Peacekeeping in Africa: Politics, Security and the Failure of Foreign Military Assistance 9781350987470, 9781786733412

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Marco Jowell is a research associate at the Centre for African Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) and Director of the Africa Research Group. He is a leading expert in the politics, political economy and security dynamics of East and Central Africa and holds a PhD in Politics and International Studies from SOAS, University of London.

‘This fascinating study provides major insight into the world of Africa’s politico-military aristocracy, underlining how peacekeeping training centres have increasingly become the centrepiece of Western-African security engagement. Marco Jowell, a former technical and strategic adviser to a number of these institutions, is uniquely placed to explain not only what is meant to happen in peacekeeping training centres but also what actually does. In piecing together the curricula and cultures of centres across the continent, Peacekeeping in Africa demonstrates the flawed assumptions that undergird many of these organisations and the extent to which they, unintentionally, help to reify and consolidate fundamentally illiberal regional security cultures.’ Jonathan Fisher, Senior Lecturer in African Politics, University of Birmingham ‘Peacekeeping is a generic term covering a variety of modes of conflict resolution. This study of the Peace Support Operations training centres in Kenya, Ghana, Rwanda and Ethiopia, based on the author’s extensive personal testimony, shows the dangers of exploitation by patrimonial, financial and national interest. It is well researched and makes a real contribution to our understanding of an important dimension of peacekeeping.’ Professor J.E. Spence OBE FKC, Department of War Studies, King’s College, London ‘Marco Jowell’s book has broken new ground in the study of global peacekeeping. This is a timely and highly welcome contribution to scholarship.’ Philip Cunliffe, Senior Lecturer in International Conflict, University of Kent ‘What happens when international donors try and infuse liberal norms into politicised African militaries through regionally focused peacekeeping training regimes? Based on a decade of experience as part of this process, Marco Jowell’s innovative study uncovers the power dynamics at the heart of this peculiar form of foreign military assistance. Drawing on techniques of military sociology he examines the intended and unintended consequences of training African peacekeepers with case studies of missions in Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia, as well as several regionally focused training centres. His conclusion – that these efforts have often been subverted to support partisan domestic agendas – highlights the need for fundamental reforms in how training processes are organised and managed.’ Paul D. Williams, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University, USA

PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

Politics, Security and the Failure of Foreign Military Assistance

MARCO JOWELL

I.B. TAURIS Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, I.B. TAURIS and the I.B. Tauris logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in 2018 Paperback edition published 2019 Copyright © Marco Jowell, 2018 Marco Jowell has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgements on p. ix-x constitute an extension of this copyright page. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-7845-3989-4 PB: 978-1-8386-0153-9 ePDF: 978-1-7867-3341-2 eBook: 978-1-7867-2341-3 Series: International Library of African Studies 60 Typeset by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters. For Mum and Dad, Adam, Laura and Alexis

CONTENTS

List of Figures Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Introduction Training African Peacekeepers: A Continuation of Foreign Military Assistance Hypotheses, Research Questions and Assumptions Structure of the Book 1.

2.

viii ix xi 1 4 8 11

Conceptualising Peacekeeping Training: Functional Integration, Pan-Africanism and the Development of the Military in Africa Introduction Research Methods Regional Integration and Africa The Development of Regional Peacekeeping Training Centres in Support of APSA Military Officers in African Politics Conclusion

22 24 37

Peacekeeping in Africa: Tasks and Activities from UN and AU Peace Support Operations Introduction Peacekeeping in Africa

39 39 40

14 14 15 18

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(i) MONUC/MONUSCO: The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Congo (ii) UNAMID: The United Nations and African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (iii) AMISOM: The African Union Mission in Somalia (iv) The African Standby Force (ASF) Conclusion 3.

The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC): How it Works Introduction Developing IPSTC Objectives, Organisation and Structure Donor Support Course Content and Delivery Conclusion

4.

Deconstructing the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) Introduction Institutionalising Informality: Departments, Staff and Structures Student/Participant Selection and Incentives Donor Approach Training Delivery Training Aids: Africa is a Country Courses and Content: Quality vs. Quantity Exploring Training Delivery Conclusion

5.

Other African Peace Support Operation (PSO) Training Centres Introduction Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) Rwanda Peace Academy (RPA) Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) Conclusion

41 52 61 68 74 77 77 78 82 87 89 101 102 102 103 109 110 114 118 123 129 144 147 147 149 166 174 179

CONTENTS

6.

The Unintended Consequences of Foreign Military Assistance to Africa: A Satisficing Model Introduction Comparing PSO Training Centres: Trends and Commonalities The Unintended Consequences of PSO Training A Satisficing Model Improving PSO Training Conclusion

vii

182 182 183 192 198 208 212

Conclusion The PSO/SSR Conundrum Situating PSO Training Centres African Armed Forces: A New Framework for Analysis The Military and Peacekeeping Training in Kenya, Ghana, Rwanda and Ethiopia The PSO/SSR Conundrum: Implications of the Findings

214 214 215

Appendix Course Participants Notes Bibliography Index

222 226 250 263

218 220

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 A Typology of African Armed Forces.

27

Figure 2.1 MONUC Organisational Structure 2009/10.

48

Figure 2.2 ASF Deployment Scenarios.

68

Figure 2.3 EASBRIG/EASF Benchmarks and Objectives.

72

Figure 6.1 The ‘Conflict Cycle’.

187

Figure 6.2 Post-Conflict Reconstruction.

188

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research has taken a great deal of time and really begins in 2007 when I met Colonel Andy Mason in the sticks in Rwanda. I am indebted to ‘Mace’ for taking me on while I was a wide-eyed young man in his early twenties and for planting the ‘PSO/SSR’ seed in my head from day one, as well as being an inspiration to work with. This book has been a labour of love and I have been extremely fortunate in having a great deal of support but also willingness to discuss some of the issues on the part of my respondents. I am extremely grateful to a large number of people who have assisted me, talked to me and supported me over the last three years. In Kenya I must thank the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) and staff members there, in particular the Director Brigadier General Robert Kabage and his predecessor Major General Robert Kibochi. Although we may disagree on some aspects of the analysis, their willingness to engage with a controversial researcher and to accept me within their training centre is testament to their professionalism. I am indebted to the rest of the staff at IPSTC for a plethora of frank discussions, open access attitude and for accommodating me. Gratitude is also extended to the East African Standby Force and staff, and in particular Benediste Horeau, who had an open door policy to my many visits. Thanks must go to Professor Makumi Mwagiru for the many evenings of whiskey and political debate at the mess bar in the National Defence College in Nairobi. In Rwanda I am eternally indebted to Brigadier General Frank Rusagara who has been an inspiration, provided invaluable assistance with my research there and has been a dear friend

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for many years. Thanks also to Colonel Jill Ruteremara and the rest of the team at the Rwanda Peace Academy who hosted me during my stay. In Ethiopia, a great deal of thanks to Colonel ‘Yossi’ Yonatan who guided me around the EIPKTC. From the Kofi Annan Centre, Emma Bwirakong deserves a notable mention for answering all my probing questions. In Uganda Colonel Felix Kulaigye, Simon Mulongo and Colonel Stephen Kashure; all of whose professionalism, open-mindedness and friendship have assisted me greatly in my research. In London, I owe a great deal of thanks to Professor Stephen Chan who has been my academic mentor for ten years. His guidance has been invaluable and inspiring, and without it I certainly would not have been able to undertake this, nor any other academic endeavour. A deep appreciation must be said of Nick Bates, Umar Anwer and Josh Kron who have been supportive and encouraging throughout. Others who warrant an acknowledgement include Colonel James Cunliffe, Wanyama Masinde, Lt Colonel David Holmes, Colonel Joyce Sitienei, General Karenzi Karake, Jonathan Fisher, Phil Clark, Pritish Behuria, Benjamin Chemouni, staff at the AU PSOD and many others who supported, assisted and worked with me over the last few years. All errors are of course my own. Finally, a great deal of thanks must go to my family. To my mother and brother, my stepmother, in-laws and late father, who have all been so supportive throughout. An important thank you to both John Cobain and Danny Jowell who provided much needed and crucial reviewing. Most of all a colossal thank you to my wife Laura who provided no end of assistance, support and advice and who is a daily inspiration.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAR ACCORD ACOTA AFDC AFDL-C/Z AFISMA AMIC AMIS AMISOM APSA APSTA ARS ASF ASPR AU BINUB BPST-EA CAO CAR CCIR CIMIC CMO

After Action Review African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Armed Forces Defence Committee Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Libe´ration du Congo/Zaire African-led International Support Mission to Mali African Union Mission in Carana African Union Mission in Sudan African Union Mission in Somalia African Peace and Security Architecture African Peace Support Training Association Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia African Standby Force Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution African Union United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi British Peace Support Team – Eastern Africa Civil Affairs Officer Central African Republic Commanders Critical Information Requirement Civil Military Coordination Civil Military Operations

xii

COA COE COIN CONOPS CoS CPA CPBL CPX CV DDPD DDPS DDR DDRRR DFC DFS DJSR DPA DPKO DRC DSA DSC DSRSG EAC EASBRIG EASF EASFCOM ECCAS ECOMOG ECOWAS ECPF EIPKTC ENDF EOD EOT EU EU SEC

PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

Course of Action Contingent Owned Equipment Counter Insurgency Concept of Operations Chief of Staff Comprehensive Peace Agreement Collaborative Problem Based Learning Command Post Exercise Curriculum Vitae Doha Document for Peace in Darfur Development Diplomacy for Peace and Security Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement Deputy Force Commander Department of Field Support Deputy Joint Special Representative Darfur Peace Agreement Department for Peacekeeping Operations Democratic Republic of Congo Daily Subsistence Allowance Defence Staff College Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General East African Community East African Standby Brigade East African Standby Force East African Standby Force Coordinating Mechanism Economic Community of Central African States Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre Ethiopian National Defence Force Explosive Ordinance Device Election Observation Training European Union EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the Congo

LIST

FAR FARDC FC FDLR FDPE FHQ FIB FNL FOC FoE FPU FTX GAF GTZ HILEX HoM HPF HPSS HQ HR I4S IAPTC ICC ICD ICGLR ICRC ICSC ICU IDP IED IGAD IHL IMATC IMPP IOC IPSO IPSTC

OF ABBREVIATIONS

xiii

Forces Arme´es Rwandaise Forces Arme´es des Republic Democratic du Congo Force Commander Forces Democratique pour la Libe´ration du Rwanda Force Development Planning and Execution Force Head Quarters Force Intervention Brigade Front National pour le Libe´ration Full Operating Capability Friends of EASF Formed Police Unit Full Training Exercise Ghana Armed Forces Gesellschaft fu¨r Internationale Zusammenarbeit High Level Exercise Head of Mission Harmonised Policy Framework Humanitarian Peace Support School Head Quarters Human Rights International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres International Criminal Court Inter-Congolese Dialogue International Conference on the Great Lakes Region International Committee of the Red Cross Independents Combatants du Sud Carana Islamic Courts Union Internally Displaced Person Improvised Explosive Device Inter-Governmental Authority for Development International Humanitarian law International Mine Action Training Centre Integrated Mission Planning Process Initial Operating Capability Integrated Peace Support Operation International Peace Support Training Centre

xiv

ISS JCB JCP JEM JSR KAIPTC KAR KDF KMOSD KUSLO LECIAD LGBT LOAC LRA MDMP MILOB MINUSCA MINUSMA MINUSTAH MISCA MK MLC MoD MoU MONUC MONUSCO MPC MPRI NACS NAF NDC NGO

PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

Institute for Security Studies Joint Control Board Joint Campaign Planning Justice and Equity Movement Joint Special Representative Kofi Annan International Peace Support Training Centre Kings African Rifles Kenya Defence Force Kenya Ministry of State for Defence Kenya-United States Liaison Officer Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Law of Armed Conflict Lord’s Resistance Army Military Decision-Making and Planning Military Observer United Nations Multidimensional Integrated ?Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Haiti African-led International Support Mission in Central African Republic Umkhonto we Sizwe Mouvement pour la Libe´ration du Congo Ministry of Defence Memorandum of Understanding United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo Movement Patriotique de Carana Military Professional Resources Incorporated Nordic Advisory Coordination Staff Nigerian Armed Forces National Defence College Non-Governmental Organisation

LIST

NRA OAU OCHA OHHCR ONUC PAO PCSS PILOT PIO PIR PLANELM PMC PNC PoC PPC PSO PSRD PSTC QUIP RCD RDC REC RECAMP RoL RPA RPA RPF RPTC RSML/SML RSOM SADC SADF SAF SALW SANDF SAT

OF ABBREVIATIONS

xv

National Resistance Army Organisation of African Unity Organisation for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights United Nations Operation in the Congo Political Affairs Officer Peace and Conflict Studies School Partnering Integrated Logistics Operations Tactics Public Information Office Primary Information Requirement Planning Element Private Military Company Police National du Congo Protection of Civilians Pearson Peacekeeping Centre Peace Support Operation Peace and Security Research Department Peace Support Training Centre Quick Impact Project Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Democratie Rapid Deployment Capability Regional Economic Community Renforcement des Capacite´s Africaines de Maintien de la Paix Rule of Law Rwanda Patriotic Army Rwanda Peace Academy Rwanda Patriotic Front Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre Regional Senior Mission Leaders/Senior Mission Leader Reception, Staging and Onward Movement Southern African Development Community South African Defence Force Sudanese Armed Forces Small Arms and Light Weapons South African National Defence Force Selection Assistance Team

xvi

SGBV SLA/M SME SOAS SOMI SPLA SRSG SSR STAREC STM TA TACON TED TCC TDRA TFG TFHQ TPDF UK UN UNAMID UNDP UNHCR UNISFA UNMEE UNMIL UNMISS UNOCI UNPOS UNSC UNSSS UPDF US WAFF WAPI

PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

Sexual and Gender Based Violence Sudan Liberation Army/Movement Subject Matter Expert School of Oriental And African Studies Staging Onward Movement and Integration Sudan Peoples Liberation Army Special Representative of the Secretary General Security Sector Reform Stabilisation and Recovery Strategy Standardised Training Modules Technical Adviser Tactical Construction Training Evaluation and Development Troop Contributing Country Transitional Darfuri Regional Authority Transitional Federal Government Task Force Head Quarters Tanzanian Peoples Defence Force United Kingdom United Nations United Nations and African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur UN Development Programme United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Interim Security Force United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea United Nations Mission in Liberia United Nations Mission in South Sudan United Nations Mission in Cote D’Ivoire United Nations Political Office for Somalia United Nations Security Council UN Security and Support Strategy Uganda Peoples Defence Force United States West Africa Frontier Force West African Peacebuilding Institute

INTRODUCTION

On the surface, Peace Support Operations (PSO)1 training centres2 in Africa are non-sensitive, technical education facilities that are peripheral to broader national politics. Peacekeeping training centres are for want of a better word ‘boring’. They are essentially military educational institutions or departments within national military academies. They host and deliver short-term courses of perhaps two weeks not only to students who are predominately serving military personnel, but also to government civil service men and women and to police officers. Every country that sends one of their own service people to a peacekeeping mission ensures that they are trained, perhaps not comprehensively, but in some form. These training centres are inherently technical and seen as a formality or surplus training on the periphery of ‘proper’ soldiering skills that the military develops through intense instruction followed by operations. Rather like media studies or business studies are often regarded in secondary schools, PSO training is often seen by the military as second best to the intended role of the armed forces. After all, soldiers are trained in the management and machinery of organised and legitimate violence, not in issues of developing peace through non-violent activities. However, this seemingly boring, non-sensitive and peripheral surface belies a complicated web of power dynamics, internal and external relations and perhaps most importantly provides a window into the murky world of military culture and diplomacy. In this sense PSO training centres in Africa are not boring; far from it. The centres provide an insight into the politics of African military culture and the

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implementation of foreign military assistance programmes at the microlevel with implications for broader development assistance. African states have developed an impressive training infrastructure for training their peacekeepers. National defence academies and war colleges all have PSO components, and foreign pre-deployment packages for national contingents are standard practice and greatly valued by Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). Both collective and individual training is provided in several different ways. UN training courses are provided through various UN departments and national universities have courses at various levels for the growing number of individuals involved with peace operations. In addition peacekeeping, peacebuilding and associated areas in conflict resolution have become accepted areas of employment. Similar to humanitarians, the ‘peacekeeping international’ is a large pool of persons either directly employed by UN or other peace operations or in associated areas related to peacekeeping. A number of studies have highlighted the vested interest these individuals have in the success of the liberal international peacebuilding approach. Severine Autessere’s recent assessment of this world is that of a Peaceland3 where the ‘peacekeeping international’ exists in a separate planet of acronyms, idealism and also a complete disconnect from the daily lives of real people and especially those they are trying to assist. Other studies on peacekeeping have touched on even more provocative implications. Cunliffe’s Legions of Peace depicts a far more Machiavellian and self-interested system of unequal power dynamics from centre to periphery in an almost carbon copy of the colonial administration and infrastructure that the early peacekeeping internationals sought to end.4 In Cunliffe’s view the intent of international peacebuilders, as well as the implementing system in the pre- and postindependence period, is the same. These two positions are on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum with derision from Cunliffe about liberal peacebuilding whereas Auterserre is clearly a supporter. However, the system that emerges is much more akin to a ‘peace industry’ involving not only pecuniary incentives but also more importantly a reinforcing system of econometric measurables that dictate a market orientated approach to peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Unintended consequences are paramount which Autesserre correctly highlights as a central reason for failures in peacekeeping and peacebuilding,5 however these terms are defined. At the same time Autesserre fails to make the connection

INTRODUCTION

3

between the unintended consequences and the system implementing and underscoring these interventions. It is not the intention but rather the system that is faulty, a system that both Cunliffe and Autesserre have no problem describing as liberal international peacebuilding. In this regard then, the nature as well as the implementation of liberal international peacebuilding, as outlined by authors such as Roland Paris, Oliver Richmond and others is a self-reinforcing system that perpetuates a very technical approach as well as certain histories, historiographies, truths, myths, legends and propaganda all in the name of peace for the greater good of humanity.6 All the while the day-to-day grind on the ground in some of Africa’s conflicts and war zones in other continents continues in a variety of forms, and often not in the mould outlined by peacebuilders or theoretical and empirical assumptions underlying their positions. PSO training centres are part of this system. Developed to improve the capability of liberal peacebuilding’s soldiers and administrators the centres are part and parcel of the ‘peace industry’ and provide invaluable insights into some of the dynamics that characterise foreign military assistance in the name of peace. This book is borne out of a decade of research and analysis on peacekeeping training, conflict and the military in Africa. Within this period I was employed, or rather seconded, as one of the foreign ‘technical advisers’ at the PSO training centre in Kenya, the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) and subsequently as a strategic adviser to the Rwanda Peace Academy. It was during my time at IPSTC and whilst immersed in the training centre that the seed for this topic began to take root. I was tasked with establishing an applied research wing within the research department at IPSTC. The intent was to develop a team of researchers, operating procedures and a system to inform training at the centre through rigorous analytical research. I found myself thrust into a bizarre environment of donor-recipient relations and military personnel from Africa and from donor states trying to develop training courses for African Union (AU) peacekeepers. I was employed directly by the British military that had a team co-located with IPSTC. The commander of the British military team initially steered me to this topic. Colonel Andy Mason was an imposing bull of a man, a walking embodiment of the British Army’s Parachute Regiment where he came from. ‘Mace’ (as he was respectfully referred to by his

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subordinates) called me into his office one day and after some pleasantries barked a direct order at me, ‘I want you to do a research paper for me on the PSO-SSR Conundrum’. I didn’t know what he was talking about so I stared back and blithely responded ‘Yes Colonel’. Colonel ‘Mace’ Mason proceeded to go through a selection of slides from various PowerPoint presentations looking at the development of the proposed Eastern African Standby Force or EASBRIG, as it was known then. While he was doing this he constantly reiterated the need for context and relevance; ‘what we don’t want to be is the Kofi Annan Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana which is basically a prostitute; it just does training for training’s sake and will cater to anyone paying’. I left Colonel Mason’s office in a state of concern. What did he mean by this? PSO-SSR conundrum? Prostitute? It was only some years later when contemplating this research and refining the exact topic that Colonel Mason’s ‘PSO-SSR Conundrum’ began to make a great deal of sense. What Mace was getting at is essentially the pivotal issue in contemporary peacekeeping, and the politics of contributing soldiers for multinational peace missions. That is, how can military forces that are from a variety of African states with great differences in history, language and political systems and with militaries at different levels of capability with different cultures be capable of conducting complicated multinational peacekeeping operations? Although this seems obvious, the implications of this ‘conundrum’ and the issues of interoperability in military operations is not limited to technical capacities alone. They are inherently political, in that it is the far more complex areas of social, political and economic factors that have shaped individual nations and their militaries that is the contentious issue, even if commonalties exist on the surface. Before turning to examine in detail the theories, cases and analysis at a more micro-level, there are several interconnected areas regarding peacekeeping and military assistance that merit some explanation.

Training African Peacekeepers: A Continuation of Foreign Military Assistance Peacekeeping Training in Africa Peacekeeping training is not a new phenomenon. It goes hand in hand with the deployment of multinational peacekeeping forces. Peacekeepers have been deployed to a variety of operations across the globe for over

INTRODUCTION

5

half-a-century under a variety of authorising agencies. The United Nations has been the most prolific peacekeeping organisation in terms of historical lead, global legitimacy and ability to deploy large numbers of men and women to a variety of operations at the same time. However, other international organisations have managed to deploy peacekeeping forces. NATO, the European Union, the African Union and even subregional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Africa have managed to put boots into theatre to keep or to enforce peaceful co-existence between warring factions. African-led peacekeeping has rapidly increased since the end of the OAU and the establishment of the African Union in 2001. The AU has deployed significant troops in green helmets to several hotspots and conflicts in Africa, but the organisation is stretched and constantly learning as AU missions have evolved into more proactive and robust enforcement operations dominated by national politics and foreign policy priorities of troop contributing countries. The early days of AU PSO were mostly more ‘classical’ peacekeeping operations in that AU missions were deployed to environments where there was a peace to keep. Peace agreements in Burundi and Darfur dictated the deployment but also the types of mandates that authorised those missions. AMISOM in Somalia in 2007 began to change the nature of AU peace operations that would later inform some debates within the UN DPKO (as can be seen by the offensive mandate provided to the Force Intervention Brigade of the UN peacekeeping mission in DR Congo in 2013). At the same time the AU and major TCCs continued the expansion into PSO and collective security operations due to the accolades received from foreign donors, mainly in the West, and ensuing financial and political support. The AU even took PSO a step further by authorising a Joint Task Force against the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in 2010. There was nothing peaceful about this operation and to all intents and purposes it is a multinational death squad seeking to obliterate Joseph Kony in the hope of dismembering the LRA dragon that has blighted Uganda and then its neighbours for the last thirty years. Plans are also in place for a similar multinational AU enforcement task force against Boko Haram in Nigeria, indicating a consolidation if not increased eagerness for AU multinational peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

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Foreign Military Assistance to Africa Many donor nations, predominately but not limited to Western states, give some form of military assistance to developing countries across the globe. This phenomenon is not new. Military assistance has existed for as long as diplomacy. Civilisations that became Empires relied on military assistance. The Romans, Ottomans, Moguls, Genghis Khan and so on all maintained security across large swathes of territory, relying on military might. Military might was also the bedrock of colonial expansion with colonial outposts receiving substantial funds for military forces. Colonial armies, such as those in India, Indo-China and also African regiments in East and West Africa institutionalised a system of defence engagement from centre to periphery paving the way for today’s military assistance. Military assistance continued unabated during the post-independence period and the Cold War. Proxy war was in fashion and many parts of the world were the battlefields for super power confrontation. In Africa it was the Lusaphone countries, Zaire and the Horn of Africa where Cold War rivalries were most pronounced and where ideological differences between East and West resulted in huge amounts of military assistance to priority states on the Cold War front lines. As Gutteridge notes, this foreign military assistance took many forms and broadly resembled colonial defence development. Technical advisers were seconded in senior positions and entire foreign battalions were deployed into recipient states. Substantial military equipment was sold to client states, training packages were delivered regularly, and vast sums were delivered to states to develop their military capability.7 Since the early nineties, this approach to military assistance remains remarkably similar to previous eras of Cold War rivalry and Imperial rule. Ideology, language and diplomacy may well have evolved but practicalities and the implementation of foreign military assistance is essentially unchanged. Today’s military assistance is implemented in line with notions of development, capacity building and bringing a social order through improving human rights, building institutions and ultimately building the states they seek to govern; albeit built in the model of Western modernisation and in a fraction of the time Europe took to fight for its current status. At the same time military assistance is also immersed in notions of security. Security is often defined broadly, and depending on the person or entity tasked with its definition, can relate to individual, collective, state/national, non-state

INTRODUCTION

7

and international security. Security, as defined by Western foreign policy makers is associated with a set of international norms surrounding the issue of rights and ideology. The ideology is not one of state planning versus economic liberalisation, although liberalisation is part of international norms of security. Rather, military assistance is delivered in part to protect the norms, practices and ideas of the paymaster and their perception of security, often from a Western state immersed in notions of a liberal peace. In addition threats to these notions of security are demonised in that they are portrayed as diametrically opposite, an approach of ‘good vs. evil’. So in that sense ideological grandstanding is a crucial part of foreign military assistance. Previous incarnations have evoked the threat of the ‘savages’ and the need to civilise them. The threat of eastern expansionist ideology or Western decadence and most recently the concentration on a US and Euro-centric view of political violence and global terror on the one hand and a plethora of conservative non-Western views that often condone the use of violence in the face of perceived neo-imperialism or other such threat on the other. Included in this are fundamentalist Islamic groups such as Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and more recently Boko Haram and Islamic State and is equally applicable in degrees to the LRA, the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, RENAMO in Mozambique and other non-state actors prone to using violence to further political strategies. Given these perceived and real notions of security, liberal peacebuilders have identified several ‘tools’ in their policy ‘tool-box’ that seemingly bridge the gap between philanthropic or developmental capacity building and more self-interested security threats. That is to create, or to impose, or to build, or to develop states in their own image, with security organs they can identify and relate to in order to make their own domains safer. Both physically, so that immediate threats are countered or mitigated, and also metaphysically so that the potential threat to a particular world view, international profile and ideology of global affairs is not shattered or subjected to a paradigmic shift. To continue old activities in another more altruistic guise, foreign military assistance has gone through a rebranding process in order to shrug off the negative connotations of supporting abusive soldiers with taxpayers’ money for political gain. Now these assistance packages are known by decidedly more acceptable terms such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), Security Sector Governance, criminal justice capacity

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building and so on. In reality these areas can contain just as many nefarious activities as the previous military development packages as well as the more benevolent areas of modern development such as training in human rights and building the accountability of institutions. Broadly speaking all these ‘reform and capacity building’ initiatives involve seconding technical advisers, training and providing equipment in order to help recipient states develop. However, this development must be seen to be on the terms of the providers of capital and assistance as opposed to those of the recipient. It is this donor-recipient relationship and the intimate issues of power between patron and client state that is often distorted, subverted and overlooked. This relationship is most prominent in foreign military assistance and especially in the politics of peacekeeping training. The following chapters seek to examine this dynamic through an analysis of PSO training centres in Africa.

Hypotheses, Research Questions and Assumptions Peacekeeping training institutions in relation to African armed forces and the politics of the military is part of a broader literature on the military in Africa, which has been dormant for several years. The area of study is rich in its implications and it is a shame in some respects that this investigation is limited to PSO training centres, and does not extend to broader military cultures or case studies of specific military forces in great detail. Future research in these areas will no doubt shed even more light on the politics of peacekeeping in Africa. This analysis then touches on numerous areas worthy of further research, both in terms of the theoretical understanding of some of the concepts addressed but also areas that are crying out for more empirical based approaches to the topic. Issues around peacekeeping training are also woefully under researched. This is hardly surprising given that these centres have only been in existence for ten years, and that they are essentially confined to the secretive and closed realms of the military and diplomats. However, analysis on the training of peacekeepers based on evidence from relevant peacekeeping missions is lacking. Although not exhaustive in terms of identifying a training need, I seek to fill some of that gap in the literature, at least intellectually, by highlighting the major fault lines both theoretically and empirically as well as identifying areas for improvement.

INTRODUCTION

9

This book also aims to add to the literature on the military in Africa, military sociology and civil-military relations. Civil-military relations theory and military sociology has a significant body of work dedicated to understanding military institutions and military development. Journals such as Armed Forces and Society are solely dedicated to this area of study and a number of political scientists and behavioural psychologists, predominately Western, have dominated this field.8 However in relation to Africa and military relations the literature is lacking. There are very few examples of civil-military relations approaches grounded in rich empirical data. The notable exception is Robin Luckham’s analysis of the Nigerian Military9 and Samuel Decalo’s prolific analysis on the issue of military coups and army rule.10 My own small contribution on the Rwanda Defence Force is an addition to the literature.11 Other studies do exist as we shall see in Chapter 1 but there is a dearth of knowledge on this important area of African politics and African studies. This book hopes in part therefore to reinvigorate the study of African military forces, both theoretically and empirically. This study also seeks to add to the debate on broader development assistance to Africa and the nature of aid relationships from external patrons to client states and also importantly foreign policy priorities within African states. Exploring power dynamics within the politics of aid and its disbursement from the west to African states and elsewhere has received a great deal of attention and is argued from several angles. Economists such as Paul Collier and Jeffrey Sachs have stressed the importance of good governance or lack of it and reflect the broad positions of International Financial Institutions and some approaches to development aid.12 Other economists and anthropologists have berated foreign aid as contributing to underdevelopment and corruption.13 Political scientists and political economists such as Mark Duffield, Bill Easterly and Nicholas Van de Walle have identified the system of aid delivery itself, and how externally imposed approaches contribute to some of the negative issues associated with foreign aid such as supporting and actively encouraging authoritarianism through technical programmes. Ultimately this last set of authors deride the propensity for development workers and peacebuilders to see things in economic terms and the pseudo-imperial bureaucracy of aid delivery. In particular these authors highlight the similarity between today’s developmentalists and

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governor-generals of old overseeing grand designs for colonial subjects complete with Apartheid style ‘bunker development’ provided to locals by the West from behind barbed wire-covered citadels of civilisation.14 The following chapters touch upon the sentiments and ideas of some of these schools of thought, but military assistance is a far more murky and politicised area of engagement than, say, education or health. The intention here is to situate PSO training within military assistance and military assistance within the broader scope and debate of foreign development aid. However, this analysis takes a different turn from some other assessments of grand designs and aid relationships in that this approach is a detailed investigation into military assistance projects from the bottom up. In doing so power dynamics and the way these dynamics function by both donor and recipient are made all the more clear. By applying a political-sociological approach to the study of military assistance from below, patterns, trends and commonalities are better triangulated and compared enabling a comprehensive analysis of the intended and unintended consequences of foreign military assistance to African states in the form of peacekeeping training. It is posited that regional peacekeeping training centres provide an environment for African elites, predominately military, to interact with each other through shared training and experiences. This process of interaction, or socialisation, aims to improve skills but also to forge cohesion so that future African-led missions will be managed by welltrained officers who are comfortable and willing to work within a regional or Pan-African framework. Thus it can be stated that part of the aim of peacekeeping training centres is to foster a Pan-African ‘outward’ looking ideology or disposition as well as improving technical ability. Training therefore has three core aims: first to improve African Union peacekeeping operations by creating a pool of well trained personnel; second to contribute to the professionalisation and reform of national defence forces in African states through training and instruction in international norms and third to provide areas of socialisation between African militaries in order to foster bonds and forge regional integration in the hope that the potential for regional conflict will reduce through these elite relationships. However, what is less clear is what the experiences and training in these centres actually results in. Elements of elite socialisation will be examined as will functional integration theory related to elites in order

INTRODUCTION

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to pinpoint as accurately as possible what these socialisation experiences result in and to determine the applicability of functionalist theoretical frameworks. This study therefore aims to answer the following research questions: . . . . . .

Are the aims of improving, reforming and integrating African officers being achieved? Does training lead to better peacekeepers, more professional forces and African Union-ised military officers? What are the intended and unintended consequences of experiences at the centres? To what extent are placements and the centres themselves contributing to ‘outward’ or ‘inward’ outlooks, dispositions and actions? What are the motivations for training and how do African states interpret and implement peacekeeping training? What effect do the centres have on students and instructors and vice versa?

Structure of the Book The first part of Chapter 1 sets out the research design and methodology used for collecting and analysing data. Examining the consequences of peacekeeping training is expanded into exploring the intended as well as unintended effects of placements, employment and experiences at these centres. The second part of this chapter sets the theoretical scene. The development of the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and AU peacekeeping is situated within functionalist integration theory underscored by Pan-Africanism. Aspects of spillover and elite socialisation are highlighted in conjunction with the rhetoric from Pan-Africanism as central to the continental body’s drive for institutionalising collective security arrangements. Finally, I explore the military in Africa and set out a new framework for analysis when seeking to identify commonalities and differences of African Armed Forces using aspects of military-sociology and civil-military relations. This framework of the theoretical boundaries I have set is crucial in understanding how African states and their defence institutions approach PSO training. Chapter 2 broadly explores what peacekeepers on deployment on peace missions in Africa have to do in terms of day-to-day activities. To highlight

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these issues, this chapter examines a range of peacekeeping missions in order to adequately capture the variety of tasks an individual may have to undertake but more importantly to pinpoint commonalities from different missions in order to accurately determine the detail of activities on contemporary peace operations. Four missions are selected for analysis to demonstrate commonalities from different authorising bodies. MONUSCO in DRC is examined as a UN peacekeeping mission. UNAMID in Darfur as an example of a hybrid peacekeeping mission. AMISOM in Somalia as the AU peacekeeping mission. Finally, the EASF as an example of the African Standby Force arrangement in Eastern Africa. For each of these peace operations the political/historical context specific to the operating environment is explored. Structures, mandates and activities are then analysed and specific sections on peacekeeping missions such as the military component, civilian component and police component are investigated to determine tasks. Some broad commonalities are then identified regarding activities on peacekeeping missions with implications for training. The next three chapters examine peacekeeping training centres in empirical detail, building a substantial evidence base supporting theories and assertions. Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive assessment of how IPSTC in Kenya functions on paper. The history of the centre’s development is provided in detail, highlighting crucial incentives for development such as Kenya’s history of peacekeeping. The composition and structure of the centre, as well as institutional objectives and aims is similarly explored in detail to determine as best as is possible the intentions of training at IPSTC. A brief overview of donor support is also provided. Finally, training and courses are catalogued providing a comprehensive understanding of training at IPSTC. Chapter 4 follows on from the previous chapter by ‘deconstructing’ IPSTC in terms of the institution itself and stated outputs. This chapter aims to demonstrate the dichotomy between internal and external dynamics of PSO training. A detailed investigation into the unintended consequences of placements and participation at IPSTC is explored in this chapter. Firstly, the structures and departments are analysed. Operational procedures such as student selection are explored followed by an analysis of the training delivered at IPSTC. Training concepts and methodology are critiqued in relation to contemporary peacekeeping operations in Africa. Finally, the content of courses is comprehensively examined in terms of learning plans and intended effects of training.

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This is contested against the capabilities of current peace operations. Course content is triangulated by exploring four courses in depth covering the breadth of training at IPSTC followed by conclusions. Chapter 5 continues the exploration of peacekeeping training centres in Africa by analysing other case studies. Three other studies are examined in this chapter in terms of historical development, aims and structures, approach to and delivery of training. The Kofi Annan International Peace Support Training Centre (KAIPTC) is examined, as it is the most developed and functioning operational level peacekeeping training centre in Africa. In addition the Rwanda Peace Academy (RPA) and Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) are analysed. These cases when combined with IPSTC from Kenya give a richer analysis of the issues affecting training centres. Issues of motivation and incentives for peacekeeping training are discussed relating to these three cases and commonalities and differences are teased out. Chapter 6 analyses the data from the previous chapters and seeks to demonstrate the unintended consequences of foreign military assistance to African states through the comparison of identified indicators from the case studies outlined. Training concepts, practicalities and experiences are tested against the internal-external nexus that this thesis is predicated on. In doing so the intended outcomes of PSO training of improving, reforming and integrating are investigated in relation to the case studies provided in previous chapters. It is argued that there exists a substantial gap between the Western liberal peacebuilding approach imposed by foreign donors and the entities on the receiving end tasked with implementing these concepts. The result is inertia at best and subversion at worst, producing a satisficing model of PSO training. At the same time the tools and efforts of PSO training are then geared to more endogenous reasons, incentives and motivations broadly centring around national self interest such as institutional development, foreign policy priorities, economic gains (both organisational and individual) that in the long-term could exacerbate regional and national conflict dynamics instead of reducing them. A concluding chapter briefly summarises the analysis from the previous chapters. The conclusion then relates findings to broader questions of the military in Africa, collective security arrangements and development assistance. Although the research for this study was conducted in 2013, dynamics at play are remarkably similar, if not the same, today, as they were five years ago.

CHAPTER 1 CONCEPTUALISING PEACEKEEPING TRAINING: FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION, PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY IN AFRICA

Introduction African peacekeeping has taken on a more proactive role with the creation of the African Union. Several peacekeeping missions have been deployed either by the AU or sub-regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and there are plans to develop a continent-wide rapid reaction force based in each region to be called the African Standby Force (ASF). Most crucially, the African Union has developed a concept for an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as the system to manage African conflict with components for conflict prevention, conflict management and postconflict reconstruction. In reality, the AU is limited to conflict management and mainly peacekeeping.1 Peacekeeping training centres are part of this architecture and an element of conflict management. The centres have been developed to meet a Pan-African functional requirement – the training of African soldiers, civilians and police officers for African-led and managed peacekeeping missions under the auspices of the continental body.

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As regional organisations affiliated to the AU with clear and legal parameters, these centres provide useful insights into African integration in the security field. The centres are symptomatic of some of the issues facing the AU more broadly and so provide useful case studies in understanding African integration dynamics. This chapter outlines the methodological approach for the study and situates African integration in functionalist theory underscored by PanAfricanism. In addition, I have sketched out issues pertaining to the role of the military elite in African Politics and a framework to understand issues that have shaped and continue to shape contemporary African defence forces, especially the major African troop contributors to Peace Support Operations. Due consideration is given to African authors and non-Western approaches, after all the institutions analysed are African, run by Africans and addressing African issues.

Research Methods The methodological approach taken utilises mixed methods in order to maximise validity, reliability and ‘generalisability’. Several methods for collecting data are employed and are predominantly qualitative and I employ basic surveys to complement qualitative analysis where appropriate. Comparative case studies and process tracing are the primary research methods used in the research design relying mainly on participant-observation techniques and a quasi-ethnographic approach. In addition to primary data, key sources of data are secondary literature, official documents, major media and comprehensive diaries I have maintained as an employee of one of my case studies (March 2008– Sept 2009) and during fieldwork in 2013. I also use data collected during fieldwork from the case studies and relevant other sites. In this study I analyse the aims and strategic goals of the training centres, management and administration of the centres and how training is delivered and supported. This includes an overview of the hierarchy and reporting lines, an examination of donor support and how it is implemented, and an investigation into the relationship between the AU, APSA and the centres themselves. I also analyse courses delivered and then evaluate their relevance for peacekeeping missions. An important part of this research is interviews with students and participants on courses to determine reasons why training is being undertaken.

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In order to contextualise my findings and establish best practice I analyse current peacekeeping missions. I aim to understand differences between UN and AU missions, management structures, command, control and doctrine, role of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), what tasks are common, how military officers are deployed to peacekeeping missions and identify areas of improvement. A combination of studies of both a UN and AU stand-alone mission, a hybrid AU-UN mission and the development of ASF structures cover the range of authorised missions.

Comparative Case Studies and Process Tracing Using comparative methods helps to determine causal relationships and to demonstrate theoretical frameworks. I make partial use of Mill’s methods of difference, concomitant variation and agreement2 as one way of analysing my cases. By identifying and controlling dependent variables the comparative method helps to tease out different factors affecting both cases. Differences responsible for contradictory outcomes will be identified, similar pressures affecting different outcomes can be examined and changing levels of progressiveness in terms if outcomes are used to corroborate or dismiss changing dynamics as hypothesised.3 However, the comparative method alone falls short of rigorous research methods and must be complemented to improve validity.4 Process tracing is also employed therefore to achieve further accuracy and research rigour. By employing process tracing techniques I seek to craft and construct an explanatory narrative to complement other data collection methods. As others have noted process tracing is highly compatible with the comparative method.5 By using this method a detailed narrative of peacekeeping training centres is produced with common indicators and variables as well as key differences highlighted and explained. Data Collection: Participant Observation and Interviews Data collection has been conducted on several sites, with in-depth investigation into specific case studies. In order to complement the comparative method, process tracing and participant-observation techniques have been employed. Although mindful of the role as the investigator, participantobservation techniques have enabled insights into the social

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phenomenon under investigation. It has been an on-going process of understanding through shared experiences (as far as an observer can) and has provided an insider’s perspective into social and political practices at the centres. Systematic recording of observations is central to successful investigations and a daily diary of observed phenomena has been an invaluable recording method. Open-ended and other interview techniques have been used in parallel. It is worth noting that I have already been a participant-observer at the institution in Kenya for a year and a half. During this period I was Head of Applied Research at IPSTC in Kenya. In this position I was privy to information disseminated in high-level meetings on the Centre’s development. I attended meetings with all the key donors involved with the Centre and I interacted with all the students who were trained at the Centre. I helped to design courses as well as teach. I interacted almost daily with key users of the Centre (such as regional military/peacekeeping organisations and regional economic communities) and I interacted with the staff intimately for 18 months from the Director down to the cleaners. I have maintained detailed diaries of my time at IPSTC as well as an excellent network of interlocutors within the region and beyond. I am mindful of the ethical considerations and of any bias from previous notes, especially too much of the ‘insider’ perspective. The intention is to mitigate any bias through comparative studies. Different interview techniques have complemented and/or informed other research methods employed. I employed two types of interviews. Firstly, semi-structured interviews with elite level military respondents working on peacekeeping. Secondly, open-ended unstructured interviews with staff and students at peacekeeping training centres such as fluid conversations in informal settings. Interviews have mainly been conducted in English or in French. Full consent was obtained for all interviews. A final technique building upon the interview and other data collection strategies is the convening of focus groups. Focus groups can be an important method of fleshing out and informal testing of theories and ideas. By providing both a deeper insight and a challenge function, the use of focus groups can help to validate and increase reliability. Focus groups and the natural conversation from group discussions aids in revealing the norms and feelings that underline decisions. Moreover, focus group results surpass the simplistic categorical answers generated

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by survey questions by generating nuanced, open-ended and sometimes unexpected responses.6 In addition to interview techniques and focus groups, I employed a basic survey questionnaire7 to ‘track’ students after they had received training at one of the centres under scrutiny, and also to tease out other issues pertaining to their training. Little if any data exists about destinations and deployments of African peacekeepers after training, either by the centres themselves or an external body even though the destination of students should reflect training. I try to complement other data collection methods and provide an insight into where peacekeepers deploy to after training in order to assess the relative effectiveness of the training centres.

Regional Integration and Africa Before any examination of specifics it is useful to understand the development of functionalist thought as conceived by David Mitrany. Concerned with state-society relations in a changing world system,8 functionalism advocated a gradualist approach to international organisation to mitigate future conflict.9 States would remain in their state-like form and ‘share sovereignty’ rather than lose it.10 Authority would be linked to a specific activity and can be aptly summed up by the motif ‘form follows function.’11 Mitigating future conflict certainly chimes with current African integration strategies but pure functionalism fails to fully explain how and why the AU and APSA came into being, especially regarding popular civic participation. Neo-functionalism nuances functionalist thought and has some relevance to Africa.

Neo-Functionalism The elements of neo-functionalism most relevant to integration in Africa, as defined by authors such as Haas, Lindberg and Sheingold (although they were referring to Europe), centre around the concepts of spillover and elite socialisation.12 Spillover occurs when activities in one sector infringe on other areas. It occurs where further action is needed in other connected areas in order to achieve success in the initial task. This logic continues over time, with more and more sectors becoming integrated as a product of functional

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requirements rather than as a result of any grand design. Spillover therefore centres on the expansive logic of tasks13 and the impossibility of maintaining prolonged separability of different issue areas in a complex interdependent policy.14 Integration of certain tasks therefore leads to problems that can only be solved by integrating yet more tasks.15 The inevitability of spillover is disputed16 although spillover in itself is seen as a useful model describing integrative dynamics. Disintegrative dynamics have been attributed to spillover as well.17 Concepts of ‘spillback’18 as well as spillaround, buildup, retrench, muddle about, and encapsulate19 suggest a range of disintegrative as well as integrative dynamics stemming from structural pressures and inter-personal interactions. The ‘zone of indifference’ may well be the most likely scenario for effective integration or spillover as well as the importance of reacting to a crisis in pressuring for further integration.20 Whatever the case areas where the cost-benefit ratio of integration is stacked well in favour of benefits, integration is more likely. Elite socialisation is a second key feature of neo-functionalism. The interaction of political elites and officials in coordinating regional policy would gradually lead to the transfer of loyalty to supranational bodies. Elites would undergo a learning process, thereby developing the perception that their interests are better served by supranational rather than national solutions. Elites such as government officials, political parties, interest groups and trade unions would eventually see their interests served by a higher body politic.21 Groups and individuals would forge links with similar groups across borders creating supranational interest groups. Package deals and backdoor negotiations as well as formal interactions would result in increased personal ties between elites and a sense of corporate identity leading to compromises through integration.22 By gradually ‘learning by doing’ that integration serves their interests, individuals and groups would actively promote integration.23 The inevitability placed upon the positive aspects of elite socialisation may be overplayed. Interaction between elites and bureaucrats can create a corporate identity and develop personal ties. However, this process is not inevitable and can lead to acrimony if other conditions are not met. National concerns would remain a priority, especially in important policy areas.24 As such, elite socialisation is a factor in promoting integration but can also create unintended disintegrative tendencies.

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Security integration in Africa and associated areas such as peacekeeping and the training of peacekeepers can be seen as the expansive logic of tasks. However, local and contextual political/diplomatic dynamics between African states highlight both the salience of spillover and spillback. The former can be seen by the institutionalisation of AU peacekeeping and the latter by inertia of the AU in the face of more controversial and politically sensitive issues such as failing to condemn rigged elections and perception of bias such as in Gaddafi’s fall in Libya. Peacekeeping, and certainly peacekeeping training, can be seen as the pooling of capabilities for technical, less sensitive and ‘indifferent’ tasks. The process of elite socialisation is most pertinent in the African context. As Williams points out, only through a process of socialisation can security cultures help establish core assumptions, beliefs and values of decision-makers and how security challenges can and should be dealt with.25 Summit diplomacy, staying in the same hotel, closed meetings, drinks after work and informal sessions in the margins all enhance and shape elite culture.26 It is this process of informal and formal diplomacy shaped by socialisation experiences that contribute to spillover or spillback. Shared experiences in peacekeeping and specifically peacekeeping training, as we shall see later, can lead to more integrative or disintegrative perceptions and views by elite decision-makers on the future of Africa’s security cooperation. Perhaps the greatest omission of functionalist integration theory is the role of external actors.27 The role of the United States in developing Western Europe and the polarising effect of the Cold War are neglected in the literature even though the developments of postwar Europe were intrinsically linked to these issues.28 Similarly donor governments and organisations have partly directed integration in Africa. Aid, military assistance and external dependence can all contribute to integration projects.29 Functionalist logic goes some way in explaining Africa’s integration in security although several pillars are simply inapplicable to Africa. The pure Mitranian position, as well as the neo-functionalist school, presumes some level of pluralism as well as certain liberal concepts and values. The omission of external pressures is also a crucial shortcoming as is the perceived inevitability of integration. Concepts such as the spillover of tasks and the socialisation of elites are central features of integration but contain disintegrative as well as integrative dynamics.

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Only by understanding how Pan-Africanism underscores functional integration can the development of the AU and APSA be understood.

Pan-Africanism and African Integration Pan-Africanism, although not a theory of integration in itself has been used to explain the development of the African Union30 as well as reguallry invoked rhetoric of continental and social unity and so is useful to sketch out what it broadly means and some of its forms. PanAfricanism is an invented notion in response to the systematic oppression of African people and the domination of the African continent by external forces.31 Original architects were Africans in the Diaspora, most notably William Du Bois, Frantz Fanon and Marcus Garvey.32 Pan-Africanism was a stand against slavery, colonialism and imperialism33 but also recognition of the self as African. The Pan-Africanist movement was at the forefront of promoting independence for African states influencing a pool of eager African liberation leaders and groups. Pan-Africanism began to take root on the African continent itself. Charismatic leaders such as Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, Guinea’s Sekou Toure and Senegal’s Leopold Senghor advocated for the unification of Africa, politically, economically and socially. Nkrumah went so far as to advocate for an African continental government including authority over all key policy areas such as foreign policy and even a joint African military command.34 Central concepts of Pan-Africanism concern the granting of a voice to Africa people through unification, expression of pride and achievement by Africans, returning the African diaspora to Africa, liberation from colonialism in all its forms and the eventual political unification of Africa.35 In essence Pan-Africanism is a way of articulating ‘African solutions to African problems’ and can be seen by the gradual development of African integration initiatives.36 Pan-African Congresses were held in Paris in 1919 and 1921, London in 1923, New York in 1927 and Manchester in 1945 where Pan-Africanism was officially linked to African nationalism and independence.37 Murithi refers to the congresses as the first institutionalisation of Pan-Africanism38 setting in stone concrete manifestations of Pan-Africanist ideals. The second institutionalisation can be seen as the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).39 The OAU was created to give Africa one voice but also to promote the rights of African peoples and

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unite the continent against external interference, mainly as a bastion against colonialism and later against Apartheid in South Africa. However, once Africa broke free from colonial chains and Apartheid was dismantled, the OAU fell short of living up to its Pan-African ideals. Instead, the organisation became little more than a club for dictators and authoritarian governments. The pillar of non-intervention in domestic affairs of states enshrined in the OAU charter40 rendered the beast toothless for all intents and purposes.41 Furthermore, a united Africa was not the approach adopted. In the creation of the OAU African states were split into three ideologically differing camps; the Casablanca group, the Monrovia group and the Brazzaville group resulting in an organisation of division rather than unity.42 The fourth and current phase of institutionalisation of PanAfricanism can be seen as the creation of the AU.43 The AU is an overhaul of African integration and seeks to provide a framework for growth and development. The new AU aimed to address some of the failures of the OAU in peace and security but also governance and economic development. In that regard the new AU aims to address the question of African emancipation as envisioned by early Pan-Africanists. The impetus was driven not just by structural failures of the OAU but also by a new group of committed Pan-Africanists including South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki, Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo, Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi, Senegal’s Abdoulaye Wade44 and increasingly Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni and the late Meles Zenawi from Ethiopia. With the establishment of the AU in 2000, new organs were created to address the failing of the OAU. This included an Assembly, the Executive Council, the Pan-African Parliament, an African Human Rights Court, the Peace and Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the AU Commission. Peacekeeping and associated tasks organised under the Peace and Security Council are part of the functionalist but also Pan-Africanist logic of African integration.

The Development of Regional Peacekeeping Training Centres in Support of APSA The AU was created due to significant failures by the OAU, in particular on areas of peace and security, protecting human rights and stopping mass slaughter. Conflict in Somalia, interstate war between Ethiopia and

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Eritrea, genocide in Rwanda, cross border conflict dynamics and rebels in Sierra Leone and Liberia, regional war involving the Democratic Republic of the Congo and most of its neighbours all happened on the OAU’s watch.45 Furthermore cross-border issues such as refugee flows, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), the porous nature of borders, cross-border non-state actors and possible spillover of crisis, are common features of conflict on the continent and were driving forces in encouraging states to pool sovereignty on certain security issues.46 The AU Peace and Security components for conflict management are a loose affiliation of developing initiatives termed the African Peace and Security Architecture. The AU’s vision, set out in various legal documents and interpreted and implemented by a set of interrelated institutions that constitute the APSA is highly ambitious establishing a long list of tasks related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflict across Africa.47 Provisions are for an early warning system, a multinational standby force, a panel of the wise and a peace fund at the continental level. It is envisioned that sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the EAC would also play a role in conflict management.48 To date the AU has been far more robust and proactive in peacekeeping than its predecessor. The AU has mandated and authorised peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Comoros, Somalia and Sudan49 and more recently in Mali and Central African Republic. In support of these missions and the African Standby Force (ASF) regional peacekeeping training centres have been created. Peacekeeping training centres in Africa are numerous. However, only five centres are affiliated to APSA and more specifically the ASF. Of these five only two centres are operating effectively as the centres in North, Southern and Central Africa are in embryonic form of are effectively defunct for the time being. Peacekeeping training centres provide an environment for African elites, predominately military, to interact with each other through shared training and experiences. This process of interaction, or socialisation, aims to improve skills so that future Africanled missions will be managed by well-trained officers, comfortable and willing to work within a regional framework. Furthermore, the centres aim to improve AU peacekeeping capability but also aid the development and professionalisation of national defence forces. In that sense then these centres aim to improve, reform and integrate Africa armed forces.

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However, questions remain over whether courses are merely delivered to fill slots in the calendar and to receive funds from donors or if training is directed in a manner aimed at longer-term capacity building for APSA and at developing a systematic and sustainable approach to peacekeeping training. Although technically sound, training large numbers of students and looking good on paper, preliminary indications are that these centres lack context, deliver uncoordinated training packages and ultimately fail to fulfil their mandate. Conceptual issues such as Western models and a focus on state security; political problems such as management issues, political/diplomatic disputes between member states, donor driven agendas,50 domination and manipulation by the military; and technical issues such as the wrong training, the wrong structure, the wrong staff and the wrong students are all major obstacles to effective peacekeeping training for APSA.

Military Officers in African Politics This investigation partly focuses on the socialisation of mid-level to senior military officers who are attending courses and employed by peacekeeping training centres. The officers trained at these centres should go on to participate in future AU initiatives but perhaps more importantly many will become the next crop of military and political leaders in the coming years. Most studies of African militaries focus on the propensity of coups and civil wars51 and politico-sociological studies of the African military are few and far between.52 Understanding pressures and developments shaping the military and officer corps is essential in understanding the dynamics of peacekeeping training and the AU’s security components. The officer corps is one of the most important elite groups in society controlling large numbers of men whose occupation is violence.53 Huntington’s classification of objective and subjective militaries is a useful starting point in understanding African militaries.54 The assumption is that an independent professional military will refrain from involvement in politics and serve the needs of the people.55 The military is also seen as a modernising agency given the organisational and managerial skills involved in military administration.56 This objective posture is seen as the ideal. Subjective militaries on the other hand are part and parcel of ruling structures, even if behind closed doors, and are

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intimately involved with state control and authority. The military reflects divisions in society and is inherently linked to politics.57 In essence the difference is between an apolitical military and a politicised military. In Africa the military most resembles the latter. The African military sits between the nexus of modernisation and traditional values,58 where one set of concepts and values interact and merge with others creating an organic and continuous balancing act. To understand this relationship one needs to understand the psyches of African military elites and how they have been and continue to be shaped.59 Great differences exist across the continent’s military establishments but pressures producing these differences are remarkably similar. Understanding the origins and influences, contextual environment and socialisation features of the African military and especially officer corps can illuminate this modernisationtraditionalisation relationship. An important factor is the origin of contemporary African military culture and the imposition of Western military structures. Most modern African armies have developed out of colonial forces and Western doctrines,60 which were primarily used for securing the state apparatus against possible revolution from its subjects. Managed by white colonial military officers (and some lower ranks) colonial armies reinforced the ethos of control by the metropole and subservience to a higher oppressive authority. Rapid Africanisation of the officer corps followed independence in the sixties, leading to rapid promotions due to the small number of experienced, educated and trained African soldiers.61 These new African officers were suddenly thrust into senior positions. Training and military aid was dished out by the colonial powers hoping to maintain a foothold in former conquered lands and by the Cold War super powers playing out proxy spats.62 Today African states routinely receive training and military aid from these same Western donors, along with new players, as part of broader assistance packages.63 Training, equipment provision, doctrine, structures, gestures, ideology, ethos and symbols have all been, and continue to be imported from outside Africa, mainly the west. These ‘importations’ have been implemented in line with indigenous realities.64 Although the disciplined, puritanical, professionalism of Western armies was imported to African versions the operating environment is markedly different. Exogenous structures and influences have been moulded by African agents to suit local pressures

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and contexts. It is therefore essential to understand the contextual environment in which Africa’s militaries exist as well as the factors conditioning African officers and their soldiers.65 The socio-political composition of African armies tends to reflect the sociology of the state they represent.66 Although there is no space to explore the nature of the African state in detail,67 it is assumed that decision-making follows a neo-patrimonial logic to varying degrees.68 African regimes and elites tend to employ clientalist networks, seek access to state resources, public and private sectors are blurred, power is centralised and informal mechanisms of control dominate decisionmaking.69 Elites rely on the trappings of a rational order, such as a recognisable organisational structure, even as they consistently subvert it for their own advantage.70 The military is no different, and in states where higher levels of neo-patrimonialism are found, this will be reflected in military structures.71 Military elites are part of a more comprehensive network of national leadership elites and are subject to the same influences and pressures.72 Agbese describes the Nigerian military’s corrupt practices as capital accumulation and patronage techniques.73 Mwenda and Tangri sketch out patrimonial networks of control and co-optation by Museveni in Uganda and the army top brass.74 Chan shows that the distribution of diamond concessions in the Democratic Republic of Congo to Zimbabwe’s Generals were part of the tactics of regime survival.75 That is not to suggest that (military) elites are always predatory or sinister. Rusagara demonstrates the state-building capacity of the military in Rwanda under a neo-patrimonial regime.76 N’Diaye points to continued civilian management of the military in Kenya through co-option, ethnic favouritism and the fostering of inter-service rivalry to mitigate coups.77 Rupiya and N’Diaye show that professionalisation of the military in Botswana was partly secured through patronage such as training in Western military academies.78 Rather the nature of the African state, or the failure of the post-colonial state,79 creates pressures and influences shaping elite formation and decision-making. Coupled with the outside influences highlighted above it seems entirely rational that military elites follow similar patterns to their civilian counterparts.

A Military Sociology of Africa’s Armed Forces As noted, African states and their politics vary dramatically, although some similarities can be identified. What follows is not an in-depth

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sociological or historical examination of African militaries but rather a framework for analysis, largely descriptive, and temporal in that these categories are not static and are likely to change reflecting broader political developments of the state. Concerning the development of national defence forces African armed forces can broadly be categorised as post-colonial, liberation/vanguard, integrated stalemate and institutionalised under civilian control (see Figure 1.1). This typology is especially useful when looking at the major African contributors to peacekeeping but also for African armed forces in general and provides a new framework for analysis. Post-Colonial militaries refer to states that have inherited and moulded their defence forces from previous colonial forces and developed the military in line with local political realities. Features of these types of armed forces are recognisable structures and organisation, military infrastructure such as training academies, headquarters and barracks, legal frameworks such as constitutional guarantees and other features of institutionalised defence forces. At the same time the military elite is

Post-Colonial

Liberation

Colonial structure Developed military infrastructure Checks and balances on paper only No institutionalised oversight Corruption

Origins Marxist Leninist/Maoist Usually the victors of a civil war Discipline Political indoctrination Integration of combatants

Patrimonial Clientalist networks Seek state resources Blurred public/private sectors Power is centralised Informal mechanisms of control Recognisable organisational structure Stalemate Usually after a civil war with no outright victor Integration of former warring parties on relatively equal grounds

Figure 1.1

Institutionalised Under civilian control Fully developed military infrastructure Checks and balances to counter patrimonialism Origins in one of the above

A Typology of African Armed Forces.

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part of the broader elite and distinctions are often blurred. Decisionmaking involves both formal avenues of command and informal personal networks existing simultaneously. Although civilian control is stated on paper, in reality parliament and other civic bodies have little or no oversight over the military and the armed forces are more a tool of the regime as opposed to the state. Post-colonial militaries then have high levels of patrimonialism at senior echelons such as ethnic politics and informal decision-making while a functioning bureaucratic infrastructure exists. A prime example is Kenya. The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) evolved out of the Kings African Rifles (KAR) and was established in 1962. The KAR comprised African soldiers commanded by British officers and was used more for internal policing, protection of the colonial state and suppression of local dissent rather than a military serving and protecting the population. This force was inherited by the Kenyatta Government who built upon the KAR legacy of British professional soldiering.80 The modern Kenyan military is modelled on the British colonial force and is seen as one of the more professional armed forces in Africa. The KDF comprises the army, navy and air force as well as support units. There is an impressive training system in place including a National Defence College, Staff Officer College, peacekeeping training centre and specialised colleges such as the armour school. The KDF has received significant military assistance such as equipment and training, mainly from the UK and US but also from several other partners, notably China and Israel.81 The role of the military is established in the constitution, and control is presided over by the President, the National Security Council and parliament, and the Kenyan army has not intervened directly in politics.82 The KDF has also been a consistent contributor to UN peacekeeping since the 1960s and the KDF have been part of the African Union Mission in Somalia since 2010. However, at the same time the KDF has been subject to similar pressures affecting the Kenyan state such as ethnic fragmentation, corruption and patrimonial politics.83 Ethnic favouritism again finds its roots in the colonial regime. The British recruited heavily from the Kamba community due to assertions of ‘warrior folk’.84 After independence Kenyatta began to increase the number of Kikuyu recruited as officers for the new Kenya Army.85 He also began the trend of inter-service rivalry by creating an exclusively Kikuyu presidential

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guard.86 Kenyatta relied heavily on the British for training and equipment and the UK provided all arms to Kenya as well as agreeing defence agreements for the training of British troops in Nanyuki. When Moi took over as President in 1978 he sought to follow in the footsteps of Kenyatta. And that is exactly what he did with the military, continuing the development through foreign assistance, mainly from the UK, and through co-option and financial pay offs.87 This time Kalenjin officers were rapidly promoted and came to dominate the top brass. The 1982 attempted coup by members of the Air Force, who were mainly of the Luo ethnic group, quickened the pace of ethnic promotion favouring a ‘supra-ethnic’ bloc of Nilotic communities and political loyalists88 that one author calls the ‘Kalenjinisation’ of the security sector.89 By the late nineties serious concerns over corruption in the military were beginning to surface, highlighted by the Anglo-Lessing scandal regarding the procurement of military hardware.90 With the election of Mwai Kibaki and then Uhuru Kenyatta, much has been done to continue the development of the military. At the same time senior military officers are appointed by the president with little oversight by parliament, and senior positions are dominated by Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Kamba and Meru individuals with ties to the regime and reflecting the current political settlement.91 Similarly, the Nigeria Armed Forces (NAF), several Francophone states and Southern African armed forces can be classified as a postcolonial military. The Nigerian military was seen as one of the most capable in Africa with a large (over 80,000 strong) and well-equipped army, navy and air force.92 Origins are found in the British colonial army, the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). Today, an impressive infrastructure exits including well-respected military colleges and training facilities as well as legal frameworks such as constitutional guarantees and other legal provisions. The NAF has also regularly participated in UN peacekeeping beginning with ONUC in the Congo in 1960. More recently, Nigeria has been a lead nation in ECOWAS peacekeeping missions and other AU initiatives.93 However, at the same time the military elite is part of the broader political elite, not least since the country was under military rule until the mid-nineties.94 Under military rule, corruption, nepotism, and elite divide-and-rule all developed to new extremes.95 Military rule continued under civilian guise with the election of General Obassanjo (rtd.) in 1999 and his

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subsequent re-election in 2003. Obassanjo did make some efforts to address corruption and institutionalise the military although these were largely unsuccessful.96 So, on the one hand, the NAF is seen as a professional, capable and legitimate institution, while on the other hand, a patrimonial logic is entrenched, often driven by financial and personal gain. One author sums up this system by concluding that the NAF remained essentially colonial in character and has gone through a process of reconfiguration rather than transformation.97 Furthermore, informal avenues of decision dominate, as does ethnic favouritism. Civilian institutional control bodies simply rubber-stamp army decisions and more often than not are unaware of developments.98 The recent campaign against Boko Haram militants in the north of Nigeria and the inability to conduct effective counter insurgency operations has further demonstrated some of the major issues facing the NAF. Francophone Africa also has several examples of post-colonial armed forces. This is partly due to the continued influence of France postindependence, especially in security matters in its former colonies as part of a greater Franceafrique. Regarding the military, France employed a two-pronged strategy of influencing senior security echelons: cooperation and provision.99 This included signing defence pacts with almost all its former colonies (except revolutionary Guinea) to provide training and to provide assistance in case of crisis including direct military intervention. Defence procurement was also a priority with France providing the majority of arms and equipment to these states.100 France then took on the role of external security guarantor for many of its former colonies.101 However, after French military action in Rwanda in 1994 was heavily criticised Paris became more reluctant to intervene militarily in Africa, although there have been exceptions.102 The military relationship between France and its former colonies in Africa is lengthy and one of considerable influence. Former French colonies in Africa employ French military doctrine, have adopted French ranks, French style uniforms and insignias. Perhaps most symbolic of close military relations was the Bastille Day parade in Paris in 2010 that included the militaries of 13 African former colonies.103 Up until the civil war of 2002 the Ivorian armed forces fit the mould of a colonial inherited military with France playing the external guarantor role. The Ivorian military was nurtured by France, with senior officers and technical advisers in key positions until the eighties and even

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then 68 senior officers were in influential positions in 1991.104 However, in addition to French guarantees and defence pacts, the Ivorian military was also part of broader Ivorian politics. In this sense the Ivorian military was also subject to ethnic manipulation, co-option of senior military officials into political and commercial networks and the establishment of competitive specialised units.105 Similarly, in Cameroon the military was developed out of the former colonial forces with both French and British origins, although ultimately the French military system was adopted by post-independence Cameroon. Bachman describes how the Cameroonian military was built on the French model adopting structures and doctrine with significant French support in financial resources, training and seconded French officers. Bachman also notes that the Cameroonian political system, especially under President Biya, developed the military in line with state and political realities. Biya’s development of a patrimonial political system in turn developed a patrimonial army or what Bachman terms a ‘quasiarmy’ consisting of multiple informal networks thriving under the cover of official organisation.106 Liberation/vanguard militaries tend to emerge after a civil war where one side is an outright winner and is usually a leftist revolutionary group fighting a Marxist-Leninist or Maoist protracted bush war. Liberation or vanguard militaries tend to prioritise political education and ideology, are intimately involved with the ruling party and enforce strict control and discipline. The integration of the losers at lower levels into the existing force after a lengthy process of political indoctrination is also a common feature. The leadership then is part of the political leadership and informal networks abound. Uganda and Rwanda are two examples of liberation militaries. The Ugandan Army (UPDF) is constituted from Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) that fought Idi Amin and in the overthrow of Milton Obote. The UPDF is also comprised of former combatants that were integrated into the national army and new recruits, although NRA members retain exclusive control. The NRA took power in Uganda in 1986 and began a process of re-constituting the military from scratch in order to avoid the colonial style and sectarian based army of previous regimes.107 Although several other political-military groups were integrated into the Ugandan military the NRA always retained leadership positions.108 In addition to military integration, Museveni

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prioritised political education, ideological indoctrination and control.109 The NRA campaign was a bush war and all recruits and captured combatants who were deemed appropriate were given intensive political education and re-integrated into the army.110 When the NRA took power, political education and discipline continued in the military. The development of the UPDF code of conduct was a central part of this and the UPDF continues to employ political commissars at all levels. The UPDF prides itself on being a professional and capable battlehardened force with serious operational experience in Uganda itself, DR Congo, South Sudan and peacekeeping in Somalia. At the same time informal decision-making and patronage avenues abound, especially concerning economic rewards and access to powerful or influential positions.111 As one UPDF commander told me, ‘we are still a guerrilla army and we haven’t changed.’112 Most striking has been the rapid promotion of President Museveni’s son to brigadier general within a period of five years and commander of the elite Special Forces. Rumours abound that Museveni is grooming him for a presidential handover. The Rwandan military originated from the NRA. After seizing power in Uganda, the Rwandan members of the NRA fought a second liberation war into Rwanda that culminated in the 1994 genocide before the RPA took power. The largely Tutsi RPA recognised that drastic actions were needed given they were in a minority and a decision was made to integrate large numbers of Hutu Government soldiers into the national army after a lengthy indoctrination and education process.113 The RPA approach combined institutionalising a liberation ethos into the military through integration and education as well as prioritising draconian control.114 The newly integrated army was forged together ‘through fire’115 by fighting together in the DRC, as well as by keeping the peace in several UN missions, notably in Darfur and CAR. However, senior leadership remains dominated by Tutsis born in Uganda and who fought with the NRA.116 Furthermore the military elite are part and parcel of the ruling party and exercise disproportionate power over affairs of the state. Other examples of vanguard militaries abound such as the Ethiopian military and the Eritrean army who fought successful liberation wars in the Horn. They have both prioritised political education, integration of former combatants and control and discipline and are also developing the beginnings of an institutionalised military structure as well as

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dominance of former rebel/party cadres.117 The Angolan army is a further example118 as was Tanzania under Nyerere. Integrated stalemate militaries are a third category and comprise those states emerging after a civil war where no outright winner can be discerned or at least no faction with widespread legitimacy. Regarding the military, this usually results in some form of integration package of former warring factions with some system guaranteeing representation.119 The process is extremely shaky and is typified by compromise and concessions, which can often disintegrate depending on the strength of the overarching political settlement. However, that is not to suggest that these types of militaries will fall apart as the process of compromise can also reinforce cohesion and institutionalisation in the longer term through equality and broad based legitimacy or buy in. The national defence forces of DR Congo and Burundi are both examples of an integrated stalemate force. The Congolese army, the FARDC, is comprised of several former armed groups and rebel outfits as well as some of those that made up Mobutu’s Zairian army. The FARDC is more akin to competing mafia groups then a national army. Personal fiefdoms and competing chains of command underscored by a toxic combination of ethno-regionalism pervade the FARDC.120 This reflects the broader politics in Kinshasa, and at the provincial level, which is a conglomerate of competing elite personal agendas and patrimonial networks.121 As such the FARDC is a mere shell of an army. The Burundian National Army has similarly gone through an intensive integration process after the end of the civil war in 2005, comprising the former Tutsi army and several Hutu armed groups. Burundi employed a quota system to ensure representation of Hutus and Tutsis in the army as well as massive financial support from international partners to assist the demobilisation process.122 At the same time, the Burundian peace process was accepted as broadly legitimate by key actors and the population. The Burundian military is extremely weak in terms of operational capability and still preys upon the population and in the words of one observer is ‘in need on de-politicization’.123 However at the same time it has managed to contribute significant forces for peacekeeping in Somalia. A recent failed coup attempt by elements of the Burundian army in the build-up to presidential elections in July 2015 further demonstrates the shakiness of these types of defence forces.

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The Zimbabwean Defence Force,124 Mozambican Armed Forces,125 the Sierra Leone military and Liberian military126 have all been developed by integrating former warring factions after prolonged conflict, and reflect the specific broader political systems. Most recently the Somali National Army from 2007, the Ivorian Army post-2010 and the SPLA/South Sudanese army since independence are also stalemate forces involving the cobbling together of former combatants and armed groups into one force. Institutionalised and civilian controlled militaries are the final category of African armed forces. These militaries find their origins in one of the above categories, be it from a post-colonial, liberation or stalemate force. Institutionalised militaries may well be subject to forms of patrimonialism in terms of recruitment, promotion and decisionmaking but there are established processes and mechanisms in place to balance or at least counter informal networks. Most importantly civilian institutions play a crucial oversight and scrutiny role. Decisions are made by ministers in line with relevant government institutions such as a national security council or presidential security advisory board. Crucially, all military activity is subject to parliamentary scrutiny. In addition, civil society plays a scrutiny role and the media regularly reports on national military activity. Although arguably starting off as a post-colonial military and then an integrated stalemate military in the immediate aftermath of Apartheid, the South African armed forces can be categorised as an institutionalised military under civilian control. The SANDF has been developed since the end of Apartheid, comprising the former white South African Defence Force (SADF), the ANC’s armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), and other South African liberation forces. The SANDF adopted the industrial military infrastructure of the Apartheid regime and successfully incorporated the liberation forces into it structures. The SANDF therefore reflects the broader political settlement in South Africa and the democratic foundations of the state. Concerns remain about the future of the SANDF, especially in terms of high-level corruption, favouritism and what effect HIV will have on the rank and file.127 But at the same time parliament has complete oversight of the SANDF, the minister of defence has accepted authority and an established chain of command exits and is respected. In addition public debate about the military is abundant through regular and open media

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reporting and public documents such as defence white papers. Although there are several shortcomings of the new SANDF, especially in terms of operational capability there can be no doubt that the South African military is a functioning and integrated armed force.128 The Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) can also be classified as institutionalised. The history of the GAF demonstrates the cycles of military development. The Ghana army, much like Nigeria, finds it origins in the British colonial forces of the WAFF.129 After independence the military continued a post-colonial military culture resulting in successive coups beginning with a ‘Sandhurst minded’ group of officers in 1966.130 The 1979 Acheampong coup entrenched a system of predatory and patrimonial rule leading to severe mismanagement and endemic corruption.131 In 1979 Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings staged his own coup with other junior officers and his revolutionary council and instigated a process of ‘house cleansing’ including executions of senior figures.132 Rawlings came to power with a revolutionary agenda within the constraints of a post-colonial military structure and recognised the need for reform. With the ’79 coup came the beginning of military development although the process was fraught with difficulties and interruptions.133 After Rawlings launched a second coup in 1981 he began an assault on the officer corps and sought to fundamentally restructure the military.134 Hutchful describes the first phase as a politicised democratic military or an institutional revolution with a closer bond built between the military and society as well as accountability and control;135 much like liberation force structure outlined above. Armed Forces Defence Committees were the method of governance reporting to the National Defence Council and the most ‘politically conscious’ officers sent for ideological training. From 1984 to 1987 came the re-professionalisation phase. AFDC’s and revolutionary structures were de-radicalised becoming consultative and advisory bodies. Discipline continued to be prioritised. However, at the same time ethnic divisions remained with a disproportionate number of Ewe officers, Rawlings’ own ethnic group. To counter ethnic divisions, officers were rapidly rotated in key posts and commands and UN peacekeeping became an attractive option to placate possible dissenting voices as well as provide avenues for extra training, operational experience and financial gain. Hutchful goes as far to suggest that UN peacekeeping was so economically lucrative that it subsidised the Ghanaian MoD.136

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The final phase of institutionalisation came in the early nineties moving hand in hand with broader political liberalisation of the Ghanaian state. By 1992 Ghana had returned to civilian rule with a new constitution and one that provided for the separation of the military from politics and for parliamentary oversight. The Defence Review, establishment of the Defence Administration Committee and Defence Staff Committee were crucial early steps. Today the GAF has established a comprehensive infrastructure and maintains a small but well equipped army, suited for national defence and international peacekeeping.137 Most importantly, the GAF is a civilian controlled and institutionalised force with legal frameworks, structures and policies that are enforced. Tanzania is a further example of an institutionalised military that found its origins in a liberation/vanguard force, although the TPDF never fought a liberation war. After the 1964 mutiny President Nyerere decided to reconstitute the military into an institution of the people.138 He prioritised political education and revolutionary indoctrination for all new recruits. Furthermore, all recruits were to come from the ruling party structures.139 In addition, foreign military assistance in equipment, training and advisers were sought from the eastern bloc states of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia as well as China. Political liberalisation and multipartyism in Tanzania ushered in a new era for the TPDF as a depoliticised institution under civilian control. In categorising African armed forces into post-colonial, liberation, stalemate and institutionalised there are many important differences in origins, experiences, ideologies and trajectories of militaries on the continent. However, there are also remarkable similarities. The above typology suggests that African armed forces all share patrimonial tendencies to varying degrees, seek to placate competing horizontal and vertical interests and pressures, accept significant assistance from outside and seek to become a modern and professional force. These issues however, are shaped by the nature of the state in question and its sociopolitical dynamics. In summary, therefore, both the exogenous origins of the military and the contextual environment shape the African military elite. However, it is essential to understand the socialisation of the officer corps as well as organisational structures and the nature of national politics to establish what determines ethos and behaviour.140 In assessing the officer corps Nordlinger highlights key sociological factors defining group dynamics:

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class structure, social status, cultural patterns, socialisation experiences, organisational patterns and economic issues.141 It is through socialisation that exogenous pressures meet with endogenous context. Gutteridge suggests that age, rank, experience and training are the factors that shape an officer’s behaviour and outlook during social transactions within a group of senior officers.142 Luckham’s seminal study of the Nigerian military is perhaps the most illuminating on conditions of African military officers. Concerning the Majors’ coup in 1966 Luckham states that tribal and regional ties in motivations were important but never entirely superseded organisational realities.143 Cohesion between peers forged through socialisation activities such as training in the same cohort at military academies (in this case Sandhurst), experiences in external/regional deployments (in this case peacekeeping in the Congo and service in Burma and India) and ‘mess life’ create the right conditions for the formation of peer group associations.144 Peer groups forged through socialisation underscored by local issues such as ethnicity or region are the key sources of cleavage and cohesion and therefore the most important factor shaping the ideology and values of African military elites.

Conclusion In analysing the processes of regional integration in Africa, Pan-Africanist rhetoric has been the driving force. However, the implementation of these processes follows some of the features of neo-functionalist integration theory, notably spillover and elite socialisation. The need to share efforts in order to provide needs that states cannot meet alone characterises Africa’s growing integration, especially in security cooperation. Peacekeeping and developing peacekeeping capacity through training can be seen as the spillover of conflict management initiatives (mirroring the spillover of conflict one might add145) necessitating joint action amongst states. In doing so military officers have been thrust into the integration process as key decision-makers in peacekeeping operations and training centres. Furthermore peacekeeping training centres and the experiences of soldiers, either as instructors or as students, provides an environment for socialisation to take place. The centres are also some of the few environments specifically promoting a Pan-African ethos aimed at senior officers from several different countries in the same cohort.

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It has been postulated that African military officers fluctuate between modernisers and traditionalists, reflecting the imposition of foreign organisational structures, as well as indigenous societal realities and pressures facing them. Navigating this dichotomy, military officers adapt their environments to exogenous and endogenous pressures and in doing so ‘re-traditionalise’ imported values and concepts, which may carry sociological contradictions.146 In the case of peacekeeping training centres it is how military officers interpret and implement their experiences, both formally and informally and consciously and subconsciously, that can help understand the dynamics of Africa’s integration in peacekeeping and conflict management. The unanswered question remains whether these experiences and functions of peacekeeping training are used for their intended outward looking role or whether they are used to further placate more inward looking dynamics. Outward focused values concern improved AU peacekeeping, the institutionalising of effective regional cooperation and would include increased commitment to the AU and observance of recognised international norms or improving, reforming and integrating. Inward focused values reflect the nature of indigenous societal pressures such as the promoting of nationalism, experience for promotion in rank in the national army and the continuum of neo-patrimonial networks or as one author puts it ‘the patronage, per diems and workshop mentality’.147 In order to assess and determine to what extent the centres act as more outward agents of regional integration or as a resource for inward focused realities, this study focuses on a detailed examination of several case studies. What follows is an analysis of four regional peacekeeping training centres, their explicit (and implicit) missions and aims, command and control hierarchy, the content and delivery of the training and courses provided, and analysis of their participants (students and trainers). Students are tracked to see how training is used and implemented. An assessment of AU peacekeeping in relation to relevant training received (and that is needed) is provided. An examination into the development and effectiveness of these centres and how training and experiences are perceived, adopted and implemented is the focus of the rest of this study.

CHAPTER 2 PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA: TASKS AND ACTIVITIES FROM UN AND AU PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Introduction Peace Support Operations or PSO has come to mean a variety of types of conflict resolution responses to a variety of crises. PSOs include mediation efforts under the auspices of an international body, peacekeeping missions (be they classical observer or peace enforcement missions), post-conflict reconstruction and civilian peacebuilding missions that seek to address development and stabilisation priorities as military operations come to an end.1 The AU and African states really only have capability in peacekeeping,2 although ambitious plans for conflict resolution are being developed under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). APSA comprises the Peace and Security Council of the AU, the Panel of the Wise, the AU Peace Fund, a Continental Early Warning System and the African Standby Force. Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms are also part of the APSA, although their role is somewhat unclear apart from co-ordinating regional efforts. Mediation activities tend to be of an extremely high level, such as heads or former heads of state. In addition the AU and African states have almost no capability in post-conflict reconstruction given the vast financial and other resources needed for such operations. The APSA then is less a structured institution for

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dealing with the continent’s ills and more aptly described as a complex set of interrelated institutions and mechanisms that function at continental, regional and national levels.3 Furthermore, the AU spends more time on extinguishing crises than on conflict prevention.4 The AU and African states have a great deal of capability in peacekeeping, whatever form that takes. AU peacekeeping missions have deployed to a number of different hotspots including Burundi, Comoros islands, Darfur and Somalia as well as the on-going development of the ASF and its regional standby arrangements. Peacekeeping training centres seek to improve this capability. What follows is an investigation into peacekeeping tasks in Africa informed by several case studies covering a range of PSOs in Africa. This is not an in-depth assessment or exhaustive catalogue of PSO tasks. Rather this chapter seeks to illuminate the range of environments peace operations deploy to and activities a peacekeeping mission may have to undertake with commonalities identified.

Peacekeeping in Africa Peacekeeping operations have been consistently deployed to Africa since the early 1960s and have evolved from purely observer and monitoring missions into much more complicated and multidimensional operations with military, civilian and police components. The post-Cold War period saw the UN play a much more proactive role in global conflict situations and UN peacekeeping was seen as a way of promoting and encouraging liberal international peacebuilding to take hold.5 However, UN peacekeeping debacles in Somalia, Rwanda and Yugoslavia forced a rethink of UN operations and how to improve them. New concepts in peacekeeping were developed and promulgated by the UN that built upon the previous pillars of neutrality, non-use of violence and consent. Documents like the Brahimi Report6 and the Capstone doctrine7 ushered in a new era of peacekeeping. Missions would now address causes of conflict, be more proactive militarily and try to assist longer-term development and state-building goals. Missions would consist of a substantial military component but equally important civilian and police capabilities. These much more complicated operations involve a variety of interdependent activities in order to achieve, or at least attempt to achieve, the criteria of the mandate.

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Mandates of contemporary peace operations typically involve monitoring and reporting violations of peace agreements (including human rights abuses), protection of civilians, support to national stabilisation plans, assisting the delivery of humanitarian access and protection of staff and installations of the mission. Mandates of complicated missions can involve other areas or be expanded in the course of the mission to include advisory and assistance roles in developing fledgling institutions, such as assisting in the creation of a human rights commission or developing judicial capability. Other mandated tasks may well include Security Sector Reform (SSR), especially training, mentoring and joint operations; Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) and variants; child protection and even support to elections. In terms of specific activities, contemporary peacekeeping involves a variety of cross cutting and interdependent tasks. What follows is an overview of four peace support operations with a view to determining common tasks and activities. The case studies chosen are (i) a UN standalone mission, (ii) an AU/UN Hybrid mission, (iii) a stand-alone AU mission and (iv) the AU’s regional reactive peacekeeping capability still in development. These missions represent the diversity of current peacekeeping operations in Africa in terms of concept, organisational deployment, tasks and activities and expected outcomes. Furthermore all these missions fall under the remit of regional peacekeeping training centres.

(i) MONUC/MONUSCO: The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Congo MONUC was established in the years after the Rwandan genocide and after the two Congo Wars. After the genocide in Rwanda and the success of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in seizing state power, several million ethnic Hutu refugees, including the former genocidal regime, fled Rwanda into neighbouring states. Of these, around 1.2 million refugees fled into eastern Zaire (now the DRC) and were housed in refugee camps on the border with Rwanda.8 Within these camps in eastern Zaire the former genocidal regime re-organised itself along former bureaucratic and governance lines with the aim of eventually returning to Rwanda by force.9 These militarised refugees conducted

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border raids back into Rwanda creating a sizeable security threat for the RPF in Kigali.10 At the same time, President Mobutu of Zaire, the aging dictator who had been in power for over thirty years, was facing significant challenges domestically. Zaire was teetering on the brink of collapse.11 Mobutu saw the growing refugee crisis in the east as a possible last throw of the dice to stay in power. Since coming to power, Mobutu had systematically eroded Zaire’s institutions and private sector.12 Patrimonialism and divide-and-rule was how Mobutu governed, playing individuals, communities and institutions against each other to maintain executive power. Mobutu provided sanctuary for these refugees and made no attempt to separate civilians from combatants and actively aided the reorganisation of the former Rwandan army (FAR) and its supporting militias such as the Interahamwe who were responsible for carrying out the genocide in Rwanda.13 The new RPF Government and its allies would not put up with Mobutu’s manipulations, especially if armed attacks and border raids continued into Rwanda from Zairian soil. And so began the Congo Wars. Rwanda and Uganda with support from regional states launched a proxy war against Mobutu. Kigali and Kampala did not want to be seen as instigators of a regional war and recruited Congolese rebels, many of whom were ethnic Tutsis, much like the leadership in Rwanda and to a lesser extent Uganda. Laurent Desire Kabila was headhunted by the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to lead the rebellion under the banner of the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour le Libe´ration (AFDL). Kabila’s forces, with significant financial and military support from Rwanda, Uganda and Angola were considerably more capable than Mobutu’s ragtag army. Even the presidential guard, the best of Zaire’s security agencies, was no match for the eastern rebels. The AFDL gained ground quickly and what began as an attempt to create a buffer zone in the east rapidly evolved into a full-blown revolution, not least because Zaire itself was imploding. Within months the rebels had taken Kinshasa and Kabila became President of a newly named Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1996. The second Congo War was not so straightforward.14 On taking power Kabila instigated an authoritarian pseudo-Maoist dictatorship under a one party state. Most importantly Kabila turned against his

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former backers in Rwanda and Uganda and manipulated the Rwandan Hutu refugees in eastern Congo. Rwanda and Uganda were understandably incensed. The man they had propelled from obscurity to State House in Congo was biting the hand that fed him. In 1997 the Rwandan and Ugandan military invaded DRC and used proxy forces once more as a semblance of cover. The Rwandan backed RCD and Ugandan backed Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC) were two of the prominent ‘Congolese’ groups. Kabila looked south for help and was assisted by Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean forces under the SADC. At other points nine countries were involved in the war and a swathe of militias and proxy forces. Armed groups mushroomed that included foreign armed groups supported by neighbours such as the Rassemblement Congolais pour la De´mocratie (RCD), local defence groups trying to defend their community such as Mai Mai and refugee armed groups such as the Forces De´mocratiques de Libe´ration du Rwanda (FDLR). A nasty stalemate ensued. No easy quick win but a long drawn out conflict becoming more brutal and immersed in local politics as it went on. Civilians bore the brunt of the violence.15 Furthermore armed groups as well as the national army began to sustain itself through economic activities such as control of mining areas, the regional charcoal trade and taxing locals through road blocs. At the same time governance and effective administration disappeared in Congo and were effectively replaced by fiefdoms or pockets of control, be it in urban or rural areas. The response by the AU, EU and UN was to draw up some form of peace settlement and ceasefire agreement between the warring factions. The Lusaka Peace Agreement was signed in 1999 and presented a road map for a future Congo Government. Lusaka provided for negotiations to form a government of national unity in the prelude to national elections. The process was dubbed the Inter Congolese Dialogue (ICD). The agreement also stipulated the withdrawal of foreign forces and the integration of Congolese armed groups into a new national army. In addition Lusaka called for a UN peacekeeping mission to monitor, observe and investigate the ceasefire, assist in disarmament and aid humanitarian access to affected populations. Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and his son Joseph Kabila became President. The war officially ended in 2003 after the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops from DRC.

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In 2006 Kabila won presidential elections that were financed entirely by the international community and logistically supported by the UN operation, MONUC. The opposition candidate was sent to the ICC in the Hague. In the east of the country low intensity conflict has continued. Since then Congolese and foreign armed groups have operated with impunity and have been supported from Kinshasa and neighbouring states. Various attempts have been made to integrate and disarm rebel factions but these have been paper thin and resulted mainly in the swapping of uniforms while command and control and parallel chains of command continue to exist. Regional relations have been turbulent with periods of de´tente and rapprochement as well as open hostility between Kigali, Kampala and Kinshasa.

MONUCs Initial Deployment: 1999– 2002 MONUC’s initial deployment consisted of around 500 Military Observers (MILOBS) sent to monitor the Lusaka Peace Agreement under a Chapter VI mandate in 1999.16 The mission was to perform a monitoring and liaison function to facilitate the removal of foreign forces from the DRC and to assist in the demobilisation and integration into the national army of armed groups. It was to assist humanitarian actors trying to provide relief items to communities in desperate need such as refugee and IDP camps.17 The mission was deployed along the lines of classical peacekeeping. A year later the UN Security Council extended and expanded the mission. The mission received a more ‘robust’ mandate under UN provisions. In particular, MONUC was to deploy under a Chapter VII mandate allowing the use of all necessary means, including the use of force, in carrying out its mandate. To achieve this mandate MONUC was equipped with over 5000 troops and a sizeable civilian staff comprising political advisers, human rights investigators, civil affairs officers, public information teams, child protection specialists and an administrative department. MONUC was now authorised to monitor the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations, liaise with all parties, develop an action plan for the development of the ceasefire agreement to include demobilisation, monitor weapon flows, coordinate UN agencies and to deploy de-mining experts. In addition, the mission was instructed to protect UN installations and personnel and to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence.18 However, MONUC’s main focus was the overseeing

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and implementation of the Lusaka Peace agreement with other issues such as civilian protection a secondary priority. It wasn’t until the war officially ended that MONUC expanded into the biggest peacekeeping mission in the world.

Robust Multidimensional Peacekeeping: 2003 – 2009 Post-2003 MONUC took on a much bigger role with a larger workforce that continued to swell. The mission could no longer monitor a peace agreement that had come to an end. At the same time, leaving was not an option as a plethora of armed groups still operated and violence continued unabated. In addition the Congolese state and its security organs could not administer nor protect its subjects in the eastern provinces. MONUC was authorised to bridge this gap. The mission was now mandated to assist in the reform of the security services, assist the re-establishment of state authority based on the rule of law, prepare for the 2006 national elections, support police reform, address violence against women, assist demobilisation and disarmament and of course assist in humanitarian access and protect UN staff, installations and civilians. This was new territory for UN peacekeeping having previously been limited to monitoring and investigative functions. Now the peacekeeping operation was being asked to perform a multitude of complicated tasks that included not only monitoring and investigating but also military and police training, development of local and national governance structures, human rights reporting and legal assistance. To do this, the mission was given just over 10,000 troops and civilian personnel in 2004.19 By 2008 MONUC consisted of just under 20,000 troops20 with a budget of USD$1.3 billion a year making it the largest peacekeeping operation globally. The MONUC mandate now prioritised protection of civilians and the training and mentoring of the newly constituted Congolese Army, the FARDC, made up of integrated state and non-state combatants who had agreed to disarm under the Nairobi and Goma Accords of 2008. SSR and DDR were part of the tools to achieve the development of state authority in the east. Stabilisation: 2010– present In 2010 a new phase for the peacekeeping mission in Congo emphasised an end to open conflict and the consolidation of peace termed ‘stabilisation’. The mission was rebranded MONUSCO to

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reflect the stabilisation focus although in practice little changed on the ground in terms of the operating environment and the mission’s activities. Protection of civilians remained the priority as well as support to building the Congolese state, reforming the security sector and forty other tasks revolving around ‘post-conflict reconstruction’.21 Importantly MONUSCO was mandated to develop a comprehensive stabilisation strategy for the future of eastern Congo. The strategy known initially as the UN Security and Support Strategy (UNSSS) quickly turned into the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (I4S). The Congolese Government developed its own stabilisation strategy known as the Stabilisation and Recovery Strategy or STAREC. MONUSCO’s I4S sought to address four interdependent areas; political; security; restoration of state authority and the return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs.22 Improving security is an understandable precondition for economic development of any sort. MONUSCO was authorised to strengthen the Congolese security forces through training, mentoring internal systems and logistical support as well as through the disbanding of armed groups. Demobilisation or integration into the national army were the chosen tools to do this. In order to support political processes MONUSCO was instructed to improve diplomatic relations between the DRC and key neighbouring countries as well as identify and sanction spoilers, serious human rights abusers and those involved in sexual violence, child recruitment, illicit trafficking of natural resources and breaking the arms embargo. Finally, I4S sought to restore and strengthen the state in areas where it has been weak or nonexistent by ensuring reliable road access beginning with six important axis routes in the Kivus and Orientale; deploying police, courts and prisons and re-establishing decentralised administrative services.23 However, due to increased activity by several armed groups, most notably by the Rwandan backed Congre`s National pour la De´fense du Peuple (CNDP), and on-going conflict in the eastern provinces stabilisation activities have failed to make any real impact on the ground.24 Most recently in 2013 MONUSCO took peacekeeping a step further once more. In late 2012 a small rebellion occurred instigated by an armed group known as the M23 that quickly escalated into successive skirmishes with the potential for another long drawn out insurgency. Rwanda and Uganda were accused of supporting the M23, which they

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vehemently denied. The UNSC authorised an offensive intervention brigade (FIB) to hunt down the M23 and other armed groups. This was new ground for the UN and was more akin to ‘war fighting’. After several months of targeted operations the FIB, made up of South African, Tanzanian and Malawian troops, successfully defeated the M23.

Structure and Organisation MONUC/MONUSCO is structured as a UN multidimensional peacekeeping mission. It is under civilian control and has clear roles for civilians, military personnel and police officers (see Figure 2.1). The head of the mission is the Special Representative for the Security Council (SRSG), typically an experienced UN staff member or a veteran diplomat with experience in the issues affecting MONUC/MONUSCO. The SRSG is supported by two deputies, one of whom is the resident humanitarian coordinator and the liaison with other UN agencies such as the UN country Teams, UNHCR, OHCHR etc. The SRSG and DSRSG’s oversee the civilian departments. The Force Commander oversees the military component and the Police Commissioner oversees the Police Component. MONUSCO’s military component makes up the bulk of the mission. The mission has over 20,000 uniformed personnel from nearly 50 nations although the majority of troops are provided by India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Morocco, Nepal, Uruguay and South Africa.25 Most of these are troops stationed in specific sectors under national command. These national contingents are the elements that conduct day-to-day patrols and other tactical military functions. In addition to national contingents military officers are seconded to specific managerial positions at various levels and in various other functions. Traditional military roles include the Force Commander, Deputy Force Commander, Divisional Commander, Sector Commander Contingent Commander, Head Quarter Staff Officers (G1-9), Civil-Military Coordinators (CIMIC) and MILOBs. Other positions in MONUSCO have come to include military personnel too such as DDR/RR Officers, Liaison Officers, military trainers and SSR officers. MONUSCO’s civilian component comprises an array of areas and number just under 1000 personnel.26 These individuals are specialists in their own thematic area and are usually UN diplomats/staff who have worked within the UN system and typically spend their careers working

COS DCOS

Joint Mission Analysis Cell

Security Sector Reform

Sexual Gender Based Violence

Child Protection Section

HIV/AIDS

Military Observers

Military Contingents

Mine Action Liaison Unit

Security and Safety Section

DDR/RR

Mission and Sector HQ

Forward Force HQ

Civil Affairs Office

Electoral Assistance Division

Office of the Force Commander

Division of Mission Support

Legal Advisor Section

Joint Operations Center

Conduct and Discipline Unit

External and Provincial Offices, Eastern Coordination Office

Integrated Office United Nations specialised Agencies, Funds and Progammes

MONUC Organisational Structure 2009/10.27

Gender

Human Rights

Figure 2.1

Rule of Law

Office of the Police Com.

Office of the DSRSG (Rule of Law)

Office of the DSRSG (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian)

SRSG

Political Affairs Division

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Office of Public Information

MONUC ORGANISATIONAL CHART

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in UN peacekeeping missions in some civilian capacity. Positions include Political Affairs Officers, Human Rights investigators, Rule of Law officers, Civil Affairs Officers, Child Protection Officers, DDR/RR Officers, SSR Officers, Gender Officers and admin staff. The mission itself is under civilian control with authority residing in the SRSG position supported by two deputies. The police component is the third pillar in the mission and comprises nearly 1,500 police officers drawn from 24 countries.28 The police commissioner is the highest police position in the mission and oversees all police activities. This includes police seconded to Head Quarters and Formed Police Units that are deployed in support of the mission.

Activities and Tasks In looking at the succession of MONUC/MONUSCO mandates some general tasks and activities can be discerned. Monitoring, Investigating and Project Management A core function of the mission is monitoring and investigative capabilities. Military, civilian and police components must first and foremost be able to assess, assist and oversee aspects of various peace agreements. All of the mission’s mandates state that MONUC/ MONUSCO must investigate and monitor issues such as ceasefire agreements, demobilisation of combatants, armed group activity, human rights abuses, arms embargo violation and illicit revenues from natural resource extraction. In order to achieve certain aspects of the mandate, MONUSCO’s staff must be able to successfully manage projects under the auspices of the mission, much like departments within an NGO. DDR/RR is a good example; MONUSCO’s Demobilisation and Reintegration section is but one of many departments. The DDR/RR Section of MONUSCO was set up based on two operational components. The first is the DDR/RR that deals with illegal foreign armed groups in the DR Congo, including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and National Front for Liberation – Burundi (FNL). The second is the DDR section, which focuses on the Congolese armed groups, including the residual elements of the Congolese civil war.29 DDR/RR aims to reduce the number of combatants in armed groups by providing them with

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amnesties, social support and possible avenues to go back to their homes either in the DRC or neighbouring states with incentives such as a job or vocational training opportunities. The process involves three broad phases. The DDR/RR team working with the military component are escorted into rebel controlled territory to forge contacts, disseminate leaflets and encourage defections. Combatants willing to defect are taken to demobilisation sites and from there to demobilisation camps where they spend three days before being sent to their respective destinations.30 The DDR/RR department must therefore develop a comprehensive technical system to achieve this including monitoring and evaluation strategies. In addition, and equally important, sound knowledge of the local political and security landscape in eastern DRC and the region is essential as well as the ability to forge and foster essential contacts with a host of local actors including the armed groups themselves and regional governments. DDR/RR teams must therefore comprise individuals with a range of skills including military officers and civilian specialists.

Military Activities – Operations, Training, Planning The mission is mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat using all force necessary. To achieve this MONUC/MONUSCO has conducted several military operations against armed groups in eastern Congo. Since 2009 MONUC has conducted joint operations with the Congolese national army and has provided planning and logistical support to the FARDC. In addition to the offensive operations MONUC/MONUSCO’s presence alone can provide a deterrent through regular patrols along key infrastructure axis and urban areas. Most recently in 2013 the mission has actively hunted and targeted armed groups after a surge in violence. Training is a second military activity. The mission has been tasked with supporting the reform of the security sector and improving the capability of the Congolese military. MONUC/MONUSCO must therefore design and implement training packages in soldiering and staff officer skills for the FARDC. At the same time several other actors are involved in SSR and military training, presenting challenges in coordination and duplication of effort. Planning is a further task for the military component. The mission headquarters is staffed with military officers and plans all military operations.

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Other tasks for the military are to support civilian offices and other departments of the mission. Military officers can be found in DDR/RR teams and SSR teams. They assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid through securing important roads and by providing armed escorts. Ad hoc activities such as Joint Protection Teams that MONUC employed to improve its ability to respond to violence also include military officers. Providing protection to UN staff and installations are also military priorities with implications for planning.

Civilian Activities – Liaising and advising Civilians in MONUSCO make up over a thousand personnel covering a variety of sections and roles. Civilians include not only the senior managers of the mission but also political advisers, humanitarian staff, civil affairs teams and other stand-alone sections. Non-uniformed staff are also part of DDR teams, SSR teams and Joint Protection Teams as part of a multidimensional approach working closely with military and police counterparts. Civilians do not fall under the same chain of command in MONUSCO providing further challenges around coordination and collaboration and turf wars abound.31 Civilians are specialists in specific fields and provide advice to relevant bodies. Central tasks therefore involve a great deal of collaboration between various civilian offices. Departments must collaborate with each other in order to achieve the mandates requirements. Liaising extends beyond the mission as MONUSCO is tasked with supporting the re-establishment of state authority in Congo’s eastern provinces. Civilian staff must therefore not only collaborate with the Congolese Government but also with non-state actors such as armed groups and local civil society for most activities. This also necessitates a keen understanding of the political dynamics, individuals and structural drivers of the Congolese conflict and how these dynamics interact using the ability to negotiate and build trust with a variety of individuals. Policing Activities – protecting the mission and training/mentoring MONUC/MONUSCO’s police component plays an advisory/training role as well as providing security tasks. MONUC/MONUSCO’s police officers are tasked with assisting in the reform of the Congolese National Police (PNC) through providing training packages and mentoring,

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much like the military component supports the FARDC. Police must therefore work closely with their Congolese counterparts and assist in the development of a national reform strategy with others partners. Planning, liaising and mentoring are all key aspects of the police role. Furthermore MONUSCO’s Formed Police Units provide security for UN installations in DRC. A last task is assisting the electoral process by providing capability in areas such as VIP escorting and crowd control.

(ii) UNAMID: The United Nations and African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur In 2003 conflict erupted into violence in the Darfur region of Sudan.32 The region has been historically marginalised by the government of Sudan, much like the South of the country which itself was fighting a brutal and lengthy civil war with Khartoum. In Darfur the two most prominent rebel groups were the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) who launched a military campaign against Khartoum. In response, the Government of Sudan used proxy militias to combat the Dafuri rebels mainly in the form of arming and supporting nomadic Arab groups in Darfur. These marauding men on horseback are commonly known as the Janjaweed. In addition the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) not only provided arms but logistical and financial support and even military support to the extent of following up raids by Janjaweed militias with aerial bombardments. Violence escalated across Darfur with civilians specifically targeted by Janjaweed militias and Khartoum. Violence was typified by mass killings, rape, looting and abductions. Militias would ransack entire villages in order to destabilise Darfur so that rebel groups could not count on local support or create safe havens. Violence was so intense and polarised that many observers claimed that genocide was being perpetrated by an Arab state against a predominately black African population, much like perceived dynamics of the larger NorthSouth conflict between Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). An entire global advocacy movement and spin offs mushroomed with all the trappings of celebrity endorsements. The Save Darfur campaign and others such as 24 Hours for Darfur endorsed by individuals such as Mia Farrow and George Clooney did much to bring

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the situation to sustained international attention, albeit through a very specific lens. By 2004 international attention was firmly on Darfur and specifically on the role of President Bashir to the extent that an international arrest warrant was issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity. On the ground in Darfur a stalemate ensued. Janjaweed militias and their SAF patrons had managed to disrupt support networks and lead a scorched earth strategy in areas of operation but JEM and SLA/M rebels were still active and were not significantly weakened although splits within the Darfuri groups began to emerge. Darfuri civilians however were disrupted. Infrastructure in Darfur was decimated. The social fabric of Darfuri society was destroyed and a serious humanitarian disaster continued unabated. A ceasefire was signed in N’djamena in Chad in 2004, brokered by Chadian president Idriss Deby. The Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement stipulated that all parties should refrain from recruiting, conducting military operations, expanding areas of control, laying landmines, supplying and purchasing arms and ammunition, violence against civilians, sabotage and allow the free movement of goods and persons, stopping propaganda and military activities.33 In support of this a Joint Commission and a Cease-Fire Commission were appointed and an African Union peacekeeping mission was authorised. AMIS was deployed to Darfur in October 2004. The mission’s mandate was extremely broad given its resources. AMIS was mandated to monitor and observe compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April which tried to address security, humanitarian and political concerns. Tasks were predominately to observe and report ceasefire violations including to monitor and verify the provision of security for returning IDPs; monitor and verify the cessation of all hostile acts by all the parties; monitor and verify hostile militia activities against the population; monitor and verify efforts of the Government of Sudan to disarm militias; investigate and report about allegations of violations of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and to protect civilians in its vicinity. Crucially the protection of the civilian population remained the responsibility of the Government of Sudan. AMIS was also instructed to assist humanitarian access and relief operations through proactive military patrols and escorts as well as a range of monitoring and liaising activities.

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In order to carry out these tasks AMIS initially comprised only 150 Rwandan peacekeepers in an area the size of France. The AU decided to double its efforts, and a further 150 soldiers, this time from Nigeria were deployed to Darfur. In 2005 given that little had been achieved and violence continued AMIS was beefed up to 600 troops, then 3,300 and finally 7,000. However even with this rise in troop numbers the mission was still incapable of creating a stable environment for negotiations with some observers questioning whether there was indeed a peace to keep and even if there was would the AU be able to keep it given its shortcoming in logistics, resources and experience in peacekeeping.34 Others similarly suggest that AMIS failed due to the restrictive and limited mandate, lack of will by Khartoum and the rebels, a lack of logistics and AU internal divisions.35 A combination of factors were highly problematic for AMIS such as the lack of infrastructure, slow mobilisation of forces for AMIS, lack of UN involvement and contribution and poor information gathering capability and operational analysis.36 As AMIS slowly deployed and expanded over a period of several years the situation on the ground continued to deteriorate. Dafuri rebels fractured into smaller groups while Khartoum stepped up its military campaign. Khartoum was already negotiating the end of the civil war with the South with the signing of the comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. In 2006 the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in Abuja between the Government of Sudan, JEM and the Abdul Wahid al Nur faction of the SLA. The DPA was intended to provide the basis of a lasting and inclusive framework for peace negotiations and the future of Dafur more broadly. Provisions were all encompassing. Wealth sharing measures were prioritised such as a basket fund of USD$300 million for provincial reconstruction activities and commissions (such as for IDPs and refugee returns). Power sharing was the second pillar of the DPA, which aimed to create a more inclusive and representative system of local government. There were quotas for ethnic and political affiliations as well as provisions for Darfuri representation in Khartoum and even one of the deputy presidents of Sudan. The final pillar revolved around security. The DPA’s security provisions sought to create an enabling environment for the necessary political negotiations and humanitarian relief effort. The DPA provided for a comprehensive ceasefire and stipulated that all armed groups should

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return home. Demilitarised areas and buffer zones were established as were humanitarian supply routes. Disarmament of armed groups was part of the DPA as was the provision for integrating around 4,000 combatants into the national army as well as allocation of senior positions.

Mandate and Deployment of UNAMID The tasks and activities outlined in the DPA were far too broad and complicated for the African Union to undertake alone. The AU had no capability for complex and multidimensional peace operations with all the trimmings of military, police and civilian components nor any ability to support these forces in theatres of operations given the lack of logistics and other important support resources. Furthermore President Bashir refused to allow a UN mission to deploy in Darfur and would only accept a mission predominately African in character. The combination of manipulations by the host nation and lack of AU capability in peacekeeping led to the authorisation of the United Nations and African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur in 2007 under UNSCR 1769. This hybrid mission was mandated to support the implementation of the DPA, which meant assisting the three pillars of wealth sharing, power sharing and security. Protection of civilians and protection of UNAMID personnel and installations were also core tasks. The first mandate also recognised that a military solution was not possible and that only a political solution could achieve any form of peace as well as reaffirming the sovereignty of the Government of Sudan. The role of UNAMID then was to create an environment where all parties could sit down and discuss solutions to various grievances with a pen rather than a sword but also to play an advisory and investigative role. To do this UNAMID was authorised to deploy 19,555 military personnel (including MILOBS), an appropriate civilian capability (although numbers are not specified), 3,772 police officers and 19 Formed Police Units (consisting of 140 officers in each).37 AMIS forces would be subsumed into UNAMID accounting for some of the troop numbers. After several years of various stages of conflict, still no real progress had been achieved with the DPA. The Government of Sudan had failed to disarm the Janjaweed and SAF were still supporting their operations. Darfuri rebel groups continued their armed struggle but

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also fractured into different wings calling into question the validity of the out-dated peace agreements. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) deal was signed to try and forge some resolution building on the DPA with the added provisions for justice and reconciliation and human rights and fundamental freedoms, all with an ambitious implementation timetable. UNAMID tasks became more detailed in successive Security Council resolutions as well. By 2011 UNAMID was tasked with protection of civilians, assisting humanitarian access, liaising with other UN offices in the region and complementing and assisting the political processes of the DPA and Doha.38 UNAMID mandates also provided some detail for military activities and urged the mission to conduct regular patrols to monitor and investigate violations of the agreements, be proactive in deployments and operations, provide security in IDP camps, develop an early warning strategy and provide escorts and develop critical infrastructure for humanitarian access.39

UNAMID Structure UNAMID is unique in peacekeeping operations in that there are two authorising bodies. As the first ever ‘hybrid’ mission UNAMID is governed and affiliated in equal share with both the UN and AU. This hybrid approach is due mainly to the request of the Government of Sudan. The result is a recognisable structure but one that combines both UN and AU elements. Instead of an SRSG there is a Joint Special Representative (JSR) and logos of both international organisations are mandatory. The head of the mission is the JSR, supported by a deputy JSR. Both are civilian positions for senior African diplomats or international organisation bureaucrats. The DJSR is also responsible for the coordination of humanitarian activities within Darfur and in this capacity must work with the DSRSG of UNMISS who double hats as the humanitarian coordinator for all of South Sudan. Supporting advisers such as the Chief of Staff are also crucially important for the effective mission management.40 The Force Commander and Police Commissioner support the civilian heads. The Force Commander must be African and is responsible for all of UNAMID’s military activities. The Police Commissioner is responsible for all police activities including FPUs. All senior management have deputies, several administrative and advisory staff.

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Military Component UNAMID’s military component is substantial comprising nearly 20,000 troops. However this number is still relatively small when considering the size of Darfur. Troops are predominately African with Rwanda and Nigeria providing the bulk of the forces. The military component is organised into three sectors; North, South and West Darfur. The Force Head Quarters is located in El Fasher and is a fully integrated multidimensional Head Quarters comprising military staff officers (G1-9) as well as civilian and police staff. Sector Head Quarters are located at El Fasher, Nyala and El Geneina. The primary purpose of UNAMID’s military is to assist in establishing a stable and secure environment in Darfur.41 In addition it encompasses the protection of civilians, monitoring and verification of ceasefire violations and support to the implementation of the DPA and other high-level peace agreements. Monitoring and assisting the ceasefires through patrolling of buffer zones, border monitoring, supporting DDR is key. To achieve this, certain areas are prioritised such as IDP camps, trade routes, demilitarised and buffer zones, humanitarian supply routes and nomadic migration areas. Documenting and reporting activities are also a fundamental role of the military component through MILOBS and Military Liaison Offices. Civilian Component The Political Affairs Component is comprised of civilian Political Affairs Officers (PAOs). The PAOs are drawn from UN and AU member states who are experienced diplomats. The political team is tasked with supporting the provisions of various peace agreements such as the DPA and Doha agreement. The political affairs component is the channel between UNAMID and these agreements and aims to target UNAMIDs activities in support of the provisions outlined and articulated in the high level agreements. The political affairs team is the key component in trying to achieve UNAMIDs political goals. Activities therefore include liaison functions with all parties in the conflict such as the Government of Sudan, the leadership of Darfuri rebel groups, Darfuri local leaders, international diplomats, international organisations, other peace operations in Sudan and elsewhere, liaising with different components within UNAMID itself, and other important actors. Monitoring and verifying is also a central activity such as monitoring and analysing local

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political dynamics. Crafting and disseminating reports is also a central activity and must be done regularly to decision-makers within the mission but also to policy makers in New York and Addis Ababa. While the political affairs component focuses on high level ‘top down’ peace agreements and their implementation, the Civil Affairs component aims to support ‘bottom up’ initiatives from the grass roots level in support of high level agreements such as the DPA and Doha Agreement. Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs), working closely with their political counterparts seek to address local issues on behalf of UNAMID. Providingthe link between the mission and the humanitarian community of international and local NGOs, national humanitarian departments and multilateral organisations providing humanitarian aid is a central function of civil affairs officers. In Darfur the Civil Affairs component is tasked with assisting the development of local institutions such as the Transitional Dafuri Regional Authority (TDRA), the Land Commission, the Civil Service Commission and other local institutions. Tasks are mainly advisory. CAOs are deployed throughout Darfur. Activities include community level capacity building and civic education through holding workshops, training groups and communities in specific issues and advising local leaders. The Human Rights component is tasked with making sure human rights issues are adequately incorporated throughout the mission and its activities. HR teams must firstly monitor, investigate and report human rights violations in Darfur. To do this human rights investigators need to work with other civilian sections in UNAMID such as civil affairs as well as with he military and police components to reach areas in Darfur where human rights violations are reported. HR teams must also liaise and collaborate with other actors in Darfur such as NGOs and local community groups. The Human Rights component also plays an advisory role with local institutions such as Human Rights commissions but also within UNAMID itself. The HR component provides advice on human rights issues within the mission and should be part of all highlevel decision-making. HR teams also sensitise UNAMID troops and staff to international human rights standards. The Rule of Law section in UNAMID includes judicial systems and prison advisers and aims to assist all stakeholders in Darfur in developing legal, judicial and penal institutions and agencies. The RoL team must also work closely with other agencies with similar remits in

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Darfur such as UN Country Teams (UNDP etc), NGOs and local actors. The RoL team essentially has an advisory role and consists of legal experts. Core tasks include collaborating with national authorities, supporting judicial reform through vetting measures, supporting the development and reform of judicial systems and laws, providing technical assistance to local courts, reforming the prison system in Darfur and assisting security sector reform. Functions therefore are predominately advisory, mentoring, training, liaising and advocacy. UNAMID’s child protection section aims to enhance the mission’s capability in protecting those that are most vulnerable in Darfur. Child protection teams monitor, advise and investigate issues relating to child rights and the abuse of children. Tasks include providing training and sensitisation to UNAMID troops and staff as well as national and local monitors and civil servants in Darfur. The team primarily provides a monitoring and advisory function. The Gender Component fulfils much the same function as child protection except focuses on issues pertaining to women’s rights and sexual and gender based violence.

Police Component UNAMID’s police component is the third pillar of the multidimensional approach in support of the mission’s military and civilian staff. UNAMID police aim to support the mission’s mandate through training and capacity building, monitoring and investigation and protection of civilians, UN staff and installations. Specifically UNAMID police are tasked with training Sudanese and Darfuri police in IDP camps in Darfur in basic policing skills such as developing a crime scene, evidence gathering techniques, crowd control and so on. Furthermore UNAMID police is tasked with assisting the development of the Sudanese police in Darfur in accordance with international standards. This necessitates designing and delivering training packages to local police units deployed in Darfur with the aim of institutionalising international legal instruments into policing culture such as International Human Rights Law and IHL. Mentoring, training and advice are key activities in this respect. UNAMID police must also monitor, investigate and report violations of the ceasefire agreements and focus on IDP camps, demilitarised areas and buffer zones.

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In addition to police officers UNAMID has 19 Formed Police Units (FPUs) to protect UN staff, property and installations. FPUs can also provide extra manpower in the policing tasks outlined.

DDR Component Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration component in UNAMID aims to reduce the number of armed combatants in armed groups and militias in Darfur through defections and surrenders. DDR in Darfur involves several activities with a wide range of actors. Firstly, DDR teams must analyse and monitor armed groups. To do this, detailed political and technical assessments of the armed groups and militias must be undertaken to include strength/size, leadership, structure, ideology/politics, constituency/support base (including political and economic support), socio-ethnic composition, activities/ modalities (recruiting patterns, areas of operation, methods of operations/military tactics). Any assessments would need the involvement of other sections in UNAMID such as political officers, civil affairs teams and military officers. Monitoring recruiting patterns is essential. DDR sections must manage the process of finding potential defectors, securing their escape from armed groups and providing them with skills and then a place to use those skills. DDR teams must therefore be able to establish and forge contacts with a plethora of armed actors in Darfur as well as securing ‘safe sites’ as areas for assembly of combatants in hostile areas. Once assembled the weapons must be taken away and stored safely or destroyed. The tasks of storage and destruction of weapons is not an easy one and there is an established process for doing so. Specialist weapons experts such as SALW advisers, EOD teams or military engineers must therefore be part of any DDR team. Once ‘D’ and ‘D’ are taken care of ‘R’ must be addressed. This is by far the most difficult aspect to undertake. Demobilised combatants, mainly comprising traumatised young men and children, are given re-insertion packages. These individuals are provided with vocational training (such as carpentry, hair dressing and so on) with the aim of sending them back to their home villages or areas. Further activities may also include sensitising villages and communities to the plight of these young people who are often stigmatised or rejected if they are perceived to have been part of a militia.

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DDR in Darfur, as with many other peace operations, is a complicated and difficult process involving political and technical aspects that involve several mission sections. DDR teams must be comprised of both military and civilian officers. Furthermore, the military component must actively support DDR teams in securing assembly sites and assisting defection campaigns (such as through disseminating pamphlets in areas of operation or flying helicopters with speakers blaring out messages from above). Political and Civil Affairs components must also be involved in assessments and the design of reinsertion packages. UNAMID has several other components in support of the mission’s objectives. The Public Information Office is the communications section of the mission and is responsible for liaising and communicating with the media and providing information about the mission’s activities. The PIO is essentially the propaganda wing of the mission. Safety and security and conduct are responsible for the well being and life support for the mission’s staff members and as a point of call to report internal problems and perceived abuses.

(iii) AMISOM: The African Union Mission in Somalia The African Union Mission in Somalia is the AU’s most ambitious attempt at conflict management on the continent. Since its establishment, AMSIOM has been engaged in offensive operations in an environment where many analysts and commentators have been hasty to state that no peace exits. The deployment of AMISOM was groundbreaking in the sense that the mission was prepared to fight and die from day one. Since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 central authority in Somalia has been non-existent. An alliance of several warring factions removed the military regime resulting in a violent transition and associated humanitarian emergency. The UN deployed successive peacekeeping missions and the United States sent in troops culminating in the Black Hawk Down debacle where several US soldiers were killed by Somali militants. The UN and US ultimately pulled out of Somalia given the deteriorating situation and continuous violence as there was no peace to keep. That is not to say that Somalia descended into a lawless Hobbesian nightmare. Rather,

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recognisable central authority had been removed and in its vacuum pockets of order based around local practical interests and realities began to surface. This involved and emboldened clan politics and also religious actors, given that most Somalis are Muslim. Amidst this climate of central state collapse, foreign withdrawal and perceived failure of elite politics, conservative Muslim authorities emerged. Centred around establishing order and Sharia Law these entities, predominately local in character, began to fill the legal and administrative vacuum left by several years of conflict. Although preaching and implementing a conservative version of Islam, these courts also provided Somalis with a form of order and stability in the face of crumbling state structures. The local courts became more established and legitimate in the eyes of many Somalis, eventually forging broader alliances with each other into what became known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). By 2006 the ICU controlled all of South and Central Somalia.42 However, this bottom up form of stability was not the preferred choice for several important external actors. The AU and regional organisations, notably the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), tried to establish some form of federalised central authority through an alliance of clan polities. By 2004 IGAD had assisted the establishment of a Transitional Federal Charter paving the way for a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) with transitional parliament and elections scheduled for 2009.43 Most important was the role of Ethiopia and the US. The US quickly came to the conclusion that the ICU was an Al-Qaeda affiliated organisation. Post-September 11 2001 the Bush administration’s ‘War on Terror’ cemented this categorisation of the ICU as a terrorist organisation. In doing so negotiations, or potential for any form of constructive communication was lost. Ethiopia was happy to play policeman for the US in Somalia as part of the close relationship between Washington and Addis Ababa. Ethiopian officials aimed to retain Addis’ position as hegemon in the Horn and to combat an ally of arch foe Eritrea and Isais Afewerki who supported the ICU. These players, both international organisations and states, would also much rather deal with a recognisable central authority as opposed to a conglomerate of perceived extremists. A central problem with the approach taken by the AU, US and others was that Somalis did not have confidence in the newly established TFG. Part of the difficulty was the lack of TFG presence in Somalia itself as it

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was confined to Nairobi in Kenya. External patrons on the other hand identified the ICU as the ‘spoiler’ in Somalia stopping the TFG from gaining any legitimacy. In this assessment the logical step would be to remove the Islamic Courts. And so in 2006 with US approval, Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia in order to dislodge the ICU. Initially Ethiopian forces secured Baidoa and the surrounding areas but quickly marched onto Mogadishu and by the end of 2006 ICU authority was decimated. That is not to say that the Ethiopian operations were successful for longterm stability. Ethiopian forces did remove the ICU, but in doing so employed a scorched earth policy and committed atrocities against civilians. Arbitrary murder, rape, looting and wanton destruction were hallmarks of the Ethiopian campaign.44 Even worse, the Ethiopian invasion was popularly perceived as an attempt to impose a Western and Ethiopian puppet government in Mogadishu that had little relevance for ordinary Somalis or their way of life. The TFG should have been able to consolidate gains after the removal of the ICU. However deep divisions and political infighting within the TFG and its inability to appeal to the Somali population rendered the federal initiative mired in internal disputes.45 Although the ICU was defeated, its more hard-line elements found sanctuary in Eritrea and Djibouti eventually establishing an armed alliance called the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS). Within this alliance was the violent extremist group Al-Shabaab.

Uganda and Burundi to the Rescue It was in these circumstances of a practically illegitimate and ineffectual government supported by a perceived foreign occupying force controlling a tiny part of the country under siege from hard-line rebel forces and a hostile population that AMISOM deployed to Somalia. Initially the UN toyed with the idea of sending blue helmets but eventually declined as it was too dangerous on the ground and there was no peace to keep. The AU sought to deploy an IGAD-led and managed peacekeeping force but this ultimately failed to materialise. It wasn’t until Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda, agreed to send a Battalion of Ugandan soldiers to Mogadishu in 2007 that some form of intervention arrived in Somalia. AMISOM deployed alongside Ethiopian troops in Mogadishu and was mandated by both the UNSC and the AU Peace and Security Council to support dialogue and

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reconciliation. It provided protection for the TFG and its institutions, assisted the national stabilisation plan especially regarding the training of the Somali security services, assisted humanitarian access and activities to protect AMISOM and UN personnel and installations.46 In practice the Ugandan troops were limited to a small area of operations around the presidential palace, airport and seaport in Mogadishu.47 Ugandan forces deployed into an extremely hostile environment and even took fire as they were landing in Mogadishu. The Ugandans were later supported by Burundian troops in December 2007. The initial AMISOM deployment was comprised of soldiers only with no civilian or police component. Essentially AMISOM was a Ugandan military initiative legitimised by the AU. Logistics, mentoring and other assistance were provided by the US private security firms Bancroft and Dyncorp.48

Stalemate By early 2009 Ethiopian forces withdrew from Somalia, leaving not only a path of destruction in its wake but also a dangerous security vacuum. With a non-existent security sector and limited AMISOM forces, this vacuum was quickly filled by Al-Shabaab. At the same time infighting within the TFG and a series of power plays and resignations limited the newly formed administration even further. 2009 saw the consolidation of the Al-Shabaab into the most prominent anti-TFG group with one analyst describing this period as the ‘Golden Age of Al-Shabaab’.49 During this period Al-Shabaab adapted its tactics, turning to more ‘asymmetric warfare’ such as improvised bomb making (IEDs), suicide attacks, snipers and the control of civilian communities for protection and provoking civilian casualties.50 AMISOM with a force strength of only a few thousand and little capability in areas such as surveillance and intelligence gathering was limited to Mogadishu allowing Al-Shabaab to consolidate control over most of the country. Recognising the shortcoming in logistics and administration support the UN authorised the UN Support Office for AMISOM based in Nairobi.51 Stalemate still ensued but two major failures in 2010 on the part of Al-Shabaab led the way for an enhanced and far more robust AMISOM; the Ramadan offensive and the Kampala bombings.

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Al-Shabaab’s offensive in Mogadishu on Ramadan was no match for the Ugandans. AMSIOM successfully repelled the attack and killed around 40 Al-Shabaab fighters, the group’s biggest loss in battle. After a month of fighting the group lost over 500 fighters.52 The status of Al-Shabaab was severely diminished after the Ramadan offensive. In addition, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a series of bombs that exploded in Kampala, Uganda in July 2010 killing several hundred innocent civilians. The intent was to target Ugandans in order to persuade Kampala to pull troops from AMISOM. The effect was the exact opposite making President Museveni more resolute in reducing the Al-Shabaab threat from Somalia. The attacks also cemented the Western perception that Al-Shabaab was an Al-Qaeda proxy intent on carrying out a global Jihad and guaranteed the support of Western nations, especially the US, UK, Canada, France and other EU states for intervention in Somalia.

AMISOM Expansion Post-2010 AMISOM expanded significantly. The UN and AU authorised a troop ceiling of 12,000 with a beefed up concept of operations. In addition to protecting the TFG and training the Somali security services AMISOM would consolidate and expand areas of control. Most importantly Kenya joined the intervention. Kenya invaded Somalia unilaterally in 2011 in response to several kidnappings of British and French tourists in North-Eastern Kenya by Al-Shabaab as well as growing insecurity in the borderlands area with Somalia. Operation ‘Linda Nchi’ aimed to capture Jubaland province in Somalia in order to secure a buffer zone along the Kenya– Somali border. The following year Kenya re-hatted its forces in Somalia as AMISOM. Several reasons dictated this deployment and can broadly be summarised as security, economic and political concerns. Security was perhaps the greatest driving force for KDF involvement. In addition to kidnapping of tourists, Al-Shabaab had launched cross-border incursions, infiltrated refugee camps such as the overflowing Dadaab camp housing half a million Somali refugees. Economic concerns were also a considerable driving force. Oil and its potential exploitation is a priority for Eastern African states and Kenya in particular. A final economic incentive is the prospect of access to international financial resources.

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Politically, the KDF intervention served the needs of certain domestic constituencies in the years running up to a general election. Sticking ‘one up’ the Somalis was sure to win some Kenyan votes. The intervention was also violating an international arms embargo and by rehatting as AMISOM, the Kenyans got out of some very murky legal water.53 Regional positioning as a counter to Ethiopia but also Uganda and other countries with dreams of regional hegemony are further incentives for the significant Kenyan role in AMISOM. Finally, the integration of the Kenyan military elites with other Eastern African states, but especially with Uganda and Ethiopia, assisted forging some sort of regional consensus on Somalia; facilitated and underscored, of course, by Western military aid money for peacekeeping and PSO training. Being part of AMISOM legitimised their presence in Somalia and gave them command positions within the mission structure, including Deputy Force Commander. Although under an AU mandate KDF remained under Kenyan control. AMISOM was split into sectors with Kenya initially in control of Sector 2 covering Jubaland where the KDF invasion and consolidation was based. In practice the transition from KDF to AMISOM was mainly in the form of swapping uniforms even if closer coordination with UPDF, the Burundians and Ethiopia was a much needed result. From 2012 AMISOM expanded even further. In July 2012 the UN and AU authorised an enlarged AMSIOM with a troop ceiling of 18,000.54 In addition, reimbursements rates and allowances were brought up to the much higher UN standards. As a result, several other countries contributed troops and assets to AMISOM. Sierra Leone and Djibouti became troop contributors and Nigeria and Ghana sent policemen.55 AMISOM itself was restructured into sectors. Sector One around Mogadishu was the responsibility of 9,500 Ugandan and Burundian troops. The Multinational Force Head Quarters is also based in Mogadishu. 4,200 Kenyan troops, supported by a battalion from Sierra Leone had responsibility for Sector Two in the South West that includes the key port city of Kismayo. Sector Three around Baidoa had 2,500 Ugandan and Burundian troops with some Ethiopian support in control. Sector Four in the North East was the domain of the Djiboutian contingent again with additional support from Ethiopian troops not under AMISOM control.56 By January 2014 around 4,000 Ethiopian troops re-hatted as AMISOM.

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Activities and Tasks The missions’ tasks have increased since 2007 and seek to address not only immediate security threats but also longer term institutional development of the TFG. AMISOM’s initial deployment centred on creating an environment for the TFG to operate. Military operations firstly by Ugandan and then Burundian forces were the only activities the operation could muster. As the force expanded so to did the mandate and associated tasks and activities. By 2008 AMISOM had a bigger force, additional resources in terms of logistics and greater institutional support from the UN and AU. The mission was tasked with supporting the Djibouti Peace Agreement as well as securing infrastructure routes for humanitarian assistance, assisting the development of the Somali National Security Services, protection of individuals involved in the peace process and protection of the mission’s personnel and installations. Five years later the troop ceiling had been raised to 18,000, a significant UN logistics and support operation was established and greater capability in non-military activities was provided. From 2013 AMISOM’s mandate not only included its previous tasks, but the added provisions of assisting institutional development, planning for national elections in 2016 and a greater focus on assisting the fledging Somali army in military operations.57 The mission’s military component has been the primary component existing for the first several years almost entirely without civilian and police capability. AMISOM’s troops have several important tasks. Firstly, the military must conduct offensive operations or ‘war fighting’. These operations are principally to secure an environment, or at least provide some form of security for the mission’s personnel and installations and also the TFG and its institutions and personnel. Operations also seek to consolidate and expand areas of TFG control i.e. AMISOM forces in support of the Somali National Army are tasked with ensuring that Al-Shabaab and other armed groups do not encroach on TFG controlled areas but also to conduct proactive military operations to expand these areas of operation and control. The military must also conduct operations to secure key infrastructure axis such as roads, ports (air and sea) and key areas such as markets and IDP camps in order to assist humanitarian access. In addition to military operations, the troops in AMISOM have several other activities and tasks. Importantly, AMISOM is tasked with

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developing the Somali Security Services. This entails training and mentoring by the AMISOM military component as well as joint operations. The military must also work with other components in certain areas. Assisting defections through DDR, assisting with quick impact projects (QUIPs) such as emergency bridge and road building or even building clinics for local communities, monitoring ceasefires and human rights violations are all expected of AMISOM’s military component. AMISOM’s other tasks mainly involve providing advice to the TFG to develop and enhance the capacity of their institutions particularly those of National Defence, Public Safety and Public Service.58 This necessitates significant civilian capability in the areas of political affairs, civil affairs and legal expertise.

(iv) The African Standby Force (ASF) The ASF is envisaged as a standby force, i.e. not a standing army, consisting of brigade size forces (up to 5,000 personnel) from five African regions based on the following Regional Economic Communities (RECs): ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, ECCAS (Central Africa) and the Arab Mahgreb Union. A continental ASF Headquarters and Planning Element (PLANELM) are envisaged in Addis Ababa with regional HQs and PLANELM for each of the five regions. The AU’s aim is for the ASF to be able to undertake various peacekeeping missions by 2015 (see Figure 2.2). Forces are intended to be multidimensional with

1

AU/Regional military advice to a political mission. 30 days.

2

AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission. 30 days.

3

Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission. 30 days.

4

AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peacebuilding). 30 days.

5

AU Peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers. 90 days with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days.

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AU intervention, e.g. in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly. 14 days with robust military force.

Figure 2.2

ASF Deployment Scenarios.59

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military, civilian and police components and multinational, with forces contributed by the various regions themselves. At the time of writing, only the East, West and South brigades are feasible and only East and West are in any state of development. The ASF is a purely interventionist peacekeeping force with no capability in longer-term peacebuilding operations. The scenarios are rapid reaction rather than peacebuilding. Therefore any ASF mission would have to deploy for a short term initial period with the aim of working alongside some other form of international intervention, be it AU, UN or other. This means that activities and tasks are limited to very specific areas depending on the deployment scenario. The scenarios are much the same as UN intervention guidelines bar one. The ASF differs from the UN in that under scenario six ASF forces are authorised to deploy into a non-permissive environment and would be mandated to use all necessary force to stop hostilities. In other words, a future ASF force could deploy into a situation such as the genocide in Rwanda.

East African Standby Force The East African Standby Force (EASF) is the ASF force for Eastern Africa. As one of the five regional standby brigades EASF will eventually seek to undertake the above scenarios. Formerly known as the East African Standby Brigade, EASBRIG, the force was rebranded to EASF to convey its multidimensional structure. EASF consists of thirteen states from East Africa, the Great Lakes region, the Greater Horn of Africa and some Indian Ocean islands. EASF’s permanent organs are spread over two countries, Ethiopia and Kenya. The Brigade Head Quarters and the Logistical base are in Addis Ababa and the EASF Coordinating Mechanism (EASFCOM) and the Planning Element (PLANELM) are based in Nairobi. EASF is funded in two ways: firstly, through member states contributions and secondly, through partners and donors by way of the Friends of EASF (FoE, chaired by the UK). EASF is also supported by various ‘Technical Assistance’ initiatives including the British Peace Support Team-Eastern Africa (BPST-EA), the Nordic Advisory Coordination Staff (NACS, led by Denmark and Norway), the Netherlands, the US, France, Canada and Germany.

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Organisation EASBRIG decision-making and administrative organs consist of several institutions. The Assembly of East African Heads of State meets once a year and is the supreme authority of EASF, comprising the heads of state of member countries. The Assembly formulates policy and directs and controls the strategic functioning of EASF. The Council of Eastern Africa Ministers of Defence comprises Ministers of Defence of EASF member states. The council performs a managerial role of issues relating to the Assembly such as procedures and protocols. The council also has responsibility for appointing senior figures such as Force Commander and Head of Mission for an EASF stand-alone mission. The council meets twice yearly. The Committee of Eastern African Chiefs of Defence Staff operates in an advisory role for the Council and Assembly and is comprised of Chiefs of Defence Staff from EASF member states. In terms of operational activities EASF comprises three multinational decision-making bodies; the EASF Coordinating Mechanism (EASFCOM), the planning element and the logistics base. EASFCOM was created in lieu of a regional economic community that covers all EASF member states. Previously this role was undertaken by IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) as it was the only REC in the region that covered a majority of member states. However as IGAD does not cover all member states, EASFCOM was created to replace it. Essentially EASFCOM is the political/diplomatic arm of EASF with the aim of turning strategic policy from the AU and other organs into operational decision-making for EASF. EASFCOM is primarily focused on resource mobilisation, lobbying donors and members and the following core functions: management and liaison of operational policy matters; political and policy guidance; implementation of EASF policies; mobilise resources in collaboration with AU, RECs and other sources; management of EASF Funds; coordinate meetings in consultations with the relevant authorities; performing public relation activities; receive and disseminate information; liaise with AU, RECs and other organisations on matters relating to EASF; development and review of EASF policy documents for approval by council and performing any other activities as directed by the organs of EASF. EASFCOM staff are all seconded by member states and are supported by several foreign (mainly) military technical advisers.

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The Brigade HQ is the command headquarters for force preparation and operational command of EASF. On deployment, the Brigade HQ will come under the control of the AU or UN depending on the mission. The HQ will also provide the Committee with secretarial services. The PLANELM is a multinational full time planning HQ for EASF. Comprising of military and civilian staff drawn from the region, the PLANELM is responsible for designing the strategy for deployment of forces and for the planning of contingencies, whilst EASF is ‘in-theatre’. This includes operations planning, rotation of forces, working with training institutions and producing a quarterly report on progress. Essentially the PLANELM works out how to deploy forces into theatre, what to do with them whilst the operation unfolds and how to either remove forces from a mission or replace them with relieving forces from elsewhere. The Logistics Base is in Addis Ababa with the responsibility of maintaining, storing and managing of all logistics infrastructure of EASF. The Log Base coordinates all EASBRIG logistics and external logistic requirements.

Force Generation Force generation is the process of securing contributions of military, police and civilians from member states. The concept was initially envisaged to consist of multinational mixed Brigades. However the force generation concept rapidly changed due to the difficulty in securing troop contributions, partly because of the vast differences in the capabilities, structures, composition and doctrines of the region’s national defence forces. Instead, a selection of national high readiness forces to sit within their own nations or Rapid Deployment Capabilities (RDC) are being developed. RDCs are purely national forces earmarked for EASF. Donors have spearheaded this initiative with the UK funding RDC infrastructure and training in Kenya and Uganda whilst Denmark has assisted the development of RDCs in Rwanda and there are plans for developing an Ethiopian RDC.60 In practice, these RDCs are part of national capability and are used not only for regional purposes but for national duty as well. EASF Objectives, Exercises and Benchmarks EASF has several objectives and benchmarks in order to achieve its Full Operating Capability (FOC) that are outlined below (Figure 2.3). The objectives address long-term development and structural issues that

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Objective 1

Political decision-making structure that can authorise, mandate and oversee the employment of the EASF.

Objective 2

Command and Control structure capable of preparing, planning and commanding the EASF.

Objective 3

Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of a trained force of Brigade size on standby and maintained in member states to the required readiness levels by the end of 2010.

Objective 4

A trained Police Element on standby and maintained in member states to the required readiness by the end of 2010.

Objective 5

A roster of trained civilians within the region available for deployment by the end of 2010.

Objective 6

A logistic system capable of supporting the deployment and sustainment of regional capability, in accordance with force structures, initially by 2010.

Objective 7

An integrated regional training system able to provide individual and collective training for the regional forces by the end of 2010.

Objective 8

Efficient administrative processes and structures including adequate resources to support EASBRICOM objectives.

Figure 2.3

EASBRIG/EASF Benchmarks and Objectives.61

need to be in place for EASF to function effectively. The benchmarks evaluate whether EASF is on the right track to achieving these objectives through different controlled exercises. EASF has had several benchmark dates, not least having full operational capability by 2015. Several exercises have been conducted with several more planned for the coming years. Command Post Exercises (CPX) have been conducted yearly. The CPX is a controlled exercise involving the PLANELM. The CPX centres around predeployment planning to the fictitious African country of Carana (see chapter 4). Other exercises include the High Level Exercise (HILEX) July 2009 and the Full Training Exercise (FTX) Nov– Dec 2009. The FTX is a controlled exercise based on one of the last ASF intervention scenarios. The exercise will involve a brigade size multidimensional force to enact a proper intervention simulation. The adoption of Harmonised Policy Framework (HPF) is yet to be adopted and the link to the AU is almost non-existent. The HPF is the legally binding commitment of EASF member states to develop the body with general consensus. It is extremely important that all member states are in agreement regarding EASF’s development and that they are

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prepared to honour their commitments. The HPF could be an invaluable step in the right direction if it is ratified. The HPF has been agreed upon by the Chiefs of Defence Staff but must still be passed by the Committee of Ministers.

Current Status and Future Prospects EASF has progressed somewhat since its inception. There are tangible and basic structures in place, albeit structures of low capacity. Highlevel organs from the Assembly of Heads of States to Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff are engaged and committed to an extent with the ASF initiative. However, regional mistrust and jockeying for prime position and influence still outweighs real consensus and drive from the member states. Objectives have been met in some instances and not in others. EASF’s development can be categorised as slow but steady – with the emphasis on slow. National priorities often trump effective implementation of EASF policies. Although there is buy-in there is also a great deal of infighting between individuals and states, which has caused problems.62 Rivalry between Kenya and Ethiopia for a dominant role in EASF has brought issues such as the adoption of a harmonised policy framework to a standstill. Bigger players such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Sudan try to dominate the initiative whilst smaller states such as the Seychelles, Djibouti and Comoros simply try to make sure that they are involved in some form. A further problem is regional blocks; Horn of Africa nations tend to stick together in decision-making issues as do countries of East Africa or the Great Lakes region and even the Indian Ocean Islands. As with the grander scheme for the ASF, EASF supposedly had Initial Operating Capacity (IOC) by 2010 where it will be able to intervene under scenarios 1 – 3 of the ASF and Full Operating Capacity to intervene under scenarios 4 – 6 by 2015. Some EASF officers did deploy to AMISOM’s multinational HQ in 2012 to provide advice but the effect has been negligible. By the time of writing the EASF still has not achieved the ability to deploy a peace support operation of any significance and is unlikely to in the near future. Crisis in Burundi in 2015 and on-going violence in South Sudan, Central African Republic and Somalia were potentially opportune deployments for the EASF but due to a sheer lack of ability and development nothing has materialised.

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Conclusion Having had a closer look at a range of peacekeeping operations in Africa it is clear that the missions have differing characteristics of command, mandates, composition and importantly the operating environment they deploy to. However, some commonalities can be identified. In terms of structure, contemporary peacekeeping missions are under civilian control through a high level diplomat as special representative who reports to the authorising authority. A lt general fills the force commander position with a police equivalent. These positions plus supporting individuals (deputy force commander, chief of staff, etc.) form the high decision-making echelons directing the strategy of the mission. Beneath this top tier lies the operational level of the mission, the elements involved in day-to-day management of the mission and those who implement directives from above. The operational level comprises the military, civilian and police components. Operational military personnel are at a senior level, usually from captain to a brigadier or even major general. These individuals can be found within the multinational headquarters, as contingent commanders, sector commanders and also military advisers in analysis cells, DDR and SSR sections and other sections requiring some form of military advice. Civilian positions in various sections are also at the operational level, as are police planners and commanders. The military component in the peacekeeping mission is tasked with consolidating or establishing a conducive environment for the cessation of hostilities between warring factions. In terms of operational issues for the military the Force Head Quarters (FHQ) is the most senior body of decision-making and forms the epicentre of military activity in a peacekeeping mission. Much like a national military campaign, the FHQ turns directives from the Force Commander and senior mission management into a plan of action for the mission’s military component known as the Concept of Operations (CONOPS).63 FHQs in peacekeeping missions are multinational with individual officers seconded by contributing countries. Other areas of the mission are less mixed, especially from sector and contingent level down. FHQ’s design plans for the use of the military component. Military operations are a key part of this but unlike national campaigns there are several issues

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associated with peacekeeping that must be incorporated into designing plans. Issues such as collaborating with NGOs, dealing with the media, working with other nations, working with IDPs, international legal frameworks, working within the UN and AU system, working with competing departments and individuals and so on.64 Military operations are not the only task for peacekeeping troops. Assisting Security Sector Reform through training and mentoring the security services can be additional tasks for military planners in a peacekeeping mission. Assisting humanitarian aid delivery is a further common task to peace operations and is a separate activity to be calculated when using military assets. This can include securing roads and key ports as well as providing military escorts. The civilian component of a peacekeeping mission comprises a variety of cross cutting departments. Missions tend to have political affairs sections, civil affairs, legal advisers and human rights advisers, DDR as well as safety and security and administration personnel. But sections such as electoral assistance, child protection, SSR, HIV/AIDS, Rule of Law, SGBV can also be part of a peacekeeping mission. These roles tend to be provided by the UN, whether in a full mission as in MONUSCO or as a supporting body such as the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). Tasks for civilians therefore involve a range of advisory, analytical and collaborative tasks. Firstly, interpreting and assisting the implementation of mandates and peace agreements is central to civilian efforts in a mission. So design for advisory strategies must be in line with agreed upon peace processes; whether it is assisting the development of local institutions, assisting in mediation activities or in advising transitional governing arrangements. Liaising is a second key function for civilians in a mission. All civilian offices must liaise and collaborate with separate departments in the mission, with parties to the conflict and with external actors. Political analysis is also a central function of civilians in a mission. Civilian staff at the operational level must understand the context they are operating in; this includes understanding key political dynamics such as who the players are in the conflict and also socioeconomic and cultural issues, the geography and topography of the region and a historical perspective. Fourthly, civilians must manage projects, often with competing agendas and competing agencies. Turf wars between political and humanitarian departments are common.

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Managing budgets, staff and priorities within the confines of development measurements must also be included. Civilians must monitor, investigate and report. Civilians in Human Rights sections, political officers, civil affairs teams and DDR teams must all produce report after report on progress and challenges as well as monitoring a variety of violations and trends. Finally, civilian staff must provide expert advice within their own areas of speciality and must therefore have the necessary skills set. Rule of Law advisers should have a legal background with a proven track record for assisting in the development of judicial institutions or as experts in military or police reform; civil affairs staff should have a history of being an aid worker in complex emergencies with experience of delivering relief to needy populations in a conflict zone and so on. Police in peacekeeping missions are often neglected but are incredibly important. Much of peacekeeping is akin to community policing. Peacekeepers act as referees much like a ‘bobby on the beat’ in a constabulary providing a deterrent but also keeping an eye out for potential disturbances. Police should immerse themselves in communities and take the approach of winning hearts and minds, although this is not always possible. Police in peacekeeping missions tend to be used for protecting staff and installations and also for training and mentoring national police units, providing security to IDP camps and assisting the military when required. The following chapters seek to understand and explore how some of the individuals intended to deploy to these and other peacekeeping missions are trained.

CHAPTER 3 THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTRE (IPSTC):HOW IT WORKS

Introduction Peacekeeping training centres in Africa are numerous and are affiliated to the African Union. They aim to train predominately African military officers but also civilian specialists and police officers who will be deployed to peacekeeping operations in Africa. These centres are part of broader military assistance programmes provided by the United Nations and other bi-lateral or multilateral donors, and are completely funded from outside. The centres are staffed predominately by African military officers and foreign military officials seconded as technical advisers. The intent for these centres is three-fold. Firstly, these centres aim to contribute to improving African Union peacekeeping operations by creating a pool of well-trained personnel. Secondly, these centres aim to contribute to the professionalisation of national defence forces in African states through training and instruction in international norms, such as international human rights legal frameworks and Western military doctrine. Finally, the centres are intended to provide areas of socialisation between African militaries in order to foster bonds and forge ties, in the hope that the potential for regional conflict will reduce through these elite relationships. The International Peace Support Training centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi, Kenya is one such centre. This chapter and the next chapter will examine IPSTC in detail to examine whether the intended aims of improving,

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reforming and integrating are achieved, and to what extent IPSTC addresses the capability gaps in APSA.

Developing IPSTC IPSTC in Kenya has evolved from serving Kenyan PSO training needs to being the principal peacekeeping training centre for the Eastern African region. The Centre is the largest and most expensive in East Africa, although it has a long way to go before realising its aims as a regional centre of excellence and in institutionalising a coherent training system for the emerging peace and security architecture in Eastern Africa. IPSTC is the main training centre for the EASF, the ASF for Eastern Africa and is trying to find a niche as a centre of excellence of PSO training focused towards the AU and APSA. IPSTC focuses towards operational and tactical level training, i.e. the training of individuals who constitute peacekeeping missions in theatre. The decision to create and develop a regional PSO training centre in Kenya is down to several overlapping internal and external pressures. These pressures are fluid and interdependent such as the way national priorities interact with outside pressures of donor demands and regional politics. What is important for IPSTC is how Kenya navigates this complex web of pressures. A historical and existing commitment to UN and African peacekeeping was the basis for the international community and Kenya’s decision to develop IPSTC. Without a history of peacekeeping the Kenyan Government wouldn’t have a leg to stand on when seeking funding for PSO training. Equally important are practical national interests. Regional diplomacy and relations with neighbours have been drivers for developing IPSTC. Perhaps most important are the financial benefits that the Kenyan Government and individuals would receive if a centre was developed.

Kenyan Peacekeeping The long history of UN peacekeeping and support to APSA is the starting point for developing IPSTC. Nairobi and donors needed to justify why Kenya was chosen as host nation. Commitment to peacekeeping as well as democratic governance in a neighbourhood of military regimes was part of the justification to invest in Kenya’s PSO school.

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The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) have participated in a variety of peacekeeping missions since first deploying troops to the 1979 Commonwealth Peace Mission in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and has contributed forces for both UN and AU missions. These include the OAU mission in Chad (1982), Namibia (1989), the UN intervention in the former Yugoslavia (1992–1995), Sierra Leone (1999 and 2003), UNMEE in Ethiopia/Eritrea (2000–2008), East Timor, Burundi (BINUB on-going) and Southern Sudan (UNMISS on-going). One of Kenya’s preferred peacekeeping contributions has been Military Observers (MILOBS). Kenyan MILOBS have been sent to Angola, Former Yugoslavia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Iran/Iraq, Kuwait, Liberia, Morocco, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Chad, Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique, Burundi, Sudan and Cote D’Ivoire.1 KDF personnel themselves prefer these positions as MILOBS are rarely in harms way and receive UN salaries directly into their bank accounts (unlike other UN positions where salaries are received via national defence ministries where some is typically kept by the ministry). Kenya ranks number 30 out of the 90 troop contributors of military and civilian police to UN operations and has contributed military observers, staff officers, civilian police monitors and infantry troops.2 Kenya has also seconded a large number of senior officers and military/civilian equivalents (2-star general) as force commanders, chief military observers, and chiefs of staff to several UN Missions and the UNHQ in New York.3 Kenyan peacekeepers have served in 16 different countries in Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans and Asia. Currently 828 Kenyan peacekeepers are deployed to UN missions.4 In addition to UN peacekeeping Kenya has also been a leading nation in developing a regional security apparatus for Eastern Africa and contributes forces to AU missions. The late 1990s and early 2000s saw the institutionalisation of African peacekeeping missions. Although some operations had been authorised by the OAU, its successor was to take a far more robust and systematic approach to African-led peacekeeping operations. Missions were deployed to Burundi, the Comoros Islands, Somalia and Sudan and most recently Mali and the Central African Republic. The AU, with its new peace and security organs, can authorise and manage complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions as well as developing a continental wide rapid reaction force, the ASF.5 East African nations have been developing mechanisms

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to deal with violent conflict. These mechanisms support a revamped AU at the continental level with, amongst other things, more peacekeeping capability, the development of the EASF in line with the ASF concept, peace and security components for various RECs (IGAD, EAC etc.) and training institutions in support of the emerging security apparatus. Kenya has been instrumental in developing the APSA as well as East Africa’s emerging peace and security apparatus with many organisations either based, or with key offices, in Nairobi. Although several years after the inception of IPSTC, KDF have deployed its forces to the AU Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, including the Deputy Force Commander and enough troops to be the lead nation in two operational sectors. Kenyan commitment to international and African peacekeeping and the evolution of APSA are therefore key factors in IPSTC’s development. Motivations for Kenyan peacekeeping are diverse and reflect some of the reasons for developing IPSTC.6 Kenya has been a consistent contributing nation to global peace operations since the late seventies and sees peacekeeping as a part of its broader international relations with the UN, international donors and within Africa. Kenya also prides itself as the economic powerhouse in East Africa. However its military capability, although more professional, is far less capable than that of some of its neighbours. Peacekeeping is also one of Kenya’s tools in developing and increasing influence in regional matters. Monetary reasons are also a massive incentive, especially regarding UN missions but peacekeeping in general. UN, and to a lesser extent AU salaries, stipends, daily allowances and benefits are enormous and are a key motivation for contributing troops and partly subsidises the Kenyan Defence budget. Other resources such as kit, equipment, training, medical cover are all additional benefits and incentives. A further motivation is access to key UN positions, such as senior military and political appointments within the UN system. A final but important motivation is providing troops with operational activities and training as part of building a capable armed force and career development for individuals. Equally important in developing IPSTC are Kenyan pragmatic interests. Specifically, regional politics and the scramble for resources from the AU and the international community have been serious benefits for the Kenyan Government and especially the defence establishment and high-ranking individuals. Regional political relations are a key

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calculation for Kenya when developing IPSTC. Most importantly, rivalry for regional hegemony with Ethiopia is an important issue for the Kenyan Government. Kenya is the largest economy in the region and is a growing actor in peace and security initiatives in Eastern Africa. However, in terms of military power Kenya is seen to be less experienced than many of its neighbours, and especially Ethiopia. The Kenyan military prior to 2008 had never really seen prolonged combat, bar the Shifta war in the mid-sixties. Ethiopia and some others, notably Rwanda and Uganda, have large and battle-hardened armed forces that have recently returned from, or are still engaged in regional conflicts. In addition Ethiopia is a key state for peace and security in the region. Several organisations are headquartered in Addis Ababa including the AU itself. Nairobi and Addis both regularly play host to regional peace agreements. This rivalry is partly down to competition for foreign aid resources for peace and security but it is equally driven by a desire for regional hegemony. This collaboration and competition dynamic characterises the rest of Kenya’s regional diplomatic relations and within regional organisations such as the East African Community (EAC) and AU. IPSTC is part of this regional rivalry for greater influence within the peace and security architecture of Eastern Africa. The Centre is therefore partly a symbol of achievement over neighbouring and other regional states. Economic benefits are a third crucial calculation for developing IPSTC. The decision to build IPSTC was accompanied by the guarantee of significant financial and other benefits for Kenya. A modern and impressive training facility would be built, run and staffed almost entirely with foreign aid money. Kenya would provide the land and some staff members. As a result the Kenyan Government and associated partners such as suppliers, caterers and other businesses stood to gain a great deal. Furthermore Kenyan students would be given priority slots for training and jobs would be created for Kenyan military officers in a prestigious regional PSO training school. A combination of these incentives steered the Kenyan military establishment to transform its national peacekeeping training centre and de-mining school in support of Kenyan contingents for peacekeeping missions into a regional peacekeeping training centre supporting the training needs of the Eastern African emerging security architecture, as well as the AU and APSA.

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From National to Regional The evolution of IPSTC from a national centre to a regional focus began in 2001.7 The Kenyan Government created the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) within the Defence Staff College (DSC) in leafy Karen, an upper-class suburb of Nairobi. The Centre was initially developed to train Kenyan forces (mainly military) for pre-deployment to peacekeeping operations. Courses and seminars were delivered at the DSC as part of a Staff Officer training curriculum. From 2004 international donors, mainly the UK and Germany, invested in developing the centre in tandem with the EASF or EASBRIG8 as it was then known. The PSTC was quickly allocated as the principle training centre for the EASF and a new site next to the DSC and the EASF Planning element (PLANELM) and coordinating mechanism (EASFCOM) was found.9 From 2004–2007 construction of facilities took place and the centre was rebranded IPSTC to reflect the new regional remit. At the same time the UK Government entered into a joint venture with the Kenya Ministry of State for Defence (KMOSD) and built a demining training school called the International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC) in Embakasi on the other side of Nairobi. As natural partners in peacekeeping training, the two centres began to coordinate courses and training, not least due to the oversight of and massive support invested by the UK Government. From 2008 IPSTC entered into a process of integration and internationalisation. KMOSD took the decision (almost unilaterally) to declare IMATC a Kenyan institution and it was subsumed officially under IPSTC. Both IPSTC and IMATC began to deliver and institutionalise courses for a regional audience. At least 60 per cent of all students on IPSTC courses are from EASF member states.10 A second rebranding phase took place creating an umbrella organisation with two campuses. The Karen campus was named the Peace and Conflict Studies School (PCSS) with a focus on operational level training and Embakasi was branded the Humanitarian Peace Support School (HPSS) with a lower focus of tactical level training.11

Objectives, Organisation and Structure IPSTC has various grandiose goals with some perhaps more feasible than others. The Centre aims to be an independent Eastern African research, training and education centre responsive to peace operations

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training and education requirements of the APSA and to provide strategic and operational level decision-making and leadership training to enhance planning and management of multidimensional peace operations.12 The Centre aims to achieve this through a ‘systems approach to training’ where applied research feeds into the training design and delivery process followed by an evaluation of the training with results fed back into the research. To deliver these goals the Centre is split into a HQ, PCSS, the research department, HPSS and a management board. There are several other supporting sections within IPSTC including a reproduction cell, facilities management, transport, post room, IT, several secretarial staff, store managers and other supporting offices. Much like other peacekeeping training centres in Africa, IPSTC employs a military structure and chain of command. This is due to the centre’s origins as part of the Kenyan defence establishment. The Centre is staffed predominately by Kenyan military and Kenyan civilian personnel with several technical advisers seconded by donor nations, all of whom are military officers. Even though IPSTC is structured and commanded under the Kenyan military hierarchy, it is exclusively dependent on external resources and support. Furthermore most senior positions at the centre are dominated by Kikuyu, Meru and Kalenjin officers.13 The ethnic dominance of these groups is unsurprising and reflects the strategy of co-option and favouritism in the military employed by successive regimes in Kenya.14 In total there are around 250 staff members at IPSTC. IPSTC HQ comprises the Director, Plans and Programmes and Admin and Finance. Local Kenyan civilian staff are often the sons and daughters of Kenyan military personnel.15 The Director is the head of the centre and is a Kenyan 1-star general. The former incumbent, Brigadier Kabage, has had some experience in PSO namely participating in the UN Mission in Sierra Leone as a DDR officer, as Kenya’s Defence Attache´ to the UN and by participating in several PSO orientated courses. The Director is responsible for implementing the strategic plan and oversees the running of the centre. He is the key liaison with partner institutions (AU, EASF, EAC, IGAD, APSTA, IAPTC etc.) as well as the link between the KMOSD, IPSTC and donor nations directly involved in the Centre’s development. The Director sits on the Joint Management Board and is supported by a command team and the three subordinate departments. In practice the

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Director is involved in almost all aspects of the centre’s running and tends to serve the interests of his superiors in the Kenyan military establishment over those of the Centre. The Director is supported by a plans and programmes team responsible for coordinating training across the two campuses. At the time of writing, the Chief of Staff of IPSTC and de facto number two in charge or running the Centre was a French lt colonel on loan to the British Government and seconded to IPSTC. The former CoS (2009–2013) was the main driving force and figure of accountability in IPSTC with the majority of donors wondering what will happen to IPSTC now that his tour has finished.16 He is a former French intelligence officer with operational experience in Algeria and DR Congo and has no prior PSO experience. He had a vision for the Centre and immense work ethic that has been at the backbone of the Centre’s rapid development from 2011–2013. Administration and finance departments manage activities such as procurement, logistics, external contracts (catering, water, petrol etc.) and human resources. Comprising a team of four, finance and administration mainly manages donor funds. However the Centre does generate substantial income from courses; for every course there is an administration charge of USD$100/week, a facilities charge of USD $100/day for large lecture halls and USD$55/day for classrooms. Accommodation is the largest income generator with rooms going for USD$85 including full board. All of this is charged to the donor sponsoring a course as well as funding a mentoring team, funding all flights for participants and any other resource needed to deliver a course.17 If one were to make a conservative estimate, a 10-day course with 20 participants using 1 lecture hall and 2 classrooms would generate around USD$20,000. If 30 courses at 10 days each are held at PCSS a year that is USD$500,000 generated by the operational level training wing alone. This estimate is surely on the low end, as it does not include the courses held at HPSS. The estimate also assumes courses are held for two weeks when some are for four weeks, does not include weekends which also incur charges and courses are more often than not over 25 participants plus several mentoring staff. When these are calculated the Centre is probably generating over a USD$1million per year. (According to IPSTC financial documents there was a surplus in 2011 of KSH65,712,942 which is roughly USD$760,000. In 2010 the surplus was over USD$1 million). 18

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Training is delivered through PCSS and HPSS depending on the level of students. In 2013, 93 courses were delivered at the Centre.19 In 2012, 94 courses were delivered at IPSTC over the two campuses, training 2,107 men and women to be peacekeepers at various levels. PCSS is the operational level training school in Karen and has facilities for up to 50 students as well as impressive teaching and lecture facilities. Since 2009, PCSS has trained over 3,000 peacekeepers at the operational level. Since 2001 the number of operational peacekeepers trained at PCSS is over 5,000.20 PCSS is staffed by several Kenyan and international military officers, some Kenyan civilian directing staff as well as a multitude of locally employed Kenyan civilians (who are mainly the sons and daughters of serving Kenyan military personnel) and is headed by a Kenyan colonel. Two Canadian majors and a US lt colonel are seconded to PCSS. However, when it comes to delivering courses there is no in-house ability at all. Staff at PCSS may deliver individual modules in a specific area but even this is below standard and more often than not the wrong information is taught. In reality, PCSS is little more than a conference centre hosting a large number of courses funded and delivered from outside, a fact well understood by donors, staff and participants alike but hotly contended in public by IPSTC. Due to its pre-deployment and tactical level focus involving collective training, HPSS is far larger than PCSS and is also under the command of a Kenyan colonel who reports to the Director of IPSTC. Facilities at HPSS include several accommodation blocks for up to 160 students and lecture halls and classrooms.21 HPSS also has a range for explosive and field training and perhaps most impressive of all is the development of a mock up PSO village. The PSO village is intended to replicate a variety of potential scenarios for peacekeepers and will involve role-playing and enactments of specific situations and cost USD $1.5million. Initial development phases were funded by the UK, Canada and Germany and finalisation of the village is thanks to the US.22 The village is in the final phases of development and is the only one of its kind on the continent. So far the village is used for a basic demonstration of a single, simple and somewhat unrealistic scenario of a UN platoon protecting an IDP camp. The research department has developed rapidly in four years. Now the peace and security research department (PSRD), it was initially staffed

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by a Kenyan and a Canadian major. Funded by Japan and the EU, the department currently has several civilian researchers and research funds although in-house expertise and capacity is still astoundingly low. The research department aims to inform training delivery and is split into two teams; applied research and curriculum design. The two sections were housed in different buildings until a newly constructed office was completed in 2015, however teams rarely interact with each other and the two sub-departments focus on different areas. As such the research department suffers from a lack of coordination, and applied research and curriculum design have little or nothing to do with each other. The applied research team has sections on Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and Post-Conflict Recovery, albeit arbitrarily designed with little relevance, and seeks to inform training design and delivery through ‘rigorous analysis of issues relating to peace operations’.23 Products include demand led papers, occasional papers, holding seminars and workshops and liaising with relevant organisations. Curriculum design is part of the research department comprising two civilian staff members and two Kenyan military officers, a major and a captain. A Canadian major heads the curriculum design department. The team is responsible for designing course aims, identification and analysis of target audience, determining course learning outcomes, determination of modules to the learning outcomes, drafting module specifications sheets, development of a generic block syllabus and determine the mode of training, evaluation and validation.24 These aims seem to blur with those of the training department. The team tries to meet these aims by producing learning plans for courses through writing boards involving external consultants and by commissioning external consultants to produce facilitator guides for each course. Much like course delivery, course design is entirely contracted out at great expense. The PSRD is also responsible for maintaining a library, a newsletter and publications as well as hosting a monthly guest lecture slot called the Amani Lecture series for Nairobi based and local experts. This has dissipated however and the last Amani Lecture was in 2010. Future plans include a massive expansion into an independent separate research institute co-located with IPSTC but autonomous of the centre.25 The Joint Control Board (JCB) sits above the Director and provides strategic oversight for the management and development of the centre and is the decision-making body of IPSTC. The JCB convenes twice a

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year and members are the Kenyan Assistant Chief of Defence Staff, ASF representative (EASF), Director Africa desk Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commander BPST-EA (UK), Kenya – US Liaison Officer (KUSLO), Canadian Defence Attache´, Japanese liaison officer and the Director of IPSTC.26 The lack of EU and regional involvement in the development of IPSTC is striking.

Donor Support Without donor support the centre would still be in embryonic form if it existed at all. Donors have been the driving force in developing IPSTC and assistance has come in the form of seconding technical advisers (mainly military), funding construction projects, funding courses and funding running costs.27 The donor approach to IPSTC is part of broader support to peacekeeping initiatives in Africa and aimed at developing African capability in peacekeeping. The British Government through the British Peace Support Team – Eastern Africa (BPST-EA)28 was the largest and longest serving donor to IPSTC and has financed all major construction projects, paid for running costs and seconded up to five military officers as advisers and managers to IPSTC. UK engagement is part of similar activities elsewhere in Africa and is partly based on the assumption that supporting regional conflict management initiatives staffed by African officials will forge regional cooperation and integration. The UK approach also assumes that by training large numbers of African peacekeepers a pool of persons will be created to be sent to peacekeeping operations and associated areas. The UK has peacekeeping training and military assistance teams in several countries in Southern, West and East Africa as well as bi-lateral projects focused towards building African capacity for peace operations and towards building autonomous democratically accountable security services in Africa.29 Since 2011 the UK has stepped back from IPSTC inasmuch as it has stopped all running costs and has cut back on most British secondments. What remains is funding for several courses and seconding a Lt Col to the HQ (a position that has often been a French liaison officer to the British Army). In 2011 the UK provided USD$2.2million which when broken down was USD$720,000 on courses, USD$368,000 on administration support, USD$321,000 contribution to the PSO village and USD$875,000 on

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advisers’ life support. This support was reduced to USD$545,000 in 2012 with the finalisation of the PSO village, the reduction of administration costs and the reduction of seconded military officers. The United States is the largest donor to IPSTC in terms of hard cash, although their role is less concerned with institution building and focuses more on training large numbers of peacekeepers. One Western TA described this approach as ‘drive by training’30 referring to the way the US team is parachuted in and then taken out without a trace after the course has been delivered. The US, through the State Department and ACOTA spends the majority of its funds on courses as well as seconding a liaison officer to the centre.31 The US also helped fund the PSO village. In 2012 the US gave USD$1.134 million to IPSTC. The European Union is the second largest donor to IPSTC allocating USD$845,000 in 2012 funds for courses as well as research activities. The EU delivers funds through its Africa Peace Fund as part of its support to the AU and APSA.32 As such funds for PSO training are administered by Brussels,33 bypassing the EU delegations in Addis and Nairobi. EU-AU support was developed from the Joint Europe Africa Strategy in Lisbon 2007.34 There is no permanent EU staff member seconded to IPSTC. Japan is another significant donor through the UNDP (2009–present) and funds research activities and some courses. In 2012 the Japanese Government through the UNDP provided USD$516,000. Much like the EU, Japanese funds are distributed through a third party (in this case the UNDP-Kenya) nor is there any permanent Japanese representation at the centre. Japan provides funds to several peacekeeping training centres and academies across Africa as part of a growing role in peacebuilding. Japan is not only a major donor at IPSTC but also to other training centres in the region and provides support to UN and AU peacekeeping missions. Japan provides funds for operating costs as well as courses and is the largest contributor to the research department. The last major donor is Canada, providing around USD$583,000 in 2012. Canada has been a longstanding partner of IPSTC seconding military advisers, funding courses, assisting research activities and funding part of the construction of the PSO village. There are several other donors involved with IPSTC. Germany through its development agency GTZ was instrumental in the inception of the centre but pulled out in 2008 only to re-engage later on. Other donors such as the Netherlands, Nordic states, Switzerland, Australia, and various

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international organisations are also tentatively becoming more involved, but for the present are content to either pay for an ad hoc course to be run or deliver it themselves as a stand alone package. IPSTC for its part aggressively seeks out new donors and visiting dignitaries are a weekly occurrence at the centre. Most striking is the Eastern African contribution to IPSTC, or rather lack of it. Given that IPSTC is a regional centre affiliated to APSA and the AU it is noticeable that there is no AU or regional contribution to the centre in terms of staff and/or funds. A Ugandan civilian and a Burundian lt colonel are staff in the research department but they have no role in terms of training delivery or the strategy of the centre, nor are they seconded by their governments. As two senior British officers said to me: ‘IPSTC is pretty much dominated by Kenya.’35. . . and . . . ‘Ultimately IPSTC is a Kenyan institution. It’s a KDF centre when you look around and see who is working here.’36 Kenya for its part is logged in the financial records as the largest donor to the centre providing USD$2.3million in 2012. However, these funds are the salaries of serving KDF staff who would be paid wherever they are sent and funds for training KDF pre-deployment which would have been funded by Kenya anyway. On paper it may look like Kenya is paying its way, but the reality is that without donor support no courses would take place at IPSTC.37

Course Content and Delivery Course content is extremely broad and aims to cover issues across the ‘conflict spectrum’ outlined in IPSTC’s strategic plan.38 The centre addresses this spectrum through courses with three programmes; the Conflict Prevention Programme, the Conflict Management Programme and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Programme.39 IPSTC’s official focus is the development of the EASF as well as AU stand alone missions, with UN missions a secondary priority. However, when looking at the range of courses UN issues and activities are clearly prioritised. More often than not courses at IPSTC address areas the AU either has limited or no capability in. As a result a great deal of confusion ensues regarding course

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content. Training meant for AU peacekeepers becomes a combination of UN and AU relevant activities blurring the two organisations and their different approaches to peacekeeping and related tasks.

Operational Level Courses All courses are delivered by external mentors and presenters and all courses are funded by Western donors.40 Furthermore, donors often insist on specific themes or issues that may be at odds with IPSTC’s needs and strategy. The Centre does have a role to play in designing course outlines, learning plans and facilitator guides but real design and delivery of these courses is all contracted out to external consultants and the products such as IPSTC’s course guides are rarely used. IPSTC has 26 operational level courses and several other training activities employing a systems approach to training. Training design and delivery is intended to be a four-stage process. The research department in collaboration with the training department begins the design process devising a learning plan. The learning plan is then researched by a resident expert and further developed until a course can be delivered. After course delivery there is then an evaluation and validation process examining conduct and content. However, the majority of courses are delivered by external partners and are all funded by donors. IPSTC has little ‘in-house’ expertise or capability to design and deliver courses by itself. Below is a detailed summary of operational level courses at IPSTC. Summary of Operational Level Training at the Peace and Conflict Studies School (PCSS) PCSS has three programmes, each with its own array of courses: a Conflict Prevention Programme, a Conflict Management Programme and a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Programme. Conflict Prevention Programme The Conflict Analysis and Prevention Course lasts 10 days and aims to enhance participants understanding of conflict issues. Students are taught analytical tools enabling them to identify and interpret key issues and dynamics of conflict systems. Target participants are practitioners working on peace and security issues in general and conflict prevention in general. Priority is given to participants working on peace and

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security on a daily basis and occupy positions as ‘desk officers’ that provide inputs into the decision-making process of their institutions. There are 24 slots for students and the course is funded by Japan through the UNDP. There are five learning outcomes: to understand the concept of conflict and its theoretical foundations; to understand the concepts of conflict specifically related to Africa and the issues that have shaped conflict dynamics on the continent since independence; to understand the foundations of conflict prevention theory and conflict prevention initiatives in Africa; to understand the importance of conflict analysis, the issues and tools of conflict analysis and apply the same to their office work and daily life and to apply conflict analysis skills and tools in the development of a ‘conflict prevention plan’.41 Dialogue, Negotiation and Mediation is a 10-day course of up to 24 participants. The course aims to increase participants’ effective response and ability to resolve conflict. Participants are exposed to a variety of skills associated with dialogue, negotiation and mediation processes as a tool for resolving and/or preventing conflict. Students should already be on a PSO or earmarked to deploy on a peacekeeping mission. Priority is given to roles interacting with combatants or actors in a conflict situation (e.g. Civil Affairs, Political Affairs, MILOBS, Early Warning and Conflict Prevention specialists, Election Monitors, Humanitarian Affairs etc.). The course is funded by Japan through the UNDP. There are five learning objectives: to understand the foundations of conflict and the conduct of conflict analysis relating to PSO; to increase the effectiveness of communication skills in an intercultural context; to understand the responses to conflict and the requirements of each of those responses; to apply skills associated with negotiations on PSO and to apply skills associated with mediation on PSO.42 The Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy Course is also a 10-day course for up to 24 participants. The course aims to equip students with relevant knowledge and skills in Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy so that they can participate in conflict prevention and other regional peace initiatives. Students should be top and middle level practitioners who are working with international, regional and sub-regional organisations and peacekeeping in general. Potential students should be involved on a daily basis in preventive and warning issues such as diplomats and special envoys. There are six learning outcomes: Demonstrate an understanding of the concepts

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of early warning, preventive diplomacy and conflict; understand early warning and preventive diplomacy in the context of armed conflict; understand the importance of early warning and armed conflict in PSO; identify and examine the role of international organisations in early warning and preventive diplomacy; demonstrate skills in the application of early warning and identify and examine the challenges and opportunities in the practice of early warning and preventive diplomacy in Africa.43

Conflict Management Programme The Senior Mission Leaders Course is IPSTC’s most prominent course. The course lasts 10 days and aims to equip participants with a better understanding of tasks and challenges associated with PSO leadership and management in order to increase the effectiveness of PSOs. The course targets military/civilian/police from selected organisations in East Africa (e.g. East African Standby Force, East African Community, IGAD etc.). The course is funded by the UK and EU. Course content is broad and students will become familiar with tasks and challenges associated with PSO leadership and management; questions regarding the leadership dimension of a multinational and integrated peace mission, including strategic thinking, sensible decision-making and problemsolving; issues related to the coordination and management of an integrated mission, negotiation and maintenance of good relations with leading parties in a host country, the ‘Conflict Cycle’ and the various interventions that may assist with conflict prevention and management and the frameworks associated with Security Sector Reform efforts.44 The Peace Operations Planning Course is a 10-day course for up to 30 participants. The course aims to enable participants to be effectively employed in the planning staff of a PSO as an operational planner. The course targets mid-level military staff officers in a mission planning capacity from the EASF or AU/UN operation. The course is funded by Japan through the UNDP. Course content is broad and students will become familiar with: the integrated mission planning process and products and processes needed for effective deployment of a PSO; preplanning activities such as identifying a crisis and rigorous analysis with a view to possible UN/AU intervention; UN/AU strategy development for a specific intervention; description of integrated functional strategies, identification of senior management and leadership and to assess and

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prioritise options; the products and processes associated with the development of mission plans and mandate implementation including transitioning of mission planning responsibilities to the Head of Mission and HQ. The Middle Level Leadership and Management Course lasts 5 to 10 days for up to 24 participants. The course aims to enhance students’ understanding of the principles of leadership and the application of management tools to increase efficiency in regional organisations. The course targets selected members of regional organisations addressing peace and security issues such as EASF, EAC, IGAD, ECOWAS, SADC and member states. The course has 12 learning outcomes: to be able to demonstrate the principles of leadership; to be able to identify the effects of culture on leadership; to be able to state and analyse small group dynamics; to be able to demonstrate an understanding of critical thinking; to be able to demonstrate competent skills in team building; to be able to apply skills in creative thinking and decision-making; to use project management skills effectively; to demonstrate and apply human resource management skills; to carry out facilitation; to detect and observe time management; to demonstrate an understanding of work place conflict resolution and to demonstrate recognition of communication theory.45 The Peace Operations Staff Officers Course is a 15-day course of up to 40 participants. The course targets selected military staff officers serving within a Brigade level HQ for the EASF, AU or UN. The course aims to enable participants to support the operational planning process within a unit HQ. There are five learning objectives: familiarity with operational staff skills including knowledge of Command Post Operations at sector level; ability to function in a multinational PSO; be able to effectively participate in HQ operations in a mid- to high-intensity environment; familiarity with the operational planning process including intelligence preparation on the battlefield, mission analysis, briefings, orders and execution; familiarity PSO including AU/EASF organisation, integrated mission planning process, PSO logistics, doctrine, organisation and function of an operations centre, standard operating procedures, time management, law of armed conflict, human rights, gender in PSO, child rights, HIV/AIDS, media relations and UN code of conduct.46 The Tactical Operations Staff Course (TOSC) is a 15-day course for up to 30 participants. TOSC aims to equip students with knowledge of HQ operations at the sector (brigade) and mission (division) levels. Students

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will be able to operate within a multinational PSO and in a mid- to high-intensity ‘battle rhythm’ operations centre. Students are selected field-level military officers from the EASF, AU and from PSO more widely. There are five learning outcomes: be able to demonstrate technical skills and tactical proficiency in operational tasks; demonstrate ability to visualise the ebb and flow of a mission; develop enhanced understanding in mastery of time and space as well as common operational culture and language; demonstrate ability to employ and deploy military resources through subordinate HQ and demonstrate ability to use the decision-making process efficiently.47 The Civil-Military Coordination Course (CIMIC) lasts 15 days for up to 40 participants. The CIMIC course aims to provide students with skills to perform coordination and liaison functions between civilian and military components of a PSO. Students are mid-level military and civilians (major – lt colonel and equivalents) likely to serve on a PSO as civil-military liaison. There are two learning outcomes: familiarity with PSO civil-military liaison including principles, concepts and activities; familiarity with CIMIC frameworks, processes and tasks including CIMIC concepts and terms, CIMIC structures and organisations, CIMIC planning, mission support, community support, quick impact projects (QUIPS) and CIMIC as part of integrated PSO.48 The Human Rights in PSO Course lasts 10 days for up to 20 participants. The course aims to enhance students’ understanding of the role of rights issues and how they relate to PSO. Students are drawn from selected regional organisations such as EASF, EAC, IGAD, ECOWAS, SADC etc. The course is funded by Japan through the UNDP. The course has five learning outcomes: Human rights – including definition of human rights, human rights and conflict, legal basis of human rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), examples of human rights, human rights violations and the application of human rights concerns for the conduct of a PSO; Humanitarianism – including definition of humanitarian assistance, delineation of humanitarian space, basic principles of humanitarian action, humanitarian actors, military support to humanitarian action and humanitarian consideration in planning; Gender Rights – including UNSC Resolution 1325 (women’s rights), definition of gender, the ‘gender perspective’, gender discrimination and violence, gender and human rights, gender and the cycle of conflict and gender mainstreaming in PSO; Child Rights – including the

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Convention on the rights of the child, definition of a child, obligation in line with international conventions and agreements, sexual abuse, child soldiers, activities designed to protect children’s rights, monitoring, reporting and protection of children’s rights and child’s rights consideration for PSO planning and conduct; Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) – including purpose, components and sources of LOAC, basic principles of LOAC, status of combatants and non-combatants, LOAC and the conduct of land warfare, chain of command legal obligations, individual legal obligations, war crimes and treatment of wounded, PoWs and civilians.49 The Peace Operations Logistics Course lasts 10 days for up to 40 participants. The course aims to provide selected officers with the necessary knowledge and skills to deploy as logistics officers on PSO, as support officers in a national HQ or in a mission HQ. Students are military officers from captain to lt colonel and civilian and police equivalents expected to deploy to a PSO. The course is funded by Canada. There are seven areas of instruction: UNHQ and DPKO and DFS organisation and functions; mission planning, deployment, reception, staging and onward movement (RSOM), sustainment and redeployment; UN field mission logistic and administrative support organisation; contingent owned equipment (COE), finance, procurement and contracting; national operational and logistic functions in PSO, current operational and logistic experiences/realities in PSO and the role of civilian, police and military observers in PSO.50 The Sexual and Gender Based Violence Course (SGBV) is a 10-day course for up to 24 participants. The course aims to enhance understanding of legal frameworks and international legal standards for the prevention of and response to SGBV. Focus is dedicated to the role of SGBV in PSO planning, implementation and conduct. Students are mid-level military, civilian and police personnel from the rank of major to colonel and civilian/police equivalents. There are six learning outcomes: understand how gender relates to contemporary PSO; understand the concepts of gender and sex, male and female; understand the causes of SGBV in armed conflict; be able to examine SGBV within international, regional and national legal frameworks as well as be able to respond appropriately; provide students with tools to prevent and respond to GBV and SGBV and to equip students with knowledge of strategies and mechanisms for appropriate prevention and response to SGBV.51

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The Media in PSO Course is a 10-day course for up to 24 participants. The course aims to enable peacekeepers to handle media related matters in the context of the mission. Participants should be earmarked to deploy on a PSO. Priority is given to three target groups: (i) firstly, military officers from the rank of captain-colonel (warrant officers are considered if appropriate) who will deploy in Sector HQs, as MILOBs and military advisers/experts at company and battalion levels; (ii) secondly, equivalent civilian ranks about to serve as Public Information Officers (PIO) on PSO and (iii) thirdly, equivalent ranked police officers in similar roles. The Media course has seven course outcomes: ability to identify and discuss key media concepts and tools; ability to demonstrate understanding of media and conflict; ability to outline the role of the media in PSOs; ability to identify role and challenges of PIOs on peacekeeping missions; demonstrate understanding of host country’s geopolitical, social, cultural and geographic environment; demonstrate ability to plan, develop and execute an effective PSO media strategy – including plan and conduct media interviews, public relations, media campaigns, press conferences, media reports, media briefs and releases and information analysis; demonstrate an enhanced understanding of the roles and use of media in PSO.52 The Protection of Civilians Course (PoC) is a 10-day course for up to 24 participants. The PoC course aims to enhance understanding of the importance of PoC in peacekeeping missions. Focus is on identifying legal instruments related to PoC and the effective implementation of protection within an operational framework of a PSO. Students are mid to higher level military/police/civilians from the rank of colonel to brigadier. Participants are selected individuals who are serving or will be serving in staff positions in regional organisations (EASF, IGAD, ICGLR and EAC) and PSOs (AMSIOM, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNMIS). There are six learning outcomes: demonstrate enhanced understanding of the concept of PoC in peacekeeping missions; identify legal frameworks of PoC; ability to discuss various ways to protect civilians in armed conflict; ability to discuss how to protect civilians in UN missions – including successes, setbacks and remaining challenges; ability to identify and develop guidance to prevent and respond to systematic attacks on civilians and ability to identify the need and ability to plan and implement a PoC plan.53 The AMISOM Multinational Force HQ Command and Staff Training Course is 20-day course for up to 49 participants. The aim is to produce

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AMISOM staff officers who understand contemporary PSO and are able to employ the military decision-making process in AMISOMs operations. Students are staff officers in a UN or AU mission HQ. The course is funded by the US. There are six learning outcomes: Multinational Force HQ training mission; ability to operate as part of a legally constituted multinational force implementing a agreement negotiated by legitimate international organisation; ability to supervise separation of warring factions using a zone of separation; protect NGO distribution activities; protect NGO medical installations and safeguard personal and public property using check points and patrols.54

Post-Conflict Recovery Programme The Security Sector Reform (SSR) Course lasts 10 days for up to 30 participants. The SSR course aims to enhance participants understanding of SSR objectives, framework and processes are applied in PSOs. Students are military/police/civilians who will deploy to a PSO or who are currently on a mission with an SSR focus. The course is funded by Japan through the UNDP. There are two learning outcomes: Familiarity with issues related to reform and good governance of the security sector; and ability to discuss issues related to the African context. Issues include security issues (extremism, organised crime, weapons of mass destruction), SSR conceptual frameworks, SSG (governance) conceptual frameworks, regional security co-operation, security strategies, security policy, post-conflict environment and the rule of law and transitional justice, the development of security structures and principles of modern policing.55 The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Course lasts 15 days for up to 40 participants. The DDR course aims to equip students with skills so that they can be effectively employed in support of the DDR component of a PSO. Students are military/ civilian/police personnel earmarked to deploy to a PSO in a DDR capacity. There are ten learning outcomes: UN integrated DDR standards; ‘Conflict Cycle’; SSR; participants and beneficiaries; DDR plans and planning; disarmament; arms control, security and development; demobilisation; social and economic reintegration and conflict resolution.56 The Community Policing Course lasts 10 days for up to 24 participants. The course aims to equip participants with policing skills in relation to

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PSO. Students are military/civilian/police staff officers who will deploy to a brigade level HQ within the EASF or other AU/UN mission.57 The Rule of Law (RoL) Course lasts 10 days for up to 24 participants. The course aims to expose students to the various aspects of RoL in relation to planning and conduct of a PSO. Students are military/police/ civilian staff officers from captain to colonel or equivalents. Participants should be serving currently or preparing to deploy to a PSO or Regional Economic Community (REC). Priority is given to the EASF and other ASF bodies. The course is funded by Japan through the UNDP. There are eight learning outcomes: ability to identify and explain the purpose, components and sources of RoL; ability to discuss basic principles of RoL; ability to differentiate between RoL and human rights in PSO; ability to understand concepts of RoL; ability to define and discuss aspects of human security; ability to practise RoL in the conduct of land operations; ability to identify the relationship between RoL and legal obligations and ability to identify and analyse existing PSO RoL initiatives and challenges.58 The Election Monitoring and Management Course lasts 10 days for up to 24 participants. The course aims to help students understand issues around election monitoring for the planning and conduct of PSOs. Students are military/civilian/police personnel of sub-regional organisations as well as Director level officials from foreign and defence ministries. There are three learning outcomes: Enhance participant awareness of factors around election monitoring and management; enhance ability to carry out election monitoring and management and improve the ability to recognise and deal with problems around election monitoring and management.59 The Operational Management of Prisons Course lasts 10 days for up to 24 participants. The course aims to strengthen capacity of students to carry out reforms in the corrections sector in a post-conflict environment. Students are serving corrections officers in South Sudan and AU/UN missions. There are six learning outcomes: ability to explain the role of prisons officers in enforcing the rule of law; identify problems associated with prisons in post-conflict situations; explain the role of prisons in peace and security; ability to identify and discuss legal responsibilities of a prison officer; demonstrate understanding of gender considerations in prison management and demonstrate how to implement a human rights approach to prison management.60

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Summary of Operational Level Training at the Humanitarian Peace Support School (HPSS) HPSS directs training at the tactical or theatre level61 and has three programmes: A Mine Action Disaster Programme, a Pre-Deployment Programme and a Disaster Management Programme. Mine Action Disarmament Programme The Mines and Small Arms Awareness Course lasts 10 days for up to 24 participants. The course aims to enhance understanding around mines and small arms for the planning and conduct of a PSO. Students are military/ civilian/police mid-level officer from captain to colonel and equivalents. Priority is given to personnel from EASF, EAC, IGAD, ICGLR, AMISOM, UNAMID, UNMIS and IPSTC. The course has eight learning outcomes: ability to identify mines and unexploded ordinances; demonstrate UXO clearance skills; ability to discuss mines in PSO; ability to identify UN policies around demining in PSO; ability to prepare and apply necessary skills for demining; demonstrate understanding of demining procedures; outline and explain the role of SALW in PSO and identify and discuss factors that cause SALW proliferation in PSO.62 The Counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Course lasts 10 days for up to 24 participants. The course aims to enhance understanding of issues relating to IED disposal, Law of Armed Conflict and associated factors for PSO planning and conduct. Students are military/civilian/police from the rank of captain to colonel and equivalents. Students should be drawn from regional organisations and PSOs. There are five course learning outcomes: demonstrate understanding of factors associated with IEDs for the planning of PSO; identify and describe different IEDs and their impact; how to deal with and IED detection/explosion situation; demonstrate an enhanced understanding of bomb management procedures and to be able to conduct IED risk assessment and develop an IED reactionary plan. Tactical level courses include a Humanitarian Deming Course and Explosive Ordinance Disposal Course. Pre-Deployment Programme The Military Observer (MILOB) Course lasts 15 days for up to 40 participants. The course aims to equip students with the relevant skills to deploy as MILOBs on a PSO. Students are drawn from PSOs and a

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variety of organisations and are from the rank of captain to colonel. There are five learning objectives: demonstrate understanding of the structures and procedures of the UN and AU; recognise the various layers in a PSO, principles of PSO an associated actors; demonstrate understanding of historical and geopolitical backgrounds, mandates and organisation of relevant PSOs; ability to state the duties and tasks of a MILOB and to develop skills to improve effectiveness on a mission – including observation skills, negotiation and mediation techniques, use of language assistants, briefing skills, search techniques, logging and reporting, communication, crater analysis, map reading, driving skills, first aid, mine awareness and security and survival skills. The Civilian Pre-Deployment Training Course is a 10-day course for up to 30 participants. The course aims to prepare students to be employed in civilian capacities on a PSO or field office. Students are civilians earmarked for deployment. The course has thirteen learning outcomes: PSO meaning and legal context; actors in PSO; conflict analysis; humanitarian assistance; CIMIC; gender issues in PSO; code of conduct; reporting techniques; field skills – map reading, compass, radio etc.; security skills – mine awareness, arms recognition; first aid; stress management and conflict resolution.63 The Contingent Pre-Deployment Training Course lasts 10 days for up to 60 participants. The course intends to prepare staff officer to deploy at battalion or sector level on a PSO. The course targets mid-level military staff officers. The course has 11 learning outcomes: demonstrate understanding of the UN system and PSO; understand UN legal frameworks; understand stress, HIV/AIDS and malaria management; understand codes of conduct and rules of engagement in PSO; understand cultural diversity in an multidimensional environment; understand the prevention of sexual abuse and exploitation; understand security awareness, UXD and land mines; understand human rights and gender equality; familiarity with UN agencies; ability to conduct DDR and ability to apply the UN log system for country owned equipment (COE).64 There is also a tactical level UN/AU Police Course.

Disaster Management Programme The Disaster Management Programme focuses on training national forces and relevant civilian bodies in response to natural disasters and hazards. Courses include Incident Command Systems, Military Disaster

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Response, Disaster Response and Management and a Search and Rescue. Disaster Management courses are not focused towards peacekeeping operations.

Conclusion IPSTC has progressed rapidly from its origins as Kenya’s national peacekeeping training institution to an international centre serving the region’s PSO training needs. The Centre has impressive facilities, especially the mock-up village and has trained over 5,000 men and women to be peacekeepers since its inception. Courses are delivered focusing on operational and tactical level training and the centre has begun to produce research publications. The important steps of internationalisation and stepping away from the KMOSD are beginning to take place paving the way for IPSTC to effectively deliver regional PSO training. However, questions remain about the quality of some of the training delivered at IPSTC as well as the Centre’s conceptual basis, operating style and structures. The following chapter will seek to deconstruct IPSTC in order to investigate these issues.

CHAPTER 4 DECONSTRUCTING THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTRE (IPSTC)

Introduction The previous chapter outlines the official version of IPSTC, how it articulates the delivery of training and how the Centre functions on paper. This chapter explores the training and organisational practices of IPSTC and investigates the relevance and effects of courses delivered. In doing so I show how the Centre falls short of achieving its stated and official aims of building regional and AU peacekeeping capability and instead caters to a set of informal and more internally focused dynamics. The intended outcomes of improving, reforming and integrating Eastern Africa’s military elite is patchy at best. Instead the system of training employed at IPSTC is governed by national and other internal priorities. For the purposes of this analysis, I explore the role of structures, staff and departments as well as the organisational culture and management systems. I also analyse courses delivered to IPSTC in relation to AU peacekeeping (see Chapter 2) in order to determine applicability of training. A deeper analysis of four diverse courses delivered at IPSTC is also provided to tease out the detail of PSO training dynamics. This chapter constitutes much of the data collected during the period of fieldwork from 2013 as well as substantial material I gained whilst I was employed at the Centre from 2008–2009. I employed an ethnographic

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approach to gathering data during my stay at IPSTC in 2013. I attended all courses over a period of three months. During this time I stayed at the student accommodation block at the Centre, which gave me unique access to both formal and informal settings at IPSTC. I took all meals with participants at the mess, which is co-located with the accommodation block and attended after work social interactions with staff and students, such as drinks in the mess and day trips to Nakuru for specific courses. This approach provided access to all staff, students and donors, and more importantly, being onsite 24/7 enabled me to inform a detailed narrative of how the Centre functions, both formally and informally, intended and unintended. The following analysis is therefore based on participantobservation interviews with staff, donors and students to tease out some of the more informal and unintended effects stemming from the development of and training delivered at IPSTC.

Institutionalising Informality: Departments, Staff and Structures Training at IPSTC is intended to target the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), in particular the development of the African Standby Force and AU peacekeeping capability.1 However, IPSTC courses are predominately focused on UN operations to the detriment of AU training. As a result much course content is only partly relevant for AU missions. The arbitrary nature of IPSTC’s structures plus the disproportionate influence Western technical advisers have has encouraged not only UN heavy course content, and rapid expansion into overly ambitious or unrelated areas but an ethos of external imposition. Kenyan military and IPSTC staff have given their tacit approval to this system fearing that aid money will be turned off if they contest donor assistance. As a result IPSTC is more akin to a conference centre or hotel catering to external patrons as opposed to a centre of excellence in regional PSO training. Departments at IPSTC are somewhat detached from the core business at the Centre and have a limited role to play in the day-to-day delivery of courses, in part due to the externally imposed nature of training delivery. The training department is woefully understaffed and the few existing staff have little to do except as administrators sourcing external experts for specific courses. Finance and administration are perhaps the most effective departments managing donor financial flows to the Centre.

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The research department, much like the training department, is far detached from training and provides a useful insight into the disconnect between rhetoric and reality at IPSTC. The research department has no link whatsoever to the core activities of the Centre. Current research activities do not inform training nor do they address peacekeeping needs at all. Instead research at IPSTC looks at conflict in Eastern Africa from a very broad perspective ranging from inter-communal conflicts at the local level to oil and gas dynamics in Eastern Africa.2 Research topics are extremely ambitious and do address different aspects of conflict in Eastern Africa. However, few topics if any apply to training at IPSTC or peacekeeping tasks more broadly. There is a limited attempt to address regional training needs nor is there any real attempt to feed research into the strategy or outputs of the Centre. There is almost no attempt to research issues around AU peacekeeping or the development of the ASF and EASF specifically, which is central to IPSTC’s existence. Instead research is ad hoc and uncoordinated with no real target audience. Research products are completely unrelated to peacekeeping and instead focus on local political issues with a bias towards issues affecting Kenya alone. Furthermore, research products are lengthy and there is no defined or visible readership. Even the donors who fund the research department rarely read or use research products. When speaking about Japan’s relationship with IPSTC a Japanese Government official noted some of these shortcomings: There are also some concerns about research. Who reads the papers? Maybe they are too long. The Minister (Japanese Development Minister) commented that no one will read over ten pages. And they only do these long thirty page papers. I’m not sure who reads them or acts upon them more importantly. And that is the point. They need to act on the research, but who does? We don’t know who reads it. For example we supported a research symposium looking at South Sudan and issues of conflict. They should have sent the papers to the governments of South Sudan and Kenya who in turn needs to read the papers and act on them. But this never happened.3 The diplomat has touched upon the questionable approach the research department undertakes, a department that her government funds. The response to these identified shortcomings was not real concern but

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indifference, further reflecting the donor’s tacit approval of the current system. To put it simply, if the research department was removed, the Centre would be able to continue delivering training at current course output with no effect on content, procedures or capability. These issues have also not escaped the notice of several Kenyan academics in Nairobi who have worked with the Kenyan military for several years. When discussing the role of research at the Centre with a lecturer from the Catholic University of East Africa who was lecturing on a course he observed: The research department is not focused on the mandate of IPSTC at all, nor is the content of much of the training. All these courses are imported. There is no proper evaluation of the courses at all. What is the research department doing?4 Staff members themselves contribute to a culture of mediocrity at the Centre. Few staff are qualified if at all to be employed in the positions they fill; both military and civilian and both Kenyan and Western technical advisers. As one Western military officer seconded to IPSTC said to me: The main problem with IPSTC is staff and management, or should I say mismanagement. The head of training doesn’t know how to do his job. I’ve never received an email from him and we are supposed to be working together. We don’t get the best guys from KDF. I know there are excellent and competent officers in KDF, I’ve taught them. But there is no one here who is that competent, that’s for sure. It’s the passed over military we get here.5 This technical adviser expanded on his point about management and staff with a concrete example of how the lack of adequate experience as well as the dominance of military personnel play out in the day-to-day setting: Canada wanted to run a MILOBS course here at IPSTC when General Kibochi was Director. I wanted the Kenyans to take the lead so that we could build the capacity of IPSTC and the Kenyans to deliver a MILOBS course themselves. Kibochi agreed wholeheartedly to this.

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But after having agreed this, the Kenyans just didn’t deliver at all. Not because they couldn’t but because there was no desire or commitment to get stuck in. So the Canadians had to get more involved and we were then accused of dominating the course. I had to say to Director IPSTC that your men are not following direction. That was a mistake. He went nuts. Wrote letters to the Canadian Ambassador to try and get me removed. Just because I was seen to be criticising KDF. I wanted to build capacity but the Kenyans failed to deliver.6 The Centre is dominated by military personnel and the few civilian positions are extremely junior with no say on the strategy of the Centre. There is no civilian influence at senior levels at all. As a result, vastly under qualified individuals in peacekeeping are developing, designing and implementing courses in areas they have no knowledge about. The Kenyan military who fill most positions at IPSTC are loathe to assist in expanding the Centre to become regionally staffed or to become independent of Kenyan defence structures. As one instructor at IPSTC said to me in response to my questioning the lack of regional representation, ‘it’s a Kenyan Centre.’7 Most KDF staff at the Centre reflect broader civil-military relations in Kenya in that they are representative of a fragmented socio-political elite structure underscored by ethnicity and patrimonialism.8 In that regard the majority of military officers at IPSTC belong to the ‘supraethnic’ bloc of nilotic communities who have historically constituted the military and elite circles since independence.9 As a result, informal decision-making around regime security dictates the running of the Centre. So, while the Director position has been staffed by competent individuals, at the same time the Director is beholden to the whims of KMOSD and will tend to put the commands of his superiors in the Kenyan military over the concerns of the Joint Management and Control Board. Few, if any other Kenyan military staff members have been to a peacekeeping mission or have any real qualification to be posted to a PSO training centre. As a result, no Kenyan military staff can deliver courses at IPSTC, as noted by the Canadian Technical Adviser above. The only civilians at IPSTC are mainly confined to the research department. Two directing staff have recently been hired within the training department but are essentially administrators. Civilians at IPSTC are vastly unqualified for their positions. None have any

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background in peacekeeping, regional conflict or associated issues. Most are Kenyan with either a background in Kenyan grass roots NGOs, or have just finished university. Although civilians are educated with at least an undergraduate degree, few are in a relevant field and none have any practical or research experience in peacekeeping at all. It is almost as if these civilians have been subsumed into a military hierarchy towards the lower end. This has certainly not gone unnoticed by observers. One of the British military advisers co-located with IPSTC was quite frank in his conversations with me about the staff at IPSTC: What is missing really is any form of regular oversight to say that the material taught remains current and up to date relating to the tactical environment and theatre of operations to where the troops will be deployed. What is also needed is the local context. You can’t teach something before you have experienced the challenges and particular dynamics on the ground. I would question the quality of some of IPSTC’s staff. There is almost no experience in current complex peacekeeping by the Kenyans, except in Somalia since 2010. It seems that doing a course on PSO is qualification enough to then become an instructor.10 A legion of technical advisers are also present at IPSTC and have come in the form of Western military officers, mainly at major or lt colonel level but also several NCOs, seconded by their national defence forces to support PSO training. As a result chain of command is extremely blurred. As full time IPSTC staff members, TAs must report to the Director in the Centre but real authority lies with their home governments. This arrangement amplifies the feeling of superiority of the TAs who can be derogatory and demeaning about their African counterparts at times of frustration and during professional disagreements. This was highlighted to me over and over again by several individuals. One senior EASF official was acutely aware of the donor-recipient relationship at IPSTC. In discussing this issue he conceded the need for support from outside given resource limitations by the Centre but also that elements of superiority underscored relationships between Western technical advisers and African military officials: The first day I was at EASF is a good example. I am a trainer. In the Seychelles I was a police trainer in intelligence and counter

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terrorism. At the main planning conference for the CPX (annual EASF exercise) this German guy and a Swedish guy were talking to me and they thought I was a white man from somewhere. He said to me ‘look at them. They come here for the $250 DSA, they just come to take our taxpayers money’. There were Burundians, Rwandans Kenyans sitting someway away that he was referring to. This flipped me over. I didn’t say anything but as someone from this continent I was offended. The same thing was repeated to me by some other donor a month later. It was only when I spoke my mind in a meeting that they knew I wasn’t a white man per se! In Germany they probably live in a small apartment. Probably take a train to work or have a small car. Probably have loans to pay. I said to them that in my country I am not a rich man. But my house in Seychelles you can’t afford! So I said don’t think that all Africans are after your money. In fact it is Africa that is making you live like a king! Your cottages, your maids, your big dogs, your big cars, the restaurants you eat in on our behalf, the five star living you do on our behalf.11 On arriving at IPSTC these Western technical advisers find themselves thrust into a bizarre environment where they are suddenly propelled to positions of serious influence. All TAs are on extremely lucrative international packages, some with diplomatic status and all with luxurious life support; a far cry from serving in their military back home or on operations abroad. Work tends to be slow at the Centre and some TAs revel in the fact that they can take a more relaxed attitude whilst still fulfilling their workload. Few have any real experience in African PSO, although a minority have been to UN missions. TAs seconded to the Centre soon realise that in order for IPSTC to deliver products they will have to be the driving force. Attitudes differ of course with some TAs content to do the minimum required whilst others are workaholics striving to make the Centre better. Others have used the Centre for their own benefits such as carving out senior areas for themselves with a view to getting a UN job or staying on at a Private Military Company (PMC) in East Africa. Whatever the case, TAs are usually looked upon by other IPSTC staff as the ones who will do the work and provide the money.

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Student/Participant Selection and Incentives Student selection is a real issue. The selection process tends to be longwinded and dysfunctional. There is no grading or examination process at all and a certificate is guaranteed by course attendance only. For each course a participant request is sent to the EASF Coordinating Mechanism (EASFCOM) as the principle audience for training. The request is sent on to Member States who select participants and then refer the names back to EASFCOM who in turn refer them onto IPSTC. Equal slots are given to EASF Member States although the Kenyan Ministry of Defence and IPSTC have a disproportionate percentage of slots allocated to them. According to donors, EASF officials and IPSTC staff very few participants are deployed to AU peacekeeping missions.12 IPSTC also lacks a system of tracking students as well as ensuring that those trained will deploy to a peace mission. Although a database has been established to log students and to follow up on where they go, it is almost impossible to track students effectively with little invested in this area by the Centre.13 Participant selection is highly personalised and on an individual basis with some slots on a course given to friends, confidents and loyalists of member states. Selection problems may also arise due to inefficiency within national Defence Ministries resulting in last minute searching for an adequate participant.14 Indeed when interviewing students from four different courses it was clear that very few would go to a peacekeeping mission, although most wanted to. Participants not only attended courses to gain insights into specific PSO orientated topics but also to get a certificate, build CVs, create networks of contacts, gather intelligence, national capability building, a holiday to Kenya or to see family members who live in Nairobi, rewards for up-and-comers or for retiring friends and of course for per diems or the daily subsistence allowance (DSA). The breadth of training in turn effects the target audience and student selection. As courses are broad in nature with some courses outside the remit of AU peacekeeping, such as the more ‘peacebuilding’ orientated courses, other institutions and organisations are targeted in order to fill slots on courses. In addition to APSA, IPSTC specifically targets Regional Economic Communities (RECs), National Ministries, UN Missions, UN Country Teams, National Religious Leaders, National Youth leaders and some course outlines state that it is open

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to ‘anyone working in the field of peace and security.’15 The target audience is extremely broad with no real specifications bar that of a ‘practitioner on peace and security’. Furthermore, peacekeepers are low down on the list of desired applicants whereas national defence policy makers and those in international organisations are preferred. Specifically targeting AU peacekeepers is mentioned in less than half of the course learning plans and only in those under the Conflict Management pillar.

Donor Approach IPSTC has a plethora of donors who are essentially the lifeline of the Centre, keeping it alive through the drip of seemingly eternal funds. The donor approach to IPSTC is part of broader support to peacekeeping initiatives in Africa, and is seen as complimentary to improving the capability of specific missions in Africa and also improving the professionalisation of African armed forces. In this regard donors invest in IPSTC as it is seen as part of Security Sector Reform (SSR), one of the buzzwords for today’s diplomats and development staff. PSO training also fits neatly into donor measurement models. Donors can count or measure how many African peacekeepers are trained with their aid money. However, who they are and where they go is not recorded. Quantitative assessments tend to trump more qualitative methods of validating training delivered across the board. National and organisational interests are also key considerations for donors. By providing aid to IPSTC, donors can further their own unilateral foreign policy and development goals, such as access to opaque military structures, immigration control and footholds in regions prone to conflict or terrorism. This approach may fit well with donor development models and theories on capacity building, but by forgoing a qualitative approach to PSO training and foreign assistance it is extremely difficult to establish whether courses are contributing to enhanced African PSO capability, especially if there is almost no ability to track and trace students. In doing so, foreign military assistance has changed precious little in the last hundred years or so. The aims are to reform for the better or ‘civilise’ the indigenous forces into an effective regional force to be deployed into African theatres in order to control local violence, reminiscent of the

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Kings African Rifles, West African Frontier Force and to a lesser extent the Force Publique. Military aid, for that is what PSO training is, is dished out to favoured or trusted states and foreign influence and conditionalities, whether explicit or implied, are crucial calculations for donors. As a result much local context is lacking and the unintended consequences and internal effects of foreign military assistance of this kind are simply not anticipated. The UK’s consistent support to IPSTC through the British Peace Support Team-Eastern Africa (BPST-EA) has been based on the assumption that supporting regional conflict management initiatives staffed by African officials will forge regional cooperation and integration. The UK approach also assumes that by training large numbers of African peacekeepers a pool of persons will be created to be sent to peacekeeping operations and associated tasks. A final rationale for support is based on UK internal priorities of assisting the curbing of foreign immigration to the UK from Eastern Africa, assisting with UK foreign policy on Somalia and gaining access to the militaries of the region. BPST-EA have had a longstanding relationship with IPSTC and other partners such as EASF, the AU and the KDF. The team is extremely professional and dedicated to the job in hand. However, serious disputes and confrontations have occurred in the history of BPST. Several BPST staff have been removed from EASF positions in the past and the team is often referred to as ‘colonial’ by African partners with one senior EASF official stating ‘who are these blue-eyed boys coming here and telling us what to do?’16 BPST staff, although seemingly aware of this perception, have been content to persevere with the same approach. One issue is that the team is composed of almost entirely military personnel with little in-depth experience of Africa although there are some exceptions. And civilian staff tend to be ex-military. Frustrations abound, especially over time keeping, designing policies and implementing policies. The team itself live an extremely comfortable life. Residences are paid for by the UK Government and BPST personnel are entitled to large four or five bedroom houses in one of the most exclusive neighbourhoods in Kenya with all the trimmings of large gardens and house staff. Family flights are included, as is an extra pay benefit as BPST is considered an operational deployment by the UK MoD. Given this opulence the

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technical advisers live in, it is hardly surprising that life support consumes 50 per cent of BPST’s operating costs and the perception among BPST’s recipients is that they live a very comfortable life reminiscent of a bygone era. A further trend is that many former BPST employees have opted to end their career in the military after finishing their tour with BPST and seek to stay on as consultants or working in private security companies in East Africa. Although beyond the scope of this research, it would be interesting to investigate possible correlations between the rise of PMCs in Africa in line with retiring military advisers from donor-funded military assistance programmes. The US approach to PSO training at IPSTC is almost the complete opposite to the UK. Although the notion of building African PSO capability is shared, the approach is remarkably different. Typically the US, through the State Department, trains African peacekeepers through its African Contingency Operations and Training Programme (ACOTA). The US will also only sponsor and deliver a course through its Department of Defence or a US private military company and will not build capacity in terms of developing the training centre. The rationale for US assistance is a simple financial calculation as one of the ACOTA trainers explained: It’s a cost-benefit issue. To send one American solider into theatre, with all his kit, transport and everything else costs about USD $10,000 a month. An African soldier costs USD$1,000. It’s a matter of economic calculations. That’s why the US wants to train African peacekeepers. It’s as simple as that.17 Although financial calculations are part of the reason for this approach, other factors such as building support for the Global War on Terror within Eastern Africa and maintaining a foothold in the region are also key considerations for the US.18 ACOTA seconds a US liaison officer to IPSTC between the Centre and Washington. He is a lt colonel and assists in courses and also keeps an eye on where the US can add value and for national information gathering. When ACOTA sponsors a course at IPSTC it is delivered by Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), a US private military company. The State Department uses aid money to pay a US registered company to deliver the training. MPRI teams are composed of former US military service personnel with limited or no African experience. Courses are targeted

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to specific missions and are based on US doctrine (see AMISOM FHQ course below). There is a country manager in Kenya but all other MPRI members are US-based. The EU supports IPSTC through funding from the Africa Peace Fund and provides finance only. Over the next four years the EU will provide 11.4 million Euros to 17 training centres across the continent.19 The EU sees its support as part of its engagement and strategy with Africa and the African Union. Support to PSO training centres compliments support to broader peacekeeping in Africa, which includes financing UN and AU missions and also several other peace initiatives ranging from EU Security Sector Reform missions, such as the EUSEC in DRC, to political offices such as UNPOS for AMISOM and peacebuilding missions such as BINUB in Burundi. Support to peacekeeping training is then opened up to support the EU’s wider priorities, which sometimes fall outside the remit of IPSTC. As one EU official responsible for PSO training activities put it ‘EU training policy covers everything.’20 The EU therefore funds training centres guided by its own priorities, approach and perceptions in developing Africa’s peacekeeping capability that are imposed upon recipients in order to receive funding. The detachment of the EU from the Centre is striking in that all support provided by Brussels goes through other organisation such as the AU or EASF and there is no EU seconded position at the Centre. The EU distributes funds from afar for courses but with no appetite to evaluate the quality or content of the courses paid for. This is hardly surprising given that support to IPSTC is one branch of support to training centres across the continent, which in turn is one branch of peacekeeping support which is itself one branch of peace and security support. Finally peace and security support is a further tributary of the EU’s strategic support to the AU. The result is a complicated web of departments that provide financial support to the Centre. The activities and products used with EU funding have limited oversight except to have some relevance to EU peace and security priorities in Africa, which, as has been stated, covers almost everything. Although Japan is a major donor to IPSTC there is limited oversight and evaluation of its assistance by Japanese officials. Part of the difficulty is the arrangement Japan has that necessitates working through the UNDP in providing assistance. As the Japanese constitution prohibits a military and military assistance, the Japanese Government must

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distribute funds for programmes through a third party.21 As a result Japanese diplomats are quite detached from IPSTC. Diplomats will perhaps visit the Centre twice or three times a year for official launches, course openings and other official and protocol reasons but substantial oversight on Japanese Government funds from Tokyo is lacking. The Centre for its part encourages this arrangement as they can point to support from both the UN and the Japanese Government and fall somewhere in between accountability lines. The employees like it as they can say they have been employed by the UN on their CVs. Strangely these shortcomings of IPSTC were identified by one of the Japanese diplomats involved in supporting the Centre: We joke around the office that IPSTC is there so that they can send ‘the bad ones’. In all seriousness it’s basically a vacation with cash. They get a per diem and come to nice Nairobi for a few weeks; go shopping, go to bars etc., and then just sit in class, take a few notes and get a certificate.22 An interesting motivation for the serious interest Japan has taken in this area is that there are plans to develop a PSO training centre in Tokyo. In the last few years the Japanese Government has been at the forefront of trying to support innovative approaches to PSO training. The approach has almost been one of trial and error or at least an experiment to see what works and doesn’t work in this field with a view to taking lessons back to Japan in order to build a Japanese Centre of Excellence.23 Other donors such as Canada and Germany share these dynamics of external aims delivered in line with internal agendas and priorities. The donor dynamic to IPSTC is therefore also governed by an internalexternal dynamic to the detriment of achieving quality PSO training. Donors are un-coordinated and competitive in their support to IPSTC indicative of a broader malaise in foreign military assistance and peacekeeping support. Such an approach not only lends itself to abuse and manipulation on the part of the recipients but also actively encourages it.

Training Delivery Courses at IPSTC are a prime example of the meretricious nature of training and structures. IPSTC’s focus on Conflict Prevention, Conflict

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Management and Post-Conflict Reconstruction are not underscored by any rationale but are seen as accepted wisdom and loosely correspond to a simplified version of liberal peacebuilding. There may well be salience in employing this approach but there is limited context regarding the Centre’s remit. The AU and the ASF are really only capable of conflict management with specific elements cross-cutting these broad areas.24 African Union missions are predominately military, although civilian and police capacity is also important in specific and context relevant areas. As seen in Chapter 2, the AU peacekeeping tasks are limited to military operations and political and technical advice in certain areas. Instead of trying to add value to peacekeeping, by specialising in specific courses relevant to AU and UN missions, IPSTC has preferred to try and deliver as many courses as possible seeing success in quantitative rather than qualitative terms. Indeed IPSTC staff members will delight in expressing how many courses are held at IPSTC when compared to other Centres in the region. The courses themselves are detailed in compulsory learning plans outlining the training need of the course, the aim, course modules and course delivery. These learning plans are extremely generic and reflect a very technical approach to conflict. Course learning plans are populated through writing boards. Three to five subject matter experts (SMEs) are invited to IPSTC for three days to design a course. The SMEs with members of the research department sit down and hammer out a learning plan. A writing board is conducted for each course at great expense, at around USD$8,000.25 The proceedings from the writing boards are then turned into a learning plan by IPSTC. However the majority of learning plans tend to be duplicated in a ‘cut and paste’ approach. A prime example is the learning plan for Pre-Battalion Deployment.26 This learning plan has teaching outcomes and modules cobbled together from various courses producing an impressive sounding but ultimately irrelevant course outline. Modules range from detail of the ‘Conflict Cycle’, to negotiation and mediation and even include conflict analysis and conflict prevention even though this course aims to train a military contingent to deploy to a PSO within a specific sector of operations. For other courses, modules and teaching points may have some relevance but more often than not they are less relevant for operational level peacekeepers.

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Facilitator guides are commissioned by IPSTC at USD$6,000 each and are intended to be the main teaching aid for a specific course. These are lengthy handbooks providing detail of course content such as a breakdown of teaching points, reference material, lesson plans and all aspects needed to deliver the course.27 However, the cut-and-paste approach in producing these handbooks is evident and facilitator guides are only available for a select few of the courses conducted at IPSTC. Those facilitator guides the Centre does have in its possession are rarely, if at all, used when delivering a course. The conceptual basis for each course is the ‘Conflict Cycle’.28 Conflict is seen as having a starting point, a peak and then a trough indicating a rise in hostilities and then an eventual reduction in violence. This process is presented as static and linear much like a mathematical equation. This cycle neatly correlates to IPSTC’s pillars and notions of building a liberal peace beginning with the conflict prevention phase, peaking with conflict management followed by a post-conflict reconstruction phase. Taught interventions for peace are related to different stages of the ‘Conflict Cycle’ such as the deployment of a peacekeeping mission, SSR and disarmament programmes, UN country team development activity and diplomatic prevention tactics. Although some of this basis is salient there is rarely any detail or debate about the ‘Conflict Cycle’ itself or the nature of conflict in specific areas. Instead conflict is seen as an established and accepted set of technical processes that can be individually addressed and mitigated if a set of agreed steps are taken at the right time. Furthermore the sheer breadth of issues at play at various stages of this definition of conflict gives the Centre license to organise courses on almost any activity as long as there is some mention of ‘conflict.’ This conceptual basis for training is so broad that UN doctrine dominates course content in order to be relevant or applicable. AU peacekeeping does not have the scope to address the entire ‘Conflict Cycle’ as it is presented at IPSTC contributing to UN heavy course content. Most striking is that course content is highly theoretical to the detriment of more practical training and relevance for activities on a peacekeeping mission is lacking. The result is a plethora of generic and technical courses with little grounding in the reality of contemporary peace operations in Africa. In discussing the development of the EASF peacekeeping capability and IPSTC support, a senior EASF military

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official was quite candid in his view of the training provided by the Centre: IPSTC’s curriculum does not apply to issues on the ground. They want to showcase instead. Everything is funded by foreigners and everyone wants to take advantage of it. Its part of a broader rent-seeking mentality. Look at the curriculum, there is no analysis to see if it is relevant. The courses are just put together as they go along. They are all over the place.29 In summary, the process of training delivery is acutely flawed. The Centre has limited in-house capacity to deliver courses at all and is more of a conference centre than training school. All courses are paid for and delivered by external donors, subject matter experts, facilitators and mentors. IPSTC staff may provide basic teaching plans and guides, administrative support and the odd lecture but everything else is paid for, conducted and delivered from outside. As a result IPSTC has no real say over course content and how it is delivered. This means that there is little appetite or incentive to critically examine and evaluate courses by the Centre itself. In addition no capacity or capability is built within the Centre to deliver courses independently once donor funding and outside support is removed, calling into question long-term sustainability of the current system employed. Teaching methodology is also extremely limited and ineffectual. The majority of courses are lecture based with some plenary discussion. Practical exercises are few and far between. Various adult education techniques are articulated in IPSTC’s operating documents but few are implemented given that courses are delivered by outside facilitators, some of whom are practitioners, academics or specialists in areas of peacekeeping. However, many facilitators and subject matter experts are unqualified for assisting IPSTC with courses. Most have been involved with the Centre since it was a national PSO training centre and many others are either alumni of the Centre or regional or international consultants with a history of working with IPSTC. As a result a small ‘old boy’ network of SMEs, facilitators and consultants work closely with IPSTC. Other SMEs are invited from current peacekeeping missions outside of Kenya and even from Europe and North America, at great expense to donors. All receive lucrative hourly or daily rates for services and luxurious treatment.

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Training Aids: Africa is a Country The two main training aids are standardised throughout IPSTC’s training; the country study of Carana and a mock up village for interactive PSO training and demonstrations. From a technical perspective these aids are an asset to the Centre by providing insensitive and practical exercises to explore issues of peacekeeping that missions may encounter in-theatre. However, the construction of these two training aids are imposed from outside and reinforce distorted preconceptions. The intention of providing ‘catch all’ scenarios results in a fractured picture that depicts an imagined state of Africa rather than an African state. It is worth examining these issues in further detail in order to show how even the training discourses around peacekeeping in Africa are subject to the internal-external influences.

Carana: An Imagined State of Africa The common training scenario used across the variety of courses delivered at IPSTC is the fictional country of Carana. This training scenario was originally developed for UN peacekeeping training but has been adapted by the Canadian organisation the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) for the African Standby Force. The AU has accepted the use of this scenario and is used in most regional PSO training centres on the continent. The set of documents relating to this scenario is extremely lengthy involving a weighty 250-page detailed country book covering in-depth geographic, social, economic, political and historical issues.30 A detailed 60-page regional overview sets out the geo-politics in the fictitious region of Katasi. The constitution of Carana is also included.31 These documents create a narrative of a ‘typical’ African state.32 Geographically the continent of Katasi lies off the Coast of Somalia with Carana on the east coast. Five other countries make up the peninsula. Carana itself is 120,000 sq/km, roughly the size of Eritrea or Malawi, with 300 km of coastline. Its topography includes mountains, forest, semi-desert and arable land. Carana is also endowed with natural resources such as diamonds, minerals and wood. Caranese society comprises a number of ethnicities, each with several tribal groupings with its own cultural and societal attributes, traditional language, and culture. The three major groups in Carana are the Kori, Falin and

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Tatsi.33 There are 15 other ethnic groups but we are told they are small in number and are socially and politically irrelevant.34 Religion is also mentioned with the population Christian, Muslim or following traditional beliefs. Social activities deemed important are the role of sport, music and arts and crafts, which are presented as the sole pastimes of the Caranese population when not engaged in civil conflict.35 Economics is the least detailed section in the country profile. The economy is dominated by multinational companies engaged in natural resource extraction with a small manufacturing sector.36 The country has a detailed history of colonisation by the Azurian Empire, a fictitious colonial power which retains close links in the independence period.37 The Cold War period is a succession of ethnic politics dominated by the Falin group, military coups, and autocratic regimes. Recent history is portrayed as a period of severe economic mismanagement and autocratic governance by the Falin ethnic group, inevitably leading to the establishment of two rebel groups; the Kori Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and the Tatsi group the Independents Combatants du Sud Carana (ICSC). Eventually civil war breaks out between these rebel movements and the government and the AU decides to deploy the AU Mission to Carana (AMIC) after a ceasefire has been declared. Other issues are also sketched out such as the current humanitarian situation and refugee and Internally Displaced Persons. Brief country profiles of other states on the 8th continent are also provided, although they are only two pages long. This portrayal of a fictional African state is used instead of real world scenarios of African states suffering from conflict in order to sidestep possible disagreements and potential diplomatic incidents. This is an important issue and Carana does manage to avoid potential diplomatic incidents. As one Canadian military trainer put it: with a fictional country no one can get offended. If you use real terrain there’s always the chance someone can get offended at the way a country is represented.38 The Canadian officer is referring to the fact that the scenario is used when training individuals on specific PSO issues involving countries from all over Africa. It is understandable that disagreements can arise in classes where students include Sudanese from Khartoum and Juba, students

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from Somalia and Kenya who may have different views on the interventions in the Horn of Africa or even Rwandan students taught by French facilitators. In order to sidestep these issues an attempt has been made to incorporate as many aspects of various country specific issues into a ‘one mould fits all’ scenario. In doing so nuances and complex dynamics of understanding specific situations and myriad causes and pressures involved in conflict resolution are lost. Furthermore, a stereotype is produced that is painfully ignorant of real world social dynamics and that is bordering on racist. Rather than reflecting a current conflict situation in Africa that requires a response and assistance from the AU, Carana comes across instead as a Western cartoon stereotype of Africa. Ethnicity is the defining characteristic of the scenario. It is stated early on that: Society is shaped by a complexity of social structures and hierarchies (political, social, and economic), roles (based on gender, age, etc.), legal and customary norms, and religious, cultural and civic values. The framework of these dynamics dictates the maintenance of life-sustaining resources, the upkeep of social structures, and the creation and solving of social dilemmas. Caranese societal organization is a complex phenomenon, due to the complex relationships among the different ethno-religiouslinguistic groups.39 However, the ‘complexity of social structures’ is never alluded to in the following text. Ethnicity is presented as static and the defining identity that is not affected to any degree by other social pressures. All historical, economic and political activities are described in ethnic terms. When describing inter-ethnic relations one set of relationships is characterised solely in terms of colonial disputes: Inter-tribal relationships were fundamentally altered (during colonization) such as the Falin’s history of enslaving and selling Tatsi to the colonizing forces from Azuria and elsewhere. This exploitative relationship scarred Falin-Tatsi relations and continues to be felt today in the form of deep rooted animosities between the two groups. In the past, this bitter relationship has spilled over to affect Carana-Katasi relations through localised

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ethnic disputes almost automatically drawing in tribal relations across the border. The potential to do so again is always great.40 This statement seeks to summarise the history and histiography of social groups in terms of ethnicity and ethnic hatred alone. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that there are a large number of ethnic groups the rest are deemed unimportant as: Relationships between the other minor ethnic groups have remained largely civil, with occasional misunderstandings generating tension and sometimes violence.41 As such, no other group is mentioned and large sections of society are erased from the history of Carana. It is not just the simple portrayal of identity that is problematic with the Carana scenario. The role of the international community, individual states, international organisations and non-state actors is severely underplayed if not completely skewed. The UN, AU and other international organisations are portrayed as the bastion of a free world and the knights in shining armour coming to the rescue of the oppressed people – in the sense that they face no obstacles to deployment or implementing initiatives. Most striking is the complete absence of international diplomacy. There are no individual donors or murky bilateral dealings. There are no diplomatic relations to work with or play against each other, either within Africa or from outside. This is in stark contrast to reality where the diplomatic and donor-recipient relationship is central to any conflict management initiative in a variety of forms. IPSTC has two Carana versions, one long and one short. The long version includes the documents outlined above. The short version is a 16page summary of the entire Carana package. It is the short version that is distributed on courses at IPSTC. Participants are told to access the detailed country scenario via the Centre’s website but this rarely occurs and more often than not the short version is quickly skimmed during course proceedings. The short version is a very brief study of Carana that simply provides a basic overview of current issues relating to recent conflict. As a result, complicated socio-political dynamics are explored even less and issues are all framed in terms of static and unrealistic perceptions of what a

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‘collapsing African state’ looks like. What is therefore adopted as a UN/AU endorsed scenario for peacekeeping training is a distorted and unreal stereotype designed and construed from outside and conceptually similar to Kaplan’s ‘A Coming Anarchy’ of tribal brutality.42 Although the scenario is useful in avoiding diplomatic disputes in classrooms it is precisely this multinational and complex multicultural environment that peacekeepers will eventually deploy to. Therefore in terms of portraying a ‘real world’ situation for the AU to engage with, Carana falls short.

The PSO Village One of the greatest training aids IPSTC has is the multimillion-dollar mock up PSO village intended for active practical scenarios. The facility is impressive and is the only one of its kind in Africa. The PSO village has serious potential to be a significant tool in PSO training by providing ‘real life’ and ‘real time’ interactive training. For instance, a multitude of practical exercises and scenarios of different types could be designed so that students can put into practice lessons learnt in the classroom to really explore the dynamics of peacekeeping in theatre. Furthermore, various PSO scenarios could be filmed and used as training aids to assist classroom lectures and even disseminated to other Centres. Instead the PSO village is used for a single scenario looking at Protection of Civilians. It is completely unrealistic to PSO situations. It involves an IDP camp with national police protecting it. A rebel group suddenly comes in waving weapons demanding medicines. A UN patrol swoops in guns raised and after some shouting the rebels disperse cordially. The demonstration lasts 20 minutes but takes half-a-day for the participants as the village is on the other side of Nairobi. After the demonstration there is no attempt to discuss what has just been shown or to tease out some of the crucial points to take back. When asked about filming the demonstration to use as a training aid instead of wasting so much time for such a limited demonstration IPSTC staff commonly replied ‘but we want to showcase the Centre, we want them to go to the village’. It seems showcasing the Centre trumps effective training. The only other activities held at the PSO village is hostile environment training for NGOs and small conferences for donors, all of which comes at a premium. Essentially several million dollars worth

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of aid money has enabled IPSTC to put on a 20 minute unrealistic play of little use to PSO training. This issue was noticed by a longstanding partner of IPSTC and the EASF: The demo is largely fantasy in that it doesn’t reflect the reality of contemporary PSO especially in complex environments. They need scenarios of various kinds. It would be an amazing training aid. But I suppose if the Centre doesn’t design courses itself and contracts everything out there is limited scope to use it practically.43 The German official has identified one of the contradictions at the Centre, the fact that courses are designed and delivered from outside deters critical thinking and curbs appetites to improve how training is delivered at IPSTC.

Courses and Content: Quality vs. Quantity It has been argued that IPSTC is conceptually flawed. The Centre has been developed from outside, and organisational structures are inadequate for effective PSO training, but at least basic tasks such as course administration and finance are functioning. Training methods investigated above are similarly flawed but courses are being delivered and in great numbers. Student selection is also flawed but this remains largely outside the control of the Centre and students are regularly sent to IPSTC, even if they are not destined for peacekeeping. So, in a sense, IPSTC is working even if there are serious flaws in its conception and design. Course content is key for IPSTC to achieve its stated position as a Centre of Excellence but also importantly to improve peacekeeping missions and to improve national defence forces. The next section addresses course content, including who is targeted, which modules are included and what do learning outcomes intend to achieve. The analysis is based on a comprehensive review of all of IPSTC course learning plans and facilitator guides that were provided to the author as well as discussions with staff members and trainers.

Conflict Prevention Course content under the pillar of Conflict Prevention is extremely theoretical to the detriment of practical peacekeeping training. There is

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minimal application of teaching to the AU and APSA and courses are targeted to a wide range of potential students, many of whom are unlikely to deploy to a peacekeeping mission. Aims of the courses are therefore extremely broad. For example, the aim of the Conflict Analysis and Prevention Course is: To enhance participants understanding of conflict and to equip students with analytical tools and skills to identify and interpret key issues and dynamics of conflict systems and to apply these skills in a manner appropriate to their respective organization. The purpose of these conflict analysis tools and skills are to develop inputs with a view to enhancing organizational decision-making processes.44 The target audience for these courses is indicative of shortcomings in course content as they are so broad that anyone could attend. These courses prioritise national positions and those of regional organisations, mainly because course content is only partly relevant for peacekeeping, certainly for AU peacekeepers. Peacekeeping missions tend to be a third or fourth priority reflecting national interests and military priorities. The level of seniority of participants is also usually too high. The Centre is fixated on trying to entice toplevel regional decision-makers rather than operational level peacekeepers. The Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy course for example targets: Top and middle level ‘practitioners’ who are working with International, Regional and Sub-Regional organizations and PSO in general. Potential participants should be decision-makers on a daily basis and occupy positions as diplomats and special envoy officers that provide input into the overall decisionmaking process of their respective organizations. Examples of potential participants are from four areas: 1) Sub-Regional Organizations; 2) Relevant parliamentary committees of member countries; 3) Interstate Boundary Commissions of the member states; 4) Senior Mission Leaders AMISOM, UNMIS, MONUC, and UNAMID; 5) Academia /Research; 6) Media and 7) NGOs.45

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Modules and learning outcomes are similarly diffuse, are highly theoretical and there is much repetition. For example module 1.2 and module 4.3 of the Early Warning Course are on the ‘Conflict Cycle’ and the ‘Conflict Circle’ respectively.46 Learning outcomes for this course are extremely theoretical and largely irrelevant for operational level peacekeepers deploying to mission: . .

. .

.

To understand the concept of conflict and its theoretical foundations. To understand the concepts of conflict specifically related to Africa and the issues that have shaped conflict dynamics on the continent since independence. To understand the foundations of conflict prevention theory and conflict prevention initiatives in Africa. To understand the importance of conflict analysis, the issues and the tools of conflict analysis and apply the same to their office work and daily life. To apply conflict analysis skills and tools in the development of a ‘conflict prevention plan.’47

The learning outcome for Dialogue, Negotiation and Mediation does mention PSO yet none of the modules for the learning outcome address peacekeeping. Modules instead focus on the technical and theoretical aspects of conflict: To understand the foundations of conflict and the conduct of conflict analysis as it may relate to a peace operation. This Learning Outcome is comprised of 18 periods of instruction in the following Enabling Components: . . . . .

Module 1.1 Module 1.2 Module 1.3 Module 1.4 Module 1.5

– – – – –

Introduction to Conflict Concepts. Cycle of Conflict. Individual and Group Reactions to Conflict. Conflict Analysis Tools. Conflict Analysis Practical Exercise.48

Conflict Management On paper, courses under the Conflict Management pillar have far more relevance than others at IPSTC for the needs of operational level

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peacekeepers. Courses under the middle pillar address issues facing peacekeeping missions, both AU and UN. For example the aim of the Peace Operations Planning course is to: To enhance participants’ understanding of strategic/operational level planning processes and to equip them with analytical tools and planning skills to produce an integrated mission plan for an African Union peacekeeping operation.49 Other Conflict Management courses all have similar aims, with AU and or UN operational level peacekeepers stated as the priority. Modules and teaching outcomes similarly address the needs of a peacekeeping mission in specific areas but are of varying quality. The CIMIC (Civil Military Coordination) course for example is directly related to the needs of peacekeeping and modules cover UN and AU peacekeeping missions and the technical aspects of CIMIC.50 The Civilian Foundation course aims to improve civilian effectiveness in peace operations, a serious shortcoming in contemporary peacekeeping. However, the detail of this course is more theoretical than practical with separate modules on critical thinking, creative thinking, how to set up a meeting, good time keeping and work place conflict resolution51 to the detriment of civilian related peacekeeping activities such as political affairs, civil affairs, DDR and so on. As Conflict Management courses are more specialised and related to peacekeeping than others, the target audience is far easier to design with relevant persons prioritised in learning plans. As an example the Media course targets: Peace Support Operations practitioners who are working in peace operations environment and related organizations in general. Potential participants should be working in this field on a daily basis as ‘Commanders’ Public Information Officers,’ and occupy positions as ‘desk officers’ that provide input into the overall media relations in peace operations processes of their respective organizations. Furthermore, given the multidimensional operation environment, effort must be made to have adequate representation

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from the civilian, military and police components. Examples of potential participants are from three areas: . .

.

Military, Company level, Battalion level, Sector HQs and Military Experts/Military Observers (WOs, Capt-Col), Civilians with equivalent serving or potential to serve in the field of PSO as Public Information officials. (Civilians from political and civil affairs, local and international regional organizations (UN/AU missions and EASF, AMISOM, UNMIS, UNAMID, NGOS other UN agencies humanitarian), Civilian Police with equivalent serving or potential to serve in the field of PSO as Public Information cell.52

On paper then Conflict Management Courses at IPSTC are designed with peacekeeping needs in mind and the AU is prioritised where possible. However, when these courses are delivered they often fall short of their aims as is demonstrated in depth below.

Post-Conflict Recovery Much like the pillar of Conflict Prevention, courses under PostConflict Recovery largely fall outside the remit of AU peacekeeping. The AU has limited capacity to conduct Security Sector Reform or Demobilisation activities and no ability to organise electionmonitoring missions, stabilisation plans and other activities termed as ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ such as developing the Rule of Law. The UN does have these capabilities and so it is not surprising that UN doctrine, teaching materials and examples are used exclusively. Aims of the courses are extremely broad and only address UN or national capabilities. Peacekeeping in general is surprisingly neglected. For instance, one of the learning outcomes of the DDR course is: To demonstrate an understanding of the structures and processes of DDR planning and programming in peace operations.53 And yet none of the modules in the course mention peacekeeping nor is there an attempt to look at how a DDR section in a peacekeeping

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mission functions. Similarly the Rule of Law course neglects to mention peace operations bar one module on the legal foundations of peacekeeping.54 How a Rule of Law section in a peacekeeping mission functions is never mentioned. As the courses are extremely generic and largely inapplicable to the AU, student selection is open to a variety of international and regional organisations and national positions, even if unrelated to peacekeeping. The SSR course, for example, targets: Middle level practitioners who are working with International, Regional and Sub-Regional organizations and PSO in general. Potential participants should be able to influence decisionmaking on a daily basis and occupy positions as policy makers that provide input into the overall decision-making process of their respective organizations: 1) Regional Peace and Security Policy Makers e.g. AU, EASF, IGAD, EAC and ICGLR, RECSA; 2) Member states Decision/policy Makers, National Actors e.g. Mid level management (Ministerial Directors and Secretaries, Colonel, ACP or equivalent from Parliamentary select committee on security and defence (policy level) and Traditional leadership; 3) Sector heads UN Peace Missions MONUCSO, UNMIS, UNAMID AMISOM (SSR Sector/Department).UNDP SSR Unit (Kenya, Somaliland, Sudan) and DPKO SSR Unit; 4) Civil Society (e.g. Human rights) on SSR; 4) Media and 5) Think Tanks/ Academia.55 This critique of course content has demonstrated the largely technical and extremely broad base of much of the courses delivered at IPSTC. courses suffer from a serious lack of context in that the African Union and its peacekeeping capability is hardly mentioned. The majority of course learning plans are extremely generic. This is hardly surprising as all courses are delivered from outside and so the Centre has no real say in how courses are delivered. Furthermore, the course learning plans do not prioritise peacekeepers but rather focus towards national entities calling into question much of the rational of the training. What follows is an in-depth investigation into four courses.

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Exploring Training Delivery To illuminate these issues it is useful to look a little closer at some of the courses delivered. What follows is a brief analysis of four of the courses delivered in 2013 at IPSTC: the Regional Senior Mission Leaders course, Protection of Civilians, AMISOM Force HQ and Human Rights in PSO course. The major donors to IPSTC – the UK, EU, Japan and the US – fund all four courses. The selected courses also cover the spectrum and levels of training at IPSTC, both AU and UN. On paper these courses prioritise both AU current and future PSO initiatives (the EASF and/or AMSIOM) and constitute the more relevant and better put together courses at IPSTC. I attended all of the above courses and this analysis is based on participant observation and ethnographic research methods. I conducted around 100 interviews with participants, IPSTC staff members, EASF officials and donors. I also attended After Action Reviews (AAR) as well as attending and assessing every module for each of these courses.56

Regional Senior Mission Leader Course (RSML) The RSML course at IPSTC seeks to find a niche in African and AUfocused PSO training, but at the same time retains its core UN affiliated curriculum. As a result, the RSML course blurs UN and AU missions but loses depth in terms of course content given the broad spectrum of issues covered in the course. The RSML course is a lavish affair and is hailed as the ‘flagship’ course at IPSTC. There is clearly a great deal of pride on behalf of IPSTC in hosting this course as it is deemed the most prestigious in terms of PSO training. The course aims to train potential force commanders (FC) and civilian heads of mission. Although it is important to include these positions it is also crucial to focus training towards the level of deputy force commander (DFC) and police/military/ civilian section heads (such as head of Civil Affairs, contingent or sector commander/police adviser etc.). Most participants are at colonel and equivalent level, meaning that it is unlikely participants on the SML course will be FC or HoM in the short to medium term. However they could deploy as senior staff officers in a mission at the operational level and should be trained accordingly. The course I attended was delivered by a capable mentoring team lead by Gen (rtd.) Henry Anyidoho. It is significant that the mentors were all

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African former senior mission leaders themselves providing much needed African context, an important factor that was missing from previous RSML courses. However, three of the four mentors were from UNAMID, one had been in UNAMIR in 1993– 1994 in Rwanda during the genocide and one was from the now defunct UNMEE, the more classical peacekeeping operation on the border with Ethiopia and Eritrea that closed in 2008,57 with no AU representation. As a result there was a clear lack of AU emphasis and understanding. The RSML finds its roots in the UN Senior Mission Leaders course, a UN accredited course, targeting individuals destined for senior posts in UN PSO. UNSML courses have been identified as a key part of the UN’s agenda for PSOs after the publication of the Brahimi report in 2000 looking at the future of global peace operations.58 Since then numerous UN sponsored SML courses have been held several times a year all over the world in various institutions or conference centres. The UK Government funded the course to the tune of GBP£120,000 and the EU also funds one of these courses.59 Participants were mainly from Eastern Africa with a few exceptions and from the rank of lt colonel to brigadier and civilian and police equivalent. The course included a trip to Nakuru to ‘see Kenya’.60 Unlike every other course at IPSTC no learning plans have ever been written for the RSML. Whether the RSML course achieves its aims is questionable at best. The Centre hosts two RSML courses a year training around 50 people to be senior leaders annually. At the same time the relevance and method of some of the teaching is questionable. Since its inception IPSTC has conducted seven RSML courses of around 25 participants per course resulting in 175 personnel trained for senior positions in peace operations targeting the EASF as a priority. Of these 175 people trained only a handful have been deployed or will deploy to a PSO as a senior mission. Student selection is laborious, uncoordinated and more often then not results in the wrong nomination, i.e. someone who is not destined for a PSO. National and regional bureaucratic inefficiency as well as diplomatic sensitivity can be blamed for the most part. A point should be made about grading. Every participant who attended the RSML course was guaranteed a certificate stating that they can deploy is some form to a PSO. There was no examination process or real evaluation of the students’ capabilities for participating on a PSO.

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In a sense the two-week period is mere formality. Participants could turn up, participate as much or as little as they want, and still pass the class. On institutionalising the RSML course into the IPSTC curriculum the Centre falls short. The RSML is funded exclusively by external donors and as such the donors have the final say in exactly what is taught. Furthermore there is no in-house capacity whatsoever to deliver the course independently or even partly at IPSTC. The majority of course modules are contracted out to external facilitators/presenters. A few modules are presented by IPSTC staff but are lacking in quality.61 The result is a two-week conveyer belt of external presentations held together by a mentoring team which itself is parachuted in a day before the course begins. In this process IPSTC is nothing more than a conference centre. The inability to take ownership and importantly oversight of course content and delivery is a major shortcoming of the Centre. Due to this lack of oversight a great deal of cohesion and flow between modules is lost during the two weeks. Coordinated and relevant AU related training was seriously lacking with many AU presentations repeating each other and failing to address AU standalone missions. Although current AU missions are part of the schedule, presentations instead tended to focus on the ASF. The module addressing the AU and peacekeeping delivered by the Director of IPSTC failed to mention AU standalone missions for example. AU modules are good in scope and on paper but in practice fail to address an operational need. The AU presentations mainly repeated each other and several were cobbled together from previous presentations losing a great deal of relevance. The main case study was Carana (see above). Other specific modules were also unconnected to training peacekeepers. The module ‘Conflict Analysis in Eastern Africa’ was mainly theoretical and largely irrelevant. The module was delivered by a newly employed directing staff at IPSTC who had very limited knowledge of peacekeeping. Furthermore he proceeded to simply talk about various schools of thought on conflict analysis and failed to connect with the content or students. ‘Integrated Mission Planning Process’ (IMPP) should be one of the most practical modules and yet a very theoretical and conceptual lecture was given with no practical exercise. Time was also too limited to fully appreciate how to work through IMPP. One of the military participants, an experienced Ugandan colonel, commented that he gained nothing

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from this module although he would assume it to be one of the most important parts of the course. The ‘Practitioner’s view on the Horn of Africa’ was presented by a French brigadier from the base in Djibouti and was more of a PR exercise for French Africa policy, which was not lost on the participants. An extremely rose-tinted picture of donor assistance to African conflict management was presented framed in terms of ‘French philanthropy’ with no critical evaluation of donor roles in supporting African PSO. In the coffee break afterwards several participants voiced their consternation of the French General’s presentation and questioned its validity citing more neo-colonial reasons for French security engagement in Africa. ‘Legal Framework of PSO’ simply provided a very basic overview of legal frameworks with no attempt to address practical issues such as mandates and rules of engagement. ‘Negotiation and Mediation’ modules were all largely irrelevant for the needs of the participants. Dr Maluki, an academic at the University of Nairobi, delivered the first module. Static concepts about negotiation issues focussing on interpersonal conflicts with basic definitions were presented without any reference to peacekeeping operations or specific scenarios. Modules did not even attempt to address practical activities on a PSO such as negotiating humanitarian access with rebels forces, issues needed for mediating between warring factions at the operational level and so on. Several of the participants and IPSTC teaching staff had encountered Maluki before and I was informed that he simply rolls out the same presentation each time. Maluki has several friends and former students at IPSTC and when questioned about his capability the Centre was reluctant to dismiss him. Participants felt let down by this section with one participant threatening to walk out of Maluki’s presentation. The ‘Human Rights’ module was extremely short and extremely theoretical. A useful overview of key legal frameworks was presented but there was no attempt to apply these issues to peacekeeping. Again a newly employed directing staff with no PSO experience was tasked to deliver the module. In addition only 45 minutes was allocated to this issue, perhaps indicative of how important the Centre deems it to be. Similarly ‘Protection of Civilians’ (PoC) was confusing and unfocused, although it did try to demonstrate the variety of PoC programmes that are being implemented by the UN peacekeeping

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mission in DR Congo. No attempt was made to include AU and protection issues. The demonstration at the PSO village depicted an unrealistic scenario with no discussion after the demo (see above). Other modules were similarly broad in scope, prioritised the conceptual over the practical and external presenters were of a mixed calibre. A note should be made about Kenya specific examples. Kenya and the electoral violence in 2008 was used far too often as an example in several presentations (conflict analysis, peacebuilding, stabilisation, negotiation and mediation). Although interesting, the example of Kenya and specifically the Kenyan election violence has limited relevance for a peacekeeping training centre. Teaching methodology was mainly in the form of lectures of around 45 minutes to an hour followed by a question and answer session. Some modules stipulated a plenary discussion or panel discussion of relevant themes with three or more presenters. A small number of practical exercises are included in some of the modules but these are few and far between. There are practical exercises included in the binder given to mentors and participants at the beginning of the course but these by and large remained unopened. Presenters are informed in advance of the topics they need to present and are from a variety of backgrounds but are predominately academics and PSO practitioners from various fields. However, there were some presenters that were unsuited for such a PSO environment and those that are were not given detailed instruction about what they had to do. One of the presenters explained to me his situation: I wasn’t given guidelines as to what they wanted me to talk about! I give many lectures at IPSTC and this is always the case. I could talk about anything, and people do, I’ve seen it. They didn’t tell me specifics at all. So I went to them with a PowerPoint and said is this ok? They said it was fine but hardly took an interest. I doubt others share their presentations with them. As I said they much prefer to promote their own work and this dysfunctional system actually encourages this!62 Some modules managed to bridge the gap between theory, practice and relevance, but these were in the minority. The module on gender issues fared better than others in terms of methodology. The presentation lasted

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around 30 minutes with a brief question and answer session of around 10– 15 minutes followed by an hour involving three brief practical exercises. This method resonated with participants, as they were equipped with the concepts related to gender and PSO specifically with adequate time for clarification. They were then given the opportunity to put these issues into practice through practical exercises. The result was a contextual and relevant appreciation of the role of gender in contemporary PSO and how these issues should be interpreted and implemented by an operational decision-maker on a peacekeeping mission in Africa.

Protection of Civilians The Protection of Civilians course was a two-week course held at IPSTC, funded by the EU through the AU.63 Protection of Civilians has become a cornerstone of complex peacekeeping mandates (see Chapter 2). The course aims to train participants in PSO principles, the conventions and legal frameworks for protection and how to conduct protection activities on a peacekeeping mission. The course guide has four ‘learning outcomes’. By the end of the course participants should be able to outline the origins and current state of Protection of Civilians’ concepts, identify the legal frameworks associated with Protection of Civilians’ activities, state the factors affecting the conduct of Protection of Civilians’ activities within the context of a peacekeeping mission and identify the conduct (assessing, planning and implementing) of Protection of Civilians’ activities in a peacekeeping mission.64 The learning plan also stipulates that 70 per cent of participants should be team leaders on or earmarked for deployment to a peacekeeping operation, 20 per cent should be personnel involved in the planning of peacekeeping operations either at the international or national level and 10 per cent should be personnel from the ‘Protection Cluster’ in the various countries with existing peacekeeping operations.65 From day one there was limited investment in the course by the Centre with no After Action Review or any quality control or supervision by IPSTC. A newly employed and under qualified directing staff was nominated to deliver the course a week prior to its commencement. She had to source mentors and presenters, sources participants and prepare the course timetable and module selection within an extremely small time frame. Participants ranged from captain to major and civilian and police equivalent. It was clear that the lead

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facilitator, a Nigerian civilian, had limited knowledge and experience of protection issues and had never been to a peacekeeping mission. His only qualification was that he is executive director of a virtual NGO called Environmental Aid and that he has attended two courses at IPSTC as a participant, including a Protection of Civilians course. Even the course director admitted some of the shortcomings of IPSTC: The Centre seems not to be really interested in the delivery of the course. They just want to show they are doing a number of courses to look effective but real action is lacking.66 Institutionalisation of the course was also lacking. External presenters drawn together in an ad hoc fashion delivered the course. Many did not realise that they were instructing potential peacekeepers which was reflected in their presentations. One presenter who was from the SSR section in UNMISS said to me that she didn’t know these were peacekeepers. She thought they were just learning about peacekeeping. IPSTC and external presenters were either unqualified, presented incorrect or irrelevant information or plugged their own organisation and its products. Most presentations and modules failed to address protection issues for multidimensional peacekeeping. Sections on PSO involved a great deal of duplication and factual inaccuracies. UN peacekeeping presentations were cut-and-pasted from previous courses and UN doctrine and guidelines were extremely confused. The few IPSTC staff presentations were especially poor and most presented the wrong information. Student selection was also problematic and only organised last minute. The 20 participants came from all over Eastern Africa but also included two Kenyan majors employed at IPSTC. Six of the participants couldn’t speak English, only French and Arabic. Instead the non-English speakers had to rely on bi-lingual participants as there were no translation services. Perhaps most striking was the fact that only one of the participants was either currently working in or destined for peacekeeping. An Egyptian major was going to be deployed in Darfur as a military observer. Although enjoying the trip to Kenya he had reservations about the course: I find the course very boring. In Egypt we have a four-month course on PSO. Then the best students pick which mission they want to go to. This course is not related to PSO enough. But I get USD$70/day

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per diem. I would get USD$200/day if the Centre didn’t pay accommodation and meals. The most useful thing about this course is meeting other African soldiers regardless of protection issues or whatever it is we are doing. Making connections and contacts like this across borders is incredible. I never knew African soldiers before this and these guys are good. I now have contacts in all these countries which I can pass on to colleagues in Egypt.67 Other participants similarly voiced that they were not going to a peacekeeping mission. A Rwandan captain had recently returned from two years in Darfur on deployment with UNAMID but said he would not be going back as he had finished his second tour. He also talked about financial compensation: I have just returned from UNAMID and now I am in the Defence Staff College. I’m not going to a peacekeeping mission again but I can share what I have learned with my colleagues at the DSC. I also receive USD$400 for the two week course. In the RDF (Rwandan army) usually lt-colonels get USD$400 for two weeks. Brigadiers and above get more.68 Financial motivations seemed to be a common theme but other incentives and reasons for participation were also evident. A Ugandan participant echoed this and suggested that: People are in it for the money and resources. I know what my government is like and I don’t like that part. Favours. They will just nominate people who won’t go to a mission. Of course it is patronage, per diems and other reasons. We get USD$800 for 2 weeks. That is not bad when you consider basic salaries.69 Other participants stated they were similarly not going to a peacekeeping mission but were grateful for the per diems and potential career opportunities. One participant from the Seychelles described her experience: I was selected because no-one else wanted to go. I even said I didn’t want to go but my boss forced me. So I went. My friend said it was

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nice. She did the foundation course last year. I work in the section of government dealing with NGOs and coordinating NGO activity. This particular course is not relevant for my job. Not at all. Maybe I can use it in the future. I am applying for other jobs, this course should help in that. I will also share what I have learnt with others at home after this course.70 A participant from the Comoros gave his story: I work in the President’s office as a legal adviser. I’m not going to peacekeeping. Yes I found this course useful and interesting, I would love to go to a PSO as it would be good for my career.71 At the end of the two weeks every participant received a certificate even though they were at different levels, as mentioned, with five unable to speak English and therefore couldn’t understand most of the course as instruction is in English. The PoC course was intended to instruct participants on how to turn protection norms into practical activities within a peacekeeping environment. However, there was limited instruction on practical elements of peacekeeping, none of the participants were going to a peacekeeping mission and instead were present for other more internally focused reasons.

AMISOM Force HQ IPSTC hosts the AMISOM Force Head Quarters course twice a year. The role of the Centre is limited to that of conference centre in that the training team arrives from the US for four weeks, delivers the course and then leaves. Indeed the only reason the course is held here is that it is cheaper than a hotel.72 IPSTC has no say in course content or delivery. Administrative support such as IT, classrooms and accommodation are provided by the Centre at a cost. The AMISOM Force HQ course was funded by the US State Department through the ACOTA Programme. The course is a package delivered in its entirety by MPRI, a US Private Military Company (PMC). This course targets staff officers from AMISOM Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and to train them to deploy to the Force HQ in Mogadishu. Participants were from Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda all of which contribute forces to AMISOM. However when speaking with participants it was

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clear that few thought they would deploy to Somalia in the near future.73 A former senior employee at IPSTC echoed this sentiment: Student selection is probably the biggest issue here next to course content. But even with a good course like this student selection is an issue. Even the AMISOM courses funded by the US have no control over which students are sent.74 The MPRI team admitted that only 20–30 per cent trained will ever go to a mission and that was being optimistic.75 As one of them stated to me, ‘training is merely used for national capability but there is a knockon effect for PSO’.76 This statement by the US trainer implies that the aim of training is not only to improve immediate peacekeeping capability but also that there is a hope that national forces will professionalise in terms of adhering to international and mainly Western norms. Student selection is, however, a lengthy process. Troop Contributing Countries to AMISOM must send a list of participants to the US embassy in their countries. The embassy then relays the list to Washington for a multiagency vetting process as stipulated by the Leahy Act, established to prevent US military assistance to persons who are involved in terrorism or those who hare guilty of human rights abuses.77 After vetting the list of accepted participants it is sent back to the Embassy who relays the list back to the host country. The host country for its part is supposed to select participants earmarked for deployment to AMISOM Force Head Quarters. However more often then not those participants selected do not deploy to mission although some do. The four weeks covered a great deal of issues related to AMISOM but focus was on offensive operations rather than AU PSO. In the words of the MPRI boss, ‘we are teaching them war fighting, not peacekeeping’.78 Several other MPRI team members stated similar sentiments.79 Other tasks associated with peacekeeping were neglected and time spent on specific areas was indicative of their importance. For instance several days were dedicated to military planning, intelligence and counter insurgency whereas a single morning was allocated to AMSIOM issues, just one afternoon was provided for the law of armed conflict, gender received one hour as did DDR. The course was, however, targeted specifically to AMISOM, used AMISOM and Somalia relevant examples

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in the main and actively aimed to equip potential staff officers with necessary tools and skills to fulfil their duties. The first week situated the course with the usual day dedicated to ceremony, photos and introductions. The first day of study briefly summarised AMISOM with presentations from external subject matter experts, including the Deputy Force Commander of AMISOM, a Kenyan General. After initial pleasantries and overview of AMISOM, the modules soon dived into the nitty-gritty of offensive operations. The first two weeks and beginning of the second week was dedicated to CMO, the US army terminology for CIMIC or civil-military coordination followed by military decision-making and planning (MDMP). CIMIC relates to military engagement with the multitude of civilian activities and entities during conflict such as liaising with humanitarian organisations and providing medical services to civilian populations. MDMP is the step-bystep process of designing, implementing and carrying out orders for operations. A week was spent on detailed instruction on the practical aspects of CIMIC and MDMP. The third week focused on more military activities spending several days covering intelligence gathering and surveillance processes and counter insurgency tactics and scenarios or COIN. Modules included a comprehensive approach to planning counter insurgency operations including logistics, the use of drones and VIP protection. Strangely, in this section examples from Iraq and Afghanistan were used, highlighting the offensive and ‘war fighting’ nature of the training as well as the imposition of a US-centric approach. The final week was a series of detailed exercises leading to a final scenario of the FHQ receiving an order and having to plan an operation in Somalia. The course content was clearly geared towards offensive operations in line with the AMISOM mandate. This resonated with students who, as soldiers, could quickly identify with the issues they were presented with. A basic AMISOM overview was provided but some context was lacking. Modules were based on US Army doctrine and some examples, scenarios and exercises were from Afghanistan and Iraq although AMISOM briefings, orders and official documents were used in the main. US army slang and ‘troop speak’ was common. A plethora of acronyms dominated instructions; COIN, MDMP, TACON, COA, CMO, CIMIC, PIR, CCIR and so on. Most modules and teaching points on technical aspects were directly taken from a book called The Battle Staff Smartbook: Guide to

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Designing, Planning and Conducting Military Operations which can be ordered from Amazon.80 A further interesting aspect was the MPRI team itself, the language they used as well as their personal behaviour and perceptions during the course. The team was composed of six former US military officers. The head of the team was Col. Don Zimmer (retired), former US liaison officer to Kenya and the most senior US military person in the country. He had retired recently and lives in Kenya having married a Kenyan. He was supported by a CIMIC/CMO specialist Dave Robicheaux. Robicheaux is a retired major from the US Army who has been on the PSO training circuit for several years. In addition to delivering the course Robicheaux was separately contracted by the Centre to write a CIMIC facilitators guide for around USD6k.81 Other instructors included a former military intelligence officer and US army ranger (who was marrying the Kenyan IT officer at IPSTC who he had met through delivering courses). A sixth logistician was also involved. Throughout the course the team was professional and dedicated to delivering the course well. They were knowledgeable about their subject areas and were excellent at presenting their modules. Some cultural clashes did occur especially with the Djiboutian participants over prayer time on Friday. The Muslim Djiboutian participants wanted to pray on Friday morning which would have interrupted some lesson time, much to the ire of some of the MPRI team. The incident nearly descended into fisticuffs after a great deal of heated discussions. In other conversations it was clear that the Anglophone African participants were held in much higher esteem by the US instructors. They found it far more difficult to engage with the Burundian and Djiboutian troops as none of them could speak French and there was no translation provided. The course was delivered in its entirety by MPRI who sourced external experts themselves when needed for a few specific modules and IPSTC provided the venue. The course director summed up the approach and role of IPSTC in delivering the course: This place is basically a conference centre. We bring the whole package, and money of course. We front the first two days with the UN compulsory modules, the airy-fairy stuff and the rest is proper military activities.82

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The course effectively used a combination of lectures and practical exercises. The MPRI team regularly delivers this course and the smoothness and professionalism of delivery far exceeded that of the other courses at IPSTC. The AMISOM FHQ course ticks several important boxes when compared to other courses at IPSTC. The course package is targeted to the needs of AU peacekeeping, to the extent of focussing on a single mission. Teaching instruction and methodology is more useful in that there is an emphasis on practical exercises. Course content is also far less conceptual than other courses at IPSTC providing instruction in practical and real world situations. However, the similarities with other courses exist in that student selection is dysfunctional and training is externally imposed.

Human Rights in PSO Human rights in PSO is part of the raison d’etre of the Centre and should be one of the core courses delivered at IPSTC. It is areas such as human rights where peacekeeping is most concerned. After all the majority of peacekeeping missions are deployed to stop human rights abuses and protect civilians under an imminent threat of danger. Given the importance of human rights issues to peacekeeping there is a real opportunity to develop a contextually grounded course on these issues. The IPSTC course on human rights in PSO aimed to: Enhance participants understanding of the various Human Rights issues and their centrality in planning, analysis and conduct of peace operations/interventions.83 Participants should be equipped with skills to address human rights violations in the context of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Modules on the course include introduction to PSO, introduction to Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, Gender Rights, Child Rights and a Carana exercise. The human rights course lasts two weeks and is funded by the EU. However, the delivery of the course as well as module content had little applicability to multidimensional peacekeeping. Furthermore some of the tutelage condoned activities that donors such as the EU would consider abusive of certain human rights. Furthermore few participants were destined for peacekeeping and external contractors delivered the majority of lectures.

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Once again a newly employed Directing Staff was tasked with delivering the course from scratch. There was no oversight provided by IPSTC. A mentor was sourced from the Organisation for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) only to be dismissed by the deputy commandant of PCSS in favour of a Lt Colonel, who was director of Human Rights Affairs in the Ugandan Army, a force not known for its best human rights practices.84 It was clear that the Lt Colonel had never been to a peacekeeping operation but also that his perception of human rights could be seen at odds with some donor agendas. On women’s rights he suggested that it is a ‘cultural thing’ and that mind-sets need to change. He gave himself as an example: I am Luo, in our culture a women expects to get beaten or else she is not appreciated. But now we say no. On political rights the Lt Colonel made his position clear too. Regarding the brutal suppression of the main opposition figure in Uganda, Kizza Besigye, and his ‘Walk to Work’ campaign he was firm in his belief that: he [Besigye] infringed on other people’s right to work so we were justified in hospitalising him. On traditional rights and minority rights he was equally candid: we have people who want to develop Uganda, they don’t want to see naked people running around in Karamoja [an arid rural region of Uganda home to pastoralist communities]. Perhaps most staggeringly, the Lt Colonel used the example of homosexuality in almost all of his presentations and lectures about human rights. He argued continuously that homosexuality should be combatted as it is immoral and therefore homosexuals have no rights. Furthermore, he espoused a theory that there was in fact an international conspiracy by NGOs to promote homosexuality for financial gain: NGOs are there to make money. Gays and lesbians get paid and then put in flash hotels in Addis to lobby the AU about promoting

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their rights. But they are in it for the money. In 50 years time the world will stop if gays are allowed as there will be no children. This bizarre approach to human rights in PSO training by the director of the course would surely be at odds with the approach of the EU in safeguarding civil liberties. Even one of the course participants, a Ugandan legal officer, questioned the depiction of LGBT rights. What is even more remarkable is that he brought up these issues unilaterally, presented in open sessions and largely irrelevant for Peace Support Operations. Other lecturers and presenters were mainly from external organisations, some of whom didn’t show up, resulting in the early closure of teaching on several days. Presentations were of a mixed quality but few applied to the needs on a peacekeeping mission. Sections delivered by the International Committee of the Red Cross only addressed ICRC concerns and programmes and not the needs of peacekeeping. The presenter from OCHA similarly only discussed issues about rights in an extremely conceptual way although the sections on IHL and Humanitarian law were important and well delivered. Several other lectures were cut-and-paste jobs from previous courses and there was a great deal of repetition. Concepts of International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law were part of each lecture. Introduction to PSO was clearly lifted from previous courses as they still had title and date from earlier presentations and there was simply no attempt to address the AU or AU peacekeeping capability, even though the African Union Mission in Carana was the case study for the course. Furthermore the presentations on peacekeeping had several factual inaccuracies such as referring to peace enforcement missions as CH VIII (CH VIII refers to regional organisations mandated by the UNSC) and clumsy and rigid approaches to conflict such as intra- and inter-state conflict as globally accepted measureable distinctions. Teaching methodology was largely ineffectual. Modules were all too often single hour-long presentations with limited time for questions and answers and almost no practical exercises. Timing issues also hindered the delivery of the course. The first few days started several hours late and finished several hours early due to lack of presenters but also lack of quality modules that finished all too quickly. A further day was also cancelled so that participants had a chance to ‘go shopping’ even though the weekend was allocated as free time.

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Again, it was clear by their own admission that none of the participants were destined for a peacekeeping mission though many wanted to. All participants were drawn from national institutions, although on the participant list the affiliated organisation is EASFCOM, perhaps to persuade the course funders in Brussels that students were from relevant organisations. At the end of the course all participants received a certificate stating that they had successfully completed a human rights in PSO course. In addition, the Francophones were at a severe disadvantage as there was no French translation. These four courses are indicative of how the Centre operates. IPSTC was essentially a conference centre hosting these externally funded and delivered courses. No attempt was made to implement learning plans or to use facilitator guides. Even the usually optimistic former Chief of Staff conceded that this was an issue: Training guides have been developed and sent to commandant and head of training. They never read it. Nobody reads them.85 Training methodology is predominately a sequence of lectures delivered by externals with almost no practical exercises involved. Courses mixed up UN and AU issues losing coherence and focus of the training. Mentors were sourced on a personnel basis with relevant expertise a secondary concern. All participants on all four courses received a certificate of achievement even though quality of participation varied dramatically. Most importantly, only a small percentage of participants who attended these courses will deploy to a peacekeeping mission in the short to medium term. Although looking good on paper and seemingly meeting the needs of operational level peacekeeping training these four courses demonstrate the disconnect between concept and delivery in practice.

Conclusion The Centre has an ambitious but unrealistic strategy. Its remit is vast and conceptual basis is flawed. IPSTC aims to cover in depth issues of conflict ranging from preventive diplomacy to post-conflict reconstruction. These areas alone are out of line with current AU peacekeeping capabilities. The AU only has the capacity for military operations under lead nations (e.g.

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Somalia and Joint Task Forces), rapid reaction/stabilisation interventions that would eventually be taken over by the UN (e.g. Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali) or a hybrid UN-AU mission (e.g. Darfur). The AU and APSA have little or no capacity for post-conflict reconstruction activities.86 An adviser seeking to develop the capacity of the AU’s rapid reaction force in East Africa thought that course content and lack of AU oriented training was a major shortcoming: The Training at IPSTC is too UN heavy. Not enough AU or ASF stuff. I suppose most partners just do UN and so impose these issues when they allocate funds. As a result much of the training and courses at IPSTC are irrelevant for the APSA vision. In my opinion they are not even training operational decision-makers for PSO. Even if they had the right people the content of the courses is so poor that there wouldn’t be a tangible effect.87 Lt Colonel Sugden has identified the two areas neglected by the Centre that are most important; course content and student selection. Moreover all training is contracted out to external presenters and mentors with all activities funded externally by foreign donors even though IPSTC generates substantial income itself. The Centre has little say in course content and capacity for course design is painfully low. A senior EASF official who has both been a trainer on IPSTC courses and trained at IPSTC noted this: When it comes to facilitators some of them have no clue about what they were talking about. Some of them come and promote their own books and research. Some of them are invited because they are friends of someone at IPSTC. This applies to all courses.88 The staff at the Centre are vastly under qualified for the job in hand and are either Kenyan nationals or Western military officers seconded by donors. The AU and the EASF have no official link to the Centre calling into question IPSTC’s strategy.89 In part this is because KMOSD retains a tight grip on the Centre reflected in the dominance of Kenyan military personnel casting doubts over plans for internationalisation.

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Student selection is highly dysfunctional due to a combination of bureaucratic inefficiency that typifies multilateral institutions as well as issues relating to the informalisation of decision-making and associated dynamics of patronage and patrimonialism, especially within militaries in Eastern Africa.90 Participants are therefore more often than not drawn from organisations unrelated to peacekeeping and most will never deploy to a peace mission, although there are some exceptions. In reality students attend courses at IPSTC for more individualistic, personal and national reasons such as building CVs and financial incentives rather than improving regional or continental PSO capacity. Crucially the relationship between course content, regional training needs and contemporary peacekeeping tasks remains anecdotal and under investigated. Questions remain over whether training is conducted for training’s sake or to fill slots and attract funds rather than addressing the training needs and improving the region’s security apparatus. The above analysis demonstrates that the intended outcomes of improving, reforming and integrating are yet to be achieved in any meaningful way and instead the system is subverted towards internal realities. Interestingly, all key parties are content with the status quo. Kenya is happy as it is host to a regional Centre of Excellence and receives several financial and political benefits. The donors are happy as they fund the training of thousands of African peacekeepers annually, justifying massive financial commitment to foreign military assistance in support of domestic agendas. The students and participants are generally happy as they have the opportunity to better their CVs and line their pockets at the same time. Whether IPSTC is achieving its aims in terms of improving the quality of AU peacekeeping is a secondary and distant concern.

CHAPTER 5 OTHER AFRICAN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION (PSO) TRAINING CENTRES

Introduction In addition to IPSTC in Kenya, peacekeeping training centres are dotted all over Africa with various remits and areas of focus. These centres range from the national level to regional or international centres with some officially recognised by the AU. In West Africa three centres have a regional focus. The Nigerian National War College in Abuja addresses the strategic decision-making level, training senior Generals. A tactical level centre training majors and below is based in Bamako, Mali, and the Kofi Annan International Peace Support Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana are operational level peacekeeping training centres for the West African region, training midlevel to senior officers and police and civilian equivalents from captain to brig/major-general. There are other centres in West Africa with a regional remit but not affiliated to the AU such as War Colleges and training centres in Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Burkina Faso.1 East Africa is not only home to IPSTC (see Chapters 3 and 4) in Nairobi but also the Rwanda Peace Academy (RPA) in Musanze and the Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) in Addis Ababa, with provisional plans for centres in Sudan and the Seychelles. In Southern Africa the principal regional training centre is supposed to be the Regional Peace Training Centre in Zimbabwe, although this

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centre is yet to deliver significant training. The South African War College, The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Peace Operations Training Centre in Pretoria provides peacekeeping courses for regional students as do centres in Botswana, Malawi and Tanzania. North Africa is home to PSO schools in Cairo and Algiers and Central Africa host’s schools in Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon.2 These centres have the same intent and function in much the same way as IPSTC, to varying degrees. As I will seek to illustrate in this chapter, they employ similar structures, provide similar if not identical courses and operate within the same boundaries and concepts. Most of the centres and courses for (regional) peacekeeping are externally funded by bi-lateral donors or international organisations and external subject matter experts deliver all the courses. Furthermore, all centres have almost no capacity to deliver in-house PSO training or conduct instruction independently and most centres are administered under their own national military hierarchy.3 National and financial interests as well as a commitment to international peacekeeping are driving forces in their development. Differences are also evident in that the host nations and their respective militaries and defence forces are from a variety of organisational and ideological origins as outlined in Chapter 1. What is striking is that given these differences in organisational structure such as ethos, doctrine and so on, the centres function in a remarkably similar fashion through foreign military assistance of peacekeeping training support. This chapter explores these commonalities through an analysis of three PSO Training Centres at varying stages of development. The following analysis is not an exhaustive assessment of the specific centres in terms of minute detail. Rather the intent is to demonstrate that the previous chapters’ analysis is representative of PSO centres across the continent, and that IPSTC in Kenya is broadly representative of the dynamics affecting them. This chapter provides a brief assessment of three other training centres in order to demonstrate the depth of similarities affecting PSO schools in Africa. In doing so I show that the dynamics of internal and external forces that shape IPSTC and PSO training in Kenya are applicable elsewhere in Africa. KAIPTC in Ghana, the RPA in Rwanda and the EIPKTC in Ethiopia have been chosen as comparative case studies. KAIPTC is the most developed PSO school in Africa and is the benchmark for other schools on the continent. The RPA and EIPKTC provide useful cases as they fall within the same region as IPSTC and demonstrate

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inter-school and regional dynamics. These centres are at different stages of development proving that the issues outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 are applicable across PSO schools. Furthermore the centres are staffed with soldiers from different military sociologies which is important to bear in mind when teasing out commonalities and differences. Research for this chapter is predominately based on primary sources from all three training centres, including all relevant curriculum material such as course prospectus and strategic plans. In addition, I conducted interviews at KAIPTC in Ghana during two visits in 2008/9 and with KAIPTC research staff in London in 2013. I also spent a week at the EIPKTC to conduct interviews with staff and donors, including the AU Peace Support Operations Department (AUSPOD), as well as two weeks in Rwanda at the RPA and the Rwanda Military Academy in October 2013.

Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) Unlike other centres, KAIPTC is advanced in its physical development as well as training delivery, and is by far the largest and most expensive peacekeeping training centre on the continent.4 The Kofi Annan Centre has a regional focus concentrating on West Africa’s conflict management initiatives in support of the African Union’s emerging APSA.5 KAIPTC also trains international peacekeepers, as well as national contingents for various types of peace operations. For example KAIPTC has trained UN and ECOWAS peacekeepers, UN staff and African Standby Force personnel. Since the first peacekeeping training course was delivered in 2003, the Centre has run over 170 training courses for more than 5,400 individuals from over 86 countries and major organisations in Europe, North and South America, Asia and Africa.6 The Centre is not only affiliated formally with the AU and APSA through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) but is also a member of the African Peacekeeping Trainers Association (APSTA) and the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC).

Development and Donor Support Since the concept of KAIPTC, the centre has developed rapidly. Plans for the centre were devised in 1998 as well as christening it after the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. This in itself is important; the

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symbolism of having the name of one of the most important individuals in global peace and security, who also happens to be an African and a West African from Ghana is crucial. No other PSO training school in Africa has the official endorsement of such a figure. The name alone suggests certain qualities of peace and humanity but also exceptionally high standards, of an African approach and an internationally recognisable brand name. All things an African regional centre of excellence should espouse too. Ghana and its defence institutions take great pride in the Kofi Annan Centre’s name and in turn the man himself is ever present in the form of logos on paper and stationary, on email chains and in his portrait that hangs in the vestibule of the Centre itself. Much like the Mandela factor in South Africa and beyond or Julius Nyerere in Eastern Africa, Annan’s presence, symbolic and aloof though it may be, is an important part of the Centre. KAIPTC itself is impressive to behold. A large site of imposing and immaculate buildings painted in UN blue sits opposite the Atlantic Ocean. KAIPTC was built next to the Ghanaian Armed Forces Command and Staff College in the Teshie area of Accra. Originally the Centre was to be built in Ho in the east of Ghana. However, the isolation of this location was abandoned in favour of Accra due to its proximity to the Ghanaian military establishment, Ghanaian educational institutions (University of Ghana etc), African organisations regional offices (AU, ECOWAS etc.), quick regional continental and international transport links and the diplomatic/donor community. Accra is a far better location for fundraising, networking and international access. In 2000 Secretary General Kofi Annan officially commissioned the Centre. Although Ghana is the host nation, the Centre has been dominated in decision-making, led and built by the international community. Donors have invested heavily in the success of KAIPTC, far more than West African states. This massive investment has come in the form of seconding technical advisers, paying for buildings, procuring equipment and paying for courses. The German Government and the Government of the United Kingdom supplied initial support for two phases of development. This led to the provision of basic infrastructure, such as buildings and equipment and also curriculum design and programme development enabling the KAIPTC to deliver its first course in 2003. On 9 February 2006 KAIPTC took the important step of establishing its own Governing Board although in practice control remains with the

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Ghanaian Ministry of Defence. Initially donors provided finances for the construction of the KAIPTC comprising classrooms, administrative offices, an auditorium and a Command and Staff Simulation Training Centre. During September and October 2003 staff were hired or seconded and began to occupy the facilities in preparation for the KAIPTC’s first Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration course in November 2003. The Centre was officially opened on 24 January 2004 by the President of Ghana, John A. Kufuor, and the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder. The building programme was funded by the UK, Italy and the Netherlands and was completed in 2006. The conference centre, capable of hosting up to 400 delegates, was completed in May 2004, and a 70-room accommodation block, in 2005. After basic infrastructure, management structure, curriculum and staff levels had been completed or installed, donors continued to support the Centre in several ways such as cash injections directly into the Centre’s budget, provision of equipment (IT, vehicles, flags etc), funding or delivery of specific courses, seconding technical advisors for training or management and further construction projects. The UK, due to domestic financial concerns, pulled all of its funding and secondments from KAIPTC in favour of similar projects in East and Southern Africa in 2009. However, a host of other nations have picked up the slack with support in 2010 coming from Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UN and the US. Germany alone has invested over EUR6 million since 2000. Since the Centre’s inception donors have contributed nearly USD$20 million.

Objectives and Structure The Kofi Annan Centre has four stated objectives: 1) to contribute to the development of regional and sub-regional capacity in the delivery of integrated peace support operations; 2) to enhance regional and subregional capacity for conflict prevention, management, resolution and peace building; 3) to enhance understanding of critical peace and security in West Africa in particular and the continent as a whole; 4) to create an effective, efficient and sustainable management and support arrangements for the KAIPTC.7 These aims are deliberately broad allowing the Centre to address West Africa’s specific training needs but also cater to international demands and pressures for the institutionalisation of certain international norms. Developing capability of West

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African peacekeepers through training national armed forces, instilling international norms such as respect for human rights and fostering closer working arrangements within ECOWAS are all key goals of the Centre. In practice then KAIPTC caters to a regional requirement as well as an international demand for training that addresses the improvement, reform and integration of West African armed forces. KAIPTC employs a military structure and chain of command, reflecting its origins as part of the Ghanaian defence establishment. Employees at the Centre are either Ghanaian civilian staff from the Ministry of Defence, Ghanaian Armed Forces Personnel or technical advisers appointed on contract or directly by donor funding to KAIPTC. On the one hand KAIPTC is structured and commanded like a unit in the Ghanaian Armed Forces and on the other hand it relies heavily on donor support as any NGO.8 The head of the Centre is the commandant and is a Ghanaian 2-star general. The commandant is responsible for the strategic direction of the Centre and is the point of call for higher decision-making bodies such as Ghana’s Ministry of Defence or the ECOWAS Commission. He is supported by a one star deputy and a command team, (including a legal and communication section). He is also head of the executive management team and is supported by the head of the research department (a civilian academic) and the head of the training department (a colonel in the German Army). Three departments sit beneath the commandant and constitute the day-to-day running of the Centre and training delivery: the training department, the research department and the administration department. The training department at the KAIPTC has sections focusing on individual training and is responsible for all training delivery and related activities at the KAIPTC. Although the majority of training is contracted out to external providers, the training department delivers instruction when it can. Collective training oversees the pre-deployment training activities of the Ghana Armed Forces and the training evaluation and development (TED) section monitors and evaluates training programmes. This section also develops training programmes/ courses and conducts lessons learned design and development (LDD) processes. TED also develops and manages the database of the Centre’s facilitators and participants. The training department works closely with the research department in course design and evaluation of the Centre’s

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content for training programmes. Staff in the training department are predominately Ghanaian military officers although a few regional officers and civilians are now part of the team. However staff in the training department may teach the odd module when appropriate but there is no in house capability to deliver training independently. External organisations and individuals, at great expense, deliver all courses. As such the training department is more akin to a secretariat with staff members acting as mere administrators as opposed to qualified trainers. The research department aims to feed into KAIPTC’s training through research and analysis on issues related to peacekeeping, conflict and associated areas by producing a variety of analytical papers and reports. Analysts and researchers in the department organise and participate in workshops and seminars and also assist course delivery when appropriate. Research products are intended to inform training delivery. In practice, the relationship between research and training is less institutionalised than it should be. The department is located on site and consists of a head of department, deputy and seven programme heads/analysts with sections ranging from international institutions to gender issues. The staff are mainly civilian academics or specialists from Ghana and are extremely well qualified in their respective fields producing quality research papers. In addition a few technical advisers are seconded from donor countries. However, the department is rather detached from training activities at KAIPTC and has little real influence on courses delivered. The department functions more like an academic department or think tank aloof from the KAIPTC’s core business of PSO training. The administration department is tasked with overseeing and managing activities essential for training to be delivered. The department is split into two sections; operational support and finance. The responsibilities of this department include the design, implementation, review, monitoring and evaluation of the Centre’s strategic plan in the context of administration. Other activities of the department include IT support, procurement, contract management, security, human resource management, maintenance and operations, financial policy development and implementation. As well as the departments, KAIPTC is managed and directed by a senior board. The Governing Board under the chairmanship of the

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Ghanaian Minister for Defence provides strategic guidance to the commandant and his staff, and supports efforts to consolidate the KAIPTC as an essential element of West Africa’s peacekeeping capabilities. The Board consists of 13 members reflecting Ghana’s leading role in the Centre and its regional focus, but perhaps more importantly its dependence on international donors. Members of the Board include the Ghanaian Minister for Defence and Dep. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Representation of the ECOWAS Commission, UNDP Resident Representative (Ghana Country Office), Ghanaian Chief of Defence Staff and Inspector General of Police, Commandant KAIPTC, Representative of Civil Society, the Danish Ambassador, the German Ambassador, the Canadian Ambassador, the Italian Ambassador and the Ghanaian Chief Director, Ministry of Defence.

Training and Courses at KAIPTC Training is delivered through a variety of courses, although seminars and workshops as well as other educational activities are part of the training calendar. Courses are aimed at the operational level or at key decision-makers commanding or heading departments in theatre on a peacekeeping mission. The operational spectrum is wide and overlaps onto strategic and tactical levels and can include anyone from the level of a force commander (3-star general) to staff officers (captain) and civilian/police equivalents. Course content is broad and aims to cover issues in peacekeeping as well as wider issues around conflict (see course list below). In 2011 KAIPTC held over 20 training events, including courses, seminars, tailored training, writing boards, and symposiums. All courses, workshops, events and seminars are funded externally by foreign donors and the Centre has little to say about what is presented as KAIPTC training and education. For the most part KAIPTC acts little more than a conference facility and service provider. As a former staff member has observed ‘The situation is not so much donor imposed, as it is due to the astounding on-going lack of in-house knowledge and expertise for a Centre of Excellence’.9 There were 16 courses scheduled to be delivered at KAIPTC during 2012. The Centre’s programmes are ‘demand driven’, meeting UN training standards. Surprisingly AU and APSA focused training is far more limited with course content favouring UN activities and criteria. Courses target operational/mid-level military officers, police officers and

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civilians. Conceptually courses range from conflict prevention to conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction and are delivered in both English and French. The Centre also offers postgraduate (Masters) level courses in Conflict, Peace and Security in partnership with the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration. Below is a detailed summary of current courses at KAIPTC.

Summary of Operational Level Training Courses10 The Civil Military Coordiation Course (CIMIC) at KAIPTC aims to provide students with knowledge to conduct civil-military planning and co-ordination programmes, including understanding of civil-military doctrines, principles and guidelines. Students are mid-level/operational military and police officers and civilian middle management. The CIMIC course is part of a continental syllabus and has been designed by the South African organisation ACCORD.11 There are six course units or teaching points: cultural awareness and code of conduct; CIMIC doctrines, principles and guidelines; negotiation and mediation; media relations; facilitation and working with interpreters and organising Quick Impact Projects (QUIPs). The course is two weeks long. Collaborative Problem Based Learning (CPBL) is a one-week course and aims to train facilitators in training delivery techniques. Essentially training the trainers course, CPBL is a way of creating a common method or ‘doctrine’ of training at KAIPTC. Students are the Centre’s facilitators itself (from the research and training departments) and those students on other courses who have been earmarked as potential facilitators and trainers on other courses. There are seven teaching units: preparations and planning for a training course; dealing with different personality types; use of training aids; presentation skills; facilitation skills; teaching facts/ideas/concepts using CPBL; teaching skills and knowledge; preparation of a lesson plan and a mock facilitation exercise. The course is funded by GTZ. The Conflict Prevention Course aims to provide knowledge and understanding on factors that cause and trigger conflicts. Conceptually the course recognises the importance of ‘human security’ and its relationship with state, regional and international security as a precursor for socio-economic development. The course is expected to contribute to the implementation of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) and APSA by targeting students who will become practitioners

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in the field. Potential students include those preparing for deployment into an operational theatre (mainly in the ECOWAS region), NGOs, multilateral organisations, the AU and UN. Adult-based learning techniques are employed in training delivery including mini-lectures, case studies, audio-visual aids, plenary discussions, exercises and group work. There are 10 course units or modules: new wars, conflict and multidimensional peacekeeping: a methodological approach; women and conflict prevention; the nature of African states; citizens, government and conflict prevention; the rule of law and conflict prevention; human rights, transitional justice and conflict management; elections, democracy and conflict; security sector systems and conflict prevention; natural resource governance and conflict prevention in Africa, media and conflict prevention in Africa and risk assessment and vulnerabilities. On completion of the Conflict Prevention Course students should be able to examine existing and emerging mechanisms for preventing conflict. They should be able to identify challenges facing actors in complex and politically sensitive situations and they should be able to explore mechanisms for improved peacebuilding, stabilisation and postconflict reconstruction as well as how to better manage transitions from prevention to sustainable peace. Students should also be able to examine critical issues and actors relating to conflict prevention and understand the changing nature of peace support operations. The course lasts two weeks and is funded by Norway through the Training for Peace Programme. The Development Diplomacy for Peace and Security Course (DDPS) aims to prepare students to meet current and future challenges in bi-lateral and multilateral diplomacy and security co-operation. Specifically, the course aims to ground students in the political, legal, economic, social and ecological factors of regional and international security co-operation. Students are mid-level military, police and civilians on PSOs, NGOs, affiliated government or international organisation. The course lasts five weeks and includes a variety of instruction techniques such as practical exercises, a study tour to a neighbouring country and scenarios. The course has six units: Global Governance, International Relations and the African Peace and Security Architecture; International Humanitarian Law (IHL) Human Security, Responsibility to Protect and gender and conflict; Communication, Mediation and Negotiation Skills; Good

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Governance and Conflict; Governance, Private Actors and Conflict and Civil-Military interfaces and Security Sector Reform (SSR). The course is funded by GTZ The Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Course (DDR) aims to enhance UN and regional peacekeeping capacity by providing students with comprehensive and practical understanding of the principles and procedures involved in the planning, co-ordination and conduct of DDR programmes. Problem-based learning (PBL) is employed for training using a combination of lectures, case studies, small/break out groups and exercises. The course targets mid-level officers predominately from Sub-Saharan Africa. Priority is given to UN, AU and ECOWAS civilian staff, national DDR Commission staff and those directly involved in DDR operations. The course is designed by KAIPTC staff in collaboration with international consultants. Course content is modelled on the UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) document. Subject matter experts (SMEs) are drawn from relevant UN departments and GTZ provides funding for the course. The DDR course consists of around 40 modules covering the following broad areas: Concepts, Policy and Strategy – the UN approach to DDR, post-conflict stabilisation, peacebuilding and recovery frameworks and beneficiaries and partners; Structures and Processes – integrated DDR planning, DDR programme design, national institutions for DDR, mission and programme support and monitoring and evaluation of DDR projects; Operations, Programmes and Support – DDR and UN military and police responsibilities; Cross-Cutting Issues – women, gender and DDR, gender, youth, special needs groups and DDR, SSR/DDR nexus, cross-border population movements, food aid programmes and health/ HIV and DDR. KAIPTC has a second DDR course but at an advanced level. The DDR Advanced Course lasts two weeks and is aimed at students who already have an enhanced technical capacity in DDR. Priority is given to planners and implementers of DDR programmes in Africa. As with the basic DDR course instruction is through PBL. The course is supported by several UN agencies and international organisations with core funding from GTZ. On completion students are expected to be able to plan and implement DDR programmes. The DDR course contains a number of modules and teaching units including: linkages between reintegration and reinsertion; guiding principles, approaches and

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elements of reintegration: reintegration assessments and analysis: design of reintegration programmes and coordination and institutional mechanisms for integration. There are also a number of modules on specific issues such as economic/political/social reintegration, psychosocio counselling, transitional justice, advocacy and resource mobilisation, special needs groups and the nexus between SSR and DDR. Election Observation Training (EOT) is a two-week course aimed at civilians already deployed or preparing to deploy to a mission in election observation capacities. The course is organised by KAIPTC in collaboration with ZIF. EOT has three modules: Essential knowledge on election observation; Election observation themes within ECOWAS policy frameworks; and Practical application in Election Observation Missions in Africa. Integrated Peace Support Operation (IPSO) is a three-week course that aims to enhance the effectiveness of operational planning, co-ordination and conduct of PSOs. The course is designed for military officers from low level staff officers (captain) to operational commanders (lt colonel/ colonel). Equivalent police and civilians are also expected on the course. Priority is given to West African forces earmarked for deployment to a PSO under the AU or ECOWAS. The course is split into three weeks: week 1 – the universalism of PSO; week 2 – understanding IPSO at the operational level; and week 3 – practicing IPSO at the operational level. Units in the first week include the nature of conflict in Africa, conflict analysis, legal frameworks of IPSO, impact of conflict on youth and children and a planning exercise. The second week includes International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in IPSO, use of force/rules of engagement, gender issues in IPSO, civilian/military/police dimensions of IPSO, crisis mapping, negotiations in IPSO, mediation/facilitation in IPSO, governmental view on IPSO, intro to the UN system, logistics in IPSO and coordination between IPSO elements. The final week includes units on SSR, DDR in IPSO, CIMIC in IPSO – the AMISOM experience, social and economic dimension of conflict resolution and policies in the aftermath of conflict. Joint Campaign Planning (JCP) is a two-week course that runs twice a year. JCP aims to enhance regional PSO capacity by targeting senior officers from ECOWAS countries. Priority is given to officers ear marked for the ECOWAS Standby Brigade. Students are instructed in the principles and procedures of PSO planning. The course has three

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modules: Organisation and Procedures of a Task Force Head Quarters (TFHQ); Development of Operational Planning Methods; and Planning a PSO for Regional Deployment. Partnering Integrated Logistics Operations Tactics (PILOT) is a two-week course focusing on the planning, co-ordination and conduct of logistics in PSO and aims to train logisticians for multidimensional peacekeeping. Students are military or civilian logisticians expected to deploy to peacekeeping missions and the ASF. Course content include units on: the UN HQ the DPKO; UN logistic field and support organisations; mission planning and Force Development Planning and Execution (FDPE); Staging Onward Movement and Integration (SOMI), sustainment and redeployment; ASF logistic and administrative support organisations; contingent owned equipment, finance and contracting; national operational and logistic functions in peacekeeping operations; current operational and logistic experiences/realities in PSO; role of civilian police and fire departments in PSO and introduction to DDR. Protection of Civilians in Africa (PoC) is a two-week course examining national, regional and international legal institutional frameworks for protecting civilians during conflict. Students are experts from national governments and NGOs working on protection issues. KAIPTC designed this course in collaboration with the International Peace Support Training Centre, (IPSTC), the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), the National Defence College Nigeria (NDC), the Southern African Development Community – Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) and the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR). Modules include: Introduction to PoC; Legal frameworks of PoC; PoC activities and actors in different contexts; National, regional and international communication, cooperation and coordination; PoC in the framework of PSO in Africa; Implementing African PoC and conduct of PoC. Rule of Law (ROL) is a two-week course developed by KAIPTC in collaboration with international and West African consultants and uses PBL as the method of instruction. The course aims to enable students to support Rule of Law frameworks at the national and regional levels as well as conducting duties within the parameters of the Rule of Law. Students are mid-level military/civilian/police involved in transitional justice issues in conflict. Priority is given to students from ECOWAS and AU PSO. The course consists of seven modules: RoL in

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PSO – Concept, Context and Scope; International Law, IHL and Institutions; Applicable Law and Local Institutions; Monitoring and Evaluating the Rule of Law; Fact-finding for establishing RoL; Executive Functions and RoL and Capacity development of RoL. Police Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a two-week course designed by KAIPTC in collaboration with the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) to assist police personnel and carry out reform roles in post-conflict reconstruction phases. Students are mid-level police and relevant others. Priority is given to AU and ECOWAS police officers preparing to deploy to a PSO. The course consists of four modules: Peace and Security in Africa; Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Environments; Reconstructing, Reforming and Rebuilding Police Institutions and Security Sector Governance. The Small Arms and Light Weapons Training Programme (SALW) is a West African initiative of five distinct but interrelated courses. Courses range from basic level to specialised courses. The SALW Foundation Course lasts two weeks and aims to ground students in issues around SALW as well as preparation for a role in a national SALW commission. The course employs PBL as a method of instruction and targets personnel from the 15 National SALW commissions in the region and technocrats from partner institutions. The course is funded by the Government of Japan through the UNDP. There are 19 course units: basic definitions, concepts and theories; supply and demand of SALW; misuse of SALW; SALW and post-conflict peace building; evolution of SALW control initiatives; international legal and policy frameworks on SALW; functions and structure of a national commission; research skills and use of SALW national surveys; national action plan; project cycle management; monitoring and evaluation; managing inter-agency relationships; SALW and vulnerable groups; national presentations; ICT skills; SALW critical stakeholders and issues; resource mobilisation; communication processes and advocacy skills and communication strategy design. The Higher Level Training Seminar lasts three days and is aimed at policy makers from regional governments, security institutions and civil society. The seminar is designed to promote understanding of SALW among regional policy makers and also to gain feed back to design future SALW training courses. Stockpile Management is a specialised course lasting two weeks. The course aims to enhance participants’ skills in managing SALW and seeks

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to support ECOWAS SALW initiatives. The course targets stockpile/ depot commanders and managers at the battalion and division level as well as civil servants managing national stockpiles. Lawmakers are encouraged to attend the course as well. There are four modules: key concepts of stockpile and national stockpile; why stockpiles need to be controlled; elements of good stockpile control and an introduction to safety issues – including physical structure of stockpiles, visit to stockpiles, standard operating procedures, stockpiles and communities and stockpile and surplus destruction. Marking, Record Keeping and Tracing is a second specialised course lasting two weeks. The course aims to equip students with skills in identifying and managing weapons in West Africa including best practice in marking and tracing. The course targets military commanders, mid-level police and equivalent officers working in national arms registries in the ECOWAS region. The course has 11 components: marking techniques; legal basis for marking; registration and tracing; classical and security markings; registration; recordkeeping; tracing; usefulness of marking, recording and tracing arms; key regional and global instruments on marking and comparative analysis of regional instruments. Border Security Management is a two-week course and aims to enhance understanding of border management in Africa and issues facing effective control measures such as trafficking and smuggling. The course targets mid-level ECOWAS member state personnel working as customs officials, immigration officers; police, air traffic control, maritime authorities, the navy and civil society. There are 10 learning outcomes: border issues in Africa and West Africa; challenges in managing birders in West Africa; measures in addressing border insecurity – lessons from other regions; basic characteristics of integrated border posts; cooperation among countries; types of borders; international law enforcement cooperation; future trends in integrated border management; border management and gender and enforcement of ECOWAS protocol on free movement. United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Pre-deployment is a twoweek course for Selection Assistance Team (SAT) cleared police officers preparing to deploy to UNAMID. The course aims to enable students to undertake UN police roles as well as complement prior induction training. The course is based on UN Standardised Training Modules

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(STMs) for Darfur and seeks to ground students in understanding of UN police functions on PSOs. The Media Course addresses the role of the media in PSO. Students are military/police/civilians with priority given to nationals from ECOWAS member states. KAIPTC also hosts other training and education activities, notably the West African Peace building Institute (WAPI) and a Master of Arts in Conflict, Peace and Security. WAPI is a selection of specialised training sessions lasting three weeks. WAPI aims to educate students in conflict transformation and peacebuilding. The MA in Conflict, Peace and Security is a year long academic course for military/police/civilians in partnership with the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration. The MA costs USD$4,000 per student. Degrees are offered in partnership with the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration. In part this is an effort to diversify funding and to move away from donor dominance. The KAIPTC also hosts a Field Training Team, which conducts pre-deployment training courses for units in Ghana Armed Forces, military observers and other staff officers designated for UN/AU Missions. This team trains an average of 3,800 individuals every year at the Bundase Training Camp.

Incentivising the Development of KAIPTC Ghana’s longstanding contribution to peacekeeping and West Africa’s growing peacekeeping role are key considerations in the creation of KAIPTC.12 By the late nineties, the Ghanaian Ministry of Defence saw a role for itself as one of the leading African contributors to international and African peacekeeping operations as part of Ghana’s international relations within Africa and abroad.13 The Ghanaian armed forces have consistently participated in UN and other peacekeeping operations since the sixties and are currently the fifth largest troop contributing country (TCC) for UN peacekeeping missions, out of 117. Over 80,000 peacekeepers (military/civilian/police) have toured in more than 30 missions around the world and in Africa, including Cambodia, Chad, Cote D’Ivoire, DR Congo, Eastern Europe, Lebanon, Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. In 2011, Ghana had around 3,000 personnel deployed to UN missions. Out of a total force strength of under 10,000, Ghana must keep around 7,000 personnel in rotation for UN peacekeeping missions, let alone for regional operations and national security.

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Ghana has also been a lead nation in the development of West Africa’s security architecture, most notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It has positioned itself as a leading African actor with democratic credentials in the development of ECOWAS as well as the UN’s peacekeeping capability. ECOWAS has deployed peacekeeping operations to Cote D’Ivoire (2002), Liberia (1990– 1996, 2003) and Sierra Leone (1997). West African states saw the need for ‘interoperability’ of peacekeeping between states in the sub-region given their vast differences such as language, military doctrine and political culture.14 Furthermore, as ECOWAS began to take a more institutional and robust approach to conflict management so too was the continental body that was supposed to oversee it. The transformation of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) to the African Union in 2002 ushered in a new era for African-led and managed peacekeeping. The OAU was essentially dismantled due to its non-interference policy and successive failures over crises on the continent; notably the international peacekeeping debacles in Rwanda and Somalia and also wider conflict issues such as Angola, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Great Lakes region.15 As well as an economic focus, the new AU was developing its concepts for future conflict management initiatives on the continent, including a commitment to AU-led peacekeeping operations and support to existing regional groupings (such as ECOWAS) and also the establishment of regional standby brigades with associated training centres. Ghana’s massive commitment to UN and AU peacekeeping and the rise of West Africa’s security apparatus was instrumental in the decision to develop KAIPTC. The decision to develop KAIPTC is also informed by Ghana’s regional diplomatic relations. Most importantly KAIPTC is part of the scramble for foreign aid resources and as part of the strategy to counter Nigerian hegemony of regional security and economic issues in West Africa. Although West African states collaborate on regional integration far better than other sub-regions in Africa, inter-state competition and national priorities are important calculations for the Ghanaian Government. Nigeria is the largest economy and largest military in West Africa, with Ghana following closely behind. Some suggest that Nigeria is indispensible to West Africa’s conflict management capability, which would undoubtedly fail without economic and military support

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from Lagos.16 However, whilst Nigeria is perceived to be the most powerful state in West Africa regarding the economy and military, it is also seen to be one of the most chaotic in terms of stability, social-cohesion and corruption. Furthermore, Nigerian peacekeeping under ECOWAS/ ECOMOG in the nineties has been likened to a ‘bull in china shop,’17 a reflection on the Nigerian military’s heavy handedness and corrupt practices on peacekeeping missions. Most recently the inability to deal with militant Islamist group Boko Haram and the continuation of insurgency in the North of the country with devastating effects has diminished the reputation of the Nigerian military even further. Ghana in contrast is seen as a stable and democratic state and the UN has consistently lauded Ghanaian peacekeepers. Peacekeeping and democratic governance are two important areas where Ghana is seen to out-do Nigeria which are key issues for foreign donor assistance. Other regional rivalries are also a calculation, such as competition with Francophone states, especially Senegal.18 The decision to create KAIPTC, a centre for the region but based in Accra, can therefore be seen as part of Ghana’s regional diplomatic strategy. Economic rationales also inform the development of KAIPTC and are part of broader international financial flows from the West to Africa for peacekeeping operations and activities. In 2010 Ghana received USD$74 million alone for UN peacekeeping while expenditures amounted to USD$42 million resulting in a ‘profit’ of around USD$32 million which was used for defence procurement.19 Yearly peacekeeping ‘profits’ are likely to be much higher as this figure does not include AU/ ECOWAS peacekeeping or associated peacekeeping tasks such as training. KAIPTC is part of this ‘peace industry’ and is entirely funded from outside. Since the Centre’s inception Ghana has received over USD $20 million for KAIPTC including for infrastructure and training. Internal and organisational priorities are a final incentive. The Ghanaian defence establishment and individual military officers receive significant benefits from KAIPTC. In practice, a military college has been built free of charge for the Ghanaian armed forces and has been subsumed in the wider national military infrastructure. KAIPTC is not only an international centre but is also part of the national military establishment. All peacekeeping pre-deployment training for Ghanaian officers occurs at KAIPTC for example.20 Individual benefits abound as well. Staff members are predominately from the Ghanaian military

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providing employment to officers with career development opportunities such as chances to participate on courses held at KAIPTC and other centres, as well as trips abroad for official visits. Students also receive financial benefits. In addition to a qualification all students, many of whom are from the military in Ghana, receive lucrative per diems from external donors. As such the Ghana defence establishment has a great deal to gain organisationally and financially and at various levels from KAIPTC. The decision to create KAIPTC is inherently pragmatic and due to a combination of internal and external pressures. The significant commitment to international peacekeeping and a commitment to developing African conflict management capabilities is an important external pressure. National interest and regional diplomacy plus financial incentives are important internal influences. The combination of these external and internal pressures steered the Ghanaian defence establishment to institutionalise a regional centre of excellence in peacekeeping training with the aim of not only supporting Ghanaian contingents for peacekeeping missions but the training needs of the West African security apparatus. Questions remain over whether courses are merely delivered to fill slots in the calendar and to receive funds from donors or if training is directed in a strategic manner aimed at long-term capacity building for APSA. The quality of training is also questionable as course content is extremely broad and based on UN doctrine as opposed to the AU based modules and all courses are delivered and paid for from outside. Although KAIPTC makes more of an effort than other centres to deliver relevant and applicable training courses for AU peacekeepers there is a clear bias towards a broader liberal peacebuilding agenda and UN peacekeeping activities. Courses such as UNAMID pre-deployment, CIMIC, Protection of Civilians, joint campaign planning and integrated logistics are all targeted towards developing the AU’s peacekeeping capability. Tactical and technical courses such as SALW, stockpile management are also complimentary to these missions. However, courses such as the Rule of Law, SSR, Conflict Prevention, election monitoring and development diplomacy are largely outside the remit of the AU and can only really be undertaken by the UN. Much like IPSTC in Kenya, KAIPTC caters to a wide range of peacekeeping actors to the detriment of focused and relevant training.

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Student selection for training at KAIPTC reflects these issues. As a large proportion of training is not relevant for AU peacekeepers, individuals are sent to KAIPTC from a variety of international, national and local organisations. The hosting of an MA in Conflict Studies again calls into question overall aims of KAIPTC. Is it a college of theory and academia, or a technical training institute seeking to improve tangible skills? The Centre therefore functions less as a Centre of Excellence for peacekeeping but as a vehicle for regional workshops, patronage and associated pecuniary benefits. It should be recognised, nevertheless, that KAPITC has made important strides since its inception. For instance there is no Senior Mission Leaders Course as it is was deemed too high level and Carana is not used as the baseline scenario due to its inappropriateness. Perhaps most interestingly KAIPTC has sought to re-evaluate some of the course content in the last few years as some donors have pulled out of funding, notably the UK.21 Although these improvements are important KAPITC still caters to an internal logic above a regional requirement.

Rwanda Peace Academy (RPA) The Government of Rwanda set up its own PSO training centre in 2009; the Rwanda Peace Academy. The Centre is still in embryonic form but has managed to deliver several courses since its inception. The Rwandan Government has stipulated an effort to avoid duplication of PSO training in the region by focussing on post-conflict recovery issues rather than peacekeeping mission training. However, in practice, courses mirror those in other regional peacekeeping schools. Like other PSO training centres, the RPA is completely funded from outside and aims to be a regional Centre of Excellence in PSO training in support of the AU Peace and Security Architecture.

Structures and Objectives The Centre is based in Musanze, about a two-hour drive from Kigali. The RPA is co-located with the Defence and Staff College at the foothills of the Virunga mountains, home to the endangered mountain gorillas. Initially the site was part of the Defence and Staff College before being allocated to the RPA. Construction of the Centre began in 2009 and is on-going. Although most of the teaching blocks and lecture halls are

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complete, the RPA has no accommodation block and must rely on local hotels to house students and external teaching staff. Donors have funded all construction and training activities although the Government of Rwanda has provided the land and staff members (worth over USD$1 million). Initial funding was provided by the Government of Japan to the tune of USD$3 million. Other donors have been interested in partnering or funding courses at the RPA but alleged Rwandan military activity in the DRC in 2012 resulted in aid cuts, especially in foreign military assistance that included cuts to PSO training.22 The RPA is similar in organisation, structure and ethos to other PSO schools in Africa. The RPA aims to be a regional Centre of Excellence in PSO training and part of the African Peace and Security Architecture. The RPA is intended to be an ‘educational, training and research institution specializing in post-conflict recovery and peace building.’23 The RPA’s stated vision is: To be an independent and internationally recognised centre of excellence for training and research on conflict prevention, management, and resolution drawing on Rwandan and international best practices.24 With a mission to: Conduct research, develop and deliver internationally recognised professional training courses and educational programmes in order to equip the military, police and civilian personnel with the competences and knowledge required to meet Africa’s present and future complex peace and security challenges.25 The RPA’s specific objectives are much the same as other regional PSO schools: .

To enhance national, sub-regional and regional capacity for conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and peace building, by drawing on Rwanda’s extensive peace building experience based on home grown solutions and international best practices, as well as anticipating and preparing for future challenges.

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To contribute to the development of a sub-regional and regional capacity in the delivery of integrated Peace Support Operations at the strategic and operational levels. To support the African Union Peace and Security Architecture and regional initiatives by adding value through research and innovative thinking, capacity building and exchanges at the regional and international levels. To enhance the understanding of critical peace and security issues, particularly the recovery-development nexus, at the regional and international levels. To establish collaborative relations with national and international institutions and to organise public events to raise awareness and promote understanding of peace building at the national and international levels.? To create an effective, efficient and sustainable management and support arrangements for the Rwanda Peace Academy.26

Aims and objectives then seek to facilitate the improvement of regional responses to violent conflict and are in line with the approach taken by other PSO training schools. The RPA seeks to contribute to these responses through international and Rwandan best practice. Thus an ethos of reform according to international norms underscores training at the RPA. Training is also intended to foster collaborative relations within APSA and sub-regional security actors and so aims to further the integration of African nations in political and security matters. Finally, the RPA seeks to build capacity and so improve the capability of armed forces in addressing violent conflict. The RPA then is part of the broader approach in PSO training that seeks to improve, reform and integrate. The RPA constitutes three departments: training, research and administration. There is also a PR and IT section reporting directly to the director. The director sits at the top of the Centre. The current incumbent is Colonel Jill Rutaremara, the former military spokesman and former party political commissar and mobiliser. As well as the director there are 11 permanent staff members at the RPA, all of whom except one are military officers. A lone civilian researcher is head of training and education. However, in practice the RPA has no in-house capability to deliver training, design courses or conduct research, in part due to the fact

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that the RPA is in its early stages but also as most of the Centre’s products are delivered and paid for from outside. Courses have to be delivered by external expertise. As a result the RPA functions as a conference centre. The RPA has some impressive facilities although more is needed to be a fully functioning training school. The site is host to a large building with several classrooms, syndicate rooms, offices and lecture halls. There is also a library and computer room and a large conference room for up to 180 people. However, a severe shortcoming is that there is no accommodation block and the RPA must accommodate students and visiting trainers in nearby hotels at around USD$60 per person per day.27

Overview of Training Between 2009 and 2013 the RPA has hosted several courses each year and have trained over 600 regional peacekeepers. Although training is supposed to combine Rwandan and international approaches to preventing and alleviating conflict, all courses are delivered by external expertise and this reduces the host nations ability to influence and inform training. This is reflected in the nature of training and the types of courses that have been delivered at the RPA. Courses have covered a wide range of issues and include Gender Based Violence; Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis; 3x Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC); Workshop to Document Rwanda Peacekeeping Experiences; Introduction to Peace Support Operations (Basic Course); Leadership, Teamwork and Team Building in Peace Operations (Advanced Course); Security Sector Reform level I; Military Observers (MILOBS) Course; United Nations Senior Mission Leaders (SML) Course; Security Sector Reform Course (Level II); Eastern Africa Stand by Force (EASF) PSO Foundation Course for Civilians; Protection of Civilians in Peace Operation – Special Focus on Child Soldiers; Security Sector Reform; Gender, Leadership and Peace building; Good Governance and Peace building; Political Affairs Course; The Prevention of the Use of Child Soldiers; Defence Attaches Workshop and Study Tour; Prevention and Response to Conflict; Transitional Justice and Peace building; PSO Foundation Course; Maritime Search and Rescue; Rwanda Defence Forces Senior Command and Staff Course 02: ‘Peace Support Operations Module’ and Protection of Civilians.28 Courses at the RPA are a plethora of UN orientated training modules at the very conceptual level to the detriment of AU relevant activities.

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The Centre has prioritised a quantitative approach over qualitative in that there has been an urgency to host already accepted and recognised courses at the RPA as opposed to developing training based on Rwanda’s experiences in PSO. The fact that Rwanda has experienced its own history of conflict and ensuing reconstruction and is a significant TCC to peacekeeping in Africa, does not automatically mean that training at the RPA is informed by these experiences. For further insights into training at the RPA I attended two days of a Protection of Civilians course. The course directors were former employees of IPSTC in Kenya and one was a former military officer in the Kenyan army. The course was imported from IPSTC and used the same modules, concepts, timetable and general approach (see Chapter 4). Students were from regional states, however, it was clear none would be deploying to a peacekeeping mission. One of the participants was not even eligible for a position in a peacekeeping mission as she was an undergraduate student from one of the less well-known universities in Nairobi.

Problematising the RPA Several factors have steered the Government of Rwanda to create the RPA. First is Kigali’s commitment to peacekeeping. Rwanda is the fifth largest global contributor to UN peacekeeping missions and one of the major contributors to AU peacekeeping. Around 41,000 Rwandan peacekeepers have been deployed to missions in the last ten years, which makes up almost the entire army.29 Rwandan peacekeepers (military, police and civilians) have served in MINUSMA in Mali (including Force Commander), MINUSTAH in Haiti, UNAMID, UNISFA and UNMISS in Sudan and South Sudan, UNMIL in Liberia, UNOCI in Cote D’Ivoire and MISCA in Central African Republic. Furthermore Rwanda is part of the East African Standby Force (EASF) and other Eastern African regional initiatives with peace and security components such as the EAC and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).30 However, this massive commitment to peacekeeping has not been decisive for the development of the Centre. Rwandan peacekeepers are intensively trained in peacekeeping issues and technical soldiering activities before going to a mission at the Rwanda Military Academy Gako.31 This pre-deployment training involves several months

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of classroom and field training prior to mission as well as a six months post-mission training/reinsertion support.32 Other reasons, therefore, have dictated the development of the RPA. According to the Rwandan Government the establishment of the RPA is informed by Rwanda’s own peacekeeping experiences and lessons, which has been substantial. Rwandan peacekeepers have served in a variety of peace operations and returning peacekeepers and the lessons they bring are extremely valued by the RDF. In addition Rwanda’s history of development and state reconstruction after civil war and genocide is cited as a key motivation for developing the RPA. The leadership in Rwanda believes it has first hand experience in successfully re-constructing a state after civil war and violent conflict and is morally obliged to share these experiences with other states.33 Linked to this is the failure of the international community to intervene successfully in African conflict situations and the desire on the part of the Rwandan leadership to avoid dependence on international actors. Official government reasons for the creation of the RPA include some of these issues and are available on the Centre’s website: .

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International approaches to conflicts in Africa have often proven inadequate in ensuring stabilisation and sustainable peace because of the complex nature of those conflicts. Post-conflict recovery and peace building programme is not given the due attention and consideration that it deserves. Rwanda offers a rich background of experiences to draw from in the area of post-conflict recovery and peace building including practical case studies of home-grown solutions. There are some good regional and international best practices to borrow from. Rwanda’s active contribution to regional and international peacekeeping; The realisation that peace and security is a prerequisite for sustainable development.34

These official reasons suggest that the development of the RPA is intended to firstly share experiences from RDF peacekeeping. The Centre’s senior management echo this sentiment:

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Rwanda can share its experiences but also share international best practice. Not just in conflict resolution but also PSO as Rwanda is a major TCC to peacekeeping.35 Secondly, the specific areas of post-conflict management issues are to be prioritised in order to add value and fill gaps in the region. The Director expanded on this and was clear that: we want to avoid duplication given that there are other PSO training centres in the region. They have Mali, Kenya, SADC (RTPZimbabwe), West Africa and more are coming like Ethiopia.36 Finally, there is an undertone of mistrust of international approaches to conflict resolution based upon Rwanda’s own experience of an international community frozen in the face of genocide.37 However salient these experiences may be in influencing decisions to deploy to peacekeeping mission it seems only partly applicable to the decision to develop a regional PSO training centre, not least as the military is trained for peacekeeping elsewhere and that current courses are not informed by Rwanda’s history of conflict or experiences in peacekeeping. Although this local context is part of the picture other reasons have dictated the decision to develop a regional peacekeeping training centre. In addition to these reasons for developing the RPA national interest in regional geo-politics and economic benefits are also important calculations. Competition within Eastern Africa for foreign military/ security aid is hotly contested. Developing a regional PSO centre almost guarantees external funding. This is acutely understood by the Rwandan Government. When asked about the regional dynamic a senior officer was quick to reply: The politics of the centres is a problem. Other centres try to sabotage others. Take IPSTC in Kenya. It constantly takes courses away from us and from the donors. IPSTC is a commercial operation, they just want as much money as they can get.38 A senior official at the EASF in Nairobi echoed the RPA commandant’s sentiments:

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two or three training institutions are needed in Eastern Africa to build some competition but also to focus on specific areas. But IPSTC (Kenya) thinks you are sabotaging them if money goes to others training centres like RPA.39 Interestingly, during my data collection period, I encountered this dynamic of competition and collaboration. I was asked personally on several occasions by the Director of IPSTC in Kenya and several other senior staff members to stay in communication if I spent time at the RPA in Rwanda. I was repeatedly asked to relay information back to IPSTC about the RPA’s possible strategy and courses demonstrating a significant mistrust between the centres. This may be in part due to a severe lack of coordination between the centres that see themselves as national possessions as opposed to regional schools. Indeed it was clear that there was no co-ordination between the training schools whatsoever. The Chief of Staff at IPSTC, arguably the most dynamic staff member, had no idea what the RPA was doing and thought it was a national centre only.40 A militarised leadership in Rwanda that prioritises security issues is also an important factor in developing the RPA. The senior leadership in Rwanda is constituted of predominately military or rebel fighters who seized power in 1994 with the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF was a guerrilla movement on a loose Marxist-Leninist model of revolutionary war.41 These individuals have forged a close-knit group and form much of the leadership in contemporary Rwanda.42 As a result the political system is heavily militarised with security concerns and issues prioritised such as developing military institutions but also providing opportunities for individuals in the army and security services. Foreign policy goals and competition and collaboration within the East African region are an additional set of calculations for developing the RPA. As a centre training mainly regional government and security officials the RPA feeds into Kigali’s diplomatic strategy with donors, African states and regional organisations. Economic incentives are a fourth consideration. The RPA is entirely funded with external resources from foreign donors as are all training activities. RPA staff and the Rwandan leadership have seen the benefits other countries like Kenya and Ghana receive by hosting an internationally recognised training centre. Individual benefits are also

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recognised as Rwandan military officers will not only staff the Centre but fill many of the student slots as well. The RPA is a developing centre with a great deal of potential and has managed to deliver some training. The Centre reflects Rwanda’s commitment to peacekeeping and also serves Kigali’s regional and national priorities as well as financial benefits. The Centre itself is little more than a conference centre with ambitious plans. There is no in-house capability to deliver any training and foreign donors fund all activities. So far courses have been broad in scope, conceptual in nature and UN heavy to the detriment of practical training for operational peacekeepers intended to be part of an AU mission or APSA. Rather than serving East Africa’s regional PSO training needs the RPA is serving Rwanda’s financial and foreign policy needs and internal priorities of the military.

Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EIPKTC)43 Since 2013 the Government of Ethiopia has been developing its own Centre of Excellence for PSO training. Although still in the construction stages, and little more than a building site, the EIPKTC will eventually become a third PSO training centre in Eastern Africa with a national, regional and continental remit and host courses aimed at military, police and civilian participants. The EIPKTC was supposed to have started training peacekeepers by the end of 2013 but this has not occurred. Construction is yet to be completed and a curriculum is yet to be designed. However, the EIPKTC is an interesting case study to triangulate PSO training issues given its early stages of development, how it conceptualises PSO training and how it conceives itself. The EIPKTC is completely funded from outside. The British Government has provided GBP£1.3 million for construction and is heavily invested in the centres development.44 The Government of Japan is the second largest donor providing USD$790,000.45 The UNDP and the EU are also invested in the development of the EIPKTC. The Ethiopian Government has provided provisional staff for the Centre including its Director, Major-General Ibrahim Hassan and a few other senior officers as well as the plot of land in Addis Ababa. France has provided a military adviser to the Director and other donors are engaged through diplomatic channels such as Defence Attache´s.

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Courses at EIPKTC will target both building national peacekeeping capability and also improve regional African contributions to peacekeeping missions.46 That is EIPKTC aims to train Ethiopian but also Eastern Africa’s military, civilians and police in peacekeeping topics and activities. The Centre’s top management already has an idea of what courses will be available at EIPKTC. When discussing the future curricula with a senior staff member at EIPKTC he had a clear idea of what types of training the Centre is trying to develop. Potential areas of training will most likely include a Senior Mission Leaders Course, Civilian Police, DDR, SSR, Brigade Head Quarters, Logistics Head Quarters, Training of Trainers, MILOBS, Human Rights, Protection of Civilians, Conflict Management and Post-Conflict Recovery and English language training for peacekeepers.47 The Centre will also have an applied research department.48 Although seeking to add value to training Eastern Africa’s peacekeepers as well as aiming to coordinate with other centres and not duplicate effort the courses outlined above are exactly the same as courses held at IPSTC in Kenya and other PSO training centres. Course areas correlate not with the development of the AU and its peacekeeping capability but are again extremely broad and are more appropriate for UN missions especially the focus on post-conflict reconstruction, SSR and DDR. The aims of training however are clear. Courses seek to improve the ability of national and regional peacekeepers, courses are underscored by international norms broadly reflective of the UN oriented training and the centre seeks to improve the development of APSA. It can be said then that the EIPKTC seeks to improve, reform and integrate, much like other PSO training centres on the continent.

Rationalising EIPKTC The decision to build the EIPKTC closely resembles the development of other PSO training centres in Africa in that Addis and donors serve their own national policy priorities. Rationales for the development of the centre are diverse and are informed by national pragmatism and internal priorities rather than pan-Africanism, other normative discourse or ideology or commitment to developing regional peacekeeping capability. Ethiopia’s practical experience and history of involvement in peacekeeping is the initial basis for the development of a PSO training centre. Ethiopia is a long time contributor to UN peacekeeping since the

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1950s. Since 2003 Addis has provided significant contributions for peacekeeping missions and Ethiopia is the largest contributor to peacekeeping operations in Africa and the fourth largest TCC globally.49 Ethiopia has prioritised UN missions in Africa and currently provides peacekeepers to six missions – UNOCI in Cote D’Ivoire, UNMIL in Liberia, UNAMID, UNIFSA (almost the entire mission), UNMISS in Sudan and South Sudan and recently AMISOM in Somalia (although ENDF were operating unilaterally in Somalia in collaboration with AMISOM for several years). In addition to these current peacekeeping missions, Ethiopia is at the forefront of developing the African Peace and Security Architecture and is a key state in the EASF hosting the EASF Logistics base and Deployable Brigade Headquarters (see Chapter 2). Clearly the Ethiopian Government is heavily invested in peacekeeping and many Ethiopian forces will deploy to a theatre under UN or AU control. Training for these scenarios and building peacekeeping capability is therefore a legitimate and important concern for the Ethiopian military establishment. This applies to both collective and individual training. Economic benefits are also a key calculation and arguably outweigh any normative or even practical necessity. The Government of Ethiopia has realised that by investing or agreeing to host a regional peacekeeping training centre a great deal of financial resources will follow at various levels. This realisation has already born fruit with donors providing around GBP£2 million before any training has been delivered with more cash promised on the horizon for activities, structures and training delivery. At the individual level, Ethiopian forces will be given priority and as a result will receive a great deal of training with associated private benefits such as a per diem and certificates. The Centre will be staffed by Ethiopian military personnel and civilians providing not only jobs but also avenues for patronage and patrimonialism. Regional geopolitics is a further key consideration for establishing the EIPKTC. Further integration within the Eastern African region is seen to be part of developing a regional PSO school in Ethiopia. Both Addis and donors believe that having a centre in Addis will better serve the region’s PSO needs and also bring regional elites into contact with each other providing situations of socialisation. This socialisation is seen as a way of fostering a group of elites who see their national interests served though regional integration. Ethiopia’s involvement with the

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AU, IGAD, EASF and others, as well as its proactive military have all been cited as reasons why the EIPKTC should be developed. In addition the fact that the AU has its headquarters in Addis Ababa has been a further rationale for developing an AU affiliated centre in Ethiopia. Regional competition is equally important and perhaps more so than integration. Specifically the development of the EIPKTC can be seen as part of the Kenyan-Ethiopian rivalry and competition for regional hegemony but also as Ethiopia’s foreign policy within Eastern Africa more broadly and with Western states and organisations. Nairobi and Addis have been at a scramble for donor support for their own security sectors. When deciding about hosting the EASF it was a contest between Kenya and Ethiopia for the bulk of the institutions. Kenya came out on top and received not only the EASF coordinating mechanism and Planning Element but funds for a regional training centre as well. Ethiopia received merely a logistics base and small deployable headquarters. When Kenya joined AMISOM in 2011 even more donor support was provided to Nairobi and this trend has continued. Recognising the benefits of multilateral peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool and financial resources Addis has stepped up its PSO contributions, to the extent of officially joining AMISOM in 2014. The development of EIPKTC is therefore in direct competition with IPSTC in Kenya and is part of the Addis-Nairobi jockeying for regional power. Although donors and AU officials state that collaboration between the centres is essential and duplication of courses should be avoided at all costs the reality is that the EIPKTC is an almost carbon copy of the operational level training centre in Nairobi. Structures are the same in that the centre is under the authority of the Ethiopian Ministry of Defence and the Centre’s staff are all ENDF military officers. All financial resources are from external donors and intended courses mirror those of IPSTC and other training centres. The Government of Ethiopia has seen the national benefits Kenya has received from IPSTC in the form of financial resources and seeks to tap into the extremely deep pool of funds ear marked for PSO training by donors. The Government of Ethiopia will have an institution built for them, jobs will be created for Ethiopian military officers as instructors and many Ethiopian students will be trained at EIPKTC at no cost to the government. In terms of regional diplomatic relations this dynamic has therefore created an environment of collaboration and competition. The training

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centres are part of this interstate dynamic, and foreign aid funds earmarked for PSO training and other activities in Eastern Africa have created a scramble for these external resources. The centres are also a source of pride, legitimacy and at a very basic level a status symbol of military and political achievement. The development of EIPKTC can also be seen to be part of Ethiopia’s approach to development and statehood. The Eastern African region is not only plagued by states immersed in conflict or states with potential for violent conflict such as Central African Republic, DR Congo, Somalia and South Sudan but also countries that have emerged from conflict typically as an outright victor of a guerrilla movement. States such as Ethiopia, and also Rwanda and Uganda, have functioning state structures, economies and especially military power. The leadership of these states is highly militarised owing to the particular history of seizing state power through guerrilla warfare and the military plays a disproportionate role in state policy making. It is not uncommon to find that many of the key decision-makers in these governments are military officers, former military officers or former guerrilla fighters. As a result, military programmes such as military institutions are prioritised over other policy areas. Donors accept this dynamic and actively encourage it. By providing military assistance in the form of cash and technical advisers, donors believe they will have an entry point into the shadowy world of African militaries. Undoubtedly the proximity to Somalia and Ethiopia’s growing role as regional hegemon in the Horn of Africa is a further incentive for donors. Ethiopia is also pointed at as a success story in terms of post-conflict reconstruction but also as an effective development state.50 This tacit support from Western states to Ethiopia’s military in the form of peacekeeping training provides Addis with a certain degree of political legitimacy as well as muting international criticisms of internal repression or the curbing of civil liberties at home.51 EIPKTC is much like other training centres in Africa. Even though the Centre is yet to deliver any training, parameters have been set and the organisation has been conceptualised. The Centre will seek to improve, reform and integrate Eastern African armed forces as well as civilians and police along similar lines to IPSTC in Kenya. Courses and the concept of training is identical to the Nairobi based centre in that a broad curriculum of individual training is envisaged that will cover

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conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction activities along the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. Rationale for development involves a combination of external and internal priorities all serving Ethiopia’s national security, regional diplomatic and financial interests.

Conclusion The case studies above show commonalities in the decision-making process to develop PSO training centres among three states with differing approaches to statehood and the military, although Rwanda and Ethiopia share many similarities. Firstly, a proven track record of commitment to peacekeeping and African conflict management initiatives is a pre-requisite for hosting a peacekeeping school. Host nations are all significant contributors to peacekeeping missions. Many have long histories of peacekeeping deployments and Rwanda has been a significant player in global peacekeeping since 2003. All are key states in the development of the AU’s peacekeeping capability and all are significant contributors to UN missions in Africa. Regional diplomacy and pragmatic national interests are the second commonality for developing a PSO centre. Host nations of the major PSO schools in Africa see these centres as serving their regional and national interests be it in terms of inter-state rivalry as with Ghana and Nigeria and Kenya and Ethiopia or by providing a military institution. In addition the centres are a status symbol or benchmark of national military development. Economic benefits are a third and crucial incentive. Hosting a regional centre of excellence affiliated to the AU almost guarantees flows of foreign financial and technical assistance. All centres are completely funded from outside at a limited cost to the host nation. Furthermore, jobs will be created for national military and other personnel as instructors, directing staff, administrative staff, researchers and even cleaners, secretaries, drivers, gardeners and other positions. Host nations are also given priority slots for their own students on every course. Other beneficiaries abound such as hotels, catering and suppliers will also receive business in procuring training aids and accommodating individuals. All of which is paid for by foreign donors.

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Institutionally all PSO schools operate in practice as part of their national military hierarchy as opposed to an international or regional organisation. All centres are headed by a senior military officer from the host nation. Desires of the national ministry of defence and national leadership trump all other priorities, including regional and AU needs although interests do converge in some areas. Centres all have similar structures and all have, or desire to have, a training department, a research department and an administration department who report directly to the Director. As all courses are delivered from outside the training departments these centres largely function as administrators. Staff members are more akin to secretaries or clerks assisting foreign directing staff and external subject matter experts. As long as training is delivered from outside this status quo of inertia that exists within PSO schools across Africa will remain. Related to this is role of research. The research departments of these centres are supposed to inform course delivery through rigorous research which is then fed into training design. However, as all training is delivered from outside there is limited scope to influence course content and course delivery. Research papers therefore tend to be unrelated to training and many have limited relevance for peacekeeping. The administration departments are then the only really functioning department within these centres. This is hardly surprising in that as long as these centres are seen to be functioning bureaucratic organisations with measurable outputs such as numbers of students trained, number of research papers produced and have functioning internal organisational systems foreign financial and technical assistance is likely to continue. Most striking is the nature of course content across the three centres. The centres articulate different angles and approaches to training. KAIPTC states it is an operational level centre for West African peacekeeping capability, the RPA seeks to develop post-conflict reconstruction from an African context and EIPKTC seeks to develop Eastern Africa’s conflict management capability in collaboration with IPSTC in Kenya and the RPA. In practice, the courses are carbon copies of each other with all centres hosting the same courses in terms of intended learning outcomes and modules, even if course titles may differ. Most importantly all centres host courses that mainly cater to UN PSOs and the wider liberal peacebuilding agenda. The prioritisation with the

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range of liberal peacebuilding activities from mitigation activities to post-conflict reconstruction tasks immediately loses applicability to AU and APSA’s peacekeeping capability. In addition these centres are in states that are not grounded in liberalism or the social democratic ideals as promoted by liberal peacebuilding such as democratic elections and human rights, although Ghana and South Africa meet most of the criteria for liberal statehood. Most host states have high levels of patrimonialism and blurred state structures. To a large degree, genuine democracy is an alien concept in that accountability, civil liberties and representation of wider society are not institutionalised. These states have also developed different political structures to Western states. Colonisation, authoritarianism, revolution and democratic ripples have been hallmarks of African development and liberal democracies are yet to be institutionalised fully, even if elements of liberal statehood exist in some cases. Regarding PSO training centres the result is for illiberal military academies from illiberal states to train illiberal soldiers from other illiberal states in the basic tenants of liberal international peacebuilding. This chapter has sought to demonstrate that peacekeeping training centres in Africa share strikingly similar dynamics. Even though PSO schools are numerous, focus at different levels, are dotted all over the African continent in extremely diverse cultural and linguistic operating situations, somewhat surprisingly, the creation and development of these centres is remarkably uniform. As striking are the similarities in organisation, conceptual foundation, structure and the consequences, both intended and unintended, of how these centres operate and function.

CHAPTER 6 THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA:A SATISFICING MODEL

Introduction This book has focused on understanding the issues around peacekeeping training schools in Africa. These schools are identified as units of analysis to determine the intended and unintended consequences of what training, employment and interaction within PSO training centres results in. It is posited that these training centres aim to address various externally oriented goals such as building African Union peacekeeping capability and forging closer relations between national political elites across different African states, as well as imposing or promoting liberal peacebuilding norms at the continental, regional and national level. However, it seems that internal oriented realities are the priority with external intentions a distant concern or at least of secondary importance resulting in a ‘satisfying approach’ to peacekeeping training. This chapter examines these external and internal issues using the comparative case studies explored in previous chapters. By examining Kenya’s IPSTC in depth, followed by comparative cases from Ghana, Rwanda and Ethiopia, commonalties can be identified, both intended and unintended. PSO centres form the dependent variable in this analysis. Military officers from the region, in the form of employees and participants, donors who fund and who are seconded to the centres, and courses

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delivered all form independent variables. Commonalities are determined through tracing the process of the development of these centres and also through teasing out the realities of daily life within the environment of a peacekeeping training centre through ethnographic research. By investigating and comparing these units of analysis a comprehensive assessment of what PSO training schools provide is determined. Most importantly, this study demonstrates that even though a variety of independent variables exist such as military origin, student or centre employee, type of course delivered or type of donor approach used, the result in terms of the centre in question (as these cases from Kenya, Ghana, Rwanda or Ethiopia show), is remarkably uniform. Differences are present, mostly around issues of military culture, that help to explain the specific approach to training and organisation adopted by the Kenyan military, the Ghanaian military, the Rwandans and Ethiopians and go some way in determining why military officers are sent to courses. By identifying these differences in military culture between these independent variables commonalities of the dependent units of analysis are more accurately identified.

Comparing PSO Training Centres: Trends and Commonalities PSO Training Centres are part of broader foreign military assistance and development policies from national governments and multilateral organisations seeking to support and improve peacekeeping in Africa. This support to peacekeeping training centres can be classified as military assistance in a broad sense. Most of the funding provided finds its way to the militaries of the host nation in varying forms. Donor defence ministries are often the lead department in programme design and almost all technical advisers seconded to the centres are serving or former military officers. Although ‘multidimensional approach’ rhetoric is bounded about in seminars and policy documents the majority of actors that are involved in PSO training are for the most part military or former military officers. In this regard it is entirely salient to classify support to PSO training in general as foreign military assistance. The centres themselves share remarkably similar characteristics providing useful comparative case studies in establishing trends, causes and effects. All PSO training centres began as national training centres

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in some form, whether as part of an existing War College as in South Africa, Nigeria and Cameroon, as a national pre-deployment centre as in Kenya, Ghana, Zimbabwe and Mali, or simply a department of an existing military college as in Rwanda and Ethiopia. All PSO training centres are staffed predominately by host national military personnel and report to the national ministry of defence. Furthermore, courses delivered at the centres are by and large the same across the continent in terms of conceptual basis and course content. Courses range from what is considered conflict prevention activities (such as negotiation and mediation, early warning, conflict prevention and conflict analysis), conflict management courses (such as peace operations planning, senior mission leaders, CIMIC, human rights and protection of civilians) and post-conflict reconstruction courses (such as DDR, electoral observation courses, SALW, SSR and the Rule of Law). Furthermore, most courses subscribe to the conceptual basis of the ‘Conflict Cycle’ and training fits around liberal peacebuilding theory. Most striking is that all PSO centres are funded from outside. Donors fund all running costs and all courses as well as some staff positions. If donor funds were removed PSO training centres would cease to exist. In terms of aims and objectives again the centres are remarkably uniform, which is hardly surprising as they have been supported and directed by external patrons. The three core principles of improving, reforming and integrating are common to all training centres. The primary aim of PSO schools is to improve the capability of AU peace support operations. Current AU missions such as AMISOM in Somalia and future missions needs capable personnel who have been equipped with the right skills for specific positions in AU peace operations. At the operational level this is mainly limited to the mission’s management, Staff Officers in the Force Head Quarters, Sector Head Quarters and senior civilian staff such as political affairs officers or rule of law advisers. At the same time the development of the AU’s agreed upon future peacekeeping strategies are also being targeted by the training centres, most notably the African Standby Force and its regional brigades. Secondly, and perhaps more on the donor interest side, rationale for the centres is framed in terms of reforming African forces for the better. The intention is to expose and train African militaries and leaders in a variety of international norms considered essential for peacekeeping but also to instil some of these norms into national defence forces in Africa in

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the hope of making them more professional. The hope is that by training African militaries in liberal norms such as human rights and protection activities and also in (Western) organisational and technical military culture these trained forces will refrain from what is perceived to be ‘bad behaviour’ by outsiders and will enter the more ‘righteous’ world of militarised peace enforcers. Finally, all centres aim to integrate Africa’s senior military elite through processes of socialisation, limited to sub-regional elites, broadly along the lines of Elite Socialisation in neo-functionalist theory,1 but underscored by Pan-African solidarity.2 These elites will be sent to PSO training centres and will find themselves as individuals amongst peers from neighbouring states. The hope is that two weeks together will breakdown preconceived boundaries of prejudice and provide the right environment for bonds to be built between individuals. They will begin to see their national and immediate regional and continental goals and policy priorities served better by working together under a regional or continental framework as opposed to unilateral policymaking. These centres have an ambitious but unrealistic strategy. Remits are vast and conceptual basis is flawed. All centres aim to cover in-depth issues of conflict ranging from preventive diplomacy to post-conflict reconstruction. These areas alone are out of line with current AU peacekeeping capabilities. The AU only has the capacity for either rapid reaction/stabilisation interventions that would eventually be taken over by the UN (e.g. Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali) or a hybrid UNAU mission (e.g. Darfur). The AU and APSA have little or no capacity for post-conflict reconstruction activities.3 This has not gone unnoticed in the AU. As a senior AU diplomat with responsibility for developing training for peace mission said to me: Currently there are no AU courses at IPSTC. IPSTC is mainly about building national capacity even though it says it focuses itself to the AU’s needs. It is wishful thinking that training national forces equals improved AU capacity and integration. It doesn’t! If the centres are not part of the AU then there is no effect. Another issue is that the wrong courses are being taught. For example the AU has no mission doing DDR. Which mission? Who are you training and for what? IPSTC does wholesale training for whomever and for whoever pays! UK, US, UN etc. It’s largely training for training’s sake.

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Given we are already engaged in combat operations why is there a need to do a course in Conflict Analysis? Regional Security Studies? Preventive Diplomacy? There needs to be some evidence for these courses. Currently this is lacking.4 As the centres are intended to be part of the APSA by focusing on predominately UN activities a large focus of the training is obsolete. As one Western military adviser to EASF stated: The training is far too UN heavy. There is not nearly enough AU or ASF stuff. I suppose a lot of the partners just do UN and impose this when they allocate funding. As a result much of the training and courses are irrelevant for the APSA vision.5 Even when addressing UN standards and activities courses often fall short. A former military adviser to the African Union summarised these issues: PSO centres are a combination of misunderstanding and wishful thinking. These centres already existed for other reasons. National contributions and training national contributions to peace operations. People think they were APSA to begin with but that is simply not the case. Therefore they all have this national element which is very difficult to remove. You can’t just wish that away. The connection between national/ASF/AU was simply assumed to work. Donors thought that by training national components it would also build the capacity of the ASF. This is simply not the case. So far there has been little if no progress in creating a cadre of officers equipped with the necessary skills to deploy as part of the ASF or on a PSO. Nobody is sending the right people to the training centres. How do African states select people? For instance no one who has done an RSML/SML course in Africa has been selected to be a Force Commander. Have any AMISOM FC’s done an SML? The training centres try to talk AU doctrine but when it doesn’t apply they revert to UN doctrine resulting in a jumbled up programme of various doctrines and activities that become very broad brush.6 The fact that all training is contracted out to external presenters and mentors with all activities funded externally by foreign donors means

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that centres have little say in course content. Capacity for course design is painfully low and staff are vastly under qualified for the job in hand. The AU and the ASF regional brigades have no official link to the centres calling into question their strategy.7 In part this is because national defence ministries retain a tight grip on the centres, reflected in the dominance of national military personnel and casting doubts over the rhetoric of international centres.

The ‘Conflict Cycle’ Conceptually, the basis of training can be seen as static ‘liberal peacebuilding’ in that training is rooted in a basic liberal discourse applied to peacekeeping but lacking in both rigour and analysis. The conceptual basis for the majority of courses at all PSO training centres is the ‘Conflict Cycle’. Figure 6.1 summarises the conceptual basis for most of the training delivered at PSO Training Centres. Three broad phases of preventive diplomacy/conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding/post-conflict resolution are highlighted with corresponding levels of violence split into peace, conflict and war. Various conflict resolution activities are suggested as interventions to mitigate violence at specific times. So if the level of violence is at a peak (i.e. war) and the time phase is in the early periods (i.e. conflict prevention or conflict management) then the way to solve the crisis is to deploy a peacemaking Start of Armed Conflict

Armed Conflict

Formal Cessation of Armed Conflict

PostCeasefire

Escalation

Threshold of Armed Conflict

Peace negotiations

Threshold of Sustainable Peace Peace

D, D and R

International Response Prevention

Mitigation

Termination

Recovery

Peacekeeping Operations Peace Enforcement Operations

Peacebuilding Operations

Peace Operations Conflict Prevention Activities and Operations (e.g. Diplomacy)

Figure 6.1

Humanitarian and 'Peacemaking' Operations

The ‘Conflict Cycle’.8

Arms Control

188 Post-Conflict Tasks

Stabilisation

Transition

IFIs: World Bank/IMF

Peacekeeping Operation

UN Country Team, Donors, NGOs

ICRC / Humanit. NGOs

Time Conflict

Figure 6.2

Long-Term Development

LOCAL INSTITUTIONS

ECONOMIC GOV INFRA INVESTMT CIVIL ADMIN ELECTIONS POLITICAL SECURITY DDR RULE OF LAW CAPACITY BLDG HUMANIT ASST

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Sustainable Peace

Post-Conflict Reconstruction.9

or peace enforcement mission. Similarly if the violence is low and comes after war then peacebuilding initiatives should be considered. As a basis there is some salience in this approach. Different aspects of conflict and war are clearly demarcated and a selection of issues and dynamics can be associated or at least articulated with elements within the cycle outlined above. Certain activities are highlighted that can mitigate escalating or future conflict such as diplomatic activity or deploying a peacekeeping mission. More detail is provided for specific phases of the ‘Conflict Cycle’. Figure 6.2 shows the approach used for post-conflict reconstruction training.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction In this more detailed and specific diagram peacebuilding interventions, such as humanitarian relief activity, World Bank reconstruction efforts, and UN development programmes are once again plotted against a time axis. This approach does not necessarily provide the wrong information but rather the information provided is static, under investigated and taken at face value. There is no critical evaluation of this approach and most importantly there is no attempt to apply the cycle outlined above to real world situations and context that would need these types of peacebuilding interventions. Conceptually then the approach is static liberal peacebuilding or liberal peacebuilding at face value.10

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Liberal peace in this sense is presented as the only way to address violent conflict with the ultimate aim of democratic elections, a free market economy and the development of Western notions of Westphalian statehood. That is not to say that supporting the deescalation of violent conflict is a bad thing. Far from it. Nor is it wrong to aim for more inclusive and representative forms of government, economy and social organisations. However, by presenting and understanding conflict and conflict management on rigid and measureable terms using rigid analytical frameworks, the reality of how violent conflict emerges, develops and evolves is distorted at best and at worst lost beyond recognition. Crucially, technical steps in conflict management are presented as a panacea to solve almost any outbreak of violence without taking into consideration deep rooted and ingrained historical, political and economic issues that tend to shape violence. All courses are based on these assumptions as are training aids such as the country study of Carana.11 For discussions on the nature of conflict and a critique of technical approaches to conflict resolution several important studies debunk some of the current thinking, especially in policy circles. Cramer’s 2006 study Civil War is not a Stupid Thing12 articulately argues that conflict is diverse, multilayered, inherently rational (even the most heinous of abuses) and driven by local political interests and pressures. Keen similarly derides current conflict resolution that addresses conflict in purely technical and strict liberal peacebuilding terms. Instead Keen, in Complex Emergencies,13 suggests that the interaction of certain political, economic and social issues is crucial in understanding contemporary conflict and therefore in trying to resolve it. Similarly, Goodhand and Walton describe the liberal approach to peacebuilding in Sri Lanka and conclude that liberal peacebuilding and conflict resolution may look very different from how it was originally framed ‘once it has hit the ground’.14 It is the once it has hit the ground that is the most crucial aspect of training to understand and mitigate conflict. Violent conflict can and will take different forms and therefore will need different conflict resolution approaches based on local contexts and ‘what works in reality’ as opposed to ‘what works on paper’. These studies are not in isolation and scholars specialising in both area studies and thematic areas of security and conflict support the need for more context appropriate approaches in understanding and responding to violent conflict.15

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The case studies from Chapter 2 support this argument. Conflict in the DRC would certainly not fit the cycle of conflict as promulgated by PSO training centres. A history of authoritarian rule and deep-rooted political and socio-economic grievances (such as land rights, citizenship and community favouritism) coupled with regional foreign policy and security concerns were all part of the recipe for the conflict in Zaire/ Congo. Not only did these structural and immediate issues cause conflict but they have also sustained violence, albeit at various levels of intensity. In Darfur, again a history of authoritarianism, deep-rooted socioeconomic grievances, such as the marginalisation of Darfur and the escalation of inter-communal competition resulted in the establishment of armed groups with support from neighbouring states. War in Somalia has not followed the concepts of the ‘Conflict Cycle’ either. Long protracted armed struggle between local polities with the addition of successive armed conservative Islamic groups, along with several foreign interventions have resulted in extremely complex societal responses, often violent but underscored by local interests. The point is that violent conflict has not followed a linear or predictable course and often it is unexpected or rather unanticipated issues that have stymied the work of international peacebuilders. In the DRC regional military intervention and the cyclical support provided to proxy armed groups has meant that MONUSCO has barely managed to keep a lid on violence let alone mitigate against it in the future. In Darfur the UN/AU mission has been asked to drawdown significantly even though conflict continues unabated and Somalia still has no real central authority nor legitimate candidates for the role. Indeed, recent history suggests that conflict of some form will continue in these areas even though international peacebuilders have spent decades trying to implement a liberal peace from outside. Using the ‘Conflict Cycle’ as a conceptual basis for training and instruction to potential peacekeepers can have some salience if expanded upon, deconstructed, applied to real life practical scenarios and critiqued. However, this rarely occurs at PSO training centres, which are all too content to present a very basic and technical approach to conflict. In doing so the reality of violent conflict is distorted, simplified and largely irrelevant. Crucially the relationship between course content and regional training needs remains anecdotal and under-investigated. Questions

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remain over whether training is conducted for training’s sake or to fill slots and attract funds rather than addressing the training needs and improving the continent’s security apparatus. There has never been a comprehensive study investigating the actual requirements of peacekeeping training or in development speak a ‘training needs analysis’ (TNA). As the former Head of Training at IPSTC remarked to me: There is no analysis on the courses delivered. Are they relevant? Why are we doing specific courses and how do they link up to our core business? There is no analysis on this at all.16 There is no evidence-based analysis stating who needs to be trained, in what issues and why. As a result the design of courses is completely arbitrary and is mainly directed by external partners. Crucially this means that intended recipients of training, namely potential peacekeepers, peacekeeping missions and the African Union are woefully under-represented in the design stage, further questioning the salience of training and target audience. Most importantly student selection is highly dysfunctional. Participants are more often than not drawn from organisations unrelated to peacekeeping and most will never deploy to a peace mission, although there are some exceptions. One official explained this issue when speaking about a course paid for by Japan: How do they choose participants? We (Government of Japan) paid for a Human Rights course for South Sudan. I don’t think the Centre informed the host nation what the course was about or for. As a result the South Sudan Human Rights commission didn’t quite get what we were doing and so pretty much all the participants were completely unqualified or irrelevant for the course.17 The senior EU military adviser to the African Union with oversight of all AU training activities on the continent echoed this statement: In my experience almost on every course the students/participants do not deploy to a PSO afterwards, and there is an enormous amount of training being done.18

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When speaking with a Ugandan officer who attended a course at IPSTC in 2009 he was clear about the murkiness of the selection process: The decision to send students is taken at the strategic level. It’s the bosses in the MoD who choose. And it’s mainly a political decision. Allowances, information gathering, contacts are all part of it too. I don’t know how I was selected for a course. I was just told a day before to go.19 Several students have been known to take the same course twice or spend the majority of their working time attending as many different courses as possible. ‘Course Tourism’ is extremely common and indicates that PSO training is part of the patronage system for African states. Partly these shortcomings are down to time management and bureaucratic inefficiency, as the former Director of EASFCOM described to me: It can be a question of time. The MoDs in member states leave it to the last minute to nominate a participant for a course and then just send anyone just to fill the slot. They are busy ministries and some have operational priorities. But if students consistently don’t have the right profile or background then it is a waste. There is no point in simply training anyone, unfortunately this seems to be happening a great deal.20

The Unintended Consequences of PSO Training Clearly the rose-tinted picture of PSO training and the ‘Centres of Excellence’ delivering this training should be tempered with some much needed reality. What though are the immediate and longer-term consequences, both intended and unintended, of peacekeeping training and do PSO training centres achieve their aims? Are the three aims of improving, reforming and integrating Africa’s security forces being met? ‘Partially, at best’ is probably the correct answer and likely in a manner unintended by those who design and pay for the courses. As noted above, course content is either irrelevant for contemporary AU peacekeeping or approached in such a way that most practical elements are lost. Furthermore only a small percentage of students trained at these centres will ever go to a peacekeeping mission. Some students are more likely to

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go than others, such as students from countries already involved in contributing forces to a peace missions – but that is still no guarantee as noted by a foreign technical advisor involved in supporting PSO training: There was an interesting statistic from the AU that about 5 per cent of those considered for AMISOM and AFISMA have been trained through these mechanisms (peacekeeping training centres) and only of those recruited 1 per cent have been on relevant training courses. It is simply not a consideration in recruitment whether they have been through these centres. And furthermore we are not tracking the students. How do we know where they go?21 The fact that both training and student selection are acutely flawed calls into question the first aim of improving AU peacekeeping capability. Furthermore, training at regional PSO training centres is on an individual basis. That is only one or a small number of individuals from any one nation participate on a course and they are usually from different departments. Real capability for peace operations is built through collective training carried out for national contingents. Much is invested in pre-deployment training of this kind by states involved in peace operations. Significant resources are allocated for training contingents for peace operations and PSO training has become part of the national curricula for many of these countries.22 National contingents for peacekeeping are trained for lengthy periods of time for specific missions. Training modules and instruction target the mission in question using real life scenarios and examples. Donors typically provide financial support to some of these activities but unlike individual training international packages for collective pre-deployment training tends to be extremely well coordinated, contextually relevant and with significant buy-in from both donors and recipients. The result is practical, operational and important training for African soldiers deploying to peacekeeping missions.23 As one observer intimately involved in training support to the East African region noted: As an example, look at the training delivered to Ugandan forces deploying to AMISOM. Three Battalions come together for a detailed and targeted training package that lasts six weeks. The first four weeks are dedicated to staff and command training with practical exercises the mode of instruction through out. The last two

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weeks are focused to individual skills and a final field exercise. Training isn’t generic at all its very specific to AMISOM’s requirements. This training is carried out at Singo camp in Uganda and the training package is developed with the Ugandans and a seriously coordinated French, US and UK effort. And it works well.24 The Commandant of Singo camp echoed these sentiments: Singo is not for fun like other PSO training centres. All battle groups for AMSIOM pass through here whereas at regional PSO centres the students never go to mission. Here we train specifics. We have a battalion staff officer course that lasts 10 weeks, a company grade staff officers course, PSO soldiering skills, logistics training, UN/AU structure modules, modules on the Somali conflict and hearts and minds training. Training at other centres is far too generic, not like here at Singo.25 All major African TCCs are similarly invested in collective pre-deployment training.26 These same states are much less invested in the success of training at international PSO training centres, unless as host nation, as can be seen by the lack of regional staff and inappropriate students indicating a perception amongst African defence establishments that the regional PSO centres do not contribute to tangible and practical improvements in their peacekeeping capability. Similarly, the AU is almost completely disengaged from peacekeeping training centres and there is no official link between the centres and the continental body again calling into question the centres’ aim of building AU peacekeeping capacity. On the second aim of assisting the professionalisation of national security sectors again questions are raised. Issues such as human rights legal instruments and protection norms have not by and large informed national defence force development. Instead, national militaries have been more adept at adopting and subverting certain practices for their own reasons. Enhanced capability may have been achieved in certain areas such as in civil-military coordination (CIMIC) and military planning for peace operations. Both Kenya and Uganda for instance have now developed CIMIC departments and capabilities for their own national defence forces after several years of PSO training in this area.27 At the same time several African states have been criticised for their human rights record, both at

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home and abroad, for corrupt practices and for abuses against civilians. Out of the major TCCs in the Eastern African region the Kenyan military has been accused of abuses against civilians in the borderlands area with Somalia28 as well as involvement in the illicit trade of charcoal from the Kismayo area.29 In addition, the Al-Shabaab attack on the Westgate shopping mall in October 2013 demonstrated some serious shortcomings in Kenya’s military capability including inter-agency competition, a lack of planning capability and outright thievery.30 Other states have also come under scrutiny. Rwanda has consistently been accused of operations and supporting proxy forces in neighbouring DR Congo with devastating effects31 and the Ugandan military has been criticised for abuses in Somalia as part of AMISOM.32 Burundian troops at home regularly prey upon the population and the recent coup attempt in 2015 highlights the fragility of the Burundian military. Ethiopian troops also have a terrible track record for human rights abuses in areas of operations as well as being a significant contributor to UN and AU peace operations.33 That is not to say that these national defence forces are ineffectual, corrupt or bloodthirsty. Rather they are complicated national and foreign policy tools used by political elites to further their aims with the added complication of significant pressures from below and competing interests. In addition, military culture differs dramatically and can include professional soldiers, praetorian guards, bush fighters, former rebels, gendarmeries, special forces, liberation forces and so on. All with varying levels of experience, education, a variety of languages and a multitude of differing worldviews. The point is that providing these forces with brief and basic training in simplified versions of international norms with the intent, expectation and hope of changing institutional and political culture is wishful thinking. Socialisation and the integration of regional elites is the third expected outcome of training at these Centres akin to placements in foreign military academies. It is hoped that PSO Training Centres like IPSTC and KAIPTC will provide an environment for officers from different countries in the region to socialise with each other, break down perceived barriers and cultural preconceptions and importantly convince these persons that their national security interests are better served through regional integration. However, courses are only ever two weeks long with some rare exceptions that are four weeks long. This time is far

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too short to forge integrative socialisation. As several military advisers pointed out: A two week course is frankly a waste of time. That is no way long enough to develop skills to deploy to a mission. It is also wishful thinking to assume that training in this fashion will lead to greater integration and better quality AU peacekeeping.34 and In order to properly be trained in some of the complicated areas two weeks just isn’t enough. There is also an assumption that these people have the proper background and experience for the job, often they don’t. So how will two weeks fill that gap? It can’t!35 Even IPSTC senior staff conceded that two weeks was perhaps too short to equip participants with adequate skills for a peace operation: How can you be trained sufficiently after two weeks? We are cheating people a bit with our courses sometimes. I would say very frankly that what we are doing here is sensitisation. When you train people for two weeks only on protection of civilians, rule of law or SSR. . . . this is sensitisation. How can it be more than this? If you want to be an expert you have to be in the field and implement some stuff on the ground . . . in mission! What you have learnt needs to be implemented! What we are doing is sensitisation. It should be the start of something to be built upon.36 In fact, short courses may have the opposite effect by reinforcing preconceived prejudices given the short period of time. Anecdotally, during the courses attended and witnessed by this author at IPSTC, cliques of likeminded and sub-regional states were common. Individuals from states in the Horn of Africa would tend to sit and socialise together as would East African Community member states. Linguistic divisions were also obvious with French speakers such as Burundians and Seychellois forming their own groups. Religious identities were also visible with Islamic students forming small groups such as individuals from Djibouti and Sudan. These types of groups were not rigid with individuals with several identities floating from

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group to group but distinctive groups were visible. The military adviser to EASF also noticed this dynamic: Uganda, Rwanda, and Kenya are especially close. You can see the cliques quite clearly. Francophones, EAC states and those from the Horn tend to stick together.37 This is hardly surprising for such short periods of time in a strange environment and although some individuals will be better at socialising than others (especially if they are an intelligence officer for instance) tight-knit, integrative and long-lasting peer groups are unlikely to be created and sustained. Short-term results from training at PSO Centres are therefore limited at best and do not meet their aims. But what about longer-term effects? Given the nature of militaries trained at these centres there are some areas of concern that have implications for peacekeeping but also for future conflict dynamics. Firstly, by providing significant resources to military hierarchies in the form of training activities, the system also provides avenues for placating patrimonial and clientalist networks. This can take the form of sending favoured individuals for high-level courses and for keeping potential troublemakers out of the country. What is important, is that for African defence policy makers peacekeeping training centres are first and foremost used as a source of rewards and patronage for national and endogenous interests with concerns for peacekeeping training a secondary interest. The diversity of military cultures has surprisingly limited influence in this regard. As noted in Chapter 1, the major African contributors to peace operations have decidedly different military cultures reflected in their approach to statehood. These states however employ PSO training centres for remarkably similar reasons, whether a postcolonial military, liberation force, integrated/stalemate military or one that is institutionalised and under civilian control. In the case of IPSTC an entire military college has been built for the Kenyan military free of charge, providing a resource for inter-ethnic politics between Kikuyu and Kalenjin officers and their political masters. In Ghana the centre provides prestigious employment for retired or end of career soldiers as well as one-upmanship against Nigeria. The centres being developed in Rwanda and Ethiopia serve national defence and army organisational interests such as bargaining chips in

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regional diplomatic relations, securing foreign financial flows and patronage for serving officers. Secondly, the current status of PSO training encourages corruption at various levels that reinforces patrimonial and personalised systems. Financial gains, both formal and informal, have nurtured a culture and expectation of monetary gain. An Ethiopian General in charge of planning for the EASF summarised the current system of PSO training support: From my experience here and before, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, all this peace related thing is big business! I’m talking money here. A lot of people are making a lot of money which could be spent on something more useful in Africa to address some of the problems. Not just the Africans but the Europeans and American as well. Everybody is making money!38 Per diems and certificates are an incentive alone for training and depending on the course and its level, students can make significant sums from attendance. Defence establishments that nominate students understand this and many take an informal ‘cut’ or expect certain professional or personal favours in order to ensure an individual can attend a course at a PSO centre. This system is highly personalised, financially driven and largely informal. Furthermore the lack of accountability and seemingly ‘no strings’ attitude feeds into and reinforces already murky systems of bureaucracy found in Africa’s military structures. The combination of significant resources available for opaque military structures and a system that actively encourages patrimonial and personalised tendencies is likely to consolidate existing pressures and trends in the longer term. Under these circumstances militaries are unlikely to reform in the manner expected by foreign development partners. Instead national military doctrine and military culture will be reinforced and respond in-line with national and local realities and priorities. These realities and priorities may well include improved peacekeeping capability but they will be dominated by the political imperatives of national and military elites.

A Satisficing Model Interestingly, all key parties are content with the status quo echoing a broader malaise in peacekeeping. As one author notes, the system is a

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‘satisficing approach that prioritises order and stability more than transformation oriented towards progressive goals.’39 Cunliffe’s ‘satisficing approach’ is applied to the macro-level of UN peacekeeping but dynamics at the micro-level are similar in that peacekeeping training centres placate organisational and individual priorities over delivering effective training. This is hardly surprising given the various benefits and incentives at play for hosts, students and donors. It is important to state that the primary objective is not to deliberately subvert, even if this occurs in practice. This model outlined above is not a sinister or Machiavellian strategy by African elites to enrich themselves at all costs or for foreign donors to re-colonise or exploit former properties or to make the global south economically dependent on the north. Centres are not manifestations of the political instrumentalisation of disorder40 nor of a criminal state.41 The intention for ‘good’ is there in that collectively the aim on the part of the hosts, students and donors is to improve the capacity of African Union peacekeepers to respond to violent conflict. Rather it is the manner in which these good intentions are devised and carried out that has these negative connotations and unintended consequences come to the surface.42 There is certainly an order and an organisation to peacekeeping training centres, imposed in its entirety from outside and adopted and implemented by below. This imposition is implemented in line with indigenous realities producing unintended outcomes that serve local priorities. If course content and student selection were relevant then the unintended aspects of PSO training, such as patronage for staff and students, would be less problematic as the centres would be closer to achieving their stated aims, at least in part. A brief discussion on incentives for hosts, students and donors illuminates this satisficing model.

Hosts PSO training centres are greatly desired by African states. Those already in existence are examples to others of what could be gained at various levels. Host nations receive a great deal of political and economic benefits, which arguably creates a rush to build these centres before addressing broader training needs. What is lacking is how such centres can add value to the region and continental conflict management systems. Kenya is delighted as it is host to a regional ‘Centre of Excellence’ and receives significant financial and political benefits. A large and impressive military college has been built for Kenya free of charge

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with running costs and staff salaries all paid for. An entire training package has also been designed for the Centre and will be delivered at no cost to the government. In return for granting a few acres of land, Kenya and its defence establishment has secured millions of dollars in aid money, regional and international prestige and diplomatic bargaining chips. The Kenyan military also has disproportionate slots on courses at IPSTC, as one employee remarked to me: The benefit to Kenya is that the centre is Kenyan so we can train our soldiers. It’s good that we can take more slots on all the courses. One of the only benefits is that the Centre is Kenyan so we get preferential treatment.43 Perhaps most importantly Kenya has secured extra resources for placating and managing internal rents, patrimonial networks and other pressures from within the Kenyan military. This can take several forms, such as senior management positions in the centre for favoured officers or retiring loyalists or for access to lengthy courses abroad with associated per diems and travel. As one instructor at IPSTC put it: I want to go to a course in India. A tank technician’s course. I don’t know much about them but its 2 years long and I will almost double my salary with allowances. And then I want to go to a peacekeeping mission. You get good allowances.44 Staff at IPSTC are also well placed to be nominated for Kenyan contributions to UN peacekeeping operations or other UN positions. Perhaps most rewarding are the financial incentives IPSTC makes from training. As established in Chapter 3 IPSTC makes around USD$1 million in surplus annually. Other centres stand to make considerable financial profits as all activities have a premium attached. The centres not only make significant financial rewards from securing courses but also by hiring out lecture halls and accommodation blocks, hosting conferences and workshops for external organisations. Furthermore, rumours of scams abound such as with the procurement of stationary, vehicles, water, taxis, fuel, catering and so on. Financial gain even extends to sourcing mentors and external lecturers. As one EU military official with responsibility for PSO training in Africa remarked to me:

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Regarding training centres themselves, given that the courses are mainly irrelevant and that students never go to a PSO it’s about resource catching. African states will look to grab foreign development/assistance finances. This is especially true of the training centres. There is pretty much no effect.45 Similarly, other PSO centres have catered to national priorities and interests. Ghana also has a prestigious military college built free of charge with foreign aid money. Ghanaian military officers have further avenues of employment and career development. KAPITC can also be seen as part of broader West African diplomatic relations and in particular feeds into the relationship with Nigeria. Much like IPSTC serious financial interests are at stake both individually, such as salaries and per diems, but also collectively in the sense that the Ghanaian defence establishment and the training of Ghanaian peacekeepers subsidised by foreign aid flows.46 The Rwanda Peace Academy and the Ethiopian Peacekeeping Training Centre are also placating national priorities. Political legitimacy for authoritarian regimes is a further incentive. Both Ethiopia and Rwanda have been described as authoritarian regimes, ranging from development patrimonialists, military dictatorships and a full blown police state.47 Significant support from foreign donors, especially in security and peacekeeping support helps to deflect potential criticism over internal rights abuses.48 This political legitimacy or at least tacit approval through foreign military assistance should not be discounted. Both states are essentially military regimes, even if uniforms of senior officials have been removed. They are not only significant contributors to peacekeeping but also arguably significant contributors to war making as well. Successive military interventions have been carried out by Rwanda in DR Congo since 1996 as well as the fostering of proxy-armed groups. Ethiopia has conducted several interventions in Somalia, as well as engaging Eritrea in a devastating war. By providing military support in whatever form to the Rwandan and Ethiopian militaries donors are also providing an element of political support to these same forces and by association their political masters. Financial expectations are also central to Kigali’s and Addis’ decision to develop their own PSO training centres. The RPA and EIPKTC are also both built by foreign donors exclusively and at great expense. Again economic

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interests are a major incentive in terms of construction, salaries, benefits, courses and so on. The Director of the RPA summed this up. When asked about donor support and the future of the RPA his emphatic reply was, ‘Just tell the British to give us money.’49 Competition for aid resources is also a key motivator for all states. The perception that there is a certain amount of donor funds available has created a ‘scramble for military aid.’ Africa’s defence policy makers are acutely aware that if they don’t receive a slice of this cake their neighbours and regional rivals will. A final incentive is of course employment for loyal military officers as senior managers at the centres but also courses for the host’s military forces.

Students The students and participants are generally content as they have the opportunity to better their CVs and line their pockets at the same time. Whether PSO training centres are achieving their aims in terms of improving the quality of AU peacekeeping is a secondary and distant concern. In reality students attend courses for more individualistic, personal and national reasons and competition for slots is hotly contested in home countries which in itself can give rise to informal and more patrimonial practices such as paying superiors to be sent to a course. Participants not only attended courses to gain insights into specific PSO orientated topics, but more importantly for internal reasons. Most importantly all students and participants are guaranteed to receive a certificate no matter how much effort they put into a course. A participant can do all the reading, engage during the lessons, seek to use the time appropriately or they can choose to fall asleep or do as little possible. The result is the same. The sole criterion for receiving a certificate is attendance. Gaining a certificate is immensely important and in terms of the individual is a major incentive for attending courses. A senior EASF official who regularly lectures at IPSTC was quick to point this out and explained why exactly certificates were so important: A lot is for personal development. For a way out. Some people think that the more certificates they collect the more courses they do and the more contacts they make gives them a better chance to get into the UN and international organisations. It gives then a way out, one previous unavailable due to money issues.50

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These certificates are part of CV building and ultimately are part of career development for mid-level elites, predominately military but equally important for civilians and police. A certificate is a sure way of promotion in national hierarchies. For senior military positions attendance on PSO course is becoming almost a prerequisite for promotion. Certificates are also a stepping-stone for jobs with international organisations and NGOs. Notwithstanding the intention to train peacekeepers, certificates build CVs more broadly to potentially have access to a lucrative international packages and high level jobs within the UN system, international NGOs and so on. As the content of training is so broad, certificates can apply to most positions in international development, conflict resolution, humanitarian relief, security organisations and many more. After completing the AMSIOM FHQ course one participant stated that it would ‘help his career’ as opposed to making him a better peacekeeper. Per diems or the daily subsistence allowance (DSA) is perhaps the second most important incentive for participants. Much like a certificate, all participants receive a daily financial allowance. The amount will depend on both the state and the level of the individual. Senior people tend to have higher per diems than their subordinates. Furthermore, students from the more economically developed states such as Kenya, Ghana and Egypt will tend to receive more allowances than their poorer counterparts from Burundi, Comoros or Somalia. Depending on the rate of reimbursement the per diem is a very welcome perk for those from richer states whereas for other perhaps poorer individuals attendance on courses can actually subsidise salaries. Whatever the case, participants are guaranteed some financial reward for attending a course and are therefore keen to attend as many courses as possible and are reluctant to criticise proceedings or question the current approach in PSO training. Participants also treat courses as a holiday or to see family members who may live in the safer environment of another country. Shopping trips are usually worked into course programmes and places like Kenya and Ghana may have cheaper goods or goods unavailable at home for some of the participants, especially those from smaller economies or from states in conflict. Diaspora and family reasons are also important. There is a large Somali and Sudanese Diaspora in Nairobi and almost all Somali participants on courses at IPSTC have family in Kenya. One participant when reading the student list for a course saw some Somalis

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he knew and stated immediately that his colleague would probably not attend as his family lived in Nairobi. He was correct. Patronage and rewards for up-and-comers, potential trouble makers or for retiring friends is a perhaps the most important incentive for national defence ministries. Slots on foreign courses, especially those that build careers, is a tried and tested method of civil-military relations and control in Africa.51 Students selected for courses are usually part of informal networks of regime insiders. This can take several forms depending on the state in question such as party or personal loyalties, ethnic solidarity (although this tends to be overstated), potential loyalists being groomed and so on. Selection for a course can also demonstrate that the individual is taken care of in some way by their own government so in a sense participants are the favoured few, the chosen ones, selected to represent their own government in regional matters. In this regard being selected for a course comes with a great deal of pride on the part of the student in question. Building national capability is a further incentive related to CV building and collecting certificates. As the majority of participants do not deploy to peacekeeping missions, slots on courses are used by national defence ministries to train existing staff members in peace and conflict issues but also to build up some cohesion in national forces, especially newly integrated combatants after armed conflict. A group of Burundian participants on an AMISOM Force Head Quarters course in Kenya explained why they were sent to the course: This is the tactic used to integrate our army. To make it a cohesive force. We send all these different Burundian soldiers. By that I mean all different armed factions that were integrated in to the national army. We also send them to fight together in Somalia. They work together, they fight together, they get to know each other and forge relationships. They have to. Just look at the Burundian students on this course. They are from different backgrounds and they work and cooperate together. This course will make us even closer.52 Participants are also schooled in the ways of liberal international peacebuilding providing host nations with individuals who can navigate international development speak used by the donor community. States

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therefore have access to Western approaches, Western concepts and Western doctrine. Much like the colonial education system and introduction of Christianity, some children were sent to colonial schools to ‘learn the ways of the West’ in order to better understand and interact with foreign and externally imposed concepts. Like the Kenyan author Ngugi Wa Thi’ongo, sent by his father to the new British run school in Limuru or the proud and powerful Okonkwo who sent his son to be tutored in the Mr Wintabotta’s college in eastern Nigeria.53 The intention is the same and peacekeeping training is no different. Sons and daughters of the state are sent to externally driven educational institutions in part to learn the ways of the outsiders. Courses also provide participants with a network of contacts in the region and beyond, whether directly involved in peacekeeping or not. This is not singularly the most important issue for participants and their home ministries but it is a useful by-product. More useful, especially to home states, is the excellent cover PSO training courses provide for more nefarious activities. Intelligence gathering is common as the courses provide a perfect environment to have informal discussions with military and security types within the centres or alternatively attending a course provides an alibi for intelligence and security operations.

Donors The donors are also content with the status quo as they fund the training of thousands of African peacekeepers annually justifying massive financial commitment to foreign military assistance in support of domestic agendas as well as showing that ‘aid works’. This approach may fit well with development models and theories as well as promoting success to domestic constituencies but the effect on improved peacekeeping is less clear. By taking a quantitative and technical approach to PSO training there is no way of establishing whether courses are contributing to enhanced African PSO capability. As a result, much local context is lacking and the unintended consequences and internal effects of foreign military assistance of this kind are simply not anticipated. Several reasons dictate the donor indifference in establishing effective policies beyond what seems to fit with various development and organisational worldviews. Peace Support Operations training supports a broad range of foreign development and Western assistance priorities and ticks many of the

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diplomatic and developmental agendas as well as contribute to wider liberal peacebuilding. PSO training addresses several major donors wider government aims. The UK’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy,54 the European Union’s Africa-EU Partnership and the Africa Peace Facility,55 France’s RECAMP,56 the US ACRI and ACOTA programmes57 as well as other donor programmes all have specific provisions on peacekeeping and PSO training in support of wider development and capacity building agendas. These approaches feed into higher level development agendas of Security Sector Reform, institutional development and fostering liberal democratic norms as a prerequisite for economic development such as the establishment of the Rule of Law, respect for Human Rights and so on. By training significant numbers of African peacekeepers the hope is that a pool of persons will be created to not only be able to deploy to crisis areas as conflict managers but also to instil a liberal democratic ethos into these individuals who will become the next crop of senior managers, policymakers and leaders within Africa. At the same time several more internally driven imperatives satisfy donor engagement in peacekeeping training. Organisational issues such as justifying budgets, programming and approach is crucial in understanding donor support. Securing funding for the following year is a key concern for aid policy makers or the ‘shovel money out the door’58 effect in order to secure similar amounts of funding for the next financial year. PSO training serves these needs spectacularly well as training fits in with most development organisations measurement and evaluation procedures such as the ‘Theory of Change’ that have come to dictate much of the development and foreign policy making approach.59 By training large numbers of African peacekeepers the African Union and regional organisations will have a larger pool of trained people to select from, which means that peacekeeping capability will improve. This entirely technical and quantifiable approach neglects to consider who exactly is trained, how they are trained and where they end up. Although course content in the main is inappropriate and the majority of students on courses will not deploy to peacekeeping missions, development partners can still justify aid programmes through these quantifiable evaluation models. Most importantly, peacekeeping training gives donors an in-road into the murky and opaque workings of African militaries in several ways. Firstly by building a PSO training centre long-term engagement with a

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national military is guaranteed, cementing relationships and building formal but also importantly informal entrance points such as with the Director of a PSO centre who is usually a senior colonel or brigadier and regime loyalist. Donors also gain access to regional militaries by funding and helping to deliver courses. Relationships can be built as instructors or as participants. Seconding military technical advisers is a further method of maintaining influence and gathering information, reminiscent to colonial and post-independence modalities of military assistance. Other issues are also salient for donor engagement and relate primarily to national security threats or at least perceived threats. Countering a growing terrorist threat is becoming more and more important for foreign donors, especially the US, the UK and France. Countering immigration is equally important. Although played down if mentioned at all by donor policymakers these issues are part of donor calculations when supporting peacekeeping training. Much like the recipients of aid, competition with other donor partners is also an incentive leading one observer to remark: These training centres have become a political playground. And not an African one! You have the French who don’t like the Swiss. The Canadians, the British, the Japanese. Who else? The problem is that we have this play going around and it is heavily foreign dominated. All courses are funded from outside. And inside IPSTC for instance you have a Chief of Staff who is French. You have a head of research who was Swiss. How is it an African centre?60 Not wanting to lose out to opportunities that may be given to other supporting states is always a calculation in foreign development assistance and should not be discounted in PSO training. A last point should be made about individuals. Policymakers and advisers from donor countries seconded to training centres are also loathed to critically evaluate the centres to an extent. Typically these individuals are on highly lucrative packages in luxurious living standards for several years and any significant criticism could see them ‘short toured’ and sent home. More importantly secondments to training centres are highly desirable positions in terms of career development as

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well. Many will go on to better positions and so the centres are useful stepping-stones for individual promotion. Donor support to IPSTC is therefore governed by an internal-external dynamic to the detriment of achieving quality PSO training. Donors are un-coordinated and competitive in their support to IPSTC indicative of a broader malaise in foreign military assistance and peacekeeping support. Moreover, national policy priorities are a crucial part of foreign assistance packages and can often trump the intended outcomes. Such an approach not only lends itself open to abuse and manipulation on the part of the recipients but also actively encourages it.

Improving PSO Training It is clear that a great deal of dysfunctionality exists within peacekeeping training centres in Africa, whether an older more established school or one in embryonic form. What is certain is that these training centres will continue to operate and are likely to expand with continued donor support. Furthermore it is likely that more PSO training centres will emerge across the continent. Therefore getting ‘things right’ or ensuring applicability to the needs of current peace support operations as well as institutionalising a coherent system of organisation and training is essential. No matter what the stage of development similar patterns of dysfunction exist and thus a number of suggestions can be made that are applicable across all training centres. The following suggestions are a number of incremental actions in specific areas that could be taken that would result in greater effect and impact and would at least enable the centres to achieve some of their stated aims.

Course Content Course content should be the priority. Developing courses that reflect the need of peace operations and the reality of peacekeeping issues is key. The types of courses delivered at PSO training centres can cover a range of different activities and concepts. However course syllabi should reflect the needs and realities of peace support operations. It is essential that a detailed training needs analysis is conducted with UN and AU missions as well as UN and AU PSO training departments in order to determine what exactly is needed for military, police and civilian peacekeepers and

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peacebuilders in terms of training. PSO training centres should identify crucial training courses that can form a core curriculum that is applicable to contemporary peace operations. It is important to stress the need for quality courses as opposed to trying to deliver as many courses as possible, forgoing quality over quantity. The detail of courses needs to be improved. As examined in previous chapters course content tends to consist of a number of ad hoc presentations stitched together. PSO training centres can have a crucial role to play in ensuring quality course content. This includes ensuring appropriate and relevant modules through course design, effective sequencing, avoidance of duplication and irrelevant content, developing or overseeing exercises or role plays and course assessments. Further to this is the need for real life training. Courses should consist of real life scenarios in order to improve the applicability of training. The research department can play an invaluable role in developing cases and role plays for specific courses and modules such as examples of protection activities from different peacekeeping missions, best practice of rule of law mechanisms in conflict zones, cases of specific peacekeeping missions and conflict zones etc.

Organisational Structure and Departmental Roles Currently all training centres have three departments: training, research and admin as well as a senior management team in a school headquarters. The headquarters needs to provide effective strategic direction as well as competent management of subordinate departments. Director positions are always serving generals or senior military officers from the host nation. These senior defence decision-makers should be supported by a senior civilian advisor or chief of staff who has significant experience in peace support operations and PSO training. The headquarters team should provide the interface with partners as well as ensuring coherence of effort throughout the training centre. Coordination between subordinate departments within an effective management system is crucial such as regular inter-departmental meetings and constant communication. Training could be the priority department, as all key products are training outputs. The training department should play the lead role in developing, designing and running courses. It is essential that an

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effective system of training be developed with the training department in the lead. Training officers have important roles in leading the design and delivery of courses, in collaboration with other departments. Trainers could also use the research department and request specific research products to assist them in carrying out their core tasks of course design and delivery. The research department could inform training, and therefore could play a subordinate role to other departments. Research in PSO training centres should be more akin to a research or analytical cell that focuses on practical ‘policy’ advice as opposed to academic publishing. Research products should seek to inform training outputs and organisational development by providing analytical inputs into the centre. Research products should be internally focused such as shortish, concise analytical notes that can be acted upon by departments or developing training aids. Research should then play a crucial role in supporting training in PSO centres through developing case studies and examples for specific courses, providing inputs into course design, providing analysis for the centres departments and finally developing research papers for publication. The priority should be internally focused analysis. The admin and finance department should develop financial systems grounded in transparency akin to best practice in international organisation administration. Developing quality financial and operating procedures is key and can be a prerequisite for international assistance, partnership and sponsorship.

Student Selection The method of selecting students and participants in acutely flawed. Much of the system remains outside the power of the training centres as explained above. However the centres could take a number of steps to try and ensure students are as applicable as possible. Detailed invitations should be send out well in advance of any course explicitly stating the intention of the course and the type of individual required to attend. Any one not fitting the description of the requirement should not be allowed to attend the course. A system of grading and examinations could also be introduced with results fed back to host departments. This would contribute to student participation but also would send a message that PSO centres are serious educational

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institutions as opposed to opportunities for financial gain and informal patrimonial rewards.

Staffing It is crucial that staff members are relevant, well qualified and have experience in the areas of employment. Training officers should be seasoned trainers with a background in peace support operations or former peacekeepers with practical experience of PSO. Researchers must have postgraduate qualifications but most importantly have been working in a professional applied research capacity on conflict, peace support operations, peacebuilding and so on. In order for training centres to deliver their products they need capable staff members who have the ability to undertake allocated tasks and responsibilities. System of Training Most importantly is the need to develop a functioning system of training that is led and undertaken by the training centre, or ‘owned’ in development parlance. A basic system of training incorporating research, but led by the training department, should be developed. Ideally training centres should develop a ‘wish list’ of core courses that fit with the remit of the centre and strategic plan. These courses should all aim to equip individuals (civilians, military and police) with skills needed for deployment on peace support operations. After courses are identified funding and assistance should be sought by potential partners. During these sponsorship deliberations it should be made clear that the training centre will lead on course design and delivery utilising in-house expertise. Once funding for a course has been secured the process of training can take place. Course design should be led by the training department. A writing board or course design workshop should be convened lasting around three days with follow up days included with the aim of developing a detailed course curriculum and course package. Members should be from the training department and research department as well as external experts where required. Ideally the members of the writing board should be the team that delivers the course as well. A subsequent workshop may be required to finesse and evaluate the curriculum. These workshops need to be concluded well in advance of course delivery.

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After a course package has been developed and finalised, the centre, perhaps in collaboration with sponsoring partner, should issue invitations. A course team should be identified and secured. A member of the training department should be course director for every course delivered. In this way the centre retains control over its outputs. However, to do this centres require quality staff with the right expertise who are capable of delivering PSO training courses. It is essential to be as clear and firm when issuing invitations about the need for individuals who will participate in peacekeeping, PSO and peacebuilding missions. After Action reviews should be conducted daily as well as a more detailed post-course evaluation incorporating the training department, course delivery team and relevant researchers. By developing a simple yet effective system of training that utilises the relevant departments and in-house expertise PSO training centres can improve their ability to meet their aims. This requires quality and relevant staff members and effective systems and operating procedures. If organisational structures and practices are developed in this way PSO training centres will be able to deliver far more effective and relevant training than currently exists and will be on the way to achieving some of their stated aims. Both donors and African states and their militaries will be subjected to and influenced by a range of internal pressures, agenda and influences. Overarching priorities are also unlikely to co-inside such as the development of a liberal democratic order or seeking out rents to placate patrimonial networks. However, all these actors are involved in peacekeeping in one form or other and so synergies of interest do exist. Developing training centres that equip individuals with appropriate skills and requisite knowledge to carry out expected tasks and responsibilities once in mission is one of these areas.

Conclusion Peacekeeping training centres in Africa have a limited effect in terms of achieving their stated aims of improving AU peacekeeping capability, developing national defence structures and providing spaces for the interaction and building of bonds between national military elites. In part this is due to the largely irrelevant content of training packages, the inadequate selection process for students, the short courses and the

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dynamics of interaction between donors and recipients. All parties are content with the status quo however, as donors can ‘demonstrate impact’ of aid money well spent, students have avenues of financial gain and professional development and host states have a military college built free of charge. While these centres are yet to achieve their short-term goals, longer term effects could stymie these stated ambitions. It is argued that these centres reinforce and cater to existing socio-political realities in their respective militaries such as identity politics, patrimonial systems and national foreign policy priorities with peacekeeping a secondary concern. This is partly due to the fact that collective pre-deployment training for peacekeeping occurs elsewhere. In doing so these centres actively contribute to the very dynamics and practices they seek to combat. By using these peacekeeping training centres as units for an analysis through comparative case studies the commonalities and trends have been identified. All centres employ the same conceptual basis, employ the same structures and deliver the same training. The intended outcomes of improving, reforming and integrating are yet to be achieved. The centres may differ in terms of host military culture but the effects of the centres on all parties are remarkably uniform in that an internal logic dictates how these centres are used to the detriment of externally oriented aims.

CONCLUSION THE PSO/SSR CONUNDRUM

This book has several aims. Firstly, to understand the full implications of peacekeeping training, how it is delivered through regionally focused training centres and the degree to which intended recipients benefit from their training. Secondly, to provide an insight into some of the dynamics and consequences of foreign military assistance, both intended and unintended. Finally, the intention is to further the debate on African armed forces and to suggest a conceptual framework for analysing military forces in Africa. This concluding chapter distils some of the immediate implications from the findings regarding the nature of PSO training. As mentioned, although the research for this study was conducted in 2013, dynamics at play are remarkably similar, if not the same, today.

Situating PSO Training Centres Peacekeeping Training Centres are part of the broader liberal peacebuilding agenda. Immediate aims are threefold. Firstly, to develop the capability of African armed forces to undertake complicated peace support operations as outlined in some detail in Chapter 2. Secondly, to accustom African soldiers to international norms such as in the laws of armed conflict, the rule of law, international humanitarian law, human rights and protection norms. Finally, these centres provide an area for military personnel from different African states to socialise, forge bonds, break down barriers of preconception and ultimately foster an outward orientated ethos where individuals view their policy priorities served through regional cooperation and regional initiatives. These aims of

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improving, reforming and integrating reflect the cornerstone of the liberal peacebuilding agenda as well as satisfying foreign imposed development goals and external policy priorities. As described in Chapter 6, the liberal project can be loosely seen as developing democratic statehood and a free-market economy underscored by the guarantee of individual rights through the rule of law. Accountable and democratic institutions, in that incumbents and officials should regularly be shuffled, is also a basic tenant. Liberal leaning donor states, in particular the US, UK, France and European states as well as the UN, EU and IFIs see their own national and organisational priorities served by the liberal project. Common development aims tend to centre around capacity building, institutional reform, elections, safeguarding civil liberties and conflict resolution. In doing so domestic agendas are furthered in donor states and organisations, usually relating to national security or business interests. At the same time, alien and externally designed and constructed interventions are thrust upon poorer and nonliberal states with the expectation of total compliance with external demands, as well as an assumption of concurrence of priorities, aims and agendas. In addition, these interventions tend to be extremely technical in nature and short-termist especially regarding budgetary allocations and systems of evaluation. As a result the bulk of local context is lacking, and unintended consequences of this type can take on its own momentum resulting in more effects than the intention. PSO training centres are part of this self-reinforcing liberal approach to foreign assistance and as such are symptomatic of issues within development and African politics, making them extremely useful units of analysis in understanding the wider malaise in development assistance, especially when regarding murky and informal institutions such as the military in Africa.

African Armed Forces: A New Framework for Analysis Before any assessment about peacekeeping training and how it is delivered can be made it is essential to have an understanding of the military in Africa. After all, African officers and soldiers make up most of the staff members at these regional PSO training centres and constitute the majority of the students sent to the centres to attend courses. It is therefore the military that receives the bulk of assistance in

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one form or other making it crucial to understand some of the issues facing these opaque institutions. As Chapter 1 outlines in some detail, there are distinct differences between military forces in Africa even if some important similarities can be identified. Militaries in Africa, as with other states, reflect the broader socio-political features of the state they are defending. This seems like an obvious observation but it is highly pertinent within a continent as diverse as Africa where states, even within the same sub-region, have drastically different political and social systems. In developing a framework for analysis of the military in Africa certain crosscutting areas are essential to incorporate and highlight. Historical analysis and understanding the trajectory of the national defence establishment and its various services is crucial. Tracing the methods and means of building the defence institutions is part of any meaningful analysis on today’s soldiers. Just as important as the institutions however are individuals. Politicised militaries are inherently informal or at least have a hierarchy outside of purely technical and official avenues of authority, both horizontally and vertically. Understanding how individuals are shaped in terms of soldiering capability but also ethos, worldview, perceptions and so on is an essential part of developing the military and military capability. It is therefore vital to incorporate elements of sociology into any plausible explanation of military culture in Africa, or elsewhere for that matter. Understanding the military then must build upon these historical, political and social analytical tools by applying nominal political analysis to military forces. This is surprisingly neglected in the literature and yet forms the crux of any discussion of African security, the military and responses to violent conflict. Traditional military sociology and civil-military relations theory therefore suffers from a lack of this practical application of historical, political, social and contextual inputs into the analysis of African armed forces. By taking this approach in a comparative analysis of military forces in Africa, a broad typology of armed forces can be delineated highlighting important differences as well as common characteristics. Although not exhaustive and in dire need of much more empirically grounded data, this broad typology nevertheless provides some explanation of different modalities of subversion and function. Post-Colonial militaries have a developed military infrastructure along recognisable modalities often reflecting the former colonial power’s

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structures and hierarchy, even if a multitude of other influences are present. At the same time this system is subverted, meeting the needs of defence and political elites through informal avenues of power relations that are subject to the same pressures of the national body politic. States such as Kenya, Nigeria and Cameroon would be considered under this category. Liberation armies concerns the group of states that find their origins or at least influences through Marxist-Leninism and/or Maoism, even if on the surface free-market liberal capitalism has been embraced. The militaries of these states are inherently politicised in that the defence elites are interchangeable from the political elite and political education and control are a priority. States such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda as well as Tanzania under Nyerere would fall under this label. A third group of Stalemate/Integrated Armies describes those armed forces that have been brought together and forced to form a separate body. Separate in the sense that two different entities, who were fighting each other without a real victor have been forced to work together in a new institution representative of all interests under one banner, as opposed to Liberation Armies who tend to subsume individuals and groups into an existing institution. In this regard the militaries of Burundi, DR Congo, Cote D’Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Liberia can be seen as Stalemate/Integrated forces. Finally a small number of African states have managed to Institutionalise their armed forces under civilian control. These states may have fallen into one of the above categories but over time have transitioned into a different modality of civil-military relations, reflecting developments in national level politics. Institutionalisation involves issues of accountable armed forces to civil authority, either through effective parliamentary oversight or military justice; the development of quality soldiering skills such as a training infrastructure and adequate procurement of kit and equipment; and developing cohesion within the ranks such as welfare opportunities and regular salaries. States like South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania, Botswana and Senegal could be considered states with institutionalised militaries. The above typology is not an exhaustive assessment of national military capability nor judgement passed on which form of military is best. Rather, the typology is descriptive in nature highlighting key differences between states that exist at the same moment in time.

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Emphasising the temporal nature of these categories is important. States can and will change the nature of their armed forces depending on wider national politics. At the extreme end is state collapse or revolution where the likely result is a new military institution entirely different to its predecessor and reflecting the politics, ideology and social hierarchy of the incoming social and political order. The point is that in politicised militaries, any wave in national politics will ripple through the military, and other state institutions. This typology is also useful when seeking to identify commonalities. Although differences of ideology, doctrine, ethos and approach may be obvious, all are politicised militaries to varying degrees employing patrimonial and informal avenues of decision-making. Pecuniary agendas and the centralisation of authority are also common to all military forces in Africa and elsewhere. It is within this area of the commonality of informality across different forms of military forces that issues around foreign assistance are so pertinent. Although differing greatly in culture and ethos as outlined above the subversion of foreign military assistance for national and internal ends is a striking common thread.

The Military and Peacekeeping Training in Kenya, Ghana, Rwanda and Ethiopia It is important to consider the above typology when accounting for foreign military assistance to African states as it helps to explain the unanticipated results of this type of engagement but also why donor assistance of this sort is more often than not subverted and directed to more endogenous oriented priorities and realities. PSO training illuminates this dynamic exceptionally well. As noted, regional centres of excellence have been developed in several different African states. All employ military officers as core staff and all centres train predominately military officers from Africa, although police and civilians are also part of the target audience. By taking a comparative approach of several centres, all hosted by states falling under at least one of the above categories of military forces, differences and commonalities are teased out. The results suggest that the particular background of African states will inform the implementation of foreign development assistance while at the same time political, patrimonial and pecuniary incentives dictate the functionality of all training centres.

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IPSTC in Kenya as outlined in Chapter 3 and deconstructed in Chapter 4 demonstrates the nature of support to a post-colonial military. On the one hand IPSTC is a functioning training centre having trained thousands of African peacekeepers in international norms and best practice in peacekeeping activities and has a recognisable hierarchy and comprehensive infrastructure spanning two sites. In practice IPSTC is little more than a conference centre with no in-house capability to develop or deliver training packages without assistance from outside. Course content is remarkably irrelevant for contemporary peacekeeping as detailed in Chapter 2 and courses that are delivered are mainly cutand-paste jobs lacking in local context and catering to a static liberal peacebuilding agenda that is arguably far detached from reality. This is hardly surprising as donor states fund, provide and dictate almost every aspect of the Centre. The Kenyan military accept this system or turn a blind eye to what is quite clearly external imposition, as financial and other benefits, both collectively and individually, trump the humility of donor dominance. As a result, a satisficing model of mediocrity as outlined in Chapter 6 is replicated where staff and host nation, by accident or by design, encourage subversion or implementation along endogenous realities of foreign development assistance. Participants on courses also willingly accept this model as careers are furthered, CVs are built and per diems are accrued while in practice relevant and contextual PSO training is a secondary priority. An interesting comparison for future analysis would be with military institutions in similar states, or at least those with similar types of military. A comparison between the Kenyan National Defence College, the Nigerian and Cameroonian War Colleges would be a useful study in this regard as would studies comparing Ghana, South Africa and Senegal for instance, or Uganda, Ethiopia and Rwanda. Other PSO training centres are similarly subject to the host nation’s military influences and ethos, even if other issues such as external dominance and the dysfunctional system of student selection exist. The Kofi Annan Centre in Ghana is an example of an institutionalised defence force implementing foreign military assistance. As Chapter 5 outlines, even in this instance, subversion or the dominance of internal realities occurs to the detriment of PSO training. KAIPTC is by far the most developed PSO training centre in Africa and has some in-house

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capability to deliver training, even if the majority of courses are paid for by external funding. KAIPTC has managed to have some say and direction in the strategy of the Centre. Senior Mission Leaders Courses have been rejected by KAIPTC, which sees it as less relevant for the operational need of current peace operations. Similarly KAIPTC has stopped using the Carana country study. Training packages tend to be geared towards current peacekeeping operations and the development of West Africa’s security architecture. However, national priorities such as regional diplomacy and financial rewards for the Ghanaian defence establishment are a central calculation in developing KAIPTC. Training Centres in Rwanda and Ethiopia are similarly dominated by internal priorities of the host nation. The Rwanda Peace Academy and EIPKTC in Addis are, like all other PSO training centres in Africa, funded in their entirety from outside. These external resources are implemented in line with strict liberation army direction and discipline, much to the admiration of foreign donors. Although embryonic, prospects for developing the centres in Rwanda and Ethiopia are on track in the sense that buildings will be completed, military officers are already, or will be, staff members, and a range of peacekeeping courses will be delivered. At the same time, these two heavily militarised states receive finances and legitimacy from outside. Both export both peace and violence, in that they are two of the largest contributors to peace operations but have also destabilised the region through military adventures in neighbouring states that have necessitated the deployment of peacekeeping missions. Both states are dominated by ‘securocrats’ in that military officials are interchangeable with broader political decision-makers. As a result significant resources are provided to essentially praetorian guards of the regime in question, and regimes which utilise the international system for national priorities. Again it seems foreign imposed military assistance in the form of PSO training and its intent is subverted for national, internal and endogenous priorities.

The PSO/SSR Conundrum: Implications of the Findings This study has explored issues around developing African armed forces of different nationalities, capabilities and backgrounds to conduct AU peacekeeping operations and the intended and unintended consequences

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of this type of assistance or the ‘PSO/SSR conundrum’. Military forces in Africa and their socio-political construction have been assessed. Contributing these forces to peacekeeping missions and what is expected of these individuals once in theatre has also been examined. Centres that seek to equip these individuals to meet the expectation and need of these peacekeeping missions have been investigated in detail and form the core case studies of this research. The findings demonstrate that the system of military assistance through the development of externally funded and imposed regional peacekeeping training centres serves internally focused ends and generally do not achieve the stated aims of improving, reforming and integrating Africa’s armed forces. Instead, peacekeeping training centres serve the priorities, needs and agendas of a diverse range of African states with effective PSO training a secondary concern. This ‘PSO/SSR conundrum’ then has profound implications and touch upon both academic, practical and policy considerations. This study has aimed to add to the academic discussions around the military in Africa as well as development assistance more broadly. A new framework for analysing African military forces has been suggested as has an affirmation of the need for contextual and empirically grounded research incorporating historical, political and sociological methodologies. In taking this academic approach, this thesis also argues for a new approach in practical areas and policy circles. Foreign military assistance packages such as training, seconding technical advisers and Security Sector Reform initiatives are not only called into question but are proven to cater to a set of pressures that actively contribute to potential conflict dynamics in the longer term. Subversion of this type of assistance drives informality, patrimonialism and corruption as well as serving national and internal interests. The training of African military officers and soldiers for peacekeeping missions may well meet some of its intended aims to varying degrees depending on the state and individual. However, the unintended consequences of this type of military assistance cater to an internal logic and to national priorities that will persist as long as the satisficing model that exists continues.

APPENDIX COURSE PARTICIPANTS

RSML Course, IPSTC, February 2013 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

Col. Col. Col. Col. S/ACP ACP. Col. Col. Col. Ms. DIGP Mr. Brig Gen. Mr. Mr. ACP. Ms. Mr. Brig Gen. Brig Gen. Mr. Maj Gen.

Egypt Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya Ethiopia Uganda Rwanda Sudan Seychelles Rwanda Burundi Somalia Somalia Comoros Uganda Kenya Kenya Burundi Nigeria Rwanda Ethiopia

Military Military Military Military Police Police Military Military Military Civilian Police Civilian Police Civilian Civilian Police Civilian Civilian Military Military Civilian Military

Peacekeeping Centre Staff Assistant Director Defence Staff College Deputy Commissioner Intelligence officer Spokesman EASF Chief J3 Intelligence officer 1st Sec MOFA former Maj-Gen in military Mogadishu Division Comdr Ministry of Finance Assistant Commissioner Intelligence officer Intelligence officer DA to Kenya Director Mil Trg Acdmy Senior Adviser UNPOS Inspector General

APPENDIX 23. 24. 25. 26.

Brig Gen. Col. Col. Col.

Ethiopia Ethiopia Kenya Tanzania

Military Military Military Military

223

Deputy Log Commander EIPKTC staff IPSTC staff Director Military records

Protection of Civilians Course, IPSTC, February 2013 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

Ms Mr Maj Mr Lt Col Ms Maj Ms Mrs Maj SP Ms Mrs Capt Mr Maj Lt Col Maj Maj Maj

Burundi Burundi Burundi Djibouti Ethiopia Ethiopia Uganda Uganda Sudan Sudan Kenya Kenya Seychelles Rwanda Comoros Comoros Egypt Kenya Kenya Kenya

Civilian Civilian Military Civilian Military Civilian Military Civilian Civilian Military Police Civilian Civilian Military Civilian Military Military Military Military Military

Advisor Min of Protocol Chief of Service Brigade Staff Officer Legal Ad Min of Defense EIPKTC staff Gender and HIV/AIDS NGO Dir CIMIC Special Forces Research Officer MoD Focal Point (CAAFG) Staff Officer on Dept D/OCPD Second Secretary MFA Senior Admin Assistant Directing Staff Mil Acdmy Legal Ad President’s Office Chief of G4 Infantry Egypt Army IPSTC Staff IPSTC Senior Instructor IPSTC SO2 Snr Instructor

AMISOM FHQ Course, IPSTC, April 2013 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

Lt Lt Col Col Col Col Col Lt Col Maj Lt Col Maj

Djibouti Djibouti Burundi Burundi Burundi Burundi Burundi Burundi Burundi Burundi Burundi

Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military

Operations Officer Operations Officer Deputy Chief Engineer Bde Comd Adviser of PS MOND Trg Officer Battalion Commander Bde Commander ARNEE Dep Comdr of Log Brigade 2nd Commander Batallion

224 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86.

PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA Capt Lt Col Col Maj Maj Lt Maj Maj Capt Capt Capt Capt Capt Capt Capt Maj Maj Lt Col Capt Lt Col Capt Col Maj Maj CPT Maj Col Maj Lt Col

Burundi Burundi Burundi Burundi Burundi Djibouti Djibouti Djibouti Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya Uganda Uganda Uganda Uganda Uganda Uganda Uganda Uganda Uganda Uganda Uganda Uganda

Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military

Batallion Comd Service Deputy Military academy Asst to the Comdt Chief Service in BDE Operation Officer Technical Coordinator Pilot (president’s office) Admin Officer COY 21C SO3 Troop Commander Admin AB HQs Artillery Officer SO3 Admin AB HQs Officer Commanding UPDF DCOS DMI Brigade Commander BN Ops Trg Officer D/CPP Brigade Ops and Trg Staff Officer Training Intelligence Officer BN Ops Officer UPDF Ops and Trg Officer Administrator Commanding Officer

Human Rights in PSO Course, IPSTC, April 2013 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95.

COMDT Mr Capt Ms Maj ACP D/COMDR Ms SSP

Comoros Comoros Djibouti Djibouti Burundi Ethiopia Ethiopia Uganda Uganda

Military Civilian Military Civilian Military Police Police Civilian Legal Officer MoD Police

APPENDIX 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107.

Capt SP Ms Ms Maj Maj Maj Maj Maj Maj Maj Maj

Seychelles Seychelles Rwanda Sudan Egypt Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya

Military Police Civilian Civilian Military Legal Officer MoD Military Military Military Military Military Military Military

225

NOTES

Introduction 1. For the purposes of this analysis I use PSO and peacekeeping interchangeably to describe various forms of multinational and multidimensional peace operations mandated by an international organisation. These missions can range from simple military observer deployments, missions with sizeable civilian components and even offensive military operations that seek to enforce peace where no agreement has been reached. For more detail on different types of PSO and peacekeeping see Part 3 of Bellamy, Alex J., Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin. Understanding Peacekeeping. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008. 2. It is important to state that the period examined in this book is roughly between 2005– 2015. There have been a number of changes, not least in the international environment. However, support to peacekeeping training centres remains steady and underlying dynamics, of both recipient and disburser, remain the same. 3. Autesserre, Se´verine, Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 4. Cunliffe, Phillip. Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers from the Global South. London: Hurst & Co, 2013. 5. Autesserre, Peaceland, p. 183. See also Autesserre, Se´verine. The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 6. See, Paris, Roland. ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism.’ International Security, vol. 22, no. 2, 1997, pp. 54 – 89; Paris, Roland. ‘International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice’.’ Review of International Studies, vol. 28, No. 4, 2002, pp. 637– 656 and Richmond, Oliver P. ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace.’ Millennium, vol. 38, no. 3, 2010, pp. 665 – 692.

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7. Gutteridge, W.F. The Military in African Politics. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1969, pp. 6 –7. 8. Shils, E, & Janowitz, Morris. ‘Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II.’ Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 12, issue 2, 1948, pp. 280 – 315; Siebold, G. L. ‘Core issues and theory in military sociology.’ Journal of Political & Military Sociology, vol. 29, Summer 2001, pp. 140 – 159; Siebold, G. L. ‘The Essence of Military Group Cohesion.’ Armed Forces & Society, vol. 33, no. 2, 2007, pp. 286–295; Siebold, G. L. ‘Key Questions and Challenges to the Standard Model of Military Group Cohesion.’ Armed Forces & Society, vol. 37, no. 3, 2011, pp. 448–468; MacCoun, R. et al.‘Does Social Cohesion Determine Motivation in Combat? An Old Question with an Old Answer.’ Armed Forces and Society, vol. 32, no. 4, 2006, pp. 646–654; King. A. ‘The Existence of Group Cohesion in the Armed Forces: A Response to Guy Siebold.’ Armed Forces and Society, vol. 33, no.4, 2007, pp. 638–645 and Savage, Paul and Richard Gabriel. ‘Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army: An Alternative Perspective.’ Armed Forces and Society, vol. 2, 1976, pp. 340–376. 9. Luckham, Robin. The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority & Revolt 1960– 67. London: Cambridge University Press, 1971. 10. See Decalo, Samuel. Coups and Army Rule in Africa. New Haven: Vail-Ballou Press, 1990 and Decalo, Samuel. Civil-Military Relations in Africa. Gainsville: Florida Academic Press, 1998. 11. Jowell, Marco. ‘Cohesion through socialization: liberation, tradition and modernity in the forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).’ Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 8, issue 2, 2014, pp. 278– 293. 12. See Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing ad What Can be Done About it. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War.’ Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 5, 2004, pp. 563 – 595; Sachs, Jeffrey. The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time. New York: Penguin, 2006 and Calderisi, Robert. The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn’t Working. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. 13. Moyo, Dambisa. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus & Griroux, 2006; Trefon, Theodore (ed.). Reinventing Order in the Congo: How People Respond to State Failure in Kinshasa. London: Zed Books, 2004; Trefon, Theodore. Congo Masquerade: The Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and Reform Failure. London: Zed Books, 2011 and Uvin, Peter. Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1998. 14. Easterly, William. The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. New York: Penguin, 2006; Collinson, Sarah and Mark Duffield et al. ‘Paradoxes of Presence: risk management and aid culture in challenging environments.’ Humanitarian Policy Group, March 2013 and Van de Walle, Nicholas. African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis: 1979– 99. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

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Chapter 1 Conceptualising Peacekeeping Training: Functional Integration, Pan-Africanism and the Development of the Military in Africa 1. Makinda, Samuel and Wafula Okumu. The African Union, Challenges of Globalisation, Security and Governance. Oxford: Routledge, 2008, p. 39. 2. Mill, J.S. Philosophy of Scientific Method. New York: Haffner, 1950. 3. See also Ragin, Charles C. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. London: University of California Press, 1987 and Rihoux, Benoit and Charles C. Ragin. Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analytic (QCA) and Related Techniques. London: Sage, 2009. 4. Tilly, Charles. ‘Means and Ends of Comparison in Macro Sociology.’ Comparative Social Research, vol. 16, 2007, pp. 47 – 57 and Lijphart, Arend. ‘Comparative Politics and Comparative Method.’ American Political Science Review, vol. 65, Sept 1971, pp. 682 – 693. 5. Little, Daniel. Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. 6. Bratton, Michael and Beatrice Liatto-Katundu. ‘A Focus Group Assessment of Political Attitudes in Zambia’. African Affairs, vol. 93, issue 373, 1994, pp. 535 –63. 7. The survey will be basic using a combination of multiple choice and scaled questions providing a thicker more nuanced set off responses although this may be harder to code. 8. Sewell, J.P. Functionalism and World Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. 9. Mitrany, David. A Working Peace System. Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966, p. 27. 10. Mitrany, Working Peace System, p. 29. 11. Ibid., p. 27. 12. Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe. ‘Neo-Functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of New Dynamism of the EC.’ Millennium-Journal of International Studies, vol. 20, issue 1, 1991, pp. 1 – 22; Niemann, Arne. Explaining Decisions in the European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 29 and Jensen, C. ‘Neo-Functionalism’ in Cini, Michelle. European Union Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 81 – 88. 13. Haas, Ernst. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950– 1957. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958, p. 211. 14. Schmitter, Phillippe C. ‘A Revised theory of Integration.’ International Organisation, vol. 24, issue 4, Autumn 1970, p. 846. 15. Tranholm-Mikklesen, ‘Neo-Functionalism’, p. 5. 16. See Moravcsik, A. ‘The Choice for Europe’ in Nelsen, Brent F. and Alexander Stubb (eds). The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003. Others demonstrate the fallacy of the automacity of spillover to integration and Schmitter and Nye call

NOTES

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32.

33. 34. 35.

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for a nuanced approach to spillover. See Nye, J. S. ‘Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist Model.’ International Organization, vol. 24, no. 4, Autumn, 1970, pp. 796 – 835; and Schmitter, ‘Revised Theory’, p. 847. Groom, A,J.R. and Alexis Heraclides. ‘Integration and Disintegration’ in Light, Margot and A.J.R.Groom (eds). International Relations, A Handbook of Current Theory. London: Pinter Publishers, 1985, pp. 194 – 200. Nye, ‘Common Markets’, p. 805. Schmitter, ‘Revised Theory’, p. 846. Ibid. Haas, Uniting of Europe, pp. 113– 198. Lindberg, Leon. The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963, pp. 49 –94. Schmitter, ‘Revised Theory’, p. 853 and Taylor, Paul. Limits to European Integration. Beckenham: Croom Heim Ltd, 1983, p. 80. Taylor, Limits to European, p. 80. Williams, Paul D. ‘From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union’s Security Culture.’ African Affairs, vol. 106, issue 423, 2007, pp. 253 –279. Ibid. Nye, ‘Common Markets’; Niemann, Explaining Europe, and TranholmMikklesen, ‘Neo-Functionalism’. See Judt, Tony. Post War: A History of Europe Since 1945. London: Vintage Books, 2005. Nye, ‘Common Markets,’ p. 820. Murithi, Tim. The African Union: Pan-African Peacebuilding and Development. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, Makinda & Okumu, African Union and Francis, David J. Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems., Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006. Murithi, African Union, p. 18. Du Bois’ writing on slavery and Fanon’s works from experiences in Algeria and Martinique were driving influences. See Fanon, Franz. Black Skin, White Masks. London: Pluto Press, 1986; Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin Books, 2001 and Rodney, Walter. ‘How Europe Underdeveloped Africa’ in Grinker, Roy and Christopher B. Steiner. Perspectives on Africa: A Reader in Culture, History & Representation. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1997 as well as chapters by Leopold Senghor and Sekou Toure. Campbell, Horace. Pan-Africanism: Struggle Against Neo-Colonialism and Imperialism. Documents of the 6th Pan-Africanist Conference, Afro-Carib Publications, 1975. Nkrumah, Kwame. Africa must Unite. London: Heinemann, 1963. Matthews, Kay. ‘Renaissance of Pan-Africanism’ in Akokparti, John, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba and Tim Murithi (eds). The African Union and its Institutions. Cape Town: Jacana, 2009, p. 27.

230 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

42.

43. 44.

45. 46. 47. 48.

49.

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Ibid., p. 27. Francis, Uniting Africa, p. 11. Murithi, African Union, p. 23. Ibid., p. 26. OAU Charter – http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_Charter_ 1963_0.pdf. Mwagiru, Makumi. Conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management. Nairobi: CCR Publications, 2006; Murithi, African Union, Makinda, & Okumu, African Union; Francis, Uniting Africa; Engel, Ulf and Joao Gomes Porto (eds). Africa’s New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalising Solutions. Farnham: Ashgate, 2010; Cilliers, Jakkie and Greg Mills. Peacekeeping in Africa. University of Virginia: Institute for Defence Policy, 1995. The Casablanca group comprised the more radical states of Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali and Morocco pushing for a federal system of government. The Monrovia group consisted of twenty African states advocating for a gradualist approach to African integration. The Brazzaville Group consisted of Francophone states and viewed integration along similar lines to their counterparts in the Monrovia group; namely that integration in Africa should be a gradual process of economic cooperation rather than political integration. The Monrovia group’s model of integration was adopted with the core principles of equality of sovereignty, the acceptance of colonial borders, non-interference in domestic affairs of other states and not to harbour dissidents from other states. Murithi, African Union, p. 31. Matthews, Kay, ‘Renaissance’, p. 28; Murithi, African Union and Makinda and Okumu, African Union. Now that some of these pro-AU leaders are out of power for various reasons it remains to be seen whether others will fill the same role. Mwagiru, Conflict in Africa, pp. 142– 163. Williams, Paul D. War & Conflict in Africa. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011, pp. 40 – 43 and Mwagiru, Conflict Management, pp. 71 –85. Williams, Paul D. ‘The African Union’s Conflict Management Capabilities.’ Working paper, The Council on Foreign Relations, October 2011, p. 3. See Church, William and Marco Jowell. ‘Conflict Circuit Breakers in the African Great Lakes Region’. African Security Review, vol. 16.1, 2007, pp. 18 – 33 and Fanta, Emmanuel and Marco Jowell. ‘Regionalising Peace and Security in Eastern Africa: Credible Hope or Elusive Dream.’ Working Paper, presented at International Studies Association Annual Conference, New York, February 2009. See Murithi, Tim, ‘The African Union’s evolving role in peace operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia.’ The African Security Review, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, Vol. 17.1, 2008, pp. 70 – 82 and Williams, Paul

NOTES

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52. 53. 54. 55.

56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

64. 65. 66.

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D., ‘The African Union’s Peace Operations: A Comparative Analysis.’ African Security, vol. 2, issue 2 – 3, 2009, pp. 97 – 118. One study illuminates the underhand agendas of the US Government in military training. See Gil, Leslie. School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas. London: Duke University Press, 2004. Decalo, Coups and Army Rule; Ali, Taisier M., and Robert O. Matthews (eds). Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution. Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press; 1999 and N’Diaye, Boubacar. The Challenge of Institutionalising Civilian Control: Botswana, Ivory Coast and Kenya in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Leighton Books, 2001. One stands out. See Luckham, Nigerian Military. Nordlinger, Eric A. Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments. London: Prentice-Hall, 1977, p. 46. Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil – Military Relations. Boston: Belknap, 1981, pp. 80 – 85. For more detail on Civil-Military relations see Finer, S.E. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. London: Penguin Books, 1975; 1975; Janowitz, Morris. Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977 and N’Diaye, Civilian Control. See Janowitz, Military Institutions, p. 116. Luckham, Nigerian Military; Gutteridge, Military in African, p.10 & Janovitz, Military Institutions, pp. 116– 118. Mazrui, Ali A. (ed.). The Warrior Tradition in Africa. Leiden: Brill, 1977, p. 258. Ibid. Gutteridge, Military in African, pp. 6 – 7. Ibid. p. 9 and Luckham. Nigerian Military, p. 30. Laidi, Zaki. The Super-Powers and Africa: The Constraints of a Rivalry 1960– 1990. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. Gutteridge, Military in Africa, p. 6; case studies in N’Diaye; Civilian Control; Berman, Eric G. and Katie E. Sams. Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities. Pretoria, Institute of Security Studies, 2000, pp. 300 – 398 and the collection of case studies in Rupiya, Martin (ed.). Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005. Luckham, Nigerian Military, p. 111. Reflecting Fanon’s ‘Prospero Complex’ although an ‘Othello Complex’ may be a more apt analogy. See Fanon, Black Skin, p. 83. Gutteridge, Military in African; Luchkam, Nigerian Military; N’Diaye, Civilian Control; Rusagara, Frank K. A History of the Military in Rwanda. Kigali: Foundations Publishers, 2009; Kieh, George Klay and Pita Ogaba Agbese (eds). The Military and African Politics: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004 and Mwagiru, Conflict in Africa.

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67. See Bayart, Jean-Francois. The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009; Zartman, I. William (ed.). Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1995; Clapham, Christopher. Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Chabal, Patrick and Jean-Pascal Daloz. Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument. Oxford: James Currey, 1999 Jackson, Robert H. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. London: Cambridge University Press, 1993; Villalo´n, Leonardo Alfonso and Phillip A. Huxtable (eds). The African State at a Critical Juncture: between disintegration and reconfiguration. Boulder Lynne Reiner, 1998 (especially the chapter by Joshua Forest). 68. Taylor, Ian and Paul D. Williams. ‘Political Culture, State Elites and Regional Security in West Africa.’ Journal of Contemporary African Studies, vol. 26, issue 2, 2008, pp. 137– 149. 69. Out of the main Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to the AU only South Africa and Ghana could argue that their militaries are not dominated by neopatrimonial pressures. 70. Taylor & Williams, ‘Political Culture’, p. 140. 71. N’Diaye, Civilian Control, pp. 51 – 69; Howe, Herbert. Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, pp. 27 –73. See also Lutterbeck, Derek. ‘Arab Uprisings, Armed Uprisings and Civil-Military Relations’. Armed Forces and Society, vol. 39, issue 28, 2013, pp. 28 – 52. 72. Luckham, Nigerian Military, pp. 109– 130. 73. Agbese, Pita Ogaba. ‘Defence Expenditures and Private Capital Accumulation in Nigeria’. Journal of Asian and African Studies. vol. XXIII, No. 3– 4, 1988, pp. 270– 286. See also Kraxberger, Brennan. ‘The Geography of Regime Survival: Abacha’s Nigera.’ African Affairs, vol. 103, issue 412, 2004, pp. 413 –430. 74. Mwenda, Andrew and Roger Tangri. ‘Patronage Politics, Donor Reforms, and Regime Consolidation in Uganda.’ African Affairs, vol. 104, issue 416, 2005, pp. 449– 467 and Mwenda, Andrew and Roger Tangri. ‘Military Corruption & Ugandan Politics since the late 1990s.’ Review of African Political Economy, vol. 30, issue 98, 2003, pp. 539 – 552. 75. See Chan, Stephen. Southern Africa: Old Treacheries and New Deceits. New Haven: London, 2011.and Clark, John F. (ed.). The African Stakes of the Congo War. New York: Palgrave, 2002 for motivations of African forces for conflict in the Congo. 76. Rusagara, History of the Military. 77. N’Diaye, Civilian Control, p. 123; Odetola, Olatunde. Military Regimes and Development: A Comparative Analysis in African Societies. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982, p. 23. 78. Ibid; Rupiya, (ed.). Evolutions & Revolutions. 79. Francis, Uniting Africa, pp. 33 – 35 and Murithi, African Union, p. 42.

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80. Hornsby, Charles. A History of Kenya Since Independence. New York: I.B.Tauris, 2012, p. 100. 81. Ibid., p. 230 & p. 337. 82. Katumanga, Musambayi, ‘Morphing mirror images of military culture and the nation-state insecurities in Kenya’ in Vrey, Francis et al (eds). On Military Culture: Theory, Practice and African Armed Forces. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2013, p. 152. 83. Branch, Daniel and Nic Cheeseman. ‘Democratization, sequencing, and state failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya’. African Affairs, vol. 108, issue 430, 2009, pp.1 – 26; Kagwanja, Peter. ‘Courting genocide: Populism, ethnonationalism and the informalisation of violence in Kenya’s 2008 post-election crisis.’ Journal of Contemporary African Studies, vol. 27, issue 3, 2009, pp. 365– 387; Wrong, Michela. Its our Turn to Eat. London: Harper Collins, 2009; Branch, Daniel. Kenya: Between Hope and Despair. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011; Murunga, Godwin et al. (eds). Kenya: the Struggle for a New Constitutional Order. London: Zed Books and Nordic Africa Institute, 2014 and Hornsby, History of Kenya. 84. Duder, C.J.D. ‘An Army of One’s Own: The Politics of the Kenya Defence Force.’ Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol. 25, issue 2, 1991, pp. 207– 225. 85. Hornsby, History of Kenya, p. 87. 86. Ibid., p. 98. 87. N’Diaye, Civilian Control, p. 130. 88. Hornsby, History of Kenya, p. 556. 89. N’Diaye, Civilian Control, p. 130. 90. Katumanga, ‘Morphing mirror images’, p. 145, Branch and Cheeseman, ‘Democratisation’, pp. 253– 258 and Wrong, Our Turn. 91. N’Diaye, Civilian Control, p. 131, Katumanga, ‘ Morphing Mirror Images’, p. 152, Hornsby, History of Kenya. 658 and Ruteere, Mutuma, ‘Security and Human Rights in the New Constitutional Order in Kenya’ in Murunga, Kenya. 92. The Military Balance, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2014, p. 451. 93. Saliu, Hassan A. ‘Nigeria and Peace Support Operations: Trends and Policy Implications.’ International Peacekeeping, vol. 7, issue 3, 2007, pp. 105– 119. 94. See Ihonvbere, Julius O. ‘Are Things Falling Apart? The Military and the Crisis of Democratisation in Nigeria.’ The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 34, issue 2, 1996, pp.193 – 225 and Kraxberger, ‘Geography of Regime’, pp. 413 –430. 95. Ibid. and Agbese, ‘Defence Expenditures. 96. Fayemi, J, Kayode. ‘Entrenched Militarism and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria’ in Koonings, K. and Kruijt, D. (eds). Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy. London: Zed Books, 2002, pp. 221–231 see also Nwagwu, Emeka, Nwagwu, Emeka. Taming the Tiger:

234

97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108.

109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117.

118.

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Civil-Military Relations and the Search for Political Stability in Nigeria. Boston: University Press of America, 2002, pp. 227 – 229. Nwagwu, Taming, pp. 206 & 221. Ibid. p. 230. Clayton, Anthony. France, Soldiers and Africa. London: Brassey, 1988. Charbonneau, Bruno. France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in SubSaharan Africa. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008, p. 60. N’Diaye, Civilian Control, p. 99. Operation Licorne in Cote D’Ivoire from 2002 and deployment to CAR in 2014 are two recent examples of unilateral French intervention in former colonies. ‘African Troops March in bastille Day Parade’ RFI, 14th July 2010 http:// www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20100714-african-troops-march-bastille-day-parade. N’Diaye, Civilian Control, p. 105. Ibid. p. 109. Bachman, Olaf, ‘Quasi-Armies: Obstacles to, or Vehicle for, State-building in Central Africa’, Unpublished PhD thesis, Kings College London 2013. Museveni, Yoweri, Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda, Macmillan, London, 1997, p. 174. Ibid., pp. 174 – 176, Brett, E.A. ‘Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: the Role of the Military in Politics’. Journal of African Studies, vol. 33, issue 1, 1995, pp. 129– 152, Mudoola, Dan. ‘Institution Building: The Case of the NRM & the military 1986– 89’ in Hansen, Holger & Michael Twaddle (eds). Changing Uganda. Oxford: James Currey, 1991, pp. 233 – 237. Madoola, ‘Uganda’, p. 260 and Ngoga, Pascal. ‘Uganda: The National Resistance Movement’ in Clapham, Christopher (ed.). African Guerrillas. Oxford: James Currey, 1998. p. 99. Ngoga, ‘Uganda, pp. 91 – 107. Mwenda and Tangri, ‘Military Corruption.’ pp. 539 –552. Interview with Colonel UPDF, Kampala, Uganda, March 2013 Jowell, ‘Cohesion through socialization,’ pp. 278 – 293. Ibid. Rusagara, History of the Military, p. 195. Jowell, ‘Cohesion through socialization’, pp. 289 – 93. Luckham, Robin. ‘Radical Soldiers, New Model Armies and the Nation-State in Ethiopia and Eritrea’, in Koonings and Kruijt, Political Armies, pp. 238– 269; Woldemikael, Tekle Mariam. ‘Political Mobilization and Nationalist Movements: The Case of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front’. Africa Today, vol. 38, no. 2, 1991, pp. 31 – 42 and Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe. ‘Armies and Democratic Transitions: Challenges and Prospects of building a professional army in Ethiopia’ in Very et al. (eds). On Military Culture. Leao, Ana and Martin Rupiya. ‘A Military history of the Angolan Armed Forces from the 1960s onwards’ in Rupiya (ed.). Evolutions and Revolutions,

NOTES TO PAGES 33 – 35

119.

120. 121.

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pp. 7 – 43 and Hodges, Tony. Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism. Oxford: African Issues, James Currey, 2001, pp. 167 – 175. Hartzell, Caroline. ‘Mixed Motives? Explaining the Decision to Integrate Militaries at Civil War’s End’ in Licklider, Roy (ed.). New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Military Forces After Civil Wars. Washington DC: Georgetown, 2014, pp. 13 – 30. Stearns, Jason, Judith Verweijen and Maria Eriksson Baaz. ‘National Army and Armed Groups in eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian Knot of Insecurity.’ Usalama Project, Rift Valley Institute, 2013. Stearns, Jason. Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa. New York: Perseus Books, 2010 and Africa Confidential DR Congo reports, especially ‘Kabila for Ever’, 26th September 2014 and ‘A government of Few Talents’, 25th May 2012. Wolpe, Howard. ‘Making Peace after Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process.’ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Peaceworks no. 70, Washington, DC, U.S. Institute of Peace, March 2011. See also Nindorera, Willy. ‘Security Sector Reform in Burundi: Issues and Challenges for Improving Civilian Protection.’ Centre d’Alerte et de Pre´vention des Conflits (CENAP)/NorthSouth Institute (NSI) Working Paper, Ottawa, NSI, July 2007. Nindorera, Willy. ‘Burundi: The Deficient Transformation of the CNDDFDD’ in De Zeeuw, Jeroen (ed.). From Soldiers to Politicians. London: Lynne Reiner, 2007, p. 125. Chitiyo, Knox and Martin Rupiya. ‘Tracking Zimbabwe’s Political History: The Zimbabwe Defence Force from 1980– 2005’ in Rupiya (ed.). Evolutions and Revolutions, pp. 331– 365 and Chan, Southern Africa. Malache et al. ‘Profound Transformations and Regional Conflagrations: The History of Mozambique’s Armed Forces from 1975–2005’, in Rupiya (ed.). Evolutions and Revolutions, pp. 155–199 and Seegers. Annette. ‘Revolutionary Armies of Africa: Mozambique and Zimbabwe’ in Bayham, Simon (ed.). Military Power and Politics in Black Africa. Chatham: Mackays, 1986, pp. 144–156. Godwin, Ashlee & Cathy Haenlein. ‘Security-Sector Reform in Sierra Leone.’ The RUSI Journal, vol. 158, no. 6, Dec 2013, pp. 30 – 39 and Kandeh, J. ‘What does the ‘Militariat’ Do when it Rules? Military Regimes, the Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia.’ Review of African Political Economy, vol. 23, issue 69, September 1996, pp. 387 – 404. See Very et al. (eds). On Military Culture. Licklider, Roy. ‘South Africa’ in Licklider, New Armies, p. 119 and Le Roux, Len. ‘The Post-Apartheid South African Military: Transforming the Nation’ in Rupiya (ed.). Evolutions and Revolutions, pp. 235 – 269 and the edited volume Vrey et al. (eds). On Military Culture. Aboagye, Festus. The Ghana Army. Accra: Sedco, 1999. p. 33. Austin, Dennis. ‘The Ghana Armed Forces and Ghanaian Society’. Third World Quarterly. Vol. 7, No. 1, 1985, pp. 90 – 101. Ibid.

236

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132. Ibid. 133. Hutchful, Eboe. ‘Military Policy and Reform in Ghana.’ The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 35, issue 2, 1997, pp. 251 – 278. 134. Ibid. 135. Ibid. 136. Ibid. 137. The Military Balance 2014. 138. Stapleton, Tim. A Military History of Africa, Vol. III. Oxford: Praeger, 2013, pp. 87 – 88. 139. Luanda, Nelson. ‘A Changing Conception of Defence: a historical perspective of the military in Tanzania’ in Rupiya (ed.). Evolutions and Revolutions, pp. 302–305. 140. Odetola, Military Regimes, p. 23. 141. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, p. 31. 142. Gutteridge, Military in African, p. 8. 143. Luckham, Nigerian Military, p. 8. 144. Ibid. pp. 48 & 109–145. Others also state the importance of mess life, training and external experiences such as peacekeeping see Gutteridge, Military in African; Odetola, Military Regimes and Agabese, Military and African. 145. Mwagiru, Conflict in Africa; Buzan, Barry, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1998; Prunier, Gerard. ‘Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo 1986– 99.’ African Affairs, vol. 103, issue 412, 2004, pp. 359 – 383; Prunier, Gerard. From Genocide to Continental War: The Congolese Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa. London: Hurst & Co., 2009 and Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geo-Politics 1996 – 2006. London: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 146. Mazrui (ed.). Warrior Tradition, pp. 239– 240. 147. Smith, J. ‘Patronage, Per Diems and the ‘Workshop Mentality’: The Practice of Family Planning Programs in South eastern Nigeria.’ World Development, vol. 31, no. 4, 2003, pp. 703 – 715.

Chapter 2 Peacekeeping in Africa: Tasks and Activities from UN and AU Peace Support Operations 1. Bellamy et al., Understanding Peacekeeping, pp. 165– 187. 2. Makinde and Okumu, African Union, p. 39 and Murithi, ‘The African Union’s evolving role’. 3. Williams, ‘The African Union’s Conflict Management Capabilities.’ 4. The AU does have capacity for conflict prevention but this is usually at the highest level of head of state, former head of state or nominated special envoy. These individuals are too senior and are outside the remit of PSO training centre. 5. Ghali, Boutros Boutros. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Report of the United Nations Secretary General, New York, 17th June 1992.

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6. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, ‘Brahimi Report’, UNGA, 2000. 7. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, ‘The Capstone Doctrine’, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), January 2010. 8. Prunier, Gerard. The Rwanda Crisis: A History of a Genocide. London: Hurst, 2005, p. 312. 9. Ibid., and Prunier, Genocide to Continental, (especially Chapters 2&3). 10. African Rights. Rwanda: The Insurgency in the Northwest. London: African Rights, 1998. 11. For some excellent analysis on the deterioration of Zaire see Young, Crawford and Thomas Turner. The Rise and Decline of Zairian State. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985. 12. Callaghy, Thomas. The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984. 13. See Prunier, Rwanda Crisis and Prunier, Genocide to Continental War. 14. For detailed analysis of this period see Reyntjens, Great African War; Stearns, Dancing in the Glory; Prunier, Genocide to Continental; Reyntjens, Filip. ‘Briefing : the Second Congo War : More Than a Remake.’ African Affairs, vol. 9, issue 86, 1999, pp. 241 – 250; McNulty, Mel. ‘The collapse of Zaı¨re: implosion, revolution or external sabotage?’ The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 37, issue 1, 1999, pp. 53 – 82 and Wrong, Michela. In the Footsteps of Mr Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in the Congo. London: Harper Collins, 2001. 15. Several UN investigate reports on the illegal trade of weapons and minerals as well as documentation of human rights violations testify to the brutality and longevity of the violence. See UN Group of Experts on DR Congo reports http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroup.shtml, the UN OHCHR. Mapping Report on Human Rights Violations in DRC 1992– 2003. New York: UN OHCHR, 2010 and the suppressed ‘Gersony Report’. Various Human Rights Organisations have documented similar findings. See Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of Congo, ‘What Kabila is Hiding: Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo,’ October 1997. 16. Reynaert, Julie. ‘MONUC/MONUSCO and Civilian Protection.’ International Peace Information Service, February 2011, p. 15. 17. UNSCR 1279: 30 November 1999. 18. UNSCR 1291: 24 February 2000. 19. UNSCR 1493: 28 July 2003. 20. UNSCR 1856: 22 December 2008. 21. UNSCR 1925: 28 May 2010. 22. Interview with Winter, Philip, former Stabilisation Adviser, MONUC, Goma, DR Congo, April 2009.

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23. Paddon, Emily and Guillaume Lacaille. ‘Stabilizing the Congo.’ Refugee Studies Centre Policy Brief, No. 8. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2012. 24. Ibid. and interview with Philip Winter, Goma, DR Congo, April 2009. 25. Not including the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) of 2013. See MOUSCO Fact Sheet; http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/facts.shtml. 26. Ibid. 27. MONUC organisational structure. Taken from Reynaert, ‘MONUC/ MONUSCO’, p. 41. 28. Ibid. 29. MONUSCO website – http://monusco.unmissions.org. 30. Ibid. 31. Interview with Phillip Winter, Goma, DR Congo, April 2009. 32. See Prunier, Gerard. Darfur: A 21st Century Genocid e. New York: Cornell University Press, 2008 and De Waal, Alex and Julie Flint. Darfur: A Short History of a Long War. London: Zed Books, 2006. 33. Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, Ndjamena 2004, http://www.usip.org/ sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/sudan_ceasefire_ 04082004.pdf. 34. Aboagye, Festus. ‘The AU/UN Hybrid Operation in: Challenges, Lessons and Implications for Regional Peacekeeping Training’. Presented at The SADC Workshop on Peace Support Operations, SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, Harare, Zimbabwe 3 – 5 November, 2007. 35. Mansarry, Allan Vic. ‘AMIS in Darfur: Africa’s litmus test in peacekeeping and political mediation.’ African Security Review, ISS, vol. 18.1, no. 1, 2009, pp. 35 – 48. 36. Aboagye, ‘AU/UN Hybrid Operation’, 2007. 37. UNSCR 1769 31 July 2006. 38. UNSCR 1935 30 July 2010. 39. UNSCR 2003 29 July 2011. 40. Interview with Lt Gen Karenzi Karake, Former Deputy Force Commander UNAMID, Rwanda Defence Force, London, October 2014. 41. SRSG’s Report, 2007. 42. Williams, Paul and Bronwyn E. Bruton. ‘Counter Insurgency in Somalia: Lessons Learned from the African Union Mission in Somalia 2007– 2013.’ Joint Special Operations University, September 2013, p. 9. 43. Williams and Bruton, ‘Counter Insurgency in Somalia’, p. 8. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid., p. 14 and Hansen, Stig Jarle. Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group 2005–2012. London: Hurst & Co., 2013. 46. UNSCR 1744 20th Feb 2007 and AU PSC/PR/Com (LXIX), 19th Jan 2007. 47. Williams and Bruton, ‘Counter Insurgency in Somalia’, p. 46. 48. Ibid. 49. Hansen, Al-Shabaab, pp. 73 – 103.

NOTES 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

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Williams and Bruton, ‘Counter Insurgency in Somalia,’ p. 48. UNSCR 1863 16 January 2009. Hansen, Al-Shabaab, p. 102. Williams and Bruton, ‘Counter Insurgency in Somalia’, p. 61. UNSCR 2036 22 February 2012. Williams & Bruton, ‘Counter Insurgency in Somalia,’ p. 65. Ibid., p. 64. UNSCR 2036 22 February 2012. Ibid. Taken from Cilliers, Jakkie. ‘The African Standby Force: An update on progress’. ISS Paper 160, March 2008, pp. 3–4. Robinson, Colin. ‘The Eastern Africa Standby Force: History and Prospects.’ International Peacekeeping, vol. 21, issue 1, September 2014, p. 27. East African Standby Force Strategic Plan 2012– 2015, November 2007. Interview with Simon Mulongo, Former Director EASFCOM, Kampala, Uganda, March 2013. Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre (JDCC), Peace Support Operations. Joint Warfare Publication, Ministry of Defence UK, Para 517. Interview with General Karenzi Karake, Former Deputy Force Commander, UNAMID, London, October 2014.

Chapter 3 The International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC): How it Works 1. See Kenya Army website – http://www.mod.go.ke/army/?page_link¼ peacemissions. 2. For an analysis of Kenyan Peacekeeping see Ahere, John. Kenya Country Profile. Providing for Peacekeeping, International Peace Institute and George Washington University, 10 January 2015. 3. UNOMIL (Liberia) – Force Commander and Chief Military Observer UNUMOZ (Mozambique) – Chief Military Observer UNTAG (Namibia) – Deputy Force Commander UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia) – Chief Military Observer UNMOP (Croatia) – Chief Military Observer. 4. For statistics on contributions to UN peacekeeping see UN Peacekeeping website – http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contri butors.shtml. 5. Williams, ‘The African Union’s Conflict Management’. 6. See Ahere, Kenya Country Profile. 7. IPSTC Strategic Plan 2012– 1015, p. 2, www.ipstc.org. 8. The ASF brigade for Eastern Africa, (see Chapter 2). 9. For more detail on HPSS see the IPSTC website www.ipstc.org. 10. IPSTC Strategic Plan, p. 3. 11. www.ipstc.org. 12. Ibid.

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13. Interview participant RSML course, Nairobi, Kenya, February 2013 & Interview with IPSTC senior management, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2013. 14. N’Diaye, Civilian Control, and Ruteere, ‘Security & Human Rights’, pp. 164–171. 15. Interview with IPSTC senior management, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2013. 16. Interviews with diplomat Japanese Embassy; Canadian technical adviser seconded to IPSTC; Colonel Colin Brundle, Commander British Peace Support Team-East Africa and Benediste Horeau, Head of Civilian EASF; all in Nairobi, Kenya, Feb – April 2013. 17. Interview with Patrick Maina, Head of Finance, IPSTC, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2013. 18. Author’s notes. 19. Interview with Lt Col. JB, Beaudeaux, Chief of Staff, IPSTC, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 20. Statistics from the IPSTC Training Management System, author’s notes. 21. See IPSTC website, www.ipstc.org. 22. Peacebuilders News, IPSTC Newsletter, vol. 5, Issue 3, July – Sept 2012, p. 13. 23. IPSTC Prospectus p. 7. 24. IPSTC Prospectus, p. 48. 25. Interview with Lt Col Joyce Sitienei, Head of Applied Research, IPSTC, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2013. 26. IPSTC Strategic Plan, p. 5. 27. Author‘s notes. 28. BPST-EA is a team of 15 military officers funded by a cross-UK Government initiative called the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), see Chapter 4. 29. Interview with Lt Col Simon Ethrington, Former DA to Uganda and Force Generation Adviser for EASF, BPST-EA, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 30. Interview with Maj Barker Canadian TA to IPSTC, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2013. 31. Much like the UK the US aims to build African capability for PSO. 32. Interview Col Jaques Deman, EU Defence Attache´ to the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 2013. 33. Interview with Dr Nicole Ball, consultant to EU examining EU funds to APSA, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2013. 34. Joint European Union–Africa Strategy, 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/development/ icenter/repository/EAS2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf. 35. Interview Col Colin Brundle, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 36. Interview Lt Col Simon Ethrington, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 37. Interview Budget Manager IPSTC, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2013. 38. IPSTC Strategic Plan, p. 9. 39. See IPSTC website, www.ipstc.org. 40. Course Calendar at PCSS and HPSS, 2013, author’s notes. 41. IPSTC Prospectus 2012, p. 3. 42. Ibid., p. 4. 43. Ibid.

NOTES TO PAGES 92 –109 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

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Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 9. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., p. 12. Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 15. Ibid., p. 16. Ibid., p. 17. Ibid., p. 18. Ibid., p. 19. Ibid., p. 21. Ibid., p. 22. Ibid., p. 23. Ibid., p. 24. Ibid., p. 25. Ibid., p. 26. Non-Commissioned Officer and Junior Staff Officer level. IPSTC Strategic Plan, p. 31. Ibid., p. 36. Ibid., p. 37.

Chapter 4 Deconstructing the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) 1. See Malan, Mark. ‘Building Institutions on the Run’ in Donald, Daniel et al (eds). Peace Operations. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008, pp. 89 – 119. 2. IPSTC Peace and Security Research Department Workshop Agenda 2013, author’s notes. 3. Interview with Japanese diplomat, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 4. Interview with Lecturer Catholic University of East Africa and Director of the East African Integration House, Nairobi, Kenya, February 2013. 5. Interview with Canadian Maj, TA to IPSTC, Head of Training Support, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 6. Ibid. 7. Interview Kenyan Maj Senior Instructor, IPSTC, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2013. 8. Branch and Cheeseman, ‘Democratisation’. 9. Horsnby, History of Kenya, p. 556 and Chapter 1. 10. Interview with British Lt Col BPST-EA, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 11. Interview with Head of Political of EASF, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 12. Interview, British Lt-Col BPST-EA, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013 and interview with Simon Mulongo, former director EASFCOM, Kampala, Uganda, March 2013.

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109 –121

13. Interview with Database Manager IPSTC, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2013. 14. Interviews with Major-General Cyrille Ndayirukiye, Director EASFCOM; Lt Col CoS of IPSTC; Col Commander BPST-EA and with participants on RSML, Protection of Civilians and AMISOM Force HQ courses, Nairobi, Kenya, between February and April 2013. Interview with Col Cheick Dembele, AU PSOD Head of Training, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 2013. 15. Learning Plan, Conflict Analysis Course, IPSTC, 2009. 16. Interview Amb. Teffera Shiwal, former head of Administration EASF, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 2013. 17. Interview Maj (rtd) Dave Robicheaux, MPRI/ACOTA, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 18. Fischer, Jonathan. ‘Managing Donor Perceptions: Contextualizing Uganda’s 2007 Intervention in Somalia.’ African Affairs, vol. 111, issue 444, 2012, pp. 404 –23. 19. Interview with Col Jaques Deman, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 2013. 20. Ibid. 21. Jain, Purnendra. ‘National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy.’ Kokusai Mondai (Japanese Institute of International Affairs), No. 637, December 2014, pp. 15–25. 22. Interview Japanese diplomat, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2013. 23. Ibid. 24. See Chapter 2 and Makinda & Okumu, African Union and Murithi, African Union’s. 25. Writing Board Financial breakdown, author’s notes. 26. Learning Plan, Battalion Pre-Deployment Training, IPSTC, 2009. 27. Facilitator guide, IPSTC Human Rights Course. 28. See Chapter 6. 29. Interview with Brig-Gen Negash Dagnew Ayele, Joint Chief of Staff, EASF PLANELM, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 30. Carana Country Study, Base Scenario Package, Version 1.1, 6th May 2009. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid., p. 2. 33. Ibid., p. 39. 34. Ibid., p. 36. 35. Ibid., p. 84. 36. Ibid., p. 145. 37. Ibid., p. 10. 38. Quoted in Daily Nation, Weds Oct 2010 http://www.nation.co.ke/News/ 26%20African%20countries%20have%20trained%20troops%20on%20peace keeping/-/1056/1032464/-/61ik97z/-/. 39. Carana country study, p. 77. 40. Ibid., p. 39. 41. Ibid., p. 78.

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42. ‘The Coming Anarchy: How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet’, Robert D. Kaplan, The Atlantic, February 1994. 43. Interview with Ludwig Kirchner, GTZ technical adviser to EASF, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 44. Ibid. 45. Learning Plan, Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy Course, IPSTC, 2010. 46. Learning Plan, Conflict Analysis Course, IPSTC, 2009. 47. Ibid. 48. Learning Plan, Dialogue, Negotiation and Mediation Course, IPSTC, 2009. 49. Learning Plan, Peace Operations Planning Course, IPSTC, 2009. 50. Learning Plan, CIMIC Course, IPSTC, 2009. 51. Learning Plan, Civilian Foundation Course, IPSTC, 2009. 52. Learning plan, Media in Peace Support Operations Course, IPSTC, 2009. 53. Learning Plan, DDR Course, IPSTC, 2009. 54. Learning Plan, Rule of Law Course, IPSTC, 2010. 55. Learning Plan, SSR, IPSTC, 2009. 56. See Annex 1 for full list of course participants from the RSML Course, Protection of Civilians Course, AMISOM FHQ Course and Human Rights in PSO Course. 57. UNMEE fact sheet – http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmee/. 58. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, ‘Brahimi Report’, UNGA, 2000. 59. Interview with Umar Anwer, Budget Manager BPST-EA, London, UK, January 2013. 60. Which is coincidentally where the Director, most of the senior staff at IPSTC and most of the senior Kenyan elite in general come from, have businesses and live. It is an area populated by mainly Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic communities who have dominated elite politics in Kenya since independence. 61. Except for the Gender in Peace Operations module, delivered by the acting Head of Research, Lt Col Sitienei. 62. Interview with Benediste Horeau, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 63. In practice the EU pays for the course through its Africa Peace Fund distributed from Brussels. The AU says it has no formal link with IPSTC. 64. Learning Plan, Protection of Civilians Course, IPSTC, 2010. 65. Ibid. 66. Interview with David Azetoru, Director Environmental Aid and Course Director, Protection of Civilians Course, IPSTC, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2013. 67. Interview with Egyptian Major, participant, Protection of Civilians Course, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2013. 68. Interview with Rwandan Captain, Participant, Protection of Civilians Course, March 2013. 69. Interview with Ugandan participant, Protection of Civilians Course, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2013.

244

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70. Interview with Seychellois participant, Protection of Civilians Course, IPSTC, Nairobi Kenya, March 2013. 71. Interview with Comorian participant, Protection of Civilians Course, IPSTC, Nairobi Kenya, March 2013. 72. Interview Col Don Zimmer (rtd), Country Director – Kenya, MPRI, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 73. Interview with Ugandan, Djiboutian, Kenyan and Burundian participants, AMISOM FHQ Course, April 2013. 74. Interview with Lt Col Jaques Baud, Former Head of Research at IPSTC, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2014. 75. Interview Col Don Zimmer, Lt Col Eric Young, Maj Dave Roubecheax, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 76. Interview with Col Don Zimmer, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 77. Serafino, Nina et al, ‘’Leahy Law’ Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue Overview’, Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, R43361, 29th January 2012. 78. Interview with Col Don Zimmer (rtd.), Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013 79. Author’s notes. 80. Wade, Norman. The Battle Staff Smartbook: Guide to Designing, Planning & Conducting Military Operations. Lakeland FL: Lighting Press, 2010. 81. He was rather shocked to find that while he was writing the guide IPSTC was running a CIMIC through Norway and was wondering why they needed an additional course. 82. Interview Col Don Zimmer (rtd.), Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 83. IPSTC Human Rights in PSO Facilitator Guide, p. 10. 84. Numerous Rights organisations have documented serious human rights at the hands of the UPDF, notably in Northern Uganda, DR Congo and Somalia. See ‘Uganda officers suspended over sex crimes’, Al-Jazeera, 4 November 2014; UN OHCHR. Mapping Report on Human Rights Violations in DRC 1992– 2003. New York: UN OHCHR, 2010; Human Rights Watch. ‘Human Rights Violations by Uganda’s National Army in Law Enforcement Operations in Karamoja Region.’ 12th September 2007 and Human Rights Watch. ‘Uprooted and Forgotten Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda.’ 20th September 2005. 85. Interview Lt Col CoS at IPSTC, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 86. Malan, ‘Africa: Building Institutions’, pp. 86 – 106. 87. Interview with Lt Col Henry Sugden, Military Adviser to EASF, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 88. Interview with Head of Political EASF, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 89. Interview Col Cheick Dembele and Training Adviser Zino Alghadi, AU PSOD, Addis Abba, Ethiopia, March 2014 and interview with Maj-Gen Cyrille Ndayirukiye Director EASF, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2013. 90. See Chapter 1.

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Chapter 5 Other African Peace Support Operation (PSO) Training Centres 1. Africa-EU Partnership Presentation, given by Col Jaques Deman, EU Defence Attache´ to AU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 2013. 2. Ibid. 3. The ISS in South Africa is a notable exception. See www.issafrica.org. 4. Malan, ‘Africa: Building Institutions’, p. 106. 5. Williams, ‘The African Union’s Conflict Management Capabilities’, p. 6. 6. Malan, ‘Africa: Building Institutions’, p. 106. 7. See KAIPTC website – http://www.kaiptc.org/About-Us.aspx. 8. Malan, ‘Africa: Building Institutions’, p. 106. 9. Ibid. 10. This section draws on the KAIPTC training calendar and course syllabus. See KAIPTC website -http://www.kaiptc.org/Training/Courses.aspx. 11. Aning, Kwesi. ‘Landmarks in peacekeeping training in West Africa and the role of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre’. Africa Institute of South Africa. AISA Policy Brief, Number 32, June 2010, pp. 5–6. 12. Aning, ‘Landmarks in peacekeeping training’, p. 1. 13. Aubyn, Festus and Kwesi Aning. Ghana Country Profile. Providing for Peacekeeping, International Peace Institute and George Washington University, 23rd February 2013. 14. Aning, ‘Landmarks in peacekeeping training’, p. 1. 15. See Williams, ‘The African Union’s Conflict Management Capabilities’. 16. Adebajo, Adekeye. Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. London: Lynne Reiner, 2002, p. 140. See also Adeleke, Ademola. ‘Politics and Diplomacy in West Africa: The Ecowas Operation in Liberia’. Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 33, no. 4, 1995, p. 577. 17. Adebajo, ‘Building Peace’, p. 139. 18. Adekele, ‘Politics and Diplomacy West Africa’, pp. 569– 593. 19. Aubyn and Aning, Ghana. 20. Ibid. 21. Interview with Emma Bwirakong, Senior Researcher KAIPTC, London, December 2014. 22. ‘UK and the Netherlands withhold Rwanda budget aid’, BBC News, 27th July 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19010495. 23. See RPA website – http://rpa.ac.rw/about-us/vision-mission-motto/. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. See RPA website – http://rpa.ac.rw/about-us/objectives-core-values/. 27. Interview Methode Ruzindana, Head of Training RPA, Musanze, Rwanda, October 2013. 28. See RPA website – http://rpa.ac.rw/training-education/conducted-courses/. 29. Jowell, ‘Cohesion through socialization’, p. 288.

246

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30. Beswick, Danielle and Marco Jowell. Rwanda Country Profile. Providing for Peacekeeping, International Peace Institute and George Washington University, 17th March 2014. 31. Jowell, ‘Cohesion through socialization’, p. 288. 32. Ibid. 33. Interview with Gen Karenzi Karake, London, October 2014; Beswick, D. ‘Peacekeeping, regime security and ‘African Solutions to African Problems’: Exploring Rwanda’s involvement in Darfur’. Third World Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 5, 2010, pp. 739 – 754 and Beswick and Jowell, Rwanda. 34. See RPA website – http://rpa.ac.rw/about-us/history-background/. 35. Interview with Col Jill Ruteremara, Director RPA, Ruhengeri, Rwanda, October 2013. 36. Ibid. 37. Beswick, ‘Peacekeeping, Regime Security’. 38. Interview Col RDF, Rwanda, October 2013. 39. Interview Benediste Horeau, Head of Political EASF, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 40. Interview Lt-Col J-B Beaudeaux, CoS IPSTC, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 41. See Jowell, ‘Cohesion through socialization’, pp. 282–290; Prunier, Gerard. ‘The Rwanda Patriotic Front’ in Clapham (ed.). African Guerillas, pp.119–128; Prunier, Rwanda Crisis and Rusagara, The History of The Military. 42. Jowell, ‘Cohesion through socialization’, pp. 282 – 290. 43. EIPKTC has changed name several times since writing and is now the Ethiopian Peace Support Training Centre. 44. Interview with Col Colin Brundle, Commander BPST-EA, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 45. ‘New international peace-keeping training center under construction in Ethiopia’ Press TV, 29th July 2013. 46. Interview with Lt Col Phil Spicer, BPST-EA Liaison Officer with EASF and EIPKTC, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 2013. 47. Interview with Col Yosef Aron Yonatan, EIPKTC coordinator, ENDF, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 2013. 48. Programme to Establish the Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EIPKTC), Project Document, UNDP & Government of Japan, April 2013. 49. Dersso, Solomon. Ethiopia Country Profile. Providing for Peacekeeping, International Peace Institute and George Washington University, 16 November 2013. 50. Vaughan, Sarah. ‘Revolutionary democratic state-building: party, state and people in the EPRDF’s Ethiopia.’ Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 5, issue 4, 2011, pp. 619– 640. 51. Fischer, Jonathan and David Anderson. ‘Authoritarianism and the securitization of development in Africa.’ International Affairs, vol. 91, no. 1, 2015, pp. 131 – 151.

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Chapter 6 The Unintended Consequences of Foreign Military Assistance to Africa: A Satisficing Model 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

Haas, Uniting Europe, pp. 113– 1980 and Schmitter, ‘Revised Theory’. Williams, ‘From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference’. Malan, ‘Africa: Building Institutions’, pp. 86 – 106. Interview with Zino Alghadi, PSO Training Adviser AU Peace Support Operations Division, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 2013. Interview Lt Col Henry Sugden, Military Adviser EASF, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. Interview with Col Sandy Wade, former UK and EU Defence Attache´ to the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 2013 Interview AU PSOD Head of Training and Training Adviser, Col Sheik Dembele and interviews with Director EASF and Head of Civilian EASF component, African Union, Addis Ababa and Nairobi, Feb – March 2013 Taken from IPSTC Strategic Plan 2009 –2011. Taken from a power point presentation on Integrated PSO, Senior Missions Leader Course, IPSTC Feb 2013, author’s files. For studies looking at static and technical approaches to peacebuilding see Paris, ‘Peacebuilding’; Paris, ‘International Peacebuilding’; Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace’; Barnett, Michael et al. ‘Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?’ Global Governance, vol. 13, 2007, pp. 35– 58 and Chapter 3 of Cunliffe, Legions of Peace. See Chapter 4. Cramer, Christopher. Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing. London: Hurst, 2006. Keen, David. Complex Emergencies. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009. Walton, Oliver, & Goodhand, Jonathan. ‘The Limits of Liberal Peacebuilding: International Engagement in the Sri Lankan Peace Process.’ The Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 3, no. 3, 2009, p. 305. See Auteserre, Trouble with the Congo; Richards, Paul. Fighting for the Rain Forest: Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone. London: African Issues, 1996; Collinson, Duffield et al., ‘Paradoxes of Presence’; Paris, ‘Peacebuilding’ and Paris, ‘International Peacebuilding.’ Interview with Major Rod Little, Canadian TA to IPSTC, Head of Training Support, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. Interview with diplomat, Embassy of Japan, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. Interview with Col Jaques Deman, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 2013. Interview Col Stephen Kashure, Commandant Singo Camp, Kampala, Uganda, March 2013. Interview Maj Gen Cyrille Ndayirukiye, Director EASFCOM, Nairobi, Kenya, February 2013. Interview with Ludwig Kirchner, GIZ technical adviser to EASF, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013.

248

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22. See Jowell, ‘Cohesion through socialization; Beswick and Jowell, Rwanda. See also Providing for Peacekeeping profiles on Uganda, South Africa, Ghana and Ethiopia – http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/profiles/africa/. 23. Hampton, Dan. ‘Creating Sustainable Peacekeeping in Africa.’ Africa Security Brief, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, No. 27, April 2014. 24. Interview with Lt Col Peter Wright, UK Defence Attache´ to Uganda, Kampala, Uganda, March 2013. 25. Interview Col Stephen Kashure, Kampala, Uganda, March 2013. 26. See Jowell, ‘Cohesion through socialization; Beswick and Jowell, Rwanda. See also Providing for Peacekeeping profiles on Uganda, South Africa, Ghana and Ethiopia. 27. Interview with Col Don Zimmer, ACOTA, Nairobi, Kenya April 2013. 28. Human Rights Watch. ‘Criminal Reprisals: Kenyan Military and Police Abuses Against Ethnic Somalis.’ 4th May 2012. 29. ‘Kenyan Peacekeepers Aided Illegal Somalia charcoal Export’ Reuters, 14th July 2013. Also see reports by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia http:// www.un.org/sc/committees/751/mongroup.shtml. 30. See HBO Documentary ‘Terror at the Mall’ and ‘Nairobi mall attack: new CCTV footage shoes soldiers looting from cash registers’ The Telegraph, 6th October 2013. 31. See the yearly reports by the UN Group of Experts Report on DR Congo http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/democratic-republic-ofthe-congo/. 32. ‘Uganda officers suspended over sex crimes’, Al-Jazeera, 4 November 2014. 33. Williams and Bruton, ‘Counter Insurgency in Somalia’, p. 10. 34. Interview with Col Jaques Deman, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 2013. 35. Interview Lt Col Simon Ethrington, BPST-EA, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 36. Interview with Lt Col JB Beaudeaux, CoS IPSTC, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 37. Interview with Lt Col Henry Sugden, Military Adviser EASF, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 38. Interview with Brig-Gen Negash Dagnew Ayele, Joint Chief of Staff, EASF PLANELM, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 39. Cunliffe, Legions of Peace, p. 67. 40. Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works. 41. Hibou, Beatrice, Stephen Ellis and Jean-Francois Bayart. The Criminalisation of the State in Africa. Oxford: James Currey, 1999. 42. Merton, Robert K. ‘The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposeful Social Action.’ American Sociological Review, vol. 1., issue 6, 1936, pp. 894– 904; Mica, Andrea et al. ‘Sociology and the Unintended: Robert Merton Revisited.’ Polish Studies in Culture, Nations and Politics, vol. 1, 2011; Auteserre, Peaceland, pp. 183 – 188; Taylor and Williams, ‘Political Culture, State Elites’ and Smith, ‘Patronage and Per Diems.’ 43. Interview with Maj Johnson Chelelgo, Kenyan Senior Instructor at IPSTC, Nairobi, Kenya, 7 March 2013.

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44. Interview Maj Macau Mbev, Kenyan Instructor at IPSTC, Nairobi, Kenya, March 2013. 45. Interview Col Jaques Deman, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 2013. 46. Hutchful, ‘Military Policy and Reform’, pp. 251 –278. 47. See Booth, David, & Golooba-Mutebi, F. ‘Developmental Patrimonialism? The case of Rwanda’. African Affairs, vol. 111, May, 2012, pp. 379– 403; Reyntjens, Filip. ‘Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship.’ African Affairs, vol. 103, issue 411, 2004, pp. 177 – 210; Reyntjens, The Great African War; ‘Kagame’s authoritarian turn risks Rwanda’s future’, Stephen Kinzer, The Guardian, 27 January 2011; ‘Big Tent: Ethiopia’s Authoritarian Balancing Act’, Terrence Lyons, World Politics Review, 18 February 2014, Fisher and Anderson, ‘Authoritarianism and the securitization’. 48. Fisher and Anderson, ‘Authoritarianism and the securitization’. 49. Interview with Col Jill Ruteremara, Director Rwanda Peace Academy, Musanze, Rwanda, October 2013. 50. Interview with Benediste Horeau, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013. 51. Decalo, ‘Modalities of Civil-Military’ p. 574, Decalo, Civil-Military Relations in Africa; Luckham, Nigerian Military, p. 111; Gutteridge, Military in African; N’Diaye, Civilian Control; Jowell, ‘Cohesion through socialization’ and chapters in Rupiya, Evolutions and Revolutions. 52. Interview with Burundian participants AMISOM Force Head Quarters Course, IPSTC, Kenya, April 2013. 53. Wa Thi’Ongo, Ngugi. Dreams in a Time of War: A Childhood Memoir. New York: Pantheon Books, 2010 and Achebe, Chinua. Things Fall Apart. London: Anchor Books, 1994. 54. Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS), FCO, DFID and MoD, 2011. 55. Pirozzi, Nicola. ‘Strengthening the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security: The Africa Peace Facility.’ Foundation for European Studies, IAI, 2012 and EPLO Briefing Paper 2012. 56. Renforcement des Capacite´s Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP), see RECAMP website – http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/recamp.pdf. 57. Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), see ACOTA website – http://www.state.gov/p/af/rt/acota/. 58. ‘How do you spend £3.7bn in just 8 weeks?, The Telegraph, 16 January 2015 and National Audit Office, Managing the Official Development Assistance Target, 16 January 2015. 59. Anderson, Andrea. The Community Builder’s Approach to the Theory of Change: A Practical Guide to the Theory of Development. New York: Aspen Institute Roundtable on Community Change, 2005; DFID Research: Review of the use of the Theory of Change in International Development, 30 August 2012 and A Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for Peacebuilding, EU 2007. 60. Interview Benediste Horeau, Nairobi, Kenya, April 2013.

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INDEX

Acheampong coup, Ghana, 35 ACRI programme, 206 administration departments, 153, 180, 210 Afewerki, Isais, 62 Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), 112, 137, 206 Africa-EU Partnership, 206 Africa Peace Facility, 206 African armed forces, framework for analysis, 215 –18 African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), 155 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), 14, 23 –4, 39 –40 and EIPKTC, 175, 176 and IPSTC, 103, 144 and KAIPTC, 154, 155 –6 and orientation of training, 186 and RPA, 166 African Standby Force (ASF), 14, 68– 73, 68 fig.2.2, 103, 186– 7 African Union (AU) development of, 5, 14, 21, 22– 3, 79– 80, 163 and EIPKTC, 175, 177 improvement of capability, 184, 193 and IPSTC, 89 –90, 103, 115, 116, 144, 145

and IPSTC, individual courses, 127, 128, 130– 1, 140, 143 and KAIPTC, 154, 165 and PSO centres, 180, 184, 185– 7, 194 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 5, 61 –8 African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), 53–4, 55 Agbese, Pita Ogaba, 26 aid to Africa, 9 – 10 aims of PSO training, 10, 184 – 5, 214 Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Libe´ration (AFDL), 42 Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), 63 Al-Qaeda, 62, 65 Al-Shabaab, 63, 64– 5 Amani Lectures, 86 AMISOM see African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) AMISOM Force HQ course, IPSTC, 96–7, 137 – 40 Anglo-Lessing scandal, 29 Annan, Kofi, 149–50 Anyidoho, Henry, 129 Assembly of East African Heads of State, 70 Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR), 159 Autessere, Se´verine, 2– 3

264

PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

Bachman, Olaf, 31 Bancroft (security firm), 64 Bashir, President, 53, 55 benefits to donors, 178, 205 – 8 benefits to hosts EIPKTC, 176, 177, 201– 2 IPSTC, 81, 199 – 200 KAIPTC, 164, 165, 201 RPA, 172, 173, 201– 2 benefits to seconded staff, 207 benefits to students, 135 –6, 165, 198, 200, 202– 5 Besigye, Kizza, 142 Biya, Paul, 31 Boko Haram, 5, 30 Border Security Management (SALW) course, KAIPTC, 160 –1 Botswana, 26 Brahimi Report, 40, 130 Brigade HQ, EASF, 71 British Peace Support Team – Eastern Africa (BPST-EA), 87, 111 –12 Building Stability Overseas Strategy, 206 Burundi, 33, 66, 195 Cameroon, 31 Canada, 88, 95 Capstone doctrine, 40 Carana (fictional country), 118 – 22, 166, 220 case studies, comparative, 16 certificates, 202 –3 Chan, Stephen, 26 Child Protection component (UNAMID), 59 Civil Affairs component (UNAMID), 58 civil affairs staff, 76 civilian component of missions, 47– 9, 51, 57– 9, 75– 6 Civilian Foundation Course, IPSTC, 126 Civilian Pre-Deployment Training Course, HPSS, 100 civilian staff, IPSTC, 106 –7 Civil-Military Coordination capability, 194 Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) course, KAIPTC, 155 Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) courses, IPSTC, 94, 126, 139

cohesion within militaries, 204 Cold War, 6 collaboration between PSOs, 173, 177 –8 Collaborative Problem Based Learning (CPBL) course, KAIPTC, 155 collective training, 193 – 4 Collier, Paul, 9 colonial armies, 6, 25, 35 see also post-colonial militaries Command Post Exercises (CPX), EASF, 72 Committee of Eastern African Chiefs of Defence Staff, 70 Community Policing course, IPSTC, 97–8 competition between donors, 207 competition between PSOs, 173, 177 – 8 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (Sudan), 54 Conflict Analysis and Prevention course, IPSTC, 90 –1, 123 – 4 Conflict Analysis in Eastern Africa, module, IPSTC, 131 Conflict Cycle, 116, 187–90, 187 fig. 6.1 Conflict Management Programme, IPSTC, 92 –7, 125 – 7 Conflict, Peace and Security MA course, KAIPTC, 162, 166 Conflict Prevention course KAIPTC, 155 –6 Conflict Prevention Programme, IPSTC, 90–2, 123 – 5 Congo see Democratic Republic of Congo Congolese National Police (PNC), 51–2 Congo Wars, 41– 4 Congre`s National pour la De´fense du Peuple (CNDP), 46 consequences see unintended consequences of foreign military assistance Contingent Pre-Deployment Training course, HPSS, 100 corruption, 198 Council of Eastern Africa Ministers of Defence, 70 Counter Improvised Explosive Device course, HPSS, 99 course content at PSO centres, 180, 208 –9 see also individual PSOs Cramer, Christopher, 189

INDEX cultural differences, 140, 196 – 7 Cunliffe, Phillip, 2, 199 Curriculum Design, IPSTC, 86 daily subsistence allowance (DSA), 109, 203 Darfur, 190 see also United Nations and African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), 54– 5 data collection, 16 –18 Deby, Idriss, 53 Decalo, Samuel, 9 Defence Staff College (DSC), Nairobi, 82 democracy, 181 Democratic Republic of Congo, 26, 33, 41– 4, 51– 2, 190 see also United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Congo (MONUC/ MONUSCO) Development Diplomacy for Peace and Security (DDPS) course, KAIPTC, 156 – 67 Dialogue, Negotiation and Mediation course, IPSTC, 91, 125 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) component (UNAMID), 60– 1 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) course, IPSTC, 97, 127 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) course, KAIPTC, 157 – 8 Disaster Management Programme, HPSS, 100 – 1 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), 56 donor relationships, 8, 107–8, 178, 201, 206 – 7 donors, benefits to, 178, 205 – 8 donors to EIPKTC, 174 donors to IPSTC, 87– 9, 107–8, 110–14, 145 – 6 donors to KAIPTC, 150, 151 donors to RPA, 167 Du Bois, William, 21 Duffield, Mark, 9 – 10 Dyncorp (security firm), 64

265

Early Warning and Preventative Diplomacy course, IPSTC, 91– 2, 124 – 5 East African Standby Force (EASF), 4, 69–73, 72 fig. 2.3, 145 East African Standby Force Coordinating Mechanism (EASFCOM), 69, 70 Easterly, Bill, 9– 10 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 163 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), 155 – 6 Election Monitoring and Management course, IPSTC, 98 Election Observation Training (EOT) course, KAIPTC, 158 elite socialisation, 10, 19, 20, 185, 195– 6 Eritrea, 32 –3, 62, 63 Ethiopia and development of EIPKTC, 175 –9, 201, 220 and EASF, 69, 73 and Kenya, 73, 81 and Somalia, 62, 63, 66 Ethiopian army, 32 –3, 195 Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EIPKTC), 174 –9, 201, 220 ethnic division in Burundi, 33 in Carana scenario, 120 –1 in Ghana, 35 in Kenya, 28– 9, 83, 106, 197 in Rwanda, 32 European Union, funding by, 88, 92, 113, 129, 134, 141 Ewe community, 35 expansive logic of tasks, 19, 20 facilitator guides, IPSTC, 116 Fanon, Frantz, 21 Field Training Team, KAIPTC, 162 finance departments, 210 financial benefits of PSO centres EIPKTC, 176, 177, 201 –2 IPSTC, 81, 199 –200 KAIPTC, 164, 165, 201 RPA, 172, 173, 201 –2 financial benefits to students, 135– 6, 165, 198, 200, 203

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force generation, 71 Force Headquarters (FHQ), 74 Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), 47 Forces Arme´es de la Re´publique De´mocratique du Congo (FARDC), 33, 50 Forces Arme´es Rwandaises (FAR), 42 France, 30– 1, 132, 174, 206 Full Training Exercise (FTX), EASF, 72 Gaddafi, Colonel, 22 Garvey, Marcus, 21 gender issues module, IPSTC, 133 Germany, funding by, 88, 150, 151 Gesellschaft fu¨r Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 157 Ghana, 35– 6, 66, 150 – 1, 162 –6, 201, 219 – 20 see also Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) Ghana Armed Forces, 35– 6 Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, 162 Goodhand, Jonathan, 189 Governing Board, KAIPTC, 153 – 4 grading of students, 130, 136, 143, 202, 210 Gutteridge, W.F., 6, 37 Harmonised Policy Framework (HPF), 72– 3 Hassan, Ibrahim, 174 Higher Level Training Seminar (SALW), KAIPTC, 160 High Level Exercise (HILEX), EASF, 72 homosexuality, 142 –3 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, 53 Humanitarian Peace Support School (HPSS), 82, 85, 99 –101 human rights abuses, 194 –5 Human Rights component (UNAMID), 58 Human Rights in PSO course, IPSTC, 94– 5, 141 – 4 Human Rights, module, IPSTC, 132 Huntington, Samuel P., 24 Hutchful, Eboe, 35 Hutu community, 32, 33, 41

immigration, 207 improvement of AU capability (core aim), 184, 193 improvement of national militaries (core aim), 194 –5 improvement of PSO training, 208 – 12 inaccuracies in courses, 143 income from training, IPSTC, 84, 200 institutionalised and civilian controlled militaries, 34– 6, 217, 219– 20 Integrated Mission Planning Process, module, IPSTC, 131 Integrated Peace Support Operation (IPSO) course, KAIPTC, 158 integrated stalemate militaries, 33–4, 217 integration (core aim), 185 intelligence operations, 205 Interahamwe, 42 Inter Congolese Dialogue (ICD), 43 Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), 62, 70 International Criminal Court (ICC), 53 International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC), 82 International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), course content, 89–101 Conflict Management Programme, 92– 7 Conflict Prevention Programme, 90 –2 Disaster Management Programme, 100 – 1 Mine Action Disarmament Programme, 99 Post-Conflict Recovery Programme, 97– 8 Pre-Deployment Programme, 99 –100 International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), deconstruction of, 102 –46 conclusion, 144– 6 courses and content, 123 – 8, 219 departments, staff and structures, 103 – 8 donor approach, 110–14 exploring training delivery, 128 –44 introduction, 102 – 3 student/participant selection and incentives, 108 – 10

INDEX training aids, 117 – 23 training delivery, 114– 17 International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), training delivery, 90, 114 –17, 128 –44, 219 AMISOM Force HQ Course, 137– 40 Human Rights in PSO Course, 140 –4 Protection of Civilians Course, 133 – 7 Regional Senior Mission Leader Course (RSML), 129–33 International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), workings of, 77– 101 conclusion, 101 course content and delivery, 89– 101 development of, 78– 82 donor support, 87– 9 introduction, 77 –8 objectives, organisation and structure, 82– 7 International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (I4S), 46 Islamic Courts Union (ICU), 62, 63 Italy, funding by, 151 Ivory Coast, 30– 1 Janjaweed, 52, 53, 55 Japan, funding by for EIPKTC, 174 for IPSTC courses, 91, 92, 94, 97, 98 for IPSTC generally, 88, 104, 113– 14 for RPA, 167 Joint Campaign Planning (JCP) course, KAIPTC, 158 – 9 Joint Control Board, IPSTC, 86– 7 Joint Task Force against the Lords Resistance Army, 5 Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), 52, 53, 54 Kabage, Brigadier, 83 Kabila, Joseph, 43, 44 Kabila, Laurent-De´sire´, 42– 3 Kalenjin community, 29, 83, 197 Kamba community, 28, 29 Keen, David, 189 Kenya benefits of PSO centres, 199 –200, 219 and Ethiopia, 73, 81

267

military, shortcomings of, 194 – 5 peacekeeping, commitment to, 78– 82 and post-colonial military, 28– 9 and Somalia, 65– 6 see also International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), deconstruction of; International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), workings of Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), 28– 9, 65–6, 79, 89, 105 – 6 Kenyatta, Jomo, 28– 9 Kenyatta, Uhuru, 29 Kibaki, Mwai, 29 Kibochi, General, 105– 6 Kikuyu community, 28– 9, 83, 197 Kings African Rifles, 28 Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), 4, 149 – 66 development and donors, 149 – 51 incentivising development, 162 – 6 and institutionalised military, 219 – 20 objectives and structure, 151 – 4 summary of courses, 155 – 62 training and courses, 154 – 5 Kony, Joseph, 5 Kufuor, John A., 151 language difficulties, 135, 136, 140, 143, 196 Leahy Act, 138 learning plans, IPSTC, 115 Legal Framework of PSO, module, IPSTC, 132 Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), 159 LGBT rights, 142 –3 liberal peacebuilding, 3, 7 –8, 188 – 9, 206, 214–15 liberation/vanguard militaries, 31– 3, 217, 220 ‘Linda Nchi’, operation, 65 Lords Resistance Army (LRA), 5 Luckham, Robin, 9, 37 Luo community, 29, 142 Lusaka Peace Agreement 1999, 43, 44, 45

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PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

M23, armed group, 46– 7 Majors’ coup, Nigeria, 37 Maluki, Dr, 132 Marking, Record Keeping and Tracing (SALW) course, KAIPTC, 161 Mason, Andy, 3– 4 Mbeki, Thabo, 22 Media in PSO course, IPSTC, 96, 126 Media in PSO course, KAIPTC, 162 Meru community, 29, 83 Middle Level Leadership and Management course, IPSTC, 93 militaries, dominance of policy, 178 militaries in Africa, framework for analysis, 215 –18 military assistance, background, 6– 8 military component of missions, 47, 57, 67– 8, 74– 5 Military Decision-Making and Planning (MDMP), module, IPSTC, 138 Military Observer Course, HPSS, 99– 100 Military Observers (MILOBS), 79 military officers in politics, 24– 37 background, 24– 6 sociology of military, 26– 37 Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), 112, 137, 139 – 40 military structure of PSO schools, 179 – 80 Mill, J.S., 16 Mine Action Disarmament Programme, HPSS, 99 Mines and Small Arms Awareness course, HPSS, 99 minority rights, 142 Mitrany, David, 18 Mobutu, President, 42 Moi, Daniel arap, 29 MONUC/MONUSCO see United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Congo (MONUC/MONUSCO) Mouvement pour la Libe´ration du Congo (MLC), 43 Murithi, Tim, 21 Museveni, Yoweri, 22, 26, 31– 2, 42, 63, 65 Mwenda, Andrew, 26

National Defence College, Nigeria (NDC), 159 national militaries, improvement of, 194 –5, 204 National Resistance Army (NRA), 31– 2 N’Diaye, Boubacar, 26 Negotiation and Mediation, module, IPSTC, 131 –2 neo-functionalism, 18– 21 Netherlands, 151 Nigeria, 29– 30, 66, 163 –4 Nigeria Armed Forces (NAF), 29– 30 Nilotic communities, 29, 106 Nkrumah, Kwame, 21 Nordlinger, Eric, 36 –7 Norway, 156 Nyerere, Julius, 36 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 22, 29– 30 Operational Management of Prisons course, IPSTC, 98 Organisation for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 142 Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 21–3, 163 Pan-Africanism, 10, 21– 2, 185 participants see student selection Partnering Integrated Logistics Operations Tactics (PILOT) course, KAIPTC, 159 patrimonialism in Cameroon, 31 in DR Congo, 33 in Ghana, 35 in militaries, 26, 27 fig.1.1, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35 in Nigeria, 30 and PSOs, 106, 145, 197, 200, 202, 204 in Zaire, 42 Peace and Conflict Studies School (PCSS), 82, 85 peacekeeping in Africa conceptualisation of peacekeeping training, 14– 38 deconstructing IPSTC, 102 – 46 International Peace Support Training Centre, 77– 101

INDEX introduction, 1 – 13 other African PSO Training Centres, 147 –81 PSO/SSR conundrum, 214 – 21 tasks and activities from UN and AU Peace Support Operations, 39– 76 unintended consequences of military assistance, 182 – 213 ‘peacekeeping international’, the, 2 peacekeeping organisations, 5 peacekeeping training, as continuation of foreign military assistance, 4 –8, 183 peacekeeping training centres background, 1 –8, 14– 15, 77– 8 comparison of, 183 – 92 situating, 214 – 15 peacekeeping training centres, others in Africa, 147 –81 conclusion, 179–81 Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EIPKTC), 174–9 introduction, 147 – 9 Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), 149 –66 Rwanda Peace Academy (RPA), 166 –74 peacekeeping training, conceptualisation of, 14– 38 conclusion, 37– 8 development of regional training centres, 22– 4 introduction, 14 –15 military officers in politics, 24– 37 regional integration, 18– 22 research methods, 15 –18 peacekeeping training, improving, 208 – 12 peacekeeping training, unintended consequences of, 192 – 8 Peace Operations Logistics course, IPSTC, 95 Peace Operations Planning course, IPSTC, 92– 3, 126 Peace Operations Staff Officers course, IPSTC, 93 Peace Support Operations, definition, 39 Peace Support Operations, structure of, 74– 6

269

Peace Support Operations (AU and UN), tasks and activities from, 39 –76 African Standby Force (ASF), 68– 73 AMISOM, 61– 8 conclusion, 74 –6 introduction, 39– 40 MONUC/MONUSCO, 41 –52 UNAMID, 52– 61 Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC), 118, 160 peer groups, 37 per diems, 203 Planning Element (PLANELM), 69, 71 police component of missions, 49, 51 –2, 59–60, 76 Police Security Sector Reform (SSR) course, KAIPTC, 160 Political Affairs component, UNAMID, 57–8 political benefits of PSOs, 80– 1, 164, 173, 176–7, 179 post-colonial militaries, 27– 31, 27 fig. 1.1, 216 – 17, 219 Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 188, 188 fig. 6.2 Post-Conflict Recovery courses, IPSTC, 127 –8 Post-Conflict Recovery Programme, IPSTC, 97 –8 Practitioner’s view on the Horn of Africa, module, IPSTC, 131 Pre-Deployment Programme, HPSS, 99–100 presenters of courses, 133, 134 – 5 Private Military Companies, 108, 112, 137 process tracing, 16 Protection of Civilians (PoC) course, IPSTC, 96, 133 – 7 Protection of Civilians (PoC) course, RPA, 170 Protection of Civilians in Africa (PoC) course, KAIPTC, 159 Protection of Civilians, module, IPSTC, 132 Protection of Civilians, scenario, IPSTC, 122 –3 PSO/SSR conundrum African armed forces, framework for analysis, 215 –18

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implications of findings, 220 –1 the military and peacekeeping training, 218 –20 situating PSO training centres, 214 –15 PSO training centres see peacekeeping training centres PSO Village, 122 – 3 quantitative assessments, 110, 115, 170, 205, 206 Rapid Deployment Capabilities (RDC), 71 Rawlings, Jerry, 35 Red Cross, 142 reforming national militaries (core aim), 184 – 5 regional integration, 18 –22 Regional Senior Mission Leader course, IPSTC, 129 – 33 regional training centres, development of, 22– 4 relevance of courses, 116 –17, 144, 165, 185 – 7 Renforcement des Capacite´s Africaines de Mantien de la Paix (RECAMP), 206 research departments of PSO centres, 85– 6, 103 – 5, 153, 180, 209, 210 research methods, conceptualising peacekeeping training, 15 –18 research questions, 11 Robicheaux, Dave, 139 Rule of Law component of missions, 58– 9, 76 Rule of Law (ROL) course, IPSTC, 98, 127 Rule of Law (ROL) course, KAIPTC, 159 – 60 Rupiya, Martin, 26 Rusagara, Frank K., 26 Ruteremara, Jill, 168 Rwanda benefits of PSO centres, 201–2 and liberation military, 32, 220 and MONUC, 41 –3 see also Rwanda Peace Academy (RPA) Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA), 32 Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), 41, 173

Rwanda Peace Academy (RPA), 166 –74, 201 –2, 220 Sachs, Jeffrey, 9 salaries, 79, 80 SALW Foundation course, KAIPTC, 160 satisficing model, 198 –208, 219, 221 Schroeder, Gerhard, 151 security, 6 –7 Security Sector Reform, 110 Security Sector Reform course, IPSTC, 97, 127 –8 Security Sector Reform, PSO/SSR conundrum, 220 – 1 selection of students see student selection; target audience Senghor, Leopold, 21 Senior Mission Leaders course, IPSTC, 92 sensitisation, 196 Sexual and Gender Based Violence course, IPSTC, 95 shortness of courses, 196 –7 Sierra Leone, 66 similarities between PSO centres, 183 – 92 Singo Camp, Uganda, 194 Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Training Programme, KAIPTC, 160 –1 sociology of military, 26– 37, 27 fig1.1, 216 institutionalised and civilian controlled militaries, 34– 6 integrated stalemate militaries, 33– 4 introduction, 26– 7 liberation/vanguard militaries, 31 –3 post-colonial militaries, 27 –31 summary, 36– 7 Somalia, 190 see also African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) South Africa, 34– 5 South African National Defence Force (SANDF), 34– 5 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 43 Southern African Development Community- Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC), 159 spillback, 19, 20

INDEX spillover, 18– 19, 20 Stabilisation and Recovery Strategy (STAREC), 46 staff at centres, 105–8, 134, 145, 152, 153, 211 stereotyping, 120 – 1 Stockpile Management (SALW) course, KAIPTC, 160 – 1 structure of PSO centres, improving, 209 – 10 student selection dysfunctionality of, 191–2, 210 at IPSTC, 108– 10, 127 – 8, 130, 135 –6, 138, 143, 145 at KAIPTC, 166 see also target audiences subject matter experts (SME), 115 Sudan see African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS); United Nations and African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), 52, 55 Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M), 52, 53, 54 Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), 52 Sugden, Henry, 145 systems of training, improving, 211 –12 Tactical Operations Staff course, IPSTC, 93– 4 Tangri, Roger, 26 Tanzanian People’s Defence Force (TPDF), 36 target audiences, 124, 126, 127– 8, 137 – 8 teaching methodology, 117, 132–3, 141, 143 technical advisers (TAs), 107 – 8, 111–12, 183, 207 terrorism, 62, 63, 64– 5, 207 Toure, Sekou, 21 tracking of students, 109, 193 traditional rights, 142 training aids (IPSTC), 117 –23 training departments, 103 –4, 152– 3, 209 – 10 Training for Peace programme, 156 Tutsi community, 32, 33, 42

271

Uganda, 31– 2, 42– 3, 63 –4, 65, 66, 194 Ugandan Army (UPDF), 31, 32, 141 – 2, 195 Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), 34 UNAMID see United Nations and African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur unintended consequences of foreign military assistance, 182 –213 comparison of PSO training centres, 183 – 92 conclusion, 212– 13 improving PSO training, 208 –12 introduction, 182 – 3 satisficing model, 198 –208 unintended consequences of PSO training, 192 –8 United Kingdom, funding by for EIPKTC, 174 for IPSTC, 82, 87– 8, 92, 111 – 12, 129 for KAIPTC, 150, 151, 166 United Kingdom, influence on Kenyan military, 28 United Nations and African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 52– 61 background, 52 –5 mandate and deployment, 55 –6 structure, 56– 61 United Nations and African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Pre-deployment course, KAIPTC, 161 –2 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 174 United Nations peacekeeping, post-Cold War, 40– 1 United Nations Security and Support Strategy (UNSSS), 46 United Nations Senior Mission Leaders course, IPSTC, 129 United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Congo (MONUC/MONUSCO), 41–52 1999 – 2002, 44 –5 2003 – 2009, 45 2010 – present, 45– 7 activities, 49 –52 background, 41 –4 structure, 47– 9, 48 fig.2.1

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Van de Walle, Nicholas, 9– 10

West African Frontier Force (WAFF), 35 West African Peacebuilding Institute (WAPI), KAIPTC, 162 Williams, Paul D., 20 women’s rights, 142 writing boards, 115, 211

Wade, Abdoulaye, 22 Walton, Oliver, 189 weapons, 60

Zaire (now DRC), 41– 3 Zenawi, Meles, 22 Zimmer, Don, 140

United States, and Somalia, 61, 62 United States, funding by, 88, 97, 112, 137, 206