of state-specific varieties of the Russian language. This change commenced in the mid 1870s in Austria-Hungary’s Galicia. Publishers and historians (importantly Volodymyr Anronovych and Mykhailo Hrushevsky) began to use the double-barreled adjective Ukrainian-Rus’an (Ukrains’ko-Rus’kyi) in opposition to the Russian imperial term Great Russian, to stress the ethnolinguistic separateness of the Ruthenians/Little Russians vis-à-vis the (Great Russians). The traditional ethno-adjective Rus’kyi, often rendered as Russkii in Russian spelling, was insufficient, because to most people concerned, it suggested the ethnolinguistic sameness of the Ukrainians and the Russians, given the aforementioned 1830s change in the Russian name of the Russian language from Rossiiskii to Russkii. Rus’ko-Ukrainskyi was an alternative rendering of this double-barreled neologism. Slavists in Austria-Hungary had already begun to use the linguonym ‘Ukrainian’ in preference to Little Russian or Ruthenian in 1915, as a patriotic gesture to deny enemy Russia any claims to Vienna’s

Russian as a pluricentric language 171 ‘loyal Ukrainians.’ Finally, with the founding of Ukraine as a state in 1917, this doublebarreled ethno-adjective was firmly replaced by the single term Ukrainian for denoting the Ukrainian language, nation and state, in agreement with the normative isomorphic principle of Central Europe’s ethnolinguistic nationalism (Farion 2015: 217–218; Halushko 2016: 16–17; Wendland 2011: 412). 8 The origin of the doubled [s] in such names as Russkii and Rossiiskii is quite interesting. This tradition first appeared in the late 1590s in Poland-Lithuania’s Kijów (Kyiv) Orthodox Metropolis, which in 1596 entered an ecclesiastical union with the Roman Catholic Church. Perhaps this phenomenon was a result of the Latinate tradition that compelled nobles in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to double letters in their surnames – for instance, Poczbutt or Radziwiłł. However, the pronunciation of the indicated consonant was not doubled. Following Muscovy’s seizure of Kyiv in 1654 (confirmed by a treaty in 1667), this (Little) Ruthenian tradition of the doubled [s] spread to publications brought out in Moscow during the second half of the 17th century. Both versions, single [s] and double [s], brushed sides in Muscovy until the founding of the Russian Empire in 1721, with its official name Rossiia with the double [s] (Gil 2018: 49; Kloss 2012: ch 8). 9 In ethnolinguistic nation-states, the term philology is often preferred to the word linguistics in popular and even scholarly use. In other countries, the term philology is seen as somewhat obsolete and ‘prescientific.’ For instance, in English since the 1920s, the term linguist has been decisively more often employed than has philologist for denoting a person who does research on language (Use of the Term ‘Philologist’ 2018). However, in German, the term Philologe (philologist) decisively dominated over Sprachwissenschaftler (linguist) until the mid 1970s, and since then, a stable parity between both terms has been reached, with only a slight dominance of the latter (Use of the Term Philologe 2018). In Russian, the term filolog (philologist) has consistently dominated over lingvist (linguist) during the past two centuries. A parity between these two terms with a somewhat-diminished domination of the term filolog was achieved during the Soviet period (1920s–1980s). However, since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the term filolog has been used twice as frequently as its counterpart, lingvist. This is a clear sign of the growing ideological dominance of ethnolinguistic nationalism in present-day Russia (Use of the Term Filolog 2018).   Ethnolinguistic nationalists express their loyalty to their nation through the ‘love of their national language’ (cf Dynak 1994: 42). This sentiment merges perfectly with the meaning of the Greek term philology, or ‘love of word(s).’ This term’s ‘word(s)’ may be interpreted as ‘reason,’ ‘scholarship’ or ‘scholarly discipline’ but also as ‘love of language.’ The last reading is preferred by proponents of ethnolinguistic nationalism (cf Instytut 2018). 10 Russia’s 2014 military seizure of Crimea from Ukraine is not internationally recognized and is widely pronounced illegal. In light of international law, this Ukrainian territory is under Russian occupation. 11 In spite of conducting quite an extensive search to this end, thus far I have not found a Russian-language collocation ‘Kyrgyz (Kyrgyzstani) Russian,’ be it in a printed source or on the web. 12 To a degree, the Russkii Mir Foundation builds on the decades-long experience of the Pushkin Institute (based in the Russian capital) that continues to function as a separate institution in its own right. This institute was founded in 1966 as part of Lomonosov Moscow State University. In 1973, the Pushkin State Russian Language Institute gained institutional independence and became the leading methodological center for teaching Russian as a second language across the Soviet bloc and the world. During the Soviet period, this institute maintained methodological delegations in the Soviet bloc countries, but unlike Russkii Mir, it never opened full-fledged branches in other

172  Russian as a pluricentric language countries. In turn, in 2010 Russkii Mir opened its own center (Russkii tsentr) in the Pushkin Institute, where the latter provides the former with methodological teaching expertise and materials. Between 1966 and 2015, half a million students from over 90 countries attended language courses and summer language schools offered by the Pushkin Institute (Istoriia i missiia 2018).

7 Conclusion The dilemma of numbers

How many Slavic languages exist – one, two, 12, 40 or even 60? Counting languages is like counting water. The sum will change depending on the size of a vessel used for this purpose, meaning the unit of measurement. Languages, like liters or gallons, are not entities in their own right but (‘shape-giving’) ‘measures’ (filters-cum-shapers and concepts) of the linguistic. However, languages (Einzelsprachen) as measures are often as incommensurable with one another as barrels with hectoliters. In addition, in different parts of the world during this or that historical period, groups of people tended to construe the linguistic in a variety of ways with the employment of locally developed concepts (i.e., ‘shape-giving vessels’). But nowadays the Western (European) dichotomy of languages and dialects has become the unchallenged global norm since the age of high imperialism in the 19th century (Kamusella 2016a). In this regard, the West, as a self-proclaimed ‘acme of civilization’ and of all ‘things normal,’ imposed on the rest of the world its preferred set of categories and concepts of thinking about social reality and for operationalizing it (cf Amin 2009; Brantlinger 2003; Duchesne 2012). Thus this social reality was overhauled and normativized in line with the West’s wishes and interests all around the globe (cf Phillipson 1992; Stoll 1982). Such a Western-driven uniformization of social reality across the world not only extinguished local practices of organizing and construing about social reality (including the linguistic) but also erased any remembrance of these practices. Many knowledges were lost, especially those concerning the organization and thinking about the linguistic (Burke 2012: 139–159). At present, we must do research on and recover a memory of as many of these lost traditions and knowledges as possible for the sake of regaining indispensable points of reference for an improved understanding of the past of human societies. An awareness of such lost traditions and knowledges would make clear that construing about the linguistic in the terms of the Western dichotomy of Einzelsprache and dialect is just one of a myriad of possibilities in this regard. Potentially, there are as many ‘shape-giving vessels’ (‘units of the linguistic,’ ‘filters-cum-shapers’) for construing and for managing the linguistic as there are distinctive human societies. Determining the total number of Slavic Einzelsprachen depends on who counts what and why, and on what basis. If every ethnic and ethnoregional (speech)

174  Conclusion Before the invention of writing

Primary (unmediated) sociolinguistic reality

Before 19th c.

Sociolinguistic knowledge 1 (e.g., Aztec Empire): Unit 1 of the linguistic

Sociolinguistic knowledge 2 (e.g., China) Unit 2 of the linguistic

Sociolinguistic knowledge 3 (e.g., subSaharan Africa) Unit 3 of the linguistic

Since 19th c.

Sociolinguistic knowledge 4 (the West) Unit 4 of the linguistic – i.e., Einzelsprache

Figure C Sociolinguistic knowledges and the West: linguistic imperialism

community must consider the use of their speech in writing as amounting to an Einzelsprache in its own right, then at present there are at least 40 Slavic languages or even 60 if one chooses to treat state-specific varieties of Russian as Einzelsprachen in their own right. This tally could rapidly increase given that nowadays almost all Slavic speakers are literate and most are rather well-to-do from the global perspective. Most live in the rich Global North. Courtesy of the easy and relatively cheap access to computers and the internet in the world’s rich areas, almost everyone living there (including Slavophones) who wishes to do so may write and publish online in whatever language or script. And if a script or language is missing from cyberspace, activists from the rich Global North have at their disposal necessary means and skills, alongside a good command of English, to make their concerns heard. Afterward, it is just a matter of submitting with the Library of Congress and SIL International a well-written (in English, of course) and well-argued application for granting a language in question with an ISO 639 code. With such a formal recognition in hand, international organizations that run the systems (‘architecture’) of the internet will expedite the adding of this language (Einzelsprache) to the appropriate software menu lists, alongside the introduction to the web of this language’s unique script or its special characters of an already-recognized writing system (cf Ślōnsko 2019). In turn, gatekeepers of a variety of online resources will allow for (and even encourage) translating these resources’ interfaces into this newly recognized ‘internet language’ (e.g., the Facebook menu) and for creating online resources (e.g., a new Wikipedia) with the employment of this newly registered Einzelsprache (Kamusella 2012a). On the other hand, should only state official languages be taken into consideration, when it comes to counting Einzelsprachen, nowadays there are no more than 12 Slavic languages. But if one were to decide to disregard tiny differences and made an effort to understand speakers and writers of other Slavic (literary) varieties, then the number of Slavic Einzelsprachen would arguably plummet even

Conclusion 175 further. This ‘total number of Slavic languages’ is a moveable feast, fully depending on the perceiver, alongside changing group views on and attitudes toward what should count as a ‘proper’ language and what ought not to. During the past two centuries, the pendulum has swung widely from one extreme to another, from a single or just a couple of Slavic languages to many. At present, it seems, this pendulum went back a bit again, at least in the case of the Common Language (or Serbo-Croatian). Some prefer to see it as a single Einzelsprache rather than as the officially recognized and separate four post-Serbo-Croatian languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian. The all-too-rarely discussed practice of ‘suprastandard bilingualism’ (nadstandardní bilingvismus) between speakers of Czech and Slovak (cf Bednaříková 2010: 15) also alludes to the mutual closeness of these two Einzelsprachen, which stops short of unification. On the other hand, the phenomenon emphasizes that Slovak is not foreign to Czech speakers and vice versa, unlike other Slavic languages vis-à-vis Czech and Slovak. Hence, in this manner, the common near-Czecho-Slovak language consisting of two standards still exists, though nowadays no one utters its name any longer either. Such swings of the Western in its origin conceptual pendulum of Einzelsprachen one way or the other are bound to continue periodically, as long as so much political and social capital is invested into Einzelsprachen. In Central Europe, since the mid 19th century, languages have been seen as the basis of statehood creation, legitimation and maintenance. Languages are the totem of modern Central Europe’s politics. In the early 21st century, the appeal of such totemized (politicized) Einzelsprachen has been rapidly spreading eastward, to Eastern Europe and across the Russian Federation, reaching post-Soviet states in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Languages are seen as more important than states, because from the perspective of ethnolinguistic nationalism, Einzelsprachen produce states and nations, not the other way around (Kamusella 2017a). In this manner, languages are entirely speciously endowed with false agency. A fundamental fact is all too easily overlooked: only people and their decisions create and maintain languages, states and nations. All these entities are products (artifacts) of human imagination and creativity and as such belong to social reality, as generated, maintained and altered by humans and their groups. Languages are unable to do anything on their own. They are not persons or any autonomous entities endowed with agency or free will. Languages exist only in human imagination, stored in the brains of people living in groups that share the concept of Einzelsprache and that choose to act in agreement with it. Without humans, there would be no languages and there would be no social reality. In this socio-political deification of Einzelsprachen, Central (and Eastern) Europe is (almost) unique in the world. The only other region that stakes so much political importance on language is Southeast Asia, alongside Japan and both Koreas in East Asia. However, this East and Southeast Asian love affair with Einzelsprachen as the basis of statehood construction, legitimization and maintenance – that began to flourish after World War II – is not any local development steeped in a local knowledge. The phenomenon is a result of ‘modernization’ understood as the imposition of the Western knowledge on the rest of the world. This ‘rest of

176  Conclusion the world,’ which actually accounts for the vast majority of the globe’s inhabitants, had no choice but to accept this imposition in the high age of imperialism or had to accept it to escape being colonized by the West. Southeast and East Asian countries borrowed the political concept of the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state from (Central) Europe (i.e., the West), but this is a story for another essay or book (cf Kamusella 2016b). The emergence of the concepts of Einzelsprache, nation and nation-states as standard ‘units’ of modernity is connected to two developments that took place in (Western) Europe. First, in the late middle ages and in the early modern period (from about the 13th to the 17th centuries), a new tradition of construing and measuring space and time emerged, alongside mathematical methods underpinning such concepts and measures. For the sake of measuring and controlling (on the plane of human relations, of course) these two essentially continuous phenomena of space and time, novel concepts, units (measures) and methods of measurement and keeping records were developed. This innovative methodology, steeped in the numerical strictness of mathematics and Euclidean geometry, allowed people to see space and time as composed from equal ‘quanta.’ These quanta (or countable and enumerable units) could be precisely, rigidly and invariantly measured. It turned out that this method happened to describe the material reality quite effectively and faithfully. Hence, the aforesaid quantification, mathematization and geometrization of the European perception of the material reality constituted the basis of the successful rise of engineering, large-scale construction, cartography, physics, chemistry, accountancy and statistics (Crosby 1997: 227–240; Kuhn 1957). Second, this scientific method of ‘rational’ research and administration enabled mass industrialization in (Western) Europe, nowadays known as the Industrial Revolution. Technological inventions and increased productivity, gradually less dependent on human brawn, enabled this continent’s ‘great powers’ to colonize the ‘rest’ of the world. As a result, Western imperialism spread this model of ‘rational mathematization’ to the colonies or, rather, imposed it on colonial societies. The Western style of doing things in this regard was posed as the ‘only possible and true’ kind of ‘rationality,’ which ‘irrational and childish’ non-Westerners (cf Said 1978) were compelled to accept. The Eurocentric promotion of this ‘method,’ nowadays often qualified as ‘Newtonian,’ worked fine until the turn of the 20th century. At this time, the discrepancy between scientific assumptions and actual observations increasingly falsified the Euclidean assumptions and practices of the Newtonian method. The resultant epistemic tension between seemingly inexplicable observations and this model’s decreased explanatory power eventually spawned Albert Einstein’s theory of general relativity and quantum physics (cf Kuhn 1970). The military and economic success of the West, as ‘proven’ by European colonialism on the global scale, convinced some Western scholars that the ‘Newtonian method of rational quantification’ could be also employed for analyzing, comprehending and ‘ordering’ human societies in a ‘scientific’ manner. The first attempts of this kind took place in the 18th century, when practitioners of Cameralia Oeconomica (‘applied state economics’) and Policeywissenschaft (‘applied public administrative policy’) developed mathematized methods of description,

Conclusion 177 running and controlling state economy and domestic ‘social’ politics in the Holy Roman Empire and Prussia – that is, in what nowadays is Central Europe (cf Wüst 2001–2015). In the 19th century, with the rise of statistics and state-wide censuses of population, such methods of ‘rational mathematization’ were applied to all the inhabitants across a given polity’s territory (cf Foucault 2007). Already in the early 19th century, some proposed a new field of (applied) research that they referred to as ‘the physics of organized bodies’ or ‘social physics’ (Iggers 1959). Later, this approach yielded what at present we recognize as the disciplines of sociology and anthropology or, more broadly, the social sciences. However, this trend also spawned the now-somewhat-forgotten deterministic, biologizing and highly biased ‘sciences’ of eugenics, Rassenhygiene (‘racial hygiene’) and Rassenkunde (‘science of race’). Their practitioners ‘scientifically proved’ the ‘existence of races’ and ‘innate inequality’ among ‘races’ (human groups), leading to the ‘equally scientific justification’ of ethnic cleansings and genocides, first conducted in colonies and subsequently undertaken in Europe during World War II. Promoters and practitioners of social physics mistook social reality for the material reality. While the latter is independent of humans and their will, the former is entirely crated, maintained and altered by humans and their groups alone. The material reality equates the universe, whereas social reality is entirely contained within the brains of humans. Elements of the material reality directly accessible to human senses can be – in the Newtonian fashion – objectively (invariantly) and rigidly quantified, measured and, on this basis, manipulated in technological applications. On the other hand, social reality, as imagined into existence by humans and their groups, is fully at the mercy of human will. There are no Newtonian-style mathematized concepts and methods that would allow for delineating quanta of social reality and measuring them precisely, rigidly and invariantly – that is, unambiguously and objectively – as expected of such subfields of physics as mechanics or optics. This kind of the objectivity of measurement is possible only when observed entities are independent of human will. Hence, it works (relatively) fine when applied to the material reality. However, it becomes highly unreliable and arbitrary when employed for ‘weighing’ and ‘measuring’ figments of human imagination, of which social reality is composed. The material reality is independent of human perception, while the existence of social reality hinges on this perception. The human gaze merely records innumerable parts of the universe, which are accessible to humans and their senses. On the other hand, this gaze is responsible for creating and maintaining all social reality. For better or worse, this popular but epistemically erroneous equation of social reality with the material reality enabled the rise of the ‘standard and equal’ quanta of human imagination. This also continues to condition the widespread fallacious view that such ‘social quanta’ are real in the material sense. People believe that such a quantum (standard unit) of the linguistic is Einzelsprache, while in the cases of the social and the political, quanta of this kind are the nation and nation-state, respectively. The global dominance of the West from the 18th century to the mid 20th century imposed this erroneous belief on human societies all around the world. Conseuqently, these social quanta became the basic building blocks of modernity

178  Conclusion as we know it nowadays. A certain coherence in their application and maintenance is ensured by nationalism, which at present is the sole legitimate ideology of statehood creation, legitimation and maintenance. Nationalism is the ‘infrastructural ideology of the present-day world,’ or of the uniformized and standardized social reality that underlies the globe’s states and societies, that is, nation-states and nations. In the case of Central Europe and Southeast Asia, proponents of the ethnolinguistic offshoot of this infrastructural ideology of nationalism firmly associate Einzelsprache as the quantum of the linguistic with the nation and its nation-state. In this line of thinking, they elevate Einzelsprache above the two latter quanta of the political and the social. In the eyes of ethnolinguistic nationalists, only Einzelsprache is primary, whereas the nation and nation-state must be secondary. Hence, according to them, the former quantum ‘naturally’ (or in the sense of the material reality) spawns the two latter quanta, not the other way round. To be exact, in line with ethnolinguistic nationalism’s ideological equation – language = nation = nation-state (i.e., the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state) – Einzelsprache is believed to produce the nation, and in turn, the nation produces its nation-state. Einzelsprache, or the quantum (standard unit) of the linguistic, is maintained to be primary; the nation, or the quantum (standard unit) of the social, is secondary; and nation-state, or the quantum (standard unit) of the political, is tertiary. Therefore, from the perspective of ethnolinguistic nationalism, which is widely accepted in Central Europe, the stability of state frontiers and statehood is of tertiary importance. The pride of place is given to the national language (Einzelsprache), while the second place in this ideologized ranking of collective significance and prestige goes to the nation. However, outside of Central Europe and Southeast Asia, proponents of nationalism accord the primary position to state as the creator of the nation, paying no explicit attention to Einzelsprache. As a result, on average, during the past century, state frontiers and statehood have been more stable there than in Central Europe or in Southeast Asia. This example shows how fickle human will is at generating social reality, despite the fact that scholars and politicians emphatically propose that Einzelsprache, the nation and nation-state are equal, invariant, stable, objective and rational quanta. They are not. Social reality is radically different from the material reality. The mathematized Newtonian method of conceptualization and measurement that works in the case of the material reality is highly fallible and arbitrary when one attempts to apply it to social reality. The error of this approach rests in that we human beings try to measure our dreams and imaginings with, for instance, a weighing machine or ruler originally developed for measuring the material reality. The weight of a ton of coal is independently and invariantly checkable if expressed in metric or imperial units, but no one knows or will ever know what the weight of Nation X can be. Likewise, the leg of a table can be measured, but the length or breadth of Nation X remains a mystery. To reiterate, social reality entirely depends on human will, whereas the material reality exists externally and independently of humans, and the latter does not respect our wishes.

8 Addendum The Declaration on the Common Language

Faced with the negative social, cultural and economic consequences of the political manipulation of [the common] language and of the current language policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia and Serbia, we the undersigned present to the public [the following document]

The Declaration on the Common Language When the question is asked whether in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia and Serbia a common language is employed, the answer is in the affirmative. [Yes, it does.] This is a common standard language of a pluricentric type – that is, a language spoken by several nations living in several states, a language with recognizable [national and state] variants, which is also the case of German, English, Arabic, French, Spanish, Portuguese and many other languages [across the world]. This fact is corroborated by Štokavian as the dialectal base of the [aforementioned common] standard language. Differences existing within [the boundaries of] this [aforementioned dialectal base] allow for and do not prevent mutual intelligibility. The use of the four names for the standard varieties of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian does not entail that these variants constitute four languages [in their own right]. Insisting on [preserving, deepening, creating and multiplying] a small number of the extant differences [between these four varieties] and the violent separation of the four standard varieties [from one another] have led to a series of negative social, cultural and political phenomena, such as the use of language as an argument for segregating children in some multinational contexts, unnecessary ‘translation’ [from one variety into another] in administrative use or in the mass media, the invention of differences [between these varieties] where they did not exist before, and bureaucratic impositions such as censorship (including [the spreading] feeling of [the necessity of] self-censorship), in line with which linguistic expression is subjected to being a sign of ethno-national affiliation and the [ultimate] means of proving one’s political loyalty [to one’s nation and state].

180  Addendum We, the signatories of this declaration, believe the following: • • • • • •

•

The fact of the existence of a common pluricentric language does not call into question the individual’s right to express their own affiliation to different nations, regions or states; Any state, nation, ethno-national or regional community can freely and independently codify its own variety of the common language; All the four [now] extant standard varieties [of the common language] are equal and none can be considered a language in its own right, while others as varieties [dialects] of that language; Pluricentric standardization is a democratic form of standardization, which is closest to the actual use of language; The fact that it is a common pluricentric standard language gives users the option to name this language as they wish [or require]; Between the standard varieties of the pluricentric [common] language are differences in linguistic and cultural traditions and practices, in the use of scripts, at the level of vocabulary as well as at other linguistic levels, which actually may also appear between different versions of [the text of] this declaration when it is published in different standard varieties of the common language; Standard, dialectal and individual [idiolectal] differences do not justify any violent official (institutional) separation [of the common language’s standard varieties], but rather should [be allowed to] contribute to the vast wealth of this common language.

Therefore, we, the signatories of this declaration, appeal for the following: • • • • • • •

the abolition of all forms of linguistic segregation and language discrimination in educational and public institutions [in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia]; stopping the repressive and unnecessary practices of language separation [in the aforementioned countries] that are harmful to users [of the common language]; the termination of rigid definitions of the standard varieties [of the common language]; avoiding unnecessary, thoughtless and expensive ‘translations’ [between the standard varieties of the common language] in courts of law, administration and in the means of public information; the freedom of individual choice [of a standard variety] and the appreciation of [the common] language[’s] diversity; the freedom of language [choice of a given variety] in literature, the arts and the mass media; the freedom of use of dialects and regional [nonstandard] varieties [of the common language];

Addendum 181 •

ultimately, the freedom of mixing of, [and] the mutual openness and permeation of different forms and expressions of the common language to the universal benefit of all its speakers.

Done at Zagreb, Podgorica, Belgrade and Sarajevo on 30 March 2017. Translated from the Common Language (Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian, or Serbo-Croatian) by Tomasz Kamusella Suočeni s negativnim društvenim, kulturnim i ekonomskim posljedicama političkih manipulacija jezikom i aktualnih jezičnih politika u Bosni i Hercegovini, Crnoj Gori, Hrvatskoj i Srbiji, mi, doljepotpisani, donosimo

Deklaracija o Zajedničkom Jeziku Na pitanje da li se u Bosni i Hercegovini, Crnoj Gori, Hrvatskoj i Srbiji upotrebljava zajednički jezik – odgovor je potvrdan. Riječ je o zajedničkom standardnom jeziku policentričnog tipa  – odnosno o jeziku kojim govori više naroda u više država s prepoznatljivim varijantama  – kakvi su njemački, engleski, arapski, francuski, španjolski, portugalski i mnogi drugi. Tu činjenicu potvrđuju štokavica kao zajednička dijalekatska osnovica standardnog jezika, omjer istoga spram različitoga u jeziku i posljedična međusobna razumljivost. Korištenje četiri naziva za standardne varijante – bosanski, crnogorski, hrvatski i srpski – ne znači da su to i četiri različita jezika. Inzistiranje na malom broju postojećih razlika te nasilnom razdvajanju četiri standardne varijante dovodi do niza negativnih društvenih, kulturnih i političkih pojava, poput korištenja jezika kao argumenta za segregaciju djece u nekim višenacionalnim sredinama, nepotrebnih”prevođenja” u administrativnoj upotrebi ili medijima, izmišljanja razlika gdje one ne postoje, birokratskih prisila, kao i cenzure (te nužno auto-cenzure), u kojima se jezično izražavanje nameće kao kriterij etno-nacionalne pripadnosti i sredstvo dokazivanja političke lojalnosti. Mi, potpisnici ove Deklaracije, smatramo da • • • •

činjenica postojanja zajedničkog policentričnog jezika ne dovodi u pitanje individualno pravo na iskazivanje pripadnosti različitim narodima, regijama ili državama; svaka država, nacija, etno-nacionalna ili regionalna zajednica može slobodno i samostalno kodificirati svoju varijantu zajedničkog jezika; sve četiri trenutno postojeće standardne varijante ravnopravne su i ne može se jedna od njih smatrati jezikom, a druge varijantama tog jezika; policentrična standardizacija je demokratski oblik standardizacije najbliži stvarnoj upotrebi jezika;

182  Addendum •

činjenica da se radi o zajedničkom policentričnom standardnom jeziku ostavlja mogućnost svakom korisniku da ga imenuje kako želi; • između standardnih varijanti policentričnog jezika postoje razlike u jezičnim i kulturnim tradicijama i praksama, upotrebi pisma, rječničkom blagu kao i na ostalim jezičnim razinama, što mogu pokazati i različite standardne varijante zajedničkog jezika na kojima će ova Deklaracija biti objavljena i korištena; • standardne, dijalekatske i individualne razlike ne opravdavaju nasilno institucionalno razdvajanje, već naprotiv, doprinose ogromnom bogatstvu zajedničkog jezika. Stoga, mi, potpisnici ove Deklaracije, pozivamo na • • • • • • • •

ukidanje svih oblika jezične segregacije i jezične diskriminacije u obrazovnim i javnim ustanovama; zaustavljanje represivnih, nepotrebnih i po govornike štetnih praksi razdvajanja jezika; prestanak rigidnog definiranja standardnih varijanti; izbjegavanje nepotrebnih, besmislenih i skupih”prevođenja” u sudskoj i administrativnoj praksi kao i sredstvima javnog informiranja; slobodu individualnog izbora i uvažavanje jezičnih raznovrsnosti; jezičnu slobodu u književnosti, umjetnosti i medijima; slobodu dijalekatske i regionalne upotrebe; i, konačno, slobodu miješanja, uzajamnu otvorenost te prožimanje različitih oblika i izričaja zajedničkog jezika na sveopću korist svih njegovih govornika.

U Zagrebu, Podgorici, Beogradu i Sarajevu, 30.03.2017.

9 Postscript on methodology People see what they want

Different people and their groups may ‘see’ different ‘things’ while observing themselves or others. In a social context, this act of observation barely involves what actually meets the eye by way of radiation reflected from physical objects in daylight or artificial light. Most of such ‘mental’ watching and seeing takes place in the proverbial ‘mind’s eye.’ We humans, in observing one another and our groups, want to establish our own and others’ relative social positions. We probe into who is an equal, who is a superior, and who is a subordinate. Or more simplistically, we assess who is a friend, who is a foe, and who is just a neutral bystander. This exercise is conducted time and again, almost automatically, without much if any reflection on the act itself, when a person instinctively interacts with others. A similar screening of the social situation is often run simultaneously when a person confronts the position of their group vis-à-vis other groups, especially when interacting with a member of a different group. In essence, this kind of ‘mental gaze’ establishes a ‘pecking order,’ which in turn conditions the dynamics of interpersonal and intergroup relations. International relations are quite similar, built from and conducted by human groups masked speciously as unitary entities, which we tend to dub ‘states.’ This act of ‘mental seeing’ is about power and deciding who is stronger and who is weaker, whose group dominates and which one is dominated. Such ‘mental watching’ is solely confined to human groups, because this type of power relations is ‘visible’ only to those in ‘the know.’ To ‘see’ social relations of this type humans involved have to share some concepts about what counts as a feature making one person or human group (e.g., a state) more powerful than another, alongside some notions about the structuring of human societies as non-face-to-face groups – in other words, as imagined communities (cf Anderson 1983). ‘Mental observation’ is confined to social reality, which we humans generate through our use of language (Sprache) (cf Berger and Luckmann 1966). Language in its evolutionary sense is the biological capacity for speech. The primary function of this evolutionary development is to make group bonding more time efficient. Among nonhuman primates, group bonding is achieved through one-on-one touching, mostly in the form of fur grooming. A primate is unable to groom two individuals at the same time, unlike a human who can simultaneously ‘groom,’ in a verbal fashion, two or even three individuals. Hence, ‘verbal grooming’ is twice

184  Postscript on methodology or even three times more efficient than ‘touch grooming.’ As a result, humans are able to build and maintain cohesive face-to-face groups that are two or three times bigger than the biggest groups achieved by primates (Dunbar 1993, 1996: 191). Another stage in group building, which is unavailable to primates, is that of non-face-to-face groups – that is, imagined communities. The use of language among humans allows us to generate a social reality, or a set of shared notions and concepts. These do not exist in any material sense (apart from neural configurations in the brain), but we humans and our groups act in line with such notions and concepts (Austin 1962; Searle 1995).1 A tree or a stone is equally visible to and accessible to the senses of a human, cat, bird, cow or a hypothetical extraterrestrial. A tree and a stone are elements of the material reality, which can be detected and measured with instruments devised by physicists for probing into energy and matter. Hence, one can measure the height of a tree or weigh a stone. A telescope can be used for scrutinizing the details of a tree removed by a kilometer from the observer. Likewise, a geologist may avail themselves of a microscope to decide whether a tiny formation found in a stone is a crystal or not. The naked eye is sufficient to decide what the color the stone is or the aforementioned tree’s leaves are. On the contrary, social reality and its elements are invisible to the eye, the length of a religion cannot be measured, a nation cannot be weighed, the telescope does not suffice to see any state from the earth’s orbit, and a microscope cannot detect decency in a flower pot or under a table. Anyway, what is the color of university education or established democracy? We humans alone, through our use of language, generate social reality.2 This type of reality is fully stored in humans’ brains and as such is totally dependent on human will. Therefore, social reality is not accessible to nonhumans. To ‘mentally see’ the obtaining social reality, one must be a human and participate in the generation of this kind of reality through language use. On the other hand, the material reality is independent of human will and fully accessible to the senses of touch, sight, hearing, smell and taste of all other DNA-based living beings on this planet (i.e., ‘animals,’ ‘plants’ and the like). One cannot access social reality through one’s senses, but only by talking to other humans and sharing some beliefs and notions, in accordance with which all members of a given group act consistently, above all, for the sake of constituting (creating and maintaining) their group. This power of belief (or rather of the suspension of disbelief) grafted on language use allows us to imagine that we belong to non-face-to-face (imagined) groups, such as the faithful of a religion, a nation, a professional group or a state. At present, such groups typically range from tens of thousands to millions and even over a billion members. One cannot hope to meet and fraternize even with a

Philosophy of language Evolutionary psychology Social Reality

Cultural anthropology Study of nationalism Imagined Community

Figure Pa Social reality ≈ imagined community ≈ legal fiction(s)

Jurisprudence Legal studies Legal Fiction(s)

Postscript on methodology 185 tiny fraction of all the members of one’s own group of this type. However, thanks to some shared ideas regarding what makes a given group, one can readily recognize a member of this group even when one has not met them previously. Of course, such recognition takes place in one’s ‘mind’s eye’ through the deployment of language for checking whether an encountered person belongs to our group. At the level of face-to-face groups, the most typical instrument for deciding whether a person belongs to a group or not is a given individual’s working memory of regular verbal interactions with the person in question. Such interactions create a high degree of sameness in language use. Hence, language difference (nowadays construed as ‘different languages’) becomes an important signal that an encountered person (rather) belongs to another group. Language difference (‘languages’) functions as a basic metonymy for belonging to a specific group; it is the badge of a club. When a group grows beyond the confines of face-to-face contact, language difference often becomes the sole instrument of determining whether an individual belongs to this or that group. In the case of non-face-to-face (imagined) groups one has no possibility to fall back on a working memory of regular verbal interactions with a person just encountered for the sake of deciding whether slight language difference should be overridden or rather acted upon to re-confirm that the stranger does not belong to my non-face-to-face group. Language difference has become a handy and widespread tool for checking whether an individual belongs to a group, because of the high costs (i.e., time and effort) of acquiring or abandoning a given language difference (‘languages’). Language acquisition takes months and even years, and it is never perfect beyond adolescence. Hence, in pre-state societies, language difference is quite a fool-proof sign of belonging to a specific group. However, other elements of social reality (such as a passport, religion or symbol) may override language difference as the effective badge of membership in a group. Nevertheless, to this day, language difference remains an important and quite potent telltale sign of belonging to a group, be it a nation or state (Nettle 1999: 97–114). When a group fissures, successor groups go their separate ways. This process engenders a growing degree of separation between these successor groups, generated by each such group’s creating a new norm (or set of salient features) of its own specific groupness. In pre-state times, successor groups most often moved away from each other in terms of space. The resultant distance of many tens of kilometers ensured stable separation. In turn, the spatial isolation maintained, with each successive generation, language difference grew too. Later, when ‘empty’ (i.e., not controlled by other human groups) space was not readily available, separation began to come about institutionally through taboos, enforced endogamy, the religiously underwritten prohibition of talking to and associating with ‘the others’ or drawing a policed line in the proverbial sand, which we now construe as ‘borders.’ On the other hand, when two groups decide to meld, the subsequent spatial and institutional closeness, if maintained for some generations to come, swiftly levels any language difference. In the modern age, compulsory elementary school and the ubiquitous mass media tremendously accelerate this process of in-group linguistic (cultural) homogenization at the level of states (cf Deutsch 1966 [1953]).

186  Postscript on methodology If language difference construed in Europe as languages (Einzelsprachen) is an important metonymy for group membership, the fluctuation in the number of Slavic languages during the past two centuries should directly correspond to the equally changeable number of human groups, at present typically known as nations and states. Conversely, the higher a number of aspiring and recognized nations and states, the higher the number of Einzelsprachen. In the case of Central Europe, this direct ratio is fortified and enforced by ethnolinguistic nationalism, which has become the sole accepted ideology of statehood building, legitimization and maintenance since World War I. This ideology equates each Einzelsprache with a nation and in turn the nation with a state, resulting in the normative isomorphism (i.e., tight spatial and ideological overlapping) of language, nation and state. Nowadays, even when the correlation of languages with states is almost nonexistent outside Eurasia or quite weak in many areas of Asia and Europe, it remains quite robust in Central Europe and in Southeast and East Asia. In these two areas of Eurasia where ethnolinguistic nationalism dominates as the primary ideology of nation and state building (creation), this normative isomorphism is the standard manner of creating, legitimizing and maintaining groupness at the state level (Kamusella 2017a). In accordance with the ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism, the past two centuries have seen several waves of nation and nation-state building that swept across Central Europe. Gradually, some nonnational polities were replaced with nation-states during the long 19th century, before such nonnational polities were in essence removed from the political map of Europe in a single sweep after 1918. Every (rather, almost every) new nation-state in Central Europe declared a different Einzelsprache as its own national and state language. Subsequently, the number of such languages grew, especially after each wave of renewed state building: after the Great War; to a degree after 1945, especially in the wake of the fall of communism; and after the breakups of the ethnoterritorial federations of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The process is not over yet, as indicated by the founding of Montenegro as an ethnolinguistic nation-state in 2006, the Russia-supported 2008 declarations of independence by the ethnolinguistic de facto states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the Kremlin’s use of ethnolinguistic nationalism for justifying the illegal military seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Ethnolinguistic nationalism remains the most important ideology of statehood formation, legitimization and maintenance in Central Europe, and nowadays (the late 2010s) its political and social significance appears to be on the rise across Eastern Europe. Most classical studies of nationalism draw predominantly on ethnolinguistic cases from Central Europe (cf Breuilly 1985; Brubaker 1996; Gellner 1983; Hobs­ bawm 1990; Hroch 1985; Kohn 2017 [1944], Smith 1986; Stalin 1935 [1913]), and on this highly limited basis, this discipline generalizes about the entire modern world. However, many nation-states in Eurasia are not of an ethnolinguistic type, and none of them is on the other continents. The situation is clearly evidenced by the fact that outside Eurasia exclusively European colonial languages are employed in official capacity, not the Indigenous ones.3 Some scholars notice

Postscript on methodology 187 this methodological problem and strive to probe into nationalism from a different angle than the dichotomy of the ethnic (ethnolinguistic) and the civic (cf Billig 1995; Greenfeld 1992). But almost all of them limit their purview to Europe or the West. Exceptions to this rule are few and far between (cf Anderson 1983), and even fewer authors generalize about nationalism from a non-Western perspective (cf Winichakul 1994). However, after the massive wave of decolonization that took place mainly during the 1960s, all the world’s polities define themselves as nation-states and are acknowledged to be such, with the rare exception of the Vatican City State. Ideological and other differences (e.g., the size of territory, population, ideology or economy) between such states as the United States and Iran, North Korea and Argentina or Tuvalu and China may appear huge and even insurmountable. Yet in light of international law and in the practice of modern international relations, each of these polities is a nation-state, period. They all share the rarely articulated assumption that nationalism is the sole acceptable ideology of statehood creation, legitimation and maintenance. Between the 1960s decolonization and the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union, nationalism became the sole infrastructural ideology of the world, or humankind’s social reality on the global scale. The Soviet Union was the only large nonnational polity that survived so long into this age of globalized nationalism. All the post-Soviet successor states are straightforward nation-states, most of which are ethnolinguistic in their character, from Estonia in the west to Kyrgyzstan in the east. This infrastructural ideology of nationalism uniformly underpins the modern socio-political world. As a result, nationalism also homogenizes our thinking about what is ‘normal, legal and acceptable’ in the case of human groups at the level of states. The basic assumption of nationalism is that one state should be for one nation only, irrespective of how in reality such a nation is defined or composed. The nation is posed as the taxonomically ‘highest’ possible kind of a human group. In turn, only human groups recognized as ‘nations’ have the right to statehood. There are no discernible criteria or principles for a human group to meet in order to be recognized as a nation. Likewise, no rules regulate how these two juridically separate entities of nation and state ought to meet each other and merge into the composite and normatively required entity of nation-state. Although in theory the nation is an actor and the state is a result of the nation’s political will, in most cases, states are proclaimed or founded before their specific nations have been even built. Typically, the populace (or its predefined part) that happens to reside within the boundaries of a newly established polity is declared to be a nation – hence, yielding a nation-state. The pronounced lack of any normative principles that would govern these processes makes the post-1918 ideal of ‘national self-determination’ a dead letter. Contingency, accident and warfare alone allow for the emergence of new nation-states, alongside the disappearance or remolding of extant nation-states. This usual ‘mess’ of history produces nationstates. There is nothing orderly or predictable about it. Nevertheless, the infrastructural ideology of nationalism gives a sheen of perceived normalcy and order (often seen as ‘naturalness’) to such a typical ‘mess of

188  Postscript on methodology history’ and its end result in the form of the world’s nation-states. Polities of this type are highly variegated, perhaps as much as their nonnational predecessors in earlier epochs. The apparent order of today’s state system stems from the now universally shared belief that all of the world’s habitable land must be divided among the extant nation-states. And because there are no ‘higher’ human groups than nations, each human being must ‘naturally’ belong to a nation. By the same token emerges a normative tautology: a worldwide state for all humankind is a sheer impossibility, because humankind was, is and will remain divided into (‘natural’) nations.4 To the ‘modern human’ – educated in state-controlled compulsory elementary schools, encased within the strenuously policed boundaries of their state, imbued by the mass media with oft-repeated slogans of patriotism and unity, directly controlled by the state’s bureaucracy, and taught to see all the other states and their citizens as ‘foreign’ and potentially ‘dangerous’ – the nation seems to be the ultimate (social) reality.5 The modern world’s universally national reality appears to be ‘natural’ and ‘solid,’ many believing it to be even ‘god given’ or a ‘product of nature.’ On the basis of our everyday experience of this national reality obtaining all around the globe, we are nowadays prone to believe that it has always been like that and will continue unaltered into the indefinite future. However, across most of the globe, in postcolonial countries, their inhabitants are removed only by one to three generations from the starkly nonnational past. On the other hand, very few people now alive were born and raised in a pre- or non-national context. However, only we humans, from our experiences, can see that there is nothing universal or inescapable about the division of humankind into nations housed in respective nation-states of their own. This division and form of political organization are as arbitrary as any others invented and practiced by human groups throughout the existence of the species of Homo sapiens sapiens. We and our groups generate, maintain and overhaul social reality, not a god or nature. The rise of the bureaucracy-based hierarchic state is associated with the invention of agriculture and the technology of writing (which allows for separating the functions of communication and bonding, in language use). Before that, all nonface-to-face human groups were uniformly small, their size hovering just above the upper threshold of the face-to-face group, estimated at 150 individuals (Dunbar 1993; Dunbar’s Number 2018). Perhaps, non-face-to-face (imagined) groups were even a rare exception to the norm dictated by the predominance of faceto-face groups in the age of hunter-gatherers. Importantly, each of these groups had its own culture and language (Binford 2001: 143). Perhaps, the best example of a similar situation is nowadays attested in Papua New Guinea. Most of its ‘traditional’ population is organized in territorialized ethnic groups (‘tribes’), usually no bigger than a thousand members. Most of them are agriculturalists, but they did not invent writing, which was brought from outside by European colonialists. Thus, these numerically quite small non-face-to-face ethnic groups represent a transitional stage between typically face-to-face ethnic groups of hunter-gatherers and the overwhelmingly non-face-to-face bureaucratic states (Novotny 2009: 21, 61).

Postscript on methodology 189 Of course, members of each of these highly different human groups see the structure and customs of their group as the golden standard of socio-political organization. They stick to their type of social reality so strongly that they are hardly able to imagine that other human groups can live differently. This is their ‘solid and natural’ reality, which they assume to be ‘universal’ or ‘normal.’ When two groups that differ radically in structure and customs meet, both are in shock. The dominant (most often militarily victorious) group usually imposes its norms and form of social (and political) organization on the absorbed group or on survivors of a vanquished group. Hence, the cognitive shock is most felt by members of the subordinate group, who knew ‘how life had been’ earlier, before they encountered the dominant group. Later, the distinctiveness (i.e., culture, language, customs) of the subordinate group is erased. Children of the surviving members of the vanquished group born into this new, radically changed social reality know no other type of social reality than that of this dominant group. They have effectively become members of the dominant group. This process of a dominant group’s destroying subordinated groups and absorbing their members can be vividly illustrated by the colonial situation in which European ‘settlers’ (i.e., invaders) from a bureaucratic agricultural polity (‘kingdom’ or ‘empire’) conquered and subjected to their rule societies of huntergatherers (and, more rarely, agriculturalists) outside Europe. That is exactly what happened when British (later US) colonizers subjugated a huge number of huntergathering ethnic groups across North America and Australia (Crosby 1986). The languages and cultures of the vast majority of these subjugated groups were lost, or rather destroyed, in the process of subjugation. As a result, nowadays the average Westerner maintains that English is the sole language of Australia, Canada or the United States. Some would correct this by adding French to English in the case of Canada, but hardly anyone would even know of the Indigenous language of Inuit, which is uniquely co-official, alongside English and French, in Canada’s distant and sparsely populated territory of Nunavut. The multiplicity of Indigenous ethnic groups, their languages, their traditions and their customs encountered in colonies appeared to European (Western) colonizers as ‘strange, barbaric and uncivilized.’ On this account, colonial administration claimed that these ‘native’ ethnic groups were ‘without history’ and as such had no voice, did not own their land, and needed to follow the law imposed by European invaders and robbers (Wolf 1982). But in other parts of Eurasia, such as the Indian subcontinent, European colonizers encountered populous agricultural polities with considerable literate elites. The slate could not be ‘wiped clean’ with the use of genocide or ethnic cleansing, as it was the case in North America and Australia (cf Moses and Stone 2007). The colonized societies in Eurasia were typically too numerous and vibrant to be successfully subjugated through the destruction of their cultures and languages. European colonialists did not have the sufficient workforce to replicate what they visited upon the Indigenous ethnic groups in North America or Australia. A different approach had to be applied. In the second half of the 19th century, when statistics became all the rage in the sphere of ‘modern governance,’ British administrators embarked on huge

190  Postscript on methodology censuses of the entire population in British India. But like the case of the census question about ‘nationality and language’ in Europe, quizzing the Indian population about their identity (‘language, caste, tribe or race’) amounted to a query about the population’s social reality. It was not an innocent question. Akin to the nation-state in Europe, the colonial administration asked this question with a preconceived idea about what the reply should be. However, in most instances, the questioned were not privy to the colonial elite’s pet ideas about what one’s identity and its connection to a group should be or was expected to be. Hence, the abundance of ‘incorrect’ replies given in early censuses never ceased to surprise state elites in Europe or colonial administrations operating outside Europe. On the other hand, these ‘incorrect’ answers only reconfirmed the deeply entrenched conviction of European elites that the continent’s population at large (mostly peasants and workers) were ‘immature’ or ‘childlike.’ In the colonies, on the same basis, European administrators and bureaucrats saw such ‘incorrect replies’ as ‘clear proof’ that Indigenous peoples were ‘definitely uncivilized.’ A  solution to this dilemma was compulsory elementary education for ‘ignorant masses’ in Europe and ‘civilizing mission’ (mission civilisatrice) in the case of the colonized populations outside Europe (cf Constantini 2008). In both cases, this meant none other than a concentrated effort to impose a certain type of social reality preferred by the state in Europe or Western colonial elites elsewhere (cf Freye 2007), for the sake of replacing the Other – vernacular or precolonial (disparaged as ‘backward’ or ‘uncivilized’) – types of social reality. In the case of self-declared identity (language included), census allowed for ‘taking stock’ of the views of a given territory’s population in this regard and of how radically these views differed from the elite’s preconceived ideas on what was deemed ‘correct’ or ‘desirable.’ Enormous exercises of this kind undertaken by the colonial administration in British India flabbergasted census takers most. For instance, in 1911, in the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, with a population of 3.16 million (Khan 1912: 15), the inhabitants declared 5,934 major identities and 28,478 minor ones, or in total 34,412 identities, corresponding to the same number of ethnic groups (referred in the census as ‘castes, tribes, races, subcastes, etc.’) (Khan 1912: 199). The numbers yield around 92 people (members) per group on average, which is a result that corresponds well to the territory’s tiny and often-isolated face-to-face village communities. The relation of ‘minor’ to ‘major’ groups is not clearly elaborated in the census results. But assuming that the latter are subsets of the former, the major groups, with 533 members, are on average of a clearly non-face-to-face character, whereas sub-groups, with an average number of 111 members, are definitely face-to-face. In the colonial administration’s eyes, this result was neither ‘modern’ nor ‘civilized,’ especially when compared with the nation of 42 million Brits inhabiting their nation-state of Britain in 1911. From the European perspective, a ‘proper nation’ should contain at least several million members. In this normative view, a nation of 533 people was an impossibility and a nation of 92 members a travesty of the idea of a nation.6 The ideal tacitly proposed by the ideology of nationalism was that of a homogenous nation inhabiting its own nation-state, with no large

Postscript on methodology 191 pockets of ‘foreigners,’ or people ‘belonging to’ other nations. The spatial limits of the nation should tightly overlap with the frontiers of the nation-state. The norm of national homogeneity disregards any economic, professional, class, confessional, racial, linguistic, ethnic, regional, historical or other differences that in reality split any pre-national population and also any actual nation itself. Because of this studious disregard for such differences always present in large groups of people, apparently the mythic ideal of national homogeneity has been successfully achieved, or because of such disregard, it is interpreted as the ‘natural’ state of matters social. This opinion, often seriously maintained by a state’s government and elite, is a form of self-imposed political blindness for legitimizing the rule of a given regime over millions. The ‘masses’ are defined as a nation living within a delimited territory that, in turn, is construed as the nation’s nation-state. ‘Civilized’ British colonial administrators, as convinced members of the British nation, wanted to see in India a degree of such normative socio-spatial ‘national’ homogeneity that they knew from their home nation-state – despite awareness of the well-known fact that apart from being a Brit, they could also be an English, Irish or Welsh person, or a Scot for that matter. But what they actually saw in British India –, for instance, through the lens of the aforementioned 1911 census – was strange and incomprehensible to them, namely a plethora of group identities rooted in villages and in turn intersected by supra-regional, regional and sub-regional elites, alongside professional or family loyalties. Furthermore, all these were underpinned by a variety of religions, scripts and different historical memories of socio-political and economic significance.7 In other words, it was quite a faithful anthropological snapshot of how the subjected colonial population(s) saw themselves and their place in the socio-political order of their day in a given territory, where they happened to live. But this anthropological faithfulness was both too ‘fuzzy’ and too ‘detailed’ for colonial administrators’ needs and wishes. Because of their own ‘superior’ education and convictions, they wanted some ‘clarity,’ meaning results that would more closely follow their British (European, Western, ‘civilized’) ideal of

Figure Pb The ideal socio-spatial stratification in the nation-state: full homogeneity

192  Postscript on methodology

Figure Pc What the British administrators saw: Group identities in the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (schematically represented)

(ethnolinguistic, ethnocultural or ethnoconfessional) national homogeneity. From the bureaucratic perspective, extending direct control over or official communication with 30,000 groups as separate administrative entities was not practical or feasible. On the other hand, the premodern and early modern style of indirect administration – perfect for dealing with such a multitude of socio-politically defined groups – was increasingly shunned as ‘obsolete’ or ‘insufficiently civilized.’8 Hence, after the initial censuses that generated such ‘incorrect’ (unexpected) results, the feverish period of ‘rationalization’ (i.e., ‘massaging’ the data) commenced. Groups and sub-groups and their respective languages ‘enumerated’ in these censuses were merged from above (typically without any consultations with the concerned)9 into bigger (i.e., bureaucratically ‘manageable’) entities. In turn, such bigger ‘rational’ (from the colonial administration’s perspective) entities were ‘standardized’ or ‘fixed’ through mapping and streamlined classification as duly recorded in governmental gazetteers, which subsequently served as normative references for subsequent generations of colonial administrators (Jha 2018: 42). But the colonial administration’s consensus on such bigger entities was not stable. When governors or political needs changed, different entities and different kinds of entities were preferred from one time to another (cf Beek 1997). In independent India (less Bangladesh, Burma and Pakistan that used to be parts of British India), with the population of 838 million at the turn of the 1990s,

Postscript on methodology 193 the number of enumerated groups (‘communities’) continued to be progressively ‘rationalized,’ down to 4,635 in the 1991 census (Singh and Manoharan 1993: 10). Out of this total, 2,209 groups were recognized as ‘main.’ This statistic yields, on average, 181,000 members per group, or 379,000 per main group, definitely all of them non-face-to-face in their character, each the size of a larger regional city. While colonial censuses transferred the concept of the nation (or the ideal of national – that is, ethnolinguistic, ethnoconfessional or both combined – homogeneity) to colonial India, the Linguistic Survey of India (1903–1928) did the same for the transfer of the European concept of Einzelsprache to this subcontinent (Grierson 1903–1928). In (mainly Central) Europe, the census question about language (Einzelsprache) as the measure of ‘nationality’ (or the fact of belonging to an ethnolinguistically defined nation) has been asked regularly since the 1860s, thus contributing to the construction of ethnolinguistically defined national movements and nations across the region. The 8th International Congress of Statistics, held in 1872 in St. Petersburg, made this equation of Einzelsprache with nationality into a ‘civilized’ standard of statistics (Labbé 2019b: 53–56; Report 1875: 37, 41). In 1886, 14 years after, the 7th Oriental Congress, held in Vienna, recommended that the (colonial) government of India conduct a survey of all the British colony’s languages. Meanwhile, the question about nationality had already been asked in the 1872 British India census. Afterward, the question about Einzelsprache replaced this question on nationality in the subsequent Indian census of 1881, or only a year after the same question about language had been included for the first time in Austro-Hungary’s seminal (or fateful) census of 1880. Since then, the language question has become the stalwart of all India’s censuses and remains as such to this day. The question about nationality was revived in independent India for the two censuses, in 1961 and in 1971, but was dropped subsequently. The overlapping (normative isomorphism) of language and nation (effectively imagined into being through the declaration of one’s nationality) could result in the fortification of ethnolinguistic national movements that might eventually splinter the country, as had happened in 1918, in the case of AustriaHungary. Hence, the bureaucracy of colonial and independent India did their best not to allow any such overlapping of an Einzelsprache and a nation to become a political ideal that would override the existing political and administrative boundaries (Census 2018; Singh and Manoharan 1993: 3–4). The Linguistic Survey of India, completed in 1928, registered 872 Einzelsprachen. However, in the list presented to the colonial administration, the number of valid Einzelsprachen was driven down to 723. Additionally, 544 Einzelsprachen were downgraded to the level of ‘dialects,’ imagined as ‘belonging’ to the remaining 179 Einzelsprachen that were accorded with the status of ‘recognized languages.’ Meanwhile, the colonial administration sought to be more ‘rational’ than descriptive, as exemplified by the 1921 census, which recorded 237 Einzelsprachen, or 188 languages and 49 dialects (Singh and Manoharan 1993: 4). The first census in much-smaller, independent India (from which Bangladesh, Burma and Pakistan were detached), carried out in 1951, recorded 845 Einzelsprachen, though only 13 (alongside the non-Indian postcolonial language

194  Postscript on methodology of English) were recognized as official (‘scheduled’) languages for official use in administration and education (Mahapatra 1990: 1). A  decade later, the 1961 census recorded twice as many Einzelsprachen, or 1,652, though only 184 were recognized as languages (‘classified languages’). Two decades later, the 1981 census reported even fewer, specifically 112 ‘classified languages.’ The number of all Einzelsprachen (‘mother tongues’) and that of the classified languages were merged in the 1991 census, resulting in 325 ‘languages spoken at home and in kin groups.’ The previously much higher number of ‘dialects’ continues to be reflected in the ‘total number of communities’ (‘nations’?), which stood at 4,635 in 1991 (Singh and Manoharan 1993: 5–6, 30–31). The 2001 census recorded 356 Einzelsprachen in India. The disliked label ‘dialect’ was abandoned and replaced with the label ‘mother tongue,’ which emphasizes that all reported Einzelsprachen are recognized as languages in their own right. However, for the sake of bureaucratic ‘rationalization,’ the total of 356 Einzelsprachen was split into 122 ‘languages’ and 234 ‘mother tongues.’ The former group is construed as consisting of 22 ‘scheduled (official) languages’ employed in administration and education and 100 ‘languages with more than 10,000 speakers’ (Statement 1 2018). In the early 21st century, the process of imagining, classifying, rationalizing and officializing Einzelsprachen in India seems to have been largely completed. It took over a century, especially because of the employment of some democratic procedures that at times required consultation with the targeted (‘enumerated’ or ‘censused’) populations. Another disruption in this process was the breakup of British India and the founding of the postcolonial nation-states of Bangladesh, Burma, India and Pakistan. Going through these ‘civilizing’ moves was much faster in the communist states of the Soviet Union and China. Both totalitarian governments yet further reduced the need for consultations with the targeted populations. At the same time, monopartyism typically prevented any political forces other than the communist party from drawing legitimacy and support from one ethnolinguistic group or another. The Kremlin and Beijing saw such a tendency of sub-state (regional) and noncommunist political forces to gain political legitimacy on an ethnolinguistic basis as ‘(ethnic) splintering,’ which had to be as harshly suppressed as any other kind of ‘political splintering.’ Only the communist government could decide the state’s political line and the appropriate mix of approved ethnic features that might be acted on in public. In the Soviet Union, despite prominent voices against it, language was equated with nationality (Hirsch 2005: 116), basically in agreement with the recommendation of the aforementioned 8th International Congress of Statistics (1872). This recommendation was adopted by Joseph Stalin in the ‘communist’ definition of the nation, proposed in his 1913 seminal essay on the national question (Stalin 1935 [1913]). In preparation for the first Soviet census of 1926, ethnographers (anthropologists) were tasked with drafting an exhaustive list of ‘nationalities’ (i.e., ethnic groups) living across the Soviet territory (Hirsch 2005). After several rounds of scholarly ‘rationalizations’ – which reduced the eventual number of ethnic groups – census takers and ethnographers came up with the list of 188 nationalities and 123 languages (Narodnost’ 1928: 22, 36). Subsequently, party

Postscript on methodology 195 bureaucrats pared the number of recognized nationalities down to 172, and this reduced list was employed for the 1926 census (Hirsch 2005: 134). By the mid 1930s, the number of recognized nationalities in the Soviet Union had been further reduced to 112. At that time, a novel Soviet distinction was also introduced between natsional’nosti and narodnosti (both confusingly translated into English as ‘nationalities’), or ‘developed (civilized) nations (ethnic groups)’ and ‘underdeveloped (uncivilized) proto-nations (ethnic groups)’ (Hirsch 2005: 143). Afterward, the total number of Soviet nationalities remained largely stable. The 1970 Soviet census recorded 104 nationalities, or 73 natsional’nosti and 31 narodnosti (Hirsch 2005: 322). This statistic ‘proved’ the Soviet success at ‘progress,’ understood as a civilizing process. (From the perspective of numerous non-European ethnic groups, it was none other than typical colonial imposition, a Soviet type of communist ‘civilizing mission.’) In the sphere of nationality policy, this entailed decisive improvements in the overall level of educational achievement (literacy) and living standards, obviously measured against Western-style benchmarks, as arbitrarily decided by the Kremlin. In view of the bureaucratically adopted classificatory scheme, such ‘success’ permitted reclassifying more narodnosti as natsional’nosti. Ideally, all the remaining Soviet narodnosti were soon to become full-fledged national’nosti. In India, census results on languages and communities were not directly translated into the administrative division of the colony (country). But the Soviet revolutionary bureaucrats, led by Joseph Stalin in his capacity as people’s commissar (minister) of nationalities, made census results of this type into the basis of the administrative division of the Soviet Union (Blank 1994; Kaiser 1994: 102–123). For this sake, Soviet apparatchiks equated ‘civilizedness’ and ‘progress’ with full literacy in a nationality’s language, so that each ‘underdeveloped (uncivilized)’ narodnost’ could swiftly rise to the level of ‘developed (civilized)’ natsional’nost’. But the vast majority of the ethnic languages attested across the Soviet territory did not have a written form. In the unprecedented exercise of nation (nationality) and language building, over 100 languages were endowed with writing, yielding around 130 recognized Soviet languages. This number corresponded well to the number of the recognized nationalities in the mid 1930s (Klimovich 1975: 15). Another ‘modernizing’ decision applied from above was the uniformization of the Soviet languages’ scripts. In the ‘revolutionary’ process of ‘Latinization’ (Khansuvarov 1932), all the Einzelsprachen were to be endowed with the Latin alphabet for writing and printing. At that time, this script was arbitrarily (though in line with Western preconceptions) equated with modernity, as opposed to the ‘backward’ Arabic or Chinese scripts or the ‘somewhat lacking’ Cyrillic or Greek alphabets. By the mid 1930s, when the policy was discontinued, the Latin script had already been adopted for 69 Soviet languages (Nurmakov 1934: 156–160). Afterward, Latinization was rapidly reversed, this alphabet now seen as a sure sign of ‘bourgeois-national deviation’ (Reshetar 1953; Schlesinger 1956: 19, 27). Between 1935 and 1941, all the Soviet languages were endowed with a form of Cyrillic, with the rare exceptions of Armenian, Georgian and Yiddish, which were allowed to retain their ‘ancient’ and unique scripts.10 A high degree of scriptal

196  Postscript on methodology homogeneity was achieved across the Soviet Union, thus unifying the multitude of Soviet languages in the almost homogenous scriptal fold of Cyrillic.11 One way or another, this led to the ideological equation of Cyrillic with Soviet communism, pointing the way to the rise of Russian as a presumably neutral, de-ethnicized communist language of interethnic communication for the classless communist Soviet narod (people or nation) (cf Ivanov 1986; Russian as a Language 2012), which at times was referred unequivocally as the Soviet natsiia (nation) (Sinitsin 2018). The recognition of so many languages and nationalities as the foundation of statehood building and legitimization caused the Soviet ethnofederal project to go into ideologically motivated overdrive. In the period of korenizatsiia (nativization, indigenization), or the empowering of nationalities (Kaiser 1994: 124– 135), by 1932, over 17,300 national autonomous administrative entities had been established across the Soviet Union. It was a leninist reply to the wilsonian principle of national self-determination for ethnolinguistically (and ethnoconfessionally) defined nations. At that time, the communist country’s population stood at 147 million, yielding on average 8,500 inhabitants per an autonomous area. This situation was not to last, and by 1938, the number of such autonomous administrative entities had been drastically reduced to 46, or reduced 376-fold (Martin 2001: 413). Despite the fact that the Soviet Union gained much territory in the wake of World War II, the number of national autonomous entities did not rise considerably. Before its breakup in 1991, the Soviet Union contained 15 union (national) republics, 20 autonomous republics, eight autonomous regions and ten autonomous districts – that is, 53 in total. These 53 national (autonomous) administrative units were earmarked for 58 ‘titular nationalities’ (Marusenko 2015: 121). Some elements of this system of ethnoterritorial federalism are retained in today’s Russian Federation, where in 2013 (before the annexation of Crimea), among the country’s 89 federal entities, 31 enjoyed a degree of ethnolinguistically defined national autonomy (Marusenko 2015: 121–122). However, many of these autonomous territories are inhabited by majoritarian Russian populations. Ethnic non-Russians account for 19 percent of the country’s inhabitants (Demographics of Russia: Ethnic Groups 2018). As in numerous other ways, during the 1950s and 1960s, early communist China closely emulated the Soviet Union in its approach to the ‘national and language’ question (cf Bernstein and Li 2010). Having accepted the Western (colonial) and Soviet (‘progressive’) equation of the nation (ethnicity, nationality) with language (Einzelsprache) (Mullaney 2011: 42–68), in 1954 Chinese ethnographers came up with the list of 400-odd minzu12 groups – that is, non-Han (ethnically non-Chinese) nationalities (ethnic groups) (Mullaney 2011: 34). In the span of just two years, the number was radically reduced, and in 1956, the dogma of China’s 56 minzus was enshrined. And each minzu comes complete with its own language (Huang and Lianzhu 2005; Mullaney 2011: 120–124; Yang 2009). Many of these languages had to be endowed with a written form; hence, the interwar Soviet Union’s experience of vast language building (‘engineering’) came in handy. For these recognized 56 nationalities (minzus), well over a thousand

Postscript on methodology 197 autonomous administrative entities were founded. Most survive to this day, adding up to 1,345 – specifically five autonomous regions, 33 autonomous prefectures and leagues, 169 autonomous counties and banners and 1,138 autonomous townships and sumus (Administrative 2018). In 2010, around 112 million people belonged to China’s recognized 56 minzus, meaning that on average one autonomous territory was created for 98,000 minzu inhabitants. However, because Hans (ethnic Chinese) account for more than 90 percent of the country’s population, often many more Hans live in these autonomous territories than do members of the titular minzus (Demographics of China 2018). As a result, the situation is similar to what is observed now in many autonomous territorial entities in present-day Russia. After the conclusion of the Vietnam War in 1975, the Soviet model of ethnic classification of nationalities (minorities)13 was adopted in united communist Vietnam. This step resulted in the Chinese-style dogma of the set number of 53 groups of this kind in the country, as announced by the authorities in the first postwar census of 1979. However, Hanoi’s propaganda stresses that Vietnam is inhabited by 54 equal ethnic groups. The additional 54th group corresponds to the majoritarian ethnic Vietnamese – that is, the Viet (Kinh) (Masako 2013). At the same time, the Soviet and Vietnamese practice of formulating and pursuing nationality policies was also adopted in communist Laos (Pholsena 2006: 151–179). In the 1995 census, the Laotian authorities settled on 47 ‘main ethnic groups’ and 149 sub-groups, usually subsumed under the former. Counterintuitively, in the early 21st century, the numbers were revised upward to 49 main ethnic groups and over 160 of their sub-groups (Lao 2006: 4). Hence, apparently, the process of ‘rationalizing’ the number of enumerated groups has not yet begun in Laos, or a different approach has been adopted on this matter in communist Laos. The future will tell. Of course, in their effort to put the population into neatly defined and delineated ethnic categories, to a degree, Vietnamese and Laotian party officials-cum-anthropologists also fell back on the prerevolutionary tradition of the rather rudimentary ethnographic research and colonial censuses, as earlier pursued by the colonial administration of French Indochina (Cincotta-Segi 2011: 13; Michaud 2007; Pholsena 2006: 152–154; Salemink 1999). Interestingly, after the 1974 revolution deposed the emperor, the colonial-cumSoviet-style ‘nationality policy’ of classifying and recognizing ethnic groups, endowing them with languages and allowing a degree of cultural-cum-territorial autonomy, was also implemented in Soviet (Derg) Ethiopia. (Derg, or ‘council’ in Amharic, is none other than soviet ‘council’ in Russian.) Earlier, this highly multiethnic empire was gradually fashioned as an ethnolinguistic nation-state. After the 1930s, all the (educated – that is, literate) population were expected to speak and write the country’s sole national and official language of Amharic. Ironically, the proposed ethnic federalization of communist (Soviet) Ethiopia did not progress much until 1991, when the Derg (Soviet) regime was toppled in a military conflict. To many observers’ surprise, the victorious new anticommunist government retained the idea of territorial autonomies for ethnolinguistically defined nationalities. What is more, it actually overhauled postcommunist Ethiopia into

198  Postscript on methodology a genuine federation of vaguely (or broadly?) defined ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ with the right to self-determination, including secession (Constitution of the Federal Democratic 1994: Art 39). (A provision to the same effect had been included in the Soviet Constitution [Constitution 1977: Art 72]). Also, all the languages of Ethiopia’s more than 80 ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ were recognized, and should their users wish so, these vernaculars may be made into ‘working languages’ of administration and education. Amharic continues to be recognized as the working language of the entire federation, though in reality, English seems to fill this role (Constitution of the Federal Democratic 1994: Art 5). Although the Ethiopian 2007 census recorded over 80 ‘ethnic groups’ (a popular statistical shorthand for the lengthy constitutional designation ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’) and their languages, the ten ethnic groups with a population of more than one million are singled out as somehow the most important (‘main’) ones (Population 2008: 16, 84–110). This perfect equation of about 80-odd ethnic groups with their 80-odd Einzelsprachen is reconfirmed on the country’s government websites (cf About Ethiopia 2018). As of 2005, out of Ethiopia’s 84 ethnic (national) languages, an estimated 24 were already endowed with writing. Of these 24 ‘written languages,’ 22 were employed to a varying degree as media of education (Seidel, Moritz and Tadesse 2009: 60, 64). But apart from English, actually as few as four Ethiopian languages seem to be in regular official use in administration. On top of that, English remains the sole medium of instruction at the country’s universities (Ethiopia 2018). Last but not least, the first timid attempt at ‘rationalization’ (i.e., the bureaucratic reduction in the number of languages) failed quickly in the late 1990s, due to strong grassroots opposition14 (Vaughan 2003: 248–260). That is a clear proof that top-down language and ethnic engineering projects are hard to implement in nontotalitarian regimes, when concerned populations disagree and enjoy some effective form of political representation at the state level. That is why decisions about recognizing (or not) ethnic groups (nationalities) and languages corresponding to them were the swiftest and most thorough (including ‘rationalization,’ or the bureaucratically driven radical reduction of their numbers) in the totalitarian communist polities of the Soviet Union and China. Similar impositions were easy enough to implement by the colonial administration in British India, but they became increasingly stalled by grassroots opposition and local interests in independent India. Similar policies attempted in Ethiopia, already in the age of the internet, were met with much stauncher, faster and moreeffective opposition. The aforementioned examples drawn from India, the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, Laos and Ethiopia illustrate how the intimately related European concepts of nation and Einzelsprache were imposed on or adopted by numerous non-European territories and polities (cf Burke 2000). In this process Indigenous concepts of groupness and linguistic units were de-normalized, abandoned and often actively denigrated as ‘backward,’ ‘uncivilized’ and even ‘barbaric.’ As a result, non-European knowledges of this kind were suppressed, replaced and – in most cases – irrecoverably lost (destroyed) (cf Arias 2017: 221; Bunda 2018:

Postscript on methodology 199 89; Burke 2012: 135–159; Mülhäusler 1996: 144). Nowadays this huge cognitive loss underlies the nearly universal conviction that humankind is ‘naturally’ divided into nations and all the human linguistic heritage and diversity into Einzelsprachen (cf Mülhäusler 1996: 54). This strong normative belief produces deep prejudices against human groups who do not or do not want to follow this Western ‘norm.’ They are denigrated as ‘tribes’ and their own linguistic units as ‘idioms’ (or as ‘vernaculars’ and ‘dialects’), both ‘not modern’ or, even more strongly, ‘backward’ and in ‘dire need’ of ‘progress’ and ‘modernization’ (Chodakiewicz 2017; Dawkins 2018; Dikie 2018; Głębocki 2006: 291). Should such groups display some modern-style political aspirations for the sake of reaffirming their Indigenous political and cultural needs and identity, the West and Western-educated local state leaders already in power brush off the groups’ movements and organizations as a form of ‘tribalism’ or a kind of politics that is ‘backward’ and should not be listened to or acted on. The unarticulated agenda is the normative conviction that the territorial integrity of colonies should be preserved no matter what, because after gaining independence, they were already transformed into nationstates. So what was announced to be the success of ethnolinguistically defined national self-determination in Central Europe after the Great War or in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union now is negatively branded as ‘tribalism’ in postcolonial countries in Africa or South Asia (Lentz 1993; Problems 1970; Schwarz 1966; Wołejko 2008). On the other hand, when in British India some Indigenous movements sought to employ religion in conjunction with a language (or instead of a language) as a basis for building nations and to avail themselves of the principle of national selfdetermination, their efforts were criticized as equally backward ‘communalism’ – which critics contrasted with ‘real, healthy or progressive nationalism’ – that seeks to preserve the territorial integrity of multicultural, polyglot and multiconfessional India (Bahadur and Johari 1982; Chandra 1984; Chatterji 1994), as though religion had had nothing to do with the founding of such European nationstates as Belgium in 1831, Bulgaria in 1878 or Bosnia in 1992. Catholicism decisively contributed to the separation of Belgium from the ideologically Protestant United Kingdom of the Netherlands. Orthodox Christianity played the same role in separating Bulgaria from the ideologically Muslim Ottoman Empire in 1878. And in turn, the Bosnian national identity steeped in Islam led to the emergence of independent Bosnia from the overwhelmingly Christian Yugoslavia. At present, no one disparages Belgian, Bulgarian or Bosnian nationalism as a form of ‘communalism,’ yet this accusation continues to be leveled against their Pakistani, Sri Lankan and Burmese counterparts. Islam was the basis for the founding of Pakistan, while Buddhism fulfilled the same role in the case of the other two nation-states.15 Unlike Pakistan, Einzelsprachen were also employed in the process of nation-state building in Sri Lanka and in Burma, respectively Sinhalese and Burmese. Ironically, such terms of cognitive and ideological abuse as ‘tribe’ or ‘idiom’ are of European (Western) origin and initially were applied by Christians and Christian powers against ‘heathens and infidels’ (non-Christians) in the effort to

200  Postscript on methodology (re-)Christianize the continent of Europe. What is more, the very ‘tribalism’ – or endowing ‘tribes’ as defined by colonialists with languages that were arbitrarily codified (i.e., constructed) most often by missionaries – was a European (Western) imposition from above. This imposition came complete with the normative equation of language with ethnic group (i.e., the nation) (Chimhundu 1992; Mülhäusler 1996: 145, 147, 169, 171; Vail 1989). In the wake of the imperial expansion of Europe and the West, the task of ‘civilizing’ the ‘benighted’ Indigenous populations in the colonies was left (or rather, outsourced) to missionaries. Frequently a network of missions doubled as an educational and administrative system for ‘natives’ (that is the colonized). Missionary schools, with the colonial administration’s support and approval, were to overhaul ‘uncivilized natives’ into ‘cultural whites’ (that is ‘European-like’), with an eye to filling in the lowest ranks of a settler society of colonists (cf Jarkowiec 2018; Prucha 1990: 59). Part and parcel of the modern process of ‘Christianizing heathens’ during the past two centuries entails translating the Bible into the world’s ‘all languages.’ Hence, the Western (European) norm of Einzelsprache, more or less tacitly posed as a metonym for ‘tribal’ (i.e., national, ethnic) groupness continues to spread to the globe’s each corner, more often than not leading to the wholesale destruction of Indigenous cultures and concepts (Novotny 2009: 25–28; Stoll 1982). Nowadays ‘seeing’ and participating in social reality of one’s group is not a straightforward, let alone innocent, act. If the perceiver is from Europe (or the West), the gaze of their ‘mind’s eye’ reinforces and projects the worldwide ‘infrastructural’ norms of the nation and Einzelsprache, the two standard units of groupness and linguistic difference, respectively. On the other hand, the nonWesterner’s gaze of the same kind agrees (however grudgingly) to this Western (European) colonial (or civilizational) imposition and contributes to the continued forgetting and loss of other (Indigenous) concepts (units) of human groupness and linguistic difference. In this manner, the loss of non-Western knowledges has been rather sealed. To a large degree, in Europe, nationalism was initially a similar cognitive imposition on (often-unfree) peasant masses, as executed by a narrow (noble or bourgeois) elite who staffed state (imperial) administration and schools. It was so, especially in early modern Central and Eastern Europe, where nobles and serfs were whole worlds apart. With the employment of today’s scholarly terminology, we can propose that nobles and their serfs belonged to two entirely different ethnic groups. Or more exactly, the serfs – due to their spatial and social immobility and implied isolation – constituted a myriad of (local or micro-)ethnic groups (Dorfethnos, Lokalethnos) (Moritsch 1991a: 31, 43, 1991b: 82), contained to a given village, parish or specialized town quarter (cf Linek 2013; Moritsch 1991b; Kizwalter 1999: 21, 23; Struve 2011). Such village or parish micro-ethnic groups of serfs in spatial and social dimensions were quite similar to Indigenous (micro-) ethnic groups of hunters-gatherers in the Americas, Australia and Africa (cf Varese 2006: 158). Micro-ethnic groups of this kind were typically (almost) face-toface in their character. Similarly, Central Europe’s micro-ethnic groups of serfs (or their descendants) usually preserved their own concepts of social groupness

Postscript on methodology 201 and linguistic difference well until the turn of the 20th century. All this time, they creatively adapted these local concepts to the changing socio-political and economic situations and challenges (cf Liszka 1996; Méryová 1990; Paládi-Kovács 1988; Schwarz-Denk 1983). However, the homogenizing force of the ethnolinguistic nation-state finally extinguished such local knowledges through compulsory education, military service and the ubiquitous mass media and intrusive state bureaucracy in a single national language. For members of a rural micro-ethnic group, their (social) world looked like in the schematic representation of a society of estates given next (cf Gellner 1983: 10). Somewhere far away in the kingdom’s capital and in the almost as distant capital of their region, the monarch, bishops, dukes and nobles resided and busied themselves with the ruling of the realm. Much farther away lived the pope and emperor, who ‘reigned over the world.’ All these ‘high-flying’ personalities moved freely around their kingdom or realm, across Europe and the entire globe. This fact appeared fable-like to a land-bound unfree serf and hence was almost impossible to imagine. The male serf’s world was contained to his village and parish, from which, during his entire life, he typically never traveled farther than the nearest market town. (Peasant women were even more limited in their spatial mobility, the perimeter of the female serf’s world being the nearest church or chapel.) The only time that the male serf could glimpse his ‘social betters,’ belonging to the estates (social ethnic groups) of nobility and clergy, was when a representative of the latter said mass in the parish church or when a noble landowner of the village and the vicinity arrived to collect taxes and dispense (often dubious) patrimonial justice. Serfs from a single village-centered micro-ethnic group were as distrustful of nobles and priests as of members of other peasant micro-ethnic groups. Their ‘real social’ world was their village community alone. In their ‘mind’s eye,’ they could hardly ‘see’ farther than their home village, their parish and perhaps the closest market town, alongside the neighboring villages with their own ‘foreign’ micro-ethnic groups (cf Stomma 1986: 87, 143, 206). That is why serf peasants belonging to micro-ethnic groups were astounded when in the 19th century, from time to time, an amateur noble scholar and, later, an early national activist descended on them, demanding an answer to the confusing question whether they belong to Nation X or Nation Y. Serfs could not refuse getting engaged in a conversation with a noble at the pain of possible punishment but were patently unable to come up with a ‘correct reply,’ as expected by such a scholar or national activist. Peasants often proposed that they belonged to the nation of their village or parish, to the nation of their monarch or religion, or to the local nation of wherever they lived. The serf peasants to whom this question was posed vaguely sensed from the flow of the discussion that the unfamiliar term nation had something to do with their loyalty to the noble landowner, the king or the top ecclesiastical hierarch. Asking a serf peasant about their language (in the enquirer’s naïve belief that language equates to nation) did not help either. A peasant typically replied that they and their neighbors were talking ‘in their own or local way’ or ‘in a Catholic (Muslim, Orthodox) manner.’ This experience was equally mystifying to an

202  Postscript on methodology

Figure Pd Society of estates: A socio-spatial diagram (adapted from Gellner 1983: 10)

intrepid noble scholar or national activist, because in the course of their formal (modern) education, they had become inculcated with the – at present universally accepted – ‘infrastructural norm’ (belief) that humankind is ‘naturally’ divided into nations and that linguistic difference is fully contained in the supposedly discrete units of Einzelsprachen. Hence, in the scholar’s or activist’s view, serfs should ‘naturally’ know about ‘their’ languages and nations, because these divisions of the social and linguistic were ‘visible and known to all and sundry’ as ‘created by god’ or ‘produced by nature’ (cf Stančić 2002: 81–82). Noble scholars and early national activists were sure that if they asked this national-cum-language question in a sufficiently ‘simple way,’ a peasant would ‘naturally’ provide a ‘correct’ answer that would correspond to this ideal of national homogeneity (Figure Pb). But serf peasants’ replies were tied to their resepctive quotidian social experiences of the isolated and underprivileged bottom corner in a given polity’s society of estates, namely to the respective micro-ethnic group of their village and parish (Figure Pd).16 With time, though without admitting this explicitly, national activists came to an understanding that for peasants to begin defining themselves as belonging to this or that nation, they must be first educated to ‘see’ social reality in this specifically national manner. Compulsory elementary education for all children (including girls), military conscription for all men, and equality before the law for all (despite any earlier or still obtaining estate differences) were the basic instruments employed for spreading the intended ‘national message.’ Schools provided all the population with literacy and numeracy. Access to newspapers and books allowed peasants to ‘see’ that beyond one’s village is also one’s (national) polity in a huge world of numerous states, colonies and empires. Military service allowed men to experience personally this polity of ‘their own’ and even some foreign lands. And last but not least, equality before the law (followed by full male and female suffrage) gradually convinced peasants that after all nobles and clergy may not

Postscript on methodology 203 belong to ‘foreign estate nations’ – that actually peasants, nobles, priests, sailors, merchants, soldiers and city dwellers may all be members of the same nation. In Central Europe, such a nation was typically delineated (defined) by the shared ‘national language,’ or the specific Einzelsprache that served as the sole medium of education and administration. A commander shouted out loud orders in the same national language, and soldiers of peasant origin read newspapers and chapbooks printed in this Einzelsprache too. The concept of the ethnolinguistically defined nation was counterintuitive and oftentimes flabbergasting to Central Europe’s serfs, in the first half of the 19th century. But it began spreading fast across the region during the latter half of this century, following the phasing out of any remaining elements of the serfdom (‘feudal’) system (Sundhaußen 1973). This belief in the ethnolinguistic nation was bolstered and fleshed out with the ‘scientific’ findings of statewide censuses. In their course, the questions about an individual’s language and nationality (or the fact of belonging to a nation) were regularly asked and were subsequently reported and hotly debated in the press. The terms nation and Einzelsprache left the sphere of esoteric scholarly terminology and became emotionally tinted buzzwords of mass politics and everyday conversations. This novel national conviction, underpinned with a corresponding Einzelsprache, began to delegitimize Central and Eastern Europe’s typically nonnational monarchical kingdoms and empires. From a political vantage point, this looked inappropriate: a single polity comprised several ethnolinguistically defined nations. In the rapidly ascending age of mass politics, fueled by universal male (and later also female) suffrage, the narrow post-estate multiethnic elite was too weak and too sparsely spread out to keep a vast or small nonnational polity together if it appeared to be ‘multinational,’ from the perspective of ethnolinguistic nationalism (Figure Pe). Another version of this dilemma made an appearance when a single ethnolinguistically defined nation seemed to be torn asunder among several nonnational polities. This is a national interpretation of the situation. The polities in question typically existed for a long time before such an ethnolinguistic nation was even postulated and then created (Figure Pf). Typically, in a purely chronological sense, before 1918 each nonnational polity that was destroyed in Central Europe to make room for nation-states was much older than any of the ethnolinguistic nations for which these national polities were founded. For instance, the Holy Roman Empire dissolved in 1806 and was officially founded in 962 or even in 800. German national activists began propagating and shaping an ethnolinguistically defined

Narrow all-imperial/all-state (estate) elite Ethnolinguistic nation A

Ethnolinguistic nation B

Ethnolinguistic nation C

Ethnolinguistic nation D

Ethnolinguistic nation E

Figure Pe An old, nonnational polity in which several ethnolinguistically defined nations emerged

204  Postscript on methodology nation of Germans (i.e., German speakers) at the turn of the 19th century, during the Napoleonic wars. The promise of German nationalism was fulfilled with the founding of the German nation-state in 1871. It came in the form of the federal German Empire, which incorporated, as constitutive federal entities, the nonnational kingdoms, (grand) duchies, principalities and free cities from the northern half of the Holy Roman Empire. Ideologues of ethnolinguistic nationalism, in their widespread espousal of hardly ever questioned perennialism, claimed the contrary. With no evidence to support this view, they proposed that every ethnolinguistic nation was much older than any then-extant multiethnic empire in Central Europe. According to ethnolinguistic nationalists, their nations were presumably ‘dormant’ for centuries before ‘awakening’ in this modern age to claim – in terms of population and territory – what was ‘rightfully theirs’ by a ‘god’s will’ or by ‘nature.’ This is the source of the lasting popularity of the nationalist slogan ‘(re)awakening of our nation’ (also rendered as ‘national rebirth’ or ‘national revival’)17 for referring to the process of building an ethnolinguistic nation. This phrase often doubles as a ‘neutral term’ of analysis in Central Europe’s national historiographies. With time, the mythologizing (and at the same time normative) hold of ethnolinguistic nationalism became so strong that even an average national activist tended to believe, quite blindly, that they only hastened the ‘natural’ process of (re)awakening an ancient (or even eternal) nation, rather than believing that they were involved in cocreating it from scratch here and now (cf Maxwell 2020). Findings of sample censuses in select regions in Central Europe’s polities, as carried out from the turn of the 19th century until the 1860s, did not confirm the postulated existence of any ‘dormant ancient’ nations waiting to be ‘(re)awakened.’ They could not, because censuses of this kind took place before the normative ideological equation of Einzelsprache with the nation in a given administrative region of an empire or kingdom became a widely accepted political and scholarly norm of human groupness. Census questions about features of social reality were limited to those about the religion (denomination) and estate membership of a person. In the pre-national age, exclusively these features counted as of political and social significance, in accordance with (Central) Europe’s early modern (‘Westphalian’) model of statehood organization, legitimization and maintenance. In non-European states (especially colonies), the situation was similar. The vast majority of the population were to a degree unfree and mostly worked in agriculture. As a result, they were socially and spatially immobile and were illiterate, like serf peasants in Central Europe. Religion and the estate-like fact of belonging Polity A

Polity B

Polity C

Polity D

Polity E

A single ethnolinguistically defined nation Figure Pf A newly created ethnolinguistic nation imagined to be divided among several much older, nonnational polities

Postscript on methodology 205 to the colonial or Indigenous elite mattered most. As in Central Europe, also in colonies, national (anticolonial) movements and industrialization radically altered this ‘natural’ status quo through compulsory elementary education and military conscription. Both phenomena produced mass society composed of equal citizens with the legally enshrined same opportunities of spatial and social mobility. This unprecedented development was facilitated by technology in the form of rapidly expanding train and road networks, alongside those of telegraphy, telephony and transoceanic travel. The changes seen as hallmarks of Western-style ‘modernization’ both enabled and necessitated an explosive growth in newspaper and book publishing, or Andersonian ‘print capitalism.’ It was in this mental ‘mirror’ of the printed page in which freshly literate and mobile individuals belonging to rural micro-ethnic groups, for the first time ever, saw themselves as members of spatially and demographically huge non-face-to-face nations. Through this looking glass of differing perceptions and expectations, these individuals made a leap of national faith, crossing to the ‘national shores of modernity’ (Anderson 1983: 39–38; Cheah and Culler 2003; Jeffrey 2000; Reed 2004). In Central Europe, the change from the estate to national model of sociopolitical organization of human groups was strongly tied to the abolishment of serfdom. In colonies strewn across the Eastern Hemisphere (or the ‘Old World’), the usual breaking point was independence, or in other words, decolonization, which – by default and without much discussion – overhauled colonies into nation-states in close emulation of the West. In the runup to the emergence of nations and the founding of their national polities, both in estate contexts and in colonial contexts, politicians and national-cum-independence activists perceived the structure of society as unjust and unduly divisive. It was highly vertical and horizontal, with the narrow ruling and administering elite at the top of the social pyramid, who oversaw the ‘rest’ pushed to the bottom. This ‘rest’ was composed of disenfranchised masses atomized and made powerless in their spatially isolated villages and distant provincial towns. The Western European ideology of marxism (communism, socialism, social democracy) endowed this perception of the obtaining social situation with much political urgency and a potential (or even need) for a revolutionary change. Marxists of a variety of political stances agreed that this situation was intolerable and in essence illegitimate and that it amounted to unjust and unjustifiable exploitation of the ‘toiling’ majority (‘masses’) by a ‘parasitic’ minority (nobility, colonial administration). The blueprint for a change – national, anticolonial or communist revolution – was at hand (cf Fundamentals 1963: 394– 430; Nzula, Potekhin and Zusmanovich 1979 [1933]). Before the destruction of nonnational polities and their replacement with nationstates, the powers that be tried as well as they could to accommodate growing national demands, alongside workers’ and peasants’ economic postulates, in order to preserve the extant nonnational polities. Likewise, colonial administrations across Eurasia and Africa embarked on a similar program of self-preservation, especially in the wake of both world wars, which had entailed the draft of millions of colonials (‘natives’) to the Western armies. Their participation in the ‘white man’s war’ was a great eye opener that after the conflict translated into veterans’ growing social and

206  Postscript on methodology

Figure Pg Estate or colonial society at the verge of the nationalizing change

political self-awareness and influence across colonial societies. In Europe, peasants and workers enjoyed suffrage, even women did in some countries. The continent’s Indigenous languages were made into national languages and replaced the imperial languages. And above all, the two world wars proved that all humans were equal. The racist belief in the superiority of ‘white skin’ did not make Westerners or white colonial administrators immune to death in combat or to disease. Bullets and viruses did not discriminate between ‘white people’ and ‘non-white people,’ or for that matter, between descendants of nobles and serfs. Under the influence of the aforementioned ‘modernizing’ reforms, which were to preserve the existence of non-national polities in Europe and of colonies in Africa and Asia, the estate and colonial structure of society (cf Figures Pd and Pc) began undergoing transformation. This change rapidly altered how both elites and masses perceived their position in this overhauled social structure, alongside the relations between these two strata. Modernization, be it nation building or decolonization, brought about unprecedented sociopolitical flux with concomitant upheavals. In the eyes of those concerned, the goal of this gigantic overhaul was a homogenous society of equals, whether they agreed with it or not. In terms of statehood, the change was underpinned by the novel worldwide (‘universal’) infrastructural ideology of nationalism, which prescribed ‘one state for one nation’ only. National activists in Europe carried out the program of building nation-states across the continent, while anticolonial-cum-national activists in Africa and Asia adopted this Western ideology as their own and carried out decolonization in line with the logic of this ideology (cf Mishra 2012). As a result, nationalism became the globe’s first ‘infrastructural ideology’ – in other words, the sole accepted ideology of statehood construction, legitimation and maintenance. Nonnational polities were rapidly delegitimized, destroyed or overhauled and were eventually replaced by nation-states all around the world during the latter half of the 20th century. Since the breakup of the nonnational Soviet Union in 1991, nowadays almost all the extant polities are nation-states (cf Figure Pb).

Postscript on methodology 207 This new normative ideal of nation-states for all the globe entailed a lot of requirements to be met. First, compulsory free elementary education for all, equality before law for all, full suffrage had to be combined with the growing ease of transportation and communication on a mass scale. These achievements made large-scale industrialization possible and simultaneously necessitated an explosive growth in and the proliferation of towns and cities (i.e., urbanization). The subsequent mass movement of population from the countryside to urban and quickly urbanizing areas took place in the context of the post-World War II population boom, fueled by improved healthcare and the green revolution in agriculture. The latter almost liquidated the phenomenon of periodic famines that earlier had blighted all parts of the world, including the West, leading to the continual curbing of population growth. From the perspective of societal structure as overhauled and perceived by its members of different statuses, the spatial mobility of former nobles and members of colonial administrations got limited to the frontiers of the new nation-state of which one happened to be(come) a citizen. Simultaneously, former nobles and colonial administrators had no choice but to accept (however grudgingly) the extended spatial mobility of former serfs and ‘colonial natives’ across the entire territory of the nation-state, alongside their growing social mobility throughout the nation’s entire ladder of socioeconomic classes. On the other hand, from the perspective of peasants and subjected colonial populations, becoming equal with former overlords necessitated leaving the face-to-face (often-stifling) coziness of one’s village, parish or mahalla (ethnoconfessional city quarter). This typically meant traveling vast (from the traditional village’s perspective) distances across the nation-state, or even from one continent to another, in search of better life and for the sake of successful competition with one’s former ‘social betters.’ As a result, old social structures (Figures Pd and Pc) were ‘melting away’ and thus were gradually giving way to the striven-for normative homogeneity of the nation (Figure Pb). This momentous social and spatial change is schematically depicted in Figure Ph. In the diagram, some peasants or colonials had already left their villages, while their perception of social reality became increasingly broadened, to encompass the administrative region of their residence and, at times, even the entire nation-state. Nobles or colonial administrators try to hinder this novel spatial and social advancement of peasants or colonials by containing them to this or that region and subservient status and by replicating former noble and colonial elites at the level of such regions or in successor nation-states. Normative full equality or national homogeneity is at the center of the present-day socio-political game. All the population of a given nation-state is inching ever closer toward this ideal. But the ideal once again becomes elusive, due to the rise of yet another type of inequality that keeps undermining social unity (homogeneity), be it racial, gender, health, income or pay differences and concomitant (however subtle) discrimination. In today’s world, underpinned by the infrastructural ideology of nationalism that puts a premium on (national) homogeneity, those pleased with their place under the sun, when they are looking at their own nation-state, see perfect social homogeneity (cf Figure Pb). However, those who do not feel to be as equal

208  Postscript on methodology

Figure Ph Society in flux: En route from estate or colonial society to the nation (national homogeneity)

as promised and expected and who consider their rights to be still trampled by ‘higher classes’ or their ‘social betters,’ perceive that society (the nation) remains rather transitional – as in Figure Ph. Significant differences among the inhabitants in their perception of social reality in a given nation-state generate political tensions. In turn, a political tension of this kind fuels discussions in parliament, the press, television, on the radio, in cyberspace and over the course of everyday conversations with family members, neighbors and acquaintances. Talking as much generates, legitimizes and maintains a certain type of social reality as it changes this social reality. Such a change occurs through questioning, delegitimizing, destroying and replacing social reality as we have known it until now. Today’s nations, Einzelsprachen and nation-states seem to be set in stone in the eyes of the generations born to this national condition. Yet these ‘building blocks’ of modernity will inescapably change and disappear as other types of Western and non-Western concepts of statehood (social groupness) and linguistic difference (alongside their actualizations) did in the past. The shape of social reality is a river, its bed and banks always transforming. The metaphoric water flow is constantly ebbing and flowing (Bauman 2000). This will continue as long as there are people around in numbers sufficient for the rise and maintenance of non-face-to-face groups, or Benedict Anderson’s imagined communities. Πάντα ῥεῖ panta rhei ‘everything flows.’

Postscript on methodology 209 The postcommunist After the breakup of the last extensive self-declared nonnational period polity – that is, the Soviet Union in 1991 – nationalism became The cyberspace the world’s sole ‘infrastructural’ ideology of statehood age creation, legitimation and maintenance The 21st century The new norm: nationalism = modernity (Interestingly, in the modern period, the Soviet Union [full name: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] was the sole polity with a name that does not contain any geographic or ethnic reference. The names of all other states contain such references as a matter of course. The name of the Soviet Union was invented in such a manner to be credible and usable for a potential worldwide [communist] state for all humankind.) In terms of Einzelsprachen and cyberspace, the cleavage between the ‘poor Global South’ and the ‘rich Global North’ is compounded with another cleavage, that between Eurasia and the Rest. In Eurasia, indigenous Einzelsprachen are employed in the function of official and national languages and as media of education. Elsewhere, in Africa, the Americas and Australasia, European colonial languages (and the Asian Einzelsprache of Arabic) are overwhelmingly employed in these functions. Hence, the new norm: Eurasia’s indigenous languages (cultures) are overwhelmingly used for creating and dominating the internet – that is, ‘global culture.’ In the terms of the politics of script, this cleavage between Eurasia and the Rest is predominantly marked by the employment of the European script of Latin letters across the Rest, while in Eurasia a variety of state and regional scripts are in use. From the perspective of cyberspace, the Western (European) dominance of the internet was marked by the initially exclusive use of Latin letters for URL addresses. Gradually, other scripts were allowed in this function after 2010, but their uptake is slow and Latin alphabet–based URL addresses predominate to this day. Hence, the old norm was recast as a new one: Latin alphabet = progress = modernity = the ‘most developed’ script = ‘neutral script’ The Western (European) cultural and linguistic imperialism is visible in sharper relief on the internet than in ‘real’ life (offline). In 2020, almost 90% of the internet content is available only in European Einzelsprachen, and as much as 60% is available in English alone. Although Chinese-speaking users of the web amount to almost 20%, the Chinese-language online content barely constitutes more than 1%, or just half of the content available in Japanese, Persian or Turkish. Hence, the old norm was recast as a new one: Europe’s old imperial languages = the internet’s overwhelmingly dominant (imperialistic) Einzelsprachen Figure Pi Devices for creating and delimiting the concept of Einzelsprache and its actualizations – that is, languages (Einzelsprachen)18

210  Postscript on methodology Surprisingly, after English, the second-largest linguistic content on the web is available in Russian, amounting to the whooping 8%, though Russian speakers make up a mere 2.5% of all internet users. An explanation of this surprising development may be the ideology of the ‘Russian World,’ which is employed to justify Moscow’s widespread use of the web for cyberwarfare and hybrid war. A similar discrepancy between online content and Web users is observable between the Einzelsprachen of Arabic and Persian. Although at over 5% Arabic-speaking internet users are twice as numerous as their Persian-speaking counterparts, online content in the former language standing at a mere 1% is almost one-third that of Persian, which amounts to 2.7%. This means that in cyberspace Shia Iran is winning (for the time being) with Sunni Saudi Arabia. At present, China appears to be content with the tight control over the Chinese-language internet content and does not seem to aspire to employ cyberspace for projecting its power across the globe. The new norms: 1. disproportionally more online content available in an Einzelsprache than its speakers (potential internet users) = more state power extended in cyberspace – especially if the language in question is associated with or controlled by a single state 2. cyberspace = extension of a polity’s territory (sovereignty) on the internet 3. in cyberspace, the soft power of a culture in a given Einzelsprache = (potentially) hard power (poor) Global South (globalized non-West)

The Soviet-style nationalities policy and a program of language building (engineering) was adopted in Soviet (communist) Ethiopia in the late 1970s. But it began to be implemented with the use of censuses and anthropological research only two decades later, already in postcommunist Ethiopia, which thus was made into a Soviet-style ethnic federation. In this process, over 80 Einzelsprachen were identified (created), and by 2020, ethnic (national) autonomous territories (units) have been earmarked for at least half of such ethnolinguistically defined ethnic groups (‘peoples, nations and nationalities’). However, apparently the process of language building lags considerably behind the adoption of ethnolinguistic federalism in the administrative organization of the state. As of the turn of the 21st century, China, Iran and North Korea began tightly or fully controlling and isolating their national

Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 211 internets (cyberspaces) from the rest of the world. In this way, the previously borderless internet (cyberspace) became reterritorialized in these nation-states. Under this influence, in 2019, Russia adopted the policy of the (Russian, state-specific, territorialized) sovereign internet. The new norm: global illiberal modernity = sovereign (i.e., censored, state-controlled and territorialized) internet (cyberspace) In 2014, Russia stealthily attacked Ukraine and illegally annexed the latter country’s region of Crimea, with the mixed use of cyberwarfare and the limited deployment of military troops, leading to the rise of ‘hybrid warfare.’ The new norm: with the employment of the internet, the soft power of culture (Einzelsprachen) is transformed into an effective hard power of effective use, including a military offensive In 2007 and 2008, Russia launched mass internet attacks against Estonia and Georgia, respectively. In this manner, cyberwarfare left the pages of science fiction novels and became a new instrument of waging military conflicts between states. The Russian cyberattack on Georgia took place during Russia’s military war on this country. Both events amounted to a precursor of ‘hybrid warfare’ – as later employed against Ukraine (2014) on a full-scale basis. Beginning in 2007, Moscow adopted the new ideology of Русский мир Russkii Mir (‘Russian World’), which is none other than ethnolinguistic nationalism customized for imperial needs, in order to legitimize any of the Russian Federation’s expansionist forays across the post-Soviet space and farther afield. The new norms: 1. Russian Einzelsprache is the sole ‘big’ (world) language without any state-specific varieties = this language’s single form (or Russian Federation’s Russian) is fully controlled by Russia alone 2a. all native speakers of Russian = Russian nation Figure Pi (Continued)

212  Postscript on methodology 2b. Russian speakers, irrespective of their state of residence or citizenship, are expected by the Kremlin to be loyal only to ‘their Russian nation’ 3. territories compactly inhabited by Russian speakers nowadays located outside Russia ‘rightly belong’ to Russia, and Moscow may, in its belief legally, intervene there 4. Cyrillic = Russianness = ‘Russian World’ = Russia’s ‘true territory’ 5. Russian modernity = global illiberal modernity = Cyrillic + Russian Einzelsprache In 2002, in the Russian Federation, the previously informal principle of monoscriptalism in Cyrillic was officially reaffirmed. All languages indigenous to Russia’s territory must be written in Cyrillic only. This decision was made to prevent the adoption of the Latin alphabet for writing and publishing in the Einzelsprache of Tatar, or the official and national language in Russia’s Republic of Tatarstan. The new norm: Russian modernity = Cyrillic + Russian language In the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet Turkicphone states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) decided, in emulation of Kemalist Turkey and the interwar Soviet policy of Latinization, to replace Cyrillic with the Latin alphabet for writing their official and national languages of Azerbaijani (Azeri), Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek. The change was successfully completed in the case of Azerbaijani and Uzbek and at present is underway in the case of Kazakh (planned to be completed by 2025). Under Russia’s influence, such a Latinizing change was (so far) abandoned in the case of Kyrgyzstan. However, also late Soviet and freshly post-Soviet Moldova resigned from Cyrillic in favor of Latin letters for writing and publishing in the Moldovan (Moldavian) language. As a result, Moldovan became identical with Romanian. However, for political and legal reasons, both are treated as separate Einzelsprachen in their own right. The new norm: post-Soviet modernization = Latin alphabet/ English ≠ Cyrillic/Russian Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 213 (rich) Global North (globalized West)

In 2013, Croatia joined the European Union, and as a result, the following 24 Einzelsprachen are official and equal in this organization: Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenia, Slovene, Spanish and Swedish. All these languages are written in Latin letters, apart from Bulgarian and Greek, which are written in Cyrillic and in the Greek alphabet, respectively. As a result, the EU has three official scripts: Cyrillic, Greek and Latin. The EU’s language practice and its policy are open-ended, multilingual and polyscriptal. The new norm: liberal (democratic) modernity = open-ended multilingualism + polyscriptalism In 2006, the online machine (statistical, neural) translation service Google Translate was launched. With the use of the ISO 639 standards for registering (recognizing) languages and the ISO 15924 standard for registering these languages’ scripts and keyboards, Google Translate offers translation among 109 Einzelsprachen, as of 2020. European languages constitute a plurality (46) of this online service’s Einzelsprachen and Eurasian ones the overwhelming majority (91). The non-Eurasian Einzelsprachen included in Google Translate number only 18: one from the Americas (Haitian Creole), three from Australasia (Hawaiian, Maori and Samoan) and 14 from Africa (Afrikaans, Amharic, Chewa, Hausa, Igbo, Kinyarwanda, Malagasy, Sesotho, Shona, Somali, Swahili, Xhosa, Yoruba and Zulu). In addition, almost one-quarter (11) of the European Einzelsprachen are minority, regional, lesser-used or special-case languages (Catalan, Corsican, Esperanto, Galician, Irish, Latin, Luxembourgish, Maltese, Scots Gaelic and West Frisian). The norm of linguistic (cultural) imperialism and globalization in cyberspace: 1. European languages + a few Asian languages = ‘real Einzelsprachen’ 2. Europe’s (the West’s) economic and cultural power = even Europe’s minority, regional, lesser-used or special-case languages = ‘real Einzelsprachen’

Figure Pi (Continued)

214  Postscript on methodology The North–South divide in the field of cultural (linguistic) neoimperialism is amply illustrated by the rise of Wikipedias and economically viable literacies in Europe’s nonstate (regional, obsolete, constructed) ‘microlanguages,’ employed by as few users as from a couple to some tens or hundreds of thousands (cf Alemannic, Aromanian, Extremaduran, Silesian, Venetian or Võro). At the same time, outside Europe, there are languages that do not have a Wikipedia, even though they are spoken by millions and even tens of millions of people (e.g., Ao, Khasi, Mizo, Madurese or Xiang). The rise of the global online encyclopedia Wikipedia (established in 2001) created a new benchmark of recognition, which ‘real’ (true) languages need to meet. Thus far, Wikipedias have been created in over 300 Einzelsprachen. Most Wikipedias and their articles are written in Western (European) languages. What is more, almost all of the Wikipedias and their articles are composed in Eurasia’s languages. This is the new measure of the depth and extent of the North–South divide in the field of cultural (linguistic) neoimperialism. During the 1990s and in the first decade of the 21st century, the gradual breakup of Yugoslavia was paralleled by the split of the country’s (main) official language of Serbo-Croatian into Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian. It is a clear proof that languages are artifacts of human creativity and ingenuity. Hence, humans and their groups can create, maintain, change, split, merge or destroy languages as they wish. Because of the explosive spread (facilitated by word processing and the internet) of the use of different languages for publishing and broadcasting, in 2007, the Library of Congress effectively replaced the ISO639-2 standard with that of ISO 693-3. This new standard’s scope is to cover all the world’s Einzelsprachen. So far, under this standard, almost 8,000 Einzelsprachen have been cataloged and endowed with codes. In 2009, the maintenance of this standard was outsourced to the Christian proselytizing organization (ostensibly for translating the Bible into all the world’s languages) Summer Institute of Linguistics, which for this purpose was ‘secularized’ as SIL International. Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 215 The result: Almost no un-Einzelsprache-ized linguistic difference remains in the world. All the linguistic difference used in publishing and broadcasting strictly conforms to the European (Western) model of Einzelsprache. In addition, under the guise of ‘ideological neutrality,’ Christianity-based Westernization continues, contributing to the destruction of the last ‘not-yet-modernized’ non-Western cultures (i.e., ethnic groups, non-Einzelsprachestyle languages or religions). In 1998, the Library of Congress developed ISO 639-2, a new standard for registering (recognizing) Einzelsprachen of publication and broadcasting, by effectively merging its MARC system with ISO 639 (renamed as ISO 6391). Under this standard, over half a thousand Einzelsprachen were recognized. The standards of ISO 639 and ISO 15924 emulate the practices of how Einzelsprachen are used ‘in real life,’ thus enabling the replication of these practices and Einzelsprachen online. As a result, the employment of Einzelsprachen in cyberspace is thus enforced. In 1990, the internet (portmanteau of the collocation ‘interconnected network’) became operational in the US. It became a global phenomenon during the second half of the 1990s. Between 2005 and 2019, the share of internet users in the globe’s population grew from 15% to 54%. As a result, most of communications switched to the internet, making it into a novel ‘cyberspace.’ In this respect, the stark disparity between the rich Global North and poor Global South remains. As of 2019, 87% of the rich countries’ inhabitants have access to the web, as opposed to 47% of their counterparts in the poor countries. During the 1980s, with the rapid development of computers and software, it became necessary to standardize the coding of characters (letters, graphemes) used for ‘electronic’ writing and publishing. In 1990, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) proposed a universal character set contained Figure Pi (Continued)

216  Postscript on methodology in the standard ISO 10646, which the following year was entrusted to (the) Unicode (Consortium) for maintenance and development. Subsequently, the number of scripts of numerous Einzelsprachen serviced by this standardized character set grew quickly. As a result, in 2004, this development necessitated the unrolling of another standard, ISO 15924, for registering and endowing with codes such scripts. Unicode also maintains and develops this standard. The short 20th century (II: 1945–1989)

Communist In the Soviet bloc (including Afghanistan, Cuba, (totalitarian) Ethiopia, Laos, Mongolia, Vietnam and South world Yemen, as well as Albania and China until the late 1960s), Russian was imposed or adopted as the preferred communist language of international (global) communication. Hence, it was also the preferred or compulsory foreign language taught in school. The new norm: Russian = communism = progress (fewer superstitions – e.g., religion) = new civilization = ‘even better modernity’ In the de facto Soviet protectorate of communist (Outer) Mongolia, in 1930 the traditional Mongolian script was replaced by the Latin alphabet (Mongol Latiin ysyg ‘Mongol Latin letter/writing system’), in line with the interwar Soviet policy of Latinization: Latin alphabet = progress = modernization. A decade later, in 1941, this Mongolian Latin alphabet was Cyrillized (Монгол Кирилл үсэг Mongol Kirill üseg), like all other ethnic Latin alphabets across the Soviet Union had been: Cyrillic = new Soviet communist civilization = ‘even better’ modernization. As a result, to this day, Mongolian is written in Cyrillic in Mongolia, while in the traditional script in China’s Inner Mongolia. Under Soviet influence, in 1935, Vietnamese communists adopted the policy of cultural autonomy and language building for Vietnam’s non-Kinh (ethnically nonVietnamese) ‘nationalities’ (ethnic groups). The policy was enshrined in the 1959 Constitution of communist (North) Vietnam and fully implemented after the end of the Vietnamese War, in 1976. Ethnographers (anthropologists) and censuses identified 54 nationalities (ethnic groups), which are nowadays officially recognized in this country.

Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 217

As in China, a variety of traditional scripts are preserved for these nationalities with an established tradition of literacy, while the Latin alphabet has been preferred when writing systems were devised for previously unwritten languages (limited Latinization). As a result, the European model of Einzelsprache decisively spread across Vietnam’s entire population. Similarly, as in the Soviet Union (where in the sphere of literacy the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution had been celebrated by ‘simplifying’ the Russian Cyrillic alphabet in 1918), in 1955 the Chinese Character Simplification Scheme (reform) was officially promulgated. As a result, communist China’s Simplified Chinese script (简化字 Jiǎnhuà zì ‘simplified word/character’) is graphically different from the (capitalist) Traditional Chinese script (繁體字 Fántǐ zì ‘traditional word/character’) of Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore and Taiwan. The norm was: simplified script = progress = communism = (People’s) China Under the impression of the successes of the Soviet 1928 introduction of Latinization for Chinese (汉语 Hanyu ‘language of the Han [ie Chinese]’) – as employed by the Chinese minority – since the 1930s, China’s communists had proposed to adopt the Latin alphabet for writing the Chinese language. But this communist Latinization movement was extinguished in 1944 – that is, half a decade after Latinization had been replaced by Cyrillization in the Soviet Union. A surviving aspect of this aspiration to Latinize (= modernize) Chinese is Pinyin (拼音 ‘spelled sounds’), or communist China’s official system for transcribing Chinese into Latin letters, adopted in 1958. The founding of communist China (1949) supported by the Soviet Union led to a decade of Soviet political, cultural and linguistic domination in this country. A Soviet-style policy was adopted for identifying ethnolinguistically defined nationalities (minzus 民族 ‘people + family’) through anthropological research and censuses. Figure Pi (Continued)

218  Postscript on methodology Subsequently, the program of constructing languages (Einzelsprachen) for minzus with no written languages was instituted. Thus, the model of Einzelsprache decisively spread throughout continental East Asia. China’s nationalities and their languages were bureaucratically recognized much faster than they were in the Soviet Union, and now the Chinese ones stand at 56. The Soviet proposal to use communism’s Cyrillic script of ‘modernity and progress’ for writing the nationalities’ languages (especially for Mongolian in China’s Inner Mongolia) was considered but eventually rejected. Extant traditional scripts have been retained for the nationalities’ languages (including the Arabic script for Kazakh or Uighur); otherwise, the Latin script has been used for this purpose (limited Latinization). As a result, the European (Western) model of Einzelsprache decisively spread across China’s entire population. The Soviet Western-style and missionary-like model of ‘developing’ freshly created nonWestern ‘Indigenous’ Einzelsprachen by translating the ‘Soviet bible’ (The History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks): Short Course) into them was broadened by the new tradition of translating the selected works of the incumbent communist leader during his (always a male) lifetime, beginning with Joseph Stalin’s Collected Works (1946– 1951). In China, the publication Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (1964) – popularly known as the ‘Little Red Book’ (= ‘communist China’s bible’), because of its format and style as a prayer book – became the most widely translated book into the languages of this country’s recognized minorities. During World War II, nazi Germany and wartime Slovakia disregarded interwar Czechoslovakia’s composite Czechoslovak language (which consisted of two varieties – i.e., Czech and Slovak) and instead insisted on using in writing, administration and education Czech and Slovak as separate Einzelsprachen in their own right. After the Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 219 war, Czechoslovakia was reconstituted, but the Czechoslovak language was not. Hence, communist Czechoslovakia had two official languages, Czech and Slovak. Likewise, in occupied and partitioned Yugoslavia (1941–1944), the official and national biscriptal Einzelsprache of SerboCroato-Slovenian (informally known as ‘Yugoslavian’) was broken up, for different territories, into Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian. In addition, ‘southern Serbia’ found itself under Bulgarian occupation, so its ‘southern Serbian dialect’ of SerboCroato-Slovenian was made into part of the Bulgarian language. After the war, ‘southern Serbia’s Bulgarian’ was made into the brandnew Einzelsprache of Macedonian, the separateness of Slovenian was reconfirmed, and the central core of Serbo-CroatoSlovenian was reconstituted as the biscriptal Einzelsprache of Serbo-Croatian (informally known as ‘Yugoslavian’) In conclusion, humans and their groups shape and reshape languages, which are none other than artifacts of human imagination and creativity. Postcolonial world

By the 1970s, the majority of the world’s colonies gained independence and were transformed into nation-states – that is, states for one nation only. As a result, nationalism became the world’s sole accepted ‘infrastructural’ ideology of statehood creation, legitimation and maintenance (the sole significant exception was the Soviet Union, legitimized through the nonnational ideology of communism) Outside Eurasia, practically all the decolonized nation-states adopted the colonial (i.e., European) languages, (invariably written in the Latin alphabet) as official and national, excluding from any official use Indigenous languages. Outside Eurasia, ‘modernity’ is monoscriptal in the European script of Latin alphabet and monocultural in Europe’s imperial Einzelsprachen only.

Figure Pi (Continued)

220  Postscript on methodology The sole exceptions are as follows: 1. In North Africa’s Arab nation-states, although Arabic became indigenized in this area, historically speaking, it is an Asian language originating from the Arab Peninsula. Arabic was spread across North Africa in the wake of the Islamic conquest of this region during the 7th century. 2. In Ethiopia, the indigenous language of Amharic, written in the indigenous Ethiopic syllabary, was adopted in this country as official and national. But, most of secondary education and all of university education is provided in the European (post-)imperial Einzelsprache of English. 3. In Somalia, the indigenous language of Somali was adopted in this country as official and national. But in 1972, the European writing system of Latin alphabet was adopted for the Somali language. Furthermore, most of secondary and university education is provided either in the European (post) imperial Einzelsprache of English or in the nonindigenous Arabic language. The new norms: modernity = former colony + nationalism = nation-state Cultural/linguistic imperialism: 1. modern (‘true’) language = post-colonial (European) language = Latin alphabet 2. Indigenous/missionary Einzelsprache ≠ ‘true’ language 3. Indigenous/missionary Einzelsprache = ‘backwardness’ In Eurasia’s postcolonial (never colonized) nation-states, the use of Indigenous languages and (mostly) Indigenous/non-European scripts – though duly shaped into Westernstyle Einzelsprachen – is more widespread than it is in postcolonial polities located outside Eurasia. 1. Communist and postcommunist nationstates (that used to be colonized or dominated by Western powers) were originally influenced in this regard by the Soviet Union’s ethnolinguistic policies, namely Afghanistan, Cambodia, China, Iran, Laos, (North) Korea, Mongolia and Vietnam. 2. In the late 19th century, Japan adopted ethnolinguistic nationalism from Germany. Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 221 3. Postcolonial (never-colonized) nationstates, which adopted (or were influenced by) the Japanese model of ethnolinguistic nationalism in the interwar period or after World War II, especially in the wake of wartime Japanese occupation, include Burma, Cambodia, (interwar) China (and Taiwan), Iran, (South) Korea, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. But de facto, the European (post)imperial Einzelsprache of English, dominates in state administration and (especially university) education in South Asia (Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) and parts of Southeast Asia (e.g., Malaysia). The new norms: modernity = former colony/not colonized polity + nationalism = nation-state Cultural/linguistic independence or imperialism: 1a. modern (‘true’) language = Indigenous language (but reshaped in accordance with the European/Western model of Einzelsprache) = Indigenous alphabet 1b. modern (‘true’) language = postcolonial (European) language = Latin alphabet = more employment and other opportunities 2. Indigenous/missionary Einzelsprache = fewer employment and other opportunities (‘backwardness’) The division of and independence for British India made nationalism defined through religion, script and language into the ideological basis of the successor states, in Bangladesh (Islam-Bengali script-Bengali), Burma (Buddhism-Burmese script-Burmese), India (Hinduism-Devanagari-Hindi), Nepal (Hinduism-Devanagari-Nepali), Pakistan (Islam-Arabic script-Urdu) and Sri Lanka (Buddhism-Sinhalese scriptSinhalese). The South Asian norm: religion = script = language = nation = state The liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule in 1945 led to a reaction against Japanese and Chinese loan words and phrases in the Korean language (purism). This reaction was a proof of the success of the Japanese introduction of the European model of Einzelsprache in colonial Korea. Figure Pi (Continued)

222  Postscript on methodology The 1953 division of Korea – reflected in the name Choson (조선), for communist North Korea, and Hanguk (한국), for capitalist South Korea – also resulted in different names (linguonyms) for the Korean language, respectively Chosonmal (조선말) and Hangugeo (한국어). The difference between these two de facto Einzelsprachen in their own right was deepened by the 1950 decision to ban the use of Chinese characters for writing the communist language of Chosonmal. On the other hand, the capitalist language of Hangugeo retained the use of Chinese characters, alongside the Korean alphabet of Hangul (한글 ‘Han[guk] writing [system]’). (For instance, the name of South Korea written in Chinese characters is 韓國.) In North Korea, this alphabet is referred to as Chosongul (조선글 ‘Choson writing [system]’) The West

In 1990, under Brazil’s pressure, Portugal and other countries with Portuguese as their official language (for instance, Angola and Mozambique) signed an agreement on a spelling reform, which de facto led to the adoption of Brazilian Portuguese as the leading standard of the Portuguese language. This reform came into force in the mid 2010s. In 1980, Belgium and the Netherlands contracted a language union (Taalunie), making the former country’s co-official language of Flemish (Vlaams) and the latter state’s national language of Dutch (Duits) into a single Einzelsprache of Netherlandish (Nederlands). In 2004, Latin American country and former Dutch colony Suriname joined this union. In 1967, the international standard ISO 639 was developed for ‘sorting’ numerous Einzelsprachen in which books and newspapers were produced. Initially, it was a private initiative conducted in Vienna. In 1971, this initiative was officialized when UNESCO adopted it in the form of an International Information Centre for Terminology (Infoterm). Eventually, under this standard, almost 200 Einzelsprachen were recognized and endowed with machine-readable codes, subsequently used in computer software.

Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 223 In 1956, the Treaty of Rome created the three European Communities (EC). Their institutions were merged in 1967, leading – over three decades later – to the founding of the European Union (EU) in 1992. Significantly, the EC (EU) adopted all the member states’ official languages as its own. Hence, at the turn of the 1990s, the EC’s official languages numbered nine, namely Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish. This solution deimperialized Europe’s global languages (English, French, Portuguese and Spanish), gave a modicum of recognition to the former global languages (Italian and German), and recognized Europe’s ‘small languages’ (Danish, Dutch and Greek) as formally equal to the ‘big Einzelsprachen.’ The new norms: 1. ‘small languages’ = ‘big languages’ = democratization of language politics in (Western) Europe 2. all official languages (and scripts) of the EU member states are equal The rapid spread of literacy across the world after World War II – compounded with the rise of numerous postcolonial independent states, which emphasized their cultural identity through the use of a growing number of Einzelsprachen – led to exponential growth in publications regularly produced in these new Einzelsprachen (around 500 in the 1980s). To manage this tide of highly multilingual (and multiscriptal) information, in the mid 1960s, the Library of Congress (in Washington, DC, USA) developed MARC (machine-readable cataloging) standards for cataloging that also cover information on publications’ languages. In 1945, the US occupation administration introduced an official transcription (Latinization) system of Japanese into Latin letters (Romaji) that had been increasingly used in Japan since 1937. The Japanese government officially adopted Romaji in 1954. The norm was Latinization = modernization = peace = West Figure Pi (Continued)

224  Postscript on methodology Globalized world

The short 20th century (I: 1914–1945)

In 1945, the United Nations (UN) replaced the League of Nations (officially dissolved in 1946) as the world’s only universal political organization. Apart from the Western Einzelsprachen of English and French (which used to be the League of Nation’s sole working languages), also the not fully Western (communist) Einzelsprache of Russian, Latin America’s lingua franca of Spanish, and the non-Western Einzelsprachen of Arabic and Chinese were added as the UN’s working languages. As a result, the UN has four official writing systems: Arabic, Chinese, Cyrillic and Latin. Interwar Germany and Japan wanted their Einzelsprachen of German and Japanese to be made into the League of Nations’ working languages, but their defeat in World War II at the hands of the Allies dashed this possibility in regard of the UN. The norm: Institutionally recognized global languages must be used in numerous states, and the main state shaping or using such an Einzelsprache must be a member of a victorious coalition that won the most recent world war

Fascist/nazi Despite changing sides in World War II in 1943, (totalitarian) Italy was relieved of its colonies after 1945, world dashing the hopes of making Italian into a global language. The postwar loss of its empire made Japan into a typical ethnolinguistic nation-state, meaning that Japanese is used as an official language only in this country. Similarly, as in the case of German, this development dashed Japan’s hopes of making Japanese into a global language. During World War II, Japan extended its empire (rebranded as the ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’) by annexing eastern China, Indochina, the Philippines and what today is known as Indonesia, Malaysia and New Guinea. Japanese control over these territories was too brief to effectively extend the use of Japanese there. But the Japanese administration banned or limited the use of colonial (European) languages (English, French, Spanish and Portuguese) in administration, thus encouraging the employment of local

Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 225 (Indigenous) languages in this function. Japanese investment in the development of these languages helped make these languages into regular Western-style Einzelsprachen. This achievement, in line with the Central European ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism (language = nation = state), underpinned the success of the region’s colonies at gaining independence. Most of them were fashioned into ethnolinguistic nation-states, as in the case of Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, Malaysia and Vietnam. Thailand, briefly dominated by wartime Japan, had already followed this route in the interwar period. However, the traditional South and Southeast Asian norm prevailed: Script = Einzelsprache That is to say, writing systems of classical written languages of religions or a local translation of a corpus of religious texts were adopted for creating (modernizing) Westernstyle Einzelsprachen, which serve as the aforementioned polities’ national languages. Hence, Burmese – Burmese script; Khmer (in Cambodia) – Khmer script; Korean – Korean script; Lao – Lao script; and Thai – Thai script. The only exceptions are the Einzelsprachen of Indonesian, Malaysian and Vietnamese, for which the Latin alphabet was adopted. Germany’s defeat in World War II was followed by the loss of the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, from which the German inhabitants were expelled, alongside ethnic Germans (German speakers) from elsewhere in Central Europe (outside Germany and Austria). This finally dashed Berlin’s hopes of making German a global language. In line with the ‘science of race’ (Rassenkunde), Europe’s (mainly Ashkenazic) Jews were largely exterminated in the Holocaust, perpetrated by nazi Germany (including Austria) and its European allies. Because Ashkenazim spoke Yiddish (‘Jewish German’ written in Hebrew letters) and could easily understand and master German, this genocide destroyed a significant population who de facto used German as a global language across Central and Eastern Europe. As a result, the potential of German as a language of all-European or global communication was nullified or radically scaled down. Figure Pi (Continued)

226  Postscript on methodology To facilitate the rise of German as a global language of (fascist) modernity, in 1941, Fraktur (Blackletter) – disparaged as ‘Jewish letters’ (Judenlettern) – was replaced by Antiqua, dubbed ‘the normal script’ (Normalschrift). It was a kind of ‘typographic’ Latinization = modernization = (global) nazism (fascism) During World War II, the Third Reich made German into another global language by extending its official use from Spain to Moscow and from Scandinavia to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). After the Great War, the official use of German was radically limited, because of Germany’s loss of territory in Europe and of overseas colonies and also because of the breakup of Austria-Hungary, replaced by ethnolinguistic nation-states with official languages other than German. German was retained in this function only in the post-Austro-Hungarian polity of Austria. In line with the Italian national myth that equates the Roman Empire with Italy, the construction of an Italian maritime empire during the first half of the 20th century extended the use of Italian (alongside the Latin alphabet) to North Africa, the Balkans and the Horn of Africa. The creation of the Soviet bloc and the emergence Communist of Soviet-style communist states around the (totalitarian) world (Afghanistan, China, Cuba, Ethiopia, world Korea, Laos, Somalia, South Yemen and Vietnam), alongside some pro-Soviet ones (e.g., India, Angola and Nicaragua), led to the rapid spread of the use of Russian as a global communist language of international communication. The 1941–1945 alliance of the Soviet Union with the UK and the US (and later France), followed by their victory over the Axis Powers, made Russian into another recognized global language, alongside English and French. During the Cold War, English and Russian became the two most important languages of international politics. Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 227 The 1939–1941 alliance with nazi Germany allowed the Soviet Union to expand its territory westward, where Russian replaced other languages in official use and education. As a result, German and Russian became the two most important Einzelsprachen of international (interethnic) communication across Central and Eastern Europe during World War II. Beginning in 1938, Russian was promoted in the Soviet Union as the Soviet communist people’s (de-ethnicized) language of interethnic communication and as the globe’s international language of communism. Other Soviet languages were gradually sidelined in favor of Russian. The new norm: Cyrillic = communism = ‘even better’ modernity = Russian Interestingly, the ideology of communism replaced religion as the (West’s) main indicator of which script should be employed for writing an Einzelsprache In the mid 1930s, the project of Latinizing Russian (alongside Belarusian and Ukrainian) was abandoned, heralding the end of Latinization. Afterward, Cyrillization was announced as synonymous with Soviet-style communist modernity. As a result, by the early 1940s (almost) all recognized Soviet languages written in Latin letters adopted a form of Cyrillic (including Chinese and Korean). Simultaneously, the number of ethnolinguistic (national) autonomous entities was drastically limited, to a mere 51 (as of 1939). With the small exceptions of Armenia, Birobidzhan and Georgia (where the Hebrew, Armenian and Georgian scripts remained in use for writing and publishing in the official-cum-national Einzelsprachen of Yiddish, Armenian and Georgian, respectively), all the Soviet Union’s languages became uniformly monoscriptal in Cyrillic. The new norm: Cyrillic = Soviet Union = communism = new civilization = ‘even better’ modernity From the mid 1920s to 1938, the campaign of Latinization was conducted in the Soviet Union. Either the writing systems of extant Figure Pi (Continued)

228  Postscript on methodology Einzelsprachen were changed to a form of the Latin alphabet or languages freshly endowed with a written form had to adapt Latin letters for writing and publishing. The new Soviet norm: Latinization = modernization (Westernization) = socialism and communist future Over 70 languages were ‘Latinized’ in the Soviet Union and in the two other Soviet-style communist polities of Mongolia and TannuTuva. All Soviet languages written in Arabic letters were Latinized, without any exceptions. Armenian, Georgian and Yiddish were allowed to retain their specific – Armenian, Georgian and Hebrew – scripts, because these three writing systems ‘justified’ the Soviet Union’s claims to ancient Middle Eastern history = ‘cradle of Western civilization.’ The Western missionary model of ‘developing’ freshly created non-Western ‘Indigenous’ Einzelsprachen by translating the Bible into them was copied in the ideologically ‘atheist’ Soviet Union. However, instead of the Bible, works of the classics of marxism-leninism (Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and Vladimir Lenin) were translated into Bashkir, Chuvash, Evenk or Udmurt. The most widely translated, published and distributed volume was The History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks): Short Course (1938), which became a kind of the ‘Soviet bible.’ During the 1920s and 1930s, newspapers, textbooks and books were published in approximately 130 Soviet languages. These freshly minted Einzelsprachen were employed as languages of education and administration. In line with the ethnolinguistic principle, the Soviet Union was radically federalized, yielding approximately 17,300 autonomous entities across the state’s territory. Result 1: The European model of Einzelsprache decisively spread across the Soviet Union’s entire population and also in the interwar communist states of Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva (de facto Soviet protectorates). Result 2: The influence of this Soviet-style adoption and ideologized use of the European model of Einzelsprache strongly reverberated among communist parties across all of Asia. Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 229 In the Soviet Union, over 170 nationalities (nations) and their Einzelsprachen were identified through anthropological (ethnographic) research and the 1926 census. Most of these languages had no a written form. But soon dictionaries and grammars were written for them, and approximately 100 were thus made into regular Einzelsprachen in an unprecedented feat of mass linguistic engineering (language building). This mass language building (engineering) followed the missionary pattern of imposing without any consultations the European (Western) Einzelsprache on the target population. The only difference between the missionary and Soviet manner of language engineering was that the latter dispensed with religious justification and actually actively combated religion (= ‘scientific atheism’). The new norm: Soviet modernity = ‘atheism’ = language building = Western-style Einzelsprachen vs. bourgeois (capitalist) modernity = evangelization (Christianization) = language building = Western-style Einzelsprachen After the 1912 study tour in Austria-Hungary, in 1913 Joseph Stalin worked out a definition of the nation, which equates the nation with a given Einzelsprache (national language). In the sphere of literacy, the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia was celebrated by the 1918 orthographic reform. It presumably ‘simplified’ Russian Cyrillic and removed ‘unnecessary’ letters, mainly used for writing Greek loan words for specialized ecclesiastical usages. Non-Western areas not colonized by the West

Figure Pi (Continued)

At the Peace Conference in Paris (1919), Japan was recognized as equal to the Western powers. As a result, the League of Nations entrusted Germany’s southern Pacific colonies to Japan’s care as a mandate. In 1932, Japan annexed Manchuria. In all these areas, Japanese was introduced as the sole or main official language, paving the way for making Japanese into a global (world) language.

230  Postscript on methodology As a result, Japan’s successful modernization on the country’s own cultural terms (partial Westernization) encouraged a variety of anticolonial national movements across Asia, also contributing to the spread of the European model of Einzelsprache, as embodied by the success of Modern Japanese. The Allies’ attempted partition of the Ottoman Empire was reverted in Anatolia, where in 1923 Turkey was established as a revolutionary (secular) ethnolinguistic nation-state of the Turkish nation, in line with the normative isomorphism of language = nation = state. The political success was sealed by the radical separation from the Ottoman past by replacing, in 1928, the Arabic script with the Latin alphabet (Latinization) for writing the Turkish language, simultaneously created by purging (purism) Arabic and Persian elements from Osmanlıca. This conscious instance of language engineering (language building) was ‘justified’ on the basis of the specious sun language theory, improbably claiming that all the world’s languages stem from Turkish. West’s maritime colonial empires

Beginning in the mid 19th century, Bengalilanguage literature was arguably the most productive and ‘modern’ (Westernized) in British India, thus becoming an Indigenous model of how the European invention of Einzelsprache may be put to practical use. This Bengali success was recognized by the West, when in 1913 Rabindranath Tagore became the first non-European and non-Westerner to receive a Nobel prize in literature. In British India, despite the imposition of the Western-style policy of language building, there was no attempt at imposing the Latin alphabet on Indigenous languages shaped as Western-style Einzelsprachen. The colonial administration encouraged a variety of scripts, which lowered the cohesion of India’s anticolonial movements. The norm: script + religion = language This norm emerged when the majoritarian Hindu opposition (since the late 1860s) to official

Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 231 Hindustani written in Arabic letters led the 1881 split of this language in two: the Arabic script–based Urdu, for Muslims, and Hindi, written in the Devanagari (देवनागरी ‘divine city’ or ‘abode of deities’) syllabary, for Hindus. In 1881, for the first time in modern history, Hindi became an official language, namely in the province of Bihar. The Linguistic Survey of India was completed in 1928, and along with the inclusion of the language question in the colony’s censuses, beginning in 1880, it led to a partially negotiated (with the target populations) introduction of the European model of Einzelsprache, complete with the investment in the production of dictionaries and grammars (language engineering or building) for the most important recognized ‘native’ languages. The intention was to use these freshly minted ‘native’ Einzelsprachen in local administration and education. British India’s various anticolonial (national) movements accepted this imposition, given that the model of Einzelsprache had already become the norm of ‘dealing’ with linguistic difference in such role model countries of non-Western modernization as Japan, Turkey and the Soviet Union. ‘West’

Figure Pi (Continued)

In 1933, the Summer Institute of Linguistics was founded. Since then, it has married the Christianizing (missionary) zeal and the expert knowledge of linguistics for the sake of converting linguistic diversity in non-Western areas into Western-style Einzelsprachen that are built with the use of grammars and dictionaries. This languagebuilding (-engineering) effort has not been for the sake of modernization (as in Japan) or political empowerment through cultural autonomy (as in the Soviet Union) but rather solely for translating the Bible into thus-created Einzelsprachen, in line with the eschatological belief that the second coming of Christ will not take place before all humans have obtained access to the Christian ‘god’s word’ in their own languages (i.e., Einzelsprachen). Missionariescum-linguists typically have not consulted their translation projects with the target populations.

232  Postscript on methodology As a result, as quickly as a new Einzelsprache has been built and the Bible translated into it, the destruction of a local culture (community, ethnic group, religion) of the Einzelsprache’s speakers has been effected. The founding of the League of Nations as the world’s first global (universal) political organization spawned the category of world languages, at which time English and French were made into the league’s working languages (to the exclusion of the neutral language of Esperanto). The defeat of the Central Powers mainly at the hands of the United Kingdom and the United States commenced the replacement of French with English as the preferred lingua franca of world politics, commerce and scholarship. In order not to fall foul of the ideological strictures of ethnolinguistic nationalism (or normative isomorphism: language = nation = state), Czechoslovakia followed the Norwegian model and in 1920 announced Czechoslovak as its sole official and national language. This Einzelsprache was construed as consisting of two equal varieties, namely Czech and Slovak. A year later, in 1921, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (starting in 1929, Yugoslavia), emulated the same solution, by declaring Serbo-Croato-Slovenian as its official and national language, which consisted of three equal varieties – that is, Serbian (written in Cyrillic) alongside Croatian and Slovenian (both written in Latin letters). The post-1918 breakups of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire and the huge territorial losses of Russia and Germany enabled the Allies to create a host of ethnolinguistic nation-states across Central Europe. Ethnolinguistic nationalism’s normative isomorphism of language = nation = state became the political norm of statehood formation, legitimation and maintenance across this region. Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 233 During the Great War, in Austria-Hungary, the linguonym Serbo-Croatian was banned, alongside Cyrillic for publishing in this language (i.e., Serbian). This South Slavic Einzelsprache written in Latin letters was referred to exclusively as Croatian. In the Russian western borderlands occupied by Germany and Austria-Hungary, Russian was banned as an official language, and the use of (Russian) Cyrillic was either banned or discouraged. Instead, German and local languages were employed in official capacity. For the first time in history, Belarusian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Yiddish were used as languages of administration and education, facilitating their development into full-fledged Einzelsprachen. All these languages were written and published with the use of Latin letters, with the exception of Yiddish (written in Hebrew letters) and the partial exception of Belarusian (also written in Cyrillic). The long 19th century

Non-Western areas not colonized by the West

At the turn of the 20th century, hoping to escape European colonization, the Ethiopian Empire (Abyssinia) replaced Ge’ez of the 4th-century translation of the Ethiopian Bible with the court and army vernacular of Amharic as the state’s official language. The Ethiopic syllabary of Ge’ez was retained for writing and publishing, because the Latin alphabet was that of the Italian invaders. As a result, the old Middle Eastern confessional norm was retained: holy book = script = language = power With the missionaries’ help, Amharic was shaped on the model of the European imperial Einzelsprachen of English, French and Italian. However, the state’s 1931 Constitution was drafted in emulation of Japan’s Imperial Constitution in order to emphasize Ethiopia’s independence via-à-vis Europe. With the annexation of Hokkaido, Korea, Okinawa, Sakhalin and Taiwan, Japan began building a ‘modern’ (Western-style) colonial empire. On Imperial Germany’s and Imperial Russia’s ethnolinguistic model, Modern Japanese (alongside the Japanese script) was imposed as the (leading) official language of this empire.

Figure Pi (Continued)

234  Postscript on methodology In the process of self-modernization (selfWesternization), Japanese intellectuals and writers decided to modernize the Japanese language. The model to follow was obviously dictated by the main European imperial Einzelsprachen (English, Russian, German or French). The guiding principle (norm) was that the written national language be close to actual speech. Because Classical Japanese was Classical Chinese in Japanese pronunciation, Japanese ‘modernizers’ (Westernizers) decided that it had to be abandoned. By the turn of the 20th century, Modern Japanese had been created on the basis of the Tokyo dialect. In China, a similar tension between Classical Chinese and everyday speech led to the rise of Modern Chinese steeped in the dialect of Beijing (accepted as official in 1932). In the Ottoman Empire attempts at closing the gap between Osmanlıca and everyday Turkish speech stopped half-way. Not unlike the case of Greece, where Katharevousa (‘purifying’ [language]), or a mixture of new Testament Greek and Demotic (everyday speech) was in official use from the early 19th century to 1976. In the process of the modernizing (Westernizing) reforms in Japan, beginning in the mid 1880s, several projects of the Latin script (Romaji ‘Roman’) for the Japanese language were proposed. Because it was believed that Latinization = modernization, as late as the 1910s some reformers and linguists proposed that a Latin script should replace the Japanese script. Such a proposal was never implemented. In the Ottoman Empire, Albanian speakers faced the danger of their homeland being split between Greece and Montenegro/Serbia. To prevent such a development, they decided to adopt a Latin alphabet for writing and printing in Albanian (1908), following the example of Romania in this respect. This script graphically separated the Albanian language from Greek and Serbian written, respectively, in Greek letters and in Cyrillic letters. In addition, such a Latinization of Albanian ‘modernized’ (Westernized) this language into a Europeanstyle Einzelsprache. Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 235 In the Khedivate Egypt (nominally an autonomous Ottoman province but de facto independent from the Ottoman Empire), during the 1830s and 1840s, under the state sponsorship, a translation program was established for rendering numerous French books (alongside some Italian ones – mainly textbooks and manuals but some literature as well) into Arabic (and some into Osmanlıca). As a result, Arabic was modernized (Westernized) in emulation of Europe’s Einzelsprachen for the sake of expressing ‘modern’ (Western) military, technical, scientific, political and cultural ideas. In the 1860s, the technology of printing was introduced from Egypt to the Ottoman Empire, including state-sponsored translation programs from Europe’s imperial Einzelsprachen into Osmanlıca (Ottoman Turkish). As a result, Osmanlıca was increasingly ‘modernized’ (Westernized) in emulation of Europe’s Einzelsprachen. Due to the growing British influence in Egypt and Egypt’s Sudan, another translation program unfolded in the 1880s and 1890s of selected works from English into Arabic. Importantly, the Arabic script was preserved, alongside Quran Arabic in the function of the standard language. The gap (diglossia) between the standard (written) language and everyday speech (which was also a norm in the case of Greek, Japanese or Chinese), uniquely, continues in Arabic to this day. The West’s maritime colonial empires

Starting in the 16th century, missionaries in Vietnam had employed Latin letters for producing Vietnamese dictionaries and grammars, alongside translations into Vietnamese. In 1907, Vietnamese nationalists adopted a Latin script for the Vietnamese language (Quốc Ngữ ‘national language/ script’), and the Chinese-style script was officially abandoned in 1918. The belief was that Latinization = modernization, and in addition, the Latin alphabet also allowed for separating Vietnamese graphically from Chinese. In 1901, in the Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia), the colonial administration replaced the Jawi (‘from Java’ = Malay = Arabic) script with the Latin (Rumi, ‘Roman’)

Figure Pi (Continued)

236  Postscript on methodology alphabet for writing and publishing in the Malay (Indonesian) language. In British Malaya, a similar process of the Latinization of the Malay (Malaysian) language unfolded from the 1880s to the 1920s. In French Algeria, the colonial administration adopted a Latin alphabet for writing and publishing in the local Berber language. Also, Latin script–based dictionaries and phrasebooks of the local Arabic dialect (variety) were published for French (‘white’) settlers. Between 1922 and 1928, in Lebanon, Arab nationalists unsuccessfully pushed for the adoption of a Latin alphabet for Arabic, hoping that such a change would automatically ‘modernize’ (= Westernize) their countries, giving rise to the ethnolinguistically defined Arab nation. The 8th International Congress of Statistics (1872, St. Petersburg) recommended that censuses include the question about language as a measure of nationality. In the same year (1872), the India census asked a question about nationality, which subsequently, beginning with the 1881 census, was replaced by the language question. The 7th Oriental Congress (1886, Vienna) recommended that the (colonial) government of British India (or today’s Bangladesh, Burma, India and Pakistan) should conduct a survey of all the British colony’s languages. Such a Linguistic Survey of India was completed in 1928, paving the way for recognizing and building numerous Einzelsprachen across the subcontinent. The traditional Indian norm: script = language In 1835, Persian was replaced by the European imperial Einzelsprache of English as the official language of British India. Additionally, the use of local vernaculars was encouraged in education and publishing, giving rise to numerous Indian Einzelsprachen (e.g., Bengali, Gujarati, Hindustani, Telugu, or Tamil). The traditional Indian norm: script = language The British and Foreign Bible Society was founded in 1804. Alongside a host of similar societies, it has aspired to translate and Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 237 publish the Bible in all the world’s languages. Western (European) missionaries (not the non-Western populations concerned) decided what a (‘native’) language ‘really’ was or should be, wrote grammars and dictionaries, and thus molded such a ‘missionary native language’ in line with the Western concept of Einzelsprache. In the vast majority of cases, the Latin alphabet was employed for writing and publishing in languages of this type. The result was unprecedented religion-driven mass language engineering, or language building. Hence, the new norm: Christianization = modernization = Latinization = political, economic, cultural and linguistic imperialism Subsequently, non-Western cultures and religions were demonized, marginalized and in most cases destroyed outside Eurasia, including ‘languages,’ construed in line with either the Indigenous concepts of the linguistic or the aforementioned ‘missionary native languages.’ The successful publication of the Bible in a ‘native (Indigenous) language’ tends to mark the subjugation of a non-Western culture and linguistic diversity to the West, in a political and intellectual sense. This ‘achievement’ usually commences a swift decline and destruction of such a newly created Westernstyle ‘native language,’ which typically is summarily abandoned for a Western (European) (post)imperial Einzelsprache as the preferred language of administration and medium of education. ‘The West’ With the growing nationalization and politicization (i.e., Western of Einzelsprachen, a realization appeared that and Central the equation language = power prevented Europe; neutral communication among people construed alongside as equals. The dream of neutral (nonthe ‘Neopolitical) language was fulfilled when in 1887 Europes’ LL Zamenhof published his project of the of North international language of Esperanto, and – America and importantly – relinquished any personal control Australasia; over it. As a result, Esperanto rapidly gained and along much popularity worldwide until in 1924 France with the blocked the League of Nations from adopting it areas politias an official language. Subsequently, bans were cally and imposed on Esperanto in nazi Germany (1936) culturally and the stalinist Soviet Union (1937), followed by persecution and killings of Esperantists. Figure Pi (Continued)

238  Postscript on methodology Westernized over the course of the ‘first globalization’ – i.e., Eastern Europe, Central and South America and Southern Africa)

Interestingly, Zamenhof began his project as a language combining Romance and Germanic elements of Spanyol and Yiddish, respectively. The idea was that such a language would enable communication between Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jews. Jews, however, rejected his initiative on account of the use of the un-Jewish (= Gentile) Latin alphabet. In 1905, Norway gained independence from Sweden and made Norwegian into the sole official and national language. However, since 1885, this language had been construed as consisting of two equal varieties, which nowadays are known as Bokmål (‘Book Language’ = Dano-Norwegian) and Nynorsk (‘New Norwegian’). Under different circumstances, these varieties would be seen as separate Einzelsprachen in their own right. Democratization brought about by the 1905 Revolution in Russia led to the lifting of the bans on the use of various languages as media of education and on the Latin alphabet for publishing in Belarusian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Moldovan, alongside the ban on the use of non-Russian varieties of Cyrillic for Ukrainian and Belarusian. The reaction to the former policy of Russification and forced Cyrillization accelerated the development of numerous Einzelsprachen across European Russia. Between the 1860s and 1880s, elements of ethnolinguistic nationalism were adopted for the empire’s politics in European Russia. The initial push for replacing the Latin alphabet with Cyrillic for writing and printing in all European Russia’s languages (normative monoscriptalism) was limited to Belarusian, Lithuanian (and Samogitian), Latvian, Moldavian (Moldovan/Romanian) and Ukrainian. Afterward, Russian was made into the empire’s sole official and administrative language. Other languages were removed from administration and education. The political and economic success of Russia as the world’s sole Orthodox power led to the spread of the use of Modern Cyrillic

Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 239 (Grazhdanka), between the 1830s and 1860s, for writing and publishing in Slavophone Orthodox countries – that is, in the Einzelsprachen of Bulgarian and Serbian. The Russian example also led to the closing of the gap (diglossia) between Church Slavonic and the vernacular in the case of Bulgarian and Serbian by the end of the 19th century. The rise of world-class Russian literature is associated with the figure of Alexander Pushkin, active especially during the 1820s and the 1830s. In his writings, he overcame the continuing dualism (diglossia) between ‘dignified’ (Church) Slavonic and the Muscovian vernacular, by blending these two into what became a standard Russian language, composed from both North Slavic (vernacular) and South Slavic (Church Slavonic) elements. In the Russian Empire, the victorious war against Napoleon caused the Russian nobility to abandon French as their sociolect (estate language) in favor of Russian (or other ethnic and regional languages, such as German, Polish or Tatar). However, the standardization of Russian emulated numerous French morphological and phraseological examples. The 1867 overhaul of the Austrian Empire into Austria-Hungary made Hungarian into a national, state and royal language, on the German and French model. The gradual federalization of the ‘Austrian half’ of the Dual Monarchy was a reply to the rise of ethnolinguistic national movements, leading to the following languages’ being shaped into Einzelsprachen: Czech, Croatian, Italian, Polish, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian, Romanian and Ukrainian. The 1861 Prussian census and subsequent German censuses include the question about language as the measure of one’s ethnic identity – that is, ‘nationality’ (the fact of membership in an ethnolinguistically defined nation). Prussian statistician Richard Böckh proposed this method in his eponymous article ‘Volksprache als Kennzeichen der Nationalität’ (1866, The Statistical Significance of the Vernacular as an Indicator of Nationality). The 8th International Congress of Statistics (1872, Figure Pi (Continued)

240  Postscript on methodology St. Petersburg) recommended that the language question be included in all state censuses. Austria-Hungary started asking the language question in the 1880 census. Nationalism dictated the acceptance of the originally confessional (Middle Eastern monotheistic) norm that a person can have only one ‘native language’ (mother tongue) and thus can belong only to a single nation. Hence, when in a census a respondent insisted that she spoke several languages, this reply was to be disregarded and reinterpreted ‘accordingly’ by the census taker. Under the influence of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859), Saxe-Meiningen linguist August Schleicher wrote Die Darwinsche Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft (1863; Darwinism Tested by the Science of Language, 1869). He proposed that languages are ‘living organisms’ that ‘live and die,’ ‘are born’ and ‘give birth’ to ‘children or sister languages.’ This organicist (biologizing) view of languages as ‘creatures of nature’ to this day fortifies the concept of Einzelsprache and ‘undergirds’ (conditions) the currently widespread Western perception of languages. In this book, Schleicher also introduced the genealogical (family) tree of languages (Stammbaum), which at present is the most popular metaphor of representing relations among languages (in Europe and Asia). Einzelsprachen are seen as clearly separate branches, a system that corresponds well to nationalism’s claims that nature (god) created nations as separate entities, each with its ‘own destiny’ (and language). Beginning in the early 19th century, the first maps depicting the presence of different languages in a given state were published in Europe. By the turn of the 20th century, such maps had become accepted as a ‘proof’ of the existence of an ethnolinguistically defined nation in a given area. This approach was rapidly translated into a political program of ethnolinguistic nationalism, implying that the aforesaid area of a nation should be made into this nation’s nation-state, to the destruction of the extant nonnational and multiethnic empires. Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 241 After the 1871 founding of the German nationstate, the Gothic (Fraktur, Blackletter) type of the Latin alphabet became increasingly identified with the German nation and language. As a result, other Protestant nationstates and populations gradually abandoned Gothic (Fraktur) for writing and printing in their languages (e.g., Estonian, Danish, Finnish, Latvian, Norwegian, Slovak, or Swedish). In these cases, Fraktur was replaced by Antiqua. In German-language scientific and scholarly publications, Antiqua was also preferred to Gothic (Fraktur). In the 1860s, ‘scientific racism’ and social darwinism rubbed off on language politics, namely the stereotypical ranking of races (as ‘better’ or ‘biologically fitter’), which yielded a similar ranking of scripts as ‘modern’ or ‘civilizationally better.’ The best were alphabets (cf Latin, Greek or Cyrillic), followed by abjads (i.e., consonantaries, such as the Hebrew or Arabic script), syllabaries (e.g., Indian and Japanese scripts) and morphemic (logographic) scripts (i.e., the Chinese writing system). The same biased way of thinking led to the ranking of Europe’s extant alphabets, where the Latin script was declared as the best, followed by the Greek alphabet and Cyrillic. In the 1860s, ‘scientific racism’ and social darwinism yielded a stereotypical ranking of ‘civilizations,’ where ‘Christian’ (Protestant and Catholic) West(ern Europe) was on the top. Most rankings of this type included ‘Orthodox’ Russia and Balkans as ‘second best,’ or at the ‘West’s own bottom.’ The rest was declared to be the ‘decadent’ Orient – that is, Asia, the Middle East and North Africa – where peoples presumably stood on a ‘lower rung of civilizational development,’ as symbolized by their ‘imperfect’ or ‘backward’ writing systems (abjads, syllabaries and morphemic scripts). ‘Oriental monotheists’ writing in abjads and with their own ‘holy books’ (Muslims and Jews) were seen as ‘better’ than ‘heathen polytheists’ ‘without’ a religion (religion normatively defined as a form of monotheism) or holy book (normatively defined as a single book, not a corpus or canon of writings), namely Buddhists, Hindus, Shintoists and Taoists. Figure Pi (Continued)

242  Postscript on methodology In turn, the foregoing ranking led to another, namely that between the ‘civilized world’ and ‘the savages,’ the former defined as peoples and areas with a tradition of writing and literacy and the latter as peoples and areas without such a tradition. In spatial terms, this divide was between Eurasia (including Muslim North Africa) and the Rest (of the world), colonized and subjugated by the West between the 14th and the 19th centuries. Such a biased and unilateral distinction ‘justified’ the colonization and expropriation (dispossession) of colonized peoples. Since the turn of the 19th century, compulsory elementary education for all children emerged as a ‘civilized norm’ in Western Europe. By the end of this century, almost all children had received this type of education, from the UK to Austria-Hungary and from Spain to Germany. Such education was almost invariably provided in the medium of the national language, thus contributing to the rapid spread of its command in the population at large. The press, cheap books and compulsory military service for men facilitated this spread of the national language. Soon afterward, prescriptivism reached out from the sphere of writing into that of everyday speech. In 1898, German linguist Theodor Siebs (born in the polity of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen) published his Deutsche Bühnenaussprache (German Theater Pronunciation), which set out the officially adopted standard of how to ‘speak correctly’ in German. Not in many other European nation-states was the unification of speech (pronunciation) attempted in a similar state-approved, formalized manner. But in the 20th century, such unification of pronunciation was de facto effected by the unprecedented spread of electronic mass media (radio and television) that broadcast in the ‘correct’ form of the national language. The United Kingdom’s Received Pronunciation (BBC English), as defined by Daniel Jones’s English Pronouncing Dictionary (1917), never really spread among the target population(s) in the United Kingdom or across the British Empire, apart from the narrow aristocraticcum-intellectual elite. Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 243 In the wake of the founding (‘unification’) of the German Empire (1871) on an ethnolinguistic basis, in 1876 philologists presented a similarly ‘unifying’ ‘reform’ of the (orthographic) principles of correct written usage in German as the unitary Einzelsprache of the German nation. The new national polity’s state administration adopted this reform. Afterward, ‘orthographic reforms,’ or reforms of ‘correct written usage,’ became a popular instrument of official prescriptivism (purism), usefully marrying national languages and nation-states (political power). In line with the principles of ethnolinguistic nationalism, the Piedmont-led (Kingdom of Sardinia–led) coalition brough about the 1861 founding of a Kingdom of Italy as the Italian nation-state. Ten years later, in 1871, the Prussia-led economic bloc (German Customs Union) and political bloc (North German Confederation) founded the German Empire as the German nation-state. Prussian philologists from Hesse-Kassel Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm (brothers) invented a new type of total dictionary (‘on historical principles’) for gathering all the words and phrases of an Einzelsprache as used in writing and publications from the accepted emergence of this language to the present moment in all the areas where this language was and still is in use. The Deutsches Wörterbuch (German Dictionary) began to be published in 1832 and was completed in 1961. This feat was attempted for numerous other European national languages but was rarely completed. The other most famous example of such a total dictionary is the Oxford English Dictionary (1884–1928). In the wake of the Napoleonic wars, part and parcel of the German ethnolinguistic nationalism was linguistic purism. Any French (Romance) and other ‘foreign loan words’ were to be expunged from the German language, which in this process was to be ‘regenerated’ and made ‘pure’ again. This lexicographic and phraseological form of prescriptivism and purism created and reinforced the lexical boundary of the national Einzelsprache of German. Figure Pi (Continued)

244  Postscript on methodology Linguistic purism became an important instrument of prescriptivist ‘language reforms’ (now known as language planning) that created and reinforced the separateness of national languages (e.g., Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, Slovak or French) across Continental Europe. ‘Foreign words and phrases’ were typically replaced by neologisms formed from ‘native’ (‘pure’) words – for instance, Rundfunk in German, not ‘radio.’ In a popular 1813 soldier song for the Prussian army, ‘Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?’ (What is the German’s Fatherland?), Ernst Moritz Arndt (from Sweden’s Pomerania) invented the seminal formula of ethnolinguistic nationalism: ‘[Germany is] where the German tongue sounds,’ namely language = nation = state (cuius regio, eius lingua ‘whose realm, his language’). After the 1806 dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, under Napoleon’s pressure, there was no polity left that according to the French civic model could be declared (or which would early German nationalists would want to declare) a German nation-state. Hence, the basic dilemma was how to define the German nation. The reply was that all the speakers of the German Einzelsprache (i.e., the German speech community) should be recognized as members of the German nation. Subsequently, all the territories compactly inhabited by German speakers (with no respect for the pre-existing political borders) should be made into a German nation-state. In accordance with the equation Latinization (script) = modernization = Europeanization, in Romania, in the mid 1860s, Cyrillic was replaced by the Latin script for writing and printing in the Romanian language, to distance the new Romanian nation-state from Orthodox Russia and its ‘half-civilized’ (= ‘barbaric’) Cyrillic. In Romania, all things Slavic began to be seen as ‘backward,’ so Slavic linguistic loans were replaced by Italianisms in the 1830s and later by Gallicisms. The reform (‘modernization’ = Westernization) of Romanian was effected through lexicographic and phraseological de-Slavicization and re-Romance-ization, in addition to its abandoning Cyrillic. Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 245 Between the first decade of the 1800s and the 1870s, under the impression of the military and economic successes of the French nation-state (and later also of the Italian and German nationstates), ethnolinguistically variegated Orthodox Christians of the Rum Millet carved out from the Ottoman Empire their ecclesiastically defined nation-states. Hence, the norm: extant or extinguished Orthodox patriarchate (autocephalous Church) = nation-state The homogeneity of the nation was defined in purely religious terms: exclusively for Orthodox Christians. Language came as an afterthought, mediated through ecclesiastical-cum-scriptal use. Hence, the Greek alphabet (symbolic of New Testament Greek) was earmarked for the Greek nationstate and Cyrillic (symbolic of Church Slavonic) for the Slavophone nation-states of Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia and for the Romancephone Romania (Wallachia and Moldavia united). As a result, the following norm emerged: patriarchate (autocephalous Church) = nationstate = holy tongue’s script In Western Europe and Scandinavia, the sovereign territorial states (established or stabilized in line with the early modern principle of cuius regio, eius religio) were gradually overhauled into nation-states, but with the retaining of royal or imperial languages as official (= national). The homogeneity of the nation was defined in civic terms (with elements of state religion). This persisting religious component of this type of nationalism led to the 1831 founding of Belgium as a Catholic nation-state. Hence, the norm: (territorial) state (+ religion) = nation = nation-state But the religious (and also linguistic) element of national homogeneity was successfully defied in favor of citizenship only in the case of Switzerland, refounded in 1848 as a nation-state, after the 1847 religiously motivated (CatholicProtestant) civil war. German, French and Italian were made into this nation-state’s official languages. However, to stress that none of these Einzelsprachen was of more import than the others, the state’s official name was adopted in Latin, namely Confoederatio Helvetica. Figure Pi (Continued)

246  Postscript on methodology Between the 1810s and the 1820s, under the impression of the military and economic successes of the French and US nation-states, most colonies in Central and South America gained independence. The postcolonial polities were made into nation-states, the homogeneity of the nation defined in civic and racial terms (for whites and creoles only). The European colonial languages (Spanish, Portuguese) were retained and declared national languages, to the exclusion of the (Indigenous) ‘general languages’ in what is now known as the Americas. Hence, the norm: state = nation (= race = European language ≠ US language) The French Revolutionary War and the Napoleonic War (1792–1815) spread the ideology of nationalism and the model of nation-state across the world (to Central and Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, the Balkans, the Apennine Peninsulas and the Iberian Peninsula, Central and South America, the Middle East and North Africa). Nationalism: the early modern concept of a sovereign territorial state (under a single ruler and ideally consisting of one piece of territory) with the religiously homogenous population (Protestant caesaropapism, meaning ruler = head of church and decided on the population’s religion) became the basis for the rise of nation-state = state for one (homogenous) nation only. The first (postcolonial) nation-states (the homogeneity of the nation defined in civic and racial terms) were the United States of America and (post-slave) Haiti. The Kingdom of France was overhauled into a nation-state, the homogeneity of the nation defined first purely in civic terms but soon afterward (1794) also through the French language, declared as the sole official (national) language. Hence, the dominant norm of nationalism: state = nation (= race) With France’s (ethno)linguistic afterthought added to it, the dominant norm: state = nation = (capital’s and elite’s) language (≠ regional and non-elite languages) Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 247 The early modern period (16th–18th centuries)

Slavic ‘Eastern Cyrillic-based book printing, which slowly developed in Muscovy under the influence of (Orthodox) Poland-Lithuania Orthodox and Uniate (Greek Christianity’ Catholic) printing houses, began to flourish in the Russian Empire, ensuring the dominance of Grazhdanka over Church Cyrillic in printed books. Hence, (Grazhdanka) Cyrillic became known as the ‘Russian alphabet (letters).’ In emulation of the Western (European) model, Muscovy was overhauled into the Russian Empire (1721). The employment of the previously official (Church) Slavonic and Church (Old) Cyrillic was limited to ecclesiastical uses. For state-related (nonecclesiastical) needs, Church Cyrillic was remodeled (‘modernized’ = Latinized) in emulation of the Antiqua type of the Latin alphabet, yielding Grazhdanka (‘civil script’ = Modern Cyrillic). ‘Civil (nonchurch) books’ written and printed in Grazhdanka were produced in the increasingly vernacularized Slavonic. Hence, of the Russian language, consciously constructed on the Western model began to emerge. The model: Latinized (Westernized) Cyrillic (= Grazhdanka) + separation of church and state + vernacular + Academy of Sciences + academic authoritative dictionary + academic grammar = modern (Westernized) Orthodox Einzelsprache (= Russian) The use of the local Orthodox population’s Slavic vernacular for official written purposes in the politically non-Christian (later Catholic) Grand Duchy of Lithuania, led – as early as the 13th century – to the rise of the first Orthodox vernacular Einzelsprache written in Cyrillic, namely Ruthenian. Hence, the norm: non-Christian polity + Orthodox Slavophone population = holy tongue’s script + vernacular = language In addition, the traditional Orthodox distrust of printing (mechanical copying) was overcome in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania under the impression made by Catholic and Protestant book production elsewhere in Poland-Lithuania.

Figure Pi (Continued)

248  Postscript on methodology In the Romancephone Orthodox principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, Cyrillic was employed for writing and printing in the Romance vernacular, and thus, the Wallachian (Romanian) language was produced. Hence, the Rum Millet’s norm for non-Greek speakers – that is, the vernacular can be written in the holy tongue’s script, if this vernacular is not cognate with (close to) the holy tongue – was replicated. The goal of developing Wallachian (Romanian) was to emphasize these two principalities’ ecclesiastical and political autonomy (independence) vis-à-vis the Rum Millet and the growing Orthodox power of Muscovy (Russia). Hence, the norm: Orthodox holy tongue’s script + non-cognate vernacular = Einzelsprache = political and ecclesiastical autonomy or independence Cyrillic-based Slavonic was employed as the official language in the Orthodox principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia – where Romance speakers predominated – for emphasizing political and ecclesiastical autonomy or independence vis-à-vis, first, the Rum Millet, with its Greek script and language, and second, Hungary and Poland, where the ‘Catholic’ (‘un-Orthodox’) Latin alphabet was employed for written purposes. Hence, the norm: holy tongue (≠ vernacular) = script = instrument (sign) of political autonomy or independence Among Slavophone Orthodox Christians (in the Ottoman Empire, Muscovy, Poland-Lithuania, the Habsburg lands and Venice), the language and script of the Slavic translation of the Bible (9th c.) were employed for writing, namely (Old Church) Slavonic in Cyrillic letters. Slavonic was almost a millennium removed from Slavic vernaculars. Hence, the norm: (holy) language ≠ vernacular Thus, the East Roman (‘Byzantine,’ millet, Greek, East Roman) norm was preserved: holy book (liturgy) = script = language = (autocephalous) Church or patriarchate Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 249 Greek ‘Eastern Some Rum Millet printing in Greek developed in the 18th century in the Ottoman autonomous (Orthodox) Orthodox principalities of Wallachia and Christianity’ Moldavia (present-day Romania) ruled by ethnically Greek (Phanariot) Orthodox Rums (Romiois ‘Romans’). Hence, the norm: regional (delegated) power = millet-specific (religion) script = language (≠ region’s vernacular) = printing That is, the effective (regional) ruler (elite) chose (usually their ethnic, ethnoconfessional) script and language. Orthodox Church (Rum Millet) shared Islam’s suspicion of printing (mechanical = inhuman book [re]production). And (hand-written) manuscript tradition persisted. The humanistic printing that was developing across Western Christian Europe in Classical (Hellenistic) Greek was seen as ‘heathenish’ and thus was shunned by the Rum Millet and its elite. The norm was: true Christian Rum/Roman (New Testament) language vs. the heretic West’s heathen (= ethnic, Hellenistic, pre-Christian) (pseudo) language Vernacular literacy and book production in the Greek alphabet developed within the Rum Millet for Turkic-speaking Orthodox Christians in central Anatolia (Karaman and Cappadocia) and Budjak (present-day Ukraine’s southern half of the Odesa region), yielding the Einzelsprachen of Karamanlı (Καραμανλήδικα, Karamanlídika – that is, ‘Rum [Orthodox] Turkish’) and Gagauz (Γκαγκαούζ Gagaoúz). Similarly, Greek letters were used for writing and printing among Albanian- and Romance-speaking Orthodox Christians, thus producing the languages of Arvanitika (Αρβανίτικα) and Aromanian. The use of Greek letters for writing in Slavic contributed to the later emergence of Macedonian. Hence, the norm: non-Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians’ actual speech may be employed for writing and printing, but always in Greek letters (Millet = religion = script) But ideally, all the Rum Millet’s non-Greek speakers should eventually master Greek; nonGreek vernacular literacies in Greek letters were a mere means to this end. Figure Pi (Continued)

250  Postscript on methodology New Testament (‘Byzantine’) Greek (removed over one millennium from ethnic Greeks’ actual speech, Demotic [vernacular]) was the language (Einzelsprache) of the Orthodox (Rum = Roman) Millet (nonterritorial autonomous ethnoreligious group) in the Ottoman Empire. In the 19th century, this Einzelsprache was consciously ‘modernized’ (= Westernized) and became known as Katharevousa Καθαρεύουσα ‘pure (purifying) language.’ Hence, the earlier established norm continued: holy book (liturgy) = script = language = Millet (church) As a result, the norm was also as follows: the speech community’s Einzelsprache (language) = a written form removed one millennium from the vernacular ≠ everyday speech (Demotic) The same situation of diglossia was the norm among Slavophone Orthodox Christians, Armenians and Jews and still is among (Muslim) Arabs. The term Demotic stems from Greek δημοτική dimotikí ‘of the people, commoners.’ Earlier Demotic was also known as Romaic ‘Roman language,’ or the common speech of the Orthodox Christian population in the Ottoman region of Rumelia (= former East Roman Empire), or the Balkans. The term diglossia is a Greek-based scholarly neologism διγλωσσία diglōssia ‘two languages (language varieties).’ Armenian diaspora

Figure Pi (Continued)

Printing was adopted by Armenians, across Central and Eastern Europe, in the Ottoman Empire, Persia and British India for publishing, first in the holy (ecclesiastical) tongue of Grabar (into which the Armenian Bible was translated in the 5th c.) and afterward in Armenian vernaculars (Modern Armenian, Armeno-Kipchak, Armeno-Turkish, or Armeno-Kurdish), which were thus made into Einzelsprachen. All Armenian Einzelsprachen united by normative monoscriptalism in the Armenian alphabet of the holy book (= the Armenian translation of the Bible). The term ‘Grabar’ stems from Old Armenian գրաբար grabar for ‘language, script.’

Postscript on methodology 251 Jewish diaspora

Printing was adopted by Jews, across Western and Central Europe and in the Ottoman Empire for publishing, first in the holy tongue of Hebrew (= the Torah) and afterward in Jewish vernaculars (Spanyol/Ladino, Yiddish, or Judeo-Arabic), which were thus made into Einzelsprachen. All Jewish Einzelsprachen were united by normative monoscriptalism in the Hebrew script of the holy book (= the Torah).

Colonial world Interestingly, in the German maritime colonial of ‘Western empire, as founded in the late 19th century, Christianity’ the use of German was discouraged, because it was to remain the sociolect of the ‘racially better’ colonizers. For the ‘natives,’ local languages were adopted or developed (cf ‘general languages’ in the Spanish Empire), such as Swahili for German East Africa (present-day Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania). Likewise, Dutch was discouraged across the Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia) until the interwar period. Hence, the norm: a European empire’s Einzelsprache had to be withheld from the colonial population, because the empire’s European people was believed to be ‘racially superior’ to the colonial one. As of the 18th century, exclusively European powers’ official Einzelsprachen were used for administering maritime empires – that is, Spanish and Portuguese in the Americas and along the Indian Ocean littoral, English and French in North America, the Caribbean and India, Dutch in what is today Indonesia (but only after the Great War), and Danish and Swedish in some smaller colonies. The norm: European power’s Einzelsprache + translation of the Bible (with the use of the Latin alphabet) = official and standard language = medium of colonial (imperial, overseas) administration In addition, the Indigenous – Mesoamerican (= Mayan, Aztec) and Andean (= Incan) – literacies were destroyed, to erase the precolonial traditions, practices and symbols of power from use and living memory. Figure Pi (Continued)

252  Postscript on methodology Because of the founding of the Spanish and Portuguese empires in the Americas, between the 16th and the 18th centuries, it became necessary to use Indigenous languages for administration and Christianization. They were fashioned into typical Western Europeanstyle Einzelsprachen (i.e., Lengua General in Spanish and Língua Geral in Portuguese), complete with grammars, dictionaries and translations of the Bible that ensured effective prescriptivism and state (ideological) control. All these colonial ‘general languages’ in the Americas were written in the Latin alphabet (Antiqua) of Catholicism. Hence, the norm: monoscriptalism = power = (maritime, colonial) empire The ‘non-Western’ (non-Catholic) alphabet ‘Western of Cyrillic for accommodating substantial Christianity’ Orthodox populations in Poland-Lithuania (Holy and the Kingdom of Hungary were accepted. Roman However, in these Catholic polities, the Empire) Orthodox populations were pressed to enter ecclesiastical unions with Rome. Hence, the norm: ‘non-Western’ literacy for ‘non-Western’ Christians would be tolerated if they switched their ecclesiastical loyalty to the pope Nevertheless, with time, they were expected to master Latin or other ‘Catholic vernaculars’ written in Latin letters. That is, the following norm: Catholicism = Latin alphabet ≠ Cyrillic = Orthodox Christianity Next was the political ascendance of France at the expense of the Holy Roman Empire and papacy reinforced the separation of state and church, which was also reflected in the functional replacement of Latin by French as the language of politics, the elite (nobility, burghers), economy and scholarship, meaning power = language. Europe’s nobles from Portugal through Russia and from Scandinavia to the Ottoman Empire were expected to be fluent in French as their sociolect (estate, status language of prestige and sociopolitical distinction). Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 253 Officializing prescriptivism: To this day, the norm is that only those with full command of ‘pure’ (i.e., standardized) Einzelsprache in writing and speech, as confirmed by a university degree, are eligible for employment (career) in state administration. Officializing prescriptivism: the emergence of Academy (of Sciences) in Florence, France and across the Holy Roman Empire (16th–17th centuries), as a secular state-controlled institution for guarding (i.e., defining and enforcing) ‘language purity’ (i.e., ‘correctness’). Its main task was to produce an authoritative comprehensive ‘academic (monolingual) dictionary’ of a given Einzelsprache, alongside a similarly authoritative ‘academic grammar’ of this language. Hence, the norm: ‘proper language’ = one recognized through a state-approved dictionary and grammar State became the sole authority with the power to recognize and regulate an Einzelsprache. In a 1492 work on the grammar of Castilian (Spanish), Antonio de Nebrija famously proposed that ‘language has always been the perfect instrument of empire.’ Hence, the dual norm: state = language and language = state (power, empire) The Renaissance (from Neo-Latin renascentia and French renaissance [the] ‘rebirth’ [of preChristian, classical, ancient Greek and Roman models and traditions]): humanistic translation program of, first, Greek classics into Latin and, then, Greek and Roman (Latin) classics into new unholy Einzelsprachen (vernaculars), including ‘heathen’ (pre- and non-Christian) authors, earlier shunned by the Christian Church. Lost Graeco-Roman classics were (back) translated from medieval Arabic translations. Given the pecuniary demands of the market, printers standardized language use. For instance, a high number of chancery Germanic Einzelsprachen attested across the Holy Roman Empire was limited to six Druckersprachen Figure Pi (Continued)

254  Postscript on methodology (‘printing languages’). In turn, the main centers of power (Catholic Habsburgs, Protestants and Hanseatic League) limited this variety to three German(ic) languages: Common German of the Catholic imperial court in Vienna, High German of Martin Luther’s translation of the Bible, and Low German (= Dutch) of the Hanse along the Baltic littoral. Eventually, the Protestant variety won, and a single German language (Deutsch) was gradually created and accepted for written purposes. But the independence of the Netherlands (from the Holy Roman Empire), as officially confirmed in 1648, led to the rise of the separate written language of Dutch (Duits). First, in the mid 16th century, French replaced Latin as France’s official language, and afterward, vernaculars either joined Latin as co-official languages or replaced Latin in this function (Latin was replaced by Hungarian in the Kingdom of Hungary as late as 1844). A new norm was established: ruling elite’s vernacular (‘indigenous speech’) = state’s official language The term vernacular stems from Latin vernācul(us): ‘household, domestic, native.’ Because Latin lost its speech community during the Middle Ages, soon more books were produced and consumed in the new Einzelsprachen than in Latin. Normative monoscriptalism was preserved, though a typographic differentiation appeared, namely the revived humanistic Antiqua (‘ancient Latin letters’ as employed in classical Rome) were used for Latin and other Einzelsprachen employed by Catholics, and the medieval Gothic script (Blackletter, Fraktur ‘broken letters’) was used for Einzelsprachen used by Protestants. Hence, the norm: typographic variety of the Latin script = religion (The term Gothic, initially a pejorative for barbaric, is an adjective formed from the ethnonym Goths, who sacked Rome in 410.) Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 255 In Protestant polities, the ascendance of vernaculars as ‘new unholy’ Einzelsprachen, was facilitated by the subjection of the Church (religion) to the state in a form of new caesaropapism, the ruler doubling as the head of a polity’s Protestant Church. Hence, the norm: state = church = Einzelsprache (Cuius regio, eius religio ‘whose realm, his religion’) This normative equation was underpinned by the novel principle of sovereignty. It prohibited any foreign rulers from intervening in the polity’s internal matters, thus leading to the rise of the normative model of ‘territorial state.’ Reformation (Protestantism) and the Catholic reaction in the form of Counter-Reformation allowed for the publication of the Bible in translations into numerous ‘new unholy’ Einzelsprachen, making them into ‘proper languages’ on par with Latin. The speech community of a new Einzelsprache was made into a book market for publications in this Einzelsprache (cf Benedict Anderson’s concept of print capitalism). The introduction of print in Europe exponentially increased book production and consumption, and it contributed to a steady rise in literacy. As a result, a demand for books in people’s vernaculars appeared (especially across Western and Central Europe), which through the technology of printing were made into ‘new unholy’ Einzelsprachen. The previously elevated role of Latin was gradually undermined, especially beginning in Romancephone countries. The Middle Ages (7th–15th centuries)

Enforcement of normative monoscriptalism ‘Western and the elevated role of Latin as the Christianity’ sole holy tongue and the sole or the most (Holy important official language of religion, state, Roman scholarship and education, effected by banning Empire) translations of the Vulgate (Bible) into vernaculars (new ‘unholy’ Einzelsprachen). Lack of effective political centralization led to the rise of the practice of writing in ‘vernaculars’ (dialects) such as (Old) English,

Figure Pi (Continued)

256  Postscript on methodology Irish, German(ic) and Slavic (Czech, Polish), and different state-specific (regional) forms of Latin appeared (‘vulgar Latin’), before spawning a variety of Romance languages. However, the norm was as follows: all these new Einzelsprachen had to be written in the same Latin script of the Vulgate = monoscriptalism Christianization spread the model of Einzelsprache through the reinforcement of Western Europe’s religious-cultural-political unity (emperor = pope = Christianity = Latin = Latin script). Hence Latin (and its Latin script) was made the sole official language of church and state. (Eastern) The rise of autonomous (autocephalous) Roman Churches and Christianizing missions led to Empire the spread of the model of Einzelsprache and (Byzantium) to the emergence of a new norm. The new norm: adoption of Christianity by a non-Greekspeaking people = new script = translation of the Greek Bible into this people’s speech = creation of a new Christian Einzelsprache (e.g., Armenian, Georgian, Syriac or Slavonic) Latin was replaced by Greek as the empire’s official language, meaning the norm Einzelsprache = power was consciously realized, hence Einzelsprachen could be selected and removed from official use at will by the ruler’s decision. Caesaropapism: The emperor heads both the empire and the church. Islam, Caliphate, Islamic world

Figure Pi (Continued)

The farther from the Arabian Peninsula and the further from the time when the Quran was composed (‘revealed’), the more (official, written, standard, Qur’anic) Arabic (known in Arabic as ‫ الفصحى‬al-fuṣḥā ‘the purest’) became distant from (unintelligible vis-à-vis) local speech (vernaculars, dialects), but only Arabic was considered to be a (true) language.

Postscript on methodology 257 Hence, the norm: holy tongue (religion) = Einzelsprache The only concession was the rise of the parallel use of Turkic (Chagatai, Osmanlıca) and Persian, due to the political influence of the Turkic and Persian empires in the Islamic world. Hence, the by-rule: (Islamic imperial) power (center) = Einzelsprache = Arabic script The ruling elite (ruler) may choose (or make a vernacular into) a language different from Arabic, though it must be written in Arabic letters. Across the Perso-Indian culture zone, the Arabic script–based Persian became the language of ruling courts, administration, scholarship and cultural pursuits. In Turkic Central Asia and the Turkic-speaking parts (Anatolia, Balkans) of the Ottoman Empire, Persian became the language of cultural pursuits and distinction. In the Perso-Indian culture zone (from present-day Afghanistan to Bangladesh) the Arabo-Persianized concept and practice of Einzelsprache met the similar indigenous (Hindu) concept of holy tongue, as embodied by Sanskrit (संस्कृत saṃskṛta ‘perfectly formed’). A program of translating from Sanskrit classics into Persian. Both traditions interacted and reinforced the original (East) Roman norm. The norm: Einzelsprache = writing = script = (holy) book (canon) Persophone ascendancy in the Islamic world: A program of translating Arabic classics into the Arabic script–based Persian in Safavid Persia, which adopted Shiism as its state religion. Persian also became the main language of Sufism. These developments, within the same scriptal-religious-cultural sphere of Islam, emphasized the independence of Persia vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire and caliphate and signaled the doctrinal autonomy of Shiism and Sufism vis-à-vis Sunnism. Hence, the norm: non-holy language (but written in Arabic letters) + nondominant branch of Islam = political independence and cultural autonomy (dominance) in the Islamic world Figure Pi (Continued)

258  Postscript on methodology Normative monoscriptalism: because the Arabic script functioned (and still does) as a potent symbol of Islam, languages other than Arabic but employed for official and educational purposes in Muslim countries (e.g., Chagatai [Chaghatay], Malay, Osmanlıca [Ottoman or Old Turkish], Tatar, Persian, Swahili and Urdu [Hindustani]) must be written in Arabic letters. As a result, the concept of Einzelsprache spread across North and Northeastern Africa, alongside Western, Central, South and Southeast Asia. Islamization of prescriptivism: 1. lack of writing/‘incorrect’ speech = dialects = barbaric + heathen 2a. writing and speaking in Christian or Jewish Einzelsprachen of the Bible = tolerated monotheist infidels (dhimmi ‫ ذمي‬ḏimmī ‘residence in return for tax’) 2b. writing and speaking in languages of nonmonotheist peoples = not tolerated kaffirs (‫كافرون‬ َ ُ ِ َ kāfirūna ‘infidels, rejectors [of the “true faith”]’) 3. in spite of how much the believers’ everyday speech may differ through time and space from the Arabic of the Quran, they are obliged to master the latter for correct (as ordained by god) speaking and writing Islamization of rhetoric: God’s word (speech), as recorded in the Quran, is the basis for good (correct) speaking and writing in Arabic. The development of Islamic scholarship, including grammars, dictionaries and school textbooks (emphasizing rhetoric and pronunciation as the basis of correct recitation of the Quran) is based on Greco-Roman models. A program of translating Greek and Roman Classics into Arabic. The East Christian model of caesaropapism was adopted: Caliph is both god’s representative on the earth (supreme religious leader) and emperor (supreme political leader); religion = politics; and as a result, he governs and worships through ‘god’s single and perfect Einzelsprache’ of Arabic. Figure Pi (Continued)

Postscript on methodology 259 Hence, the norm: Einzelsprache = religion = power = legitimacy The Judeo-Greek-Roman model of Einzelsprache was adopted in the Quran (Arabic ‫القرآن‬ al-Qurʾān, for ‘the recitation’). Hence, the norm: God’s word = holy book (religion) = script = holy tongue (Einzelsprache) = caliphate (empire, state) = ummah (the believers, faithful), as opposed to ‘infidels’ (the unfaithful) = barbarians = uncultivated = without writing Late Antiquity (3rd–6th centuries ce)

Christianity and Roman Empire

Christianization of prescriptivism’s norm: lack of writing/‘incorrect’ speech = dialects = barbaric + heathen The term heathen is a pejorative for ‘nonscriptural’ religion – that is, not based on any holy book. It originates from Germanic heath for ‘uncultivated land, a tract of forest.’ Hence, the stereotype: uncultivated = uncultured = oral/not written = uncivilized = not (fully) human The rise of the Christian canon, meaning nonand pre-Christian works seen as ‘anti-Christian’ (‘heathen’) were banned and earmarked for destruction. Hence, the norm: non-Christian = heathenish/pagan = illegal Vulgate (‘commonly used [version]’): the officially approved Latin translation of the Bible. Hence, the Hebrew model was adopted across the Roman Empire: state (empire) = religion (holy book) = script = language Christianity was adopted as the official religion of the Roman Empire. Hence, the norm: state = religion = holy book Septuagint (Latin ‘seventy,’ the traditionally accepted number of this version’s translators) – the Greek translation of the Old Testament, which amounted to the creation of the Christian Bible in Greek (Greek expression τὰ βιβλία tà biblía for ‘the books’ gave rise to the term ‘Bible’).

Figure Pi (Continued)

260  Postscript on methodology Classical Antiquity (2nd century BC–2nd century ce)

Roman Empire

Hebrew as a language of everyday communication was gradually lost, but the norm (prescriptivism) that worship must be said in the holy tongue (‘god’s word’), as recorded in writing in the Pentateuch (= the Torah) rose. The term Pentateuch stems from Greek πεντάτευχος pentáteukhos ‘five scrolls (books),’ for the first five books of the Old Testament. The term Torah is Hebrew ‫ הָרֹוּת‬tora for ‘instruction, teaching, or law.’ The New Testament was composed in Greek. Hence, the adoption of the Hebrew model: Greek = script = holy book (religion) = holy tongue Those who spoke ‘incorrectly’ or ‘unintelligibly’ (i.e., in different languages) were considered ‘barbarians’ βάρβαρος (‘the inferior Other’). Their speech was negatively evaluated as ‘barbaric (dialect)’ – that is, ‘incomprehensible’ ‘bar bar bar’ to a Greek speaker. Hence, the following stereotype: lack of writing/‘incorrect’ (‘incomprehensible,’ ‘uncivilized’) speech = dialects = barbaric Rhetoric (from Greek ρητορ ritor ‘orator’) = prescriptivism extended to speech – that is, written Einzelsprache – became the model for ‘official,’ ‘beautiful,’ ‘clear,’ ‘lucid,’ ‘intelligible’ speaking. Prescriptivism, or ‘authorized use’ (= how to write ‘correctly,’ as the ruling elite does), and the canon κανών (‘measuring stick, rule’) of approved (by religion, state, elite) exemplary (the best) works to be emulated (and followed) emerged. A program of translating Greek works into Latin took place. First grammars (from Greek γραμματικὴ τέχνη grammatikē technē ‘art of letters = writing’), dictionaries and school textbooks of both Greek and Latin were developed. The Greek thinking on language, including the concept of Einzelsprache, was adopted.

(Ancient) Greeks

Figure Pi (Continued)

The first libraries (from Latin liber ‘book’; however, the Latin term for ‘library,’ or bibliotheca, is derived from the Greek word βιβλίο biblío ‘book’) emerged.

Postscript on methodology  261 The first books, seen as a product of conscious editing, often by several people or a structured group of editors, were published. The concept of Einzelsprache = ‘written language,’ also known as ‘literary language’ (Einzelsprache in which a body of books, texts = literature is available), emerged. The following equation emerged: Attica (Athens) = political and cultural dominance = Koine (κοινή ‘common language’) + writing = language (other regional speech variants were not to be written = dialects [διάλεκτος]; their users were expected to acquire and write in the prestigious Koine) The following European (Western) dichotomy emerged: writing = language (Einzelsprache) vs. speech = dialect Early Antiquity

Hebrews: god’s word = holy book (religion) = script = holy tongue (Einzelsprache) Middle East and the Mediterranean region: script = Einzelsprache Mesopotamia: invention of writing spread across Western and Central Eurasia (including ancient Egypt) NB: The other place in Eurasia where the technology of writing was invented independently was China. The country is the source of origin of the Chinese (morphemic) writing system, at present employed in China, Japan, Taiwan, partly in Korea and in the past also in Vietnam. The technology of writing was also independently invented in Mesoamerica (Mayas, Aztecs) and Andean Latin America (Incas: quipu). The European invasion of the Americas extinguished the use of both Indigenous forms of this technology during the 16th and 17th centuries. The norms: 1. writing = (political) power 2. the destruction of one polity (empire) by another often leads to the destruction (removal, replacement) of the defeated polity’s institutions and elite (= culture), including a specific technology of writing or a writing system (The term norm stems from Latin norma: ‘precept, principle, rule, carpenter’s square.’)

Figure Pi (Continued)

262  Postscript on methodology

Notes 1 In recent popular writings on the phenomenon of social reality, this type of reality tends to be misleadingly referred to as fictitious reality (cf Harari 2014: 36–39). The adjective ‘fictitious’ wrongly suggests that such reality is nonexistent (Shotter 1993: 141). On the contrary, it does exist in a social sense and conditions human behaviors and how our groups behave. From the perspective of the material world, social reality is ‘invisible,’ as fully contained in human brains. This understanding is quite clear to lawyers who have long employed the term legal fictions for characterizing, for instance, corporations as ‘(juristic) persons’ (Del Mar and Twining 2015; Kelsen 2005: 96–97). 2 I mean not to suggest that social reality is pliable to an individual’s free will. One is born to the obtaining social reality, which one tends to perceive to be as ‘tangible’ as the surrounding material reality. Any change in social reality takes the collective determination of many people (e.g., demonstrations, an act legislated by a legislature and gradually implemented by its corresponding government) for a long time (e.g., the banning of slavery all around the world). Hence, social reality is a product of groups of individuals and the collective will of such groups. 3 With time, the non-Indigenous former colonial languages employed in official capacity get ‘domesticated’ and may be even deployed for creating and maintaining ethnolinguistic differences. The telling example is that of Cameroon in Central Africa. In 1884, the German Empire established its colony of Kamerun in this area. After the Great War, the colony was split between France and the United Kingdom in the form of mandated territories of the French Cameroons and British Cameroons, respectively. In 1960–1961, both gained independence and formed a single nation-state of Cameroon. The subsequent preference for French and French speakers over English and English speakers in administration, education and business breached the constitutional provisions of equal bilingualism and marginalized the latter group. The conflict turned violent in 2018–2019, thus far leaving half a thousand dead and displacing half a million. Until the effective elementary education for all was ensured in the late 20th century, no Cameroonians spoke French or English as their first (L1, ‘native’) language. Even today, the vast majority of 23 million Cameroonians speak the country’s 200 or so Indigenous Einzelsprachen as their L1 languages (‘mother tongues’). But when it comes to politics, education and statewide (national) identity, for better or worse, Cameroonians now side either with French or English, which are their preferred L2 languages. Sadly and ironically, Cameroonians struggle and suffer for a European-inits-origins difference that is not of their making (Cameroon’s Deadly 2019; Freeman 2018; Munshi 2019; O’Grady 2019). 4 Interestingly, in modern times, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was the sole polity with a singularly universal name that did not contain any ethnic or geographic references. In the names of all the other polities, either ethnic or geographic references always feature. In contrast, the Soviet Union’s official name was devised to fit the Bolshevik program of a worldwide revolution. Bolsheviks hoped that such a revolution, if successful, would be followed by the founding of a universal communist polity for all humankind – a state for the entire species of Homo sapiens sapiens (cf Blair and Curtis 2009: 144). 5 The technology of writing makes it possible to separate the secondary function of (neutral, nonbonding) communication from the primary (biological, evolutionary) function of language, which bonds humans such that they form cohesive groups. When a disembodied message (information) is separated from its human creators and receivers, it appears to be an autonomous entity (even subject) in its own right. This strong (though false) conviction allows for the construction of social reality that underpins the existence of non-face-to-face human groups. However, the recent exponential mass increase in communication facilitated by the ubiquitous mass media of television, the

Postscript on methodology  263 internet and mobile telephony (that aspires to combine all other e-media) appears to be effectively collapsing the function of communication into that of bonding (cf Jeffrey and Doron 2013). In this age of ‘information overload’ and ‘fake news,’ language’s primary function of bonding seems to take over again, the volume of genuine communication (information) in all e-traffic exponentially limited to much less than 1 percent. As a result, unprecedentedly huge non-face-to-face groups (i.e., nations and nationstates) appear to be more real and cohesive than ever before – as if they were face-toface in character.   Thanks to decades-long research on how human societies and groups are constructed, maintained and changed, the modern state enjoys quite finessed and flexible control over the input channels via which populations are coaxed to transform in a manner required by the government. These channels, among others, are compulsory state education, ubiquitous (intrusive) state bureaucracy (surveillance) or the mass media, as well as effective (political, administrative or economic) control over such channels. Total control over politics cannot be successfully achieved without control over information flows, epitomized by the initially ‘borderless’ internet that ‘freed’ information. Since 1998, China has pioneered the world’s most comprehensive and ambitious system of multifunctional cyberspace that would remain tightly (but not stiflingly) under the Communist Party government’s full (ideological) control (Golden 2018). This poetically named Golden Shield Project underpins the currently implemented Social Credit System (commenced in 2014), which means to embrace all China’s inhabitants by 2020 (Social Credit System 2018). This system, with the use of ‘big data,’ ‘facial recognition’ and bionic (iris) identification (Lihua 2016), will continuously check on how effectively individuals absorb and conform to social reality as consciously produced and shaped by the totalitarian regime (Mistreanu 2018). The Chinese province of Xinjiang became a testing ground of these techniques of social control and management. As a result, since 2014, one-tenth of the region’s 11.5 million Uighurs have been incarcerated in the concentration (‘re-education,’ ‘thought-transformation,’ ‘vocational training’) camps (‘centers’). The inmates account for 5 percent of the region’s inhabitants (Xinjiang Re-education 2019; Xinjiang Victims 2019; Zenz 2019). 6 The Soviet writer Andrei Platonov made a small nation of several tens of people the topic of his renowned 1935 novella ‘Soul’ (Platonov 1999). The narrative is ostensibly about ‘bringing socialism’ to the pastoralist nation of Dzhans, which meant making them part of the bigger Soviet people (nation). Yet these ‘civilizing’ efforts did not bring ‘progress and happiness’ to the Dzhans, as promised, but rather misery, or the forced collectivization of the herds and holodomor (death by starvation). What Platonov alludes to is the loss of culture and tradition, the tragic process of destroying the Dzhans as a group, making them into an indistinguishable part of the imperial underclass of ‘natives,’ known in the language of Soviet propaganda as the ‘toiling masses’ of Soviet Central Asia. 7 Censuses and ‘ethnographic’ research provided the Habsburg administration with a similarly faithful picture of a multitude of groups, languages, estates and identities residing everywhere within the Austrian Empire. The follow-up bureaucratic ‘rationalization’ of a given language or a given identity as an officially accepted category allowed for limiting the number of ‘enumerated’ languages and identities. In turn, the state’s bureaucratic policy of such ‘rationalization’ produced ethnolinguistic ‘boxes’ from which, later, ethnolinguistic nations would spring up. Such nations were created and shaped first, rather inadvertently, by the Habsburg administration itself and only later by national activists who seized upon this political momentum (cf Stergar and Scheer 2018). Not all ‘potential nations,’ as identified by nonnational imperial statisticians, coalesced into actual nations. For instance, the officially Moravian-speaking Moravians, regularly recorded in the Austro-Hungarian statistics until 1918, disappeared without much trace, mostly collapsed into the Czech(oslovak) nation (cf Adelung 1809: 676; Fischel 1906: 334–335).

264  Postscript on methodology 8 This normative fear of socio-political diversity within a polity must have underpinned the highly negative image of the Holy Roman Empire, which during the 19th and 20th centuries was regularly denigrated by its critics as ‘backward.’ Their disapproval hinged mainly on the fact that this empire was composed of over 2,500 more or less sovereign states (cf Lipp 2011: 12). In the mid 17th century, the empire’s population totaled 16 million, yielding on average 6,400 inhabitants per such an imperial state. This demographic mean corresponded to a town or a rural county in this empire. 9 The pretense of co-opting colonized peoples in British India allowed for limited nonviolent protest, typically disregarded by administration or silenced from above. It took the sustained efforts of hundreds of activists and thousands of supporters to implement a socio-political solution demanded by colonized peoples. For example, the Oriyaspeaking elite, under the European influence, proposed that Oriya speakers constitute a nation. Yet between 1866 and 1949, over eight decades of patient canvassing, repeated demonstrations and numerous grassroots organizations were required before all the disparate territories inhabited by Oriya speakers were merged into a single ‘linguistic’ province of Orissa (Patra 1979). 10 In 1940, the Soviet Union conquered Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which were made into the communist polity’s union republics. However, the Latin alphabet was retained for writing and publishing in the respective republican languages of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian, perhaps in recognition of the fact that the populations of these three new Soviet republics were more literate and more educated on average than inhabitants in other Soviet areas. Hence, imposing Cyrillic on the three languages might have triggered an even-stronger and even-more-widespread popular opposition to Soviet rule. The Kremlin did not want a state of permanent civil war in these three new republics. Retaining Latin letters for writing and publishing in Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian seemed a small price to pay to avoid that. 11 The Soviet policy of scriptal unification (homogenization) differs from India’s approach to writing systems. Following in this respect the British colonial administration, Delhi allows quite a number of various scripts for official use. Like the medieval and early modern Middle East, in India each ethnoconfessional group aspires to write its Einzelsprache in the script of the group’s religion. The number of approximately 40 scripts on the eve of India’s independence was reduced to 25 by the 1981 census. Out of this total, 11 scripts were recognized as ‘major’ and typically are employed for writing and publishing in the scheduled languages. Furthermore, 12 scripts, labeled as ‘minor,’ are in use for writing other languages, and the Latin alphabet is employed for writing and printing in English (Singh and Manoharan 1993: 28). 12 The Chinese term minzu 民族 is composed of two Chinese graphemes, which mean ‘a people’ and ‘family,’ respectively. In contrast, the Chinese term for nation is guozu 國族, its former grapheme denoting ‘country, state’ and the latter ‘family.’ Guo 國 is none other than ‘state’ in Chinese. In modern (communist, Soviet-inflected) Chinese usage, the nation should enjoy its own state, whereas ‘nationalities’ (ethnic groups, minorities), by definition, are stateless. The nation-state, or a ‘state for one nation only,’ is denoted in Chinese with the lengthy neologism 民族國家 minzu guojia. As explained earlier, minzu means ‘nationality, ethnic group, ethnolinguistic nation.’ In turn, guojia means ‘country, state,’ and its constituent graphemes can be translated literally as ‘state’ and ‘family,’ respectively. Hence, at the level of graphemes the meaning of guojia is the same as that of the aforementioned guozu. 13 The Vietnamese official term for nationality (minority, ethnic group) is dân tộc. The term’s two constitutive elements mean ‘a people’ and ‘clan,’ respectively. Interestingly, in Vietnamese, the same term is employed to denote the ‘nation,’ though the quốc gia may be used to express the meaning of the term nation, but rather as defined through statehood than language and ethnicity. Like the Chinese term for state, the Vietnamese term for state is focused on the word country – that is, nhà nước, literally ‘home +

Postscript on methodology  265 country.’ On the other hand, the neologism for ‘nation-state,’ or quốc gia dân tộc, combines the term for state-centered nation with that of nationality, ethnic group, minority. 14 Wolaytta (Wolayita, Welayta) is a language in southern Ethiopia, with about 1.5 million speakers. During the 1940s, missionaries endowed it with a written form. In 1981, a Wolaytta translation of the New Testament was published (Wolaytta Bible 2019). In 1997, the Ethiopian authorities decided to merge Wolaytta with the languages of Gamo, Goffa (Gofa) and Dawro, still with no established written forms. The move had been preceded by the merger of these four ethnic groups’ political parties, yielding a composite ethnic designation for their new common party’s name – that is, Wogagoda (initially WoGaGoDa). The same ethnic designation was adopted for the proposed common composite language in which a school textbook was published in 1997. In the following year, this textbook was introduced to schools in North Omo Zone, leading to strikes and demonstrations (mainly by Wolayttas) that, between September and December 1998, left over ten people dead and hundreds wounded in their wake. More than 1,000 demonstrators were also arrested (Aalen 2009: 117–118; Dea 2005–2006; Ethiopia 2005: 192; Kefale 2006: 937). Although the composite Gamo-Gofa-Dawro K’ala (‘mother tongue’ – i.e., language), which has about two million speakers, seems to have survived the 1998 breakup of Wogagoda, only a few publications were produced in it (Brenzinger 1997: 217; Wolff 2003: 99). Furthermore, because of this ethnic strife, and in line with the ethnolinguistic principle, in 2000 North Omo Zone was split into the three ethnolinguistically defined zones of Dawro, Gamo-Gofa and Wolayita (Vaughan 2003: 251–260). Only Gamo-Gofa remains a biethnic zone. The separateness of Wolaytta as an Einzelsprache in its own right was underscored by the 2002 publication of a translation of the entire Bible into this language (Wolaytta Bible 2019). In addition, Dawro and Gof(f)a translations of the New Testament came off the press in 2011 and were followed by a Gamo translation in 2012 (Dawro 2019; Gofa 2019; The Whole 2017). 15 In 1947, India was created as a civic nation-state for all its multiethnic, polyconfessional and multilingual populations. However, in 2019, a new citizenship act was passed, which privileges members of the Hindu religion in access to Indian citizenship (Varughese 2019). Hence, India may soon morph from a civic nation-state to an ethnoconfessional nation-state. Then it would become similar in this aspect to its archenemy, namely Pakistan, which is a Muslim ethnoconfessional nation-state. 16 In spite of the seemingly woman-centered term ‘mother tongue’ (Muttersprache in German), so heavily employed by scholars, nationalists and statisticians, all the aforementioned amateur scholars and national activists venturing into villages in search of nations and Einzelsprachen were invariably men. Likewise, they tended to talk to male peasants only. This was a staunchly patriarchal world, in which the man knew best, and the woman was to keep quiet, stay out, and follow her father, brother or husband, including these men’s convictions, decisions and plans. In the oft-repeated Germanlanguage saying, the three Ks delineated the woman’s space: Kinder, Küche und Kirche (‘children, kitchen and church’). 17 In Czech, this nationalist term posing as a ‘neutral’ historiographic notion is národní obrození (‘national rebirth’) or even národní vzkříšení (‘national resurrection’); rilindja kombëtare (‘national rebirth’) in Albanian; нацыянальнае адраджэнне nacyjanalnaje adradžennje (‘national re-birth’) in Belarusian; ազգային զարթոնք azgayin zart’vonk’ (‘national awakening’) in Armenian; milli oyanış (‘national awakening’) in Azerbaijani; национално възраждане natsionalno vızrazhdane (‘national rebirth’) in Bulgarian; narodni preporod (‘national rebirth’) or narodno buđenje (‘national awakening’) in Croatian; rahvuslik ärkamine (‘national awakening’) in Estonian; kansallinen herääminen (‘national awakening) in Finnish; ეროვნული გამოღვიძება erovnuli gamoghvidzeba (‘national awakening’) in Georgian; nationale Wiedergeburt (‘national rebirth’) or nationales Erwachen (‘national awakening’) in German; εθνική

266  Postscript on methodology αφύπνιση ethnikí afýpnisi (‘national awakening’) in Greek; nemzeti ébredés (‘national awakening’ in Hungarian); risveglio nazionale (‘national awakening’), rinascita nazionale (‘national rebirth’) or risorgimento nazionale (‘national resurgence’) in Italian; tautinis atgimimas (‘national awakening’) in Lithuanian; nacionālā atmoda (‘national awakening’) in Latvian; nasjonal oppvåkning (‘national awakening’) in Norwegian; odrodzenie narodowe (‘national rebirth’) in Polish; renaştere naţională (‘national rebirth) in Romanian; национальное пробуждение natsionalnoe probuzhdenie (‘national awakening’) in Russian; národné obrodenie (‘national rebirth’) in Slovak; narodni preporod (‘national rebirth’) or narodno prebujenje (‘national awakening’) in Slovenian; millî uyanışı or ulusal uyanış (both meaning ‘national awakening’) in Turkish; національне відродження natsional’ne vidrodzhennia (‘national rebirth’) in Ukrainian; natsyanale avakening ‫‘( גנינעקַאווַא עלאנאיצאנ‬national awakening’) in Yiddish; farther afield, such as 民族覺醒 mínzú juéxǐng (‘national awakening’), in Chinese; kebangkitan nasional (‘national awakening’) in Indonesian and Malay(sian); and 民族覚醒 minzoku kakusei (‘national awakening’) or 民族再生 minzoku saisei (‘national rebirth’) in Japanese. 18 The table is organized in the form of a timeline, with the earliest period located at this table’s bottom and the present times at the top. Within some periods subsections are distinguished on a cultural-geographical basis, as appropriate for the discussed subject.

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Index

Page numbers in italics indicate a figure on the corresponding page. Page numbers followed by ‘n’ indicate a note. 7th Oriental Congress 193, 236 8th International Congress of Statistics 193, 236, 239 – 240 Abaza 66 Abkhazian Russian 157, 158 Adelung, Johann Christoph 84n5 Adyghe 66 Aegean Macedonian 59, 61, 76; see also Macedonian al-Assad, Bashar 167 Albania 61, 123 Albanian 16, 69, 72, 73, 75, 77, 145 Alliance Française 165 All-Slav Congress 10, 54n8; see also Pan-Slav Congress, panslavism All-Slavic dialect continuum 31; see also dialectology All-Slavic languages and politics of script 135 alphabets, of Slavic state languages 106 – 107, 114 Altai 66 Anglo-Saxon Wikipedia 90, 91 – 92 Anronovych, Volodymyr 170n7 anthropomorphization, of languages 5, 8 Antiqua 132, 226, 241, 254 antisemitism 68 Arabic 117n6, 144, 145, 146, 147, 169n1, 210, 256 – 258 Armenian Russian 162 Armenians 86n15, 228, 250 Arndt, Ernst Moritz 244 ASCII standard of character coding 95, 101, 102n5 Austria 61, 115, 118n8, 145

Austria-Hungary 9 – 11, 48, 54n7,n11, 73, 74, 76, 77, 86n15, 109, 131, 151, 153, 170n7, 193, 232, 233, 239 Avar 66 Axis Alliance 132, 226 Azeri (Azerbaijani) Russian 162 Baijal, Tanushree xv Balachka 62, 74 Balkans 11, 73, 75, 81, 110, 121, 126 – 128, 142n10; see also Rumelia Balkan Slavic languages 111 Bashkir 66 Basic English 133, 143n14 Basic Slovak 133 Basque 82 Bauxite (Boksitskii) language 64 BBC English 242 Beijing 64, 165, 194, 234 Belarus 18, 48 – 50, 55n15, 59, 60, 61, 67, 90, 97, 101, 107, 111, 119, 137, 141n1, 151, 162, 163 Belarusian 12, 14 – 18, 38, 48 – 49, 55n15, 60, 66, 84n5, 92, 95, 97, 98, 102, 102 – 103n5, 107, 108, 109, 119 – 111, 123, 132, 138, 151, 160, 163, 164, 169n2, 233; see also Classical Belarusian Belarusian Russian 158, 161, 168 Belarusian Wikipedias 90; see also Classical Belarusian Wikipedia Belgium 20, 81, 82, 145, 199, 222, 245 Belorussiia 55n15 Bengali-language literature 230 bilingualism 48, 64, 65, 71, 73, 74, 77 biscriptality 106

324  Index Böckh, Richard 239 Bohemian (Czech) language 126 Bolshevik Revolution 55n16, 229 book production 107 – 109, 249, 255 border trade pidgins 63 Borovička, Michal 134 Bosnia 16, 73, 77, 84 – 85n7, 114, 179 Bosnian 9, 38, 84 – 85n7, 87, 92, 95, 97, 98, 100, 102, 105, 109, 112, 114, 115, 120, 121, 123, 124, 126, 137, 179; see also Serbo-Croatian British and Foreign Bible Society 236 British Council 165 British English 158 British India 190 – 191, 199, 221, 230, 264n9 Buddhism 199 Budineo, Piersimeone 127 Bulgaria 11, 13, 15, 54n9, 61, 73, 75 – 76, 103n5, 123, 142n10 Bulgarian 39, 47, 51, 69, 75, 87, 92, 95, 97, 98, 102, 102 – 103n5, 105, 108, 108, 110, 112, 113, 115, 123, 125, 126 Bulgarian Exarchate see Bulgarian Orthodox Church Bulgarian Orthodox Church 75, 85n9 Bulgarian Tsar (Emperor) 125 Bunjevac 59, 61, 74, 89, 100, 121, 123; see also Serbo-Croatian Burgenland Croatian 59, 61, 74, 89 Buryat 66 Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic 119; see also Belarus Byzantine Empire 148; see also Roman Empire (Byzantium) caesaropapism 256, 258 Čakavian 52, 59, 61, 122; see also Croatian Cameroonians 262n3 Catalonian 82 Catholicism 74, 88, 120, 199 Central Europe 1, 81 – 83, 87, 92, 115, 164, 175, 177, 186, 203, 205 Charles IV (Bohemian king) 126 Chechen 66 Chinese 93, 97, 117n6, 144, 146, 169n1, 209, 210 Chinese Character Simplification Scheme 217 Choson 222; see also Korea Christianity: Bulgaria adopted from Constantinople 125; Eastern 126, 247, 249; Orthodox 69, 89, 120, 126, 131,

167, 199, 247, 249, 252; and Roman Empire 4 – 5, 26, 259; Western 120, 126, 251, 252, 255 Chukchi 66 Church Cyrillic script 104 Church Slavonic 50, 100, 102, 105, 125, 126, 128, 129; see also Old Church Slavonic Chuvash 66 civic nationalism 85n7 Classical Belarusian 60, 61, 87, 89 – 90, 96, 110, 112, 113, 115, 123; see also Belarusian Classical Belarusian Wikipedia 90; see also Belarusian Wikipedia classical orthography, Belarusian 60 Cold War 15, 17 – 18, 64, 73 Columbus, Samuel 84n5 Common Language (Serbo-Croatian) 95, 108, 108, 120 – 121, 144, 146, 146, 147, 175; see also Declaration on the Common Language, Serbo-Croatian communalism 199 communist: China 217; and postcommunist nation-states 220 compulsory universal elementary education 21, 25; for all 33, 63, 202, 207, 242; for masses 190; and military conscription 205; in modern age 185, 188; spread of 98 Confucius Institute 165 Cossacks 62 creoles see pidgins (creoles) Crimea 116n3 Crimean Tatar 14, 96, 116 – 117n3 Crisanius, Georgius 127 – 128 Crnogorska Enciklopedija (Montenegrin Encyclopedia) 88; see also Montenegrin Wikipedia Croatia/Croats 12, 13, 16, 61, 71, 85n7, 89, 104, 116, 131, 143n16, 179, 213, 232 Croatian 9, 12, 15, 37, 39, 87, 92, 95, 97, 98, 100, 102, 104, 105, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115, 120 – 122, 121, 123, 124, 126, 137, 179; see also Serbo-Croatian cross-border trade 64 Cuba 133 cultural and linguistic imperialism 209 cultural (linguistic) neoimperialism 214 Cumerdai, Blasius 128 cyberattack 211 cyberspace 35, 59, 81, 102n2, 165, 215; age 209; China and 263n5; Cyrillicbased segment of 95; Einzelsprachen

Index  325 in 87, 98; extension of polity’s territory 210; globalization in 213; languages 88, 105; multilingual/multiscriptal 87; Slavic languages in 104 cyberwarfare 210, 211 Cyril and Methodius (saints) 125 Cyrillic script/alphabet 10, 12, 14, 49, 54n11, 56n25, 61, 88, 95, 102n5, 104 – 106, 105 – 107, 111, 112, 114, 135 Czech 15, 39 – 40, 47, 52, 70, 87, 92, 95, 97, 98, 102, 105, 108, 110, 111, 112, 115, 116, 117n6, 120, 124, 126 – 127, 144, 164, 218, 265n17 Czechoslovak 9, 10, 12, 47, 218; see also Norwegian, Yugoslavian Czechoslovakia 12, 15, 17, 47, 70, 116, 131, 133, 144, 218 – 219, 232 Czechoslovak-Polish 120, 121 Czecho-Slovak triglossia 47 – 48 Czech Republic 9, 47, 59, 61, 69, 78, 137 dân tộc (nationality) 264n13 Dargwa 66 Darwin, Charles 5, 240 Darwinism Tested by the Science of Language (1869) 240 Dayton Agreement of 1995 85n7 Declaration on the Common Language xv, 23, 120, 144, 179 – 181; see also Common Language de-ethnicization rate 144 – 146, 146, 169n1 democratization 238 Demotic 250 desktop computing and internet development 35, 98 deterritorialized and dialect-based languages 51 Deutsches Wörterbuch (German Dictionary) 243 diacritics 103n5, 110 – 111, 113 dialectology: North Slavic dialect continuum 29; South Slavic dialect continuum 27 dialects (narecha) 4, 8, 53n3, 151; continuum 7, 23 – 24, 36, 57n28, 164; as Einzelsprachen 22; literary 9 – 10, 10, 120, 121, 122, 130 diglossia 250 digraphs 103n5, 110 – 111 discrete dialect (concept) 24, 53n5; see also Einzelsprache Dobrowsky, Josef 9, 129 Dolgan-Russian pidgin 63 Ducal Prussia 70

Duma (Russian Parliament) 148 Đurđević, Čedomir 132 Dutch East Indies 235 Eastern Christianity 126, 247, 249 Eastern Europe 102n5, 133, 146, 175, 186, 200, 203 East Slovak (Slovjak) 59, 61, 89, 139; see also Slovak Egypt 235 Einstein, Albert 176 Einzelsprache/Einzelsprachen (language/ discrete languages): of Arabic and Persian 210; Arabo-Persianized concept and practice of 257; classifying schemes for 23; concept of 4 – 8, 21 – 22, 33, 36, 53n1 – 2, 53n4 – 5, 176, 209 – 261; in cyberspace 87, 98, 209, 215; dialects and 25, 27, 28, 29, 32, 34, 57n27, 117n6; European model of 228; ISO 639 – 3 standard code 100; Judeo-GreekRoman model of 259; as measure of nationality 193; monocentric 121, 134, 155; nation-state and 19 – 20, 25, 208; new classificatory schemes of 35; process of creating/producing 32, 37; production of 33 – 35, 36; scripts and 34; single All-Slavic dialect continuum and 31; Slavic 10, 36, 51, 52, 71, 73, 73, 78 – 80, 111, 122, 136; as social reality 57n27, 80, 124; state-level Slavic 14; status of 22; technology of writing 7, 11, 21, 32, 57n28; unique/unshared 20, 21; using as L1/L2 languages 144; Western (European) norm of 200 English 95, 97, 133 – 134, 144, 146, 146, 147, 156 English Pronouncing Dictionary (1917) 242 Erzya 66 Eskimo (Eskimo-Aleut languages) 66 Esperanto 131, 133, 237; see also Slavic Esperanto Estonian 14, 160, 264n10 Estonian Russian 158, 160, 162, 168 Ethiopia 133, 197 – 198, 210, 220, 265n14 Ethiopian Empire 233 ethnolectization process 67 ethnolects 65, 66, 102n4 ethnolinguistically defined national selfdetermination 81, 82, 160, 193, 199, 203; see also korenizatsiia ethnolinguistic homogeneity 122, 140

326  Index ethnolinguistic nationalism 115, 130, 155, 178, 203; as basis of statehood construction 52, 80, 82, 186; characteristic of 58n31; dilemma of 79 – 83; elements of 238; emergence of 24; German 243; ideology of 5, 9, 13, 21, 24, 32, 34, 87, 119, 137, 145, 169, 186, 204; languages and 22; logic of 115 – 116, 164; myth of 5; normative isomorphism 20, 34, 81, 122, 176, 178, 186, 193, 232; normative perspective of 20, 70, 122, 123; norms of 81; political aspirations of 1, 19; seminal formula of 244; use of 140 ethnoreligious: nationalism 81; polities 11 Eurasia 78, 144, 186, 189, 205, 209, 214 Eurocentrism 20, 176 Europe, brief unnatural history of languages in 6 – 8 European Communities (EC) 223 European Union 213 Even (language) 66 Evenk 66 Evenki-Russian 63 Facebook 93, 94, 95 Fahlke, Bruno Owe 133 ‘filters-cum-shapers’ 31 – 32, 33, 164, 165, 167 Finnish 72, 160 Flemings 82 Fraktur (Blackletter) 132, 226 France 81, 82, 246, 254 French 82, 144, 146 French Algeria 236 French Revolutionary War 246 FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) 86n11; see also Macedonia Galicia 96, 109 Galician 48, 96; dialect 48; Ukrainian 48, 151 Gallicisms 244 Gay, Ludwig 9 Gellner, Ernest 87 Georgian Russian 162 German 72, 73, 75, 82, 89, 111, 129, 130, 144, 145, 146, 147, 226 German Empire (1871) 243 Germanicphone Bavarians 23 German-Russian pidgin 64 Germany 14, 20, 61, 68, 70 – 71, 81, 90, 115, 145, 225

Gibson, Catherine xv, 57, 86n13, 102n4, 141n4, 170n4 Glagolitic script 104, 105, 114, 126, 136; see also Church Slavonic global illiberal modernity 211 ‘global war on terror’ campaign 155 Goethe Institut 165 Golden Shield Project (China) 263n5 Google Translate 92 – 93, 94, 213 Goralenvolk 55n17 Gorani (Našinski) 59, 61, 74, 77, 100, 122, 123 gosudarstvo (state) 150, 170n3 Gothic type of Latin alphabet 241; see also Fraktur grammars and dictionaries 6 Grand Duchy of Finland 71 Grand Duchy of Lithuania 48, 50, 67, 101, 110, 113, 127, 142n11, 148, 150, 159 Grand Duke of Muscovy 148 graphemes (letters) 110 – 113, 112 Grazhdanka 50; see also Cyrillic grazhdanstvo (citizenship) 150 Greater Bulgarian 122 – 123 Greater Yugoslavia 123 Great Russian 158 – 160, 162, 169n2, 170n7 Great War 9 – 11, 21, 23, 74, 76, 79, 81, 82, 85n9, 115, 131, 153, 186, 199, 226, 233 Greece 61, 77, 86n11 Greek 72, 73, 75, 148; Catholicism 74, 117n5, 120; Civil War (1946–1949) 76 Grimm, Jacob 243 Grimm, Wilhelm 243 group building 184 guozu (nation) 264n12 Habsburg: administration 263n7; Kingdom of Hungary 71; lands 51; Monarchy 9 Hanguk 222 Hebrew 5, 6, 64 – 67, 251, 260; see also Jews, Ivrit, Yiddish Herkel, Joanne 9, 130 Herzegovina 179 Hilferding, Alexander 10 History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks): Short Course (1938) 228 Holý, Bohumil 131 Holy Roman Empire 126, 177, 203, 244, 252, 255; see also Roman Empire homogenous monolingualism 24, 32 Hošek, Ignác 131 Hrushevsky, Mykhailo 170n7 Hučko, Mark 134

Index  327 Humanese 4, 6, 8, 53n1 Hungarian 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 111, 145 Hungary 23, 54n7, 59, 61, 76, 84n2, 143n18 hybrid war/warfare 210, 211 Illyrian 58n30, 124, 124; see also SerboCroatian imperialism, linguistic 165, 174, 209, 213 India 195, 265n15 Indian English 157 indigenization 196 Industrial Revolution 176 Ingush 66 Instituto Cervantes 165 interethnic communication 132, 147, 148, 227 international communication (mezhnatsional’noe obshcheniie) 148 International Information Centre for Terminology (Infoterm) 222 International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 215; see also ISO 639/639 – 1/639 – 2/639 – 3 standard codes international relations (mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia) 150, 170n3, 183 internet 87 – 102, 215; development 35; language 60 Irish 37, 82, 155 Islam 199, 256 – 258 ISO 639/639 – 1/639 – 2/639 – 3 standard codes 98, 99, 100 – 101, 101, 213, 215, 222 ISO 15924 standard codes 213, 215, 216; see also ASCII standard of character coding Israel 64 – 65, 68, 71, 117n4, 154, 162, 167 – 168 Israeli Russian 162, 168 Italian 72, 73, 75, 76 – 77, 82, 89, 226 Italy 11, 23, 51, 59, 61, 76, 81, 82n10, 114, 224 Ivrit (Modern Hebrew) 64, 67; see also Hebrew, Israel, Yiddish Japan 175, 220 – 221, 223, 229 – 230, 233 Japanese 221, 229, 233 – 234 Japelj, Jurij 128 Jaskułowski, Krzysztof xv Jasliska, Marianus de 127 Jewish ethnolects 66 – 68, 68 Jews 64 – 69, 73, 86n15, 225, 251; see also Hebrew, Ivrit, Knaanic, Yiddish

Język Tutejszy 84n6 Jones, Daniel 242 Kabardian 66 Kajkavian 47, 52, 59, 61, 74, 81, 100, 122; see also Croatian, Slovenian Kalmyk 66 Karadžić, Vuk 84n5 Karamzin, Nikolai 128 Karelian 66 Karen, Jiří see Podmele, Ladislav Kashubian 59, 61, 70, 87, 88, 100, 102, 112, 113, 120 Kazakhstani 160, 162 Kazkhstani Russian 168 Khakas 66 Khanty 66 Kiakhta pidgin 62 Kievan Rus’ 100 – 101, 119, 148 Kijów (Kyiv) 127, 171n8 Kingdom: of Hungary 23, 54n7, 71, 74, 75, 85n8, 129; of Italy 11; of Poland 50; of Serbs 12, 116, 131, 232; of Sweden 71 Knaanic 67; see also Hebrew Kolkop, Edmund 131 Kollár, Jan 9 Komi 66 Komi-Permyak 66 Konečný, Josef 131 Kopitar, Bartholomäus 9, 130 Korea, division of 222 korenizatsiia (nativization) 48, 119; see also ethnolinguistically defined national self-determination Koryak 66 Kosovan 77; see also Albanian Kosovo 61, 77, 82 Kremlin 96, 116n3, 162, 165 – 167, 194, 195 Križanić, Juraj 127 – 128 Kukan pidgin 62 Kumerdej, Blaž 128 Kumyk 66 Kupała, Janka 170n2 Kyivan Rus’ see Rus’ Kyrgyzstan Russian 158, 162, 171n11 Lachian 59, 61, 89, 120; see also Prussian, Silesian Łacinka 110; see also Classical Belarusian Lak 66 Landsmål (Nynorsk) language 121; see also Norwegian

328  Index Langham, Robert xv, 2 languages: anthropomorphization of 8; as artifacts 2, 142n9; boundaries 21; brief unnatural history, in Europe 6 – 8; of broader communication 138; building 210, 229; and dialect xiii; difference 185 – 186; graphemes 110 – 113, 112; ideologies 8; and internet 87; meaning of 4 – 5; microlanguages 51, 59, 60, 61, 70 – 71, 74, 75, 139 – 141; minority 86n15; national 22, 36 – 37; non-Slavic imperial and dominant 73, 75; notional pluricentric 121; planning 244; as power 1; primary function 4; program of constructing, for minzus 218; trade 62 – 63; type of 10 – 11, 13 – 14, 16 – 20, 60, 88; Wikipedias 87 – 92, 91, 92; see also Slavic languages; specific languages Latgalian 141n5; see also Latvian Latin: script/alphabet 49, 61, 74, 88, 95, 102 – 103n5, 104 – 106, 105 – 107, 111, 112, 114, 135, 195, 209; Wikipedia 90, 92 Latinization: of Albanian 234; Arabic script with 230; for Chinese 217; limited 217; of Malaysian 236; revolutionary process of 195; of Romanian 244; socialism and communist future 228; Soviet policy of 212, 216 Latvian 10, 14, 160, 233, 264n10 Latvian Russian 160, 162, 168 League of Nations 224, 232 Lemkian (Rusyn) 59, 61, 89, 119; see also Ukrainian Lezgian 66 liberal modernity 213 Library of Congress 98, 214, 215, 223 Liechtenstein 82, 145 Linde, Samuel Bogumił 120 – 130 Lingua Slavica Universalis see Universal Slavic Language linguistic(s) 1, 18, 159, 164, 171n9; areas 25; boundaries 49; differentiation 22; engaging with 35; Hungarianization 74; imperialism 165, 174, 209, 213; purism 243, 244; reality 11, 19, 20, 59; remnants 139; terrorism 139; units of 36, 37; uses of 36 Linguistic Survey of India (1903–1928) 193, 231 literary dialects, of Slavic language 9 – 10, 10, 120, 121, 122, 130 Lithuania 67, 101, 110, 168

Lithuanian 10, 14, 67, 126, 127, 233, 264n10 Lithuanian Russian 158, 160, 162, 168 Lithuanian Statute 150; see also Grand Duchy of Lithuania Litovskii/Litvan (Lithuanian) see Ruthenian Little Red Book 218 Little Russian see Ukrainian Local Russian(s) 63 Lomonosov, Mikhail 125, 128, 142n12 Lower Sorbian 59, 61, 83 – 84n1, 87, 88, 100, 102, 120; see also Upper Sorbian Luxembourg 20, 81, 82, 97, 145 Macedonia 69, 73, 75 – 77, 79, 86n11, 106, 121 – 123, 131, 136, 145 Macedonian 15 – 19, 40, 47, 51, 75, 77, 87, 92, 95, 97, 98, 102, 102n5, 105, 107, 108, 110, 112, 113, 115, 121, 122, 123, 125, 145; see also Yugoslavian macrolanguage 100 Maghrebi (Libyan and Tunisian) dialect 169n1; see also Arabic Magyarization 74; see also Kingdom of Hungary Magyars 23, 125, 129; see also Hungary Maima(t)chin pidgin 62 Majar, Matija 130 Manchurian pidgin 62 Mandarin 144 Mansi 66 Mao Tse-tung 218 MARC (machine-readable cataloging) standards 223; see also ASCII standard of character coding Mari 66 marxism 205 Maskalska (Muscovian) 151; see also Russian mass internet attacks 211 mass production, of books 34 material reality 177 Matthews, Christopher xv Maxwell, Alexander 25 Mayans 36 Mazurian 59, 61, 70, 120 mental observation 183 Merunka, Vojtěch 136 Mežduslavjanski jezik (Inter-Slavic) language 133, 136 microlanguages 51, 59, 60, 61, 70 – 71, 74, 75, 139 – 141, 214 Miensk dialect 48; see also Belarusian

Index  329 millets (ethnoreligious communities) 86n15 minzu 196 – 197, 217 – 218, 264n12 Mistrík, Jozef 133 Moksha 66 Moldavian (Moldovan) 14, 95, 118n8, 160, 162, 168, 212; see also Romanian Moldova 23, 55n16, 95, 118n8, 152, 154, 166, 212 Molisean see Molise Slavic Molise Slavic 59, 77, 61, 88; see also Croatian Mongolia 62, 133, 216, 228 Mongolian 216 Mongolian Russian 158 monocentric: Einzelsprachen 121, 124, 134; literary dialects 123 monopartyism 194 monoscriptality 106, 212 Montenegrin 40 – 41, 88, 92, 93, 95, 97, 98, 100, 102, 103n5, 104, 105, 109, 111, 112, 113, 115, 118n8, 120, 121, 123, 124, 137, 179; see also Serbo-Croatian Montenegrin Wikipedia 89, 92; see also Crnogorska Enciklopedija Montenegro 11, 16, 19, 54n6, 56n22, 73, 142n10, 179, 186 Moraczewski, Andrej 134 Moravian 26, 59, 61, 89, 126; see also Czech Moscow 158, 165, 166; Declaration 115; dialect 50 Mülhäusler, Peter 36 multiculturalism 137 multilingualism 37, 74, 79, 145 Muscovian 126; see also Russian Muscovy (Russia) 127, 153 Muslims 73, 76 mutual comprehensibility 121, 131 Nanai 66 Napoleonic War (1792–1815) 246 narcissism, of small graphic differences 112 narod (people) 149, 160, 170n3 narodnost’ (nationality) 150 national communists 24 nationalism 5, 66, 240, 246; assumption of 187; civic 22, 85n7; classical studies of 186; ethnoreligious 81; in Europe 200; infrastructural ideology of 178, 187, 206, 207, 209, 219; for state and nation building 23 – 24; see also ethnolinguistic nationalism

national rebirth/national resurrection/ national awakening 265 – 266n17 nation-states 187 – 188, 190 – 191, 207 – 208, 240, 264n12; Austrian 115; building 199, 206; Central Europe’s 70, 186, 203; and Einzelsprachen 25, 35, 36 – 37; ethnolinguistic 2, 19 – 20, 24, 34, 77, 79, 92, 139, 147, 155, 171n9, 197; German 145, 204, 243; Hungarian 74; ideal socio-spatial stratification in 191; language 147; modernity and 176; multilingual 20; and nonstate actors 35; Slavic 11, 19, 80 – 81, 87, 104, 105, 130 – 131, 136, 137, 139 – 141, 143n17; Slavophone 67, 73, 87, 122, 133, 139, 245; supporting national academy of sciences 52; see also ethnolinguistic nationalism natsia (nation) 149, 160, 170n3 natsionalnost (nationality) 149 Negidal-Russian pidgin 63 Nenets 66 Netherlands, the 81, 222 New Slavic (Neuslavisch) language 131, 136 New Testament (Byzantine) Greek 250 Newtonian method 176 Nganasan-Russian pidgin 63 Nogai 66 nonnational polities 24, 34, 186 – 187, 203, 203, 204, 206 nonstate Slavic languages 59 – 83 normative: isomorphism 20, 34, 81, 122, 176, 178, 186, 193, 232; monoscriptalism 250, 251, 254, 255, 258 North Macedonia 77; see also Macedonia North Slavic dialect continuum 23, 25 – 26, 28 – 30, 47, 164, 166 Norway 12, 238 Norwegian 12, 232, 238; see also Czechoslovak, Yugoslavian Notaerts, Pierre 133 notional pluricentric languages 121 Novoslověnsky 136 Official Belarusian 60, 87, 96, 105, 110, 112, 115, 123; see also Belarusian Ogden, Charles Kay 133 Olbanian 65; see also Russian Old Church Slavonic 87, 90, 98, 125 – 127, 136; see also Church Slavonic Old Church Slavonic Wikipedia 91, 104

330  Index Old East Slavic (Old Russian) 100; see also Muscovian, Russian Old Ukrainian 101; see also Ruthenian One Belt and One Road initiative 78 online services, Slavic languages in 94 On the Origin of Species (1859) 240 Opšteslovenski language 128 oral languages 4, 6 Orange Revolution (2004–2005) 49 Orfelin, Zaharija 128 Organizatsiia Ob’’edinenykh Natsii (United Nations Organization) 149, 170n3 oriental monotheists 241 Orthodox(y) 117n5; Christianity 69, 89, 120, 126, 131, 167, 199, 247, 249, 252; Church (Rum Millet) 249; Slavophones 127, 129 orthographic reforms 243 orthography 60, 111 Osmanlıca 71, 73; see also Ottoman Empire Ossetian 66 Ottoman Empire 71, 73, 74, 86n15, 129, 230, 232, 234 Oxford English Dictionary (1884–1928) 243 Pakistan 265n15 Pan-Slav Congress 130; see also All-Slav Congress, panslavism panslavism 9 – 10, 130 Papua New Guinea 188 patriotism 1, 140 Paulician (Banat Bulgarian) 59, 61, 74, 77, 88, 100, 122, 123 Peace Conference in Paris (1919) 229 Pentateuch 260 Persian 210, 236 Perso-Indian culture zone 257 philologist 1 philology 159, 171n9 phonemes 111, 113 pidgins (creoles) 62 – 63 Pinyin 217; see also Latinization Platonov, Andrei 263n6 pluricentric/monocentric languages 100, 119 – 141, 123 – 124, 144, 146, 155, 180 Podlachian 59, 61, 89 Podmele, Ladislav 133 Polabian 100 Poland 61, 93, 153 Poland-Lithuania 36, 37, 50, 86n15, 120, 126 – 127, 142n11, 150 – 151, 153, 171n8

Poliakov, Igor 136 Polish 14, 15, 37, 41 – 42, 50, 51, 52, 70, 73, 78, 87, 89, 90, 92, 95, 97, 98, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 115, 119, 120, 127, 138, 148, 151, 164 politics of script 104 – 116 Poltava dialect 48; see also Ukrainian polyglossia 37, 66, 74, 79, 145 Pomakian 59, 61, 74, 76, 100; see also Aegean Macedonian, Bulgarian, Greek Porabje Slovenian 84n2 Portuguese 97, 144, 146 postcolonial nation-states 221 post-Serbo-Croatian languages 19, 51, 59, 90, 93, 101, 108 – 111, 121, 124, 137, 168, 175 post-Soviet: modernization 212; Turkicphone states 212 Prekmurje Slovenian (Prekmurjan) 59, 61, 74, 84n4,n2, 122, 143n18; see also Slovenian Pre-Revolutionary language 96; see also Russian prescriptivism: and canon 260; Christianization of 259; Islamization of 258; officializing 253; and purism 243; and state control 252 ‘primary sociolinguistic reality on the ground’ 23, 24, 31, 32, 33, 36, 57n28, 174 Primorian pidgin 62 printing press 33 Protestantism 74, 117n5, 255 protestant polities 255 Prussia 9, 22, 127, 159, 177 Prussian 59, 61, 71, 89; see also Lachian, Silesian Pushkin, Alexander 128, 239 Pushkin State Russian Language Institute 171n12 Putin, Vladimir 160 Quran 235, 256, 258 – 259 Rabindranath Tagore 230 racial hygiene 177 Radzikowski, Steeven 134 Rasiejskaja 151; see also Russian rationalization 198 rational mathematization 177 recensions/redactions 126; see also Church Slavonic, Old Church Slavonic Rečnik, Ondrej 136

Index  331 Regiolekt (regiolect/regional lect/regional language) 159 – 160 Reich, Matija 130 religions, for statehood legitimization 33 Renaissance 253 Republic of Venice 71 Republika Srpska 19, 56n25; see also Bosnia Resian 59, 61, 77, 88, 89, 100, 122; see also Slovenian Revolution of Dignity (Euromaidan) 48, 49, 116n3, 163; see also Ukraine Riksmål (Bokmål) language 12; see also Norwegian Roma 66, 68 – 70, 68, 73, 86n15; see also Romani Romaic Roman language 250 Romaji 223, 234; see also Japanese, Latinization Roman Catholicism 117n5 Romancephone 125 Romancephone Moldavia 127 Roman Empire 129, 148, 226; see also Holy Roman Empire Roman Empire (Byzantium) 26 Romani 69 – 70, 145; see also Roma Romania 61 Romanian 69 – 70, 75, 77, 88, 95, 111, 126, 145, 244 romanization schemes 102 – 103n5; see also Latinization Romansh 82; see also Switzerland Ros 148; see also Rus’ Royal Prussia 70 Rozumio 136 Rumelia 54n9 Rum (Roman) millet 74 – 75, 249; see also Orthodox(y) ‘Runglish’ 65; see also Russian Rus’ 31, 101, 119, 125, 148 – 151, 153, 159, 166 Rus’an 119 – 121, 124, 126, 153, 153, 163, 170n7; see also Ruthenian, Ukrainian Rus(s)ki(i) and Rossiiskii 42, 101, 148, 150 – 152, 150, 153, 159; see also Russia, Russian Ruski Jezik (Ruski Language) 127 – 128 Russia 19, 62, 64, 95 – 97, 101, 127 – 128, 148, 151 – 152, 154 – 155, 159 – 163, 166, 167, 169, 211 Russian (language) 14 – 18, 42 – 44, 70, 87, 92, 95 – 98, 102, 102 – 103n5, 105, 108, 115, 119, 125, 129, 132 – 133, 138, 141n1; -based Opshti Slovenski

language 128; books production 66, 106 – 109, 116n3, 117n4; codification of 149 – 150; communism 216; as co-official language in Belarus 49, 60, 97, 163; as co-official language in Latvia 163; country-specific 158; de-ethnicization rate 145; as deterritorialized language 51; dialects 10, 49, 62, 96, 119, 158, 159, 162, 166; dictionaries/grammars 157; domination 48, 139; Einzelsprache 211; and English 65; ethnolects of 65, 66, 67, 69, 72; expansion in Caucasus 62; as global communist language 226; government 152; graphemes 110, 112; imperial character of 159; as imperial lingua franca 10, 144; as interethnic language 48, 132; international use of 133; L1/L2 speakers 91, 145, 146, 162; legislation 65; as Maskalska 151; members of speech community 152; modernity 212; as monocentric language 152; nation 154; North Slavic dialect of Moscow 37, 125; online services 96; as pluricentric language 121, 144 – 169; political terms 149 – 150; recension 126; refugees 71; Rus(s)ki(i) and Rossiiskii 42, 101, 148, 150 – 152, 150, 153, 159; as single monocentric input language 157; speech community 90; as states official/ national language 146, 147; statespecific/territorial/ethnic varieties, as pluricentric language 161; styles (shtil) 128; temporal varieties of 96; territorial variants 159 – 161, 166 – 167; Ukrainian standard of 163; use of 154 Russian Academy of Sciences 152 Russian-based pidgins: Alaskan pidgin 63; mixed (macaronic) languages 65; Siberian pidgin 63; trade languages 63 Russian Empire 9 – 10, 48, 52, 62, 70, 71, 128, 130 – 131, 151, 153, 159, 166, 239, 247, 259, 260 Russian Federation 64, 66, 79, 91, 96, 119, 148, 153, 154, 160, 161, 167, 175, 211, 212 Russian Wikipedia 90 Russkii Mir Foundation 160, 171n12 Russkii Mir ideology 101, 120, 122, 131, 147 – 148, 150 – 152, 154, 156, 158 – 162, 165 – 169, 169n2, 172n12, 210, 211 Russo-Chechen wars 64, 155 Russonorsk (Norwegian-Russian) 62

332  Index Russo-Ottoman War of 1877 – 1878 142n10 Russophones 64, 65, 71, 91, 163, 167 Russo-Ukrainian War 49, 96 Rusyn xiv, 37, 51, 59, 61, 70, 74, 79, 87, 88, 95, 96, 98, 100, 102, 112, 113, 119, 139, 145; see also Ukrainian Ruthenian 12, 36, 48, 73, 101, 109, 110, 127, 142n11, 247; see also Belarusian, Ukrainian Šafařík, Pavel Josef 9, 130 Sanskrit 257 Sapelj, Jesuit Georg 128 Schleicher, August 5, 240 science of race 177 scientific racism 241 Sclauica 127 scripts, politics of 104 – 116; see also Serbo-Croatian; writing self-modernization 234 Serbia 11, 16, 54n10, 61, 73, 105, 142n10, 179 Serbian: Cyrillic 14, 44, 88, 92, 95, 100, 102, 102 – 103n5, 104, 109, 112, 115, 120, 121, 123, 125, 137, 179; Latin 97, 98; Wikipedia 91; see also SerboCroatian Serbo-Croatian 12, 15 – 18, 37, 51, 54n11, 58n31, 59 – 60, 61, 70, 73, 76, 77, 87, 89, 98, 100, 101, 102 – 103n5, 104, 111, 120, 121, 123, 133, 137, 146, 233; see also Common Language Serbocroatoslovenian 12, 14, 15, 116, 121, 123, 131; see also Yugoslavian serfs 200 – 202 Shia Iran 210 Shiism 257 Šuškievič, Stanisłaŭ Stanisłavavič111 Siebs, Theodor 242 Silesian 59, 61, 70, 79, 87, 89, 95, 98, 100, 102, 112, 113, 120, 139 Simple English Wikipedia 143n14 single Slavic dialect continuum 23, 26, 28, 31 single Slavic language pluricentric, at multiple levels 134 single Slavic nation 130 Skype 94, 97 sla group code 100; see also ISO 639/639 – 1/639 – 2/639 – 3 standard codes Slaveno-Bulgarian 129; see also Bulgarian

Slaveno-Muscovian (Slaveno-Russian) 128; see also Russian Slaveno-Serbian 128; see also Serbian Slaveno-serbskii Magazin 128; see also Serbian Slavic Esperanto 131, 136 Slavic languages: in 1914 11; in 1930 13; in 1943 14; in 1945 16; in 2017 19, 20; All-Slavic languages and politics of script 135; alphabets/populations/ book production in states 106 – 107, 114; classifying 23 – 53; during Cold War 17 – 18; correspondence between written and spoken in 52; cyberspace languages (2017) 88, 105; deterritorialized/dialectbased 51; Einzelsprachen 10, 36, 51, 52, 71, 73, 73, 78 – 80, 111, 122, 136; with ISO 639 codes and Unicode (2017) 99, 100; literary dialects of 9 – 10, 10, 120, 121, 122, 130; localization/ scripts of microlanguages (2017) 61; microlanguages 51, 59, 60, 61, 70 – 71, 74, 75, 139 – 141; nonstate (minority/ regional) 59 – 83; North and South groups of 108, 109, 111, 123; official 11; in online services (2017) 94; other languages influence on 38 – 47; other Slavic-based ethnolect registers 72; pluricentric 123, 124; regional and minority 88, 88; Russian-based pidgins 63, 65; single common 129; single Slavic language pluricentric 134; sociopolitical subgroups of 109; state/substate 11, 13 – 14, 14, 16 – 19, 17; sub/ nonstate 59 – 60; used in state armies during Cold War 18; Wikipedias, in North and South Slavic languages 90, 92 Slavomolisano 100; see also Molise Slavic Slavophone(s) 9, 10, 13 – 14, 56n23, 76, 77, 106, 126, 131; Bulgarian 75; Orthodox Christians 248; Wikipedias 91, 92 Šležan 134 Slouignisky 127 Slovak 15, 18, 44 – 45, 69, 87, 92, 95, 97, 98, 102, 105, 108, 110, 112, 115, 116, 117n6, 120, 124, 133, 145, 164, 218 Slovakia 13, 61 Slovenia 9, 15 Slovenian 12, 15 – 18, 45, 47, 51, 61, 87, 92, 95, 97, 98, 102, 105, 108, 111, 112, 115, 116, 121 – 124, 130, 131, 145; see also Yugoslavian

Index  333 Slovenisku see Old Church Slavonic Slovianski 136 Slovianto 136 Slovio 134 Slovioski 136 social: cohesion 115, 154; darwinism 241; exclusion 66; physics 177; quanta 177 – 178; reality 8, 12 – 13, 18, 20 – 23, 36, 80, 124, 165, 173, 177, 178, 184, 184, 208, 262n1,n2 Social Credit System 263n5 society: of estates 202; in flux 208 sociolinguistic knowledges and West 174 socio-spatial stratification, in nation-state 191 Sofia 15, 122 – 123 Somalia 220 sootechestvennik (compatriot) 148; see also Russia, Soviet Union Sorbian languages 100; see also Lower Sorbian, Upper Sorbian South Slavic dialect continuum 23, 25, 26 – 27, 37, 47, 58n31, 59 sovereign internet 211 sovereignty 84 – 85n7, 255 Soviet Union 13, 17, 35, 48, 63 – 64, 96, 102 – 103n5, 110, 119, 123, 132, 133, 147, 153, 158, 159 – 160, 187, 194, 196, 209, 217, 229, 264n10 Spanish 82, 97, 117n6, 144, 146 Sprache/Einzelsprache (language) 4 – 7, 7, 53n1,n2, 80, 183 Stalin, Joseph 194, 195, 218, 229 standard language: practice of creating 37; varieties 17, 17 statehood construction 5, 20, 24, 32, 33, 36, 52 Steenbergen, Jan van 134, 136 Stephen V (Pope) 125 Stergar, Rok xv, 53n5, 54n7, 56n22, 84n2, 118n8 Štokavian 179; see also Serbo-Croatian Stoll, David 36 St. Petersburg 159, 193 St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences 129 Stratimirović, Stefan 128 Stratimirowitsch, Stephan 128 Stur, Lajos 9 Sufism 257 Summer Institute of Linguistics 214, 231 Sunnism 257 suprastandard bilingualism 175 Surzhyk 49, 52, 62, 137 – 138, 139, 162

Sveslav 132 Svoboda, Gabriel 136 Switzerland 20, 81, 82, 145, 245 Tabasaran 66 Taiwanese 97 Tajik (Tajikistani) Russian 162 Tannu-Tuva 228 Tatar 66, 69, 70, 212 Taymyr Russian pidgin 63 Taz-Russian pidgin 63 TED (technology, entertainment, design) service 94, 98 TeleCapodistria 85n10; see also Slovenia, Yugoslavia Thessaloniki 125, 127 Thomson, Zoe xv Tolkien, JRR 90 Tomić, Filip xv Torah 260 Torlakian dialects 121 total dictionary 243 totalitarianism 24 trade languages 62 – 63 Transnistria 55n16, 95; see also Moldova Transylvania 85n8 Trasianka 49, 52, 137 – 138, 139, 162 tribalism 199 – 200 Turkey 61, 73, 170n4, 230 Turkish 69, 72, 73, 75 Turkmenistan Russian 158, 162 Turks/Turkic 73 Tuscan 76; see also Italian Tutejsi (locals) 12 Tutejszy 84n6 Tuvan 66; see also Tannu-Tuva TV Koper-Capodistria see TeleCapodistria Twitter 93, 94, 95 Udege-Russian pidgin 63 Udmurt 66 Ukraine 11, 61, 101, 106, 116n3, 153 Ukrainian 12, 14 – 18, 46 – 47, 48 – 49, 58n33, 66, 70, 87, 90 – 92, 95 – 98, 102, 102 – 103n5, 105, 108, 109 – 111, 112, 115, 119, 132, 138, 151 – 152, 160, 169n2 Ukrainian Russian 158, 162, 163 – 164, 168 Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 152 Ukrainian Wikipedia 91 Uniatism see Greek Catholicism Unicode 99, 101 – 102, 103n7, 216

334  Index United Nations Organization 15 – 16, 149, 170n3 Universal Slavic Language 130 Upper Sorbian 59, 61, 83 – 84n1, 87, 88, 100, 102, 120; see also Lower Sorbian Upper Sorbian Wikipedia 91 US 63, 68, 82, 90, 132, 168, 246; English 157; occupation administration 223 Ussurian pidgin 62 Uzbek (Uzbekistani) Russian 162 Van Rooy, Raf 53n2 Veglian 76 Venetian 76 Venetian Slavic 59, 61 verbal grooming 183 – 184 vernaculars 6, 47 – 48, 129, 190, 199, 249, 254 Viber 94, 97, 103n6 Vietnam 133, 197, 198, 235 Vietnamese 78, 197, 216, 235, 264n13 Vilnius 48, 50, 127 Vilnius dialect 48; see also Belarusian VKontakte 94, 95 – 96 Vojvodina 51, 59, 74, 89, 139; see also Serbia Volhynian (Ukrainian Ruthenian) 127; see also Ruthenian Vseslovanski Jazyk see Universal Slavic Language Vuozgašchai (Vozgian) 134 Wallachia 127; see also Romania Wallachian (Romanian) language 248; see also Romanian Walloons 82 Wenedyk 134

wen group code 100; see also ISO 639/639 – 1/639 – 2/639 – 3 standard codes Western Christianity 120, 126, 251, 252, 255 Western Europe 83 West Polesian 59, 61, 89, 119 WhatsApp 94, 97 White Russian/White Ruthenian see Belarusian Wikipedias 87 – 92, 214; in North and South languages 92; Slavophone 91; see also Wikipedias in specific languages Wilno see Vilnius Wogagoda 265n14 Wolaytta 265n14 writing: forms of 104; genres of 6; and reading skills 102n4; systems 33, 113; technology 5, 7, 11, 21, 32, 33, 57n28, 102n4, 104, 261, 262n5 written languages, discrete character of 6, 53n5 Yakut 66 Yanukovych, Viktor 163 Yiddish 14, 67, 93, 119, 195, 233; see also Hebrew, Jews Yugoslav Constitution (1963) 16 Yugoslavia 12, 16 – 17, 61, 76, 116, 123, 133, 214 Yugoslavian 12, 15, 121, 219; see also Common Language, Serbo-Croatian, Serbocroatoslovenian Zajc, Marko 58n31 Zamenhof, L L 237 – 238 Zavtražnov, N A see Fahlke, Bruno Owe Žídek, Arnošt Eman 132 Zilijski see Majar, Matija