Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Soul 2.7-12 9781472551948, 9780715633052

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Preface Richard Sorabji This is one of the most original of ancient texts on sense perception. Philoponus in the sixth century AD considers how far perceptual processes are incorporeal. Colour affects us in a way similar to light which, passing through a stained glass window, affects the air, but not by colouring it. It colours only the masonry beyond, an idea repeated in the thirteenth century by Roger Bacon (opus maius, ed. Bridges, ii, 409-10).1 Sounds and smells come lower in the hierarchy, being somewhat more physical. They travel most of the way to us with a moving block of air, but even they do not travel in this physical fashion quite all the way to us. Only the organ of touch, the most physical sense, takes on the tangible qualities perceived, because reception of sense qualities needs to be cognitive (gnôstikôs), not physical. Neither light nor the action of colour involves the travel of bodies. Nor do our capacities for psychological activity follow (hepesthai), or result from (apotelesma), the chemistry of our bodies. They merely supervene (epiginesthai) on that. On the other hand, Philoponus emphasises the physical, when he shows knowledge of the sensory nerves, and he supposes that thought and anger both warm us. Let us see how he arrives at his views in more detail. Because observers at different angles can all see the same thing, Philoponus takes Aristotle to be tacitly committed to the view that the activity (energeia) of colour which he postulates must fill the whole of the air, or other transparent medium, in every direction (330,33-5). But this raises two problems for Philoponus (334,38-336,3). First, why are not distant objects seen as clearly as near ones, if the action of colour is equally everywhere? The answer suggested is that the action of colour weakens with distance. Secondly, why cannot I see a given object in whichever direction I look, if its colour affects the air in every direction? It is in answer to this problem that Philoponus says that the air is not coloured in every direction. It is merely affected in the way that air is affected by a sunbeam passing through coloured glass. As in that case

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it is not the air, but only the masonry in a direct line beyond, that takes on colour, so it is with the air when we see.2 There is another problem that has been traced by John Ellis.3 Philoponus’ teacher, Ammonius, discusses Aristotle’s claim in Categories ch. 2, 1a25, that a particular instance of a quality is not separable from what it is in. Why should not the fragrance of something float off into the surrounding air, and get separated from what it was in? Ammonius (in Cat. 28,15-18) replies, and Philoponus (in Cat. 35,24-31) accepts the reply, that it is not the fragrance that gets detached from the object smelt, but little portions of the original matter, and the fragrance stays attached to the little portions. But when Philoponus comes to write his commentary on On the Soul, instead of that on the Categories, he realises that this creates a fresh problem. Aristotle thinks that the sense organs never work by direct contact with what is perceived. You cannot see what is placed on the eye, and the same is true for Aristotle of sound and odour, On the Soul 2.7, 419a25-35. These three of the five senses are distinguished as long-distance senses. Even touch and taste work at a distance in a way, on Aristotle’s theory, because their true organ is in the heart, not at the surface skin or the tongue. Consequently, Philoponus now goes against the view of the Categories commentaries and says that the fragments of fragrant apple do not travel all the way to the sense organ, 391,11-29; 392, 3-19; 413,9-12. The second passage gives yet more evidence that the travel of odour is not by physical wafting of air. For vultures can perceive carrion almost immediately from distances too great for wafting to have taken place, and crocodiles smell meat suspended above the water, even though the vapour from the meat travels up, not down. How, then, would Philoponus solve the original problem in the Categories, that an instance of odour cannot be separated from what it is in? Perhaps he thinks it solution enough that what the vultures and crocodiles receive is not said to be the odour itself, but the activity (energeia) of the odour, if these are different. Touch is different, because the four tangible qualities of hot, cold, fluid and dry are the only ones that are literally taken on by a sense organ (400,18-21). But this is not what explains perception, since perception involves not a literal, but a cognitive (gnôstikôs) reception of sense qualities. All the senses thus retain a certain degree of incorporeality in their operation, but there is a hierarchy of incorporeality, with sight as the most incorporeal. The activity of colour is distinct from light for Aristotle.4 Light is the mere presence of firelike stuff in a transparent medium, a presence which makes the transparent medium actually seeable through, by contrast with media in the dark, which are only potentially seeable through. Neither light nor the activity of colour travel for Aristotle (On the Soul 2.7, 418b18-26; On Sense Perception 6, 446b27-447a11). Sambursky has supposed, wrongly I believe, that Philoponus changes this,

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and allows that the activity of colour travels.5 Rather, I think, what happens is that Aristotle and Philoponus are alike in finding it hard to avoid language that superficially suggests travel, like talk of the activity of colour arriving somewhere. But what they are talking about is directionality, not travel. The activity of colour works on us in a certain direction, but not by arriving at a midway point before arriving at us. With light too, Aristotle uses language superficially suggesting travel, when what he really needs is only the idea of directionality, but in the case of light there is the difference that his account of light as a mere presence makes it hard for him to explain its directionality. Even so, travel is certainly not what he wants. Philoponus also rejects the travel of light (325,1-330,28) and reports Aristotle as denying the travel of the activity of colour (334,38). Moreover he sees himself as defending (sunagônizomenos huper) Aristotle on the activity of colour. To get rid of the idea of light travelling, Philoponus compares light with the instantaneous vibration of a reed upon contact (330,15-19), although he rejects the corporealist suggestion that corporeal rays of light are affixed to the sun and avoid travel that way (328,27-31). Philoponus agrees with Aristotle that light does not involve travelling bodies (325,6-326,26; 416,30-4). One argument (325,30-2) is that the eye jelly is not large enough to admit bodies from a quarter of the universe when we look at the heavens. Light is incorporeal (326,39329,2; 330,19-27), or we should be forced to say (325,30-2) that when it is found in transparent bodies, there are two bodies in exactly the same place. A standard objection to that is the sky in a grain (328,13-15) or sea in a cup. If you could put one spoon of sea water into exactly the same place as the wine in a cup, without enlargement, then you could go on doing the same trick until you had spooned the whole sea into the cup, which is obviously absurd. The medium in vision conveys not bodies, but only the activity of colour (331,13-16; 330,32-331,1). Philoponus rejects the view of Galen6 and the doctors that psychological capacities follow (hepesthai) the chemistry of the body and the proportions in its chemical blends, or that psychological impulses are the result (apotelesma) of that. That would prevent philosophy from counteracting our chemistry (51,13-52,1). Perception is not a chemical proportion, but merely supervenes upon (epi, epiginesthai) a chemical proportion and depends on it (439,33-440,3). Despite opposing an over-physicalist view on all these matters, Philoponus is aware, unlike Aristotle, of the optic nerve (336,33-5; 366,10-14). He also thinks that thought and anger warm us (332,12-17), a physiological effect in the opposite direction from Galen’s, since it is from psychological activity to bodily change. This may qualify the claim that philosophical thought can counteract chemical tendencies, for it may do so via its other effects on the body. Elsewhere (in Phys. 7, translated from Arabic by Lettinck, 771,21-772,3), Philoponus holds that attending lectures can make us lean and dry and hence less

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irascible, and he argues that but for such effects of the mind on the body, there would not be the same knowledge of other minds. For the lecturer would not be able to see on the faces of students whether they had understood or not. Notes 1. Translated in Richard Sorabji, ‘From Aristotle to Brentano: the development of the concept of intentionality’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, supp. vol. 1991. 2. Richard Sorabji, op. cit. 3. John Ellis, ‘The trouble with fragrance’, Phronesis 35, 990, 290-302. 4. Richard Sorabji, ‘Aristotle on colour, light and imperceptibles’, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, 2004. 5. S. Sambursky, ‘Philoponus’ interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of light’, Osiris 13, 1958, 114-26. Richard Sorabji, ‘John Philoponus’, ch. 1 in Richard Sorabji, ed., Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science, London 1987, 1-40. 6. Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, Oxford 2000, ch. 17.

PHILOPONUS On Aristotle On the Soul 2.7-12 Translation

Exegesis Of the Second Book Concerning Soul [Chapter 7] 418a24 That of which sight is [the sense]1 is what is seen. He has spoken generally about sense and sense-objects, and he is about to set forth an account of each sense on its own; but before each special sense2 he discusses its sense-objects, and first of all the sense-objects of sight, since he is also going to discuss sight before the other [senses]. Then he says that what is apprehended by sight is both colour and something which is explained in an account, but which does not have a name in colloquial speech, of which kind are glowworms and fish-scales3 and some other things. Then he defines what colour is, that it is such as to change what is in act transparent. Then since in the definition of colour he has mentioned the transparent, he teaches us what in fact the transparent is, that it is a nature present in several things, in water, air, glass and others, which transmits colours; and when light is not present, it is in potentiality this thing, transparent, but when light is present, it becomes in act transparent. Since, then, he has mentioned light, he first gives an account concerning this. ‘That of which sight is’ – we should understand ‘such as to apprehend’ as added – this is seen. 418a26-8 The object of sight is both colour and what can be described in an account, but happens to be without a name; [what we mean will be clear as we proceed.] Having said that the object of sight is that which sight apprehends and in connection with which its power acts, he next adds what things are the objects of sight: that they are both colour and certain other things which do not have a common name, but which are explained in an account and of which he will speak as he proceeds, such as glow-worms, heads of fish, fish scales, eyes of hedgehogs, shells of sea-creatures, which things are seen not in light but in the dark. For he does not think that the fiery quality in them that appears in the dark is colour. For it is a peculiarity of colour to be seen in the light, whereas the fiery quality of these things is not seen in the light.

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Translation [320] 418a29-31 For the object of sight is colour. This is what is on [the surface of] that which is of itself an object of sight, of itself not in account, but because it has in itself the cause of its being an object of sight.

Having said that it will be clear to us as we proceed what the nameless things are that he has said to be objects of sight, he passes to [the discussion] of colour, but as though it were the [sole] object of sight. This, he says, is colour, I mean, the object of sight: that which is present on what is of itself an object of sight. And by ‘what is of itself the object of sight’ he means surface. In what way surface is an object of sight ‘of itself’, he has himself explained. It is not, he says, called an object of sight ‘of itself’ in the way in which something is ‘of itself’ in account, that is, by definition. For in the Analytics [An. Post. 1, 73a34-b16] he says that one thing is said to be ‘of itself’ [a second thing] if either it [the second] is included in the definition of the subject [the first], as animal and rational in the definition of man (for these belong of themselves to man), or the subject is included in the definition of it, as nose is included in the definition of snubnosedness and number in the definition of even and odd. For these belong of themselves to number. For we say that what is even is a number that divides in two, and what is odd is a number that is not capable of being divided in two. Similarly we say snubnosedness is concavity in a nose. It is not in this way that surface is said to be of itself an object of sight, but because it has in itself the cause of its being an object of sight. And this is colour. For it is the colour in surface that is the object of sight, and it is this that sight-streams4 apprehend. For they do not apprehend colour in depth.5 For if we think that we see stones that are transparent coloured through the whole of their depth, we are mistaken in our sight-streams. For because the stones are transparent the sight-streams or the activities of the colours6 pass through the depth, but we apprehend only through the colour in the surface of the stones; and on account of this we think we have also seen the colour in the depth. It is an indication of this that if one surface of glass or a transparent stone has been coloured, we will think that the whole body is coloured through its depth, even if we look at the surface that has not been coloured, and this will be thought by us to be the same colour as the coloured surface, although it has not been coloured with that colour. And with glazed mirrors, indeed, we think the outside surface is the colour of the tin, and when drinking cups are coloured on the inside they seem to be coloured throughout their body because the sight-streams see through the transparent to the last surface and apprehend the colour of that. What, someone might say, do we not see in transparent stones [321] if any alien colour should happen to be in the middle, like the

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little insects caught up in amber? And in the other transparent stones, if there should happen to be any alien colour in the depth in any part it comes to be perceived by us; so it is clear that sight apprehends the colour in the depth, and that is how it comes about that it makes the discernment of the colour in the middle which is alien from the rest. I say to this that if the alien colour in some part of the depth of the transparent stone is deeper and more pungent than the colour in the whole stone, the sight-streams apprehend it through the transparent that is in the stone; but if it is weaker, apprehension of it does not occur. For manifestly there are some transparent stones like carnelians and certain others that are not coloured through their depth, but are white7 in their depth, and these seem to be coloured with the same colour through their depth, because sight does not apprehend their depth. But in those in which the alien colour does appear in the middle it is because the colour in the surface is dimmer that the acts of sight are not hindered from apprehending the deeper colour in some part of the depth. So if glass has been dyed in a dimmer and not intense colour and you smear one surface with deep black, it [sc. the glass] will all seem black to you, though it is not all coloured black. So with transparent stones also, even if we seem to see the depth coloured, we do not in truth see the depth, even if it should be coloured, but we apprehend the surface only. For just as when the sight-streams going through air or water see the colours in the middle (for the colours in every transparent [medium]8 are seen), still sight does not penetrate to the depth of the things seen themselves, but they are apprehended only as to their surface, so it happens also with transparent stones through the transparency in them. When all of the stone is not held by some forceful colour, a colour that falls along in the middle9 is seen through the transparency of the stone, but the colour which is seen itself is seen only as to the surface of the part in which it is, not as to the whole depth. Since, then, it is the colour in the surface that is the object of sight, for that reason he says that the surface is an object of sight of itself, since it is the subject of that which is an object of vision of itself.

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418a31-b4 Every colour is such as to change what is in act transparent, and that is its nature. [Hence it is not an object of sight without light, but every colour of each thing is seen in light. Therefore we must first discuss light and say what it is.] This would be a definition of colour that points it out by what is incidental and peculiar, not by its substance; for the definition of it from its substance is given by him in the de Sensu et Sensibilibus.10 He says that colour is such as to change what is in act transparent, that is, what is lit. What [322] is not lit is transparent in potentiality.

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‘Such as to change’ is in place of ‘such as to perfect’. For light is such as to perfect it, in that it perfects it and makes it in act transparent, and colour also is such as to perfect it, in that it brings its transmitting ability to activity. For it is put into a certain state by the colour in receiving a certain imprint of it,11 in the way in which it is its nature to receive an imprint without being affected, and passing it on to sight. But light is such as to perfect what is in potentiality transparent, for it perfects it and makes it in act transparent, whereas colours are such as to perfect what is in act transparent. They perfect it, however, not insofar as it is transparent, but insofar as what is in act transparent is in potentiality a thing that transmits and announces colours; so when colours are present it becomes like that in act. If colour, then, is such as to change what is in act transparent, and what is in act transparent is what is lit, and seeing comes about through the change in it, then it follows that for this reason without light there is no seeing of colour. Anyone, then, who is going to speak of objects of sight needs an account of light, which is that through which colours are objects of sight. And having said that colour is such as to change what is in act transparent, he indicated that the actuality of the transparent is light by adding, ‘Hence it is not an object of sight without light.’ What is ‘not an object of sight’, clearly, is colour. For light is the actuality of the transparent, and colour is such as to change what is in act transparent. Since, then, an account of light is necessary for anyone who is going to discuss objects of sight, let us first, he says, speak of light. But since light is the actuality of the transparent, before giving a discussion of light he gives a discussion of the transparent. 418b4-6 There is such a thing, then, as transparent. I call ‘transparent’ what is indeed an object of sight, but an object of sight not of itself, to put it simply, but through a colour belonging to something else. I have already said that it is his purpose to speak about objects of sight; that for an account of objects of sight an account of light is needed, and that for an account of light, one of the transparent … [this he now]12 discusses. He gives us the difference between the transparent and the other objects of sight, I mean colours, by saying that the transparent is an object of sight not through its own colour, but through one belonging to something else. By ‘colour’ he means light,13 for it is as it were the colour of the transparent. And now he calls it ‘colour’, but further on [418b11] he will more accurately say ‘as it were colour’. For light is not a colour. The transparent, then, he says, of itself is not an object of sight but when it receives light, which is a colour belonging to something else, it then becomes an object of

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sight: light either from fire or from the heavenly bodies, the sun, the moon, the stars. But the [323] statement14 seems to me puzzling. For the transparent would seem both to be and not to be an object of sight. For if you put away a lamp in an earthen jar or some such utensil, with the light going upwards through the opening, then, if you look at the air above the opening through which the light is going up, you will not see it lit, unless there happens to be a ceiling above or some other solid body; for then, when the solid body resists the light, it is plain to us that the air is lit. But if there is not a lit body resisting the light,15 you will not see the air lit. So to this extent the lit air would seem to be visible not through itself but through the solid body resisting it, since so far as rests with it itself, it would not be seen. Perhaps, then, it is an object of sight incidentally because colours appear in it. And what we have said of this small scale16 example may be said also of the light of the Sun. For perhaps because solid bodies are resisting the light of the Sun on every side, for this reason the air around us becomes an object of sight. For it is clear that wherever we look, whether up or down or sideways, we see earth or sky or water. So if, as in the case of the example [of the lamp] given, we were able to look at the place above17 in which the light of the sun is not resisted by a solid body, perhaps we should not know that the air in that part was lit. In this way, then, lit air will seem, so far as rests with itself, not to be an object of sight. But since we know plainly when it is day and when night, discriminating by no sense-organ other than sight, and not only we, but non-rational animals also – for they go into shelter and come out of shelters because they discriminate night and day – clearly to this extent lit air is an object of sight. And just as, for the reason that air is not an object of sight without light, we say that it is not an object of sight at all, since neither can anything else be seen without light, and not only light, but there is need also of a medium and of the transparent if sight-objects are to come to be (which is why Plato in the Timaeus18 says that sight is the most expensive of the senses, because it needs many things, more than the others, to act with its own activities), so too if lit air is not seen even in light unless the light falls on a solid body, for that reason it would not be an object of sight.19 For if light is nothing else but the actuality and perfection of what is in potentiality transparent, and light is discerned by nothing else but sight, it is clear that lit air too is an object of sight, insofar as it is lit, even if it needs other things. But light is not the substantial quality of air.20 So it is an object of sight not through its own quality but through one belonging to something else, I mean light, which he loosely calls colour, because what is seen most of all is colour.

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Translation [324] 418b6-9 Of this sort are air, water and many solids. [For it is not by being water or air that they are transparent, but because there is present a certain nature which is the same in both these and in the eternal body above.]

For it is not only through air and water that we see because they have the transparent, but also through many solid bodies. There are many [bodies] like this, for instance, moonstones, crystals,21 horn, glass, transparent gypsum, and many others. So if the transparent is in a plurality of bodies, it is clear that it is not by virtue of being water or air or any of the other transparent things that a thing has transparency. If the transparent were transparent by virtue of any of these, for instance, because it was air, then what was not air would not be transparent. But in fact there are also things that are transparent and not airy. Similarly with the others. So there is a certain nature of the transparent which has its being in many substances and subjects. For just as there is a nature of moistness or heat or, in a word, of every quality, and these qualities are other than their subjects and come to be in many bodies, so too there is the nature of the transparent which comes to be in many subjects and is other than they. He says ‘in both these’, that is, in air and water, since he has just mentioned them, and also as they are of things the most transparent. And he says that the eternal body above shares in transparency. He means by that the material of the spheres. For they are all transparent. For we see the stars in the fixed sphere22 through the others. The spheres themselves, then, are transparent, but not the stars too – which is why they also occult one another. Thence, for instance,23 comes eclipse of the sun when it is occulted by the moon. For if it [the moon] were transparent it would not, when it passes under it,24 occult it. And stars25 when they pass under others make them invisible by occultation, from which it is clear that the nature of the transparent does not exist in the stars. 418b9-10 Light is the actuality of this transparent insofar as it is transparent.26

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Having said what the transparent is, that it is that which is an object of sight, indeed, but an object of sight not through its own colour, but through that belonging to something else, he passes to the discussion of light, and says that light is the actuality of the transparent insofar as it is transparent, [‘actuality’] instead of ‘form and perfection’ of it. For when the transparent is in potentiality, light comes along and makes it have form and perfects it and makes it in act transparent. For in air and water and the like there is the nature of the transparent, and when light is not there it is not in act transparent (for we

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could not see any colour through it), but when light is present it has its own form and perfection. Hence when light is present we see through air or through water, but not also through earth, clearly because it does not have in itself, even potentially, the nature of the transparent.27 Of those who have spoken of light, some [325] have said it is a body, others incorporeal. That light is not a body, and also that seeing does not occur through the emission of any bodies from the sightorgans,28 we must first show, establishing by way of refutation this very thing, that it is impossible either that light or that the sightstreams should be a body; after that [329,3ff.] we must set out the opinion Aristotle held on these things, and in addition [330,28ff.] examine the difficulties raised against it. If seeing came about in us through the emission of certain bodies, how would it be possible for us when looking upwards to apprehend the whole of the heavens all at once? For how would it be possible for a body to move so great a distance in no time at all? For it has been proved that the distance from the earth to the heavens is two signs of the zodiac.29 For the line from the centre is equal to the side of the hexagon, and the side of the hexagon is the distance of two signs of the zodiac.30 And the circumference [of a circle] is three and a seventh times the diameter, and the distance from the centre is half the diameter. Clearly, then, since the whole diameter contains four signs approximately,31 since the circumference contains twelve, half the diameter must contain two signs approximately. How then can a body move in no time at all so great a distance? For the swiftest of movements itself, I mean that of the fixed sphere, takes two hours to move a sixth of the whole, I mean two signs. How is it not irrational to suppose that bodies emitted from the sight-organs are swiftermoving even than the fixed sphere? Again if we see by rays [emitted from the eyes], and they are bodies, then since when we look upwards we see a fourth part of the heavens, it is wholly necessary that the sight-streams when they go through the air either move through it, and then one body will move through another, which is impossible, or else they cut it. And if they cut it, then we ought not to see the heavens, or the other objects of sight, as continuous, since they do not move through the whole of the air but cut it. It is clear then that the parts of the sight-objects that are behind the parts of the air that are not cut could not be seen, and thus we should see none of the things we see as continuous, but as divided into parts. Then, since when we look upwards we see a fourth part of the heavens, if seeing occurs through the emission of certain rays that are of corporeal form, it is wholly necessary to suppose the sight-streams to be such large bodies as to extend from us to the heavens and embrace the fourth part of it. Which is irrational, to say that from a

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small part, the eye, or rather not even the whole eye but from the pupil,32 such large bodies are emitted as to embrace a fourth part of the whole universe. But in reply to this they say that that there occurs on the part of the objects of sight a kind of going out to meet the sight-streams. For light-particles33 are emitted from the heavenly bodies which go out to meet the sight-streams and provide apprehension of themselves. To this we say that if sight does not strike upon the heavenly bodies themselves, but [only upon] the light-particles emitted from them, how is it that astronomers know the sizes of the stars?34 How their movements? How their distances, their conjunctions and recessions [326] and all the other things they demonstrate concerning the heavenly bodies? For it is on the supposition that they are apprehending the spheres themselves that they then make their demonstrations concerning them. Then these light-particles that come out of them must be either bodies or incorporeal. If they should be bodies, they [these theorists] will be refuted by the same arguments by which we shall next refute those who say that light is a body. If, on the other hand, a light-particle is incorporeal, what need is there of the emission of the acts of seeing and of the going out to meet [them] in advance? For if they are wholly incorporeal activities, then even if there occurs no going out to meet, they will get as far as the sight-organs, and in that case they [these theorists] will be saying the same things as Aristotle about acts of seeing and light, as we shall soon see below. In general, if seeing occurs by virtue of an emission from the sight-organs, the things emitted must be either bodies or, as the mathematicians seem to say, lines. But if the sight-streams that go out are lines, clearly they will touch the objects of sight at points. They say that sight occurs because the sight-streams touch the objects of sight. They touch them at points. It follows that they apprehend the objects of sight at points too. Therefore they do not apprehend magnitudes,35 which is absurd. If, on the other hand, they are bodies, either the part of the cornea around the pupil must be bored through, which is false (for it is continuous, and if it were bored through, the liquids would immediately pour out); or a body must move through a body, which too is impossible; or the sight-streams must pass through certain pores. But that it is impossible bodies should be made of pores is shown in the de Generatione.36 Besides it is wholly necessary that there should be certain masses and bodies in the membranes by which the pores are separated. Through those, then, sight-streams cannot move, so it should not be possible to see the ground or anything else as continuous, but some parts should be seen and others not. For it should be impossible to see those parts of the sight-object which lie in a straight

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line with the masses separating the pores. It follows that nothing is seen as a continuum, which is contrary to plain fact. But neither is it possible that an incorporeal activity should go out from the sight-organs. For either it will go out with its own vehicle,37 or it will not. If it goes out with its own vehicle, again there will be bodies going out, and the same arguments will hold. If, on the other hand, the activity goes out separated from its own vehicle, then it is wholly necessary it should occur in some other subject. Since, then, the power to perceive is a kind of life (for it is impossible for what does not share in life to share in sense), and life makes anything in which it should occur live, it follows that the power to perceive too, when it goes out from the eye and occurs in air or water or, in a word, in any of the things that are transparent, makes that thing live, and therefore also an animate being, which is ridiculous. But if it does not do that, then there will be life in what is not living, which is impossible. And besides, if the power to see goes out in act from the eye and comes to be in air or water or some such thing, that thing will be what sees, and become a perceiving thing. That nothing comes forth from the eyes, neither body nor incorporeal, can be shown many other ways too, but what has been said is sufficient. But that [327] light is not a body either is clear from what follows. If it were a body, again, how would it be possible for the movement of a body to occur thus all at once? For the sun comes above the horizon, and at that moment suddenly in no time at all the whole hemisphere above the earth has been lit up. And if I cover a lamp and bring it into the house and then take it out of the covering, the whole house is lit all at once. How then could a body move thus in no time at all? Then, if light is a body, since it is simple, clearly it will move with a simple movement. But there are two simple motions, in a straight line and in a circle. If light moves in a straight line, then either it moves upwards and will not move downwards, or it moves downwards and will not move upwards. But in fact it is seen moving up and down and right and left. But every body that moves in a straight line moves only with an upward or only with a downward motion. And that it does not move in a circle is manifest from plain fact. For if I bring a lamp into a narrow oblong room, at the beginning of the room straight off directly it lights up the whole; if it is placed low down it lights what is above, if on high, likewise what is below. And those who apply themselves to optics show plainly that light advances in a straight line, not in a circle. If you bore through a panel or make a slit in it, and on one side of the panel you apply a lamp at the slit, and on the other side you stand another panel, the light of the lamp, entering through the slit, will come to be at the second panel. If, then, from the light which comes to be on the second panel

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you stretch a straight line, it will pass through the slit to the lamp, so it is clear that the movement of the light is in a straight line. Therefore if it does not move in a straight line as bodies do, either only upwards or only downwards, and neither does it move in a circle, and every body moves with one of the stated motions, it looks as if light is not a body. Again, if light is a body, it is altogether necessary, if it moves through the whole of the air, that there should be a body in a body;38 whereas if it does not move through the whole, but either cuts the air or moves through its pores, then necessarily there is not light in every part of the air, but some parts of it are lit, others are made dark. So not all will be lit. Neither will there be air everywhere, but where there is light there must be no air, and where air, no light. And in this way it will come about that we breathe light and air; and there will be times when we breathe light only and not air as well, when we happen to breathe what is lit all by itself. These things are manifestly absurd and contrary to plain facts. And where wind blows all at once and continuously, either it should make the place on which it falls completely dark, driving out the body of the light, or at least it should make the place darker, since it has driven out the body of the light or at least parts of it and come to be in their place. But as it is, this does not happen. And we see [328] that even when air is lit, the same activities of air occur. For when we breathe we are chilled in the same way, although it is the nature of light to heat even air itself, not to chill. In addition to this those who say that light is a body say that a sort of sphere of light comes out from the sun, since the sun is spherical; and the air too is spherical; so it is altogether necessary that that the sphere of light that comes out towards us should either push the sphere of air [out of the way], and by thus taking over its place light the place around us, or else not push it, but move through it. If it pushes the air and takes over its place, the hemisphere that is lit will be empty of air, which is impossible; for as I said [328,1], all the works of air occur even when all that is around us is lit. And if it does not push it, it will not illuminate, since it will not reach us. If, on the other hand, it [the light] moves through it [the sphere of air], a body will have moved through a body, which is impossible. If they say that being a non-material body it can go through a body, that statement is quite impossible. For in that way it should be possible for the heavens to come to be in a millet seed. And then if it is through being non-material that it can move through a body, it should move not only through air but through any other body whatever. What will be the principle of decision, if by being non-material body can move through body, but not through every body? So light ought to be able to move also through solid bodies, I mean, through earth and the like. Why, then, even when the sun is beneath the

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earth, do we not see above it, with the light moving even through the earth? Next, if light is a body and moves through the body air, the whole ought to become denser and thicker; but in fact on the contrary air becomes finer-textured when it has received light, which would not happen if light were a body. Just as if water moves through earth, and the place in which they both are does not become greater, it is altogether necessary that the body which consists of both should have become thicker,39 so too air must become thicker when light comes to be in it. But in fact on the contrary it becomes finer when it has been lit. If anyone should say in objection to the argument about the movement of light,40 that there are certain rays suspended from the sun, and they illuminate by the passage of its movement without any need for movement from above to the earth (for they are always suspended from to the sun)41 he speaks quite contrary to plain evidence. For the sun illuminates in the same way as the moon and fire and all the rest, and he will not be able to say this also about fire or any of the others. And when in the dark by rubbing together the kindling materials I kindle a fire in a really very large house, in no time at all the light takes over the whole house. And when the air has become dense [sc. with cloud] the sun is invisible, but all the place around us is lit up. Furthermore I shall ask about the solar rays whether they are body or incorporeal [329] and whether the rays move through the whole of the air or not through the whole, and again the same difficulties will befall. Moved by these and similar considerations we are forced to say that neither light nor the sight-streams are body. What then? How does seeing occur? And what also is the nature of light? We speak then first about seeing and say, following Aristotle, that the transparent, air, has a power that transmits colour, though itself it is colourless. For if it had any colour of its own, it would impede its transmitting of the other colours. Indeed, if glass is colourless, it transmits all colours, but if it is coloured any colour, it will not transmit all (for it will not transmit those that are dimmer), nor will it transmit accurately. Air, then, has in every part of itself the power to transmit colours; for indeed it is transparent through and through. For when something is placed here it is seen both by those in front, and by those behind and, in a word, by those in every quarter. Certain activities, then, from the objects of sight come to be in the air without its being affected; they do not colour it, since it is not by nature such as to be coloured. That is why different people seeing through the same part of the air42 see different colours, which, if the air itself were coloured, could not happen. For it could not be coloured contrary colours at the same time. For instance let the air be O, black be M [melan] and white be L [leukon]. If A sees white and B sees

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black, the activities of white and black will move through the air O. If they move through it and are contrary, clearly they do not colour it; for it is impossible that the same part should have received contrary colours at the same time. And what is said about two colours can be said also about more. If there are several people seeing and several things seen, the several activities of the colours will come through the same air coinciding with one another; and if they coloured the air, this could never occur. The activities of the colours, then, pass through the transparent and announce to sight their own subjects, I mean the colours themselves, and they act upon the sense itself in this way or that, but impose no affection43 on the transparent. And we need not enquire how the activity of the colour moves from its own proper subject and arrives at sight. For it comes to be in the air as its subject, and then through it acts upon sight, just as the activity of the carpenter goes through the adze, and acts on the wood, shaping it in this way or that, but does not act on the adze in any such way as on the wood. As it is with these, then, so in the case of light we say that a certain incorporeal activity is sent out from the illuminating body to the transparent [bodies], which are by nature such as to receive this. And just as fire even when placed somewhere at quite a distance from us warms us, not because it itself travels to us, but because it [330] warms the air which is nearest to itself and by nature such as to be affected by fire, and that, when it has been warmed, becomes such that it too can warm things adjacent to itself, and this happens all through, and thus even the things furthest from the fire are warmed, primarily indeed by the fire, but proximately and in the second place by the things adjacent, [just as it is with fire]44 so too with transparent bodies: they are placed in succession (for the spheres are in contact with each other, and next to the last [sc. innermost] sphere all the air around us is in contact with it, and next to this the water), and the Sun proximately acts on the body that is adjacent to it and in contact with it, and makes that transparent in act; and the latter when it becomes similar [sc. transparent in act] has power itself too to act on what is near and make it similar, and in this way the illuminating power proceeds to the things that are last [in the succession], and the activity of the Sun does not travel immediately to the things that are last, but the things that are near and affected first are able in their turn also to act with a like activity upon what is receptive. If the activity occurs in all, all at once, that is not amazing when the activity is incorporeal. And just as when a long rope of twisted rushes45 is stretched out, and someone moves the end, the whole rope is moved along with it in no time at all because of the continuity of the parts, the earlier moving what comes next, so it happens, we should think, with the activity of light, because all the bodies of the universe are in contact with each other in succession.

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Light, then, is not a body, but the actuality of the transparent insofar as it is transparent, which occurs by the agency of that which makes [it transparent in act]. That which makes is primarily and most genuinely the sun, and secondarily as many things as share in some effluence from it and thereby themselves become illuminating, such as the moon, the other stars and fire. For god has fixed the first fountain of light in the sun. In this way we escape all the difficulties that have been stated, and neither will body move through body nor is there any impossibility in the activity’s occurring all at once in no time at all, since it is incorporeal. But we have people raising the difficulty against these hypotheses about light and acts of seeing, that if light and the acts of seeing are not body, whence, then, are reflections in mirrors?46 Whence also in kindling materials?47 How is there friction from bending of rays, and from this, warming?48 Why are mountain ridges less warmed than plains? And if the activities of objects of sight are in the air, why do we not also see what is behind us? For if air has the activities of colours in every part of itself, as is shown by the fact that people looking from every direction see the same colour (for if the colour is A and there are several people around it who see, B, C, D, E, F, G, they all see it: clearly because the air has in every part the activities of the colours), if that is so, why on earth do we not also [331] see the things behind us? To all these [objections] we provide a single solution, using hypotheses for the account in terms of activities which those who say that sight-streams and light are bodies also used. For just as they suppose that sight-streams and rays are emitted in straight lines and reflected from smooth bodies at equal angles,49 so too we suppose, both concerning the activities of colours and concerning light, that they are both emitted in a straight line and reflected from smooth bodies at equal angles. For this reason, then, the images also in mirrors are seen, not because our acts of sight are reflected towards the objects of sight, but because the activities of the latter are reflected towards us. For this reason too we do not see things that are behind us, since the activities move in a straight line towards the sight-organs, and the activities of the objects of sight will not be able to be carried to the sight-organs unless we come to be facing them. For the activities are always in the air without its being affected, but they do not act upon us except when the sense-objects are in a straight line with the sight-organs, just as50 nor do the sight-streams of themselves strike upon the sight-object unless they are in a straight line with it. That is why we do not see the colours behind us even if we look sideways, although the activity of the colours is in the air, because the activity does not move in a straight line to the sightorgans. That also, then, is how we say that the reflections of light and of

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the activities of sight-objects occur, when they are reflected from smooth bodies at equal angles. And for this reason, by the same argument as with the sight-streams, when the mirror happens to have such a position relative to us and to the object of sight that the activities, when they fall on it and are reflected at equal angles, travel to the eye, then we also see things that are placed not in a straight line with the eye, that is, things that are behind or above or below or to the side. And in a word, what they say in connection with sightstreams we say without alteration about the activities and thereby save the appearances.51 For what is the difference between straight lines’ proceeding from the eyes and travelling to the mirror, and their being reflected back from the mirror to the eye? If, then, both these people and Aristotle’s account suppose these things in common, but he with regard to activities, they with regard to sight-streams, but ten thousand impossibilities follow upon the hypothesis of sightstreams, the hypothesis of Aristotle should be taken in preference: it both saves the appearances and avoids the absurdities. Whence, then, the warmth in the air, if the sun is not hot, and the rays are not body? For if they are not body, there is no friction; and if there is no friction, how is the air warmed? For that friction heats, even so as to burst into flame52 if it becomes rather vehement, is manifest from plain fact. For fire is kindled, indeed, both from wood and from stones and iron when they are rubbed together. And in kindling material, if we do not so fit the ray to the tinder that [332] the rays do not make an obtuse angle, but one so acute that the folding up53 finishes almost at one straight line, and by its density rubs together the air left in between, fire will not be kindled. And we see this with our senses. So for those who suppose the rays are body, the appearances result; whereas they no longer result for those who suppose activities. For how will the activity of what is not hot heat? How can there be friction by what is incorporeal? I reply to this that just as by the agency of the soul, though it is not hot, a sort of vital activity of life occurs in the body, which stirs up the innate hot54 and brings the animal to life, and when the soul withdraws, immediately the innate hot is quenched too, so also, I say, from the sun some vital activity is produced through light in the air, and this changes the innate hot in the air and heats it through. And just as the spirited power55 of the soul is not itself hot, but when it is changed it heats thoroughly the blood around the heart,56 and likewise intelligence heats, though it is an incorporeal activity of soul, so too it is nothing unreasonable that the sun, though it is not hot, by its vital activity, which is light, should change the heat in the air and heat it thoroughly. And if the activity is such as to heat, wherever there is more activity there, of necessity, there is more heat. So in refractions when the activity is folded and encloses the small amount of air within, since a great deal of activity is heating a small amount

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of air, not by friction, but in the way stated, by changing the innate heat in it, it is reasonable that there occurs the kindling of fire. And that noon is warmer than dawn or sunset we can explain again by the same causes. Since when the sun is rising and setting the activities are slanting and make obtuse angles and enclose a great deal of air within them, for this reason they heat less. Besides, both when the sun is rising and when it is setting, it strikes upon us through a great deal of haze. The haze is watery (for it is an evaporation), and on that account it is reasonable that the activities should warm less, since they strike upon us through a great deal of haze. And that the haze is greater at the eastern and western horizons than at the zenith is clear from the following. Let the inner circle be the earth and the outer the [circle] of the haze surrounding the earth.57 The [straight] lines sent out from the centre of the earth will clearly be equal, since indeed in every circle the straight lines sent out to the circumference are equal. But if from our abode58 you send out straight lines, if it is to the heavens, then clearly since the whole earth holds the relationship of centre to the whole universe, even if they are unequal, still, since their difference is imperceptible in relation to the magnitude of the whole universe59 they will be equal [sc. for practical purposes]. But if you send out the lines from our abode to the haze, then since, as has been shown in the Meteorology [1, 340a25-32, 340b29-341a12], [333] the evaporation from the earth is not carried to a great height – the mountains, at least, are above the clouds – and since we do not have our abode in the centre [but on the surface], of necessity they will not be equal, but the shortest will be towards the zenith, and of the rest, those furthest removed from the zenith will be longest and those nearer the zenith shorter. Of the lines brought from the surface, where we have our abode, the shortest is that to the zenith, the longest that [downwards] through the centre, and of the rest, those closer to the zenith are shorter and the rest longer. And in summer60 when it [sc. the sun] spends more time above the earth it heats more. For61 it is the nature of light, when it falls on some smooth and polished body, so to act on it that it too sends back a like activity, as [happens] with silver coins, mirrors, water, glass and many other things. Every body that receives the activity of light is, it too, by nature such as to send back the same activity, but especially smooth bodies like those mentioned. It is for this reason, indeed, that the moon when it receives the light of the sun lights things here [on earth], and this is what we call ‘reflection back of light’, the reflection from those that have received [light] and are able to act with a like activity. In summer, then, and at noon when many similar activities occur in the same place it comes about that the air is warmer. In this way, then, the difficulties brought against the account in terms of activities are resolved.

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And if light is an activity and not a body, and if, moreover, seeing does not occur through the emission of certain sight-streams that are bodies, but the activities of the objects of sight come to us, why does Aristotle use these hypotheses in the Meteorology?62 I say that he uses the hypotheses of rays and acts of seeing because they are clearer. For it is not easy to conceive of activities being bent back, or of the activities of colours moving through the air at all. But whatever was established through those hypotheses, the same will be established through these. Just as there [sc. on the hypothesis of corporeal ‘sight-streams’] we said that cones come out from the eyes from some centre, and then as they proceed become wider, so too it can clearly be said of activities. For since the activities of the objects of sight are discerned at a narrow centre of the lens,63 they must start from the breadth of the object of sight itself, and finish at the narrowness of the eye; and this is a cone having as apex the pupil or the centre of the lens, and as base the object of sight itself. So the difference between the hypotheses does no damage to the things proved. And the [conclusions] concerning reflections will be the same on both hypotheses. So much by way of advocacy for Aristotle’s hypotheses. But it seems difficult to imagine how it is with the bending of activities, how it is possible for the activities, though they are something incorporeal, to be bent back and make angles. For obtuse and acute angles belong to extension, extension [334] to magnitude, and magnitude belongs to and is in bodies. But the activity is incorporeal, and has its being not in the air but in that which acts. How then is it bent separately from its own proper subject? And besides, if it is bent, either it is bent along with the air or by itself. If by itself, again, how can a thing that is incorporeal be bent back and make angles? If, on the other hand, it is bent along with the air, since the air, being moist, moves round giving place to itself,64 the air which is bent must push aside other air occupying the place in which it comes to be, and another part of the air65 will take over that same place. Clearly, then, the air which is moving round away from the bent air together with the activity of light in it will give way to the bent air, so that there will be no doubling up of the activity of light in one and the same air. For in the face of the bent activity in the middle of the air the other activity with the air that is moving round it will have given way. And if the activity is not doubled up, it will not warm any more [than before]. Therefore the account in terms of bendings of activities is of no use for the making of greater heat,66 since the activity which was formerly in the place where the bending occurs moves round out of the way of the bent activity along with the air. But to this I say what I have already said in anticipation: that in the way in which it is the nature of the moon, when it receives activities from the sun and is lit, itself to act in return through the

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brightness of its body and light things here, so too there are very many other things which are by nature such that having received the activities of light they themselves act in return, for instance, water, glass, silver, bronze and, in a word, everything smooth and polished. When, therefore, it is said that the activity is bent back from smooth bodies, nothing else is meant but that when such bodies receive the activities of light and of the objects of sight, they do not make to bend those very same activities they received, but it is their nature themselves to act in return with similar activities. And that is why we take so much trouble in directing light onto kindling materials, in order that the activity from the sun falling upon the kindling material and the activity arising back from it should not diverge from each other, but be close and by this density heat. It is the same as with sightstreams. Let that be our arbitration on that. But someone might plausibly raise this difficulty, that if seeing does not occur by the emission of sight-streams, but the activities of the objects of sight travel to the eye, how do we get to know the distances between us and the things seen? For if the activities travel as far as the eye, both things near and things far should be seen in the same way; if, however, we get to know the distances of the objects of sight, clearly the images67 or activities of the object of sight do not travel to us. And how could one even imagine activities of shapes and colours travelling through the air? But to this the Philosopher said that the activities do not travel as far as the eye but, in a word, all the air is filled with all objects of sight. But this is even more difficult and absurd. For in the first place the same difficulty still remains. For if the air generally [335] is filled with the presentations of objects of sight, how do we get to know their distances? What is extremely far and what is near should appear in the same way. Not even the furthest things should escape perception if the air is filled with all presentations. But perhaps to this one68 might say that, just as those who suppose sight-streams say that they are weaker as they proceed further, and that is why they do not see what is far off, we suppose the same about the activities, that they are weaker when they proceed a long way. But what can be said to this? If all the air is filled with presentations, what need is there to make the supposition that the activities go in a straight line? For we ought to see those that are not far from us and in a word, all that we are able to see, wherever we look, if the air is absolutely filled with presentations. Why, then, do we not see the heavens and every object of sight without gazing at them? But one who is contending on behalf of Aristotle’s opinion can call to witness the plain facts. For we see that when a ray of the sun strikes through a glass69 that is coloured red or some such colour, the air remains unaffected and transmits the colour and shape of the

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glass until they come into contact with some solid body, and then the colour and shape of the glass are printed off onto it. And really it is amazing to see. If one gazes at the air through which the ray of the sun passes, one sees it unaffected by the colour and shape of the glass. But in the solid body where the termination of the ray occurs, there are seen both the colour and the shape. And we ought not, I think, to hold reflection of sight-streams responsible here.70 For this sort of thing happens not simply with smooth bodies, but even in wool, if the ray falls there, in a garment, in sand, in what you will, with the sight-organ being positioned however it may chance, so it is impossible that the reflection comes to the glass from there. From this, then, it is clear that in reality activities of the objects of sight move through the air without its being affected, and after that come to be in the sense-organ, since in the case described they imprint both the colours and the shapes of the sight-objects on the solid body; it is because the sense-organ too is affected by them in this way that discernment passes through to the sense. But against this it may be said that we do not see the same thing happening with the objects of sight that happens with the model. For what is described will not otherwise occur unless the ray falls through the glass, whereas the objects of vision are seen even if a ray from the sun does not strike upon them in a straight line. Besides, in the case of the glass, on whatever things the ray falls, in those the appearance of colour occurs. But nothing like this is apparent with the objects of sight. [336] They are not found acting upon other bodies, even if the ray is carried through them.71 It follows that what happens in the case of the model is something other than the activity of the sight-objects or in general apprehension. People raise this difficulty too against the account in terms of activities. Why, they say, when some humour runs in the eye, do we not see this, though it is within? For if in general the activities of sense-objects act when they come to be in the eye itself, and it is not the case that our sight-streams go out to them, we ought to see the humour gathered in the eye within.72 But in fact this does not happen, but we apprehend it outside. For indeed, if that humour happens to be coloured, we apprehend the colour outside in the air, and if it should be shaped, again, we perceive the shape too outside. And it is not possible for someone to say that the activity of this [sc. the humour] goes out into the air and is reflected back from this to the eye. For it is not simply in the nature of acts of sight and activities to be reflected by air, especially as that at times is extremely finetextured.73 Besides, if this were so [sc. with the humour], why does not the colour of the iris74 do this same thing? The activity of this too should go out and be reflected to us and be apprehended by us. But in fact it is not. It is then perfectly clear, they say, that the optic pneuma is affected by the internal humour, and then goes out, and using the

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lit air as a vehicle, it then apprehends the affection produced in it by the humour within [the eye]. For the pneuma being continuous in itself, when that part which strikes on the humour is once affected and changed, by virtue of the continuity it [sc. the rest of the pneuma] in turn is altered; and since apprehension of objects of sight does not occur otherwise than through lit air, it is reasonable that it should apprehend the affection that occurs outside.75 To these things, then, we say this: that we shall not accept the hypothesis of sight-streams going out from the eyes before they resolve the absurdities that attend upon this hypothesis. For if in general [the hypothesis of] sight-streams going out from the eyes is demolished, we shall not tolerate their using this hypothesis as though it were true in order to give their explanations of the [phenomena] in question. We, then, following the hypotheses that have been stated [sc. of ‘activities’] say that this humour which gathers in the eye does not have its [place of] gathering anywhere else but round the aperture itself of the iris outside the liquids. For if it gathered more within, either in the liquids or in the optic nerve, it would completely impede sight. We say, then, that in reality the optic pneuma descends from the brain through the optic nerves, and goes on until it reaches the lens, and its terminations are in that. That is why the discernments also of the objects of sight are there. And that is why [337] it too [sc. the lens] is transparent, so that the activities of the objects of sight may be transmitted through it to the optic pneuma. And that is why the middle of the iris is bored through. For since the iris is coloured, and on this account is bound to impede the transmitting of the activities of colours, the part towards the lens is bored through in order that the activities of the sight-objects may travel unimpeded through the cornea and the liquids, these being transparent and uncoloured. The humour, then, gathers outside the liquids, and the liquids being transparent, the activity of the gathered colour or shape goes through them to the optic pneuma.76 And since, even if the liquids are transparent, still, it is by the presence of light that their transparency is perfected and becomes in act transparent, having formerly been transparent in potentiality, for this reason when our eyes are shut we do not see and nothing can be presented to us. Why, then, do we not also see the colour of the iris, its activity being shown through the liquids? We have already said that the part of it towards the lens is bored through. Since its substance, then, is not at that part in which discernments of sight-objects occur because the terminations of the optic pneuma are there, it is reasonable that neither should apprehension of it occur. What? – he [an objector] says, Does the optic pneuma occupy only so large a place as is the extent of the pupil? Then, if it both occupies such a place and remains unchanged in that part, it is not plausible

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that it should also spread on either side. But does not its increase and diminution make the whole eye either more concave or protruding? To these things I reply succinctly that even if it comes about that a spreading of the pneuma to either side occurs, still the apprehension of the sight-objects occurs only in that part of it in which the pupil is constituted. And this is clear both from plain facts and from argument. For we see that if any affection occurs in the pupil itself, I mean a gathering of humour or some dirt and thickening of the cornea, immediately our seeing is impeded. If, however, this and the parts around it are in their natural state, but all the parts on either side are affected in some way, with tumours or efflux of humour or the like, our sight stays unimpeded, so it is clear that apprehension occurs through the pupil alone. And the cause77 is clear. If the iris is bored through here for this purpose, in order that it may not impede the apprehension of the sight-objects by its own colour, where it is not affected in this way, clearly, it will impede. So even if the pneuma were spread through the whole eye, it would be impossible to apprehend through the whole. And just as if there were a house with only one aperture, and in that aperture there were glass that was intensely black, then, since light could not illuminate the house through it, those within would have no apprehension either of it [the aperture] or of anything else, so too it comes about with the iris. For even if all the things inside of it [liquids, cornea etc.] should be transparent, [338] since light cannot bring their transparency to activity because of the colour of the iris, their internal power will not apprehend even the iris itself. And in that if we do not see at all78 through the whole iris, but only through the pupil, it is pointless to enquire why sight does not also apprehend the iris. Yes, he says, and if we see the humour that is inside without sight-streams proceeding out to what is outside, why do we not perceive that the affection is inside, but think that the internal affection is outside? I say in reply that it is in the nature of pretty well all states that are contrary to nature to experience something like this. For people suffering from dizziness attach their own affection to what is outside, and not because some pneuma goes out from the brain to external things. And those who have some juice79 that is contrary to nature in their mouths think that this belongs to their food and drink. That is why it has been said, and will be said again, that what is going to apprehend things must not be qualified by any of those things of which it is to have apprehension, and similarly what transmits these things must not be occupied in advance by any of their qualities. And on this account, since air transmits both colours and sounds and odours, in itself it is both colourless and soundless and odourless. For if it were occupied in advance by any colour, that would impede the transmission of the rest. And that is why, as I have already said [321,6-28], those glasses that are coloured cannot transmit all col-

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ours. Just, then, as glasses coloured with red or blue-green stain show all things seen through them as the same colour as themselves, so too when each of the sense organs is first occupied in advance, through some disease, by one of those qualities it is able to discern, it attaches this quality round all the others. In this way, then, when the tongue too is qualified it thinks this quality which it had beforehand belongs to all the things tasted. For when it tastes the taste-object, since the juice it has in itself is more pungent, it tastes it first and thinks it is attached around the object that comes to it. That is why people in this state apply more pungent juices, perhaps vinegar or the like, in order that this may become dominant over that which is present in the tongue contrary to nature, and may be apprehended by the power to perceive. The same, then, happens also with sight. We think that things outside are coloured with the colour that occurs in us contrary to nature, as happens with sufferers from jaundice; for they think all things are yellow. since the transparent parts of the eye through which we apprehend the sight-objects, namely the liquids and the cornea, have become yellow, we think that all the things we see through them are like that, just as also things seen through glasses are thought to be the same colour as the glasses. And thus too when humour is gathered in the eye we attach its colour and shape to the air. And as I have already said [338,8ff.], just as in the case of the other sense-organs, [339] when they are in a state contrary to nature, their own affection is thought to belong to the sense-objects, although in their case perceiving does not occur by virtue of an emission, it is plausible that the same should happen with sight; therefore we will not accept, because the sense-organ apprehends its own affection as outside, that pneuma-streams go out from the eye. And it comes about that according to the shape of the humour that invades [the eye] things outside too are seen as similar for the same reason. For if the invading humour takes possession of the whole pupil, the whole activity is damaged; but when it is imposed upon the seeing power in a part of the pupil, and sight-objects and light are entering from all directions, but there is sightlessness in that part only, then because of the imposition of the humour a kind of error occurs, and that part by which [the patient] does not see is thought to be a body, outside, that is, and similarly shaped. That is why also if it comes about that the humour is not stationary but moves, it seems that there is some body outside moving all the time as the blindness occurs in different parts. What is amazing if there are mirrors that produce the presentation of images outside? But who would suspect that this same thing, the image appearing to be moved around outside, is produced when the states of the eye are contrary to nature?80 Why, they ask, do we no longer see when mydriasis81 occurs? Those who hold sight-streams responsible [for sight] have a plausible expla-

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nation: it is because the sight-streams are scattered immediately on coming out and diffused and do not in their emission preserve the shape they preserved when the pupil was in its natural state. But what are you to say on [the hypothesis of] activities? With the pupil being wider the activities should enter more easily and we should see more. Once again one can give an answer to this too on the same hypotheses:82 as has been said many times, the sense-objects must be placed in a straight line with the organ. One will say, then, that when the pupil is dilated the activities will be diffused and not be carried to the centre itself where the discernment occurs.83 But that is ridiculous. If they were bodies, what is said would have some persuasiveness. But as it is, how is it possible for incorporeal activities to be diffused? For always, whatever may be the position of the centre,84 some sight-objects will be in a straight line with the sense-organ in which the discernment occurs. What, then, prevents their apprehension from being accurate? And what is the cause [of the error] when the pupils are turned aside and not in one and the same straight line, whether by a natural defect or by intended effort, as when pressing a finger on the lower eyelid we displace and dispose upwards the position of one of the two eyes,85 and in states like these we see things double? I was once asked this and, using the hypothesis of sight-streams, I gave the following explanation of what happens: we say that two cones go out from the eyes in one and the same unslanting straight line86 carried through the centres of the vitreous humours, and the sight-streams strike87 the sight-objects and make triangles having as base [340] the senseobject and as sides the sight-streams diverging equally on each side from the axes of the cones (and it is by virtue of them [these sightstreams] that discernments of the sight-objects occur), and there are two axes, [one] for each cone, which the rest of the sight-streams surround.88 Clearly then, if the line taken through the centres of the vitreous [humours and lens] is unslanting,89 the sight-streams diverging equally from the axes of the two cones will strike the sight-objects at the same points, so that the extremities of the sightstreams fit onto each other and make equal angles,90 since the sense-objects are discriminated by the angles91 that occur from the sight-streams diverging equally from the axes, and since the cones are unslanting, [sight-streams] equally diverging from the axis of each cone strike the same points, it is reasonable that they should apprehend one thing as one. Just then as if there are two senseobjects, because one sight-stream falls on one and another on the other and they do not at all coincide with each other and make different angles, for this reason the things seen also are thought to be two or more,92 so if the position of the sight-organs is turned aside93 it comes about that the sight-streams from each cone strike the same sense-object diverging not equally from the axes.94 And since the angles

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from the same points on the sense-object are different, it is reasonable that the discernments are two also, and on this account the one sense-object is thought to be two. In this way, then, from the hypothesis of sight-streams it is possible to give an explanation of what happens in a convincing manner. But what explanation of this might one offer using the hypothesis of activities?95 In reply to the difficulty about distances [334,32-3], I mean the one that runs: ‘If the activities travel up to us and it is not the case that something is emitted from the sight-organs to the sense-objects, whence do we acquire perception of the distances and magnitudes?96 For one thing should not appear any nearer or further than another, since all the sense-objects travel up equally to the sense-organ. How can they [sc. the distances] appear greater or smaller when all terminate at a single point?’97 – in solution of this the proponents of activities theory say that if we manifestly perceive by hearing whether what is sounding is far off or not, though manifestly the sense-object travels to the sense-organ and nothing goes out from that which perceives, what is amazing if this should come about also in the case of sight, with the activity of the sight-objects falling on the sight-organs? For that it is not that same air which is struck and sounds that comes close up to hearing, that the air rather passes the sounds through by virtue of its own sound-conveying power, as it also does the activities of colours, is clear from the fact that we hear sounds occurring in the air even when we are in water, though the sounding air certainly does not move through the water, but it is the sound-conveying power in water (for in water too there is what conveys sound) that announces the sounds. Though [341] indeed, if the sounding air itself did come up to the sense-organ, that would plead even more for what is being proposed. For how, if the sounding air travels up to the sense-organ, do we perceive, whether the thing sounding is 98 far off? So even if one cannot give the explanation of this sort of thing, still that does not refute Aristotle’s hypothesis concerning objects of sight. That is sufficiently shown by the situation over sounds. In their case too the sound-conveying power of air announces the sounds to the sense-organ, though nothing goes out from the sense-organ, and nevertheless we perceive whether the sounding thing is far or near and whether it is in front or behind. 418b10-11 And dark is present also potentially in the things99 in which this exists.100 Since the transparent is not always transparent in act (I mean the transparent with us;101 that which is in the heavens is always transparent [in act]), in things in which there is what is transparent potentially there must also be dark;102 for before it becomes transpar-

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ent in act it is dark. For that which is still in potentiality by virtue of this sort of potentiality, I mean the first,103 is in a state of lacking that of which it is capable. And lack of light is dark. Those things, then, that by their presence make light in what is transparent potentially, by their absence make lack of light in that same thing; and lack of light is dark. Just, then, as sight is a form, and the absence of this does not bring along another form, but only lack of sight, and this is blindness, and as the absence of the steersman sinks the ship104 without any other form occurring in the ship, but only lack of the steersman, so too the absence of light of necessity is dark. And if light lies opposite to dark, and dark is a lack, light is necessarily a form; for form lies opposite to lack, according to what is said in the Physics [1, 190b13-16]. And if light is a form, and forms are incorporeal, for a body is what consists of form and matter, clearly it follows that light is not a body. But if anyone wants light and dark to lie opposite not as state of having and lack but as contraries, on the ground that a state of having changes to a lack but the lack does not also change to the state of having,105 and light and dark change to one another, and if he wants them to be contraries for this reason, because contraries change into one another, even so light will no less be shown to be incorporeal. For if light is the contrary of dark, and in the case of composite substances,106 no substance is contrary to any substance, as has been shown in the Categories [3b24-7], and bodies are composite substances, it follows that light is not a body. For nothing is contrary to a body, since nothing is contrary to a composite substance. For if fire lies opposite to water, it is not as a body but as something qualified with contrary qualities. So dark is in one respect a contrary, and in another not a contrary, and likewise in one way a lack, in another not. For if someone says that a lack is something that does not turn back to the form [sc. the positive state of having], [342] dark is not a lack but a contrary. But if he means by ‘lack’, as is said in the Physics [1.7], only the absence of form, something that does also turn back to form, then dark would be a lack. Again, if someone were to say that contraries are things that have been made to have form and have [each] their own power and activity, dark is not contrary to light. For it has no form or power of its own or activity. But if one should mean by contraries simply all things that change into each other, dark is contrary to light. And that dark is not a form should be clear also from the following. The cause of light is the sun or fire or the moon or something else like that, whereas we see nothing that is cause of dark, but the mere absence of that which lights is sufficient for the existence of dark. But nor is dark some quality of air, as one might suppose. If it is a quality of air, why is it not seen in the light? Why does it disappear all at once in no time at all at the presence of light? No

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quality retires from its subject in no time at all. But if dark is lack of the activity that lights, it follows that light is an activity. But no activity is a body. It follows that light is not a body.

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418b11-13 Light is as it were a colour of the transparent when it is transparent in actuality through the agency of fire or something similar such as the body that is above. He said above that light is colour (for ‘by “transparent” ’, he says, ‘I mean what is an object of sight, not of itself, however, but through a colour belonging to something else, namely light’).107 But having said above that light is a colour without drawing further distinctions, here he further articulates his account and says that light is ‘as it were’ a colour of the transparent. Not a colour, but ‘as it were’ a colour. For that it is not [not]108 without qualification a colour of the transparent he indicated by adding ‘when it is in actuality’. For it [the transparent] is always transparent, but it does not always have light. So it is not present in its nature as a colour of the transparent,109 but it is as it were a colour by analogy. For just as the objects of sight are objects of sight through having colour, so also the transparent when it has light becomes an object of sight. Since, then, the transparent does not have a colour of its own but one belonging to something else, he reasonably says also what it has this from. It is from the presence of fire or the body that is above, the body of sun, moon and stars.

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418b13 For indeed one and the same thing110 belongs to this.111 One and the same thing, that which lights, belongs to fire and to the body above of sun and moon, inasmuch as each of these brings the transparent to act and perfects it. Just as transparency, then, though it is one and the same, belongs to many things that are different in substance, so too does light, even though the degrees both of the transparency and of light are different. For the things near us [sc. sublunary things] are sometimes transparent in potentiality, sometimes in act, whereas the things [343] in the heavens always have transparency in act. For they are always lit by the sun. For it has been shown that even if the shadow of the earth stretches out before it as far as the sphere of the moon or even that of Mercury, still the part [of the heavens] that is in shadow is very small. For its cone, striking with its apex the sphere of the moon or even that of Mercury shades only the least part. 418b13-16 It has now been said what the transparent is and what light is, that it is neither fire nor any body at all, [nor an efflux from any body (for in that case also it would be a body)]

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Neither is the transparent a body, since it is in a body (for it is in water or air or something similar, and these are bodies) and that a body should be in a body is impossible; but nor is light a body, since it is actuality and form of the transparent. For in that case too [sc. if light were a body], there would be a body in a body, seeing that the transparent is in a body, and light is the perfection and form of this. And if it is not a body, nor is it fire or an efflux of fire, as Plato, at whom he is here hinting, seems to say in the Timaeus;112 for in that case too it would be a body, for the efflux from a body is a body. And besides, if not only does fire light but other things too, light should not be an efflux from fire. And to think of an efflux in connection with the heavenly luminaries is foolish. For things that have an efflux also need an influx, and augmentation and diminution are to be seen in them. If none of these things is seen in the heavenly bodies, then it cannot be by an efflux of bodies that they do their illumination. And if light is not an efflux of body, he113 does not mean an efflux of bodies, but what Aristotle calls ‘emissions’ and ‘activities’ he called ‘efflux’. 418b16-17 … but it [sc. light] is the presence of fire or something similar in the transparent114

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[Presence] not because fire comes to be in the transparent (for it is not because the transparent has received fire in itself that it then becomes in act transparent), but by sharing in an incorporeal power. For when fire is at a distance the transparent that is in a straight line with it is lit. By ‘presence’ he means the relationship arising from the association of fire with the transparent, as if one were to say that the right becomes right by the presence of the left.115 418b17 for it is not possible for there to be two bodies in the same place at the same time, Having said that light is a body he also adds the demonstration. It is not possible, he says, for two bodies to be in the same place. That this is impossible is shown by many things. For if it were possible for a body to move through a body, then, as he himself says elsewhere [Physics 4, 221a22-3], the sea might go into a ladle [344] and the heavens into a millet seed. For if the ladle of water were to receive another ladleful in the same place, it could receive a third and a fourth and an infinite number. For if the same place that was the place of one body were to have room for two at all, why not also more, or an infinite number? And in that way the sea could come to be in a ladle. But if it is not possible for a body to move116 through a body, and light does move through air, it cannot be a body. And if anyone were to say that it moves in the pores of the air, that is particularly absurd. For he will be introducing a void. For when it has been separated from

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air it will leave void the place in which it was. And then the air should become thicker and denser as a result of the filling of the pores; but in fact it becomes finer when light is present.

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418b18-20 … and light seems to be contrary to dark, and dark is the lack of such a positive state in the transparent; [so it is clear that also the presence of this is light.] The proof from its contrary that light is not a body. If dark lies opposite to light, and dark is nothing else but the lack of light (for it is not because something comes to be in air that dark occurs, but only by the absence of light), and the opposite to a lack is a state of having, it follows that light is the state of having such a power in the transparent, and not a body. And as we have said already [341,32ff.], even if someone should say that dark is the contrary of light, it is wholly necessary that it [light] is not a body, since nothing is contrary to a substance. But even if someone should say that dark is lack of light, and light lies opposite to it as a form, as is said in the Physics [1.7], even so light is not a body. For every form is incorporeal. For indeed the very form of a body, namely to extend in three dimensions, since it fits all particular bodies, cannot be a body. For if it were a body, it would have some determinate magnitude, and in that case it would not fit in the same way both a body the size of a cubit, and a body the size of a finger and the rest. So, taken itself by itself, the form of a body must be incorporeal; for any particular body is one that consists of matter and form. So if light too is a form in the transparent, ([as it must be] for dark is a lack,) of necessity it is not a body. 418b20-6 And Empedocles or117 anyone else who spoke thus was not right that light moves and sometimes comes to be118 between the Earth and the surrounding [heavens], without our perceiving this. [That is contrary both to the evidence of argument and to the appearances.119 In a short distance we might not perceive it, but that from the east to the west it should escape notice is too much to ask.] Having shown that light is not a body he calls to account those who have supposed it is, among whom is Empedocles. He [Empedocles] said that light is a body and flows out from the body that illuminates,120 and first comes to be in the place between the earth and [345] the heavens, and then arrives at us, but this movement of light is not perceived by us because of its speed. This, he says, is contrary both to the argument and to the appearances. For it is not seen moving and then reaching us, and to say that the movement is unperceived – if it was over a short distance, someone might grant

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that, but that something should move from the east to the west without being perceived, that really is too much to ask. And by what he says against Empedocles he shows again that light is not a body. For if it were a body it would need a movement in order to come to us; and if a movement, then also a time, since every movement is in time. But in fact things that are near to what illuminates and things that are far are illuminated simultaneously. For it is unreasonable, as I have already said, that such a movement should occur without being perceived. The words ‘and anyone else who spoke thus’ might be aimed at Plato. For he too in the Timaeus seems to say both that it [light] is a body and that it comes to us by an efflux [see above 343,13-21]. 418b26-7 And what is colourless is receptive of colour, and what is soundless of sound. Having shown that light is not a body, but as it were a colour of the air, and that the air receives this as a colour belonging to something else, he now adds something germane to what has been said, that what is going to receive a colour should not itself have any colour of its own because this, if it is mixed in, does not allow the colour that comes into it to be pure. The air, then, if it is to transmit colours or light or sounds or odours should itself be colourless, soundless and odourless, and that is the reason why colours are seen through the transparent, that it itself in its own nature is colourless. That too is why among transparent stones in those that have a rather intense colour like black or red we see the transparency impeded, but in those that have no such colour it is less impeded and the things seen through them are seen better. Because of this we see accurately though white glass,121 since that is nearly colourless, whereas through glass of another colour we see things as like the colour. For it too is a transparency, and the other colours are transmitted more or less.122 418b28-31 The transparent is colourless, and so is what is not seen123 or seen with difficulty, [as seems to be the dark. The transparent is like that, not, however, when it is transparent in act, but when it is potentially.]

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with difficulty and dimly, as towards twilight; for then air is both lit and seen, but dimly, because it has not yet become perfectly transparent. Either ‘seen with difficulty’ should be taken like that or, as Alexander thinks, ‘invisible124 or seen with difficulty’ should be taken as referring to the same thing, I mean, to air that has been made completely dark, since dark too seems to be discerned in a way by sight,125 and if that is so, then it is also seen. For dark is recognised by sight, as has been said many times, by denial, by lack of light and the objects of sight. For each sense also apprehends incidentally the lack of its proper sense-objects. And for this reason he said ‘seen with difficulty’ too, because it is a sight-object not of itself but incidentally. By ‘the dark’126 he means that which has been made dark.

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418b31-419a1 For the same nature is sometimes dark and sometimes light.

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The same nature of the transparent, that is, the subject itself [through which we see], is receptive both of light and of dark. By ‘light’ he means that which is in act transparent, and by ‘dark’, that which is potentially. These are as it were colours of it. For just as snow is called ‘white’ on the ground that it has whiteness, so also is called ,127 since a statue too is called this very thing, ‘a statue’, and not ‘bronze’.128 In this way also in colloquial speech we call a place that has a share in the sun ‘the sun’. ‘Put it,’ we say, ‘in the sun’.129 He too130 was speaking like this.

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419a1-5 But not all objects of sight are [seen] in light, but only the colour that belongs to each thing as its own. [For some things are not seen in light but cause perception in the dark, for instance, things that appear fiery and shining, (there is no one name for these things), such as a snuffed wick, horn, the heads of fish, fish-scales and eyes.] A little earlier he said that what is an object of sight is colour and what can be said in an account but has no one word as its name. Then he said how colour is an object of sight, by changing what is in act transparent; and this led him to speak of light, in which and through which colour is an object of sight. And now he passes to the things that are seen other than colours. These are things not seen in light, for that is a peculiarity of colours. And he lists what these are, namely a snuffed wick, horn, fish-heads and fish-scales and so-called glowworms, and in a word, all things that are fiery and shining. Of these, some are seen only at night, others both at night and by day. And in general there are four divisions of sight-object. Some are seen only by day, some only at night, [347] some both at night and by day, and

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some are by nature such as not to exist along with dark at all. What each of these is will be clear from the following. Of objects of sight, some are colours, and some nameless, but to call them by one name as though they had some colour, they are the shining. Colours are seen only by day, and not at all at night. Of shining things, some are seen only at night, some only by day, and some both at night and by day. For some of them are super-shining, some are dimly shining, and some middling. Those that are dimly shining are seen only at night, such as glow-worms and fish-scales and the like; for their shining does not appear by day, being overcome by a greater.131 And also the majority of stars. Those that are middling are seen both at night and by day, such as the moon and some of the stars, for instance the Morning Star when the sun is near the horizon and the Morning Star itself is near its perigee. Fire also. For this perfects air to as great a distance as it can and brings its transparency to act so as to show also the colours that are in it, but in the rest132 it shows itself, indeed, but does not bring the transparency of that part to actuality. Hence we see it itself when we are a long way off in the dark, but none of the colours around us. By day, again, fire appears as something shining, but not as doing anything to the air because that is already affected by a greater shining, and then it appears in a way like the other colours, but more in the way the shining of the moon also, because it is not too dim, appears by day: so also with the shining of fire, when it is shown not far away and it is light. But the super-shining are seen only by day, viz. the sun, since indeed it is the cause of day and of light. ‘Alone’ should be added [after ‘light’] to ‘not all objects of sight are seen in light’. For not every object of sight is seen in light alone, but [only], he says, the colour that belongs as its own to each thing. For it is colours that are seen in light alone. He133 added ‘alone’ since the brightness of fire, which is not a colour, is seen in light, but not in light alone, but also in the dark. 419a6 But the colour that belongs to each of these as its own is not seen.134

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In general, then, he says, the objects of sight are six, and of these he mentions five and leaves aside the sixth, perhaps because it is obvious.135 Colours are seen only in light, certain other sight-objects only in the dark, such as glow-worms and the like, and others both in the dark and in light, such as the moon, fire and certain of the stars, for most of the stars are seen only in the dark, because they are overcome by the solitary greater light of the sun. He also says that the transparent in act, that is, air that is lit, is an object of sight. For as we showed earlier, there is nothing else by which we discern that it is day but sight. In addition to this he says that the transparent in

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potentiality, that is, dark, is an object of sight by denial. And in addition to these there is a sixth kind of sight-object, the sun, the brightest of all things, which you could not say appears either in the dark (for it makes [348] dark disappear) or by day, for it itself is what makes day. And all [the objects of sight] except for colour and darkness are themselves the causes to themselves of their being seen because they are luminous in form. For at night the colour of glow-worms and fish-scales and the rest are not seen, but [only] by day. For their shining is not able so to make the air transparent that it also transmits the colour that is on the rest of their bodies, but it has only the strength to make itself evident, not colours too.

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419a6-7 The reason why these are seen is [matter for] another discussion. The reason, he says, why the things we see at night are seen, it is not for the present discussion to say. In the de Sensibus [sic] et Sensibilibus he says that it is the nature of air to be lit by what is shining, as are the heavenly bodies.136 Because they have a share in this [sc. in shining], by night they dimly light the air around them, when it is not lit by the shining that is greater and makes the light of these things invisible. They illuminate just so much as to show forth themselves, since fire too, when it is big, lights the transparent to such an extent that colours too can be seen, but when it is small, it lights the transparent [only] so far that it alone can be seen, and if though big it is far off, it has not the strength to make the air right up to us transparent, but only shows itself. And the stars at night are like that too. For by day the light of the sun does not allow them to appear. And yet the light of the sun always shines upon the heavenly bodies. For as I said just now [343,3-5], it is a small part of the air that is in shadow. But if both at night and by day all the heavenly bodies receive the light of the sun, why by night do we not see the heavenly bodies illuminated?137 Why do we see the stars at night? Why does the sun hide their light more in the day than at night, if they are always shone upon by the sun? I reply that when the cone of [the earth’s] shadow is spread around us we are not able to see the air illuminated on either side beyond the shadow, but the stars, and of these the brighter ones, announce themselves to us, as has been said.138 And that it is not at all impossible that this should come about is clear from the following. For when a big fire brightly lights some air, as I said before [347,1317], those who are at a distance do not see the air illuminated, but there are times when they see the fire itself. But the reason why we see the stars at night, even though the sun is shining upon them, is that the sense-organ of sight is not forced apart too much by the sun’s

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rays. That this is the cause you may see from this. When the sun is at noon we are not able to look intently at the disk of it because the optic pneuma, as I said, is too much [349] forced apart. For when it is near the horizon, and especially when the air is rather hazy, then we are able to look intently at it and we see it accurately, because we are seeing it haze, and the sight-organs are not forced apart. The same happens also at night, when its rays do not travel up to the air around us because of the screening by the earth. And indeed in a clear sky one descends into a deep well one will see stars,139 though at the top of the well one will not see them. For the shadow in the depths of the well takes the place of night and forces together the sight-organs and does not allow them to be forced apart by the light [sc. of the sun], and thereby makes one apprehend the objects of sight. And from this one might infer that nothing goes out from the eyes to apprehend the sight-object, but, as with the other senses, the sight-object travels up to the sense-organ itself. For if sight-streams went out, obviously the further out in length they protruded, the weaker they would become and thus striking upon light they would be more forced apart. But in fact even when at night they reach as far as the sphere of the fixed stars they are not forced apart by the light that is there. And when someone looks from a well, once the sightstreams get above the well where they strike upon the light that is there, they should be forced apart in the same way, and thus should no longer see the stars. But in fact they do see them. Therefore they are not forced apart. Clearly, then, it is when light strikes upon the eye itself that the sight-organs are forced apart. That is why also the man in the well, since there is shadow around him and light does not strike upon his eye or force it apart, is able to receive the activities of the objects of sight; and that comes about also at night. 419a7-11 But now this much is plain, that what is seen in light is colour; which is why also it is not seen without light. [For this is what colour has for its essence, to be such as to change the transparent in act; and the actuality of the transparent is light.]

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That what is seen in light is colour is abundantly clear, since colour is not seen at night but [only] in the presence of light. For light is a positive state of the transparent, and colour is such as to perfect the activity [sc. transmitting colour] that is in accordance with that state. For when colour is present, what is transparent in act also becomes a thing that transmits colours. That is why this is the very definition of colour, to be such as to change the transparent in act, ‘act’ of course being that which is in accordance with the positive state, and ‘such as to change’ being in place of ‘such as to perfect and bring forth the act’.

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419a11-21 An indication of this is plain: if anyone puts what has colour on the sight-organ itself, it will not be seen. [But the colour changes the transparent, for instance, the air, and by this, since it is continuous, the sense-organ is changed. For Democritus did not speak well on this when he thought that if the space between became void we should see clearly even if there were an ant in the heavens. That is impossible. For seeing occurs because the sense-organ is affected in some way. It cannot be [affected] by the seen colour itself [since that is at a distance]. It remains that it is affected by what is in between. So it is necessary that there should be something in between. If a void occurred we should see not accurately, but nothing whatever.] It is ‘an indication’, not, he means, that light is the actuality of the transparent, but [350] that colours are seen in light and that they are such as to change the transparent in act, that if someone puts what has been coloured on the sense-organ itself, I mean on the eye, we do not see it. For when we are anointed we do not see the spatula,140 and that is not because there is no sense-organ of sight – there is – but because there is no medium, I mean, no transparent that is by nature such as to be changed by colour, and being continuous both with the object of sight …141 Democritus for saying that if the space between those who see and sight-objects were void, the things seen would be seen much more accurately, so that even if there were an ant in the heavens it would be seen because there was no body impeding in between. Not only, he says, would we not see more accurately if the space in between were void, but we should not see at all, since there would be nothing to transmit the activity of the sight-object to the eye. Then he establishes this through what comes next. ‘For seeing occurs,’ he says, ‘because the sense-organ is affected in some way.’ If the sense-organ is affected in some way when it apprehends the object of sight (an affection, obviously, that is perfective),142 it is altogether necessary that it should be affected either by the colour itself or by what is in between, that is, by the lit air that is adjacent and in contact with the sense-organ. So there has to be a medium which is capable both of being changed and of changing [sc. something else]. Void is not like that. So if there were a void, nothing would be seen. People reasonably raise the difficulty here: if when there is no medium we cannot see, how is it that we see the cataracts gathered outside the liquids around the cornea, though there is no air in between? For whatever colour the gathered humour is, people seem to see all things outside as like that, since they attach the colour within themselves to the things without. And they often seem to see little insects outside when the humour in the eye is thick: seeing this the sense thinks it is outside.

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To this we should reply that the optic pneuma in the vitreous humour is what does the discernment of sight-objects. For that the discernment is there is shown by doctors from their dissections. And the vitreous humour is further in, clearly, not only than the membranes of the cornea and the so called iris, but also than the aqueous humour,143 and that too is transparent. This aqueous humour which is transparent, as also is the lens, occurs between the optic pneuma, which does the discernment in the lens, and the cataract, which gathers around the cornea. So that here too there is something in between. And that is why the colour within is understood to be outside, since also when we see things through coloured glass we think that those things too have the same colour as the glass. And that is because, as has been shown [320,19ff.], it is the colour on the surface that is the object of sight. The colour [351] in the depth we do not see, but if the thing seen is transparent we think that the depth is coloured with the same colour as the surface. And if we put with it something that is coloured a dimmer colour,144 that too will appear like it. Since, then, we see through the gathered humour, which is coloured, we think that the things outside too are coloured that colour. And that is why he said that what is receptive of colour should be colourless, so that it does not with its own colour impede the objects of sight from being seen as they are. But to what has been said people again raise a further difficulty, and say that if the aqueous humour suffices to fill the need of a medium, and that is why we see the gathered humour around the cornea, then a spatula which is in contact with the eye and, in a word, every object of sight ought not, because there is not air in between, to impede sight, but ought to be seen. In these cases too the aqueous [humour] should fill the need for an intermediate. We reply that just as air when it receives light becomes in act transparent, so do all transparent things. When, therefore, we apply a spatula to the eye it darkens it and does not allow the potentially transparent liquids in the eye to receive light and become in act transparent. But the humour that gathers, being transparent, passes the light through to the liquids. That is why if we should shut our eyes we no longer see the humour, because the eyelids make a screen against the light. And the humour itself when it becomes thick is no longer seen, and neither does it allow anything else to be seen because it makes a screen against the light. But when the thickened humour is small in quantity so as not to take possession of the whole pupil, the part of the liquids that is under it does not become transparent, and therefore the sight-organs145 falling on that part no longer see; hence there is dark at those parts, but the sight-organs around them see and it comes about that their small amount provides the appearance of little insects. But if the spatula applied makes a screen against the light because

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it is not transparent, then if one imagines a spatula of glass or some other transparent matter, it ought not, when placed on the eye, to impede its being seen. But it ought, even if it is placed on the eye itself, to be seen, which indeed happens. For when we glue our eye to the glass itself we see through it, but fearing that we may injure the eye by the contact, instinctively we cannot bear the contact but close our eyelids; so if we steel ourselves, keeping our eye intent, to bring it close to something transparent, we shall certainly see, as indeed the eye in contact with the air sees, and those who have dived down in water see the things in the depths, though their eyes are immediately in contact with the water. But when what the eye is about to touch is hard, we instinctively fear we shall be harmed by the contact and close our eyelids. And that it why it comes about, even if the spatula is transparent, that we do not see through it,146 not because it is applied [352] to the sense-organ, as in the case of the spatula that is not transparent. For in that latter case, even if the eye should be intent, since it is not transparent we should not see through it.

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419a22 Fire, however, is seen in both, both in the dark and in light.147 The reason why fire is seen not only in light but also in the dark, is that it has an illuminating activity capable of announcing its colour. 419a23-4 And that is necessary, for it is by its agency that the transparent becomes transparent.148 For the substance of fire is by nature such as to make the transparent in potentiality transparent in act. That is why we also see colours at night when there is fire. But he is not saying this, that this is why we see [sc. fire], because the air, having become transparent in act, transmits its activity to the sight-organs (for indeed, even when the fire is at a distance and not acting upon [i.e. lighting up] the air around us, it is still seen, and so are glow-worms and most of the stars), but because, if fire has a nature to bring the transparent to act, so that sight-objects appear through it [sc. the transparent], all the more it is itself seen even at night. And we say the same too of all the things that are seen at night. For indeed even glow-worms, if they come to be very close and are held in the hand, show the colour of that

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part of the hand in which they are held. But since their light is very dim it seems not to act on the air at all. 419a25-30 The same account holds also for sound and odour. [For none of them produces perception by being in contact with the sense-organ, but what is in between is changed by odour and sound, and each of the sense-organs is changed by this. And when someone places the sounding thing or the odorous thing on the sense-organ itself, it produces no perception.]

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After the discussion of objects of sight he passes to the discussion of objects of hearing, and then to that of objects of smell, proceeding in order from the more perfect to the less perfect. And someone might enquire why, when he said earlier [415a22-5] that one should start from what is less perfect and more common,149 he started by teaching not about touch (for this is the sense that is commonest and last in order and least estimable), but about sight, which is both less widely distributed and more perfect than the others.150 We reply, then, that earlier he said one should start from what is more common and less perfect, because the things that are more common are clearer; and one should start from what is clearer, and the vegetative [soul] is more clear than the rational, and more even than the perceiving. But now in dealing with the senses he has surprisingly run together being the more perfect and less widely distributed senses and being the clearer. Sight, at least, is the clearest of all, since the object of sight too, [353] I mean colours, is clearer both than the object of touch and than the other sense-objects. That is why he uses this order in his teaching. And having spoken about objects of sight he passes to those of hearing, for these were the things lying over against [the sense of] hearing. And after that he will speak of objects of smell. The same account, then, he says, holds for sound and odour as does also for objects of sight. What this same account is he has added clearly: that these too are such as to change something that is between them and their own sense-organs, and when this, I mean the medium, is changed, their sense-organs are changed too. For just as the activity of the object of sight is transmitted to the sense-organ through what is between, and does not itself touch the organ, so also the objects of smell and hearing are transmitted to their sense-organs through water or air; for as both have the transparent power, so too they have the powers to convey sound and smell. That these powers, to convey sound and smell, are also in water, is shown by fish: they fly from sounds and follow prey by smell.151 Those, at least, in our part of the world152 who go after fish in the marshes are accustomed to bang on the panels of their little boats in order to drive the fish into the nets. And that fish also smell is clear from those

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that hunt also at night. And then if they manifestly share in sight and hearing, and it is impossible to share in what is more perfect without sharing in what is less, and smell is less perfect, it follows that they share in that too. It follows, then, that there is in water the power to be a vehicle not just of sound but also of odour. And even we, when we dive down under water, hear anyone who shouts up above. We do not perceive odours under water as fish do, since all things that breathe smell by breathing, and it is impossible to breathe under water since there is no air. But fish do not breathe, since nor do they have lungs.153 Why it is that nothing that breathes smells without breathing, he will say in the discussion of smell. And that odours and sounds too need something to transmit them is clear. For if, he says, one were to bring the object of smell to the sense-organ itself, so that it was in contact with it, it would not be smelt. For it is not the nose that is the sense-organ, but the mastoid process of the brain within. If anyone, then, were to make the object of smell fine enough to be passed through to this, so that it touched it, it [sc. the mastoid process] would not perceive [it, sc. the object]. Similarly neither is the ear the sense-organ of hearing but the eardrum within or the pneuma in it; and if you were to bring the object of hearing to this it would not perceive. This too is clear in the case of sight. If, then, these three senses need a medium and will not perceive without that, it is clear that the others do too, as he will show, even if these seem to be affected by the sense-object through touching it immediately. [354] 419a30-1 It is the same with touch and taste, though it does not appear to be. The reason why will be clear later. Similarly, he says, touch and taste too apprehend the objects of taste and touch through something in between. But these seem not to need any medium. Why they seem not to need the air in between will be said in the discussion of touch. For the medium for these is not external as with the others, and that is why it is unclear.

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419a32-b3 The medium for sounds is air, for smell something nameless.154 [For it is an affection belonging to air and water in common, and as the transparent is to colour, so what belongs to both these is to that which has odour. For aquatic animals too seem to have a sense of smell. But man, and such footed animals as breathe, cannot smell without breathing. The reason for these things too will be said later.] Here he says only that air transmits sounds [and not that water does]; though in fact fish also hear, as we have said. And that earth has neither the power to convey odour nor that to

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convey sound is clear from the following. If someone screens off the ears or the nose with wax or clay or something earthen, there will be neither hearing nor smelling. He calls the power common to air and water, through which odours are transmitted, ‘nameless’; but those who came later, among them Theophrastus, have assigned to it the name ‘smell-vehicle’ as also to what transmits sounds ‘sound-vehicle’,155 as Aristotle [gives the name] ‘transparent’ to the power of transmitting colours. [Chapter 8] 419b5-8 [Now let us first draw distinctions concerning sound and hearing.] Sound is twofold. There is sound in act and in potentiality. [We say that some things do not have a sound, for instance, sponge, wool, and others have a sound, for instance, bronze and as many things as are solid and smooth, in that they are able to sound]

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Just as in the case of sight he said that the object of sight is twofold, that which is a sight-object in act and that which is potentially (for colour when light is not present is in potentiality an object of sight), so too with the object of hearing, that is, sound, there is what is in act and what is in potentiality. Similarly too with the other sense-objects. What it is that is sound in potentiality he shows when he has separated from things that sound things that cannot sound at all. In things that are capable of sounding, that is, solid and smooth things, there is sound in potentiality when they are not acting as things that sound. For the very suitability by which they are able to sound, that is sound in potentiality. And when things that can sound do it, that is sound in act. ‘Sound is twofold’: he proposes to speak of sound, because he proposes also to speak of hearing, and one should first speak of the things that lie over against [each sense], and sound lies over against hearing. He says, then, what he also said in the de Caelo,156 that sound, to put it succinctly, is a blow of air that occurs in a particular way. For the occurrence of sound there must occur a coincidence all at once of two hard and smooth bodies with one another. [355] For the air that is caught up in them, being forced out violently all at once, makes the noise. For soft bodies like sponges and wool do not sound, and nor do those that are hard, indeed, but do not knock against each other all at once, but only gently and little by little. For in that case the air is already dispersed bit by bit. That is why there has to be a forceful coincidence of the hard bodies, in order that much air may be caught up in between, and that air, when it is caught up and pushed out all at once, makes the sound. For the blow gets ahead and shuts off its

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exit and squeezes it out all at once. And soft things do not sound because the air caught up in them cannot be pushed out all at once. It exits through the pores (for soft things are open-textured) chopped up in bits. And the bodies that strike need smoothness, especially if a lot of sound is to occur, since all the air that is caught up is forced out at once, whereas in those that are not smooth there are many hollows and it is chopped up in them and does not go out all at once. Gongs and cymbals when they are struck make a sound that lasts, and that is because of their hollowness. For the air is caught up in the hollowness, and being whirled round and round the hollow unable to escape, it draws out the sound. And a bell that is struck on its convex parts rings for longer when it is suspended by a thin strap. The cause is the same. When it is struck it is moved, and being moved it moves the air caught up in the hollows, which again is whirled round and round, and knocking against the bronze prolongs the sound. And that this is so [is clear from this]157: if it is not suspended from a thin strap but restrained by a hand so that it does not vibrate under the influence of the blow, it does not prolong the ringing: that is because if the gong is not moved it will not move the air inside. What? If I move the gong with my hand, will it not move the air inside, or if I hit it with wood? Why does not the sound occur in the same way as when someone knocks against it with bronze or any other such material? It is agreed, [I reply,] that there must be suitability in the matter of the bodies struck. Perhaps it is because in the substance of bronze or silver or similar metals there is implanted much air, which is the cause of sounds, that such metals are resonant. For there is air in the substance of wood, but it is mixed with earth, which is why it is soundless or sounds only a little. Whereas the air in the substance of bronze and the like is mixed with water,158 and that too has the power to convey sound. What happens with drinking cups is also an indication of the things just said. If we move a moist finger round the brim, a ringing occurs because the air, forced out by the finger, falls into the hollow of the drinking cup and by its blow accomplishes the ringing. And that this is so [356] becomes manifest to the senses from this. If you pour water in the cup you will see during the movement of the finger round the brim a tremor produced in the water below, clearly because air, falling into it with the rubbing by the finger, is making the movement in the water. And if the cup is nearly full, many drops are continuously thrown out.159 And if one holds the cup by the base, the things stated come about; but if one holds not the base but the cup itself, no ringing at all occurs when the finger is moved round. That is because the thing struck needs to vibrate gently in order that the air may not be pushed out, but being continually reflected towards the inside, and striking the walls of the cup, and being pushed back to another part

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by the hollow curve, it stays for a long time and is not scattered; and staying thus it accomplishes a long sound. So too, if we suspend iron or something similar by a fine string, and strike it gently with bronze or the like, the ringing lasts a long time, because, as I said, with the iron vibrating there occurs a pushing against each other of both it and the air for a long time. That is why, if we take hold of the iron in the middle of the ringing, the ringing also stops, because the air is then scattered and is no longer reflected against that which rings, something that also happens with gongs and bells. And that too is why, if we do not suspend the iron on a string, so that it vibrates, and similarly also a little bell, but strike it while holding it in our hand, it sounds once and immediately stops, because there does not occur a bending back against it of the air. But also if we suspend the iron by a fine string, but give it not a gentle but a very great blow, the ringing does not remain, because the pushing back against each other of the iron and the air does not occur many times, but the air once pushed by the violent blow does not run back again. And perhaps that is where the little bell [kôdônion] gets its name, from singing as it moves [en tôi kinein aidein]. When, therefore, one holds it and brings it to a halt, what is sounding will cease for the reason given; for it being brought to a halt, the air inside or outside that is vibrating is brought to a halt too. 419b8-9 That is, to make a sound in act between itself160 and hearing. If sound is taken as object of hearing, this cannot occur in act unless there is hearing that perceives, just as colour is not an object of sight if there is not one who sees. Having said, then, that there is that which has sound (he means the sense-object of hearing) in potentiality, he adds ‘that is’ and the rest. For sound can be in what is between the thing sounding and something other than hearing, but this is an object of hearing in potentiality and not in act. In order, then, that he may indicate what is an object of hearing in act he adds ‘between itself’, that is, the sounding thing, ‘and hearing’. [357] 419b9-11 Sound in act, when it occurs, is always of something and in relation to something and in something; [for a blow is what produces it.] Having said in what things there is sound in potentiality, namely, in those that are capable of sounding in act, he here adds how it is that sound in act occurs. A blow, he says, is what produces the sound, and a blow is a blow of something and in relation to something and in something. It is the blow of that which strikes it; it is in relation to [i.e. upon] the thing struck; and it is in something between. (For the

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blow occurs by a change in respect of place; this is a change of something and in something. It is the change of the thing changed, and it is in – not just any chance thing, for the change cannot occur either in a void or through a solid – but in air or water.) It is wholly necessary, then, that sound too should be of something and in relation to something and in something: it is of that which strikes, in relation to that which is struck, and in the air. For it is impossible for sound to occur in water. For if, when you are immersed deep in water you clap your hands together, you will not make a sound because, as I have already said [355,1-2], it is the air between things struck when it is forced out violently that makes the sound.161 For water does have the power to convey sound, I mean, the power to transmit sounds, but apart from air it is not able to make sound. And this deserves to be a problem. If the reason why air that is caught up in striking bodies sounds is that it has the power to convey sound, and for this reason there is always need of air if sound is to occur, why on earth, when solid bodies strike in water, does the water caught up in them not sound too, though it too has the power to convey sound? To this we reply first that, as we have already said, the coming together of the things striking must occur all at once, so that the air that is caught up may be forced out all at once and not little by little. This cannot occur in water because of its thick texture. When the striking bodies are coming together, before the impact the water is first forced out little by little. And then air is by its nature easily moved because of its upward tendency, so if it happens to get a start from that which pushes it, it is carried on in a rush with the air next to it parting. But this does not happen also with water. Water is heavy by nature and needs much force if it is to be pushed; and that, as I said, cannot happen in water. And besides, since neither is the water that is pushed easily moved, nor does the water next to it easily part and give a passage, it comes about that a pushing of water does not occur, or not sufficiently. Hence it comes about that sound does not occur either. For indeed, in the case of air it is not any chance movement that produces sound. And besides we must think that even if the power to convey sound is present both in water and in air, still it is not present equally, but air is more sound-conveying. Since, then, it is both more sound-conveying and more easily moved, it is reasonable that [358] sound should occur in it, but not also in water. But even if water does not sound, when air sounds water can transmit the sounds because it has in general the power to convey sound; for in this case the water does not have to be changed, but only to have its power perfected. That is why, as I said,162 when sounds occur in the air they are perceived by people under water and by fish, even if not in the same way. For just as water is not transparent in the same way as air, so neither is it sound-conveying or odour-conveying in the same way.

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So the efficient cause of sounds is solid and smooth bodies, and of these, those that are hollow, while air is material cause. For sound has its existence in air and comes to be as it were its form. And for the efficient causes there is needed not only magnitude and solidity and smoothness, but also a certain sort of substance. For bronze sounds in one way and iron, lead, silver and wood in other ways. That is why also harmonicas are usually constructed of different materials, so that they may produce harmony by the difference of their discrepant sounds; for harmony is ‘the uniting of things multifarious and contrasting’.163 419b11-13 Hence too it is impossible there should be sound with [only] one thing. [For the striker is other than the thing struck. So what sounds, sounds in relation to something.]

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Since sound is a blow, and what strikes, strikes a thing struck. What? When we strike the air with a whip,164 do we not make a sound, and similarly with fans?165 But then the air fulfils the two requirements, that for a thing struck and that for a medium. For the air which is pushed by the whip with its blow is forced out knocking against the air that comes after it, and that receives the role of thing struck, and the air in the middle forced out by both, by the whip and the air that comes after it, resounds. And often air receives the roles of all three, the striker, the thing struck and the medium, as when we whistle forcefully. The air going out at the start strikes, the air that is next is pushed by it and knocks against other air, and being constrained and forced out by both it pushes.166 And here too it [sc. air] is more that which strikes. For there are the lips and the palate, and the air knocking against these is forced outside. That is why those whistling must bring their lips together, in order that they may become narrower for the air to knock against as it is forced out. And in snores167 the air is pushed by the lung and knocks against both the wind-pipe and the whole mouth. But in the case of the whip the air is pushed not by one thing but in a way by two. For it is when the whip is bent it accomplishes the requirement of two things; each part of it in fact strikes the air enclosed within, and that is how it pushes. Indeed, if there is a thick piece of wood or something else that does not bend in movement, it does not make a sound in the same way, or only faintly, [359] so as scarcely to be heard. So clearly, both in the case of the whip and in the case of the rod168 that strikes the air, the sound occurs for the reason given, the whip doing the requirement of two things striking. That too is why, because it often bends with several bends, we perceive several sounds in the one blow. 419b13 And a blow does not occur without movement. Having shown that sound is of something in relation to something, by

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saying that it is a kind of blow, and that the thing striking strikes a thing struck, he here establishes that it is also in something. If sound is a blow, and a blow is not without movement, and that is change in respect of place, and change does not occur through a void, but [always] in something, either air or water, it follows that sound too is in something, that is in air, as we have already shown. For this, being caught up all at once by that which strikes onto a smooth or hollow body struck, sounds. A smooth thing when it is struck makes a sound for this reason, that the air is enclosed all at once onto this by the thing striking, and a hollow thing, because the air that is first struck in these things, being unable to go out because of the hollowness of what surrounds it, is carried now to one part of the hollow thing and now to another, and being reflected and whirled back violently, makes more blows and rings for a longer time.

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419b13-18 And as we have said, sound is not the blow of any chance things. [For wool makes no sound if it is struck, but [only] bronze and as many things as are smooth and hollow: bronze, because it is smooth; and hollow things make many blows after the first by reflection, since the [air] that is changed cannot get out.] Since he has said that sound is a kind of blow, but not every blow occurring by the agency of any chance things is a sound, he here draws this very distinction, saying what those things are, a blow from which is sound, and how they must be, namely solid. For wool when struck does not sound …169 for rough things also sound when struck, but because the former sound more.

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Here he makes articulate what was said elliptically before. For before he said that only air transmits sounds; but now he says that water too is like that, though less so than air. For water is thicker and blocks off the channels of hearing. And hearing in water is different from hearing through water, as he will show as he proceeds. For sound is heard through air alone; but it occurs also and is heard in water, as in air too. 419b19-25 … but air is not in control of sound, and nor is water, [but there must occur a blow of solids [striking] upon one another and upon air. That occurs when air remains after being struck and is not dispersed. Hence, if it is struck quickly and forcefully it sounds; for the movement of the hitter must be

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It is not the case, he says, just because we have said that [360] air and water transmit sound, that these things are in control of sound;171 for by their own nature they are soundless, which is why, indeed, they are receptive of sound, as the colourless is of colour. But it is the striker and the thing struck, if they are solid, that are in control of sound and produce it. For efficient causes are those most in control.172 Either he is saying that or, what is better, that air and water are not sufficient by themselves to produce sound, but there must also be bodies that strike and are solid. And making this clear he adds ‘but there must occur a blow of solids [striking] upon one another and upon air’. For this [air] is struck by the solid bodies that catch it up, and it only makes a sound when it is pushed away rapidly by the things that strike it, so that the blow has occurred first before the air has been dispersed; for then it is pushed out all at once and sounds. Just, then, as if a stream as it were of sand runs from some funnel, if one hits the stream beneath the funnel all at once so that the blow occurs first before the sand has been divided into bits, here too one will produce a sound, but if one hits gently, there will no longer be a sound (for the sand has dispersed); [so] the same also comes about with air; for that too is easily dispersed. 419b25-7 Echo occurs when from173 air which has become one because the container delimits it and prevents it from being dispersed, the air is pushed away back, like a ball.

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Having discussed sound generally … [following upon the]174 general account is the account concerning echo. He says, then, that echo occurs by virtue of a reflection from resistant, smooth bodies, especially concave ones, of air that has been struck by voice. For a person speaking pushes just about all the surrounding air, but most of all the air in front. That is why we hear better if the person speaking is looking at us than if he is turned away. This air in front that is pushed, when it is carried to something resistant that possesses concavity, such as a cave, being continuous and remaining unscattered because of being surrounded by this hollow, which he calls ‘a container’, falls upon it and because it is a resistant body, it is pushed backwards like a ball thrown against a wall, and thus it moves [back] to that which struck the blow, the air, of course, acting between the two by virtue of its power to convey sounds. For it is not only because it is not allowed by the hollow place to scatter that it is pushed away in the contrary direction by the resistance of the hard body just as it was carried to it, but because this hollow into which it falls is not a void when it falls into it, but full of air, and this air is continuous and

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unified by what surrounds it. The [361] air, then, that has been struck by the person speaking and is sounding divides this [air in the hollow place] with its movement, and being prevented by it, since it is continuous and unified, from scattering, it strikes upon the hard body, and since it cannot move further it is reflected back to the rear along with its own activity, I mean, with the sound, and thus it comes about that the sound runs back again. But we should think, as Alexander thinks, that echo occurs as follows. It is not the case that the very same air that is struck is first carried as far as the container, and again that same air is reflected to that which struck the blow, but the air that is first struck, because of the speed of the blow, remains continuous and undivided, but shapes the air that comes after it with a blow similar to that by which it was itself shaped by the [original] blow, and this again shapes the air after it, and thus by continuity the process gets as far as the container. For as long as the blow that is passed on is stronger than the dispersal of the air, so long one [parcel of air] keeps being shaped by another. The last is struck and shaped up at the container and prevented by the container from passing on the blow any further, and this is pushed away backwards by the resistance of the solid like a ball rebounding from some solid, and strikes and shapes the air on this175 side of it again, and thus the passing on backwards of the blow and the sound on this side occurs. The echo that occurs is articulate because the air that is first struck by us when we speak is also first reflected, and brings us back the echo of the first utterance, the air struck second that of the second, and thus the order of the discourse176 is preserved. From this it is possible to reason persuasively about the situation also with the activities of objects of sight. The difficulty was raised [334,1-3] how it is possible to suppose reflections of activities of sight-objects when they are incorporeal. For what reflection can there be of that which is incorporeal? If now sound is a kind of activity of air and a perfecting of the sound-conveying [property] in it, and this activity is plainly reflected when it falls on what is smooth and hollow, as is the case with echo (for there is no doubt here that reflection occurs), what is impossible if this same thing should come about with the activities of sight-objects? But I reply to this that even if sound is reflected, still it is not reflected itself by itself, but along with its own subject, I mean air. For it was said that echo occurs from concave things chiefly for this reason, that the air is reflected because it is not scattered but preserves its continuity on account of what surrounds it. But the activities of sight-objects are said to be reflected themselves by themselves without a subject. But perhaps even in the case of sounds it is not true that the sounding air itself is reflected. For we see that not only those in a straight line with the people from whom there is reflection hear the

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echo, but also those to the side. If it is not possible, then, that the air should come away all together in every direction, and if, were it dispersed, it would no longer sound, [362] perhaps, here too there occurs reflection only of the activity, I mean, of the sound itself. For if sounds are passed through to the sense-organs of people sunk under water, though the struck air does not travel to the sense-organ at all, it is clear that neither does a sound come together with the struck air to the smooth or concave thing on which it falls, but just as with light a certain sort of matter when it receives light is able itself to illuminate in a similar way the things that are adjacent, and we call this sort of activity ‘reflection back’, what is to stop the same thing also happening with sounds? And that light is not a body has been clearly shown. 419b27-30 It looks as if an echo always occurs, though not a clear one, since it happens with sounds as it does also with light. For light is always reflected [(otherwise there would not be light everywhere, but there would be dark outside what is sunlit).] That reflection of light occurs not only from smooth things but from all bodies, he establishes succinctly from the obvious fact that every place is lit, not just the place directly facing the sun, but also that which is drawn back and covered by some solid body like things under a roof or wall. If there did not here occur any reflection of light either from the earth or from some wall, they ought to be in darkness and not lit. But the reflection that occurs from any chance body is not like that from water or bronze or anything smooth. The reflection from bodies such as these is more evident and almost equivalent to the illumination from the first striking of the sun. The things, at least, which are shone upon by the sun are marked off from the rest by shadow, and similarly the things shone upon by reflections from such things [as water and bronze]. For if a body occults the light reflected from such bodies, a shadow occurs in the occulted part. The difference between the reflections is manifestly evident also from this. If there are two places, one sunlit, one in shadow from some interposition of a wall, that there is some reflection on the place in shadow either from the earth or from something similar is quite clear from the fact that there is not darkness in that place but light; but the reflection is small, and not such that solid bodies in it make a shadow. For when we are standing in shady places we make no shadow. But if in the sunlit place you put bronze or water or glass or something smooth facing the shady place, you will see another reflection occurring in the shady place, so that the shady place too is sunlit like the rest, and so that then, as I have already said, another shadow can occur in it if anything occults [the reflected beam]. Just, then, as in the case of light, he says, [363] reflection occurs

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from every body, but not a similar reflection from all, but a bright one from smooth bodies, a faint one from those that are not smooth, so too, he says, in the case of sound it looks as if reflection occurs from every resisting thing, but not one that is similar or as clear as occurs in the case of echo from places that are concave and at the same time smooth, for the reasons that have been stated. For if something should be not concave but flat, the air is scattered and does not flow to us, but is diffused or only a little is carried to us. And if the flat surface is not smooth, the reflection that occurs is still fainter for the reasons stated. 419b31-3 But it [light] is not reflected as it is from water or bronze or anything else smooth, so as to make a shadow, by which we define light.177

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For where there is much light, there shadow occurs when something occults. In the other part, then, where there is neither reflection from smooth things nor direct sunlight, a kind of reflection does occur, but not so much as to make a shadow when something occults, whereas that occurs with reflection from smooth things. 419b33-420a2 Void is rightly said to be in control of hearing. [For air is thought to be void, and it is this that produces hearing, when a quantity that is continuous and one is changed. But because it is loose-textured it does not make itself heard unless the thing struck is smooth. And then at the same time it becomes one because of the flat surface; for the flat surface of the smooth object is one.] Having said that air is cause of sound and hearing, and not only that but a contributory cause as matter (for he said that sound is a blow of something in relation to something and in something, the striker, the thing struck and the medium, and this medium is air), and intending to show this yet again, he wants to bring in as witnesses to this same thing all the students of nature who went before him. All of them, he says, said that void was in control of sound. And, he says, they said this rightly, for they thought that air was void. Inasmuch, then, as it is in thinking air to be void that they say void is in control of sound, they say rightly. But inasmuch as they thought that air is void, they were no longer right. Air, in fact, is in control of hearing as a contributory [cause], when it is continuous and one and is changed by the striker and the thing struck. And it becomes continuous and one when that which strikes is smooth; for then it is all changed at the same time. For what is smooth is one; so being changed by what is one and the same, it [the air] is178 one. What is rough, on the other hand, is not one. With every bump and unevenness it throws out a

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different surface. Since air, then, is easily dispersed, when it is pushed away from something rough, in being changed it does not remain one but is dispersed. 420a3-4 That which sounds, then, is that which changes air that is one by continuity up to hearing. [And air is inborn in hearing.]

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Since not every striker and thing struck without qualification produce sound, he defines what it is that sounds: it is that, he says, which can [364] change air, keeping it one and continuous, up to hearing.179 Of this sort is what is solid and smooth, for the reasons stated. When he said ‘changes air that is one’ he added ‘by continuity’ only; he did not say ‘in number’; [but air that is one] so as to remain continuous and undispersed on account of the blow, and to give a similar shape to what comes after it, and do this continuously up to hearing. This must be said not of sound without qualification, but of heard sound, which is why also he adds ‘up to hearing’. For sound can move beyond hearing, but no longer as heard [sound]. Having said this, lest someone should think he means that air moved from outside arrives up at the eardrum itself, and that this [air] is what proximately changes the sense-organ, he adds the words that follow: ‘And air is inborn in hearing’. For there is certain air that is inborn and built into the cavities of the ears in the eardrum180 itself; and this, having first been affected by the air changed from outside, receives the activities of sounds and transmits them to the primary thing that perceives. This is the acoustic pneuma that resides in the eardrum itself. For the senses,181 starting from the brain, proceed through the nerves as far as the sense-organs. The power to hear, then, proceeds to the roots of the ears, which are called the ‘eardrums’.182 There is a nerve proceeding from the brain which is equipped with a channel, and the acoustic pneuma is in that channel. There is certain air, then, which is enclosed in the cavity of [the sense-organ of] hearing, which is inborn with the eardrum and membrane.183 This air, then, receives the sounds from the air outside, and having itself the power to convey sound, through itself transmits the sounds to the eardrum. It proceeds from a wider channel to narrower, I mean, from the cavity of the ear to the channel of the eardrum.184 But it must not be thought that this air, even if it is inborn, is also indestructible, so that it is always one and the same in number. Rather, it passes away and is generated bit by bit like the rest of a man’s body. But if this air should be affected in the whole of itself and pass away, the activity of hearing of the animal is destroyed. For indeed this is why it is thrown forward185 by the nature of the eardrum, in order to receive the impulses of the air outside, and lest

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the air outside, striking upon the eardrum, should destroy it. As is the case also with sight. For in that case too nature has established some inborn transparent in the eye, I mean the vitreous humour and in general the liquids and the corneal membrane, which are transparent and first receiving the activity of the outside transparent, transmit this through themselves to the optic nerve, in which there is the optic pneuma; [365] and this nerve comes down from the brain and terminates up at the beginning of the lens. Just, then, as in the case of sight, if these defences or any one of them are injured, the activity of sight is destroyed, so too in the case of hearing if this airy defence is destroyed, the activity of hearing is destroyed because the eardrum is injured by receiving the impulses of the air outside immediately. That is why, also, hearing is injured by great sounds: the outside air is pushed forcefully and with that force pushes the air inborn in the ears and often scatters it. Both for this reason, then, nature has built into the ears this air, and for the sake of the hazardous186 activities of the animal, such as dives in water. For if this air were not there, in dives the water would have to come close up to the sense-organ itself and harm it, or if nature had thought of some defence in order that the water might not come in,187 the animal would not hear under water, since there would be nothing sound-conveying to pass on the sounds to the sense-organ. It is built in, then, as a guard for the sense-organ. That is why, too, nature has made the channels of the ears of winding form, so that air or water or anything else may not enter easily and strike the eardrum.

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420a4-6 And because it is in air, when the [air] outside is moved,188 that inside is moved. [That is why the animal does not hear everywhere.189 air does not go in everywhere.190] That is, because the inborn air built into [the organ of] hearing is continuous with the outside air (for that is what he means by ‘it is in air’), when the air outside is moved, by virtue of the continuity the air inside is moved too, though it is unmoving in itself as inborn. But perhaps he does not mean that it is changed in respect of place (for he says next [420a10] that it is unmoving), but [changed] in that it sends through the sounds. For [the outside air]191 being changed in this respect, the inside air also sends through sounds because it is continuous with that outside. And this, he says, is the cause of our hearing only with our ears, and not with every part of the body, because in the ears alone is air caught up that is inborn and continuous both with the outside air and with the sense-organ of hearing, and thus able through itself to pass on the affection that occurs in the outside air. Just as the optic pneuma does not everywhere have liquid sending through to it the activities of colours in the air (for there is no vitreous [humour] or

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anything else similar in the direction of the choroid membrane192 that is continuous with the air and the optic nerve, but another body that is thick and screen-forming, which is why we do not see behind us), so it is that since there is not caught up in us everywhere some air that is innate and continuous both with the air outside and with the part that hears, but only in ears, for that reason we do not hear through any other part. But that there is inborn air in the cavities [366] of the ears, is clear from this. If with one’s finger one blocks up one’s ears, one will perceive a sort of sound and change in the air inside. This affection occurs because the air outside around the ears, being pushed by the finger and pressed into a smaller place, presses the inborn air, and it [the latter] being changed by the force of the pressure knocks against the internal bodies,193 which are cartilaginous and hard, and thus makes the sound. And he says [420a15-16] it is a great sign of the ear’s being healthy that the internal air should sound. For if it were not healthy, one would not perceive the sound produced by the internal air. 420a6-7 For the part that will be changed and is animate194 does not have air everywhere, as the pupil and the liquid.195 Just as the liquid is put before the pupil in order that it [the pupil] may apprehend the objects of sight through it (by the pupil he means not the aperture in the iris membrane, for the liquids are on the inner side of this, but rather the channel of the optic nerve, through which the optic pneuma goes out), so too the inborn air is put before the sense-organ of hearing. Since, then, the part that is animate and hears, I mean the eardrum, does not have inborn air everywhere continuous both with itself and with the air outside, but only in the ears, for that reason the animal does not hear all over, but only through the ears. 420a7-9 In itself196 air is soundless because it is easily dispersed; but when it is prevented from being dispersed, its movement is sound.

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At the beginning too he said that just as what receives colour must be colourless, so also what receives sound must be soundless. But not everything soundless is receptive of sound, but only what is like air. And he adds the reason why it is soundless: it is because it is easily dispersed, he says, that it is soundless. But when by a blow of something smooth and solid striking all at once it is prevented from being dispersed in accordance with its own nature, then its movement comes to be sound. He here says plainly that sound is a movement in air that is continuous and remains one when it is prevented from being dispersed by a certain kind of blow.

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420a9-11 The air in the ears is built in to be unmoving [so that it may perceive accurately all the different kinds of movement]. Just as the air outside is in itself soundless because of being easily dispersed, so too is the air inside because of being unmoving. For he said that sound is a certain sort of movement [or change] of the air. The air in the ears, then, is established unmoving for this purpose, in order that being soundless it may be such as to transmit all sounds. For if it had a sound of its own, that would knock out the sound from outside. So this also might be the reason why the air in the ears is built in unmoving, in order that it may be able pass all sounds through. If it were moved, then when [367] being moved by some blow it sounded, not only, as I said before [364,31-2; 365,3-6], would the sense-organ be hurt, but it would not be able to pass all sounds through [to the organ of hearing]; for when the air outside sounds, it does not also pass through the sounds occurring elsewhere in the air in the same way, but confuses them.

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420a11-12 That is why we hear also in water, because it does not come in to the inborn air itself.

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That hearing does not occur because of the entry into the ear of air outside, but because of contact with the air built into the ears, is indicated by our hearing also in water, because the water does not come into the ear. If it came in, it would destroy and push out the inbuilt air, which ministers to hearing, and being immediately in contact with the eardrum would harm it with its blow, (and in addition, remaining caught in the concavities it would be destroyed197 and harm the sense-organ in that way; many, at least, have been so harmed); and with the eardrum being harmed, the sense is destroyed along with it. Just, then, as when we are in water we hear, though the water does not come in, but by its sound-conveying power it transmits sounds through to the inborn air, and that then [transmits them] through to the eardrum itself, so too when we are in the air hearing occurs because the air outside comes into contact with the air that is inborn and passes on the sounds to the eardrum. And this very thing is the greatest indication that there is certain air as it were inborn in the eardrum, that when people are in water, water does not enter the ear without the application of much force, since its entry is repelled by the air inside (and much force is needed to expel water or any such liquid that is within)198 and at the same time the tortuous layout of the ear too helps to prevent the pushing out of the air within by things entering from outside. And he himself added the reason for water’s not going into the ear when he said:

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Translation 420a12-14 Nor even to the ear, because of its windings. [But when this does happen, there is no hearing]

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Not only, he says, does the water not come in and push out the inbuilt air, but it does not even come into the ear itself because of the bends in it; and at the same time he here teaches us the reason why the ear is made by nature like this: it is that nothing may easily come in and hurt the air that is built into it. 420a14-15 Nor [sc. is there hearing] if the ear-drum 199 like the skin on the pupil [when it is sick].

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What he calls ‘the pupil’ is either its underlying parts or the parts put in front, that is, the membranes and liquids. Just, then, as when any of these is sick we do not see, so too when the eardrum is sick of any disease [368] we do not hear. Or perhaps ‘pupil’ should be understood more simply, according to colloquial usage, as the aperture of the iris, and the ‘skin’ on this as the so-called corneal membrane. Just then as when this membrane is sick, either because it is thickened or because otherwise certain scars from wounds have formed on it, it comes about that we do not see, nor can the activities of the sight-objects any longer pass through it because it has lost its transparency, so too when the eardrum is sick, injured in some way by time or disease, it can no longer receive the activities of sounds. 420a15-17 But also it is a sign of whether or not one hears that the ear always resounds, like a horn;200 [for the air in the ears is always moving with a movement of its own.] He has said that if the inborn air or the ear-drum is injured in some way we do not hear, but it often happens that when none of these things happens people are slightly deaf, for instance, if some dirt is put before the inborn air and prevents the sound from being passed on unimpeded by the air from outside, because earth does not have the sound-conveying [power], or if anything like this comes about. So he says that we must judge whether or not that which hears is healthy by blocking up the ear with our finger or covering the ear with our hand. If it is healthy, we hear a booming. For the pressure of the finger or the hand pushes air from outside, and this, being made narrow and knocking against the inborn air, produces the booming. Then the inborn air as usual transmits this booming to the sense. As, he says, the air also caught up in hollow horns always itself moves and makes a sort of sound, when it is moved by the air blowing from outside, and being moved strikes the horn, so too, then, the air in the ears when it is moved by the sound from outside. This is said as indicating that there is some air in the ears proper [to them] (for it is

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this that is receptive of the sound from outside); and when this is injured in some way, since it is not moved with its own movement it does not transmit sounds to the sense; and hence there is no hearing. People enquire reasonably why, having said [420a9-10] that the air built into the ears is unmoving, he now says that the air in the ears is always moving with its own movement.201 We must understand in the earlier place that it is unmoving with any movement caused by something else; [‘unmoving’] is in place of ‘always remaining the same in the ears and not being displaced [369] or coming to be one thing at one time and another at another, like the air in hollow horns, but always remaining inborn.’ That the air moves with some movement of its own is clear from the fact that motes are seen moving in the sunbeams through windows even on windless days. But it can also be said that the inborn air moves not in respect of place, but in a vital way, and he means by ‘movement’ the transmission of sounds to the sense. And that is its own movement, not simply transmitting (for the air outside too has that property), but transmitting to the sense. When, therefore, the inborn air in its customary way announces sounds to the sense, and the sense apprehends, it is quite clear that that which hears is healthy.202

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420a17-19 But sound belongs to something else and is not proper [sc. to what hears]. And that is why they say that we hear with what is void and resounding, because we hear with what has in it air that is marked off.203 For the sound that occurs in the ears is not that of the inborn air,204 not even when a booming occurs through our shutting off the ear; it is that of the air from outside which either enters from outside with sound or sounds inside because of the pressure. It belongs to the inborn air to announce the sound that occurs in something else. It does not follow, because it is moved, that it also sounds. For not everything moved sounds, but that which sounds must be moved with a forceful blow. And that is why, he says, people say ‘we hear with what is void and resounding’. They said we hear with what is ‘void’ because they supposed that air was void, but in fact we hear with the air caught up in the ears; and with what ‘is resounding’, because this air is marked off and always the same, and sends on sounds without itself sounding, but only acting with its own sound-conveying power. 420a19-21 Is it the thing struck or the striker that sounds? Or is it both, but in different ways. Having said that sound is of something and in relation to something and in something, I mean, the striker and the thing struck and the

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intermediate air, he here reasonably enquires which sort of thing it is that makes the sound, whether the striker or the thing struck. And he says it is both. In ‘Or is it both’ [the word] ‘both’ at once sets out the complete division [370] (for either that which strikes must be that which sounds or that which is struck or both), and also gives the decision that it is not one or the other but both that produce the sound. But even if it is both, they do not produce it in the same way, but that which strikes produces it by moving and pushing the air, and the other by remaining and not allowing it [sc. the air] to go through, so that with both of them forcing it out it may rebound and resound. And the one affects, the other is affected. And it is possible for both to be thought of both as striker and as thing struck, when one does not stay unmoved while the other moves, but both are struck moving. 420a21-3 For sound is the movement of something that can move in this way, like things rebounding from smooth [surfaces] when someone knocks them. He here shows that it is not one or the other that sounds, but both. For since sound is a movement of air as it were rebounding all at once, like things squeezed out from certain smooth bodies, and air cannot do this of itself, it follows that there must be something smooth from which it must rebound. But since it is impossible that it should rebound back from some smooth body if there is nothing that strikes and encloses the air all at once at this smooth and solid thing, clearly it could not spring off from one thing only, but both are needed, both a striker and a thing struck. For that there must be both is clear also from this. If both are not smooth and solid, they do not make a sound, for instance, if you strike bronze with wool or a sponge, a sound will not be produced. Not every movement of air, then, is sound, but [only] such a one as comes from smooth things. For if the things struck are not smooth, the air does not rebound all at once, but is held in the hollows, just as when a ball is thrown against a wall, if the wall is smooth, it rebounds from it because of the resistance, but if not, it often remains in the hollows. Just as such things, then, rebound from smooth things, so too does air. But it is only in that the air rebounds from smooth things that he takes there to be a likeness with things rebounding from smooth things like the ball; he is not also saying they are completely like in the cause of the rebound. Unless one were to say this, that just as a person throwing a ball with force pushes air along with it, and the air, being pushed forcefully and forced out by the ball and the wall, is squeezed out and pushes the ball along with it as it rebounds, so also when things suddenly strike one another the air rebounds and by virtue of the movement, sounds. ‘For sound is a movement’: he may mean not a spatial movement,

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but the activity. ‘Of something that can move’: [371] this must be taken as spatial movement. So the whole [sc. definition] is: sound is an activity of that which can move in respect of place as do things rebounding from certain smooth [surfaces] like a ball from a wall. But even if we understand [‘movement’] as movement in respect of place, as we have already taken it, there is no absurdity. For he is not saying that every movement of air without qualification is sound, but [that sound is] a certain particular movement, that from smooth things.

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420a23-4 As has been said, not every struck thing and striker sound [for instance, if a needle were to hit a needle] Having said that two solids striking one another are needed for the occurrence of sound, lest anyone should think that solid and smooth objects of any sort whatever suffice to produce sound, he adds this, that not only must things that produce sound be two [in number] and solid and smooth, but they must also have an appropriate magnitude and a certain sort of shape. For if the magnitudes are very small, like needles, they enclose very little air, so that the sound does not become perceptible. But205 he said in the Physics [1, 187b16-21] that a [specific] form starts from a determinate magnitude – he was there aiming at Democritus206 and refuting the existence of atomic bodies. For magnitudes, he says, inasmuch as they are magnitudes, are divisible to infinity potentially. For it is always possible, so far as its own nature is concerned, to cut a given magnitude in thought, and cut that [the resulting section] to another, and so to infinity. But inasmuch as they have some form, that of flesh, for instance, or a nerve or the like, the division is not possible to infinity even potentially, but it is necessary to take some last parts as indivisible,207 so that it is no longer possible from there on to divide into something else of the same sort. For instance, it is possible to cut flesh into parts that preserve the form of flesh, and these into others that again preserve the same form. But it is not possible to do this to infinity, but there is some magnitude at which you must stop, and if you cut that, you no longer preserve the form of flesh because of the exceeding smallness. For as I said, just as forms need a certain qualitative mixture in order to subsist, so too they need a certain quantitative magnitude, and as it is not possible for there to come into being a man or horse an inch high, but there must be a magnitude appropriate for these, so indeed it is the nature of parts of an animal, both the organic parts and those with similar parts and, in a word, of every form, to come to be in a certain determinate magnitude. Just as it is, then, with these, so too with sounds: not every magnitude that strikes and is struck makes a sound, for instance, needles [do not], but these things must have an appropriate magnitude. And there must also be a suitable shape. For if a sphere should

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touch a sphere, it will not make a sound. For it has been shown that a sphere touches a sphere at a point. Since, then, it does not catch up enough air, it will not make a sound. But as to the spheres manufactured with us, [372] since it is not possible to round off their surface accurately, it is not surprising if a sphere when it strikes a sphere makes a small noise; because since there are strictly speaking no spheres with us, they do not strictly speaking touch each other at a point.208 420a25-6 But that which is struck must be even, so that the air may rebound and be shaken all at once. He says ‘even’ in place of ‘flat’.209 And he does well to say that the thing struck must be flat, but not necessarily the thing striking as well. For even if the thing striking is not flat but cylindrical, sound occurs. The reason is because not only is the air caught up that is under the striking part – that air is almost without extension – but also the air pushed by the other parts of the cylinder; and this, if it falls against some fine and sharp body, since it is not prevented from spreading abroad, is diffused and does not resound, but if it falls on one that is flat, it does not spread but is caught up and launched [back] by the smoothness and resistance, and thus rebounding it resounds. ‘Be shaken’: he applies this not to [the air] that rebounds from everything without qualification, but to that which is caught up in the case of things that are concave and ring210, as happens with a gong struck by a pebble. For when the gong is shaken, the air caught up in its cavity is shaken too, and falling now on one part of the concave surface of the gong and now on another it makes a ringing. Indeed, if we restrain the gong the ringing ceases too, because when the gong is stopped from moving, the moving air is stopped with it. It is possible, then, as I said, to understand ‘even’ as being in place of ‘flat’. For having said that not all that strikes and is struck sounds (for a needle does not sound when touching a needle), in contradistinction against needles he adds ‘but that which is struck must be even’, not that needles are uneven in their parts, but clearly he says ‘even’ in contrast not only to their shape, but also their magnitude. But it is possible also to understand ‘even’ as ‘not rough’, and this is clear from the addition ‘so that the air may rebound all at once.’ For from bodies that are rough and uneven it does not rebound all at once since it is chopped up, but it does from those that are even because it is continuous and one. 420a26-9 The differences between things that sound are shown in their actual sounding. For just as colours are not seen without light, so high and low are not [heard] without sound.

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He says ‘things that sound’ in place of ‘sounds’, since different sounds occur according to the differences of the things that sound. The differences [373] among sounds, he says, are the high and the low. He says that these are recognised not in potential sounds but in actual. For potential sounds hardly exist; and how can there be discernment of things that do not exist? For each thing is discerned according to its own actuality. For just as we apprehend the differences of colours, he says, not when the air is transparent potentially, but when it is transparent in act, that is, when it is lit, so too we perceive the differences of sound not when it is potentially sound-conveying but when it comes to be sound-conveying in act, that is, when it has already received sound. But sounds are to this extent different from colours, that colours are things other than the transparent, and it is because they are other that they change it (for it is only their activities that the transparent sends through), whereas sounds are not things other than the actually sound-conveying air, but have their seat in this.

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420a29-31 These things [sc. ‘high’ and ‘low’] are said by transference from objects of touch. [For the high changes the sense a great deal in a little time, the low a little in a great time.] High and low,211 which are the differences among sounds, are so called, he says, by transference212 from objects of touch. For high [sharp] and low [heavy] occur in masses, which are genuinely objects of touch, and by transference from these we speak of high and low in sound. In touch ‘sharp’ is said of what acts fast,213 for instance, a knife is sharp because it stabs fast, and blunt if it acts slowly, as it were not stabbing but pushing, like a pestle.214 For such things as we wish to make suitable for stabbing we make sharp-angled, and such as for pushing, blunt-angled.215 In this way too with sounds we call that ‘high’ which comes quickly up to the sense216 and lasts, and we call that ‘low’ which, like the blunt, comes slowly up to the sense and quickly fades away. As with one of the strings, the bottom.217 For being this [sc. bottom string] and tightened more than the others, when it is plucked, because of its tension it strikes the air fast and makes a very high pitched sound. And it does this in a short time, but preserves it for a long time, as do those bows that are hard and more tight-strung. For when the archer draws the string of one of these bows and then releases it, in a short time because of the tension it settles back in its own [original] place. That is why it pushes the arrow [only] for a short time and through this same push sends it a great distance. For it belongs to a greater power to move something the same distance in a short time that a lesser does in a longer.218 And that is what happens with strings that are more tightened. Those that are tightened less, in contrast, like the top string, take a

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long time to bring about a change in the sound-vehicle of the air, and preserve it for a short time. The reason is that some strings are fine, and not having much air resisting them, move it quicker, and besides, being tightened and not impeded by much air they hasten faster [374] to their own place and regain the straightness from which they were changed when they were struck because of being strained away from the ends. Because of this, then, in a short time they change the sound-vehicle of the air and preserve the sound for a long time, because being very much tightened they strike the air forcefully, and being struck more forcefully it in turn strikes back the string and is again struck back by it, and this goes on for a longer time. And while the string is vibrating, the sound too is necessarily prolonged for a long time. But strings that are thick and less tightened, like the top-string, experience just the opposite. For they have a lot of air resisting, and not being so much tightened they both move the air more slowly and settle back slower. Therefore they both have a lower sound and do not much prolong the sound, because they do not move the air forcefully and nor are they struck back forcefully, and on this account they do not vibrate for long. And when that does not happen the sound is lost more quickly. 420a31-b4 Not, indeed, that the high is fast and the low slow; [but the change involved in the one comes to be of a certain character because of fastness, and that involved in the other because of slowness. And they seem to bear some analogy to the sharp and blunt in connection with touch. For the high as it were stabs and the low as it were pushes, since the one effects a change in a little time and the other in a long time, so it comes about that the one is fast and the other slow.]

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Having said that high sound changes the sense fast, and when it becomes perceptible remains for a longer time, and the low conversely, lest anyone should think that high sound itself moves fast or slowly (for it is an incorporeal activity of air, and what is incorporeal does not move in respect of place), whereas [in fact] sound is called ‘high’ because the air of which it is an activity is moved sharply, and similarly also ‘slow’,219 either he means this when he says ‘but the change involved in the one comes to be of a certain character because of fastness, and that involved in the other because of slowness’, [saying this] in place of ‘because of fastness in the moving body in which it is, the change also of the sense by the sound comes to be of this character’; or else [he means] that is because just as with objects of touch, division by masses occurs fast because of the sharpness in them, and sharp is one thing, and a body’s being divided by them quickly is another (for the latter follows upon the former, and it is incidental to what is sharp to divide fast; for it would be sharp even

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if it did not divide, and similarly with blunt), so also in a high voice high is one thing, and what is incidental to this, that it changes hearing fast, is another. And similarly with slow and low voice.220 The words ‘so it comes about that the one is fast, the other slow’ are equivalent to ‘so fast and slow are incidental to these things and are not their substance’. And it is incidental to the sharp, for instance, the knife, to effect change fast, because it is opposed by only a small amount of body, and to the blunt, for instance, the pestle, to do so slowly, because it is opposed by a large amount of body. [375] 420b5 Concerning sound let these be the determinations we make. He has said what sound is, that it is a change on the part of that which can be changed in this way, namely as are things rebounding from smooth [surfaces] when they collide with them; and how it occurs, that it is with something striking and something struck; and through what, that it is a blow in air from solid objects against each other with a forcefulness on their part that exceeds the division and dispersal of the air; and he has also said of what sort221 the bodies struck must be, and through what the sound is heard and how.

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420b5-7 Voice is a kind of sound of something animate. [For nothing inanimate speaks with a voice unless it is said to speak with a voice by virtue of similarity, like a pipe, a lyre.] Having spoken about sound, following on he speaks also about voice.222 For voice is a species of sound. He says, then, that voice is a kind of sound; for not all sound is voice, for instance, the sound of inanimate things is not. For the sound arising from waves or winds or stones dashed against each other is not voice, but voice is a kind of sound of something animate. But not every sound of something animate is voice either. For clapping with the hands is not voice, nor is clearing the throat or coughing. These are sounds, not voice. But voice is the sound of something animate that is made through the voice-producing parts. The voice-producing parts are the lung and all the respiratory parts and the wind-pipe and pharynx. But not even every sound made by these is voice. For a cough is made by these, but a person coughing is not said to speak. But when these parts are moved with imagination that signifies,223 the sound of them that then occurs is called ‘voice’. In what way voice comes into being through these organs, and in what voice differs from a cough, we shall see from what he himself says as we proceed. Voice, then, is a sound made by something animate. For even if some inanimate things are said to speak, that is by transference and a kind of similarity because they have something resembling the

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voice of man. For these three things are to be seen in the voice of man: rhythm, harmony and phrasing.224 Rhythm has to do with long and short in the time of utterance. That is why people in the past called those vowels that take more time to utter ‘long’, and those that take less, ‘short’. For if we speak naturally, we shall see we take more time to bring out those called ‘long’, such as êta and omega, and less to bring out the short. And it is from the putting of these together with one another that good rhythm in words225 arises. Harmony is to do with proportion of high and low. And phrasing is to do with the shaping226 of the syllables, by which the thought in what is said is signified. Since the voice of man has these things in a genuine way, but musical instruments too imitate this in a way, [376] for this reason they too are said to speak, by virtue of resemblance. For they imitate not only the rhythm and harmony, but also phrasings. Indeed, they sometimes know what the so called tune is, and sing along with it with their instruments.227 And they imitate not the voice of man without qualification, but the discourse. For as I said, they also have228 the putting together of phrasing that occurs through the tongue. Someone might enquire how rhythm differs from metre. We say that rhythm is something more generic, and metre is a species of rhythm. For if something has metre, it also has rhythm, but the reverse is not also the case. For rhythm can be seen when people [stamp and] clap with their feet and hands. For when the fast and slow [tempo] in the lifting and putting down of the feet have some proportion to each other, rhythm comes into being. And hence by transference from these, when such a combination of syllables is taken over to generate metres, it is called ‘feet’. And by the same resemblance ‘rhythm’ is applied to the clapping of hands and to pipes and other such things, it being a proportionality in the time in which the change occurs. For indeed rhythm is seen in pipes too. For people cover some of the holes of the pipe with their fingers for a longer time and some for a shorter, and thus make the notes some longer and some shorter. And of the holes, some are larger, some smaller, and some nearer the tongue,229 some further. And those that are narrower are higher [in pitch] than those that are broader (which is why also the voices of boys and women are higher), while the broader holes are lower, and similarly the nearer [to the tongue] are higher than the further. By the proportionality of these, harmony and melody come into being, and rhythm by the proportionality of fast and slow. And that rhythm is to be seen in the other instruments too is clear to all. It is achieved by the proportionate lifting and putting down of the fingers. In other cases, then, rhythm is characterised in terms of slow and fast, but in spoken speech in terms of long and short, and this alone is called ‘metre’. Long is analogous to slow and short to fast. And metre is seen not only in poetic utterances but also in rhetorical. For

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we say that a clause is long or clipped, and if the clauses are not proportionate, the sentence does not come to have good rhythm. Those, indeed, who have written on the form of speech230 have handed down to us the kind and number of feet which, taken into a rhetorical clause, accomplish this well. So much in digression; let us recur to the text. 420b7-8 And whatever other inanimate things have extension, melody and discourse. He says ‘extension’231 in place of rhythm; for, as I said, [377] it is in connection with greater or less extending in time and their proportionality that rhythm is seen. He says ‘melody’ in place of ‘harmony’, which is to do with the proportionality of high and low; and ‘discourse’ is the putting together of phrases.

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420b8 And232 they are similar since voice too has these things. The sound of musical instruments, he says, is similar to voice, in that it has the things stated [sc. rhythm etc.] in mimicry of it. It is clear that by ‘voice’ now he chiefly means discourse; for it is only in connection with this that phrasing is seen. For in articulate spoken words233 there is melody and rhythm, but not also phrasing. For even if you should speak of phrasing in the case of a jay or a parrot or the like, it is phrasing not in a genuine way, but by imitation and resemblance, as also in the case of inanimate things.

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420b9-10 Many animals do not have voice, for instance, those that are bloodless and, among those that have blood, fish. He said that voice is a sound of something animate. But since not everything animate speaks with a voice, but some are voiceless, he draws this same further distinction. For it is not animate beings without further qualification that speak, but animals, and not even all animals, but only those that have lungs, that is, as many as breathe (for the matter of voice is breathed air, as he will show further on), and not insects, like flies, bees and the like, as nor do bloodless animals like grubs. But nor do all those with blood, for instance as many aquatic animals as are not amphibious, such as fish. For they do not have lungs, and for that reason do not speak. And that is why they are called dumb [ellopes], as lacking voice [elleipontes têi opi]. But nor do all that are amphibious speak. For neither do animals with a hard shell like cockles, nor those with a soft shell, like crabs and eels.234 But among amphibians the hippopotamus and the crocodile speak, for the latter too is said to speak a little. But someone might raise the question why insects are said not to

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speak. For what is more vocal than the cicada? And flies make enough buzz in fluttering. I reply that their discordant sound235 is not voice. For it is not produced through the organs of speech. For there is a membrane round the surface under the breast of the cicada, and it is by striking this with their wings and forcing out the air caught up in it that they make a sound. Similarly too flies make a sound by beating with their wings, which are rough. Indeed when they have come to rest they no longer buzz. 420b10-11 And that is reasonable, seeing that sound is a kind of movement in air.

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Having said that fish do not have voice, he adds the reason for this same thing. [378] If, he says, sound is a change in air, as has been shown, and voice is a kind of sound, and fish lead their lives not in air but in water, it is to be expected that they do not have voice, since they do not move air, but water. And as many amphibians as have voice are not able to speak in water; for we, when we have dived down into water, cannot speak either. 420b11-13 But those said to speak in the Achelous …236 [make a sound with their gills or some other such part.]

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… there are large [fish], and some people think that they speak when they get to the surface of the water. He says that one should not think they speak; for they make the sound not through voice-producing parts, but by some movement of the gills.237 For when they swim near the surface of the water, being large and catching up much water in their gills and then closing their gills, they emit the water, disturbing it in the emission; and that, being disturbed, catches up some air, and this, when it is forced out by the blow from the water, makes a sound. And that is why they are thought to speak with voice, as is the case, we said, with flies and cicadas.238 So the sound occurs outside the animal, and not through organs of speech. What happens with such things is something akin to what happens with doves which, when they flutter, make a sound with their wings. Such a sound, then, is like clapping of hands. So if parrot-wrasses are said to speak, this same thing must be understood as happening with them. He adds ‘or some other such part’, because it is possible that they make a sound, not only by closing of the gills in the way we have said, but also by receiving water into the mouth and forcing it out with a whistle. When they are deep down, of course, they do not make a sound, for it is impossible for sound to occur in water. That is why, as I have already said [357,12-17], if we clap our hands together in water, they do not sound. For water is sound-conveying, but not such as to make a sound.

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420b13-14 But voice is sound of an animal, and not made by any chance part. Having differentiated things that speak from things that do not, and thereby provisioned himself for his account of voice, he next wishes to give an account of what is genuinely voice. And he differentiates this from other sounds in two ways, by the manner in which it is produced and by its end. By the manner in which it is produced, in that voice occurs when air that has been breathed in is forced out by contraction of the thorax by virtue of the power present in it [the thorax] to make sound, and falls upon the windpipe and the air caught up in it; and this last, rebounding without being dispersed by the blow which is struck all at once, keeps striking the air that is nearest until it reaches hearing. For the cavity of the mouth down to the root of the tongue is pharynx. From there two passages are carried down, one [379] to the thorax, which is called the windpipe, the other into the sinew that goes to the belly, which is called the oesophagus. Through the oesophagus the passage of food occurs, and through the windpipe the passage of breath, both that of breathing in and that of breathing out; and the breath that is breathed out in the manner stated makes a sound which is called ‘voice’ when it occurs with some imagination that signifies.239 That, then, is how voice differs from other sounds by the manner of its production. Such sounds as are not of animate beings, or rather of animals, neither are produced through the stated organs of speech nor are voice. And [voice is differentiated from other sounds] by its end, in that voice occurs by an impulse240 of the animal to signify something. Therefore its occurrence is attended also by imagination. That is why the sounds of non-rational animals too are voice. ‘Following its mate,’ he241 says, ‘it roars.’ For indeed, whenever a dog imagines that there is a stranger, it barks, and when one of its own household, it fawns. And in a word, animals receiving in their imagination different imprints speak in different ways. That is why also their voices are significant of psychological states. For indeed, when seeking food they use a certain sort of voice, and [they speak] in one way when they are in a state of pain, and in another in a state of pleasure. But a cough, even if it occurs with the exodus of breath through the wind-pipe, is not voice. It is different both in the manner of its production and in its end, in the manner of its production, in that in the case of voice the breath that is pushed comes out gently and naturally, and strikes the [breath] in the windpipe and the windpipe itself in an orderly fashion, and the latter [breath] being pushed a little by the [breath] that strikes it and by the windpipe sounds euphoniously (for it occurs with the animal’s own free will), whereas when people cough, since the breath is moved in a manner contrary to nature, it comes out of the thorax and strikes both itself and the

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windpipe all at once and in a disorderly way. For when liquid gathers contrary to nature in the thorax, nature wants to push it out through breath, and then, when the breath does not have the strength to push it out, it is struck back by it and often its impulse is cut short. That is why there also occurs a shaking of the body. This being cut short and shaken is a sign of the breath’s not having the strength to push out what is adjacent [sc. the liquid]. Also when some part in the thorax is inflamed, the breath is constricted, and becomes the cause of difficulty in breathing and the disorderly movement of a cough. A cough differs from voice, then, both in this and in its end, in that it does not occur with imagination (for it is not for the sake of signifying something), but against the [cougher’s] will, unless something has occurred by way of agreement, for instance ‘if I clear my throat or cough, I signify so-and-so.’ For then these things too are kinds of voice. Summing up, then, one may say that voice is a sound of an animal occurring through the voice-producing parts and with imagination, imagination, that is, with a view to signifying something. That is why also we move the air breathed into the thorax only a little, so that we may have the choice of speaking with rapidity [380] or slowness. These, then, are the organs of voice; those of discourse are tongue, palate and teeth. For the tongue, by a particular sort of curling, shapes the voice-uttering breath this way and that, and thus makes phrases. That is why those whose tongue is loosed or tied beyond due measure cannot speak at all or cannot speak articulately, since the tongue is no longer able to make in the regular way the movements through which voice is shaped. For just as with pipes and organs242 the fingers shape this way and that and order into phrases the sounding breath that is blown out into the pipes through the skins or body, so too the tongue shapes into phrases the breath that is breathed out from the thorax and sounds against the wind-pipe. Hence non-rational animals, since they do not have a rational soul, have tongues hanging out and grinning lips; for they do not need them in the service of discourse. That is why such birds as have some propinquity to men in the tongue and the state of the jaws, a state of not entirely grinning, are able to imitate discourse, for instance, jays, parrots and the like. 420b14-16 But since every sound is made because something strikes, and strikes something, and does so in something, [namely air, it is reasonable that those things only should speak that receive air.]243 ‘Something’ [strikes, that is], the striker;244 ‘something’ [is struck, that is], the thing struck; ‘in something’, the air, as he himself indicates saying ‘namely air’. And if that is how sound occurs, it is

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reasonable that those things that do not have lungs and those that pass their lives in water should none of them have voice.

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420b16-24 For nature uses what is breathed for two functions, just as it uses the tongue both for taste and for discourse [ – of which tasting is necessary, which is why also it belongs to more things, while expression is for well-being245 – so too it uses breath in connection with the internal warmth as something necessary (the reason will be stated elsewhere) and for voice, so that there may be well-being. The organ of breathing is the pharynx; and that for the sake of which this part exists is the lung.] Having said that [only] as many animals use voice as breathe, and those that breathe have another need for breathing that takes precedence, he here adds how it is that breathing contributes to voice. Just, he says, as nature has made the tongue for two functions, of which one, taste, helps towards the existence of those that have it, and the other, discourse, towards well-being, so too it has made two functions for breathing, one directed towards existence, the other towards well-being. For nature strives for economy. Therefore it uses the same things in many [functions]. Nature uses the tongue, then, both for the use of flavours and for discourse. Of these, the one helps towards existence (for without food it is impossible to live), whereas discourse helps towards well-being. It is from discourse that man is a social animal, and through it we are made people with knowledge by teachers. That is why every animal has taste but not every animal has discourse, nor [381] voice at all, but only those that are more perfect. As it is with the tongue, then, so with breathing. It helps with the cooling of the internal heat, which is a necessary natural function. For it contributes to the existence of things that breathe, as is said in the de Partibus Animalium [1, 642a31-b4] and the de Respiratione [478a28-34], to which, indeed, he defers [the topic], since he will discuss it there. For the lungs need breathing, he says, being rather hot by nature in the case of footed animals because they lie by the heart, and the heart [needs it] long before that. For it is from the heart that there is excessive heat in the lungs too. That is why he said [420b25-6] that the region round the heart needs cooling first. It [the heart] is cooled because the lungs receive the breathed air and by their own cooling they cool it [the heart] too. That, then, is the necessary need for breathing, to help towards the existence of animals. It also helps towards discourse, which belongs to us for the sake of well-being, since it helps also towards voice. For voice is the matter of discourse. Air that is breathed out is the matter of voice, nature is the efficient cause and the windpipe the instrumental. For it is like a

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pipe. Indeed the young are more pleasant-voiced because they have their windpipe smooth, and old men are more harsh-voiced because theirs is rougher. The final cause is signification. For the end of voice for the animal is to signify through it states of the soul. And the matter of discourse, as was said, is voice, the efficient cause is the rational soul, the instrumental the tongue, palate and teeth, and the final cause is the signification of thoughts. The organ of voice is the pharynx. When ‘pharynx’ is used in the feminine, it signifies what is genuinely the pharynx. This is the cavity [of the mouth] after the root of the tongue. But when it is used in the masculine, it often means the larynx, as indeed here. The larynx is the last [sc. top] part of the wind-pipe which is surrounded by three cartilages, the so called arytenoid, the thyroid and the one without a name, and these, when closed and opened by the muscles there, give order to voice. By a particular sort of closing and opening of them to a greater or less extent, voice is made to have form as regards high and low and any other form246 that may be seen in this connection, just as discourse is made to have form by the tongue, the palate, and the teeth. He says, then, that the organ of voice, to put it in a summary way, is the windpipe. And the beginning of this is the larynx or, as he says, the pharynx. That for the sake of which this part exists is the lungs. It is for the sake of the lungs, he says, that the windpipe, which he calls the ‘pharynx’, has been produced, in order that breath may enter through it and cool them. For as many things as [382] have lungs have also a windpipe. As many, then, as have lungs cool the internal heat with the windpipe, since the air enters through it. But fish cool the internal heat through gills,247 closing them and taking in water, so they do not need lungs. And besides, aquatic animals do not altogether need cold to enter in from outside to cool them; for the water surrounding them by its very contact effects the cooling. But if they also have some need in the depths of the passage in of cold, they do this through the gills as they close and open. 420b24-6 For footed animals have more heat than others in this part. [And the region around the heart needs breathing first.] Those animals that are footed, he says, if they have lungs, surpass aquatic animals in the heat in their lungs. For the latter, since they do not have lungs, do not have heat in them either. They do not have lungs because they do not have a heart either; for things that have a heart have lungs.248 But it must not be supposed that this is said because footed animals are hotter altogether than aquatic, but they are hotter in this part, since as I said, the latter do not have lungs at all; but some aquatic animals are hotter by nature than footed animals. Some fish, at least, digest sand and all kinds of muddy things that footed animals do not digest.

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420b26-7 That is why it is necessary that when it is breathed inwards,249 air should enter. Breathing is the common genus of breathing in and breathing out. Here, then, he says ‘when it is breathed’ – this in place of ‘when the animal breathes in’ – ‘it is necessary that air should enter’ into the region round the heart first. For this is first in need of cooling. For the heart is the fountain of the innate hot.250 And it is because the lungs lie by this, and receive much heat from it, that they too need cooling. First, then, the heart needs cooling, and because of it the lungs do too. Through breathing in, then, they are cooled, and through breathing out the smoky residues are filtered out. 420b27-32 So that the blow of the air that is breathed in, etc. [by the soul in these parts against the so-called windpipe is voice. For not every sound of an animal is voice, as we have said, (for it is possible to make a sound with the tongue, and as people do in coughing), but that which strikes must be animate,251 and it must involve some imagination] Here he defines voice first by the manner of its being produced. Voice, he says, is a blow against the windpipe of the air breathed out by the psychical power in the lungs and thorax. [383] He will add to the definition next [a statement] also of what it is for, saying that what strikes and is animate does this for the sake of something involving imagination. Hence this sort of sound, I mean voice, is significant. 420b32-421a1 For voice is a kind of significant sound, and it is not, like a cough, the sound of the air that is breathed, [but with this [sc. the breathed air] it strikes the air in the windpipe against the windpipe itself] He separates a cough from voice in two ways, as I have already said [378,29ff.]: both by the end, in that it is not significant, but occurs against the will because of some affection, and in that its production is not altogether like that of voice either. In the case of voice the breath that is forced out from the thorax falls little by little on the breath caught up in the windpipe and strikes it pressing it against the windpipe itself, and when the latter is thus struck by the breath in it, the sound of voice is produced. It becomes articulate, when the tongue takes the air pushed out of the concavity of the wind-pipe around the cavity [of the mouth] and shapes it this way or that. In the case of a cough it is pushed out of the thorax, but all at once, and it does not only strike the air in the windpipe but is also struck by it, and the other things happen, as I have already said [379,22-31].

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Translation 421a1-3 It is a sign [sc. that this is how voice is produced] that one cannot speak when breathing or breathing out, [but [only] holding one’s breath; for the person holding his breath effects the change with this.]

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He says ‘breathing’ in place of ‘breathing in’, for he used the generic name in place of the specific. What, then, does he say? It is a sign, he says, that the air breathed out produces voice, that a person cannot breathe in while speaking, since the breath is going out, and if it meets other air coming in, it is cut short. And not only is it impossible for someone speaking to breathe in, but he cannot breathe out either. And yet voice is produced when this very thing happens, [i.e.] people breathe out, and he said that that is the production of voice, the air breathed out. Perhaps, then, he says this [latter thing], because we cannot speak while breathing out all at once. For the breath is squandered in an expiration of breath all at once, and we are not able to speak before we have breathed in other breath which will serve, when breathed out, for the production of speech. That is why also we wonder at tragic actors who draw out their songs without cutting short or loss of force, because their breath lasts them a long time. That it is so they themselves show, since when they are about to sing, they breathe in much breath in advance, and only then start to sing, in order that it may last them for the breathing out. For this reason too we are unable to speak for long without taking breath, because the breath in the thorax is spent. So we must first breathe in some more for the furnishing of [384] voice. It is impossible to breathe in and to speak at the same time, because nor is it possible to breathe in and to breathe out at the same time. For they are contrary. ‘Holding his breath effects the change with this.’252 For a person who is going to speak holds the breath in the thorax and with this changes that in the windpipe. The breath caught up in the windpipe is analogous to the air built into the ears, except that what is in the ears is unchanging and always the same, while that in the windpipe is different at different times. 421a3-6 It is plain also why fish are voiceless. [They have no pharynx. They do not have this part because they do not receive air or breathe. But the reason why that is so will be another discussion.]

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From what has been said, the reason why fish are voiceless is clear. Since voice is produced by breath that is breathed out when it falls on the windpipe, because fish do not have lungs, for the sake of which this part [sc. the windpipe] exists, it is reasonable that they are voiceless. And any people, he says, who think that they speak because

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the fish in the Achelous make a sounds, are quite mistaken in thinking that the sound is speaking. But there are some who say that fish breathe, and some try to show by this that there is air in the sea too. That is false. For if fish should breathe air while they are in the water, why do they not live in air, [but they do not,] just as we do not live in water? The gills are not sufficient to draw air inside, which is why after enduring for a little time [sc. when out of water] they perish. For this reason, then, since they can neither breathe in nor breathe out, it is reasonable that they do not speak either. And besides, how could there be air in water? It is not in the nature of air to withstand water.253 That is shown by inflated skins and empty wine-jars when they float and by the bubbles that occur, since a small amount of air is caught up in them. ‘But the reason why, let that be another discussion.’254 He means either ‘the reason why they [sc. the benighted ichthyologists] err and are misled [into thinking] that they speak’, or, better, ‘the reason why they [sc. fish] do not breathe’. He has stated the reason for this too in the de Partibus Animalium.255 Cooling from air is not sufficient256 for them. That is why they do not have parts that breathe air. For nor do they have air around them. But for them water supplies this need; like air that is breathed, it is drawn in by them through the gills and squirted out again. Neither do bloodless animals need cooling because there is not so much heat in them. And insects, as we have already said, are cooled, if there should be any need, through their slits.257 And insects too are all or most of them bloodless.

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[Chapter 9] [385] 421a7-16 Concerning odour and the object of smell it is less easy to make determinations than about the things just discussed. For it is not clear what sort of thing odour is in the same way as sound or light258 or colour. [The reason is that we do not have this sense in an accurate form; we have it worse than many animals. For man smells badly, and perceives no smell-object except as displeasing or pleasant, which indicates that the sense-organ is not accurate. It is plausible that hardeyed animals perceive colours in this way too, and that the differences between colours are not clear to them except insofar as they are fearsome or unfearsome. Mankind too is like that about odours.] He has put his teaching about smell and the objects of smell in a middle place, third after sight and hearing, but before taste and touch. That is because it has also a middle nature relative to the others, both as to its activities and as to its subjects. As to its activities, in that sight apprehends things that are furthest off, and

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hearing too apprehends things that are far, but less so than sight. For we do not also hear sounds from the same distance from which we see. So,259 at least, it is said in the Meteorology [2, 369b7-9], that we hear the thunder later and see the lightning first for this reason, that we can see quicker than we can hear. For thunder occurs when pneuma dashes against the clouds, and from their dashing together a conflagration of the pneuma occurs,260 as happens with stones when by rubbing and dashing together they kindle fire. So the thunder is produced first, but we see the lightning first because sight is quicker and apprehends things further off than hearing. That is why when lightning occurs thunder also follows immediately. For hearing requires the nearby air to be affected more by the sound, in order that after that it may apprehend it. And with rowing, if one is some way off one will first see the oar carried back and then perceive the sound.261 And taste and touch apprehend sense-objects by being in contact with them. Smell, however, neither apprehends things as far off as sight and hearing, nor needs to have the sense-object as close as touch and taste, but is in the middle relative to each. That, then, is how smell is intermediate as regards activities. And [it is intermediate] as to subjects, since sight is to do with colours and light, which are fiery, and fire is the finest-textured [of bodies] and, as bodies go, incorporeal, hearing is to do with sounds which belong to air, something thicker than fire but finer than the rest (some people, indeed, think air is void), and taste with flavours which belong to water; for the moist is the vehicle of flavours; and touch is to do with things that are solid and earthen. Of these four smell again is in the middle since it is to do with vapours and with half-formed body, things that are intermediate either between earth and fire, like the dry exhalation, or between air and water, like the moist.262 And Plato also [Timaeus 65B ff.] uses the ordering of the elements just stated and marks off the senses by each. It is reasonable, [386] then, with smell holding the middle place, that he [Aristotle] should give us his teaching about it also in the middle. He says, then, that the account of smell is less easily determined than the other senses, because the account of the object of smell too is not easily made clear. The cause of the unclarity in these matters, he says, is that we do not have this sense in an accurate form, but worse than many animals. Just as in touch we surpass all the rest, so in this we fall short. That is shown by tracking dogs and birds that smell across a great distance. ‘Like the pace of a keen-nosed hound of Spartan breed’ [Sophocles, Ajax 8], and again, ‘which detects the swift-footed hare even when high above’ [Homer, Iliad 17.676].263 For this reason, I mean, because our sense of smell is feeble in comparison with the other senses, in the case of the others we know not only the genus of the sense-objects that are subject for each sense, but also the

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species contained under the genus. For we know that colour is the genus of objects of sight, and we discriminate accurately the species of this genus, namely white, black, red, grey, and the rest. Similarly with hearing, the genus is sounds, the species are high and low. Similarly the genus of taste-objects is flavours, the species are sweet, bitter, and the rest. In the case of objects of touch too the genus is not easily made clear (for we do not have one name by which to call this; that is why also he raises a problem about touch, whether it is one sense or many, since it is not possible to embrace all objects of touch in one genus, since there are several oppositions in species), but their species are altogether evident, hot and cold, dry and moist, heavy and light, soft and hard, and the rest. In the case of smell, not only do we not know what the genus of smell-objects is, but we do not get to know their difference in species either. Hence we are unable even to name them. For when we speak of ‘smell-objects’ we call them by a term derived from the sense, as we call colours ‘sight-objects’ and flavours ‘taste-objects’ and sounds ‘hearing-objects’; for these words name not the natures of the senseobjects but their relationship to the senses. For to colours in themselves it belongs to be colours, for even if sight does not apprehend them they are none the less colours; being sight-objects belongs to them in their relationship to sight-acts. In this way, then, too when we say ‘smell-objects’ or ‘taste-objects’, we say the names of the relationship that they have to the senses, but we have no name to signify their nature as we have ‘colour’ for sight-objects, ‘flavours’ for taste-objects and ‘sounds’ for objects of hearing. But in the case of touch-objects, even if there is no name for what is common, each of their species at least is discriminated, namely hot, cold, soft, hard, and the rest. But with smell-objects, neither is it clear to us what the common nature of them may be, [387] nor is each of the species; for we cannot discriminate smell-objects by their species, but we discriminate them only by their being pleasant or unpleasant, not knowing what peculiarity of the smell-objects has pleased or displeased us as we know in the case of colour that this colour, say, this excessive white, is displeasing, whereas black does not displease the sense, and [as we know] that sweet flavour pleases and bitter pains. Similarly with sound and the others. For ‘sweet-smelling’ and ‘foulsmelling’ are not names that show the nature of the smell-objects, but names of the states produced by them in the sense, just as with sight-objects we say ‘well-looking’ and ‘ill-looking’ and with objects of hearing, ‘well-sounding’ and ‘ill-sounding’. The cause of our being unable to discriminate the species of smellobjects is that man has this sense in a faint form. Since, then, this sense is weak in us as compared with other animals, because of that, he says, the account of it too is hard to determine. We have smell, then, he says, as also hard-eyed animals like crabs and fish264 have

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sight. That, indeed, is why nature has not made fore-coverings for these, as in other animals it has made eyelids: because they cannot easily be harmed on account of their hardness. Just as we, then, do not apprehend smell-objects accurately because we do not have this sense in an accurate form, but discriminate them only by their being pleasant or displeasing, so too it is plausible that hard-eyed animals apprehend colours: they apprehend them as pleasant or displeasing only, not as white or black, whereas other animals know both the colour white and that it pleases or displeases. For that non-rational animals attend to the differences between colours and other sense-objects is clear from plain facts. For just as they recognise their master by attending to his particular shape, aquiline, as it might be, or snub-nosed, or something else like that, so too they know that he is white, as it might be, or black.265 And they differentiate bread or grass not just by the smell, but by its having such a colour. That is why they also go in error to what is the same colour. So it is with other animals; but he says plausibly that the hard-eyed do not apprehend the differences in colour themselves because of the weakness of their sight, but differentiate them only by their being pleasant or painful. As the hard-eyed, then, have sight, so we have smell, because we do not attend to the substance of smellobjects, and cannot name them, but refer to them either by periphrasis, saying ‘the smell of saffron’, or as ‘acrid’266 or ‘bitter’, or some other taste-object. What the resemblance is and why we call them so, we shall see in the detailed commentary. 421a7 Concerning odour and the object of smell …267

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Either he says odour [osmê] and object of smell are the same, as it were the genus of smell-objects, just as that which sounds is the genus of objects of hearing, though they are not genuinely a genus, but, to put it simply, the common name is brought over as a derivative term from ‘smell’ [osphrêsis], as [388] ‘sight-object’ is from ‘sight’ and ‘hearing-object’ from ‘hearing’; or else by ‘smell’ [osmê] he means the activity of smell [osphrêsis], and by ‘the object of smell’ the actual thing apprehended by the sense, namely the vapour or, in a word, this particular sort of affection apprehended by smell. 421a8-9 For it is not clear what sort of thing odour is in the same way as sound or light or colour.268 See how he likens smell to sound and light and colour, things that are more generic. 421a13 And it is plausible that in this way …269

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Since it is not clear whether hard-eyed animals see in this way, he does well to say ‘It is plausible’. For the likelihood is that if the skin is hard the activities of the colours are not transmitted accurately to the sense. 421a15 … except insofar as they are fearsome or unfearsome270 That is in place of ‘except insofar as they are pleasant or displeasing’.

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421a16-26 For it [sc. smell] seems to bear some resemblance to taste, [and the species of flavour likewise those of odour, but taste in us is more accurate, because it is a kind of touch, and that sense is most accurate in man. In other senses man falls short of many animals, but in touch he is much more outstandingly accurate than the rest. Because of which he is also the most intelligent of animals. It is an indication [sc. of this] that members of the human race are well-endowed or ill-endowed in accordance with the organ of this sense and no other. For the hard-fleshed are ill-endowed for thought, and the soft-fleshed well-endowed.] Smell, he says, has some resemblance to taste, because by transference on account of a certain resemblance we apply the names of flavours to smell-objects too, saying that a smell is ‘sweet’, ‘acrid’ etc. But even if there is some resemblance between smell and taste, still smell in us is faint, whereas taste is very accurate. Then he gives the reason why taste in us is accurate. It is because taste is a kind of touch, he says, and touch is most accurate in us men. In the other senses we fall short of many animals, but in this we are the most accurate of all, because, he says, man is the most intelligent animal of all. For being soft-fleshed, by virtue of which he is also more perceptive by touch, he more quickly disperses271 residues, and that in him which imagines and reasons is not muddied. But we should notice that it is as material cause that he holds flesh responsible; it does not make intelligence, unless as a contributory cause. For because of the conjunction,272 the motions of the soul are disposed along with mixtures of the body; they are not generated by the mixture, but they do not act in this way or that without such a mixture. And if there are any other animals that have flesh softer than man, such as grubs, it is clear that they are defective in the other things [sc. that distinguish man]. They do not have imagination in a perfect form.273 But now the discussion is about perfect animals. And perhaps what grubs have is not flesh at all, any more than what winged insects have. That it is through having softer flesh that man is more intelligent [sc. than other animals], he establishes from the fact that among men

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themselves the softer-fleshed are more intelligent and betterendowed.274 And because of that also we call the stupid ‘thickskinned’. And it is clear that, other things being kept the same, the same upbringing, the same nature (lest you should [389] compare man and woman) and both being in a similarly healthy275 condition, the soft-fleshed are better-endowed, because, as I said, their residues are dispersed quicker, and so their pneuma, on which imagination is founded, becomes purer. I said ‘other things being the same’, because a person can, as a result of many exercises, and of activities in connection with the manual skills,276 have harder flesh than those who live indoors and lead a life of inactivity. The statement looks to natural constitution. So all other things must be the same, and then one must look for the truth of the statement. He said ‘and of no other’ [421a24-5] in place of ‘people are wellendowed or ill-endowed by virtue of no other sense-organ’s being in a worse or better state, but only [that of] touch.’ If anyone, when he [Aristotle] says that touch is more accurate than the other senses, should raise the problem why he starts with sight (for one ought to start from what is clearer), we say that, even if touch in us is more accurate, still it is more intractable than the others for purposes of teaching. For he will raise the problem about it: perhaps touch is not one sense at all, but several. For every sense has to do with one opposition, sight with white, black and intermediates, hearing with high and low pitched sounds, taste with sweet and sour and intermediates; but there are several opposites in touch, hot and cold, dry and moist, heavy and light, and several others. 421a26-b3 And as there are sweet and bitter flavours, so too there are [sc. sweet and bitter] odours. [But some things have a similar odour and flavour, I mean, for instance, a sweet odour and a sweet flavour, and some the contrary. Similarly there is acrid and dry277 and piercing and oily odour. But as we have said, since odours are not very plainly clear in the way flavours are, they take their names from the latter according to the resemblance of the things, sweet [smell] is the smell of saffron and honey, sharp of thyme and the like, and the same with the others.]

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Having said that smell-objects have some resemblance to tasteobjects, and that smell does not apprehend smell-objects quite as taste does taste-objects, and having shown why taste is more accurate than smell, he wants to show that smell-objects have a resemblance to taste-objects and what it is: that just as among flavours some are called ‘sweet’ flavours, some ‘acrid’ and some ‘oily’, so too with smellobjects we use these names by transference, since a certain faint common property can be seen in both.

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And of things that are at the same time objects both of smell and of taste, some, he says, have a flavour consonant with the odour, such as saffron and honey (for the odour of both is called ‘sweet’ as too is the flavour, similarly thyme, garlic and leek are acrid both to smell and to taste), and others not consonant, for instance the aloe278 has a sour taste but a sweet odour, and similarly storax. It is clear that these names are applied properly to taste-objects, since they catch their substance, and to smell-objects by analogy, since acrid flavour is biting, and there is a smell-object after this [390] fashion, and on that account we call this too ‘acrid’. And there is the same analogy with the others. 421b3-8 And just as hearing and each of the senses is, the one [sc. hearing] of that which is audible and that which is inaudible, and another [sc. sight] of that which is visible and that which is invisible, smell is too [smell] of that which can and that which cannot be smelt. [That which cannot be smelt comprises what cannot possibly have an odour at all and that the smell of which is small and feeble. What cannot be tasted is so called in the same way.]279 Just as he said it is with the other senses too, sight and hearing, that they apprehend not only their own sense-objects, but also lacks and excesses (for dark, which is not visible, [is discerned by nothing other than sight, and the soundless, which is inaudible,280] by nothing other than hearing), so also, he says, with smell: it apprehends not only that which can be smelt but also that which cannot. For with what else do we discern the odourless but smell? But it does not discern everything that is odourless without qualification, any more than sight discerns everything invisible. Sounds and flavours are both odourless and invisible, but we do not on that account say either that sight apprehends them or that smell does. For it is reason that discerns that sound is invisible and odourless, not sense. But sense apprehends that lack which lies opposite the positive state proper to the sense-objects, for instance when something of a nature to be seen is not seen, like the transparent, or when what is of a nature to be smelt has no odour, like a rotten apple. Clearly it apprehends these things incidentally and by denial. And that which cannot be smelt, he says, is again twofold, that which cannot be smelt at all by virtue of lack, like the odourless, and that which can be smelt, indeed, but faintly, as a thing is said to be invisible in twilight: for example mephitic vapours281 when they are choking and other things like that. And what cannot be tasted also, he says, is so called in two ways, like that which cannot be smelt. He will say this in the [discussion] of taste [422a20-31].

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Translation 421b8-10 Smell too is through a medium, namely air or water. [For aquatic animals seem to perceive odour.]

[He says] that just as with sight and hearing there was need of a medium for the apprehension of sense-objects, so too with smell apprehension occurs through a medium. The medium for smell is water or air, as for sight and hearing too. For this power to convey smell is common to air and water. For that water too is smell-conveying he establishes in an evident way from fish. For many aquatic animals smell and go by odour to meet prey at a distance, as also do many birds, such as vultures. For from great [391] distances these apprehend the odour of dead bodies. There are cases also with footed animals such as hunting dogs, as Sophocles says, ‘Like the pace of a keen-nosed hound of Spartan breed’ [Ajax 8]. Just, then, as many birds and footed animals apprehend odours from afar because of the smell-conveying power of the air, so also do many aquatic animals because that power is present in water. Mussels, at least, though they do not have sight, plainly go after prey, and crocodiles go after meat when it is hung up above the surface of water. And that fish do not go after prey simply by sight is clear, as I have just said, from little mussels which, though they do not have sight, pursue prey, and is also shown by other fish that hunt by night. But someone might raise the problem, if smell apprehends through a medium which is air or water, why one odour overpowers another. For often when there is a foul-smelling odour, a sweet-smelling odour comes along and overpowers it, or the other way round, and this should not happen if air transmits odours, and the vapours that can be smelt do not themselves come up to the sense-organ, just as air transmits all colours and the activity of white, say, never overpowers any other colour, say black, because it is not the colours themselves that come to be in the air, but their activities. That is how it should happen with odours too, if indeed air transmits only their activities and not the vapours themselves, which are bodies. And this also sharpens the same difficulty, I mean [supports the suggestion], that the sense does not apprehend smell-objects through a medium, but the smell-object itself comes up to the sense-organ. We apprehend incense at the time when it is put into fire and resolved into vapour. For the smoke can be seen plainly rising and coming towards us. And indeed when we want to apprehend the smell quicker, we wave the smoke to our nose with our hands. So a kind of corporeal effluence is manifestly produced from the sweet-smelling bodies themselves, and the air does not transmit their activities as it does with colours and sounds. And we solved282 that other difficulty, I mean the one that seemed to show by the production of the sweet smell from the apple,283 that qualities are separated from subjects, in this way: we said that the

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sweet smell does not travel from the apple and from neighbouring things all by itself, but with some substance, and we confirmed the account by the fact that in time the apple becomes wrinkled, and the fact that if a cloth is placed over the nostrils, we breathe air (we should not live if we did not breathe) but we do not apprehend odour because the substance in which the smell-object resides is too thicktextured and cannot pass through the cloth, though the air passes through. How, then, are both statements to be [392] reconciled, the one just stated and the one saying that odours are transmitted incorporeally to the sense-organ through the smell-conveying power of the air? We say in reply that certain fine-textured effluences are in truth produced from sweet-smelling bodies, and especially from incense, and therefore when they occur in the air the one that has the greater and more pungent odour overpowers the less, since indeed even in the case of sound, where there is no effluence of bodies, the greater sound overpowers the less, and the excessively bright overpowers the less bright.284 But even though there is a kind of effluence, it is not this that comes to be in the sense-organ and thereby provides apprehension, but there must be a medium, water or air, which transmits the activities of the smell-objects. Since how do aquatic animals smell things that are above the surface of the water? It is not likely that this effluence should travel downwards through the water, but rather upwards, whether it is vaporous or smoky, as he will say next. But in fact crocodiles smell meat hung above the surface of the water. And that it is not by seeing that they make for it,285 but by smelling, is clear from those that hunt also at night. And vultures from enormous distances perceive dead bodies, and effluences from the bodies will surely not travel so far. But it looks as if our sense of smell, being faint and weak, needs a stronger activity. Since, then, an activity transmitted through much air becomes less, as happens also with objects of sight and hearing, for that reason we need the effluence from the smell-object to occur nearer the nose, so that the activity may still be strong, and therefore smell may be easily affected by it, the air in the nose being altered, just as those who have weak sight or ears do not apprehend unless they bring the objects of sight or hearing close. And because of this, if a cloth is placed on the sense-organ, it comes about that the smell is not apprehended, and especially if the cloth is thick-textured or the smell is not forceful, since if the smell should be forceful, then even when a cloth is applied, the smell-conveying power of the air suffices for the sweet-smelling vapour, even without approaching the sense-organ, to do something to it. The sense-organ of smell is the mastoid process of the brain at the front of the brain after the ethmoid bones on the inside.286

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Translation 421b10-13 … in the same way both those with blood and those without, [as do those in the air. For indeed some of these go to meet their food from afar, being guided by smell.]

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This is a parenthesis. The flow of the construction is as follows: ‘For indeed aquatic animals seem to perceive smell as also do those in the air.’ Then next comes what establishes that aquatic animals smell: ‘ indeed some of these go to meet their food from afar,’ ‘of these’, [393] [meaning] clearly ‘aquatic animals’. The words ‘… both those with blood and those without in the same way’ refer both to aquatic animals and to those in the air, for in both [categories] there is this division. And bloodless animals smell too, for instance insects. If ‘in the same way’ is taken as doing double duty, the construction becomes sound.287 421b13-21 Hence also a problem appears: do all things smell in the same way? Man smells when breathing. [When not breathing but breathing out or holding his breath he does not smell anything either at a distance or near, not even if it is placed within the nostril. That something placed in the sense-organ itself should not be perceived is common to all,288 but not to perceive unless breathing in is peculiar to men. But it is clear if you try it. So bloodless animals, since they do not breathe, must have some sense other than those described.] He has said that not only land animals but also aquatic animals smell, and in each [category] both those with blood and those without, and that all do so through a medium. And since of these some smell when breathing,289 namely man and all that have lungs (for he takes man as a representative of all those that breathe), whereas neither fish nor those among land animals that are bloodless breathe, and those that have blood290 come to apprehend odours through the smell-conveying power of air, he here raises a problem: if all things that smell apprehend odours in the same way, and man, that is as much as to say, all animals that breathe, smell when drawing in breath, and neither when breathing out nor when holding their breath, as is clear from plain facts, no matter whether the smellobject is distant or very near – so much so as to lie inside on the nostril itself, it should follow that the other animals that smell also smell when breathing. For the others also [sc. in other respects] smell in the same way as those that breathe. For they do not apprehend either when the smell-object is a long way off or when it is placed inside the nostril. But to smell through drawing in breath, he says, is peculiar to man – that is to say, to all animals that breathe. If that is so, and all animals that smell share in everything else, but those that breathe do not smell except through drawing in breath, then it seems to follow

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that animals that do not breathe, namely the bloodless, do not have smell but some other sense [instead]. For if the smell-conveying power of air, even though they do not breathe, passes through the odours to their sense-organ, why does this not also happen with those that do breathe? Why do they have to draw in breath? That is the problem. Next he attaches the solution. First [421b21-6] he shows that those animals also that do not breathe have no other sense. Then [421b26422a3] he also adds the reason why those that breathe cannot smell without drawing in breath, whereas the others have no need of breathing at all for the apprehension of objects of smell. He says ‘breathing’ in place of ‘breathing in’, using the generic term in place of the specific. But that a smell-object placed on the sense-organ of smell does not provide apprehension of itself is not something of which we have assurance from plain fact. [394] For this sense-organ does not fall under our observation as something manifest. But it is possible to infer this both from the other senses that need a medium and from the fact that we do not smell when either breathing out or holding our breath, which shows that the air must definitely be affected in some way by the smell-objects and do this to us [sc. affect us]. In the case, indeed, of those senses that do not need a medium, I mean taste and touch, if the object of touch or taste does not touch the sense-organ itself, it does not provide us with apprehension of itself because air is not affected in any way by flavours; and that is reasonable. For water is the vehicle of flavours, whereas vapours are the vehicle of odours, and vapours are rather of air [sc. than of water]. But we must not think, as I have said already [391,11-392,19], that the vapours themselves in which the odours are present must come up to the sense-organ (and that is clear from the fact that fish too smell); but [we must think] that these qualify the smell-conveying power both of air and of water. It is not the case that the substance too of the water receives the odour, but its smell-conveying power is perfected, just as nor is it the case that substance of air itself is qualified by colours, but its power to transmit colours is perfected.

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421b21-6 But that is impossible, if they perceive odour. For the sense for objects of smell, both foul-smelling and sweet-smelling, is smell. [And further, they are clearly destroyed by the strong odours by which men are, for instance bitumen, brimstone and the like. So of necessity they smell, but they do not breathe.] He here shows that animals that do not breathe do not use any other sense but smell. If they have perception of odour, he says, and odour is not perceived by any other sense, but only by that of smell, it follows that they have smell and not some other sense. And that they

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perceive smell he establishes from their apprehending the opposition that there is in smell, I mean, between sweet smell and foul smell, which above [421a12] he called ‘pleasant’ and ‘displeasing’. This, then, is one proof by which he establishes that they have smell and not some other sense, I mean the proof from their acting with the same activities as animals that are agreed to smell (for if things have the same activities, their powers must also be the same). Another is that just as animals that breathe are destroyed by destructive odours, such as bitumen, brimstone, so too are those that do not breathe. If that is so, clearly these latter also smell. 421b26-422a3 And it looks as if in men this sense-organ differs from that in other animals [as do [our] eyes from those of hard-eyed animals. For the former have eyelids as a protection and a kind of sheath, and if they do not move and open these, they do not see, but hard-eyed animals have nothing like this but see straight off things whatever occurs in the transparent. So too, then, some [animals] have the organ of smell uncovered, like the eye, whereas those that receive air have a covering, and when they breathe in, this is uncovered because the veins and pores are dilated.]

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He here gives the reason why some animals smell without breathing, whereas for others it is impossible to smell without breathing. He says [395] that something happens over smell similar to what happens over sight. Just as in that latter case hard-eyed animals do not have eyelids as fore-coverings and shields for the eyes, since they have safety straight off because the hardness makes them not easily affected, whereas soft-eyed animals have eyes covered with eyelids as a protection for their sense-organs, since they are more easily affected, and on this account those that have eyelids, if they are going to see, must first open their eyelids, whereas those without do not need this, so too with smell: those animals that breathe are likely to have a kind of fore-covering and sheath for the part that smells, it being, probably, rather weak, whereas those that do not breathe have this sense-organ uncovered, and need no fore-covering. Those, then, that have, as it were, a covering over the sense-organ need breathing in so as to dilate the vein (he uses ‘vein’ for the olfactory nerve), in order that they may receive in a pure way the activities of the smell-objects. He himself says as much as that. Perhaps, however, since the sense-organ of smell is within the ethmoid291 bone, and in the perforations of this bone there come together mucous discharge and other residues that are viscous, that is why we have need of breathing in, and perhaps even [breathing in] rather strongly, in order to purify these perforations and make the way wider for the smell-conveying

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air. Perhaps too there is some piece of flesh or membrane lying on it [sc. the sense-organ], and this too is lightened by breathing in. Someone might raise a problem about amphibians. As they do not need to breathe in when they are in water in order to smell, do they, in the same way, not need breathing in even in the air in order to smell? It would be nothing surprising if in water the cooling effect of the water should suffice for them,292 but when they come to be in the air they use their respiratory parts. For since they are amphibians, nature has furnished them with organs for both.

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422a3-6 And that is why animals that breathe do not smell when they are in what is moist. [For they have to have breathed in to smell, and it is impossible to do this in what is moist.] Having stated the reason why things that breathe do not smell when not breathing, he reasonably says that such things do not smell in water for the reason given: for in water it is not possible to breathe. Since neither is there air there, it is reasonable that they cannot smell in water.

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422a6 Odour belongs to what is dry, as flavour to what is moist. He says that the matter of that which is tasted is the moist, since things that are wholly dried out are also completely flavourless. He will speak about this shortly. As [396] flavour, then, he says, belongs to the moist, so does odour to the dry. By ‘dry’ he means not the earthen, but the fiery, such as is, we said, the smoky exhalation. That is shown by incense which produces this sort of emission when it is burnt. And that odour belongs to the dry he says more fully in the de Sensu [442b27-443b16]. But by ‘the dry’ we must understand not that which has no moisture at all (for this is actually odourless, as is shown by incense when it is completely dried out), but that which has some share in moisture, but is more dry than moist. And he has shown also in the Meteorologica [2, 360b26-361a3] that smoky exhalation is not otherwise sent up from the ground unless the ground has been soaked with rain. 422a7 And the organ of smell is like that in potentiality. Having spoken about the object of smell he also speaks about that which smells. He said generally about every sense that it is in potentiality that which the sense-object is in act. So he says the same too about that which smells,293 that it is potentially what the smellobject is. It comes to be like it when it receives the activities of the smell-objects and becomes a thing smelling in act. For it does not become foul-smelling or sweet-smelling, but it is made to expand or

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contract by the sense-object. He has already said in a more complete way how the sense-organ becomes what the sense-object is. And what he has now said about sense [sc. generally]294 he will next [ch. 12] say about sight and the rest. For in the foregoing when he spoke of objects of sight and hearing, he seemed to say nothing about sight and hearing.295 Someone might reasonably raise the problem: why does he say that the matter of odours is the dry and that of flavours the moist? For dry things are not objects of smell more than moist, such as balsamic juice and as many other juices as are sweet-smelling or foul-smelling. And conversely, flavour is not more in what is moist than in what is dry. For all solid foods are dry. And some foods or medicines that share in flavour are often so dry both to touch and in power, that they dry those who consume them. Besides water, which among moist things chiefly underlies296 flavours, is either wholly or nearly tasteless, and is given its quality by the things in the dry with which it is mixed. That, at least, is how he himself in the Meteorologica says the sea has its tart and salty flavour from the underlying earth.297 And also when water comes to be in earth,298 it has the differing flavours of herbs and trees. So it follows that it receives flavours more from the dry. So that even if someone pleading for the statement that odours are in the dry should concede that water generates the sweet and foul odours in juices from the dry substance of the earth or the [397] trees in which it is mixed, then of necessity by the same argument flavours too should belong more to the dry, since the moist receives them too from the dry substance with which it is mixed. But to this they say299 that the moist underlies flavours as matter, and that when water is mixed in with the dry the flavours arise in it not because they are present in act in the dry, but the dry then as it were produces the flavours in the moist, so that we may take the dry as efficient cause of flavours, and the moist as matter. But in the first place it is possible to use this argument also for odours. For water, which is odourless, when it comes to be in the dry receives ten thousand forms of odours, which were not present in act previously in the earth. It is possible, therefore, to say again that the moist has received odours as matter, and the dry has the relation of efficient cause. And then it is possible also to turn the argument the opposite way, in that there are certain dry things that are objects of smell or taste, which while they remain unmixed have, like earth, neither odour nor flavour, but which when mixed in with the moist have both, and it can be said that water stands to these as efficient cause, and the dry underlies as matter. This account, then, that marks off odours for the dry and flavours for the moist, is not sound, but just as what underlies colours is not simply some one of the simple bodies, but such and such a mixture

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underlies such and such colours, and for this sort of colour, it might chance, the underlying thing is moister, for another drier, so too indeed the underlying thing both for odours and for flavours is composite. And according to the peculiarity of the flavour or the odour, the underlying thing too is drier or moister. But if it is really necessary to partition out the two, I mean the moist and the dry, we should mark off the moist for flavours (for indeed, flavour is chiefly produced in food-dishes by the moist and by the qualities in it and, as I have already said, when they are completely dried, they do not share in flavour at all, whereas the moist, such as water, however pure and unmixed it may be, has some share in flavour), and odours likewise for the dry. For water, when it is most absolutely pure, is completely odourless; whereas nothing prevents the dry from having a share in odours, and it needs the moist not in order that it may impart odour, but in order that it may more easily vaporise and help send up the dry exhalation, and the air being thus affected may act on us. Often at least in this way when the earth is soaked by rain, it gives off vapour and a sweet smell goes up.

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[Chapter 10] 422a8-10 The object of taste is a kind of object of touch. And that is the reason for its not been perceived through a medium that is an alien body; for nor is touch.300 He goes on to treat of taste and taste-objects. He says that this sense differs [398] from the three foregoing in that they did their apprehension of the proper sense-objects through a certain medium, whereas this sense does not apprehend taste-objects through a medium, but the sense-object must touch the sense-organ itself. And he gives the reason why taste does not need any medium for the apprehension of taste-objects. Taste is a kind of touch, he says, and the object of taste a kind of object of touch, and touch does not occur through any medium. The sense-object touches the sense-organ itself, which is why, also, it is called ‘touch’. Since taste also, then, is a kind of touch, it is reasonable that it does not need a medium. He calls taste a kind of touch, not because it can be reduced to the sense of touch, but because it occurs by virtue of touching. Since, then, dependence on touching is common to both, as there is no medium for touch, so there is none for taste either. We shall give the reason in the discussion of touch. He adds ‘that is an alien body’ because, as he will say in the discussion of touch, there is still, even in these cases, a kind of medium, but not one that is alien, as with the [sc. other] three senses. In their case there is a twofold medium: what is alien and what is their own. Air and water are alien. In the case of the eyes, the liquids

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and membranes are their own and inborn with them, in the case of hearing, the inbuilt air, in the case of smell either the nostrils or the air inborn about the ethmoid301 bones or something else of that sort, for it [sc. smell] is similar to the others. In the case of touch and taste, however, there is nothing alien through which they perceive, but only what is their own. He means that flesh is the medium, and that which perceives is something else, as we shall see more accurately there [sc. in the discussion of touch]. And just as in the case of the three the transparent, the soundconveying and the smell-conveying are underlying things302 through which the colours, sounds and odours are passed through to the senses, so too with flavours the moist is the underlying thing. But in the case of the [sc. three] former, the transparent, the sound-conveying or the smell-conveying does not become the matter, but only announces their activities without being affected. In the case of flavours the moist underlies as matter, and when it is affected by them and given their quality, it then by contact with the sense-organ provides apprehension of them. 422a10-11 And the body in which the flavour is, the object of taste, is in the moist as matter; [and this is a sort of object of touch].303 That taste is a kind of touch, and on that account does not need a medium, he establishes here. The body, he says, in which flavour, which is the object of taste, has its being as [form] in matter, is moist. For in what comes next [422a17-19] he will say that the moist is underlying thing to flavours. So if the object of taste, flavour, has its being in the moist, and the moist is an object of touch (for touch apprehends moist), [399] it follows that the object of taste is an object of touch. For flavour by itself is incorporeal, as also are colour and the other qualities, but it has its being in body that is moist. So if the moist is underlying thing for flavour, and the moist is an object of touch, it follows that it is reasonable for taste not to need a medium. For what is going to apprehend flavour needs to be in contact with the body in which it has its being, I mean, with the moist. 422a11-14 That is why, even if we were in water, if something sweet were thrown in, we should perceive it; [and our perception would not be through a medium, but because of its being mixed with the moist, as with drink.]

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through water, nor in the way things are smelt through water. For in the former case the apprehension occurs even though the colours are not in the water, nor are the things themselves of which smell, the apprehension, occurs,305 but here the sweet thing must be thrown into the water itself, and the water must receive the sweetness as matter and be given form by it and itself become sweet. That is why stirring is needed for a honey-posset,306 so that the honey may be divided up in the water into bits, and the very substance of the honey may be mixed in with the water. It is not so in the other cases. The colours are not mixed in with the water, neither are the smell-objects or the things that sound. That is why here when tasting the water we apprehend the sweet flavour, whereas there we apprehend through it, and are not in contact with the thing itself. Alexander says that there is also another reading reported [sc. for 422a10-11]: ‘And the body in which the flavour is, the object of taste, is in the moist as water’. And he says that this reading signifies that flavour is in a kind of moist that is like water.307 For air does not seem to be receptive of flavours, although it is moist, unless the flavour is forceful indeed. For often when wormwood is present, in tasting we perceive its bitterness at the same time, clearly, because the adjacent air is qualified and affected by the adjacence, or because some substance flows out and is mixed in with it,308 as happens with honey and water. (That is why it happens chiefly if it is freshly pounded and not dried out.) Though in the case of most qualities that are objects of taste, air does not become receptive of them. Water is either completely flavourless in its own nature, as the doctors think, or nearly flavourless. For we perceive water that is sweet or salty, even if they say that such qualities are adventitious to it. That is why waters that are finer-textured are more lacking in qualities. It is an indication [sc. of this] that if water has been strained and distilled, and experienced something like this many times, it becomes almost without qualities. For if straining and distilling are separating it from what is more thick-textured and earthen, clearly, [400] it itself in its own nature is without qualities, seeing that it comes to be flavoured by the admixture of the earthen. Though it is either completely flavourless in itself or nearly. It has, however, the power to receive all flavours, which is why it takes advantage of every flavour, if it comes near it, and becomes its matter. Flavour, then, is in what is moist ‘as in water’;309 for it is not in what is moist like air. Air is neither an object of taste nor the matter of flavours. ‘As with drink’ is a model for how when we are in water we perceive the sweet, that it is by tasting, as with drink, and not as through a medium.

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Translation 422a14-15 Whereas colour is not seen in this way, by its being mixed in, nor by effluences.

When we are in water we perceive flavour because the body that is sweet is mixed in with it. That is why, as I said [399,16], there is need also of stirring. But it is not thus that we see colours through air or through water, for the colours are not mixed in with the transparent. For the transparent does not become matter for them, as the moist does for flavours, nor does the transparent, having been coloured, fall under sight, but through it the colours are seen. But nor are colours seen in this way, [namely] through sending effluences to sight. He will show this in the de Sensu et Sensibilibus [440a15-20]. For if seeing were by virtue of an effluence from the colours, the effluence would be a body. And being a body, it is to be expected that it remain for a little after the departing of the things from which it flows. Further, if there is an effluence, why is it not shredded by the winds? So it is neither because the colour is mixed with the transparent that seeing occurs nor because of an effluence, but through the transparent as an intermediate. For it [sc. the transparent] does not become matter for the colour and is not coloured by it. So we do not perceive taste when we are in water in the same way as colours. 422a15-16 So there is nothing as medium. But as colour is the object of sight, so flavour is the object of taste.310

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Having stated the difference between taste and the other senses, he now says what taste has in common with all the other senses generally. Taste, he says, inasmuch as it does not do its apprehension of the sense-objects that are subject to it through any alien medium, has nothing in common with the fore-going three; for it is in this that it has something in common with touch. But it has something in common with sight and hearing. For just as each of these has the things subject to it called by us by a single name, sight having ‘colours’, and hearing ‘sounds’, so too taste has as subjects for itself ‘flavours’. Smell, however, does not have the things that are its subjects called by a common name. [401] For if someone calls them ‘smell-objects’ he calls them by a term derived from the sense, as are ‘sight-objects’, ‘hearing-objects’, and ‘taste-objects’. The reason for this is that we men do not have smell in an accurate form. We are beaten by the other animals in respect of this sense. They have it in a more accurate form than we, just as we have touch in a more accurate form than the others. That is why we do not [differentiate odour] by species [and it is not the case that, as with colour we speak of black, white]311 and those between, and similarly high and low notes, and hard and soft, heavy and light, moist and dry, hot and cold, and as we say, as it

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might be, that white lead and milk and swans have one colour, white, and water, air, milk and wine share the quality moist, so too with smell we can differentiate smell-objects by species; we differentiate them only by their being pleasant or displeasing. For we do not know particular smells, or what species of smell-object they belong to. We often know what it is from which the smell comes; but the smell itself, what species of smell-object it belongs to, we cannot differentiate. 422a17-19 Nothing produces perception of flavour without moistness, but it may have moistness either in act or in potentiality, [like the salty. For that dissolves easily, and is a solvent to the tongue.] Having said that every flavour is in the moist as [form in] matter, he now shows that even things that seem dry share in flavour by having moistness in potentiality. It is in this way that things like salt312 have flavour. For when taste apprehends this, it dissolves, being in potentiality moist, and in addition it is a solvent to the tongue, causing the moisture to exude from it and moistening it thereby. And if any other dry thing is an object of taste, for instance, bread and the like, it is not by virtue of being dry that it is an object of taste, but insofar as it shares in moistness. Indeed things that are overcooked become almost or wholly tasteless, and then act only on the sense of touch. If perception of flavours occurs together with moistness, it is reasonable for him to call taste a kind of touch. For if it [sc. flavour] were in the moist, but apprehension of it did not occur together with moistness, it would not be an object of touch. For colour is not an object of touch though it has its being in what is an object of touch, because that object is not apprehended together with the colour itself. But it does not seem true that the moist is marked off peculiarly for flavour. Why rather moist than dry? For pepper and Armenian nuggets313 and also stone and ten thousand other things are by nature dry, and though neither in act nor in potentiality do they share in moistness, they share in flavour. Besides, the flavours in what is moist are few and easily defined, while those in dry things are more numerous; for there are more foods than drinks. Besides, he himself in the Meteorologica [2, 359b8-21] showed that the [402] different qualities in waters, such as carbonated, pitchy, bitter and salty, come from their underlying earth. And in general we have shown [399,34400,2] that water, so far as its own nature goes, is nearly without qualities or indeed completely without qualities. So it will seem that flavour has its seat more in the dry, in earth, since indeed water when it is pure and comes to be in earth acquires its countless qualities from it. To this is may be replied that in truth none of the simple bodies can be seen to be flavoured: not fire or air or water, and not earth

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either. For as I said [401,24], things completely overcooked become almost flavourless. Just as the different colours come from the particular mixture of simple bodies, so too we must suppose flavours to be produced. For that they are not in earth in act is clear from the fact that we obtain no consciousness of them. And then we see that the flavours which are in plants themselves change their form as they ripen. For often the flavour is first bitter, then sharp, then sweet, and conversely sweet, then sharp: it is clear314 that they [sc. flavours] are not in the simple bodies, but it is produced in composites. Why then has Aristotle marked off the moist for them rather than the dry? I say that he was attesting that the moist is capable of receiving every flavour. For any dry thing at all mixed in with water can give it quality, even if one only soaks it in water and does not liquefy it and mix it in. This cannot happen in the dry. It is not possible for every dry thing to receive every flavour; some cannot receive any at all; and this is true not only of flavour in moist things but still more of flavour in dry. Whereas both the flavour in dry things and the flavour in moist can be mixed into the moist, and into any moist thing whatever. It is probably on this account, then, that he says it is rather the moist that underlies flavours. 422a20-26 And as sight is of what can be seen and what cannot be seen [(for dark cannot be seen, but sight discerns this also) and also of the excessively bright (for this too cannot be seen, but in a different way from dark) and similarly hearing is of sound and silence, of which the one can be heard and the other cannot be heard, and of great sound as sight is of the [sc. excessively] bright (for as a small sound is inaudible, so in a way is that which is great and violent) ….]

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I have already said [400,26-7] that after saying how taste differs from the other senses he wants to say also what it has in common with them. Having said, then, what it has in common with sight and hearing on their own,315 he now says what it has in common with all the senses. Just as the others apprehend both the sense-objects that are their own and their lacks, and also their excesses and deficiencies, so too does taste. For instance sight, he says, apprehends both what can be seen and what cannot be seen, what can be seen, colours, what cannot be seen, either what cannot be seen because of a lack, such as dark (for each sense of itself apprehends its own sense-objects, and incidentally [403] also the lacks, as sight does dark; for by not being affected by sight-objects it is said incidentally to apprehend dark) – it apprehends, then, both what cannot be seen because of lack, and what of itself can be seen, but by excess destroys the sense and for that reason is said to be invisible (for the bright, which is a thing that can be seen, when it is in excess, destroys the sense), and what is too

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dim and borders upon the lack, as we say is twilight, for this too is said to be nearly invisible, because it cannot change the sense in an accurate way. As it is, then, with sight, so too with hearing. What can be heard is sounds themselves, inaudible is what is inaudible by virtue of lack, as silence is said to be a thing perceived incidentally, or sound that is excessive (for this too destroys the sense, as happens with the thunder-struck), or sound that is faint, like whispering. As it is, then, with these and with the other senses, so also with taste: the same analogy is preserved for all. 422a26-31 … and ‘cannot be seen’316 applies, on the one hand, to what cannot be seen at all, as with other cases of impossibility, on the other, to what is by nature such as to be seen, but is not seen or seen poorly – as do ‘footless’ and ‘stoneless’ [– so too taste is both of what can be tasted and of what cannot be tasted, and the latter is what has a small or poor flavour or what is destructive of the sense.] Since he has said that sight apprehends what can and what cannot be seen, but ‘cannot be seen’ is said in many ways, he gives a division of the things signified by ‘cannot be seen’. What cannot be seen, he says, may be so called either because it is completely impossible for it to be seen; in that way also the incorporeal things that come after colour are said to be invisible (in that way indeed both voice and odour are invisible and, in a word, the things that fall under the other senses); or if it is by nature such as to be seen, but it is not seen; this is what is in a state of lack, like what is transparent in potentiality when light is not present; or what is said to be invisible as is the poorly visible (such is either that which is destructive of sight through excessive brightness, or that which through dimness does not act on the sense).317 Sight, then, apprehends that what cannot be seen cannot be seen, not in the case of what is not by nature such as to be seen, such as sounds and the sense-objects of the other senses (for it is not sense but reason discerning through the organ of sense that discerns that these cannot be seen), but sense apprehends what is invisible by virtue of a lack and the other [sc. types of invisible]. For nonrational animals too discern incidentally by sight that it is dark through not being affected by sight-objects, which is why they lie up in their lairs.318 And perhaps imagination and not sight is what discerns that which is invisible by virtue of a lack, since the senses do their discerning in being affected, and not being affected in the dark they are inactive (which is why they can be seen as present only dispositionally), and if they are not acting, how can they discern? [404] ‘Footless and stoneless’: applying not to what does not have

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feet at all, but to what has small and poor ones. For indeed we describe as ‘stoneless’ not olives that do not have stones but those that have small ones. In that way too we say that animals are ‘footless’ not when they do not have feet, but when they have small ones. There is a sort of winged creature of this kind that resembles a swallow and flutters about in the evening, which is called a ‘bat’.319 Having said this he says taste too apprehends what can and what cannot be tasted, not that which cannot possibly receive flavour (for then it would be able to discern colour and sound), but things which can receive it but have not done so, or which have received it poorly either by excess or by defect.320 422a31-3 The source seems to be what is and what is not drink; for both are kinds of taste, [but the taste of one is poor and destructive, while the other is in accordance with nature.321] Since he has said that every flavour is in something moist (for dry things, he said, are objects of taste only by virtue of sharing in moist), and what is most of all and primarily moist is drink,322 it is reasonable that the source of that which can be tasted is drink – the material source, that is.323 But also the moist that is not drink is the source of what cannot be tasted when it becomes undrinkable through the admixture of undrinkable flavour,324 just as also drink became drinkable through the admixture of wholesome flavour. The words ‘both are kinds of taste’ are in place of ‘[both are kinds of] taste-object’. And how what is not drink is an object of taste, he himself goes on to say: not as something perfective of taste, but as destructive of it through the villainousness of the flavour. Either, then, we shall understand in this way [the statement that] what is and what is not drink are the source of objects of taste; or what is and what is not drink are sources of objects of taste in that it is into them that taste-objects are first divided, and these are again subdivided into the species of taste-object. And again what is drink is a taste-object in that it is preservative and perfective of that which tastes in accordance with nature, whereas what is not drink is a taste-object as contrary to nature and destructive. 422a33-4 And drink is common to touch and taste. Since drink is moist and the moist is apprehended by touch, it is as something moist, then, that it is a touch-object, and as having such and such a flavour it is a taste-object. On this account, then, it is common to taste and touch, to touch as one of its proper sense-objects, to taste as the matter and vehicle of taste-objects.

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[405] 422a34-b3 Since the object of taste is moist, it is necessary that the sense-organ for it should be neither moist in actuality nor incapable of being made moist. [For taste is affected in some way by the taste-object as such.] Since the sense-organ is in potentiality as the sense-object is in act, and the object of taste is moist, the sense that tastes must be moist in potentiality, not in act, so that when it apprehends the moisture in which the flavour is, and is made like it, it may become moist in act. For if it were moist in act, it would not also be affected by the moistness in the flavours, being such already. And in that case nor would it apprehend the flavours , because it would mix along its own moistness and render ineffective the power of the flavour. And further, it would confound the flavour that is brought to it325 with the flavour that is in itself, in its own moistness, and so would not apprehend it. For a thing that touches, touches what is nearest and first, so it would perceive its own moistness, since that is what it would first touch. As it is, then, with the other sense-objects and senses – for each sense-organ is in potentiality what its own senseobject is in act – so it is too with taste.

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422b3-4 It is necessary, then, that that should be made moist which is capable of being made moist while being preserved, but is not moist, [and this is] the organ that tastes.326 For if the sense is affected by the sense-object, and the object of taste is moist, it follows that it must be in the nature of the sense-organ that tastes to be made moist in such a way as to preserve its own nature even in the state of moistness. For the moistness produced in the sense-organ is not destructive, but on the contrary preservative and perfective. But that the sense-organ that tastes, the tongue, is not always made moist by flavours, but by some it is actually made drier, I have already said above [396,24-6]. For pepper does not moisten the tongue, nor does dried meat327 or dry bread or ten thousand other such things, yet they can be tasted; rather they make dry; [they do this,] however, not as things with flavour, but through some quality that is an object of touch, such as dryness or heat. For it is not the dry bread that dries, or the dried fruit and nuts and the like, but by being dry or hot they cause the moistness in the tongue to exude. ‘While being preserved’ may be read as marking a contrast with certain other things, nitre328 or the like, which make moist without preserving: they dissolve. 422b5-10 It is an indication [sc. of this] that the tongue does not

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Translation taste either when it is completely dry or when it is excessively moist; [for this contact occurs329 with the first thing that is moist, as when having first tasted some strong flavour one tastes another, and as to sick people all things seem bitter because they perceive with a tongue full of bitter moisture.]

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It is an indication, he says, of the tongue’s needing to be moist in potentiality but not in act, that when people have their tongue either dry or wet beyond measure, they do not apprehend taste-objects. Then he also adds the cause of this. [406] ‘For this contact,’ he says, ‘occurs with the first thing that is moist,’ that is, the reason why a tongue that is excessively moist does not apprehend flavours is that the moisture in it is flavoured, and striking on the tongue comes to be its first contact and provides it with apprehension of itself, and thereby prevents apprehension of the moisture from outside. For it is of what is adjacent and first touched that we come to have taste. It is an indication of this, he says, that those who have first tasted another flavour, especially if it is rather strong, no longer perceive those that come after it in the same way. And also to those suffering from jaundice every flavour seems bitter because the moistness around the tongue has this flavour, and tasting that first it [sc. the tongue] does not apprehend those that are brought to it. But someone might raise the enquiry: yet if the flavour around the tongue is bitter, then when honey is brought to it, it ought to seem less bitter, since the sweet is mixed in and chastens the disproportion of the bitter. But in fact when the sweet thing is brought to it, it apprehends bitterness all the more. This, however, is not true. It does not then apprehend bitterness more, but because the sense is at rest before this, it does not apprehend the flavour that is around it; since if it is changed [i.e. becomes active], even though nothing is brought to it, it will be more aware of the bitterness. Just, then, as one who has a moist tongue perceives less, so does one who has a tongue that is too dry. For, as I said [405,17ff.], the sense-organ should be affected by the taste-object, and that is moist. That which is too dry is affected less by what is moist and takes longer [sc. to be affected]. That is shown by leather skins that have been completely dried out: for a long time they are not affected by the moist. 422b10-14 The species of flavour are like those of colour; the simple are the contraries, sweet and bitter; [next to the former is the oily and to the latter the salty; and between these are acrid and dry and astringent and piercing; and those seem to be just about the different sorts of flavour.]

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He does an enumeration of the species of taste-object. Just as with colours the simple ones are the contraries white and black (for these are mixed neither out of other colours nor out of each other), and the ones between are no longer simple, but are achieved by the particular mixture of these with one another, and of them, some are closer to white, such as yellow, and some closer to black, such as blue-green, and the rest are between these, such as grey and red, so it is also with flavours. For with them the contraries are again simple, sweet and bitter, and the others are mixed and intermediate. But oily is nearer to sweet, salty to bitter, and the others he enumerates are between these. But those in between are not always also mixed. Those that are mixed are also in between, but the converse does not hold too. Just as with colours, grey is mixed and intermediate, but red or yellowgreen330 do not always arise from a mixture of the contraries, [407] but are called ‘intermediate’ because they do not share in either of the extremes, so also with flavours: salty is mixed, as salt is (for it has its genesis from bitter sea-water and sweet), whereas acrid and dry and piercing are intermediate in that they share in neither extreme. For they do not always have their genesis from a mixture of the extremes. He enumerates eight species of flavour, and says that these are just about the species that there are. For if there is any other, it is close to being flavourless, such as the insipid and the like.331 [Aristotle, then, lists eight species of flavour and says there are two extremes, sweet [gluku] and bitter [pikron], and six intermediates, oily [liparon] close to sweet, salty [halmuron] close to bitter, and in the middle astringent [struphnon], dry [austêron], acrid [drimu] and piercing [oxu]. Galen, however, among simple [sc. flavours] describes as extremes not sweet and bitter, but acrid and piercing.332 And they do not disagree. For the one, being a doctor, looks to qualities that are objects of touch, and calls these ‘extremes’. For the extreme in heat is the acrid,333 and in cold is the piercing. The other, as a philosopher, did not also look to qualities that were objects of touch, but to those that were objects of taste, and made his opposition accordingly; for in taste-objects the extremes are sweet and bitter. Plato, however, speaks of seven flavours [Timaeus 65B-66C]. For he joins the oily together with the sweet, saying that that which anoints [sc. roughened parts of the organ of taste], if conjoined with pleasantness, is sweet, and if it does so without pleasantness, it is oily.334 We use the word ‘sweet’ for honey, for instance, ‘oily’ for things like olive oil, ‘piercing’ for vinegar, ‘astringent’ for wild pear, for instance, ‘dry’ for wine, ‘salty’ for salt, ‘bitter’ for wormwood and ‘acrid’ for pepper. And Plato335 puts them in the following order. The extremes, he says, are piercing and acrid; next to extreme are, close to piercing, astringent, and close to acrid, bitter; next to the middle are, close to bitter, salty, close to astringent, dry, and in the middle is sweet. And he matches

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these over against the seven planets, piercing against Mercury, acrid against Mars, bitter against the Moon, sweet against the Sun, salty against Venus, dry against Jupiter, astringent against Saturn. The reason for this matching we may overlook since it is nonsense.] 422b15-16 So that which tastes is what is like this in potentiality, [and the object of taste is that which makes it such in actuality.]

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Having spoken about the things that lie over against the power to taste, I mean the objects of taste, he next speaks of that which tastes, I mean, of the power itself, it being for the sake of this, indeed, that he did the discussion of the things that lie over against it, as with the other senses also. He indicates this when he says, ‘So that which tastes is what is like this in potentiality’, as though bringing the argument to a conclusion. That which tastes, then, he says, is such in potentiality as the object of taste is in act – either sweet or bitter or one of the intermediates; and this taste-object makes that which tastes such in act as it is itself. [Chapter 11] 422b17-22 The same account holds for that which is touched and for touch.336 [For if touch is not one sense but several, the sense-objects of touch must also be several. But there is a problem whether there are several senses or one, and what the sense-organ is of that which touches, whether it is flesh and in other [animals] what is analogous, or not – whether that is rather the medium, and the primary sense-organ is something else inside. [422b23-7] For each sense seems to be of one contrariety; for instance, sight is of white and black, hearing of high and low, and taste of bitter and sweet. But in the objects of touch there are many contrarieties, hot, cold, dry, moist, hard, soft and such others as are similar. [422b27-33] But there is a kind of solution to this problem: that with the other senses too there are several contrarieties, for instance, in sound not only highness and lowness, but also greatness and smallness, and smoothness and roughness of voice, and others that are similar. And with colour too there are other such differences. But what one thing is the subject to touch in the way sound is to hearing – that is not wholly clear.

Translation [422b34-a11] And is the sense-organ within, or is it not, is it straightaway flesh? It seems to be no indication of that, that perception occurs at the same time as when things are touched. For as things are, if one were to make a sort of membrane and stretch it round our flesh, immediately on touching it would signal the perception in the same way; yet it is clear that the sense-organ is not in this. And if it came to be actually growing round us, the perception would pass through even quicker. Hence this part of the body [sc. flesh] seems to be as if air were growing round us in a circle. For we should think that we were perceiving sound and colour and odour all with one thing, and that sight, hearing and smell were one sense. But as it is, because it is marked off distinctly what the changes occur through, it is manifest that the senses mentioned are different. [423a11-21] But in the case of touch, as things are, this is unclear. For it is impossible that an animate body should be composed of air or water; it has to be solid.337 It remains that it is mixed from earth as well as these. Flesh and what is analogous seem to be like this [sc. mixed from earth]. So it is necessary that the body should be the medium, growing onto us, for that which perceives by touch, and that the senses338 should come to be through this and be several. And that there are several is shown by touch in the tongue; it perceives all the objects of touch by the same part as flavours. If the rest of our flesh too perceived flavour, taste and touch would be thought to be one and the same sense. But as it is they are thought two because they do not convert.339 [423a22-b1] But someone might raise the following problem. If every body has depth, and this is the third magnitude, and when there is some body between two bodies, the latter cannot touch one another, and if what is moist is not without body, nor is what is wet, but it must either be or contain water, and if when things touch one another in water, since their extremities are not dry, they must have between them the water with which their last parts are filled, if [all] this is true, then it is impossible for one thing to touch another in water. And in the same way [sc. it is impossible for things to touch each other] in air too (for air stands to the things in it as water to the things in water, but animals in air and in water escape our notice more,340 if wet touches wet). [423b1-12] So is perception of all things alike, or is perception of

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Translation different things different, as it now seems that taste and touch perceive by touching and the other senses from a distance? That is not so, but we perceive even hard and soft through other things, just as we do that which sounds and the objects of sight and smell. But the latter are further off, the former near, which is why we do not notice. For we perceive all things through a medium, but in these cases [sc. the hard and soft] it escapes our notice. And indeed, as we said earlier, even if we perceived all the objects of touch through a membrane and did not notice that it kept them apart, we should then be as we now are in water and in air; for we now think that we touch them and perceive nothing through a medium. [423b12-17] But objects of touch differ from objects of sight and things that sound, in that we perceive the latter because the medium acts in some way upon us, whereas we perceive objects of touch because we are acted upon not by the medium but along with the medium, like a man struck through a shield. For it is not the struck shield that buffets him, but it comes about that both are struck together. [423b17-26] Altogether it looks as if, just as air and water stand to sight and sound and smell, so flesh and the tongue stand to the sense-organ [sc. of taste and touch] as do each of those. And when the sense-organ itself is touched, neither in the one case nor in the other can perception occur – for instance, if someone were to place a white body on the outermost part of the eye. From which it is also clear that that which perceives objects of touch is within. For then it will come about what happens also with the others. Things placed on the sense-organ are not perceived, but things placed on our flesh are perceived; so flesh is the medium of that which has the sense of touch.]

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The account of touch is still missing from that of the senses, and he sets it forth now. He here establishes two surprising propositions, one that touch is not one sense but several, the second that flesh is not the sense-organ of touch, but the sense-organ is something else, [408] and flesh is a medium, as in the other cases is the transparent or the smell-conveying or the sound-conveying, or as is the composite, air and water.341 That the sense that touches is not one but several he establishes by two proofs,342 one [422b23] that each single sense is concerned with a single contrariety, and touch is concerned not with one contrariety, but with several. It follows that touch is not one sense. For sight has to do with white and black and their intermediates, similarly taste

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with sweet and bitter and their intermediates, hearing with high and low pitched sound, and smell, as we said, is feeble and so does not differentiate smell-objects by species, but only by their being pleasant or displeasing. Touch, however, has to do with several contrarieties which are not subordinate one to another and have nothing in common, namely hot and cold, dry and moist, soft and hard, heavy and light, rough and smooth, friable and viscous,343 and the like.344 So if these oppositions are several and are not subordinate one to another (for what have light and heavy in common with dry and moist or with the rest, or any of the others with the rest?), and each single sense is concerned with a single opposition of sense-objects, it looks as if touch is not a single sense. One proof, then, that touch is not a single sense is this. A second [422b32-3] is that each single sense is concerned with one genus, but touch is not concerned with one genus, therefore touch is not a single sense. For sight has to do with colours, taste with flavours, hearing with sounds (for smell, for the same reason for which it does not discriminate the species of smell-objects, does not have a name for their genus). But touch, though it is most accurate with us, still does not have a single genus, whether named or nameless, embracing the sense-objects that are its own. These are the proofs that touch is not a single sense. And Themistius345 says that they are irrefutable: for in reality touch is not one sense, but several. And of the two proofs, he says, Aristotle did not even attempt to say anything against the second; he did try [422b2732] to upset the former one, but played a trick on us. For he tells us (Themistius says) that the other senses too occupy themselves not with one opposition, but with several. For hearing has to do not only with high and low sound, but there are rough and smooth in sound and dark and light346 and great and small347 and short. Likewise in colour too there are rough and smooth, smooth being what is pleasing to sight, like the colour of dawn,348 and rough the displeasing. But in saying this, Themistius says, he gives us a fallacious argument. For when he said that every sense has to do with one opposition among sense-objects he was clearly speaking of the proper senseobjects. But then, trying to upset this argument, he says that hearing too has to do not only with the high and [409] low but with the great and small, and the great and the small are among the common objects. He ought to have shown if the other senses have to do with several oppositions of proper sense-objects. So says Themistius; but he did not realise that he himself was giving a fallacious argument. For great and small as said of sounds are proper to hearing alone, which is why no other sense can discern great and small in sounds except hearing. The great and small that were said to be common sense-objects were the continuous great and small in bodies, and of these touch and sight are the judge. And it is

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clear that even if we speak of dark and light sound, we do so because of a resemblance and likeness to what is in colours; and similarly with the others [sc. rough, smooth etc.] But there is a reply to this too [sc. to this defence of Aristotle349] that the great and small in sound is not a different opposition from that of high and low pitched sound, in the way in which with touch hot and cold are a completely different opposition from heavy and light or rough and smooth and each of the others; but they [sc. large and small in sound] indicate the abatement or intensification of sounds, and this is not a peculiarity shared by any other opposition.350 This sort of great and small, indeed, is found with all sense-objects. In this way, indeed, we can find great and small flavour, for instance, that of honey, perhaps, is great, and that of dried fig is small, because the sweetness is intensified in honey and abated in dried fig. And also one might call dark colour that is intense ‘great’, and that which is not so, but pale, ‘small’, applying to what is simply forceful or faint the words ‘great’ and ‘small’. So this sort of great and small is not a different opposition. And if we speak of dark and light sound, we do not speak of a different species of opposition of sounds either. For it is not possible to find a differentiation of these apart from the high and the low in the way in which we can see hard and soft separated from the others and similarly rough and smooth, but they are as it were peculiarities to be seen in the case of the high and the low, not a change to a completely new sort of species to do with high and low pitched sound. It is worthwhile enquiring why it is that when ‘great’ and ‘small’ are said [sc. literally] only of magnitudes, we apply them by transference only to forceful and faint sounds, saying ‘a great sound’, ‘a small sound’, whereas we do not call the excessively sweet ‘a great sweet’ or call what has faint sweetness ‘small’, or do this in any other case. I reply that sound does not subsist as a thing all at once, but in a process of occurring; and it occurs in time, and all time is continuous. For this reason we call a sound that takes much time to occur ‘great’, and one that takes little ‘small’. The excessively sweet, in contrast, and the excessively black and the rest are such by virtue of the forcefulness of the quality, [410] not by virtue of the length of time. Themistius, then, does not have a good objection against Aristotle. It is possible, however, to say this, that in the case of objects of touch there are several oppositions that have nothing in common with each other but are separate. The opposition of moist and dry is separate from that of hot and cold, and hence fire is hot and dry, water cold and moist. Similarly hard and soft, rough and smooth, friable and viscous, these are all separate from one another. For none of these is to be seen either in fire or in water, and they do not even attend upon all composite bodies. For not everything is either friable or viscous. Those stones, for instance, which are firm and difficult to break for

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that very reason are not friable, but neither are they viscous; the viscous is to be found in the moist. The oppositions, in contrast, that Aristotle mentions in sounds can be found in every sound.351 Every sound is great or small; for indeed, high sound is either great or small and either smooth or rough, and low sound likewise. So they are incidental to every sound; in virtue of the quantity of the production of the sound they are great and small, and similarly in virtue of the quality they are smooth and rough. So they are not oppositions between different objects of hearing or sounds. In the case of touch, as we have shown, the oppositions are separate from each other and have nothing in common with one another, nor are some incidental upon some and others upon others, and hence they are not to be seen in all touch-objects. For why, just as every sound is great or small, or rough or smooth, is not every touch-object too either friable or viscous, either rough or smooth? If every one is either hot or cold, either dry or moist, that is because these oppositions are constitutive of the substance of bodies. And if heavy and light divide all bodies among themselves, still it is not because they are incidental to the other qualities, I mean, to heat and cold or to dryness and moistness. For it is not the case that as great and small and rough and smooth attend upon the quantity and quality of sounds, so also, I mean, by intensification and abatement, the rough and smooth or heavy and light and the rest attend on the quantity of hot and cold and dry and moist. Likewise it is not the case, because every composite thing is either rough or smooth, that therefore these qualities are attendants upon other qualities. Rather they follow on the position of the parts. For according as the position of the parts is equal or unequal, rough and smooth are produced. So these are completely separate from each other, and there is nothing like them to be seen with the other sense-objects. To the second proof Themistius, as I said [408,27-8], thinks Aristotle has said nothing in reply, I mean to the proof that every sense has to do with one particular genus, [411] but touch does not have one common genus for touch-objects. But the Attic interpreters, who attend accurately, say that Aristotle gave the solution, though very succinctly, to this also, when he said [422b33] that it [sc. touch] too is occupied with a single genus, but that the one genus which is the subject of touch is not immediately clear: in these words he signified that it exists, but is not manifest. What is it, then? We say that it is the resistent. By the ‘resistent’ I mean not what lies opposite to the soft and does not yield to touch,352 but every natural body that falls upon and touches touch,353 in contradistinction to mathematical bodies, which do not touch or oppose touch. That which in any way whatever opposes touch, we say, is ‘resistent’ and the common genus of touch-objects. But this does not seem to embrace heat and cold. For apprehension

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of these is not by means of pushing, unless someone should say that it is along with the bodies that underlie these qualities, along with air or something else, that apprehension of them too occurs. If that is so, then the account will be universal. But if that is so, why should the resistent be the genus of objects of touch any more than of objects of sight, hearing and the rest? For this [sc. the resistent] underlies not only the qualities that are touched, but also colours and sounds and flavours and odours. For if we mean nothing else by saying ‘resistent’ than natural body, why should we say that this is the subject of the qualities that are touch-objects more than of all the others? And if every single genus always divides into one primary opposition, as colour does into white and black, flavour into sweet and bitter, odours into sweet-smelling and foul-smelling, sound into high and low, let them state the division of the resistent and say into what primary opposition it divides – besides which, as I have already said [411,10-19], it is not at all reasonable to bring under this heat and cold, dryness and moistness. This resistent, then, is not the genus of touch-objects but the subject of them as of the others too. But it was not in this way that every sense which is one was said to be occupied with one genus of sense-objects, namely that it is occupied with one subject of sense-objects (for it is common to all that there is one subject for them); ‘genus’ was said in the sense of that which is predicated in respect of what they [sc. essentially] are of several things differing in species, as colour is of white and black (for each is a colour), sound of high and low (each is a sound), flavour of sweet and bitter (each is a flavour), and similarly with the rest. So far as this goes, then, neither of the proofs stated has met with a solution. Having put forward the two proofs stated that the sense of touch is not one, Aristotle then puts forward a third argument pleading that touch is not one [412] sense but several. But he does not establish such a conclusion straight off, but it is an objection to a syllogism attempting to show that the sense of touch is one and not many. This syllogism is not put forward [sc. explicitly], but since Aristotle’s refutation seems to be given as an objection to such a syllogism, the interpreters make a conjecture at the syllogism which Aristotle’s refutations resolve, and say that in potentiality it is like this. If the sense-organ of touch is one, namely flesh, the sense of touch must also be one. For if things have one sense-organ, they are the same as each other,354 and if sense-objects are the same, their sense also is one. But the sense-organ for objects of touch is one, flesh. It follows that the sense of touch too is one. He then shows that both the conditional premise and the additional assumption355 of this syllogism are false. That the conditional premise [sc. is false], he shows thus.356 It is not necessary, he says, if there is one sense-organ, that there should therefore be one sense. For see! The tongue is one sense-organ, but the senses are different, the

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sense of taste and that of touch, and the sense-objects too, those of touch and taste. That they [sc. the senses] are different is abundantly clear, because we perceive by touch with all the rest of the body, but we do not taste [sc. with all]; nevertheless in the case of the tongue, which is one sense-organ, both senses run together. It is false, then, to say that if the sense-organ is one, the sense also is one. For if, he says, just as both run together in the tongue, so it came about that they ran together in all of the body, so that we did not merely touch with all but also tasted, we should not discern that these senses are different, but should think them one and the same. But as it is, because the converse does not hold, and not everything sharing in touch shares also in taste, touch is shown to be other than taste. It follows that it is not necessary, because the sense-organ is one, that the sense too should be one. On the contrary, because the senseobjects are several, it is plausible that the senses too should be several, as with the tongue. So it is not the case that if the sense-organ of touch is one, the sense of touch must also be one. That is how he demolishes the conditional premise. And he demolishes the additional assumption [saying] that flesh is not the sense-organ of touch at all. But since the refutation of the additional assumption of the syllogism runs together with the second of the propositions357 (for the meaning of each is that flesh is not the sense-organ), he establishes each with proofs that are common. He shows this, I mean, that flesh is not the sense-organ, by both setting out the arguments used by those who want flesh to be the sense-organ to establish that it is, and demolishing them. These are three in number. One [423a1-2] is from the lack of a time interval in the apprehension, since without a time interval we simultaneously touch the objects of touch with our flesh and apprehend them. For if flesh were a medium and not a sense-organ, time would be needed for apprehension, I mean, time in which the flesh would have to be affected and then pass on the affection to the [413] sense-organ that was within. That would be reasonable, just as with hearing apprehension does not occur through the medium without a time-interval simultaneously with the occurrence of the sound, especially when what sounds is far away, but time is needed so that the air may be affected and then this may act on hearing. So indeed it was shown in the Meteorologica [2, 369b7-11, cf. above 385,10ff. and n.], that although the thunder occurs before [sc. the lightning], we apprehend it after, and although the lightning occurs after, we apprehend it before, because hearing is more coarse-grained and because the movement of light is swift; and similarly with rowing we first see the oar carried back and then hear the sound. Similarly smell, being more corporeal in form than hearing, needs more time for apprehension, even if the object of smell is quite close, until the air that is affected passes through into the nostrils, so that the affection may pass

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through faster to the sense-organ.358 But indeed, sight itself, the swiftest of the senses, does not always have accurate apprehension of sight-objects in no time at all. For if a circle falls upon the eye from a distance and is lying in the same plane as the eye, it seems to be a straight line, and triangles appear circular, even though sight touches them.359 Just then as in these cases, when senses apprehend through a medium, the sense that is more corporeal in form needs more time for apprehension, so surely it is reasonable that touch too, if flesh is not the sense-organ but a medium, should not apprehend simultaneously with touching without a time-interval, but should need some time for apprehension, until the flesh is affected and passes on the affection to the sense-organ that is inside. That, then, is one argument of those that want flesh to be the sense organ, and another is this. We do not see at all, they say,360 any other sense-organ of touch apart from flesh, so it is vain to leave that aside and seek some other that is not apparent. The third argument is the solution to an objection. Those who want flesh not to be a sense-organ but a medium bring an objection like this against those who want it to be a sense-organ [cf. 423b20-6]. If flesh is a sense-organ, whatever is present in the case of all sense-organs must be seen, surely, with it too. Just, then, as with them apprehension occurs through some medium, I mean, air or water, so too in the case of this sense the touch-objects should strike upon flesh through some medium. In the case of the others, at least, when the senseobject is placed on the sense-organ perception does not occur. If this does not occur,361 but flesh touches the touch-object itself to apprehend it, it looks as if it is not a sense-organ but a medium, if indeed we must preserve the same agreement with all the senses, and touch is not to disagree with the others. For taste too is a kind of touch and involves the same difficulties. He tries to upset this objection as adeptly as possible, pleading on behalf of those [414] who want flesh to be a sense-organ. He says, then, [cf. 423a22-b8] that the same resemblance of the senses is preserved even in the case of touch, and apprehension does occur through a medium. For just as if we dip our fingers in water or olive oil and then touch something, there is some moist body between the finger and what it touches (indeed, when we have removed the finger we still see on it the moist substance),362 but because of the littleness of the medium the things that touch seem to touch immediately, so it comes about necessarily with air, and there is some air between things that touch, but it escapes notice because of its small extent. So in the case of touch too the apprehension by flesh is not immediate but through a certain medium. And if that is so, it follows that here too the agreement of touch with the other senses is preserved. These are the arguments, then, by which it seems to be established that flesh is the sense-organ of touch, and when he has demolished

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them he has it shown that flesh is not a sense-organ but a medium. The first argument, then, which establishes that flesh is the senseorgan from the time taken for apprehension, he refutes as follows [422b34-423a6]. It is not necessary, he says, for showing that flesh is a sense-organ, that apprehension of touch-objects occurs at the same time as contact with it.363 For even as things are, if someone stretches a membrane around the finger like the skin of an egg or of a clove of garlic or the like, apprehension even so will none the less occur at the same time as the contact. And if one were to conceive the skin actually growing round the finger, less than ever would it impede [sc. apprehension]. So if when an alien body surrounds flesh it comes to be no impediment to apprehending without a time-interval, all the more when flesh is growing round the sense-organ it need not impede the apprehension of the sense-objects. It follows that the lack of a timeinterval in the apprehension does not show that flesh is a sense-organ. Against the second argument, which states that there is no other sense-organ beside flesh to be seen, he says this [cf. 423a6-10].364 If the air, he says, were thickened and grew around us so as to conceal the organs of sight, hearing and smell, then because we should both see and hear and smell through one and the same thing, I mean, the air growing round us, we should think that there is some one sense that apprehends all these things, because we should not see differentiated the parts through which the apprehensions of these things occur. But as it is, we see the organs divided [sc. one from another] because the air does not grow out around us, and therefore even if we apprehend the different objects through one thing, I mean air, which by virtue of its transparent and sound-conveying and smell-conveying power brings us the sense-objects, still we judge that the [sc. sensory] powers too are different, as too are the sense-organs. And just as that is the case, so we must not think, because the different objects of touch come to be apprehended by us through one thing, flesh, that therefore the sense-organ too is one; [415] but since the oppositions among touch-objects are different, the sense-organs too should be several, though these are hidden by the growing round us of flesh, which is a medium between the sense-objects and the sense-organs; since if flesh were not growing out around us, but it was in its nature to be separated [sc. from us] like air, the sense-organs for touchobjects that are now hidden by it would appear, just as contrariwise, in the case of the imaginary supposition just stated, if someone did not attend to the difference between objects of sight, smell and hearing because the air, if it so chanced, was growing out round us, he would think that the air growing out around us was the senseorgan for all these. It follows that nor is it the case that, because we do not see any other sense organ besides flesh for objects of touch, that is a sufficient assurance that flesh is the sense-organ.

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But to this I should reply that if there are several sense-organs for touch-objects hidden under flesh, flesh being a medium, then, since sense-organs must be bodies, it is necessary, surely, that they should be divided in place, just as also now the other sense-organs are divided from one another in place. And if they must be divided in place it should not be the case that any chance touch-object approaching any chance part of our flesh should be apprehended, just as nor would it be the case that an object of sight was seen, if air grew around us and the object were brought, not to that part of the air which is in reality in a straight line with the eye, but to one in a straight line with the channel of hearing. Clearly in the present case too, if there were several sense-organs for touch-objects hidden under flesh, since these would be divided in place, it would be altogether necessary that not every species of touch-object approaching every part of our flesh would be apprehended. But in fact every one is. It is clear, then, that there are not several sense-organs within. But if anyone says that there are several, but each apprehends all, that is empty. One is enough. It follows that there are not several sense-organs for objects of touch, but one. And if one, it is altogether necessary it should be flesh. For nothing else with similar parts365 pervades the whole of the animal continuously as does flesh. That, then, is how Aristotle refutes the second argument, and how we answer him. He refutes the third in this manner [cf. 423a22-b12]. It was the argument resolving the objection brought against those who want flesh to be a sense-organ. The objection was that flesh does not preserve the resemblance to the other sense-organs, I mean, their apprehension through a medium. This is resolved by the fact that here too there is likewise a medium, as when things touch in water there is the adhering moisture. It is plausible that thus too in the air there is some little air between things that touch. Aristotle refutes this solution.366 Even, he says, if there is also some medium in the case of things touched, still it is not like the medium for other senses. For this little intermediate is common to the others too; indeed, in the case where spatula367 is placed [416] on the eye there must be this sort of intermediate of necessity; for clearly the spatula too touches the cornea. If things that touch, then, touch through an intermediate, clearly there is also an intermediate between the spatula and the eye; but still we do not see the spatula, because what is needed is not something intermediate without qualification but something that is also appropriate in distance. For we shall see objects of sight neither if what is intermediate between them and the eye is greatly out of proportion to them, nor if it is extremely small, as is the case with the spatula lying upon the eye. In the case of touch also, then, there should be a medium analogous to the others. But in fact there is not.

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Clearly then even if one accepts their solution,368 one will still not find the analogy with the other senses preserved. But to this too – I mean this argument of Aristotle’s – there is a possible answer. The eye does not need something intermediate without further qualification, but something transparent, and not just that, but also lit. One may say, then, that we do not see [sc. the spatula] through what is intermediate between the eye and the spatula not because it is little, but because the spatula makes a screen against light, and does not allow this intermediate to become transparent in act. So if the spatula did not make a screen against light, we should see it. And in general it is irrational to preserve the same resemblance in respect of the quantity of the medium with all the senses. For if the senses that are of more corporeal form need less of a medium (for hearing does not also apprehend objects of hearing over the same distance over which sight apprehends sight-objects, as is shown by what happens with rowing, I mean, that we first see the oar going back and then perceive the sound;369 nor does smell apprehend over as great a distance as hearing), it is reasonable that touch, being the coarsest-grained of all, should need the least medium of all. And in general the need of touch to have a medium is not established necessarily by the resemblance with the other senses. For in the first place, taste does not need one either. For it is not necessary that everything that befalls in the case of sight-streams shall also befall with the rest, nor what befalls with hearing and smell, or with the rest. For instance, [it comes about] that sight perceives by emission,370 that the rest perceive by having things sent in, and it is not the case that because of these, sight too perceives by having things sent in. Again, with the others air must be affected as matter, so that afterwards the sense may be affected, for instance, the air must become sweet-smelling or must sound, but it is not so with sight, for the air does not become coloured. And [it comes about] that sight does not act without light, but the others do. It is not necessary therefore that the same things should happen with all the senses. So it is nothing surprising if, though the others should need a medium, taste and touch should not. And the very nomenclature is indicative of this same thing, that touch has its apprehension by touching.371 That is what [417] Aristotle says, thinking thereby to establish that there are several senses of touch and not one, and that flesh is not the sense-organ of touch, but a medium; and that is how we go to meet what he says. But perhaps he did not intend to establish the two things stated, but one only, that touch is several senses, and the second relates back to that. For in refuting the syllogism that shows it is one sense from the sense-organ’s being one, he showed that neither the conditional premise of it nor the additional assumption is sound. The additional

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assumption was that flesh, which is one thing, is the sense-organ of touch. In order, then, to show that the sense-organ is not one [he showed that flesh is not the sense-organ],372 but a medium, and he showed this by the three proofs we have stated. Such, then, are the proofs Aristotle produced for the two propositions, if two they are; training us, as I have already said,373 not to accept as persuasive just any arguments without qualification, but true ones. But Aristotle’s [own] opinion is both that the sense of touch is one and that flesh is the sense-organ. That he knew the sense of touch is one he showed in the introduction to the third book. ‘That,’ he says, ‘there is no sense over and above the five …’ [424b22], and when he enumerates these he counts along touch also as one of the five [424b23]. So if there are five senses, and touch is one of these, it follows that the sense of touch is one. And he implies that flesh is a sense-organ where he says, ‘Touch is by touching them’, [435a17] and still more, again, where he says, ‘and as many things as we perceive by ourselves touching them374 are sense-objects to touch, which we find we have’ [424b27-9]. If we perceive by touching, and it is flesh that touches, it follows that flesh is a sense-organ. If, however, one rather deduces the Philosopher’s thought from his scattered utterances, one might say that he knew that touch is both one sense and many, and not only it, but the other senses too, and that flesh is both a sense-organ and a medium, and similarly the other sense-organs too. For indeed, our soul is both one and multipartite. For just as the account of colour in itself is without parts and without shape,375 but it [sc. colour] is divided and shaped along with the underlying body, so too the non-rational soul is in its substance without parts and without extension (since how could it apprehend white and black at the same time and by virtue of the same thing?),376 but comes to have parts in connection with bodies and is extended along with them. Since, then, it is both without parts in a certain respect and with parts, it is reasonably said to be both one and many. And on that account each of its powers also is both one and also many, because it is divided along with the underlying thing and apprehends one sense-object with one part and another with another. And it was reasonable for him to seek [sc. to show] this chiefly from touch. For since that is more connected with matter and more corporeal in form, it is reasonable [418] that its multipartite character should be more manifest; and the others are more one than many, while it is more many than one. And why do I speak of the non-rational soul, when even the rational as compared with intellect is with parts in a way, because it also uses premises and pieces of reasoning and conclusions? It is plausible too that flesh should be a sense-organ. For suppose it were a medium. It is thicker than air and water, and in their case, though they are finer, still some time is taken for the senses to

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apprehend sense-objects through them (for we first see the oar lifted up, and then later hear the sound, and when thunder occurs, the lightning appears first to us; and when something sweet-smelling comes near, we do not immediately at the same time apprehend the odour, but some time is needed for the apprehension). So if, though air is fine-textured, time nevertheless is needed to apprehend both sound and odour through it, then all the more with touch, if flesh were not a sense-organ but a medium, we should need time for the apprehension of touch-objects because of the thickness of flesh – unless in the case of the others the distance is responsible [sc. for the need for time]. But in the case of odour, even when the incense is quite close, we still need a certain time to apprehend it. But nevertheless, even if flesh is a sense-organ, it is a medium too, as with the other sense-organs. For what is genuinely a sense-organ is the pneuma. In the case of the eye the vitreous [humour] and the other liquids and the membranes are in relation to the pneuma a medium, though in relation to air and other things they are a senseorgan. But in that case these things are rather sense-organ than medium; in the case of touch, flesh is rather a sense-organ than a medium because it is more connected to matter and earthen. For the organ of sight is more akin to pneuma than is flesh. That is Aristotle’s opinion too. But it should be known that Themistius also puts forward another piece of reasoning377 showing that flesh is not a sense-organ. Sense-organs, he says, are such as to discern contraries; for sight discerns white and black, taste sweet and bitter, hearing high and low pitched sound; touch, however, though light and heavy are opposed, discerns heavy things by their pressing on it and pushing it, but it does not also discern light things because it is not at all affected by them. I say, then, that just as we said [402,31-403,14] of the other senses that they apprehend not only their proper sense-objects, but also the lacks, (for sight apprehends dark and hearing silence; we said that they apprehend these not by assertion but by denial,378 through not being affected), so we say that touch apprehends lightness too by denial, since by the same argument we should have to say that the other senses do not apprehend opposites either. For sight is not affected by dark, neither is hearing by silence; but light lies opposite to dark, [419] and silence to sound or voice …379 when it apprehends cold and hot, dry and moist, rough and smooth, which are contraries. That the sense-organ of touch is one, and that this is not other than flesh, can be shown in this way; and so far as the sense-organ’s being one is concerned, you may show it as follows. If you bring whatever of the touch-objects you please, say, hot, to whatever part of the body you please, there will always be apprehension of it: similarly cold and dry and moist and all the rest. So if flesh apprehends each sense-object in whatever part you please, it is clear, surely, that there are not several

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sense-organs. For [sc. if there were] they would be separated in place; and if so, the same sense-object would not come to be apprehended when brought to every part of one’s flesh. For it is clear that when it was placed on some part of one’s flesh, if the sense-organ that apprehends it were not underlying [that part], it would provide no apprehension of itself, just as we do not apprehend a sight-object that is behind us. For indeed, if the air were growing round us, according to our supposition [423a5-10], and hid the organs of sight, hearing and smell, then too a sight-object would not be seen placed on every part of the air growing round us. For if it were placed on the part in a straight line with the channel of hearing, it would not be seen, and yet if an object of hearing were placed opposite the same place it would be heard all the more. Similarly an object of smell would provide apprehension of itself better if it were placed in a straight line with the channel of smell. So in this way the different sense-organs would be differentiated, and thereby the different senses. So if, as things are, flesh is growing round several organs of touch and covering them, why do they perceive every touch-object in every part? Indeed, even if in the case of the other three with the air growing round them they all perceived,380 still this should not happen with touch, because touch apprehends not things at a distance but [only] things that are near. That there are not several sense-organs of touch is clear from that. And that the sense-organ of touch is nothing else besides flesh is clear from what follows. If flesh381 were a medium, and where senseorgans have a medium, if the sense-object is placed on the organ itself, it provides no apprehension of itself, it is clear that the same would happen here too. But in fact, if one removes a small amount of flesh, and places something hot or hard or something else like that on what remains, it will always be perceived, and again if you take away another portion of flesh, and this will happen right down to the bone itself. So if that is true, it is clear that flesh is the sense-organ of touch. For if there were something else within, then when flesh is removed little by little, it would be necessary to arrive eventually at the sense-organ, and when the sense-object was placed on that, consciousness would not longer occur. And that the power to perceive is one [420] and not several you might infer from this, since nature has marked off for every power to perceive its proper sense-organ. For to say that the tongue is both thing that tastes and thing that touches is ridiculous. For it is not only the tongue that has the sense of touch, but the whole body all through, and the reason has been stated,382 that we are constituted out of these things, hot, cold, dry and moist. How then do both come together more in the tongue than in the eye and hearing and the channel of smell? For these too are at the same time both such [i.e. both eyes, hearingorgans etc.] and things that touch. But because that which tastes

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perceives by touching like that which touches, it seemed to have something exceptional as compared with the others, though indeed, as I said, it has nothing distinguishing it from the others. And it is clear that this argument, which says that touch ought to have a medium if it is to agree with the other senses, is not strong either. For there are five senses, of which two, sight and hearing, apprehend things at a great distance and two, taste and touch, things very near; for they must touch the sense-organ, seeing that it has been shown that the sense-organ is flesh. The remaining sense, smell, has been allotted a middle place, since it apprehends neither what is a long way off nor smell-objects that touch the sense-organ itself. So it is rather with touch and taste being as they now in fact are, that a certain agreement and order are better preserved among the senses. For if the four apprehended things from outside in the same way, there would be some persuasiveness in saying ‘Why not the remaining sense too?’ But if that is not so, but the tongue apprehends by touching, and smell apprehends things very near and almost touching, what necessity is there for touch also to apprehend through a medium? For to say that taste too is a kind of touch is not true. For [sc. if it were], why is not touch taste? It is plainly evident that both the sense-organs and the powers are differentiated. If it is because we taste by touching, if that is why taste is touch, in the same way one might say that hearing is sight and sight hearing; for both apprehend through a medium. But perceiving objects of touch, as I said, is common to the whole body. It remains, then, to enquire if perhaps that argument is true which says that every sense has to do with one opposition of sense-objects and one common proximate genus – sight with white, black, and things in between, and with their common genus colour, hearing with high and low and the common genus sound, taste with sweet and bitter and what is between and their common genus flavours, and smell, because it is feeble, does not differentiate either species or (because it does not differentiate species) a genus – but with touch there are manifestly several oppositions, as has been said, and they cannot be brought back under one common proximate genus. And we have shown that there is not something similar with the others.383 For great and small in [421] sound and rough and smooth are present by analogy with every sense-object. Like this among objects of sight are strong and intense black and what is dimmer, in taste, the strongly sweet and the less sweet, and likewise with smell-objects. Rough and smooth are present in hearing, if displeasing and pleasing are, and this same thing is present with every sense. It is clear, I think, that these things are not well understood384 by Aristotle. For they attend upon every sense-object and do not make a differentia for sense-objects. For, as he himself showed in Physics 5

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[228b28-229a1], things that attend upon every genus do not make the differentia of a species. For the text of the Physics runs thus: ‘And for that reason fastness and slowness are not species of movement,385 because they attend upon all that differ in species. So that nor are heaviness and lightness as applied to the same thing, for instance, they do not make different species of earth, or different species of fire.’ For one kind of earth is said to be heavier or lighter than another, but this does not make a differentia of earth. For every kind of earth is heavier than some kind and lighter than some other; and similarly fire is lighter and heavier than fire. Hence fire does not differ from fire by this, and neither does earth from earth, though earth does differ from fire [sc. by being heavy]. For the lightness in fire does not attend on any earth, and neither does the heaviness in earth attend on any fire. And every movement is faster than some other movement and slower than some other. So if it attends also on all sense-objects, not, I mean, on objects of hearing alone, but on all without qualification, to have their own quality intensified or abated, some more than some and others more than others, which is how Aristotle understands ‘great’ and ‘small’, and if pleasing or displeasing likewise [sc. attend on all], which is how he understands ‘rough’ and ‘smooth’ in connection with hearing, then it follows that such things should not make a differentia of sense-objects, since nor did fastness and slowness make a differentia of movements. And when this happens in the case of one sense only, it does not even then make a differentia of sense-objects. Large and small attend upon every sound, and likewise rough and smooth. Such things, therefore, are not differentiae of sounds. Roughness and smoothness and friable and viscous do not attend upon every quality that is an object of touch. But even those qualities that are constitutive of bodies, hotness, coldness, dryness, moistness, do not attend upon each other as greatness and smallness attend on sound, but being different and completely removed in species they interweave to constitute bodies. In the other case, great and small belong to the quantity of sound and rough and smooth to the quality; they are not [sc. themselves] qualities. Besides, we agree that touch differs in this [sc. that it has to do with several ‘oppositions’] from the other [senses]; what we must enquire is whether this makes touch not one sense, but several. Perhaps just as sight seemed to be alone in making its apprehension of objects of sight by emission, no other sense being suspected of doing such a thing, so too touch has it as something exceptional [422] that it apprehends several oppositions. In general, to say that it apprehends several oppositions is to attend to what is exceptional in it in comparison with the others, but it is not immediately necessary because of this that it should be not one sense but several. For if it is several because of this, that it has a certain general difference rela-

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tive to the others, why is it not rather one because its sense-organ is one? For as to the tongue, we have made the defence that it is not as a tongue that it has the sense of touch, but because all the body is like that; the sense-organ of sight, indeed, and the others also, have at the same time the sense of touch. So there is no evident indication or persuasive account that shows that touch is not one sense but several.

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422b17 The same account holds for that which is touched and for touch.386 What account? That we should start from the things that lie opposite, that here too apprehension is through a medium, that here too the activity of touch is concerned with one genus and one opposition, at least so far as it follows the others.387 422b17-19 For if touch is not one sense but several, the senseobjects must also be several.388 The conjunction [sc. ‘for’], since it signifies a giving of an explanation, makes the whole thought of this text something like this: since the same account holds for touch and for the object of touch (for as is the object of touch, so must be touch and conversely) then of necessity if the objects of touch are several, there are also several senses of touch, and if the senses of touch are several, the objects of touch are several too, seeing that the same account holds for both. But it is also possible to take the conjunction as relating not to what has been said before, but to the thought of what is to come.389 The thought of the text will be clear if we change the order like this: ‘There is a problem whether there are several senses [sc. of touch] or one; for if the objects of touch are several, it is necessary that touch too should be not one sense but several.’ And perhaps also since the statement is convertible390 he uses it indifferently. For he ought, as I said, to speak thus: ‘If the objects of touch are several, there are also several senses’, if he is going to establish what is unclear from what is agreed. But in fact he said the contrary: ‘If there are several senses, the objects also are several.’ But it is also possible, as I said, to take the passage as hyperbaton.391 Here, then, he puts forward as problems the two propositions I said in my initial exposition he would prove: is the sense of touch one or several, and is flesh the sense-organ for objects of touch, as sight392 is for objects of sight, or, in the other animals that do not have flesh, what is analogous to flesh (for there are certain animals that do not have flesh, but something analogous to flesh, such as insects, ants, flies and the like), or is flesh not the sense-organ, nor what is analogous to flesh, but is it a medium through which perception occurs, just as with the other senses too there is something interme-

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diate between the sense-objects and the sense-organs, and is what genuinely and primarily perceives the objects of touch something else inside the flesh analogous to the other sense-organs? [423] 422b23-4 For each sense seems to be of one contrariety Here is the first proof that touch is not [just] one sense. If every sense discerns one contrariety, and touch discerns several, then it necessarily follows that however many contrarieties touch apprehends, there are that many senses of touch. 422b27-8 But there is a kind of solution to this problem

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In these words he upsets the former proof, saying that not only has touch to do with several oppositions, but the other senses have too. We have already said earlier that ‘rough’ and ‘smooth’ and ‘light’ and ‘dark’ are said of sound by virtue of resemblance [409,9-10], and that great and small in sounds are not the same as in magnitudes, as when we say ‘great line’ or ‘great body’ [cf. 409,4-8]. With colours we do not say ‘great’ and ‘small’, but we do say ‘rough’ and ‘smooth’ and ‘intense’ and ‘faint’. Similarly an odour is not called ‘great’ or ‘small’, but ‘sweet’ and ‘bitter’, and ‘sharp’ and ‘flat’.393 It is clear, then, that here too ‘great’ and ‘small’ are not applied by virtue of resemblance, except in the case of sounds alone,394 since great and small belong to continuous quantity, as do long and short. As, then, we call ‘long’ and ‘short’ sounds that occur in a greater or less expanse of time, because time is a continuous quantity, so too, since sound occurs in a movement of air, and movement is again a continuous quantity, we call a sound occurring in a great or small movement ‘small’ or ‘great’. Since sound, then, always involves movement – I mean movement in respect of place – and that is a kind of quantity, and none of the others needs movement in respect of place in its subject, it is reasonable that in their case the resemblance in large and small is not preserved. 422b32 But what one thing is the subject to touch in the way sound is to hearing – that is not wholly clear. The second proof that the sense [sc. of touch] is not one. Every sense is concerned with one genus, sight with colours, hearing with sounds, taste with flavours, smell with odours. But there is no one common genus for the things that fall under touch. But it might be thought that sight does not occupy itself with one common genus either, seeing that he himself has said earlier that ‘the object of sight is both colour and what can be described in an account but happens to be without a name’ [418a26-8]. But I say that this too is to be reduced to colour; for this whole thing395 is bright colour.

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[424] 422b34-423a2 And is the sense-organ within, or is it not, is it straightaway flesh? It seems to be no indication of that, that perception occurs at the same time as when things are touched. It is not possible to find the hypothetical syllogism we stated in the initial exposition [412,6-10] manifestly in the text, but in the things from which he refutes both the additional assumption and the conditional premise the syllogism also is embraced potentially. And what was the syllogism? If the sense-organ of touch is one, that is, flesh, necessarily the sense also is one. But the sense-organ, flesh, is one. It follows that touch is one sense. He refutes this by saying that it is not the case that if the sense-organ is one, the sense must be one, as is the situation with the tongue, (for though the organ is one there are two senses, touch and taste) and also that flesh is not the sense-organ at all. But we in the initial exposition first set out the refutation of the conditional premise and secondly that of the additional assumption, in order that the argument we gave establishing that flesh is not a sense-organ but a medium might be continuous. He himself, however, has not used that order. But since, as I said [412,29-31], the second of the propositions and the refutation of the additional assumption of the hypothetical syllogism were one and the same, I mean, that flesh is not the sense-organ, he first puts forward the [sc. first] two proofs, through which he shows that flesh is not the sense-organ, and then next refutes the conditional premise of the syllogism and the additional assumption in this argument establishing the second proposition. In potentiality he also puts forward the hypothetical syllogism stated by us. But because it is not put forward directly by Aristotle, the interpreters have inferred from the things said396 that he was refuting some such syllogism [cf. 412,3-6].

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422b34-423a2 And is the sense-organ within, or is it not, is it straightaway flesh? It seems to be no indication of that, that perception occurs at the same time as when a thing is touched.397 Of the three proofs by which he shows that flesh is not the sense-organ, he gives one in these words. This is the one that refutes the proof by which it seemed to be shown that flesh is a sense-organ, namely that derived from the apprehension’s being in no time at all. This, he says, is not a sufficient indication of flesh’s being a sense-organ, since even if we touch objects of touch through a membrane, we apprehend them in no time at all, though the membrane is not a sense-organ, but something intermediate between flesh and the sense-objects. What then prevents flesh too from being something like that?398

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[425] 423a6-8 Hence this part of the body [sc. flesh] seems to be as if air were growing round us in a circle, etc. The second argument, which established that flesh is a sense-organ from the fact that nothing else appears besides this through which we apprehend objects of touch. He refutes this by saying that flesh is like how it would befall if air grew around us in a circle and became something growing out of us and, as it were, solidified. Just as if that were to befall, because the sense-organs would be covered, and we hear, see and smell through one and the same air, we should think that there was one sense-organ for all the things mentioned, for objects of sight, hearing and smell, namely the air growing on around us, and that apart from it there was no other sense-organ at all (for no other would be apparent to us) – something which, as things are, is refuted because the sense-organs are plainly differentiated – this, we are to think, now happens with flesh, since it grows around us and hides the sense-organs of touch. So we must not think, because there is not apparent anything else besides flesh through which we apprehend objects of touch, that this by itself is sufficient proof that flesh is the sense-organ.399 And this proof can also be a refutation of the conditional premise of the syllogism. Next to this, at least, Aristotle puts the refutation we have stated of the conditional premise400 and he makes it continuous with the present proof and dependent on it. In order that we may show this – I mean, that the conditional premise of the syllogism is also refuted by the statements we have before us, we shall take the passage before us from above and interpret it. 423a6-10 Hence this part of the body [sc. flesh] seems to be as if air were growing round us in a circle. For we should think that we were perceiving sound and colour and odour all with one thing, and that sight, hearing and smell were one sense.401 Since he has shown that flesh is not a sense-organ where he refutes the supposition that made it seem to be a sense-organ, I mean, that apprehension occurs in no time at all, and since it remains that flesh is an intermediate body growing out of us, and that the sense-organ of touch is within, he uses this latter opinion to refute the conditional premise of the hypothetical syllogism, and shows that it is not necessary that the power of touch should be one because apprehension of objects of touch occurs through one and the same thing, flesh. For if, he says, the air that surrounds us had solidified and come to be growing on around us, so that the sense-organs were concealed, then because we see and hear and smell through it we should have thought that these three senses were one, because we apprehended objects of sight and hearing and smell through the one thing, air, [426] and the

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sense-organs that discern them had been concealed. Just, then, as even though our apprehension [of these objects] occurred through one thing that was growing out around us, still sight, hearing and smell would not be one on that account but several, because the sense-objects too are several, colours, sounds and odours, so it might not be the case, because flesh, through which we apprehend all the several contrarieties of touch-objects, is one and grows onto402 us, that the sense of touch is one rather than many because of the distinctness of the sense-objects. With the other senses, because the medium through which apprehension of sense-objects takes place – air, I mean – is separated from us, and because the organs themselves are marked off from each other, their distinctness is manifest. But in the case of flesh, since though it is a medium, it grows onto us, it is unclear if there are more senses of touch than one; but by the differences between the objects of touch we come to discern the plurality of senses of touch. And perhaps the proof that is before us can also refute the additional assumption of the syllogism. Indeed, that is even truer. For he means to show by this that it is not the case, because apprehension of touch-objects occurs through one thing, flesh, that the sense-organ of touch too is thereby one. For perhaps the flesh that grows out of us is a medium, and the sense-organs are within and several, as in the imaginary supposition. 423a12-13 For it is impossible that an animate body should be composed of air or water; it has to be solid. He means to tell us the reason why that through which touch occurs, flesh, I mean, grows onto us, whereas air and water, through which the senses we have mentioned [sc. sight, hearing and smell] apprehend, do not also grow out around us, but are external. Because it is impossible, he says, for an animate body that is going to pass its life on land, to consist of [just] one of the simple bodies, either water or air (for each thing must be made as like as possible to those things among which it is going to spend its life), although apprehension by the senses mentioned takes place through these things, I mean air and water, it is reasonable that they should not grow out around us. For the air that is built into the ears is not growing out of us, though it is inseparable. But since touch has its apprehension through flesh and that is its medium, and the body of the animal is also of that sort, solid and mixed [sc. from several simple bodies], it is therefore reasonable that it [sc. flesh] should grow onto us, and that is the reason why the apprehension of touch occurs through a medium that is a body growing onto us.

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423a15-16 So it is necessary that the body should be the medium, growing onto us, for that which perceives by touch, etc. For it is not prevented, as the other [sc. media] are, from growing on by the fact that it is not possible [427] for the animal’s body to be of this sort, since if they could, they too would necessarily grow on. For if we ourselves consisted of this sort of thing and also there is apprehension of sense-objects through it, what is to prevent our seeing through what belongs to us and not needing what is alien? Since, then, the apprehension of objects of touch occurs through flesh, this is as a medium through which apprehension of touch-objects occurs. For nature aims at what is necessary and economical. For this reason, then, since among the parts of the animal it found flesh, through which it is the nature of touch-objects to be apprehended, it made use of this and did not need some other medium from outside. 423a17-18 And that there are several is shown by touch in the tongue; it perceives all the objects of touch by the same part as flavours. You see how, as I said [425,16ff.], the things said before this too were a refutation of the conditional premise of the hypothetical syllogism; I mean, [they showed] that it is not necessary, if we perceive through one thing, that thereby the sense too is one. For as one who has shown this in advance in the foregoing, that it is possible that though the sense-organ of touch is one, namely flesh, still there are several senses – [he showed this] by making the supposition that there has come about with flesh what would have come about if air, through which we see and hear and smell, grew out around us, he then adds: ‘And that there are several is shown by touch in the tongue’. For since the proof did not come from things themselves, but it was from a supposition that he concluded it possible for apprehension of senseobjects to occur through one thing when the perceptual power is not one, he confirms from things themselves, I mean, from touch in the tongue, that the supposition is not impossible. For see! The tongue is the sense-organ both for objects of taste and for objects of touch. But still the power to taste is other than the power to touch. It follows that that statement is not true which says that if the sense-organ is one, the sense too must be one. For that touch is other than taste is abundantly clear, since in the rest of the body there is touch but not taste, while the tongue apprehends both all objects of touch and, in addition, flavours. 423a22 But someone might raise the following problem. If every body has depth

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Here is the third of the proofs that show that flesh is not a senseorgan, but a medium. It is like this. He brings an objection, as I have already said [413,25], against those who want flesh to be a senseorgan, and resolves it, and then again refutes the solution. The objection is that if with the other sense-organs apprehension occurs through a medium, and flesh apprehends touch-objects by touching [them], it looks as if it is not a sense-organ. He shows, [428] then, that flesh does not touch the object of touch either, but there is something in between. ‘If every body has depth,’ he says [423a22-3], ‘and this is the third magnitude,’ (instead of ‘the third dimension’: the first dimension is length, the second breadth, and the third depth), it follows that if there is some body between things, there must be depth between them belonging to something else, of whatever quantity and however small. And if there is depth between things belonging to something else, they cannot be in contact with one another. And whatever things have moisture belonging to something else upon their surface have some body surrounding them. It follows that whatever things touch each other in water have, since they are wetted, some body between them and do not [sc. strictly speaking] touch each other. And as with bodies in water touching each other, so too with bodies in air. It follows that also when bodies touch in air there is some air between them. But it escapes notice because of its small extent, since also when bodies touch each other in water it can escape notice that there is some water between them, but we should not on that account say that there is nothing between them. ‘But someone might raise the following problem. If every body has depth’: the passage is unsyntactical. For having said, ‘someone might raise the problem’, he does not go on to say what problem might be raised. But the problem is further down from here. For we should join on [the words] ‘whether wet touches wet’ [423b1]. That, he says, is the problem that is raised: whether wet things touch one another and there is not an alien body between them. And he shows that there is the moist, and that is a body. ‘What is moist is not without body, nor is what is wet’ [423a24-5]. What is moist is what has moisture as part of its nature, as water has, whereas what is wet has moisture that is alien to it, as has mud. And moisture has its being in body. Therefore what is moist must be water and what is wet must have a share of water. Since things that touch in water, then, do not have their surfaces dry, and everything moist has body, it follows that there is some body between these things and they do not touch one another. Similarly, then, things in air too [sc. do not touch one another], even though the air that is between escapes notice more than the water, since even when things touch in water it can escape notice whether there is something between them.

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423a30-b1 But animals in air and in water escape our notice more,403 if wet touches wet.404

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405 too bears on what has just been said, that if animals are in air or water, it escapes our notice whether they touch each other, because the things with which they touch, that is, the surfaces, are wet; for because of the continuity with the water or air this is not evident. But it is shown by the fact that if we have wetted our fingers in water and then touch, when we separate them they still preserve their moistness. But even if it escapes the notice, still reason provides a refutation from what happens when people first have their flesh wetted and then touch: after the separation the flesh is seen to be still moist. And if water, which is thicker-textured, still, because of its moistness, is not forced out but adheres in the flesh, it is all the more impossible that air, which is finer-textured, should be forced out completely by the things touching. What? If these things are so and this argument is true, [429] it will come about that no solid body touches any other, if indeed all things that touch each other touch either in air or in water. It comes about, then, that solid bodies touch only liquids, and solid never touches solid. But against this it may be said that when, having wetted a finger or some other part of the body, we touch another solid, then because flesh is open-textured and soft, in the pressing it receives the liquid through into the pores that are present in it or into the hollows in it, and, because of the open texture, even into itself, and then, after they are separated, it comes about that the moisture again appears. Strictly speaking, then, it comes about that the whole flesh touches, but it does not touch anything else with those hollows in which the liquid was collected. And after the parting the liquid in them flows back and fills the surface. It comes about also that the liquid when pushed gets to be in unseen pores, and this after the force [sc. of the contact] flows back around the surface. For indeed, if you take bodies that are altogether hard and smooth, such as pieces of glass or accurately burnished bronze or iron, and so shaped that when they are put together the surfaces fit together exactly, so as not to leave the most trifling empty space between them, and then you wet these and put them one on the other and press so that they touch exactly, and you then part them, I think, you would not find even the most trifling moisture on them. For it is not in the nature of water to resist solid bodies. It is reasonable, then, that when they are pressed, since it is not in the nature of water to resist solid bodies, and since there is no space in between, whether manifest or unseen, into which the water could go, that it should be forced out and move out; and air still more, since that is easily moved and the least resistent of things and by nature such as to give way to every kind of body.

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Besides it is not necessary that things touching should always touch each other through something in between. For if it were necessary that things touching should touch each other through something in between, this must come about ad infinitum. For if air and water are both objects of touch (we perceive them, at least, when they are cold or hot), then, when we touch water,406 is there something between us and the air or water, or is there not? If there is not, [then there is not always something between us and the thing touched; if there is,]407 there will be the same question again about this, whether there is something between it and us or not, and so ad infinitum. It follows that it is not necessary that things touching should touch each other through something in between. In general, it is necessary that things genuinely touching should not have anything in between, since they could not be said to touch one another, if indeed those things are said to touch, as he defined it in Physics 5408, the extremities of which are together, and things are not together when there is something between them keeping them apart. And that it is not necessary for things touching in air to have any air between them, you may see from the following. Those [430] bodies that are soft, such as flesh and the like, if anyone pushes them rather forcefully with a finger, yield so as to depart from their own position. And why do I say ‘things that are soft’? It is possible for someone with wetted hands to push a stone or something similar. If the hand does not touch it immediately and push in that way, but pushes through the body that is in between, I mean the moist, it will come about that it pushes by means of it [sc. the moist] as one pushes a door by means of a stick. How is it not absurd to say that a solid body is pushed by one that is fluid and yields to everything? Perhaps someone will say that it pushes through the moisture in the hand as an intermediary, in the way in which someone who has stretched a skin or a piece of cloth round the hand then pushes. And what am I saying? Flesh itself is soft, but nevertheless since it does not push all by itself, but along with the bones which push through it as an intermediary, it can also push the hardest things. To this I reply that flesh is continuous with itself and not such as to be scattered, and further, because it grows on around the bones, it does not divide or fall apart in the thrust, even though it is clear that in reality it too yields on each side (which is why if someone used much force, the skin409 would be broken, but not in the same way,410 both because it is not itself such as to be scattered and because, being stretched around411 and so to speak growing out of it, it endures the same things as flesh). But water and air are such as to be scattered and are easily dispersed and give way to the most trifling force and close around things that push them. You might see also from this. It is surely clear that an empty jar is

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full of air. When, therefore, I fill it with water, all the air gives way so that not the least quantity of it is left. At least if any should be left, because it is not in its nature to withstand the water, it makes bubbles in the water and breaking these, goes on to its own totality.412 If, then, it is not in the nature of air to withstand water which is so soft and fluid and almost similar to itself, nor to endure its pressure, how much the less, when solid and resistent bodies go against each other, can it be left behind between them, since it does not endure the onset even of a mosquito but gives way at once to everything? So it is impossible that any water or air should be left behind between bodies that are touching, unless there are certain spaces in between, invisible or manifest, where the touching bodies do not fit together with each other. For the surfaces of bodies are not so formed that whole fits together with whole exactly. So the moisture remains caught in the interstices, and after the touching bodies have parted from one another it runs back and fills the surface, and especially if the things touching and pushing are soft, either one or both of them. For when flesh, which can be compressed more [sc. than the bodies just mentioned], is pressed, the moisture collects in the concavities; then, when the things touching part, the flesh returns to its own position, and the moisture then, which had been on one surface [sc. that of the concavities], spreads to the other parts too. [431] 423b1-2 So is perception of all things alike, or is perception of different things different? Having shown that things that seem to touch in water or air do not touch each other in either, because there is either air or water between them, he uses this as an assumption and passes to the project he has in view. This is to show that even with touch the same resemblance to the other senses is preserved, I mean, that apprehension occurs through a medium with touch too. For it was by this that they thought to show flesh not to be a sense-organ, by the same resemblance’s not being preserved that there is with the other senses. The apprehension of the sense-organs is not different, he says, as is now believed. For it is believed that taste and touch have senseorgans that themselves touch the sense-objects, and that is how they apprehend them, but it is not so with the others, but sense-objects and sense-organs are at a distance from one another and thus they apprehend them through a medium. This, he says, is not true, but with touch too there is a medium, just as with the others. But in the case of hearing, sight, and smell, the medium is much in extent (which is why it is manifest and does not escape notice), whereas in that of taste and touch it is little, and therefore also unnoticed. For if things touching in air are as things touching in water, and the latter have their extremities moist when they touch, it follows that things

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in air also do not touch each other immediately. But since the air caught up between them is little, it is reasonable that it escapes notice and is thought not to exist at all. And it is no wonder if it escapes notice, since even if a membrane were stretched around us when we touched, we should think we were touching immediately, because it would escape notice through its small extent and it would not be clear that, through itself as an intermediate, it was keeping apart the things touching. That is how, as things are, because of its small extent we do not notice that the air keeps us apart and does not allow us to touch the objects of touch immediately. But even if it escapes the notice of sense, still reason derives a refutation [sc. of the belief that we touch objects in air immediately] from what happens with people touching in water and having wetted flesh. 423b12-13 But objects of touch differ from objects of sight and things that sound, etc. Having said that it is something common to all the senses that their apprehension occurs through a medium, he now says how taste and touch differ from the rest. The other senses, he says, are not affected primarily by the sense-objects themselves, but the medium is first affected by the sense-objects and then the sense-organ is affected by the medium. For indeed, colours [432] were said to be such as to change the transparent in act, sound such as to change the soundvehicle, and similarly odours the smell-vehicle. But with touch and taste it is not the case that the medium is first affected by the sense-objects and then the affection is passed through the medium to us with the medium acting upon us. Rather we are affected by the sense-object along with the medium. For the objects of touch put both the medium and the sense-organ into a state at the same time. In confirmation of this he uses a very perspicuous model. If someone is struck by a spear or a stone or the like through a shield, simultaneously with the shield he too is wounded by the spear or stone; it is not the case that he is wounded by the shield and the shield by the spear: he too [is wounded] along with the shield. That is what the word ‘simultaneously’ indicates. For just as the moist when it receives flavour itself becomes a sense-object by having received the flavour into itself, (and that is why we do not perceive the flavour through it, but are affected by the flavour along with it,) so too perception of objects of touch occurs through things that are intermediate and are themselves affected in the same way as the sense-organ. It is not the case that sight too apprehends colours in this way, [that is,] by virtue of the air’s being coloured; rather it receives them through this as an intermediate.413

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423b12-13 But objects of touch differ from objects of sight and things that sound, etc.414

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The argument that wanted flesh to be a sense-organ, but was refuted by the fact that the similarity to the other senses is not preserved in the case of flesh, showed that in the case of touch too, just as with the others, there is a medium, and flesh does not come up to objects of touch immediately. But then again to this argument it was objected that the peculiarity of touch and the meaning [sc. of the word] is no longer preserved (for things do not touch one another if they are kept apart by something in between; that, indeed, is why it is called ‘touch’, because the other senses are not affected immediately by the senseobjects, but the medium is affected by the sense-objects and the senses by this; whereas touch is affected immediately by the touchobjects themselves). So it is as a solution to this objection that he adds this, that even if there is a medium in the case of touch too, as with the others, still this does not destroy the peculiarities of the sense of touch. For the sense is not affected by the medium, as the others are, but by the sense-objects themselves along with the medium. So it is the case both that the similarity to the other senses is preserved in the case of touch too, in that with it too there is a medium, and also that the peculiarity of touch is not destroyed.415 For the medium itself is qualified and becomes matter for the hot or cold or moist or dry, and with it the sense-organ. That does not happen with the others. The senses receive only the activities of the sense-objects. But it should be known that nor is the sense-organ of touch qualified by every perception. For when it apprehends heavy or light, viscous or friable, rough or smooth, flesh does not become like that itself, but receives the forms of these things only in a cognitive way. [433] But since, as has often been said, every body consists of a mixture together of moist and wet and hot and cold, for this reason also whenever it is affected by them, as a sense it apprehends and gets to know them, but as a natural body it is affected in a material way by them. And from this it may be inferred that these are the only two oppositions of which every natural body consists, because they alone qualify the sense-organs that are affected by them and come to be present in them in a substantial way, whereas heaviness and lightness, though they attend upon every natural body (for every body that comes into being416 is either heavy or light), still, when they act upon touch do not change flesh to their own peculiar character, as do heat and moistness and cold and dryness. 423b17-20 Altogether it looks as if, just as air and water stand to sight and sound and smell, so flesh and the tongue stand to the sense-organ [sc. of taste and touch] as do each of those.

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Having raised the problem that perhaps in the case of touch and taste too there is something between flesh and the objects of touch, as with the other senses, as a result of which the same resemblance is preserved with touch too, so that flesh can be a sense-organ, here he goes back and proves on the contrary that neither flesh, nor the tongue is a sense-organ. He establishes this, as I have already said [416,10], from the analogy with the other senses. He gives a syllogism for this in the second figure as follows. When sense-objects are placed on the sense-organ, they do not produce perception, but when placed on flesh and on the tongue, they do produce perception. It follows that flesh and the tongue are not sense-organs. And yet, when a white body is placed on the eye, there must always be something in between, as there is too with touch, but still it is not apprehended, because there needs to be something between of a certain quantity.417 If the same resemblance, then, is to be preserved for all the senses, and with the others when sense-objects are placed on the senseorgans, apprehension of them does not occur, but when objects of touch are placed on flesh, it does, it looks as if it is not a sense-organ but a medium. Therefore, if there must be some sense-organ for touch and taste, as in the case of the others there is the eye, hearing, smell (for the sense-organ of the power to hear is the eardrum, and that of the power to smell, the mastoid process of the brain), it follows that the sense-organ of taste and touch must be inside the flesh. For pneuma is the common sense-organ for all. For indeed the common sense418 is in this. As far as here, then, Aristotle’s proofs proceed on both sides.419 But as I have said already [417,23ff], if anyone should collect together his whole thought from the things said, he will say that in the statements we have mentioned Aristotle means that flesh is both a medium and a sense-organ. And it is not necessary always to demand the same resemblance with [434] all the senses, since if flesh is a medium, then the same resemblance should be preserved with all the senses, and just as the medium for the others, through which there is perception, does not perceive, so flesh should not perceive either, if it is through flesh as an intermediate that touch occurs. It follows420 that the same resemblance does not have to be preserved with all the senses.421 423b27-31 The differentiating features of body as such are objects of touch,422 [I mean the differentiating features that mark off the elements, hot, cold, dry and moist, about which we spoke earlier in the treatise concerning the elements [the de Generatione et Corruptione]. The sense-organ for them is that of touch, and that in which the sense called ‘touch’ belongs is the part which is in potentiality of this sort.] Having raised problems about touch, he takes up his account and

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enquires what things, indeed, are objects of touch; and he enumerates their species, as he did also with the others. He says that touchobjects423 are the differentiating features of body as such, those differentiating features, that is, which are constitutive. For in the de Generatione et Corruptione [2.2] (it is this that he calls ‘the treatise concerning the elements’), he enquired what might be the qualities that are constitutive of all bodies generally, and said that they are neither colours nor flavours nor any like these, because we are looking for the principles that are most general, and these do not extend to all [bodies]. For there are bodies that are colourless, like air, and flavourless, like this same thing [sc. air] and many others, and, according to the doctors, water. But the most general principles of bodies are the qualities that are objects of touch, because every body is straightaway also an object of touch. But having enumerated several opposed pairs among objects of touch, he brought them all back under those of hot and cold and dry and moist, and showed that these are the most general principles of bodies and that it is by them that even the elements are made to have form. And it was reasonable for him to add [to ‘body’] ‘as such’. For it is not as bodies that coloured things are coloured. If it were, every body would have to be coloured. But in fact things are not so. And nor is it as bodies that things are sweet-smelling, or have flavour, or sound. If that were the case, everything that is a body would straightaway have to have these qualities, but in fact it is not. But the opposed pairs hot and cold and dry and moist extend to all bodies; for every body is straightaway either dry or moist, either hot or cold. So it is well said that these opposed pairs of qualities alone are constitutive differentiating features of bodies. What? Are not heavy and light divided among all bodies? Of bodies that come into being now, certainly. But I say that in the first place heavy and light are qualities that are objects of touch and are brought back under the ones stated [sc. hot, cold, dry and moist], as he showed in the de Generatione. And then that every body when in its own totality424 is neither heavy nor light, but becomes heavy or light when it has departed from its own totality. Since nothing, then, is always [435] in what is contrary to its nature, when fire contrary to its nature comes to be below, it hastens to regain its natural place, and on that account moves upwards; and it is what moves upwards that we call ‘light’. Similarly, if a clod of earth has, contrary to its nature, come to be in an upper region, it hastens to its natural place and moves downwards, and what moves downwards we call ‘heavy’. But if bodies in their natural place move neither up nor down, they must be neither heavy nor light. Besides, heat and coldness, dryness and moistness are differentiating features such as to act on things and be affected, whereas

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lightness and heaviness are not.425 It is the former that are needed for the genesis and constitution of the elements. 424a1-2 For to perceive is to be affected in some way [so that which affects makes it [sc. the organ] such as it is in act, it being [sc. before the action upon it] such in potentiality.] Having said [423b31] that that which touches is potentially what the touch-object is, he establishes this same thing. In general, he says, to perceive is to be affected in some way, as has been said [416b33-4]. We laid it down that that which is affected is in a way the same as that which affects it, and in a way not the same, potentially the same but in act not the same. For while it is being affected it is not the same, but after it has been affected it is the same. And if when it is being affected by the sense-object it comes to be like it, it follows that before it was affected it was potentially what the sense-object was [sc. in act].

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424a2-4 That is why we do not perceive what is equally hot or cold or hard or soft, but only the excesses Since the sense-organ is a body, and every body is an object of touch, and that which touches when it is affected by the object of touch becomes like it in act, and nothing is affected by what is like it (for nor does anything perceive an object of touch that is mixed in the same way [sc. as itself]), so that426 if it does not apprehend things that are like, apprehension must be of excesses and deficiencies.

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424a4-6 … because the sense is a sort of a mean in relation to the contrariety in the sense-objects. And this is why it discerns the sense-objects [for what is in the middle discerns]427 He now calls the sense-organ the ‘sense’. And he says that the sense is a mean, referring either to touch (for that is the subject of the present discussion) or to every sense as well. For each sense is in the middle of the contrariety which it discerns, and it is in the middle in this way, that it can receive the form428 of either contrary. For it is not, simply by virtue of being in neither of the contraries, thereby genuinely in the middle (for how can what is colourless be said to be a middle between black and white?) But as I said, [it is in the middle] inasmuch as it is capable of receiving the form of either contrary. Similarly too the soundless, the odourless, and the flavourless. For in the case of touch the sense-organ must in act be mixed in a middle way from the contrary pairs that are objects of touch; but it is not just the same with the other sense-organs, that because they have been given qualities in a mean state [436] between the contrary pairs [sc.

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white and black, high and low etc.] they then perceive them. For it is not by virtue of those qualities that natural bodies have their being, but by virtue of the qualities that are objects of touch. Hence touch is in reality a mean, for it has a quality in between the extremes. But the others, in which the extremes are not mixed, but absent,429 – how could they be means except in a way stated, because they receive the form of the contraries? 424a6-10 For in relation to each extreme it becomes the other. [And just as what is to perceive white and black must be neither of them in act, but both in potentiality (and so too with the others), in the case of touch also it must be neither hot nor cold.]430

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He shows in what way the middle comes to discern the excesses. For that which is in a mean state between [two] things is in a way to each of them the other extreme. In relation to what exceeds its own heat it is cold, and to what exceeds its own coldness it is hot. And in this way it is like the contraries potentially and not in act, and it is affected by them not because they are like but because they are unlike. It is affected by what is hotter as something cold and by what is colder as something hot. This can be said of touch as something peculiar to it. 424a10-16 Further, just as sight was of what is seen and, in a way, of what is invisible, and similarly the other senses are of opposites, so too touch is a sense of what is an object of touch and of what is intangible.431 [A thing is intangible if it has a differentia of touch-objects only in an extremely small way, as is the case of air, and [also intangible] are the excesses of touchobjects, such as those that are destructive. We have now spoken in outline about each of the senses.] As he said of the other senses that they discern not only their proper sense-objects but also the lacks, so too he says of touch that it discerns both touch-objects and intangibles. But in the case of the others there was genuine lack, in that of sight, dark, in that of hearing, silence, in that of smell and taste, the odourless and flavourless. In the case of touch-objects there is no body that is completely intangible since, as has been said, the qualities that are touch-objects are constitutive of bodies; but he says that those things are intangible which are either destructive because of excess or else touch-objects [only] to a slight extent. Of the latter sort are things not far removed from the senseorgans in those qualities that are objects of touch, but closely similar and therefore touch-objects [only] to a slight extent, because like is unaffected by like. Such is air. Hence we perceive its excesses, I mean,

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when it is too chilled or too heated, for then it goes outside its likeness to the sense-organs, and then they are affected as contrary by contrary. But when it is in a state of proportionality, we hardly perceive the quality in it at all. It is also possible here to understand the intangible as either what is not by nature such as to fall under touch at all, like colour or sound, or the faint, or the harmful.432

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[Chapter 12] [437] 424a17-24 In general in connection with every sense we should take it that the sense is that which receives the perceived forms without the matter, [as the wax receives the sign of the ring without the iron and the gold, and takes the golden or brazen sign, but not as gold or bronze; similarly the sense too of each [sc. kind of object] is affected by that which has colour or flavour or sound, but not insofar as it is said to be each of those things, but insofar as it is of that sort, and according to that description.433] Having spoken about each sense on its own and about the proper sense-objects of each, he now means to speak about them all generally and make distinct the things about which he has spoken unclearly in the discussion of each. For instance, he said in connection with each that the sense is potentially what the sense-object is, and is brought to act by it; for indeed, it is [sc. then] what the latter is. He now says how the sense is affected by the sense-objects and made completely like them. This, he says, is how the sense comes to be what the sense-object is: it does not become white or sweet, but it receives the form of the sense-object without the matter, that is, it takes pure impressions in a cognitive way of the forms of them. For in general nothing that is affected by anything receives the matter of that which affects it, rather it receives the form that is in it, as too the wax receives the seal that is in the gold [sc. of a signet ring], but not the gold. For it is not insofar as the seal is of gold or silver that the wax is made like it, but insofar as the seal has such and such a form. For if the wax were made like the seal insofar as it is of gold or iron, that would be coming to be and passing away, coming to be of gold or iron, passing away of wax. So in this way too the sense [sc. of taste] receives the form of sweetness in honey, not insofar as it [sc. the thing tasted] is honey, but insofar as it has such a form of sweetness. And things that perceive differ from things that are affected simply without perceiving in that the former receive [sc. forms] in such a way as to recognise and discern the form that comes to be in them, whereas the latter are affected, indeed, but do not recognise – mirrors

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are like that and matrices and things similar to these.434 Mirrors, then, and matrices differ from senses in that they cannot discern the affection produced in them. And both these same things and senses differ from other things in that, even though all natural bodies are affected (for they are affected by heat and coldness and by whiteness and things akin), still, things that qualify435 these [other] things qualify them in respect of both together [i.e. both their form and their matter], and that is how they are affected. For fire does not act upon air and warm it in respect of form only, but in respect of both together. It acts upon it as body. A clear indication is provided from sweet and foul smell, for sweet smell acts along with what underlies it [sc. the sweet-smelling object] upon air and upon garments, and some substance from the sweet-smelling body is mixed in with them.436 Garments that are coloured [sc. by dye] are affected in the same way. And flavours act upon bodies. Bodies, at least, that are washed in fresh water are put into one state, and those in salty water into another, because some substance is mixed in [438] with the flavour. And builders first soak for a time stones they want to be strong in fresh water, and only then take them over for building. And brine from the sea plainly eats through rocks. Inanimate things, then, and in general all bodies as such are affected by the qualities that are sense-objects, with that which acts acting as the two [sc. form and matter] together, and that which is affected also being affected as the two together. But sense is neither affected by the two together, but only by the form (as the wax, too, is affected by the seal), nor is it itself affected in respect of the two together (for the sense-organ is not coloured, nor does it become sweet-smelling), but in respect of the form alone, I mean, in respect of the perceiving power itself. For both the body and the sense of touch are affected by the heat, but it is not the same affection.The sense is affected only by the form of the hot and in a cognitive way, but the sense-organ, the flesh, is affected as matter in respect of both together, becoming underlying thing to the heat and being affected as a whole by the whole thing that heats. And it is not at all amazing if the sense is affected in one way by the sense-objects, whereas the sense-organ and in general the body is affected in another. For it is one thing for the sense-objects to be colours or flavours or sounds or hot or cold, and another to be sense-objects. That is why they are colours and flavours and sounds and the rest even if no sense exists, but they are not sense-objects unless there is a sense apprehending them. They act upon the senses, then, as sense-objects, but on bodies no longer as sense-objects but as colours or flavours, and insofar as each has a certain form and substance: whole acts in relation to whole, and what is affected is affected whole by whole.

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424a24-5 The primary sense-organ is that in which such a power exists. Having spoken about sense he speaks also about the sense-organ. He says that the primary sense-organ, in which the power to perceive exists, is the pneuma that is underlying thing to the non-rational soul; for it is in this primarily that sense has its being. For eyes and ears and nose are sense-organs too, but not the primary ones. For the perceiving soul is not in these, but the affection is sent up to it437 through these.

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424a25-6 It is, then, the same [sc. as the sense], but its being is other.438 [For that which perceives is a kind of magnitude, but neither being a thing that perceives nor sense is a magnitude, but a kind of form and power of a magnitude.] The sense, he says, (that is, the perceiving power,) and the sense-organ in which primarily this power resides are the same in number439 (for the sense does not exist all by itself without the underlying thing, that is, the pneuma, which is the primary sense-organ); so these are one in subject, as we say that a man is one and that a ship is one, the matter along with its own form, calling the composite whole ‘one’, but in substance they are two. For the sense is one thing and what is underlying thing for it another; for the one is incorporeal and without magnitude, whereas what is [439] underlying thing for it is a body and a magnitude, and it is called ‘a thing that perceives’ not because it has magnitude but because it has sense.

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424a28-32 It is clear, then, from this both why it is that excesses in sense-objects destroy the sense-organs [(for if the change in the sense-organ should be too strong the form440 – that is the sense – is resolved, just as the consonance and tuning if the strings are struck forcefully)] Having shown that the sense-organs as such have their being in a certain form and proportionality (for it is insofar as they have the power to perceive, which is their account and form, that it belongs to them to be sense-organs), he says that the reason why excesses in sense-objects destroy the sense-organs is clear from this. For if insofar as they are sense-organs they exist in a certain proportionality and mean state, as he has already said, (for it is because it is mixed in a certain way that the sense-organ is suitable for receiving sense,) and if, further, it is because the sense-organs are changed by the sense-objects that perception of the sense-objects then occurs, it follows it is reasonable also that change beyond measure of the sense-organs by the sense-objects should destroy their proportional-

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ity. And when the proportionality is destroyed they become unsuitable for housing the power to perceive. The sense-organ, then, undergoes two affections, one simply as a body, the other as a sense-organ. As a body it is affected by body, as a sense-organ, on the other hand, it is affected by the activity of the sense-objects. For instance, the eye as a sense-organ is affected when it is compressed or expanded by the activity of colours, while as a body it is affected by fire, as it might be, heating it; and hearing similarly is affected as a sense-organ by sounds, while as a body it is affected by the forceful movement of air. For sound and movement of air are not the same, but nevertheless sound does not exist without movement of air. In great sounds, then, there occurs great movement of air, and the movement by pressing on it harms the sense-organ of hearing as a body. And how the form of the sense-organs is undone by a too violent blow by the sense-objects he shows by the adjustment of things [sc. strings] that have been tuned. For in their case the consonance of the strings, which is a kind of mean state and form [eidos] of a certain sort of adjustment of the strings, is undone and destroyed by a certain tightening and loosening, even though the strings are not destroyed; and it would be similar if the strings were struck too forcefully. For excesses are destructive of things that have their being in a certain proportionality and mean state. By ‘form’ [logos] he does not mean the attunement of the composite things. For then he would call the soul an attunement, and this [theory] he demolished in the first book [ch. 4]. But by ‘form’ he means the species [eidos]441 that supervenes upon a certain composition and proportionality,442 and when that is undone the species too is necessarily destroyed. And the attunement of the strings differs from the power to perceive [present] in the proportionality of the sense-organs in that the attunement is the proportionality itself, which is undone by excess [440] even in the tightening of the strings, whereas the sense is the power [present] in this particular proportionality, which, though it is something other than the proportionality, is destroyed along with it when the latter is destroyed. It is something of the latter and exists in it; for it is its form. 424a32-b2 … and why it is that plants do not perceive, though they have a psychical part and are affected by objects of touch, for indeed they are cooled and heated.[The reason is that they do not have a mean state, nor a principle that is such as to receive the forms of sense-objects.] Having said that from what has been stated about sense and about sense-organs the reason becomes apparent why excesses in the senseobjects destroy the sense-organs – because they exist in a mean state, and mean states are destroyed by excess – he says that from these

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same things it is apparent also why it is that plants do not perceive, although they have the vegetative part of the soul (for they are nourished and grow and generate things like themselves) and also they are affected by objects of touch. For they are heated and cooled. The reason for this is that they do not have a part which is in a mean state relative to touch-objects, nor, further, do they have a power and source in this that can receive the forms that are in the sense-objects without the matter. For that which perceives is not just any animate thing, but one that has this sort of power. He calls the sense-organs ‘a mean state’ either because it belongs to a mean state to apprehend the sense-objects and be harmed by excess and deficiency, or he says ‘a mean state’ because they [sc. the sense-organs] are in the no man’s land between the sense-objects and the senses.

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424b2-3 … but they are affected along with the matter.443 That is, even if they [sc. plants] are affected by sense-objects, they are not affected in the same way as things that perceive, which are affected in respect of their form and not their matter, but they are affected along with their matter, that is, in a material and bodily way. For the matter that underlies them is affected by the sense-objects and receives the affections of the sense-objects in itself; it becomes matter for them and as matter receives them into itself, just as if it were inanimate. For ‘along with the matter’ signifies that it is as matter that they are affected;444 and a thing is affected as matter if it is made to have form by the affection that affects it. Some people, then, have understood ‘being affected along with the matter’ as being in place of ‘being affected in that their own matter is changed and made different.’ What? By ‘affected along with the matter’ he means the matter of the sense-object, because the senses, as we have already said earlier [438,6-7], are affected only by the forms of the sense-objects, sight by colour and not by the white lead or wool or whatever it is that is underlying thing to the colour, and similarly with the rest. But inanimate things when they are affected by sense-objects are affected not only by their forms but by both together. For it is because something is mixed in, [441] to water, perhaps, that it then becomes sweet,445 and similarly the smoke adhering to the garment makes it sweet-smelling. And similarly colours too act upon bodies, for instance, when they are dyed; they are mixed into the garments along with their own material. Likewise sound also when it breaks wood446 does this with the thrust of the underlying air. It seems to be only in the case of hot and cold that this does not happen. When there is a fire adjacent, its heat alone alters underlying things such as air, and similarly with cooling: ice when adjacent cools without having its substance mixed in with the thing that is cooled, but altering it just

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by its quality. That is because these alone among qualities contain the efficient cause of coming to be and passing away, and it is the nature of passing away and coming to be to occur through change of the underlying substance. 424b3-5 But someone might raise the problem whether that which is unable to smell can be affected in any way by odour, or that which cannot see by colour, [and similarly with the others.]

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Having said that inanimate things, although they do not have sense, are affected by the qualities that are objects of touch, but are affected in a bodily and material way, he here reasonably447 enquires whether it is possible for things with no share in sense to be affected at all by the other qualities too. 424b5-9 If odour is that which is smelt,448 [if it acts in any way, odour makes smell. So none of those things which are not able to smell can be affected by smell (and the same account holds for the others); nor can any of those that are able, except insofar as it is a thing that perceives.]

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Here he resolves the problem and shows that none of those things that do not have sense are affected by sense-objects. For if that which can be smelt, he says, is nothing other than odour, and that which can be tasted nothing other than flavour (for if something produces taste, it is flavour, and if smell, it is odour; and similarly with the rest), and odour is for449 nothing other than smell (for it both is and is spoken of in relation to smell, and similarly that which is tasted to taste, and that which is seen to sight, and similarly with the others), then nothing can be affected by qualities that are sense-objects as senseobjects if it does not have sense; nor can anything that is able [sc. to perceive],450 except insofar as each is a thing that perceives. Even the things, he says, that are capable of being affected by sense-objects, are affected by them not by virtue of being anything else, but [only] by virtue of being things that perceive; for instance, the eye is affected also in other ways, but it is affected by a sight-object only as451 [sc. itself] a thing that sees. So if the affection produced by qualities that are sense-objects is not produced by them except insofar as the things affected are things that perceive, it follows that what does not perceive cannot be affected by them. Perhaps the passage can also be thought of like this, that even if a thing is able to be affected in some way by sense-objects, it cannot be affected by them in any other respect than that in respect of which it is a thing that perceives.452 [442] For instance, the eye is such as to be affected by sense-objects, but by sense-objects not other than those by which it is its nature to be affected; for the eye cannot be affected

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by an object of hearing, but only by one of sight, nor is hearing affected by an object of smell, but only by one of hearing. All the less, then, can things that are not by nature such as to be affected at all by senseobjects, be affected in any way by them.

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424b9-12 But it is also clear in this way. Neither light and dark nor sound nor odour does anything to bodies, but rather the things in which they [sc. these sense-objects] are, [for instance, it is the air which is with thunder that splits the wood.] Not only, he says, is it clear a priori453 that nothing that does not have sense is affected by sense-objects as such (for sense is something relative to a sense-object, and a sense-object to sense); it is clear also from the evidence of facts. For neither do light and dark, that is, what is seen and that through which we see objects of sight, do anything, insofar as they are objects of sight, to a body that does not have sight – for what does not have sight does not apprehend them as objects of sight – nor do objects of hearing and smell act as such upon things that do not hear or smell. Next, since some bodies that do not perceive seem to be affected by sounds (for some bodies are split by thunder, wood, rocks and the like), and things are affected also by lit air, for they are warmed by it, and air too becomes sweet-smelling by the agency of odours, he says in reply to this that bodies broken by thunder are not affected by it as an object of hearing, but when they are struck by sounding air which is forcefully moved, they are parted in virtue of being struck; they are not parted by the sound insofar as it is a sound and an object of hearing. That is what he means in saying ‘the things in which they are’, that is, the things underlying the sound (and air is what underlies it); it is by this that things split by thunder are affected. And similarly in the other cases. For inanimate things are warmed by lit air not because it is lit nor by the light, but by the air itself insofar as it is hot, because it makes them expand. And both air and the other things [sc. garments etc.] are affected also by odours not insofar as the odours are objects of smell, but by virtue of what underlies the odours, things are mixed up with the substance of the vapours themselves in which the odours exist, as is the case with honeyposset.454

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424b12-13 But objects of touch and flavours do do something; if they did not, by what would inanimate things be affected and altered? Having said that things which do not have sense are not affected by sense-objects, and having shown this for colour, sound and odour, he here says that even if [443] the other sense-objects do not do anything

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to things without sense, at least objects of touch and taste do something. For bodies are heated and cooled, and all bodies are both dried and moistened by the qualities that are objects of touch, not, however, insofar as they perceive, but simply insofar as they are bodies. For if they are not affected, he says, by qualities that are objects of touch and taste, by what could they be affected? There is a risk, then, that they would be unaffected and unaltered, which is absurd. For if they are affected neither by the other qualities nor by those that are objects of touch and taste, there will be nothing else by which they can be affected: it follows that they will be unaffected altogether. 424b14-16 Will the others too do something? Or is not every body such as to be affected by odour and sound, and are those which are affected indefinite [and such as not to remain, like air (for it reeks as though it were affected).] Having said that bodies are affected by qualities that are objects of touch and taste, he enquires whether bodies are affected by the other sense-objects too, though not in a sensible way (just as they are not affected in a sensible way by objects of touch and taste). And he says that not all bodies are such as to be affected by odour or sound (saying ‘such as to be affected’ [pathêtika] in place of ‘affected’ [pathêta]).455 So not all are affected by these, as they all are by objects of touch. For by these latter every body that can be affected456 is affected. But the things that are affected by the former are moist, such as air and water. For the things that are both affected and changed by colours, sounds and odours are like that. But they are not thought to be affected, he says, because being unbounded457 and moist they do not keep the affections of the sound or odour or colour. For it is a peculiarity of unbounded things not to remain as they are because they have no shape of their own and are easily changed. Moist and unbounded things, then, are affected by colours and sounds; and not only these things but also certain solids are affected by odour and having been affected become sweet-smelling. But it is a peculiarity of air to be quickly put into a state and quickly to lose the state. And furthermore, the underlying thing for odour, I mean vapour, when it is mixed into bodies like a flavoured liquid such as honey,458 since it is fine-textured and easily dissipated, is quickly dissolved and lets go off the things in which it has come to be. And when this has been dissipated the odour too perishes along with it. So even though that which has received the odour, the garment, for instance, is not easily altered, still because of the weakness of the vapour the affection does not remain for long. And in that it differs from the affection that occurs in perception. For sense preserves the affection that occurs, for cognition of the form does not flow away.

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And it is possible to extend the account to all the sense-objects, and understand ‘indefinite’459 in such a way that by this we can differentiate the affection that is produced by sense-objects on sense from that produced on bodies. For the affection produced on bodies is [444] indefinite, and neither occurs all at once nor remains the same. For the more a body approaches what is hot the more it is heated, but sense simultaneously with striking upon460 the sense-object [has]461 the cognition it has got, and it keeps the affection always the same without intensification and without abatement. For from the moment when the sense of touch cognises the hot, even if it remains for a long time, it will not cognise it any more. But the body does not undergo the same affection from the hot, but the affection is different at different times according as it intensifies or abates. Perhaps, then, he means to indicate this too by ‘indefinite’. 424b16-18 What then is smelling besides being affected?462 Or is smelling perceiving,463 whereas the air quickly comes to be perceived? Having shown that things without sense too are affected by senseobjects (for the transparent in act is affected by colours, and air by odours and sounds), he reasonably enquires, since also things that perceive are affected by these, how those that perceive differ from those that do not, but are nevertheless affected by sense-objects. For it seems that both are affected by them in the same way. Resolving this problem he says: ‘Or is smelling perceiving, while the air quickly comes to be perceived.’ For it is not sufficient for perceiving to be able to receive form separately from matter, but a power of the soul is needed, which does not exist in all things that receive forms of sense objects separately from matter. For it is not the case that if something is affected by some sense-object, it thereby also perceives, since then water and air and mirrors would perceive, but a power is needed such as can discern the affections produced by sense-objects, which does not exist in every body, but [only], as he showed, in a natural organised body, and not in the whole of this, but in that part of it which because of a particular proportionality and good mixture is capable of receiving this power. How then is the principle not destroyed that sense-objects are relative to sense and sense to sense-objects, if not only are things which have sense affected by sense-objects but also things that do not have sense? Because it is not the same for each of the sense-objects to be the thing it is and to be a sense-object. It is not the same for colour to be colour and to be an object of sight, but the substance464 of colour is one thing,465 if indeed it is the extremity of the transparent as such,466 and being a sight-object is incidental to it. For it is insofar as it is such as to change the transparent in act that it is a sight-object.

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Similarly too [445] with the others. As sense-objects they put into a state only things with sense; but as those things by being in fact which they are sense-objects,467 and which are something else (for it is one thing to be a sense-object and another to be colour), in the latter respect nothing prevents them from being such as to produce some other things too. For nothing besides smell is affected by sweet smell as a sense-object, but air too, though it is inanimate, is affected by it as odour simply and sweet-smelling. Similarly with the others. For each inanimate thing is affected by sense-objects not as something that perceives but as something that itself too becomes a sense-object by virtue of the affection they produce in it. For it is in its substance itself that it undergoes the affection and is changed. For inanimate things are affected by the substance of sense-objects, and not insofar as the things affecting them are sense-objects;468 and in being affected they themselves too become sense-objects, being made completely like them, whereas animate things are affected by their activities and become things that perceive in act.

Notes 1. These words, though they begin a new chapter, follow immediately upon ‘But of the things which are of themselves sense-objects, the proper ones are genuinely sense-objects, and the substance of each sense is by nature relative to them.’ I think, therefore, that it is natural to understand ‘sense’ here. However, Philoponus at lines 18-19 below suggests that we supply antilêptikê, ‘apprehending’, to give the sense ‘That which sight apprehends is that which is seen.’ 2. Aristotle speaks of objects ‘proper’, idia, to particular senses and objects ‘common’, koina, to all; Philoponus, like many other commentators, takes the common objects to be objects proper to a further ‘common’ sense, and so speaks of sight, hearing etc. as ‘special’ or ‘proper’, idiai, senses. 3. Perhaps phosphorescent. 4. opseis; besides using opsis for the sense of sight, Philoponus uses it for acts of seeing, organs of sight, and also (following Aristotle’s practice in Meteor. 1, 345b11) for rays of sight or streams of optic pneuma; cf. 316,29 and the passage from Vaticanus 268 printed by Hayduck in the apparatus on p. 294. He probably means such sight-streams here, though he could be using the word for acts of seeing or for sight-organs. 5. There cannot, strictly speaking, be colour in depth if, as is stated in the de Sensu passage referred to at 321,35, colour is essentially two-dimensional, the limit or surface of a three-dimensional expanse. 6. Philoponus juggles with two rival theories of vision. According to one, sight-streams go out from the eye to the object of sight; according to the other, ‘activities’, that is, visible qualities or forms, come from the object to the eye. These theories are examined in detail below, 324,35ff. 7. Not milky, but colourless. 8. Or perhaps: ‘the colours in the whole of, throughout, a transparent medium’; cf. below 321,25. 9. For instance, the colour of the fly in the amber. 10. In de Sensu 439b11-12 Aristotle says that colour is ‘the limit [i.e. the outer surface] of the transparent in a determinate body’. 11. For this transitive use of anamattesthai, cf. Plotinus 4.3.26. 12. There is a lacuna here (322,29); as Hayduck says, we need to supply some such words. 13. A surprising interpretation. Aristotle could mean that whereas Diares’ son, say, is an incidental object of sight by virtue of his own colour, what is transparent is an object of sight by virtue of the colour of something else, namely the thing seen through it. There is a suggestion of this at 323,10-11. It is interesting that Aristotle says the transparent is perceived at all, but neither interpretation explains this oddity, which Philoponus addresses below, 322,36ff.

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14. Presumably that the transparent is an object of sight. 15. For instance, if you carry out the experiment at night out of doors; you cannot then tell whether the lamp is lit or not. 16. merikos, a word often used for the particular, as contrasted with the general, but here, probably, because the light of a lamp is small compared with that of the sun. 17. i.e. the periphery of the universe. 18. Actually at Republic 6, 507C7. 19. Philoponus is still stating the case for thinking that the transparent is an object of vision, but explaining (again) why someone might think differently. Hayduck says there should be a negative at line 24, ‘And just as it is not the case, because air is not an object of sight without light, that we say it is not an object of sight at all’, but this does not seem to me necessary. 20. i.e. the quality that constititutes its substance. 21. Or, perhaps, ‘jewels’. 22. Literally ‘the fixed’; a reference to the sphere of the ‘fixed’ stars. 23. goun, often to be translated ‘at least’, but here, as sometimes, simply introducing an example. astron, star, is used, as often, to cover the sun and moon as well as the planets. 24. i.e. between it and the earth. 25. i.e. planets. 26. The OCT punctuates differently to give the sense: ‘Light is the actuality of this, the transparent insofar as it is transparent.’ 27. There now follows a long theôria, or continuous exposition, on light and vision. This may be compared, though Philoponus does not refer to them, to the essays in Alexander, Mantissa, 127-50. 28. opseis, used by Aristotle also for organs of sight, e.g. Metaph. 11, 1063a7-10; see n. 4 above. 29. i.e. two-twelfths of the circumference of the zodiac. 30. The text is corrupt; translating words taken from Sophonias’ in An. 76,30 as Hayduck suggests. Philoponus is thinking of the zodiac not as a circle, as he does next, but as a hexagon with two of the twelve signs in each side. In a regular hexagon the diagonals are double the length of the sides. 31. If it contained exactly four, the circumference would contain more than twelve. 32. On what precisely is to count as the pupil, see 366,11-13 below. 33. phôta; I take this to be not from phôs, light, see phôtois in 325,36, but from phôton, a useful word not recorded by Liddell and Scott. Hayduck takes phôtois to be an unusual form of the dative of phôs. For the theory that images, eidôla, go out from the objects seen and meet the sight-streams, see Alexander, Mantissa, 134,30-138,2. 34. i.e. the sun and moon. 35. Because (or so people thought before Cantor) a magnitude cannot be made up of points. 36. Not exactly; but in GC 1.8 Aristotle sketches the theory (held by Empedocles and others) that interaction occurs because bodies contain microscopic pores, 324b25-35, and argues that bodies cannot consist solely of pores with nothing solid and continuous bounding them, 325b8-19, and that in general postulating pores to explain interaction is useless, 326b6-24. 37. okhêma, used in common speech for a vehicle like a cart, but by the Neoplatonists for the body that is the vehicle for a soul. 38. i.e. two bodies in the same place.

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39. Philoponus is thinking of clay which is ‘thicker’, more solid and massive, than dry soil. 40. Probably the argument of 328,3-13. 41. The sun is imagined trailing these rays rather as a jellyfish trails filaments. The rays would sweep the earth in ‘the passage of the sun’s movement’ as it revolves round the earth. 42. Philoponus is probably imagining different people facing each other across the same space; I might see a black Ethiopian standing against a red wall, he might see a white European standing against a blue wall. The intervening air cannot be coloured both black and red and white and blue. 43. pathos, a word used often for a passive state or quality produced in something when it is affected (paskhei) by action upon it. 44. A beautiful example of Philoponus’ long sentences; it runs for 16 lines of Hayduck without grammatical incoherence, but the English reader (or translator) needs to take breath. 45. skhoinos; the word could also be used for a single reed. 46. Or, possibly, ‘refractions in [curved] mirrors’. 47. pureiois: this word is used for sticks rubbed together to make fire (Plato, Republic 4, 435A2), but it is hard to see how these present a difficulty for Philoponus’ theory of light. I take him to be speaking of tinder of some kind, lit by focussing the sun’s rays, as the next sentence suggests. 48. The suggestion seems to be that when rays are bent by a lens and focussed, they rub together and heat by friction: see below, 331,38-332,3. 49. That is, the angle at which a ray falls on a smooth body is equal to the angle at which it leaves it. 50. sc. on the hypothesis of ‘acts of sight’ that are emitted from the eyes. I here use the two expressions ‘sight-organs’ and ‘sight-streams’, but Philoponus uses the single word opsis. See note to 320,20 above. 51. i.e. we preserve as true what is generally thought to be true. 52. ekpuroun, a favourite word with the Stoics. 53. diplôsis, doubling or folding; the idea is that when light passes through a lens the rays are folded together like material passed through a ring. 54. Aristotle speaks, e.g. in Meteor. 2, 355b9, of innate heat in animals, probably residing in their innate or connate (sumphuton) pneuma. 55. The ‘spirited’ part of the psukhê is one of the three parts distinguished by Plato in Republic 4. 56. And thereby makes us angry: DA 1, 403a31-b1. 57. We must imagine a diagram with two concentric circles. 58. Our part of the earth’s surface. 59. According to Meteor. 1, 340a6-8 the size of the earth is ‘as good as nothing’ compared with that of the whole universe. 60. Reading therei for thermôi, hot (sc. season) as Hayduck suggests; cf. 333,16 below. 61. How does Philoponus think this phenomenon of reflecting back explains why it is hotter in summer and at midday? Perhaps (as an anonymous reader of my translation suggests) when the sun is directly overhead the ‘activities’ are reflected straight back up into the air above us in acute angles, whereas when it is nearer the horizon, they form more obtuse angles; cf. 332,23-5 above. 62. Aristotle speaks of visual rays or sight-streams in the Meteorologica, e.g. 1, 345b11; 3, 373a35. We have a commentary by Philoponus on book 1 of this work. 63. krustalloeides, literally ‘crystalline’ or ‘ice-like’; the word is used for the lens, and also for the vitreous humours that the lens separates from the

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Notes to pages 18-24

aqueous. Other writers, however, use hualoeides for the latter purpose, and Dr Inna Kupreeva (informal communication) is of the opinion that Philoponus uses krustalloeides hugron to refer to a third kind of humour supposed by Galen to make up the substance of the lens. 64. antiperiistatai, a word used by Aristotle in the Meteorologica. At 1, 348b2-17 and 4, 382b8-10 it is used for one thing being concentrated by another that presses round it, but at 4, 382a11-14 it is applied to something that moves around another that presses upon it. Water, says Aristotle, is not soft, for when something is pushed into it, it moves round that thing; a soft thing gives way without doing this. It is in this second sense (as an anonymous reader of my translation persuades me) that Philoponus uses the word here. Air, being moist, will behave like water. So quantities of air resist being folded into each other or merged with one another, and if the activities are in air, heating cannot be explained by folding or doubling up of activities. 65. sc. the part that has been bent or refracted. 66. Or, perhaps (taking eis with logos instead of with mataios), ‘Hence the account in terms of bendings of activities for the making of greater heat, is empty.’ 67. eidôla, a word used in this context by the Epicureans. See also Alexander, Mantissa 134,30-136,28, mentioned above. 68. Understanding tis here and at 335,7 below. Alternatively we could take ‘he’, sc. ‘the Philosopher’ as subject. Parisinus 1914 and Trincavelli read phêsaien, ‘they might say’, but that seems wrong. ‘They’ are the believers in corporeal visual rays. 69. spheklon, taken from the Latin speculum, a mirror or looking glass, cf. below 335, 20 huelos. Philoponus might be thinking of a ray reflected from a mirror, but his words better fit the case of light passing through stained glass. 70. We should not think that a sight-stream from the eye strikes the solid body and is reflected out through the coloured glass. 71. The ‘them’ could refer either to the ‘other bodies’ or to the objects of sight; in either case the point seems to be that objects of sight do not affect all bodies but only animals with sight. 72. That is, we should take it to be within. (Why we should so take it is not altogether clear.) 73. i.e. rarefied; to reflect it would have to be dense. 74. rhagoeides, literally ‘grape-like’, from rhax, ‘a grape’. 75. The idea seems to be that the humour initially affects the pneuma in the eye, but the affection spreads out into the sight-stream outside the eye, and is apprehended there. 76. This does not explain why we take the colour of the humour to be outside the eye. Philoponus comes to that problem only when it is raised again at 338,5. In the interval he tries to explain why, though we see the humour which is within the eye, we do not see the iris, which is also within the eye. 77. Presumably of our not seeing the colour of the iris. 78. ho kai holôs ei mê horômen: a difficult text; it might also be translated: ‘And if we do not see it [sc. the iris] through the whole iris ….’ 79. See note to 404,16. 80. The point of these rhetorical questions seems to be that when an image in a mirror moves, we know this is the effect of movement in the object reflected, but when humours move in the eye we do not realise that what looks like a moving body is an illusion produced by this internal movement. 81. Morbid dilatation of the pupil: see [Galen], Introductio sive Medicus, 14.768.7 Kühn. 82. sc. as those used by the advocates of sight-streams.

Notes to pages 24-25

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83. Hayduck punctuates here only with a semicolon, but the next words seem to begin a fresh objection to ‘activities’ theory. 84. Reading tou kentrou for ta kentra, as Hayduck suggests. 85. Hayduck suggests that for diatithentes, toiautais we should read dia to en tais toiautais. This would give a more straightforward Greek sentence which we could translate ‘as when pressing a finger on the lower eyelid we displace upwards the position of one of the two eyes, why in states like this do we see double?’ But the emendation is unattractively bold. 86. That is, with the optic axes parallel. 87. Philoponus changes the construction from accusative and infinitive to indicative. 88. Philoponus seems to imagine that the field of vision of each eye is a cone with its central axis passing through the centre of the lens, and streams of optic pneuma form cones around these axes. If that is right, then if the axes are parallel and we look at a six foot tall man ten feet away, the distance between the eyes being small in comparison with the height of the man, it will be as if the bases of the sight-stream cones coincided. If, however, the axes are not parallel, but one, say, is parallel to the ground and the other slants down, the sight-stream parallel with the ground will form a cone the base of which is filled by the man, but the slanting sight-stream, to take in the man, will need a larger base only part of which will be filled by the man. 89. Strictly speaking, if the optic axes, rather than being parallel, converge at the centre-point of the object seen. 90. That is, the bases of the sight-stream cones will subtend equal angles to the two eyes. 91. Berkeley in his New Theory of Vision claims that none of the angles invoked in traditional theories of vision are ‘immediately’ or (to use Aristotle’s term) ‘of themselves’ seen (ss.12, 52). In fact, however, the angular magnitude of an object, the angle it subtends to the eye, is ‘of itself’ seen: what Berkeley calls ‘visible’ magnitude (ss. 49, 54) is precisely angular magnitude. 92. The two sight-streams referred to here are not, surely, the sight-streams from the two eyes, but the two composite sight-streams, coinciding from both eyes, to the two objects. The different ‘angles’ they make are not the angles formed at the eyes by the sides of the cones, but rather by the two numerically distinct bases of the cones (cf. Alexander, Mantissa 146,31-5). The words ‘or more’, ê pleiona, are awkward, and perhaps a gloss. 93. e.g. by a finger, as at 339,32-5 above. 94. Here the sight-streams are from the two eyes. They no longer coincide (‘diverging not equally from the axes’), so there are two bases or angular magnitudes. 95. Philoponus does not answer this question (unless there is a lacuna), but he would probably want to say that if eyes have parallel optic axes, the same ‘activity’ strikes both in the same way, whereas if one eye squints, activities will strike it at a different angle. 96. i.e. (probably, see below 340,26-7) how do we know the magnitude of the distance of the object from the eye. This is also a problem of how we know the size of distant objects, since depending on its distance an object will subtend different angles, but Philoponus seems not to be raising this question. 97. cf. Berkeley, New Theory of Vision 2: ‘Distance is a line placed endwise to the eye.’ 98. Supplying eite engus as Hayduck suggests. 99. The OCT reads the singular, hôi, ‘in that in which’. 100. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation but not as a lemma.

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Notes to pages 25-31

101. Not just ‘in our part of the world’, but in the sublunary sphere as contrasted with the heavens. 102. skotos: this noun is not obviously abstract; it could be supposed to signify something concrete; so it seems better to use ‘dark’ than ‘darkness’ to translate it. 103. Two kinds of potential are distinguished by Aristotle in ch. 5 and by Philoponus in his commentary ad loc. A man is in potentiality one who Fs in the first way if he is capable of acquiring the ability to F, say, by being taught; he is in potentiality one who Fs in the second way if he has the ability but is not exercising it. 104. For the example, see Physics 2, 195a13-14. A reading alternative to ‘sinks’, kataduei, is ‘wrecks’, kataluei. 105. So Categories 13a31-6: a man with sight can become blind, but not (Aristotle thinks) vice versa. 106. Composite, probably, not in consisting of a plurality of material components, but in consisting of matter and form. 107. The last two words are not the text quoted (418b4-6); they are derived from 418b11; and Aristotle could mean that the transparent is visible through the colours of the objects seen through it. 108. Deleting this negative with Hayduck. 109. Perhaps because a coloured thing’s colour is present in it always. 110. The OCT adds ti, ‘something that is one and the same’. 111. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not a lemma. 112. At Timaeus 58C Plato says that there is a kind of fire that comes from flame and provides light to the eyes. 113. Plato, when he says in the Timaeus that light is an efflux (though he does not use the word aporrhoê but merely speaks of something apion) 114. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 115. The same analogy is used by Alexander, Mantissa 143,7-18. Alexander uses it, however, to suggest that coming to be illuminated is a change in an ‘extrinsic denomination’. 116. khôrein, the same verb as for holding or having room for something. 117. Philoponus here reads ê ei tis, whereas the OCT reads oud’ ei tis, but the difference in meaning is negligible. 118. gignomenou; so many MSS of Aristotle, but others read teinomenou, ‘stretches’. Ross accepted this variant in his OCT but abandoned it in his 1961 edition. 119. i.e. to what is generally thought to be the case. 120. e.g. the sun. 121. Philoponus probably means glass that is clear, not opaque. 122. Or, reading di’ hês after gar esti with t, ‘a transparency through which the other colours …’. 123. Reading to aoraton with t and Aristotle. 124. aoraton: although this word is used for the invisible, i.e. what cannot be seen, it could mean, and Alexander perhaps takes it to mean, what is not seen. 125. So de Anima 3, 425b20-2. We tell that it is dark by recognising that we cannot see, and for this we need the sense of sight. A blind person cannot tell if it is light or dark. 126. Not skotos, the noun I translate ‘dark’ to contrast with phôs, ‘light’, but the adjective skoteinos. 127. There is a lacuna here; Hayduck suggests we supply phôs to pephôtismenon; I follow the suggestion of an anonymous reader and supply phôs ho pephôtismenos aêr as at 347,35.

Notes to pages 31-38

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128. andrias, literally ‘a statue of a man’, signifies the form or shape given to the bronze, but it is used for the ‘composite substance’, bronze with this shape. 129. That is, we say: ‘Put it in the sun,’ meaning not that the object (perhaps something we wish to dry) is to be put in the celestial body, but that it is to be put in a place that is sun-lit. 130. sc. Aristotle, in calling the transparent (which is a body) ‘light’. 131. sc. the shining of the sun. 132. sc. of the air, which lies beyond the air it has so perfected that the colours of objects in it can be seen. 133. Hayduck suggests we might amend to ‘I’; it is possible, however, that ‘he’ refers to the lecturer. 134. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 135. Aristotle does not offer this classification of sight-objects explicitly; Philoponus extracts it from what he says. The sixth item that Aristotle does not mention is the super-shining sun. 136. As Hayduck observes, Aristotle does not say this in the de Sensu. 137. sc. by the sun, and therefore rendered invisible. The expression is not very felicitous. 138. The idea seems to be that if we could see the air beyond the shadow, it would be full of sunlight and so the stars would be invisible; but since we cannot see it, it is just if it were not there and darkness extended all the way to the stars. 139. cf. Aristotle GA 5, 780b21. 140. Here and below at 351,10.15.25.27.38 the MSS read mêlên, mêlês, mêlê, mêlôn, milên, mellê or mile. In all these cases Hayduck amends to lêmên or lêmê, ‘rheum’. Nevertheless it is incredible that this lectio facilis should have been corrupted in so many places. Moreover we are not ‘anointed’ with rheum (350,3), nor do we apply it to the eye (351,15.25-8). I accept the suggestion originally made, Inna Kupreeva tells me, by R.B. Todd, ‘Philosophy and Medicine in John Philoponus’ Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima’ in Dumbarton Oaks Papers 38 (1984), 103-10, at 107 n. 41, that Philoponus, who was familiar with the technical vocabulary of doctors, used a word for a probe, mêlê, for something we do apply: a kind of instrument, something like a thin spatula, for administering ointments or drops, and I have translated it ‘spatula’ here and at p. 416 below. 141. There is a lacuna here. As Hayduck says, it could be filled by the words ‘and with the eye, changes the sense-organ. That is why also he censures.’ 142. As constrasted with one that is destructive: cf. 417b2-3 and commentary ad loc. 302,6-14. 143. ôioeides, literally ‘egg-like’ from ôion, ‘egg’. 144. e.g. put pale pink stained glass behind red stained glass. 145. Presumably nerves or streams of pneuma coming from the brain. 146. sc. because we shut our eyes; Philoponus is presumably not imagining that we have shutters inside the eye that we can close unconsciously when the spatula is applied. 147. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 148. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 149. i.e. common to more things. 150. This question of the proper order of exposition is one that fascinates Philoponus; see, for instance, 229,2ff. 151. i.e. by their sense of smell, or, perhaps, by the odour of the prey. 152. A rare and refreshing glimpse of Philoponus’ own world.

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Notes to pages 39-46

153. Philoponus is less knowledgeable about piscine anatomy than about human. 154. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 155. diosmon and diêkhes, words formed on the model of diaphanes, ‘transparent’. diaphanes literally means ‘appear-throughable’ diêkhes ‘soundthroughable’ and diosmon ‘perfume-throughable’. Aristotle takes the power of air and water to have things appear through it as a positive property, extending through what has it, and the de Sensu definition of colour makes it the outer limit or surface of this property. 156. Aristotle speaks of sound in de Caelo 2.9 when discussing whether the movements of the heavens cause sound, but he does not, as here, offer a definition of sound. 157. Accepting Hayduck’s suggestion that words to this effect have dropped out. 158. Bronze and other substances that melt were thought to be composed of water, not earth. 159. It seems rather that the water picks up the movement of the finger and is thrown out by centrifugal force; too bad that Philoponus did not ask relative to what the water rotates. 160. autou, ‘itself’, i.e. the sounding thing, as Philoponus says at lines 37-8. 161. It is remarkable that Philoponus did not try striking pieces of metal together under water. 162. Perhaps referring to 353,13-16 and 21. 163. A Pythagorean definition: see in An. 1, 146,5. 164. Lines 358,33-5 and 359,4-5 suggest Philoponus has in mind the cracking a whip, and not just the whistling or humming sound of its lash. 165. rhipisin. rhipis is a word for a fan, but Philoponus may be using it for a bellows. 166. That is, it produces the sound we hear. 167. khasmai, a word that usually means ‘yawn’, but the description seems to fit snoring better. 168. Presumably a thin, pliant rod or switch; it is not clear if Philoponus wants to contrast this with a whip that cracks. 169. There is a lacuna here. Hayduck suggests supplying from Aristotle ‘but only bronze and as many things as are smooth and hollow’. I think Philoponus may have said something like ‘he says “smooth things” not because rough things do not sound, for rough things also sound’ etc. 170. hormathon, translated ‘eddy’ by Liddell and Scott, followed by Ross and Hamlyn. They seem to take Aristotle to be saying that as we can hit an eddy of sand before the grains have dispersed, so one body striking another can complete its movement before the air has dispersed. On this interpretation, the blow on the eddy need not be heard; it is an analogue to a sound rather than an example. I think Aristotle may have meant that just as we have to hit sand very fast to produce a sound because the air obviously disperses easily, so anything producing a sound must strike quickly. hormathos is also used of strings or chains, so it might here mean a stream of sand or even a ridge such as is made by waves. 171. A puzzling phrase on which Philoponus proceeds to offer two interpretations. 172. Or perhaps, ‘are the most genuine causes’. The word used, kurios, has both meanings. Elsewhere (Metaph. 4, 1010b15-17) Aristotle says that the senses are ‘in control’, that is, authoritative, with regard to their proper objects.

Notes to pages 46-52

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173. In his OCT edition Ross deletes ‘from’; this yields a genitive absolute: ‘Echo occurs when, air having become one, the air is pushed away back.’ 174. There is a lacuna here. In place of this sentence Vaticanus 268 has a sentence missing its beginning: ‘since the discussion of echo follows upon the account of the nature of sounds. That is why after the latter it is proper also to treat of this. Echo, then, occurs by virtue of reflection ….’ 175. ton epi tade, the side towards us. 176. i.e. the echoed syllables. 177. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 178. i.e. remains; see 363,30 below. 179. ‘Hearing’, akoê, here means ‘the organ of hearing’ (in which air is ‘inborn’), and ‘change’ is a better translation than ‘move’ for kinêtikon in view of what is said above 361,5-362,8 about the air not being moved and below about the wave-motion, ‘giving a similar shape’. 180. pros autêi têi mêningi, literally ‘adjoining the drumskin’; mêninx can signify a membrane (see in de Anima 1, 19,10) and hence the drumskin or the whole drum that contains air or pneuma, as at 364,15-16. 181. Not the capacities but the pneuma that is the proximate possessor of the capacities. The nerves are thought of as conduits of the pneuma. Pneuma, a kind of gaseous substance, does the work for Philoponus and Aristotle that is done in modern physiology by electric impulses. 182. Philoponus does not take account of the labyrinth, where the acoustic nerves would today be thought to terminate. 183. The outer membrane of the drum, the ‘drumskin’. 184. The ‘cavity of the ear’ is the external meatus; the ‘channel of the ear-drum’ is probably the channel referred to above that carries the pneuma to the ear-drum. 185. probeblêtai, from proballein, a word used for throwing up defensive works, as it might be against the sea or against advancing troops. Philoponus is thinking of the air in the eardrum and the drumskin as defences; the image is applied also to the liquids and mebranes of the eye, 365,2. 186. peristatikas: ‘hazardous’ or perhaps simply ‘occasional’. 187. sc. into the outer ear, a kind of solid ear-plug; perhaps, however, a word meaning ‘different’ or ‘solid’ has dropped out before problêma, ‘defence’. 188. kinoumenon, ‘moved’ or perhaps better, as Philoponus goes on to observe, ‘changed’. 189. i.e. the whole of its body is not sensitive to sound. 190. The MSS have variant readings here indicating that the words were found puzzling. A simple solution is to insert ‘for’, gar, after oude. The meaning will then be that animals do not hear with every part of their bodies because they do not have air in every part. 191. Hayduck indicates a lacuna here and plausibly supplies the words gar tou exô. 192. tenôn, the word for a tendon, but used by Galen, (I am told on the authority of J. Hankinson) for the choroid membrane which surrounds the eyeball. 193. The walls of the middle ear, and perhaps also the labyrinth. 194. empsukhos; Ross says this word is ‘pointless’ and wants to follow Torstrik in amending to empsophos, a rare word meaning ‘made to have sound’. Philoponus (366,14) takes it to mean the part that has the power to hear, this power being part of the soul. 195. The words ‘as the pupil and the liquid’ are not in the MSS of Aristotle, and Ross (p. 249) suggests they are added by Philoponus as an elucidation: the

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Notes to pages 52-59

organ of hearing does not have air on every side, any more than the pupil has the essential liquid on every side. This whole passage is printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 196. Philoponus here reads auto, Aristotle’s MSS read autos, ‘air itself is soundless’. 197. One might have expected an active sense, ‘it would destroy’; does Philoponus think the trapped water would harm the sense-organ by evaporating or turning foetid? 198. Is Philoponus thinking of syringing out wax? 199. kamêi, ‘is sick’, is added here in Aristotle’s MSS and the OCT, and the words at the end ‘when it is sick’ are bracketed by Ross. This passage is printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 200. Aristotle perhaps means that a horn held to the ear produces a faint sound like the distant booming of the sea; but Philoponus apparently understands him (368,21-3; 369,1) as comparing the sound in a stopped ear to the sound of a horn when we blow it. 201. Vaticanus 268 has here the following: ‘But it is possible to say that now he is saying that it moves in part, [i.e. that parts of it move relative to one another], which is not genuinely movement. For in truth the pneuma does not move. For it moves neither in a straight line (for this does not fall under our perception) nor in a circle, for it would then be indestructible, for things that move in a circle are indestructible. So it does not move at all. Why, then, does he now say it moves, having there [at 420a9-10] said it was unmoving?’ 202. In place of this sentence Vaticanus 268 has: ‘For always, he says, this pneuma is alive and provides life and activity to the part [sc. the sense-organ]. For apart from it [sc. this pneuma] there can be no hearing. And why is it not itself sufficient [accepting arkei in place of akouei as Hayduck suggests] for hearing? Because it does not extend as far as the sense-objects. There is need, then, also of that [sc. air] which is outside, to bring along the sound. For hearing apprehends sound that belongs to something else, not sound that is its own. That is why it has need of the air as a sound-vehicle, the air that is said by others to be void.’ 203. The OCT has a definite article, ton, before aera, ‘air’. 204. Philoponus takes Aristotle to be saying that the booming sound we hear when we block our ears is not the sound of the air inside the ear-drum, but really belongs to something external. Other readers, including Ross and Hamlyn, take him to be saying that the booming is not, strictly speaking, a sound because it is the sound of air in the ear-drum, and strictly speaking sound is the sound of something other than the sense-organ and external. 205. Philoponus here begins an enormous sentence running for 20 lines of Hayduck (371,14-33); I have broken it up. 206. In fact he refers to Anaxagoras. 207. Or perhaps: ‘to arrive at some last indivisible parts’. 208. Here as elsewhere Philoponus’ account of sound is vitiated by his ignorance of elasticity. 209. platu; platus can mean either ‘broad’ or ‘flat’, but the latter seems to be the sense needed here. 210. The onomatopoeic effect achieved in English by ‘gong’, ‘ring’, ‘ringing’ is achieved in Greek by êkheion, êkhêtikos, êkhos. 211. oxu and baru; these words also do duty for our ‘sharp’ and ‘flat’ and baru has the further meaning ‘heavy’. 212. metaphora; the source of our word ‘metaphor’ but meaning simply ‘transference’.

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213. oxus can in fact mean ‘fast’, as at 325,15; 413,7.12. 214. Philoponus is probably thinking rather of a surgeon’s knife making an incision than of an assassin’s inflicting a wound. 215. Or ‘acute-angled’ and ‘obtuse-angled’, oxugônia and amblugônia. 216. Philoponus thinks that high sounds travel faster than low; he does not distinguish the speed with which sound waves are propagated from the speed with which a sounding body vibrates. 217. The bottom string on the lyre, but the highest in sound. Hayduck puts only a comma before this sentence; I have punctuated more heavily. 218. This is what Philoponus means, though the construction seems to change awkwardly in mid-sentence. 219. Perhaps Philoponus wrote bradus, ‘slow’, here carelessly in place of barus, ‘low’. 220. Philoponus conceives sound as a kind of quality [energeia] given to air and transmitted to the air in the eardrum. A quality cannot move in the way a body can; it moves if a body that has it moves, and in this passage high sound is conceived as being carried by a moving quantity of air; but earlier it is described as being transmitted from one part of air to another, in effect as a wave-motion. Either way high sound moves faster than low, but its quality of being high is not the same as its greater speed. 221. Broad and sizeable, no doubt, unlike needles. 222. phônê: this word is used for the voice of a speaker, and also marks the distinction between sound that has a pitch and noise. 223. meta phantasias sêmantikês: the phrase, which appears also at 379,5-6, means literally ‘with imagination (or appearance) that signifies.’ We might be tempted to understand it as meaning ‘with an appearance of signifying something’; but 379,9ff. it appears that phantasia should be taken as imagination, not appearance, and that Philoponus wants to define voice in terms both of imagination and of signifying; the sound must be made by animals that have imagination, animals, that is, to which things appear, and for the purpose of signifying what appears. 224. lexis; not, it seems, use of words, but rather articulate phrasing, whether of significant words or of other sounds. 225. epê, ‘words’ or, perhaps, ‘poetry’. 226. diatupôsis: that this means shaping seems to be shown by Philoponus’ use of skhêmatizein, ‘to shape’, at 380,3. 227. The subject of this sentence, as of that preceding it, seems to be ‘instruments’, in which case Philoponus may be referring not to ordinary musical accompaniment, but to sympathetic resonance. 228. ekhei; taking the subject of this to be the neuter plural organa, though Philoponus has just used the plural form mimountai. Further on this phrasing see below 380,7-11. 229. epiglôttis, the tongue of the instrument, situated in the mouthpiece. 230. Hermogenes of Tarsus has left a treatise with the title Concerning the Forms of Speech. 231. apotasis; Hamlyn translates this ‘variation of pitch’, but the meaning may simply be ‘sustained sound’. 232. The OCT reads gar, ‘for’, instead of de, ‘and’. 233. phônais: Philoponus has been using phônê in the singular for voice, but here the plural seems to be used, as often elsewhere, for spoken words. 234. Or sea-snakes; Philoponus uses he words karkinoi, skutalai; it is not clear exactly what species he has in mind. 235. diaphônêsis, a word not in LSJ.

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236. There is a lacuna here. The words appear to be the beginning of a lemma (though Hayduck prints them simply as a quotation), but the OCT adds hoion , ‘such as those’, before ‘in the Achelous’. I have supplied the rest of Aristotle’s text down to the next lemma. The lacuna includes some words of commentary. As Hayduck suggests, they may have had the sense: ‘People say that in the Achelous ….’ 237. brankhiois: ‘gills’ rather than ‘fins’, cf. Aristotle de Respiratione 478a32-4. 238. The similarity lies not in their being thought to speak, but in the wrongness of this opinion, since the sound is made in the wrong way. 239. See note to 375,19-20. 240. hormê, used by Stoic writers for acts of will. 241. Apollonius Rhodius, Argonautikon 4, 1337. 242. In the absence of organs worked with bellows the word can be applied to instruments like bag-pipes and pan-pipes. 243. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 244. Aristotle in the lemma uses the verb tuptein for ‘to strike’, and Philoponus in his paraphrase uses plêttein. 245. We need taste (to discriminate between what is nourishing and what is not) if we are to exist at all, whereas we need to express ourselves in discourse if our existence is to be at a good level. Well-being is a life superior to bare necessity. 246. Perhaps ‘quality’, i.e. that which distinguishes a flute, say, from a lyre or one vowel from another. What is missing from Philoponus’ account, of course, is any reference to the vocal cords. 247. So de Respiratione 478a32-4. 248. This is not Aristotelian doctrine. Aristotle thinks that fish have hearts (HA 2,507a3-5) but not lungs (Respir. 476a6-7). 249. Philoponus, as his commentary line 23 shows, read anapneomenou, genitive not agreeing with aera, whereas the OCT emends this to anapneomenon, which does agree, giving the sense ‘that is why it is necessary that air should be breathed in and enter.’ Philoponus takes anapneomenou to be a genitive absolute. 250. See above 332,8-12 and note. 251. empsukhon; so the MSS of Aristotle. In the OCT Ross amended this to empsophon, ‘sonorous’ or ‘resonant’, but in his 1955 edition he reverted to the MSS reading, and took ‘that which strikes’ to refer to ‘the soul in these parts’ of 420b28. 252. Probably not a lemma; Philoponus here omits a couple of words, gar, ‘for’, and the definite article, that are in Aristotle’s MSS. 253. A dictum repeated below, 430,22. 254. This too differs in slight ways from Aristotle’s MSS and is probably not a lemma. 255. Philoponus is probably thinking of PA 3, 669a3-6, which, however, refers for a fuller account to de Respiratione 475b15-476a15. 256. One would have expected Philoponus to say it is not necessary for them. 257. ‘I call ‘ “insects”, entoma, such animals as have slits, entomas, in their bodies’, Aristotle, HA 1 487a32-3. 258. Philoponus seems (see 388,4-5 below) to have read ê to phôs, ‘or light’ here, words omitted in some MSS of Aristole and the OCT. 259. The Meteorology passage says that sight is quicker than hearing, not that it has a longer range; Philoponus seems to assimilate the two. 260. So Meteor. 2, 369a24-9.

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261. So Meteor. 2, 369b9-11: you see the rowers carrying the oars back, anapherontôn palin, after the stroke, before you hear the splash of their going in. 262. These exhalations play star explanatory roles in Meteor. 1-3. 263. The first quotation is apposite but the second is not, since Homer is speaking of an eagle that detects by sight, not smell. 264. At HA 2, 505a35-b1 Aristotle says that (unlike crabs and insects) fish do not have hard eyes. ‘Hard eyes’ are contrasted with ‘moist eyes’, hugrophthalma, that is, eyes containing liquids (PA 2, 648a17-19). That fish are moist-eyed and see well is confirmed PA 2, 658a3-10, a passage Philoponus seems to have overlooked; it gives an alternative teleological explanation of why fish do not have eyelids. 265. aithiops, literally, Ethiopian. 266. drimus: the passage from Vaticanus 268 printed below after 407,7 gives as an example of something drimus pepper, and there ‘fierce’ or ‘burning’ seems the best English equivalent, though they are not normal taste-words. 267. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. It looks, however, as if Philoponus is now passing from a continuous exposition (theôria) to a detailed commentary (rhêton or lexis). 268. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, but not as a lemma. 269. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 270. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 271. diaphoreitai; the undigested residues of food, perittômata, are apparently broken down and extruded through soft skin; the word, however, echoes diapherontôs, ‘outstandingly’, in Aristotle’s text. 272. sundesmos: the grammarian’s word for a conjunction, but here used for the soul’s being bound together with the body. 273. See DA 3.11, 434a4-7, a passage that fascinated the commentators. 274. euphuês: a word suggesting both a good natural constitution and a pleasing appearance. 275. Literally, ‘both being similarly in a state according to nature’. 276. Ploughing, ditching, etc. 277. austêros: in the sense in which wine is called ‘dry’: wine is given as an example of something austêros in the passage from Vaticanus 268 printed after 407,7. 278. aloas: probably a variant for aloê, though not recorded as such in Liddell and Scott. 279. Aristotle here draws one distinction, whereas Philoponus below draws two, between things which are not of a nature either to have an odour or to be odourless, such as musical tones or prime numbers, and things which are; and among the latter, between things that cannot be smelt at all because they are totally lacking in odour, like very clean cups and things which can be smelt but with difficulty have either a very faint odour or one that is too powerful. 280. There is a lacuna here; I adopt Hayduck’s suggestion for filling it. 281. Vapours and gases given off by volcanoes, including hydrochloric and carbonic acid. 282. Philoponus in Cat. 35,24-31. 283. i.e. from the fact that something near an apple can acquire its odour. 284. Philoponus is doubtless thinking of the Sun and the stars. 285. Philoponus here probably returns from crocodiles to aquatic animals generally and their prey. 286. Amending isthmoeidê, ‘isthmus-shaped’ to êthmoeidê, ‘sieve-shaped’ or ‘ethmoid’. The ethmoid bone, which forms the roof of the nasal cavity, ‘is

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Notes to pages 79-84

cuboidal in shape and is composed of a central portion and two lateral masses, which are connected together by a thin horizontal plate pierced with holes like a sieve, and called cribriform. This cribriform plate forms part of the floor of the cranial cavity; on it rest the two olfactory bulbs, and the branches of the nerves of smell … pass through the holes in this plate into the nose’ (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 10th ed., vol. 1, p. 824); Philoponus seems to have seen a certain amount of this. The MSS exhibit uncertainty about the right word for this bone at 395,15 and 398,19, but it seems to me unlikely that Philoponus himself was in error. 287. Philoponus wants to construe the whole sentence: ‘For indeed aquatic animals seem to perceive smell – in the same way both those with blood and those without – in the same way as also do animals in the air’. This involves taking homoiôs, ‘in the same way’ as doing double duty, peritteuei, literally, ‘as going beyond’, in the parenthetical clause and in the whole sentence. Sharks and mussels would be aquatic animals with and without blood respectively; Spartan hounds and mosquitoes would be included among animals ‘in the air’. 288. All the senses, or perhaps, in view of the next clause, all animals. 289. anapneonta: this word can be used both for breathing and for breathing in. Aristotle in the lemma probably intended to use it in the sense ‘breathing in’. Philoponus, however, (see below, 393,33) takes it as the generic term, ‘breathing’, used in place of the specific, ‘breathing in’ or ‘drawing in breath’, for which he himself uses eispnein. 290. Hayduck suggests ‘those that have blood’ here, enaimôn, should be corrected to ‘the bloodless’, anaimôn, and this would give the clause more point. 291. Emending isthmoeidôn, ‘isthmus-shaped’, to êthmoeidôn. It is significant that Parisinus 1914 reads ithmoeidôn 292. Suffice to cool the hot region around the heart. The suggestion is that if these amphibians cool themselves in different ways when in the water and on land, they may also smell in two ways. 293. The mastoid process, or perhaps ‘inborn air’ in the ethmoid bone, see 398,19. 294. Hayduck suggests altering aisthêseôs, ‘sense’ to osphrêseôs, ‘smell’, but the corruption is unlikely, and Philoponus could be saying that having in ch. 5 said in general way that the sense-organ becomes like the sense-object, he will develop this point for the senses in detail in ch. 12. 295. i.e. about the organs of these senses. 296. hupokeitai; hupokeisthai, literally ‘to lie under’, and serving as the passive of hupotithenai, ‘to put under’, has several uses in philosophical Greek. It is used for hypotheses, that is, propositions which are assumed true, such as axioms and scientific principles. It is used for subjects of a sense or branch of knowledge, that is, for the things perceived or studied. And it is used for things supposed to be present already. In this usage I translate it ‘underlie’ and participle hupokeimenon used as a noun, ‘underlying thing’. An ‘underlying thing’ may be a thing out of which something else arises, as bronze is underlying thing for a statue, and grape-juice is for wine. It may be that which acquires or (as Philoponus says) ‘receives’ a property. Claret would be underlying thing or subject in this way for a red colour and a fruity flavour. In such a case, Philoponus says, it underlies ‘as matter’ (though for Aristotle matter is primarily that which underlies in the first way, as ‘that out of which’). Or it may be something that has to be there though it does not have either of these roles, as is, see 398,22-7, the medium for the senses of sight, hearing and smell. 297. Aristotle in fact (Meteor. 2, 358a3-27) gives a different explanation: he says the saltiness comes from rain.

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298. Perhaps Philoponus means, when it is taken in by plants; the wood, fibres etc. of plants are earthen. 299. Reading phasi with Parisinus 1914 and Trincavelli. Hayduck reads phêsi, ‘he says’, with A. The difficulty with this reading is that ‘he’ should be Aristotle, and Aristotle does not give the reply that follows. Some readers might wish to take ‘he’ to be the lecturer. 300. In the OCT Ross amends hê haphê, ‘touch’, to têi haphêi, ‘that which is perceived by touch’. 301. Correcting isthmoeidê (Parisinus 1914 ithmoeidê) to êthmoeidê as above 392,32; 395,15. 302. See note to 396,27. 303. Aristotle’s sentence is careless. It is not clear if ‘the object of taste’ should be taken as being in apposition to ‘flavour’ (Philoponus so takes it) or with ‘the body’, and while the flavour is in the moist as matter, the body in which the flavour is is surely identical with the moist, not present in it as form in matter. 304. Ross and Hamlyn take Aristotle to be imagining that we are aquatic animals living in water like fish, but Philoponus’ matter-of-fact commentary (399,19-20; 400,7.11.24) suggests he is attributing to Aristotle the less bold thought-experiment that we are bathing. 305. For instance the meat suspended above the water which the crocodiles smell. 306. melikraton: Philoponus speaks of it as containing honey and water. Such a mixture was offered in pre-Christian times to the inhabitants of the underworld, but Philoponus may be thinking of it as a medical prescription. 307. Alexander interprets ‘in the moist as water’ as ‘in what is moist as water is moist’. 308. ‘It’ is probably the air, rather than the thing tasted. 309. After the digression on whether water is completely flavourless, Philoponus returns to the reading reported by Alexander, but now gives it as hôs en hudati, ‘as in water’, instead of as hôs hudati, ‘as water’, which is closer to the reading accepted by Ross, hôs hulêi, ‘as [form in] matter’. 310. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 311. There is corruption here; as Hayduck says, it looks as if words to this effect have dropped out. 312. Philoponus uses the plural, hales, but I think he is referring rather to grains of salt than to kinds of salt. 313. bôlos hê Armênia: Armênia is Hayduck’s conjecture. The reference seems to be to a kind of limestone coloured blue by copper carbonate. 314. An awkward sentence; one would expect a conjunction such as ‘therefore’ and the number of the verb changes from plural to singular. 315. There are words for species of flavour as there are for colours and sounds, but not for smells. 316. Philoponus here has the spelling anoratos; the OCT has aoratos, the spelling Philoponus prefers in his commentary. 317. Closing brackets unclosed in Hayduck’s text. 318. Philoponus may be thinking of hibernation in the dark season as well as withdrawal at night. 319. The martlet (swift) is not only described but depicted as footless in heraldry. 320. In place of ‘not that which cannot … by defect’, Vaticanus 268 has: ‘And that which cannot be tasted is fourfold: either that which is unflavoured up to now, but which can be flavoured, or that which is a subject of the other senses, like sound, or that which has a little flavour, like the watery kinds of gruel, or

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Notes to pages 92-97

that which has an evil taste, like poisons. And it is clear which of these taste apprehends and which not. These four meanings [i.e. of ‘cannot be tasted’ etc.] can also be discriminated in the case of the other senses.’ 321. The OCT is emended by Ross to give the sense ‘there is taste of both, but the taste of one is poor and destructive, while that of the other is in accordance with nature’. 322. Or perhaps: ‘what is moist is most of all and primarily drink’. 323. An alternative and perhaps more plausible interpretation is offered below, lines 20-3. 324. This word khumos can also mean ‘juice’ or ‘humour’ but it would be confusing of Philoponus to use it in that sense here without warning. 325. prospheromenon; or perhaps ‘that is consumed’, as at 396,26 and Aristotle, de Sensu, 441b27-442a1, but the original meaning of bringing one thing to another from elsewhere is appropriate here and at 406,10. 326. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 327. tarikhê, a word applicable to salted or dried fish or meat. 328. Possibly sodium carbonate. These dry without preserving. 329. Philoponus at 406,1 reads hautê gar haphê which I translate as above. Ross in the OCT read tautêi gar haphê, which Hamlyn translated ‘In the latter case there is contact’. In his 1961 edition Ross reads hautê gar haphêi, ‘this [sc. perceiving] occurs by contact’. 330. prasios, literally ‘leek-coloured’. 331. The following passage occurs here in Vaticanus 268. Hayduck prints it in his apparatus. 332. cf. de Simplic. Medic. Facult. 4.15, 11.665-73 Kühn. 333. drimus, which as a word for a flavour I translate ‘acrid’, can also mean ‘fierce’ or ‘burning’. 334. See Timaeus 66B-C. Plato says that if the particles coming to the organ of taste ‘anoint the things that have been made rough’ and restore them to their natural state this cure is called ‘sweet’; he does not give a separate account of the ‘oily’ (liparon). 335. The ordering and the associated astrological ‘nonsense’ should be attributed not to Plato himself, but to later Platonists. 336. The long theôria which follows, 407,18-422,10, covers 422b17-423b26. Since Philoponus moves backwards and forwards over that section of Aristotle’s text and interprets some of it idiosyncratically – he wants to assert something Aristotle denies, namely, that flesh is the sense-organ for touch, without explicitly contradicting Aristotle: compare his commentary, 417,14-15 with 423b22-6 – it seems convenient to give it all here. 337. Philoponus here reads dei gar stereon einai (426,20), as do Ross’s MSS PUX. The OCT reads ti stereon, which would be translated ‘It must be something solid’, or even: ‘There must be something solid’. 338. aisthêseis: this can mean (as Aristotle is at pains to point out) either senses or actual perceptions. Usually the context makes clear which he intends, but here he seems to take advantage of the ambiguity; the perceptions ‘come to be’ or occur through a medium, but it is senses that he claims are several. 339. ‘It cannot be said,’ says Hamlyn p. 112, ‘that the course of Aristotle’s argument is very obvious.’ There seems to be an assumption that a genuine sense-organ should be composed of air or water; since animals have to contain earth as well, the earthen parts such as flesh can only be media. And the tactile senses are many, or rather they do not have to be only one in number, because it is agreed that touch is a different sense from taste even though the same thing, the tongue, has both.

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340. That this was the reading of Philoponus’ text appears from 428,26-7. The OCT has ‘but this escapes our notice more, as it escapes the notice of animals in water if wet touches wet’. 341. The terms ‘transparent’, ‘smell-conveying’ etc. signify the form of the medium, the terms ‘air’ and ‘water’ the composite of form and matter. 342. Philoponus will later (417,11-13) say that Aristotle does not really accept these proofs, but provides them to ‘train’ us. 343. i.e. crumbly and sticky. 344. For the list cf. Aristotle, GC 2, 329b18-20. 345. See in An. 72,25-35. Philoponus has expanded and sharpened Themistius’ criticism. 346. Differences of timbre. 347. i.e. loud and soft. 348. heôsphorou: literally, ‘bringer of dawn’; the word is usually used for the Morning Star but here it seems to refer to the dawn itself. 349. The defence (409,4-10) is that the great and small in sound are not those common to several senses but objects proper to hearing. The reply is that they are not proper objects distinct from the high and low. Philoponus in effect corrects Themistius’ ‘not good’ (410,1-2) objection. 350. That is, great and small in sound, or loud and soft, are supervenient properties on high and low, not on sweet and bitter, hot and cold, or any other pair of opposites, and the same is true, Philoponus goes on to say, of large and small in flavour or colour. 351. phônê; Philoponus could mean voice, but the point holds generally for every sound. 352. That would be the ‘hard’, sklêron. 353. This sounds more awkward in English than in Greek: Philoponus uses two words, thinganein for the verb, haphê for the noun. He is reaching for a notion comparable to Locke’s solidity. 354. That is, presumably, they belong to the same class of sense-objects. 355. proslêpsis: in a hypothetical syllogism, the premise that states the antecedent of the conditional premise. For a discussion of the term, see J. Barnes, ‘Proofs and Syllogisms in Galen’, in J. Barnes, J. Jouanna (eds), Galien et la philosophie, Geneva, 2003, 1-24 at 8-10 and 9 n.13. 356. The point that the tongue is an organ both of taste and of touch is made at 423a17-21, but those lines are certainly not explicitly a refutation of Philoponus’ conditional premise. 357. Referred to at 407,19. 358. This sentence suggests that the odoriferous object first works its effect gradually through the air into the nostrils, and then transmits its odour to the organ housed by the ethmoid bone. 359. Philoponus seems to be working here with the hypothesis of sightstreams or optic rays. What takes time, however, is not for the sight-streams to reach the object or the ‘activities’ to reach the eye, but for the perceiver to make a more thorough examination. 360. Reading phasin, ‘they say’, in place of phêsin, ‘he (sc. Aristotle) says’. Philoponus thinks this argument is presupposed by 423a5ff.; at 414,25-6 he interprets these lines as a reply to it. 361. i.e. if this failure to perceive does not occur in the case of touch. 362. Closing brackets here; Hayduck closes them after ‘immediately’ a line below. 363. This looks confused. The first argument goes: ‘If there is no time interval, flesh is not a medium.’ Aristotle argues against this that flesh might

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Notes to pages 105-112

be a medium and there might still be no time interval, i.e. the lack of a time-interval is not sufficient for showing that flesh is not a medium. Philoponus says that Aristotle argues that the lack of a time-interval is not necessary for showing that flesh is a sense-organ. 364. One of Philoponus’ longest sentences, running from here to 415,9, and reaching its main verb ‘we must not think’ only at 414,37. I have broken it up. 365. tôn homoiomerôn; a technical term for anything which is divisible into parts that satisfy the same description as the whole. It is assumed that a sense-organ must consist of something that has similar parts in this sense and is sensitive enough to ‘receive’ perceived qualities. 366. It is hard to discern this refutation in the de Anima. 367. Reading mêlê for lêmê here and at lines 2-4,7,14-16; see n. 140 above. 368. The solution of those ‘who want flesh to be a sense-organ’ to the objection that there is no medium (415,30-1). 369. See n. 261 to 385,21. 370. sc. of optic rays or streams of pneuma; Philoponus seems to come down here in favour of opseis. 371. Philoponus here uses two words, haphê for the sense of taste and thinganein for touching, but he could have used haptesthai instead of thinganein. 372. As Hayduck says, words to this effect seem to have dropped out. 373. Philoponus has not said this here. 374. autoi haptomenoi; the OCT has autôn haptomenoi, ‘as we perceive by touching the things themselves’. 375. That is, it contains no mention of parts or shape. 376. sc. if it were extended; but the parenthesis would be easier to understand if it were placed after the next clause. 377. At in An. 75,35-76,2 Themistius says: ‘We perceive light and heavy by the power within, not by contact’, and adds that this argument is not given by Aristotle. 378. ‘Denial’, apophasis, is often used in this context, ‘assertion’, kataphasis less often; but they express the forms of thought that correspond to lacking and having or not being and being. ‘Apprehending’ silence is not thinking-present a negative thing called ‘silence’ but thinking-absent a positive thing called ‘sound’. 379. There is a lacuna here. Hayduck suggests it might be filled by such words as: ‘Touch, then, discerns opposites in the same way as do the other senses ….’ 380. i.e. even if visible objects were perceived in whatever direction they might be, as objects of hearing and smell are. 381. Reading hê sarx, ‘flesh’, for the MSS ho aêr, air, which seems pointless here. 382. Philoponus may be thinking of 423a12-15. 383. Before giving his own reply to this argument (which he starts to do only at 421,33) Philoponus repeats his criticism of Aristotle’s reply, see above 409,10-410,34, and strengthens the difficulty by arguing (421,5-33) that great and small and rough and smooth are not genuine opposed qualities in the way hot and cold, dry and moist and friable and viscous are. 384. Or perhaps ‘these terms are not well applied’. 385. Aristotle is speaking of kinds of motion, sc. rectilinear translation, rotation etc., and that fast and slow rotation, for instance, are not two species of rotation; but the point holds for all kinds of change generally, for instance, fast and slow alteration are not two species of alteration. The MSS of the Physics

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contain here the words oude diaphorai ‘or differentiae’, omitted in Philoponus’ quotation. 386. Hayduck prints this as a quotation, not a lemma, but in fact it is the first lemma in the detailed commentary or lexis. 387. Here Philoponus seems to take ‘the same account’ as meaning ‘the same account that we have given of the other senses’; below he seems to take it to mean ‘whatever account we give of the objects of touch we must give of the sense’. 388. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 389. The first interpretation does relate the explanation to what goes before, sc. ‘the same account holds’, but more as an explanandum than as an explanans: gar is understood as ‘so’. The second relates it to what is to come, sc. ‘there is a problem’, but is hard to extract from the Aristotle’s text. 390. If there are several senses, there are several kinds of object and conversely. 391. i.e. to take the words as being out of order. Philoponus seems to be looking back to his second interpretation. 392. opsis, a carelessly chosen word to cover whatever may be the organ of sight. 393. bareia; oxus and barus are used for high and low in sound. 394. This is compressed. Philoponus in 409,4-35 says that ‘large’ and ‘small’ are applied to sounds as they are to objects of other senses on grounds of intensive, not extensive, magnitude, and are therefore different from the large and small that are objects common to several senses; but large and small in sound have a connection with large and small in extensive magnitude which strong and weak in colour, odour etc., lack, because sound is bound up with time, which is extensive. 395. The whole field of the visible, or perhaps these nameless phenomena of phosphorescence. 396. ek ton eirêmenôn: either the things actually said by Aristotle, or the things mentioned in the commentary above. 397. Hayduck prints this as a quotation but not as a lemma. It here has thinganomenou, singular, ‘when a thing is touched’, whereas above there was the plural thinganomenôn, ‘when things are touched’. 398. Supplying a question mark missing in Hayduck. 399. The word translated ‘proof’, elenkhos, usually means ‘disproof’ or ‘refutation’. It might here mean ‘proof against those who say that the sense-organ is not flesh but something internal’, or we could suppose that a negative particle has dropped out: ‘sufficient refutation of the proposition that flesh is not the sense-organ’. 400. This premise was originally: ‘If the organ of touch, that is, flesh, is one, the sense is one’; Philoponus is now writing as if it were: ‘If that through which we perceive objects of touch is one, the sense is one’, or even: ‘If flesh is one, the sense is one.’ 401. Hayduck prints this as a quotation, not a lemma. 402. prospephuke; Philoponus changes from using sumphuesthai and sumphues to prosphuesthai. I have translated the sum- compounds ‘growing out around’ and prosphuesthai ‘grow onto’; the sum- compounds are appropriate for something congenital, while prosphuesthai would suit something grafted on, but I doubt if Philoponus has that distinction in mind here, and think it likelier that he uses the different compounds just for variety. 403. The OCT has a different reading here: ‘but this escapes our notice more, as it escapes the notice of animals in water if wet touches wet’. Philoponus’

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Notes to pages 120-126

reading is difficult, as his commentary 428,28-31 shows. It escapes our notice whether the surfaces of things appearing to touch in water are wet, because the water on their surfaces is continuous with the rest of the water, but it is not clear how continuity causes uncertainty when things seem to touch in air. 404. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 405. Inserting touto after kai in line 28, as Hayduck suggests. 406. Philoponus means, presumably, ‘when we touch air or water’. 407. There is a lacuna here which Hayduck suggests filling with these words from A. 408. Hayduck refers to Phys. 5, 226b23, where Aristotle says that things touch if their extremities, akra, are together, but Philoponus may be thinking of the more formal and elegant definition at the beginning of Phys. 6, 231a23 where he uses the same word as here, eskhata. 409. Deleting the comma after rhageiê at 430,15, and reading ho humên for ou mên, an emendation for which I am grateful to Stephen White. Hayduck’s text would have to be translated ‘it would be broken’ the ‘it’ standing for a masculine noun, and there is none available. The subject one would wish to supply in the absence of a noun is sarx, flesh, but that is feminine, and also does not give a satisfactory sense. 410. sc. as air and water; or perhaps as it would be but for the things about to be mentioned. 411. sc. flesh. Alternatively, the word peritetasthai could be taken to mean ‘covered around [sc. by skin]’. 412. It reunites itself to the continuum of the atmosphere. 413. When we see grass, the air between us ‘transmits’ the ‘activity’ green but does not itself become green, whereas when we feel the bath water, our toe becomes warm. 414. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 415. A adds: ‘for it perceives by touching and being in contact with the touch-objects.’ 416. As distinct (Philoponus thinks) from the heavenly bodies. 417. This sentence interrupts the exposition to deal with the objection raised at 415,35-416,5. 418. aisthêsis koinê: the so-called common sense or sensus communis, which is conceived by most commentators as a power additional to sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch, by which we perceive the ‘common’ objects, size, shape etc., and perform certain other perceptual functions. 419. Both for and against the proposition that flesh is the organ of touch. 420. If Philoponus is right and flesh is a sense-organ as well as a medium. 421. This is the end of the detailed commentary on the part of the chapter that was discussed in the theôria. 422. Philoponus here reads hapta, neuter plural, whereas the OCT has haptai, feminine plural agreeing with diaphorai. The translation offered here will do for both readings, but Philoponus’ text allows us to understand ‘objects of touch’ as the subject rather than the complement: having spoken about the sense of touch, Aristotle passes to the objects of touch and says that objects of touch are the differentiating features of the elements. I have translated 434,9 in that way, though it would be possible to take ‘touch-objects’ as the complement there too. 423. See last note. 424. That is, see below, 435,5-7, in its natural place, where most of it is congregated in a homogeneous mass; the totality of water is above the totality

Notes to pages 126-134

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of earth, and the totality of air above that. An element has no natural movement so long as it remains in its own totality, in An. 1, 65,36-8; 66,6-9. 425. That is, when a heavy object meets a light one it does not make it heavier. 426. Either the construction of the sentence changes at this point or the initial ‘since’, epei gar, literally ‘for since’, should be taken as picking up ‘that is why we do not perceive’ in the lemma. 427. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 428. logos, here simply ‘form’, cf. 432,38. 429. The organ of sight, for instance (lens, liquids, pneuma etc.), is in a mean state between white and black by being colourless. 430. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 431. Philoponus has a definite article before anaptou, ‘intangible’ missing from Aristotle’s MSS. 432. But what is intangible in the first of these ways, like colour or sound, will be discerned by reason, not the sense of touch (403,28-30). 433. e.g. affected by snow or by a lyre, not insofar as it is snow or a lyre, and satisfies the definition of such a substance, but insofar as it is white or sounding middle C, and satisfies the definition of that colour or sound. 434. Philoponus here blithely sidesteps what seems to philosophers today the chief philosophical problem about Aristotle’s account; he has, however, some relevant suggestions below, 443,32-444,7; 444,26-445,12. 435. poiountôn; I take this to be from poioun, ‘to qualify’, but it could be from poiein, ‘to affect’. 436. The evidence for this cannot be provided by microscopic examination; presumably it is that the garment continues to have the sweet smell after the sweet-smelling object – not, surely, a heavily scented lover, more likely a smoking thurible (441,1-2) – has departed. 437. ekeino: this cannot be the soul, which would be ekeinên, so it must be the primary sense-organ. 438. Printed as a quotation by Hayduck, not as a lemma. 439. That is, they are one thing and not two; sameness in ‘number’ or (line 34) ‘subject’ in this way is contrasted with sameness in ‘being’, ‘form’ or ‘account’. 440. logos: ‘form’, or perhaps, with an eye to the necessary physical composition of the organ, ‘proportion’. 441. Philoponus uses two words here, logos and eidos, but does not seem to attach different meanings to them; eidos is not intended to signify species as distinct from genus, but simply form. 442. This view is lucidly expounded by Alexander in his de Anima 24,1826,30 443. Printed by Hayduck as a quotation, not as a lemma. 444. That is, they are affected in their material aspect, not in their formal. This is a natural way to interpret the lemma. 445. Honey-posset, not fresh as constrasted with salt water. 446. A reference to the supposed splitting of trees by thunder-claps; see Aristotle’s text 424b11-12. 447. Reading eikotôs for Hayduck’s misprint eikotos. 448. The argument is better if Aristotle’s words are taken in this way, with osmê, ‘odour’, as subject; the claim is then implicitly a second order claim, that ‘odour’ means ‘that which can be smelt’. The word order, however, is ambiguous, and Philoponus at 441,20-1 takes to osphranton, ‘that which is smelt’ as subject. One might expect him then to understand the claim as first-order: nothing can in fact be smelt except odour. However, the reason he gives, ‘If something

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Notes to pages 134-138

produces smell, it is odour’, would support the second-order claim that by ‘odour’ we mean that which produces smell. 449. i.e. ‘is odour for’ or simply, ‘is relative to’. 450. Reading dunaton at 441,27 for adunaton as Hayduck proposes in his Addenda et Corrigenda. 451. Reading ê where Hayduck misprints hê. 452. On the first interpretation of ‘except insofar as it is a thing that perceives’, it is only insofar as they have the power to perceive that sense-organs are affected by colours, sounds etc., ‘as such’. On the second, our sense-organs are affected only by those particular sense-objects it is their nature to apprehend, the eyes only by colours, hearing only by sounds etc. 453. Literally, as a consequence, ek tou akolouthou. 454. Cf. 399,13-17. In a honey-posset honey is mixed up with the substance of water, and when air or a garment is affected by the sweet smell of incense, the material, gum or what not, that underlies the odour is mixed up in the smoke that carries it to the sensitive mastoid process. 455. A rarer word, used, however, by medical writers for parts morbidly affected. 456. As contrasted, perhaps, with the heavenly bodies. 457. aorista: this usually means ‘indeterminate’ to ‘indefinite’ but in the present context it probably means ‘having no definite boundaries’. 458. The honey-posset model again. 459. aoriston, see note to 433,19 460. prosballein; this and epiballein and their cognates are used for direct intuition, sensory or intellectual. 461. A verb is required, and has perhaps dropped out. Philoponus is probably thinking of the point made by Aristotle in Metaph. 8, 1048b23, that we simultaneously see and have seen. 462. The OCT has ‘being affected in some way’, paskhein ti. 463. The OCT has ‘also perceiving’, kai aisthanesthai. 464. Usually (e.g. at 445,9-10) by ‘substance’, ousia, Philoponus means matter, but here it means form or essence. 465. allê; we expect this to be picked up by another allê or allo, ‘being a sight object is another’, but the construction of the sentence changes. 466. de Sensu 439a27-9. 467. That is, as colours, sounds etc., which sight-objects, hearing-objects etc., in fact are. Philoponus uses the idiom ho pote on which makes a slightly notorious appearance in Aristotle’s account of time, Phys. 4 219a20-1; see Ross’s commentary ad loc. 468. That is, they are affected by the matter of the sense-objects, not by their form as sense-objects or their ‘activities’: cf. 438,4ff.

English-Greek Glossary a priori: ek tou akolouthou abate: anienai abatement: anesis abode: oikêsis have abode: oikein absolutely: hapax accept: paradekhesthai account: logos call to account: enkalein accurate: akribês accurately: akribôs acoustic: akoustikos achieve: apotelein acquire: anadekhesthai acrid: drimus act, in act: energeiai, kat’ energeian act in return: antenergein act on: dran, energein such as to act on something: drastikos activity: energeia actuality: energeia, entelekheia acute (of angles): oxus additional assumption: proslêpsis adeptly: entrekhôs adhere: enizanein, prosizanein admixture: epimixia adjacence: parathesis adjacent, be adjacent: parakeisthai adjustment: parathesis advantage, take advantage of: apolauein adventitious, be adventitious to: prosginesthai advocate: sunêgorein adze: skeparnon affect: poiein be affected: paskhein is affected: pathêtos can be affected: empathês such as to be affected: pathêtikos

easily affected: eupathês not easily affected: duspathês without being affected: apathôs affection: pathos agree: sumphônein agreement: sumphônia aim at: apoteinesthai, stokhazesthai, teinein air: aêr airy: aerios akin: oikeios, paraplêsios alien: allotrios aloe: aloas alter: alloioun easily altered: eualloiôtos without alteration: aparallaktos always: aei, pantôs amazing: thaumastos amber: êlektron amphibian: amphibios analogous: analogos be analogous to: analogein analogy: analogia angle: gônia animal: zôion animate: empsukhos announce: apangellein that announces: apangeltikos anoint: enkhriein, hupaleiphein answer: anteipein give an answer: hupantan ant: murmêx apart, keep apart: dieirgein aperture: trêma apex: koruphê appearance: phantasia apple: mêlon apply: huphaptein approach: prospelazein appropriate: summetros approximately: kai pros

162

English-Greek Glossary

apprehend: antilambanein, antilêptikos einai such as to apprehend: antilêptikos apprehended: antilêptos apprehension: antilêpsis, lêpsis aquatic: enudros aquatic animal: enudron aqueous (humour): ôioeides aquiline: grupos arbitrate: diaitan archer: toxotês argument: logos arrive at: phthanein articulate: enarthros make articulate: diarthroun further articulate: prosdiarthroun articulately: enarthrôs arytenoid: arutainoeidês as it were: hoion ask, too much to ask: mega lian aitêma assertion: kataphasis association: sunodos assumption: lêmma assurance: pistis astringent: struphnos astronomer: astronomos atomic: atomos attach: episunaptein attach around: peritithenai attempt: epikheirein attend: ephistanai attend upon: akolouthein, parakolouthein attendant: parakolouthêma attest: suneidenai attunement: harmonia augmentation: auxêsis aware, be aware: aisthanesthai axis: axôn ball: sphaira balsamic juice: opobalsamon base: puthmên basis: basis bat: nukteris be, being: einai beaten, be beaten: hêttesthai befall: empiptein, sumbainein bell: kôdôn little bell: kôdônion belly: gastêr bend (v.): anaklan, kamptein

bend back: anaklan bend back again: antanaklan bend (n.): kampê bending: anaklasis bending back against: antanaklasis between, in between: metaxu beyond: peraiterô bird: ptênon biting: daknôdês bitter: pikros bitterness: pikria, pikrotês bitumen: asphalton black: aithiops, melas blindness: tuphlotês block off: epiphrattein block up: emphrattein blood, having blood: enaimos without blood: anaimos bloodless: anaimos blow (n.): plêgê blow (v.): phusan blow out: ekphusan blue-green: kuanos blunt: amblus blunt-angled: amblugônios boat, little boat: akation bodily, in a bodily way: sômatikôs body: sôma bone: osteon book: logos booming: bombos border on: engizein bore through: tetrainein bottom string: neatê bow: toxon brain: enkephalos bread: artos breadth: platos break: rhêgnunai difficult to break: dusthraustos breath, without taking breath: apneusti breathe: anapnein that breathes: anapneustikos breathe in: eispnein breathe out: ekpnein breathing: anapnoê difficulty in breathing: duspnoia breathing in: eispnoê breathing out: ekpnoê bright: lampros, phanos, tranês brightness: lamprotês brim: kheilos

English-Greek Glossary brimstone: theion brine: halmê bring back: anagein bring close: prospelazein bring forth, such as to bring forth: prokheiristikos bring out: propherein bring to: prosagein, prospherein bring together: krinein, sunagein bronze: khalkos bubble: pompholux build into: enkatoikodomein builder: oikodomos bump: exokhê burn: thumian burnish: stilboun buzz (v.): bombein buzz (n.): bombos call: prosêgorein call to account: enkalein carbonated: nitrôdês carnelian: sardios lithos carpenter: tekton carry back: anapherein cartilage: khondros cartilaginous: khondrôdês cataract: epikhuma, hupokhuma catch: katalambanein catch up in: enapolambanein remain caught in: enapomenein cause: aitia, aition cave: antron cavity: akhaneia, akhanês, akhania, koilôma ceiling: orophê centre: kentron change (v.): kinein, parameibein such as to change: kinêtikos easily changed: eukinêtos change (n.): kinêsis channel: poros equip with channel: poropoiein chasten: kolazein choking: pnigôdês chop up: katakermatizein cicada: tettinx circle: kuklos circular: kuklikos circumference: perimetros clap (v.): krotoun clap together: sumplêttein clapping: krotos

163

clause: kôlon clay: pêlos clear throat: khremptesthai clear, clear sky: aithria kathara absolutely clear: prodêlos immediately clear: endêlos perfectly clear, easily made clear: eudêlos clipped: kolobos clod of earth: bôlos close: sunkleiein, sustellein close around: antiperiistanai closing: sustolê cloth: rhakos piece of cloth: himation cloud: nephos above the clouds: hupernephês coarse-grained: pakhumerês cockle: kokhlias cognise: ginôskein cognitive, in a cognitive way: gnôstikôs cognition: gnôsis coincide: sumballein coincidence: sunemptôsis cold (n.): psuxis cold (adj.): psukhros coldness: psukhrotês collect: surrhein collect together: eklegein collide: antikrouein colloquial speech: sunêtheia colloquial usage: sunêthes colour (v.): khrônnunai become coloured: khrônnusthai colour: khrôma the same colour: homokhrous colourless: akhrômatistos, akhrous combination: sumplokê come about: sumbainein come to, come close up to: prospelazein come to be, that comes into being: genêtos coming to be, coming into being: genesis come up to: paraginesthai common: koinos common property, thing in common: koinônia have in common: koinônein compare: paraballein compress: pilein, sunkrinein

164

English-Greek Glossary

concave: koilos concavity: koilotês conceal: apokruptein conceive of: ennoein, epinoein conclude: sunagein conclusion: sumperasma bring to a conclusion: sumperainein conditional premise: sunêmmenon cone: kônos confirm: pistousthai confirmation: pistis confound: epitholoun confuse: sunkhein conjecture, make a conjecture: stokhazeshai conjunction: sundesmos, sunodos consciousness: sunaisthêsis consist: sunistasthai consonance: sumphônia consonant, not consonant: asumphônos constitute: eis sustasin be constituted: sunistasthai constrain: biazein constrict: stenokhôrein construct: kataskeuazein construction: suntaxis, sustasis consume: prospheresthai contact: haphê, thixis be in contact: haptesthai come into contact with: prospsauein container: angeion contend on behalf of: sunagônizesthai continuity: sunekheia continuous: sunekhês as continuous: kata sunekheian continuously: kata sunekheian contract, make to contract: sunkrinein contraction: sustolê contradistinction: antidiastolê contrariety: enantiotês contrary: enantios contrary pair: enantiotês contrast: phronein dikha say in contrast: antidiastellein as marking a contrast: pros antidiastolên contribute: suntelein contributory cause: sunaition, sunaitios control, in control: kurios converse hold: antistrephein conversely: anapalin, empalin

convertible, be convertible: antistrephein convex: kurtos cool (v.): empsukhein, epipsukhein, katapsukhein, psukhein cooling, cooling effect: empsuxis, katapsuxis, psuxis cornea: keratoeidês corporeal: sômatikos of corporeal form, corporeal in form: sômatoeidês cough (v.): bêssein, bêttein cough (n.): bêx count along with: sunarithmein countless: apeiros cover: epikaluptein, epipômazein, kaluptein covering: epikalumma, kalumma crab: karkinos crocodile: krokodeilos crystal: lithos cup, drinking cup: potêrion curling: periagôgê custom, in customary way: sunêthôs cut: temnein cut short: diakoptein cutting short, without cutting short: adiakopôs cylinder: kulindros cylindrical: kulindrikos cymbal: kumbalon damage: lumainein dark (n.): skotos be in darkness: skotizesthai make dark: skotizein dark (adj.): melas, skoteinos darken: episkotein dash against: prosarassein, prosrhêgnunai dashing against: prosrhêxis dawn: heôs, heôsphoros day: hêmera deaf, be slightly deaf: duskôphein decision, give decision: epikrinein principle of decision: apoklêrôsis deduce: sunagein deep (of colour): bathus defect: hamartia defective, be defective: elleipein defence: problêma make defence: apologizesthai defer: hupertithenai

English-Greek Glossary deficiency: endeia defined, easily defined: euperioristos definition: horismos, horos degree: metron delimit: diorizein demand: apaitein demolish: anairein demonstrate: apodeiknunai demonstration: apodeixis denial: apophasis dense: puknos become dense: puknousthai density: puknotês depart: existanai, parapheresthai depend: artasthai depth: bathos derived, by a term derived from: parônumôs destroy, be destroyed: apollusthai principle be destroyed: luesthai destroy along with: sumphtheirein destructive: phthartikos detailed commentary: rhêton determinate: hôrismenos determine, hard to determine: dusdioristos easily determined: eudioristos diameter: diametros differentia: diaphora differentiate: diakrinein differentiation: diakrisis difficulty: aporia, aporon raise a further difficulty: epaporein diffused, be diffused: diakheistai, kheisthai digest: pettein digression: parekbasis dilate: dieurein, eurunein dim: amudros dimension: diastasis extends in three dimensions: diastaton trikhêi diminution: meiôsis dimly: amudrôs dimness: amudrotês dip: baptein direct: aparenklitos directly: authothen dirt: rhupos disagree: diaphônein disappear: aphanizesthai makes disappear: aphanistikos discern: krinein, kritikos einai

165

come to discern: diaginôskein such as to discern: kritikos discernment: diakrisis, krisis discourse: dialektos discrepant sound: apêkhêsis discriminate: diaginôskein, diakrinein discuss: dialegesthai discussion: logos disease: nosos disk: diskos disorderly: ataktos in a disorderly way: ataktôs dispersal: thrupsis disperse: diaphôrein, thruptein dispersed, easily dispersed: euthruptos displace: parakinein be displaced: methistanai displease: lupein displeasing: lupêros dispose: diatithenai dispose along with: sundiatithenai dispositionally: kath’ hexin disproportion: ametria dissection: anatomê dissipate: diaphorein easily dissipated: eudiaphorêtos dissolve: dialuein, têkein easily dissolved: eutêktos distance, distance apart: apostêma, diastasis, diastêma distil: exatmizein distinct, make distinct: diorizein distinction, draw further distinctions: prosdiorizein without drawing further distinctions: aprosdioristôs distinctness: heterotês distinguish: idiazein distributed, less widely distributed: merikôteros disturb: tarattein dive (n.): katadusis dive down: kataduein diverge: diïstanai divide along with: summerizein divide among selves: dianemesthai divide into bits: karakermatizein divisible: diairetos division: diairesis, diaphora give a division: diairein dizzy, be dizzy: skotodinian do, do to: poiein

166

English-Greek Glossary

doctor: iatros dog: kuôn dominant over: epikratesteros door: thura double: diplous do double duty: peritteuein double up: diplasiazein doubt: amphibolia dove: peristera draw back: hupostellein draw out: ekteinein dried fruit and nuts: tarikhos, trôgalia drink: poton not drink: apoton drop: rhanis dry (v.): xêrainein dry (of flavour, adj.): austêros dry (not wet): xêros dry completely (v.): apoxêrainein dry out, dry out completely: kataxêrainein dryness: xêrotês dumb: ellops dye (v.): baptein dye (n.): bamma ear: ous eardrum: mêninx earth: gê earthen: geôdês east, the east: anatolê eastern horizon: anatolikon easy: eukherês easily: eukherôs eat through: diabibrôskein echo: êkhô eclipse: ekleipsis economical: suntomos economy: suntomia eel: skutalê effect (v.): ergazesthai efficient: poiêtikos effort, intended effort: epitêdeusis effluence: aporrhoia efflux: aporrhoê egg: ôion element: stoikheion elliptically: ellipôs else, belong to something else: allotrios embrace: emperiekhein, periekhein, perilambanein embracing: periektikos

emission: anados, ekpompê emit: ekpempein empty: kenos, mataios enclose within: apolambanein end: peras, telos endure: diarkein, hupomenein enquire: zêtein enumerate: aparithmein enumeration: aparithmêsis equivalent, be equivalent: isodunamein err: apatan error: planê go in error: planasthai escape: exerkhesthai establish: kataskeuazein to establish: eis kataskeuên argument establishing: kataskeuê estimable, less estimable: atimoteros eternal: aidios ethmoid: êthmoeidês euphoniously: eurhuthmôs evaporation: atmis even (of numbers): artios even (sc. smooth): homalos evident: epidêlos exactly: akribôs examine: episkopein example: paradeigma exceed: huperballein exceeding: polus excess: huperbolê excessive, be excessive: peritteuein exhalation: anathumiasis exist along with: sunuparkhein existence: huparxis exit: exodos exodus: exodos expand, make to expand: diakrinein expanse: paratasis experience (v.): hupomenein expiration: ekpnoê explain: apodidonai, exêgeisthai, hermêneuein explanation: aitia exposition, initial exposition: protheôria expression: hermêneia extend: diêkein, ekteinein, epekteinein extend along with: sundiïstasthai extending: ektasis extension: apotasis, diatasis without extension: adiastatos

English-Greek Glossary extent: diastêma to a slight extent: êrema extreme: akron next to extreme: parakron extremity: eskhaton, peras exude, cause to exude: exikmazein eye: omma, ophthalmos shut eyes, have eyes shut: muein eyelid: blepharon facing: antiprosôpos directly facing: katantikrus fade away: apopauesthai faint: amudros fall against: antipiptein fall along in: parempiptein fall apart: diapiptein fall on: prospiptein fall short: elleipein, leipesthai fall under: hupopiptein fallacious, give fallacious argument: paralogizein fan: rhipis fastness: takhos fawn (v.): sainein fearsome: phoberos feeble: amudros, phaulos feminine, in the feminine: thêlukôs fiery: purios the fiery quality: to purôdes fig, dried fig: iskhas figure: skhêma filtre out: apokrinein fill, being filled: plêrôsis final: telikos fine: leptos fine-textured: leptomerês finger: daktulos finish: lêgein fire: pur fire be kindled: exapsis ginesthai firm: sterros first (adv.): proteron, prôton in the first place: malista fish: ikhthus fish-scale: lepis fit: epharmozein fixed sphere, sphere of fixed stars: aplanês flame, burst into: ekpuroun flat: epipedos, platus (of sound): barus flavour (v.): khumoun

167

flavour (n.): khumos flavoured: enkhumos flavourless: akhumos flesh: sarx piece of flesh: sarkion float: epipolazein flow: rhein flow away, flow out: aporrhein flow of the construction: akolouthon tes suntaxeôs fluid: rhutos flutter: hiptasthai fly (n.): muia fold: diploun folding up: diplôsis follow: akolouthon einai, methepein following: akolouthia food: brôma, sitia, trophê solid food: brôton food-dish: edesma foolish: euêthês foot: pous footed animal: pezon footless: apous force: bia without loss of force: meta sphodrotêtos force apart: diakrinein force out: ekthlibein force together: sunkrinein forcing out: ekthlipsis forceful: biaios, drastêrios, sphodros forcefully: biaiôs, sphodrôs fore-covering: prokalumma foregoing: prolabonta form (v.): diaplattein (of scars): enskirtasthai form (n.): eidos, idea, logos make to have form: eidopoiein foul smell: dusôdia foul-smelling: dusôdês fountain: pêgê fourth part: tetartêmorion fresh (of water): glukus friction: paratripsis fulfil: anaplêroun funnel: khônê function: ergon furnishing: khorêgia garlic: skorodon garment: himation gather: sunistasthai

168

English-Greek Glossary

gathering: sustasis gaze: atenizein general: koinos generally: koinôs generate: gennan generated: gennêtos generic: genikos genesis: genesis gently: êrema genuine: kurios genuinely: kuriôs genus: genos germane: oikeios give way: huphexistasthai, hupokhôrein gill: brankhion giving: apodosis glass: huelos, spheklon of glass, glazed: huelinos glow-worm: pugolampis glue to: proskollan go after: agreuein go against: antibainein go outside: ekbainein God: theos going on: akolouthos going out to meet: apantêsis gong: êkheion grass: khortos great: megas greatness: megethos grey: phaios grin: sairein ground: edaphos grow: auxanein grow onto: prosphuesthai grow out around: sumphuesthai growing out around: sumphuês grub: skôlêx gruel: rhophêma guard: phulakê guided by smell: huposmos gypsum: gupsos half-formed: hêmigenês hand: kheir hand down: paradidonai hang up: kremazein hard: sklêros with hard shell: ostrakodermos hard-eyed: sklêrophthalmos hard-fleshed: sklêrosarkos hare: ptôx

harmonica: oxubaphon harmony: harmonia harsh-voiced: kakophônos hasten: epeigesthai having, state of having: hexis hazardous: peristatikos haze: akhlus hazy: akhluôdês head: kephalê hear: akouein, epaiein that hears: akoustikos thing heard: akouston make self heard: gegônein hearing: akoê of hearing: akoustikos object of hearing: akouston heart: kardia around the heart: perikardios heat (v.): thermainein such as to heat: thermantikos heat thoroughly: ekthermainein heat (n.): thermasia, thermotês internal heat: thermon entos heaven, the heavens: ouranos heavenly: ouranios heavenly body: ouranion heavy: barus height: hupsos hedgehog: ekhinos help send up: sunanapherein hemisphere: hêmisphairion herb: botanê hexagon: hexagônon hide: kruptein high (in sound): oxus hinder: empodizein hint: ainittesthai hippopotamus: hippos potamios hit: rhapizesthai hold: apotithenai hold in: eniskhein hole: trêma hollow (n.): koilôma hollow (adj.): koilos hollowness: koilotês honey: meli honey-posset: melikraton horizon: horizôn horn: keras hot: thermos innate hot: emphuton thermon house (v.): stegein humour: khumos

English-Greek Glossary hunt: thêran hurt: lumainein hyperbaton, take as hyperbaton: huperbatonizein hypothesis: hupothesis hypothetical: hupothetikos ice: krustallos ill-endowed: aphuês ill-looking: duseidês ill-sounding: dusêkhês illuminate: kataphôtizein, phôtizein illuminating: phôtistikos illumination: phôtismos image: eidôlon imagination: phantasia, phantastikon imagine: phantasian ekhein, phantazesthai difficult to imagine: dusphantastos that imagines: phantastikon imitate: mimeisthai imitation: mimêsis immediate: amesos immediately: amesôs, prosekhôs immerse: baptizein impact: plêxis impart: metadidonai impede: empodizein imperceptible: anepaisthêtos implant: enkataspeirein impose: empoiein impose upon: epiprosthein imposition: epiprosthêsis imprint, make in imprint: entupoun receive imprint: anamattesthai, tupousthai impulse: hormê, prosbolê inactive: anenergêtos inactivity: argia inanimate: apsukhos inaudible: anêkoustos inborn: sumphuês incense: thumiama inch, an inch high: daktuliaios incidental: kata sumbebêkos be incidental to: sumbebêkenai include: perilambanein incorporeal: asômatos incorporeally: asômatôs increase (n.): auxêsis indefinite: aoristos indestructible: aphthartos indicate: dêloun, dêlôtikos einai

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indication: sêmeion, tekmêrion indicative: dêlôtikos indivisible: adiairetos ineffective: exitêlos infer: sullogizesthai infinite: apeiron to infinity: ad infinitum, ep’ apeiron inflame: phlegmainein inflated: pephusêmenos influx: epirrhoê, epirrhoia initial exposition: protheôria initially: hapax injured, be injured: paskhein innate, innate hot: emphuton thermon insect: entomon little insect: kônôpion insipid: pladaros instance, for instance: goun, hoion instinctively: automatôs instrument: organon instrumental: organikos intangible: anaptos intelligence: phronêsis, phrontis intelligent: phronimos intense: katakorês, sphodros intensely: katakorôs intensification: epitasis without intensification: anepitatos intensify: epiteinein intent: atenês intently: atenes intermediate (n.): meson, metaxu interposition: epiprosthesis interstice: dialeimma interweave: sumplekein intractable: duskherês introduction: proöimion invade: enskêptein invisible: anoratos, aoratos, aphanês iris: rhagoeidês iron: sidêros irrational: alogos irrefutable: alutos itself, of itself: kath’ hauto jar: amphoreus earthen jar: khutra jaundice, suffer from jaundice: ikterian jaw: genus jay: kitta join on: episunaptein judge (v.): krinein

170

English-Greek Glossary

judge (n.): kritêrion juice: khumos, opos Jupiter: Zeus keen-nosed: eurhis keep: têrein kindle: exaptein kindling materials: pureia knife: makhairion knock: krouein knock against: proskrouein knock out: ekkrouein know, get to know: epiginôskein, ginôskein not know: agnoein knowledge, person with knowledge: epistêmôn lack: sterêsis ladle: kuathos lair: phôleos lamp: lukhnos land: gê land animal: khersaion larynx: larunx last (v.): epimenein, exarkein that lasts: epimonos later, coming later: metagenesteros launch: akontizein lay down, be laid down: keisthai lay out (n.): kataskeuê lead: molibdos least, at least: goun leather skin: bursa leave: kataleipein leave aside: ean, paraleipein leek: prason length: mêkos lens: krustalloeides let go: aphienai lie by: epikeisthai lie opposite: antikeisthai lie over against: antikeisthai lie up: êremein life, bring to: zôiogonein pass life: bioteuein pass life in: diaitan lift up: anaspan lifting: arsis light (v.): direct light onto: phôtizein that which lights: phôtistikon light up: katalampein, kataphôtizein light (n.): phôs

light particle: phôton light (in sound): leukos (in weight): kouphos lighten: kouphizein lightness: kouphotês lightning: astrapê like (adj.): kat’ analogian make like: homoioun make completely like: sunexomoioun say to be completely like: exomoioun liken: apeikazein line: grammê straight line: eutheia lip: kheilos liquefy: leptunein liquid: hugron list (v.): katalegein little: brakhus littleness: mikrotês long: makros look (v.): apoblepein look for, look to: zêtein look upwards: anablepein loose-textured: psathuros loosely, use loosely: katakhrêsthai loosen: khalan loosening: anesis lose: apoballein low: barus luminary: phôstêr magnitude: megethos without magnitude: amegethês make: poiein maker: poiêtikon man: anêr, anthrôpos manifest: euphanês, phaneros manifestly: phanerôs, enargôs, prophanôs manual skill: banausos tekhnê mark off: aphorizein, periorizein marked off: hôrismenos mark off from: diorizein Mars: Arês marshes: limnê masculine, in the masculine: arsenikôs (adv.) mass: onkos master: despotês mastoid: mastoeidês match against: antitithenai matching: anathesis

English-Greek Glossary mate: sunnomos material (n.): khuma material (adj.): hulikos in a material way: hulikôs mathematical: mathematikos mathematician: mathematikos matrix: ekmageion matter: hulê connected with matter: prosulos mean (v.): legein mean (n.): mean state, mesotês meaning: sêmasia measure, due measure: metrion beyond measure: ametrôs medicine: pharmakôdes medium: metaxu meet, go to meet: hupantan go out to meet: proapantan going out in advance to meet: proapantêsis melody: melos membrane: humên, khitôn mention: mimnêskein mephitic vapours: Kharônioi osmai Mercury: Hermês metal: metallon metre: metron middle: mesos next to middle: parameson middling (adj.): mesos middling (adv.): mesôs millet seed: kenkhros mimicry: mimêma minister to: hupêretein mirror: enoptron, esoptron, katoptron mislead: paragein mistake, be mistaken: apatan be quite mistaken: diamartanein mix along: parameignunai mix in: emmeignunai, enkatameignunai, sunanakirnanai mixed with: summigês, summiktos mixture together: sunkrasis good mixture: eukrasia model: paradeigma moist: hugros make moist: hugrainein moisten: hugrainein moistness: hugrotês moisture: hugron moon: selênê of the moon: selêniakos

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moonstone: phengitês Morning Star: heôsphoros mosquito: kônôps mote: xusma motion: kinêsis mountain range: akrôreia mouth: stoma move: khôrein, kineisthai move round: antiperiistanai moved, easily moved: eukinêtos movement: kinêsis, phora mucous discharge: muxa mud: pêlos muddy (v.): epitholoun muddy (adj.): iluodês multifarious: polumigês multipartite: polumerês muscle: mus musical: mousikos mussel: konkhulê little mussel: konkhulion mydriasis: platukoriasis name (v.): onomazein name (n.): onoma have a name for: katônomasmenon ekhein without a name: anônumos nameless: anônumos namely: hoion narrow: stenos make narrow: stenoun naturally: autophuôs nature: phusis be by nature such as to, be of a nature to: pephukenai as part of its nature: sumphutos student of nature: phusikos near: plêsion nearest: prosekhês needle: belonê net: diktuon night, by night: nuktôr middle of the night: mesonuktion nitre: nitron no man’s land: metaikhmios nomenclature: onomasia non-material: aülos non-rational: alogos non-rational animal: alogon nonsense: phluaria noon: mesêmbria nose: rhis

172

English-Greek Glossary

nostril: muktêr note (musical): apêkhêsis notice: ephistanai nourish: trephein nugget: bôlos number: arithmos oar: kôpê object (v.): enistasthai be objected: antipiptein objection: enstasis have a good objection: kalôs enistanai oblong: heteromêkês obtuse angle: ambleia gônia obvious: prophanês occult: epiprosthein occultation: epiprosthesis occupy in advance: prokatekhein occupy self with: kataginesthai odd: perittos odour: osmê odour-conveying, conveys odour: diosmos odourless: aôdês, aosmos oesophagus: oisophagos oily: liparos old man: gerôn olfactory: osphrantikos olive: elaia olive oil: elaion like olive oil: elaiôdês once, all at once: athroos (adj.) onset: hormê open: diastellein open-texture: manotês open-textured: manos opening (i.e. aperture): opê (process of): diastolê oppose: antibainein opposed pair: antithesis opposite, lie opposite: antikeisthai turn opposite way: antistrephein opposition: antithesis optic: optikos order: taxis give order to: rhuthmizein orderly, in an orderly fashion: eutaktôs ordering: taxis organ: organon organised: organikos overcook: huperkaiein

overpower: epikratesteros ginesthai own, its own: idios, oikeios on its own: idiai pain (v.): anian pain (n.), be in a state of pain: aêdôs diakeisthai painful: aniaros palate: huperôia pale: hupheimenos panel: sanis parenthesis: metaxulogia parrot: psittakos parrot-wrasse: skaros part (v.): diïstanai part (n.): meros, morion with parts: meristos with similar pars: homoiomerês without parts: amerês particular: merikos partition out: merizein pass: metabainein pass on: diadidonai pass through: diabainein, diabibazein, diabibastikon einai, diêthein passage: angeion, khôrion (in a text): lexis passage in: parodos passes away: phthartos passing away: phthora passing on: diadosis past, people in the: palaioi pebble: psêphis peculiar, as peculiar to: idios peculiar character: idiotês peculiarity: idion, idiotês pepper: peperi perceive: aisthanesthai perceived: aisthêton without being perceived: anepaisthêtos, anepaisthêtôs that perceives, perceiving: aisthêtikos perceive at the same time: sunaisthanesthai perceptible: aisthêton perfect (v.): teleioun such as to perfect, perfective: teleiôstikos perfect (adj.): teleios less perfect: atelesteros perfecting: teleiôsis

English-Greek Glossary perforation: trêsis perigee, near perigee: perigeioteros periphrasis: periphrasis perish: apollusthai perish along with: sunapollusthai perspicuous, very perspicuous: enargês persuasive: pithanos persuasiveness: pithanotês pervade: phoitan pestle: huperon pharynx: pharunx phrase, phrasing: lexis piercing: oxus pipe: aulos pitched sound: phthongos pitchy: asphaltôdês place: taxis, topos in the second place: kata deuteron logon place near: paratithenai plain (n.): pedias plain fact: enargeia plane: epipedon plant: phuton plausible: eulogon plausibly: eulogôs plead for: sunagônizesthai pleasant: hêdus pleasant-voiced: euphônos please: hêdein pleasure: hêdonê pluck: krouein pneuma: pneuma pneuma-streams: pneumata poetic: poiêtikos point (n.): sêmeion point out: dêloun pointless: mataios poison: dêlêtêrion polished: stilpnos poor: phaulos poorly: phaulôs pore: poros make of pores: poropoiein position: thesis positive state: hexis possession, take possessin of: apolambanein posture: thesis potentiality, in potentiality: dunamei potentially: dunamei pound, newly pounded: neodreptos

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pour in: emballein pour out: ekkhein power: dunamis precedence, take precedence: proêgeisthai premise: protasis conditional premise: sunêmmenon presence: parousia present, be present: huparkhein become present: paraginesthai be present previosly: proüparkhein presentation: emphasis preservative: sôstikos preserve: phulattein press: pêgnuein, pilein, thlibein pressing, pressure: pilêsis prey: delear principle: arkhê print off onto: enapomattein problem, as a problem: aporêtikôs process: apophusis produce: poiein production: genesis project in view: prokeimenon prolong: parateinein proof: epikheirêma, epikheirêsis proper: idios propinquity: paraplêsia propose, be proposed: prokeisthai proposition: problêma proportion: logos, summetria out of proportion: huper analogian proportionality: summetria proportionate: summetros protection: phragma protrude: proïenai provision oneself: ephodiazein proximate: prosekhês proximately: prosekhôs psychical, psychological: psukhikos pungent: drastikos, plêktikos pupil: korê pure: eilikrinês, haplous in a pure way: katharôs purify: kathairein purpose, be purpose: prokeisthai push: ôthein push along with: sunôthein push back: antôthein push out: exôthein pushing: ôsis, ôthêsis pushing back against: antôthêsis put away: apotithenai

174

English-Greek Glossary

put before: proballein put forward: protithenai put with: paratithenai putting down: thesis putting together: sunthesis puzzling: aporos qualification, without qualification: haplôs qualify, give quality to: poioun quality: poion, poiotês without qualities: apoios quantity: poson of whatever quantity: hoposos quarter: meros quench: aposbennunai question: logos rain: huetos rapidity: takhos rational: logikos ray: aktis reading: graphê realise, not realise: agnoein reason: aitia, aition, logos that reasons: logistikos reasonable, be reasonable: logon ekhein reasonably: eulogôs reasoning, piece of reasoning: kataskeuê rebound (v.): aphallesthai, apopallesthai rebound (n.): apopalsis receive: anadekhesthai receive through: diadekhesthai receiving: hupodokhê receptive: dektikos recession: apostasis recognise: gnôrizein reconcile: sunagein recur: anatrekhein red: eruthros, purros reduce: anagein reek: ozein reflect: anaklan reflect back: antanaklan reflecting back: antanaklasis reflection: anaklasis refraction: anaklasis refutation: anaskeuê refute: anaskeuazein, dielenkhein, elenkhein

that can refute: anaskeuastikos regain: katalambanein region: topos regular, in the regular way: kata logon relate back: epanapherein remission, without remission: ananetos remove: diïstanai repel: exôthein representative: paradeigma resemblance: analogia resembling: empherês reside: hidrusthai residue: perittôma resist: antibainein, antipiptein, antitupein resistance: antitupia resistent: antibatikos, antitupos resolve: epiluein, luein resonant: êkhêtikos resound: êkhein respiratory: anapneustikos responsible, be responsible: aitiasthai rest, be at rest: êremein restrain: katekhein result: sunagesthai rhetorical: rhêtorikos rheum: lêmê rhythm: rhuthmos good rhythm: eurhuthmos ridiculous: geloion ring: êkhein that rings: êkhêtikos ringing: êkhos ripen: pettesthai risk, be a risk: kinduneuein rise: anatellein rock: lithos rod: rhabdos role: taxis room: oikêmation have room for: khôrein root: rhiza rope of twisted rushes: skhoinos rotten, be rotten: sêpesthai rough: trakhus round off: apotorneuein rowing: eirêsia rub together: paratribein rubbing: tripsis rubbing together: paratripsis run back again: palindromein

English-Greek Glossary run together: suntrekhein saffron: krokos salt: hals salty: halmuros sand: psammos Saturn: Kronos say earlier: proeipein scar: oulê scatter: diaskedannunai, diathruptein such as to be scattered: skedastos scattered utterances: diesparmenôs eirêmena easily scattered: eudiathruptos scent (v.): osmasthai screen, make a screen: antiphrattein screen off: apophrattein screen-forming: antiphraktikos screening: antiphraxis sea: thalatta sea creature: thalattion sea-water: thalassion hudôr seal: sphragis seat: sustasis see: horan be seen: theôreisthai that sees: horatikos can be seen: horatos cannot be seen: aoratos seeing, act of seeing: opsis seek: oregesthai send along: parapempein send back: antipempein send out: ekpempein send through: diakomizein send to, having things sent to it: eispompê send up: anapempein sense: aisthêsis by the senses: aisthêtôs sense-object: aisthêton sense-organ: aisthêtêrion sentence: logos separate: dialambanein separation: khôrismos serve: hupourgein service: hupêrêsia set (v.): dunein set forth: prokheirizesthai set out: ektitheshai settle back: apokathistasthai severally: ana meros shadow: skia

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be in shadow: skiazesthai shady: eskiasmenos shake: klonein, seiein shaking: klonê shape (v.): skhêmatizein shape along with: suskhêmatizein shape (n.): skhêma without shape: askhêmatistos shaping: diatupôsis share, be without share: amoirein sharing: koinônia sharp: oxôdês, oxus sharp-angled: oxugônios sharpen: epiteinein sharply: oxeôs sheath: elutron shell: ostrakon with hard shell: ostrakodermos shelter: phôleos go into shelter: emphôleuein shield: aspis, phulaktêrion shine: lampein shine upon: katalampein shining (n.): lampron shining (adj.): lampros short: brakhus show: dêloun show in advance: prodeiknunai show forth: diadeiknunai shredded, be shredded: skidnasthai shut eyes, have eyes shut: muein shut off: apokleiein, phrattein sick, be sick: kamnein sideways, to the side: epi ta plagia, ek plagiôn sight: opsis of sight: optikos sight-act, sight-stream, sight-organ: opsis sight-object, object of sight: horaton sightlessness: aorasia signification: sêmasia signify: sêmainein, sêmantikos einai signifying: sêmantikos silence: sigê silver: arguros silver coin: argurion similar, be similar: analogon ekhein with similar parts: homoiomerês similarity: homoiotês simple: haplous simple body: haplon simply: haplôs

176

English-Greek Glossary

simultaneously: hama sinew: tenôn sing: aidein, phônein sing along with: sunaidein sink: kataduein sixth: hektêmorios skin: askos, derma, lepos slant: klan slight, to a slight extent: êrema slit: entomê slow: bradus slowly: skholaios slowness: bradutês small: brakhus, mikros however small: hopêlikos smallness, small extent: smikrotês small-scale: merikos smear: khriein smell (v.): osmasthai, osphrainesthai smell (n.), sense of smell: osmê that smells, of smell: osphrantikos can be smelt: osphrantos cannot be smelt: anosphrantos object of smell, smell-object: osphranton guided by smell: huposmos smell-vehicle: to diêkhes smoke: atmos, lignus smoky: kapnôdês, lignuôdês smooth: leios smoothness: leiotês snubnosed: simos snubnosedness: simotês soak: apobrekhein, brekhein first soak: probrekhein social: koinônikos soft: malakos soft-eyed: malakophthalmos soft-fleshed: malakosarkos with soft shell: malakostrakos solid: stereos solid food: brôton solidify: pakhunein solidity: stereotês solution: epilusis, lusis solvent: suntêktikos song: melos sort, of what sort: potapos soul: psukhê of the soul: psukhikos sound (v.): êkhein, psophein that sounds, such as to make a sound: psophêtikos

sound (n.): êkhos, phônê, psophos sound-conveying, conveys sound: diêkhês sound-vehicle: to diêkhes production of sound: ekphônêsis sound (adj.): hugiês, katharos soundless: apsophos sour: pikros source: arkhê space: khôra spatial: topikos speak: dialegesthai, ekphônein, phthengesthai speak with voice: phônein spear: doru special sense: aisthêsis idia species: eidos specific: eidikos speech: logos of speech: phonêtikos speed: takhutês spend: dapanan spend life, spend time: diatribein sphere: sphaira spherical: sphairikos spirited: thumoeidês split: diïstanai spoken: prophorikos sponge: spongos spread: kheisthai, perikheisthai spread abroad: dierkhesthai spreading: khusis spring off: hallesthai squander: analiskein squeeze out: ekpurênizein squirt out: apoptuein stab: kentein star: astêr, astron state: diathesis put in a state: diatithenai statement: logos, rhêsis statue: andrias steel self: karterein stick: baktêria stir up: anakinein stirring: kinêsis stone (mineral): lithos stone (of fruit): purên stoneless: apurênos stop: katalêgein stop with: sumpauein storax: sturax straight line: eutheia

English-Greek Glossary that moves in a straight line: euthuphorikos straight off, directly: eutheôs, ep’ eutheias straightness: euthutês strain (by pouring): diêthein (by tension): sunteinein stranger: allotrios strap: himas stream (of sand): hormathos strength, have strength: exiskhein stretch around: periteinein stretch out before: phthanein strictly speaking: akribôs strike: krouein, plêssein, plêttein, prosballein, tuptein strike back: antiplêttein strike upon: prosptaiein striking: prosbolê string: inarion, khordê, neuron strive for: antipoiein strong: iskhuros, sphodros strongly: sphodra stupid: anoêtos subdivide: hupodiairein subject: hupokeimenon subordinate to one another: hupallêlos subsist: huphistanai substance: hupostasis, ousia substantial: ousiôdês in a substantial way: ousiôdôs succinctly: suntomôs suddenly: autothen sufficient, sufficient by itself: autarkês suitability: epitêdeiotês suitable: epitêdeios sum up: sunairein summer: theros sun: hêlios of the sun: hêliakos sunbeam: hêlios sunlit, be sunlit: hêliousthai sunset: deilê super-shining: huperlampros supervene: epiginesthai suppose: hupolambanein supposition: huponoia, hupothesis imaginary supposition: hupodeigma surface: epipedon, epiphaneia on the surface: epipolês surpass: pleonektein surprising: paradoxos surprisingly: paradoxôs

177

surround: perikeisthai, perikheisthai suspend: apartan, artan swallow: khelidôn swan: kuknos sweet: glukus sweet smell: euôdia sweet-smelling: euôdês sweetness: glukutês swim: nêkhesthai swift: oxus swift-moving: oxukinêtos syllable: sullabê syllogism: sullogismos give syllogism for: sullogizesthai take (i.e. interpret): eklambanein take already: prolambanein take in: eisdekhesthai, paralambanein take over: katalambanein, paralambanein taste (v.): geuesthai first taste: progeuesthai, progeumatizein that tastes, of taste: geustikos cannot be tasted: ageustos taste-object, thing tasted: geuston taste (n.): geusis tasteless: ageustos teach: didaskein teacher: didaskalos teaching: didaskalia tendon: tenôn tension: tasis terminate: teleutan termination: apoteleutêsis text: rhêton thick: pakhus thick-skinned: pakhudermos thick texture: pakhumereia thick-textured: pakhumerês thicken: pakhunein thickening: pakhunsis thin: leptos think: epinoein thorax: thorax thought: dianoia, ennoia, noêma three and a half times: trisplasiephebdomos throat, clear the throat: khremptesthai throw forward: proballein throw out: anarrhiptein, ekballein thrust: ôsis thunder: brontê

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English-Greek Glossary

thunderstruck: embrontêtos thyme: thumon thyroid: thuroeidês tie (v.): dein tightening: epitasis time: khronos time, in no time at all: akhronos, akhronôs (adv.) time-interval, lack of a time-interval: to akhronon without a time interval: akhronos, akhronôs (adv.) tin: kattiteros tinder: hupekkauma together, both together, the two together: sunamphoteron tolerate: anekhein tongue: epiglôttis, glôtta top string: hupatê tortuous: skolios totality: holotês touch (v.): ephaptesthai, haptesthai, thinganein that touches, of touch: haptikos touch-object, object of touch: hapton touch (n.): haphê touching: thixis tragic actor: tragôidos train: gumnazein transference: metaphora transformation: tropê transmission: metabasis transmit: diaporthmeuein transmitting, that transmits: diaporthmeutikos travel: diaphoitan, phoitan treat of: dialambanein tree: dendron tremor: phrix triangle: trigônon trick, play trick: sophizesthai trifling: tukhon trouble, take trouble: spoudazein tuning: tonos tumour: skirros tune (v.): harmozein tune (n.): aisma turn aside: parastrephein turn back: anakamptein twilight: lukophôs in twilight: to lukophôton two, in two: dikha

unaffected: apathês unaltered: analloiôtos unbounded: aoristos unchanged: akinêtos unclarity: asapheia uncoloured: akhrômatistos uncovered: akaluphês undergo: hupomenein underlie: hupokeisthai underlying thing: hupokeimenon understand: lambanein understand as added: prosupakouein undispersed: athruptos undivided: adiairetos undo: luein undrinkable: apoton uneven: anômalos unevenness: anômalia unfearsome: aphobos unflavoured: akhumôtos unify: henoun unimpeded: anempodistos, anempodistôs uniting: henôsis universal: katholikos universe: kosmos unmixed: akratês, amigês unmoving: akinêtos unperceived: anepaisthêtos unreasonable: apeikos, paralogos unseen: adêlos unsuitable: anepitêdeios unsyntactical: asuntaktos upbringing: agôgê upset: saleuein upward tendency: anôphoron utensil: skeuos utter: ekphônein utterance: ekphônêsis, lexis vaporise: atmizein vaporous: atmidôdês vapour: atmos give off vapour: exatmizein mephitic vapours: Kharônioi osmai vegetative: phutikos vehement: puknos vehicle: okhêma vein: phlebion Venus: Aphroditê vibrate: kradainesthai villainousness: mokhthêria vinegar: oxos

English-Greek Glossary violent: biaios violently: biai, biaiôs viscous: gliskhros visible: horaton vital: zôtikos in a vital way: zôtikôs vitreous: krustalloeidês vocal: poluphônos voice: ops, phônê voice-producing: phônêtikos voiceless: aphônos void: kenos vowel: phônein vulture: gups warm (v.): thermainein warming: thermansis warmth: thermê wash: louein water: hudôr under water: hupobrukhios watery: hudaros, hudatôdês wave: kuma wax: kêros weak: asthenês be weaker: asthenein weakness: astheneia well (n.): phrear well-endowed: euphuês well-looking: eueidês well-sounding: euêkhês west, the west: dusmai western horizon: dutikon wet (v.): brekhein wet (adj.): dieros whip: mastix whirl around: eilein whirl back: aneikein whispering: psithurismos

179

whistle (v.): emphusan, phusan whistle (n.): rhoizos white: leukos white lead: psimuthion whiteness: leukotês wholesome: khrêstos wider, become wider: eurunein, eurunesthai will, against the will: akousios of own free will: hekon wing: pterux winged creature: ptênon wind: anemos window: thuris windpipe: artêria trakheia winding, of winding form: helikoeidês windless day: nênemia winged insect: muia withstand: huphistanai witness, call to witness: marturesthai wood, piece of wood: xulon wool: erion word: epos, onoma in a word: haplôs spoken word: phônê work: ergon wormwood: apsinthion wound (v.): titrôskein wound (n.): trauma wrinkled, become wrinkled: rhutidousthai yellow: ôkhros, xanthos yellow-green: prasios yield: hupeikein young: neos zenith: koruphê zodiac, sign of: zôidion

Greek-English Index The capital letter A following page and line number indicates that the word is to be found in the text of Ms. Vat. gr. 268 (=A) printed by Hayduck in his apparatus; line numbers following A in this Index correspond to the line numbers in the text printed in Hayduck’s apparatus. adêlos, unseen, 429,12.22 adiairetos, undivided, 361,9 indivisible, 371,21 adiakopôs, without cutting short, 383,30 adiaphorôs, indifferently, 422,26 adiaskedastos, unscattered, 360,26 adiastatos, without extension, 372,9; 417,30 aêdôs diakeisthai, be in a state of pain, 379,15 aei, always, 328,30 aêr, air, 319,14; 323,3.6.8; 324,2.7.14.30; 327,26.30-2; 328,1.3.5; 329,6.11; 338,16; 344,5-8; 345,16.17.20; 348,28.32; 357,10.12.14; 358,2.5.7; 363,16; 364,1; inborn, 364.11; 369,2.5; not in water, 384,14.19.20.22; 399,24.26.30 aerios, airy, 324,8 aerôdês, airy, 365,4 ageustos, cannot be tasted, 390,23; 404,6.15 tasteless, 401,24 agnoein, not know, 386,23 not realise, 409,4 agôgê, upbringing, 388,35 agreuein, go after, 353,15.17 aidein, sing, 356,26; 383,32 aidios, eternal, 324,15 ainittesthai, hint, 343,14 aisma, tune, 376,3 aisthanesthai, perceive, 435,12 be aware, 406,17

aisthêsis, sense, 319,5; 391,22; 394,20.22; 396,12; 443,35 perception, 335,3; 394,21; 432,14.36 aisthêsis idia, special sense, 319,7 and n. 2 aisthêsis koinê, common sense, 433,35 and n. 418 aisthêtêrion, sense-organ, 339,24; 341,3; 349,12; 350,2.4.13.17; 353,7.9.10.28.29.32; 362,2.4; 364,17; 365,12.14.15; 391,15-16.23; 392,2-3.9.27; 395,6.11.12; 396,17; 398,4.7; 405,3.14.18.20; 418,19; 424,7-12; 433,18-24; 438,26; 439,5-20.24 aisthêtikos, perceiving, that perceives, 326,37; 340,30; 352,32; 364,14-15 perceptive, 388,21 aisthêtikê dunamis, power to perceive, 326,30.32; 338,31; perceptual power, 427,23 aisthêtikôs, in a sensible way, 443,13 aisthêton, sense-object, 331,14; 396,12.17; 437,7; 439,8.12.13 idion aisthêton, proper sense-object, 346,12; 398,2; 408,36; 409,3; 418,32; 436,18; 437,4 koinon aisthêton, common sense-object, 409,2.7 aisthêtos, perceived, 394,22 perceptible, 371,14 aisthêtôs, by the senses, 332,4 aitêma, mega lian aitêma, too much to ask, 345,6

Greek-English Index aithiops, black, 387,27 and n. 265 aithria kathara, clear sky, 349,6 aitia, cause, 332,23; 337,29 reason, 366,34; 394,34; 395,28; 398,4 explanation, 339,18 aitiasthai, be responsible, 418,15 aition, cause, 320,18; 342,8 akaluphês, uncovered, 395,10-11 akation, little boat, 353,15 akhanes, cavity, 378,35 akhaneia, cavity, 383,14 akhania, cavity, 381,23 akhluôdês, hazy, 349,1-2 akhlus, haze, 332,26.37; 349,3 akhrômatistos, colourless, 329,7; 345,21; 434,14 uncoloured, 337,5 akhronos, without a time-interval, 413,2; 414,23 in no time at all, 413,13; 424,30 to akhronon, lack of a time-interval, 412,36; 414,25 akhronôs, without a time-interval, 413, 19 in no time at all, 325,8; 327,3.6; 342,13 akhrous, colourless, 329,9; 338,17; 345,23; 360,2; 435,30 akhumos, flavourless, 395,34; 396,28; 399,31; 400,2; 434,15; 435,32; 436,21 akhumôtos, unflavoured, 404,6-9 A 1 akinêtos, unchanged, 337,17 unchanging, 384,6 unmoving, 365,22.24; 366,31.32.35; 368,28.30 akoê, hearing, 340,32; 364,1.5; 365,4.6 akolouthein, attend upon, 336,26 akolouthia, following, 422,14 and n. 387 akolouthos, akolouthon einai, follow, 393,18 akolouthon tês suntaxeôs, flow of the construction, 392,35 ek tou akolouthou, a priori, 442,8 and n. 453 akolouthôs, going on, 397,36 akontizein, launch, 372,13 akousiôs, against the will, 379,33 akoustikos, that hears, 365,36; 366,15

181

akoustikê aisthêsis, sense of hearing akoustikon aisthêtêrion, sense-organ of hearing, 353,32; 365,29; 366,13-14; 439,24 akoustikê dunamis, power to hear, 364,17; 433,32 akoustikê energeia, activity of hearing, 364,29; 365,4-5 akoustikon pneuma, acoustic pneuma, 364,15.19-20 akoustikos poros, channel of hearing, 359,29; 415,19; 419,17 akouston, [thing] heard, object of hearing, 352,23-4; 353,3.10; 354,21; 359,1; 364,8 akratôs, unmixed, 397,13 akribês, accurate, 388,16-18; 389,11.13 akribôs, accurately, 329,11; 372,1 exactly, 429,15; 430,31 strictly speaking, 372,3; 429,9 akron, extreme, 407,1.4; 436,3.4 akrôreia, mountain ridge, 330,32 aktis, ray, 325,19.28; 328,28.37; 331,4; 332,1.4; 335,33.35; 348.34; 349.4 alloioun, alter, 441,6.9 allotrios, alien, 321,1.7.13; 398,14-16.20; 400,29; 414,22 stranger, 379,12 belong to something else, 322,26.31; 427,4 aloas, aloe, 389,33 and n. 278 alogos, irrational, 325,17; 416,18 non-rational, non-rational animal, 323,22, 379,11; 380,11 alogos psukhê, non-rational soul, 417,30; 438,26-7 alutos, irrefutable, 408,25 ambleia gônia, obtuse angle, 332,1.24; 333,38 amblugônios, blunt-angled, 373,20 amblus, blunt, 373,18.22; 374,27.33 amegethês, without magnitude, 438,37 amerês, without parts, 417,28.30.33 amesos, immediate, 414,9 amesôs, immediately, 330,12; 353,36; 414,6; 430,4; 431,20.23; 432,20.24 ametria, disproportion, 406,12 ametros, 439,13 ametrôs, beyond measure, 405,34

182

Greek-English Index

amigês, unmixed, 397,27 amoirein, be without share, 441,17 amphibios, amphibian, 377,19.22.23; 378,4; 395,21.25 amphibolia, doubt, 361,28 amphoreus, jar, 430,19 amudros, dim, 321,14.16; 329,11; 351,3; 352,21; 421,3 faint, 358,36; 363,2.8; 389,29; 409,21.30; 423,13 feeble, 386,9; 408,8; 420,34; 421,3 amudrôs, dimly, 346,4; 347,7; 348,13 amudrotês, dimness, 403,26 anablepein, look upwards, 325,7.27 anadekhesthai, receive, 358,22.24 acquire, 402,6 anadosis, emission, 396,3 anagein, reduce, bring back, 398,9-10; 423,32; 434,18.31 anaimos, without blood, bloodless, bloodless animal, 377,18; 384,29.32; 393,3.8.12 anairein, demolish (of a proposition), 336,27; 412,28; 414,13; 439,33 anaisthêtos, without sense, 443,1 anakamptein, turn back, 341,39; 342,2 anakinein, stir up, 332,8 anaklan, bend, bend back, 333,24.37; 334,3.5-11.22 reflect, 331,4.7.9; 336,12.13.16; 356,9.17; 359,17; 361,7.20.26 anaklasis, reflection, 330,30; 331,19; 335,22; 360,20; 361,24-28; 362,12.17-29.34; 363,1-4 bending, 330,31; 333,36 refraction, 332,18 analiskein, squander, 383,27 analloiôtos, unaltered, 443,6 analogein, be analogous, 376,28; 384,4 analogia, analogy, 342,26; 389,36; 390,2; 403,14; 416,10; 421,1 resemblance, 376,1; 387,35; 388,12; 389,23.26; 409,9; 414,2; 416,17.25; 423,9.15.24; 431,6.9; 433,20 kat’ analogian, like, 345,28 huper analogian, out of proportion, 416,5-6 analogos, analogous, 416,8; 422,33-6 analogon ekhein, be similar, 398,19

anamattesthai, receive imprint, 322,5-6 and n. 11 ananetos, without remission, 444,4 anapalin, conversely, 373,33 anapempein, send up, 438,30 anapherein, carry back, 385,21; 413,8 anaplêroun, fulfil, 358,19 anapnein, breathe, 327,32.33; 328,2; 353,23-5; 377,16.17; 380,24.25; 384,13.15.24; 393,9 and n. 289; 393,11.15.31; 395,8.10 anapneustikos, respiratory, 375,17; 395,24-5 that breathe, 384,26 anapnoê, breathing 380, 26.29; 381,2.6; 382,22; 393,32.33; 394,35 anaptos, intangible, 436,19.22.23.31 anarrhiptein, throw out, 356,5 anaskeuastikos, can refute, 426,14 anaskeuazein, refute, 371,16; 414,16; 415,28.29; 424,6.9-10 anaskeuê, refutation, 412,4.6; 424,14.17 anaspan, lift up, 418,8 anatellein, rise, 332,23.26 anathesis, matching, 407,8 A 16 anathumiasis, exhalation, 385,33-4; 396,3.9; 397,30-1 anatithenai, match against, 407,8 A 14 anatolê, the east, 345,5 anatolikon, eastern horizon, 332,29 anatomê, dissection, 350,27 anatrekhein, recur, 376,34 andrias, statue, 346,19-20 and n. 128 aneilein, whirl back, 359,17-18 anekhein, tolerate, 336,28 anêkoustos, inaudible, 390,8 and n. 280 anemos, wind, 375,12 anempodistos (adj.), unimpeded, 337,27 anempodistôs (adv.), unimpeded, 337,3; 368,14 anenergêtos, inactive, 403,35 anepaisthêtos, imperceptible, 332,36 unperceived, without being perceived, 345,4.11 anepaisthêtôs (adv.), without being perceived, 345,6 anepitatos, without intensification, 444,4 anepitêdeios, unsuitable, 439,14

Greek-English Index anêr, man, 389,1 anesis, abatement, 409,14; 410,28 loosening, 439,29 angeion, container, 360,27; 361,7.11.15 passage, 378,36 anian, pain (v.), 387,6 aniaros, painful, 387,31 anienai, abate, 409,19; 421,20; 444.7 anoêtos, stupid, 388,34 anômalia, unevenness, 363,29 anômalos, uneven, 372,28 anônumos, nameless, without a name, 320,4; 346,26; 381,27; 408,23; 423,31 anôphoron, upward tendency, 357,27 anoratos, invisible, 390,12.13 anosphrantos, cannot be smelt, 390,10.19 antanaklan, bend back against, 356,17 reflect back, 361,3 antanaklasis, reflection back, 333,15; 362,7 bending back against, 356,21 anteipein, answer, 415,29 antenergein, act in return, 334,18.20.25 anthrôpos, man, 393,9.10.14.21 antibainein, resist, 323,6.13; 429,19.20 oppose, 374,33.34; 411,9 go against, 430,26 antibatikos, resistent, 429,23 antidiastellein, say in contrast, 372,26 antidiastolê, contradistinction, 372,23; 411,8 pros antidiastolên, as marking a contrast, 405,28 antikeisthai, be presented, 337,10 lie opposite, 341,23.25; 390,16 lie over against, 353,3; 354,29 antikrouein, collide, 375,3 antikrus, manifestly, 391,27; 424,5 antilambanesthai, apprehend, 419,13-14; 420,13.16,19; 422,1; 423,4; 424,32-3; 425,4.15; 426,6.23; 427,30.37; 431,12 antilêpsis, apprehension, 321,9; 390,28.29; 392,9; 426,2.30.32; 427,4.5

183

antilêptikos, such as to apprehend, 319,19 antilêptikos einai, apprehend, 319,22; 393,14; 398,36; 419,12 antilêptos, apprehended, 319,9; 388,2.3; 404,26; 414,38; 415,16.22; 419,10-11; 427,9 antipempein, send back, 333,10 antiperiïstanai, move round, 334,6 and n.; 334,8.12.14 close around, 430,19 antiphraktikos, screen-forming, 365,34 antiphrattein, make a screen, 351,19.20.26; 416,14.16 antiphraxis, screening, 349,5 antipiptein, fall against, 372,11 resist, 373,35 be objected, 432,21.26 antiplêttein, strike back, 374,5.11 antipoiein, strive for, 380,30-1 antiprosôpos, facing, 331,12; 362,32 antistrephein, turn the opposite way, 397,12 converse hold, be convertible, 412,23; 422,26 antithesis, opposition, 389,16.18; 408,13.16.30; 409,3; 410,3.11.23; 411,20; 415,1; 422,1.13 opposed pair, 434,18.26.28 antitupein, resist, 363,3 antitupia, resistance, 360,32; 361,16; 370,26; 372,13 antitupos, resistent, 360,20-1.25.27; defined 411,6-10; 411,25-6; 430,26 antôthein, push back, 356,10 antôthêsis, pushing back against, 356,15.24 antron, cave, 360,26 aorasia, sightlessness, 339,9 aoratos, cannot be seen, 402,34.35; 403,3.18-20 invisible, 346,1.7 and n. 124; 403,4.21.24; 436,14 aoristos, unbounded, 443,19.22 indefinite, 443,33; 444,8 aosmos, odourless, 338,17; 345,22; 390,10.13; 396,6; 397,9.28; 435,32; 436,21 apaitein, demand, 434,1 apangellein, announce, 329,27; 352,8; 369,9; 398,27

184

Greek-English Index

apangeltikos, that announces, 322,10; 340,37 apantêsis, going out to meet, 325,33 aparallaktôs, without alteration, 331,26 aparenklitos, direct, 339,38; 340,4.9 aparithmein, enumerate, 406,33; 407,5-6; 417,17; 434,8 aparithmêsis, enumeration, 406,24 apartan, suspend, 356,13 apatasthai, be mistaken, 320,22 err, 384,23 apathês, unaffected, 436,27; 443,6.8 apathôs, without being affected, 322,6; 329,15; 331,13; 398,26 apeikazein, liken, 388,5 apeikos, unreasonable, 332,15 apeiron, infinite, 344,2 ep’apeiron, to infinity, 371,17.19.20.24; ad infinitum, 429,26.31 apeiros, countless, 402,6 apêkhêsis, discrepant sound, 358,14 note, 376,17-18 aphallesthai, rebound, 370,13-14.16; 372,14.15 aphanês, invisible, 324,21; 328,36; 348,14; 430,29 aphanistikos, makes disappear, 347,39 aphanizesthai, disappear, 342,12 aphienai, let go off, 443,27 aphobos, unfearsome, 385,1-3 (Aristotle, DA 421a15) aphônos, voiceless, 377,14; 384,8.11 aphorizein, mark off, 385,35; 397,16.23; 420,2 Aphroditê, Venus, 407,8 A 16 aphthartos, indestructible, 364,26; 368,29 A 3 aphuês, ill-endowed, 389,10 aplanês, fixed sphere, sphere of the fixed stars, 324,17 and n. 22; 325,16.18; 349,14 apneusti, without taking breath, 383,34 apoballein, lose, 443,24 apoblepein, look, 331,17 apobrekhein, soak, 402,19 apodidonai, explain, 332,23; 339,36 apodosis, giving, 422,16 apodeiknunai, demonstrate, 326,1 apodeixis, demonstration, 343,31

apokathistasthai, settle back, 373,29; 374,10 apoios, without qualities, lacking in qualities, 399,34.35; 400,1; 402,3.4 apokleiein, shut off, 355,7 apoklêrôsis, principle of decision, 328,17 apokrinein, filtre out, 382,29-30 apokruptein, conceal, 414,28; 425,32-3; 426,1 apolambanein, enclose within, 332,25; 351,21; 358,34-5; 359,15; 364,20 take possession of, 339,7 apolauein, take advantage of, 400,3 apoleipein, leave behind, 430,26-8 apollusthai, perish, 384,18 be destroyed, 432,28.32 apologizeshai, make defence, 422,6 apomattesthai, take impression, 437,11 apopallesthai, rebound, 370,5.26-9.33.34; 378,34 apopalsis, rebound, 370,30 apopauesthai, die away apophasis, denial, 346,10-11; 347,38; 390,19; 418,35.36 apophrattein, screen off, 354,11 apophusis, process, 353,30; 392,32; 433,33 apoptuein, squirt out, 384,29 aporêtikôs, as a problem, 422,30 aporia, difficulty, 325,5 aporon, difficulty, 413,36 aporos, puzzling, 322,36 aporrhein, flow out, 344,34; 399,27; 400,20 flow away, 443,32 aporrhoê, efflux, 343,13-22 aporrhoia, effluence, 330,22; 345,13; 391,27; 392,3.7.22; 400,17.20-23 aposbennunai, quench, 332,10 apostasis, recession, 325,38 apostêma, distance, distance apart, 325,38 apotasis, extension, 376,37 apoteinesthai, aim at, 371,16 apotelein, achieve, 406,27 apoteleutêsis, termination, 335,21; 336,35; 337,14 apotithenai, put away, 323,2 hold, 352,19.20

Greek-English Index apoton, not, drink, undrinkable, 404,15-24 apotorneuein, round off, 372,1 apous, footless, 404,3 apousia, absence, being absent, 341,17.19; 342,2; 436,4 apoxêrainein, dry completely, 397,25 aprosdioristôs, without drawing further distinctions, 342,21 apsinthion, wormwood, 399,25 apsophos, soundless, 338,17; 345,21; 355,32; 360,2; 366,21.22.30.33; 390,8 and n. 280; 435,32 apsukhos, inanimate, 438,4; 440,25; 442,26; 445,6 apurênos, stoneless (of fruit), 404,2 Arês, Mars, 407,8 A 15 argia, inactivity, 389,6 argurion, silver coin, 333,11 arguros, silver, 358,12 arithmos, number, 320,14-16 arithmôi, in number, 438,32 and n. 439 arkhê, source, 404,14.20.21 principle, 434,13.16 arsenikôs, in the masculine, 381,24 arsis, lifting, 376,10.25 artan, suspend, 328,29.30; 355,22; 356,19.22 artasthai depend, 425,19 artêria trakheia, wind-pipe, 358,31; 375,17; 378,33; 379,1.17.24; 381,16.25-6.33.35; 382,1.2; 383,10.11; 384,4.6.9-10 artios, even, 320,14.15 artos, bread, 401,23; 405,23 arutainoeidês, arytenoid, 381,26 asapheia, unclarity, 386,4 askhêmatistos, without shape, 417,28-9 askos, skin, 380,8; 384,21 asômatos, incorporeal, 325,1; 326,3.5.6; 341,26.31; 343,25; 374,18; 399,1 asômatôs, incorporeally, 392,1 asphaltôdês, pitchy, 402,1 asphaltos, bitumen, 394,30 aspis, shield, 432,8-10 astêr, star, 324,20; 347,10; 348,25.33 astheneia, weakness, 443,30 asthenein, be weaker, 335,5.7 asthenês, weak, 321,9

185

astrapê, lightning, 385,12.16.18; 413,6; 418,9 astron, star, 322,36; 324,17.18; 325,37; 347,11.33; 348,20.29 astronomos, astronomer, 325,37 asumphônos, not consonant, 389,33 asuntaktos, unsyntactical, 428,14 ataktos, disorderly, 379,31 ataktôs, in a disorderly way, 379,23 atelesteros, less perfect, 352,25; 353,19 atenês, intent, 352,2 atenes, intently, 348,36; 349,2 atenizein, gaze, 335,12 athroos, all at once, 327,2; 330,14; 366,25; 409,33; athroôs all at once, 444,1 athruptos, undispersed, without being dispersed, 364,4; 378,34 atimoteros, less estimable, 352,28 atmidôdês, vaporous, 392,13 atmis, evaporation, 332,27; 333,1 atmizein, vaporise, 397,30 atmos, vapour, 385,32; 391,15.21.24; 392,30; 394,9.10; 442,30; 443,25.29 smoke, 441,1 atomos, atomic, 371,16 aulos, pipe, 376,14-16; 380,7.8; 381,16 aülos, non-material, 328,14 austêros, dry, 407,3; 407, 8 A 3.11.14.16; 406,23 autarkês, sufficient, sufficient by itself, 360,5; 371,10.36; 384,25 automatôs, instinctively, 351,31.36 autophuôs, naturally, 375,29 autothen, suddenly, 370,34 directly, 424,23 auxanein, grow, 440,12 auxêsis, increase, 337,18 augmentation, 343,18 axôn, axis, 340,1.5.9 baktêria, stick, 430,6 bamma, dye (n.), 338,21 banausos tekhnê, manual skill, 389,5 baptein, dye (v.), 321,16; 441,3 dip, 414,3 baptizein, immerse, 357,13 barus, low, 373,1.14 and n. 211; 373,16.22 flat, 423,14 and n. 393

186

Greek-English Index

heavy, 408,12.14; 409,13; 421,13; 432,37; 434,29.31.33; 435,5 barutês, heaviness, 421,17; 435,8 basis, base, 333,32; 339,39 bathos, depth, 320,21-7; 321,3.4.11.12.15.19.23; 351,1; 428,4 bathus, deep [of colour], 321,7.15.17 belonê, needle, 371,13.32; 372,22-5 belos, arrow, 373,29 bêssein, cough (v.), 379,22 bêttein, cough (v.), 375,14.19 bêx, cough (n.), 375,18.22; 379,16.31.32; 383,6.14 bia, force, 357,30; 429,13 biai, violently, 357,15 biaios, violent, 356,25; 439,25 forceful, 369,19 biaiôs, violently, 355,2 forcefully, with force, 370,32 biazein, constrain, 358,27 bioteuein, pass life, 426,25 blepharon, eyelid, 339,33; 351,19.32.37; 387,16; 395,2-3.5 bôlos, clod of earth, 435,3 bôlos Armênia, Armenian nugget, 401,31 and n. 313 bombein, buzz, 377,31 bombos, booming, 368,18-20; 369,15 buzz, 377,26 botanê, herb, 396,31 bradus, slow, 374,29; 376,10.24.26 bradutês, slowness, 380,1; 421,23 brakhus, small, little, 362,29; 416,14 short (of vowels), 375,29; (of sounds), 408,32 brankhion, gill, 378,9 and n. 237; 378,11.20; 382,3.8; 384,17.29 brekhein, soak, soak with rain, 396,9; 397,32; wet, 428,8.31.34; 429,4.17; 431,28 brôma, food, 401,34-5 brontê, thunder, 385,11.13.16.18; 413,5; 418,9; 442,17.20.25 brôton, solid food, 396,24 bursa, leather skin, 406,21 daknôdês, biting, 389,37 daktuliaios, an inch high, 371,28 daktulos, finger, 339,33; 366,1.3; 428,32; 429,5; 430,2 dapanan, spend, 383,34 deilê, sunset, 332,23 dein, tie, 380,4

dektikos, receptive, 330,13; 345,33; 346,17; 366,20-2; 399,24 delear, prey, 353,14; 390,32; 391,6.9 dêlêtêrion, poison, 404,6-9 A 3 dêlôtikos einai, indicate, be indicative of, 432,11; 416,36 dêloun, show, 353,13 indicate, 322,17; 342,24 point out, 321,35 dendron, tree, 396,32; 397,1 derma, skin, 368,2 despotês, master, 387,24 diabainein, pass through (intr.), 329,26-7; 335,30; 368,5; 413,11 diabibazein, pass through (tr.), 327,21; 340,33; 351,17; 362,3; 365,14; 366,36; 367,4; 393,26; 398,24 diabibastikos einai, pass through, 367,2 diabibrôskein, eat through, 438,3 diadeiknunai, show forth, 348,15 diadekhesthai, receive through, 429,6 diadidonai, pass on, 322,6; 361,12; 365,29; 367,18-19; 368,14; 412,39 diadosis, passing on, 361,17 diaginôskein, discriminate, 386,13-14; 404,6-9 A 5; 408,21 come to discern, 426,12 diairein, give a division, 403,19 diairesis, division, 369,30; 371,20 diairetos, divisible, 371,17 diaitan, arbitrate, 334,30 pass life in, 380,20 diakheisthai, be diffused, 363,7; 372,12 diakomizein, send through, 365,24-5; 373,10 diakoptein, cut short, 379,27.28; 383,23 diakrinein, discriminate, 323,21-3; 386,36; 387,1 differentiate, 378,27.29; 387,19; 401,11.14; 408,9; 414,31; 419,20-21; 420,24 force apart, 348,34; 349, 3-4.9.14-18.21 expand, make to expand, 396,16; 439,18; 442,27-8 diakrisis, discernment, 321,5; 373,3 differentiation, 409,24 dialambanein, separate, 326,21.24

Greek-English Index treat of, 360,19 A 2; 397,36 dialeimma, interstice, 430,32 dialegesthai, discuss, 319,6.8; 360,19 speak, 360,22.24; 383,34; 384,1 dialektos, discourse, 361,21; 376,4; 377,3.7; 380,1.29.32.34.36; 381,13.14.20.32 dialuein, dissolve, 443,27 diamartanein, be quite mistaken, 384,12 diametros, diameter, 325,11-14 dianemesthai, divide among selves, 410,24 dianoia, thought, 422,17.22.23 diaphaneia, transparency, 321,25.27; 324,15; 368,6 diaphanês, transparent, 319,12.13.14; 320,21.23; 321,37; 322,1.3.29-34; 324,2.4-7.12.15.18.22; 337,4-9; 341,11-14.17; 352,1.11 354,15-16 and n. 155; 373,5; 390,17; 400,14.15.23; 444,12.32.33 diaphanês lithos, transparent stone, 320,26.34; 321,2.7.9.18.27; 345,23-4 diaphoitan, travel, 392,19 diaphônein, disagree, 407,8 A 4; 413,35 diaphora, division, 346,34; 393,3 differentia, 421,7.9 diaphorein, disperse, 388,22; 389,3 dissipate, 443,28 diapiptein, fall apart, 430,14 diaplassein, form, 430,31 diaporthmeuein, transmit, 329,8-11; 335,16; 336,36-7; 338,19; 345,29; 348,6; 352,13; 353,8.10.27; 358,2; 364,14.23.36; 391,16.20.29 diaporthmeusis, transmission, 338,18; 369,5-6 diaporthmeutikos, transmitting, that transmits, 319,15; 322,4.10; 329,6.12; 338,14-16; 345,33; 349,28-9; 354,8.15-16; 357,16; 366,33 diarkein, endure, 384,17 diarrhein, divide, 430,13 diarthroun, make articulate, 359,26 diaskedannunai, scatter, 360,31; 361,2 diastasis, distance, 325,8

187

dimension, 428,3 extension 333,38 diastaton trikhêi, that extends in three dimensions, 344,22 diastellein, open, 381,28; 382,8-9 diastêma, distance, 325,9.11.15; 334,32; 340,21; 373,30; 416,5; 418,15 extent, 337,16 diastolê, opening, 381,29 diathesis, state, 338,8; 339,16.34; 379,14; 387,8; 443,24 diathruptein, scatter, 360,14 diatithenai, put in a state, dispose, 322,4; 339,34; 432,6; 443,24; 445,1 diatribein, spend time, 333,8 spend life, 426,26 diatupôsis, shaping, 375,33 and n. 226 didaskalia, teaching, 352,27; 386,2 didaskalos, teacher, 380,35 didaskein, teach, 319,13 diêkein, extend, 325,29; 434,14.26 diêkhês, sound-conveying, conveys sound, 357,37; 358,7; 368,15; 373,7.11 to diêkhes, sound-vehicle, that which conveys sound, 340,37; 354,15 and n. 155; 369,10 A 5; 373,33; 374,3; 432,2 diêkhês dunamis, power to convey sound, sound-conveying power, 340,33.36; 341,6-7; 353,12.13.20-1; 354,10; 357,15-16.19.22; 358,3; 364,22 dielenkhein, refute, 415,36; 424,21.25.29; 425,5.21 dieirgein, keep apart, 429,35; 431,24.25; 432,23 dierkhesthai, spread abroad, 372,12 dieros, wet, 428,16.20.22 diesparmenôs eirêmena, scattered utterances, 417,23 diêthein, pass through, 391,38 strain, 399,34.35 dieurunein, dilate, 394,33 (Aristotle, DA 422a2) diïstanai, diverge, 334,28 part, 357,28.32; 429,10-11.18; 430,32.36 split, 442,17.25 remove, 414,5 dikha, in two, 320,15.16

188

Greek-English Index

diktuon, net, 353,16 diorizein, delimit, 360,17 mark off from, 426,9 make distinct, 437,5 diosmos, conveys odour, odour-conveying, 358,7; 390,31 smell-vehicle, 354,14; 432,2 diosmos dunamis, power to convey odour, odour-conveying power, 353,12.13.20-1; 354,10; 390,30; 391,4-6; 393,13.26; 394,12 diplasiazein, double up, 334,10.12 diplôsis, folding up, 332,2 diploun, fold, 332,18 diplous, double, 339,34 diskos, disk (of the sun), 348,37; 349,2 doru, spear, 432,9.10 dran, act on, 329,29.32.34; 330,9.10; 331,14; 352,14.21; 437,28.31.33; 438,5.6 drastêrios, forceful, 321,26; 392,28; 399,24 drastikos, pungent, 338,27.29; 392,5 such as to act on, 435,8 drimus, acrid, 387,34; 388,14; 389,27.37; 390,1; 407,3; 407,8 A 3.4.6.11.12.13.15 dunamis, power, 319,22 dunamei, in potentiality, 319,16 potentially, 371,17.20; 424,6 see also aisthêtikê, akoustikê, diêkhês, diosmos, optikê, osphrantikê dunein, set, 332,24.26 dusdioristos, hard to determine, 387,13 duseidês, ill-looking, 387,9 dusêkhos, ill-sounding, 387,10 duskherês, intractable, 389,13 duskôphein, be slightly deaf, 368,12 dusmai, the west, 345,5 dusôdês, foul-smelling, 387,7; 391,13 dusôdia, foul smell, 394,25; 396,34; 437,30 duspatheia, not being easily affected, 395,4 dusphantastos, difficult to imagine, 333,36 duspnoia, difficulty in breathing, 379,31 dusthraustos, difficult to break, 410,10

dutikon, western horizon, 332,29 ean, leave aside, 413,24 edaphos, the ground, 326,22 edesma, food-dish, 397,24 eidikos, specific, 383,21 eidôlon, image, 331,8; 334,36 and n. 67; 339,14.15 eidopoiein, make to have form, 324,29; 342,4; 381,29-30.32; 399,15; 434,20; 440,27 eidos, species, 375,9; 376,7; 386,12; 439,33 and n. 441 form, 341,18.19.21; 342,2; 344,21.22; 437,10.21.28; 440,3; 444,18.19 eilein, whirl round, 355,15-16.20 eilikrinês, pure, 345,19 einai, to einai, being, 399,5 eiresia, rowing, 385,20; 413,8; 416,20 eisdekhesthai, take in, 382,4 eispnein, breathe in, draw in breath, 378,31; 379,37-8; 383,20.22.24.28.32; 384,1; 393,9 and n. 289; 393,15.21.24.31 eispnoê, breathing in, 379,4; 382,22.29; 393,33; 395,12.17.20 eispompê, having things sent in, 416,29.30 ekbainein, go outside, 436,28 ekballein, throw out, 363,29 êkhein, ring, 355,18; 356,16; 359,18 resound, 358,23; 369,21; 372,12.14 sound, 366,7 êkheion, gong, 355,14.24.25; 356,18; 372,16-19 êkhêtikos, resonant, 355,30 that which rings, 356,17; 372,15 ekhinos, hedgehog, 319,26 êkhô, echo, 360,19.20 êkhos, sound, 355,2; 359,27; 368,22.27; 374,3 ringing, 355,23.35.37; 372,12.19 ekkhein, pour out, 326,17 ekkhôrein, move out, 429,22 ekklinein, avoid, 331,33 ekkrinein, discriminate, 340,7 ekkrouein, knock out, 366,34 eklambanein, take [i.e. interpret], 346,7; 371,1.4 eklegein, collect together, 433,37 ekleipsis, eclipse, 324,19 ekmageion, matrix, 437,22.23

Greek-English Index ekpempein, emit, 325,32.34; 378,11 send out, 329,36 ekphônein, utter, 375,28 speak, 375,29 ekphônêsis, utterance, 375,27 production of sound, 410,15 ekphusan, blow out, 380,8 ekpnein, breathe out, 380,10; 381,15; 383,21.24; 383.23-6.29; 384,2 ekpnoê, breathing out, 379,4; 382,22.29; 383,33 exspiration, 383,27 ekpompê, emission, 325,2.6.28; 326,6.9; 333,20; 339,2.19; 343,21; 378,12; 416,28; 421,36 ekpurênizein, squeeze out, 355,8; 370,14.33 ekpuroun, burst into flame, 331,36 ektasis, extending, 376,37 ekteinein, draw out, 383,30 extend, 443,33 ekthermainein, heat thoroughly, 332,12 ektithesthai, set out, 370,1 ekthlibein, force out, 355,1.12; 357,15.23-4.26; 378,13.31; 428,36-8; 429,22 ekthlipsis, forcing out, 370,5 elaia, olive, 404,2 elaiôdês, like olive oil, 407,8 A 10 elaion, olive oil, 414,3 êlektron, amber, 321,2 elenkhein, refute, 341,5; 417,7; 425,29 elenkhos, proof, 425,15; refutation, 427,13 and n. 399 elleipein, fall short, 386,6 be defective, 388,28-9 ellipôs, elliptically, 359,26 ellops, dumb, 377,21 elutron, sheath, 395,9 emballein, pour in, 356,1 embrontêtos, thunderstruck, 403,12 emmignunai, mix, mix in, 396,28-9 397,3.5.14; 399,18 empalin, conversely, 422,19 empathês, that can be affected, 443,16 emperiekhein, embrace, 424,7 emphanês, manifest, 394,1 emphasis, presentation, 334,41; 335,3.8.11; 339,14 empherês, resembling, 375,24

189

emphôleuein, go into shelter, 323,22 emphrassein, block up, 366,1 emphusan, whistle, 358,25 emphuton thermon, innate hot, 332,8-10 and n. 54 empiptein, befall, 329,2 empodizein, hinder 321,14 impede, 329,8; 336,33; 337,2 empoiein, impose, 329,30 empsukhein, cool, 328,2.3; 381,10 empsukhos, animate, 375,13.15; 377,13.15; 426,24 empsuxis, cooling, cooling effect, 381,9.11; 382,7.25-8; 384,29; 395,24 enaimos, having blood, 377,19; 393,3.8.12 enantios, contrary, 329,18; 341,28.30-32; 384,2; 435,28 enantiôsis, contrariety, 408,4.5.10; 423,3.4; 426,5; 435,27 contrary pair, 435,33; 436,1 enapolambanein, catch up in, 321,1; 355,1; 357,18.21.24; 359,12; 360,8; 431,21 enapomattein, print off onto 335,17 enapomenein, remain caught in, 367,12; 430,32 enaposkêptein, invade, 339,5 enargeia, plain fact, 326,26; 327,12.34; 331,37; 335,13; 337,23; 393,16.35 enargês, very perspicuous, 432,6 enargôs, manifestly, 321,10 enarthros, articulate, 361,18; 377,7-8; 383,13 enarthrôs, articulately, 380,5 endeia, deficiency, 402,33; 404,9; 435,22; 440,19 endêlos, immediately clear, 411,4 energeia, activity, 322,4; 326,7 actuality, 322,16.18.22; 324,27; 330,20; 347,16 energeiai, kat’energeian, in act, 319,12.16; 322,3 energein, act on, 401,25 engizein, border on, 403,6 eniskhein, hold in 370,24 enistasthai, object, 412,5 kalôs enistanai, have a good objection, 410,1-2 enizanein, adhere, 428,36 enkalein, call to account, 344,33

190

Greek-English Index

enkatamignunai, mix in, 402,20; 437,32.35; 440,35 enkataspeirein, implant, 355,29 enkatoikodomein, build into, 364,12; 365,9.15.20; 367,8.10.28.31-2; 368,29; 384,5; 398,17-18; 426,28 enkephalos, brain, 336,34; 338,10; 353,30; 364,16; 365,1; 392,32; 433,33 enkhriein, annoint, 350,3 enkhumos, flavoured, with flavour, 400,2; 402,8; 406,3; 434,23; 443,26 ennoein, conceive of , 333,24 ennoia, thought, 375,34 enoptron, mirror, 330,30 enskêptein, invade, 339,7 enskirousthai, form [of scars], 368,4 enstasis, objection, 412,2; 413,25.26.37; 415,31; 427,33.35 entelekheia, actuality, 349,34; 342,18.24 entomê, slit, 327,17-21; 384,31 and n. 257 entomon, insect, 377,17; 384,30; 422,35 entrekhôs, adeptly, 413,37 entupoun, make an imprint, 335,29 enudros, aquatic, aquatic animal, 377,19; 382,5.12-13.16-18; 390,32; 391,5; 392,11.36.37 epaïein, hear, 354,9 epanapherein, relate back, 417,5 epaporein, raise further difficulty, 351,8 ephaptesthai, touch, 326,12 epeigesthai, hasten, 373,36; 435,1.4 epekteinein, extend, 369,10 A 3 epharmozein, fit, 344,24 fit together, 429,15; 430,30.31 ephistanai, attend, 387,23.25.33; 411,2; 415,6, 422,2 notice, 388,23 ephodiazein, provision oneself, 378,27-8 epidêlos, evident, 431,17 epiginesthai, supervene, 439,34 epiginôskein, get to know, 386,23-4 epiglôttis, tongue, 376,19-20 epikalumma, covering, 395,12 epikaluptein, cover, 395,5 epikeisthai, lie by, 381,7

epikheirein, attempt, 408,27 epikheirêma, proof, 394,26; 408,3.24; 411,34.35; 412,32; 417,10; 423,2.7.27; 424,19.27-9 epikheirêsis, proof, 344,13; 408,17.27; 410,35; 417,12; 433,36 epikhuma, cataract, 350,32 epikratein, overpower, 391,13-14; 392,6.7 epikratesteros, dominant over, 338,30 epikratesteros ginesthai, overpower, 391,12.17 epikrinein, give decision, 370,2 epiluesthtai, resolve, 340,27 epiluein, resolve, 415,31.33; 432,26-7; 441,19; 444,16 epilusis, solution, 415,35 epimenein, last, 373,22 epimixia, admixture, 404,16.17 epimonos, that lasts, 355,14 epinoein, think, 343,17 conceive of, 414,20 epinoia, thought, 371,18 epipedon, surface, 363,7-8.29; 430,37 plane, 413,15 epipedos, flat, 363,6-8 epiphaneia, surface, 320,7.8.18.19.24.27.28; 321,14.20.24.28-30; 350,36; 372,1; 428,30; 429,11.13.16; 430,31.33 outside, 377,28 epiphrassein, block off, 359,29; 368,16 epipolazein, float, 384,21 epipolês, upon the surface, 428,7 epipômazein, cover, 368,17; 376,17 epiprosthêsis, occultation, 324,21 imposition, 339,10 interposition, 362,27 epiprosthein, occult, 324,18-21; 362,23.25.36; 363,11 impose upon, 339,8 epipsukhein, cool, 381,11 epirrhoê, influx, 343,18 epirrhoia, efflux, 337,27 episkopein, examine, 325,5 episkotein, darken, 351,15 epistêmôn, person with knowledge, 380,35 episunaptein, attach, 393,29 join on, 428,16

Greek-English Index epitasis, intensification, 409,14; 410,28 tightening, 439,28-29; 440,1 epitêdeios, suitable, 439,10 epitêdeiotês, suitability, 354,26; 355,27 epitêdeusis, intended effort, 339,32 epiteinein, sharpen, 391,21 intensify, 409,18; 421,20; 444,7 epitholoun, muddy, 388,22 confound, 405,10 epos, word, 375,32 and n. 225 ergazesthai, effect, 382,7 ergon, work, 328,10 function, 380,27.29; 381,3 êrema, gently, 379,19 to a slight extent, 436,24.26 êremein, lie up, 403,33 be at rest, 406,15 erion, wool, 335,24; 355,3; 359,23; 370,21; 440,32 eruthros, red, 338,20; 386,14; 406,30.36 eskhaton, extremity, 429,34 esoptron, mirror, 333,11 êthmoeidês, ethmoid, 392,32 and n. 286; 395,15 and n. 291; 398,19 and n. 301 eualloiôtos, easily altered, 443,29 eudêlos, perfectly clear, 336,17 easily made clear, 386,3.17 eudiaphorêtos, easily dissipated, 443,27 eudiathruptos, easily scattered, 360,15 eudioristos, easily determined, 386,3 eueidês, well-looking, 387,9 euêkhos, well-sounding, 387,10 euêthês, foolish, 343,17 eukherês, easy, 333,24 eukherôs, easily, 357,32 eukinêtos, easily moved, 357,27.37 eukrasia, good mixture, 444,25 eulogon, plausible, 412,26; 415,34 eulogôs, plausibly, 334,30 reasonably, 342,29 euôdês, sweet-smelling, 387,7; 391,13; 434,23; 437,32; 442,19 euôdia, sweet smell, 391,31.33; 394,25; 396,34; 397,32; 437,30.31 eupathês, easily affected, 395,6 euperioristos, easily defined, 401,34 euphônos, pleasant-voiced, 381,17

191

euphuês, well-endowed, 388,33; 389,2.10 eurhis, keen-nosed, 386,8 eurhuthmos good rhythm, 375,31; 376,31 eurhuthmôs, euphoniously, 379,22 eurunein, dilate, 395,13 eurunesthai, become wider, 333,28 eutaktôs, in an orderly fashion, 379,20 eutêktos, easily dissolved, 401,16 (Aristotle, DA 422a19) eutheia, straight line, 327,21; 413,15 kat’eutheian, in a straight line, 327,7.16.22.23; 331,4 ep’ eutheias, in a straight line, 327,8; straight off, directly, 327,14 euthruptos, easily dispersed, 363,30; 366,23.30; 430,18 euthuphorikos, that moves in a straight line, 327,11 euthutês, straightness, 374,1 eutreptos, easily changed, 443,21 exairetos, exceptional, 420,9; 421,37; 422,2 exairetôs, especially, 333,13 exakontizein, expel, 367,23 exallagê, change to something completely new, 409,27 exallattesthai, be completely removed, 421,31 exapsis, conflagration, 385,14 exapsis ginesthai, fire be kindled, 331,38; 332,3.21-2 exaptein, kindle, 328,34; 385,15 exarkein, last, 383,31.33 exatmizein, give off vapour, 397,32 distill, 399,34.36 exêgeisthai, explain, 320,8 exêgêtês, interpreter, 411,2; 412,5; 424,24 exerkhesthai, escape, 355,16 exikmazein, cause to exude, 401,21; 405,27 exiskhuein, have strength, 348,7.18; 379,26.29 existanai, depart, 430,2; 434,34 exitêlos, ineffective, 405,9 exodos, exit, 355,7 exodus, 379,16 exokhê, bump, 363,29

192

Greek-English Index

exomoioun, say to be completely like, 370,30 exôthein, push out, 327,36.37; 355,6; 360,11 repel, 367,22 Galênos, Galen, 407,8 A 3 gastêr, belly, 379,2 gê, the earth, 328,20.21 earth, 354,9; 421,12-17 land, 426,24 gegônein, make self heard, 363,15 (Aristotle, DA 420a1) geloios, ridiculous, 339,26 genesis, production, 379,6.18; 383,8.25 genesis, 407,3.5; 435,9 coming to be, coming into being, 437,16; 441,10.11 genêtos, that comes into being, 433,8; 434,30 genikos, generic, 376,7; 383,20 gennan, generate, 440,12 gennêtos, generated, 364,27 genos, genus, 386,11.22; 408,18.19; 411,1 genus, jaw, 380,14 geôdês, earthen, 354,11; 385,31; 396,2; 399,36; 400,1; 418,23 gerôn, old man, 381,17 geuesthai, taste, 399,19; 406,9 geusis, taste, 380,28.36; 388,12.15; 397,36; 398,4.9.20.32; 400,27.28.34; 402,28.33; 416,26.35 geustikon, that which tastes, 404,24 geustikê aisthêsis, sense of taste, 405,4 aisthêtêrion geustikon, sense-organ of taste, 405,18.21-2; 433,34 geuston, thing tasted, taste-object, object of taste, 338,25; 354,3; 386,16; 389,23.25.26; 395,33; 398,3; 404,6.13.14.18-23.27.29; 405,4 ginôskein, get to know, 334,33.35; 433,4 cognise, 444,5 gliskhros, viscous, 395,17; 408,13; 410,7.9.11; 421,28; 432,37 glôtta, tongue, 338,25.30; 376,5; 378,36; 380,2.27.32; 381,21.24;

405,22.27.33.34; 412,13.17.27; 420,3.6; 422,6; 424,11; 427,25 glukus, sweet, 399,10.14.15; 406,31.32; 407,3.14; 407,8 A 2.4.8.10.14.15; 408,7 fresh (of water), 437,34; 438,2 glukutês, sweetness, 399,14-15; 409,32; 437,18.19 gnôrizein, recognise, 373,1; 437,20.21 gnôsis, cognition, 444,3 gnôstikôs, in a cognitive way, 432,38; 437,11; 438,13 gônia, angle, 332,1.24; 333,38; 340,7.8 goun, for instance, 324,19; 410,9 indeed, 385,29; 403,21 at least, 385,10; 386,35; 413,31; 443,1 grammê, line, 326,11 graphê, reading, 399,21.22 grupos, aquiline, 387,25 gumnazein, train, 417,12 gups, vulture, 390,33; 392,17 gupsos, gypsum, 324,4 hallesthai, spring off, 370,19 halmê, brine, 438,3 halmuros, salty, 396,30; 406,32; 407,2 hals, salt, 401,19; 407,2 hama, simultaneously, 345,9 hamartia, defect, 339,32 hapax, absolutely, 335,10 initially, 336,21 haphê, contact, 351,31; 367,8; 382,6 touch, 352,26; 388,17.18; 389,10.11.13.15.18; 398,5.6; 407,18.20; 422,13 haplôs, simply, 335,23 without qualification, 342,23 in a word, 324,10 haplous, simple, 327,6 pure (of water), 397,26.28; 402,5 haplon, simple body, 397,18; 402,7.10.16; 426,25 haptesthai, touch, 330,6-8 be in contact, 350,16; 367,11; 399,5 haptikos, that touches, of touch having sense of touch, 422,6.8 haptikê aisthêsis, sense of touch, 398,9; 408,2-3; 411,36; 412,27-8; 426,12; 432,29; 438,11 haptikon aisthêtêrion,

Greek-English Index sense-organ of touch, 407,21; 412,27; 414,13; 417,2-3; 432,36; 433,34 haptos, hapton, object of touch, touch-object 353,1; 354,4; 373,15; 410,19; 411,1; 421,27; 426,5; 436,23.25; 443,5.7 harmonia, harmony, 358,14; 375,26.32; 376,2; attunement, 439,32.35.37 harmozein, tune, 439,26 hêdein, please, 387,3.6.22; 408,33; 421,5.21 hêdonê, pleasure, state of pleasure, 379,16 hêdus, pleasant, 401,11; 408,9 hekôn, of own free will, 379,22 hektêmorios, sixth, 325,16 hêliakos, of the sun, 323,12.13.17; 348,23.34 solar, 328,37 helikoeidês, of winding form, 365,16 hêlios, the sun, 322,36; 324,19; 328,5.29; 330,8.21.24; 332,24; 334,17; 346,21.22; 347,38; 348,20.26.36; 407,8 A 15 sunbeams, 369,4 hêliousthai, be sunlit, 362,26.31.34 helix, winding, 367,27 hêmera, day, 323,20.23; 347,1.5.6; 348,1.4 hêmigenês, half-formed, 385,33 hêmisphairion, hemisphere, 327,3; 328,10 henôsis, uniting, 358,15 henoun, unify, 360,34 heôs, dawn, 332,22; heôsphoros, the Morning Star, 347,12.13 dawn, 408,34 and n. 348 hermêneia, expression, 380,23 (Aristotle 420b16-20) hermêneuein, explain, 319,9-10; 319,24-5 Hermês, Mercury, 343,3.5, 407,8 A 15 heteromêkês, oblong, 327,13 heterotês, distinctness, 426,7.12 hêtteshai, be beaten, 401,3 hexagônon, hexagon, 325,10 hexis, state of having, 341,28; 344,16.17 positive state, 349,26.31; 390,16 kath’ hexin, dispositionally, 403,36

193

hidrusthai, reside, 364,15-16; 391,37; 438,32 himas, strap, 355,18.22 himation, piece of cloth, 430,9 garment, 437,31.33; 443,29 hippos potamios, hippopotamus, 377,23-4 hiptasthai, flutter, 377,26; 378,17; 404,5 hoion [before a noun] as it were, 322,32.33 for instance, 324,3 namely, 338,35; 386,14 holotês, totality, 430,24; 434,33 and n. 424; 434,34 homalos, even, 372,6.21.26 homoiomerês, with similar parts, 415,26 homoiotês, similarity, 432,19.31 homoioun, make like, 405,6; 437,14.16 homokhrous, the same colour, 320,29; 338,21; 387,28 hopêlikos, however small, 428,5 hopênika, when, 429,28 hoposos, of whatever quantity, 428,5 horan, see, 319,19.27.29 horatikos, that sees, 441,30 horatos, visible, can be seen 323,8; 390,8; 403,4 horaton, object of sight, sight-object, 319,23; 320,5-8; 322,28.30; 323,1; 326,12-14; 342,20.26.27; 346.25.26; (four divisions of), 346,33; (six kinds of), 347,25-38; 361,23.24; 403,2 hôrismenos, determinate, 344,24 marked off, 369,22 horismos, definition, 319,12; 320,9.10 horizesthai, define, 319,11; 429,34 horizon, horizon, 327,2-3; 347,12; 349,1 hormathos, stream [of sand], 360,12 hormê, impulse, 379,9 and n. 240 onset 430,27 horos, definition, 320,11 hudaros, watery, 404,6-9 A 3 hudatôdês, watery, 332,27 hudôr, water, 319,14; 324,2.5.14.30; 357,12.13.15; 358,1-4.7; 382,4.6; 384,16.19.20.27; 390,29-31; 391,5.7.12; 396,27; 399,9-19; 402,3

194

Greek-English Index

huelinos, glazed, of glass, 320,30; 429,14 huelos, glass, 319,15; 320,26; 321,16; 324,4; 329,9; 335,20; 337,33; 345,27; 350,34.35 huetos, rain, 397,32 hugiês, sound, 397,16 hugrainein, moisten, make moist, 401,22; 405,18.21.24; 443,3 hugros, moist, 385,31.34; 396,1.22.24.27; 397,3-8; 405,4.6; 406,2.17; 408,11.14; 428,19.21 hugron, liquid, 379,24; 429,3.7.10.11; 443,26 [in eye] 326,17; 336,31.32; 337,4.6.8.11; 338,35; 350,20; 351,16; 364,34; 398,17; 418,20 to hugron, moisture, 428,20 hugrotês, moistness, 324,10; 401,18; 405,7.8.28; 410,25; 411,25; 421,29; 428,32.36; 433,10 moisture, 396,6.7; 401,21; 405,5; 428,7; 429,8; 430,8.32.35 hulê, matter, 362,5; 377,16; 381,14.15.20; 395, 33; 396,21; 397,7.16; 398,27.33; 400,4.6.14; 404,29; 432,33; 437,10; 438,13; 440,22-30; 444,18.20 hulikê arkhê, material source, 404,14 hulikon aition, material cause, 358,9; 388,23 hulikôs, in a material way, 433,4; 440,23 humên, membrane, 364,21; 377,28; 395,19; 414,18; 424,32.33; 431,22 skin, 430,9.15 and n. 409 hupaleiphein, anoint, 407,8 A 9 hupallêlos, subordinate one to another, 408,10.14 hupantan, give answer, 339,23 meet, go to meet, 383,23; 417,3 huparkhein, be present, 319,14 hupatê, top-string, 373,33; 374,8 hupeikein, yield, 411,7 hupekkauma, tinder, 331,39 huperballein, exceed, 436,9.10 huperbibazein, take as hyperbaton, 422,29 huperbolê, excess, 390,8; 402,32; 403,4.5.25; 404,9; 435,22; 436,7; 439,30.37; 440,18 hupêresia, service, 380,13

hupêretein, minister to, 367,11 huperkaiein, overcook, 401,24; 402,9 huperlampros, super-shining, 347,7.22 hupernephês, above the clouds, 333,1 huperôia, palate, 358,28; 380,2; 381,21.31 huperon, pestle, 373,19; 374,33 hupertithesthai, defer, 381,5 huphaptein, apply, 327,18 hupheimenos, pale, 409,21 huphexistasthai, give way, 430,21 huphistanai, subsist, 371,27; 409,33 withstand, 384,20; 430,22 hupobrukhios, under water, 358,5-6; 365,13 hupodeigma, model, 335,32, 336,2 imaginary supposition, 415,6; 426,18 hupodiairein, subdivide, 404,22 hupodokhê, receiving, 439,11 hupokeimenon, subject, 320,11; 324,9-13; 326,30; 400,30.32.34; 411,18.26; 438,34.37 underlying thing, 437,31; 438,26.33 hupokeisthai, underlie, be underlying thing 396,27 and n. 296; 396,30; 397,4.18; 398,23; 411,12.15; 417,29; 442,24.29 hupokhôrein, give way, 334,9.12; 429,24; 430,18.28 hupokhuma, cataract, 350,20 hupolambanein, suppose, 342,11; 369,21 hupomenein, experience, 338,9; 374,8 endure, 430,17.27 undergo, 445,9 huponoein, suppose, 402,11 suspect, 421,37 huponoia, supposition, 425,26 hupopiptein, fall under, 400,15 huposmos, guided by smell, 392,34 hupostasis, existence, 358,9 substance, 410,23 hupostellein, draw back, 362,15 hupothesis, hypothesis, 330,28; 331,1.31.32; 333,22.23.26; 336,26.28.29; 340,19-21 supposition, 427,21.23 hupothetikos sullogismos, hypothetical syllogism, 424,4.17-18.22-3; 425,29; 427,14

Greek-English Index hupotrekhein, pass under, 324,20.21 hupourgein, serve, 383,28 hupsos, height (above the earth), 332,38 iatros, doctor, 350,26; 399,31; 434,16 idea, form, 397,10 idea logou, form of speech, 376,32 idiai, on its own, 319,5; 437,4 idiazein, distinguish, 420,10 idion, peculiarity, 319,28; 346,29; 432,29; 443,20.23 idios, proper, own, own proper, 329,31; 381,11; 398,16 idion aisthêton, proper sense-object, 346,12; 398,2; 408,36; 409,3; 418,32; 436,18; 437,4 idiôs, as peculiar to, 436,13 idiotês, peculiarity, 397,21; 409,26; 432,22 peculiar character, 433,10 idou, see! 412,13; 427,25 ikhthus, fish, 353,13.16.24; 354,9; 377,20.33; 378,2; 378,6 and n. 236; 382,3.19; 384,8.12-16; 387,15 and n. 264; 390,31; 391,8 ikterian, suffer from jaundice, 338,33; 406,8 iluôdês, muddy, 382,19 inarion, string, 356,13.19.22 iskhas, dried fig, 409,18.19 iskhuros, strong (of argument), 420,10 isodunamein, be equivalent, 362,20-1 isthmoeidês, see êthmoeidês kakophônos, harsh-voiced, 381,17 kalumma, covering, 327,5 kaluptein, cover, 327,4; 419,23; 425,7 kamnein, be sick, 367,35; 368,1 kampê, bend (n.), 367,29 kamptein, bend (v.), 358,33.36; 359,4 kapnôdês, smoky, 392,13-14; 396,2.9 kardia, heart, 381,7.8.10; 382,15.24.26.27 karkinos, crab, 377,23; 387,15 karterein, steel self, 351,32 kataduein, sink, 341,21 dive down, 351,34; 353,21; 378,5 katadusis, dive (n.), 365,10.11

195

kataginesthai, occupy self with, 408,30; 423,30 katakermatizein, chop up, 355,10.12-13; 372,28-9 divide in bits, 360,13; 399,16 katakhrêsthai, use loosely, 323,36 katakorês, intense, 321,16; 409,20; 421,2 katakorôs, intensely, 337,33 katalambanein, catch, 389,36 take over, 328,7.35; 334,8 regain, 374,1; 435,2 katalampein, light up, light, 328,36, 348,14 shine upon, 348,21.26; 362,22 katalegein, list, 346,30; 407,8 A 1 katalêgein, stop, 371,25 kataleipein, leave, 430,21 katalimpanein, leave, 429,16 katantrikrus, directly facing, 362,14 kataphasis, assertion, 418,34 kataphôtizein, light up, 327,4 illuminate, 337,34 katapsukhein, cool, 382,3 katapsuxis, cooling, 381,3 kataskeuazein, establish, 333,25.26; 350,12; 359,8; 390,31; 394,24.26; 407,19; 408,3; 412,1; 414,12.15; 424,15 construct, 358,13 kataskeuê, piece of reasoning, 418,4.26 argument establishing, 424,22 eis kataskeuên, to establish, 412,34 kataskeuê skolia, tortuous layout, 367,25 kataxêrainein, dry out, dry out completely, 395,33; 399,29; 406,21 katekhein, restrain, 372,19 kathairein, purify, 395,18 kathapax, completely, 428,37; 436,22 katharos, sound, 393,4 katharôs, in a pure way, 395,14 kath’hauto, of itself, 320,6-17 katholikos, universal, 411,13 katônomasmenon ekhein, have a name for, 408,22 katoptron, mirror, 320,30; 331,8.22.28-9; 339,14; 437,22.23; 444,22 kattiteros, tin, 320,31

196

Greek-English Index

keisthai, be laid down, 435,12 kenkhros, millet seed, 328,15; 343,34 kenos, empty, 328,9 void, 344,7; 350,7.10.18; 357,9; 359,10; 363,21-4; 369,19.20 kentein, stab, 373,18.19 kentron, centre, 325,10; 332,31.35; 339,26.38 kephalai ikhthuôn, fish-heads, 319,25; 346,31 keras, horn, 324,4; 346,30; 368,21; 369,1 keratoeidês, cornea, 326,16; 337,4.25; 338,35; 350,20.28.32; 351,10; 416,2 keratoeidês khitôn, corneal membrane, 364,34; 368,2-3 kêros, wax, 354,11; 437,13.16.17; 438,8 khalan, loosen, 380,4 khalkos, bronze, 358,12 Kharônioi osmai, mephitic vapours, 390,22 kheilos, brim, 355,35 lip, 358,28.29; 380,12 kheir, hand, 430,3 kheisthai, spread, 337,18; 348,27 be diffused, 339,19.24.27 khelidôn, swallow, 404,5 khersaion, land animal, 393,7.11-12 khitôn, membrane, 326,21; 350,28; 364,34; 366,12; 368,3; 398,17; 418,20 khondrôdês, cartilaginous, 366,5 khondros, cartilage, 381,26 khônê, funnel, 360,12 khôra, space, 429,16.21; 430,29 khordê, string, 373,32; 439,27.28; 440,1 khorêgia, furnishing, 383,35 khôrein, move, 328,8.12-16; 329,20.21; 344,5 and n. 116 have room for, 344,3 khôrion, passage, 428,14 khôrismos, separation, 428,35 khortos, grass, 387,27 khremptesthai, clear throat, 375,14; 379,34 khrêstos, wholesome, 404,17 khriein, smear, 321,17 khrôma, colour, 319,11.15.28; 320,6.19.21; 321,1-5.22.26; 322,3.5.8; 323,35.36; 338,16;

342,20-3; 345,28.29; 350,1.15; 351,2-7; 352,9.12.20; 397,17.19; 400,13-16; 408,33; defined 444,30-32 khrônnunai, colour, 320,22.27-32; 321,10-12.18; 329,17.18.22; 400,23; 432,16; 434,21.22 khrônnusthai, become coloured, 416, 32 khronos, time, 409,34; 410,1; 423,18 khuma, material, 324,16 khumos, humour, 336.4.7.9.18; 337,5.24; 338,38; 339,6-13; 350,21.24; 351,4.10.17 juice, 338,11.27.29 flavour, 380,32; 385,30.31; 389,27.30.32; 394,8; 396,21.23.30-32; 397,2-5.7; 400,11.15; 401,17.19; 402,5.11; 404,16 and n.; 406,7-11.16; 432,11.13 khumoun, flavour (v.), 404,6-9 A 2 khusis, spreading 337,21 khutra, earthen jar, 323,2 kinduneuein, be a risk, 443,5 kinein, change, 332,11 kineisthai, move, 325,8.15 kinêma, psukhika kinêmata, motions of the soul, 388,25 kinêsis, motion, movement, 325,16; 327,12; 345,8.9; 413,7; 421,23-4 change, 359,10 stirring, 399,16; 400,12 kinêsis haplê, simple motion, 327,7 kinêsis kata topon, change in respect of place, 357,7-8; 359,10 kinêtikos, such as to change, 319,12; 321,36-7; 322,1; 349,30.31; 350,1; 432,1.2 kitta, jay, 377,9; 380,15 klan, slant, 332,24 klonein, shake, 379,28 klonos, shaking, 379,27 kôdôn, bell, 355,17; 356,18 kôdônion, little bell, 356,20.25 koilôma, hollow, 355,13.16; 360,27; 370,24.27; 429,7.9-10 cavity [of ear] 364,12.20.24; 365,37 koilos, concave, 337,19; 359,13.15.17; 360,21; 363,5 hollow 360,31.33 koilotês, concavity, 320,17; 360,25; 367,12; 383,13; 430,35

Greek-English Index hollowness, 355,15; 359,16 koinônein, have in common, 400,31; 408,11 koinônia, sharing, 343,25 common property, thing in common, 389,29; 400,27 koinônikos, social, 380,34 koinos, general, 434,13 koinê aisthêsis, common sense, 433,35 and n. 418 koinon aisthêton, common sense-object, 409,2-7 koinôs, generally, 434,11 kokhlias, cockle, 377,22 kolazein, chasten, 406,12 kolobos, clipped, 376,31 kôlon, clause, 376,30.31.33 konkhulê, mussel, 391,6 konkhulion, little mussel, 391,9 kônôpion, little insect, 321,2; 350,23; 351,25 kônôps, mosquito, 430,27 kônos, cone, 333,27.31; 339,37; 340,1.5.9.16; 343,4; 348,27 kôpê, oar, 385,21; 413,8; 416,21; 418,8 korê, pupil, 325,31; 326,16; 333,32; 337,16.22.24; 339,7.8.20.21; 351,22; 366,10.11; 367,33; 368,1 koruphê, zenith, 332,29; 333,3 apex, 333,31; 343,4 kosmos, universe, 330,19 kouphizein, lighten, 395,20 kouphos, light, 408,12.14; 409,13; 410,24; 421,13-15; 434,29.31.33; 435,3 kouphotês, lightness, 418,35; 421,11.16; 433,7-8; 435,8 kradainesthai, vibrate, 355,23; 356,8.14.19.28; 374,6.12 krasis, mixture, 371,27; 388,25.26; 397,18 krauros, friable, 408,12; 410,6.9; 421,28; 432,37 kremazein, hang up, 391,8 krinein, discern, 323,32; 333,30; 373,4; 390,11.14; 403,29.31; 409,6; 437,20.24; 444,22 krisis, discernment, 335,30; 337,13; 350,26.32 kriteon, we must judge, 368,16 kritêrion, judge, 409,8 kritikos, such as to discern, 338,23; 404,8; 418,27; 426,1; 436,7

197

kritikon einai, discern, 435,27; 436,17 krokodeilos, crocodile, 377,24; 391,7; 392,14 krokos, saffron, 387,34; 389,31 Kronos, Saturn, 407,8 A 16 krotos, clapping, 375,14; 376,13; 378,18 krotoun, clap (v.), 376,9 krouein, knock, 370,11 pluck, 373,25 strike, 439,30 kruptein, hide, 415,2.5; 425,13 krustalloeides, lens, 333,29 and n. 63; 333,32; 336,34-5; 337,3.12; 350,31.32; 365,2 krustalloeides hugron, vitreous humour, 339,38; 340,4; 350,25.27; 364,33-34; 418,19-20 krustallos, ice, 441,8 kuanos, blue-green, 338,21 kuanous, blue-green, 406,29 kuathos, ladle, 343,34; 344,1-4 kubernêtês, steersman, 341,20 kuklikos, circular, 413,15 kuklos, kata kuklon, kuklôi, in a circle, 327,8.12 kuknos, swan, 401,8 kulindrikos, cylindrical, 372,8 kulindros, cylinder. 372,10 kuma, wave, 375,11 kumbalon, cymbal, 355,14 kuôn, dog, 379,12; 391,2 kurios, in control, 360,1-4 and nn. 171, 172; 363,23 kuriôs, genuinely, in a genuine way, 373,15; 375,34; 377,9; 378,28; 381,23; 418,19 kurtos, convex, 355,17 lambanein, understand, 421,6.20.21 lampron (n.), shining, 347,4.9; 348,5 lampros (adj.), shining, 346,32; 347,5; 348,14 bright, 348,29; 423,33 lamprotês, brightness, 334,18; 347,27; 403,25 larunx, larynx, 381,25.33 legein, mean, 324,16 lêgein, finish, 333,31 leios, smooth, 331,5.7.20; 334,21.22; 354,25.32; 355,12; 359,13; 363,2.5.7.12.14; 370,14-18; 408,12; 409,14; 432,38

198

Greek-English Index

(of colour), 408,33; 423,12 (of sound), 408,32; 409,26; 423,9 leiotês, smoothness, 355,10; 358,11; 372,13 leipesthai, fall short, 388,19 lêmê, rheum, see mêlê lêmma, assumption, 431,5 lepis, fish-scale, 319,11.26; 346,31; 347,9; 348,4 lepos, skin, 414,19.21 lêpsis, apprehension, 336,3 leptomerês, fine-textured, 328,23; 336,13; 385,27; 392,4; 399,33; 418,12; 428,37; 443,26 leptos, fine, 328,27, 344,9; 353,30; 385,29 thin, 355,18.22 leptunein, liquefy, 402,20 leukos, white, 321,11; 346,19 light (of sound), 408,32; 409,9.23; 423,9 leukotês, whiteness, 346,19; 427,36 lexis, utterance, 361,20 passage, 422,30; 425,21 phrase, phrasing, 375,26.33; 376,2.5; 377,3.7.8; 380,3.9 lignuôdês, smoky, 382,29 lignus, smoke, 391,25.27 limnê, marshes, 353,14 liparos, oily, 389,27; 406,32; 407,8 A 2.8 lithos, stone, 321,2 rock, 442,17 crystal, 324,4 logikos, rational, 352,31-2 logistikon, that which reasons, 388,23 logos, account, 319,9.24; 322,15.21.28 argument, 337,23; 411,36 book, 417,15; 439,33 discussion, 322,22.23 form, 435,28 and n. 428; 437,11; 439,5.31.33 proportion, 376,10 question, 429,30 reason, 428,33; 431,27 sentence, 376,31 statement, 323,1; 389,7.8; 392,1 utterance, 376,29 logos prophorikos, spoken speech, 376,27 kata logon, in the regular way, 380,6

kata deuteron logon, in the second place, 330,4-5 logon ekhein, be reasonable, 411,24 louein, wash, 437,34 luein, resolve, 427,34 undo, 439,25.29.34-5 luesthai, principle be destroyed, 444,26 lukhnos, lamp, 323,2; 327,4.13.18.20.22 lukophôs, twilight, 346,5; 403,7 lukophôton, in twilight, 390,21 lumainein, hurt, 367,1.31 damage, 333,33 lupein, displease, 387,3; 408,34 lupêros, displeasing, 387,2; 401,11 lusis, solution, 331,1; 393,29; 413,25; 427,35 makhairion, knife, 373,17; 374,32 makros, long (of vowels), 375,28 malakophthalmos, soft-eyed, 395,4-5 malakos, soft, 355,2.8.10; 408,12; 409,25 malakosarkos, soft-fleshed, 388,21; 389,2 malakostrakon, with a soft shell, 377,22-3 malista, in the first place, 434,31 manos, open-textured, 355,9; 429,6 manotês, open texture, 429,7-8 marturasthai, call to witness, 335,13 mastix, whip, 358,18.20.32.33; 359,3 mastoeidês apophusis, mastoid process, 353,29-30; 392,32; 433,33 mataion, pointless, 338,4 empty, 415,24 mathêmatikos, mathematician, 326,11 mathêmatikon sôma, mathematical body, 411,8 megas, great (usage of), 409,29-35; 423,11-16 great (of sound), 408,32; 409,1.4.6; 420,37; 421,25.32; 423,10.20.21.24 megethos, magnitude, 326,15; 358,10; 371,13.15.17.27; 423,11 greatness, 421,30 meiôsis, diminution, 337,19; 343,18 mêkos, length, 349,12; 410,1; 428,3

Greek-English Index melas, black, 408,6 dark (of colour), 408,32; 409,19 dark (of sound), 408,32; 409,9.23; 423,9 mêlê, spatula, 350,4 and n. 140; 351,10.15.25.38; 416,1 and n. 367; 462.2.3.4.7.14.15.16 meli, honey, 389,31; 399,16.17.28; 406,11; 409,17.19 melikraton, honey-posset, 399,16 and n. 306; 442,31 mêlon, apple, 390,18; 391,31-4 melos, melody, 377,2.8 song, 383,30 mêninx, eardrum, 353,32; 364,9.13 and n. 180; 364,15.30.31; 365,17; 367,11.17-20.35; 368,6.11; 433,32 merikos, particular, small scale 323,11 and n. 16 merikôteros, less widely distributed, 352,28-9.33 meristos, with parts, 417,33; 418,3 merizein, partition out, 397,23 meros, part, 323,18 quarter, 329,14 ana meros, severally, 414,32 mesêmbria, noon, 332,22; 333,16-17; 348,36 mesonuktion, middle of the night, 346,4 mesos, middle, 385, 4.6 middling, 347,11 meson, intermediate, 351,13 mesôs, middling, 347,7 mesotês, mean state, mean, 435,25.34; 436,3.7-8; 439,9.31; 440,9.17-18 metabainein, pass, 320,5 metabasis, passage, 328,29 metadidonai, impart, 397,30 metagenesteros, coming later, 354,13 metaikhmios, no man’s land, 440,19 metallon, metal, 355,29.30 metaphora, transference, 373,14 and n. 212; 373,16; 375,24; 388,12-13; 389,28; 409,30 metaxu, intermediate, in between, 414,2.10; 415,38; 416,1-6.12-15; 420,31.33; 424,33 medium, 350,5.17.19; 351,9; 353,7.35; 358,20.25; 363,18.19;

199

390,26.29; 394,2.5; 398,2-5.14.15.20; 408,1; 413,1.17.19.26.29.30; 415,32.33; 416.17.24; 418,5; 420,11.23; 424,15; 432,3-6.27-30 metaxulogia, parenthesis, 392,35 methepein, follow, 379,11 methistasthai, be displaced, 368,31 metrion, due measure, 380,4 metron, degree, 342,35 metre, 376,6.7.28 mikros, small (of sound), 408,32; 409,1 mikrotês, littleness, 414,6 mimeisthai, imitate, 375,35; 376,2.4 mimêma, mimicry, 377,6 mimêsis, imitation, 377,9 mimnêskein, mention, 319,13.17 mokhthêria, villainousness, 404,19 molibdos, lead, 358,12 morion, part, 325,26; 395,25 mousikos, musical, 375,35; 377,5 muein, shut eyes, have eyes shut, 337,9; 351,18 muia, fly, 377,18.26.30; 422,35 winged insect, 388,31 mukês, snuffed wick, 346,30 muktêr, nostril, 391,35; 393,17.20; 398,18; 413,11 murmêx, ant, 350,8; 422,35 mus, muscle, 381,28 muxa, mucous discharge, 395,17 neatê, bottom-string, 373,24 nêkhesthai, swim, 378,9 nênemia,windless day, 369,3 neodreptos, newly pounded, 399,29 neos, young, 381,16 nephos, cloud, 385,13 neura, string (of a lyre), 373,24.28; 374,5.6.7 neuron, nerve, 364,16.18 neuron optikon, optic nerve, 336,32.34; 364,36; 365,33; 366,13 neuron osphrantikon, olfactory nerve, 395,13 nitrodês, carbonated, 402,1 nitron, nitre, 405,29 and n. 328 noêma, thought, 381,22 nosos, disease, 367,35 nukteris, bat, 404,5 nuktôr, by night, 348,13

200

Greek-English Index

odous, tooth, 380,2; 381,21.31-2 oikein, have abode, 333,2 oikeios, its own, 322,31; 345,18-19; 373,29 germane, 345,17 akin, 418,23 oikêmation, room, 327,13.14 oikêsis, abode, 332,33.37 oikodomos, builder, 438,1 ôioeidês, aqueous, 350,29 and n. 143; 350,30; 351,8.13 ôion, egg, 414,19 oisophagos, oesophagus, 379,2 okhêma, vehicle, 326,27-9 and n. 37; 336,18; 385,30; 394,8; 404,29 ôkhros, yellow, 338,33.35 omma, eye, 326,33.36.38; 351,29-36; 416,1.3.6.7; 433,25 onkos, mass, 326,20; 373,15 onoma, name, 319,10.24; 386,18.33 word, 346,26 onomasia, nomenclature, 416,35 onomazein, name, 386,24; 408,23 onomazesthai, get name, 356,25-6 opê, opening, 323,3.4; 337,33 ophthalmos, eye, 325,31; 395,5; 441,29; 442,1.2 opobalsamon, balsamic juice, 396,22-3 opos, juice, 396,23.34 ops, voice, 377,21 opsis, sight, 319,8.9.22; 329,28.31; 336,33; 340,30; 341,18 act of seeing, sight-act, 326,8; 330,29; 386,31 sight-stream, 320,20 and n. 4; 320,22.23.32; 321,8.14.21; 325,20.29.34.35; 326,6.12.13.19.22; 329,4; 331,3.15.21.31; 333,20; 334,29.31; 335,4.22; 336,6.25; 349,12.16.19; 351,23.24 sight-organ, 325,2 and n. 28; 325,18; 326,7.10.26; 331,11.12.18; 335,25; 340,15.23.31; 349,4.8; 352,13 optika, optics, 327,15 optikê dunamis, power to see, 326,35-6 optikon aisthêtêrion, sense-organ of sight, 348,34-5; 350,4; 422,7 optikon neuron, optic nerve,

336.32.34; 364,36; 365,1.33; 366,13 optikon pneuma, optic pneuma, 336,17.20.33.37; 337,6.14.32; 348,37; 350,25.31; 364,36; 365,30; 366,13 oregesthai, seek, 379,15 organikos, organised, 444,24 organikon [sc. aition], instrumental cause, 381,15.21 organon, instrument (musical), 375,35; 377,5 organ (bodily), 375,21; 380,1; 381,22; 395,25; 426,9 organon phônêtikon, organ of speech, 377,28; 378,15; 379,8 organ (musical), 380,7 and n. 242 orophê, ceiling, 323,5 ôruesthai, howl, 379,11 ôsis, pushing, 411,11 thrust, 430,14; 441,4 osmasthai, scent (v.), 386,7 smell, 393,14.15.18 osmê, smell, 387,37; 388,1.5 odour, 338,16; 387,34.37; 391,1.4.12.13.15; 394,30; 396,21.33; 397,8.14.17.20; 442,19.28-30; 443,22.25.28.29; 445,5 sense of smell, 353,14 and n. 151; 385,23 Kharônioi osmai, mephitic vapours, 390,22 and n. 281 osphrainesthai, smell, 393,3.7; 394,3.11; 396,15 osphrantikos, that smells, 394,22-3; 395, 9; 396,11.13 osphrantikê dunamis, power to smell, 433,33 osphrantikon aisthêtêrion, sense-organ of smell, 392,31; 393,34; 395,15-16 osphrantikon neuron, olfactory nerve, 395,13 osphrantikos poros, channel of smell, 419,20; 420,7 osphranton, object of smell, smell-object, 352,24; 385,4; 386,3.23.25.31; 387,1.3.7.10; 389,23.24.26.28.30.36; 396,11.14 osphrantos, can be smelt, 389,37; 390,10

Greek-English Index osphrêsis [sense of] smell, 353,19.26; 385,4.25-6.32; 389,24; 420,15 osteon, bone, 430,11 ostrakodermos, with a hard shell, 377,22 ostrakon, shell, 319,26 ôthein, push, 328,6.8.11; 356,24; 357,30.31; 358,21.26; 365,7; 368,18; 430,3-12.19 ôthêsis, pushing, 357,33; 418,30 oulê, scar, 368,4 ouranion, heavenly body, 322,36; 325,34.36; 343,19; 348,12.21-4 ouranios, heavenly, in the heavens, 341,12; 343,1.16-17 ouranos, heavens, 325.7.9; 328,15 ous, ear, 353,32; 354,11; 364,12.18; 365,9.26.27.36; 366,1.3.7.16; 367,7-10; 368,16.17.24.29 ousia, substance, 337,13; 341,33.34; 342,34; 344,19; 355,28.31; 358,11; 387,32; 391,33.37; 414,6; 437,32.35; 438,36; 441,8.11;444,31; 445,9.10 ousiôdês, substantial, 323,34 ousiôdôs, in a substantial way, 433,7 oxos, vinegar, 338.29; 407,8 A 10 oxubaphon, harmonica, 358,13 oxugônios, sharp-angled, 373,20 oxukinêtos, swift-moving, 325,18 oxus, acute (of angles), 332,1; 333,38 swift, 325,15; 413,7.12 piercing (in flavour), 407,4; 407,8 A 10; 389,22 (Aristotle, DA 421a30); 406,23 high, sharp, 373,1.14 and n. 211; 373,16.17.21.25-6 oxeôs, sharply, 374,19 oxôdês, sharp, 402,14 ozein, reek, 443,10 (Aristotle, DA 424b16) pakhudermos, thick-skinned, 388,34 pakhumereia, thick texture, 357,25 pakhumerês, thick-textured, 391,36-7; 392,28; 399,36; 428,35 coarse-grained, 413,6; 416,23 pakhunein, thicken, 351,19.21; 368,3-4; 414,27-8 solidify, 425,6.32 pakhunsis, thickening, 337,25 pakhus, thick, 328,22; 418,5 pakhutês, thickness, 418,15

201

palaioi, people in the past, 375,27 palindromein, run back again, 356,25; 361,5 pantôs, always, 406,33.36 paraballein, compare, 388,35-389,1; 418,3 paradeigma, example, 323,11.16 representative, 393,10 model, 400,6; 432,7 paradekhesthai, accept, 339,5; 416,9 paradidonai, hand down, 376,32 paradoxos, surprising, 407,19 paradoxôs, surprisingly, 352,32-3 paragein, mislead, 384,23-4 paraginesthai, become present, 346,1 come up to, 373,21.23; 391,16.23; 394,10 parakeisthai, be adjacent, 330,2.5.8; 350,16; 362,6; 379,29; 399,26; 441,6.7 parakinein, displace, 339,33 parakolouthein, attend upon, 410,9.28-9; 421,7.8.16; 433,8 parakolouthêma, attendant, 410,31 parakron, next to extreme, 407,8 A12 paralambanein, include, 320,11.13 take over, in, 376,12.33; 438,2 paralimpanein, leave aside, 347,30 paralogizein, give fallacious argument, 408,35; 409,4 paralogos, unreasonable, 345,10 parameibein, change, 422,23 parameson, next to the middle, 407,8 A 13 paramignunai, mix along, 405,8 parapempein, send along, 369,22 parapheresthai, depart, 400,20 paraplêsia, propinquity, 380,13 paraplêsios, akin, 378,15-16; 437,26-7 parastrephein, turn aside, 339,31; 340,15 paratasis khronou, expanse of time, 423,18 parateinein, prolong, 355,16.21; 374,6.10 parathesis, adjacence, 399,27 adjustment, 439,26.28 paratithenai, place near, 330,2 put with, 351,3 paratithesthai, see parakeisthai

202

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paratribein, rub together, 331,38 paratripsis, rubbing together, 328,34 friction, 330,31; 331,35.36; 332,6.20 parekbasis, digression, 376,34 parempiptein, fall along in, 321,26 parodos, passage, passage in, 357,32; 379,3; 382,8 parônumôs, by a term derived from, 386,25; 387,39; 401,1 parousia, presence, 341,16 paskhein, be affected, 330,1.13; 364,28 be injured, 365,2.5.6 pathêtikos, such as to be affected, 435,8; 442,1; 443,14 pathêtos, is affected, 441,29; 443,15 and n. 455 pathos, affection, 329,29 and n. 43; 336,19.24; 350,14 pedias, plain, 330,32 pêgê, fountain, 330,24; 382,25 pêgnuein, press, 339,32 pêlos, clay, 354,11 mud, 428,20 peperi, pepper, 401,31; 405,23 pephukenai, be by nature such as to, be of a nature to, 333,9 peraiterô, beyond, 364,7 peras, extremity, 340,7; 444,31 end, 374,2 periagôgê, curling, 380,3 periekhein, embrace, 411,11 periektikos, embracing, 408,24 perigeioteros, near perigee, 347,13 perikardios, around the heart, 332,13 perikeisthai, surround, 414,22 perikheisthai, surround, 425,32; 428,7 spread, 430,37 perilambanein, embrace, 325,30.32; 386,19 perimetros, circumference, 325,11.13 periorizein, mark off, 362,22 periphereia, circumference, 332,32-3 peripheres, curve, 356,11 periphrasis, periphrasis, 387,34 periphuesthai, grow round, 414,27; 425,6.13 peristatikos, hazardous, 365,9-10 and n. 186 peristera, dove, 378,16

periteinein, stretch around, 430,9 and n. 411 peritithenai, attach around, 338,24 peritteuein, be excessive, 381,8-9 do double duty, 393,4 perittôma, residue, 382,29; 388,22; 389,2; 395,16 perittos, odd, 320,14.16 pettein, digest, 382,19; 402,13 pettesthai, ripen, 402,13 pezon, footed, footed animal, 381,7; 382,12.16.20; 391,2.3 phaios, grey, 386,14; 406,30.35 phaneros, manifest, 429,21 phanos, bright, 347,39 phantasia, appearance, 351,25; 375,19-20; 379,6 imagination, 379,10.13.36; 403,33 phantasian ekhein, imagine, 379,12 phantastikon, that which imagines, 388,22 imagination, 388,29; 389,3 phantazesthai, imagine, 334,37 pharmakôdes, medicine, 396,25 pharunx, pharynx, 375,17; 378,36; 381,22.23.35 phaulos, feeble, 390,5 (Aristotle, DA 421b8) poor, 404,2 phaulôs (adv.), poorly, 403,25; 404,9 phengitês, moonstone, 324,4 phlebion, vein, 395,13 phlegmainein, inflame, 379,29-30 phluaria, nonsense, 407,8 A 17 phoberos, fearsome, 385,1-3 (Aristotle, DA 421a15) phoitan, travel, 329,39; 331,24.28; 334,32-38; 340,22.26.29; 362,2 pervade, 415,27 phôleos, shelter, 323,22 lair, 403,33 phônê, voice, 360,22; 374,27; 375,9 and n. 222; 375,10-15.18; 378,28.31; 379,7.9.11; defined 379,35.36; 403,21 sound, 408,31; 409,9; 410,12 and n. 351 word, spoken word, 377,8 and n. 233; 409,22 phônêen, vowel, 375,27 phônein, speak, speak with voice, 375,19; 377,14.15-25; 378,27

Greek-English Index sing, 383,33 phônêtikos phônêtikon morion, voice-producing, 375,16; 378,8; 379,36 phônêtikon organon, organ of speech, 377,28; 378,15 phora, movement, 359,9 phôs, light, 319,15.17.26; 322,14-17; 324,26-9.31; 327,1.6; 341,16-18.25.27; 342,5-8.15.16; 344,13-20; 349,26; 352,6.7; 416,15.16; 442,12.27 phôstêr, luminary, 343,17 phôtismos, illumination, 343,20; 362,21 phôtistikos, illuminating, 329,37; 330,11; 352,8 that which lights, 342,10.32 phôtizein, light, 321,37; 322,13; 323,4-8; 327,5.15; 343,2.15.26-7; 362,6.14.18; 373,6 illuminate, 328,12; 344,35 direct light onto, 334,26 phôtoeidês, luminous in form, 348,3 phôton, light-particle, 325,34.36; 326,3 phragma, protection, 394,33 (Aristotle, DA 421b29) phrassein, shut off, 369,15 phrear, well, 349,6.7.20 phrix, tremor, 356,2 phronein dikha, contrast, 358,15 phronêsis, intelligence, 388,24 phronimos, intelligent, 388,20.31.33 phrontis, intelligence, 332,14 phthanein, stretch out before, 343,2 arrive at, 419,36 phthartikos, destructive, 394,30; 404,19.24; 405,19 phthartos, passes away, 364,27 phthengesthai, speak, 380,1 phthongos, pitched sound, 373,26; 389,17; 408,8; 409,12 phthora, passing away, 437,16; 441,10 phulakê, guard, 365,15 phulaktêrion, shield, 395,3 phulattein, preserve, 361,21-2; 371,23 phusan, whistle, 358,29 blow, 368,23 pephusêmenos, inflated, 384,20-21

203

phusikos, student of nature, 363,20 phusikon sôma, natural body, 411,7; 433,4.6; 436,1-2; 437,25 phusiologia, account of the nature of, 360, 19 A 1 phusis, nature, 319,14; 324,9.22; 338,8.11; 380,31; 420,2; 427,6; 435,1-3 phutikos, vegetative, 352,31; 440,11 phuton, plant, 402,13 pikria, bitterness, 406,13 pikros, bitter, 386,16; 387,35; 396,30; 402,14; 406,10-13; 407,2 sour, 389,18.34 pikrotês, bitterness, 399,26; 406,17 pilêsis, pressure, pressing, 366,5; 368,18; 418,30; 429,6; 430,25; 439,24 pilein, press, 366,4; 429,17.20; 430,34 compress, 430,35 pistis, assurance, 393,35; 415,10 confirmation, 432,7 pistousthai, confirm, 391,34; 427,24 pithanos, persuasive, 417,13 pithanotês, persuasiveness, 339,27; 420,20 pladaros, insipid, 407,7 plagia, epi ta plagia, sideways, 323,15 ek plagiôn, sideways, to the side, 331,16-17.25 planasthai, go in error, 387,28 planê, error, 339,10 platos, breadth, 333,30; 428,4 platukoriasis, mydriasis, 339,17 platus, dilated, 339,25 flat, 372,7 and n. 209; 372,21 plêgê (aeros), blow (of air), 354,31; 355,7; 357,5-7; 358,17.20; 359,5.7.9 plêktikos, pungent, 321,7 pleonektein, surpass, 382,12; 386,6 plêrôsis, being filled, 344,9 plêsion (adv.), near, 330,10.12; 334,28 plêssein, strike, 358,17 plêttein, strike, 355,11; 358,20.22.24 plêxis, impact, 357,26 pneuma, pneuma, 338,10; 339,4; 353,33; (of lightning), 385,13.14; 418,19.20,24; 433,34; 438,27.33 breath, 379,3-4.26.30; 383,10.12; 384,3.4; 389,3

204

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pneumata, pneuma-streams, 339,4 see also akoustikon, optikon pneumôn, lung, 353,25; 358,31; 375,16; 377,16.20; 381,6.8.10; 382,1.5.12; 393,10 pnigôdês, choking, 390,22 poiein, make, produce, 332,1; 357,5 affect, 370,6; 435,13 do to, 394,5 poiêtikon, maker, 330,20.21 poiêtikon aition, efficient cause, 358,8.10; 360,4; 381,15.20; 397,7.11-12 poiêtikê aitia, efficient cause, 397,15; 441,10 poiêtikos, poetic, 376,29 poion, quality, 410,16.26 poiotês, quality, 323,34; 324,10; 338,23.24; 341,37; 342,10.11; 391,31; 397,25; 399,2.30.33; 405,25; 409,36; 410,30-1; 411,12.16.19; 434,24; 436,2.3.31; 441,9.15.16; 443,3.5.7.11 poioun, qualify, give quality to 338,14.25; 341,36; 394,12.15; 396,28; 398,28; 399,26; 402,19; 432,33.36; 433,6; 435,34-436,1; 437,27.28 and n. 435 polumerês, multipartite, 417,27; 418,1 polumigês, multifarious, 358,15 poluphônos, vocal, 377,26 polus, exceeding, 371,26 polutelês, expensive, 323,27 pompholux, bubble, 384,21; 430,23 poropoiein, make of pores, 326,19 equip with channel, 364,19 poros, pore, 326,18.21.24; 344,6.9; 355,9; 429,7.12 channel, 364,19.24.25; 365,16; 366,12 see also akoustikos, osphrantikos poson, quantity, 410,15.26 poson sunekhes, continuous quantity, 423,16.19.20 potamios hippos: hippopotamus, 377,23-4 potapos, of what sort, 375,6 pote, to pote on, 445,2 and n. 467 potêrion, drinking cup, cup, 320,32; 355,34.37; 356,1.4.6.10 potimos, drinkable, 404,16 poton, drink, 400,8; 404,14.16.20-23

pous, foot, 376,10; 404,1 (metrical) foot, 376,13 prasios, yellow-green, 406,36 prason, leek, 389,32 proapantan, go out to meet, 325,34 proapantêsis, going out in advance to meet, 326,6.7 proballein, throw forward, 364,30 and n. 185 put before, 366,10 problêma, defence, 365,2.12 proposition, 407,19; 412,31; 417,11; 422,31; 424,17 probrekhein, first soak, 438,2 prodêlon, abundantly clear, 349,25; 412,15; 427,28 prodeiknunai, show in advance, 427,15-16 proêgeisthai,take precedence, 380,25 proeipein, say earlier, 423,8.31 progeuesthai, first taste, 406,6 proïenai, protrude, 349,13 prokalumma, fore-covering, 387,15; 395,3.9.11 prokatekhein, occupy in advance, 338,15 prokeisthai, be purpose, be proposed, 322,27; 354,28 be before, 336,28; 425,20.21 prokeimenon, project in view, 431,5 prokheiristikos, such as to bring forth, 349,31 prokheirizesthai, set forth, 319,6; 407,18-19 prolambanein, take already, 398,1 prolabonta, foregoing, 396,19; 427,16 proödos, process, 361,11 proöimion, introduction, 417,15 prophanês, obvious, 347,30 prophanôs, manifestly, 327,33; 340,28.29; 417,37-418,1 propherein, bring out, 375,30 pros, kai pros, approximately, 325,13.14 prosagein, bring to, 419,6.10 prosagoreuein, call, 400,33.35 prosarassein, dash against, 375,12 prosballein, strike [upon], 325,36; 331,15; 332,26.28; 340,6; 343,4; 349,13.16.19.21; 413,31; 444,3 and n. 460

Greek-English Index prosbolê, striking, 362,21 impulse, 364,31; 365,6 prosdiarthroun, further articulate, 342,21 prosdiorizesthai, draw further distinction, 377,14 prosekhês, nearest, 329,39; 378,34; proximate, 420,30.36 to prosekhes, what has just been said 428,28 prosekhôs, proximately, 330,8; 364,10 immediately, 351,35 prosgeumatizein, first taste, 405,32 (Aristotle, DA 422b7) prosginesthai, be adventitious to, 399,32 prosizanein, adhere, 415,34; 441,1-2 proskollan, glue to, 351,30 proskrouein, knock against, 355,3; 358,26-31 proslêpsis, additional assumption, 412,11.29.30; 417,8; 424,5.14.17.21; 426,13 prospelazein, approach, 415,16.22 come close up to, 340,32; 365,11 come to, 432,21 bring close, 351,33 prospherein, bring to, 405,10; 406,10 prospheresthai, consume, 396,26 prosphuesthai, grow onto, 426,5.10.22.32.36; 427,2 prospiptein, fall on, 323,30; 327,36 prospsauein, come into contact with, 335,16 prosptaiein, strike upon, 361,2 prosrhêgnunai, dash against, 385,13 prosrhêxis, dashing against, 385,14.15 prosulos, connected with matter, 417,37; 418,23 prosupakouein, understand as added, 319,18 protasis, premise, 418,4 protheôria, initial exposition, 422,30-1; 424,4.13 protithenai, put forward, 422,30 proüparkhein, be present previously, 397,10 psammos, sand, 335,24; 360,12.14; 382,19 psathuros, loose-textured, 363,15 (Aristotle, DA 419b35)

205

psêphis, pebble, 372,16 psimuthion, white lead, 401,8; 440,32 psithurismos, whispering, 403,12 psittakos, parrot, 377,9; 380,15 psophein, sound (v.), 340,28.32; 341,2.3; 354,23.24; 355,32; 357,21; 359,23; 360,11; 369,16.18.23; 372,35 bang, 353,15 psophêtikos, that sounds, such as to make a sound, 354,26; 363,35; 378,25; 399,19; 434,23 psophêtikê dunamis, power to make sound, 378,32 psophos, sound (n.), 338,16; 340,33.35.37; 341,7; 354,21; 355,7.14.21.30; 356,31.35; 357,5.13.15; 358,10; 360,1-5; 365,6.25; 366,6.8.21.25.26; 369,6.9; 372,2; 384,12; ontology of, 409,32-4 dunamei, kata dunamin psophos, 354,23.25.27; 356,34; sound in potentiality, 357,3 psophos kat’ energeian, sound in art, 357,4f. psukhê, soul, 381,19 logikê psukhê, rational soul, 381,20-1 psukhikos, psychological, 379,14 psychical, 382,34 of the soul, 388,25; 444,19 psukhein, cool (v.), 436,28; 440,13 psukhros, cold, 382,6; 408,11 psukhrotês, coldness, 421,29; 436,10; 437,26 psuxis, cooling, 384,26; 441,7 cold, 407,8 A 6; 410,25; 411,11.25; 433,10 ptênon, winged creature, 380,13; 404,4 bird, 386,7; 390,33; 391,3 pterux, wing, 377,29; 378,17 ptôx, hare, 386,9 pugolampis, glow-worm, 319,10-11.25; 346,31; 347,9.32; 348,3-4; 352,15.19 puknos, dense, 328,22; 344,8-9 vehement, 331,37 puknotês, density, 334,28 puknousthai, become dense, 328,35 pur, fire, 342,29.31; 343,12-15;

206

Greek-English Index

347,13.18; 348,16; 352,7.10.11; 385,15.27; 421,14-17 pureia, kindling materials, 328,34; 330,30 and n. 47 purên, (fruit) stone, 404,3 purios, fiery, 385,27 purôdês, fiery, 346,32; 396,2; to purôdes, the fiery quality, 319,28.29 purros, red, 335,14 puthmên, base, 356,5.7 rhabdos, rod, 359,2 rhagoeidês, iris, 336.14-15 and n. 74; 336,31; 337,1.11.29.36; 338,1.4.5; 350,28; 366,12; 368,2 rhakos, cloth, 391,35.38; 392,26.28.29 rhanis, drop, 356,4-5 rhapizein, hit, 359,32 (Aristotle, DA 419b23) rhêgnunai, break, 430,15 rhein, flow, 363,6 rhêsis, statement, 425,20 rhêton, detailed commentary, 387,36 text, 392,36; 422,17.23; 424,5; 441,34 rhêtorikos, rhetorical, 376,30 rhipis, fan, 358,19 and n. 165 rhis, nose, 320,13.17; 353,29.30; 392,22.24 rhiza glôttês, root of tongue, 378,36; 381,24 tôn ôtôn, root of the ears, 364,18 rhoizos, whistle, 378,22 rhophêma, gruel, 404,6-9 A 3 rhupos, dirt, 337,24; 368,13 rhuthmizein, give order to, 380,9; 381,28 rhuthmos, rhythm, 375,26; 376,1.6-8.23.26 rhutidousthai, become wrinkled, 391,34 rhutos, fluid, 430,7.24 sainein, fawn, 379,13 sairein, grin, 380,12.15 saleuein, upset, 408,28.36; 413,37; 423,7 sanis, panel, 327,17-20; 353,15 sardios lithos, carnelian, 321,10 sarkion, piece of flesh, 395,19 sarx, flesh, 388,28.31; 398,21; 407,21; 408,1; 412,7.10.29.32-4; 414,12;

415,2.4.10-12; 417,2.14.19.22-3.26; 418,5; 424,9.12.15; 430,10.12.17; 433,16-19 seiein, shake, 372,14-17 selênê, the moon, 322,36; 324,19; 330,23; 334,17; 342,8.30.32; 347,11.33; 407,8 A 15 selêniakê sphaira, sphere of the moon, 343,3.5 sêmainein, signify, 379,10.34 sêmantikos, signifying something, significant, 375,20; 379,5-6; 383,3 sêmantikon einai, signify, 440,26 sêmasia, signification, 381,18.21 meaning, 432,22 sêmeion, indication, 320,26; 349,34; 424,31 point, 326,12-14; 340,6.10.17.27; 371,35; 372,3 sêpesthai, be rotten, 390,18 sidêros, iron, 358,12 sigê, silence, 403,10; 418,33.38; 419,1; 436,21 simos, snubnosed, 387,25 simotês, snubnosedness, 320,13 sitia, food, 379,3 skaros, parrot-wrasse, 378,18 skedastos, such as to be scattered, 430,13.16.18 skeparnon, adze, 329.33.35 skeuos, utensil, 323,2 skhêma, figure (of syllogism), 433,21 shape, 371,33 skhêmatizein, shape, 329,34; 336,10; 361,9.10.13.14.17; 380,3.7; 429,15 skhesis, relationship, 343,27; 386,27.30.32 skhoinos, rope of twisted rushes, 330,15.16 skholaios, skholaiteron, more slowly, 374,9 skia, shadow, 349,8.20; 362,21.24.30.31; 363,11.13 (the earth’s) shadow, 343,2; 348,27.28 skiatraphein, lead life indoors, 389,6 skiazesthai, be in shadow, 343,4; 348,22; 362,26-7 eskiasmenos, shady, 362,30-4 skidnasthai, be shredded, 400,21 skirros, tumour, 337,27

Greek-English Index sklêrophthalmos, hard-eyed, 387,14.20.29.32; 388,7; 395,2 sklêros, hard, 354,32; 355,5; 408,12; 409,25; 429,13 sklêrosarkos, hard-fleshed, 388,11 (Aristotle, DA 421a25) skolêx, grub, 377,18; 388,28.30 skolios, tortuous, 367,25 skorodon, garlic, 389,32; 414,19 skoteinos (adj.), dark, 327,36; 346,14 skotizein, make dark, 327,29.35; 346,8.14 skotizesthai, be in darkness, 362,17 skotodinian, be dizzy, 338,9 skotos, dark, 319,27.28; 328,33; 341,13 and n. 102; 341,14.16.18.23.29-342,3; 344,14.15.18.20; 347,28.31-3.37.39; 403,32.35; 436,20 skutalê, eel, 377,23 and n. 234 smikrotês, smallness, small extent, 371,26; 414,8; 421,30; 428,11 sôma, body, 320,27; 324,16; defined, 344,21-7; 411,7.18; 437,29 sômatikos, corporeal, 391,28 sômatikôs, in a bodily way, 440,23 sômatoeidês, of corporeal form, corporeal in form, 325,28; 413,9.17; 416,18; 417,37 sophizesthai, play trick, 408,29 sôstikos, preservative, 404,23; 405,20 sphaira, sphere, 328,4.6.7; 371,34.36; 372,2.3 [heavenly sphere] 324,16.18; 330,7 ball, 360,28; 370,25.32.33 sphairikos, spherical, 328,5 spheklon, glass, 335,14-17 and n. 69; 338,19.21.36.37; 351,30 sphragis, seal, 437,13-15; 438,8 sphodra, strongly, 421,3 sphodros, intense, 345,24; 423,13 strong, 421,2 forceful, 355,5; 409,21.29.36 sphodrôs, forcefully, 358,25 sphodrotês, meta sphrodrotêtos, without loss of force, 383,30 spongos, sponge, 355,3; 370,21 spoudazein, take trouble, 334,25-6 stegein, house, 439,15 stenokhôrein, constrict, 379,30 stenos, narrow, 364,24

207

stenoun, make narrow, 368,19 stereos, solid, 354,24; 360,3,6.9; 429,1-5 stereotês, solidity, 358,11 sterêsis, lack, 341,15.17-342,3; 344,14.16.20.28; 346,11.12; 390,7-8.15.20; 402,32.35; 403,1.3.6.30.33; 418,33 sterros, firm, 410,10 stilboun, burnish, 429,14 stilpnos, polished, 333,9; 334,21 stoikheion, element, 385,35; 434,20; 435,9 stokhazesthai, make a conjecture, 412,5 aim at, 427,6 stoma, mouth, 338,11 struphnos, astringent, 407,8 A 3.10.12.16 sturax, storax, 389,34 sullabê, syllable, 375,33; 376,12 sullogismos, syllogism, 412,2-4; 417,6; 424,4.6.7.18.20.23.25; 425,29 sullogizesthai, infer, 394,1-2; 420,1; 424,24; 433,5 give syllogism for, 433,21 sumbainein, come about, befall, 327,31; 416,26 sumbebêkenai, be incidental to, 374,26.28 kata sumbebêkos, incidental, 374,31 sumballein, coincide, 340,13 summerizein, divide along with, 417,35 summetria, proportion, proportionality, 375,32-3; 376,14.22-3; 377,1; 436,30; 439,5-6.9.14.31.34; 440,2; 444,25 summetros, appropriate, 371,12.29.33; 416,5 proportionate, 376,25.31 summigês, mixed with, 355,33 summiktos, mixed with, 355,31 sumpauein, stop with, 372,20 sumperainein, bring to a conclusion, 407,13 sumperasma, conclusion, 418,4 sumphônein, agree, 420,11 sumphônia, agreement, 413,35; 414,11; 420,18 consonance, 439,27

208

Greek-English Index

sumphtheirein, destroy along with, 367,14; 440,3 sumphuês, inborn, 364,12.21.25-6.33; 365,8.20.23.28.35.37; 366,4.14.15; 367,16; 398,16 growing out around, 414,30; 415,3-4.9; 425,6.32; 426,29 sumphuesthai, grow out around,414,20-1.33; 415,2.7.9; 426,23.28; 427,18 sumphutos, as part of its nature 428,19 sumpiptein, coincide, 329,25 sumplekein, interweave, 421,31 sumplêttein, clap together, 378,24 sumplokê, combination, 376,12 sunagein, bring together, 358,29 conclude, 427,21-2, deduce, 417,23 reconcile, 391,38-392,1 sunagesthai, result, 332,5 sunagônizesthai, contend on behalf of, 335,13 plead for, 341,2 sunaidein, sing along with, 376,3 sunairein, sum up, 379,35 sunaisthanesthai, perceive at the same time, 399,25 sunaisthêsis, consciousness, 402,12; 419,37 sunaitios, sunaition, contributory [cause], 363,17.25; 388,24 sunanakirnanai, mix in, 442,29-30 sunamphoteron, two together, both together, 437,27-9; 438,5-8; 440,35 sunanapherein, help send up, 397,30 sunapollusthai, perish along with, 443,28 sunarithmein, count along with, 417,17 sundesmos, conjunction, 388,25 and n; 422,16.21 sundiatithenai, dispose along with, 388,25 sundiïstasthai, extend along with, 417,29.32 sundromê, coming together, 357,23 suneidenai, attest, 402,17 sunêgorein, advocate, 333,35 sunekheia, continuity, 336,22

kata sunekheian, as continuous, by continuity, 325,22-3; 326,22-3.25; 336,22; 361,11; 364,5 continuously, 415,27 sunekhês, continuous, 325,26; 423,16.20 sunêmmenon, conditional premise, 412,11.12.28; 417.7; 424,6.13.20; 425,16.18.20.29; 427,13-14 sunemptôsis, coincidence, 354,32; 355,5 sunêtheia, colloquial speech, 319,10; 346,21 sunêthes, colloquial usage, 368,1-2 sunêthôs, in customary way, 369,8-9 sunexomoioun, make completely like, 445,11 sunistasthai, gather, 336,30; 379,25 be constituted, 337,22; 420,5 consist, 433,2.6 sunkhein, confuse, 367,4 sunkleiein, close, 351,32.37 sunkrasis, mixture together, 433,1-2 sunkrinein, force together, 349,8 make to contract, compress, 396,16; 439,18 sunnomos, mate, 379,11 sunodos, conjunction, 325,38 association, 343,27 sunôthein, push along with, 370,33 suntaxis, (grammatical) construction, 392.35; 393,4 sunteinein, strain, 374,2 suntêktikos, solvent, 401,21 suntelein, contribute, 380,26 sunthêkê, putting together, 376,5; 377,3 agreement, 379,34 sunthesis, putting together, 375,31 composition, 439,34 sunthetos, composite, 397,21; 410,8 suntomia, economy, 380,30 suntomos, economical, 427,6 suntomôs, succinctly, 337,20; 354,30-31; 411,2 suntrekhein, run together, 352,33; 412,17.19.30 sunuparkhein, exist along with, 347,1 surrhein, collect, 429,10; 430,35 suskhêmatizein, shape along with, 417,29 sustasis, constitution, 373,12; 435,9

Greek-English Index eis sustasin, to constitute, 421,31 gathering, 336,31; 337,24 seat, 402,4 sustatikos, constitutive, 410,22; 421,28; 434,10.12.28; sustellein, close, 378,11; 381,27; 382,4.8 sustolê, contraction, 378,32 closing, 378,20; 381,29 takhos, fastness, 374,22; 421,23 rapidity, 379,38 takhutês, speed, 345,2 tarattein, disturb, 378,12 tarikhos, dried fruit and nuts, 405,23 and n. 327 tasis, tension, 373,25.29 taxis, order, 361,21; 420,18; 422,23 ordering, 385,35 place, 386,1; 420,15 role, 358,22.24 teinein, aim at, 345,12 tighten, 373,24.27 têkein, dissolve, 401,20; 405,30 tekmêrion, indication, 367,19; 422,8 tektôn, carpenter, 329,33 teleios, perfect, 381,1 teleiôsis, perfecting, 361,26 teleiôtikos, perfective, such as to perfect, 322,2.3.6.8; 349,27-8.31; 404,19.23; 405,21 teleioun, perfect, 322.7; 324,29 teleutan, terminate, 365,1 telikon aition, final cause, 381,18.21 telos, end, 378,30; 379,9.18.32; 381,18; 383,7 temnein, cut, 325,22.24.25; 327,27; 371,18.22.25 tenôn, tendon, 365,32 and n. 192 sinew, 379,2 têrein, keep, 443,19 tetartêmorion, fourth part, 325,20.30.32 tetrainein, bore through, 326,15.17; 327,17; 337,1.3.12.29 tettinx, cicada, 377,26.29 thalassion hudôr, sea-water, 407,2-3 thalatta, sea, 384,14; 396,29 thalattion, sea-creature, 319,26 thaumastos, amazing, 330,14; 335,18 theion, brimstone, 394,30 thêlukôs, in the feminine, 381,22-3

209

Themistios, Themistius 408,25; 409,3 theôreisthai, be seen, 375,25 theos, God, 339,24 thêran, hunt, 391,2.11 thermainein, warm, 330,1-4.32; 442,18.25-6 heat, 332,6; 436,28; 438,14-15; 439,20; 440,13; 443,2 thermainesthai, be warm, 332,22; 333,18 thermansis, warming, 330,31 thermantikos, such as to heat, 332,17 thermasia, heat, 332,18 thermê, warmth, 331,33 thermos, hot, 332,5; 408,11; 410,4.5 thermon entos, internal heat, 381,2; 382,2 emphuton thermon, innate hot, 332,8-12; 382,25 thermotês, heat, 324,10; 332,16; 382,13.14; 405,26; 410,25; 411,11.25; 421,29; 433,10; 436,9; 437,26; 438,11.14 theros, summer, 333,16 thesis, position, 331,22; 410,32; 430,2.36 posture, 430,2 putting down, 376,10.25 thinganein, touch, 326,13.14; 351,36; 353,36-7; 398,3.7; 416,36 thixis, touching, 398,10.11 contact, 414,17.20 thlibein, press, 383,11 thlipsis, rubbing, 356,3 thôrax, thorax, 378,32; 379,1.23.25.30.38; 382,34; 383,9.15.35; 384,3 thruptein, disperse, 355,4; 360,11; 361,38; 366,24.27 thrupsis, dispersal, 361,12; 375,6 thumiama, incense, 391,23-4; 396,3.7; 418,16 thumian, burn, 396,4 thumoeidês, spirited, 332,12 thumon, thyme, 389,32 thura, door, 430,6 thuris, window, 369,4 thuroeidês, thyroid, 381,27 titrôskein, wound, 432,9 tonos, tuning, 439,4 (Aristotle, DA 424a32)

210

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topikê kinêsis, spatial movement, 370,35-36; 371,1 topos, place, 415,14.15.21 (natural and unnnatural), 435,2.4.6 region, 381,10 toxon, bow, 373,27 toxotês, archer, 373,28 tragôidos, tragic actor, 383,29-30 trakhus, rough, 359,23; 363,28.30; 377,31; 408,12; 409,14; 432,38 in colour, 408,33; 423,12 in sound, 408,31; 409,26; 421,26.33; 423,9 trakheia, sc. artêria, windpipe, 379,3 tranês, bright, 363,2 trauma, wound, 368,4 trêma, aperture, 336,31; 366,11; 368,2 hole (of musical instrument), 376,16.18 trephein, nourish, 440,12 trêsis, perforation, 395,16.18 trigônon, triangle, 413,15 triplasiephebdomos, three and a seventh times, 325,11 trôgalia, dried fruit and nuts, 405,26

tropê, transformation, 441,11 trophê, food, 379,15 tukhon, trifling, 429,16.18 tuphlotês, blindness, 341,20 tuptein, strike, 360,3 tupousthai, receive imprint, 379,13 xanthos, yellow, 406,28 xêrainein, dry, 396,26; 405,24.26; 443,2 xêros, dry, 396,1-8.21-34; 397,2-17; 405,34; 406,18; 408,11.14; xêrotês, dryness, 405,25; 410,25; 411,25; 421,29; 433,11 xulon, wood, 355,25.31; 358,12 piece of wood, 358,35 xusma, mote, 369,3 zêtein, enquire, 329,30 look for, 389,8 look to, 389,7 Zeus, Jupiter, 407,8 A 16 zôidion, sign of the zodiac, 325,9.13 zôion, animal, 320,11 zôiogonein, bring to life, 332,9 zôtikos, vital, 332,7.10 zôtikôs, in a vital way, 369,5

Subject Index The capital letter A following page and line number indicates that the word is to be found in the text of Ms. Vat. gr. 268 (=A) printed by Hayduck in his apparatus; line numbers following A in this Index correspond to the line numbers in the text printed in Hayduck’s apparatus. Achelous, 378,6; 384,12 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 346,7n.; 361,5; 399,21 De Anima 24,18-26,30, 439,34n. Mantissa 127-50, 324,35n. Mantissa 134,30-138,2, 325,34n. Mantissa 134,30-136,28, 334,36n. Mantissa 146,31-5; 340,14n. Mantissa 143,7-18, 343,29n. Apollonius Rhodius, Argonautica 4.1337, 379,11 Aristotle, 325,4; 326,8; 329,6; 331,30.32; 333,2n.; 333,35; 335,13; 341,5; 343,21; 354,15; 402,17; 407,8 A1; 408,28; 410,2.12.36; 411,3.35; 412,4.6; 415,28.36;416,11; 417,1.11.14; 418,25; 421,6.20-21; 424,24; 425,18; 433,36 Cael. 2.9, 354,30n. Cat. 3b24-7, 341,34 Cat 13a31-6, 341,29n. DA 1 403a31-b1, 332,14n. DA 2.5, 341,15n. DA 3, 425b20-2, 346,9n. DA 3, 434a4-7, 388,29n. GA 5, 780b2, 349,7n. GC 1, 324b25-35, 326,20n. GC 1, 325b8-19, 326,20n. GC 1, 326b6-24, 326,20n. GC 2.2, 434,10-11.32 HA 1, 476a32-3, 384,32n. HA 2, 505a35-b1, 387,15n. HA 2, 507a3-5, 382,15n. Metaph. 4, 1010b15-17, 360,4n. Metaph. 8, 1048b23, 444,3n.

Metaph 11, 1063a7-10, 325,2n. Meteor. 1, 340a6-8, 332,36n. Meteor. 1, 340a25-32, 332,38 Meteor. 1, 340b29-341a12, 332,38 Meteor.1, 345b11, 333,22n. Meteor. 1, 348b2-17, 334,6n. Meteor. 2, 355b9, 332,8n. Meteor. 2, 358a3-27, 396,29-30n. Meteor. 2, 359b8-21, 401,35 Meteor. 2, 360b26-361a3, 396,8 Meteor. 2, 369a12-19, 387,15n. Meteor. 2, 369b7-9, 385,10-11; 413,4 Meteor. 2, 369b9-11, 385,21n. Meteor. 3, 373a35, 333,22n. Meteor. 4, 382a11-14, 334,6n.; 382b8-10, 334,6n. PA 1, 642a31-b4, 381,4 PA 2, 648a17-19, 387,15n. PA 2, 658a3-10, 387,15n. PA 3, 669a3-6, 384,25n. Phys. 1, 190b13-15, 341,25; 342,1-2; 344,21 Phys. 2, 195a13-14, 341,21n. Phys. 4, 219a20-1, 445,2n. Phys. 4, 221a22-3, 343,34 Phys. 5, 226b23, 429,34n. Phys. 5, 228b28-229a1, 421,8.9 Phys. 6, 231a23, 429,34n. Post. An. 1, 73a34-b16, 320,10 Resp. 475b15-476a15, 384,25n. Resp. 476a6-7, 382,15n. Resp. 478a28-34, 378,9n.; 381,5; 382,3n. Sens. 348,11n. Sens. 439a27-9, 444,32n. Sens. 439b11-12, 321,35n.

212

Subject Index

Sens. 440a15-20, 400,17-18 Sens. 441b27-442a1, 405,10n. Sens. 442b27-443b16, 396,4-5 Armenian nugget, 401,31n. Attic interpreters, 411,1-2 Berkeley, George, 340,8n.; 340,27n. breathing, 380,24-381,13; 381,34-382,30; 383,20-384,32 colour, 349,25-31 cough, 379,16-35; 383,6-17 dark, 341,10-342,15; 346,6-14 Democritus, 350,6; 371,15 depth-seeing, 320,20-321,28; 350,35-351,4 discourse, 376,1-5;380,1-7; 380,27-381,1; 381,13-32 echo, 360,19-363,8 Empedocles, 326,20n.; 344,34; 345,6-7 flavours, 389,29-390,2; 395,33-4; 396,20-397,32; 398,32-399,5; 401,17-402,25; enumeration of, 406,24-407,7 and A1-14 flesh, whether medium of touch, 398,21-2 Galen, 339,17n.; 365,32n.; 407,8 A 3 God, 330,24 great and small as sense-objects, 408,29-410,1; 420,36-421,27; 423,8-24 hearing, theory of, 364,11-32 heat, and light, 331,33-333,19 high and low pitch, 373,14-374,34 Homer, Iliad 17.676, 386,8-9 honey-posset, 399,16 Jupiter, 407,8 A 16 light, what it is, 329,35-330,27; 343,22-9; not a body, 327,1-329,2; 330,19-331,33; 341,23-342,16; 343,31-345,13; nor an efflux, 343,12-22; experiments with, 323,2-10; 327,12-22; 328,33-5; light-particles, 325,34-326,9 light and heavy, 434,29-435,9

Locke, John, 411,8n. Mars, 407,8 A 16 Mercury, 343,3.5; 407,8 A 15 metre, and rhythm, 376,6-34 moist, and wet, 428,19-22 Moon, 334,17; 343,3.5; 407,8 A 15 odour, theory of, 395,33-396,9; 396,20-397,32; 398,18-19 perception, as receiving forms in a cognitive way, 432,37-433,4; 437,19-32 distinguished from being affected as a body, 443,32-444,7; 444,26-445,12 Philoponus, in Cat. 35,24-31, 391,30n. in An. 19,10, 364,13n. in An. 146,5, 358,15n. Plato, 407,8 A 8.12 Rep. 4, 332,12n.; 435 A 2, 330,30n. Rep. 6.507C7, 323,28n. Timaeus, 323,28n. Timaeus 58C, 343,13n.; 345,12 Timaeus 65B-66C, 385,34; 407,8 A 10n. Plotinus, Enn. 4.3.26, 322,5n. pneuma, the primary sense-organ, 438,25-30 acoustic, 364,15-16 optic, 336,17-22; 336,33-337,7; 348,37-349,1; 350,24-33 resistent, defined 411,6-10 rhythm, and metre, 376,6-34 Saturn, 407,8 A 16 sense-objects, proper and common, 319,7n. sight, theory of, 329,5-330,19; 333,19-341,9; 350,25-32; 361,22-363,14; 364,32-365,3; 365,30-5; 418,18-22 not by effluences, 400,16-22, cf. 325,33-326,9 of what cannot be seen, 403,18-36 seeing in depth, 320,20-321,28 sight-streams, 320,20; 325,6-32; 326,9-39; 336,16-29; 349,9-22; 416,28-9; 421,35-6 smell, theory of, 390,27-392,33; 394,34-395,26; 396,11-16

Subject Index solidity 411,8-9n. Sophocles, Ajax 8, 386,7-8; 391,2-3 Sophonias, in An. 76,30, 325,10-11n. Spartan breed of hounds, 386,8 sound, theory of, 354,30-355,13; 357,3-17; 359,7-24; 369,27-373,32; 409,4-410,1.11-17 experiments with, 355,34-356,12 sun, 324,19; 328,5.29; 330,21.24; 347,38; 407,8 A 16 super-shining, 347,7.22-4; 347,30-348,2 taste, theory of, 399,8-20; 405,3-28 Themistius, 408,25; 409,3; 410,1.35 in An. 72,11ff., 408,25n. in An. 75,36ff. 418,25-6n. Theophrastus, 354,14 totalities of earth, air etc., 434,32-435,7

213

touch, theory of, 417,11-418,24; 419,3-420,27; 421,33-422,10; 435,11-436,13; experiments connected with, 429,13-19 objects of, 434,7-435,9 of the intangible, 436,17-33 transparent, 319,12-17; whether an object of sight, 322,27-323,36 Venus, 407,8 A 16 voice, theory of, 375,9-376,5; 378,27-380,1; 381,13-32; 382,32-384,13 sounds similar to voice, 376,37-378,25 White, Stephen, 430,15n. Zodiac, signs of, 325,8-17