EU foreign and security policy in Bosnia: The politics of coherence and effectiveness 9781526102416

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Europeinchange

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EU foreign and security policy in Bosnia

The politics of coherence and effectiveness

✭

ANA E. JUNCOS

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EU foreign and security policy in bosnia

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EUROPE in change

SERIES EDITORS :

THOMAS CHRISTIANSEN

AND

EMIL KIRCHNER

The European Union and the accommodation of Basque difference in Spain ANGELA K . BOURNE From integration to integrity: administrative ethics and reform in the European Commission

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MICHELLE CINI

The transatlantic divide OSVALDO CROCI AND AMY VERDUN Germany, pacifism and peace enforcement ANJA DALGAARD - NIELSEN The changing European Commission DIONYSSIS DIMITRAKOPOULOS ( ED .) Supranational citizenship LYNN DOBSON Reshaping Economic and Monetary Union SHAWN DONNELLY The time of European governance MAGNUS EKENGREN Adapting to European integration? Kaliningrad, Russia and the European Union STEFAN GÄNZLE , GUIDO MÜNTEL , EVGENY VINOKUROV ( EDS ) An introduction to post-Communist Bulgaria EMIL GIATZIDIS Non-state actors in international relations: the case of Germany ANNE - MARIE LE GLOANNEC Globalisation, integration and the future of European welfare states THEODORA ISMENE - GIZELIS Habermas and European integration: social and cultural modernity beyond the nation-state SHIVDEEP GREWAL

Mothering the Union ROBERTA GUERRINA European internal security: towards supranational governance in the area of freedom, security and justice CHRISTIAN KAUNERT Turkey: facing a new millennium AMIKAM NACHMANI Europolis: constitutional patriotism beyond the nation state PATRIZIA NANZ The EU and its neighbours: values versus security in European foreign policy GEORGANA NOUTCHEVA , KAROLINA POMORSKA AND GISELLE BOSSE ( EDS ) The changing faces of federalism SERGIO ORTINO , MITJA Zˇ AGAR AND VOJTECH MASTNY ( EDS ) A political sociology of the European Union: reassessing constructivism MICHEL MANGENOT AND JAY ROWELL ( EDS ) The activation of citizenship in Europe THOMAS PFISTER Democratising capitalism? The political economy of post-Communist transformations in Romania, 1989–2001 LILIANA POP Europe and civil society: movement coalitions and European governance CARLO RUZZA Constructing the path to eastern enlargement ULRICH SEDELMEIER The European Union and industrial relations: new procedures, new context STIJN SMISMANS ( ED .) Governing Europe’s new neighbourhood: partners or periphery? MICHAEL SMITH , KATJA WEBER , AND MICHAEL BAUN ( EDS ) Two tiers or two speeds? The European security order and the enlargement of the European Union and NATO JAMES SPERLING ( ED .) Recasting the European order JAMES SPERLING AND EMIL KIRCHNER The Europeanisation of conflict resolution: regional integration and conflicts in Europe from the 1950s to the twenty-first century BOYKA STEFANOVA Political symbolism and European integration TOBIAS THEILER Rethinking European Union foreign policy BEN TONRA AND THOMAS CHRISTIANSEN ( EDS ) The Europeanisation of the western Balkans: EU justice and home affairs in Croatia and Macedonia FLORIAN TRAUNER The European Union in the wake of Eastern enlargement AMY VERDUN AND OSVALDO CROCI ( EDS ) Democratic citizenship and the European Union ALBERT WEALE Inclusion, exclusion and the governance of European security MARK WEBBER

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Ana E.Juncos

eu foreign and security policy in bosnia The politics of coherence and effectiveness

MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS Manchester and New York distributed in the United States exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan

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Copyright © Ana E. Juncos 2013 The right of Ana E. Juncos to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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Published by Manchester University Press Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9NR, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk Distributed in the United States exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA Distributed in Canada exclusively by UBC Press, University of British Columbia, 2029 West Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for

ISBN

978 0 7190 8240 5 hardback

First published 2013 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Typeset by Action Publishing Technology Ltd, Gloucester

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To my parents, for their love and support

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CONTENTS

List of tables, figures and boxes Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

page viii ix xi

1

Introduction

1

2

The institutionalisation of EU foreign and security policy

21

3

The politics of coherence and effectiveness

42

4

The ‘hour of Europe’? Struggling for peace in the Balkans

64

5

The EU’s intervention in the aftermath of the war

94

6

CSDP in Bosnia: from stabilisation to integration

125

7

Conclusion

163

Appendix Bibliography Index

178 181 199

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TABLES ,

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FIGURES AND BOXES

Tables 5.1 EC assistance to Bosnia, 1991–2003 6.1 EU civilian and military crisis management operations, 1991–2012

Figures 1.1 Number of EU declarations and CFSP decisions on Bosnia, 1993–2010 2.1 CFSP/CSDP institutional structures pre-Lisbon 2.2 CFSP/CSDP institutional structures post-Lisbon 6.1 Use of Bonn powers, 1997–2010 6.2 EUFOR chain of command

Boxes 1.1 Timeline: EU–Bosnia relations 1.2 Instruments/initiatives deployed in Bosnia in the framework of EPC/CFSP 3.1 Categories of coherence

page 97 127

9 29 32 135 154

6 8 47

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book has its origins in a PhD thesis which I completed in 2007. Back then, I was puzzled by the failure of the EU to deal with one of the worst conflicts in post-Cold War Europe. This book is my attempt to make sense of the EU’s intervention in Bosnia for more than two decades and to explain how it has not only contributed to the stabilisation of the country, but also shaped EU foreign policy along the way. I am indebted to the following people and institutions for making this research possible. Sincere thanks go to all the EU officials and national policymakers who gave generously and patiently of their time to speak to me and to share their experiences. This book has benefited enormously from these interviews. My gratitude goes also to the Department of Politics, History and International Relations at Loughborough University, for their financial and academic support and to the people there who facilitated my stay and provided me with various kinds of assistance and with an intellectually stimulating research environment. My gratitude goes foremost to my PhD supervisor Mark Webber for his constant support and encouragement and for his valuable advice. Special thanks go to Dave Allen, Helen Drake, Mike Smith and Monica Threfall for all their help and encouragement during those years. I am also grateful to my external examiner Michael E. Smith for his valuable comments and support. During the completion of my PhD I also had the opportunity to meet exceptional people. Among them, I would like to mention, in particular, Karolina Pomorska, Asimina Michailidou and Borja Garcia. Thank you so much for your helpful insights and friendship. I owe a special debt of gratitude to the foundations Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (Sweden), Compagnia di San Paolo (Italy) and VolkswagenStiftung (Germany) which funded the last stages of my PhD through their European Foreign and Security Policy Studies Programme. A special mention goes to the institutions that warmly welcomed me during my fieldwork: the Center for Security Studies (Sarajevo), the Croatian Institute for International Relations and the Centre for International Crisis and Conflict Studies (Université Catholique de Louvain). The Department of European Studies and Modern Languages at the University of Bath was also a welcoming place during my post-doctoral fellowship. I would like to thank Richard Whitman in particular for his invaluable support and advice. Finally, the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at the University of Bristol has been more than a home to me during the last few years, coincid-

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Acknowldgements

ing with the last stages of the writing up of this book. Special thanks go to all my colleagues at Bristol for their support and encouragement. I am also grateful to the editors of the ‘Europe in Change’ Series, the two anonymous reviewers who provided invaluable comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript and to the Manchester University Press editorial team for their able guidance in putting together this book. This book is dedicated to my parents. Without their love and support, it would have never seen the light of day. Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Alex Prichard, for reading successive drafts of this book and for his love, patience and encouragement throughout.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CIVCOM Committee on the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management CJTF Combined Joint Task Force COWEB Western Balkans Working Group Coreper Committee of Permanent Representatives CMPD Crisis Management and Planning Directorate CPCC Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy DG Directorate-General EC European Community ECMM/EUMM European Community/European Union Monitoring Mission EEAS European External Action Service EPC European Political Cooperation ESDI European Security and Defence Identity ESDP European Security and Defence Policy EUAM European Union Administration of Mostar EUFOR European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina EUMC European Union Military Committee EUMS European Union Military Staff EUPM European Union Police Mission EUSR European Union Special Representative FAC Foreign Affairs Council GAC General Affairs Council GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council ICFY International Conference on former Yugoslavia ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia IFOR Implementation Force IPTF International Police Task Force IPU Integrated Police Unit JNA Yugoslav National Army MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation OHR Office of the High Representative in Bosnia OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PfP Partnership for Peace

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xii PIC PoCo PSC QMV SAA SAP SEA SFOR SITCEN TEU UN UNPROFOR UNSC UNSCR WEU

Abbreviations Peace Implementation Council Political Committee Political and Security Committee Qualified Majority Voting Stabilisation and Association Agreement Stabilisation and Association Process Single European Act Stabilisation Force Joint Situation Centre Treaty on European Union United Nations United Nations Protection Force United Nations Security Council United Nations Security Council Resolution Western European Union

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Introduction

From the beginning of the 1990s, when the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia brought war back to the European continent, the development of the EU’s foreign and security policy has remained inextricably linked to the fortunes of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia). In June 1991, just days before the war in Slovenia broke out, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos famously proclaimed that the ‘hour of Europe’ had come and that the European Community (EC) could and would handle this crisis on its own.1 This rhetoric was not, however, matched by decisive EC intervention in the former Yugoslavia and many voices were raised to condemn the paralysis of the nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The conflict that erupted in Bosnia became a baptism by fire for the embryonic EU’s foreign and security policy (Ginsberg, 2001) and, for many years, the failure to deal with a military crisis in its own backyard became a bête noire for the EU and its ambitions to play a major role worldwide. Much has changed since then. In response to these criticisms, the European Union (EU) underwent changes in its external action by both enhancing the CFSP – including its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)2 – and boosting its economic presence on the world stage through its trade and development policies. In the event, the EU’s intervention in Bosnia, and in the Balkans more generally, resulted in a transformation of its identity from that of a civilian power, to use Duchêne’s concept (1972), to one of a more muscular and multidimensional international actor making use of a comprehensive range of economic, political and military instruments in order to promote its values and objectives (European Council, 2003b). Despite the fact that more than two decades have lapsed since the beginning of the war in Bosnia, in 2012 the political situation in the country remains fragile and the EU’s engagement is more needed than ever. Should Bosnia recede into conflict again, painful questions would have to be asked about the EU’s ability to act outside its borders, and in particular, in the realm of foreign and security policy. If the EU cannot deal with ethnic conflict in a small country in its own backyard, how can it claim to be a world player? Similarly, if the EU cannot exercise its influence in this case – where it holds out the promise of future EU membership – how can we expect it to have an impact further afield, in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, North Africa or the

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Middle East? If EU member states cannot formulate a common position and act in unison in Bosnia, how can we expect the EU to present a common front regarding other complex international issues? Policy failures such as the Libya crisis in 2011 are a constant reminder of the gap between the rhetoric of the EU as a security actor and its ability to shape international conflicts. To date there are no scholarly analyses of the important role that the EU has played in Bosnia since the 1990s, nor of the implications of EU foreign policy in Bosnia both for the stabilisation of the Balkans and for the development of the EU as a global security actor. Although there are an increasing number of works that analyse the role of the EU in conflict resolution (Coppieters, 2004; Tocci, 2007; Diez et al., 2008), the case of the EU’s intervention in Bosnia has not received sufficient attention. By contrast, those studies that have paid attention to the EU’s role in Bosnia and, more generally, in the Western Balkans, have focused on the role of conditionality and enlargement, rather than on the CFSP proper (Domm, 2007; Noutcheva, 2009). Hence, taking a long view from 1991 to date, this book seeks to fill this gap in the literature and to provide a comprehensive analysis of EU foreign and security policy in Bosnia, using coherence and effectiveness as its main conceptual tools. There is indeed a significant literature that describes and analyses the performance of the EU in world politics (Galtung, 1973; Sjostedt, 1977; Allen and Smith, 1990, 1998; Hill, 1990, 1993; Piening, 1997; Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; Ginsberg, 2001), utilising a whole range of concepts to capture the substance of the EU’s external activities. These include ‘presence’ (Allen and Smith, 1990), ‘actorness’ (Sjostedt, 1977), ‘impact’ (Ginsberg, 2001) and ‘international identity’ (Whitman, 1998). In particular, scholars have sought to determine ‘what kind of power’ the EU exercises in world affairs, describing the EU as a ‘civilian power’ (Duchêne, 1972, 1973), ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002) or ‘superpower’ (Galtung, 1973). Christopher Hill (1993), for example, has coined the concept of ‘capability–expectations gap’ to refer to the difficulties of the EU’s foreign policy in responding to internal and external demands and expectations (Hill, 1998: 20–33). In Hill’s words, this capability–expectations gap ‘was seen as the significant difference which had come about between the myriad hopes for and demands of the EU as an international actor, and its relatively limited ability to deliver’ (Hill, 1998: 23). With the improvement of foreign and security capabilities undertaken in subsequent Treaty reforms, observers have argued that the concept of a ‘consensus–expectations gap’ can better encapsulate the difficulties surrounding the formulation of a successful foreign policy. From this perspective, Europe’s foreign policy problems stem from a ‘lack of cohesiveness, the capacity to make assertive collective decisions and stick to them’ (Toje, 2008: 122). While these are important contributions in their own right, they do not tell us much about how successful EU foreign policy has actually been, in

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particular in relation to its coherence and effectiveness. This is an important lacuna because problems of coherence and effectiveness have been singled out in political and academic debates as undermining the EU’s aspirations to become a global security actor. For instance, the CFSP has been described, inter alia, as a ‘failure’, a ‘misnomer’, in a ‘state of paralysis’, ‘uncommon’, ‘incoherent’ and ‘ineffective’ (see European Commission, 1995; European Parliament, 1996; Gordon, 1997/1998; Peterson and Sjursen, 1998; Zielonka, 1998a, 1998b). Hence, in this book, I seek to contribute to these debates by exploring how coherent and effective the CFSP/CSDP has been over time. The key questions that this work seeks to address are: to what extent has the EU been able to speak with one voice in the case of Bosnia, or, what degree of coherence has it achieved? And, to what extent has the EU been able to achieve the objectives of its external action in the case of Bosnia, or, how effective has it been? Any such endeavour should start with a clear conceptual framework. In order to avoid inaccurate judgements about CFSP failure/success and the snapshot analyses that have dominated in the literature to date, in this book, coherence and effectiveness are considered in terms of degree. Moreover, by distinguishing different dimensions and categories of coherence and effectiveness, one can better account for the multifaceted reality of these concepts. More importantly, the analysis set out in this book will show that these two concepts are intrinsically political and that assessments depend on who sets the criteria, when and for whom, as well as on implicit assumptions about the EU’s finalité politique. I will return to these issues in Chapter 3. This book is not only concerned with how well the CFSP works, but also about why it either fails or succeeds. The explanatory framework of this analysis is informed by the theoretical insights of historical institutionalism. I examine the development of CFSP institutions over time as well as the ability of those institutions to deliver a coherent and effective foreign and security policy. This focus on the impact of institutionalisation processes on policy outcomes promises to contribute to both the extant institutionalist literature and scholarship on the CFSP/CSDP (Menon, 2011a). In particular, the book addresses the following questions: Do institutions matter? Has the institutionalisation of the CFSP, i.e. the development of foreign policy institutions at the EU level, increased the EU’s effectiveness and coherence in Bosnia? Or have we reached the limits of institutions? Based on the empirical evidence provided by the case of Bosnia, I make three interrelated claims. First, that institutions have had a crucial impact on levels of coherence and effectiveness over time.3 Second, that contrary to rationalist assumptions about the purported efficiency of institutions, the increasing CFSP institutionalisation has not done away with problems of coherence and effectiveness and in some cases it has raised new ones. Unintended consequences, path dependency and obstacles to the institutionalisation of learning can be blamed in this regard. Third, I also argue that

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intergovernmental, bureaucratic and local political contestation have played a key role in the formulation and implementation of a European foreign and security policy. In sum, by examining the coherence and effectiveness of the EU’s intervention in Bosnia, this book contributes to the assessment of post-conflict stabilisation and resolution in Bosnia as well as the complex and changing nature of EU foreign and security policy. More specifically, the book defends the position that the EU’s involvement in Bosnia has not only had a significant impact on this Balkan country in its path from stabilisation to integration, but has also transformed the EU and its foreign and security policy, and shaped the development of the EU’s international identity along the way. The remainder of this chapter provides a brief overview of the conflict in Bosnia and the EU’s role to date. It then introduces the theoretical framework that will guide the analysis of CFSP activities in Bosnia. It is argued that a focus on institutions and political conflict can help us better understand the development of EU foreign and security policy in the past two decades and, in particular, the vexed issues of coherence and effectiveness.

The war in Bosnia: the darkest ‘hour of Europe’

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia not only brought back memories of the brutality and destruction of the Second World War to Europe, but it also challenged established international principles, in particular, those of state sovereignty and non-intervention. Intervention in Bosnia was particularly problematic because of the intra-state dimension of the war, which constituted a departure from the Westphalian principle of non-intervention. The conflicts in the Balkans also contributed to the post-Cold War transformation of the European security architecture, confirming the demise of some organisations such as the Western European Union (WEU), the transformation of other institutions – NATO and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) – and the rise of new ones (the EU). At the time, the response of the Western powers and institutions to the conflict in Yugoslavia was considered by many to have been ‘too little, too late’ (Woodward, 1995: 147; Buchan, 1993) and the ‘greatest collective failure’ (Holbrooke, 1998: 21). In a context of international re-alignment following the end of the Cold War, the international community, and in particular, European and American powers, failed to react in time to the events in Yugoslavia. These were especially turbulent times in the EC, where negotiations on a new treaty were in full swing. At the two parallel intergovernmental conferences opening in December 1990, the member states sought to negotiate a monetary union and a political union to better deal with some of the challenges brought about by the end of the Cold War. For its part, the US, trying to find its own place in the international arena and with its

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attention turned to the events in Iraq and the Soviet Union, was keen to hand the baton to the EC leaders. Some American policy-makers considered that the time had arrived for the Europeans to assume their responsibility in upholding security on the continent (Almond, 1994: 236). American and European policy-makers thus took no notice of the worrying signs that were coming from the Yugoslav Federation or were simply preoccupied with events elsewhere.4 Among these signs one could mention the rise of Slobodan Miloševi´c to power and his nationalist policies, including the abolition of the autonomy of the Vojvodina and Kosovo; the economic crisis and the tensions between the wealthier republics of Slovenia and Croatia, and the federal government; and the progressive weakening of the federal institutions, under increasing Serbian control (Biermann, 2004). The dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation had devastating consequences for the multi-ethnic republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Until then, the three main ethnic groups, Bosniaks (or Bosnian Muslims), Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats had peacefully coexisted under the federal structures of Tito’s communist Yugoslavia. When Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence, tensions arose over the future of the republic, with Bosnian Serbs determined to stay within the Yugoslav Federation while maintaining their formal links to Belgrade, and with Bosniaks and Croats strongly in favour of declaring the independence of the country. A referendum on independence was held on 29 February and 1 March 1992. An overwhelming majority of Muslims and Croats voted yes (99.7 per cent); by contrast, the Serbs boycotted the referendum en masse. The EC recognised Bosnia a month later, after some hesitations among the member states and under pressure from the US. What would follow was one of the most violent European conflicts of the post-Cold War period, with more than 100,000 people killed and the creation of over two million refugees and internally displaced persons. For most of the duration of the war, European and American policymakers disagreed about the best way to deal with the war in Bosnia. After active engagement during the early stages of the conflict under the umbrella of the EC (see Box 1.1), European countries supported UN efforts to achieve a peace agreement among the parties in the context of the International Conference on former Yugoslavia (ICFY) launched in September 1992 in Geneva. However, both the Vance-Owen and the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plans were rejected by the conflict parties. European countries also remained the main troop contributors to the UN peacekeeping mission, UNPROFOR. This caused tensions with the US who advocated a policy of ‘lift and strike’, meaning the lifting of the UN arms embargo imposed on the Yugoslav republics (which was seen as maintaining the military supremacy of the Bosnian Serb Army), along with the threat of NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. European countries, and in particular, the UK and France, rejected such a policy arguing that it would endanger their troops on the ground.

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Box 1.1 Timeline: EU–Bosnia relations • 25 June 1991: Slovenia and Croatia declare independence. Slovenia’s Ten Days War begins. • July 1991: EC-mediated Brioni Agreement is signed. Deployment of the EC Monitoring Mission in Slovenia. • September-December 1991: Croatian war. EC Peace Conference opens in September. Carrington Peace Plan rejected by Serbia. • March 1992: Bosnia’s referendum on independence. The country declares its independence on 3 March. • April 1992: EC member states recognise Bosnia. Bosnian War starts. • January 1993: Vance–Owen Peace Plan. • July 1993: Owen–Stoltenberg Peace Plan. • March 1994: Washington Agreement establishes the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. • July 1994: The EU Administration of Mostar commences its operations. • July 1995: Srebrenica massacre. • August 1995: NATO strikes against Republika Srpska’s army. • December 1995: Dayton Peace Agreement signed in Paris. EU launches the Royaumont Process. • April 1997: Council of the EU adopts the Regional Approach for the Western Balkan countries. • 1999: Stability Pact and Stabilisation and Association Process launched. • June 2000: Feira European Council endorses Bosnia’s status of ‘potential candidate’ and the prospect of EU membership. • January 2002: Paddy Ashdown appointed as first EU Special Representative/High Representative in Bosnia. • January 2003: European Union Police Mission launched. • June 2003: Thessaloniki European Council confirms membership perspective for Bosnia. • December 2004: EU military force (EUFOR Althea) deployed to replace NATO’s SFOR mission. • 2005: Negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and Bosnia begin. • December 2006: Bosnia joins NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. • April 2008: Bosnian parliament approves police reform plan. • June 2008: SAA signed between EU and Bosnia. • November 2010: Visa liberalisation agreed for Bosnia. • July 2011: Peter Sørensen appointed as Head of Delegation and EU Special Representative in Bosnia.

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In 1994, the Contact Group, consisting of the US, Russia, the UK, France and Germany, was established, taking the lead in the peace negotiations. That year also saw the signing of the Washington Agreement between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats establishing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the summer of 1995, following the massacre at Srebrenica and the shelling of Sarajevo’s marketplace, NATO launched air strikes on Bosnian Serb military positions. NATO’s response and changes in the military balance on the ground forced the parties to negotiate a peace agreement. The General Framework Agreement for Peace, which put an end to the Bosnian War, was agreed at the US air base in Dayton in autumn 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. To support the implementation of what came to be known as the ‘Dayton Agreement’, the peace plan foresaw the deployment of a 60,000-strong military force, the Implementation Force (IFOR), and the establishment of an international civilian representative, the High Representative. At the Peace Implementation Conference held in London in December 1995, a Peace Implementation Council (PIC), comprising fifty-five states and international organisations, was established in order to support the peace process in Bosnia. It was also decided to establish an executive body, the Steering Board, to provide the High Representative with political guidance in his/her mission. Later, and due to increasing obstruction from the local parties, the PIC Conference in Bonn in December 1997 strengthened the mandate of the High Representative by granting him the power of removing from office public officials who failed to comply with the Dayton Agreement, and of imposing laws when Bosnian legislative bodies failed to do so – the so-called ‘Bonn powers’. Although the Dayton Peace Agreement ended the war, it did so by sanctioning the ethnic cleansing that had taken place during the war, with the creation of two ethnically based ‘entities’: the Serbian majority Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dayton was conceived as the lesser evil, with the hope that one day it would serve to overcome the actual partition on the ground. Bosnian Serbs (and to a certain extent, Croats) agreed to Dayton because of the high degree of decentralisation offered by the plan, which effectively recognised a state (the Republika Srpska) within another state, plus the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The international community hoped that nationalist politics would progressively fade away and that a more ‘Western-style’ party system would develop to replace them. However, more than fifteen years later, ethnic politics still dominate political life in Bosnia. Another consequence of the Dayton Agreement was the establishment of a highly decentralised (and dysfunctional) state, based on the principles of power-sharing. According to this consociational model, each ethnic group is represented within the legislative and executive institutions at the state level and retains a veto power. Although this model ensures peace in the short

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term, it makes functional governance very difficult as any ethnic group can oppose decisions that threaten their vital interests. Only continued intervention by the international community, supported by a strong military force and the High Representative, has brought about some institutional reforms in a context of domestic political impasse. Since the end of the war, some progress has been made with the establishment of a common currency and a central bank, a common customs system, a state border agency, the reform of the judiciary, intelligence and defence, and the establishment of several other state institutions. However, these reforms have been a time-consuming process and the result of strong international pressure, and have come at the price of reducing local ownership and responsibility. After years of marginalisation, the launch of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) in 2000 inaugurated a phase of intensive engagement by the EU in Bosnia. The stated end goal, endorsed by the European Council in Thessaloniki in June 2003, was to integrate the Balkan region into the mainstream Euro-Atlantic organisations. The prospect of future membership for the Western Balkans constituted a crucial shift in the EU’s strategy in Bosnia (see Chapter 5). After years of economic assistance and weak conditionality, the EU acknowledged for the first time that the ‘future of the Balkans is within the European Union’ (European Union, 2003). However, despite significant financial and technical assistance, progress towards membership has remained limited to say the least. The Bosnian state remains fragile and contested notwithstanding the EU’s strategic focus on institutionbuilding.

Box 1.2 Instruments/initiatives deployed in Bosnia in the framework of EPC/CFSP • • • • • • • • •

EC/EU Monitoring Mission (1991–2007) EC Peace Conference (1991–92) Economic sanctions and arms embargoes (1991–1998) EC/EU envoys (Lord Carrington, Lord Owen, Carl Bildt) (1991–95) EU Administration in Mostar (1994–96) Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe (1999–2008) EU Special Representative in Bosnia (2002–) EU Police Mission (2003–12) EU Military Force Althea (2004–)

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9 19 6 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 0 20 5 06 20 07 20 08 20 0 20 9 10

95

19

19

93

19

94

Bosnia was also where the EU first tried to introduce a comprehensive approach towards conflict management in line with the European Security Strategy (see European Council, 2004). Throughout this time, the EU has deployed the full spectrum of instruments at its disposal, including political tools like conflict mediation, sanctions and crisis management instruments, in the process becoming a key security actor in the country (see Box 1.2). Moreover, the EU has now assumed a position of leadership in Bosnia, taking over from the UN and NATO operations in the country, symbolising the Europeanisation of both the agenda and the external presence in the country. As Figure 1.1 shows, EU declarations and CFSP decisions in relation to Bosnia have also experienced several peaks: at the end of the war (1995–96); between 2003 and 2005 with the launch of the first CSDP missions; and in 2007, as a response to the political crisis in the country and the implementation of CSDP operations (renewal of mandates, appointments of Heads of Mission and Force Commander, etc.). In sum, the EU’s engagement in Bosnia can be considered as one of the most distinctive and dynamic features of its emerging foreign and security policies. If in the early 1990s the crisis in Bosnia constituted one of the main challenges for the recently established CFSP, nowadays it has become a testbed for new CSDP developments and continues to be a major focus of

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Figure 1.1 Number of EU declarations and CFSP decisions on Bosnia, 1993–2010 Note: The table also includes decisions targeting the whole of the Western Balkan region such as the EUMM, the Stability Pact and measures in support of the ICTY. From 1 December 2009, common positions and joint actions were replaced with decisions. Source: Council of the EU website, available at www.consilium.europa.eu/ (accessed 1 October 2011).

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attention for policy-makers in Brussels. Thus, after more than twenty years of indirect and direct engagement in the country, it is time to take stock of CFSP activities and to assess how successful the EU has been in promoting its objectives and in contributing to conflict resolution in the country. This is the central aim of this book. The period analysed in this book (1991–2011) covers different phases of the conflict in the Balkans, from open war to post-conflict stabilisation, and towards closer integration with the EU; but it also analyses the evolution of EU foreign policy from the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 to later developments such as the addition of the CSDP and the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. In the book, I investigate the EU’s involvement during the war, but also the range of CFSP tools and instruments deployed after the war to help post-conflict reconstruction and those used more recently by the Union to lead this fragmented country from stabilisation to integration (see Box 1.2). In order to do so, I will examine nine CFSP initiatives undertaken between 1991 and 2011: the EC Monitoring Mission (ECMM), the EC Peace Conference, the non-decision on military intervention during the war, the EU Administration of Mostar (EUAM), the non-decision on military intervention in 1996–98, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, the EU Special Representative (EUSR), the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and EUFOR Althea. This should allow us to determine whether coherence and effectiveness have increased over time and to determine what factors have influenced those levels of coherence and effectiveness. In sum, in this book I seek to contribute to a better understanding of the substance and nature of the EU’s intervention in Bosnia and its potential to contribute to conflict resolution in the country, but also its limitations. What is more, the analysis considers not only the EU’s impact on Bosnia, but also how learning from this intervention has shaped and transformed the EU itself, and in particular, its foreign and security policy. The following section develops the theoretical underpinnings of this argument.

A historical institutionalist approach to EU foreign and security policy

There is a broad agreement that the EU’s intervention in Bosnia has become both a test of the EU’s foreign policy and also a testing ground for the development of this policy, particularly its civilian and crisis management operations. However, how this came about and the precise factors that led to this being the case have not been fully described in the literature, let alone explained. With this objective in mind, I draw on institutionalist theories to better disentangle EU foreign institutions and processes, and more importantly, their impact on the policy outcome (i.e. its coherence and effectiveness). Hence, this book moves ‘beyond establishing the existence of [European foreign policy] to assessing its outcomes’ and contributes to a

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narrowing of the theoretical capability-expectation gap in this area of the literature (Ginsberg: 1999: 429). Most of the institutionalist research on the CFSP/CSDP to date has concentrated on the emergence and institutional configuration of this policy on the one hand, and the performance of the EU foreign policy in specific cases on the other. However, few studies have examined the two-way relationship between institutional change and policy output.5 Moreover, a common assumption among policy-makers and academics alike is that an increasing degree of institutionalisation, symbolised by the establishment of new bureaucratic organisations and new procedures in EU Treaties, should lead to an improvement of the EU’s ability to achieve its goals on the ground in an effective and coherent manner, and in particular, in the area of crisis management and conflict resolution. In the same vein, the response to every failure of the EU to deal with external crises has been to increase the levels of institutionalisation. Institutional reform has thus become an antidote to problems of coherence and effectiveness. Hence the oft-cited problem of ‘procedure as a substitute for policy’ (Allen and Wallace, 1977) or what Nicolaïdis (2010: 25) has termed ‘an addiction to institutional reform’ in EU circles. It is thus essential to unpack these implicit and explicit assumptions to determine the impact of institutions on levels of coherence and effectiveness. The objective of this book is thus to determine whether or not a correlation between greater levels of institutionalisation and greater levels of effectiveness and coherence can be established. For the purposes of this book, institutionalisation is defined as the process whereby CFSP institutions (formal rules and informal norms) are created and developed. Although one needs to distinguish between institutions as the ‘rules of the game’ and bureaucratic organisations as the ‘players’ in the game (North, 1990), the creation and development of bureaucratic organisations will be used in Chapter 2 as an indicator of institutionalisation, together with formal decision-making rules and informal norms. In the CFSP area, formal rules laid out in the Treaties constitute actors (i.e. create new bureaucratic organisations such as the High Representative, the Policy Unit, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), etc); they also regulate their behaviours (what they can and cannot do); and deal with procedural matters such as the voting system. Informal norms such as consensus-building or the ‘coordination reflex’ also regulate actors’ behaviours within CFSP committees, but might also have constitutive effects in the long term, i.e. norms become internalised, acquiring a taken-for-granted quality. Although it has been claimed that CFSP institutionalisation helped promote greater levels of cooperation among the member states (Smith, 2004), thus far no study has looked at how institutionalisation can affect CFSP effectiveness and coherence. Among EU policy-makers, few have questioned the implicit assumption that institutionalisation increases coherence

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and effectiveness. In fact, a prevalent view has been that CFSP institutionalisation has improved the EU’s performance in world politics. According to 92.9 per cent of respondents to an online survey, CFSP coherence and effectiveness has increased since 1991. In this respect, several respondents pointed to the creation of several bureaucratic organisations such as the PSC, the High Representative and the EUSRs, as well as the development of the CSDP, as factors increasing coherence and effectiveness. 60.7 per cent of respondents considered the establishment of the High Representative and the PSC to be a positive step and 57.1 per cent thought the same about the Policy Unit. Similarly, changes in procedural rules were perceived to have improved the performance of the CFSP, although to a lesser extent.6 So, is this ‘institutionalisation = coherence and effectiveness’ assumption truly valid? An answer to this question requires a closer look at the literature, and in particular, institutionalist studies. According to rational choice institutionalism, institutions are consciously created in order to facilitate signalling and cooperation (Tsebelis, 1994; Garret, 1995; Pollack, 1997). From this perspective, institutionalisation processes can have a positive impact, increasing coherence and effectiveness (Young, 1992; Wagner, 2003; Heider, 2009). In other words, institutions ‘emerge as good things, and it is their goodness that ultimately explains them’ (Moe, 2005: 216). Institutions also provide actors with information and enforcement mechanisms that reduce uncertainty about the environment and the behaviour of others as well as transaction costs. In so doing, institutions affect individuals’ utility calculations and help overcome collective action problems (Keohane et al., 1993; Martin and Simmons, 1998; Ruggie, 1998). In this vein, one could argue that the establishment of permanent organisations based in Brussels such as the Council Secretariat or the Council working groups aimed at reducing transaction costs. If defection and cheating are problems, then the establishment of rules that constrain state behaviour and make defection less attractive should help increase opportunities for cooperation – this argument is also endorsed by liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993). In the CFSP area, there are no enforcement mechanisms – however, the Treaties refer to the member states’ political obligation to ‘support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and . . . comply with the Union’s action in this area’ (article 24, TEU Lisbon). Institutions provide information about governments’ intentions thereby reducing uncertainty and making policies more predictable. For instance, the role of CFSP counsellors and the CORTESY communication network,7 as well as committee meetings in Brussels, serve this function. Finally, iterative interactions within an institutional framework (e.g. within the Council of the EU or CFSP/CSDP committees) increase the transparency and credibility of commitments and facilitate issue-linkages (Martin, 1992). Other effects of institutions that can increase policy effectiveness are the reduction in reaction

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times and the containment of strong members through formal rules such as qualified majority voting (QMV) (Heider, 2009). In sum, from this perspective, one should expect increasing coherence and effectiveness as a result of increasing institutionalisation in this field. By contrast, from a historical institutionalist perspective, there are two key reasons why higher institutionalisation might not result in increasing coherence and effectiveness. First, because of bounded rationality (March and Simon, 1964), one might expect the occurrence of unintended consequences. Actors do not have access to complete information and cannot foresee all the consequences of their actions when designing institutions. Individuals are not ‘perfect statisticians’ and can make errors when drawing inferences from their experiences (Levitt and March, 1988: 323). Pierson (1996) also explains unexpected consequences as a result of the complexity at the European level and the fact that sometimes politicians do not take into account the long-term effects of their decisions. Another source of unintended consequences might result from the delegation of powers to supranational institutions (Pollack, 1997). Because of the limited cognitive capabilities and time horizons of their designers, once established, supranational organisations take on a life of their own and produce unintended consequences. Principal–agent analyses have also shown how bureaucratic organisations such as the Commission or the European Court of Justice can act autonomously and perform their tasks in a way unforeseen by the member states or even expand their competences beyond the role originally assigned to them (Pollack, 1997; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001). The second reason why institutions might develop in unintended ways is path dependency and institutional legacies: institutions are never created from ‘scratch’ as rationalist analyses suggest, but build upon previous institutional settings. To explain inefficient institutions, one has to go back to explain the interests and context at the outset as well as their subsequent evolution. Rationalist analyses that take political interactions as a ‘one-shot interaction’ miss this point, as well as the fact that historical development can trap actors in concrete dynamics. This means that not only does history matter, but what also matters is the particular sequence of events. External forces will not have the same result in every period; previous political outcomes will determine the impact of current external forces and then a specific historical development or ‘path’ (Pierson, 2000: 251). In other words, ‘choices made at a particular moment eliminate a whole range of possibilities from later choices while serving as the very condition of existence of others’ (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 955; Wight, 2006). Path-dependent processes affect the creation of new institutions, since they are not created in a vacuum, there is no tabula rasa. The existence of these institutional legacies will favour some decisions and exclude others, eventually, shaping the political outcome. Path dependency also implies that particular courses of action, once introduced, can be difficult to reverse. Institutions are ‘sticky’ or resistant to

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change (Pierson, 1996; Pollack, 2004). What is more, path dependency is selfreinforcing in the sense that steps in one direction induce more steps in the same direction (Pierson, 2000: 252). The resulting situation would be one of institutional inertia and lock-ins. Although from a historical institutionalist perspective, institutions are seen more as constraining than enabling actors, emphasising the enduring effects of past policy choices and institutional continuity (Peters et al., 2005; Steinmo 2008), historical institutionalism can still accommodate change and a role for agency in the form of critical junctures, learning and political conflict. The concept of critical juncture evokes the ‘branching tree’ metaphor, moments when a new ‘branching point’ is opened from which institutional development moves onto a new path (Hall and Taylor, 1996) or ‘moments when the freedom of political actors and impact of their decisions is heightened’ (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 343). As the latter suggest, critical junctures still allow for agency and choice to play a role. It is at this time of uncertainty that actors can play a larger part than in normal circumstances. In EU foreign policy, critical junctures often occur as a consequence of external events (economic crises or military conflicts) or internal ones (for example, a new intergovernmental conference or enlargement). Actors may exploit these ‘windows of opportunity’ to introduce innovative institutional changes, producing a clear departure from previous configurations. Change can also be the result of learning. This entails the possibility of creative agency, i.e. actors are capable of learning from past experiences and new information, and are able to adapt and respond to structural pressures (Bulmer, 1998; Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001). Learning enables actors to correct some errors or unintended consequences and to introduce incremental changes. According to Jack Levy (1994: 283), learning refers to ‘a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observations and interpretation of experience’. Learning is usually regarded in positive terms as a qualitative change in beliefs that may help increase the effectiveness or efficiency of a policy. For example, actors might improve their understanding of the world, which would in turn facilitate their ability to achieve their aims (Levy, 1994: 291). I will defend the position that an ‘effectiveness criterion’ should not be included in the definition of learning. Thus, even ‘bad lessons’ can be considered as learning if they involve a change in individual beliefs as a result of interpretation of new information. A question which arises when discussing learning is under which conditions one might expect learning to occur. Some authors have argued that learning is more likely to occur when actors are in a new and/or uncertain environment (Levy, 1994; Checkel, 2001). Hence, learning is more likely in periods of crisis or structural change because, in these situations, individuals are ‘cognitively motivated to analyze new information’ (Checkel, 2001: 562). Learning is also more likely from perceived failure than from success (Haas,

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1990: 45; Levy: 1994: 305). If objectives have been achieved, actors will not be motivated to change or reassess their previous beliefs, to learn from new information or from past experience. Success often leads to continuity, not to change. Finally, learning is more likely to occur when the interactions take place in less politicised settings, such as meetings of experts or at the implementation level than when interactions take place in high-level politicised settings (like the European Council or the Council of Ministers). In less politicised settings, actors are more willing to reassess their prior beliefs when confronted with new information (Checkel, 2001). For learning to occur, there must be a change in individual beliefs as a consequence of the observation and interpretation of experience. Moreover, for learning to have an impact on policy it needs to be transferred from the individual to the organisation and become institutionalised. Organisational learning stems from previous individual learning, but it does not proceed in the same way. Organisations do not learn as individuals do. Organisational learning requires a consensus among the members of that body (either bureaucrats or national representatives from the member states) because different lessons may be drawn from the same event. In the case of negotiations among the member states in the CFSP domain, the institutionalisation of learning will be constrained by intergovernmental politics and the voting procedures as it will depend on the ability of the member states to achieve consensus under the unanimity rule. As Nye (1987: 381) has argued, ‘political power determines who learns’; in other words, learning is fundamentally a political process. Further, even in those cases where organisational learning takes place it might not lead to a policy change (i.e. it might not be institutionalised) due to a lack of resources or institutional turf battles (bureaucratic politics). In other words, learning can help to increase coherence and effectiveness, but it might be limited by the institutional constraints under which it operates, namely the turnover of personnel, institutional memory, and decentralisation (Levinthal and March, 1993) as well as intergovernmental and bureaucratic politics. Linked to the previous point is the role of politics. Although many institutionalist approaches have neglected the role of power and political conflict in the making and implementation of EU foreign policy, this need not be the case (Menon, 2011a). To paraphrase Paul Pierson (2004), a historical institutionalist approach allows us to put ‘politics in time’. First, political conflict can be seen as a factor initiating change. For instance, Peters et al. (2005) demonstrate how conflict over ideas, in particular, has played a significant role in motivating incremental change in the areas of macroeconomic policy, administrative reform, and welfare state policies. In the EU context, and more specifically the CFSP, political conflict between advocates of supranationalism and those that want to retain a more intergovernmentalist system has played a key role initiating and shaping institutional change, as we will see in Chapter 2.

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Second, political conflict remains a key explanatory factor during periods of stability or path dependency. Institutions are rarely the object of consensus; rather institutional stability and continuity often conceal political disagreement and power asymmetries, resulting in institutional winners and losers. As Thelen (1999: 385–6) pointed out, ‘the losers do not necessarily disappear, and their adaptation can mean . . . biding their time until conditions shift, or it may mean working within the existing framework in pursuit of goals different from – even subversive to – those of the institution’s designers’. This might result in further institutional change (Peters et al., 2005: 1278). Third, and linked to the previous point, institutional configurations also have an impact by empowering some actors and disempowering others. According to Thelen (1999: 394), ‘institutions are not neutral coordinating mechanisms but in fact reflect, and also reproduce and magnify, particular patterns of power distribution in politics’. Particular institutional configurations empower some actors and disempower others and this means that some institutional choices become blocked in favour of others. In sum, politics and power need to be brought back into any analysis of the development and impact of CFSP institutions. In particular, the study of CFSP coherence and effectiveness needs to take into account the impact of intergovernmental politics (among the member states), bureaucratic politics (between different institutional actors) and local politics (among political elites in Bosnia). I will return to this point in Chapter 3. In sum, this book seeks to test the institutionalisation hypothesis that ‘institutions matter’ and that they can have a positive impact on levels of coherence and effectiveness. Although this study agrees with the claim that institutions are a key variable in explaining levels of CFSP coherence and effectiveness over time, it posits that their impact might not always be as ‘rational’ and positive as one might expect. Rather, from the perspective of historical institutionalism institutions are the ‘enduring legacies of political struggles’ (Thelen, 1999: 388). By rejecting functionalism and rationalism, historical institutionalism allows us to examine the impact of institutional legacies, lock-ins and unintended consequences. Although historical institutionalism concentrates on exploring ‘how institutions matter’, it does not neglect the role of other variables such as interests and power; on the contrary, it offers the methodological tools to analyse the complex interactions between interests and institutions over time (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). As far as levels of coherence and effectiveness are concerned, one might expect institutions to improve the outcome of EU foreign policy by facilitating information-gathering and information-sharing, as well as the implementation, coordination and monitoring of EU policies. By facilitating communicative practices and socialisation processes, CFSP institutions can nurture the emergence of a common understanding and increase the convergence of member states’ interests regarding the EU’s policy towards Bosnia. However, consistent with a historical institutionalist approach, one might still

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expect unintended consequences, path dependency and political conflict to have a negative impact on levels of coherence and effectiveness. Unintended consequences might mean that even a fully implemented policy only achieves partial effectiveness as it develops in an unforeseen way. Path dependency can be expected to maintain the status quo or even reduce coherence and effectiveness. Because of the limited time of response, difficulties in achieving an agreement and the resources that have been invested in past initiatives, decisions often follow past models. This explains why CFSP decision-makers would prefer to imitate and to introduce incremental changes than to innovate. This can lead to sub-optimal institutions maintaining the status quo or even reducing levels of coherence and effectiveness. Furthermore, political conflict – in particular, intergovernmental, bureaucratic and local politics – might explain problems of coherence and ineffectiveness, as well as some of the problems related to the institutionalisation of learning. By contrast, learning from its own and from others’ experiences might become an important factor increasing coherence and effectiveness of the CFSP in the medium and long term.

Outline of the book

The remainder of the book proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 examines the process of institutionalisation that has unfolded since the establishment of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the late 1960s. Two conclusions can be deduced from this account. First, CFSP institutionalisation has increased over time as shown by the establishment and development of bureaucratic organisations, formal rules and the informal norms shared among policymakers. Second, CFSP institutionalisation has developed by default rather than design. In this regard, path dependency, unintended consequences and learning, as well as intergovernmental and bureaucratic politics, have become key driving forces behind CFSP institutionalisation. Chapter 3 provides the conceptual tools to operationalise the concepts of coherence and effectiveness. It also situates these concepts within broader political and academic debates. In particular, it draws attention to the political and contested nature of these two concepts. Coherence, it is argued, has become a buzzword in official and academic debates. What is not often acknowledged, however, are the positive and normative connotations associated with this term as a proxy for success, integration or supranationalism. As far as effectiveness is concerned, how these problems are approached depends, inter alia, on the conceptualisation of EU foreign policy and of the EU more broadly (as a state-like entity, an international organisation or sui generis), the components of the external action considered and the timeframe of the analysis. The chapter also discusses the complex but not always positive relations between coherence and effectiveness.

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The empirical evidence presented in this book is organised into three different periods: the EU’s intervention during the war; EU post-conflict activities in the run-up to the Kosovo war; and finally, CFSP/CSDP developments in Bosnia since 2002. Each chapter is in turn divided into three mini case studies or initiatives carried out by the EU during the period under examination – for instance, the EC Peace Conference in 1991–92 or the appointment of an EU Special Representative in 2002. These chapters provide a detailed examination of these initiatives and offer substantial empirical evidence for claims made regarding levels of coherence and effectiveness and institutionalisation. Chapter 4 deals with the early stages of the EC’s intervention in Bosnia. The first initiative examined in this chapter is that of the ECMM. Following the Brioni Agreement, the EC sent its first ever monitoring mission to observe the ceasefire between the Slovenian and the Yugoslav Federal Army. The innovative nature of this mission and its longevity in the region make it a fascinating case. The second case study evaluates the coherence and effectiveness of one of the most important initiatives in this period, the EC Peace Conference that opened in September 1991. The inability to agree on a common position concerning the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia illustrated the limitations of the EU’s foreign policy under EPC. The third case study covers a non-decision on military intervention. While the newly negotiated Maastricht Treaty opened the possibility of developing a ‘common defence’, the lack of agreement among the member states on whether to deploy military forces to back up their threats or even support the ECMM contributed to the failure of the overall conflict resolution effort in the former Yugoslavia. During this period, low degrees of EPC/CFSP coherence and effectiveness were seen, resulting from a combination of factors: a lack of appropriate institutions and crisis management capabilities (including military capabilities), EC inexperience in managing international conflicts, a poor understanding of the situation in the Balkan region, an unwillingness of the member states to get militarily involved in the conflict, and inflated expectations both from insiders and outsiders of what the EU could do in the situation. In spite of these limitations, the member states showed a willingness to engage in conflict resolution under the EC umbrella, in particular during the early stages of the conflict, and some degree of foreign policy innovation. Commenting on the latter, van den Broek, the Dutch Foreign Minister, said: ‘The Twelve had tried to go to the limits of their imaginative thinking to endeavour to save the peace in Yugoslavia’ (quoted in Kintis, 1997: 151). Chapter 5 explores the EU’s intervention in the aftermath of the war. During this period, the CFSP was characterised by a low level of activity (the exception being the EU civilian administration in Mostar), a continuation of past initiatives such as the ECMM and a secondary role in Bosnia in comparison with Community activities and the operations of international

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organisations such as the UN or NATO. This chapter begins with an examination of the EU’s civilian administration in Mostar. One of the main contributions of the Maastricht Treaty was the possibility of launching joint actions and making use of Community funds to finance CFSP decisions. In this way, the CFSP became an operational and not merely a declaratory policy. Greater effectiveness of the CFSP in this respect was evident from the administration of Mostar. However, institutional turf wars, as well as problems of strategy and political obstructionism, undermined this initiative. The analysis of a non-decision on military/police measures in Chapter 5 allows us to explore why the EU limited its involvement in Bosnia to ‘soft’ and low-level activities during 1996–98. This non-decision best exemplifies the (self-imposed) paralysis of the CFSP during this period and the consensus among the member states that the EU should not resort to the use of military instruments. Only the crisis in Kosovo in 1998–99, because of its impact on the stability of the region, triggered changes in the EU’s approach towards Bosnia and bolstered significant institutional developments (CSDP). In a time of crisis, the EU’s response was the launch of the Stability Pact, but time and institutional constraints meant the initiative did not significantly improve levels of coherence and effectiveness. Chapter 6 illustrates the dynamic engagement of the EU in Bosnia since 2002 with the launch of several initiatives: the EUSR, a police (EUPM) and a military mission (EUFOR). The EUSR has clearly helped improve the coherence of the CFSP in Bosnia thanks to the establishment of numerous forums for coordination. The position has also increased the visibility of CFSP activities, but only partially its effectiveness. Similarly to other peacebuilding ventures, the EU confronts in Bosnia the problem of how to promote reforms while ensuring local ownership and the sustainability of reforms. As for the EUPM, being the first EU police mission, it suffered greatly from the EU’s inexperience in civilian crisis management which led to problems with the design of its mandate and lessons learned system. Institutional and local politics also affected the mission. Finally, EUFOR Althea has presented high degrees of effectiveness. Taking over from the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), EUFOR maintained the same levels of deterrence and accomplished most of its mandate; although it is also true that the mission was deployed in a ‘benign environment’. Coherence with the police mission was particularly problematic during its first year of deployment. What is revealing from this third period was the high degree of consensus among the member states vis-à-vis EU policy towards Bosnia, and more specifically the responsibility of the EU to uphold stability in the region. There was also an increased consensus concerning the need to use (and combine) both civilian and military instruments to achieve this end. The concluding chapter summarises the findings and further reflects on the institutional and political challenges to the EU’s foreign and security policy in Bosnia. It reviews the impact of institutionalisation on the EU’s

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foreign and security policy, the politics of coherence and effectiveness and the overall contribution of EU foreign policy to conflict resolution in Bosnia.

Notes

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4 5 6

7

When reference is made to a historical context prior to the entry into force of the TEU, the term used is European Community (EC). For references after 1 November 1993, the term used is European Union (EU). Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the CSDP was referred to as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); for the sake of consistency, the term CSDP is used throughout the book. Following John Duffield (2007: 7–8), institutions are defined as ‘relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the international system, the actors in the system (including states as well as non-state entities), and their activities’. Thus, this definition would include both formal rules, as understood by rationalists, and (informal) inter-subjective norms, as found in the constructivist and sociological institutionalist scholarship. This definition also distinguishes different functions that rules and norms might perform: constitutive (creating actors and determining their capabilities and rights), regulative (prescribing, prohibiting or permitting certain behaviours), and procedural (regulating actors’ behaviours within the institution or vis-à-vis the institution itself) (J. Duffield, 2007: 12–15). A CIA report leaked to the New York Times had already predicted the collapse of the Federation in October 1990 (Sharp, 2004). However, see Ginsberg (2001) for a discussion on feedback mechanisms. Online survey, Appendix. The online survey was conducted by the author in spring and autumn 2005. A questionnaire was sent by e-mail and handed in person to 70 member state representatives to CFSP Council working groups. The response rate was 40 per cent (28 answers). The survey sought to garner information about general patterns of cooperation and negotiation within the CFSP framework and the impact of institutional developments on coherence and effectiveness. COREU was the abbreviation of the first telex system named ‘Correspondence Européenne’, which was then replaced by the COREU Terminal System (CORTESY) in 1997.

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The institutionalisation of EU foreign and security policy

Despite successive treaty reforms, the CFSP remains obstinately intergovernmental, at least on paper. The member states retain a veto power in the decision-making process given that unanimity is the rule within the CFSP, and QMV the exception, even after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. However, over the years, it is possible to see a move beyond intergovernmentalism. In this chapter, I argue that the CFSP governance system has followed a particular institutional path: neither a strict community method nor a pure intergovernmental one, but a hybrid model that combines elements of both (see also Øhrgaard, 2004; Howorth, 2010; Juncos and Pomorska, 2011; Sjursen, 2011). Notwithstanding the role member states play in the CFSP, supranational elements – including the involvement of EU institutions such as the High Representative – and the development of informal norms has meant that the member states are no longer fully in control of this policy as an intergovernmentalist perspective might suggest (Hoffmann, 2000). Characteristic of the institutional path followed by the CFSP is its increasing ‘Brusselisation’. According to Dave Allen (1998: 54), Brusselisation involves a physical move of the CFSP governance system to Brussels or, in other words, ‘a gradual transfer, in the name of consistency, of foreign policy-making authority away from the national capitals to Brussels’. As a result, Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) have increasingly been displaced from the core of the process by the intergovernmental bodies located in Brussels through this Brusselisation process. More specifically, I argue that the process of CFSP institutionalisation and Brusselisation have run parallel: that is, the physical move of foreign policy decision-making authority has been accompanied by an increase in the number of Brussels-based bureaucratic organisations, formal rules and informal norms. In this chapter, I probe how the institutionalisation of Europe’s foreign and security policy came about. In order to do so, I go back to the establishment of EPC in the late 1960s. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a historical institutionalist approach presupposes that prior institutional structures limit future options and leads one to expect resistance to change owing to institutional legacies. This is particularly true if one looks at CFSP development having in mind prior institutional developments under EPC. The path of institutionalisation described in this chapter resulted from particular

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choices made by the member states when establishing EPC, something that led to the development and institutionalisation of particular CFSP rules and norms later in time. In line with a historical institutionalist perspective, in the case of the CFSP, change has usually been incremental rather than innovative (Smith, 2004). In other words, change has usually taken the form of minimal adjustments which have not altered the fundamentals of the CFSP institutional setting, rather than being innovative or a major alteration of existing structures (March, 1991). On the few occasions that innovative change has occurred, it has been the result of critical junctures, as we shall see below. This chapter will also shed light on how political conflict (that between supranationalists and intergovernmentalists) has shaped the institutional development of the CFSP since its early days. Having embarked upon an intergovernmental path at the outset, successive reforms failed to communitarise this policy. However, because of unintended consequences and institutional legacies, the resulting institutional outcome – a hybrid mode between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism – differed from that originally foreseen by its designers, the member states. Thus, although a historical institutionalist approach does not neglect the importance of member states’ preferences in determining early forms of cooperation, it does emphasise the importance of institutional legacies and the pervasive effect of initial choices on subsequent decisions. What is more, although the member states remain the ‘master of the treaties’, their capacity to shape political outcomes might be undermined by the autonomous activity of bureaucratic organisations. Let us begin by examining the early years of European foreign policy: European Political Cooperation.

Looking back to the origins: the institutionalisation of EPC

The establishment of EPC, launched informally in 1970, was the result, among other things, of the disagreement between two views concerning European foreign policy. On the one side were those such as France and the UK who wanted an intergovernmental system of coordination of member states’ foreign policies that would allow Europe to make its voice heard on the international scene, but without implying a communitarisation of national foreign policies. On the other were those countries (Italy and some smaller member states) who wanted foreign policy coordination to be incorporated into the EC framework (Smith, 2004: 65). Eventually, under French pressure, the first view prevailed. Initially, the EPC machinery was limited to the Meetings of Foreign Ministers, supported by the Political Committee (PoCo)1 and a small number of working groups. The Presidency, held every six months by a member state, played a key role chairing meetings, setting the agenda and facilitating compromise in its role as primus inter pares. However, no member state could have predicted at the time the progres-

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sive development of EPC and later the CFSP. For those who sought to maintain an informal and pure intergovernmental procedure, the institutionalisation of EPC in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, and later the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1993, implied a significant move away from their original idea. For those who wanted a supranational system firmly in the hands of the Commission and accountable to the European Parliament, later developments fell short of expectations, but were still better than the original form of cooperation established with EPC. This points to the fact that, contrary to intergovernmental accounts, the member states do not tightly control the institutionalisation of the CFSP, but unexpected consequences might occur. As Allen put it (1998: 58), the Brusselisation of foreign policy took place ‘by default more than design’. The need to increase both coherence and effectiveness helps explain the development of European foreign policy cooperation towards Brusselisation (see also Chapter 3). This also shows the role that ideas have played in the institutional development of the CFSP. The member states found themselves trying to square the circle of generating a more coherent and effective foreign policy, but keeping it away from the Commission’s competencies; or, in other words, to conciliate an autonomous foreign policy with the wish for the EU to play a role as an effective global power. The Brusselisation process was thus an unintended consequence of the tension between EPC and EC policies. EPC was established in the first place to prevent national foreign policies from colliding with EC policies (Smith, 2004). However, once established, the Brusselisation of EPC resulted from the need to ensure a more coherent approach in external relations, which required increasing coordination with the Commission, even making use of communitarian instruments to implement EPC (Allen, 1998: 49–50). Rather than communitarising foreign policy, it was decided to set up new provisions and new Brussels-based bodies to ensure coherence. Increasing effectiveness was also another aim of successive institutional reforms. Even those countries that favoured an intergovernmental system of foreign policy cooperation did acknowledge the need to establish better structures for decision-making and implementation to enhance the Union’s international role, a need that was particularly felt during international crises. However, the member states were not ready to transfer these competencies to the Commission irrespective of the heavy cost to the Presidency. The only solution was to create some permanent bodies but under the firm control of the member states.

The establishment of a permanent secretariat: a diplomatic service in the making?

With the SEA, it was acknowledged that both the Commission and the Council should ensure the coherence of external relations. The incorporation

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of the Commission into EPC (the Commission was to be ‘fully associated’) was not among the original intentions of the ‘masters of the Treaties’, but resulted from the need to ensure consistency between EC and EPC policies. Then again, the SEA only gave a legal character to a practice that had taken place since the 1970s.2 Even though the member states tried hard to keep EPC away from Brussels (perceived as the domain of the Commission), the SEA confirmed that the EPC working groups would take place in Brussels and that a permanent EPC Secretariat would be created within the Council Secretariat to support the work of the rotating Presidency in this area. The PoCo and the Foreign Ministers’ meetings would still take place in the state holding the Presidency, although the SEA opened the possibility of discussing EPC matters during Council meetings. In any case, EPC and Community activities were kept strictly separated from each other. As a way of illustration, the EPC Secretariat was separated from the rest of the Council Secretariat ‘by doors with special locks on them’ (Allen, 1998: 50). The establishment of the EPC Secretariat was one of the main elements in the SEA. The physical site of the EPC Secretariat had been a subject of heated debate among the member states since the establishment of EPC. Some member states (mainly, the Benelux and Italy) argued for the secretariat to be located in Brussels, but this was opposed by France and the UK, since it could risk a ‘communitarisation’ of EPC. Instead, France had pushed for the Secretariat to be based in Paris, something rejected by those member states which wanted a progressive incorporation of EPC into the Community structures (Smith, 2004: 166). The final decision was more the result of pragmatic concerns than a resolution to this political conflict. Prior to the establishment of a secretariat, the EPC’s limited machinery and archives had to move from one capital to the next Presidency capital every six months. This practice was hugely cumbersome and particularly costly for smaller member states. Thus, the member states learnt ‘by doing’, that the EPC system required a permanent body to support its day-to-day work. Institutional legacies were also important. The precedent of the EPC Secretariat can be found in the Troika system. The London Report (1981) established the Troika composed of the present, previous and subsequent Presidency in order to maintain EPC consistency. To support the task of the current Presidency, the London Report, formalising a previous practice, foresaw a limited administrative structure consisting of one official of the past and the future Presidency being at the disposal of the Presidency at the helm (Smith, 2004: 166). This incremental development made the establishment of the EPC Secretariat in the SEA easier. The new body would be based upon ‘an extended troika’, staffed with 17 officials, from the previous, current and following Presidency, plus an archivist, administrative and communication staff and a Head of Secretariat (Tonra, 2000: 153). With the establishment of a single institutional framework at Maastricht, the EPC Secretariat was merged with the Council Secretariat and it soon

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became an important body maintaining the CFSP ‘institutional memory’. The Council Secretariat served key purposes: logistical support for the Council meetings and the Presidency, provision of legal advice and record keeper. The latter function was crucial. Council officials, when drafting documents for Council meetings, sought to identify ‘problems, possible solutions and the respective degrees of support which exist for various options for going forward’ (Westlake and Galloway, 2004: 149). This function also exemplified the trust placed in officials of the Council Secretariat by national representatives. The Council Secretariat also supported the Presidency by writing drafts, although this support varied from one Presidency to the next, with small member states being more dependent on the Secretariat. By doing this, Nuttall (2000: 253) argued, the Council Secretariat was ‘assuming in practice the right of initiative without any formal change to its status’. With the establishment of the post of High Representative and the launch of the CSDP, the Council Secretariat developed additional ‘new’ roles, of a more political nature. Christiansen and Vanhoonacker (2008) argue that this amounted to a critical juncture, diverting the ‘old’ Secretariat from its traditional path of development. Among the new roles developed by the Secretariat, one might include those of ‘facilitator’, ‘policy entrepreneur’ and ‘implementation agent’ (Juncos and Pomorska, 2010). First, the Council Secretariat acted as a facilitator by identifying points of disagreement among the parties and possible ‘ways out’. Thus, the Council Secretariat helped build consensus and speed up negotiations and supported the role of the Presidency. The Council Secretariat, particularly those officials attached to the Policy Unit, also acted as a political entrepreneur. The Council Secretariat’s influence was amplified by the fact that the member states seconded high-ranking officials to it. Yet the most important development was the extension of its role in the CSDP to carry out planning and executive functions. The creation of the Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the establishment of a civilian crisis capability3 increased the operational capacities of the Council Secretariat in the field of military and civilian crisis management. The need to undertake these new tasks, however, imposed some strains on the Secretariat’s structures, which were not originally designed for this type of task and required the recruitment of a further battery of officials from the member states (seconded national experts) to cover these functions. These developments resulted in increasing tensions between different bureaucratic cultures (in particular, old administrative secretariat/new political secretariat) coexisting within the Council Secretariat, just as one might expect from a bureaucratic politics approach. In the case of civilian crisis management, they also led to some clashes with the Commission. The development of the Council Secretariat over the years can be seen as an example of unintended consequences. Once created, institutions take on a

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life of their own – acting sometimes independently in ways not intended by the member states that created them. To the discontent of many member states, the Council Secretariat became a crucial behind-the-scenes actor that developed a role in the CFSP beyond what was initially foreseen. Commenting on its role, one national representative mentioned that ‘the Council Secretariat does not have any formal power; they are only the secretariat of the Council . . . But the Council Secretariat is taking upon itself a more dominant role, taking advantage of the rotating Presidency because they have a permanent structure. They are more and more speaking as an autonomous independent actor in line with some other member states.’4 The establishment of European External Action Service (EEAS) in the Lisbon Treaty has introduced important changes to the role of the Council Secretariat (Council of the EU, 2010b). Although the Secretariat continues to have an administrative role in CFSP/CSDP issues, the political elements of the Secretariat have been moved to the new service under the responsibility of the High Representative. However, where the rotating Presidency still has responsibility (trade, development, enlargement, etc.), the Council Secretariat continues to play a significant role.5 With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative has the right of initiative in this area and the EEAS will provide key support to the High Representative for the exercise of this sensitive job (article 27.3, TEU Lisbon). The EEAS, formally established on 1 January 2011, is composed of officials from the Commission, the Council Secretariat and the diplomatic services of the member states. When the service reaches its full capacity, officials from EU institutions should represent at least sixty per cent; national diplomats should represent at least thirty per cent of EEAS staff (European Union, 2010). The establishment of the EEAS was preceded by timeconsuming negotiations about the composition, organisation, budget and accountability of the new service. As argued by Vanhoonacker and Reslow (2010: 3), the member states were aware that decisions made at this stage were crucial because once the service was in place, introducing changes would be difficult, as ‘institutions tend to be “sticky”’. And while member states and other institutional players tried to forward their own interests, the debates between intergovernmentalists and supranationalists, past practice and institutional legacies played a crucial role in the EEAS set-up as far as the staffing, scope and functions of the service are concerned (Vanhoonacker and Reslow, 2010).

The Maastricht Treaty and the single institutional framework

As far as the CFSP machinery was concerned, the Maastricht Treaty was more of a rationalisation and clarification of the policy-making process than a revolution (Forster and Wallace, 2000: 473; Smith, 2004: 176). The CFSP policy

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process was slightly clarified regarding which competencies were assigned to each body: agenda-setting to the European Council; shared initiative for the member states and the Commission in day-to-day CFSP decision-making; and the role of external representation and implementation of the CFSP to be fulfilled by the Presidency, assisted by the Commission. In addition, the Council of Ministers and the Commission were charged with ensuring the unity, coherence and effectiveness of EU external action. A significant institutional change was the establishment of the three pillar structure under a single institutional framework. The single institutional framework meant that from then onwards the EPC Meetings of Foreign Affairs took place together with the EC Council meetings.6 Moreover, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, also known as Coreper, would discuss EPC activities when preparing Council meetings. For its part, the PoCo would report to the Council through Coreper. This caused heated rivalry among the two bodies that was only eased with a gentleman’s agreement.7 The establishment of the Political and Security Committee (PSC),8 which de facto took over the role of PoCo as the main preparatory committee in the CFSP, did not put an end to the power struggle, this time between PSC and Coreper (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007: 135). The establishment of the single framework also resulted in some problems regarding the merging of the Council working groups, the main preparatory bodies of ministerial meetings.9 These problems were due, to a great extent, to institutional legacies, and in particular, the organisational culture of the MFAs where economic and political affairs had been traditionally separated. The separation between EC and EPC fitted very well in that context. Therefore, in those cases where EPC and the EC working groups were merged, it was difficult to determine who would be attending and chairing those meetings (the Brussels representatives or the officials from the capitals). In spite of the single institutional framework, the practice during several years was to separate the CFSP from EC items in the agenda, having a different chair depending on which issues were discussed. On some occasions, CFSP meetings even took place separately. Thus, institutional legacies, unintended consequences and organisational culture limited de facto the implementation of legal provisions. Nevertheless, the merging gradually led to the Brusselisation of the CFSP decision-making process, with a progressive move of national representatives to the Permanent Representations in Brussels taking place. In addition, the change did not only affect the composition, but also the role of working groups which, in the event, would become much more ‘legislative’ (drafting joint actions, common positions and action plans) and would deal with more operational issues. The decision-making procedures were also enhanced at Maastricht with the creation of two new instruments, common positions and joint actions, to be added to the traditional political declarations and démarches existing

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under EPC. These instruments entailed a significant change, putting a greater emphasis on generating policy outcomes, although confusion between different instruments was still evident in the first few years following the Maastricht Treaty (Winn and Lord, 2001: 67). An important innovation was the introduction of the possibility of using QMV to adopt joint actions. Although the initial decision for CFSP action had to be unanimous, subsequent decisions regarding the delimitation of means, duration, and procedures for implementation or financing could be subject to QMV (except in the case of defence issues). Although, to date, the use of QMV has been very limited, its symbolic effects are not to be underestimated. As one CFSP participant commented, majority voting ‘is designed to create habits of thinking, it has no legal effect, but in practice that might be very much like a consensus procedure’ (Tonra cited in Glarbo, 1999: 649). The Maastricht Treaty also established some provisions for the use of EC financial resources in CFSP activities. Article J.11 (TEU Maastricht) distinguished between ‘administrative’ and ‘operational’ expenditure, providing a clearer procedure to finance actions.

The Treaty of Amsterdam: advancing Brusselisation

According to Allen: ‘The Amsterdam Treaty appeared to represent continuity more than change in that it continued – perhaps accelerated – the process of “Brusselisation”’ (1998: 57). The more important innovations of the Amsterdam Treaty were the creation of the High Representative and the Policy Unit, two more steps towards the Brusselisation of the CFSP (see Figure 2.1). The creation of the Special Representatives (article 18.5, TEU Amsterdam) ‘Brusselised’ the EU’s shuttle diplomacy and formalised a practice that had taken place de facto during the Yugoslavian wars. Acting under the authority and operational direction of the High Representative, the EUSR was expected to be the principal bridge between Brussels and the actors in the field. To a great extent, these institutional reforms stemmed from the impact of exogenous factors, and most notably, EU failure over the Yugoslav wars. As discussed in the previous chapter, external events may facilitate learning. Therefore, external crises served to put CFSP institutions to the test and often led policy-makers to realise the need for change (learning from failure). In this specific case, and having in mind the problems during the Balkan conflicts, the reforms agreed at Amsterdam led to the creation of several new instruments. These new instruments, for their part, developed a role of their own, far from the one that was initially envisaged by the member states. The failure over Yugoslavia underlined the need for a permanent external representation instead of the six-monthly rotating Presidency (see contributions in Pappas and Vanhoonacker, 1996). However, as it often happens, even

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Figure 2.1 CFSP/CSDP institutional structures pre-Lisbon

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if everyone learnt the lesson, this learning was translated into very different proposals. Following from the EU’s failure, and trying to exploit the TEU provisions, the new President of the Commission Jacques Santer attempted to give a stronger role to the Commission by appointing four Commissioners in charge of external relations, coordinated by himself (Peterson 1998: 6–7). In response to this move, the French proposed the creation of a Mr PESC (CFSP) or High Representative (Buchet de Neuilly, 2002). Some member states, which were at the outset opposed to the French initiative (mainly Belgium and Italy),10 finally agreed, although for different reasons. For the supranationalist camp, the High Representative could only be conceived as a new ‘Commission for the CFSP’.11 This new institution was justified in their eyes because the Commission had proved unable to take leadership of the EU’s external relations in the last few years. For other member states such as France and the UK, the nomination of a High Representative, as agreed in the Intergovernmental Conference, increased the role of the member states in Brussels, by placing this institution firmly within the Council’s structures (the High Representative would also be the Secretary General of the Council), hence much more easily manageable than the Commission. However, in practice, under the helm of Javier Solana (1999–2009), the High Representative was to become a powerful actor beyond that foreseen by those member states who wanted to limit this figure to an administrative assistant to the Presidency. This shows the problems for the member states in controlling the implementation of decisions agreed in the Intergovernmental Conference (Buchet de Neuilly, 2002). It could be argued, however, that by nominating a high-profile person like Solana, they allowed this to happen. Usually perceived as less dangerous than the Commission in the field of foreign affairs, the member states entrusted the High Representative with significant mediating missions such as in the case of the Balkans, Ukraine or Iran. There was also a willingness to provide the post with resources as witnessed with the development of the Council Secretariat (see above). Yet the attempt to balance the power of the Commission in the communitarian sphere by building a strong actor in the CFSP area produced the unforeseen result of creating a ‘Commission II’ (Buchet de Neuilly, 2002: 28). In the words of a national diplomat: ‘sometimes we are too concentrated on the Commission . . . but we do not realise that we have created an instrument that is playing its own game, the High Representative’.12 The Lisbon Treaty was intended to alleviate the long-standing frictions between the Commission and the Council and between the political and economic dimensions of the EU’s external action by establishing a doublehatted High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (article 18, TEU Lisbon), a position held by Catherine Ashton at the time of writing (see Figure 2.2). Under the new Treaty, the High Representative is both the chair of the Foreign Affairs Council and a Vice-President of the Commission and replaces the rotating six-monthly member state Presidency in the

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CFSP/CSDP. The High Representative has gained the right to make proposals to the Foreign Affairs Council, a significant upgrading when compared with the previous powers of this institutional figure. The High Representative also takes over other responsibilities previously held by the Presidency in the implementation of the CFSP, proposing candidates to be appointed as Special Representatives and the duty to consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP. The High Representative is also one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission and one of his or her competencies is to ensure the consistency of the EU’s external policies. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission can only submit joint CFSP initiatives with the High Representative (article 22, TEU Lisbon). This provision is intended to ensure consistency between the positions of the High Representative and the Commission, but it is based on the implicit assumption that the High Representative will embody what is a shared view within the Commission. As far as formal decision-making rules are concerned, the Amsterdam Treaty also introduced significant changes. The Amsterdam Treaty extended the use of QMV as the norm for implementing common positions and joint actions already adopted with the Council. QMV could also be used when adopting decisions on the basis of a common strategy, adopted by unanimity by the European Council. Yet it would not apply to military decisions. This formal extension of majority voting was however accompanied by the proviso that no vote could be taken if a member state ‘for important and stated reasons of national policy’ declared its opposition to the adoption of a decision by QMV (article 23, TEU Amsterdam). However, it is worth noting that, in this case, the member state affected would have to justify its position at the European Council. At the same time, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the possibility of constructive abstention, providing a basis for overcoming potential situations of impasse without undermining the principle of sovereignty. The Amsterdam Treaty also introduced a new instrument, the common strategies, ‘to be implemented by the Union in areas where the member states have important interests in common’ (article 13, TEU Amsterdam). Decided by unanimity, common strategies were an attempt to increase coherence and effectiveness because they covered both CFSP issues and EC activities in a geographical area. However, only three common strategies, on Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean region, were ever concluded and soon this new instrument fell into disuse. The Lisbon Treaty adopted a more pragmatic view, replacing common strategies and joint actions by so-called EU ‘decisions’ that ‘commit’ the member states (article 25, TEU Lisbon). Changes in funding procedures were also agreed in Amsterdam as a consequence of the difficulties encountered in funding past CFSP joint actions. Giving legal character to a previous agreement reached between the Council and the European Parliament, article 28, TEU Amsterdam charged administrative expenditure and non-military operational expenditure to the

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European Council

Foreign Affairs Council

Court of Justice (no jurisdiction)

Chairperson

VicePresident

High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

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COREPER European External Action Service

CMPD

CPCC

EUMS

SITCEN

European Commission

European Parliament

Political and Security Committee (PSC)

CFSP committees and working groups

Figure 2.2 CFSP/CSDP institutional structures post-Lisbon

EC budget, leaving operations with military or defence implications to be funded by those states which have not exercised their right of constructive abstention. Following from the need for a permanent financing mechanism for military operations, in 2004 the member states agreed on the so-called ATHENA mechanism which provides a single set of rules and procedures for common costs of military missions.

A new peak in the Brusselisation process: the institutionalisation of the CSDP

The initial institutional development of the CSDP took place informally. The Kosovo crisis (1998–99) is often seen as a critical juncture in the development of an autonomous EU defence policy. The Franco-British summit at St Malo (1998) kicked off the process of building an autonomous EU military capacity, while maintaining a commitment to NATO. At the Cologne European Council (June 1999), it was decided to formally establish, within the CFSP pillar, some EU security structures. At the Laeken Council, in December 2001, the CSDP was declared operational. Without going into too much detail about the causal factors that led to the establishment of the CSDP (see Howorth, 2007), the decision at St Malo has to be explained by taking into account long-term positions regarding European defence and security policies that had crystallised around EPC/CFSP. Although the development of the CFSP until the late 1990s showed a high level of institutional stability as far as security and defence is concerned, this stability cannot be taken as a sign of consensus. In fact, there

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existed long-standing political disagreements between the member states regarding the role of the EU in security and defence issues, in particular between Europeanists and Atlanticists; between NATO and non-NATO members (including neutral countries); and between member states with different conceptions about the role civilian and military instruments should play in security issues. These divergences shaped the institutional design of the CSDP (Howorth, 2007; Menon, 2011a). Nonetheless, institutional legacies also played a role. Several developments during the 1970s and 1980s facilitated the incorporation of security and defence issues into the EU’s agenda. With the London Report (1981), the possibility of discussing issues bearing on the political aspects of security was foreseen. The SEA then allowed for cooperation on the political and economic aspects of security. The Maastricht Treaty did not establish a common defence policy, although it stated as one of the EU’s objectives ‘the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’ (article J.4.1, TEU Maastricht). At that time no common defence bodies were contemplated; only a compromise could be reached to declare the Western European Union (WEU) both the ‘European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance’ and the ‘defence arm of the EU’ (Declaration on Western European Union, TEU Maastricht). Moreover, it was decided that its Secretariat would move from London to Brussels and a small military planning cell would be established. As far as defence provisions were concerned, although there were plans at the Amsterdam summit to merge the WEU into the EU, Britain and the neutral countries blocked them. All that could be agreed was an unspecified commitment to ‘enhance cooperation’ between the two organisations, that EU members not part of the WEU could participate in some WEU activities, and that a merging of the WEU into the EU was hypothetically possible, ‘should the European Council so decide’ (article 17, TEU Amsterdam). The role of the WEU in the emergence of an EU security capacity in actuality continued to be insignificant. However, by incorporating the Petersberg tasks,13 the Treaty reflected the operational ambitions of the EU. These developments paved the way for the incorporation of a security dimension in the integration project; but of course they alone do not explain the move from the WEU to an autonomous EU defence and security policy. To explain this we have to look at the changes in the British policy on these issues (the main brake on EU defence policy hitherto) and why the UK finally accepted the development of an autonomous CSDP after having vetoed it for so long. What one can see is that learning played a crucial role. First, the Bosnian experience served as a trigger for a change in the strategy of the British elites in the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). According to Howorth (2004: 217),

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Bosnia offered two linked lessons. First, as had in any case become abundantly clear from the burden-sharing debates on Capitol Hill, Uncle Sam’s cavalry was no longer available on request to manage minor European security crises. Second, Franco-British cooperation on the ground in the Balkans had brought home to military planners in both countries that the shift within Europe from deterrence to intervention was forcing London and Paris into one another’s arms.

Officials in the Ministry of Defence and FCO (i.e. ‘epistemic communities’) were the ones behind the change in the Blair government’s policy by putting forward new strategic thinking in which the EU would play a more important role in European security (Howorth, 2004). But another event led Tony Blair to modify his policy. Prior to the elections and also during the negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty, Blair maintained practically the same position as the Major government concerning this issue, arguing that NATO should remain the main defence organisation in the continent (Latawski and Smith, 2003: 127–8). However, the Kosovo crisis and the unlikely prospect of the Europeans responding to this crisis motivated Blair to take a different stance on the EU’s security and defence policy.14 Howorth (2004: 221) notes that ‘when Blair was first properly briefed, in mid-1998, on Europe’s seriously defective capacity to react to a hypothetical crisis in Kosovo, he was appalled. Europe, he concluded, simply had to turn its attention to defence. The rest followed Pörtschach, St Malo, Cologne, Helsinki and Nice.’ Nonetheless, in this case, one can only talk about a change in strategies, more than a change in fundamental beliefs as a result of learning. Blair and his advisors did not change their standpoint about NATO and about the role it should play in European security. They believed that NATO should not be weakened by the development of the EU’s security and defence capabilities. On the contrary, this development should strengthen and complement the Alliance. The fact that it was only a change of strategy also explains some of the problems in agreeing on a clear common policy at the EU level, especially with France. Ambiguity has surrounded the development of the CSDP since then and there is still no agreement on the end state goal. Later developments in Kosovo created a window of opportunity to consolidate and justify what had been agreed at St Malo. Most of the institutional design was done in the corridors of the ministries of defence of the Big Three – although the Nordic countries were also very active in advancing the civilian component of the CSDP – and only then approved by the European Council. For instance, most of the institutional engineering took place during the German Presidency that led to the Cologne European Council. For its part, the establishment of the PSC and the Headline Goal were British proposals. As in the early years of EPC, the new bodies created to manage the CSDP were first established outside the treaties and only later incorporated into the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). For instance, an interim PSC was established as early as March 2000, just three months after

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the decision to do so at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999. The PSC responsibilities were further specified in a Council decision in January 2001 (Council of the EU, 2001a), at the same time as the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EUMS were established (Council of the EU, 2001b). For its part, CIVCOM, the Committee on civilian aspects of crisis management, was established much earlier by a Council decision of 22 June 2000 (Council of the EU, 2000a). Finally, the Iraq War can also be considered as a critical juncture for the institutional development of the CSDP. Although not without problems, it served as a window of opportunity and led to the establishment of a ‘civ/mil’ cell and the launch of the European Defence Agency,15 adding new impetus to the Brusselisation of the CSDP. The Lisbon Treaty has not altered this institutional path, although it has led to a reorganisation of the crisis management bodies under the EEAS (see Figure 2.2). With the establishment of the CSDP, and its increasing Brusselisation, the decision-making process has shifted from the capitals to Brussels. Indeed the creation of a permanent committee in Brussels, the PSC, and the gradual displacement of the Political Directors (based in the national capitals) as the gatekeepers of the CFSP/CSDP decision-making process best exemplifies the move to a more ‘Brusselised’ and operational CSDP. The administrative structures created in Brussels have also taken over the planning and day-today implementation of the CSDP operations, especially in the area of civilian crisis management. However, as far as military operations are concerned the member states are still reluctant to give up control in this area.

The emergence of informal norms

The institutionalisation of European foreign policy has not just meant the creation of bureaucratic organisations and the development of formal rules as discussed in the previous sections, but also the emergence of shared norms. The development of CFSP institutions, and in particular the Brusselisation of the CFSP, has facilitated socialisation processes, by bringing together diplomats to regular, permanent and highly institutionalised consultations (Tonra, 2000: 158). Thus, since the 1970s, scholars have documented the existence of several procedural norms followed by policy-makers and the emergence of a so-called esprit de corps (Nuttall, 1992, 2000; Manners and Whitman, 2000; Tonra, 2001; Winn and Lord, 2001; Smith, 2004). It should be noted that, in this case, the institutionalisation of CFSP norms refers not so much to the introduction of new norms, as to changes affecting norms at work since the 1970s as a result of the increase in policy-makers’ interactions and socialisation. These changes can be summarised as an increase in the coordination reflex and consensus-building norms and a decrease in the domaines réservés over the years.16 Let us discuss each of these in turn.

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Initially, a process known as the ‘coordination reflex’ developed between the national diplomats involved in EPC. This was noted in the Copenhagen Report (1973). According to the document, the habit of working together had become ‘a reflex of coordination . . . which has profoundly affected the relations of the member states between each other and with third countries’ (quoted in Allen and Wallace, 1982: 26). This practice is today a well-known fact in CFSP cooperation. The coordination reflex refers to a process of sharing information with the rest of member states before a decision has been taken (Smith, 2004: 122). This coordination reflex also implies a tendency to take others’ views into account when formulating national positions, which helps develop a common understanding among national representatives and foster consensus-building. The coordination reflex is also seen by the diplomats as a way to increase their chances in the negotiations and to prevent being marginalised. According to one practitioner, ‘one cannot ignore the positions of twenty four other countries and the Commission when formulating a statement – this is a starting point to avoid being left in isolation’.17 According to the online survey, 89.3 per cent of the respondents stated that they had consulted other national delegations prior to formal meetings always or most of the time18 and several interviewees pointed to the importance of informal exchanges to facilitate compromise.19 The coordination reflex is perceptible in the development of communicative practices among CFSP officials. Informal consultations prior to the meeting are part of the every-day work of the representatives to facilitate consensus. By contrast, in those very rare cases where informal contacts are not so intense, cooperation and consensus are harder to achieve. Communicative practices take place through formal channels, such as the CORTESY network or official mailing lists. Nonetheless, the large bulk of information-sharing is informal. The representatives remain in close contact through e-mails, mobile phones and frequent meetings that often occur in the corridors and over lunch. During these informal negotiations, national representatives inform other colleagues about their positions, in particular ‘red lines’, or exchange other types of information that may help the decision-making process. They also undertake informal negotiations in order to achieve a compromise before the meeting. As a result of the increase of these communicative practices among national representatives, EU member states no longer feel threatened by sharing information with their European colleagues. On the contrary, they have multiplied their mutual exchanges. According to the online survey, ‘similarity of values and norms’ constitutes the first criteria that national representatives take into account when sharing information with other colleagues, while security interests, geographical proximity or the size of the country were considered less important.20 Some of them admit they even share selected sensitive information with their counterparts, in particular if it helps reach a compromise. Such information includes circulating national

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instructions, security assessments or other political information at a strategic level.21 Another code of conduct that has been identified in the CFSP literature is the consensus-building practice when it comes to the adoption of decisions, by contrast to hard-bargaining or confrontational methods (Tonra, 2001; Smith, 2004). As noted before, the CFSP is subject to intergovernmental bargaining with states retaining their veto powers. A national representative affirmed ‘in CFSP you can always say no. And if you are really serious about your no, nobody can stop you from blocking it. But this is rarely seen’.22 Interestingly enough, member states do not generally make use of their veto power during negotiations; on the contrary, there is a general practice to keep everyone on-board and to achieve consensus. According to one official, ‘the most important thing is the readiness of everybody to contribute to a solution’ and another mentioned that ‘there is a very strong impulse to reach a compromise’.23 Member states’ diplomats try to generate a broad agreement regarding the decision, so no member state is excluded (in decisions by QMV) or autoexcluded (resorting to constructive abstention). This is a two-way process because not only will the majority try to integrate the minority, but also the potentially isolated will try to find supporters, instead of behaving unilaterally, ‘especially if you are a country of small or medium size’.24 That is why CFSP policies are not the exclusive result of lowest common denominator decisions. According to the online survey, 96.4 per cent of the respondents stated that consensus-building, rather than hard-bargaining is the predominant behaviour in CFSP negotiations.25 National representatives often have a common interest in being effective. Thus, it is common that at the final stages of a long meeting there is significant pressure stemming from the group to reach agreement and not leave unsolved problems to be passed on to a higher political level. Despite often-expressed doubts about whether these norms would continue to be observed after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, a majority of the interviewees claimed that the coordination reflex and the consensusbuilding practices still remain.26 The recent enlargements have actually increased the importance of these informal practices; informal exchanges of information have increased and more is done outside the formal meetings in order to reach consensus (Juncos and Pomorska, 2008). Cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy has been guided by another principle: the existence of domaines privés or issues that cannot be submitted to discussion and interference from the rest of the member states. These areas have traditionally included security issues (national defence, borders, nuclear status or neutrality) and special relationships (like the US–UK relationship). For example, a member of a group dealing with transatlantic relations pointed out that any politically ‘hot’ matters in EU–US relations, such as Iraq, were kept out of the discussions.27 Other examples of

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debarred issues include: in the Western Balkans Working Group, issues discussed by the Peace Implementation Council (Bosnia) or the Contact Group (Kosovo); broader cooperation between EU–NATO (in the EUMC Working Group); borders and bilateral issues of EU member states.28 Nevertheless, since the establishment of the CFSP, a contraction in the number of areas considered as domaines réservés can be noted, allowing for more of these issues to be included in CFSP discussions (Manners and Whitman, 2000). According to the online survey, for instance, 50 per cent affirmed that there were no sensitive issues excluded from the discussions, which shows that, unlike EPC, the CFSP domain is gradually understood as involving all aspects of foreign and security policy.29 In sum, there is plentiful evidence of informal norms adopted by actors as a consequence of their involvement in CFSP cooperation. Even though socialisation processes do not constitute the main bulk of this study, research shows that it is increasingly difficult to talk about national positions without acknowledging the impact of interactions in Brussels and how national representatives find themselves in contact with new information that might lead to a redefinition of national positions (Juncos and Pomorska, 2011). As one diplomat admitted: ‘this is the first lesson that you learn when you come to Brussels: the toughest negotiations take place between the capital and Brussels’.30 The representatives emphasise the difference between the perceptions of officials in Brussels and those in the capital, which occasionally leads to discussion over the instructions or convincing the capital that the instructions should be changed for the sake of the state’s (and representative’s) credibility within the group. In this way, national diplomats are able to use their expertise and institutional position to influence not only the CFSP negotiations in Brussels, but also the definition of national positions.

The institutionalisation of EU foreign and security policy: Lisbon and beyond

In this chapter, I have examined the institutionalisation process undergone by the CFSP in the last four decades. This analysis drew on a historical institutionalism perspective in order to examine institutional patterns unfolding over time. Such a diachronic perspective highlights the importance of institutional factors preventing member states from having total control over CFSP development. National interests are affected by processes of path dependency that reduce the range of possibilities for legitimate action. This account, however, does not neglect the importance of agency and power; on the contrary, it sheds light on how institutional development rests on power politics, as well as on the role of influential actors, in particular, during critical junctures. From this perspective, the possibility of institutional change is not foreclosed and it is usually facilitated by organisational learning or critical

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junctures. Yet a historical institutionalist approach argues that incremental change, rather than innovative or fundamental change, will be most likely to occur. As a result of the boundaries of rationality, unintended consequences should also be expected, although learning processes might play an important role in correcting them. As discussed above, the path inaugurated with the SEA and the TEU towards the enhancement of the institutions located in Brussels has been reinforced in recent years. This process might have reduced the direct control of the member states over the CFSP decision-making process by shifting the structures to Brussels; however, it does not seem to have substantially increased the role of the Commission, the European Parliament or the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the CFSP. For instance, the Lisbon Treaty has not fundamentally altered the role of the European Parliament in this area. As was the case before, the High Representative has to consult the European Parliament on the main CFSP questions, take its position into consideration and keep it regularly informed. Yet the main role of the European Parliament continues to be the approval of the CFSP budget. In the case of the Commission, it has lost the shared right of initiative that until then it had enjoyed in this policy area (although the High Representative as VicePresident of the Commission does have the right of initiative). In other words, this institutionalisation process has led to an increasing Brusselisation, rather than a communitarisation of the CFSP. The institutionalisation of the CFSP has altered the competencies of specific bureaucratic organisations, created new organisations on top of existing ones, developed new formal and informal rules and maintained the path towards Brusselisation over the years. The evidence presented in this chapter confirms that the levels of institutionalisation of the CFSP have increased over time. The institutionalisation of the CFSP/CSDP has resulted from several factors: external events (the end of the Cold War, the Yugoslavian wars, the Iraq War) and internal events (intergovernmental conferences and enlargements) that have served as windows of opportunity. Several CFSP institutions such as the Council Secretariat and the High Representative have also developed in unforeseen ways and acquired a life of their own, extending their informal role beyond the scope agreed by the member states at intergovernmental conferences. Actors have introduced incremental changes following from learning processes to remedy previous mistakes and policy failures. However, institutional path-dependency (sunk costs, uncertainty and veto points) has constrained the scope for reform. Overall change has been incremental, not innovative. In other words, changes have not altered the fundamentals of the institutional matrix. The Lisbon Treaty has not altered this institutional path and despite the establishment of the new post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the EEAS, the CFSP remains a mixed system of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, characterised by an increasing Brusselisation. Having established the institutionalisation path followed by the CFSP, I will now

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move on to examining the concepts of coherence and effectiveness in the next chapter before investigating what impact the increasing institutionalisation of the CFSP has had on the EU’s role in Bosnia in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

Notes

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The PoCo, composed of the Political Directors from the MFAs, was the original body entrusted with responsibility for preparing EPC issues for the Council. The Political and Security Committee is now responsible for these tasks and, after the entry into force of the Nice Treaty, PoCo’s role has been reduced to a symbolic one. In the Luxembourg Report (1970), the Commission was invited to make known its views and in the London Report (1981) it was fully associated with EPC. The structure of the Council Secretariat underwent several organisational changes in the period 1999–2011, with the creation of the Civ/Mil Cell, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) in order to strengthen the EU’s capabilities in crisis management (in particular, its civilian dimension) and to facilitate coherence between civilian and military instruments. Author’s interview with a national diplomat, Brussels, January 2006. With the Lisbon Treaty, the role of the Presidency has decreased dramatically in the area of foreign and security policy and the role of chairing CFSP committees and the Foreign Affairs Council has been taken over by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, except when trade issues are on the Council agenda (article 18, TEU Lisbon). This Council formation is currently known as the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). The FAC, consisting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU member states and chaired by the High Representative, is the body actually in charge of the day-to-day working of CFSP matters and the main decision-making body. The formation of Defence Ministers can also meet under the umbrella of this Council. A ‘gentleman’s agreement’ was reached in May 1992 by which the Coreper would only introduce amendments to the PoCo conclusions on institutional, financial and EC matters, but not on political issues, before submitting to the Council. It was not established as a modus operandi until January 1996 (Nuttall, 2000: 246–8). Established as a consequence of the development of the CSDP, the PSC is in charge of monitoring the international situation and helping define policies and strategies in CFSP areas, as well as being responsible for the follow-up of CFSP implementation. It also has responsibility for the political direction and strategic control of EU crisis management operations (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007). The role of the Council working groups is to discuss and draft CFSP decisions. Currently, there are thirty-six working groups dealing with CFSP issues and these follow thematic or geographical lines. For more on the role of the Council working groups, see Juncos and Pomorska (2006). Some member states saw in this proposal the danger of large member states’ dominance of the CFSP (Forster and Wallace, 2000: 482). Author’s interview, Brussels, 6 April 2006. Author’s interview, Brussels, 28 November 2005. In 1992, the WEU Ministerial Council identified the so-called Petersberg tasks including ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’. Latawski and Smith argue that other factors such as trying to maintain leadership and

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influence in Europe, at a time when the UK had opted for self-exclusion from the euro, explain the change in the British position. According to them, in this context, the Kosovo crisis provided the ‘backdrop’ for the change in the British policy, but ‘[g]iven the other, political pressures on the Blair government it is highly likely that the Pörtschach/St Malo initiatives would have been developed anyway’ (2003: 133). The Civ/Mil Cell was set up within the Council Secretariat’s structures in 2005 with two main functions in mind: to support the strategic and conceptual planning of civilian and military operations and to serve as a non-permanent autonomous headquarter. The European Defence Agency is tasked to develop EU defence capabilities, in the area of research, acquisition and armaments in order to enhance interoperability and rationalise the defence expenditure of the member states. Other norms have been documented in the literature such as the obligation to justify national positions (Winn and Lord, 2001), confidentiality or the prohibition of hardbargaining (Smith, 2004), or mentioned by the interviewees, inter alia, ensuring vertical and horizontal consistency and respect for ‘agreed’ language. For more on this, see Juncos and Pomorska (2006, 2011). Author’s interview, Brussels, 31 January 2006. 53.6 per cent affirmed that they consulted with other delegations many times per week, 32.1 per cent once per week, 10.7 per cent once per month and 3.6 per cent less than once per month (Online survey, Appendix). Author’s interviews, Brussels, 2005–6. Online survey, Appendix. Author’s interviews, Brussels, 2005–6. Author’s interview, Brussels, 25 January 2006. Author’s interviews, Brussels, 2005–6. Author’s interview, Brussels, 27 January 2006. Online survey, Appendix. Author’s interviews, Brussels, 2005–6. Online survey, Appendix. Author’s interviews, Brussels, 2005–6. Online survey, Appendix. Author’s interview, Brussels, 26 January 2006.

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The politics of coherence and effectiveness Debates about (in)coherence and (in)effectiveness of EU foreign policy are nothing new. In fact, academics and policy-makers alike have long bemoaned the failure of the EU to shape world politics in a way commensurate to its economic power. From the Gulf War to the Libyan crisis, the EU has been criticised for its inability to respond to international events in a coherent and effective fashion (Peterson and Sjursen, 1998; Menon, 2011b). In 2003, the European Security Strategy emphasised the need to make the EU ‘more active, more coherent and more capable’ (European Council, 2003b: 11); but despite some progress achieved with the development of the CSDP, these objectives had not been fully met by 2008, according to the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (European Council, 2008: 2). Needless to say, many of the institutional reforms that have been introduced in the last decades which were discussed in the previous chapter aimed, to a great extent, at improving CFSP performance, that is, its effectiveness and coherence. For instance, talking about the most recent of such reforms, the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, argued that the main purpose of the Treaty ‘was to address the two points where we collectively were under-performing: to promote more unity amongst EU member states so that we have the necessary political weight; secondly, to forge more integrated strategies, so that we are more effective on the ground’ (Ashton, 2010). More concretely, the newly created EEAS aimed to ‘enable greater coherence and efficiency in the EU’s external action and increase its political and economic influence in the world’ (Council of the EU, 2010a: 8). Although both coherence and effectiveness have become buzzwords in the EU’s jargon, broader conceptual and theoretical implications have hitherto been neglected. In other words, there has been no serious scholarly attempt to theorise the variables that impinge upon them. In particular, the basic assumption behind the establishment of the EEAS, the High Representative and other institutional innovations – that institutions matter and that they will improve coherence and effectiveness – remains underresearched. This chapter goes some way in addressing these lacunae by dissecting the academic and political debates over these issues and defining the concepts of coherence and effectiveness, as a first step before empirically testing the relationship between institutional factors and coherence and effectiveness in chapters 4–6.

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This chapter also has a second objective: to shed light on the intrinsic political nature of these two concepts and how they have shaped EU foreign and security policy. There are three aspects to the politicisation of coherence and effectiveness. First, in this chapter, I argue that not only has the quest for coherence and effectiveness become a mantra in the EU’s discourse, but it has also become politicised in the sense that coherence and effectiveness have become key drivers for further political integration. Both have been linked to demands for increasing institutionalisation at the EU level, the assumption being that the latter can improve the former. When institutions were perceived to be dysfunctional, pressures for institutional reform mounted. Second, coherence and effectiveness are inherently political because, as discussed in the previous chapter, they reflect competing political agendas, in particular, between those supporting a supranational project and those seeking to maintain a strong control by the member states over the policy process. Thus, these two concepts are pregnant with meanings about what the finalité politique of the European project should be and what it should look like. In this way, coherence and effectiveness have become sites of political contestation among different actors. The search for coherence can also hide power politics as different institutional arrangements designed to ensure better cooperation will empower some actors and disempower others. For its part, effectiveness not only serves different political agendas and reveals different positions vis-à-vis European integration, but it has also become a means to legitimise particular actions. Especially in the context of the CSDP, labelling an operation as ‘successful’ constitutes a way to legitimise the EU’s international role. Third, as discussed in Chapter 1, coherence and effectiveness are also the product of power politics: in particular, the politics between the member states (intergovernmental politics); between different institutional actors (bureaucratic politics); and politics at the domestic level (local politics). The first part of this chapter introduces the concept of coherence and different categories that will guide the empirical analysis and then moves on to a historical overview of debates about coherence in EU foreign policy to tease out the politics of coherence, which are usually only implicitly acknowledged in the literature. The concept of effectiveness is then scrutinised. As will be shown, effectiveness remains a fuzzy concept and, consequently, assessments of effectiveness have differed greatly depending on the eye of the beholder. Finally, the chapter turns to examine the role of intergovernmental, bureaucratic and local politics. Although for analytical purposes this study will consider them separately, it is obvious that coherence and effectiveness are interconnected in several ways. It is to this issue that the next section turns.

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Interactions between coherence and effectiveness

The main assumption in policy and academic circles is that a positive relationship exists between coherence and effectiveness, and in particular, that coherence constitutes a prerequisite for effectiveness: ‘The assumption is of course that, by acting unitarily and with a common purpose, the EU . . . also becomes ipso facto more efficient and effective’ (Missiroli, 2001: 82). Without a coherent use of the entire panoply of its instruments and resources, it is difficult to produce effective outcomes. For instance, the Council has stated that ‘reinforcing the coherence of the Union’s external action and realising its policy objectives are priorities if the Union is to pull its full weight in international affairs’ (Council of the EU, 2000b; also European Commission, 2006). The belief is that, by acting coherently, the EU becomes a more effective international actor. As far as policy coherence is concerned, if one considers that coherence implies synergies as a result of mutually reinforcing policies oriented towards a common goal, improvements in policy coherence should enhance CFSP effectiveness. Similarly, in the case of vertical coherence, where the member states are able to maintain a single voice, one might expect the EU to have an increased influence in that policy area, for example, regarding the abolition of the death penalty (Manners, 2002). As put by Joseph Jupille (1999: 409) ‘The EU can decisively shape international outcomes by concentrating the weight of its . . . member states on a single substantive position and rendering that position critical to any internationally negotiated agreement.’ Conversely, a lack of coherence among policies or its member states can be a key factor undermining the effectiveness of EU policy. However, as Missiroli has argued (2001: 82), this assumption ‘is more intuitive that well founded, given that European foreign policy has often achieved unanimity at the expense of effectiveness and that, in general, a policy can be effective without necessarily being consistent’. Thus, coherence does not always guarantee effectiveness. For instance, in his study on the EU’s support for the International Criminal Court (ICC), Thomas (2012) found that despite the fact that the EU demonstrated considerable coherence with the member states achieving an agreement on the issue of ICC ‘non-surrender agreements’, it failed to have any visible impact on third states. He concludes that although coherence might be a necessary condition for effectiveness, it might not be a sufficient one. According to Thomas, coherence does not guarantee that the EU will be able to punch above its weight politically. On the other hand, effectiveness might be hampered on some occasions in the name of a unitary action. This might result in a slow response in the best of cases, a policy being watered down, ambiguous declarations – the response of the EU to the declaration of the independence of Kosovo constitutes a case in point – or inaction, in the worst case. The contrary is also true. Sometimes, the EU has privileged effectiveness over the pursuit of coherence.

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Inconsistencies between EU objectives and EU short-term policies, for example, supporting or not censuring authoritarian governments, have been justified as a way of achieving other EU goals in the long term (regional stability, security, democratic transition). The creation of the Contact Group and other ‘coalitions of the willing’ have also been justified in terms of effectiveness despite the fact that they have undermined the EU’s internal cohesion. Finally, as I will show in the case of CFSP activities in Bosnia, effectiveness has sometimes clashed with coherence. On some occasions (e.g. decisions on military intervention), the requirements for a unitary (coherent) action have undermined CFSP effectiveness and the credibility of the EU; on other occasions, the need for flexibility in the EU (e.g. constructive abstention, enhanced cooperation) has made it difficult to achieve coherence amongst all the member states’ positions. Moreover, the need for new instruments and/or units to improve the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign and security policy has put enormous pressures on the CFSP to achieve coherence. In sum, given the fact that it is hard to establish a clear causal relationship between effectiveness and coherence, in this study I make the case that these two concepts should be assessed in a separate manner, although possible interactions between the two will be noted when relevant. Having made this clarification, the next section looks at the issue of coherence, its definition, different categories and the political and academic debates surrounding this concept.

Coherence Definition Before examining the question of coherence in EU foreign policy, it is worth pausing on the meaning of this concept. Although referred to by many academics as ‘consistency’ (Krenzler and Schneider, 1997; Nuttall, 2001, 2005), this study employs the term ‘coherence’. That said, the term ‘consistency’ also has a status in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). While in its English version, this term is preferred,1 in the other versions of the treaty, the term used is coherence: ‘cohérence’ for the French version, ‘kohärenz’ for the German version, ‘coherencia’ for the Spanish version, and so forth. The fact that these two terms can be found in different versions of the TEU leads to the question of whether there is any difference between them, and if so, which term should be used to analyse EU foreign policy. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘coherence’ means ‘the action or fact of sticking together and remaining united in arguments’, as well as ‘logical connection or relation; congruity, consistency. Harmonious connexion of the several parts, so that the whole “hangs together”’ (Simpson and Weiner, 1989, Vol. III: 449). On the other hand ‘consistency’ implies ‘the

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quality, state or fact of being consistent; agreement, harmony, compatibility’ (Simpson and Weiner, 1989, Vol. III: 773). Therefore, in the normal sense, there is no substantive difference between these two terms and they could be used interchangeably. From a political point of view, the distinction also appears negligible. Usually, consistency and coherence have been used to articulate similar concerns. Both terms express the need for the EU to speak with one voice in the international scene through coordinated and unitary actions. However, in recent years, the term coherence has become increasingly privileged, as the discussions within the European Convention illustrate (European Convention, 2002). Numerous academic studies that have analysed the concept of coherence in legal terms maintain, however, that there is a difference. For some authors, the two terms, albeit related, have differences of meaning (Monar; 1997a; Tietje, 1997; Missiroli, 2001; Medina Abellán, 2002). In other words, the wording of the Treaty in the various official languages is somewhat confusing, but not insignificant. According to this literature, consistency implies the absence of contradictions and this concept has a negative and static sense. For its part, coherence involves positive interactions, generating synergies between policies or institutions. In other words, two policies would be coherent if they are mutually reinforcing. Ultimately, it means that it would be possible to distinguish different degrees of coherence (something can be more or less coherent), whereas consistency does not allow for such a distinction (it is either consistent or not) (Missiroli 2001). Furthermore, a relationship between consistency and coherence can be established, with the former being a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the latter (Tietje, 1997). Consistency would thus be a minimal requirement, while coherence would constitute a higher standard for EU foreign policy. In this light, I take the term coherence to mean both consistency (minimal requirement) and coherence (a higher standard). Coherence can be defined as the lack of contradictions between policies/institutions/instruments, plus a variable degree of synergy as a result of policies/institutions/instruments working together in order to achieve a common objective.2 Categories of coherence In order to facilitate the assessment of coherence in practice, one should also note different categories of coherence. Two types of coherence have been often distinguished by scholars: horizontal coherence among EU policies, and vertical coherence among EU policies and the member states’ policies (Tietje, 1997: 211; Smith, 2003, 65–7; Smith, 2004: 211). Nevertheless, according to Simon Nuttall (2001, 2005), it would be better to establish a three-fold categorisation, which I will follow in the remainder of this book, between horizontal, institutional and vertical coherence:

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Horizontal coherence or coherence between different EU policies. The TEU refers to this type of coherence in article 21.3 (TEU Lisbon): ‘The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies.’ Thus, this article also points to the need to coordinate the EU’s internal and external policies. This category also applies to different elements of one policy, such as coherence between the civilian and military aspects of the CSDP. Institutional coherence means coherence between the two different bureaucratic bodies of the EU (the Council and the Commission), and basically between two decision-making systems: intergovernmental (unanimity) and communitarian (QMV). According to Nuttall (2005: 97), problems of coherence arise not because of different policy objectives (as is the case in horizontal coherence), but as a result of divergent approaches to the same problem by different bodies. In this way, the establishment of a double-hatted High Representative with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty represents a major attempt to improve institutional coherence. Vertical coherence refers to coherence between EU and national policies. In this case, the Treaty establishes a general obligation that member states ‘shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity’ (article 24.3, TEU Lisbon). However, there are no concrete provisions for the enforcement of this obligation.3

Problems of horizontal coherence are also experienced by the member states. For example, incoherence between agricultural, development and trade policies has been a constant in their external policies. By contrast, institutional coherence, between the communitarian and intergovernmental pillars, and vertical coherence, between national and EU policies, appear as unique features of EU external action; I shall therefore pay special attention to these two categories in this study. ‘Coherence, coherence, coherence’ Coherence has become a mantra in the EU’s official discourse. Academics and officials have repeatedly pointed out problems in the EU’s search for a

Box 3.1. Categories of coherence Horizontal coherence: coherence between EU policies. Institutional coherence: coherence between and within EU institutions. Vertical coherence: coherence between EU and member states’ policies.

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coherent and unitary voice in international politics. Coherence has also become politicised as it has been used to justify further institutional reform or particular policy solutions. To be sure, discussions about how to ensure coherence did not take place until the beginning of the 1970s, developing in parallel with the emergent role of the EU in international affairs. The earliest official concerns about coherence came to the surface with the birth of EPC. Both the Council and the Commission were aware of potential conflicts that could appear between EC and EPC policies. Therefore, both the Luxembourg Report (1970) and the Copenhagen Report (1973) mentioned the requirement of coherence. The latter stated that the EPC machinery should assume its tasks keeping ‘in mind, inter alia, the implications for and the effects of, in the field of international politics, Community policies under construction’ (Hill and Smith, 2000: 88). In the years that followed, the terms of coherence and consistency would be incorporated into the ‘euro-jargon’ and become a recurrent issue in official debates. In fact, the problem of institutional coherence was more or less under control until the beginning of the 1980s, if only because the member states were strongly opposed to the use of communitarian instruments to implement EPC. Similarly, the Commission tried to avoid contamination of the Community pillar with intergovernmental practices (Nuttall, 2000: 25–7). However, the growing interdependence and the development of economic sanctions as an instrument of EPC increased interferences and the risk of overlap. During this decade, certain events exemplified the incoherence and weakness of EPC, especially because of unilateral policies and the conflicting interests of member states: the unilateral action of France during 1982 regarding the Middle East (Soetendorp, 1999: 110), for example, or the case of the Falklands War and the reluctance of Ireland and Italy to adhere to a common position. South Africa was also an example of incoherence at least until the end of the 1980s because of the dissension between the member states (White, 2001: 84–93). All these episodes, which took place in parallel with the discussion of the SEA and the institutionalisation of EPC, increased concerns and demands for a more coherent external action. Hence, the SEA (1986) introduced some dispositions to ensure that the EC spoke with one voice in international relations – it was the first time the word ‘consistency’ appeared in a legal document. For instance, the SEA introduced a general obligation of coherence between economic and foreign policies (article 30.5, SEA); however, it did not put in place any real mechanisms to ensure it on the ground. At the same time, as I noted in the previous chapter, this document institutionalised the separation between EPC and EC policies, formalising two different procedures, bureaucracies and cultures which, in the long term, would complicate the overall requirement of coherence. The Maastricht Treaty did not improve matters and again reflected the politics of coherence. Discussions at the Intergovernmental Conference of 1991 about how to tackle the question of coherence were mainly determined

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by disagreements between those defending a supranational project and those in favour of an intergovernmental vision of the process of European integration. Eventually, these differences led to the characteristic ambiguity of the Maastricht Treaty. Even so, it widened the concept of coherence and laid out some provisions on coherence between EU policies (inter and across pillars) and between the Union’s and the member states’ policies, guaranteed by a loyalty clause (article J.1.4., TEU Maastricht). Innovations introduced at this stage such as the establishment of a single institutional framework, the incorporation of the EPC Secretariat within the Council Secretariat General and the new instrument of joint actions aimed at increasing the coherence and wherewithal of the EU in the international scene. However, the establishment of three pillars symbolised the distinction between supranational and intergovernmental policies and procedures, reinforcing existing divisions. Thus, in spite of the innovations introduced in the TEU, the capabilities of the EU were soon considered insufficient for the EU to fulfil its desired role in the international arena. Problems of coordination among EC and CFSP policies were recurrent and the Union remained cacophonous to external parties. Moreover, the fact that more objectives, instruments and mechanisms were created was seen as making it more difficult to achieve coherence. The development of external action entailed the deployment of numerous instruments in different areas that were not always compatible, and sometimes, the aims of economic, cooperation and security policies simply clashed (Holland, 2002). In addition to the dynamics of the integration process, a series of unexpected and traumatic events combined to challenge EU external action. The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the emergence of post-communist states in Eastern Europe, and the Yugoslav wars certainly tested EU external action structures. In particular, Yugoslavia became the bête noire of the CFSP during the 1990s (Piening, 1997: 194). However, the EU’s failure in Yugoslavia was only the tip of the iceberg. As Regelsberger and Wessels (1996: 29) put it, ‘The handling of the Yugoslavian case is perceived not as an exception to otherwise positive experiences but as highlighting structural deficiencies.’ Most of these deficiencies had to do with the lack of coherence. These criticisms promoted subsequent institutional reforms in the Amsterdam Treaty. To solve problems of visibility and continuity, the Treaty of Amsterdam created the post of the High Representative. Yet this figure, a senior official reporting to the Council and Presidency, was still considered by some as inadequate to solve problems of EU visibility and representation since it did not rationalise EU external representation, but increased the number of actors claiming to represent the EU. Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapter, the final decision to establish this post also reflected different views among the member states regarding the role this figure should play in EU foreign policy. In European institutions, concerns regarding coherence – perceived as a condition for the Union to be a fully-fledged inter-

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national actor – rather than fading away, intensified with time. For instance, the European Council at Helsinki (December 1999) invited the Council of Ministers ‘to take the necessary steps to ensure that optimum use was made of the various means at the Union’s disposal for more effective and comprehensive external action by the Union’. Moreover, the Council adopted some measures to ensure coherence and effectiveness in specific policies: development, human rights, conflict prevention and environmental policies (e.g. Development Council, 1997; Secretary General/High Representative and Commission, 2000b). For its part, the Commission embarked on an important reform of its external relations service as part of a more impressive reform after the debacle of the Santer Commission. Despite these efforts, the development of the CSDP and the increasing role of the Council Secretariat in this area would lead to more tensions between the Commission and the Council and to inter-pillar frictions in areas of crisis management and security sector reform, in particular. The negotiations on the Nice Treaty, which focused mainly on institutional reform to prepare the EU for the 2004 enlargement, did not really tackle these problems. It was not until the next round of institutional reform, with the launch of the European Convention in 2002, that issues of coherence were directly addressed. The shortfalls detected in the external action of the EU obliged the Convention to establish a separate Working Group on External Action. The Convention members found early agreement that it was ‘important for the EU to be a strong, effective and efficient player on the international scene’ (quoted in Duke, 2003: 3). The Convention devoted considerable time to discussing these issues and numerous articles of the Constitutional draft were designed to enhance the coherence of EU external action (European Convention, 2002). Similarly, the European Security Strategy adopted at the end of 2003 emphasised the need for the EU to be ‘more capable’ and to take robust action, and added that ‘Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states’ (European Council, 2003b: 11, 13). The Lisbon Treaty, like its ill-fated predecessor the Constitutional Treaty, brought about significant changes in this regard, the most important of all being the creation of a double-hatted High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. The rationale for the establishment of this post was to end the problems of incoherence between the Commission and the Council in the area of external relations (Whitman and Juncos, 2009; Ashton, 2010). However, assessments of whether these institutional provisions will improve coherence are still mixed (Donnelly, 2010; Menon, 2011b; Duke, 2012). While the Lisbon Treaty has officially abolished the pillar structure and the role of the Presidency in the CFSP, the creation of a new semi-permanent President of the European Council has made it more difficult to coordinate the external representation of the EU. In sum, the lack of coherence within Union activities has become a

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recurrent concern among observers of the EU’s external action, especially since the establishment of the tri-pillar structure under the Maastricht Treaty. To some extent, one might argue that the EU has become a victim of its own success: its increasing functional and institutional complexity has made it hard to develop a coherent external action. Another problem has to do with the fact that the EU has reached the limits of what Dave Allen called ‘governance without government’. In other words, the EU does not possess the sort of centralised governmental institutions ‘capable of identifying, selecting, and implementing a coherent set of objectives that could be legitimised as being in the European interest’ (Allen, 1998: 47). However, one needs to remember that problems regarding conflicting external policies and the lack of coordination of internal bureaucracies are not exclusive to EU foreign policy. Even the most centralised governments in the world are unable or unwilling to solve these problems (Allison and Zelikow, 1999). The same can be said of other intergovernmental organisations. For instance, problems of coherence among different UN actors and agencies led to significant changes, towards a more ‘integrative’ approach, in the way the UN deals with its peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions (Campbell, 2008). In the area of development, in particular, coherence has also been an oft-repeated issue (Carbone, 2008). One might even argue that perfect or absolute coherence would seem impossible in anything other than a pure dictatorship (Nuttall, 2005: 93). Even in the most centralised systems problems of coherence arise not only because of faults in institutional design, but also because of organisational culture, the boundaries of rationality or turf battles between departments and units within a government or organisation (see, for instance, Allison and Zelikow, 1999). A certain measure of incoherence thus remains inevitable in a pluralist system. If that is the case, why has coherence continued to receive so much attention at the EU level? First, as I discussed earlier in this chapter, coherence has been conceived as a prerequisite for a more effective external action. As argued by Ben Tonra (2001: 37), ‘The commitment of most Member State governments to the Union’s CFSP is rooted in their belief that coordinated and concerted collective action is more effective than the disparate foreign policy efforts of the Member States acting individually.’ Thus, in the eyes of the member states, not only is there a positive relationship between coherence and effectiveness, but the requisite of coherence constitutes a legitimising factor for EU foreign policy cooperation. For others, coherence goes beyond this pragmatic approach to cooperation and it is linked to the politics of integration. In fact, Gauttier (2004: 24) argues that coherence is ‘subject to eminently political parameters regarding the different forms European construction may take on’ and symbolised by the divide between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. In most EU documents the quest for coherence is associated with other goals such as ‘speaking with one voice’, ‘unity’, ‘solidarity’. As Carmen Gebhard (2011: 110) has put it, this concept is ‘positively loaded in

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the sense that it directly appeals to the very core objectives of integration’. This implies that the search for coherence is inherently political, not only regarding what objectives to achieve, but also regarding who does the coordination. In other words, coherence demands some political and bureaucratic hierarchisation and thus involves power struggles over competing objectives and competencies – this refers to what Nuttall (2005) calls the ‘malign’ understanding of coherence.4 These power struggles have been played out between the CFSP and the EC in the security area (e.g. security sector reform, crisis management) and are evident in the turf battles between the Council and the Commission and between EU institutions and the member states. For instance, by assigning the Commission the responsibility (together with the Council) for ensuring consistency between economic and foreign policies, the SEA legitimised the role of the Commission in EPC matters. The Lisbon Treaty, on the other hand, adds another actor to the picture, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who according to article 18.4 (TEU Lisbon) ‘shall ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action’. Although this could be seen as a sign of the increasing significance of this institutional actor, the Treaty also reminds us in article 21.3 (TEU Lisbon) that the High Representative shall ‘assist’ the Commission and the Council in their task to ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action (see also Chapter 2). How these different actors might cooperate in achieving this goal is however left unanswered and could become the subject of turf battles. Thus, the search for coherence can be seen as an eminently political activity used to justify particular institutional trajectories in the interest of particular actors. An examination of the use of the concept of effectiveness in EU foreign policy also reveals similar issues, but let us first define this term.

Effectiveness Definition As Baldwin reminds us, the study of foreign policy has usually concentrated on the policy process to the neglect of outcome (Baldwin, 2000: 167). This is even truer in the case of European foreign policy where procedures have often been considered as a substitute for policy. It is no surprise therefore that the concept of effectiveness has received little attention in the CFSP literature to date. While scholars have devised different terms that aim to capture the role of the EU in international affairs (e.g. civilian or normative power), a framework for the evaluation of effectiveness has not yet been developed. Analysts have tended to evaluate EU external action in terms of failure or success (Jørgensen, 1998: 87). These judgements can suggest powerful images, especially when talking about failure; yet it is problematic to judge EU actions in this way. Failure/success assessments are too general and too simplistic.

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The reality is never so simple and thus an assessment of EU foreign policy looking at different degrees of effectiveness seems more appropriate. Moreover, the concept of effectiveness has generally been taken at face value by academics, as well as in official documents. The CFSP has often been judged by observers to be ‘effective’/‘ineffective’, but without explicitly stating what the criteria for effectiveness are. Therefore, this study argues that a framework for the evaluation of effectiveness is required if one wants to make sense of the past and future performance of the EU’s foreign policy. Although not coterminous with effectiveness, the concepts of presence and actorness introduce some useful yardsticks in this regard. First, to be effective, the EU should have a presence, i.e. it should have the capacity to act and mobilise resources, and it ought to be recognised by outsiders and shape their expectations and perceptions (Allen and Smith, 1990, 1998). Secondly, to be effective, the EU has to deploy a purposive action reflecting the political will of the member states to define certain objectives, matched by the necessary resources and institutional capacities. These criteria amount to a measurement of actorness (Sjostedt, 1977; Bretherton and Vogler, 1999). The problem with concepts such as presence or actorness is that they tell us more about the European Union itself (what role, what structural requirements) than about the quality of the actions it undertakes. Presence and actorness do not allow for an analysis of to what extend the European Union fulfils its international responsibilities and influences the external environment. Ron Ginsberg (2001) took a first step in this direction with his focus on impact; that is, the effects of European foreign policy actions or outcomes on nonmember states and international politics. Yet, as Ginsberg acknowledged, ‘External political impact is a requirement for, but not a guarantee of, external political effectiveness’ (2001: 279). Political impact does not consider the link between external influence and attainment of objectives. In sum, both actorness and impact are necessary, but not sufficient conditions of effectiveness. Effectiveness is thus more than presence, actorness or just having an external political impact. The key distinction between these concepts and that of effectiveness is that the latter takes into account the degree of achievement of intended goals. Thus, as in public policy analysis, effectiveness in the CFSP relates to goal attainment (Vedung, 1999: 36–7). The concept of effectiveness also provides us with a better tool to assess the EU’s international performance and, in particular, to reject categorical assessments of the CFSP/CSDP. As put by Simon, ‘Goal attainment is a matter of degree’ (quoted in Baldwin, 2000: 173). It seems more meaningful to ask to what extent the CFSP has been effective rather than to ask the question of whether it has been effective or not. Sjostedt (1977: 14) suggested something similar to assess the EU’s actor capability: ‘It is not necessary to assume that the capacity of being able to behave as an international actor is something indivisible, some sort of absolute quality which one has or has not . . . the capacity of being an actor is

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most appropriately conceived of as a variable property which the Community may possess to a greater or lesser extent.’ Therefore, effectiveness is conceived here in terms of a scale or gradation. The CFSP will be described as being more or less effective. Defined as ‘goal attainment’, effectiveness takes into account not only outputs (decision-making), but also outcomes (implementation), analysing the whole policy process. An effective external action is not only an action that achieves the planned objectives, but also the action that achieves the objectives in the way it was planned.5 I will thus examine both the decisionmaking process and the implementation level, even though it might sometimes be difficult to establish a clear-cut distinction between the two. For example, a decision can be an action in itself, such as in the case of démarches; whereas in the case of non-decisions (see Chapter 4 and 5), the implementation phase is missing; and most of the time, the implementation process will feed back (and have an impact) on the decision-making process (Ginsberg, 2001). As part of the decision-making level, one should assess the EU’s ability to reach a decision, as well as the substance/content of the decision itself. Effectiveness will also be analysed at the implementation level. Looking at policy implementation is relevant for several reasons. Firstly, effective decision-making is seen as a necessary, but not sufficient condition for an effective implementation of the CFSP. One cannot expect that once a decision is taken, it will automatically produce the expected results. Implementation can deviate from what was projected by policy-makers and produce a different outcome. Secondly, effective implementation (trying to achieve the objectives in the way it was planned) is not always synonymous with effectiveness: ‘even where implementation of a policy takes place as planned, it may well not lead to the predicted or anticipated results’ (Webber and Smith, 2002: 79–80). Even a fully implemented policy can be ineffective because of unintended consequences or changes in the international context. Not only the nature of foreign policy, but also the uncertainties and complexities of the international arena, make it extremely difficult to control all the variables that can affect policy implementation. Therefore, any analysis of CFSP performance will have to take into account the impact of exogenous factors. Of relevance in this case is the impact of local politics as I will discuss below. One of the key problems about defining effectiveness as goal attainment refers to how to determine the criteria against which effectiveness is to be evaluated. Because effectiveness is intrinsically political, assessments of effectiveness will depend on who sets the evaluation criteria. Thus, European foreign policy objectives can be set up by external observers (public opinion, third states, academics) or internally by EU policy-makers and, even in those cases, it is possible to find differing assessments. External evaluations of the EU can vary according to the target country concerned (Chaban et al., 2006; Fioramonti and Lucarelli, 2008). And within the EU, desirable objectives

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would differ between the Commission, the European Council, the European Parliament and the member states. In recognition of these problems, I consider effectiveness against two sets of objectives. First, a narrow conception of effectiveness will examine whether a CFSP initiative has achieved its declared aims or mandate. This is an internal assessment or ‘internal effectiveness’, in the sense that objectives are internally fixed by EU actors, and presumably, with the exclusive participation of EU elites (or in the best case, with narrow participation of EU citizens). In the case of the CFSP, decisions are taken by the member states, although other EU institutions such as the Commission, the High Representative or the European Parliament, might also have an impact on the decision. Evaluating the internal effectiveness of the CFSP depends, among other things, on which internally defined objectives the CFSP is intended to achieve. To be sure, the main purpose behind the establishment of a system of foreign policy cooperation in the 1970s was not to solve all the world’s problems, but to promote internal cohesion amongst member states and to avoid disagreements on foreign policy issues that could damage economic integration. It was a modest, but still difficult, attempt to consult and coordinate foreign policies among European states. As this cooperative network developed, other objectives were added to the original one. Thus, EPC and, later on, the CFSP were to assert the EU’s international identity (i.e. to promote a common voice in the international scene) and to advance the EU’s interests and values worldwide (articles 3 and 21, TEU Lisbon). However, the member states have not been able to agree on specific ‘European interests’, but only general (longterm) CFSP objectives. Since CFSP long-term objectives are too broad to assess CFSP internal effectiveness, in the empirical analysis I will mostly be guided by CFSP short-term objectives (as established in Country strategy papers, Council declarations, decisions, joint actions, etc.), even if some references to mid- and long-term objectives will also be made. The dangers of using internal assessments of effectiveness are all too obvious. One problem has to do with the fact that policy-makers might set several objectives with regard to a particular target, complicating any evaluation of effectiveness (Baldwin, 2000: 173). What happens when one of the goals has been achieved but not the others? Do we consider that initiative as being overtly effective? Can we establish a hierarchy of objectives? This might not be possible in all cases. Besides these problems, the obvious problem is that modest, narrow or ambiguously defined objectives might be declared internally effective (as a kind of public diplomacy exercise), even when the initiative has a limited or even negative impact on the target situation itself (Rodt, 2010: 3). For this reason, I also consider a broader understanding of effectiveness or ‘external effectiveness’. In so doing this study uses academic criteria to evaluate effectiveness in terms of the achievement of externally defined goals.

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In particular, I examine the EU’s contribution to conflict resolution, i.e. to what extent the EU has contributed to the goal of conflict resolution in the case of Bosnia.6 I define conflict resolution not just as bringing an end to an armed conflict, but as an intervention whereby ‘the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed and transformed. This implies that behaviour is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile, and the structure of the conflict has been changed’ (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 29). In this sense, conflict resolution includes activities carried out under the labels of conflict prevention (civilian and military), crisis management and peacebuilding. This approach is not without its problems though. As noted by Ramsbotham et al. (2005: 29), a problem linked to this definition of conflict resolution is that it refers both to the process itself (through which changes are brought about) and the completion of the process (the end result). Another methodological challenge results from the fact that it is difficult to isolate the EU’s contribution to conflict resolution, as the EU often intervenes alongside other domestic and international actors. While it is important to determine whether the EU’s practice matches its rhetoric (internal effectiveness), one also needs to assess the ability of the EU to prevent and manage violent conflict (external effectiveness). To paraphrase Ramsbotham et al. (2005: 317), the final criterion to determine whether EU foreign policy has been effective or not is ‘the verdict of those affected by it’. Moreover, a focus on the recipient end of EU foreign policy will help avoid charges of (neo-)imperialism which can certainly have a negative impact on the EU’s international image and credibility. In the next section, I trace the political and academic debate on the effectiveness of EU foreign policy to show how effectiveness is pregnant with meaning and is always subject to different interpretations depending on different political agendas and the focus of analysis.

Effectiveness and the eye of the beholder

While the definition I introduced above provides a useful starting point to judge the EU’s role in international politics, one also needs to take into account the multiple dimensions that compose EU foreign policy, as this might influence the outcome of any assessment (Jørgensen, 1998: 96). Assessments of EU foreign policy have in fact varied depending on the particular conceptualisation of the EU and its foreign policy adopted by the observer (as a state-like entity, an international organisation or sui generis), the components of the external action considered (CFSP/trade/development) and the actors included in the comparisons (US, other international organisations, member states). First, for many observers, the EU simply cannot have an effective common foreign policy because it does not fulfil the requirements of

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statehood. By contrast, if one takes the view that the EU is just an intergovernmental organisation, which allows its members to reach their goals in a cooperative manner, a different conclusion might be reached – in that light, the EU appears as a particularly effective regional organisation. The fact that the EU does not have a centralised authority with a single executive and an army has been the focus of a number of criticisms (Allen, 1998; Smith, 2002: 1–7). Moreover, the question of whether one can identify a genuine ‘European interest’ and which body is responsible for defining it at the EU level is also said to compound the EU’s ability to formulate and implement an effective foreign policy (Allen, 1998). However, as has been indicated elsewhere (Smith, 2002: 6; Hix, 2005: 395), these problems are not exclusive to the EU; the majority of states and international organisations also suffer from them. The US, for instance, has failed on numerous occasions to reach its projected external goals – Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan provide obvious examples. Second, assessments of the EU’s foreign policy have also varied according to the activity concerned. The reduction of EU foreign policy to the CFSP has often led to pessimistic evaluations (Patten, 2001; Smith, 2002: 8–9). By contrast, analyses focusing on the external economic activities of the Union tend to be more positive, even in the context of the economic and financial crisis. Even if problems of (in)effectiveness are common to all dimensions of policy, when the EU is judged solely in relation to its economic power it is believed to be an important actor in world politics (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; Hix, 2005: 404) – or, at least, more important in relative terms. For instance, Hill (1990) argued that the EU could be seen as a ‘power bloc’ in the world economy system. Zielonka (1998a: 5) considered the EU to be a ‘strong and dynamic actor’ regarding economic activities, but ‘in a state of paralysis’ regarding security and diplomacy. In general, the poor performance of the second pillar has received numerous criticisms. For instance, Rummel and Wiedemann (1998: 53) considered that the CFSP ‘is neither common, nor foreign, nor dealing with security, nor can be called a policy’. As bluntly summarised by Peterson (1998: 11), the meagre performance of the CFSP has also made it difficult to progress in other areas: ‘there seems little question that the CFSP [has not made] the EU a more important international actor, and may even have damaged its reputation as an international actor’. Although more than a decade has passed since this assessment, there are still serious concerns about the EU’s international actorness (Toje, 2008; Krotz, 2009). At other times, and linked to the state-like model, criticisms have focused on the lack of military power, especially in comparison to the US and NATO. In the 1980s, Hedley Bull (1983: 151) argued that ‘Europe is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one’ because it does not have real power, that is military power. Its influence in the international arena would hinge on the support of military power provided by other actors.

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By contrast, according to the idea of ‘civilian power’ coined by Duchêne (1973), given growing economic interdependence the only feasible prospect for the EC to play a significant role in world politics was to emerge as a world economic power, using economic and diplomatic tools to promote its interests and values. From this viewpoint, the EU is seen as more effective and coherent in two principal domains. First, in the deployment of ‘soft security’ instruments rather than in ‘hard security’; and second, the EU is seen to be more effective and coherent in long-term situations than in solving conflicts in the short term. This perception of the EU as a civilian power implies that civilian and economic activities are seen to be generally more effective, and that the achievement of military power is neither essential nor desirable (Zielonka, 1998a; Smith, 2000; Manners, 2002). Unlike the US, the Union gives preference to rewards and incentives rather than threats and punishments. In this vein, Hazel Smith (2002) affirmed that the EU was better equipped to provide the ‘butter’, while the US concentrated on the ‘guns’. However, Robert Kagan (2002) has argued that the EU has favoured multilateral and diplomatic methods, not because it believes in the superiority of those practices, but because it is weak; whereas the US has privileged military instruments because it has the capabilities to do so. The failures in the Balkans were to change this picture to some extent. In particular, the perceived effectiveness of NATO’s use of force in Bosnia and Kosovo provided a justification for the development of an EU military capability and among national and EU policy-makers, the idea that an effective external action required the development of military capabilities became more engrained. According to the St Malo Declaration, The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage . . . To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. (Hill and Smith, 2000: 243)

The European Security Strategy backed this argument by insisting that the EU has to be ready to engage, when necessary, in ‘robust intervention’, using all the instruments at its disposal, including military ones (European Council, 2003b: 11). However, this does not mean that policy-makers attach less importance to the EU’s civilian capabilities. For instance, the EU is believed to be well placed to engage in conflict prevention and to treat the root causes of conflicts (European Council, 2003b). It is argued that the wide range of instruments at its disposal allows the Union to effectively manage pre- and post-conflict situations, as part of a ‘comprehensive approach’. Furthermore, the EU is said to be more effective in long-term initiatives aiming to maintain stability, peace and economic development than in the short-term management of conflicts. Yet while the thrust of the debate has changed with the development of the CSDP, the gap between Europe and the US as far as

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military capabilities is concerned remains, and this is often linked to the EU’s (poor) performance in international crises (Witney, 2008; Menon, 2011b). In sum, different conclusions about effectiveness have been drawn by policymakers and scholars according to the elements incorporated into the analysis: the finalité politique behind the process of integration (sui generis versus statelike model), the activities (CFSP/trade/development), the actors included in the comparisons (US, other international organisations), or the period of time selected (short/long term). Finally, it is also worth noting that ‘effectiveness’ – or ‘success’ as policymakers usually refer to it – has become a very sensitive political matter in EU crisis management for different reasons. First, effectiveness contributes to legitimising the EU’s role as an international security actor. Since the EU has only recently developed its military and civilian crisis management capabilities, each operation the EU conducts becomes a test case not only for the EU’s capability to launch operations in a crisis area, but for the EU’s ability to act in world politics more generally. Hence it is no surprise that EU policymakers were very cautious when choosing the scenarios in which to deploy the EU’s first CSDP operations. This is also compounded by the fact that there is no agreement among the member states on the role of the EU as a security actor. Thus, a failure would make subsequent agreement among the member states more difficult. Also, given some of the problems in dealing with conflict in the past (chiefly in the Balkans), the EU has been keen to prove to others that it can effectively deploy and run a crisis management operation. Central to this is also the assumption that the EU’s own security is a function of its capacity to provide security beyond its borders. For all these reasons, the EU has been quick to declare a ‘success’ each of the CSDP missions that it has deployed as the case of Bosnia will illustrate.

Intergovernmental, bureaucratic and local politics

Linked to the previous point, in this section I contend that not only are coherence and effectiveness eminently political concepts, but also that any examination of coherence and effectiveness needs to take into account the role politics has played in the formulation and implementation of a common foreign and security policy and the impact intergovernmental, bureaucratic and local politics have had on CFSP coherence and effectiveness. As far as intergovernmental politics are concerned, it has been argued that, in the case of the CSDP, ‘Member States have engaged in almost perpetual conflict over the nature of this policy area . . . Such tensions led to continual pressures on the prevailing institutional structure. Constant contestation over institutional form has thus translated into pressure for institutional evolution’ (Menon, 2011a: 89). Intergovernmental politics have also shaped institutional structures and policy outcomes through their impact

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on the institutionalisation of learning. That is to say, lessons learned have not been institutionalised in some instances because of national interests. Intergovernmental politics also appear as a key factor explaining problems of coherence and effectiveness. For instance, Ginsberg acknowledges that ‘When national foreign policy positions on a given issue are too diverse to be fashioned into a European one . . . the EU will be unable to act in international politics’ (2001: 276). In general, these difficulties are related to the unwillingness of the member states to accept common policies. Unilateral actions have been frequent in the past, damaging the image of the Union inside and outside its borders. With this conduct, European states have appeared as ‘inconsistant [sic] and divided’ (Hill, 1990: 49). Inaction and ambiguity can also be the result of divergent national interests. When national representatives were asked about which was the main obstacle for a coherent and effective CFSP/ESDP, 53.6 per cent of respondents referred to ‘divergences among member states’ interests’, while 25 per cent identified ‘inappropriate institutions’ and 17.9 per cent ‘the lack of a common identity’.7 In short, a key problem in implementing an effective and coherent CFSP is that this policy has to coexist with the foreign policies of member states pursuing their own interest in the same arenas as the EU. Bureaucratic politics also need to be added to the picture. According to the bureaucratic politics approach, decisions are the product of behind-thescenes bureaucratic struggles (Halperin, 1974; Allison and Zelikow, 1999; Hill, 2003: 85–92). Each bureaucratic organisation has their own specific interests (often in the form of increasing competences, size, budget, prestige) that they will seek to promote resulting in constant competition among organisations. In the EU, scholars have long identified conflicts between and within EU institutions (Christiansen, 2001), and in particular between the Council and the Commission as evidence of bureaucratic turf wars. For example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) judgement best exemplifies the efforts by the Commission to protect its traditional field of competence from what was considered an aggressive takeover by the Council. The ECJ found that the Council had indeed encroached upon Community competence when it provided financial and technical assistance to ECOWAS in the fight against small arms and light weapons. As this example shows, one of the main sources of incoherence is the pillar division, which also reinforces the development of two different procedures and two different bureaucratic cultures (Nuttall, 2000; Winn and Lord, 2001). Rummel and Wiedemann (1998) criticised the three-pillar structure because it undermined the coherence and unity of EU foreign policy, separated policies in an artificial way and hindered interactions between EU institutions. As discussed in the previous chapter, with the development of the CSDP, rivalries between the Commission and the Council Secretariat have increased, in an attempt to protect (in the case of the Commission) or expand (in the case of the Council Secretariat) their competencies in the field of

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civilian crisis management (Klein, 2010). Although the Lisbon Treaty has formally abolished the pillar structure, it has not done away with the tensions between Commission and Council bodies. Finally, one also needs to consider the impact of local politics: the role that political conflict among local elites might have on the implementation of the CFSP. Obviously, the CFSP is not implemented in a vacuum and thus the political climate (from latent conflict to open war) in the target country is of utmost importance. For instance, non-cooperative elites might obstruct CFSP initiatives in order to safeguard their political and/or economic interests. This is because, despite attempts to portray some EU initiatives as technocratic and/or neutral, CFSP initiatives are inherently political. They touch upon highly sensitive issues such as who exercises the monopoly over the use of force or control over a given territory, affecting the balance of power among conflict parties. By promoting a specific policy, the EU empowers and disempowers one side or the other of any given conflict (Juncos, 2011b). The role of intergovernmental, bureaucratic and local politics will be explored in more detail in the case of Bosnia in the following chapters.

Conclusion

As far as the EU’s achievements in the international scene are concerned, official and academic views have been noticeably varied. However, from the most pessimistic positions to those that underscore partial successes (for example, in ‘low politics’ or ‘soft security’ policies), there seems to be a commonly held view that problems of coherence and effectiveness have hindered EU external action, and more particularly the CFSP. Although there is widespread acceptance that the Union enjoys international presence, this presence shows numerous problems of effectiveness and coherence. Countless failures of the EU in coping with international conflicts have alarmed external observers and institutional reforms have not dispelled these concerns. On the contrary, the increasing complexity of the CFSP institutional architecture and the functional and geographical broadening of its activities seem to have exacerbated anxieties. Thus, incoherence and ineffectiveness are regarded both by academics and politicians as persistent obstacles in the way of advancing the EU’s presence and actorness. In the remainder of this book I attempt to ascertain to what extent this assessment is valid, concentrating on an examination of CFSP activities in Bosnia. In other words, has the increasing institutionalisation described in Chapter 2 led to increasing coherence and effectiveness of the CFSP in Bosnia? Aware of the limitations of any definition, as an attempt to delimitate complex realities, in this chapter I have proposed some working definitions for the concepts of coherence and effectiveness. To avoid simplistic judgements on coherence and effectiveness, I have suggested that a gradation, as

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well as a distinction between different categories of coherence and effectiveness, can allow for a better assessment of CFSP policies. By making explicit the criteria for evaluating coherence and effectiveness, I aim to provide a better framework for assessment of EU foreign policy. Coherence is thus understood not only as the lack of contradictions between policies, institutions and actors, but as the attainment of synergies. I also introduced a distinction between horizontal, vertical and institutional coherence. For its part, the concept of effectiveness as defined here can be helpful for the analysis of the EU’s international performance for several reasons. First, effectiveness does not anticipate any judgement on the direction of the process of integration (towards a state-like or another sui generis actor). Second, the concept of effectiveness presented above incorporates both internal and external criteria and thus avoids some of the pitfalls of one-sided evaluations. Third, by considering effectiveness as a matter of degree, I avoid simplistic judgements of failure/success of the CFSP. Furthermore, it is an attempt to keep away from explicit or implicit comparisons with other actors (member states, US, international organisations such as NATO or UN) that pervades the analysis of EU foreign policy. Finally, in this chapter I sought to bring to light the politics of coherence and effectiveness. Although not always acknowledged in official debates, discourses of coherence and effectiveness sustain particular political agendas behind the institutionalisation of the CFSP. As has become evident in this chapter, demands for increasing coherence and effectiveness have usually been accompanied by calls for further institutionalisation and Brusselisation. These institutional reforms do not only seek to promote a particular notion of ‘integration’, but they also empower some institutional actors over others. The concepts of coherence and effectiveness can also have a legitimising function both in the case of institutional actors and the EU’s role as an international security actor. In the following chapters I will apply the concepts of coherence and effectiveness and the categories discussed in this chapter to the CFSP activities in Bosnia since the beginning of the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation in 1991 to the most recent deployment of CSDP operations. The analysis will highlight the impact that institutionalisation processes and intergovernmental, bureaucratic and local politics have had on levels of coherence and effectiveness over time.

Notes 1

2

It should be noted that there is a reference to coherence in the context of the promotion of the EU’s democratic principles (article 11, TEU Lisbon). A previous reference to coherence in the context of enhanced cooperation (former article 27a, TEU Nice) has now disappeared. Coherence also involves complementarity and coordination, and for this reason, these two terms will be used sometimes to refer to specific aspects of coherence.

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Coordination implies the existence of institutional structures that facilitate communication and linkages between different actors (institutional bridges). Complementarity, meanwhile, refers to the perfect ‘matching’ of different policies, instruments or institutions working together, each of them adding some useful skills and/or features to the whole. Coherence not only has an internal dimension, but also an external one (Smith, 2003). Even when the formulation of policies is coherent within the Union, some policies may be applied differently according to which third country is concerned (problems of ‘double standards’). Nonetheless, this aspect of coherence is not examined since the empirical evidence draws on a single case study. Similarly, it has been argued that coherence has contributed to the politicisation and governmentalisation of humanitarian aid (Macrae and Leader, 2000; Duffield, 2007). For this reason, effectiveness is also related to efficiency and the appropriate use of available resources. For a discussion of alternative criteria in the case of conflict management, see Rodt (2010: 4–5). Online survey, Appendix.

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The ‘hour of Europe’? Struggling for peace in the Balkans The idea that Yugoslavia would be the test case of a more unified Europe and of new security institutions in the EC . . . arose before those institutions were well in place. Yugoslavia was to serve as a vehicle to create those institutions and force that unity, not as its beneficiary. (Woodward, 1995: 162)

Introduction

From the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, many European leaders echoed Jacques Poos in arguing that the ‘hour of Europe’ had come. Having been sidelined by the US during the Gulf War, European policy-makers were keen to step up their diplomatic efforts in Yugoslavia. For instance, Jacques Delors, the President of the European Commission, declared: ‘We do not interfere in American affairs. We hope they will have enough respect not to interfere in ours’ (cited in Zielonka, 1998a: 36). His statement summarised the high expectations about the development of a common European foreign policy – expectations which made subsequent failure even more evident and painful. The search for a negotiated solution that could stop the bloody conflict in former Yugoslavia was considered by both European and international observers to be the first test for the embryonic CFSP. However, for most of the duration of the conflict, the EU was forced to resort to the weak foreign policy machinery of EPC. In other words, institutionalisation was still low. Although the member states had agreed to enhance cooperation in the area of foreign policy with the SEA, the institutional framework remained weak. Given previous failed attempts in the area of security and defence – mainly, the European Defence Community in the 1950s and the Fouchet Plans in the 1960s – the development of EPC was initially an informal and strongly intergovernmental form of foreign policy cooperation. The institutional set-up of EPC consisted of a small secretariat supporting the role of the six-month rotating Presidency; the Troika system made up of the current, previous and past Presidency; and a dozen functional and geographical working groups under the responsibility of the Political Committee (PoCo). The involvement of other supranational institutions (the Commission and the European

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Parliament) was very limited and the ECJ did not have jurisdiction over foreign policy issues. The EC and the EPC systems remained formally apart as the member states tried to avoid the contamination of EPC with the EC’s procedures and rules (see Chapter 2). The Bosnian War, more than any other event, showed not just the institutional limitations of EPC, but also the difficulties of a multinational organisation agreeing and implementing a common policy. Overall, the role of the EC in the Bosnian War was quite intense during the first stage of the conflict, but it was progressively marginalised by other international actors such as the UN and, in particular, the US and the Contact Group. Nevertheless, this was the first time that the EC/EU had engaged in crisis management, putting in place innovative policy instruments like a monitoring mission, a peace conference, and Special Representatives to negotiate the ceasefires and peace agreements. It was also at the EC that a committee was first set to investigate the atrocities during the Bosnian War in January 1993, setting a precedent for the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Ginsberg, 2001: 69). The EU also played a significant role in the provision of humanitarian aid and imposing sanctions that were later supported by other international actors. In this chapter, I analyse EPC activities in three case studies: the EC Monitoring Mission, the Hague Peace Conference and the non-decision about military intervention. Both the decision-making and the implementation phases are explored, except in the case of the non-decision about military intervention where the implementation phase is, by definition, absent. At the decision-making level, the analysis will look at policy formulation and negotiation, as well as at whether the mandate, instruments and resources set up at this stage were appropriate to ensure a coherent and effective implementation. At the implementation phase, my aim will be to gauge how coherent a CFSP initiative was and to what extent the CFSP objectives were achieved. The aim of this chapter, as well as of Chapters 5 and 6, is to determine whether there is a correlation between the degree of EPC/CFSP institutionalisation and levels of coherence and effectiveness. In doing so, the analysis of the EU’s intervention in Bosnia will seek first to establish for each case study the degrees of coherence and effectiveness reached by CFSP activities, and second to determine which factors explain this state of affairs. Before moving to the three case studies, the chapter provides an overview of the EC’s role in the conflict during the period 1991–95.

European responses to the conflict in Yugoslavia

Relations between the EU and the Western Balkans date back to the Cold War. During this period, ties between the EC and the Yugoslavian Federation were closer than with any other Central and Eastern European country.

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Yugoslavia enjoyed significant preferential trade conditions with the EC. The EC and Yugoslavia had signed a Cooperation Agreement in 1980, and it was estimated that over 50 per cent of the country’s trade was with the EC (Edwards, 1992: 168). Accordingly, in the first stages of the crisis, the traditional instruments of the EC as a civilian power (economic assistance, prospects of association and membership) were brought to the table. It was expected that Yugoslavia would follow the steps of other Central and Eastern European countries in negotiating an Association Agreement and that this would help the process of democratisation. However, while the EC was negotiating a series of economic agreements with the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante Markovi´c, in the spring and summer of 1991, de facto the Federation had already collapsed under Slovene and Croat pressure. On 25 June 1991, the two republics declared their independence. The civilian and economic power of the EC had failed. It has been argued that the EC was too slow to react to the disintegration of the Federation and that economic incentives were offered too late, when the crisis in former Yugoslavia was irreversible (Woodward, 1995). The conflict broke out at a time when the attention of the EC and its member states was absorbed by other events: the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War. In this context, the geostrategic role that the Federation of Yugoslavia had played as a non-aligned country during the Cold War became less important (Woodward, 1995: 150; Holbrooke, 1998: 26). This together with deficient information about the situation in the Federation and an excess of confidence in its own power of attraction could explain the initial reaction of the EC (Vetschera and SmutekRiemer, 1994).1 During the following months the EC adopted a high profile, leading the international response to the conflict. On 28 June 1991 the European Council decided to send the Troika to mediate in the conflict that had just flared up in Slovenia when the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) launched an offensive against this republic in response to its attempt to secede from the Federation. The EC negotiators achieved the ceasefire which ended the war in Slovenia on 7 July 1991, the so-called Brioni Agreement, which was heralded as a success of the EC’s diplomacy, in turn raising internal and external expectations about the EC’s role in the conflict. Brioni should not be overestimated though. Indeed, the agreement served well Miloševi´c’s interests as there were no Serb minorities in Slovenia (Little and Silber, 1995: 164). In contrast, the attention of Miloševi´c moved to Croatia, where a significant Serb minority lived in the Krajina region. Thus, while the EC negotiators and the international community were still celebrating the conclusion of the Brioni Agreement, the JNA troops were heading for Croatia. Despite its limitations, the Brioni Agreement allowed for the deployment of the EC monitoring mission, which I will examine in the following section. EC diplomacy continued to be active during the following months. The

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EC adopted diplomatic and economic sanctions intended to force the parties to a negotiated solution. On 5 July 1991, the member states agreed on an embargo on all military material and threatened to suspend the EC’s aid to the Yugoslav republics. In August 1991, the Dutch Presidency sent the first EC Special Representative to negotiate with the parties on the ground, Ambassador Henri Wijnaendts, who was succeeded by Ambassador Jose Cutileiro when Portugal took over the Presidency. EC member states also agreed to the launch of an EC-sponsored peace conference (see below). However, as the conflict intensified, the EC was progressively marginalised by the intervention of other international actors, primarily the UN. With the failure of the EC Peace Conference at the end of 1991, the EC continued to play an important role in the diplomatic efforts, the implementation of sanctions and the provision of humanitarian aid, but its activities were increasingly carried out within the framework of the UN, including the ICFY and the peace negotiations led by Cyrus Vance and David Owen. A regime of sanctions was also approved by subsequent UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). Among others, UNSCR 757 (1992) of 30 May, imposing comprehensive sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and UNSCR 777 (1992) and 821 (1993) recommending the suspension of its membership of the UN and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The EC committed itself to assist in their implementation and it was also an important actor in the provision of humanitarian aid from the beginning of the conflict (Tonra, 2001: 235), while the member states supplied the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with troops. With the creation of the Contact Group in April 1994, the EU as an organisation became increasingly marginalised, causing bitterness among some of its member states (Owen, 1995; Neville-Jones, 1996/1997). It ought to be noted, however, that efforts were made to keep some illusion of EU involvement: David Owen, the ICFY Co-Chairman ‘appointed’ three experts from the UK, France and Germany to the Contact Group, briefed the Twelve, and then issued a COREU message de facto establishing the Contact Group (Owen, 1995: 279). From then onwards, the US and the Contact Group led the international effort in Bosnia, at a time when a growing consensus was emerging favouring military intervention by NATO. At Dayton, although the EU nominally co-hosted the talks and the new EU Co-Chairman of the ICFY, Carl Bilt, was invited to participate in the negotiations, the European delegation was virtually sidelined, with the US running the show (Neville-Jones, 1996/1997). In sum, during the war, the EC tried the full array of conflict management tools, with the exception of military force – which, as we will see below, constituted a crucial deficiency. The EC was involved in assisting the peace negotiations, dispatching monitors, imposing sanctions and contributing to the humanitarian effort. As will become more apparent in this chapter, the EU demonstrated a great deal of creative thinking, but that was insufficient to

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compensate for two key weaknesses: weak institutions and the lack of political will. First, although the EC’s external economic instruments played an important role in conflict prevention in the form of economic assistance and humanitarian aid, the EC lacked early warning capabilities and crisis management means in the form of deployable civilian and military operations. The EPC machinery was also ill-adapted to deal with complex crisis situations which required a great deal of urgency and expertise. Second, differences among the member states or the ‘clash of wills’ (Hodge and Grbin, 1996: 47) – which reflected different perceptions of the conflict, historical legacies and domestic interests – also contributed to undermining the coherence and effectiveness of EC action. In the following section, I will examine one of the first EC initiatives during the conflict, the ECMM.

The EC Monitoring Mission

The ECMM was the first crisis management operation organised by the EC/EU, long before the CSDP was established. It is also one of its less-known missions. Its origins can be found in the Brioni Agreement signed on 7 July 1991 that put to an end the ‘Ten Days War’ in Slovenia. During the first stages of the conflict, the CSCE was the first port of call, given the role it had played in confidence-building and mediation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. However, the complexity of the tasks, the intergovernmental nature of the organisation and the opposition from Russia and the Yugoslav Federation relegated the CSCE to a secondary role (Maloney, 1997: 27–8). At a CSCE meeting in Prague, it was agreed that the EC would take the lead in monitoring the implementation of the Brioni Agreement by sending an unarmed monitoring mission. A first contingent of around fifty monitors (including military personnel, diplomats and civilian experts) arrived in Slovenia and Croatia soon after the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding on 13 July. Canada, Sweden, Poland and Czechoslovakia also agreed to contribute to the operation. The monitors were dressed all in white and drove white vehicles with the EC’s flag and so they were commonly known as the ‘ice cream men’ (Little and Silber, 1995). Misha Glenny (1992: 158) writes that the monitors were ‘comforting but strange figures . . . It was as though they were emissaries from outer space who had been sent to save the human race from itself.’ The original task of the ECMM was to oversee the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia. As the war in Croatia escalated, the mission’s mandate was extended and revised to include monitoring of the (quickly broken) ceasefires in Croatia and it was then deployed to other Yugoslav republics. Unarmed ECMM monitors thus found themselves in the middle of a war zone in Croatia, and later on in Bosnia. In January 1992, an ECMM helicopter was shot down by the JNA, killing five monitors on board. This attack constituted

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‘a baptism by fire for the EC who – as an emerging, yet inexperience and illequipped, actor in international politics – had never before suffered the consequences of crisis management in a zone of war’ (Ginsberg, 2001: 69).2 Despite the increasingly challenging situation and the deployment of UN peacekeepers in Croatia after the signing of the Vance Plan, the EC decided to retain the ECMM on the ground as it played an early warning role. However, as relations with the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia worsened, the ECMM had to pull out of Bosnia in April–May 1992. At the same time, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania asked the EC to deploy monitors to their borders with Yugoslavia to avoid a spillover of the conflict to their countries. Hence, from a couple of dozen monitors in 1991, the mission reached its peak deployment in 1997 with around 600 monitors. The member states agreed to maintain the mission after the war, being the only EU instrument on the ground at the time, apart from the Commission Delegations. On 22 December 2000, the Council adopted a Joint Action establishing the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) as a successor of the ECMM (Council of the EU, 2000c). The EUMM had six regional centres in Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia (closed in 2004), Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro. It was officially closed down in December 2007. The following sections examine the coherence and effectiveness of this operation, especially during the early stages of the conflict. Coherence under the shadow of the Presidency The EPC institutional machinery accounts for some of the problems of coherence encountered by the mission. According to the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 13 July, the ECMM Head of Mission would be appointed by the member state holding the EC Presidency and would report directly to it. The EC Presidency would then inform the other member states of the findings of the ECMM. This arrangement was to cause a lot of organisational turmoil, with all the senior staff and the logistics section effectively changing every six months. To the logistical problems that this caused, one has to add problems of continuity and leadership (Landry, 1999: 4). Every time there was a change of Presidency, it would take the mission a couple of weeks to adapt to the new chain of command and operating procedures. Reliance on the rotating Presidency meant that operational objectives would also change depending on the country at the helm, and in line with its interest in the region. For instance, according to an ECMM official, [The] Greeks are overtly pursuing a national agenda with specific emphasis on reopening the Belgrade-Zagreb highway and miscellaneous smaller initiatives that would seem to be beneficial to the Serbs. [In] all fairness, it should be noted that . . . most nations were pursuing national agendas under the thin veneer of ECMM but the Greeks were perhaps the most blunt. (Quoted in Maloney, 1997: 44–5)

Small member states’ Presidencies were also criticised for failing to provide appropriate leadership to the mission: some officers for example complained of a leadership vacuum during the Belgian and Portuguese Presidencies (Maloney,

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1997: 42). Finally, there were also times when intergovernmental politics and the lack of consensus among the member states would also have a negative impact on the ECMM. According to Landry (1999: 5), ‘Even though the EU should have been talking with one voice, there were at times serious disagreements within the foreign ministries of the major EU countries, which had a direct impact on the leadership provided to the ECMM by the EU.’ Problems of institutional coherence were not an issue during this period, but became increasingly problematic at the end of the war, not only with other EU actors on the ground, but also with other international organisations.3 It would take several years until these problems were finally addressed, after the establishment of the post of High Representative in 1999. Apart from the symbolic change of name, the Joint Action on the EUMM adopted in 2000 introduced significant organisational changes. The new mission was to be directly responsible to the High Representative and report to the Council through the High Representative, rather than through the rotating Presidency, ensuring more continuity over time. The Head of Mission was to be appointed by the Council (although the Deputy Head of Mission was still seconded by the rotating Presidency). Pointing at the importance of organisational learning in this case, a concept paper on ‘EU Monitoring Missions’ adopted in 2003 recommended similar arrangements to those of the EUMM for future missions (Council of the EU, 2003b: 8). The limits of civilian power in a war zone According to the Memorandum of Understanding of 13 July, ECMM tasks were to help stabilise the ceasefire by monitoring the return of the JNA units to their barracks. The ECMM was also responsible for monitoring the suspension of the implementation of the declarations of independence for three months as agreed at Brioni and for monitoring the release and exchange of prisoners when necessary. Monitoring was defined in a limited sense as observing, evaluating and reporting, i.e. the mission was not charged with implementing the ceasefire agreement (which would have amounted to peacekeeping), but with monitoring its implementation. With the escalation of the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia, ECMM tasks were extended to monitor and report on the political, humanitarian and military situation, participate in confidence-building measures and assist humanitarian organisations. After the war, the mandate was slightly amended to include monitoring of refugee return, internally displaced persons and other inter-ethnic issues. Thus, one of the key features of this operation was its flexibility, adapting its mandate as the conflict developed and according to the needs on the ground. The mission was based on monitoring teams, rapidly deployable and that could easily perform different prevention and monitoring tasks depending on the situation. The information gathered by these monitoring teams was sent to the Coordinating Centres and Regional Centres for analysis, and then to the ECMM Headquarters.

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As far as the effectiveness of the operation is concerned, the final verdict depends on the specific period under consideration. While the ECMM was very successful in achieving its original mandate in Slovenia, the same cannot be said for Croatia and Bosnia where ceasefire after ceasefire was broken. Yet the ECMM played a key role even in these cases. It contributed to confidencebuilding measures among the belligerents, such as facilitating local talks and the exchange of letters and prisoners. It also provided assistance to humanitarian organisations in the delivery of aid and, later on, to the ICTY. Glenny (1992: 158) even went on to argue that ‘their mere presence helped save lives’. Thus, one can argue that, albeit limited, the ECMM did play a role in the management of the crisis. As well as having an impact on the conflict itself, the mission played a key internal function feeding back crucial information into the policy-making process at the EU level. The fact that the mission was deployed across the region rather than based on a single country provided the EU with an ‘addedvalue to the national diplomatic reporting’ (Council Secretariat, 2007). However, the information was not reported directly to Brussels, but through the Presidency, and this introduced some problems. For instance, sometimes the Presidency would fail to report specific information because of national interests or political sensitivities. According a former official quoted by Maloney (1997: 34): ‘We sent the information we collected from various sources to Lisbon, including some very damming reports from Amnesty International. I know for a fact that a lot of information stopped right there. It was not issued. They did not want to rock the boat.’ Talking about the Greek Presidency, another official mentioned that ‘anything to do with [Macedonia was] heavily edited to reflect Greek policy’ (Maloney, 1997: 45). Another problem had to do with the processing of large amounts of information at the political level, especially since there was no permanent body in charge of this task, but it was done by the rotating Presidency. In particular, small member states’ Presidencies were overwhelmed with the amount of information produced by the mission. This problem of ‘information overload’ would persist after the war.4 The ECMM, and later the EUMM, felt at times that there was not enough interest in Brussels on the activities of the mission. Usually, they did not get asked for supplementary information and Brussels would accept the daily, first, and then weekly, report without providing feedback. It would seem as though the mission’s purpose was mostly symbolic: to show that the EC was ‘doing something’. It is not surprising then that the concept paper on EU monitoring missions mentions the need to ‘enhance EU visibility on the ground, demonstrating EU engagement and commitment to a crisis or region’ as one of their key functions (Council of the EU, 2003b: 6). Another question refers to whether the mission collected intelligence for the EU and its member states. During the war, the mission did gather some information on military operations and other geopolitical information of

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relevance, but according to Maloney (1997: 35–6), this was only for internal use, to plan for future mission operations and to ensure the safety of its staff. He also maintained that Canadian officers used to send back to their capital this information to prepare for the deployment of Canadian UNPROFOR troops. One might expect that other European countries did the same. Landry (1999: 5) went on to argue that ‘It was well known within the Mission that the monitors from the EU’s major powers were reporting directly to their own country, even though they were placing the independence and impartiality of the mission at risk by doing so.’ Although the context was rather different in 2005, according to an EUMM official, direct reporting to their countries continued to happen, although it was less common.5 In its first year of operation, effectiveness was also marred by logistical and organisational problems. For example, a former ECMM official noted that ‘any relationship between [ECMM] and a well-organised peacekeeping operation was coincidental’ (quoted in Maloney, 1997: 33). Secured communications were also a problem during the first year until the British Presidency introduced more portable satellite systems. Problems with understaffing, the quality of personnel and training – which would become an all-too-recurrent problem in EU crisis management – also impinged upon the mission’s effectiveness. High staff rotation levels, varying from three to six months and sometimes a year, and depending exclusively on the contributing country, affected the performance of the mission (Landry, 1999). As pointed out by one of the interviewees, continuity of personnel is crucial for any crisis management operation, but especially for monitoring missions, as it takes time to build trust with local elites and populations and to understand the local politics and culture.6 Related to this is the issue of impartiality. Because the ECMM was a civilian, unarmed mission, this facilitated its operations and allowed the mission access to areas that no other international actor could have entered. The fact that the ECMM monitors lived among the civilian population rather than being isolated, as peacekeeping operations usually are, also added to its credibility. In effect, cooperation from the belligerents was rather good during the withdrawal of the JNA troops from Slovenia and the mission achieved its mandate before the end of the year. However, during the conflict in Croatia, impartiality was continuously questioned and, particularly, the Serbian side was little inclined to cooperate with the ECMM. According to Maloney (1997: 35), ‘The Serbs believed that the ECMM was gathering military intelligence and passing it on to Croatia, while Croatian forces thought that the ECMM was preventing them from seizing and securing territory which was, to them, rightfully Croatian.’ Some were also suspicious of the fact that most of the members of the ECMM had a military background or came from intelligence services of the contributing countries. Moreover, since ECMM monitors were unarmed, their safety became a serious concern and thus the ECMM had to rely on the UN peacekeeping

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mission in Croatia and Bosnia to guarantee their personal security. Because of their civilian nature, their ability to influence the conflict parties was also rather limited. The shooting down of an ECMM helicopter in 1992 and other attacks on ECMM personnel served as a constant reminder that the mission was not trusted by the conflict parties. These problems would inform the ‘Concept for Monitoring Missions’ the EU adopted more than a decade later. According to this document, ‘it should be ensured that the monitoring mission constitutes an integral part of an overall EU effort to prevent or resolve a conflict . . . This also means that careful consideration must be given to issues such as objectivity/impartiality, credibility and perception by the local population of the mission’ (Council of the EU, 2003b: 8). As has become usual practice in EU crisis management, the successor of the ECMM, the EUMM, was deemed to be a success at the time of closure (European Union, 2007). Official rhetoric aside, this mission made a significant contribution to the management and monitoring of the crisis, in particular in its early stages since it was effectively the only international actor on the ground until the beginning of 1992. However, as discussed above, institutional problems, and in particular, the reliance on the rotating Presidency and the lack of a permanent structure in charge of the planning, management and the political processing of information, negatively affected its coherence and effectiveness. Two other key challenges are worth mentioning: the challenge of impartiality and the limitations of an unarmed mission in the middle of a dangerous conflict zone. The speed of the deployment and the flexibility of the mission were however impressive, especially considering the fact that this was the first time that the EU had deployed a crisis management operation. Because of the longevity of this operation, the ECMM/EUMM would become an important source of lessons learned, for instance in the Concept Paper on monitoring missions (Council of the EU, 2003b: 4), and would also shape future monitoring missions such as those in Aceh and Georgia. In the next section I explore an equally innovative initiative, the EC Peace Conference.

The EC Peace Conference on Former Yugoslavia

In the past, the EC, through EPC, had made some attempts to mediate in international crises, mainly in the European continent (the Portuguese Revolution, the Cyprus coup, the Turkish–Greek conflict) and the Middle East. However, these attempts were largely limited to declaratory policy. With the organisation of a peace conference, the EC demonstrated its willingness to play a strong role in the Yugoslavian conflict. This was the first time that the EC had embarked upon such a diplomatic venture and would thus be fully involved in conflict resolution broadly defined. In the first days of the crisis, in June 1991, it was not entirely clear which

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international organisation would be leading the peace efforts. Germany, who was at the time the chair of the CSCE, tried to activate the crisis management mechanism in the CSCE to start discussions on the matter. A further attempt to mediate among the parties was blocked by the Yugoslav delegation which was suspicious of the German chairmanship (Libal, 2004: 81). However, EC mediation was accepted by the parties when the war broke out in Slovenia and the success of this mission encouraged further involvement by the EC. During the summer months, the EC Presidency tried without results to secure a ceasefire in Croatia where the Croat Army and Croat Serb rebels, assisted by the JNA, clashed in intense combats. The Presidency of the EC, held by the Netherlands, seemed more and more frustrated by the lack of progress. It was in this context, and following a Franco-German proposal, that the EC decided to establish a peace conference at the end of August. The aim of the EC Conference was to stop a conflict that threatened to spread across the whole of Yugoslavia, and to find a peaceful, lasting solution. The EC Peace Conference on Former Yugoslavia opened in The Hague on 7 September 1991, following an EPC Declaration of 3 September. Lord Carrington, a former British Foreign Secretary, was appointed as the EC’s negotiator. The leaders of the six republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia) and the Yugoslav Federation were invited to the Conference. By participating in the Conference, the parties subscribed to several principles including the unacceptability of the use of force, the unacceptability of any change of borders by force and respect for human and minority rights (Hill and Smith, 2000: 364). At the opening session, it was also agreed to create an Arbitration Commission, presided over by Robert Badinter, to advise the disputing parties on a solution in line with international law. From the beginning, the EC Peace Conference did not generate enough support among its participants. It was continuously hampered by Serb attacks on Croatian objectives, as well as by a boycott on the part of the Slovenian and Croatian governments. After five failed ceasefires and a fact-finding tour by Lord Carrington on 7 October, the parties agreed on some principles for future negotiations. These included, inter alia, the creation of a loose alliance of sovereign republics and adequate arrangements for the protection of the rights of minorities, including the possibility of a special status for certain areas. Based on these principles, on 18 October, Lord Carrington presented a peace plan proposal based on an association of independent republics sharing certain central institutions (a council of ministers, a court of justice and a joint parliamentary body) and cooperating in economic and foreign policy, a model inspired by the EC’s own institutional arrangements. The Carrington Plan maintained the borders between the republics, therefore not including Serbia’s demands for an independent status of Serb minorities in Croatia, although it set provisions for the protection of minority rights. The Serbian opposition to Carrington’s plan prevented a successful

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outcome of the Conference. The Serbian leader, Slobodan Miloševi´c, opposed the concession of the same rights to minorities within Serbia (i.e. Kosovo) that he claimed for Serb minorities in other republics. Serbia was then given a deadline, expiring on 5 November, to agree to the peace plan or face trade and diplomatic sanctions. On 8 November, the EC announced sanctions against Serbia involving the immediate termination of the EC–Yugoslavia trade and cooperation agreement. In contrast, those republics accepting the agreement were offered new aid packages. For the first time, the EC deviated from its policy of equal treatment to the parties. The EC also asked the UN Security Council (UNSC) to establish appropriate measures to effectively monitor the arms embargo against Yugoslavia and asked for additional measures such as an oil embargo. The Serbian rejection of the Carrington Plan as well as the continuing violence in Croatia halted the peace process. Although the Peace Conference continued over the following months – Carrington only resigned in August 19927 – these factors, together with the EC’s recognition of the republics of Croatia and Slovenia, reduced the chances for an overall settlement in the territory of former Yugoslavia. Increasingly, the attention of the international community moved from Croatia to Bosnia. Speaking with one voice? In the case of horizontal coherence, the EC Peace Conference was coherent with other attempts and initiatives that the EC had launched to stop the conflict, including several economic and diplomatic sanctions, the mediation of the Troika and the dispatch of the EC’s monitoring mission. However, the Commission was not represented at the EC Peace Conference in spite of the economic dimension of the crisis. Even though in the first stages of the crisis the Commission was involved in several diplomatic initiatives, with the worsening of the conflict in Croatia and later in Bosnia, it was relegated to providing humanitarian aid. The involvement of the Commission in dealing with the conflict could only take place when the EC Council asked the Commission to propose new economic measures and sanctions since at that time it did not have a formal role in the Troika. For instance, the Commission advised on new economic measures to be taken against Serbia as required by the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve and the EPC Decision of 11 November established several restrictive measures in order to pressure Serbia to agree to the Carrington Plan. In this regard, institutional coherence can be said to have worked well in practice in spite of the lack of formal arrangements. The main problem the Peace Conference was faced with was that of vertical coherence. The initiative did not establish appropriate coordinating mechanisms to ensure vertical coherence – i.e. that the member states could reach a unitary position represented by Lord Carrington – and did not prevent the member states from negotiating at other parallel forums such as meetings among the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve, and bilateral negotia-

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tions with the parties involved in the conflict. This state of affairs was due, in part, to the lack of a permanent body that could speak for the Twelve – Lord Carrington only had a temporary and weak mandate – the lack of resources dedicated to the Conference and the fact that the Presidency was held during this period by three small member states (Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal). Although a small EPC Secretariat was officially established with the SEA (see Chapter 2), it lacked the wherewithal to play a significant role during the Conference and the UK had to supply a small secretariat to the EC for the duration of the conferences on Yugoslavia (Gow, 1996: 87). The creation of this ad hoc secretariat was an innovative formula since it set up a standing structure to support the peace negotiations, instead of a rotating one dependent on each Presidency (as was the case with the ECMM); however, it was not an optimal solution and could not rally the member states in support of a common position. Intergovernmental politics constituted the main obstacle to coherent EC action. The EC could not prevent unilateral moves from its member states, and, for instance, some observers noted problems with the implementation of the embargoes on Serbia (Almond, 1994: 245). But certainly the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and Germany’s ‘Alleingang’ (unilateral action), constitute the most remarkable example of vertical incoherence. The EC policy line during the first stage of the conflict reflected its commitment to preserving the status quo, the unity of Yugoslavia. On 26 March, the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve declared that: ‘a united and democratic Yugoslavia stands the best chance to integrate itself in the new Europe’ (Hill and Smith, 2000: 362). Jacques Delors and Jacques Santer, Presidents of the Commission and the Council respectively, visited Belgrade on 29–30 May and made conditional the Association Agreement between the EC and Yugoslavia on the unity of the country (Woodward, 1995: 160). In June, an EC statement on Yugoslavia again emphasised the Community’s willingness to retain its relationship with a united Yugoslavia (Kintis, 1997: 149). On 23 June, the EC Foreign Ministers met at Luxembourg and decided not to recognise any unilateral declaration of independence from Slovenia and Croatia. Therefore, during this period, the policy of the EC was quite coherent, with the clear objective of maintaining a united Federation. However, the images of war in Slovenia and, in particular, in Croatia, had a great impact on public opinion within some member states. Domestic pressures were particularly felt in Germany and from the beginning of July, German leaders supported Slovenian and Croatian independence. When the Peace Conference opened, the majority of the member states were against an early recognition of these two republics and warned that a unilateral recognition by Germany would be counterproductive to the peace talks (Guardian, 1991a). While the EC Conference and the Carrington Plan were intended to maintain Yugoslav unity in the form of a loose federation, the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia meant that this plan would not have any leverage on

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these two republics and would undermine the EC’s neutrality in Serbia’s eyes. For this reason, several member states criticised the German position, including the UK, France, and the Netherlands.8 In spite of these warnings, repeated failures in the negotiations increased German demands for recognition, subsequently joined by Denmark and Italy. As the fighting continued in Croatia, member states became more receptive to the idea of recognition. The issue was therefore not whether to recognise the Yugoslav republics, but the modalities of recognition (Caplan, 2005: 18–19). On 8 October 1991, the Badinter Commission declared that Yugoslavia was legally in the process of dissolution and that the federal institutions no longer existed. This endorsed the republics’ right to take unilateral measures for secession and therefore, seemingly vindicated German arguments. The general view was, though, that recognition had to take place within the framework of a comprehensive political settlement for Yugoslavia with guarantees for minorities. The recognition of the Yugoslav republics was discussed at the EPC meeting on 15–16 December. While the list of conditions was not difficult to agree following from the recommendation of the Arbitration Commission, a thorny issue was the date of recognition, with Germany pressing for recognition as soon as possible. An intricate compromise was reached to avoid an embarrassing split, days after the Maastricht summit. When German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher declared to his colleagues in Brussels that his country would announce recognition of Croatia before Christmas, the other EC Foreign Ministers tried to produce a decision that could keep a semblance of unity. In the final text, the member states decided to recognise those republics that had applied for recognition before 23 December and that met the criteria established by the Badinter Commission, but agreed that they would not ‘implement’ the recognition until 15 January 1992. Germany respected the second compromise: under pressure from its partners, Bonn agreed to postpone implementation of its decision for a month. However, after the meeting, the German Chancellor repeated his willingness to recognise Slovenia and Croatia before Christmas, disregarding the conclusion of the Badinter Commission. On 23 December Germany recognised the two republics, although, as agreed, the decision was not officially implemented until 15 January. In January, the Badinter Commission expressed its concerns about the respect of minority rights in Croatia, and only recommended the recognition of Slovenia and Macedonia. In the case of Bosnia, recognition was made conditional on the organisation of a referendum for independence. On 15 January, the member states, taking no notice of the Badinter Commission’s advice, recognised Slovenia and Croatia. The main obstacle to Macedonia’s recognition was Greece’s opposition, as Greece objected to the use of the name Macedonia, for historical and territorial reasons. While recognising the importance of national idiosyncrasies and histori-

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cal affinities, institutional weaknesses (in the form of weaker informal norms) may also explain problems of coordination between the different national positions regarding the Peace Conference. Although EPC had put in place a ‘coordination reflex’ (see Chapter 2), meetings among national representatives, consultations and the sharing of information through COREU messages were still limited. For example, the EPC expert group discussing former Yugoslavia met only once every two or three weeks in spite of the urgency of the situation.9 Arguably, socialisation among EPC officials at that time was less intensive since meetings took place less often and they were attended by officials from the MFAs and not from the Permanent Representations in Brussels. In these conditions, it was difficult to forge consensus. Closer contacts among national representatives and the creation of a permanent body could have facilitated the coordination process among different national positions. For instance, an experienced observer commented about the recognition issue: neither the other member states nor the Community as a body had an adequate understanding of the historical antecedents of the respective Greek and German positions . . . member states arrived at EPC meetings with their national policies, dictated by national attitudes, ready made. There was no independent capacity of analysis and briefing within EPC, which would have made for a better understanding of the positions of individual countries and possibly a greater readiness to accommodate their positions. (Nuttall, 1994: 19)

Yet for all its limitations, what seems clear is that ‘the EC shaped the interests and preferences of its member States’ (Lucarelli, 2000: 121). First, indicative of the impact of EPC institutions and the value attached to them is the fact that the first reflex of the member states was to resort to the EC to intervene in the first stages of the conflict. Second, as Sonia Lucarelli (2000) has shown in her analysis of the recognition issue, Germany could have taken a decision recognising Slovenia and Croatia much earlier; however, because of the importance that Germany attached to the integration project, it decided to wait and negotiate at the EC Council between 15 and 16 December (see also Caplan, 2005: 23). In the case of the UK and France, when accepting German demands for recognition, they also took into consideration the need to maintain a common position, just after the Maastricht Treaty had been agreed. For example, Douglas Hurd mentioned that the compromise was ‘achieved not without difficulty’, but that the alternative of disagreement would have been ‘deeply damaging’ to the EC (Press Association, 1991b). What seems clear is the preference of the member states to achieve consensus at any price. According to Ginsberg (2001: 80), ‘the EC members opposed to recognition at the time sacrificed their national positions for the façade of EC foreign policy unity’. Moreover, the fact that the member states complained about Germany’s attitude can also serve as proof of the significance of this consensus-building practice and that to a great extent the need for the EU leaders to do something collectively was more important than the substance

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of the decision itself (Jørgensen, 1993: 86). As Tonra (2003: 742–3) put it, rationalistic accounts ‘cannot understand what makes so many policy-makers labour so long and so hard for what can only be seen as so little . . . Policymakers devote themselves to this task, not only to contribute to a resolution of a particular crisis, but also to see themselves acting, as they believe they must, collectively.’ Despite member state attempts to formulate a common policy on 16 December, the truth is that Germany, partly reassured that the EC policy was now closer to its own policy and partly fearing that the decision of the Badinter Commission would constitute a new obstacle to the recognition of Croatia, decided to make this announcement unilaterally. This decision however undermined the EC’s credibility as a mediator. This lack of a coherent approach, in turn, impacted on the effectiveness of the EC’s policy, as I shall now discuss. Effectiveness: looking at the objectives, mandate and instruments When measuring the effectiveness of the EC Peace Conference, one needs to first determine the goals that the Conference was intended to serve. In order to do so, it is worth looking at the EC’s official documents. For instance, according to the SEA, the EC should aim ‘to display the principles of democracy and compliance with the law and with human rights to which they [the member states] are attached, so that together they may make their own contribution to the preservation of international peace and security’ (Preamble, SEA). Even though the crisis in Yugoslavia was not considered as a significant threat to the EU’s ‘fundamental interests and independence of the Union’ or to ‘the security of the Union and its member states’ (Article J.1.2, TEU Maastricht),10 the decision to establish a Peace Conference to reach a negotiated and lasting peace agreement can be seen as a means to achieve peace and stability in the territory of former Yugoslavia. The Conference was to discuss possible changes to the constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ‘by peaceful means and by agreement’ and strongly criticised the JNA’s military offensive in Croatia. The EPC declaration of 27 August 1991 convening the Conference made clear that ‘The Community and its member States will never accept a policy of fait accompli. They are determined not to recognise changes of borders by force and will encourage others not to do so either’ (Hill and Smith, 2000: 363). The declaration also mentioned that negotiations should be based on the ‘principle of the fullest protection of the rights of all, wherever they might live in Yugoslavia’. Yet a cursory analysis of the events that followed shows that the Conference was unable to achieve its objectives, both from an internal (as stated in the EPC declaration and documents) and from an external point of view (contributing to conflict resolution). Firstly, one needs to look at the mandate of the Conference. Although the EPC declaration mentioned very general goals to be achieved by the

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Conference, no specific guidelines were set in this document. The fact that the EC did not have a clear policy regarding the right to self-determination and recognition at that time (Almond, 1994: 237–40; Woodward, 1995: 153) resulted, nevertheless, in a very ambiguous mandate. According to Woodward (1995: 179), the corollary of such a mandate was that ‘the EC remained ambiguous about its political objective and competing political principles, inconsistent in its declarations as a result of internal conflict, and unwilling to commit military forces’. Recognition of the republics (or the lack of recognition) could have been used by the EU as a tool for conflict management. Not only because it could have served as a reward to exercise some leverage on the republics – and for some time this conditional recognition led to the postponement of the declaration of independence of Croatia and Slovenia – but also because the autonomy arrangements for minority groups envisaged in the EC’s plan were thought to be a way to diffuse or, at least, reduce levels of conflict in Yugoslav multi-ethnic societies (Caplan, 2005: 5–6). According to Caplan, conditional recognition could have played three roles during the Balkan conflict: as a threat to end Serbian aggression (negative conditionality); as a way to internationalise the conflict (turning it into an inter-state rather than intra-state conflict); and as an incentive for compliance (positive conditionality). However, the divisions among the member states over recognition of the republics and the failure of the Carrington Plan deprived the EC of this valuable tool. Furthermore, the means that the EC Conference had at its disposal to pressure for a peaceful settlement – economic and diplomatic tools, including the recognition of the republics – were rather limited since, at this stage, the EC did not possess any instruments for crisis management. In other words, ‘the Yugoslav conflict . . . highlighted the mismatch between the EU’s declared foreign policy objectives and the means available to achieve those objectives’ (Cameron, 1999: 32). Both problems, the lack of clarity regarding recognition criteria and the lack of instruments to achieve the aforementioned CFSP objectives, had a negative impact on the Peace Conference’s ability to achieve an agreement among the republics. The lack of intelligence capabilities at the EC’s level was another factor to be considered. The dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation was a reality in spring 1991; yet the EC did not seem to have received these signals or it had not drawn the necessary policy lessons from them. According to one senior diplomat, ‘the member states did not realise at that time what was the situation in Yugoslavia. They had decided to maintain stability at any price’ and another diplomat acknowledged that it was ‘an absolute failure of intelligence’ and that ‘some countries were deliberately ignoring the information’.11 It was not until October that the majority of the member states recognised the possibility of Yugoslavia’s dissolution. By the time the EC had changed its strategy and proposed a confederation, it was too late. Commenting on how

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the EC dealt with the crisis in Yugoslavia, Jacques Delors affirmed that ‘the lesson to be learned here is that strategic planning and analysis capabilities are needed at the European level’ (cited in Edwards, 1997: 190–1). Intergovernmental and local politics were also crucial in explaining the failure of the Conference. The internal divisions among the EC member states about the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the lack of will to intervene with troops in the conflict (see next section), as well as the opposition of Serbia to the Carrington Plan contributed to undermining the EC’s negotiating strategy. As far as the latter is concerned, Serbia was confident that the Europeans would never deploy troops to stop the conflict; hence they did not feel pressured to reach a negotiated agreement. The Serbian government used the EC negotiations to gain some time to pursue its strategy of military aggression and ethnic cleansing, ‘giving the impression of participating in the modalities of peace negotiations without seriously committing to them’ (Ginsberg, 2001: 65). Serbia was reassured by European officials’ declarations, in particular those of the British, who repeatedly rejected military intervention. Threats of sanctions and diplomatic recognition were the only instruments that the EC could use to exert pressure on the republics. In the first case, economic incentives and sanctions were mobilised too late (Buchan, 1993: 68–9), and some member states failed to apply the arms embargo. Moreover, one could argue that in the context of ethnic conflict, these economic instruments were insufficient to bring the parties to a compromise. This view was already clear at the opening of the Conference: ‘In the absence of will among the EC governments to send armed troops to enforce a ceasefire in Yugoslavia, the Community has discovered that its clout as the world’s leading commercial power and its attraction as a zone of prosperity are not enough to overcome the violent historical animosities there’ (Washington Post, 1991). As far as the ‘recognition weapon’ is concerned, the divergences among the member states showed that the EC did not have a clear policy on selfdetermination, undermined its credibility at the negotiating table and wrecked the EC Conference (Almond, 1994: 41). With its decision to recognise Slovenia and Croatia, the EC also lost its last chance to play an impartial role in mediation, losing its neutrality in the eyes of Serbia. Thus, a resumption of the EC Peace Conference on 9 January was not possible because of the increasing suspicions of Serbia. A statement by the Federal Government of Yugoslavia stated that the Conference ‘showed very soon that the good services, which the Yugoslav side accepted with hope and confidence, turned into a biased approach to the secessionist republics’ (United Press International, 1992). The EC’s decision to recognise the breakaway republics also came in for a lot of criticism from the US and the UN, both of whom considered that the move risked spreading the conflict to other republics and in particular to the multi-ethnic Bosnia. The same concerns

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were voiced by the Bosnian and Macedonian republics (Guardian, 1991b). Yet, as some authors have pointed out, the EC’s recognition did not initiate the conflict in Bosnia, although it might have speeded up the outbreak of the war. In reality it was just a matter of time, since preparations for the war were already ongoing in the summer of 1991 (Caplan, 2005: 120–1). Thus, recognition was not a cause, but a pretext for the war. In conclusion, in spite of the high expectations, institutional deficiencies meant that the EC punched well below its weight during the Peace Conference. Among the institutional deficiencies that hindered the Conference, one can mention inappropriate intelligence and analysis capabilities and the lack of strong diplomatic machinery to support the negotiations. According to one of the interviewees, the unfortunate declaration of Jacques Poos raised expectations that the EU could not fulfil with the instruments available.12 As discussed above, levels of coherence and effectiveness achieved by this initiative were low. In the case of coherence, problems of vertical coherence due to disagreements among the member states were in evidence and were best exemplified by Germany’s decision to recognise Croatia and Slovenia. What is more, this problem hindered its effectiveness. Although the member states were in agreement regarding the establishment of this initiative and the Conference acted in accordance with CFSP objectives (aiming at achieving a peaceful settlement of the conflict), the Conference only managed to have a very limited impact on the exYugoslav republics and it did not reach its expected outcome. Even though many policy-makers realised the need for reform, the institutionalisation of the lessons learned from the Peace Conference would take time. The Maastricht Treaty, in process of negotiation when the conflict erupted, did reinforce the foreign policy machinery of the EU by merging the EPC Secretariat with the Secretariat General of the Council. Yet the Yugoslav crisis was not so instrumental in this reform; rather other factors were more influential, such as alleviating the burden on the rotating Presidency. Learning from the failure during the Bosnian War was only institutionalised later on in the Amsterdam Treaty. The latter strengthened EU analysis capabilities with the creation of the Policy Unit and the establishment of a permanent position to improve EU external representation: the High Representative. Further, one of the main criticisms of the EC Peace Conference was the lack of instruments to compel the belligerents to an agreement. This feature was common, however, to other international organisations including the UN, which convened (together with the EC), the ICFY with similar illfortune. Lacking any coercive instrument, apart from economic sanctions, the EC’s leverage on the parties was quite limited. Yet one could argue with Nuttall (1994: 17) that even if lacking these instruments, the EC’s effectiveness could have been higher had it acted sooner and had it maintained a unified position from the beginning. In sum, the examination of this case has

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shown the impact of intergovernmental politics on coherence and effectiveness, but also how deficiencies in institutions did play a part. The next section analyses the debate on military intervention that took place during the second half of 1991 and that continued during the course of the Bosnian War.

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The non-decision on military intervention

One of the most debated issues regarding the EC’s role during the Yugoslavian wars has been the fact that the EC and its member states failed to act in a forceful way to stop the hostilities, and, in particular, their failure to intervene militarily. In this section I examine what is termed here as a ‘nondecision’. According to Christopher Hill (2003: 107), one can distinguish three types of non-decision. First, where there is a collective decision ‘not to act, to do nothing, despite considerable temptation, and possibly both the need and pressure to act’. Second, where decision-makers avoid taking a decision (i.e. decide not to decide). This can be deliberate, but can also be the result of failure in the decision-making machinery. Third, a non-decision can also refer to issues that are excluded from the agenda. Simply, some issues become unthinkable as a question for decision. According to Bachrach and Baratz (1963: 641), one could expect this type of non-decision ‘when the dominant values, the accepted rules of the game, the existing power relations among groups, and the instruments of force, singly or in combination, effectively prevent certain grievances from developing into full-fledged issues which call for decisions’. As I will show below, up until September 1991, one could identify a nondecision of the first type: a decision by the EC not to act. The member states actually discussed the issue of military force, but having failed to agree on a particular option, decided not to intervene militarily and this was stated in an official declaration. The issue was discussed again in subsequent meetings, but there was no collective decision. This was a non-decision of the second type. Finally, there was a case of a non-decision of the third type: the issue of a possible EC military intervention disappeared from the EC’s agenda and moved to the UN and NATO’s agendas. The problems encountered regarding the dispatch of an armed forced to former Yugoslavia have been summarised succinctly by Nuttall as follows: ‘there was neither a force to send nor consensus to send it’ (1994: 22). Although the EC had been mediating since the first stages of the conflict, the means at its disposal were limited to economic and diplomatic tools. Military capabilities were under the control of the individual member states. The EC as such did not have any military capabilities and could only act through the WEU, which was composed of nine of the twelve member states. As early as July 1991, some member states, most notably France, had called on the EC and the WEU to send some kind of peacekeeping contingent

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to Yugoslavia as an attempt to force a ceasefire between Serbia and Croatia. The first proposal for military intervention by the WEU was brought to the table by the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, on 29 July. This would be one of many French initiatives aimed at giving an operational role to the WEU (Lucarelli, 2000: 171). The Dutch, then holding the EC Presidency, used the possibility of military intervention as a threat to bring the parties to a negotiated solution. Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek warned the parties that if they did not stop the fighting ‘then probably further appeals will be launched in favour of sending something like a peace force to the country, probably through WEU’ (Edwards, 1997: 185). The WEU Council met in London on 7 August at France’s request to consider a possible WEU role in supervising a ceasefire. However, for the time being, this proposal was opposed by a majority of member states, in particular the UK, but also by Germany as well as the Nordic and neutral countries. Nonetheless, the violence in Croatia exposed the limits of the EC monitors on the ground and the need for an armed force to support their mandate. A proposal to this end was put forward by the Dutch at an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council in The Hague on 19 September. According to the Dutch Foreign Minister, the type of force proposed would be ‘a peace-keeping force of lightly-armed troops like, for example, the UN forces’ (Press Association, 1991a). With the alarming news coming from Croatia, more member states were in favour of a peacekeeping force. France, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium espoused the idea of an intervention force but the Portuguese were more cautious. The Germans supported the initiative, but expressed their reluctance to send troops in line with their Constitution’s provisions. Although there were different views about what type of force should be dispatched, it seemed clear to all the member states that troops would only be sent to maintain and not to enforce peace. In the same vein, the WEU Secretary General, Willem Van Eekelen, stressed that ‘whatever we are sending is not a force which would engage in military action against any of the military parties’ (AFP, 1991a). However, any proposal involving the WEU was strongly opposed by the British who were deeply concerned that the distinction between peacekeeping and peacemaking could become blurred and that WEU forces could be drawn into combat. In the end, no agreement was achieved. Apart from British opposition, all member states agreed that any deployment would require the agreement of the warring parties and a durable ceasefire, conditions that had yet to be met. In spite of this, they decided to create, on the initiative of the French, an ad hoc working group to examine ways of ensuring better protection of the ECMM. According to the final EPC declaration of 19 September: ‘It is [the Twelve’s] understanding that no military intervention is contemplated and that, before a reinforced monitor mission were established, a ceasefire would have to be agreed with a prospect of holding and that all Yugoslav parties would have expressed their agreement’ (Hill and Smith, 2000: 364).

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The options prepared by the committee of WEU experts were discussed at a WEU meeting on 30 September, followed by an EPC meeting. The WEU experts presented four options: 1) logistic support for EC monitors, which might require 2,000 to 3,000 personnel; 2) escort and protection of monitors by armed military forces (5,000 to 6,000 personnel); 3) a lightly armed peacekeeping force of military personnel (4,500 to 5,000 soldiers) backed up by a logistical contingent (3,000 to 5,000) to police the ceasefire and to support the civilian monitors; or 4) a full-scale peacekeeping exercise requiring 20,000 peacekeeping forces plus 10,000 additional support personnel to control the implementation of the ceasefire agreed upon by all Yugoslav parties. However, once again, there was no agreement among the member states (AFP, 1991b). While France was supportive of a full-scale operation, the British expressed their concern that options three and four might provoke an extension of the conflict (Financial Times, 1991), with everyone aware that any of the options would require the participation of UK troops. Failing to get an agreement, and to avoid criticisms of inaction, the German Foreign Minister Genscher, who chaired the WEU meeting, declared that any decision on whether to send military personnel to Yugoslavia would depend on a request from Lord Carrington for new measures to strengthen the ceasefire mission (AFP, 1991b). The truth was that British opposition was too strong to be overcome and neither the WEU Council nor the EPC meeting that followed could reach agreement on intervention. This issue reappeared in the following months in the agenda of the EC at the request of France, amidst increasing violence in Bosnia. At a meeting of the EC Foreign Ministers on 2 May 1992, the French proposed strengthening the EC’s involvement in Yugoslavia, including the deployment of troops from the WEU. Roland Dumas proposed ‘a step-by-step process’ starting with the dispatch of a mission to evaluate the situation in Bosnia, and continuing with the sending of a lightly-armed force of ‘a few hundred men’. This force would be in charge of protecting UN buildings and high officials involved in the peace process, but it could grow into ‘a fully-fledged peacekeeping force’ separate from the UN one (Independent, 1992). This proposal was again blocked by the UK. The same debate about a possible WEU intervention was held over the re-opening of the Sarajevo airport to allow for the distribution of humanitarian aid. The British position remained unchanged. John Major stressed the military risk involved and compared ‘Sarajevo’s geographical position with the isolated and doomed French military garrison at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in the 1950s’ (Guardian, 1992). However, the member states agreed to support a UN intervention if needed (European Council, 1992). On 28 June, after the Lisbon Council, President Mitterrand flew to Sarajevo. As a result of his visit, the Serbs agreed to hand over the airport to the UN. However, by not informing his colleagues at the European Council, Mitterand’s action damaged the unity of the EC’s policy. When the discussions on a WEU force failed, the debate moved to the UN

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where the details of the WEU contingency plans were forwarded (Edwards, 1997: 187), while the EC concentrated on the negotiation of a peace settlement through different initiatives (Vance-Owen Plan and Owen-Stontelberg Plan). On 12 November 1991, through its permanent members, the Twelve asked the UNSC to consider a peacekeeping force to Croatia which led to the creation of UNPROFOR. The EC member states supported UN resolutions to send peacekeeping forces and were the biggest contributors to UNPROFOR. They also participated in the implementation of the UNSC Resolutions establishing ‘no fly zones’ and ‘safe areas’ (Hill and Smith, 2000: 367). When the situation deteriorated as a result of the Serbian atrocities in Sarajevo, Srebrenica and Goražde, they supported NATO strikes against Serbian positions. Hence, during this stage of the crisis, the European countries had ‘a coherent collective policy towards Bosnia’, albeit one outside the EC’s framework.13 For its part, even if limited, the WEU saw a certain revival during the conflict. From August 1992, the WEU participated in the monitoring of the Adriatic (Operation Sharp Guard) in cooperation with NATO. From April 1993, the WEU was in charge of enforcing the arms and trade embargo in the Danube River and provided a police force for the Bosnian city of Mostar from 1994 to 1996 (see Chapter 5). According to Gordon (1997/1998: 90), the WEU was charged with these operations ‘more as a way of giving the WEU some sort of a role – in the name of European “identity” – than because the WEU was best equipped for the job’. Without doubt, the role played in the Yugoslavian conflict encouraged the idea that its operational capabilities should be strengthened. With this objective, new bodies such as a Situation Centre, a Satellite Centre and an Institute for Security Studies were created. The Petersberg tasks adopted on 19 June 1992 by the WEU Ministerial Council in Bonn widened the operational spectrum of the WEU. As discussed in Chapter 2, these reforms, which aimed to turn the WEU into the defence component of the EU, set the basis for the development of the CSDP. Disagreements about Europe’s security architecture The coherence of this non-decision on military intervention was mainly affected by internal divergences among the member states about the appropriateness of the use of force as well as about which organisation should carry out a given intervention. The last point refers to the role of different military organisations (NATO, WEU) on the continent, and even the role of the EC in the world, since the traditional image of the EC as a civilian power was still strong in the political discourse. The lack of national interests at stake in Yugoslavia can explain why the member states could not agree on a military operation there (Rupp, 1998: 160), but it cannot explain why some of them did propose this initiative within the EC context. In the case of France, it called for the dispatch of a European armed force on the argument of a new ‘right to intervene’, i.e. the view that humanitarian

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concerns could justify the use of armed force across national borders to prevent massacres. But interestingly, one of the main reasons behind the French initiative had to do with its institutional preferences. While most of the new institutional design of the CFSP had been agreed upon in spring 1991, the question of what the role of the WEU should be was still open by the late summer (Nuttall, 2000: 172–3). Hence France, convinced that the EC should develop autonomous defence capabilities, saw the Yugoslav crisis as a perfect opportunity to encourage the revival of the WEU (Buchan, 1993: 68). It was very much about ‘symbolism’, even though the French knew that this initiative could never be successful.14 The French position was not generally supported. Germany, whose Constitution did not allow it to participate in any military operation outside the NATO area, endorsed French proposals after some hesitations, but tried to raise the issue of a peacekeeping force in other forums like the CSCE (The Times, 1991). For its part, the Dutch government called for a credible military threat and participated in both the WEU and NATO operations in Yugoslavia. Other non-WEU members opposed a military intervention or were more suspicious of it. The position of the Irish was that the use of force should be a last resort instrument, carried out only by the UN (not the EC or NATO), and only when other measures (economic/diplomatic) had failed. Denmark was also very cautious about the use of force to stop the conflict, although it contributed afterwards to the UNPROFOR mission with a tank company (Tonra, 2001: 236–7). The risks of getting bogged down in Yugoslavia’s civil war and the large scale of the operation were some of the arguments used by the British to oppose sending in a peacekeeping force (Simms, 2003). Arguments based on their experience in Northern Ireland were voiced on several occasions (Gow, 1996: 89). Douglas Hurd also repeated that there was ‘no sense’ in sending a peace keeping force to Yugoslavia without a ceasefire (IPS, 1991). He stressed that Europe could not intervene in Yugoslavia either diplomatically or militarily without the full agreement of all parties concerned (United Press International, 1991) and warned that it was much easier to put troops on the ground than to get them out. Apart from these general concerns about the use of force, the British government opposed an operation led by the WEU in particular (Jørgensen, 1993: 87). The UK argued that NATO should remain the key security organisation in Europe and could not agree to any action that might endanger the traditional role of the US in Europe. Therefore, the UK opposed any military intervention by the WEU that could set a precedent, at a time (autumn 1991) when these issues were still to be agreed in the Maastricht Treaty. These divergences among the member states prevented the EC from playing a stronger role during the conflict. The debate about military intervention continued during the following years, but it moved from the EC to other forums. The problems involved in agreeing a common position among

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the member thus affected EPC’s vertical coherence. A non-decision could have been perfectly coherent had this been agreed by all member states, but that was not the case concerning the EC’s military intervention. The role of the WEU as the defence arm of the EU was only formalised with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty a couple of months later, but these provisions would not enter into force until November 1993, i.e. when the conflict in Bosnia was well advanced. In spite of the operations carried out by the WEU during the Yugoslav conflict and the new treaty provisions, the role of the WEU would remain vague and weak, showing the limitations of institutional design and the incremental (instead of optimal) pace of institutional reform. The new CFSP established in the Maastricht Treaty extended the EU foreign policy domain to ‘include all questions related to security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’ (Art. J.4.1., TEU Maastricht). However, any question regarding defence issues had to be decided by unanimity. In other words, although the Treaty gave a role to the WEU as the EU’s defence arm, it did not establish specific provisions about how it could play that role, but was actually dependent on agreement among the member states. In this respect, the lessons from the Yugoslav conflict were not appropriately incorporated, among other reasons because the treaty provisions had been almost agreed before summer 1991 and the debate about military intervention only took place later on. Neither did the Amsterdam Treaty bring a ‘sea change’, although it introduced the Petersberg tasks and mentioned the possibility of merging the WEU with the EU, arguably reforms that were motivated by the failure in Bosnia (WEU Assembly, 2004). Institutional legacies and path dependency can explain why no other alternative/innovative model was sought. The cost of establishing new arrangements (including learning and coordinating effects) concurred with the unanimity procedures that required consensus among the member states, something virtually non-existent at that time. In this situation, the default option, maintaining the existing defence arrangements, was retained. As expected from a historical institutionalism approach, institutions became ‘sticky’. Other lessons were learnt from the war in Bosnia concerning European security and defence policy, supporting the argument that learning is more likely to occur in situations of crisis/failure. One of the main elements of discord during the Bosnian War was the disagreement over which should be the main security organisation in Europe. Whereas some countries, most notably France, supported the idea of an autonomous European defence capability, other countries, and in particular the UK, would not support any initiative that threatened to damage NATO’s role in the continent. The conflict in Yugoslavia would have an impact on these positions, producing if not a change in preferences, at least a change in strategies in some instances. Firstly, US policies towards Bosnia, by supporting ‘lift and strike’ and denying diplomatic backup to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, created a certain frustra-

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tion among its European allies, especially the UK. For example, Sir Dudley Smith, President at that time of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, suggested that the US decision proved just how much Europe needed ‘to be autonomous where intelligence gathering, satellite reconnaissance and logistics support’ were concerned (quoted in Kintis, 1997: 161). These transatlantic tensions thus confirmed the need for an autonomous defence capability and hence reaffirmed French beliefs. According to the French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppé: ‘The conflict in Bosnia [showed] the necessity to move beyond NATO and American guarantees’ (Simms, 2003: 111). Therefore, from the beginning France asked for a strong role of the WEU as a symbol of a nascent autonomous European defence capability. However, confronted by the realities of the war and the failure of the peace process, France modified its strategy and progressively adopted a position closer to that of the US, supporting the enforcement of the ‘no-fly zone’ by NATO. The conflict in Bosnia also facilitated a certain reintegration of France, NATO’s enfant terrible, into the Alliance’s structures. For the first time in almost three decades, the Defence Minister Francois Léotard attended a ministerial meeting of the Alliance in September 1994 (Lepick, 1996: 85). Another important element that would later facilitate the Franco-British initiative on a common European defence was the cooperation on the ground experienced during the Bosnian War. According to Douglas Hurd: ‘the experience in Bosnia brought service cooperation between the British and the French to a new post-war high’ (cited in Simms, 2003: 111). The Bosnian conflict also raised the issue of German military intervention outside the NATO area. In 1994, the Constitutional Court allowed the Federal Republic to take part in military operations beyond the country’s borders (Cali´c, 1996). But even before this decision, German AWACs participated in the surveillance of no-fly zones in Bosnia, since the German Constitutional Court in a decision of April 1993 considered such participation compatible with the German Constitution. Thus, the Bosnian War served as a testing ground, a learning-by-doing experience for later developments in the European security and defence policy. Assessing effectiveness As a result of the lack of agreement, the member states could only issue an official declaration that excluded military intervention in September 1991. Although there was a collective decision in this regard, and even when the member states agreed on the medium-term objectives (promotion of peace and stability in the region in accordance to the CFSP objectives), there was no agreement on the short-term objectives (whether to deploy a supporting mission, limited military intervention or full-scale intervention) and even less on the institutions that should carry out the implementation of these objectives (WEU, NATO or UN). In later stages (October 1991–June 1992), the member states could not even agree on an EPC collective decision. From an

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external point of view, in particular, this failure to agree on a particular course of action meant that the EC’s impact on the resolution of the conflict was seriously undermined. Although the EC had agreed to deploy other instruments in order to deal with the growing violence in the Balkans, the hesitation and disagreements over the use of force weakened the EC’s credibility vis-àvis the conflict parties. As to whether an agreement on the use of force could have increased the EC’s effectiveness, as suggested by some observers (Gordon 1997/1998; Cameron, 1999; Kintis, 1999), this is a moot point. Firstly, even if the member states had agreed on a military intervention, any such intervention would have required the agreement of all the parties and a ceasefire along with the conditions set in the EPC declaration of 19 September; yet, at the time, no ceasefire was in place. As far as the agreement of the parties was concerned, it is doubtful that the Serbians would have accepted an EC intervention since they were very suspicious of German intentions. A principle of humanitarian intervention or the responsibility to protect was yet to emerge; by contrast, the principle of non-intervention was strongly adhered to. Second, and linked to the previous point, to earn the support of all EC members, an operation in Yugoslavia would have required the authorisation of the UNSC, something particularly difficult because of the opposition of Russia during the first stages of the conflict to any kind of intervention against Serbian forces. Hence the need for legitimacy regarding a military intervention implied extra burden for effective action. As Nicole Gnesotto has pointed out, this would have ‘reduced the autonomy of the Twelve, insofar as policy then became dependent on the agreement of the United States, Russia, and China’ (quoted in Edwards, 1997: 191). Even if the member states had agreed on the WEU’s intervention, it is not clear whether they had the means to carry out a full-scale operation without the support of the US or NATO (Gow, 1996: 95; Dover, 2005). One British representative at that body recalled that the WEU ‘didn’t have the military wherewithal to compete with the sort of force structures and arrangements which NATO had at its disposal. The WEU was . . . essentially a political organisation. It wanted to flex military muscle which frankly it didn’t possess’ (quoted in Simms, 2003: 101). According to Rupp, the European powers were not able to intervene militarily in Yugoslavia since ‘only the United States maintained the airlift and sealift capabilities necessary to maintain two or three hundred thousand troops in the Balkans’ (1998: 171). And Yugoslav Army analysts concurred that the EC countries could not have intervened militarily through the WEU without the support of the US (Kintis, 1999: 284). In any case, the lack of military capabilities affected the effectiveness of the EU not so much because the EU could have actually used these capabilities to stop the war – many authors have questioned the effectiveness of military force during the Bosnian conflict, in particular air strikes and the

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costs of deploying ground troops (Edwards, 1997; Piening, 1997) – but because had the EU had military capabilities to threaten the use of force at an early stage of the crisis (1991), this might have contained the Serbian expansionist ambitions. Instead EC diplomatic actions not backed up by military threats were not credible: ‘It was goodwill without the will to power’ (Kintis, 1999: 284).

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Conclusion

In the context of a transformation of European security institutions after the end of the Cold War, there were high expectations about what the EC could do in Yugoslavia. This led the EC to engage intensively in the first stages of the crisis. David Owen described this period as creating ‘an air of unreal expectation about the EC’s early involvement’ (quoted in Tonra, 2001: 226). The EC tried to exhaust all the EC and EPC instruments at its disposal during this period from economic carrots (offering aid and an Association Agreement), economic sanctions (oil embargo, arms embargo, suspension of trade agreements and assistance), diplomatic sanctions (withdrawal of member states’ ambassadors), ‘good offices’ in the peace talks, conditional recognition, sending an EC monitoring mission, to finally convening the EC Peace Conference. Thus, contrary to some of the characterisations of the EC’s role in the Yugoslavian wars, ‘Europe was not timid, it was overly-ambitious’ (Debié, 1997: 124). The intervention of the EC in the conflict in former Yugoslavia was seen not only as a challenge for the EC – requiring an effective response to a conflict in its neighbourhood – but also as an opportunity to define the EC’s role in the world and its relationship with other international organisations, at a time when a new system for enhanced cooperation in foreign policy (CFSP) was in the process of being agreed. However, when the Yugoslav conflict began, the only mechanism at the EU’s disposal was EPC, that is, a coordinating mechanism of foreign policy, and not a conflict prevention and crisis management policy per se. According to Jacques Delors, then president of the Commission, ‘the Community is like an adolescent facing the crisis of an adult . . . It now only has the weapons of recognition and economic aid. If it were 10 years older, it might be able to impose a military peace-keeping force’ (Washington Post, 1991). Although the member states tried to produce pioneering solutions, the cases presented above have shown some deficiencies of the EPC institutions when dealing with a conflict that affected mainly effectiveness, but also coherence of the CFSP and that contributed to broaden the capabilities – expectations gap (Hill, 1993). Institutional weaknesses, together with divergences between the member states’ interests (intergovernmental politics) explain the inadequate response of EC to the crisis and the degrees of

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coherence and effectiveness of EPC during this period. Moreover, the impact of local politics – mainly on the effectiveness of the EC’s activities – cannot be forgotten. Some examples of opposition to the EC’s mediating role (particularly by the Serbs) include the cases of the ECMM and the Peace Conference. As far as institutional deficiencies are concerned, EPC lacked appropriate arrangements for external representation. The Troika system composed of the three Presidencies (past, current, future) did not seem an appropriate arrangement to deal with a crisis and to lead the negotiations with the parties. This was particularly evident during the first period of the conflict when the Troika was composed of three small member states (Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal), whose influence and resources were limited – it is not clear, though, whether had a larger member state held the Presidency the outcome would have been any different. In the early stages of the conflict, the Presidency not only had to deal with a crisis in its neighbourhood, but it was also involved in running the Intergovernmental Conference. On the other hand, the EC did not have a permanent body in charge of the planning and running of EPC initiatives, but these tasks were to be carried out by the sixmonth rotating Presidency, thus having a negative impact on effectiveness as shown by the ECMM. Moreover, there was neither a permanent body with an exclusive right of initiative to put policy proposals on the agenda nor a policy planning unit to provide an informed analysis of the situation. The Council Secretariat had very limited resources and would exclusively undertake administrative tasks for the time being. Even if limited, a reflex coordination, a habit of working together and efforts to build coalitions with like-minded countries, had emerged prior to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. Yet, as expected from an institutionalist point of view, the low levels of institutionalisation before the signing of the TEU also meant lower opportunities for socialisation among national diplomats within EC forums. In the case of the Political Directors and Foreign Ministers, contacts were limited to those taking place during meetings organised in the capital of the member state holding the Presidency. In the case of the EPC working groups, meetings took place in Brussels, but national representatives were still based in the MFAs. Although the COREU network could be and was used as a means to communicate with other colleagues, the fact that they were not permanently based in Brussels limited the impact of socialisation among them and thus made the search for compromise among different national positions more difficult. For some authors, one of the main drawbacks of the EC’s intervention in Bosnia was the lack of military instruments, which was seen to highlight the need for an autonomous defence capability (Gordon, 1997/1998; Piening: 1997; Kintis, 1999). Had the Maastricht Treaty been in place in 1991, it is a moot point, however, whether it would have significantly changed the EU’s approach to the crisis. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the CFSP did not imply a revolution in foreign and security policy, but built upon previous EPC institutions, preserv-

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ing the existing institutional path. Even if the Maastricht Treaty introduced the possibility of a security and defence policy, no specific provision to enact this policy was foreseen; instead, the TEU served as a reminder of NATO’s commitments for all its members. This operational limitation might be explained because at that time the image of the EU as a civilian power was still predominant among the EU member states, thus highlighting the importance of the EU’s international role and its impact upon the EU’s foreign policy output. When the use of force was considered indispensable, the majority (as seen in the case of non-decision) expressed their preference for another international organisation taking over this task, either NATO (UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark) or the UN (Ireland) – the significant exception being France. But even in the case of France, the use of force was only contemplated when a ceasefire had been agreed. In other words, peace enforcement was not seen as an appropriate task for the EU. The prevalence of this civilian power image meant that the member states did not have problems with agreeing on humanitarian assistance, economic sanctions or diplomatic initiatives, all of them within the traditional realm of the EU. It was also easy to agree on the deployment of civilian monitors or the organisation of a peace conference but obstacles to agreeing on military intervention proved insuperable. In conclusion, a combination of both institutional deficiencies, and intergovernmental and local politics, can explain the low degrees of coherence and effectiveness of the CFSP during this period. The reforms introduced by the Maastricht Treaty would again create high expectations as to how much influence the EU could wield on the international stage. In the next chapter, I will review the EU’s record and its role in post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation during the post-war period.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14

Author’s interview, Brussels, 13 September 2006. It was not until 2008 that the CSDP would experience another casualty, the death of a French soldier during the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation. Author’s interviews, Brussels, November 2005. Author’s interview, Sarajevo, 14 June 2005. Ibid. Ibid. Another British former Secretary, David Owen, took Carrington’s place. Author’s interview, Brussels, 13 September 2006. Ibid. However, it has to be mentioned that the crisis had a significant impact in terms of the refugee crisis and economic instability, especially for the neighbouring countries (Italy and Greece). Author’s interviews, April and September 2006. Author’s telephone interview, 11 July 2006. Ibid. Ibid.

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The EU’s intervention in the aftermath of the war The conflicts in the Balkans have demonstrated a tendency for the European Union to be little more than the paymaster of policies directed from the other side of the Atlantic . . . the European Union cannot afford to be an economic giant but a political dwarf in its own part of the world. (Bildt, 1998: 388)

Introduction

This chapter examines the post-conflict intervention of the EU in Bosnia until 2001. EU foreign policy during this period was marked by continuity. The EU’s intervention in Bosnia continued to be mainly civilian (economic and humanitarian) in nature since military initiatives were avoided by the member states. To paraphrase Carl Bilt, the High Representative in Bosnia, while being an ‘economic giant’, the EU was condemned to be ‘a political dwarf’. The EU’s role was also undermined by a lack of a clear strategy towards the Balkan region. Although the EU was fully committed to supporting the reconstruction and stabilisation effort in the short term, there was no agreement among EU policy-makers regarding the EU’s long-term relationship with the region. During the second half of the 1990s, the EU was already dealing with a long queue of aspirants to membership and had neither the institutional capacity nor the willingness to commit to advancing another enlargement wave. Despite its limitations, the EU managed to launch and run a civilian administration in the city of Mostar which contributed, albeit in a limited way, to the peaceful management of the conflict in Bosnia. The EU’s policy towards Bosnia would be challenged, however, by the events in Kosovo. The Kosovo War sent shock waves all the way to Brussels and the capitals of the member states, resulting in a transformation of the EU’s strategy and instruments. The transformation of its strategy is best exemplified by the launch of the Stability Pact, but also the transformation of the EU’s instruments, in the form of an increasing institutionalisation of the CSDP (see Chapter 6). Before examining in detail three case studies, a brief overview of the EU’s foreign policy in Bosnia during this period is in order. Despite the marginalisation suffered by the EU during the latter stages of the armed conflict (see Chapter 4), with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the EU assumed responsibility for helping with the post-conflict

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reconstruction of the war-torn region. While negotiations were taking place at the US Air Base of Dayton, the EU was able to deploy an innovative operation with the Administration of Mostar (1994–97). This was the very first time the EU engaged directly in the administration of a territory. While there is no doubt that this was a tremendously challenging task in post-war Bosnia, it also served to highlight the institutional limitations of the newly established CFSP. As mentioned in the previous chapter, many of the lessons of the early EU intervention in Bosnia were not incorporated in the Maastricht Treaty, but only later on in the Amsterdam Treaty. Yet the Maastricht Treaty introduced important institutional changes, including the establishment, not without symbolism, of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. While still firmly intergovernmental, under a single institutional framework, the CFSP could rely on a stronger Secretariat, access to EC funding and the possibility of adopting operational decisions through joint actions and common positions (see Chapter 2). However, as I will show below, despite these innovations, institutional challenges remained. Although the text of the Dayton Peace Agreement did not mention the EU as one of the key implementing organisations, at the Madrid European Council the EU expressed its commitment to contributing to the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace agreement by providing humanitarian aid and participating in reconstruction efforts (European Council, 1995), playing on its strengths as a civilian power, something that had proved impossible during the war. Carl Bildt was also appointed to coordinate the EU’s involvement from Sarajevo through his position as High Representative. According to the Joint Action (Council of the EU, 1995), the EU would bear part of the expenditure of the establishment and running of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), who, the EU insisted, had to be a European and report to the Union where necessary (GAC, 1995). The Joint Action also stated that the Presidency, in association with the Commission, would represent the EU at the PIC, the main decision-making body for the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Yet the overall strategy of the international community in Bosnia followed the US approach – a minimalist strategy with an emphasis on NATO peacekeeping and a residual role for the High Representative – rather than the European one, which had favoured a strong civilian organisation led by the High Representative and supported by NATO. Over the following years, EU activities in Bosnia concentrated on the economic recovery of the country and the EU was the main donor of humanitarian aid and economic assistance (see Table 5.1). From 1996, Bosnia benefited from trade preferences and from the PHARE (‘Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies’) and OBNOVA (‘Reconstruction’) programmes. The former had been launched by the EC in 1989 to support transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe; the latter was launched in 1996 to assist the countries of former Yugoslavia. However,

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despite the EU’s involvement in the provision of aid, the EU’s political role in the country remained very limited. Another characteristic of this period was the emphasis placed on conditionality in the EU’s relations with Bosnia. In the Council Conclusions of 30 October 1995, EU Foreign Ministers stated that clear economic and political conditionality should govern the EU’s policy towards Bosnia and that it would be part of a regional approach. These two principles, which would go hand in hand, would be developed in subsequent documents and would constitute the main pillars of the EU’s policy towards the region. The regional approach was incorporated into every single EU initiative, from the Royaumont Process and the Regional Approach to the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), the objective being to encourage cooperation and good neighbourly relations between these countries, providing a long-term structural solution to the conflicts in the Balkans. Future cooperation agreements with the EC and assistance were made conditional on the readiness of each country to cooperate with their neighbours and to fulfil other principles such as respect for democracy, rule of law and human rights (European Commission, 1996). In sum, the main contribution of the EU to peace resolution would be the use of its ‘power of attraction’ to support ‘the process of stabilisation and economic renewal’ through regional cooperation (GAC, 1996). The first initiative within this wider context of regional cooperation was the process of stability and good-neighbourly relations in South-Eastern Europe, otherwise known as the Royaumont Process, launched on 13 December 1995. Originally, this initiative was designed to complement the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, although afterwards the emphasis was placed on regional cooperation, in particular on democratisation and civil society (Council of the EU, 1998). Its objectives were, however, too broad, limiting the potential effectiveness of the initiative (European Stability Initiative, 1999). On 29 April 1997, based on a Commission strategy paper, the Council adopted the Regional Approach establishing political and economic conditionality for the development of bilateral relations with the countries of South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). Even though conditions applied to all the countries, it was stated that ‘each country will be judged on its own merits’ (GAC, 1997). Thus, a tension between a country’s individual progress and regional cooperation was already evident in this approach and would become even more evident in later initiatives (Gordon, 2009). Moreover, the regional approach lacked a clear and purposive strategy. The EU gave no indication of what its long-term relationship with the region (and for that matter Bosnia) would be. It was not ready to offer the prospect of membership at a time when it was having difficulty in meeting the demands of potential new members from Central and Eastern Europe (Friis and Murphy, 2000). The EU also faced deep problems of trying to encourage regional cooperation among countries that had been at war with each other in the recent past.

442.42

360.86

295.25

105.26

10.00

0.60

3.96

0.40

90.30

2000

131.78

25.00

0.80

0.75

105.23

2001

74.20

2.30

71.90

2002

80.00

15.00

2.00

63.00

2003

2435.58

75.00

18.60

225.16

1035.74

1081.08

Total

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Source: European Parliament (2004a).

216.38

0.80

30.90

58.90

118.36

1999

233.96

495.47

1.80

15.00

87.95

190.50

1998

Total assistance

4.80

39.90

105.00

211.16

1997

25.00

4.80

65.40

142.45

229.77

1996

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0.70

Democracy and human rights

145.03

0.65

70.00

495.26

0.21

1995

Specific actions

ECHO (humanitarian assistance)

PHARE, OBNOVA and CARDS

1991–94

Table 5.1 EC assistance to Bosnia, 1991–2003 (£ million)

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Furthermore, the EU did not occupy the primary position of leadership in the region in that US intervention during the war had relegated it to a secondary role, limited to providing economic assistance under the umbrella of the UN mission in Bosnia. The EU’s role in the Balkans region would, however, start to change after the events in Kosovo. The conflict in Kosovo (1998–99) made apparent that without a clear offer of membership the EU’s engagement in the region could not provide long-term stability to the Western Balkans. This suggested an increasing awareness of the fact that problems in the Balkans directly affected the EU and thus drove home the point that the EU had a responsibility to promote stability in the region. In other words, Europeanising the Balkans seemed more attractive than Balkanising Europe (Wheeler, 2003). With this in mind, the EU launched the Stability Pact (1999), an initiative of the German Presidency to develop a long-term strategy for the region, including the prospect of EU membership for the Balkan countries. In this spirit, the EU also decided to launch the SAP, which remains to date its main strategy for the region (see Chapter 6). Aside from its regional approach, the EU used other carrots and sticks in its dealings with post-war Bosnia. For instance, economic incentives were very important in pressuring the Republika Srpska to comply with the Dayton Peace Agreement. For example, following a UNSCR of March 1996, the EU suspended sanctions that were imposed during the war against those areas of Bosnia under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces in order to support economic recovery. Moreover, after the establishment of a new moderate government in Republika Sprska headed by Milorad Dodik, in February 1998, the EU agreed on a Joint Action to provide rapid short-term assistance to the new government. Sanctions or the ‘stick approach’ were brought into play when economic incentives seemed not to work. On several occasions, the Commission and the Council representatives reminded Bosnian authorities that aid from the EU was dependent upon compliance with the terms of the peace accord, respect for human rights and full cooperation with the ICTY (Presidency of the EU, 1997). The suspension of aid was one of the most frequent threats against the parties, but it was rarely used and remained an instrument of last resort. On a few occasions, the EU suspended economic aid to Republika Srpska in protest at the refusal of the authorities there to arrest indicted war criminals, such as Radovan Karadzi´c or Ratko Mladi´c. Finally, even though the EU agreed to lift the arms embargo to the countries of former Yugoslavia following UNSCR 1021, the member states pledged ‘a policy of moderation on the part of arms-exporting countries’ and adopted a common position on arms exports to former Yugoslavia, maintaining the embargo towards Bosnia, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Council of the EU, 1996a). Against this backdrop, I will focus on three issues in the following sections. Firstly, the EU’s role in the administration of the divided city of

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Mostar. Secondly, on a non-decision on military/police measures, which allows us to explore why the EU limited its involvement in Bosnia to ‘soft’ and low-level activities during 1996–98. And thirdly, on the Stability Pact, an initiative that was launched as a reaction to the recurrence of conflict in the Balkans and gave a boost to the EU’s political involvement in the region.

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The EU Administration of Mostar (EUAM)

In November 1993, the Maastricht Treaty entered into force. A major breakthrough was the possibility of the Council deciding on joint actions (article J.3, TEU Maastricht), a new CFSP instrument that increased the operational impact of EU external action, along with the possibility of resorting to the EC budget in order to fund CFSP expenditure. The EUAM was one of the first CFSP joint actions decided by the EU and, without doubt, the biggest up to that point in terms of funding and personnel. It was also the first time the EU was involved in running a civilian administration – it would take more than fifteen years for the EU to head another civilian administration, this time in Kosovo. The Maastricht Treaty had also proclaimed the WEU as the ‘defence arm of the EU’ (Declaration on Western European Union, TEU Maastricht). Hence, the EUAM served to test cooperation between the EU and the WEU since it was the first full involvement of the WEU in an EU joint action (Edwards, 1997: 185). In sum, this initiative allows us to examine the impact of increasing institutionalisation on coherence and effectiveness. Once a multi-ethnic city,1 Mostar had suffered not only a siege by the Serbian Army in 1992, but also, since May 1993, the heaviest fights between Muslims and Croats. Mostar, designated as the capital of Hezeg Bosna, played a key role in the Bosnian Croats’ ambitions to establish their independent statelet within Bosnia. During the war, both parties engaged in murders, rape, forced evictions and other war crimes and thousands of refugees, mostly Bosniaks and Serbs, fled the city (Bose, 2002: 100–6). The war that ravaged the city left physical destruction and a divided city between the Bosniaks living on the eastern side of the Neretva river and Croats living in the (less affected) west of the city. Administration by a neutral international organisation was proposed as an interim solution to the problem of lack of agreement on common institutions after the ceasefire, as well as to help with the reconstruction of the city. The idea of supporting the administration of Mostar was originally launched in October 1993 in the context of the negotiations of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. According to this proposal, Sarajevo would be under UN administration and Mostar under that of the EU. At a meeting in Luxembourg on 4 October 1993, the EC’s Foreign Ministers discussed the issue and called on the WEU to examine the support it might provide for the organisation of a police force in Mostar under EC Administration. However, it is worth noting

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that this request was made without reference to article J.4.2 (TEU Maastricht); instead the operation was organised on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and the WEU (Missiroli, 1999). The EC’s proposal was accepted by all parties, but it was made dependent on the signing of the Washington Agreement between Croats and Muslims, an agreement which created a federation between Bosniaks and Croats. As soon as the agreement was signed (March 1994), the EU sent an advance party to study the situation on the ground and to prepare the deployment of the EUAM. The Joint Action of 16 May 1994 provided support for the administration with the aim of reunifying the city and restoring its basic infrastructure (Council of the EU, 1994). A WEU police force was also envisaged to maintain public order and to establish a joint Muslim–Croat police force. The EUAM commenced its operations on 23 July 1994, once the city had been demilitarised, with a mandate of two years. It was composed of around 150 technical experts and 40 administrators, plus the WEU police force contingent. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the EU and WEU member states and the parties involved in the conflict on 5 July 1994.2 It was the first step in the process of establishing a multi-ethnic city that could serve as ‘a model for other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Presidency of the EU, 1994). However, from the beginning, the Administration suffered from obstructionism by the Croat side, who wanted to maintain a city divided along ethnic lines. On 11 September, just a few months into the EUAM mandate, there was a failed assassination attempt against Hans Koschnick, the EU Administrator, when an anti-tank rocket fired by Croat extremists destroyed his room at EUAM headquarters in Hotel Ero. Ironically, this incident took place hours before the inauguration of the reconstruction of the first bridge between East and West Mostar. It was clear that ‘building bridges’ among the population was going to be more difficult than anticipated by the EU. One of the main objectives of the EUAM was to establish an Interim Statute for the city administration. During the negotiations, the EU Administrator proposed the idea of establishing a large unified central zone, jointly administered, a proposal that was accepted by the Bosniaks, but strongly rejected by the Croats who wanted to see the size of this zone reduced. When on 7 February 1996 Koschnick issued a decree with his plan, the Croats responded with a riot and an infuriated crowd trapped the EU Administrator in his car for an hour, threatening to lynch him (AFP, 1996a). The EU Presidency called for an emergency meeting in Rome with all the parties. The EU’s cave-in to Croat pressure resulted in the Rome Agreement signed on 18 February 1996. This agreement reduced the size of the central zone, against Koschnick’s proposal. The European Council also decided to extend the mandate until 31 December 1996 as requested by the parties, provided that the elections were successful (European Council, 1996a).

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The Rome agreement considerably damaged the EU Administrator’s image among the parties (ICG, 2000: 9). He resigned a month later and was succeeded by Ricardo Pérez Casado until the end of the EUAM’s mandate on 22 July 1996. The latter was responsible for the organisation of the municipal elections held on 30 June. A coalition including the Muslim party SDA won the election by a narrow percentage. However, the Croat party HDZ rejected the official results, arguing that there had been irregularities. The EU supported the results of the elections and pressured the Croat side to accept them, fearing that a Croat rejection could jeopardise the upcoming Bosnian elections due in September. The EU also put pressure on Zagreb authorities to force the HDZ to accept the results (Council of the EU, 1996b) and the EUAM issued a threat to withdraw its personnel and assistance if the Croats did not end their boycott of the elections. Following this diplomatic pressure, on 6 August, the Croats accepted an agreement regarding the city council composition. From 23 July 1996, the EU appointed an EU Special Envoy to Mostar, Sir Martin Garrod. He was in charge of coordinating the phasing-out of the EUAM, the transfer of authority to the new city administration and the reintegration of Mostar into the overall Dayton structures. Obstacles to freedom of movement and practices of ethnic cleansing continued to be a reality, especially on the west side of the city (European Council, 1996b). On 31 December 1996, the EUAM put an end to its presence in Mostar. The impact of institutions: charting new waters This was the first time that the EU had engaged in civilian administration and, not surprisingly, it did not have appropriate institutional arrangements for the planning or day-to-day management of this kind of operation. During the planning phase, internal coordination was inadequate, mainly due to the fact that the Presidency at the time, Greece, was overloaded. Before drafting the Joint Action, the Council sent a three-person advance party to Mostar in midApril to prepare for the arrival of the Administrator and to report on the situation on the ground. The advance party submitted 28 reports to the Presidency. Some of them requested advice or approval from the Presidency; however, none of these responses were provided (Court of Auditors, 1996: 6). Because the EU did not have a permanent body in charge of the planning or the implementation of the operation, the management of the EUAM fell under the responsibility of the Presidency, assisted by an advisory working party. The Council Secretariat would perform a purely administrative function supporting the Presidency and the working party. As had been the case with the EUMM, these arrangements, however, did not promote a coherent policy since the six-month rotating Presidency did not provide continuity in the management of this initiative. On some occasions, it was unclear to the people on the ground which body or individual within the Council was responsible for overall coordination. As a result of these deficient

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arrangements, those in Mostar lacked strategic direction from Brussels. For example, regarding one of the main documents negotiated there, the EUAM Strategy Document, the Administrator did not receive any comments from the decision-making bodies in the Council (Court of Auditors, 1996: 9). Besides, the member states in Brussels decided on the appointment of the EUAM staff without consulting the EU Administrator. This led to some duplication, for example, when two humanitarian advisors were sent to the EUAM, from the Commission and Denmark, respectively (Reichel, 2000: 14). The effectiveness of the operation was also affected by institutional deficiencies. The Special Report of the Court of Auditors pointed to the fact that decisions were usually delayed because the national representatives had to consult with their capitals and could not cope with the day-to-day management of the operation (Court of Auditors, 1996: 8). The limited room for manoeuvre from their capitals, the lack of experience on these issues and the fact that they had to attend other working parties may explain the problems which affected the implementation of the EUAM. To ensure institutional and horizontal coherence, the Commission had one representative in the Council working party and two staff seconded to the EUAM. Although the Commission was in charge of administering the EC budget of the mission, the EU Administrator had no obligation to report to the Commission, only to the Presidency. In spite of these procedural gaps, inter-pillar coordination worked well during the implementation of the mission (Winn and Lord, 2001: 102). Because of the nature of the projects carried out by the EUAM (reconstruction projects and humanitarian assistance), in practice the role of the Commission during agenda-setting and implementation was very important. According to Winn and Lord (2001: 96–7), the experts from the Commission were instrumental in the design of the Joint Action and in later reforms during the implementation phase, advising national representatives in the advisory working party and EUAM officials. The role of the Commission also proved crucial in the disbursement of funds from the Community pillar to implement the projects of the EUAM. The funding of the Joint Action raised some tensions with the European Parliament, though. One problem arose because there was no formal Council mechanism in place to ensure that adequate funding was provided for the fact-finding mission. For this reason, the Council decided to finance the advance party with loans from the ECMM and from the German Federal Budget. The Council classified the expenses of the advance party as administrative expenses. However, this decision was criticised by the European Parliament who asked the Council to better define what administrative and operational expenditures were. According to a previous gentleman’s agreement between the Council and the European Parliament, only operational expenditure had to be submitted to the oversight of the European Parliament. Hence the latter feared that the Council was using the strategy of declaring expenditure as ‘administrative’ to escape from its control (Monar,

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1997b: 37). These battles over the Mostar Joint Action financing led to subsequent reforms in the Amsterdam Treaty. Apart from bureaucratic politics, there were some problems and delays with the contributions from the member states that affected the effectiveness of the operation on the ground. From the initial €32 million, 15 million was financed from the EC budget and 17 million from the member states, on a GNP basis. Yet by 31 December 1994, €4.9 million (around 15 per cent of the EUAM budget) was still unpaid by France and the UK (Court of Auditors, 1996: 9). Interestingly, these two countries had opposed the communitarisation of the CFSP budget at Maastricht. Due to these problems, the 1995 budget for the EUAM was entirely financed from the EC budget (Monar, 1997b: 46). Finally, other logistical problems affected the mission. For instance, of the 200 or so officers that were supposed to compose the WEU Police Force (WEUPOL), only 15 had arrived in Mostar in September 1994 (AFP, 1994). This delay in deployment impaired the effectiveness of the mission, requiring support from UNPROFOR. According to Reichel (2000: 15), the WEU never provided the entire contingent of police officers envisaged, and only 163 officers were deployed in Mostar. Commenting on the lack of resources, the International Police Commissioner Col. Jan Meijvogel said, ‘I am not able to drive in a car that only exists on paper’ (Reichel, 2000: 15). The analysis of this initiative also illustrates how policy learning was crucial during implementation. Despite these initial problems, programmes and budgets were adjusted in order to correct gaps between objectives and actual implementation, and to adapt to changing conditions on the ground. In this process of policy learning, networks of experts were crucial in devising new policies (Winn and Lord, 2001: 89, 98–103). Experts and mid-level officials ‘framed the policy for the higher levels to rubber stamp’ (Winn and Lord, 2001: 170). The first policy change took place with the preparation of a Strategy Document by the EU Administrator, turning the objectives of the Memorandum of Understanding into more limited and pragmatic ones. During the implementation of the mandate, changes had to be made to fit problems on the ground. Thus, after non-compliance by the Croats, the EUAM suspended the completion of the project of the Bijeli Brijeg Hospital. Similarly, due to the delays suffered in implementation, the working plan of the WEU police force had to be adjusted accordingly. The implementation gaps can be explained because some of the assumptions upon which the EUAM was designed did not materialise, in particular the assumption that ‘the EUAM would progressively gain the confidence of the citizens and not be obstructed in achieving its aims and objectives by any of the parties’ (Reichel, 2000: 5). Learning thus served to correct unintended consequences that resulted from the limited knowledge available to policy-makers and the limits of their foresight and rationality. From the account above, it seems that the main problems affecting

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coherence refer to the deficient internal structures for managing and coordinating these types of operations. Although the member states agreed on the main goal and on the mandate and there were no contradictory objectives among the different levels (Brussels/Mostar) and between the Council and the Commission policies, problems relating to EU crisis management structures (or lack thereof) prevented synergies among the activities of the different actors involved in implementation. As pointed to in the Special Report, it was ‘more a matter of chance than a consequence of the procedure adopted that the team has managed to work well together’ (Court of Auditors, 1996: 12). Similarly, bureaucratic politics between the Council and the European Parliament and logistical problems affected the effectiveness of the operation, but to a lesser extent. As will be discussed in the next section, problems of effectiveness had more to do with the mission’s mandate and local politics. ‘Technical aid’ in a hostile environment Although the phenomenon of international administrations is not a new one (cf. Wilde, 2001), the scope and breadth of the tasks performed in the postCold War period have become unprecedented – as exemplified by the EUAM’s mandate. As I have discussed earlier, the CFSP machinery was not ready for such a huge undertaking. However, institutions alone cannot explain all the problems confronted by the EUAM; one needs to put politics back into the picture: the EU’s liberalisation strategy and the fact that the EU failed to acknowledge the political nature of its activities, together with the intransigence of local politicians, help explain some of the shortcomings experienced by the EUAM. The strategy followed in Mostar, with minor deviations, would become the standard approach in subsequent international administrations and peacebuilding enterprises: one of democratisation and marketisation (Paris, 2002). In Bosnia, Croatia, East Timor and Kosovo, peace was to be achieved through a strategy of political and economic liberalisation. The EUAM goals were consistent with the EU’s objective to contribute to a peaceful solution to the conflict (European Council, 1995). In the political sphere, the main objectives of the EUAM were to create conditions for the unification of the city, to hold elections and promote the respect of basic liberties. In other words, ‘to contribute to a climate leading to a single, self-sustaining, multi-ethnic administration’ (Reichel, 2000: 4). In the economic sphere, the aim was ‘to assist in the transition from a former economic system to a more liberal one which is expected and wanted by all’ (quoted in Reichel, 2000: 27). This liberalisation strategy was thus inherently political, despite the efforts of EUAM officials to portray it as ‘technical aid’. Despite the political nature of its mandate, the day-to-day implementation of the mandate focused on reconstruction projects. In fact, according to the Mayor of East Mostar, ‘If you ask a person in east Mostar what they most

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associate the EU with, they will say THW (Technische Hilfswerk: Technical Aid), which distributes building materials for the reconstruction of damaged and destroyed homes’ (Orucevic, 1996). In the first months, the work of the EUAM concentrated on the reactivation of the local economy and the reconstruction of basic infrastructure (bridges, houses, public schools and hospitals), activities more suitable for an EC initiative than a CFSP one. Even though there was significant progress on the achievement of these objectives (Court of Auditors, 1996: 3; Reichel, 2000: 23–32), some of the projects had not been implemented by the end of 1995, and others (like the reconstruction of Mostar’s hospital) were awaiting compliance by the Croats regarding free access for all citizens (Reichel, 2000: 25). The only functioning joining project was the bus company that operated between Mostar East and West, although the company operated separate routes and was managed by separate agencies on each side (Court of Auditors, 1996: 3). The generous economic assistance of the EUAM did not contribute to sustainable economic recovery in the area by creating new jobs. The black-market economy continued to be the main mode of survival for many Mostar citizens (Bose, 2002). Another EUAM official also complained that not enough effort had gone into improving the sustainability of the reconstruction projects in Mostar (Yarwood, 1999). Even if the EU had contributed to the reconstruction of a large number of public schools, hospitals and other public buildings, the city did not have the resources for maintenance or repairs. The implementation of these apparently ‘technical’ projects also showed the significance of political factors. For instance, the physical reconstruction of the city without guaranteeing freedom of movement or refugee return served to consolidate its division into two separate ethnic cities and administrations since the EUAM financed separate projects for each part of the city (ICG, 2000: 6). In other words, ‘The line of separation between the Muslim, East, and Croat, West Mostar [became] increasingly clear and marked, so that Mostar ha[d] definitely become a divided city’ (BBC, 1994). Undoubtedly, the main problem concerned the achievement of the EUAM’s political objectives. At the end of its mandate, the city was still divided, in spite of the fact that a Mayor had been elected for a single municipal council. Freedom of movement was severely restricted, with complaints about this from the Muslim side. The lack of a unified police force prevented freedom of movement and refugee return to the Croatian side of the city. In December 1996, at the end of the EUAM’s mandate, the assessment of the European Council was mixed: The European Council is satisfied that the primary objective of the EU Administration of Mostar – ensuring the establishment of a basis for a functioning unified local administration in the town – has now been met . . . However, many problems persist in Mostar, including continuing expulsions, harassment, intimidation and the influence of organised crime, and some local parties continue to obstruct political progress. (European Council, 1996b)

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Even the success identified by the European Council could be considered a rather optimistic estimation given that the unified city institutions were an empty shell, with the real work taking place at the level of municipal (ethnicbased) districts. Moreover, most of the public utilities were duplicated in the west and east sides. The situation concerning refugees and internally displaced persons was especially worrying. Despite a Decree on Stopping Expulsion from Houses in October 1994, forced evictions were taking place after the EUAM had left in 1997 (Reichel, 2000: 28). The pace of refugee return was also lower than in the rest of the country. It was not until 2001 that the refugee return figures increased from below 400 to nearly 5,000, with a total of 15,000 minority refugees by 2004 (Bieber, 2005: 430). Another objective of the EUAM was to create a unified police force. The WEU component, known as WEUPOL, was to advise and train the Croat and Muslim police forces. Yet the opposition of the parties prevented the implementation of this mandate. From the beginning, the police from West Mostar opposed the creation of mixed police units and by August 1995, the Administrator acknowledged that there were still two separate police forces (ICG, 2000: footnote 6). Only after the Rome Agreement was a joint police force created to patrol the central zone and joint patrols started on 1 March 1996 (AFP, 1996a). In August 1996, the WEUPOL put forward a plan to create the United Police Force composed of 380 officers (AFP, 1996b). The WEUPOL contingent assisted the EU Special Envoy until the transfer of powers to the local authorities on 15 October 1996. One could argue that the EU’s liberalisation strategy resulted in unintended consequences. Rooted in this strategy was the idea that democratisation and quick elections should follow soon after the end of hostilities: ‘elections were intended to begin the process of knitting back together the country’s physically and ethnically separated communities’ (Paris, 2002: 100). Thus, among the objectives of the EUAM was to hold elections before the end of the two-year mandate. Despite a growing debate about the appropriateness of this approach, the EU Administrator decided to go ahead and plan the Mostar elections for spring 1996, the first elections in Bosnia after the conflict, and a litmus-test of the viability of such an exercise in the rest of the country. This decision was strongly backed by the Clinton administration, against critics who argued that early elections would only serve to consolidate the power of nationalist parties (Bose, 2002: 116; Paris, 2002: 100–1). The critics were proved right when the elections in Mostar took place in June 1996. Although the elections were peacefully conducted, two main nationalist parties (the Croat HDZ and the Muslim SDA) obtained the majority of votes. The only multi-ethnic moderate list got just 3.5 per cent of the votes (Bose, 2002: 117). Once in power, Croat nationalists did anything they could to boycott the work of those institutions they had been appointed to. The limited freedom of movement in the city and the atmosphere of fear – forced evictions from West Mostar continued throughout 1996–97 – also

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prevented some elected representatives from attending the meetings of the newly elected institutions. With hindsight the truth is that Mostar’s elections took place too early, before the details about the joint governance of the city had been agreed. The parties had few incentives to cooperate with the establishment of common institutions and all the incentives to boycott those formal institutions. Such dangers were not foreseen by EU policy-makers at the time. It was only later in the ‘EU Concept for Civilian Administrations’ that this issue was recognised: ‘It is fundamental to be aware of the potential dangers deriving from premature elections. The practicability and desirability of holding the elections with an international community involvement at a particular time is a political issue, which needs to be carefully considered within the appropriate institutional forums’ (Council of the EU, 2003d: 27). Although the EUAM was launched with the agreement of the parties who had signed the Memorandum of Understanding, there were different perceptions as to how legitimate the intervention of the EUAM was. Croats repeatedly complained about the ‘colonial’ and ‘imperialistic’ nature of the administration. They also made clear that they had only agreed to the deployment of the EUAM following pressures from the international community and Croatia (Reichel, 2000: 41). Bosniaks, for their part, were fully committed to the reunification of the city given their numerical advantage, and supported a stronger role of the EUAM (Orucevic, 1996). EU officials adopted a cautious attitude. The EU Administrators only resorted to decrees on very few occasions and even then the power to enforce those decrees was very weak (as occurred with the ban on forced evictions). But on several occasions EU representatives had to reject claims that the mission was an ‘imperialist’ one. For instance, the French Ambassador to Bosnia affirmed that ‘Europe will not impose any solution, because we are not colonialists nor is the relationship here a colonial one. You must reach an agreement with your partners. We are here to help you with advice’ (quoted in Orucevic, 1996). Nationalist parties were also keen to exploit the consociational electoral system that had been established in order to facilitate power-sharing and ethnic reconciliation. The model that was instituted by the EUAM was an exercise of electoral engineering and foresaw joint governance by the three ethnic communities with a fixed and proportional number of seats for each of the communities, ensuring that no single community would have a majority of seats (Bieber, 2005). However, the realities on the ground meant that the nationalist parties (HDZ and SDA) would recruit candidates from the minority groups in order to obtain more seats in the municipal councils to gain a majority (Bose, 2002). The rigidity of the system also led to institutional deadlock, with the ethnic parties failing to agree on a distribution of executive offices such as the positions of Mayor and Deputy Mayor. More than fifteen years after the conflict, the inefficiencies of the electoral system were said to affect the governability of the city (ICG, 2009).

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Another weakness had to do with the instruments foreseen to implement EUAM objectives, and in particular, the lack of military instruments. The EUAM did not have the back-up of its own military force, but was dependent on the support of UNPROFOR first, and the NATO peace Implementation Force (IFOR) later. IFOR, for its part, refused to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the EUAM and was only expected to respond to violence from the ethnic parties in cases of direct threat (Reichel, 2000: 15). The only leverage that the EUAM had was the possibility to withdraw the economic assistance granted for the reconstruction of the city – not a very powerful one when the vital interests of the warring parties are at stake. However, the EUAM did not make an appropriate use of this incentive either. A threat to withdraw economic assistance in the face of Croat non-compliance with the Memorandum of Understanding could have had some impact, even if limited. However, the EUAM only used this threat at the end of its mandate, after the June elections. In the words of Safet Orucevic, Mayor of East Mostar, ‘the Administration, in order to create an appearance of progress . . . took the risk and started to finance [Croat] projects. It also started to buy, at high cost, small concessions from the local Croat leadership. One could say that the Administration had a concept of investing not so much in a united city as in the status quo – and . . . in its own survival’ (Orucevic, 1996). Moreover, the fact that the EUAM mandate had an ‘end date’ fixed in advance also resulted in problems. The time that the Administration had given itself to achieve its mission (reunification and reconciliation) was unrealistic. Even for reconstruction projects that was a tight deadline (Yarwood, 1999). The end date also reduced the incentives of the parties to comply; it was just a question of waiting until the end of the mandate. In sum, the impact of the EUAM, in comparison with previous initiatives, was high. Yet in spite of the changes introduced by the TEU, there were still many problems. Whereas the position among the member states over Mostar was quite unified,3 the lack of appropriate decision-making structures within the Council caused delays and problems of coordination. For instance, problems with the financing of the mission were due to 1) turf wars between the Council and the European Parliament and 2) the lack of experience of the EU in crisis management. The deployment and implementation of the WEU police force also experienced some problems, although it would be a good learning experience for this organisation and for the development of the EU civilian crisis management capabilities more generally (WEU Assembly, 2004). As pointed out in the Special Report of the Court of Auditors (1996: 13), an operation of this type would have required a permanent body to oversee the day-to-day implementation of the operation and to provide a strategic direction from Brussels, as well as a special unit within the Council Secretariat or Commission to prepare the planning. At the time, there was neither a permanent body with an exclusive right of initiative to put policy proposals on the agenda nor a policy planning unit to provide an informed analysis of the situation.

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Moreover, one of the main reasons for the lack of success was of course the obstructionism from the Croat side, which was to be expected (ICG, 2000). Hans Koschnick noted in 1995: ‘the Herzegovinian Croats have been quickly learning to sign agreements but not to respect them’ (quoted in ICG, 2000: footnote 3). These problems might have been reduced had the member states had the will required to pressure the parties to respect their commitments. As early as 1995, in a report to the Council, Koschnick pointed out that ‘it is obvious that notably our political aim – the single, self-sustaining and multi-ethnic administration of Mostar – will not be achieved without the forceful assistance of our governments’ (ICG, 2000: 5). The member states failed to back Koschnick when the Croats rejected his project of Interim Statute and when he was attacked by a furious mob. The Rome Agreement, where the Council of the EU accepted Croat demands, undermined the credibility of the EU Administrator and served as an example of incoherence between the different political levels managing the mission. Unhappy with the lack of support from the member states, he resigned. According to an EUAM official, ‘The EU said loud and clear that it supported his plan and then changed it. The Croats won . . . Koschnick has no more leverage over the Croats now . . . It means that a few hundred criminals can attack the European administrator and 10 days later they get what they want’ (AFP, 1996b). The failure of the EU in Mostar also had to do with its ‘technical’ approach and its failure to recognise the political nature of its mission. Because of its own limitations, as well as the reliance on the Commission’s support, the EUAM took on this task as if it was just a matter of providing technical assistance. However, it would soon come to the realisation that the improvement of living conditions was not enough to bring trust and reconciliation among the different ethnic groups. Its liberalisation strategy not only failed to deliver improvements in terms of democratisation and economic reforms, but also resulted in unintended consequences from the implementation of early elections and a consociational system. Thus, by the time the EUAM left, Mostar remained a divided city. Almost a decade later, the EU sought to develop a concept and guidelines for the planning and implementation of civilian administrations (Council of the EU, 2002c, 2003d) as one of the four major areas of EU civilian crisis management identified at the Feira Council (2000) – together with police, rule of law and civil protection. Despite the fact that the EU’s experience in Mostar is not explicitly mentioned in these documents, there is some integration of lessons learned, mainly from the activities of other international organisations in Kosovo, East Timor and Bosnia. For instance, the need to promote the sustainability of reforms is emphasised, something which was not accomplished in Mostar. Yet, while the links between politics, rule of law and administration are acknowledged, the EU’s concept of civilian administration articulated in these documents remains essentially a technocratic one dealing with ‘the most essential functions of a public administration in order

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to ensure that the key public services can be delivered’ (Council of the EU, 2003d: 4).

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EU crisis management in the aftermath of the war (1996–98)

Drawing on the definition and categories of non-decision introduced in the previous chapter, one can identify another case of non-decision-making regarding a potential EU crisis management operation in the aftermath of the war. The question is whether this issue was on the EU agenda and was discussed among the member states’ representatives and EU officials, or whether it was ruled out as a question for decision altogether. In other words, did the member states decide not to decide (type 2 non-decision) or were these issues simply not on the agenda (type 3 non-decision)? After the signature of the Dayton Agreement no new diplomatic or crisis management initiatives were undertaken by the EU – the EUAM had been formally launched before the end of the war. During 1997 and 1998, the EU concentrated on economic activities, limiting the political influence of the Union in the overall peace process. Although the EU had pledged to make ‘a major contribution’ to the peace process (Presidency of the EU, 1996), efforts were circumscribed to providing humanitarian aid, technical assistance, economic assistance to support the establishment of the OHR and other minor actions, such as providing support for the elections, organised under the aegis of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The European Parliament deplored ‘the lack of ambition in defining an overall policy through a common position on the Balkans, which meant that, despite its considerable financial contribution to the post-war reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the political impact of the EU [had] been very limited compared to that of the USA’ (European Parliament, 1998a: 8). The High Representative for Bosnia, Carl Bildt, drew a similar conclusion in his memoirs (Bildt, 1998: 388). To improve the EU’s political impact, several actors (the Commission, the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly) called for a stronger EU role in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement by contributing through the WEU to its military aspects and/or the police operation; yet no decision was adopted by the member states. In other words, in this case, the member states decided not to decide (type 2 non-decision), even though the issue was on the EU’s agenda. In relation to a potential EU military mission in Bosnia, the debate concentrated on the takeover from the NATO-led force by the WEU. This debate was especially lively in the first half of 1996 because of the uncertainty surrounding the retention of US troops on the ground. According to the Dayton Agreement, IFOR, consisting of 60,000 troops, was to stay in the country for twelve months. The subject was a very sensitive one, with US Presidential elections due in November 1996. Thus, the US administration

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made clear on several occasions that its troops would not stay in Bosnia a day longer. The European allies were in favour of maintaining a military force, but only if American troops stayed in Bosnia. However, no one wanted to mention this issue until the Presidential elections had passed (Observer, 1996). Public discussions on a possible follow-on force were considered ‘taboo’ (Guardian, 1996a) and ‘heresy in official circles’ (Independent, 1996a). Nevertheless, to maintain stability on the ground, some kind of reassurance that there would be a successor to IFOR was required. Thus, from spring 1996, there were some suggestions to use the WEU, ‘the military arm of the EU’, to send a follow-on force to Bosnia. It was argued that the WEU could launch an operation to test the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, which would allow the WEU to make use of NATO’s assets, even when the US did not participate in the operation, making the WEU ‘separable’ from NATO, but not ‘separate’.4 On 7 May 1996, Hans van den Broek, the External Relations Commissioner, called on the EU and the WEU to take over from IFOR to avoid a security vacuum (Guardian, 1996b). The member states disavowed these comments, regarded as ‘irresponsible’ by the French Foreign Minister, Hervé de Charette, a judgement supported by British diplomats. The German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, was also reported to have telephoned the External Relations Commissioner to remind him of the European stance (Guardian, 1996c). The reluctance of the member states to discuss this issue at formal Council meetings was due to several reasons. Although the WEU had experienced a revival during the armed conflict in Bosnia, it was still seen by the majority of EU member states as incapable of taking over the NATO mission. Jose Cutileiro, the then WEU Secretary General, stated that ‘the magnitude of the task . . . is simply too big’ (Guardian, 1996b). The WEU Assembly was more committed to the eventuality of a WEU operation and reminded the EU member states that ‘Europeans should bear in mind, however, that in the not too distant future they will have to face their own responsibilities for security in European territory’ (WEU Assembly, 1996). Nonetheless, it was also acknowledged that As regards the question of whether the Europeans would be able to assume their responsibilities in a purely European military operation after the end of the IFOR mission in December 1996, there is little cause for optimism . . . A common European defence policy, which should be considered a logical consequence of the common foreign and security policy, is therefore still an objective for the future rather than a tangible reality. (WEU Assembly, 1996)

Even though the French had pushed for an autonomous European defence policy in the past, in this instance they adopted a more pragmatic attitude and strongly supported the idea of ‘in together, stay together, leave together’, referring to the fact that US troops and European troops had gone to Bosnia together and would leave together (Independent, 1996b). In the end,

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amid fears that violence might erupt when the pull-out of IFOR took place, NATO members decided to maintain a new force in Bosnia. In the autumn of 1996, the NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers assessed the different security options and agreed that a reduced military presence was needed to provide the stability necessary for consolidating peace. The possibility of sending WEU troops was not even mentioned. The North Atlantic Council approved the launching of a Stabilisation Force (SFOR) with an initial mandate of eighteen months and around 32,000 troops. However, discussions concerning a possible European takeover continued in the following years, in particular when the end of SFOR’s mandate was approaching (June 1998), but the position of the member states remained unchanged. Commenting on a possible follow-on force to SFOR, George Robertson, then British Defence Secretary, argued that ‘it will have to be NATO-led, with NATO-led credibility, and with all the major players sharing the risks on the ground’ (quoted in Winn and Lord, 2001: 131). This time the request for a more proactive EU strategy came from the European Parliament, which recommended to the Council the continuation of EU participation within a NATO operation, but coordinated by the WEU. In this way, the European Parliament wanted to improve ‘the consistency, quality, impact and visibility’ of the EU’s engagement in Bosnia (European Parliament, 1998b). However, the Council ignored this recommendation and again, no references to a possible WEU mission in Bosnia appeared in Council documentation. This issue was also discussed in academic literature (see, for example, Clément, 1998; Wilson, 1998). In their analysis of different post-SFOR alternatives, the contributors to the Clément volume (1998) argued that the EU could assume the responsibilities in Bosnia, although there were still problems because of a lack of political will and problems with the implementation of the CJTF concept. According to Marie-Janine Cali´c (1998: 11): ‘only a minority seem to believe that it would be wise to establish a purely European post-SFOR (EFOR) as early as mid-1998, or that such a force would be likely to succeed’. In spite of this, she proposed three phases that would lead to a progressive reduction of the American troops and the ‘Europeanisation of the Bosnian peace operation in the long run’ (Cali´c, 1998: 11). According to Jane Sharp (1998: 23–4), Europe had the capabilities to replace US components of SFOR and carry out an effective operation. The problem was the lack of political will to assume this task. Nicole Gnesotto (1998: 5) agreed that ‘no European country is ready to accept that Europe alone takes on Western intervention in Bosnia’. European troops on the ground and a NATO/US reaction force outside the theatre would probably have replicated what happened during the conflict and it would have never been accepted by the Europeans. Apart from the fact that the US contribution was still considered crucial, there was an agreement that the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO and the CJTF concept were still not ready to be

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tested on the ground, and particularly in such a complex situation as Bosnia. According to Gnesotto (1998: 5), from the EU’s point of view, ‘1998 has the appearance of yet another missed opportunity’. Another issue raised during this period was the launching of a European police mission to replace the existing UN one (the International Police Task Force or IPTF). This possibility was mostly discussed at the WEU Assembly during the years 1996–98, but it was never echoed by debates in the Council of the EU. Already in October 1996, a WEU report on the role of Europe in Bosnia stated that ‘there is a need for a European-run public security force which should be an armed body, more substantial in size and better equipped but with the same general mandate as the IPTF and able to implement it without the support of an IFOR successor force’ (WEU Assembly, 1996). On these grounds, the WEU Assembly recommended that the WEU Council establish a successor of the IPTF under WEU command and also a WEU mine-clearing operation in the country. Later, in its 1997 Report, the WEU Assembly suggested setting up an operation under WEU command to provide ‘assistance’ to the IPTF and replace it if need be (WEU Assembly, 1997). Arguably, in the light of its recent experience during the Yugoslav wars, and in particular, of the establishment of a WEU police force in Mostar and the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) in Albania, confidence was high regarding its ability to run police missions. The argument was that since the UN police mission had greatly depended on IFOR and SFOR to implement its mandate, a reduced military force after June 1998 could hamper the mission’s effectiveness. For this reason, it was suggested that ‘the IPTF be strengthened by greater European involvement through the deployment of a substantial WEU police force’ (WEU Assembly, 1997). This proposal seemed even more appropriate in autumn 1997 and the beginning of 1998, when the possibility of creating a special police element to maintain public order was being discussed, to fill in the ‘security gap’ between SFOR and IPTF. The WEU Council did not agree on this mission, arguing that it was ‘premature to elaborate on the question of the establishment of an SFOR successor force’. This answer, however, missed the point, since the WEU Assembly’s recommendation only referred to a European armed police element and not to the taking over of SFOR as such. After the creation in 1998 of the Multinational Specialised Unit which included some non-European countries as part of SFOR, this recommendation disappeared from subsequent WEU Assembly Reports. Assessing coherence and effectiveness According to the categorisation I set out in the previous chapter, the issue of military deployment entailed a type 2 non-decision, i.e. an implicit refusal to decide on the part of the member states. A stronger role for the EU as a political or even security actor in Bosnia was not on the official agenda of the EU Foreign Ministers even though it was part of the extant political debate

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about the EU’s engagement in Bosnia. Institutional preferences and institutional limitations explain the member states’ reluctance to discuss these issues. For the time being, the member states could only foresee a civilian role for the EU, while ‘hard power’ was reserved for NATO. Surprisingly, even France supported this assessment. According to the statements by different national representatives, the member states opposed the EU’s engagement in a military mission, police operation or through diplomatic activities other than the existing soft approach. As far as the Big Three were concerned, they agreed that the EU/WEU was not the appropriate organisation to undertake military tasks in Bosnia, and that any mission in the country needed the support of the US, and should be carried out by NATO. Thus, vertical coherence was relatively high as far as this initiative is concerned, but the same thing cannot be said about institutional coherence. There was a major disagreement between the member states’ positions and that of other actors (the European Commission, the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly). Turning to its effectiveness, even though the possibility of launching a military or police operation in Bosnia was not officially on the Council’s agenda, other actors, notably the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly, had requested action. The Commissioner for External Relations, moreover, had publicly expressed the view that the EU/WEU should take over the IFOR mission. These initiatives point to the fact that there was a situation which required the EU’s attention. Yet the member states did not want to intervene, and what is more, did not officially want to discuss these issues: i.e. they decided not to decide. This remained a case of negligible effectiveness because of an absence of any collective action to be pursued. Consequently, the EU failed to have any impact on conflict management and conflict resolution in Bosnia. The member states’ position resulted from the realisation that the EU did not have the capabilities necessary for an appropriate operation. In other words, this was an example of adjusting expectations to existing capabilities. This strategy was at work during the post-war period and, in a way, it (artificially) increased the effectiveness of the Union by lowering the objectives that the EU was supposed to achieve. The low profile of the CFSP during these years can also be linked to problems stemming from institutional deficiencies such as the lack of a planning unit and defence capabilities at the EU level. The experiences of the Bosnian crisis did prompt some reforms in the Amsterdam Treaty such as a reinforcement of Council Secretariat structures and the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks. However, a further failure during the crisis in Kosovo was needed to move things forward, something that illustrates how learning processes are not always accompanied by the institutionalisation of the lessons learned, especially in a multinational organisation such as the EU. From his experience as High Representative for Bosnia, having to report

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regularly to the Council, Carl Bildt (1998: 387) noted that the coordinating process and policy-making machinery in Brussels had improved since the war with the establishment in 1996–97 of an extensive network of committees involved in the decision-making process. Yet despite this improvement, and even when it was easier for the EU to reach a common position, the main weakness of the EU related to its capacity to implement policy compared to the US. Bildt added, ‘I often wished that there were a strong European Union apparatus in Brussels, planning policy, offering resources, ready for initiatives, with which I could have cooperated in order to complement and balance the strong pressures of the US machinery in Washington’ (1998: 388). During the period 1996–98, CFSP policy machinery was still in the making, especially when compared with the Community committee network. In the area of external relations, the merging of the working groups that should have followed the signing of the Maastricht agreement did not occur (see Chapter 2). CFSP issues were still dealt with by ‘capital formation’ working groups composed of representatives coming regularly from the MFAs to the meetings in Brussels; whereas the representatives to the Council working parties, based in the Permanent Representations in Brussels, focused on community and economic matters. According to one practitioner, the former did not produce many decisions and the meetings served mainly to generate a common analysis, not substantive policies. Instead, the work of the latter had a bigger impact and it was a key aspect of the EU’s policy at that time.5 The EU’s policy in Bosnia also lacked visibility and a political dimension. The absence of clear leadership helps explain some of these shortcomings. In the context of the transition between the Delors and Santer Commissions, the Commission was ‘a weak institution’ and ‘very shy to take some leadership’.6 At the same time, the Commissioner in charge of External Relations, van den Broek, had a very radical position on some issues, particularly on former Yugoslavia, a position which was too distant from the preferences of the member states. Because of this, the Commission isolated itself and could not play a role as primus inter pares; it did not represent a medium position that could bring the member states together around a common policy. According to one interviewee, before the creation of the post of High Representative, ‘we did not have a person capable to present a common view . . . a position reflecting the common feeling among the member states’.7 Finally, as regards the development of a European security and defence policy, intergovernmental politics continued to affect the institutionalisation of this policy. This period witnessed hesitation amongst the member states between an autonomous European defence and one under the umbrella of NATO (i.e. the US); between an institutionalised mechanism (either in the form of an autonomous WEU operation or through the CJTF) and an ad hoc coalition of the willing (as seen during the crisis in Albania in 1997). These discussions went beyond crisis management in Bosnia. The issues at stake were the development of the EU as an autonomous security actor and the

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nature of the transatlantic relationship. The events in Kosovo and the St Malo summit of 1998 were to change the direction of these debates. Thus, at an informal meeting of the EU defence ministers in November 1998, the then British Defence Secretary, George Robertson, noted that ‘Europe had reached a “defining moment” for defence policy and that Bosnia and Kosovo had raised the question of “when we press the button for action, is it connected to a system and a capability that can deliver?”’ (quoted in Duke, 1999a). For Aggestam (2004: 244), the events in Yugoslavia could be seen as a ‘formative experience’ and opened the ‘discursive space for the reasoning of new rules of action’, which would begin to take form after the events in Kosovo. In the next section, I turn to the analysis of the Stability Pact, one of the main policy consequences of the crisis in Kosovo.

The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe

Following the crisis in Kosovo that broke out in spring 1998, a growing consensus that something had to be done to break the cycle of conflict in the region emerged among EU leaders (Busek, 2004: 1). The events in Kosovo meant that the EU had failed once more to prevent a war in the Balkans. Once again it was confronted by a humanitarian and refugee crisis in its neighbourhood and, as experienced during the Bosnian War, the US had taken the leadership in the military and political arena. As a result of this state of affairs, and immediately after the beginning of the NATO bombings in March 1999, the German Foreign Affairs Minister, Joschka Fischer, suggested that the EU should take responsibility for bringing stability to the Balkans. The idea was to launch a long-term strategy promoting regional cooperation as a way to prevent conflict in the region, and to offer the perspective of EU membership. The Council Conclusions of 26 April 1999 affirmed that: ‘The stability pact will give all countries in the Balkans region a concrete perspective of stability and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures’ and in the case of Bosnia noted that ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina too shared in the perspective of European integration in accordance with the EU’s regional approach’ (GAC, 1999). The Kosovo crisis marked a point of no return in EU policy, a critical juncture that explains not only the developments in the EU’s security and defence policy, but also the decision to offer the perspective of membership to the Balkan region. Intergovernmental politics are crucial in explaining why such a decision was adopted. According to Ehrhart, the Stability Pact was mainly supported by Germany, Austria, Greece, and Italy ‘because of their specific interests in Southeast European stability and security’ (2003: 124). One of the key objectives of the Stability Pact was therefore to contribute to the long-term stabilisation of the region (Bendiek, 2004: 15). However, material interests alone (economic impact and the refugee crisis) cannot explain this decision. The role of the German Presidency in framing the issue

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as a question of the ‘credibility’ and ‘responsibility’ of the EU as an international actor should also be taken into account (Friis and Murphy, 2000: 769). Even if some member states were not particularly keen on the initiative,8 they were compelled to support it. The German Presidency presented the issue in such a way that to oppose the initiative would contradict the self-understanding of the EU as a promoter of democracy and peace (the presumed constitutive values of the Union). As stated by Chancellor Schröder: ‘it is unacceptable for the European Union to do nothing when human rights are being trampled upon only an hour’s jet flight away’ (quoted in Friis and Murphy, 2000: 769). Reference to EU common values as a means of persuasion worked reasonably well in this case, highlighting how identity and not only material factors can be used strategically by policy entrepreneurs to mobilise action (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Sedelmeier, 2004). This example also shows how institutions – in this case, the EU Presidency – can be instrumental in promoting a specific initiative. Path dependency also helps elucidate why the member states decided to propose the Stability Pact and why it assumed a particular institutional design (Friis and Murphy, 2000). The limited time that the member states had to react to the crisis in Kosovo explains why they decided to imitate rather than engage in the design of a more innovative plan. The costs of establishing a wholly new institution from scratch would have outweighed the benefits of doing so. This was not the first time that the idea of a ‘stability pact’ had been suggested within the EU context. The Plan Balladur for Central and Eastern Europe adopted in 1995 and a similar initiative for Bosnia proposed by Hubert Védrine can be seen as antecedents. When the Kosovo conflict erupted, and given the limited time of response, EU leaders decided to resort to earlier initiatives. Hence the initiative closely followed the model set up at the Helsinki process and modelled as the CSCE. As in the case of the CSCE, the Stability Pact was set up not as an international organisation, but an intergovernmental forum for dialogue. There was no foundational treaty or charter, only the political declarations signed at Cologne and Sarajevo. Three Working Tables, similar to the ‘three baskets’ system of the CSCE, were established on democratisation and human rights; economic reconstruction, development and cooperation; and security issues. Those past models, in particular the CSCE, were perceived as highly effective and legitimate by European policy-makers, which explains why actors opted for these models, rather than elaborating new ones (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The preferred strategy, then, was one of imitation, something which clearly shows the impact of path dependency in the CFSP. Without reflecting on the actual needs of the Balkan region, EU leaders decided to launch an initiative, which added little to existing international engagement in the region. The only innovative element was the perspective of membership, but without any specific commitment that could bind the EU. Even if the Stability Pact could be primarily considered as a first pillar

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initiative given the focus of its activities (regional economic development, infrastructures, foreign investment), it was initially launched under the framework of the CFSP (GAC, 1999). The decision to establish the Stability Pact was taken in Cologne on 10 June 1999 and the initiative was officially launched at the Sarajevo Conference on 30 July 1999 by 28 states and the main international organisations involved in the region, as well as different regional initiatives (Council of the EU, 1999; Stability Pact, 1999). It was the first time that such a multilateral initiative was organised to deal with the complex situation in the Balkans. Although the EU launched the initiative, it was agreed that the Stability Pact would be formally placed under the auspices of the OSCE. The main decision-making body was the Regional Table, which included all the governments and international organisations participating in the initiative. The Stability Pact was chaired by a Special Coordinator and supported by a small office with staff seconded by the participating governments and international organisations. The first Special Coordinator was Bodo Hombach, followed in 2002 by Erhard Busek (Council of the EU, 2001c). The Office of the Special Coordinator played a role of political coordination of the Stability Pact activities. However, the coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the projects were very limited given the lack of resources of the Office. In spite of this, the Special Coordinator played an important role of mediation and good offices, as was the case, for example, during the negotiations between Romania and Bulgaria on the construction of a new Danube bridge (European Stability Initiative, 2001: 10). The first phase of the Stability Pact focused on the launch of a Quick Start Package aimed at raising international funding to undertake urgent tasks – most of them infrastructure projects. Also during this first phase, the key political aim was to prompt political change and bring a new democratic Serbia into the Stability Pact, which was achieved at the end of 2000 after the fall of Miloševi´c. Once the first phase was completed, the activities of the Stability Pact were re-focused, concentrating on narrower initiatives in specific sectors such as energy, cross-border issues or organised crime and corruption (European Stability Initiative, 2001: 11). Institution-building projects also had a greater significance in the second phase. In February 2008, the Stability Pact was transformed into a new framework for cooperation, the Regional Cooperation Council, effectively led by the countries from the South-Eastern European region. Reacting to the crisis: bad times for coherence Confronted by the crisis in Kosovo, the EU was urged to take immediate action; however, there was limited time to design a coherent strategy and to think about how this initiative would fit together with other EU and international initiatives in the Western Balkans. The unnecessary multiplicity of initiatives and bureaucratic structures was criticised by former Commission

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President Jacques Santer in a letter to the Heads of State and Government of 16 July 1999. He argued that the proliferation of initiatives undermined the clarity and visibility of EU policies. He also pointed out that there was no transparency regarding the financial arrangements and that the EU should coordinate the different initiatives, for example, incorporating the work of the Royaumont Process within the Stability Pact (Friis and Murphy, 2000: 777). Following some of his recommendations, the member states decided that the Common Strategy for the Western Balkans that was in the process of being drafted was no longer required. However, the existing regional initiatives were not merged. Regarding horizontal coherence, in principle, there was no contradiction between the Stability Pact’s objectives and other initiatives launched in the Western Balkans, in particular the Royaumont Process and the SAP. Having said that, it should be noted that there was no ‘added value’ coming from the Stability Pact. In other words, there were no synergies between this initiative and others already in place. This reflected a lack of coordination and the overlapping aims of the different initiatives, in particular between the Stability Pact and the Royaumont Process. In both cases, the objective was to promote good neighbourly relations through regional dialogue, confidence-building measures, regional cooperation and economic reconstruction. However, in spite of the commonalities between the two initiatives, the Royaumont Process was not integrated into the Stability Pact at first, in part because of institutional legacies and the lack of an overall strategy for the region, and in part because of conflict of interests between the member states. The Royaumont Process was only later dismantled and its projects incorporated into the Stability Pact. In theory, relations between the Stability Pact and the SAP were meant to be complementary. According to the Cologne document of June 1999, aspirants to EU membership would be evaluated on, inter alia, their contribution to achieving ‘the objectives of the Stability Pact, in particular progress in developing regional cooperation’ (ICG, 2001: 247). The SAP, meanwhile, aimed to establish the basis for a contractual relationship between the EU and the individual countries of the Western Balkans, but also placed considerable emphasis on regional cooperation. Therefore, one of the conditions to start membership negotiations was a ‘proven readiness to promote good neighbourly relations’ and regional cooperation was included in the individual Stabilisation and Association Agreements, as one of the criteria to determine readiness for integration into the EU; however, no mention was made of how this commitment related to the process launched within the Stability Pact. To ensure institutional coherence, the Commission was included as a signatory of the Stability Pact, and participated in the Regional Table. In practice, the Stability Pact was complementary to the initiatives of the Commission in the Western Balkans and contacts between the Office of the Coordinator of the Stability Pact and the Commission were frequent. Thanks

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to the high degree of flexibility and low level of politicisation of the former, it could launch initiatives that the Commission would take over later.9 However, because of problems in design, for some Balkan countries it was difficult to pursue the regional approach advocated by the Stability Pact and the individual approach of the SAP at once, regional cooperation being the loser in this game. According to Elbasani (2008: 298),‘the SP was soon overtaken by the SAP . . . The EU initiative to lead the policy shift and take a common position on the pact was probably more attractive for the target countries than the pact itself.’ Tensions resulted not only from the way the Stability Pact and the SAP were presented, but also from the particular circumstances of the region. The Western Balkan countries were suspicious that regional cooperation might serve as a Trojan horse for reconstituting a new Yugoslavian project and that it could lead to the loss of recently achieved sovereignty. Furthermore, there was a broad view in the region that if the Balkans were treated as a group, progress would move forward at the pace of the slowest country, hindering and even stopping the whole process of integration. Finally, given the limited resources of these countries, for many of them, investing in regional cooperation meant sacrificing the (already scarce) resources required to support the process of reform prior to EU membership. However, after learning the consequences of this fragmented approach to the Balkans, the need for coordination and complementarity between the Stability Pact and the rest of the EU initiatives was made more explicit in subsequent official documents and speeches, in an attempt to correct unintended consequences (Secretary General/High Representative and Commission, 2000a). Although the emphasis was placed on the SAP as the main approach towards the region, ‘the regional dimension’ added by the Stability Pact was recurrently brought to the fore, making it more explicit to the potential candidates that regional cooperation was one of the criteria that would be taken into account when evaluating progress towards membership. Aiming too high? Effectiveness of the Stability Pact Even though there was a collective decision according to CFSP objectives, the foundational documents did not clearly establish how the objectives of the Stability Pact would be achieved, how it would be financed and how it related to other EU initiatives. The main problem was that the objectives of the Stability Pact were too broad: establishing long-term stability; fostering democratisation and civil society; preserving ethnic diversity, protecting human rights and minorities; creating dynamic market economies; improving the infrastructure, health and education; and combating crime and corruption (Stability Pact, 1999). Moreover, there were no clear deadlines, no benchmarks for the target countries to adopt the reforms, and not enough resources (either financial or human) to support their implementation. To some extent, the roots of these problems can be found at the time of the establishment of the Stability Pact as a result of intergovernmental politics. At that juncture, there was a lack of

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agreement among its members about how the Stability Pact should achieve its objectives, combined with an excess of expectations about what the Stability Pact was and about what it could deliver, both among international donors and the South-Eastern European countries themselves. Thus, it is not surprising that subsequent assessments noted the failure of the Stability Pact to achieve its objectives. For instance, one report noted that for most of its participants, the Stability Pact seems to have generated more frustration than satisfaction. The high-profile launch in Sarajevo in 1999 encouraged a misconception in the region that the Pact would serve as second Marshall Plan . . . In fact, the Pact was not provided with independent funds . . . The Pact will never become more effective than its participants . . . allow it to be. It depends on their financial resources, know-how and political commitment. (ICG, 2001: 242)

As a result of these deficiencies, both internal and external effectiveness were negatively affected, and thus it achieved only some of its stated objectives. For example, the Stability Pact was successful in the areas of energy, investment and free trade; but there was not comparable progress regarding corruption, organised crime and issues related to the promotion of democracy and conflict resolution. Because the Stability Pact did not involve the conditionality and enforcement mechanisms open to the EU or other international financial institutions, it could only achieve limited effectiveness. The Stability Pact set up regional initiatives on some of the most urgent problems for the region, including the Anti-Corruption Initiative and the Anti-Organised Crime Initiative. Other important initiatives focused on cross-border policies, migration, the return of refugees, and human trafficking. These regional initiatives, while promoting regional cooperation, did not involve a regional treaty. This approach had the advantage of flexibility and low cost. However, it required a strong commitment from the participants, because there were no formal obligations, and over time, its power of attraction diminished as it assumed the appearance of just another top-level bureaucratic process. Furthermore, these regional initiatives overlapped with others launched in the same areas by the Commission, the Council of Europe, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation forum, the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative and the World Bank, resulting in ‘cooperation fatigue’. These organisational overlaps also make it difficult to isolate the effectiveness of the Stability Pact. As far as conflict resolution is concerned, the Stability Pact was expected to make a contribution by moving from short-term crisis management initiatives to long-term conflict prevention drawing on two key instruments: regional cooperation and the prospect of EU membership (Elbasani, 2008: 297–8). The Stability Pact aimed at promoting peace, democracy and respect for human rights. According to Joschka Fischer: ‘The previous policy of the

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international community vis-à-vis former Yugoslavia had two severe deficits: It concentrated on the consequences instead of on the sources of conflict, and it tackled the problems of the region individually and separately from the ones in other parts of Europe’ (quoted in Bendiek, 2004: 15). It is true that the Stability Pact helped to establish contact among officials from the region to consult and coordinate on different issues facilitating regional reconciliation. However, as was the case with the SAP, the Stability Pact put too much emphasis on the ‘integration’ rather than stabilisation of the countries in the region (Gordon, 2009). Moreover, the ‘ownership’ dimension that was expected from the Stability Pact was lacking and it largely remained an initiative ‘sponsored-from-above’ (Andreev, 2009: 92). The establishment of the Regional Cooperation Council has gone some way to address these issues. Political and economic problems in the Balkan countries also got in the way of reforms. According to Economides (2001), two key problems affected its effectiveness: weak absorption capacity by and political instability in the recipient countries. In short, although the objectives of the Stability Pact were valid and appropriate, the question is whether or not it had the instruments and resources to achieve these objectives, or in other words, could it match rhetoric with reality, words with actions? Unfortunately, the answer is negative. Even after the change of orientation at the end of 2000, the Stability Pact was never able to deliver what was expected when it was launched in the summer of 1999.

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the Bosnian War, the EU adopted a civilian power approach, primarily based on economic tools. This long-term and ‘softer’ approach sharply contrasted with the ‘tougher’, short-term military intervention, led by the US. The CFSP adopted a low profile, EU activities were increasingly channelled through Community instruments and the EU’s policy was characterised by a certain degree of continuity with the war period up to 1995, with the EUAM being a remarkable exception. Although the civil administration of the city of Mostar showed some degree of innovation in a particularly challenging context, the non-decision on the use of military instruments illustrates not only the limitations of CFSP institutions, but also a degree of resignation on the part of the member states to the EU’s role as an ‘economic giant’, but a ‘political dwarf’, a sort of selfimposed operational paralysis. Even countries such as France, which had traditionally supported the building of autonomous defence capacities for the EU, gave in to this and opposed any moves by other actors to increase the role of the EU in Bosnia, especially given the difficulties faced by the EUAM. The prevalent image of the EU as a civilian power explains the opposition of the

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member states to military intervention. By contrast, it was easier for them to agree on the EU’s control of the civilian administration of Mostar. While the EUAM focused mainly on reconstruction activities, and therefore did not imply new roles for the EU (Dover, 2005: 307), a military intervention involved high start-up costs, coordinating and learning effects (as actors had to establish new structures, learn how to implement this role and establish new coordinating arrangements), thus making innovation in EU policies difficult and reinforcing institutional legacies in the security policy domain. The fact that the EU limited itself to economic activities had a negative impact on its image and visibility. Even though the EU was the biggest contributor in terms of humanitarian aid and economic assistance and individual European nations were the biggest providers of troops on the ground via SFOR, in the mind of the local media and populations the US was still seen as the lead actor in the peace process. Only the events in Kosovo seemed to provide the necessary stimulus to change the EU’s approach towards Bosnia and the Western Balkans by opening up the accession perspective. Yet the element of ‘emergency’ behind the Stability Pact might explain why imitation, instead of innovation, was the selected strategy at the time and hence some of the problems that it experienced afterwards, in particular problems of compatibility with other EU initiatives. Although the Stability Pact was meant to increase the coherence and effectiveness of the CFSP in Bosnia, problems of design, resources and strategy limited its impact in practice. The crisis in Kosovo also served as a reminder of the limitations of the EU’s power in its own neighbourhood, and facilitated changes in the EU’s self-image as a civilian power. The EU could not continue to ‘wait and see’ whether the Americans would come and save the day once again in its neighbourhood. From then on, EU policy-makers would recognise the need to develop military capabilities as an additional instrument in the EU’s toolbox. This critical juncture would be a crucial factor behind the Franco-British agreement at St Malo. However, it would still take time before the operational capabilities of the EU would reach maturity. In this respect, Bosnia would again become a crucial testing ground for CFSP/CDSP capabilities as I will show in the following chapter.

Notes 1

2

3

Before the war, the population was ethnically mixed with 35 per cent Bosniaks, 34 per cent Croats, 19 per cent Serbs and the rest from other ethnic origins (Yarwood, 1999). The percentage of mixed marriages was also very high. According to Edwards (1997: 185), the fact that the EU did not have legal personality created some problems in launching the mission. The solution was a Memorandum of Understanding, involving the member states, within the framework of the EU, and the Commission. Author’s interview, Brussels, 6 April 2006.

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5 6 7 8

9

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EU foreign and security policy in Bosnia The CJTF concept (multinational, multiservice, easily deployable forces) was adopted at the NATO Brussels summit in 1994. With the CJTF, upon the decision of the North Atlantic Council, NATO assets were made available to the WEU, supporting the building of a European Security and Defence Identity. This would be the precedent of the Berlin Plus Agreements (see Chapter 6). Author’s telephone interview, 11 July 2006. Author’s interview, Brussels, 6 April 2006. Ibid. Some member states such as France feared that the Stability Pact could result in obligations for the EU, having to deal with another round of enlargement (Friis and Murphy, 2000: 773). The negotiation of a Regional Energy Market serves as an example.

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CSDP in Bosnia: from stabilisation to integration

The security of Europe depends on stability in the Balkans. They are also a test case for Europe’s enhanced Common Foreign and Security Policy. Nowhere more than in the Balkans is the EU expected to deliver. (Solana, 2001)

Introduction

This chapter discusses CFSP activities in Bosnia from 2002 to 2011, a period of profound transformation, not only for Bosnia, but also for the EU with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. During this time, the main goal of the EU’s strategy in the country was to move from post-conflict stabilisation to the integration of Bosnia into the Euro-Atlantic structures (EU and NATO). Although there was some continuity with the previous period (e.g. the emphasis on conditionality and regional cooperation), two main elements were added to the EU’s strategy in this later phase. First, the EU put the offer of membership clearly on the table at the Thessaloniki Council in 2003. Second, the EU evolved from a civilian power to a more muscular and multidimensional one, resorting to military instruments in order to promote its values and objectives, through the development of the CSDP. The result of this transformation has been that ‘the EU is now seen more and more as a political player, rather than just an economic player’.1 During this period, the EU assumed a position of leadership in Bosnia taking over from the UN and NATO operations in the country, symbolising the Europeanisation of both the agenda and the external presence in Bosnia (Chandler, 2005). Two main factors explain the initiatives launched by the EU in Bosnia. Firstly, the EU’s engagement could be seen as the result of a ‘guilty conscience’: having failed to stop the bloody conflict that ravaged the country between 1992 and 1995, the EU felt a responsibility to promote peace and stability and to bring Bosnia closer to the European perspective. Secondly, Bosnia became a testing ground for the new capabilities developed under the CSDP. As summarised by one member state representative, ‘Bosnia is a kind of hangover for EU politicians . . . but it has also become a laboratory for the EU to test new instruments, and for our coordination and effectiveness’.2

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The process of stabilisation of Bosnia ran parallel to an increase in the levels of institutionalisation and Brusselisation of the CFSP. The institutionalisation of the EU’s security and defence policy gathered pace after the St Malo summit of 1998. New bodies were created to put flesh onto the new bones of what was known at the time as ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy). Although the EU had managed to deploy a monitoring mission and a civilian administration before the inception of the CSDP, the creation of new CSDP bodies such as the PSC and the EUMS improved the EU’s operational capabilities, allowing for a more efficient implementation of civilian and military crisis management operations. The institutionalisation of the CSDP continued with the creation, among others, of the European Defence Agency, the CPCC and CMPD, aimed at improving the EU’s crisis management capabilities and civil–military coordination. The Petersberg tasks were also incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty and a new financing mechanism for military operations (ATHENA) was agreed by the member states. New instruments and procedures for decision-making and implementation were created; the scope and number of CFSP activities increased; and there was a higher, although still limited, involvement of the Commission in this pillar, by providing flanking missions and administrating the budget for civilian crisis management operations – however, the role of the European Parliament has been negligible concerning military operations in particular. The institutionalisation of the CFSP and CSDP has continued with the Lisbon Treaty, and in particular, the establishment of the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the EEAS (see Chapter 2). The EEAS now houses the main CSDP administrative structures and provides support for the formulation and implementation of CSDP operations. Evidence also pointed at an intensification of practices of sharing information and communication due to more regular contacts among CFSP officials during this period. With the Brusselisation of the CFSP and the creation of permanent committees in Brussels such as COWEB (Western Balkans working group), national officials were permanently based in Brussels, and thus it was easier for them to maintain frequent contacts than was previously the case. This had an impact on decision-shaping and policy formulation. In the case of EU policy towards Bosnia, representatives in Brussels emphasised the consensus atmosphere in COWEB, and also the efforts made by all sides to maintain this atmosphere. According to a national diplomat, in COWEB ‘there is no big divide between the member states, which makes work easier. We have a general policy line and an economic agenda, and no one is against that.’3 In short, an increase in informal norms such as consensus-building and the coordination reflex has facilitated the emergence of a consensus on policy towards Bosnia. An upward degree of institutionalisation has also been evident in the launch of CSDP operations in Bosnia, namely the EUPM and EUFOR Althea as well as the EUSR (for an overview of CSDP operations to date, see

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Table 6.1 EU civilian and military crisis management operations, 1991–2012 Name

Location

Nature

ECMM/EUMM EUPM Concordia Artemis EUPOL Proxima EUJUS Themis EUFOR Althea EUPOL Kinshasa EUSEC

Western Balkans Bosnia FYROM RD Congo FYROM Georgia Bosnia RD Congo RD Congo

Civilian Civilian Military Military Civilian Civilian Military Civilian Civil–military

Type

Monitoring Police Military Military Police Rule of law Military Police Security sector reform EUJUST LEX Iraq/Brussels Civilian Rule of law Support to AMIS Sudan Civil–military Assistance AMM Aceh/Indonesia Civilian Monitoring EUBAM Rafah Palestinian Territories Civilian Border EUBAM Ukraine-Moldova Civilian Border EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories Civilian Police EUPAT FYROM Civilian Police EUPT Kosovo Civilian Planning EUFOR RD Congo Military Military EUPOL RD Congo Civilian Police EUPOL Afghanistan Civilian Police EUFOR Tchad/RCA Military Military EU SSR Guinea-Bissau Civil–military Security sector reform EULEX Kosovo Civilian Rule of law EUMM Georgia Civilian Monitoring EUNAVCO Somalia Military Assistance EUNAVFOR Somalia Military Military EUTM Somalia Civilian Training EUAVSEC South Sudan Civilian Security sector reform EUCAP NESTOR Horn of Africa Civilian Training Source: Council of the EU (2012).

Duration 1991–2007 2003–12 2003 2003 2004–5 2004–5 Since 2004 2005 Since 2005 Since 2005 2005–6 2005–6 Since 2005 Since 2005 Since 2006 2006 2006–8 2006 Since 2007 Since 2007 2008–9 2008–10 Since 2008 Since 2008 2008 Since 2008 Since 2010 Since 2012 Since 2012

Table 6.1). These activities have not been limited to economic and civilian initiatives. The main lesson from the Bosnian conflict was that if the EU wanted to be a credible and effective actor in its neighbourhood, it needed to be able to back up its diplomacy with the possibility of using military instruments (European Council, 2003b).4 Since the Cologne European Council (1999), the use of military force has been included in the EU ‘toolbox’, and it has been considered a necessary development in order to achieve an effective external action. The EUPM and EUFOR Althea constitute the best examples of the new security capabilities developed by the EU. The EU’s activities in Bosnia have consequently expanded to include security sector reform and

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state-building. The externalisation of its internal security policies (Rees, 2005) has been another factor behind the deployment of CSDP instruments in Bosnia. The fact that transnational organised crime has become a subject of concern at the EU level, being identified as a key security threat in the European Security Strategy (European Council, 2003b), explains the emphasis the EU has placed on its anti-organised crime policies, particularly in its own neighbourhood. Since the Balkans are considered by EU policymakers as the first line of defence of the EU borders, CSDP policies towards the region have placed the fight against organised crime and security sector reform among their top priorities (Juncos 2009). The chapter proceeds as follows. After a brief discussion of the main trends in EU foreign and security policy during this period, I analyse the coherence and effectiveness of the following initiatives: the EU Special Representative in Bosnia; the launch of the first ever civilian crisis management operation under the CSDP, the EU Police Mission; and the deployment of what constitutes the largest EU-led military contingent to date, EUFOR Althea. The analysis should serve to assess the performance of CFSP decisionmaking and implementation structures and the impact of growing CFSP institutionalisation and Brusselisation on levels of coherence and effectiveness.

Europeanising Bosnia?

The SAP remains to date the EU’s main strategy for the region (European Commission, 2002). The prospect of future membership for the Western Balkans, endorsed by the European Council in Feira in June 2000, was reconfirmed by the European Council in Thessaloniki in June 2003 (European Council, 2003a). The criteria and the process were established following the strategy used in past accessions in Central and Eastern Europe: conditionality and the ‘regatta principle’, i.e. each country proceeds towards membership on its own merits and at its own speed. In addition to the political, economic and institutional criteria established at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, the SAP added five further specific criteria: full cooperation with the ICTY, respect for human and minority rights, the creation of real opportunities for refugees and internally displaced persons to return, and a visible commitment to regional cooperation (European Commission, 2003: 5). Those countries complying with the relevant criteria would be offered a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) that mirrored the European Agreements, but were tailored to the particular conditions of the Balkan region. Further preferential trade concessions were also adopted for Bosnia, as well as, from 2001, more economic assistance under the new CARDS programme.5 From October 2004, the Western Balkan countries became the responsibility of DG Enlargement, and no longer of DG External Relations,

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symbolising a shared understanding that Bosnia ‘is no longer a matter of classical foreign policy, but it is all about enlargement’.6 Despite the enlargement nature of EU relations with Bosnia, foreign and security instruments continued to be at the core of the EU’s strategy in Bosnia. In 2002, the EU appointed an EU Special Representative who would also be the international community’s High Representative in Bosnia. In 2003, the EU decided to launch its first ever police mission with a mandate to bring Bosnian policing closer to European and international standards. Finally, in 2004 the EU launched a military operation, EUFOR Althea, with the main task of maintaining a safe and secure environment and supporting the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. In the summer of 2004, with a view to preparing the deployment of EUFOR, the European Council approved a Comprehensive Policy for Bosnia (European Council, 2004). With this document, the EU identified Bosnia as one of the initial priorities for implementation of the European Security Strategy. The objective was ‘to ensure that the EU had a comprehensive approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on a clear EU policy and modalities to pursue that policy in a coherent manner’ (European Council, 2004). The document mentioned among the Union’s objectives the full implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the SAP, with the aim of integrating Bosnia within the EU, and included a long section on coherence, acknowledging the difficulties in Bosnia ‘given the magnitude of the EU’s involvement’ in the country. The ‘membership carrot’ was intended to promote internal changes in Bosnia, propelling the country from stabilisation to association and eventually to integration. The medium-term objective was the signature of an SAA, as an initial (albeit distant) step toward membership. In this connection, successive EU documents (a Road Map in 2000, a Feasibility Study in 2003) identified reforms that the country was required to carry out to bring it closer to EU standards. However, obstructionism from local elites and, in particular, the opposition of Bosnian Serbs to the police reform proposed by the OHR and backed by the EU led to a stalemate in the process of Europeanisation of Bosnia (Juncos, 2011b). After years of painful negotiations and political wrangling, the parties agreed to sign a new political declaration on police reform in October 2007. The House of Peoples (the upper house in the Bosnian Parliament) passed the police reform legislation on 16 April 2008 and the SAA between Bosnia and the EU was finally signed on 16 June 2008. The signing of the SAA was expected to open a new phase in EU–Bosnian relations with the long-awaited closure of the OHR and its replacement by an EU double-hatted Special Representative. However, despite direct and indirect intervention by the international community, the political situation in the country remained tense by the end of 2011, confirming the fragility of post-conflict reconciliation. In the following sections, three initiatives launched by the EU during this period are analysed in terms of their coherence and effectiveness. This should

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allow an assessment of the degree to which the EU’s objectives have been achieved and how the coordinating arrangements have worked in practice. Furthermore, the chapter tracks the causal impact of the institutionalisation process on degrees of effectiveness and coherence.

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The EU Special Representative in Bosnia

The practice of sending EU envoys to conflict zones was inaugurated in 1991 when the Dutch Presidency decided to send Ambassador Henri Wijnaendts to mediate among the parties in the Yugoslavian crisis (Wijnaendts, 1993). It would later be institutionalised in the Amsterdam Treaty (article 18, TEU Amsterdam) and has since become common practice under the name of EU Special Representatives (EUSRs). The EUSRs are the lynchpin in a two-way information flow: they report to the PSC, through the High Representative, about progress on the ground and coordinate EU actors in the country. Grevi (2007) identified six roles played by EUSRs: information providers, policymakers, crisis managers, lynchpins of coordination, networkers and agents of effective multilateralism. On 18 February 2002, the GAC agreed that the next High Representative in Bosnia should also be the EUSR (Council of the EU, 2002b). Paddy Ashdown took charge of this position against the background of the EU’s poor performance during the war. At that time, the EC nominated a series of Special Representatives to mediate among the warring parties. However, the memories of the EU’s failure to put an end to the war were still present in the minds of the Bosnian population. By nominating an EUSR, the EU sent a strong and ‘clear signal’ about the EU’s commitment to the country, reaffirming its willingness to support the integration of Bosnia into the European mainstream (Council of the EU, 2002b). Thus, the decision to appoint an EUSR was a political and symbolic one. There was a common interest among the EU member states in playing a stronger role in Bosnia, particularly among those not represented at the PIC.7 The EUSR was also proof of the EU’s growing assertiveness as a political actor in its own neighbourhood. The EUSR position was to be financed out of the CFSP budget. Member states would contribute through seconding some of the EUSR’s staff members. However, the number of staff seconded to the EUSR was initially very small, especially by comparison to those of the OHR. Three years after his appointment, the EUSR had only five people at his disposal. With the appointment of Christian Schwarz-Schilling in 2006 – followed by Miroslav Lajcˇák in July 2007 and Valentin Inzko in March 2009 – the EUSR office was reinforced. This decision was adopted with a view to strengthening the antiorganised crime capabilities of the EUSR and to prepare for the disbandment of the OHR structures. In a joint report by Olli Rehn, Commissioner for Enlargement, and Javier Solana, High Representative, it was recommended

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the position of EUSR be reinforced after the closure of the OHR, although a merger with the Commission Delegation was not foreseen; only co-location under the same premises (European Union, 2006). Yet, two years later, another joint report urged the EU to consider a ‘personal union/doublehatting’ arrangement (European Union, 2008). By the end of 2009, the political climate had worsened and a decision on the closure of the OHR was yet again postponed by the PIC to a later date. This delay also reflected the institutional uncertainties surrounding the establishment of the EEAS and the role the EUSRs would play in the overall structure. It was not until 2011 that the EU agreed to appoint Peter Sørensen as EUSR and Head of EU Delegation, despite the fact that no decision on the closure of the OHR had been taken at the time. The following sections examine the role of the EUSR has played in terms of coordination and the promotion of the EU’s goals in the country. The conclusion also touches upon issues of legitimacy, accountability and sustainability. Who coordinates the EU family? The appointment of an EUSR was openly aimed at increasing the coherence of EU activities in Bosnia, in what it soon became one of the most complex engagements of the EU to date, judging by the number of actors on the ground. The fact that different EU actors were deployed at different times and with different rationales contributed to this complexity. Moreover, the EUSR coordinating role, regulated in Joint Action 2002/211/CFSP (Council of the EU, 2002b), had to adapt to changes to the EU’s overall strategy and conditions on the ground. For instance, Joint Action 2004/569/CFSP modified the EUSR’s role to incorporate his/her role regarding EUFOR Althea (Council of the EU, 2004a). The latter also introduced some modifications seeking to improve coordination arrangements on the ground and between Brussels and Sarajevo in line with the Comprehensive Policy for Bosnia. The Joint Action of 30 January 2006 appointing the new EUSR, Schwarz-Schilling, slightly modified the mandate to prepare for the phasing out of the OHR (Council of the EU, 2006). Finally, the 2011 Council Decision appointing Peter Sørensen modified the EUSR mandate by combining the Special Representative’s functions with that of the Head of EU Delegation in order to strengthen the EU’s leverage in the country (Council of the EU, 2011). The main tasks of the EUSR are to promote overall EU political coordination in Bosnia and ensure coherence of CSDP activities, as well as to maintain an overview of the whole range of activities in the field of the rule of law (Council of the EU, 2004a). Initially, the EUSR had a formal role in the EUPM’s chain of command to provide political guidance to the Head of EUPM, and was also tasked with offering political advice to the EUFOR Commander when necessary. In practice, this coordination role worked well with EUFOR. There was regular communication between the EUFOR Commanders and the EUSR regarding issues such as organised crime, ICTY

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indictees and the EUFOR’s six-month review.8 By contrast, relations between the EUPM and EUSR were sometimes difficult, especially under Ashdown’s time in office. In 2006, there was a discussion about a possible merger of the political, legal and media departments of the EUSR and EUPM to avoid duplication of functions or a divergence of voices and as a way to save money.9 This was the EUSR’s preferred option. However, after much political wrangling, only a few small-scale reforms, instead of the wholesale reorganisation, were agreed. This model of coordination, with the EUSR becoming the lynchpin of coordination between Brussels and CSDP missions on the ground, became the practice in other cases (Macedonia, Congo, Georgia, Darfur) and was enshrined in EU documents such as the ‘EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform’. However, this role was to change with the establishment of the new civilian command structures in Brussels and the position of Civilian Operations Commander within the CPCC. It was then decided to remove EUSRs from the chain of command of CSDP civilian operations, including the EUPM in Bosnia. According to Adebahr (2009: 146), this decision aimed to reduce the complexity of EUSRs’ mandates, but it was also a response to their lack of expertise on policing issues. Still, EUSRs are expected to provide local political guidance to CSDP operations (see Council of the EU, 2011). Despite institutional turf battles between the Commission and the Council at the Brussels level, coherence between the EUSR and Community policies was achieved on a day-to-day basis through dialogue between the relevant actors on the ground. Although not always easy, cooperation was said to be satisfactory. There was regular consultation on CARDS/IPA priorities and the EUSR also gave input on issues such as the rule of law. However, this was not without problems, a case in point being police reform. Perhaps one of the most important steps towards post-war normalisation in Bosnia, police reform became a central goal for the then High Representative, Paddy Ashdown (Muehlmann, 2007). As he could not impose this reform, he did not hesitate to use EU membership as a core incentive to put pressure on Bosnian elites. He thus persuaded the European Commission and other EU actors to back up his model of police reform and to incorporate this requirement as a precondition to signing an SAA (Juncos, 2011b). Even though this might suggest a coherent approach, since EU actors officially maintained an image of unity, in private there were some disagreements expressed by Commission and member state officials, which affected negatively the credibility of the EU.10 The double-hatting of the EUSR and Head of EU Delegation should help ease some of these problems and it should also increase the EUSR’s overall influence in the country as he/she will have access to ‘a broad and balanced set of instruments’ (Council of the EU, 2011). Coordination with EU actors and other international actors (as a way to implement the principle of effective multilateralism) has been facilitated over

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the years through different structures such as the EU’s Head of Missions meetings held fortnightly in Sarajevo and the Board of Principals’ meetings, chaired by the OHR/EUSR and attended by the EU and other international agencies (OHR, UNHCR, OSCE). As far as vertical coherence is concerned, the EUSR established weekly meetings with the ambassadors of the EU member states. This meeting was not chaired by the EUSR, but by the rotating Presidency. The EUSR only attended the meeting once a month, at the breakfast meeting with the ambassadors of the member states. The EUSR was also meant to facilitate coordination between CFSP structures in Brussels and Sarajevo. However, this was not always an easy task due to tensions between different institutional actors in Brussels and the compartmentalisation of the Council Secretariat into several units (see Chapter 2). This institutional division made it difficult for the EUSR to communicate and to coordinate the overall strategy for Bosnia across bodies. Although the establishment of the EEAS has been heralded as a way to improve institutional coherence, problems of coordination between the EEAS and the Commission and between Brussels and EU Delegations continued to hamper EU external action (European External Action Service, 2011). In sum, despite bureaucratic politics, the EUSR has played a key coordinating role, as well as providing information from the field to the member states and EU institutions. This information was particularly valued by small member states.11 According to Adebahr and Grevi (2007: 58), EUSRs ‘play a significant role in the development of a stronger and more effective CFSP by contributing to policy-making with regular reports to the Council working groups and the PSC. This helps provide a level playing field for deliberation and negotiation in these committees, which may make it easier to achieve consensus on common policy guidelines.’ Thus, the EUSR’s role was crucial in terms of promoting consensus-building among the member states. The EUSR’s effectiveness As seen in the previous section, one of the EUSR’s main aims was to coordinate EU agencies in Bosnia, something that, with minor exceptions, was achieved satisfactorily. Apart from this general objective, the EUSR aimed to achieve two key substantive objectives: to create a stable, peaceful and selfsustaining multi-ethnic Bosnia and to get the country irreversibly on the path towards EU integration. In order to achieve these objectives, the EUSR was charged with tasks such as offering the EU’s advice to mediate in the political process and to promote overall EU political coordination, in particular regarding the rule of law. However, as mentioned earlier, the EUSR was not given sufficient resources to achieve these objectives or at least to become a credible actor in his/her own right.12 Part of the explanation here is that the mandate of the EUSR for Bosnia was designed following the model of other EUSRs and it did not take into account the unusual responsibilities of this double-hatted position. Until 2011, the EUSR had both an EU ‘hat’ and an

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international ‘hat’ as the High Representative in Bosnia, with the latter having an executive mandate and the possibility to resort to the use of the Bonn powers as necessary. To ascertain how effective the EUSR was in achieving these objectives is not easy for several reasons. As in the case of other EU activities in the country, effectiveness is difficult to determine because of the complex range of actors involved, which makes it hard to isolate the ‘EU effect’. In the case of the EUSR, it is even more problematic due to the fact that the EUSR and the High Representative were the same person and it was not always easy to distinguish which impacts were due to the use of the Bonn powers and which to the ‘membership carrot’. Yet in the minds of many Bosnian elites and citizens, and until Paddy Ashdown left the position on 30 January 2006, the incumbent was acting in his role as High Representative ‘90 per cent of the time’.13 Things started to change with the reinforcement of the EUSR staff and the closure of some OHR departments which took place during Christian Schwarz-Schilling’s and then Lajcˇák and Inzko’s terms in office. In particular in recent years, ‘the possibility of becoming an EU member has been one of the most significant leverages’ mobilised by OHR/EUSR officials to pressure local authorities to comply with EU criteria.14 This is evident when one looks at the declining use of the Bonn powers by recent High Representatives (see Figure 6.1). As far as the overall effectiveness of the EUSR is concerned, results are mixed. During the period up to 2006, positive results were reached in the sphere of defence reform, where an agreement between the entities was reached in July 2005, and progress was achieved in other areas, with the establishment of a single VAT, an intelligence service and state court for war crimes. As far as police reform is concerned, after intense pressure from the OHR/EUSR and the Commission Delegation, a deal was adopted by Republika Srpska’s Parliament in October 2005. In line with the European Commission’s policy, Paddy Ashdown did not use the Bonn powers to impose the police reform, which had been identified as one of the conditions for the signing of the SAA. However, he did not hesitate to use his authority to establish an official expert commission and to force local politicians to comply by threatening the use of the Bonn powers. Even though one would be tempted to argue that effectiveness was high during this initial period, this needs at least to be qualified. As noted earlier, during Ashdown’s period, the adoption of reforms can be credited to the ‘push’ of the Bonn powers rather than to the ‘pull’ of Europe. By contrast, during the period 2006–9, reforms slowed down and ethnic tensions increased as the OHR/EUSR took a more ‘hands off’ approach, with some observers even warning of Bosnia being at the brink of collapse. By associating itself with the strategies of the OHR, EU conditionality became tainted with the same criticisms that had been levelled against the OHR and the use of the Bonn powers (Chandler, 2005). Essentially, it was

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Number of OHR decisions

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CSDP in Bosnia

1997 1998 1999

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Figure 6.1 Use of Bonn powers, 1997-2010 Source: OHR website, available at www.ohr.int (accessed 1 September 2011).

argued that these policies engendered a ‘dependency syndrome’ and that the sustainability of some of these reforms would remain questionable. For instance, regarding police reform, local politicians knew that they could still evade the original agreement during the implementation process. It is not surprising that in 2009 the European Commission acknowledged that despite a formal agreement on the police reform ‘limited progress’ had been made in this area (European/Commission, 2009: 59). In short, external imposition without internalisation of the reforms did not lead to sustainable compliance. Over time, the association between the OHR and the EUSR damaged rather than strengthened the role of the latter, especially on the back of the failure over police reform. This might explain why the EU decided to ‘separate’ the two positions in 2011. These problems also highlighted a trade-off between democracy and effectiveness, between increasing local ownership and the provision of effective governance (Domm, 2007). While international administrations often suffer from a problem of legitimacy and supplant democratically elected local institutions, their ability to produce results and to improve the conditions of the local populations (i.e. their effectiveness) is hailed as their key contribution to conflict resolution (Harland, 2004; Zaum, 2006). The new double-hatted EUSR will need to respond to this dilemma, which will become ever more critical after the departure of the OHR. As discussed above, the establishment of the EUSR does not constitute an innovation in the EU’s policy, but finds a precedent in the practice of appointing EU special envoys. However, in this case, the institutionalisation

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of this practice represents a huge step in the EU’s involvement in Bosnia. From the shuttle diplomacy that characterised the EU’s policy during the first period (1991–95), the EU moved to having a continuous presence on the ground. As expected from an institutionalist perspective, this has facilitated constant communication between Brussels and Sarajevo and allowed for political monitoring, early warning and problem-solving diplomacy on a daily basis. According to EU officials, the EUSR has improved the coherence of the EU in Bosnia, among EU bodies and member states, helping to convey a clearer message to the Bosnian authorities.15 However, coherence on the ground has been impeded by the limited resources at the EUSR’s disposal and the number of actors involved, the latter, clearly, an unintended consequence of the EU’s increasing engagement in Bosnia. The complexity of decision-making structures in Brussels coupled with complex chains of command, similarly, has obstructed coordination on the ground. Even though the EUSR proved instrumental in promoting increased integration of EU missions in theatre, some problems were identified regarding the EUSR’s role in the civilian mission’s chain of command. Hence, the creation of the CPCC aimed at establishing a clearer command structure from Brussels to the ground. As far as effectiveness is concerned, faced with recalcitrant local political elites, the OHR/EUSR (and by extension the international community) has been unable to promote sustainable EUoriented reforms. Resource limitations and tensions between interventionism and local ownership of the reforms have also had a negative impact on effectiveness. The analysis of the EUSR’s role does, however, provide evidence of the EU learning by doing. It has been argued that the development of EUSRs more generally resulted from learning by doing at the institutional and policy level (Adebahr, 2009). In the case of Bosnia, the original Joint Action appointing the EUSR (Council of the EU, 2002b) was amended on several occasions to incorporate new tasks and to adapt to changes on the ground, resulting from EU-related changes, as well as changes in the political landscape. This led to an increase in funding, a reinforcement of coordinating mechanisms following the adoption of the Comprehensive Policy for Bosnia and other alterations in line with the deployment of CSDP missions in the country. These changes highlight the importance of policy learning and incremental change in the structures of the EUSR that have facilitated regular adaptation of its instruments and policy goals. Furthermore, the EUSR has had to submit regular mandate implementation reports to the PSC, which have served as a basis for any decision on renewal, amendment or termination (e.g. Council of the EU 2002b; 2006). In this way, the EU has established an in-built mechanism able to adjust to changes on the ground or to new CFSP/CSDP developments. The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty has not introduced major changes to the figure of EU Special Representatives, although it has strengthened the role

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of the High Representative in terms of ‘right of initiative’ and overall responsibility. The Lisbon Treaty states that member states might appoint an EUSR ‘on a proposal from the High Representative’ and that EUSRs shall carry out their duties under his/her authority (article 33, TEU Lisbon). The main challenge, however, comes from the establishment of the EEAS and the Union Delegations (all the country-based EUSRs have now been double-hatted as Heads of EU Delegations). Not only do EUSRs need to be adequately integrated into the EEAS structures, but their role will also need to be clearly defined and criteria developed for future use (Adebahr, 2011).

The EU Police Mission in Bosnia (EUPM)

Since the launch of the CSDP, the EU has developed the capabilities to plan and conduct civilian crisis operations that cover the wide range of rule of law, from policing to border monitoring to judicial reform. Bosnia has been the testing ground for many of these developments. Missions in Bosnia have also generated important lessons for subsequent EU civilian crisis management operations. The launching of the EUPM made the EU’s commitment to develop autonomous civilian crisis management capabilities operational. It was the Union’s first ever crisis management operation within the framework of the CSDP. Demonstrating the credibility of commitments laid down at the Helsinki Council (1999), and further developed at Feira (2000) and Götenborg (2001), was consequently of some importance. At the Feira Council, the EU member states identified four priority areas in civilian crisis management (policing, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection) and made a commitment to provide 5,000 police personnel by 2003. Even though civilian crisis management developed in the shadow of EU military capabilities, progress in this area was rapid. Of the institutional structures set at Helsinki, the Committee on the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) was the first body to become operational and of the twenty-nine CSDP missions launched so far, twenty-two have been civilian in nature (see Table 6.1). The EUPM has also been the longest-lasting police mission so far (terminated in June 2012), which allows us to trace the development of EU civilian crisis management over time. The EUPM officially began on 1 January 2003 with a three-year mandate, taking over from the International Police Task Force (IPTF), the UN-led police mission. The operation was initially staffed by around 500 police experts from the then 15 member states and from 19 non-member states. Its mandate was ‘to establish sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnia ownership in accordance with best European and international practice’ (Council of the EU, 2002a). In January 2006, the mission was downsized, both in terms of personnel and objectives. While the mission’s main objective remained unchanged, the new mandate for the period 2006–7 included two

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key tasks: coordinating and assisting in the fight against organised crime and corruption and assisting police restructuring (Council of the EU, 2005). The mandate was further extended with minor changes until its termination on 30 June 2012 (see below). After the closure of the EUPM, the EU will continue to provide Bosnia with assistance in the area of law enforcement and security through the financial and technical assistance provided by the IPA programme. Moreover, the EUSR is to be reinforced with the creation of a small Law Enforcement Section which will advise local authorities at the political and strategic level on these matters. At the time of the deployment of the EUPM (January 2003), CSDP procedures, doctrines and institutional structures were almost non-existent and this certainly had an impact on the planning of the mission (Hansen, 2006). The participation of non-member states also introduced financial and legal difficulties that required individual ad hoc arrangements being negotiated with each contributing state. Although the financing of the mission was agreed among the member states without too much trouble, in 2003 problems arose concerning operational costs because the approval of the European Parliament was required to increase the CFSP budget. In November 2003, the European Parliament finally agreed to an increase of €17.5 million. The compromise formula used – one part covered by the participating states for the per diems of their seconded personnel and the other by the Community budget for the operational costs – was later used for other civilian crisis management operations. According to Hansen (2006: 18), as this was the first EU civilian crisis management mission, ‘there was also an understanding that decisions made in the planning for the EUPM might set a precedent and become established procedures and models for future CSDP operations’. Despite these difficulties, the planning of the EUPM constituted a huge leap forward compared to previous crisis management operations such as ECMM and EUAM. As a result of the Brusselisation process undergone by the CFSP, a standing structure – even if a relatively small one – was in place to plan and run the operation, and efforts were made to agree on a set of standard operating procedures (Council of the EU, 2003c). However, some national representatives expressed their dissatisfaction with the large degree of room for manoeuvre that the Council Secretariat enjoyed in planning and running this mission, and especially when determining the composition of the police force.16 This fact supports the observation made in Chapter 2 that the Council Secretariat developed a role beyond that which was intended by the principals (i.e. the member states) (see also Klein, 2010). The challenge of coherence In terms of vertical coherence, there were no major divergences among the member states’ positions regarding the appropriateness of this mission. EU member states, which had been looking for a ‘benign’ environment in which to test CSDP capabilities, saw Bosnia as the best opportunity to do so. Even

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though the OSCE had previously expressed its desire to take over from the IPTF, the EU’s proposal was finally accepted by the PIC and the Bosnian authorities (Hansen, 2006: 18). Only the issue of the type of mandate (executive or non-executive) raised some controversy. In executive missions, international police officers with enforcement powers are deployed on the ground and participate in police operations to substitute/support the local police forces. Non-executive police missions do not have an operational role, but are limited to specific tasks such as monitoring, advising, training and mentoring, and have limited enforcement powers. In the end, following the advice of the IPTF and the Planning Team, a non-executive mission was preferred. However, this issue re-appeared during the discussions about the extension of the mission’s mandate in 2005. In particular, those countries that wanted to see a stronger role of the EUPM in the fight against organised crime advocated an executive mandate. This executive mandate was never introduced, although it was agreed that the EUPM would have a stronger, more proactive role and that the inspection component would be given more attention. Member states also disagreed on the end date of the mission, with countries such as France and Germany favouring the termination of the mission at the end of 2011 and others such as the United Kingdom wishing to extend its mandate until December 2012. The final end date (30 June 2012) was thus a compromise between these two positions. The 2002 Joint Action (Council of the EU, 2002a) established a clear chain of command in order to ensure internal coherence: the PSC, advised by CIVCOM, would exercise political control and strategic direction of the mission. In the field, the Police Commissioner would report to the High Representative through the EUSR. With the establishment of the CPCC, the Civilian Operations Commander exercises command and control of the EUPM operation (Council of the EU, 2009). Coordination with other EU actors was to be facilitated at the EU Head of Mission’s meetings chaired by the EUSR and in the case of EUFOR, a coordinating cell. Despite these arrangements, problems of coordination between civilian and military instruments and between civilian instruments arose. Let us turn to each of these below. Civ–mil coordination The deployment of 7,000 EU troops in Bosnia by 2004 entailed not only an important challenge in terms of planning and conducting a large-scale operation, but also required a coordinated approach involving all relevant EU actors participating in security sector reform (SSR) activities. From the outset, there were problems of coordination between civilian and military actors, a case in point being coordination between the EUPM and EUFOR in the fight against organised crime. In theory, the mandates of the two missions did not clash. Whereas the EUPM’s mandate aimed at the long-term capacitybuilding of the police forces, EUFOR focused on the short term (deterrence). The first had a non-executive mandate (monitor, mentor and inspect); the

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latter had an executive one, i.e. it could resort to the use of force if necessary. In spite of the different mandates and approaches, during EUFOR’s first year, tensions arose between the two missions due to overlapping tasks, especially in the fight against organised crime. The EUPM provided expert advice and monitored the creation and strengthening of various state institutions to increase the local capacity to fight organised crime. The role of EUFOR Althea was rather different. Having been identified as one of the supporting tasks of EUFOR’s mandate, the then EUFOR Commander General Leakey expressed his personal commitment to play a significant role in this issue. In private, some EU officials argued that EUFOR had to step in because the EUPM had interpreted its mandate too narrowly and because of its lack of assertiveness in the fight against organised crime (Muehlmann, 2008: 396). From December 2004, several operations were launched to support local law enforcement agencies in fighting illegal activities such as weapons smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal logging. Although EUFOR officials stressed that these operations were not meant to usurp local efforts, the mission’s assertive approach generated some criticism amongst the EUPM and other EU officials for exceeding its mandate and undermining the EUPM’s objective of promoting long-term capacitybuilding and ownership of the reforms.17 This tension between the two operations showed Brussels’ difficulty in designing a comprehensive civilian and military approach to crisis management. Several factors combined to make possible some changes in autumn 2005: 1) political pressure coming from the member states in Brussels; 2) pragmatic considerations on the part of the Operation Commander (including the need to reduce troops in Bosnia); and 3) the EUSR’s realisation that these problems could eventually undermine his image and authority in Bosnia.18 In September 2005, the representatives of the EUPM, EUFOR and the EUSR agreed on Seven Principles for Coordination (EUPM, EUFOR, EUSR, 2005). According to this document, the EUPM would take the lead in the policing aspects of the CSDP, supporting efforts in tackling organised crime and assisting the local authorities by mentoring and monitoring the planning of these operations, while EUFOR would provide the operational capabilities to these operations, all under the political coordination of the EUSR. This agreement was later developed into Operational Guidelines that specified the new ‘adjusted roles’ of the EUPM and EUFOR in supporting Bosnian law enforcement agencies in fighting organised crime and corruption. The implementation of these guidelines led to EUFOR progressively reducing its role in the fight against organised crime and transferring these tasks to the Bosnian police forces. At the same time, from 2006 the EUPM would have a stronger, more proactive role in the fight against organised crime, assisting the local authorities in planning and conducting investigations. In sum, Bosnia provides some interesting lessons on how civil–military coordination in SSR activities can be worked out.

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Civ–civ coordination Coordination between the Commission and the EUPM was facilitated by an informal Joint Coordination Group. Moreover, a small CARDS/IPA team was co-located at the EUPM Headquarters. Although coordination with the Commission worked fairly well,19 some difficulties are worth noting. The lack of appropriate funding procedures generated some troubles for the EUPM, having to apply for Community funding in order to launch new projects or seek funding through the member states’ embassies.20 Moreover, there was not always full cooperation in harmonising the projects launched by the Commission and the EUPM, leading for example to the duplication at times of advisors to some Bosnian institutions, with one co-located police officer coming from the EUPM and one advisor from the Commission’s twinning projects.21 This duplication caused confusion among local stakeholders and undermined the consistency of EU policies in the country. Other problems were due to bureaucratic politics, aggravated by the pillarisation of the EU’s external action, which has had malicious consequences in the area of rule of law. For instance, police operations like the EUPM were designed by the Council structures to tackle the urgent needs of local police forces, whereas the Commission designed its own long-term institution-building projects which did not always follow the same logic. Therefore, one of the main challenges was coordination between the first and the second pillar, and particularly, between the Council Secretariat and the Commission (Gourlay, 2004). As witnessed in the case of Bosnia, CSDP missions ended up stepping on the Commission’s territory and carrying out institution-building activities, as well as operational management. This created a lot of tension between the services of the Commission and the Council Secretariat. The creation of the new External Action Service and the appointment of a double-hatted EUSR/Head of EU Delegation have gone some way to addressing these problems. Promoting a professional and sustainable Bosnian police force The EUPM operated as the leading organisation in the field of police reform, as part of the programme of rule of law reform launched by the OHR/EUSR. According to the first Joint Action, the aim of the EUPM was ‘to establish sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnia ownership in accordance with best European and international practice’ (Council of the EU, 2002a). This objective was in accordance with the EU’s objectives in the country, supporting the Mission Implementation Plan of the High Representative and the SAP. To implement its mandate, the first EUPM mission co-located police officers, in around 30 monitoring units, at the medium and senior level, supported by two mobile inspection teams operating around the country. As the mission downsized, its mandate was refocused, concentrating on support in the fight against organised crime and corruption (Council of the EU, 2009).

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Although the mandate has been renewed on several occasions, it is worth looking at the EUPM’s first mandate (2003–5) because it reveals some of the wider problems that have affected EU civilian crisis management operations. The Joint Action stated that the EUPM would ‘mentor, monitor and inspect’, according to ‘best European and international practice’, but it did not define what was meant by these concepts or provide any guidelines that could help in the implementation of these criteria. EUPM officials voiced concerns relating to the ambiguity of their mandate on many occasions.22 It was very difficult to determine what was the ‘best European practice’, given that policing practices varied across European countries, and how to develop programmatic objectives into operational projects, especially when most of the police officers of the first contingent were former IPTF officers and were not used to a non-executive mandate. Although, presumably, ‘teething troubles’ of this sort were inevitable, it took some time and a lot of discussion during the first year of the operation to clarify these issues, and this limited the effectiveness of the mission. In the case of ‘European standards’, given the difficulty of defining common standards among the contributing countries, it was decided to assign particular programmes to different countries.23 It was only later that ‘European and international standards of policing’ were defined in Council documents, including the following: police forces structured in accordance with criteria of effectiveness and efficiency; based on the rule of law; protected from improper political interference; acting in accordance with democratic values and human rights standards; and whose main task should be to protect citizens’ rights and properties (Merlingen, 2009: footnote 9). These standards remained rather vague though. The EUPM was a strengthening mission with the objective of educating, instructing, assisting, monitoring and advising local police. That is, the EUPM pursued long-term, structural reform aimed at producing a change in the police structures (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2005: 8). It was not just about providing quick relief to a crisis situation, but strengthening institutions, capacity-building and the sustainability of the Bosnian police forces. The need for a long-term approach was acknowledged by EUPM officials, as well as the difficulties of achieving its objectives within a short three-year mandate. Commenting on EUPM objectives, some officials pointed to the fact that the mandate was too broad and ‘unrealistic’.24 One official recognised that ‘It is very easy to create structures and institutions, but you also have to change the mindset and that takes time. The more you go on to the substance and the cultures, the more it takes time.’25 However, at the same time, this raised dangers of ‘mission creep’. Given the wide-ranging and longterm nature of the issues the EUPM had to deal with it is not surprising that the mandate was renewed several times and that the mission was in place for much longer than initially expected. The first mandate also revealed the EU’s attempt to portray its intervention in Bosnia as a mere ‘technocratic’ venture, despite the political nature of

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any such intervention. The language of the mandate avoided references to those political elements and instead chose neutral terms such as ‘sustainable’, ‘best practice’, etc. The projects undertaken by the EUPM were presented as technical reforms and justified as a way to increase the efficiency and rationalisation of Bosnian police forces. No mention, however, was made of how these reforms might impact on the balance of power among the conflict parties or the legitimacy of the EU’s intervention more generally. Tensions between the EUPM’s technocratic approach and the politics involved in the EU’s state-building enterprise in Bosnia became even more evident during the negotiations and implementation of the police reform, which the EUPM was tasked to support from 2006. Moreover, the first mandate was too narrow in the sense that it only focused on policing issues. By contrast, later mandates responded to criticisms that the EUPM had neglected the rule of law dimension in the fight against criminality. For instance, a Criminal Justice Interface Unit was created to address problems regarding cooperation between the police and the prosecutorial authorities. This trend is also visible in the development of EU police missions more generally, as the launch of the rule of law mission in Kosovo, EULEX, exemplifies. Another issue related to the implementation of the EUPM’s nonexecutive mandate. The EUPM’s main strategy was based on a management approach consisting of ‘monitoring, mentoring and inspecting managerial and operational capacities of the Bosnia police’ (Council of the EU, 2002a). This means that the EUPM had to implement its mandate through advice and mentorship, trying to persuade Bosnian police officers that the identified reforms were the ones to be followed. Obviously, this choice entailed some problems in terms of effectiveness as there were no consequences when the locals did not comply with what had been advised by EUPM officials. Even if conditionality from other EU projects could be and was linked, it only had a limited impact, as proved by the police reform. The only person who could remove non-compliant individual officers was the OHR at the recommendation of the Head of the Mission. The EUPM only resorted to this procedure a couple of times, and the OHR was, according to some interviewees, very reluctant to remove police officers. Although most of the EUPM officials, as well as officials in Brussels, agreed that an executive mandate would not have been appropriate for this specific operation, they argued that the EUPM could have been ‘tougher’ in applying its original mandate, in particular, the inspecting component. As one interviewee put it, ‘had [the inspecting component] been applied from the very beginning we would have been able to see more progress’.26 This problem was only addressed in 2006 after the refocusing of the mission. Another problem experienced by the EUPM concerned personnel. At the beginning of the operation some member states did not provide sufficient committed personnel, and some positions remained unfilled for lengthy

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periods of time. Rotation levels were also quite high, affecting the performance of the mission. Further, while the first contingent of personnel was highly qualified, later participants did not maintain the same quality. Sometimes the officers recruited were not the most suitable for a specific position or did not have sufficient English language skills. EUPM officials also agreed that this type of mission (management at medium and senior levels) would require more civilian experts or police experts with high qualifications and experience in the management of projects instead of police officers. These problems have affected other civilian crisis management operations, despite the Capability Headline Goals launched to increase the numbers and quality of member state contributions. The EUPM encountered several problems stemming from difficult local circumstances (Muehlmann, 2007: 380; Merlingen, 2009: 168; Juncos, 2011b). According to Osland (2004: 553), ‘the EU may learn some hard lessons regarding resources, mandate etc, connected to the institutional establishment of the EUPM. Nevertheless, it is the legacy of the war in Bosnia that represents the greatest obstacle to the success of the EUPM.’ These legacies include organised crime, corruption and hardline nationalism. EUPM activities took place in the context of an ethnically and administratively fragmented country with an unsettled political situation and a fragile economy. Several EUPM officials and national representatives in Brussels pointed to local circumstances to explain some of the problems experienced by the EUPM. For instance, in spite of the EUPM’s efforts to promote an ethnically balanced police force and to integrate minorities, this had limited success owing to minorities’ reluctance to operate outside their ethnic area and the politicisation of police appointments, especially at the senior level. The fragmentation of the Bosnian police forces due to the complex constitutional set-up of the country established by the Dayton Agreement also hindered efforts at reforms, as did the lack of financial resources, politicisation of reforms and corruption among politicians and police officers. In spite of these problems, one can identify several successes during the period 2003–5. There was some progress regarding institution-building and capacity-building with the establishment of a Ministry of Security at the state level, the strengthening of the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), the State Border Service (SBS) and other state-level agencies. The EUPM helped in drafting and implementing laws, the recruitment of personnel, and the provision of financial and other expert advice on police matters. It also managed to create an understanding of the necessity of intelligence in fighting crime, and the beginnings of a culture of exchanging intelligence among law enforcement agencies. There were also some successes in trying to improve cooperation in the field among state and entity institutions, and even with other agencies from the Balkan region. The EUPM tried to strengthen local ownership of reforms with the establishment of a Police Steering Board at the level of the Police Commissioner/Director of Police, where projects of reform were

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discussed and agreed upon. The EUPM also advised on the creation of Project Implementation Boards that were set up throughout Bosnia to develop projects at a local level. The EUPM thematic programmes aimed at improving the operational capacities of the local police forces. During the period 2006–12, the EUPM focused on two key tasks: supporting the process of police restructuring and strengthening local capabilities to fight organised crime and corruption. Regarding the first issue, progress was slow because of obstruction from local politicians. However, the EUPM did help with the implementation of the 2008 police laws and in particular, the establishment of the Bosnian Directorate for Coordination of Police Bodies. While the first task became hostage to local politics, the EUPM was more active in the fight against organised crime and corruption. The EUPM worked on strengthening the police–prosecutor interface and criminal justice experts provided advice to Bosnian law enforcement agencies. Improving the accountability of Bosnian police forces was also a key objective so as to reduce problems of political interference and corruption.27 In the last years of its mandate, it moved from assisting specific operations to providing more structural assistance in order to improve ‘co-ordination, co-operation and communication at national, regional and international levels, between police-prosecutor-penitentiary sectors’ (Ioannides and Collantes-Celador, 2011: 430–1). However, despite the EUPM’s efforts, and until socioeconomic problems are included in the EU’s approach to fighting organised crime, EUPM initiatives could only have a limited impact (Juncos, 2009). Overall, in terms of its contribution to conflict resolution, Merlingen (2009: 162) argued that ‘EUPM . . . advanced the transformation of the Bosnian police from an instrument of ethnic warfare into a professional service’ and ‘made significant headway in changing Bosnian policing mentalities, institutions and practices in line with European norms and standards’. In sum, despite some contribution to the promotion of EU objectives and conflict resolution in the country, the effectiveness of the EUPM mission was hampered by three main factors. First, many problems had to do with the illdefined nature of its original mandate. Second, inexperience and still-in-the-making EU civilian crisis management capabilities caused many problems regarding planning, operating procedures and personnel. Third, the local circumstances in which the projects had to be implemented jeopardised EUPM effectiveness. To a certain extent, some of the pitfalls of the EUPM were due to the fact that it was the first EU mission of its kind: the EU, therefore, lacked both experience and the appropriate capabilities. Problems with planning, coordination (in particular, civ–mil coordination) and the ambiguous mandate can be explained in this way. This ‘first mission’ factor also introduced a certain degree of undue pressure because, from planning to implementation, the mission ‘[had to] be a success’.28 At the end of the mission, officials were thus

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quick to declare the mission a success (EUPM, 2012). Being the first civilian crisis management operation also meant it could set a precedent, a model for subsequent operations, and everyone (member states and EU institutions) was wary of it. According to one member of the Planning Team, ‘as a result, finding workable solutions for issues such as financing took on an extended significance’ (Hansen, 2006: 18). Other police operations would follow the funding procedures established for the EUPM and similar objectives were set in their mandates – ‘to establish sustainable policing arrangements . . . in accordance with best European and international practice’. The shortcomings in EUPM personnel numbers, meanwhile, highlighted the difficulties of extracting resources already highly valued and sometimes in short supply within the member states. The importance of learning cannot be underestimated though. The EU at this juncture did not have a ‘manual’ for crisis management procedures. Therefore, it had to ‘learn by doing’ in launching a police operation from scratch. The mission’s implementation provided the EU with a number of lessons that were later used for the improvement of other police missions and EU crisis management capabilities more generally. The lessons learned were gathered through several EUPM Mission Reviews, a Lessons Learned Report of the planning of the mission (Council Secretariat and European Commission, 2003), a review of the first 100 days of the mission (Council Secretariat, 2003) and Lessons Learned Reports which were produced at the end of each mandate. However, initially, no centralised system existed to process all the information gathered during the running of civilian crisis management missions. According to Hansen (2006: 25), the planning and management of the EUPM was ‘conducted largely by the same small group of staff and institutional memory [was] personified rather than formally recorded’. Moreover, in the early years of the CSDP, the civilian component in particular was understaffed and that meant that there was no time to produce lessons learned from EU missions or to learn from other organisations such as the UN or OSCE. As one EU official put it: ‘the papers [were] there, the lessons [were] available, but no one bother[ed] to read them, because they [were] rushing from one mission to the next’.29 Finally, pressure to declare CSDP missions a success meant that official reports were often uncritical, preventing the development of best practices. Formal procedures for the identification and implementation of lessons learned in civilian CSDP missions were not produced until 2008. According to these guidelines, the objective was ‘to improve civilian crisis management in ESDP, including the planning, management and conduct of the growing number of civilian missions and to introduce a culture of continuous improvement of practice reflecting the high political ambition of ESDP’ (Council of the EU, 2008: 2). The document identified key steps in the process of identification, analysis, implementation and dissemination of lessons learned. A task force in the General Secretariat was to be responsible for the

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process, as well as best practices officers in the missions. Dedicated software was to be set up to support the institutionalisation of lessons learned. In this way, it was expected that learning would feed back into concepts for operations, capability development, training and CSDP manuals. Despite the problems identified above, the EUPM provided ample ground for learning. According to a former member of the EUPM Planning Team: ‘EUPM made some significant changes in its second year in response to an altered environment, but also to correct inevitable misjudgements of the planning team’ (Hansen, 2006: 19). Some of the problems that were encountered during the implementation of the 2002 Joint Action led to some changes and adjustments. For example, in the summer of 2004, a more programmatic approach to implement the mandate and a benchmarking system were introduced to improve the effectiveness of the EUPM. Learning also led to changes being incorporated into the new mandate of the EUPM agreed at the end of 2005. Moreover, the ‘lessons learned’ gathered from this mission helped improve EU crisis management capabilities and procedures. First, problems identified during the planning of the mission led to an increase in the number of civilian crisis management staff in the Council Secretariat. Problems with procurement and personnel, also identified in other civilian crisis management operations such as Proxima or EUJUST-Themis, led to the launching of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. As far as planning was concerned, initiatives such as the adoption of an ‘EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning’ (GAERC, 2005) and the creation of the CPCC and the CMPD were meant to address some of the problems encountered with EUPM planning, as well as problems relating to command and control and civ–mil coordination. In the next section, I examine the coherence and effectiveness of the latest and most ambitious EU operation in Bosnia: EUFOR Althea.

EUFOR Althea

In the aftermath of the rift between the ‘old’ and the ‘new Europe’ over Iraq, the deployment of a large-scale NATO-supported EU operation in Bosnia was seen as a sign of appeasement by the two sides. Bosnia appeared as the best scenario to make two different approaches compatible: those who wanted to develop a robust EU security and defence policy, if possible independent of the US; and those who wanted to demonstrate that resorting to Berlin Plus (see below) and to NATO was in the interest of the EU. Bosnia, as with Macedonia before it, enabled the testing of the EU’s capabilities in a ‘controlled’ environment. Operation EUFOR Althea constitutes the largest EU-led military operation to date. In June 2004, NATO decided to end the SFOR mission and to hand over responsibility to an EU military operation. NATO had operated in the country since 1995 when it first deployed 60,000 troops under the

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Implementation Force (IFOR), replaced by the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) with 30,000 troops in 1997. The reasons for this decision can be found in a combination of several factors. First, a general agreement from both Washington and the EU member states that the security situation in Bosnia and in the Balkan region more broadly had improved considerably. Second, the fact that the US (and, by extension, NATO) had other priorities. The 9/11 attacks and the ‘war on terror’ shifted American priorities to other areas of the world such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Third, the launch of the first CSDP missions in 2003 – the EUPM in Bosnia, Concordia and Proxima in Macedonia and Artemis in RD Congo – convinced the US (and reassured the pro-Atlanticist member states) that the EU possessed the necessary capabilities to gradually take the lead in ensuring security in the Balkans. Fourth, after the fiasco of UNPROFOR (mainly a European force), this new force epitomised the EU’s desire to rebuild its credibility in the region, as well as on the world stage, thus making it clear that the CSDP was not simply a talking shop. Last, but by no means least, it was the last step in the process of Europeanisation of the international intervention in Bosnia. The Brussels European Council expressed the EU’s readiness to take over from the NATO mission in Bosnia as early as December 2002 (European Council, 2002). However, the Iraq War and the resulting transatlantic rift delayed an agreement on the deployment of the EU mission (Reichard, 2006: 22). It was only a year later, after transatlantic relations had improved and the EU had successfully taken over the NATO operation in Macedonia, that preparations for EUFOR Althea started in Mons and Brussels. The launch of the mission had to await NATO’s official announcement at the Istanbul summit that SFOR would be concluded. Soon thereafter, the Council adopted Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July (Council of the EU, 2004b) and launched the EU Planning Team. In the autumn, the EU adopted a Concept of Operations and an Operation Plan. On 22 November 2004, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1575 authorising the EU member states to create EUFOR as a legal successor to SFOR. The transfer of authority from SFOR to EUFOR took place on 2 December 2004. The mission is being carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, according to the Berlin Plus arrangements. The Berlin Plus arrangements were first agreed at the 1996 NATO meeting in Berlin to make NATO assets available for a possible WEU operation. A series of formal agreements for EU–NATO cooperation were adopted between December 2002 and March 2003. In Bosnia, NATO provides logistical support, the Headquarters for the EUFOR mission (Camp Butmir) and support for secure communications. EUFOR has been the last operation deployed under these arrangements to date. The running costs of this operation are administered by the ATHENA mechanism (involving contributions from member states on a GDP basis). Personnel and other items are funded on a ‘costs lie where they fall’ basis. EUFOR took over the job with approximately 7,000 troops, the same

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number that SFOR had in December 2004. This similarity can be explained by the task EUFOR had to perform (to maintain a safe and secure environment) and because the Union wanted to reassure the Bosnian authorities and population that it was serious about its engagement in the country. Essentially the same forces which contributed to SFOR were present in EUFOR (the soldiers just swapped their badges for the insignia of the European Union Force), but with the major difference that there were no US troops.30 In December 2004, 22 EU member states and 12 other non-EU member states agreed to contribute troops to EUFOR Althea. Three EU member states did not participate in the first EUFOR contingent: Malta, Cyprus and Denmark. In the case of the Mediterranean states, they did not take part in this CSDP operation because it was carried out following Berlin Plus arrangements. When the operation was launched in 2004, neither Malta nor Cyprus were NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) members and thus they did not have a bilateral security agreement with NATO. Malta re-joined the Partnership for Peace in 2008. Cyprus, as a non-PfP country, continues to be excluded from taking part in the operation itself or in discussions between the PSC and the North Atlantic Council (and the EUMC and NATO’s Military Committee). In the case of Denmark, it does not participate in CSDP operations according to the opting-out on defence issues agreed at Maastricht (Protocol 5, TEU Maastricht). Denmark as a NATO member is, however, allowed to attend meetings where EUFOR is being discussed. Non-EU countries participate in the Committee of Contributors and are regularly briefed about the progress of the operation, but they do not have a voice in EUFOR’s decision-making structures. EUFOR troops were originally organised into three Multinational Task Forces with a geographical area of responsibility. With the downsizing of the mission, these were replaced by a Multinational Manoeuvre Battalion. An Integrated Police Unit (IPU) with executive powers was also created as part of EUFOR. It was originally composed of approximately 500 troops from seven countries: Italy, Hungary, Austria, Slovenia, Romania, Turkey and the Netherlands. Between November 2007 and October 2010, the European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR) assumed leadership of the IPU.31 The IPU combines the unique features of a military unit with the capabilities and experience of a police force. Therefore, it can perform a wide range of tasks from support to maintaining a safe and secure environment to conducting police-like investigations or riot and crowd control. To facilitate coordination with the civilian authorities and population, EUFOR also established Liaison and Observation Teams living in rented houses among the Bosnian population. They are usually deployed at potential hot-spots and have served as an ‘early-warning system’. Unlike other CSDP military operations such as EUFOR RD Congo, no end date has been set and instead, completion is assessed with reference to an ‘end status’. While this ensures a strong mandate for the mission, it also raises

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dangers of ‘mission creep’ and politicisation. Every six months the PSC reviews EUFOR and forwards its recommendation to continue, terminate or if necessary adjust the operation to the Council. Hence, in December 2006 the Council noted that the ‘security situation in Bosnia has evolved enough’ to permit a substantial reduction of EUFOR (GAERC, 2006). This decision was also influenced by pressure on troop contributions after the withdrawal of UK troops in 2006 and with other member states threatening a similar move. On 27 February 2007, the PSC approved the new mission’s Operational Plan. According to this document, EUFOR would retain 2,500 troops on the ground, backed up by Over-The-Horizon Forces if needed (GAERC, 2007). A Multinational Battalion was to be based in Sarajevo and Liaison and Observation Teams were to be dispersed throughout the country to maintain early warning in case of a worsening of the security situation. The IPU element was also retained. In January 2010, although the military executive mandate was retained, the mandate was amended to include non-executive capacity-building and training tasks as part of the EU’s contribution to security sector reform in the country. As troop levels continued to decrease throughout 2010 and 2011 to around 1,300 (of a total of 2,100 troops pledged), discussions about the future of EUFOR continued. Some member states, such as Austria, wanted to retain the executive mandate. For its part, the UK did not want to terminate the mission as it is the only Berlin Plus mission currently running. Other countries such as France and Italy expressed their desire to put an end to this operation (ISIS Europe, 2011). On 10 October 2011, the Council decided to refocus the mandate of the mission, the main task of which will be to provide ‘capacity-building and training while maintaining situational awareness and a credible reserve in case called upon to support efforts to maintain or restore the safe and secure environment’ (FAC, 2011: 16). Hence, the executive mandate is retained but will now be ensured by ‘Over-The-Horizon’ forces. A final date for withdrawal has not been agreed among the member states at the time of writing (April 2012). Planning the mission The military aspects of the planning and management of the operation were dealt with by the EU Staff Group in Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, while the politico-military aspects were under the responsibility of DG VIII (Pol–Mil Affairs) in the Council Secretariat, supported by the EUMS. Input from the Commission and the European Parliament in the planning of the mission were virtually non-existent, a state of affairs heavily criticised by the latter (European Parliament, 2004b: 77). Even if one takes into account the political delays, the actual planning of the operation took almost a year. This does not bode well for the future of CSDP military operations and their ability to react to an impending crisis. Planning was complicated because NATO was already on the ground and a small contingent was to remain after the termination of the SFOR mission.

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SFOR’s advice was, therefore, very important and the EUMS staff involved in the early planning of operation Althea spent an enormous amount of time coordinating with the NATO Headquarters in Mons. SFOR’s OPLAN was used as a template to design EUFOR’s own OPLAN. During the planning phase, the transfer of operational procedures and practices from NATO was also of paramount importance. The fact that many officials in charge of EUFOR had previously taken part in NATO missions (including SFOR) or had been seconded to SHAPE cannot be underestimated (Juncos 2011a). Officials did not just follow the SFOR model, they also incorporated lessons learned from past missions and adapted the mission to the specific situation in Bosnia. EUFOR Althea was designed on the model of Operation Concordia but in such a way that path dependence did not have a negative impact on coherence and effectiveness. The ‘Lessons Identified’ from the Concordia operation were useful at the strategic/mil/pol levels (Brussels/ SHAPE) vis-à-vis intelligence-sharing arrangements, the use of NATO assets (communications and force reserves arrangements) and issues regarding the chain of command (e.g. whether or not to incorporate NATO’s Naples Headquarters). At the tactical level, Concordia’s lessons learned were taken into account to design the structure of the headquarters and the division of labour between EUFOR and the NATO Headquarters. But even if valuable, these lessons were not always transferable to the planning of EUFOR, especially at the tactical level. Hence, the operation also had to resort to learning by doing. It was the first time that the EU had launched an operation on such a large scale (7,000 troops) under Berlin Plus arrangements, and many aspects had to be designed as problems emerged, during the implementation phase. In this case, the informal transfer of lessons learned was as important, if not more so, than the formal one. Even though there was a document of Concordia’s Lessons Identified, there was no time to go through this document in detail and at the operational level, many of the staff that planned EUFOR had already worked for Concordia, and thus operational routines were more important than formal procedures. A planning team was set up in advance of the deployment of the operation, although some logistical problems affected its workings: a lack of personnel, often sent to Sarajevo too late; a lack of expertise in strategic planning; and a lack of English language skills. A EUFOR official mentioned that better consultation mechanisms with other civilian bodies (for example with the EUPM and EUMM) at the planning stage would have prevented problems during the implementation of the operation.32 The Chief of the EUFOR Planning Team also admitted that ‘the planning was frustrated because at times positions were not speedily taken in Brussels’.33 In this respect, two main disagreements amongst the member states had to be surmounted during this phase: regarding the use of Berlin Plus agreements; and the establishment of the IPU. First, the CSDP institutions created after 1999 had been the result of a

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compromise between the positions of France and the UK regarding the development of autonomous European defence capabilities and the role of NATO (and the US) in European security. While the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries did not substantially change the dynamics within CSDP committees (Juncos and Pomorska 2008), despite the new member states generally aligning themselves with the UK’s position, the enlargement to Cyprus did certainly introduce new sensitivities in the CSDP and has since been a factor contributing to the blocking of EU–NATO relations at the political level. In the case of Althea, even though all the member states initially agreed on the use of Berlin Plus, there were some disagreements on the particular distribution of tasks between NATO and EUFOR and the role of the EU Command Element (EUCE) in Naples. NATO’s decision to maintain an HQ in Bosnia, strongly supported by the US, was certainly not welcomed by some member states, especially after NATO declared its intention to deal not only with support to defence reform (in line with the Partnership for Peace programme), but also with other tasks such as counter-terrorism and the detention of persons indicted for war crimes. The division of tasks between the NATO and the EU mission thus became a contentious issue at the politico-strategic level. Many member states saw this as a source of potential conflicts between the two missions and as proof of the US’s lack of trust in the EU’s military operations. As a final agreement on the distribution of tasks could not be reached at the political level (NAC-PSC), it was up to the Commanders in theatre to come up with the technical arrangements for cooperation. The role of Naples’ command structures in EUFOR’s chain of command was also a contentious issue that had already surfaced during the planning of Concordia. France was wary of the role of NATO’s regional headquarters and argued that it did not adhere to the EU’s two-tier model, while the UK and Italy supported the idea of a three-level command structure. Finally, as a compromise, it was agreed that the command structure would run directly from Mons to Sarajevo, but that the EUCE in Naples would be kept informed (Kupferschmidt, 2006: 17). In practice, however, Naples has played a key role in the command structure coordinating the Kosovo and Bosnian operations. Second, the issue of the IPU was more delicate, and was linked to the specific role of the EUPM, and the role of the EU more broadly, in the fight against organised crime. In this respect, some countries, in particular the Nordic countries, opposed the use of any paramilitary police forces in EU operations. Other countries such as France and Spain, even though they did have paramilitary police forces, resisted their use within a military chain of command. According to these member states (Nordic countries, Spain and France), ‘such a reorganisation would have been in line with EU concepts, according to which police officers assigned to international mission should be placed under civilian command’ (Bertin, 2008: 63; Council of the EU, 2003a). Moreover, France and other member states were initially very reluctant to

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take on the proactive role of EUFOR in the fight against organised crime because they did not want this supporting task to determine the size of the mission in the future. Italy, by contrast, was very keen on the establishment of this type of force within EUFOR (it was already the main contributor to the paramilitary force in SFOR).34 Due to the divergent views amongst the member states, the final decision was to set up a paramilitary police contingent, but only consisting of forces from those few member states willing to contribute to it. Furthermore, the composition and status of the IPU was to be submitted to regular revision by the PSC. The hour of truth for EU–NATO cooperation The EU followed the ‘Macedonian model’ in Bosnia. There the EU took over from the NATO mission deployed in 2001 to monitor the security situation and to oversee the implementation of the reforms agreed in the Ohrid Peace Agreement. The Concordia Operation, the first ever EU military operation, was also the first one resorting to Berlin Plus arrangements and therefore this operation served as a ‘test case’ for EU–NATO cooperation. It was not until 17 March 2003 that a final agreement was reached regarding how to make Berlin Plus operational. The agreements allowed the Alliance to support EUled military operations, including resort to NATO assets and capabilities (headquarters, communication and information systems, access to NATO’s planning capabilities and intelligence). These arrangements sought to avoid unnecessary duplication of capabilities between the two organisations, and in principle, were originally designed to support an EU mission where NATO was not engaged at all. The latter, however, was not the case in the EU operations undertaken in Macedonia and Bosnia. This was especially problematic in Bosnia, where NATO had been camped for so many years, and the size of the operation was considerable (7,000 troops). Moreover, after the handover to EUFOR, NATO was to maintain a small headquarters in Sarajevo. As mentioned before, during the planning phase, some member states resisted a possible duplication between NATO and EUFOR tasks. Ultimately, it was up to the two Force Commanders to agree on a division of labour. It was thus decided that NATO would focus on support to defence reform, counterterrorism and the detention of persons indicted for war crimes. At the decision-making level, working arrangements were established to ensure coordination, with meetings between NATO and the EU bodies at the ministers, ambassadors, and committee level. For instance, the EU and NATO military committees meet monthly to discuss EUFOR progress. However, these meetings have been described as insubstantial and they usually serve more as a political forum, especially for non-EU member states such as Turkey. The EUFOR chain of command allowed for EU–NATO coordination at the strategic, operational and tactical levels (see Figure 6.2). Regarding the operational command of the mission, and in line with the Berlin Plus arrangements, NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander

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POLITICOSTRATEGIC LEVEL

European Council

HR/VC

Council of the EU (FAC)

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COREPER

Political and Security Committee (PSC) EUMS

North Atlantic Council (NAC)

EU Military Committee EU Staff Group

NATO Military Committee

OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Operation Commander/DSACEUR SHAPE (Mons) EU Command Element AFSOUTH HQ (Naples)

TACTICAL LEVEL

Force Commander HQ EUFOR (Sarajevo)

EUSR/HEAD EU DELEGATION LOTs

Multinational Maneuver Battalion

IPU

Figure 6.2 EUFOR chain of command

Europe (DSACEUR) acts as Operation Commander. The chain of command goes from the EU Operation Headquarters in SHAPE (Mons, Belgium) down to Naples, where the EU has established the EUCE, and to the EUFOR Headquarters at Camp Butmir in Sarajevo under the responsibility of the EU Force Commander. Both in Mons and Naples, the double-hatted posts guarantee linkage between the EU and NATO. Despite tensions at the political level (see above), several factors ensured smooth cooperation between NATO and the EU on the ground. The fact that both organisations shared the same installations at Camp Butmir as well as co-location at the operational level, increased linkages and mutual support among them. All the interviewees from NATO and EUFOR Headquarters agreed that possible overlaps of competences between the EUFOR and NATO missions were not likely to occur as cooperation took place on a daily basis. Cooperation also took place in other areas. NATO provided logistical support, the headquarters for the EUFOR mission (Camp Butmir) and

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support for secure communications. Contingency plans existed for NATO to provide Over-The-Horizon Forces if required. EUFOR also provided support for the NATO operation in Kosovo, sending an IPU unit in 2005. Despite the smooth transition, however, some problems are worth noting. For instance, it was not until June 2005, a year into EUFOR’s mandate, that the EU–NATO cooperation agreement was implemented and NATO handed intelligence it had gathered during the implementation of the SFOR operation over to EUFOR. As regards EU internal coherence, Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP had a specific section on the ‘Coherence of EU response’, where one is reminded of the responsibility of the Council to ensure the coherence of EU activities, and the responsibility of the EUSR to promote overall EU political coordination in theatre (Council of the EU, 2004b). However, the EUSR is not in the chain of command of EUFOR, although the EUFOR Commander takes into consideration the EUSR local political advice, for instance, on issues like the IPUstyle capability. In this way, both the Council, from Brussels, and the EUSR, from Sarajevo, ensure horizontal, institutional and vertical coherence. The Joint Action also stated that the EU Force Commander would liaise with the EUPM and contribute to the EU’s overall objectives in Bosnia. However, this did not prevent problems of coordination with the EUPM, as discussed above. Bridging the capability–expectations gap? As mentioned in Chapter 4, one of the key weaknesses in the EU’s approach towards the war in Bosnia was the lack of military instruments, or rather, its inability to threaten the use of force to compel the parties to the negotiating table. The development of the military component of the CSDP offered the EU such a possibility and also helped bridge the capability–expectations gap that had beset EU foreign policy since its early years (Hill, 1993). Together with other EU bodies in Bosnia, EUFOR Althea is designed to support Bosnia’s path towards joining the EU, and in particular, the objectives of the SAP (European Council, 2004). More specifically, Althea’s mandate consists of the implementation of ANNEX 1A and 2 of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Among its key military tasks can be mentioned deterrence (i.e. to prevent a resumption of violence), to contribute to a safe and secure environment and to manage residual aspects of the Peace Agreement, such as airspace management, demining, ordnance disposal or weapons collection. EUFOR’s supporting tasks include counter-terrorism, tackling organised crime, assistance in defence reform and support to the ICTY. Hence, from this, it is clear that EUFOR remains a ‘low-intensity’ mission in what it is, to a great extent, a benign environment. This pattern of intervention is also evident in other EU military operations as EU member states have been both reluctant and unable to deploy CSDP ‘high-intensity’ missions in hostile environments (Toje, 2008; Menon, 2009).

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Since SFOR was perceived as a ‘success’ by the Bosnian authorities and population, the EU military operation was to perform the same key and supporting tasks as SFOR. EUFOR took over with the same troop levels as its predecessor to ensure a smooth transition and boost its credibility. The emphasis was on deterrence and maintaining a safe and secure environment as its predecessor had done. As stated in UNSCR 1551, EUFOR was allowed to ‘take all necessary measures’ to fulfil this mandate. The aim was to retain a strong force to ensure continuity with SFOR and also to alleviate fears among the local population, for whom memories of the European intervention during the war were still fresh. In spite of this, EUFOR also wanted to be recognised as ‘different’ and a way to do this was to take over new tasks such as the fight against organised crime. The first Force Commander, General Leakey, used to characterise EUFOR as a ‘new and distinct’ operation when comparing it to SFOR (Leakey, 2006: 60). The slogan of EUFOR (‘From Stabilisation to Integration’) also sought to emphasise the added value of EUFOR. The resulting EUFOR was a very robust one with similar tasks to SFOR and an even tougher approach to organised crime. Although before its deployment there were some concerns among local authorities and the population about the EU undertaking this mission, an active public diplomacy exercise on the part of the EU, as well as the actual performance of EUFOR on the ground set aside those concerns (Bertin 2008; Keohane 2009). The general view is that EUFOR has been very effective in performing its key tasks.35 Already in 2008, the Council noted ‘the decisive progress made by operation ALTHEA towards accomplishing its mandate, and in particular the completion of the military and stabilisation tasks provided for by the Dayton/Paris Agreement’ (GAERC, 2008: 4). Among the Bosnian population, approval rates of EUFOR’s work at 47.2 per cent were similar to those of other international organisations such as the EU, OSCE, UNDP and higher than the approval rates of the OHR, US and local institutions (UNDP, 2008). In terms of deterrence, and despite some isolated incidents of ethnic violence, EUFOR has not had to deal with any direct threats. The general view among the population is that a recurrence of war in case of EUFOR withdrawal is unlikely. For instance, in November 2010, a majority of the population considered that a withdrawal of EUFOR would not lead to a new war in Bosnia (70 per cent of Bosniaks, 94 per cent of Croats and 80 per cent of Serbs) (UNDP Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010: 136). The reductions in troop levels and changes in EUFOR mandate are also a reflection of the improvements in the security situation. One can conclude that the EUFOR mission in the country remains, more than anything, symbolic, as a means to reassure the population. Given that there are no direct security threats in the country and that, in any case, EUFOR would not be able to deal with them with the current troop levels (ISIS Europe, 2011), the continuation of an executive mandate in Bosnia seems questionable. However, disagreement among the member has

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prevented the termination of EUFOR’s executive mandate. The introduction of a training and capacity-building mandate from January 2011 constitutes a step in the right direction. The reconfiguration of the operation in 2011 established a new component, the Mobile Training Teams, with the main responsibility of providing training to the Bosnian Armed Forces. EUFOR also had a very proactive role regarding the fight against organised crime during its first year of deployment. By tackling a problem that the local public was worried about, EUFOR’s credibility increased among the local population and authorities. However, it also raised criticisms among other EU officials that led to subsequent changes in EUFOR’s operating procedures (see EUPM section). Moreover, the effectiveness of EUFOR’s involvement in these activities is open to question. EUFOR was not a law enforcement agency and although its patrolling activities and roadblocks put some pressure on organised crime networks in the short term, in the medium and long term, its involvement was detrimental. First, because of practical reasons: the military did not have investigative powers or experience of dealing with the evidence of witnesses. Second, EUFOR’s activities not only overstepped the competencies of other EU agencies on the ground (the EUPM, the Commission Delegation), but also undermined the EU’s putative commitment to local ownership. EUFOR has also performed other tasks, including the control and supervision of weapons stored throughout the country and demining, although with the downsizing of the operation, EUFOR has encouraged local ownership in these areas. All the Joint Military Affairs tasks have now been transferred to the Bosnian Armed Forces. Learning has facilitated some of the changes in EUFOR’s mandate over time. The lessons learned system in CSDP military crisis management structures is much more advanced than that of its civilian counterpart. The EUMS is in charge of processing ‘lessons identified’ in completed CSDP operations. These lessons and best practices are entered into a database, the Lessons Management Application (LMA). In the case of ongoing operations such as EUFOR, learning by doing takes place through a routinised process which seeks to gather knowledge on the current performance of the military mission to contribute to the identification of problems and possible solutions (i.e. to improve effectiveness by introducing changes to the mission’s mandate). EUFOR was the first mission where an evaluation of the ongoing operation took place.36 The lessons learned system that was established in EUFOR owed much to the NATO one.37 Apart from a Lessons Identified report on EUFOR’s planning, since the launch of the mission, regular Six Month Reviews have been submitted to the PSC. On the basis of the reports, the PSC assesses how much progress has been achieved in EUFOR’s objectives and forwards its recommendation to terminate or adjust the operation to the Council. The Mission Reviews have played a crucial role in the process of policy learning and have identified necessary adjustments to the changing

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conditions on the ground, such as the decision on the reduction of troops, and regarding coordination with the EUPM in the fight against organised crime. Despite the existence of these mechanisms, some authors have pointed at the deficiencies in the EU’s lessons learned systems, with Witney (2008: 8) even talking of an inability to learn and of ‘corporate amnesia’ in CSDP. Intergovernmental politics, as much as experiential learning, have also had an impact on policy change. Given pressures to increase troop numbers in Afghanistan, several EU member states were keen to reduce their contributions to EUFOR Althea from 2007 (e.g. the UK, Germany, France, Spain and Poland). At the same time, the reconfiguration of the mission from a peacekeeping to a non-executive capacity-building and training operation was a compromise between those member states that would favour a termination of the operation (e.g. France, Finland) and those which fear that a hasty withdrawal of EUFOR could lead to instability in the country (e.g. Austria, the Netherlands).38 In sum, in spite of the existence of a lessons learned system in military operations, political considerations and bureaucratic politics do still determine to a great extent the outcome of CSDP learning processes. Other problems are worth noting here even though they have not affected EUFOR’s overall effectiveness. First, problems with secure communications between EUFOR Headquarters and Brussels. Another important issue was the multinational character of the operation, which meant not only that the contingent consisted of many different countries, but also that there was no framework nation leading the operation, as was the case with France in Concordia. Some officials have pointed out that this makes EUFOR more difficult to manage than other operations.39 National caveats (domestic laws that limit the way in which a national contingent can contribute to international peacekeeping forces) have also affected the performance of the mission, although in this respect, EUFOR is not very different from other international missions. The French troops, for instance, were not allowed to participate in crowd control operations, nor could they use dogs or bullets. The Dutch caveats were also significant in the fight against organised crime and corruption, and German troops were not allowed to use tear gas and needed approval from the Bundestag for several types of operations. Finally, the lack of personnel with English language skills has also been a problem during implementation. Problems that affected other military operations, such as force generation and setting the headquarters (see Witney, 2008), were not an issue in EUFOR as the troops were already on the ground when the handover from SFOR to EUFOR took place. However, maintaining the level of member state contributions became a problem later on as several member states withdrew their troops for military, political or financial reasons. The analysis of EUFOR has showed that coordination with NATO on the ground worked well despite intergovernmental politics. In terms of effective-

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ness EUFOR has been able to fulfil its mandate as expected for several reasons. First, for a mission of 7,000 experienced troops, Bosnia was an easy task. Second, EUFOR benefited from the experience gained from previous operations (Concordia) and from NATO’s experience and advice during the planning phase. Moreover, cooperation between the EU and NATO worked well thanks to the good working relationships between the Force Commanders in theatre. Institutional arrangements were adequate, the mandate realistic, the resources appropriate for the operation and other factors (e.g. conditions on the ground) were favourable. In spite of the considerable effectiveness of EUFOR, some observers have identified problems-in-the-making in EU’s defence capabilities that have affected past operations and could seriously undermine future CSDP initiatives, particularly if launched in high-risk scenarios. As argued by Witney (2008: 50), ‘ESDP has got through five years of operations on a wing and a prayer, thanks to good luck, ingenuity on the part of many individuals who have found ways to work the unworkable, and a collective readiness to settle for the relatively safe and unambitious.’ Although the member states have committed themselves to achieve greater defence capabilities at the EU level, the investments in defence are still too small to achieve the headlines. Problems relate not only to the amount of money spent, but also to the quality of what the EU member states get in return, in terms of training of troops and equipment, especially if we compare it with the US (Biscop, 2004; Witney, 2008; Menon, 2011b). Experts have identified a number of shortfalls in the CSDP, among them problems of interoperability of forces, deployability (for example, the EU lacks an effective strategic air-lift), sustainability of deployed forces and strategic intelligence (ICG, 2005; Howorth, 2007). Initiatives such as the Headline Goal 2010, the establishment of the European Defence Agency and the inclusion of ‘permanent structure cooperation’ in the Lisbon Treaty can go some way to addressing capability problems, but will need to rely on the willingness of EU member states to support this process – something that it is not warranted, especially amidst the current financial and economic crisis.

Conclusion

Overall, increasing CFSP institutionalisation had a positive impact on the levels of coherence and effectiveness of the CFSP as the cases of the EUSR, EUPM and EUFOR have shown. Nonetheless, there were still some problems as a result of the mushrooming of new bureaucratic bodies both in Brussels and in Sarajevo. Even though institutionalisation has generally increased the capabilities and visibility of the EU (and to some extent its effectiveness), coherence remains an elusive goal, in particular civ–civ and civ–mil coordination. The effectiveness of CSDP operations has also suffered from other problems. In some cases, the CSDP had to face teething problems that

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affected the launch and management of operations and that stemmed from the lack of appropriate capabilities, new procedures and inexperienced institutions. In this regard, Bosnia served as a valuable testing ground. Other issues relating to the availability of resources (personnel, money, equipment) have, on the other hand, become a persistent hindrance to the development of the CSDP. Apart from the negative impact of intergovernmental politics on EU–NATO relations, and problems deriving from bureaucratic politics (in particular, rivalries between the Commission and the Council Secretariat in the area of civilian crisis management), CSDP operations have had to deal with a number of challenges stemming from local factors. While such challenges are not totally unanticipated (these are after all, crisis management operations), in many cases, the EU failed to deal with these problems in an appropriate manner. Above all, CSDP operations need to pay more attention to issues of local ownership, sustainability and legitimacy. On the other hand, two issues demonstrate the existence of unintended consequences and that member states cannot fully control the integration process and/or overturn past decisions. First, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the Council Secretariat (along with other Brussels-based bodies) increased its role in CFSP/CSDP beyond what some member states had foreseen in principle. For instance, one national representative affirmed that the Council Secretariat transformed its role from a mere secretariat to ‘a policy defining institution’, especially in the Western Balkans. According to this official, the establishment of the figure of the High Representative and the Policy Unit explained this development.40 Suspicion on the part of the member states about the role played by the Council Secretariat in the case of the EUPM is a case in point. The degree of expertise required in the planning and running of this type of operation, as well as the need for an institutional memory to take stock of previous operations, explains why the role of the Council Secretariat became so significant during this period. One might expect the EEAS to play a similar role in the future. Second, the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans is perceived by some national representatives as a process that has escaped the member states’ control, and that has ‘its own dynamic’. According to one national diplomat, ‘nobody seems to be in the driving-seat, we [the member states] lost control on certain things’ and no member state seems able to ‘speak up’ against the membership perspective for this region or ‘to take the blame’ for it.41 Such behaviour would break the unwritten rule to respect the acquis politique, and the ‘agreed language’. As one national diplomat put it: ‘you cannot say now I do not agree with the Thessaloniki agenda’.42 The enlargement discourse seems unchallenged and the consensus atmosphere remains within COWEB even after the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries. This demonstrates the path-dependent effects of discursive factors on member states and how past policy discourses can limit their actual room for manoeuvre. As a result, member states cannot fully control the integration

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process and/or overturn past decisions. Finally, this chapter has pointed to the role of learning as a mechanism to improve CFSP coherence and effectiveness. It has shown numerous examples of learning from past experiences, in particular learning from failure, but also learning from others (e.g. NATO). Policy learning led to the adjustment of the EUSR’s mandate, it was crucial in the design of a new EUPM mandate and in establishing EUFOR standard operating procedures (drawing from NATO or member states’ practices). At the decision-making level, the lessons from Bosnia fostered changes in crisis management structures, doctrines and procedures. In sum, learning from experiences in the field fed back to the decision-making level through different channels and then became institutionalised, contributing at the same time to the process of CFSP institutionalisation. However, some observers (Smith, 2011; Bossong, 2012) have noted that the intergovernmental and bureaucratic politics surrounding the ratification and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty – and, to some extent, the consequences of the eurozone crisis – have detracted attention and resources from learning processes in the CSDP and led to an impasse in the institutionalisation of lessons learned, which might take years to resume.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Author’s interview, Sarajevo, 17 March 2005. Author’s interview, Brussels, 29 November 2005. Author’s interview, Brussels, 15 November 2005. Online survey, Appendix. Between 2000 and 2006, EU assistance to the Western Balkans was channelled through CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation). From 2007, the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) replaced CARDS. Author’s interview, Brussels, 29 November 2005. Author’s interview, Brussels, 31 January 2006. Author’s interviews, Sarajevo, 2005. Ibid. Author’s interview, Brussels, 15 September 2009. Author’s interviews, Sarajevo and Brussels, 2005–9. Author’s interviews, Sarajevo, 2005. Author’s interview, Sarajevo, 25 April 2005. Author’s interview, Sarajevo, 3 May 2005. Author’s interviews, Sarajevo, 2005. Author’s interviews, Brussels, 2005–6. Author’s interviews, Sarajevo, 2005. Author’s interviews, Brussels and Sarajevo, 2005–9. Author’s interviews, Sarajevo, 2005–6. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. For example, German police officers concentrated on border management and on

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31

32 33 34 35 36

37 38 39 40 41 42

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EU foreign and security policy in Bosnia support of the SBS. Author’s interviews, Sarajevo, 2005–6. Author’s interview, Sarajevo, 19 April 2005. Author’s interview, Sarajevo, 6 December 2005. Author’s interviews, Sarajevo, September 2009. Author’s interviews, Brussels and Sarajevo, 2005–6. Author’s interviews, Brussels, 2006. Before EUFOR took over, the US had around 900 troops in SFOR, i.e. around 13 per cent of the total (ICG, 2004, footnote 6). This was the first deployment of EUROGENDFOR, a multinational initiative (not an EU initiative) set up in 2006 by France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain (Romania joined in 2008). It aims to provide a multinational capability consisting of police forces with a military status to assist the EU and other international organisations. Author’s interview, Mons, 14 November 2005. Author’s interview, Sarajevo, 4 April 2005. Author’s interviews, Brussels and Sarajevo, 2005–6. Author’s interviews, Brussels and Sarajevo, 2005–9. Given the limited duration of the operation, Concordia’s lessons learned process only took place at the end of the operation and could not serve as a model for EUFOR’s system. Author’s interview, Brussels, 22 May 2007. Author’s interview, Brussels, 15 September 2009. Author’s interviews, Sarajevo and Mons, 2005. Author’s interview, Brussels, 15 November 2005. Author’s interview, Brussels, 28 November 2005. Author’s interview, Brussels, 29 November 2005.

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Conclusion Introduction

In this book, I have explored the EU’s intervention in Bosnia since the early 1990s. My primary goal has been to determine how coherent and effective CFSP activities in Bosnia have been and whether a causal link exists between CFSP institutionalisation and levels of coherence and effectiveness. The evidence presented in this book points at the increasing institutionalisation of EU foreign and security policy in the form of increasing numbers of CFSP bureaucratic bodies, formal rules and informal norms, as well as an increasing presence of the EU in Bosnia. After a very active, innovative, but generally unsuccessful intervention in the early stages of the crisis, the EU pledged itself to support post-conflict efforts by providing economic assistance and participating in the transitional administration of the city of Mostar. The biggest transformation of the EU’s foreign and security policy in Bosnia took place in the years from 1999, with the launch of the Stability Pact, the prospect of membership and the deployment of CSDP missions in the country. However, the impact of these developments on coherence and effectiveness has been mixed. Notwithstanding the EU’s intensive engagement in the country, CFSP activities still suffer from problems of coherence and effectiveness and the future of Bosnia remains uncertain. The empirical chapters have illustrated the impact of the institutional setting on coherence and effectiveness. In many cases, increasing levels of coherence and effectiveness have resulted from new institutional developments or improvements to existing ones as a result of learning processes. Nonetheless, CFSP institutionalisation has not resolved deficiencies in coherence and effectiveness, there are still problems with the institutionalisation of lessons learned, and coherence and effectiveness continue to be negatively affected by unintended consequences and path dependency, as well as intergovernmental, bureaucratic and local politics. In this concluding chapter, I reflect on the empirical findings and revisit some of the themes raised in previous chapters, including the impact of institutionalisation on the EU’s foreign and security policy, the politics of coherence and effectiveness and the overall contribution of EU foreign policy to conflict resolution in Bosnia. But first, it is worth looking at the evolution of EU foreign and security policy in Bosnia and what we might refer to as the ‘institutions–expectations gap’.

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The evolution of EU foreign and security policy: closing the institutions–expectations gap?

CFSP activities in Bosnia are illustrative of the development of EU foreign and security policy more broadly, particularly of how the EU has responded to internal and external expectations/demands by improving its institutional arrangements. In this regard, the Bosnian case best exemplifies the process of adjusting internal expectations to capabilities, as well as improving both diplomatic and military capabilities to respond to external developments. At the beginning of the conflict, the gap between the expectations of the role the EU should play and the actual means at its disposal – the so called ‘capabilities–expectations gap’ (Hill, 1993) – was difficult to close. Internal and external expectations were high, especially after the signing of the TEU and the establishment of the CFSP. According to Ginsberg, ‘by trumpeting a new Common Foreign and Security Polity (CFSP) for the EU in the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the EU raised expectations for a collective diplomacy that exceeded the capabilities of its institutions, instruments and resources’ (1999: 430). In other words, economic instruments and a weak diplomatic machinery were not sufficient to put an end to a conflict as complex as the Bosnian one. The inability of the EC/EU to bring a peaceful settlement to the conflict had the consequence of lowering internal and external expectations. The credibility of the EC was highly damaged, particularly in the Balkan region. According to Gnesotto (1998: 15), the EU’s role during the war, the divisions and problems in agreeing a common line of action were ‘all notorious handicaps that detract[ed] from the deterrent power of the Europeans in the eyes of the Croats, Serbs and Bosnians’. Looking at how this affected particular initiatives, after a first period of high but unfruitful involvement, during the second half of the war in Bosnia (1993–95) the role of the EU diminished to become almost imperceptible. During the first half of the second period (1996–98), one could argue that EU expectations and objectives were streamlined so as to adjust them to its capabilities. In other words, the EU narrowed its capability – expectations gap by lowering its internal expectations, instead of increasing its capabilities. Furthermore, it seems that following the inability of the EC/EU to stop the conflict in Yugoslavia, external expectations had also decreased among the warring parties. Talking about wider responses to the Yugoslav crisis, Buchan (1993: 172) argued that ‘Such over-ambition discredit[ed] the Community in the eyes of the outside world, which is innately doubtful about the role of a multinational conglomerate in an international system fashioned for single nation States.’ The early experience in Bosnia was a ‘baptism by fire’ (Ginsberg, 2001) that forced the EU to become more realistic about its limitations and capabilities. In sum, expectations were adjusted to capabilities almost across the board. From 2001, confidence, and hence expectations, increased with the

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creation of new institutions and instruments at the EU level that allowed the Union to undertake crisis management operations, including peacekeeping, by resorting to military instruments. Thus, for the first time, the development of expectations and capabilities ran in parallel. There was a willingness to use CSDP instruments even by those member states regarded as pro-Atlanticist or neutral, and thus the number of EU crisis management operations skyrocketed between 2003 and 2010. The (self-)declared success of the crisis management operations deployed by the EU and the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which promised to increase the effectiveness of the CSDP, served to raise expectations again (Menon, 2011b). However, the impact of the financial crisis in the eurozone on defence budgets across the EU, and the turf battles that have surrounded the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, seem to have put the brakes on the development of the CSDP and have lowered expectations about what the EU can deliver in the field of foreign and security policy once again. It might still take a few years before the new instruments established by the Lisbon Treaty (in particular, the EEAS) reach their full potential and begin to meet current expectations.

The impact of CFSP institutionalisation on coherence and effectiveness

Some general conclusions can be drawn concerning CFSP activities in Bosnia and the impact of institutionalisation. In the early stages of the EU’s involvement in the Bosnian War, coherence was negatively affected by institutional arrangements. Lacking a permanent secretariat that could oversee the planning and management of EPC/CFSP activities on the ground, the rotating Presidency was charged with these tasks. However, this constituted a source of incoherence, and in turn, the lack of strategic direction from Brussels affected effectiveness. This was illustrated by the problems faced by the ECMM, the Peace Conference and the EUAM. It was expected that the institutionalisation of the CFSP that began with the Maastricht Treaty would have a positive impact on coherence. Indeed, the development of bureaucratic organisations and new formal rules improved some of the previous problems by increasing planning and implementing capabilities and introducing new coordinating mechanisms. New mechanisms on the ground, namely the EUSR, ensured better coordination. At the decision-making level, new structures such as the Civ/Mil Cell, the CPCC and CMPD were all designed to facilitate civil–military coordination, and formal and informal meetings were intended to ensure coordination between the Commission and the Council Secretariat to minimise the negative impact of bureaucratic politics. Although levels of coherence showed a steady improvement over time, problems remained in later stages as a result of unintended consequences, path dependency, the fragmentation of the EU’s presence in Bosnia, and the

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increasing complexity of its conflict resolution instruments. Institutionalisation – and particularly the creation of new bureaucratic bodies – also had a perverse effect on coherence. The more complex the institutional structure has become, the harder it has been to coordinate and achieve coherence among different bodies. Although the EU has prided itself on being able to achieve a truly comprehensive approach to crisis management, from conflict prevention to post-conflict stabilisation, this has brought with it numerous challenges regarding coordination of different instruments on the ground. In particular, between short- (Council) and long-term (Community) instruments, and between civilian and military ones, the latter illustrated by the problems encountered between the EUPM and EUFOR in 2005. A coherent foreign policy has been difficult to achieve on the ground, not only because of the EU’s fragmented presence, but also because different actors have arrived at different times. Thus, the EC Monitoring Mission (later the EUMM) was dispatched in July 1991 to observe the ceasefire in Slovenia and then deployed to other countries in the region, including Bosnia, to monitor human rights and other security-related issues. For its part, the Commission had maintained various activities in the country since the beginning of the war in 1992 with the provision of humanitarian aid and, later, technical assistance in the framework of the SAP. Later, CSDP instruments (the EUPM and EUFOR) provided some flesh to the EU’s engagement in the country. At the same time, the EUSR was appointed to ensure the overall coordination of EU policy. Over the years, the presence of the EU in Bosnia increased, reflecting both the commitment of the EU to the stabilisation of Bosnia, and the development of the EU as a crisis management actor. However, this growing presence created enormous challenges of coherence, mainly due to the fact that there was no unified chain of command and that different actors had different objectives and strategies (not to mention organisational cultures). In terms of effectiveness, bureaucratic organisations such as the establishment of the High Representative or the creation of CFSP/CSDP committees improved the decision-making process in the case of Bosnia, by facilitating information-gathering and information-sharing, coordination and monitoring of CFSP policies. New organisations such as the EUSR and the deployment of new military crisis management instruments (e.g. EUFOR) have also increased the EU’s ability to achieve its objectives and to contribute to conflict resolution. The same can be said for formal procedures regarding voting or financial arrangements that have been established during this period – for instance, the introduction of joint actions and new financial procedures in the case of the EUAM. In general, these institutions have increased operational capabilities, sped up the decision-making process and thus increased effectiveness. Institutionalisation has also increased the learning capacity (organisational memory) of the EU thanks to the establishment of new structures and procedures (see Chapter 6) and the development of intelligence expertise within the Council.

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Notwithstanding this gradual improvement in CFSP effectiveness over time; most CFSP activities have only attained partial effectiveness, i.e. they have only imperfectly achieved internally (EU) and externally set (conflict resolution) objectives. In spite of greater institutionalisation, there remain numerous challenges to CFSP effectiveness. As seen in the case of Bosnia, the complexity of the decision-making and administrative structures at the Council has compromised the EU’s capacity of response given the ‘crisis’ nature of these operations. The development of CSDP capabilities can also be seen as a case in point (see Chapter 6). Problems regarding national caveats, personnel and the financing of CSDP operations cannot be solved only by means of institutional engineering, but require a stronger commitment on the part of the member states to provide the necessary resources to these operations. Moreover, CSDP operations are still the result of a timeconsuming process accompanying the planning and deployment of operations on the ground. This is largely due to the difficulties imposed by both intergovernmental and bureaucratic politics, with painful negotiations between the 27 member states and among different EU institutions (see below). Learning has proved to be an important factor in enhancing the coherence and effectiveness of EU foreign and security policy. Learning has resulted from the EU’s own experiences (learning by doing) and from new information provided by non-EU actors. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, events external to the EU such as the Bosnian War and the Kosovo crisis made evident the weakness and problems of the CFSP and this too served as a driving force for change. In many cases, the EU had to learn by doing since it was the first time that the EU had launched these kinds of initiatives. This was the case with the ECMM, the EC Peace Conference, the EUAM, the EUPM and EUFOR Althea, which showed the importance of Bosnia as a testing ground for EU capabilities. The EU did not have any experience in monitoring ceasefires or in organising a peace conference; it did not have any prior doctrine/experience in transitional civilian administrations, civilian crisis management and police missions at the time of deployment of these missions; nor did it have any experience in the deployment of such a large military contingent under Berlin Plus. The EU had to learn how to solve problems as they came along. New mechanisms established to guarantee comprehensive planning and the creation of the CPCC and CMPD are some examples of the process of adjustment in the medium and long term as a result of perceived flaws in the short term. Lessons from these early operations have also informed subsequent EU concept papers (Council of the EU, 2003b; 2003d). Furthermore, operational practices and knowledge were often transferred from other international organisations (mainly the UN, OSCE and NATO) and individual EU member states. For instance, the EUPM planning team considered the possibility of retaining an executive mandate like the IPTF,

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although it was finally discarded. In the case of EUFOR, learning was the result of knowledge transfers through formal and informal contacts between EU and NATO planning bodies and specific individuals who had worked in both operations. However, in both these cases, the EU sought to differentiate itself from the activities of previous organisations too. For instance, Orsini (2006: 1) argues that ‘We are not the UN!’ became a mantra in the planning of the EUPM, signalling ‘the EU’s intention to find its own niche in the international policing “market”’. For its part, the first Force Commander, General Leakey, repeatedly referred to EUFOR as a ‘new and distinct’ operation when compared to SFOR. Moreover, efforts to incorporate lessons learned by other international organisations in the area of conflict resolution and peacebuilding have been generally limited and ad hoc in nature. As expected from a historical institutionalist perspective, learning usually led to incremental adjustment, rather than institutional innovation. This usually involved adjusting mandates to conditions on the ground, improving the quality and the amount of resources, and incremental changes to the institutional setting. Thus, learning can be seen to have been one of the main mechanisms of remedying institutional faults and addressing unintended consequences not foreseen by the planners. However, learning did not always increase coherence and/or effectiveness. As mentioned above, incremental changes resulting from learning sometimes led to the creation of new structures that were added on top of existing ones (e.g. creation of new committees or units within the Council structures) that hampered both coherence and effectiveness. Moreover, one needs to recognise several obstacles to learning. Intergovernmental politics and institutional factors (lack of institutional memory, staff rotation, fragmentation of CFSP structures) have obstructed the institutionalisation of lessons learned and determined which lessons are learnt and which are not. Examples include the decision to improve coordination between the EUPM and EUFOR in the fight against organised crime, the (non-)merger between the EUPM and EUSR political departments and the decisions on the reduction of troops and termination of the EUFOR operation. By contrast, the impact of path dependency on coherence and effectiveness has been generally negative. Path dependency and uncertainty usually led to the imitation of past policies. Because of the limited time of response, difficulties in achieving an agreement and the resources that had already been invested in past initiatives (coordination and learning costs), ‘successful’ decisions tended to follow past models (when they existed), which explains why CFSP decision-makers preferred imitation rather than innovation. In some cases, such as the Stability Pact analysed in Chapter 5, this led to nonfunctional institutions maintaining the status quo, which did not increase coherence and effectiveness. The cost of dumping existing policies was also evident regarding the EU’s security and defence architecture. The role of the WEU as the defence arm of the EU, even though a sub-optimal solution, was

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difficult to reverse because of the weight of institutional legacies. Only a critical juncture such as the Kosovo crisis created the momentum to move things forward. Institutional constraints also limited the range of options available when designing CSDP operations in Bosnia. For the design of the EUPM and, particularly, EUFOR, the EU had to heavily rely on the planning and mandate of previous operations. In the case of EUFOR, imitation of SFOR’s model was also seen as a way to increase the legitimacy and credibility of the EU mission (Juncos, 2011a). In sum, even though institutional developments have increased the overall impact, credibility and effectiveness of the CFSP in Bosnia, some problems persist. In particular, greater institutionalisation has aggravated problems of horizontal and institutional coherence in the short term. Moreover, these problems have also affected the effectiveness of missions on the ground. CFSP effectiveness is also undermined by the lack of adequate capabilities and a cumbersome decision-making process. Unintended consequences, problems relating to the institutionalisation of learning and path dependency have also had a negative impact. Thus, in spite of increasing institutionalisation, CFSP coherence and effectiveness in Bosnia has only marginally increased.

The politics of coherence and effectiveness

As discussed in Chapter 3, coherence and effectiveness are intrinsically political. They have been used to legitimise foreign policy cooperation and further integration at the EU level. In particular, the search for coherence and effectiveness has become a key driver for further institutionalisation, premised on the assumption that the latter can increase the former – an assumption which has been called into question by the findings presented in this book. Calls for coherence and effectiveness have been used to justify particular institutional reforms that serve the purposes of particular actors. For instance, the creation of the High Representative was suggested as a measure to increase coherence by both the supranationalist and intergovernmentalist camps, but for very different reasons (see Chapter 2). More importantly, coherence and effectiveness are shaped by politics and power, specifically, intergovernmental politics, bureaucratic politics and local politics. Coherence has suffered from two key problems, intergovernmental and bureaucratic politics, which have affected vertical and institutional coherence, mainly during the decision-making stages. Divergences amongst member state interests and problems in reaching a collective decision at twelve, fifteen or twenty-seven members were a key obstacle to achieving a common policy in Bosnia. Examples of this were the divergent positions on the diplomatic recognition of the Yugoslav republics and the WEU-led

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military intervention, and the preference of some member states for dealing with the crisis in alternative forums (the UN and the Contact Group). As a result, degrees of coherence were particularly low during the first stage of the EC/EU’s intervention in the Yugoslav conflict. Nonetheless, in those cases, when it seemed impossible to reach a common position, the member states tried to close ranks and agree, at any price, in order to maintain at least the façade of a collective position. This was the case regarding the decision on 15 December 1991 concerning the recognition of the Yugoslav republics and regarding the non-decision on military intervention. However, by then, the damage was already done and this not only impacted on CFSP coherence, but also constrained its effectiveness. In other words, divergences among member states eroded the EC’s credibility and in so doing, limited its effectiveness in bringing a peaceful settlement to the conflict. In other cases, a coherent and unitary policy (such as the second nondecision on military intervention) concealed disagreements among the member states about European defence and the appropriate institutional arrangements in this area, as well as a lack of agreement on EU–Bosnian relations. While the first set of issues still remains a controversial one among EU member states, a consensus has gradually emerged regarding the political role of the EU in Bosnia and the end-goal in EU–Bosnian relations (EU membership). Common interests, socialisation among policy-makers and the emergence of a self-understanding of the EU as a regional power with a special responsibility in bringing stability to its neighbourhood have facilitated convergence among member state positions during this last period. For instance, a national diplomat argued that ‘the main elements of the EU policy towards the Balkans are shared by most of the countries. There is a large consensus on the main directions that we have to follow in the Balkans.’1 In contrast, divergences refer to how to operationalise this policy, for example, how to apply conditionality. Arguably, national sensitivities are still important, but informal norms such as consensus-building and the coordination reflex are helpful in bringing national positions to a common EU stance. As far as bureaucratic politics are concerned, the pillar structure and the increasing bureaucratisation and compartimentalisation of the CFSP have negatively affected institutional and horizontal coherence. Battles for turf among different institutional actors (between the Council and the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council Secretariat and between units within the Council Secretariat and the Commission) have had a damming effect on coherence. For instance, the development of the EU’s civilian crisis management resulted in increasing competition between the Commission and the Council Secretariat. Those turf battles were initially played out in Bosnia, illustrated by the duplication of experts from the Commission and the EUPM to Bosnian law enforcement institutions. CFSP funding also became a sticking point and was used by both

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the Commission (in the case of the EUPM) and the European Parliament (during the deployment of the EUAM) to protect or even expand their competencies vis-à-vis the Council. Even though informal communication practices can, to certain degree, overcome some of these problems, in practice bureaucratic politics have had a detrimental impact on coherence. As bluntly summarised by one interviewee, ‘everyone wants coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated’.2 Politics have also affected effectiveness, in particular intergovernmental and local politics. In some cases, intergovernmental politics got in the way of effective policy. There were several instances where EU member states were unable to agree on a particular policy (e.g. in the case of the non-decisions analysed in Chapters 4 and 5) or where intergovernmental politics negatively affected the outcome of the policy. For instance, the issue of recognition had a negative impact on the overall effectiveness of the EC Peace Conference. Disagreements among the member states also resulted in ambiguous and limited action. For example, the limited role foreseen for the ECMM in the monitoring of the ceasefires in Yugoslavia had a lot to do with the lack of agreement among the member states regarding the role of the EC in the conflict and, generally, concerning the use of force. The continuation of the mission after the war also reflected a disagreement between small member states – which given their limited access to information considered the mission a crucial asset – and the big member states – which have at their disposal their own sources of intelligence in the region.3 The solution for many years was to maintain the status quo, which also provides evidence of the ‘stickiness’ of institutions. Intergovernmental politics also explain why the member states could not agree on an overhaul of overlapping initiatives in the Western Balkans in 1999 with the launch of the Stability Pact. Second, it was often the case that there was agreement on the overall objectives, but not on the specific mandate and instruments to implement them. This is what Heisbourg (2000: 5) calls ‘constructive ambiguity’: EU member states agree they need to do something, but cannot agree on how to do it. As a result, mandates were usually too broad and/or unrealistic and had to be adjusted during the implementation phase, where policy learning played a crucial role. Instruments were insufficient most of the time, i.e. the CFSP lacked compliance mechanisms or inadequate personnel/financial resources (e.g. ECMM, EUAM, EUSR, EUPM). A case in point here was the EUAM, the mandate of which was too ambitious given the time and resources allocated to this operation – not to mention the inexperience of the EU in the area of transitional administration. In some cases, these problems resulted from divergences in strategies (rather than in interests) amongst the EU member states. For example, this was the case with the EUPM over the issue of deciding between an executive or non-executive mandate; or in the case of EUFOR about the role of the IPU and the fight against organised crime. On other occasions, the EU’s operational inexperience explains the deficient

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mandates/instruments. In this regard, learning by doing together with institutional development (the establishment of new CFSP bodies/instruments) helped overcome some of these problems in subsequent operations, as discussed above. Finally, local politics also got in the way of an effective implementation of CFSP initiatives. From the first initiative examined in this book, the ECMM to the more recent ones such as the EUPM, local politics affected the missions, and above all their effectiveness. In the worst cases, opposition to the EU’s intervention put the safety of EU personnel at risk as exemplified by the attacks on ECMM monitors and EUAM personnel. The shooting down of an ECMM helicopter was the most tragic example of the impact of local politics. In other cases, although less tragic, the consequences of obstructionism from the conflict parties were equally damaging to CFSP effectiveness, as witnessed by the collapse of the EC Peace Conference or the failure of the EUAM to achieve the unification of the city of Mostar. This was, of course, something to be expected as difficult local conditions were the reason why the EU got involved in the first place. The question here is how the EU dealt with potential spoilers and whether the right incentives and/or sanctions were used at the right time as a way to facilitate conflict resolution. This is the focus of the next section.

The EU’s contribution to conflict resolution in Bosnia: potential and limitations

The development of the EU’s foreign and security policy in Bosnia offers an opportunity to examine its contribution to conflict resolution in the country. The conclusions are however mixed. From the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict, the EC offered its help to resolve the conflict in a peaceful way and put an emphasis on the promotion of democracy, rule of law, and the respect for human rights and minority rights. The ECMM, for instance, played a key role in conflict management in Slovenia by monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. In Croatia and Bosnia, however, its contribution was more limited, although not insignificant, to the point that it was judged to have saved lives. As discussed in Chapter 4, the ECMM participated in confidence-building measures among the warring parties (including mediation, exchanges of prisoners and assisting the delivery of humanitarian aid). For its part, the Peace Conference also constituted an attempt to mediate among the conflict parties. It put forward an agreement based on the principles of peaceful resolution of conflicts and the respect for minority rights. The EUAM sought to help unify the divided city of Mostar, contributing to the establishment of a self-sustaining, multi-ethnic administration. The instruments launched since 1999, including the Stability Pact, the EUSR, EUPM and EUFOR also aimed at contributing to the stabilisation of the country, but

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included a new element: the promise of membership and the use of conditionality as a key mechanism to contribute to conflict resolution. However, two decades after the deployment of the ECMM, the political situation in Bosnia continues to be unstable, inflammatory rhetoric and nationalist discourses dominate political life, state-level institutions remain fragile and no consensus exists over the question of statehood. The failure of Bosnian political elites to agree on the formation of a new Council of Ministers for over a year after the 2010 October elections illustrates the outstanding challenges. The analysis of the EU’s initiatives from 1991 to 2010 also reveals other problems in the EU’s approach to crisis management and conflict resolution. The ECMM highlighted the need for EU initiatives to reflect on issues of impartiality and legitimacy. EU operations can never be neutral; thus they can be and have been perceived as biased by the parties to the conflict, leading to a potential backlash. The ECMM, for instance, was seen by the Serbs as supporting Croatian interests and by the Croats as maintaining the status quo favoured the Serbs. Similarly, the EC Peace Conference was seen by the Serb leadership as biased against the Serbs, promoting the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation. These problems limited the potential contribution of the EU to effective conflict resolution. However, the EU failed to learn from these previous experiences. More recent efforts by the EU to support police reform were hampered by similar problems as they were perceived by Bosnian Serbs as a means to advance the centralisation agenda favoured by Bosniaks (Juncos, 2011b). One of the key problems has been the technocratic approach that has pervaded EU crisis management. The EU has often portrayed its initiatives in Bosnia as technical activities. Despite claims to the contrary, the issues the EU is dealing with in the Balkans are highly political. They touch upon core attributes of sovereignty (who exercises the monopoly over the use of force) and also affect the balance of power among conflict parties. Thus, it is no surprise that many of the EU initiatives have been faced with obstruction from local actors. Problems experienced by the EUAM and the EUPM best exemplify this. For, instance, the EUAM’s attempts to depoliticise its activities in Mostar and portray them as mere technical aid failed as most of the projects launched by the Administration suffered from political obstructionism. Moreover, without real political reconciliation, EUAM projects reinforced the ethnic divisions between the east and the west of the city. The potential of the EUAM to promote conflict resolution was also undermined by its strategy of political and economic liberalisation before institutionalisation. Early elections led to more political instability and the consociational model resulted in unintended consequences and political deadlock. The EUAM also provided evidence that economic incentives are not enough when the vital interests of the conflict parties are at stake. Similar conclusions can be inferred from other EU initiatives launched during the

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period 1991–99. The lack of military instruments limited the EU’s ability to bring the parties to an agreement in the early stages of the conflict. Had the EU had military instruments, it could have threatened the use of force to stop Serbian aggression. The inability of the EU to agree on military intervention during and after the war also damaged the reputation and the credibility of the EU as a security actor in the region and beyond. The prospect of EU membership, which had contributed to democratisation in Central and Eastern European countries, was only used years later once the EU realised that it was the only alternative to unrelenting conflict and instability. However, as the EU would discover later, conditionality and EU membership are not a panacea for conflict resolution. Moreover, moving from stabilisation to integration – with its focus on harmonisation and compliance with the acquis communautaire – sometimes resulted in the EU neglecting the stabilisation component and the impact that the legacies of conflict can have on the Europeanisation of Bosnia. Finally, both enlargement and CSDP policies have struggled with the issue of promoting local ownership and the sustainability of the reforms against the backdrop of inefficient institutions and the need to ‘push’ for reforms that improve the conditions of the local population. The transformation of the Stability Pact into the regionally owned Regional Cooperation Council sought to promote ownership of the process after years of reforms ‘from above’; however, its activities continue to be hostage to the lack of reconciliation between the countries in the region. The EUSR, EUPM and EUFOR have also been criticised for supplanting local ownership in their efforts to promote security sector reform. However, the biggest challenge yet will be for the new EUSR-Head of Delegation to continue to promote reforms once the OHR finally closes down.

Bosnia and the transformation of the EU’s security role

While the EU has had a key role in the Bosnian conflict, intervention in Bosnia has also had a big hand in the making of the EU’s foreign and security policy. To paraphrase Charles Tilly (1985), the Bosnian War made the CFSP. The evidence presented in this book points to a transformation of the EU’s role from a civilian power to a comprehensive security actor. The role played by the EC/EU during the whole of the first period was that of a civilian power, an actor on the international scene which exerts its influence by diplomatic and economic means rather than through the use of military force (Duchêne, 1972, 1973). This conceptualisation of the EC/EU had been the predominant one both in academic and political circles, determining to some extent the limits of ‘possible’ EC/EU actions. For example, the image of the EU as a civilian power determined the range of EU activities the member states could agree upon during the war and in the immediate post-conflict period (see

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Chapters 4 and 5). In spite of its limitations, the EU tried to promote its own norms and its own model through the peace negotiations, although not very successfully. For example, at the EC Peace Conference, the EU proposed a confederation based on its own arrangements (Buchan, 1993: 75), but it was rejected by the Serbian government. Civilian instruments were largely ineffective because: 1) they were not mobilised quickly enough at the beginning of the Bosnian conflict; and 2) they were not sufficient to stop an ethnic war. As discussed in Chapter 4, the threat of the use of force in the early stages of the conflict could have stopped the escalation of the conflict and contributed to a peaceful resolution through the mediation at the Peace Conference. Crisis management instruments could also have supported the activities of the ECMM and the EUAM, which had to rely on the UN and NATO operations to secure the safety of their personnel. The model of the EU as a civilian (particularly economic) power was also the dominant one during the second period. Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the EU assumed responsibility for helping Bosnia in post-conflict reconstruction. Through various initiatives (the Royaumont Process, the Regional Approach), the EU established political and economic conditionality in the Balkan region for the first time. In other words, economic assistance was provided on condition that the recipients respect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. By so doing, the EU started to emphasise the normative aspect of its involvement in the Balkans. Another characteristic aspect of this period was that Community activities took preeminence over CFSP ones, with the member states refusing to give the EU a stronger role in the implementation of the political, policing or military aspects of the Dayton Agreement, with the notable exception of the EU Administration in Mostar. Yet this regional approach lacked a clear and purposive strategy and the EU gave no indication of what its long-term relationship with the region would be. The approach started to change after the events in Kosovo and the St Malo summit, when the UK and France agreed on the need to develop the EU’s military capabilities. One of the main lessons of the conflicts in the Balkans was that the CFSP, if it was ever to be worthy of its name, would have to deal with peacekeeping and crisis management, particularly in neighbouring areas. As suggested by Aggestam (2004: 245), the dealings of France, Germany and the UK in the wars in the Balkans (and one could argue the same for other member states) could be seen as ‘a learning process that eventually resulted in the manifestation of a common role of Europe as an ethical power – a role based, in the first instance on ideational and soft power, but with the instruments of hard power as a last resort’. That is, a Union committed to norms including, inter alia, the rule of law and respect for human rights, democracy and multilateralism, and privileging civilian means, but ready to use military instruments to promote those norms when necessary. The EU’s experience in Bosnia and, in particular, dealing with the

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consequences of the war has thus transformed the EU’s role into a more ‘robust’ and comprehensive security actor. CFSP institutions have thus been instrumental in the process of reshaping the EU from a civilian power into a more muscular one, committed to the promotion of certain norms and resorting to military instruments when required. Socialisation processes within Brussels-based institutions can be seen in this light as instrumental in bringing the different positions of the member states to a common stance and thereby endorsing this identity for the EU. The High Representative has also played a key role in bolstering these changes, for instance with the drafting of the European Security Strategy. The normative dimension appears to have become an integral part of the discourse and the praxis of the EU and it can be traced through numerous official documents and speeches. Thus the European Security Strategy endorsed by the member states affirmed that the EU ‘should be ready to share in responsibility for global security and in building a better world’ and, similarly, should be committed to contributing ‘to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world’ (European Council, 2003b: 1, 14). The objectives of EU external action were then seen as ‘restoring good government’, ‘fostering democracy’, ‘establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights’ and developing ‘a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and rule-based international order’ (European Council, 2003b: 6, 10, 9). In the online survey, national representatives considered the promotion of the EU’s values to be almost as important as the promotion of security interests and more important than promoting economic interests.4 The development of EU military capabilities has not challenged this normative dimension since military instruments are seen in the service of the aforementioned goals. What is more, given the reality of armed conflict, the development of the CSDP appears to be a necessary requirement. In other words, military intervention might well be needed for the EU to act as a promoter of fundamental human rights and democracy. According to former High Representative Javier Solana (2000), the EU ‘cannot continue to publicly espouse values and principles while calling on others to defend them . . . In the final analysis, as a last resort, after all possible instruments had been tried, the Union has to have the capacity to back up its policies by the use of military means.’ EU activities in Bosnia best exemplify the way these arguments have been applied in practice. First, EU activities have aimed at promoting the Copenhagen criteria by offering membership as the prime incentive. As summarised by an EU official: We have now a clear strategy that offers, on the one hand, the prospect of membership of the EU, and, on the other, the need to undertake the reforms that are necessary to join the EU. This is not just about technical reforms; there is also a commitment to the values that the EU embodies . . . Membership is the most successful, the most effective tool for entrenching democracy.5

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Economic incentives and the prospect of membership were not yet sufficient to maintain stability in Bosnia and to keep the country on track to closer integration. For this reason, CSDP instruments, including a military operation, were launched in the country to support the transition process and the rule of law. Obviously, one could argue that this is far from an altruistic enterprise, and security interests also motivate the EU, particularly if Bosnia should again become unstable and a source of violence (European Council, 2004). Even so, the normative dimension remains a strong motivation for EU engagement in Bosnia to the extent that one could argue that its involvement in recent years has been key to facilitating two processes: 1) the integration of Bosnia into Euro-Atlantic structures; and 2) the building of a new EU role as a regional power, whose influence relies on a combination of carrots and sticks, civilian and military instruments. These two parallel processes, that started to converge at some point at the end of the 1990s, are currently two sides of the same coin. After decades of constant treaty change, formal institutionalisation seems to have reached a ceiling with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. One might expect, however, informal institutionalisation to continue in the years to come, in turn shaping the EU’s foreign policy output. At the same time, the EU’s experience in dealing with conflict resolution in its neighbourhood will continue to feed back to Brussels and, in turn, transform the CFSP and CSDP. As for Bosnia, more than fifteen years after the end of the war, its future remains uncertain. Today, more than ever, the EU and its member states need to demonstrate their commitment to the future of the country. In this respect, the EU’s engagement in Bosnia will continue to provide a test for the maturity of the EU’s foreign and security policy.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5

Author’s interview, Brussels, 15 November 2005. Author’s interview, Brussels, 27 January 2006. Author’s interviews, Brussels and Sarajevo, 2005–6. See Online survey, Appendix. Author’s interview, Sarajevo, 28 July 2005.

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Online survey Q1. From your experience, which one from the list below is the main obstacle for a coherent and effective CFSP/CSDP?

Lack of a common identity Divergence among member state interests Inappropriate institutions

Percentage 25 53.6 17. 9

N 7 15 5

Q2. Do you think that coherence and effectiveness of CFSP/CSDP have increased or decreased since 1991?

Increased Decreased Remained constant

Percentage 92.9 0 3.6

N 26 0 1

Q3. Please can you indicate which of the following institutional reforms has increased coherence and effectiveness of CFSP/CSDP.

High Representative Rotating Presidency Policy Unit Political and Security Committee Constructive abstention Common strategies QMV for joint actions Right of initiative for Commission

Percentage 60.7 7.1 57.1 60.7 7.1 21.4 10.7 32.1

N 17 2 16 17 2 6 3 9

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Q4. Do you consult with other national delegations prior to formal meetings?

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Yes, always Yes, most of the time Yes, rarely Never

Percentage 17.9 71.4 10.7 0

N 5 20 3 0

Q5. If yes, how often does your delegation consult with other delegations prior to the formal meetings?

Many times per week Once per week Once per month Less than once per month

Percentage 53.6 32.1 10.7 3.6

N 15 9 3 1

Q6. From the following criteria, could you indicate which one you take into account in order to privilege communication with partners from other member states? (1 = to a lesser extent; 4 = to a greater extent)

Geographical proximity (neighbourhood) Size of the country Economic interests Security interests Similarity of values and norms

Mean 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.8 3.3

Q7. From your own experience, which of the following images is closer to the predominant behaviour in CFSP negotiations?

Consensus-building Hard-bargaining

Percentage 96.4 3.6

N 27 1

Q9. According to your own experience, are there any sensitive issues that are excluded from discussions?

Yes No

Percentage 46.4 50.0

N 13 14

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Q10. Which objective should be given priority in EU external action? (1 = to a lesser extent; 3 = to a greater extent)

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Promotion of EU security interests Respect of human rights, democracy and rule of law Promotion of EU economic interests

Mean 2.8 2.7 2.4

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References to Notes are preceded by the letter ‘n’

acquis communautaire 174 acquis politique 160 actorness 2, 53, 57, 61 aid (humanitarian) 65, 67, 68, 71, 75, 85, 91, 95, 96, 97, 98, 104, 110, 123, 166, 172, 173 Albania 69, 96, 113, 115 Amsterdam, Treaty of 28, 31, 33, 34, 50, 82, 88, 95, 103, 114, 126, 130 Ashdown, Paddy 8, 130, 132, 134 Ashton, Catherine 30, 42 Atlancism/Atlanticists 33, 148, 165 Atlantic Alliance see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Austria 116, 149, 150, 158 Balkans/Western Balkans see Albania; Croatia; Kosovo; Macedonia; Montenegro; Serbia; Slovenia Belgium 30, 84 Berlin Plus see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Bilt, Carl 67, 94 Blair, Tony 34 Bonn powers see High Representative in Bosnia Brioni Agreement 6, 18, 66, 68 Brusselisation 21, 23, 27, 28, 33, 35, 39, 62, 126, 128, 138

Bulgaria 69, 118 bureaucratic politics (theory) 25, 60 capabilities–expectations gap 2, 11, 91, 155, 164 Carrington, Lord 8, 74, 75, 76, 85 Peace Plan 6, 74, 75, 76, 80, 81 Central and Eastern European (states) 152, 160, 174 civilian crisis management 137 Capability Headline Goal 144 Committee on the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) 29, 35, 137, 139 civilian power (EU as) 1, 2, 58, 66, 70, 86, 93, 95, 122, 123, 125, 174, 176 missions 127 civ/mil cell 35, 40n.3, 41n.15, 165 coalitions of the willing 45, 115 coherence categories 46–7 definition 45–6 horizontal coherence 46, 47, 75, 102, 119, 170 institutional coherence 47, 48, 62, 70, 75, 114, 119, 133, 169 interactions with effectiveness 44–5 vertical coherence 44, 46, 47, 76, 82, 88, 114, 133, 138, 155 see also consistency

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200 Cold War 4, 5, 39, 49, 65, 66, 91, 104 Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 111, 112, 115, 124n.4 Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) 27, 29, 32, 40n.7 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) civilian missions see civilian crisis management institutionalisation 32–5 military capabilities 58, 59, 83, 90–1, 123, 164, 175, 176 military missions 127 comprehensive approach/security 58, 129, 140, 166, 174, 176 conditionality 2, 8, 80, 96, 121, 125, 128, 134, 143, 170, 173, 174, 175 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 4, 68, 74, 87, 117 see also Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe conflict prevention 50, 56, 58, 68, 91, 121, 166 conflict resolution 2, 10, 11, 18, 20, 73, 79, 114, 121, 135, 145, 163, 166, 167, 168, 172, 173, 174, 177 definition 56 consensus building see norms consensus–expectations gap 2 consistency 21, 24, 31, 45–8, 52, 112 see also coherence consociational model 7, 107, 109, 173 Constitutional Treaty 50 constructive abstention 31, 32, 37, 45 Contact Group 7, 38, 45, 65, 67, 170 Convention on the Future of Europe 46, 50 Correspondence Européenne (COREU) 20n.7, 67, 78, 92 Council of Ministers (EU) 15, 27, 29, 50 Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) 30,

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Index 31, 32, 40n.5, 40n.6 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) 29, 150 General Affairs Council (GAC) 130 coordination 62n.2 civ–civ coordination 141 civ–mil coordination 139–40 coordination reflex see norms Council of Europe 121 Council Secretariat (General) 12, 23–6, 29, 39, 40n.3, 49, 50, 60, 92, 101, 108, 114, 133, 138, 141, 147, 150, 160, 165, 170 critical juncture 14, 22, 25, 32, 35, 38, 116, 123, 169 Croatia 5, 6, 18, 66, 68, 69, 70–80 passim, 82, 84, 86, 96, 98, 104, 107, 172 Cutileiro, Jose 67, 111 Cyprus 149, 152 Dayton Peace Agreement 6, 7, 94, 95, 96, 98, 129, 155, 175 Delors, Jacques 64, 76, 81, 91 Denmark 77, 87, 93, 102, 149 development aid see aid Dodik, Miroslav 98 domaines réservés see norms double-hatting/double-hatted 47, 50, 129, 132, 133, 135, 137, 141, 154 ECMM/EUMM 10, 18, 68–73, 76, 84, 92, 101, 102, 138, 165, 167, 171, 172, 173, 175 EC Peace Conference 6, 8, 10, 18, 65, 67, 73–83, 91, 92, 165, 167, 171, 173, 175 effectiveness definition 52–5 interactions with coherence 44–5 internal/external effectiveness 55–6 enhanced cooperation 45, 91 enlargement 2, 14, 37, 50, 94, 129,

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Index 152, 160, 174 Commissioner for Enlargement 130 Copenhagen criteria 129, 176 DG Enlargement 128 potential candidate (status) 6 epistemic communities 34 EU Military Committee (EUMC) 29, 35, 38, 149 EU Military Staff (EUMS) 25, 29, 32, 35, 126, 150, 151, 154, 157 EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) 12, 19, 28, 29 EUAM 10, 18, 19, 99–110, 122, 123, 138, 165, 166, 167, 171, 172, 173, 175 EUFOR Althea 6, 10, 19, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 139, 140, 147–59, 161, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 174 Integrated Police Unit (IPU) 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 171 Liaison and Observation Teams 149, 150 EUPM (Bosnia) 10, 19, 126, 127, 131, 132, 137–47, 152, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174 co-location 131 executive/non-executive mandate 139, 140, 142, 143 strengthening mission 142, 144, 145 EUSR (Bosnia) 10, 127, 130–7, 139, 140, 141, 155, 159, 161, 165, 166, 168, 171, 172, 174 European Commission 13, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 39, 40n.2, 47, 48, 50, 52, 55, 60, 64, 75, 95, 98, 102, 104, 110, 114, 115, 119, 120, 126, 131, 133, 135, 141, 150, 160, 165, 166, 170, 171 Commission Delegation 69, 131, 134, 157 Commissioner for External Relations 111, 114, 115

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201 Directorate General for External Relations (DG RELEX) 29, 128 President of the Commission 30, 31, 76, 91, 119 Vice-President of the Commission 30, 32, 39 European Council 15, 27, 29, 31, 32, 34, 55, 66, 85, 100, 105, 106, 129 Cologne European Council 32, 34, 127 Feira European Council 6, 109, 128, 137 Helsinki European Council 35, 50, 137 President of the European Council 50 Thessaloniki European Council 6, 8, 125, 128 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 13, 32, 39, 60, 65 European Defence Agency 35, 41n.15, 126, 159 European Defence Community 64 European External Action Service (EEAS) 26, 32, 35, 39, 42, 126, 131, 133, 137, 141, 160, 165 European Gendarmerie Force 149, 162n.31 European Parliament 23, 31, 32, 39, 55, 102, 104, 108, 110, 112, 114, 126, 138, 150, 170, 171 European Political Cooperation (EPC) 17, 18, 21–8, 32, 34, 36, 38, 48, 52, 55, 64, 68, 73, 78, 91, 92 European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) 112, 124n.4 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 20n.2, 126 European Security Strategy 9, 42, 50, 58, 128, 129, 176 Europeanisation 9, 112, 125, 129, 148, 174 Europeanists 33

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202 Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 6, 7 finalité politique 3, 43, 59 Finland 158 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK) 33, 34 France 5, 7, 22, 24, 30, 34, 48, 67, 77, 78, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 103, 114, 122, 139, 150, 151, 152, 158, 175 FYROM see Macedonia Germany 7, 66, 67, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 84, 87, 93, 116, 139, 158, 175 Greece 70, 71, 77, 78, 101, 117 Headline Goal 34, 159 High Representative in Bosnia 7, 8, 94, 95, 110, 114, 129, 130, 132, 134, 141 Bonn powers 7, 134, 135 Office of the High Representative (OHR) 95, 110, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 141, 143, 156, 174 High Representative for the CFSP 11, 12, 21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 49, 70, 82, 115, 130, 160, 166, 169, 176 High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 32, 39, 40n.5, 42, 47, 50, 52, 126, 137 historical institutionalism 3, 13–17, 21, 22, 39, 88, 168 Hungary 69, 95, 149 ideas (role of) 15, 23 identity (EU’s) 1, 4, 55, 60, 86, 117, 176 IFOR (Implementation Force) 7, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 148 impact 2, 53 institution building 118, 141, 144 institutional legacies 13, 16, 21, 22, 26,

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Index 27, 33, 119, 123, 169 institutionalisation (definition) 11 institutionalism see historical institutionalism; rational institutionalism institutions (definition) 20n.3 Integrated Police Unit (IPU) see EUFOR Althea intelligence 71, 72, 80, 82, 89, 134, 144, 151, 153, 155, 159, 166, 171 Intergovernmental Conference 5, 14, 30, 39, 48, 92 intergovernmentalism/ intergovernmentalist 15, 21, 22, 26, 39, 51, 169 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 65, 71, 98, 128, 131, 155 International Police Task Force (IPTF) 113, 137, 139, 167 Ireland 48, 93 Italy 22, 24, 30, 48, 77, 84, 116, 149, 150, 152, 153 Karadzic´, Radovan 98 Koschnick, Hans 100, 109 Kosovo 5, 38, 44, 58, 75, 99, 104, 109, 143, 152, 155 Kosovo crisis (1998–99) 18, 19, 32, 34, 41n.14, 94, 98, 114, 116, 117, 118, 123, 167, 169, 175 Lajcˇák, Miroslav 130, 134 Leakey, General David 140, 156, 168 learning 3, 10, 14–15, 17, 28, 30, 33, 34, 38, 39, 60, 70, 88, 89, 103, 108, 114, 120, 123, 136, 146, 147, 151, 157, 158, 161, 163, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 175 legitimacy 90, 131, 135, 143, 160, 169, 173 Liaison and Observation Teams see EUFOR Althea liberal intergovernmentalism 12

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Lisbon, Treaty of 10, 20n.2, 21, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38–9, 40n.5, 42, 47, 50, 52, 61, 125, 126, 136, 137, 159, 161, 165, 177 local ownership 8, 19, 135, 136, 144, 157, 160, 174 lock-ins 14, 16 Luxembourg 76, 92 Maastricht, Treaty of 10, 18, 19, 24, 26–8, 33, 48, 49, 51, 77, 78, 82, 87, 88, 92, 93, 95, 99, 103, 115, 164, 165 Macedonia 69, 71, 74, 77, 82, 96, 127, 132, 147, 148, 153 Major, John 85 Malta 149 Miloševic´, Slobodan 5, 66, 75, 118 Mitterrand, François 85 Mladic´, Radko 98 Montenegro 69, 74 Mostar 6, 8, 10, 18, 19, 86, 94, 95, 99–110, 113, 122, 123, 163, 172, 173, 175 multilateralism 130, 132, 175 Netherlands 74, 76, 77, 84, 92, 93, 149, 158 Nice, Treaty of 34, 40n.1, 50 non-decision 18, 19, 54, 65, 83–91, 93, 99, 110–16, 122, 170, 171 definition 83 normative power 2, 53 norms 11, 17, 20n.3, 21, 22, 35–8, 41n.16, 78, 126, 145, 163, 170, 175, 176 consensus building 11, 35–7, 78, 126, 133, 170 coordination reflex 11, 35–7, 78, 126, 170 domaines réservés 35, 38 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Bosnian War 4–7, 9, 67, 68, 86,

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203 87, 89, 90, 93, 95, 108, 112, 114, 115, 125, 147, 175 and CSDP 32–4 Berlin Plus (arrangements) 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 167 Deputy Supreme Commander Europe (DSACEUR) 153 EU-NATO cooperation 111, 124n.4, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153–5, 159, 160, 161, 168 North Atlantic Council (NAC) 112, 124n.4, 149, 152 Partnership for Peace 6, 149, 152 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) 150, 151, 154 Office of the High Representative (OHR) see High Representative in Bosnia organised crime 105, 118, 121, 128, 130, 131, 138, 139, 140, 141, 144, 145, 152, 155, 156, 157, 158, 168, 171 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 4, 110, 118, 133, 139, 146, 156, 167 Owen, David 5, 8, 67, 91, 93n.7 Partnership for Peace see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation path dependency 3, 13–14, 16, 17, 38, 39, 88, 117, 163, 168, 169 peace enforcement 93 Peace Implementation Council (PIC) 7, 38, 95, 130, 131, 139 peacekeeping 40n.13, 51, 70, 72, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 95, 158, 165, 175 peacemaking 40n.13, 84 Petersberg tasks 33, 40n.13, 86, 88, 114, 126 Poland 68, 95, 158 Policy Unit 11, 12, 25, 28, 29, 82, 160

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204 Political Committee (PoCo) 22, 24, 27, 40n.1, 40n.7, 64 political conflict (role of) 4, 14, 15–16, 17, 22, 24, 59–61 bureaucratic politics 15, 16, 17, 25, 43, 59–60, 103, 104, 133, 141, 158, 160, 161, 163, 165, 167, 169, 170, 171 intergovernmental politics 15, 16, 43, 59–60, 70, 81, 83, 92, 93, 115, 120, 158, 160, 163, 169, 171 local politics 16, 17, 19, 43, 54, 61, 62, 72, 81, 92, 93, 104, 145, 163, 169, 171, 172 Political and Security Committee (PSC) 11, 12, 27, 29, 32, 34, 35, 40n.8, 126, 130, 133, 136, 139, 149, 150, 152, 153, 157 Poos, Jacques 1, 64, 82 Portugal 67, 76, 92, 162n.31 presence 2, 53, 61 Presidency (of the European Union) 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 40n.5, 49, 64, 69–70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 82, 92, 95, 100, 101, 102, 133, 165 qualified majority voting (QMV) 13, 21, 28, 31, 37, 47 rational choice institutionalism 12–13 refugees 93n.10, 116 forced evictions 99, 106, 107 return 70, 105, 106 Regional Approach 6, 96, 175 Rehn, Olli 130 Republika Srpska 7, 98, 134 Romania 118, 149, 162n.31 Royaumont Process 6, 96, 119, 175 rule of law 96, 109, 131, 132, 133, 137, 141, 142, 143, 172, 175, 176, 177 Russia 7, 31, 68, 90

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Index St Malo (1998) 32, 34, 41n.14, 116, 123, 126, 175 St Malo Declaration 58 sanctions 67, 75, 81, 82, 91, 93, 98, 172 Santer, Jacques 30, 76, 119 security sector reform 50, 52, 127, 128, 132, 139, 150, 174 Serbia 6, 69, 74, 75, 76, 81, 84, 118 SFOR (Stabilisation Force) 6, 19, 112, 113, 123, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 155, 156, 158, 162n.30, 168 Single European Act (SEA) 23–4, 33, 39, 48, 52, 64, 76, 79 Slovenia 5, 6, 18, 66, 68, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 149, 166, 172 Slovenian War 1, 66, 68 Schwarz-Schilling, Christian 130, 131 socialisation 16, 35, 38, 78, 92, 170 soft power 175 Solana, Javier 30, 130, 176 Spain 152, 158, 162n.31 Srebrenica 6, 7, 86 Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 6, 119, 128, 129, 131, 134 Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) 6, 8, 96, 98, 119, 120, 122, 128, 129, 141, 155, 166 Stability Pact (for South-Eastern Europe) 6, 8, 10, 19, 94, 98, 99, 116–22, 123, 124n.8, 153, 168, 171, 172, 174 State Border Service (Bosnia) 144 State Investigation and Protection Agency (Bosnia) 144 supranationalism/supranationalist 15, 17, 22, 26, 30, 39, 51, 169 Sweden 68 transatlantic relations 37, 116, 148 see also US Turkey 149, 153

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Index unanimity (voting) 15, 21, 31, 44, 47, 88 unintended consequences 13–14, 16, 17, 22, 23, 25, 37, 39, 54, 103, 106, 109, 120, 160, 163, 165, 168, 173 United Kingdom (UK) 5, 7, 22, 24, 30, 33, 41n.14, 67, 76, 77, 78, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 93, 103, 150, 152, 158, 175 United Nations (UN) 5, 9, 19, 51, 62, 65, 67, 69, 81, 82, 83, 85, 87, 89, 93, 98, 99, 113, 125, 146, 167, 168, 170, 175 UN Security Council (UNSC) 75, 86, 90, 148 UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 67, 86, 98, 156 UNPROFOR 5, 67, 72, 86, 87, 103, 108, 148 US and Bosnia 4, 5, 7, 64, 81, 88, 89, 90, 95, 98, 112, 113, 116, 122, 123, 156 and Contact Group 7, 65, 67, 81, 89, 90

205 comparisons with EU 56–8, 59, 62, 115, 159 and European security 87, 90, 111, 112, 115, 147, 148, 152 Vance, Cyrus 67 van den Broek, Hans 18, 84, 111, 115 Western European Union (WEU) 4, 33, 83–90, 99, 100, 103, 106, 108, 110–14, 115, 148, 168, 169 WEU Assembly 110, 111, 113, 114 WEU police force (WEUPOL) 100, 103, 106, 108, 113 Wijnaendts, Henri 67, 130 working groups 12, 20n.6, 22, 24, 27, 32, 40n.9, 64, 85, 92, 115, 126, 133 Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA) 18, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74 Yugoslavia see Croatia; Kosovo; Macedonia; Montenegro; Serbia