Gulf Security and the U.S. Military: Regime Survival and the Politics of Basing 9780804795067

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Gulf Security and the U.S. Military

Gulf Security and the U.S. Military Regime Survival and the Politics of Basing Geoffrey F. Gresh

Stanford Security Studies An Imprint of Stanford University Press Stanford, California

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 2015 by Geoffrey F. Gresh. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. The views expressed in this book are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the National Defense University, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gresh, Geoffrey F., author. Gulf security and the U.S. military : regime survival and the politics of basing / Geoffrey F. Gresh. pages cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978-0-8047-9420-6 (cloth : alk. paper) 1.  National security—Persian Gulf States.  2.  National Military bases, American— Persian Gulf States.  3.  Military bases, American—Persian Gulf States.  4.  Military bases, American—Arabian Peninsula  5.  Persian Gulf States—Military relations— United States.  6.  United States—Military relations—Persian Gulf States.  7.  Arabian Peninsula—Military relations—United States.  8.  United States—Military relations— Arabian Peninsula.  9.  Gulf Cooperation Council.  I.  Title. ua832.g74 2015 355'.0330536—dc23 isbn 978-0-8047-9506-7 (electronic) Typeset at Stanford University Press in 10/14 Minion

2014036174

For L e i g h , A u d r e y , J o a n , and M y P a r e n t s

Contents

Acknowledgments, ix



Introduction—Gulf National Security and the Politics of Basing

1



1 Oil and War

19



2 Negotiating a Foothold

44



3 Regime Survival and the U.S. Military

74



4 A Light Footprint in Bahrain

91



5 Sultan Qaboos and Operation Eagle Claw

117



6 A Saudi Sandstorm: Revolution, Rivalry, and Terrorism

143

Conclusion—The GCC Today and Lessons Learned for the U.S. Military Notes, 181 Bibliography of Primary Sources, 250 Index, 255

169



Acknowledgments

This book has been a long endeavor, and I am forever grateful and indebted to my many friends, colleagues, and family members who supported me throughout. To begin, I want to express my eternal gratitude to Andrew C. Hess and John Curtis Perry of the Fletcher School of Law Diplomacy at Tufts University for their unwavering support, mentorship, and friendship. They have both enriched my life in so many meaningful ways. I would also like to thank Richard H. Shultz, Ibrahim Warde, and, in memoriam, William C. Martel and Alan M. Wachman of the Fletcher School for their support and valuable insights during the early writing and research of this project. Additionally, I am deeply grateful to Bernadette Kelley-Leccese, who championed my work from the very beginning. Countless friends and National Defense University (NDU) colleagues have assisted me in multiple ways throughout my research and writing, and to them, I am extremely thankful: Hassan Abbas, Kenneth E. Baker, Alejandra Bolanos, Matan Chorev, Ethan Corbin, Thomaz Costa, Charles B. Cushman Jr., Craig Deare, William T. Eliason, Jennifer Jefferis, Sean McFate, Jeffrey Meiser, Jay M. Parker, Rebecca Patterson, Elena Pokalova, Kyle Taylor, Peter Thompson, and David Ucko. I was also supported by several great interns during the latter stages of the book, including Griffin Dottle, Jenna Hargens, Henry Holst, Zachary Lemisch, and Clayton Thomas. Similarly, I would like to thank William Kloman for his excellent copy-editing. Also at NDU, I would like to thank Chancellor Michael Bell of the College of International Security Affairs for his strong support of this project and my research endeavors. In addition to my NDU colleagues, I would like to thank Carol Atkinson, Cindy Jebb, Daniel Lake, and Jeffrey R. Macris for their fantastic insights and critiques during various ix

x  Acknowledgments

presentations and iterations of this research. I would particularly like to thank David F. Winkler of the Naval History and Heritage Command in Washington, DC, for his comments on my Bahrain chapter and for graciously lending me his personal papers and entire research collection on Bahrain. I am grateful as well to the blind reviewers for their excellent comments and insightful suggestions. And to my editor at Stanford University Press, Geoffrey Burn, and his assistant, James Holt, as well as the rest of the editorial team, thank you for the wonderful guidance and support, which has been integral to this manuscript. I am particularly appreciative of all the excellent assistance that I received in person or from afar by the staffs of the following institutions: the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, the William E. Mulligan Papers at Georgetown University, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, the Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, the African and Middle Eastern Division at the Library of Congress, the U.S. Army Center of Military History at Ft. McNair, the Naval History and Heritage Command, the British National Archives, and the Middle East Centre Archives at St. Antony’s College, Oxford University. Last, I would not have completed this book without the encouragement and love of my family. I am grateful to the Nolan family, and particularly Tony and Beth, for many years of support during numerous research and writing trips away. Thank you as well to my sisters, Kristen and Ashley, for being inspirations in all that they do to achieve deeper meaning in the world. My parents, Sean Gresh and Katherine Hoffman, deserve particular praise in their tireless enthusiasm for all my endeavors large or small, and for teaching me early on about the power of knowledge and the rewards that come with lifelong learning. My daughters, Audrey and Joan, were important sources of love, laughter, and inspiration, especially during the final push of the book. But most important, I would have never finished without the love and encouragement of my wife, Leigh Nolan. She took on many burdens over many years, including reading and offering essential insights on many drafts, and yet continued to provide endless support and good humor, which gave me motivation and strength every day. With all this, it is still important to note that any mistakes or errors found here are my own.

Gulf Security and the U.S. Military

Map courtesy of University of Texas Libraries



Introduction—Gulf National Security and the Politics of Basing

In December 2013, U.S. secretary of defense Chuck Hagel delivered a speech in Bahrain at the Manama Dialogue, a regional security summit, on the current state and future of the U.S. military’s Gulf presence. In the speech, he stated that “U.S. capabilities are not in isolation of our partners’ capabilities. Over the last three decades, we have helped Gulf nations become some of our most capable military partners. Going forward, the Department of Defense will place even more emphasis on building the capacity of our partners in order to complement our strong military presence in the region.”1 As the United States executes its final drawdown from Afghanistan, the Gulf will again come into national focus as the U.S. military positions itself to protect regional and strategic national interests in an age of austerity. Basing access will be a core component of any U.S. national security strategy, but in the wake of the Arab uprisings and the violent spillover from Syria of the past several years, many U.S. regional partners or potential host nations will face increased scrutiny and pushback against supporting a prolonged U.S. military basing presence. If the uprisings and violence continue long into the future, the U.S. military’s regional foothold could be thrown into question. In Bahrain, for example, many policy-makers and scholars alike have wondered about what might become of the U.S. Navy’s base at Juffair. In May 2013, Bahrain’s cabinet approved a parliamentary proposal to “put an end to the interference of U.S. Ambassador Thomas Krajeski in Bahrain’s internal affairs.”2 This sort of rhetoric puts the bilateral relationship on unsteady ground. Moreover, if the ruling Khalifa family proves vulnerable to domestic pressure, opposition groups will perhaps ratchet up their rhetoric beyond targeting the U.S. ambassador and take aim at the U.S. Navy’s basing 1

2  Introduction

presence. The United States has long maintained a naval presence in Bahrain, but terminating the U.S. naval basing lease is not beyond the realm of possibility for the Khalifa family if it feels the need to end the U.S. basing presence to relieve destabilizing pressure on the monarchy. It happened in the 1970s amid internal unrest, and it could happen again today. Although the spread of the Arab uprisings and regional violence since 2011 marks an unprecedented period for the region, the possibility of a U.S. military base eviction, or the unexpected termination of a basing lease, is a threat that has plagued U.S. government and military officials across the Middle East since World War II. The U.S. military established its first basing foothold in Saudi Arabia at the end of World War II, but in 1962 the Saud monarchy unexpectedly called for the U.S. military’s basing expulsion because of mounting internal pressures.3 In 1973, a similar announcement took place when the Bahraini government declared the termination of the U.S. Navy’s basing contract in the wake of the Yom Kippur War.4 Other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have similarly threatened the U.S. military with a termination of its basing access,5 including Oman in 1980, when Sultan Qaboos called for an end to a U.S. basing presence when he learned that the United States had used a local base without explicit permission during the failed hostage rescue mission in Tehran following the overthrow of the shah.6 In 1990, Saudi Arabia again permitted the U.S. military full basing access following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, but once the United States had successfully overthrown Saddam Hussein during the Second Gulf War in 2003, Saudi Arabia terminated its basing contract in response to heightened internal security concerns and the threat posed by radical domestic extremist groups seeking to overthrow the king. Indeed, “base politics” dynamics are nothing new for either the U.S. military or the respective Gulf Arab host monarchies. Probing further into these historical basing cases reveals several trends that have influenced either a U.S. military basing expulsion or the reinstallation of U.S. basing in the wake of regional events. External and internal security dynamics are the main drivers influencing a GCC host nation either to accept or reject the U.S. military from local bases. External security concerns may consist of the threat of invasion by a neighboring rival or the jockeying for control over a contested territory, while internal security problems could include social upheaval, violent opposition movements, or mounting economic grievances against the ruling regime. Understanding the puzzle of how internal and external security concerns cause either a base eviction or a basing renegotiation also helps to explain the national

Gulf National Security and the Politics of Basing 3

security strategies and policies of the host GCC countries. GCC host nations face a spectrum of national security concerns that shift in priority on a regular basis. When external security concerns outweigh perceptions of internal security, a Gulf Arab host nation is more likely to maintain a U.S. military basing presence. As rentier states, many of the Gulf monarchies are incapable of properly defending themselves against a rival neighbor and therefore require a U.S. military basing presence as an important deterring factor to assist with external security. Domestic security forces are generally well equipped to handle the local population, while few mass mobilization mechanisms exist to assemble national forces in the event of an external attack.7 By comparison, when internal security threats far outweigh external security considerations, a host Gulf Arab nation will be more likely to call for the U.S. military’s expulsion or the termination of any U.S. military basing lease. In other words, when the respective host monarchy feels that its regime’s survival is threatened due to a possible coup or the imminent threat of revolution, the monarchy will call for the termination of a U.S. military basing agreement as a means to relieve pressure and as an attempt to re-exert its power and legitimacy locally. While it would seem plausible that expulsion could lead to a souring of bilateral security relations, in the case of both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia the underlying security relationship did not appear to be severely damaged following the termination of U.S. military basing contracts. Instead, in both instances the U.S. military accepted the basing termination notices, while simultaneously proposing a subsequent light military footprint model where U.S. military personnel would be deployed solely for training missions or to advise the local government on technical matters, including maintenance and operation of U.S.-supplied military equipment. The basing eviction was a way to quiet threatening opposition groups that used a prolonged U.S. military basing presence to undermine the legitimacy of the ruling regime. A “light footprint” meant that U.S. military advisors could continue to support the local armed forces with new technology or weapon systems. For example, after the basing expulsion from Saudi Arabia in 1962, as well as in 2003, U.S. security and military advisors continued in an advisory and technical capacity to support a military training mission for Saudi Arabia’s National Guard. In Bahrain, the United States lost its full basing access by 1977 but was permitted to maintain an administrative support unit to assist with Gulf logistics and other U.S. naval operations in the region. In Oman, the United States did not lose its access but instead used promises of a lower military basing profile, as well as signifi-

4  Introduction

cant increases in military and economic aid, as a means to ensure that the U.S. military did not lose its basing access following the sultan’s threats to end the military basing presence. Since the Gulf remains a top U.S. geostrategic and national security priority, understanding the politicization associated with a U.S. military basing presence in the Arabian Peninsula is important if the United States desires to preserve a secure presence long into the future. Since World War II, the U.S. military has viewed the Gulf largely as an essential region for maintaining a forward military presence to protect regional assets and to ensure Gulf security and stability. Its regional presence also links into a larger strategy of maintaining a lifeline of foreign military bases around the world similar to those of great historical powers such as Great Britain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and France, to buttress U.S. strategic and vital national interests, including the protection of the global commons.8 U.S. strategic and vital national interests in the Middle East, and in particular in the Gulf, have remained largely constant throughout the latter half of the twentieth century: the protection of oil and natural gas supplies, unfettered economic and maritime trade, the security of Israel, regional stability, nuclear deterrence, and, until 1991, the prevention of a Soviet expansion across the Middle East and greater Gulf region. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union made numerous attempts to undermine a U.S. regional presence through the spread of communism and promotion of local revolution or by the threat of invasion following the occupation of Afghanistan in 1979. The United States prevailed in the Cold War and immediate post–Cold War era, but the security dynamic has changed significantly in the post-9/11 world. The global commons remains the same, but globalization has spurred a proliferation of new and threatening actors, especially nonstate armed groups and other rogue actors, that threaten U.S. strategic national interests as well as global security.9 The rise of domestic extremism and the continuing threat from nonstate armed groups such as Al-Qaeda or the newly formed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) are important concerns for the Gulf Arab monarchies, but for the majority of GCC nations Iran will most likely remain as a top external security priority, as evidenced by events of the past several years, including the conflict in Syria and the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. U.S. military bases will likely remain in place in the near future. But as history shows, any host Gulf Arab monarchy’s national security priority could easily and rapidly shift, especially in the currently unpredictable environment. If the U.S. military desires to avoid any future surprise announcement from a host monarchy

Gulf National Security and the Politics of Basing 5

calling for the termination of its basing presence, the United States must stay attuned to domestic politics and aware of host nation internal security affairs that could adversely affect the U.S. military basing presence. U.S. Strategic Interests and the Importance of Basing

Base politics and basing access for military forces is one of the oldest enduring features of international relations among nations and empires. Here, “base politics” is defined as the interplay between basing nations and host nations on affairs relating to the operation of local military facilities in host nations. “Basing nations” are understood as nations deploying forces overseas and “host nations” as those receiving such forces.10 Historically, a foreign and global military presence has been essential for the power projection and longevity of great world powers or empires. Thucydides described the basing access competition between Sparta and Athens and the dynamics of alliance formation between the warring Greek city-states in the History of the Peloponnesian Wars.11 In the fifteenth century, the famed Chinese admiral Zheng He sailed with an impressive fleet through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, searching for basing access to expand China’s global maritime ambitions from South Asia to the Arabian Peninsula and the Spice Islands of East Africa.12 During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Holy League, Venice, Genoa, and the Ottoman Empire engaged in an epic struggle for strategic bases, leading up to the famous battle, or “galley clash,” at Lepanto in 1571. The battle marked the end of a basing system associated with technologies and politics attached to Mediterranean warfare and the geopolitics of European oceanic sailing ships.13 By the end of the sixteenth century and beginning of the seventeenth, the Spanish, Portuguese, British, French, and Dutch all competed for global bases to build up their colonial empires.14 Alfred Thayer Mahan, author of The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660–1783, regarded command of the sea and basing access as essential to global dominance, noting that “ironically, the supercession of sailing vessels by those powered by steam increased the dependence of major powers on bases, that is, coaling stations.”15 Certainly, access to bases around the globe remained important to the European colonial powers and would become increasingly important for the United States as it emerged as a dominant world power following World War II. For the United States, establishing a global basing network became a priority only with the coming of World War II, when it was thrust into both the Euro-

6  Introduction

pean and Pacific Asian theaters of war. In 1938, it only had fourteen military bases beyond its continental boundaries, in locations or colonial outposts such as Panama, Cuba, the Virgin Islands, Midway, Wake, Guam, the Philippines, and American Samoa.16 At the start of the war, the United States focused mainly on preventing Nazi Germany’s expansion into the Atlantic and did not want to expand its basing presence into Pacific Asia, for fear of provoking a war with imperial Japan. Following the tragic events of Pearl Harbor in December 1941, however, the U.S. quickly realized the need for a global basing and logistics network.17 The Gulf fell strategically in the center of transit routes to and from Europe and the Pacific and a new emerging U.S. global basing network. Saudi Arabia and Dhahran in particular would become increasingly valuable as basing stopovers fortifying the southern flying corridor and decreasing the flying distances between East Africa and South Asia.18 In addition to the U.S. need for strategic basing, many in the U.S. government desired additional oil resources to assist with a spike in consumption during the war and postwar era. Since the United States supplied an estimated 90 percent of the oil used by the Allied powers, Saudi Arabia offered an important alternative energy source.19 It was also an added benefit to the U.S. government that most of the oil companies operating in the Gulf were American-owned or -run. Moreover, U.S. oil company lobbying helped convince the U.S. government that increasing its regional military presence would be mutually beneficial to the U.S. military and local American business interests, since the added security guarantees would ensure that oil continued to flow and assist in U.S. war efforts.20 By the end of World War II, the United States had constructed 4,433 military bases and facilities around the globe.21 It had emerged as a great maritime and military power and surpassed Great Britain as the largest overseas military power by the height of the Cold War.22 With the end of the war, the U.S. military basing network took on a renewed purpose as an important global protection element against a rising Soviet Union in Europe and Pacific Asia as well as the Gulf. In the United States, officials upheld the belief that “its extensive overseas basing system was a legitimate and necessary instrument of U.S. power, morally justified and a rightful symbol of the U.S. role in the world.”23 Maintaining its global basing network became essential in the postwar reconstruction period, since Gulf oil became a critical component for rebuilding war-torn areas of Europe and the Pacific.24 Following the initial postwar reconstruction efforts, the United States and Soviet Union continued unabated in their global competition for influence,

Gulf National Security and the Politics of Basing 7

power, and resources. The U.S. military realized the vital importance of using its global military presence to protect the world’s sea lanes of communication, particularly for U.S. maritime trade traveling from the Suez Canal to U.S. military bases in Pacific Asia, including Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. And the U.S. military’s need for oil access and other natural resources grew to new heights during the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s. At the height of the war, regular oil shipments arrived to U.S. bases in the Philippines en route to Vietnam, since an estimated 85 percent of the oil used by the United States in the Vietnam War originated from the Gulf.25 During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the U.S. military’s basing and logistics network, including air transit and tankerrefueling facilities in Spain and the Portuguese Azores, was essential to U.S. air and sea lift missions in support of Israel.26 Beginning in 1979, a U.S. military presence in the Gulf also became essential following three major events: the overthrow of Iran’s shah, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. The Gulf Arab monarchies feared Iran’s export of its Islamic Revolution, in addition to fearing further Soviet aggression following its Afghan invasion. Most of the GCC nations would rely upon a U.S. military basing presence as a deterrent against both threats. Saudi Arabia, however, was the main exception and did not permit the reinstallation of a U.S. military base during this period, because of continued and sustained internal security concerns. Since the end of the Cold War, base politics and basing access has remained an essential strategy for the United States to maintain its global influence and power. Today, with an estimated 80 percent of goods worldwide transported via the sea, protecting the global sea lanes of communication remains as strategically important as ever.27 Moreover, when it comes to the Gulf, any disruption or blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, which handles an estimated 21 percent of the world’s oil demand, or approximately 17 million barrels of oil per day, would have major repercussions for nations that rely upon maritime trade traveling in and out of the Gulf.28 Further, any interference from a menacing neighbor such as Iran to the Gulf ’s offshore oil installations or sea lanes of communication would put the global economy at risk, not to mention the Gulf states that rely on oil and gas revenues for survival. Force projection and maritime security are therefore crucial for both the United States and GCC strategic national interests. For the United States, this means an extended regional basing network to deter aggressors and contain the spread of any future Gulf conflict. In the words of Professor Kent Calder, foreign military bases

8  Introduction

are essential for “deterring aggression, reinforcing alliance relations, inhibiting balance-of-power conflict, providing formidably efficient global logistics networks, assuring smooth resource flows, and helping most recently to combat terrorism.”29 In both 1990 and 2003, U.S. military bases and basing access in Saudi Arabia and across the Arabian Peninsula were essential to conducting operations and to defeating Saddam Hussein during the First and Second Gulf Wars. The U.S. regional basing presence has also been critical during the past decade for the war in Afghanistan. According to recent official estimates, the U.S. military maintains 598 overseas bases in thirty-eight countries, excluding such countries as Qatar and Afghanistan.30 Despite this significant basing network, a more permanent U.S. military basing presence in regions such as the Gulf is not a foregone conclusion. In 2003, following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, for example, Saudi Arabia terminated U.S. military basing contracts, reacting to heightened internal security concerns. A similar dynamic could affect other GCC host nations amid the spread of regional violence and massive societal upheaval following the Arab Spring, threatening the future U.S. military regional basing posture. As the U.S. military draws down its operations in Afghanistan, new debates will undoubtedly emerge about the current and future strategy of U.S. military basing in the Gulf and how host Gulf Arab nations can best strike a balance between internal and external security concerns. Gulf National Security

Aside from benefiting the United States, any Gulf Arab host nation also reaps major benefits from permitting a U.S. military basing presence, including access to the latest military and arms technology, training, border protection, and a physical presence to assist in deterring a possible external invasion. The United States and the GCC nations have mutually overlapping interests, mainly the protection of oil assets and regional political stability. But hosting a foreign power such as the United States is also filled with significant domestic challenges, since for local populations a basing nation is often an unwelcome presence. In many instances throughout the Gulf, the host monarchy has been depicted as weak or as a puppet of the West when it permits U.S. military basing. During the 1950s, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser launched a propaganda campaign portraying the Saud monarchy as a pawn of the West for continuing to permit a U.S. military basing presence. The spillover effects into the domestic realm and the spread of pan-Arab nationalism in the king-

Gulf National Security and the Politics of Basing 9

dom made the basing issue all the more contested and seriously undermined the king’s ability to exercise power during this period.31 The 1990s witnessed a similar dynamic when conservative religious clerics and other extremist groups used the U.S. military basing presence to attract a large following pushing for the monarchy’s overthrow. As a result, Saudi Arabia and other host Gulf Arab monarchies have historically trod delicately on the subject of foreign military basing, fearing internal opposition that uses the issue to undermine the legitimacy of the monarchy. Although the conception of national security remains ambiguous and imprecise at best, GCC nations often view national security as directly intertwined with regime survival or political stability. Moreover, they view national security on a spectrum including both external and internal security concerns.32 Domestically, GCC countries have had to deal with conservative religious and sectarian forces, as well as transnational actors such as pan-Arab nationalist groups or advocates of communism that possess the ability to raise powerful opposition movements.33 As depicted by the scholars Edward Azar and Chungin Moon, “Domestic factors such as legitimacy, integration, ideology, education, economic development and policy capacity play equally important roles in shaping the national security posture. Security challenges in many parts of the Third World are of endogenous rather than exogenous origin.”34 In other words, domestic security will often be a top national security priority for Gulf Arab monarchies and can spill over, affecting the outcome of basing negotiations. This dynamic is demonstrated by the three main cases considered in this book: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman. An additional national security challenge for the Gulf Arab monarchies is that they have largely developed rent-seeking behaviors since the petrodollar windfall of the 1970s. As rentier states, the monarchies rely on oil and gas revenues to stay in power and to secure domestic political alliances. This poses a significant national security dilemma because countries such as Saudi Arabia, for example, developed a system that provided extensive benefits for society, including subsidies or monthly stipends, rather than fostering a culture of selfreliance or one that also extracts resources from its domestic population (that is, taxes and required military service). Its national defense system was inherently handicapped, lacking the manpower and mobilization capacity needed to defend its territorial sovereignty in the event of an external attack. Since the Cold War, Saudi Arabia’s armed forces have been designed mainly to operate in a domestic police state, intent on preserving the monarchy’s power and control

10  Introduction

over society.35 As a consequence, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab monarchies have few options other than to depend upon the United States when confronted with the need to protect oil installations or other regional security assets from arch-rivals such as Iraq or Iran.36 In 1990, the Saud monarchy approved a U.S. basing presence to counter a threat posed by Saddam Hussein to the monarchy that was far too great to ignore. The Saud monarchy came to realize that it was unequipped to push back Iraqi forces from Kuwait, let alone defend its own kingdom.37 A U.S. military basing presence proved essential during critical moments such as the First Gulf War, but such a presence has also historically elicited intense domestic opposition to Gulf Arab monarchies and at times became a source of violent protests. During sustained waves of anti-American sentiment or virulent domestic opposition to a U.S. military presence (as in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain), the respective host monarchies engaged in hotly contested internal debate over the prolongation of U.S. basing access. In each negotiation, U.S. basing access was never the predetermined conclusion, being such a domestically sensitive issue. During each basing negotiation period, each monarchy engaged in internal deliberations that factored internal versus external security concerns into account and evaluated how the continuation of a U.S. basing presence might affect the regime’s power domestically as well as regionally. Studying these several cases, therefore, helps explain why host monarchies widely fluctuated in their approval or disapproval of a U.S. military basing presence. As demonstrated by the Saudi and Bahraini cases, when external security concerns were the top national security priority, a U.S. military basing presence went largely unchallenged. But when external security was less a national concern and domestic threats put a host regime’s survival at risk, internal debate on the basing question often resulted in the termination of a previously agreed upon U.S. basing lease.38 There was one major exception to this rule: Oman. Oman was similarly faced with internal security concerns at the end of the 1970s, including a lingering threat from Dhofari rebels in the south. It also faced domestic and regional pressure in the early 1980s following the embarrassment of the unsuccessful U.S. Eagle Claw mission, which had used Omani bases without the sultan’s permission. The U.S. military, however, was able to stave off the termination of its basing access agreement through increased military and economic aid incentives, as well as promises of keeping a low military basing profile on Masirah Island. It is instructive to compare Oman’s case with those of Bahrain and

Gulf National Security and the Politics of Basing 11

Saudi Arabia, because it assists in providing insight into the national security dynamics of and the challenges faced by each respective host monarchy. There are valuable lessons to be derived from the Oman case that could assist the U.S. military in today’s forward operations in GCC countries. The principles described here seem to apply also to other regions of the world, such as Central Asia or Pacific Asia, but require greater in-depth research. Avoiding or mitigating conditions that cause abrupt expulsion or result in adverse changes to U.S. foreign military basing contracts may serve U.S. long-term strategic aims such as regional stability, energy security, and the end of regional conflict. As both the Arab uprisings and spread of violent extremism in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen shape the domestic policy agendas of many GCC nations, the U.S. basing question may rise urgently to the fore once more, so it is important for U.S. policymakers and military officials to be equipped with these important historical cases. Base Politics

Despite the historical and current global importance of foreign military bases for Great Powers such as the United States, the literature on base politics is rather sparse and barely addresses the broader Middle East region, let alone the questions raised here regarding when and why a host nation may evict a basing nation from its territory or renegotiate basing access after terminating a basing contract.39 Robert Harkavy has written three seminal works related to base politics, but his books are either large sweeping histories, technical assessments, or more focused on the Great Power rivalries of the past, such as U.S.-Soviet competition.40 Much of the rest of the literature offers an outdated Cold War policy perspective; focuses on the U.S. military presence in one country such as Greece or the Philippines, or a specific territory such as Puerto Rico; or concentrates on global power projection.41 Similarly, a limited amount of comparative literature exists on bilateral base negotiations between the United States and a host nation. The few works that exist are mainly journalistic or descriptive and do not study U.S. military base relations with Middle Eastern countries.42 There are numerous books on foreign basing and the European colonial empires, but they do not apply to the contemporary regional setting analyzed here.43 A small amount of literature has emerged on the politics of military-base closures in the United States and Canada.44 Still, this literature lacks a major overseas or international component, and does not address how host nations manage the domestic politicization of a foreign military presence. The Base Closure and

12  Introduction

Realignment Commission (BRAC) process and politics, a largely domestic affair, has appeared as the center of most of these studies.45 Although much of existing base politics literature is not relevant to this study, good research on base politics abroad has emerged in recent years.46 But current base politics literature has largely overlooked the Middle East and how, when, and why a host nation may terminate a foreign military basing presence on its territory or renegotiate basing access with the United States after it ended a prior basing agreement.47 The three countries examined in depth here—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman—are overlooked or not accorded deeper analysis even though their histories provide important and interesting lessons that can be applied to the region today. Some base politics analysts argue that domestic security concerns and public outcry have little effect on the outcome of basing negotiations, or even that external security concerns have an insignificant effect on basing agreement outcomes.48 Yet when external security was not a top priority for host Gulf monarchies, domestic or internal security concerns prevailed, forcing the basing expulsion of the U.S. military.49 In Saudi Arabia, for example, internal security or the threat posed by domestic opposition groups to the Saud monarchy’s survival were both driving factors behind the U.S. basing expulsion in 1962 and again in 2003. In 1973, domestic insecurity and rising internal opposition were also important elements influencing the Khalifa family’s announcement to terminate the U.S. Navy’s basing contract in Bahrain. Other authors assert that the process of democratization will influence significantly the stability of base politics in a host country. In other words, base politics became more politicized in countries undergoing democratization.50 But as examined in subsequent chapters, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are authoritarian monarchies and did not significantly democratize throughout the twentieth century, and they terminated U.S. military basing contracts on several occasions. If instances of political liberalization reforms did occur in either country, they were primarily in reaction to the unrest, not a precipitant.51 Some research has claimed that security assistance, including economic aid or arms transfers, does not assist in securing basing access.52 In Oman, however, promises of increased military and economic aid helped to ensure that the U.S. military could maintain its basing access even following the embarrassment of Operation Eagle Claw. At the time, the sultan faced significant internal opposition from Dhofari tribal groups opposed to a U.S. military basing presence. In addition to increased aid incentives, the U.S. agreed to keep a low basing profile on Masirah Island as a means to mitigate any further internal protests against

Gulf National Security and the Politics of Basing 13

the sultan for providing the U.S. military with basing access.53 Promises of increased military and economic aid were also important during the initial negotiations with Saudi Arabia during the 1950s. Although aid and other economic incentives are not a panacea for basing access, they can play an important role in tipping the negotiations toward a favorable outcome for the power seeking basing and have long been practiced by the United States when negotiating basing agreements with such countries as Paraguay, Kyrgyzstan, or the Philippines.54 Several scholars argue that host nation regimes dependent on technology transfers or specific technical knowledge from a basing nation are unlikely to abrogate that nation’s basing contract. They also claim that foreign troop levels do not affect base politicization or U.S. military basing expulsion from a host nation.55 But when delving into the cases of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, each country terminated U.S. military basing contracts on three separate occasions despite a continued dependence on U.S. technology and technicians to run and oversee their military operations.56 These two cases also highlight the importance of the light U.S. military footprint. In Bahrain, for example, the government terminated the U.S. Navy’s basing contract in 1977 but permitted it to maintain an administrative support unit to coordinate with the U.S. fleet operations in the Gulf. In Saudi Arabia, the monarchy approved a similar light U.S. military footprint following its basing eviction in 1962, including the continuation of the U.S. military training mission and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) support unit during the Iran-Iraq War. The U.S. military may have lost its local bases in these cases, but it preserved valuable security ties to Gulf Arab nations through military aid and military advisory and training missions. Indeed, a judicious studying of the history of the U.S. military in the Arabian Peninsula since World War II depicts a considerably different picture from the one appearing in much of the base politics literature. Book Overview

This book examines both Gulf Arab national security and U.S. military basing relations with the respective Gulf Arab monarchy hosts from World War II to the present day. The three in-depth country cases—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman—each help explain the important questions posed here regarding when and why a host nation either terminated a U.S. military basing presence or granted U.S. military basing access. The book also offers a fresh historical perspective on how the United States has adapted to sometimes rapidly shifting

14  Introduction

regional security dynamics that can enhance or threaten its strategic presence in the Arabian Peninsula. Chapter 1 sets the stage for how the United States came to establish its first military base in the region, while placing the Gulf in its larger strategic and global context. As the United States became more entangled in World War II, the U.S. military grew adamant about securing base installations to support its war efforts. Additionally, the U.S. military needed easy access to the valuable oil resources of the Gulf to buoy its operations abroad. Political pressure from U.S. oil companies operating in the Gulf also helped convince the U.S. government to pursue a more active regional strategy to safeguard significant U.S. investments and other regional assets. The first establishment of a base at Dhahran would be crucial at the end of the war to assist with postwar construction efforts in Europe and Pacific Asia. Chapter 2 explores the origins of the U.S. military’s complex relationship with the Gulf Arab monarchies, especially with the Saud royal family, following the end of World War II. A more permanent U.S. military basing presence was never an inevitable conclusion and depended upon a combination of shifting national security dynamics and U.S. military and economic aid packages. This chapter examines the key domestic opposition groups influenced by pan-Arab nationalism that threatened the monarchy versus external security factors, including threats emanating from the Hashemite Kingdom and a rising Soviet Union. Although pan-Arab nationalism played a certain role in stimulating domestic instability in Saudi Arabia, three separate regional factors played a more influential role in determining the Saud monarchy’s decision to permit the continued U.S. military basing presence: Hashemite threats to invade the kingdom, the ongoing Buraimi Oasis crisis between Great Britain and the Trucial shaykhdoms, and the Suez Canal Crisis. The chapter supports the argument that a combination of external security concerns helped solidify the continuation of a U.S. military basing presence. Chapter 3 examines the events that led to the eventual basing termination and expulsion of the U.S. military from its Saudi bases in 1962. By the early 1960s, the Saud rivalry with the Hashemites had declined significantly due to the rise of pan-Arab nationalism, and the Buraimi Oasis crisis had been mitigated with the help of U.S. and British engagement. With fewer external security concerns, the Saud monarchy turned its attention to domestic politics and rising concerns regarding Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser’s influence over pan-Arab national groups in the kingdom. By the end of the 1950s and

Gulf National Security and the Politics of Basing 15

early 1960s, domestic security concerns grew to a new high as the U.S. military’s presence exacerbated attacks on the legitimacy of a monarchy under mounting domestic pressure. Opposition groups portrayed the United States as an imperial occupying power, helping erode the power and damage the image of the monarchy domestically. The Saud monarchy appeared concerned about its survival and reacted to the domestic politicization of the basing issue by terminating the U.S. military’s basing contract in the spring of 1962. Chapter 4 shifts from Saudi Arabia to Bahrain following the announced withdrawal of British forces east of the Suez Canal in 1968. As the British announced their departure, the United States began a concerted effort to fill the void and increase its regional military presence in the Arabian Peninsula, in Bahrain in particular. Following its basing expulsion from Saudi Arabia, the United States desired a basing foothold to help protect its strategic regional interests. After declaring independence in 1971, Bahrain signed a basing agreement with the United States, prompted by external security fears associated with Iran’s desire to annex the tiny island nation. But Bahrain’s fear would subside once Iran secretly agreed to relinquish its claims to Bahrain in return for Great Britain’s tacit approval of Iran’s annexation of the contested Gulf islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs. With the relinquishment of Iran’s claims to Bahrain, the Khalifa family was free to address domestic concerns regarding the U.S. naval presence, but when the Yom Kippur War broke out in 1973 with the U.S. supporting Israel in the war, Bahrainis violently voiced their outrage over the U.S. naval presence. In late 1973, the Bahraini government announced that the U.S. naval basing agreement would be terminated. The U.S. lost its homeport at Juffair, but it was able to negotiate the maintenance of a light footprint including the presence of an administrative support unit for U.S. naval regional logistics. This chapter examines both the domestic security challenges faced by the Khalifas during this period and the politics involved in the homeport expulsion. Chapter 5 examines Oman’s relations with the U.S. military after the 1979 U.S. expulsion from Iran following its Islamic Revolution. It studies the incentives that aided the United States in its attempt to secure basing access in Oman, which was first established in 1975. Oman acts as a valuable historical case study that illuminates important lessons learned about what can work when negotiating for basing access with a host nation under heightened domestic pressure. Oman’s Sultan Qaboos had long faced internal opposition that stemmed from the Dhofar rebellion of the 1960s and early 1970s. He was thus hesitant

16  Introduction

to actively engage with U.S. military basing proposals. His fears were exacerbated when it became known that, unbeknownst to Sultan Qaboos, President Carter had violated Omani sovereignty in executing a secret rescue mission, codenamed Eagle Claw, to free U.S. hostages held captive by Iranian revolutionaries in Tehran at the U.S. embassy.57 The mission’s disastrous and costly failure became a major international scandal and a severe embarrassment to both President Carter and Sultan Qaboos. After lengthy negotiations and the subsequent increase in U.S. military and economic aid incentives, including promises of a less visible and low-profile military, the U.S. was able to maintain its military basing access in Oman. Chapter 6 brings us full circle to examine Saudi Arabia in the post–Cold War era and discusses the series of events that led to the re-establishment or renegotiation of a U.S. military basing presence in 1990. This chapter studies the process that led to the Saudi decision and sheds further light on the importance of internal versus external security factors in affecting base politicization. Although Saudi Arabia maintained its partnership with the U.S. military throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the United States was not given control of local bases after 1962 until the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The external threat posed by Iraq’s president Saddam Hussein was the main driver behind convincing the Saud monarchy to allow a U.S. military basing presence. From 1990 to 2003, the kingdom confronted major domestic security challenges, including several terrorist attacks motivated by the U.S. military basing presence, but it was not until Saddam Hussein was finally removed in 2003 that the U.S. military was asked to terminate its basing presence. Iraq was no longer the main threat prompting the Saud monarchy to end the U.S. military basing presence, which had become a destabilizing factor to the regime. Iran also posed less of a threat to the kingdom, since U.S. military bases surrounded Iran on both its eastern and western borders, including in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The book’s conclusion assesses the current and future U.S. military Gulf presence following its Saudi basing departure, as well as the present challenges ushered in by the Arab uprisings and the spread of regional violence emanating from Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The U.S. military maintains a significant presence across the Arabian Peninsula, but it must now confront a new and emerging dynamic where most GCC countries have begun to diversify their political, military, and security partnerships with countries other than the United States. Many GCC nations have turned in recent years to the East, to emerging powers such as China, Russia, and India, to assist with their national security needs.

Gulf National Security and the Politics of Basing 17

Nonetheless, understanding the dynamics of base politicization in a host nation remains important today, and studying base politics more broadly helps explain when and why basing access may go awry for future policy-makers and scholars of the region. It also provides an insight into developing state foreign policies and threat assessments based on a host nation’s revealing preferences that either push for eviction or renegotiation based on a state’s perception of internal versus external threats. Base politics remains pertinent today for Gulf Arab monarchies as they contend with both the threat of increased domestic instability stemming from the rise of violent extremism and discontented populations, and an emboldened Iran that threatens to alter the current regional security dynamic. The U.S. must carefully assess how to navigate yet another period of regional turbulence that could affect its future global power projection capability and influence.

1

Oil and War

Shortly before the United States entered World War II in 1941, the chairman of the board of the California-Texas Oil Company, James A. Moffett, began lobbying U.S. president Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) to provide financial assistance to Saudi Arabia’s king, Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Faisal al Saud, better known in the United States as Ibn Saud, whose nation was on the verge of financial ruin. U.S. oil companies, including California-Texas Oil, had invested millions in Saudi Arabia, including personal loans to the king, but could no longer afford to provide loans. The kingdom’s anticipated oil production was only a trickle at the start of the war, and its traditional revenue streams had drastically declined during the war, in part because of a decrease in pilgrims who traditionally paid taxes during the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.1 FDR asked the U.S. Navy if it wanted to purchase Saudi oil, but the navy declined, stating that Saudi oil quality was inferior to that of U.S. oil and did not meet U.S. naval requirements.2 FDR referred Moffett’s request to U.S. Federal Loans administrator Jesse Jones, but in a note to Jones wrote: “Will you tell the British I hope they can take care of the King of Saudi Arabia. This is a little far afield for us!”3 FDR was more concerned at the time with U.S. efforts to prevent Nazi Germany from expanding into the Atlantic and did not want to be lured into the Middle East.4 The U.S. war focus shifted, however, on December 7, 1941, when Japanese forces attacked the U.S. at Pearl Harbor, killing 3,566 Americans and injuring more than one thousand.5 The attack catapulted the United States into World War II and immediately established a U.S. need for a robust global logistics and basing network to support its operations in both Europe and the Pacific. 19

20  Oil and War

The U.S. War Department urged the construction of a military base in Saudi Arabia to help cut down on distances for its air routes between Khartoum and Karachi. It was believed that a new Arabian Peninsula route would provide an important and secure node in the U.S. military’s international transportation network.6 While FDR had appeared uninterested in Saudi Arabia just months before, his administration’s attitude toward the desert kingdom shifted dramatically as the United States became more entangled in both Europe and the Pacific. As a result of a more global focus and growing need for easy access to oil resources, the U.S. government realized that more efforts needed to be made to bolster its ties with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia because of Saudi Arabia’s geostrategic location and its presumed potential to provide the U.S. military with easy access to oil from its estimated 5 billion barrels in proven or probable reserves. As the United States ramped up its war efforts in 1942 and 1943, Saudi Arabia fast became an essential stopover and supply node for U.S. travel to and from Pacific Asia. FDR’s administration became much more receptive to pressure from U.S. oil companies operating in the Arabian Peninsula to protect U.S. investments there in the face of heightened threats from the Axis powers. U.S. oil company lobby efforts were bolstered in 1944 by the U.S. military, which had shifted its policy on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.7 Increased U.S. military ties to and a basing presence in Saudi Arabia, however, may have been desired but were never a forgone conclusion. The United States had to negotiate directly for an increased and larger presence in the kingdom with the Saud royal family, who feared domestic and regional perceptions of their new ties with the United States. As the United States began to negotiate for its first military foothold in the Arabian Peninsula in 1945, Saudi Arabia did not appear receptive to a U.S. military presence or to a proposed U.S. military training mission. From the beginning of negotiations with the United States, Saudi Arabia had to strike a balance between addressing internal and external security concerns, and this factored into the process. Internally, the Saud family faced rival tribes who felt their existence and way of life threatened by a foreign presence. Ibn Saud also needed to maintain the support of Al-Wahhab followers who were virulently anti-Western and had the ability to undermine important national decisions.8 Ibn Saud was similarly concerned about his ability to defend the two holiest cities of Islam and to sustain among rivals the perception that Saudi Arabia maintained its independence from Western powers such as the United States and Great Britain. Externally, Ibn Saud feared both the Axis powers’ expansion into the Gulf and the intentions of his main regional rivals,

Oil and War 21

the Hashemites of Iraq and Transjordan, who vowed to take back the Hejaz region that Ibn Saud had conquered in the 1920s.9 As the U.S. military grew reliant upon both Saudi oil and its strategic military stopover point in Dhahran, its leaders grew increasingly adamant about securing a long-term foothold in Saudi Arabia. In a postwar era, the U.S. military needed such strategic locations to contain a rising Soviet Union and to assist in balancing regional security. King Ibn Saud remained hesitant about a U.S. basing presence until the end of the negotiations when several key factors reportedly swayed him in favor of concluding a basing agreement by 1945: Britain’s tacit support for the increased U.S. presence and its support in balancing both the Axis powers and regional rivals; Saudi Arabia’s need to support Allied efforts to end the war; and perhaps most important, significant U.S. military and economic aid incentives. For example, the U.S. offered to extend the Lend-Lease Aid program to assist Saudi Arabia with its dire financial situation and weak currency.10 In 1943 Saudi Arabia had a deficit of 30 million riyals carried from the prior year, and the government made a budget proposal request of 109 million riyals for 1944 when it expected to collect only 37 million riyals in revenue. This left Saudi Arabia with a mounting deficit of 72 million riyals, in addition to its 1943 deficit. Ibn Saud was thus receptive to increased U.S. economic and military aid.11 In the end, Saudi Arabia approved a U.S. military presence mainly because of external security threats and promises of military equipment and other military and economic aid. The outcome of this first U.S. basing negotiation in the Arabian Peninsula is significant for several reasons. It is the first case among several examined in this book that negates assertions in base politics literature that downplay the influence external security concerns can have on a positive basing outcome.12 It also challenges arguments on any correlation between economic and security aid and basing access.13 As examined in this book, external security concerns can significantly influence basing outcomes. With Ibn Saud, for example, the combination of Hashemite and Axis power external threats are cited by U.S. and British officials as determining factors behind his permitting a U.S. military presence, albeit on a temporary basis at the beginning. The initial negotiation between Saudi Arabia and the United States is significant because it is the first time the United States establishes a considerable military presence in the Arabian Peninsula, a sign of the evolving U.S. belief that its strategic national interests are tied to that region, including interests involving oil and national security matters.

22  Oil and War

Mounting U.S. Oil Needs

Beginning in the 1930s, U.S. commercial interests helped pave the way for a large-scale, long-term U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia at first commercially and then militarily due to Saudi Arabia’s enormous natural resource and industrial potential. At the start of the war, few besides U.S. oil companies believed that Saudi Arabia could produce oil of any significance.14 In 1939, for example, Saudi Arabia reportedly produced 1,356 barrels of oil per day, compared with Iran, which produced an estimated 212,000 barrels per day, or the United States, at 3.3 million barrels per day.15 When the United States declared war on Germany and Japan at the end of 1941, the U.S. military reviewed its global war strategy and began to focus on building relationships with small but strategic countries such as Saudi Arabia. President Roosevelt and his administration also began to listen more attentively to oil executives’ calls for protection of U.S. oil company interests in Saudi Arabia; access to oil was a major concern due to U.S. fears of a waning domestic oil supply.16 By the end of the war, Saudi oil skeptics were proved wrong, since the kingdom was then producing over 21.3 million barrels of oil a year.17 The United States was concerned about getting goods, petroleum, and other war materiel to the Soviet Union via Iran to maintain pressure on Germany from the east. Access to Saudi oil was a significant added benefit. By the end of the war, the United States had thirty thousand troops stationed in Iran to keep supplies flowing to the Soviets.18 U.S. oil companies had sought to expand their operations globally in the 1920s and 1930s, spurred by the fear of exhausting their domestic supplies following World War I. Oil consumption in the United States had increased 90 percent from 1911 to 1918 as a result of the war and the nation’s new obsession with the automobile.19 The Arabian Peninsula offered ample opportunities for new areas of exploration and new markets to offset heightened oil consumption around the globe. Oil exploration in the peninsula was an open field, since most British oil companies were preoccupied with exploring Mesopotamia and Persia for oil and other natural resources during the interwar years.20 Many British officials were also skeptical that Saudi Arabia was sitting on such vast amounts of oil and gas reserves as to warrant significant attention. U.S. oil companies were therefore left to explore the entire Arabian Peninsula with little serious competition.21 The main obstacle to U.S. entry was King Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud was more concerned about water resources and did not see the pressing need for oil

Oil and War 23

exploration­.22 Ibn Saud’s trusted advisor, Harry St. John Bridger Philby, a former British Indian civil service official, knew that Ibn Saud was in dire financial straits after engaging in a national development program during the 1920s that included a network of wireless stations and the reconstruction of the water supply system for Jidda, among other costly programs.23 The value of the Saudi riyal was also in decline, and by 1931 pilgrims to Saudi Arabia, its main source of revenue, had dropped from 100,000 to 40,000 in one year as a result of the onset of the global economic depression.24 Ibn Saud lacked adequate alternative funding to run his government, rendering Saudi Arabia’s financial situation untenable. In one telling exchange, Philby told the king, “You are like a man fast asleep on top of a gold-mine, complaining of poverty but unwilling to get up and see what he is sleeping on.” Philby meant that Saudi Arabia was likely full of oil and gold, and he did not understand the king’s objection to exploiting it if he was in real need. Ibn Saud replied, “Well, Philby, I assure you that, if anyone would offer me a million pounds now, he could have the concession for exploiting all that my country possesses.”25 In the end, Philby convinced Ibn Saud to allow a U.S. geological survey team to begin work in the kingdom. Once it was apparent that the British were not interested in exploring Saudi Arabia for oil, Philby grew supportive of a U.S. entry and helped initiate contact with Charles Crane, a U.S. business mogul and philanthropist who helped organize the entry of a survey crew.26 Crane hired a team headed by Karl Twitchell, an American mining engineer who had been working on a development project for Crane in Yemen. In 1931 Twitchell submitted a final report to Ibn Saud which concluded that the kingdom’s prospects for extracting oil, gold, and other minerals were good.27 Ibn Saud was at first reluctant to have a foreign oil company operate on Saudi territory, because of internal pressures that might come from rival tribes who viewed any sign of modernization—be it the telephone, the radio, or automobiles—as instruments of the devil.28 But with news of Bahrain’s discovery of oil on May 31, 1932, Ibn Saud grew more intrigued about exploring for oil on Saudi territory. By 1933, and after a hard-fought negotiation, the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company (Casoc), an affiliate of Standard Oil of California, won the kingdom’s first oil concession. The king had understood the great potential that would emerge from lucrative oil revenues.29 Saudi Arabia’s first oil came on line only in 1938; it meant that Ibn Saud had been unable to exploit oil royalties for revenue during the previous five years despite geological surveys that pointed to large oil deposits. U.S. oil companies

24  Oil and War

knew that it was only a matter of time before Saudi Arabia would produce more oil, but the companies could no longer afford company loans to keep Saudi Arabia financially afloat. As war spread across Europe in 1940, Saudi Arabia’s financial situation continued to deteriorate. U.S. oil companies had already loaned the king an estimated $12 million to help ameliorate Saudi Arabia’s mounting deficit.30 U.S. oil companies were therefore eager for the U.S. government to step in and provide additional loans to keep Ibn Saud from financial ruin and thus prevent the loss of major U.S. oil concessions, equipment, and money.31 In the spring of 1941, James A. Moffett, chairman of the board of directors of the Bahrain Petroleum Company and its subsidiary, the California-Texas Oil Company, began pressing FDR to assist the Saudis.32 Moffett claimed that “if loans were not made to Saudi Arabia the independent Kingdom, and perhaps with it the entire Arab world, will be thrown into chaos.”33 If Saudi Arabia fell apart it would also be vulnerable to outside penetration from the Axis powers. Moffett’s requests, as already noted, were initially disregarded because President Roosevelt regarded the Middle East as well beyond the U.S. war purview, and the U.S. Navy did not consider Saudi oil worth buying for its fleet because of its high sulfur content. The “Hepburn Board Report” produced for President Roosevelt and Congress by Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn on the eve of World War II recommended a U.S. defense strategy that focused on national borders, territories, and possessions, and called for additional naval bases in the Atlantic and the Pacific to defend the United States. The report did not discuss the Middle East.34 As Germany ratcheted up its submarine campaign in the Atlantic, the United States feared that Britain would be forced to surrender its Atlantic Ocean possessions, leaving Nazi Germany dangerously close to U.S. territory. In an attempt to counter further German aggression in the Atlantic, the United States and Great Britain signed the “Destroyers for Bases Agreement” on September 2, 1940, granting the U.S. a ninety-nine-year lease to construct bases on eight British possessions in Newfoundland and across the Caribbean in return for fifty destroyers.35 With the U.S. focused on the Atlantic Ocean in 1940 and 1941, it is not surprising that Moffett gained little traction in his lobbying efforts. But Moffett was unrelenting in his attempts to persuade the U.S. government to support Saudi Arabia financially. In one follow-up proposal, he suggested that the United States provide a multimillion-dollar loan through the Lend-Lease Program in return for direct access to Saudi oil for the U.S. Navy and other U.S. government entities.36 The Lend-Lease Program was designed

Oil and War 25

to support countries aligned with the Allied powers against the Axis powers during the war. But Moffett again was met with pushback from the U.S. Navy.37 Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox responded directly to Moffett’s request, stating that the Saudi oil quality was not suitable for U.S. naval use and that Saudi gasoline had a very low octane number, classifying it as a second-grade gasoline. In addition, he argued that Saudi fuel oil contained sulfur amounts of 3.9 percent, when the U.S. Navy required sulfur levels closer to 1 percent or below. It was widely believed by naval officials that high sulfur amounts corroded a naval vessel’s exhaust system.38 Moffett and his associate Fred Davies of the Standard Oil Company of California countered Knox’s memorandum, arguing that the British Royal Navy had been using Saudi oil and gasoline successfully since it made the conversion from coal to oil propulsion. They claimed that the Royal Navy had not witnessed any major drawbacks to using oil with high sulfur content. Moffett and Davies also argued that Saudi oil would benefit U.S. merchant ships steaming through the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.39 After substantial debate between the various U.S. oil company representatives and the Roosevelt administration, President Roosevelt believed that assisting Saudi Arabia was still too much of a stretch for the United States. Further, he felt it should be more the responsibility of the British to assist the Saudis with their financial problems, since the Arabian Peninsula was in their sphere of influence.40 Despite Moffett’s unsuccessful attempts, King Ibn Saud approached Washington directly for financial assistance in June 1941. He was turned down for the same reasons as Moffett, and again FDR suggested that the British step in to handle Saudi financial affairs.41 Shortly after Ibn Saud’s request, however, Casoc, with backing from the Texas Oil Company (Texaco), issued the findings from a geological survey it had conducted in Saudi Arabia, concluding that Saudi Arabia was indeed sitting on “gigantic” oil resources.42 Casoc asked FDR to reverse his prior decision. Casoc feared that otherwise the British would respond to Ibn Saud’s requests to provide loans and therefore assert greater influence and control over Ibn Saud and his oil.43 The latest Casoc geological surveys coincided with growing concern within the FDR administration that the United States was on the verge of an energy crisis resulting from higher civilian demand and increased U.S. involvement in the war. The U.S. Navy also admitted the error of its previous statements and came to recognize that its operations significantly depended upon access to oil from places such as Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the navy began to consider the possession of petroleum re-

26  Oil and War

serves essential for U.S. world bargaining power when it came to negotiating such issues as aviation, shipping, island bases, and international security agreements. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal stated explicitly that the United States should do whatever it could to “retain and expand” these vital natural resources.44 Armed with the positive news about Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves, Casoc helped to convince Washington to approve Saudi Arabia’s prior loan request. In the end, the Roosevelt administration convinced Great Britain to transfer designated funds from the U.S. Lend-Lease Program to Saudi Arabia. In 1941, 1942, and 1943, Saudi Arabia received $5,285,000, $12,090,000, and $16,618,280, respectively, from the British in funds originally allocated to Britain under the U.S. Lend-Lease Program. Beginning in 1943, Saudi Arabia was approved as an official partner in the program and received funds directly.45 A Burgeoning Security Partnership

As the United States increased its financial support, the Saudi royal family appeared to look more favorably upon its relationship with United States. As the United States became increasingly invested in Saudi Arabia, new interest also emerged in the United States to further strengthen its military ties with Saudi Arabia, not only as a means to ensure access to oil needed to offset U.S. domestic supplies but also as a transit point to facilitate the movement of troops and materiel. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States began to rely heavily on a U.S. global logistics and basing network whereby U.S. forces could more easily traverse the globe to support war efforts both in Europe and the Pacific. Saudi Arabia emerged as an important central node in this network. In the Gulf, the United States grew increasingly concerned about an Axis invasion toward the end of the war and the potential closure of valuable trade routes through Iran that supported the Soviet Union’s war efforts on Europe’s eastern front. The British also supported the additional U.S. presence to protect its own regional interests in the Middle East and South Asia. Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Great Britain was at times strained because of longtime British support for the rival Hashemite family.46 In a demonstration of their threat to the Gulf, the Axis powers had pushed dangerously close to the Gulf in June 1941 after they invaded the Soviet Union and increasingly acted as advisors to Iran’s Reza Shah Pahlavi, a Nazi sympathizer. With Reza Shah unwilling to expel his Nazi advisors, the Soviet Union and Great Britain invaded Iran at the end of August and forced Reza Shah to relinquish power to his son, Moham-

Oil and War 27

mad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who would prove less amenable to German influence.47 With Iran under British and Soviet influence, Saudi Arabia welcomed U.S. interest in its oil supplies, but it was less keen on supporting a U.S. military presence due to the delicate balance it always had to strike between internal and external security concerns. Internally, and from the beginning of the kingdom’s inception in 1925, Ibn Saud had had to contend with powerful internal forces that viewed any foreign presence with disdain as a result of Great Britain’s regional colonial legacy. Externally, Ibn Saud had to confront the hostile Hashemites, whom he had defeated and expelled from the Hejaz in 1925. The British further complicated the relationship when they installed Hashemites as the kings of Iraq and Transjordan following their defeat in the Hejaz. Moreover, the Hashemite kings vowed to one day reclaim the land they had lost in the Hejaz. Aside from the Hashemites, Ibn Saud also worried about breaking Saudi Arabia’s neutrality in the war. He was anxious that the Axis powers would use a Saudi declaration of war to invade or bomb Mecca and Medina. In the end, and with the help of military and economic aid incentives toward the end of the war, the Americans persuaded Ibn Saud to declare war against the Axis powers and to allow the U.S. military to establish a basing foothold. Like the United States, Ibn Saud perceived the Axis powers as a major external security threat of far greater concern than internal security threats. The continued external Hashemite threat also played an important role in Ibn Saud’s decision to approve the U.S. military base. Balancing Saudi Internal and External Security

Ibn Saud’s conquest of the Hejaz in 1924 and 1925 was aided in large part by two groups: Wahhabi missionaries and the Ikhwan, desert tribal warriors also called the “Brotherhood.”48 Al-Saud family ties to Wahhabi religious specialists (mutawwa‘a) dated back to the eighteenth century and the puritanical and conservative Islamic teachings of Mohammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, who preached a return to the core principles of Islam, including opposition to Muslim innovators.49 Ibn Saud began his political rise in 1912 with the help of Wahhabi followers who spread their conservative teachings to the Ikhwan, thus helping Ibn Saud unify rival tribes to defeat the ruling Hashemites of the Hejaz. Prior to the spread and tribal acceptance of Wahhabi Islam, Arabian tribes were described as engaging in frequent “fratricidal warfare—man against man, family against family, tribe against tribe, or principality against principality.”50 Under a more pervasive Wahhabi influence, the Ikhwan were instead urged to “cling to

28  Oil and War

the rope of God and do not separate and remember that you were once enemies but by the grace of God you have become brothers.”51 Between 1919 and 1923 Ibn Saud and the Ikhwan defeated and occupied various semiautonomous Arabian states such as Ha‘il and ‘Asir. With Ibn Saud’s rise, Great Britain grew concerned about the threat he posed to the Britishbacked Hashemite family, descendants of the Prophet Mohammad in the line of Hashim, the Prophet’s great-grandfather. The British in particular had long supported the reign of Hussain bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca and King of the Hejaz, but he soon proved to be no match for Ibn Saud’s forces.52 In the fall of 1942, for example, Taif, the mountainous summer capital near Mecca, fell easily to Ibn Saud; in a last attempt to save the throne, King Hussain abdicated to his son Ali.53 But Ali’s forces were also incapable of defending the Hejaz against the Ikhwan, and Ali was forced to flee quickly from Mecca to Jidda to avoid major bloodshed in the holy city. Ibn Saud entered Mecca on December 5 and following his victory began the final siege on the last Hejazi holdout, Jidda.54 After a year of battle Jidda fell, and Ali abdicated his throne on December 16 as Ibn Saud’s forces entered the city. On January 8, 1926, Hejazi tribal leaders swore allegiance to Ibn Saud and declared him King of Hejaz and Sultan of Najd and its surrounding territories. Ali remained in exile, hoping to return one day as the rightful heir to the Hashemite lands of Arabia.55 With Ibn Saud installed in the Hejaz, Hussain sought refuge with his other sons in Iraq and Transjordan. Due to Great Britain’s historic ties and alliance with the Hashemites that dated to before the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and World War I, Great Britain rewarded the loyal Hashemites by installing Hussain’s sons, Abdullah and Faisal, as kings of Transjordan and Iraq. Even with the establishment of the new Hashemite kingdoms, the Hashemites vowed to reclaim the land they had lost to Ibn Saud.56 From the 1930s to the 1950s, the Hashemites remained a significant external security concern for Saudi Arabia that influenced its regional foreign policy and alliances, which shifted frequently between such countries as the United States and Arab powers like Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria.57 Even with the Hashemite defeat, Ibn Saud faced perpetual internal security concerns that originated separately from the Ikhwan and other rival tribes, some of whom also maintained ties to the neighboring Hashemites. The Ikhwan, for example, were described by critics as “today a sword in the hand of the prince, a dagger in his back tomorrow.”58 In a further sign of the unpredictable alliance with Ibn Saud, the Ikhwan staged a rebellion in 1929 against Ibn Saud

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that was suppressed forcefully and decisively in the Battle of Sibila.59 Certain Ikhwan factions believed that Ibn Saud had strayed from the core teachings of Al-Wahhab when he named himself King of the Hejaz.60 Many were also dissatisfied with the modernization reforms he began to implement, such as the establishment of wireless telegraphy. Such modernist reforms were seen as a threat to the puritanical way of life of Wahhabi followers.61 Many Ikhwan were similarly dissatisfied with Ibn Saud’s refusal to further expand Al-Wahhab’s teachings into the region and thus facilitate the formation of a larger Islamist state.62 Ibn Saud was criticized for negotiating a peace settlement with the British (seen as enemy infidels by many Ikhwan) in order to end the conflict with the Hashemites following their expulsion from the Hejaz.63 Even following Ibn Saud’s defeat of the Ikhwan in 1929, the king continued to face threats from rival Bedouin tribes, some of whom had external ties to the Hashemite family of Iraq and Transjordan, as well as to other Hejazi exiles living in Egypt. Numbers do not exist for the early twentieth century, but in 1956 after many attempts to sedentarize Saudi Arabia’s Bedouin population, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization estimated that 66 percent of the Saudi population was nomadic. The sizable nomadic population continued to be a significant challenge to Ibn Saud’s centralization attempts as various nomadic tribes continued to roam the desert, while in some instances maintaining ties to neighboring tribes outside Saudi Arabia.64 A drought at the end of the 1920s and a subsequent economic depression of the 1930s pushed Hamid ibn Rifada of the Billi, for example, to organize a large anti-Saudi uprising in May 1932 that included tribal members from the Huwaytat, Juhayna, and Atiyya, among others. Ibn Saud was able to quell the rebellion, but it nevertheless represented the obstacles that he continued to face as he consolidated power in the kingdom. Internal opposition has remained an important and serious factor throughout Saudi Arabia’s history, especially notable in the context of basing negotiations. Internal uprisings often flared up spontaneously during times of economic hardship but were sometimes organized by external elements. They have also been sparked by regional turbulence or war. Following the Ibn Rifada uprising, Ibn Saud enacted several laws to further suppress opposition, including a requirement for government approval of political meetings or the distribution of newspapers or other print material.65 Despite such laws, internal security necessitated the continued suppression of opposition for the Saudi monarchy as it fought to maintain control over its tribal kingdom.66 In an exchange toward the end of the war, Ibn Saud’s son and Saudi foreign

30  Oil and War

minister at the end of the war, Prince Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz, explained to U.S. officials that every Arab ruler faced both internal and external enemies. According to Faisal, his father in particular had to move cautiously in order to prevent the rise of enemies who could use the arrival of the U.S. military to stir up significant opposition against the Al-Saud monarchy. Faisal explained that the people of Saudi Arabia viewed major rapid change and innovation with suspicion because of their long experience in regional Arab affairs. They had long been a nomadic tribal society that did not take lightly to outside intervention or any internal foreign presence.67 Puritanical Wahhabi Islamic teachings that rejected the very existence of non-Wahhabi Muslims and claimed religious superiority over all other sects permeated much of Saudi Arabia’s society.68 As a result, Saudis were slow to accept modern inventions and customs, which were new to them and often appeared threatening. If they were unprepared for changes, they might be tempted to follow opposition tribal shaykhs who argued that King Ibn Saud was leading his people away from their forefathers’ traditions and virtues, as promoted by Wahhabi Islam. Faisal similarly noted that aside from internal opposition, there were external Arab groups who wanted to discredit the Saud royal family and overthrow the monarchy. These groups spread rumors throughout the Arab world that Ibn Saud was selling out his people to U.S. imperialism. They believed that he was bartering the kingdom’s religious traditions in exchange for American gold. As a result, the king had to tread delicately when negotiating the acceptance of any foreign presence.69 Nascent U.S.-Saudi Security Ties

As a new arrival to the region, the United States was sometimes perceived as being insensitive to the internal security dynamics of Arabian Peninsula monarchies. In one telling memo, the British embassy in Cairo wrote to the British Foreign Office about the feared and continued U.S. behavior toward Saudi Arabia: [T]here is a serious risk of [Americans] adopting an excessively paternalised and patronising attitude to Saudi Arabia from a failure to understand that a fanatical Moslem population does not take the same view of the blessings of American civilization as they do themselves. Great judgment and discretion will therefore be needed to avoid a heavy crop of difficulties for all concerned. If the results of misguided American benevolence should be to undermine the independence of the country and make it a satellite of the U.S.A., it would have serious reactions throughout the Moslem world and gravely prejudice British interest.70

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The British had their own regional reputation to overcome, but they were nonetheless concerned with how the U.S. arrival would affect Gulf and Arabian Peninsula politics in general. As World War II grew to global intensity after the U.S. declaration of war in 1941, the United States augmented its interests in Saudi Arabia. Concurrently, Great Britain’s position in Europe became unstable. In a sign of Saudi Arabia’s growing importance to the U.S. war strategy, for example, the United States added a formal diplomatic legation at Jidda to oversee diplomatic and consular operations beyond the Riyadh embassy. Alexander C. Kirk, minister plenipotentiary to Egypt, was temporarily put in charge of affairs in Saudi Arabia from 1941 to 1943, and James S. Moose, Jr., was reassigned from Tehran and made Jidda’s second secretary and consul general.71 In 1942 the U.S. War Department expressed a desire to establish one or more airfields in Saudi Arabia to assist in its war-fighting efforts. The State Department liked the idea and set out to ensure the favorable reception of the request for air facilities by sending the king a letter from the president proposing the dispatch and establishment of a U.S. agricultural mission to Saudi Arabia with no preconditions.72 The U.S. State Department believed an American request to construct an airfield would be dismissed unless the United States provided King Ibn Saud with incentives, such as sponsoring an agricultural mission and inviting Saudi participation in the U.S. Lend-Lease Aid program.73 Ibn Saud viewed the initial aid assurances positively but still remained concerned about how a U.S. military presence would be viewed generally in the region. In a letter to Ibn Saud from King Abdullah of Transjordan, for example, King Abdullah expressed his apprehension that the influx of Americans to Saudi soil as a result of the oil concessions was viewed in some quarters as a threat to Islam’s holiest cities. Abdullah also warned the king that rapid modernization could have a destabilizing effect on his very traditional society. Ibn Saud reportedly downplayed the letter, but it illustrates the delicate balance the monarch had to strike when negotiating a foreign military presence, not even mentioning the implementation of modernization programs.74 The Saudi finance minister, Abdullah Suleiman, initially backed the preliminary U.S. proposals and had no objection to the establishment of air rights and an airfield, provided the United States respected certain areas—mainly Duba and Al-Birk, towns respectively north and south of Jidda along the Red Sea—as off limits to the new flying routes.75 The king approved the new flying routes provided the agreement remained a secret, in order to maintain the perception that he was the master of Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty. Yet he did not approve the

32  Oil and War

airbase construction because of concerns about how rival tribes would respond. Westerners in general were viewed negatively by some local populations.76 Besides being careful to uphold an image of a Saudi Arabia not beholden to any foreign power, the king still recognized the importance of defending Saudi Arabia’s natural resources and unprotected borders. Saudi Arabia had only primitive security forces and relied heavily on Great Britain and the United States for national defense during World War II. Following the defeat of the Ikhwan, Saudi Arabia had established two small defense corps, the National Guard and the Royal Guard. The king relied mainly on the Royal Guard, a force of about one thousand men, to protect Riyadh and royal family affairs. The National Guard was in charge of keeping the peripheral tribal forces under control. With British support, Saudi Arabia also created a defense ministry in 1944. By the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, Saudi Arabia’s military forces were still limited in size and capacity to about ten thousand men.77 In 1942 the only protection for Saudi Arabia’s oil installations consisted of a small number of Saudi defense troops armed only with rifles. This tiny defense force concerned U.S. oil company executives, who believed that an attack by an outside power was highly likely. Italian bombers, for example, attacked Bahrain oil fields on October 18, 1940, as Italy was being driven from East Africa. The concern was that other Axis powers would bomb Saudi oil fields.78 Casoc, which later changed its name to the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) in 1944, spent several hundred thousand dollars to construct concrete barriers around its oil installations. These installations might have assisted in protecting against air attacks by the Axis powers, but the Saudi government also needed to install antiaircraft guns. Fred Davies, president of Casoc, spoke directly with the king about Saudi Arabia’s security concerns and relayed Saudi and U.S. oil company concerns to the U.S. government. In addition, Davies proposed the installation of U.S. troops with antiaircraft guns with one or two fighter planes stationed nearby.79 The U.S. War Department paid great attention to Davies’s messages and asked Major General Russell L. Maxwell, commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East headquartered in Cairo, to assess the possibility of sending troops to Saudi Arabia. General Maxwell sent Brigadier General Sidney P. Spalding to survey the defense and denial measures needed to protect oil installations in the Arabian Peninsula. The U.S. naval observer in Basra was also involved in surveying ways to ensure the security of U.S. oil installations and shipments from the Arabian Peninsula.80 After consulting with Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative Yusuf

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Yassin, Ibn Saud agreed to the installation of U.S. antiaircraft defenses and the presence of approximately one hundred American troops because of the Axis power threat to Saudi oil fields. Ibn Saud was adamant, however, that the U.S. military vacate Saudi Arabia once it had properly trained a significant number of Saudi troops. According to U.S. documents, the king justified his decision by stating that the emplacement would be in defense of Saudi territory and not paid for with Saudi funds.81 He also told U.S. officials that the U.S. military could act as an important balancing power to deter any potential attack on Saudi oil and military installations by the Hashemites or other rival clans, including Qasimi tribesmen from eastern portions of the Arabian Peninsula who had attacked both Iraq and Palestine.82 Ibn Saud was reportedly apprehensive about how the U.S. military presence would be perceived at home and regionally. But with Great Britain’s power on the wane and the unpredictable security environment that prevailed at the end of the war, the United States was a likely candidate to take on greater military and political advisory roles in Saudi Arabia. The U.S. Military Expands Its Vision

After King Ibn Saud approved the temporary installation of U.S. troops and an antiaircraft defense in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. made additional moves to solidify and make permanent its military and diplomatic presence in the kingdom. At the end of 1943 it requested to establish another consulate, this time in Dhahran on the eastern shores of Saudi Arabia. The consulate would also have informal jurisdiction over U.S. activities in Bahrain, which had yet to establish its independence from Great Britain.83 Shortly after receiving permission for the consulate at Dhahran, the U.S. military set its sights on establishing a base at Dhahran. First, U.S. military authorities asked the king for permission to conduct an aerial and engineering survey in Saudi Arabia to determine weather patterns, possible emergency landing fields, locations for radio communications towers, and the feasibility of a more direct air route between Cairo and Dhahran than those previously approved. The U.S. military believed a more direct route would reduce the Cairo-Dhahran-Karachi route by 212 miles. This also meant that the entire air route from Morocco to India would be conveniently divided into equal stages.84 Once the U.S. received approval, it dispatched Major General Benjamin F. Giles, commander of U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME) based in Cairo, on October 11, 1944, to begin the survey. After a short survey period, Giles

34  Oil and War

determined the field at Dhahran to be ideal for U.S. military purposes, possibly a forgone conclusion, as American military officials considered the construction of an airfield at Dhahran a necessity for the prosecution of its war efforts in the Pacific. In any case, the field proved so ideal that the survey crew declined an opportunity to study another field location at Ras Tanura, a Gulf port north of Dhahran and an important oil refinery town.85 It would also assist in keeping supply lines open to the Soviet Union and Central Asia via Iran. A stable Iran became important for U.S. war efforts in Eurasia.86 There was growing consensus that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, in addition to evolving into an important military hub, would emerge as an essential postwar oil production center.87 In 1913 the entire Middle East accounted for only 6 percent of the world’s oil production, but by the end of the war it accounted for an estimated 30 percent.88 As noted by Everette Lee DeGolyer, the American geologist, entrepreneur, and inventor of the seismograph, who traveled to Saudi Arabia in 1943, “The center of gravity of world oil production is shifting from the Gulf [of Mexico]-Caribbean area to the Middle East—to the [Arabian] Gulf area—and is likely to continue to shift until it is firmly established in that area.”89 This came as welcome news to the U.S. military, which feared a dwindling U.S. oil supply toward the end of the war. During the winter of 1942–43, concerns about an energy crisis had spread across FDR’s administration following a severe shortage of 100-octane gasoline that in turn reduced the number of combat-ready U.S. fighter jets.90 U.S. secretary of the interior Harold Ickes similarly expressed the U.S. need to secure alternate resources to support the war effort. In a 1944 article, “We’re Running Out of Oil,” Ickes wrote: “If there should be a World War III it would have to be fought with someone else’s petroleum, because the United States wouldn’t have it . . . . America’s crown, symbolizing supremacy as the oil empire of the world, is sliding down over one eye . . . . If we are to maintain and extend our gasoline civilization we must be prepared to go where gasoline is to be had.”91 Ickes ordered a report on where those foreign oil reserves would be found. According to Herbert Feis, the U.S. State Department’s economic advisor, the main place to find foreign oil reserves was the Middle East.92 Under pressure to find additional oil reserves for the U.S. military, Ickes therefore approved the dispatch of high-level materials to go to Aramco to help develop further Saudi Arabia’s oil fields. At the time, the U.S. Navy’s Pacific fleet was operating partially on oil from Iran, but Great Britain controlled most of Iran’s oil distribution as a result of prior oil concessions granted by Persia

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to Great Britain. The “Red Line Agreement” of 1928 had also granted Great Britain control over Iraq’s and Iran’s oil deposits and the creation of a Western oil cartel that prevented independent oil exploration in former Ottoman territories, including the Arabian Peninsula, but it was considered nonapplicable by the end of the war.93 Aramco was therefore given the go-ahead by Secretary Ickes to “[b]uild . . . . [G]et anything you need to, and the United States Government will support you.”94 After the war, the United States negotiated its formal exemption from the Red Line Agreement, enabling greater U.S. access to oil exploration across Saudi Arabia.95 Providing Incentives for Saudi Arabia

Despite Ibn Saud’s expressed need to defend Saudi oil fields, the United States still met certain opposition in negotiations for a basing agreement. Before the Dhahran base negotiations began officially, the United States recognized the need to offer greater incentive packages to Saudi Arabia if it wanted to station U.S. troops at Dhahran. The United States was fearful that if it did not provide additional aid it would lose its influence and cede oil access in Saudi Arabia to the British.96 Some base politics scholars claim that military and financial incentives have a minor effect on basing agreement outcomes. And some have argued that external security threats play little role in influencing basing negotiations.97 As examined here, however, the added incentives clearly helped tip the balance in favor of a final U.S. basing agreement. Due to the king’s personal extravagance and financial mismanagement over the years, Saudi Arabia was in financial arrears by the start of the war. Between 1902 and 1940, Saudi Arabia was a “cash poor” nation and relied upon the goodwill of Great Britain in particular.98 The United States entered the war in 1941 but only really began allocating funds to Saudi Arabia in 1943 through its Lend-Lease program. The Anglo-American subsidy for Saudi Arabia in 1943 was £5.5 million, including a U.S. contribution of £1.2 million.99 In 1944 the U.S. Treasury also approved a loan plan to mint 10 million riyals if the Saudi government agreed to return the silver within five years.100 Further, the United States approved the establishment of a corresponding financial and economic mission to help Saudi Arabia overcome its financial woes.101 Aside from needing economic aid and technical support, Ibn Saud lacked essential food staples to feed the Saudi population, pushing the kingdom toward a famine outbreak during the war.102 In an additional sign of heightened support to the kingdom, the U.S. approved an agricultural mission in August 1944 to help address Saudi

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Arabia’s continuing agricultural problems, further solidifying U.S.-Saudi relations.103 Aside from economic aid, in 1944 the United States established a military aid program. On March 20, the U.S. Army shipped Saudi military authorities 1,667 rifles with accessories and 350,000 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition. In the same year, the U.S. approved semi-lease-lend supplies for Saudi Arabia, including automobiles and $1.1 million in military equipment.104 It also provided uniforms for eleven thousand troops.105 Additionally, the United States dispatched eight officers and four enlisted men to train Saudi military personnel in the use, repair, and maintenance of the rifles and other equipment it had shipped to Saudi Arabia.106 The U.S. considered all of these military and economic aid programs and incentives necessary to secure a U.S. military foothold in Saudi Arabia, thereby upholding U.S. strategic national interests, which included unfettered access to future oil reserves.107 The outpouring of aid to Saudi Arabia was a significant policy shift compared with the essentially nonexistent regional policy at the start of the war. The new U.S. policy iteration meant granting direct loan assistance to Saudi Arabia that had been previously rejected.108 The United States also dispatched Colonel William A. Eddy as an advisor to serve the king in any capacity and to further secure its position in Riyadh. Congress approved of such advisors in late 1942 when it passed Public Law 722, which authorized President Roosevelt to designate military and naval personnel to advise any country the president deemed important to U.S. national defense.109 Eddy was a former college president and Arabic scholar and had been detailed to the State Department by the U.S. Marine Corps in December 1943. In January 1944, he received official word of his new position as special assistant to the minister resident in Saudi Arabia.110 Besides dispatching Colonel Eddy, the United States approved several military missions in the spring of 1944. One small mission ran jointly with the British and another mission ran directly under U.S. command headed by Colonel Garrett B. Shomber.111 Negative reactions across the kingdom and regionally emerged following the announcement of the American military training mission, including in Egypt, where some newspapers opined that the arrival of the U.S. military in Saudi Arabia was the beginning of U.S. regional imperialism.112 Saudi Arabia approved the first military missions because of its need to modernize, professionalize, and train its forces. The negative reaction among certain Arab factions highlights why Saudi Arabia moved cautiously when negotiating

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contracts renewals: it did not want to alienate friends or strengthen potential enemies.113 According to U.S. dispatches, Saudi officials appeared to appreciate much-needed increased military and economic aid packages. U.S. officials described a positive meeting between Colonel Eddy and Shaykh Yusuf Yassin, the kingdom’s deputy foreign minister, who expressed the king’s appreciation for U.S. goodwill, commitment, and friendship toward Saudi Arabia through its programs, investments, and missions.114 Yassin also hinted at a possible comprehensive treaty between the United States and Saudi Arabia covering aviation, military, and commercial trade issues if Saudi Arabia were able to secure more financial resources from the United States.115 After the meeting between Yassin and Eddy, the United States announced the continuation of its military training mission to Saudi Arabia until January 1945. The U.S. believed the mission’s successes and U.S. offers of additional support had begun to solidify the U.S.Saudi relationship.116 Near the end of World War II, the U.S. secretary of state told FDR that King Ibn Saud preferred U.S. military assistance to that of Great Britain, so long as the United States would continue to provide defense and other assistance to Saudi Arabia on a long-term basis.117 Solidifying U.S.-Saudi Ties

As World War II wound down in early February 1945, President Roosevelt extended an invitation to King Ibn Saud to meet him aboard the USS Quincy, a U.S. naval heavy cruiser, at Ismailia, Egypt. The president was returning to the United States after attending the Yalta Conference with British prime minister Winston Churchill and Marshal Josef Stalin of the Soviet Union. President Roosevelt’s prewar sentiments about Saudi Arabia had long been reversed, and he wished to hold discussions with Ibn Saud about oil, the future of Palestine, and the Middle East’s postwar configuration. Roosevelt was concerned that the destruction of Europe during the war would be exploited by the Soviet Union. The United States thus needed to ensure the availability of energy resources from the Gulf to help implement the reconstruction of Europe and Asia.118 After traveling three days aboard the USS Murphy from Saudi Arabia with his forty-eight-person entourage, including Bedouin bodyguards, coffee-servers, and the king’s astrologer, Ibn Saud arrived on February 14 to meet with President Roosevelt aboard the Quincy.119 From the beginning, Roosevelt and Ibn Saud established a strong, friendly relationship based upon mutual respect and admiration, a friendship that would help congeal the U.S. military’s regional foothold in the Gulf. The king spoke of Roosevelt as being his “twin”

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in age, responsibility as head of state, and demeanor. The president, who used a wheelchair because of his polio, replied, “But you are fortunate to still have the use of your legs to take you wherever you choose to go.” The king quipped, “It is you, Mr. President, who are fortunate. My legs grow feebler every year; with your more reliable wheel-chair you are assured that you will arrive.”120 The president said, “I have two of these chairs, which are also twins. Would you accept one as a personal gift from me?” The king replied, “Gratefully, I shall use it daily and always recall affectionately the giver, my great and good friend.”121 Years later, the king reminisced with Colonel Eddy, U.S. minister to Saudi Arabia, that “this chair is my most precious possession. It is the gift of my good and great friend, President Roosevelt, on whom Allah has had mercy.”122 Roosevelt had also impressed the king by offering him the gift of a DC-3 passenger plane. The airplane, “specially outfitted with a rotating throne that allowed the king to always face Mecca while airborne, stimulated the king’s interest in air travel and was later the first plane in the fleet of what would become—after decades of aviation and maintenance training by Americans from Trans World Airlines— the modern Saudi Arabian Airlines.”123 During the afternoon meetings the king and the president bonded over their shared visions for the future of the region. Roosevelt vowed that the U.S. government would make no concrete decision on the future of Palestine “without consultation of both Arabs and Jews.”124 Transcripts from the meeting also portray the king’s appreciation for Roosevelt’s perspective on the British. Speaking with Eddy after the meeting, the king contrasted British prime minister Winston Churchill’s “deviousness” and President Roosevelt’s sincerity. The king said, “The contrast between the President and Mr. Churchill is very great. Mr. Churchill speaks deviously, evades understanding, changes the subject to avoid commitment, forcing me repeatedly to bring him back to the point. The President seeks understanding in conversations; his effort is to make the two minds meet; to dispel darkness and shed light upon the issue.”125 During their meeting King Ibn Saud asked President Roosevelt, “What am I to believe when the British tell me that my future is with them and not with America?” President Roosevelt replied that “America favored an ‘open door’ policy in the post-war world. With no monopoly by anyone; for only by free exchange of goods, services and opportunities can prosperity circulate to the advantage of free peoples.”126 Both leaders were pleased with the meeting and parted content with their newly established relationship.127 The Saud-Roosevelt meeting aboard the USS Quincy helped fortify the

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future of U.S.-Saudi relations and helped pave the way for the more permanent installation of the U.S. military in Saudi Arabia. Establishing personal and trustworthy relationships was important in Saudi society, and President Roosevelt’s strong first impression on Ibn Saud would do a lot to strengthen U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia for decades. The meeting between Roosevelt and Ibn Saud marked a tangible decline in Great Britain’s influence over Saudi Arabia. Great Britain reportedly tried to convince Ibn Saud that U.S. interests were ephemeral and that they would turn their back on Saudi Arabia following the war.128 It was also believed this was an attempt by British officials to undermine the U.S. standing before Ibn Saud.129 The United States was quick to assure the king that the United States was a reliable partner and regional ally. American officials reiterated the U.S. stated policy on the Near East: “To assist the independent countries of the area to maintain their independence and to encourage, in appropriate ways and at appropriate times, the other countries of the Near and Middle East to obtain their independence.”130 U.S. officials affirmed that the Gulf should be governed by the Gulf ’s local population and not by outside powers.131 Negotiating for Dhahran Airfield

In just two years, from 1943 to 1945, the United States focused intensely on how best to safeguard its new interests and investments in Saudi Arabia. As basing negotiations began in earnest, Ibn Saud reiterated his hesitancy to permit a foreign military presence, citing the pushback he expected from rival tribes. In the end, however, a combination of increased military and economic aid plus fears of an Axis power invasion helped to convince the king to conclude the basing agreement with the United States. In a sign of how invested the U.S. government had become in Saudi Arabia over a short period, the State-War-Navy Coordination Committee (SWNCC) publicized its desire to ensure that Saudi Arabia received as much financial support as possible to pave the way for smooth negotiations.132 In 1945, just prior to the start of basing negotiations, the United States predicted that Saudi Arabia’s deficit would amount to $50 million over a five-year period—three-fifths of which would occur by 1947.133 This was of little concern because a general consensus emerged among State Department and Pentagon officials that Saudi oil concessions would help finance the Dhahran airfield construction, estimated at $10 million.134 Further, the U.S. government speculated that if Saudi petroleum resources could be developed further, they could replace European and Medi-

40  Oil and War

terranean reserves, thus contributing significantly to both Gulf and Western oil reserves.135 By 1945, the U.S. military overcame a major hurdle in the lead-up to formal negotiations when it received British approval from their chiefs of staff to construct the military airfield at Dhahran on the condition that the British received flyover and landing rights similar to those of the United States.136 By the end of the war, Great Britain had been significantly weakened and therefore saw the arrival of the U.S. military to the Gulf as an important anchor that could help protect British national interests, especially British oil concessions and the maintenance of trade routes to British India.137 Once negotiations for Dhahran began, in the spring 1945, the United States had successfully completed the short military training program for Saudi military officials that had begun in 1944. The king expressed his appreciation in a letter to President Truman for all the financial assistance the United States had given Saudi Arabia to prevent it from economic collapse.138 On April 30, the graduation of the third class of ninety Saudi officers at Taif was publicly celebrated before an audience of Saudi officials. Both Saudi and U.S. officials deemed the U.S. Army Military Training Mission a major success.139 Amir Mansour Ibn Abdul Aziz, son of King Ibn Saud and the Saudi minister of defense, attended the graduation ceremony and was impressed thoroughly with the professionalization of his officers. After the graduation, Colonel Eddy and Colonel Garrett B. Shomber, commanding officer of the U.S. Military Training Mission, met with the minister of defense. In their conversations, Mansour Ibn Abdul Aziz expressed great gratification with the military training mission, pleased that his officers were equipped to defend the kingdom with their modern warfare techniques and equipment.140 In the final negotiations between the United States and Saudi Arabia, the king was concerned with preserving the appearance that he had not lost control of Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. He insisted that the Saudi flag fly over the inland posts, the emergency landing field, and the isolated stations where navigational aids were located. In fact, the operation and control of technical services at these posts belonged to the U.S. Army. Colonel Eddy concurred, arguing that the king’s request would deter local tribal shaykhs from attacking the military installations, which they would if they saw a foreign flag flying. Tribal leaders would view a foreign flag as a sign of invasion and grounds for attack.141 Despite being unable to fly their flag, the U.S. military was to be given jurisdiction over any legal cases involving non-Saudi personnel within the airbase area of operations.142

Oil and War 41

Despite his reservations about internal security, in May 1945 the king gave initial approval for a basing agreement and the construction of the airfield at Dhahran. The field and fixed installations would return to Saudi control at war’s end. The king agreed to the use of the field by the U.S. military for three years after the war’s termination.143 The Dhahran base would not exceed a fivemile radius located at longitude 26°20’ north and latitude 50°10’ east. The base would be composed of two runways and the facilities necessary needed to run all its operations. Ibn Saud also granted the U.S. military exclusive rights and access to all the land at Dhahran for the duration of the agreement. The base would accommodate up to five hundred military personnel, with the option of adding up to two thousand more in the future. The final agreement also included an emergency field north of Dhahran with navigational aids, meteorological facilities, and housing, which the U.S. military would build.144 Ibn Saud supported the establishment of a U.S. military base at Dhahran, but he did not approve continuing the U.S. military training mission; he was still concerned about internal criticism that would come with its prolongation.145 Proclaiming the training mission’s end, however, was a façade put up because the king still feared his main regional rival, the Hashemites, according to Saudi and British sources.146 The king continued to support an air pilot training program in the United States, not on Saudi property.147 The king remarked that he could justify a foreign airbase on Saudi territory because it would support the Allied war effort. According to U.S. accounts, the king appeared appeased by the fact that U.S. military personnel would be restricted to the Dhahran-Ras Tanura area, far from the Holy Cities.148 The first Dhahran negotiation demonstrates that the king was convinced that the external security threat overrode internal threats, but he remained cautious nonetheless when approving any foreign military presence. From the start of the negotiations, he moved guardedly, slow to sanction any U.S. military presence because he remained apprehensive about potential tribal threats to the kingdom’s stability. Conclusion: The End of War and the Future of Dhahran

Even with Japan’s impending surrender, Saudi and U.S. officials both approved continuing the Dhahran construction. The U.S. secretaries of War and State agreed that the base construction continue (at the expense of the War Department) because both departments considered the base a postwar national security and strategic national interest necessity.149 When Harry S. Truman succeeded Franklin Roosevelt after the latter’s death on April 12, 1945, the new

42  Oil and War

president agreed to continue the project if the Saudis agreed.150 By the end of World War II, the United States was a dominant world power. In order to support global postwar reconstruction efforts, the U.S. military required basing, as well as unobstructed access to oil and natural gas reserves from the Arabian Gulf. It justified the base, stating that a foothold at Dhahran enabled the United States to protect its financial investments in the region, deter a rising Soviet Gulf presence, and maintain Saudi Arabia’s political and economic stability.151 After much debate in Saudi Arabia, the cabinet also consented to continue with the Dhahran construction. The Saudi government would permit the U.S. military to operate the field for a maximum of three years after its completion.152 At the end of July 1945 while in the United States at a UN conference, Saudi foreign minister Prince Faisal met with acting U.S. secretary of state Joseph C. Grew (President Truman was busy at the Potsdam Conference). Grew and Faisal discussed the future of Dhahran and U.S.-Saudi relations in general. According to U.S. dispatches, Faisal conveyed his father’s message that the Saudis believed President Truman, like President Roosevelt, was a man of integrity and ability and had an interest in the welfare of the Arab world. Additionally, Ibn Saud had instructed Faisal to state that he had absolute confidence in the United States and that with this trust Ibn Saud had permitted American citizens to engage in unprecedented activities in Saudi business and military affairs.153 Ibn Saud hoped that the United States would understand why he needed to move slowly in opening up Saudi Arabia entirely to American business and military initiatives. He also wanted the U.S. to understand that if the Saudi government delayed its acceptance of certain American proposals, it was not because the Saudi government did not have confidence in the American government or that it did not believe the proposals to be worthwhile. The United States had to appreciate that these delays often arose from the king’s apprehension about continued threats from internal elements opposed to any foreign military presence, including rival tribes and those with conservative religious leanings.154 On August 5, 1945, Faisal and his party set sail on the Queen Mary for Britain following the satisfactory completion of discussions in Washington.155 With President Truman’s consent, on August 6 Ibn Saud agreed to sign a final agreement for the establishment of the Dhahran military base under U.S. jurisdiction.156 In the end, Ibn Saud was swayed to conclude the basing agreement mainly because of continuing external security threats associated with the war. The influx of U.S. military and economic aid from the middle to the end of the

Oil and War 43

war, and promises that such aid would continue, contributed to the success of the basing agreement negotiations. Saudi Arabia continued to monitor internal security threats, but such concerns had been trumped temporarily by the more immediate need for money and defense against outside enemies such as the Hashemites. The approval of the Dhahran base marked the beginning of a lasting, complex, and at times fragile bilateral security relationship between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

2

Negotiating a Foothold

Following his attendance of the Potsdam Conference in Germany in the summer of 1945, President Harry Truman delivered a radio address to the American people highlighting his administration’s foreign policy objectives for the postwar era: We must do all we can to spare [Europe] from the ravages of any future breach of the peace. That is why, though the United States wants no territory or profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and of world peace. Bases which our military experts deem to be essential for our protection, and which are not now in our possession, we will acquire. We will acquire them by arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter.1

By the end of World War II, the United States had one of the world’s most comprehensive and extensive military basing and logistics systems. According to a former senior advisor to the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, America’s “overseas basing system at the end of the Second World War consisted of over thirty thousand installations located at two thousand base sites residing in around one hundred countries stretching from the Arctic Circle to Antarctica.”2 Truman sought to fortify and further strengthen this network against what was perceived as a rising Soviet appetite for aggression.3 At the end of the war, the U.S. military shifted its rhetoric and policy to focus increasingly on the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. By 1949, except for the airlift bases in Germany, Dhahran had become the busiest U.S. foreign airbase and 44

Negotiating a Foothold 45

was considered essential for U.S. postwar global operations and coordination.4 The new focus on the Gulf also aligned with a U.S. foreign policy that prioritized both energy security and deterring the Soviet Union’s expansion south into the Gulf.5 Saudi Arabia became increasingly integral to a U.S. Gulf policy as oil came online in unprecedented amounts following the war. With Great Britain and France weakened by the war, the United States, as a new global superpower, became a vital powerbroker in the Middle East, assuming responsibility for helping to balance the region’s politics and rivalries. Saudi Arabia grew concerned about the U.S. support for and alliance with Israel following that nation’s establishment in 1948. Rising anti-American sentiment in the kingdom worried the Saud monarchy to an extent during the basing negotiations of 1949 to 1951, but the negotiation outcome and updated leases had been influenced by external security concerns, mainly the fear of a Hashemite attack. The conclusion of the basing extension agreements during this period was also aided by U.S. promises of significant military and economic aid incentives. Additionally, the United States was willing to meet Saudi Arabia’s requests for munitions and military equipment because it was concerned that Saudi Arabia might otherwise buy military materiel from the Soviet Union.6 From 1952 to 1956, the Arabian Peninsula’s regional security concerns shifted with the rise of an Arab nationalism championed by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser.7 Exacerbating U.S. fears, the Soviet Union took advantage of the regional conflict and instability to adopt aggressive outreach efforts toward Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other nearby Arab countries. Saudi Arabia was dually vulnerable during this period due to both internal and external security concerns, especially in light of its poorly trained armed forces. Regionally, Saudi Arabia was concerned about its exclusion from the Baghdad Pact established in 1955 as a buffer against the Soviet Union, as well as a possible violent escalation of the ongoing Buraimi Oasis crisis involving a land and oil deposit dispute among Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, Abu Dhabi, and Oman. Domestically, Saudi Arabia experienced labor protests and revolutionary unrest that was both anti-American and antimonarchical in its eastern provinces because of poor working conditions and an influx in Arab expatriates spreading pan-Arab nationalism and socialism.8 The rise of Arab nationalism and threat of internal insurrection may have drifted to the forefront as an important national security concern in the early 1950s, but during the start of negotiations in 1956 external security concerns still played a more determinative role in solidifying the U.S. basing agreement. In this instance, Saudi Arabia desired the continuation of a

46  Negotiating a Foothold

U.S. military basing presence due to continued apprehension over Buraimi and a persistent fear that the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis might spill beyond Egypt into the Arabian Peninsula. During the three separate negotiating periods for the basing agreements of 1949, 1951, and 1957, the spread of Arab nationalism into Saudi domestic politics did not concern the monarchy to the same extent as external security concerns. This chapter examines the three external concerns that most influenced Saudi Arabia’s decision to maintain a U.S. military basing presence despite Saudi public opposition to the king’s decision to permit the U.S. military base: the continued Hashemite threat, the Buraimi Oasis Crisis, and the Suez Canal Crisis.9 Adapting U.S. Policy in the Gulf to the Cold War

Following the conclusion of World War II, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted a new global U.S. military policy: “Prepared to take prompt and effective military action wherever necessary” and to “maintain the security of the U.S., its territories, [and] possessions.”10 This new policy also included a focus on preventing the Soviet Union’s rise across the globe in a new Cold War dynamic. To help accomplish this, the United States began construction of an international intelligence structure that could monitor Soviet military, economic, political, and technological development. Further, the U.S. wanted to support and maintain a large merchant marine that could assist in expanding and coordinating operations between U.S. foreign outposts and military installations.11 In the Gulf, this meant “free access to and transit through and over the entire area [and] the preservation of the integrity of the entire area from foreign unfriendly influence and domination.”12 Certainly, this strategy included the maintenance and protection of the U.S.-leased base at Dhahran that many viewed as the best airfield between Cairo and Karachi.13 Aside from preventing the Soviet Union’s push for a warm-water port, the United States desired to maintain its position of power and influence in Saudi Arabia over Great Britain, which was seen by U.S. officials as a threat to American oil interests in the kingdom. In many instances, U.S. and UK diplomatic correspondence corroborated certain U.S. fears that Great Britain was trying to undermine U.S. credibility in the kingdom.14 At the same time, however, British diplomatic correspondence demonstrates that many in the British government embraced an increased U.S. presence in the kingdom and Gulf region because a U.S. presence was seen as helping offset Great Britain’s responsibility to maintain regional peace and security. In 1944, one British minister observed:

Negotiating a Foothold 47

It seems right, at the present time, that we should encourage American interest in the Middle East especially if that interest leads to them undertaking definite responsibilities. It seems to me that the risk of hostilities with America (which would thus create a threat to our line of communication with India and the Far East) is very small compared to the great advantage which we should obtain if the United States really consolidated themselves in the Persian Gulf area and thus reinforced our position against a possible Russian threat. Therefore if the Americans intend to come in to Saudi Arabia, I assume that on balance Britain should gain from it.15

The rising Soviet influence in the greater Gulf region became a primary concern for both Great Britain and the United States as the Cold War got under way. The United States in particular feared Soviet expansion that threatened its assets linked to the oil industry, including approximately four thousand U.S. citizens working in Saudi Arabia.16 After World War II, U.S. officials were apprehensive about the prolongation of a U.S. domestic oil shortfall. In 1948, the United States became a net oil importer, albeit briefly and for the first time, but substantiating U.S. fears.17 Amid mounting U.S. domestic apprehension, Saudi Arabia emerged in the 1950s as an increasingly essential supplier of oil to the United States, as well as to European reconstruction efforts. Saudi Arabia’s overall oil production rose from 550,000 barrels per day in 1951 to around 900,000 by the end of 1952. The spike in Saudi oil production was aided by the completion of the new 30-inch Tapline pipeline that ran from the Gulf across the Arabian Peninsula to Sidon, Lebanon. The pipeline saved tanker ships an estimated 3,500 miles traveling from the Strait of Hormuz to the Suez Canal.18 By the mid-1950s, Saudi annual oil revenue was estimated at $257 million, and Saudi Aramco supported sixty-five hundred U.S. employees and dependents.19 Although the Saud monarchy infrequently focused on the Soviet threat as a factor in its basing agreement decisions following the war, Ibn Saud and other Saudi officials were well aware of the Soviet menace and on several occasions cautioned neighboring regimes about the danger of developing close ties with the Soviet Union.20 Ibn Saud also reportedly expressed that he believed the Soviets to be “evil” people with devious intentions.21 As a deeply religious society, Saudi Arabia was less apprehensive initially about a Soviet ideology taking hold of local opposition groups. U.S. officials assured Saudi officials that the United States believed firmly in the “preservation of integrity and security of Saudi Arabia as one of its basic objectives of the U.S. in the Near East.”22

48  Negotiating a Foothold

Following Ibn Saud’s death in 1953, his son and successor, Crown Prince Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, expressed great uneasiness about the rising threat both socialism and pan-Arab national sentiment posed to the monarchy.23 Prior to the 1950s, the Soviet Union had maintained only a small presence on the Arabian Peninsula because of the strong British and American presence. But many in the Saud monarchy feared that the Soviets sought a significantly more active presence in the Gulf. Some Saudi officials were citing Yemen as receiving significant quantities of Soviet arms and equipment, which worried both the United States and Saudi Arabia because of Yemen’s geographic proximity and its porous desert borders with Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials also reported being approached by the Soviets to buy arms and munitions, which the king had refused.24 To safeguard against a heightened Soviet influence in Gulf affairs, the United States adopted a policy designed to guarantee Saudi Arabia’s security needs through U.S. economic aid and other capacity-building measures such as training missions.25 President Truman had announced his support for Saudi Arabia immediately upon his election to office. In his inaugural address on January 20, 1949, Truman had recognized the importance of the geopolitics of energy and energy security in response to the burgeoning Cold War.26 Saudi Arabia was an ideal partner to help secure these U.S. strategic national interests. In the same speech, Truman argued that economic development and rising living standards were two of the best ways to deter external aggression.27 The U.S. military also provided its interpretation of the Truman Doctrine and in one document discussing Saudi Arabia listed some of the items on its policy agenda: denying an enemy or rival the right to regional bases; the promotion of friendly relations through economic and military aid; the continued U.S. development of oil resources; the right of the U.S. military to develop and maintain facilities for its forces in the event of a threatening war.28 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an analysis of Saudi Arabia’s importance, concluded that a continued U.S. military presence at Dhahran would aid in America’s ability to fight future wars around the globe.29 In 1948, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal wrote that the U.S. vital national interests included gaining control of ocean communications from Gibraltar in the Mediterranean Sea to the Strait of Malacca at the Indian Ocean’s edge—with a stopover in the Gulf. He acknowledged a strong U.S. desire to establish a military depot in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia that could be used in case of outbreak of either regional or world war. Forrestal added that the U.S. Navy depended on oil production from Gulf countries, thus necessitat-

Negotiating a Foothold 49

ing a continued U.S. military presence. By 1948, Saudi Arabia provided the U.S. with more than 50 percent of its imported foreign oil.30 When President Dwight D. Eisenhower took office in 1953 as the thirty-fourth president of the United States, he clearly endorsed Truman’s policies on Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Peninsula. Like Truman, Eisenhower emphasized the U.S. commitment to thwart any Soviet meddling or outright regional aggression.31 Governance in a New Oil Era

As increasing amounts of oil revenue flowed into Saudi Arabia following World War II, the significant financial stream bolstered the Saud monarchy’s position but at the same time led to Saudi Arabia’s emergence as a rentier state. Oil revenue rose steadily from $10.4 million in 1946 to $56.7 million in 1950.32 The Saudi government began to depend upon the revenue derived from oil exports of the late 1940s and 1950s, defining the nation as a rentier state.33 The new wealth also meant that Ibn Saud’s inner circle became more prone to major corruption, graft, and financial exuberance, a phenomenon that left the monarchy increasingly open to criticism. With the petrodollar windfall, Ibn Saud was no longer beholden to regular Saudi citizens, enabling him to continue many regressive practices, including the maintenance of traditional tribal, religious, and kinship alliances that had historically proven successful.34 Despite the beginning of a period marked by revolutionary social ferment from rapid modernization and industrialization, the domestic political situation remained relatively inert during the first five years of the postwar period.35 Public outrage against the government did emerge in 1948 when the state of Israel was established with U.S. and British support. Many Saudis wanted Ibn Saud to break its alliance with the United States because of its support for the state of Israel and the subsequent division of Palestine. Ibn Saud was not swayed and upheld and expanded Saudi Arabia’s ties to the United States.36 He had begun to rely increasingly upon the U.S. military to support a buildup of Saudi Arabia’s military forces, which remained weak and woefully unprepared for an attack, let alone an internal insurrection.37 By the 1950s, however, Saudi Arabia faced mounting domestic security challenges linked to major labor riots in its eastern provinces sparked by poor working conditions and continued Saudi discrimination of the Shi’a minority who made up the majority of Saudi oil workers.38 Pan-Arab nationalism also grew in intensity when the leader of that movement, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, came to power in the 1952 Free Officers Movement that overthrew King Farouk

50  Negotiating a Foothold

in a military coup d’etat.39 During the initial years of Nasser’s rule, Saudi Arabia and the United States did not view Nasser’s movement as threatening, since his interests largely overlapped with those of Saudi Arabia and the United States. According to some accounts, “Colonel Nasser declared that Egypt was basically inclined toward the West and that Russia and communism represented the only conceivable danger to Egypt’s security.”40 While Saudi Arabia mourned Ibn Saud’s death in November 1953, Ibn Saud’s eldest son and successor, Crown Prince Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, began his reign by strengthening his ties to Egypt through an agreement that combined Saudi and Egyptian resources for defense, military equipment, and training.41 In another joint agreement the following year, Saudi Arabia and Egypt resolved to “render both countries as one as far as defense and all military questions were concerned.” Saudi Arabia remained concerned about the regional balance of power and rising influence of the Hashemites.42 Despite improved ties with Egypt, the Saudi government remained concerned about the spread of pan-Arab nationalism. The rise of the movement in Saudi Arabia appeared to coincide with the influx of Egyptian, Syrian, and Palestinian professionals, technicians, and laborers seeking work opportunities in Saudi Arabia’s booming new oil economy. Many of the foreign Arab workers supported the pan-Arab nationalist movement and helped to push for a more Arab national agenda in Saudi Arabia. In the early 1950s, Saudi officials found subversive, antimonarchical pamphlets circulated in the eastern provinces. And Aramco workers organized a series of labor protests and strikes for better working conditions during the same period. The 1953 Aramco workers’ strike exacerbated Saudi fears, since, during the same period, Mohammad Mossadeq, head of Iran’s communist-influenced Tudeh Party, overthrew Iran’s shah and pushed for the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The United States subsequently staged an internal coup that reinstated the shah, but the episode served as a warning to Saudi Arabia that it had entered dangerous territory.43 Following Aramco worker protests, the king issued a decree outlawing further protests and ordered the deportation of hundreds of suspected Arab collaborators.44 The unrest of the 1950s demonstrates the delicate balance that the Saud monarchy had to strike when prioritizing its national security concerns. As examined below, the basing negotiations of this period reveal that external security concerns had trumped domestic security fears linked to pan-Arab national sentiment as the Saud monarchy became apparently more focused on regional events, thus necessitating a prolonged U.S. military basing presence.45

Negotiating a Foothold 51

The Persistence of Regional Threats

Throughout the basing negotiations of 1949, 1951, and 1956, regional security fears remained the primary driving force behind the conclusion of each basing contract renewal. Saudi officials reportedly mentioned on several occasions that they felt unprepared against such regional rivals as Israel and Great Britain, even though Saudi Arabia had the financial resources to build a strong modern army.46 These findings discredit the base politics literature that downplays the role that external security concerns have on basing negotiation outcomes.47 Before analyzing the basing negotiations, this section needs to examine the three main external security factors of the period that influenced the Saud monarchy to conclude basing extension agreements with the United States: the continued threat of a Hashemite attack, the Buraimi Oasis dispute, and the Suez Canal Crisis. The Hashemites

Throughout the initial years of the postwar period, Saudi Arabia remained concerned about a Hashemite plot to attack Saudi Arabia and reclaim the territory lost from Ibn Saud in the 1920s. Saudi Arabia’s fear of a rising Hashemite threat was stoked further when the British concluded a defense treaty in March 1948 with Transjordan, later called Jordan. The treaty allowed the British to station air force units in Amman, the capital, and Mafraq, 80 kilometers north of Amman. It also established a permanent joint defense advisory board and British coordination of training and equipping the Jordanian military. British secretary of state for foreign affairs Ernest Bevin desired a similar treaty with Saudi Arabia, but Ibn Saud rejected the proposal because he did not trust the British due to their continuing political and military alliance with the Hashemites.48 The king did indeed appreciate his historic friendship with Great Britain, but Saudi officials believed that Great Britain would not sit quietly on the sidelines; it might stir up contempt among the Hashemites against Saudi Arabia since the British and Hashemites were close allies.49 In one dispatch on Ibn Saud, British officials described Ibn Saud’s continued mistrust of Britain: The main point of the King’s argument is that after being loyal to Great Britain throughout his career, he now sees his bitterest enemies, whom he had himself driven out of Arabia, supported and aggrandized by the British until they have reached a position of power and influence in which they can and do threaten the security of Ibn Saud’s position in his own country.50

52  Negotiating a Foothold

In a separate memorandum, Ibn Saud himself expressed his ongoing concern about the Hashemites’ close relationship to Great Britain: We have already put up with a great deal of intrigue, relying on our engagements with the British. The British now takes the line that Arabs themselves should resolve their disputes. But the support of the British and their protection, and their grants of weapons and money to them, that is what frightens us. In the same way we are frightened lest our dispute with them might affect the general political and military position of the British in the Middle East.51

In 1948 Saudi fears were further exacerbated by the public Hashemite proposal of the establishment of a “Greater Syria” that included a united Transjordan and Iraq to rival Saudi Arabia as a regional hegemon.52 Ibn Saud was also concerned that a unified Greater Syria would threaten Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity, including a possible attack on the Saudi Hejaz, including Mecca and Medina.53 The British tried to assure Saudi Arabia that this would never happen under the British watch, but Ibn Saud maintained his belief that British policies were designed to support the Hashemites and therefore could not be trusted.54 In 1948 the Saudi government wrote to the U.S. embassy expressing its continued concerns about the British-Hashemite alliance: “[T]he British had encouraged the Iraqis to agitate and propagandize ‘against us,’ in order to disturb relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.” The letter to the embassy also stated that Saudi Arabia was “almost certain” that the Anglo-Iraqi alliance’s purpose was to compel Saudi Arabia to move away from the U.S. and into a position where Great Britain would gain greater influence and power. At the end of the document, the Saudis asked the U.S. to prepare a statement in favor of Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty and national defense.55 The following year, 1949, Ibn Saud continued lobbying efforts for the United States to make stronger promises to defend Saudi Arabia in the event of an external attack. In one exchange, Ibn Saud makes a passionate plea to the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia James R. Childs: I am talking to you as I have not talked even with my own sons, Saud and Faisal. I consider you not only the U.S. Ambassador but a member of my own family. I want you to act in that capacity for me. I will give you a plane to take you to U.S. to present to USG [U.S. Government] the perilous state of affairs as I see them. I must have some protection of some assurance that USG will not

Negotiating a Foothold 53

stand idly by and allow British to encircle me. If Hejaz is attacked I will move with my family to [the] west coast, leaving if necessary the eastern part of Saudi Arabia with its oil undefended in order to withstand with my resources and to die if need be in defense of Hejaz.56

The United States seized upon the eroding British-Saudi partnership, reassuring Saudi Arabia of its devotion to the protection of the kingdom. Ambassador Childs told the king several times about U.S. unfettered support for Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity. Childs informed the king that if the king had any apprehensions with reference to British-Hashemite designs, he was to inform the U.S. embassy immediately for assistance.57 From Ibn Saud’s perspective, it was in his best interests to maintain military ties to the United States because Saudi Arabia was unprepared militarily to confront a Hashemite threat. The U.S. military could continue to provide a counterbalance to any possible British-backed Hashemite attack.58 Fear of a Hashemite attack continued into the 1950s, especially following the February 24, 1955, signing of the Baghdad Pact between Turkey and Iraq. Great Britain, Pakistan, and Iran later signed onto the pact, which was designed as a mutual cooperation agreement and anticommunist accord and to establish a regional buffer against a rising Soviet Union. The Saudis, however, viewed the Baghdad Pact as an affront to its regional standing and a shift in the regional balance of power in favor of the Hashemites.59 In reaction to the Baghdad Pact and to highlight Saudi Arabia’s regional security concerns, Saudi Arabia announced the formation of its own alliance on March 6 that included Egypt and Syria. The three countries signed an agreement to “strengthen the Arab structure politically, militarily and economically” and issued joint communiqués from Cairo, Damascus, and Riyadh, their respective capitals. The opposition communiqué also expressed a joint decision not to join the Baghdad Pact or another similar pact. Instead, the three countries established unique regional defense and economic cooperation, including a mutual defense treaty agreement signed in October 1955. The intent of the new alliance, which would later include Yemen, was also to restore or revitalize the defunct Arab League.60 Details of the agreement called for the creation of a joint military command to oversee the training, arming, and deployment of respective Arab armies across the region. Following the signing of the mutual defense treaty in October, Egyptian Army commander Major General Abdel Hakim Amr was named as commander-in-chief for both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. An earlier treaty had

54  Negotiating a Foothold

also placed the Syrian Army under his command. The new defense pact also proposed the collective organization of war industries and communications. Aside from military cooperation, the agreement initiated collaborative economic development. The three governments agreed, for example, to create an Arab Bank and a common Arab currency. Further, they eliminated customs and duties among the three Arab states and supported the establishment of an Arab Economic Council to manage joint industrial and agricultural projects.61 Despite the widely publicized announcement, few other Arab countries supported the new Arab cooperation. The lack of land crossings between the three countries made it difficult to implement the agreement’s fine points. The agreement never gained much momentum but still represented the continued suspicion that Saudi Arabia harbored for the Hashemites.62 The Buraimi Oasis Crisis

Prior to World War II and the discovery of oil, Buraimi, a 20-kilometer-radius settlement in the Arabian Peninsula’s southeast near Abu Dhabi, was barely contested by regional tribal powers.63 But with the war over and the prospects for oil extraction mounting, the Buraimi Oasis grew in importance for the region’s neighbors, most importantly the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, the Trucial shaykhdoms, and Saudi Arabia.64 Great Britain also had a direct vested interest in the dispute, since the British-backed Iraq Petroleum Company wanted to survey and control Buraimi’s oil exploration. Throughout the contested period, Great Britain represented and backed the interests of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman and the Trucial states, today’s Gulf emirates, putting it in direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia. The Buraimi crisis rose to the brink of war on several occasions during the 1950s but in the end resulted only in small skirmishes. The continued U.S. military presence was certainly an important factor that helped contain further escalation of the dispute.65 Heightened concern for Buraimi began in earnest in the late 1940s when Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., a subsidiary of the British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company, discovered oil in the oasis. Aside from oil, the Buraimi Oasis provided drinking water for much of the region. And it was located at a geostrategically important crossroads between the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, the Trucial states, and the western desert. Possession of Buraimi equated to control over Oman’s interior, as well as the Arabian Peninsula’s southeastern maritime territories.66 In 1951 Ibn Saud contributed to the escalating tension by making explicit territorial claims to Buraimi at an international conference

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in London.67 Throughout the 1950s, Saudi Arabia also asserted its “undisputed sovereignty” over Buraimi and its vicinity.68 The threat of a violent outbreak arose in 1952 when diplomatic talks between Saudi Arabia and Great Britain broke down after nearly two years of negotiations. King Ibn Saud continued his push to ignore the right and authority of any Trucial shaykh in Buraimi, not to mention the shaykhs of Muscat or Abu Dhabi.69 The Saud monarchy believed a military solution was the only way to solve the dispute.70 In preparation for a possible violent outburst, the Saudi government dispatched forty to fifty armed men and other unarmed support personnel toward the end of the summer 1952 to occupy the town of Hamasa, a village claimed by the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. The British foreign office considered the move a violation of their 1951 “standstill” agreement with the Saudis.71 Saudi Arabia, however, blamed the British for the dispute’s escalation and publicized a few violations: the daily flyover of British fighter jets on Saudi territory near Buraimi; the stoppage of food supplies to Buraimi’s Saudi sector; a halt to desert travel by demanding passports and visas; and the arrest of Saudi nationals in the area. Ibn Saud reportedly said local tribes were restless and ready to fight back. He also urged the U.S. to intervene immediately as a mediator on behalf of the Saudi government.72 In the fall of 1952 the sultan of Muscat began to amass his troops in preparation for a counterattack in a quickly escalating dispute with Saudi Arabia, which also began to build up an additional seven hundred troops and eighty vehicles at Al-Kharj near Riyadh. Great Britain grew nervous over the respective troop buildups and agreed to stop low flyovers to help ease tensions.73 As the dispute magnified, the United States was in a difficult position vis-à-vis its three partners: Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, and Muscat. The U.S. had historic ties with all three, including treaty relations with Muscat since 1833.74 It tried to maintain its neutrality while simultaneously reassuring Saudi Arabia of its longtime policy to defend Saudi Arabia. It had been President Truman’s policy to preserve Saudi independence and territorial integrity in the face of any external threats. If an attack did occur, the United States considered it of immediate concern.75 With mounting unease for Buraimi, Saudi prince Faisal met with U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles in March 1953 to discuss the dispute, among other regional concerns.76 Prince Faisal expressed his trepidation that Saudi Arabia could no longer trust the British, since Saudi Arabia had received reports that Britain had begun an additional troop buildup in Muscat and was

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preparing for a possible invasion.77 Saudi Arabia also lacked a well-trained and equipped military that could compete with the British.78 King Ibn Saud contributed to Saudi Arabia’s lobbying efforts and wrote directly to Eisenhower to express his increased concern for Buraimi despite President Eisenhower’s continued reassurances to assist Saudi Arabia. In Ibn Saud’s letter, he cited an event from June 27, 1953, when seven British armored cars, accompanied by British bombers, attacked the Beni Kab tribe, a Saud family ally. Ibn Saud described how the planes bombed homes with women and children, and armored cars fired machine guns at villagers in Nuweiji, between Sharjah and Buraimi. The British attack lasted seven hours and killed eight persons. After the attack, a British commander warned the Beni Kab tribal chief to surrender or else he would burn all the village’s homes.79 Saudi officials later insisted they did not provoke the assault, while Great Britain claimed to have warned the villagers of the impending attack.80 Despite Saudi allegations of inadequate U.S. support for Saudi Arabia at Buraimi, the United States took an active role in mediating the Buraimi crisis beginning in 1953. Certainly the U.S. had its own vested interests and wanted to ensure that Arabian Peninsula peace and stability was maintained. The United States was also concerned about increased Soviet outreach efforts to Saudi Arabia for “material and moral help” on the Buraimi dispute.81 Even with U.S. involvement in brokering an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Great Britain, it took approximately a year before the two powers agreed to sign a arbitration agreement. On July 30, 1954, a temporary arbitration agreement was reached and signed by British ambassador G. C. Pelham and Saudi foreign minister Prince Faisal. Great Britain signed the agreement on behalf of the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaykh Shakhbut Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, and the sultan of Muscat and Oman, Said bin Taimur. In the agreement, the two parties decided to establish an arbitration tribunal responsible for establishing a common frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi that involved Buraimi village. The British agreed not to explore for oil during the period of arbitration within the Buraimi zone.82 Despite the temporary settlement, the arbitration agreement was shortlived. Both the British and Saudis maintained their military activities in the region, thus violating the terms of the agreement.83 King Saud was enraged about the arrest and capture of certain local shaykhs who had been aligned with the Saud family. The British military had rounded up the local leaders and held them in a Dubai prison once they deemed that Saudi Arabia had violated the arbitration agreement.84 With continued U.S. pressure for mediation, however,

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the Buraimi Oasis crisis did not escalate further during this period. Since the dispute was never properly resolved, Saudi Arabia continued to rely upon the U.S. military presence at Dhahran as an important buffer against the British and to prevent against any further outbursts over Buraimi or threats thereof.85 Suez Canal Crisis

The last major regional security concern for Saudi Arabia that was referenced during the start of basing negotiations in 1956 was the shift in Nasser’s foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and the subsequent British departure from the Suez Canal zone. Beginning in 1955, Egyptian ties to Great Britain had begun to spiral downward significantly, due in large part to Great Britain’s continued alliance with Israel. Nasser’s increasing frustration with Great Britain and his more radical anti-Western rhetoric pushed him to announce a formal arms agreement with the Soviet Union in September 1955.86 During the same period, Nasser further undermined his ties to Great Britain by supporting antiBritish protests in Jordan and Bahrain; by purchasing munitions from Poland, a Soviet satellite; and by recognizing the People’s Republic of China.87 Needless to say, both Saudi Arabia and the United States grew uneasy with Nasser’s rising regional stature and more radical foreign policy, even as they continued to back Nasser financially and militarily.88 Under mounting Egyptian pressure, British troops finally departed the Suez Canal zone on June 13, 1956. President Nasser moved quickly to fill the British void; on July 26 he announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Both the United States and Great Britain had reneged on previously approved funding for Egypt’s Aswan Dam project; Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company would generate enough revenue to finish the dam.89 In 1955, the Suez Canal Company earned $103 million in gross revenues, an amount expected to increase in the future with the continued influx of Gulf oil exports. The British and the French, who possessed the largest holdings in the company, were incensed by the move. The British government alone had a 45 percent stake in the company.90 Great Britain was prepared to immediately launch a military campaign to win back the Suez Canal, but the United States tried to intervene on Nasser’s behalf to delay an attack. The looming crisis placed President Eisenhower in a difficult position because he was concerned about his ties to Egypt and how the future of the region would be affected by a prolonged conflict. And he feared that the Soviet Union would justify an intervention on Nasser’s behalf if fight-

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ing were prolonged. In one telling comment, U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles privately noted, “We did not all work so hard to get a Suez base agreement in order to turn the base over to the Soviets.”91 Great Britain initially followed U.S. calls to restrain itself from attacking Egypt. But in the interim, Great Britain convinced the French and Israelis to launch preemptive strikes on Egypt. Israel launched the first attack on October 29; two days later Great Britain and France launched a joint attack on Egyptian bases. Great Britain and France justified the assault by claiming it was for the security and protection of the Suez Canal.92 In a show of solidarity, Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic relations with both France and Great Britain on November 6. It also barred the loading and shipment of oil onto British and French vessels destined for British and French ports, in addition to cutting off the supply of oil to Bahrain, a British maritime outpost.93 U.S. fears about the shifting regional power dynamic began to materialize as the crisis escalated. The mounting crisis also coincided with the ramp-up of negotiations for the U.S. basing renewal at Dhahran. In one exchange between Secretary of State Dulles and President Eisenhower, the two discuss their fears about how the Soviet Union might take advantage of the Suez Canal Crisis: “Unless the United States ended fighting,” Dulles observed, “all of these newly independent countries will turn from us to the USSR. We will be looked upon as forever tied to British and French colonialist policies.” “How can we possibly support Britain and France,” Eisenhower added, “if in so doing we lose the entire Arab world?” U.S. inaction would enable the Soviet Union to seize “a mantle of world leadership through a false but convincing exhibition of concern for smaller nations.”94 In the end, the United States chose national security interests that included support for Nasser over its allegiance to Great Britain. The Eisenhower administration was concerned about maintaining its basing presence from Egypt to Saudi Arabia as a buffer against the Soviet Union. The United States helped negotiate a ceasefire that began on November 6.95 The United States was first concerned that the Soviet Union would intervene in Nasser’s behalf, and second, it was worried about being pulled into another war similar to the Korean War. It was similarly apprehensive about the vulnerability of important allies such as Saudi Arabia, whose military, estimated at about ten thousand, was inadequate to defend itself against a possible attack or Soviet invasion.96 In fact, President Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs: “We wanted to explore the possibilities of building up King Saud as a counterweight to Nasser. The King was a logical

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choice in this regard; he at least professed anti-Communism, and he enjoyed, on religious grounds, a high standing among all Arab nations.”97 With a ceasefire in place, the Eisenhower administration engaged in a major diplomatic effort to ensure that the crisis did not escalate. At the same time, it also defended Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, valuing its relationship to Egypt. In defending Nasser, the United States argued that Egypt had been granted authority to operate the Suez Canal as specified by the Canal Convention of 1888.98 Even so, the U.S. warned Egypt that any power controlling the canal was obligated to maintain it as an international waterway—an attempt to mitigate additional British or French criticisms. Many countries, including Saudi Arabia and the United States, relied heavily upon the flow of maritime commerce and other shipments through the canal zone. If Egypt could not guarantee this, the United States believed it should not be granted continued authority over canal operations.99 Egypt’s neighbor and ally Saudi Arabia was deeply concerned by the Suez Canal Crisis and reached out to the United States for additional support and aid during the crisis. Feeling the pressure of heightened regional turmoil, the king requested additional equipment and training from the United States so it could defend itself in the event of further violent outbursts or war.100 Following the November ceasefire, King Saud wrote to President Eisenhower to express his “urgent desire” to receive arms to defend against a possible end of the ceasefire and a spillover attack from Israel, Great Britain, or France as a result of the political uncertainty. He also desired to conclude a U.S. military basing deal on Dhahran because of the unpredictable nature of the crisis.101 Similar to the concerns expressed by Eisenhower, Saud reportedly felt that persistent instability or a reengagement of the conflict could enable the Soviet Union to justify a more active regional role. In a follow-up plea, the king urged U.S. officials for increased support: “I am spending 400 million riyals a year on the army which cannot go into action . . . . You cannot have good morale in army unless it has arms . . . . We are under pressure, directly and indirectly, take arms that have been offered [but] I have taken nothing because I gave my word to U.S. . . . We will train and you must send arms.”102 Due to its souring relationship with Nasser, which continued to erode for the remainder of the decade, the United States worked to meet Saudi Arabia’s requests. Incentives aside, the dynamics of the Suez Canal Crisis support the argument that regional security concerns were a driving factor in Saudi Arabia’s national security calculus and influenced the outcome of U.S. military basing negotiations.

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Capacity Building and Aid Incentives Influence Basing Outcomes

Before examining the basing negotiations in greater depth, it is important to examine how U.S. military and economic aid packages helped the United States maintain its position of power and influence in the kingdom, in addition to supporting Saudi Arabia’s attempts at modernization and other development programs.103 The aid packages and other friendship treaty initiatives were aimed at assisting the king justify a prolonged U.S. military presence despite mounting domestic insecurity toward the mid-1950s. The continued flow of aid to the kingdom had the added benefit of keeping Saudi Arabia buffered from increased Soviet outreach efforts to sell the king more weapons and military equipment. The Soviet Union had begun to express interest in Saudi oil resources, and the U.S. military feared that the Soviets could easily undermine a U.S. position in Saudi Arabia by offering better military equipment deals.104 Economic Aid and Treaties of Goodwill

The U.S. State Department Near Eastern Affairs Bureau viewed the role of its Export-Import Bank loans as a key U.S. foreign policy instrument in gaining a foothold in such countries as Saudi Arabia. The Near Eastern Affairs division stated that any excess funds unused in Europe or Asia should be applied to Near Eastern countries because of their geostrategic and political importance for U.S. national interests.105 Starting in September 1946, U.S. officials proposed a continued flow of aid to Saudi Arabia as a means to maintain U.S. influence in Saudi Arabia. The U.S. Export-Import Bank spoke with government officials about lending $15 million for development in Saudi Arabia. In one memorandum, U.S. government officials raised the possibility of eight survey projects that could act as pledges of allegiance toward Saudi Arabia. Sample projects included a water supply system for Jidda, an electric grid for Mecca and Riyadh, a deep-water harbor at Jidda, irrigation projects, hospitals in Riyadh and Taif, and railroad and highway construction. The projects were estimated at more than $56 million.106 The Export-Import Bank was not prepared to finance all eight projects but under White House pressure did agree to approve a $25 million credit line.107 During basing negotiations in 1950, the Export-Import Bank also played a vital role in offering an important credit line to Saudi Arabia as a means to help the United States in its negotiation efforts. It approved an additional $15 million credit line to assist Saudi Arabia’s three main cities, Jidda,

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Dammam, and Riyadh, in ongoing and future development projects.108 At the start of basing renewal negotiations in 1956, the U.S. continued to support Saudi development projects and pledged to back projects such as the construction of the Port of Dammam and the Jidda-to-Riyadh railway.109 The Dammam project, estimated at $20 million, would include three additional pier berths, two locomotives and 125 railroad cars, freight handling equipment, and the rehabilitation of existing facilities.110 In addition to loans, the State Department promoted the signing of a basic treaty on friendship, commerce, and navigation between Saudi Arabia and the United States to supplement a previous friendship treaty from November 7, 1933. It believed that the conclusion of this supplemental treaty would help in the basing negotiations of 1949. The updated treaty also enabled Saudi Arabia to send a delegation to Washington in a sign of goodwill. Bilateral delegation visits told the rest of the world that Saudi Arabia and the United States had common interests, which included Saudi independence, resistance to communism, and the development of Saudi Arabia’s vast natural resources for the betterment of its people.111 U.S. Military Assistance and Defense Aid

The U.S. provision of substantive military aid and equipment to Saudi Arabia helped maintain its position of power, goodwill, and influence in the kingdom.112 The U.S. provided significant military aid through several avenues, including military assistance and training programs and the sale of weapons and other materiel. U.S. officials believed the continued flow of military aid to Saudi Arabia safeguarded its basing presence at Dhahran.113 Saudi internal security concerns eventually outweighed the fear of external threats, leading to a U.S. military basing expulsion, but during the period analyzed here military incentives greatly assisted the basing negotiations.114 The U.S. concern was that if it did not meet Saudi military needs, the kingdom would be enticed by Soviet outreach efforts.115 As a result, the United States had much to lose if Saudi Arabia turned toward the Soviet Union and away from the U.S. for technical and military support. Saudi Arabia, with its oil-based cash liquidity, could turn on the United States at a moment’s notice and procure military equipment and munitions from somewhere else if it was not satisfied with U.S. military aid promises.116 One of the first successful U.S. incentive packages for Saudi Arabia was a military assistance program that originated in a December 1947 Saudi request

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for a military training mission. As previously noted, Saudi Arabia, apprehensive about the heightened Hashemite threat, requested U.S. support for its military training and modernization efforts, including U.S. arms and equipment.117 U.S. military officials were receptive to Saudi proposals, having grown to rely upon both Saudi oil and basing outposts for its regional and global operations. In a private U.S. military report, General J. Lawton Collins, the U.S. Army chief of staff, argued that Saudi Arabia should be given whatever equipment it desired because of the U.S. Navy’s reliance on Saudi oil for its fleet operations.118 The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed in principle to support U.S. military assistance on a reimbursable basis. In a similar effort, the Defense Department wanted to ensure that the increased military aid would solidify future Dhahran base negotiations, especially those of 1950.119 On August 11, 1950, U.S. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson submitted the Defense Department’s proposed military assistance program for Saudi Arabia, which totaled more than $75.5 million. The program would help equip and outfit a modern Saudi military force consisting of 18,085 men in the army, 108 in the air force, and 265 in the navy. The assistance program, in combination with the extended credit line already mentioned, helped convince Ibn Saud to conclude the final terms of the Dhahran base extension agreement.120 President Truman maintained a policy of offering military aid incentive packages as a means to stay in the good graces of the king and keep Saudi Arabia within a U.S. sphere of influence. In August 1952, the State Department recommended an aid extension to Saudi Arabia under Section 202 of the U.S. Mutual Security Act of 1951.121 Saudi Arabia had previously requested $43 million for a cash-reimbursable training installation at Al-Kharj, south of Riyadh.122 Acting U.S. secretary of defense William C. Foster wrote to Secretary Acheson that the grant of military aid was necessary to ensure the prolongation of military base rights in Saudi Arabia.123 In U.S. diplomatic dispatches, Ambassador Raymond A. Hare expressed a similar opinion: the military assistance agreement was meant as a trade-off for the signing of the Dhahran basing extension agreement.124 U.S.-Saudi relations grew more tense by the mid-1950s, in part because of Nasser’s revolutionary rise and his shifting foreign policy that frayed regional ties; U.S. officials responded by exploring additional ways to maintain the flow of military aid incentive packages to Saudi Arabia. The U.S. secretary of the Air Force, Harold E. Talbott, agreed to the sale of three additional B-26 aircraft to Saudi Arabia, increasing the total number of B-26s operating in Saudi

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Arabia to nine, and U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia George E. Wadsworth argued that the decision to sell additional aircraft was important for the upkeep of bilateral ties in the face of increased regional turbulence. In addition to aircraft, the State Department approved a Saudi purchase of eighteen M-47 and eighteen M-41 tanks and sixty armored cars, the sale justified under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement from the Mutual Defense Act of 1949. A U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group had proposed the sale as part of Saudi Arabia’s military modernization and expansion programs.125 The sale of the tanks in particular reportedly pleased the king, who expressed his “keen satisfaction” to Ambassador Wadsworth. The State Department responded by telling Ambassador Wadsworth to convey to the king that the United States would continue to fulfill and improve the military assistance program if the Dhahran base agreement remained in good standing.126 Certainly, a lot was at stake for the United States if it lost its basing outpost at Dhahran, which at the time was worth an estimated $46,700,000, in addition to approximately $1,000,000 in annual maintenance costs.127 Ahead of the 1957 basing renewal agreement, U.S. military aid and assistance also proved to be an important component that assisted in a positive basing negotiation outcome. On October 4, 1955, for example, Saudi Arabia communicated to the U.S. government its desire to modify and conclude the Dhahran base agreement, but only if the king continued to receive adequate arms and equipment provided by the U.S. military for the Saudi armed forces.128 The king continued to protest that Saudi Arabia was the most ill equipped militarily of all Arab states despite its substantial oil resources. Moreover, he wanted to receive additional U.S. arms and assistance without preconditions. If the United States refused, the king threatened to look elsewhere for arms, where he could buy them unconditionally.129 According to Ambassador Wadsworth, Prince Faisal would not support the base renewal unless Saudi Arabia received clear support for Saudi Arabia’s five-year plan to build up and modernize Saudi forces. In other words, Prince Faisal believed in a quid pro quo: renewal of the Dhahran basing agreement in exchange for U.S. support of Saudi Arabia’s military in the form of unconditional grant aid.130 The 1955 price tag for Saudi Arabia’s five-year plan, in the midst of an increasingly volatile regional situation, was $400 million. If purchased from the United States, military equipment and transportation aid accounted for $65 million of the total.131 Ambassador Wadsworth advised the State Department to accept the “new formula”: the United States would be responsible for building

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up Saudi military forces in exchange for the base renewal. Wadsworth believed that agreeing to such conditions ahead of time would ease the final renewal negotiations. In May 1956, the U.S. approved the sale of approximately $33 million in military equipment. The equipment included 6 jet trainer aircraft (T-33); 6 cargo aircraft (C-119); and 463 miscellaneous items or transport, quartermaster supplies, and basic infantry equipment.132 Washington also wanted to ensure the arms shipments arrived to Saudi Arabia, since the Dhahran base renewal agreement had not yet been approved.133 The king similarly remarked that if the United States wanted a Dhahran renewal, it would need to provide the arms Saudi Arabia requested.134 As the U.S. basing renewal negotiations spilled into 1957, and under pressure from the Saudis to demonstrate its commitment to Saudi Arabia more publicly with the sponsorship of larger U.S. aid packages, the U.S. military reconfirmed its commitment to provide training for the Saudi Army, Air Force, and Navy, in addition to improving Dhahran’s civilian airport and assisting in the expansion of Dammam’s port.135 The last-minute addition of naval training to the agreement was significant because Saudi Arabia had motor launches but no formal navy prior to 1957. With this new training agreement addition, the State Department believed the Saudis would have a “very modest” navy after five years, including a small fleet of ships. This program marked the first time the United States was involved in building up a navy for an Arab nation.136 The total cost for the training programs and port and basing improvements amounted to approximately $50 million over five years. The U.S. military added one last incentive that included $110 million in weapon sales, including eighteen M-47s and eighteen M-41s. In the end, military aid packages were reportedly well received and helped to ensure a positive U.S. military basing negotiation outcome.137 Getting to Yes: Negotiating for Dhahran

Military and economic aid packages aside, external and regional security concerns remained the primary factor driving the conclusion of the U.S. basing renewal agreements with Saudi Arabia during the first decade following World War II. The United States and Saudi Arabia engaged in three noteworthy basing agreement negotiations—in 1949, 1951, and 1956/1957. In one instance, and to highlight Ibn Saud’s continued fears about regional security, the king cited Saudi Arabia’s inability to defend against an external attack by a neighboring country. He argued that this was not the case for Transjordan or Iraq, since

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they had received modern weaponry and training from the British.138 During each negotiation, however, a basing agreement was never a forgone conclusion because of the persistent dilemma Saudi Arabia faced regarding how a U.S. military presence was perceived internally, not to mention regionally. During certain moments in the negotiations Saudi negotiators appeared divided over the continuation of a basing agreement due to possible domestic pushback or an internal insurrection against the Saud monarchy. U.S. documents convey the Saudis as being concerned in particular about the optics of the prolonged U.S. basing presence and how they could justify a prolonged U.S. military presence. As a result, Saudi negotiators attempted to portray negotiations as focused more on Saudi defense and U.S. military aid rather than on the U.S. basing presence. Saudi officials did not want to be viewed as a U.S. puppet that had lost control of its territorial integrity. An additional negotiation obstacle for the United States was the abrupt change the king made in chief negotiators for Dhahran in 1949. Shaykh Yusuf Yassin, a supposed U.S. sympathizer who was acting minister of foreign affairs in Jidda, had been in charge of basing negotiations before the king replaced him with the king’s royal counselor on foreign affairs, Fuad Hamza, a Druze shaykh from Palestine with a reputation as a hard-nosed bargainer.139 Yassin had been in charge of negotiating the Dhahran base agreement in 1945 and again in 1946 but was criticized internally for his leniency toward the U.S. military. Yassin’s critics, including Hamza, argued that the original basing agreement had compromised Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty.140 The United States had proposed a twenty-five-year lease agreement for control of Dhahran, but the Saudi officials were reluctant, based on the negative experience of the Egyptians and Iraqis with the British.141 It was believed the British had gained too much sovereign control over the respective territories, and Saudi officials did not want to replicate the experience with the Americans.142 The king expressed similar concerns and wanted to ensure that newly negotiated U.S. basing agreements did not provide too much leverage for the United States to prolong its presence, a potential lightning rod issue for the Saudi opposition.143 A Continued Balance of Saudi National Security Concerns

In late April 1948, the U.S. State Department received word about the king’s desire to proceed with negotiations for a Dhahran basing extension. U.S. control of Dhahran was due to expire on March 15, 1949.144 According to U.S. embassy officials, the king wanted to negotiate the continuation of the Dhahran

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base together with commitments as to how much military aid and economic assistance the United States would provide for Saudi national defense. Ibn Saud wanted to frame the negotiation in terms of Saudi national defense and mutual defense assistance rather than focusing on the U.S. military presence. But according to Yassin, the king was indeed open to almost any U.S. request if the U.S. provided enough military aid and assistance.145 In one memo, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal recognized the delicate balance Saudi Arabia had to strike in order to assuage a potential negative regional or internal reaction. He wrote that a military foothold on the Arabian Peninsula could produce “hostile propaganda” against Saudi Arabia with claims of U.S. imperialism.146 Similar concerns were voiced in a meeting on Dhahran’s renewal with Saudi minister of defense Prince Mansour; Shaykh Yassin; Colonel Richard J. O’Keefe, commanding officer at Dhahran who was later promoted to brigadier general; and Ambassador Childs. The Saudi officials mentioned their continued fears regarding the Hashemites and other Arab criticism portraying Saudi Arabia as a puppet state.147 Many Saudis viewed the United States with disdain because of U.S. support for Israel and the partition of Palestine.148 Needless to say, Saudi officials remained apprehensive about how a basing extension would be perceived, especially if it was for several decades, as requested initially by the United States.149 Despite a certain degree of political trepidation, Ibn Saud and other Saudi officials invoked Saudi Arabia’s external security calculus as a primary reason to conclude a basing extension agreement with the United States. In a private meeting with Ambassador Childs, the king conveyed his fears about regional instability, including concerns that Yemen would join forces with Iraq and Transjordan, contributing to a suspected Hashemite plot to surround and attack the Saud monarchy. The king told Childs that King Abdullah of Transjordan was negotiating concessions for Israel in Palestine in an attempt to win Israel’s support for an attack on the Hejaz in Saudi Arabia, which Ibn Saud reportedly believed to be part of a Hashemite vision of constructing a Greater Syria. Ibn Saud also mentioned his growing worry about the spread of socialism, not so much in the kingdom—he believed his people looked to him as a father—but he was troubled by inroads socialists seemed to be making in Egypt, which in 1949 he viewed as a potential rival.150 Lastly, the king told Ambassador Childs that he remained fearful of British aims to restore its power, which had been eroded in the kingdom and the region following World War II. The king said he had received word from his London ambassador that Great Britain was trying

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to undermine potential future agreements between the United States and Arab states in order to diminish Saudi Arabia’s regional influence.151 Final negotiations for the 1949 basing agreement began in mid-March, and after a week of exhaustive negotiations dealing with questions of sovereignty, the extent of the base, and duration of the lease, the negotiators reached a final draft agreement on March 25.152 A major sticking point for the Saudis was article five of the agreement, authorizing the United States “to administer and supervise . . . matters connected with U.S. military aircraft and U.S. military and civilian personnel employed at DAB [Dhahran Airbase].”153 The Saudi government requested the appointment of Brigadier General Richard J. O’Keefe of the U.S. Air Force to oversee most of the administration at Dhahran, including managing the operation and control of technical equipment, reception, and distribution of weather services, and aircraft and tower operations.154 Despite disagreement over article five and specifying O’Keefe’s role, the United States managed to keep article five’s wording the same. The U.S. did not, however, achieve a long-term basing lease. Ibn Saud agreed to only a one-year lease, wishing to limit the amount of flexibility the U.S. had in its control over Dhahran. The updated Dhahran Airfield Agreement was signed on June 23, 1949.155 Despite the short term of the lease, the king expressed his desire to enhance Saudi-U.S. relations, wanting the two countries to be more “like one government,” where Americans would be comfortable to invest and increase their operations for the benefit of both the United States and Saudi Arabia.156 Due to the short-term nature of the basing extension, Saudi and U.S. officials were back at the negotiating table the following year. The negotiating teams spent most of 1950 sorting out how much U.S. military aid Saudi Arabia would receive. Basing extension negotiations did not get under way until the end of the year. On December 24, 1950, Ambassador Raymond A. Hare, Ambassador Child’s successor, met with King Ibn Saud to finalize military assistance for Saudi Arabia and to discuss the lease extension for the Dhahran Airfield. In the meeting, the king reemphasized his concerns about Saudi sovereignty. He expressed mounting apprehension about the basing extension because of rising anti-American sentiment and hostility toward his government that a basing extension could provoke. He stated that “his people were ignorant and he did not want [to] give them reason [to] turn against either himself or [the] Americans,” asserting that past U.S. assistance in no way guaranteed any future agreement regarding the Dhahran Airfield.157 In late May 1951, the United States began its final negotiations with Saudi

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Arabia for a Dhahran base extension agreement. In the final talks, the Saudis remained adamant about U.S. promises to uphold Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty.158 Jurisdiction was another contested issue. The Saudis wanted jurisdiction over all civilians and military personnel accused of violating Saudi laws outside the base. In the end, the United States and Saudi Arabia agreed to a compromise regarding offenders off the base: Saudi officials could “arrest and conduct prompt preliminary investigation and then turn offenders over to U.S. authorities for trial and punishment.”159 The U.S. agreed to a five-year basing contract extension, less than the twenty-five years it initially wanted, in order to mitigate any future criticism about U.S. motives in the Arabian Peninsula.160 On June 18, 1951, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Treaty and the five-year extension on the Dhahran Base.161 The road to a final agreement was not straightforward, in view of continued external security threats, mainly from the Hashemites, but U.S. assurances of increased military aid and technical support helped finalize the agreement. The 1951 Dhahran Airfield Agreement technically granted the U.S. military a ten-year operating lease, subject to cancellation or modification by either the United States or Saudi Arabia after five years. During the first five years of the agreement, the Department of Defense envisioned an expansion of the base’s personnel and equipment to increase the facility’s capacity.162 The 1951 agreement placed the United States in charge of the Dhahran civilian airport without additional costs to Saudi Arabia. The U.S. also promised to train Saudi airport technicians, provide military equipment on a cash reimbursable basis, and sponsor a military training mission to enhance Saudi Arabia’s armed forces.163 Unsurprisingly, the Saudis used the five-year modification clause from the 1951 agreement to extract greater concessions from the U.S. in return for continuing the basing agreement. The kingdom also remained conflicted over how to balance its internal and external security concerns. U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia George E. Wadsworth wrote about the ongoing political tensions, arguing that King Saud relied more heavily on U.S. assistance because of the ongoing dispute with the British over Buraimi, as well as increased tensions with Iraq and Jordan.164 Indeed, as the renegotiations approached, external security considerations increasingly trumped domestic and regime security concerns because of the region’s rapid military development during the 1950s.165 Saudi domestic security concerns remained prevalent, but to a lesser extent than the perception of external threats to the nation. In the 1950s, King Saud

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began to view the Bedouin militia, formerly referred to as the Ikhwan, as less of a threat. In fact, he increasingly relied upon them as the Saudi National Guard, or White Army, to assist in suppressing antimonarchy or revolutionary activity within the kingdom.166 Even with the National Guard at hand, Saudi Arabia continued to experience workers’ protests at Aramco and increased pan-Arab national sentiment among its Arab expatriates.167 Due to the rising prominence of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser and pan-Arab nationalism, Saudi Arabia had grown concerned about revolutionary behavior, especially in the eastern provinces. Some reports noted the rise of revolutionary activity among military officers, while other sources reported the creation of a “Free Saudis Movement” that was portrayed as an underground organization seeking King Saud’s overthrow and subsequent establishment of a liberal government.168 The “Arabian Peninsula People’s Union” emerged during the same period and called for workers to unite against the monarchy after a violent government crackdown on labor unrest.169 Despite such internal domestic security concerns, national defense and the fear of a British-backed attack by Iraq, Jordan, or another country still ranked higher on Saudi Arabia’s perceived national security priorities. As the 1956 basing renewal negotiation approached, the king reportedly remained positive and receptive to U.S. proposals, especially of an increase in military and economic aid. The king, however, still conveyed apprehension about repercussions from a prolonged U.S. presence. In one conversation, he told U.S. ambassador Wadsworth that “great pressure had been brought upon him, both inside and outside of his country, against the renewal of the accord. . . . We would not agree to extend the agreement without having certain things to justify our attitude.”170 The spread of pan-Arab nationalism had slowly begun to take root in Saudi Arabia much to the dismay of the king.171 “Our relations are very good,” Saud told the ambassador. “It is my hope they will remain so. [Dhahran Airfield] is the symbol of this. But you must help us. We need some justification, something concrete which our people and others can see and point to, something which will persuade them of the rightness of my judgment and action.”172 In correspondence between Ambassador Wadsworth and the U.S. State Department, Wadsworth wrote that a “stronger surge of Arab nationalism is now increasingly influencing high policy decisions.”173 For the first time, the U.S. military began to experience visible internal opposition to its presence. It was surprised by the backlash, since it believed Saudi Arabia had benefited sub-

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stantially from the U.S. military presence, including the buildup of a civilian airport and the mass training of military recruits.174 This time around, however, the monarchy needed even better justification for the U.S. military’s basing renewal. Its position was less stable than previously because of the rise of internal pressure on the king by expatriate workers who desired better working conditions and tribal leaders who disapproved of King Saud’s handling of the kingdom and its finances. King Saud and his royal counselors met with Ambassador Wadsworth on September 11, 1956. The focus was regional security, including the Suez Crisis, Saudi-Iraqi relations, and the communist threat in Syria. Regarding Dhahran, the king stated explicitly: “Use my airfield and strengthen my Kingdom.”175 Wadsworth responded that the U.S. offer of $25 million in military grant aid on top of the $35 million in equipment already purchased was substantial compared with U.S. aid amounts offered to Saudi Arabia’s neighbors. Nevertheless, the king still wanted more substantial support to use as proof of a strong U.S. commitment to convince the otherwise highly skeptical Saudi public. The king continued: If you are desirous of cooperating with us and if you really wish to support your friend, who has been on your side and has supported you, for which there is much evidence, and if you would like to support him with his people and with the world, I will accept extension of DAF [Dhahran Airfield] agreement for 5 years on this basis—that besides the $25 million, you furnish me with the $85 million worth of arms as a grant. . . . You have offered Pakistan $300 million and Spain as much. I do not ask equivalent assistance.176

Wadsworth replied to the king that the United States could not increase its military aid amounts without a formal military grant aid agreement approved under U.S. national law. The king was still reportedly unsatisfied and reiterated that he was in an increasingly difficult position to justify the continuation of the U.S. military base. Moreover, he believed the base renewal was enough to warrant a substantial increase in U.S. military aid.177 Negotiations for Dhahran dragged into the winter and new year. King Saud seems to have driven a hard bargain on military equipment and aid responding to both internal pressure to justify a prolonged U.S. military presence and rising opposition to his rule.178 However, he admitted that Saudi Arabia understood that the U.S. military offered better protection against regional threats

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than any other power. Regional security concerns remained more important than domestic political unrest—that had been quelled temporarily by Saud’s armed forces. At the end of January 1957, President Eisenhower finally met King Saud to discuss Dhahran and the Suez Canal Crisis. The king told the president that Saudi Arabia wanted the United States to retain its rights at Dhahran.179 The king remarked: “My country has 900,000 square miles and at least 12 million people. The British are nibbling at a number of my borders and have been particularly aggressive in the case of Buraimi and the Empty Quarter.”180 He said that the Saudi government would indeed continue to rely on U.S. military support to fulfill its national security needs.181 In early February, U.S. under secretary of state Robert Murphy and Ambassador Wadsworth led a U.S. delegation to meet with Prince Fahd, son of King Saud and minister of defense, and Yusuf Yassin, deputy foreign minister, to conclude an agreement on military aid and the Dhahran military base.182 Before President Eisenhower and King Saud signed the agreement, the U.S. and Saudi delegations issued a joint statement: With respect to the military defense of Saudi Arabia, including the Dhahran Airfield, President Eisenhower assured His Majesty King Saud of the willingness of the U.S. to provide assistance for the strengthening of the Saudi armed forces within the constitutional processes of the U.S. To this end, plans are being made by representatives of both countries for the supply of military equipment, services and training, for the purposes of defense and the maintenance of internal security in the Kingdom. In the same spirit, His Majesty King Saud assured President Eisenhower of his majesty’s intention that the U.S. continue for another five years to use the facilities accorded to it at the Dhahran Airfield under conditions provided for the agreement concluded between the two countries on June 18, 1951. The U.S. agreed to consider the provision of economic facilities that would serve to augment the combined aims and interests of the two countries.183

After some minor negotiations over wording, the United States and Saudi Arabia concluded the military base renewal agreement on April 2, 1957, following more than ten months of negotiations.184 By 1957, the United States had approximately fifteen hundred military and civilian personnel on site, overseeing the estimated 16,000 acres contained within the U.S. Dhahran military base zone.185

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Conclusion

Negotiating a U.S. basing foothold in Saudi Arabia was never an easy affair or a forgone conclusion, because of the continued turbulence and instability that racked the region following World War II. During the first postwar decade, both the United States and Saudi Arabia had to adapt to the region’s everchanging political and security dynamics. Fortunately for the United States, external or regional security concerns took precedence for Saudi Arabia, justifying a continued U.S. military basing presence. While Ibn Saud was in power, he worried less about internal security dynamics than of being overtaken by the Hashemites. He remained apprehensive about his eroding relationship with Great Britain and the continuing stalemate over land and oil exploration rights in the Buraimi Oasis. Ibn Saud could be less concerned about internal security matters in part because of Saudi Arabia’s petrodollar windfall funds that helped him solidify much of his power base and the fortunate unification of the most troublesome Bedouin tribes. Even so, Saud still kept an eye toward domestic security. The United States understood this dynamic and used elaborate military and economic aid packages to maintain the goodwill of the king. American largess was particularly in evidence in times before key basing negotiation periods. By the time Ibn Saud died in 1953, however, the greater Gulf and Middle East region had begun an era of pan-Arab national ferment. The leader of this new era was Egyptian president Gamal Nasser. To begin, Egypt and Saudi Arabia proved to be natural allies, especially as the United States and Great Britain turned to Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran in the Baghdad Pact to buffer against the Soviet Union’s regional push southward. Saudi Arabia had disposable financial resources, while Egypt provided the knowledge capital and defense capability to form a mutually beneficial alliance. With Nasser’s meteoric rise, he began to adopt a radical foreign policy that was steeped in anti-imperial and pro-Soviet rhetoric. The Soviet Union took advantage of the region’s instability in the 1950s, making aggressive outreach efforts to Saudi Arabia and Egypt that served to undermine U.S. interests. As a result, the Saudi-U.S.-Egyptian alliance began to fray around the edges. Despite the shift beginning in the region’s politics, regional security concerns still took precedence as the United States and Saudi Arabia negotiated a basing renewal contract in 1956. King Saud was well aware of the mounting domestic insecurity. At the same time, however, he placed greater emphasis on keeping the United States in Saudi Arabia as insur-

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ance against possible spillover effect from the Suez Canal Crisis. Here again, King Saud’s decision was eased by continued U.S. promises to maintain capacity building programs and the flow of other aid incentives. Indeed, U.S. military and economic aid was the essential quid pro quo needed to finalize the basing renewal contracts. The United States was fortunate to conclude a five-year basing renewal contract in 1957, but the spread of Nasser’s pan-Arab national agenda would prove to have dire consequences for the Saud monarchy’s future.

3

Regime Survival and the U.S. Military

In the spring of 1957, the London Daily Mail ran a story titled: “Saud Is Out for a Strong Kings’ Trade Union: The Middle East Volcano.” The article observed that “King Saud is changing sides. . . . He has seen the danger of the Syria-Soviet-Egypt Axis.”1 Throughout the early and mid-1950s, Saudi Arabia and Egypt had maintained cordial relations and a relatively strong alliance. As Nasser adopted a more radical socialist agenda that aligned increasingly with the Soviet Union, however, Saudi Arabia distanced itself and began to counter Egypt by bolstering its ties to Iraq and Jordan, two reliably antisocialist neighbors.2 These shifting alliances, including the Egyptian-Syrian establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958, are often referred to as the beginnings of the Arab Cold War, where the Soviet Union backed revolutionary military regimes such as the UAR while the United States and Great Britain supported the region’s Arab monarchies.3 Toward the late 1950s it became increasingly apparent that King Saud would be better aligned with the region’s monarchies, or his Hashemite rivals, than with a leader who sought the revolutionary spread of pan-Arab nationalism, a persuasion by definition antimonarchical.4 In addition to forming new alliances to counter Nasser, the Saud monarchy began to support activities aimed at subverting Nasser’s revolutionary movement and the UAR, including a plot to assassinate Nasser. Nasser responded in kind, supporting opposition movements against the king, including aid to the Sons of the Arabian Peninsula based in Cairo and sponsorship of a regional and internal anti-Saud propaganda campaign.5 Needless to say, the Saudi-Egyptian alliance had crumbled by the end of the 1950s. Saud viewed Nasser’s revolutionary movement as a dangerous internal secu74

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rity problem for the kingdom, as it had gained a significant following across the kingdom during this period. The monarchy’s national security outlook shifted increasingly inward to focus on mounting internal pressure from pan-Arab nationalism, even including a faction of pro-Nasser young Saudi princes. The new inward focus thus ushered in a strained era in relations between Nasser and Saud that persisted through the 1960s. Addressing rising internal threats to the monarchy’s survival would take precedence over lesser regional security concerns, such as the Buraimi Oasis dispute or Saudi Arabia’s frayed relationship with the British.6 Indeed, the increased focus on Saudi domestic security concerns would even have negative repercussions for the U.S. military base at Dhahran. Since World War II, Saudi Arabia had relied significantly on the U.S. military for national defense and the deterrence of external threats. But as Nasser’s anti-Western nationalism spread across the Arab world, Saudi Arabia was forced to rethink the wisdom of allowing the U.S. military to base at Dhahran: opposition movements were using the prolonged U.S. military presence as a rallying cry against the king.7 In some respects, U.S. officials may have underestimated how serious internal opposition was in the kingdom. For the Saud monarchy, however, the continued U.S. presence was increasingly seen as a lightning rod that endangered the survival of the monarchy. Just as the United States and Saudi Arabia were about to begin basing renewal negotiations in 1961, the monarchy announced on March 16 via Radio Mecca that it would not renew the U.S. military’s contract when it expired the following year, and that all U.S. base personnel would be expelled.8 The internal pressure opposed to the U.S. presence had grown too great, forcing Saud to announce the expulsion of the U.S. military to relieve the threat to his rule.9 The news was instantly well received, according to an AlJumhuriyah newspaper article: There is nothing surprising in the liquidation of the Dhahran base. These bases—imperialist bases of aggression—have been sentenced to liquidation ever since the peoples realized the true facts about them and their role. . . . A great alliance unites the people today, an alliance not recorded by treaties and pacts, for which it has no need. It is the alliance of enlightenment, which includes all the peoples. This is because common problems form an indivisible unity and because no people can enjoy their full freedom and hope for a better future unless imperialism vanishes from this world, taking with it aggression and its bases. . . . We believe that bases will come to an end. They will definitely

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come to an end because it is the peoples’ wish and the result of the sound enlightenment these people possess. The repeated use of these bases for aggressive purpose and to threaten peace has helped in the promotion of this enlightenment.10

Aside from announcing the U.S. expulsion, the article reflects the type of nationalist pan-Arab rhetoric and sentiment that had spread across the kingdom and region. The United States may have lost its basing privilege at Dhahran as a result of rising domestic pressure on the Saud monarchy, but its ties to the kingdom were not irreparably ruined. Saudi internal security concerns remained as a top priority during this period, highlighting how domestic security, contrary to some conventional base politics thinking, can be a factor in producing negative basing agreement outcomes despite continuing dependence on the U.S. for aid, security, and defense.11 Deteriorating Relations with Nasser amid Rising Domestic Pressure

In the first years of the Arab Cold War, relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia were more often cold than hot and mainly involved propaganda campaigns, coup plots, posturing, and intelligence gathering.12 As King Saud moved to bolster ties with Iraq and Jordan in 1957, Nasser countered in the spring 1958 by calling for the establishment of a United Arab Republic, joining Syria and Egypt, further souring Egypt’s already tense relationship with Saudi Arabia.13 The tattered Saudi-Egyptian alliance took another severe hit in early March 1958, when as U.S. ambassador Donald R. Heath learned from King Saud himself, the monarchy planned a “military revolution” against Nasser “within a few days in Syria.”14 The plot, organized by Saudi advisor Yusuf Yassin, included plans to shoot down President Nasser’s airplane in Syrian airspace as it traveled from Damascus to Cairo. The scheme included paying £2 million to Abdel Hamid Sarraj, the head of the Syrian security service, to orchestrate a military coup. The plot failed, since Sarraj remained loyal to Nasser.15 In a March 5 speech given in Damascus, President Nasser proclaimed that a coup plot against the UAR sponsored by Saudi Arabia had been discovered.16 Nasser declared that retribution would be taken against pro-Western Arab leaders who had conspired with Saud to support the coup attempt.17 Egypt ended its military mission in Saudi Arabia and removed all 250 military and civilian advisers posted to the kingdom.18 On March 10, Nasser launched a propaganda cam-

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paign against Saud using radio and newsprint to attack his legitimacy, portraying the king as a puppet of the West. The attacks enraged the king, who threatened a complete break in diplomatic ties with Egypt.19 The removal of Egyptian military officers and the launch of an anti-Saud propaganda campaign weakened King Saud’s already unstable position. He was vulnerable domestically because of endemic financial ineptitude and his personal squandering of oil revenues that worsened Saudi Arabia’s already flailing economy, which suffered from commercial stagnation, rising inflation, and an unbalanced budget.20 The combination of Saudi Arabia’s weak economic position and King Saud’s handling of regional affairs produced a new cadre of royal family members opposed to Saud’s rule. Some family members wanted to see Crown Prince Faisal replace his brother King Saud, viewing Saud as a financial and political danger to Saudi Arabia’s future.21 Under pressure from royal family members and religious leaders, or the ulema, Saud named Faisal as prime minister and commander-in-chief of the Saudi armed forces on March 31, 1958, hoping to prevent possible financial ruin and to help ease relations with Egypt. The U.S. State Department believed that Faisal and other royal family members had been influenced by pro-Nasser Saudi tribal units desiring to temper burgeoning anger against the monarchy.22 Once in office, Faisal took immediate steps to respond to the mounting propaganda attacks by Nasser, including a pronouncement that Saudi Arabia would maintain “positive neutrality” toward Egypt despite lingering tensions with the United States, Great Britain, France, and Israel following the Suez Canal Crisis. Additionally, and perhaps more important, Faisal developed a financial plan with the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to balance Saudi Arabia’s budget and consolidate its internal and external expenses. King Saud had accumulated an estimated $100 million (400 million riyals) debt.23 In 1957 approximately 40 to 60 percent of the budget was dedicated to private royal expenses, much of which included payments to Saud’s friends and followers.24 To balance the budget, Faisal made drastic programmatic cutbacks, issued a new paper currency backed by gold, and set a new exchange rate that helped end import controls. He also banned all foreign remittances and canceled official luxury-good purchases such as cars.25 Aside from taking rein of Saudi Arabia’s finances, and as a sign of the rising anti-American sentiment fueled by Nasser’s propaganda, Faisal called for the United States to stop flying its flag at the Dhahran military base, since its prolonged presence had become ever more controversial. Although Faisal’s announcement at the time did not end the U.S.

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military basing presence, the move signaled new and growing pressure on the Saud monarchy to terminate the U.S. military base agreement because many Saudis viewed the United States as an imperial power.26 Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalist movement gained greater momentum in July 1958, when the Iraqi “Free Officers” overthrew and killed Iraqi King Faisal II, who had attempted to form a Hashemite union with Jordan in reaction to the UAR. General Abd al-Karim Qasim led the officers’ coup, which was anti-Western and inspired in large part by Nasser’s revolutionary movements of Egypt and Syria.27 Many in the Saud monarchy, including Crown Prince Faisal, grew uneasy following the coup because the Iraqi revolt increased the chances of a UAR-inspired coup or assassination of King Saud, especially as Saud’s popularity was reaching a nadir as a result of his poor public image and profligate ways.28 Following the Iraqi coup, Faisal continued his efforts to stabilize SaudiEgyptian relations, since he clearly perceived the threat posed by Nasser’s revolutionary movement and his radio and newspaper attacks against the Saud monarchy. In an attempt to appease Nasser, Prince Faisal went to Cairo for one-on-one meetings with Egyptian government officials. Faisal and Nasser did not accomplish anything concrete after four days of meetings, but Faisal believed he had assisted in reducing Nasser’s outrage toward Saudi Arabia. Further, he thought that he had decreased the threat of a UAR-backed coup against Saudi Arabia by making several positive public statements about the UAR. As an interim solution to stave off a potential Egyptian-inspired coup, he proposed Saudi Arabia’s participation in the newly established United Arab States to mitigate Arab nationalist anger against Saudi Arabia.29 U.S. officials believed Faisal had averted, albeit temporarily, a major crisis between Saudi Arabia and the UAR. With radical Arab nationalism on the rise and the Saud monarchy on the defensive and concerned about its very survival, the Saud monarchy had to adapt its regional and domestic policies to the reality that Nasser had become a regional superhero following the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the establishment of the UAR, and the overthrow of Iraqi king Faisal.30 A Surprising Announcement on Dhahran

Rising anti-Western sentiment associated with pan-Arab nationalism, placed mounting pressure on U.S. oil executives and the U.S. military in Saudi Arabia from pro-Nasser factions in the region. Rising popular discontent and the increased factionalism within the royal family left King Saud so consumed with

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staying in power that he was unable to focus on or defend American interests.31 One of the first institutions to feel the pan-Arab backlash was Aramco, because of its historic ties to the United States and the sizable American expatriate community. Aramco had experienced numerous labor riots and protests previously, but toward the end of the 1950s Arab nationalist sympathizers within Saudi Arabia began to call for the company’s nationalization. Abdullah Tariki, the nationalistic director general for Saudi petroleum affairs, for one, was determined to overhaul the relationship between Aramco and the Saudi government.32 He strongly opposed having the United States as Aramco’s primary stakeholder and called for greater Saudi integration into the company’s operations, in addition to increased profit control. One of his proposals was for retroactive compensation of approximately $100 million to the kingdom from Aramco’s Tapline oil sales at Sidon on the Mediterranean.33 The Saud monarchy did not nationalize Aramco during this period, but the tensions attributed to King Saud’s alignment with the United States and weak leadership continued to mount. In July 1960, U.S. embassy officials in Riyadh reported to the State Department that a cadre of Saudi Air Force officers were plotting a coup to depose King Saud, take over the Saudi government, and murder Prince Faisal and his advisors. The news was alarming for the United States, since the potential overthrow of the king posed a major threat to U.S. national interests in Saudi Arabia, especially its presence in Dhahran.34 Ambassador Heath alerted Prince Faisal of the coup plot, but in a surprising reply Faisal stated that the prolonged U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia was responsible for fueling the antigovernment sentiment. Faisal asserted that the U.S. military would have to vacate its Dhahran base because burgeoning anti-American sentiment threatened the monarchy’s survival.35 In a one-on-one meeting on November 28, 1960, according to State Department records, Faisal broke the news directly to the ambassador: In this modern world, with all the new inventions, the airfield at Dhahran is not of as much use or value to you as in the past. In any case, although it is an airfield, you people still call it an airbase and others regard it as an American airbase. . . . The burden of my view which as I said is expressed here for the first time is that with all the eyes on us, with all the fingers pointing at the airfield, I find that its presence hampers cooperation between us. I want to cooperate, but I can only do so when this obstacle is removed. . . . My purpose in telling you this is so that your minds will be prepared for what we intend to do.36

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Ambassador Heath left this meeting believing that Faisal was in a minority and that King Saud and other Saudi officials would still renew the basing agreement when it was up for renewal in 1962. Moreover, he believed that the monarchy continued to rely upon the U.S. military at Dhahran despite Prince Faisal’s opinion.37 The encounter between Faisal and Heath, however, marked the beginning of the end of U.S. control over Dhahran. No possible incentive could prevent the U.S. expulsion from Dhahran, because the prolonged U.S. presence there had become too much of a domestic political lightning rod for the Saud monarchy. Nasser’s continued propaganda campaign against Saud had also taken its toll.38 According to one CIA report: Faisal is unable to understand why President Nasser has allowed the press and radio attacks to degenerate to such a low and personal level. The inclusion of the whole royal family in the attacks has made Faisal’s position on rapprochement most difficult. In Faisal’s opinion, the only outstanding issue between Saudi Arabia and the UAR is Nasser’s desire to export his brand of socialism to Saudi Arabia.39

As demonstrated again, Saudi Arabia’s persistent domestic insecurity finally outweighed its external security concerns, leading to the eventual annulment of the Dhahran basing agreement prior to planned renewal discussions in 1962.40 External security concerns such as a potential outbreak over Buraimi Oasis or the threat of attack from a neighboring country was not top priority for the monarchy in the early 1960s. The Hashemites no longer presented a major threat, and Saudi officials reportedly appeared less concerned about the frozen Buraimi conflict than in previous years.41 Great Britain was also more worried about Nasser than about Buraimi.42 As for an external Egyptian threat, Nasser was less of a concern during this period because he too was on the defensive trying to maintain the cohesion and strength of the UAR, which later ended abruptly on September 28, 1961, following a successful Syrian military coup and subsequent Syrian secession from the UAR.43 In an environment of mounting internal pressure on the Saud monarchy, and just two months after John F. Kennedy was inaugurated as the thirty-fifth president of the United States, Radio Mecca announced that King Saud had informed Ambassador Heath that the Dhahran basing agreement would not be renewed.44 The broadcast’s translation stated:

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His Majesty the exalted King has summoned in Foreign Minister Shaykh Ibrahim As-Suwayyil and ordered him to contact the U.S. Ambassador and inform him that his Majesty’s government does not intend to renew the agreement concluded between his majesty’s government and the U.S. government regarding the administration of Dhahran Air Base. The agreement ends in April, 1962.45

U.S. military tenure at Dhahran was over, and the Saudi government wanted both its population and those beyond the kingdom to know it. The Saudi government gave the U.S. embassy less than a day to prepare for the king’s announcement. On the evening of March 16, the U.S. State Department issued a press release: “Always recognizing and respecting the Saudi ownership and character of Dhahran Airfield [the United States] has also enjoyed certain use of the facilities at the Dhahran Airfield under agreement with the Saudi government and, at the request of the Saudi government, has aided in the operation of the services of the Airport. The U.S. government expects that its close and friendly cooperation with Saudi Arabia in various fields will continue.”46 The United States could not exact reprisal for the decision, since it relied heavily on oil imports and other investments in Saudi Arabia. It had to adapt accordingly. A few days after the announcement, the State Department offered an explanation about the surprise Dhahran announcement to President Kennedy’s staff: The precipitate action reflects the shaky internal position of his recently formed government . . . the rapid Saudi action had been made necessary to quiet his opponents both inside and outside Saudi Arabia. The King also instructed the Ambassador to reassure the U.S. that the strong relations between our two countries were not affected by the announcement and would in fact be even more soundly based in the future because of it. . . . Nevertheless, the very presence of the U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia, even though unarmed, has long disturbed Saudi and Arab nationalists. The Saudis have been keenly conscious of their vulnerability to Arab nationalist attacks for being host to foreign military forces. Alleged U.S. lack of sympathy for Arab views on the Arab-Israeli problem . . . has also been seized upon by Arab nationalists to apply pressure on the Saudi government to terminate U.S. operational facilities at Dhahran.47

Like British diplomatic correspondence of the period, U.S. documentation of the announced expulsion of the U.S. military from Dhahran emphasizes that

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virulent anti-American sentiment and other internal security problems were driving factors behind the basing agreement annulment. Nasser’s anti-Western Arab nationalism had loyal followers among the royal family, and among tribal elites who wanted to see an end to all Western symbols such as a U.S. military basing presence. By the early 1960s, Faisal had judged that the U.S. military presence at Dhahran provided a far greater danger to the kingdom’s stability than a justification to maintain the U.S. military basing presence for defense against external threats.48 During meetings with President Kennedy in early 1962, King Saud expressed his fears that President Nasser had adopted a socialist approach in his recent nationalization decrees and other policies. Saud reportedly feared that Nasser’s influence might infiltrate Saudi Arabia and lead to the overthrow of the monarchy.49 Crown Prince Faisal is said to have complained that Nasser engaged in “intelligence gathering by impermissible means, sabotage, incitement, and the organization of assassination attempts” inside Saudi Arabia. Faisal appeared to believe that Nasser’s goal was to “crush” the Saud monarch’s authority and overthrow his regime. Ending the U.S. military basing presence would likely provide relief from such existential threats for the Saud monarchy.50 Maintaining Ties

Saudi Arabia’s surprise announcement about Dhahran alarmed U.S. military officials, who relied heavily on the base for regional operations and to help protect strategic U.S. interests in the Gulf. At the time of the announcement, Dhahran had 1,332 American airmen and ten transport aircraft, as well as dependents, military support personnel, and nearby Aramco employees.51 The U.S. military lost its basing privilege at Dhahran, but other ties to Saudi Arabia remained. Both countries still relied upon each other to uphold certain strategic national interests, including the free flow of oil and the prevention of Soviet penetration into the Gulf. Saudi Arabia also continued to rely upon valuable military and economic aid that contributed to Saudi development projects and security. The protection of oil interests was essential to the fledging Kennedy administration at the time it began to focus on the conflict in Southeast Asia. Shortly after President Kennedy was sworn into office, his administration adopted a policy to expand U.S. operations in Vietnam, including $42 million in aid to the South Vietnamese government and approval of “authorized infiltration and harassment operations” against the communist Viet Cong.52 The unfettered flow of Gulf oil was an essential component of this policy as the main

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fuel source for U.S. military operations in Vietnam. The Gulf region provided the estimated 300,000 barrels of oil that was needed daily for the war efforts.53 President Kennedy’s desire to preserve U.S. ties to Saudi Arabia despite the pending basing expulsion was made clear in a letter Kennedy wrote to King Saud following the Radio Mecca broadcast. In it, the president expressed hope for a prosperous and flourishing future U.S.-Saudi relationship.54 Kennedy later asserted that in view of the great importance he placed on their relationship, he would continue to fulfill all military equipment requests, arms sales, and training missions for Saudi Arabia despite the basing agreement annulment. Vietnam had quickly consumed his administration and he wanted to preserve all other aspects of the strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia even if the U.S. military lost access to Dhahran.55 To assist in achieving this goal, the Kennedy administration approved $13.5 million in credit to the Saudi government for purchasing arms in 1962. The U.S. also exempted Saudi Arabia from paying interest on the credit line, since interest, or riba, was forbidden in Islam.56 In some instances the Department of Defense viewed the arms and equipment the Saudis requested as being too sophisticated, but Kennedy insisted that the United States continue to provide as much as it could to Saudi Arabia in order to remain in the king’s good graces.57 King Saud did not initially respond in kind to Kennedy’s gestures of goodwill. In a response to one of President Kennedy’s letters, King Saud attacked the U.S. pro-Israeli stance and lack of a strong show of support for Palestinian refugees during a UN General Assembly meeting. Saud believed that the Arabs and Palestinians had a legal right to control Palestine. Further, he stated that Israel had unlawfully captured Palestinian land and was a predator backed by the United States.58 Kennedy’s staff saw the king’s response as undiplomatic and even insulting. Yet they also believed that the letter demonstrated the king’s difficult domestic political situation. In combination with the Dhahran eviction, the letter represented Saud’s attempts to appease political enemies who used the U.S. military presence to undermine the king’s legitimacy. The Kennedy White House concluded that the king wanted to prove wrong the naysayers and rivals who painted him as a puppet of the Americans. In short, Saud needed to show his critics that he could indeed stand up to the United States and oppose its regional policies.59 The optics of the basing annulment were important for the survival of the Saud monarchy, but beneath the rhetoric some Saudi officials also made efforts to uphold their ties to the United States. In July 1961, for example, Presi-

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dent Kennedy and U.S. Near Eastern Affairs assistant secretary of state Phillips Talbot met with the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Shaykh Abdullah Al-Khayyal. In the meeting, and contrary to what was conveyed in prior correspondence between Saud and Kennedy, Ambassador Al-Khayyal emphasized that U.S.-Saudi relations were not in jeopardy with the cancellation of the Dhahran basing agreement. Rather, he stated, the problems arose mainly from a third state, the UAR, and its attempts to undermine the Saud monarchy through propaganda campaigns and other subversive means.60 Behind the scenes, in 1962 King Saud demanded more economic and development aid from Kennedy. He claimed that Saudi Arabia was in desperate need of meeting the demands of its growing population, estimated at 5 million. Specifically, King Saud requested support for the construction of schools, ports, highways, and hospitals. President Kennedy had already ordered an economic survey commission to assess Saudi Arabia’s economic and infrastructure needs and told the king he would back the survey’s final proposals. Kennedy added that the World Bank would contribute to bolstering Saudi Arabia’s weakened economy through aid and development projects.61 Aside from economic aid, King Saud requested radio transmitters and broadcasting equipment from President Kennedy to combat President Nasser’s propaganda campaign against Saudi Arabia, which had been waged through radio and other telecommunication technologies. Kennedy promised he would do whatever he could to ensure the sale and arrival of radio transmitters to Saudi Arabia.62 In April 1962, he approved the shipment of three 5-kilowatt radio transmitters as a gift to the king. According to one State Department memo, the United States regarded the gift of radio transmitters “as an earnest of our desire to be responsive to the King” and “to maintain the momentum in the development of our relations.”63 The strength of King Saud’s ties to the United States was put on public display when he fell ill at the end of November 1961. King Saud was transported to Boston when Saudi doctors could not adequately care for the king following a heart attack complicated by an inflamed esophagus and chronic high blood pressure.64 While in Boston, the king also underwent eye surgery to improve his eyesight by removing cataracts that had plagued him since childhood.65 The president wrote the king wishing him a speedy recovery.66 In January 1962 King Saud was moved from the hospital to Palm Springs, Florida, where Kennedy paid him a personal visit. During the visit no major business was discussed, but President Kennedy extended an invitation to Saud to visit the White House

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when he had recovered fully.67 Personal relationships were especially important in the Arab world, and goodwill gestures such as these were essential for the upkeep of the relationship. The U.S. military may have been on the verge of shutting down its operations at Dhahran, but thanks to Kennedy’s keen diplomatic skills U.S.-Saudi ties remained buoyant. The United States Relinquishes Dhahran

About a year after Radio Mecca made the surprise basing annulment announcement, Saudi Arabia and the United States conducted a quiet base transfer ceremony to avoid attracting criticism or stimulating fresh propaganda attacks from the UAR portraying the Saudi government as a marionette of the United States.68 Crown Prince Faisal reiterated to U.S. officials that Nasser had put the monarchy in a challenging position to continue the U.S. basing lease by his anti-Western propaganda: “If the U.S. is annoyed over the Saudis termination of base rights, the U.S. will have to understand that it is America’s friend, Nasser, who has made it impossible for any country in the Middle East to grant base rights to a foreign power.”69 According to official documents, on April 2, 1962, the United States “officially turned over the operation of the Dhahran Airfield to the Saudi Arabian Government and left behind sufficient equipment for the Saudis to operate the airfield in accordance with [the] 1957 Agreement.” The United States also offered to sell the Saudis additional types of equipment for basic base operations. The Saudi government contracted a private American firm to operate the airfield services and a crew of communications technicians from the International Civilian Aviation Organization.70 Indeed, the internal pressure had been so great that the Saud monarchy had little room to back away from its decision to expel the U.S. military from Dhahran. Trouble over the Horizon: Yemen’s Civil War

Six months after the U.S. military transferred Dhahran to the Saudis, new trouble emerged along Saudi Arabia’s southern border with Yemen that tested the monarchy’s basing expulsion decision. In October 1962, Yemeni General Abdullah Sallal, a Nasserist, overthrew the Saudi-backed leader Imam Muhammad al-Badr and declared the creation of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR).71 The coup marked the beginning of a civil war in Yemen between Mutawakkilite Kingdom Royalists and the YAR rebels that lasted from 1962 to 1970.72 Nasser deployed several hundred special forces to support Sallal at the beginning of

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the conflict, but before long Nasser’s involvement in Yemen was referred to as his “Vietnam” when he deployed an estimated seventy thousand troops to avenge the embarrassment of a failed UAR and to support the spread of panArab nationalism.73 Nasser had wanted to use Yemen as a gateway to access Gulf oil, which he described as the “sinew of civilization.”74 Nasser’s ramped up involvement in the conflict alarmed the Saud monarchy. Prince Faisal was concerned that if the YAR succeeded, Egypt would use its success in Yemen to take aim at Saudi Arabia using Egyptian forces and YAR rebels to attack and infiltrate Saudi Arabia from the south. Needless to say, the Yemeni coup that triggered Egypt’s involvement elicited new external security fears for the Saud monarchy.75 Fortunately for Saudi Arabia, however, Yemen’s civil war also endangered British and American interests. Both countries feared greater Soviet involvement in the civil war and subsequent threats to their oil interests. Great Britain was additionally concerned about the danger the YAR posed to its protectorate at Aden, which was an important airbase and port for its Cold War efforts. As a result, the United States and Great Britain became deeply involved in the civil war, thus relieving Saudi Arabia of a larger responsibility in the conflict.76 At the beginning of the civil war, however, Saudi Arabia was concerned about Egyptian flyovers and cross-border raids onto Saudi territory. On December 30, one Ilyushin Il-28 bomber attacked Saudi Arabia’s Najran airfield in the south, dropping nine bombs across the base. Local officials reported additional Il-28 attacks on neighboring villages the same day that killed two women and a young girl, in addition to wounding eleven others. When Egypt’s air force began attacking villages on Saudi territory, the Saud monarchy reached out to the U.S. military for temporary support to push Nasser back into Yemen and therefore mitigate escalation of the conflict on Saudi territory.77 In April 1963, the Saud monarchy and the U.S. military concluded an agreement to deploy forces temporarily to Saudi Arabia in Operation Hard Surface, composed of eight F-100s fighter jets, one transport type command support aircraft, one control and reporting post, and six KB-50 tanker aircraft for use in fueling and transportation.78 The U.S. Hard Surface mission aimed “to deter UAR air operations over Saudi Arabia, to serve as evidence of U.S. intentions to protect Saudi Arabia from external attack, to provide a limited air defense capability, and to provide an operational unit to assist in training the Saudi Air Force.” The mission was also granted permission, albeit on a temporary sixty-day basis, to operate from the bases at Dhahran and Jidda.79 The unit began its operations

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at the end of June and extended its mission to the end of the year until the monarchy deemed that Nasser’s flyovers and over-the-border bombardments posed less of a threat to national defense.80 As stated by one U.S. official: “We’ve warned Nasser again not to step on our toes.”81 In addition to the Hard Surface unit, the U.S. Navy deployed a destroyer to Jidda to monitor the situation.82 Kennedy had proposed the initiative in a private meeting with Crown Prince Faisal as a show of force in support of Saudi Arabia. Kennedy hoped the U.S. naval presence in particular would act as a deterrent to further use of force by Egypt or even the Soviet Union. A U.S. official in the embassy in Jidda later recalled that Prince Faisal asked whether such U.S. naval vessels could be dispatched quickly to the scene. The President said they could. Faisal remarked that, in any case, a friendly visit of ships of one nation to the ports of another would not lend itself to criticism or misinterpretation. He said he would hasten to inform his government of this possibility. The President promised that he would set the machinery in motion and instruct our Ambassador in Jidda to discuss the proposed visit with the Saudi Government on the spot.83

Five destroyers eventually arrived at Jidda and the Red Sea to conduct naval exercises near Yemen and the Arabian Sea by mid-March.84 A carrier task force also entered the area in the fall as a further show of force.85 It is of note here that the U.S. military operated on Saudi territory only temporarily. It was never offered a long basing contract similar to those of previous years because once the U.S. military succeeded in deterring the YAR and Egypt from cross-border raids, the Saud monarchy refocused its attention toward the continued threat of internal instability and other domestic threats to the monarchy. Faisal, who succeeded his brother as king in 1964, had long viewed Nasser’s persistent attempts to undermine the Saud monarchy through covert and internal means as a top national security concern. Indeed, Faisal’s evaluation of Saudi domestic insecurity proved accurate. Following the termination of Operation Hard Surface at the start of 1964, Nasser maintained his call for revolution and the overthrow of the Saud monarchy. He also remained committed to supporting radical or antimonarchical movements such as the Arabian Peninsula People’s Union, the Saudi National Liberation Front, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula. U.S. intelligence sources were convinced that Nasser wanted to ensure that pressure remained on the royal family from local opposition forces.86 Toward the end of 1966 Nasser

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also helped sponsor three separate assassination attempts against King Faisal, Prince Fahd, and Saudi bin Jiluwi, governor of the Eastern Province. In one instance, Yemeni insurgents who arrived to Saudi Arabia under the auspices of the Hajj detonated bomb blasts aimed at royal family members in Riyadh and Dammam. In 1967 Saudi officials captured and beheaded seventeen individuals allegedly involved in the assassination attempts. Saudi officials also alleged that Egyptian agents were trying to stir up antimonarchical labor groups to organize violent uprisings against the monarchy.87 Conclusion: Saudi Domestic Insecurity Prevails

Turbulence and instability engulfed the region when Israel attacked Egypt on June 5, 1967. The outbreak of the Six-Day War, which ultimately led to the bankruptcy and demise of President Nasser, put King Faisal in a constrained position because of his opposition to both Nasser and Israel. In the end, he sided with his Arab neighbor and denounced Israel’s actions, calling Muslims to action: “We consider any state or country, supporting or aiding Zionist-Israeli aggression against the Arabs in any way as aggression against us. To Jihad citizens! To Jihad, citizens! To Jihad, nation of Muhammad and the Islamic peoples.”88 Israel’s attack on Egypt had repercussions for the United States and its relationship to Gulf Arab nations, especially Saudi Arabia. Arab oil producing states, in reaction, temporarily stopped oil shipments to the United States. On June 7 anti-American protests also broke out in Dhahran that damaged a U.S. officers club and the U.S. consulate. This was followed by larger protests against the United States and Israel in Riyadh. The outburst of protests was unsettling for the Saudi regime and placed additional strain on an already delicate relationship. The continued domestic insecurity also reaffirmed the Saud monarchy’s prior concerns about the virulent anti-American sentiment that persisted despite the U.S. military’s basing expulsion from Dhahran.89 By the end of the summer of 1967, Egypt’s embarrassing defeat by Israel had forced Nasser to negotiate with King Faisal over Yemen. On August 29, 1967, Nasser met with Arab leaders in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, to discuss regional affairs, mainly the lingering impacts of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Nasser’s potential future involvement in Yemen. At the summit, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya proposed a $280 million annual aid package to assist Egypt recoup the revenues lost from the Suez Canal’s closure in the war. The offer was good only if Nasser agreed to unilaterally remove his troops from Yemen. Nasser caved under the pressure, since he was desperate for any and all aid. The

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Soviet Union had withdrawn support for Nasser the year before as a result of his opposition to Soviet requests for military basing rights in Egypt in exchange for economic and military aid. On November 29, Egypt withdrew its last troops from Yemen, marking the beginning of the downfall of Nasser and the re-establishment of Saudi dominance in Arabian Peninsula affairs. The downgrade in Soviet-Egyptian ties also meant that the Soviet Union was less a threat to both Saudi Arabia and the United States.90 When Nasser died of a heart attack on September 28, 1970, the Arab Cold War slowed to a halt.91 Nasser’s downfall and death may have come as a relief to the Saud monarchy, but it was not the end to the Saud monarchy’s internal security dilemma. The increased U.S. entanglement with Israel, for example, was wildly unpopular in the kingdom and pushed the royal family to downplay any ties to the U.S. government. Saudi officials were particularly displeased with the United States due to inaction in the UN Security Council when it could have taken a stance condemning Israel’s actions against Egypt. Saudi officials described pro-Israeli U.S. policy as “obstructionist” and “vague.”92 Although Saudi Arabia and the United States maintained their military and economic aid partnership during the next decade, the Saud monarchy downplayed its relations to the United States internally because of the continued domestic insecurity and virulent anti-American sentiment. Nasser may have been forced to retreat from Yemen after 1967, but his pan-Arab dream lived on among millions of adoring Arabs across the region. Moreover, pan-Arab national sentiment did not dissipate overnight and continued to challenge the monarchy domestically. This historic basing expulsion case examined in this chapter is valuable because it demonstrates how internal security concerns, such as the threats posed by Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalist movement, can indeed be a driving factor behind a basing agreement annulment and subsequent basing expulsion. The case also demonstrates the importance of listening to host nation officials when they express concerns about how a U.S. military basing presence is perceived. In this case, local opposition movements and regional propaganda campaigns used the prolonged U.S. military basing presence as fodder to oppose the Saud monarchy. The Saud monarchy feared for its survival during this period and therefore used the basing expulsion announcement to assist in relieving pressure against the king. Following the U.S. military expulsion from Dhahran, the U.S. military did not regain a more permanent basing foothold again until the outbreak of the First Gulf War in 1990, when Saudi Arabia’s external security concerns pushed aside prior internal security threats to become the top national security

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priority for the Saud monarchy, the subject of Chapter 6. Indeed, all countries face an ever-changing continuum of national security concerns, but in the case of Saudi Arabia in the 1960s, internal security concerns took center stage and impacted the U.S. military’s ability to maintain the basing presence that it had established during World War II.

4

A Light Footprint in Bahrain

The tiny island nation of Bahrain, 15 miles off the coast of Saudi Arabia, offers another example of how, as in the U.S. military’s experience in Saudi Arabia during the 1960s, internal security pressures can impact military basing agreement outcomes. Bahrain was ruled by the Khalifa family, a distinct Sunni minority among Bahrain’s Shi’a majority. At the outbreak of the 1973 Arab-Israeli October War, the U.S. Navy had only just concluded a short-term basing lease in 1972 for its five-ship U.S. Middle East Force following the British departure and Bahrain’s declaration of independence in 1971.1 With no other substantive bases in the Arabian Peninsula, Bahrain was an ideal location for the U.S. Navy; it was located at the heart of the Gulf and well placed to have the U.S. Navy help safeguard U.S. strategic national interests, including unfettered access to the region’s oil and gas and the protection of U.S. regional financial investments. U.S. support for Israel during the war contributed further to the negative perception of the United States in Bahrain and across the Arab world. The Khalifa family, headed by the emir of Bahrain, Shaykh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa, had already been under significant domestic pressure prior to the war because of explosive social and political change of the early 1970s, which was spurred in part by the rapid rise in oil prices, subsequent petrodollar windfall, and growth in personal wealth. The cash infusion permitted Gulf countries such as Bahrain to adopt major economic and military modernization programs that in turn led to major regional instability and social change. The traditional structure of Gulf Bedouin societies came under significant strain as a result of the large influx of powerful technologies, foreign technicians and workers, and rapid urbanization. In such an environment, the Khalifas faced an increasingly rest91

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less Shi’a majority population that opposed its minority rule, while calling for greater participation in government, among other grievances.2 When the October War broke out, opposition forces in Bahrain called vociferously for the U.S. Navy to vacate its base at Juffair near Manama, Bahrain’s capital. Bahrain’s ruling family found itself in a challenging position because of its reliance on external powers such as Great Britain and the United States to assist in traditional matters of national defense.3 But fearful for its own survival, the Khalifas acceded to internal pressures and on October 20, 1973, announced the U.S. Navy’s eviction from its base in Bahrain. In 1971, the Gulf had produced approximately 30 percent of the world’s oil, in addition to possessing 60 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves.4 A U.S. naval homeport in Bahrain had been important for easy access to oil resources and to support U.S. Cold War efforts to prevent further Soviet penetration into the Gulf or Arabian Peninsula. Indeed, Bahrain’s 1973 expulsion announcement came at an inopportune moment for the United States, since the Soviet Union had recently begun to ramp up its naval activities in the Mediterranean, Gulf, and Indian Ocean just as the U.S. military began to shrink it global engagements following the start of the drawdown of U.S. forces from Vietnam.5 Bahrain’s main regional security threat had historically been Iran. For centuries, Iran had laid claim to Bahrain as an extension of the ancient Persian Empire. But in a series of backroom negotiations between the Iranian shah and British officials prior to Great Britain’s final withdraw of its forces east of the Suez Canal by 1971, the shah agreed to relinquish Iran’s claims to Bahrain in return for Great Britain’s tacit approval of Iran’s takeover of the contested Gulf islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. For the first time in modern history, Iran was less than a high national security priority for the Khalifas when domestic unrest flared up in Bahrain during the early 1970s. As a result, the Khalifa family shifted its national security agenda following Bahrain’s independence to make domestic security and the regime’s survival a top priority compared with its prior focus on Iran. One way for the family to relieve pressure on its rule during this period was by supporting domestic liberalization reforms such as the creation, albeit short-lived and in name only, of a national assembly, and by supporting the eviction of the U.S. Navy from its homeport at Juffair. The U.S. Navy was able to delay its formal departure from Juffair until June 30, 1977, when the U.S. Middle East Force’s commanding officer, Rear Admiral William J. Crowe Jr., lowered the U.S. flag at Juffair but could not push the departure date back any further because of the continued strong domestic opposition.6

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Similar to the U.S. experience in Saudi Arabia, the U.S.-Bahrain bilateral security partnership was not irreparably damaged by Bahrain’s basing eviction announcement. In fact, the U.S. military continued to provide essential military aid and economic assistance to Bahrain. The Khalifas also permitted the U.S. Navy in 1977 to maintain a small, nondescript Administrative Support Unit (ASU) to assist in future offshore coordination, in addition to permitting the U.S. Navy to supply and service its Middle East Force on occasion during the year.7 The new light footprint and low profile was a major domestic win for the Khalifas, since they were able to demonstrate that the U.S. Navy had been evicted from its homeport at Juffair, while at the same time maintaining its security partnership with the United States through the ASU. This historic case also demonstrates again how internal security can shape and influence a basing agreement outcome between a host and foreign basing nations. This chapter also further challenges the traditional base politics thinking that views foreign troop levels or base size as being insignificant factors in base politicization or the expulsion of the U.S. military from a host nation.8 Contending with Iran and Bahrain’s Road to Independence

To appreciate Bahrain’s national security perspective during the 1970s and how it increasingly shifted its attention from external or regional security concerns toward domestic security matters following the 1973 October War, we must first examine Bahrain’s relationship to such regional and global powers as the Persian Empire or modern-day Iran and Great Britain. Throughout history, control over Bahrain was desired by regional powers because of Bahrain’s important geostrategic location in the Gulf. In more recent history, the Khalifa family had relied on forging critical regional alliances to preserve its survival. Past rulers of Bahrain were not always as successful at warding off invasions from the Persian Empire, Arabs, and others. By the end of the nineteenth century, Great Britain had succeeded in establishing Bahrain as a British protectorate and remained as its primary security guarantor for the next century against external threats. In 1971, British defense guarantees came to an end as British forces withdrew from Bahrain to align with Great Britain’s policy to remove all forces east of the Suez Canal by 1972. As Great Britain prepared for the final departure of its estimated eighty-four hundred troops stationed in the Gulf, Bahrain declared independence while the United States sought to define its new regional balancing role following Great Britain’s departure.9 The United States

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was, however, constrained as a result of its focus on and investment in the Vietnam War.10 Bahrain and Persia

Persia had claimed Bahrain as its territory for centuries. Persian control of the island began in the third century, when Sassanid King Ardashir conquered the island and left his son, Shapur I, as Bahrain’s ruler. Persia controlled Bahrain until the seventh century, when Arabs associated with Baghdad’s caliphate defeated the Persians in Bahrain. Arab rule lasted approximately two centuries, until the Shi’a Ismaili Qarmathians took control of Bahrain in the ninth century. Thereafter, Bahrain switched rulers among various rival clans and sects for several centuries.11 Beginning in the sixteenth century, the Portuguese conquered and held Bahrain until the Persians expelled them in 1622. For the next two centuries, Bahrain was transferred back and forth between Persian and Arab rulers. Bahrain was recaptured by the Persians in 1733 and remained under their control until 1783, when it was conquered and ruled by the presentday Khalifas, a north Arab family who was related to other east Arabian ruling tribes.12 Persia never again established rule over Bahrain. However, in 1859 both the Ottoman Turks and the Persian governor of Fars attempted to hoist their respective flags over Bahrain in response to Bahrain’s call for protection against British naval incursions. In the end, Great Britain overpowered both the Ottomans and Persians for Bahrain’s control.13 Bahrain as a British Protectorate

Great Britain’s control over Bahrain evolved gradually throughout the nineteenth century. Beginning in 1820, Bahrain signed the General Treaty of Peace for the cessation of piracy. Much to the Persian Empire’s dismay, Great Britain and Bahrain also signed treaties of peace, friendship, and cooperation in 1861, 1868, 1880, and 1892. The Treaty of 1892 was otherwise known as the “Exclusive Agreement,” and it affirmed Great Britain’s stronghold or protectorate over Bahraini affairs.14 Great Britain also consistently referred to the shaykh of Bahrain as “the ruler of an independent state under the protection of his Majesty’s Government and in special treaty relations with [Great Britain].”15 As its security guarantor, Great Britain protected Bahrain from external threats, in addition to defending against or rejecting any territorial claims by the Ottoman Turks or Persians. In 1905, for example, Iran made claims to Bahrain to which the British replied: “His Majesty’s Government consider the island of Bahrain and its inhabitants to be under British protection and must

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decline to entertain any further representations on the subject.” In the 1920s, Iran continued to make formal claims on Bahrain through the newly established League of Nations. Great Britain categorically rejected Iran’s position, even though Iran cited international legal precedent to defend its stance. In a further sign of defiance, the Persian government refused to recognize British passports issued for Bahrainis in the 1930s.16 Following World War II, Iran continued its policy of irredentism toward Bahrain. On April 19, 1946, for example, the Iranian cabinet reaffirmed that Iran considered Bahrain an integral part of its territory. On December 1, 1947, Iranian prime minister Ahmad Ghavam el-Saltaneh reiterated Iran’s desire to annex Bahrain. Four months later, in April 1948, Iran’s foreign minister announced to parliament that Iran’s rights to Bahrain “are indisputable” and that the Iranian government “has not lost and will not lose any opportunity of asserting its rights in this question.”17 Because of Bahrain’s militarily weak position, it relied on Great Britain to help deter Iran. At the time, Bahrain had a national guard of two battalions, or approximately seventeen hundred soldiers, to protect its population of 200,000.18 Iranian irredentist claims continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s, including an official government declaration in 1958 that Bahrain was an extension of Iranian territory.19 Iran’s expansionist drumbeat intensified in the 1960s following the establishment of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which set prices and quotas on oil production. By the end of the 1960s, OPEC had enabled Iran and other oil producing states to shift the control of oil prices from oil consuming nations to oil producing states. This revolutionary change empowered Iran in particular to engage in massive construction projects and equally large arms acquisition, which was troubling for its neighboring Gulf Arab states, including Bahrain.20 Fortunately for Gulf Arab states, Great Britain’s long historical presence acted as an important buffer to prevent Iranians and Arabs from going to war. Great Britain also maintained significant oil concessions across the Gulf, most importantly in Iraq and Iran, underlying its concern about regional peace and stability.21 A strong regional British presence also helped the United States deter the Soviet Union from gaining a greater Gulf foothold.22 Great Britain’s Departure

In January 1968 the Labour Government made its formal announcement to withdraw all British armed forces east of the Suez Canal by 1972, ending its Gulf

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presence after close to two centuries. The decision reflected a rearrangement of British priorities and was not purely an economic calculation—only £12 million was saved annually by the new policy.23 Great Britain’s final withdrawal from Bahrain began on January 1, 1971.24 The United States was alarmed by the 1968 announcement, since it relied upon Great Britain to defuse any tensions or strife that arose over oil deposits or other territorial disputes between the Gulf Arab nations or with Iran.25 Moreover, the United States remained on the defensive in Vietnam and therefore relied upon the British to maintain a proactive presence in strategic regions such as the Gulf or Middle East. One week following Great Britain’s troop withdrawal announcement, the United States was stunned by the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, which included a massive coordinated attack by eighty thousand communist troops, pushing the United States to soberly realize that it was unable to readily fill the British void in the Gulf.26 While U.S. commitments in Vietnam deepened, Iran took advantage of Great Britain’s announcement to begin jockeying for a more prominent regional position. Following a British military departure, the shah wanted to establish Iran as the “boss” of the Gulf, controlling greater areas such as the Musandam Peninsula or Muscat and Oman.27 Iran also began to express an open desire to take control of the contested Gulf Islands, Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, which were also claimed by the tiny emirates of Ras al-Khaimeh and Sharjah. In addition to its Gulf island claims, Iran upheld its claims to Bahrain and stated that addressing the Bahraini question was a prerequisite for any talks involving the Gulf islands. In other words, Iran was willing to relinquish its claims to Bahrain if it were given territorial rights over Abu Musa and the Tunbs.28 Great Britain was receptive to Iran’s proposals—if the question of Bahrain could indeed be resolved. The emir of Kuwait also reassured the British that most Gulf Arab states would tacitly support Iranian control of the islands.29 Similarly, Saudi Arabia expressed that it would not object to the takeover of the islands so long as it was not seen as acquiescing publicly to the occupation.30 On October 21, 1969, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Iran’s shah, visited the United States and met privately with President Richard Nixon in a further diplomatic attempt to solidify Iran’s designs on the Gulf. During his trip, the shah also met with Secretary of State William P. Rogers. In one meeting, the shah told Rogers that despite Iran’s legitimate claim to Bahrain, he would accept mediation through the United Nations to determine the political will of the Bahraini people.31 From the U.S. perspective, the Nixon administration was concerned mainly that the weakened lower Gulf states and ensuing dis-

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order following a British departure might threaten U.S. commercial interests and Gulf oil production. This concern also reflected fears about greater Soviet penetration into regional affairs.32 At the time, the U.S. Gulf investment was $3.5 billion. The U.S. government relied upon an annual income of more than $2 billion from Gulf oil and trade revenues.33 Overall, U.S. government officials supported Iran’s enhanced position in the Gulf because it aligned with the broader “Nixon Doctrine,” which aimed to promote a U.S. containment strategy through economic and military assistance to deserving allies such as Iran.34 The administration also supported Iran’s takeover of the islands, since it was tied to Bahrain’s independence. According to a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report, U.S. officials believed that ending the Bahraini dispute would increase regional security.35 Iran Relinquishes Its Claims

In 1969 Iran began to work with the United Nations to resolve its Bahrain claims. Negotiations proceeded over the course of a year among Iran, Great Britain, Bahrain, and Kuwait.36 The UN secretary general hired Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi as his personal representative to Bahrain to assess Bahrain’s position on Iran and independence. Guicciardi traveled to Bahrain in March and April 1970. He concluded that a majority of Bahrainis desired independence, which refuted any claims Iran may have had. On May 11, 1970, the UN Security Council voted on the report and unanimously passed Resolution 278 (1970), approving Guicciardi’s report.37 The Iranian Senate unanimously approved the Guicciardi report one week later.38 The event was a watershed for Bahrain, which had feared a Persian takeover for many centuries. After the Security Council resolution, Bahrain could count few significant regional adversaries—even the UAR had been weakened following Nasser’s death in 1970.39 The British believed the primary source of future turmoil would be internal subversion sponsored by a radical regime such as southern Yemen or some other Soviet-backed entity.40 Even so, it was the combination of a pending British Gulf departure and the end of Iranian claims that set the scene for Bahrain’s declaration of independence and the beginning of a new era in Gulf politics and security. Bahraini Independence

Bahrain initially hesitated to declare its independence until it received solid regional approval and support from Saudi Arabia, a trusted longtime ally. Great Britain believed Bahrain should declare independence regardless of Saudi ap-

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proval. Great Britain supported Bahrain’s decision to declare independence despite ongoing British attempts to create a federated emirates nation in the Gulf that included Bahrain.41 Nixon administration officials advised the president to immediately acknowledge and support Bahrain’s independence upon declaration to bolster continuing U.S. regional interests. Such an action would also place the United States in good standing with the Bahraini government, since the United States planned to take over Juffair upon Great Britain’s departure.42 Bahrain declared independence on August 14, 1971, and the following day the United States announced its recognition of the new nation. Saudi Arabia declared its support for Bahrain’s independence on the same day as the United States.43 The United Nations and Arab League approved Bahrain’s independence, as did Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.44 Bahrain’s independence came only months before Great Britain’s final departure from the Gulf and the end of British treaty relations with the Gulf ’s littoral nations. Britain officially terminated its treaty relations with Bahrain on December 1, 1971. Following Bahrain’s independence, Iranian troops took control of the Tunbs and a predetermined portion of Abu Musa on November 30, 1971. Much to the outrage of the United Arab Emirates, Iran had received a tacit go-ahead to take over the islands in the behind-closed-doors negotiation between British government officials and the shah.45 A new era had dawned in the Gulf, and the United States believed that it was in good standing, albeit temporarily, with Iran and the Gulf Arab countries to work toward balancing regional security. But more turmoil would soon spread across the Gulf following the outbreak of the 1973 October War, jeopardizing the U.S. naval basing presence in Bahrain. The U.S. Navy in Bahrain

Beginning in 1949, and with British permission, the U.S. military maintained a limited naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Gulf area. Its presence consisted of one flagship and two destroyers. The fleet was commanded by a rear admiral and named the Middle East Force, or MIDEASTFOR.46 By comparison, the British had maintained two Royal Air Force squadrons, six mine sweepers, one frigate, and a battalion divided between Bahrain and Sharjah.47 With a deep-water seaport and international airport, Bahrain had acted as a strategic military outpost and base for Great Britain.48 As noted, the U.S. military realized the vast importance of the giant sea-lanes of communication between the Suez Canal and the Far East, and the importance of unfettered access to Gulf oil reserves to assist in postwar reconstruc-

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tion efforts. Postwar reconstruction gave way to U.S. reliance on Gulf oil to fuel over 85 percent of its war effort in Vietnam, and to support its Cold War containment efforts.49 Bahrain was a relatively small oil giant but still earned more than $20 million in annual oil revenues, producing an estimated sixty thousand barrels a day by 1975 estimates.50 Bahrain first struck oil in 1932 under the supervision of two American-owned oil companies. The companies, Standard Oil of California (Socal) and Gulf Oil, had joined forces in the late 1920s to establish Bahrain Petroleum Company (BapCo), which underwrote Bahrain’s first discovery of oil. The two American-owned oil firms also helped establish an enormous refinery in Bahrain capable of handling Saudi Arabia’s extra crude oil—even today 80 percent of the oil it refines originates in Saudi Arabia and travels through a shared pipeline under the Gulf.51 The pending British military Gulf withdrawal triggered an important policy debate within the Nixon administration. Nixon officials were not prepared to take over Great Britain’s position in the Gulf while dealing with U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and a subsequently constrained budget. The United States had previously participated only sparingly in Gulf naval and military exercises.52 Nonetheless, Nixon and his aides realized the Gulf ’s geostrategic importance and began to prepare ways by which the U.S. could safeguard its Gulf interests and establish a more permanent military or naval presence there. The Nixon administration feared what would happen when the Gulf ’s eleven small states—Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the seven Trucial states, and Muscat/ Oman—no longer had Great Britain as their political and military protector.53 Once the British made their withdrawal announcement in 1968, they offered the U.S. Navy the right of first refusal on Bahrain’s naval facilities. The Bahrainis were also initially open to continuing a U.S. naval presence. U.S. officials supporting such a move stated: “[The Middle East Force] would counter the symbolic effect of the increased Soviet naval activity. A pull out at the same time as UK withdrawal would seem to signify abandonment of Western interests. [The U.S. Navy] does not see any other homeport as a feasible alternative to Bahrain.”54 It was also believed that the continuation of a U.S. naval presence would exhibit U.S. desire for regional peace and stability.55 According to one U.S. National Security Council document: “On-scene (or over-the-horizon) naval capabilities are seen to provide inherent leverage, if only for the preemptive purposes, in local affairs.”56 Those opposed to a continued U.S. naval presence in the Gulf argued that the presence of the U.S. Navy would antagonize other regional radical Arab regimes and destabilize Bahrain’s government,

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given the fervent anti-American and anti-imperialist sentiment.57 The skeptics were proven correct following the October War, but for the time being Nixon officials favoring a continued U.S. naval basing presence won out.58 The Gulf was too valuable, and showing the U.S. flag there was important for the maintenance of U.S. regional power and influence. As Admiral Thomas H. Moorer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted, “The U.S. is a maritime nation; anything that restricts its movements on the ocean is inimical to our interests.”59 The U.S. government apparently thought a homeport at Bahrain would also contribute to other overflight and staging rights in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. And control of these sea and air corridors would help deter the Soviet Union from gaining greater access to the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula.60 U.S. officials also envisioned a Gulf naval presence as important for potential quick future regional intervention. One U.S. National Security Council memo noted: “The Navy can bring flexibility and unobtrusiveness to showing the flag in peacetime, providing a powerful force in being on the scene in a time of tension.”61 Until 1972 the 1,800-ton USS Valcour was the main flagship in Bahrain before the U.S. Navy replaced it with the USS Lasalle, a 14,000-ton LSD.62 Before signing a conclusive basing agreement in 1972, Admiral Moorer called for an upgrade and modernization of the Middle East Force and Bahrain’s naval facilities, as well as requesting two new missile-carrying destroyers similar to the Berkley class that would be on continuous regional deployment.63 Admiral Moorer also noted in a meeting with Nixon’s national security advisor, Henry A. Kissinger, that he would soon send two more task force units to the Indian Ocean and Gulf region detached from the navy’s Seventh Fleet. This included an aircraft carrier, a tanker, and four or five destroyers.64 Additional requests to Bahrain from the U.S. Navy included modestly increasing the frequency of port visits, especially areas not normally visited by MIDEASTFOR; increased use of Singapore for logistical support; and deployment of the existing maritime air surveillance detachment (three planes) based at U-Tapao in the Indian Ocean.65 Aside from coordinating with Singapore, the U.S. Navy began planning for greater synchronization between its emerging presence at Diego Garcia and Bahrain.66 Diego Garcia was located in the southern Indian Ocean more than 2,600 miles from Bahrain and 1,000 miles south of India; it did not initially have a major effect on U.S. operations in Bahrain but would later prove essential following the shah’s overthrow. The U.S. Navy formally inaugurated its new $19 million Diego Garcia naval facility in 1973. The base became important for the U.S. military’s global operations, since it would possess two two-

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mile-long runways and a deep-water port capacity to house an aircraft carrier task force and other naval vessels.67 In the late 1960s, the U.S. Navy’s fears about a ramped-up Soviet naval presence in the Gulf were confirmed when the Soviet Union deployed a Pacific fleet naval task force to the region in 1967, consisting of three to four naval expeditionary units, making numerous port visits across the Indian Ocean and Gulf in a strategic show of force.68 With the United States consumed by Vietnam, the Soviet Union moved to take advantage of Great Britain’s pending departure by bolstering its naval presence throughout the Gulf and Indian Ocean region, including establishing a small naval presence at the port of Umm Qasr in Iraq.69 Aside from Iraq, the only permanent Soviet presence in the Gulf was a diplomatic outpost in Kuwait. The U.S. government feared that once the lower Gulf states declared independence, the Soviet Union would take the opportunity to establish additional diplomatic missions, leading to a major regional Soviet footprint. The United States believed that a Soviet presence would mean Soviet sponsorship of Arab radicalism and revolution.70 By 1972 the Soviet Union had more than doubled its regional naval strength with twelve to fifteen surface ships operating in the area, in addition to ten nuclear-powered submarines.71 Bahrain’s Approval of a U.S. Homeport

Shortly prior to Great Britain’s departure, Bahraini officials expressed their country’s support for a continued U.S. naval presence beyond 1971 but also stated clearly that Bahrain wanted “a U.S. presence, not a base.”72 At the time, public outcry and propaganda efforts against a U.S.-Bahraini stationing and base lease agreement were palpable in Bahrain.73 U.S. diplomats portrayed the Khalifa family as hoping the U.S. would downplay any base facility arrangements publicly, as well as privately, in order to mitigate public rancor against the agreement.74 According to U.S. documents, Bahraini officials had noted that it was in the best interest of the U.S. to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict if the U.S. Navy expected to win over greater public support and maintain an enduring presence in Bahrain, in addition to a more secure Gulf foothold.75 Bahrain officials feared that radical Gulf Arab elements would regard the MIDEASTFOR presence as a symbol of Western military imperialism propping up autocratic Gulf rulers, and would exploit the U.S. presence to advance efforts to overthrow the monarchies of the Gulf.76 Amid this political dynamic, and as the U.S. Navy began to negotiate a homeport near Manama in 1970, the Bahraini government debated whether a U.S. naval presence would reinforce or weaken the Khalifa

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family’s legitimacy and power.77 In the end, the royal family chose to uphold the foreign basing precedent established by the British, recognizing regional security concerns as their top priority. On December 23, 1971, Bahrain signed a temporary naval basing agreement with the United States. President Nixon later signed the agreement as an executive order so as to conclude it without congressional oversight or approval.78 In the agreement, Bahrain granted the U.S. Navy only 10 percent of Great Britain’s naval base access, or 98 acres.79 This included ground installations, such as electronic surveillance to monitor Gulf military traffic.80 The commanding rear admiral for the Middle East Force was Marmaduke G. Bayne. He oversaw an expanded complement of 260 men, up from 200 men previously, in addition to the crewmembers of the U.S. flagship.81 Fearing how the agreement would be perceived, the Bahrainis delayed making the basing announcement for several weeks. The Khalifas remained sensitive to both outside and domestic recognition that it was the only Gulf Arab country to grant the U.S. Navy a homeport and permanent base.82 Following the basing announcement and the subsequent domestic outcry against the United States, Bahrain’s foreign minister, Shaykh Mohammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, held a press conference on January 10, 1972, asserting that the agreement was essentially commercial and would not affect Bahrain’s newly established sovereignty.83 In the end, Juffair was still considered a “base” to outside powers despite Bahrain’s initial wishes not to call it a base.84 By 1973 the Khalifa family’s fears would become more pronounced and the U.S. Navy quickly learned how powerful Bahrain’s internal forces had grown in opposition to its presence. Rising Radicalism and Bahrain’s Internal Security

According to the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate in 1967: “The oil wealth is bringing about fundamental social changes, and the [Gulf] region is becoming the target of revolutionary ideas and influences from the outside that are hostile to the political, social, and economic status quo. This not only represents a threat to the existence of local dynastic regimes, but also raises questions regarding the future of the US and UK interests there.” The report also observed that ideas like nationalism and socialism had only just begun to penetrate the lower Gulf countries such as Bahrain.85 Further, and as noted in another National Security Council memorandum, traditionalist tribal authority had eroded, threatening the region’s entire social fabric in view of the rapid nature of regional political change and urbanization.86 Shaykh Isa Salman Al Khalifa, who ruled Bahrain from 1961 to 1999, gov-

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erned over a turbulent period for Bahrain’s restless Shi’a majority. The Shi’a accounted for approximately 60 percent of Bahrain’s population.87 In general, Shaykh Isa was successful at calming the various Arab nationalist and other radical or Shi’a opposition movements in Bahrain. He adopted a modernist approach to governing, employing liberalized reforms such as the establishment, albeit temporarily, of a national assembly. He also embraced a pragmatic foreign policy that viewed Iran and Saudi Arabia less as rivals and more as essential partners for Bahrain’s survival. Because of rising internal pressure following the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War in 1973 and to secure his family’s continued rule, Shaykh Isa publicly espoused the termination of the U.S. naval basing agreement. Iran had become less a security concern at this point, so Shaykh Isa was free to address mounting internal instability and other domestic security concerns.88 Forces of Internal Instability and Rising Unrest

Like Saudi Arabia during this same period, Bahrain and its ruling family were increasingly challenged by vocal opposition and rising revolutionary movements supported by external entities such as the UAR, Iraq, or the Soviet Union. Rising internal opposition and threats to the Khalifa family’s rule help explain why the U.S. naval basing presence would become a hot button issue in Bahrain. Prior to the 1970s, the United Arab Republic was seen as the primary menace to most countries of the region, including Bahrain. The UAR was known to support radical or anticolonial movements, in addition to providing subversive training to extreme leftist Bahrainis. It also offered money and assistance to the Beirut-based Arab-Nationalists’ Movement (ANM) that had cells in Kuwait and Bahrain.89 After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the UAR’s power and prestige dwindled as a result of subsequent regional defeats. The regimes in Damascus, Baghdad, and Aden replaced the UAR as the primary voices of regional opposition to pro-Western regimes.90 All three regimes financially supported dissident activity and used telecommunications technologies to spread subversive propaganda attacks against pro-Western monarchies and oligarchies such as the one in Bahrain.91 Iraq and Syria also engaged in supporting subversive activities associated with Ba’athist elements and clandestine training for dissidents from Bahrain and Oman—though their efforts were largely unsuccessful.92 Bahraini Ba’athists in particular claimed to desire “evolution over violent revolution” and therefore placed demands on the Khalifa family for shared power in government.93 Aside from the Ba’athists, small numbers

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of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Gulf (PFLOAG) and various Palestinian fedayeen groups also operated from Bahrain.94 The Soviet Union was said to have been an external backer of these and other regional anti-imperialist groups, including the Bahrain National Liberation Front, a communist-influenced group.95 As a result of the explosive social and economic change of this period, a burgeoning generation of semiliterate Bahraini youths with little prospect of employment had grown increasingly receptive to regional pan-Arab nationalism and other revolutionary beliefs.96 Bahrain’s economy was still unsophisticated, relying primarily on oil revenues to run the government, making the nation a rentier state. With high unemployment, Bahrain was rife with unrest and had previously experienced riots and protests among its 200,000 inhabitants largely because of its disenfranchised Shi’a majority.97 In fact, some U.S. officials expressed their concerns that Bahrain would erupt in chaos following Great Britain’s departure, jeopardizing U.S. strategic national interests as well as undermining the Khalifa family’s ability to rule.98 Prior to 1971, the permanent British presence had acted as a deterrent to any potential unrest on the island.99 In the late 1960s, British nationals heading up Bahrain’s police force arrested leaders from the National Liberation Front in Bahrain, which helped thwart most future dissident operations. Bahrain’s police force had been set up by Sir Charles Belgrave and was modeled generally after the Royal Irish Constabulary. Belgrave had hoped to establish an indigenous police force, but in practice British and other foreign nationals oversaw policing in Bahrain.100 Prior to declaring independence, the Khalifa family had prioritized external national security threats including the irredentist stance held by Iran over internal security considerations. Bahrain’s national security priorities quickly shifted, however, once Iran relinquished its claims to Bahrain. Prior to the UN resolution ending Iran’s claims to Bahrain, Bahrain was not in a position to end its basing partnerships with Great Britain or the United States, even though they were unpopular. But once Bahrain perceived that it faced relatively few external national security threats after 1971, it focused more on internal public opinion and domestic security fears. Specifically, the Khalifas had grown apprehensive about Bahrain’s increasingly agitated population, which disapproved of the U.S. Navy’s presence and saw the ruling family as a puppet of the West.101 Failure to conclude an Arab-Israeli settlement contributed to the mounting pressure on the United States and Bahrain. Indeed, America’s strong support of Israel began to erode and threaten its influential position across the Gulf.102

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One National Security Council memorandum noted that “internal instability stemming from internal agitation motivated by the Arab-Israeli conflict was a stronger threat than overt military aggression from a regional or great power like the Soviet Union or China.” The memorandum concluded that radical movements had become the greatest threat to the Khalifa family’s rule by the early 1970s.103 In fact, some Bahraini officials cited the political and military coups in Libya, Sudan, and Somalia as a specific cause for concern. They were equally troubled by Palestinian-sponsored attacks in Lebanon, as well as other civil unrest ignited in Jordan. These socionationalist movements had undermined many of the region’s regimes and could easily undermine Khalifa-family rule, it was believed.104 Adopting a Constitutional Monarchy

As domestic insecurity mounted, including the spread of labor protests in March 1972, the Khalifa family began studying the feasibility of instituting a constitutional monarchy in an attempt to curb public outcry.105 Bahrain was one of the first Gulf Arab countries to propose the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. The Khalifas wanted to remain ahead of popular sentiment, believing itself susceptible to violent public revolt.106 In the summer 1972 the Khalifa family announced that it would begin implementing plans to establish a constitutional monarchy by the fall. Previously, Shaykh Isa had established the Council of State to offer consultative advice to the royal family.107 The Khalifas were worried that if they did not grant local Bahrainis some role in government, they would fall victim to a political coup.108 As pointed out by one British official, “The dilemma [for Bahrain] is that nothing short of revolution will satisfy the opposition leaders, who always seem able to muster support at election.”109 By the 1970s, Bahrain, as well as other lower Gulf countries such as Qatar, had turned increasingly inward to focus on domestic security concerns and other internal problems. As part of Bahrain’s attempt to calm opposition groups, Shaykh Isa proposed the election of a constitutional assembly to oversee the drafting of a constitution that would lay the foundation for the creation of a representative national assembly. The election for the twenty-two members of the constitutional assembly was held on December 1, 1972. The newly elected body immediately set to work, and after almost one year of intermittent deliberations the constitutional assembly approved a draft constitution, including a proposed national assembly, with more than a hundred articles submitted

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for Shaykh Isa’s approval.110 The Khalifas had reportedly come to believe that a political solution was more promising for Bahrain’s future internal security than solving its problems through brute force.111 Bahrain’s announcement of impending reforms aligns with theories on how monarchies in general often use liberalization as a mechanism to curb unrest or internal instability.112 But it was not the process of democratization, as some argue, that drove base politicization or influenced the basing agreement outcome; the basing expulsion announcement had been made well in advance of the election of the national assembly in December 1973.113 Since external security threats were largely nonexistent at the start of the 1970s, Bahrain had been able to focus more on domestic politics in order to mitigate internal unrest and opposition. Domestic Politics and Base Negotiations, 1973–79

The outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War on October 6, 1973, and spread of regional anti-American sentiment exacerbated Bahrain’s already fragile domestic political situation, thereby having an adverse effect on the prospect of a continued U.S. naval presence in Bahrain.114 The first signs of the challenges that lay ahead for the United States came when Bahrain joined other regional Arab countries in calling for an oil embargo against the United States and other countries supportive of Israel at the outbreak of the war. At the end of October, oil-producing Arab states voted on a total U.S. trade and production embargo, as well as a 5 percent decrease in production per month. Eight Arab states signed on to the embargo: Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Algeria, Bahrain, and Dubai. Shortly after the embargo was enacted, President Nixon further fueled Arab rage when he requested $2.2 billion to aid Israel militarily.115 Toward the beginning of the October War, Bahrain’s foreign minister, Mohammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, met with the U.S. chargé d’affaires and protested “U.S. support of Zionism.” He warned that continued support for Israel would have major negative repercussions for the U.S. standing in Bahrain.116 Another Bahraini official noted that the Americans “don’t seem to realize how closely the Palestinian question is linked to Gulf security. The road to Gulf security runs through Palestine.”117 On October 20, Bahrain followed through with its prior warnings to the United States when Foreign Minister Shaykh Mohammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa announced the termination to the U.S. Navy’s basing agreement and requested the removal of all its forces within a year.118 The decision would ultimately affect more than a thousand naval personnel

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and other dependents based in Bahrain.119 The announcement was seen a sign of solidarity with other Arab countries.120 Bahrain’s decision was a major blow to the U.S. Navy, since Bahrain was the only U.S. base in the Gulf. At the time, the Middle East fleet included a command ship and two old destroyers.121 As noted in one memorandum to President Nixon from National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger: The recent [1973] conflict in the Middle East highlighted the vulnerability of our overseas military base structure to political restrictions and denial. It has become apparent that we need an interagency study of the requirements for and the problems of maintaining a viable overseas military base structure over the next 10 years in light of possible contingencies and national strategy.122

In other words, and contrary to some base politics literature, U.S. military basing agreements were susceptible to public opinion and domestic security concerns especially when regional security concerns were not a top priority for the host nation.123 In the case of Bahrain, the Khalifas used the U.S. basing expulsion announcement to relieve internal pressure on its regime. Throughout much of the basing controversy the Khalifa family was split on the final verdict. Shaykh Isa, for example, voiced his personal displeasure to U.S. officials regarding his government’s decision to annul the basing agreement—he had supported the arrangement from the beginning. However, he explained that his cabinet ministers, who were primarily family members, had been influenced by public opinion and the general uproar against U.S. support for Israel.124 He noted that Bahrain had to remain attuned to any popular insurrection that could affect the Khalifa family’s rule.125 He expressed the hope that the basing agreement could be resolved once Bahrainis elected the national assembly’s new representatives on December 7, 1973.126 The election for the new national assembly inspired 112 candidates to run for 30 seats. In the end, 14 of the 30 seats went to previously appointed cabinet ministers, while the remaining 16 went to opposition groups. Much to the Khalifa family’s dismay, the radical opposition groups used their newly elected seats to press the government for a greater political voice.127 Contrary to Shaykh Isa’s initial hope that a national assembly could be pressured to assist in resolving the U.S. basing issue, the establishment of the new body only complicated his ability to reverse the basing termination decision. Regional anti-U.S. sentiment had eased slightly by March 1974, when the oil embargo was lifted after nine months, but by early July the national assem-

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bly had yet to reverse the decision to terminate the basing agreement. Many in the royal family approved of a U.S. naval presence, but the majority of the national assembly opposed it. Some Bahraini officials remarked that they were in a quandary regarding the status of the U.S. Middle East Force, since the U.S. government had never formally responded to the base termination decision from October 1973. Henry Kissinger, who became secretary of state in September 1973, believed the best policy was to ignore the Bahrain government’s basing termination announcement and work to convince them to reverse the decision.128 Bahrain’s foreign minister, Mohammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, asked the United States to acknowledge Bahrain’s decision if it wanted Bahrain to reexamine the basing issue, and Shaykh Isa called full U.S. jurisdiction over the base a major sticking point for Bahrain if the U.S. Navy desired to stay. He also requested that the navy use the pier space as little as possible.129 Aside from making these demands, Shaykh Isa reminded U.S. officials that Bahrain’s public remained skeptical of any permanent U.S. naval presence. Some U.S. officials feared that the U.S. Navy’s future in Bahrain rested entirely upon the nation’s unpredictable domestic political situation.130 If Bahrain’s domestic political situation was not challenging enough for U.S. policy-makers, Kuwait’s government also inserted itself into the mix, pressuring the Khalifa family to uphold its decision to evict the U.S. Navy from Bahrain. Kuwait offered to pay Bahrain “five times” as much as the U.S. Navy’s $600,000 annual compensation for the base. Kuwaiti pressure split the Khalifa family on what to do about the navy. The State Department believed that Shaykh Isa was one of the few royal family members not completely convinced by Kuwait’s offer.131 Even so, Bahraini officials advised the United States that if it wanted to continue with the basing arrangement, it might have to significantly increase the compensation it paid to Bahrain.132 Shaykh Isa also wanted the United States to guarantee the recruitment and deployment of technical advisors for the Bahraini government.133 U.S. officials were understandably worried by Kuwait’s offers, especially since Bahrain had not yet reversed its basing decision despite reassurances from Shaykh Isa and others in his family that it would be done. With the one-year eviction notice scheduled to take effect in October 1974, the U.S. was unprepared to vacate the base and tried to stall the decision in any way it could. According to State Department records, this included offering to increase its rent payments and allowing greater Bahraini criminal jurisdiction over the base. By summer 1974, however, the national assembly was still deadlocked on what to do about the U.S. Navy in Bahrain.134

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A Decision Reversal?

In late July 1974, the Nixon administration received the news it had hoped for regarding the Middle East Force but it came with preconditions. As articulated by Bahrain foreign minister Mohammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Bahrain was willing to rescind the “notice of termination stationing agreement” (which the United States had never formally acknowledged), but the announcement had to remain confidential until certain problems could be worked out: 1. Modalities—exchange of confidential notes in which the U.S. acknowledged the original termination notice and expressed interest in Bahrain’s decision reversal resulting from the changed regional security situation. Bahrain’s reply would also indicate it had reconsidered the decision but a decision reversal was subject to the resolution of specific issues such as criminal jurisdiction. 2. Legal Questions: Bahrain desired to see a termination provision shortened from one year to six months in the new agreement. 3. Economic Questions: This area would concentrate largely on technical assistance as evidence of a stronger U.S.-Bahraini relationship. This discussion would also include rental fees directly related to the U.S. naval presence. However, U.S. “technical assistance” would not be tied directly to a basing agreement. One last issue would be the question of the Middle East Force’s use of pier space at Mina Sulman, since it was an important commercial pier for Bahrain’s economy.135 Bahrain’s decision to reexamine its termination notice to the navy came amid mounting turmoil in Bahrain and resulted in a bitterly divided national assembly. Bahrain had been gripped by a series of labor protests between January and June of 1974. In an interview, Bahrain’s prime minister and brother to Shaykh Isa, Shaykh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, remarked that the intent of the protests had been to “paralyze the country and to prove to Bahraini public opinion that the government is weak and cannot take any firm measure. . . . We discovered that a number of national assembly members and leftists were instigating workers to strike.”136 The tension between the government and national assembly came to a head on October 22, when Shaykh Isa called for the passage of a “law on state security.” The proposed law would enable the government to “arrest and imprison any citizen without investigation or trial for a term of up to three years on suspicion of ‘opposing’ the government’s domestic or foreign policy.”137 Leftist opposition groups in the national assembly boycotted parlia-

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mentary sessions and refused to vote on the law, further angering Shaykh Isa after he had made numerous personal attempts to see the bill voted into law.138 The United States grew frustrated with the Khalifa family also because it never followed through with its proposal to relinquish its termination notice by the end of 1974. Due to the impasse in the national assembly, Bahrain and the United States never completed their updated basing agreement. The only part decided was a sixfold increase in compensation paid by the U.S. for use of the naval base, or $4 million.139 In another setback, the national assembly voted again in August 1975 to terminate the U.S. Navy’s basing agreement.140 The national assembly vote placed the Khalifa family in a compromised position on the basing issue, in turn forcing the Bahraini government to uphold the assembly’s decision while also announcing that the U.S. Navy had until mid-1977 to remove its forces. Several Khalifa family members and other Bahraini officials again demonstrated their vulnerability to the winds of domestic politics and a radical internal opposition to the Khalifa family’s rule.141 By August 1975, it had become reportedly apparent to Shaykh Isa that leftist radicals in the national assembly had grown aggressively outspoken and extremely powerful on “bread and butter” issues, simultaneously threatening a confrontation over the U.S.-Bahraini security relationship. At the recommendation of his brother, Prime Minister Shaykh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, Shaykh Isa ordered the arrest of radical members of the national assembly and other opposition leaders; on August 26 he dissolved the parliamentary assembly indefinitely. The national assembly had become a threat to his rule.142 Following the dissolution of the assembly, Bahraini officials purportedly foiled a plot to overthrow the government when it captured a shipment of arms headed to Bahrain with alleged ties to the outlawed Arab Communist Organization.143 Shaykh Isa also claimed that several national assembly representatives had also been involved in activities directed at subverting the royal family.144 Although the issue is still debated as to what specifically drove Shaykh Isa to dissolve the national assembly, the primary factor still appears to be that the national assembly had significantly hindered his ability to govern freely. And its inability to pass Isa’s proposed state security law had ruptured the relationship irreparably.145 Even with the dissolution of the national assembly, leftist groups continued to berate the Khalifa family and demanded the U.S. Navy’s departure. Further, it was noted that “Bahrainis were upset over Henry Kissinger’s hint, when he was Secretary of State, that the U.S. might use military force in the Middle East

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in the event of another crippling oil embargo.”146 Despite Bahrain’s 1975 basing decision, Kissinger remained incredulous and in one of his staff meetings stated: Anybody knowing an Arab statement of intention knows that between now and 1977 that may mean we will go out in 1977 or in 2063. A unilateral declaration by the Bahrain Government doesn’t mean anything. I don’t see what we gain by agreeing to it. I am very pre-disposed against announcing now that we are going to get out in 1977. I am not fighting for staying in there. Once we have Diego Garcia, we can announce in 1977.147

Defending Bahrain’s position, its foreign minister reiterated: “All BahrainAmerican relations concerning the naval facilities or concerning commercial relations depend on the American stand concerning peace and stability in the Middle East and the just cause of our Arab brothers in the area.”148 Indeed, Bahrain’s brief experiment with democracy had ended, but public opinion and internal security concerns continued to determine the Khalifa family’s ability to renegotiate the U.S. naval basing agreement. Lowering the U.S. Flag

In 1975 the U.S. Navy in Bahrain accommodated approximately 1,200 military personnel, including 50 officers on the admiral’s staff and fewer than 90 people operating the base’s shore facilities.149 Following the 1975 national assembly vote, U.S. officials tried to overturn Bahrain’s basing decision but, according to Admiral Crowe’s recollection, Foreign Minister Shaykh Mohammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa advised his cousin the emir Shaykh Isa that the Bahraini government could not reverse the decision because of political sensitivities leading to a possible backlash, telling him, “You may not like the Parliament’s decision, but to reverse it by fiat would be a grievous error. You will anger and alienate every government in the Gulf, most of whom want you to eject the Americans. Your own people will also resent it. The damage is done; trying to undo it now would create serious problems.”150 Rear Admiral Thomas J. Bigley, commander of the Middle East Force in 1975, also expressed pessimism regarding Bahrain’s ability to reverse the basing decision: “Unless we are prepared to go begging to the government of Bahrain, I see little chance of our presence here being extended under any circumstance.”151 After almost two years trying to stall the basing decision, Bahrain officially reaffirmed on June 29, 1977, that the homeport basing agreement would be terminated the following day.152 The

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U.S. Navy’s Bahraini homeport at Juffair was the only onshore command between Subic Bay in the Philippines and the Mediterranean—Diego Garcia was still being upgraded and did not operate at full capacity.153 According to one National Security Council report, increased confidence among the smaller Gulf states helped explain why the U.S. military presence was terminated in places such as Bahrain. Those states believed that they could handle their own security affairs and did not need further outside assistance: “So long as this attitude persists, U.S. access to military facilities in the Gulf will be subject to severe constraints.”154 Public outcry over U.S. support for Israel, in addition to leftist radical movements that challenged the monarchy, took precedence over the regional and national security dynamics that had necessitated an active presence by a Great Power such as the United States.155 Simply stated, internal security concerns continued to take precedent over external national security threats. As noted by Bahrain’s information minister, Tariq Abdal Rahman al Muayyid, “Political pressures made a renewal of the [base] lease impossible. . . . Let us just say the previous lease agreement was out of context with the times.”156 Despite Bahrain’s announcement, its foreign minister, Shaykh Mohammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, stated that the Middle East Force would still be able to use the port to take on supplies or to service its ships on occasion, but that it would no longer be a homeport or U.S. naval headquarters: “If a ship would like to come here, yes, of course [the U.S. Navy] will have to make a request each time, but we will make arrangements. They will be welcome to take supplies. But we don’t want the U.S. presence in such a way that it could be construed as a base and give other Gulf or Indian Ocean countries an excuse to allow foreign powers to put in military bases.”157 In a separate meeting, Foreign Minister Shaykh Mohammad reiterated a similar and telling message to U.S. ambassador to Bahrain Wat Cluverius: “Bahrain must be able to say in June that MIDEASTFOR has been withdrawn. . . . If Bahrain can say convincingly that there is no longer a U.S. base in Bahrain, then the number of days of ships’ visits or amount of supplies they load here is Bahrain’s business for which it need not apologize.”158 The Middle East Force’s commander of the fleet, Rear Admiral Crowe, stated that the eviction from Bahrain would mark the beginning of a “fundamental change” in how the U.S. Navy would operate regionally.159 U.S. naval officials also noted that the U.S. Navy would lose important access to Bahraini commercial piers for supplies, thus reducing the fleet’s effectiveness at sea, if the

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navy had to adapt to a schedule dictated by the Bahrainis. Crowe announced that the U.S. Middle East Force would be converted into an “afloat command,” whereby command ships would be controlled from abroad without a regional homeport.160 Despite changing the Middle East Force’s operational structure, Ambassador Cluverius negotiated an agreement that permitted sixty U.S. sailors to remain in Manama for logistical support in what would be called the Administrative Support Unit (ASU).161 As part of the agreement, the Bahraini government allowed the United States to occupy and maintain buildings at the 10-acre Juffair compound. The ASU lease agreement was signed on August 23, 1977.162 In order to maintain a low profile and light footprint, the U.S. Navy forbade its few remaining officers and other personnel from wearing their uniforms in Manama. There was also no permanent housing for the ASU personnel at the Juffair compound. The Bahraini government, however, did permit the United States to continue operating its Department of Defense School in Manama. The six hundred children attending the school came mainly from families of American businessmen, Western foreign service officers, and affluent Bahrainis. Although the U.S. presence was not entirely eliminated, the homeport eviction was an important symbolic move, and it helped assuage the persistent opposition that used the U.S. naval homeport presence to undermine the Khalifa family. On June 30, 1977, the U.S. Navy lowered all U.S. flags on the Juffair base and a farewell reception was held for the Middle East Force’s commanding officer, Rear Admiral Crowe.163 Thereafter, the Middle East Force’s homeport was Norfolk, Virginia.164 The U.S. Navy Returns

Almost two years after Admiral Crowe lowered the American flag over Juffair, the shah of Iran was overthrown in the Islamic Revolution, which brought chaos to the region. The shah’s “White Revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s created disorder among Iran’s traditional religious and agrarian society, which in turn triggered a backlash against the shah and his modernization programs. The combination of the 1970s influx of oil wealth and the subsequent rise of a kleptocracy that led to major wealth discrepancies also enraged Iranians.165 The Soviet Union contributed to the regional chaos at the end of 1979 when it invaded Afghanistan to prop up the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, a Marxist-Leninist regime.166 If these events were not destabilizing enough for Bahrain and the region, war broke out between Iraq and Iran on September

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22, 1980.167 Both countries had used their oil wealth to engage in major military modernization programs during the 1970s with the help of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. By the end of the decade, it came as no surprise that Iran and Iraq were headed for war after Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, called for the overthrow of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and his autocratic Ba’athist regime, as well as the export of Iran’s revolutionary ideology to other Shi’a communities in the Gulf.168 The U.S. Navy had upheld Bahrain’s decision to terminate its homeport status after June 1977, but by the 1980s the Khalifas were forced to embrace a more robust U.S. naval basing presence when regional security concerns again took top priority over fears about internal instability.169 The Khalifa family’s gradual shift placing regional security matters above domestic security concerns began in 1979, following the shah’s overthrow when a maverick Iranian religious leader, Ayatollah Sadek Rouhani, threatened to seize Bahrain if it did not implement Islamic law. Rouhani revived Iran’s age-old claim that Bahrain was Iran’s “fourteenth province.”170 The Khalifa family reportedly became concerned when other clerics followed Rouhani’s lead in the autumn of 1979 calling for the annexation of Bahrain.171 The Khalifas knew that Iran financed the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, a militant Shi’a group, which adopted a platform stating that Iran would take Bahrain by force. The group had also organized demonstrations against Khalifa-family rule.172 Other Iranian Islamic clerics denied the legitimacy of the threats made by Rouhani, but the Khalifa family was not prepared to take any chances.173 It recognized that Bahrain’s national defense forces were no match against Iran’s large military, especially given Iran’s threat to export its Islamic revolution to Bahrain’s majority Shi’a population. During August and September 1979, an estimated fourteen hundred Shi’a protested in demonstrations in Manama, as well as across Bahrain’s Shi’a villages. During the protests, many demonstrators held Khomeini posters and called for the creation of an Islamic Republic like the one in Iran.174 Saudi Arabia also experienced Shi’a uprisings in its eastern provinces and was especially concerned about what would transpire in Bahrain as a result of the two countries’ close relationship and similar foreign policy concerns. By 1979 most Gulf Arab countries viewed Iran as their primary national security threat.175 Iran exacerbated these fears when it staged naval exercises in the Gulf to demonstrate its force capabilities.176 At the time, and excluding Iraq’s army, the six Gulf Arab states had combined armed forces of approximately 110,000 soldiers, one-fourth the size of Iran’s army. Making mat-

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ters worse, the Gulf Arab states were far behind in their development of a large modern military.177 By the spring of 1979, and in light of the region’s volatile events, the Khalifas had begun to contemplate renegotiating a more robust basing deal with the U.S. Navy that included more than just the ASU. According to a statement by Shaykh Isa: “We would rather see our friends here than our enemies.”178 It was only a matter of time before the Khalifa family was convinced by the escalation of regional events to permit a more heightened U.S. naval basing profile and agreement.179 In reaction to the Gulf ’s explosive events, especially the Soviet Union’s December 1979 invasion in Afghanistan and the ongoing U.S. hostage crisis in Iran, the U.S. military deployed twenty naval vessels by January 1980 to the Gulf and Arabian Sea area, including multiple aircraft carrier groups.180 Despite continued internal division over the U.S. basing issue, the Khalifas approved an agreement that permitted a public and more robust basing profile for the U.S. Middle East Force’s five ships at Juffair/Mina Sulman by 1981.181 According to one U.S. official report, the Gulf Arab monarchies all felt “exposed to external pressure, from Iraq and Iran, as well as Soviet-backed subversion and political pressure from South Yemen. The Soviet move into Afghanistan has intensified this anxiety.”182 Moreover, and contrary to some base politics thinking that treats external security factors as insignificant in basing agreement outcomes, the events of 1979 and the early 1980s help explain why Bahrain would accept restoration of the U.S. naval basing presence at Juffair.183 The Khalifa family had more pressing issues to worry about than internal unrest and could no longer remain beholden entirely to domestic politics or public opinion.184 Debates over the U.S. naval basing presence soon became distant history as the Iran-Iraq War spilled into the Gulf by the early 1980s, threatening to disrupt regional oil production and other maritime commerce.185 To assist Bahrain and the other Gulf Arab monarchies, the U.S. Navy deployed 18 combat ships and 13 support ships by the end of 1980. With other Western navies added to the mix, such as the French and British, the total naval ships operating in the Gulf region numbered 60. By comparison, the Soviet Union had 12 combat ships and 17 support vessels.186 Saudi Arabia, unsettled by the region’s events, increased its involvement in Bahraini internal affairs by announcing the start of construction on the King Fahd Causeway in 1981 that would link Saudi Arabia and Bahrain by land. The 16-mile, four-lane causeway was completed in 1986 and was to be used by Saudi Arabia’s military in the event of any Iranian-backed activity or

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insurrection that aimed to overthrow the Khalifa family.187 The events of 1979 and 1980 had ushered in a new regional security dynamic that pushed the Gulf Arab monarchies closely together, while also enabling Bahrain to once again raise the profile of the U.S. naval basing presence. Conclusion: A Light Footprint Prevails

Bahrain’s reestablishment of the U.S. Navy’s pronounced basing presence by 1981 marked the end of a decade of negotiations addressing whether or not the United States would maintain a homeport presence in Bahrain. As demonstrated by this historic case, domestic politics and subsequent threats to the Khalifa family were driving factors behind a U.S. naval homeport eviction announcement beginning in 1973. Certainly, the U.S. presence had not been entirely eliminated as demonstrated by the maintenance of the ASU at Juffair. However, Iran’s relinquishing of its claims to Bahrain in 1971 freed up the Khalifas to focus more intently on internal security concerns during this period. With a reprioritization of Bahrain’s national security agenda toward domestic security concerns in the 1970s, the Khalifas focused much of their attention on mitigating threats from radical opposition elements that used the U.S. naval homeport presence to undermine the family’s rule. In an effort to quell Bahrain’s domestic unrest, the Khalifas supported the adoption of a constitution and the establishment of a national assembly, a democratic experiment ultimately ending in failure, in addition to complicating Shaykh Isa’s ability to support the continuation of the U.S. Navy’s homeport at Juffair. In the end, the U.S. Navy was able to maintain a token presence through promises of a light footprint and the maintenance of its Administrative Support Unit.188 This served the purposes of both the Khalifas and the United States: the Khalifas could demonstrate to opposition forces that it was in control of its sovereignty by the U.S. naval homeport eviction in 1977. And the United States maintained a small but critical presence that would later prove useful when it was called back into action to protect the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War. The U.S. naval presence at Bahrain would also prove essential to regional security when the Gulf War broke out in 1990.

5

Sultan Qaboos and Operation Eagle Claw

As the U.S. Navy negotiated with Bahrain at the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, President Jimmy Carter’s administration had already begun to explore military basing options in the Sultanate of Oman. Located at the Gulf ’s mouth and along the Strait of Hormuz, Oman, meaning “peaceful land” in Arabic, was an ideal basing location for the United States. Oman’s geostrategic location aligned with U.S. visions of a basing network between Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and Manama, Bahrain in the Gulf. After being expelled from Iran in 1979 by the Islamic Revolution, the U.S. military needed a regional basing foothold from which to monitor the Gulf and the Indian Ocean’s political, military, and maritime affairs, including a recently increased Soviet naval presence. Oman’s Masirah Island was particularly well suited as a potential long-term U.S. military base due to its remoteness and its strategic location 10 miles from Oman’s southern coast.1 Like its Gulf neighbors, Omanis viewed a U.S. military foothold with skepticism, a result of Oman’s experience with Great Britain’s more than centurylong presence. Moreover, Omani officials reportedly desired greater military independence and control over Oman’s armed forces as the British began their 1970s regional drawdown.2 As Great Britain relinquished its last basing installations in 1977, Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said, Oman’s ruler, expressed opposition to America’s takeover of the former British bases because of a perennially unstable domestic political situation. Qaboos had just defeated a rebellion in Dhofar, a southern region bordering Yemen, at the end of 1975 after more than a decade of fighting and feared that a military basing partnership with the United States might stoke additional internal resentment against his rule. In an inter117

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view, the sultan stated, “I have always said we are well disposed towards our friends and if a friend asks us for an aircraft to land, in normal circumstances, we would have no objection. But a base—out of the question!”3 Several years later, following the Iranian shah’s overthrow, Sultan Qaboos reiterated the same fear about pushback he might receive from a robust basing relationship with the U.S. military. He did not want to see a dynamic similar to Iran’s played out in Oman. He therefore remained uneasy about the possibility of Marxistled rebels using a U.S. military presence to spark another rebellion in Dhofar province.4 Despite the sultan’s internal security concerns, he was also aware of Oman’s regional vulnerabilities. In particular, he was worried about what the Soviet Union might do from its newly established airbases in western Afghanistan, in addition to its continued support for the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Soviet regional aggression could disrupt oil flows and other maritime trade through the Strait of Hormuz and into the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Thus, Qaboos did not want to completely dismiss U.S. military desires for basing in Oman. In 1975, the Omani government had granted the United States limited basing access and flyover rights.5 After the fall of the shah and Soviet Afghan invasion in 1979, the United States made a case to Oman that it needed greater basing access and rights in order to protect the region and its strategic national interests. The United States needed Oman as an integral part of its emerging “Southwest Asia Strategy,” which sought to keep the Soviet Union out of the region and to uphold and protect the free flow of oil and other Western regional investments. The U.S. also sought to establish a system of rapid regional deployment for U.S. forces through the buildup of regional bases and other security partnerships and programs.6 Regardless of the regional security dynamic that emerged after 1979, the sultan remained reluctant about supporting a robust basing agreement with the United States due to the sultan’s continued internal security fears. But with an eye toward Oman’s need to balance internal and external security concerns, Sultan Qaboos agreed in 1980 to hold negotiations with the United States for an enhanced basing agreement that included Masirah Island. The U.S. used promises of greater military and economic aid incentives and a low military profile to help entice the sultan in accepting a renewed basing agreement. Just as basing negotiations began in the spring of 1980, however, the future of U.S. basing access in Oman was jeopardized when Omani officials learned that the United States had used Omani bases without permission for the secret, and ul-

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timately failed, Eagle Claw mission that attempted to rescue U.S. embassy employees taken hostage in Tehran by Iranian revolutionaries. The sultan was embarrassed by the event and threatened to call off negotiations. He did not want opposition groups or other regional neighbors to view him as a puppet of the West. He also reportedly feared that Marxist-led rebels might use the news to undermine his rule.7 President Carter and his administration had been equally embarrassed by the failed rescue mission and quickly dispatched Ambassador Philip C. Habib as the president’s personal emissary to help ease bilateral relations, since Oman remained a critical ally for Carter’s future regional strategy.8 Ambassador Marshall W. Wiley, U.S. ambassador to Oman at the time, worked with Habib to help guide the basing negotiations back on track. In the end, the Carter administration was able to get Oman back to the negotiation table by significantly increasing prior U.S. offers of economic and military aid, in addition to promises of maintaining a low military profile in the sultanate. The added incentives and promises of a light footprint convinced the hesitant sultan and helped pave the way for a basing agreement in June 1980.9 As turbulence spread into the Gulf as a result of the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s, the sultan’s acceptance of a U.S. military presence evolved to more embrace openly his security and basing partnership with the United States. Indeed, by the mid to late 1980s, external security concerns began to take precedent over the sultan’s prior domestic security fears associated with the Dhofar rebellion and other regional Marxist threats. Like the U.S. Navy’s experience in Bahrain, and in contrast to certain traditional base politics thinking, this historical case exemplifies how promises of a low basing and military profile can assist the United States to achieve positive basing negotiation outcomes.10 In the case of Oman, increased economic and military aid incentives following the failed Operation Eagle Claw also provided sufficient impetus to bring the sultan to support a final basing agreement between Oman and the United States.11 Sultan Qaboos’s Ascendancy

From the start of Sultan Qaboos’s reign in 1970, the sultan faced internal upheaval throughout the decade caused by the war in Dhofar and broad social unrest caused by his rapid modernization and development programs. Marxist rebels in Dhofar, the largest of Oman’s eleven governorates, sought to topple the sultan and the sultanate. Furthermore, the sultan’s efforts to transform a largely tribal and rural society into a modern industrialized one in a short period of time brought a decade of unprecedented change and instability, as well

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as violence. Oman’s internal security dynamic would have direct bearing on the U.S. military’s ability to increase its basing presence in the Gulf following a British drawdown and the closure of its local bases. The desire of the United States for a pronounced basing presence placed Qaboos in a challenging position given his concerns about how a foreign basing presence would be perceived—locally and regionally. He remained adamant about protecting Oman’s sovereignty and independent nature.12 Throughout most of the 1970s, Sultan Qaboos would prioritize internal security concerns over permitting a robust U.S. military presence that might help assuage anxieties associated with an ever-menacing Soviet Union. Inheriting the Dhofar War

Sultan Qaboos came to power following the overthrow of his father Sultan Sa‘id ibn Taymur during a July 23, 1970, palace coup. Sultan Sa’id had failed to quell a growing internal rebellion, and his longtime extreme isolationist policies had turned many tribesman and even many of his own advisors against him. According to one of Oman’s first national development reports, “Before 1970 Oman completely lacked the base requirements of a modern state. There were no government agencies or ministries in the modern sense. There were no asphalted roads to link the various parts of the vast country. Only one small port existed and this had a limited capacity with no modern equipment.”13 Sultan Qaboos’s father had long been under the influence of the British during his reign, from 1932 to 1970, but as the UK began to decrease its regional military presence in the early 1970s, Qaboos moved forward delicately to fill the British void. One way to do this was to drift slowly toward the United States, seeking political and security assistance without appearing too enthusiastic about a robust U.S. military presence.14 When Qaboos came to power, Oman was geographically ill defined and demographically diverse and included an empty northwest quarter and an isolated peninsula called Musandam in the Strait of Hormuz. The Musandam Peninsula today remains separated from the rest of Oman by the United Arab Emirates.15 Of Oman’s approximately 890,000 inhabitants, only 5 percent lived in an urban area; the rest were spread across Oman’s vast 82,000-square-mile territory, including rugged interior mountains, gravel plateaus, and a 1,000mile coastline.16 Aside from local tribal elements, Baloch, Indo-Pakistani (about 90,000), and East African minority populations were the main ethnic groups of Oman.17

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One of Qaboos’s first objectives when he took power was to end the Dhofar War in the south. The Dhofar governorate, the southernmost in Oman, shared a border with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen or South Yemen. The continuation of the fighting there threatened to further destabilize Oman and the whole region if it were not stopped. The prolongation of the rebellion jeopardized the expanded exploration of valuable natural resources and thus imperiled the revenue from Dhofar Province that Qaboos needed to modernize and develop Oman. Oil was first discovered in Oman in 1960; Dhofar contained some of its largest deposits.18 Beginning in 1963, and in part as a reaction to Sultan Sa’id’s despotic rule, Dhofari tribal elements began attacking U.S. oil installations in Dhofar. A fullfledged rebellion emerged the following year when the Benevolence Society of Dhofar merged with a local branch of the Arab National Movement to form the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF). The DLF was backed by various communist and leftist governments, including the People’s Republic of China, Cuba, East Germany, and the PDRY. It held its first official congress in June 1965.19 In 1968 the DLF officially adopted a Marxist platform and changed its name to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). China was particularly supportive of the PFLOAG and sent advisors to Hadramaut to train rebels. PFLOAG also sent thirty rebels to China to receive training in guerrilla warfare.20 PFLOAG wanted to spread its mission beyond Oman to the rest of the Gulf, but with Sultan Qaboos’s arrival its efforts were increasingly thwarted because of Qaboos’s successful efforts to contain the rebellion. Qaboos was greatly aided in large part by significant military and security assistance from Great Britain, Iran, and Jordan. Iran was particularly helpful, dispatching four thousand troops to help quell the rebellion.21 Perhaps a sign of its waning power, PFLOAG changed its name to the more modest Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) in 1974 and adopted a more political strategy to gain power elsewhere in the Gulf rather than the continuation of violent conflict. By mid-1974, Omani forces had confined PFLO to a 20-square-mile area.22 PFLO’s defeat came in November and December 1975, when the sultan’s forces succeeded in closing off a main access route near the PDRY border.23 After arresting or defeating many of the remaining rebels, Sultan Qaboos announced an end to the Dhofar War on December 11, 1975.24 Despite the widely celebrated victory, many PFLO insurgents escaped to the mountains or across the border into the PDRY after the sultan’s final Dho-

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far offensive.25 The fact that many rebels remained at large weighed heavily on the sultan throughout the remainder of the decade. The fear was that PFLO rebels remained powerful enough to undermine the sultan’s rule through a revival of the insurgency, especially with continued support from such communist regimes as those in PDRY, China, or Cuba.26 Iraq also backed the PFLO and was not swayed under Omani pressure to shut down a local PFLO office.27 The sultan was also aware that PFLO elements threatened to use a basing agreement with the United States to stir up another violent conflict.28 Omani officials were equally well aware of the Soviet Union’s capacity to support Marxist revolutions to overthrow noncommunist regimes. In Ethiopia, for example, the Dergue, a communist military junta, ousted Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1974 with Soviet and Cuban support.29 This enduring internal security dynamic would influence U.S. military basing negotiations with Oman throughout the 1970s. Modernization and Social Unease

While addressing continued threats emanating from Dhofar, Sultan Qaboos implemented a plan for Oman’s swift modernization and development. Oman’s rapid national transformation during the 1970s created numerous new domestic strains for the largely nomadic, rural, and tribal society. Like other Gulf nations, the traditional structure of Omani society was challenged significantly by the arrival of new foreign technology, foreign technicians and workers, and accelerated urbanization. The Muscat metropolitan area, for example, expanded from 40,000 residents to an estimated 500,000 in two decades. Many tribal leaders lost much of their powerbase and prior influence over the sultan as a new generation moved to cities, gaining financial independence from traditional familial or clan structures.30 In addition, the sultan faced the difficult task of filling positions in his military expansion and civilian infrastructure programs resulting from a lack of indigenous skilled manpower. As a result, Oman witnessed an influx of foreign workers seeking to fill these and affiliated positions. The influx of foreign workers contributed further to the sultan’s domestic challenges as locals grew frustrated by increased competition for jobs and rising unemployment that provoked domestic resentment.31 Despite these emerging social tensions, Sultan Qaboos was able to use his approximately $100 million in annual oil revenue to support many ambitious military and economic development projects throughout the 1970s.32 Sultan Qaboos invested significantly in the expansion of his armed forces: in 1968

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Oman’s armed forces numbered 1,400 men. By 1970 Oman had an army of 4,000 men; a small air force with Provost, Caribou, and Beaver aircraft; and a navy with only two armored dhows. In 1978 Oman allotted $767 million to defense and had 19,200 native Omanis in its armed forces, including an air force with 2,100 personnel and access to 32 combat aircraft. Oman’s navy numbered 900 men and 18 vessels, with 3 patrol craft, 7 fast patrol boats, 1 training ship, and 3 small landing craft.33 As for economic development, Sultan Qaboos initiated national programs that built schools, hospitals, roads, and houses. Hospitals were virtually nonexistent in 1971; Oman only had one hospital with twelve beds.34 Oman also had only two main paved roads: a paved road from Muscat to the military base of Bayt al-Falaj, next to Masrah, and a dirt road from the oil-shipping terminal west of Masrah across Al-Hajar to the oil fields.35 Sultan Qaboos’s initiatives delivered quick results but also made many Oman watchers, especially in the United States, fearful of social instability that could have been a result of the rapid pace of change and displacement of Omanis from rural to urban areas. Moreover, the swift changes that took place in Oman during the 1970s help explain why the sultan remained strongly opposed to a more robust U.S. basing presence. He reportedly knew that a permanent U.S. military base would not be embraced locally during an unsettling, turbulent period. Between 1975 and 1980, Oman’s gross national product grew an average of 20 percent a year. This was aided in large part by the sultan’s national infrastructure and development projects: in 1970 Oman had only 10 kilometers in asphalted roads; in 1980 it had 2,143 kilometers. Oman also constructed three new ports, at Muscat, Matrah, and Raysut, in addition to a major international airport at Seeb, near Muscat, and a new domestic airport at Salalah.36 The number of schools also soared from 3 to 363 and the number of students increased from 909 to 94,823 during the same period. By 1991 there were more than 300,000 students enrolled. In business, Oman boasted 12,555 registered companies in 1980, whereas it had none registered in 1970. Unemployment, however, remained a challenge.37 By the late 1970s, many young Omanis had left behind traditional jobs of farming or fishing in search of new jobs in Oman’s urban areas. As the local population became more educated, domestic pressure on the sultan grew to continue providing adequate employment opportunities for Omanis. These added pressures certainly factored into his concerns related to a U.S. military presence.38

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America Tries to Fill a Void

The sultan’s internal security concerns may have taken top priority throughout the 1970s, but external security was still part of the sultan’s national security calculus. The Soviet Union remained Oman’s top external threat, especially with its ties to neighboring South Yemen. Due to Oman’s delicate domestic security situation, however, the sultan had to tread carefully when deciding how to deal with the United States as Great Britain closed its bases. The sultan remained reluctant about permitting an immediate ramp-up of U.S. forces on Omani soil because of the pushback and resistance he would receive locally as well as regionally.39 According to U.S. officials, the sultan was more susceptible to an internal campaign of subversion than a direct military affront from a neighboring adversary.40 Although many British military advisors stayed throughout the 1970s in varying capacities, many top Omani officials wanted the sultan to establish even greater independence from Great Britain, not to mention the United States, following the British basing departure. Those officials believed that Omanis could handle any future internal security concerns on their own.41 Sultan Qaboos reflected this stance at the 1976 Gulf Foreign Minister Muscat Summit, where he expressed his desire to “achieve Gulf security without outside interference.”42 Despite this local Omani resistance, the United States sought ways to fill the pending British security void, in addition to building a strong regional basing network. After the 1973 October War and subsequent regional political backlash against the United States, especially in Bahrain, the U.S. needed a security partner such as Oman to maintain its Red Sea, Gulf, and Indian Ocean operations, particularly to gather intelligence against a notably more active Soviet navy.43 In the long term, the U.S. military envisioned a full-fledged base on Masirah Island.44 Masirah was an ideal location for a base, since it was separated from Oman by a 10-mile-wide channel and located about 200 miles south of Muscat. It was also located 2,200 miles northwest of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The island was 40 miles long and 12 miles wide and housed a local Omani population estimated at four thousand.45 By 1975 it already had two runways (one gravel), a communications facility, living quarters, and the capacity to store 311,000 barrels of fuel.46 It could also support one antisubmarine patrol squadron or one tactical fighter squadron.47 The British had established the base in 1932 and thereafter maintained and operated it as an important outpost along the South Arabian air and sea corridor en route to British India.48 In 1962 the

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British created berths for Polaris submarines and constructed installations for surface ships and a forty thousand–man garrison.49 The sultan may have been reluctant to accept a U.S. basing presence, but he was also well aware of Oman’s need to keep good relations with the United States because of its fear of the Soviet Union and Soviet designs to control more of the maritime traffic and commerce across the Indian Ocean and Gulf.50 The Soviet Union already had strong ties to Aden in South Yemen.51 In a sign of the strategic importance of bilateral relations, Sultan Qaboos traveled to the United States in January 1975 to meet with U.S. officials about improving the U.S.Omani security partnership.52 Sultan Qaboos, however, made it clear that he was open to only limited U.S. military access at Oman’s Masirah Island facilities following Great Britain’s basing departure from Masirah and Salalah, scheduled for March 31, 1977. He argued that limited U.S. basing access rights would not have the same negative effect as a more permanent U.S. basing facility.53 The U.S. military respected the sultan’s wishes and in exchange for the initial limited basing access the U.S. government agreed to fulfill his military requests for immediate delivery of TOW antitank missiles, infrared night-vision equipment, Claymore mines, and the possibility of airplane and helicopter pilot training. In total, the United States would provide $20 million in credits for arms purchases. And the U.S. Department of Defense proposed to dispatch a team of three officers to assess future ways to improve Oman’s navy and ground forces. In return, Sultan Qaboos agreed to the U.S. use of Masirah Island and two other landing fields by U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in need of refueling or for rendering emergency assistance.54 The initial agreement was for two years and it was renewed again in 1977 with little hassle, since Omani officials remained optimistic that the extension would not produce a major uproar either regionally or among Omanis. The United States also agreed not to establish a more permanent basing presence.55 The sultan’s national security calculus and acceptance of the U.S. basing presence, however, were about to be challenged by the outbreak of regional turbulence beginning in 1979. Once again, Oman’s external security concerns would be pushed to the fore. Oman’s Delicate National Security Balance

The year 1979 began with the shah’s overthrow on January 16, and was followed by a radical assault on the Grand Mosque in Mecca on November 20, and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in late December.56 Although

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the United States was an important ally, Sultan Qaboos did not swing instantly toward an open embrace of U.S. military basing or a security partnership, because of continued domestic security threats that undermined his rule. Prevalent Arab disdain for the United States remained palpable, and pro-Western Arab countries such as Oman feared that a close a relationship with the United States could eventually prove devastating for regime survival. As a result, the sultan continued to harbor his reservations about a permanent U.S. military basing presence.57 The sultan reportedly appeared to remain focused on Omani domestic security in 1979, but he was acutely aware of the rising threat that the Soviet Union posed for the region, especially after 100,000 troops invaded Afghanistan and established bases 300 miles from the Strait of Hormuz, an hour’s flight from Afghanistan.58 Qaboos opined that the Soviet Union would seek to take advantage of the regional power vacuum left in the wake of the shah’s demise. Still, Qaboos appeared to prioritize stabilizing Oman’s domestic situation, thus choosing the survival of his regime over focusing on a theoretical invasion by the Soviet Union, or a Soviet-backed power such as the PDRY. Iran’s Islamic Revolution, no doubt, left a strong impression on the sultan and reminded him that even an absolute monarchy with an apparently firm grip on power could be vulnerable to revolution despite a professional modern army and a vigilant internal security apparatus.59 Sultan Qaboos feared a PFLO resurgence. He was particularly distressed to learn about a PFLO official visit to Moscow in April 1979; it was the first such visit since 1975. Qaboos believed that PFLO rebels were plotting with Soviet officials to launch a coup against his regime. The withdrawal of Iranian troops at the start of Iran’s Islamic Revolution made Oman all the more vulnerable to a PFLO insurgency.60 The sultan knew that the Soviet Union and PDRY would ramp up their propaganda attacks in support of the PFLO. And Oman’s population was especially vulnerable to outside influences and opinion, thanks to a spike in unemployment, which went from 37.5 percent in 1972 to 67.9 percent in 1976. Many Omanis expressed general dissatisfaction toward the government following the sultan’s numerous modernization and national development programs, which displaced many from rural to urban areas in a short period.61 As Qaboos had feared, the PFLO launched radio propaganda attacks in 1979 calling for the overthrow of Qaboos and the liberation of the Omani people from foreign occupation, meaning the United States:

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The U.S. military presence and the continued existence of a regime such as that of Qaboos in Muscat constitute a great danger to the area. We in the Popular Front are struggling and continuously calling for the liberation of the Sultanate of Oman from foreign presence and for keeping the Gulf area far from any military alliances and from any foreign military presence. Only through this will we achieve genuine security and stability.62

The reference to the U.S. military presence helps explain why Qaboos remained resistant in the 1970s to a more robust U.S. presence. Indeed, few Omani officials were eager to jump into a full-blown security pact with the United States. A large-scale military presence was sure to attract unwanted attention and act as fodder for revolutionaries. The U.S. military had already been used as a propaganda weapon to undermine the sultanate; even an updated basing contract had not yet been established.63 According to one Carter administration memo, Gulf Arab states such as Oman wanted open security assistance only in the event of an attack from the Soviet Union. The memo predicted that Gulf Arab states [w]ill avoid to the extent possible any appearance of a) relying on the U.S. for protection, and b) of being a U.S. client state and thereby bowing to U.S. wishes and pressures. This does not mean that they want any lessening of the U.S. security commitment to them, but it does mean that they want the U.S. security commitment to be one of low visibility. They do not want a U.S. military presence except in case of direct attack by the USSR or one its surrogates. They want U.S. military equipment for themselves and for designated neighbors.64

The sultan was in a tenuous position in 1979 and did not want to further undermine his regime’s chances of survival with a public basing agreement. The sultan’s delicate national security situation was highlighted in a U.S. National Security Memorandum: If the radical states perceive that the moderates are cooperating too closely with the U.S. by providing bases and logistics support they may step up their efforts to subvert and overthrow the moderate governments. The moderate regimes may also suffer a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of their own people if they appear to become tools of the U.S., a factor which could lead to greater unrest and internal instability.65

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Preparing the Negotiation Team

That many Carter administration officials understood the sultan’s security position did not stop the U.S. military from pushing for a robust basing presence in Oman. Following the hostage-taking of U.S. embassy employees in Tehran in November 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the next month, the U.S. military felt even greater urgency to establish an expanded basing presence in places like Oman to protect vital U.S. interests in the Arabian Gulf. President Carter laid out his regional strategy on January 23, 1980, in his State of the Union address.66 In the president’s words: “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”67 To implement his doctrine, Carter proposed the creation of a new security framework for the Gulf region.68 As part of the regional strategy, the Carter administration meant to establish regional bases and storage depots, as well as to obtain greater overflight and base access rights across Southwest Asia. It intended to provide increased military aid and political assistance to Southwest Asia allies.69 President Carter announced the creation of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) that would be battle-ready in the event of a major regional conflict. The RDJTF would have 110,000 troops and cost $10 billion over five years.70 Its mandate was “to ensure the unimpeded flow of oil” and “to deter aggression from outside [Southwest Asia and the Gulf] and to assist nations in the region in resisting aggression.”71 This was the first time since the height of fighting in Vietnam that an American force would be deployed in the event of military conflict.72 In his pursuit of Gulf military bases, President Carter dispatched a team headed by the State Department’s Reginald Bartholomew to negotiate an enhanced basing agreement with Oman. The team also went to Kenya and Somalia to seek basing agreements.73 The base negotiation team would have the tough task in a political environment like Oman’s, where a U.S. military presence was popularly opposed.74 In preparation for the delegation’s arrival to Muscat, Carter administration officials prepared a list of policy objectives Oman might seek from an agreement: • Oman will be willing to enter negotiations on U.S. military access to Omani facilities provided U.S. visibility is kept low. • Access will be afforded provided Omani sovereignty concerns are respected.

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• The U.S. will be asked to fund facility improvements it requires. • Oman will insist that wherever possible, facility improvements made to accommodate the United States include tangible benefits “to the process of civil infrastructure development and Omanization.”75 • Carter’s administration also understood that it would have to provide Oman with assurances that the U.S. would come to Oman’s aid and protect it if any external adversary attacked or threatened it.76 White House officials gave the negotiating team explicit instructions that a basing agreement should not commit the United States to paying access fees, since it would establish a precedent with other countries. The Carter administration believed the U.S. Congress would oppose any such fees, which would be perceived “as a ‘back door’ device for supplying military assistance or aid funds.”77 The Department of Defense agreed with the White House and opposed paying base access fees, arguing that the U.S. would have no control over what happened to the fee money, most of which would go to the ruling elite. The Department of Defense preferred to provide funding to upgrade port facilities or other transportation infrastructure to assist in Oman’s broader development and modernization plans.78 The White House also instructed the negotiating team to avoid discussing “buying access,” since it could embarrass Sultan Qaboos. Rather, the team was told to stress how a base would be mutually beneficial, serving U.S. interests while protecting regional interests through force projection in the Indian Ocean and Gulf.79 The Carter administration wanted the negotiators to emphasize that increased access would give proof of the genuine interest by the United States in Oman’s security, strengthening overall regional deterrence.80 The U.S. wanted to provide enough military aid and assistance so that Oman could defend itself. As an incentive, the White House proposed offering $10 million for Oman in 1980 and $15 million for 1981 in foreign military sales (FMS) credit. And there would be other forms of security assistance, such as international military education and training (IMET). If need be, President Carter was willing to offer up to $25 million in FMS for the fiscal years 1980 and 1981, including such items as howitzers with trucks, C-130s, TOW missiles, and armored cars.81 The administration also hoped the team could convince Saudi Arabia to provide financing for the twelve to sixteen F-5s that Sultan Qaboos had requested previously. This demand was worth between $75 and $100 million.82 In return for providing FMS credit, the U.S. made several requests. On Ma-

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sirah Island, it asked for: Periodic P-3 maritime air patrol and fleet logistics support flights; use of Masirah as a divert and training field for carrier air wings when deployed in the area; rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force tactical fighter squadrons; stationing of up to 100 military support personnel; limited number of U.S. prefab structures; and if feasible, an agreement in principle that Masirah could be used to receive and support large U.S. forces arriving into the area on short notice to help with regional defense.83

At Muscat, the United States requested “continued usage of Seeb Airport for P-3 and C-141/C-5 aircraft; contingency operations of E-3As and KC-135s; ship visits (bearing in mind sensitivities to sizes); and pier side berthing for two to four ships (pre-position Ro/Ro) for 30 to 45 days periods.” At Thumrait in Oman’s south, the U.S. sought “agreement for periodical tactical fighter squadron exercises with concomitant use of Salalah for logistics support of exercises at Thumrait.” The United States intended to “maximize joint use of Omani facilities by carefully integrating U.S. improvements and expansion efforts with proposed Omani military development programs.” It also called for “a small permanent presence which is not conspicuous.”84 Aside from these specific requests, the United States was sensitive to how its presence might be perceived regionally, as well as locally, upon a basing agreement conclusion. In instructions prepared for the negotiating team, the Carter administration reminded the negotiators to emphasize that the U.S. military would maintain a low profile: “If the Sultan finds the access proposals too ‘visible,’ the team should say that we will work with the Omanis on the details of these proposals to ensure austere manning and low visibility.”85 U.S. and Omani officials alike feared communist states and Arab radicals would exploit a U.S.Omani agreement and “portray Qaboos as a Western stooge” to fuel rebellion against his government. The Soviets and PDRY had already increased its funding and was training the PFLO.86 In addition to a regional backlash from a new agreement, the United States understood Sultan Qaboos’s unsteady domestic situation and how enhanced U.S.-Omani cooperation could provide fodder for rebellion against his rule: Greater U.S.-Omani cooperation also would probably contribute to a further erosion of domestic popular support for the Qaboos regime. Younger Omanis are growing increasingly resentful over British influence in Oman

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and the slow pace of converting the military into a purely Omani force. Many younger Omanis are eager for a greater political role and are upset by Qaboos’ tolerance of corruption and other policies they regard as conflicting with national interests. They are likely to become increasingly restive if U.S.-Omani cooperation appears to benefit the U.S. more than Oman.87

The U.S. negotiating team was about to confront a skeptical Sultan Qaboos, who continued to wrestle with Oman’s serious division between the eastern maritime regions that were educated and multicultural, and the Dhofar communities in the south that were tribal and closed in nature. The sultan remained particularly concerned about Dhofar’s local population and how it would perceive U.S.-Omani partnership.88 Oman Makes Demands

Omani officials appeared ready to support a greater U.S. military basing presence only if the U.S. was willing to meet Oman’s significant military and economic assistance demands. Qaboos remained skeptical that the Carter Doctrine would be effective in the Gulf.89 If the sultan were going to risk the stability of his rule by permitting the United States a more robust basing presence, he would have to be convinced that he would benefit significantly from the deal.90 Throughout the negotiations, Reginald Bartholomew, the head U.S. negotiator, and the Carter administration ran up against several obstacles. First, the Omani government made high economic and military aid requests that the U.S. was unwilling to honor completely. Second, Oman’s government broadcast an announcement in mid-February stating that “any agreement for facilities would exclude the granting of bases to U.S. or stationing of American armed forces on Omani territory.”91 Oman remained sensitive to its national and regional security situation and understood how a final agreement might be perceived at home and regionally.92 Moreover, it indicated its intention to take military preemptive action to prevent any attacks forged against the sultan for signing a security agreement.93 Large Aid Requests

Negotiations for a new basing agreement began in February 1980.94 The Omanis pushed for both strong security support and significant amounts of economic assistance. In discussions held in Muscat on February 9, Bartholomew’s team reassured Omani officials about U.S. security guarantees: “The security and independence of Oman are of importance to the U.S. The U.S. would view

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any direct threat to Oman with serious concern, and would consult promptly with the Omani Government on an appropriate response, and would react in accordance with U.S. Constitutional processes.”95 The Omani team appreciated the reassurances, but they pressed for more formal written assurances from the president. They wanted the United States to guarantee it would respond to any future security threats after consultations with the sultan.96 Aside from security assurances, the Omani team also pressed the U.S. delegation for $100 million annually over five years in economic aid.97 Although the Omanis desired both significant economic aid and strong national security assurances, they were not keen about any public declarations of such assurances from the United States. As the U.S. had anticipated, Oman wanted the United States to maintain a low profile because of its internal security dilemma. Bartholomew replied that he would try his best, but that the U.S. Congress had to be informed of any agreements or allocations, making a private or secret agreement difficult.98 While the negotiations continued from afar in early March, Oman’s minister of state for foreign affairs, Qais Al-Mun’im Al-Zawawi, traveled in a private capacity to the United States and Washington, DC.99 While in Washington he met with Carter administration officials to discuss the status of the negotiations.100 Meeting with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, he learned that the U.S. would not meet Oman’s request for increased economic assistance.101 The United States would offer Oman only $25 million in FMS financing for 1980 and 1981 but no further economic assistance. U.S. officials tried to reassure Zawawi that Oman would receive spin-off benefits from a security arrangement, including improved infrastructure and facilities and increased military equipment purchases.102 The Carter administration also reassured Zawawi and other Omani officials that it would respond rapidly to fulfill Oman’s request for weapon sales. In particular, the U.S. agreed to sell C-130 or L-100 aircraft and would deliver 50 to 60 Sidewinder missiles within six months, as well as the fuse system for the Sidewinder. Further, it would sell 6 tanks and expedite the delivery of TOW missiles and launchers, with two separate but equal orders of 10 launchers and 220 missiles to be delivered respectively in July and December 1980.103 Negotiation Obstacles

Reflecting the sultan’s disappointment over what he considered lackluster U.S. aid proposals, Omani officials continued to cite the ramp-up of negative propaganda against the sultan resulting from the U.S. basing negotiations. In

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particular, the Omani public as well as the broader Arab world viewed the U.S. creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force negatively. Although Carter’s intention was to deploy the RDJTF only in the event of a major conflict, the Arab world perceived the force differently. The official Arabic translation of RDJTF, for example, meant “rapid intervention force,” not a rapid deployment force.104 Additionally, Omani officials were troubled by the intensification of PFLO radio attacks on the sultan that used Qaboos’s relationship with the United States to recruit followers, thus threatening the future stability of Oman as well as the sultan’s domestic standing. One PFLO news bulletin declared that 10,000 U.S. officers, soldiers and engineers are now stationed in the regions of Khasab, Bakha, Dayah and Bay’ah in the Sultanate of Oman. This was announced here today by a PFLO spokesman, who said that the Sultanate of Oman has become a U.S. military arsenal, from which the rapid intervention forces . . . can set out. The [PFLO] spokesman said that work was now in progress to establish two main bases in Umm al-Ghanam and Musandam, in addition to other U.S. military installations in mountainous areas overlooking the Arab Gulf. The spokesman [called] on the Arab and world public, as well as the forces that love freedom, justice, and peace, to launch a world campaign of solidarity with the Omani people’s struggle and armed revolution. On another level, the PFLO issued military communiqués today on operations it had carried out in a number of regions. It [referred to] three battalions, special forces, police forces and a brigade called the Dhofar Bridge [words indistinct] tribes, numbering a total of 6,400 soldiers and officers.105

The possible resurgence of the PFLO made the sultan even more skittish about a possible basing deal with the United States. The propaganda played to his worst fears about the threat to his regime’s survival. New U.S. Incentives

With the negotiations on weak footing, President Carter dispatched Reginald Bartholomew and his negotiating team to Muscat for another round of talks in late March 1980. To put the negotiations back on track, Carter permitted Bartholomew to offer a new, improved list of aid incentives. The Carter administration did not want to lose such an important strategic ally in the Gulf. The U.S. negotiating team was prepared to offer a total of $100 million from 1981 to 1982. The funds would be in the form of up to $50 million credit from a long-term Economic Support Fund and up to $50 million in credit from the

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Export-Import Bank to assist in commercial investments and infrastructure projects.106 Similarly, the U.S. Department of Defense approved a $157 million military construction program for Oman over two years, including military construction on the Musandam Peninsula. U.S. officials argued that the construction projects would be a major boost to Oman’s economy.107 President Carter had sent Bartholomew to Oman with a letter reassuring the sultan of his commitment to Oman’s national security.108 In the March 29 letter to Sultan Qaboos, President Carter wrote: I am heartened by your stand against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In keeping with my view of vital U.S. interests in the Gulf region, I want to emphasize that the security and independence of Oman are of great importance to the United States. The new cooperative arrangements between our two governments are tangible evidence of our concern in this regard and are mutual response to threats to the security of the sovereign nations of the region. Any such threat to the independence and territorial integrity of Oman would be regarded by the United States with grave concern, and in that event it would be our firm intention to consult promptly with your government on an appropriate reaction in accordance with our Constitutional process. . . . Our agreement on joint development and use of your military facilities is an important step toward deterring Soviet aggression. It will send a clear signal to the Soviets not to interfere in the internal affairs of the nations of the region.109

Aside from President Carter’s personal assurances, Bartholomew reassured the Omanis of U.S. continued promises for FMS credits and construction projects on existing and future military facilities.110 The Omanis appeared pleased but proceeded to press Bartholomew for a $25 million per year commitment extended to 1982 and 1983, as well as a U.S. pledge to sponsor an International Military Education and Training program for Omani military officers. On economic assistance, the Omanis dropped their desire for grant aid temporarily and reacted optimistically to a U.S. offer to establish a Joint Commission for Economic and Technical Cooperation to manage U.S.-Omani economic and commercial relations.111 As the negotiations dragged into April, the Omanis made new requests on Bartholomew’s team. First, they desired an extension of FMS commitment into 1984 and 1985. In the same timeframe, they also wanted the United States to reduce its operating and construction plans at Seeb. In general, they remained displeased, always wanting a larger U.S. aid package.112

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A U.S. Rescue Mission Threatens Negotiations

With negotiations already on unsteady ground, more misfortune beset the U.S. negotiating team in late April 1980 when news reports detailed the secret and unauthorized U.S. use of Omani bases for its failed hostage-rescue mission to Iran, codenamed Operation Eagle Claw. It was a major international embarrassment for both Carter and Qaboos. In reaction to the news, the sultan threatened to cancel the negotiations and thus shut down the U.S. military’s future basing access. After quick action and some astute diplomacy by U.S. State Department officials and the White House national security staff, including the dispatch of a personal emissary to Muscat on behalf of President Carter, a proposed increase of economic and military aid incentives, and renewed promises of a lower military profile, the U.S. was able to steer the negotiations back on track to conclude a basing access agreement. The combination of the added aid incentives and promises of a small military profile helped influence a final basing outcome favorable to the United States. The ability of the United States to turn around a potential disaster to its basing plans undercuts widespread assumptions about what will or will not influence basing negotiation outcomes.113 Here, aid incentives and assurances of a smaller U.S. footprint worked to convince the sultan to conclude an agreement even though it posed a risk for him during a period of regional turbulence and internal instability. Blowback from Operation Eagle Claw

On April 24, 1980, and unbeknownst to Sultan Qaboos, President Carter ordered a secret, ultimately unsuccessful, rescue mission, codenamed Eagle Claw, to free U.S. hostages held captive since the previous November by Iranian revolutionaries at the U.S. embassy in Tehran.114 Without asking the sultan’s permission, Carter had approved the U.S. military’s use of Oman’s Masirah Island as a staging point before flying into Iran and the U.S. secret landing site, Desert One. Six C-130s carrying a ninety-man raiding team with weapons and equipment en route to Iran landed in Oman. The aircraft carrier USS Nimitz was also sailing through the Gulf of Oman into the Arabian Sea to support the mission and assist in coordination and logistics.115 The mission began with great anticipation but ended as an enormous tragedy following a helicopter collision at Desert One. According to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s real-time debriefing notes, the crash “killed eight and burned three.” Years later, Carter said of the mission’s disastrous ending, “I am still haunted by memories

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of that day—our high hopes for success, the incredible series of mishaps, the bravery of our rescue team, the embarrassment of failure, and above all, the tragic deaths in the lonely desert.”116 When news of the mission spread worldwide through the press, the sultan was outraged. He was already sensitive to the negative publicity he had received from negotiating a basing agreement with the United States. He feared the latest news would destabilize his regime.117 According to several reports, Sultan Qaboos protested the unauthorized use of Masirah Island and claimed it violated previous agreements that necessitated any preapproval of basing usage. He had trusted the United States and was embarrassed by the affair. Needless to say, with news of the failed mission U.S. officials feared that it would derail the ongoing basing access negotiations, which were described as “prickly” and “very tough.”118 Initially, it was thought the sultan would double or triple his asking price in exchange for a U.S. basing agreement.119 According to the Associated Press, Sultan Qaboos sent President Carter a message that “he was no longer willing to allow U.S. forces in his country because transport planes involved in the rescue mission refueled in Oman.”120 A Personal Envoy with New Incentives

With the failed secret mission gaining international attention, White House officials worked on quick damage control. In an April 27 memorandum to Zbigniew Brzezinski, General William Odom, Brzezinski’s military assistant, laid out his concerns about future relations with Oman and reported that the chief U.S. basing agreement negotiator, Reginald Bartholemew, and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher have recommended a presidential letter to Sultan Qaboos “to prompt further discussions and gain some time for the sultan to test his fears and our willingness to help him.” Such a letter should manifest a “strong personal tone and underscore the sui generis nature of the relationship; repeat that no other state was consulted; describe the importance of the relationship to both parties, why both profit from it more than they can lose. And suggest some ways that we can help Oman limit damage in this case.” Brzezinski agreed with General Odom’s suggestions and authorized sending a letter immediately to the sultan from the president.121 At the beginning of May, President Carter approved the dispatch of Ambassador Philip C. Habib as his personal emissary to apologize to the sultan and to jumpstart basing negotiations. Prior to his trip, the White House gave Habib his instructions:

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• We do not expect [the Omanis] to reopen the access agreement in detail, and shall resist if they propose this. So long as we don’t delay more than a few weeks, neither side is in a rush to formally sign the access agreement immediately for fear of leaks at a delicate time. • The Omanis may try to raise the ante substantially on security assistance and economic aid. We see no signs of this now. If they do, Ambassador Habib is empowered only to bring back their new requests. • We have a few things that were authorized to offer earlier which we did not have to use. One we now propose to fold into our assistance package IMET [International Military and Education Training], another we’ll hold for use if needed (Musandam Port, in conjunction with assistance on coastal security).122 • The Omanis clearly want help on coastal security, and want it gratis. We propose to be as helpful as we can, but must await results of a survey before getting specific. [We] believe we shall have to be more generous in any case than merely offering to let them buy what we decide they need. To the extent we have appropriate equipment in hand, it will probably be possible to offer it on a no (or low) cost lease.123 But to the extent we have to create new equipment (e.g. refit patrol boats), money will have to be found . . . . At this point we have no choice but to work the problem as it comes.124 Oman’s outrage over the U.S. failed secret mission had decreased significantly by the time Ambassador Habib arrived in mid-May. The calmer environment was created in part by the efforts of the U.S. ambassador to Oman, Marshall W. Wiley, and his promises to both increase military and economic aid for Oman and maintain a low military profile, including limiting publicity on an agreement and other U.S. military activities in Oman.125 A low profile also meant that U.S. military personnel would wear civilian apparel rather than uniforms, the military would use more civilian contractors than military personnel, and U.S. military exercises occurred well removed from largely populated regions.126 Habib’s mission provided support to Ambassador Wiley and effectively helped smooth over any residual misgivings the sultan may have had, including reassuring the sultan about U.S. continued interest in Oman’s territorial integrity and independence. But Habib’s most important contribution was to help push the basing negotiations back on track toward a final agreement.127 Certainly, U.S. diplomacy was important in stabilizing the basing negotia-

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tions, but it was ultimately the substantial increase in prior aid incentives that helped convince the sultan to conclude an agreement. Although not always a panacea for concluding basing agreements, aid incentives definitely contributed to the U.S. success in concluding this particular agreement. One of the most significant augmented aid proposals came in the form of military construction for Oman. The United States, for example, proposed more than $300 million compared with its prior offer of $157 million to upgrade Oman’s military facilities. The construction was proposed in three phases over three years and would focus on Masirah, Seeb, Musandam, and Thumrait.128 In addition to military construction, Ambassador Habib promised to include to improvements for the facilities on Musandam Peninsula. Specifically, the United States agreed to extend and pave the dirt runway at Khasab, a base that supported Goat Island’s naval station off the tip of Musandam Peninsula. Omani patrol boats also used Goat Island to police the Strait of Hormuz.129 For FMS credit, the Carter administration approved $25 million in funding for 1980, compared with $10 million previously, and $25 million for 1981, compared with a prior proposal of $15 million. This was an overall increase of $25 million from previous offers. Additionally, it proposed $5 million annually in the form of an Economic Support Fund (ESF) grant that would assist in the formation and operation of the Joint Economic and Technical Commission. And for fiscal years 1982 and 1983 the White House agreed to $90 million in Export-Import Bank and ESF credits that would in part assist in water development projects and other technical training needs.130 The added aid incentives and Habib’s mission were the essential ingredients needed to convince the sultan finally to approve, albeit reluctantly, a basing agreement with the United States. The combination of the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan convinced Qaboos that he needed the external support of the United States. In the end, he would approve of U.S. access to facilities on Masirah Island, harbor facilities at Muscat and Salalah, four airfields, and military quarters at Seeb.131 In a subsequent interview with Sultan Qaboos, he laid out the reasons behind his support for the agreement: We must make clear that the questions of facilities has been overblown and given different interpretations. Some have even gone as far as saying they are bases in the guise of facilities. This is unthinkable from the outset, and we refuse to discuss it in any way. However, because of the conditions created in the world, and our area in particular, it was necessary to have some kind of

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understanding between us and our friends, without specifying a particular state. Also, while the United States is on one side of the international scale, it has become necessary for the area that there be a balance because the opposite side has become heavy and the Eastern camp’s presence has become large . . . [particularly] in South Yemen and Ethiopia as well as in Afghanistan in the north.132

The sultan cited the need to align with the United States in order to create a necessary balance to a rising Soviet regional threat. At the same time, he was clear that the basing agreement was limited in nature and that the United States could use Omani facilities only following approval of the Omani government and only when Oman could not fend off any direct external threats.133 After a turbulent negotiating period, Oman and the United States signed a final basing agreement on June 4, 1980. According to a State Department press release, the agreement was designed “to strengthen stability and security in the region in the face of Soviet expansionism.”134 The U.S. military now had an important military foothold from which to potentially launch regional operations in the Gulf and Indian Ocean. The deal also provided important facilities to assist in RDJTF deployments and forward staging.135 The sultan benefited from the agreement, but he remained cautious about how the agreement might create a domestic and regional backlash. Oman’s Delicate Balance

Regardless of signing a military basing access agreement with the United States, Sultan Qaboos and other Omani officials publicly downplayed any relationship with the United States following the conclusion of the agreement in June.136 Sultan Qaboos was concerned about his regime’s survival and the ability of certain groups to stir up an internal rebellion capable of overthrowing his government. In particular, he remained anxious about reports regarding increased military activity and terrorist training camps financed by the PDRY along its borders in Dhofar province. This coincided with a continued rise in propaganda attacks after signing a security and basing agreement with the United States.137 The sultan was reportedly worried about “the possibility of an indigenous upheaval by Khomeini-style Islamic fanatics.”138 Since the sultan remained under continued pressure in 1981 and 1982, he continually played down the 1980 basing agreement with the United States, meanwhile warning U.S. officials about pushing too hard for a more perma-

140  Sultan Qaboos and Operation Eagle Claw

nent regional presence. He believed that the idea of a permanent U.S. basing presence was too sensitive an issue for potential host nations and any backlash would be counterproductive to U.S. interests. The sultan noted that the U.S. military should be cautious about widely publicizing its regional military exercises and be careful that they were not portrayed as an invasion of the region.139 He wanted assurances that the U.S. military would maintain a small presence and low profile in November 1981 when it conducted military exercises in Oman called Operation Bright Star. At the time, the sultan came under pressure from Libya, Syria, and South Yemen, among other hardline Arab states, to call off the exercises, which were being dubbed “an American invasion of the Arab world.” The U.S. military continued with the military exercises but tried to respect the sultan’s wishes to minimize the publicity and size of the exercises.140 The sultan may have initially downplayed his basing relationship with the United States following the 1980 agreement, but his thinking began to shift in favor of a more open embrace of a U.S. military presence as regional events began to threaten the sultanate, especially following the outbreak of the IranIraq War on September 22, 1980.141 Since Iran sat just 21 nautical miles across from Musandam Peninsula at the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, Oman likely feared what would happen as fighting spilled increasingly into the heart of Gulf waters and through the Strait of Hormuz.142 During a three-year period, the Iran-Iraq War had grown in intensity and did not appear to be abating, thus reinforcing the sultan’s more open acceptance of a U.S. military basing presence to assist in protecting maritime commerce transiting the Strait of Hormuz. As a result, by 1983 the sultan’s previous dominant domestic security concerns began to shift to the background while he focused more and more on the threats posed to the sultanate by both the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the IranIraq War. It was also helpful that the sultan felt increasingly reassured domestically by the fact that Oman and South Yemen were in the process of negotiating a rapprochement agreement that would ease the sultan’s fears about South Yemen’s support of the PFLO and thus the PFLO’s ability to stir up a rebellion to undermine his rule.143 Qaboos’s gradual shift in his attitude toward the U.S. military presence in Oman was most apparent during a formal visit in 1983 with President Ronald Reagan at the White House. Throughout his visit, Sultan Qaboos was open about U.S. military and economic support and evidenced less concern about how an open security relationship would be perceived domestically or by other Arab states. He made open references to the U.S. military presence in Oman,

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as well as U.S. base usage. This was a significant shift in his rhetoric compared with prior interviews and other declarations that had denied the existence of U.S. military basing access.144 Sultan Qaboos’s official statements during his visit with Reagan exemplify his new embrace of the United States: We fight our own battles. But we realize that in the present state of the world no country can act in isolation, that a concerted effort must be made by the free world if freedom itself is not to be extinguished. We, therefore, look to our friends for their support, just as we offer ours to them in the trials and dangers that jointly face us. This is, therefore, Mr. President, why, I, particularly, welcome this opportunity to acknowledge the valuable contribution which the U.S. has made and continues to make to the development and the interests of Oman.145

The language used by the sultan in a highly public forum marked a significant change in language compared with previous years.146 In a similar spirit, President Reagan thanked Sultan Qaboos for his continued support of U.S. operations in Southwest Asia.147 He also referenced indirectly Oman’s support in developing capabilities (that is, military bases) to help deter aggression in the Gulf, in addition to safeguarding U.S. interests.148 Around the time of the visit, the Reagan administration had reportedly planned to station five thousand RDJTF troops and personnel at a military base in the Dhofar governorate.149 By 1985 the U.S.-Omani basing agreement was again up for renewal, but with an Omani–South Yemeni rapprochement largely intact and the Iran-Iraq War continuing to threaten the region’s stability and security, the sultan agreed to approve the prolongation of the agreement for an additional five years.150 By this time, Oman had become a major military staging point for U.S. operations in the Gulf and Indian Ocean and had become one of Washington’s most trusted regional allies.151 Although many Omani officials still wanted to constrain U.S. military activities in Oman, external security concerns prevailed and continued to influence the sultan’s new embrace of a U.S. military basing presence.152 Conclusion: The Importance of Incentives and a Low Military Profile

Since the 1980s, Oman has remained a steadfast ally to the United States. Moreover, the base politics dynamic that emerged in the late 1970s and early

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1980s continues to be an important case study of how the U.S. military uses aid incentives and promises of a low military profile to succeed in concluding final basing agreements. Throughout the 1970s, Sultan Qaboos’s internal security situation remained his top priority as he fought to end the Dhofar War and modernize Oman. The sultan, however, was pragmatic in his national security orientation and recognized that he needed the U.S. military in some fashion or another because of a rising Soviet threat and increased fears about the Iran-Iraq War, both of which threatened the stability of the entire Gulf region, not only the sultanate. That said, it was only when the United States offered really significant amounts of military and economic aid, in addition to promises of keeping a low military profile following its failed Eagle Claw mission, that the sultan was willing to accept the U.S. military basing access agreement. And even then, Qaboos downplayed the agreement, unsure how it would play domestically. That the agreement succeeded in large part as a result of U.S. aid incentives exemplifies why this case provides valuable insight into the national security dilemmas that host Gulf nations have typically faced since World War II. The lessons learned are indeed a valuable takeaway for those involved in other U.S. basing access negotiations that are in jeopardy or viewed skeptically by a host nation that fears potential domestic blowback from the conclusion of such an agreement.

6

A Saudi Sandstorm: Revolution, Rivalry, and Terrorism

While Oman and Bahrain were negotiating their respective basing agreements with the U.S. military in 1980, Saudi officials were working diligently to disassociate the Saud monarchy from any basing relationship with the United States. When Iran’s Islamic Revolution erupted in 1979, the Saud monarchy feared what might happen in Saudi Arabia, itself vulnerable to domestic instability and even overthrow. It did not want to be the next victim of social upheaval. So when the U.S. military tried to achieve a military basing presence in Saudi Arabia after the shah’s overthrow, the Saud monarchy vigorously and publicly rejected the request. Anti-American sentiment across the kingdom was palpable, and the Saud monarchy feared that a U.S. military basing presence would tip the scale against its rule.1 The monarchy also understood that a U.S. military basing presence would likely be used by pan-Arab leaders (such as Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi) to foment antimonarchical sentiments among the Saudi population. Maintaining strong opposition to U.S. military basing would help the monarchy appear strong and resolute before its people, as well as its neighbors. The Saud monarchy did not permit a U.S. military base in the 1980s, but it did allow U.S. military advisors and trainers to assist in military operations and in support of the Saudi’s newly acquired weapon systems. This light footprint allowed the monarchy to benefit from America’s valuable technical expertise while warding off any significant domestic backlash. During the 1980s, for example, the U.S. Air Force deployed personnel in Operation Elf One to assist the Saudis with radar detection and other kinds of monitoring during the Iran-Iraq War.2 The U.S. military basing question, however, would reemerge 143

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in August 1990, just two years after the Iran-Iraq War, when Iraqi president Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. After conquering Kuwait, Saddam Hussein envisioned Saudi Arabia as his next conquest.3 Saudi Arabia had not hosted a U.S. military base since the early 1960s, but with Iraqi tanks gathering on their border, the monarchy was forced to look to the U.S. military for support, thus allowing a U.S. military basing presence in the run-up to the First Gulf War. By 1990 the external threat had become far too great to avoid. After the establishment of bases in Saudi Arabia in 1990, the United States maintained its basing presence for thirteen years, until Saddam Hussein was removed during the Second Gulf War in 2003. During this time, the Saud monarchy encountered many troubling domestic events, including the 1996 Khobar Tower bombings carried about by radicals linked to Al-Qaeda and the 2002 arson attack on a U.S. fast food restaurant in Al-Kharj. The Saudi-born leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, also announced in 1996 “A Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places” aimed at the Saudi government for maintaining security ties with the United States.4 It was not until 2003 and the final overthrow of Saddam Hussein, however, that the Saud monarchy terminated its basing agreements with the United States. Prior to 2003 Iraq remained one of the kingdom’s greatest external security threats, thus justifying the continued U.S. basing presence. But once Saddam was removed, in 2003, the monarchy could focus again on its looming domestic security concerns, leading it to terminate the U.S. basing presence. In the September 11, 2001, attacks, fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were Saudi-born, providing the Saud monarchy with a new domestic reality that became a top concern for the royal family’s survival. The U.S. basing presence had once again become a liability for the monarchy.5 This chapter examines the national security shifts faced by Saudi Arabia from the early 1980s until the early 2000s. The U.S. military was only invited back in 1990 when an imminent threat from Saddam Hussein took immediate precedent over domestic security concerns. But once Saddam was removed in 2003, the monarchy asked the United States to close down its bases. Not that bilateral security cooperation was irreparably damaged. During the past decade and more, the U.S. military has continued to support Saudi Arabia with military training missions and other technical support. The last case exemplifies the complex base politics that are influenced and shaped by shifting internal and external security dynamics.

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Prolonged Domestic Instability

Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, Saudi Arabia experienced a heightened period of domestic unrest and instability that forced the Saud monarchy to adamantly and openly oppose any suggestion of a U.S. military base on Saudi territory. The U.S. military continued to sell arms and remain in an important advisory capacity for the Saudi armed forces, but establishing a U.S. base was far too risky for the royal family. A combination of local unrest and regional events spilled into the domestic realm, making internal security the top priority for the Saud regime during this period. Domestically, and similar to the experiences of Oman and Bahrain, the Saudi government’s rapid modernization programs in education, the military, and the industrial sector set the stage for increased instability and social upheaval. Saudi conservatives felt threatened socially and religiously by the modern transformation of their society. Regional influences seeping into the domestic sphere included a combination of factors: (1) Pan-Arab nationalism, (2) an increase in anti-American sentiment following the Camp David peace accords, (3) the overthrow of the shah and subsequent fear of a Shi’a revolution on Saudi territory, and (4) the rise of domestic extremism as exemplified by the Grand Mosque seizure in 1979. The combination of these significant domestic and regional forces compelled the Saud monarchy to reject initial U.S. basing requests in 1979 and to distance itself further from any U.S. military basing question until 1990, when external security replaced internal security as a top priority. Rapid Modernization Spurs Domestic Backlash

Saudi Arabia’s modernization efforts began in earnest during the 1970s, underwritten by rising oil prices and a massive petrodollar windfall. An estimated 90 percent of Saudi Arabia’s income came from petroleum revenues. During the fiscal year 1979–80, the government received $54 billion in oil and gas sales. The following year, it was $93 billion.6 The cash infusion into the kingdom, however, had the effect of spurring rampant corruption and fostered the image among the Saudi population that only the elite were gaining from the immense oil revenues. Hundreds of Saudi royal family members became millionaires practically overnight. This seriously undercut popular support for the royal family’s reform efforts, since many already believed the monarchy was betraying its roots as the protector of Islam’s Holiest Cities. The Saud monarchy was already struggling to control the population through

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weak and unrepresentative institutions that were unable to deal with increased political demands from a population larger and better educated by the 1980s.7 Saudi national student enrollment rose from 746,000 in 1972–73 to 1.58 million by 1980–81 as a result of nascent education reform efforts. And by the end of the 1970s, more than 10,000 Saudis were studying abroad in U.S. colleges or universities.8 While increased education levels led to more social mobility and better training for some in the workforce, it also meant greater resistance from local tribes who felt threatened by modernization and industrialization. Many conservative tribal leaders were displeased with the effect that modern education was having on traditional ways of life. U.S. officials similarly feared that if modernization progressed at a steady pace throughout the 1980s, a real clash between social conservatives and moderates could erupt and create major instability across the kingdom. Moderates and conservatives had already been engaged in Islamic legal battles over such issues as the application of Sharia law and the role of women in society. The Saud monarchy trod delicately on such issues for fear of a clerical and conservative backlash. At the same time, it needed to promote development and the expansion of the Saudi workforce to meet the demands of a growing economy.9 Saudi industrialization in the oil and gas sector led to an influx in Arab migrant laborers to fill positions not wanted by Saudis, creating additional societal stress. Toward the end of the 1970s, Saudi Arabia had an estimated 1.3 to 1.5 million foreign Arab workers among a population of approximately 5.6 million.10 Approximately 1 million had migrated from Yemen, and the remaining 200,000 or more came from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. By 1985, nonnationals made up an estimated 71 percent of the Saudi labor force, including Arab, South and Southeast Asians, and Westerners.11 The large foreign labor force left the monarchy vulnerable to domestic attacks. Conservative leaders voiced concern that the large foreign workforce threatened Islamic values.12 And the influx of foreign workers raised possibility of worker unrest as a result of their poor working conditions and low wages. In 1975, a Communist Party of Saudi Arabia was established as a direct affront to the Saud monarchy. Although it did not have major influence, it did represent a new leftist opposition movement that could in time organize and unite “the working class, the poor peasants, the settled and nomadic population, and the democratic strata of the intelligentsia and students.”13 Though not directly organized by the Communist Party, Saudi Arabia experienced worker protests, especially among its Shi’a

Revolution, Rivalry, and Terrorism 147

population, beginning in the late 1970s motivated by endemic discrimination, poor working conditions, and low wages.14 Besides growing tensions with its foreign workforce, the Saudi government confronted additional dilemmas trying to execute a major military modernization. On the one hand, the monarchy wanted to remain competitive with its main regional rival, Iran. But the only way to keep apace with Iran’s rapid military expansion during this period was to rely upon the United States to supply arms, equipment, and technical advisors.15 To assist its military expansion efforts, successive White House administrations made every effort to meet Saudi arms and equipment demands throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for example, established a special unit in the late 1970s to assist Saudi Arabia in constructing three military cities: Khamis Mushayt (near the Yemeni border), Hafar al-Batin (near the Iraqi border), and Tabuq (near the Jordanian border).16 Arms and equipment sales continued to increase throughout the 1970s, thanks to both the spike in Saudi oil revenues and Nixon’s twinpillar policy. By fiscal year 1981, U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia totaled more than $2 billion.17 The new arms and equipment were meant for Saudi Arabia’s expanding armed forces, estimated at 50,000 in 1976.18 As part of its military modernization program, the armed forces grew by 10,000 men, while the National Guard more than doubled to 35,000 men by 1979.19 Even with an increase in manpower and weapons capacity, the Saudi armed forces were hampered by a need for more personnel and technical training, not to mention basic literacy.20 Since the Saud monarchy did not want to openly rely upon the United States for military support and training, the government made many arrangements to hire Pakistani military officers to help fill the ranks needed for Saudi military operations during the 1970s and 1980s. Some estimates placed the Pakistani military presence as high as 20,000 men, though the number was probably closer to 4,000. Because of the strong anti-Western sentiment across the kingdom during this period, Pakistan became an important ally and supplier of military labor for the Saud monarchy as a non-Western Muslim nation.21 Regional Forces Spill into the Saudi Domestic Sphere

As examined previously, the late 1970s and early 1980s were a tumultuous period for the Gulf region, with real repercussions for the Saud monarchy. A combination of a pan-Arab nationalist resurgence championed by Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, virulent anti-American sentiment across the kingdom result-

148  A Saudi Sandstorm

ing from U.S. support for Israel, and the shah’s overthrow complicated Saudi Arabia’s relationship to the U.S. military. Qaddafi and Pan-Arab Nationalism.  As in the days of Nasser’s reign, the Saud monarchy expressed anew its fears regarding the resurgence of pan-Arab nationalism across the region. Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, who was king of Saudi Arabia from 1982 to 2005, frequently told U.S. officials that he was concerned about the rise of pan-Arab radical threats to Saudi Arabia.22 He was particularly concerned about the new champion and leader of pan-Arab nationalism, the young and charismatic Colonel Muammar Qaddafi of Libya. Qaddafi came to power in a bloodless military coup in 1969 that overthrew Libya’s King Idris. He soon proclaimed himself the new “Muslim messiah” and advocated the creation of an Islamic form of socialism. He was antimonarchical in his politics and claimed to be fighting on behalf of the oppressed classes.23 Qaddafi’s rhetoric and behavior greatly concerned the royal family. In the spring of 1977, Saudi fears were solidified when Saudi intelligence officials foiled a Libyan plot to overthrow the monarchy. Libya, which had been renamed the same year the “Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” had penetrated a Saudi Air Force unit with the backing of Libyan Captain Muhammad Idris alSharif, director of Libya’s Security and Military Intelligence Service. With heavy funding, Al-Sharif organized thirteen pilots to plot a coup against the Saud monarchy. The plan was to bomb government buildings and the royal palace before declaring the establishment of an Arab republic.24 The 1977 coup attempt bore similarities to the 1969 coup attempt inspired by Nasser against the Saud monarchy.25 Although the plot was foiled, the monarchy was unnerved by the attempted coup and continued to quash any signs of pan-Arab movements in the kingdom.26 Israel-Palestine and Anti-American Sentiment. In addition to the Libyanbacked coup attempt, the Saudi government was concerned about residual and simmering anger across the region regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The monarchy feared that a renewal of the Arab/Israeli dispute could spread revolution across the Arab world that would give the Soviet Union an additional reason to become more active in countries such as Iraq or Syria. Saudi officials also argued that an Arab revolution or general upheaval would threaten the monarchy’s survival, as well as undermine Saudi ties to the United States.27 Toward the end of the 1970s, bilateral relations did indeed erode between Saudi Arabia and the United States when the U.S. began working proactively

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for a peaceful settlement between Egypt and Israel. In November 1977 Egyptian president Anwar Sadat visited Israel in an attempt to start negotiations for a bilateral peace agreement.28 As peace talks progressed into the spring of 1978, the Saudis broke off ties with Egypt under mounting internal and regional pressure, and because a majority of Saudi princes had adopted the popular “rejectionist” Arab sentiment toward any type of agreement with Israel.29 Despite significant regional pressure, Egypt and Israel signed the first portion of the Camp David Peace Accords after two final weeks of intense negotiations on September 17, 1978. The second portion of the peace agreement was signed on March 26, 1979.30 Saudi Arabia announced its opposition to the settlement and stated that it would not accept the peace agreement. The Saud monarchy was concerned about a potential blowback if it aligned itself openly with the United States after the agreement. The U.S. may have been on the verge of establishing a basing presence in Bahrain and Oman, but in Saudi Arabia such an arrangement was not in the realm of possibility. The Saud monarchy reportedly feared that its survival would be undermined by both pan-Arab national propaganda and local opposition to the perceived anti-Arab agreement brokered by the United States.31 For Saudi King Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1975–82) and Crown Prince Fahd, the Camp David Peace Accords tarnished U.S.-Saudi relations because a more pro-Arab settlement had not been reached. As noted in one national security memorandum to President Carter, “[King Khalid and Prince Fahd] fear stagnation or deterioration in the Arab-Israeli situation as a clear and present danger—the source of a return of radicalism and Soviet influence in the Arab world. In such an atmosphere they might feel forced to choose between their desire to work closely with the U.S. and their need to survive in an antiAmerican Arab world.”32 The Shah’s Overthrow and a U.S. Basing Request Rejection

Between June 1978 and January 1979, Iran’s political situation deteriorated rapidly, ending with the collapse of the shah’s regime on February 11, 1979. The overthrow of the shah also meant the end of a U.S. twin-pillar policy. The United States had underestimated the animosity that existed toward the shah and the general speed at which his regime collapsed.33 The overthrow of the shah sent shockwaves throughout the Saud royal family. The monarchy was concerned that a dynamic similar to that in Iran would emerge, including the possibility of a coup, if it did not stay attuned to domestic opposition and other

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radical religious movements. Indeed, many Saudis believed that the shah’s relationship with the United States had contributed to his downfall. And many royal family members noticed that U.S. weapons and technology had not saved the shah from revolution. As a result, there was increased pressure on King Khalid to further distance himself from the United States.34 Saudi calls for a more reserved relationship with the United States came at a particularly challenging time for the U.S. military as it scrambled to gain a basing foothold in the Gulf. On the eve of the shah’s overthrow, as it became increasingly apparent that Iran was on the verge of implosion, the U.S. military dispatched twelve unarmed U.S. Air Force F-15 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia in January 1979 as a sign of continued U.S. concern for Saudi Arabia’s security. The temporary deployment of fighter jets was followed by a U.S. request to establish military bases on Saudi territory. While the Saud monarchy assessed the spillover effects from the shah’s overthrow at the start of February, the U.S. military had already embarked on a mission to readjust its regional security presence. Overnight, it had lost one of its most important strategic regional footholds, in Iran, and had to reconfigure its presence accordingly.35 On February 10, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown made a formal basing request during his visit to Saudi Arabia, but King Khalid was in no position to accept the basing demand because of continued domestic threats to his regime’s survival. Saudi officials publicly rebuked Brown’s request.36 According to U.S. defense officials privy to discussions between Brown and Saudi officials during his visit, “We talked to the Saudis about a number of ideas, including the establishment of a base in the area, but they quickly turned us down.” The Saud monarchy preferred arms to hosting a U.S. base, which was too controversial in a region where anti-American sentiment was so widespread. Additionally, Saudi officials feared that a U.S. permanent presence and establishment of a base in Saudi Arabia would instantly become a lightning rod for both domestic and regional criticism.37 As noted in one U.S. embassy dispatch, “The greatest danger to the [Saudi] regime remains the classic Arab nationalist coup organized by disaffected army officers.”38 When discussions about a U.S. basing presence emerged again in the spring, the Saud monarchy reaffirmed its prior assertions during a March meeting between the Saudi minister of foreign affairs, Prince Saud, and U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Prince Saud stated that internal security concerns remained high on the government’s priority list, especially the threat of radical opposition groups and other subversive entities: “I would like

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to mention some things about the threat; we share the view of an ever present Soviet threat. It is indeed external but it uses internal forces to spread itself through subversion.”39 In a later U.S. National Security Inter-Agency meeting, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown acknowledged that Saudi Arabia was under significant internal pressure that prevented it from permitting a U.S. military basing presence: “[The Saudis] feel that the domestic irritant that would come from a military presence in that country outweighs the security game.”40 Even after a year of regional tumult, Saudi officials stood firm in opposition to a U.S. basing presence, wanting to see the Gulf region “free from the presence of any superpower.” In the words of then Second Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah: The Kingdom’s concern was to prevent the Gulf region from becoming an arena for rivalry among the foreign powers. The Saudis support an over-thehorizon naval presence as an exercise of the U.S. global strategic role, but they remained sensitive of any American attempts to increase a force presence in the region or any suggestion of joint military cooperation or the basing of the U.S. forces on Saudi soil.41

The basing question was clearly too much of a hot button issue for the Saudis to consider. Domestic security continued to take precedent even amidst major regional turmoil. Religious Extremism and a Growing Sectarian Divide

In addition to the internal security dynamics examined here, religious extremism remained one of Saudi Arabia’s greatest domestic threats during this period. The danger was multipronged and included both Wahhabi radicals opposed to the monarchy and a deepening fissure between Saudi Arabia’s Sunni and Shi’a populations, especially following the success of Iran’s Shi’a Islamic Revolution. The growing religious conservatism was a particular challenge to the monarchy, since many conservative clerics opposed the monarchy’s reform efforts, in addition to any and all ties to the United States. A Radical Opposition and the Grand Mosque Takeover.  Saudi Arabia’s conservative Wahhabi ulema had ties and held allegiance to the Saud royal family that dated back to the days of Ibn Saud. But the combination of rapid modernization of the 1970s and the rise of regional instability following the shah’s overthrow, among other factors, helped create a new radicalized generation of Muslim clerics and followers violently opposed to the Saud regime. These small,

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fringe elements directly undermined the monarchy, publicly proclaiming that the Saudi regime was no longer Islamic. In their opinion, the royal family had failed to protect Islam and Saudi Arabia from the influence of outsiders and infidels.42 In September 1979 Saudi officials learned about a growing movement opposing the monarchy and began arresting suspected group members, especially military officers. The group, referred to as the “Movement,” included the Arabian Peninsula People’s Union (APPU). The APPU was a mixture of military officers, immigrant workers, students, and various high-level members of the Utaibi and Qahtani tribes. In the year leading up to the initial crackdown, the Movement had begun distributing antimonarchical literature and recruiting foreign laborers. The Saudi National Guard, however, was not initially concerned and did not view the Movement’s activities as part of a larger and more serious opposition network.43 The Saud monarchy would learn quickly that it had gravely miscalculated how significant and organized the opposition was when hundreds of armed men affiliated with conservative and opposition tribes within the kingdom stormed Mecca’s Grand Mosque in the fall of 1979. On November 20 of that year, a group of approximately 500 to 600 rebels stormed the Grand Mosque in a siege that lasted for fifteen days and resulted in 269 deaths. It was a huge public relations disaster for the monarchy and represented a major crisis of legitimacy for the royal family.44 The leader of the rebel group, Juhaiman bin Muhammad bin Saif al-Utaibi, was known for his outspoken and severe criticism of the monarchy. He had previously accused the royal family of ignoring the tenets of Islam, practicing corruption, and having abandoned the leadership of conservative Wahhabi Islam. Al-Utaibi’s publications had featured xenophobic opinions and general opposition to Christians, Jews, and Shi’a Muslims. During the Grand Mosque siege, Al-Utaibi called for a return to Saudi Arabia’s Islamic fundamentalist roots. He and his followers strongly opposed the perceived Westernization that Saudi Arabia had undergone during the 1970s.45 The message propagated by Al-Utaibi and his rebels symbolized the general backlash within Saudi society to the kingdom’s ambitious modernization programs and reflected overall disdain for the effect that these programs had on sacred Islamic rituals and other longtime tribal social norms. Many young Saudi technocrats, who had been educated or trained in the United States, expressed parallel concerns about the waste and corruption that had infected the government and its ministries. As noted in one U.S. government report on the

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mosque takeover: “The maldistribution of wealth, conspicuous consumption, corruption, urbanization, and the association of these phenomena by many Muslims with the moral and social values of the West have generated resentment and added to disillusionment to the extent of potentially affecting USSaudi relations.”46 Some within the monarchy saw the Mecca mosque takeover as a call for the government to take proactive measures to stamp out any future opposition movements. According to one observer, “Crazy as it may sound, Mecca might have been beneficial to us all. It awakened us to things. We cannot be complacent after such a traumatic event.”47 Crown Prince Fahd went on record in an interview, stating that “there is no doubt the incident at the Holy Mosque has underlined several matters that were not given proper attention.”48 A Shi’a Uprising and Other Threats

In addition to the Grand Mosque takeover, the Saud monarchy had to address the Shi’a unrest that erupted around the same time. The Saudi Shi’a population numbered about 125,000, or 30 percent of the population, and was located largely in the oil-rich Eastern Province near Qatif and Al-Hasa oasis. Saudi Arabia’s Shi’as had long been discriminated against because of their low socioeconomic standing as subsistence farmers and oilfield workers. Following Iran’s Islamic Revolution, Saudi clerics ratcheted up their rhetoric against Shi’a Muslims, proclaiming them to be heretics and infidels, contributing further to their misery. The Saudi religious police also forbade Shi’a communities from broadcasting their call to prayer as well as other public forms of Shi’a devotion.49 Official state discrimination placed a mounting strain on the Shi’a communities of the Eastern Province, but it was Ayatollah Khomeini’s pledge to export Iran’s Shi’a revolution to other Shi’a communities across the Gulf that most exacerbated sectarian tensions in the kingdom. On November 28, 1979, at the start of Ashura during the holy month of Muharrem, which honors the seventh-century assassination of Shi’a Imam Hussein, Shi’a followers began to protest in Sayhat, a small town north of Dammam, chanting anti-Saud refrains such as “Oh Khalid, give up your power; the people do not want you!” The protestors quickly ran up against some of the twenty thousand Saudi National Guard who had been deployed as a security precaution. The inexpert guardsmen responded to rock throwing and taunting by the crowd by firing on the religious celebrants, killing several protestors.50

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Over the next several days, angry protesters reassembled and demonstrated in larger numbers against the killings, the government’s ongoing anti-Shi’a policies, and its favoritism toward Sunni Muslims. Shi’a protestors also used the riots to express their rising disdain for the widening economic inequality and the corruption rampant among Saudi Arabia’s elite. By the end of the uprisings, approximately 60 persons had been killed, 150 wounded, and 600 others imprisoned. The Saudi National Guard temporarily suppressed Shi’a unrest by early December, but by February 1980 further violent demonstrations erupted in Qatif celebrating Khomeini’s one-year anniversary of his return to Iran. The government again succeeded in quashing the uprisings with brute force, but the Saud monarchy had been shaken to its core and remained worried about the future of its government. During this prolonged domestic turbulence it is no surprise that the Saudis wanted to maintain their distance from the United States, thus foreclosing consideration of any sort of U.S. basing presence.51 A Delicate Balancing Act

The 1980s ushered in increasing regional turbulence that further tested the Saud monarchy’s resilience, and its handling of its security partnership with the United States. The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War emerged as two new events that seriously challenged Saudi Arabia’s national security balance and raised questions about whether the United States could be permitted to establish local bases in response to the emerging regional security dynamic. The two wars were indeed significant external security concerns, but the Saud monarchy still viewed domestic security as its main priority throughout and thus could not permit a U.S. military basing presence. One way for the monarchy to help fill the Western military void was by reaching out to its neighbors to form the Gulf Cooperation Council, which could act as both a security and economic regional coordination agency. Certainly, Saudi Arabia could not rely entirely on its Gulf neighbors for issues related to national defense. To help fill this gap, the monarchy gladly welcomed the continued flow of U.S. arms, equipment, and technical advisors. This small-footprint approach to the U.S. military assisted the Saud monarchy in striking the right balance between domestic and external national security affairs. The monarchy did not want to exacerbate its internal security situation by establishing closer ties to the United States. By not permitting a U.S. basing presence, the king would be less vulnerable to domestic opposition pushback.52 The United States too had to adapt to the new regional uncertainty and

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instability, even though it greatly feared that its strategic interests might be severely compromised without a foothold in the kingdom. Throughout the period, many U.S. officials recognized Saudi Arabia’s fragility and thus argued that the U.S. military should steer clear of the Saudi basing question, which continued to be a sensitive topic for the Saudis. U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia John West advocated for great delicacy in dealing with the U.S.-Saudi basing issue: We think the USG should be more sensitive to Saudi concerns for their own security. The Saudis want an open military supply relationship with the U.S. for cash. . . . Unfulfilled requests become irritants in our bilateral relationship and eventually they take on the character of grievances. This means, for example, that we should not place the Saudis in such a situation that they must give public approval of a U.S. military presence in the peninsula or in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia does not object to a U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean as long as the Soviets are present and as long as we respect the Saudi wish not to be openly identified with the American presence.53

Ambassador West cautioned the White House that it needed to be more aware of the continued threat to the Saud monarchy posed by Arab nationalism. In one memo, he stated that the United States “should anticipate and even encourage a public perception of Saudi independence from U.S. policies and a low U.S. profile in Saudi Arabia.”54 Although the U.S. military was temporarily unable to persuade the Saudis to permit a U.S. base on Saudi territory, both the Carter and Reagan administrations made sure that military aid and equipment continued to flow to the kingdom, which remained an important geostrategic ally. The monarchy benefited because the new arms and equipment helped fortify the kingdom’s national defenses and bolstered its military modernization programs. U.S. Military Aid under Carter

Beginning in 1978, the Carter administration approved the sale of sixty-two F-15 jet fighters to Saudi Arabia, but the bulk of them did not arrive until 1982 and 1983.55 The Saudis were pleased with the F-15 sale, but it did not help convince King Khalid to approve a 1979 U.S. military basing request. Regardless of the basing request rejection, the Carter administration continued to advocate for the maintenance of its bilateral security partnership through arms and military equipment sales. The White House still relied upon Saudi Arabia to ensure that oil flowed freely from the region and that the Saud monarchy would

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assist in U.S. efforts to keep the Soviet Union out of the Gulf, in addition to backing efforts to contain the Islamic Republic of Iran. In a sign of its continued support for the monarchy, Carter pushed Congress in late July 1979 to approve the sale of $1.2 billion in military equipment for Saudi Arabia’s National Guard modernization program.56 Later in the year, the Department of Defense also expressed its support for the allocation of approximately $1.5 billion to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s expanding F-15 program.57 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Even as the region descended into chaos throughout the 1980s, the Saud monarchy remained opposed to a U.S. military basing presence. Internal security continued to trump external security concerns. The Saudis viewed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, less as an explicit external threat and more as a sign of U.S. weakness and its inability to contain the Soviets in Eurasia. Despite growing fears of a rising Soviet presence, the monarchy strongly opposed any additional foreign or Western military presence in the region. Soon after the Soviet Afghan assault, Saudi foreign minister Saud Al-Faisal declared on January 14 that Saudi Arabia had “no desire for foreign troops in the area, for any reason whatsoever.”58 The Saud monarchy was also instrumental in persuading the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to vote at their meeting in Islamabad on a resolution to oppose any foreign regional presence, Western and Soviet alike: “[The OIC condemns] efforts of certain great powers to exert various forms of pressure on the Islamic states and to establish military bases on their territories to protect the interest of those great powers and their strategic plans in the context of the struggle raging between them.”59 When the Carter administration announced on March 1, 1980, that it would create and deploy a U.S. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to deter future regional aggressions, the Saudi government voiced its continued opposition to the large U.S. military footprint unless the United States stayed “over the horizon” in such countries as Oman. In one telling statement, Crown Prince Fahd openly expressed his disapproval of a significant regional U.S. military presence: “We will never permit the creation of foreign bases on our territory because we do not want to enmesh our country in the intricacies of big-power conflicts.”60 In a follow-on interview, Fahd reiterated Saudi Arabia’s refusal to provide “military bases or facilities” for the U.S. military.61 Indeed, the royal family continued to fear the spread of Arab nationalism, rising extremism, and how anti-American

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sentiment would play out domestically if it permitted a U.S. military basing presence. As noted in a memo to Zbigniew Brzezinski, strong anti-American sentiment persisted across the kingdom in part because of the unabashed U.S. support for Israel and its failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.62 A lingering legacy of anticolonialism and a rejection of secularist modernism were two other operative factors.63 Iran-Iraq War and the Reagan Administration

As the Soviet invasion progressed in Afghanistan, tension between Iran and Iraq had been mounting as a result of Iran’s desire to export its Islamic revolution across the region, most importantly into Iraq, which possessed a Shi’a majority ruled by a Sunni minority. Throughout the 1970s, Iran and Iraq had a fraught relationship over land and maritime borders, including the Shatt AlArab waterway and Iraq’s claim on Iran’s Khuzestan province.64 The protracted and escalating border clashes between Iraq and Iran resulted in the outbreak of war at the end of September 1980, when Iraq launched air raids on several Iranian military airfields. Many of the Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia had historically tepid relations with Iraq because of the rise of its secularist Ba’ath Party. But when the Iran-Iraq War broke out, Saudi Arabia was more strongly opposed to Iran’s Islamic Revolution and did not want to see Iraq lose to Iran because such an event would produce dire regional consequences.65 To counter Iran’s offensive, the Gulf states provided some $50 to $60 billion in aid and support to Iraq during the eight-year conflict. As noted by Prince Fahd, the Saudis “found [themselves] faced with the duty that is dictated by Arab and Islamic ties and imposed by neighborliness.”66 The United States also played a critical role by maintaining the flow of arms, equipment, and technical support to the kingdom throughout the decade. Beginning in late September following the start of the war, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones, traveled to Saudi Arabia to discuss regional security and a way forward. Shortly after his visit, it was announced that the Department of Defense would deploy four U.S. Air Force Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to Saudi Arabia, along with support personnel and radar and communications equipment. The aim of the deployment was to help enhance Saudi Arabia’s radar defense capabilities, including the protection of Saudi offshore oil fields and installations. The technical support mission was referred to as Operation Elf One, and it lasted for the remainder of the Iran-Iraq War. Over and above providing technical

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support for the AWACS, the United States agreed to sell Saudi Arabia its own AWACS aircraft following the November 1980 presidential election. The Carter administration also promised to sell fuel tanks and AIM-9L Sidewinder air-toair missiles, in addition to assisting the Saudi government with intelligencegathering throughout the Iran-Iraq War.67 When President Ronald Reagan transitioned to the White House in 1981 after defeating President Carter, Reagan’s administration by and large upheld Carter’s policies on arms and aircraft sales to Saudi Arabia. His administration, for example, agreed to push forward with the sale of fuel tanks and air-to-air missiles to increase Saudi Arabia’s air defense capabilities. He would also continue with Carter’s proposal to sell five E-3A AWACS aircraft worth $8.5 billion. Furthermore, the Reagan administration agreed to oversee a technical study to assess Saudi Arabia’s air-to-ground needs in the event of an attack.68 Although continuously denied basing access in Saudi Arabia, President Reagan, like President Carter, wanted to ensure that the Saudis were equipped to defend and protect their oil and gas fields if attacked during the Iran-Iraq War.69 Arms, equipment, and technical support continued in a steady manner throughout the 1980s, but the monarchy remained opposed to a regional U.S. military presence, especially on Saudi territory.70 To offset the American military’s void in the kingdom, the monarchy began to reach out to its Gulf Arab neighbors in attempt to engage in a new security cooperation alliance system. The Saud monarchy wanted the region free from foreign powers and believed that any sort of a security cooperation should be framed in an Arab and Islamic manner. Although discussions had been held in the 1970s, one of the first concrete proposals for a regionally independent Arab cooperation organization came in 1981 with the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Saudi Arabia was one of the main backers of the GCC initiative, which was formed to foster economic, political, security, and informational coordination and cooperation across the Arabian Peninsula. The new organization included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. The first meetings of the GCC took place between February 4 and May 26, 1981.71 During the initial meetings, the GCC countries recognized their internal vulnerabilities and vowed to work mutually to uphold independence and to keep foreign powers out of the Gulf. The council was not originally intended as a formal defense pact, but from the beginning the Gulf Arab monarchies proposed to pool their defense resources and militaries in the event of an attack on any one of them from Iran. Oman also proposed a joint force capable of

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defending the Strait of Hormuz. This proposal later materialized as the GCC’s Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). When it formed, the RDF reportedly had ten to thirteen thousand troops representing the six GCC countries; it held its first “Peninsula Shield” exercises in the fall of 1983.72 As the regional security organization became more established, the Gulf Arab monarchies reiterated their continued opposition to Western protection or other regional bases. One of the reasons given was that they believed a major U.S. presence would provoke greater Soviet regional intervention rather than deterrence. The GCC reportedly feared the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet clash in the region if it permitted a large U.S. military basing presence.73 If attacked, the Saud monarchy was believed to prefer to reach out to Muslim Pakistan for military support rather than the United States.74 By 1984, Saudi opposition to a U.S. military base was again put to the test when the Iran-Iraq War began to spill into the maritime waterways of the Gulf. In mid-May an Iranian fighter jet attacked the Yanbu Pride, a Saudi oil tanker, about 35 miles from Ras Tanura, one of Saudi Arabia’s largest oil ports. In the same week, two Kuwaiti tankers were also attacked. Despite the attacks’ proximity to Saudi Arabia’s coastline, the monarchy remained reluctant to reach out to the U.S. military; it desired to handle the situation with its own defense forces or with the aid of the GCC’s RDF. Other Gulf Arab monarchies appeared concerned that an increased U.S. presence would escalate the conflict to something much larger, and might trigger a Soviet response.75 The United States respected the Gulf Arab position but had already deployed four ships to monitor the Gulf, with more ships over the horizon beyond the Strait of Hormuz, including an aircraft carrier and minesweepers.76 Attacks on Gulf tankers and other oil installations flared off and on for the next few years. Between 1981 and 1987, Iran or Iraq attacked a total of 451 ships traversing the Gulf.77 The U.S. Navy did not become more involved in the conflict, later called the Tanker War, until July 1987, when the navy deployed vessels to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers and the Gulf ’s sea lanes of communication. President Reagan justified the increased involvement, stating it was in support of the U.S. “right of navigation in international waters.”78 The U.S. reflagged Kuwaiti vessels to defend them against Iranian attacks and to ensure oil and gas shipments could travel out of the Gulf with a sense of security. This was important, as the volatile oil markets had reacted negatively to the uncertain maritime security situation. At one point at the height of the Tanker War, the United States had twenty-eight to thirty ships deployed to protect tankers and general

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U.S. strategic interests.79 Despite an enhanced U.S. naval role in the Tanker War and increased attacks by Iraqi and Iranian forces on tankers and refineries in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia remained opposed to a U.S. military basing presence on Saudi soil, but was reportedly ready to approve of a basing presence if the situation escalated beyond Saudi Arabia’s control, such as in the event of a Soviet intervention.80 Fortunately for the Saudis, the Tanker War never escalated to the point of a Soviet Gulf intervention. After eight years of fighting, Iran and Iraq agreed to a UN brokered ceasefire on August 20, 1988.81 Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union collapsed, marking the start of a new era where the Soviet Union no longer factored into the region’s national security threat spectrum. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the First Gulf War

Iraq and Saudi Arabia had never been close allies, largely because of the Saud monarchy’s opposition to Iraq’s secularist Ba’ath Party and its historically pro pan-Arab nationalist tendencies. The Saud monarchy had supported Iraq during the war, but with the conflict drawn to a close the Saudi government handled relations with Saddam Hussein cautiously due to his increasingly vitriolic rhetoric against Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Gulf monarchies. Saddam asserted, for example, that he would not pay back the debt he owed his Gulf neighbors, since “we paid with our blood” during the war. Moreover, he claimed that the Gulf Arab states owed him $80 billion for fighting the war and preventing Iran’s expansion into the Gulf.82 Saddam’s rhetoric soon solidified into inflammatory action when he invaded Kuwait in August 1990, accusing it of having stolen Iraqi oil, among other issues. Instantly, the Saud monarchy’s national security priorities were put to the test. Was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait enough of an external security threat to warrant calling in the U.S. military to help push back Saddam Hussein’s forces? Or did domestic security concerns still take precedent, making a U.S. military presence too dangerous for the Saudi regime? Although initially reluctant, the U.S. persuaded King Fahd and other royal family members that an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia was inevitable. More important, if the king did not permit a U.S. military basing presence, his monarchy would be in jeopardy of being overthrown by Saddam. In the end, the king recognized the grave standing of his monarchy and therefore permitted the U.S. to re-establish a military basing presence. The king’s shifting stance on the basing question yet again provides an important insight into how a host nation is influenced by shifting internal versus external security concerns. Iraq was such a pressing external threat in 1990 that it warranted the immediate

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arrival of U.S. forces in what would become another war, the First Gulf War. The other reality was that, as a rentier state, Saudi Arabia lacked the capacity to mobilize and support its population to defend the kingdom.83 Saddam Hussein was particularly aggressive following the Iran-Iraq War, since he faced major economic hardship at home with rising inflation, an international debt estimated at $50 to $80 billion, declining oil prices, and an economy too weak to absorb 1 million soldiers returning home after the war, not to mention the loss of hundreds of thousands of casualties who died during the war. Iraqis were also frustrated by the regime’s inability to negotiate the release of the approximately sixty-seven thousand prisoners of war held in Iran.84 Despite its struggling economic position, Iraq continued to invest heavily in a large military and defense budget. Annual defense budget estimates ranged from $7 billion to $10 billion, which was similar to Iraq’s defense budget during peak points in the Iran-Iraq War.85 In July 1990 Iraq accused Kuwait of “stealing Iraqi oil, building military installations on its territory, and reducing its oil income by cooperating with an ‘imperialist-Zionist plan’ to depress oil prices through overproduction.”86 It was really an excuse to divert attention away from Iraq’s souring domestic situation and to justify Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, which took place on August 2, 1990.87 Once Iraq was able to take Kuwait under full control, it turned its attention to Saudi Arabia. The Saud monarchy was initially incredulous and did not believe the U.S. intelligence reports or other satellite images demonstrating an Iraqi troop buildup close to the Kuwait-Saudi border. Saudi Arabia had signed previously a nonaggression pact and security agreement with Iraq in 1989 and did not believe that Saddam Hussein would violate the agreements.88 King Fahd had joined forces with Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak to try to negotiate a diplomatic settlement, but to no avail. Even with the invasion under way in early August, the king remained in denial about Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. On August 3, U.S. officials began to appreciate the grave urgency of the situation and called for a meeting with Saudi officials to discuss how the United States could help Saudi Arabia defend itself in the event of an Iraqi invasion.89 King Fahd reportedly did not believe that Saudi Arabia needed U.S. ground support but rather preferred assistance from U.S. airpower.90 Even so, he appeared unconvinced that Iraq was planning to invade Saudi Arabia and remained concerned about how the rest of the Arab world would react if he permitted a U.S. military basing presence on Saudi territory.91 As an Iraqi invasion loomed over the kingdom, President George H. W. Bush

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sent his defense secretary, Dick Cheney, to persuade Fahd that the U.S. military should be granted access to bases in Saudi Arabia if he wanted to prevent an Iraqi invasion and the overthrow of the Saud monarchy.92 Cheney arrived to Saudi Arabia on August 6 with Robert Gates, the president’s deputy national security advisor, and General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of Central Command. Schwarzkopf was responsible for planning the operations and a U.S. military deployment to Saudi Arabia.93 During his meetings with the Saudis, Cheney assured them that the United States “will only come in if you want us. We will only come in for as long as you want us. We are not coming to establish a permanent military presence. But we will stay as long as we can do the job.”94 In a briefing with King Fahd, Cheney and his team displayed satellite images, photos, and other intelligence reports about Iraq’s troop buildup near the Saudi border. The satellite imagery demonstrated that Iraq had stationed seven Scud missile launchers near Kuwait City, in addition to hundreds of tanks camouflaged in the desert and nearly 70,000 troops close to the Saudi border ready to attack.95 Following Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait, Iraq had doubled its tank presence in Kuwait to five hundred and its troop presence had increased to 120,000.96 By comparison, Saudi Arabia’s armed forces, including the National Guard, totaled only 111,500, whereas Iraq had an army five times that size.97 General Schwarzkopf finished his briefing to the Saudis by noting that Iraq would possibly invade in the next forty-eight hours. In other words, it was critical for the king to grant U.S. immediate access to Saudi bases and installations if the monarchy desired to help push Iraqi forces back.98 King Fahd had been convinced by the U.S. team briefing on the emergency nature of the situation and the necessity to allow U.S. troops to occupy Saudi bases to prevent Saddam Hussein from crossing into Saudi territory. At this point, it was apparent that external security concerns vastly outweighed the monarchy’s internal security worries and therefore necessitated a U.S. military basing presence. The speed at which Saudi Arabia decided to permit U.S. military bases on Saudi territory was unprecedented.99 As King Fahd noted, “If we do anything with our American friends, we do it only in self-defense, not as aggressors. . . . We have to do this. The Kuwaitis waited, they waited too long, and now there is no longer a Kuwait.” King Fahd spoke directly to Secretary Cheney: “Mr. Secretary, we approve of the principle. Let’s believe in God and do what has to be done. We will proceed with the details. I don’t care what other people say. The most important thing is to proceed to protect our country together with the Americans.”100

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After weeks of high-level discussions, Saudi Arabia approved Washington’s plan to deploy troops to Saudi Arabia and establish U.S. military bases that would drive Saddam Hussein’s troops from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.101 As noted in one report: “The Saudis are finally being forced to make commitments they always resisted making. Saudi Arabia’s royal rulers have in the past kept the Americans at arm’s length, partly because of Washington’s close ties with Israel, partly because of Saudi Arabia’s role as the guardian of Islam’s holiest shrines.”102 Internal security concerns were no longer the top priority; Iraq’s looming invasion had become the top threat to the regime’s survival. After the final basing approval, President Bush weighed in: “My military objective is to see Saudi Arabia defended. . . . Our overall objective is to see Saddam Hussein get out, go back and have the rightful regime of Kuwait in place. We’re not in a war. We have sent forces to defend Saudi Arabia.”103 Following the Cheney trip and the decision to allow a U.S. troop deployment, Saudi Arabia decried Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and called for the end of its occupation. On August 8, King Fahd made a television appearance with the exiled emir of Kuwait, Shaykh Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, in a show of support for the Kuwaitis.104 Privately, Saudi officials thanked the United States for quickly coming to its aid and providing support. As the Washington Post reported: “Their normal sensitivity to outside Arab reaction toward every Saudi action seems to have been replaced by a ‘who-gives-a-damn-what-they-think’ attitude.”105 Domestically, it appeared that the decision to allow a U.S. military presence was met with very little resistance, even among royal family members. In a symbolic shift in public thinking about a U.S. military presence, the Saudi religious establishment also supported the monarchy’s decision. Shaykh Abdulaziz bin Baz, a conservative religious leader, issued a fatwa citing the Quran and Sharia law to justify the king’s announcement allowing non-Muslim troops on Saudi soil.106 As noted by one twenty-one-year-old Saudi male interviewee: “As long as religion accepts it, there are no objections, even if the devil comes to help us.”107 With its newly acquired approval to deploy troops to the kingdom, the U.S. military began positioning forces immediately. Over several months, more than 200,000 troops would deploy to Saudi Arabia.108 At the peak of fighting and aerial bombardment that began on January 17, 1991, the United States had deployed an estimated 600,000 troops across the region in “Operation Desert Storm” to expel Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. Saddam’s forces were quickly defeated and expelled from Kuwait by the beginning of March, but Sad-

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dam remained in power. Even so, the U.S. military pushed Iraqi forces back into Iraq where they would be confined between a northern and southern nofly zone for the next decade, thus remaining a major external threat for Saudi Arabia.109 To protect the no-fly zone, the Saud monarchy allowed the U.S. Air Force to station approximately two hundred military aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base, along with military support personnel.110 The monarchy recognized that its armed forces were incapable of properly defending the kingdom in the event of a future attack and therefore required either external military and security assistance or a prolonged U.S. military basing presence. Moreover, it was certainly not in a position to uphold UN Security Council Resolution 688 or the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Iraq. As a rentier state, Saudi Arabia had never extracted resources from its people but rather established a culture of providing social benefits and other subsidies to the people as a means of establishing their loyalty and complacency. As a result, its national defense system was inherently handicapped, unable to protect Saudi Arabia from invasion. Its armed forces had been trained to focus on domestic security challenges, thus ensuring the monarchy’s survival and grip on power. Since Saddam Hussein continued to act as an unpredictable regional aggressor, the Saud monarchy was forced to allow a U.S. military basing presence even though it was quickly contested following the end of Operation Desert Storm. In the end, and despite its growing unpopularity throughout the 1990s, the United States would maintain a military basing presence until Saddam was removed in 2003.111 Should the U.S. Stay or Go? Mounting Internal Pressure, 1991–2003

While opposition groups remained initially silent following the arrival of U.S. forces to the kingdom, it did not take long before the U.S. presence grew increasingly unpopular. The Saud monarchy faced numerous domestic threats and attacks aimed at undermining its rule throughout the 1990s. It was clear that opposition leaders were using the U.S. basing presence to foment unrest and anger aimed against the royal family. Even under mounting domestic pressure, however, the Saud monarchy did not terminate the U.S. military basing presence until 2003, when Saddam was removed once and for all. With Saddam Hussein overthrown, Saudi Arabia’s main external security threat had vanished; the situation therefore did not warrant the continuation of a U.S. military basing presence. The first signs of renewed resistance against both the Saud monarchy and

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the U.S. military emerged among Saudi Arabia’s conservative religious clerical class but also came from radical leaders and other dissidents. Shortly after the U.S. military’s arrival, opposition leaders used a continued U.S. military presence to recruit followers and promote the overthrow of the monarchy.112 The most prominent aggressor and opposition leader of all was Osama Bin Laden, a member of the wealthy Saudi Bin Laden construction family and founder of the terrorist group Al-Qaeda. Bin Laden had long held the view that “Al Saud failed to rule according to Islamic law and managed the kingdom’s oil reserves to suit America’s needs. When authorities cracked down on dissidents, he condemned Al Saud for persecuting the ulama.”113 Bin Laden was kicked out of Saudi Arabia in 1991 for these beliefs along with his anti-government activities, but he was not deterred and continued to promote his message of radical extremism and virulent anti-Western rhetoric. Bin Laden, along with Al-Qaeda’s local Saudi offshoot, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), quickly became the Saud monarchy’s most dangerous opponent, advocating a radical jihadist struggle against the West as well as the overthrow of the monarchy.114 Throughout the 1990s, Osama Bin Laden’s message grew stronger and more vitriolic against the West and the Saud monarchy. In 1996, he launched a global jihadist campaign against the United States: “Today your brothers and sons, the sons of the Two Sanctuaries, have started their jihad in the cause of Allah, to expel the occupying enemy from the Land of the Two Sanctuaries [in Saudi Arabia].”115 Bin Laden was taking up arms to fight U.S. troops on Saudi soil just as he had done against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In addition to taking aim at the United States, Bin Laden also set his sights on the Saudi royal family, declaring it “outside the religious community” by virtue of its “acts against Islam.”116 Prior to Bin Laden’s declaration of global jihad, Saudi Arabia had already experienced two devastating terrorist attacks against Saudi and U.S. military installations. The first terrorist attack came on November 13, 1995, at a Saudi National Guard office building in Riyadh. A truck bomb explosion killed seven, including five Americans, and injured more than thirty. Saudi officials reportedly thought it was an aberration, but almost eight months later, on June 25, 1996, terrorists struck again on a much larger scale. At 9:50 p.m. they exploded a truck bomb with an estimated 20,000 pounds of TNT force at the Khobar Towers military installation in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. The attack killed nineteen U.S. military personnel and wounded nearly five hundred.117 The two terrorist attacks represented the harsh reality of the violent opposition faced

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by the Saud monarchy. Since the U.S. military presence was seen as a strong motivator behind these attacks, one might have thought that they would have been enough to persuade the king to terminate the U.S. military basing presence. The king, however, did not terminate the U.S. basing leases, and the U.S. military was permitted to stay. The only precaution that the monarchy took was to move most of the remaining U.S. soldiers to bases well removed from large population centers such as Riyadh and Dhahran, locating the U.S. soldiers beyond the public’s eye. One of the new U.S. basing locations was a base near Al-Kharj, 60 miles southeast of Riyadh.118 Indeed, internal security posed a significant threat to the king throughout this period, especially following the Khobar Tower attacks and Bin Laden’s announced fatwa calling for jihad against the monarchy. The Saud monarchy, however, permitted the United States to maintain its military basing presence, since Saddam Hussein remained as a top external security threat. The kingdom’s inability to defend itself against Iraq in 1990 had forced the king to view Saddam Hussein as its central security concern for the remainder of the decade. Since Iraq was a top national security priority, the monarchy was willing to take the risk of maintaining a U.S. basing presence despite mounting domestic attacks aimed at undermining the monarchy’s legitimacy.119 After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, in which fifteen of nineteen hijackers were Saudi, it should have been apparent that violent domestic elements were a serious threat. Al-Qaeda had become a potent force in the kingdom and could chip away at the monarchy’s legitimacy. Virulent antiAmericanism also undermined the king’s rule—local Saudis condemned both the Iraq and Afghan wars. Even with such pressing internal threats and other jihadist activity aimed both at the United States and the monarchy, including a November 2002 attack on an American fast food restaurant in Al-Kharj, the king did not ask the U.S. to terminate its basing presence until 2003, when the United States overthrew Saddam Hussein in the Second Gulf War.120 At the start of that war, Saudi Arabia housed an estimated five thousand U.S. troops and military staff, but the number increased to as many as thirteen thousand at the height of operations.121 The Saud monarchy had ample opportunity to expel the U.S. military from its bases prior to 2003, but it did not do so until Saddam was removed as Saudi Arabia’s main external security threat. On April 29, approximately two months after the start of the U.S. invasion and just two days prior to President George W. Bush’s announcement that the goals of U.S. combat operations in Iraq had been accomplished, Secretary of Defense Donald H.

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Rumsfeld and his Saudi equivalent, Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, proclaimed that “the American military mission in the kingdom would end late this summer. It is now a safer region because of the change of regime in Iraq.”122 Prince Sultan also remarked that “following the end of Operation Southern Watch, in which U.S. and British warplanes enforced a no-fly zone over southern Iraq, there’s no need for them to be here.”123 The U.S. military’s final departure came on the eve of major car bomb attacks that ripped through several Riyadh housing compounds on May 12, 2003. AQAP organized the attacks, in which thirty-five people died with scores wounded. The May bombings marked the beginning of a concentrated AQAP terrorist campaign throughout the kingdom that lasted until very recently and claimed hundreds of deaths along the way. The May 2003 bombings also symbolized the Saudi regime’s worst fears: regime instability and a threat of internal revolution. However, regardless of this growing internal threat, it was not until Saddam Hussein’s deposition that Saudi Arabia ended the U.S. military basing presence on Saudi territory. On August 26, the U.S. military held a small ceremony with a select group of military personnel and engineers numbering about a hundred to mark the closure of the Prince Sultan Air Base and a general termination a U.S. military basing presence in the kingdom.124 Conclusion: What’s Past Is Prologue

This most recent Saudi case brings the book full circle. From the Cold War to the post-9/11 world, the Saud monarchy has confronted a spectrum of internal and external security concerns that have exerted widely varying influences on the U.S. military basing question in the kingdom. In the period examined here, from the late 1970s to the early 2000s, the Saud monarchy experienced several shifts in its national security outlook. From the 1970s through the 1980s, domestic security took precedence over regional security concerns and thus prevented the reinstallation of U.S. military basing even though desired and requested by the United States. Certainly, this did not negate a U.S. military presence during this period. U.S. arms, equipment, and technical advisors continued to support the Saudi armed forces, especially during the Iran-Iraq War. The U.S. military maintained a light footprint through the deployment of strategic and other technical advisors rather than establishing a more robust basing presence. But the moment the king’s survival was threatened by an outside enemy like Saddam Hussein in 1990, he became convinced that he needed to allow a U.S. military basing presence, since his survival was at stake.

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The U.S. military quickly built up a basing presence in the kingdom beginning in 1990 and thereafter maintained a robust basing presence until 2003, when U.S. forces overthrew Saddam Hussein in the Second Gulf War. The king faced numerous domestic attacks aimed at his regime and the U.S. military throughout the 1990s, including several terrorist attacks inspired by the U.S. basing presence, but the king did not terminate the U.S. basing presence until Saddam fell. He recognized that without the U.S. military basing presence his armed forces were unable to defend against an external invasion. With Saddam’s removal, the monarchy’s primary external security threat ended, prompting the monarchy to return to focusing on domestic security as the top threat, including the rising power of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist affiliates. Indeed, U.S. military bases had helped to fuel the antimonarchical sentiment, contributing to the erosion of the monarchy’s legitimacy throughout this period, which explains why the king, when he was free to do so, was so keen to end the prolonged U.S. military basing presence. While the U.S. military may have closed its bases in 2003, it still retains an influential military presence in the kingdom. During the past decade, the U.S. military has shifted again to the light-footprint approach that had previously proven successful. The U.S. military continues to supply arms, equipment, and other technical support to the kingdom, including building up a Saudi-U.S. drone program, maintaining the U.S. Military Training Mission, and even establishing a train-and-equip program for Syrian rebels in Saudi Arabia.125 While the monarchy appears to prioritize internal security over direct threats to the kingdom’s territorial integrity today, the cyclical nature of history suggests that external security will one day push to the fore again, and when it does there is a high likelihood that the U.S. military will return to the bases that it has inhabited off and on since World War II.



Conclusion—The GCC Today and Lessons Learned for the U.S. Military

The prolonged period of revolutionary change in the Middle East following the Arab uprisings of 2011 and the recent spate of regional violence raises important questions about the future of U.S. military basing in the Arabian Peninsula and across the region, questions complicated by the U.S. troop drawdown in Afghanistan. Amid continued domestic upheaval in Bahrain, for example, will the U.S. Navy be required to vacate its base at Juffair? Will the U.S. Air Force lose its foothold in Qatar because of domestic pushback and rising regional anti-American sentiment? And how will a new political dynamic in the Gulf affect the shape and longevity of a U.S. basing regime there? Indeed, these questions are challenging to answer because the situation on the ground is changing at a pace that makes predictions difficult. However, if events of the past decades examined here are any indication and external threats remain a top priority to the Gulf Arab monarchies, including the continued threat of an emboldened Iran, the U.S. military will likely maintain its current regional military basing foothold at least in the near future. Today, the Gulf Arab monarchies are particularly apprehensive about several external emerging dynamics linked to Iran’s rising influence that could further destabilize the region and threaten the survival of their respective regimes. Specifically, they are concerned about Iran’s influence in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as about the possibility of a nuclear deal signed between the United States and Iran. The Gulf Arab monarchies see much of the current crises through a sectarian lens and hope to thwart or deter Iran’s rising power through strong alliances and a greater securitization of the region, including support for the “anti-Shi’a jihad in Iraq and Syria.”1 Inevitably, this brings the U.S. military 169

170  Conclusion

into the fold, since it has long and deep ties to the Gulf Arab monarchies. When it comes to the U.S. military basing question, most GCC countries must continue to balance delicate national security dynamics that encompass significant internal and external security concerns. That said, the majority still view the U.S. military as being an important deterrent against Iran, thus justifying a U.S. military basing presence in such countries as Bahrain or Oman. The Saud monarchy remains the most cautious in how it engages with the U.S. military, since the United States remains domestically unpopular and a potential further destabilizing factor for the Saud monarchy similar to the past. In other words, internal security remains the top priority for the Saud monarchy, particularly following the Arab uprisings of 2011 and the recent transition of power after the death of King Abdullah. It is also speculated that the Saud royal family feels protected enough for the time being from Iran by the ring of U.S. military bases that line the eastern shores of the Arabian Peninsula in such countries as Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE. At present, the Saud monarchy permits only a light U.S. military footprint in the kingdom through training and technical advising missions, since it continues to fear domestic pushback in the event of a more pronounced and prolonged U.S. military basing presence similar to that in the 1990s. As noted previously, the light footprint or low military profile will be a key component to ensure that the U.S. military’s future presence is not jeopardized. More broadly, the U.S. military must remain attuned and sensitive to the domestic vulnerabilities of host Gulf nations because of continued virulent anti-American sentiment and other internal opposition. For the time being, external security concerns and the increased threat from Iran will prevail as a top national security priority for most Gulf Arab monarchies and therefore will likely result in a continuation of a U.S. military basing presence in such countries as Bahrain and Oman. The U.S. military may indeed maintain its strategic regional basing presence for many years to come, but in the past couple years there has also been a growing trend of Gulf Arab monarchies increasingly bolstering their ties and partnerships with the emerging powers of Eurasia to the East, including China, India, and Russia. China in particular is on the hunt to secure greater regional natural resources, while many of the Gulf Arab monarchies desire to offset the U.S. military influence. Although only now emerging as a new regional influence, China has increased its Gulf presence in a significant manner recently and will remain an important factor in the region’s future stability and security.

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Drawing Lessons from Bahrain Today

The latest base politics dynamic, which has developed in the past several years in Bahrain following the domestic revolts against the Khalifa monarchy, represents a dilemma for the royal family similar to that of the 1970s. Bahrain’s Shi’a majority—which has long been discriminated against and under-represented in government—organized protests against the ruling family beginning in the winter of 2011 that have continued intermittently for the past several years.2 The protests have been brutally suppressed by the Khalifa monarchy, since many within the royal family view the protests as a possible avenue by which Iran can shape the future politics and security of Bahrain. From the U.S. perspective, the protests have focused more on Bahrain’s undemocratic system of governance rather than taking aim at the U.S. Navy’s basing presence, but this could certainly change. More important, for the Khalifas Iran remains a primary external security concern and therefore helps to explain why they have not pushed for closure of the U.S. naval base even though it remains unpopular. The Khalifa family is undeniably confronted by significant domestic security challenges influenced in large part by the regional uprisings that began in Tunisia and Egypt, but fear of Iran’s extended arm and influence remains as one of Bahrain’s top national security priorities.3 In a sign of regional concern for Bahrain’s latest round of uprisings, including possible growing linkages to Iran among other concerns, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates deployed one thousand troops as part of the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force to help quell the spreading protests during the initial wave of violence in the late winter and early spring of 2011. Collectively, the three countries fear the future arc of Iran’s influence and how it could use future protests or riots to undermine their royal families. The toppling of the Bahraini monarchy would provide a Shi’a-dominant Iran with a potential new foothold and the opportunity on the Gulf ’s western shores to further weaken the Gulf Arab monarchies. Iran’s prior saber-rattling under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, including his controversial visit to the contested islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs in 2012, and other increased military activity in the Gulf during his presidency, have put the region on edge. Many regional experts have expressed quiet optimism following the 2013 election of the more moderate Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, but if provoked down the road Iran still possesses the ability to use the contested islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs as a staging point to affect regional politics or impede the maritime trade that traverses the Strait of Hormuz.4

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The United States remains committed to supporting Bahrain despite calls from various members of the international community to distance itself from the Bahraini government because of its human rights abuses and violent crackdown against the protest movement. Despite mounting pressure, the Obama administration and senior military officials desire to keep their Bahraini naval base in full operation. In February 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, traveled to Bahrain to meet with King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa to express continued U.S. support for the small island nation.5 The United States also continues to move forward on a major $580 million construction project that will increase the U.S. Navy’s Bahraini operational capabilities.6 During a May 2012 visit to the United States by Bahraini crown prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, the Obama administration announced that it would move ahead with a security assistance package that included such items as harbor patrol boats, ground-based radars, Seahawk helicopters, and night-vision equipment—items reportedly needed for “external defense.”7 As the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan, its Bahraini naval base will gain new importance as the U.S. military attempts to restructure its regional posture and forward projection capabilities. In a December 2013 speech, U.S. secretary of defense Chuck Hagel reiterated the Gulf ’s continued great importance to U.S. strategic and national security interests. The United States, Hagel emphasized, would not turn its back on the Gulf anytime soon. As long as Iran remains a top national security priority, Bahrain in turn will most likely reciprocate, showing its unwavering support for the U.S. Navy’s basing presence.8 As demonstrated by the historical case studies of this book, host Gulf nations such as Bahrain are likely to terminate a U.S. military basing contract only when internal security concerns clearly trump all external threats, as was the case in the U.S. military’s 2003 basing departure from Saudi Arabia. At the same time, a continued flow of economic and military aid to the Bahraini government is an essential secondary component that should ensure a steady long-term basing presence. A New Security Dynamic: The Gulf Looks East

If Iran were not troubling enough, the U.S. military must also contend with the increased regional involvement of emerging Eurasian powers such as India, China, and Russia. Although not the focus of this work, it is an area of rising importance for future research and scholarship as realignments with Eurasia’s emerging powers could influence the U.S. military’s future Gulf position, ushering in yet another evolution of political and security dynamics for the Gulf.

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Aside from grappling with the region’s current volatility, the U.S. military must confront the fact that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries are looking increasingly toward the East as a source of new political, military, technological, and economic partnerships. This is not to say that the United States will lose its dominant position in the Gulf anytime soon—from a military standpoint the U.S. still maintains significant installations, bases, and prepositioned equipment in most GCC countries, including Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. However, as highlighted briefly below, the past decade has ushered in a new era of political and economic competition that includes states such as Russia, India, China, and other Pacific Asia nations that vie for the region’s wealth of natural resources to fuel their growing economies. As these emerging powers become ever more invested in the region, Gulf security and stability will rely further on these new regional actors, especially as the United States endeavors to recalibrate its regional position following a decade of war. Although the region’s future remains unpredictable, greater ties between the Gulf and the emerging powers of Eurasia would certainly represent a significant change for the United States, which has been the region’s main security guarantor and trading partner since the withdrawal of the British in the 1970s. Among the region’s rising powers, China in particular has the greatest potential to become the major U.S. competitor in the Gulf. While the GCC remains concerned about a more dominant Iran, recent events, including the Saudi-led Peninsula Shield invasion of Bahrain, obscure the fact that Iran and Saudi Arabia increasingly share a growing economic market and Great Power ally in China. China’s gradual realignment from squarely backing Iran to courting Saudi Arabia in recent years heralds an important geostrategic shift in China’s foreign policy and marks the stirrings of a Chinese “twin-pillar” policy in the Gulf similar to that of President Nixon.9 China’s increased focus on the Gulf is predicated on securing energy resources for its expanding economy. Due to the extraordinary growth of its industrial, petrochemical, and manufacturing sectors, as well as the rapid expansion of personal automobile use, China is currently the world’s second largest consumer of oil—and several economists predict that it will be the primary consumer of oil by 2025.10 Despite aggressive pursuit of supply diversity, as much as 70 to 80 percent of China’s future oil imports will have to come from the Middle East and North Africa.11 To meet this growing demand, over the past ten years China has actively courted Iran and the Gulf Arab monarchies through a variety of economic and political inducements as a key part in ensuring a stable flow of energy for its expanding

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demands. In 2004, for example, the China-Arab Cooperation Forum was established to promote greater trade, energy cooperation, information sharing, and other political exchanges.12 The impact of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the events of the recent Arab uprisings and spread of violence in Syria and Yemen, have placed the traditional Great Power regional alliance structures in significant flux. Saudi Arabia’s intensified diplomatic outreach to both Russia and China in the wake of U.S. support of President Hosni Mubarak’s ouster in Egypt and the protests in Bahrain sent a clear message that it was willing to recalibrate its orientation toward the East if the U.S. missteps. The Saud monarchy has also grown frustrated with U.S. inaction in Syria, since it believes that Iran has gained an upper hand in the conflict, in addition to now possessing a greater capacity to promote Shi’a militancy and to increase its regional influence.13 China has welcomed this shift away from the United States and seized upon the events of the past several years to enhance its ties to and support for Saudi Arabia. Moreover, China has become an attractive partner for the kingdom, as it offers improved economic relations without insisting on political reforms. Indeed, China’s model of rapid economic development within an autocratic framework is cited by many in the Saud royal family as a template for Saudi Arabia’s transformation to a modern knowledge economy. The model offers economic growth without democratization, an attractive formula as autocratic regimes are destabilized in the region.14 China’s increased focus on the Gulf became more apparent during the 2000s as it sought to secure strategic natural resources for its growing economy. In fact, by 2009 Saudi Arabia had become the leading supplier of crude oil to China. China is also the top importer of oil and gas from Oman, while it is the second largest trading partner with the UAE behind India.15 In 2013 Sino-Saudi trade was estimated at $73 billion, up from $40 billion in 2008.16 This compares with U.S.-Saudi bilateral trade at $43 billion in 2010 (the latest data available).17 In February 2009, China’s president Hu Jintao and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia concluded a $1.8 billion contract to build a railway line between the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, to be completed at the end of 2015.18 The strengthening of economic ties between Saudi Arabia and China have increasingly corresponded with greater political and security cooperation. From 2008 to 2011 China sold $700 million worth of armaments to Saudi Arabia, and more recently it concluded an agreement to sell Chinese drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles.19 During a bilateral summit in June 2011 between

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Chinese premier Wen Jiabao and Saudi Arabia’s speaker of the Majlis Ash-Shura Council Abdullah Bin Mohammed Bin Ibrahim Al Sheikh, Premier Wen said that “China and Saudi Arabia hold wide consensus and identical interest on such major issues as coping with the international financial crisis, maintaining regional peace and stability, and respecting civilization diversification.”20 In a follow-on statement, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted: “Saudi Arabia expects to join hands with China to lift the bilateral relations to a higher level.”21 Months before this meeting, it is also interesting to note, China’s sixth naval escort flotilla arrived in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for the first time on a goodwill visit in November 2010. The symbolism of this naval visit is significant, considering that the United States ended its basing presence in 2003 and now maintains only military training missions and other technical advising teams.22 China’s engagement with Saudi Arabia aligns with its ratcheting up of economic and political ties throughout the region. With the prolonged involvement of the United States in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other neighboring countries, China is slowly but surely beginning to challenge American political and economic influence across the region, a trend likely to persist as China continues to align itself with majority Arab opinion (often opposed to that of the United States) on other salient regional issues, such as the Palestine question, as evidenced by its recent vote in favor of Palestine joining UNESCO. China is a popular regional alternative to the widely unpopular United States, but more research is still needed to better understand these emerging dynamics and trends.23 As China tries to enhance its economic engagement with Saudi Arabia, there will inevitably come a moment when it is unable to stand apart as a disinterested actor in the regional security dynamic. With influence comes interest. Possible positive spillover for China from its new regional role could include assuming, willingly or not, the responsibility of becoming a go-to regional power broker. Other GCC states might also come to rely upon China in the future as a reliable security guarantor or mediator of Gulf stability. Since China is viewed as a less controversial security partner than the United States, China might be a preferable strategic ally for Gulf Arab monarchies if domestic and regional instability persists. Historical Lessons Learned

The 2003 closure of U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia presents a significant case that highlights the themes of this book regarding how host Gulf Arab nations respond to a spectrum of internal versus external security concerns that can influ-

176  Conclusion

ence U.S. military basing presence outcomes, positively or negatively. As demonstrated through the various cases examined in the book, when the external security threat to a regime’s survival becomes greater than domestic security threats, the host Gulf nation is most likely to permit a U.S. military basing presence. This was demonstrated in the 1950s, when Saudi Arabia viewed the Hashemite kingdoms as a major external threat and thus permitted the U.S. military to maintain its local military presence despite growing Arab nationalist unrest and even the threat of overthrow. And it was demonstrated again in 1990, when the Saud monarchy permitted the U.S. military to occupy local bases following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. It was also shown in the case of Bahrain in the 1980s, when the U.S. Navy was permitted renewed full basing access, albeit initially with a much lighter footprint, in the wake of Iran’s Islamic Revolution and calls by certain Iranian leaders to annex Bahrain as an Iranian province. These findings can be broadened and applied in part to the 2014 case of the re-establishment of a U.S. military base at Subic Bay in the Philippines. The U.S. base there was closed in 1991, but the Philippine government invited the U.S. military back to the base in response to both regional security concerns and fears of an increasingly proactive and menacing China in the South China Sea.24 In contrast, when a host Gulf monarchy perceived domestic security concerns as a greater threat to the regime’s survival than any external security threat, the host monarchy was more likely to expel U.S. military forces or terminate its basing agreements to appease its population. Terminating a basing agreement also assisted in quelling regime opposition that used the U.S. military basing presence to undermine the monarchy. Expulsion is more likely to take place when protests and public outcry take on a more anti-American slant at the same time that a host nation’s external security concerns are perceived as nonthreatening. This was certainly the case for Saudi Arabia in 1962 and again in 2003; Bahrain exhibited similar behavior beginning in 1973. In both of these cases, the U.S. military’s presence was extremely unpopular, and terminating the U.S. military basing agreements publicly was a way to temporarily appease the population as well as helping secure the domestic standing of each respective monarchy. When a regime’s stability is at risk from a credible external military threat, however, domestic security concerns play little to no role in influencing basing outcomes. This was demonstrated by the Saudi case in the 1990s, when the Saud monarchy experienced several domestic terrorist attacks motivated in large part by the prolonged U.S. military basing presence. Despite repeated attacks and threats to the monarchy, the Saudi government did not

The GCC Today and Lessons Learned 177

terminate the U.S. military basing presence until 2003, when Saddam Hussein was once and for all removed as the Saud monarchy’s main external enemy. Sultan Qaboos’s regime in Oman also struggles with balancing internal versus external security concerns to this day. Sultan Qaboos threatened the U.S. military with expulsion after learning about the secret use of Oman’s Masirah Island during America’s failed Tehran hostage rescue mission in 1980. Sultan Qaboos was angered and acutely embarrassed by this event, in addition to facing several significant ongoing domestic security concerns during this period in which the U.S. military basing presence was used to undermine the sultan’s legitimacy. The U.S. military was able to stave off the termination of its basing lease in this case by promising to maintain a less visible military profile while offering an increase in economic and military aid. This experience provides a valuable lesson learned for the U.S. military. If the U.S. military were placed under similar circumstances of being threatened with the termination of its basing agreements as a result of revolutionary sentiment gripping Gulf countries such as Bahrain or Oman today, promises of a lighter footprint and heavier U.S. technical or military assistance may well help protect the nation’s future standing in those countries and stabilize its regional basing footholds. The history of the U.S. military in the Arabian Peninsula documented here brings into question previously popular theories about basing negotiations and their politicization. Current theories presume that changes in domestic institutions or regimes—from authoritarian to democratic transition to democratic consolidation—affect base politicization. Primary source documents from each case examined, however, demonstrate that a host regime’s internal security concerns determined the U.S. military’s basing outcome significantly more than the politics of democratic transition. Moreover, none of the GCC regimes significantly democratized in the period studied here, although they did terminate U.S. military basing agreements on several occasions. Bahrain enacted limited political liberalization reforms in the early 1970s, but it was only in reaction to the unrest rather than its precipitant.25 Current theories also hold that regimes dependent on technology transfers or specific technical knowledge will not abrogate a foreign nation’s basing agreement. As shown in both the Saudi and Bahraini cases, this does not always hold true. Both countries remained dependent on U.S. military equipment and technical prowess but nonetheless terminated U.S. basing contracts. And while many prevalent theories insist that an authoritarian regime will not expel a foreign military power when it is financially reliant on the power for military base rents, this was clearly not the case

178  Conclusion

across the Arabian Peninsula, where the United States paid only nominal sums for maintaining its foreign military presence compared with other worldwide basing partners. The issue rarely came up in the historical documents; the influx of oil wealth meant that most of the Gulf monarchies involved were much less dependent on the U.S. military as a source of revenue than they were on its weapons and technical support. Policy Implications

The broader findings of this book provide valuable lessons for current U.S. military and government officials alike. U.S. policy-makers must recognize that a large U.S. military presence in developing countries can often have a damaging effect on a host nation’s internal security, especially during our age of swift and massive global information flows. The U.S. military might be able to avoid a public display of its expulsion or the termination of its basing leases if it is more sensitive to how local populations perceive its military bases. Any protracted foreign military presence in a volatile region such as the Gulf can stir up major anger and animosity toward the foreign forces and put them at risk of local mob attack or suicide bombings such as those carried out recently in Saudi Arabia. In Bahrain and Oman in the 1980s, promises of a lighter military footprint or lower basing profile positively affected the basing outcomes in both countries, helping to divert local attention away from the controversial and unpopular basing presence. As the U.S. military executes its drawdown from Afghanistan and the greater Southwest Asia region, the lily pad basing model or light footprint approach may be the most effective strategy to both uphold U.S. force projection and remain responsive to host nation sensitivities. Host Gulf nations engaged in future base politics dynamics may not be able to easily mollify local opposition to U.S. military basing, as a result of the difficulty of controlling the flow of information in a global satellite communications era. Previously, GCC regimes were able to control local media outlets and print forums. As witnessed in 1962 in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the 1970s, each respective monarchy was able to defuse public animosity toward the U.S. military as well as opposition movements against the monarchy, by publicly announcing that a U.S. military basing contract would not be renewed and that the U.S. military was being required to vacate its facilities. The optics proved important for maintaining the host regime’s power and local legitimacy, even though many U.S. military advisors have remained in these countries over the years to support military training or technical advising missions.

The GCC Today and Lessons Learned 179

Today’s outbreak of violence across the Middle East has left the United States and other nations struggling to figure out how to craft policy in a region undergoing swift, sometimes radical change. Overnight, the region’s status quo has been shattered and the political dynamic dramatically altered. Revolutionary unrest that began in Tunisia and Egypt quickly spread to the rest of the region, including new and old U.S. strategic allies such as Libya, Bahrain, Oman, Yemen, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. military and the nation’s policy-makers are deeply concerned about the future of U.S. regional influence and assets, including its strategic military basing outposts and U.S. commercial interests. In the wake of the Gulf region’s revolutionary ferment, one of the central questions of this book remains vitally important: will the U.S. military be able to maintain its strategic basing footholds, or will a U.S. military basing presence become too much of a threat to a host monarchy’s stability and survival? Initially, and for the immediate future, the answer is most likely that the United States will retain its regional military basing presence. But the Gulf ’s always unpredictable and complex environment may change again at a moment’s notice, as it has in the past. Indeed, most of the revolutionary behavior witnessed across the region thus far has more focused on internal democratic change or sectarian struggles than anti-American sentiment or opposition to a U.S. military basing presence. Moreover, external security, especially the threat posed by Iran to the GCC, remains a top priority for most of the Arabian Peninsula. At present, no GCC military, let alone the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force, would be able to handle a direct military confrontation involving Iran based upon current troop capability estimates.26 Accordingly, it would not be in any GCC country’s best strategic national interest to terminate their respective U.S. basing agreements, considering the vital deterrent role that a U.S. base could have on Iran, though even that may change following a final and enforceable nuclear deal between the United States and Iran. Even if the case does arise in which a host monarchy threatens to shut down U.S. bases, proposing a lighter footprint combined with increased military and technical aid is an incentive that has worked previously and may work again. The Gulf region has embarked on a period of unprecedented instability, and if the United States wants to ensure that it is able to continue to defend and protect its strategic national interests in the Gulf, understanding the intricacies of the region’s basing politics will be essential for years to come.



Notes

Introduction

1. Remarks by Secretary Hagel at the Manama Dialogue from Manama, Bahrain, December 7, 2013, available at www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript. aspx?transcriptid=5336. 2. Brian Dooley, “Diplomacy, Threats, and Bahrain’s Cabinet,” Foreign Policy, May 10, 2013. 3. Michael A. Palmer, On Course to Desert Storm: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1992a), 99; Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York: Owl Books, 2004), 219. 4. David F. Winkler, Amirs, Admirals & Desert Sailors: Bahrain, the U.S. Navy, and the Arabian Gulf (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 63–65. 5. Countries of the GCC include Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. 6. C. T. Sandars, America’s Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 293–94. 7. F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), 119–26. 8. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower upon History, 1660–1783 (Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing Company, 1890; reprinted 2003); Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28, no. 1 (2003): 5–46. 9. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007; 2nd ed.). 10. The U.S. Department of Defense’s basing classification system and definitions are also applied here. This book focuses primarily on what are termed “Main Operating 181

182 Notes to the Introduction

Bases” or “Forward Operating Sites.” See Andrew Krepinevich and Robert O. Work, A New US Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2007), 18–19; U.S. Department of Defense, Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, September 2004, 10; Kent Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 257. 11. Robert E. Harkavy, Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200–2000 (New York: Routledge, 2007), 2; Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War (New York: Touchtone, 1996). 12. See Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China’s Quest for Seapower (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982); Harkavy 2007, 2. 13. See Andrew C. Hess, “The Battle of Lepanto and Its Place in Mediterranean History,” Past and Present, no. 57 (November 1972): 53–73; Harkavy 2007, 2. 14. Harkavy 2007, 2. 15. As quoted in Robert E. Harkavy, Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 2. See also Bernard Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), ch. 7; H. Rosinski, The Development of Naval Thought (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977). 16. Catherine Lutz, ed., The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 10–11. 17. “The Advance Bases,” Building the Navy’s Bases in World War II: History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps 1940–1946, vol. 2, part 3, Naval History and Heritage Command (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947); James R. Blaker, United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma (New York: Praeger, 1990), 28–29; Lutz 2009, 12. 18. H. Freeman Matthews, Top Secret Letter from Acting Chairman of the StateWar-Navy Coordinating Committee to the U.S. Secretary of State. Subject: Acquisition and Construction of a United States Military Airfield at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, April 25, 1945; Acting Secretary of State, Top Secret Letter from U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary of State to the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, Concerning War Department Requests to Establish an Air Route from Cairo through Saudi Arabia to India, and the Need to Construct an Airfield in Dhahran to Support Such a Route, April 25, 1945, in U.S. Records on Saudi Affairs 1945–1959, ed. K. E. Evans, vol. 2 (London: Archive Editions and University Publications of America, 1997), 87–88. 19. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York: Free Press, 2009), 375. 20. Dispatch to Secretary of State from Cairo, September 29, 1944, U.S. Policy in Saudi Arabia, no. 25(12), 1944, FO 921/192, British National Archives; Dispatch to HQRAFME from A. M. Whitehall, October 18, 1944, U.S. Policy in Saudi Arabia, no. 25(12), 1944, FO 921/192, British National Archives.

Notes to the Introduction 183

21. Sandars 2000, 5. 22. See Elliott V. Converse III, Circling the Earth: United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Base System, 1942–1948 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2005). 23. Blaker 1990, 28. 24. Telegram from Jedda to Foreign Office, no. 590, Meeting of Ibn Saud with CIGS, December 18, 1945, E 9947/209/25, FO 371/45543, British National Archives; Secretary of State (Byrnes) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), November 19, 1945, Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers (FRUS) 1945, vol. 8, ed. E. Ralph Perkins (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969), 968. 25. Paper Prepared by the National Security Staff, “Persian Gulf: Analytical Summary of IG Response to NSSM 66,” June 4, 1970, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970, Box H–111, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, Richard M. Nixon Library (RMNL); Report to the Verification Panel, “Arms Limitation in the Indian Ocean: Issues and Alternatives,” n.d., Staff Material: Middle East, NLC-25-78-1-2-6, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (JCL); Lutz 2009, 27. 26. Harkavy 2007, 3. 27. When measured by cargo tonnage, at least 80 percent of the world’s traded goods are carried by sea. UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, 2006 (Geneva: UN Conference on Trade and Development, 2006). See also Noel Mostert, Supership (New York: Knopf, 1974). 28. U.S. Energy Information Administration, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, August 22, 2012, available at www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p3. 29. Calder 2007, 1. 30. U.S. Department of Defense, Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2013 Baseline, available at www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/Base%20Structure%20Report%202013_Baseline%2030%20Sept%202012%20Submission.pdf. See also Louis Jacobson, “Ron Paul Says U.S. Has Military Personnel in 130 Nations and 900 Overseas Bases,” Tampa Bay Times Politifact.com, September 14, 2011, available at www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/sep/14/ron-paul/ron-paul-says-us-has-military-personnel-130-nation/. 31. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, March 10, 1958, FRUS 1958–60, vol. 12, 716. 32. Helga Haftendorn, “The Security Puzzle: Theory-building and Discipline-building in International Security,” International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 1 (1991): 5. 33. Anthony H. Cordesman and N. Obaid, National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses and Challenges (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005). 34. Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon, “Rethinking Third World National Security,” in National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal vs. External Threats (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 1988), 11–12.

184 Notes to the Introduction

35. F. Gregory Gause III, “Official Wahhabism and the Sanctioning of Saudi-US Relations,” in Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and the State, ed. Mohammed Ayoob and Hasan Kosebalaban (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 380–81. 36. Gause 1994, 140–41. 37. Eugene Rogan, The Arabs: A History (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 443–44; Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Pocket Star Books, 1991), 238–57. 38. W. Andrew Terrill, Regional Fears of Western Primacy and the Future of U.S. Middle Eastern Basing Policy (Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2006). 39. As Robert E. Harkavy (2007, 2) writes: “The subject of the (historically) global (or sub-global) basing networks of the rival, contending great powers and global hegemons is one which has been the subject of surprisingly little scrutiny by academic theorists.” 40. Harkavy 1989; Harkavy 2007. 41. See, for instance, Desmond Ball, A Base for Debate: The U.S. Satellite Station at Nurrungar (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987); Fred Greene, ed., The Philippine Bases: Negotiating for the Future (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988); Jacqueline K. Davis, Forward Presence and U.S. Security Policy: Implications for Force Posture, Service Roles and Joint Planning, National Security Paper no. 16 (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1995); Thanos Veremis and Yannis Valinakis, eds., U.S. bases in the Mediterranean: The Cases of Greece and Spain (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy, 1989); Katherine T. McCaffrey, Military Power and Popular Protest: The U.S. Navy in Vieques, Puerto Rico (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002); Joseph Gerson and Bruce Birchard, eds., The Sun Never Sets . . . : Confronting the Network of Foreign U.S. Military Bases (Boston: South End Press, 1991); Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley Press, 1989); Blaker 1990. 42. See, for example, John W. McDonald, Jr., and Diane B. Bendahmane, U.S. Bases Overseas: Negotiations with Spain, Greece, and the Philippines (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); Geraldo M. C. Valero et al., A Comparative Analysis of United States Military Base Agreements (Manila: International Studies Institute of the Philippines, 1987). 43. See, for instance, J. H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (New York: Knopf, 1967); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (New York: Scribner’s, 1976); A. N. Porter, ed., Atlas of British Overseas Expansion (London: Routledge, 1991); C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire: 1415–1825 (New York: Knopf, 1969); Peter Padfield, Tide of Empires, vols. 1, 2, 3 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, 1982). 44. See David S. Sorenson, Military Base Closure: A Reference Handbook (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007); David S. Sorenson, Shutting Down the Cold War: The Politics of Military Base Closure (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Lilly J. Goren and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, The Comparative Politics of Military Base Closures: How Congress Balances Geographic and General Interests (Orono: University of Maine

Notes to the Introduction 185

Canadian-American Center, 2000); Lilly J. Goren, “BRAC to the Future: Evasive Delegation and Blame Avoidance in Base Closings,” Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College, 1998. 45. Goren and Lackenbauer 2000, 3–4; Calder 2007, 73. 46. See, for example, Andrew Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-US Base Protests (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Stacie L. Pettyjohn, U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783–2011 (Washington, DC: RAND, 2012); Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, “‘The Empire Will Compensate You’: The Structural Dynamics of the U.S. Overseas Basing Network,” Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 4 (December 2013): 1034–50; Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt, Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Lutz 2009. 47. See Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Alexander Cooley, “Base Politics,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2005), available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61202/alexander-cooley/base-politics; Robert J. Hanks, The U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1982); Robert E. Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1982); Blaker 1990; Sandars 2000; Gerson and Birchard 1991; Carnes Lord, ed., Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century (New Port, RI: Naval War College Press, 2006); Pettyjohn 2012. 48. Cooley 2008, 18, 255–56; Calder 2007, 44–45. 49. See Terrill 2006; Joseph Nye, “Conflicts after the Cold War,” Washington Quarterly (Winter 1996): 5–23; Cynthia Enloe, “Foreword,” in Lutz 2009, x. 50. See, for example, Cooley 2008. 51. See also Joshua Teitelbaum, ed., Political Liberalization in the Persian Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 52. Harkavy 1989, 324, 356. 53. Anthony Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE: Challenges of Security (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), ch. 3. 54. See, for example, Chalmers Johnson, Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2007), 169; Lutz 2009, 33. 55. Cooley 2008, 257, 266. 56. Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-first Century: The Military and International Security Concerns (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 107–8. 57. Michael A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833–1992 (New York: Free Press, 1992b), 108–9. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Failed Mission: The Inside Account of the Attempt to Free the Hostages in Iran,” New York Times Magazine, April 18, 1982, 28–30; Richard H. Kyle, The Guts to Try: The Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-scene Desert Commander (New York: Orion, 1990).

186 Notes to Chapter 1

Chapter 1

1. Defence of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, April 28, 1942, E2622/330/25; Saudi Arabia: Defence of Oil Fields, July 5, 1942, E 4001/990/25, FO 371/31453, British National Archives. 2. Memorandum by the Federal Loan Administrator (Jesse Jones) to the Secretary of State, August 6, 1941, FRUS 1941, vol. 3, 643. 3. Quotation of FDR in Memorandum by the Federal Loan Administrator (Jesse Jones) to the Secretary of State, August 6, 1941, FRUS 1941, vol. 3, 643. 4. “The Advance Bases,” Building the Navy’s Bases in World War II: History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps 1940–1946, vol. 2, part 3, Naval History and Heritage Command (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947). 5. Pearl Harbor Navy Medical Activities, Administrative History Section, Administrative Division, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, The United States Medical Department of War, 1941–1945, vol. 1, parts 1–2 (Washington, DC: The Bureau, 1946), 1–31; Steven M. Gillon, Pearl Harbor: FDR Leads the Nation into War (New York: Basic Books, 2011), 50. 6. H. Freeman Matthews, Top Secret Letter from Acting Chairman of the State-WarNavy Coordinating Committee to the U.S. Secretary of State, Subject: Acquisition and Construction of a United States Military Airfield at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, April 25, 1945; Acting Secretary of State, Top Secret Letter from U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary of State to the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, Concerning War Department Requests to Establish an Air Route from Cairo through Saudi Arabia to India, and the Need to Construct an Airfield in Dhahran to Support Such a Route, April 25, 1945, in U.S. Records on Saudi Affairs 1945–1959, ed. K. E. Evans, vol. 2 (London: Archive Editions and University Publications of America, 1997), 87–88. 7. Dispatch to Secretary of State from Cairo, September 29, 1944, U.S. Policy in Saudi Arabia, no. 25(12), 1944, FO 921/192, British National Archives; Dispatch to HQRAFME from A. M. Whitehall, October 18, 1944, U.S. Policy in Saudi Arabia, no. 25(12), 1944, FO 921/192, British National Archives; Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York: Free Press, 2009), 375. 8. “Notes on the History and Doctrines of the Wahhabis of Central Arabia,” n.d., Saudi Arabia: General Articles nos. 1–9, 1923–26; “The Triumph of the Wahhabis,” July 8, 1926, address given at a meeting of the Central Asia Society at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, UK; Saudi Arabia: General Articles nos. 10–17, 1926–29, 1/4/9/3, Philby Collection, GB165-0229, Middle East Centre Archives (MECA), St. Antony’s College, Oxford University; Harry St. John Bridger Philby, Sa’udia Arabia (London: Ernest Benn, 1955), chs. 9–10. 9. Memorandum on Anglo-American Relations in Saud Arabia, E9331, November 30, 1945, E 8665/209/25, FO 371/45543, British National Archives. 10. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), January 1, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 670.

notes to chapter 1 187

11. Dispatch to Secretary of State from Cairo, September 29, 1944, U.S. Policy in Saudi Arabia, no. 25(12), 1944; Oral History Interview with Loy W. Henderson, June 14, 1973, and July 5, 1973, Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL); Minister of Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State, January 13, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 672. 12. Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 256; Kent Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 47. 13. R. Harkavy, Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 324. 14. “The Black Gold of the Middle East,” article from a Russian émigré newspaper in Paris, Russian News 5, no. 198, January 14, 1949, 5/3/13/7, Newspapers and Correspondence, 1948–56, Philby Collection, GB165-0229, MECA, Oxford. 15. “Official Crude Oil Output of the World,” compiled by the Oil Forum from the data supplied by governments, August 1947, 5/3/13/7, Newspapers and Correspondence, 1948–56, Philby Collection, GB165-0229, MECA, Oxford. 16. “Middle East Oil,” July 23, 1944, 1/4/9/3/27, Saudi Arabia: General Articles. nos. 26–37, 1942–47, Philby Collection, GB165-0229, MECA, Oxford. 17. Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 319–20. 18. Oral History Interview with Loy W. Henderson, June 14, 1973 and July 5, 1973; Michael B. Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil, 1941–1947 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 101–3. 19. Yergin 2009, 178. 20. David S. Painter, Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Oil Policy, 1941–1954 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 7–14; David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989), 460–62, 499–506. 21. “Middle East Oil,” July 23, 1944. 22. Ibid.; Harry St. John Bridger Philby, Arabian Jubilee (London: Robert Hale, 1952), 175–79. 23. Mohammad Almana, Arabia Unified: A Portrait of Ibn Saud (London: Hutchinson Benham, 1980), 90–92. 24. H. St. John Philby, “Economics in Araby,” March 8, 1933, 5/2/11/7, Observations on Arabian & Middle East Economy, 1929–47, Philby Collection, GB165-0229, MECA, Oxford. 25. “Middle East Oil,” July 23, 1944. 26. Philby 1952, 175–79; “Middle East Oil,” July 23, 1944. See also Harry St. John Bridger Philby, Arabian Days: An Autobiography (London: Robert Hale, 1948).

188  notes to chapter 1

27. Philby 1933, 269–71; Yergin 2009, 269–71. 28. Clive Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia, 1925–1939: The Imperial Oasis (London: Frank Cass, 1983), 114–20. 29. Almana 1980, 191–99. 30. Saudi Arabia: Defence of Oil Fields, July 5, 1942, E 4001/990/25, FO 371/31453, British National Archives. 31. Robert Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 64–67; Anthony Cave Brown, Oil, God, and Gold: The Story of Aramco and the Saudi Kings (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1999), chs. 4–5. 32. For additional information, see Hearings before a Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, part 41, Petroleum Relationship with Saudi Arabia, U.S. Senate, 80th Congress, Session 1, on S. Res. 46 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1948). See also Mr. James A. Moffett to President Roosevelt, April 16, 1941, FRUS 1941, vol. 3, 624. 33. U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Saudi Relations,” Decimal File, Department of State National Archives, 711.90F/4-1147, as quoted in James L. Gormly, “Keeping the Door Open in Saudi Arabia: The United States and the Dhahran Airfield, 1945–1946,” Diplomatic History 4, no. 2 (April 1980): 189–205. 34. Arthur Japy Hepburn, Report on need of additional naval bases to defend the coasts of the United States, its territories and possessions: Letter from the Secretary of the Navy transmitting report of the Board appointed to report upon the need, for the purposes of national defense, of additional submarine, destroyer, mine, and naval air bases on the coasts of the United States, its territories and possessions (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939); “Hepburn,” Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Department of the Navy—Naval Historical Center, available at www.history.navy.mil/ danfs/h5/hepburn.htm. 35. “The Advance Bases.” 36. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State, April 21, 1941, FRUS 1941, vol. 3, 627; Jeffrey R. Macris, The Politics and Security of the Gulf: Anglo-American Hegemony and the Shaping of a Region (New York: Routledge, 2010), ch. 2. 37. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State, April 21, 1941, FRUS 1941, vol. 3, 627. 38. Memorandum by the Secretary of the Navy (Knox) for President Roosevelt, May 20, 1941, FRUS 1941, vol. 3, 635. 39. Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. John D. Jernegan of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, August 7, 1941, FRUS 1941, vol. 3, 644–45. 40. Macris 2010, ch. 2. 41. Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy—Report together with

notes to chapter 1 189

individual views, to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, by the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2, 1975). 42. Yergin 2009, 376–80. 43. “The Americans Outstrip the British,” article from a Russian émigré newspaper in Paris, Russian News 5 no. 198, January 14, 1949, 5/3/13/7, Newspapers and Correspondence, 1948–56, Philby Collection, GB165-0229, MECA, Oxford. 44. Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State, December 11, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 755–56. 45. Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy—Report together with individual views, to the Committee on Foreign Relations. 46. Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia, March 17, 1945, E 1996/209/25, FO 371/45543, British National Archives. 47. Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 105–6. 48. Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 2nd ed.), 37. 49. “Notes on the History and Doctrines of the Wahhabis of Central Arabia,” n.d.; David S. Sorenson, An Introduction to the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008), 54. 50. “The Triumph of the Wahhabis.” 51. John S. Habib, “Wahhabi Origins of the Contemporary Saudi State,” in Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and the State, ed. Mohammad Ayoob and Hasan Kosebalaban (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 64–65. 52. “The Stew Arabia,” n.d., Saudi Arabia: General Articles nos. 1–9, 1923–26, 1/4/9/3, Philby Collection, GB165-0229, MECA, Oxford. 53. H. St. J. B. Philby, “King of the Hejaz and Nejd Ibn Saud,” April 1928, 1/4/9/1/4, Saudi Arabia Articles: Ibn Saud, 1926–45, 1/4/9/1, Philby Papers, GB165-0229, MECA; “The Stew Arabia.” 54. “The Triumph of the Wahhabis”; “The Stew Arabia.” 55. William Ochsenwald, “The Annexation of the Hijaz,” 76, in Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and the State, ed. Mohammad Ayoob and Hasan Kosebalaban (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009); Habib 2009, 63; Al-Rasheed 2010, 43–44. 56. Briefing Book for King Saud’s 1/30/57 visit, reference paper, “Inter-Arab Rivalries,” U.S. Department of State, January 1, 1957. Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Farmington Hills, MI: Gale, 2011. 57. J. Rives Childs, Foreign Service Farewell: My Years in the Near East (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1969), 143–44; Philby 1928; Briefing Book for King Saud’s 1/30/57 visit. 58. Habib 2009, 64–65.

190  notes to chapter 1

59. Leslie McLoughlin, Ibn Saud: Founder of a Kingdom (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 103–9. 60. Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent (New York: Palgrave, 1999), 46. 61. Joseph A. Kechichian, “The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 18, no. 1 (1986): 59–60. 62. Christine Moss Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Political Identity (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 70, 79–82. 63. Fandy 1999, 46–48. For more background on Saudi Arabia’s negotiation with the British, see H. St. J. B. Philby, “Arabian News,” November 30, 1929, 1/4/9/2/21, Saudi Arabia: Current Affairs Articles, 1926–34, 1/4/9/2, Philby Papers, GB165-0229, MECA, Oxford. 64. Toby Craig Jones, Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 32. 65. Ochsenwald 2009, 80. 66. Philby, “Arabian News,” December 4, 1930. 67. “Notes on the History and Doctrines of the Wahhabis of Central Arabia,” n.d.; Visit of His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal to Washington, July 31–August 1, 1945, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), July 31, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 1002–3. 68. “Notes on the History and Doctrines of the Wahhabis of Central Arabia,” n.d.; Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 17. 69. Visit of His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal to Washington, July 31–August 1, 1945, 1003. 70. Dispatch to Secretary of State from Cairo, September 29, 1944, U.S. Policy in Saudi Arabia, no. 25(12), 1944. 71. The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister of Egypt (Kirk), April 15, 1942, FRUS 1942, vol. 4, 568. 72. Letter from Saudi King Abdul Aziz Al-Saud to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 13, 1942, Saudi Arabia, President’s Official File 3500, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library (FDRL). 73. The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister of Egypt (Kirk), April 15, 1942, FRUS 1942, vol. 4, 568. 74. Ibn Saud’s Concessions to Americans in the Hejaz; attitude of Amir Abdullah, June 12, 1944, E3459/128/25, FO 371/40265; Copy of Translation from Amir Abdullah of Transjordan on Ibn Saud’s Concessions to Americans in the Hejaz, April 5, 1944, E3459/128/25, FO 371/40265, British National Archives. 75. The Minister of Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State, May 19, 1942, FRUS 1942, vol. 4, 570.

notes to chapter 1 191

76. The Minister of Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State, July 31, 1942, FRUS 1942, vol. 4, 574. 77. Sarah Yizraeli, The Remaking of Saudi Arabia: The Struggle between King Sa’ud and Crown Prince Faisal, 1953–1962 (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1997), 150–51. 78. William E. Mulligan, “Air Raid! A Sequel,” Saudi Aramco World 27, no. 4 (July/ August 1976); “Sa’udi Arabia: 2. The Political Scene,” 1946, 1/4/9/3/32, Philby Collection, GB165-0229, MECA, Oxford; Saudi Arabian Oil Fields: Defence Measures, September 9, 1942, E 5322/990/25, FO 371/31453, British National Archives. 79. “Sa’udi Arabia: 2. The Political Scene”; Memorandum of Conversation by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling), April 16, 1942, FRUS 1942, vol. 4, 576. 80. The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State, July 13, 1942, FRUS 1942, vol. 4, 578. 81. The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State, September 14, 1942, FRUS 1942, vol. 4, 585. 82. Philby 1952, 19–22. 83. The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State, March 4, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 659–60. 84. The American Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (James S. Moose) to the Saudi Arabian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Yusuf Yassin), July 29, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 660–61. 85. The Vice Consul at Dhahran (Hart) to the Secretary of State, October 12, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 665–66; Informal Statement Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, November 9, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 667–68. 86. Stoff 1980, 101–3. 87. For a good discussion on the origins of U.S. geological and water surveys in Saudi Arabia, see Jones 2010, chs. 2–3. 88. Sir William Fraser, Chairman, Anglo-Iranian Company, “Middle Eastern Oil: New Focus of International Petroleum Industry,” The Times, April 14, 1947, 5/3/13/7, Newspapers and Correspondence, 1948–56, Philby Collection, GB165-0229, MECA, Oxford; “The Black Gold of the Middle East.” 89. Everette DeGolyer, “Preliminary Report of the Technical Oil Mission to the Middle East,” Bulletin of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists 28, no. 7 (July 1944): 919–23. See also Fraser, in the following article he authored based upon a speech he gave to the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers, “Middle Eastern Oil.” 90. Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy—Report together with individual views, to the Committee on Foreign Relations. 91. Harold L. Ickes, “We’re Running Out of Oil,” American Magazine, January 1944, 26–27, 84–85. See also Harold L. Ickes, Fightin’ Oil (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943).

192  notes to chapter 1

92. Herbert Feis, Seen from the E.A.: Three International Episodes (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1947), 102–6. 93. Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), ch. 2; Oral History Interview with Paul H. Nitze by Richard D. McKinzie, August 5 and August 6, 1975, President Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL). 94. Oral History Interview with Edwin M. Wright, July 26, 1974, HSTL. 95. Oral History Interview with Paul H. Nitze by Richard D. McKinzie, August 5 and August 6, 1975, HSTL. 96. William A. Eddy, Telegram Mfd-412 from U.S. Minister in Jeddah to Secretary of State in Washington, Top Secret, Concerning Possible Saudi Requests to Americans and British on Improvements at Jeddah and Dhahran Airfields, April 17, 1945, in U.S. Records on Saudi Affairs 1945–1959, vol. 1, 88. 97. See Harkavy 1989; Cooley 2008. 98. Jones 2010, 28–30. 99. U.S. Policy in Saudi Arabia, no. 25(12), 1944, FO 921/192, British National Archives. 100. The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose), March 23, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 677, 682. 101. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), May 1, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 697. 102. “Sa’udi Arabia,” May/June 1946, 1/4/9/3/29, and “Sa’udi Arabia Today,” November 18, 1947, 1/4/9/3/37, Philby Collection, GB165-0229, MECA, Oxford; The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State, February 24, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 675. 103. Foreign Office Dispatch September 11, 1944, U.S. Policy in Saudi Arabia, no. 25(12), 1944, FO 921/192, British National Archives; Note by Sir William Croft, September 13, 1944, U.S. Policy in Saudi Arabia, no. 25(12), 1944, FO 921/192; S. R. Jordan’s Despatch no. 88 on Anglo-American Collaboration in Saudi Arabia, September 6, 1944, U.S. Policy in Saudi Arabia, no. 25(12), 1944, FO 921/192, British National Archives. 104. “Middle East Oil,” July 23, 1944. 105. The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson), October 5, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 745. 106. The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (James S. Moose) to the Secretary of State, March 29, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 678–79. 107. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, April 3, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 679–80; Eddy, Telegram Mfd-412 from U.S. Minister in Jeddah to Secretary of State in Washington, vol. 1, 88. 108. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, April 3, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 679–80. 109. Translation of G. Osipov, “The Rivals,” Moscow Literary Gazette, no. 70, Sep-

notes to chapter 1 193

tember 1, 1948, 16/5, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1932–58, Box XVI Files, Philby Collection, GB165-0229, MECA, Oxford; The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose), April 18, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 687–88. 110. The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose), ibid. 111. The Minister Resident (Moose) to the Secretary of State, May 3, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 697–98. 112. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), August 1, 1945, FRUS, vol. 8, 1006; Visit of His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal to Washington, July 31–August 1, 1945, ibid., July 31, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 1003–4. 113. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), August 1, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 1006. 114. For further evidence, see King Abdul Ibn Saud, President’s Secretary’s Files: Diplomatic Correspondence, Box 50, Saudi Arabia and President’s Personal File 7960, FDRL. 115. The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State, September 7, 1944, FRUS 1945, vol. 5, 735–36. 116. The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson), October 5, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 745. 117. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, December 22, 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 5, 758. 118. Reception of Ibn Saud in Egypt, February 21, 1945, E 1573/209/25, FO 371/45542; Aaron David Miller, Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939–1949 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 129–31. 119. William A. Eddy, Eddy’s Account of Ibn Saud-Roosevelt Meeting on February 14, 1945, in U.S. Records on Saudi Affairs 1945–1959, vol. 2, 255; Miller 1980, 129–31. 120. William A. Eddy, F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud (New York: American Friends of the Middle East, 1954), 29–37; Memorandum of Conversation, February 15, 1945, Naval Aide’s Files, Box 165, Crimean Conference, Map Room Papers, FDRL. 121. Eddy 1954, 29–37; Memorandum of Conversation, February 15, 1945, FDRL. 122. Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, Subject: President’s Call on King Saud of Saudi Arabia at Palm Beach, January 24, 1962, NSF, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 11/20/61– 1/31/62, John F. Kennedy Library (JFKL); Eddy 1954, 29–37. 123. Thomas W. Lippman, “The Day FDR Met Saudi Arabia’s Ibn Saud,” The Link 38, no. 2 (April–May 2005); “Sa’udi Arabia,” May/June 1946, 1/4/9/3/29, Philby Collection, GB165-0229, MECA, Oxford. 124. Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to King Ibn Saud, April, 5, 1945, President’s Secretary’s Files: Diplomatic Correspondence, Box 5, Saudi Arabia, FDRL. 125. The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State, March 3, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 8.

194  notes to chapter 1

126. Barry Rubin, “Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia, 1941–1945,” Journal of Contemporary History 14, no. 2 (April 1979): 264. 127. “Sa’udi Arabia,” May/June 1946, 1/4/9/3/29, Philby Collection. 128. The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State, March 3, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 8. 129. Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office, no. 4855, September 7, 1944, E 5522/128/25, FO 371/40266, British National Archives; Dispatch to Foreign Office from Minister Resident in Cairo, no. 107, May 7, 1944, U.S. Policy in Saudi Arabia, no. 25(12), 1944, FO 921/192, British National Archives. 130. Report by the Coordinating Committee of the Department of State on U.S. Political and Economic Policies, May 2, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 35. 131. Draft Memorandum to President Truman Prepared by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) and submitted to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) early in August 1945, n.d., FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 45–46. 132. Rubin 1979, 262–63. See also Report by the Ad Hoc Committee of the StateWar-Navy Coordinating Committee, February 22, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 852. 133. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson), March 8, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 861. 134. The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State, March 24, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 868. 135. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn), April 7, 1945, FRUS, vol. 8, 869–70. 136. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia, April 17, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 874–75. 137. Joint Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India and the Secretary of State for Air, War Cabinet, Subject: Arabia—Proposed Acquisition of Masirah Island as a Permanent R.A.F. Base, December, 1944, AIR 2-7075, British National Archives; Jordan’s Despatch no. 88 on Anglo-American Collaboration in Saudi Arabia, September 6, 1944. 138. King Abdul ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia to President Truman, June 1, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 927. 139. The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State, May 4, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 888. 140. Ibid., 889. 141. Letter from William A. Eddy to Shaikh Yusuf Yassin, August 5, 1945, Folder 23, “Dhahran Airfield,” Date Span: 08/06/1945–06/07/1961, Box 7, William E. Mulligan Papers, Georgetown University Special Collections; The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to Secretary of State, August 8, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 944. 142. Letter from William A. Eddy to Shaikh Yusuf Yassin, August 5, 1945.

notes to chapters 1 and 2 195

143. The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State, May 13, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 894. 144. Ibid. 145. The Vice Consul at Dhahran (Sands) to the Secretary of State, July 4, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 920. 146. Copy of translation from Memorandum by His Majesty King Abdul Aziz al Saud, dated November 23, 1947, E 11752/10169/25, Saudi Arabia, 1947, FO 371/62112, British National Archives; Telegram from Mr. Trott, Jedda to Foreign Office, no. 386, November 27, 1947, E 11255/10169/25, Saudi Arabia, 1947, FO 371/62112, British National Archives. 147. The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to Secretary of State, July 15, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 929. 148. The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State, July 8, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 925. 149. Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State (Dean Acheson) to President Truman, September 22, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 957. 150. Memorandum by President Truman to the Acting Secretary of State, September 28, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 958. 151. Telegram from Jedda to Foreign Office, no. 590, Meeting of Ibn Saud with CIGS, December 18, 1945, E 9947/209/25, FO 371/45543, British National Archives; the Secretary of State (Byrnes) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), November 19, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 968. 152. Letter from William A. Eddy to Shaikh Yusuf Yassin, August 5, 1945. 153. Visit of His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal to Washington, July 31–August 1, 1945, vol. 8, 1000–1002. 154. “Notes on the History and Doctrines of the Wahhabis of Central Arabia,” n.d.; Visit of His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal to Washington, July 31–August 1, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 1002. 155. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy), August 8, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 1008. 156. See also “Agreement,” December 18, 1945, Folder 23, “Dhahran Airfield,” Date Span: 08/06/1945–06/07/1961, Box 7, Mulligan Papers; Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State (Dean Acheson) to President Truman, September 22, 1945, FRUS 1945, vol. 8, 957. Chapter 2

1. Radio Report to the American People on the Potsdam Conference, August 9, 1945, Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1945–53, HSTL. 2. George Marion, “U.S. Military Bases and Empire,” Monthly Review 53, no. 10 (March 2002): 1–14.

196  notes to chapter 2

3. Telegram from A. C. Trott, Jedda Embassy to the British Foreign Office, January 13, 1951, ES 1224/1, Dhahran Airbase, FO 371/91776, British National Archives. 4. Record of conversation with U.S. Minister at Jedda on the lease of the Dhahran Airbase, Enclosure in Jedda Letter no. 195/5/49G, February 7, 1949, E 2210/1221/25, FO 371/75525, British National Archives. 5. Oral History Interview with Paul H. Nitze by Richard D. McKinzie, August 5 and August 6, 1975, HSTL. 6. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956–1961 (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965), 116–18; Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York: Free Press, 2009), 514–17; Memorandum on Saudi Arabia by I. A. C. Fry, June 4, 1955, ES 1192/3, FO 371/114892, British National Archives; “Russian Offer to Saudi Arabia: Aid on Buraimi Issue,” November 16, 1955, ES 1192/15(A), FO 371/114892, British National Archives. 7. For an overview on the origins of Arab Nationalism, see Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson et al., eds., The Origins of Arab Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). 8. Joseph A. Kechichian, Succession in Saudi Arabia (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 97– 101. 9. For historical overview, see Memorandum from King Saud to H. E. President Eisenhower on his views concerning Saudi Arabian Relations with the U.S.A. and Affairs of the Middle East, January 18, 1957, Visit of King Saud January 30, 1957–February 9, 1957, Box 5, Subject Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, 1951–59, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL), DDRS. 10. Memorandum Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Basis for the Formulation of a U.S. Military Policy, March 27, 1946, FRUS 1946, vol. 1, 1163. 11. Ibid., 1164. 12. Memorandum, United States Strategic Requirements in the Arabian Peninsula, n.d. 1948, G28/43/48, FO 115/4358, British National Archives. 13. British Embassy Jedda Despatch no. 189–227/89/49G, October 18, 1949, E 8453/1221/25, FO 371/75525, British National Archives; Text of Proposed Remarks by American Ambassador at Dhahran Airfield, March 31, 1949, Enclosure in Jedda dispatch no. 69 (382/8/49G) of April 12, 1949, E 5076/1221/25, FO 371/75525, British National Archives. 14. “Oil Negotiations,” 5/3/13/7, Newspapers and Correspondence, 1948–56, Philby Collection, GB165-0229, MECA, Oxford; Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office, no. 3635, July 5, 1944, E 3839/128/25, FO 371/40266; Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office, no. 4855, September 7, 1944, E 5522/128/25, FO 371/40266, British National Archives; John A. DeNovo, “The Culbertson Economic Mission and Anglo-American Tension in the Middle East, 1944–1945,” Journal of American History 63, no. 4 (March 1977): 913–36; James L. Gormly, “Keeping the Door Open in Saudi Arabia: The United States

notes to chapter 2 197

and the Dhahran Airfield, 1945–1946,” Diplomatic History 4, no. 2 (April 1980): 190; Barry Rubin, “Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia, 1941–1945,” Journal of Contemporary History 14, no. 2 (April 1979): 253–67; Philip J. Baram, The Department of State in the Middle East, 1919–1945 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), 223–39. 15. Sir William Croft, Minister, September 27, 1944, U.S. Policy in Saudi Arabia, no. 25(12), 1944, FO 921/192, British National Archives; Saul Kelly, “A Succession of Crises? SOE in the Middle East, 1940–1945,” in The Politics and Strategy of Clandestine War: Special Operations Executive, 1940–1946, ed. Neville Wylie (New York: Routledge, 2007), 145. 16. Report by the Subcommittee on Rearmament to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Policy Concerning Provision of United States Government Military Supplies for Post-War Armed Forces of Foreign Nations, March 21, 1946, FRUS 1946, vol. 1, 1159. 17. David E. Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 106–7. 18. J. H. Carmical, “Oil from Middle East Hits a New High Mark,” New York Times, March 23, 1952, E4. 19. Milton Bracker, “Oil Battle Roils the Middle East,” New York Times, January 27, 1956, 4. 20. Note by Croft, Minister, September 27, 1944, U.S. Policy in Saudi Arabia, no. 25(12), 1944; Telegram from Jedda to Foreign Office, no. 590, Meeting of Ibn Saud with CIGS, December 18, 1945, E 9947/209/25, FO 371/45543, British National Archives. 21. Telegram from Jedda to Foreign Office, no. 57, February 2, 1945, E 769/209/25, FO 371/45542, British National Archives. 22. The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister of Egypt (Tuck), January 19, 1946, FRUS 1946, vol. 7, 738–39. 23. H. St. J. B. Philby, “The New Reign in Sa’udia Arabia,” January 21, 1954, DS 244. J4, Saudi Arabia: General Articles, nos. 38–50 c 1950–59, 1/4/9/3, Philby Collection, GB 165-0229, MECA, Oxford. 24. Briefing Memorandum, January 30, 1957, Briefing Book—King Saud Visit (1)(4), State, Department of (January–February 1957), Confidential File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Records as President (White House Central File), 1953–61, DDEL, DDRS; Eisenhower 1965, 114–20; Eugene Rogan, The Arabs: A History (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 8–10, 331–32. 25. Report by the Subcommittee on Rearmament to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, FRUS 1946, vol. 1, 1159. 26. President Harry S. Truman’s inaugural address, January 20, 1949, HSTL. 27. The American Ambassador (Childs) to the King of Saudi Arabia (Ibn Saud), n.d., FRUS 1949, vol. 6, 1587. 28. Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal), August 10, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 5, part 1, 244–45.

198  notes to chapter 2

29. The Secretary of Defense (James Forrestal) to the Secretary of State, November 8, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 5, part 1, 252. 30. William S. White, “U.S. Seeks Surety of Arab Oil Supply,” New York Times, January 30, 1948, 1–2. For U.S. dependence on Gulf oil, see also Oral History Interview with Loy W. Henderson, June 14, 1973 and July 5, 1973, HSTL. 31. Memorandum of the Exchange of Views, U.S. Department of State, CA-6659, February 7, 1957, ES 10345/18, FO 371/127155, British National Archives; The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister (Faisal), March 26, 1953, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2441. 32. Arthur N. Young, Saudi Arabia: The Making of a Financial Giant (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 20. 33. For a great discussion on Saudi Arabia as a rentier state, see Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010). 34. Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent (New York: Palgrave, 1999), 25–31. 35. Tim Niblock, Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy, and Survival (New York: Routledge, 2006), 21–23. 36. The Minister of Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State, February 9, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 5, part 1, 221; Long 1985, 106–7. 37. The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister (Faisal), March 26, 1953. FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2441. 38. Incident at Dhahran, June 19, 1956, ES 1015/22, FO 371/120754, British National Archives; Kechichian 2001, 97–101. 39. William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000, 2nd ed.), 295–300. 40. Malik Mufti, “The United States and Nasserist Pan-Arabism,” in The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment, ed. David W. Lesch (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007, 4th ed.), 141–43. 41. “Saud’s Bid Arabs Destroy Israel,” New York Times, January 10, 1954, 2. 42. Kennett Love, “Two Arab Nations Will Pool Defense,” New York Times, June 12, 1954, 1. 43. See Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2003); Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), ch. 6. 44. Translation of the text of a Royal Decree no. 12/2/23/2639, ES 1015/17; British Embassy Washington, DC Despatch no. 10261/5/56, June 28, 1956, ES 1015/15, FO 371/120754, British National Archives; Michel G. Nehme, “Saudi Arabia 1950–1980: Between Nationalism and Religion,” Middle Eastern Studies 30, no. 4 (1994): 930–43; Toby Craig Jones, Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 92–93.

notes to chapter 2 199

45. Briefing Memorandum, January 30, 1957, Briefing Book—King Saud Visit (1)(4), DDEL; Telegram from Foreign Office to Washington no. 5599, November 25, 1955, PREM 11/1448, British National Archives. 46. Briefing Memorandum, January 30, 1957, Briefing Book—King Saud Visit (1)(4), DDEL; the Internal Security of the United States, NSC 17/2, Transmittal Note, Sydney W. Souers, Executive Secretary, to the National Security Council, July 21, 1949, Talking points for 10/23–10/25/57 U.S. visit of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan: U.S.-U.K. differences with respect to Persian Gulf; Eisenhower dictates from memory the gist of a private conversation with the King of Saudi Arabia 1/30/57, topics include: Saudi Arabia’s relations with the British; economy; 2 islands in the Persian Gulf; ArabIsraeli relations; Issue Date: January 31, 1957, Date Declassified: August 17, 1983, DDRS. 47. Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 218–19, 255–56; Kent Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 45–46. 48. Briefing Book for King Saud’s 1/30/57 visit, “Arab Military Alliances,” Department of State, January 1, 1957, DDRS. 49. The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State, February 21, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 5, part 1, 223. 50. Telegram from A. C. Trott, Jedda to Mr. Bevin, “Arab Differences: British Policy,” no. 171, December 12, 1947, E 11752/10169/25, Saudi Arabia, 1947, FO 371/62112, British National Archives. 51. Copy of translation from Memorandum by His Majesty King Abdul Aziz al Saud, dated November 23, 1947, E 11752/10169/25, Saudi Arabia, 1947, FO 371/62112, British National Archives. 52. Greater Syria refers to the unification of the Hashemite kingdoms, as well as Palestine and possibly Lebanon. Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 62–63; The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to Secretary of State, January 20, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 5, part 1, 62–63, 212. 53. Clifton Daniels, “Arab Countries Beset by Internal Problems,” New York Times, April 3, 1949, E4; The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State, February 3, 1949, FRUS 1949, vol. 6, fn. 1578. 54. Telegram from Mr. Trott, Jedda to Foreign Office, no. 386, November 27, 1947, E 11255/10169/25, Saudi Arabia, 1947, FO 371/62112, British National Archives. 55. Editorial Note, FRUS 1948, vol. 5, part 1, 216. 56. The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State, November 17, 1949, FRUS 1949, vol. 6, 1621. 57. The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State, February 21, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 5, part 1, 223. 58. Briefing Book for King Saud’s 1/30/57 visit, “Arab Military Alliances.” 59. Telegram from Foreign Office to Washington no. 5599 and Original on Middle

200  notes to chapter 2

East (Policy) Turco-Iraqi Pact, PM/55/172, November 25, 1955, PREM 11/1448, British National Archives; Memorandum from King Saud to H. E. President Eisenhower on his views concerning Saudi Arabian Relations with the U.S.A. and Affairs of the Middle East, January 18, 1957, DDEL; Briefing Book for King Saud’s 1/30/57 visit, Reference Paper, “Inter-Arab Rivalries,” U.S. Department of State, January 1, 1957, DDRS; “Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Iraq and Turkey (the Baghdad Pact), Baghdad, February 24, 1955,” in The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1950–1959, ed. Behcet Kemal Yesilbursa (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 225; Special National Intelligence Number 30-7-56, Probable Consequences of U.S. Adherence or Nonadherence to the Baghdad Pact, December 14, 1956, Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Council Special Collection. 60. Briefing Book for King Saud’s 1/30/57 visit, Reference Paper, “Inter-Arab Rivalries,” U.S. Department of State, January 1, 1957, DDRS; “Egypt, Saudi Arabia Sign Defense Pact,” New York Times, October 28, 1955, 11; Robert C. Doty, “Three of Arab States Join in Military-Economic Plan,” New York Times, March 7, 1955, 1. 61. Briefing Book for King Saud’s 1/30/57 visit; Kennett Love, “Saudi Arabia’s King Is Reported Moving to Prevent a Revolt,” New York Times, April 6, 1956, 1. 62. Additionally, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria all desired the incorporation of Lebanon and Jordan into the pact. However, Lebanon wanted to maintain its neutrality between Iraq and Egypt, and Jordan was in a weak position to disobey its British-run military. Robert C. Doty, “Arabs Split Sharply on Plans for Defense,” New York Times, March 13, 1955, E5. 63. Editorial Note, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2614. 64. Memorandum from King Saud to H. E. President Eisenhower on his views concerning Saudi Arabian Relations with the U.S.A. and Affairs of the Middle East, January 18, 1957, DDEL; King Saud Briefing Book, 2/13/62-2/14–62, Saudi Arabia, National Security Files, JFKL. 65. For an in-depth history, see Michael Quentin, Buraimi: The Struggle for Power, Influence and Oil in Arabia (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2013). For good additional primary sources, see Buraimi, 1948–54, Box 5/6; Boundaries Oman, 1952–66, Box 5/5; Oman, 1874–80, Box 13/1, Julian Paxton Collection, GB 165-0331, MECA, Oxford. 66. W. Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 63. 67. Memorandum of Conversation by Edwin Plitt, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, December 4, 1952, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2502. 68. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, December 17, 1952, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2506. 69. The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Abbey) to the Department of State, May 14, 1952, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2469. 70. Fain 2008, 65.

notes to chapter 2 201

71. “Saudi Arabian Dispute: Incursions into Sheikhdoms,” The Times, March 6, 1953, Articles and Letters on the Buraimi Dispute, DS 228.G7, Box XVI, Philby Collection, MECA, Oxford; King Saud Briefing Book, 2/13/62–2/14/62, Saudi Arabia, National Security Files, JFKL; Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert Sturgill of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, September 18, 1952, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2471. 72. The Consul General at Dhahran (Bishop) to the Department of State, October 6, 1952, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2480–81. 73. The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Dhahran, October 8, 1952, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2485–86; Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Hart), October 6, 1952, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2484. 74. King Saud Briefing Book, 2/13/62–2/14/62. 75. Memorandum of Conversation [John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, U.S.; Saud ibn Abdul Aziz, Crown Prince, Saudi Arabia; other U.S. and Saudi officials], May 18, 1953, Papers as President of the U.S., 1953–61 (Ann Whitman File), DDE Diaries, Folder: Jan. 1957, Staff Memos, Box 12, DDEL, DDRS. 76. Ibid. 77. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian PeninsulaIraq Affairs (Fritzlan), March 3, 1953, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2521; Memorandum of Conversation [John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State; Saud ibn Abdul Aziz, Crown Prince, Saudi Arabia; other U.S. and Saudi officials], May 18, 1953. 78. The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister (Faisal), March 26, 1953, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2441. 79. King Ibn Saud to President Eisenhower, June 28, 1953, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2545. 80. The Consul General at Dhahran (Bishop) to the Department of State, June 29, 1953, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2546. 81. “Russian Offer to Saudi Arabia.” 82. The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State, July 31, 1954, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2614. 83. Prime Minister Robert Anthony Eden’s Statement on Failure of Arbitration, “Buraimi Oasis Taken over by Former Occupants,” October 27, 1955, Box 5/5, Julian Paxton Collection, GB 165-0331, MECA, Oxford; “Saudi Arabian Protest: Rejection of Peaceful Means,” The Times, October 26, 1955, Boundaries Oman, 1952–66, Box 5/5, Julian Paxton Collection, GB 165-0331, MECA, Oxford; Editorial Note, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2615. 84. Telegram from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, November 6, 1955, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 287. 85. Eisenhower dictates from memory the gist of a private conversation with the King of Saudi Arabia 1/30/57, DDRS; Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, October 26, 1955, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 280.

202  notes to chapter 2

86. Saudi Foreign Policy, June 29, 1956, ES 1021/38, FO 371/120756, British National Archives; R. Stephen Humphreys, Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Trouble Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 92–94. 87. Steven A. Cook, Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 66–68; Peter Hahn, “National Security Concerns in US Policy toward Egypt, 1949–1956,” in The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment, ed. David W. Lesch (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007, 4th ed.), 80–81. 88. Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 180–81; Alexander Bligh, From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud (New York: New York University Press, 1984), 59–64. 89. Telegram from Jedda to Foreign Office no. 317, October 1, 1956, ES 1021/93, FO 371/120757, British National Archives; Hahn 2007, 80–81. 90. Humphreys 2005, 95–96. 91. Ibid., 93–94. 92. “Events Leading Up to the Middle East Crisis,” New York Times, November 4, 1956. 93. Editorial Note, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 403. 94. Hahn 2007, 82. 95. The Rt. Hon Lord Owen CH, “The Effect of Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s Illness on His Decision-making during the Suez Crisis,” QJM 98, no. 6 (June 2005): 387– 402, available at http://qjmed.oxfordjournals.org/content/98/6/387.full. 96. In 1953, the Saudi land force structure estimates ranged from seventy-five hundred to ten thousand. With Saudi Arabia’s irregular forces, including the Khiwaya (Royal Guard), paramilitary police, and Bedouin units, the numbers more than doubled. The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister (Faisal), March 26, 1953, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2441; Hanson W. Baldwin, “The Explosive Mideast,” New York Times, November 6, 1955, 4. 97. Eisenhower 1965, 116. 98. Memorandum of the Exchange of Views, U.S. Department of State, CA-6659, February 7, 1957. 99. Eisenhower dictates from memory the gist of a private conversation with the King of Saudi Arabia 1/30/57, DDRS. 100. Memorandum from King Saud to H. E. President Eisenhower on his views concerning Saudi Arabian Relations with the U.S.A. and Affairs of the Middle East, January 18, 1957, DDEL. 101. Telegram from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, December 15, 1956, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 406–7. 102. Briefing Memorandum, January 30, 1957, Briefing Book—King Saud Visit (1)-

notes to chapter 2 203

(4), DDEL; Telegram from the Consulate General in Dhahran to the Department of State, January 6, 1956, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 409. 103. Military Aid to Saudi Arabia, Interview with Mr. Childs, December 13, 1949, E 8453/1221/25, FO 371/75525, British National Archives. 104. “Arabia Termed Ready for Oil Deal with U.S.,” New York Herald Tribune, February 26, 1946, E 2204/2014/24, Saudi Arabia, 1946, FO 371/07/2013, British National Archives; Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 5, 1955, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 275–76. 105. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson), June 4, 1946, FRUS 1946, vol. 7, 8. 106. Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henry S. Villard) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton), September 27, 1946, FRUS 1946, vol. 7, 747. 107. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia, October 22, 1946, FRUS 1946, vol. 7, 750. See also Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Richard H. Sanger of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, March 1, 1948. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, FRUS 1948, vol. 5, part 1, 226. 108. Editorial Note, FRUS 1950, vol. 5, 1182; Memorandum of Conversation, by Messrs. Samuel Gorlitz and Wilfred Koplowitz of the Investment and Economic Development Staff, April 19, 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. 5, 1168. 109. Text of the Note of the Under Secretary of State of the United States, Robert Murphy to His Excellency the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia in Washington Abd Allah al-Khayyal, n.d., Folder 23, “Dhahran Airfield,” Date Span: 08/06/1945–06/07/1961, Box 7, William E. Mulligan Papers, Georgetown University; Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, Subject: Aid to Saudi Arabia, February 19, 1962, Saudi Arabia, White House Memoranda, 1/61–11/63, Robert W. Komer, National Security Files, JFKL; King Saud Briefing Book, Saudi Arabia, 2/13/62–2/14/62, National Security Files, JFKL. 110. King Saud Briefing Book, 2/13/62–2/14/62. 111. For an assessment on Saudi Arabia’s domestic politics during this period, see “Conditions inside Saudi Arabia,” January 9, 1956, ES 1015/3, FO 371/120754, British National Archives. The American Ambassador (Childs) to the King of Saudi Arabia (Ibn Saud), n.d., FRUS 1949, vol. 6, 1587–88. 112. Memorandum on Saudi Arabia by I. A. C. Fry, June 4, 1955. 113. Letter from John Foster Dulles to Secretary of Defense Charles D. Wilson, June 10, 1953, Chronological—John Foster Dulles June 1, 1953 (6), Box 3, John Foster Dulles Chronological Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, 1951–59, DDEL. 114. For example, see “King Saud Visit to U.S.A.,” W. no. 199, February 11, 1957, ES 10345/7(D), FO 371/127155, British National Archives. 115. Briefing Memorandum, January 30, 1957, Briefing Book—King Saud Visit (1)(4), DDEL; the Internal Security of the United States, NSC 17/2, Transmittal Note, July

204  notes to chapter 2

21, 1949; Eisenhower dictates from memory the gist of a private conversation with the King of Saudi Arabia 1/30/57, DDRS. 116. Eisenhower 1965, 116–18; Yergin 2009, 514–17. 117. “Saudi Arabia. Discussion of entry of U.S. forces to Dhahran area; question the amounts of assistance that should be provided during FY 1950 to further the security interests of the U.S.,” February 1, 1949, Department of Defense, DDRS. 118. Excerpt of Report by the Chief of Staff of the United States Army (Collins) to the Secretary of the Army (Gray), April 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. 5, 1164. 119. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, May 10, 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. 5, 1184–85; The Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson), March 8, 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. 5, 1175, 1130. 120. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, May 10, 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. 5, 1184–85. 121. Memorandum by the President to the Director for Mutual Security (Stassen), March 14, 1953, Eisenhower approves military aid for Saudi Arabia, DDRS. 122. The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State, February 27, 1952, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2411. 123. The Acting Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of State, June 13, 1952, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2416. 124. Memorandum of Conversation by Robert Sturgill of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, September 19, 1952, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2422–23. 125. Memorandum, April 29, 1955, ES 1192/1, FO 371/114892; Letter from R. W. Bailey to A. C. I. Samuel, May 30, 1955, 1194/2/180/55, Tanks for Saudi Arabia, ES 1192/2, FO 371/114892; Memorandum on Saudi Arabia by I. A. C. Fry, June 4, 1955; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, September 3, 1955, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 265–66. 126. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, September 14, 1955, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 267–68. 127. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, September 24, 1955, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 273. 128. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, October 10, 1955, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 278–79. 129. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, October 17, 1955, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 279. 130. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, December 8, 1955, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 297. 131. Telegram from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, December 13, 1955, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 299; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, August 31, 1956, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 397–98. 132. Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern,

notes to chapter 2 205

South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State, May 11, 1956, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 370–71. 133. “More U.S. Arms Go to Saudi Arabia,” New York Times, May 17, 1956. 134. Memorandum of a Conversation, Jidda, April 2, 1956, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 357. 135. “Saudi Arabia, U.S. Formally Extend Dhahran Airfield Lease,” United Press, April 9, 1957, Folder 23, “Dhahran Airfield,” Date Span: 08/06/1945–06/07/1961, Box 7, Mulligan Papers; Determination under Section 3 of Joint Resolution no. 117, 85th Congress, under Title II of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, providing economic assistance to Saudi Arabia, June 3, 1957, DDRS. 136. Saudi Arabian Naval Survey Board, Submission of Report of Transmittal Memorandum, Ser 018, J. B. Monroe, Senior Member, Naval Survey Mission to Saudi Arabia, to the Chief of Naval Operations. April 10, 1957. Encl: Survey on Plan to Establish a Saudi Arabian Navy [goals of effort to build up navy, time schedule, extent of U.S. commitment, base construction planning, armaments, and training]. Department of Defense, DDRS; Dana Adams Schmidt, “Saudis Lengthen U.S. Lease on Base and Get Arms Aid,” New York Times, April 9, 1957, 1. 137. Letter from Gary Owen to F. W. Ohliger (VP in Dhahran), October 6, 1956, Folder 23, “Dhahran Airfield,” Date Span: 08/06/1945–06/07/1961, Box 7, Mulligan Papers; Memorandum of Conversation with the British Ambassador Mr. Caccia at the British Embassy, February 7, 1957, Memos of Conversation-General-A Through D (3), General Correspondence, John Foster Dulles Papers, 1951–59, DDEL, DDRS; “Dhahran Airbase Agreement Reported,” Al-Qahira (Cairo Arabic Daily), March 5, 1957, Middle East Press News Item vol. V, no. 13, Week Ending Friday, March 29, 1957, Folder 23, “Dhahran Airfield,” Date Span: 08/06/1945–06/07/1961, Box 7, Mulligan Papers; White House staff notes: expedited MAP deliveries to Middle East countries, September 20, 1957, DDRS; Determination under Section 3 of Joint Resolution no. 117, 85th Congress, under Title II of the Mutual Security Act of 1954. 138. Eisenhower dictates from memory the gist of a private conversation with the king of Saudi Arabia 1/30/57, DDRS. 139. Yussuf Yassin may have been criticized by Hamza, but the British portrayed Yassin as having “proved himself exceedingly pettifogging and difficult” during basing negotiations. Telegram from British Embassy Jedda to British Foreign Office, no. 1384/24/51G, May 16, 1951, ES 1224/8, FO 371/91776, British National Archives; The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Bergus) to the Secretary of State, July 20, 1949, FRUS 1949, 1603; The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State, April 2, 1949, FRUS 1949, vol. 6, 1590. 140. The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Bergus) to the Secretary of State, July 20, 1949, FRUS 1949, vol. 6, 1603. 141. Dhahran Lease, British Embassy Telegram no. 1384/7/51G, January 8, 1951, ES 1224/3; Telegram from A. C. Trott, Jedda Embassy to the British Foreign Office, January 13, 1951, ES1224/1, Dhahran Airbase, FO 371/91776, British National Archives.

206  notes to chapter 2

142. The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State, December 24, 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. 5, 1197–99. 143. The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State, April 2, 1949, FRUS 1949, vol. 6, 1590. 144. The Secretary of State to the Legation in Saudi Arabia, August 14, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 5, part 1, 246. 145. Enclosure in Jedda Despatch no. 195/4/49G, January 27, 1949, E 1695/1221/25, FO 371/75525, British National Archives; The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State, April 24, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 5, part 1, 237. 146. White, “U.S. Seeks Surety of Arab Oil Supply,” 1–2. 147. The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State, December 18, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 5, part 1, 260; see also Letter to King Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdul Rahman el Faisal al Saud from Amir Abdullah Ibn el Hussein, n.d., E4362/128/25, FO 371/40266, British National Archives. 148. Oral History Interview with J. Wesley Adams (Foreign Service Officer and Second Secretary to Cairo 1950–52) December 18, 1972, HSTL; The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State, April 2, 1949, FRUS 1949, vol. 6, 1590–91. 149. The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State, December 18, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 5, part 1, 260. 150. The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State, May 10, 1949, FRUS 1949, vol. 6, 1595. 151. Ibid.; Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State, February 5, 1951, FRUS 1951, vol. 5, 1038. 152. For the draft agreement copy, see Proposed Dhahran Airfield Agreement 25 March 1949, Dhahran Airfield, E 4493/1221/25, FO 371/75525, British National Archives. 153. The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Bergus) to the Secretary of State, July 20, 1949, FRUS 1949, vol. 6, 1604; The American Ambassador (Childs) to the Saudi Arabian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Yassin), June 23, 1949, FRUS 1949, vol. 6, 1608. 154. The American Ambassador (Childs) to the Saudi Arabian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Yassin), June 23, 1949, FRUS 1949, vol. 6, 1612. 155. For an overview of the final agreement, see Saudi Arabia: Future of the United States Air Base at Dhahran, July 11, 1949, E 8453/1221/25, FO 371/75525, British National Archives; The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Bergus) to the Secretary of State, July 20, 1949; the American Ambassador (Childs) to the Saudi Arabian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Yassin), June 23, 1949, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, FRUS 1949, vol. 6, 1602, 1611. 156. The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Hill) to the Secretary of State, August 25, 1949, FRUS 1949, vol. 6, 1612. 157. Telegram from British Embassy Jedda to British Foreign Office, February 26,

notes to chapter 2 207

1951, ES 1224/4, FO 371/91776, British National Archives; The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State, January 3, 1951, FRUS 1951, vol. 5, 1017–1019. 158. Telegram from A. C. Trott, British Embassy Jedda to the British Foreign Office, January 13, 1951, ES1224/1, Dhahran Airbase and Telegram from British Embassy Jedda to British Foreign Office, February 26, 1951; The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State, May 31, 1951, FRUS 1951, vol. 5, 1053. 159. For a copy of the 1951 base lease extension agreement, see Annex B: Draft of Note from Saudi Arabia Minister of Foreign Affairs to American Ambassador Constituting Agreement of Dhahran Airfield, May 31, 1951, ES 1224/13, FO 371/91776, British National Archives. 160. “U.S. Signs Defense Agreements With Saudi Arabia,” Press Release, July 13, 1951, William E. Mulligan Papers, Box 7, Folder 23, “Dhahran Airfield,” Date Span: 08/06/1945– 06/07/1961; The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State, May 31, 1951, FRUS 1951, vol. 5, 1054. 161. “U.S. Signs Defense Agreements with Saudi Arabia,” Press Release, July 13, 1951; Frank C. Nash, “Appendix United States Overseas Military Bases: Saudi Arabia,” Report to the President, December 1957, 145–47, Nash Report-U.S. Overseas Military Bases (1) (2), Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President (Ann Whitman File), 1953–61, DDEL. 162. The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Director of the Mutual Security (Stassen), February 27, 1953, FRUS 1952–54, vol. 9, part 2, 2437. 163. Nash, “Appendix United States Overseas Military Bases: Saudi Arabia,” 145–48, DDEL; Telegram from D. J. McCarthy, British Embassy Jedda to H. A. Dudgeon, British Foreign Office, no. 1384/22/51G, March 29, 1951, ES 1224/5, Dhahran Airbase, FO 371/91776, British National Archives. 164. Memorandum of a Conversation, Jidda, April 2, 1956, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 360. 165. Safran 1988, 77–81. 166. Joseph A. Kechichian, Faysal: Saudi Arabia’s King for All Seasons (Miami: University Press of Florida, 2008a), 112–13; “History of the Saudi National Guard,” Asharq Alawsat, September 11, 2006, available at www.aawsat.net/2006/09/article55265322; Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 341. 167. “Conditions inside Saudi Arabia,” January 9, 1956; Fandy 1999, 44. 168. Love, “Saudi Arabia’s King Is Reported Moving to Prevent a Revolt,” 1. 169. Kai Bird, Crossing Mandelbaum Gate: Coming of Age between the Arabs and Israelis, 1956–1978 (New York: Scribner, 2010), 103–4. 170. Editorial Note, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 373. 171. Briefing Memorandum, January 30, 1957, Briefing Book—King Saud Visit (1)(4), DDEL; Eisenhower 1965, 116–18. For a deeper discussion on Arab nationalism in the kingdom, see Jones 2010, 151–61. 172. Editorial Note, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 373.

208  notes to chapters 2 and 3

173. Ibid., 374. 174. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, July 11, 1956, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 389–90. 175. Telegram from the Consulate General in Dhahran to the Department of State, September 13, 1956, FRUS 1955–57, vol. 13, 399–400. 176. Ibid., 400. 177. Ibid. 178. Eisenhower 1965, 114–20; Eisenhower dictates from memory the gist of a private conversation with the King of Saudi Arabia 1/30/57, DDRS. 179. Memorandum from King Saud to H. E. President Eisenhower on his views concerning Saudi Arabian Relations with the U.S.A. and Affairs of the Middle East, January 18, 1957, DDEL; King Saud and President Eisenhower outline areas for substantive discussions to be held by advisors during King Saud’s U.S. visit, February 1, 1957, DDRS. 180. Eisenhower 1965, 118. 181. Visit of King Saud to the United States, February 19, 1957, ES 10345/18, FO 371/127155, British National Archives; Eisenhower dictates from memory the gist of a private conversation with the King of Saudi Arabia 1/30/57. 182. Memorandum for the President from John Foster Dulles, Subject: Military and Economic Discussions with Saudi Arabians, February 7, 1957, John Foster Dulles Chronological January 1957 (1), Box 14, John Foster Dulles Chronological Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, 1951–59, DDEL; Text of the Note of the Under Secretary of State of the United States, Robert Murphy to His Excellency the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia in Washington Abd Allah al-Khayyal, n.d. 183. Joint Statement Following Discussions with King Saud of Saudi Arabia, February 8, 1957, Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, in The American Presidency Project [online], ed. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters (Santa Barbara, CA), available at www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10976; “Eisenhower-Saud Text,” New York Times, February 9, 1957, 2. 184. Draft Translation Based on Text Broadcast by Radio Mecca Royal Decree Renewing the Dhahran Airbase Agreement, n.d., Folder 23, “Dhahran Airfield,” Date Span: 08/06/1945–06/07/1961, Box 7, Mulligan Papers; Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhaus, Bricks, Sand and Marble: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Construction in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1947–1991 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History and Corps of Engineers, United States Army, 2009), 160–66. 185. Frank C. Nash, “Appendix United States Overseas Military Bases: Saudi Arabia,” 145–146, DDEL. Chapter 3

1. Anthony Nutting, “Saud Is Out for a Strong Kings’ Trade Union,” Daily Mail, May 14, 1957, ES 1022/8, FO 371/127152, British National Archives.

notes to chapter 3 209

2. Frank C. Nash, “Appendix United States Overseas Military Bases: Saudi Arabia,” 147, DDEL. 3. Jesse Ferris, Nasser’s Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 2. 4. Enclosure on Discussions with State Department on the Middle East, n.d. but attached to letter from May 13, 1957, ES 1022/9, FO 371/127152, British National Archives. 5. Geoffrey Wawro, Quicksand: America’s Pursuit in the Middle East (New York: Penguin Press, 2010), 243; Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 354–55. 6. Telegram from Bagdad to Foreign Office no. 633, May 15, 1957, PREM 11/1940; Termination of the Dhahran Base Agreement, March 16, 1961, BS 103145/1, FO 371/157002, British National Archives; Vassiliev 2000, 357. 7. “U.S. Gets Order to Quit Base,” Daily Express, March 17, 1961, BS 103145/3, FO 371/157002, British National Archives. 8. Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office no. 679, March 16, 1961, BS 103145/1, FO 371/157002. 9. Outward Saving Telegram from Foreign Office to New York no. 828, April 11, 1961, BS 103145/2, FO 371/157002, British National Archives. 10. ‘Al-Jumhuriyah on the Liquidation of Dhahran Base, March 19, 1961, ME/595/A/2, BS 103145/3(L), FO 371/157002, British National Archives. 11. This important case once again opposes certain conventional wisdom in the base politics literature that argues a host nation will be less likely to terminate a basing agreement or to expel a nation from its bases such as the United States when it depends on the basing nation for defense technology and other military munitions. See Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 266. 12. Ferris 2013, 2. 13. Steven A. Cook, Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 74. 14. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, March 3, 1958, FRUS 1958–60, vol. 12, 714. 15. Said K. Aburish, Nasser: The Last Arab, A Biography (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004), 158–61. 16. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to Secretary of State Dulles, March 14, 1958, FRUS 1958–60, vol. 12, 719. 17. Editorial Note, Saudi Arabia, FRUS 1958–60, vol. 12, 715. 18. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to Secretary of State Dulles, March 14, 1958, FRUS 1958–60, vol. 12, 719.

210  notes to chapter 3

19. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, March 10, 1958, FRUS 1958–60, vol. 12, 716. 20. The Middle East Record, vol. 1 (London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960), 372–73; Editorial Note, Saudi Arabia, FRUS 1958–60, vol. 12, 715. 21. Gerald de Gaury, Faisal: King of Saudi Arabia (New York: Praeger, 1967), ch. 13. 22. National Intelligence Estimate, April 19, 1960, Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Saudi Arabia Documents, FRUS 1958–60, vol. 12, 759–60; Vassiliev 2000, 355. 23. Bruce K. Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam and Democracy in the Arab World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 132; Tim Niblock, Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy, and Survival (New York: Routledge, 2006), 43; Joseph A. Kechichian, Faysal: Saudi Arabia’s King for All Seasons (Miami: University Press of Florida, 2008a), 67. 24. Thomas Lippman, Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 105; Sarah Yizraeli, The Remaking of Saudi Arabia: The Struggle between King Sa’ud and Crown Prince Faysal, 1953–1962 (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1997), 122. 25. The Middle East Record, vol. 1, 372–73; Kechichian 2008a, 67. 26. Michael Sharnoff, “Looking Back: Nasser’s Inter-Arab Rivalries: 1958–1967,” Al Arabiya News, July 30, 2011, available at English.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/30/160027. html; Editorial Note, FRUS 1958–60, vol. 12, 728. 27. Sandra Mackey, The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2002), 150–55; Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 22–23. 28. Editorial Note, FRUS 1958–60, vol. 12, 733. 29. Ibid.; Telegram from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, July 25, 1958, FRUS 1958–60, vol. 12, 730–33. 30. R. Stephen Humphreys, Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Trouble Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 98; Special National Intelligence Estimate: The Outlook in Saudi Arabia and the Consequences of Possible U.S. Courses of Action, September 9, 1958, FRUS 1958–60, vol. 12, 735. 31. For a good background on King Saud’s internal challenges, see Kechichian 2008a, 74–76. 32. Nathan J. Citino, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa’ud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 152– 55; Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York: Free Press, 2009), 495–96. 33. Memorandum from William R. Crawford, Jr. of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs to the Director (Meyer), March 3, 1960, Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 63 D 89, Saudi Arabia: US-Saudi Relations, 1960, FRUS 1958–60, vol. 12, 756.

notes to chapter 3 211

34. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, July 20, 1960, FRUS 1958–60, vol. 12, 762–63. 35. Telegram from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, November 30, 1960, FRUS 1958–60, vol. 12, 768. 36. Telegram from the Embassy in KSA to Dept of State, November 30, 1960, Department of State, Central Files, 786A.56311/11-3059, FRUS 1958–60, vol. 12, 768–69. 37. Ibid. 38. Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office no. 679, March 16, 1961; Saudi Statement on Relations between Arab and Moslem Countries, Appendix B: Saudi Arabia, June 22, 1957, ES 1022/11, FO 371/127152; Outward Saving Telegram from Foreign Office to New York no. 828, April 11, 1961. 39. Memorandum from the Central Intelligence Agency, August 18, 1962, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 7/62–9/62, NSF, JFKL. 40. Termination of the Dhahran Base Agreement, March 16, 1961; “Dhahran Airbase Agreement Will Not Be Renewed,” All Middle East Radio Broadcasts, March 16, 17, 18, and 20, 1961, Folder 23, “Dhahran Airfield,” Date Span: 08/06/1945–06/07/1961, Box 7, Mulligan Papers. 41. Memorandum from Roger Hilsman to Harlan Cleveland, August 9, 1962, Saudi Arabia, 1/61–11/63 (folder 2 of 2), Robert W. Komer, NSF, JFKL. 42. Enclosure on Discussions with State Department on the Middle East, n.d. but attached to letter from May 13, 1957. 43. James Jankowski, Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 174–78; Malik Mufti, “The United States and Nasserist Pan-Arabism,” in The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment, 4th ed., ed. David W. Lesch (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007), 152; Rutherford 2008, 132. 44. Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office no. 679, March 16, 1961, BS 103145/1, FO 371/15700, British National Archives; Memorandum from the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant (Dungan), March 21, 1961, Saudi Arabia, General, 1/1/61–8/18/61, NSF, JFKL. 45. “Dhahran Airbase Agreement Will Not Be Renewed,” All Middle East Radio Broadcasts, March 16, 17, 18, and 20, 1961; Translated Radio Mecca Broadcast to Saudi Arabia and the Arab World, March 16, 1961, Saudi Arabia, General, 1/1/61–8/18/61, NSF, JFKL. 46. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, March 16, 1961, Saudi Arabia, General, 1/1/61–8/18/61, NSF, JFKL; Department of State for the Press, March 16, 1961, Folder 23, “Dhahran Airfield,” Date Span: 08/06/1945–06/07/1961, Box 7, Mulligan Papers. 47. Memorandum from the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant (Dungan), March 21, 1961.

212  notes to chapter 3

48. “Dhahran Airbase Agreement Will Not Be Renewed,” All Middle East Radio Broadcasts, March 16, 17, 18, and 20, 1961; De Gaury 1967, ch. 13. 49. Memorandum of Conversation, February 13, 1962, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 2/20/62–3/16/62, NSF, JFKL. 50. Memorandum of Conversation, October 5, 1962, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 10/62, NSF, JFKL. 51. Memorandum from the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant (Dungan), March 21, 1961. 52. Eugenie M. Blang, Allies at Odds: America, Europe and Vietnam, 1961–1968 (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2011), 10–13. 53. Memorandum of a Briefing by Director of Central Intelligence McCone, June 29, 1967, FRUS 1964–68, Number 252, vol. 34. For additional global security context from this period, see Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy East of the Suez, 1947–1968 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 59–60, 236–40, 284–308, 317–20. 54. Letter from President Kennedy to King Saud, April 18, 1961, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 1/1/61–8/18/61, NSF, JFKL. 55. Memorandum of Conversation, June 29, 1961, Saudi Arabia, General, 1/1/61– 8/18/61, NSF, JFKL; Memorandum of Conversation, July 7, 1961, Department of State, Central Files, 601.86A11/7-761, FRUS 1961–62, vol. 17, 180; Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); W. Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 144–46. 56. Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, August 15, 1962, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 7/62–9/62, NSF, JFKL. 57. Request for Credit Terms on Recent Saudi Arms Purchase Request, Saudi Arabia, King Saud Briefing Book, 2/13/62–2/14/62, NSF, JFKL. 58. Ibid. 59. Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, July 13, 1961, United Arab Republic, 7/61–10/61, Country Series, NSF, JFKL. 60. Memorandum of Conversation, July 7, 1961, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 1/1/61– 8/18/61, NSF, JFKL. 61. Memorandum of Conversation, February 13, 1962, Saudi Arabia, General Files. 62. Memorandum from Consul General Horner, Dhahran, April 22, 1962, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 3/17/62–4/30/62, NSF, JFKL. 63. Ibid. See also Memorandum from the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), April 11, 1962, Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/4–1162, FRUS 1961–62, vol. 17, 585. 64. Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, January 24, 1962, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 11/20/61–1/31/62, NSF, JFKL; Document 161230Z, November 16, 1961, and Depart-

notes to chapter 3 213

ment of State dispatch November 19, 1961, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 8/19/61–11/19/61, NSF, JFKL. 65. Memorandum to the President and Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, January 24, 1962, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 11/20/61–1/31/62. 66. Letter from President Kennedy to King Saud, December 23, 1961, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 11/20/61–1/31/62, NSF, JFKL. 67. Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, January 24, 1962, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 11/20/61–1/31/62. 68. Memorandum from Ambassador Hart to the Secretary of State, March 29, 1962, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 3/17/62–4/30/62, NSF, JFKL. 69. Central Intelligence Agency memo, “Prince Faysal’s Objectives in Visiting the U.S.,” September 21, 1962, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 7/62–9/62, NSF, JFKL. 70. Memorandum from the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), April 11, 1962, vol. 17, 585. 71. Wawro 2010, 242–43. 72. Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, October 9, 1962, Saudi Arabia, 1/61– 11/63 (folder 2 of 2), Robert W. Komer, NSF, JFKL; F. Gregory Gause, III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 30; David E. Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 116; Stephen Dorril, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service (New York: Free Press, 2000), 698. 73. Burton Kaufman, The Arab Middle East and the United States: Inter-Arab Rivalry and Superpower Diplomacy (New York: Twayne, 1996), 38–40; Joel Gordon, Nasser: Hero of the Arab Nation (Oxford: Oneworld Publishers, 2006), 85; Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 309. 74. Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 54–56; Warren Bass, Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israel Alliance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 99–100. 75. Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, October 9, 1962, Saudi Arabia, 1/61– 11/63 (folder 2 of 2); Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina), 184–86. 76. Kaufman 1996, 35–40; Bass 2003, 135–38; Darby 1973, 236–43; Wawro 2010, 243. 77. Ferris 2013, 118. 78. Message #38465 from the Department of the Air Force, April 18, 1963, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 4/63–5/63, NSF, JFKL; Memorandum from USMILTNGMSN to the Secretary of State, December 31, 1962, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 11/62–12/62, NSF, JFKL. 79. Message #38465 from the Department of the Air Force, April 18, 1963.

214  notes to chapter 3

80. The Hard Surface Operation later extended its operations to December. See Message from U.S. Embassy in Jidda, June 28, 1963, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 6/15/63– 6/30/63, NSF, JFKL; Department of the Army Staff Communications Division, November 9, 1963, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 9/3–11/63, NSF, JFKL; Memorandum of Conversation, Annex C: U.S.-Saudi Arabian Security Cooperation, Folder 2: Saudi Arabia vol. IV, May 1973–December 31, 1973, Middle East, Country Files, NSF, RMNL. 81. Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy, February 21, 1963, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, vol. I, President’s Office Files, JFKL. 82. Oral History Interview with Nicholas G. Thacher (Consular of American Embassy, Jidda, Saudi Arabia, 1962–65), May 28, 1992, HSTL. 83. Ibid. 84. Message from U.S. Embassy at Jidda to the Secretary of State, March 12, 1963, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 1/63–3/63, NSF, JFKL. 85. Message from Ambassador Hart to the Secretary of State, September 27, 1963, Saudi Arabia, General Files, 9/3–11/63, NSF, JFKL. 86. National Intelligence Estimate, “The Persian Gulf States,” Number 30-1-67, May 18, 1967, U.S. Intelligence Board, 4–5, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library (LBJL), DDRS; David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud: The Rise and Rule of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), 250. 87. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military Balances in the Gulf, and Trends in Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 132–33. 88. U.S. Embassy in Jidda memorandum cable to Secretary of State, June 17, 1967, DDRS. 89. Adeed Dawisha, Saudi Arabia’s Search for Security, Adelphi Paper no. 158 (London: IISS, 1980), 3–6; Cordesman 1984, 133. 90. John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 99, 166–67; Abdel Magid Farid, Nasser: The Final Years (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1994), 55–67, 112–13; Dawisha 1980, 4; Ferris 2013, 170–73, 290–94. 91. Christopher Daigle, The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–1973 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 115–17, 154; Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). 92. U.S. Embassy in Jidda memorandum cable to Secretary of State, June 17, 1967, DDRS.

notes to chapter 4 215

Chapter 4

1. Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., The Line of Fire: From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 163. 2. Robert B. Oakley, National Security Council Report approved by General Scowcroft: “NSSM 238: US Policy toward the Persian Gulf,” January 12, 1977, Staff Material Middle East, NLC-25-72-7-3-5, Jimmy Carter Library (JCL). The NLC (“National Library Carter”) number includes the information in what collection, box, and folder the document was originally located. For instance “NLC 6-23-5-1-1” would mean it was from NLC collection 6, which happens to be the National Security Advisor files, in box 23 (the second number in the NLC above) and from the fifth folder; Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhaus, Bricks, Sand and Marble: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Construction in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1947–1991 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History and Corps of Engineers United States Army, 2009), 320–21. 3. Administrative Support Unit Bahrain, Draft of Master Plan, May 1988, Folder: PWD/NAVFACENGCOM, David F. Winkler Papers, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC; Vice Admiral W. J. Crowe, “The Persian Gulf: Central or Peripheral to United States Strategy?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review (1978): 184–209, Winkler Papers. 4. J. C. Hurewitz, “The Persian Gulf: British Withdrawal and Western Security,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 401 (May 1972): 107. 5. Ibid., 107–8. 6. New York Times, May 15, 1977, 7, column 1. 7. RADM Sam Packer’s comments on “From MIDEASTFOR to Fifth Fleet: Forward Naval Presence in Southwest Asia,” Center for Naval Analyses, October 4, 1996, Winkler Papers; Thomas W. Lippman, “Bahrain Sets Limit on U.S. Use of Port,” Washington Post, May 14, 1977. 8. For example, see Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 257, 266. 9. W. Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 172. 10. Paper Prepared by the National Security Staff, “Persian Gulf: Analytical Summary of IG Response to NSSM 66,” June 4, 1970, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970, Box H–111, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, Richard M. Nixon Library (RMNL). 11. Abbas Faroughy, The Bahreini Islands, 750–1951 (New York: Verry, Fisher and Co., 1951), 52–60. 12. Biographical Sketch of Bahrain’s Amir ‘Isa ibn Salman al Khalifa, Central Intelligence Agency, March 22, 1976, DDRS. 13. Division of Research and Analysis for Near East, South Asia, and Africa, U.S.

216  notes to chapter 4

State Department, “Intelligence Report, no. 7607: Concessionary Agreements Relations to Islands or the Sea Bed in the Persian Gulf,” November 5, 1957, DDRS. 14. Faroughy 1951, 79–90. 15. Division of Research and Analysis for Near East, South Asia, and Africa, U.S. State Department, “Intelligence Report, no. 7607,” November 5, 1957. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: US-UK Talks on Persian Gulf, March 11, 1969, National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Files 1967–69, Political Affairs and Relations (POL) UK-US. See also Memorandum for James H. Boughton, Acting Staff Director, NSC IG/NEA, “Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf,” n.d., NSSM 66, Box H-156, NSSM Files, Study Memorandums (1969–74), National Security Council (“H”) Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL; National Security Council Group Memorandum, “Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf,” n.d., Persian Gulf 6/5/1970, Box H-046, Senior Review Group Meetings, Meeting Files (1969–74), National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files), Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 19. Memorandum from Stuart W. Rockwall to Mr. Rountree, “Ruler of Bahrain Urges Public U.S. Statement regarding Status Bahrain,” February 27, 1958, Office Files Relating to Middle Eastern Affairs, 1958–59, 61D43, A11322, Box 15, Bahrain: Political Activities, Political Parties-General, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Record Group 59, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). 20. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York: Free Press, 2009), ch. 26. 21. For broader historical background see: “Middle East Oil,” July 23, 1944, 1/4/9/3/27, Saudi Arabia: General Articles. nos. 26–37, 1942–47, Philby Collection, GB165-0229, MECA, Oxford. For additional context, see Nathan J. Citino, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa’ud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 2002). 22. Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: US-UK Talks on Persian Gulf, March 11, 1969. 23. National Security Council Group Memorandum, “Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf,” n.d. 1970, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–81 (on CREST computer), NLC-132-176-13-1-5, JCL. 24. Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: US-UK Talks on Persian Gulf, March 11, 1969. 25. Paper Prepared by the National Security Staff, “Persian Gulf: Analytical Summary of IG Response to NSSM 66,” June 4, 1970. 26. James J. Wirtz, The Tet Offensive (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 18–20; Alvin J. Cottrell, “British Withdrawal from the Persian Gulf,” Military Review 1,

notes to chapter 4 217

no. 6 (June 1970): 19; Clark Dougan and Stephen Weisset, Nineteen Sixty-Eight (Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1983), 8. 27. Telegram from British Embassy in Tehran on U.S. Forces in Bahrain after 1971, August 1, 1968, FCO 8/517, British National Archives; Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: US-UK Talks on Persian Gulf, March 11, 1969. 28. Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: US-UK Talks on Persian Gulf, March 11, 1969. See also Tore T. Petersen, Richard Nixon, Great Britain, and the Anglo-American Alignment in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula: Making Allies out of Clients (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), ch. 3. 29. Report Prepared by Director of Central Intelligence Helms, “Views on the Persian Gulf,” July 1971, Middle East General, vol. VIII, Country Files, Box 647, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 30. Ibid. 31. Memorandum of conversation, October 22, 1969, Visit of Shah of Iran October 21–23, 1969, Box 1245, Saunders Files, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 32. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, “The Persian Gulf: Groping toward a New Power Balance,” December 12, 1969, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group NSSM 90 5/21/70, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–044, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 33. Memorandum for the President from Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr., “Persian Gulf,” March 10, 1970, Middle East: General vol. III February 1970–May 1970, Box 645, Country Files-Middle East, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 34. The policy was later adapted to the Gulf and referred to as Nixon’s “twin-pillar policy,” which used Iran and Saudi Arabia to assist in maintaining regional security. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon, 1969, Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen, July 25, 1969; Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam, November 3, 1969 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 544–48, 901–9; Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 395–96; Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 139–43. 35. NSSM 66, NSSM Files, Box H-156, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–156, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 36. Memorandum from J. P. Bannerman on “British Involvement in the Settlement of the Iranian Claim to Bahrain,” October 7, 1979, FCO 8/3308, British National Archives; “Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf,” n.d. 1970, NLC-132-176-13-1-5. 37. Yearbook of the United Nations 1970, vol. 24 (New York: Office of Public Information United Nations, 1970), 284–87.

218  notes to chapter 4

38. Telegram 2153 from Tehran, May 19, 1970, POL 19 BAHRAIN IS, Central Files 1970–73, Record Group 59, NARA. 39. According to this report, the UAR was bogged down in other affairs and was no longer a major source of finance or insurrection in the Gulf. Report Prepared by Director of Central Intelligence Helms, “Views on the Persian Gulf,” July 1971. 40. Ibid. 41. Memorandum from Harold Saunders and Rosemary Neaher of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), “Status Report on the Arabian/Persian Gulf,” May 19, 1971, Middle East: General, vol. VIII, Country Files, Box 647, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 42. Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon, “U.S. Recognition of the Gulf States of Bahrain and Qatar,” July 14, 1971, Trucial States, Middle East, Country Files, Box 632, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 43. Telegram 2853 from Jidda, August 15, 1971, Persian Gulf, Saunders Files, Box 1276, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 44. Memorandum from Secretary of State William P. Rogers to President Nixon, “Persian Gulf,” December 16, 1971, FRUS 1969–76, vol. 24, 354–55. 45. Note on the linkage between the Iranian Claim to Bahrain and to other Gulf Islands by Patrick Bannerman, July 19, 1979, FCO 8/3308, British National Archives; Memorandum for Mr. Henry A. Kissinger from Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., “Persian Gulf Situation,” December 1, 1971, Middle East-General vol. 8, 1971 [1 of 2], Country Files-Middle East, Box 647, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Persian Gulf: Iran’s Role (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1972), 45–68. 46. Telegram from the British Political Agency in Bahrain, 1215/67, July 9, 1967, FCO 8/517, British National Archives; National Security Council Group Memorandum, “Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf,” n.d. 1970, NLC-132-176-13-1-5. 47. Memorandum of Conversation, “Persian Gulf,” January 13, 1970, POL 33 Persian Gulf, Central Files 1970–73, Record Group 59, NARA, FRUS 1969–76, vol. 24, 246–48. 48. National Intelligence Estimate Number 30-1-67, “The Persian Gulf States,” May 18, 1967, Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Council Special Collection. 49. Paper Prepared by the National Security Staff, “Persian Gulf: Analytical Summary of IG Response to NSSM 66,” June 4, 1970; Report to the Verification Panel, “Arms Limitation in the Indian Ocean: Issues and Alternatives,” n.d., Staff Material: Middle East, NLC-25-78-1-2-6. 50. National Intelligence Estimate Number 30-1-67, “The Persian Gulf States,” May 18, 1967; Crowe 1978, 184–209. 51. Yergin 2009, 265–66. 52. “Arms Limitation in the Indian Ocean,” NLC-25-78-1-2-6. 53. “Persian Gulf: Analytical Summary of IG Response to NSSM 66,” June 4, 1970.

notes to chapter 4 219

54. Analytical Summary of IG Response to NSSM 66, June 4, 1970, Persian Gulf 6/5/1970, Senior Review Group Meetings, Meeting Files (1969–74), Box H-046, National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files), Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 55. Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, “U.S. Persian Gulf Policy,” February 4, 1970, POL 33 Persian Gulf, Central Files 1970–73, Record Group 59, National Archives. 56. Paper Prepared by the National Security Staff, n.d., NSSM 110-Indian Ocean Follow-On Study, SRG Meeting Indian Ocean 10/6/71, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-060, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 57. Analytical Summary of IG Response to NSSM 66, June 4, 1970, Persian Gulf 6/5/1970. 58. “Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf,” n.d. 1970, NLC-NLC-132-176-13-1-5. See also NSSM 66, NSSM Files, Box H-156, Study Memorandums (1969–74), National Security Council (H-Files), Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 59. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting, April 21, 1971, Subject: Indian Ocean, NSSM 110, SRG Minutes 1971, Senior Review Group, Box H-112, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials; Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting, Subject: Indian Ocean, October 6, 1971, SRG Minutes 1971, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-112, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 60. Memorandum from C. A. Crocker for Colonel Kennedy, “The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Twilight of the Pax Britannica,” October 12, 1970, NSSM 66 [3 of 3], NSSM Files, Study Memorandums (1969–74), Box H-157, National Security Council (H-Files), Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 61. Memorandum from Walter Slocombe for Dr. Lynn, “NSSM-50, part II, Draft,” September 11, 1969, NSSM 50 [3 of 3], National Security Study Memorandums, Study Memorandums (1969–74), Box H-137, National Security Council (“H”) Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 62. Command History for 1972, U.S. Ship La Salle (AGF-3), June 12, 1973, Folder: LaSalle CH 1973–77, Winkler Papers; Hanson W. Baldwin, “And the U.S. Presence,” New York Times, March 22, 1972. 63. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting, Subject: Indian Ocean, October 6, 1971. 64. Ibid. 65. Memorandum from Richard Kennedy and Harold Saunders of the NSC Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), August 9, 1971, SRG Meeting Indian Ocean 10/6/71, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-060, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 66. Ibid.

220  notes to chapter 4

67. David Vine, Island of Shame: The Secret History of the U.S. Military Base on Diego Garcia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 68. Memorandum from Vice Director of the Joint Staff (Freeman) to Secretary of Defense Laird, May 1, 1971, FRUS 1969–76, vol. 24, 100–102. 69. “Imperialist Plans in Persian Gulf: Tass Statement,” Tass, March 3, 1968, FCO 8/517, British National Archives; National Intelligence Estimate, “The Persian Gulf after the British Departure,” April 1, 1917, Persian Gulf, Saunders Files, Box 1276, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 70. Memorandum of Conversation, “Persian Gulf,” January 13, 1970. See also “Persian Gulf: Analytical Summary of IG Response to NSSM 66,” June 4, 1970. 71. John W. Finney, “Indian Ocean Role is Planned by U.S.,” New York Times, January 7, 1972. 72. Telegram from the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dhahran, May 16, 1970, Political Affairs and Relations (POL) 7 BAHRAIN IS, Central Files 1970–73, Record Group 59, NARA. 73. Telegram on U.S. Forces in Bahrain after 1971, August 8, 1968, FCO 8/517, British National Archives; NSC Report on “Non-Strategic Naval Limitations in the Indian Ocean,” February 15, 1972, NSSM 104 [2 of 2], NSSM Files, Study Memorandums (1969– 74), Box H-176, National Security Council Institution (H-Files), Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 74. State Department Telegram 187449 from U.S. Embassy in Tehran to the Secretary of State, November 19, 1970, NSSM 104 [2 of 2], NSSM Files, Study Memorandums (1969–74), Box H-176, National Security Council Institution (H-Files), Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 75. Telegram from the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dhahran, May 16, 1970. 76. DOD/JCS Proposed Changes, Memorandum from Harold H. Saunders and Richard T. Kennedy to Dr. Kissinger, “NSC Review Group Meeting—Persian Gulf,” June 3, 1970, Persian Gulf 6/5/1970, Senior Review Group Meetings, Meeting Files (1969–74), Box H-046, National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files), Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 77. “Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf,” n.d. 1970, NLC-132-176-13-1-5. See also NSSM 66, Box H-156, RMNL. 78. The initial basing agreement was for six months, with annual renewals thereafter. Master Plan: Administrative Support Unit Bahrain, August 1982, Folder: ASU-Bahrain 1979–89, Winkler Papers; Memorandum for Mr. Henry A. Kissinger from Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., “New York Times article on the Middle East Force Agreement,” January 6, 1972, Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat, 1969–74, Country FilesMiddle East, Box 632, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL; “Foreign Base Pacts Backed at Hearing,” New York Times, February 2, 1972.

notes to chapter 4 221

79. Telegram from SECDEF OASD: PA to RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR on “Shore Support of the Commander Middle East Force,” Dated R062049Z January 1972, Winkler Papers; Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, “U.S. Presence in the Persian Gulf—Summary of Developments,” March 13, 1972, NSDM 92, National Security Decision Memoranda, Box H–220, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 80. For a detailed report on Bahrain’s facilities, see enclosure in Memorandum from Commander, Atlantic Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, to Commander Middle East Force, “Facilities Study for Commander Middle East Force and Naval Control of Shipping Office Bahrain Persian Gulf,” September 30, 1971, Winkler Papers; Drew Middleton, “Bahrain Is Said to Relent on U.S. Base,” New York Times, October 4, 1974. 81. John W. Finneys, “U.S. Agreement with Bahrain to Set up Navy Base Disclosed,” New York Times, January 6, 1972. 82. Ibid. 83. Emile Nakhleh, Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 112–13. 84. NSC Report on “Non-Strategic Naval Limitations in the Indian Ocean,” February 15, 1972. 85. National Intelligence Estimate Number 30-1-67, “The Persian Gulf States,” May 18, 1967. 86. Memorandum from C. A. Crocker for Colonel Kennedy, “The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Twilight of the Pax Britannica,” October 12, 1970. 87. Peter Hopkirk, “Bahrain Anxiety Replaces Calm,” The Times (London), February 6, 1980. 88. Biographical Sketch of Bahrain’s Amir ‘Isa ibn Salman al Khalifa, Central Intelligence Agency, March 22, 1976. 89. National Intelligence Estimate Number 30-1-67, “The Persian Gulf States,” May 18, 1967. 90. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence Files, Job 79–T00832A, “The Persian Gulf: The End of Pax Britannica,” September 21, 1972. 91. “Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf,” n.d. 1970, NLC-132-176-13-1-5. See also NSSM 66, Box H-156, RMNL. 92. Ibid. 93. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence Files, Job 79–T00832A, “The Persian Gulf.” 94. Airgram from the Department of State to the Embassies in Turkey, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and Iran, December 28, 1972, FRUS 1969–76, vol. 24, 115–16. 95. National Intelligence Estimate Number 30-1-67, “The Persian Gulf States,” May 18, 1967. 96. Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: US-UK Talks on Persian Gulf, March 11, 1969.

222  notes to chapter 4

97. National Intelligence Estimate Number 30-1-67, “The Persian Gulf States,” May 18, 1967. 98. Ibid. 99. National Security Council Group Memorandum, “Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf,” n.d., Persian Gulf 6/5/1970, Box H-046, RMNL. See also Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: US-UK Talks on Persian Gulf, March 11, 1969. 100. “Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf,” n.d. 1970, NLC-132-176-13-1-5. See also NSSM 66, Box H-156, RMNL; Mahesh K. Nalla and Graeme R. Newman, eds., Community Policing in Indigenous Communities (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013), 4–6. 101. Memorandum for the President from Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr., “Persian Gulf,” March 10, 1970. 102. Paper Prepared by the National Security Staff, “Persian Gulf: Analytical Summary of IG Response to NSSM 66,” June 4, 1970. 103. Memorandum from Harold H. Saunders to Henry A. Kissinger, “Military Supply Policy for the Lower Persian Gulf States, July 12, 1972, NSDM 186, National Security Decision Memorandums Files, Policy Papers (1969–74), Box H-236, National Security Council Institution (H-Files), Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 104. Memorandum from C. A. Crocker for Colonel Kennedy, “The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Twilight of the Pax Britannica,” October 12, 1970. 105. Airgram from the Department of State to the Embassies in Turkey, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and Iran, December 28, 1972, 115–16. 106. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence Files, Job 79– T00832A, “The Persian Gulf.” 107. Biographical Sketch of Bahrain’s Amir ‘Isa ibn Salman al Khalifa; Joseph A. Kechichian, Power and Succession in Arab Monarchies: A Reference Guide (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008b), 71–73. 108. Telegram from the Department of State to Secretary of State Rogers in Australia, Tosec 93/116175, June 28, 1972, FRUS 1969–76, vol. 24, 368. 109. Telegram to the Right Honorable James Callahan, MP, December 18, 1975, FCO 8/2415, British National Archives. 110. Adoption of the national constitution was realized on June 2, 1973. Biographical Sketch of Bahrain’s Amir ‘Isa ibn Salman al Khalifa; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence Files, Job 79–T00832A, “The Persian Gulf.” See also U.S. State Department Telegram Ref. Manama 698, “Amir Wishes Closest US-Bahrain Relations,” November 14, 1973, Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat, 1969–74, Country Files-Middle East, Box 632, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL; Fred H. Lawson, Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 87–90. 111. Memorandum from Harold H. Saunders to Henry A. Kissinger, “Military Supply Policy for the Lower Persian Gulf States,” July 12, 1972, NSDM 186, RMNL.

notes to chapter 4 223

112. See Joshua Teitelbaum, ed., Political Liberalization of the Persian Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 113. Cooley 2008, 56–57. 114. Oral Interview with Hamza A. M. Kaedi, December 2, 1998, Naval Historical Center, Folder: Hamza Kaedi, Winkler Papers; Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945, 3rd ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 69–70. 115. Richard Eder, “4 More Arab Governments Bar Oil Supplies for U.S.,” New York Times, October 22, 1973; Yergin 2009, 588–91. 116. Edward Cow, “A Saudi Threat on Oil Reported,” New York Times, October 16, 1973. 117. Michael C. Hudson, “Bahrain, the Gulf ’s ‘Guinea-Pig Society,’” New York Times, November 1, 1979. 118. Biographical Sketch of Bahrain’s Amir ‘Isa ibn Salman al Khalifa. See also Drew Middleton, “U.S. Navy Setback Giving Soviet an Edge in Mideast,” New York Times, November 10, 1973, and “Bahrain Orders U.S. Navy to Leave Dock Facilities,” New York Times, October 21, 1973. 119. Lippman, “Bahrain Sets Limit on U.S. Use of Port,” Washington Post, May 14, 1977. 120. Biographical Sketch of Bahrain’s Amir ‘Isa ibn Salman al Khalifa. 121. Middleton 1973. 122. Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to the President, “NSSM on Overseas Military Base Structure,” n.d. 1973, NSSM 196 [1 of 2], NSSM Files, Study Memorandums (1969–74), Box H-203, National Security Council Institution (H-Files), Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 123. See Cooley 2008; Kent Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 124. U.S. State Department Telegram Ref. Manama 698, “Amir Wishes Closest USBahrain Relations,” November 14, 1973. 125. U.S. State Department Telegram Ref. State 201367, “Safety of American Citizens,” October 11, 1973, Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat, 1969– 74, Country Files-Middle East, Box 632, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 126. U.S. State Department Telegram Ref. Manama 698, “Amir Wishes Closest USBahrain Relations,” November 14, 1973. 127. Kechichian 2008b, 72–74; Biographical Sketch of Bahrain’s Amir ‘Isa ibn Salman al Khalifa. 128. Kissinger’s approach to the announcement had always been to “play it calm and cool and let the events in the area and climate move along.” See State Department Staff Meeting, Attached to Decision Summary Dated July 17, 1974, Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings, 1973–77, Department of State Records, Box 4, Record Group 59, NARA, Digital National Security Archive; U.S. State Department Tele-

224  notes to chapter 4

gram Ref. Manama 0514, “Retaining Middle East Force in Bahrain,” July 17, 1974, Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat, 1969–74, Country Files-Middle East, Box 632, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL; Associated Press, “Arab Nations Lift Oil Ban on Dutch,” New York Times, July 11, 1974. 129. U.S. State Department Telegram Ref. Manama 00470, “Status Middle East Force,” July 3, 1974, Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat, 1969–74, Country Files-Middle East, Box 632, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 130. U.S. State Department Telegram Ref. Manama 0397, “Status of MidEastFor in Bahrain,” June 18, 1974, Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat, 1969– 74, Country Files-Middle East, Box 632, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL; U.S. State Department Telegram Ref. Manama 0495, “Retaining Middle East Force in Bahrain,” July 11, 1974, Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat, 1969– 74, Country Files-Middle East, Box 632, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL; U.S. State Department Telegram Ref. Manama 0475, “Meeting with Prime Minister,” July 4, 1974, Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat, 1969–74, Country Files-Middle East, Box 632, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials. 131. U.S. State Department Telegram Ref. Manama 0514, “Retaining Middle East Force in Bahrain,” July 17, 1974. 132. State Department Staff Meeting, Attached to Decision Summary Dated July 17, 1974. Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings, 1973–77. 133. U.S. State Department Telegram Ref. Manama 0527, “Remaining Middle East Force in Bahrain,” July 22, 1974, Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat, 1969–74, Country Files-Middle East, Box 632, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 134. State Department Staff Meeting; Attached to Decision Summary Dated July 17, 1974, Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings, 1973–77. 135. U.S. State Department Telegram Ref. Manama 0538, “Retention MidEastFor in Bahrain,” July 24, 1974, Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Muscat, 1969–74, Country Files-Middle East, Box 632, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, RMNL. 136. “Bahrain: Suspension of Democratic Life,” An Nahar Arab Report, no. 35, September 1, 1975, FCO 8/2415, British National Archives. 137. Ibid.; Kechichian 2008b, 74–75. 138. Nakhleh 2011, 169. 139. Eric Pace, “Bahrain Says Continued U.S. Use of Naval Station Depends on Support for Arab Cause in MidEast,” New York Times, March 9, 1975; Fred Emery, “Bahrain Asks U.S. Navy to Withdraw,” The Times (London), October 1, 1975. 140. Biographical Sketch of Bahrain’s Amir ‘Isa ibn Salman al Khalifa; “Izvestiya Reports Bahrain—U.S. Base Conflict,” Moscow Izvestiya, October 1, 1975, FBIS-SOV-75-193 on 1975-10-03.

notes to chapter 4 225

141. Telegram from F. Gallagher, October 14, 1975, FCO 8/2415, British National Archives; “The Secretary’s 8 AM Staff Meeting, Wednesday, August 6, 1975,” Transcripts of Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings, 1973–76, Executive Secretariat, Box 7, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, NARA, Digital National Security Archive. 142. Telegram to the Honourable I. T. M. Lucas from the British Embassy Bahrain, August 26, 1975; Telegram from Bahrain 090845Z on “Bahrain Internal,” September 9, 1975; Telegram from F. Gallagher, October 14, 1975; Biographical Sketch of Bahrain’s Amir ‘Isa ibn Salman al Khalifa; “Bahrain Crisis over U.S. Base Discussed,” Moscow Daily Report, August 29, 1975, FBIS-SOV-75-171 on 1975-09-03. 143. “Arms Shipment for Bahrain Seized, 31 Arrested,” and “Bahrain Arms Shipment: 2 Links with Arab Communist Organization,” Qatar News Agency, n.d. 1975; Malcolm Ward, “Sabotage Ring Smashed: Arms Seized, Security Forces Arrest Left-Wing Plotters,” n.d. 1975, FCO 8/2415, British National Archives. 144. Administrative Support Unit Bahrain, Draft of Master Plan, May 1988. 145. The U.S. Navy has been accused by some as a driving factor behind the dissolution of the national assembly. Based upon British and American government documents and other news reports from the period, it appears that the national assembly’s inability to pass legislation was the primary reason that motivated the Khalifas to call for its dissolution. See Translation of the Prime Minister’s Letter of Resignation to his Highness the Amir of the State of Bahrain, August 24, 1975; Memo by T. J. Clark, Middle East Department, on “Bahrain: Internal Situation,” September 9, 1975, FCO 8/2415, British National Archives; Telegram from the British Embassy Bahrain to T. J. Clark, September 9, 1975, FCO 8/2415, British National Archives; “Bahrain: Suspension of Democratic Life.” 146. “For the U.S. Navy, a Strategic Setback in the Persian Gulf,” U.S. News and World Report, June 6, 1977. 147. “The Secretary’s 8 AM Staff Meeting, Wednesday, August 6, 1975,” Transcripts of Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings, 1973–76. 148. Pace 1975. 149. Crowe 1993, 169–70; Pace 1975. 150. Crowe 1993, 163. 151. COMIDEASTFOR to CINCUSNAVEUR, message dated 130803Z March 1976, MEF Admin. Correspondence, 1967–87; David F. Winkler, Amirs, Admirals & Desert Sailors: Bahrain, the U.S. Navy, and the Arabian Gulf (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 75. 152. “Eviction from Bahrain: For the U.S. Navy, a Strategic Setback in the Persian Gulf,” U.S. News and World Report 82, no. 22, July 22, 1977, FCO 8/2872, British National Archives; “Bahrain Is Ending Port Services for U.S. Navy,” New York Times, June 30, 1977. 153. “For the U.S. Navy, a Strategic Setback in the Persian Gulf,” U.S. News and World Report, June 6, 1977.

226  notes to chapter 4

154. Oakley, National Security Council Report approved by General Scowcroft: “NSSM 238: US Policy toward the Persian Gulf,” January 12, 1977. 155. Ibid. 156. William E. Schmidt, “Somewhere East of Suez; Weighing Anchor,” Newsweek, July 11, 1977. 157. Lippman, “Bahrain Sets Limit on U.S. Use of Port,” Washington Post, May 14, 1977. 158. Winkler 2007, 80. 159. Lippman, “Bahrain Sets Limit on U.S. Use of Port,” Washington Post, May 14, 1977. 160. “For the U.S. Navy, a Strategic Setback in the Persian Gulf,” U.S. News and World Report, June 6, 1977; Lippman, “Bahrain Sets Limit on U.S. Use of Port,” Washington Post, May 14, 1977. 161. Memorandum from Cyrus Vance to the President, June 27, 1977, Jimmy Carter Library, Plains File, NLC-128-12-9-19-7. 162. Telegram from CNO Washington, DC, to CINCUSNAVEUR London UK, dated R110059Z August1979, Folder: MEF Admin Correspondence, 1967–87; Master Plan: Administrative Support Unit Bahrain, August 1982, Folder: ASU-Bahrain 1979–89. 163. See Principal of Bahrain International School Dr. Rod Wannebo (1971–90s); Master Plan: Administrative Support Unit Bahrain, August 1982, Folder: ASU-Bahrain 1979–89; U.S. Naval Control of Shipping Office, Bahrain, 1974 Command History, Folder: NCSO Bahrain CH 1974–78, Winkler Papers. 164. Memorandum on Service support for units assigned to COMIDEASTFOR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, November 20, 1979; Telegram from CINCUSNAVEUR London UK to COMNAVMILPERSCOM, Washington, DC, dated R 051626Z May 81, Folder: MEF Admin Correspondence, 1967–87; Memorandum from Commanding Officer, USS La Salle to Director of Naval History, “USS La Salle Command History for 1977,” February 28, 1978, Folder: LaSalle CH 1973–77, Winkler Papers. 165. William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000, 2nd ed.), 287–92. 166. Lutfi Nasr, “Afghanistan-Muslim World,” Akhbar al-Khalij (Bahrain), August 10, 1979, FCO 8/3308, British National Archives. 167. Chronology of Significant Events, Administrative Support Unit and Commander Joint Task Force Middle East/Commander Middle East Force for the 1985–89 period, which are held in the Post 1974 Command File, October 28, 1998, Winkler Papers. 168. Oles M. Smolansky with Bettie M. Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), ch. 6. 169. Telegram from CINCUSNAVEUR London UK to CNO Washington, DC, dated R 031357Z September 80, Rotation of Middle East Force Flagship: GOB Request for Careful Publicity, Folder: MEF Admin Correspondence, 1967–87, Winkler Papers.

notes to chapter 4 227

170. “Bahrain’s Freedom and Arab Character Will Be Maintained,” Al-Mawakef, no. 282, June 25, 1979, 3, FCO 8/3308, British National Archives; Hopkirk 1980. 171. Telegram to R. Lumb from O. Paget, NBB 021/1, December 7, 1979, FCO 8/3308, British National Archives. 172. Jonathan C. Randal, “U.S. Raid Triggers Arab Criticism, Protests in Bahrain,” Washington Post, April 27, 1980. 173. Translation of an interview with the Bahrain Prime Minister in Akhbar alKhalij, Telegram from British Embassy Bahrain, no. 179, August 8, 1979, FCO 8/3308, British National Archives; Otto C. Doelling, untitled, Associated Press, October 28, 1979. 174. Doelling 1979; Randal 1980; Hopkirk 1980. 175. Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Saudis, Stressing Regional Stability, See Soviet Threat,” New York Times, October 4, 1979. 176. Doelling 1979. See also John Kifner, “Arab Voicing Fear about Persian Gulf,” New York Times, October 20, 1979. 177. Nicolas B. Tatro, “Arab Officials Wary of U.S. Bases,” Associated Press, January 11, 1981. 178. “Advice from Bahrain: You’ve Got to Support Your Friends,” U.S. News and World Report, April 2, 1979. 179. Master Plan: Administrative Support Unit Bahrain, August 1982, Folder: ASUBahrain 1979–89. 180. Richard Halloran, “Crises Impelling U.S. to Plan Permanent Naval Presence in Indian Ocean,” New York Times, January 5, 1980; Stuart Auerbach, “U.S. Fleet in Gulf Keeps Low Silhouette; Ducking Intervention Charges,” Washington Post, September 27, 1980. 181. Telegram from H. B. Walker to H. D. A. C. Miers, May 31, 1980, FCO 8/3499, British National Archives; Discussion Paper, “US Relations with Arab States of Persian Gulf,” n.d., National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–81 (on CREST computer at Library), NLC-132-109-7-2-5, JCL. See also Auerbach 1980; Tatro 1981; “Iran: Effects of a Total or Import Blockade,” n.d. 1980, Staff Material: Middle East, NLC-25-143-6-5-5, JCL; George C. Wilson, “Administration Plans Jet Sale to Bahrain in $180 Million Deal,” Washington Post, September 23, 1982. 182. Discussion Paper, “US Relations with Arab States of Persian Gulf.” See also Oral Interview with Rear Admiral John F. Addams (Ret.), March 2, 1999, Naval Historical Center, Folder: RADM John F. Addams (1983–86), Winker Papers. 183. For example, see Cooley 2008, 218. 184. Administrative Support Unit Bahrain, Draft of Master Plan, May 1988. 185. Chronology of Significant Events, Administrative Support Unit and Commander Joint Task Force Middle East/Commander Middle East Force for the 1985–89 period, which are held in the Post 1974 Command File, October 28, 1998. 186. Tatro 1981; Auerbach 1980. 187. Beginning in the late 1960s, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia began surveying how

228  notes to chapters 4 and 5

to construct a causeway to connect the two countries. It is perhaps no coincidence that construction began shortly after the Iranian Revolution and commencement of the Iran-Iraq War. Saudi Arabia was worried about a Shi’a infiltration into the eastern Gulf after 1979. More important, the King Fahd Causeway, as it was called, placed Bahrain’s future fate into Saudi Arabia’s hands and made the two countries physically bound to one another. See “History of Causeway,” King Fahd Causeway Authority, available at www.kfca.com.sa/about_his.htm. 188. See Cooley 2008, 24, 218. Chapter 5

1. Note by the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Subject: Arabia—Acquisition of Masirah Island as a permanent R.A.F. Base, Appendix: Masirah Island, 1945, AIR 2–7075, British National Archives; Lord Chalfont, “Russia and the Indian Ocean: New Attitudes to Sea Power,” New Middle East, no. 44, May 1972, 4–6, Box 8, Graham Papers, John Graham Collection, GB 165-0327, MECA, Oxford; Robert W. Love, Jr., History of the U.S. Navy, 1942–1991, vol. 2 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992), 687–96. 2. Oman—Withdrawal from Masirah and Salalah, Disposal of Assets, January 25, 1977, D/DS20/17/3/11, DEFE 24/1335, British National Archives; Note by the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Subject: Arabia—Acquisition of Masirah Island as a permanent R.A.F. Base, 1945; D. L. Price, “Oman: Insurgency and Development,” Conflict Studies, no. 53, January 1975, Box 8, Graham Papers, John Graham Collection, GB 165-0327, MECA, Oxford. 3. David Holden, “Americans Not Taking Over Oman Base from RAF, Sultan insists,” The Times, February 4, 1977, FCO 8/2955, British National Archives. 4. Michael O’Sullivan, “New Base for U.S. in Mid-East,” The Guardian, February 2, 1977; “East-of-Suez Farewell,” Sunday Times, January 30, 1977, and Interview by Douglas Stuart with David Holden, n.d., FCO 8/2955, British National Archives. 5. Draft Letter from J. E. Jackson to W. J. A. Wilberforce on U.S. Proposal for the Use of Masirah, February 11, 1975, DP 14/2; Letter from J. E. Jackson to Mr. Clark, MED, February 3, 1975, DP 14/2, FCO 46/1292, British National Archives. 6. U.S. State Department Paper on “U.S. Efforts in Oman,” September 14, 1981, DEFE 24/2108, British National Archives. 7. Herman Frederick Eilts, “Foreign Policy Perspectives,” in Crosscurrents in the Gulf: Arab Regional and Global Interests, ed. H. Richard Sindelar and J. E. Petersen (London: Routledge, 1988), 28–36, Box 4/2, Foreign Affairs, 1988–92, Ian Skeet Collection, GB 1650329, MECA, Oxford. 8. Robert Wright, Our Man in Tehran: The True Story behind the Secret Mission to Save Six Americans during the Iran Hostage Crisis and the Foreign Ambassador Who Worked with the CIA to Bring Them Home (New York: Other Press, 2010), 320–24.

notes to chapter 5 229

9. Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from Defense Policy Coordination, Evening Post, May 7, 1980, Staff Material: Defense Security, NLC-31-212-9-15-7, JCL; Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the American Embassy in Amman, May 15, 1980, Staff Material: Middle East, NLC-25-73-12-2-9, JCL. See also Michael Getler, “Oman Again Receptive to U.S. Use of Its Bases,” Washington Post, May 12, 1980, available from Dow Jones Factiva. 10. For example, see Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 257, 266. 11. For a further discussion on arms transfers and economic aid, see R. Harkavy, Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 356. 12. Sultan Qaboos speech in response to the Lord Mayor of London, March 18, 1962, Sultan’s Armed Forces Association Newsletter, no. 29, June 1982, Box 1, Sultan’s Armed Forces Association, GB 165-0333, MECA, Oxford. 13. Sultanate of Oman Development Council, “The Five-Year Development Plan, 1976–1980,” Box 4/1, Development Plans, 1976–96, GB 165-0329, Ian Skeet Collection, MEC, Oxford. 14. Robert Graham, “Oman: Foreign Policy/Defense—A Stance of Its Own,” Financial Times Survey, November 17, 1976, 19, Western Media Press Cuttings, 10/2, Charles Hepworth Collection, GB 165-0410, MECA, Oxford; Oman Background Notes, August 1981, U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public of Affairs, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, White House Staff and Office Files, Speechwriting, Office of Research Office: Records, Box 113, 09/08/1983 Taping: US-Oman Anniversary of Treaty of Amity and Commerce. 15. Oman Background Notes, August 1981. 16. Thomas J. Abercrombie, “Oman: Guardian of the Gulf,” National Geographic, September 1981: 344-376, 04/12/1983 State Visit: Sultan Qaboos of Oman (3), Speechwriting, Office of Research Office: Records, Box 90, White House Staff and Office Files, Ronald Reagan Library (RRL). See also “Oman,” 09/08/1983 Taping: US-Oman Anniversary of Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Speechwriting, Office of Research Office: Records, Box 113, White House Staff and Office Files, RRL. 17. Oman Background Notes, August 1981. 18. Oman began exporting oil only in 1967. Gill Marais and Geoffroy Gaussen, “The Traveler Reports: Oman,” Traveler 16, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 14–19, Western Media Press Cuttings, 10/2, Charles Hepworth Collection, GB 165-0410, MECA, Oxford; “The Dhofar Rebellion,” September 28, 1977, Box 3/4, Materials Acquired by Searle, 1977–78, Pauline Searle Collection, GB 165-0328, MECA, Oxford. 19. For additional good background on the Dhofar War, see Mark Valeri, Oman: Politics and Society in the Qaboos State (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 58–64; Ian Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan: A First-hand Account of the Dhofar In-

230  notes to chapter 5

surgency (London: Pen and Sword, 2006); Graham, “Oman: Foreign Policy/Defense— A Stance of Its Own”; Historical Background Brief—Revolution in Oman, n.d., 2/2/3, Charles Hepworth Collection, GB 165-0410, MECA, Oxford. 20. “The Dhofar Rebellion,” September 28, 1977. 21. “East-of-Suez Farewell,” Sunday Times, January 30, 1977; Stephen Webbe, “Oman’s Uneasy Sultan,” Christian Science Monitor, March 25, 1980, 04/12/1983 State Visit: Sultan Qaboos of Oman (1), Speechwriting, Office of Research Office: Records, Box 90, White House Staff and Office Files, RRL. 22. Oman Background Notes, August 1981. 23. Memorandum for Mr. Bowdler from William Wolle, Oman: The Sultanate is not about to go under, April 16, 1979, Staff Material: Middle East, NLC-25-73-7-14-2, JCL. 24. Oman: Position of Loan Service Personnel under the Reorganisation of the Sultan of Oman’s Forces, February 4, 1977, E29/1, DEFE 24/1850, British National Archives; “His Majesty Sultan Qaboos Bin Said Al-Said Sultan of Oman: A Biography,” 04/12/1983 State Visit: Sultan Qaboos of Oman (2), Speechwriting, Office of Research Office: Records, Box 90, White House Staff and Office Files, RRL. 25. Oman Background Notes, August 1981. 26. Memorandum on South Asia-Middle East Communist Groups, February 1, 1979, Brzezinski Material: Brzezinski Office File, NLC-15-127-7-5-3, JCL. 27. “Iraq: A View of the Gulf,” July 21, 1978, Staff Material: Office NLC-17-139-8-1-1, JCL. 28. Price 1975; Eilts 1988, 28–36. 29. Television Interview with H. E. Qais Abdulmunem al Zawawi—Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, May 26, [n.d.], Box 3/3, Material Created by Searle, 1972–76, Pauline Searle Collection, GB 165-0328, MECA, Oxford; Letter to Zbigniew Brzezinski from Oles M. Smolansky of Lehigh University, February 7, 1977, CO 118 Executive 1/20/77–1/20/81, Box CO-48, White House Central Files, JCL. 30. Valeri 2009, 122–23; Francis Owtram, A Modern History of Oman: Formation of the State since 1920 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 136–37. 31. Head of State, [Post 1981], Box 9/2, Personalities in Government, c1981–83, Julian Paxton Collection, GB 165-0331; G. L. Bondarevskiy, “The Continuing Western Interest in Oman—As Seen from Moscow,” New Middle East, no. 35 (August 1971): 11–15, Box 8, Graham Papers, GB 165-0327, John Graham Collection; Ian Skeet, draft chapters from book manuscript on Oman, December 3, 1990, Box 1/1, Correspondence, 1972–90, Ian Skeet Collection, GB 165-0329, MECA, Oxford; Robert B. Oakley, National Security Council Report approved by General Scowcroft: “NSSM 238: US Policy toward the Persian Gulf,” January 12, 1977, Staff Material: Middle East, NLC-25-72-7-3-5, JCL; Whitehead Middle East Ltd. And Birks Sinclair Ltd., “Ophier: Oman Perspectives on Human Investment Exports and Regeneration,” Draft Final Report Parts I and II, c 1989, Box 2/2, Economy and Finance, c 1989–94, Ian Skeet Collection, GB 165-0329, MECA, Oxford.

notes to chapter 5 231

32. By 1976, oil revenues accounted for approximately 58.5 percent of Oman’s GDP. “Sultan’s Armed Forces Association Newsletter,” no. 40, March 1991, Box 1, Sultan’s Armed Forces Association, GB 165-0333, MECA, Oxford; Dana Adams Schmidt, “Oman to Seek Guerillas’ Amity,” New York Times, August 24, 1970. 33. His Majesty the Sultan’s Armed Forces, May 1978, Box 3/4, Material Acquired by Searle, 1977–78, Pauline Searle Collection, GB 165-0328, MECA, Oxford; Alvin J. Cottrell, Military Forces in the Persian Gulf, The Washington Papers 6, no. 60 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1978), 47–50. 34. Speech by His Majesty Sultan Qaboos Bin Said, Sultan of Oman, November 18, 1980, Box 8/4, Speeches given by the Sultan of Oman, 1980–98; “Oman: An Introduction,” Aramco World Magazine 34, no. 3 (May–June 1983): 2, Box 8, Graham Papers, John Graham Collection, GB 165-0327, MECA, Oxford. 35. “Oman,” 09/08/1983 Taping. 36. Oman ’83, 04/12/1983 State Visit: Sultan Qaboos of Oman (4), Speechwriting, Office of Research Office: Records, Box 90, White House Staff and Office Files, RRL; Oman Background Notes, August 1981. 37. “Sultan’s Armed Forces Association Newsletter,” no. 40, March 1991, Box 1, Sultan’s Armed Forces Association, GB 165-0333, MECA, Oxford; Whitehead Middle East Ltd. and Birks Sinclair Ltd., Ophier: Oman Perspectives on Human Investment Exports and Regeneration,” Draft Final Report Parts I and II, c 1989, Box 2/2, Economy and Finance, c 1989–94, Ian Skeet Collection, GB 165-0329, MECA, Oxford; Civil Aid Department—Southern Region, October 20, 1977, and Reign of His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said, September 27, 1977, Box 3/4, Material Acquired by Searle, 1977–78, Pauline Searle Collection, GB 165-0328, MECA, Oxford; Education in Oman, Department Series Middle East Department, DS no. 10/18, September 16, 1981, DEFE 24/2108, British National Archives; “The Simple Secrets of Oman’s Success,” Washington Times, April 8, 1983. 38. Ann Fyfe, “Oman: Hatred of Communism Abounds amid Improved Lifestyle,” The Times, November 18, 1976, Western Media Press cuttings, 10/2, Charles Hepworth Collection, GB 165-0410, MECA, Oxford. 39. Eilts 1988, 28–36. 40. Draft Action Memorandum to the Secretary from Harold H. Saunders, Strategy Paper for Oman, n.d., Staff Material: Middle East, NLC-25-73-7-13-3, JCL. 41. Price 1975; Oakley, National Security Council Report approved by General Scowcroft: “NSSM 238: US Policy toward the Persian Gulf,” January 12, 1977. 42. Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 86. 43. Chalfont, “Russia and the Indian Ocean”; Security Policy toward Oman, Memorandum from Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. to Henry A. Kissinger, March 5, 1975, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia, NSSM 217, Presidential Directives, part II, Item Number: PR01292, available from ProQuest; Evolu-

232  notes to chapter 5

tion of Our Policy toward Oman, Action Memorandum from Clinton E. Granger and Robert Bigger Oakley to Henry Kissinger, NSSM 217 Related, January 29, 1975, Presidential Directives, part II, Item Number: PR01291, National Security Council, available from ProQuest. 44. Security Policy toward Oman, March 5, 1975, NSSM 217. 45. Note by the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Subject: Arabia—Acquisition of Masirah Island as a permanent R.A.F. Base, Appendix: Masirah Island, 1945; Security Policy toward Oman, March 5, 1975. 46. Oman—Withdrawal from Masirah and Salalah, Disposal of Assets, January 25, 1977; Note by the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Subject: Arabia—Acquisition of Masirah Island as a permanent R.A.F. Base, 1945; Security Policy toward Oman, March 5, 1975; Agenda Paper on Indian Ocean Facilities for Thursday’s SCC, n.d., Staff Material: Defense/Security, NLC-31-214-13-2-4, JCL. 47. Presidential Review Committee Meeting, National Security Council, November 30, 1978, Staff: Middle East, NLC-25-122-9-14-5, JCL. 48. Oman—Withdrawal from Masirah and Salalah, Disposal of Assets, January 25, 1977. 49. Webbe 1980. 50. Graham, “Oman: Foreign Policy/Defense—A Stance of Its Own”; Miriam Joyce, The Sultanate of Oman: A Twentieth Century History (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 115. 51. Robert Graham, “Oman: Modern State in Embryo,” Financial Times Survey, November 17, 1976, 19, 10/2 Western Media Press Cuttings, GB 165-0410 Charles Hepworth Collection, St. Antony’s College, Oxford University. 52. Draft Letter from J. E. Jackson to W. J. A. Wilberforce on U.S. Proposal for the Use of Masirah, February 11, 1975; Evolution of Our Policy toward Oman, Action Memorandum from Clinton E. Granger and Robert Bigger Oakley to Henry Kissinger, NSSM 217 Related, January 29, 1975. 53. Oman—Withdrawal from Masirah and Salalah, Disposal of Assets, January 25, 1977; National Security Study on U.S. Policy toward Oman, Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to President Gerald A. Ford, NSSM 217 Related, c. January 9, 1975, Presidential Directives, part II, Item Number: PR01290, National Security Council, Digital National Security Archive. 54. Evolution of Our Policy toward Oman, Action Memorandum from Clinton E. Granger and Robert Bigger Oakley to Henry Kissinger, NSSM 217 Related, January 29, 1975. See also National Security Study on U.S. Policy toward Oman, Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to President Gerald A. Ford, NSSM 217 Related, c. January 9, 1975; Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Oman: In Dire Straits,” Newsweek, September 24, 1979, 60–61. 55. Biography of Qays ‘Abd al-Munim Zawawi, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, September 6, 1977, DDRS. 56. Maxwell Orme Johnson, The Military as an Instrument of U.S. Policy in South-

notes to chapter 5 233

west Asia: The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 1979–1982 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 8–10. 57. Carol J. Riphenburg, Oman: Political Development in a Changing World (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 225–26; Owtram 2004, 149; Eilts 1988, 28–36. 58. Letter from Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman to President Carter, January 3, 1979, Oman, 1977–79, NSA-15, Box 36, Brzezinski Material, JCL; Borchgrave 1979; Majid AlKhalili, Oman’s Foreign Policy: Foundation and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009), 85. 59. “Saudi Arabia—The Lesson of Iran—After Six Months,” n.d., Brzezinski Material: Brzezinski Office File, NLC-15-46-7-31-4, JCL. 60. Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, Daily Report, February 15, 1979, Brzezinski Material: Trip File, NLC-4-18-3-6-9, JCL. 61. Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from the Situation Room, Additional Information Items, June 9, 1979, Brzezinski Material: President’s Daily Report File, NLC1-11-1-27-8, JCL; Draft Action Memorandum to the Secretary from Harold H. Saunders, Strategy Paper for Oman, n.d. 62. “PFLO Statement on the Hormuz Strait,” Aden Voice of Oman Revolution, September 29, 1979. 63. Discussion Paper for PRC Meeting on Middle East Security, June 20, 1979, Staff Material: Middle East, NLC-25-141-4-6-8, JCL; Policy Review Committee Meeting on Middle East Security and US Military Presence, June 21–22, 1979, Staff Material: Defense/ Security, NLC-31-11-12-4-8, JCL. 64. The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), or North Yemen, existed from 1962 to 1990 in the western part of present-day Yemen and was inspired by Nasser and the UAR’s Arab national movement. In 1962, YAR rebels deposed recently crowned King Mohammad al-Badr, which sparked Yemen’s northern Civil War that lasted sporadically until 1967. “Saudi Arabia—The Lesson of Iran—After Six Months,” n.d. 65. Memorandum on Military Presence in the Middle East/Persian Gulf, June 18, 1979, Agenda and Papers for PRC Meeting, Staff Material: Staff Secretary, NLC-20-24-21-0, JCL. 66. Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski for the President, NSC Weekly Report #141, May 16, 1980, Plains File, NLC-128-10-3-1-5, JCL. 67. Middle East Peace 1980 special report, in Congress and the Nation, 1977–1980, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1981), retrieved from CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Public Affairs Collection; Johnson 1983, 1–2. 68. Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski for the President, NSC Weekly Report #141, May 16, 1980. 69. Memorandum for Staff Secretary, National Security Council, Indigenous Force Capabilities and Military Assistance Programs, November 7, 1980, Staff Material: Office, NLC-17-44-4-6-5, JCL.

234  notes to chapter 5

70. “Afghanistan: The U.S. Response,” National Security Record, February 1980. 71. Strobe Talbott, “Stay Just on the Horizon, Please,” Time, October 25, 1982, 47–50. 72. Middle East Peace 1980 Special Report. 73. Memorandum for the President from Warren Christopher, December 24, 1979, Plains File, NLC-128-14-14-17-1, JCL. 74. Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron from Fritz Ermarth and Jasper Welch, Near-Term Exercises in the Middle East, January 16, 1980, Staff Material: Middle East, NLC-25-87-3-3-3, JCL. 75. Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from the Situation Room, Additional Information Items, January 28, 1980, Brzezinski Mat’l: President’s Daily Report File, NLC1-13-9-18-8, JCL. 76. Agenda Paper on Indian Ocean Facilities for Thursday’s SCC, n.d.; Special Coordination Committee Meeting on Indian Ocean Access, January 30, 1980, Donated Historical Material–Brzezinski, Zbigniew, NLC-33-14-13-1-5, JCL. 77. Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron from Fritz Ermarth and Jasper Welch, Subject: Indian Ocean Access SCC, January 28, 1980, Donated Historical Material–Brzezinski, Zbigniew, NLC-33-14-13-1-5, JCL; Special Coordination Committee Meeting on Indian Ocean Access, January 30, 1980. 78. Indian Ocean Access SCC, January 28, 1980. 79. Memorandum from Jim McIntyre for the President on Base Access in Kenya, Somalia, and Oman, January 31, 1980, Donated Historical Material–Brzezinski, Zbigniew, NLC-33-14-13-1-5, JCL. See also Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron from Fritz Ermarth and Jasper Welch, Subject: Indian Ocean Access SCC, Insert: Instructions for State/Defense Team Visit to Kenya, Somalia, Oman and Saudi Arabia January 28, 1980. 80. Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron from Fritz Ermarth and Jasper Welch, January 28, 1980. 81. Ibid. 82. Agenda Paper on Indian Ocean Facilities for Thursday’s SCC, n.d.; Special Coordination Committee Meeting on Indian Ocean Access, January 30, 1980. 83. Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron from Fritz Ermarth and Jasper Welch, January 28, 1980. 84. Ibid. 85. Ibid. 86. Memorandum on Oman, January 25, 1980, NLC-33-14-13-1-5, JCL. 87. Ibid. 88. Ibid. 89. Kechichian 1995, 86–87. 90. Eilts 1988, 28–36. 91. Indian Ocean Ports Possible Available for calls by the Marine Amphibious Unit

notes to chapter 5 235

(MAU), n.d., Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf—2/80, Geographic File, Box 15, Donated Historical Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, JCL. 92. Telegram from Reginald Bartholomew to the Secretary of State, Subject: Oman Access, April 4, 1980, Brzezinski Material: General Odom File, NLC-12-44-4-22-2, JCL. 93. Indian Ocean Ports Possible Available for calls by the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), n.d. 94. Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from Fritz Ermarth and Jasper Welch, “Basing (Possible BBV),” January 22, 1980, Meetings—Vance/Brown/Brzezinski: 1/80– 2/80, Subject File, Box 34, Donated Historical Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, JCL. 95. Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron from Fritz Ermarth, Robert Kimmitt, Gary Sick and Jasper Welch, Basing Access, February 27, 1980, Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf—2/80, Geographic File, Box 15, Donated Historical Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, JCL. 96. Ibid. 97. Memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski from Cyrus Vance, Visit of Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, March 3, 1980, Jimmy Carter Library, Brzezinski Material, NSA-15, Box 36, Oman 1980. 98. Ibid. 99. Minister Zawawi came from a wealthy merchant family and was one of Sultan Qaboos’s most trusted advisors. Memorandum for the President from Cyrus Vance, Visit of Qais Zawawi Minister of Foreign Affairs of Oman, March 3, 1980, Jimmy Carter Library, Staff Material: Middle East, NLC-25-73-10-1-2. 100. Memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski from Peter Tarnoff, Executive Secretary, Visit of Omani Foreign Minister, February 23, 1980, Jimmy Carter Library, Brzezinski Material, NSA-15, Box 36, Oman 1980. 101. Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, Visit of Qais Zawawi Minister of Foreign Affairs of Oman, March 3, 1980, Jimmy Carter Library, Staff Material: Middle East, NLC-25-73-10-1-2. 102. Security Framework Follow-up, Political and Economic Actions with Persian Gulf States, February 28, 1980, Jimmy Carter Library, Donated Historical Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Geographic File, Box 15, Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf—2/80; Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron from Fritz Ermarth, Robert Kimmitt, Gary Sick & Jasper Welch, Basing Access, February 27, 1980. 103. Aide Memoire for Oman, March 10, 1980, Oman Bases, 3-10-80, NSA-6, Box 58, Brzezinski Material, JCL. 104. Talbott 1982, 47–50. 105. Khasab, Bakha, Dayah, and Bay’ah are located throughout the Musandam Peninsula at the mouth of the Gulf. “PFLO Statement on US, Egyptian and British Activity in Oman,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 25, 1980.

236  notes to chapter 5

106. Aide Memoire for Oman, March 10, 1980. 107. Ibid. 108. Mini-SCC Meeting on Oman, Somalia, Kenya Facility Access, March 28, 1980, Staff Material: Middle East, NLC-25-68-8-2-0, JCL. 109. Letter for Sultan Qaboos of Oman from President Carter, March 29, 1980, Oman 1980, NSA-15, Box 36, Brzezinski Material, JCL. 110. Telegram from Reginald Bartholomew to the Secretary of State, Subject: Oman Access, April 4, 1980. 111. Telegram from Reginald Bartholomew to the Secretary of State, April 4, 1980, NLC-12-44-4-22-2, JCL; Oman Background Notes, August 1981. 112. Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from Defense Policy Coordination, Evening Report, April 7, 1980, Staff Material: Defense/Security, NLC-31-135-5-7-6, JCL. 113. For further debate see, Alexander Cooley, “Base Politics,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 (November/December 2005): 79–92; Kurt Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward, “New Battle Stations?” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 5 (September/October 2003): 95–103; Harkavy 1989, 324–25. 114. Michael A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833–1992 (New York: Free Press, 1992b), 108–9. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Failed Mission: The Inside Account of the Attempt to Free the Hostages in Iran,” New York Times Magazine, April 18, 1982, 28–30; Richard H. Kyle, The Guts to Try: The Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-scene Desert Commander (New York: Orion, 1990). 115. “Oman Reportedly Cancels U.S. Base Deal,” Associated Press, May 3, 1980; Jeff Gerth and Judith Miller, “U.S. Is Said to Develop Oman as Its Major Ally in the Gulf,” New York Times, March 25, 1985; “Concern over US Military Bases in East Africa,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 16, 1980; “U.S. Rescue Could Have Taken 10 minutes,” Globe and Mail, May 14, 1980; Mark Bowdin, “The Desert One Debacle,” Atlantic Monthly, May 1, 2006. 116. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam, 1982), 516–18; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 498–500; Bowdin 2006. 117. Getler 1980. 118. John K. Cooley, “Aftermath of Rescue Attempt Makes Another Try Tougher,” Christian Science Monitor, May 12, 1980; David B. Ottaway, “U.S., Oman Hold Delicate Negotiations over Bases; Sultanate Pushing for Greater Control over Access to Persian Gulf Facilities,” Washington Post, July 19, 1985. 119. Cooley, “Aftermath of Rescue Attempt Makes Another Try Tougher,” Christian Science Monitor, May 12, 1980. 120. “Oman Reportedly Cancels U.S. Base Deal,” Associated Press, May 3, 1980. 121. Based on handwritten notes on Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski.

notes to chapter 5 237

Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron from William Odom, Omani Threat to Back out of the Base Access Agreement, April 27, 1980, Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf—3/80, Geographic File, Box 15, Donated Historical Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, JCL. 122. Memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski from Fritz Ermarth, Habib Mission to Oman, May 8, 1980, Staff Material: Defense/Security, NLC-31-11-13-15-5, JCL. 123. In an earlier memo, one of the proposals to “sweeten” the basing deal for Oman had been to respond to Oman’s request for a “gift” of six M-60 tanks by giving them these tanks as a “loan.” Memorandum for the Record, “Items from the Restricted Session of the SCC Meeting, April 29, 1980, Serial Xs—[2/1/80–4/15/80],” Subject File, Box 37, Donated Historical Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, JCL. 124. Memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski from Fritz Ermarth, Habib Mission to Oman, May 8, 1980. 125. Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from Defense Policy Coordination, Evening Post, May 7, 1980; Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the American Embassy in Amman, May 15, 1980. See also Getler 1980. 126. Kechichian 1995, 148. 127. Memorandum for the President from Edmund S. Muskie, May 28, 1980, Plains File, NLC-128-15-5-14-3, JCL. 128. U.S. State Department Paper on “U.S. Efforts in Oman,” September 14, 1981; Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski for the President, NSC Weekly Report #141, May 16, 1980; Summary of discussions between Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Oman government officials regarding: U.S.-Oman Relations; the Iraq-Iranian War; the situation in Yemen and Afghanistan; U.S.-Libyan relations. Cable Department of State, February 13, 1982, DDRS. 129. Talbott 1982. 130. Background paper on “US/UK Cooperation in Oman,” September 14, 1981, DEFE 24/2108, British National Archives; Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski for the President, NSC Weekly Report #141, May 16, 1980; Memorandum for Staff Secretary, National Security Council, Indigenous Force Capabilities and Military Assistance Programs, November 7, 1980. 131. Johnson 1983, 43–44; J. A. Duke, “Oman, the Gulf and the United States,” in Oman: Economic, Social, and Strategic Developments, ed. B. R. Pridham (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 186–91. 132. “Interview with Sultan Qaboos of Oman,” Al-Majallah, May 7, 1982, 12–17, FBIS-MEA-V-82-089. 133. Kechichian 1995, 147–48. 134. “U.S. Get Bases in Oman,” Facts on File World News Digest, June 13, 1980; “Oman Liberation Front Representative on the ‘Growing US Presence,’” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 27, 1980.

238  notes to chapter 5

135. Robert H. Reid, “Oman Gives U.S. Military a Foothold in Arabian Peninsula,” Associated Press, December 10, 1985. 136. Fred S. Hoffman, “Oman Puts Restraints on U.S. Show of Muscle,” Associated Press, November 5, 1981. 137. Summary of discussions between Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Oman government officials regarding: U.S.-Oman Relations, February 13, 1982; Dennis Mullin, “Behind Oman’s Move to Bolster Ties with U.S.,” U.S. News and World Report, March 8, 1982. 138. Talbott 1982. 139. Ibid. 140. Drew Middleton, “‘Bright Star’: Omanis Play Balancing Act; Military Analysis,” New York Times, December 7, 1981; Fred S. Hoffman, “Oman Puts Restraints on U.S. Show of Muscle,” Associated Press, November 5, 1981. 141. Al-Khalili 2009, 90. 142. R. K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 13. 143. Speech by His Majesty Sultan Qaboos Bin Said, Sultan of Oman, November 18, 1985, Box 8/4, Speeches given by the Sultan of Oman, 1980–98, John Graham Collection, GB 165-0327, MECA, Oxford; Oman ’83. 144. “Washington Visit by Sultan of Oman: Increase in US Presence,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 4, 1983; Bernard Gwertzman, “President Calls for ‘Bold Move’ by Palestinians,” New York Times, April 13, 1983. 145. Exchange of Toasts between the President and Sultan Qaboos of Oman, April 12, 1983, State Visit: Sultan Qaboos of Oman (Rohrabacher) 04/12/1983 (1), Speechwriting, Office of Speech Drafts: Records, Box 83, White House Staff and Office Files, RRL. 146. See, for example, Letter from I. T. M. Lucas to H. D. A. C. Miers on Oman, the U.S. and the Gulf, February 10, 1980, FCO 8/3545; Interview by Douglas Stuart with David Holden, n.d., 1977, FCO 8/2955, British National Archives. 147. Presidential Remarks, State Visit of Sultan Qaboos of Oman, Draft April 6, 1983 for April 12, 1983, State Visit: Sultan Qaboos of Oman (Rohrabacher) 04/12/1983 (2), Speechwriting, Office of Speech Drafts: Records, Box 83, White House Staff and Office Files, RRL. 148. Arrival Statement for Sultan Qaboos, April 12, 1983, State Visit: Sultan Qaboos of Oman (Rohrabacher) 04/12/1983 (3), Speechwriting, Office of Speech Drafts: Records, Box 83, White House Staff and Office Files, RRL. 149. Another report claimed that up to ten thousand U.S. troops had begun prepositioning on Masirah Island, but because of classification constraints this estimate requires further verification. “US Manoeuvres in Oman: A Threat to the Gulf,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 8, 1982; “Iran—Under the Siege of the Pentagon’s Bases,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 4, 1982.

notes to chapters 5 and 6 239

150. Speech by His Majesty Sultan Qaboos Bin Said, Sultan of Oman, November 18, 1985; Ottaway 1985. 151. Gerth and Miller 1985. 152. Eilts 1988, 28–36. Chapter 6

1. Memo to Lord Carrington from James Craig, “Saudi Arabia: Annual Review for 1980,” January 25, 1981, British Embassy Jedda, 014/2, FCO 8/4200, British National Archives. 2. Author interview with U.S. Department of Defense subject matter expert, February 19, 2014; “Chronology of the 552nd Air Control Wing,” Air Force Historical Research Agency, 552nd Air Control Wing, U.S. Air Force. 3. Roger Harrison, “The Gulf Wars: Nationalism and Threats,” Arab News, April 21, 2010; John Esposito, ed., Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 56–58. 4. Roel Meijer, “The ‘Cycle of Contention’ and the Limits of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia,” in Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society Foreign Affairs, ed. Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman (New York: New York University Press, 2005), 271–300; “Suspect in McDonald’s Arson Will Be Caught and Tried: Naif,” Arab News, November 22, 2002. 5. Robert Lacey, Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia (New York: Viking, 2009), 225–52. 6. Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives, “Saudi Arabia and the United States: The New Context in an Evolving ‘Special Relationship,’” August 1981 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981). 7. Summary Report of INR/XR Conference on Saudi Arabia, April 12, 1979, Saudi Arabia, 4/79, Collection 25, Box 82, Staff Material—Middle East, Subject File, National Security Affairs, JCL; Ali Hassan Alyami, “The Impact of Modernization on the Stability of the Saudi Monarchy,” unpublished dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, ProQuest, UMI Dissertations Publishing, 1977; Abdulaziz Ismail Daghistani, “Economic Development in Saudi Arabia: Problems and Prospects,” unpublished dissertation, University of Houston, ProQuest, UMI Dissertations Publishing, 1979; Thomas Ferris, “Riding the Saudi Boom: Saudis Saudis,” New York Times, March 25, 1979, SM6; Department of State memorandum on Middle East/Southwest Asia: Security Framework in the Persian Gulf Area, n.d., NLC-128-6-19-1-2, JCL. 8. Leigh E. Nolan, “Keeping the Kingdom: The Politics of Higher Education Reform in Saudi Arabia,” unpublished dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, ProQuest, UMI Dissertations Publishing, 2011; Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 224–25;

240  notes to chapter 6

Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 2nd ed.), 146. 9. Memorandum from U.S. Embassy Jidda to Department of State, Subject: Iran: Can It Happen Here? January 14, 1979, NLC-15-46-4-20-9, JCL; Bahri 1982, 502–515. 10. Department of State Country Summary: Saudi Arabia, n.d., Middle East: Saudi Arabia, 10/77–6/78 [CF, O/A 712], Box 36, Counsel Lipshultz, Staff Offices, JCL. 11. J. Birks, I. Seccombe, and C. Sinclair, “Labour Migration in the Arab Gulf States: Patterns, Trends, and Prospects,” International Migration 26, no. 3 (1988): 267–68. 12. Tim Niblock, Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy, and Survival (New York: Routledge, 2006), 72. 13. Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 395. 14. Toby Craig Jones, Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 179–80, 201–2. 15. “Ar-ra’y Al-’Amm Analyzes Saudi-Iranian Tension,” Ar-ra’y Al-’Amm, October 2, 1975, FBIS; Memorandum from Cyrus Vance to President Jimmy Carter, Subject: Your Meeting with Crown Prince Fahd, May 24–25, May 17, 1977, NLC-15-45-11-12-1, JCL. 16. Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhaus, Bricks, Sand and Marble: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Construction in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1947–1991 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History and Corps of Engineers United States Army, 2009), 355–57; Fred Halliday, “A Curious and Close Liaison: Saudi Arabia’s Relations with the United States,” in State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia, ed. Tim Niblock (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 137. 17. CRS Report on Saudi Arabia 1981. 18. Department of State Country Summary: Saudi Arabia, n.d. 19. Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. to Sell Saudis $1.2 Billion in Arms,” New York Times, July 14, 1979. 20. “Defense Minister Speaks on Arab War Production,” Al-Anwar, August 26, 1975, 8, FBIS. 21. Memo on Pakistanis in the Saudi Armed Forces, May 31, 1981, FCO 8/4218, British National Archives. 22. Memorandum from Cyrus Vance to President Jimmy Carter, Subject: Your Meeting with Crown Prince Fahd, May 24–25, May 17, 1977. 23. Sandra Mackey, The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987), 329–30. 24. Gwynne Dyer, “Saudi Arabia,” in World Armies, ed. John Keegan (New York: Facts on File, 1979), 620. 25. Safran 1988, 138–42, 192. 26. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi

notes to chapter 6 241

Arabia, the Military Balances in the Gulf, and Trends in Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 140. 27. Memorandum from Cyrus Vance to President Jimmy Carter, Subject: Your Meeting with Crown Prince Fahd, May 24–25, May 17, 1977. 28. Cordesman 1984, 193–94. 29. “Foreign Report: Saudi Uncertainties,” Economist Newspaper, April 25, 1978, 1–2, Jimmy Carter Library, NSA-6, Brzezinski Material, Box 67, Saudi Arabia 4–7/79. 30. “Amman Radio Reports on Outcome of Camp David,” Amman Domestic Service, September 18, 1978, JN180732Y, FBIS; David W. Lesch, 1979: The Year That Shaped the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), 91–93, 125–39. 31. “Cabinet: Camp David Not ‘Final, Acceptable Formula for Peace,’” Riyadh SNA, September 19, 1978, LD192040Y, FBIS; Memorandum “Saudi Arabia’s Six Crises in 1979: What Effect Did They Have on the Future of the Present SAG?” by Ambassador John West, n.d., NLC-128-4-2-15-7, JCL; Memorandum from Cyrus Vance to the President, Subject: Visit of Prince Saud, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister on Tuesday, October 25, n.d., NLC-15-46-1-17-6, JCL. 32. Memorandum from Cyrus Vance to the President, NLC-15-46-1-17-6. 33. Memorandum from U.S. Embassy Jidda to Department of State, Subject: Iran: Can It Happen Here?, January 14, 1979. 34. Memorandum “Saudi Arabia’s Six Crises in 1979,” n.d.; Elham Manea, Regional Politics in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen (London: Saqi, 2005), 83. 35. “Riyadh Radio Announces U.S. F-15 Fighters to Visit,” Riyadh Domestic Service, January 11, 1979, LD112023Y, FBIS; Bernard Gwertzman, “Saudi Leader Drops His Visit to U.S. Amid Conflicting Explanations,” New York Times, February 24, 1979; Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Oman: In Dire Straits,” Newsweek, September 24, 1979, 1979. 36. “U.S. Regional Military Plan Reportedly Rejected,” Kuwait News Agency, February 13, 1979, LD131130, FBIS; Cordesman 1984, 252–53. 37. “F-15s in Saudi Arabia Aimed at Dividing Arabs,” Ath-Thawrah, January 15, 1979, LD221653, FBIS; “Paper Criticizes Visit of U.S. Planes to Saudi Arabia,” Iraqi News Agency, January 15, 1979, JN150946Y, FBIS; Richard Burt, “Saudis Reject Idea of a U.S. Base,” New York Times, February 27, 1979. 38. Memorandum from U.S. State Department to U.S. Embassy Jidda, Subject: Mecca Mosque incident and Shi’a unrest in the eastern province: Future stability in Saudi Arabia, December 26, 1979, NLC-16-119-5-3-5, Jimmy Carter Library. 39. Summary of Meeting with Prince Saud al-Faysal al-Saud, Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 17, 1979, Prince Saud’s Office in Riyadh, 3:30–5:30 p.m., Serial Xs—3/79, Subject File, Box 36, Donated Historical Material Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, JCL. 40. National Security Inter-Agency Meeting Minutes, White House Situation Room, Subject: Middle East Security Issues, May 11, 1979, NLC-25-124-2-6-9, JCL. 41. Ibid.

242  notes to chapter 6

42. Madawi Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 65–72, 104–6. 43. Cordesman 1984, 231–32. 44. Dispatch from U.S. Embassy in Jidda to U.S. Secretary of State, Subject: Iranian Agitation of Saudi Shi’as and Mecca Mosque Occupation, November 21, 1979, Iran— Saudi Arabia, 1979—Seizure of “Mecca,” Box 35, Chief of Staff Jordan, JCL; “Saudi Arabians Behead 63 for Attack on Mosque,” Washington Post, January 10, 1980; CRS Report on Saudi Arabia 1981. 45. Joseph A. Kechichian, “Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman al-’Utaybi’s Letters to the Saudi People,” Muslims World 80, no. 1 (1980); F. Gregory Gause III, “Official Wahhabism and the Sanctioning of Saudi-US Relations,” in Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and the State, ed. Mohammad Ayoob and Hasan Kosebalaban (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 137–40; CRS Report on Saudi Arabia 1981. 46. CRS Report on Saudi Arabia 1981. 47. John Nielsen et al., “Saudi Arabia: A Shaky U.S. Pillar of Security,” Newsweek, March 3, 1980. 48. “Ministers Discuss Mosque Attack, Internal Development,” Riyadh SNA, December 17, 1979, LD172008, FBIS-MEA-79-244; CRS Report on Saudi Arabia 1981. 49. Jacob Goldberg, “The Shi’i Minority in Saudi Arabia,” in Shi’ism and Social Protest, ed. Juan Cole and Nikki Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 239; Nader Hashemi, “Religious Leaders, Sectarianism, and the Sunni-Shia Divide in Islam,” in Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking, ed. Timothy D. Sisk (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 35–37; Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent (New York: Palgrave, 1999), 196–98. 50. Memorandum “Saudi Arabia’s Six Crises in 1979,” n.d.; Jones 2010, 180–85, 202–3. 51. Memorandum from U.S. State Department to U.S. Embassy Jidda, Subject: Mecca Mosque incident and Shi’a unrest in the eastern province: Future stability in Saudi Arabia, December 26, 1979; Memorandum “Saudi Arabia’s Six Crises in 1979,” n.d.; CRS Report on Saudi Arabia 1981; Al-Rasheed 2010, 141–42. 52. Memo to Lord Carrington from James Craig, “Saudi Arabia: Annual Review for 1980,” January 25, 1981; Memorandum for William P. Clark from Robert M. Kimmitt, Re: Weinberger Trip to the Mideast, February 18, 1982, DDRS; Cordesman 1984, 387. 53. Memorandum “Saudi Arabia’s Six Crises in 1979,” n.d. 54. Department of State memorandum on Middle East/Southwest Asia: Security Framework in the Persian Gulf Area, n.d. 55. Charles Mohr, “Issue and Debate: AWACS for Saudi Arabia: In the National Interest,” New York Times, October 1, 1981. 56. Safran 1988, 404.

notes to chapter 6 243

57. Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. to Sell Saudis $1.2 Billion in Arms,” New York Times, July 14, 1979; Pranay B. Gupte, “Saudis Expect U.S. to Agree on F-15s,” New York Times, February 22, 1981. 58. Memorandum “Saudi Arabia’s Six Crises in 1979,” n.d.; CRS Report on Saudi Arabia, 1981. 59. CRS Report on Saudi Arabia, 1981. 60. Nielsen et al. 1980; Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 104–5. 61. “U.S. to Press for Oman, Kenya, Somalia Outposts,” New York Times, January 10, 1980. 62. Memorandum from Gary Sick to Dr. Brzezinski, “MBB—F-15s Items for Saudi Arabia,” June 10, 1980, DDRS; Memorandum from U.S. Consulate in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia to U.S. Secretary of State on “Secretary Weinberger’s Meeting with Crown Prince Fahd,” February 8, 1982, DDRS. 63. Cordesman 1984, 252–53, 259. 64. Shaul Bakhash, “Iran’s Foreign Policy under the Islamic Republic, 1979–2000,” in Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001), 251–52. 65. F. Gregory Gause, III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 57–72. 66. “King Fahd’s Speech to Hajj Pilgrims,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Middle East, June 25, 1991, 1107 A/1. 67. Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: SCC Meeting on Saudi Request for Military Assistance and Protection, September 27, 1980, NLC-25-45-9-8-8, JCL; “Elf One,” Globalsecurity.org, available at www.globalsecurity. org/military/ops/elf-one.htm; Author interview with Department of Defense official, February 17, 2014; CRS Report on Saudi Arabia, 1981. 68. Statement read by the Department of State Acting Spokesman (Dyess), March 6, 1981, Document 397, in Department of State, American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1981 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 808; Mohr, “Issue and Debate,” New York Times, October 1, 1981; Michael A. Palmer, On Course to Desert Storm: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1992a), 108–9. 69. Statement by the Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 28, 1981, Document 403, in Department of State, American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1981 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 812–13. 70. “Fahd Statement Is ‘Electric Shock’ for West,” Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, February 24, 1981, LD251251, FBIS. 71. “Formation of Gulf Cooperation Council Announced,” Saudi Press Agency, Feb-

244  notes to chapter 6

ruary 14, 1981, LD142145, FBIS; “Commentary on Role of Gulf Cooperation Council,” Riyadh Domestic Service, February 11, 1981, LD 111930, FBIS; Rouhollah K. Ramazani and Joseph A. Kechichian, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1988), 1–11. 72. “6 Arab Nations Plan Rapid Deployment Force,” International Herald Tribune, November 30, 1984; Peter Hellyar, “Hormuz Straits Defence ‘Global Responsibility,’” Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 3, 1984, Folder: RADM John Addams—Newspaper Clippings, Winkler Papers. 73. CRS Report on Saudi Arabia 1981. 74. Anthony Tucker, “The Strategic Implications of the Iran-Iraq War,” Middle East Studies Quarterly 1, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 1989): 58–69. 75. David B. Ottaway, “Kuwait Rejects U.S. Offer of Gulf Tanker Escorts,” Washington Post, March 28, 1987. 76. David Ignatius and Gerald F. Seib, “Widening Gulf: Attack on Saudi Tanker Near Oil Fields Sparks Fears of a Broader War—U.S. Is Ready to Send Help if the Saudis Request It after the Raids by Iran—Oil Market Get More Jittery,” Wall Street Journal, May 17, 1984. 77. Ronald O’Rourke, “The Tanker War,” Proceeding/Naval Review 114, no. 5 (1988): 30–34, Folder: Tanker War, Winkler Papers. 78. Doyle McManus, “Moves beyond Tanker Escorts U.S. Widens Military Goals in Persian Gulf,” Los Angeles Times, July 6, 1988. 79. “Prime Minister Holds News Conference,” Kuwait Domestic Service, July 20, 1987, LD202101, FBIS; Admiral Wesley J. McDonald (ret.), “The Convoy Mission,” Proceeding/ Naval Review 114, no. 5 (1988): 36–44, Folder: Tanker War, Winkler Papers. 80. Tim Carrington. “Tanker War Resumes in Persian Gulf, U.S. Forces May Be Caught in Crossfire,” Wall Street Journal, September 1, 1987; Bernard Gwertzman, “Saudis to Let U.S. Use Bases in Crisis,” New York Times, September 5, 1985. 81. “Commentary on Borders,” Tehran Domestic Service, August 20, 1988, LD2008142488, FBIS; Patrick E. Tyler, “Iran Says Terms Set for Peace,” Washington Post, October 9, 1988. 82. “Behind Iraq’s Grab for Kuwait Sagging Economy, Stalemate on POWs, and Heavy Debt Prompted Move, Analysts Say,” The Christian Science Monitor, August 7, 1990. 83. F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), 119–23. 84. “Twenty Years after the End of the Iran-Iraq War, Tens of Thousands of Combatants Still Unaccounted For,” International Committee of the Red Cross Resource Centre, October 16, 2008; Faleh A. Jabar, “The War Generation in Iraq: The Case of Failed Etatist Nationalism,” in Iran, Iraq and the Legacies of War, ed. Lawrence G. Potter and Gary Sick (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 129–30; “Behind Iraq’s Grab for Kuwait Sagging Economy,” August 7, 1990.

notes to chapter 6 245

85. “Behind Iraq’s Grab for Kuwait Sagging Economy,” August 7, 1990. 86. Caryle Murphy, “Iraq Accuses Kuwait of Plot to Steal Oil, Depress Prices,” Washington Post, July 19, 1990; Associated Press, “The Iraqi Invasion; Iraqi Invasion, Step by Step,” New York Times, August 3, 1990. 87. Associated Press, “The Iraqi Invasion; Iraqi Invasion, Step by Step,” New York Times, August 3, 1990. 88. Patrick E. Tyler, “Iraq Pursues Politics of Pragmatism,” Washington Post, May 13, 1989. 89. Eugene Rogan, The Arabs: A History (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 443–44; Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Pocket Star Books, 1991), 224–27. 90. Woodward 1991, 235–37. 91. David B. Ottaway, “Shock Waves Could Transform Saudi Arabia; Conservative Kingdom Surprises Even Itself as It Reacts to Crisis in the Gulf,” Washington Post, September 6, 1990. 92. Helen Thomas, “Bush Dispatched Cheney to Saudi Arabia,” United Press International, August 5, 1990. 93. Jim Stewart, “Cheney to Ask for Use of Military Bases in Saudi Arabia,” CBS News Transcripts, August 6, 1990. 94. Woodward 1991, 245–46. 95. Ibid. 96. Molly Moore and Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Sends Troops, Jets to Saudi Arabia as Iraqi Forces Pose ‘Imminent Threat’; Fahd Accepts Multi-Nation Aid; Egypt Reportedly to Take Role,” Washington Post, August 8, 1990. 97. Gause 1994, 124–25. 98. Woodward 1991, 250–51. 99. Ottaway, “Shock Waves Could Transform Saudi Arabia,” Washington Post, September 6, 1990. 100. Woodward 1991, 252–54. 101. Robert Mackay, “U.S. Sending Aircraft, Troops to Saudi Arabia,” United Press International, August 7, 1990. 102. Bernd Debusmann, “Saudi Arabia Shifts toward Western Camp,” Toronto Star, August 8, 1990. 103. Susanne Schafer, “Bush: ‘We’re Not in a War,’ in Defending Saudi Arabia,” Associated Press, August 8, 1990. 104. Andrew Rosenthal, “Bush Sends U.S. Force to Saudi Arabia as Kingdom Agrees to Confront Iraq; Seeks Joint Action,” New York Times, August 8, 1990. 105. Ottaway, “Shock Waves Could Transform Saudi Arabia,” Washington Post, September 6, 1990. 106. Ibid. 1990; F. Gregory Gause III, “From ‘Over the Horizon’ to ‘Into the Backyard’: The U.S.-Saudi Relationship and the Gulf War,” in The Middle East and the United States, ed. David W. Lesch (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007, 4th ed.), 388.

246  notes to chapter 6

107. Ottaway 1990. 108. Jeffrey R. Macris, The Politics and Security of the Gulf: Anglo-American Hegemony and the Shaping of a Region (New York: Routledge, 2010), 224–25. 109. Don Van Natta, “The Struggle for Iraq; Last American Combat Troops Quit Saudi Arabia,” New York Times, September 22, 2003. 110. W. Andrew Terrill, Regional Fears of Western Primacy and the Future of U.S. Middle Eastern Basing Policy (Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2006), 36–37; Stewart M. Powell, “The U.S. Forces Leaving Saudi Arabia Military Moving to Qatar Now That Iraqi Threat to Oil-rich Kingdom Is Gone,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, April 30, 2003. 111. Rogan 2009, 448; Gause 2007, 380–81. 112. Andrew Guthrie, “U.S. Exits Saudi Arabia,” Voice of America News, May 1, 2003. 113. David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 186. 114. Thomas Lippman, Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 342–44; Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia News Conference, Topics: Counterterrorism Activities and Economic and Political Reform, Briefer: Adel al-Jubeir, Foreign Policy Adviser to Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, May 16, 2003. 115. Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 161. 116. “Declaration of Jihad against Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries,” in Al-Qaeda in Its Own Words, ed. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 47–50; Abdul Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), 45–46; Rogan 2009, 448. 117. Rebecca Grant, “Khobar Towers,” Air Force Magazine 81, no. 6 (June 1998); “The Protection of U.S. Forces Abroad,” Executive Summary of the Downing Task Force Report on the Khobar Towers Bombing and Terrorism, Part of Annex 1 in a Secretary of Defense Report to the President, Released September 16, 1996, Defense Issues 11, no. 88, available at www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=937. 118. Howard Schneider, “Saudi Arabia Finds Calm after Storm; Desert Rulers Nurture Stability,” Washington Post, January 9, 2000. 119. Joseph A. Kechichian, “Saudi Arabia’s Will to Power,” Middle East Policy 7, no. 2 (2000): 47–60; Rogan 2009, 448. 120. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia News Conference, Topics: Counterterrorism Activities and Economic and Political Reform, Briefer: Adel al-Jubeir, Foreign Policy Adviser to Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, May 16, 2003. 121. The U.S. military moved its operations from Saudi Arabia to neighboring Qatar, where they remain today. Terrill 2006, 36–37; Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia

notes to chapter 6 and the Conclusion 247

News Conference, May 16, 2003; Powell, “The U.S. Forces Leaving Saudi Arabia Military Moving to Qatar,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, April 30, 2003. 122. Van Natta, “The Struggle for Iraq,” New York Times, September 22, 2003; “U.S. President Bush Declared End to Iraq Combat; Major Operations Over after 43 Days U.S. Forces Will Leave Saudi Arabia,” Facts on File World New Digest, May 1, 2003. 123. Omar Hasan, “U.S. Ends Military Presence in Saudi Arabia, a Key Al-Qaeda Demand,” Agence France Presse, April 30, 2003. 124. Van Natta, “The Struggle for Iraq,” New York Times, September 22, 2003. 125. Greg Myre, “Air Base in Saudi Arabia Is Latest Drone Secret to Be Revealed,” National Public Radio, February 6, 2013; Donna Miles, “Gates Lauds U.S. Efforts to Boost Saudi Military Capacity,” American Forces Press Service, May 6, 2009; U.S. Military Training Mission, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, “About us,” available at http://usmtm.org/ about.html; Ed Payne, “Pentagon: U.S. to Begin to Train and Equip Moderate Syria Rebels,” CNN, January 16, 2015, available at www.cnn.com/2015/01/16/us/syria-rebeltraining/. Conclusion

1. Zachary K. Goldman and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Gulf Reconciliation Council: The Right Way to Reassure the Gulf Monarchies,” Foreign Affairs, December 3, 2013; James Cockburn, “Iraq Crisis: How Saudi Arabia Helped Isis Take Over the North of the Country,” The Independent, July 13, 2014. 2. Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, “Bahrain’s Base Politics: The Arab Spring and America’s Military Bases,” Foreign Affairs, April 5, 2011; Joost R. Hiltermann, “Pushing for Reform in Bahrain,” Foreign Affairs, September 7, 2011. 3. Wam, “GCC Summit Rejects Iran’s Interference in Gulf States’ Internal Affairs,” Emirates 24/7, December 24, 2012, available at www.emirates247.com/news/ government/gcc-summit-rejects-iran-s-interference-in-gulf-states-internal-affairs-2012-12-25-1.488702. 4. Dahlia Kholaif, “Gulf States Hesitant about Iranian Overtures,” Al-Jazeera, December 8, 2013; “Is Trouble Brewing between the UAE and Iran?” Al-Jazeera, April 19, 2012; Awad Mustafa, “UAE-Iran Islands Deal Would Face Major Obstacles,” Defense News, January 19, 2014; “Peninsula Shield Force: Ensuring the Gulf ’s Security,” Asharq Al-Awsat, March 16, 2011. 5. Donna Miles, “Mullen Reaffirms American-Bahraini Alliance,” Department of Defense Press Release, February 25, 2011, available at www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62934. 6. Kenneth Katzman, “Bahrain: Reform, Security and US Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report, April 20, 2011. 7. Victoria Nuland, U.S. State Department spokesperson, “Renewal of U.S. Security Cooperation with Bahrain,” U.S. State Department Press Release, May 11, 2012, available

248  notes to the Conclusion

at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/05/189752.htm. See also Josh Rogin, “Obama Administration Seeks to Bolster Bahraini Crown Prince with Arms Sales,” Foreign Policy—The Cable, May 11, 2012. 8. Remarks by Secretary Hagel at the Manama Dialogue from Manama, Bahrain, December 7, 2013, available at www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript. aspx?transcriptid=5336. 9. Geoffrey F. Gresh, “China’s Emerging Twin-pillar Policy in the Gulf,” Foreign Policy, November 7, 2011. 10. Matthew Nelson et al., “Fueling the Dragon’s Flame: How China’s Energy Demands Affect Its Relationships in the Middle East,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2006. 11. Jin Liangxiang, “Energy First (China and the Middle East),” Middle East Quarterly 12, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 3–11. 12. “Officials Expect 5th China-Arab Cooperation Forum to Lay New Cornerstone for Ties,” Xinhua News, May 30, 2012. 13. Saud Al Sarhan, “From Qusair to Yabrud: Shiite Foreign Fighters in Syria,” AlMonitor, March 6, 2014. 14. “Saudi Ambassador a ‘Chemistry with China,’” China Daily, September 26, 2011. See also “Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Visits Saudi Arabia on March 12, 2011” for additional context, available at http://big5.fmprc.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.chinaembassy.lt/ eng/xwdt/t806497.htm; Steve Yetiv, “China, Saudi Arabia Broaden Ties under U.S. Security Umbrella,” World Politics Review, April 6, 2011. 15. Gulam Ali Khan, “Oman-China Bilateral Trade Volumes at $23bn in 2013,” Muscat Daily, March 4, 2014; Courtney Trenwith, “China-UAE Trade: Enter the Dragon,” Arabian Business, March 10, 2013. 16. Naser al-Tamimi, “The Ties That Bind Saudi-Chinese Relations,” Al-Arabiya, March 14, 2014; “Saudi-Chinese Trade Increases by 14 Percent,” Asharq Al-Awsat, November 20, 2013; Saed Ahmad, “The Ever-changing Oil Map,” Al-Monitor, October 16, 2013; “China, Saudi Arabia Convene 4th Joint Meeting on Economy, Trade,” Xinhua News Agency, January 10, 2011. 17. “U.S.-Saudi Arabia Trade Facts,” Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, accessed March 13, 2014, available at www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/ middle-east/north-africa/saudi-arabia; U.S.-Saudi Arabian Business Council, available at www.us-sabc.org/custom/news/details.cfm?id=952. 18. Since many firms are unable to contract in Mecca because of the restriction on the entrance of non-Muslims, one recent Economist article described how Chinese firms are even converting hundreds of its workers to Islam to secure the contractual work. “Looking East,” The Economist, December 9, 2010; “China and the GCC Join Forces to Tackle Economic Crisis,” Middle East News, May 4, 2009; Deema Almashabi, “Saudi High Speed Rail Project in Construction Phase after Delays,” Bloomberg News, January 6, 2014.

notes to the Conclusion 249

19. Richard Grimmett and Paul Kerr, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004–2011,” Congressional Research Service, August 24, 2012; Zachary Keck, “China to Sell Saudi Arabia Drones,” Diplomat, May 8, 2014. 20. “Wen Jiabao Meets with Speaker of the Consultative Council of Saudi Arabia Abdullah,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, June 13, 2011, available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594 /2878_663746/2880_663750/t830773.shtml. 21. Ibid. 22. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia News Conference, Topics: Counterterrorism Activities and Economic and Political Reform, Briefer: Adel al-Jubeir, Foreign Policy Adviser to Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, May 16, 2003; Terrill 2006. 23. John Irish, “UNESCO Grants Palestinians Full Membership,” Reuters, October 31, 2011. 24. Joel Guinto and Norman P. Aquino, “Philippines to Let U.S. Build Military Facilities on Bases,” Bloomberg News, March 14, 2014. 25. See also Joshua Teitelbaum, ed., Political Liberalization of the Persian Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 26. See Geoffrey F. Gresh, “Traversing the Persian Gauntlet: U.S. Naval Projection and the Strait of Hormuz,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 33, no. 2 (Winter/Spring 2010): 41–56.



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American Association of Port Authorities. Available at www.aapa-ports.org. Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center. Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Council Special Collection. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence Files. “Chronology of the 552nd Air Control Wing.” Air Force Historical Research Agency, 552nd Air Control Wing, U.S. Air Force. Available at www.552acw.acc.af.mil/ shared/ media/document/AFD-070517-082.pdf. Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale, 2011. Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. Naval History and Heritage Command. Available at www.history.navy.mil/danfs/h5/hepburn.htm. Digital National Security Archive. Available at http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com. Evans, K. E., ed. U.S. Records on Saudi Affairs 1945–1959. Vols. 1–8. London: Archive Editions and University Publications of America, 1997. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Grathwol, Robert P., and Donita M. Moorhaus. Bricks, Sand and Marble: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Construction in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1947–1991. Washington, DC: Center of Military History and Corps of Engineers United States Army, 2009. Hepburn, Arthur Japy. Report on need of additional naval bases to defend the coasts of the United States, its territories and possessions: Letter from the Secretary of the Navy transmitting report of the Board appointed to report upon the need, for the purposes of national defense, of additional submarine, destroyer, mine, and naval air bases on the coasts of the United States, its territories and possessions. Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional Government Printing Office, 1939. Pearl Harbor Navy Medical Activities, Administrative History Section, Administrative Division, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. The United States Medical Department of War, 1941–1945. Vol. 1, parts 1–2. Washington, DC: The Bureau, 1946. Available at www.history.navy.mil/faq/faq66-5.htm. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia News Conferences. Available from LexisNexis. Saudi Ports Authority. Available at www.ports.gov.sa/default.cfm. UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Review of Maritime Transport, 2006. Geneva, 2006. U.S. Department of Defense. Secretary Robert M. Gates Speeches. Available at www. defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1539. U.S. Department of Defense. Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture Report to Congress. September 2004. Available at www.dmzhawaii.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/global_posture. pdf. U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers (FRUS).

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U.S. Energy Information Administration. “Country Analysis Brief: China.” November 2010. Available at www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/Oil.html. U.S. Energy Information Administration. “World Oil Transit Chokepoints.” August 22, 2012. Available at www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p3. Woolley, John T., and Gerhard Peters, eds. The American Presidency Project. Santa Barbara, CA. Available at www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9689. Yearbook of the United Nations 1970. Vol. 24. New York: Office of Public Information United Nations, 1970. Newspapers, Radio Transcripts, and Periodicals

Aden Voice of Oman Revolution Agence France Presse Air Force Magazine Al-Arabiya Al-Anwar Al-Jazeera Al-Majallah Al-Monitor Al-Qahira (Cairo Arabic Daily) American Forces Press Service Amman Domestic Service APS Diplomat Recorder Ar-ra’y Al-‘Amm Arab News Arabian Business Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat Associated Press Ath-Thawrah Atlantic Monthly BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Bloomberg News CBS News Transcripts China Daily China View Christian Science Monitor Defense News Diplomat Economist Newspaper Emirates 24/7 Facts on File World News Digest

Foreign Policy Globe and Mail International Herald Tribune Iraqi News Agency Jane’s Amphibious and Special Forces Jane’s Defence Weekly Jane’s Navy International Jane’s Sentinel Assessment Kuwait News Agency Lloyd’s List Los Angeles Times Middle East Middle East News Moscow Daily Report Moscow Izvestiya Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda Muscat Daily Muslims World National Geographic National Public Radio National Security Record New York Times New York Times Magazine Newsweek Radio Mecca Reuters Riyadh SNA Saudi Press Agency Seattle Post-Intelligencer Tampa Bay Times

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Tehran Domestic Service Time Times (London) Toronto Star United Press International U.S. News and World Report

Vela International Marine Limited Voice of America Wall Street Journal Washington Post Washington Times Xinhua News Agency



Index

Abdullah, King of Saudi Arabia, 170, 174 Abdullah, King of Transjordan, 31 Abu Dhabi, 106. See also Buraimi Oasis crisis Abu Musa, 92, 96–97, 98, 171 Acheson, Dean, 62 Aden, British airbase, 86 Afghanistan: Soviet invasion, 4, 7, 113, 115, 118, 125–26, 154, 156; U.S. forces in, 1, 8 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 171 Al-Khayyal, Abdullah, 84 Al-Qaeda, 4, 144, 165, 166 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), 165, 167 Al-Sharif, Muhammad Idris, 148 Al-Utaibi, Juhaiman bin Muhammad bin Saif, 152 Amr, Abdel Hakim, 53–54 ANM, see Arab-Nationalists’ Movement APPU, see Arabian Peninsula People’s Union AQAP, see Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Arab Cold War, 74, 76–77, 89. See also Cold War Arab Communist Organization, 110

Arab countries, see Gulf Arab states Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), 32, 34, 35, 47, 50, 69, 79 Arabian Peninsula People’s Union (APPU), 87, 152 Arab-Israeli conflict: Arab criticism of U.S. support of Israel, 83, 89, 104–5, 106; Chinese position, 175; effects in Saudi Arabia, 148–49; Six-Day War (1967), 88, 89; U.S. peace efforts, 148–49 Arab-Israeli War (1973), 2, 7, 91, 92, 106 Arab League, 53, 98 Arab nationalism, see Pan-Arab nationalism Arab-Nationalists’ Movement (ANM), 103 Arab Spring uprisings, 1, 8, 169, 171, 179 Aramco, see Arabian American Oil Company Asia, see China; Philippines; Vietnam War Azar, Edward, 9 Badr, Muhammad al-, 85–86 Baghdad Pact, 45, 53, 72 Bahrain: British departure, 93, 95–98, 255

256 INDEX

99; as British protectorate, 33, 58, 93, 94–96, 104; Department of Defense school, 113; external security concerns, 92, 102, 103, 113–16, 171; history, 93–95; independence, 92, 97–98; internal security concerns, 1–2, 91–92, 101–5, 107, 109–10, 112, 169, 171; Iranian claims, 92, 94–95, 96, 97, 104, 114; Italian attack on oil fields, 32; national assembly, 1, 92, 103, 105–6, 107–8, 109– 10, 225n145; national defense forces, 114–15; oil production and revenues, 23, 91, 99, 102, 104; opposition groups, 1–2, 91–92, 101–5, 107, 109–11, 114, 116, 171; police, 104; political liberalization, 12, 92, 105–6, 177; relations with Saudi Arabia, 98, 115–16, 227–28n187; relations with United States, 33, 172; as rentier state, 104; Shi’a majority, 91–92, 102–3, 104, 114, 171; social and political change, 91–92, 102–3, 104; strategic location, 98; U.S. ambassador, 1–2; U.S. economic and military aid, 93, 172. See also Juffair base; Khalifa family Bahrain Petroleum Company (BapCo), 24, 99 Bartholomew, Reginald, 128, 131–32, 133–34, 136 Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC), 11–12 Base politics: definition, 5; democratization and, 12, 177; expulsion threats, 1–2; historical, 5; host nations, 8–9; importance, 17; jurisdiction issues, 68; scholarship on, 11–13, 177–78. See also Bahrain; External security threats; Internal security concerns; Oman; Saudi Arabia

Bases, see Gulf Arab states, U.S. bases in; Juffair base, Bahrain; Oman, United States and; Saudi Arabia, U.S. bases in Basing nations, 5, 11. See also Great Britain; United States Basing strategy, U.S.: access fees, 129; of Carter administration, 117, 118, 128–29, 139, 150, 154–55, 156–57; in Cold War, 6–7, 21, 44–45, 46, 48–49, 58, 118, 139; current number of bases, 8; in future, 1, 4–5, 8, 169–70, 178–79; global, 4, 5–8, 24, 44; lily pad model, 178; of Nixon administration, 100, 107, 124; of Obama administration, 1, 172; policy implications, 178–79; strategic interests, 1, 4, 6, 7–8, 21, 128, 155, 179; in World War II, 5–6, 19–21, 24, 26. See also Gulf Arab states, U.S. bases in; Light military footprint Bayne, Marmaduke G., 102 Baz, Abdulaziz bin, 163 Belgrave, Sir Charles, 104 Bevin, Ernest, 51 Bigley, Thomas J., 111 Bin Laden, Osama, 144, 165, 166 BRAC, see Base Closure and Realignment Commission Britain, see Great Britain Brown, Harold, 150, 151 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 135, 136, 150, 157 Buraimi Oasis crisis, 45–46, 54–57, 68, 80 Bush, George H. W., 161–62, 163 Bush, George W., 166 Calder, Kent, 7–8 California-Arabian Standard Oil Company (Casoc), 23, 25, 26, 32 California-Texas Oil Company, 19, 24 Camp David Peace Accords, 149 Carter, Jimmy: Gulf region strategy, 128,

INDEX 257

131, 133, 134, 150; letters to Qaboos, 134, 136; relations with Oman, 119 Carter administration: analysis of Gulf Arab states, 127; basing strategy, 117, 118, 128–29, 139, 150, 154–55, 156–57; Camp David Peace Accords, 149; Iranian hostage crisis, 115; negotiations on base access in Oman, 118–19, 128–35, 136–39; Operation Eagle Claw, 2, 10, 118–19, 135–36, 177; relations with Saudi Arabia, 149, 155–56, 157–58 Carter Doctrine, 131 Casoc, see California-Arabian Standard Oil Company Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 80 Cheney, Richard, 162 Childs, James R., 52–53, 66 China: energy consumption, 173–74; involvement in Gulf region, 170, 173–75; leftist groups supported, 121, 122; maritime ambitions in fifteenth century, 5; navy, 175; threat to Philippines, 176; weapons sales, 174 China-Arab Cooperation Forum, 174 Christopher, Warren, 136 Churchill, Winston, 37, 38 CIA, see Central Intelligence Agency Cluverius, Wat, 112, 113 Cold War: end of, 160; in Middle East, 74, 76–77, 86, 89; U.S. basing strategy, 6–7, 21, 44–45, 46, 48–49, 58, 118, 139. See also Soviet Union Collins, J. Lawton, 62 Communist Party of Saudi Arabia, 146 Communists, see Arab Communist Organization; Marxist rebels; Socialism Corruption, 49, 145, 152–53, 154 Crane, Charles, 23 Crowe, William J., Jr., 92, 111, 112–13

Davies, Fred, 25, 32 Defense Department, U.S.: Dhahran airfield plans, 68; military aid to Oman, 125, 134; opposition to base access fees, 129; school in Bahrain, 113. See also Basing strategy; Military aid; Saudi Arabia, U.S. military aid DeGolyer, Everette, 34 Democratization, 12, 177 Desert Storm, Operation, 163–64. See also Gulf War, First Dhahran, U.S. consulate, 33 Dhahran Airfield, Saudi Arabia: administration, 67; American personnel, 71, 82; base agreements, 41, 42–43, 63, 65, 67, 68, 71; as buffer, 57; construction, 41–42; flag, 40, 77–78; importance in postwar era, 44–45, 46, 48–49; maintenance costs, 63; monetary value, 63; negotiations, 35, 39–41, 42–43, 66–71, 72–73; Operation Hard Surface, 86–87; private operation, 85; proposed U.S. use, 33–34; size, 41, 71; strategic value, 6, 21, 33–34, 82; termination of agreement, 75–76, 79–82, 85; transfer to Saudis, 85. See also Saudi Arabia, U.S. bases in Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF), 121 Dhofar rebellion, Oman, 10, 117, 121–22 Diego Garcia, 100–101, 111, 112, 124 DLF, see Dhofar Liberation Front Domestic security, see Internal security concerns Dulles, John Foster, 55, 58 Eagle Claw, Operation, 2, 10, 118–19, 135–36, 177 Economic aid: Export-Import Bank, 60– 61, 133–34, 138; Lend-Lease program, 21, 24–25, 26, 31, 35; U.S. policies in

258 INDEX

World War II, 36. See also individual countries Eddy, William A., 36, 37, 38, 40 Egypt: air force, 86; military coup (1952), 49–50; Mubarak’s ouster, 174; peace talks with Israel, 148–49; relations with Britain, 57; relations with Soviet Union, 45, 57–58, 72, 74, 88–89; relations with United States, 36; SixDay War (1967), 88, 89; Suez Canal Crisis, 46, 57–59, 71, 73. See also Nasser, Gamal Abdel; United Arab Republic Egypt, relations with Saudi Arabia: air attacks, 86–87; alliance, 50, 53–54, 72, 74, 76; coup plot against Nasser, 76–77; Nasser’s propaganda campaign against Saud monarchy, 8, 74, 76–77, 80, 84, 85, 87; tensions under Nasser, 72, 74–75, 76–78, 82, 84, 87–88; workers in Saudi Arabia, 146. See also PanArab nationalism Eisenhower, Dwight D., 49, 56, 57–59, 71 Elf One, Operation, 143, 157–58 Eurasian powers, 172–73, 174. See also China Export-Import Bank, U.S., 60–61, 133–34, 138 External security threats: balancing with internal threats, 3, 10, 172, 175–77; as drivers of basing decisions, 2–3, 10, 51; to Gulf Arab states, 2–3, 4, 7, 10, 127, 169–70; Iran as, 4, 7, 95–96, 114–16, 169–70, 171, 179. See also individual countries Fahd, King, 148, 160, 161–62, 163, 166, 167–68 Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Prince, 71, 87–88, 149, 152, 156, 157 Faisal, King, 87–88

Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz, Prince: Buraimi Oasis crisis and, 56; as commanderin-chief, 77–78; expulsion of U.S. military, 79–80, 82, 85; on internal and external threats, 29–30; potential coup, 79; as prime minister, 77–78; relations with Egypt, 78; relations with United States, 42, 55–56, 63, 87; succession as king, 87; Yemen civil war and, 86 Faisal II, King of Iraq, 78 Feis, Herbert, 34 Forrestal, James, 26, 48, 66 Foster, William C., 62 France, Suez Canal Crisis, 46, 57–59, 71, 73 Gates, Robert, 162 GCC, see Gulf Cooperation Council Giles, Benjamin F., 33–34 Great Britain: Aden protectorate, 86; Bahrain and, 33, 58, 93, 94–98, 99, 104; Buraimi Oasis crisis, 45–46, 54–57, 68, 80; “Destroyers for Bases Agreement,” 24; Dhahran airfield and, 40; diplomats, 30, 46–47; Hashemites supported, 26, 28; Iran and, 26–27, 34–35; Middle East interests, 26, 27, 28, 40; military aid to Oman, 121; military forces in Gulf, 98, 99, 117, 120, 124–25; negotiations with Iran on Bahrain, 92, 96, 97, 98; oil companies, 22; Oman bases, 120, 124–25; relations with Egypt, 57; relations with Jordan, 200n62; relations with Saudi Arabia, 25, 26, 28, 35, 39, 46, 51–53, 66–67; Royal Navy, 25, 124–25; on Saudi relations with United States, 30–31; Suez Canal Crisis, 46, 57–59, 71, 73; treaty with Transjordan, 51; view of U.S. role in Middle East, 46–47; Yemen

INDEX 259

civil war and, 86. See also World War II Greater and Lesser Tunbs, 92, 96–97, 98, 171 Greater Syria, 52, 66 Grew, Joseph C., 42 Guicciardi, Vittorio Winspeare, 97 Gulf Arab states: Eurasian powers and, 170, 172–75; military forces, 114–15; nationalism, 102, 105; national security strategies, 2–3, 10–11; as rentier states, 3, 9, 49, 104, 161, 164. See also External security threats; Internal security concerns; Oil and natural gas; and individual countries Gulf Arab states, U.S. bases in: Afghanistan war and, 8; benefits to host countries, 8; current bases, 173; dependence on, 9–10; deterrence of Iran, 169–70, 179; deterrent value, 7–8; drivers of decisions on, 2–3, 4–5, 8–11; expulsion threats, 1–2, 3, 8, 176, 177, 179; future of, 1–2, 4–5, 8, 168, 169–70, 172, 178–79; goals, 4, 7–8; lessons learned, 11, 175–78; military exercises, 140; mutual interests, 8, 9–10; negotiations, 10; opponents, 1–2, 3, 10, 159, 170, 176–77, 178; rents, 177–78; strategic interests supported, 1, 4, 6; in World War II, 6, 20–21. See also Basing strategy, U.S.; Juffair base, Bahrain; Light military footprint; Oman, United States and; Saudi Arabia, U.S. bases in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): formation, 154, 158; members, 181n5; Peninsula Shield Force, 171, 173, 179; Rapid Deployment Force, 159; security cooperation, 158–59. See also Gulf Arab states; and individual countries

Gulf Foreign Minister Muscat Summit, 124 Gulf Oil, 99 Gulf War, First (1990), 2, 8, 10, 116, 144, 160–64 Gulf War, Second (2003), 2, 8, 144, 166–67 Habib, Philip C., 119, 136–38 Hagel, Chuck, 1, 172 Hamza, Fuad, 65 Hard Surface, Operation, 86–87 Hare, Raymond A., 62, 67 Harkavy, Robert E., 11 Hashemites: British support, 26, 28; Hejaz conflict with Saudi Arabia, 20–21, 27–28, 66; improved relations with Saudi Arabia, 74; monarchies, 27, 28, 74; threat to Saudi Arabia, 51–54, 66, 80. See also Iraq; Jordan Heath, Donald R., 76, 79–81 Hejaz region: conflict, 20–21, 27–28, 66; Mecca and Medina, 19, 20, 23, 28, 52, 152–53, 174; Saudi control, 28, 29, 52–53 Hepburn, Arthur J., 24 Host nations, 5, 8–11, 12, 13, 177. See also External security threats; Internal security concerns; and individual countries Hu Jintao, 174 Hussein, Saddam, 2, 114, 144, 160, 161, 166. See also Gulf War, First; Gulf War, Second; Iraq Ibn Saud, King: base agreements, 41, 62; Buraimi Oasis crisis and, 54–55, 56; conquest of Hejaz, 28, 29; death, 48, 50; external security concerns, 20–21, 27, 64–65, 66–67, 72; Ikhwan rebellion, 28–29; internal security concerns, 20, 28–30; meeting with FDR, 37–39;

260 INDEX

negotiations with United States, 31–33, 40–41; oil revenues, 22–23, 49; relations with Britain, 51–53; relations with United States, 19, 37, 40, 42, 49, 52–53, 63, 65–67; view of Soviet Union, 47. See also Saud monarchy Ickes, Harold L., 34, 35 Ikhwan, 27–29, 32, 69 IMF, see International Monetary Fund Indian Ocean, see Diego Garcia Internal security concerns: balancing with external threats, 3, 10, 172, 175–77; as drivers of basing decisions, 2–3, 10; of Gulf Arab states, 1–3, 8, 9, 10, 127, 171, 179. See also individual countries International Monetary Fund (IMF), 77 Iran: claims to Bahrain, 92, 94–95, 96, 97, 104, 114; foreign policy, 96; Islamic Revolution, 7, 113, 114, 117, 125–26, 143, 149–50, 153; military, 147, 179; Mossadeq’s rule and overthrow, 50; navy, 114; nuclear program negotiations, 4, 169, 179; oil production and revenues, 22, 34–35, 95; Operation Eagle Claw, 2, 10, 118–19, 135–36, 177; relations with China, 173; relations with Oman, 121; relations with United States, 96–97, 149–50; Syrian conflict and, 169, 174; threat to Gulf Arab states, 4, 7, 95–96, 114–16, 169–70, 171, 179; U.S. hostages, 115; in World War II, 22, 26–27, 34 Iran-Iraq War: beginning of, 113–14, 157; end of, 160, 161; Gulf states supporting Iraq, 157, 160; Saudi radar monitoring, 13, 143, 157; Saudi reactions, 154, 157– 59; Tanker War, 159–60; threat to Gulf states, 7, 115, 119, 140, 141 Iraq: Baghdad Pact, 45, 53, 72; defense budget, 161; Hashemite monarchy, 27,

28, 78; Iranian influence, 169; military, 162; no-fly zone, 164; oil production, 35; Omani rebels and, 122; relations with Saudi Arabia, 74, 144, 157, 160–64, 166, 168; sectarian tensions, 157. See also Gulf War; Hussein, Saddam; IranIraq War Iraq Petroleum Company, 54 ISIS, see Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Islam: extremists, 143, 144, 149–50, 151–53; religious conservatives in Saudi Arabia, 146, 151, 163, 164–65; Wahhabis, 20, 27–29, 30, 151, 152. See also Shi’a populations Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, 114 Islamic Revolution, Iran, 7, 113, 114, 117, 125–26, 143, 149–50, 153 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), 4 Israel: establishment, 49; peace talks with Egypt, 148–49; relations with United States, 4, 7, 83, 89, 104–5, 106; Suez Canal Crisis and, 58. See also ArabIsraeli conflict Johnson, Louis, 62 Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S., 46, 48, 62, 100 Jones, David, 157 Jones, Jesse, 19 Jordan, 74, 121, 200n62. See also Hashemites; Transjordan Juffair base, Bahrain: Administrative Support Unit, 3, 13, 93, 113, 116; agreement (1971), 91, 101–2, 108, 220n78; British forces, 98, 99; future use of, 169, 172; light military footprint, 3, 93, 113, 116, 178; negotiations on, 101–2, 108–9, 111;

INDEX 261

opponents of U.S. presence, 1–2, 92, 101–2, 103, 107–8; reestablishment of U.S. presence, 115–16; strategic interests of United States and, 91, 92, 98–100; strategic location, 91, 98; termination of agreement with U.S., 2, 92, 106–9, 110–13; U.S. personnel, 111; visits by U.S. ships, 112–13 Kennedy, John F., 80, 81, 82–85, 87 Khalid, King, 149, 150, 155 Khalifa, Hamad bin Isa Al, 172 Khalifa, Isa bin Salman Al, 91, 102–3, 105–6, 107, 108, 110, 111, 115 Khalifa, Khalifa bin Salman Al, 109, 110 Khalifa, Mohammad bin Mubarak Al, 102, 106, 108, 109, 111, 112 Khalifa, Salman bin Hamad Al, 172 Khalifa family: constitutional monarchy, 105–6; domestic opposition, 1–2, 91– 92, 101–5, 107, 109–11, 116, 171; history, 94; national assembly and, 107–8, 109–10, 225n145; Saudi support, 115–16. See also Bahrain Khobar Towers bombing, 144, 165–66 Khomeini, Ruhollah, Ayatollah, 114, 153, 154 King Fahd Causeway, 115–16, 227–28n187 Kirk, Alexander C., 31 Kissinger, Henry A., 100, 107, 108, 110–11, 223n128 Knox, Frank, 25 Krajeski, Thomas, 1–2 Kuwait: Arab nationalists in, 101; British protection, 99; emirs, 96, 163; Iraqi invasion, 160, 161, 162; negotiations with Iran on Bahrain, 96, 97; oil embargo, 106; oil production, 161; oil tankers, 159–60; Soviet diplomats, 101; support of Bahraini expulsion of U.S.

Navy, 108; U.S. military presence, 173. See also Gulf War, First (1990) Lebanon: neutrality, 200n62; pipelines, 47; terrorist attacks, 105; workers in Saudi Arabia, 146 Leftist groups: in Bahrain, 102, 105, 109–10; foreign support, 4, 74, 104, 121, 122, 126; nationalist, 102, 105; in Oman, 121–22, 126–27, 130, 133; in Saudi Arabia, 45, 69, 74–76, 87–88, 146, 150– 51. See also Marxist rebels; Socialism Lend-Lease Aid Program, 21, 24–25, 26, 31, 35 Libya, 105, 106, 143, 148 Light military footprint: in Bahrain, 3, 93, 113, 116, 178; in Oman, 3–4, 119, 130, 132, 135, 137, 140, 178; as policy, 177, 178; in Saudi Arabia, 3, 13, 154, 168, 170 Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 5 Marxist rebels, in Oman, 10, 117, 121–22, 126–27, 139, 140 Masirah Island base, Oman, 117, 118–19, 124–25, 129–30 Maxwell, Russell L., 32 Mecca and Medina, 19, 20, 23, 28, 52, 152–53, 174. See also Hejaz region Middle East: Arab Spring uprisings, 8, 169, 171, 179; British interests, 26, 27, 28, 40; U.S. influence, 45, 46–47. See also Gulf Arab states; Oil and natural gas; Soviet expansionism; and individual countries Middle East Force, U.S. Navy, 91, 93, 98–102, 107, 108, 109, 111–13, 115 Military aid: to Bahrain, 93, 172; base politics and, 35, 129, 142; British, to Oman, 121; dependence on, 177; to Israel, 106; to Oman, 3–4, 125, 129, 132,

262 INDEX

134, 142; Soviet, to Yemen, 48; types, 3; U.S. policies in World War II, 36–37, 40. See also Saudi Arabia, U.S. military aid Moffett, James A., 19, 24–25 Monarchies, see Gulf Arab states; Hashemites; Khalifa family; Saud monarchy; and individual countries Moon, Chung-in, 9 Moorer, Thomas H., 100 Moose, James S., Jr., 31 Mossadeq, Mohammad, 50 Muayyid, Tariq Abdal Rahman al, 112 Mubarak, Hosni, 161, 174 Mullen, Mike, 172 Murphy, Robert, 71 Musandam Peninsula, 96, 120, 133, 134, 137, 138, 140, 235n105 Muscat and Oman, Sultanate of, 54, 55–56, 96, 99. See also Oman Nasser, Gamal Abdel: Arab nationalism and, 45, 69, 82; assassination plot, 74, 76; coup plans in Saudi Arabia, 78, 148; downfall, 88, 89; foreign policy, 50, 57, 72; military coup, 49–50; propaganda campaign against Saud monarchy, 8, 74, 76–77, 80, 84, 85, 87; regional influence, 74–75, 78, 82; socialist policies, 82; Suez Canal Crisis, 57–59; UAR and, 74, 76, 80; Yemen civil war and, 85–87, 88–89. See also Egypt; PanArab nationalism Nationalism, in Gulf states, 102, 105. See also Pan-Arab nationalism National security, see External security threats; Internal security concerns National Security Council, U.S., 99, 100, 102, 105, 112 Natural gas, see Oil and natural gas

Nixon administration: Bahrain base agreement, 101–2, 108; basing strategy, 100, 107, 124; Iranian claims to Bahrain and, 96–97; military aid to Israel, 106; relations with Bahrain, 98, 99–100; weapons sales to Saudis, 147 Nixon Doctrine, 97 Obama administration, 1, 172 October War, see Arab-Israeli War (1973) Odom, William, 136 OIC, see Organization of the Islamic Conference Oil and natural gas: Chinese demand, 173–74; demand in World War II, 6, 25, 34–35; embargo, 106, 107; Middle East reserves, 34; national interest of exporters, 7; pipelines, 47, 79, 99; prices, 91, 95; revenues, 9; transport, 7, 159–60; U.S. consumption, 22; U.S. imports, 47, 49, 97, 98–99; U.S. Navy use, 48–49, 62; U.S. production, 22, 34, 47; U.S. strategic interests, 4, 6, 7; use in Vietnam War, 82–83. See also individual countries Oil companies: British, 22; relations with Saudi government, 79; workers, 49, 50, 69, 79, 146 Oil companies, American: in Bahrain, 99; expatriate employees, 47, 50, 79, 146; in Oman, 121; in Saudi Arabia, 19, 20, 22–24, 32–33, 47, 50, 79; security concerns, 32, 47; during World War II, 6 O’Keefe, Richard J., 66, 67 Oman: armed forces, 117, 122–23, 125, 134; British presence, 120, 121, 124–25; Buraimi Oasis crisis, 45–46, 54–57, 68, 80; Dhofar rebellion, 10, 117, 121–22;

INDEX 263

Dhofar region, 131, 139, 141; external security concerns, 119, 124, 125–26, 138–39, 140, 158–59; foreign workers, 122; geography, 120; internal security concerns, 10, 117–18, 119–22, 124, 126–27, 130–31, 139–40; modernization, 119–20, 122–23, 126; navy, 123, 125; oil production, 121, 174; opposition groups, 103; population groups, 120; strategic location, 117, 140. See also Qaboos bin Said Al Said, Sultan Oman, United States and: base access agreements, 125, 136, 138–39, 141, 142; base access negotiations, 10, 12–13, 118–19, 128–35, 136–39; domestic criticism of security relationship, 126–27, 130–31, 133, 139–40, 177; economic aid, 3–4, 132, 133–34, 135, 137–38, 142; expulsion threats, 2; improved relations, 140–41; lessons learned, 11, 142, 177; light military footprint, 3–4, 119, 130, 132, 135, 137, 140, 178; limited access to bases, 118, 125; Masirah Island base proposal, 117, 118–19, 124–25, 129–30; military aid, 3–4, 125, 129, 132, 134, 142; military and economic aid as incentives, 10, 12, 118, 119, 129, 135, 137–38, 142; military exercises, 130, 137, 140; number of U.S. troops, 141, 238n149; Operation Eagle Claw, 2, 10, 118–19, 135–36, 177; security guarantees, 131–32, 134; Seeb airport use, 130, 134, 138; strategic interests of United States, 118; sultan’s U.S. visits, 125, 140–41 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 95 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 156 Ottoman Empire, 5, 94

Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza Shah, 26–27, 96, 98, 113, 149–50 Pahlavi, Reza Shah, 26–27 Pakistan, 53, 147, 159 Palestinians, 104, 105, 146. See also ArabIsraeli conflict Pan-Arab nationalism: in Gulf states, 103, 104; in Iraq, 78, 160; Qaddafi and, 143, 148; rise of, 45, 49–50, 72; in Saudi Arabia, 45, 48, 50, 69, 74–76, 78–79, 81, 89, 143; state support, 103; as threat to Saud monarchy, 8–9, 74–76, 78–79, 89 PDRY, see People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen Pelham, G. C., 56 Peninsula Shield Force, 171, 173, 179 People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY; South Yemen), 118, 121–22, 124, 125, 126, 139, 140 Persian Empire, Bahrain and, 94. See also Iran Persian Gulf, see Gulf Arab states Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., 54 PFLO, see Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman PFLOAG, see Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Gulf Philby, Harry St. John Bridger, 23 Philippines, U.S. bases in, 6, 7, 13, 176 Politics of basing, see Base politics Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), 121–22, 126–27, 130, 133, 140 Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Gulf (PFLOAG), 104, 121 Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, 164, 167 Qaboos bin Said Al Said, Sultan: ascension to power, 120, 121; base

264 INDEX

agreements, 135, 138–39, 141; external security concerns, 140; internal security concerns, 117–18, 119–22, 124, 126–27, 130–31, 139–40; response to Eagle Claw, 2, 4, 119, 135, 136, 137, 177; U.S. visits, 125, 140–41; views of U.S. base, 117–18, 119, 123, 124, 126, 127, 140–41. See also Oman Qaddafi, Muammar, 143, 148 Qaeda, see Al-Qaeda Qasim, Abd al-Karim, 78 Qatar: Bahraini independence and, 98; British protection, 99; oil embargo, 106; U.S. military presence, 169, 173, 246n121. See also Gulf Arab states Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), Gulf Cooperation Council, 159 Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), U.S., 128, 133, 139, 141, 156 Reagan, Ronald, 140–41, 158, 159 Red Line Agreement, 35 Regime survival, see Internal security concerns; and individual countries Rogers, William P., 96 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 37–39, 41 Rouhani, Hassan, 171 Rouhani, Sadek, Ayatollah, 114 Royal Navy, 25, 124–25 Rumsfeld, Donald H., 166–67 Russia, 174. See also Soviet Union Sabah, Jaber al-Ahmed al-, 163 Sa‘id ibn Taymur, Sultan, 120, 121 Sallal, Abdullah, 85–86 Sarraj, Abdel Hamid, 76 Saud, King: expulsion of U.S. military, 75–76, 80–82; external security concerns, 70–71; foreign policy, 74;

health care in United States, 84–85; internal security concerns, 48, 68–69, 70, 74–76, 77, 78–79; Kennedy and, 82, 83, 84–85; Nasser and, 76–77; potential coup, 79; relations with Egypt, 50; relations with United States, 58–59, 69, 70–71, 72–73; succession as king, 48, 50 Saud, Mansour Ibn Abdul Aziz Al, Prince, 40, 66 Saud, Saud Al-Faisal Al, Prince, 150–51, 156 Saud, Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al, Prince, 167 Saudi Air Force, 41, 79, 86–87, 148 Saudi Arabia: alliances, 28, 53–54; Bedouin population, 29, 69, 72; Buraimi Oasis crisis, 45–46, 54–57, 68, 80; corruption, 49, 145, 152–53, 154; education, 145–46; effects of World War II, 19, 24, 27, 32; fiscal problems, 21, 23, 24, 25, 35, 39, 77; foreign workers, 50, 69, 70, 146; modernization, 31, 49, 145–47, 151, 152–53, 174; national defense system, 9–10; oil embargo, 106; oil exports and revenues, 47, 49, 72, 77, 145, 147, 174; oil production, 19, 20, 22–24, 25, 35, 39–40, 47; opposition groups, 8–9, 29, 69, 83, 87, 89, 152–53, 154, 164–66; population growth, 84; relations with Bahrain, 98, 115–16, 227–28n187; relations with China, 173, 174–75; relations with Russia, 174; relations with Soviet Union, 45, 47–48, 56, 60, 72; religious conservatives, 146, 151, 163, 164–65; as rentier state, 9, 49, 161, 164; Shi’a minority, 49, 114, 146–47, 151, 153–54; tribal leaders, 20, 29, 70, 146, 152; Wahhabi influence, 27–29, 30, 151, 152. See also Egypt, relations

INDEX 265

with Saudi Arabia; Hejaz region; Saud monarchy Saudi Arabia, external security concerns: Arab-Israeli conflict, 148–49; balance with internal security concerns, 20–21, 27–30, 50, 70–71, 154, 170; Britain as, 66–67; during First Gulf War, 10, 144; during Iran-Iraq War, 157–60; Iraq as, 144, 160–64, 166, 168; military buildup in response, 147; in 1970s and 1980s, 147–50, 154, 157–60; in postwar period, 45–46, 48, 51–59, 64–65; as priority in basing decisions, 21, 41, 45–46, 64–67, 68, 72–73, 144; Soviet Union as, 48; during World War II, 20–21, 27, 32–33; Yemen civil war, 86–87. See also Hashemites Saudi Arabia, internal security concerns: balance with external security factors, 20–21, 27–30, 50, 70–71, 154, 170; Bedouin population, 29; current, 170; financial, 77; Ikhwan, 28–29, 68–69; Islamic extremism, 20, 143, 144, 149–50, 151–53; labor unrest, 45, 49, 50, 69, 70, 79, 146; leftist groups, 45, 69, 74–76, 87–88, 146, 150–51; modernization and, 145–47; in 1970s and 1980s, 145–47, 150–54; in 1990s, 164–66; pan-Arab nationalism, 45, 48, 50, 69, 74–76, 78–79, 81, 89, 143, 148; in postwar period, 20, 45; role in terminating base agreements, 75–76, 80–82, 89–90, 144; Shi’a minority, 49, 146–47, 151, 153–54; terrorist attacks, 144, 165–66, 167; tribal rivalries, 20, 29, 32, 70, 146, 152 Saudi Arabia, relations with United States: after Dhahran closing (1962), 82–85, 86–87, 88; agricultural mission, 31, 35–36; antiaircraft defenses, 32–33;

anti-Americanism, 45, 79, 81–82, 88, 89, 143, 150, 157, 166; Arab-Israeli conflict and, 148–49; British view, 30–31; Buraimi Oasis crisis and, 55–57; diplomats, 31, 33; economic aid, 13, 26, 31, 35, 36, 48, 60–61, 65–66, 84; during Iranian revolution, 150; during Iran-Iraq War, 157–58; Israel issue, 83; Lend-Lease program, 21, 24–25, 26, 31, 35; Operation Hard Surface, 86–87; in postwar period, 42–43, 45, 48–49, 52–53; Roosevelt meeting with king, 37–39; security partnership, 26; shared interests, 82; during Suez Canal Crisis, 58–59; temporary troop deployment, 32–33; trade, 174; treaties, 61, 68; U.S. goals, 48–49; during World War II, 19–21, 24–27, 31–39 Saudi Arabia, U.S. bases in: agreement (1945), 21, 27, 41; defense against Iraqi invasion, 161–64; economic aid incentives, 21, 31, 35–37, 39, 60–61, 66, 73; evolution of Saudi policy, 167–68, 175–77; extension agreements, 45, 62, 63, 65–66, 67–68, 71, 73; future of, 168, 169, 172; during Gulf War (1990), 2, 8, 10, 144, 160–64; Khobar Towers bombing, 144, 165–66; light footprint, 3, 13, 154, 168, 170; negotiations (1945), 20–21, 39–40, 42–43, 65; negotiations (1949-51), 45, 51, 60–61, 62, 64–68; negotiations (1950s), 13, 50, 72–73; negotiations (1956), 51, 57, 61, 63–65, 68–71, 72–73; negotiations (1961), 75; number of troops, 166; opponents, 7, 8–9, 30, 65, 69–70, 75–76, 77–78, 81–82, 156–57, 164–66, 170; opponents, Al-Qaeda, 144, 165; Prince Sultan Air Base, 164, 167; proposed airfield (1942), 31–32; reestablishment requests

266 INDEX

(1979), 143, 150–51; regional reactions, 36–37; in remote locations, 166; seen as imperialism, 66, 75–76, 77–78; sensitivities, 155; sovereignty issue, 31, 40, 65, 67–68; strategic value, 6, 20, 21, 26, 33–34, 44–45; supporters, 163; survey, 33–34; termination of agreement (1962), 2, 3, 75–76, 79–82, 85; termination of agreement (2003), 2, 3, 8, 144, 166–67, 175–77; in World War II, 6, 20–21. See also Dhahran Airfield Saudi Arabia, U.S. military aid: advisors, 143, 145; after Dhahran closing (1962), 83; after Suez Canal Crisis, 59; aircraft sales, 62–63, 155, 156, 158; dependence on, 49; equipment and supplies, 36; as incentive, 61, 62, 63–64, 65–66, 67, 68, 70; during Iran-Iraq War, 157–58; in 1970s and 1980s, 13, 143, 155–56, 157–58; in postwar period, 61–64; strategic interests of United States and, 45, 48, 61, 155–56; tanks, 63; technical assistance, 3, 13, 147, 157–58; training, 3, 36, 37, 40, 41, 68, 70, 143, 145, 168; weapons sales, 36, 143, 147, 155, 158, 168; during World War II, 36–37, 40 Saudi Arabian Airlines, 38 Saudi Arabian military: air force, 41, 79, 86–87, 148; commanders-in-chief, 77; defense ministry, 32, 40; equipment and supplies, 36, 62, 63; forces sent to Bahrain, 171; internal focus, 9–10; modernization, 147, 155, 156; navy, 64; oil installation defense, 32; Pakistani officers, 147; Royal Guard, 32, 202n96; size, 32, 58, 62, 147, 162, 202n96; training, 33, 36, 37, 40, 41, 61–62, 68, 70; weakness, 49, 58, 164; during World War II, 32–33, 36, 40

Saudi National Guard: equipment, 156; establishment, 32; office building bombed, 165; opposition groups and, 69, 152, 153, 154; size, 147, 162; training, 3 Saud monarchy: assassination plots, 87–88; divisions within royal family, 75, 77; expenses, 77; internal security concerns, 69, 78–79, 89–90, 170; legitimacy, 83, 152–53, 166; military protection, 9–10; pan-Arab nationalism as threat, 8–9, 74–76, 78– 79, 89; plots to overthrow, 148; Royal Guard, 32; wealth from oil revenues, 49, 145. See also Saudi Arabia; and individual kings Schwarzkopf, Norman, 162 Sectarian tensions, see Shi’a populations Security threats, see External security threats; Internal security concerns September 11 attacks, 144, 166 Sheikh, Abdullah Bin Mohammed Bin Ibrahim Al, 174–75 Shi’a populations: in Bahrain, 91–92, 102– 3, 104, 114, 171; in Iraq, 157; in Saudi Arabia, 49, 114, 146–47, 151, 153–54 Shomber, Garrett B., 36, 40 Six-Day War (1967), 88, 89 Socal, see Standard Oil of California Socialism: in Egypt, 66, 82; in Gulf states, 102; of Qaddafi, 148. See also Leftist groups; Marxist rebels; Soviet Union Sons of the Arabian Peninsula, 74 Southwest Asia Strategy, 118 South Yemen, see People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen Soviet expansionism in Middle East: Arab-Israeli conflict and, 148; British role in preventing, 95; during Cold War, 4, 72, 92; military aid to Yemen,

INDEX 267

48; naval presence, 99, 101, 115, 124; Omani concerns, 124, 125–26, 140; Saudi concerns, 47, 48; support of revolutionary groups, 4, 74, 104, 122, 126; threats following Afghan invasion, 4, 115, 118, 126, 140; U.S. efforts to counter, 21, 45, 48, 49, 97, 100, 118, 139. See also People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen Soviet Union: Afghanistan invasion, 4, 7, 113, 115, 118, 125–26, 154, 156; collapse, 160; navy, 92, 99, 101, 115, 124; relations with Egypt, 45, 57–58, 72, 74, 88–89; relations with Middle East countries, 45, 47, 48, 118, 124, 125; relations with Saudi Arabia, 45, 47–48, 56, 60, 72; Suez Canal Crisis and, 58; in World War II, 22, 26–27. See also Cold War Spalding, Sidney P., 32 Standard Oil of California (Socal), 23, 25, 99 State Department, U.S.: military aid for Saudi Arabia, 63–64; Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, 60, 61; negotiations on Saudi base, 31, 65–66, 69–70; negotiations with Oman, 128–35, 136–39; relations with Bahrain, 108; relations with Saudi Arabia, 79, 81 State-War-Navy Coordination Committee (SWNCC), 39 Strait of Hormuz, 7, 118, 120, 138, 140, 171 Suez Canal Crisis, 46, 57–59, 71, 73 Suleiman, Abdullah, 31 SWNCC, see State-War-Navy Coordination Committee Syria: alliance with Saudi Arabia, 53–54; conflict, 1, 4, 168, 174; Iranian influence, 169, 174; workers in Saudi Arabia, 146. See also United Arab Republic

Talbot, Phillips, 84 Talbott, Harold E., 62–63 Tariki, Abdullah, 79 Technology, military, 177. See also Military aid Terrorist attacks: in Saudi Arabia, 144, 165–66, 167; of September 11, 144, 166 Texas Oil Company (Texaco), 25 Thucydides, 5 Trade, 4, 7, 174. See also Oil and natural gas Transjordan, 27, 28, 51, 52. See also Hashemites; Jordan Trucial states, 54, 55, 99 Truman, Harry S., 40, 41–42, 44–45, 48, 55, 62 Truman Doctrine, 48 Tunbs, see Greater and Lesser Tunbs Turkey, see Baghdad Pact Twitchell, Karl, 23 UAE, see United Arab Emirates UAR, see United Arab Republic United Arab Emirates (UAE): Bahraini independence and, 98; military forces sent to Bahrain, 171; oil exports, 174; Oman and, 120. See also Gulf Arab states United Arab Republic (UAR): coup plot, 76–77; establishment, 74, 76; relations with Saudi Arabia, 78, 80, 84; support of revolutionary groups, 82, 103; Syrian secession, 80; Yemen civil war and, 85–86, 88–89. See also Egypt; Syria United Kingdom, see Great Britain United Nations: Bahraini independence and, 98; General Assembly, 83; Security Council, 89, 97, 164 United States: Arab-Israeli conflict and, 7,

268 INDEX

148–49; Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 11–12; Israel supported by, 83, 89, 104–5, 106; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 46, 48, 62, 100; oil consumption, 22; oil imports, 47, 49, 97, 98–99; oil production, 22, 34, 47; September 11 attacks, 144, 166; Vietnam War, 7, 82–83, 96, 99, 101; Yemen civil war and, 86–87. See also Basing strategy; Cold War; and individual presidents U.S. Air Force, 13, 143, 150, 157, 164, 169 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 147 U.S. Navy: dependence on Middle East oil, 48–49, 62; Diego Garcia facility, 100–101, 111, 112, 124; First Gulf War, 116; Middle East Force, 91, 93, 98–102, 107, 108, 109, 111–13, 115; presence in Gulf during Iran-Iraq War, 159–60; view of Saudi oil, 19, 24–26; Yemen civil war and, 87. See also Basing strategy; Juffair base Vance, Cyrus, 132 Vietnam War, 7, 82–83, 96, 99, 101 Wadsworth, George E., 63–64, 68, 69–70, 71 Wahhabis, in Saudi Arabia, 20, 27–29, 30, 151, 152

War Department, U.S., 20, 31, 32 Weapons, see Military aid; Saudi Arabia, U.S. military aid Wen Jiabao, 174–75 West, John, 155 Wiley, Marshall W., 119, 137 World Bank, 84 World War I, 22 World War II: demand for oil, 6, 25, 34–35; expansion of U.S. bases abroad, 5–6, 19–21, 24, 26; Iranian role, 22, 26–27; Pearl Harbor attack, 6, 19, 26; Saudi military, 32–33, 36, 40; Saudi-U.S. relations, 19–21, 24–27, 31–39; U.S. economic and military aid, 36–37, 40 YAR, see Yemen Arab Republic Yassin, Yusuf, 32–33, 37, 65, 66, 71, 76, 205n139 Yemen: alliances, 53; civil war, 85–87, 88– 89; Iranian influence, 169; relations with Soviet Union, 48, 118; workers in Saudi Arabia, 146. See also People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), 85–86 Yom Kippur War, see Arab-Israeli War (1973) Zawawi, Qais Al-Mun’im Al-, 132, 235n99