Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies 9811680310, 9789811680311

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Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies Edited by Shiping Hua

Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies

Shiping Hua Editor

Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies

Editor Shiping Hua University of Louisville Louisville, KY, USA

ISBN 978-981-16-8031-1 ISBN 978-981-16-8032-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8032-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

For “United Societies of China Studies.”

Acknowledgments

This book was inspired by my involvement with United Societies of China Studies (USCS) that was established in Louisville, Kentucky, the United States of America, in 2006. It is a coalition of eight scholarly organizations of China studies. These organizations are: International Chinese Sociological Association; Chinese Communication Association; Association of Chinese Professors in Social Sciences; Association of Chinese Helping Professionals and Psychologists-International; Society for Chinese Studies Librarians; Association for Information Systems; Global Forum of Chinese Political Scientists; and Chinese Historians in the United States. USCS edits two book series: China Studies: International Outlook published by City University of Hong Kong Press and China: From Revolution to Reform published by Amsterdam University Press.

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Contents

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Introduction: Paradigmatic Trends in China Studies Shiping Hua

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Paradigms of Anthropology in China Gordon Mathews

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Shifts of Journalism and Communication Education in China and the Political and Ideological Contributing Factors Jing Niu, Junhao Hong, and Lujian Bi

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The Changing Landscape of Economic Studies on China: A Scopus-Based Literature Review Sarah Y. Tong and Yao Li

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The Shift of Paradigms in Writing Chinese History Qiang Fang

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Paradigm Shift in Chinese Legal Studies Guobin Zhu, Jian Qu, and Han Zhai

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Three Paradigms for Studying Chinese Philosophy Ronnie Littlejohn

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One County, Many Paradigms: Diversity in China Political Studies John James Kennedy and Rigao Liu

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CONTENTS

Advancing Psychology of China: A Call for Paradigm Shift Changming Duan and Fenglan Li

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Hiding in Plain Sight: Paradigms Shifts in the Study of the ‘Religious Question’ in China André Laliberté

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Situated Knowledge and Situated Action: The Rise of Chinese Sociology Since 1978 Fei Yan and Liqun Cao

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Deconstructing Chinese Art Music’s Paradigms and Paradigm Shift Hon-Lun Yang and Arturo Irisarri Izquierdo

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Index

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Notes on Contributors

Lujian Bi is a doctoral student in the School of Journalism and Information Communication at Huazhong University of Science & Technology, China. Her research focuses on communication ethics. Liqun Cao, Ph.D. (1993), is Professor of Sociology and Criminology at Ontario Tech University. His research interests include comparative studies, criminological theory, minority-majority relationship, and policing. His research essays have appeared in many national and international journals, including Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, Journal of Criminal Justice, Justice Quarterly, Social Forces, Social Problems, etc. He is the author of Major Criminological Theories: Concepts and Measurement (2004) and the lead author of Policing in Taiwan: From Authoritarianism to Democracy (2014). He co-edited Lessons from International/Comparative Criminology/Criminal Justice (2004) and Routledge Handbook of Chinese Criminology (2014). In addition, he has three co-authored criminological books in Chinese. Changming Duan, Ph.D. is a Chinese American licensed counseling Psychologist and Professor of Psychology at University of Kansas. Her research interests include learning about the role of culture in mental health and psychology, understanding culturally specific counseling process and outcome, and using strength-based interventions to promote psychological healing and growth for diverse people in diverse social and cultural contexts.

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Qiang Fang is Professor of East Asian history at University of Minnesota Duluth. He is the Executive Vice President of Association of Chinese Professors of Social Sciences and former President of Chinese Historians in the United States (2017–2019). He has authored and coauthored many books including, among others, The Communist Judicial System in China, 1927–1976: Building on Fear (2021), Power Versus Law in Modern China: Cities, Courts, and the Communist Party (2017), Zhongguo shangfang zhidushihua (2013), and Chinese Complaint Systems: Natural Resistance (2013). Junhao Hong is a Professor in the Department of Communication at State University of New York at Buffalo, the United States. He received his Ph.D. in Communication from University of Texas at Austin, the United States. His research focuses on international communication and international politics, mass media and social change, and the impact of new media. He has published a dozen or so books and numerous research articles. Shiping Hua is Calvin & Helen Lang Distinguished Chair in Asian Studies, Professor of Political Science, and Director of Asian Studies Program at the University of Louisville, United States. He has published 14 books in English, edited or single-authored, including Chinese Legal Culture and Constitutional Order, Chinese Utopianism: A Comparative Study of Reformist Thought with Japan and Russia (1898–1997), and Scientism and Humanism: Two Cultures in Post-Mao China (1978–1989). He edits two book series, Asia in the New Millennium with University Press of Kentucky and Comparative Asian Politics with Routledge. Arturo Irisarri Izquierdo is currently a Ph.D. student at the Hong Kong Baptist University under the support of the RGC’s Hong Kong Ph.D. Fellowship Scheme. His dissertation is focused on piano music in China and the development of a Chinese national style of piano concerti, exploring issues of nationalism, ideology, and identity politics in connection to music from a Hegelian-psychoanalytic perspective. Originally trained as a pianist, he has appeared regularly at stages across several European countries. John James Kennedy is a Professor and Chair of the Political Science Department at the University of Kansas. His research covers local governance and social development including local elections, tax reform, family planning, health care, and the cadre management system.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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André Laliberté, Ph.D. (1999), University of British Columbia, is Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Ottawa’s School of Political Studies. He has published articles for peer-reviewed journals and book chapters, about different aspects of domestic politics in Taiwan and China, as well as about cross-strait relations. The issues he has examined include nationalism, freedom of conscience, democratization, social policies, and labor rights for migrant caregivers. He has published on religion and politics in China and Taiwan, including the Politics of Buddhist Organizations in Taiwan (Routledge, 2004). He has co-edited Buddhism After Mao with Ji Zhe and Gareth Fisher (Hawai’i University Press, 2019), and Concepts and Methods for the Study of Chinese Religions with Stefania Travagnin (de Gruyter, 2019). Fenglan Li, Ph.D. is currently a Professor of Psychological Health Education at Huazhong Agriculture University in Wuhan, China. She received her doctoral degree in clinical and counselling psychology from Central China Normal University. Her research mainly focuses on understanding the outlook on and relationships among culture, values, and mental health. She is also specialized in promoting mental health literacy among teenagers and adolescents and engaged in program and teaching material development for strengthening mental health education in schools. Yao Li is currently a Research Fellow, East Asia Institute (EAI), National University of Singapore. Before joining EAI, she served as a tenuretracked Associate Professor for University of Electronic Science and Technology of China from 2011 to 2019. She received her Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, where she was also a degree fellow of the East-West Center. She has published papers in World Economy, Review of Development Economics, Energy Policy, Journal of Asian Economics, Singapore Economic Review and Journal of international Trade and Economic Development. Her ongoing research focuses on China’s public policies related to digital economy, FDI, international trade, inequality, and pollution issues as well as China’s role in global economic development. Ronnie Littlejohn (张任宁) is the Chaney Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Director of Asian Studies at Belmont University in the United States and Concurrent Professor in the School of Foreign Languages, Zhengzhou University (Henan, PRC). He is author

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of eight books, including the recent titles: Historical Dictionary of Daoism (2020); Chinese Philosophy: An Introduction (2016); Confucianism (2011, Chinese translation 2019); and Daoism: An Introduction (2010). He is also co-editor with Jeffrey Dippmann of Riding the Wind with Liezi: New Essays on a Daoist Classic (2011), and with Marthe Chandler of Polishing the Chinese Mirror: Essays in Honor of Henry Rosemont, Jr. (2008). Rigao Liu is a Ph.D. student studying Comparative Politics and International Relations from the Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas (KU). He is also a Graduate Researcher of KU Trade War Lab. His research centers on local governance and political economy in China. Gordon Mathews is Professor of Anthropology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He has written What Makes Life Worth Living: How Japanese and Americans Make Sense of Their Worlds (1996), Global Culture/Individual Identity: Searching for Home in the Cultural Supermarket (2001), Hong Kong, China: Learning to Belong to a Nation (with Eric Ma and Tai-lok Lui, 2008), Ghetto at the Center of the World: Chungking Mansions, Hong Kong (2011), and The World in Guangzhou: Africans and Other Foreigners in South China’s Global Marketplace (2017). He has recently completed a book on senses of life after death in the United States, Japan, and China. Jing Niu is a Professor in the School of Journalism and Information Communication at Huazhong University of Science & Technology, China. She is also an Associate in Center for Studies of Media Development at Wuhan University. She received her Ph.D. in Journalism from Huazhong University of Science & Technology. Her research focuses on media policy, communication ethics, and online expression. She has published a dozen or so books and numerous research articles. Jian Qu Dr. Phil. (Heidelberg University), Dr. iur. (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven) is Associate Professor of Law in Department of Law, College of Humanities and Development Studies, China Agricultural University, Beijing, China. He is the author of two award-winning books: Social Order Through Contracts: A Study of the Qingshui River Manuscripts (Springer, 2021) and Taking Promulgated Words as Law: Collation, Annotation, and Study of “Records of the Procurement of Imperial Timber” (in Chinese, Huamulan, 2019).

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Sarah Y. Tong is Senior Research Fellow of NUS’ East Asian Institute and its cluster coordinator for the economics team. Her research interests concentrate on the development and transformation of Chinese Economy, including development in trade and foreign investment, development of regions, financial sector reforms, the reforms of state-owned enterprises, industrial policies and restructuring, and social economic impact of population aging. Her work appeared in journals such as Journal of International Economics, Global Economic Review, China: An International Journal, Review of Development Economics, China and the World Economy, Comparative Economic Studies, and China Economic Review. In addition to contributing chapters to numerous books on contemporary China, she also edited and co-edited books including China and Global Economic Crisis (2010), Trade, Investment and Economic Integration (2014), China’s Evolving Industrial Policies and Economic Restructure (2014), China’s Great Urbanization (2017), China’s Economic Transformation Under the New Normal (2017), China’s Economic Modernization and Structural Changes (2019), and China and Asia Economic Integration (2020). Fei Yan, Ph.D. from the University of Oxford (2014), is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Tsinghua University. He was a Postdoctoral Researcher at Stanford University in 2014–2016. His research focuses on historical sociology, political sociology, contentious politics, and social movements. Dr. Yan has published numerous refereed articles at the top national and international journals, including Social Science Research, Urban Studies, The Sociological Review, Social Movement Studies, Oxford Bibliographies in Sociology, Development Policy Review, The China Quarterly, Modern China, China Information, and China: An International Journal. He was awarded the Graduate Student Best Paper Prize by the Association for Asian Studies in 2015. Currently, he serves as the Vice Chair of the Department of Sociology, Tsinghua University. Hon-Lun Yang is Professor of Music at Hong Kong Baptist University. She is the co-editor of China and the West: Music, Representation, and Reception (University of Michigan Press, 2017) and the lead author of Networking the Russian Diaspora: Russian Musicians and Musical Activities in Interwar Shanghai (University of Hawai’i Press, 2020). Her book chapters appeared in monographs such as Sound Alignments: Popular Music in Asia’s Cold Wars (Duke University Press, 2021), The Bloomsbury Handbook of Popular Music and Social Class (2019), The

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Oxford Handbook of Music Censorship (2018), Composing for the State (Ashgate, 2016), Music and Protest in 1968 (Cambridge University Press, 2013), and her articles were published in Journal of Musicological Research (2019), Journal of the American Liszt Society (2018), TwentiethCentury Music (2018), Music and Politics (2013), Twentieth-Century China (2012), International Review of Aesthetics and Sociology of Music (2011), and Asian Music (2010). Han Zhai Ph.D. (Tilburg University), is Associate Research Fellow on special appointment at Wuhan University, China. She holds an LL.M. of Chinese University of Political Science and Law and an LL.B. of Inner Mongolia University. She worked as Research Fellow at Israel Institute for Advanced Studies (IIAS Research Fellow, 2019–2020). Her current research topics include socialist constitutional legacies, national security and public law, and professional ethics of constitutional scholarship in China. Her recent book is Constitutional Identity of Contemporary China: The Unitary System and Its Internal Logic (Brill|Nijhoff, 2019). Guobin Zhu, Ph.D. is Professor of Law, School of Law, City University of Hong Kong; Director, Public Law and Human Rights Forum, City University of Hong Kong; Co-Associate Director, Centre of Public Affairs and Law, City University of Hong Kong. B.A., M.A., LL.M. (Renmin University), LL.M. (Hong Kong University), Ph.D. and Habilitation (Aix-Marseille University). He is a Titular Member of International Academy of Comparative Law and has extensively published in the above fields, in English, Chinese, or French, and the most recent articles are published in Stanford Journal of International Law, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Human Rights Quarterly, China: An International Journal, Hong Kong Law Journal.

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1

Fig. 4.1

Fig. 4.2

Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4

Fig. 8.1

Annual Publications on “Marxist View of Journalism” on CNKI (Source This figure is constructed on the data collected from China National Knowledge Infrastructure Visualization Analysis, 2020) GDP growth, 1980–2020(%) (Note D-EAP refers to East Asia & Pacific excluding high-income countries. Source World Development Indicators) Contribution to economic research on China, by authors’ geographic affiliations, 1978–2020 (Note The shares of economic studies on China by authors based in China (China), four English speaking developed economies (UUAC) and five of China’s neighboring economies in Asia (Asia5) among all economic studies on China) Share of Studies on China’s Economy with International Cooperation (A) Share of Economic Studies with International Cooperation (B) (Note The share of studies coauthored by China-based scholars with scholars outside China in all economic studies (Econ) and in all economic studies on China (Econ_CN). The numbers are of five-year moving averages) Number of articles and books in Google scholar for “Peoples’ Republic of China” and “political science” from 1950–2021 in English (Source Google Scholar search January 2021)

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68

78 81

81

175

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 8.2

Fig. 11.1

Fig. 11.2

Fig. 11.3

Number of articles and books in Google Scholar for “中华人民共和国” and “政治学” from 1950–2021 in Chinese (Source Google Scholar search January 2021) The decline of “social movements” contents in Chinese sociology textbooks (Note A methodological note: we first collected a total of 17 sociology textbooks published between 1978 and 2017. Textbooks written by the same author in different time periods and textbooks sponsored by the Ministry of Education are our prior choices. Next, we obtained the total word count length of each textbook from the copyright page and the word count length of the “Social Movement/Collective Action” section by calculating the number of words per page multiplied by the number of pages in the section. Finally, we calculated the coverage ratio of “Social Movement/Collective Action” section in each textbook) The rising focus on “social issues/social governance” in Chinese sociology textbooks (Note We used the same 17 sociology textbooks published between 1978 and 2017 as our sample pool and calculated the coverage ratio of “Social Issues/Social Governance” section in each textbook) The rise and fall of sensitive topics in two Chinese sociological journals (Note Open Times was founded in 1982 and Sociological Studies was founded in 1986. Therefore, there is no data for Sociological Studies between 1982 and 1986. We first summed up the total number of published research papers in each journal and then counted the number of published articles that are belong to the categories of six under-developed sub-fields of sociology. We finally calculated the publication ratio of under-developed sub-fields of sociology in both journals across the time)

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 11.1

Curriculum setting of research methods in some Universities Structure changes Main areas of economic studies on China, based on analysis of keywords Main policy issues under economy research on China, based on analysis of keywords Rank of disciplines by share of studies in economic studies on China Under-developed sub-fields of sociology in China

52 69 71 75 79 276

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Paradigmatic Trends in China Studies Shiping Hua

As the introduction to this edited volume, this chapter addresses the following issues: the relations between social change and scholarly paradigms; paradigms and area studies; paradigms and China studies; paradigms and scholarly disciplines. The current round of globalization started with the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991. The globalization was endorsed by the leaders of Western countries with the optimistic promise that ideological disputes had become less important and democracy as an ideal had won universally (Fukuyama, 1989). The globalization has produced mixed result. The wealth of the world has increased immensely, especially for China: its GDP per capita increased by about 30 times since 1990, compared with the United States for about three times. By PPP, China’s economy had become larger than that of the United States as early as 2014. But China under Xi Jinping who took

S. Hua (B) University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 S. Hua (ed.), Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8032-8_1

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office in 2012 has started an ideological reversal process that has made China more authoritarian, in spite of the continued economic growth. The United States and China fought a trade war since President Donald Trump came to office in 2017. The two countries reached an agreement in January 2020 that gave people some hope for a more stable bilateral relationship in the years to come. In addition, the COVID-19 virus that started in China in late 2019 but later spread to other parts of the world initially gave people some hope for collaboration between the two countries, because the disease can’t be fought by one country. However, the opposite has happened: the decoupling process between the two countries got accelerated since the pandemic. Commenting on the impact of the COVID-19 virus, Henry Kissinger said that the world will be fundamentally different after the pandemic (Kissinger, 2020). The neo-liberal order of the world since the collapse of the USSR probably has come to an end. China under Xi has proved that the basic promise assumed by the American elites in the last four decades is wrong: China has not become more democratic in spite of its rapid economic expansion and its incorporation to the global liberal system. In the last four decades, the mainstream China field and the US government had expected that China would gradually move in the direction of pluralism, even democracy. Xi Jinping’s reversal of the reform confounded many in the China field (Economy, 2018). This assumption is based on the so-called modernization theory. The logic is that economic prosperity will bring about a large middle class that are well educated and they naturally would want to have a voice in the governance of the country. In other words, democracy will follow substantial economic development. The theory was influential also because it demonstrated validity in the developments of some other countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore (Huntington, 1991). This is not the first time that area studies failed to guide policies for country leaders. The China field in the United States was largely un-prepared by the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989. Practically, no Russia experts in the West predicted the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union in 1991. Surely, that’s not because of the lack of scientific vigor by the Russia experts. After all, in socio-economic terms, the gap between the former USSR, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe was getting

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closer, not wider, implying communism as a development model was not as inefficient as people thought. Going hand in hand with China’s reversal of the reform in recent years, democracy globally has experienced decline in the last decade (Freedom House, 2019). This made people wonder about the function of theories in social sciences: Do social sciences theories go before social change in predictions, or do they go after social change to justify it? Disappointed by the area specialists in guiding policies, American political leaders are no longer as eager to turn to area experts to guide their policies. Instead, they increasingly turned to strategists. The two key policymakers of US China policy in the Trump administration are not scholars: Peter Navarro does not speak the Chinese language and Matthew Pottinger is a former journalist. In the previous administrations, the presidents’ advisers for China were mostly prominent scholars, such as Michel Oksenberg, Susan Shirk, and Thomas Christensen. This situation calls for a reexamination of the field of China studies. Historically, scholarly paradigms shifts often went hand in hand with drastic social change. As we have entered an era of great uncertainty, it is constructive to reflect on the paradigms in China studies in the past and explore the possibility of new paradigms in the future. How are the shifts of major western theories, methods, and paradigms in China studies related to social change? How did some of China’s paradigms impact on the country’s social change and developments? This book is a study of the change and continuity in paradigmsin China studies, both in the west and in China. The term “paradigm” refers to a framework of the basic assumptions, ways of thinking, and methodology that are commonly accepted by the academics. The adjective “paradigmatic” is a fancy word for describing something that is an ideal or standard. The term “paradigm” is used because it is broader and more general than the more commonly used terms of “theories” and “methods.” As an interdisciplinary study, this project intends to incorporate not only social sciences, but also humanities, with the former such as political science being more conscious about using theories and methods than the latter such as literature.

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Area Studies and the Paradigms The developments of area studies are closely related to social development; for example, area studies began to be taken seriously with the start of the Cold War era as enemy (socialist) states research. Yet, more than half a century has passed and area studies in United States have not developed a distinct analytical framework (Amako, 2017). This is partly because while humanities do not claim to be possessing “truth,” the “scientific nature” of social sciences itself is in doubt by many in the west. The theories in social science were described as like “clouds,” while the theories in natural science were described as “clock.” The former’s shape is unclear and unstable, while the latter is more accurate and stable (Almond, 1990). For some, even natural science is not as accurate as we believe. For instance, it is hard to measure the mechanism and dynamics of falling leaves from the trees, or the movements of a rock that is rolling down from the top of a hill. Globally, the ratio of male babies and female babies is about 105 to 100 regardless of ethnicities and regions, although each conception is accidental. There got to be some kind of “un-seen hand” somewhere that regulates the universe. The unexplained pattern of this and other phenomena made people to believe “nowadays, nobody knows what science is.” Some even go as far as to say that social sciences originated in the United States are more related to the development of capitalism than anything else (Kuhn, 1996; Manicas, 1987). This is what we call the “non-liberal” paradigm about the nature of science; that is, science equals truth. For this school of thought, each concrete social phenomenon is different and needs to use different theoretical and methodological approaches to study it (Sayer, 1983). While the basic promise of this is valid from a philosophical perspective, operationally it has a danger for researchers: it could create a situation when whoever in power decides on what truth is, as was the case with Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao’s China, because there was no objective standard to judge the validity of research. A more widely accepted definition of science, i.e., a “liberal” one, has a limited expectation about what science is. Therefore, science is defined as having the following principles: the empirical principle, the quantitative principle, that phenomena have causes, and that science does not equal truth (Hua, 1996). We are getting closer to truth through the efforts of different scholars approaching the target from different perspectives. We

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never get to truth. Science is a process and a method that enables us to get one step closer to truth. Viewing from this perspective, the efforts of those in humanities are just as fruitful. The disciplinary boundaries in social sciences and humanities is the recognition of the limitation of each researcher’s mind power. This is the philosophical foundation of this volume. Since social sciences were created in the west especially in the United States, the cultural environment is “liberal.” As a country of immigrants, the American society is noted for its emphasis on objectiveness and neutrality. In a sense, objectiveness and neutrality sometimes equal justice and science. For this liberal version of science, procedure is more important than the result. In science, procedure is more important than the result in that as long as a scientist follows the procedure, it is “professional.” Whether or not the result is correct does not matter. Its legal system follows the same logic. In the O.J. Simpson case, the Americans care less about who the killer is. As long as the case was handled according to the proper procedure, it is acceptable. In politics, twice in recent decades, the majority voters’ preference was overruled by the election procedure: Al Gore was defeated in the campaign against George W. Bush, because of the Supreme Court’s intervention that stopped the recounting of votes in Florida. The successful election to presidency by Donald Trump was because of the rules of the Electoral College, not because of the preference of the majority of the voters. In economics, the US Security and Exchange Commission is to check on the legality of those economic activities on Wall Street, not who made more money from the process than others. Those social sciences theories created in this “liberal” environment certainly have limits when used in other cultures. For instance, “rational choice theory” widely used in economics and political science in the west may not be as effective when used in other cultures where people tend to value long-term interest more than short-term interest, such as Japan. Rational choice theory believes that human behavior is conditioned by people’s short-term interest. Unlike the United States that is a country of immigrants where people tend to value short-term interest more, the Japanese give greater emphasis on long-term interest.

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China Studies and the Paradigms Before China’s opening to the outside world, area studies about China in the west were unable to use scientific methods, because the empirical data were for the most part not available. Therefore, Western studies about China were highly abstract and general. Communist countries were put into the category of “totally un-free,” i.e., “totalitarian.” For example, Politics in China by James Townsend analyzed Mao’s China under a framework of “radical totalitarianism” (Townsend, 1980). China during the reform era has been interpreted under a framework known as the “authoritarianism model” or “regime of authoritarianism,” that generally means the country is politically un-free, but in economic and social terms there is flexibility. But many China specialists did not follow this paradigm. For them, “China is China is China”; that is, the China field does not generate theories/methods nor does it use theories/methods. Due to in-accessibility, China studies relied on interviews of those who escaped from China (Chan, 1985) and psychological analysis. The empirical data of these studies were thin (Pye, 1968). China studies in the west became more in line with the Western disciplinary boundaries during the reform era. For instance, Tianjin Shi’s survey research on Chinese political culture was possible only after China’s opening up to the outside (Shi, 1997). From the perspective of Chinese scholarship itself, the paradigm in scholarly pursuit in pre-modern times was different from the west. Confucianism is not interested in the metaphysical notions of issues like where the universe comes from. The universe was taken for granted. The Western notion of ontology is not entirely applicable here. For the Chinese philosopher Li Zehou (1985), Confucians were idealist, as was represented in the ideas of Wang Yangming (Chang, 1970). Instead, the emphasis is on morality. China’s Confucian tradition strongly emphasized humanities instead of scientific knowledge. Historically speaking, no other country valued humanities such as philosophy, literature, and history as much as ancient China, as noted by Max Weber (Weber, 1968). Civil service examination was about writing essays on Confucian morality, not about scientific knowledge such as the curing of disease for patients. China has a big government tradition and its scholarly paradigms reflected this. The Confucian Analects is a philosophical dialogue of the

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sage with the rulers, not for the people. Even nowadays, the desirable career pattern for an academic is still to work for the government. Confucians despise those who are only specialized in particular skills such as math or mechanics. He must be an all-round person, Jun Zi Bu Qi. Chinese historical works such as the Twenty-Four Histories (Er shi si shi) are largely about court politics, not about the development of Chinese society in a holistic sense. Those science areas that were connected with politics were more developed, e.g., astronomy, because the movements of stars had meanings for politics. Astronomy was supposed to reflect and even predict political events, such as the collapse of a dynasty. China’s so-called Four Big Discoveries were all connected with the state: powder, for military; compass, for military; paper, for administration; printing, for administration. During the Maoist era, the Marxist paradigm dominated China’s scholarly world. One of them was the rejection of Western disciplinary boundaries; for example, all Western disciplines were missing from the Chinese curriculum during the Cultural Revolution. Universities during the time period were closed with the exception of those having to do with science and technology. It was believed that Western social sciences were fake and humanities can be learned by the students themselves. Among the Gang of Four, the radical leaders of the Cultural Revolution, three are “literati,” using the word by Weber. Jiang Qing was noted for her Eight Revolutionary Operas; Zhang Chunqiao, for his political essays; and Yao Wenyuan, for his literary critique. That’s why it was called “Cultural” Revolution, not political revolution. It was widely believed that Mao read the fictional novel The Dream of the Red Mansion (Hong Lou Meng) as if it were history (Dong, 2009) and he read The Romance of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguo Yanyi) as if it were a classic of military strategy (Boorman, 1964). In the post-Mao era, the Western paradigm became the mainstream in the sense that China’s disciplinary divisions during the time period were similar to that of the west. In recent years, however, there was a reversal of some of these practices, e.g., the establishment of the Schools of Marxism at major universities.

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Disciplines and the Paradigms Some fruitful research about paradigms, theories, and methods has been done in China studies in the areas of sinology in general (Amako, 2017), political science (Guo and Blanchard, 2009), international political economy (Toohey et al., 2015), women and gender studies (De Kloet, 2008), fine arts (Tang, 2015), communication (Li, 2019), religion (Lagerwey, 2018), economics (Cohn, 2019), literature (Swartz, 2008), law (Fan, 2012), and philosophy (Rosker, 2012). On anthropology, Gordon Mathews argued in Chapter 2 that there were significant efforts in the first half of the twentieth century to create an anthropology based on a Chinese paradigm. Today, however, that ideal has faded, with anthropology in China being fundamentally different from anthropology in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Anthropology in China primarily focuses on minority nationalities and is closely aligned to the Chinese state and Communist Party—it stays away from societal issues, and its mission is thought to be one of aiding the government. In Hong Kong, on the other hand, anthropological investigations of China and Hong Kong, the dominant foci of anthropological investigation, are likely to be critical of government and have much in common with anthropology as practiced in Western societies. Today, this is not only an academic matter. Given Beijing’s expansion of control over Hong Kong, anthropology too may be snuffed out in its independence and may eventually come to be sucked into the Chinese orbit as an anthropology serving the state. In communication, the major paradigmatic issue is the relations between the government and the media: Are the media supposed to serve the interest of the party or the people? In recent decades, however, the changes in paradigms were also driven by technology. Communication has moved from the first generation of bi-directional communication, to the second media age of mass communication, and to the third media age of immersive communication. As technology advances, so does the way people communicate with each other. Consequently, the paradigms in scientific inquiry change as well (Li, 2019). In Chapter 3, Junhao Hong et al. noted that because of the advance of technology in recent decades, social media have become an important venue, therefore posing a serious challenge to the official domination of the media. In just less than 10 years, social media users in China reached over 900 million, meaning around 70% of the population in the country

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are social media users. Currently, the majority of the Chinese obtain news and information mainly from social media instead of from state/party media. In economics, sometimes paradigm shift was driven by political and economic currents, not by economic reasoning. When the economic reforms began in 1978, Marxist economics infused all China’s institutions of economic theory. By the year 2000, neoclassical economics dominated these institutions and influenced most economic discussion (Cohn, 2019). In Chapter 4, Sarah Y. Tong et al. focus their study on the interactions between economic development and the studies of economics during the post-Mao China. In history, the paradigmatic debate in contemporary times is also politicized. According to Marxist historical materialism, history moves forward driven by the productive forces. The path of history is linear. During the reform era, Jin Guantao challenged this by arguing that history can go in circles. In the last two thousand years, the dynasties would collapse periodically. But the new dynasty would be built on the same social and political structure of the old dynasty (Jin, 2011). In Chapter 5, Qiang Fang outlines three paradigms in Chinese history research. In ancient times through the Republic era, official histories had focused on rulers, ministers, and other social elites. After Marxist theory was ushered in China, class struggle and glorification of the Party’s accomplishments became the overriding thread in writing history. In the wake of Mao’s death and China’s reopening to the West in the late 1970s, the paradigm of writing history has stepped into a more complex domain, a mixture of the diminishing Marxist theory, modern Western historical paradigms, and a traditional paradigm reminiscent of dynastic official historians. For law, the Marxist paradigm said little about law, because it belongs to the category of superstructure which is not as essential as the economic base. Both in the former USSR and in China, the governance alternated between having no law and rule by law. On the eve of the reform, there was almost no law. During most part of the reform era, legislative borrowing was predominantly from Anglo-American model. In the last few years, this move toward the west halted. Instead, the Chinese legal system is moving to the rule by law of the imperial past.

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In Chapter 6, Guobin Zhu et al. identified two general paradigm shifts across the legal scholarship and academia of legal studies in the post1978 China: de-Sovietization and de-Marxization one the one hand, and legalization of market economy and Westernization of law on the another. Although most of the time paradigms in scientific inquiry witnessed changes, continuity in certain disciplines also exists. Philosophy is such an example. For instance, some of the present-day paradigms in philosophy can be found in ancient China; for example, the paradigm of structural epistemology was already found in the earliest Chinese theories of knowledge (Rosker, 2012). In Western paradigmatic discussions about philosophy, the dichotomy of materialism and idealism has widely been noted. For instance, Ronald H. Chilcote in comparative politics puts those theories into two camps, materialism represented by Marx and idealism represented by Weber (Chilcote, 2018). Domestically, the major paradigmatic issue growing out of the issue of idealism vs materialism is the dichotomy of human initiatives and objective laws that had significant impact on the communist endeavors. For instance, the major post-Mao theory of “primary stage socialism” adopted in 1978 was based on the historical materialism notion that the change of social relations needs to go after the development of productive forces. In other words, China can’t jump into communism by skipping the stage of capitalist development. Ronnie Littlejohn argues in Chapter 7 that the original paradigm for the study of Chinese philosophy began with the translation of Western texts into Chinese and Chinese philosophy into Western languages. This resulted in the marginalization and overt neglect of Chinese thought in the philosophy programs by Western academies. Another paradigm for approaching Chinese philosophy was the emergence of the sub-discipline within philosophical discourse of comparative philosophy in the Western academy. This paradigm was constructed by philosophers who were committed to an intentional recognition of the value of Chinese thought and dialogue with its traditions. They sought not to show the superiority of Western philosophy, but to engage and learn from Chinese philosophy. Currently, there is a third paradigm developing from the growing understanding of the full range of Chinese philosophical traditions and the serious ways in which Chinese thought has been understood owing to the work of comparative philosophers. This paradigm does not pretend

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to any new theory that unlocks all the riddles or solves all the quandaries arising in comparative philosophy. Instead, the goal is to create a different sort of philosopher—one who does not so much inhabit the standpoints represented by the traditions from which they draw, but gives birth creatively to a new way of seeing the human condition by drawing extensively from global philosophical sources. In political science, sometimes changes in paradigms were driven by the peculiar composition of the practitioners in the field and accessibility for research. For instance, the influential structural-functionalism in social science in the United States was partly driven by the World War II immigration of a group of engineers from Europe (Parsons, 1961). With the rise of China-born Chinese-American researchers in the West during the reform era, the depth of empirical probes in Chinese political studies has improved (White, 2009). In Chapter 8, John James Kennedy et al. noted that the lack of a single paradigm reflects the breadth and diversity of China field. They argue rather than searching for the new generally accepted paradigm; we should accept diversity in the China field and embrace the various approaches and explanations. Like other social science disciplines, psychology as a discipline was not recognized before 1978 when psychological problems were often dealt with politically. Quite often, deviant social behavior by individuals was viewed as that of “political consciousness was low.” The assassination of Reagan in the United States was widely viewed as originating from psychological factors. In China, however, the assassination of political leaders would have likely been viewed as a political event. In Chapter 9, Changming Duan pointed out that in the past decades, psychology in China has developed with significant Western influence, and from theory to method and practice, Western thinking dominates. Recently, the unprecedented and unexpected COVID-19 pandemic challenged psychology anywhere in its understanding of human mind and behavior. Among others, the virus underscored the interdependent nature of individuals, the advantages and limitations of certain values that are central to psychology, and the collective and collaborative nature of effective human survival in face of crisis. In Chapter 10, André Laliberté identifies three stages of the development of the Chinese religious studies since the nineteenth century. A first stage of fruitful interactions between European and Chinese scholars, who laid down the foundation for the study of religion from the perspective

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of social sciences and the humanities. The second stage saw a deep freeze in scholarship within China for three decades after 1949 and a decline in interest outside the country. When it became possible again to study religions in China, three paradigms have emerged. The first one, bringing together scholars from the PRC and outside, tries to revitalize the previous tradition in a significantly different religious context. A second paradigm, inspired by the American school of religious economy, places much emphasis on politics. PRC scholars, ever mindful of the constraints their work face, have sought to develop organically a third paradigm. In sociology, lots of problems that were uniquely for women were not recognized during the Maoist regime, with the belief that men and women were equal and the differences in a biological sense were marginal. Anti-social behaviors of adolescence were dealt with through political means, e.g., rehabilitation through manual labor (Lao Gai). The post-Mao regime allowed the introduction of some Western sociological theories and methods to be used in China. Nevertheless, China’s situation is unique and sociology during the post-Mao era has its unique characteristics. In Chapter 11, Liqun Cao et al. conclude that while the birth and growth of sociology have its embedded social and political logic common to the rest of the world, its subject matters in China have outgrown its American and European roots and take some characteristics unique only to Chinese Party-State milieu. In visual culture, such as paintings and films, scholars’ attitudes toward politics can make them take a different paradigm in their evaluations. Those who take a more politicized approach can view the subject matter from the binary of government propaganda and dissident. However, those who take a less politicized approach can view the subject matter by taking a more nuanced multi-dimensional paradigm (Tang, 2015). In Chapter 12, Hon-Lun Yang et al. outline the developments of the paradigms in Chinese music in different stages of social developments: the colonial influence in the early part of the twentieth century, the Marxist influence during the pre-reform period of the People’s Republic of China and the mixture of different paradigms during the post-reform era. In literature, a major paradigmatic issue in contemporary times is whether it should be a reflection of class consciousness or a reflection of human nature. In the study of classics such as The Dream of the Red Mansion (Hong Lou Meng ) in the 1950s, Mao supported Li Xifan who

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argued that the classic reflected the decline of the feudal society in refuting Yu Pingbo who interpreted it as a romance (Li and Ling, 1954). The paradigms in the study of Tao Yuanming were impacted by international forces as well (Swartz, 2008). Like many contemporary “disciplines,” “Comparative Literature” is a product of modernization. In post-Mao literature, a significant novel that de-emphasized class struggle is White Deer Plain (Bai Lu Yuan) by Chen Zhongshi. One of the characters Lu San is a servant of the landlord Bai Jiaxuan. Yet, Lu San is a strong defender of the feudal political structure that was supposed to oppress him, in contrast to Lu Zilin, another landlord who was not as faithful to the feudal order from which he benefited. Lu San killed his daughter-in-law who tried to break the feudal order (Chen, 2017). The rediscovery of Zhang Ailing and Qian Zhongshu’s “anti-hero” novels such as The Story of a Gold Lock (Jin Suo Ji) (Zhang, 1944) and Encircling the City (wei cheng ) (Qian, 1991) also reflected the de-politicization of Chinese literature during the reform era. A Grand Paradigm? The Japanese Sinologist Satoshi Amako introduced a framework by the Chinese philosopher Jin Guantao. Jin proposed an analytical framework that is supposed to be able to help analyze human society from a holistic view point: “the four massive aspects” (population, region, ideology, and power) and “the four divisions” (elite and people, human network and system, city and country, and politics and economics) (Amako, 2017). Most of the studies about paradigms in China studies deal with one discipline. It is also possible to have interdisciplinary study from a particular angle, such as development that involves politics, economics, and the media (Florence and Defraigne, 2012). Under the current circumstances, this is probably the best we can possibly get. The purpose of this project is to provide a forum in which the authors from different disciplines present their views from their own disciplinary perspectives and let the reader to synthesize their own views about the paradigm changes. This author does not believe that it is fruitful trying to have a grand framework to study China or another country that incorporates all disciplines.

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References Almond, G. (1990). A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science. Sage Publications. Amako, S. (2017). “Methods for Area Studies and Contemporary China Study.” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, Volume 6, Issue 1. Boorman, S. A. & Boorman, H. L. (1964). “Mao Tse-tung and the Art of War.” Journal of Asian Studies, Volume 24, Issue 1, November 1964, pp. 129–137. Chan, A. (1985). Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation. London: The MacMillan Press; Seattle: University of Washington Press. Chang, C. (1970) Wang Yang-Ming: Idealist Philosopher of Sixteenth-Century China. St. Johns University Press. Chen, Zhongshi. (2017). White Dear Plain (Bai Lu Yuan). Changjiang Literature Press; 1st edition. Cohn, S. M. (2019). Competing Economic Paradigms in China. Routledge Contemporary China Series. Chilcote, R. H. (2018). Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm Reconsidered. Boulder, CO: West View Press. De Kloet, J. (2008). “Gendering China Studies: Peripheral Perspectives, Central Questions.” China Information, July 1. Dong, Zhixin. (2009). Mao Zedong Read The Dream of the Red Mansion, Mao Zedong du hong lou meng Shengyang. Liaoning: Wan Juan chubanshe. Economy, E. C. (2018). The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State. London: Oxford University Press, Preface. Fan, X. (2012). The Initial Succession of a Thinking Paradigm: Studies on the Succession of Civil Law Theory in Late Qing Dynasty and Earlier Period of the Republic of China (Chinese Edition). Law Press. Florence, E. & Defraigne, P. (2012). Towards a New Development Paradigm in Twenty-First Century China: Economy, Society and Politics, Comparative Development and Policy in Asia. Routledge. Freedom House. (2019). Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/ china/freedom-world/2020 (Accessed March 17, 2021). Fukuyama, F. (1989). “The End of History?” The National Interest. Guo, S. & Blanchard, J. F. (2009). “The State of the Field: Political Science and Chinese Political Studies.” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Volume 14, pp. 225–227. Hua, S. (1996). Scientism and Humanism: Two Cultures in Post-Mao China. State University of New York Press. Huntington, S. (1991). The Third Wave. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Jin, G. (2011). Prosperity and Crisis: On the Ultra-Stability of Chinese Society (xingsheng yu weiji: lun zhongguo shehui de chao wending jiegou). Beijing: Falu chubanshe.

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Kissinger, H. (2020). The Coronavirus Pandemic Will Forever Alter the World Order. Wallstreet Journal, Opinion. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/ articles/the-coronavirus-pandemic-will-forever-alter-the-world-order-115859 53005 (Accessed March 17, 2021). Kuhn, T. (1996). Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press; 3rd edition. Lagerwey, J. (2018). Paradigm Shifts in Early and Modern Chinese Religion. Brill. Li, Q. (2019). Immersive Communication: The Communication Paradigm of the Third Media Age. Routledge. Li, Xifan, & Ling, L. (1954). On “A short discussion of the Dream of the Red Mansion (guanyu hong lou meng jianlun ji qita). wen shi zhe, No. 9. Li, Zehou. (1985). Chinese Political Thought in Ancient Times zhongguo gudai sixiang shilun. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe. Manicas, P. T. (1987). A History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Blackwell. Parsons, T. (1961). Theories of Society: foundations of modern sociological theory. Free Press. Pye, L. (1968). The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development. The M.I.T. Press; 1st edition. Qian, Zhongshu. (1991). Wei Cheng. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe. Rosker, J. S. (2012). Traditional Chinese Philosophy and the Paradigm of Structure. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Sayer, D. (1983). Marx’s Method: Ideology, Science & Critique in ‘Capital’. Prentice Hall. Shi, T. (1997). Political Participation in Beijing. Harvard University Press. Swartz, W. (2008). Reading Tao Yuanming: Shifting Paradigms of Historical Reception (427 - 1900). Harvard East Asian Monographs. Tang, X. (2015). Visual Culture in Contemporary China: Paradigms and Shifts. Cambridge University Press. Toohey, L. & Picker, C. B., et al. (2015). China in the International Economic Order: New Directions and Changing Paradigms. Cambridge University Press. Townsend, J. (1980). Politics in China. Little. Brown & Company. Weber, M. (1968). The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism. New York: Free Press. White III, L. T. (2009). “Chinese Political Studies: Overview of the State of the Field.” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Volume 14, pp. 229–251. Zhang, A. (1944). Chuan Qi. Shanghai: Za Zhi She. Zhang, Y. (2019). Establishment of “Drama” Orientation: Transition of the Research Paradigm of Chinese Dramas in the 1920s and 1930s. Routledge.

CHAPTER 2

Paradigms of Anthropology in China Gordon Mathews

Introduction There is a significant difference between anthropological studies of China from beyond China and those from within China itself. These studies are linked, because they both study the same society in all its massive transformations, and also because many anthropologists who study China from elsewhere grew up in China, and a significant number of anthropologists who are now based in China received their PhDs overseas. However, the foci of these two anthropologies are different, with anthropology in China based largely on the study of minority nationalities (which is

Anthropology we may define in this chapter as “the study of human groups through long-term ethnographic fieldwork.” It differs from sociology in its emphasis not on statistical measures but on fieldwork. It differs from ethnology in China in being not only focused on ethnic minorities, and in not necessarily emphasizing practically serving the state, but in being more academic in focus. G. Mathews (B) The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 S. Hua (ed.), Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8032-8_2

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also the focus of what is known in China as ethnology), and anthropologists overseas primarily studying aspects of contemporary modernity in China. Bruckermann and Feuchtwang (2016) explore how anthropological studies of China are linked to and contribute to anthropology in general; but although they do discuss the famous Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong’s work (2016: 24–31), their focus is primarily on anthropologists based outside China. In this chapter, I instead explore anthropology as it is practiced and taught today within China. I first explore in brief the history of anthropology in mainland China. I then examine the current practice of anthropology in mainland China, based on interviews with professors or graduate students in anthropology, before briefly considering Taiwan and Hong Kong. What we will see as most pivotal is the role of the state in shaping, constraining, and encouraging different types of anthropological research and teaching in mainland China. This leads to a crucial question: should anthropology serve the state, or should anthropology be critical of the state? This is a divide separating anthropology as practiced in China as opposed to anthropology in the developed world outside China. China today offers a lesson to anthropology around the world, one both cautionary and potentially exemplary.

The Development of Chinese Anthropology Anthropology departments in China were not established until the late 1940s, at universities such as Jinan, Zhejiang, Tsinghua, and Zhongshan (Dirlik 2012: 10); but anthropology has had a presence in China from earlier in the twentieth century. This took place through prominent scholars such as Huang Wenshan, who studied anthropology with Franz Boas, the founding figure of American anthropology, at Columbia University in the 1920s (Li 2012: 111–112). He subsequently became a professor at various Chinese universities and a proponent of “culturology” as a way of understanding Chinese culture apart from any standard universal cultural evolution. Huang believed that a full understanding of culture through “culturology” could help create social transformation in China; but political developments forced him to leave mainland China; after 1949, he fled and spent the remainder of his life and career in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States.

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Another key early anthropologist in China was Li Anzhai, who studied with Kroeber and Lowie at Berkeley and Sapir at Yale in the 1930s— other foundational figures of American anthropology—and returned to China to pursue extensive ethnographic research among Tibetan communities (Yen 2012: 144). Li argued neither for Han assimilation of Tibet nor for Tibetan autonomy, but for a middle path, involving “a ‘cultural dialogue’…between the two” (Yen 2012: 146). However, his work for the Chinese Communist Party contributed to China’s takeover of Tibet: “Ironically, the non-Marxist, liberal-oriented Li…could never have anticipated that his name would be forever attached to the history of the CCP’s colonization of Tibet” (Yen 2012: 153–154). Anthropology fell into disfavor in China in the 1950s and 1960s, and Li spent the last years of his life teaching English in Sichuan. There is also the key figure in Chinese sociology and anthropology Fei Xiaotong, who studied with Malinowski in London in the late 1930s and wrote the classic books Peasant Life in China (1939) and From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society (1992). He pioneered the practice of in-depth fieldwork “from the bottom up” in several Chinese villages (Bruckermann and Feuchtwang 2016: 25) and became a prominent theorist of Chinese worldviews and behavior, whose works are still widely cited today. During the 1950s and 1960s, he was cast out and was physically attacked during the Cultural Revolution. He was rehabilitated in 1980 and honored in China, but by then he was an old man, having lost decades of potential research (Bruckermann and Feuchtwang 2016: 26). The writings of these and other anthropologists could have served as the basis for a Chinese anthropology not intellectually grounded in anthropology in the United States and Western Europe. However, the politics and the policies of the Chinese state derailed their careers. Because of this, they were intellectually deprived of the opportunity to create what might be thought of as a new paradigm for Chinese anthropology. Anthropology in the early 1950s in China was denounced as a bourgeois discipline: “One key error…was held to be an overemphasis of the superstructure (religion, ideology, myths) as opposed to the economic base of the society in question” in accordance with Marxist teachings…. “‘Hunting for exotica’ (lieh qi) was another chief accusation brought against field researchers” (Guldin 1990: 13). The discipline continued in different form as ethnology in the 1950s and then as nationality studies (Guldin 1990: 5, 8–9, 14–15; Fan 2019), in accordance with the theorizations of Stalin. “The project of ethnic minority identification… was

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the main task Chinese anthropology undertook from 1950 to 1964,” a project which “reveals a main characteristic of Chinese anthropology: the discipline adhered to the dictates of the Party-State” (Song 2017: 230). Today, ethnology continues as an academic discipline in China alongside anthropology, with ethnology devoted to serving the state in its management of ethnic minorities in China and anthropology somewhat more independent of the state in its endeavors; but the intellectual boundaries of these disciplines remain overlapping. The Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s effectively stopped scholarly endeavors; anthropology was reborn as a discipline in the early 1980s. Guldin in 1990 looked forward to China potentially making a contribution to world anthropology in its emphasis, unlike in Western countries, on team fieldwork and on applied anthropology (1990: 27– 28), both emphases continuing today, although not without critique. Song writes that in China today, “the established practice is that one gets funding at the national or local level, then recruits students to form a team, and then, through local connections, arranges to go to the field for several days of investigation. Later articles or books are produced based on this kind of superficial, short-term fieldwork” (2017: 236)—unlike the fieldwork of many months or years that is generally viewed as the sine qua non of anthropological practice. Anthropology in China has flourished in recent decades, although it has continued to be regarded by the Ministry of Education as a second-level discipline under sociology, with ethnology regarded as a separate first-level discipline, to the chagrin of many anthropologists. Pieke (2014: 124) and Chen (2017: 221) have both discussed how, in the 2000s, increasing numbers of foreign-trained PhDs returned to China to teach, providing a linkage between anthropology within and beyond China. The International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, the largest association of world anthropologists, had its conference in Kunming in 2008 abruptly canceled, apparently because of political concerns of the Chinese government before the Beijing Olympics over criticisms of its ethnic minority policies (Glenn 2008), although the conference was indeed held a year later; subsequent international conferences have also sometimes been postponed or canceled, apparently due to government political sensitivities. Chen, noting the growth of the China Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences as well as two other Chinese anthropological associations, writes that “the strength of Chinese anthropology has gradually accumulated in the modern era, and reveals

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the current feature of Chinese anthropologists with diversified research interests, rich study topics, and high enthusiasm in communicating with each other” (2017: 221). However, because CUAES “is attached to the State Ethnic Affairs Commission and has a government background, it is not widely accepted in the academic field of Chinese anthropology” (Chen 2017: 223); many anthropologists in China harbor skepticism toward state intervention in anthropology, although most do not voice this loudly. The study of ethnic minorities in China has long been the major focus of Chinese anthropology as well as ethnology. This has been not only because of the emphasis of the Chinese state, but also because anthropologists generally believed that they should specialize in their society’s indigenous groups, leaving problems of modern society to sociologists. But this division is giving way. As a Chinese graduate student told me, “China is a vast country, and you can always find something interesting! A lot of students my age no longer focus on ethnic minorities, but look at current social trends, for example, aging. It’s not marginal but dealing with mainstream issues in Chinese society.” The American-based journal HAU will publish in 2021 articles in translation by Gao Bingzhong advocating that Chinese anthropologists do ethnography outside China. As the introducer and translator of these articles notes (Kipnis 2021), Gao must present this advocacy as something that has “practical value for the Chinese state,” invoking Fei Xiaotong as “a way of demonstrating loyalty to the nationalist, pro-development academic agenda the Party apparatus sets in China” (Kipnis 2021). If Chinese anthropological research does indeed come to involve anthropologists moving outside China to conduct their fieldwork, it will mark a milestone in its emergence on the world stage of anthropology.1 Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, wrote of paradigms as "universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a

1 Anthropology as practiced in more affluent societies, such as the United States, Japan,

and those in Western Europe, has typically involved the study of groups beyond one’s own society. Anthropology in less affluent societies, such as India, Indonesia, and Brazil, has generally involved the study of indigenous groups within one’s own society. The call for Chinese anthropologists to conduct research outside China mirrors the broader movement of China toward greater prosperity and global influence.

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time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of practitioners” (1996: 10).2 Establishing such a universal paradigm seems beyond the reach of Chinese anthropology and perhaps of anthropology in general, which to many of its practitioners may or may not be a science. However, in a more modest sense, Chinese anthropology may be able to create an anthropological paradigm for the study of China. “Chinese anthropology has made achievements in the study of kinship systems, religion and ritual, comparative politics, and economic cultures that are worthy of pride” (Chen 2017: 224), and the worldwide rise of China provides an opportunity for China to make new contributions to world anthropology in exploring a society “that is much more than just another culture” (Pieke 2014: 132–133) in the complexity of its history and historical traditions and its current societal transformations (Chen 2017: 225). Just as Chinese governance today provides an alternative to Western governance based on liberal democracy, so too might Chinese anthropology come to provide an alternative paradigm to Western anthropology in its study of China, especially since growth in anthropology as a discipline seems to follow growth in a society’s economic standing, leading to the rise of anthropology in East Asia as a whole (Mathews 2015: 364–365). At present, however, rather than an intellectual Chinese paradigm for the anthropological study of China, what we see is a political orientation set forth by the Chinese state, making the practice and theorization of anthropology different in China as compared to most other societies. Western academic anthropologists, and indeed anthropologists around the world, view it as a point of integrity to be critical of their society’s government, and universities are not expected to adhere to the state’s goals; but this is not the case in China (Song 2017: 238). In China, universities are expected to serve the state, and anthropologists are expected to follow suit. As we will discuss at the close of this chapter, this might perhaps be China’s new anthropological paradigm.

2 Fan (2019) argues that there has indeed been a paradigm shift in Chinese ethnology between the 1950s and the 1990s, which has moved from reliance on Lewis Henry Morgan’s rigid evolutionary schema, as channeled through Marx and Stalin, to a more fluid and realistic theorization of ethnicity and ethnic groups based on Fredrik Barth. This implies how ethnology has been more closely tied to communist orthodoxy than has anthropology in China; breaking away from that orthodoxy thus constituted a paradigm shift in ethnology as it has not in anthropology in recent decades.

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The Experience of Chinese Anthropology Today What, then, is it like to be an anthropologist in mainland China today? To explore this question, I interviewed 11 professors and graduate students on the mainland or trained on the mainland, two of whom I have already quoted from in the preceding section3 ; I also interviewed 4 anthropologists based in Taiwan or in Hong Kong. There is a bias in my sample, in that all but two of the people I interviewed obtained their graduate education outside mainland China, whether in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Taiwan, or Hong Kong; however, overseas experience has become the norm among younger Chinese anthropologists today.4 From what they have told me, I first discuss the intellectual content of anthropology in mainland China and then turn to the teaching of anthropology. The Intellectual Content of Anthropology, as Linked to Language and Information In the anthropological theory class I have taught to anthropology postgraduate students in Hong Kong, many students over the years have been from mainland Chinese anthropology programs. When I have asked them how anthropology in mainland China differs from that in Hong Kong, their most common answer has been that unlike in Hong Kong, anthropology in China is presented as having no relation to politics. Anthropology in Hong Kong and Taiwan, at present if not necessarily in the future, resembles anthropology in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, in being acutely conscious of power and its effects in shaping culture, both state political power and power as exerted in everyday life. In China, such discussion is largely taboo, since discussion of power could easily morph into criticism of the Chinese Communist Party. 3 To preserve the anonymity of interviewees who sometimes spoke to me with remarkable frankness, I do not identify (and in a few cases disguise) the affiliation, gender, and age of those I spoke with. 4 As one anthropologist told me, “For young Chinese anthropologists and other social

scientists at most Chinese universities, it’s a requirement: if you want to be promoted to associate professor, and haven’t been educated overseas, you must stay abroad at least one year, in America or Europe, or Taiwan or Hong Kong. But now, in the last two years, the relationship between China and other countries has gotten worse, so I don’t know if this policy exists anymore, especially under covid-19.”

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As one junior anthropology professor described to me, “the anthropologists here always talk about Fei Xiaotong, and about village studies—very old style. Many of them think that anthropology is the study of ethnic minorities in China.” This has been changing in recent years, as we’ve seen. But even those younger anthropologists who study contemporary issues of concern in China still cannot directly discuss politics. Anthropologists, using their ethnographic methods, have the opportunity to deal with pivotal issues in Chinese society today, but cannot discuss in a critical way the policies of their government. This issue is linked to the languages that anthropologists present their research in. Chinese anthropologists are restricted if they write up their research findings in Chinese. As one foreign-trained junior anthropology professor said, “When I submit journal articles to Chinese journals, I’m told that the topics I’m writing about are too sensitive to get published. I was told for one paper I wrote that I should change the tone completely, to discuss how well the government has done in dealing with the problems I discuss. I think I should be honest about what I’ve found in my research, but in China I simply cannot do that.” I myself have had a recent book contracted by a Chinese university press and translated, but then blocked from publication, as has also been experienced by several of my Hong Kong colleagues—they may have published their works in English and in the traditional Chinese used in Hong Kong and Taiwan but cannot do so in mainland China, where translation rights have been bought but never used. The anthropologists I interviewed were generally quite critical of Chinese anthropology; as a senior anthropologist trained overseas said, “I don’t think that most anthropologists in China produce high quality papers, both because of censorship and because they are not trained well.” The problem of censorship of research for fear of the wrath of the state, the Chinese Communist Party, is real; but there also is the more mundane problem of refereeing. As a junior anthropologist told me, in a fit of exasperation, “To be honest, most Chinese anthropologists publish rubbish in Chinese. Eighty percent is nonsense. Someone told me that anything can get published if you have a good relation with the editor. Double-blind review in Chinese journals doesn’t work, because you know who is reviewing your paper.” A senior professor said, “I think that the referee system is getting better in China now, but not everyone is treated equal—for senior professors, it’s easy to get through it!” I was told the same thing in Japan in the 1990s (although this is apparently less the

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case now)—the referee system does not work well if the anthropological community is small and everyone knows who everyone else is. This is the situation in many anthropological communities in which writing in one’s native language is stressed—because these anthropological communities are small, the referee system cannot properly function. Beyond this, there is the fact that if an anthropologist publishes in Chinese, they may have no readers beyond the Sinophone world. As a senior professor explained, while some good theory is indeed written by Chinese anthropologists, “the problem is that it’s written in Chinese—even if they have a good theory, still, it’s unknown to Western scholars.” The alternative is to write in English. This is a global problem, as I have stressed in earlier writings (Mathews 2012, 2015): Chinese anthropologists, like other anthropologists around the world, are pushed to write in a foreign language that they may not have mastered and are placed at a disadvantage compared to native English speakers. Anglo-American anthropology, in its referee system, may impose its own imperialistic barriers in referees’ judgments as to what proper anthropology may be (Kuwayama 2004; Mathews 2010): Anglo-American referees typically approve of papers written in general accordance with the Anglo-American anthropological world in its concerns. However, writing in English does enable Chinese anthropologists to elude censorship and opprobrium from authorities and colleagues at home. As one junior professor said: Yes, I think that my department would be happy if I publish my piece in English, as long as no one reads it and notices that I am criticizing the government. If I publish only in English, I would be fine in terms of my career; it’s better to publish in English than in Chinese. And I’d probably be safe, because probably no one would read my paper except for the title because it’s in English.

Of course one’s work in English might be read and could get one in trouble; but by this professor’s reckoning, this probably won’t happen. This reflects a paradox in Chinese anthropology at present. Authorities within and beyond one’s university may sometimes object when a professor assigns too many English-language readings to students. They may also object when an anthropologist uses what is deemed to be an excessively Western approach to anthropology. As one scholar trained overseas said,

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I wrote an anthropological article in Chinese, and I was told, “Why are you using all those Western theories? Why don’t you learn from Chinese theorists?” They weren’t happy with my writing….In Chinese writing, you can use Western theory, but you need to challenge it, to bring up a Chinese perspective.

At the same time, however, it remains better for one’s academic career to publish in English than in Chinese, as linked to the fact that global university rankings and citation indexes heavily privilege English (Mathews 2015: 367–369), rankings and indexes of which Chinese university authorities are well aware. Chinese anthropology seeks to assert its own Chinese perspective, an indigenization and Sinicization of anthropology. However, it also seeks recognition within a global anthropological power structure, based in part on citation indexes, which reinforces an Anglo-American anthropological norm. This is a remarkable contradiction: a Chinese anthropological paradigm is sought, but one which will have to pass Anglo-American gatekeeper referees in order to attain full validation. Funding is linked to this contradiction. Academic anthropologists are expected to apply for funding for their research. While funding from sources outside China is possible, the overwhelming source of funding is the Chinese government, which typically funds projects that are development-oriented, serving the state’s goals. “If you want the money, you have to follow the protocol, being either pro-government or apolitical,” one professor told me. Another professor was critical of grant proposals for their praise of China’s leader: “In writing grant proposals, so many of them in their titles praise Xi Jingping. It’s ridiculous, but in applying for a grant, they feel they have to do it.” However, if one writes up one’s research findings in English, one may have difficulty getting published if one does not provide a degree of critical political analysis, not least because of the bias of Western referees. Funding thus comes nationally, bearing one agenda, but prestige in publication comes internationally, bearing a different and often opposing agenda. There is also the problem of where one can find information. In China, Google Scholar and other essential sites for research may be blocked by

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the Great Firewall unless one has a VPN.5 As one professor maintained, “If you have a VPN, you can do better work as an anthropologist. If you don’t use a VPN, you can only use very old stuff in your research.” Hundreds of millions of Chinese use VPN, but they are sometimes balky. “On a day-to-day basis, I can use my VPN to get information. But during certain times of year, when political gatherings are taking place, the internet isn’t working well; they’re trying to control information, and that’s why it’s so slow.” Beyond this, using a VPN is illegal. As another anthropology professor said, “I spent lots of time finding a reliable VPN….I worry sometimes if I’ll get in trouble. The police know who is using VPN; it’s a matter of when or if they’ll take action.” Other anthropologists were not concerned, noting that many universities in China provide VPN for faculty members. “No, I don’t think it’s dangerous to use a VPN—I don’t worry about it.” A senior professor said, “Yes, VPNs in China are unstable. However, there are many ways to access the academic world outside China, including some shared ebook websites, e-journals, the database of university libraries, and so on. Also, we can get related papers and books through professors, friends and students abroad.” Beyond this, there is also the paywall surrounding much anthropological literature worldwide. As a foreign graduate student doing research in China told me, “anthropology journals are [generally] not blocked by the firewall [in China], but if you don’t have a subscription, what difference does it make? The publishing companies are essentially doing China’s censoring job for them” (Mathews 2015: 364). Although the internet is providing more and more open access, the unavailability of the journals of Western publishers seeking to preserve their profits may remain a greater factor than Chinese government censorship in restricting Chinese anthropologists. All this leads to a critical anthropological question: Is Chinese anthropology ultimately for the globe or for the state? Is it meant to benefit China, or anthropology around the world? Anthropologists in China today “organize workshops on the anthropocene, ecology, and the ontological turn,” I am told—all hot topics in the discipline in a global sense. This anthropologist was emphasizing to me that anthropology in China 5 A VPN—Virtual Private Network—can be obtained relatively cheaply in China, enabling one to overcome the Great Firewall of censorship in China. However, because of the constant cat-and-mouse game between Chinese government censors and VPN providers, providers often must be changed.

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is indeed striving to be global. At the same time, however, the role of the state in anthropological practice in China is far greater than in most other societies. This is particularly apparent in the classroom. Teaching Anthropology One issue faced by teachers is that of what can be said and what cannot be said in classes. As one overseas-educated junior professor said, “You see the camera in class, you don’t know when it’s on or off; yes, there’s always a camera.” Probably no one is paying attention to what is said in class, this professor maintained, but they do not know this for certain. Another professor said, “they record lectures and keep the camera on just in case the teacher or students say anything that is against the government. But no one knows where the recording will go and who is watching it.”6 This professor also must be concerned about students: “Several students have warned me about what I say in class, because they have classmates who may feel that what I say is inappropriate and will report me.” As for the content of what cannot be uttered, this teacher said, “multiculturalism—I should not talk about it, because it means a split, and we should talk about uniting Chinese people. I shouldn’t talk to students about the construction of ethnic identity. We’re supposed to talk to students about how they were born Chinese.” A foreign professor teaching in China said: In the classroom, there are specific subjects we have been told we cannot touch: we are not supposed to talk about NGOs, about Taiwan, about Xinjiang, about sexuality: there were six or seven items they told us that we couldn’t talk about with students in class. That was in 2016 or 2017; now the list is no doubt longer. But the thing is, you never know what might be sensitive or cross the censorship line—there’s no telling; this is what makes it scary! When I’m teaching, I cannot criticize China; I can only criticize the US. That’s the safest way.

6 Cameras, a more senior professor has noted to me, “usually are used to monitor students to prevent them from cheating in exams,” as well as, on a random basis, for course evaluations. Many professors in different disciplines, from science to literature to philosophy, have little worry about being watched, since they are not teaching potentially sensitive subject-matter; but in anthropology some have worries.

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A Chinese graduate student now overseas said, “I went to a major university in Beijing and graduated in 2015. When I was a student, it was freer. We had lecturers who, for example, could invite speakers from the LGBTQ community; now it’s forbidden. It began to change in 2016, and restrictions set in.” As another young Chinese professor educated at a foreign university said, “Even how we talk about Marx is different in China than what I was taught! I learned about the idea of Marxist revolution in graduate school. The students in my anthropological theory class here said that I should not talk about Marxist revolution, because I might get reported by students upset by what I teach.” Another professor was more relaxed: “Normally no one is looking over the recorder. If some student made a report to the university, then they’d come back to check; but no one has reported on me, so I don’t need to worry. In my graduate seminar, I can be fairly free in what I say—I can be very critical of the government.” Indeed, professors who received their graduate education in China took these kinds of restrictions in stride. One anthropology professor told me that while the fear of straying into perilous areas in one’s teaching certainly existed, the idea of being reported by students “is like the fear of being accused of sexual harassment by students in the West. It’s in the back of your mind as a possibility, but you don’t really worry about it on a regular basis.” Being criticized by students for one’s teaching also happens overseas in terms of course evaluations; if teachers could lose their jobs in China for teaching in a way that students criticize, the same thing could happen in the United States, this teacher said. There are taboo topics in the United States, such as talking about ethnic relations or gender issues in certain ways in the classroom—these topics completely differ in content from those topics deemed taboo in China, but the fact of taboo exists in both societies. One professor spoke of foreign-born or foreign-educated professors as simply needing to remember that they were now in a different cultural context: “You need to know the environment and the laws; you need to be culturally sensitive. You need to have a sensibility of what’s allowed and what isn’t. This is basic anthropological knowledge.” However, a Chinese graduate student whom I interviewed who was contemplating an academic career in China rejected the idea that pressure in China was equivalent to pressures elsewhere: You mention the Chinese professor who told you that worry about Communist Party and censorship in China is like worry about sexual

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harassment charges in the US. No, I totally disagree. Sexual harassment is a personal issue. But those political issues, you can’t imagine the kind of power the government holds. If the government decides to get me, it can destroy my career, and also influence my family—if I have a child and she wants to work for the government, for example, she won’t be able to do it. It’s on record. And you never know where the line is.

These different professors and graduate students are considering whether or not restrictions in the anthropology classroom in China are fundamentally different from those in anthropology classrooms elsewhere. They are stricter; but still, the overwhelming majority of anthropology professors in China today do not lose their jobs; they have career trajectories not dissimilar to anthropologists elsewhere in the world. Many do indeed joke with their students about aspects of the Communist Party; it clearly is an exaggeration to say that China is a police state, with no freedom of expression in its anthropology classrooms. Still, the role of the state looms large. As another professor said, “Yes, in China you can get in trouble for teaching critical thinking. There are many stories online in Chinese social media about professors being demoted because they had been discussing Western history or said something positive about the West, and has not spoken positively enough, about China.” These stories no doubt play a cautionary role; but they describe far more the exception than the rule among contemporary Chinese anthropologists.

Anthropology in Taiwan and Hong Kong Over the past seventy years, and particularly during the Cultural Revolution, China abolished a number of its traditions; it has also at times blocked anthropological research. This has meant that for many overseasbased anthropologists, Hong Kong and Taiwan have been where they have researched China; these societies have seemed more suitable for research and more representative of “traditional China” than the mainland (see, on Hong Kong, Evans and Tam 1997: 1–2). Linked to this—and linked to the suppression of anthropology in mainland China in the 1960s and 1970s—Taiwan and Hong Kong at one time seemed to be replacing mainland China as the central site for the construction of a Chinese paradigm for anthropology. The Taiwan-born Hong Kong-based anthropologist Chiao Chien discussed this in his writings in the 1980s and

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1990s (Chiao 1985, 1998)—not a universal paradigm, as Kuhn’s definition of paradigm specifies, but a particular Chinese paradigm for the study of China. “Professor Chiao was saying,” a senior professor in China told me, “that Chinese anthropology should be nativized, localized. We should have our own concepts and theories.” However, today, the era of seeking a Chinese anthropological paradigm seems past in Taiwan and Hong Kong. As Chang writes about social sciences in Taiwan, “Today, ‘indigenization’ is commonly used in Taiwan to refer to… ‘Taiwanization’ in the cultural and political arenas. Typically the concept is opposed to ‘Chinese-ness’ or ‘Sinicization,’ premised on the conviction that Chinese culture and national politics are alienating and have been imposed on the land and the people of Taiwan” (Chang 2012: 211; see also Chun 2012). An anthropology professor from Taiwan affirmed this: I don’t think that anyone in Taiwanese anthropology now is thinking about a Chinese anthropological paradigm. Instead, it is a Taiwanese paradigm…to understand what we can learn from Taiwanese anthropology, as related to our background as Taiwanese….This relates to the changing political context. There is more of a Taiwanese identity now as compared to the past.

The anthropologist Tan Chee-Beng has emphasized the importance of researching cultural Chineseness beyond the national boundaries of China: “a study of China cannot be territorially bound to China only” (Tan 2012: 201). But this has not been a matter of seeking a Chinese paradigm for anthropology, but rather of understanding “different models of being Chinese” (Tan 2012: 203). The professor from Taiwan quoted above added, “if you say that ‘there is a Chinese paradigm,’ it is essentializing cultural differences, and that doesn’t fit anthropology today.” Cultural essentialism, the idea that there is a “Chineseness” common to all those who are nationally or culturally Chinese as opposed to all those who are not, has become anathema to anthropologists in an era of migration and globalization. As this professor continued, “For most Chinese anthropologists, it’s not a matter of creating a Chinese paradigm for global anthropology. More, it’s a matter of how China can contribute to global anthropology.” This is the view held by many anthropologists today in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong alike.

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Anthropology in Taiwan today is focused on Taiwanese culture and identity, as well as on China, with particular local peculiarities (Huang 2017: 181–189). Anthropology in Hong Kong has become AngloAmerican in its orientation over the past two decades in terms of publication and teaching, under the sway of an intense “audit culture,” monitoring professors’ performances at every turn (Bosco 2017: 190– 202), reflecting not the Chinese state, but global corporate managerialism. Taiwan and Hong Kong cannot serve as the basis for a new paradigm for Chinese anthropology, but they can perhaps serve as the models for a Chinese anthropology that is free of state coercion. However, Chinese control over Hong Kong has become tighter and more restrictive over the past year, a trend that will no doubt continue; there is a clear possibility of China exerting greater and greater political influence over Taiwan as its global power increases. The comparative independence from the state of anthropology in Hong Kong and Taiwan is thus under threat, as these societies are increasingly drawn into the mainland Chinese orbit.

A New Chinese Anthropological Paradigm? My portrayal in the preceding pages has shown anthropology in mainland China in an unflattering light. Anthropologists cannot write about a range of topics and cannot criticize their government if they want to get published (unless they do so in the foreign language of English). In the classroom, they run the risk of running afoul of student censors who will report them, or of the ubiquitous cameras in the back of classrooms, if they venture to discuss topics ranging from Taiwan to LGBTQ or offer criticisms of the Chinese Communist Party.7 Even finding scholarly information from beyond China is hindered by the presence of the Great Firewall and the potential difficulties of going beyond it. All of this makes China in its authoritarianism seem an unappealing place in which to be an anthropologist. And yet, there may indeed be something that anthropology around the world can learn from China. We have seen how Chinese anthropologists 7 This, however, varies from region to region and university to university in China, I am told; what might be allowable in one university in one region might not be allowable in another. Shanghai is reputed to be freer than Beijing, and in minority areas in western China, surveillance is said to be particularly strict.

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had earlier attempted to create a new paradigm for Chinese anthropology but were foiled in the latter half of the twentieth century by the Chinese state. However, it is at least possible to consider the Chinese state not as an obstacle but as itself a potential embodiment of a new paradigm for anthropology. Anthropologists around the world tend, to varying degrees, to be critical of the government of the society they belong to; in many societies, supporting the government would be looked at as “selling out.” In the United States, for example, many US anthropologists had an intensely negative reaction to anthropologists being employed in the “Human Terrain System” designed to provide American military commanders insights into local populations they were interacting with (see Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Science 2013; Wikipedia 2021). Although the US government is a major employer of those with PhDs in anthropology, anthropology students in the United States are generally trained to be reflexively critical of the state—this is a part of what is deemed “critical thinking,” the essence of anthropological pedagogy in the United States and much of the world. This may sometimes seem excessive—why shouldn’t anthropologists be encouraged, at least cautiously, to work, through government employment, to make their society a better place? But this is not the position taken by many anthropologists in the United States and in much of the developed world. This distrust of the state is also the case in China, to a considerable extent. As one mid-career Chinese anthropologist maintained to me, “Few anthropologists in China will agree…that state impediments are for the good of the country and therefore should be embraced, because critical thinking is the basic training of anthropology even in China.” He then maintained that as long as the researcher stays away from topics deemed sensitive by the state, it is still possible to engage in critical thinking, something which he highly values: While certain kinds of research, such as on civil society, religion, and ethnic identities, are limited, anthropologist can turn to so-called insensitive issues, such as foodways, health, intangible cultural heritage, ecology and sustainable development and still retain their intellectual and critical thinking….There are numerous new phenomena worth studying in China nowadays, far beyond state restrictions.

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His strategy of doing research that the state will not find objectionable is no doubt the strategy of the majority of anthropologists in China: “stay out of the state’s way and do your own research.” In his view, the role of the state in shaping anthropology is not a paradigm that anthropologists themselves have internalized, but rather an externally coerced framework which anthropologists must work within in order to survive in China. However, there are at least some anthropologists who seek explicitly to serve the state. In 2014, I came across a Chinese anthropology PhD student doing research on Africans in China who was helping police to find and interrogate African visa overstayers (Mathews et al. 2017: 71). When I asked him why he would help the police to capture some of the very people he was researching in his fieldwork, he said that it was important for an anthropologist to serve the state. As he explained, “As an anthropologist, of course I want to make my country better, and the most effective way to do that is to work with the government” (Mathews 2015: 367). He may have been extreme in helping the government detain his interviewees—several Chinese anthropologists have told me that he no doubt acted for the sake of personal career benefit rather than because of ethical principles. Nonetheless, in a less ethically questionable way, many anthropologists do indeed turn to research that will aid their state: to applied research “such as medical humanities and caregiving, to try to promote social development and well-being in a state-approved way,” I was told. “They are trying to explore alternative ways to understand what happened in transforming China, and to find other possibilities to promote the development of both the nation-state and local societies.” They may seek, without violating their own ethical and intellectual principles, to serve the Chinese state. As earlier discussed, serving the state is more directly advocated by those who consider themselves to be ethnologists than by those who define themselves as anthropologists. As said one anthropologist, trained overseas but long resident in China, “For those ethnologists who were trained in China, most of them might consider ethnology as a kind of knowledge for governance over ethnic affairs. In this sense, their position will be state-oriented; their thoughts and reflections are usually generated within the framework of national discourse, which forms an internal intellectual paradigm.” For anthropology, however, this is not the case. This professor continued, “the difference between ethnology and anthropology is that usually ethnology emphasizes serving the state, while anthropology emphasizes intellectual thinking and criticism.” However,

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these disciplines overlap; anthropologists in China, as this professor emphasized, “are also unavoidably influenced by the political and social environment in China,” and must stay well attuned, with their ears close to the ground, to the ever-changing political and social environment. Certainly, it is possible for an anthropologist to seek to serve the state, while at the same time criticizing and working to improve the state’s efforts. One recent chapter (Fan 2019) is exemplary in stressing this. He notes that in the 1950s and 1960s, “with only a few exceptions, most scholars thought that whatever the party [The Chinese Communist Party: the Chinese State] wanted must be right” (Fan 2019: 175). However, the party, as Fan discusses, was working off an obsolete paradigm, that of Western social evolutionists of the nineteenth century, one that led some Chinese even in the late twentieth century to treat ethnic minorities as “primitives.” Fan notes that “paradigms formed in Chinese academia arise not so much because of breakthroughs, new discoveries, or leading scholars’ contributions, but more by determinations by state power” (2019: 187). He does not directly confront this in his chapter but offers this counsel in concluding: “The problem is how to encourage the Chinese government to realize that good governance requires knowing how their actions might bring real benefits to the people they claim to be concerned with” (2019: 188). Fan, in the above passages, seems to be saying that while the state in China may determine what anthropological paradigms are to be followed more than the intellectual breakthroughs of anthropologists themselves, nonetheless anthropologists may have an essential role in critically advising the government as to how to behave in a beneficial way toward the people it governs. Perhaps between the complete adherence to state and Communist Party ideology in China as practiced of necessity by some anthropologists in China, and the wholesale rejection of any possibility of aiding one’s government as practiced by some Western anthropologists, there may be a middle path, a path whereby anthropologists cautiously but earnestly strive to help their states and governments to be better at what they do. This leads to a larger point. One senior Chinese anthropologist, when I mentioned the idea of serving the state, scoffed, “What Chinese anthropologists thinks that anthropologists should serve the state? No one really believes that.” This anthropologist then said, “But there are anthropologists in China who truly believe that anthropology should serve the country. Yes, in China, anthropologists do say, ‘you should serve your

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country’; lots of people say this in their writings.” This professor then added, in response to my query, “Yes, maybe love of country really could be a Chinese paradigm in anthropology.” Anthropologists I have met from countries in the Global South on occasion say they are trying to help their country develop, but I have yet to meet an anthropologist from the Global North making this claim. An anthropologist from the United States or Western Europe or Japan who says that “I seek to serve my country” might be viewed as an intractable conservative, or even an incipient fascist; I have never heard an anthropologist from these societies make such a claim.8 And perhaps this is the Chinese paradigm that can most help anthropologists in the world, particularly in the Global North. Its claim might be: “Do not only criticize and dismiss your country, for it is your home, for better or for worse. And do not dismiss the government of your country either, however you may dislike it: most governments make efforts to make lives better for their people. Aid the government in these efforts with all your heart but at the same time criticize it and offer suggestions for its improvement.” This is a strange suggestion coming from me, for I have fled the United States, the country of my birth and citizenship, and will never again live there. And yet, for anthropologists particularly in the Global North, might not serving one’s country be a legitimate anthropological aim? Perhaps this simple but subversive idea may be China’s fullest potential anthropological contribution and paradigm for countries of the Global North.

References Bosco, Joseph. (2017). The view from Hong Kong anthropology. Asian Anthropology 16(3), 190–202. Bruckermann, Charlotte, and Stephan Feuchtwang. (2016). The anthropology of China: China as ethnographic and theoretical critique. London: Imperial College Press. Chang, Maukeui. (2012). The movement to indigenize the social sciences in Taiwan: Origin and predicaments. In Arif Dirlik with Guannan Li and Hsiaopei Yen (eds.), Sociology and anthropology in twentieth-century China: Between 8 I have been involved in the World Council of Anthropological Associations since 2009, attending many global meeting and conferences, and I am currently its deputy chair, and so I have had opportunity to explore issues such as this with anthropologists from around the world.

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universalism and indigenism (pp. 209–253). Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Chen, Gang. (2017). The general state of anthropology in China and its future outlook. Asian Anthropology 16(3), 219–227. Chiao, Chien. (ed.). (1985). Proceedings of the conference on modernization and Chinese culture. Hong Kong: Faculty of Social Science and Institute of Social Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Chiao, Chien. (1998). 中国人类学的困境和展望 [The dilemma and prospect of Chinese anthropology]. In Rong Shixing and Xu Jieshun (eds.), 人类学 的中国化 [The localization of anthropology in China] (pp. 1–4). Guangxi: Nationalities Publishing House. Chun, Allen. (2012). From sinicization to indigenization in the social sciences: Is that all there is? In Arif Dirlik with Guannan Li and Hsiao-pei Yen (eds.), Sociology and anthropology in twentieth-century China: Between universalism and indigenism (pp. 255–282). Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Dirlik, Arif. (2012). Zhongguohua: Worlding China: The case of sociology and anthropology in 20th -century China. In Arif Dirlik with Guannan Li and Hsiao-pei Yen (eds.), Sociology and anthropology in twentieth-century China: Between universalism and indigenism (pp. 1–39). Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Evans, Grant, and Maria Tam. (1997). Introduction: The anthropology of contemporary Hong Kong. In Grant Evans and Maria Tam Siu-Mi (eds.), Hong Kong: The Anthropology of a Chinese Metropolis (pp. 1–21). Richmond, UK: Curzon. Fan, Ke. (2019). Paradigm change in Chinese ethnology and Frederick Barth’s influence. In Keping Wu and Robert P. Weller (eds.), It happens among people: Resonances and extensions of the work of Fredrik Barth (pp. 171–190). New York: Berghahn Books. Fei, Xiaotong. (1939). Peasant life in China: A field study of country life in the Yangzte Valley. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Fei, Xiaotong. (1992). From the soil: The foundations of Chinese society (Gary Hamilton and Wang Zheng, trans.). Berkeley: University of California Press. Glenn, David. (2008). Unexplained ‘difficulties’ force postponement of scholarly conference in China. Chronicle of Higher Education, May 9. Guldin, Gregory Elihu. (1990). Chinese anthropologies. In Gregory Elihu Guldin (ed.), Anthropology in China: Defining the discipline (pp. 3–29). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Huang, Shu-min. (2017). Convergence and divergence between Taiwanese and US anthropologies. Asian Anthropology 16(3), 181–189. Kipnis, Andrew B. (2021). Introduction: ‘Overseas ethnography’ and the audiences of academic anthropology in China. HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 11(1).

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Kuwayama, Takami. (2004). Native anthropology: The Japanese challenge to Western academic hegemony. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press. Kuhn, Tomas S. (1996) The structure of scientific revolutions, 3rd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Li, Guannan. (2012). Cultural policy and culture under the Guomindang: Huang Wenshan and ‘culturology.’ In Arif Dirlik with Guannan Li and Hsiao-pei Yen (eds.), Sociology and anthropology in twentieth-century China: Between universalism and indigenism (pp. 109–137). Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Mathews, Gordon. (2010). On the referee system as a barrier to global anthropology. Asia-Pacific Journal of Anthropology 11(1), 52–63. Mathews, Gordon. (2012). Contesting Anglo-American hegemony in publication. Journal of Workplace Rights 16(3–4), 405–421. Mathews, Gordon. (2015). East Asian anthropology in the world. American Anthropologist 117(2), 364–383 Mathews, Gordon, with Linessa Dan Lin and Yang Yang. (2017). The World in Guangzhou: Africans and Other Foreigners in South China’s Global Marketplace. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Science. (2013). Social scientists and the Human Terrain System (HTS) project. http://www.onlineethics.org/Res ources/ Cases/HTSproject.aspx. Accessed 4 April 2021. Pieke, Frank. (2014). Anthropology in China and the Chinese century. Annual Review of Anthropology 43, 123–138. Song, Ping. (2017). Anthropology in China today. Asian Anthropology 16(3), 228–241. Tan, Chee-Beng. (2012). Chinese of different nationalities, China, and the anthropology of Chinese culture. In Arif Dirlik with Guannan Li and Hsiaopei Yen (eds.), Sociology and anthropology in twentieth-century China: Between universalism and indigenism (pp. 191–208). Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Wikipedia. (2021). Human terrain system. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Human_Terrain_System#:~:text=The%20Human%20Terrain%20System% 20(HTS,and%20staff%20with%20an%20understanding. Accessed 10 April 2021. Yen, Hsiao-pei. (2012). Li Anzhai and frontier anthropology: Tibet, discourse of the frontier, and applied anthropology during World War II, 1937–1945. In Arif Dirlik with Guannan Li and Hsiao-pei Yen (eds.), Sociology and anthropology in twentieth-century China: Between universalism and indigenism (pp. 139–160). Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.

CHAPTER 3

Shifts of Journalism and Communication Education in China and the Political and Ideological Contributing Factors Jing Niu, Junhao Hong, and Lujian Bi

Introduction Chinese journalism and communication education originated during the period of the Republic of China (1912–1949), which was marked by the launch of the Institute of Journalism of Peking University in 1918 (Deng and Li 2018). During the last century, Chinese journalism and communication education set out in a time of political turmoil. At that time, universities in China just drew experience from western universities on their journalism education. Universities in China drew mainly from the United States, but scarcely had their own scientific and comprehensive

J. Niu · L. Bi School of Journalism and Information Communication, Huazhong University of Science & Technology, Wuhan, China J. Hong (B) State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 S. Hua (ed.), Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8032-8_3

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understanding of the development of their own journalism and communication. Thus, they failed to formulate a professional education system as it was intended to be (Duan 2000). Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese universities learned and imitated the Soviet Union’s journalism and communication education models. However, neither a complete discipline system nor a mature teaching model was shaped in such a short time. Later came the stage of slow development or even a stasis. After reform and opening-up, Chinese journalism and communication education began to undergo dramatic changes and show impressive growth. The researcher in the colleges and universities took practical exploration independently in this field. Reform and opening-up period proved to be a key turning point in the history of Chinese journalism and communication education. Over forty years after that, the scale of journalism schools had been expanding. Journalism and communication education had been improving constantly and academic research in this field had gone further than ever before. Finally, notable advancement was made in Chinese journalism and communication education. From 1978 to 1982, China gradually resumed journalism education. Resumption was seen at the enrollment of students at journalism departments in universities like Renmin University of China and Jinan University. Subsequently, six other universities including Zhengzhou University and Anhui University set up journalism majors. At that time, there were only twelve journalism and communication educational institutions in the undergraduate and junior colleges in total across the country (Li 2019). The year 1983 witnessed the first climax of the development of Chinese journalism and communication education. With the successive launch of Journalism Departments in Lanzhou University, Xinjiang University, and some other universities, the number of nationwide colleges and universities with journalism majors increased to twenty-one (Deng and Li 2019). Since the 1990s, the number of colleges and universities with journalism majors continued to rise. In 1996, fifty-five colleges and universities offered journalism majors for undergraduates with the approval of the State Education Commission of the People’s Republic of China (Zhao and Pang 2008). From 1978 to 2019, 721 undergraduate colleges and universities offered the major, (The Research Committee on the History of Journalism and Communication Education of Chinese Association for History of Journalism and Communication 2020). In the meantime, journalism and communication education made improvements and the graduate and doctoral education system gradually

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became mature. In 1981, the academic degree system was implemented in China’s higher education system. Renmin University of China, Fudan University, and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences took the lead in offering master’s degree programs in journalism, followed by a total of 22 journalism colleges and departments in 1986, 1993, and 1998 (Li 2020). In 1985, Renmin University of China and Fudan University began to enroll doctoral students in journalism (Li 2020). In 1996, there were only two doctoral programs in journalism in China. However, the number of doctoral programs in the journalism and the communication increased to 11 and 10, respectively in 2016, including 6 doctoral degrees conferring spots of first-level disciplines in journalism and communication disciplines (Zhao and Pang 2008). By 2019, the number of specialized colleges and universities with doctoral programs in journalism and communication distributed in 16 provinces in China increased to 26, the number of First-level Major spots authorized to offer master degrees in journalism programs rose to 115, and the number of colleges with the journalism and communication discipline authorized to offer master degree program went up to 165 (The Research Committee on the History of Journalism and Communication Education of Chinese Association for History of Journalism and Communication 2020). With the vigorous development of journalism and communication education, academic researchers in this field developed in-depth and numerous academic researches with rich perspectives and diverse themes emerged. After reform and opening-up, there is an ongoing upward trend in the number of research results on journalism and communication year by year. Searching keywords “journalism” and “communication” on China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI), 172 documents on journalism and communication disciplines were published in 1988, 735 documents were published in 2000, and 12,781 documents were published in 2020. Before reform and opening-up in 1978, Chinese journalism and communication education mainly focused on the journalism field. It was not until the introduction of western communication science in the 1980s that a complete journalism and communication education system was finally established in China. The system then laid the foundation for the rapid advancement of journalism and communication education later. There were three remarkable and significant changes: Firstly, the introduction of communication into China which changed the situation of

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“journalism without theory”. Secondly, scholars’ reflection on communication studies converted the traditional view of “learning from western communication studies in an all-round way”. Thirdly, the re-politicization and kill-biased technology tendency of journalism and communication education emerged.

The Introduction of Communication Studies into China Changed the Situation of “Journalism Without Theory” 1) Journalism Education Focused on Journalism Practice and Highlighted Its Political Service Function Before reform and opening-up, China’s journalism education chiefly aimed at cultivating professional newsmen to adapt to social requirements in a short time with more stress on teaching journalism practice, basic knowledge, and professional skills training. There was a brief prosperous outlook of the newspaper industry in the 1920s. During this time, the newspaper offices needed numerous professional journalists, which then gave birth to journalism research and teaching groups represented by the Institute of Journalism of Peking University. Those groups focused on studying journalism theories and teaching journalism practice courses and thus started the tradition of considering journalism practice skills as the main part of Chinese journalism and communication education. After that, some universities in Shanghai, Beijing, Xiamen, and other places set up journalism departments and disciplines modeled after universities in America. Central to the journalism and communication education during this period was teaching and training professional journalism knowledge and skills (Cai 2003). In the 1950s and 1960s, China’s journalism education remained the tradition of placing considerable value on journalism practice. Meanwhile, it learned from the Soviet Union of journalism in a copycat fashion and this was done mainly to achieve political ideological consistency. Thus, journalism and communication departments with socialist characteristics and ideologies were set up. The purpose of journalism and communication education was to train journalism “cadres” for the country. As a consequence, the curriculum system was designed to foster students with

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solid loyalty to certain political ideologies, with the training of professional skills taking second place (The Research Committee on the History of Journalism and Communication Education of Chinese Association for History of Journalism and Communication 2016). 2) The Lack of Journalism Theory and the Prevalence of “Journalism Without Theory” China was a latecomer on journalism research. Its initial academic viewpoints and concepts were shaped based on western journalism by means of absorbing theories from the western world and reconstructing them according to Chinese context. In the 1920s, journalism works authored by Chinese scholars came out successively, including Xu Baohuang’s “Journalism”, Ren Baitao’s “Applied Journalism”, and Shao Piaoping’s “General Review of Journalism”. However, Chinese journalism academic research did not make significant progress during this period (Cao 2018). “There were not many monographs on journalism and the research contents were deficient. The authors of the monographs were either scholars returning from abroad or newspaper practitioners. The scholars might find it hard to grasp the essence of journalism practice, while the newspaper practitioners failed to get a thorough knowledge of the journalism theories. Therefore, they both tended to take up and adopt others’ thoughts instead of using their own or even plagiarized from others to lengthen their articles. Consequently, journalism research field was in a mess and a certain pattern was difficult to form” (Cao 2018). Most of the works in the 1950s were books of general interest or translations from books of the former Soviet Union. Those works placed emphasis on the popularization of practical knowledge, but lacked research-based achievements (Huang 2018). With the development of journalism and communication practice, scholars no longer only depended on translating western works but began to conduct independent academic exploration. However, just as Yuanpei Cai once mentioned: the development process of Chinese journalism was featured with “theory comes after technology”. China’s journalism academic research was rooted in journalism teaching and practice. Journalism education in China concentrated on professional skills teaching and journalism practice paid attention to improve the professional abilities of news talents. In this context, journalism academic research laid more emphasis on the research

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of journalism practice. Substantial research results emerged, such as “The Production and Evolution of News Headlines”, “The Basic Functions of News Headlines”, “The Angle Selection of Collecting and Writing Social News”, “On the Language Features of News”, and “Journalism Interview is an Independent Applied Science”. Those publications were concerned with news headlines, interviewing, and news writing. However, theoretical research on journalism was still relatively rare. Before reform and opening-up, many newsmen agreed with the view of “journalism without theory”. They believed no theories or regular patterns exist in journalism and they only needed to carry out practical activities according to the relevant instructions and requirements of the propaganda department. They thought that the journalism work was meant to serve the propaganda affairs. The reason why such cognition existed in the industry was that Chinese journalism and communication cause had long been closely linked with political propaganda work, which considerably weakened the academic feature of journalism. There was always a tradition of “literati politics” in ancient China. In the late Qing Dynasty, the first upsurge of Chinese people running newspapers appeared in China. Scholars like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao launched political newspapers such as Briefs of Home and Abroad, Qiangxue Journal, and Current Affairs to publicize their political ideas. During this period, Liang Qichao puts forward the “mouthpiece theory” from the perspective of political struggle which compared the function of newspapers to our “eyes and ears” and “mouthpieces”. This theory emphasized the political attribute of news media, which had a far-reaching impact on Chinese journalism. Since then, “serving political propaganda is the main mission of journalism” had been a tradition that was passed down. Even after the founding of People’s Republic of China, the boundary between “journalism and communication” and “political propaganda” was still being blurred and muddled. News was commonly regarded as an affiliated part of publicity, and “journalism and communication” were directly treated as “journalism and propaganda” among the news industry. During the Cultural Revolution period, the political attribute of journalism and communication drew particular attention. People were influenced by extreme political discourse and arbitrarily regarded news as a vassal of politics (Liang 2019). Meanwhile, the academic circle had always had a convention of “prefer practice to theory” and the concept of “journalism without theory” was also prevalent among scholars.

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3) Introduction of Communication Science into China and Full Absorption of Western Communication Studies In the 1980s, the introduction of communication science into China provided abundant theoretical resources for Chinese journalism and communication researches, made up for the lack of theoretical researches in traditional journalism, and consequently changed the stereotypical view of “journalism without theory”. The comprehensive acceptance and absorption of western communication theories were prominent in this period. In July 1978, Professor Zheng Beiwei of Fudan University paraphrased articles including “Introduction to Public Communication Tools” and “American Bourgeois Journalism: Public Communication” and defined the concept of “communication” (Zhang and Shao 2018). From then on, Chinese academic circles began to introduce western communication studies on a large scale. In the 1980s, a large quantity of works of journalism and communication were translated and introduced into China, including Walter Lippman’s Public Opinion (1984), Werner Severin and James Tankard’s Communication Theory: Origin, Methods and Uses in the Mass Media (1985), Denis McQuail’s Communication Models for the Study of Mass Communications (1987), M.L. Defleur and Dennis, E.D’s General Information (1989), etc. (Liu 2019). With the publication of abundant translated works introducing western communication studies, communication theories such as the 5W theory, the Magic Bullet theory, the Uses and Gratifications theory, and the Gatekeeper theory gradually became well-known in China. There were several features as follows during this stage. Firstly, the introducers were university teachers and newsmen with excellent commands of foreign language or overseas study and work experience; secondly, the introduction of empirical research methods enriched the methods of Chinese journalism and communication research; thirdly, the introduction of information theory, cybernetics theory, and system theory broadened the methodological vision of China’s journalism. The import of substantial journalism and communication terms and theories deconstructed the highly politicized traditional journalism and concepts like information, communication, and dialogue prompted the collective “depoliticization” tendency in the field, which significantly changed the relationship between journalism and propaganda. It also profoundly affected China’s mainstream politics and its discourse system

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(Liu 2019). Journalism theory had been inextricably linked with “propaganda” and “class struggle” for more than a decade. Facing the newly introduced communication ideological trend, many scholars deconstructed the journalism system from the perspective of communication in the hope of realizing ideological emancipation. At this stage, the whole communication field in China was still in a state of confusion and ignorance about the general features of communication. In addition, little did they know about the interdisciplinary origin of communication studies, the development of branch research fields, or the ideological schools of communication studies. Researchers shared a common motivation and interest in how to promote the reform of Chinese journalism science and industry. Although they formally criticized the communication theories of the western world, they inevitably used these ready-made theories for study and research (Wang 2009). The introduction of communication had a profound impact on journalism and communication education in China. In February 1980, the Journalism School of Fudan University offered an optional course of communication among undergraduates (Liao 1998). In May 1982, Wilbur Schramm, the “father of communication”, visited universities and news research institutions in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. In November 1982, China’s first symposium on western communication studies was held in Beijing. Here, a decision was made to translate and introduce communication books into China, and qualified universities were allowed to open communication courses (Xin et al. 2009). In June 1986, Fudan University was the first university in China that established a communication research institution, the “Culture and Communication Research Center”. This marked the discipline of communication as being officially recognized among domestic colleges and universities (The Research Committee on the History of Journalism and Communication Education of Chinese Association for History of Journalism and Communication 2017). With the increasing recognition of western communication theories in Chinese universities, traditional journalism education was transforming into modern journalism and communication education.

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The Normalized Development of Journalism and Communication Disciplines 1) Localization Exploration of Communication Under the Binary Framework At the initial stage of the introduction of western communication into China, the way that researchers learned and absorbed comprehensively from the western world transformed traditional journalism. This way of learning posed potential pitfalls to the later development of communication in China. In the 1980s, due to the limitation of academic resources, Chinese researchers studied western communication theories through translations of foreign documents, which slowed the pace of the research. This also prevented scholars from gaining insight into the general features and theoretical context of communication science, which underlay a misreading to different degrees. On one hand, the specific context of foreign communication theories was ignored and the concepts were uncritically introduced and used, which generated a sense of ambiguity and inexplicability. This led to a different understanding of the concepts, meaning that the scholars rarely had common languages (Wu et al. 2011). On the other hand, the adoption of western communication theories led to the loss in touch with the practical social and cultural environment at that time. Scholars mechanically put the “western theory” into “Chinese practice” and applied western communication theories to explain Chinese cultural phenomena, which resulted in their failure in bridging the cultural differences between the two sides (Xu and Yu 2020). Therefore, scholars inquired into the localization of communication science. In 1982, the principle of “systematic understanding, analytical investigation, critical absorption and independent creation” was put forward at the first national communication conference. This principle was considered as the first “research criterion” (also called the “16Chinese-character principle”), which was proposed by Chinese journalism scholars. It was of great significance to localization in the process of introducing western communication studies into China. This principle was also an active response to the difficulties and ideological problems that scholars had to face when they were going to spread the western communication theories across China at that time (Wang 2007). Yu Yelu, a Chinese scholar, held a week-long conference on “Theory and Practice of Communication in Chinese Culture and Tradition” in Hong Kong and

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Taiwan, respectively. He strongly advocated the localization of communication and suggests the three-step principle of localization: “There is a great deal of knowledge accumulated in Chinese cultural heritage from which we can find some general principles or summarize some principles. This will be the first stage. Then we can take these principles as assumptions and put them into practice in the current social background and try to explore and investigate to figure out if they are reasonable. This will be the second stage. If these principles are proven to be reasonable or even universally valid, then a general theory can be built up. A continuous stream of such kinds of theories can not only guide the implementation of domestic policy and media activities in China but also will enrich the knowledge about communication worldwide. I believe the foreigners will appreciate these things very much. This will be the third stage” (Hu 2011). In 1993, the third national communication conference was held in Xiamen, China. Scholars had an animated discussion on the theme of “localization of communication” and tried to explore communication localization from historical and realistic perspectives. The discussion laid particular emphasis on the practicality of communication theories, which was regarded as a succession of the “16-Chinese-character principle” proposed before (Zhang and Shao 2018). From the 1980s to the 1990s, scholars not only studied western communication theories comprehensively, but also examined their applicability in China critically and insistently thought about the further development of Chinese journalism and communication. 2) The Reflection and Reconstruction of Communication Theories with Chinese Characteristics Since the 1980s, two orientations had been discussed on the localization or indigenization of communication: “asking for the traditional works for help” or following the “copinism” (i.e., the “all-takenism”) principle. Under the guidance of “asking for the traditional works for help”, researchers were prompted to sort out some worthwhile traditional documents. However, these researchers just put Chinese traditional experience into the shoes of western theories inappropriately instead of making western theories localized successfully due to their lack of consciousness of questioning. Finally, it was simply a further recognition of the universality of western theories. Researchers following the path of “copinism”

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advocated the critical assimilation of pioneering communication theories and methods in the world and then to figure out the distinguishing features of local communication research (Zhang 2005). It had gradually become a trend in this period to bring western theories into practice in China. Since 1998, a series of western theories were used for the empirical research on the localization in China, and certain academic results were achieved, such as the Agenda Setting theory, the Uses and Gratifications theory, the Spiral of Silence theory, the Cultivation theory, and the Third Person Effect theory. (Zhang and Shao 2018). Both localization paths mentioned above were proposed on the basis of the binary framework of “western theory and Chinese experience”. Some scholars held the opinion that the localization of communication research should be conducted based on a diversified academic consciousness. Generally, it could be deemed as Chinese scholars’ critical consciousness, rooted in the process of academic dialogue with the western world (Hu 2011). With the expanding of reflection and exploration on the localization and internationalization of communication, researchers gradually realized that the real sense of “internationalization” was not to simply “apply western theories blindly and mechanically” and “localization” was not to “apply domestic theories exclusively” (Liao et al. 2013). Researchers’ reflection and criticism on the initiative of western communication theories promoted the localization of these theories and the internationalization of Chinese communication studies. During that period, scholars reassessed western theories—they treated them as a cognitive framework and constantly reflected on their applicability rather than regarded them as fixed standards. It was a mark of the awakening of Chinese scholars’ academic consciousness, although such deconstruction, questioning, and criticism of the imported theories did not completely discard their dependence on various western concepts, theories, and methods (Hu and Zhang 2018). In recent years, there are signs that communication theories had sunk into involution—it focused solely on the development of internal details, repeatedly shown off the supremacy of techniques with formalism, but did not dare to boldly innovate in thoughts, which finally ended up “being exquisite mediocrity” (Chen 2020). There were also scholars who realized that although western theories could afford a tool of strong explanatory power for their researches to a certain extent, they should not rely too much on the western communication theories or allow the western communication theory to occupy a hegemonic position in

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academic research. The localization of communication remained to be a significant indication of discipline independence. The realistic problem was how to enhance the explanatory power of these theories to practical problems, exert their imagination of the future and how to absorb, transform, and even surpass the western theories (Tong 2017). Taking the reality into consideration, researchers were intensely concerned about the new issues and phenomena during the course of social transformation in China, including rural communication, political communication, and media integration. They attempted to bring forward a set of interpretative frameworks that could “transcend the West” (Liu 2019). Thus, the academic circles bid farewell to the fanatical pursuit of western communication studies and hence absorbed and transformed the essence of theories with more objective and rational attitudes and embarked on exploring a communication theoretical system with Chinese characteristics that could meet the needs of China. 3) Standardization and Systematization of Journalism and Communication Disciplines In 1997, the Academic Degrees Committee of the State Council (ADCSC) in China issued a postgraduate program catalog, in which journalism was listed as “journalism and communication” with two subdisciplines of journalism science and communication science, upgraded from being a second-level major to a first-level one (Ye et al. 2017). In 1998, the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China issued the Catalogue of Undergraduate Programs in Ordinary Colleges and Universities in which four undergraduate majors were included under the category of journalism and communication, like journalism, radio and television journalism, advertising, editing and publishing (Lu 2016). This represented the extension of traditional journalism to journalism and communication, marking the formal establishment of the discipline status of journalism and communication. Journalism and communication education gradually stepped forward to be standardized and systematic. Much attention was paid to the cultivation of students’ comprehensive abilities when the curriculum system was set up. Students were not only required to take general courses, but

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also should take other professional courses integrated with other disciplines (Liao and Luo 2016). Specifically, the previous courses including “interviewing, writing, compilation and reviewing” in journalism practice were merged and streamlined to keep in line with the talent training requirements in the new era. The new curriculum system insisted that students learn both arts and science courses rather than “pure liberal arts” like before. Many colleges and universities added science courses such as physics, advanced mathematics, probability and statistics to undergraduate courses, which were primarily geared toward training students’ logical thinking. At this stage, researchers developed an awareness of methodology and actively applied research methods to practical teaching activities and academic research. Additionally, many colleges and universities also set up corresponding courses teaching research methods. Initially, Chinese journalism researches were conducted on the basis of the most elementary logical reasoning methods like induction and deduction. In comparison, the mainstream communication science in the United States had always emphasized the application of scientific methods like social survey, psychological experiment, and content analysis in the study of communication effect and to draw empirical conclusions by means of quantification and statistics (Dong 2008). The quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis system of communication science enriched the research methods in the field, which made the academic researches more scientific. It also consequently weaned Chinese researchers off the criticism of “doing researches unprofessionally”, “being self-talk” or “doing research without the support of scientific methods” gradually. Therefore, colleges and universities in China attached importance to the establishment of research methods courses, especially courses on empirical research methods which were listed as a basic professional course by journalism and communication schools of many colleges and universities like Fudan University. This course was set as a general compulsory course, a professional compulsory course, an optional course, or a professional optional course in different colleges and universities. (Wang 2007) (See Table 3.1 for details).

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Table 3.1 Curriculum setting of research methods in some Universities College/University

Undergraduate Course

Postgraduate Course

Peking University

General Statistics, Social Survey, Research Methods, Market Research Practical Statistical Method

Communication Research Methods, Advanced Statistics

Tsinghua University Fudan University

Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Nanjing University

Xiamen University

Communication University of China

Communication Research Methods, Radio and Television Viewing, Research, Market Research, Statistics Communication Research Methods, Social Survey and Statistics

Media Research and Statistics, Market Investigation, Advertising Effectiveness Test Communication Research Methods Advertising Research and Effectiveness Test Communication Research Methods, Advertising Research

Huazhong University of Science and Technology

Communication Research Methods

Central China Normal University

Social Survey Methods

Sichuan University

Advertising Research

Wuhan University

Advertising Research

Hunan University

Advertising Research

Communication Research Methods Journalism and Communication Research Methods Mathematical Statistics, Mass Communication Research Methods, Media Market Research and Analysis Communication Research Methods Communication Research Methods, Advertisement Research Methods Communication Research Methods, Market Research, Audience Rating Research Communication Empirical Research Methods Special Research of Journalism Theories and Methods Journalism and Communication Research Methods Mass Media investigation Research Methods Communication Theories and Methods Research

(continued)

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Table 3.1 (continued) College/University

Undergraduate Course

Postgraduate Course

Shandong University

Market Investigation and Analysis

Nankai University

Media Research, Fundamentals of Statistics Audience Survey and Media Effects Social Survey Methods, Advertising Research and Effect Analysis Statistics, Advertising Effect Measurement Theory and Method of Communication Research

Humanities Methodology, Communication Research Methods Audience Investigation Research Communication Research Methods Communication Research Methods

Tongji University Lanzhou University

Tianjin Normal University Shanghai University

China Youth University of Political Studies

Communication Research Methods, Communication Statistics, Social Survey Methods, Social Statistics

Principles and Methods of Public Opinion Communication Research Methods, Empirical Study on Journalism and Communication Communication Research Methods

Source This table is modified based on a table in an article by Wang (2007). See the details in the references

The Re-politicization and Technical Inclination of Journalism and Communication Education 1) The Re-politicization Tendency of Journalism and Communication Disciplines Before reform and opening-up, there was a trend toward high politicization in journalism activities and researches. Journalism was even functioning as a powerful tool for class struggle. After reform and opening-up, the rise of communication science provided theoretical support for the reflection on the highly politicized journalism, witnessing the emergence of a trend of depoliticization in journalism (Ye 2019). There is a close affinity between journalism and politics that the news industry could not exist independently from the political environment. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Chinese government realized the

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importance of journalism in the construction of socialist cause so that journalism and communication education gained more attention and emphasis. Thus, Chinese journalism and communication education and academic research showed a trend of re-politicization, specifically in the following two aspects: Firstly, the research subjects were significantly influenced by policies and had to keep up with current political hotspots. On October 3, 2013, President Xi Jinping of People’s Republic of China delivered an important speech entitled “Jointly Building a China-ASEAN Community with a Shared Future” in the Indonesian parliament. Since then, the Belt and Road Initiative had become a major issue in journalism and communication research. Up to now, the research results on this topic emerged one after another with diverse horizons, covering a wide range of subjects like cross-cultural communication, international communication, global governance, external communication strategies, discourse system construction, and so on. Apart from that, there are abundant research objects involving domestic media, overseas media, documentaries, TV programs, TV plays, films, Internet technology, translation and publication, national image, Chinese values, Chinese think tanks, etc. (Ren and Wang 2020). In 2016, Xi Jinping delivered another vital speech on media, network and information work of the Communist Party of China. After that, research subjects such as Xi Jinping’s view on news reporting and public opinion, the guiding power of news and public opinion, governance of public opinion on the Internet, media integration, law-based management of the new media became hotspots during that year (Chen and Fei 2017). Journalism had always been closely linked with politics. Especially in China, researchers were more inclined to conduct academic researches associated with political hotspots. On one hand, it illustrated that Chinese researchers had strong political sensitivities. On the other hand, political policies are crucial to guide academic research. If there were policies leaning toward a certain research field, it would be easier for researchers writing relevant papers to be recognized by the journals. Moreover, their correlative projects could be more likely to obtain financial supports from the government or universities. Secondly, the study of Marxist view of journalism gained prominence, and a theoretical system of Marxist journalism was established. The concept of “Marxist view of journalism” was first proposed in the 1990s. In 1997, Feng Lin published an article entitled “Stress Politics and Uphold the Marxist View of Journalism” on News Front. As he puts it,

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“the Marxist view of journalism is the rationale of socialist journalism and the guiding ideology for China’s journalism work”. He also defined the research category of Marxist view of journalism and reckoned it included “Marxism-Leninism news theory, Mao Zedong’s thought on journalism, Deng Xiaoping’s discourse on news, Jiang Zemin’s discourse on news, and the relevant decisions and regulations of the Party and the country” (Zhu and Xie 2019). As a fundamental element of journalism and communication practice under socialist ideology, Marxist view of journalism had come under the light in the new era. Searching articles with the key phrase “Marxist view of journalism” in the CNKI website and a total number of 2,928 articles could be found in the discipline branch of “journalism and media” in 2021. Before the twenty-first century, the number of articles on “Marxist view of journalism” being published in 1999 was the largest by far, with the number of 11. Since 2000, researches on the “Marxist view of journalism” show a spurt of growth, and 2001 was considered as a turning point in the journalistic history because a total number of 198 articles were published in that year. Some scholars believed that it was highly correlated with the domestic political climate because 2001 marked the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China and Chinese academic circles thus saw a climax of research on the journalism thought of the Communist Party of China (Zhu and Xie 2019). Since then, the number of researches on Marxist view of journalism remained steady. On February 19, 2016, Xi Jinping emphasized at the symposium on news reporting and public opinion work of the Communist Party of China that journalistic values were the soul of news reporting and public opinion and that China should strengthen the education of Marxist journalism view. The domestic journalism and communication academic circles responded to this call positively. They explored Marxist view of journalism in depth and strived to build a Marxist theoretical system of journalism. For this reason, 310 articles were published then, which in turn led to a new research climax. (See Fig. 3.1 for details). In general, the number of research results on Marxist view of journalism showed a rising trend in fluctuation from 2000 to now. Especially in the last five years, the number of researches continued to grow steadily with the research contents being enriched. In the twenty-first century, the re-politicization of journalism and communication education was mainly manifested in the “ministryuniversity co-constructed” journalism school mode with distinct Chinese characteristics. At the end of 2013, the Publicity Department of the

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Fig. 3.1 Annual Publications on “Marxist View of Journalism” on CNKI (Source This figure is constructed on the data collected from China National Knowledge Infrastructure Visualization Analysis, 2020)

Communist Party of China and the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China co-issued the Opinions on the Co-construction of Journalism Schools by Propaganda Departments of Local Party Committee and Colleges and Universities according to Fudan University’s experience in successfully co-constructing a journalism school. It was required that publicity department of Party Committees of all provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) should build a journalism school with colleges and universities and the major news institutions of the central government should also build a journalism school with colleges and universities in principle. In addition, ten colleges and universities were chosen to launch pilot projects (Ma and Zhou 2019). Such mode of “ministry-university co-construction” was dominated by education departments and propaganda departments, participated by news media institutions and colleges and universities. To be more specific, the publicity departments of the Party Committees would carry out political supervision and guidance and provide financial supports to the journalism schools. Furthermore, it offers more internship opportunities for the students and gives teachers chances to take a temporary post for their personal training and development outside the universities. Meanwhile, media workers with both practical experience and theoretical knowledge were designated to give lessons or hold lectures in the journalism schools in their part time (Wang and Wu 2015). The mode of “ministry-university co-construction” combined the management institutions of ideology and media with the institutions for

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news talents training. It was primarily designed to educate students with the journalism theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics and to cultivate high-quality, all-media, interdisciplinary, professional journalism and communication reserve talents with national identity and international vision on a massive scale (Zhang 2018), with the core task of imparting the Marxist view of journalism to students. Journalism schools and departments all over the country promoted the education of Marxist view of journalism by adjusting the teaching contents and holding serial lectures. Nanjing University invited famous journalists and editors from the major news institutions to give lectures, including the specialized course of “Marxist View of Journalism in Practice”. Hainan Normal University added courses like Marxist View of Journalism, Professional Ethics of Journalism in its teaching programs and properly prolonged the practical courses (Shan and Li 2015). The “ministry-university coconstruction” mode was an innovative one in the history of journalism and communication education in China, which was conducive to train journalists, promote exchanges between academic circles and industries, and build up internship bases. At the same time, this mode was still at the exploratory stage and there were still some problems. For instance, there was not a single, clear regulation on the relationships between the universities and the publicity departments of Party committees in the exercise of power. In the process of co-construction, some colleges and universities failed to adopt measures suiting local economic and social conditions, nor did they highlight their own characteristics according to their self-positioning and distinct conditions. They slavishly imitated others’ experience rather than effectively responded to the needs for journalism talents. 2) The Education and Research of Journalism and Communication Went Hand in Hand with Technology In the twenty-first century, the innovation of technologies like the Internet, big data, and artificial intelligence had brought disruptive changes to journalism and communication and also impacted the academic circles significantly. Researchers paid more attention to the changes in media technology than ever before, which engendered the changes of research hotspots every year. Research hotspots comprised the new media ecology of “Internet plus”, the characteristics of mobile

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Internet users, platform media, big data journalism, etc., in 2015 (Chen and Fei 2016), governance of Internet public opinion, law-based management of new media, virtual reality (VR) news, etc., in 2016 (Chen and Fei 2017), news production reform under the background of artificial intelligence, algorithm-based personalized news feed, netizen sentiment in the new media environment, etc., in 2017 (Chen and Wang 2018), online news production, short videos, county-level convergence media center, artificial intelligence, block-chain technology, etc., in 2018 (Chen and Xia 2019), 5G technology, video podcast, We-media “article spinner”, digital labor, etc., in 2019 (Chen and Sun 2020), and live-streaming marketing, platform capitalism, social bots, etc., in 2020 (Chen and Sun 2021). According to the data above, it is apparent that the research hotspots each year are concerned about the latest media technologies and relevant new phenomena’s. Journalism and communication education was bound up with technology at this stage. In order to adapt to the changes in the industry, journalism schools in universities made corresponding adjustments by fully integrating new technologies like the Internet, VR, and Big Data into traditional classes. Thus, new professional courses like Big Data Network, Data News, and Shooting News by Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) emerged. Some journalism schools set up practical course platforms by in-depth cooperation with the news industry. For example, School of Journalism and Communication of Renmin University of China and Tou Tiao Company had jointly established a sharing platform for new media practice courses. The platform was committed to building a practical curriculum system that adapted to the new media environment and was also opened to teachers and students in journalism and communication colleges and universities across China. Universities with journalism and communication or relevant majors were allowed access to these courses (Journalism and Communication Experimental Center of Renmin University of China 2017). To train journalism talents that meet the demands of the media market, many journalism colleges and departments also set up teaching laboratories for students to learn and practice. For example, journalism schools in universities like Nanjing University, Fudan University, Jinan University, Hong Kong Baptist University, and Shandong University had built big data and artificial intelligence laboratories. The technological shift remained a critical driving-force for the reform and development of journalism and communication education. This posed impacts on the media industry status and journalism and also

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urged communication education to constantly adjust the content of practical courses to cater to the rapidly changing media market requirements for talents.

Conclusion Looking back on the entire development process of journalism and communication education in China, practice-oriented journalism education initially occupied a dominant position. The introduction of communication science broke the situation of single-discipline and enriched the theoretical resources and research methods, which in turn inspired Chinese scholars to reconstruct the discipline system. After that, journalism and communication education centered around three topics, “comprehensive absorption”, “exploration for localization”, and “reflection and reconstruction”. The interaction between journalism and communication provided the main impetus for the development of journalism and communication education during this course. In the twenty-first century, journalism and communication were characterized by re-politicization and skill-inclined technology. Journalism and communication had taken root in China and were deeply influenced by China’s political and cultural environment among which policy factors took a leading role in the reform of journalism and communication education. In 1983, the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China and the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China jointly held a national symposium on journalism and issued the Opinions on Strengthening Journalism Education. The conference called for vigorous efforts for strengthening journalism education and required that every province which was eligible should endeavor to build a journalism department, which set off the first upsurge of running journalism schools in China. By the end of the 1980s, all major administrative regions in China had established journalism teaching centers and China generally formed its own education pattern of journalism. In the twenty-first century, “ministry-university co-construction” of journalism departments and schools was a fresh model in China. This mode of journalism communication education with distinctive Chinese characteristics was flourishing nationwide soon after. As of October 2018, 122 journalism schools altogether had implemented the mode of “ministryuniversity co-construction”. There were two main reasons as to why

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government policies could influence the development direction of journalism and communication education. The first reason was that the media had a vital political propaganda function in China’s political environment. Journalists were supposed to adhere to correct political and value orientation. Colleges and universities with journalism schools must follow the mainstream ideology and constantly adjust themselves according to the practical political environment. The second reason lied in that educational resource distributions in China were dominated by administrative forces. For example, the license of doctoral and master’s programs should seek approval from the government. In other words, it was the administrative forces that managed the educational resources while education was subject to political policies. In the twenty-first century, technology started to have a visible bearing on the development of journalism and communication. The disciplines of journalism and communication had strong features of practicality and applicability. Journalism colleges and departments must take the skill requirements of the industry for journalism talents into full consideration in the process of carrying out personnel training. In the prime of traditional media, companies demanded journalism graduates with good commands of corresponding skills such as TV editing, newspaper typesetting, image processing, etc., which urged the colleges and universities to offer experimental courses. For example, Communication University of China established the Experimental Teaching Center of Radio, Television, and New Media in 2003. It was equipped with numerous laboratories including a live broadcast laboratory, a non-linear broadcast editing laboratory, a photography fundamental laboratory, and a TV pair editing laboratory, which were designed primarily for various educational practical training such as broadcasting, interviewing, music recording, TV shooting, post-editing, broadcast instructing. (Xin et al. 2009). In the last decade, the revolution of news media technologies continued to accelerate at an extremely rapid rate so that various skill requirements were proposed for graduates by media companies. Consequently, dramatic changes in journalism departments in colleges and universities were occurring. Many of them had launched reforms in the curriculum system, course contents, and teaching methods. For instance, technical courses such as big data analysis were added (He and Dong 2019). In the academic research field, more attention was paid to the influence of technological transformations on journalism and communication than ever before. Research results on media technology sprang up in an endless

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stream. Nowadays, the worship of technology appears to take on a more manifest trend in China’s journalism and communication education. In conclusion, political policy and technical factors will remain affecting the reform of China’s journalism and communication education for a long time to come. When these two factors act too much, China’s journalism and communication education will lack independence and autonomy. For the educators and researchers of journalism and communication, except for being concerned at the technological frontier and keep up with the pace of social change, they should also have an awareness of reflection and criticism. They should give full play to academic consciousness and motivation so as to promote the development of journalism and communication disciplines and enable the disciplines to evolve into a more scientific and standardized one.

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CHAPTER 4

The Changing Landscape of Economic Studies on China: A Scopus-Based Literature Review Sarah Y. Tong and Yao Li

Introduction After more than four decades of reform and opening-up, China’s economy has achieved remarkable development and modernization.

Sarah Y Tong is Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. Li Yao is Research Fellow at the same institute. They would like to thank Ms Chen Juan for her help in conducting text analysis used in the study. S. Y. Tong (B) · Y. Li East Asian Institute (EAI), National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] Y. Li e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 S. Hua (ed.), Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8032-8_4

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Alongside, economic studies on China have witnessed considerable expansion and constant change. By examining the nearly 50,000 academic studies on China’s economy, published since the late 1978, the authors aimed to answer two questions. First, as the economy expands and becomes more complex, have economic studies follow these trends, modify and broaden the key issues of academic enquiry. In relation to that, the authors also examine to what extent economic research on China is connected to China’s policy process. It is widely acknowledged that government and government policies have played and will continue to play, an instrumental role to facilitate China’s development and modernization. In particular, the authors investigate whether economic studies on China have become more closely proximity to topics emphasized by the government and in the governance plans. Second, while economic studies on China have largely shifted from a Marxist-Leninist tradition to neoclassic theory-driven research, China-based scholars have in recent decades grown to dominate the field, in numbers and perhaps also in defining the key topics. Meanwhile, research conducted by scholars with different institutional affiliations, measured by geographic locations, may have demonstrated somewhat varying preferences, with respect to topics. The study is conducted using the software CiteSpace to analyze the nearly 50,000 academic studies on China’s economy, collected in the Scopus database. As the world’s leading citation database, the Scopus provides information on studies from over 7,000 publishers that have been reviewed and selected by an independent Content Selection and Advisory Board.1 The Scopus records provide a wide range of information including the authors’ and co-authors’ names, affiliations, and addresses, as well as the study’s topic, title, abstract, keywords, grant number, research area, year published, and the publication source (journal, book, or conference). The database used in this study consist of publications under the category of “Economics” that include either “China” or “Chinese” in the record’s title, abstract, or keywords. The year of publication is between 1978 and 30 June 2021. The above filtering resulted in a database with 49,137 publications.

1 Scopus is one of the three major literature citation databases which are used by scholars most. The other two are the Web of Science database and the Google Scholar. According to Martín-Martín et al. (2018) Scopus has more Journal coverage than Web of Science and more details of studies than Google Scholar.

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To investigate the changes in economic studies on China, the authors divide the post-reform period into four decade-long sub-periods.2 Although China’s economic reform has taken place in a gradual and experiment-based fashion, the authors believe distinctive features in the economy become present across different decades. In addition, a ten-year cycle is also roughly in line with the cycle of China’s leadership transition in post-1978 era. The authors aim to examine whether economic studies on China demonstrated visible changes over time, through the four decades under study. Moreover, a further division into eight five-year periods is used to study whether China’s changing policy-priorities, often linked to its five-year plans (FYPs), affect economic studies on China. Our review finds that as China’s economy expands and modernizes, economic research on China has grown significantly, in size, in coverage, and in complexity. More importantly, the central issues under research have move along with the economy itself, from reform-heavy, to growth and development-centric, to more future-oriented, on such issues as environment and innovation. As research topics grew and Chinabased research capabilities expand, international cooperation between China-based and outside scholars continue to play an important role in economic research on China. Meanwhile, the prominence of Chinabased scholars has increased and their responsiveness to domestic policy agenda observed. It is also very clear that more theory- and quantitativebased studies, as well as interdisciplinary research, have been published on Chinese economy. It is interesting to see what contribution such studies may have to the economics studies as a social sciences discipline.

The Expansion and Changes in Economic Studies on China There is little doubt that China’s economy has made significant strides since the adoption of economic reform and opening up in 1978. As is shown (Fig. 4.1), economic growth has consistently outpaced that of the world and the countries of East Asia and the Pacific, even when highincome countries are excluded. As a result, China’s economy as a share to the world total, measured by GDP, rose from about one percent in 1978

2 In some cases, we added studies published in 1978 and 1979 into those of the 1980s and studies in 2021 into those of the 2010s.

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16

12

8

4

0

China

D-EAP

World

-4 1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

2012

2016

2020

Fig. 4.1 GDP growth, 1980–2020(%) (Note D-EAP refers to East Asia & Pacific excluding high-income countries. Source World Development Indicators)

to 4.5% in 2000 and further to 14.4% in 2020. China is now the world second largest economy, on US dollar account, and the world largest based on purchasing power parity. Alongside the rapid expansion, the Chinese economy has also experienced significant structure changes. As can be seen (Table 4.1), the composition of economic output shifted from traditional sectors such as agriculture, forestry, and fishing to modern sectors including industry, construction, and services. The share of the former declined from 30% in 1980 to less than 10% in 2020. Meanwhile, the share of rural population dropped from over four fifth to less than two fifth in four decades. China transformed itself from a poor, rural economy to become a member of the upper-middle-income countries. A significant feature of China’s economic transition is its adoption of trade liberalization and embrace of economic globalization, reflected by its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. Growth and structural transformation have led to improvement in the population’s standard of living. For example, China’s per capita GDP rose by 24 times in four decades, from 1980 to 2020, and its ratio to the world average rose from 5.5% to 80%.

Structure changes

1980

China

2020

1980

2020

1980

2020

East Asia & Upper middle Pacific income (excl. high income) 1980

World

2020

Note a The figures are for 2019 Source CEIC

GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) 347.19 8405.18 557.28 6881.02 2646.50 8773.88 6280.92 10,565.5 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added 29.63 7.65 28.92 8.56 21.19 6.40 . 3.55a (% of GDP) Industry (including construction), value added 48.06 37.82 46.52 37.18 41.59 31.10 . 24.79a (% of GDP) Services, value added (% of GDP) 22.31 54.53 22.91 53.75 34.11 56.82 . 65.04a Rural population (% of total population) 80.64 38.57 78.66 42.52 64.32 32.41 60.65 43.85 Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 5.91 18.50 11.16 22.85 11.19 23.99 18.78 29.49a Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of 0.03 1.31a 0.38 1.52a 0.63 1.78a 0.52 1.95a GDP) Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 34.61 43.25a 32.85 39.95a 29.58 30.06a 26.92 24.50a Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 28.56 42.82a 27.90 39.57a 25.78 29.36a 25.62 23.76a Trade (% of GDP) 12.42 34.51 22.48 43.48 23.44 46.47 38.53 58.24a

Table 4.1

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China’s rapid economic expansion and modernization, underlined by its gradual and continuous market liberalization and economic opening, have important implications on economic studies on China. Mostly apparently, the number of studies on China’s economy rise significantly and, in recent decades, exponentially, from less than 600 in the 1980s to nearly 33,000 in the 2010s. Meanwhile, their shares in overall economic studies rose from less than one percent to over five percent. Indeed, there are evident changes in the focus areas of economic studies on China. In the three years from 1978 to 1980,3 economic studies on China have a strong focus on rural/agricultural issues. For 1978, six of the ten top-cited articles dealt with such issues as rural labor, welfare practice in rural China, incentives in rural collectives, and rural industrialization. One good example is the article by Urger (1978), that discusses the government’s efforts to incentivize peasants in the farming community of a rural village. While there were less studies on rural agriculture focused studies among the top ten (3 for 1979 and 4 for 1980), issues of incentives in rural collectives remained important topics. For example, Chinn (1979) studied team cohesion and collective-labor supply in Chinese agriculture and Ng (1979) examined incentive policy in Chinese collective agriculture. Such studies echoed the central significance of rural reforms, both as a government objective and as reform experiments on the ground. For studies published since 1981, keywords of the articles are used to analyze trends in economic studies on China. As shown in Table 4.2, there are significant changes over time in the main areas of investigation. In the following, we will examine these changes and relate them to the shifting characteristics of China’s economy and its policy objectives. In the 1980s, the number of studies is small and the keywords of these studies are quite scattered, where only 25 terms occurred for more than three times, excluding “China” and “economics.” The top area of study is demography- and population-related issue, followed by topics of reform,

3 To examine the changing emphases in economic studies on China, we also use for analysis the titles of the articles published in academic journals. This is useful for studies carried out in the early years, when “keywords” of the articles were not provided by the publications and thus not readily available in Scopus.

582

1918

4 2

Stock market Sustainable development

All

46 30 27 27 23

Demography/population Comparative Foreign investment SOEs Hong Kong

28 23 19 9 9

Asia Developing country Economic reform Industry Rural/agriculture

185 150 73 69 64 60 58 70 55 55 51

Developing country

34

Demography/population Economic reform Asia Rural/agriculture Growth Trade Modeling Industry Development Carbon/Environment Transition

1991–2000

Transition Economic reform Developing country SOEs Sustainable development Demography/population Innovation Comparative

Trade Industry Development Carbon/Environment Growth Modeling Rural/agriculture Foreign investment Stock market Hong Kong

Asia

2001–2010

75 64 50 9927

176 169 107 98 76

729 509 428 428 387 369 276 208 197 186

2136

Main areas of economic studies on China, based on analysis of keywords

1981–1990

Table 4.2

Comparative Developing country Transition

Trade Industry Modeling Development Growth Rural/agriculture Stock market Innovation Foreign investment Sustainable development Asia Economic reform SOEs Demography/population Hong Kong

Carbon/Environment

2011–2020

246 158 138 32,746

361 361 332 290 250

2523 2287 1819 1586 1257 863 677 601 471 393

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industry development, and rural agriculture development.4 These seem reasonable. First, China implemented a less restrictive population policy of “late marriage, fewer children, and further apart between births” (wan shao xi) in the early 1970s and began its one-child policy in 1980. Meanwhile, experiment-based reforms in rural China, for urban state-owned enterprises, and in trade and foreign investment started gradually from 1979 onward. As will be seen, studies on these important reform areas appeared more significantly in the follow decade. To go further from the above relatively crude account, we look at the ten top-cited articles of the 1980s and find signs consistent with those summarized above and with additional specifics. • Studies on China’s rural/agriculture continued to feature prominently among the top-cited studies during the period, especially during 1981–1984, where 13 of such studies were recorded by Scopus. These include Ellman (1981), on agricultural productivity, Griffin and Saith (1982), on income inequality in China, Watson (1983), on agricultural production responsibility system, and Nolan (1983), on de-collectivization in agricultural. Studies on rural agriculture continued in the second half of the 1980s, including those on rural reforms like household responsivity system (Lin 1987). • Studies on China’s industries have risen in numbers among the top-cited studies, especially in the second half of the 1980s. Examples include Wong (1986) on economics of shortage and reform in China’s industry, Wu and Zhao (1987) on dual pricing in China’s industry, Kuan et al. (1988) and Jefferson (1989) on industrial productivity. • Another feature of top economic studies on China is the strong emphasis on the discussion of market vs plan and economic reform. We mention a few examples here, including De Wulf (1985), Tam (1986), Wong (1987), Byrd (1989), and Dollar (1990). • In addition to reform, industry, and rural agriculture, the top-cited studied during the 1980s cover a range of other issues in China’s economy, including income and income distribution (Kravis 1981, Adelman and Sunding 1987), investment (Kamath 1990), China’s special economic zone (Sit 1985).

4 The relatively more appearance of “Asia” and “developing country” as keywords may not have much significance here, as they likely just indicate China’s geographic location and developing country status.

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In the 1990s, economic reform toped economic research on China, followed by those on rural agriculture, trade and foreign investment, and industry. In addition, growth, development, and transition also ranked among the tops, indicating an increasing emphasis on systematic studies on China.5 Meanwhile, demography and population studies still had an important presence, but much less in relative terms. Another useful point during this period is that studies on carbon emission and environmental issues also ranked among the major research areas. This area gained further prominence in the following decades, especially in the 2010s. During the 2000s, economic studies on China surged, increased by more than five times over that of the previous decade, indicating a significant increase in China’s global influence. In particular, studies on China’s trade ranked the top and studies on foreign investment also rose in significance. These are consistent with the rising importance of China’s trade and foreign investment for the country’s development, following China’s WTO accession. The emphasis on industry, outpaced that on rural agriculture development, while studies on development, growth, and transition continued to make up a key part of economic research on China. During this decade, studies on stock market entered the top ranks, signaling the importance of the country’s financial market which drew growing attention from academia. This continued in the following decade. Moreover, it seems clear that the importance of reform-related studies declined. Turning into the latest decade, a few characteristics are worth highlighting. First, the number of studies continued to rise rapidly, more than tripled. Second, carbon- and environment-related studies were the most significant area of economic research on China. Third, studies on trade grew faster than overall economic studies on China and those on foreign investment. And fourth, studies on innovation became a top area of studies. In the above, we assessed the changes among economic studies on China with respect to their main research areas since the late 1970s. Two addition points worth mentioning. First, research on industrial development and rural/agriculture issues remain at the central stage throughout the four decades. These suggest that, on the one hand, China’s industries remain essential for the country’s modernization, from its early economic

5 The entering of “modelling” as top ranked keywords supports this argument.

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takeoff to present-day restructuring and upgrading. On the other hand, as China remains a large developing country with a considerable rural population and huge rural–urban gap, studies on rural China still matter greatly. Second, it should be noted that for each of the areas listed, the contents have become much richer and more complex. For example, the term “economic reform” for the 1980s includes only two entries, “economic reform” and “policy reform.” For the 1990s, the same term included additional entries such as “market reform,” “trade reform,” “financial reform,” and “institutional reform.” More were added for the 2000s, such as “fiscal reform,” “housing reform,” “enterprise reform,” and “tax reform.” Another example concerns the term “modelling.” In the 1990s, the term included entries such as “modelling approach,” “simulation model,” “mathematical model,” and “theoretical model.” In the 2000s and 2010s, the number of entries under this term was about 30 and 80, respectively. As we discussed, the key issues under economic study on China have shifted and expanded since the 1980s, very much in line with China’s development experience. Further, we are interested to see if researchers’ attention to the issues has been connected to the government’s policy process, such as the FYPs. Specifically, we ask whether the issues highlighted in the FYPs appeared more frequently in the academic research. The motivations for such an inquiry are two-fold. First, we want to know whether academic research ex ante provide useful foundation ex ante for policy-making or policy assessment ex post. Second, researchers may be interested in conducting policy-related studies which may be useful to apply government research funding and official recognition, especially for China-based scholars. Indeed, the role and the formulation of FYPs have undertaken significant changes since the late 1970s. In the early 2000s, in particular, the government changed the titles of the 11th and future FYPs, from Plan to Program (from 计划 to 规划), indicating their non-compulsory nature. It is also a sign of welcome for non-government players to contribute to the policy-making process. To examine whether academics have indeed placed greater emphasis on topics and issues stressed in government documents in formulating FYPs, we focus on the latest 20 years and divide the 20 years between 2000 and 2020 into four 5-year sub-periods, in accordance with the 10th to 13th FYPs.

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Table 4.3 Main policy issues under economy research on China, based on analysis of keywords 2000–2005 Poverty 13 Carbon Innovation 2 2710

0.4% 0.1%

2006–2010

2011–2015

2016–2020

2021

63 30 50 7,217

62 0.5% 299 2.3% 202 1.6% 12,999

71 0.3% 812 3.4% 361 1.5% 23,616

17 0.4% 217 5.6% 124 3.2% 3,869

0.9% 0.4% 0.7%

In Table 4.3, we selected three selected keywords with important policy relevance and compared their frequency in the four five-year periods and in the first half of 2021. Eradication of absolute poverty was a key policy objective for the Xi leadership. Carbon neutrality and innovation-driven development also top the current government’s policy agenda. It is interesting to observe that there is no significant increase on poverty studies in recent years, in relative terms. This might due to the fact that poverty reduction has also been at the center stage during the Hu-Wen era and various policy measures were already formulated and implemented. Meanwhile, the growing concentration on carbonand innovation-related studies is very obvious and, in the case of carbon studies, rather striking. An important factor is that, in recent years, a significant portion to economic studies on China were carried by researchers affiliated with mainland China stationed institutions. Such studies will likely respond more strongly to important policy matters.

Research Cooperation Across Geographic Regions and Across Disciplines In this section, we further investigate how economic studies on China evolved based on authors’ regional affiliations. In particular, we see how scholars based in advanced countries (such as the US and the European countries) and in China’s neighboring economies (such as Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore) began to take an interest in academic research on China’s economy during the early years after China embarked its reform and opening up in the late 1970s. In addition, a growing number of economic studies on China have also been accompanied with increasing cooperation and exchange among scholars affiliated with institutions across different regions. It is interesting to see, how academic research on

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China’s economy by China-based academics has grown and outshine their overseas counterparts and whether they demonstrate different preferences in topics and issues for their academic endeavor. As China’s economy expanded and modernized, the number and complexity of economic issues under academic inquiries rose rapidly, which have attracted a growing number of researchers from different parts of the world and many different disciplines. Indeed, according to the literature recorded by Scopus, the annual publication of economic studies on China rose from 36 in 1978 to 4992 in 2020. During the three years of 1978 to 1980s, only 91 researchers took part in economic studies on China, among which, 84 researchers have only one related publication. Even the top two authors, Dennis L. Chinn from the Food Research Institute of Stanford University and Hagemann, Ernst from German,6 have only four and three related publications, respectively. In contrast, for the period of 2016–2020, 157 researchers have published ten or more economic studies on China. The top two, Huang, Jikun of Peking University and Chan, Kam of Western Kentucky University, have 49 and 45 publications recorded, respectively. Similar trend exists for institutions. During 1978–1980, only 48 institutions were recorded by Scopus having economic studies on China, among which 39 institutions have only one related publication. The top two, Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv (Hamburg World Economic Archive) and Stanford University, have just four related publications each, respectively. During the period of 2016–2020, over 160 institutions have more than 40 economic studies on China. There are 628 and 590 records for the top two contributors, Peking University and Renmin University, respectively. The number of countries or regions with economic studies on China has also increased, from 9 for the period of 1978–1980 to 134 for the period of 2016–2020. For the entire period of 1978 to 2020, Chinabased scholars are the largest group contributing to the studies (in over 40%), followed by those in the US, the UK, Hong Kong, and Australia. It is important to note that, before 2007, US-based scholars contributed the most to economic studies on China, since then overtaken by China-based scholars with growing gaps between the two.

6 The information of institution affiliation is not available.

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We noticed that, for the period of 1978–1980, although most studies related to Chinese economy still focus more on its history or Mao’s period, some scholars, based in advanced economies such as the NorthAmerican and European countries, were interested in China’s new stage of economic development, shortly after the country embarked on reform and opening up in the late 1970s. For example, the first study recorded by Scopus that discusses China’s economic policy after Mao’s death is a journal paper published in 1978 (the year China started its reform and opening), titled “China’s Economic Policy on a New Course” by Wolfgang Borchardt and Ulrich Dietsch from Germany. It introduces the shifts of China’s economic policy focuses, including the new “Four Modernizations,” the reactivated foreign policy, and the changes in the income system. Morawetz, David (1979) from the Boston University introduced his experience in China during February–March 1978. He admitted the impressive economic progress achieved in China first, while focused more about the negative aspects of and the lessons from China such as the desperate poverty, extremely low productivity, the hidden inequality, etc. Fan and Fan (1980) from the Colorado State University discussed the post-Mao development in China’s schemes in agriculture sector. They argued that China will continue its changes in the incentive structure as it strives for higher productivity. Economists from China’s Asia neighbors also began to conduct studies on China’s economy in the late 1970s. They seem to be keen on understanding China’s new policies, their motivating factors, and the possible impacts. The first Scopus record is an empirical study by John Wong (1980) from Singapore. He analyzed the factors that impacted China’s import of wheat during the period of 1960–1976. The author pointed out that modernization was an important drive of China’s wheat import and would become stronger following China’s relaxation of consumption rationing and other reform measures. Chongwei Ji (1983) and Shigeru Ishikawa (1983) are the first two studies in Scopus that directly focus on China’s opening and reform, respectively. Chongwei Ji (1983) from the Chinese University of Hong Kong discussed China’s new policies related to foreign investment, while Shigru Ishikawa (1983) from the Aoyama Gakuin University in Japan tried to understand the underlying factors of China’s economic system reform. Figure 4.2 shows the share of economic studies on China by authors based in China, four English speaking developed economies (US, UK,

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70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

China

UUAC

Asia5

Fig. 4.2 Contribution to economic research on China, by authors’ geographic affiliations, 1978–2020 (Note The shares of economic studies on China by authors based in China (China), four English speaking developed economies (UUAC) and five of China’s neighboring economies in Asia (Asia5) among all economic studies on China)

Australia, and Canada, short for UUAC hereafter) and five of China’s neighboring economies in Asia (Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, short for Asia5 here after) among all economic studies on China for the period of 1978–2020. We can see that except 2011, for a long period of 1978–2014, researchers from UUAC dominated the economic studies on China recorded by Scopus every year and cumulatively contributed more than 43% of the economic studies on China in this period. Since 2015, China has surpassed UUAC to become the largest contributor every year and the annual share of studies based in China keeps increasing to be more than 60% in 2020. We also find that, in addition to economics, the Scopus subjects involved in economic studies on China increased from 6 for the period of 1978–1980 to 22 for the period of 2016–2020. This indicates that, scholars from other disciplines are interested in economic issues on China and contribute more interdisciplinary studies. However, the disciplines that have more research related to Chinese economic issues change across period. Table 4.4 shows the ranks of disciplines based on their shares

11 9 7

6 10 7

7 8 9 10

1 5 2 8 4

1 5 2 12 3

1 5 3 6 4

2 3 4 5 6

3

86–90

4

81–85

2

78–80

1

78–20

12 8 6

1 4 2 9 5

3

91–95

12 7 8 14

1 5 3 6 4

2

96–00

13 8 10 12

2 5 4 3 6

1

01–05

7 8 9 11

2 4 3 5 6

1

06–20

Rank of disciplines by share of studies in economic studies on China

Business, Management, and Accounting Social Sciences Environmental Science Arts and Humanities Energy Agricultural and Biological Sciences Computer Science Engineering Decision Sciences Biochemistry, Genetics, and Molecular Biology

Subject Area

Table 4.4

4 8 9 10

2 5 3 7 6

1

11–15

8 6 9 10

2 3 4 5 7

1

4 6 10 9

2 3 7 5 8

1

12 8 7 14

2 4 3 6 5

1

11 7 8 14

2 4 3 5 6

1

16–20 China UUAC Asia5 4 THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF ECONOMIC …

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of interdisciplinary studies in economic studies on China for different periods and regions.7 We can see that for the earlier periods of 1980s and 1990s, social science, arts, and humanities were the top two disciplines that had scholars paying attention to China’s economic issues. Since 2001, business, management, and accounting have become the discipline that contributes most to economic studies on China. The ranks of studies from natural science disciplines such as environment science, energy, computer science, and engineering have also moved up significantly. This indicates that quantitative studies and nature science related issues have attracted more attentions in research on Chinese economy. The share ranks of interdisciplinary studies are also different for scholars based in different regions. For example, scholars based in China pay more attention to the nature science related issues such as computer science and engineering, while there are more studies related to Arts and Humanities by authors from UUAC and Asia5. Authors affiliated with institutions outside of China also have more studies related to decision science than those from China. The expansion of studies on China’s economy has also been accompanied with growing exchange among scholars. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the increasing importance of China-based scholars in cooperation with other scholars in conducting economic studies on China. As is shown, researchers based in UUAC and Asia5, when conducting such studies, over 40% of the output have been the results of cooperation with China’s based scholars in recent years, compared to less than 20% before the mid-2000s. On the other hand, China-based scholars have also been active to work jointly with scholars based outside China. As can be seen (Fig. 4.4), in early 2000s, among all economic studies that China-based scholars took part, more than 55% were conducted with collaborators based outside China, a significant increase from less than 30% before the mid-1990s. The share has since declined to less than 50%, possibly due to a significant increase of domestic research positions and researchers since early 2010s,

7 Due to the space limit, we only report disciplines ranked top ten for the period of 1978–2020 in Table 4. The column “China” covers studies by authors from China, but excludes those coauthored with scholars outside of China. The columns “UUAC” and “Asia5” cover studies by authors from UUAC or Asia 5 but exclude those coauthored with China-based scholars.

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60 UUAC

Asia5

40

20

0

Fig. 4.3 Share of Studies on China’s Economy with International Cooperation (A) 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 Econ_CN

Econ

0

Fig. 4.4 Share of Economic Studies with International Cooperation (B) (Note The share of studies coauthored by China-based scholars with scholars outside China in all economic studies (Econ) and in all economic studies on China (Econ_CN). The numbers are of five-year moving averages)

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as well as more domestically oriented research topics and publications. It is interesting to note that a similar trend is observed for economic studies on China, except during the 1980s, when cooperation between China-based and outside-based scholars are more pronounced.

Concluding Discussion China’s development experience in the past four decades has been one of the most remarkable in recent history. As the country’s transformation continues to unfold, much remains to be observed and examined. As we have shown, as China’s economy grew and modernize, economic studies followed closely with the evolving policies and practices. Meanwhile, studies on many important issue are a large number of issues are yet to be resolved, from population aging to income gaps and rising environmental challenges. There have been two tendencies in academic research in recent years. One is to respond promptly and focus closely to government’s policy calls in conducting research. The other is to rely on complicated quantitative research methods and let that drive academic research. While both are useful elements of good research, those alone are probably not sufficient. Studies with a clear understanding of theoretical foundation and solid knowledge on the work of market and institutions remain significant. More importantly, collaboration among scholars from different organization, countries, and disciplines will continue to benefit academic enquiries.

References Adelman, I., Sunding, D., “Economic policy and income distribution in China”, Journal of Comparative Economics 11 (3), September 1987. Borchardt, W., & Dietsch, U. “China’s economic policy on a new course”, Inter Economics 13 (7–8), 1978. Byrd, W.A. “Plan and market in the Chinese economy: A simple general equilibrium model”, Journal of Comparative Economics 13 (2), June 1989. Chinn, D. L., “Team cohesion and collective-labor supply in Chinese agriculture”, Journal of Comparative Economics 3 (4), December 1979. De Wulf, L., “Economic reform in China”, Finance & Development 22 (1), 1985. Dollar, D., “Economic reform and allocative efficiency in China’s state-owned industry”, Economic Development & Cultural Change 39 (1), 1990.

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Ellman, M., “Agricultural productivity under socialism”, World Development 9 (9–10), September 1981/October 1981. Fan, C., & Fan, L., (1980). “Some recent developments in Chinese incentive schemes in agriculture”, Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 28 (2), 1980. Griffin, K., Saith, A., “The pattern of income inequality in rural China”, Oxford Economic Papers 34 (1), March 1982. Ishikawa, S., “China’s economic system reform: Underlying factors and prospects”, World Development 11 (8), 1983. Jefferson, G.H., “Potential sources of productivity growth within Chinese industry”, World Development 17 (1), January 1989. Ji, Chongwei, “China’s utilization of foreign funds and relevant policies”, Chinese Economic Studies 17 (2), 1983. Kamath, S.J., “Foreign direct investment in a centrally planned developing economy: The Chinese case”, Economic Development & Cultural Change 39 (1), 1990. Kravis, I.B., “An approximation of the relative real per capita GDP of the People’s Republic of China”, Journal of Comparative Economics 5 (1), March 1981. Kuan, C., Hongchang, W., Yuxin, Z., Jefferson, G.H., Rawski, T.G., “Productivity change in Chinese industry: 1953–1985”, Journal of Comparative Economics 12 (4), December 1988. Lin, J.Y., “The household responsibility system reform in China: A peasant’s institutional choice”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69 (2), May 1987. Martín-Martín, A., Orduna-Malea, E., Thelwall, M., & Delgado López-Cózar, E., “Google scholar, web of science, and scopus: A systematic comparison of citations in 252 subject categories”, Journal of Informetrics, 12 (4), 2018. Morawetz, D., “Walking on two legs? reflections on a china visit”, World Development 7 (8), 1979. Ng, G.-b., “Incentive policy in Chinese collective agriculture”, Food Policy 4 (2), May 1979. Nolan, P., “De-collectivisation of agriculture in China, 1979–82: A long-term perspective”, Cambridge Journal of Economics 7 (3–4), September 1983. Sit, V.F.S., “The Special Economic Zones of China: A new type of export processing zone?” The Developing Economies 23 (1), March 1985. Tam, O.-K., “Reform of China’s Banking System”, World Economy 9 (4), December 1986. Unger, J., “Collective incentives in the Chinese countryside: Lessons from Chen Village”, World Development, 6 (5), May 1978. Watson, A., “Agriculture looks for ‘shoes that fit’: The production responsibility system and its implications”, World Development 11 (8), August 1983.

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Wong, J., “China’s wheat import programme”, Food Policy 5 (2), 1980. Wong, C.P.W., “The economics of shortage and problems of reform in Chinese industry”, Journal of Comparative Economics 10 (4), December 1986. Wong, C.P.W., “Between plan and market: The role of the local sector in postmao China”, Journal of Comparative Economics 11 (3), September 1987. Wu, J., R Zhang. “The dual pricing system in China’s industry”, Journal of Comparative Economics 11 (3), September 1987.

CHAPTER 5

The Shift of Paradigms in Writing Chinese History Qiang Fang

China is one of the few countries that has maintained a long tradition of recording its history. As early as 841BCE, China rolled out its accurate record of history by year. The scholarly dispute on the birth date of Confucius is no longer which year he was born but rather which month he was born as his birth year is indisputable. In the Eastern Zhou (770– 221BCE), many history books had been compiled or written. Among the earliest and most renowned were the Ancient Book (shangshu) and the Commentary of Zuo (zuozhuan), a chronicle history book that recorded the history of the state of Lu during the Spring and Autumn period (770–476BCE). Since Ban Gu edited the history of the Western Han or Early Han dynasty (206BCE–8CE), successive dynastic governments had retained the tradition of recording the history of the previous dynasty. This tradition lasted until the Republican period (1912–1949). In the late Qing (1644–1911), Western style of history writing had impacted

Q. Fang (B) University of Minnesota Duluth, Duluth, MN, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 S. Hua (ed.), Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8032-8_5

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China along with their military and cultural encroachment. The socalled grand/general history writing had been eroded and replaced by more discursive and specific histories. Moreover, history was no longer dominated by governments as many historians educated in the West or influenced by Western histories started to conduct historical research on topics such as, among others, economy, military, diplomacy, gender, culture, and education, albeit grand history continued to gain traction among some historians. This new trend was temporarily disrupted by the Marxist or Materialistic history writing championed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the era of Mao Zedong (1893–1976). But it was mostly resuscitated after the PRC under Deng Xiaoping reopened China to the West after 1978. In this chapter, I am going to examine the different paradigms in history writing from the earliest period to the present. In general, there are four different paradigms of history writing in Chinese history: traditional history writing, new and evolutionary historiography, Marxist material historiography, and modern and freer historiography.

Traditional History Writing While each dynasty after the Han has compiled official histories, two of them are most famous and influential that will be briefly analyzed in this chapter. The first one is Sima Qian’s Historical Record (shiji) and the other one is Sima Guang’s Comprehensive Mirror in Assisting Governance (zizhi tongjian). Sima Qian lived in the Western Han dynasty whose father was also a historian. In 99BCE, when general Li Ling surrendered to the Huns after his army was exhausted and perished, Han Wudi (r.140– 87BCE) was angry because Li did not commit suicide. When Wudi asked Sima Qian for his comments, Sima Qian frankly praised Li Ling as both a filial son and a brave soldier. Li surrendered only because his army was outnumbered and there was no arrow left but not because he was a coward and did not fight. Wudi accused Sima Qian of telling a lie and had him castrated, one of the few corporal punishments left at this time (Sima 2010: 716–17). Having suffered the humiliating penalty, Sima Qian made decision to write the Historical Record (Sima 1982: Ch. 130),which was, in the words of Liang Qichao, one of the crucial figures in the 1898 reform and a prominent scholar in the late Qing, a book of exquisite writing that “no subsequent official history is able to surpass.” Sima Qian

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was also lavishly lauded as the first real historian in China who was peerless in the following 2000 years (Liang 1928: 27). The Historical Record covered a history of around 2000 years from semi-legendary rulers such as Yao and Shun to the era of Han Wudi. Sima Qian divided his book into several parts including biographies of twelve rulers, thirty kings and high-ranking officials, and seventy officials, generals, or others. To show his respect to Confucius, Sima Qian entailed the biography of Confucius into the category of “dukes or senior officials.” In many ways and styles, the Historical Record served as the model for future official histories. For example, the biographies of rulers, generals, and officials had been preserved in almost all official histories. More important, unlike Liang Qichao’s criticism that the China’s traditional history writings only focused on the royal families (Li 2013: 33), Sima Qian did record the histories of neighboring countries, the economy and businessmen, and the law, rites, calendar, and music (Sima 1982: Ch. 130). In the early twentieth century, Zhang Taiyan, a fringe activist against the Qing who was imprisoned in the notorious case of Subao in 1903, chided Liang Qichao and others who had dismissed China’s official histories as “a mere family record for royal families.” Zhang argued that histories such as the Spring and Autumn Annals, the Historical Record, and the History of the Han Dynasty were all but the family records of royal families. The scholarship, articles, customs, and politics of these histories could all be verified (Zhang 2014: 122). Another famed historian is Sima Guang who was both a famed historian and a conservative minister in the Northern Song dynasty (960–1127) (Kuhn 2011: 54). In 1066, Song Yingzong (r.1063–1067) created an office for Sima Guang to compile a history. In about nineteen years, Sima Guang finally completed the Comprehensive Mirror in Assisting Governance, which chronologically covered a range of period from 403BCE to 959CE in 296 volumes. The primary aim of this great historical book was, unlike Sima Qian’s Historical Record, to provide rulers with the successes and failures in history in hopes of preventing rulers from making similar mistakes in the past. In addition, Sima Guang offered 118 comments to give his personal views on specific policies, rulers, and decisions. At the very beginning of the book, Sima Guang started from Zhou Weiwang’s order in 403BCE to appoint three usurpers of state Jin to be dukes. For Sima Guang, this order not only manifested the weakness of the Zhou court, but, more adversely, set off a precedent that usurpers would be encouraged rather than punished. Sima Guang

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argued that rite or order was more important than ruler, but it was overshadowed by fen (分) and ming (名) (hierarchy). Sima Guang ascribed the fall and demise of the Zhou dynasty to Zhou’s own destruction of the rites and order. Throughout the multi-volume book, Sima Guang consistently stressed the importance of hierarchical order and denounced usurpers and any deeds against the political order and rites (Sima 2010: 1–5). To alarm future rulers, Sima Guang also was critical of past rulers who had made risky and false policies leading to devastating results on the nation. Han Wudi was a capable ruler in the Han. During his long reign (53 years), Wudi had defended the Han dynasty against invasions and harassments from the Huns in the north and paved the way for the eventual split and escape of the Huns. Ban Gu, the author of the History of the (Western) Han, acclaimed Wudi as a ruler of “great ambition and ability” who had from the beginning of his reign singled out Confucianism as the dominant learning, revised rituals, decided calendar, respected hundreds of gods, and the like. Yet, Sima Guang criticized Wudi for his aggressive, wasteful, and headstrong policies. “Wudi possessed excessive desires, imposed numerous punishments and heavy taxes.” Sima Guang wrote, “[Wudi] built gorgeous palaces, fought wars against barbarian minorities, was enamored of spirits and gods, and traveled frequently. All of that had exhausted the commoners and compelled them to become robbers and thieves.” In Sima Guang’s words, Wudi was no different from Qinshihuang, the brutal and notorious unifier of China in 221BCE (Sima 2010: 747). Aside from the lack of reference, a universal issue among all China’s historical writings including Sima Guang’s book, the Comprehensive Mirror in Assisting Governance was, as many late Qing scholars had lashed out, centered mostly on the rises and falls of royal families, high-ranking ministers, and powerful generals. If the Historical Record contains at least a modicum of cultural, economic, and social history, Sima Guang’s book does not mention them at all. We cannot fault Sima Guang for his deliberate omission because his purpose of compiling the book was to help future rulers and ministers better govern their states and avert similar mistakes made by their predecessors.

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New and Evolutionary Historiography In its final years, the Qing dynasty reeled from a series of external and internal challenges. Two of the fatal blows to the aging dynasty were its devastating defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and the invasion of the Eight-Power Alliance in 1900. The Qing court was forced to pay an outsize number of indemnities totaling over one billion Chinese silver dollars. In the wake of national disasters and humiliations, many scholars and reformers called into question the fundamental problems in, inter alia, Chinese culture, civil service examination, military, politics, and law. In 1901, the Empress Dowager Cixi herself issued an order on her way back to Beijing, the capital she had to flee several months ago, that China needed to learn the “essence” of the West and not merely its “hair and skin” (Dreyer 2017: 56). Cixi’s edict unfolded the last-ditch reforms in the late Qing. While these reforms that to some extent one of the most comprehensive and thorough reforms in Chinese history failed to save the dynasty, they nonetheless laid the foundations for legal and political reforms in the Republic of China. Some fruits of the reforms in China’s law and judicial systems have been revived in China’s post-1978 reform (Li and Fang 2013: Intro.). From Guo Songtao to Zheng Guanying and Liang Qichao, a motley crew of reform-minded scholars, businessmen, and officials in the late Qing had perceived the relatively more advanced culture and political institutions of the West. They called for urgent political and cultural reforms of the late Qing lest China would be lagged further behind if it did not act as soon as possible (Wagner 1999). In 1902, Liang Qichao who had been in exile after the failed 1898 reform became the firebrand in reforming history writing. In his book entitled New Historiography (xinshixue), Liang chastised traditional history writing and pinpointed several of its shortcomings. “From Sima Qian to…Zhao Oubei, there are no fewer than 100 renowned historians. History writing has developed for over 2000 years.” Liang wrote, “However, all of them…are the same and I have yet to hear any historian who has opened up a new frontier in historiography.” The first shortcoming of traditional history writing was its focus on dynastic courts but not states. All the twenty-four official histories were nothing than a record of royal families. Even though Sima Guang was a capable historian, his book was simply written for the rulers alone. All of Sima Guang’s comments were aimed to advise rulers. “It is because

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all histories [in Chinese history] have been written for rulers and ministers. None of them is written for the commoners.” Second, Liang blamed traditional historiography for their focus on “person (geren, i.e. ruler)” and not on “group (qunti, i.e. people).” For historians in the past, history was a stage on which only heroes played. If a person was not a hero, no historian would write history for him. “While there were many historians,” Liang argued, “I have not heard that any of them has paid attention to the history of the development of a group of homogenous people.” In addition, Liang pointed out that traditional history writing failed to touch any current affairs. In Liang’s words, it was wrong for historians only write epitaphs for dead people or compose dramas for some stories in history. In stark contrast to their Chinese counterparts, Western historians tended to focus on current history. A critical problem in China was that historians were not allowed to write the history of a contemporary dynasty unless it was replaced or overthrown by a new dynasty. Finally, Liang claimed that China’s history writing knew only facts but not “ideal.” It was because traditional histories merely recorded the daily facts of certain days but not the causes and outcomes of these facts. Despite myriad volumes of histories in China, all of them were tantamount to the “lifeless wooden images in a wax work museum.” Liang went on to assert that the above four shortcomings would give rise to two “diseases.” One was that Chinese history writing did more on trivial narratives but less on useful folk customs and other ordinary histories. The other “disease” was the paucity of creation in Chinese history writing. Throughout Chinese history, only about six historians such as Sima Qian and Sima Guang had made creative contributions to history writing. Moreover, in thousands of years, many Chinese just knew political history and nothing about literary history, business history, or religious history. Seeing the weakness of China and its insipid nationalism, Liang was eager to reform China’s history writing and transform it into a weapon to inspire his countrymen and invigorate nationalism. “Today if we want to promote nationalism and make it possible for our 400 million nationals to stand in a world only the strongest can survive,” Liang warned, “our own national history should be read by people from all walks of life, all ages…But among the tens of thousands of volumes of existing histories, there is almost no one that fits our need.” Accordingly, Liang called for the creation of a new historiography, the evolutionary historiography

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(jinhua shixue), so to speak. Liang argued that the nature of human history should be evolutionary, which differed from natural learnings such as astronomy, physics, and geography that were certain and static. Liang criticized Mencius’s claim that all political entities were cyclic between good governance and chaotic governance. Instead, Liang remarked that human history should evolute in accordance with Confucius’ theory of “three worlds” (upheaval, turning to peace, and peaceful world). In addition to political evolution, history was also the evolution of human because, in comparison with ancient human, todays’ human knew much more than Confucius and Plato, albeit their intelligence was similar. Traditional history writing in China concentrated too much on the biography of certain famous persons and spilled little ink on the history of groups. As a result, Chinese readers were able to know the histories of rulers and ministers but not the evolutionary history of Chinese as a group. Liang encouraged new historiography to pay more attention to the evolutionary history of the world and the relations between history and other scholarships such as geography, geology, anthropology, religion, law, and the like (Liang 1902). In his last years, Liang Qichao continued to promote his new historiography. In 1928, Liang published one of his important books on history research entitled The Methodology of Chinese History Research (zhongguo lishi yanjiufa). From the outset, Liang noted that the progress of historiography contained two characteristics: objective collection of historical sources (keguande shiliao zhengli) and revolution of subjective notion (zhuguande guannian gexin). The former needed to stress that historical sources in the past should be reevaluated so that history would be based on “authentic” sources. The latter was largely a repeat of Liang’s 1902 censure of China’s traditional historiography that centered on heroes and royal families. He wanted new history writing to help readers become citizens through comprehending the meaning of group life in China. Liang praised Western historiography for following the above two directions in the past 100 years. If Chinese historians could not sort out the voluminous sources, these sources would simply become useless debris. If they could, the sources would be a gold mine. Any historian studied just a tiny part of that mine would suffice to make him famous. Dissatisfied with Sima Guang’s book that only noticed rulers and ministers, Liang suggested that China needed a “Comprehensive Mirror in Assisting Governance” for citizens or humans and nor for rulers. “Who are today’s history readers?” Liang asked, “As democracy has become

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the basis for China, every Chinese stands as both a citizen of China and a person of mankind. What today’s history needs is ‘Comprehensive Mirror in Assisting Governance for citizens.’” The goal of historians was to “assist citizen to find out the intimate interactions between modern life and the past and future.” Unlike traditional historians that focused mostly on rulers, Liang urged contemporary historians to consider historical topics such as Chinese nation, language, philosophy, literature, music, art, science, and their value (Liang 1928: 1–8). It is clear that Liang Qichao’s advocation of a new historiography was tremendously influenced by Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory and even the omnipresent Social Darwinism backed and empowered by many Western and Japanese imperialists. A key argument of the Social Darwinism is “survival the fittest.” Few contemporaries in China knew more than Liang about the impact of imperialism that grated in the Qing dynasty in its final days. Liang displayed no shy from admitting the impact of Social Darwinism on him. Liang believed that China had to move forward, otherwise, it would be outperformed by other countries. In his book entitled Historical Research and Other Things (yanjiu lishi jiqita), Liang demonstrated his strong awareness of Social Darwinism while expressed pity for Qing’s loss of Taiwan, Vietnam, and Korea to Japan and France. “National expansion is the best thing to be celebrated as it can prove that our nation is still in its youth and not adulthood.” Liang stated, “among the tragic things in the past 50 years are Taiwan, Korea, and Vietnam…oversea colonies have also suffered setback. We should know that while our nation is moving forward, other nations will also be moving forward. If we do not take new efforts, I am afraid that [China] will go backwards and will not have any chance to expand.” Liang acknowledged the progress China had made in the past 50 years. Yet, he encouraged people to compare China’s progress with that of the world powers such as Japan, Germany, and Russia. All of them had advanced far ahead of China. Even relatively older powers such as the Great Britain and France were also running fast. “Has the Chinese scientific circle made one or two world-class inventions in the past 50 years? Have Chinese press published one or two world-class books in the past 50 years?” Liang asked. For Liang, the only realm that had witnessed the biggest evolution in the past 50 years was politics because China had established the first republic in Asia (Liang 1966: 234–40). There is no denying that Liang Qichao was the first scholar in modern China who publicly chanted the slogan of “new historiography.” His

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ideas, however, mostly echoed the views of others in both China and Japan. His theory of “evolutionary historiography” was in part affected by Yan Fu, one of the prominent reform-minded scholars in the late Qing to “open their eyes” to the outside world. Deeply stunned by China’s lost in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Yan Fu translated Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics and propagated the idea of “survival of the fittest.” Yan Fu asserted that the most convincing learning of the West was natural competition as “Survival of the fittest and natural selection are the common words for every person [in the West].” In 1902, the same year that Liang Qichao published his New Historiography, Yan Fu wrote to a newspaper against conservative view that the past was better than today. On the contrary, Yan Fu supported the Western view that “the past cannot match today as the world is moving forward every day.” Twenty years senior to Liang Qichao and a famed translator, Yan Fu’s evolutionary theory would undoubtedly have had immense impact on Liang. As Dong Genming points out, the nature of Liang Qichao’s New Historiography accommodated to the needs of the contemporary national rescue consciousness in China, which was in line with Yan Fu’s evolutionary thought (Dong 2014: 98, 101). Some scholars argue that Liang Qichao’s New Historiography originated from Japanese thinker Yukichi Fukuzawa and other Japanese scholars when he stayed in Japan after the 1898 reform. According to Wang Qingjia, as early as 1875, almost 30 years prior to Liang Qichao’s New Historiography, Fukuzawa published a book entitled A Brief Comment on the History of Civilization (wenmingshi gailun) in which he stated that Western civilization had since the Reformation continued to develop and accordingly should be the “real civilization.” Whereas the Oriental Civilization entailing Japan and China was merely the “quasi-civilization” that was better than the “barbarous (yeman)” civilizations in both Africa and Latin America. The key difference between a “quasi-civilization” and a “real civilization” was whether its people were “indulged” in old habits or were constantly exploring, creating, and advancing. The attainment of a “real civilization” was not the duty of a few people or sages but rather of the whole nation where everyone had to be involved. Instead of resisting the West, Fukuzawa emphasized the significance in learning Western civilization. He was confident that Japan could one day surpass the West if it continued to move forward. Applying the evolutionary theory into historiography, Fukuzawa lambasted the traditional “moral historiography (daode shixue)” in China and Japan.

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For him, the so-called moral historiography stressed too much on the rise and fall of dynasties and the high and low moral standard of rulers, which were out of step with social progress and civilization. In turn, historians should amplify their scope and study the development of the entire society, people’s intelligence, and economy. Like Fukuzawa, Liang Qichao discussed evolutionary historiography in The Scope of Historiography (shixue zhijieshuo). Liang referred to three features of evolutionary historiography. First, history should target the evolution of everything in the world; second, history should describe the evolution of human groups; third, history should probe into the common principles and examples of human evolution. All of the three arguments were “in line with Fukuzawa’s analyses in A Brief Comment on the History of Civilization.” Wang Qingjia remarks that both Fukuzawa and Liang Qichao had noticed the necessity of pivoting the existing historical perception in their respective countries and had championed a revolution in historiography (Wang 2003). To be sure, while Liang Qichao was believed to be the first scholar calling for a new historiography in the late Qing, he was not the only one who held such thoughts. Similar arguments have also been made by other well-known scholars. I have mentioned that Yan Fu was impacted by Western evolutionary historiography. Zhang Taiyan, a staunch anti-Qing revolutionary and scholar, also expressed strong endorsement of new history writing and evolutionary historiography. In his article “A Short Example of Chinese History (zhongguo tongshi lueli),” Zhang was critical of China’s traditional history writing. Zhang wrote that even though China had since the Qin dynasty (221–206BCE) had countless history works, there were limited history about the social and political evolution and development. Unlike Western histories that spilt history into different periods, Chinese histories centered on biographies and specific issues. The significance of history was to “know the evolutionary trajectory from the past to the present.” Zhang also pointed out that most traditional history books in China paid much more attention to political institutions and the changes of personnel than to social prosperity and failure as well as political strength and weakness (Zhang 2002: 273–74). Zhang supported Liang Qichao’s slogan of a new historiography but not his wholesale dismissal and rebuttal of China’s traditional history writing. For Zhang, it was true that the traditional history writing in China had many problems especially its incongruity with the modern

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world. Zhang retained faith in some of the histories such as Confucius’ Spring and Autumn Annals and Sima Qian’s Historical Record whose scholarship, articles, customs, and politics were not at all “records of royal families” as Liang asserted. Moreover, Zhang trumpeted “historical nationalism” vis-à-vis Liang’s “nationalist historiography.” Zhang asserted that “historical nationalism” had to be based on Chinese and not Western traditional history. Whether a nationalism fit China had better be decided by Chinese history and not the “universal principles or regulations” created by the West. Although both Zhang and Liang emphasized the importance on history in China’s national revival, Zhang’s history, which stuck to China’s traditional history, was in sharp contrast to that of Liang that was in favor of a new Western historiography (Zhang 2014: 122–27). Wang Qingjia also argues that Zhang Taiyan, like Liang Qichao, found Fukuzawa’s “civilized historiography” more intriguing than China’s traditional “moral historiography.” This was because the former adopted theories and methodologies from sociology whose ultimate goal was to explore historical evolution. In 1902, Zhang Taiyan translated a Japanese sociology book that was parallel to Liang Qichao’s new historiography. But Zhang Taiyan did not want to “jettison the format of China’s official histories” (Wang 2003: 231). In that regard, Zhang was culturally more conservative than Liang, even if Zhang, in terms of politics, tended to be more radical as he was an ardent supporter of a political revolution against the Qing. Probably the most influential legacy of Zhang Taiyan’s views on history writing is his support of grand or general history. He argued that “civilized historiography” should transcend the traditional perimeter of biological and chronological format by employing the format of “grand history (tongshi)” to display and interpret the historical process of evolution. “If today’s history simply focuses on one dynasty, it will be difficult to discover new reason. Nor will it conduct detailed investigation.” Zhang wrote, “The only way is to write a grand history of the entire historical period that stresses law and biographies but does not have to comment on historical figures. In so doing, many scholarships from psychology to religion can be included” (Zhang 2002: 273). The impact of Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan on modern China historiography was tremendous. Many historians had not only commended their views on new historiography but also adapted them in writing history. If republican historians such as Zhou Gucheng and

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Zhou Yutong had not evidently made Liang’s “new historiography” the beginning of modern Chinese historiography, later Hong Kong historians such as Huang Jinxing and Wang Fansen have conspicuously declared that Liang’s “new historiography” was the manifesto of modern Chinese historiography. Historians in mainland China held a conference in 2002 to commemorate the 100th anniversary of Liang’s new historiography, which further testified the importance of Liang Qichao’s stance in modern China’s history writing (Wang 2003: 193). In addition, Liang Qichao’s call for more histories on social, religious, and literature rather than politics and Zhang Taiyan’s emphasis on grand history writing also resonated among historians in the Republican period and beyond. Many historians such as Yang Honglie and Zhou Gucheng spent their time on grand history. For example, Yang Honglie in 1936 published a book entitled History of Chinese Legal Thought (zhongguo falu sixiangshi) which entailed a relatively comprehensive and evolutionary review of Chinese legal thought from the Shang and Zhou dynasties to the late Qing when Chinese law experienced a major transformation due to the influence of Western law (Yang 1936). Three years after Yang Honglie’s book on Chinese legal history, Zhou Gucheng completed his book entitled A general History of China (zhongguo tongshi) that spanned from the primitive period to the modern time (Zhou 1939). Lü Simian, a history professor at Guanghua University in the 1930s (Yeh 2000: 84–5),1 may be one of the Republican historians who had conspicuously acknowledged the influence of Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan’s views on new history writing. The first part of Lü’s book on Chinese history was published in 1940 and the second part was published in 1945. In the first part, Lü, as Liang Qichao suggested, centered on a range of topical history of China from, among others, culture, ethnicity, official system to money, economy, law, and education. The second part was mostly chronological that addressed issues from the origins of the Chinese nation to the dynasties and ended in the Republic of China. In Introduction, Lü echoed Liang’s criticism in arguing that traditional Chinese histories emphasized too much on political and military history. He questioned recent scholars’ claims (i.e., Liang Qichao) that all official histories in China were “records of royal families” and believed such 1 Guanghua University was founded partly by patriotic professors and students who were dissatisfied with the passive response from the elite St. John’s University in the 1925 incident in which a Chinese worker was killed by Japanese.

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comments went a little too far. Yet Lü mostly sided with Liang’s rebuttal of traditional history writings. The reason why official histories in the past inclined to focus on politics and rulers was that politics easily became the center of a state and people including historians considered nothing but politics. In fact, Lü remarked that politics was just the surface, which was based on society. Without first comprehending society, a person would not have understood politics. Therefore, today’s historians paid attention to both politics and culture. Lü then described the importance of evolutionary historiography advocated by both Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan about 40 years ago. “While the formation of our body is similar to that of barbarians [living in the primitive era],” Lü said, “their respective methods of reining in environment are quite different. It is because one of them is biological evolution and the other is cultural evolution…It is evident that human evolution is completely cultural evolution.” Thus, Lü argued that history should focus on cultural evolution because “almost all human activities are interconnected with culture.” That is why the first part of Lü’s book of Chinese history contributed entirely to cultural history (Lü 1992: 2–4). Indeed, as I will discuss below, many so-called Marist historians in the Republican and PRC periods continued to focus on grand and topical histories, albeit via different politically charged ideologies.

Marxist Material Historiography Shortly after the Russian October Revolution in 1917, Marxism and Leninism were introduced to China. The CCP claims that early Communist leaders such as Li Dazhao had embraced Marxism as early as 1919, the year he published his article “My View of Marxism (wode makesi zhuyiguan),” which, in the words of Patrick Shan, was “a milestone to mark his self-conversion into communism” (Shan 2020: 15). Historian Arif Dirlik argues that top GMD (aka. KMT) leaders including Hu Hanmin and Dai Jitao were actually among the earliest and most knowledgeable Marxists in China. After the CCP and the GMD split in 1927, Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD imposed draconian repression against communists and labor unions. The influence of Marxism in China, however, witnessed a surge rather than a slump due to the mounting interest among young and radical intellectuals as evidenced in the rising leftist publications in the 1930s (Dirlik 1989: 30). Enamored of Marxism, many young and communist-leaning historians began adopting Marxist

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theories such as “historical materialism” and “class theory” in history writing. One of the most prominent radical historians was Guo Moruo, an expert of ancient Chinese language and a famous writer. In 1929, Guo Moruo applied Marxist theories to his first book on Chinese history. At the outset of his book, Guo, not dissimilar from Liang Qichao almost three decades ago, scoffed contemporary historians and scholars for their ignorance and myopia of Chinese society and history. “Chinese society has been fixed by feudalism for over 2000 years, all Chinese social history sources especially those of periods prior to feudalism, have mostly been flouted and distorted by hired scribbler (yuyong xuezhe).” Guo wrote, “Having been trained under feudalism for over 2000 years, all of our eyes have become nearsighted. Some are even obviously suffering cataract.” Those scholars who had already been “blind” could no longer be cured. But scholars who were nearsighted, as Guo suggested, could still be treated by modern and scientific means as early as possible. Guo criticized Hu Shi, one of the most famous scholars and advocators in the New Cultural Movement, for his book entitled A Guideline of Chinese Philosophical History (zhongguo zhexueshi dagang ). While Hu Shi’s book has “dominated the new scholarship” in China, it was completely irrelevant to the real conditions of ancient China. “If the origin of society is not clear,” Guo argued, “then talking about the start of thought will be improbable.” Guo frankly admitted that his book was influenced by Frederich Engels’ book on the origin of state. Unlike Engels’ book that only examined American Indians, ancient Greece, and Roman empire, Guo’s book would cover China, which had not mentioned by Engels. Guo continued to mock his peers and reminded them that it was more important to read books of Marx and Engels than books of Qing scholars such as Dai Dongyuan and Zhang Xuecheng. “Without a concept of material dialectic (weiwu bianzhengfa),” Guo wrote, “I cannot even chat with you about ‘national history (guogu)’.” Strictly adapting Marxist “class theory” to his book on ancient China, Guo Moruo asserted that China in its early years had experienced “a slavery society.” “In the beginning of a nation, there was a pure slavery system.” Guo said. The source of slaves came from conquered alien nations or the weak in the same nation. There were only two “classes” in China: nobles and salves. Slaves belonged to nobles and nobles were the dominant and exploitative class. With the advent of iron, there came a second social reform as many enterprises were controlled by slaveholders.

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The society gradually transformed into feudalism in which the class struggles turned from between slaves and nobles to between landlords and peasants. Feudal lords replaced nobles as the new rulers. Feudal society and slavery society were basically the same. Peasants in a feudal society were de facto slaves, though slavery system was the vestige of clan society (shizu shehui). Since the invention of the steam engine in the late eighteenth century, industry arrived in a new stage: mass production. As a result of the concentration of big capitals and overseas discovery, capitalism grew out of feudal society, which eventually smashed feudalism and gave birth to capitalist system. In a capitalist society, class struggle was between bourgeois and labors. Invoking Marxist views of “scientific socialism,” Guo went on to argue that all societies advanced, and no society had anything that was unchangeable. Social science should be able to predict the process of future society (Guo 1929: 1–7). Ultimately, the proletarians what Marx once referred to as the last class that would overthrow the bourgeois and “swept away the conditions for the existence of class and antagonism…and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class” (Marx 1848). To justify his newly learned Marxist theory, Guo made many claims that had later been disputed by historians as European models that might not be compatible with Chinese history. For example, Guo argued that the agriculture in the Zhou dynasty developed swiftly after iron was discovered, which paved the way for the dynasty to create a brand-new society: slavery. Guo also interpreted the terms of “gentlemen (junzi)” and “small-minded men (xiaoren)” in ancient Chinese books as “noble” and “slave” in the Zhou era (Guo 1929: 15). Such a claim may be farfetched as “gentlemen” was, according to the Book of Songs, Confucius, and Sima Guang, normally referred to men with lofty morality (Du 2011; Sheng 2005: 1–2; Sima 2010: Vol 1).2 Additionally, Guo made a bold and problematic comparison between Western Zhou (ca. 1046–771BCE) and ancient Greece and Roman empire. He argued that Western Zhou and its European counterparts

2 In Analects, gentlemen for Confucius were the exemplar for his disciples who had

good morality and deeds and loved to study, but gentlemen did not have to be noble or powerful people. In the Book of Songs, gentlemen were also men with good morality; also, in the first volume of his book, Sima Guang divided people into four categories and gentlemen were whose “virtue surpasses their capability” in contrast to small-minded men whose “capability surpasses their virtue.”

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were all “sheer (chuncuide)” slavery system. The “heyday” of China’s slavery was in the reign of Zhou Muwang (ca. 992–922BCE) because he initiated an institution of using money to atone corporal punishment. In other words, Guo claimed, the atonement system “signified a liberation of slavery.” Another questionable statement made by Guo was his perceiving the plebian rebellion in 842 BCE that toppled Zhou Liwang (ca. 890–828BCE), a cruel and ruthless ruler, as a political revolution whose intensity and significance were not inferior to that of the Paris riots in 1871 or the Russian revolution in 1917. The plebian rebellion eroded the slavery system and the power of the Zhou rulers. In the Eastern Zhou (770–256BCE), China gradually turned from slavery to “authentic” feudalism that lasted until the end of the Qing dynasty. Guo’s rationale was that China in Eastern Zhou had started to see the class struggle between landlords and peasants, a typical Marxist view of interpreting human history. But this view may have neglected the disparities or individual features between China and European history on which Marx’s class theory was based. During China’s long feudal period, despite numerous “peasant revolutions” began with Chen Sheng in the late Qin, Guo noted that all of them had been duped by crooked rebel leaders who became the “new dominant class.” “Therefore,” Guo wrote, “while all China’s twenty-four official histories have become a tragic history for bloody revolutions, the feudal economic and political structure remain intact.” A critical reason behind that was a missing discovery of steam engine or, in other words, modern capitalism. As a young Communist, Guo condemned “foreign devils (yangguizi, Westerners)” who bombarded China with “capitalist cannons.” Consequently, Guo stated, “Chinese society that had been hardened for thousands of years finally was shaken. The ‘sleeping lion’ called by Napoleon had become a fat pig to be slaughtered by thousands of [Western] people.” Guo Moruo also expressed views that clearly bore heavy influence of Russian Communist leader Vladimir Lenin. Guo stated that, after the Republic of China was established in 1912, Chinese bourgeois class seemed to have experienced a tectonic political shift from emperor to president. However, the world capitalism, according to Lenin’s premature conclusion in his 1916 book entitled Imperialism is the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Lenin 1916), had reached its highest stage and become a “moribund capitalism” because imperialism had already transformed capitalism from national form into international form. Previous social

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revolution that naturally developed had become the last-stage world revolution. Hence, Guo asserted, “no matter how hard Chinese bourgeois have tried to catch up, the capitalist imperialism would reduce more than 90% of the nationals to proletarians before they (i.e. Chinese bourgeois) could develop their industry” (Guo 1929: 18–21). This is exactly what Lenin argued about 10 years ago that the “enormous growth of industry and the remarkably rapid concentration of production in ever-larger enterprises” would make it easier for proletarians to destroy capitalism (Lenin 1916; Li 2016). Guo Moruo’s interpretation of ancient China with Marxist theories quickly drew criticism from other historians. Some of them charged Guo with “mechanical or rigid” application of Marxist theories into China. Marx himself had not determined that his theories could be applied to all societies and had not said clearly that his theory of “five sequential historical stages (i.e., slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, communism)” had to be followed universally. Yet, Guo Moruo assumed that all societal development should clinch the Marxist theory. Others specifically raised eyebrows over Guo’s assertion on slavery in the Western Zhou without a lucid definition of slavery. One historian noted that the presence of slaves did not mean the existence of slavery production method. Moreover, Guo failed to provide sufficient evidence to show the existence of slavery through the relations of gender. Historians like Li Ji also criticized Guo for his dearth of archeological evidence to study ancient China. The number of excavated oracles and bronze wares was limited, and they were wondering how Guo could draw his conclusion that the Shang dynasty only had copper wares and not iron wares. One contemporary observer even argued that Guo Moruo’s understanding of Marxism was quite tangential as he improperly employed social science in his analysis of traditional research (Dirlik 1989: 128–33). No matter what questions critics have raised, Guo Moruo to the CCP has been a loyal and productive Marxist scholar and historian. Cai Zongjun, a PRC write, praises Guo Moruo as a Marxist scholar. “Since the Northern Expedition (in 1926), Guo Moruo had made Marxism his credo and increasingly developed an interest in studying Marxism, Leninism, and social science.” Cai states, “In the long revolutionary path, Guo Moruo had used Marxism and Mao Zedong thought as the lighthouse and continued to attentively study them. In his later years, Guo still told people that ‘he is not too old to stop study’” (Cai 1985: 41).

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Although Guo Moruo’s book on ancient China has been regarded as the first Marxist history book in modern China, Fan Wenlan and his book entitled A Brief Edition of the General History of China (zhongguo tongshi jianbian) had a more important standing among Marxist histories and was hailed as the “first Chinese history book guided by Marxist views” (Cai 2000: 1–11). As Huaiyin Li writes, Fan Wenlan “stood out for his writing, which had a profound impact on Chinese historiography during and after the communist revolution,” though Fan’s work was “neither the earliest nor the most solid Marxist analysis of modern Chinese history in China” (Li 2013: 74, 88). Graduated from Peking University in 1917, Fan Wenlan joined the CCP in 1926, one year before the GMD crackdown. He became an instructor at Peking University in 1928 until the eruption of the SinoJapanese War. He went to Yan’an, the capital of the CCP, in 1939 and was appointed as the head of the history research unit at the Academia Sinica (zhongyang yanjiuyuan) where he completed his book on Chinese history. The motive for Fan to write the history was the urge from CCP leader Mao Zedong. Prior to Fan, Zhang Wentian and Li Dingshen had drafted their history of China and, according to Huaiyin Li, both Zhang and Li “were adept at using Marxism” and their “interpretations of modern Chinese history were closer than Fan’s to the orthodox Marxist views of the Comintern.” The reason underlying Fan’s more dominance in Marxist history was the result of political infighting within the CCP. In May 1941, Mao complained that both Zhang and Li’s works on Chinese history did not have organized historical research. Therefore, many Party members were still “in a fog about Chinese history, whether of the last hundred years or of ancient times” (Li 2013: 99). Like Huaiyin Li, Cai Meibiao remarks that the CCP in 1941 was kicking off a rectification campaign to eliminate “leftist” influence in the Party. Mao urged Party members to pay attention to China’s revolutionary practice and reality rather than to the revolutional histories in Russia or other countries (Fan 1999: 3). Amid his power struggle with Wang Ming, a Soviet-trained CCP member backed by Comintern, Mao had little mood in reading modern Chinese history focusing on the Comintern and Soviet influence (Guo 2014). Mao then turned to Fan Wenlan and encouraged him to write a book on Chinese history that could be read by CCP cadres. In the words of Fan himself, the book was “an attempt to use Marxist views and methodologies to write [Chinese] history.” Fan highlighted the different features of his book from others such as the toilers were the master of history, China

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had a long feudal history, and class struggles centering on the suppression of toilers by the corrupt and brutal ruling classes (Fan 1999: 4). Many of the features in Fan’s book seem synonymous to Guo Moruo’s pioneer Marxist book. Mao’s trust of Fan continued until Fan’s death in 1969. Even during the height of the turbulent Cultural Revolution when thousands of scholars had been denounced, tortured, and even killed (Fang 2021: Ch. 7; Yan 1987; MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006; Esherick et al. 2006; Clark 2008; Wu 2014; Walder 2006), Mao sent one of his daughters to see Fan in July 1968 and pass a message encouraging him to continue his history work (Li 2013: 104). In his introduction, Fan conceded with Liang Qichao and Guo Moruo that simply reading the twenty-four official histories and Sima Guang’s Comprehensive Mirror in Assisting Governance was not going to be productive and effective because these books were not only too voluminous to read but also too repetitious on activities of emperors, local tyrannies, and ministers to care about the life experience of the masses. Apparently influenced by Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan’s evolutionary historiography, Fan accused traditional history works of ignoring or distorting China’s development. He argued that his book would explore how Chinese society advance and through what course. In contrast to Guo Moruo, Fan traced Chinese history to the era prior to the Xia dynasty, a legendary period with little tangible archeological evidence (Xinhuanet, November 30, 2019; Xinwen zhoukan, March 21, 2021).3 Fan claimed that from the legendary Yellow Emperor to Da Yu, the founding father of the Xia dynasty, belonged to what Marx called a primitive society or the earliest form of human society (Wang 2019). Fan then wrote that the era of Da Yu was a watershed of class society: There was no class and exploitation before Da Yu and all properties belonged to the public. But after Da Yu, properties became privately owned and rulers would be succeeded by rulers’ heir. In the Xia dynasty, Fan, with no archeological evidence to support, tended to be hypothetical as he argued that “there seemed to have struggles between slaves and slaveholders.”

3 Chinese government has invested millions of yuan to discover the Xia dynasty. Some scholars believe that Erlitou may be the site of Xia, but others remain suspicious of it. In March 2021, Sichuan discovered many artifacts buried 3000 years ago such as a gold stick and bronze tree that were similar to things found in ancient Egypt. Some scholar argue that earliest Chinese may have come from Egypt).

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After Shang Tang, the founder of the Shang dynasty, invaded Xia, many of Xia’s nobles had been sent to different regions to become officials. But, according to the rules that war prisoners would be slaves, some Xia commoners became slaves in the Shang dynasty. Like Guo Moruo, Fan agreed that the Shang dynasty witnessed a dominance of slavery system. He claimed with little evidence that many of the ancient oracle words such as “small minister (xiaochen),” “child (tong ),” and “concubine (qie)” were slaves. Slaves in the Shang were forced to work and fight in battles and the “so-called politics was mainly exploiting and repressing slaves.” Fan also conceded with Guo that the Zhou dynasty was the inception of what Marx referred to as feudalism. “The Zhou institution began in the Jichang era (founding father of the Zhou),” Fan wrote, “it is sufficient to prove that Zhou had attained feudalism even before it toppled the Shang. But it does not mean that Zhou had completely scraped slave production. [I] just argues that its feudal element had exceeded the slavery element.” Invoking both Marxism and evolutionary historiography, Fan noted that Zhou, which represented a new social system, could inevitably overcome Shang, an old and corrupt social system. Siding again with Guo, Fan wrote that China had experienced a long feudal history lasting until the late Qing. Yet, the peak of feudalism was in the Ming dynasty. Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of Ming, killed his prime minister in 1681 and abolished the prime minister system. The residual power of prime minister no longer existed, and the emperor was in charge of all political and military power. As a result, the central concentration system started in the Qin and Han dynasties had continued to develop, which turned out to be a “big reform” in China’s politics (Fan 1999: 32–4, 96, 564). Some historians have criticized the view that rulers in the Ming dynasty had absolute power. For example, Ray Huang argued in his 1981 book that emperor Wanli had refrained from meeting his ministers for about two decades because ministers opposed his selection of heir apparent (Huang 1981). Another renowned Marxist historian in the PRC was Wu Han who was a left-leaning historian in the Republic of China and a leading researcher on the Ming dynasty. A friend of Mao, Wu became a high-ranking official in Beijing in the PRC. But his friendship with Mao was undercut on the eve of the Cultural Revolution when his play on an upright official in the late Ming was charged by radical scholars with applying history to serve the current political event. Wu Han was later denounced by major Party newspapers and forced to resign. The incident of Wu Han and his play

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marked the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Wu Han’s patron Peng Zhen, the Beijing mayor, also suffered attacks in the Cultural Revolution (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006: 15–9). Wu Han’s most famous book was a biography of Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang. According to him, the book had been revised and published four times owing mostly to his “lack of thought of transcending class (chaojieji siciang ).” The first edition of his book was published in 1944 and the second one came out five years later when the PRC was founded. Wu Han confessed in the introduction of the fourth edition of his book that there were three “serious” mistakes in the first two editions. First, he applied his transcending-class thought to describe a monk rebel named Peng Yingyu and praised the monk for his retirement after the success of rebellion. Regarding late Yuan rebellion as the same as modern revolution, Wu criticized himself for erroneously believing that “revolution” could end halfway and did not have to be thorough. Once he arrived in the CCP-controlled region in the 1940s, Wu gradually improved his theoretical standard and admitted his mistake; second, Wu claimed that his ignorance of Lenin’s study on state resulted in his false comprehension that state mechanism was merely bureaucracy and army and compared them to a feudal empire’s two wheels (legs); the third “serious mistake” was his use of innuendo history censuring Chiang Kai-shek. Wu explained that it was because of his abomination of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Accordingly, Wu, while underscored Zhu Yuanzhang’s historical value, exaggerated Zhu’s errors that were not in tune with the actual and objective evaluation of Zhu. Because criticisms of his book came after the publication of the second edition of his book, Wu decided to correct the “errors” in the third edition. Distracted by his busy official commitments, Wu was not able to revise his book until 1954. In 1955, when the third edition of the book came out, Wu only printed around 100 copies and distributed them to his academic friends for comments. He said that the “key mistakes” in the third edition were insufficient attention to class relationship, class contradiction, and class analysis. Additionally, some said that his evaluation of Zhu Yuanzhang was not comprehensive. In the following nine years, Wu continued his “theoretical study” that should be reading of Marxist books. The fourth and final edition of the book was completed and published in 1964, just one year before his play on a Ming official was condemned. In his own words, Wu remarked that the purpose of rewriting the book was to “understand the backdrop” of his book

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(Ming dynasty) and to provide standard and boundary for evaluating historical figures like Zhu Yuanzhang. Wu, like many other authors in his age and after, asked readers to critique and correct because of his “limited grasp of knowledge and backward theoretical standard” (Wu 2000: 1–3). Like most, if not all, publications in this time, Wu quoted Mao’s 1939 book entitled Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party (zhongguo geming hezhongguo gognchandang ) as saying “in a feudal state, the emperor had absolute power…and relied on landlord and gentry as the base of all feudal governance” (Mao 1939). Due to his tragic involvement in the Cultural Revolution, Wu had been attacked and imprisoned in 1968. He died in 1969. Had he not died in the Cultural Revolution, Wu Han would have wanted to revise his book once again during the reform period when the political and academic milieu was much open and tolerant. In his last edition of Zhu Yuanzhang, Wu adroitly applied Marxist theories of class struggle and five stages of human society. He argued that the aim of Zhu Yuanzhang’s uprising was to “overthrow the joint rule of Mongol and Han landlord class.” In that regard, Zhu had completed his mission. However, Zhu failed to eliminate the “repression of one class (landlord) against the other (peasants) in a feudal society.” Thus, “the victorious fruit of struggle of people from many ethnicities” had been seized by Zhu Yuanzhang. This statement was a typical Marxist theory of class struggle. Wu did not mention that Zhu Yuanzhang was unable to end the class suppression because what he wished was to become an emperor and what his followers wished were to garner political powers, lands, and treasures. Wu explained that many old landlords and landlord militias had joined Zhu Yuanzhang’s army, and many rebel generals had “transformed themselves into new landlord class.” Zhu himself and his family turned to be the representative of the new landlord class. The transformation of Zhu and his generals was determined by their class nature. It was because peasants who had suffered repression would bravely fight and resist. But they were still small private owners and they craved for more land and better life. After their rebellion succeeded, some of their generals would become the landlord class they had once vehemently opposed. For the landlord class, they had to support the old regime if they wanted to protect their properties. Their class interest and nature determined that they would always be against peasants (Wu 2000: 185). Wu criticized Zhu Yuanzhang for establishing a rule of the landlord class. Although Zhu had fought against many landlords and made

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compromise to peasants, the nature of his regime was the landlord class whose ultimate goal was to serve the interest of the landlord class. Zhu’s compromise to peasants was only to double down on the ruling power of the entire landlord class. All major powers such as local leaders, judges, and grain commissioners were all controlled by landlords. Children from the landlord class could have the opportunity and right to have education. Through taking the civil service examination, members of the landlord class could become officials and gentry both of whom enjoyed legal exemption of service. Under Zhu Yuanzhang, officials were nobles, while the commoners were rabbles (jianren) (Wu 2000: 308). If Wu Han’s rigid application of Marxist theory to Chinese history is problematic, his accusation of Zhu Yuanzhang for his betrayal of his peasant class would be nothing but laughable. As a historian of Chinese history, Wu should be aware that Zhu Yuanzhang was not different from any other peasant rebel leaders such as Liu Bang, the founder of the Han dynasty in 206BCE, Liu Yu, the creator of the Song dynasty in 420 CE, or Li Zicheng, the destroyer of the Ming in 1644. All of them believed that heaven bestowed mandate upon them and they very likely had no sense that they had betrayed their class because they did not believe that they belonged to peasant class forever. As Chen Shen, the leader of the socalled first peasant rebellion in the late Qin, said that “no person was born as the king, duke, general, or minister” (Sima 2010; Des Forges 2003). Aside from a strong influence of Marxism, the history writing in Communist China has another striking feature: distorting history in favor of the CCP and its nationalism. Here I will discuss two historical issues: (1) Who was the main resistance against Japan? (2) Who was the invader in the Korean War? In many history books, Chiang Kai-shek was Chinese leader in the Sino-Japanese War between 1937 and 1945 and Mao Zedong was just a regional leader. While CCP armies had conducted guerrilla warfare against Japan in northern China, their role was largely peripheral and accessorial if compared with the GMD army that had lost hundreds of thousands of soldiers in several major campaigns in Shanghai, Xuzhou, and Wuhan in the first year of the war. Mao himself was said to have urged his Party to use only 10% of its resources and army to engage in the Japanese forces, 20% to oppose the GMD, and 70% to expand the red army and paramilitary troops (de Ven 2018: 146). However, the well-known truth and the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union had helped win the

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war did not prevent Mao and the CCP from making false claims that the CCP army had played a key role in winning the war against Japan. Mao made the assertion in August 1945 in the wake of Japan’s surrender. “To whom should the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance belong?” Mao asked. “It is obvious. Take a peach tree for example. When the tree yields peaches, they are the fruits of victory. Who is entitled to pick the peaches? Ask who planted and watered the tree.” Mao claimed that the CCP was justified to pick the “fruits of victory.” “During the eight years,” Mao said, “our people and army in the liberated [CCP] area, relying solely on our own efforts, have liberated vast territories and resisted the majority of Japanese aggressors and all puppet troops.” In this assertion, Mao attributed no credits to both American and Soviet armies and aid. Nor did he mention the courageous resistance and horrendous sacrifice of the GMD armies throughout the war. Instead, he lashed out at Chiang Kai-shek and his army for “hiding atop the Mt. E’mei” during the war and, by collaborating with the American imperialist, taking major cities such as Shanghai, Nanjing, and Hangzhou after Japan was defeated (Mao 1945). Mao’s assertion that it was the red army that had resisted and defeated Japanese army was apparently groundless for anyone today who has read the history of World War II. Yet, Mao’s claim has for a long time been authoritative and standard for Chinese history books and publications (Kai 2006). No one including historians in the Mao era dared to challenge his claim, let alone to mock Mao for his emphasis of using only 10% of the CCP force to fight Japan. Even today, official history books in China still say that the CCP and its red army were the tower of strength against Japan in the war. But in Taiwan, textbooks argue that the CCP took advantage of the war to develop itself rather than to fight the Japanese (Zhou and Wang 2018). Another sheer misinformation forged and spread by the CCP propaganda is the initiator of the Korean War. Despite the widely known fact that it was the North Korean army launched the offensive against the south on June 25, 1950 (Chen 1994), the CCP and its powerful and omnipresent propaganda has long claimed that the United States army initiated the war by invading North Korea in order to legitimize the involvement of the Chinese Volunteer Army. According to a South Korean newspaper, the 2010 edition of the history textbook for eighth graders in China still wrote that the United States was the aggressor that fired the first shot against North Korea. Unlike in the United States

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and many other democratic countries such as Japan where schools or professors could choose their history textbooks, all history textbooks in Chinese middle schools and colleges have to be approved by the Ministry of Education. In other words, history textbooks deviating from official rhetoric will not be allowed to enter schools lest they mislead or poison naïve students (Zhang 2013).

Modern and Freer Historiography After Mao’s death in 1976 and especially after the CCP decided to reopen to the West in late 1978, the overwhelming political restrictions on history writing under Mao began to loosen. In the early 1980s, Western books and ideas gained traction among young people and intellectuals. Many college students scrambled to learn English and cherished the opportunity to study abroad. In 1981, new CCP leaders who had been attacked by Mao and his radical supporters made an official rebuke on Mao and many of his political campaigns from the Anti-Rightist movement in 1957 to the Cultural Revolution (Xinhuanet, October 14, 2009). The historical circle soon sensed an aura of opening and freedom, albeit it would take a relatively long time for historians to remove their fear of telling the real history. Some of the hackneyed but politically orthodox theories such as the Marxist method in historiography would clinch for a prolonged time. As China enters the twenty-first century, historians begin to enjoy more freedom and flexibility in writing history. In 1983, two years after CCP’s denunciation of Mao’s mistakes, many authors continued to apply Marxist theories in history writing. For example, Zhong Zhaoyu in his book on Confucius published that year still used Marxist class theory in describing the period when Confucius was living. In his introduction, Zhong promised to employ Marxist historical materialism and “base his book on the material economic conditions in certain historical period to explain all historical incidents and concepts.” “Confucius advocated ‘succession and reform (yinge)’,” Zhong wrote, “If we only look at the part of ‘succession (yin)’ that could be adapted to both slavery and feudal systems, it will not be enough to judge the class nature of Confucian thought.” For the question why Confucian thought appeared in forms of “following Zhou and invoking ancient things,” Zhong argued that it was because, while the newly emerging landlord class (i.e., Confucius) was on the rise, it remained feeble in comparison with the slavery power. Aware that the contemporary landlord class

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was not strong, Confucius had to dust off the precedence in the idealized ancient period. To strengthen his argument, Zhong, as many of his peers did in this time, quoted Marx’s words that the new and weak class tended to invoke dead spirit, borrow their names, slogans, and clothes to perform the “new scene in world history.” The only progressive meaning of Confucius was that he had “elevated the social status of slaves to men and not women,” which, according to Zhong, was the new wave under the contemporary historical condition. Yet, Confucius continued to use “gentleman” and “small-minded men” to illustrate different classes of people (Zhong 1983: 23–4). Although Zhong Zhaopeng demonstrated a strong Marxism in his criticism of Confucius for his class limitations, he nonetheless provided some positive comments on Confucius such as his calls for “humane governance (renzheng )” and “educating people after they become rich (fuer houjiao)” (Zhong 1983: 23–4). He argued that Confucius had been used and abused by politicians in the past including the recent “Anti-Lin (Biao) and Anti-Confucius” movement whose primary goal was to use AntiConfucius against many revolutionary cadres (Fang 2021: Ch. 7). Zhong commended Confucius as a farsighted thinker in his era who showed slight awareness of people’s power (Zhong 1983: 10–1). Had Zhong’s book published ten years ago, he could have been punished as a rightist for his moderate and positive views on Confucius. In 1983, the frozen political situation had yet to be fully melted, Zhong was wary about his touchy comment on Confucius. Thus, he carefully added a statement in his book that Confucius’s advocation of humane governance and hoping people rich were nothing but to soften the class contradiction between people and rulers. His solutions were not at all aimed to change the fundamental interest of the ruling class (Zhong 1983: 24). In 1975, one year before Mao’s death and eight years prior to Zhong Zhaopeng’s book, Feng Tianyu, another scholar studying Confucius, published a “politically correct” book entitled A Criticism of Confucius’ Educational Thought (kongzi jiaoyu sixiang pipan). Contrary to Zhong’s argument that Confucius represented the novel feudal system, Feng accused Confucius of “stubbornly defending the reactionary standpoint of the slaveholder class, traveling around the country championing the slavery system, and attempting to roll back historical trend [from feudalism to slavery].” He also condemned Confucius for his “steadfast opposition to any political and economic reform policies of the newly emerging landlord class.” Feng’s opinion is both Marxist and evolutionary

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that is in line with what earlier Communist historians such as Fan Wenlan had argued (Feng 1975: 7). It is worth noting that Feng’s book was part of the ongoing campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius led by the “Gang of Four” with Mao’s wife Jiang Qing as the head. Feng could be one of the “two-universities” scholars organized by the “Gang of Four” (Fang 2021: Ch. 7; Fan 1999; Yue 1987). In the late 1990s, the historical circle in China had enjoyed more freedom in writing history than before and deviated further from the traditional orthodox theories of Marxism. For instance, when the new edition of Fan Wenlan’s influential Mao-era history book on China republished in 2000, a couple of famous historians tacitly chastised the application of Marxist class theory into Chinese history writing, whereas they still reaffirmed their belief in Marx’s materialist concept of history (weiwu shiguan). Dai Yi, a specialist on Qing history at Renmin University, wrote a preamble for Fan’s book. Dai first reviewed the evolutionary historiography since the late Qing and noted that it was a striking character of historiography in the twentieth century. Dai wrote, “Ever since Yan Fu translated the book of Evolution and Ethics, the view of social evolution has prevailed over China and the best historians in modern China have made it as the model.” He also applauded the introduction of Marxist material historiography in the early twentieth century, which was “a higher level of theory than the evolutionary historiography.” However, progressive and important Marxist material historiography could be, Dai warned that social history differed from natural history as social history involved human and should be more complex than natural history. While Dai acknowledged Marxist theory that production development was the decisive force for historical advancement, he cautioned that many other factors could also play roles in historical development. “If we only stress the decisive role of economy,” Dai argued, “we may fall into the simple conclusion of economic determinism.” Dai suggested that historical research would not advance unless historians heeded political, economic, cultural, military, and geographical factors. In addition, Dai questioned Marxist class struggle as the dominant element in the past history writing. “Material historiography perceives class struggle as the driving force in class societies,” Dai stated, “…[but] we should not regard class struggle as the only thing in a society and absolutize class struggle.” Dai went on arguing that the Mao-era slogan “taking class struggle as the key link (yijieji douzheng weigang )” was a distortion of Marxism.

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Dai implicitly chided early Marxist scholars from Li Dazhao, Guo Moruo to Fan Wenlan that their historical theory was still immature and accordingly their studies were nonetheless crude (cucao), albeit their application of Marxist theory helped them stand out from traditional history (official histories in the dynasties). Moreover, Dai classified modern Chinese historians into four generations. To begin with, the mission of the first-generation historians such as Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan was to promote Chinese traditional historiography to the modern evolutionary and rational historiography. They had vehemently censured traditional historiography and propagated evolutionary historiography. Guo Moruo and Fan Wenlan belonged to the second generation who had been guided by Marxist material historiography. Their biggest attainment was creating Marxist historiography in China. All of these historians were patriots, and they all envisioned a powerful China. Dai again hinted that their research should not be discarded entirely in spite of many problems. The third-generation historians grew up in the PRC who had inherited not only Marxist historiography but also evolutionary historiography as well as rationalism in history. Historians in this period continued to focus more on general history and less on specific topics. This generation of historians had several problems including the influence of “leftist” proclivity and dogmatism in research, imbalance between scholarship and society, and using history as a tool in politics. Above all, the problems of this generation of historians were that they had engaged in political campaigns too profoundly to focus on pure scholarship. In particular, Dai denounced the “innuendo history (yingshe shixue)” that was once rampant under Mao as “blurring history with reality, gravely distorting history, and misrepresenting Marxist material historiography.” The last generation of historians including Dai Yi himself arose after the end of the Cultural Revolution and out of the “cultural debris.” After the downfall of the “Gang of Four,” Dai said that many historians had rethought the manipulation of history as a political tool in the Cultural Revolution. Unlike earlier PRC historians, this generation of historians had been exposed to historical theories from the West as well as Hong Kong and Taiwan. While it was true that Marxism was still regarded as “scientific theory and method,” the government could no longer coerce historians to apply Marxist theory in history writing. Even in the early twenty-first century, Dai Yi was not bold enough to question Marxism in Chinese historiography, yet he instead suggested that how to “voluntarily

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apply Marxism in historical research” remained a “pressing mission” for historians and especially the CCP. Then, Dai Yi turned to the new edition of Fan Wenlan’s book. He first praised Fan’s book for disclosing the “dark side” of Chinese history and condemning rulers such as Empress Wu in the Tang dynasty (618– 907). Dai did not forget to explain that Fan’s motives to write such a history book in the 1940s was due to the contemporary need of revolution. In other words, Fan disregarded impartiality, the necessary principle for all historians, and wrote his book for CCP’s course of revolution. Dai pointed out that Fan had made a big change in revising his book in the PRC. Dai urged readers not to “simply” judge that the earlier edition of Fan’s book was false, and the latest edition was right. “No scholarship can exist without its base,” Dai remarked, “[readers]’d better grasp nutrition out of all previous achievements” (Fan 2000: 3–15). Dai Yi’s criticism of Fan Wenlan and other older-generation historians in the PRC were mild but explicit. It demonstrates a departure of the latest-generation historians who lived in the reform era from their predecessors who had to survive under political pressure. As China’s reopening and economic reform deepened in the twentyfirst century, the current generation of historians enjoy more freedom and become bolder than Dai Yi. In 2011, Wang Jiafan, a historian at the East China Normal University, published a general history book of China. In introduction, Wang flatly rejected the existence of a “slavery society” in China, a heterodox and anti-Marxist view in Mao’s era that could have been labeled as a “rightist” and lost teaching position at his university. Ten years ago, Dai Yi dared not make such a view. Wang claimed that ancient China was a unique agricultural society possessing a “striking character.” Instead of using Marxist method to divide human society into five stages, Wang chose to split ancient Chinese history into three stages: clan or tribal period (buzu shidai), feudal period, and unified imperial period. The first one of a clan or tribal period was not Wang’s invention. As Wang noted, historians such as Gu Jiegang and Zhou Gucheng had coined the term in the Republican period and only Guo Moruo, the Communist historian, adopted the idea of a slavery society in the Shang and Zhou dynasties. Wang challenged the use of feudalism in China. In his words, the term of “feudal” originally came from Japan and the term of “feudal society (fengjian shehui)” was initiated by former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.

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“In fact, what we later call ‘old feudal’ or ‘new feudal’ are not compatible with the ‘model of feudalism’ in the medieval age of West Europe,” Wang noted, “they are interpreted mostly in compliance with Stalin’s ‘classic definition (jiangdian dingyi)’ in his Bolshevik textbook.” Wang went on to lambasted Stalin as the most “dogmatic and arbitrary” person because Stalin loved to make “ironic definition.” Wang argued that the clan feudalism in Western Zhou was similar to that in West Europe, albeit there were some differences. Wang was aware of the danger in making such “bold” arguments in the Mao era. He mentioned the instance of historian Lei Haizon who had in 1957 cast doubt on the orthodox Marxist view that there was a slavery system in ancient China. Wang admired Lei’s courage in making such an argument in the 1950s. But he also noted that Lei had paid a serious price as he was denounced as a rightist in the Anti-Rightist movement. It was not until the 1980s that the academic circle finally was able to break the restricted academic domain by questioning the existence of slavery society in China. Wang was able to mock Guo Moruo and Fan Wenlan for falsely applying Marxist “feudalism,” which referred to a kind of socioeconomic institution, to Chinese history from Western Zhou to the late Qing. He stated that overseas Chinese historians such as Ray Huang and Xu Chuoyun had commented on Western Zhou’s feudalism and they were critical of the blind use of feudalism by Chinese historians. Another traditional history writing that Wang found absurd was dividing Chinese history by peasant rebellions. Wang recalled that in 1959 the Chinese historical circle had a brief discussion on “smashing the royal system” and later some historians proposed to use peasant wars as the standard to divide Chinese history. When Wang himself was assigned to teach Chinese history for “students of worker, peasants, and soldiers,” the textbook he used was awkwardly divided by three peasant rebellions (i.e., late Qin, late Tang, and late Yuan), which in China today would be laughable. Wang expressed pleasure that new history books on Chinese history including one authored by Bai Shouyi no longer mentioned slavery system (Wang 2011: 1–80). Wang’s book marks the age in China that Marxist theories such as material historiography and the universal five stages human society have lost their dominance in history writing. Historians today have more freedom in applying other Western theories such as Max Weber and Habermas to their writings. Wang’s frank attacks of traditional historiography are not uncommon in China today. Indeed, since the 1980s, historians have begun correcting

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problematic or false accounts of historical events that have been purposely produced by CCP leaders and official historians to mislead the public or to promote anti-GMD and anti-American sentiments. For example, in a book coedited in 2002 by Guo Rumei and Huang Yuzhang, the authors lauded the brave and bloody fights of GMD armies in a number of “frontline battlefields (zhengmian zhanchang ),” such as Shanghai, Xuzhou, and Wuhan that were different from CCP’s so-called “guerrilla warfare.” Although GMD armies lost the Shanghai battle, they had “unified China, heartened the great spirit of the Chinese nation to seek independence and resist foreign aggression, and enlarged the international influence of Chinese resistance.” Additionally, the battle had waged a “serious attack on foreigners who believed that China would be defeated in three months and China’s resistance would lead to its demise” (Guo and Huang 2002: 589–91). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has released numerous classified archives on the Korean War, and many Chinese historians such as Shen Zhihua and Chen Jian have taken advantage of the archives in their reinterpretation of the war. In 2002, Shen Zhihua wrote in his book entitled The Last Heavenly Kingdom: Mao Zedong , Kim Il-sung, and the Sino-Korean Relations (zuihou detianchao: Mao Zedong, Jin Richeng yuzhongchao guanxi) that it was the North Korean army that initiated the war by invading South Korea. And one month before the outbreak of the war, Kim Il-sung visited China and told Mao in person about his invasion plan (Shen 2002: 206–7). Even though the archives and new history books have clarified the perpetrator of the Korean War, some Chinese official history textbooks are still brainwashing students that the United States was the invader of North Korea and the Chinese army helped their North Korean comrades defend their country (Zhang 2010). More thorough and progressive change in history writing in the new century is the wide and discursive scope and focus, which is in stark contrast to histories in the Mao era that were predominantly centered on grand history (Fan 2000). The latest generation of historians, like their counterparts in Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the West, have the freedom to study a broad range of topics from the traditional political and economic history to cultural, legal, gender, and social history. The paradigm of history writing has become more manifold and flexible as many history books study only one dynasty or even one short but important period. More important, the Chinese government has paid increasing attention to history and many major cities especially Shanghai

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and Beijing have arranged and opened tremendous number of archives for both domestic and overseas historians to read. Today, many journals and publishers in the West as well as in China prefer to publish books with specific topics rather than general history.

Conclusion From China’s first history writings to the present, we have roughly seen the shift of four paradigms of writing. Ever since the great historian Sima Qian completed his exemplary Historical Record some 2000 years ago, subsequent dynasties had generally retained the tradition of compiling official history of their immediate dynasties. Among the first series of this tradition is Ban Gu’s Book of the Han or History of the Western/Former Han Dynasty to distinguish it from Fan Ye’s History of the Latter/Eastern Han (houhanshu). The last official history is the Historical Materials of the Qing (qingshigao) edited in the Republic of China. The traditional paradigm of history writing had a disproportional emphasis on dynastic rulers and minister, which had been under fire by late Qing scholars such as Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan who had absorbed the modern historiographies and evolutionary theory from the West as “merely a record of the royal families” and nothing about the commoners and social development. Wary of the imminent and grave crises for China and the Chinese race in the face of foreign powers, late Qing scholars called for an overhaul of the traditional historiography by embracing the evolutionary historiography or “New History” to enhance the capability of the Chinese nation to meet foreign challenges. Younger and more radical scholars such as Li Dazhao, Guo Moruo, and Fan Wenlan went further than the so-called New History advocators. They championed both the newly introduced Marxist material historiography and the evolutionary historiography. Guo became the first historian to incorporate Marxist theories of five stages human history and class struggle into his book published in 1929. A decade later, Fan Wenlan, under the request of Mao Zedong, finished a more comprehensive and Marxist history of China. After the CCP took power in mainland China in 1949, Marxist historiography gained official and dominant status in the PRC. Historians were compelled to adapt Marxist theories in history writing, a new paradigm suited the course and need of the CCP. Any contrarian would be labeled as rightists and stripped of their teaching or research posts. As Wang Jiafan recalled in 2011, China’s long history in the Mao era was simplified and

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divided by three major peasant rebellions. In addition, Mao-era histories tended to distort historical facts in order to fan out nationalism and justify the CCP leadership. It is not until the death of Mao and new CCP leaders rolling out the market-oriented reform in the late 1970s that the Chinese historical circle began to enjoy some freedom and flexibility. While history books in the 1980s remained to be confined by orthodox Marxist theories, historians in the early twenty-first century were bold and confident enough to criticize traditional Marxist history books. Contemporary historians such as Wang Jiafan have capitalized on the freer political and academic environment to mock Marxist history writings and correct their mistakes in the Mao era. The latest paradigm in China’s history writing undoubtedly marks both the loosening grip of the CCP ideological restriction and a return to the rational and less politicized history writings in the Republican period, Hong Kong, and Taiwan after 1949. This positive new trend of paradigm in history writing, if persists, would allow Chinese historians to better communicate and collaborate with their counterparts in the rest of the world. Yet, the recent anti-scholarship and pro-Party-control backlash in China casts a shadow over the prospect of such a paradigm. While it is still too early to say that the Marxist historiography would make a resounding comeback, many historians have already sensed the chill of political climate.4

References (2009). “New China Archives: Resolutions Regarding Some Historical Issues of the Party Since the Beginning of the PRC (xinzhongguo dang’an: guanyu jianguo yilai dangde ruogan lishiwenti dejueyi)” in Xinhua.net, October 14. http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-10/14/content_1438653.htm (April 2021).

4 Since 2012, the academics and universities in China have felt more limitations in their speaking, writing, and teaching. Many professors, journalists, or scholars have been detained and imprisoned due to their criticism of the CCP. For some recent reports see Javier C. Hernandez, “Professors, Beware. A ‘Student Information Officer’ Might be Watching” in The New York Times, November 1, 2019; Austin Ramzy, “Hong Kong Bookseller Confesses on TV to Evading Rules on Shipping to Mainland” in The New York Times, March 1, 2016; Benjamin Carlson, “7 Things You Can’t Talk about in China” in Global Post, June 3, 2013. https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-06-03/7-things-you-canttalk-about-china (April 20, 2021).

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(2019). “Finding Solution to Goldbach’s Conjecture in Chinese Archeology (qiujie zhongguo kaoguxue gede bahe caixiang )” in Xinhua.net, November 30, 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-11/30/c_1 125292348.htm (April 2021). (2021). “How Does Sanxingdui Come From (sanxingdui daodi zenme laide)?” in Xinwen zhoukan, March 21. https://m.k.sohu.com/d/522393875?channe lId=5&page=1 (April 2021). Cai, Zongjun. (1985). Snapshots of Guo Moruo’s Life (Guo Moruo shengping shilue). Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe. Cai, Meibiao. (2000). “Introduction (qianyan)” in Fan Wenlan, A Brief Edition of the General History of China (zhongguo tongshi jianbian). Shijiazhuang: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe. Carlson, Benjamin. (2013). “7 Things You Can’t Talk About in China” in Global Post, June 3. https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-06-03/7-things-youcant-talk-about-china (April 20, 2021). Chen, Jian. (1994). China’s Road to the Korean War. Columbia: Columbia University Press. Clark, Paul. (2008). The Chinese Cultural Revolution: A History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Des Forges, Roger. (2003). Cultural Centrality and Political Change in Chinese History: Northeast Henan in the Fall of the Ming. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Dong, Genming. (2014). “Yan Fu’s Evolutionary Historical View and its Impact on New Historiography (Yan Fu dejinhua shiguan jiqidui xinshixue deyingxiang )” in Journal of Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Science, Nov., No. 6, pp. 98–102. Dirlik, Arif. (1989). Revolution and History: Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919–1937 . Berkeley: University of California Press. Dreyer, June T. (2017). China’s Political System. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Du, Daosheng. (2011). Annotates, New Annotates and Translations of Analects (lunyu xinzhu xinyi). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. Esherick, Joseph, Pickowicz, Paul, and Walder, Andrew G., eds. (2006). The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Fan, Daren. (1999). Past Stories About Liangxiaos (liangxiao wangshi). Hong Kong: Mingbao chubanshe. Fan, Wenlan. (2000). A Short Edition of the Comprehensive Chinese History (Zhongguo tongshi jianbian), pp. 3–15. Hebei: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe. Fang, Qiang. (2021). Communist Judicial System in China, 1927–1976: Building on Fear. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Feng, Tianyu. (1975). A Criticism of Confucius’ Educational Thought (kongzi jiaoyu sixiang pipan). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.

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Guo, Dehong. (2014). A Chronicle of Wang Ming (Wang Ming nianpu). Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe. Guo, Moruo. (1929). A Research on Ancient Chinese Society (zhongguo gudai shehui yanjiu). Shanghai: Zhongya shuju. Guo, Rumei and Huang, Yuzhang, eds. (2002). Recording Frontline Battles in China’s Resistance against Japan (zhongguo kangri zhanzheng zhengmian zhanchang zuozhanji). Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe. Hernandez, Javier C. (2019). “Professors, Beware: A ‘Student Information Officer’ Might Be Watching” in The New York Times, November 1. Huang, Ray. (1981). 1587, a Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline. Newhaven: Yale University Press. Kai, Yue. (2006). “Look at Our History Books (kankan women de lishishu),” December 14, 2006. http://www.aisixiang.com/data/12204.html (a liberal website in China) (April 2021). http://mcms.nbweekly.com/iphone/article. php?id=118420234&ref=iphoneshare (April 2021). Kuhn, Dieter. (2011). The Age of Cionfucian Rule: The Song Transformation of China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Li, Huaiyin. (2013). Reinventing Modern China: Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Li, Xiaobing and Fang, Qiang, eds. (2013). Modern China Legal Reform: New Perspectives. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. Liang, Qichao. (1902). New Historiography (xinshixue). https://zh.m.wikiso urce.org/zh-hans/%E6%96%B0%E5%8F%B2%E5%AD%B8. ———. (1928). Studying Method of Chinese History (zhongguo lishi yanjiufa). Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan. ———. (1966). Historical Research and Other Things (yanjiu lishi jiqita). Hong Kong: Sanda chuban gongsi. Lü, Simian. (1992). General History of China Wirrten by Lü (lüzhu zhongguo tongshi). Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe. Lenin, Valdimir. (1916). Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 1916. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/. Li, Jie. (2016). “Reread Lenin’s ‘Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism’ (chongdu lienin diguozhuyi shiziben zhuyi zuigao jieduan)” in Hongqi wengao, August 8. http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0808/c14384428619883.html. Marx, Karl. (1848). Communist Manifesto. https://www.marxists.org/archive/ marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch02.htm. MacFarquhar, Roderick and Schoenhals, Michael. (2006). Mao’s Last Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Mao, Zedong. (1939). Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party (zhongguo geming hezhongguo gognchandang ). https://www.marxists.org/chi nese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-193912.htm (April 2021).

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Yan, Jiaqi. (1987). Ten-Year History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (wenhua dageming shinianshi). Hong Kong: Hong Kong Dagongbaoshe. Yang, Honglie. (1936). History of Chinese Legal Thought (zhongguo falu sixiangshi). Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan. Yeh, Wen-Hsin. (2000). The Alienated Academy: Culture and Politics in Republican China, 1919–1937 . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asian Center. Yue, Daiyun. (1987). To the Storm: The Odyssey of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman. Berkeley: University of California Press. Zhang, Binglin (Zhang, Taiyan). (2002). Book under Pressure (qiushu). Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe. Zhang, Shigu. (2010). “United States Invaded North Korea in Chinese Textbooks (zhongguo jiaokeshu meiguo qinlue chaoxian)” in Zhongyang ribao, South Korea, June 21. ———. (2013). “Korean War in the Textbooks of Four Countries (siguo jiaokeshu zhongde chaozhan)” in Nandu zhoukan, June 1, 2013. Zhang, Zhaojun. (2014). “The Transformation of Modernity of Zhang Taiyan and Chinese History Learning (Zhang Taiyan yuzhongguo shixuede xiandaixing zhuanhuan)” in Tianjin Social Science, Vol. 4, pp. 120–128. Zheng, Guanyin. (2002). Blunt Words in a Time of Prosperity (shengshi weiyan). Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe. Zhong, Zhaopeng. (1983). Study of Confucius (kongzi yanjiu). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe. Zhou, Wei and Wang, Fan. (2018). “Same Chinese History and Different Textbooks on Both Sides of the Taiwan Strait (tongyang delishi butongde liangan jiaokeshu)” in BBC.com, August 17. https://www.bbc.com/zho ngwen/simp/world-45195207 (April 2021). Zhou, Gucheng. (1939). A general History of China (zhongguo tongshi). Shanghai: Kaiming chubanshe.

CHAPTER 6

Paradigm Shift in Chinese Legal Studies Guobin Zhu, Jian Qu, and Han Zhai

Introduction A paradigm shift, a concept developed by the American physicist and philosopher Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn, 1962), now means a major or fundamental change in the basic concepts, experimental practices and research methodology of a scientific discipline. Its first use was restricted to describe the development of natural sciences. As we witness today, this concept has been widely adopted in social sciences including legal science. To investigate the paradigm shift in contemporary Chinese legal

G. Zhu (B) School of Law, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong e-mail: [email protected] J. Qu Department of Law, College of Humanities and Development Studies, China Agricultural University, Beijing, China e-mail: [email protected] H. Zhai School of Law, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 S. Hua (ed.), Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8032-8_6

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science is to revisit the scholarship itself, rather than to review the pure methodological changes in the existing literature. Contemporary Chinese legal science did not truly blossom in the early years after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (“the PRC”) in 1949, and it gradually took shape since the implementation of the Reform and Opening-up Policy in the late 1970s (hereafter referred to as the “Reform Era”). In the early history of the PRC, the immature Chinese legal scholarship grew up directly under the Soviet influences, and was basically dominated by orthodoxic Marxism-Leninism that firmly held that law belongs to the category of superstructure, law is the expression of will of the ruling class, and law is the tool of class struggle, etc. Meanwhile, an astonishing fact was that China did not complete legislating its civil law, criminal law, and corresponding procedural laws except for the 1954 Constitution and several organic laws under it before the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution commenced in 1966. In fact, the earliest works of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (the “NPCSC” and “NPC”) were mostly treaties with foreign countries, especially countries of former Socialist bloc, and the NPC did not perform as a de facto national legislature until post-1978 China. The NPC, regrettably, could not fulfill its legislative role mainly due to its limited meeting sessions and part-time status of its people’s deputies. In other words, the 1954 Constitution, the first one of the PRC, was not able to provide any workable national legislative system, let alone the lack of normalized workings of a national legislature. We can identify two general paradigm shifts across the whole legal scholarship and academia in the post-1978 China. The first is: Almost all fundamental legal disciplines have significantly experienced the reflections on the former Soviet influences, though leaving behind it a highly debatable topic: whether the scholarship of these main legal research areas has successfully archived its goal of de-Marxization. The second is: The legal scholarship is highly sensitive to the new issues occurred in the Reform Era. These issues rose around the emerging private ownership generated by the Reform itself, and they presented the interactive structure between the scholarship and the reality. In this process, the Reform brought about theoretical challenges and new legislations, which then stimulated relevant discussions and debates across the legal academia. In some specific cases, legal academia and their academic discoveries have successfully impacted on actual law-making.

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This chapter aims at offering a brief sketch of the changed and changing paradigms in contemporary Chinese legal studies. The authors pay special attention to the events and features that stimulate, generate, or speed up the process of paradigm shift in contemporary Chinese legal studies and academia. The chapter first acknowledges a proper presentation of chronological or typological legal events and literature. We admit that such an approach is insufficient to reveal the complicated mechanism which determines the knowledge generation and production of the Chinese legal academia, and the limits of legal professionalism in post1978 China. However, properly providing a roadmap of what the scene has been so far with critical remarks shall be the very departure for any relevant future works. In view of the fact that legal science is rather a comprehensive area of research which can be further divided into many sub-areas, i.e., disciplines studying specific branch law or departmental law (Bumen Fa), we cannot investigate every single discipline within the next limited pages, we shall develop the central theme of paradigm shift around the three broad sub-areas of law that are: legal theory/jurisprudence, public law, and private law.

Legal Theory/Jurisprudence In the Chinese context, Legal Theory (Faxue Lilun) is often used in two senses: narrow and broad. In the broad sense, it generally means “Theoretical Legal Science” (Lilun Faxue) which includes these branch disciplines of law: jurisprudence, philosophy of law, comparative law, sociology of law, legislative science, legal logics, psychology of law, and legal theory. In its narrow sense, it bears its literal meaning and is equivalent to Jurisprudence (Falixue) in the West. Using it in the broad sense, China may be having the largest jurisprudential research community in the world. In terms of the number of researchers, there are probably more people studying jurisprudence in China than all other regions of the world combined (Yu, 2019: 1). In this chapter, we examine legal theory/jurisprudence mainly in its narrow sense, and legal theory/jurisprudence may be used interchangeably. Over the past forty years or so, beginning with the initiation of the Reform policy, the paradigms employed by this large research community have undergone significant changes. The ancien régime gradually disintegrated and new discourses were introduced or emerged; as the number of

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researchers grew, the topics and areas of interest to Chinese jurisprudence also became increasingly broad (Qian, 2019: 28–31; Yu, 2019: 2). In general, the development of contemporary Chinese studies of jurisprudence since 1978 can be divided into three phases/stages. It is not the intention of this section to provide a precise chronology of the different phases, as the temporal division between them does not appear to be perfectly clear, although reader can find such attempts in many other studies (Huang, 2009: 3–8; Li, 2019: 273–293; Liu et al., 2008: 4–8; Shi, 2012: 174; Shu, 2019). The first two phases are marked by the evolution and change of the names of the discipline. Following the Soviet tradition, the discipline concerning the theory of law was first named “General Theory of State and Law (Guojia Yu Fa de Yiban Lilun)”; subsequently, in the 1980s, the name of this subject was gradually replaced by “Fundamental Theory of Law (Faxue Jichu Lilun)”; and later in the early 1990s, “Jurisprudence (Falixue)” became a more widely accepted designation for the discipline (Shu, 2019: 9, 12–13; Tian, 2021). These two shifts in subject/disciplinary names represent the first two phases of the development of studies of jurisprudence. The third phase began perhaps without milestone events: After the completion of the disciplinary system in relative terms, the studies of jurisprudence entered an era of highly diverse themes, which at the same time led to a certain degree of paradigm loss. The following paragraphs examine the paradigm shift that occurred during the transitional process between the aforementioned three phases. Driving Away from Vyshinsky Before the Reform Era, the system of Chinese legal theory was primarily and heavily influenced by the doctrine of Andrey Y. Vyshinsky (1883– 1954), the Soviet General Procurator, a well-established jurist as well as a diplomat in the 1930s, and even more so with regard to the studies on basic legal theory (Shu, 2018: 18; Zhang et al., 1998). Vyshinsky’s doctrine remained the dominant jurisprudential theory in the Soviet Union (Wang, 2009: 485); it is believed that “every Soviet student of government and law reads Vyshinsky’s book”, and “administrators and jurists use it for reference” (Hazard, 1948). As a legal scholar, Vyshinsky’s name was closely associated with his legal theory known as “Theory of State and Law” (Vyshinsky, 1955). Also, he headed the Institute of State and Law of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (Isaeva, 2018: 36).

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All these have directly led the Chinese counterpart to adopt the name “General Theory of State and Law” (Wang & Liu, 2017). The core paradigm of Vyshinsky’s legal theory can be seen in his definition of law, which still enjoys high popularity in Chinese textbooks of jurisprudence even today (Wang, 2009: 482). In 1938, Vyshinsky formulated a new definition of the law (Homan, 1965: 407); he believed that “Soviet law is the aggregate of the rules of conduct established in the form of legislation by the authority of the toilers and expressive of their will,” and “the effective operation of these rules is guaranteed by the entire coercive force of the socialist state in order to defend, to secure, and to develop relationships and arrangements advantageous and agreeable to the toilers, and completely and finally to annihilate capitalism and its remnants in the economic system, the way of life, and human consciousness in order to build a communist society” (Vyshinsky, 1948: 50). This definition of law, and the view of seeing the state and law as tools of the ruling class and especially tools of “class struggle”, was almost entirely embraced by China at the time, and for a long time, was held dear in China as the authoritative view of Marxist legal theory (Shu, 2019: 6). However, starting in the late 1970s, this long-held authoritative view modeled after Vyshinsky began to be constantly challenged in China. Legal scholars began to discuss issues such as “equality before the law” and “rule of man versus rule of law,” which were considered politically sensitive at the time. To some extent, it was believed that this was not only an academic discussion but also a political discussion (Zhang, 2001: 30). In 1980, an article published in the Chinese Journal of Law entitled “Is the Law Simply a Tool of Class Struggle?” sparked a huge reaction among legal scholars (Cui & Li, 1998: 204–205; Shu, 2019: 10). This article directly raised the issue of attempting to redefine what the law is (Zhou, 1980). The author argued that it was not correct to see the law as a tool of class struggle, and to link the law to the state, and to believe that the law came into being with the state and would disappear with the state (Zhou, 1980: 37). Although there were still many voices defending the previously dominant position of linking the law to the class struggle (Cui & Li, 1998: 205–207), the controversy marked the start of a departure from the path defined by Vyshinsky in the development of Chinese jurisprudence. Since 1978, the year when Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) held its 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Congress and announced the Reform policy, Chinese jurisprudence had attempted to break away from

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Vyshinsky and seek a more “de-ideologized” or “neutralized” path. It had been argued that, to a large extent, the law does not seem to have to be closely tied to the state, the (ruling) class, or even the political ideology (Tian, 2021: 145). As a result, the name “General Theory of State and Law” was gradually replaced by “Fundamental Theory of Law” (Tian, 2021: 146). In the new textbook named after the latter, contents about the state, such as the creation, nature, form, and main functions of the state, were removed (Guo, 2012: 90). In a word, the law was separated from the state. In fact, from hindsight, it can be said that the entire study of Chinese jurisprudence in the 1980s was essentially a debate on the question of whether the Chinese jurisprudence should be “de-Sovietized”, or more specifically, whether China’s understanding of jurisprudence should drive away from Vyshinsky. Although the debate was quite heated, the final answer is clearly a resounding yes. This must be seen as a landmark paradigm shift in Chinese jurisprudence. From “Fundamental Theory of Law” to “Jurisprudence” The end of deconstruction often means the beginning of reconstruction, although attempts at the latter do not often succeed. Having discarded Vyshinsky’s doctrine, the question that immediately follows is, if not Vyshinsky, then who should it be? Or, if the law is not understood in the context of “class struggle,” how should it now be understood? In response to this question, “bewildered jurists” in China at the time, with their anxiety, had introduced various popular Western theories and methodologies into their legal studies (Shu, 2019: 10). In a sense, any approach that differed from the Soviet one could be the answer to the question of Chinese jurisprudence. A positive point during the process is that Chinese jurisprudence has succeeded in clarifying a number of basic ideas of the discipline through extensive debates at the time of the transition between deconstruction and reconstruction (Zhang, 1993). One of the most important discussions was about the rights-based approach to the studies of jurisprudence. In 1986, a number of legal scholars clearly realized that after deSovietization, China’s “current jurisprudential system lacks a clear theoretical cornerstone” (Zhang & Ma, 1986: 24–25). They then suggested that, as opposed to the class struggle (Shu, 2019: 11), “the basic categories of jurisprudence are rights and duties” (Zhang & Ma, 1986:

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26). The establishment of the rights-based approach in Chinese jurisprudence then went through three stages with constant controversy: First, rights and duties were established as the basic categories of jurisprudence; second, the dominant role of rights was established as opposed to duties; third, between state power and civil rights, the more fundamental status of civil rights was confirmed (Guo, 2019: 104–111). Progressively, jurisprudence in China had been transformed from a discipline about “class struggle” to a discipline centered on rights. At the same time, a number of basic categories of Western jurisprudence have been widely accepted by the academic community. For instance, people have opted for the former between the rule of law and the rule of man (Fu & Wang, 2018: 19–20; Zhang, 2001: 31). Admittedly, China’s jurisprudence in this period was still somewhat “naïve” or “childish,” as it was commented by the scholar of the time (Shu, 2019: 10; Zhang, 2001: 31). However, this assessment also provides a clear picture of the basic state of a discipline at the time of its (re-)establishment. As the name of the discipline implies, the main task of Chinese jurisprudence in the era of “Fundamental Theory of Law” was to seek the most general theoretical paradigms for the study of all legal branches and to establish the basic theoretical consensus for the Chinese legal community. In 1983, a call emerged to rename the discipline as “Jurisprudence” (Chen, 1983). But as the research community expanded and research deepened, it was not until the 1990s that “Jurisprudence” started to become a more popular designation for the discipline. As of 1993, the name of the “Society of Fundamental Theory of Law of the Chinese Law Society,” the official association of the researchers in the discipline in China, has been changed to the “Society of Jurisprudence of the Chinese Law Society”; since then the name “Jurisprudence” was generally used in textbooks edited by the legal scholars across the country (Huang, 2009: 5). It is worth mentioning that “Legal Philosophy” once had the possibility of replacing “Jurisprudence” as the name of the discipline, but this more philosophically oriented approach was not chosen in the end (Tian, 2021: 153–154). The final establishment of the disciplinary name of “Jurisprudence” in China was claimed to represent the final departure from the Soviet version of the “theory of state and law” (“Vyshinsky’s jurisprudence”) and the beginning of the theoretical effort to build a jurisprudence system with “Chinese characteristics” and of “Chinese style” (Zhang, 2017: 33). In fact, this also marked a new stage

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in the introduction of jurisprudence under the Western tradition to the Chinese legal community since the Reform Era (Tian, 2021: 159). In short, China has filled the vacuum resulting from Vyshinsky’s departure with a “jurisprudence” that is more a Western tradition and term. Moreover, some ideas and categories that now seem to be rather basic were first established in China during this period. It can be observed that the most basic paradigm for the study of Chinese jurisprudence was formed and took shape at this stage. Is the Chinese Jurisprudence at a Loss? Chinese scholars specialized in “Jurisprudence” soon realized that the question brought about by the abandonment of Vyshinsky was not really solved by the introduction of Western jurisprudence. At the very basic level, it can be said that there is a common theoretical foundation for the application of various Western legal theories. However, once the study goes deeper, researchers find that there are huge differences between different teachings. As a result, the differences in paradigms among Chinese researchers of different Western legal theories have become increasingly significant (Shu, 2019: 16). In the 2010s, this phenomenon has eventually led to a great debate over “legal dogmatics (Rechtsdogmatik, Fa Jiaoyixue)” versus “social sciences of law” (Sheke Faxue) (Xu, 2016: 194–197). Certain scholars believe that legal research should start from the hermeneutics of legal texts, while others argue that law should be understood from the perspectives of social sciences such as history, sociology, and economics. While the former approach of legal dogmatics clearly derives from the German or continental European tradition, the path of the latter is primarily influenced by the American approach to legal studies. Thus, one realizes that this debate is in fact “the encounter between the German and American jurisprudential traditions in the Chinese legal field” (Bu, 2010: 3–5). The debate that catches the eyes of almost every legal scholar in China has not ended up with a definite winner (Fu & Wang, 2018: 23). However, it is undeniable that Chinese legal dogmatics has since begun to blossom and flourish, and there seems to be a shift from focusing on more general legal theory to emphasizing the specific practices of Chinese law itself. This is firstly due to the growing number of Chinese legal scholars who have studied in Germany in recent decades or have been influenced

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by the continental tradition, and also to the increasing sophistication of the Chinese legal system—especially with the enactment of the Chinese Civil Code in 2020—which has provided the adherents of legal dogmatics with a large body of authoritative legal texts that are interrelated, and which was unthinkable in China some forty years ago. Such changes imply, of course, the heightened prominence of Chinese legal practice in the study of jurisprudence in China, but also a growing awareness among Chinese scholars of some particular Western legal research traditions. Whether it is Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, Gustav Radbruch, Jürgen Habermas, or Richard A. Posner, Herbert L. A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, Niklas Luhmann, Robert Alexy, etc., a considerable group of researchers focusing on one or several of these Western legal theorists can be found in the Chinese jurisprudence community today (Shu, 2019: 15). While this phenomenon indicates a boom in the study of jurisprudence in China, it has also had two somewhat undesirable effects. First, the excessive diversity of research topics (Xie, 2009) has to some extent divided the jurisprudence research community; truly effective academic dialogues cannot take place as scholars do not really know each other’s research content (Shu, 2019: 15–16). Second, one realizes that no Chinese jurisprudential studies have emerged among these diverse themes. It has been argued that there is actually no “Jurisprudence of China” but only “Jurisprudence in China” (Ji et al., 2016: 9). Thus, a Chinese jurisprudence in the cultural sense still remains absent (Yu, 2019: 4). These culminated in a scholarly declaration of “death” of the Chinese jurisprudence (Xu, 2016). The central reason why Chinese jurisprudence was declared dead is the lack of unity of the discipline, except for being the “political lessons in law schools” (Chen, 2019: 16–18; Xu, 2016: 191–192) and for sharing the same standard textbook (Shu, 2019: 16). According to a claimant, for a discipline to qualify as a “science” worth studying, it must have at least three elements: a unified conceptual theme, a coherent logical system, and an original research methodology (Xu, 2016: 190–191). It is claimed that the study of jurisprudence in China used to meet this criterion in its phase of “Fundamental Theory of Law,” but its subsequent development has marked the “death” of the discipline in light of the above criterion (Xu, 2016: 191–197). This announcement has caused the Chinese jurisprudence community to rethink of and reflect on its very own paradigm (Ji et al., 2016; Pan, 2019; Wang, 2016). More radical scholars even argue

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that the Chinese jurisprudence is not even “born” yet, let alone “dead” (Wang, 2016). In fact, for a long time, the search and rethinking of the development path of the discipline has been unceasing within the Chinese jurisprudence community (Deng, 2014). The loss of one’s own research paradigm in the study of the (perhaps Western-origin) jurisprudence has also led Chinese scholars to turn their attention back to China itself (Tu, 2020; Wang & Solum, 2012). It is believed that the future of Chinese jurisprudence lies in extracting humanity and rationality from the Chinese cultural tradition and using them as the gene and nourishment for the growth of the spirit of Chinese jurisprudence; although the development in this regard is not yet in-depth, turning back to China could be the ultimate paradigm shift that Chinese jurisprudence needs to face and accomplish (Xu, 2008: 5–6). Interim Summary From the above discussions of the three phases of the development of Chinese jurisprudence, the following concluding remarks can be drawn concerning the paradigm shift in contemporary Chinese jurisprudence research. Firstly, the Chinese jurisprudence has completed the task of deSovietization, or more specifically, de-Vyshinskyization, but so far it has still largely failed to break away from its position as a discipline of “political lessons in law schools.” In a way, this disciplinary orientation in effect serves as the basis for unifying the studies of Chinese jurisprudence into one self-contained discipline. Secondly, after moving away from Vyshinsky’s doctrine, Chinese jurisprudence began to introduce a large number of other Western jurisprudential theories and doctrines. Since the underlying logic of these teachings was largely based on somewhat similar foundational settings, such as the employment of rights-based approach and the emphasis on the rule of law, Chinese jurisprudence during its reconstruction period was able to build a relatively unified disciplinary system with a coherent narrative and discourse on the basis of the introduction of these settings. Thirdly, as the Chinese studies of Western jurisprudential teachings advanced further, differentiation inevitably emerged, leading to a rather fragmented picture in terms of the subject matters of Chinese jurisprudence. In fact, the development of the Chinese jurisprudence in the past few decades has only solved the problem of what kind of jurisprudence

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China does not want, but it has not completed the construction of a consensus on what kind of jurisprudence China wants. On the one hand, there exists a dizzying array of the Western theories for Chinese scholars to choose from, while, on the other hand, the exploration of jurisprudential resources that originate from the indigenous Chinese tradition and culture, and thus are more legitimate for China, is still far from being mature. All of these have resulted in a situation in which the current Chinese jurisprudence as a discipline is unified only at the level of “textbook jurisprudence,” but is remarkably diverse considering the current state of differences of scholars in jurisprudence. The paradigm shift toward a truly Chinese jurisprudence has not yet occurred, but it is worth expecting. Lastly, based on the above general observations of the evolution of the discipline, the so-called paradigm shift in the broad field of theoretical laws is closely correlated with the evolution of trends of the Chinese society, of which the whole process has taken place from and around de-Sovietization, marketization, and Westernization, to returning to the Chinese roots or resorting to local resources. This conclusion may not be hundred percent accurate, but is a highly relevant indication.

Public Law Brief Review of the Trajectory of Constitutional Law Scholarship Since the Reform Era In the Chinese legal scholarship, Public Law (Gongfa) generally refers to constitutional law, administrative law, criminal law, and to some, law of human rights; they are the laws regulating public power and restricting the use of public power. In most cases, public law is first used to designate constitutional law. In this chapter, our focus is mainly placed on the study of constitutional law. Contemporary Chinese constitutional scholarship started its rebuilding process after the promulgation of the 1982 Constitution. Back to the 1980s, the most significant and polemic topics heatedly debated during its construction process included the promotion of the rule by law over the rule of man (Zhang & Zeng, 1979), governing the country by law or policy (Wu, 1986), whether the nature of law was class struggle or social interests (Zhou, 1980), and the relationship between the Constitution and the “Four Cardinal Principles” (Zhang, 1982). As far as the last

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aspect is concerned, the mainstream school in constitutional law scholarship concluded that the “Four Cardinal Principles” was an essential part of the 1982 Constitution. The scholarship of constitutional law in 1980s has witnessed the vagueness of the basic terms and glossaries, implying the blurring intellectual awareness toward the constitutional knowledge transplanted from the Western world. Scholars or commentators did not solely adopt the term “constitutional” (Xian) law in its generic sense, they also opted for such words/terms as “fundamental” (Genben) law or even “political” law. The vocabulary “fundamental law” which first emerged in 1981 largely embraced the idea of constitution as supreme authority and as a legal instrument when considering its normativity, rather than a merely political document or program (Wang, 1981). The vocabulary “political law” was generally defined to refer to the legal rules that regulate the relations between political actors, regard the principle according to which the ruling party shall operate and behave in the scope of the Constitution and laws, and include the constitutional entrenchment of the Special Administrative Region, the limitation of powers of specific state institutions, limited legislative delegation, the protection of the fundamental rights, etc. (Wang & Zhang, 1987). Reflections on the necessity of de-politicizing the scholarship occurred since the mid-1990s, which brought about a methodological change that excluded empirical studies and was against the reception of the Soviet theory of state and law according to which Constitution was only the codified justification of political realities without normative binding effect. Even in the very first constitutional law textbook “Constitutional Law” (Xianfa xue), written edited by a group of the founding professors of the post-1978 Chinese constitutional scholarship and published in 1983, such an intellectual trace of transplantation of the Soviet theory of state and law remained dominant, which identified that the study of constitutional law belonged to social science (Wu, 1983: 1). So far, little research has investigated the realistic process of de-politicization in constitutional law scholarship in post-1978 China, which we will examine later in this chapter. The answers to these questions would significantly benefit both the global comparative constitutional community in revealing the complex intellectual process of migration and transplant of constitutional ideas and systems and evolution of domestic public law scholarship. While somehow emotionally rejecting empirical studies, as we observe, the

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currently dominant interpretative methodology largely neglects the functioning and problems of the Chinese constitutional and political structure of Party-state. Debate Between Normative Constitutionalists and Political Constitutionalists and Its Methodological Implications We begin our discussion first with the significant methodological debate between normative constitutionalists (Guifan xianfa xuezhe) and political constitutionalists (Guifan xianfa xuezhe) that started in 2008. It appears that the debate is essentially a competition between the two main paradigms in constitutional law studies and is also the first one that has demonstrated the somewhat radical change of research methodology and research paradigm after the de-Sovietization in legal research in general and in constitutional studies in particular since the Reform Era. It is interesting to note that the “battle” between the school of political constitutionalists and the school of normative constitutionalists has its focus on interpretive methodology: The normative perspective has been reluctant to regard the ruling party and its constitutional role and implications in China, being, as one criticized, “trapped in the comfort zone of semantics, logic and storytelling” (Chen, 2010: 89). It is not an exaggeration to state that the debate has inspired numerous review articles which have greatly contributed to the abundant constitutional discourse (Zheng, 2011; Zhou, 2016a; Li, 2016; Zhai, 2016). So far, parts of this important debate and the outcomes arising from it have attracted attention of the international constitutional community, and the topic of Chinese reception of Carl Schmitt has been identified as core of new discourse (Mitchell, 2020; Xie & Patapan, 2020; Brang, 2019). Most normative constitutionalists, regarded as the mainstream in Chinese constitutional law scholarship, share the universal understanding of constitutionalism. In fact, they do not fully ignore the political reality in China and they are fully aware of “those elements that shall be inferior to the Constitution but actually keep on challenging constitutional norms in China” (Lin, 1999: 35) and to them, the 1982 Constitution still remains a semantic constitution without any effective form of judicial review (Lin, 1999: 43). The normative constitutionalists just do not know how to prevent the 1982 Constitution from being overfrequently amended, and how to establish a constitution with stability

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and actual binding effect. The normative school has posed a good question to the whole Chinese constitutional academia: how constitutional law research would do to eliminate or find a solution to, the paradox between insisting on continued reform and opening up and safeguarding the existing constitutional order under the 1982 Constitution (Lin, 1999: 34). Political constitutionalists, on the other hand, insist on designing constitutionalism based on the “political” reality underlying China’s reform, namely taking into account the ruling party and one-party-state structure. Political constitutionalists in China informally only identify two leading scholars with their contrast positions in political spectrum: One is Gao Quanxi, from Shanghai Jiaotong University Law School, for his liberal standing, and another is Chen Duanhong, from Peking University Law School, for his statist stance. But in research, political constitutional studies also include Zhai Xiaobo’s works on populist constitutionalism (Zhai, 2007). For most overseas readers, Jiang Shigong, also from Peking University Law School, is a more widely recognized figure and is usually considered as one of leading political constitutionalists; but he was not. Peers from the school of political constitutionalists review Jiang’s works as “constitutional sociology on the one-party state” (Gao, 2012: 25). However, most of their contributions still remain focusing on methodological discourse, not finally reaching to any clear program for future constitutionalism. The only shared stance among political constitutionalists is that the CCP itself shall constraint its power under the 1982 Constitution, especially Article 5(4), and all political parties must behave themselves in the scope of the Constitution and laws. In the writings of the younger political constitutionalists, the Article 5(4) is considered as the source of constitutional restriction and bindingness over the ruling party (Zhou, 2016a, b).

Private Law In this section, we choose three topics/issues to showcase the process of paradigm shift in Private Law (Sifa) and the changing landscape of legal scholarship. They are: early debate between civil law scholars and economic law scholars, constitutionality of property law, codification of personality rights in the recently promulgated Chinese Civil Code.

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Early Debate on Public and Private Divide This sub-section on private law embraces two disciplines of law, namely civil law and economic law, because the formation of private law research in post-1978 China departs from a particular intellectual situation where scholars in civil law and their colleagues studying economic law had an intense debate that went throughout the emergence of market economy in China during the 1980s. Economic law, by its name, stands for the law that regulates economic activities as a significant feature of Socialist law. When the debate occurred, the idea of making a Chinese civil code already emerged in Chinese legal academia back in the 1980s, while the whole academia has not reached any consensus on the sphere of civil law. In other words, the idea of the public–private divide, property rights, and even individualism had no root in the Chinese legal academia yet then. This significant debate is the first sigh of the division between public sphere and private domain. What once intensively debated in the 1980s was the respective “regulated objects” of each discipline. Since the planned economic system did not provide the enterprises with any independent legal personality, legal research then has not gone very far from its Soviet past. To promote the knowledge of civil law originated from the grand tradition of Roman law, an interesting intellectual presentation was that civil law scholars interpreted the basic principles of civil law according to Marxist theories. For example, by referring to the chapter on commodity exchange in Capital (Das Kapital in German), Tong Rou, from Renmin University Law School and representing early generation of civilists, argued that the primary significance of economic activities in the state required the national legal system to recognize ownership (Liu, 2009: 7). Meanwhile, the history of Roman law was also introduced during the debate as the undercovered knowledge transplantation. “Roman is not built in one day,” the civil law system in China might develop much slower than the common impression as far as we could recall. In 1981, Law on Economic Contracts was adopted which once tolerated free contract under the planned economy system. In 1984, at the 3rd Plenum of the 12th Central Committee of the CCP, the Party in its “Decision on Economic Restructuring” initiated the grand reform toward socialist market economy, while temporarily aiming at the “planned commodity economy.” The freedom of contract, as the cornerstone of the civil law, was finally established in 1999. And five years later,

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the expropriation clause was written into the 1982 Constitution in 2004, which articulates that in public interest and in accordance with the provisions of law, the State may expropriate or requisition land for its use and shall make compensation for the land expropriated or requisitioned. Ever since then, private ownership has been constitutionally confirmed and explicitly protected in Article 13 (3) of the 1982 Constitution. Constitutionality of Property Law After the promulgation of the Contract Law in 1999, the drafting of the Property Law has drawn the attentions of civil law scholars since 2000. The skeptics of a property law that might be unconstitutional rose after the fourth reading of the Draft, triggered by an Open Letter from Gong Xiantian, a professor from Peking University Law School. Gong enumerated five “unconstitutional” issues in the 4th Draft of Property Law and released a letter online addressing the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (“the NPCSC”) on August 12, 2005. The core argument of this Open Letter was that Property Law would unconstitutionally undermine the foundation of Socialism because it would protect the private ownership of the wealthy minority over common people if the private ownership was legally considered parallel to Socialist public ownership (Gong, 2006: 13). One deep concern of Gong, clearly presented in his Letter, was that the emphasis placed on private ownership and private property would widen the gap between the wealthy and the poor, and would eventually worsen the lasting loss of state-owned assets that had been occurring during the economic reform (Gong, 2006: 14). In order to protect state-owned assets and supervise its use, Gong urged the national legislature to stop the legislative process. Meanwhile, he also argued that experts and politicians should perform different professionalism in drafting such a crucial law, and it should be the politicians’ obligations to watch the whole picture (Gong, 2006: 15). This Open Letter has had its sweeping effect in law-making, we reckon. On September 26, the same year, Wu Bangguo, then Chairman of the NPCSC, issued three instructions on further modification of the Property Law Draft, which were concretized into three principles: adhering to the correct political direction, proceeding according to the country’s national conditions and reality, and properly handling the relationship between Property Law and other relevant laws (Wu, 2007). Since then, the 5th Review of the Property Law (Draft) did not proceed as expected, nor was

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it submitted to the NPC in 2006 for deliberation and voting as originally scheduled. After ten months of deliberation, on August 22, 2006, the Property Law (Draft) (five deliberations) was submitted to the 23rd Meeting of the NPCSC for deliberation. On October 26, the 6th Review Draft was submitted again for review. In addition to taking seriously this “unconstitutional storm,” most scholars continued to publish serious comments on the 4th, 5th, and 6th Drafts of the Property Law in special issues of such important legal journals as Chinese and Foreign Law, Global Law Review, etc. Actually, almost all leading civil law scholars have participated in this nation-wide and farreaching debate, and we can name these scholars, for example: Liang Huixing, Wang Liming, Yang Lixin, Sun Xianzhong, Yin Tian, Meng Qinguo, Chen Huabin, Liu Baoyu, Yi Jiming and Wang Yi, etc. After more than a year spent on this “unconstitutional disturbance,” academic efforts on the Property Law (Draft) gradually returned back to the right track. When explaining the Draft at the 5th Review Process, the Head of the Legal Works Committee of the NPCSC commented as follows: “adherence to our country’s basic economic system and equal protection of state property, collective property and private property are an organic whole. Without considering the former, changes will be made to the nature of socialism; without considering the latter, it will violate the principles of market economy, which in turn will undermine the basic economic system” (Zou & Wu, 2006). The Open Letter also triggered intensive debates in legal academia, even beyond civil law. For instance, the 3rd Issue of Journal of Henan Institute of Political Science and Law in 2006 which was titled “Property Law and the Construction of a Harmonious Society in China” published six papers all from the widely recognized civil law scholars, including Wang Liming, Yang Lixin, Guo Mingrui, Yin Tian, Zhao Wanyi, and Liu Jingwei. They argued that the Constitution does not implement the principle of differentiated protection of property under different ownership systems, so the Property Law (Draft) is constitutional. The 7th and 8th Issues of Legal Science in 2006 published “Reconsideration of the Constitutional Issues in the Draft of the Property Law and Their Solutions” authored by Tong Zhiwei, and “My Opinions on the ‘Unconstitutional’ Issues of the Property Law (Draft)” authored by Hao Tiechuan, both professors of constitutional law, expressing different opinions from constitutional law perspective. Tong proposed that the original intention of the Constitution was to implement differential protection of property under

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different ownership systems and further explained the unconstitutional theory (Tong, 2006). Some constitutional scholars also believed that the principle of equal protection of public property (including state and collective properties) and private property in the Property Law (Draft) was fundamentally different from the differential treatments of public property and private property in country’s Constitution. The implementation of the principle of equal protection in the Property Law (Draft) was not unconstitutional (Jiao, 2006). We should not blame the property law, but should revise the Constitution, because from legal perspective, private law was the foundation of the Constitution, and the Constitution was a sublimation of the concept of private law, and it should be unified with the principles of private law (Hao, 2006). Some other scholars took a middle way approach and believed that there are certain contradictions and frictions between “equal protection of property rights” and “sacred and inviolable public property” (Zou & Wu, 2006). Inclusion of a Separate Part on Personality Rights in the New Civil Code China initiated the compilation and codification of civil law four times in 1954, 1962, 1979, and 2001, respectively. The first three times did not involve the issue of personality rights. In the 4th edition of the Draft Civil Law in 2001, the Legal Works Committee of the NPCSC washed out on its own the idea of compiling personality rights as an independent part. In October 2014, at the 4th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, the CCP adopted the “Decision on Several Major Issues concerning Comprehensive Promotion of the Rule of Law” with the clear proposal of a “Civil Code.” On March 8, 2017, Li Jianguo, Vice Chairman of the NPCSC, made the “Explanation on the ‘General Provisions of Civil Law of the PRC (Draft)” which stated that “the Civil Code will be composed of the General Regulations Part and the separates parts. At this point, Civil Code is proposed to include these parts: Property Rights, Contracts, Tort Liability, Marriage and Family, and Inheritance [in addition to the part of General Principles].” Whether the future Civil Code should include a separate part on Personality Rights, scholars in civil law were divided. Liang Huixing, a veteran researcher from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, believed that the objects of personality rights were mainly personal interests such as

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life and health, not the interests of the relationship between people. The personality rights would only be involved in the relationship with the third party when it was infringed, but this kind of infringement could often be absorbed by the tort liability relationship (Liang, 2016: 53). In short, the protection of personality rights would be lifted to a too high level if compiled as an independent part. At the same time, Liang also tied the inclusion of personality rights to the “color revolution” triggered by the “Ukrainian Civil Code” with its independent status of personality rights, and believed that this event should serve as a warning to the Chinese legislature. Yin Tian, a professor of civil law from Peking University Law School, concurred with Liang’s opinion. Yin argued that the separate part specially reserved for personality rights would restrict the scope of protection of civil law, and this protection was mainly the application of tort liability law (Yin, 2015: 3). In an early work, he firmly held that personality rights are a legal phenomenon resulting from the existence of personality of individuals in reality, not vice versa; in nature, personality rights are constitutional (Yin, 2007: 7). Furthermore, the content of personality rights was passively defensive and thus lacked the typical behavior norms for judicial decision (Yin, 2016: 56). On the opposite side, Wang Liming strongly advocated the inclusion of personality rights as a separate part in the future Civil Code. The rationale for it could be summarized as follows: First, a separate part for personality rights is the summation of judicial practices and this legislative design would not put any limit on the open system of personality rights itself (Wang, 2018: 3). Second, the fact that civil law jurisdictions usually do not set up any separate part for personality rights should not prevent China from embracing a separate part of personality rights; in so doing, it would demonstrate the novel endeavor in compiling a socialist Civil Code (Wang, 2017a: 2). Third, such a separate part of personality rights would offer detailed protection on private rights articulated in the Constitution (Wang, 2017b: 81). Referring to foreign legislative systems, the protection of personality rights is mainly reflected and embodied in public law arena. In China, the protection is basically realized through the private law channel, which means private law has necessary room for the protection of personality rights. The reasons behind this character are mainly related to the following aspects: First, China’s Constitution has not been judicialized, or to say, is not justiciable, and as anticipated by many, this situation

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of non-justiciability would last for a long period of time in the future, which demonstrates that the protection of personality rights still needs to be realized by applying other laws. Second, although the protection of personality is also reflected in Chinese criminal law, there are too few provisions, which leads to the situation of incomplete scope of protection. As we observe, criminal law mainly serves severe punitive function, so it is still necessary to make specific provisions through private law. Third, the outcomes of many cases regarding the infringement of personality rights are not very significant, and the protection by applying public law is too strict and even too thin. In the end, resorting to private law to protect personality rights has been confirmed by legislation, and the new Civil Code has codified it as a separate part, i.e., Part IV.

Conclusions In this chapter, we have identified two general paradigm shifts across the legal scholarship and academia of legal studies in the post-1978 China: de-Sovietization and de-Marxization, one the one hand, and legalization of market economy and Westernization of law, on the other. However, it is still a debatable topic of whether the scholarship of these main research areas has successfully archived its goal of de-Sovietization and de-Marxization, and whether legalization of market economy and Westernization of law has arrived at a mature stage. In response to these inquires, Chinese legal scholars have started their search for a legal system (and legal scholarship) “with Chinese characteristics.” It is an ongoing process that is worth our continued observation. While the precondition of true paradigm shift in any area is that there does exist mature research activities and mature academia, the post-1978 Chinese legal scholarship does not really and fully meet this criterion. That said, the early immature days also constitute a pivotal stage in the growth of contemporary Chinese legal scholarship and its academia. The utmost important work that has been accomplished during such a period of time is the formation and growth of basic knowledge of law by way of borrowing and transplant under the auspices of Marxism and socialism discourse. Only through a realistic lens can we indeed discover, examine, and recognize this subtle process of paradigm shift in Chinese legal studies.

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CHAPTER 7

Three Paradigms for Studying Chinese Philosophy Ronnie Littlejohn

Introduction In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn wrote that, “The successive transition from one paradigm to another via revolution is the usual developmental pattern of mature science” (1962: 12). Since that time, the phrase “paradigm shift” has become rather commonly used and not just in philosophy. Interpreters speak of paradigm shifts in all sorts of areas: natural sciences, politics, psychology, communication, and the arts. Kuhn thought of paradigms as general understandings that provide a broad framework in which assumptions, fundamental concepts, and even methodological rules are embedded. Classic examples of paradigms taken from science include Ptolemy’s geocentric model of the universe, the medieval theory of the four “humors” in medicine, Darwin’s theory of evolution, plate tectonics in geology, Quantum mechanics, and gene theory in biology.

R. Littlejohn (B) Belmont University, Nashville, TN, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 S. Hua (ed.), Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8032-8_7

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Paradigm shifts occur when one overarching framework is replaced with another, as when Ptolemy’s geocentric model of the universe was replaced by Copernicus’s heliocentric one. Some shifts occur with urgency and rapidity; at other times they come only after resistance and as part of a more general social disorder. Shifts in paradigms bring about changes in what one actually sees or notices, or even what one takes as evidence for a belief or claim. A common example drawn from moral ethology is that before Darwin, when Descartes and others held a paradigm that conceived of nonhuman animals as “machines” without minds, persons observing primate behavior were struck by how different it was from human action, but after the publication of Origin of Species (1859), informed observers characteristically noticed the similarities to human emotions and rational behavior, not the differences. Kuhn’s approach has been appropriated to explain both entrenched views that tend to resist new discoveries and also dramatic changes representing the overturning of previous approaches and understandings. Shifts in epistemological paradigms have been particularly important to the course of global philosophy. In the West, for example, the standard empiricist conception of the verification of a claim was crucial to the emergence of critical philosophy from the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth. This paradigm carried with it an understanding of the relationship between language and the world (i.e., referential correspondence); what counts as an evidential fact, rather than a subjective opinion; and just when a claim may be said to be proven and confirmed as true. As with many paradigms before it, this empiricist frame has undergone various adjustments, some more threatening to its persistence than others. Existentialism and Pragmatism both represent significant tinkering with this paradigm, but not its complete overturn. Ludwig Wittgenstein diverged from this paradigm in the mid-twentieth century, especially in the remarks that were published under the title, On Certainty (1969). He showed convincingly that language games both within and between natural languages might express different world views and possess standards for truth that diverge from the empirical one. In this present chapter, I give attention to paradigm shifts having to do with the study of Chinese philosophy in the West. I do not address shifts within Chinese philosophy itself. I first describe the original exclusionist paradigm for studying Chinese philosophy based on the initial encounters with the tradition beginning in the late sixteenth century and extending

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until the dawn of the twenty first century. Next, I turn to a substantial shift away from the exclusionist model and toward the comparative philosophy paradigm. Finally, I conclude by suggesting that the study of Chinese philosophy in the West is now in the beginning stages of a third paradigm shift which I call constructionist philosophy. This essay provides a survey of these changes in paradigm by first addressing the basis for and practice of the exclusion of Chinese philosophy from “true” philosophy in the West. This approach may be called the original paradigm for approaching the study of Chinese philosophy. It is defined by the marginalization of Chinese texts and thinkers and the exclusion of Chinese philosophy from the discipline and activity of Western philosophy itself. The construction of this paradigm began with the translation of a small group of Chinese philosophical texts into Western languages and the location of these works with respect to the intellectual terrain of Western thought. These early Western language translations formed the basis for understanding Chinese philosophy from the beginning of the eighteenth century through the early twentieth century. The result of the position taken by the philosophers who crafted the exclusionist paradigm was that Chinese philosophy was marginalized and led to claims that the Chinese actually did not actually “do philosophy,” because philosophy was understood as a particular method for approaching fundamental questions, marked most dominantly by identifying which of these could be answered only by rigorous argument. Under this paradigm, Western philosophers and professional scholarly journals and associations ignored, overlooked, and sometimes actively suppressed the study of and dialog with Chinese philosophical texts and figures. The construction of the second paradigm for approaching the study of Chinese philosophy was marked by the emergence of the subdiscipline of comparative philosophy in the Western academy. A few philosophers of Chinese ancestry made their way into U.S. academic programs and they insisted on the intentional recognition of the value of Chinese thought to a dialog with Western thinkers and traditions. A new generation of scholars who studied with these pioneers crafted the discipline of comparative philosophy which did not seek to establish the superiority of Western philosophy, but actively engaged Chinese philosophy as a corrective to Western traditions and as a viable content for dealing with philosophy’s fundamental questions. There is an emerging third paradigm for the study of Chinese philosophy developing from the growing appreciation for the full range of

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Chinese philosophical traditions and the serious ways in which Chinese thought has been understood through the work of comparative philosophers. I call this paradigm “constructionist philosophy.” This third paradigm is not directed toward some new theory that unlocks all the riddles or solves all the quandaries arising from comparative philosophical work. Instead, the goal is to create a different sort of philosopher. These new philosophers bend language and culture. They do not so much inhabit one or both of the standpoints represented by the traditions from which they draw, as they give birth to an emerging standpoint different from both the history of Chinese philosophy and that of Western philosophy.

The Exclusionist Paradigm for Approaching Studies of Chinese Philosophy It is perhaps strange that the appreciation for Chinese philosophy was actually greatly hampered in the West by the fact that Chinese philosophy was excluded from philosophical discourse and critical study beginning as early as the eighteenth century. Indeed, among the great philosophers of the West, there were many who were deliberately dismissive of nonWestern philosophies and Chinese philosophy specifically. It was G.W.F. Leibniz (1646–1716) who was the first Western philosopher to take a substantial interest in China (Mungello 1977, 1979: 659). His writings on China were most fully developed in Novissima Sinica (i.e., Latest News from China, 1699) in which he argued that human civilization and refinement were concentrated in two cultures: Europe and China (Leibniz 1994: 45–46). While Leibniz held that Europe was superior to China in science and mathematics, he wrote that the Chinese were far ahead of Europe in precepts of civil life. “[C]ertainly they surpass us (though it is almost shameful to confess this) in practical philosophy, that is, in the precepts of ethics and politics adapted to the present life and use of morals (Leibniz 1994: 46–47).” Leibniz observed to his European readers, “We need missionaries from the Chinese (Leibniz 1994: 51).” By 1708, Leibniz actually began to set the tone for two hundred years of exclusion of Chinese thought from Western philosophical discourse by reducing Confucianism to social morality. In making such a move, Leibniz was swimming in the river of the growing criticism of changes in morality and sociocultural practices in Europe and England which regarded them as deviations from the transcultural, universal norms confirmed by their presence in China (Li 2011; Lach 1965; Mungello 1999). Nonetheless,

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Leibniz thought that the cultural and moral richness of the Chinese was not indicative of actual philosophy. He claimed, “Among the Chinese, I believe, neither history nor criticism nor philosophy are sufficiently developed (Leibniz 1994: 71).” Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) lectured frequently on Chinese moral philosophy in his annual physical geography course. In an unpublished version of these lectures, he stated: Philosophy is not to be met with in the entire orient. … Their teacher Confucius lectures in his writings on nothing but moral precepts for princes…. This entire nation is incapable of rising to that which is noble and concerns duty, and the entire ethics of Confucius consists in moral maxims that are unbearable, because every individual can reel them off. Studies are required in order to arrive at the idea and incentive of the good, of which they know nothing. (Von Glasenapp 1954: 103–104)

Kant considered Confucian thought to be little more than common etiquette, and he referred to Daoism as “the monster system” of Laozi. He held that Laozi had taught that nothingness was the highest good, advocating as his philosophy of life a perpetual nonaction. Such a reading revealed either Kant’s unwillingness or disinterest in trying to understand the extremely important notion of wu-wei 無為 (Von Glasenapp 1954: 104). G.W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) seemed prepared to take Daoist thought more seriously and it appears that his work on the tradition benefited from a direct knowledge of the Daodejing. He even drew tentative parallels between Daoism and pre-Socratic philosophy. But Hegel consigned Daoism to “philosophy’s infancy,” saying in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy that it was stuck in an elementary stage of Spirit (Clarke 2000: 41). Of Confucius, Hegel wrote in 1892, He [Confucius] is hence only a man who has a certain amount of practical and worldly wisdom with whom there is no speculative philosophy. We may conclude from his original works that for reputation it would have been better had they never been translated. (Hegel 1996: 120–121)

There are two overarching explanations for the strength of the exclusionist paradigm. First, a great deal of the Early Modern and Enlightenment periods both on the Continent and in England was feeling the oats of empiricism. David Hume’s (1711–1776) distinctions between

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fact and value and the skepticism that lay at the end of his applications of empirical data were mirrored by John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic (1843), Bertrand Russell’s Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922). Western philosophy carved a rigorous correspondence theory of truth that relegated Daoism to mysticism or religious nonsense and locked Confucianism into its place as a social etiquette. A second explanation for why Chinese philosophy was excluded from philosophy proper by Western philosophers was the sheer lack of familiarity with both the history and range of issues addressed in Chinese philosophical texts. The Jesuit focus on Confucian thought had a profound influence in the West, with the first Latin publication in Europe of the Analects (Lunyu), the Great Learning (Daxue), and the Zhongyong in Philippe Couplet’s Confucius Sinarum Philosophus (Confucius, the Philosopher of China, 1687) (Meynard 2015). Moreover, the first English translation of the Analects was not done until the nineteenth century by Joshua Marshman (1809). Later, David Collie’s, The Chinese Classical Work Commonly Called the Four Books (1828) was followed by Legge’s, Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean. The Chinese Classics (1861b). The foundational texts of Daoism were much more difficult than those of Confucius to squeeze into the interpretation of Chinese thought as evidences of universal patterns for social life. Couplet tried to salvage Daoism as a social ethic by following the Jesuit line that the Daodejing’s daojia 到家 was fundamentally different than the superstitious and fictitious religious practice the missionaries had observed in China (daojiao 道教) (Harper 2019: 32). In fact, making this difference in the history of Daoism was advocated as well by Legge and continues to shape English language reception of Daoism in Western scholarship down to the present day. The earliest Western translation of the Daodejing was a Latin version produced by Jesuit missionaries in China and presented to the Royal Asiatic Society by Matthew Raper in 1788. The text was later made available in French translation (1842) by Remusat’s successor, Stanislas Julien (d. 1873), but the first English version was not produced until that of John Chalmers (1868), followed by Legge’s translation in 1891. The Zhuangzi was regarded as a much less important Chinese text than either the Analects or the Daodejing. It presented philosophy through a medium that intentionally set aside logical argumentation, providing an

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additional reason for its exclusion (see the Qi wulun 齊物論 chapter). Frederic Balfour made the earliest English translation of Zhuangzi in 1881 and in his introduction to his 1894 work on other Daoist texts, he wrote: The descent from these sublime and simple ethics (i.e., of Daodejing and Zhuangzi) during the Han and succeeding dynasties was fatally rapid. They soon became obscured in a mist of hocus-pocus and imposture, in which idolatry, the prolongation of life, the elixir of immortality and the transmutation of metals played a prominent part. With this degraded phase of Taoism we have nothing whatever to do…The “orthodox” theories of the Rationalist (i.e., Confucian) school have surely had an ample share of attention from Western scholars, while the independent doctrines of the rival teachers remained for a long time neglected. And yet the Naturalists (i.e, Daoists) are far bolder and more original in thought than the Rationalists; they are trammeled by no slavish reverence for departed kings and exploded platitudes; their minds are free, their theories striking, and their practice pure. (Balfour 1975: vi)

Balfour’s translation of Zhuangzi was followed by those of Herbert Giles (1889) and Legge (1891) (Komjathy 2003). Of the Zhuangzi, Legge held a different view of Zhuangzi than did Balfour: “The brilliant pages of Kwang-tze [Zhuangzi] contain little more than his ingenious defense of his master’s [Laozi’s] speculations, and an aggregate of illustrative narratives…in themselves for the most part unbelievable, often grotesque and absurd” (Legge 1891: 39). So, what we may call “the exclusionist canon of Chinese philosophical texts” that came into the hands of Western thinkers was severely limited both in number and range of content. It is clear that some major works that would have delivered a very different view of Chinese philosophy were simply unknown in translation until the twentieth century. The most important of these is definitely the Mozi. Mozi was available to Western philosophers of the nineteenth century in only fragmentary forms. In fact, the first complete English translation of Mozi was not until Ian Johnston’s (2010). Legge included three chapters in his work on the Mengzi (1861a), but these were chosen only because they contained Mozi’s remarks on universal love (jian ai 兼愛). A few scattered passages were translated into German by Ernst Faber in 1877 and J.J.M. De Groot’s rendering of the chapter on “Moderation in Funerals” came out in 1892. Only one version of Mozi was extensive and that

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was Alfred Forke’s (1922) German one, although it was still incomplete (Forke 1922). Yipao Mei published two books on Mozi in the first part of the twentieth century (1929, 1934). What was striking about Mei’s translated work is that it completely omitted Parts III and V of the Mozi, with Part III being the important early Chinese discussions of epistemology, language, and science. Indeed, these passages helped establish the arts of the debaters (bianshi 辯士) and argumentative philosophy for centuries in China. One wonders whether such a thorough exclusion of Chinese philosophy from “philosophy proper” would have been sustainable had the Mozi’s analytical sections been available to Western thinkers beginning in the eighteenth century. The accumulating effect of these two forces created the exclusionist paradigm. Two essays that shine light on the deleterious effects of this framework were written by Bryan Van Norden: “An Open Letter to the APA (1996a)” and “What Should Western Philosophy Learn from Chinese Philosophy? (1996b).” Perhaps unsurprisingly, since paradigms are often quite difficult to dislodge, Van Norden’s essays had little effect. Indeed, as recently as 2006, one of the most clearly stated understandings of the exclusionist paradigm was entitled, “On the Pseudo-profoundity of Some Eastern Philosophy.” The anonymous author wrote, “What is the sound of one hand clapping?” “What did your face look like before your ancestors were born?” These are some allegedly profound questions posed by Zen masters, as discussed in Doubt: a History, by Jennifer Hecht. It is also the sort of philo-babble that gives philosophy a bad name – and sells plenty of titles in the Eastern philosophy section of bookstores. Consider the first question: it is, in fact, utter nonsense, since clapping – by definition – requires two hands (no, you are not clapping if you bang your hand on another source, you are just making noise). The second question is nonsense on stilts, since I did not exist before my ancestors were born, and I need to exist in order to have a face. These are not questions to which it is difficult to find an answer because they are too deep, there is no answer because there is no question, and if you spend decades of your life seeking enlightenment this way, I feel sorry for all the waste of human potential. (Pigliucci 2006)

The persistence of the exclusionist paradigm for studying Chinese philosophy was recently criticized again. “[We] ask those who sincerely believe

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that it does make sense to organize our discipline entirely around European and American figures and texts to pursue this agenda with honesty and openness. We therefore suggest that any department that regularly offers courses only on Western philosophy should rename itself ‘Department of European and American Philosophy’ (Garfield and Van Norden 2016).” The article containing this criticism was translated into Chinese by Wu Wanwei (2016), but the responses from Western philosophers were dismissive. Mairead McArdle (2016) wrote, “This statement [of Garfield and Van Norden] is rather baffling since the point of philosophy is to seek the truth, not to include as many schools of thought as possible.” Robert McGarvey seemed somewhat to miss the point, as he defended the exclusion of Chinese philosophy in a circular fashion by saying that the ideas that matter in the West came from Western philosophers (McGarvey 2016). While stating his respect for “all wisdom traditions.” Kyle Peone stated bluntly, …non-Western wisdom traditions are not philosophy….What Profs. Garfield and Van Norden are proposing is not offensive because Europeans and Americans have any sort of privileged hold on truth that must not be sullied with inclusivity. It is offensive for the opposite reason: because it would be an enormous overreach on the part of philosophers to subsume all other wisdom. The philosopher can always learn something from the Taoist, as the Taoist can always learn something from the philosopher (and both can learn something from the physicist and psychologist and fine artist). But it is a mistake to think that the two are reducible, one to the other. (Peone 2016)

Van Norden gave an interview to Skye Cleary providing perhaps the strongest rejoinders to date to the claims of exclusionists that Chinese philosophy lacks logical argument and use of evidence by referring to arguments by Mencius, Hanfeizi, Fazang, Wang Yangming, Mou Zongsan, and Liu Shaoqi (Cleary 2016).

The Comparative Paradigm for Studying Chinese Philosophy While this tenacious exclusivist understanding of Chinese philosophy continues to manifest itself in all the ways that Van Norden and

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Garfield notice, a new paradigm for studying Chinese philosophy has emerged known as comparative philosophy. Studies that introduce this new paradigm and its methods include Connolly (2015) and Li and Littlejohn (2021). Also extremely helpful to an understanding of the work of comparative philosophers we should include Sor-hoon Tan’s, The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Chinese Philosophy Methodologies (2016) and Van Norden’s Taking Back Philosophy: A Multicultural Manifesto (2017). Indeed, understanding just what comparative philosophy is has been the subject of a substantial body of ongoing scholarly reflection (e.g., Krishna 1988; Larson and Deutsch 1988; Wong 1989; Balslev 1997; Neville 2001; Kupperman 2002; Shen 2003; Ni 2006; Sim 2007; Mou 2010; Struhl 2010; Cline 2013; Connolly 2015; Rosemont 2015). The comparative philosophy paradigm arose because of stresses created by the exclusionist model. Two of these stand out. Chinese philosophical works unknown in the exclusionist canon were introduced in translation and a new wave of philosophers trained in both Western and Chinese philosophy came onto the scene. Accordingly, it became clear that what was needed was not a modification of the old exclusionist paradigm, but a new set of commitments for understanding the philosophies of the West and China. The ice finally began to melt on dialog with Chinese philosophy in the West as a few philosophers of Chinese ancestry made their way into Western philosophy programs. They were committed to an intentional recognition of the value of Chinese thought and dialog with its traditions. Wing-tsit Chan (陳榮捷, 1901–1994) who trained at Harvard and served as a professor at two American universities was one of the most formidable of these scholars. He edited A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy which brought into English selections from a wide array of Chinese philosophical sources, exploding the exclusionist canon of Chinese texts. Antonio Cua (1932–2007), who did his graduate work in philosophy at University of California, Berkeley and edited the Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy also served as President for the Society of Asian and Comparative Philosophers. Feng Yu-lan (馮友蘭; 1895–1990) completed his graduate work at Columbia University with John Dewey as his supervisor. In 1934, he published his influential work, History of Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexue shi 中国哲学史) which was explicitly comparative in its presentation, often interpreting Chinese positions by reference to Western ones.

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Several early comparative studies are worth noting as examples for how this paradigm worked differently than the exclusionist one. For example, Herbert Fingarette’s (1972) comparison of transcendent understandings in the West with his construction of Confucius’s sacralizing of common life. A.C. Graham (1989) conclusively demonstrated that Chinese philosophy had a substantial and complex history of rigorous logical and philosophical argument that could be favorably compared to the West’s appreciation for evidentialism and proof. Some of the early comparative philosophical work set major thinkers such as Mencius and Aquinas in dialog (Yearley 1990). Robert Solomon (1995) undertook to do a comparative philosophical study of human emotions. David Hall and Roger Ames published several important comparative works in the 1990s (1995, 1998). The paradigm of comparative philosophy also brought forward a new set of philosophical issues with great intensity. David Wong (1989) and Alasdair Macintyre (1984, 1988) undercut the Enlightenment, Modernist, and Positivist projects by a thorough investigation of the central problem of all comparative study of Chinese philosophy: incommensurability. Other studies continue to consider metamethodological questions related to the work of comparative philosophy (Smid 2009; Connolly 2015). Among the many questions about the uniqueness of comparative philosophy as a paradigm arguably none seems as obvious as the objection that all philosophy is comparative. So, there is nothing special about comparing Chinese and Western philosophy. In fact, Robert Allinson (2001) has taken the position that comparative philosophy as an isolatable task or method for doing philosophy is quite simply a myth. Allinson’s point is that philosophers throughout history have habitually engaged the positions of other thinkers, and what we generally now call comparative philosophy is simply an extension of the range of this contrast of views to include traditions and authors such as those from China. One wishing to respond to Allinson’s position might take one or more of several approaches. For example, one may stress that in the comparative philosophy paradigm ideas derive from strikingly different cultural traditions than those found in divergent thinkers who nonetheless stand within the same culture of the West. The move across cultures made in comparative philosophy is not merely a difference in degree as Allinson seems to have thought. It is a difference in kind that shows itself in the sort of philosophical questions considered, those omitted from attention, the kinds of answers that are proffered by philosophers of varying cultures

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and what it might entail to find one, and even whether one should be looking for an “answer” at all. For example, a comparative philosopher might point out that it really makes no sense to ask what view Confucius held of democracy. There is nothing in his worldview to suggest that the people should rule and certainly not by voting. The particular forms of incommensurability that arise in comparing philosophical traditions from different cultures and those from the same reveal that differences in degree may, indeed, become differences in kind. Of course, engaging philosophical works even within a single cultural tradition may require the use of more than one language, as Allison notes. English speaking philosophers in the West often depend on translations of Kant or Rousseau, and non-English speaking scholars look to their own linguistic renditions of Hume and Locke. This need for translation invites one to think that perhaps Allison is right and there is no real philosophical distinction to make between comparative philosophy across cultural traditions and comparing philosophers within the same cultural frame, but who speak different languages. However, consider that the comparative philosopher Henry Rosemont argued that Chinese philosophical texts lacked completely certain important philosophical concepts found in all Western philosophical grammars (e.g., “the Good,” “Truth,” and “God”). Rosemont held that there was no lexical item corresponding to “moral” in classical Chinese, but also there was none for “freedom,” “choice,” “duty,” “rights,” “dilemma,” “individualism,” “autonomy,” or “ought” (1986: 206). He went on to identify the concept-cluster doing the work of moral appraisal in Confucian ethics as including terms like junzi 君子 (exemplary person), shengren 聖人 (sage), li 禮 (ways of propriety), dao 道 (the Way), ren 仁 (humaneness), yi 義 (appropriateness), shu 恕 (reciprocity), xiao 孝 (filial piety), xin 信 (trustworthiness, sincerity), and de 德 (virtuous efficacy) (1986: 204). Other samples of comparative philosophy that address whether there are deep incommensurabilities between Chinese philosophy and the West include Raphals (2015) and Rosemont (2004). Philosophers working within the paradigm of comparative philosophy have developed analyzes that consider the criticism of both philosophical views internal to a tradition and external to it. Internal criticism takes note of the tradition’s richness of philosophical viewpoints and sets aside reductionist beliefs that regard the history of Chinese philosophy as monolithic. Such examination is necessary both to understand the full range of positions available for comparison and also to reveal

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the lines of argument and justification used in a tradition to advocate for the preferability of one position rather than another. For example, Chinese philosophers themselves routinely disagree about how Xunzi’s philosophy of human nature should be understood—does he really mean that all persons are born evil, or does he mean only that all persons are born with an inclination to pursue their own self-interest? In contrast, external criticism of philosophical views is what one most readily thinks of regarding comparative philosophy; namely, given divergent positions across cultures, which ones are philosophically preferable. The external comparative task is one that not only weighs alternative positions, but also must come to some rapprochement about the criteria for preference (e.g., the benefit or pragmatic yield of a position vis a viz its truth, and what truth means comparatively). For example, comparative philosophers may wonder how we should evaluate Wang Chong’s epistemology relative to Plato’s since Wang that argues for the categories of justified belief (i.e., knowledge), demonstrated falsehoods, and xu beliefs (i.e., beliefs lacking sufficient evidence to be considered true, but which are emotionally seductive and continue to be embraced because of our sentimental attachment to them). An important development in the comparative dialog between Chinese and Western philosophy has occurred within the last decade in China. Several prominent universities in China have begun graduate programs in philosophy which are both taught in English and also richly engage Western and Chinese traditions. These M.A. programs focus on both Chinese Philosophy and Comparative Philosophy. In fact, we may consider this particular model at the university level to truly be “the cutting edge” of Comparative Philosophy in the twenty first century. The number of philosophical journals distinctively committed to comparative philosophy has expanded since Van Norden’s first criticisms (1996a) to include, Philosophy East and West, Dao: A Journal in Comparative Philosophy, Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy, and Comparative and Continental Philosophy. The Society of Asian and Comparative Philosophy now convenes its own sections in the annual meetings of the American Philosophical Association, the American Academy of Religion and the Association of Asian Studies, as do the Association of Chinese Philosophers of America, and the International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophies. Some publishers have also created monograph and edited book series specifically

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devoted to Comparative Philosophy. The State University of New York (SUNY) is well known for two of its series: “Asian Studies Development” and “Chinese Philosophy and Culture.” The Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy series has published some of the most highly recognized recent comparative philosophical collections. Bloomsbury Publishing is building a significant list of works on Chinese and Comparative Philosophy. Some of the most recent specialized conferences featuring comparative dialog between Chinese and Western philosophy include the following. “What Makes Us Human? Philosophical and Religious Perspectives in China and the West” was held at the Central European University in the summer of 2016 in Budapest, Hungary. The Sungkyun Institute for Confucian Studies and East Asian Philosophy (SKKU) hosted an International Conference on the theme “Confucianism, Buddhism, and Kantian Moral Theory” in September 2019. In the summer of 2019, the conference, “Comparative Philosophy Forum” was held in Beijing. Also in 2019, East China Normal University in Shanghai sponsored the conference “Beyond Comparisons: Chinese Philosophy Today.” The Chinese University of Hong Kong sponsored a conference devoted to the work of Michael Slote, entitled “Slote Encountering Chinese Philosophy.” Papers have found their way from these conferences into books and journals on a staggering array of topics in the comparison of Chinese and Western philosophy (Carr and Ivanhoe 2010; King and Schilling 2011; Huang 2020). Arguably, the most important ongoing international internet blog forum for dialog on Chinese and Comparative Philosophy is Warp, Weft, and Way (http://warpweftandway.com). While not an internet blog, another kind of intellectual community emerged in Beijing in 2010 called, ThinkIN (http://www.thinkinchina.asia/). It has occupied a space to express comparisons between Chinese and Western philosophy very broadly and outside of conventional university curriculum and academic publishing and conferences.

The Constructionist Paradigm It has been evident for two decades that a third paradigm shift has been occurring in the study of Chinese philosophy. Taking a rather ready-made label, some philosophers have called this shift simply, “Beyond Comparative Philosophy.” For reasons I will make clear below, I much prefer a more descriptive label for this new paradigm. I call it “Constructionist

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Philosophy.” While Bo Mou (2010) sets out what he calls “constructiveengagement” as a method for approaching differing philosophical cultural traditions, I hold that the constructionist paradigm is not so much marked by any specific approach to philosophical method or even the requirement of attention to some specified content. It is represented by a shift in the kind of philosopher that makes the texts he/she compares live again, often in new vocabularies. It is not some new theory that unlocks all the riddles or solves all the quandaries arising from comparative philosophy. Instead, this paradigm is marked by the emergence of a different sort of philosopher. These new philosophers bend language and philosophical culture. They do not so much inhabit one or both of the standpoints represented by the traditions from which they draw, as they give birth to a new way of seeing the human condition. They take a move toward novelty and originality informed by comparative study. Philosophers working in a constructionist paradigm lay no claim to a “view from nowhere,” but rather exploit and recreate the “view from many” texts and traditions. Here we can bring forward a remark by Roger Ames, who may be regarded as a constructionist in my sense, and not a mere comparativist philosopher (Behuniak 2019). In one of his answers to his critics in the work Confucian Role Ethics (2011), Ames argues that the philosopher’s task in approaching texts from different cultural traditions is not a passive one. Try as we might, we cannot avoid to some degree “making up” our interpretation and “making over” the text with it. But at the same time, one way or another, there is always the possibility of enlarging the meaning of the text in making it our own. To thus “appreciate” the text means not only to become aware of its scale and sophistication, but also to become creatively responsive to it, and in the process of becoming intimate with it, to add our own unique value that expands the text further. (2011: 39)

Philosophers working in a constructionist paradigm enter as dialogical partners with the texts, traditions, and the philosophical communities they are comparing in order to create a new understanding that is not reducible to the meaning of any single text. Ames speaks of his activity as “appreciating” the texts, in the double meaning of admiring them and also adding to them. For constructionist philosophers, this appreciation may reach down to the appropriation and revision of use of concepts and terms drawn from a text, whether Chinese or Western. The focus is not so much lexical, deriving meaning only from the dictionary, but

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learning to appropriate and use the term in new contexts and for enlarged purposes. Ames draws on A.N. Whitehead’s remarks, aligning himself with the “speculative school” in the following. The Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary divides philosophers into two schools, namely, the “Critical School” which repudiates speculative philosophy, and the “Speculative School” which includes it. The critical school confines itself to verbal analysis within the limits of the dictionary. The speculative school appeals to direct insight, and endeavours to indicate its meanings by further appeal to situations which promote such specific insights. It then enlarges the dictionary. The divergence between the schools is the quarrel between safety and adventure. (Whitehead 1938: 173)

An important example of a monograph working in the area of constructionist philosophy is Edward Slingerland’s, Trying not to Try: Ancient China, Modern Science, and the Power of Spontaneity. This work is an intentional effort to appreciate the ancient Chinese concepts wu-wei and de by the employment of contemporary cognitive science. Likewise, the essays in P.J. Ivanhoe, et al., The Oneness Hypothesis: Beyond the Boundary of the Self (2018) were collected to prepare for a constructionist result. The aim of this volume is focused on describing versions of the oneness hypothesis as found in a variety of philosophical, religious, and psychological writings, evaluating their plausibility, and exploring some of their major implications. We intend this anthology to serve as an important first step in the larger project of developing a new and psychologically well-grounded model for reflecting on conceptions of the good human life and, in particular, our relationship to and responsibility for the rest of the natural world that can inform and guide a wide range of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. (Ivanhoe et al., 2018: 2)

The constructionist paradigm is something more and other than seeking a consensus or middle ground between philosophical traditions of different cultures. While comparative philosophy may indeed reveal a kind of sweet spot of phenomenological universals in the intersection of the venn diagram of traditions, the constructionist draws not merely on the commonalities, but also the profound differences between traditions,

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using these as inspiration for inventing philosophical views. Henry Rosemont may also be classified as a philosopher working in the constructivist paradigm. Speaking of his work, Rosemont wrote, Some Western philosophical concepts will, and should remain with us; some others will have to be stretched, bent, and/or extended significantly in order to represent more accurately non-Western concepts and conceptclusters; and still other Western philosophical concepts may have to be abandoned altogether in favor of others not yet extant, but which will issue from future research as new (and old) concept-clusters are advanced and examined. (1991: 94)

Speaking of the role of translation to his project against Western individualism, Rosemont took a decidedly constructionist position. He wrote, But even if we are both [i.e., Ames and Rosemont] interpretively mistaken in attributing an ethics of roles to the early Confucians, it would not alter my basic position about the importance of challenging individualism and advancing an ethics of roles, for I could simply re-title this work “Role Ethics: A Different Approach to Moral Philosophy Based on a Creative Misreading of Early Confucian Writings.” (Rosemont 2015: 8)

It is perhaps somewhat shocking to hear a philosopher say bluntly that he sees his task as sometimes requiring “creative misreadings” of his sources. But Rosemont’s point was that even if it could be shown that he was wrong in any specific reading of the Confucian or Western individualist tradition, his construction of what he called “role ethics for the modern world” would still be philosophically valuable and could stand on its own merit. There is a rather serious worry that philosophers have with those who work in a constructionist paradigm as I have described it. The concern is that this new sort of philosopher may import biases or predispositions into texts and traditions that do not belong in association with them. In using a text from another tradition to create a new philosophical view one may be giving it a meaning that it did not have in the past. Some recent work reveals this concern in various ways. For example, Lauren Pfister makes a distinction between “reading a text historically” and “reading a text hermeneutically” (2006: 11–14). John Makeham speaks of the “historical” and “scriptural” meaning of the text. By “scriptural” meaning of the text he points to the ways a text’s meaning cannot be fixed even by

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its historical context, because no interpreter is immune from the ongoing process of the text’s reception and its living presence in a later appropriation (2006: 96–97). He recommends that greater emphasis should be given to understanding the scriptural meanings of the texts in the commentarial literature of the history of Chinese philosophy (Makeham 2006: 105). Just why Makeham stops here is not altogether clear to me. While the commentarial traditions on classical texts have merit and demand study, it is unclear philosophically that their interpretations can themselves be frozen or that they should be anything other than themselves a kind of constructionist reach beyond the original text to create new philosophical content. Even if we agree on what a commentator’s reading of a specific classical text is, the point on which a constructionist philosopher would insist is that a commentator’s interpretation is just one among many possible appropriations. Why should we privilege the commentator’s reading as the best or most philosophically compelling? If Zhu Xi’s context made his readings of Daoism or Confucianism particularly convincing or illuminating in his period, that does not mean that they are transferable into a contemporary context with the same efficacy. The concern that I am expressing is not that a commentator’s remarks on a classical text might be wrong. I mean rather that they represent only one appropriation of the text within the broader stream of the tradition of interpretation. I think this has very convincingly been demonstrated by Makeham (2004, 2006), Ivanhoe (2002), Littlejohn (2018), and MacIntyre (1984, 1988).

Conclusion I would like to say that those working in the constructionist paradigm always “appreciate” the text in the two senses Ames means. Unfortunately, sometimes there is misunderstanding and some readings seem far removed from the text. But the most significant challenge to philosophizing within the constructionist paradigm has been expressed by one of America’s most careful and courageous interpreters of Daoism: Russell Kirkland (2008). Kirkland holds that there is a quandary that philosophers face in exploring classical texts and it may be stated simply and clearly. Classical Chinese texts deserve to be understood and respected in their own right and not for any “scriptural,” “edifying,” or constructionist use they can have for us. He explains that the idea that ancient philosophers considered their thoughts applicable to persons who would

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live thousands of years later in a world that they could not even imagine is wildly absurd. He doubts that any of the classical texts were written to help us with our lives or even to have some enduring message for generations beyond those most immediate to the text. He thinks that they should be approached as texts from an alien culture, in a distant age and that studying them means exploring an alien world….not ourselves. From his viewpoint, a constructivist approach rips the classical texts from their moorings in Chinese culture and society and recreates the text as some idealized image made to speak to moderns and post-moderns (Kirkland 2008: 152). However, at the most basic level, whether source authors or editors of classical Chinese texts had any idea that their ideas would be appropriated twenty centuries later or regarded as existentially valuable for persons living in a world and time they could not even imagine may not be relevant after all. It must finally be said that persons philosophize with Chinese texts in a dialogical relationship. Philosophers are not interested exclusively in the text for itself. Nevertheless, the text as analyzed historically and critically must be a dialogical partner even within the constructionist paradigm. P.J. Ivanhoe argues that as we join the ongoing tradition of interpretation and commentary with classical philosophical texts, it is our responsibility to make a case for the connection of the particular construction we espouse and the text with which it is connected. He understands this process to be very much like building evidence in a courtroom, accounting for as many facts as possible and weaving them into a coherent and comprehensive story (2012: 310). My own view of the role of the classical text in the constructionist process is that it should provide resistance, guidance, and correction, just as the creation of understanding between speaker and hearer occurs in everyday discourse. The philosophers of classical China may have had no notion of the reach of their ideas into the twenty first century, but quite apart from what they believed to be the scope and force of their ideas, if generations of interpreters down to our own period have found various of these arguments for how to live, construct governments, and think of our relation to nature of value, then this is the ongoing story of their reach across the ages and a rewarding way to study Chinese philosophy.

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CHAPTER 8

One County, Many Paradigms: Diversity in China Political Studies John James Kennedy and Rigao Liu

Introduction No single paradigm guides China scholars in 2021. This is due to the wide range of theoretical frameworks and approaches to the study of China’s political development. China scholars from the 1950s and into the 1990s were able to identify paradigms, but the dramatic increase in the number of political scientists studying China since 2000 has generated a large array of theories and approaches across China, North America, Europe and the globe. Thus the political science subfield maybe too broad and diverse to identify a single China paradigm. Rather than attempting to generate a new paradigm, it may be better to accept the wide-ranging sub-fields and approaches to the study of China’s political development and global influence. One of the key aspects of a paradigm is an accepted theoretical framework for a field of study that guides the production of knowledge (Kuhn

J. J. Kennedy (B) · R. Liu Department of Political Science, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 S. Hua (ed.), Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8032-8_8

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2012). This requires clear communication between scholars and a general understanding as well as acceptance of approaches, methods and a theoretical framework. However, achieving a consensus regarding theory and methods is becoming more allusive as China field expands with increasing number of scholars from various countries with diverse academic training. From the 1950s to the 1980s, the production of knowledge—mostly journal and book publications in English—regarding China’s domestic political development and international influence came from scholars in North American and European academic institutions and research centers. These scholars had political science training and resources from top universities. In the 1990s and 2000s, more scholars within China were developing research centers and subfield knowledge production in English and Chinese. In addition, foreign academics also had greater access to China and Chinese academic institutions. This led to research collaborations and exchanges as well as the introduction and training of North American and European political science theories and research methods. This typically occurred in China’s top east coast universities and produced English and Chinese publications. At the same time, scholars trained in Chinese universities with little or no foreign collaboration focused on more indigenous theories and approaches to the study of China’s political development. These research centers and universities are usually in central or western China and mostly generated Chinese publications. Over the years, English and Chinese scholarship on China has increased exponentially since 1950s with a sharp rise after 2000, and 2010. A simple search in Google Scholar reveals the increase in the number of published articles on “Political Science” and the “People’s Republic of China” since the 1950s. Figure 8.1 shows a sharp increase over the last several decades. The figure shows the results of the Google Scholar search for publications in each decade such as 1950–1960, 1961–1970 and so on. The numbers are not cumulative. In the 1950s and into the 1970s, most scholars were publishing in English from North America and Europe. Moreover, there were relatively few people researching the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with just of few hundred published works. The opening of the PRC after 1980 reflects expanding primary data sources and access to the PRC and in turn more publications. However, the PRC entrance into the World Trade Organization, rapid economic growth and the “rise of China” generated greater interest in China studies in North America, Europe and Australia. This translated into a sharp increase in China scholars and an increase in scholarship (i.e.,

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Fig. 8.1 Number of articles and books in Google scholar for “Peoples’ Republic of China” and “political science” from 1950–2021 in English (Source Google Scholar search January 2021)

production of knowledge) especially after 2010. The over 15,000 English publications produced between the years 2011–2021 reflect the broad spectrum of scholarship from a wide range of scholars. When examining Chinese publications, we observe the same pattern. Figure 8.2 displays the number of publications through a Google Scholar search in Chinese. There is a sharp increase in publications after 2000. While some of these 5,680

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publications are translations of English works, most of these publications tend to be original research.1 While the number of articles and China scholars increases, there is a huge difference between scholars inside and outside China regarding theories and explanations of China’s political development. In addition, there is also a variation in theories and methods among China scholars inside the PRC as well as diverse approaches among China scholars within North America and Europe. Thus, we cannot easily place scholars into “East” and “West” categories, and a unified theory or approach to China’s political development and global influence is difficult to achieve. In addition, most studies in English rarely discuss the production of knowledge coming from African, South Asian and Latin American scholars. Since 2000, universities in African nations, South Asia and Central and South America have established China academic programs and research centers. While the increase in the presence of Confucius Institutes (CIs) in these regions has gained much attention, China academic programs and research centers are not the same as CIs. The mission of CIs is to introduce Chinese language and culture. Teaching language and culture is the main goal and this is why the management of the international CIs are through Hanban and the Ministry of Education in the PRC. However, the mission of these public and private university academic programs and research centers on China is to teach students how to critically evaluate and study China as well as producing knowledge. Over the years, many non-North American, nonEuropean and non-Chinese universities have been developing their own China programs with domestically and “western” trained China scholars as well as nationals who studied in China and returned to a university in their home country to teach and conduct research on China. A similar Google Scholar search on “China and Political Science” in other languages yields the same results as in English and Chinese. In Spanish, there were 1,820 before 2000 and it is 16,400 publications after 2000. In Turkish, 57 publication before 2000 and over 5,000 after. In Indonesian, there were 167 publications before 2000 and over 13,000 after. Of course, some of these publications are translations from English to their native language. Nevertheless, the dramatic increase in native 1 We also used Baidu (百度) search engine in Chinese and there was a significantly higher number of publications, but many were on political science in China rather than political science studies on China.

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language publications after 2000 corresponds with the rise in China studies and scholarship in these countries. This suggests that the nonNorth American, non-European and non-Chinese scholars are producing knowledge on China’s political development and international influence. Thus, we observe a very large and diverse group of China scholars who approach the study of China in many different ways suggesting one country with many paradigms. The first section of this chapter examines Chinese scholars and the development of political science in the PRC. There are two general groups of scholars in China political studies. First are the foreign-trained Chinese scholars, who have received their doctorates in North America, Europe or Australia and returned to China, applying “western” theories and methodologies to the China case. The main approach is deductive hypothesis testing. Second are indigenous trained Chinese scholars, who reject using China as a test case for “western” theories, and focus on China’s exceptionalism. They adopt a more inductive and hypothesis generating approach. While the “historical political” (lishizhengzhi) approach is currently gaining popularity in political science departments, there is no accepted paradigm of China politics studies in China. The second section considers the first, second and third generations of China scholars in North America and Europe. Each generation is defined by a specific paradigm and the increasing number of China scholars in the field. The totalitarian model is expressed in the first and second generation (1960s and 1970s), while the state and society paradigm reflects the third generation (1980s and 1990s). However, the increase in the scholarship and diversity of theories and approaches suggest no identifiable fourth or fifth generation of China scholars. As a result, there is no single generally accepted paradigm, but rather an array of theories and approaches. The final section investigates the developing China programs and scholars in African, Latin American and South Asian universities (i.e., non-North American, non-European and non-China). These scholars have received little attention. Although there are still relatively few China scholars in these countries, they have a growing regional and international academic and policy influence on China studies.

Chinese China Scholars from the Inside Out While universities had departments and schools of Politics and Marxism in the 1950s and 1960s, for China scholars in the PRC, the study of

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political science and development of academic departments and research centers did not begin until the introduction of economic reforms in the 1980s. For example, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences established the Institute of Political Science in 1985. At the same time, the institute launched the journal Political Science Research (zhengzhixueyanjiu). From the 1980s and after 2000, a division among Chinese political scientists took shape. Some scholars went overseas to North America, Europe and Australia to study political science and China studies then returned to Chinese universities to teach and start their own research centers. These scholars designed academic programs around North American and European research methods and approaches. Other Chinese scholars received their degrees in China and started their own research centers and academic programs. Many of the first China scholars to study in North America in the 1980s (post Cultural Revolution) did not return to China. These scholars found professional or academic jobs in the United States, Canada and Europe (White 2009). However, several scholars did return to China to start some of the earliest “western” inspired research centers (Yang and Li 2009). Indeed, China’s top universities recruited these westerntrained scholars and encouraged the establishment of research centers as well as published research in top English journals and book publishers. One of the most prominent scholars and centers is Shen Mingming and Research Center for Contemporary China (RCCC) at Peking University (Beida). In 1982, Professor Shen received his undergraduate degree at Beida in politics and then went to the University of Michigan to pursue a PhD. He received his doctorate in political science in 1994 and that same year he established the RCCC. His research publications and collaborations with North American scholars reflect the China political studies paradigm at the time especially state-society relations and democratization literature. China is viewed as a case to test North American theories based on the accepted paradigm (i.e., hypothesis testing). This included a fruitful collaboration with the RCCC and the University of Michigan for the Beijing Area Surveys as well as Ronald Inglehart and the World Values Survey (Dowd et al. 1999; Eldersveld and Shen 2001). Although these surveys applied rigorous sampling methods, interviewer training and questionnaire design, the RCCC faced significant institutional and political limitations regarding the contents of the surveys and questions asked (Landry and Shen 2005). In fact, all the returning scholars had to deal with this challenge.

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In recent years, a number of Chinese nationals have received their PhDs in North America and Europe and returned to teach and conduct research at China universities. These scholars have contributed much to the political science literature on China in English and Chinese. There are many examples. Professor Xi Tianyang completed his undergraduate and Masters at Fudan University then he went to New York University to complete his PhD in political science. In 2013, he took a position at National School of Development, Peking University. His research follows the accepted North American and European paradigm examining China’s state-society relations as well as state institutions and bureaucracy (Xi 2019). He has published in top English journals such as Comparative Political Studies and top Chinese journals such as Journal of Public Management. Professor Liu Yu completed her doctorate at the department of political science of Columbia University in 2006. She then accepted a tenure track position at Tsinghua University. Her research and published work in English follows the general democratization and statesociety paradigm examining the China case (Liu 2017; Liu and Chen 2012). She has published in top English journal on China and political science such as The China Quarterly, Modern China, Social Science Quarterly and Foreign Affairs. By 2010s, many political science department in China’s the top universities have North American or European trained PhDs teaching in their departments. The North American and European paradigm also disseminates in China through a number of joint positions or strong affiliations between China scholars based in American universities and China schools and research centers. For example, Professor Guo Sujian is the Dean of the Institute for Advanced Study in Social Science (IASSS) at Fudan University and he is a professor in the Department of Political Science at San Francisco State University. In addition, the majority of the academic advisory committee members for IASSS received their doctorate degrees in North American or European universities. Zhong Yang is a professor at University of Tennessee and affiliated with the School of International and Public Affairs at Shanghai Jiaotong University. Professor Lü Jie has a tenure position at American University and he is associated with Renmin University (Renda). Renda also hosts the China General Social Survey (CGSS) that started in 2003. The CGSS is a national representative survey project with a survey conducted about every two years. One of the principle investigators is Bian Yanjie who is also a professor at University of Minnesota. The CGSS survey is a remarkable resource for scholars inside

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and especially outside of China. The survey questions mostly address research topics related to state-society relations and political behavior that allow researchers to treat China as a case to test North American and European political theories (i.e., the accepted paradigm). In fact, out of 15 members of the CGSS Consultant Committee only two are from mainland China universities and nine are from American universities. Indeed, foreign researchers often find it easier to collaborate with North American and European trained scholars in China’s top universities. Research publications from these “western” trained scholars in China as well as their partnerships with foreign researchers have led to the production of knowledge on China focusing on accepted paradigm at the time. The research approach is hypothesis testing and most of the theories are derived from North American and European theories of modernization, democratization and civil society. However, these “western” trained scholars do not represent all China scholars or research produced on political science in China. A number of China scholars have embraced an alternative approach to studying political development and governance in China. While most “western” trained scholars in PRC view China as a case to test western theories (i.e., hypothesis testing), a set of China scholars have adopted an inductive or hypothesis generating approach (Guo 2018). This reflects the nativist or indigenous school Xiangtu that includes sociology and political science. Much of this research examines local governance and takes the holistic approach to studying society in China. The leading scholars are He Xuefeng, Xu Yong and Tong Zhihui. These scholars reject the notion of China as a test case and “western” theories of democratization and authoritarian resilience as well as state and society relations. Instead, they view China as a unique cultural, social and political phenomenon. From this view, it is imperative to generate new theories and explanations from China’s cultural and historical experience as well as current practice. Understanding practice requires information and data from in-depth interviews, ethnographies, observations, surveys and archives. For example, North American and European scholars have studied village elections for over three decades. The research focuses on election process and outcomes including post-election governance and the relationship between elected village leaders, village party secretary and villagers (O’Brien and Han 2009; Guan 2018). The theoretical explanations tend to follow democratization, institutionalization and modernization (the three “zations”). The data may be quantitative, such

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as surveys and economic data, or qualitative, such as interviews and observations, but the goal is the same to isolate variables of interest to determine causation. However, scholars that adopt the indigenous (xiangtu) paradigm do not dissect the village election experience for narrow hypothesis tests, but rather they examine the whole experience and practice within the political, cultural and historical context (Tong 2019; Xing 2009; Xu 2004; He 2016, 2002). From their perspective, this is a more “unified” approach to studying China’s political development and local governance. For example, Xing (2009) suggests that rather than examining village elections, scholars should focus on the cultural, historical and institutional influence on village governance. The complexity of village politics, elections and governance is understood through careful analysis and observation of villagers, families, social organizations, local cadres and the natural environment.2 Another Chinese paradigm is the historical political approach. One of the leading scholars in this movement is Yang Guangbin a Professor and Dean of the School of International Studies at Renmin University. Historical politics examines the ontology and epistemological development of political ideas and behavior that are unique to China (and other countries). History is a way to examine the origin and evolution of ideas, systems and behaviors that affect current political, economic and social relations. These scholars emphasize the importance of time and context in their political analysis. Yang (2019: 3) suggests “Considering China’s tradition of ‘governance’ since ancient times, historical politics is China’s political science, or at least a new way to develop Chinese political science.” In a recent article, Xu and Yang (2019) examine the origins of political civilization and the continuation of political values and behavior from the Zhou Dynasty (1046–771 BC). This is not a historical account of the Zhou Dynasty or leadership, but an analysis of the values and ethics that developed at the time and influenced political consciousness. While some of these scholars examine the political continuities from previous dynasties, others focus on how these ideas and values influence modern leaders. Ren (2019) shows how the historical accumulation of political knowledge influences modern Chinese academics. He 2 Guo Sujian provides a good overview of the debate between western and indigenous theories and approaches to Chinese political science (see Guo 2018). He also examines ways to integrate and balance the two approaches through “Glocalising” (see Wang and Guo 2019). This is an important debate, but it is beyond the scope of this chapter.

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examines Liang Qichao (1873–1929) who was one of the pioneers of modern Chinese political science. Ren suggests that despite the introduction to western theories and ideals during the late Qing and early Republican period, Liang’s traditional education and practice reflects the conscious maintenance of the inherent historical values and governance. He attempts to establish the relationship between political practice and historical traditions. These scholars are also explicit regarding a new paradigm for China political studies. According to Ren (2020: 74) “the rise of historical politics contains an opportunity for paradigm shift; it allows us to reconstruct the disciplinary resources of Chinese political science based on our own practical experience rather than foreign theories and values.” Like the Xingtu approach, the historical political scholars empathize China’s uniqueness. They study China as a political phenomenon rather than a particular case. The rise of historical politics also has its roots in Marxist theory and education in China. It reconnects university political science departments with the schools of Marxism. In the 1980s, top universities created schools of social science and the field of political science became separate from the Marxist studies. However, the new paradigm seems to be conceptually connecting political science with Marxism. Of course, this also follows general political trend from Beijing and Xi Jinping’s emphasis on bringing Marxism back into politics and the party (Economy 2018). After decades of market reforms and increased international trade, education campaigns stressed Marxist ideals including more required courses on Marxism in universities. Nevertheless, historical political studies are a legitimate paradigm that is gaining greater acceptance among China scholars in the PRC. Finally, there is a geographic influence on the production of knowledge in China. Traditionally especially in the 1990s and 2000s, the vast majority of North American and European trained scholars, who return to China, accepted positions at the top universities such as Peking University, Tsinghua and Fudan. Most of these universities are in larger cities in eastern China. Universities offered these scholars relatively high salaries to start new research programs and centers. Few “western” trained scholars went to universities in central or western China or smaller lower ranked universities in eastern China. However, since 2010, more North America and European trained Chinese scholars are returning to the PRC. As

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a result, more have found teaching and research positions at universities in central and western China. At the same time, more universities have established political science departments and social science research centers. There are also more Chinese trained political scientists teaching and conducting research. Figure 8.2 reflects this increase in publications and the production of knowledge in Chinese especially after 2010. Ironically, this also contributed to the increase in English publications as well. Both major and minor universities across China require English publications in journals listed on the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) for promotion and tenure. Western-trained scholars at major universities have the advantage due to their overseas academic experience, levels of English, collaboration with foreign scholars and resources for research. Scholars at smaller universities in central and western China have the similar pressure to publish in SSCI journals, but they have and fewer resources and international collaborations.

Generations and Various “Western” China Scholars: North America and Europe China political science paradigms in North America and Europe have changed over the last 70 years. It started with the first generation in the 1950s and the totalitarian model, then the second generation in the 1960s and 1970s with the Cultural Revolution and the totalitarian as well as pluralist approaches. During the reform era into the 1980s and early 2000s, state and society paradigm influenced the third generation of China scholars. With each generation, the number of scholars and access to available data increased exponentially. Since the early 2000s, the China field has generated subfield specializations and, as a result, various paradigms within China political studies. Some scholars find this lack of cohesive approaches in the age of specialization troubling, while others embrace the plurality (White 2009; O’Brien 2011, 2018; Alpermann 2009). Although previous generations of China scholars could review the “state of field” to find the current generally accepted paradigm, China scholars are now faced (for better or worse) with the current “state of the subfields” and multiple theories and approaches. There are two key reasons for this plurality of paradigms in North America and Europe. First is the sheer number of China scholars studying political science or China politics. It has become a crowded field compared to the first, second and early third generation of China

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scholars. Publications on China dramatically increased from 2000–2010 and from 2011–2020 (see Fig. 8.1). This reflects the significant rise in the number of scholars researching, teaching and writing about China. Since the early 2000s especially after China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO), universities across North America, European and Australia started teaching more classes on China to meet growing interest and the need for China specialists in the general workforce. This includes establishing East Asian and China academic and research programs. The result is training more China scholars to meet the growing demand for professors and researchers in political science departments as well as think tanks and public service positions. These scholars have adopted various research approaches from archival, in-depth fieldwork, cases studies and large (national) survey research as well as metadata analysis. As the filed broadens with more scholars using the same national survey data, such as CGSS, World Values Survey and Asian Barometer, and greater access to field sites in China, young scholars are adopting sophisticated methods for hypothesis testing from field experiments and intervention studies to multilevel statistical models. Indeed, this is similar to the trend in American politics. Over time, so many American scholars are using the same American National Election Survey data that the only way young scholars can distinguish themselves from the pack is to apply increasingly sophisticated statistical models to the same data.3 The China field in political science seems to be following this trend in American politics. The second related reason for many paradigms is the sharp increase in research specialization and mid-range theories as well as greater contributions to the political science discipline (as opposed to the China field). O’Brien (2011, 2018) discussed this potential problem. The era of specialization has narrowed areas of research at the risk of losing broad area specialists in China studies. As O’Brien (2011, 2018) suggests, younger professors in political science departments need to publish in discipline journals to be more competitive in the job market and earn tenure. This incentive structure contributes to narrower areas of research where these scholars are writing and presenting to political scientists rather than general audience of China scholars. In addition, China politics scholars tend to be testing specific hypothesis and mid-range theories

3 The trend towards greater statistical sophistication in testing mid-range theories at the expense of broader theoretical development and research questions.

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connected with democratization, social mobilization and governing institutions. This is also a result of a more crowded field, but it has also moved away from general and more encompassing theories of China’s politics and society. In fact, the accepted paradigms of the first, second and third generation of scholars may also be a function of cohort size. Only a few mostly North American scholars made up the first and second generation of scholars in the 1960s and 1970s. The third-generation cohort grew in the 1980s during the early reform period and then field exploded after 2000. In fact, there is little discussion in the literature about the “fourth generation” of China scholars because there are too many individuals researching a wide variety of approaches to squeeze into a single category. Nevertheless, the generational changes reflect the paradigm shifts in China studies from single identifiable general explanations to many paradigms. Early in the North American China field, Halpern (1963) describes the first generation of China scholars and the problems they faced. The accepted paradigm is the totalitarian model. That is, the CCP and Mao Zedong’s monopoly on power as well as the politicization and control of social life. Although these scholars have contributed to a general understanding of the Chinese revolution and CCP national authority at the time, Halpern views much of the research as too descriptive and general. He suggests that future research should provide greater use of the data and more comparative political studies. In addition, there are too few China scholars in the early 1960s, and this means, “the data will progressively exceed the capacity on the academic world to analyze it” (Halpern 1963: 375). Twenty years later, Harding (1984) reviewed the “state of the filed” discussing the contributions of the first and second generation. Because the first generation is a small cohort of scholars from top universities, there are only a few landmark studies published in the 1960s (Lewis 1963; Barnett 1967; Townsend 1967; Schram and Matz 1967).4 These scholars wrote wide-ranging and comprehensive studies of the CCP leadership, the bureaucracy and administration as well as societal changes and political participation. These studies were mostly descriptive and took on broad theories of authoritarian governance. The second generation expanded number of China scholars. American universities were starting to invest

4 There are more examples of key works. This is just a select few.

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in more China studies and research centers. This led to an increase in China scholars and research on China during the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s. Still the general approach fell within the totalitarian paradigm, but Harding points out that the areas of research became more specialized. These include areas of research on higher education (Taylor 1973), public health and policy (Lampton 1977), industrialization and agriculture (Butler 1978), bureaucratic management (Harding 1981), Cultural Revolution youth (Bernstein 1977) and national minority policy (Dreyer 1976). In addition, the second generation of scholars began to adopt a more social science approach as well as more quantitative studies including hypothesis testing and examining specific factors. Ten years after Harding’s article, Perry (1994) reviews the “state of the field” and reviews the third generation and the new state-society paradigm in China political studies. Perry (1994: 705) states that, “The causes, character and consequences of political change were interpreted as a product of interactions between the state apparatus and society at large.” This addresses broader questions on the relationship between market reforms and democratization, civil society and state building. Feeding the scholarship and production of knowledge of China in the 1980s and 1990s is greater access to field sites in China including interviews as well as archival material and local (city and county) gazetteers. Some of the leading studies ushering in the third generation focus on state and society in general (Nee and Mozingo 1983), rural reform (Oi 1989; Kelliher 1992), rural governance and reform (Shue 1988), urban work units and labor (Walder 1986) and social welfare and the state (Solinger 1993). Of course, Perry mentions other core studies produced during this time, but the key point is that the increase in available data was driving the new state-society paradigm. In combination with a greater number of trained China scholars in North America and Europe publications at the beginning of third generation increased threefold (see Fig. 8.1). In addition, areas of specialization within this paradigm mushroomed. Just after China officially entered the WTO, Dittmer and Hurst (2003) examined the state of the field. They found that “the analysis of Chinese politics has fallen into a sort of limbo” and conclude that the “field of Chinese political analysis has changed and grown as China has changed and grown, becoming increasingly polycentric, ambiguous, and sophisticated” (Dittmer and Hurst 2003: 11). Many studies at this time follow the state and society paradigm such as urban workers (Blecher 2002; Gallagher 2002; Chen 2000; Hurst and O’Brien 2002; Solinger 2002),

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villagers (Bemstein and Xiaobo Lu 2002; Manion 1996), cadres (Dickson 2003), military personnel (Shambaugh 2003) and intellectuals (Yang et. al. 2001). This is just to name a few key studies. While the state-society paradigm led to the increased publications and production of knowledge on China, other paradigms also gain a foothold in the 1990s and especially after 2000. Dittmer and Hurst (2003) were concerned that political culture was being neglected compared to previous generations, but a number of studies on political culture and ideology were produced from the 1980s and into the 2010s (Pye 1981, 1990, 2001; Moody 1994; Shi 2001; Sun 1995; Hua 1993; Tang 2016; Zhong 2013; Zhang 2016; Keliher and Wu 2016). Besides the political cultural and state-society approach, neo-institutionalism took hold in the China field. Since the 1980s and into the 2010s, many scholars have adopted an institutional approach to China’s political and economic development especially with regard to central state and local government relations (Wong 1992; Shirk 1993; Montinola et al. 1995; Feeney 1998; Oi 1999; Lin and Liu 2000; Malesky et al. 2011; Mattingly 2017; Sun 2019). These studies also vary widely regarding methodologies. For example, Malesky et al. (2011) is a comparative study of China and Vietnam using descriptive data for their analysis, while Mattingly (2017) compares regions within China through an experimental design and quantitative analysis. The first, second and third generations of China scholars were identified through new paradigms, but the there is no clear identifiable fourth or fifth generation in the literature. The reasons are due the dramatic increase in China scholars since the early 2000s and the diversity of theories and methods adopted across the China political studies. In 2009, Guo and Blanchard examine the state of the field in a special issue of Journal of Chinese Political Science. They concede that the field has grown with diverse theories and methodological approaches. In this issue, White (2009) provides a complete overview of the positive and negative trends in China political studies. One of the positive developments for China political studies is the increase in Chinese scholars, who came to the North American and European universities, to study political science and remained in these countries to teach in political science departments. These scholars have made valuable contributions to the production of knowledge on China. However, White (2009) is concerned with the increasingly narrow (specialized) research that focuses more on methodology than broader research questions. This is a similar point that O’Brien (2011, 2018) makes in his articles on the state of

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the field. Yang and Li (2009) address the state of the field of political studies within China and the potential problems Chinese political scholars find when directly applying “western” theories to China’s political and social issues. Alpermann (2009) examines the variation in theories and approaches and suggests China scholars should accept the diversity within China political studies. This includes different methodological approaches and theoretical assumptions. One key point is that there is no generally accepted “western” approach to China studiesdue to the distinctive methods and theoretical explanations between North American and European scholars.5 Still some North American and European scholars share their concern regarding over specialization in the China field (Svensson 2018; O’Brien 2018). Recently, scholars have published the “state of the subfield” articles focusing on the breadth of specific topics within the China political studies. Teets and Noesselt (2020) edited the Journal of Chinese Governance special issue on the “state of the field for governance and policy innovation in China” and Zang and Chan (2020) on the state of the field of public policy and public administration in China for the Handbook of Public Policy and Public Administration in China. Over the years, there have been a number of state of the subfield articles on urban studies (Ma 2006), civil society (Yang 2002) and research on media studies in China (Yang 2012). These review articles and special issues reflect the widening gap between specializations and subfields within China politics. Nevertheless, there are recent attempts to introduce broad paradigms to the China filed. Two recent publications introduce new and separate paradigms for China political studies. One focuses on the practice of governance in China and the other on China in the world bridging comparative politics and international relations in China studies. Shue and Thornton (2017) put together an edited volume that focuses on evolving governing practices rather than governing institutions. Their aim is to provide a “refreshed framework for approaching the study of governance in China” as well as a “progressive new orientation for future research” (Shue and Thornton 2017: 2). The chapters offer insights and alternative approaches into studying the dynamics and processes of governance. In a special issue for the Studies in Comparative International Development journal, Fravel

5 Also see Svensson (2018).

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et al. (2021: 1) propose a “China in the World” paradigm that “purposefully migrates across the traditional boarders of comparative politics and international relations in the study of China.” The goal is for scholars of China’s domestic politics to consider the international perspective of their research. This requires examining China from the perspective of international relations as well as comparative politics, and this necessitates additional training for each sub-field. Both of these proposed paradigms are promising and have much to offer China scholars, but at this stage of development in China studies, these new paradigms are still viewed as “one among many.” Beyond the North American and European search for paradigms, a small but growing number of China scholars in African, Latin American and South Asian universities are adopting their own approaches to China studies. This reflects a “China scholars in the world” trend that will eventually have a broader influence on China political studies in general.

Non-Chinese, Non-North America and Non-European China Scholars Most of the attention on China in African and Latin American nations has been on China’s foreign direct investments, loans and especially Confucian Institutes (CIs). However, few studies have examined the emergent China academic programs and scholars in these countries. While CIs promote Chinese culture and language in their host countries, domestic China academic programs train students to critically evaluate China and its impact on their home country and regions. Unlike CIs, these China programs are producing knowledge about China’s domestic and international as well as local and regional influences. The development of China programs in these countries also strengthens the agency of these African, Latin American and South Asian China scholars with regard to their relationship with China as well as with North American and European scholars. While previous publications on the “state of the field” and new paradigms are important and help move China studies forward, non “western” and non-Chinese scholarship is missing from these discussions of China political studies and paradigms. Despite the relatively small cohort, these first generation of non “western” and non-Chinese China scholars are producing important work on China political studies adopting their own approaches and mixed methods.

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Since the first conference on China-African relations in 2000 and the first summit meeting for the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2006, African nations have started to establish China academic and research programs. The main reason for launching these China Studies initiatives is to satisfy the demands for local expertise on China and strengthen Africa’s capacity to engage with China (Hoeymissen 2021). Some of the top China programs are at Makerere University in Uganda, University of Ghana, Stellenbosch University in South Africa, University of Botswana and the University of Johannesburg. Like academic programs in Chinese universities, African China scholars have various academic backgrounds and adopt diverse paradigms and approaches to study China. China scholars in African universities have “western” academic training, domestic (African) and others have received their degrees in China. Ross Anthony completed his doctorate at the University of Cambridge, and he served as the director of the Center for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University (South Africa) from 2014 to 2018. His research examines the local impact of China-Africa relationship. For instance, Anthony (2020) studies China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Kenya and focuses on the how local context influences the implementation of specific projects. He positions Kenya (political, social and cultural aspects) as the central feature of the research. Thus, his research suggests a paradigm shift in studying the BRI in Africa, whereby he removes China as the central player and places China as a peripheral actor. Meryl Burgess completed her PhD in Political Science at Stellenbosch University in 2017, and she continues as a research fellow at the Center for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch. Her research examines how the political systems of China (authoritarian) and South Africa (pluralist) shape the roles of environmental NGOs in conservation policy (Burgess 2012, 2020). Lloyd Adu Amoah is the director of Center for Asian Studies at University of Ghana, and he received his PhD in Public Administration from Wuhan University, China. He focuses Africa-China relations and public policy formation as well as the politics of economic development. Amoah adopts qualitative methods and inductive approach to study the interaction between Africa countries and China (Amoah 2012, 2016; Amoah and Quame 2021). Sara van Hoeymissen from the China Studies Program at the University of Botswana recently wrote on “China Studies in Africa,” and she demonstrates that African China scholars are critical in the production of knowledge on China-African relations (van Hoeymissen 2021). These

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scholars, who are on the ground, tend to generate applied policy oriented knowledge about China in African nations. In fact, van Hoeymissen (2021: 203) states, “it is scholars who understand and have access to the lived realities of African interactions with and perspectives on China who can play a critical role in enabling China studies in Africa to become the impactful field it aspires to be.” In response to China’s increase in trade and foreign direct investment with Latin American countries, China research centers and academic programs have been established across the continent in universities from Mexico to Chile. The range of China scholars also varies with PhDs from American and domestic universities to scholars with advanced degrees from China. For example, Enrique Dussel Peters received his PhD from the University of Notre Dame, and he is the coordinator of the China-Mexico Studies Center of National Autonomous University of Mexico and the coordinator of Latin American and Caribbean Academic Network on China (ALC-China Network). His research focuses on international political economy and China-Latin America relationship (Peters 2012, 2016, 2020). Eduardo Tzili-Apango is a research professor at the Metropolitan Autonomous University-Xochimilco, Mexico City, and he received his PhD in political science from the National Autonomous University of Mexico. His research examines China-Latin America relations, China and global public goods and China in international institutions (Tzili-Apango and Palacios-Cabrera 2018; Tzili-Apango 2018; Tzili-Apango and Legler 2020). A final example is Andrés Bórquez. He is the coordinator of Chinese Studies Program at The University of Chile, and he received his Ph.D. in Political Science and International Politics from Fudan University in 2018. His research focuses on comparative economic policies of East Asia and Chinese foreign policy with regard to South America and Chile (Borquez 2020; Borquez and Bravo 2021; Song et al. 2020). There are also a number of China programs and research centers throughout South Asia in India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines. China’s growing presence and influence in the region have been driving these centers and the need for domestic China experts. Like China scholars in Latin American and African universities, these scholars examine the policy implications and the domestic consequences (negative and positive) of China in their respective countries and regions. The overview of non-western and non-Chinese scholarship on China reveals two trends. First, beyond the Confucian Institutes, African, Latin

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American and South Asian universities are investing in China programs and these centers and academic programs are contributing to the production of knowledge on China. This is the first generation of non-western and non-Chinese China scholars, and these programs are training China experts for their respective countries and regions. Second, the first generation is receiving academic training from “western,” Chinese and domestic universities. Despite this diversity in training, we observe a larger number of China scholars coming from Chinese universities. For example, studies have reported increasing numbers of students from African nations studying in China (Li 2018). While most are undergraduates, a number these are returning doctoral students. In fact, there is a growing number of Chinese trained professors teaching in African and South Asian China programs (Hayhoe 2017). This is an expected outcome of South-South higher educational exchange and between China and African and South Asian nations. Although this can generate closer positive ties between Chinese universities and their international alumni, these China scholars are also producing research that is critical of the PRC especially when it comes to China relations with their respective countries. Indeed, we observe the same this thing with US trained Chinese scholars who return to China and publish research that is critical of America regarding USChina relations (Zhao 2019). Scholars with on the ground experience, perspectives of their home country and China can produce important and critical knowledge about China and its international influence.

Conclusion The importance of understanding the domestic and international dimensions of a rising China will continue to drive the need for China scholars across continents. The result is greater diversity in the generation of scholarship and production of knowledge about China. Yet, China scholars vary not just by research, but also resources. North American and European universities as well as some of the top China academic institutions tend to have greater resources to conduct research and publish on China than scholars in African or Latin American universities. Even within the United States, there is a huge gap in resources between tops ranked universities and vast majority of scholars, who teach and conduct research on China, in Colleges and Universities across America. The lack of a single paradigm reflects the breadth and diversity of China field.

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Rather than searching for the new generally accepted paradigm, we should accept diversity in the China field and embrace the various approaches and explanations. Alpermann (2009) makes a similar argument regarding the difference between European and North American approaches, but we suggest accepting the broad and growing China filed including specializations and “state of the subfields.” Ten years ago, O’Brien (2011) admits that there are so many researchers and studies on China it is nearly impossible to read and stay caught up in the field. In 2021, the sheer number of China scholars across the globe with diverse theoretical and methodological backgrounds means the “multiple paradigms” genie is out of the bottle. Although it is unlikely that the genie can return to the bottle, there is room for mid-range and comprehensive theories on China. This includes studies that examine the big picture and broad research questions on governance and society as well as narrower questions on the local impact of specific policies in China or other countries. Indeed, broader studies may bridge the specializations and mid-range theories in the China filed as well as published pieces on the “state of the sub-fields.” Thus embracing the diversity may be the new approach reflecting one county, many paradigms.

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CHAPTER 9

Advancing Psychology of China: A Call for Paradigm Shift Changming Duan and Fenglan Li

Chinese psychology (psychology of China), as opposed to modern psychology in China, has had an over 2000-year-long history (Jing and Fu 2001) and has offered “a rich body of psychological insights” (Wang 1993, p. 88) to the world. Today, it is discernable that traditional Chinese psychological thinking is not only contained in diverse philosophical, political, military, and other literature but also applied to various practices such as education, medicine, and management (Jing 1994; Murphy and Kovach 1972). Surprisingly, however, Chinese psychology has been most often misperceived as a new field of study that was introduced from the West at the beginning of the last century, marked by the first psychological research lab built by Daqi Chen (陈大齐) in Peking University in 1917 (Yang and Ye 2014). This misperception is unfortunately understandable

C. Duan (B) University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA e-mail: [email protected] F. Li Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan, China

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 S. Hua (ed.), Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8032-8_9

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as traditional Chinese psychology has been replaced or overshadowed by modern psychology in the past century and “Western psychology has achieved the status of cultural authority in China” (Yang 2021, p. 126). The noticeable speedy growth and rapid development of modern psychology in China occurred shortly after the implementation of Chinese economic Open-Door Policy in 1978 (Zhao 2000). This door opening to globalization turned on green light to imported foreign cultural values and products besides creating upsurges in foreign trades and business investments (e.g., Duan 2018; Hsu and Barker 2013; Huang 1986). That was also a time for Chinese universities to start serious discipline rebuilding post the 10-year-long Cultural Revolution, during which higher education experienced major disruptions. Thus, Western psychology, among other cultural products, reentered China quickly and forcefully, not only as a science or theory but also as a non-medical healthcare profession. Western theories and systems of practice were imported in a whole-sale and ready-for-use fashion, and quickly filled the space and occupied the market of psychology in China (Duan 2018). As a result, the mainstream modern psychology in China till this day remains a transplanted Western phenomenon and Western thinking dominates both scientific investigation and clinical practice (Yang and Ye 2017). It should be noted, however, some Chinese scholars and theorists have been concerned about the cultural misfit of Western psychology in China all along. They have pursued and achieved considerable success in developing Chinese indigenous psychology (Hwang 2020). The scholarship developed has gained recognition and respect among both Western and Chinese cultural or cross-cultural scholars, but unfortunately not yet become centered in the mainstream psychology in China. It will take more than having good alternative theories available (e.g., Chinese indigenous psychological propositions) to advance psychology of China (vs. psychology in China). A “scientific revolution” (Hwang 2020), or a fundamental paradigm shift (Yang 1993), is necessary to rebuild and popularize a psychology that is made in China and by Chinese. We are in support of the argument that paradigm shift is necessary to advance Chinese psychology, which involves reconnecting with Chinese traditional psychology and eliminating dregs and keeping the good from the contemporary psychology. We do not claim to be original in this proposition or know exactly how paradigm shift will evolve. However, we do see the necessity and urgency that existing paradigms in psychology including its ontology, epistemology, and methodology be

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evaluated and challenged. Our perspectives are based on the awareness of serious cultural misfits created by the largely Western modern psychology in China and the scholarly literature on both the cultural nature of psychology and the narrowness and unrepresentativeness of the cultural positions embedded in Western psychology. We have learned from contemporary distinguished and pioneering Chinese cultural psychologists, such as Yang Guoshu (杨国枢, 1932–2018), Hwang Kwang-Kuo (黄光国), Yang Zhong-Fang (杨中芳), and others, who have promoted paradigm shift from those reflecting Western philosophies to those centered in Chinese culture. Moreover, our position is also informed and enriched by the current calls by progressive Western psychological scholars for decolonization (e.g., Adams et al. 2015), dismantling white supremacy (Grzanka et al. 2019), and liberation (Comas-Diaz and Rivera 2020) in psychology. In this chapter, we present our review and arguments in three sections. First, we review the dominant existing paradigms in psychology and the increasing calls for paradigm shift by progressive Western scholars. Second, we review psychologies in China, including both traditional Chinese psychology and modern psychology. The last section is on paradigm shift as a condition for advancing psychology of China. We propose possible directions or alternative paradigms for psychology to shift away from the current Western empiricism in research, individualism in theory, and medical model in psychotherapy.

Paradigm and Paradigm Shift Development of any scientific discipline involves utilization of paradigms that are consisted of universally recognized principles and achievements, methodological processes, and cultural concepts that refer to the work of the scientific community of a certain era (Kuhn 1962), and “for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of practitioners” (Kuhn 1996, p. 10). In psychology, paradigms provide assumptions, perspectives, vocabulary, methods, and evaluative criteria for both psychological research and its application in psychotherapy and counseling. How researchers frame their research questions and understand answers to those questions are determined by the paradigms they subscribe. How practitioners view mental health or illness and how to pursue healing for their clients are also influenced by the paradigms. For instance, prior to the introduction of mental illness diagnosis system from the West a few

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decades ago, individuals who experienced emotional difficulties in China would be seen as having thought problem (思想问题), but now they can be labeled as having depressive disorder (抑郁症). Ideological education (思想教育) would be used as an intervention then, and clinical treatment (临床治疗) is often employed now. We know so well that in understanding human behavior/psychology, so-called universal principles or achievements or model problems and solutions are all specific to the people, the time, and the place and not generalizable to other people, settings, and contexts. As Kuhn (1962, 1996) pointed out, both the scientific community (people) and the specific era (time and place) are important determinants of the aptness of existing paradigms, and paradigm shift becomes necessary when more and more “anomalies” (phenomenon that can’t be explained with the existing paradigms) arise and can’t be written off. As we see it, now is the time for a paradigm shift movement to change the worldview adopted by the Western psychology in China and establish Chinese culture-based paradigms for psychology of China. The urgency of this paradigm shift is also being prompted by the awareness of cultures’ roles in the global fight against the ongoing COVID-19 crisis. Recent research has shown that individualismcollectivism cultural orientations influenced the spread of the pandemic (Maaravi et al. 2021) and global analysis confirmed that tightnesslooseness of cultures predicted numbers of cases and deaths due to the pandemic (Gelfand et al. 2021). In the medical field in the United States, a call for paradigm shift from the current “sick care” to real “health care” in the post COVID-19 future is voiced (Kraft 2021). Needless to say that paradigm shifts are even more necessary in psychology, especially in China and in psychotherapy practice. Dominant Paradigms of Modern Psychology Dominant paradigms in modern psychology either as a science or as a mental health profession are rooted in the Western philosophies of science and the ethos of modern Western civilization (Hwang 2020). The knowledge generated under these paradigms is mostly created by and for Western people who are from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies (Henrich et al. 2010). Many psychological theories are often assumed to be applicable to all humans while in fact members of WEIRD societies are “among the least representative

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populations” (p. 61). Nonetheless, due to the large influence of the West, the current state of psychology in the global village can be described as “being colonized by Western academic hegemony” (Hwang 2020, p. xiii). There are multiple ways to identify and classify paradigms in psychology. We choose to describe one example in each of the three areas: research, theory, and mental health practice. For guiding psychological research, the following four paradigms (or slightly different versions) have been typically recognized: positivism, postpositivism, constructivism, and critical theory (Heppner et al. 2016). These paradigms vary in assumptions across the ontology, epistemology, and methodology dimensions, showing a progressive trend from positivism to critical theory. To different degrees, they reflect the Western empiricism that sense experience is the ultimate source of all concepts and knowledge (Shelley 2006). Qualitative researchers have shown concerns that positivism/postpositivism has dominated psychology and encourage researchers to select paradigms “in accordance with an understanding of belief systems, values, personality, and knowledge of research design” (Heppner et al. 2016, p. 10). In theoretical psychology where human behavior is understood theoretically and philosophically grounded in ideas of epistemology, classic paradigms include psychoanalysis (e.g., Sigmund Freud), behaviorism (e.g., B. F. Skinner), and humanism (e.g., Carl Rogers). There are also less classic and more recently proposed ones such as social constructivist (e.g., Gergen 1985; Walker 2014), cross-cultural (e.g., Murdock 1957) or multicultural (e.g., Pedersen 1997), feminist (e.g., Riger 2014), and cognitive neuroscientific (e.g., Tryon 2014) paradigms. The most recently proposed is social justice-focused paradigm (e.g., Ratts 2009). Notably, most of the newly proposed paradigms are the results of the multicultural movements in psychology and in society where awareness of the culture’s roles has gained significant attention. Focusing on mental health counseling and psychotherapy specifically, Cottone (1992) modified Kuhn’s (1970) definition of scientific paradigm and specified criteria for paradigms in clinical application: the efficacy of the paradigm can be tested in a specific way, being philosophically distinct from its competitors; must “reframe the interpretation of cause and effect” (Cottone 1992, p. 21); must be practiced by an identifiable professional group; and must have “a number of clearly identifiable counseling theories or therapeutic approaches incorporated under its framework” (p. 21). Accordingly, he identified three established paradigms, namely the organic-medical, psychological, and systemic-relational paradigms. He

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further noted that these different paradigms share some common propositions, namely (a) a focus on the individual, (b) individuals possess nonphysical traits and characteristics which need to be assessed, (c) cause is linearly defined, and (d) change happens when one individual does something to another individual to change the target individual’s traits or characteristics (Cottone 1992). These are quite discernable in counseling and psychotherapy practice in which client experiences and traits (e.g., personality traits, cognitive or communication style) and mental health symptoms (e.g., depression, anxiety, anger, hopelessness) are measured and “treated.” Increasing Calls for Paradigm Shift in the West Calls for paradigm shift have been increasingly made in recent years. On the front of science, critics of modern psychological research point out some serious and unavoidable problems with the current scientific paradigms. From how data are collected, analyzed, and interpreted to how the results are used, questionable practices have led to erroneous outcomes (Kahneman 2011). Further, the current structure of the scientific information dissemination system including the award system for publication in the academy is not actually designed to support good data practice. Obvious is the problem associated with small and nonrepresentative sample sizes, throwing out “outliers,” selecting favorable results for publication, and the practice of publishing positive results only. In clinical practice of psychology, the recognition has widened that the medical model in diagnosis and treatment is fundamentally and functionally problematic and can harm clients and communities (Elkins 2009; McCulloch et al. 2005). The current disease-based diagnosis system using DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) is subject to clinician variation and bias (e.g., Kirk and Kutchins 1994), lacks validity and reliability (e.g., Kirk and Kutchins 1994), has limited clinical utility and functions, leads to over-emphasis of biological interventions such as medication (Boyle 2013; Cromby and Harper 2013), and is prone to decontextualization of client experience and ethnocentric bias (e.g., Fernando 2010). As a result, disease-based clinical practice may reinforce discrimination and social exclusion (Read et al. 2006); post negative impact on diverse clients’ sense of self and outlook on life (e.g., HonosWebb and Leitner 2001); marginalize knowledge from lived experience

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(e.g., Beresford 2013); and disempower clients who have to rely on the experts’ treatment (e.g., Bassman 2007). To call for a paradigm shift, Society of Clinical Psychology (Division 12 of American Psychological Association) issued a formal position statement “to affirm publicly that the current classification system as outlined in DSM and ICD (International Classification of Diseases), in respect of the functional psychiatric diagnoses, has significant conceptual and empirical limitations. Consequently, there is a need for a paradigm shift in relation to the experiences that these diagnoses refer to, towards a conceptual system not based on a ‘disease’ model” (Division of Clinical Psychology 2013, p. 1). Progressive psychological scholars and practitioners have promoted several newer paradigms for counseling and psychotherapy. One is the social constructivist paradigm (e.g., Gergen 2009) that assumes that individual psychological experience is socially constructed (vs. determined by biological or intrapsychic drives) and the cultural context has a determining role in individual experience. This move, going beyond positivism and postpositivism, challenges the notion of objective truth about individuals such as the classic ontological understanding of idealized autonomous self and leaves room for epistemological relativism to aid the understanding of the constructed self. Further, a social constructivist paradigm disputes medical model’s position and views mental illness as socially constructed. From cultural diversity and equity points of view and from the need to prevent harm and increase efficacy of psychotherapy for the culturally diverse in the new era, the proposals for multicultural and social justice paradigms have intensified. There has been strong support to view multiculturalism as the fourth force of psychotherapy and the social justice the fifth (Fleuridas and Krafcik 2019). The prompting factors for these advances lie in the political and cultural contexts in the United States and other Western countries, including the civil rights movements, feminist movement, LGBT right movement, Black Life Matter movement, and those combatting other social/cultural injustice and oppressive -isms. Another push for paradigm shift calls for moving away from the long-lasting “illness ideology” toward “a positive psychology ideology that emphasizes well-being, life satisfaction, and what makes life worth living” (Maddux 2021, p. 73). The concept of “positive psychology” was coined by Abraham Maslow in his book Motivation and Personality (Maslow 1954, p. 354), who pointed out psychology had succeeded

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on revealing illnesses and shortcomings but done little about individuals’ virtues or aspirations. Several decades later, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi’s (2000) seminal paper published in American Psychologist introduced “a psychology of positive human functioning will arise that achieves a scientific understanding and effective interventions to build thriving in individuals, families and communities” (p. 13).

Psychologies in China The ongoing process of paradigm shift in the Western psychology demonstrates that psychology is a discipline prone to the demands from cultural, social, and political contexts in new times. This process should be pursued in advancing Chinese psychology, which may involve integrating what is currently available and what can be constructed based on the Chinese context. Traditional Chinese Psychology (TCP) Due to the narrow definition of psychological science using the Western scientific paradigms, writers often use “psychological thought” or “psychological thinking” to label traditional Chinese psychology (e.g., Jing and Fu 2001). This is like when shoes don’t fit, we doubt the legitimacy of the feet. We shouldn’t deny the existence of a cultural phenomenon because it does not fit a certain scientific paradigm. It is only logical to redefine the paradigm or develop a new method to study the cultural phenomenon that has existed for thousands of years. Thus, we choose to use the clear term Traditional Chinese Psychology (TCP) in this chapter. Scholars would view TCP as molded by three major philosophical systems, Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism (Higgins and Zheng 2002). A variety of topics about humans and their relationships were addressed by these philosophies, such as those regarding human nature, knowledge development, human-nature relationship, mental and medical rehabilitation, competence evaluation through civil service examinations, and management of human resources (Wang 1993). Theories and propositions from these philosophic roots have permeated into the thinking of philosophers and psychological theories in China and around the world. A thorough review of these philosophies is beyond the scope of this chapter, and we offer a few examples to show that TCP has solid cultural and philosophical foundations.

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The teachings of Confucius (551–479 BC) about human nature, personality, and personal growth and education have served as the underpinnings of TCP and impressed his contemporaries of great thinkers such as Plato (429–347 BC) and Aristotle (384–321 BC). The Confucian promotion of a hierarchical and authoritarian social system and teachings about the role of each member of the system has been a foundation for psychological understanding of Chinese individual identity and personsystem relationships (Jing and Fu 2001). Confucian ethics and moral philosophies that provide “a set of guidelines for ways of human relationship and interactions and the code of people behavior for citizenship in society” (p. 408) are also important elements of both traditional and modern psychology anywhere. The emphasis on self-improvement and humanity has provided active ingredients to psychotherapy in modern times (Leung and Lee 1996; Wallace and Shapiro 2006). Taoism has had a deep impact on psychology as well. According to Lao-tzu (570?–490? BC), the founder of Taoism, nature always keeps a proper balance and any extreme movement toward one direction will sooner or later swing back toward the opposite to regain balance. Thus, synthesis of contrary systems operates to form an integrated unity that is “a manifestation of the power and operation of the Yang and the Yin, the alternating forces expressive of light and darkness, birth and decay, male and female” (Fitzgerald 1976). This philosophical position underlies the traditional Chinese medicine and traditional psychology in view of health, and is also more and more endorsed by Western psychology (e.g., Downes 2011). The influence of Buddhism in psychology can’t be over-stated. In fact, Buddhism is psychology (e.g., De Silva 2005), in addition to being a religion and a philosophy, because it offers analyses and explanations of human experiences, including emotions, behaviors, cognitions, and motivations, and provides therapeutic healing from human suffering. Buddhist scripture would refer to the Buddha as “The Great Healer.” His Four Noble Truths (truth of suffering, the cause of suffering, the end of suffering, and the path that frees us from suffering) offer what might be expected of a healer: “lays out the nature of the disease... offers an etiology,... a prognosis, and... a remedy” (Scotti 2020). Buddhist concept of enlightenment and practice of meditation, chanting, mindfulness, and self-reflection have been integrated into psychological interventions worldwide.

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It was on these rich and solid philosophical foundations that traditional Chinese psychology existed. In the book History of Chinese Psychology, edited by late historian Gao (高觉敷 2009), Yang and others described the focal categories of study in TCP, including mind–body unison (形 神), psychological-material world connection (心物)、 universe-human in one (天人)、human-beast difference (人禽), perception to recognition process (知虑), emotion-desire relationship (情欲), intention-purpose consistency (志意), intelligence-ability relationship (智能), nature-nurture connection (性习), and knowledge-behavior relationship (知行). In comparison with the foci of modern psychology, some of these themes are unique such as mind–body unison, psychological-material world connection, universe-human in one, and human-beast difference, while others are compatible to those studied by modern psychology. From a methodological perspective, Guocai Yan (2002) identified that Chinese psychology pursued knowledge through both a scientism orientation (科学主义) and a humanism orientation (人文主义). For instance, the first Chinese encyclopedia of medicine, published about 2,000 years ago, Medical Principles of the Yellow Emperor (皇帝内经) connected brain pathology and psychological problems and showed a biopsycho-social model for medical and mental treatment (Wang 1993). This reflected the perspective from materialism in seeing the mind–body connection and humanism shown in the idealism that could deepen the understanding and reveal “reasonable kernels” (合理内核, Yan 2002, p. 13) of Chinese psychology. Furthermore, historical review also showed that the paradigm of traditional Chinese psychology was heavily influenced by the philosophy of monism and holism, resulting in the concepts such as “body-mind unity” (身心一体), “universe-human in one” (天人合一), and “humanthing connection” (人物相通), and the recognition of “spiritual unity” ( 精神统一体) composed by human, nature, all things, and gods unity (Su and Ye 2020). It was noted that Chinese psychology has been “One of the earliest and most important sources of psychology in the world” (Gao 2009, p. 470). Therefore, using scientism singularly as in the empiricism paradigm in understanding TCP is obviously problematic. Modern Psychology in China Modern psychology in China is considered an imported discipline (Yang and Ye 2017). Western psychology was introduced to China by Western missionaries during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but it did

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not become a recognized discipline until the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. In 1889, Yongjing Yan (颜 永京) translated and published Joseph Haven’s book Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities and Will, which marked the start of transplantation of Western psychology to China (Yan 2006). As a result, the first few decades of the twentieth century witnessed the birth of a “new” discipline of psychology. Translated Western psychological books began to be published, university psychology classes taught, psychological laboratories built, and professional associations established, marking the early stage of modern psychology in China. The development of the field stagnated due to the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and experienced a renewal after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. For the first few years in the new China, heavy influence from Soviet Union seemed to have replaced that from the West. The psychological community invested in making Marxism-Leninism, Mao’s thoughts, and dialectical materialism the theoretical foundations for studying psychology and focused on learning the Soviet psychology, especially the classical conditioning paradigm developed by Ivan Pavlov (Li 1994). Following the upsurge of the Soviet influence, debates and reflections occurred regarding the direction of the discipline. The recognition became stronger that “psychology must serve the Chinese socialist construction” and adopt an independent way of thinking “to establish the Chinese version of psychology that would concern itself more with traditional Chinese culture” (p. 283). Following the second stagnation period due to the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and the open-door policy in late 1970s and early 1980s, a rapid development via Westernization of psychology occurred and is still in motion today. The system of Western psychology was adopted to guide the discipline building in China. An example is the publication of Chinese Psychological Science in 1997 that used an existing Western framework to report research progress in 10 areas (Huang 2008). Remarkably, this time, the Western influence not only brought new scientific advances in psychological science, but also introduced clinical and counseling psychology as a clinical practice, along which Western mental disorders were brought in as well (Watters 2010). For the first time, a “mental health” profession, outside medicine, was created and Western “treatment” systems quickly entered both the marketplace and Chinese people’s mind (Duan 2018). For instance, traditional Freudian psychoanalysis as a theory and as a psychotherapy system caused high “folk fever” (Jia 2016, p. 379) and

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let “Freudians put China on the couch” (Tatlow 2010) in just few years after it was introduced by a group of Western scholars. Although efforts have been made by Chinese professionals to put cultural spins on the imported material, the current psychological science and practice remain largely consistent with the Western standards including paradigms and associated theoretical knowledge and methodological/technological operations. Training of psychologists in and outside the university settings is basically making “technicians for maintenance and operation of their manufacturing systems, rather than to promote rationalization of their cultural systems” (Hwang 2020). In clinical practice, Western value-based theories dominate psychological diagnosis and interventions, and “people have been subject to overdiagnosis or misdiagnosis, or even mislabeled as mentally ill” (Yang 2021, p. 126). This state of art for psychology and psychological care must change for the sake of improving Chinese people’s wellness.

Paradigm Shift: Advancing Psychology of China In the current global context, China is rising as an economic high power and reasserting its position in the world as a culture. Psychology of China is destined to grow and to enter the world stage. A large challenge for this growth, as we see it, is the recognition of the need for and engagement in paradigm shift: shifting the science and practice of psychology developed on the basis of Western culture-determined paradigms to those rooted in Chinese culture. China needs a psychology that has “a psychological system of its own” (Liu 2018, p. 13), which inevitably will involve challenging the Western systems, conducting “the creative transformation of traditional Chinese psychology” (p. 13), and constructing theories “on the deep structure of human mind” of Chinese (Hwang 2020, p. xiv). There are multiple areas in which we can examine and question the existing Western paradigms and propose new options. For this chapter, we chose to discuss possible shifts from three major paradigms: (1) Western empiricism for research, (2) extreme individualism in theory, and (3) Western medical model in psychotherapy. Due to the cultural partiality of these paradigms and the power imbalance between offering and receiving parties during the “Westernization” (Norsworthy 2006) of psychology, paradigm shift demands courage to change, openness to a new way of thinking, and knowledge/wisdom of the change process. It will take

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the whole psychological community’s collective effort to succeed in such paradigm shifts. We hope to “throw bricks to draw jade” (抛砖引玉) and start the conversation regarding courses of actions needed. From Exclusive Western Empiricism to Methodological Holism/Integration From an ontological and epistemological perspective, modern psychology has been defined by Western empiricism that believes knowledge is generated from the senses, thus relying on the observable empirical evidence for theory development (Ryan 2018). Under this paradigm, traditional Chinese psychology (TCP) never earned the due respect and recognition as scientific or scientifically valid. The situation is similar with Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM, 中医). In Western scientists’ mind, TCM is not a testable and therefore not an effective medical practice, and the experienced effectiveness for generations of people is no more than a placebo effect (Vance 2016). The Wikipedia even described TCM as “fraught with pseudoscience” (Wikipedia 2021). It is unfortunate that the adequacy of research methodology, rooted in the Western empiricism, is rarely questioned and only erroneous conclusions get circulated. Apparently, paradigm matters, and paradigm appropriateness is crucial. In modern epistemology, empiricism and rationalism form a mutually exhaustive set of ways of obtaining knowledge, with the former claiming “all knowledge of existing things is derived from experience” (Martin 2009, p. 22) and latter maintaining “some concepts are innate... and that reason, or intuition by itself independently of experience, is an important source of knowledge” (p. 21). In modern psychology, the endorsement of both paradigms was present throughout the history especially in theoretical debates. However, empiricism seems to have had much more control than rationalism over knowledge development and theory construction (Martin 2009). Tracing its historical roots, the separation between empiricism and historico-cultural investigation or rationalism/thinking was made at the very beginning by founding fathers of Western psychology. For instance, William James (1842–1910) laid foundation for study of “self” by differentiating me (the empirical person) and I (the judging thought) and concluded “the identity found by the I in its me is only a loosely construed thing, and identity ‘on the whole,’ just like that which any outside observer might find in the same assemblage of facts” (James

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1890, p. 373). Concurrently, Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) established the pioneering psychological laboratory in Leipzig 1897 and made clear his view about separation of the two paradigms. He believed that some human behavior and mental activities are to be studied experimentally and others historico-culturally (Toulmin and Leary 1985). Since then, the experimental tradition has dominated psychology. The overreliance on the empiricism has become the “historical origin of the problem” (Hwang 2020, p. xii) that made “Wundt’s ‘second psychology’... culture-inclusive psychology... an elusive goal” (Cole 1996, p. 8). What comes out of this tradition has led to the significant development of psychological science, but unfortunately modern psychology has been gradually molded into “a secular and largely culture-bound discipline” (Sotillos 2021, p. 20) and drifted into “the cult of empiricism” (Toulmin and Leary 1985, p. 594). Scientific observations are made into controlled observations, then scientists construct limited theoretical hypotheses from those controlled observations, and the discipline only reward those who produce within this “hypothetico-deductive system” (p. 607). In the clinical realm, the quantitative randomized controlled trial experimental design has been the designated “gold standard” (Meldrum 2000) in qualifying evidence-based treatment used by insurance companies for third-party reimbursement. Chinese cultural psychology theorists (e.g., Hwang 2013 and 2020; Yan 2002; Yang 1993 and 1999; Yang 2009) explicitly challenged the application of Western empiricism. The fact that repeated efforts failed in replicating Western laboratory findings in non-Western settings supported the conclusion that using inductively derived axioms of the constitutive laws to study psychology has been an exclusive WEIRD phenomenon and is inappropriate in understanding non-Western psychology (Henrich et al. 2010; Shweder 1991). Thus, to advance psychology of China in today’s time, “[i]ndigenous psychologists must change their ontology, epistemology, as well as methodology” (Hwang 2020, p. 10) and “renounce the mentality of colonialism which is characterized by a blind transplantation of Western research paradigms” (p. 13). Methodological Holism A natural starting point for a paradigm shift is to consider the Chinese cultural history, characteristics, and ways in which the culture contains and nurtures people, which can be best accomplished by reconnecting

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to TCP theories and theory development (Liu 2018). According to Yan (2002), both scientism and humanism were embedded in TCP and an integration of them would be necessary, ideal, realistic, and helpful in pursuing modern Chinese psychology. A compatible concept to this integration may be that of empiricism and rationalism in the language of Western philosophy of science. Instead of being “either – or” selecting one paradigm, a “both - and” or “integrated” approach may be helpful. Although with differences, Western critical rationalism has some resemblance with the rational nature of Confucianism (Lam 2017), Buddhism (Sullivan 2012), and Taoism (Pettman 2005). As Yan (2002) suggested, using both the “external logic” (e.g., referencing Western psychological perspectives) and “internal logic” (e.g., discovering psychological characteristics, structures, and laws based on the basic facts and developmental logics inherent in TCP itself) is optimal. Holism, by definition, would allow diverse ways of knowing and may suit Chinese psychology. Contrary to the reductionistic nature of the Western empiricism that focuses on the constituent parts of a system, holism provides views of human behavior entrenched in the whole system, including social/cultural contexts and mind–body unity. A holistic perspective leads to the belief that parts of a whole (e.g., individuals or individuals’ behavior) cannot exist or be understood independently. This paradigm is informed by constructivist epistemology that views meaning and knowledge as materialized from human interactions with the world (Ashcroft et al. 2017). As a paradigm for studying human behavior and psychology, holism may help researchers and practitioners appreciate the complexity that “biological, ecological, cultural, social, and spiritual aspects converge to create a constellation effect of extended patterns and unique formations” (p. 462). In understanding human psychology, induction of “truth” from observations is one valid component of discovery and so is deductive reasoning, because beyond observable behavior, human thoughts, being, knowledge/wisdom, and perception of reality are all valid modes of knowing. This is especially true in understanding Chinese psychology, which requires “digging deeper, systematic collating, and gradually constructing and perfecting” (深入挖掘, 系统整理, 逐渐建构和完善, Yan 2002, p. 385). Only holistic methodological approaches can shift psychology from relying on a “fully enclosed sense of self... as the criterion for existence” (Sotillos 2021, p. 28) to embracing diverse cultural heritages to understand humans in relationships and contexts. As Su and

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Ye (2020) pointed out, integrating the “embodied cognition” of Western psychology with Chinese ontological ideas of “body-knowing” is consistent with the Chinese philosophy of monism and holism, reflecting the “perspectives of things and human beings are one, nature and human beings are one and Gods and human beings are one [that] demonstrate the spatial characteristic of China’s ‘body’ (theory of Qi)” (p. 398). Culture-Centered Hermeneutic Approach For conducting research rooted in local Chinese culture, Zhongfang Yang (杨中芳) proposed that researchers should start with finding a “cultural interpretation system” (文化释义系统), reflecting a hermeneutic model of culture (Christopher et al. 2014). Culture is viewed as “a set of shared meanings that structure and orient human existence” (p. 648). Under this paradigm, researchers would observe, recognize, and understand the laws and patterns underlying behavior in specific cultural, social, and historical context and stay away from creating ahistorical and acultural constructs to frame human experience. Topics worth research along with theoretical frameworks and specific research plans will emerge as the cultural interpretation process unfolds (Yang 2009). Yang’s proposed paradigm puts culture in the center as the core, rather than as a peripheral layer of the research sphere. It is like using the stratigraphic model (Geertz 1973) to view human existence being embedded in a series of concentric rings like an onion. Notably, Yang’s prototype fundamentally differs from that of Western psychology that has treated the most innermost ring being biogenetic, and “with psychological, interpersonal, social and culture domains successfully layered onto it” (Christopher et al. 2014, p. 651). Yang’s cultural interpretation system centers culture as the core. Similarly, Hwang (2020) called for shifting attention to studying cultural psychology by linking science to philosophy in the culture. Human psychology is shaped by culture and operating Western paradigms in studying the Chinese has broken the innate link between human experience and the culture from which humans are inseparable. He criticized the Etic approach (studying culture as an outsider looking in—an outsider’s perspective), imposed (implying absolutism), or derived (implying universalism), in studying Chinese psychology. Instead, he supported an Emic approach (focusing on intrinsic cultural distinctions—an insider’s perspective) rooted in relativistic philosophical presumptions, and using “the indigenous approach to construct psychological theories with serious

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considerations of the normative philosophies prevalent in Chinese Society” (p. 150). He agreed with the view that human nature contains one mind, many mentalities (Shweder 1996), and promoted a hermeneutic and holistic approach to study psychology by digging into the deep structure of human mind in specific cultural mentalities. Taking an integrationist position, Wenbo Che (车文博) called for a reform in psychology by integrating all existing paradigms for increasing the cultural and historical explanatory power of psychological theories and for constructing “the Great Psychology” (大心理学, Che 2010, p. 18). This Great Psychology vision may need psychological science to be freed from Western empiricism that holds dualistic separation between phenomenon and noumenon, and adopt hermeneutic and integrative approaches (Christopher et al. 2014) that “explore the wisdoms and cultural values supporting an individual’s social actions and devote themselves to construct theories that represent not only the universal mind of human beings but also the mentality of people in a given society” (Hwang 2020, p. 65). From Exclusive Individualism to Epistemological Pluralism Individualism is a dominant Western value system that underlies the discipline and practice of modern psychology. It champions individual rights, liberty, and freedom over those of the group or collective one is in. As pointed out by Waterman (1984), the principles of individualism in psychology “are derived from a philosophical orientation, defined by eudaimonism, freedom of choice, personal responsibility, and ethical universality” (p. 762). Although the countries that are high on individualism including the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom represent only a very small portion of the world population (Henrich et al. 2010), individualism ideology has shaped and dominated modern psychology everywhere, and “U.S. psychology... is likewise the heir to individualist ideology and a disregard for culture” (Christopher et al. 2014). Serious criticisms have been expressed for decades about rooting psychology in individualism. Scholars have noted that under the individualism paradigm psychology has offered mechanisms to reduce social connectedness and diminish a sense of personal control by promoting selfconcepts such as self-esteem, by confusing autonomy with independence, by creating a “separate self,” and so on. (Eckersley 2005). They warned

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that individualistic values could promote conditions for individuals to become “egocentric, atomistic, narcissistic, and alienated” (Waterman 1984, p. 762). Hogan (1975) sharply noted “The ideology of individualism and the personal conscience orientation that characterize much American psychology appear symptomatic of a sick society” (p. 539). As the result of this paradigm, psychological well-being has become “no more than personal fulfillment or private gratification” (Christopher et al. 2014, p. 651), and happiness “to satisfy, maintain and strengthen the self” (Shiah 2020, p. 39). Human relationships are studied using social exchange or justice theories that are constructed on the presumption of individualism, implying “only an interpersonal relationship or instrumental tie or market pricing” matters (Hwang 2021, p. 95). Due to the individualism paradigm, Western psychological research findings are often not replicable in other cultures (Henrich et al. 2010) due to the fact that most human societies tend to promote values “that emphasize social obligations and self-restraint and discourage those that promote self-indulgence and anti-social behavior” (Eckersley 2005, p. 254). Chinese cultural psychologists have recognized and articulated the cultural misfit of imported Western psychology in China (e.g., Yang 1993, 2009; Hwang 2020), but their concerns have yet to be considered fully by the “mainstream” of the field. Considering being in a culture that is more collectivistic (Hofstede 2001) and relational (Hwang 2020) than individualistic, psychology of China has to grasp “the embedded nature of Chinese behavior patterns within the contexts of their own historical and cultural traditions” (Marsella and Pickren 2020, p. x). Chinese culture is the foundation as well as the material needed for advancing this discipline, because “[n]othing in the social world or in what is mistakenly thought of as an inner self exists apart from culture. It is culture all the way down” (Christopher et al. 2014, p. 651). Accordingly, we consider the following paradigms to be potential replacements or supplements to individualism in Chinese psychology and in the global psychology. Collectivism. In contrast to individualism, collectivism refers to a cultural mentality that emphasizes the goals and needs of the group over the individual, a tight social framework in which people distinguish between in-groups and out-groups, and a practice that individuals rely on the in-group to look after them when in need (Moran et al. 2014). Although both individualism and collectivism exist within every individual, culture, and society, some countries are more individualistic than collectivistic or vice versa at a cultural level. China has been viewed as

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more collectivistic than individualistic by foreign researchers who focus on cross-cultural differences using Western individualism as a reference point (e.g., Hofstede 2001). The importance of including collectivism as a paradigm seems to become obvious during the recent COVID-19 pandemic. Having no cultural or country borders, the virus reminds humans of the global community of human destiny and claims respect for the connectedness (vs. individualistic) of people. For human survival and flourishing, collectivism has critical functions to serve. For instance, Lu et al. (2021) found that people in more collectivistic cultures were more likely to wear masks, a critical preventive practice, than people in more individualistic cultures during the COVID-19. Some Western cultural scholars even call for new interventions that can “help countries tighten social norms as they continue to battle COVID-19 and future collective threats” (Gelfand et al. 2021, p. 2). A study conducted in a rural area in China revealed that those women who prioritize “myself” in life reported lower subjective happiness than those who put the interest of family, country, and world ahead of “myself” (Li 2020). Among young Chinese population, a recent survey reported in Global Times showed that more and more of them have increased their pride for identifying with Chinese culture (more collectivistic than individualistic) and decreased preference for Western cultural values in the past 5 years (Shen 2021). It is timely for Chinese psychology and global psychology to adopt and integrate collectivism as a paradigm. Relationism/Familism. Rooted in the Confucian tradition, a relational focus is the core feature of Chinese culture that defines the individuals’ self in relationship terms (Hwang 2020). Scholars rightfully point out the limitation of using individualism-collectivism to explain Chinese behavior patterns and proposed adding relationalism to form a tripartite framework for studying the Chinese way of viewing self in relation to others (e.g., Wang and Liu 2010). Hwang (2020) persuasively argued that Confucian social relations are the foundations of Chinese psychology. For instance, various culture-specific Chinese psychological concepts, such as guanxi (关系), face (面子), and renqing (人情) or valued virtues of benevolence (仁), righteousness (义), courtesy (礼), wisdom (智), honesty (信), loyalty (忠), and filial piety (孝) are all relational in nature (Zhang 2013). Traditional cultural beliefs regarding proper behavior such as “It is impolite not to return what one receives

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(来而不往非礼也)” and “The gentleman aims at harmony, and not at uniformity (君子和而不同)” also portray a relational mentality. Familism is a family-centered worldview that treats family as a form of social institution where the maintenance, continuity, and functions of the family are prioritized in its operation (Lee 1953). Chinese culture is always known to have family relationships at the center. Three of the five most important human relationships from the Confucian teachings are among family members, parent and child, husband and wife, and elder and younger siblings. Notably, the China’s Marriage Law encompasses “the responsibilities of spouses, parents, children, grandparents, and siblings to one another” (Hare-Mustin 1982, p. 477). From the ancient time till today, “A peaceful family will prosper” (家和万事兴) idiom has been integrated into people’s subconsciousness. Logically and practically, it is epistemologically impossible and unrealistic to understand Chinese psychology without having relationism/familism as the foundation. Holism or Whole-View (整 整体观). Besides being seen as a methodological paradigm, holism remains somewhat a fussy concept (Scheid 2016), but it has generally been accepted as an epistemic orientation (e.g., in Gestalt psychology) or a designation of ontology where the whole is always greater than its parts (Christopher and George 1998). Holism does share resemblance with the Chinese term 整体观 (Whole-View), a basic tenet of Chinese culture and an important moral principle since the ancient times. This whole-view underlies the very core of Chinese traditional medicine, Yin/Yang thinking (Scheid 2016), which is very relevant to human psychological peace and harmony. Under the whole-view, psychology can be seen as a “spiritual unity” that consists of the “bodyhuman-things-gods” (Su and Ye 2020, p. 386) and exists in nature and environment (human nature in one, 天人合一). Notably, the whole-view may contradict the individualistic view regarding human relationships. For instance, in the face of individual differences, the whole-view would support eliminating differences for harmony, while individualistic view would emphasize the individual differences and rights in relation to a group, the state, and society (Tian 2017). Clearly, human experiences governed by the whole-view can’t be explained by the individualism-based psychology, and the discovery of laws and patterns underlying Chinese behavior has to be pursued with a holistic or whole-view. Epistemological pluralism. Considering each of the paradigms discussed above owning a certain level of explanatory power, a pluralistic

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approach certainly has advantages. Epistemological pluralism accepts the validity of multiple ways of knowing and thinking and allows syntheses of diverse explanations/mechanisms for psychological phenomenon (Suri 2013). As critiqued most recently by Sotillos (2021), Western psychology in general and psychotherapy in particular had suffered from the mechanistic, reductionist, and determinist assumptions of the CartesianNewtonian worldview due to the discipline’s exclusive reliance on a single way of knowing. It “has never been neutral, nor can it be... it has a definite belief system from which it arises and it rarely questions its own assumptions” (p. 26). It is time, he argued, that modern psychology be decolonized toward a true postcolonial or perennial psychology grounded in epistemological pluralism including “an authentic metaphysical framework that reflects the diverse religious and spiritual traditions of humanity” (p. 21). With epistemological pluralism, Chinese psychology may benefit the most from the traditional cultural wisdom and resources to enrich the understanding of humans holistically as members of collectives and individuals in relationships and nature. From Western Medical Model to Eastern Philosophical/Cultural Models in Psychotherapy Western medicine is the product of Western culture and philosophy. It sets out to treat medical conditions by trained professionals with scientifically approved methods (medication, surgery, etc.). It takes a reductionist view of health and looks at illness from a one-cause, one-disease, and onecure perspective (Schramm 2018). It breaks the human body down into many specialties such as internal/external medicine, neurology, dermatology, urology, and so on. What is often overlooked, however, is that medicine is culturally constructed (Lupton 2003). It was tied specifically to Western cultural values, paradigms for defining disease/illness and therapeutic care, and views of clinical reality. Medical attention and therapeutics are decided and delivered accordingly, which is a process of active social construction. Socially constructed phenomena are always culture and context specific (Kleinman et al. 2006). Psychotherapy was dominated by the Western medical model (Cottone 2007) from the very beginning because most early theorists (e.g., Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, Fritz Perls, Aaron Beck, and so on) were all medical doctors who treated psychological problems as diseases. Medical model dictates the psychotherapeutic processes, including assessing and

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diagnosing mental illness or disorder, identifying a biological explanation for the illness or disorder, using treatment to disrupt the biological system underlying the disorder, and designing and implementing logic treatment procedures (Wampold and Imel 2015). The general notion that a good therapist should understand underlying causes of mental problems and is able to fix them, or reduce negative symptoms, is widely accepted. Thus, psychotherapist training generally follows that for training medical doctors and teaches disorder-based knowledge and science-based interventions. Although most practicing psychotherapists do not prescribe medication or even do not feel loyal to a medical model, the therapeutic thinking rooted in the medical model is salient and pervades the assessment, diagnosis, and treatment process of psychotherapy (Wampold and Imel 2015). The assessment tools are developed to capture behavioral expressions of disorders, diagnosis (required by the third-party payer) uses DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders), and interventions are expected/required to be symptom focused and science based. In practice, clinicians strive to recognize and discover client problems/symptoms, analyze them with theoretical explanations, and intervene using suggested treatments from specific theoretical systems. Clinical thinking skills in diagnosis, case conceptualization, and treatment planning are the core of psychotherapist training. This is the state of psychotherapy practice both in the West and in China at the present time. Criticisms were articulated decades ago (e.g., Szasz 1974) and have accumulated in recent years about medical model’s dominance in psychotherapy, questioning its validity, appropriateness, exclusive focus on pathology, as well as potential harm it may cause (McCulloch et al. 2005). McCulloch et al. quoted specific condemnations by well-known critics who pointed out that the medical practice in mental health had operated as an “empire building well beyond its scientific and empirical basis and generating an epidemic of iatrogenic disease” (p. 8). Under the medical model, mental health service could become “a means of oppression” (p. 8) that socializes mental patients to their role defined by the diagnosis labeling and prevents true understanding of their experiences. Such anti-sentiment has paved the way for the great effort by some scholars and practitioners to argue for a paradigm shift in recent decades. The arguments include those about “the ethical implications of diagnosing certain clients with a ‘mental disorder’ when a more accurate model would suggest that those clients are simply reacting in a human way

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to the difficulties of life” (Elkins 2009, p. 77) and “we know in our hearts that those clients are just as sane and normal as we are” (p.78). However, the actual implementation of such shift is yet to start due to the economic and political structures in the West. The health insurance industry has significant power in setting the rules for healthcare practitioners including counselors and psychotherapists, and “playing the game” (p. 80) under the medical model has been ingrained in psychotherapy practice. It has been noted that the potential harm is even greater when the Western medical model-based mental health therapeutic practices are transplanted to other countries/cultures (e.g., Christopher et al. 2014; Watters 2010). What come with the therapeutic theories and methods are the “American psyche” or “mental illness” and associated cultural assumptions about human nature to many countries including China (Watters 2010). Some basic assumptions include “beliefs about what type of life event is likely to make one psychologically traumatized,” “venting emotions by talking is more healthy than stoic silence,” “humans are innately fragile and should consider many emotional experiences as illnesses that require professional interventions,” and “mental health (and a modern style of self-awareness) can be found by throwing off traditional social roles and engaging in individualistic quests of introspection” (p. 4). Considering both the danger of imported mental illness and the gross unfit of these cultural assumptions, shouldn’t we consider a paradigm shift for the well-being and mental health of Chinese people? Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) is the product of Ancient Chinese cultural civilization and “derives from a unified Chinese cosmology that situates the well-being of the human body within an interrelated universe” (Lee 2020, p. 22). Although we are not able to do its justice by offering a reasonable review here, we touch on a few tenets to support our call for its inclusion as a paradigm for psychotherapy. TCM inherits a macroscopic and holistic view of health and conceptualizes illness as a state of disequilibrium between Yang and Yin, and between person and environment/nature. The clinical intervention of TCM focuses on re-establishing the equilibrium and restoring lost human body harmony, rather than eliminating symptoms as typically done in Western medicine. In a sense, Western medicine doesn’t have a clear view of health except a freedom from specific pathological conditions, and TCM clearly defines health as holistic balance of Yin-Yang energies. In psychotherapy, TCM model as a paradigm could generate higher explanatory power for Chinese psychological experiences than Western

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medical model. Yang (2009) pointed out that Chinese view health/illness differently than Westerners, because of different frame of mind or mindset. The Chinese tend to exercise “moderate practical thinking” (中庸实践思维, Yang 2009, p. 248) and attend more to the consequences/implications of behavior than Westerners who would emphasize the causes of the behavior. For instance, in understanding how people make moral judgment, Western philosophers focus mostly on the reasons that a behavior is conducted, which does not account for the Chinese’s reverence to self-control for courtesy (克己复礼) and emphasis on consequence or implication of the behavior on others. Specific to mental health, research has shown that consideration of outcome/consequence on others and on society is an important component of Chinese people’s evaluation of mental illness, including their judgment in severity and intervention preference (Yang 2009). Under the TCM paradigm, psychotherapy can be liberated from conducting the proven unproductive “treatment” (Wampold and Imel 2015) rooted in a disease/deficit-based model that pathologizes human behavior, over emphasizes biological determinism, decontextualizes diagnosis, creates doctor-patient relating mentality, compartmentalizes fixing strategies, and aims at symptom removal. These characteristics of psychotherapy make positive outcomes too difficult to obtain because psychological problems are not diseases/illnesses. A strength- and resource-based approach (e.g., Wong 2006) has much more promise in facilitating healing from suffering and growth in living a meaningful life in contextualized environment. To gain and regain the balance of Yang/Yin energies and person-environment and person-person harmonies, individuals just need to feel motivated to engage in what is right (vs. what is wrong) in a TCM framework. This Yang/Yin balance-focused approach under TCM can also avoid negative side effects of psychotherapy such as making client feel sick (with diagnosis), over occupied by negative aspects of life (reinforcing negative experience by talking about it all the time in therapy), and incompetent (having to face an “expert”). The danger of these side effects can be understood by considering the power of expectations in causing nocebo effects in human experience (Vance 2016). Social and cultural constructivism. The meaning of all human experiences, including psychological problems, is socially and culturally constructed. In psychology, social constructivism has gained significant traction as a paradigm for understanding human behavior and become a major theoretical movement (Cottone 2007). Social constructivism is

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postmodern at its foundation and concerned more with relationships than individuals. Without getting into the complexity and diversity in specific viewpoints of different constructivist theories, it is worth noting that the application of social constructivism in psychology may alter how mental health or illness is viewed and how effective treatment is achieved. Kenneth Gergen’s (2009) criticism of nosology of mental illness is a perfect example to show the relevance of social constructivism in psychotherapy. Prior to 1974, homosexuality was considered a mental disorder and it had its own diagnostic category according to DSM published by American Psychiatric Association. It was the result of a vote of 5854 to 3810 among its members in 1974 that removed this disorder category from DSM and overnight millions of Americans who had this “disorder” were “cured.” As we can imagine that the vote could have gone to the other way and those otherwise perfectly healthy individuals would have continued being seen as mentally ill. This example demonstrates the “arbitrariness” in categorization of “illness” and illustrates the constructed nature of diagnosis. As noted by Bacon (2018), once the diagnostic categories are created, they become self-sustaining because clinicians are going to use them and sell them to clients, and clients will then organize and report their experience accordingly. In a significant way, “we are not discovering a new diagnostic category, we are creating it” (p. 74), and “[i]f we stop manufacturing ‘mental illness’ we don’t have to fight stigma” (Walker 2014, p. viii). Psychotherapy can be seen as a process of construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction. For instance, one common assumption embedded in different treatment approaches is that the cause of the problem is in the past (e.g., past psychological injury or trauma) and working through the past may lead to recovery (Elkins 2009). However, psychological science on human cognition and memory has demonstrated that recalling the past unavoidably involves reconstruction. Yalom and Leszcz 2008) stated “The past is not static: every experienced therapist knows that the process of exploration and understanding alters the recollection of the past. In fact, current neurobiological research tells us that every time we access an old memory we automatically alter it according to our current context, and the revised memory is then returned to longterm storage in place of the original memory” (p. 187). From a social constructivist perspective, psychotherapy is basically a process in which therapist and client “begins by co-creating a pathological world and then replaces it with a more functional one” (Bacon 2018, p. 75).

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Considering that human psychology and culture mutually influence each other and the relationship between them is “inherently dynamic” (Lehman et al. 2004, p. 703), cultural construction in psychotherapy/counseling conducted in China deserves attention. This is particularly critical when dominant theories in practice are all made outside of China. From defining to achieving holistic health (including mental health), the Chinese philosophical foundations (e.g., Hwang 2020), cultural values (e.g., Yan 2002), cognitive frame of mind (e.g., Yang 2009), moral vision (e.g., Li 2013), and symptom expression (e.g., Lee 2020) are to be fully considered. Psychotherapy/counseling is supposed to serve people’s needs in cultural context, not create/promote new cultural values/practice. We consider the latter directionally wrong because sustaining individual health or well-being is only possible when it is supported by the person’s cultural and social context. Due to its cultural foundations, modern psychotherapy practice manifests a self-centric philosophy that assumes “a subject-object dichotomy and focuses on static, isolated, and substantial entities” (Chen 2017, p. 1). In contrast, built on the cultural cosmology of the Chinese civilization, the Chinese philosophical thinking emphasizes “continuity, dynamism, relativity, relationships, and the totality” (p. 1). Such fundamental cultural differences can translate into drastically different views of health and mental health and potentially construct different psychologies or psychological realities. For instance, enhancing the public’s mental health level, societal mental stability, interpersonal harmony, and public well-being and good morals is seen as the mission of the mental health profession in China (中国国家卫生和计划生育委员会, 2016). This level of emphasis on the collectives (public, society) and morality is a distinct characteristic of Chinese culture where collective good is accepted as the basis for the individual good. Just like the belief that “nothing in the pot, what can be in the bowl?” has been integrated into Chinese common sense. It should be noted that a moral vision is always deeply embedded in Chinese worldviews such as Confucian virtue ethics like dao (道), junzi ( 君子), ren (仁), moderation (中庸), and interpersonal principle Do unto others as you would have them do unto you (己所不欲勿施于人). Although psychotherapy practice is not commissioned to teach or evaluate these values, the power of these values in culturally constructing individuals’ psychological experience can’t be ignored. Otherwise, it won’t be possible to differentiate right and wrong, good and bad, or healthy and unhealthy, or detect the mechanisms that are responsible for decontextualization and

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pathologization embedded in Western psychotherapy/counseling theories. Moving from the Western “self-enhancement” to “Eastern wisdom of self-cultivation toward self-enlightenment” (Hwang 2021, p. vii) as the ultimate counseling goal requires a culturally constructed therapeutic system.

An Ending Note In this chapter, we made arguments for paradigm shift in psychology and psychotherapy to advance psychology of China (vs. psychology in China). We reviewed different theories and theorists’ positions on the topic. Our goal is to stimulate discussion among professional colleagues. We do not claim to have the right answers as our views are inherently biased due to our own identities and learning experiences. We are nonetheless relatively sure about one observation; that is, psychology in China has reached a place where reflection and renewal are necessary. Considering the time, the place, and the people in China and in the global village, existing psychological science and practice are to be renewed, for which the Chinese, supported by the long and rich history of a cultural civilization, must lead.

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CHAPTER 10

Hiding in Plain Sight: Paradigms Shifts in the Study of the ‘Religious Question’ in China André Laliberté

Introduction The study of religion in China has faced and continues to face obstacles of a political, epistemological, and ontological nature. Political forces have regulated the practice of religion from time immemorial, at times seeking to eradicate it. In this climate, the legitimacy of the professional study of religion itself has been compromised to such an extent that the epistemic community of research about religion came close to disappear four decades ago. In relation to these two trends, a long-running trend in Chinese elites has even disputed the existence of religion as a social fact in Chinese societies. The paradigmatic changes seen in the study of religion in China reflect shifts in these forces. The first paradigm for the study of religion, held by Confucian elites and by Western missionaries,

A. Laliberté (B) University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 S. Hua (ed.), Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8032-8_10

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was defined by the premise that Chinese have no well-defined religious belief. A new and more nuanced paradigm emerged in the nineteenth century with Chinese and Western social scientists looking past the biases of Confucian elites and paying attention to the religious practice of the common people. Promoters of the third paradigm, a Marxism gradually adapted to the realities of China, wavered between approaches to knowledge that served different strategies, from the co-optation of religion to its annihilation. The hegemony of this paradigm prevailed for three decades before an epistemological pluralism re-emerged with the policy of reform and opening. Since then, a more pluralist Marxist paradigm co-exists with a liberal paradigm in which the study of Christianity has played a significant role, and a paradigm of ‘multiple modernities’, which stresses the importance of contextualization and de-centering the study of religion from its Western origins.

The Study of Chinese Religions Before 1949 Chinese since time immemorial had developed religious systems and harbored beliefs in life after death, the existence of hell and heaven, and the influence of supernatural beings and forces on this world. Outsiders, with their own biases, looked down at the Chinese religions as ‘superstitions’, or as ethical system without transcendence, and therefore unwittingly confirmed the bias of the Chinese governing elites, who looked down at the beliefs of the commoners as ‘heresy (jin 尽)’ or ‘evil teachings (xiejiao 邪教)’ while they upheld a religious order of their own. This complex and pervasive cosmology, moreover, has changed over centuries, a process documented in great details by the numerous contributions from Chinese and Western scholars to the eight-volume work under the general editorship of John Lagerwey (2018). This collection shows how much modern scholarship has moved well past the previous conceptions and documents clearly that Chinese have worshiped, prayed, and held a variety of religious beliefs through their history. This is not to deny that humanist and atheist thought also existed in China through times, as the ambitious work on the subject by Ya Hanzhan and Wang Yousan (2011) demonstrates. What remains disputed today is to what extent the views of the latter have always prevailed over those of the former in the minds of most people. Conversely, a major certainty remaining is the steadfastness of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in promoting the teleology that religion is bound to wither away as Chinese

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society becomes fully developed, and the necessity to manage this gradual unraveling of religion through ‘religious work (zongjiao gongzuo 宗教工 作)’ to solve the ‘religious question (zongjiao wenti 宗教问题)’ (Wang 2010: 401–410). Three different fields of knowledge originally contributed to the study of Chinese religion as a recognized field outside China with its own paradigms in social sciences and humanities: Western Christian missionaries; the Chinese Confucian elites they interacted with; and those who produced and commented on religious texts, which the two other groups dismissed as ‘superstitious’, or ‘heretics’. The Western science of sinology, the knowledge of China for non-Chinese, owes much to the early attempts by people of faith in the West who hoped to convert Chinese to their respective version of Christianity. To meet their long-term goals, early missionaries to China had to pay attention to the customs and worldviews of their prospective converts, looking for means to convince them of what they viewed as the correctness of their views. The first among them were Jesuits, who laid the ground for the Western scholarship that would follow, until Protestant missionaries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries superseded them in importance. These pioneers have produced an immense corpus of texts. One of the rare studies of sinology’s history, by David Honey (2001), covered the field from the beginning until the 1980s, although he looks at philology as the foundation of the discipline, not at religion. The early interlocutors to the missionaries were the elites in the Chinese bureaucracy, whose conceptions of the world and cosmologies permeated public morality, family ethics, and social life. State officials, who reached their status thanks to their knowledge of the Confucian canon, looked down at the practices of the peasants and merchants, which they considered superstitious or even dangerous for the established social order. Western missionaries, who witnessed this contempt toward popular religion, conveniently overlooked the religious dimension of Confucianism itself, and concluded that Chinese society was eminently secular, a perception that Confucian elites came to encourage, as Lionel Jensen (1997) argued. Although the Twentieth-Century Chinese revolutions rejected Confucianism and the diffused religious system associated to it, the state has sought throughout these periods to keep its prerogative in policing and monitoring religions. In that sense, CCP cadres perpetuate the legacy of the Confucian elites. Despite their respective biases against

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popular religions, the abundant literature produced by Western missionaries and the Confucian elites represents an indispensable source to begin to understand Chinese religions since ancient times up to the Republican period. The third source for the study of Chinese religion, the largest in terms of its production, is the primary material produced and read by the believers themselves. These sources are not academic, but they shed light on the nature of the beliefs and their moral implication. Scholars of religions in China stand to benefit enormously in exploring this material, because these texts shape the worldviews of their readers. They can be subdivided into three categories. Firstly, morality books (shanshu 善书), which are non-denominational, are distributed in temples of all tradition for free. They are instructions on how to live a good life, detailing the moral retribution of sins or good deeds, and teach people about proper rituals and behavior. Vincent Goossaert (2017) has translated and annotated in French a representative sample of some of the most important of these texts still in use in China today. Secondly, the canonical scriptures of Buddhism and Daoism remain largely available in places of worship or online. One could add in this category the texts of new religions like Falungong and Yiguandao, whose diffusion the state seeks to restrict. Finally, the many commentaries and interpretations written by lay people and clerics on their own religious traditions are widely available in bookstores. This includes popular writings on specific aspects of the Chinese tradition identified with Daoism as well as the popular religions/beliefs and the communal religions, such as geomancy (fengshui), qigong, divination (yijing ), numerology, and Chinese traditional medicine. Although the earliest among these three kinds of texts predate 1949, many are reprinted, and many in the third categories are recent addition. But they show some continuity with pre-socialist religious practices in China, still relevant outside the PRC. The canonical literature for the institutionalized religions and for the practices related to popular and communal religions is immense and Donald Lopez, Jr. (1996), offers a good introduction to these texts. The early works on the study of Chinese religions by social scientists and scholars in humanities that were neither missionaries nor part of the official bureaucracy nor devotees burgeoned in the late nineteenth century with scholars such as the Dutch sinologist and historian of religion De Groot (1892–1910), whose monumental work on the religious system of China comprised six volumes, produced over a period of

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18 years. His French colleague Marcel Granet (1998 [1922]), a student of the sociologist Emile Durkheim, would apply the methods of the nascent discipline to analyze religious practices in ancient Chinese society. Henri Maspero (1971 [1950]), who devoted much of his attention to Daoism in ancient China, wrote on the contemporary practice of popular religions and mythology: his research, undertaken before World War II, was published posthumously, and constituted a reference on which other scholars of religion writing in Western language would build upon. Some of the great names of Chinese sociology of religion used their training in this Western tradition of sociology to study religions in contemporary Chinese society. For instance, the Guangzhou-born Yang Ching-kun (1994 [1961]), who completed his PhD at the University of Michigan, used functionalist sociology to draw the distinction between diffused and institutionalized religions to describe its diversity and complexity. For half a century, his work constituted one of the rare references for the study of contemporary religions in China, and a reference for later generations of scholars. Although Yang worked after 1949, he used among his sources a considerable amount of material written by Chinese scholars, which remains untranslated, mostly written at the end of the Qing Dynasty and during the Republican period, with the oldest source, ‘Whole Book on Searching the Deities of the Complete History of the Three Teachings (Sanjiao yuanliu soushen daquan 三教源 流搜神大全)’, written by an unknown author during the Yuan Dynasty (1264–1367). As China entered a century of revolution, field work within the country of these early sinologists—whether Westerners or Chinese—was interrupted for decades by warfare and the radicalization of social revolution under Mao Zedong. Most Western scholars in social sciences and humanities interpreted China’s transformations as vindication for the paradigm of secularization and with the Communist Party’s control unquestioned, only people of faith concerned about the well-being of their co-religionists paid attention to religion in China, and they often did that with respect to Christianity, a religion embraced by a tiny fraction of the population (Masland 1952). Within China, the study of religion had become an academic dead-end for sociologists, historians, and philosophers: it became a casualty of political struggles and the scant knowledge about contemporary religion in the PRC depended on the rare comments from exile and dissidents. However, the field survived thanks to the patient labor of sinologists based in Hong Kong and Taiwan, who analyzed CCP

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and state official documents and scrutinized the Chinese mainland press to look at all aspects of Chinese society, not only its religions, such as Laszlo Ladany and his colleagues at the China News Analysis (Leys 1990). Following the dramatic changes of the last four decades since the end of the Cultural Revolution, the scholarship on Chinese religions has experienced a remarkable renewal. Most of those who pay close attention to the country and its people agree that many Chinese today, like before, worship, pray, and hold a variety of religious beliefs. However, they would also find that humanist and atheist thought, which has existed since time immemorial, prevails in the public sphere of contemporary society. The dominant view, which officials encourage, is that religion is bound to wither away as China progresses, and current scholarship in that country has to take that factor into account. This means that scholars of Chinese religions must consider at least three paradigms: a Marxism paradigm that continues to benefit from official support but that has evolved enough to include some of the findings and methods of a variety of approaches, and two more diffuse paradigms, in formation, whose characteristic is to overlook, rather than criticize, Marxism. These two paradigms update the research done by Chinese scholars before 1949—namely those mentioned above—and incorporate research from abroad, by expatriate Chinese as well as by Western sinologists, people whose career is defined by the study of China, who knows its classical language and can read religious texts, as well as social scientists in the fields of the sociology of religion, anthropology, and political science. Before considering the latter two paradigms in the study of religions in China, it is important to consider the official paradigm and its intellectual framework, or doctrine, which the state imposes.

The Official Voice Before the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power, the issue of religion was not a priority. Mao did not write much on that topic, except to condemn religion as the expression of feudalism. None of his writing on the issue, however, deserves credit as social science work. On the other hand, some of the CCP leaders, especially those involved with United Front Work, which sought to rally non-party members to their cause, seriously reflected on the nature of religion, to ensure that believers would not sabotage the party’s effort to win over the population to its cause and maintain its dominance once it has taken power.

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Reflecting these concerns, the CCP ensured after 1949 that ‘religious work’ became a component of governance, with only a brief interruption during the Cultural Revolution. Within this Marxist paradigm, one can observe three phases of unequal length, with a possible fourth one taking shape under Xi Jinping. During the first period, since its founding in 1921 until the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the CCP was divided between a rigid interpretation of Marxism used to condemn all religions and a more pragmatic approach, known as the ‘five characteristics’ of religion. Then followed a brief period, lasting until 1978, when the more dogmatic version prevailed along with the persecution against all religions, and the academic study of religion ceased. The third period, which came in the heel of Deng Xiaoping’s reform, reversed the situation, as the ‘five characteristics of religion’ became the guideline for CCP religious work. These stages of official policy have shaped the study of Chinese religions inside and outside the country. Before the CCP took power, the critique of religion in the philosophical writings of the young Marx and the justification that Lenin offered for the atheist policy implemented by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union constituted the most important theoretical sources for the CCP understanding of Chinese religion. However, after the failure of the early uprisings and during the Long March, Mao and his followers came to the realization that to win over the masses, they needed the support of the peasantry. Aware of the prevalence of popular and communal religions, as well as the influence of Buddhism, Daoism, and even Christianity and Islam, the CCP adopted an approach that broke with Leninism, and that adapted to the Chinese conditions. Li Weihan, who was the first director of the CCP Central Party School, developed the theory of the ‘five characteristics’ of religion. The five characteristics of religion included its mass character (qunzongxing ), its long duration (changqixing ), its international nature (guojixing ), its relevance to ethnic minorities (minzuxing ), and its complexity (fuzaxing). Li has not left any book-length writing on his view, but Ye Xiaowen and Wang Zuo’an, as heads of the religious affairs’ bureaucracy, would later appropriate his theory as a guideline for the CCP religious work. The historian of CCP religious policy Duan Dezhi (2013) presents the development of this theory in its historical context. There is not much to be said about the ten years of the Cultural Revolution with respect to the paradigms for the study of Chinese religions except to say that a simplified and dogmatic interpretation of Marxism prevailed by default because Mao ordered the dismantling of religious

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associations. Li Weihan’s ideas faced criticism and he was himself persecuted. In these conditions, research on religions by Chinese academics was devalued, and the academic study of Chinese religions in practice by foreign social scientists and humanities’ scholars could only happen in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other locations outside of the PRC. The CCP nihilistic approach to religion during the Cultural Revolution did not result from a long-term and well-planned strategy, but constituted an expedient action serving broader political struggles. It is telling that sociologist of religion Ninian Smart (1974) wrote in an essay about Mao that his thought had come to function as a new religion. The untold damage to victims of persecution, however, could not prevent the revival of religion and in its wake, the renaissance of scientific study of this phenomenon. In the third stage of official policy on religious affairs, which took shape as Deng Xiaoping launched his policy of reform and opening and the evidence of religious revival become clear, the field of religious studies experienced a remarkable come-back, which would persist under his successors. The CCP sought a better understanding about a social phenomenon whose resilience they had not anticipated so they concluded that unfettered scholarship would better equip them in dealing with the religious question/issue/problem better than a blind faith in its disappearance under socialism. In the context of reform and opening, Deng encouraged the renewal of contact with religious networks in Taiwan and among overseas Chinese to channel investments. The main official statements on Christian seminaries called for their re-opening, encouraging international cooperation. Finally, the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS)’s Institute for World Religions (IWR) resumed activities and engaged in an objective study of religion, as discussed below. The compilations of texts in translation edited by Donald MacInnis (1989) and Luo Zufeng (1991) represent rare cases of the scholarship and official views on the subject then available in English. Under Jiang Zemin, not only did China experience one of the fastest increases in conversion to Christianity, but new religious movements such as Falungong emerged and reached out worldwide among overseas Chinese. Jiang appointed Ye Xiaowen, a former sociologist who had criticized the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, as director of the Bureau for Religious Affairs in 1995. Ye had promoted the view of Li Weihan and argued that the CCP had been wrong in claiming that religion is backward. His view that ‘religion is compatible with socialism’ came to

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represent the official position of the CCP under Jiang. In 1998, the State Council restructured the government, and the BRA became the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), suggesting that the CCP granted more importance to religious affairs. If earlier writings had suggested that Ye (1997) was open-minded, his public denunciation of the Falungong indicated otherwise. His political longevity was remarkable, as he stayed in place under Jiang’s successor and could then ensure continuity in religious work as he promoted Hu’s harmonious society (Ye 2010). Under Hu Jintao, the CCP showed even greater interest in religious affairs, as it promoted the organization of Buddhist and Daoist international forum. Hu appeared to go further than his predecessors in the direction of opening to religion, his slogan of ‘Harmonious Society’ appearing to indicate a promotion of Confucianism and Chinese traditional religions. However, his attitude did not prove vastly different from that of Jiang. Under Hu, the CCP maintained a tight control over Christian associations, Muslims, and Tibetan Buddhism: in 2007, SARA director Ye issued the ‘Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism’. In 2009, near the end of his administration, Hu appointed Wang Zuo’an (2010), who was trained in philosophy, as director of SARA. Xi Jinping, like his predecessors, seeks to leave his mark in politics and has quickly established his ambition for the country with the slogan of realizing the ‘China Dream’. His wide-ranging objectives include the ‘sinicizing of religion (zhongguohua)’, which means a closer coordination between the CCP and the religious associations that the state recognizes, along with tighter monitoring of all forms of religious activity. In 2018, during his second mandate, Xi dissolved SARA and its activities became integrated within the CCP United Front Work Department. As consequence of this reorganization, Wang, as head of SARA, became Vice-Chair of the CCP UFWD. In the context of these recent changes in the management of religious affairs, and the persecution against Muslims in Xinjiang and the campaigns against churches for being ‘too ostentatious’, the future of scholarship on Chinese religions remains uncertain. Yet, its achievements remain. A multi-disciplinary scholarship on Chinese religions has grown since Deng, defined by three competing paradigms: a conservative Marxist paradigm that hew to the materialist view on religion promoted by the state apparatus; a liberal-universalist one inspired heavily by the study of

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Christianity; and a pluralist one that endorses the view of multiple paths to modernity and religious diversity. It is grounded in Chinese historical and sociological realities: however, it lacks a unifying theory. These three paradigms have not developed on an equal playing field. Within China, the Marxist paradigm has received institutional endorsement from the authorities. The two other paradigms, always at risk of marginalization during changes in political climate, benefit on the other hand from greater respectability in the global epistemic community because of the efforts by individual scholars to gain from their contacts outside China exposure to the newest developments in theory and methods, and viceversa, as non-Chinese scholars work with their colleagues in the field. The three paradigms differ in their assumptions, but they all agree on the view that religion matters in contemporary China. The first of these paradigms prevails in China. Conversely, the liberal-universalist paradigm has found limited echo in China because of obvious political constraints, while the nascent paradigm of multiple modernities has yet to coalesce into a unified field. The next section elaborates on the first of these two paradigms.

The Marxist Paradigm in the Academic Study of Religion in China The academic study of religion in China could not stray away too far from a narrow-minded variant of the Marxist paradigm before 1978 because of the political conditions imposed on those who generated knowledge in that field. When religion was considered a remnant of feudal society, its study naturally was a subject for historical or philosophical research rather than a topic for sociologists, anthropologists, let alone political scientists or economists. The increasingly visible manifestations of religious revival since Deng Xiaoping became paramount leader and even more so under his successors worried the CCP authorities, as they realized that they needed an objective understanding of religion, to better manage its development. This situation led to a rise in importance for the SARA Bureaucracy, as an institution that provides the party with knowledge on religious matters, but also guidance to religious institutions. Like the CCP and the state bureaucracy in general, bureaus for religious affairs oversee the activities of religious associations at all levels of government. The need to fill this large bureaucracy with competent personnel has provided the incentive for the development of religious studies at a level that would have been unthinkable at the time of Mao.

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The study of religion legitimized under Jiang has expanded significantly under Hu and Xi, with the IWR producing every year a voluminous report about the Chinese scholarship on religious studies for every year, under the general editorship of IWR party secretary, such as Cao Zhongjian between 1996 and 2007. In 2001–2002, Cao counted 35 research centers and departments of religious studies in university throughout the country and listed an impressive number of volumes written on the five officially recognized religions, religious issues such as ‘evil cults’, and theories in religious studies. These studies usually do not include research on traditional religious practices such as geomancy (fengshui), divination (yijing ), the ritual of ancestors’ worship, or Confucianism, seen as part of national studies (guoxue), or as a matter of philosophy. By the time of the transition from Hu to Xi, the IWR sponsored the publication of an annual report, the blue book on religions, jointly edited by the IWR President Jin Ze 金泽 and Qiu Yonghui 邱永 辉, a well-known expert on Hinduism, that presents an account of each of the five officially recognized religions: Buddhism, Daoism, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam. Every year, the report also highlights some key topics. The 2009 edition discussed the popularity of Christianity and the effects of the financial crisis on the growth of religion; the 2011 report presented debates about the status of Confucianism. Qiu assumed sole responsibility after 2014. Some of the most prolific authors on the study of religion in China worked for the CCP Central Party School and the CCP United Front Work Department. Not surprisingly, their work reflects the priority of authorities. Gong Xuezeng (2003) theorized about how much religion can become compatible with scientific socialism. Ren Jie (2007) described CCP policy on religious matters as a set of new forms of coordination with the government. Zhu Xiaoming and Shen Guiping (2009), reflecting the concerns of the authorities, wrote about how religions must ‘strengthen’ their ‘love of the country’. This interest on religion, however, did not point to a change in CCP policy. Xi Wuyi (2012), director of the CASS Institute of Marxist studies, reminded its official position on the importance of guiding religious study with scientific atheism. Many of these books are available to the Chinese public but most of them are not translated. A good introduction to the CCP thinking on religion available in English is compilation of key texts edited by Lu Daji and Gong Xuezeng (2014) on Marxism and religion.

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The IWR, Buddhist academies, and seminaries for the training of religious personnel under CCP guidance had developed in China under Deng but it took years and sustained work before teaching and research on religion emerged as a legitimate subject at public universities. Among the top ten universities, Beijing has a department of Philosophy (and religion), while Fudan University has opened in 2015 a department of religious studies. Many of the prominent researchers on religion in contemporary China have been trained in departments of philosophy, history, literature, and sociology, which made possible a plurality of approaches. Reinforcing this trend toward a break from the Marxist paradigm is the decision by some of them who have completed their training with visiting professorship in European and North American universities, ensuring that they would be familiar with Western theories. Many of them have also developed contacts through international conferences with Taiwanese and Japanese colleagues. These many occasions have ensured that Chinese scholars can keep abreast of the paradigmatic changes in the field of religious studies. What follows is a sample of some of the best-known of these scholars, many of whom have developed contacts abroad, many of whom whose works await translation. Many of the scholars presented below have moved beyond the Marxist interpretative framework of religion as the ‘opiate of the masses’. In some cases, they have embraced other paradigms originating from the West. The adoption of the idea of classical sociologists such as Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, and more recently Robert Bellah, Michel Foucault, and Jose Casanova, have added elements of pluralism. Some have gone further: they have considered the scholarship from the West and combined it with the study of the Chinese religion to develop new theorizations and new concepts. I could not find translation in English or in French for the books written by most of the authors discussed here. It is regrettable because some of their idea deserve a much broader audience. Each of the authors presented here are prolific and established scholars known in China and abroad in the sinologist circles, many of whom have traveled in North America and Europe. They have questioned the Marxist paradigm of religious study in China but have carefully avoided direct criticism of CCP religious work. The government may consult them for guidance in its United Front Work and request reports about their research. These scholars walk the fine line between doing sociological research that meets the highest standards of academic integrity

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while avoiding writing remarks that would contradict openly the views promoted by the government. A good example of that scholarship is Li Xiangping (2006, 2010). Trained as a historian, he became a sociologist of religion and advocated a ‘sociology of belief’ grounded in theory as well as solid empirical observations and has promoted an enlarged definition of religion, in two key volumes that have yet to be translated. In the first one, he proposed a more inclusive approach in the sociological study of religious phenomena, including the so-called evil cults. In the second book, he elaborated on his views about spiritual beliefs, which suggested that Chinese who may not indicate affiliation to an institutionalized religion, are nevertheless holding worldviews that sociologists would consider religious. He has founded a journal, Zhongguo xinyang yanjiu 中国信仰研究, that discusses a variety of social phenomena that can be included in this expanded definition of belief, including political beliefs. Many of Li’s colleagues, trained in the study of a specific religion from a historical, sociological, or anthropological perspective, have established a solid record as experts in their field whom foreign scholars must read before delving into their research deeper. Taking, for example, the study of Buddhism, the research on Chinese religions that has developed away from the Marxist canon has mined the centuries of written material to develop a scholarship that is original, even if difficult for non-Sinologist outsiders to understand. The late philosopher Fang Litian (2003), who was one of the most prominent scholars in the field, has developed scholarship on ethics, esthetics, as well as eschatological beliefs. Among his former students, Wei Dedong counts as one of the few who has an established record in English. He has co-written with Andre van der Braak and Zu Caifang (2016) a book on religion and social cohesion in comparative perspective. Deng Zimei (1994), alone or in cooperation with Chen Bing (2003), stands out as a historian of Chinese Buddhism since its introduction in the country. Xue Yu (2011, 2015) has promoted the study of Buddhist support to the regime during the Korean War and in the first years after the CCP took power. Hou Kunhong (2012) wrote a ground-breaking counterpoint to that historiography, which emphasized the persecution from the CCP against Buddhists. Finally, Wang Jia (2014) has written on the re-emergence of Buddhist philanthropy. These scholars represent only a fraction of a larger epistemic community that documents how this religious tradition remains relevant in contemporary China.

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Another trend of scholarship on religion that deserves mention is the study of Christianity because Chinese Christians and scholars of that tradition have developed ties with co-religionists abroad and scholars of religion, which often led to deeper exchange with a scholarship that stresses the importance of liberal values. This interest for universal values does not contradict the interest for the future of China. Hence, He Guanghu (1999), who received his PhD from the IWR in 1989 in religious studies, became a leading ‘cultural Christian’, a philosophical current that promoted the articulation of theology in Mandarin, but also the view that Christianity would help renew Chinese civilization. Gao Shining (2006), another scholar of Christianity who has traveled extensively abroad, stressed that while social order promoted by religious values for the whole society is important, faith is a personnel matter, implicitly suggesting that it is not an aspect of social life for the CCP to regulate too tightly. Tao Feiya and Lai Pinchao (2016), in their work to valorize the importance of Chinese Christianity in social service and the youth, point to the value of that tradition to contemporary society and nuance the discourse on the ‘sinicization’ of religion. Finally, Liu Peng (2006), another well-traveled scholar with expertise in the study of North America and religion, has promoted for decades the passing of a law on religion to protect religious freedom and put his knowledge of the US Church-State separation to serve that objective. The scholars named so far have all traveled abroad but for most of their career, their academic affiliations were Chinese research institutes or universities. In the next section, I present the scholarship on Chinese religions generated outside of China: one key point to note is that some of the scholars mentioned below are Chinese who worked with their colleagues just mentioned above and keep contact with them. They have chosen to have a career abroad, and very few of them would claim any intellectual debt to Marxism. Many of them would unapologetically identify with the liberal-universal paradigm in the study of Chinese religions. It is no small irony that the latter scholars ground their approach in the scientific study of religion in North America, a point they share with those who identify with scientific Marxism. For the former, scientific inquiry vindicate their view that religion is a fundamental and constant feature of all society, for the latter, religion should wither away as scientific knowledge extends throughout society.

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Two Paradigms in the Study of Chinese Religions Outside China Most scholars outside China looking at Chinese religions agree on a fundamental issue that puts them at odds with the proponent of the Marxist approach: they believe that religion is a constant, which has remained a key aspect of Chinese society despite active efforts to suppress it. In other words, these scholars share a rejection of the paradigm of secularization that used to be dominant in the Western sociology of religion and promoted by the official interpretation of Marxism in China. These scholars reject the view held before that China was an oddity because of its precocious secularization—which according to the theory should have happened at a later stage of industrialization. The idea that religion could experience a revival met with indifference in the 1980s, but two phenomena had changed dramatically this teleological perspective and led to the revisionist perspective. Firstly, and contrary to prediction of its demise, religion became more salient in global politics, with the rise in Islamist militancy, the re-emergence of Hindutva in India, the role of the Catholic Church in transitions to democracy from Latin America and East Europe to East Asia, and the rise of the Christian Right in the US. Secondly, and to the dismay of Jiang Zemin, the popularity of the Falungong in the 1990s revealed to the CCP that new religious movements were growing in China as well and branched out outside. These developments had far-reaching consequences for the scholarship on Chinese religions outside that country. Beyond the fundamental agreement about the resilience of religious life in contemporary China, however, scholars of Chinese religions outside that country approach their object of study from vastly different angles. One can distinguish two contrasting approaches. A universalist, liberal paradigm, believes that there are no religious phenomena that cannot be subjected to a comparative analysis, no matter how different they appear from each other in their form. The most ardent promoters of this approach subscribe to the idea that it is possible to do a rigorous social scientific study of religion in China. At the other end of the spectrum, some believe that this approach is at best a simplification, at worst a form of cultural arrogance. Few scholars stand at each end of that spectrum, and many who wish to do comparison between China and other Asian or non-Asian countries, reckon the importance of context and the fact that ‘something gets lost in translation’. Conversely, very few believe in the

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incommensurability of cultures, and even those who insist on the necessity to contextualize admit that bounded generalization can be useful. For a good account of the contemporary scholarship on the study of religion in China, one could usefully consult the three volumes under the editorship of Stefania Travagnin and André Laliberté (2019), Stefania Travagnin and Paul Katz (2019), and Stefania Travagnin and Gregory Scott (2020), which include contributions identified with the two paradigms. Among the scholars who promote a view that Chinese religions deserve comparison with those of any other regions of the world, there are various degree of approaches. One school of thought has risen to prominence because of its ambition to create a new paradigm for the study of religion that could be valid for the comparative study of religions in all societies. Inspired by the American school of religious economy, it proposes a developmental approach to religion, from superstition to fully constituted religions. Among its better-known representatives, Yang Fenggang (2011) has contributed to the visibility of Chinese religions in academic circles. As a leading figure in the liberal paradigm in the study of religion in China, he seeks to explain the resilience and revival of religion in that country. His developmentalist approach posits a progression between ‘pseudo-’ and ‘quasi-’ religious to ‘semi’ and ‘full’ ones. Starting from the postulate that religion is a given in human societies, he argued that when states intervene to impose their ideologies to either manage or eliminate religion, this creates a demand that favors the development of religions. This approach has generated quite a lot of attention back in China. For years, Yang has organized with his colleagues in Beijing, Wuxi, and other cities conferences to discuss religious affairs from a comparative perspective, free from state interference. These activities have diminished in importance in China but the center that he has established in the US, which welcomes visiting scholars from China, keeps open channels for exchanges. This paradigm has influenced scholars in the social sciences interested by the status of religion in contemporary China. It seeks to provide explanations for the revival of religions in China despite repression from the state and seeks to provide an analytical framework valid for the study of religion in other societies. In that sense, it is a universalist approach. The journal Review of Religion in Chinese Societies, founded by Yang Fenggang, publishes the work of scholars who have adopted this approach, although people who did not have also seen their work appear in its pages. Yang has also sponsored the creation of the East Asian Society for the

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Social Scientific Study of Religion, which brings together scholars who specialize in the study of religion in China, Taiwan, as well as Japan and Korea. The label of a scientific approach to the study of religion does not refer to Marxism but refers to an ambition to grant epistemic legitimacy to the study of religion as a social science (Stark and Bainbridge 1987). This approach to scholarship obscures a strong normative content, which looks at religion as a social object of inquiry, but also as a value that deserves protection. Hence, scholars such as Daniel Bays (2012), Marie-Ève Reny (2018), and Carsten Vala (2018) have emphasized the fight for religious freedom and human right implied in the different forms of worship that the CCP seeks to limit. Although a large proportion of those who identify with this paradigm of a scientific approach to the study of religion have chosen as their object of investigation Christianity, others have also looked at the issue of state relations with Chinese minorities (McCarthy 2009); and from a comparative perspective (Marsh 2003). The second paradigm, which I label that of multiple modernities, much larger than the previous one, does not represent a unified school of thought. People included in this group form a more eclectic group: they come from many different disciplines, each with its own methodology, theoretical debates, and ontology. It is difficult to present a coherent picture of this large group of scholars, and even to define some of them by their privileged subject of study would not do justice to their contributions. The approach of multiple paths to modernity has found much support among scholars who have done empirical studies based on extensive fieldwork and textual analysis of religious texts. The monograph by Vincent Goossaert and David Palmer (2011), which represents the summation of their research and a multi-disciplinary survey that incorporate the findings of Chinese and non-Chinese scholars, constitute an indispensable reference on religion in modern China. Their work came out after a few other good multi-disciplinary edited volumes looking at specific aspects of religion in contemporary China. Hence, the contributors to Ashiwa Yoshiko and David Wank (2009) looked at the mutually constitutive nature of the state and religion in modern China. Contributors to Yang Mayfair (2010) explored the relationship between state and religion by privileging the optics of the religious actors rather than the state. Meanwhile, John Lagerwey (2010) offered a book-length treatment on that subject, with the thought-provoking argument that China is a religious state.

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A few other edited volumes added to these generalization more focused themes. Hence, the contribution to Adam Chau (2010) focused on religious practices, and argues that the policies of economic reforms, after the Cultural Revolution, stimulated a renewal of old practices, but more importantly, the creation of new forms. Stefania Travagnin (2016) brought together scholars to discuss the importance of media in the dissemination of religious beliefs. The contributions to David Ownby et al. (2017) look at the process of saint-making and religious leadership across a wide variety of Chinese religious traditions, altogether providing evidence for a phenomenon transcending their differences. Although not an academic work per se, the recent monograph by Ian Johnson (2017) nevertheless deserves mention here because of the wealth of its interviews and testimonies about lived religions. The above edited books or the overview of religions in modern China often constituted the distillation in a chapter of book-length research by individuals who have specialized on one tradition, one religion, or one specific phenomena. The following mentions a few of them, according to their area of specialization. Communal religions, whether in the countryside or in cities, have received significant amount of attention and have required extensive fieldwork as well as archival works. One of the most ambitious studies of this kind by Kenneth Dean (1998) stands out as an example of collaboration between local scholars and outsiders. Thomas Dubois (2005) study of popular religions combined parsing through official documents from the Qing Dynasty and interviews during the late 1990s in Southern Hebei. Adam Chau’s (2006) ethnography of social organization around a temple in Northern Shanxi between 1995 and 1998 documents the change in state-society relations induced by the policies of reform. Taken altogether, these studies reveal the richness and diversity of Chinese religious practices at the most basic level of governance. A few studies have looked at specific aspects of popular religions, or social practices that stand out in the liminal space between religion and other spheres of social life. These practices were often stigmatized by elites as superstition. Ole Bruun’s (2003) study of the Fengshui, or geomancy, constitutes an early example. The study of the qigong fever that swept China in the 1990s, by David Palmer (2007), presents a detailed account of how the attempt to create a new Chinese medical science became a new religious movement that ran afoul of the government, the Falungong. The attempt by the modern Chinese state since the Republican era to distinguish between so-called modern religion

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and superstition constitutes the central theme of the work by Rebecca Nedostup (2011). The case of Falungong has brought to the fore one of the most important aspect of Chinese religions over centuries from the angle of governance and political stability: the existence through Chinese history of sectarian movements that have challenged the government. That conceptual link between the Falungong and sectarian movements was evoked by Maria Chang (2008), and James Tong (2009) has described in his analysis of the persecution against Falungong the consequences of that belief held by CCP cadres. In his analysis of the movement, David Ownby (2008) sees it as an example of the redemptive societies that Prasenjit Duara (2003) documented before 1949 in Northern China. There exist an abondance of studies undertaken by historians on the sectarian movements to which Falungong has sometimes been associated with. In his study of the White Lotus, Barendt ter Harr (1992) has helpfully clarified that the imperial state used such designation as a shorthand to lump together a variety of movements rather than a movement with a unified leadership. Meanwhile, starting from a different perspective, Paul Cohen (1997) enriched our understanding of the sectarian movements by arguing convincingly about their political importance in his study of the Boxer rebellion, which underlined the religious belief that constitutes a key element of the rebels’ motivation. Likewise, the historian Jonathan Spence (1996) made a similar point about the Taiping rebellion. The symbiotic relations the state has maintained over centuries with communal and popular religions, the distinction between ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘heresy’ or between ‘religion’ and ‘superstition’, and the persecution against sectarian movements often brings to light the reference to Confucianism, one of the three scriptural traditions that is included in the communal and popular religions. A long-running debate has existed among scholars about the status of Confucianism. Reflecting the position long held by the governing elite in China, many choose to look at this tradition as a philosophical system, an approach adopted by political scientists such as Daniel Bell (2010). This is not the approach used by many others. Hence, in his book-length introduction to that tradition, Yao Xinzhong (2000) argued that Confucianism includes an ethical and a religious tradition. Anna Sun (2013) has gone further, looking at Confucianism as a religion within and outside China, while Sebastien Billioud and Joe Thoraval (2015) have documented empirically how deeply Confucianism permeates religious life.

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Another tradition that at times Western scholars considered a philosophy rather than a religious system, Daoism has received much attention among Western scholars. Among those who have paid attention to the tradition as a religious system, they have covered a wide range of aspects. Hence, Stephen Little and Shawn Eichman (2000) choose to emphasize the esthetic dimension of Daoism. Norman Girardot et al. (2001) emphasized the environmentalist dimension of that tradition. Catherine Despeux and Livia Kohn (2003) presented one dimension rarely explored in the study of most religions: the multiple roles held by women as cleric and practitioners. Gil Raz (2012) has traced its emergence as a new religion, with many lineages and communities of practice. David Palmer and Liu Xun (2012) have brought together scholars to present Daoism as a lived and multi-faceted religion in modern China. Livia Kohn (2016) made clear the correspondence in that tradition between cosmology and ethics. Despite the diversity of their approaches, these scholars of Daoism clearly demonstrate that this resilient tradition, unique in its form, represents a fundamental dimension of religious life in contemporary China. The tradition of Buddhism has received the largest amount of attention among Western scholars, in ways that reflect the abundance of literature produced by their Chinese colleagues. The abundance of historical scholarship on a variety of subjects ranging from popular sectarianism (Overmyer 1976) to the importance of Buddhism, to the economy by Jacques Gernet (1995), and to intellectual history of modern thinkers such as Taixu by Don Pitmann (2001) has for a while contrasted with the shortcomings on contemporary Buddhism. For decades, the three volumes by Holmes Welch (1967, 1968, and 1972) served as the only sources on Buddhism in the Twenty-first century. With the opening of the country to outsiders, fieldwork has produced ethnographic accounts that updated his findings. Of note are the study of lay Buddhists by Gareth Fisher (2014), the in-depth observation of the youth camps by Ji Zhe (2016), and the multi-sited study of Buddhist philanthropy by Robert Weller et al. (2017). Two introductions to the multi-faceted dimension of that tradition cover the religious and social dimensions of Buddhism. The contributions to Jian Kiely and Brooks Jessup (2016) cover a period from the late Qing to post-Mao period. The contributions to Ji et al. (2019) cover contemporary Chinese Buddhism under Xi. On Tibetan Buddhism, Gray Tuttle (2005) has drawn attention to its importance in the creation of Chinese national identity.

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Scholars of Islam in China have often discussed their subject as part of ethnic studies. This was the perspective Dru Gladney (1991) adopted on the subject in his well-known study of Hui, or Chinese Muslims. More recently, Garner Bovingdon (2010) has done the same with respect to Uyghurs. The conditions on the ground have made it exceedingly difficult to provide up-to-date monographs about Islam as a lived tradition in contemporary China. Although overtaken by recent events, the study by Rafael Israeli (2002) provided background to the intersection of religion and politics among Muslims in China. Likewise, the study of Christianity in China cannot escape considerations over the interaction between politics and belief. However, one can discern two broad trends within that field. On the one hand, earlier scholars of Catholicism in China such as Richard Madsen (1998), and Protestantism, such as Philip Wickeri (2011), and Gerda Wielander (2013) have shown the struggle of these religions to come to term with the new regime, and the strategies of mutual accommodation that the faithful have adopted. More recently, in his examination of ‘Christian bosses’, Cao Nanlai (2010) has demonstrated how much Christianity has become a vital part of the Chinese cities’ social fabric.

Conclusion The dissemination of knowledge about religion in China today in Western languages owes a lot to people who have dedicated a lot of time to study the language and history of that country. They are all immensely indebted to the Chinese scholars who have devoted their lives to the study of a tradition to which they are close because of their native language, their place of birth, or their kinship, sometimes at great risk during the many changes in the last seventy years. Thanks to this cumulation of research, discussion on religion has opened the eyes of outsiders to the vitality and variety of beliefs and practices in that country. This represents an enormous progress from discussions twenty years ago that locked the study of religion in China within the frameworks of its inevitable disappearance or that of its opposition to the CCP. At the time of writing, however, the actions of Xi Jinping suggest that the government has not given up on its materialist teleology and expects that scholars work within the confines of that approach. The extent to which our peers in China can continue their work without undue political pressure remains an open question for the

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moment. The good news is that knowledge about that important social reality has spread wide outside of China.

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Tong, James W. 2009. Revenge of the Forbidden City: The Suppression of the Falun Gong in China, 1999–2005. New York: Oxford University Press. Travagnin, Stefania, ed. 2016. Religion and Media in China: Insights and Case Studies from the Mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong. London: Routledge. Travagnin, Stefania, and Paul Katz, eds. 2019. Concepts and Methods for the Study of Chinese Religions III: Key Concepts in Practice. Berlin: De Gruyter. Travagnin, Stefania, and André Laliberté, eds. 2019. Concepts and Methods for the Study of Chinese Religions I: State of the Field and Disciplinary Approaches. Berlin: De Gruyter. Travagnin, Stefania, and Gregory Scott, eds. 2020. Concepts and Methods for the Study of Chinese Religions II: Intellectual History of Key Concepts. Berlin: De Gruyter. Tuttle, Gray. 2005. Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China. New York: Columbia University Press. van der Braak, Andre, Wei Dedong, and Zu Caifang. 2016. Religion and Social Cohesion: Western, Chinese and Intercultural Perspectives. Vu University Press. Vala, Carsten. 2018. The Politics of Protestant Churches and the Party-State in China: God Above Party? London: Routledge. Wang Jia 王佳, ed. 2014. Zhongguo fojiao he cishan gongyi shiye 中国佛教和慈善 公益事业. Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe. Wang Zuo’an 王作安. 2010. Zhongguo de zongjiao wenti he zongjiao zhengce 中 国的宗教问题和宗教政策. Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe. Welch, Holmes. 1967. The Practice of Chinese Buddhism, 1900–1950. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Welch, Holmes. 1968. The Buddhist Revival in China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Welch, Holmes. 1972. Buddhism Under Mao. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Weller, Robert P., Julia Huang C., Wu Keping, and Fan Lizhu. 2017. Religion and Charity: The Social Life of Goodness in Chinese Societies. New York: Cambridge University Press. Wickeri, Philipp L. 2011. Seeking the Common Ground: Protestant Christianity, the Three-Self Movement, and China’s United Front. Eugene: Wipf and Stock. Wielander, Gerda. 2013. Christian Values in Communist China. London: Routledge. Xi Wuyi 习五一. 2012. Kexue wushenlun yu zongjiao yanjiu 科学无神论与宗教 研究. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe. Xue Yu 学愚. 2011. Fojiao, baoli yu minzuzhuyi: Kangri zhanzheng shiqi de Zhongguo fojiao 佛教, 暴力与民族主义: 抗日战争时期的中国佛教. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Xue Yu 学愚. 2015. Zhongguo fojiao de shehuizhuyi gaizao 中国佛教的社会主义 改造. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.

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Ya Hanzhan 牙含章 and Wang Yousan 王友三. 2011. Zhongguo wushenlun shi 中国无神论史. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe. Yang Ching-Kun. 1994. Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and some of their Historical Factors. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1961. rpt: Taibei: SMC Publishing. Yang Fenggang. 2011. Religion in China: Survival and Revival Under Communist Rule. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Yang, Mayfair May-hui, ed. 2010. Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Yao Xinzhong. 2000. An Introduction to Confucianism. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ye Xiaowen 叶小文. 1997. Duo shijiao kan wenti 多视角看社会问题. Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe 中共中央党校出版社. Ye Xiaowen 叶小文. 2010. Hexie shehui de zongjiaolun 和谐社会的宗教论. Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe. Zhu Xiaoming 朱晓明 and Shen Guiping 沈桂萍. 2009. Aiguo zongjiao liliang jianshe wenti yanjiu 爱国宗教力量建设问题研究. Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe.

CHAPTER 11

Situated Knowledge and Situated Action: The Rise of Chinese Sociology Since 1978 Fei Yan and Liqun Cao

Sociology is a fully institutionalized academic major in China, yet it is also a uniquely Chinese version of sociology with distinctive characteristics. This is, in many respects, hardly surprising given the history of the discipline itself within China. That history can be roughly divided into four eras or periods: the initial development (1900–1951), the long hiatus (1952–1978), renewal and expansion (1979–2012), and formal institutionalization since 2012, when Xi Jinping became the general-secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Essentially brought back to life by Deng Xiaoping’s reform and open-door policy in 1979, Chinese sociology dramatically illustrates one of the most successful “comeback” stories in academic history. A number of scholars have chronicled this remarkable

F. Yan Tsinghua University, Beijing, China e-mail: [email protected] L. Cao (B) Ontario Tech University, Oshawa, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 S. Hua (ed.), Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8032-8_11

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history, but we have yet to examine how it has shaped the central contours and concerns of the discipline itself, at least as it has developed in China. In this paper, we first briefly review the historical development of sociology in the early period and then in Mao’s era. We then critically examine sociology as a discipline in China since 1978, in terms of its process of knowledge development, academic positioning, content, research methodology, and discipline building. Finally, we will use several sub-fields of sociology to illustrate our point that the narrow focus of Chinese sociology has missed many opportunities to develop the full potential of sociology.

The History of Sociology in China By the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, sociology came to China when repeated interactions with the West resulted in the gradual realization among Chinese intellectuals that China could not afford to be isolated from the increasingly interconnected world and needed to change, not only in science/technology and but also in thinking/ideology (Chiang, 2001; Fung, 2010). It was in the missionary universities that sociology was first taught as a course (Chen, H., 2018; Cheng and So, 1983). The first Department of Sociology was established at St. John’s University in Shanghai in 1914 (King and Wang, 1978). Early sociology in China was greatly influenced by the American progressives who focused their studies on the struggles of those at the bottom of the social strata (Freedman, 1962; King and Wang, 1978). Embedded in the “encounter between China and the emerging modern world” in the twentieth century (Holzner, 2007), Chinese sociologists devoted considerable efforts to assimilating the concepts, methods, and approaches of Western sociology while still retaining their distinctive Chinese identity and addressing China-specific problems. At Tsinghua University, pioneering sociologists conducted extensive social investigations at Ding County at Hebei Province, spurring the eventual boom of “social survey movements” in China (Lam, 2011). From 1927 to 1935, more than 9,000 survey projects were completed by Chinese sociologists (Chen, H., 2018, p. 16). In fact, sociology was so prosperous that British sociologist Maurice Freedman (1962, p. 113) commented that “China was the seat of the most flourishing sociology in the world” outside of North America and Western Europe before WWII.

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Soon after communists took power following a bloody war in 1949, a completely new mode of social transformation in the control and management of the Chinese society was established. In the regime’s own words, the goal was to create a “new society” entirely. As Mao declared ominously in 1949, the taking over of the national government was only “the first step in the long march” (wanli changzheng de diyibu) of his revolution that would touch the souls of all Chinese. Seeking to emulate the Soviet Union, the CCP ordered all universities to abandon their programs of sociology in 1952 (Cheng and So, 1983; King and Wang, 1978) and a Marx-Engels version of sociology became the governmentimposed orthodoxy instead. “Dialectical and historical materialism” in its various forms as Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, and Maoism were converted into the foundation of epistemology, backed by the state itself, which controlled the reward/punishment system, including employment and retirement. Power politics gradually permeated every corner of the society. Within this realm, social science in general and sociology in particular, along with other components of culture such as art and music, were understood and valued only as tools of revolutionary transformation that purportedly served “the people,” which were blatantly equated with serving the Party ever since. After the 1957 Anti-Rightist Movement, the “mass line” and the “class line” comprised the dominant control strategy of the Communists. The tactic was frighteningly effective because the meanings of “mass” and “class” remained latent, only to be selectively applied when needed to achieve broader political objectives. This approach to governance began with Mao’s infamous “sociological investigation” that asked: “Who are our enemies, who are our friends?” This single question dominated the Chinese lifeworld in a myriad of ways, including how to keep the intelligentsia in line with the Party (Cao and Hebenton, 2018). During Mao’s time, the country operated almost entirely on the basis of this binary divide: “friend” or “enemy” (see Dutton, 2005 for the classic exposition). Life was extremely painful for almost every sociologist as they were forced to do self-criticisms in order to survive under the new regime. For example, Fei Xiaotong, a pioneer Chinese anthropologist and sociologist, was active in self-criticism and even openly condemned sociology as anti-socialism in the early 1950s (Freedman, 1962). Then, in 1957, he spoke honestly in favor of reviving sociology in the early stage of Hundred Flowers Campaign, but was subsequently forced to shut up for the sake of his own life (Cheng and So, 1983). Pan Guangdan, another leading

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sociologist teaching at Tsinghua University who was later denounced as a right-wing reactionary during the Cultural Revolution, summarized his deplorable experience as a sociologist since 1949 with four English words, all starting with “s” shortly before his death in 1967: surrender, submit, survive, and succumb (Wang, 2013).

The Reincarnation of Sociology After Mao’s death in 1976, when the Chinese Communist Party shifted its attention from class struggle to economic development, sociology was allowed to rebuild itself (Cheng and So, 1983; Li et al., 1987). The CCP remained cautious, however, regarding sociology’s potential to foment critical thinking. To counter this, Chinese sociology had to explicitly claim Marxism as its guiding ideology and Mao’s field investigation as its method (Hsiung, 2017).1 The new cohort of sociologists selected during this period were required to have “formally undergone an intensive training in Marxism” (Li et al., 1987, p. 630). A strict political background reliability check (zhengshen) was also conducted to ensure upcoming scholars were qualified as “both red and expert” (youhong youzhuan) (Cheng and So, 1983). Fei Xiaotong reemerged as one of the top surviving sociologists in China and willingly allowed himself to serve as a pawn for the reformminded new regime under Deng Xiaoping. He was also instrumental in reframing sociology as a variant of Marxism, thus making a convincing case for its rehabilitation. He also vowed to “construct a non-Western theoretical foundation for a sociology of Chinese society” (Hamilton and Zheng, 1992, p. 4). His previous anthropological focus was replaced by

1 The requirement to align with Marxism was particularly ironic, as Marxism had been seen as counter-sociology in the 1930s; see King and Wang (1978). In addition, all aspects of anti-system, anti-authority, and anti-exploitation of the poor by the powerful in Marxism are mysteriously missing in the Chinese official version of Marxism. As for Mao’s field investigation method, it entailed three key directives: (1) to develop a sense of camaraderie by “eating together, living together, and learning/working together” (santong ) with the informants; (2) to immerse oneself in the local site for a period; and (3) to generalize from case studies (Mao argued that one only needed to dissect a sparrow in order to know all birds, because all birds shared the same organs (Hsiung, 2017). While the first two points of view are valid, the third one is dubious and detrimental to Chinese understanding of the typical (diaoxing ).

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a fetishization of “hard science” that favored quantitative multivariate analysis above all other sociological methods (Hsiung, 2017). Immediately following the student movement in 1989, sociology was essentially frozen again for a period (Chen and Yan, 2019), but political control began to loosen in the 1990s. China increasingly sought to conform with international norms by giving academics limited freedom and further separating the Party from administration (Cao, 2007). The changes were largely superficial, however, and only required the state to tolerate minor forms of difference and dissent. All state control mechanisms remained intact. Scholars were still kept in line via disciplinary forms of regulation, such as extensive personal files that covered all aspects of life, including employment, professional activities, and research funding, as well as continued control of salary, housing, and other financial incentives for intellectuals (Dutton, 2005; Hebenton and Jou, 2010; Jou, Hebenton, and Cao, 2014). Notwithstanding a few sociologists who have done pioneering work on the consequences of social stratification and inequality (see Chen and Wu, 2004), the discipline as a whole sidelined the study of social problems at the bottom of stratification system in favor of state-serving investigations in economic sociology. Sociologists essentially became interpreters and confirmers of the Party’s policies. Even so, with limited freedom, sociology has thrived in many ways, surpassing its first historical period and outperforming every other nation in the world except the U.S. By 2008, nearly 900 journal articles were produced (Bian and Zhang, 2008), and this number has now significantly increased in recent years with a parallel increase in sociology journals. By 2015, sociology in China employed more than 6,000 professionals in universities and academies, was taught in numerous undergraduate programs, and offered 87 masters’ programs and 16 doctoral programs (Wu, 2015).

The Institutionalization of Sociology with Chinese Characteristics The new stage of sociology began when Xi Jinping took over power in 2012, heralding a shift to what CCP propagandists describe as the “New Era” (xin shidai). Under Xi, China reversed some reform measures by the previous administrations and began to rule according to Maoist principles and practices, such as the Maoist political logic of “sticking to the Party’s unified leadership” (yiyuanhua lingdao) at local levels, “deciding

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an issue with a final say by one person” (dingyuyizun) at the center, and expecting all academic disciplines to serve as instruments of social engineering. With increased control of both the press and academia, sociology included (Guan et al., 2017; Yan, X., 2014), intellectuals began to face more risk of being fired or penalized for expressing doubts about the central government policies (wangyi zhongyang ). The press, in particular, is rewarded for publishing government-sponsored books and punished for publishing anything critical of government policies. Despite economic and technological changes in the society, history seems to begin repeating itself as Marxist ideology regains central control, and the Party dictatorship makes deviation from the Party line impossible. As such, Chinese sociology appears to be an applied social science with Marxist ideology as its core guiding principle. More recently, in a speech at a symposium of experts in economic and social fields, Xi explicitly emphasized the need to “develop the socialist sociology with Chinese characteristics” (Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi shehuixue) (Xinhua News Agency, 24 August 2020). But what exactly is “socialism sociology with Chinese characteristics”? First and foremost, the current approach of Chinese sociology as an intellectual discipline is inherently self-limiting in its mandates and objectives, censoring of its human subjects, and bankrupt of creative potential. The drive to produce knowledge based on empirical data—rather than analyses of social reality based on critical thinking (Mills, 1959)—might have a more profound significance, masked behind the professed antitheoretical empiricism of this scholarship. One must read between the lines in order to understand the true meaning of sociological discourse among sociologists these days. For example, many sociologists talk about China’s “great transformation” (Wen and Wang, 2017; Wu, 2015) but say nothing about the direction of this great transition with many obvious downsides for social equity, human rights, and widespread poverty. China’s state media, meanwhile, trumpets the successes of the “New Era” (xin shidai) under Xi Jinping. Xi has sought to reestablish Party legitimacy using a post-reform ideology that combines Confucian traditions, civilizational pride, and socialist core values. The CCP’s language has changed accordingly. Ideological control has been tightened, especially in universities (Hao and Guo, 2016; Phillips, 2016; Shepherd, 2019; Yan, X., 2014). Once dormant and inactive cells of communist branches have become active in monitoring what a professor can say and how to say it in class. Whereas previously, during more tolerant times, the

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state cajoled intellectuals into compliance, the regime now simply clamps down (Shepherd, 2019). Some academics are fearful that the dreaded excesses of the great Cultural Revolution may be coming back to China, this time wrapped in the mantle of the “New Era.” Self-censoring is occurring on a broader and more ubiquitous scale. While this tightening of discipline at Chinese universities is un-mistakable, little is to be heard from Chinese sociologists whose “value-free” disciplinary self-definition precludes involvement in the articulation of opposition. Consider, for example, the Ministry of Education-sponsored sociology textbook, edited by Zheng Hangsheng from the People’s University of China. The text has no section on sociological theory, but proclaims the guidance of Marxism in the preface (Zheng, 2003). Warned against expressing any doubts about the central government policies (wangyi zhongyang ), textbooks used by Chinese college students in general feature few new hypotheses, and content related to potentially sensitive topics have declined significantly over the years. As Fig. 11.1 shows, between 1978 and 2017, the coverage ratio of “social movement/collective action” section in published sociology textbooks has decreased to a large degree, implying that “social movement/collective action” is not an important sociological topic in the Chinese context. As a result of rapid economic growth in recent years, however, China has in fact witnessed more frequent and widespread mass protests than in other authoritarian settings, and many scholars believe that these protests pose an even greater political challenge to the stability of the regime in comparison to the fragile situation of the 1989 Tiananmen movement (Yan, F., 2013; Elfstrom and Li, 2019). The second characteristic is the pragmatic application of sociology in empirical studies. To understand sociology in China, we must develop some understanding of the content from which sociology has developed. The current regime is a combination of antient despotic tendencies with influence also from Confucianism and the Soviet dictatorship with communism (Cao and Hebenton, 2018), resulting in form of control similar to what Foucault (1977) and Dutton (2005) describe as “disciplinary power.” The Chinese communist system consists of a despotic center with decentralized local practice, the former using Party organizations to exercise highly centralized control over policy making and cadre appointment, and the latter given some initiative and autonomy in actual implementation. In-group trust and Guanxi (Bian, 2018; Fei, 1992) take priority over out-group trust and over universal principle. The system’s

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Fig. 11.1 The decline of “social movements” contents in Chinese sociology textbooks (Note A methodological note: we first collected a total of 17 sociology textbooks published between 1978 and 2017. Textbooks written by the same author in different time periods and textbooks sponsored by the Ministry of Education are our prior choices. Next, we obtained the total word count length of each textbook from the copyright page and the word count length of the “Social Movement/Collective Action” section by calculating the number of words per page multiplied by the number of pages in the section. Finally, we calculated the coverage ratio of “Social Movement/Collective Action” section in each textbook)

explicitly avowed ideology includes communism or social equity welfare for all and, since 1978, developmentalism. In actual practice, however, primacy is increasingly given to economic development (understood as quantifiable GDP growth) above all else. This developmentalist preoccupation has undergirded a kind of central and local “collusion.” Cheap “informal economy” labor from the countryside and relative disregard for workers’ welfare has been used to ensure higher rates of return for invested capital and to attract outside investment. The result has been both stunning GDP growth and mounting social inequalities and environmental degradation. The avowed goals of social equity cum workers’ right protection are more talk than substance; in actual practice, GDP growth is the “hard” logic that must be obeyed.

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As a result, Chinese sociologists show little interest in abstract thinking or theorizing about universal principles. Most of them are content, even willing, to compromise the way they engage with and write about social reality (Hao and Guo, 2016; Perry 2020). Responding to American colleagues’ lament about sociologists’ invisibility in the USA, Wu (2015, p. 8) said that “Chinese sociologists have tended to focus on practical problem-solving, either through policy research consultations to the government or through public discussion and articles in the mass media.” In this regard, Chinese sociologists increasingly concentrate their research related to the sustainability of the communist regime, such as social governance, social management, urban construction, community organization, and so on so forth (Li, P., 2016). Especially in recent years, reinforcing social governance and innovating techniques of social management have been emphasized as crucial to building a prosperous society of China, as “the governments at all levels sought for the possibility of transforming social governance from every aspect and by all means” (Li, Y., 2019, p. 177). Figure 11.2 further shows that between 1978 and

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Fig. 11.2 The rising focus on “social issues/social governance” in Chinese sociology textbooks (Note We used the same 17 sociology textbooks published between 1978 and 2017 as our sample pool and calculated the coverage ratio of “Social Issues/Social Governance” section in each textbook)

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2017, more and more space in sociology textbooks has been allotted to “social issues/social governance” (including social construction and social management), thus suggesting that these are the most pressing and important sociological topics for Chinese sociologists. Under these conditions, sociological inquiry has become ever more utilitarian in the sense that it provides knowledge for the state that only supports that state, rather than raising doubt and/or critiquing it in any way. It is the unidirectional relationship with the state (Jou et al., 2014), in which the state supports and exerts total control on sociological development and access to data and research funding. Sociologists undertake data gathering and publish results depending upon state permission. The sociological viewpoint is thus subordinated to the Party line all the time. Previously, one of the important functions of sociology before 1949 was to provide an alternative vison of society and address existing social problems (Lu, Y., 2019), whether the government liked it or not. Now, by contrast, Chinese sociology has pawned its identity in deference to the Party-state. Sociologists, instead of being free thinkers and applying their sociological imagination (Mills, 1959), live and work for the very Party-state that exploits and cages their subjects. The third characteristic of “socialist sociology with Chinese characteristics” is the localization (or indigenization, bentuhua) of sociology in theoretical areas. In recent years, when state leaders and intellectuals were preoccupied with the uniqueness of Chinese experience and social development, localization of sociology has become so popular in China that we can now speak of there being a “localized bandwagon.” Li, Q. (2018) characterizes Chinese sociology as “a probe into social reality, in-depth social investigations, closer to the society, and more down-toearth.” The process of localizing sociology with its fundamental changes in research questions, theory and methodology, research diagrams, social practice, and ways of social engagement is interwoven with its focus of social problems appearing in the economic reform and the modernization. Generally, the localization of sociology is affected through three means: the localization of research questions, the localization of theory and methodology, and the localization of research paradigms (Xie, 2018). Some scholars argue that the localization of social practice, social experiment, and social intervention of Chinese sociology should be included in this domain of discussion as well (Li, Q., 2018). Some would argue that the localization of sociology is itself a false proposition. Xie (2018) and Liang (2018), for instance, both insist that research questions

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proposed by Chinese sociology are localized already, so the goal should instead be to engage more with discourses of social sciences worldwide. Others insist that the localization of sociology remains an unfinished and ongoing project that encourages scholars of this generation to continuously explore and contend with each other (Hong, 2018; Li, Q., 2020). For most scholars of this generation, the ultimate goal is “to first localize and to globalize thereafter” (Zhou, 2020). We suggest that this effort to localize sociology is a form Chinesecentrism, given to the way in which Chinese scholarship ignores decolonial scholars from within its borders (Chen, K., 2010), resulting, ironically, in a situation of localization without localizing. The debate also confirms Dirlik’s argument (1996) that China itself contributed to the development of an Orientalist representation of itself. The debate suggests the CCP remains uneasy with sociology as an institutionalized academic discipline (Xie, 2018). Cao and Du (2018) encourage Chinese sociologists not to confuse change and progress and urge them to pay more attention to different voices within sociology. The debate might also be a sign that Chinese sociologists are lost in the time of anomie and uncertainty (Zhao and Cao, 2010). It is an appeasement of official as well as popular nationalistic feelings that has been on the rise in recent years (Jou et al., 2014). As Chen, K. (2010) has shown, Chinese sociologists today have not thought enough about how their current projects differ from efforts to decolonize sociology that preceded them. If a lack of theoretical interrogation is one of the most pressing issues that Chinese sociology may face, one of the most concerning issues relates to not being representative of all China. If Chinese sociology is to deserve such a title, one might reasonably expect it to include a broad range of issues and perspectives within China, not just those things that the Party tells sociologists to say or to study. With these three distinct features, Chinse sociology faces two interrelated obstacles: limited academic freedom and no rights consciousness. Western sociology is staunchly committed to academic freedom, rationalism, and objectivity. It takes as its mandate universal truth-seeking, it offers a narrative of unflagging scientific progress, and it centers the autonomous liberal subject as the foundational element of modern life. In contrast, Chinese universities pledge to follow the Party line and maintain a hierarchy in which state-sponsored scholars are paid much more than scholars in the universities. The administrations adopt the policies and discourses of the marketplace and fall into line with post-secondary

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educational policies of fiscal responsibility, human resources training, and applied relevance; the impact is reverberating throughout the academy at ground level. No reflexive theory has been proposed after so many years. Unlike Western sociology, in which new theories provide guidance and anticipation for change, Chinese scholars are content with “crossing the river by feeling the stones” (mozheshizi guohe). State-building in China has channeled abundant resources into sociological research, but this has resulted in little autonomy for the sociological discipline (Hebenton and Jou, 2010), as the close ties between sociologists and the government are still hailed as “the blessing of the party-state” (Wu, 2015, p. 11). Meanwhile, the potential drawbacks of such a close relationship are ignored. The traditional tie between scholars and officials has both benefits and pitfalls akin to that of guanxi, which may help you but also obligates you to nepotism. The relationship is indeed Janus-faced (Chen, H., 2018). Without the “blessing” of the state, those few scholars with critical and reflexive ideals are sanctioned and whistle-blower sacked swiftly (Shepherd, 2019).

Under-Developed Sub-fields of Sociology in Chinese There are many under-developed sub-fields of sociology in the Chinese context, including but not limited to: stratification, criminology, gender equality, human rights, medical sociology, migration, over-development, state crime, social movements, religion (especially underground religion), domestic violence, and social welfare. The inadequate attention to these topics in sociological studies in Chinese is a boon for those who publish these topics in English. It is not coincidental that poverty rates are underestimated in the official statistics (Zhang et al., 2014) and that the consequences of poverty have not been adequately studied. Likewise, it is not coincidental the advantages of being “one of them” (i.e., top communists and their offspring) are not widely known (Chai et al., 2020; Liang and Cao, 2013; Wang, Fang, and Li, 2019; Zhang, 2019; Zhu et al., 2020). More than any other social sciences, sociology’s domain outside China seems especially broad and vague, if not shallow (Abbott, 2018). Chinese sociology, in contrast, is relatively narrow with a focus on economic

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development or economic sociology, with a goal to build “a comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable development of Chinese society” (Lu, X., 2020). A list of sociological concerns includes social inequality and mobility, community governance, and migration and its social ramification, social networks, and institutional change (Bian and Zhang, 2008; Wu, 2015). These may sound normal but in reality they are quite unique. The study of social inequality, for example, focuses on the issue of strata instead of class conflict/struggle. Few studies examine the dire consequences of inequality, and the suffering and sacrifice of migrants and their families. These stories exist in English media and occasionally in sociological investigations in English, but they do not appear in any sociological studies in Chinese. While there is an abundance of empirical data these days (Bian and Zhang, 2008; Wu, 2015), limits on academic freedom shape how data are collected and interpreted in several ways. First, data are censored to the point of not even being collected in the first place; and even when certain surveys are permitted, “political sensitive items” are eliminated. It was permitted to collect data on some sensitive topics at one point in the late 1990s, but it was later banned and scholars were not allowed to use any of the collected data. Second, even once a general social survey got the green light to go ahead, many items such as measurement of political attitudes and religious issues were considered too “sensitive” and thus eliminated. This makes comparing survey data for China with that of other nations impossible (Zhuo and Cao, 2016). Finally, the quality of data is questionable; in a nation without a history of freedom of expression for the public, all survey data are implicated. Questions of data protection, anonymity of informants, and the research principle to “do no harm” are particularly pertinent for sociologists to consider (Chen et al., 2021) when nationalist emotion is high, Party censorship is widespread, and/or when individuals do not trust the surveyors. To empirically examine to what extend those sub-fields have been missing on the part of Chinese sociologists, we selected a total of 18 Chinese scholars who specialize in sociology from universities in Beijing and asked them: if there were no political pressures to consider, what direction or topic should sociology study? Based on their answers, we identified six major sub-fields that are largely neglected in contemporary Chinese sociology (see Table 11.1). In particular, there has been little progress in sociological research on gender issues, collective actions, political control and suppression, civil society, underprivileged social groups,

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Table 11.1 Under-developed sub-fields of sociology in China Sub-fields of Sociology

Specific topics

Sociology of gender

Feminist sociology, gender equality, same-sex relationships, LGBT, sexual identity, sex industry, and prostitution Social conflicts, political conflicts, collective actions, popular protest, collective violence, and contentious politics Government trust, political suppression, political control, corruption, social anomie, and social justice Civil society, civil rights, civic engagement, political voting, democracy, and religious practice Income disparities, marginalized social groups, disadvantaged social groups, class politics, and class consolidation Interest groups, political capital, political stratification, and government-business collusion

Social movements Government Political participation Social inequality Power

and business-government collusion. As with gender issues, sociologists in China have also largely avoided the related topics of same-sex relationships and sexual identity (see Zhang and Brym, 2019). Scholarship on these themes is extremely sparse. The Party-state is inclined to view matters such as homosexuality and transgender identification as immoral. Without insights from sociological study, the tendency to moralize as opposed to seeking understanding will continue to characterize Chinese societal and governmental thinking in this area (Liang and Cao, 2013). We also examined two prominent Chinese sociological journals—Sociological Studies (shehuixue yanjiu), which is sponsored by the Institute of Sociology at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, and Open Times (kaifang shidai), which is sponsored by Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences in Guangzhou. Both journals publish highquality empirical studies on contemporary Chinese society with important theoretical and policy implications. According to the journal, information on the website of Open Times, key topics published include “the changing social stratification/social inequality in China; social movements and contentious politics; the sociological studies on economic reform and development; social organizations and social governance; family and demographic studies; migration, migrant workers and urbanization; cultural and ideological change since the reform; the sociological understanding of the environment; social security and social policy.” Overall, the topics covered in Open Times are much bolder and politically sensitive compared with those of Sociological Studies, as “the complex bureaucratic

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0

.05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3 .35 .4 .45 .5

system in Guangzhou diminishes the capacity of the central Department of Propaganda to produce coherent censorship standards” (Lei, 2016, p. 26). However, according to our analysis, we found that both journals deliberately avoid publishing sensitive topics in the above six major subfields of sociology. As Fig. 11.3 shows, the representation of these six sub-fields of sociology in both journals rose in the 1990s and reached a peak in 2010, but then significantly declined after 2012 when Xi took power. The fundamental problem for the under-developed sub-fields of Chinese sociology is, of course, not limited to the study of sensitive social topics. The Chinese do not have a rights-conscious orientation to social life and political institutions (Lorentzen and Scoggins, 2015). For example, when studying the status of women in China, we should first understand that women’s rights are human rights, and human rights go

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Fig. 11.3 The rise and fall of sensitive topics in two Chinese sociological journals (Note Open Times was founded in 1982 and Sociological Studies was founded in 1986. Therefore, there is no data for Sociological Studies between 1982 and 1986. We first summed up the total number of published research papers in each journal and then counted the number of published articles that are belong to the categories of six under-developed sub-fields of sociology. We finally calculated the publication ratio of under-developed sub-fields of sociology in both journals across the time)

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beyond gender equity to include the right of free speech, free association, and academic freedom in universities—an extension of the right of free speech within the confines of higher education institutions. Under the all-powerful and societally ubiquitous CCP, rights are not pre-existing possessions of all individuals, but rather state-issued privileges that can be altered or taken away as the state wishes. After all, the Party-state defines the causes, methods, and vision of change and serves as the guardian and (male) protector of women’s rights and interests. Although women can be mobilized for change, they themselves cannot be their own agents of change. Women-work (funv gongzuo) was subordinated to the Party’s “central work”—and such work has never become a high priority for the Party. The various rights accorded to women have been “granted by the state,” not won by women themselves (Liang and Cao, 2013; Mann, 2011; Yang and Yan, 2017; Zhang and Brym, 2019).

Conclusion Pierre Bourdieu once said that “sociology is an instrument of liberation and therefore of generosity” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 212). It remains unclear, however, whether sociology in China is “an instrument for human liberation” or “a tool of political power.” On the one hand, Chinese sociology has made a remarkable comeback under a reform-minded communist regime (1979–2012) and empirical research has mushroomed even though sociological knowledge has not accumulated much (Zhou and Pei, 1997) and even though critical sociology is still significantly under-developed (Bian and Zhang, 2008). The restoration of sociology was spurred by the needs of top-down political power to govern the people, and this decision was clearly conferred from the intellectuals at the bottom. Meanwhile, social sciences and sociologists will constantly strive to realize the ontological turn from “creative adaptation” to “creative transformation” (Xiao, 2018). Chinese sociology is something of a misnomer, with only a consultant role, subordinate status, and little independent thinking. A more accurate, albeit more clunky, title would have been “Communist Sociology in China.” This will surely disappoint a clutch of epistemologists working within China. The world sociology community clamors for a more descriptive nature of the discipline. Sociology, Chinese sociology included, has immense emancipatory and transformative potential. The newest generation of Chinese sociologists is

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a mixture of local and foreign trained Ph.D. scholars who are aware of the twisty history of sociology in China and have developed “educated acquiescence” (Perry, 2020). We have both confidence and the patience to hopefully see not only China’s great economic transformation, but also progress on other fronts. Starting from China’s own historical traditions and unique strengths, Chinese sociologists should engage with global sociological discourse more actively and confidently. We should be asking big questions (Cao and Du, 2018), like “where is modernity taking China?” Will China join the world system economically and politically, or only economically? Will China carve out a completely new and different form of modernity? As the largest economy in the world (Allison, 2020), such questions cannot be ignored. In many respects, Chinese sociology has failed to join with sociology in the rest of the world, where sociological research is all-inclusive, universal in nature, emancipatory in intention, and humanitarian in its concern for the poor, the disfavored, the accused, and the incarcerated. At the same time, Chinese sociology has arguably limited itself as it has in order to simply survive within China. The language of the CCP and the mentality of xenophobia have returned to national prominence. Chinese sociology is large enough to do many self-containing studies and self-congratulating feel-good experiments. Also, it should be noted that Chinese sociology is not entirely monolithic (Hao and Guo, 2016) and does contribute to the understanding of China and to world sociology (Bian and Zhang, 2008; Liu and Wang, 2015; Qi, 2016; Walder, 2011; Wu, 2015; Zhou and Pei, 1997). Building from the foundation—however limited—that has been established in recent years, Chinese sociology may still realize its full potential.

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CHAPTER 12

Deconstructing Chinese Art Music’s Paradigms and Paradigm Shift Hon-Lun Yang and Arturo Irisarri Izquierdo

Art music, an alternative term for Western classical music, or merely any music of high esthetic value, “serious” and “cultivated,” in contrast to folk music or popular music (Eisentraut 2013), was not indigenous to China, which has a long musical tradition distinct from the European one. Western art music associated with the European tradition was first brought to Ming China by missionaries in the seventeenth century (Tao 1994; Melvin and Cai 2004; Urrows 2017) and then by settlers who resided in treaty ports such as Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangzhou after the mid-nineteenth century (Yang 2020). After having encountered with Western music, Chinese music’s trajectory changed, edifying

All Chinese names in this chapter are presented last name first as in Chinese practice. H.-L. Yang (B) · A. Irisarri Izquierdo Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 S. Hua (ed.), Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8032-8_12

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a clear paradigm shift in its development and scholarship in the twentieth century. “Paradigm” refers to how things are done or operated, such as shared ideas, unstated assumptions, and deep-rooted beliefs, “a pattern or model, an exemplar; a typical instance of something, an example” (Oxford English Dictionary). Chinese and Western music each has its own paradigm marked by cultural-specific features, transmission format, organology, tuning system, least to say musical language and performing practice. How these two entirely different musical systems interacted and how the impact of one on the other illustrate not only the collision of paradigms, but also paradigm shift and paradigm construction as a result. The objective of this article is to examine how the notion of paradigm and paradigm shift could be applied to deconstruct the trajectory and discourse of Chinese art music in the twentieth and twenty-fist centuries. Firstly, it examines what defines the paradigm of Chinese art music, how it is distinguished from that of traditional Chinese music, and when such paradigm shift took place, for example, in the 1930s. Secondly, it examines how the paradigm of new Chinese music was connected to colonialism and how colonial undertones ingrained the musical development and discourses that shaped the new paradigm of Chinese music afterward. Thirdly, it examines how politics, ideology, and paradigms were intertwined with examples from the Maoist period. Fourthly, it examines the post-1980s art music scholarship, focusing on literature pertinent to piano music, revealing how scholarly trends and new paradigms were manifestations of the political system and dominant ideology.

Art Music as a New Paradigm Traditional Chinese music was largely functional, and there were different types of music that served different societal needs, for instance, court music for dynastic ceremonies, folk music for social events such as ancestral worship, wedding, and funeral, and qin music for literati’s personal enjoyment and enhancement. Hardly any of these music genres can be classified as “art music,” with the exception perhaps of the music of the qin (seven-string zither), an ancient instrument with a long musical tradition with its unique notation and music esthetics that strove for artistic excellence in the form of connoisseur appreciation (Henochowicz 2009, 2010). In this regard, the paradigm of Chinese music and Western art music is distinct.

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According to Thomas Kuhn (1962), paradigm shift takes place when the current paradigm is seen as inadequate or problematic. When Chinese musicians began to explore non-indigenous musical genres, they embarked on a journey to challenge the existing paradigm of Chinese music. The first type of Western music that got propagated in the Chinese soil was xuetang yuege (school songs), unison-singing songs, some of which composed by Chinese musicians, some adapted from Japan, Europe, and America, introduced to the school curriculum in the late nineteenth century along with China’s other modernization measures such as military and economic reforms (see Li 2019; Qian 2001). The literati Zeng Zhiwen (1879–1929), one of the composers of school songs, used the term “new Chinese songs” in 1904 to describe these songs as distinct from traditional Chinese folk songs with the aspiration that they would improve the Chinese society (Zeng 1904). Gradually, other types of non-indigenous music also emerged. For instance, the US educated linguist and amateur composer Zhao Yuanren (Chao Yuen Ren) (1892– 1982) published the first piano piece Heping jinxingqu (March of the peace) in the Shanghai journal Kexue (Science) in 1915 (cited in Ming 2012), and his art song Jiao wo ruhe bu xiang ta (How could I forget him) (1926) has become a classic of the Chinese art song repertoire (Wang 2009). The establishment of a paradigm, as Kuhn (1962) points out, is in stages. At the initial stage, the phenomenon would be interpreted differently, but the divergence would later disappear when one school of thought dominates. Kuhn’s observation finds resonance in China’s changing musical paradigm in the twentieth century. In 1931, the songwriter Li Jinhui (1891–1967) created the first musical drama in Western pop song style and in the preface to the publication of his one-act drama Three Butterflies, he referred to his endeavor as “new music” that would improve and construct China (cited in Ming 2012). In 1936, the leftist musician Lü Ji defined “new music” as a weapon to win the masses (cited in Ming 2012). In other words, in the 1930s, Chinese musicians were still negotiating the meaning, scope, and future of Chinese music, and they looked at all sorts of musical endeavors as “xin yinyue” (new music) as long as they were not traditional music, which were called “jiuyue” (old music). Art music that we generally associate with Western classical music— such as sonatas, symphonies, string quartets, operas, art songs, etc.— therefore was/is a subset of Chinese “new music” which entails clearly

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other genres rooted in the Chinese context, namely, “school songs,” film songs, pop songs, music dramas, anti-Japanese songs, mass songs, and folk operas that emerged and flourished in the 1930s and 1940s as well as after. Chinese art music such as piano works and art songs are part of this “new music” paradigm, which only started to flourish after the mid1930s, and symphonic and orchestral works, aside from scattered attempts by composers trained abroad such as Huang Zi’s overture In Memoriam (1929) and Xian Xinghai’s Yellow River Cantata (1939) were developed largely after the founding of the PRC in 1949. An incident that contributed to the consolidation of the paradigm of Chinese new music in the 1930s was the piano music composition competition organized by the Russian émigré composer-pianist Alexander Cherepnin in 1934, who at the time was visiting the National Conservatory in Shanghai (Winzenburg 2020). The competition’s objective to encourage Chinese students to think about how to infuse Chinese elements into piano writing laid the foundation for the future development of Chinese piano music, and the event also nurtured the first prominent composers of Chinese art music such as He Luting (1903– 1999) and Ding Shande (1911–1995). The first prize-winner of the competition, He Luting’s Cowherd’s Flute has since become a classic of Chinese piano music.

Colonialism, Chinese Music, and Scholarship Western music flourished in China after the 1930s for at least three reasons. Firstly, after the New Culture Movement (1919), Western cultural practices were seen as necessary means to modernize the country and were in general receptive by the public. Secondly, the founding of the National Conservatory in Shanghai in 1927 that provided training to Chinese youngsters who aspired to study Western music was a crucial step in the development of Chinese art music. Thirdly, an aspect often overlooked was the presence of a good number of high-caliber émigré musicians from Russia and Germany during the interwar period, who served as pedagogues in the conservatory and who successfully trained a good number of youngsters to become China’s leading performers (see Yang 2013, 2020). In this regard, Kuhn’s explanation of the cause of paradigm shift in the scientific sector is only partially applicable to the paradigm shift in Chinese music. Shift in paradigm, particularly in the cultural arena,

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takes more than a certain scientific discovery or a few actors’ questioning and doubting existing assumptions and beliefs. What contributed to the paradigm shift in Chinese music in the early twentieth century was a complex process that involved the zeitgeist, the need for change, and the appropriate actors who took the lead in the process, as well as the receptors who were willing to collaborate and support the change, and last but not least, colonialism, a power imbalance between China and the West after the Industrial Revolution in that China was forced to open its cities for trade and settlement through brutal force that was part of the process of colonialism. Chinese elites thus believed that learning from the West and embracing Western paradigms, even in music, were the only way to modernize and strengthen China. Therefore, it is not a surprise that colonial undertones tainted the new paradigm that shaped discourses on Chinese “new music” from this period. Accompanied by strong nationalistic sentiments, these writings were yet infused with the Darwinist perspective of evolution and progress. Chinese music, which came from a tradition much longer than Western music and which took a developmental path different from Western music, was often seen as backward, as evident in writings by Zeng Zhiwen (1904), Li Jinhui (1931), and Lü Ji (1936) (all cited in Ming 2012) mentioned above. Another Chinese elite of the time, the German-educated doctorate Wang Guangqi (1892–1936) was also a case in point of colonialism’s impact on Chinese scholars’ psyche, at a time cultural relativism was only emerging. Wang’s many writings from the 1930s—in four categories: Chinese music, Western music, comparative study of Chinese and Western music, and music education (Lü 1992)—laid the paradigm of Chinese music scholarship in the twentieth century in its scope as well as methodology. Influenced by European musical nationalism and heavily ingrained by colonialism and Darwinism, Wang encouraged Chinese musicians and scholars to consolidate traditional music on the one hand and collect folk music on the other, and then use the “scientific method” of the West to create China’s national music, a sentiment shared by other Chinese scholars after him (1928). Wang was trained to look at both Chinese and European music from an evolutionary perspective—from monophonic music to polyphonic music and then to homophonic music (1928). Thus, he saw Chinese music as not reaching an advanced stage of development in its musical language. In his monograph Ouzhou yinyue jinhua lun [The evolution of European music] (1928), he lamented the fact a nation without national music was a shame, such was also a view evidently

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shared by other scholars such as Xiao Youmei, the founder of the National Conservatory as evident in his writings from the late 1920s (see Xiao 1928, 2004a, 1929, 2004b). In addition, Wang also lamented the shame from the lack of a systematic attempt to narrate the history of Chinese music that he aspired to accomplish before his untimely death in 1936 with his monograph Zhongguo yinyue shi [Chinese music history] (1941). Colonialism, aside from leaving a mark on the psyche of Chinese musicians and scholars, also left its mark on Chinese music scholarship by Western scholars. Purporting to write from a perspective of objectivity, these scholars often presented Chinese music as a primitive, underdeveloped manifestation in comparison to its Western counterpart. The orientalist perspective was not uncommon here, with many scholars praising the “exoticism” of Chinese music, in a patronizing tone short of a total dismissal of Chinese works as mere rarities. An example of this type of writing is Grace Phillips’s Music of China, Old and New (1958). Writing for a Western audience, Phillips’s article is full of remarks that would be deemed unacceptable today, due to their markedly colonial overtones. As such, Phillips writes lines such as “the Western world was destined to make these important contributions to music, while the inventive, musical Chinese still cling to their sheng [Chinese free-reed mouth organ], ch’in [guqin, seven-string zither] and tsing [zheng, pluck zither]” (36), or “when the Chinese people are free again and come into their own, we may expect them to excel in music” (37).

State Ideology and Socialist Music Chinese music and scholarship went through another paradigm shift after the founding of the PRC in 1949, a period thought of as marked by political turbulence yet with heavy transformations in the social-economic infrastructure (Sullivan and Hearst 1997), which further exemplifies the impact of power and ideology on paradigm shift not covered by Kuhn. As a regime of dictatorship, the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) asserted power on all art forms and made “cultural workers” follow party directives closely. In the PRC’s early years, some of the new genres emerged from the 1930s such as art song, pop song, and Western music of the abstract category were banned or the least discouraged for their not befitting with the communist artistic ideology. However, other forms of Western music were seen as having the potential to be revamped to serve the society and its people (Yang 2007), the paradigm traceable to Mao’s 1942 Zai

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yan’an wenyi zuotan hui shang de jinaghua [Talks at the Yan’an forum on literature and art], the artistic mandate of the new socialist paradigm of the nation that emphasized on massification of arts and their use for the revolutionary cause (McDougall 1980; Fu 2015). In fact, the CCP’s belief in music’s power to win over the masses in political struggle did lead to large-scale developments in music infrastructure after 1949 such as the founding of conservatories and various types of performing groups in major cities. Musicians, particularly composers, were encouraged to write music that edified state sanctioned ideologies, such as socialist realism and revolutionary romanticism (Edmonds and Yang 2003; Yang 2004). A repertoire of works with explicit socialist characteristics were created before China’s economic reform in 1978. These socialist music compositions formed a new paradigm of socialist Chinese music epitomized in the yangbanxi (model operas/works) from the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), a repertoire of thirty some collectively composed works by the country’s leading musicians—Beijing operas, ballets, symphonic pieces, and even a piano concerto and a string quartet—supposedly to be “models” for other Chinese composers to follow (see Pang et al. 2016). Nonetheless, due to incessant political turmoil and strict ideological control, a good portion of these works were generally seen as heavy in propaganda and short in artistic quality. To facilitate a complete paradigm change, music scholars had to go through re-education through various state measures organized by their workplace units such as attending education camps and field trips to factories and country-sides to work along the masses. The objective of these activities was to help cultural elites internalize the new socialist worldview so they would infuse the teachings of Marx and Mao into their compositions and writings. The journal Renmin yinyue [People’s Music], founded in 1950, was a site to cultivate and showcase the new paradigm of socialist music in discourse. The journal title itself is a “symbolic sign” of CCP’s music ideology, and together with its contents, it was meant to educate the public about the paradigm of socialist music being a tool to serve the masses, to unite masses of different classes, and to draw inspiration from the masses (Yang 2006). As a result, Chinese discourses from this period, often dismissed as mere propaganda, are marked explicitly with socialist ideological intent. Their interpretation of musical works conformed to the guidelines set by the Party, in support of the Maoist cause. Some of the most clear examples of this type of writings can be found in the collection Renmin zhanzheng

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de zhuangli songge: zan zangqin xiezouqu “huanghe” [A magnificent ode to the people’s war: Praise the Piano Concerto “Yellow River”] (1970), which compiles a series of articles by several authors on the Yellow River Piano Concerto, a “model work” composed at the height of the Cultural Revolution that, immediately after its premiere, became one of the most well-known representatives of the Chinese repertoire. Although each of the articles appeared originally in a different venue, they all share the common position characteristic of the aforementioned type of writing, namely that they engage with the work to appraise it, justifying the musical decisions on the ideological message supposedly embedded in the work. But this ideologically mandated approach toward discourse and scholarship gradually lost its grounds after 1976, a watershed in China’s history. The death of Mao in 1976 also marked the end of the Cultural Revolution and the beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s era. His reforms profoundly transformed China not only economically but also culturally, including its music paradigm as well as discourse by Chinese scholars to be discussed in later part of this chapter.

The Postcolonial Turn and English-Language Academia In the West, the publication of Edward Said’s seminal Orientalism in 1978 (see Said 2003) opened a new phase in academic scholarship, commonly known as the postcolonial turn (see Bachmann-Medick 2016). This new paradigm rendered no longer acceptable, for the first time, the traditional position that regarded Chinese music as subordinate to its Western—mostly European—counterpart, advocating instead for a serious and fair treatment for this repertoire that would grant it the academic attention it deserves, as a unique and important cultural product on its own. The following monographs evidence this new approach to Chinese art music and its development. Although not fully embracing the postcolonial turn yet, Richard C. Kraus’s Pianos and Politics in China (1989) may nevertheless serve as an illustration of the changing paradigm in Chinese music studies. A booklength study, Pianos and Politics in China provides an analysis of the role played by Western art music in the PRC, with a special emphasis on the Mao era (1949–1976). Kraus’s background as a political scientist

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is apparent in Pianos and Politics, which does not develop a musicological investigation in the strict sense but embraces instead a biographical approach, where musical works appear merely as illustrations. Nevertheless, the book constitutes a valuable attempt to explore the largely uncovered area of Chinese music for western instruments, setting a highly influential precedent for later scholars who will further analyze this topic. Focusing on a specific instrument—the piano—due to its high popularity in the country, Kraus structures his book around four prominent figures of Chinese music—the composer Xian Xinghai (1905–1945), and pianists Fou Ts’ong (1934–2020), Liu Shikun (b. 1939) and Yin Chengzong (b. 1941)—aiming to illustrate the evolution of the Chinese perception of Western art music and its influence on local composers and musicians through the different periods of Mao’s government. While Kraus’s theorization is still far from postcolonial concepts such as hybridity, and at times the Western bias emerges unreservedly, the book is nonetheless meritorious for its disposition toward Chinese music and its interactions with its Western counterpart as worthy of a lengthy and detailed analysis. The optimistic commentary on the fate of Sino-Western art music in post-Mao China, which serves as the book’s conclusion, may be indicative of this shift in the attitude of numerous scholars toward previously oft-overlooked Chinese cultural products. Paradigm shifts are often gradual, and the one transforming the study of Chinese music is not an exception. As such, some publications showcasing elements from the aforementioned colonial attitude continued to appear sparingly through the 1980s and 1990s—although scattered across a range of journals and authors, we could cite as examples Larry Sitsky’s (1985) article on music and education in China and David Larson’s (1980) article describing and evaluating the current state of music in China. These occasional publications notwithstanding, many other researchers started to embrace the postcolonial turn, thus contributing to a paradigm shift in academic discourse. This movement forward into a new research direction, though not necessarily defining a new paradigm immediately, eventually led to the publication of several substantial musicological investigations on specific aspects of contemporary Chinese music, avoiding its positioning as a mere counterpoint, a curious other, to the Western tradition. Thus, important gaps and under-explored areas in the study of Chinese music—and in the musicological field in general—started to be properly addressed. Barbara Mittler’s Dangerous Tunes (1997) constitutes one of the most successful

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attempts to bridge one such gap. The book explores the category of New Chinese Music, the term used by Mittler to define music by Chinese composers under Western influence, a category that first appeared during the early twentieth century and that has developed since then into one of the most relevant and vibrant forms of Chinese music. New Chinese Music, thus, can be understood as a hybrid product, in contraposition to the previous consideration of Chinese musicians as simply imitating elements from the Western canon, considered as the dominant culture. For Mittler, New Chinese Music includes Chinese works composed in a multiplicity of Western styles, including—but not limited to—classicist, romanticist, or modernist idioms. Dangerous Tunes traces the history of New Chinese Music since 1949 in its connection with politics in three different regions of the Sinosphere, namely mainland China, Taiwan, and the Hong Kong-Macau region. As the first English monograph written on the subject (as stated by Yu 2001: 257), Mittler’s book marked a milestone in the study of Chinese art music, remaining as of today as one of the most influential publications on the field.

Chinese Students on a Journey to the West On top of allowing foreign scholars greater access to China, the opening reforms gave rise to a significant increase in the number of Chinese scholars and musicians traveling to Western institutions to further their academic training. Thus, integrated within the Western academic community—at least through the duration of their programs of study—these scholars were exposed to a set of practices and methods significantly different from the dominant paradigm within Chinese academia. These circumstances favored the appearance of a new type of research publication, written by Chinese authors on Chinese matters but aimed for English-language readers. Although a large portion of the writings within this category have appeared, and continue to do so, in the form of graduate dissertations with little to no follow-up (many of them are the only scholarly work published by their authors), they constitute still an important contribution and a substantial enrichment of the Sino-musicological sphere, providing an emic perspective essentially different from that of Western scholars, largely groomed in the occidental tradition. Furthermore, as a consequence of their non-commercial nature, the range of topics covered by these publications is extremely diverse, exploring both well-consolidated and niche areas, which may otherwise have been left

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unexplored due to their reduced market potential. Appearing at an everincreasing pace since the early 1980s, providing an account of all the different subjects studied and approaches espoused in these investigations would be a titanic quest, well beyond the scope of this chapter. However, we will try to define some of their most relevant characteristics through a couple of examples. The first example is Liang Yongsheng’s (1994) doctoral dissertation on the influence of Western music in China during—roughly—the first half of the twentieth century. In the epilogue, Liang explicitly states the intended aim of his dissertation, that of presenting to Western readers a different perspective, the Chinese one, as he believes it is crucial to understand musical development in China (229). This dissertation is organized in a chronological manner, structured as a series of biographies of important figures in the Chinese musical scene in the early 1900s—including names such as Zeng Zhiwen (1879–1929), Xiao Youmei (1884–1940), Huang Zi (1904–1938), Xian Xinghai (1905–1945), or He Luting (1903–1999), among others. Liang’s approach may be labeled as a purely descriptive one, as his analyses correspond to biographical details of each composer interlined with technical commentaries on some of their most relevant works. At all times, Liang seems to avoid theoretical interpretations, focusing exclusively on analyzing the structure and describing the elements present on the score. A special focus is set on the idea of separating what is Western from what constitutes the Chinese aspect in the music, although the two are often reduced to purely observable technical devices—such as modal harmonies or use of certain types of ornamentation. We can see here a distancing from assessing any political implications of the works and their composers, with all attention being focused instead on the “purely musical” elements and, at most, providing a historical account of the work that largely avoids dealing with issues that could be considered politically sensible. The second example is Chen Shing-lih’s dissertation (1995). There, Chen sets her focus on a particular work, in an instance of one of the most common formats among writings within this category, case studies a large-format piece or several shorter works (see Chun 1991; Lang 1992; Hu 1994; Chen 1997; Pei 1997). The dissertation revolves around the Yellow River Piano Concerto, with Chen devoting considerable effort to identifying the Chinese and Western influences present on the work. Once again, these influences are ascribed to particular technical

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resources, confined to the “purely musical,” the central issue of the dissertation—roughly two thirds of it correspond to a chapter that elaborates a musical analysis of the Concerto, describing mainly the structure, melody, harmony, rhythm, and orchestration of each of the four movements that conform the piece. While in both the introduction and the conclusion Chen does write a few lines on the political implications of the work, these remarks are however limited to describing the political situation under which the Concerto was originally conceived, in an account that conforms to the official stance toward the Cultural Revolution promoted by the CCP since the avowed condemnation of the period was issued in 1981 (see CCP Central Committee 1981). While these two examples can be considered representative of the dominant trends within this literature paradigm, there are nevertheless exceptional papers that break with these tendencies, exploring avenues usually overlooked by other authors. Even without departing from studies on the Yellow River Concerto, we can find an example of such a paper in Margaret Chan’s 1996 master’s dissertation (1996). Chan investigates, in a characteristically Western fashion, the Yellow River Piano Concerto as a site for identity negotiations. In her dissertation, the political element is overtly displayed, a consequence perhaps of the non-mainland Chinese background of Chan and her interviewees—Hong Kong and the Chinese diaspora in Canada—resulting in a piece of writing much more similar to Western academic discourse than to its Chinese counterpart.

Changes in Chinese Academia The paradigm shift favored by the postcolonial turn and the opening reforms not only affected English-language academia, but its effects also had an impact in its Chinese counterpart, which in the early 1980s was still largely dominated by the partisan, highly political branch of writing popular under Mao’s regime—particularly during the Cultural Revolution—often qualified as propaganda by foreign scholars, that we have discussed earlier in this chapter. However, the flux of Chinese academics traveling abroad, with many returning after completing their studies, and the greater access to Western publications, contributed to a gradual reshaping of Chinese scholarly writing. The new attitude toward culture and the arts embraced by the government favored a certain depoliticization of the arts that also extended to research on the subject. Many scholars started to avoid dealing openly with politically sensible

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topics—often, this meant an attempt to completely exclude the political dimension from the texts—focusing instead on other characteristics of the musical works studied, such as commentaries on technical elements. This offers a clear parallel with the previously mentioned case of the Englishlanguage dissertations by Chinese scholars, providing further support to the paradigm shift hypothesis. This situation can be better understood by observing some of the writings produced during this period in China. A good case in point is Pu Fang’s 1991 article on the nationalization process of the Chinese piano concerto as a genre (Pu 1999). Reviewing the history of Chinese piano concerti since the 1930s, Pu examines in this article the evolution of the genre, understood as an ongoing, gradual process of nationalization of an originally foreign product. It is interesting to note that here, as in a large number of music research publications in China even today, the term minzuhua (nationalization) is used in a way that conflates with the issue of Chineseness, an ideological move derived from the assumption of a national entity, the People’s Republic of China, and its history (in its narrative as controlled by the Party) as the only valid sources of Chineseness. With examples from different concerti, Pu examines how the different aspects of the genre have been transformed and nationalized. As mentioned above, the focus is set here on technical characteristics, such as the use of certain harmonies, rhythms, and melodic gestures, which are traced to traditional songs and musical practices to demonstrate their Chineseness. Explicit references to political issues relating to different interpretations of a concerto—such as the polemic Yellow River—are thus avoided in this article, with the works taken at face value, their analysis being confined to the non-contentious “purely musical” dimension. However, there are two sections where the ideological element may appear most evident. These two are the section on form, an issue that in China has been historically linked to political intent—especially during the years of Mao’s regime—and the conclusion, where Pu advocates precisely for a further development of the path of nationalization as the way forward for Chinese composers and musicians involved with the piano concerto genre. The open exhortations and references to the revolution, the proletariat, and the explicit praising of the Party and particular political figures are absent in this article, yet the piece’s fundamental ideological position remains faithful to the government’s narrative.

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A New Chinese Music The changing perspectives through the 1980s and 1990s gradually set the grounds for yet another significant change, one which saw itself consolidated with the turn of the millennium, affecting both Chinese and English-language academia. This shift concerns the very definition of Chinese New Music. With the dominant perspective through the twentieth century regarded this type of music as an import, as a Western practice that some Chinese composers had taken on, since the early twenty-first century scholars have progressively shifted their consideration of this phenomenon toward that of an autochthonous Chinese product, sometimes presented as a hybrid form, but nonetheless seen as an authentically Chinese art form. One of the most influential exponents of this new perspective is Sheila Melvin and Jindong Cai’s book Rhapsody in Red (2004), which presents a history of the introduction of Western music to China since the early seventeenth century and the development of Chinese New Music through the twentieth century. The first line of the blurb already reveals the changed approach to Chinese New Music: “Western classical music has become as Chinese as Peking Opera” (2004, back cover). However, there is another, less evident, characteristic of the book that signals a perhaps even more radical change: the intended audience is no longer the highly specialized academia, instead the volume is aimed at a much wider, general audience. This gesture, far from anecdotic, represents a true Copernican turn for the study of Chinese New Music, as its inclusion in public discourse serves as proof of the successful development of a genre no longer seen as a rarity, a curio, but as an authentic, deserving cultural product. In Chinese literature, this shift is also present. An example of an open recognition of the need for a shift can be seen in the works of some scholars who, having studied in the West, returned to China and developed a career within Chinese academia. Dai Baisheng, one of the leading scholars in Chinese piano music, is an example of such a career path. Having studied a PhD in Germany, upon his return to China, he has published extensively in Chinese, particularly in the topic of Chinese piano music. For example, in his article (2005) on Chinese style in piano music, Dai claims for a new research direction, one that abandons the old approach of simply tracing the Chinese and Western elements in the music in favor of a more comprehensive study that investigates the works

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in their cultural context, an approach more closely resembling the traditional method used in Western musicology when dealing with Western works. While exhortations like Dai’s may not be present in most research publications in Chinese, the postulates he defends nonetheless can be discerned in many of the writings appearing throughout the last two decades. As an illustration, we can observe Zhang Baohua and Wang Jin’s series of three articles on the Yellow River Piano Concerto (Zhang and Wang 2014; Wang 2015a, 2015b). Here, Wang approaches the Concerto from a theoretical perspective originally devised for literary criticism—the School of Constance’s Reception Theory (see Zhang and Wang 2014). This use of theory, combined with Wang’s endeavor to explore facets of the Yellow River that had not been covered in previous publications—which largely developed either a pedagogical clarification of the meaning of the work (see Zhang 2018), or simply identified the Chinese and Western elements in the score (see Zhao 2015)—can be thus fully inscribed within this new paradigm.

Conclusion While Kuhn proposes the structure of a succession of paradigms and revolutions as characteristic of mature sciences, we have nevertheless been able to identify and trace some of the most relevant changes that have shaped the study of Chinese art music—still a relatively recent discipline. Looking back at its history of barely a century, we can affirm that research on Chinese art music has experienced a series of paradigmatic changes that have rendered the discipline a vibrant and fast-changing area of study. Having developed in parallel to its object of study—Chinese art music—colonial influences were a determinant factor in the first half of the twentieth century. The view of Western music and its theory as a superior cultural form than traditional Chinese music set the former as a model to be followed to ensure the “modernization” of the latter, a process deemed necessary by the intellectual elites in the country—such as during the New Culture Movement—if China wanted to break from a self-perceived position of inferiority with respect to the Western powers. The radical changes in the political and ideological arenas that followed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 greatly transformed the direction of both musical production and its study, putting

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music at the service of the Maoist revolutionary cause. Chinese scholarship on Chinese art music during the first decades of the PRC thus became a political tool, an active apparatus of the ideological edifice promoted by the Communist Party. The direction of Chinese music research in China became thus virtually opposed to research on the subject conducted in the West, where a perspective regarding Chinese art music as a low-value curiosity, as a poor rehash of Western traditions and techniques—highly influenced by colonialism, but also reinforced by the fierce political division between the Communist and Capitalist blocks—became dominant. Since the death of Mao in 1976, these two diametrically opposed lines of research have progressively come closer, mutually influencing each other as a result of the increased contact between China and the West, made possible with the opening reforms started under Deng’s government. The role played by the postcolonial turn in the arts and humanities that transformed academic research through the last decades of the twentieth century cannot be overlooked either. However, despite the increasing similarity between Chinese and Western (mainly Englishlanguage) scholarship, as it has been shown, some differences of perspective remain. The political factor plays here a key role, as the tight control over academic publications prevailing in China impedes the voicing of certain positions and the exploration of research avenues which are commonly present in Western venues. It is also not to overlook that a new paradigm of music study is emerging, which, instead of focusing on “new” Chinese music, draws attention to contact zones such as the intersection and interaction of Chinese and Western music cultures. Yang and Saffle’s edited volume China and the West: Music, Representation, and Reception (2017) is a case in point, the volume bringing together both Chinese and Western scholars of musicology, ethnomusicology, music theory, cultural studies, and history to examine musical-cultural interactions between China and the West, namely the representation and reception of Chineseness in the West as well as the contributions of intercultural/hybrid compositions by both Chinese and Western composers. Moving beyond colonialism and post-colonialism, this volume treats musical encounter and intersections as ways to see how musical artifacts and sounds have transported from one place to another, how people from different places have interacted through them, and how their creativities have made the world a better and more interesting place for us then as well as now.

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Indeed, this rising interest in contact zones is best embodied in a recently very popular topic in music studies—the global history of music, a new paradigm in the making. This newly emerging paradigm could be traced to the 2012 Balzan Prize for Musicology, a collaborative project led by the Oxford Professor Reinhard Strohm with the objective to explore suitable methodologies to describe a history of Western music of many different voices (https://www.balzan.org/en/prizewinners/reinhard-str ohm/research-project-strohm). The resulting volume edited by Strohm (2018) consists of twenty case studies by experts on music from different parts of the world not constrained by disciplinary or geographical boundaries, an unprecedented attempt in studies of Western music history. In around the same time, leading music organizations in the West such as the American Musicological Society, the International Musicological Society, and even the International Council for Traditional Music have all established their own study groups in response to the increasing interest in the subject matter though there is yet to be found a consensus on global music history’s definition, research scope or methodology. Nonetheless, given the objectives articulated by these study groups, it is quite certain that Chinese art music is a part of this quest for a global music history which no doubt will become a new paradigm of music studies in the twenty-first century.

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Index

A Anthropology in China, 8, 17, 20, 23, 27 Area studies, 1, 2, 4, 6 C China studies, 1, 3, 6, 8, 13, 174, 177, 178, 184–186, 188–191 Chinese anthropological paradigms, 26, 31, 32 Chinese art music, 286, 288, 292, 294, 299–301 Chinese music scholarship, 289, 290 Chinese new music, 288, 298 Chinese philosophy, 10, 150–152, 154–162, 166, 167, 216 Chinese piano music, 288, 298 Classroom surveillance, 32 Communication, 8, 39–42, 44–51, 54, 55, 57–61, 149 Confucianism, 6, 88, 152, 154, 166, 208, 215, 237, 243, 245, 253, 269 Cultural Revolution, 7, 19, 20, 30, 44, 103, 104, 106, 109, 112,

124, 178, 183, 186, 202, 211, 240–242, 252, 266, 269, 291, 292, 296 Culture, 5, 6, 12, 18, 22, 23, 31, 32, 86, 89, 96, 133, 152, 159, 161, 163, 167, 176, 187, 189, 203, 204, 214, 216, 218–221, 226, 265, 288, 294, 296 D Disciplines, 1, 7, 10, 11, 13, 20, 35, 41, 42, 51, 60, 61, 78, 80, 82, 124, 125, 137, 251, 268 E Economic policies, 191 Economic research on China, 66, 67, 73, 78 Education, 20, 23, 29, 39–43, 46, 50, 54–61, 86, 107, 109, 176, 182, 186, 201, 204, 209, 278, 289, 291, 293 Evolutionary, 86, 90–94, 97, 103, 104, 110–112, 116, 289

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2022 S. Hua (ed.), Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8032-8

307

308

INDEX

F Five-year plan (FYP), 67, 74

G Globalization, 1, 31, 68, 202

H Historiography, 86, 89–97, 102–104, 109, 111, 112, 114, 116, 117, 247

I Institute for World Religions (IWR), 242, 245, 246, 248

J Jinping, Xi, 1, 2, 54, 55, 182, 241, 243, 255, 263, 267, 268 Journalism, 39–47, 50, 51, 53–61

L Love of country, 36

M Marxist, 7, 9, 12, 29, 54, 55, 57, 86, 97–107, 109–114, 116, 117, 127, 137, 182, 240, 241, 243, 245–247, 249, 268 Modernization theory, 2

P Paradigms, 1, 3, 6, 8–13, 21, 35, 86, 116, 125, 129, 130, 135, 149, 150, 156, 173, 177, 183–185, 187–190, 193, 202–208, 212–214, 216–218, 220, 221,

237, 240, 241, 243, 244, 246, 250, 272, 286, 289, 299 Party-state, 12, 135, 136, 272, 276, 278 Pluralism, 2, 220, 221, 236, 246 Political science, 3, 5, 8, 11, 173, 174, 177–184, 187, 190, 191, 240 Political science and China studies, 178 Post-Mao reform, 10, 12 Psychology, 11, 125, 149, 201–221, 224, 226, 227 R Reform and opening up, 67, 75, 77, 136 Reform in the countryside, 252 Religious question, 242 Religious work, 237, 241, 243, 246 Research cooperation, 75 Revolutionary Operas, 7 S Scopus, 66, 76–78 Secularization, 239, 249 Social change, 1, 3, 61 Social science, 3–5, 7, 11, 12, 31, 41, 67, 80, 99, 101, 123, 130, 134, 140, 178, 179, 182, 183, 186, 237, 239, 240, 250, 251, 265, 268, 273, 274, 276, 278 Sociology, 12, 19, 20, 95, 125, 130, 180, 239, 240, 246, 249, 263–269, 272–279 State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), 243, 244 State ideology and paradigm shift, 290 State restrictions, 33 Study of politics inside China, 6, 12, 13, 19

INDEX

Survey research, 6, 184 T Taoism, 155, 208, 209, 215 U United front work, 240, 243, 245, 246 W Western music in China, 295

309

Western paradigm shift, 7, 9, 10, 216, 289

X Xiaoping, Deng, 55, 86, 241, 242, 244, 263, 266, 292

Z Zedong, Mao, 55, 86, 101, 102, 107, 115, 116, 185, 239