NATO and the Gulf Countries: An Analysis of the Fifteen Year Strategic Partnership [1 ed.] 9811638144, 9789811638145

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Ashraf Mohammed Keshk

NATO and the Gulf Countries An Analysis of the Fifteen Year Strategic Partnership

NATO and the Gulf Countries

Ashraf Mohammed Keshk

NATO and the Gulf Countries An Analysis of the Fifteen Year Strategic Partnership

Ashraf Mohammed Keshk Director of the Strategic and International Studies Program Bahrain Center for Strategic International and Energy Studies “Derasat” Awali, Bahrain

ISBN 978-981-16-3814-5 ISBN 978-981-16-3815-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3815-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgement

If crises frequently pose challenges, they sometimes present opportunities, but only for those who can wisely use them. Actually, authoring this book coincided with challenging circumstances and a severe crisis which made me indulged in bitter agony. Then, Covid-19 pandemic appeared and widely spread to multiply my discomfort and bitterness, given the restrictions which were imposed on movement. However, I tried to search for a worthy opportunity among all these ruthless circumstances, and I found it when the idea of writing a book came into my mind. I thank God so much for His generosity and countless great graces, one of which is the support of sincere colleagues who advised me to invest time in writing new book on any subject of my specialization which is the ‘regional security studies”. However, the greatest share of appreciation and gratitude is to be expressed for my dear colleague, Amany Abdel-Ghany, an M.A. researcher, at Ain Shams University, in Egypt, as she has exerted great efforts to produce the book in its current form and content. She has done her best to provide the suitable cooperation needed for making use of the most valuable and relevant research papers for this book and has professionally translated all the foreign studies, included here, using profound research tools and methods. Due to her hard work and translation efforts, this book tackled a very worthwhile package of highly significant references. Sincerely, I am very grateful for her cooperation, which was one of the main pillars for accomplishing this book and my Great appreciation to the reviewers who devoted their time to reading the book and provided comments that are an added value to the book, and all thanks and appreciation to the Springer team who were keen to work hard and continuously to publish the Book in this way. Bahrain 2021

Ashraf Mohammed Keshk

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About This Book

On December 16, 2019, Kuwait organized a tremendous celebration for the fifteenth anniversary of launching NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation initiative (ICI) which marked a significant step of cooperation with the Arab Gulf states. Representatives from the Alliance and their counterparts from the four Gulf ICI members which have joined the initiative, namely, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, attended the celebration. In my point of view, that celebration was not just a formal celebration, but rather a straightforward motivation which encouraged me to write this book for five reasons: First, my Ph.D. thesis tackles the Istanbul initiative; I got my Ph.D. in political science from the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, in 2009, with an excellent grade and I was nominated by the faculty as having the best Ph.D. thesis in political science at Cairo University for that year. That is why I am always interested in (ICI) as a subject of study and research. Second, in 2009, I was lucky to have a four-month scholarship at NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy. I say I was lucky because I got that scholarship few weeks after accomplishing my Ph.D., and it was a great opportunity for me to compare what I wrote from textual references to the actual interactions of the Alliance’s countries, in that ancient college which encompasses representatives of all the NATO members. In addition to that, there are many study programs which are attended by representatives from all the countries which have partnerships with NATO, including the Middle East region and the Arab Gulf Stats. These programs include lectures, seminars, and training courses, as well as periodical publications, issued by the college, with sober studies explaining the implications of the Alliance’s policies on all the world regions, including the Middle East and the Arab Gulf. Therefore, what this book contains is based on a mixture of academic resources and direct practical experience. Third, I was also lucky that communication with NATO college has never stopped after completing the scholarship; for ten years, from 2009 to 2018, after the scholarship has ended, the college used to invite me to participate, as an academic mentor from the Middle East, in the biannual “Crisis Management” exercise which is organized for the college’s students. A number of senior armed forces commanders, diplomats from NATO countries and other partner countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative (1994) and the Istanbul Initiative (2004) used to attend the exercise as well. vii

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About This Book

Hence, I made use of both the academic and the practical experiences in delivering a comprehensive understanding and assessment of NATO’s policies and their impact on the security of the Arab Gulf region. Fourth, I have always been academically interested in regional security, how it affects and be affected by global interactions, as a subject of study, in an endeavor to answer the question: “Is regional security a fundamental pillar to achieving global security? Or the vice versa? NATO’s engagement with the Gulf’s regional security through the Istanbul Cooperation initiative (ICI) was a remarkable step which inspired me to stud the relationship between regional security, as represented by the four GCCs which have joined ICI, and an organization with a colossal size and defensive weight like NATO. As for the fifth reason, it has mainly to do with the geographic and political status of the GCCs. Being small countries located within a highly crises- stricken region, the GCCs had but few defense options. One of these options was establishing partnerships with defense forces and organizations such as NATO. It is worth mentioning that the core question of my Ph.D. thesis was: “in light of the regional security turmoil, will NATO be a source of security for the Gulf States, or will it be part of the struggle over the Arab Gulf? For these five reasons, the aforementioned celebration of the ICI at 15, was the main basis, or, in other words, the starting point for writing this book, which should not be perceived as being the first accomplishment in this domain. Actually, over the past ten years, I have participated in many international conferences on ICI, and published studies in Arabic and in English, tackling the controversial initiative which has been raising a lot of questions about its contents and real description: is the initiative a framework for consultation on Gulf and regional security issues? Is it a security initiative or a defensive one? Even more importantly, how was this initiative developed? Was there a mutual eagerness, on the part of NATO or that of the four Gulf States, to develop it? Is it possible for the initiative to be redeveloped and have other dimensions and outlooks in the future? There are, in fact, many issues related to that initiative which I decided to tackle in this book. It is fifteen years since the Istanbul initiative has been launched, but the question that I tried to answer through my Ph.D. thesis is still raised, does NATO have a cohesive and integrated strategy for protecting the security of the Arab Gulf which commensurate with the strategic importance of that region the importance of which goes beyond the traditional concept of its rich oil resources? Or does the Alliance’s initiative towards the Gulf Stated and the Middle East form a part of NATO’s global strategy for gaining triumph in its conflict with Russia, in other words, does NATO’s initiative serves its new out of area role after the end of the Cold War, including the Middle East and the Arab Gulf?

Introduction

On December, 16 2019, Kuwait organized a celebration for marking the fifteenth anniversary of the launch of Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Representatives of NATO and their counterparts from the Gulf countries participated in that event. This four-chapter book, analyzes the strategic partnership between NATO and the four Arabian Gulf countries that joined the ICI, launched by NATO in 2004 for cooperation with these countries. The ICI was part of the Alliance’s strategy, after the end of the Cold War era, to establish partnerships in various regions of the world, including the Arabia Gulf region and the Middle East. Chapters of book proceed logically, in terms of addressing emergence of the Alliance and development of its roles and the book addresses the ICI, in terms of its foundations, operational framework and views of NATO and the Arab Gulf countries to initiative and how it developed. The book tackles the many areas of security and military cooperation between two sides, which resulted from the ICI. Given the close link between the security of the Arabian Gulf and regional security, the book addresses the role of NATO regarding threats to regional security, namely, threats to maritime security, Iranian threats, terrorism, and energy security. In addition, the book analyzes NATO’s role in supporting capabilities of the Iraqi security forces. The book addresses, as well, the most important obstacles to cooperation between NATO and the Arabian Gulf countries. Chapter 1: NATO: Origin, Legal Adaptation, and Roles This chapter analyzes establishment of NATO in 1949 and the nature of the Alliance, analyzing structure of the Alliance. The military and political committees are the most prominent entities in such structure of NATO. Mechanisms of action of the Alliance and its international legal foundation, namely Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, are also analyzed. Such article provides for individual and collective self-defense by UN member states. This chapter also analyses development of NATO’s role after the end of the Cold War era, which was a formidable challenge for the Alliance, as debate arose about the reason for existence of the alliance itself, regarding either to develop or come to an end like the Warsaw Pact organization.

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NATO has managed, however, to adapt to the reality of such era coming to an end, by establishing a number of partnerships in different regions of the world. The Alliance has also militarily intervened in addressing a number of crises outside territories of its member states, with changing the military doctrine of the alliance in the postCold War era. Such doctrine was based on three pillars: identifying sources of new threats, designating a new theater for operations, and creating the political reference for decision-making. This doctrine was expressed in the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept. Such concept is considered a high-level security pact that integrates with the Charter on setting up NATO and is not contradictory with it. In addition, NATO announced, in 2016, adopting a policy of stabilization and calming down troubles in Europe and the Middle East. Such policy required finding new mechanisms, including the establishment of NATO Strategic Direction South (NSD-S) Hub in 2017. This policy also required the establishment of the NATO-Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Regional Center in Kuwait in the same year. Within these changes in NATO policies, the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf region has received great attention from the Alliance, because it comprises vital interests of NATO member states. Therefore, NATO launched the Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative in 1994 for dialogue with seven Mediterranean countries, namely Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania. The main goal of this dialogue is bringing about mutual understanding between NATO and these countries, to confront common threats and to stabilizing the region. This involved NATO direct military intervention in the Arab region during the Libyan crisis in 2011, by means of Operation Unified Protector, in which the Alliance relied on International resolution and regional support. Chapter 2: Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) (2004) This chapter analyzes the content of Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched by NATO in 2004, and directed to countries of the enlarged Middle East, starting with the Arabian Gulf countries. The ICI included six areas of security and defense cooperation between NATO and the four Gulf states that joined it, namely the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman have remained outside the framework of ICI. Istanbul Cooperation Initiative is characterized with compromising optional areas of cooperation for countries, integrating with initiatives of other international parties in the region and taking into account the special characteristics of the Arabian Gulf countries. The ICI is concerned with practical cooperation in the areas it comprises. This means that NATO can offer security in its two ‘hard and soft’ forms, especially in the area of training and consultations. This chapter addresses also positions of the six Gulf countries regarding the ICI, whether those who joined it or those who remained outside it. This involves analyzing official statements that demonstrate these positions. The chapter also deals with the outcome of the ICI over a period of fifteen years, including the security and military agreements concluded between NATO and the Gulf countries, as well as the joint military drills between NATO and the ICI member states.

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The chapter also include a topic that is considered new in itself, namely cooperation between NATO and the Arabian Gulf countries in the area of soft security, by monitoring the most important courses attended by military and civilian representatives from the four ICI Gulf member states in the educational institutions of NATO in Rome and Berlin. The chapter also deals with the alliance’s view to the partnership with the Arabian Gulf countries, by analyzing contents of the annual reports produced by NATO. The chapter addresses, as well, the partnership and cooperation programs between NATO and individual Gulf countries and aspirations of these countries to develop these programs to include new areas of cooperation, including maritime security and countering cyber threats. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the outcome of ICI, and the way the Arabian Gulf countries will benefit from NATO in the future in the security and defense areas. Chapter 3: Role of NATO in Addressing Regional Security Threats to the Arabian Gulf Countries NATO officials are aware that the Arabian Gulf countries are an integral part of a regional security system, influencing it and influenced with it. Therefore, this chapter analyzes the role of NATO in addressing regional security threats, most notably threats to maritime security. This involves reviewing NATO’s maritime capabilities and the alliance’s perspectives to maintaining maritime security, as included in the NATO 2010 Strategic Concept and NATO 2011 Maritime Strategy. NATO’s previous experiences regarding countering threats to maritime security are also addressed, such as reflected in Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean and NATO’s participation in international efforts to confront piracy off the coast of Somalia. These experiences enhance role of NATO regarding protecting maritime security in the Arabian Gulf region. The chapter also addresses the role of NATO for dealing with Iranian threats, as the alliance has concerns not only about the military purposes of Iran’s nuclear programs, but also means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, as represented in successive generations of Iranian medium and long-range missiles. The chapter deals also with the fact that although NATO has not engaged as a party in the nuclear crisis between Iran and the United States, the Alliance adopts the policy of deterrence against Iranian threats. The fact that energy security is one of red lines crossing which by any party is not allowed by NATO is addressed by this chapter as well. This fact is confirmed by intervention by the main NATO member states to protect the Gulf oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, as well as participation of these countries in the war of liberation of Kuwait in 1991. The chapter also includes an overview on the Iranian perspective to NATO’s policies in the Arabian Gulf region, as reflected in some Iranian studies and statements in this regard. The chapter also tackles the role of NATO in supporting the Iraqi security forces, identifying foundations of this role, the stages it went through, and results of the Alliance’s efforts. This includes NATO’s decision, in February 2021, to increase the number of staff of its training mission in Iraq from 500 people to 4000 people, with its indications to the role that NATO can play in the region in general.

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The chapter also deals with the role of NATO concerning combating terrorism, especially with regard to the Alliance’s announcement of joining the international coalition to fight ISIS 2017. The chapter reviews, as well, NATO’s views on countering cyber terrorism, and concludes with an analysis on the Alliance’s role regarding energy security, as this issue is part of the strategies of NATO operations outside territories of its member states, individually or in cooperation with international parties concerned with this issue. In this respect, NATO has introduced several mechanisms to safeguard energy security. Chapter 4: Obstacles to Development of Cooperation Between NATO and the Gulf Countries Despite the outcome of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in the security and defense areas, there are still several obstacles to development of this initiative, as found out by this chapter of the book. Such obstacles include the nature of the ICI itself, as under its NATO is regarded as an organization versus each Gulf country separately (29 + 1). This does not allow existence of a collective Gulf framework for cooperation between the Alliance and the Arabian Gulf countries. There are also obstacles to NATO’s military intervention outside territory of its member states, as provided for in Article 5 of the Charter on founding Alliance. Such obstacles limit the possibility of NATO’s military intervention in the event that the Arabian Gulf countries are exposed to threats or crises that require international support. There are also challenges regarding NATO itself as an organization, including the controversy over some of the mechanisms introduced by the Alliance to coordinate with countries located on the southern front of the alliance and the extent of their effectiveness. There are also external challenges faced by NATO, especially the Russian-NATO conflict. It is notable that Russia has sought to expand its influence in regions of NATO partnerships, in the North African region and the Arabian Gulf region. There is also the conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean and the tremendous challenges it has entailed for the NATO, which is based on the concept of solidarity among the Alliance’s member states. A dispute has emerged for the first time between NATO member states, namely Turkey and Greece. Such dispute resulted in disagreement in positions of partners of NATO in the Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, on supporting this or that party. Meanwhile, the European ambition to establish an independent security identity for the European Union—that integrates with NATO and does not contradict it—is another challenge to the Alliance, given the presence of 22 countries that are member states in the European Union and in NATO at the same time. The impact of Covid-19 crisis on NATO military and training operations has proved to be another challenge to the Alliance, involving existence of strategic vacuums or loopholes that NATO’s opponents may seek to exploit. The book concludes with presenting a number of strategic conclusions for the four chapters, by assessing contents of these chapters from a strategic perspective.

Contents

1 NATO: Origin, Legal Adaptation, and Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NATO: Origin and Legal Adaptation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NATO’s Evolving Role in the Post–Cold War Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NATO’s Out of–Area Strategies in Post–Cold War Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . The First Mechanism is to Have New Non-Western Europe Members in NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Second Mechanism: The Continued Issuance of the Strategic Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Third Mechanism: The Policy of Projecting Stability in 2016 . . . . Position of the Arab Region in NATO Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Mediterranean Dialogue, 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Role of NATO in Addressing Gulf and Arab Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Importance of the Arabian Gulf Region to NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Theoretical Framework for Relation of the Arabian Gulf Countries with NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Theoretical Framework for the Relationship Between Regional Security and Global Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Contexts, Foundations, and Practical Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Visions of the Arab Gulf States for the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Gulf States Stances on the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative . . . . . . . Areas of Security and Military Cooperation Between NATO and the Gulf ICI Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NATO and Cooperation with the Gulf Countries in the Field of Soft Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Evolution and Evaluation of the Gulf-Atlantic Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mechanisms for Maximizing the Gulf States’ Benefits from NATO . . . . .

1 1 2 7 15 16 18 21 26 29 31 33 37 37 38 40 41 45 46 50 54 58 65 xiii

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3 Role of NATO in Addressing Regional Security Threats to the Arabian Gulf Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NATO’s Role in Addressing Threats to Maritime Security . . . . . . . . . . NATO’s Role Concerning Iranian Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NATO’s Role in Bolstering the Iraqi Security Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . NATO’s Role in Combating Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NATO’s Role in Energy Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Obstacles to Development of Cooperation Between NATO and the Gulf Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Nature of Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and its Impact on the Gulf Countries Alliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Controversy Over NATO’s Military Intervention in Crises Outside Territories of Its Member States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Internal and External Challenges Facing NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73 73 74 78 83 88 94 101 101 102 106 111

Strategic Conclusions of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

About the Author

Dr. Ashraf Mohammed Keshk is a research fellow and the director of the Strategic and International Studies Program at the Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies “Derasat” since 2012. He is also the editor-in-chief of “Derasat” journal, a semi-annual publication comprising analyses and studies on strategic, political, international, economic, security, and energy issues, with a special focus on Gulf and Arab affairs. Dr. Keshk holds a Ph.D. degree, with an excellent grade, in Political Science, Cairo University. His thesis was nominated by Cairo University as the best Ph.D. thesis in Political Science in 2009. For more than twenty five years, Dr. keshk has been specializing in regional security issues of the Arabian Gulf, as well as defense issues, especially the regional and international alliances. He worked as an academic mentor at the NATO Defense College in Rome, as part of the Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) which was conducted from 2009 till 2018, and gave several lectures to the College students. Keshk holds also a Defense Studies diploma from NATO Defense College, which he accomplished during a four-month scholarship, He is the author of three books: Gulf Regional Security Development since 2003: A Study of the Impact of NATO’s Strategy, Western Policies towards the Security of the Arabian Gulf, and Egypt’s Water Policy towards the Nile Basin Countries in 1990s. Keshk has published dozens of papers in reputable regional and international journals which are issued in Arabic, English, and Italian. He participated, as well, in a lot of international conferences on security of the Arabian Gulf and NATO policies, including the Gulf Research Center’s annual Gulf Research Meeting (GRM), at the University of Cambridge, and many other conferences which were held in Europe. Moreover, he gave many lectures and conducted several training courses on Crisis and Disaster Management; he has taught, for instance, Bahrain’s crisis and disaster management strategy to the MA students at the Royal Police Academy in Bahrain. He writes a weekly article in Akhbar Al-Khaleej; a Bahraini newspaper. Email: [email protected]

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Chapter 1

NATO: Origin, Legal Adaptation, and Roles

Introduction This chapter illustrates how NATO was established and its role was developed. The chapter is divided into four parts; the first part lays down the definition of NATO, its establishment and legal adaptation as a regional security organization, authorized by Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. In addition to that, the first chapter of this book introduces a comprehensive analysis of the most significant Articles of NATO’s founding treaty, with a special focus on Article 5, the crucial part which determines the mandate of NATO as a defensive organization. It states that the Alliance will treat “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”, and in this case the Alliance has the right to invoke Article 5 and take a collective defensive reaction. This part of the book focuses, as well, on Article 51 of UN Charter, because it is a fundamental aspect upon which the Alliance was established; its grantees the countries’ right to defend themselves individually or collectively. The second part of chapter one tackles the evolution of NATO’s role after the end of the Cold War era. Actually, NATO has faced bitter criticism and its very existence was even condemned due to the Alliance’s traditional role in conflict with the former Warsaw Pact during the Cold War era. However, the Alliance was able to adapt to the post-Cold War era through developing its defense doctrine of “deterrence”; this actually, has forced NATO to change its military structures. The third part analyzes NATO’s strategies in dealing with countries outside its territories in the post-Cold War era. These strategies included expanding memberships and inviting new members from the former Warsaw Pact countries to join the Partnership for Peace Program (PFP). Moreover, NATO issues the Strategic Concept, a complex security document issued every ten years. The last Concept was issued in 2010 and identified the central features and developments of the new security environment and how could the Alliance’s countries face them. The Strategic Concept complements the founding charter of NATO and does never contradicts with it. In addition to the afore mentioned, the third part of this chapter tackles the “projecting © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. M. Keshk, NATO and the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3815-2_1

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1 NATO: Origin, Legal Adaptation, and Roles

stability” policy which has been announced in Warsaw summit in 2016 to engage with North Africa (MENA) and the Arab Gulf regions. The policy aims at supporting the capabilities of the partners in both regions. That is why NATO has declared in 2017 the opening of the NATO Strategic Direction-South Hub (NSD-S Hub), the headquarters of which is in the Joint Force Command, Naples, Italy. The hub’s objective is to help fostering NATO’s engagement with the South. In general, developing NATO’s role required establishing a number of partnerships; two of them targeted the Middle East region. The first was The Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994, between NATO and seven countries in the Middle East. The second is Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) which NATO has launched in 2004 between the Arab Gulf States and NATO; four GCC States have joined it till now. This part tackles, as well, the transformations of the Arab world in 2011 and NATO’s perception of how to deal with them. The fourth part analyzes the Position of the Arab region in NATO strategies, Although NATO did not intervene in the Arab crises until 2011, when it entered the Libyan crisis, this does not mean that the Arab region was not among the concerns of the major countries in NATO

NATO: Origin and Legal Adaptation Prior to talking about the origin of NATO and its legal adaptation, NATO, as a concept, should be firstly defined. Like other concepts of social science, the Alliance has many definitions. It is defined as “a contractual commitment between a number of countries, usually, against a specific country—or countries, giving birth to an organization for achieving the objectives of that commitment within the framework of an alliance; the emerging organization is an official one based on a treaty or agreement”. According to this definition, there are three conditions that must be met in the Alliance. First, there must be a contractual commitment. Second, alliances are always established against a specific country or countries. Third, alliances establish organizations that work on implementing their objectives and monitor to what extent their members are abiding by the articles of the founding treaties of these Alliance.1 In a second definition, NATO is just “an agreement between two countries, or more, on working together and cooperation in dealing with common security issues. Countries which participate in such a pattern of security structures attempt to protect themselves from common or potential dangers threatening their interests. On the one hand, they believe that they can boost their influence and power within the world order and enhance their security through mobilizing resources and unifying efforts”. According to this definition, an official alliance is publicly recognized only when a treaty, stipulating that any attack against one is an attack against all, is signed; this is true of NATO. On the other hand, the great powers perceive alliances as having a strategic advantage when confronting their current and potential enemies. At the 1 Badris,

Emad Gad. 1988. The impact of the international system on international alliances: A practical study of NATO. Cairo: Faculty of Economics and political Science, Cairo University.

NATO: Origin and Legal Adaptation

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same time, alliances benefit their parties in many areas. Economically, for instance, when a country that has no nuclear capabilities allies with a nuclear-capable country, this is more beneficial, for the first, than building new infrastructure, technological expertise, and a weapons delivery system.2 A third definition of NATO suggests that “an alliance, in terms of international law and international relations, is a contractual relationship between two or more countries, under which the parties concerned stipulate that they will provide mutual assistance in case of war. Actually, alliances are necessary for achieving some sort of power balance”.3 It is noted that the three previously mentioned definitions have some elements in common; one of them is that alliances are established under a binding agreement which clearly states the rights and duties of each country or State within the alliance. In addition to that, defense always represents the essence and the vital aim of all alliances, despite the various and diverse objectives behind launching each. Moreover, through alliances, States can maximize their interests and enhance their influence regionally and globally. To this end, NATO was officially established in Brussels in 1949, though the Atlantic Bloc had already been there before that date; this can be proven in light of the fact that there had been an alliance comprising Britain, France, and US before the World War I. But when the conflict between the Western camp and the Eastern one exploded, France, England, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg recognized that establishing an alliance would perfectly serve their interests. An alliance had already been established on March 17, 1948. However, the partners then realized that they would not be able to encounter the Soviet expansion without a support from the United States. On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty, more popularly known as the Washington Treaty, was signed by 12 countries, in Washington. The 14-article Treaty stipulates that the signatories are committed to settle international disputes, in which they are involved, by peaceful means, and to refrain from threatening to use force. However, the commitment undertaken by the signatories shall not affect their rights and duties as UN members. At the same time, NATO members have the right to invite other countries to join the Alliance. NATO founding treaty refers to the North Atlantic Council which has a number of subsidiary bodies and agencies, assigned with achieving NATO’s objectives. The Treaty states that its items and clauses shall be reviewed each ten years, and that any member can cease to be a party “[a]after the Treaty has been in force for twenty years”. In spite of the significance of all the articles of NATO’s founding Treaty, article 5, in specific, is still, the most important one. It reflects the essence and content of the Alliance as a regional defense organization, as it states that “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an 2 Okalahan,

Martin Greevich and Terry. 2002. Key concepts in international relations. Dubai: Gulf Research Center. 3 Shukri, Mohammad Aziz. 1978. Alliances and Blocs in World Policy. Kuwait: National Council for Culture, Arts and Literature.

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armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”.4 The content of article 5 reflects 3 indications: First, NATO embodies the concept of collective security; that is the Alliance is considered a unified army for its member countries. This is as per Article 51 of the UN Charter which guarantees the countries’ right of self-defense individually or collectively; it states that “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”5 Second, there is an international legal basis upon which the Alliance was created. In parallel with other world security organizations such as the United Nations, Article 52 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter states that a group of countries have the right to establish regional arrangements or agencies which would contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Article 53 of the same chapter states that the Security Council shall use such regional arrangements or agencies “for enforcement action under its authority” in order to accomplish missions which have to do with restoring international security and peace, whenever appropriate, but on condition that any enforcement action shall be taken under the supervision and authorization of the security council.6 This was perhaps manifested through the Security Council’s issuance of some resolutions for the Libyan crisis in 2011, as well as other resolutions concerning anti-piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden in 2008; the resolutions included an invitation for regional agencies, without naming NATO or other regional security agencies, to participate in addressing these risks. According to Chapter VIII, both NATO and the League of Arab States were established as regional agencies. However, the Gulf Cooperation Council is a sub-regional security agency because it was established in accordance with Article 9 of the Charter of the Arab League, which stipulates that “States of the League which desire to establish closer co-operation and stronger bonds than are provided for by this Charter may conclude agreements to that end. Treaties and agreements already concluded or to be 4 NATO.

2018. Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). 29 November. Accessed June 5, 2020. https:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52956. 5 Nation, United. n.d. Chapter VII: Acts in Cases of Threats to and Breaches of Peace and Aggression. Accessed August 20, 2020. https://www.un.org/ar/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html. 6 Nation, United. n.d. Chapter 8: Regional Arrangements. Accessed August 2, 2020. https://www. un.org/ar/sections/un-charter/chapter-viii/index.html.

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concluded in the future between a member-state and another state shall not be binding or restrictive upon other members”.7 Despite the importance of the geographical criterion in procuring the Alliance’s membership, it should be emphasized that the strategic defense criterion is actually the defining and the crucial one in establishing the Alliance. This can be illustrated in light of the fact that NATO comprises two countries which are geographically distant from Western Europe and North America; that are Turkey and Greece. This means that the main aim behind establishing the Alliance was “to encircle the Soviet Union” during the Cold War era.8 Third, NATO, as a regional defense agency, can take any measures to defend one or some of its members, if attacked, according to Article 5 the Washington Treaty. However, any action on the part of NATO should be first authorized by the UN Security Council, as it is the only international agency concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security; this until the Council itself can take over NATO’s mission. However, because the UN has not an international army, the Alliance always carries out the defense missions under the UN resolutions, which do not refer explicitly to the Alliance’s role on this respect, but to the general efforts of international and regional agencies of which NATO is one. When was a NATO official asked: “why NATO intervenes in international disputes? He answered: “because NATO has an international army, whereas the UN has no”.9 The Alliance Consists of two Main Committees, the Political Committee (PC) and the Military Committee (MC) as Follows: The Political Committee (PC) Consists of 1.

2.

3.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC), the highest political authority. It encompasses the foreign ministers of NATO members as permanent representatives. This council discusses the political and military decisions that the Alliance intends to make. Its members meet once a year, and sometimes more than once, if necessary. Defense Planning Committee (DPC); it is a North Atlantic Council committee, consisting of all NATO permanent members. It is responsible for assessing the Alliance’s defense capabilities and making recommendations which are then referred to the NATO Council to be developed or modified. The Secretary-General, the highest political position in the Alliance, heading the NAC, the DPC, as well as the Secretariat. He is responsible for coordinating NATO members’ communications when discussing decisions and preparing for the summits. This in addition to conducting the political negotiations between the Alliance and other entities and agencies. Three divisions assist the Secretary

7 League,

Arab. n.d. Charter of the League of Arab States. Accessed August 2, 2020. http://www. leagueofarabstates.net/ar/aboutlas/documents. 8 Shukri, Mohammad Aziz. 1978. Alliances and Blocs in World Policy. Kuwait: National Council for Culture, Arts and Literature. 9 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2019. NATO at 70, five challenges confront the World’s Most Powerful Defense Organization. 17 December. Accessed August 14, 2019. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/ news/article/1193904.

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General; these are, the political division, defense planning division, and the scientific division. As for, the NATO Military Commission (MC), it Consists of two main Apparatuses: 1.

2.

The Supreme Military Committee (SMC): The highest military authority in NATO. The US-based committee comprises the NATO members’ military chiefs of staff and is headed by an elected military commander from the Alliance’s countries. The committee meets twice a year, or when necessary, to discuss issues of mutual defense and submit proposals to the Political Committee’s Council which is responsible for taking decisions concerning them (proposals). It also gives instructions for implementing any changes or modifications related to the Alliance’s military strategy. The Main Military Commands (MMC): During the Cold War era, there were three commands only in US, Britain, and Europe.

In spite of the clear wording of the Alliance’s Treaty, as well as the institutions that were established under it, NATO has faced several challenges throughout its history, including the conflicting visions of its founding members. For instance, due to independence tendency in France during the rule of Charles de Gaulle, the late French president opposed, in 1958, the way in which the crucial decisions of NATO were taken. That is why he suggested that the leadership of the Alliance should has a tripartite basis, represented by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. However, the proposal was rejected by the US as it wanted, being the only nuclear power in the Alliance at that time, to be the Alliance’s sole leading county. However, in 1960, when Franc obtained nuclear capabilities, it was encouraged to take a stance against the American dominating role. In 1966, France publicly withdrew from the Alliance’s Military Committee (MC), but it kept its membership in the Political Committee (PC). Hence, NATO’s headquarters moved from Paris to Brussels. In 2009, during the rule of the French president Nicolas Sarkozy, France rejoined the Military Committee; this is on the one hand.10 On the other hand, among the other various challenges which NATO had faced, was the mission of determining the doctrine that should be adopted to face the Soviet Union’s danger at that time, and to decide whether that doctrine should be the traditional option for NATO or the nuclear one? This controversial issue was not resolved until mid-1950s, when the United States announced the doctrine of limited nuclear war, which the former Soviet Union perceived as a sort of strategic deception. Hence, the United States began to replace that option with what it called the “Flexible Response”, the strategy, which was adopted by the Alliance in 1967, whereby NATO’s response to the Soviet threats must be flexible and calculated in accordance with both the type and level of the Soviet aggression. However, this strategy has been widely criticized; the opponents considered it as just a package of 10 Hafez,

Taleb Hussein. n.d. The New Roles of NATO after the Cold War. Accessed August 10, 2020. https://www.iasj.net/iasj?func=fulltext&aid=60708.

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options, not a comprehensive plan, nor did it, in their viewpoint, represent a unified combat doctrine like that of the Warsaw Pact, at the time. Then, in early 1970s, NATO faced another dilemma; that is the defense burdensharing dilemma which emerged as a result of the Vietnam War and the consequent losses incurred by the US, which, in turn, asked France and Western Germany to bear more defense burdens and increase their conventional and nuclear forces, but the American request was rejected. Disputes among NATO members renewed during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, when the United States asked NATO to expand its security concerns’ umbrella to include areas beyond the geographical zone of its countries. However, again, the US request was rejected, and the NATO members pretexted that the request contradicted with the articles of the Washington Treaty. Healing the rift in the Alliance concerning this controversial issue came, in 1981, through an agreement by NATO members on establishing rapid reaction military forces for a suitable and timely intervention in crises that NATO sees as an out of area threat to its members. These forces consist mainly of US forces, but they are funded by increasing the contribution of each NATO country member in the Alliance’s defense budget by 3%. However, the subsequent developments, namely, the revolutions in central and Northern Europe, the result of which was dissolving the Warsaw Pact, was the biggest challenge to NATO which has actually been associated in minds of many observers with the Cold War era.11

NATO’s Evolving Role in the Post–Cold War Era NATO is a tool which the Western countries, in general, and the United States, in particular, employ in their strategies of dealing with the post-World War II era, the most prominent feature of which was the Cold War, when the “principle of containment” prevailed in an attempt to contain the Soviet power in its territories or in Eastern Europe. This strategy aimed, as well, at undermining the Soviet influence and its endeavor to access the vital zone of the US in Western Europe, in the Middle East, or in East and South East Asia. When the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new debate concerning the feasibility of NATO was provoked, because the Alliance, in view of some observers, was established mainly because of the Cold War. In spite of the clear phrasing of the Alliance’s founding Treaty, which states that NATO’s mission is confined to the geographical boundaries of its member countries, the threats which had emerged in the wake of the Cold War led the Alliance to intervene in crises outside its territories. In 1995, NATO had intervened in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Actually, this was a crucial transformation in NATO’s role; its out– of-area interventions came under UN Resolution 757, which stipulates the imposition of economic, military, and diplomatic sanctions as well as a comprehensive trade, 11 Al-Hayali, Nizar Ismail. 2003. The role of NATO after the end of the Cold War. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.

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air, and oil embargo on Yugoslavia, the New Republic (Serbia and the Montenegro). NATO, then, launched against Sarajevo a 12-day military campaign, which paved the way for signing Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the Bosnian War. Under that agreement which became effective in December 1995, the Alliance deployed peacekeeping forces as part of the International Task Force, comprising 60,000 soldiers from NATO and non–NATO countries. This was the Alliance’s first land mission outside its territories. However, it reshaped the identity and the role of NATO after the Cold War ended. In 1999, after a 78-day air campaign by NATO in Kosovo, the Alliance deployed a force of 50,000 soldiers to provide a safe environment. Then, the Alliance handed over responsibility for maintaining security in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the European Union in 2002. However, NATO kept there a military command for defense reform purposes and for preparing the country for joining the “Partnership for Peace” program. It should be emphasized that NATO’s military intervention in that crisis was one of the most controversial decisions in its history; especially in light of the fact that the decision was taken without a mandate from the United Nations and came more than a year after the fight in Kosovo, which led to a humanitarian crisis that could have evolved into a cleansing campaign similar to what had previously happened in Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia. In other words, NATO’s operations were described as “illegal but legitimate” because they enabled NATO members to save Kosovan people from dangers of ethnic cleansing. However, these measures on the part of NATO were taken without having legal sanctions to be imposed by the Security Council on Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. For that reason, the Security Council tried to overcome that flaw and to close that legal gap in later crises. That is why when the Security Council issued the resolutions 1970 and 1973 concerning the Libyan crisis, the main focus was on protecting the civilian. This was one of the possible means for strengthening the “Responsibility to Protect Protocol” which entitles NATO countries and the international community the responsibility to help protect peoples from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In other words, in the Libyan case, the Security Council was able to bridge the gap between legitimate intervention which is morally justified and the legal intervention which is based on a UN decision. It is to be noticed, at the time, that the above-mentioned details do not mean that NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo crisis in March 1999 was not entirely unlawful. Although the Alliance’s intervention was not in accordance with a UN resolution, a decision was issued in June 1999 to legitimize NATO’s involvement in that crisis.12 Actually, the controversy which was aroused because of NATO’s interference in Kosovo was similar to other international crises in which the issue of international legal legitimacy of intervention was raised, including the American invasion of Iraq.13 12 Doyle, Michael W. 2011. The Folly of Protection: Is Intervention Against Qaddafi’s Regime Legal

and Legitimate. 20 Mars. Accessed August 20, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afr ica/2011-03-20/folly-protection. 13 Majzoub, Rowad Ghalib Sliqa and Mohammed. 2014. Managing international crises under the collective security system. Beirut: Al Halaby Human Rights Publications.

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In the wake of September attacks in 2001, the Security Council issued resolution 1368 on September 12, 2001, condemning those attacks and declaring them as a threat to the international peace and security. The Resolution grants countries the right of self-defense either individually or in groups and invites them to work together in order to confront such terrorist threats. To reaffirm resolution 1968, the council issued Resolution 1373, on September 27, 2001, which asked NATO countries to work together in order to stop terroristic acts, through procedures that could hinder these acts and all sorts of financing them.14 Although NATO did not directly contribute to the “Enduring Freedom” operation for expelling Taliban and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan in the aftermath of September attacks, the Alliance provided, in light of the afore mentioned resolutions, AWACS planes, an “Airborne Warning and Control System”, to the United States in order to support launching that campaign. However, since August 2002, the Alliance began to lead the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a force authorized by the United Nations to provide security assistance in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, and its neighboring areas, in support of the Afghan Transitional Authority, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). This force (ISAF) also determines the reconstruction needs and provides the future Afghan security forces with the appropriate trainings and capacity building. In 2003, a UN new resolution expanded the mandate of this force beyond Kabul’s borders, to help the Afghan government extend its authority over the rest of the country, and thus providing a peaceful and secure environment that could make it possible to hold free and fair elections, promote the rule of law, and reconstruct the country. Since then, NATO has been strengthening its presence in Afghanistan through the establishment of the so-called ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams’, small international teams of military and civilian personnel. The UN resolutions 1510, 1776, and 1883 stated that ISAF’s role is to provide security, the rule of law, and all sorts of assistance and support to Afghanistan.15 It is worth mentioning that NATO’s effort in Afghanistan is the Alliance’s first “out-of-area” mission beyond Europe. The Alliance undertook that mission because no other organization nor any country stepped in. Regardless of the international legal basis for NATO’s participation in confronting terrorist threats in Afghanistan after September, the attacks which targeted the United Stateswere a formidable challenge to NATO, especially as US is one of the biggest actors in the world order, a country member in the Alliance, and the largest contributor to its military budget, the dilemma lies in the fact that neither the United States nor NATO were able to deter these terrorist attacks. NATO was unable to activate Article 5, which is considered the essence of the Alliance’s role; this means that NATO needs a new review and a renovation, especially with the fact before September terroristic acts, countries were the main actor in the world order. However, in the aftermath of these attacks, there became many players and actors 14 Nation, United. n.d.

2001 Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 2001. Accessed August Resolutions-adopted-security-council-2001. Accessed August 20, 2020. https://www.un.org/securi tycouncil/ar/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-2001. 15 Bennett, James Pardew, and Christopher. 2006. NATO’s Evolving Operations. Accessed August 18, 2020. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/arabic/art1.html.

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who manipulate and dominate the international relations’ interactions, including the sub-state groups which carried out terrorist attacks against a superpower (US). In other words, as the nature of threats has changed, the strategies needed to confront them should be altered as well; this might be challenging to NATO which have been severely criticized by United States. At the first NATO summit after September attacks, Donald Rumsfeld, the former US Secretary of Defense, said: “The Alliance must further transform to meet the threat facing all of our countries in the twentyfirst century or die”. He added, “[M]mission would determine the coalition and not the other way around”, but his statement reflected NATO’s inability to support the US during that crisis. Many officials in George W. Bush’s administration, have pessimistically criticized NATO, as they saw that the Alliance waged a war in Kosovo and has excessively met the desires of the European allies. However, when it was time to participate in war in Afghanistan, it did not give an immediate response. The US anger was evident in a message, conveyed by Paul Wolfowitz, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense, during a NATO meeting in October 2001, with what some called a “Do not call us, we’ll call you if we need you’ attitude.16 Actually, NATO’s provoking of Article 5 was only symbolic at the beginning, as the military operation against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was mainly led by the United States with the support of Britain. However, that campaign reaffirmed the feasibility and the should-be role of the Alliance, the future of which had become severely ambiguous in the aftermath of the Cold War era. Although the military support of NATO countries to the United States was very limited at the beginning of the campaign, their political support and solidarity were of a great significance. On the other hand, although the content of Article 5 is very clear, its drafters did not expect that the attack would come from a terrorist group rather than a state. They did not even anticipate that the target would be the leading country in the Alliance; that is the United States. Therefore, September attacks in 2001, were a practical implementation of Article 5. The, then, Secretary-General of NATO, George Robertson, confirmed to NATO member states, on September 12, 2001 that Article 5, which tackles the principle of collective defense, applies to the terrorist attack against US. That is why the NATO Allies agreed, at the request of the United States, on a set of eight measures, individually and collectively. Specifically, they agreed to: 1.

2.

3.

Enhance intelligence sharing and co-operation, both bilaterally and in the appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it. Provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies’ aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to operations against terrorism. Provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other states which are or may be subject to

16 Gordon,

Philip. 2006. NATO’s Growing Role in the Greater Middle East. 1 January. Accessed August 29, 2020. https://www.ecssr.ae/wp-content/themes/ecssr-child/split/ELS_EN_63_Preview. pdf.

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4. 5. 6.

7.

8.

11

increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism. Take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory. Backfill selected Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against terrorism. Provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO nations for operations against terrorism, including for refueling, in accordance with national procedures. The North Atlantic Council also agreed: That the Alliance is ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve; and That the Alliance is similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (a fleet of Boeing E-3A Airborne Warning & Control System (NAEW&CF).

Noticing the content of these measures, it is found that they are far from the concept of a military operation under the leadership and direction of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) or under the command and authority of NATO. However, they prove the political commitment and the military integration within the Alliance. Some observers see that expanding the scope Article 5 to include terrorist attacks is not absolutely good for two reasons: First, because this means expanding the use of that article and, thus, increasing the possibilities of its being abused and exploited by some allies in their own struggles against terrorism; second, because it excludes the use of NATO structures. However, these perceptions can be easily refuted; as for the first point, there are good reasons for expanding the scope of Article 5; this guarantees a system of collective defense if an armed aggression that could kill in a day more than any war in history, takes place. As for the second point, the non-use of NATO structures has also its rational explanations, as there is a need, in most cases, to make use of the element of tactical surprise and to employ a high level of operational security. In addition to that, there are various advantages behind the involvement of allies who have the will and desire to participate in the Alliance’s military operations, one of which is benefiting from their capabilities and from their political support as well.17 NATO’s activity was not limited to intervening in European crises; the Middle East had a portion of that intervention. In 2005, the Janjaweed militias were carrying out attacks in Darfur that could mount to a genocide, as the US officials have described them. That is why the African Union declared it is ready to deploy peacekeeping forces in that region. It also asked NATO to help facilitate an increase in the African forces which are deployed in Sudan from 2,500 to 7,500 soldiers; and NATO agreed. Actually, this was the first mission of the Alliance in Africa. In June 2005, the Alliance contributed to transferring more than 4000 of the African-Union-affiliated 17 Gordon,

Philip H. 2007. NATO After 11 September. 27 June. Accessed August 11, 2020. https:// www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396330112331343145?journalCode=tsur20.

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troops, and established workshops for building the capacity of the African officers through a training program in Ethiopia. The Alliance made that contribution despite the objections of some of NATO members, especially, France and Belgium, which perceived that as the EU has already provided logistic assistance to the African Union, so it is, therefore, the only qualified agency that could play that supporting role, rather than NATO. On October13, 2005, NATO established an air bridge to transport supplies, donated by some European countries to Pakistan after an earthquake killed 70 thousand people, wounded 70 thousand others, and forced about 3 million people to flee their homes. The Alliance launched a planned supporting campaign, which included dispatching helicopters. NATO sent, as well, a military force of 1000 troops from NATO Rapid Response Force (NRRF) which included a battalion of engineers and other administrative personnel. This enabled the Alliance to play an important role at both the operational and the geographical levels. About 11 aircrafts, deployed at the Turkish Incirlik Air Base, were transferring relief supplies to Kashmir. By the end of 2005, the Alliance has transported more than 1000 tons of those supplies. Though all the Alliance’s members supported that assistance mission, some country members criticized it, seeing that NATO’s use of Rapid Reaction forces in humanitarian relief missions will not make them available when they are direly needed in actual crises. Moreover, other NATO countries saw some sort of “unfair burden-sharing” during Pakistan mission, as far as expenditures are concerned. That is, Poland and Spain bore the largest part of the costs which should have been equally distributed among the NATO members, being a mission of the Alliance as a whole.18 In light of NATO’s out–of-area contributions within the post-Cold War developments, the Alliance began to renew itself by developing and strengthening the military capabilities of the European allies for two reasons; first: to narrow the gap between them and the United States, second: to develop NATO’s capabilities in specific areas, such as strategic transport, precision–guided weapons, establishing rapid reaction forces, developing policy-making structures, and strengthening the inclusion of new European members. Actually, the Alliance’s support for the Iraqi security capabilities was clear and apparent in activating the Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) and launching the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) . Through these policies, NATO aimed at being influential and present in the conflicts taking place in various parts of the world. Prague summit in 2002 was a turning point in the Alliance’s policies, as a joint action plan against terrorism was approved. The allies also agreed to develop NATO’s military capabilities in areas of strategic transportation and equipment of air refueling. They agreed, also, on increasing defense capabilities against nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons, as well as increasing the stock of precision–guided munitions and establishing an advanced rapid reaction

18 Gordon,

Philip. 2006. NATO’s Growing Role in the Greater Middle East. 1 January. Accessed August 29, 2020. https://www.ecssr.ae/wp-content/themes/ecssr-child/split/ELS_EN_63_Preview. pdf.

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force, which was to reach its utmost capabilities in 2006.19 This NATO Response Force (NRF) is a highly ready and technologically advanced, multinational force made up of land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces (SOF) components that the Alliance can deploy quickly, wherever needed. It was established in 2002 and has been equipped with modern technologies. The NRF consists of a highly capable joint multinational force able to react in a very short time to the full range of security challenges. It reflects a transformation in the Alliance’s strategies from crisis management to collective defense. The Alliance’s members decided to enhance that force in 2014 by creating a “Spearhead” force, as a secondary force within it, also known as the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF); its command belongs to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The decision to deploy the NRF is taken by the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s highest political decisionmaking body.20 In addition to that, the Prague summit resulted in developing the command structure of the Alliance through creating a Brussels-based strategic military command for operations, as well as a military command for development and transformation in the US. Moreover, several technical measures were taken in the General Secretariat of NATO, aiming at simplifying the policy-making process. The summit invited seven countries to start talks in order to prepare them for joining the Alliance. Those countries have already joined the Alliance in 2004, after they took a series of measures which made them fully qualified for the Alliance’s membership. Among these measures was reforming and organizing their armed forces.21 However, what aroused a large scale of controversy was not only the post-Cold War world, but also the real environment with which the Alliance must cope, including the Greater Middle East initiative which was suggested by the US and adopted by the G-8 summit, in Georgia, USA, on June 8, 2004. This is in addition to the EU-US summit, which was held on June26, 2004, in Ireland, and was attended by both the US president George W. Bush and all the EU countries’ presidents. The Issue of “reform in the Greater Middle East and Iraq” was the main topic of that summit; this means that Ireland summit tackled the same topic which was previously discussed in Prague and Georgia summits. The dilemma lied in defining the term “the Greater Middle East”; which is actually problematic because it is hard to define. Some have applied it rather liberally to the region encompassing the whole Mediterranean area as well as Afghanistan. However, the quandary was not only placing all the regional conflicts within one frame, but also lumping all these Arab and Islamic countries into one big group and into a new north–south conflict, with all those in the south under suspicion of being terrorists. That is why defining and classifying crises and conflicts need to be very specific. It is clear that the problems and conflicts in Afghanistan are different from those in Iraq, and these are different from what is going on between the Israelis 19 Seif,

Mustafa Olwi. 2008. NATO’s strategy towards the Arab Gulf region. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. 20 NATO. 2020. NATO Response Force. 21 March. Accessed August 21, 2020. https://www.nato. int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm. 21 Seif, Mustafa Olwi. 2008. NATO’s strategy towards the Arab Gulf region. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.

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and the Palestinians. Therefore, each case has specific requirements for resolving its conflicts. Regardless of the controversy over the definition and limits of that term (Greater Middle East), its promotion coincided with the start of NATO’s out–of area activities; and this actually has a political significance for the Alliance. That is, NATO must work within that larger environment, meaning that the Alliance’s combat doctrine itself is to be transformed from deterrence and confrontation of the past to preemptive military operations that prevent threats from reaching the territories of the Alliance, especially weapons of mass destruction and terrorist acts. The Prague Summit in 2002 was a turning point, as was afore mentioned, in terms of restructuring the Alliance’s military forces, in addition to the inclusion of 7 new members that supported the Alliance’s power. On the role of the Alliance towards the Greater Middle East, Nicholas Burns, the American diplomat who served as the ambassador of the United States to the Alliance, said that The Alliance after the Prague summit has to give up the idea that defending Western Europe and Northern America is achieved by amassing “a huge continental army in Western Europe to defend Western Europe. NATO’s mandate is still to defend Europe and North America. But we don’t believe we can do that by sitting in Western Europe, or Central Europe, or North America”. He added, “We have to deploy our conceptual attention and our military forces east and south. NATO’s future, we believe, is east, and is south. It’s in the Greater Middle East”. Burn’s point of view can be illustrated in light of several reasons: first and foremost, of which the threats, coming from that region. In 2003, about 23% of terrorist acts all over the world took place in the Middle East region. Second, there is the threat of weapons of mass destruction as well as the supremacy of the anti-Western rhetoric. That is why the American diplomat added: “we have to be out on the front lines where the problems are. I don’t think this is a momentary tactical decision on NATO’s part. It’s a long-term strategic decision, which is being forced on us because of the change in security”. NATO has a political framework for consultations with partners in that region; that is the “Mediterranean Dialogue” which was launched in 1994. In addition, the new mission of the Alliance requires a new military doctrine with a new system of military capabilities, including fighters and helicopters from the air so that special missions and teams can be deployed in places far from their territories’ borders, as happened in Iraq and Afghanistan. The new mission needs also a system of safe communications, high precision guided live ammunition, and more Special Forces, being basic and normal requirement for the fighting and the peacekeeping tasks that NATO is expected to undertake. “Burns identified three problems facing the work of the Alliance beyond its territory. First, how the Alliance can finance its expected out-of-area operations? Burns stressed that the United States and France are the only two countries that have provided the military support needed for the Alliance in that period. However, the rest of the Alliance’s members had still shortcomings in adopting a defense spending policy characterized by commitment within NATO. The US diplomat pointed out that the then-US President George W. Bush received in 2003 a defense budget estimated at $376 billion from Congress, while the spending volume of 18 NATO member countries combined for that year only was $140 billion only. The Alliance has been suffering this spending gap since 1949. Second, to what extent can

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the Alliance provide working forces under its umbrella? Burns indicated that there are about 2.4 million European soldiers from NATO countries, only 55 thousand of them are deployed beyond the European borders and beyond their homelands, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Africa and other parts of the world where the Alliance assumes some responsibilities. Despite that, when the United States asks its European allies to send more forces, their usual response is that they actually provide the maximum military contributions, so they cannot provide more. However, only about 3% of European soldiers are in fact deployed overseas; that is why the European countries must provide more trained and equipped troops which could be sent to areas far from NATO’s borders, such as West Africa. Third, how could the relationships among NATO members be strengthened, especially after the US invasion of Iraq? It is worth mentioning that while Europe seeks to form and be a parallel and balancing front as compared to the United States, the latter opposes this approach and wants USEuropean relations to remain based on alliance and partnership, not on competition and rivalry. At the same time, this means that there must be a stronger and closer relationship between NATO and the European Union, as the future of NATO depends on its ability to manage crises through various practices, including carrying out combat missions, rescuing hostages, or peacekeeping operations in countries that the Alliance sees as a source of threat to the security of Europe and the world, including Central and South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa; terrorism in those areas is a vicious threat to the security of NATO countries, as well as the dangers of weapons of mass destruction.22

NATO’s Out of–Area Strategies in Post–Cold War Period In the wake of the Cold War era, NATO faced an identity crisis. With the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the Alliance faced a critical challenge; that is either to assume new responsibilities and adapt to the changing environment or to follow the suit of the Warsaw Pact and dissolve itself. The former US Senator, Richard Lugar had previously said that NATO has either to change or cease to exist. After furious discussions, the Alliance’s members chose the first option. Although the Alliance has been associated with the Cold War era, some writings mistakenly promote the idea that NATO was established during the Cold War to counterbalance the Warsaw Pact. Actually, it is the other way round, NATO was established in 1994, whereas Warsaw Pact was established, later, in 1955. It is true that NATO was the main tool of the Western bloc in its struggle against the Eastern bloc during the Cold War period, but the creation of NATO itself was six years before launching the Warsaw Pact, and it reflected the desire of Western Europe 22 Burns, R. Nicholas. Corbin P. Miller, Jan Havráneknd and Oldˇrich Cerný ˇ (Editors). 2003. “The New NATO and the Greater Middle East.” In NATO and the Greater Middle East. Prague: Prague Security Studies Institute.

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countries and North America to establish a common security identity and a doctrine of collective defense.23 After the end of the Cold War, the Alliance adopted new strategies to adapt to the new developments through three mechanisms as follows:

The First Mechanism is to Have New Non-Western Europe Members in NATO on this respect, the Warsaw region was NATO’s first destination; and it succeeded in convincing former Warsaw Pact countries to join the Alliance. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became NATO members. In 2004, the former Soviet republics, namely, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, joined the Alliance. Albania and Croatia joined in 2009, whereas the Republic of Montenegro attained a membership in 2017. There are currently 29 NATO members, including 12 founding member countries and 17 others have joined the Alliance through different historical stages.24 During the Cold War, the Alliance’s vital role had to do with developing its defense doctrine from “deterrence” to “defending the collective interests” of its member countries beyond their territories. This development might have required the existence of a new military formations with new sizes and types; that is the Alliance turned to no longer relying on large and stationed military formations, but had rather shifted to adopting smallsized, light-armed and fast-moving formations which could carry out the out-ofarea military training missions. These missions could either be training the forces of non-NATO countries, participating in or commanding peace-keeping operations, rapid intervention in areas of crises, or supervising the establishment of military academies.25 The Alliance had included these new members under what has been approved in 1994 by NATO in Brussels summit, during which the Alliance ratified the “Partnership for Peace” (PfP) program. All countries in Central and Eastern Europe joined the program, the aim of which was to qualify and prepare those countries for being NATO members. Therefore, the Alliance’s roles and functions after the endorsement of that program became various as follows: 1.

The political function: that is to support and consolidate the political transformation process in the aforementioned countries. It is the same role that the Alliance was playing towards Germany and Italy in the aftermath of World War II, when NATO set certain requirements that the Eastern Europe countries should

23 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2014. Western Policies Toward Arab Gulf Security. Manama: Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies. 24 Arabic, BBC. 2017. NATO: From “Soviet influence to Russian expansion. 13 April. Accessed August 14, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-39266694. https://www.bbc.com/ arabic/world-39266694. 25 Seif, Mustafa Olwi. 2008. NATO’s strategy towards the Arab Gulf region. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.

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2.

3.

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meet in order to be able to join NATO. These requirements include solving their ethnic, religious, and social problems by peaceful means and granting their peoples the right to self-determination, provided that the Alliance has the right to supervise these transformations. At the same time, NATO’s founding or original members should provide these countries an access to the agencies and bodies of NATO and EU, as well as The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), so that they can benefit from their experience in respects such as the democratic transformation. NATO has, as well, set for these countries a pre-condition, under which they shall adopt, in their institution, democratic values and concepts, so as not to be subject to military coups. In addition to that, the Alliance emphasized its role in monitoring and supervising the weapons of mass destruction control in these countries. Finally, this function includes also NATO’s role towards what is known as “preventive diplomacy’, the aim of which is to collect information about crisis hotspots in Europe, and, thus, enabling the Alliance and the international organization to intervene and contain them before their scope get expanded. The economic function: NATO’s economic function, since its inception, is to coordinate the economic policies of its member countries in order to maintain their solidarity. It is detected that the partnership agreements between the Alliance and the aforementioned countries have added, to this function, new dimensions; these dimensions include reviving the economies of these countries and helping them build their infrastructure. Actually, this was a useful matter for the Alliance, because those countries were open markets for the products of NATO country members. The Military function, which includes preparing the countries that have joined the Partnership for Peace program (PfP), to carry out peacekeeping missions in Europe and the Atlantic region. This requires these countries to change the structures and types of using their military forces. The Alliance had posed other pre-conditions on these countries, concerning their defense planning. In other words, these countries have to embrace transparent defense planning, have a civilian control over the armed forces, and to participate with NATO in research, air defense development, and disarmament and arms control activities. This is in addition to joining NATO in exercises related to peacekeeping operations, and to announce their commitment to develop capabilities on the long and medium terms so that these capabilities can enhance NATO’s work in his missions and operations beyond its traditional regions in Europe and the North Atlantic.26

26 Al-Hayali,

Nizar Ismail. 2003. The role of NATO after the end of the Cold War. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.

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The Second Mechanism: The Continued Issuance of the Strategic Concept Although the Alliance’s founding Treaty was—and still is—the main determinant of its work and role, flexibility and adaptation were two main features of NATO’s policies. Actually, in the aftermath of the Cold War period, the Alliance had faced hostile criticism which skepticized its significance and feasibility, in spite of the fact that NATO was not originally created as a result of the Cold War, as has afore clarified. Observers of NATO’s policies can easily notice its ability to adapt to the ramifications of the post-Cold War era, whether through the Alliance’s endeavor to establish 55-country partnerships, or through issuing the “Strategic Concept”. The “Strategic Concept” is a high-level security pact, issued every ten years. It is usually subject to study and discussion in lengthy sessions, either among the Alliance’s member countries or among partners all over the world. It outlines the most important transformations of the security threats, facing NATO’s member countries and partners, and how to confront them. In this sense, the “Strategic Concept” integrates with the founding treaty of the Alliance and does not contradict it; this, in fact, gives NATO the flexibility and the ability to adapt to the rapidly changing world security environment.27 In other words, the strategic concept is a security review of the most prominent threats facing NATO, and what the Alliance should do in order to overcome them. Most importantly is the fact that the strategic concept is formulated by NATO committees which visit the territories of the Alliance’s partners to discuss common challenges and how to face them. That is why we find that this concept is realistic, as it stems from the threats facing the Alliance and partners on the ground. On the other hand, the concept is not stiff, but rather flexible enough to allow NATO to confront the rapidly changing threats; for instance, the Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999) outlines “crisis management” as a new NATO mission, without specifying a geographical zone for that mission. That concept stipulates, as well, that the Alliance should be on alert and ready to participate, collectively and in each separate case, in the effective prevention of conflicts and to actively contribute to managing crises. This may include processes of responding to crises under UN decisions; the concept states, “the Alliance must also take into account the global context; that is the Alliance’s security interests might be threatened by risks other than assaults on its territories, such as terroristic acts, sabotage and organized crime, and disruption of the vital resources flow”.28 The Strategic Concept (1999) also includes radical transformation in the nature of NATO’s work. There are three indicators that could clearly reflect that transformation: First, the shift in NATO’s strategies from defending common territories to defending common interests beyond the boundaries of its countries. 27 Nato.2020.

Active engagement and a modern defense system. November 19. Accessed June 10, 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm?selectedLocale=en. 28 Watch, international democracy. 1999. The Alliance’s Strategic Concept. 23 April. Accessed August 20, 2020. http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/344_Nato%20Stra tegic%20Concept%20(1999).pdf.

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Second, the enlargement of NATO’s military intervention to include humanitarian missions and peacekeeping operations; Intervention is no longer confined to Article 5 only. Third, the shift from deterrence and containment to preventive action. Actually, many observers might find suitable justifications for that transformation in the repercussions of September 11, 2001, whether these repercussions had to do with the United States or with the rest of NATO member countries.29 The seventh Strategic Concept was issued in November 2010. It outlines that the “Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members”, as follows: 1.

2.

3.

Collective defense. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole. Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises—before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in postconflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security. Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.

The Strategic Concept (2010) also includes an explanation of the security threats facing the Alliance beyond its territories, namely, nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, conventional and cyber terrorism, and illegal cross-border activities such as arms, drugs, and human trafficking. It is noted that the Strategic Concept (2010) includes an important part, describing the challenges threatening energy security. This is, actually, an issue of concern to the Arab Gulf States; the concept says: “Some NATO countries will become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and in some cases, on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs. As a larger share of world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption”. To overcome these risks, the same Strategic Concept emphasized, that NATO has to “develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation 29 Al-Haramawi, Muhammad. 2013. NATO Strategy. 29 August. Accessed August 30, 2020. https://

www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=375431&r=0.

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with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning.”30 Three Remarks can be Highlighted Concerning the Strategic Concept (2010) First: The Strategic Concept (2010) has clearly identified the out of area threats facing the Alliance. NATO has an obligation to ward these threats off before they affect the Alliance’s members. However, the Concept uses general words when outlining the Alliance’s work with its partners. Second: The Strategic Concept (2010) refers, for the second time, to the risks facing energy security, as the Strategic Concept (1999) was the first to discuss the same topic; this means that the issue is a security challenge facing the Alliance and a security priority for the Arab Gulf States in the meantime. Third: Although Article 5 is the primary determinant of NATO’s military activity, and its wording is clear enough to reflect this purpose, it hindered, actually, any military intervention out of NATO’s territories. However, the Strategic Concept gave the Alliance more flexibility to have out of area operations regardless of the nature of these operations. During the post-Cold War era, the NATO leaders agreed that the security challenges facing Western countries are no longer confined to Europe but are rather concentrated in two arches. The first is the eastern arch which includes non-Arab Islamic countries, namely “Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asian countries, and Pakistan”, In the Alliance’s perspective, that region contains the underlying causes of conflicts, ethnic and religious wars, as well as the weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Moreover, the possible emergence of an Islamic alliance consists of these countries, and led by Iran and Pakistan, could form an obstacle to the new out of area role of the Alliance. The second arch is located in the south and encompasses the Arab Mediterranean countries of North Africa; this arch is a threat to the security of Europe and the Atlantic region due to the deterioration of their political, economic and social conditions. Moreover, NATO perceives that an alliance between these two arches is possible for religious, ethnic and historical considerations. That is why the Alliance’s decision-makers believe that an extending NATO’s to the east is a strategic matter to ward off potential dangers and protecting its members.31 Given what has been illustrated above, NATO’s new military doctrine, in the post-Cold War era, was founded on three pillars: identifying the sources of new threats, setting a new zone for operations, and providing the “political reference point” for decision-making. Concerning the new threats, they include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, risks of disrupting the vital resources to NATO members, the political and ethnic chaos in the former Soviet Union republics, as well as the illegal smuggling, as for the new zone of operations, the Middle East has always 30 NATO. 2010. Active engagement and a modern defense system. 19 November. Accessed June 10,

2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm?selectedLocale=en. Nizar Ismail. 2003. The role of NATO after the end of the Cold War. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. 31 Al-Hayali,

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been an area of concern for the Alliance and at the focal point of its interest. This is due to the fact that there are some Middle Eastern countries which are suspected of seeking to acquire WMD. As for the “political reference point”, it is embodied in the US leading role within NATO, given the missions it has accomplished in all wars at that time, including the war to liberate Kuwait in 1991, the Kosovo crisis in 1999 and the war on Afghanistan in 2001.32

The Third Mechanism: The Policy of Projecting Stability in 2016 In 2015, and prior to the Warsaw summit (2016), NATO held a seminar in cooperation with the Atlantic Council in Washington, during the period (24–26) March 2015. The seminar aimed at discussing the steps that should be taken by NATO in order to achieve inner and outer transformations, through which the Alliance could strengthen its defense strategy and deterrence capabilities, and, thus, be able to project stability and reduce unrests in Europe and Middle East. The seminar resulted in what was called the “White Paper” which listed the most important aspects that should be transformed in NATO’s policies. The paper mainly clarifies that the Alliance is facing unprecedented challenges, especially in its neighboring regions in Europe and the Middle East. Therefore, NATO has to formulate sustainable responses which could reflect real shifts in its policies, and to introduce these responses during the Warsaw Summit (2016). The seminar illustrated, also, that the Strategic Concept (2010) was issued within a context, different from the current events and challenges; it considered the Euro-Atlantic region as a totally free and peaceful society, whereas the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as less important to the security of the Alliance. The seminar outlined three areas of change that should be highlighted before Warsaw summit, namely: adaptation to hybrid threats, enhancement of technological excellence, and improvement of decisionmaking processes. As NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, said in one of his famous speeches, “Today, we do not have the luxury to choose between collective defense and crisis management. For the first time in NATO’s history, we have to do both at the same time”. Six key insights emerged from the Seminar which provided a potential agenda for NATO’s work in the run-up to the Warsaw Summit in 2016. These insights have to do with the projecting stability policy in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, as well as the global power shift in the Asia–Pacific region. They included also, the accelerated diffusion of a new power, embodied in the non-state actors whose role was enhanced by new, disruptive technologies. The insights are as follows:

32 Odeh,

Jihad. 2005. “The Military Basis of NATO’s Approaches to the Middle East.” Al-syasa al-Dawleiya (International Politics) 270.

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1.

NATO’s Strategy. Without reopening the Strategic Concept, a “strategic realignment” should be announced at the Warsaw summit to recognize the changed assumptions and adapt the Alliance’s core tasks accordingly. Hybrid Warfare and Cyber security. Russia and other adversaries will exploit vulnerabilities in and integration among our own societies necessitating a more comprehensive approach to Alliance security at home (not only in operations), including factors considered beyond the traditional purview of NATO. Innovation. An innovation strategy is imperative for NATO. Innovation is an essential tool that the Alliance must leverage to catalyze investments, to enhance operational effectiveness, resilience, responsiveness, in order to open the gap between NATO and potential adversaries, and to sustain Allied interoperability. Strategic Awareness. An enduring reform of information and intelligence sharing, and collection is required as rapid collective responses require a better understanding of warnings before a crisis erupts. Readiness and Deterrence. NATO forces must be able to react quickly and be stationed in ways that restore deterrence as a central tenant of Alliance strategy. Strengthening NATO’s Partnerships. Strategic implications of the crises in the East and South. NATO should develop a more coherent strategy of engagement toward strategic neighbors in the East and the South to bolster their security and capacities, as well as continuing to foster cooperation with the EU. A focused and resourced partnership initiative in conjunction and complementarity with the EU could serve as an aggregator and force-multiplier of current partnership tools and prioritize capacity building efforts to help foster functional, capable nation states around NATO’s borders.33

2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

Based on the above, and instead of focusing on collective defense only, NATO began to focus on ensuring the security environment circling its territories. This new mission was called “projecting stability’. However, it should be clarified, that NATO had two perspectives for working with partners after the end of the Cold War. On the one hand, the Alliance launched the Partnership for Peace initiative in an attempt to extend peace and stability to Eastern Europe. The initiative has also allowed some former Soviet Union countries to acquire the Alliance’s membership and, thus benefit from NATO’s protection under Article 5 of its founding Treaty. On the other hand, it was noted that the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) between the Alliance and seven Mediterranean countries in 1994, as well as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) (2004), which four Gulf States, till now, have joined, included limited number of tools for very limited work, as these two initiatives were formulated as forums for discussions and consultations in order to support and complement bilateral cooperation between NATO and the countries of the region separately. At Warsaw Summit in 2016, the Alliance renewed its emphasis on the initiative of Projecting Stability with a clear geographical focus on the South; that is North Africa and the Arab Gulf region. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has previously 33 NATO. 2015. NATO Transformation Seminar. 26 March. Accessed June 26, 2020. https://www. act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2015/nts/NATO_NTS_2015_White_Paper_Final_Public_Ver sion.pdf.

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emphasized the objective of that policy, saying, and “If our neighbors are more stable, we are more secure” The core of this policy is supporting the capabilities of NATO’s local partners. However, it seems that NATO, instead of providing a new perspective for cooperation with the South, has collected previous activities and operations under a new title; that is the “Projecting Stability” policy”. This, in fact, gives the policy a political tint, especially with the emergence of Russia again in the Middle East, following the intervention in the Syrian crisis in 2014. Actually, the Syrian crisis had widespread ramifications, such as the illegal immigration to Europe. In an attempt to implement the policy of projecting stability, the Alliance announced in 2017 the opening of the “NATO Strategic Direction–South Hub” at the headquarters of the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy. The hub was intended to be a support center for NATO’s interaction with its partners in the south. In that same year (2017), the NATO ICI Regional Center in Kuwait, the only institutional structure for the Alliance in the Middle East, commenced its operations. This is in addition to the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) and strengthening of cooperation with both Jordan and Tunisia, in terms of building defense capabilities. The afore-mentioned details mean that while it was difficult to find a political definition for the “projecting stability” concept, NATO Military Committee (MC) defined the concept as “A situation where capable, credible, and well-functioning institutions and a resilient state/society, create the conditions in which the risk or outbreak, escalation, recurrence of conflict is reduced to acceptable levels, leading to a more secure and less threatening environment”. Given this definition, NATO’s Military Committee has set specific priorities and benchmarks of success to guide practical cooperation efforts between the Alliance and its partners. However, the Alliance’s member countries did not agree on a political definition for the “Projecting Stability” policy, despite militarily agreeing on the policy. Consequently, the military concept was not approved by the North Atlantic Council, due to at these conflicting views of NATO members.34 To sum up, the partnerships that NATO sought to establish since the end of the Cold War era, have been in four stages, namely: Stage one took place from the early to late 1990s; the purpose of these partnership frameworks was to ‘radiate’ stability to the post-communist space through the diffusion of Western liberal democratic norms and urging the Eastern European countries to undertake political and military reforms, as basic requirements for membership of the Euro-Atlantic institutions. To this end, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was created in 1991, as well as the Partnership for Peace Initiative in 1994. The second stage took place from the mid-1990s onwards: until the end of that decade: This stage witnessed more practical cooperation with partners, most notably by involving them in NATO-led operations. The stage boosted the legitimacy of NATO’s role regarding collective security through the involvement of partners in humanitarian intervention, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement efforts in 34 Kohler, Kevin. 2019. “President Trump’s Foreign Policy: What Implications for NATO?” Derasat 60-68-69-70-71.

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Bosnia and later in Kosovo. Moreover, the stage did not just involve the ‘membership track’ Central and Eastern European states, but other partners such as Russia, Egypt, Ukraine and Malaysia, which all contributed to NATO’s first post-Cold War peacebuilding operation, which is the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia in 1995. The political purpose of the second stage’s operations was not only to maintain the stability of the European continent, but also to establish a legitimate collective security system which can deal with any violations of international norms and standards, advocated by the Euro-Atlantic institutions, albeit through military intervention if necessary. This stage was an era of fighting “bad examples” that might delegitimize the international norms of the West; that is, it was the era of “war of international standards and norms.” The third stage came after September 11, 2001. From then onwards, NATO is seen as moving away from its normative role of engaging and absorbing countries within a liberal democratic community. Its partnerships had become a vital component of a new kind of collective defense function for NATO: a borderless collective defense against non-state enemy actors. In other words, NATO was fighting off a “tangible enemy”, albeit one that was hard to see, engage and predict, and more importantly not tied to the geographical boundary of a State. NATO’s traditional collective defense operations which had been geographically bound by the limitations of Article 6 in the Washington Treaty, which only refers to attacks on an allied member’s territory, vessels and aircraft in the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic area, went beyond the borders of the territories, defined by the Alliance in 1949, upon the signing of NATO’s founding Treaty, and got implemented in cooperation with regional partners. Most of the mechanisms for this practical approach were set during the Prague summit in 2002 and the Istanbul summit in 2004. The Prague Summit launched the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) which aims at intensifying fruitful cooperation between NATO and the Central Asian States. Actually, none of the Central Asian countries have participated in this initiative except Kazakhstan. However, the five Central Asian members of the “Partnership for Peace” (PFP), namely “Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan” provided critical assistance aids to NATO’s Afghan operation, which was carried out after September 2001 terrorist acts in Afghanistan. Tajikistan, in specific, has provided vital assistance to NATO during that operation, including allowing the use of bases and transit routes, providing re-fueling facilities and contributing to border security. This means that NATO’s partnerships in the third stage became more practical and functional in nature, with measures aiming at addressing crime, border control, and cooperation in counterterrorism, and support for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The post-September 11 stage also saw the geographic extension of partnerships to ‘global’ partners like Australia and Japan and to new regional frameworks such as the Istanbul Cooperation Council (ICI) which was launched in 2004 and aimed at fostering new channels of dialogue with the Gulf States in the Middle East. Actually, by 2004 it became evident that NATO’s partnerships were no longer confined to the post-Communist space.

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The fourth phase; since 2010: during which the Alliance decided that normative engagement and practical cooperation should be replaced with the imperative to address head on global security challenges, highlighted in the report of the Group of Experts, chaired by former US secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, and tasked with providing guidance to NATO’s new Strategic Concept of 2010. To this end, NATO launched a new partnership policy in 2011. Like previous partnership initiatives, this one, too, is reactive to ongoing change and builds on existing partnership frameworks; that is, it is a continuation of the piecemeal approach followed so far and it lacks a broader strategic vision. At the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Berlin in April 2011, the features of this new policy were unveiled. The main themes of the new partnership policy are ‘efficiency’ and ‘flexibility’; it implies the offer of all of NATO’s partnership tools and mechanisms to all its existing and potential partners around the globe. The rationale behind this two-fold process of ‘broadening’ and ‘deepening’ partnerships includes the need to enhance ‘international efforts to meet emerging security challenges’, improve early warning and crisis prevention mechanisms, and promote regional security and cooperation. New priority areas for dialogue, consultation and cooperation include “crisis management and prevention, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and emerging security challenges such as cyber-defense, energy security, maritime security, antipiracy, and enhancing the existing partnership frameworks of the MD, ICI, etc. With the importance of the four afore-illustrated stages, some points should be noticed. First, though the new partnership policies launched by the Alliance are important, their main objectives are not clear enough. Second as with the geography, the purposes of partnerships also changed, and they became no longer necessarily a pathway to membership, nor the solely means to diffuse an international liberal world order, but instead became tailor-made initiatives concentrating on specific issues of collaboration with each partner or group of partners. NATO was able to offer a selection from its ‘toolbox’; that is, its particular expertise in the areas of defense and security sector reform, defense planning, civil-military relations and partner contribution to NATO-led exercises and missions. Thus, NATO’s expertise and knowledge was-and still is-a means to assimilate partner countries in a broader liberal democratic system. Third, the partnership initiatives which were launched by the Alliance, in the last decade, have wavered between NATO’s normative role in diffusing liberal values and its functional role as a provider of defense reform and tailor-made cooperation packages to combat global security challenges. In fact, NATO’s outreach to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) can fall in the latter category. The two regional NATO partnership frameworks, the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the ICI, have become channels for practical cooperation with North Africa and Middle East countries as well as with the Gulf States, though the MD was initially created in 1994 to complement the normative outreach to Central and Eastern Europe. With the changes of the Arab Spring in 2011, new opportunities and challenges have emerged for NATO to establish its normative role in the region, just like it once reached out to the unstable post-communist world and used its technical know-how to absorb those countries into a system of Western democratic liberal norms. To this end, NATO has offered, on a ‘case by case’ basis, dialogue and cooperation to the Middle East

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countries who are not participants of either the MD or the ICI. However, NATO has not realized that the Middle East is not comparable to the experience in Central and Eastern Europe. Nor has NATO proved to be the champion of safeguarding regional stability through military intervention followed by state-building as it previously did in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. For instance, NATO’s military intervention in Libya in 2011, did not guarantee stability in the country. Moreover, NATO has not followed its initial intervention with state-building practices like it did in the Balkans. Actually, NATO’s success or failure as a provider of stability has a significant impact on how NATO is perceived by other regional parties in areas of partnerships. This also impacts the legitimacy and attraction of NATO for potential and existing partners in the region.35

Position of the Arab Region in NATO Strategies Despite NATO’s important role in addressing crises of the European continent, the Arab region has been, at the same time, of a great concern for the Alliance. The changes that were brought forth by the Arab Spring in 2011 represented a challenge to the Alliance, not because of the changes themselves, but rather because of their implications on regional security and on NATO. First of these ramifications on NATO is the fusion of the two arches of crises, following the Russian intervention in the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, and then in Syria in 2015. NATO perceived these interventions as a formidable challenge, as one of the Alliance’s officials said, “We used to talk about the eastern threat and the southern threat, but the two fronts are now overlapped”.36 Second, the growing role of armed non-state groups, including ISIL which seek to demolish the national state, has prompted NATO to join The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Third, the challenges which have faced the Arab armies as a result of 2011 transformations. Fourth, these transformations occurred in areas of NATO partnerships. Fifth, while these transformations were taking place, Leon Panetta, the US Secretary of Defense, announced in June 2012, a new US military strategy centered on Asia. He said that “By 2020, the navy will re-posture its forces from today’s roughly 50%–50% split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60%–40% split between those oceans,”. He added, “That will include six aircraft carriers in this region, a majority of our cruisers, destroyers, combat ships and submarines.” Hence, in light of this new US defense strategy and thus its possible retreat from the regional crises, NATO was to be called upon to play a greater role in

35 Aybet, Gülnur. 2012. “The Four Stages of NATO’s Partnership Frameworks: Rethinking Regional.” In Dynamic Change: Rethinking NATO’s Capabilities, Operations and Partnerships, by Riccardo Alcaro and Sonia Lucarelli, 100–121. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali. 36 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2020. NATO’s policies toward Libya depend on the balance of power on the ground and Russia’s influence. 1 August. Accessed August 22, 2020. https://araa.sa/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5187:2020-07-28-09-55-51&catid=4344&.

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the region in order to fill the void that may result from that American decline.37 The Secretary-General of NATO, at that time, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has outlined a vision for these transformations in his speech before Carnegie Europe (the Brussels research office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) in 2011, when he said that three questions must be answered: What happened in that region? How important are these transformations or shifts for NATO? How can NATO cooperate with countries in the region in order to shape the future? Regarding transformations, NATO’s former Secretary-General has defined them as demands for which the young generations have called. For him, those generations wanted to have their share of benefit from returns of economic growth; they have also announced their demands for enjoying a fair distribution of wealth, and equal participation in the political life. As for the ramifications of these transformations on NATO, Rasmussen stressed that they represent tremendous challenges to NATO for a simple reason; that is, these transformations have taken place near the borders of NATO countries. Consequently, the threats facing the countries of the Alliance, due to theses transformations, would include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the potential disruption of energy supplies and smuggling; all these are common threats facing the Alliance’s members and the countries in the Arab region equally. That is why a meaningful cooperation between the two parties is necessary to confront them. Regarding the Alliance’s vision on facing these challenges, the former SecretaryGeneral indicated that solutions to crises, in general, must be political rather than military. Rasmussen illustrated that NATO’s role in Libya, which is grounded on a mandate from the United Nations, will end after helping the Libyan people to have a peaceful and orderly transition to democracy. However, the Alliance can play a role in the aftermath of the military operations. In other words, it can contribute to reforming the army and the security sectors, with the aim of building modern and effective military and security institutions. This, in fact, would be based on NATO’s twenty-year experience in similar respects; it is the experience which the Alliance had gained from working on the countries of Eastern Europe. However, the role of the Alliance, should actually, be complementary to other forms of assistance provided by other parties, especially the European Union and the United Nations, but on condition that this assistance be on request of the country concerned, and in close cooperation with it. To this end, the role of the Alliance requires activating and intensifying the dialogue on security issues under the two frameworks of the partnership, namely the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) (1994) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) (2004). In fact, those transformations have emphasized the necessity to upgrade dialogue and partnerships, as is stipulated in the Strategic Concept (2010). Rasmussen has also stressed that NATO is able to assist the countries of the region by helping

37 Newspaper, Al Bayan. 2020. America will deploy the majority of its vessels in the Pacific Ocean by 2020. 2 June. Accessed August 24, 2020. https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/2012-06-02-1.166 1646?ot=ot.AMPPageLayout.

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them build the future they choose and hope, not by imposing stability and security from outside.38 NATO had no interest in the Arab region and the Middle East in general since establishment of Alliance in 1949 until 1990. This was because of factors related to NATO itself, as the Alliance’s main concern was to protect the European countries from dangers of the communist expansionism. On their part, the Arab countries had fears regarding joining alliances, given their experience of the colonial legacy. NATO, however, paid an increased attention to the Arab region after the end of the Cold War in 1990. This interest was linked to changes in NATO’s strategies to operate outside territories of its member states on one hand, and changes in the Arab region on the other. There were various forms of NATO’s interest in the Arab region. They included announcement of NATO’s training of Iraqi security forces in 2004. NATO also provided the African Union with assistance for peacekeeping support in Darfur, Sudan, in 2005. There was also direct military intervention by NATO in Libya in 2011.39 After the Cold War coming to an end, NATO witnessed changes in its operating regions, principles of its doctrine and in the nature of its units, military formations and tasks to be carried out by the Alliance. The southern and eastern Mediterranean region became new regions for the NATO’s operation. The Alliance gave great attention to this region with it witnessing high level of illegal immigration to Europe, in addition to drug smuggling and terrorist acts that proved to be threats to the European countries, in addition to potential of transfers of materials or technology related to weapons of mass destruction. These threats required a serious approach in addressing them. Given such threats were untraditional and serious, they required programs for dialogue and consultation between NATO and the countries of the southern Mediterranean. Meanwhile, although September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were in the United States, they had repercussions on NATO’s policies outside territories of its member states in general and regarding the Arab region in particular. The Alliance’s responses involved expanding NATO naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean region. Such presence expanded later to the western Mediterranean region, especially the Strait of Gibraltar, after such strait became subject to the possibility of being targeted by a terrorist operation in February 2003. NATO operates in the Mediterranean by means of the Active Endeavor forces that follow the leadership of Southern Europe. These forces consist of naval vessels and helicopters from a number of NATO member states. Tasks of such forces include monitoring ships in the eastern and western regions of the Mediterranean, ensuring that suspected terrorist are not onboard, and that they are not carrying weapons 38 NATO. 2011. NATO and the Arab Spring: A speech by NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, at the New Diplomacy Forum hosted by the Carnegie Institution in Europe. 1 June. Accessed August 24, 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_74993.htm?selectedLoca le=en. 39 Zaiybat, Khair Salem. 2016. “The Role of NATO in the Middle East and North Africa 1990–2013.” Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 43.

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or sensitive materials used in terrorist activities or in developing weapons of mass destruction. The Operation Active Endeavor has proved to be an important development in NATO’s relations with countries in the southern Mediterranean, including the Arab countries that are members of the Mediterranean Dialogue. The goal was to develop the Alliance’s relations with these partners, from the consultative framework into actual actions to address common security threats.40

The Mediterranean Dialogue, 1994 The Mediterranean Dialogue is an initiative launched by NATO in 1994. It comprises seven Mediterranean countries: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania. The general goal of this dialogue involves contribution by NATO to the security and stability of this region, through concluding mutual understanding between the Alliance and these countries. The Mediterranean Dialogue is based on the mechanism of bilateral action (NATO + 1). However, it includes holding regular multi-lateral meetings (NATO + 7). This dialogue is based also on several principles, which are the freedom of countries to determine the level of their participation in the meetings and develop their own cooperation programs, as well as continuity and openness. Other principles include taking specific steps to integrate with other partnership tracks in the region, including the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Mediterranean Initiative for the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, and self-financing for activities. Meanwhile, the Alliance can support some activities provided by partner countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue. The issues of the Mediterranean Dialogue include two frameworks. The first is the political framework that includes consultation on issues of crisis management, border control, combating terrorism and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The second framework is a military one that includes NATO’s invitation to partner countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue to participate, as observers or as participant, in the Alliance’s military drills, in addition to enrolment of armed forces staff of these countries in training courses in NATO institutions in Europe. The militarily formwork also provides for the stopping of NATO forces in partner countries’ ports and carrying out joint naval drills, with the possibility of visiting the Mediterranean Dialogue partner countries’ facilities to assess the extent of the development of military cooperation between the Alliance and these countries. The Policy and Partnerships Committee manage the Mediterranean Dialogue. It was set up by the Alliance in 2011 to replace the Mediterranean Cooperation Group that was set up by the alliance during its summit in 1997. The committee meets regularly, at the level of political advisors, to discuss all issues related to the

40 Seif,

Mustafa Olwi. 2008. NATO’s strategy towards the Arab Gulf region. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.

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Mediterranean Dialogue.41 Accordance to the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, cooperative security has been identified as one of the three priorities of the Alliance. This reflects the qualitative shift that has been achieved within the path of that partnership. The NATO +7 meetings are held twice a year, and there is intelligence cooperation between the Alliance and the partner countries, especially in the areas of combating terrorism.42 Within this initiative, NATO launched 26 cooperation programs for the countries to choose from them. These programs include participation in combating terrorism, as well as scientific cooperation programs in environmental sciences and in the natural sciences. In the military field, there were many joint drills between NATO forces and naval forces from Arab partner countries, including Morocco and Algeria. In addition, NATO minesweeper paid a three-day visit to the Jordanian port of Aqaba in 2005.43 The NATO first naval group moored for a period of four days in the port of Algeria in October 2017, for carrying out a maritime interdiction drill with the Algerian naval forces. The goal of such drill was to strengthen capabilities of the Algerian forces to counter maritime security threats.44 On September 7, 2014, five ships from the NATO naval forces also conducted naval drills for several days with the Royal Moroccan Navy. There were on board of the NATO ships 490 sailors for training on carrying out joint activities at sea.45 In addition, relations of some parties to the Mediterranean Dialogue with NATO witnessed qualitative development. In this respect, Egypt decided, on March 16, 2017, to set up a permanent diplomatic mission in NATO, headed by the Egyptian ambassador in Brussels. This was an important development not only for strengthening consultations between Egypt and NATO, but for the Egyptian decision-maker’s awareness of the changes witnessed by the Alliance and the extent of its capability to control the course of the regional-global conflicts.46 Meanwhile, controversy was raised over NATO’s operating outside territories of its member states, given restrictions imposed by Article 5 of the Charter for founding the Alliance. This article restricted the Alliance’s intervention to defense against aggression on one of its member states. Such controversy, along with growing security threats to NATO member states outside their territories, resulted in the Alliance working according to Strategic Concept. Such Strategic Concept is a high-level security pact that integrates with the Charter on founding NATO and does not contradict 41 NATO. A look at the NATO and the Mediterranean countries dialogue. 25 August. Accessed April

14, 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_60021.htm?selectedLocale=ar. Ezzat. 2019. NATO on its 70th birthday. 15 May. Accessed April 15, 2021. https://ecfaegypt.org/2019/05/15. 43 Seif, Mustafa Olwi. 2008. NATO’s strategy towards the Arab Gulf region. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. 44 Agency, Algerian News. 2017. The First NATO Maritime Group “SNMG-1” docks in the port of Algeria for a four-day stopover. 1 October. Accessed April 17, 2021. https://www.aps.dz/ar/alg erie/48562-snmg-1. 45 Arabi 21. 2014. “NATO” announces from Morocco the start of military naval exercises. 8 September. Accessed April 17, 2021. https://arabi21.com/story/774391. 46 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2017. Background Notes on the Egypt Mission to NATO. 23 March. Accessed April 16, 2021. https://gate.ahram.org.eg/daily/News/202212/4/584852. 42 Saad,

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with it. The NATO Sixth Strategic Concept, issued in 1999, defined a new mission for the alliance; namely, ‘crisis management’. Such mission was the pillar of NATO’s intervention in crises outside territories of its member states. Such concept states that NATO shall “stand ready, case-by-case, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations,” in accordance with UN resolutions. It is stated also in this concept that NATO “must take into account the global context, as the Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources”.47

The Role of NATO in Addressing Gulf and Arab Crises NATO was engaged in addressing crises in the Arabian Gulf and the Arab region in general. During the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war, the NATO major countries participated in what was known as the Coalition of the willing. It was a coalition created in response to a call by the administration of former US president Ronald Reagan to provide Gulf oil tankers with security against Iranian attacks. In 1991, the main NATO member states joined the international US-led coalition to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion.48 Regarding the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and despite opposition by many NATO European countries to the idea of invasion, a number of these countries contributed to combat operations led by the US. It was notable that the level of these operations did not differ from those carried out by NATO in Kosovo and Afghanistan.49 The developments in the Arab world in 2010 in general, and in Libya in 2011 in particular, were a formidable challenge to the security of NATO member states for two causes. The first cause was the threat to NATO member states energy security, due to the suspension of supplies of light crude oil from Libya to European oil refineries and of natural gas supplies via pipelines to Italy.50 It is worth noting that the Libyan crisis led to an increase in oil prices in global markets to $108, and Italy alone imports a third of Libyan oil and gas exported to the European markets.51 The second cause was that these changes, especially the Libyan crisis, coincided with the financial crisis that NATO was facing, which was a cause 47 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2011. “NATO: From the New Partnership to Intervention in Arab Crises.” Al-syasa al-Dawleiya (International Politics) Journal, 1 July: 22–23. 48 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2020. Energy security risks: Who protects oil tankers? 28 December. Accessed April 15, 2021. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1232048. http://www.akh bar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1232048. 49 Gary, Julie. 2020. The US Role in NATO’s Survival After the cold war. Switzerland: Palgrave studies in in international relation, Palgrave Macmillan. 50 Milstein, Dan. 2012. Energy Security and NATO: A View from Washington. Accessed April 16, 2020. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/Food-Water-Energy/Energy-SecurityNATO/AR/index.htm. 51 Agency, German News. 2011. Libyan oil supplies stopped. 22 February. Accessed April 16, 2021. https://www.dw.com/ar.

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for the Alliance’s launching of the Smart Defense strategy. Such strategy sought to achieve the largest value from budgets allocated to defense, and among the ways to achieve this was close cooperation with partners. In this respect, some member states of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative contributed to the Unified Protection military operation carried out by NATO in Libya.52 The changes in the Arab countries in North Africa in general have raised NATO’s concerns, especially effects of such changes on countries capability to protect their borders, and consequently their inability to combat illegal immigration to the Alliance’s southern Mediterranean countries. Based on what is reviewed above, NATO decided to intervene militarily in the Libyan crisis. The Alliance’s intervention in that crisis was based on the consensus of its member states on the inevitability of such intervention. In addition, the intervention was based on Security Council Resolutions numbers 1970 and 1973 regarding the Libyan crisis. Such resolutions provided for referring the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court and imposing arms and travel embargo, freezing Libyan assets in Western countries and setting up a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace. Another basis for the intervention was what NATO considered regional support, by means of Arab League Resolution No. 7298 of March 2, 2011. Such resolution demanded that the Security Council assume its responsibilities regarding the deteriorating situation in Libya and take measures to ensure the imposition of a no-fly zone on the Libyan military aviation and setting up safe zones in the areas subjected to bombing. Perhaps the most important thing was that the Libyan case witnessed military cooperation for the first time between NATO and some Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait participated in NATO operations in Libya. The Secretary-General of the Alliance underlined the legal ground for the NATO’s intervention in the Libyan crisis, saying, “NATO’s move against the Libyan regime was in accordance with a strong mandate from the Security Council and clear support from countries in the region, a rare combination that we have not seen in other situations”.53 NATO’s intervention in the crisis reflects the alliance’s ability to mobilize large forces during crises. This was within NATO’s Unified Protection operation in Libya, involving imposing a no-fly zone over Libya to protect civilians. Some 8,000 NATO soldiers, more than 260 air assets and 21 naval assets have participated in this operation. NATO aircraft have flown more than 9700 attack sorties and managed to destroy more than 5900 military targets. Ships of such operation received more than 3100 ships, boarded more than 400 ships and rescued more than 600 migrants who faced dangers in the Mediterranean. In general, this operation is an important indicator to shifting in interests of NATO towards the southern Mediterranean, which comprises a number of important Arab countries.54 What is reviewed above does not mean that 52 Samaan, Jean-Loup. 2012. A new perspective on the relationship between NATO and the Arabian Gulf countries. Accessed April 16, 2021. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/Arab-Spring/ NATO-Gulf-Strategic-Dialogue/AR/index.htm. 53 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2011. “NATO: From the New Partnership to Intervention in Arab Crises.” Al-syasa al-Dawleiya (International Politics) 22–23. 54 Michael J. Mcnerney, Giacomo persi paoli and Sarab grand clement. 2017. Multi-aspect challenges and their repercussions for the Mediterranean region. Accessed April 15, 2021. https://www. rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE222/RAND_PE222z1.arabic.pdf.

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NATO’s interest in the Arab region was linked to crises only. Instead, this interest increased after the changes of the Arab region since 2010. Since then, it has been noticed that discourse of NATO officials always includes incentives for cooperation between NATO and Arab countries. In this respect, an article in Al-Hayat newspaper entitled, “the need for cooperation between Arab countries and NATO” , on December 14, 2014, included the following several important points: – Success of the United States in setting up a coalition, comprising a number of countries in the region and NATO member states, to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) means cooperation by all peace-loving countries that have a will to reject violence and extremism. This was a result of long cooperation for NATO operations in Libya under the mandate of the United Nations. This was a result also of the launch of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as these two initiatives achieved tangible success in the areas of crisis management, military training, and disaster response. – The Mediterranean Dialogue is the only permanent forum that brings together NATO members states and their Mediterranean partners on regular dates. – The security of NATO member states has become closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean and the Middle East region, give the many security challenges, namely ISIS, protection of waterways, cyberspace networks, human and drug trafficking, and proliferation of weapons in the world. – Cooperation between NATO and its partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue should be increased in three areas: The first is assisting NATO partners in modernizing the defense and security sectors in their countries. The second area is continuing to promote cooperation between armed forces to protect common interests, including confronting piracy in the western Indian Ocean, which is a clear example to the importance of collective countering of challenges. The final area is enhancing political consultations to understand common concerns and ways to address them.55

The Importance of the Arabian Gulf Region to NATO NATO’s interest in the Arabian Gulf region did not begin in an institutional way before the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in 2004. However, the major Alliance member states were the main guarantors of regional security in that region, because of its strategic importance as a source of energy and having strategic sea routes. Another cause for this stance was keenness of the major Alliance member states to maintain the regional balance of power, which is the key requirement for achieving regional security. Despite the importance of this general goal, the importance of this region to NATO can be underlined in the following: 55 Stoltenberg,

Jens. 2014. “The need for cooperation between the Arab countries and NATO.” Al-Hayat newspaper 16.

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1.

In terms of identity and goal, NATO is considered a regional defense alliance that comprises at the same time the global nuclear powers. Therefore, preventing nuclear proliferation is enforcement of the concept of deterrence, which is the core of the Alliance’s work. In this respect, the Iranian nuclear program is a challenge to the security of the Alliance and its partners in the Arabian Gulf region alike.56 The Arabian Gulf region is important for NATO’s maritime security, which was included in the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, which states that “All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption. Some NATO countries will become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and in some cases, on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs. As a larger share of world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption”.57 NATO’s interest in the Arabian Gulf region reflects the shifting of the Alliance’s own strategies from a regional defense organization to defend territories of each member state to a security organization that transcends its old national and regional borders, to defend the common interests of its member states against threats they face outside their territories. Therefore, NATO pursuit to set up a partnership with the Arabian Gulf states is a part of the Alliances expansion beyond its borders.58 Although NATO was the main tool for Western countries in their conflict with the Soviet Union during the Cold War era, setting up the Alliance was not necessarily related to that war, as it was set up six years before the Warsaw Pact organization. Nonetheless, given the Russian and Chinese ambitions against NATO in many of the strategic points of confrontation, strengthening the Alliance’s relations with the Arabian Gulf states is a fundamental pillar within NATO conflict with these two countries. “The security of the Arabian Gulf counties and the country of the Mediterranean region is very important to NATO,” Andre Rasmussen, the Secretary-General of NATO told conference organized by the United Arab Emirates on October 29, 2009, entitled “Relations between NATO and the United Arab Emirates and the future of the Istanbul Cooperation

2.

3.

4.

56 Keshk,

Ashraf Mohammed. 2017. NATO and the Iranian Nuclear Programs: Determinants of the View and Mechanisms of Confrontation. 2 November. Accessed April 17, 2021. https://araa.sa/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4314:2017-11-30-09-1937&catid=3463&Itemid=172. 57 NATO. 2010. Active engagement and a modern defense system. 19 November. Accessed April 17, 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm?selectedLocale=ar. 58 Seif, Mustafa Olwi. 2008. NATO’s strategy towards the Arab Gulf region. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.

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Initiative”. “I firmly believe that NATO is very important for your security,” Rasmussen added.59 The Arabian Gulf region, which is part of the Middle East region, contains strategic interests for NATO member states, including the United States, which contributes 75% of the Alliance’s budget. Therefore, there is a mutual keenness on both sides not to leave potential strategic vacuums that can be exploited by adversaries, in the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East. On January 9, 2020, former US President Donald Trump demanded that NATO play a greater role in the Middle East region, a call that was reflected in a statement by NATO SecretaryGeneral Jens Stoltenberg, who said, “President Trump requested an increase in the presence of the Alliance in the Middle East. It was agreed that NATO could contribute more to regional stability and to confronting international terrorism”.60

TO conclude, NATO’s transformations after the end of the Cold War era have proven that the Alliance did not devise separate strategies, whether for the Middle East as a whole, or for the Arab Gulf. On the contrary, that region was included and formed as a part of the Alliance’s holistic strategy for the territories beyond its boundaries in general, and for the Middle East region in particular, through initiatives that NATO has launched, namely the Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994 and the Istanbul Initiative in 2004.

59 NATO. 2009. Keynote address by NATO Secretary General. 29 October. Accessed April 17, 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_58573.htm?selectedLocale=ar. 60 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2020. What role does Trump want for NATO in the Middle East? 20 January. Accessed April 17, 2021. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1197402.

Chapter 2

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) (2004)

Introduction This chapter tackles the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) launched by NATO in 2004 for the broader Middle East, beginning with the Arab Gulf states. The chapter is divided into Seven topics. The first topic includes the theoretical framework for relation of the Arabian Gulf countries with NATO, the second topic includes the content of the initiative, its foundations and operational framework. It clarifies the security and defense aspects of the initiative, highlighting the principles on which the initiative was found and the circumstances in which it was launched. This is in addition to the controversy over the initiative itself and its nature; is it a security initiative? A defense initiative? Or is it just a general framework for coordination and consultation between NATO and the Gulf States? The third topic presents the various visions of the Arab Gulf states which have joined the initiative, as stated by their officials, regarding the content of the initiative and the importance of cooperation with NATO. The perspectives of NATO officials regarding the objectives of the initiative and its controlling principles are also clarified. Moreover, this part illustrates why both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman refrained from joining that initiative, at least till the date of publishing this book. The fourth topic, tackles how the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was developed during the period from its launching in 2004–2020, with a special focus on the results it has achieved in terms of security and military agreements between NATO and the Gulf States’ members of the initiative. The development of that partnership is also elucidated through analyzing the formal speeches of officials on both sides (NATO and the Gulf States) and presenting the concept of soft power provided by NATO. For that reason, the fifth topic in Chapter two of this book analyzes the activities of NATO Defense College, in Rome, which provides advanced courses for a number of military officers and civilians from both NATO and the Arab Gulf States. These activities have to do with security issues which have an impact on the Alliance and its Gulf partners, including terrorism, energy security, nuclear armament and immigration. In addition, NATO has announced the opening of the NATO-ICI Regional Center in Kuwait in 2017, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. M. Keshk, NATO and the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3815-2_2

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which provides study programs on the security challenges facing both sides. The six topic detects mechanisms of maximizing the benefit of the Gulf States from NATO, whether by taking advantage of the content of the Alliance’s defense doctrine or its armed forces’ structure. The topic discusses, as well, the extent of NATO’s ability to meet the security needs of the Arab Gulf States. The seven Topic includes the Evolution and Evaluation of the Gulf-Atlantic Partnership.

The Theoretical Framework for Relation of the Arabian Gulf Countries with NATO Cooperation between NATO and the Arabian Gulf countries is based on contents of the theory of neoliberalism. Such theory came to being as a result of development of the structure of the international system after the collapse of the socialist system in 1990. This involved new actors emerging in the system of international relations such as multinational companies, and making use of the role of international organizations, such as the United Nations that managed to create international consensus during the war of liberation of the State of Kuwait in 1991. One of the most prominent pioneers of that theory is Joseph Nye, whose theses emphasize that the rationality of the state, as an actor in international relations, press it to solve its problems in cooperation with its partners with whom it is linked through an extended network of relations, because this maximizes the absolute gains for all. Another neoliberal, Charles Lamer, believes there are opportunities to achieve collective security out of chaos, but with an institutional balance framework for state and non-state actors. In his view, collective security can be achieved by expanding the framework of the national interest into the collective interest and creating an institutional framework. According to the neoliberalism theory, the goal of achieving security in the system of international relations is not an end in itself. Instead, it is a means to achieve security. The issue is not related to the strength of the state towards other countries only. It is, rather, related to confronting non-state groups. This included the United States’ war against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The issue is related also to acknowledging existence of two regional and international environments, as two circles above the level of the state. Such two environments are two important frameworks for analysis.1 Despite the importance of contents of neoliberalism theory, supporters of realism theory believe that the international system, though being unipolar, some other powers will try to force the United States to achieve a balance. They add that small or weak countries tend to ally with great powers to maintain the greatest possible degree of independence. This is the essence of criticism by neorealism for neoliberalism. The Neo-liberals do not deny cooperation between states. However, they 1 Aqeel,

Wasfi Muhammad. 2015. “Cognitive transformations of realism and liberalism in contemporary international relations theory.” Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 106 and 107.

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believe that the cooperating countries always seek to advance their relative strength and maintain their independence.2 Intellectual trends within the realism theory have varied. They include definitions of concepts of international relations such as strength and its measurement, and the international system and the national interest that are closely related to the national security of states as defined by proponents of that theory. Nonetheless, the most important of these concepts, regarding relations of the Arabian Gulf countries with NATO, is the concept of the balance of powers. Within states pursuit to advance their strength and safeguard their national security, they always seek to have the balance of powers in their favor. In this resects, they adopt three options. The first option is to increase their military strength, in terms of quantity and quality, to achieve the concept of deterrence in their relations with other countries. The second option is to establish alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact organization, or to adopt the collective security policy. The final option is to create buffer states between two parties, or to dismantle an alliance with another party.3 These options raise controversy about the defense policies of small countries in general. Hans Morgenthau argues that countries rely on their own capabilities to achieve a balance of power with other powers, which means joining alliances is excluded. Others, such as Kyohein R.D., believe that a small state will not be able to influence the international system if it works alone or within another group of small states. Robert Rochstein agrees with this perspective. He defined the concept of the small state as the one that cannot achieve security using its own capabilities, and that it must rely on the support of major countries or international organizations. This means that a small state must pursue one of the above-mentioned options. However, these options also have limitations. The small country cannot continue to buy weapons indefinitely in the framework of ‘horizontal expansion’, because of the limited size of its population, which remains a constraint on building a large army. Regarding alliances at the regional level, they require presence of common interests, as well as a common identity; and this is not present in all regions. Therefore, the most important option is international alliances. However, small countries might end becoming parties to conflicts in which they do not have direct interests, as the more states relies on alliances, the more they are linked to them. This means that small countries may pursue another option, namely neutrality. This neutrality, however, does not last, as stronger regional parties do not want it.4 According to this theoretical approach, the content of NATO’s relationship with the Arabian Gulf countries can be addressed through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. There is agreement between the alliance and the countries that joined the initiative that there are mutual benefits for the two sides of this partnership. The other 2 Al-Sawani,

Youssef Mohammed. 2013. Theories on International Relations. Beirut: Knowledge Forum. 3 Al-Masry, Khaled Moussa. 2014. Introduction to international relations theory. Damascus: Nineveh House for Publishing and Distribution. 4 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2021. The development of Gulf regional security since 2003: a study on the impact of NATO strategy. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies.

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Gulf countries that did not join the initiative believe that there is a difference in the relative benefits from such partnership.

The Theoretical Framework for the Relationship Between Regional Security and Global Security Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter provides, in Article 52, for establishing regional security organizations that would support the role of the United Nations in achieving security, stability and settling disputes. Article 51 also provides for the right of countries to individual and collective self-defense. A large number of regional security organizations have emerged. The Cold War and the subsequent changes in the structure of the international system, however, have greatly reduced the ability of regional security organizations to play their role in addressing regional security crises. This matter has remained dependent on resolutions by the UN Security Council, which is controlled by the major powers. Nonetheless, NATO, if considered a regional organization, proved to be a model for cooperation between regional and global frameworks for security cooperation. The Alliance intervened with a successful operation in Bosnia in 1995, and Kosovo in 1999, and then Afghanistan in 2001, in addition to the Libyan crisis in 2011. NATO has also provided the Iraqi security forces with training. This means that the relation between the United Nations, a framework for global security, and NATO, a framework for regional security, will increase and get stronger in the future.5 The relationship between regional security and global security raises another issue; namely, the extent to which regional systems are generally influenced with changes in the global system. In other words, this issue is related to the factors that explain existence of international interest in a region and not in others. Such factors can be identified in five types: The first factor involves capabilities of the regional system, as the more these capabilities are weak or limited, the greater the opportunities for the global system to influence that system, as the regional systems and the small states they comprise depend more on external powers to make up for the shortage in their capabilities, for them to secure external influence. The second factor involves global interests in the regional system. If interests of the dominant powers in the leadership of the global system are of high importance and numerous in one a regional system, transformations that occur in the global system have strong effects on the sub-systems. The regional systems generally differ in terms of the degree of dependence on the international system and the type of such dependence. The regional systems, located in vital geopolitical circles for global powers dominating the global system, tend to work with one of the major powers,

5 Seif,

Mostafa Olwi. 2015. Regional security between national and global security. Cairo: International Center for Future and Strategic Studies.

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with complete coordination with such powers. Therefore, such regional systems are more affected with any changes that occur in the leadership of the global system. The third factor is related to the pattern of global-regional links. It is notable that existence of a series of relations and an increasing level of interactions and geographical proximity increase the influence of global powers on regional systems. The fourth factor is concerned with regional conflicts and the extent of cohesion of regional systems. If regional systems suffer from an increasing level of conflicts and a lesser degree of cohesion at all political, economic, social and cultural levels, whether within units of the systems or between such units, global transformations can affect such regional systems to a large degree and vice versa. The final factor is related to regional leaderships. The presence of a regional leadership that enjoys the support of other countries of a region limits the impact of global system changes on regional systems.6 Applying this on NATO’s role in the Gulf regional security issues, we find out that there are fundamental interests for the Alliance’s member states in that region. NATO has not intervened militarily in the Arabian Gulf region before. However, the Alliance’s key member states participated in protecting Gulf oil tankers during the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s. In addition, NATO major member states participated, along with the United States, in the war to liberate the State of Kuwait in 1991. Given the existence of a conflict between the Gulf countries and Iran, which seeks to strengthen its hegemony over the Arabian Gulf region, there is a strategic interest for the Alliance, not only to protect interests of allies and partners in that region, but also to maintain the balance of powers, which is a basic requirement for achieving regional security.

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Contexts, Foundations, and Practical Frameworks In an attempt to adapt to the post-Cold War environment, NATO started to launch several security partnerships in different regions of the world, including the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) in 2004, as mentioned on the Alliance’s website, in the section explaining the name of the initiative. However, the text of the initiative states that it is directed to the countries of the broader Middle East, starting with the Arab Gulf States; the objective, of the initiative as illustrated, is to develop the defense capabilities of these partners, so that they could address the security threats they face, on the one hand, and be able to militarily cooperate with NATO, on the other hand. The guiding principle of the Alliance within its partnerships was “We help you to help yourselves.” During the NATO summit, which was held in Turkey from 29–30 June 2004, the final communique referred to the launch of the Istanbul Initiative saying, “we decided to enhance our Mediterranean Dialogue and to offer cooperation to the 6 Idris, Mohammed Al-Saeed. 2001. Regional Systems Analysis: A Study in the Origins of Regional

International Relations. Cairo: Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Foundation.

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broader Middle East region through the “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative”. NATO offers this initiative to the interested countries in the region, with the Gulf Cooperation Council States on the head. That is in order to strengthen bilateral relations of mutual benefit, and thus enhancing security and stability. The initiative focuses on practical cooperation where NATO can provide an added value, especially in fields of defense and security. It is distinct from, yet takes into account and complements, other initiatives involving other international actors. While respecting the specificity of the Mediterranean Dialogue, the enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue and the “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative” are complementary, progressive and individualized processes. They will be developed in a spirit of joint ownership with the countries involved. Continued consultation and active engagement will be essential to their success. The text of that statement raises questions about the contents, foundations and practical frameworks of that initiative.7 1.

According to the text of the aforementioned communique, the Istanbul initiative aims at cooperation between NATO and the countries of the broader Middle East region, starting with the GCCs. The Initiative offers a ‘menu’ of bilateral activities from which countries can choose; it (menu) comprises a range of six cooperation areas with sub issues, including: 1. Providing tailored advice on defense transformation, and consultations in defense reforms, defense budget, planning, and civil-military relations. 2. military-to-military cooperation to contribute to interoperability through participation in selected military exercises and related education and training activities that could improve the ability of participating countries’ forces to operate with those of the Alliance; and through participation in selected NATO and PfP exercises and in NATO-led operation on a case-by-case basis; 3. Cooperation in the fight against terrorism, including through intelligence-sharing; and maritime cooperation. 4. Cooperation in the Alliance’s work on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; 5. Encouraging cooperation wherever it is appropriate and where there is a benefit added by NATO regarding border security in connection with terrorism, small arms and light weapons and the fight against illegal trafficking; 6. Encouraging cooperation in civil emergencies planning including participating in training courses and exercises on disaster assistance.

The initiative has explicitly indicated its geographic scope, objectives and principles. Geographically, the initiative targeted the broader Middle East region, starting with the Gulf States. As for objectives, the initiative aimed at getting into the Alliance a group of countries that may not have full knowledge of the transformations that NATO has undergone, especially after the end of the Cold War era; this, actually, necessitates the governments and the decision makers to develop a new understanding of these transformations. In other words, all the views of the partner countries would be taken into consideration and accepting membership of any country would take into account its diversity and specific needs. The initiative complements and integrates with the 7 NATO. 2004. Istanbul Summit Communiqué. 28 June. Accessed August 2, 2020. https://www.nato.

int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_21023.htm

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Alliance’s relationship with the partner countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue which was launched with seven Mediterranean countries in 1994. In terms of principles, the initiative included several principles upon which its work is based, namely: 1. 2. 3.

4.

5. 6.

The initiative takes into account the ideas and proposals of the regional organizations and countries. The initiative is based on mutual benefits and mutual interests of NATO and the countries in the region, taking into account the diversity of their needs. Though the ICI is considered to be independent, it takes into consideration other initiatives which have been launched by other international groups such as the G8, the European Union and other organizations. It is also complementary to the Mediterranean Dialogue. Focusing on practical cooperation in areas where NATO can provide benefits on security. This depends on the interest of the partner countries in the initiative and to what extent they show a positive reaction. The initiative does not allow joining NATO or its various partnership structures with other parties, nor does it guarantee security for any party. NATO’s participation in dialogue and cooperation with countries of the region contributes to strengthening other international efforts regarding democratic reforms and civil society.

In addition to these principles, the initiative is based on the principle of (all + 1), meaning that it is between NATO, as a defense organization, and each Gulf state separately. The introduction of the initiative, it is noticed, indicates that NATO aims at contributing to the consolidation of the regional and global security and stability. It is also discerned that achieving progress towards a just, lasting and comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must remain a priority for which the countries of the region and the international community should seek; this would, actually, make the initiative successful on the two-state solution basis.8 Despite the initiative’s importance, its launching did not come without controversy, especially among academia and experts. The debate on its contents and the context in which it was launched and its parties, can be summed up in light of the following points: First, the context in which the initiative was launched: the ICI was launched a year after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which led to an imbalance of regional power. Globally, the initiative coincided with what was called the Greater Middle East Initiative, promoted by the United States and adopted by The Group of Eight (G8) Industrialized Nations, at Georgia summit on June 8, 2004. In addition, the EUUS summit in Ireland, in which the US president and the EU countries’ presidents met, on June 26, 2004, discussed the same issues. In other words, NATO summit in 2004 tackled the same contents of the two afore-mentioned summits; that is, “the 8 NATO.

2018. Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)29 November. Accessed June 5, 2020. https:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52956.htm.

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issue of reform in the Greater Middle East and Iraq”. That proves a congruence of the approaches of NATO, US and EU, concerning the issues of the Middle East region, at the time,9 with an emphasis on the geopolitical importance of the Middle East, in general, and the Arab Gulf States, in specific, for NATO’s interests. In fact, the context of the launching of great initiatives cannot be interpreted from a single perspective; various factors combined should be taken into consideration when explaining them. In the case of the Istanbul Initiative, the most important thing is how its two parties perceive the idea of cooperation. The four Gulf States that joined the initiative may have viewed cooperation with NATO as important and vital, because of the regional threats, in general, and the direct Iranian threat, in specific. Moreover, the rising fears from a possible decline or retreat of the US role in the Middle East and the Arab Gulf region, make the diversification of the defense alliances a strategic matter, or even approach. On this respect, NATO is considered the most appropriate option; it is, for the Gulf States, an acceptable and reasonable choice in view of the Alliance’s forces and capabilities which could enable it to conduct deterrence tasks and to quickly send and deploy its military forces. This is in addition to NATO’s experience in environmental security and combating piracy. As for NATO, the Alliance has declared its intention to deepen cooperation with the Arab Gulf States in article 35 of its Strategic Concept (2010): “…develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.” Perhaps the visit of the Secretary General of the GCC, Dr. Abdul Latif Bin Rashid Al Zayani, at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, in January 2012, reflects the interest of the GCC as a regional security organization in that initiative. Within the same context, the Istanbul Initiative represents the most appropriate option for the Alliance’s policy, when implementing the concept of “Smart Defense” which means do “more with less.”10 Second, the content and nature of the initiative; some academic questions concerning the initiative were raised, including: is the initiative a common framework for consultations between the Alliance and the ICI members? Or is it a security initiative? Or a defensive one? This is because the initiative combines both solid and soft security. In spite of the importance of the ICI’s areas of cooperation, which meet some of the security needs of the Arab Gulf States, the initiative was devoid of any references to threats imperiling energy security. In addition, the initiative explicitly indicates that it does not guarantee security for the Arab Gulf States; there may be a justification for this in NATO’s founding Treaty, in general, and in Article 5 thereof in particular. However, the Arab Gulf States, which are classified as small countries, perceive the idea of establishing defense partnerships with countries and defense organizations all over the world as one of their defense options. In the subsequent meetings of NATO officials and the Gulf States, the issue of energy security was 9 Keshk,

Ashraf Mohammed. 2021. The development of Gulf regional security since 2003: a study on the impact of NATO strategy. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies. 10 Lenka filipkova, Zora hesova,Tomas Karasek, Natasa Kubikova, Jan Kuzvart and Jakubzhora. 2012. NATO and the Arab Spring: Challenge to Cooperation, Opportunity for Action? 1 April. Accessed August 11, 2020. http://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/pp-2012-01.pdf.

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raised and discussed. The Alliance has, also, developed mechanisms to globally protect energy security. NATO officials, in addition, had many statements related to energy security threats in the Arab Gulf region; in an article published in the Emirati newspaper, Al-Khaleej, on April 22, 2008 (four years after the initiative was launched), the NATO Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said, “We all share a common interest in energy security, whether we are suppliers or consumers, or transit countries. Geography is no longer useful, nor interceding or shielding us from the evils of such global challenges”.11 Third: the parties to the initiative: Will the initiative be limited to the Arab Gulf States? Or could it include other parties? Given the initiative’s objectives itself, which is directed to the broader Middle East’s countries, with the Gulf States at first, will the initiative include parties other than the GCCs which could have shared interests with the initiative? This last question is raised especially in light of the fact that the cooperation provided by NATO through the ICI is not limited to the Arab Gulf; it is offered to all countries in the region, and hence, countries such as Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Iran and Lebanon can join the initiative; this is a question for which the Arab Gulf States seek an answer.

Visions of the Arab Gulf States for the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) Prior to tackling the viewpoints of the Arab Gulf States, it is noteworthy to point at the “The Role of NATO in the Security of the Arab Gulf” conference, which was organized by the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs from November 30 to October 1, 2005. NATO’s Secretary General, at that time, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, attended the conference; this was the first time a senior NATO official did visit the Arab Gulf after launching the ICI in 2004. Delegations from the four Gulf States which have joined the initiative, namely Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar, participated in the conference. During his speech, Schaeffer emphasized that there are three reasons which motivated NATO to launch the Initiative: First, the common security threats facing NATO countries as well as the Arab Gulf States, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, human trafficking, weapons and drugs; all these threats cannot be confronted by individual efforts; second, the changing nature of the Alliance; during the Cold War era, NATO tried to prevent the outbreak of a cold war, but after the end of that era (Cold War) the memberships of the Alliance increased as it included 26 countries and started to carry out peacekeeping missions in both the Balkans and Afghanistan, provide humanitarian aids in Pakistan, and support the African Union in Darfur. In addition, NATO carried out naval operations to counter terrorism in the Mediterranean and contributed to training missions in Iraq. Moreover, the Alliance 11 Scheffer,

Jaap de Hoop. 2008. NATO, The Atlantic and the Gulf Region and New Era of Cooperation. 22 April. Accessed June 27, 2020. http://www.alkhaleej.ae/studiesandopinions/page/3ce c79cd-1349-44ca-92d3-5886fa8c9929.

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established a number of partnerships in various regions of the world, including the Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative (1994), as it is convinced that promoting security requires Joint work. The third reason has to do with the dynamics that the Arab Gulf region has witnessed in recent years, especially in terms of foreign policy, whether individually or through the GCC. The Gulf countries have emerged as an important player in facing challenges by integrating their Islamic and Arab heritage with the challenges and opportunities which have been posed by globalization. During his Same Speech, NATO Secretary General Identified Three Guiding Principles, Governing the Work of the ICI: The First Principle: Practical Cooperation This means that NATO offers a rich list of capabilities for working with partners, while each country is free to choose what meets its needs. The Second Principle: Joint Ownership Cooperation between Allies and the Gulf States takes into account the regional, cultural and political context. Moreover, the Cooperation between NATO and the Gulf States can have two tracks regarding the added value of security. Third Principle: Integration There are efforts, exerted by the Gulf States through the Gulf Cooperation Council. This is in addition to other international initiatives targeting the region which have been launched either by the European Union or G8. This means that NATO’s initiative complements and enhances those efforts.12

The Gulf States Stances on the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Four Gulf countries have publicly joined the ICI, namely, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Qatar. The stance of the four countries towards the initiative can be illustrated as follows: 1.

Kuwait

In his speech in the Conference on “NATO and Gulf Countries: Facing Common Challenges through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative”, which was hosted by Kuwait, On December 12, 2006, the then Kuwaiti prime minister, Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohammed Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, said that the partnership between Kuwait and NATO is based on mutual respect and trust. Because of the crucial oil reserves in Kuwait and the Gulf States, the stability of the region is a vital issue for the whole 12 Affairs, Qatari Ministry of Foreign. 2005. Speech by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 6 June. Accessed June 6, 2020. http://www.qat arconferences.org/Nato/security/arabic/speach2.html.

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world. With the recent expansion of NATO, the Gulf States can cooperate with it and exchange experiences. Moreover, NATO can play an important role in bridging the gap between the Gulf States and the developed countries including the Alliance’s countries, which is already a vast gap. 2.

Bahrain

Bahrain’s posture is clarified by Dr. Muhammad Abd al-Ghaffar, the then Bahraini Minister of Information, in a lecture he gave at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS), Georgetown University, the United States, during which he emphasized that “the Arab Gulf security has always been linked to the advanced defense mechanisms of the most influential forces in the world like the US and Britain”. He stressed, “As with the current partnerships with the US, NATO can play a supportive role within the Istanbul initiative, and do more when necessary”. 3.

The United Arab Emirates

Although no official statements were issued at the time of launching the ICI, an academic study entitled “NATO’s Regional Roles and Potential Role in the Arab Gulf Region”, authored by Mousa Hamad El-kallab, and issued by the Dubai-based Gulf Research Center in 2005, illustrated that a delegation from NATO Parliamentary Assembly visited the United Arab Emirates on June 18, 2005 in order to explore prospects of cooperation with the Arab Gulf State. During that visit the delegation met with a number of Emirati officials. Pierre Lellouche, the president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, said, “The UAE government has officially requested to join the Istanbul initiative in a letter which was sent to NATO General Secretariat few days ago”. NATO announced that the UAE has joined the initiative on June 22, 2005. 4.

Qatar

The Qatari point of view was expressed by the Assistant Foreign Minister for Followup Affairs during the symposium organized by The Strategic Studies Center of the Qatari Armed Forces on January 28, 2008, in which he stressed that NATO, which succeeded in protecting the security of the European societies in the past, now extends its operations’ scope to include many regions, countries and issues, including energy security. The Gulf countries have signed defense and security agreements with NATO’s major countries; these agreements have provided balance and strategic security to the Arab Gulf region. Hence, it is necessary to have future talks about agreements on military cooperation between the Alliance and the Arab Gulf States instead of the limited cooperation of the ICI.13 Analyzing the Postures of the Four ICI Gulf States Members, Three Basic Observations can be Made: First, the four GCC States are convinced with the transformation in the Alliance’s role, from which these States can benefit. Being small countries, the GCC States 13 Keshk,

Ashraf Mohammed. 2021. The development of Gulf regional security since 2003: a study on the impact of NATO strategy. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies.

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perceive International Alliances and partnerships as crucial for achieving regional balance of power. Second, it is noticed that there is a difference in GCCs’ reasons for joining this initiative. Some countries might have believed that this initiative should be developed in the future to include energy security and military cooperation. Third, the Arab Gulf states’ security and military agreements with the major countries in NATO, indicate that these States consider such agreements as a main pillar of their relations with the Western countries, and thus the Alliance’s role—regardless of the content of that role—is complementary to the roles of major countries in terms of security of the Arab Gulf region. However, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman Remained Outside the Framework of that Initiative, their Position Towards the ICI is as Follows: 1.

2.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: In 2007, the then Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud Al-Faisal, said that his country would take the appropriate decision in this regard, stressing the need to know the objectives, intentions and starting points of the Istanbul initiative so that joining the ICI cannot affect his country’s traditional status. He added, “Cooperation in the field of exchanging information, experiences and technologies related to combating terrorism, border security, crisis management, including the proliferation of weapons Mass destruction and sharing advice in planning and training between the concerned agencies, will always be welcomed”. In his response on a question, he was asked in 2008 about the reason for his country’s not joining the Istanbul initiative, Prince Khalid bin Saud, Undersecretary of the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said, “We are trying to keep the region away from regional and international alliances.” He added, “we want a region free from alliances because its problems suffice, and we do not want to add more problems to it”. One of the Saudi academics, who preferred not to be named, justified the Kingdom’s not joining the ICI, indicating that there are three reasons for KSA refraining from the ICI: First, the Kingdom is questioning why NATO did not offer the initiative to the Gulf Cooperation Council, as a regional organization, in order to have an initiative offered by the Alliance to the GCC as a whole; that is to present the ICI as an initiative between two organizations? Second, Saudi Arabia sent an inquiry to the Alliance, asking about the contents and objectives of the “defense reform” term which is mentioned in the initiative. However, the Alliance’s answers, in this regard, were not sufficient nor convincing to the Kingdom. Third, it is part of the initiative that it is directed to the broader Middle East with the Arab Gulf coming first; that is in the future, the initiative might include countries which the Kingdom may not want to be in a single cooperative framework with. The Sultanate of Oman, despite the absence of any official statement concerning why Oman refrained from joining the ICI, it can be said that the Sultanate’s position concerning the initiative stems from its general vision of the Arab Gulf’s security, which is based on a totally different perception from the

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rest of the GCC States. According to a study prepared by an Omani researcher, Oman’s vision for the security of the Arab Gulf is based on two main pillars: The first pillar is formed by the geostrategic facts such as the location of Oman at the entrance to the Arabian Gulf, “the Strait of Hormuz, which has a great strategic importance for international navigation”. However, as Iran and Oman are riparian states, the Sultanate found that it has to protect its interests first, then to protect international navigation. The second pillar is the Sultanate’s historical experience in dealing with the regional and international powers which have an influence on the Arab Gulf region. In light of these two pillars, Oman has shaped its security vision regarding the Arab Gulf on the following foundations: • Security of the Arab Gulf region is the responsibility of its countries. • Development of the Gulf States at the economic and social levels still relies on having security. • Interests of other regional countries in the Arab Gulf region must be taken into consideration, as this will make external powers lose any justification for interfering in its affairs. According to the above illustrated vision, Oman may have thought that joining this initiative which excludes Iran means antagonizing Tehran. At the same time, Oman’s attitude towards the initiative is a literal translation of the aforementioned foundations.14 According to another academic point of view, the Sultanate’s position can be interpreted in terms of five factors. First, the policy of neutrality which the Sultanate has been pursuing since joining the United Nations in 1971; the Sultanate wants to always abide by that policy. That is why it did not reject the Istanbul initiative nor accept it. In other words, Oman wants to maintain good relationship with the Arab Gulf states as well as Iran and the Euro-Atlantic countries. Second, the obstacles facing the implementation of the Istanbul initiative, including the lack of a consent from all the Arab Gulf states, the competition between the major NATO countries, the reduction of the Alliance’s defense budget, the lack of NATO’s involvement in addressing regional crises. Third, the lack of a unified Gulf vision towards the regional neighboring countries, “Iraq, Yemen, and Iran”. Fourth, Oman’s preference for bilateral relations with major powers rather than collective frameworks, as the former is more flexible and active. Fifth, Oman’s fear of possible interventions. According to this vision, the foreign policy of countries does not always remain constant but is rather changing in accordance with external developments. Thus, perhaps if NATO’s policy witnessed slightly changes, Oman might pay greater attention for cooperation in fields such as tailored training courses which have to do with intelligence cooperation. This is in addition to NATO’s contribution to the transfer of military technology. Though these two issues (intelligence cooperation and military technology) are of great interest to the Sultanate of Oman, this does not negate the fact that Oman is already cooperating with NATO indirectly through cooperation 14 keshk, Ashraf. 2009. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Agreement Between NATO and the Gulf cooperation council Countries: Obstacles and Propositions. Rome: NATO defense College.

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with its major countries. There has been a military cooperation between Oman and the United States since 1980, whereby the Sultanate has allowed the US, the major country member of the Alliance, an access to its military bases under an agreement which has been renewed later four times. On the other hand, cooperation between Oman and NATO depends also on regional and international transformations, but if its options concerning cooperation with major powers recede, NATO will be the most likely option.15

Areas of Security and Military Cooperation Between NATO and the Gulf ICI Members First of all, it should be emphasized that the Alliance provides both hard and soft security. NATO does not impose specific areas of cooperation on its partners; it rather lets each country choose according to their own needs. Since the launch of the ICI in 2004 till 2020, there have been many areas of security and defense cooperation between NATO and the Gulf ICI members. NATO have signed with each Gulf ICI member, separately, agreements on security intelligence sharing. This is in addition to an agreement on military cooperation between NATO and Kuwait. NATO has, as well, joint military maneuvers with the Gulf ICI members. Moreover, there is always an actual military cooperation between the Alliance and the Gulf ICI members during crises, including NATO operations in Libya and Afghanistan. The different areas of cooperation between both sides can be outlined as Follows: Security Agreements 1.

Cooperation Agreement on the security of information between NATO and Kuwait (2006)

On December11, 2006, Kuwait signed an agreement with NATO, under the framework of the ICI, to allow for protecting and exchanging classified and confidential information, on this respect, Kuwait exclusively obtains information from the Alliance. Sheikh Thamer Al-Sabah, Vice President of Kuwait’s State Security Agency has said, “The new agreement is concerned with preserving the confidentiality of information. It allows Kuwait to access many important and confidential information and to benefit from the extensive experiences and expertise of NATO in various defense and security fields such as combating terrorism as well as managing crises”. Sheikh Ahmed Al-Fahd, head of Kuwait’s State Security Agency, stressed that the agreement is “a security agreement rather than a military or defensive one”.

15 Yenigun,

Cuneyt. 2016. “Oman Security Perspectives and NATO Relations.” Nato,co operative Security and the Midlle East status and prospects. Austria: Austrain institute for international affairs(OIIP). 13–17. Accessed August 18, 2020. https://www.oiip.ac.at/cms/media/report_nato_w orkshop.pdf.

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Agreement on the exchange of security information between NATO and Bahrain (2008)

During the conference on “NATO-Bahrain Relations and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative" in Manama, on April 23, 2008, Bahrain and NATO signed an agreement on cooperation regarding security information exchange. Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, Assistant Undersecretary for Coordination and Follow-up of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said” The agreement has to do with the exchange of security information between Bahrain and NATO”. He added, “It is important information for both sides, either to solve security problems or to prevent security ones or even natural disasters if a radiation leak from one of the nuclear plants, for instance, occurs”.16 3.

Agreement on the exchange of information between the United Arab Emirates and NATO (2009)

During the conference hosted by UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with NATO’s Public Diplomacy Department, in October 2009, Andres Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s Secretary-General, confirmed that “NATO has taken an important step by signing an information exchange agreement with the UAE. It (agreement) is a cornerstone of cooperation between the two parties”. The conference was attended by more than 60 participants from NATO countries, about 200 senior government officials, academic figures, representatives of international organizations, security experts, opinion leaders and Media outlets from the UAE and other GCC States. Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs, affirmed that “the UAE’s relationship with NATO is strategic and vital; It aims at developing the State’s capabilities and knowledge. This s in addition to assisting UAE in carrying out some of its tasks in Afghanistan.17 4.

Agreement on exchanging confidential information between NATO and Qatar (2018)

In January 2018, NATO signed an agreement with Qatar, under which the two parties are to exchange confidential information. In a statement published by NATO on its official website, it was clarified that the agreement was signed by Brigadier General Tariq Khalid M F Alobaidli, Head of the International Military Cooperation Department, Armed Forces of the State of Qatar, and NATO Deputy Secretary General, Rose Gottemoeller. According to the same statement, “This security agreement provides the framework for the protection of exchange of classified information, as defined by 29 countries of the Alliance”. The statement highlighted that “These agreements are signed by NATO partner countries, wishing to engage in cooperation with NATO. The four ICI partner countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and U.A.E.) have now signed individual security agreements with NATO. This enables the Individual Partnership 16 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2012. The development of Gulf regional security since 2003: a study on the impact of NATO strategy. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies. 17 Newspaper, Al-Bayan. 2009. The UAE signs an information security agreement with NATO. 30 October. Accessed https://www.albayan.ae/across-the-uae/2009-10-30-1.485946.

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and Cooperation Programs (IPCP) of the ICI countries with NATO to be implemented as effectively as possible”.18 On the other hand, Qatar has signed, in November 2019, an agreement with NATO, on the "Administrative Arrangements for the Protection of Classified Information". It is complementary to the Agreement on Exchanging Classified Information, which was signed in Brussels, Belgium in 2018. This agreement contributes to activating all the terms of the individual partnership agreement and the joint cooperation program under the Istanbul Initiative.19 Military Agreements, “The Transit Agreement Between NATO and the State of Kuwait in 2017” In May 2017, the Kuwaiti National Assembly approved a law approving an agreement between the Kuwaiti government and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to facilitate the transit of NATO personnel and forces through the territories of Kuwait. The agreement consists of 19 articles and an explanatory memorandum. It stipulates the Kuwaiti government’s approval on the passage of NATO forces into the Kuwaiti territories to other countries, provided that the agreement is not used to support a military attack launched from Kuwait. The agreement includes many rules regulating that transit in terms of equipment, locations of their presence, operating expenses, immunities and privileges enjoyed by the NATO forces, as well as the nature of the tasks, cost and many other detailed matters. The duration of the agreement is five years, and it is automatically renewed for a similar period or periods. It is worth noting that the agreement was signed between the Kuwaiti government and NATO on February 19, 2016.20 The Joint Military Exercises Between NATO and the ICI Countries The military maneuvers are, in fact, messages to show deterrence in the face of threats jeopardizing countries. Therefore, NATO has been keen to conduct maneuvers with the Gulf States, members of the Istanbul Initiative, such as the naval exercises hosted by Kuwait during the period from 4th to 9th of November 2008; it was the first maneuver between NATO and the Gulf states that are members of the initiative. The maneuver was concluded by a joint training on combating common maritime threats, including terrorism and piracy. The exercise also included shooting with various weapons and how to deal with air attacks. Six naval vessels, four F-18 aircraft, and forces from a number of NATO countries participated in that exercise from the Kuwaiti side. Regarding maneuvers, in general, Sheikh Thamer Al-Sabah, acting head of the National Security Service, at the time, said that these maneuvers “are a recognition of Kuwait’s pivotal and strategic role in the Gulf, on both the regional 18 Agency, Russian News. 2018. NATO signs a security agreement with Qatar. 17 January. Accessed August 21, 2020. https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/921798. 19 Newspaper. Al-Watan. 2019. Qatar and “NATO” sign the “Administrative Arrangements for the Protection of Exchanged Classified Information” agree. 12 November. Accessed August 21, 2020. https://www.al-watan.com/news-details/id/210226. 20 Newspaper, Al-Anbaa. 2017. Approval of the transit agreement for “NATO” forces from Kuwait. 5 July. Accessed June 6, 2020. https://www.alanba.com.kw/ar/kuwait-news/743530/07-05-2017.

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and the international levels. He stressed that the ultimate objective is” to protect the international community, especially in that region, from terroristic threats, weapons of mass destruction, nuclear danger and regional conflicts”.21 Although the joint maneuvers show a message of deterrence, in his response to a question about the role of NATO in maintaining security of the Arab Gulf region in the face of the current challenges, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary-General of NATO, at the time, said, “NATO has no role in securing the Arab Gulf region…According to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO is committed to the security and stability of its member countries only.22 Military Cooperation Between NATO and the Countries of the Istanbul Initiative During wars in Afghanistan and Libya, NATO’s cooperation with the ICI Gulf members witnessed a strong development. In the Afghanistan war (2003), which was NATO’s first ground mission beyond the geographical scope of its territories, the Gulf States, members of the Istanbul Initiative, contributed to facilitating the Alliance’s military work and helped directing that work effectively through logistic and political support. Bahrain deployed elements of its special security forces in Afghanistan; Kuwait provided stationing and overflight permits for all the forces participating in the operation; Qatar offered the allies to use Al-Udeid Air Base, while the UAE provided Special Forces as well as Al Minhad Air Base as a support center. These vital assistances from the four Gulf States to NATO enhanced coordination and harmony in efforts, and boosted stability in turns.23 On the other hand, the participation of the Gulf States in those operations confirmed the fact that NATO’s objective is combating extremism, not targeting the Islamic countries as some writings tried to promote. During the international campaign against Libya in 2011, which was launched under UN resolutions, both Qatar and the United Arab Emirates contributed in the military operations of NATO, by providing military forces and aircraft. There is no doubt that the Gulf States’ assistance for these two campaigns contributed to building the Atlantic Gulf partnership, whether by combating terrorism, which is a common challenge for both sides, or through achieving security and stability in the Middle East region.24

21 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2012. The development of Gulf regional security since 2003: a study on the impact of NATO strategy. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies. 22 Agency, Kuwait News. 2008. The NATO Secretary General affirms the common interest of NATO and Kuwait to enhance cooperation. August 15. Accessed June 2, 2020. https://www.kuna.net.kw/ ArticleDetails.aspx?id=1944634&language=en. 23 Webb, Amanda. 2019. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative at 15. 19 December. Accessed September 28, 2020. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/12/16/the-istanbul-cooper ation-initiative-at-15/index.html. 24 Al-Khalidi, Mohammed Hilal. 2019. The Assistant Undersecretary of the National Security Agency submitted a research paper exclusively to “Al Anba» with which he participated in the annual gathering of the Munich Young Leaders Program. 1 January. Accessed June 8, 2020. https:// www.alanba.com.kw/ar/kuwait-news/927747/07.

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NATO and Cooperation with the Gulf Countries in the Field of Soft Security Though the North Atlantic Treaty Organization “NATO” is a regional defense organization, a fact which is illustrated in its 14-article founding Treaty, the developments which have taken place in the post-Cold War era gave rise to a fierce criticism against the Alliance. Many observers and critics doubted the feasibility of its existence after the Cold War had ended. However, despite the disparagement, NATO was able to adapt itself to the post-Cold War environment by launching a series of regional partnerships in which education, training and consultancy were main aspects. Accordingly, partners in the Middle East and the Arab Gulf region participate in many programs and study courses in both NATO College in Germany, and NATO Defense College in Rome, which witnessed an establishment of a division for the Middle East in 2009 until 2018; in 2019 this division was reintegrated into the Defense College. The academic courses are some of the most important initiatives by NATO for the partner countries of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD). They are ten-week courses and are held twice a year, once in spring and another in autumn. They were launched after Riga Summit in 2006, within the process of implementing NATO’s decision to enhance dialogue between the Alliance and its partners in areas of education. The courses are supervised by academic advisors from NATO countries, who hold Ph.D.s and have enough experiences and a comprehensive knowledge about the Middle East region. The courses, which include many lectures and discussions, aim at enhancing mutual understanding between NATO and its partners about the common concerns threatening both of them, and improving the awareness of the participants about the different dimensions of security issues which have political, strategic, and military impacts on the Alliance and its partners. The courses are available to armed forces officer with the following ranks: lieutenant colonel, colonel or brigadier general, as well as senior civil and diplomatic officials from relevant ministries such as the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries which have to do with the security and strategic issues. Since 2009 till 2020 the courses have tackled various issues, including Iraq, Iran, terrorism, piracy, nuclear armament, immigration, and energy security; they (courses) attempted to analyze the impact of these issues on regional and global security. At the end of them, the participants do a crisis management exercise, which is actually a hypothetical exercise to train them on how to manage an international security crisis, and how to determine the role of the Alliance in them and the required contributions of partners globally and regionally.25 It is worth mentioning that more than 600 armed forces officers from NATO countries, the Middle East and the Arab Gulf States, have participated in these college courses from 2009 to 2020. These programs and courses attempt to boost the capabilities of the Arab Gulf States so 25 College, NATO defense. 2019. NATO Regional Cooperation Course (NRCC). 8 January. Accessed

August 2, 2020. http://www.ndc.nato.int/education/courses.php?icode=10&lang2=ara.

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that they could face regional security challenges, either alone or through cooperation with NATO. Being an academic coach, the author of this book has participated in the aforementioned crisis management exercises from 2009 to 2018. During discussions in the exercise, trainers from both NATO and the ICI countries, in addition to participants from both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, agreed on a number of issues, including crises which require an imminent international intervention and the foundations of NATO’s intervention in them, compared to previous crises in which NATO has intervened, such as the Kosovo and the Libyan crises. The issue of linking these interventions to the change in the global security environment, which forced the Alliance to engage in those crises, as well as the foundations of that intervention, were also discussed. The exercise tackled, also, the pre-conditions required for NATO intervention, in addition to the role of NATO’s regional and global partners during crises. Through that hypothetical exercise, participants were educated the process of analyzing how to deal with crises in general, through three crucial stages: First, identifying the roots and symptoms of crises; second, identifying the parties involved in a crisis and their roles; third, determining the appropriate solutions to solve the crisis in terms of feasibility and cost. Generally speaking, the participants from the NATO countries agreed with their counterparts from the partner countries in the Istanbul Initiative, during the discussions, on five points, as follows: 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Crises which occur outside the territories of NATO countries threaten both the regional and international security alike. Hence, they require international intervention by an international organization which has the ability to resolve these crises, the same as NATO. NATO officials have confirmed that there is a reciprocal relationship as far as the issue of security is concerned. In other words, NATO’s partners should not view the Alliance, all the time, as a permanent provider of security, they have an important role to play and should share the required security burdens during crises. Though the Military solutions to crises are important to end human suffering, they do not provide a permanent solution to crises. Therefore, the concept of comprehensive solutions to crises must be carefully reviewed and reconsidered. There must be an international mandate for the Alliance to intervene in crises under a UN resolution. However, there should be parallel resolutions from regional organizations to legitimize the Alliance’s operations; this is significant so as not to appear as if the Alliance’s intervention is selective and serves only the interests of its members. Before NATO intervenes in crises, the Alliance must have correct estimates about the parties of the crisis, as well as their points of strength and weakness in order to put more real scenarios. Most importantly, is the fact that the Alliance must have various alternatives for managing crises because the developments on ground might greatly differ from what is envisioned behind the closed doors. Moreover, it is necessary for NATO to have a clear plan regarding a safe exit.

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In an attempt by NATO and the Arab Gulf States to institutionalize their partnership, the Alliance announced, On January 24, 2017, the opening of the NATOICI Regional Centre, in Kuwait. NATO officials described the center as a “new home for the Alliance in the Gulf region”. It provides educational and training courses for officers from NATO and Gulf countries on common security issues, such as maritime security, energy infrastructure security, cybersecurity, and crisis management. According to NATO officials, the training and educational programs provided by the Alliance had an impact on defense diplomacy which has been strengthened between NATO and its partners, in the Middle East and the Arab Gulf regions. The social rapprochement and the informal relations that were built through these programs allowed the two parties to have close consultations between their defense officials; this was evidently reflected on the role played by the Emirati and Qatari forces during the NATO military intervention in Libya in 2011.26 The same fact was confirmed by studies authored by ICI countries’ officials. In a study entitled “Security Cooperation: The Alliance Enlargements”, authored by both Sheikh Fawaaz Mishaal Al-Sabah, Assistant Undersecretary in the Kuwaiti National Security Service, and Dr. Rolf Schwarz a former instructor at NATO Defense College, in Rome, it is illustrated that establishing a middle east department in NATO came within the context of cooperation between the Alliance and its Arab Gulf partners. The college provides special training courses for officers and diplomats from both the Gulf States and NATO countries. These courses tackle various security issues affecting NATO member countries as well as the ICI member States, with the aim of developing a common understanding that would be the basis for tangible security cooperation programs between these countries. The Middle East department at the college contributes to developing internal expertise on Middle Eastern affairs. Although the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman are not ICI members, they actively contribute to those academic courses and programs of the college. In 2018, Kuwait, also, sent the first academic staff member—the first from the ICI States to NATO defense college; this, actually, confirms the regional importance of that security initiative’s members.27 The level of each Gulf country’s cooperation, in the field of soft power with NATO is not the same. On January 5, 2017, during the inauguration of the NATO-ICI Regional Center in Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al-Khaled, the Kuwaiti First Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that many joint activities have been held between his country and NATO. He added that an average of three varying events, conferences, sessions and meetings, were being held annually.

26 Samaan, Jean-Loup. 2020. The Modest Accomplishments of Military Cooperation between NATO

and the Middle East. 8 May. Accessed June 8, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/81745. Mohammed Hilal. 2019. The Assistant Undersecretary of the National Security Agency submitted a research paper exclusively to “Al Anba» with which he participated in the annual gathering of the Munich Young Leaders Program. 1 January. Accessed June 8, 2020. https:// www.alanba.com.kw/ar/kuwait-news/927747/07. 27 Al-Khalidi,

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The Kuwaiti concerned apparatuses have participated in more than 60 activities and events held by the Alliance, including field courses and training workshops.28 The Annual Reports Issued by the Alliance have Paid an Immense Attention to these Activities, and Indicated the most Outstanding Achievements of Cooperation Between NATO and the ICI Member States as Follows: In the Annual Report (2016) it was stated that: “NATO continued to work with countries in the Gulf region through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), improving dialogue and increasing practical cooperation. Activities in 2016 were conducted in areas including education and training, energy security, cyber defense, non-proliferation and arms control (including WMD), maritime security, civil emergency planning”. In 2017, NATO’s Annual Report referred to the fact that, “In 2017, progress was made on enhancing political dialogue and consultations with partner countries participating in the Initiative. This was also facilitated by the opening of diplomatic missions to NATO, and through visits and official meetings between high level NATO and partner nation officials. Also in 2017, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates expressed interest in contributing to NATO’s Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. Subsequently, consultations began with both countries to assist their efforts to join the Mission as partners. NATO and its Gulf partners established the NATO-Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Regional Centre in Kuwait. The Centre is the first such NATO presence in the region and was inaugurated in January 2017 during a visit by the Secretary General and the North Atlantic Council. The purpose of the new 8000 m2 Centre is to enhance cooperation between NATO and its Gulf partners including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Over the past year, the Centre’s multinational civilian and military team has delivered educational training courses in a number of fields such as exercise planning, civil-military cooperation and civil emergency planning. The Annual Report (2018) stated that, “In January, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Regional Centre in Kuwait completed its first full year of activities. Since its inauguration in early 2017, the Centre has run 14 separate courses and activities. Almost 500 military officers from the region have participated”. The Annual Report (2019) clarified that, “2019 was also the year to celebrate the 15th anniversary of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. The North Atlantic Council visited Kuwait in December and looked back at 15 years of joint efforts. On this occasion, the Council agreed to further deepen cooperation with Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partners and to continue to regularly meet to discuss security issues of common concern. NATO further developed practical cooperation with Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partners in the areas of capacitybuilding, interoperability, standardization and security sector reform. Key priority areas in 2019 included: counterterrorism, small arms and light weapons, counter improvised explosive device training, cyber defense, mine detection, enhanced 28 Al-Rai,

newspaper. 2017. Al-Mubarak inaugurated the regional center for “NATO” and the “Istanbul Initiative. 25 January. Accessed June 8, 2020. https://www.alraimedia.com/Home/Det ails?Id=48235d6c-4713-40cc-9354-d24d3d5deb6c.

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explosive remnants of war detection, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense, and crisis management. As in previous years, regional partners were active participants in NATO’s education and training activities in the Alliance’s schools and institutions. In total, 37 mobile training teams conducted training activities in Mediterranean Dialogue countries and 17 were deployed to Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries… Since its inauguration in 2017, the Centre has hosted almost 1,000 participants from the region, as well as more than 200 experts from NATO countries. Its purpose is to promote the exchange of expertise among professionals in the defense and security sectors, and to improve interoperability between NATO and its partners in the region. Its activities have included cyber defense, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense, crisis management, maritime security, energy security, political dialogue and military-to-military cooperation”.29

Evolution and Evaluation of the Gulf-Atlantic Partnership Both NATO and the Arab Gulf States were keen to organize a series of conferences and visits, the aim of which was to develop their partnership through various mechanisms. The United Arab Emirates was the first Gulf country to open a liaison office with NATO in 2008 and sent a military commander to take over that mission in Brussels. Then, it opened a diplomatic mission at NATO headquarters in 2012. After that, NATO publicly announced, in 2016, it would name the embassies of Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar as accredited missions to NATO.30 During his visit to the Kingdom of Bahrain on March 7, 2010, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the then Secretary-General of NATO, said that the security of Bahrain and the ICI partner States affects the strategic interests of NATO. He acclaimed the Kingdom’s role in hosting monthly meetings for coordinating the various operations of the International community parties, the aim of which is fighting piracy in the Horn of Africa. Rasmussen highlighted that the Istanbul Initiative has developed since its launch in 2004; it includes now about 600 areas of cooperation from which each ICI Member State can choose according to its needs. Actually, the Kingdom of Bahrain is the first ICI Member State to work on achieving Individual Partnership Programs. He stressed the need to focus more, in the future, on protecting the infrastructure of energy facilities illustrating that NATO has the enough capabilities to retaliate any sort of attacks and defend electronic systems. Rasmussen referred to the fact that energy security and maritime security are closely interrelated in general.31 29 NATO. n.d. The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019. Accessed August 3, 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_174406.htm. 30 Al Jareeda, newspaper. 2016. Officially, the Kuwaiti embassy in Belgium is a mission to “NATO”. 4 May. Accessed August 14, 2020. https://www.aljarida.com/ext/articles/print/146421168131233 5300/. 31 NATO. 2009. Keynote address by NATO Secretary General. 29 October. Accessed April 17, 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_62052.htm?selectedLocale=en.

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During his visit to the United Arab Emirates in March 2016, NATO SecretaryGeneral, Jens Stoltenberg, said that “the UAE and other GCC States are highly valuable partners to the Alliance”, emphasizing that “NATO and the Arab Gulf States are facing common enemies and dangers”.32 The Istanbul Initiative member States were similarly keen to develop that partnership. During his participation in the meeting of NATO and the ICI States, which was held on January 24, 2017, in Kuwait, the Bahraini Foreign Minister, at the time, Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa said that “the meeting is a clear evidence on the achievements which are being made through the ICI since its launching in 2004”.33 In fact, NATO officials and its academic institutions have sought to promote this initiative on a large scale; former NATO officials have talked about the achievements of the initiative during their participation in some conferences which have to do with security of the Arab Gulf. In this context, ambassador Thrasyvoulos Terry Stathopoulos, the former NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, said, “NATO has played an important role in maintaining the security of the Arab Gulf region through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched by the Alliance in 2004. It offers a box of selected areas of security cooperation. In 2010 NATO leaders expressed their desire to support the Arab Gulf security; their interest in that desire started to rise at NATO Chicago summit in 2012, then it became vivid and clear during the Warsaw Summit in 2016, as the Alliance issued the Framework Document which outlined a set of principles for strengthening dialogue between NATO and the Istanbul Initiative member States; the latter party adopted all the principles in areas such as energy security, maritime security, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, contingency planning, and electronic defense. The Alliance has taken another crucial step in terms of enhancing cooperation with the Gulf States, when it announced, in 2017, the launch of the NATO-ICI Regional Center in Kuwait which had already bore the costs of establishing the center. The Alliance has, also, launched another platform for cooperation during the Wales summit in which all the ICI states were participants. Dr. Abd al-Latif Al-Zayani, Secretary General of the GCC visited NATO headquarters in Brussels in 2012 and in 2016, when he delivered, for the first time, before the Atlantic Council, a speech. The two parties, NATO and Kuwait, agreed in that summit on strengthening their relations. At the same time, NATO’s Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, was invited to visit the Gulf Cooperation Council. In January 2017, NATO’s Secretary General and his GCC counterpart held a meeting. Al-Zayani said, “The GCC countries must develop their armament capabilities to confront Iran’s missile programs; this is a matter of concern for the Alliance which can contribute to it. This is in addition to its possible contribution in the field of crisis management.34 32 NATO.

2016. NATO: Cooperation with the UAE and the region enhances stability. 4 March. Accessed June 7, 2020. https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2016-03-04-1.2587389. 33 Newspaper, Alayam. 2017. The Minister of Foreign Affairs participates in the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 24 January. Accessed June 7, 2020. https://www.alayam.com/ online/local/627887/News.html. 34 Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies. 2018. Military Alliances in the Middle East. Manama: Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies.

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Cooperation between the Gulf States and NATO included various areas. However, the mechanism for implementing cooperation came through Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programs which last for three years each. Actually, cooperation between the Kingdom of Bahrain and NATO was carried out within the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (2016–2018). Commenting on that program, Dr. Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Undersecretary for political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Bahrain, said, “The first version of that program was an important milestone for enhancing cooperation in areas of common interest,” he emphasized “the Kingdom of Bahrain’s commitment to its partnership with NATO in order to maintain international peace and security”. The Bahraini official added that the first version of the program has achieved tangible successes in many areas, including regional security, information sharing, strategic, political and military analysis, capabilities development, combating terrorism, maritime security, and early planning for crisis prevention. While introducing the second version of the program (2018-2020), Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed Al Khalifa emphasized, during his meeting with NATO officials in Brussels, the fact that the program is based on three main pillars, namely: political cooperation, diplomatic cooperation, and exchanging expertise in fields of defense and security.35 It should be highlighted that this program has been signed by the four ICI members States under the “26 + 1” formula, which means that each individual Gulf State shall engage in bilateral cooperation with NATO as a whole entity. Within the framework of political coordination between NATO and the Istanbul Initiative Gulf members, Dr. Bahia Al-Jishi, the Bahraini ambassador to Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg, as well as the country’s representative in the European Union and NATO, has participated, on 30ths September 2020 in the meeting for which Kay Bailey Hutchinson, the US ambassador to NATO, has called. During that meeting, in which ambassadors of ICI member States participated, Al-Jishi confirmed that Bahrain is proud of the sustainable historical partnership with the United States and appreciates the importance of cooperation between Bahrain and NATO, whether on the bilateral level or through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. She presented during the same meeting Bahrain’s experience in facing the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic on the national level. The US ambassador, on the other hand, affirmed the United States’ keenness to support its allies in everything that would help maintain security and peace in the region.36 During his visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels on February 9, 2021, Dr. Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Undersecretary of the Bahraini Ministry of Foreign Affairs for political Affairs, met with Mr. Giovanni Romani, the Head of the NATO Middle East and North Africa Section of the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division. During the meeting, Dr. Sheikh Abdullah underlined the constructive and 35 Newspaper,

Alayam. 2018. A new version of the partnership between Bahrain and NATO. 17 September. Accessed June 14, 2020. https://www.alayam.com/alayam/first/752533/News.html. 36 Newspaper, Akhbar-alkhaleej. 2020. Bahrain’s Ambassador to Belgium Stresses the Importance of Cooperation between Bahrain and NATO. 1 October. Accessed October 1, 2020. http://www.akh bar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1223189.

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positive results of the two previous two versions of the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program between the Kingdom of Bahrain and NATO. He stressed that the third version of the Cooperation Program for the years 2021–2023 will focus on strengthening cooperation between the two sides in the areas of capacity building and securing qualitative training opportunities. Dr. Sheikh Abdullah also voiced aspiration of the Kingdom of Bahrain for continuous bolstering of cooperating with NATO, especially in the area of maritime security, and keeping abreast of the continuous technological developments to ensure regional security and stability.37 Generally speaking, the Istanbul initiative has marked a step change in NATO’s relations with Gulf States; that is the NATO- Gulf States relations were no longer simply practical, but strategic, aiming at deepening political dialogue and public diplomacy outreach effort to enhance mutual understanding. The result of such a change in relations, granted each of the ICI countries an access to NATO’s Partnership Cooperation Menu—a broad range of areas of cooperation. The ICI States have since also opened diplomatic missions to NATO in Brussels and accredited partner military representatives to NATO’s Allied Command Operations, also known as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe or (SHAPE) in Belgium. In addition, Kuwait contributed a military officer who became an integral part of the NATO Defense College teaching staff. NATO and ICI States have worked together at sea within the Combined Maritime Forces to counter piracy and protect maritime security in the Gulf. Moreover, all the GCCs, NATO Allies, and NATO itself, are part of the US-led international coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da’esh). Perhaps what makes the Istanbul initiative more important is the unending security challenges facing both the Gulf States and NATO countries; within this context, Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, said, “Our world is an increasingly unpredictable place. The best way to deal with that uncertainty is to be prepared. So, we must continue to strengthen the links between our forces. And their ability to work together. But as well as military cooperation, we should further deepen our political consultation”.38 Despite the important results of the Istanbul initiative regarding the benefits that the Arab Gulf states have gained from areas of security cooperation provided by NATO, the development of this initiative depends, to a great extent, on the path that the initiative has pursued. Theoretically, there are three paths: First, the strategy of modest ambition: According to this strategy, NATO is to have limited participation in soft security issues. This includes information and intelligence cooperation, confidence-building measures, and giving up any pre-conditions that could possibly be imposed on the Gulf States which have joined the initiative. This strategy has several advantages, including flexibility and taking into account 37 Agency,

Bahrain News. 2021. The Under Secretary of State for International Affairs meets with the Head of the NATO Middle East and North Africa Section of the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division. 10 February. Accessed April 20, 2021. https://www.bna.bh/.aspx?cms=q8FmFJgis cL2fwIzON1%2BDvbG65Maoc%2F%2BkqH6UsFcNEk%3D. 38 Webb, Amanda. 2019. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative at 15. 19 December. Accessed September 28, 2020. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/12/16/the-istanbul-cooper ation-initiative-at-15/index.html.

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the specificity of regional partners. However, there are, on the other hand disadvantages, including the lack of any binding commitments and the absence of financial or human resources allotted for implementation. In addition, this strategy does not help improve the image of NATO nor does it help address the problems resulting from the changing strategic environment. Second, the strategy of great ambition, it includes encouraging non-GCC countries to participate in the initiative; it is “the added partner” from outside both NATO and GCCs. This strategy has advantages, including ending the doubts and concerns that may arise between these global “added partners” and the Istanbul Initiative partners. On the long term, the strategy targets establishing a regional security forum encompassing all the regional parties. It (this strategy) has several advantages, including consolidating the principle of burden-sharing in order to enhance security and stability in the region. In spite of the importance of this strategy, it is difficult to gain support on the part of NATO countries as well as from the GCCs or even some of them. Third, the mediating strategy: it means the codified partnership that ends up leaving the bilateral framework of relationship on the basis of (26 + 1) formula to the multi-frame relations. This would encourage both NATO and the Arab Gulf States to develop their cooperation and transform it from soft security issues to hard security ones. However, the problem facing this strategy is that NATO’s out of area partnerships are based on the formula of bilateral cooperation with individual States, not with holistic organizations.39 The ICI is based on that formula; that is why in order to develop the Gulf-Atlantic partnership through that initiative, the Alliance must consider and develop a strategy that combines the advantages of the three strategies while respecting the privacy of the partners. The content of the new strategy must include all issues of “hard and soft” security combined. Evaluating the Istanbul Initiative and the Mediterranean Dialogue together as two regional initiatives of the Alliance, it can be said that their results were limited compared to other activities by the Alliance in its other partnerships for four reasons: The first reason: Despite NATO’s intention to intensify its partnerships by activating the mechanisms of “Partnership for Peace” and deepening cooperation in areas such as combating terrorism, the Mediterranean Dialogue countries did not have a strong interest which could have motivated them to enhance their participation in that initiative, except for few of them. The Istanbul initiative, on the other hand, remained limited to the mechanism of individual dialogue between the Alliance and each Gulf State separately. The second reason: In the aftermath of September attacks in 2001, NATO started to focus mainly on practical cooperation with Central Asian countries. Moreover, the support provided for the “International Security Assistance Force” for establishing and maintaining security in Afghanistan was at the expense of NATO’s partnership initiatives with the Middle East and North Africa.

39 Seif,

Mostafa Olwi. 2015. Regional security between national and global security. Cairo: International Center for Future and Strategic Studies.

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The third reason: NATO’s focus on “global partners” at Riga Summit (2006), and its subsequent offering to provide “tailored cooperation packages” for four of these global partners, namely Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, at Bucharest Summit (2008), were policies which have raised controversy over the global normative role of the Alliance. This prompted some academic experts to propose establishing a global “coalition of democracies” that would eventually replace NATO. However, the idea of founding an alliance that would include like-minded countries in the Asia-Pacific region did not receive wide acceptance.40 The fourth reason: Some of the Istanbul initiative’s articles were vague, this is in addition to the fact that it implies overly ambitious objectives, while not providing direct solutions to the Arab Gulf security dilemmas; it, rather, offers the countries wishing to join the initiative what they need in various fields included in the ICI. In other words, the countries which join the initiative should decide what they want to get from the Alliance; this makes the initiative just like a mechanism for coordination and cooperation because of its bilateral nature, meaning each individual Gulf State cooperates separately with NATO as a whole., despite the fact that the six Gulf States are encompassed under the umbrella of a regional organization; that is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).41 However, NATO is still an important partner for the Arab Gulf States, which are considered as smaller countries which must simultaneously address all regional threats; this is a massive burden on these countries’ security and defense capabilities. Moreover, Iran is still a threat endangering the interests and stability of these States whether due to Tehran’s support for the non-state armed groups in neighboring countries or its development of conventional military capabilities and the continued ambiguity concerning its nuclear programs. The Russian intervention in the Syrian crisis has enhanced Iran’s regional policies and created more imbalance of regional powers. This is in addition to terroristic groups which threaten maritime security. All these threats make it necessary for the Gulf States not only to maintain their partnership with NATO, but also to develop that partnership and upgrade it to new prospects through three simultaneous tracks. The first track is the Istanbul initiative itself which could be developed in terms of both its content and framework or mechanisms. As for the former, the initiative must include security developments, especially energy security which is crucial and vital to both NATO and the Gulf states. Regarding the later (mechanisms), there could be—in parallel with the Istanbul initiative- an annual strategic dialogue between the Alliance and all of the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and Oman through which the Atlantic-Gulf cooperation could be developed. The second track has to do with NATO’s role in addressing one of the dilemmas facing the Gulf States, which is the flaw in the regional balance of power. The Alliance can provide assistance and support for the 40 Aybet, Gülnur. 2012. “The Four Stages of NATO’s Partnership Frameworks: Rethinking Regional.” In Dynamic Change: Rethinking NATO’s Capabilities, Operations and Partnerships, by Riccardo Alcaro and Sonia Lucarelli, 100–121. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali. 41 Saqr, Abdul Aziz bin. 2008. The Necessity to Reconsider the Relations between the GCC States and NATO. 1 April. Accessed August 29, 2020. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2008/08/NATO_G ULF_RELATIONS/EN/index.htm.

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Gulf States’ defense capabilities and frequently conduct military maneuvers with the States in the region in order to deliver a message to the parties which seek to change the balance of regional powers. The third track has to do with regional security threats; NATO can contribute to supporting the security and defense capabilities of the regional neighboring countries, similar to the Alliance’s support for the Iraqi security forces. NATO can provide support to the Yemeni security forces. However, the Alliance is to have a mechanism for dealing with the possible strategic shifts in the region, such as the proposal of establishing a strategic regional alliance encompassing the Gulf States, Egypt and Jordan. It is worth mentioning that the aforementioned Arab alliance could have an immense impact on NATO’s regional partnerships.42 The fourth track should focus on maximizing the Gulf States’ benefits from what NATO provides as an “added value to security”, especially in terms of overcoming and facing threats against maritime security, given NATO’s vast capabilities and expertise on that respect. Moreover, NATO could be asked to support the Gulf States with military technology, as the current security threats are different from those highlighted in the Istanbul Initiative (2004). It is noticed that the new variant in regional security threats is the “drones” which are used by the armed terroristic militias to target vital installations in the Gulf, in what is known as “irregular wars”.43 As for NATO, its objectives must be more clearly defined. NATO has also to publicly announced what it can offer regarding the “added value to security” provided that what it offers commensurate with the Gulf States’ needs, focusing on quality rather than quantity. This is in addition to the Gulf’s advocate for drawing joint security and defense strategies and adopting the principle of transparency and mutual trust between NATO countries and the ICI Gulf members without marginalizing the Gulf Cooperation Council as a regional organization for protecting and maintaining the security the Gulf states.44 There are a number of recommendations illustrated in one of the important academic papers on NATO policies, they are as follows, 1.

2. 3.

NATO should initiate a broader strategic dialogue, which is to be based on common interests and visions for stability before it engages in areas of practical cooperation. It should do so by initiating a strategic dialogue with MD and ICI partners and invite other states such as Saudi Arabia, Oman and Lebanon to join in the process. NATO should be clear about the agenda of global and regional security challenges to be included in the strategic dialogue with regional partners. The presentation of the new partnership policy and the ‘flexible’ mechanisms for cooperation to existing and potential partners needs to be simplified. The

42 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2019. “The Istanbul cooperation initiative (ICI) and the gulf security: Perspective from the region.” The Voice of the College, NATO Defense College, 1 February: 6–7. 43 Keshk, Ashraf Mohmmed. 2017. The NATO Center in Kuwait asked 4 Questions about the Activation of the Istanbul Initiative 5 March. Accessed July 25, 2020. https://araa.sa/index.php? view=article&id=4039:4&Itemid=172&option=com_content. 44 Razoux, Pierre. 2010. What Future for NATO Istanbul cooperation Initiative? 1 January. Accessed May 13, 2021. https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/112378.

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5.

6.

7.

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goals of partnerships must be clearly identified. Is it to aid in democratic governance and political reform? To provide security for a stable environment. To provide expertise in defense reform and planning assistance? Or is it to engage in strategic dialogue to reach a common understanding of shared concerns about global security challenges? It may be better to categorize different purposes or different partnership schemes rather than to streamline them. It is preferable to hold multilateral strategic dialogues between MENA countries and NATO on an issue-based approach, focusing on specific topics such as international terrorism, failed states and energy security. NATO must make it clear that its legitimacy as a party to strategic dialogue on common interests is not linked to its success as a regional security provider. This would be helpful in shaping regional expectations. NATO’s track record in the Balkans need not be repeated in the MENA region for NATO to play an active role with partners from the region. NATO can perhaps establish a new legitimacy as a broker of strategic dialogue between various actors, ICI, MD and non-partner countries from the region. Understandably, this will evolve with practice. NATO can most probably engage in regional strategic dialogue more effectively if it acts together with other regional powers and institutions. To this end, NATO could add management of regional change and strategic dialogue with partners in the MENA region to the agenda of the NATO-Russia Council. Rather than treating Russia as a separate partner alongside many other partnership frameworks, NATO should engage Russia so that the latter becomes a joint partner in strategic dialogue with the MENA region. This may also help smooth over differences between NATO and Russia towards the region. NATO should make an effort to unlock the blocked areas of NATO-EU partnership, and also engage the European Union (EU) , alongside Russia, as a partner in initiating regional strategic dialogue. NATO should avoid using the template of the 1990s: shaping regions through normative power and using institutional leverage to induce political and defense reform. Any practical issue-based cooperation under the new partnership policy should not be presented under this pretext, especially to potential partners.45

Mechanisms for Maximizing the Gulf States’ Benefits from NATO In spite of the previously highlighted wide rang areas of cooperation which reflect the real and various benefits that the ICI member States has gained from NATO, there are other proposed areas of cooperation regarding security and defense by NATO, of which the GCCs can take advantage, after being carefully considered. Given the 45 Aybet,

Gülnur. 2012. “The Four Stages of NATO’s Partnership Frameworks: Rethinking Regional.” In Dynamic Change: Rethinking NATO’s Capabilities, Operations and Partnerships, by Riccardo Alcaro and Sonia Lucarelli, 100–121. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali.

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fact that the Gulf States have already bilateral defense agreements with the major countries in “NATO”, then the logical question to be raised is what added value can NATO provide as an organization for the Arab Gulf security? Actually, the Gulf States benefit from NATO in several areas, namely: 1.

NATO’s defense doctrine and the Gulf States’ possible benefit from it

NATO has civil and military institutions, and there is a mechanism for decisionmaking as well as committees concerned with many tasks, including strategic review, the integration between the civilian and military divisions of NATO’s international staff, making amendments to the tasks of NATO’s military committee, establishing research advisory teams that work always for achieving two objectives: reviving NATO’s role and outlining the roles that it can play. The principles upon which the military doctrine of the Alliance is based, are as follows: “security is holistic”, maintaining the structure of the armed forces unified, creation of forces more flexible and freer in movement. According to Articles Three and Five of NATO’s founding Treaty, the defense doctrine of the Alliance is based on two pillars: first, establishing a unified combat doctrine for the Alliance, because supporting the individual and collective military capabilities of NATO members does not merely mean providing them with advanced weapons, but rather how they use forces in times of attack, defense and deterrence. Second, employing this doctrine for putting Article 5 into practice through collective defense against any potential aggression; this is on the one hand. On the other hand, one of NATO’s best practices is issuing the Strategic Concept every ten years in order to bridge the gap between the provisions of the founding Treaty and security developments. The significance of issuing the Strategic Concept lies in creating a “new consensus” on the new security threats among NATO countries, and determining if the Alliance can confront them with its traditional strategies or does it need new mechanisms? That is outlined after a lengthy discussion on both the military and political levels, either among the Alliance countries themselves or between NATO and its partners across the globe.The Gulf States can benefit from NATO’s defense doctrine, as the GCC charter can be amended to explicitly state that any attack on any of the GCCs is an assault against all the Gulf States. Though the preamble of the GCC Charter and Article 4 of it emphasize the unity and integration among the Arab Gulf States46 the charter can be amended to include the content of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; that is any assault against on any Arab Gulf State would be considered as an assault against all the Gulf States, especially in light of the fact that this is what the actual Gulf practices reflected during the war to liberate Kuwait in 1991, or during Bahrain’s crisis in 2011. In addition, the GCCs can issue their own strategic concept; that is, it can conduct a security review of the threats and determine new mechanisms for confronting them. This could happen every five or ten years so that the review could complement, and not contradict with, the founding charter of the GCCS.

46 States,

The Gulf Cooperation Council. n.d. The statute of the council. Accessed July 4, 2020. https://www.gcc-sg.org/en-sa/AboutGCC/Pages/Primarylaw.aspx.

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The structure of NATO’s basic armed forces and how the Gulf states could benefit from them:

These forces consist of: Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF): They include the land, air and sea forces which are considered the first working NATO forces. These forces are on high alert and can work immediately and manage crises. They, also, have the ability to be deployed anywhere in the world in a period ranging from one week to a month. The Main Defense Forces (MDF): which represent the regular forces of the Alliance. They consist of forces from different NATO countries, but the US only contribute to 50% of these forces. The Augmentation Forces (AF): These are the reserve forces that the Alliance uses when necessary, to reinforce the main defense forces. Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF): they were established under a proposal by the United States in 1994 and consist of 17 divisions and 27 brigades distributed over the countries of the Western European Union. Two divisions have also been placed in Turkey and Greece. These forces do not achieve deterrence, but rather are nominated to work in crises areas. These forces operate under two commands; that are the Main Atlantic Command in US and include the West, East and Central Atlantic regions, and the Main Command in Europe, which includes southern, central and northwestern Europe.47 The Gulf States can benefit from NATO’s experience by dividing the joint defense forces of the Gulf Cooperation Council into three divisions. First, the rapid reaction forces; they are to be on high alert to respond to any emergency threat. They must include land, air and maritime units and have the ability to be deployed several days after being informed. These forces, have, as well, to be equipped with all the required capabilities, and be able to secure their needs within thirty days at least. Second division is the main defense forces. Third division is to include the reserve forces. This means that radical changes can be made on the Gulf joint military formations to become light-armored and fast-moving, so that they could carry out quick and successful military operations. In other words, the afore-mentioned forces are to be “forces prepared for crises” similar to NATO forces. Actually, this is extremely important, given the continuing unrests in the GCCS neighboring countries, and the regional security threats facing the Gulf States. On the other hand, the Arab Gulf States can benefit from the structure of NATO, especially the political and military committees. NATO’s Political Committee (PC) includes the Council of the Alliance, the Defense Planning Committee and the Secretary General. The military committee, on the other hand, includes two main bodies: The Supreme Military Committee and the main military commanders. The Supreme Military Committee is the highest authority in the Alliance; it includes the chiefs of staff of NATO countries’ armies and is headed by a military commander elected from its members. Its members meet twice a year or when necessary. In light of the 47 Encyclopedia, Al Moqatel. n.d. NATO Military Commands and troops: The Conventional and the Nuclear. Accessed July 4, 2020. http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Monzmat3/NATO/ mol09.doc_cvt.htm.

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Gulf States interest to implement the project of a Gulf Union project, the previously illustrated civil and military divisions can be integrated into the structure of that union; this is due to the need for specialized research teams to work permanently on strengthening the role of that union and study the challenges it would face so that the civilian vision could integrate with the military one. Within the same context, General Wesley Clark, NATO’s former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, says, “NATO is based on Article 5, which considers that any attack against a country member is an assault against all the NATO countries, as well as Article 4, which stipulates consultation between NATO members. This means that the Alliance has security as well as legal responsibilities at the same time, as legal matters which precede conflicts are given great attention. NATO’s political authority under which all its members work, is in charge of planning the operations of the Alliance; that is NATO’s political leadership has a diplomatic leverage, supporting its military action. The Alliance is, essentially, a defense organization with a strong clasp, and if it begins a military action, it must accomplish if. During the Kosovo crisis, for instance, the Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, did not realize that as conflict has started, NATO would force him to surrender, and the same was true of the overthrow of the Libyan regime in 2011.48 It should be emphasized that the Gulf States have capabilities which can qualify it to cooperate with NATO, especially in terms of defense. Among these capabilities is the experience of some ICI members which have already worked with NATO in Libya in 2011. This is in addition to the participation of the Bahraini, Saudi, and Emirati air forces in the international coalition against ISIL, which the United States has established in 2014. The UAE, Kuwait and Qatar have given Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and Italy permissions to deploy their air assets in the Gulf military bases, so as to be used in strikes against ISIL in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, Saudi Arabia leads the Arab Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen. All these developments reflect two important indicators: first, the Gulf intervention in Yemen has highlighted the Gulf States’ ability to intervene in their regional crises through building such an alliance which was based on quick political decision-making. Actually, it was the fact that Saudi Arabia is the most negatively affected by events in Yemen which propelled the establishment of the Arab Coalition. Saudi Arabia is about 80% of the total area of the Arabian Peninsula and share borders with 7 countries; that is why it is fully aware how the regional crises can affect its security. Second, the Arab Gulf States are copiously convinced of the necessity to build permanent armed forces, the aim of which is not only to protect their territories, but also to be deployed out of area to confront remote security threats, given the chronic security vacuum in neighboring countries which threaten the interests of the Gulf States. There are still suggestions regarding joint defense cooperation among the Gulf States, such as establishing a special military command for the GCC, creation of a joint maritime division, launching a ballistic defense cooperation, and founding a defense college for the Cooperation Council. The Gulf States have many strength 48 Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies. 2018. Military Alliances in the Middle East. Manama: Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies.

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points facilitating cooperation, unlike NATO which faced many cultural, historical, social, political and economic obstacles hindering their cooperation. NATO can play an important role in supporting defense initiatives of the GCCs, especially with regard to establishing a unified military command. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative can be a suitable platform for that. Actually, having a Gulf unified military command would lessen the burden on the United States. This is in addition to the role which NATO-Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Regional Centre can play; it could either help develop the partnership between the Gulf States and NATO or to be transformed into a distinct forum, in the region, for discussing security issues which impose challenges to all the Gulf States and NATO as well.49 3.

NATO and providing the Gulf States’ security needs

Given the shift in nature of the security threats, the partnership between the Gulf States and NATO attempts to meet the security needs of the Gulf States, which go beyond traditional military support. Despite the areas of security and military cooperation included in the Istanbul Initiative, in addition to NATO’s endeavor to institutionalize NATO-Gulf cooperation relations. Despite the launching of the ICI and the establishment of the NATO-ICC Regional Center which provides important training programs on crisis management, energy security, combating electronic terrorism and civil emergencies planning, there are other security needs for the Gulf States which have been formed by the regional developments. In other words, given the chronic regional crises and what NATO officials have called the “added-value to security,” the Alliance has paid great attention to the Arab Gulf states which are in need for modern military technology to retaliate attacks, in light of assaults targeting Saudi oil installations with drones. This is in addition to the importance of having joint cooperation mechanisms between the Alliance and the Gulf States in order to maintain energy security; NATO has paid this issue a great attention during NATO’s various summits, as well as in the bilateral meetings following the public launching of the ICI in 2004, but without this being crystallized within actual specific mechanisms to maintain energy security in the Arab Gulf. Moreover, NATO has a long experience and a clear strategy on facing electronic terrorism threats from which the Gulf States are suffering. In May 2013, in Manama held a symposium entitled “The Strategic Dialogue between NATO and the Gulf Cooperation Council States”, in which researchers and officials from the six GCCs participated, as well as researchers and officials from NATO. All the GCCs participants confirmed that the role of NATO is important to the Gulf States, as there are several security challenges facing them namely, Iran’s constant threatening to block the Strait of Hormuz. That is why ‘the added-value to security’ concept would be meaningless unless the content of Article 5 of Washington Treaty is modified. That is because any interruption in energy supplies will directly affect the security of NATO members and partners altogether. At the same time, building the defense capabilities of the Alliance countries, especially the 49 Samaan, Jean-Loup. 2017. Toward a NATO of the Gulf? The Challenges of Collective Defense Within the GCC. 1 September. Accessed September 25, 2020. file:///C:/Users/dcrsamk/Downloads/813048%20(1).pdf.

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missile defense capabilities will be a direct message to Iran concerning deterrence. In fact, NATO has to do that in order to achieve a balance of power with Iran, as well as to deter traditional and cyber terrorism. To that end, there were various questions about the limits of the security contribution that NATO could provide to its partner countries; for example, can NATO provide security assistance to Bahrain if it is exposed to cyber terrorism Similar to Estonia in 2007? NATO officials participating in the symposium have emphasized that NATO cannot do everything and that burdens must be shared with partners. They have also illustrated that there are many areas for security cooperation which NATO can provide, including security sector reform. However, security guarantees provided by the Alliance is dependent on Article 5, yet the Gulf States can send civilian and military experts for more trainings in NATO institutions which outline future paths for crises. NATO participants have added that “the difficulties facing the Alliance are economic challenges in addition to the United States’ acquisition of security in the Arab Gulf and thus eliminating chances for a greater role to the Alliance in that region”.50 NATO can, also, make contributions in terms of crisis management; for instance, the Alliance had provided practical training in 2013 on protecting civilians during wars. About 100,000 people from several Jordanian cities attended the training and got the required benefit from it. The Gulf States can benefit from similar trainings, as their concerns and fears lie not only in Iran’s exceeding the nuclear threshold, but also in a possible radioactive leak from any of the Iranian nuclear reactors which might lack nuclear safety measures. What enhances these fears is the fact of the locations of these reactors are near some major Gulf cities where all the major desalination plants are located on the Arabian Gulf coast, which means possible contamination of Gulf waters if sudden accidents occur. It is worth mentioning that the Iranian nuclear reactors are located in a seismic belt zone, and the exposure of these facilities to a cyber-attack is another challenge which strategically necessitate precautionary measures on the part of the Gulf States to manage any emergency incidents.51 The Gulf States have capabilities which make them an important regional partner for NATO, such as the “Maritime Security Force 81” which complements the naval section of the Peninsula Shield Force. The Gulf States can develop that force through a mechanism similar to the one which was established by NATO at the Wales Summit (2014). Moreover, the Arab Gulf States are present in the Horn of Africa, whether through efforts contributing to combating piracy or through establishing military bases there. This is in addition to the Gulf States’ experience in maritime security, which has been formed through periodic exchange of commanders of the international military coalition groups, including the following forces: The first is “Force 150” which takes over missions of maritime security and combating terrorism. The second is “Force 151” which combats piracy, while the third is “Force 152” which 50 Studies, International Institute for Strategic. 2013. The Gulf-Atlantic Strategic Dialogue. Manama:

unpublished. Ashraf Mohmmed. 2017. The NATO Center in Kuwait asked 4 Questions about the Activation of the Istanbul Initiative. 5 March. Accessed July 25, 2020.https://araa.sa/index.php? view=article&id=4039:4&Itemid=172&option=com_content. 51 Keshk,

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aims at achieving cooperation with regard to the security of the Arab Gulf. These three forces work under one coalition, its main task is monitoring, inspecting and landing on ships. The Gulf States carry out, as well, many naval maneuvers; this proves the GCCs readiness to work with partners and allies. Moreover, the Arab Gulf States have established in 2016 the Bahrain-based “Joint Maritime Coordination Center” among the Gulf States. In addition, Bahrain is the headquarters of the International Alliance for the Safety and Protection of Maritime Navigation (IASPMN) to secure navigation in the Gulf region.52 The European mission to protect the Arab Gulf, is also based in the UAE. NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, has referred to that cooperation in an article which was published in Al-Hayat, a London-based newspaper, on December14, 2014, entitled “The need for cooperation between the Arab countries and NATO,” where he indicated that there are common challenges facing NATO and its partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative (1994) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (2004). These challenges include terrorism, protecting maritime paths, energy supplies, and basic infrastructure, cyberspace networks, human trafficking and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction globally, stressing that no country can confront these challenges alone, therefore there is a need to enhance cooperation in three main areas, namely: 1.

2.

3.

The possible support which NATO could provide to its partners in terms of modernizing their defense and security sectors. NATO has a great experience in this respect and is willing to share it with partners to enable them achieving security and stability in their territories. Deepening cooperation between NATO’s armed forces and those of its partners, including joint exercises and trainings that will mobilize capabilities and enable them to address the increasing security challenges, especially threats against maritime security. Stoltenberg clarified that he has asked the Gulf States to join “Operation Ocean Shield” which was led by NATO since 2009 to combat piracy in the Western Indian Ocean. Deepening political consultations between NATO and its partners at both the bilateral and multilateral levels, in order to exchange common understanding about the concerns and threats facing the two parties and to enhance the ability to address them.53

52 Keshk, Ashraf Mohmmed. 2018. “The NATO Energy Security Strategy.” Derasat, 1 December: 69,70,75,76. 53 Stoltenberg, Jens. 2014. “The need for cooperation between the Arab countries and NATO.” Al-Hayat, 14 December: 11.

Chapter 3

Role of NATO in Addressing Regional Security Threats to the Arabian Gulf Countries

Introduction This chapter tackle’s role of NATO in addressing regional security threats that have an impact on interests of the Arabian Gulf countries. The first part of the chapter deals with role of NATO in addressing threats to maritime security, by defining vision of NATO on these threats, mechanisms it introduced to confront them and experiences of the alliance in this regard. The second part deals with role of NATO in addressing the Iranian threats to interests of the alliance’s member states in the Arabian Gulf region, which has the most important strategic sea routes. The possibility of NATO’s military intervention, if Iran crosses what the alliance calls ‘red lines’ in its conflict with the United States, is also discussed in this chapter. As for the third part, it deals with role of NATO in bolstering the Iraqi security capabilities, explaining foundations and components of such role, and reviewing stages of the training process since its launch at the Istanbul 2004 summit until 2020. Challenges faced by NATO in this respect, and coordination between the alliance and the European Union, which sent a mission to Iraq in 2017 for the same purpose, are also tackled in this part of the chapter. The fourth part of the chapter deals with role of NATO in combating terrorism. This involves clarifying NATO vision in this respect and discussing the beginning of enforcing Article 5 of Washington Treaty after September 11, 2001 terror attacks, the war in Afghanistan and NATO’s joining the international coalition to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2017. The same part tackles NATO’s role in countering cybersecurity threats. The final part of the chapter deals with NATO’s role regarding energy security. Such issue was the main topic of many meetings of NATO with the Gulf member states of Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) . This part discusses also NATO’s perspective on Iran’s threats to energy security in the Arabian Gulf.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. M. Keshk, NATO and the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3815-2_3

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NATO’s Role in Addressing Threats to Maritime Security NATO attaches great importance to maritime security. Capabilities, pillars, and mechanisms of NATO’s strategy to address maritime security threats are reviewed below: 1.

NATO’s naval capabilities

The NATO naval force consists of two naval commands, in Naples, Italy and in Northwood, the United Kingdom, and the submarine command located in Norfolk, Virginia. Such force belongs to a broader joint command structure, which includes four fixed multinational maritime groups. Two of such groups are concerned with mine clearance procedures and are permanently belongs to Naples and Northwood. There are also four fighting naval units under command of France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. There is another unit with advanced warfare capability under the command of the United States. All these units are periodically available for NATO Response Force operations, NATO Northwood Navigation Center, Ocean Navigation Planning Board, NATO Naval Armament Group, Naval Standardization Board of NATO Maritime Standardization Agency, the joint operations of the Naval Center of Excellence in Novok, and NATO Naval Training Operations Center in Crete, Greece.1 2.

Pillars of NATO to maintain maritime security

NATO has two pillars for countering threats to maritime security: The first pillar is the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, which included a lengthy paragraph on threats to energy security, stating that “All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption. Some NATO countries will become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers, and in some cases on foreign energy supply and distribution networks, for their energy needs. As a larger share of world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption”.2 The second pillar is the 2011 NATO Maritime Strategy, which included four elements, namely deterrence, collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security through strengthening dialogue and partnerships and achieving maritime security. This strategy requires conducting surveillance and patrolling, maintaining the ability of NATO’s maritime forces, and ensuring preparedness of such forces.

1 PALMER, Diego RUIZ. 2010. End of the maritime era. Accessed August 29, 2020. https://www. nato.int/docu/review/2010/Maritime_Security/end_of_naval_era/AR/index.htm. 2 NATO. 2010. Active engagement and a modern defense system. 19 November. Accessed June 10, 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm?selectedLocale=ar

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3.

NATO’s mechanisms to maintain maritime security

A.

Operation Active Endeavor: This operation was introduced as part of eight immediate NATO responses to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that targeted the United States. Under this operation, NATO ships patrolled the Mediterranean and monitored shipping to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist acts. Given development of NATO’s experience in combating terrorism, mandate granted to it in this regard is renewed, and the alliance gained during this operation enormous experience in deterring maritime terrorism in the Mediterranean. Such experience is useful for global efforts to confront terrorism and suspicion of smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and strengthened cooperation between the alliance and non-NATO states and civilian institutions. This operation aims to demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and resolve in the fight against terrorism and helps deter and disrupt terrorist acts in the Mediterranean. NATO’s increasing presence in the Mediterranean results in many benefits for all ships sailing through the sea routes and secured many benefits for the alliance itself regarding maintaining maritime security of NATO member states. Although goals of Operation Active Endeavor are limited to deterrence, surveillance and monitoring activities related to terrorism, the operation has a remarkable impact on security and stability in the Mediterranean, which is the artery of trade and economic activities in general. Around 65% of the oil and natural gas consumed annually in the Western European countries passes through the Mediterranean, by means of giant pipelines linking Libya to Italy and Morocco to Spain. Therefore, NATO ships carry out patrolling operations in ‘choke points’ as well as important routes and ports in the Mediterranean. The alliance has been carrying out this task since April 2003, in a systematic manner for all suspected ships sailing through the Mediterranean. In this respect, inspections are carried out with approval of captains of ships and the countries that own them, and in accordance with the international law. The inspection mechanism involves that merchant ships sailing in the eastern Mediterranean are stopped by naval units of NATO, which work continues in the form of patrols. These ships are required to announce their identity and the nature of the activities they carry out. Such information is sent to of NATO Allied Naval Units Command in Naples, Italy, as well as to NATO Shipping Center in Northwood, England. In the event of any unusual or suspicious matter, teams consisting of between 15 and 20 crew staff of ships intercept and stop the ship, review documents related to it, and inspect the shipment onboard. NATO officials can also send this information to the appropriate law enforcement authorities at the next port in the route of the ship, to be disrupted until the concerned authority takes action, or until it enters territorial waters of any country.

NATO ships and helicopters have also previously intervened in numerous incidents to rescue civilians on collapsed oil platforms and sunken ships. This included rescuing 48 workers who were working on an oil extraction platform in the high seas in fierce winds in December 2001. Women and children were also rescued from a

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sunken ship that was carrying about 250 refugees in January 2002, and they were helped repair the damaged ship. NATO’s increasing presence in the Mediterranean also helped strengthen security cooperation, as part of the Mediterranean Dialogue launched by the alliance in 1994, to cooperate with 7 countries in that region, namely Egypt, Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Goals of such cooperation involve strengthening regional security and stability and achieving mutual understanding between NATO and its Mediterranean partners. These countries cooperate with NATO in Operation Active Endeavor by supplying the alliance with intelligence information, as well as informing NATO of shipping operations in its territorial waters. This cooperation and its mechanisms are being developed continuously.3 Since its launch in October 2001, Operation Active Endeavor has been considered one of the most important and longest maritime security operations in history of NATO. This operation has witnessed interception of 124,000 merchant ships, escorting hundreds of ships, and inspecting 170 suspected ships. In 2015, NATO changed the classification of Operation Active Endeavor into a maritime security operation. This new classification allowed it to carry out seven different tasks, which included maritime situational awareness, freedom of navigation, maritime interdiction, countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, protecting critical infrastructure, countering terrorism at sea and maritime security capacity-building. In Warsaw Summit of July 2016, NATO member states changed the classification and name of Operation Active Endeavor into Operation Sea Guardian. By means of this mechanism, NATO can create a safe environment for civilian ships sailing in the Mediterranean Sea, by providing these ships with information about the potential risks they might face. Under Operation Sea Guardian, NATO ships can also stop sailing ships to check their identities and their shipments and board them for inspection if suspicions arise about them. This mechanism also involves that vessels from NATO member states engage in these efforts for specific periods of time, at a level of three consecutive weeks every two months, totaling six times a year. Operation Sea Guardian also provides Operation Sophia of the European Union with information and logistic support. B.

NATO’s role in countering piracy off the coast of Somalia

NATO has contributed to countering piracy off the coast of Somalia since 2008, based on UN resolutions, namely Resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838. These resolutions provide for engagement of concerned international forces and organizations in supporting international efforts to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden, off the coasts of the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. NATO has contributed, by means of forces called ‘Ocean Shield,’ to intelligence and surveillance missions, to ensure safety

3 NATO.

2016. Operation Active Endeavour. 27 October. Accessed June 13, 2020. https://www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_7932.htm.

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of shipping activities off the coast of Somalia, and to separate legitimate maritime transport from suspected pirate ships.4 In a meeting in Budapest, Hungary, on October 8, 2008, NATO defense ministers agreed to send seven frigates to the Somali coasts, to join the permanent NATO naval group in that region. On 27th of the same month, NATO announced the arrival of three warships owned by the alliance’s member states of Italy, Greece and Britain, to coasts of Somalia. Role of such worships involved guarding ships of the World Food Program allocated for African countries. On April 28, 2009, a Portuguese guarding vessel joined the NATO force. Such vessel had an important role in combating piracy in this region, as it was equipped with helicopters, heavy weapons, missiles and interception boats. In 2012, a number of NATO member states decided to purchase a number of drones from the United States to use them in their war against piracy in the Arabian Sea.5 Despite the importance of what is reviewed above, the complex reality of threats to maritime security and the cost of confronting them might have proven that NATO’s contributions to confront such threats inappropriate, given the long maritime distances traveled within maritime transport of oil. Consequently, NATO needs to integrate its efforts with partners and relevant international organizations. This has already happened in international efforts to address piracy off the coast of Somalia.6 In spite of the importance of that mission, it was subject to criticism, as some regarded it merely as part of NATO’s strategy to expand its influence into new areas, within the alliance’s policies of ‘expansion’ outside territories of its member states after the end of the Cold War era. After both Afghanistan and Iraq, NATO began to find a foothold in new regions. In the summer of 2007, a NATO multinational naval group sailed around Africa for the first time. The goal of that operation was to demonstrate concern regarding security of remote and vulnerable sea routes and to prove the capability to use a naval force in areas beyond the traditional European waters. This mission took about two months, over which NATO forces sailed for 12,500 nautical miles to the south of Africa. Such forces carried out patrols off coasts of the continent and carried out a joint drill with the South African Navy and rescued Yemeni soldiers who survived a sudden volcanic explosion on an island off the Yemeni coast. Another point of criticism for NATO mission to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia was that the alliance used heavy naval vessels whose tonnage ranges between four and seven tons, and thus they were not prepared to chase the speedboats used by pirates. Advanced offensive and reconnaissance capabilities of such vessels also raised concern of many regional powers. This confirmed that NATO’s participation 4 Politi, Alessandro. 2019. “NATO and Maritime Security in the Arabic Gulf.” Derasat 87-82-83-87. 5 Al-Marhoun, Abdul-Jalil Zaid. 2012. Maritime piracy in the Indian Ocean and its effects on regional security in the Arab Gulf region (2008–2012). 1 December. Accessed August 29, 2020. https://www.ecssr.ae/wp-content/uploads/PDF/Rua_Strategia/Rua-Issue-01/rua_page_076.pdf. 6 Keshk, Ashraf Mohmmed. 2018. Three determinants for NATO’s interference in conflicts, and security of waterways is a priority. 1 January. Accessed July 24, 2020. https://issuu.com/araa-new/ docs/127-r/113?fr=sNmQ2NzE1NTU1OD.

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in such mission was a response from the alliance to a traditional American request regarding the necessity of NATO’s engagement in facing security threats outside Europe.7

NATO’s Role Concerning Iranian Threats Although the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) between NATO and the Gulf countries is closely concerned with areas of direct bilateral cooperation between the alliance and each country separately, the security of the Arabian Gulf is an integral part of the regional security system. In turn, regional security system is part of the security of the Middle East, a region that comprises some regional NATO partnerships. Therefore, stability of region is a strategic matter for the Gulf countries and NATO alike, to maintain regional balance. In other words, the role that NATO can play in addressing regional security threats to the Arabian Gulf countries enhances cooperation opportunities within ICI itself. In fact, NATO was not far from addressing Gulf regional security threats. It intervened in the Gulf region, not as an organization, but by its major countries, twice. The first intervention was during the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) , and the second was during the war to liberate the State of Kuwait in 1991.8 The first direct military intervention by NATO was in the Libyan crisis in 2011. With the increase in severity of regional security threats, especially the continuing threat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and the Iranian threat to energy security, questions were raised by the Gulf countries about the role that NATO can play in countering these threats in general. Such questions are raised also on the role NATO can play in confronting direct military intervention in the event of a direct military threat to one of the Arabian Gulf countries, including role of NATO regarding the Iranian threats. Concerning these questions, it should be emphasized, at the beginning, that Iran regards the NATO-Gulf cooperation a challenge to it as such cooperation contradicts the Iranian vision on the security of the Arabian Gulf. Under this vision, security of the Gulf region is based on regional security arrangements among the eight counties on shore of the Gulf (the six GCC countries, Iraq and Iran). This means Iranian rejection for foreign presence in the Arabian Gulf region, and foreign means any party outside the eight aforementioned countries. Iran believes that this security can be achieved by concluding bilateral agreements between these countries. The next steps in this respect involve concluding joint non-aggression agreements and establishing mechanisms for dialogue and consultation between these countries, with them not concluding any security agreements with parties outside the region. All the 7 Haider, Mohammed Saif. 2009. NATO in the Gulf of Aden. Combating piracy

and other purposes. 18 November. Accessed August 3, 2020. http://www.alwatan.com/graphics/2009/11nov/18.11/dai lyhtml/opinion.htm. 8 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2018. Will NATO protect Bab al-Mandab Strait? 24 January. Accessed July 30, 2020. http://akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1106767.

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proposals announced by Iran regarding security of the Arabian Gulf since 2006 until 2020 have included these elements.9 By analyzing the Iranian vision on security of the Arabian Gulf, it is found out that such vision always ignores the Gulf-Iranian differences and causes of instability, foremost among them are Iranian interference in internal affairs of the GCC countries and in affairs of their neighbors. Such vision also ignores the border disputes between Iran and the Gulf countries, the ambiguity policy regarding Iranian nuclear programs, and the disagreement on the name of the Arabian Gulf and its security. Therefore, NATO officials understand that Iran is the first threat to security of the Arabian Gulf countries. Consequently, and despite what is reviewed above and the fact that NATO was not a party to the nuclear deal signed in July 2015 between Iran and the 5 + 1 countries, the official position of the alliance has been that it is necessity for the parties to the deal to comply with it. NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, emphasized this, saying, “The full implementation of the nuclear deal between Iran and the 5 + 1 Group, and identifying mechanisms to verify Iran’s commitment to fully implement its provisions, is important”. This NATO perspective to the Iranian threats is important. Nonetheless, such threats are not related to the nuclear programs only. These threats are related to means to deliver these weapons in case of possessing them, as Iran seeks to develop advanced generations of medium and long-range missiles. Iran’s threat to maritime navigation in Strait of Hormuz is another challenge to NATO, as around 17 million barrels of oil are transported through that strait, accounting for 40% of the oil transported with waterways as part of the global trade. This means that NATO must engage, whether individually or as part of international efforts, in countering the Iranian threats, given that the regions of vital interests for NATO are the same regions of Iranian influence. NATO engaged in these regions with Middle Eastern partnerships (the Mediterranean Dialogue, and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative). They include also Central Asia and the Caucasus. These regions can be called the ‘strategic contact points’ between NATO and Iran. Therefore, there is a common interest for NATO and the Gulf countries to counter Iran’s threats to regional security.10 This is basically related to balance of power. In this respect, NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, told Munich Security Conference in 2016 that “Nobody should think Nuclear weapons may be used as part of a conventional conflict. Rather, they will radically change the nature of any conflict”.11 Nonetheless, NATO has not been directly involved in addressing the Iranian nuclear issue. Commenting on US President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal in May 2015, NATO spokesperson Oana Longesco 9 Keshk,

Ashraf Mohammed. 2014. “A renewed dilemma: Arabian Gulf security in the Iranian Vision.” Al Siyassa Al Dawliya (International Politics) 81. 10 keshk, Ashraf. 2019. “NATO and the threats to the Gulf Regional Security (2011–2017).” In the Arab Gulf States and The West: Perception and realities—Opportunities and Perils, by Dania Koleilat Khatib and Marwa Maziad (editors), 256–257. London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. 11 Grand, Camille. 2016. Nuclear Deterrence and NATO in the Twenty-First century. Accessed June 15, 2020. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/nuclear-deterrence-alliance21st-century-nato/AR/index.ht.

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rsaid, “The alliance is not authorized to assess whether Iran is complying with the nuclear deal or not?”. However, she added that, “Allies within NATO are concerned about Iran’s capability to develop ballistic missiles as well as about Iranian activities that destabilize the Middle East.” Given these statements, a question is raised on whether NATO could intervene militarily to confront an imminent Iranian threat to security of the Arabian Gulf region. In fact, the answer to this question is as much complex as the reality of regional security itself. NATO’s military intervention is not easy despite the alliance’s intervention more than once outside territories of its member states. Regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, NATO’s stance is based on three things. The first is exercising deterrence, as there is a huge gap between NATO’s military capabilities and the Iranian military capabilities. In 2018, the defense spending of NATO countries totaled $918 million,12 compared to Iranian budget allocated for defense expenditures that totaled $10.3 billion in the same year.13 This is only an example, as the military spending is reflected in the reality of the forces of the two parties. The second thing is the reality of the regional and international scene. Given the Russian intervention in the Syrian crisis in 2014 and the resulting Russian Iranian partnership in many areas, if NATO confronted Iran militarily, a question arises about the Russian stance, especially that the alliance has another front of conflict with Russia, namely the eastern front, (Ukraine). The developments of the Syrian crisis clarified the path in which NATO relations with Russia are going. When Turkey— a member state of the alliance—shot down a Sukhoi Su-24 Russian warplane on November 24, 2015, claiming that it violated Turkish airspace, NATO called on Russia to exercise restraint. In addition, when the United States, the UK and France launched a tripartite strike against suspected chemical weapons sites of the Syrian regime in April 2018, Russia was informed in advance. This means that major NATO member states want to avoid a direct military conflict with Russia. The third thing on which NATO’s strategy against Iran is based is the alliance’s assessment of the degree of threat. Although the alliance has enormous military capabilities, this does not mean that it is a military machine ready to be launched permanently even in the presence of a UN resolution. There is a political establishment within the alliance and crisis management mechanism. These two mechanisms seek to achieve consensus prior to NATO intervention in a certain crisis. Such a consensus is a prerequisite for NATO intervention. Achieving consensus is not easy, given NATO comprises 22 member states, which are themselves members states of the European Union. There is no consensus among these countries to confront Iran militarily, given their different interests with Iran.14 In spite of the importance of these points, there are so-called ‘red lines’ that NATO sets and will not allow them to be crossed, especially 12 NATO. 2019. Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011–2018). 14 March. Accessed August

3, 2020. https://www.defence24.pl/upload/2019-03-15/poens9_190314pr201834eng.pdf. 13 Net, Al Arabiya. 2020. Khamenei allocates $ 1.5 billion from development allocations for military

spending. 20 May. Accessed August 3, 2020. https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/iran/2019/02/05/%. 14 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed .2018. In light of complications, overlapping interests, and the balance

of power: Will NATO confront Iran militarily?. 1 June. Accessed June 15, 2020. https://araa.sa/index. php?view=article&id=4542:2018-07-26-11-17-04.

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regarding energy security. This has been clear since the aftermath of the attack on the oil facilities of Saudi Aramco on September 14, 2019, resulting in two fires in two factories belonging to the company in Abqaiq Governorate and Hajreit Khurais, as a result of them being targeted by drones according to a spokesman for the Saudi Ministry of Interior.15 In this respect, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said, “Iran is destabilizing the entire region”. He added, saying “We call upon all parties to stop repeating such attacks because they can have negative effects on the entire region,” stressing that “the alliance is very concerned about this escalation”. This means that if NATO assumes that these red lines are crossed, its eventual intervention is possible. This also brings back to mind the controversy that arose during NATO’s intervention in previous crises, including the Kosovo crisis in 1999. As such crisis escalated, Madeleine Albright, the then US Secretary of State said, “It is not possible to wait for a resolution by the UN Security Council to intervene. NATO would have the powers to maintain international peace and security and face challenges of the twenty-first century in coordination with the United Nations as much as possible”. Although every case of NATO intervention outside its territory has it conditions and special status, energy security and the Arabian Gulf security are among strategic interests of the alliance.16 Indeed, it is notable that statements have been issued by NATO officials from time to time during escalation in the conflict between the US and Iran, involving warnings from the alliance to Iran. In this respect, Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary-General of NATO, on January 6, 2020, called upon Iran to “avoid further violence and provocation,” and said, “The United States informed NATO members states about the killing of Iran’s Quds Force Commander, Qassem Soleimani, and other regional issues”. He added that “The allies have been concerned for years about Iranian efforts to destabilize the Middle East. They have agreed not to allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons and condemned its support for various terrorist groups”. “The outbreak of a new confrontation is not to the interest of any party and Iran should avoid more violence and provocation,” Stoltenberg stressed.17 On February 22, 2021, in an interview with CNN’s Connect the World program, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said, “Iran is a source of concern because it is responsible for destabilizing actions in the region, and we are concerned about its missile program”. He added that NATO’s main concern is the combination of Iran being near to developing a nuclear weapon and its ability to deliver it with its missile program. He stressed that “Restrictions must be imposed on Iran’s nuclear program”.18 15 Germany, Deutsche Welle of. 2019. Saudi Interior Ministry: Attacks with Drone on Aramco. 14 September. Accessed 19 August 2020. https://www.dw.com/ar. 16 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2019. In light of attacks on Saudi oil facilities: NATO and grounds for intervention in regional conflicts. 1 September. Accessed June 15, 2020. http://www.akhbar-alk haleej.com/news/article/1183834. 17 Turkey, Anatolia News Agency of. 2020. Stoltenberg calls on Iran to avoid violence and provocation. 6 January. Accessed August 30, 2020. https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/%. 18 Arabia, CNN. 2021. NATO Secretary General to CNN: We are concerned about the combination of Iran’s capability to develop and deliver a nuclear weapon. 22 February. Accessed April 20, 2021. https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/article/2021/02/22/nato-sg-concerned-iran-nuclear-weapon.

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Nonetheless NATO is keen not to engage in a direct military confrontation with Iran. There are also complexities when it comes to military action by the alliance against Iran. A question, however, is raised on how does Iran regards NATO? The answer to this question is included in a study produced by the Political Research Center of the Iranian Shura Council, on effects that could result from NATO presence near Iran. The Iranian newspaper Al-Wefaq reported bout such study on 4/30/2005, noting that its findings include: A.

B.

C.

NATO’s presence near Iran has moved into a new phase, as presence of the alliance’s forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and Central Asian countries has influenced Iran’s defense decisions. NATO member states have been adopting an offensive policy instead of the defense policy they pursued in the past. Therefore, any concern by a NATO member state regarding a threat, no matter how small such threat is, creates an excuse for NATO military and political presence in the region of such threat. Since the 1980s, NATO has begun to pay great attention to the east. As Iran is a link between two strategic regions, Eurasia and the Middle East, Teheran should feel more concerned about presence of NATO forces near it.

The study recommended that Iranian decision makers should give great importance to capabilities of the new army in Iraq, and its size and types of weapons provided by NATO to such army.19 Another study, published in Persian in 2004, by an Iranian periodical, identified several options for Iran to deal with NATO, namely: – A dialogue can be launched between Iran and NATO. Participation of Iranian observers in Munich Security Conference in 2003 is an important development that can be built upon. – A NATO-Iran Council, similar to the NATO-Russia Council, can be set up, as the latter comprises two countries with different interests, but this did not prevent launching a dialogue between them. The proposed council between NATO and Iran could be a mechanism to discuss tension issues in Central Asia and the Middle East, as well as addressing environmental security issues in the Arabian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. – Security cooperation between Iran and NATO shall reflect positively on the Iranian national security. – Iran must realize that NATO is not limited to membership of the United States only. Instead, the alliance comprises other European countries that Iran has many political and commerc relations with them, and such distinguished relations between Iran and these countries would prevent the United States’ attempts to isolate Iran in the future.20 19 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2004. “The new role of NATO in the Gulf region: A new challenge to Iran’s national security.” Mukhtarat Iraniah journal 88. 20 Yad, Mandana Tish. 2005. “The presence of NATO in the vicinity of Iran.” The Majlis Research Center quarterly, 1 December.

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What is reviewed above means that Iran is aware of the growing presence of NATO near its borders, and this may explain statements issued by Iranian officials from time to time, criticizing the alliance’s policies. Such statements included, but not limited to, that of Abbas Mousavi, the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s spokesman, in which he stated that “Iran strongly condemns statements of NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, in which he justified assassination of Qassem Soleimani (a former commander in the Revolutionary Guards). “Iran believes that security will return to the region once terrorist activities of foreign forces, some of which operate within the framework of NATO, are ended, and regional security is handed over to governments of the region themselves,” he added.21

NATO’s Role in Bolstering the Iraqi Security Capabilities Although Iraq is not a member of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, NATO has attached great importance to cooperation with such country, as Iraq is part of the regional security of the Arabian Gulf countries. The role of NATO towards Iraq has had foundations and contents as reviewed in the following: 1.

Foundations of the NATO role towards Iraq

First, Iraq is an integral part of the regional security system, with which it interacts in terms of influence and impact. Given Iraq’s oil resources and NATO interest in energy security, developing relations with that country is a fundamental matter for the alliance. Second, NATO’s interest in Iraq is based on the 2010 Strategic Concept of the alliance, which states that “Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and transnational illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people”. “Crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will, therefore, engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction,” reads this strategic concept.22 Given the security challenges faced by Iraq, the country has been part of NATO’s strategy to achieve stability beyond the alliance’s borders. Third, NATO’s role in this respect is consistent with policies of the United States, which contributes the largest share of NATO’s budget. Given challenges that the United States was facing in 2004, it wanted that the alliance has a greater role in Iraq, but disagreement between the United States on the one hand, and France and Europe within the alliance on the other, prevented growth of such role in the way 21 Today, Russia. 2020. Iran attacks NATO after it “justified” assassination of Soleimani. 8 January.

Accessed August 30, 2020. https://arabic.rt.com/world/1074795. Ashraf Mohammed. 2018. NATO and the Arabian Gulf security: Regional balance and the requirements of International rivalry. 1 February. Accessed June 19, 2020. https://araa.sa/index. php?view=article&id=4400:2018-03-12-09-53-55&Itemid=172&option=com_content.

22 Keshk,

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the United States had aspired to. There are forces belonging to 16 NATO member states in Iraq. The alliance has defined mission of such forces as training but left the decision for each member state to determine the number of forces to be trained, whether they are from the army or security forces and police, and whether training is to be in military, counterterrorism or border guard operations.23 Finally, NATO’s role in Iraq was based on UN Security Council Resolution 1546 issued on June 8, 2004. The Fifteenth paragraph of such resolution calls upon Member States and relevant organizations to contribute assistance to the multinational force, including military forces, as agreed with the Government of Iraq, to help meet the needs of the Iraqi people for security and stability, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and to support the efforts of United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq”.24 2.

The contents of NATO’s role towards Iraq

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 demonstrated a clear division between major NATO member states. The United States invaded the country and the UK supported it. However, other European member states of the alliance opposed such invasion. Nonetheless, this division disappeared via UN resolutions in the post-invasion phase, especially regarding the role that NATO can play in Iraq. It is noteworthy that the beginning of NATO’s cooperation with Iraq came after a visit by a high-level NATO delegation to the country at the request of the United States. According to statements by Nicholas Burns, the US ambassador to NATO, such a delegation visited Iraq onboard of an American military plane. In June 2003, the NATO Council approved a request submitted by representative of Poland, as the commander of the multinational forces that were operating in central and southern Iraq, that NATO provides such forces with services in areas of intelligence, logistical support, assistance to movements of these forces, and coordination and support for their transportation. In 2004, the Iraqi interim government requested that NATO undertake a training role for the Iraqi security forces. The alliance accepted the government’s request, according to resolutions of the Istanbul Summit in 2004. A mission of 50 officers was established at the beginning, then the number increased since February 2005 to 360 officers with the aim of training a thousand Iraqi officers inside Iraq and 500 officers outside Iraq each year. In addition, an Iraqi center for education, training and military doctrine was set up. Tasks of such center included coordination with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to reopen the Command and Staff College, prepare and classify headquarters, providing Iraq with scientific material and formulating final plans for setting up the Higher War College. A booklet was also produced on operational concepts of armed engagement for the sake of self-protection. In addition, Norway

23 Seif,

Mustafa Olwi. 2008. NATO’s strategy towards the Arab Gulf region. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. 24 Nation, United. 2004. Resolution 1546 of 2004. 8 June. Accessed June 19, 2020. https://undocs. org/ar/S/RES/1546.

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has trained Iraqi officers and commanders in NATO War Center in Norway, which comprises many areas.25 Over the period from 2004 until the end of the first mission in 2011, NATO trained about 15,000 Iraqi security forces. Iraq’s relations with NATO have witnessed other more important developments. In 2011, after the end of the first training miss, Iraq was granted the status of a ‘foreign partner,’ (Partner across the Globe). In 2012, the Individual Partnership Cooperation Program (IPCP) was signed between NATO and Iraq. In July 2015, the ‘Building related defense and security capabilities’ package was announced, as the first training for the Iraqi security forces to be organized outside Iraq, specifically in Jordan in April 2016. At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, it was decided that such training be extended to be carried out inside Iraq. Eventually, a NATO military and civilian team has been dispatched to Iraq to coordinate training activities, mobile training teams were deployed across Iraq to provide forces with assistance tailored according to needs of each region. The last NATO mission was officially announced in July 2018, during the Brussels summit. Such non-military mission, under the command of Canadian Major General Danny Fortin, was tasked with providing Iraqi defense and security officials with assistance and technical advice. The mission consisted of 580 personnel, 250 of whom contributed by Canada alone, to cooperate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, the Office of the National Security Adviser, and educational institutions. This NATO mission in Iraq aimed generally to eliminate terrorism and build sustainable security and defense structures. This mission proved to be important, as it represents a true test of the stabilization strategy, to be emulated and applied in other countries, such as Libya.26 After the meeting of NATO defense ministers on February 18 and 19, 2021, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said, “NATO member states will increase the number of personnel they deploy in their training mission in Iraq from 500 to about 4000”. He added that, “The idea is concerned with expanding training activities for the Iraqi security forces, as well as deploying them outside Baghdad”. “The goal is to prevent the re-emergence of ISIS,” he said.,27 “The mission of the alliance came at the request of the Iraqi government, with full respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq,” he elaborated. Also, the task of the NATO mission in Iraq is not combat task, such mission may face security challenges, whether from ISIS or the armed militias supported by Iran. Such militia have been targeting the US embassy in the Green Zone, in Baghdad, by launching several missiles around. Nonetheless, with the presence of 4000 thousand NATO personnel, a question arises about the

25 Keshk, Ashraf. 2021. The development of Gulf regional security since 2003: a study on the impact

of NATO strategy. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies. 26 Koehler, Keven. 2018. Projecting stability in practice? NATO’s new training mission in Iraq. 1 October. Accessed June 21, 2020. http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1216. 27 Newspaper, Al-Watan. 2021. NATO increases its forces in Iraq 8 times. 19 February. Accessed April 20, 2021. https://alwatannews.net/article/926269/Arab.

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possibility of shifting the tasks of NATO forces to combat missions in an extremely complex regional environment.28 The opposition by NATO as an organization to invasion of Iraq does not mean that the alliance was far from developments of the war. NATO provided Turkey—a member state of the alliance—with support in the form of early warning aircraft. In addition, NATO undertook all the necessary preparations to strengthen the Turkish naval defense arsenal. The alliance’s member states also provided Turkey with helicopters.29 In spite of what was reviewed above, NATO has faced challenges in the task of training Iraqi forces. In the beginning, training was not useful, especially after the decision of the Military Governor Paul Bremer to dissolve the Iraqi army. Training was a difficult task in the absence of military structures already in place. In addition, there were a high level of absence due to the Iraqi officers having to travel to their local areas for vacation. The cultural difference between personnel of the Iraqi armed forces and NATO trainers was another source of difficulty. While Iraqis believed that NATO trainers did not show enough respect to them, the trainers had doubts about the extent of the Iraqis’ commitment. Consequently, NATO trainers were not able to quickly adapt to an environment radically different from their countries. The idea of imposing doctrines or mechanisms of Western armies in Iraq was not also successful.30 The training of Iraqi security forces was carried out by other parties other than NATO. In October 2017, the Council of the European Union announced forming an advisory mission to Iraq, to begin its work in November 2017. Tenure of such mission was extended to April 2020. The European Union’s advisory mission in Iraq aimed to “provide Iraqi authorities with advice and expertise at the strategic level, to decide and define requirements for coherent implementation of elements of civilian-related security sector reform in the Iraqi national security program and associated plans”. This meant that the mission provided advice to office of Iraqi National Security Advisor, as well as personnel of the Ministry of Interior, on the reform elements that need to be implemented. This involved policymaking, dealing with organized crime, and security legislation, as well as cooperating with other international contributors. Another objective of the advisory mission was to “analyze, evaluate and identify opportunities for greater cooperation for Iraq with the European Union, to support the security sector reform needs related to civilians”. What is reviewed above means that the point at which both NATO and the European Union meet is to improve the Iraqi national security structures. This point is an essential part of the Iraqi National Security Strategy, referred to as the “starting point towards peace”. Such strategy 28 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2021. Strategic indicators for the increase in NATO forces in Iraq. 1 March. Accessed April 20, 2021. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1240011. http:// www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1240011. 29 Rozeff, Rick. 2010. Iraq: NATO Assists in Building New Middle East Proxy Army. 13 August. Accessed June 19, 2020. https://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/08/14/iraq-nato-assistsin-building-new-middle-east-proxy-army/. 30 Gaub, Florence. 2011. Building a new Military: The NATO Training Mission-Iraq. 1 April. Accessed June 2020, 2020. http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=267.

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was formulated by the office of the Iraqi National Security Adviser, which is now responsible for implementing it. The main problems that the Iraqi National Security Strategy addresses are “getting rid of the legacy of the old regime, quick transition into democracy, and bringing about necessary changes to a strategic environment marred with violent political conflict and corruption, sectarian violence, terrorism and crime. All these things have collectively weakened the Iraqi social structure and resulted in turmoil and insecurity”. The main focus for both NATO and the European Union is the security and defense sector. NATO focuses on “training the trainers” to assist Iraqi forces in combating terrorism and preventing the resurgence of ISIS. The European Union mission, on the other hand, focuses on providing Iraqis with consultations that contribute to enforcement and implementation of the Iraqi national strategy for combating terrorism. This means that it aims to lay the theoretical and ideological foundations for the training of forces entrusted with the task of combating terrorism in Iraq. While the EU advisory mission focuses on strategic guidance, the NATO mission focuses on “action” or implementing such guidance. It can be said that the NATO’s mission relies on the consultative mission of the European Union to prepare the strategic and political foundations necessary for the success of the alliance’s mission.31 Despite the importance of what is reviewed above, assessment of success of the work of the new NATO mission to train Iraqi security forces, depends on two things. The first is the nature of the security sector governance and the political control model used in the security sector. The second is related to the issue of comprehensiveness, especially regarding negotiating the status of paramilitary groups. Therefore, the NATO training mission in Iraq should be supported with a clear vision regarding forming an effective Iraqi security sector that can be held accountable and is subject to civilian political control. During the first NATO mission from 2005 to 2011, it was noticed that the training process had many deficiencies, including preferring quantity over quality. This was due to political pressures and the failure to resolve major issues of the security sector governance, especially the issue of comprehensiveness. This resulted in a lack of cohesion within the Iraqi security sector, which has not withstood ISIS. In addition, the various groups inside the Popular Mobilization Forces were an obstacle to that training, as it became clear from the first NATO training mission and other training missions that any progress can be made in terms of capacity building and capabilities cannot be sustainable if security sectors are politicized or weakly managed. In Iraq and elsewhere, the success of building the partner’s capabilities to instill stability depends on availability of a supportive overall political context. If this is not achieved, the most that NATO can do will not go beyond building technical

31 Schafranek,

Niels. 2019. NATO and EU training missions in Iraq—an opportunity to enhance cooperation. 5 August. Accessed May 8, 2021. https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode= 1343.

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capabilities. This results in limiting the extent to which these efforts contribute to achieving larger strategic goals.32 When it comes to the impact of NATO role in Iraq and the regional security system, NATO may have a direct dialogue with Iraq in case the alliance’s tasks shifted into combat missions.

NATO’s Role in Combating Terrorism Although NATO is an organization with defensive goals, this did not prevent the alliance from having a role in fighting terrorism. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were the beginning of NATO’s interest in this issue, given the challenges they imposed to the alliance with targeting its largest member state. NATO has foundations and mechanisms for combating terrorism, which are addressed in the following: 1.

Foundations of NATO’s role in combating terrorism

First, given the difficulty in sometimes in issuing UN resolutions on issues that threaten international peace and security, including terrorism, NATO is a permanent forum for political consultations that are not limited to member states, but also include partner countries and other international organizations. This eventually creates united international front to combat international terrorism, and involves sharing information and data, and consolidating cooperation ties if necessary. The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept addresses the extent to which terrorism poses a threat to the alliance, stating that “Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in particular if terrorists were to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities”. This concept also states that for member states to confront these threats, they shall “enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves”. The concept reads also that member states shall “develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defense capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations”.33 32 Koehler, Keven. 2018. Projecting stability in practice? NATO’s new training mission in Iraq. 1 October. Accessed June 21, 2020 http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1216. 33 NATO. 2010. Active engagement and a modern defense system. 19 November. Accessed June 10, 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm?selectedLocale=ar.

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Second, NATO has the capability to launch integrated series of military operations with the participation of many countries. They include the capability to operational planning and the potential to use a wide range of military capabilities in Europe and North America. This is due to the integrated military infrastructure the alliance enjoys. NATO has also gained experience from operations it launched in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Third, NATO has the potential to continue to develop its military capabilities to cope with new dangers and threats. Setting up the NATO Response Force and modernization of the alliance’s command structure are two clear examples in this respect. It is noteworthy that NATO continues to develop its capabilities by adopting military planning mechanisms and developing its modern technologies. For example, the alliance’s Science for Peace Projects aim to devise new ways to detect extremely small quantities of anthrax and radioactive materials that can be used in manufacturing “dirty bombs”. Fourth, there is mutual keenness between NATO member states and partners to engage in close cooperation in managing situations after exposure to terrorist attacks by weapons of mass destruction, to protect civilians, infrastructure, and NATO forces from effects of terrorist attacks that could be chemical, biological or radiological.34 Combating terrorism was one of the six items in the 2004 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, but this came within a general phrase, which reads “cooperation in the fight against terrorism, including through intelligence-sharing…and maritime cooperation”. This involves inviting interested countries to participate in Operation Active Endeavor, to enhance their capabilities to be able to deter, defend and thwart terrorist acts, to ensure protection from them, by means of maritime operations carried out in the region of activities of Operation Active Endeavor. It is stated also that this should be in accordance with procedures introduced by the North Atlantic Council with regard to the support provided by non-NATO member states. Another task in this respect is to find other types of cooperation in combating terrorism, including intelligence sharing and assessing such intelligence to be in line with such cooperation.35 2.

Contents and mechanisms of NATO’s role in combating terrorism

NATO is a defensive organization for the countries of Western Europe and North America. Therefore, areas of work of the alliance remained closely related to the defense aspect. This strategy remained prevalent until 2001, with NATO regarding the threat posed by terrorism as a secondary phenomenon with a limited impact on the alliance. However, the attacks of September 11, 2001 brought about a complete change in NATO’s concepts and considerations, and the issue of terrorism became a security priority for the alliance. This was the first and only time in the history of NATO that Article 5 of its charter was invoked because of a terrorist attack. Such 34 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2018. “NATO’s Strategic Concept: Counterterrorism as a Model.” Derasat 75–76. 35 NATO. 2012. Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. 11 October. Accessed June 24, 2020. https://www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52956.htm?selectedLocale=ar.

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article states that an armed attack against one or more of NATO member states shall be considered an attack against them all and requires collective response. At the beginning, the potential reaction to the attacks seemed purely military. However, it was realized soon that initiatives to combat terrorism at the operational level involve a level of strategic vision. These terrorist attacks proved to be a challenge to NATO, with the United States demanding that the alliance act in accordance with Article 5 of its Charter. These attacks created two challenges for NATO: The first involves not only highlighting the danger posed by the phenomenon of international terrorism to NATO member states, but also multiplicity of types of this threat, including nuclear terrorism. The second challenge involves that NATO member states counter terrorist threats outside their territories, which requires dealing with these threats at their sources before they reach territories of NATO member states. This means that NATO has shifted from not only defending territories of its member states to defending their interests in the strategic sense, by carrying out preemptive strikes. This was stressed by former NATO Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who said, “The military response force of NATO is ready and working, and we have defense means to combat terrorism, especially chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks”.36 The 2010 Strategic Concept introduced this comprehensive vision. For the first time, terrorism is referred to as “a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity”. Terrorism is no longer regarded as a tactical operational threat; it is rather regarded as a strategic challenge. Therefore, this involved formulation of a vision, on how to wage a fight against terrorism. The Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism was also ratified during the 2002 NATO summit in Prague. This concept took into account a number of new initiatives such as sharing intelligence, taking chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological measures, setting up an intelligence unit for terrorist threats, planning civil contingencies and making these initiatives a priority. However, coordination and comprehensive vision remained to be two absent elements from all these separate initiatives. In 2012, this concept resulted in the so-called Anti-terrorism Policy Guidelines, which was an important step for the future. For the first time, NATO has had an agreed common policy that defines its role and powers in combating terrorism. The focus in such policy was on three areas: spreading awareness, building capabilities, and enhancing interaction and participation. Spreading awareness comes at the forefront of these mechanisms by supporting concerned national authorities in member states with consultations and sharing intelligence information through the Intelligence Information Unit at NATO headquarters. Such unit is responsible for increasing sharing intelligence information and producing analytical reports related to terrorism. NATO and agencies of partner countries share such intelligence information. This involves inviting experts from these countries to examine specific areas in the fight against terrorism. This mechanism is characterized with the fact that

36 Keshk,

Ashraf Mohammed. 2012. The development of Gulf regional security since 2003: a study on the impact of NATO strategy. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies.

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it keeps all NATO members states aware of the course of risks, as it enhances the possibility of pre-empting some terrorist operations. It should be emphasized that NATO took a long time before it developed a strategic vision to confront terrorism. The reason behind this lies in the great difference between the political and ideological visions of member states of the alliance. They eventually reached an agreement based on three general foundations that come at the forefront of the strategy of the war against terrorism. These three foundations are consistency with international law, support for allies, achieving integration in roles and avoiding duplication of efforts. The 2012 counter-terrorism policy guidelines were the strategic framework that NATO managed to adopt in its approach to combating terrorism. The next required step was to transfer these policies from a theoretical framework into the operational level. Therefore, in May 2014, NATO approved a ‘plan of action’, on which many details were not revealed. However, the general features of such action plan involved specific tasks within the framework of the three specific areas, with a focus on information and intelligence sharing between member states as well as with international organizations such as the European Union, the United Nations, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Nonetheless, the tangible and more realistic initiatives were in the field of capacity building, with an emphasis on the use of modern and innovative technology in protecting vital assets. What is mainly meant by such assets are forces stationed at more than one point of deployment and the actual infrastructure. For this purpose, NATO launched the Defense against Terrorism Program. Such program focuses on formulating research programs to achieve better protection against man-portable air-defense systems, and against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks. Other tasks of such program also involve Development of biometric identification, detection and dismantling of improvised explosive devices, the removal of mines and explosives, and the strengthening of culture of awareness among the deployed forces. One of the important roles in this regard was transferred to the NATO Center of Excellence for Defense against Terrorism, in Ankara, Turkey. As for the third area, related to interaction and participation, the Partnership Action Plan on Combating Terrorism played a pivotal role, aimed at contributing to achieving regional stability by building capabilities of partner countries. With these measures, the ‘NATO counter-terrorism strategy proved to be realistic. With the rapidly evolving environment of terrorism, however, the strategy on terrorism has had to keep pace with changing circumstances. This is why NATO launched several initiatives in the following years. Given the issue of sharing information, in particular, proved difficult to apply on the ground, a Joint Intelligence and Security Division was established in 2016, with the aim of focusing attention not only on the centralization of intelligence related to terrorism, but also on all threats faced by NATO. Meanwhile, there was a growing awareness of the need to deal with terrorism in countries regarded by the alliance as the source of terrorism. For this purpose, the concept of Projecting Stability was introduced in 2016, to achieve stability on the external borders of NATO territories, by strengthening the military strength of its neighboring countries and preventing entire

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regions from getting out of control in any way. This concept aims to strengthen local security forces and enable partner countries to combat terrorism on their own. In this respect, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said, “In the long term, it becomes much better to fight terrorism and instill stability through training local forces and capacity building of security institutions of each country, rather than deploying large numbers of NATO forces to carry out combat operations”. From 2017 onwards, NATO has sent mobile training teams to Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. However, these measures were not sufficient to achieve higher expectations. This led officials of the United States to say that the country was expecting more from NATO in terms of combating terrorism. Therefore, a series of additional initiatives were introduced in 2017. Most notably, NATO joined, as an organization, the Global Coalition Against ISIS. This was a sensitive issue for a number of European countries, especially Germany and France, which have always opposed collective participation in the anti-ISIS coalition, as this practically meant that NATO would deploy IWACs aircraft over Syria and Iraq and providing operations there with logistic support. Nonetheless, there was no doubt about the issue of sending combat missions, and this decision was considered a political concession to the US President, Donald Trump, without any major military repercussions on the ground. In spite of the progress made in several other areas, the issue of intelligence sharing remained beset by difficulties. In 2017, it became clear that it is necessary to launch an initiative in this regard, and for this purpose, “the Terrorism Intelligence Cell” was established, as a separate cell within the “Joint Intelligence and Security Division” at NATO headquarters. This cell undertook the task of ensuring a better flow of information and stronger intelligence coordination on terrorist threats and foreign fighters, allowing a better response to any new terrorist threats. Finally, the Strategic Direction South Hub was introduced in 2017, within the Joint Command in Naples, to secure a thorough knowledge of a specific set of Middle East and North Africa challenges, including terrorism. All these initiatives resulted in a remarkable expansion and intensification of the counter-terrorism strategy. NATO has succeeded in presenting itself as an international player in global security, specifically in the fight against terrorism, in line with the limits set by the alliance for itself.37 In addition to the role of NATO in fighting traditional terrorism, the alliance has had previous experiences in countering electronic terrorism. When Estonia was targeted with a cyber-attack in 2007, which led to disruption of e-mail networks and suspension of transactions of financial institutions, NATO and the European Union sent information technology experts to provide the country with assistance. In addition, NATO established a cyber defense unit in Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, after a cyber-attack against it in 2008. Moreover, cyberspace was classified, at the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, as an operational field in which the NATO military forces should be able to operate effectively just as they do on land, air, and sea. 37 Quanten, Kris. 2019. What

NATO’s counter-terrorism strategy? 31 May. Accessed June 27, 2020. http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1323.

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Since then, NATO has carried out many successful cyber offensive operations against non-governmental enemies such as ISIS. Unlike in the land, air and sea fields, the cyber field is not defined by national territorial borders. It is important to realize this difference between the virtual cyber field and the geographical field, as founding of NATO was originally a response to external military threats without the right to intervene in internal security affairs of member states that retain a monopoly right to use force internally. In the cyber field, however, the differences between external and internal security threats are almost non-existent, or rather difficult to distinguish. Therefore, when NATO member states integrate their cyber defense capabilities, the alliance will have to deal with specific aspects within internal security of member states without interfering in their sovereignty. When working in the cyber field, NATO member states must also integrate their cyber capabilities, not only to win future wars, but also to avoid any differences between allies, as a result of unilateral cyber effects that may be reflected on other countries during defending vital infrastructure. Nonetheless, NATO’s engagement in a war of this kind depends not only on determining capabilities available to the alliance, but also on identifying enemies, especially Russia, China and Iran. These countries are working to establish offensive capabilities that can be used against NATO member states. Russia targeted the energy infrastructure in the United States in 2017 with a cyber-attack. In addition, an attack targeted Ukrainian energy network in December 2015. For years, China has carried out cyber espionage operations by using cyber-attack capabilities against vital military infrastructure of NATO member states. Iran has also launched cyber-attacks against several vital infrastructure sites of NATO allies in the Middle East. Regarding NATO’s non-state enemies in the cyber field, such as terrorist organizations, the United Kingdom and the United States have launched several successful cyber-attacks against them. Most of the allies are developing cyber offensive capabilities to prevent these enemies from operating in cyberspace. It should be emphasized, however, that NATO’s ability to achieve deterrence in the field of cyber terrorism is only achieved when the alliance succeeds in revealing to its enemies the enormous damages that they could suffer in case of launching any attack against the allies. Such enemies should also be led to realize that the alliance has the ability and willingness to inflict losses on them in all operational areas, including the cyber field. There is a list of flexible deterrence options mentioned in a study. They include strengthening the status of NATO readiness through education, training and drills. They include also deploying NATO’s Rapid electronic response teams to carry out cyber-attacks and protect the vital infrastructure of NATO member states or the infrastructure on which NATO they depend. Other options in this respect include, raising public awareness of malicious cyber activities and the potential for eruption of cyber conflicts. Taking all necessary steps to gain the support of all NATO member states in responding to any cyber threats, in line with commitments set out in the 2016 Cyber Defense Pledge, as well as in 2018 Brussels Summit, is another option for strengthening deterrence. Other options include triggering Article 4 of NATO’s Charter to enhance information sharing and assistance in the cyber field. Attempts by NATO to highlight violations of international law in the cyber field, alerts about expected cyber operations, imposing electronic sanctions, carrying out cyber-attack

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operations are other deterrence options. Trigering Article 5 of the Charter, conducting offensive cyber operations in with participation of other forces across all operational domains are other deterrence options. NATO has also joint task forces, on nuclear defense, formed from volunteer allies, to be used by the alliance to address any threat of this kind. Joint training and information sharing are the foundations of the work of concerned teams, as they submit reports to allies that contribute to identifying potential threats. The Joint Excellence Center, which was established in the Czech Republic, also provides NATO member states and partners with training and expertise and operates over twenty-four hours a day to respond to their demands and provide them with practical and operational advice if targeted with attacks. The Center of Excellence for Defense Against Terrorism in Turkey also provides member states with advice and undertakes research and studies on dangers of terrorism, including those of foreign fighters.38

NATO’s Role in Energy Security The issue of energy security was not an item in Istanbul Initiative for cooperation between its Gulf member states and NATO. Nonetheless, the areas of security and defense cooperation are closely related to threats faced by the Gulf countries, including energy security. This issue can be addressed as follows: 1.

Indicators of NATO’s growing interest in energy security

The issue of energy security has been part of some aspects of the joint meetings between NATO and the Gulf countries since the launch of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in 2004. Indeed, some conferences were devoted to this issue specifically. The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized a seminar, entitled Security Energy, in cooperation with the NATO Political Committee, on October 19, 2008, in Doha. During the event, Nasser Khalil Al-Jaida, CEO of Qatar International Petroleum Company, called for formulating a strategy to ensure safeguarding security and stability in the region and to secure energy supplies. He noted that instability in the region could hinder providing the world with energy supplies. During that seminar, Assistant NATO Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Martin Erdmann, underlined the importance of close cooperation between the Gulf countries and NATO to ensure energy security. He stressed that such cooperation had become an urgent necessity, and that the seminar is the first of its kind to be convened by NATO on this issue in a Gulf country. He pointed out that these seminars would strengthen relations between NATO and countries of the region.39 38 Iftimie,

Ion A. 2020. NATO’s needed offensive cyber capabilities. 28 May. Accessed June 30, 2020. http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1441. http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news. php?icode=1441. 39 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2012. The development of Gulf regional security since 2003: a study on the impact of NATO strategy. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies.

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In an article in the Emirati newspaper Al Khaleej on April 22, 2008, the then NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said, “We all have common interests in energy security and security of energy supply lines and infrastructure, whether we are supplier or consumer countries, or countries supplies are transported across their territories. Geographical considerations have nothing to do when it comes global challenges in this respect”.40 It is notable also that summits held by NATO after the launch of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in 2004 explicitly addressed the alliance’s vision on threats to energy security. The final communiqué of the NATO summit in Riga in 2006 reads, “According to the Strategic Concept of NATO, security interests of the Alliance could be affected by the disruption of supplies of vital resources. The Alliance supports undertaking a coordinated international effort to assess dangers to energy infrastructure. NATO member states will also consult with each other about imminent dangers in the field of energy security, to identify interests in which it can contribute a role to support the security interests of allies and assist in internal efforts and international if requested”. As for 2008 NATO Bucharest summit, its final communiqué reads, “According to recommendation of Riga Summit, we have produced a report on NATO’s Role in Energy Security, for it to be put for discussion. Allies have identified principles which will govern NATO’s approach in this field and outlined options and recommendations for further activities. Based on these principles, NATO will engage in the following fields: Information and intelligence flow and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting management; and supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure. The Alliance will continue to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security. We will ensure that NATO’s endeavours add value and are fully coordinated and embedded within those of the international community, which features a number of organizations that are specialized in energy security. We have tasked the Council on Permanent Sessions to prepare a consolidated report on the progress achieved in the area of energy security for our consideration at the 2009 Summit”. It is noteworthy that although energy is one of the issues that are considered a challenge to interests of NATO, the alliance did not want to undertake the task of energy protection alone, but within an international coalition instead. In addition, NATO has not announced specific plans to address energy security threats. The alliance addressed this issue with general terms that include consultation and sharing information. Nonetheless, NATO Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said in a speech to the European Union in May 2006, “NATO will discuss the use of force If energy supplies are threatened”.41

40 Scheffer,

Hap de. 2008. NATO, the Gulf Region, and a New Era of Cooperation. 22 April. Accessed June 27, 2020. http://www.alkhaleej.ae/studiesandopinions/page/3cec79cd-1349-44ca92d3-5886fa8c9929. 41 Keshk, Ashraf Mohamed. 2012. The development of Gulf regional security since 2003: a study on the impact of NATO strategy. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies.

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In 2006, Jamie Shea, the then Director of Policy Planning at NATO put forward an academic vision on NATO’s role in safeguarding energy security. He identified this role in four areas. The first is monitoring and assessing the energy security situation, by means of political consultations with allies and partners, on securing sea routes of energy. These partners include member states of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. The second area involves security assistance that the alliance can provide member states with under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty on setting up NATO and using alliance’s Civil Emergency Plan. There are many efforts previously undertaken by NATO in this regard that can be emulated. The Third area is related to maritime monitoring and surveillance operations to deal with threats regarding which the alliance can develop special capabilities to deal with maritime lanes of energy. Operation Active Endeavour, started by NATO in the Mediterranean, can be an example of this. The fourth is securing routes of oil or gas supply. An example to this is Operation Earnest Will that was carried out by major NATO member states to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers from Iranian attacks in 1987–1988, during the IranIraq war. Nonetheless, this requires planning and preparing scenarios for NATO intervention in such cases.42 2.

Mechanisms introduced by NATO to achieve energy security

NATO is convinced that any threat to oil supplies to its member states, whether in the sources or transit routes, will be a tremendous challenge to their interests. Therefore, the alliance was keen to create institutions that deal with energy security in general. This has involved the following areas: – The issue of energy security has turned into a major issue in the education and training programs provided by NATO within its educational institutions, providing both security officials and diplomats with comprehensive perspectives about energy security threats and how to deal with them. – Scenarios related to energy security have been integrated into NATO’s maritime drills, giving the alliance the capability to manage complex crises and then take precautionary measures. In addition, a collective framework that includes regional and international parties has been pursued, as this is a mechanism through which the alliance prefers to work. – The Emerging Security Challenges Division has been created in NATO’s structure. It is concerned with monitoring all new security challenges that pose a threat to interests of NATO member states, namely electronic warfare, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and energy security. This mechanism provided the alliance’s member states with the opportunity to regularly discuss these issues, including energy security, and was reflected in the process of sharing information between them. – The establishment of the Center of Excellence for Energy Security during the NATO Summit in Chicago in 2012. 42 Shea, Jamie. 2006. Energy security: NATO’s potential role. 1 September. Accessed June 27, 2020.

https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue3/arabic/special1.html.

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– NATO set up the Strategic Direction South Hub in Naples, Italy, in 2017, within the Joint Command of the Alliance. The mission of this center is to oversee NATO’s operations in the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa, through understanding and coordinating responses to strategic security challenges that the alliance faces on the southern front, such as terrorism, immigration and extremism. In addition, NATO has been keen to carry out drills with the alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue partners. In 2015, NATO conducted joint drills with the Moroccan naval forces. The alliance also held joint drills with the Algerian naval forces in 2016 and 2018. The goal was to increase the degree of preparedness of partner countries’ forces to confront any threats in the area of maritime security in general and energy security in particular. – The NATO defense ministers approved amendments to the alliance’s command structure during their meeting in Brussels in November 2017. This involved the establishment of a command to protect shipping lines across the Atlantic Ocean. This means that the NATO’s interest in energy security has led to the institutionalization of this issue through the alliance’s keenness to find mechanisms concerned with energy security, or through institutions to secure the environment related to energy.43 3.

The role of NATO to achieve energy security

NATO always prefers to work in alliances to confront global security threats, including energy security, which is among the challenges of maritime security. The role of the alliance regarding energy security can be divided into direct and indirect military contributions, and contributions to international efforts to confront maritime security threats: – NATO’s direct and indirect efforts to ensure energy security: Although the alliance did not intervene as an organization to protect energy security in the Arabian Gulf region, its major member states intervened twice. The first intervention was during the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war, by means of a coalition known as the Coalition of the Willing, to protect the Gulf oil tankers from what was known as the ‘tankers war’. At the time, the administration of US President Ronald Reagan managed to establish the aforementioned coalition and the allied countries managed to capture some Iranian ships that were laying countermines in the Arabian Gulf. The second intervention was during the war to liberate the State of Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion in 1991, to prevent the then Iraqi regime from taking over oil of the State of Kuwait and from threatening the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. For this purpose, the United States led a coalition, joined by the main NATO members states. The direct military intervention by NATO in the Arab region was in the crisis in Libya in 2011. The stated reasons for such intervention were enforcement of Security Council resolutions and regional support for enforcements of the Arab League Resolution No. 7298 of August 2011. Such resolution called upon “the Security Council 43 Keshk,

Ashraf Mohammed. 2018. “NATO’s Energy Security Strategy”. Derasat 74.

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and the concerned countries to assume their responsibilities towards the Libyan people in these harsh conditions in which they are living, and to lift the freeze on funds, property and assets belonging to the Libyan state immediately, to meet the required needs of the Libyan people”. Meanwhile, NATO regarded the Libyan crisis as a direct threat to interests of the alliance’s member states, as the Libyan oil supplies, amounting to 1.6 million barrels per day to European oil refineries, stopped. Natural gas supplies with pipelines to Italy also stopped in 2011. This resulted in a rise in prices of oil to more than $100 a barrel. NATO also contributes to protecting sources of oil and natural gas. In this respect, an alliance official says, “NATO has concerns about the gas supplies that the region provides member states of the alliance with, given their dependence mainly on the region in that matter”. He added that, “Given absence of any interruption of supplies of energy during the past years, energy security was hardly on the agenda of NATO decision-makers during these years. There were more urgent issues, namely Russia and ISIS”. He elaborated saying that “This did not mean that the alliance did not intervene to protect energy security. NATO trained groups such as the Kurds in Iraq, and paid tribes in Algeria, to protect pipelines heading to Europe. This is very expensive as protecting 1000 km of pipelines requires presence of at least two soldiers every 50 m, and at least two other soldiers are needed for continuous shifts to guard pipelines. Even, an attack by 50 armed men may lead to destruction of a pipeline. Given the high cost of protecting oil wells, coordination with local groups is important to maintain the security of these lines”.44 – NATO’s efforts to ensure energy security as part of other international efforts. NATO has worked with many international partners to ensure energy security, with the remarkable global growth in reliance on sea routes for transport and trade, as more than half of the world’s oil production is transported overseas with oil tankers that use such routes that include narrow ones. In addition, dependence of energy infrastructures on cyberspace systems made such infrastructures a target for terrorist attacks to a great extent. This was asserted by a study produced in 2017 by Siemens in cooperation with the Ponemon Institute. Such study reviewed opinions of executives in the oil and gas sector in the Middle East and concluded that 50% of the total cyber-attacks in the Middle East targets the oil and gas sectors, and have a major impact on production, operating times, efficiency and safety.45 Based on what is reviewed above, it can be concluded that NATO has engaged in international efforts to maintain energy security. This involved including the issue of energy security within the operational issues of military missions and issues of the environment and natural resources. This has been manifested on the ground through NATO’s participation in Operation Ocean Shield to combat piracy in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Such participation was under the UN Security Council resolutions on countering piracy off the coast of Somalia, namely Resolutions 1816, 44 Ibid.

p. 69,70,75,76. Akhbar. 2017. 50% of cyber terrorism targets oil and energy sectors. November 14. Accessed August 22, 2020. http://akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1097148. 45 Al-khaleej,

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1838, 1846 and 1851. The last two resolutions explicitly call upon capable countries and regional and international organizations to effectively participate in combating piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, in line with provisions of international law, by deploying ships and military aircraft to confront such phenomenon. NATO depended on these two resolutions to intervene within international efforts to address such phenomenon. It is worth noting that the phenomenon of piracy had reached extremely dangerous rates at the beginning of 2008, when the number of Pirate attacks on ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean totaled about 111 attacks. They involved pirates managing to hijack around 47 ships, and to get ransoms of around $3.2 million. Piracy costs for ships reached $500 million, making the waters off the coast of Somalia the most dangerous sea route in the world at the time. This made it necessary to deploy 30 multinational warships in that region.46 What is reviewed above also means that cooperation of the Gulf countries with NATO is an important option for them to achieve deterrence against regional security threats. This is based on several factors, namely the decline in chances of resolving regional crises on the part of regional or even international organizations, the relative decline in US role in addressing some regional crises. In this respect, NATO has the ability and the readiness to address these matters. It is worth noting in this regard also that the then US Secretary of State, John Kerry, said, during a visit to Bahrain on April 7, 2016: “If we want to have a partnership between NATO and the Gulf countries, this partnership must support the security of the region.” Some contentious issues between GCC member states and Russia is also a factor in this regard, as it was noted that an initiative put forward by Russia on security in the Arabian Gulf in July 2019 did not receive much attention from the Gulf countries.47 In addition, NATO has experiences regarding regional crises, as the main NATO member states played a key role in securing Gulf tankers oil against Iranian attacks during the Iraq-Iran war, as well as in liberation of the State of Kuwait in 1991. In addition, NATO intervened in the Libyan crisis in 2011. Such intervention was an example to cooperation between NATO and regional partners, namely some Gulf ICI member states. What is mentioned above does not mean that there are expectations that NATO will have a military presence in the Gulf region to achieve the deterrence. There are conditions for military intervention by the alliance outside territories of its member states. NATO does not intervene to remain involved in crises. The goal of safe withdrawal remains the determinant of the alliance’s interventions outside territories of its member states. Nonetheless, NATO’s success in training the Iraqi security forces can enable the alliance to repeat such experience, for example, to rebuild the Yemeni army, in case of a formal request by the Yemeni authorities. There is a legal basis for such a move. The Security Council Resolution No. 2151 of April 29, 2015, underlines the significance of security sector reform as a basis for regional security and stability. 46 Khaleej,

Akbar Al. 2010. Business with the hundreds of millions of Dollars. 31 October. Accessed August 22, 2020. http://www.alkhaleej.ae/economics/page/dd02473c-c2a3-4125-9439a40f6ae510b2. 47 Newspaper, Asharq Al-Awsat. 2019. A Russian initiative to settle crises in the region ignores Iran’s enemies. 25 July. Accessed August 19, 2020. https://aawsat.com/home/article/1828466.

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Though the resolution stipulated that such task is entrusted to national governments, it noted that cooperation between UN member states and regional and sub-regional organizations can help achieve this goal. In addition, NATO’s stressing that there are ‘red lines’ on the issue of energy security is considered an actual practice when it comes to the concept of deterrence, regarding the Iranian threats to energy security in particular. In a statement after the attack on Aramco’s oil facilities in September 2019, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said, “Iran is destabilizing the entire region. We call upon all parties to stop repeating such attacks because they can have negative effects on the entire region”. He noted that “NATO is very concerned about this escalation”. In fact, there have been also many official statements by NATO that reflected concern of alliance’s members about Iran’s efforts to develop missile programs that can pose a threat to territories of NATO member states. In addition, NATO has joined the international coalition to fight ISIS to deter its dangers. Although NATO will not be part of the current or future regional security arrangements in the Arabian Gulf region, historical experience indicates that the presence of major countries or defense organizations of the size and influence of the alliance help achieve deterrence and then stability. They confront any regional uncalculated adventures, given the huge gap between NATO forces and any other force at the regional or Global level.48

48 Keshk, Ashraf mohammed 2018. NATO and the Arabian Gulf security: Regional balance and the requirements of International rivalry. 1 February. Accessed June 19, 2020. https://araa.sa/index. php?view=article&id=4400:2018-03-12-09-53-55&Itemid=172&option=com_content.

Chapter 4

Obstacles to Development of Cooperation Between NATO and the Gulf Countries

Introduction This chapter deals with obstacles to development of cooperation between NATO and the Gulf countries. Despite the achievements that have resulted from the cooperation between the two sides within the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), there are still obstacles facing that cooperation. Such obstacles are tackled in this chapter, which is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the nature of the ICI and the alliances of the Gulf countries. Although the ICI includes many and varied areas for security cooperation, and the Gulf countries can choose from them, the cooperation formula that the initiative is promoting, which is all +1, meaning NATO vis-à-vis each Gulf country separately, limits the possibility of a collective Gulf framework for establishing a partnership with NATO. This resulted also in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, with what they represent in terms of human and defense weight, continuing to be outside the framework of the ICI. This means also that there is more than one Gulf vision for cooperation with NATO and represents a challenge to development of the ICI towards greater horizons of future cooperation in the security and defense areas. The Gulf countries have other numerous ties of partnership as well. As for the second part, it deals with the controversy over NATO’s military intervention in crises outside territories of its member states. Article 5 of NATO’s Charter remains to be an obstacle to the issue of the alliance granting the Gulf countries with security guarantees, a defensive strategic option for small countries. NATO has also set conditions for military intervention outside territories of its member states. One of such condition is unanimous agreement by member states that a crisis represents a threat to their interests. Existence of a UN resolution and a request by the concerned state are other two conditions for intervention. This means that there is no certainty that NATO will intervene in case the Arabian Gulf countries are exposed to any emergent threat. The third part of the chapter deals with internal and external challenges facing NATO. At the internal level, institutional challenges are at the forefront of these challenges. In this respect, NATO established the Strategic

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Direction South Hub in 2017, which is considered a mechanism entrusted with monitoring threats facing the alliance’s member states on this front. The work of this center overlaps with other organs of NATO. In addition, the geographical framework of the center includes a vast area with many challenges, which is a burden for the work of this center. In terms of external challenges, the Atlantic-Russian conflict comes at the forefront of them. The Libyan crisis has reflected the intensity of this conflict, as it resulted in a state of discord between the alliance and its partners, whether in the ICI or the Mediterranean Dialogue, regarding supporting this or that party to the Libyan conflict. The nature of the relationship between NATO and the European Union is another challenge in this respect. The impact of Corona virus crisis on the external military operations of NATO is another challenge.

The Nature of Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and its Impact on the Gulf Countries Alliances First, the Nature of Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Despite the many and various areas of security cooperation included in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) , they are of optional nature. The ICI foundation is based on principle of all +1 (NATO as an organization versus every Gulf country that joined that initiative). Although this is a formula that secures a degree of flexibility for the ICI member states to choose what is suitable for their security needs, it limits existence of a collective framework for partnership by the regional security system of Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) that has common features. Therefore, it is better for the Gulf countries that this partnership be based upon the formula of (29 + 4), meaning NATO as an organization versus the four Gulf countries that joined the ICI. In addition, the presence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, two countries accounting for more than 70% of the defense expenditures of the Gulf countries, outside the framework of the ICI means that there is more than one vision on within the GCC system on the security of the Arabian Gulf. This can limit the impact and outcome of ICI for the security of the Arabian Gulf countries as a whole. Moreover, the lack of security guarantees on part of NATO for the Gulf countries is one of the most important obstacles to cooperation between the alliance and the Gulf countries. This means that the role of NATO will continue to be a complement to the bilateral security relations between the Gulf countries and the United States, regarding the issue of security guarantees. The ICI explicitly states that it does not provide any party with security guarantees, because this remains linked to the Charter on setting up NATO in general, and Article 5 of it in particular. Such article states that “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party

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or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the UN Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security”.1 Acknowledging the content of Article 5 of Charter on setting up NATO, it must be taken into account that any country or group of countries has strategic goals of establishing partnerships with countries and defense organizations. In the case of the Gulf countries, as small countries located in a turbulent regional environment, what they care about is achieving protection against regional threats resulting from the imbalance in the regional balance of power, including Iranian interference in the affairs of the Arabian Gulf countries and their neighbors. They also seek protection against threats to energy security, to oil facilities and to transportation routes. Other threats against which these countries seek protection involve the continuing regional crises with their implications for security of the Arabian Gulf countries. These threats require deterrence mechanisms, and readiness of international parties to protect such countries. NATO, with its military bases around Iran from all directions, in addition to its military forces and naval capabilities, can play this role. Such role and be achieved with Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which includes areas for security and defense cooperation. The current security environment changes (in 2020) are different from those in which the ICI was launched, (in 2004). Perhaps there is no need, or rather difficulty, in bringing about a radical change in foundations of the ICI or its mechanisms of action on the part of NATO. Nonetheless, in light of developments in regional security threats, including non-state armed groups that wage irregular wars, and dangers of electronic terrorism, NATO has experiences in these two areas. The alliance has a strategy on urban warfare, in addition to its cumulative experience regarding Cyber security, where it has developed many strategies in this regard since Estonia suffered a cyber-attack in 2007.2 According to a study by NATO Defense College in Rome in 2010, it has become necessary to rethink the future of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative launched by NATO for several reasons, namely: 1.

2.

At the summit of the sixtieth anniversary of setting up NATO in Strasbourg, the heads of state and governments of the alliance underlined the importance of security and stability of the Gulf region for NATO. In the opening speech to his tenure as NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, underlined determination to strengthen relations with member

1 NATO.

2012. Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. 11 October. Accessed June 24, 2020. https://www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52956.ht. 2 keshk, Ashraf mohammed. 2017. The NATO Center in Kuwait asked 4 Questions about the Activation of the Istanbul Initiative. 5 March. Accessed July 25, 2020. https://araa.sa/index.view=art icle&id=4039:4&Itemid=172&option=com_conten.

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states of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. He placed this goal among the three most important priorities for such tenure. NATO is developing a new strategic concept that seeks to present a road map for the alliance and its partners in the coming years. In light of the current dangerous strategic environment in the Gulf region, NATO’s interaction with the Gulf is seen as a catalyst for stability and destabilization at the same time. All this has made it difficult to predict the outcome of a number of issues, not the least of which is the uncertainty surrounding development of the situation in Afghanistan, where NATO has participated in a number of tasks since 2001. It is not clear or certain also whether the Iranian nuclear crisis, the source of threat and turmoil in the Middle East, can be solved or not. There is also fear of the poor security situation in Yemen, especially with the high rates of violence and exacerbation of the effect of presence of Al Qaeda in the country, as this may result in negative impact on security of Saudi Arabia. There are also fears of fluctuating oil prices and the impact of the financial crisis on the Gulf countries. Finally, there is concern about what will happen in Iraq after withdrawal of American forces.

This paper added that the most important strength aspects or assets upon which the ICI is that its content is not subject to misinterpretations, as each party is fully aware of the initiative’s limits and scope of work. Such parties know that the ICI goal is not to establish a dialogue between civilizations, but rather to establish cooperation in specific specialized areas. As for the second strength aspect that the ICI possesses is the fact that all its member states have ample funding at their disposal that enables them to cooperate in the area of defense.3 What is reviewed above means that all security initiatives must not be static and must be characterized with flexibility to respond to security threats facing their parties. The amendment of ICI may be a matter fraught with difficulties, as this is conditioned with consensus among NATO member states. Nonetheless, some proposals can be considered to complement content of the ICI, in the way in which NATO does every ten years by producing a Strategic Concept as a kind of security review. What is reviewed above means that despite what the ICI includes in terms of security cooperation between NATO and the Gulf countries, and existence of similar threats facing the two sides, involving ballistic missiles, regional stability, maritime security and energy security in particular, common threats alone are not sufficient to enhance cooperation. There are political and structural obstacles to cooperation between NATO and the GCC. For example, it is notable that the Gulf countries adopt individual national agendas regarding security, not collective ones. There is disagreement in this respect about the Iranian threat. There has been also a view of skepticism about intentions of NATO itself, perhaps in the early years of the ICI. There is also a 3 Razoux,

Pierre. 2010. What Future for NATO Istanbul cooperation Initiative? 1 January. Accessed MAY 10, 2021. https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication. html/112378.

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status of confusion between cooperative defense and cooperative security, because each of these two areas has different patterns of interaction. Cooperative defense is interested in consultation as an alternative to confrontation, reassurance as an alternative to deterrence, transparency as an alternative to confidentiality, precaution as an alternative to correction and interdependence instead of unilateral measures. Cooperative security, however, does not have a specific goal, but it aims to contribute to global stability and reduce the possibility of conflict by means of cooperation. Disagreements between the Gulf countries and NATO regarding understanding the nature of security challenges and cooperation mechanisms can be overcome with strategic dialogue between the two sides.4 There is a need to develop serious and practical cooperation projects in areas of common interest that have positive effects on both sides, especially in the areas of energy, maritime and cyber security. There is also a need for a more systematic and sustainable political dialogue between NATO and the Gulf countries through the GCC system as a whole. The Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council visited headquarters of NATO in January 2012, and NATO Deputy Secretary-General visited Riyadh in December 2012, seeking to establish working relations between the two secretariats general. These visits were two important indicators to institutionalization of these relations. There is also a need to build trust and to maintain public diplomacy based on dialogue, to clarify capabilities and intentions of NATO, for them not to be misunderstood by partners. Such misunderstanding can result not only in a setback to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, but perhaps to the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative itself, as this negatively affects NATO efforts to contribute to achieving long-term security and stability in the region.5 Second, Alliances of the Gulf Countries and Their Impact on Their Relationship with NATO The Arabian Gulf countries are classified among the small countries that continue to face a security dilemma. Such dilemma is larger when it comes to the Gulf countries, as they have oil wealth and have an important strategic location and suffer from an imbalance of in power with regional parties. The defense options of the small countries include four options: mobilization of the state, regional alliances, military neutrality, international alliances.6 The Arabian Gulf countries have pursued some or all of these options. They have bilateral security agreements with the major Western NATO member states. Such agreements were signed after the Kuwait Liberation War in 1991 and are constantly renewed, and this does not represent a challenge to NATO. Nonetheless, regional security developments required establishing other alliances in 4 Gaub,

Florence. 2013. “The Odd Couple: NATO and the GCC.” In The uneasy balance, potential and challenges of the west’, srelations with the gulf states, by Riccardo Alcaro and Andrea Dessì, 113–126. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). 5 Schwarz, Rolf. 2013. “NATO’s Relations with the Gulf Region.” In the Uneasy Balance: POTENTIAL AND CHALLENGES OF THE WEST’S, by Riccardo Alcaro and Andrea Dessì"editores”, 127–132. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). 6 Abdulsalam, Mohammed. 2013. “Small Countries’ Problems in Self-Defense.” Al Siyassa al Dawliya (international politics) 91.

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which the Gulf countries were involved, including the 2014 International Coalition to Fight ISIS, led by the United States. Other alliances include the 2015 Islamic Military Coalition to Combat Terrorism, led by Saudi Arabia, the 2019 Maritime Military Coalition for the Security and Protection of Maritime Navigation in the Arabian Gulf, led by the United States, and the 2020 European Mission to Monitor Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz led by France. Given membership of the Gulf countries in these coalitions, its obligations to them and to NATO may conflict if the alliance wishes to develop its partnership with the Gulf countries, especially in light of indications to the possibility of a growing role of NATO. The United States has formally requested more than once that NATO play a greater role in the Middle East. This started with requesting that the alliance deploy forces to replace the US forces in Syria. The US also demanded that NATO join the Maritime Military Alliance for the Security of Navigation in the Arabian Gulf, which establishment was announced by the United States in 2019. The US also pressed NATO to carry out some of the tasks of the International Coalition to Fight ISIS in Iraq. Regardless of whether NATO accepted these tasks or declared rejection of some of them, the constant matter is that decline in the US role in addressing some crises, results in clearing the way for Russian influence. This means that NATO will be asked to engage more in the Middle East and in the Arab Gulf region.7

Controversy Over NATO’s Military Intervention in Crises Outside Territories of Its Member States NATO military intervention remains regulated with the content of Article 5 of the Charter on setting up the alliance, which provides for two things: First, NATO shall deal with any aggression or attack against a member state as an aggression against all member states. The second involves commitment to act and respond to deter such aggression. The article explicitly states that a party or more from the alliance shall provide assistance to the other party or parties who are attacked, by an immediate individual reaction and in coordination with other parties, by using the armed forces to restore and maintain security in the North Atlantic region. With the importance of this article as the essence of NATO as a defense organization, there is ambiguity about the nature of the response that can be directed to counter the aggression, as the matter remains up to the parties to the NATO treaty to assess the situation. It is understood also, from the text of the article, that it applies only to threats that come from outside member states of the treaty. Nonetheless, the post-Cold War era witnessed a discussion about this article. In 1991 and 2003, Turkey 7 Keshk, Ashraf Mohmmed .2020. NATO’s policies toward Libya depend on the balance of power on

the ground and Russia’s influence. 1 August. Accessed August 22, 2020. https://araa.sa/index.php? option=com_content&view=article&id=5187:2020-07-28-09-55-51&catid=4344&Itemid=17.

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asked NATO to protect its borders from Iraq with assistance by the alliance, but with no response. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 brought back the argument over enforcement of Article 5. Divisions prevailed among NATO members states over enforcement of that article, and it was argued that this is permissible only if it is confirmed that the September 11 attacks were external.8 Turkey also tried to seek NATO assistance against threats resulting from the Syrian crisis after downing of a Russian plane in 2015. The alliance did not directly engage in the crisis, but issued a statement calling for “restraint” by the two parties. Questions was raised also about the role of NATO vis-à-vis threats facing Turkey as a member state when it invaded parts of Syria to establish what it called a “buffer zone”. What is reviewed above raises the issue of NATO’s military interventions outside territories of its member states. Although the major NATO member states were not individually far from regional crises in the Arabian Gulf region, starting with the Iraq-Iran war 1980–1988 and ending with the Kuwait liberation war in 1991, given escalation of regional security threats, especially after 2011, intervention by defense forces and organizations in regional crises became increasing possible. NATO acknowledges that Article 5 of Charter on setting up NATO states that any aggression on a member state is an assault on all member states, and that it remains the determinant for the alliance’s intervention or not. The alliance, however, has other conditions for intervention outside territories of its member states. First, consensus among NATO member states that a crisis is a threat to core interests of the alliance is necessary for intervention to take place. Second, there must be a legal international cover for that intervention through a Security Council resolution calling on the international community to intervene. The resolution should not necessarily refer to the NATO explicitly, but rather it should call for cooperation by the international community, as individual states or organizations, regarding a certain issue. This kind of resolutions included the UN resolutions issued on combating piracy off the coasts of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden in 2008, and the international resolutions on the humanitarian situation regarding the Libyan crisis in 2011. This, however, does not mean that NATO intervened in all cases according to a UN resolution. There were resolutions that raised controversy, such as those related to the 1999 Kosovo crisis. At that time, the then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said, “It is not possible to wait for a resolution by the UN Security Council to intervene. NATO would have the powers to maintain international peace and security and face challenges of the twenty-first century in coordination with the United Nations as much as possible”. The Third condition for intervention is the presence of a request by a concerned country for intervention to take place. Although this condition is not very necessary to a great extent, it strengthens grounds for NATO’s intervention because the request for intervention by the concerned country will require some obligations by

8 Tertrais,

Bruno. 2017. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty Its origins, Meaning and future. 10 October. Accessed May 11, 2021. https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=934.

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such country.9 Nonetheless, there have been cases of NATO military intervention outside territories of its member states that caused controversy. They included the Libyan case in 2011. NATO has based intervention in this case on UN Security Council resolutions Nos. 1970 and 1973. Such resolutions provided for referring the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court, banning arms and travel, freezing Libyan assets in Western countries, and establishing a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace. NATO based its intervention in Libya also on the Arab League Resolution No. 8298. Such resolution called upon the UN Security Council to assume its responsibilities regarding deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Libya and to take measures to impose a no-fly zone on movement of the Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe zones in the areas subject to bombing. NATO’s intervention, however, has raised three issues. The first was regarding NATO’s mission going beyond imposing an aviation ban to bombing civilian sites and headquarters belonging to the Libyan regime at the same time. Second, the UN resolutions did not specify who is responsible for implementing UN resolutions except by reading that “Member states that notified the UN Secretary-General are authorized, at the national level or through regional organizations or arrangements, and in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and inform the Secretary-General of such measures”. Third, the UN Security Council might have wanted to avoid the legal problems raised by its previous similar resolutions with focusing mostly in the Libyan case on protect civilians. This, in turn, was enforcement for the Protocol on the Responsibility to Protect, which entitles member states and the international community the responsibility to protect peoples from genocide and ethnic cleansing crimes. Consequently, the UN Security Council managed to bridge the gap between the legitimate and legal intervention. This issue was raised during the NATO intervention in Kosovo, as NATO operations were described as not legal but legitimate.10 In 2017, the author of this book had a discussion with an official working at NATO headquarters in Brussels, who preferred not to be named, about the alliance’s vision on the UN resolutions on which it based its interventions in crises outside territories of NATO member states but regarded by them as threat to their interests. This official said, “UN resolution often are characterized with ambiguity, but it is constructive ambiguity on which NATO relies in carrying out tasks of intervention if there are consensus among the alliance’s member states on inevitability of such intervention”. In a 2018 discussion with another NATO official, who preferred not to be named, he said, "There are classification for the concept of interests, which determines intervention and non-intervention. There are subsidiary interests, vital interests, and survival interests. Applying these concepts to intervention by the United States, the most influential country in the alliance, in crises and conflicts, the US confrontation 9 Keshk, Ashraf 2019. NATO’s new strategy to contribute to ensuring energy security and protection

of infrastructure. 2 November. Accessed August 2, 2020. https://araa.sa/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=4817:2019-11-06-10-08-28&catid=4251&Itemid=2135. 10 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2011. “NATO: From the New Partnership to Intervention in Arab Crises.” Al-syasa al-Dawleiya (International Politics) 22–23.

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with both Russia and China can be classified as survival interests. The US engagement in the World War II with bombing Japan was also for survival”. According to this NATO official, “the vital interests, however, are those related to political and economic aspects. The war to liberate the State of Kuwait in 1991 was for political and economic interests, as the United States would not allow Iraq to control Gulf oil, and to challenge to the United States and allies. Therefore, the United States was willing to suffer casualties and losses to confront Iraq”. As for the subsidiary interests, the NOTO official noted that they included involvement in the war in Vietnam, as it was not in the interest of the United States to wage the war. The counterinsurgency strategy required that the United States defend subsidiary interests. Under this strategy, the United States, seeks to influence every aspect of life in Afghanistan, for example, where the United States was interested in all these aspects and sought to influence them. It is difficult, however, in the US democratic political system, to maintain that strategy for a long time. In the case of Afghanistan, the United States had ten thousand soldiers and the number was increased, but if there was a rebellion in Mexico, for example, the United States can launch a military campaign in the area adjacent to its borders, according to the NATO official.11 What is mentioned above means that although NATO has defined what can be called ‘red lines’ that will not be allowed to be crossed in regional conflicts outside territories of its member states and that they regard as a threat to their interests, including energy security, it is not possible to ascertain whether the alliance intervene or not. Historical experience indicates differences in causes and circumstances of previous cases of NATO intervention in crises outside territories of its member states, such as Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya, as each case has its own specificity and regional and international context. In addition, the problem of consensus among NATO member states remains a fundamental obstacle for the alliance to intervene in regional crises outside their territories, especially in issues of vital importance to security of the Arabian Gulf countries, including threats to maritime security. The security of the waterways is a strategic issue for NATO member states. In this respect, the Chairman of NATO Military Committee, Admiral Giampaolo de Paula, said, “Piracy in the Red Sea is a threat to global security and energy security. NATO is working to strengthen efforts of countries bordering the Red Sea to combat piracy and to provide the international forces with the required support to ensure the security of navigation in the Red Sea”.,12 Nonetheless, NATO’s intervention in conflict zones in general is determined by three factors, which are consensus among member states, approval by the UN Security Council and the desire of the parties concerned. The nature of participation by NATO member states in its military operations may witness disagreements between them during the course of these same operations. In this respect, former commander of NATO forces, General Wesley Clark, said, “The challenges facing NATO are 11 Interviews

by the author with NATO officials, who preferred not to be named, in 2017 and 2018. newspaper. 2008. Chairman of NATO Military Committee: We will not allow threats to freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the Red Sea. 5 December. Accessed August 22, 2020. https://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2008/12/05/133530.html. 12 Al-Watan,

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not related to war and peace. They are related to small conflicts and terrorism, and different priorities between countries, as well as to rules of engagement and respect for national restrictions on military action. Forces of some NATO member states may not wish to work at night; others want to work in defensive sites and others in offensive sites. Each member states keep its secrets, which is a matter related to national sovereignty and interests that varies among countries in light of differences in their laws. There are also differences in views of member states regarding the alliance’s intervention in crises outside their territories, as some member states believe that a UN Security Council resolution is necessary as a basis for intervention”.13 Undoubtedly, differences indicate the very nature of solidarity among NATO member states. This means that the challenges facing NATO are internal rather than external. The extent of interdependence in this respect casts a shadow on the alliance’s vision to common threats. For example, threats from Russia, terrorism, cyber wars, and hybrid threats are evaluated by NATO member states in different ways. This depends on the geographical location of each NATO member state. Some member states also demand that the alliance do more to safeguard their security. The chronic controversy over the issue of burden-sharing and the extent of commitment by member states to spending 2% of gross national product on defense is another challenge. Although some countries have already begun to increase their defense spending since 2015, there are doubts about continuity of this. This issue has another dimension involving that the burden sharing is part of the controversy about the extent of entrenchment of the solidarity principle itself among NATO member states and the desire of each country to benefit from advantages of alliances. What undermines NATO is weakness of compliance with Article 5 itself in light of Russia’s attempts to weaken the bond that unites the alliance’s member states. Therefore, the exercise of deterrence is the most important matter in NATO’s strategies before the defense itself because this gives the alliance more credibility within its political positions as well. NATO also faces a challenge as an institutional framework for military operations, as the shift from crisis management tasks to stabilization missions reflects a development in the quality of activities aimed at building potentials and capabilities, and which is moving away from wide range operations. This means moving away from the goal for which NATO was established. Though NATO carried out two military operations in Libya and Afghanistan, in light of the policy of stabilization followed by the alliance since 2016, repeating these two operations in other crises may be difficult.14

13 Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies. 2018. Military Alliances in the Middle East. Manama: Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies. 14 Tardy, Thierry. 2018. The internal nature of the Alliance’s cohesion. 1 September. Accessed May 8, 2020. https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1204.

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Internal and External Challenges Facing NATO 1.

Internal challenges

These challenges are institutional challenges. Although NATO is flexible to face security developments by establishing mechanisms to confront these developments, some of these mechanisms are criticized. For example, NATO announced in 2017 the establishment of Strategic Direction South Hub to undertake the mission of confronting the phenomenon of illegal immigration from countries suffering conflicts in the Middle East. This center undertakes three tasks. They include communication, i.e., creating bridges and links between the alliance and these countries. The other two tasks involve providing these countries with advisory services, and coordination in advance. One of the problems facing the work of this center, however, lies in the wider geographical range in the Middle East, extending from Mauritania to Pakistan, North Africa, the African coast, and sub-Saharan Africa. This is a vast region that extends into two continents and comprises 72 countries, which includes 19 out of most fragile twenty countries in the world. In addition, the tasks carried out by the center are complex at the practical level and involve repetition and overlap with the work of other NATO bodies. This means that there is need to narrow the geographical scope of the work of the center, and for it to focus on the civil area or the military area. However, in light of NATO’s goal for the center to play the role of the executive arm of the alliance’s Defense Capabilities and Capacity Building Office, some southern countries, especially African countries that were under colonialism in the past, may not welcome NATO’s participation in any internal work or activities in them. This was the challenge faced by the United States when it wanted to establish the American Command in Africa. This means that the center can focus on specific areas such as coordination of security cooperation or capacity building and increasing the volume of coordination with projects launched by the NATO”. The center can also limit providing non-member states with advisory services. The center can also establish small offices in countries that are more important in Africa, hence leaving tasks of education and training to other NATO institutions. This means that NATO, when establishing mechanisms for communicating with non-member states, must determine their geographical scope, and then define tasks of these mechanisms precisely so that they can carry out their tasks in the best way.15 The criticism was not limited to mechanisms only; it included content of what is provided by NATO, including the quality of defense education. Although the alliance allocates a budget for education and training activities, it must implement approaches aimed at cooperation of a generation of soldier thinkers with a team of academic officers. This requires an intellectual, educational and defense revolution. In other words, there is a need to modernize defense education by establishing a group of innovative academies, established on the model of the Defense College in the Italian capital, Rome. These academies should be tasked with drawing up the 15 Mariano, Stephen J. 2020. NATO’s strategic redirection to the South. 1 June. Accessed August 1,

2020. https://ciaonet.org/record/65018?search=1.

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best plans to achieve the best modernization of educational programs and curricula, and to make use of e-learning. Defense education is generally based on four pillars, namely knowledge, education, technology and education of future leaders.16 It is also noteworthy that NATO is late when it comes to releasing its Eighth Strategic Concept. This concept should be issued in every ten years, and the Seventh Strategic Concept was issued in 2010. Despite what was included in the final communiqué of NATO summit held in London in December 2019, regarding commissioning the Secretary-General to formulate a ‘future vision’ for the alliance, to strengthening its political dimensions, including the advisory functions, there was no reference to the Eighth Strategic Concept that should have been issued in 2020. It is well known that the strategic concept ranks second in importance, directly after the Charter on setting up NATO. Seven versions of the concept have been issued since 1949, with one concept issued every ten years. The failure to issue the Eights Concept during the last summit means that member states may need another two years to issue that new concept. In response to a question in 2018 on whether NATO intends to issue a new strategic concept, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said, “What are more important than the strategic concept are the strategic measures”. This means despite the strategic changes in the security environment outside territories of NATO member states in 2018, which differ radically from the year 2010, "strategic measures" can be taken independently and separately from the existence of a new strategic concept. The communiqué and statements issued by NATO’s summits from 2014 through 2019 have shown that they have a significant impact on alliance’s policies. Even, in the absence of a new strategic concept, NATO issued a “new military strategy” and an initial concept of “deterrence and defense in the Euro-NATO region”. The drafting of the strategic concept itself is of a high degree of importance. This was evident during the drafting the 2010 Strategic Concept, which was characterized with an innovative formula and in drafting which experts from non-member states participated. Therefore, the content and the wording are important, and any negative aspects regarding issuing that concept could undermine the state of solidarity and cohesion witnessed by NATO. This means that the terms, principles and the nature of the concept are all very important issues that NATO member states should think about and should try to avoid disputes that could arise when drafting that concept.17 The divergence in NATO’s visions regarding threats outside territories of its member states is also one of the obstacles to its work. Some crises reflected the existence of differences within the alliance, including, for example, the Libyan crisis. Following announcement by the internationally recognized Government of National Accord that it took over the strategic Al-Wattayah based on May 18, 2020, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg declared in a statement to an Italian newspaper that “the Accord government and the forces of Khalifa Haftar cannot be regarded as 16 Ullman, Julian lindley-French and Harlan. 2010. The Reform and Modernization of NATO Defense Education. 1 June. Accessed August 1, 2020. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/117268/Def enseEducation_SAGIssueBrief.PDF. 17 Michaels, Jeffrey H. 2020. It’s that time of the decade again: some considerations for NATO’s eighth Strategic Concept. 23 January. Accessed August 8, 2020. http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/ news.php?icode=1412.

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equal. NATO is ready to assist the Government of National Accord, and Turkey is a strong ally and an important NATO member state”. This shift was not in NATO’s position towards the Retired Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar only, but it seemed as a kind of healing the rift between the alliance and the NATO member state, Turkey, after evident tensions between the two sides. These tensions were echoed in NATO’s resentment of Turkey’s pursuit to buy the S-400 missile system from Russia and rejection of integrating it into the NATO missile shield. Another tension issue was Turkey’s request that NATO supported it against what it regarded as threats to its security due to the Syrian crisis. Indeed, during the NATO summit in 2019, Turkey conditioned its approval of new NATO defense plans in Poland and the Baltic states with NATO’s support for it in the Syrian issue. In addition, France’s announcement of its withdrawal from the maritime security mission in which the alliance is participating, is an indication that the French-Turkish dispute has reached to the highest extent. Such disputed was not related wholly to the Libyan crisis, as its earliest signs emerged with a verbal confrontation between the two countries during the seventieth NATO summit in London 2019. What is reviewed above means that regional crises, including the Libyan crisis, will have an impact on NATO’s partnerships, especially in light of what can be considered a “state of disagreement” not “accord” in visions. During 2011, the Libyan crisis was a milestone in which the alliance had the support of some Gulf ICI Member states. However, these Gulf member states have different interests towards the conflicting parties in Libya in 2020. This is reflected in divergence in visions between some of the Gulf countries and NATO. The same applies to some parties to the Mediterranean Dialogue, especially Egypt. Though Egypt is one of the parties of such dialogue with NATO, the security and stability of Libya is closely linked to the Egyptian national security. The message of the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi was clear and unambiguous, defining red lines that will not be allowed to be crossed concerning the conflict, and declaring readiness of the Egyptian armed forces to protect the Egyptian national security.18 2.

External challenges

A.

The Russian-NATO conflict

There is a coordination mechanism between NATO and Russia represented in the NATO-Russia Council, which was established in 2002 and aims to exchange views between the two sides on common security issues, since Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014. However, the council meets only at the level of ambassadors and its role is limited to maintaining channels of communication open between the two sides without being a tool for cooperation between them.19 Russia’s pursuit to strengthen its influence in the same areas where NATO has partnerships will also lead to an 18 Keshk,Ashraf.

2020. NATO and the strategic determinants toward the conflict in Libya. 20 July. Accessed July 25, 2020. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1216370. http://www.akh bar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1216370. 19 . Jadeed, Al Araby Al. 2019. The Russia-NATO Council will be held in Brussels on Friday. 21 January. Accessed August 5, 2020. https://www.alaraby.co.uk.

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intense conflict that will have negative effects on the alliance’s regional partnerships, including the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. The Libyan crisis is a clear example to this, as some ICI members states support the National Accord government and the others support Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, unlike what was the case during NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011 to overthrow the Libyan regime. At that time, NATO had the support of some ICI member states during the military operations. Russia’s pursuit to expand in the areas of NATO partnerships, especially North Africa is another conflict that would negatively affect NATO’s partnerships. Russia regards this expansion as a correction of a strategic error involving declining role in addressing other regional issues, especially after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.20 It is worth noting that Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary-General of NATO commissioned a group of experts to produce a report on the most important challenges facing the Alliance in the future and how to confront them. The report was published in December 2020 and contained 140 recommendations. With regard to Russia, the report stated that “Russia continues to pursue stubborn policies and aggressive actions, and this is an obstacle to constructive dialogue, as it systematically carries out military intimidation operations very near to NATO’s borders. The report also states that “Russia is likely to remain the main military threat to NATO, in the long term until 2030. The Alliance must maintain a dual approach towards Russia consisting of containment and dialogue”.21 B.

The reality of the relationship between NATO and the European Union

The membership of European countries overlaps between the European Union and NATO, as 22 EU member states are member states of NATO at the same time. There have been attempts to establish a European security identity, independent from that of NATO. They included a proposal by the French President Emmanuel Macron, on November 16, 2018, to create a unified European army “capable of defending Europe, independently from the United States, against threats”.22 However, this idea is not supported by all NATO member states, especially the eastern countries in the alliance, which believes that the challenge is Russia. It was not surprising that NATO Secretary General supported the idea of building a strong European defense, but it should not be a substitute for NATO. Therefore, it can be said that the frozen conflict is the correct description of the relationship between the two sides. Nonetheless, there is cooperation between the two sides, and there were two tasks that brought together NATO and the EU. The first was in Macedonia in 2003 and the second in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004. In addition, NATO and the EU signed an agreement, comprising 40 proposals to enhance cooperation in seven areas, in December 2016. 20 Keshk,

Ashraf mohammed. 2020. NATO’s strategytoward the Libya crisis: Disagreement not consensus among member states. 1 August. Accessed August 5, 2020. https://issuu.com/araa-new/ docs/152/117?fr=sMmVkNzE3NDg2MTU. 21 NATO. 2020. NATO 2030: MAKING A STRONG ALLIANCE EVEN STRONGER. 31 December. Accessed April 20, 2021. https://www.nato.int/nato2030/. 22 Agency, The Russian News. 2018. Macron proposes the creation of a European army to protect the continent from Russia, China, and even America. 6 November. Accessed August 19, 2020. https://arabic.rt.com/world/980881.

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There is also cooperation between the two sides in the area of maintaining maritime security in the Mediterranean Sea. Attempts by the European Union to establish an independent security identity are important. However, this remains dependent on the Union’s ability to switch from the concept of “organized cooperation”, which is the mechanism of the European Union’s work, to “framework cooperation,” which is the mechanism of NATO’s work, and in which there is a leading country that has an important role and influence within the alliance. The extent of NATO’s member states commitment to allocating 2% of GNP for defense purposes and 20% for basic equipment, including research and development work, also remain to be a contentious issue and has an impact on the work of the alliance, especially when it comes to agreement in visions.23 C.

The impact of Corona pandemic on NATO’s military activities

NATO has dealt with effects of the Corona crisis with Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, declaring that member states must identify their needs and seek assistance through the Alliance’s Humanitarian Crisis Response Coordination Center. However, Corona crisis has resulted in repercussions to NATO in two respects. The first involves NATO’s military capabilities and operations abroad as a deterrence force, and the second involves the alliance’s opponents attempt to use the crisis to raise doubts about the strength of the NATO. Regarding the impact of the crisis on NATO’s capabilities and its military operations abroad, the outbreak of that epidemic coincided with a time in which the alliance was preparing to assume part of the tasks of the International Coalition to Fight ISIS in Iraq. This was after an American call for NATO in this regard and the latter’s acceptance of that mission. This mission, however, was suspended because of Corona pandemic. Drills that mainly aimed at demonstrating the qualitative strength of the NATO were also canceled. On March 11, 2020, military sources in Norway announced that NATO’s “cold response” drill, which would have comprised about 15,000 soldiers from ten member states of alliance, had been canceled due to the Corona epidemic and the desire of these forces to support national efforts to confront this crisis. The goal of such drills was to test capabilities to carry out combat activities in the harsh winter conditions. In addition, and as a result of the severe economic effects of this crisis, the extent of commitment by NATO member states to allocating 2% of Gross National Product to defense spending will remain subject to doubt and controversy. This issue can, not only increase the divide between the United States and the rest of NATO member states, but also has the potential to affect the extent of the alliance’s commitment to its operations abroad. In terms of NATO’s opponents trying to use the crisis to question the alliance’s strength, there is misleading propaganda faced by NATO. The role of Russia and China in assisting some European NATO member states was manipulated in this misleading propaganda and was regarded by the alliance as a threat. In this respect, NATO Secretary-General, James Stoltenberg, said, “The disinformation campaigns 23 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2017. “The future of NATO between the European crisis and Trump’s

policies.” Al Siyassa al Dawliya (international politics) 120.

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that we have witnessed are trying to divide us and to undermine our resolve. These campaigns can make the health crisis more dangerous, because they can mislead people regarding dealing with this health crisis”.24 D.

Controversy over NATO’ intervention/non-intervention in Middle East conflicts

NATO has given the Middle East region great attention with the Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Nonetheless, controversy remains, at least at the academic level, about NATO’s involvement or noninvolvement in the Middle East region. In this respect, there are two approaches. Under the first approach, NATO’s role concerning the Middle East should remain within the narrowest limits and should be confined to specific areas, which are very small military aid, training tasks and maritime security. Those who believe in this approach rely on a number of arguments, including that European interests that require sending forces to both Syria and Iraq are very limited. This, however, does not deny the importance of individual initiatives by France, the United Kingdom, or Denmark. Such individual initiatives give Europe a strong diplomatic influence that it lacks at the present time, taking into account the absence of a long-term American strategy towards the Middle East region. Therefore, Europe has to find some kind of “European strategic independence,” by placing crisis management in the southern neighbors at the top of its priorities. Supporters of the second approach believe that NATO should not engage in the Middle East region, especially with regard to training missions and other cooperative security activities. They believe that thinking beyond this is far from the actual capabilities of NATO, as it lacks the resources, manpower, training and even military equipment that would enable it to take over tasks currently carries out by the United States, such as waging thousands of precise strikes or carrying out large-scale operations to combat terrorism. This weakens NATO’s main role, which is mainly to deter Russia. However, supporters of this view argue at the same time that NATO should not stop completely its involvement in the Middle East, because the United States still needs allies in the alliance to shoulder more burdens, for it to focus again on geostrategic rivalry with Russia and China in Europe and other regions of the world. Away from this or that approach, there is still an academic debate about NATO’s need to understand its capabilities first, secondly understand the nature of the political agreement between its member states. More importantly, NATO should try to identify concepts such as “the south” and its geographical borders, “terrorism” and visions of NATO to confront it. Some believe that this can be achieved through increasing awareness, while others believe that it is necessary that NATO engage in international efforts to confront terrorism, but without specifying the nature of this participation. More importantly also is the divergence in views on the impact of NATO’s role in the Middle East. Some believe that this would be a source of fueling conflicts, 24 Keshk,

Ashraf mohammed. 2020. NATO’s goal is not to turn the health crisis into a security crisis: Corona strengthens the right-wing isolationist. 30 June. Accessed August 9, 2020. https:// araa.sa/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5000&catid=4323&Itemid=172.

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and others believe that the alliance could be used as a forum to conduct strategic discussions between Western and Middle Eastern countries on the whole of security threats facing both sides and how to confront them.25

25 Dempse,

Judy. 2020. Should NATO Stay Away from the Middle East? 16 January. Accessed September 12, 2020. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/80815.

Strategic Conclusions of the Book

In light of the four chapters of the book, the following strategic conclusions can be made: Conclusions of Chapter 1 1.

2.

3.

NATO was considered the main tool of countries of Western Europe and North America in their conflict with countries of the Soviet Union-led eastern camp, comprised in Warsaw Pact, at the time of the Cold War era. Nonetheless, NATO was established six years before the Warsaw Pact, to achieve regional security for its member states, according to Chapter 8 of the Charter of the United Nations. Such chapter allows UN member states to establish organizations of this kind to support the UN efforts to achieve international peace and security. NATO is also a manifestation of the concept of collective security in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter that grants individual member states or groups of states the right to self-defense. Since its establishment, NATO has faced many challenges, including crises among its member states. The most prominent of such crises was France’s withdrawal from the Military Committee of the alliance in 1966. The crises included also disagreement among member states over the content of the defense doctrine that the alliance should adopt towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War, as well as the controversy and disagreement over the fair sharing of defense expenditures among NATO member states. Other issues in this respect included the controversy over the significance of NATO’s existence after the end of the Cold War era, in addition to challenges that resulted from developments in the Arab region in 2011. The first time to enforce Article Five of NATO Treaty, which is the essence of the alliance’s work, was after terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Although member states agreed that these attacks required enforcement of such article, NATO’s military participation was limited and not all operations were directly under the command of the alliance. Such command was assumed by the United Statesinstead. Nonetheless, agreement by NATO member states on classification

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. M. Keshk, NATO and the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3815-2

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of such attacks and what must be done regarding them was an important political support for the United States at the time. The readiness and cohesion of NATO was also asserted, as the United States asked the alliance to take the eight measures reviewed above. After the end of the Cold War era and the environment that resulted from it, which was radically different from its predecessor, NATO began to adopt strategies that included reviewing the structure of its forces to be appropriate for types of threats and their sources. The alliance also started to operate in new regions away from the traditional framework of Western Europe and North America. NATO’s first destination was the Warsaw region, by targeting former members of the Warsaw Pact, in accordance with requirements and conditions set by the alliance. In addition, NATO continued to release the Strategic Concept every ten years. The Seventh Strategic Concept was released in 2010, identifying the threats faced by NATO outside the territory of its member states. NATO also announced the start of implementing a policy called ‘stabilization’, according to the outcomes of NATO summit in Warsaw in 2016. Such policy focused on Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The various historical stages of NATO’s development reflected several characteristics of the alliance, including readiness and the capability to resolve crises that threatened international peace and security and that the UN could not resolve. Other characteristics include NATO flexibility and capability to adapt, by developing new mechanisms or starting to operate in new areas without this being contradictory with the charter on founding the alliance. However, NATO has not developed integrated security and defense strategies on security of the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East appropriate for the strategic importance of these two regions. Instead, NATO’s policies regarding these two regions were by means of the Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative in 1994 and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in 2004.

Conclusions of Chapter 2 1.

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched by NATO in 2004, aimed at cooperation with countries of the broader Middle East, starting with the Gulf countries. The ICI comprised a list of areas of security cooperation that the Gulf countries can choose from them. Four Gulf countries, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, joined the ICI, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman remained outside the framework of that initiative. The countries that joined the ICI believe that it provides a security value, in light of the direct regional threats they face. As for NATO, the ICI came within the strategy of establishing regional partnerships after the end of the Cold War. The approach of the two sides became clear during the many meetings that brought them together. According to the text of the ICI, it is integrated with other international initiatives directed to the Gulf countries and the Middle East region. The ICI is based on the principle of all +1 and has sparked a lot of

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3.

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controversy about circumstances of its launch, its contents, and the countries it targets. Since the ICI launch in 2004, the areas of security cooperation between NATO and the four Gulf counties comprised by it, including security agreements between the two sides, have varied. Such areas included the agreement on crossings between NATO and the State of Kuwait in 2017, as well as the joint military drills between NATO and the Gulf countries. The areas of cooperation included also the military cooperation between NATO and ICI member states during the alliance’s intervention in some crises outside territories of its member states. This partnership developed also with the opening of diplomatic missions by the four countries at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, and with participation by many armed forces personnel and civilians in the educational courses provided by the Defense College in Rome. Around 600 officers from the Middle East and Gulf countries have participated in activities of that college since 2009, including education, training, and consultations, as part of what was called ‘soft security’. This was followed with inauguration of the NATO and ICI Regional Center in Kuwait, in 2017. It is a center for educational courses on security issues of interest to both sides. Results of this cooperation were reflected in annual reports issued by NATO, noting to this cooperation from 2016 through 2019. Such results were reflected also in individual partnership and cooperation programs between NATO and the ICI member states. Results of cooperation between NATO and the ICI Gulf member states are important. Such member states can maximize benefiting from NATO in the so-called ‘added value in security’ by benefiting from the development of the defense doctrine of the alliance and the potential of using it within efforts of the Gulf countries to achieve defense integration. They can also benefit from the structure of the armed forces of NATO, which were structured to be appropriate for countering threats to member states. Other things that can be achieved in this respect include meeting security needs of the Arabian Gulf countries, by discussing the issue of security guarantees, which is still controversial when it comes to the content of Article 5 of NATO Treaty. Supporting the Gulf countries in countering electronic terrorism, threats to maritime security is another potential aspect of cooperation. The theoretical framework for evaluating initiatives includes three tracks: the modest ambition strategy, which includes security cooperation and confidencebuilding measures, the grand ambition strategy that involves inclusion of members from outside the Gulf system, and the intermediate strategy, which means shifting from the bilateral framework for cooperation to the multilateral framework. The ICI adopted the first track, as it has established a strategic and institutional dialogue between the alliance and the Gulf countries on contents and mechanisms of cooperation that can be built upon in the future. Although the ICI took into account the specialty of the Gulf countries and their security needs, the development of the initiative was linked to circumstances in the Middle East region in general. The preamble of the ICI provides for this, reading that it integrates with other initiatives in the region. Indeed, this

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is the approach of NATO itself, as the alliance underlines, in many strategies and plans of action, the significance of operating within international collective frameworks. Nonetheless, the ICI can be developed in the future by including security developments facing the Gulf countries, such as energy security and cyber terrorism, and supporting defense capabilities of the Gulf countries as a basic requirement to achieve regional balance of power, in addition to the role of the alliance in building security services in neighbors of the Gulf countries. Conclusions of Chapter 3 1.

2.

3.

4.

NATO gave great attention to threats to maritime security by means of what was stated in the Strategic Concept issued in 2010, and by the maritime strategy issued by the alliance in 2011. Such strategy included four basic elements: deterrence, collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. NATO plays an important role in protecting maritime security, including energy security, with several mechanisms. They include Operation Active Endeavor that NATO introduced in 2001, as one of eight responses to these attacks. Such mechanisms included also participation in countering piracy off the coast of Somalia, by the Ocean Shield forces, in addition to providing the European Union-led Sophia Operation, which has aimed to protect maritime security in the Mediterranean, with support. NATO is fully aware that the Gulf countries are part of a regional security system that they influence, and with which they are influenced. Therefore, it is important to confront regional security threats, including Iranian threats, and this contributes to strengthening the NATO-Gulf partnership. Although NATO was not a party to the 2015 deal on the Iranian nuclear program, the alliance called for implementation of such deal. Questions were also raised about the possibility of NATO intervention to confront Iran militarily. NATO has a strategy in this regard, involving deterrence, given the huge gap between the alliance’s forces and the Iranian forces. In addition, such strategy involves NATO assessment for the degree of threat and its danger, given that Iran is located at strategic contact points for core interests of the alliance’s member states. NATO has had an important role in supporting the Iraqi security capabilities out of conviction that Iraq is part of the regional security system. Since 2004 through 2018, NATO established several training missions for the Iraqi security forces over different periods. In addition, the alliance granted Iraq the status of partner. NATO’s efforts are also integrated with the advisory mission established by the European Union in 2017, which aimed to provide the Iraqi security authorities with advice and expertise. NATO plays an important role in combating terrorism, given the alliance’s capability to launch an integrated series of military operations and its ability to develop its military capabilities. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a wake-up call regarding NATO’s role in confronting terrorism. The alliance introduced several mechanisms to counter terrorism, including the 2016 Joint Intelligence and Security Unit. NATO also established the Strategic

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Direction South Hub for monitoring security threats in the southern front of the alliance and joined the international coalition to fight ISIS. NATO has also planned on countering electronic and nuclear terrorism. Although the issue of energy security was not included in the ICI, it was the subject of the majority of NATO’s meetings with its Arabian Gulf countries. In addition, some final communiqués of the alliance summits noted to this issue. This was reflected also in the structure of the military command of NATO, with establishing a command with a mission to protect shipping lines across the Atlantic Ocean. The issue of energy security was included also in the education and training programs in NATO institutions, and scenarios related to energy security were integrated in NATO maritime drills as well. NATO also introduced several mechanisms to protect energy security. They included the Center of Excellence for Energy Security that was set up in 2012.

Conclusions of Chapter 4 1.

2.

3.

4.

The nature of the security commitment on part of NATO towards member states of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative is still a controversial issue and is one of obstacles to development of the partnership between the two sides towards broader horizons. The ICI does not include provision of any security guarantees to any non-NATO member states. Nonetheless, this did not prevent interference by NATO in some crises outside territories of its member states. The alliance has, however, set conditions for such interference; including consensus among NATO member states that there is a threat facing them, existence of a UN resolution, an intervention request by the concerned state. The difference in views among NATO members states regarding crises hinders the work of the alliance outside their territories. The Libyan crisis is a clear example to this. This may be explained by the overlap between NATO membership and membership in the European Union. There are 22 countries that are member states of NATO and the European Union at the same time. This division, in addition to limiting the alliance’s ability to act and take decisive resolutions, has reflections on the alliance’s partnerships. It has been notable that there is a sharp division between NATO partners in the ICI, as well as in the Mediterranean Dialogue. Such division is a threat to these two partnerships. Although the nature of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative allows a degree of flexibility, with the formula of all + one, it restricts the possibility of emergence of a collective framework for a partnership that comprises the GCC member states within a regional security system. Therefore, it is better for the Gulf countries to have the partnership according to the formula of 29 + 4. In addition, the continued absence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman from the framework of the ICI means existence of more than one vision on security of the Arabian Gulf region. NATO faces institutional challenges, including ineffectiveness of some mechanisms, such as the Strategic Direction South Hub, which carry out tasks in a wide geographical region. Reluctance by NATO member states to issue the

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Eighth Strategic Concept, which is a high-level security pact, is another challenge. Disagreement On the content and the wording of this concept will have an impact on the work of NATO and the degree of consensus inside the alliance. The external challenges facing NATO, are related to NATO-Russia alliance, with the existence of a coordination mechanism between NATO and Russia, namely, the NATO-Russia Council, which was established in 2002. Russia’s pursuit to strengthen its presence in the same regions of influence of NATO could result in intense conflict, which can, in turn, cause a split among the ICI member states. This possibility was evident during the Libyan crisis. Another external challenge facing NATO is related to relationship with the European Union, because overlap in membership of European countries between the two organizations. The impact of the Corona pandemic on NATO’s military operations, and repercussions of this on the alliance’s concept of deterrence, is another external challenge.

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 1.

2.

3.

With a transformed Alliance determined to respond to new challenges, NATO is ready to undertake a new initiative in the broader Middle East region to further contribute to long-term global and regional security and stability while complementing other international efforts. In this context, progress towards a just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict should remain a priority for the countries of the region and the international community as a whole, and for the success of the security and stability objectives of this initiative. Full and speedy implementation of the Quartet Road Map is a key element in international efforts to promote a two state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in which Israel and Palestine live side by side in peace and security. The roadmap is a vital element of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including the Syrian–Israeli and Lebanese–Israeli tracks. NATO’s initiative, based on a series of mutually beneficial bilateral relationships aimed at fostering security and regional stability, should take into account the following principles: a. b.

c.

The importance of taking into account ideas and proposals originating from the countries of the region or regional organizations. The need to stress that the NATO initiative is a cooperative initiative, based on joint ownership and the mutual interests of NATO and the countries of the region, taking into account their diversity and specific needs. The need to recognize that this process is distinct yet takes into account and complements other initiatives including by the G-8 and international organizations such as the EU and the OSCE as appropriate. The NATO initiative should also be complementary to the Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue and could use instruments developed in this framework, while respecting its

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specificity. Furthermore, the new initiative could apply lessons learned and, as appropriate, mechanisms and tools derived from other NATO initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP); The need to focus on practical cooperation in areas where NATO can add value, particularly, in the security field. Participation of countries in the region in the initiative as well as the pace and extent of their cooperation with NATO will depend in large measure on their individual response and level of interest. The need to avoid misunderstandings about the scope of the initiative, which is not meant to either lead to NATO/EAPC/PfP membership, provide security guarantees, or be used to create a political debate over issues more appropriately handled in other fora.

Taking into account other international efforts for reforms in the democracy and civil society fields in the countries of the region, NATO’s offer to those countries of dialogue and cooperation will contribute to those efforts where it can have an added value: in particular, NATO could make a notable contribution in the security field as a result of its particular strengths and the experience gained with the PfP and the Mediterranean Dialogue.

Aim of the Initiative 5.

6.

The aim of the initiative would be to enhance security and regional stability through a new transatlantic engagement with the region. This could be achieved by actively promoting NATO’s cooperation with interested countries in the field of security, particularly, through practical activities where NATO can add value to develop the ability of countries’ forces to operate with those of the Alliance including by contributing to NATO-led operations, fight against terrorism, stem the flow of WMD materials and illegal trafficking in arms, and improve countries’ capabilities to address common challenges and threats with NATO. Countries of the region might see benefit in cooperation with the Alliance through practical support against terrorist threats, access to training, defense reform expertise and opportunities for military cooperation, as well as through political dialogue on issues of common concern.

Content of the Initiative Including Priority Areas 7.

The initiative’s aim would be essentially achieved through practical cooperation and assistance in the following priority areas and illustrative menu of specific activities: a. b.

Providing tailored advice on defense reform, defense budgeting, defense planning, and civil–military relations. Promoting military-to-military cooperation to contribute to interoperability 1 through participation in selected military exercises and related education and training activities that could improve the ability of participating

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countries’ forces to operate with those of the Alliance in contributing to NATO-led operations consistent with the UN Charter: • Invite interested countries to observe and/or participate in selected NATO/PfP exercise activities as appropriate and provided that the necessary arrangements are in place. • Encourage additional participation by interested countries in NATO-led peace-support operations on a case-by-case basis. c.

Fighting against terrorism including through information sharing and maritime cooperation: • Invite interested countries, in accordance with the procedures set out by the Council for contributory support from non-NATO nations, to join Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) in order to enhance the ability to help deter, defend, disrupt, and protect against terrorism through maritime operations in the OAE Area of Operations. • Explore other forms of cooperation against terrorism including through intelligence exchange and assessments as appropriate.

d. e.

Contributing to the work of the Alliance on threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery: Promoting cooperation as appropriate and where NATO can add value in the field of border security, particularly, in connection with terrorism, small arms, and light weapons, and the fight against illegal trafficking: • Offer NATO-sponsored border security expertise and facilitate followup training in this respect. • Access to appropriate PfP programmes and training centres.

f.

Promoting cooperation in the areas of civil emergency planning: • Offer NATO training courses on civil emergency planning, civil–military coordination, and crisis response to maritime, aviation, and surface threats. • Invitations to join or observe relevant NATO/PfP exercises as appropriate and provision of information on possible disaster assistance.

Geographical Scope of the Initiative 8.

Based on the principle of inclusiveness, the initiative could be opened to all interested countries in the region who subscribe to the aim and content of this initiative, including the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as described above. Each interested country would be considered by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis and on its own merit. This initiative would complement NATO’s specific relationship with the partner countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue 2.

Strategic Conclusions of the Book

127

Implementing the New Initiative 9.

10.

This initiative would carry NATO into a new set of relationships with countries that may have a limited understanding of the Alliance as it has been transformed. Since an underlying requirement of success for the initiative is the development of ownership by countries of the region, it will be necessary to update governments and opinion-formers’ understanding of NATO and the initiative and, in the light of the reactions of the countries concerned, consider a joint public diplomacy effort. Furthermore, in developing and implementing the initiative, the views of interested countries in the region will have to be taken into account through a process of regular consultation. This initiative will be launched at the Istanbul Summit. Subsequently, in consultation with interested countries, NATO would offer a menu of practical activities within the above-mentioned priority areas for possible development with interested countries of the region. The Alliance would engage these countries, on a 26 + 1 basis, to develop and execute agreed work plans. While doing so, the new initiative could apply lessons learned and, as appropriate and on a case-by-case basis, mechanisms and tools derived from other NATO initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Appropriate legal security and liaison arrangements should be put in place. 1.

2.

Interoperability requirements constitute firm prerequisites for contributing nations such as the need to communicate with each other, to operate together, to support each other, and to train together. Specificity in this respect refers, in particular, to the composition of this initiative and the Mediterranean Dialogue, as well as the multilateral dimension of the Mediterranean Dialogue.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_21017.htm?

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Index

A Abd al-Latif Al-Zayani, 59 Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, 51 Added value of security, 46 Afghanistan, 7, 9, 10, 13–15, 20, 21, 24, 31, 38, 40, 45, 50, 51, 53, 57, 62, 73, 77, 82, 89, 104, 109, 110 African Union, 11, 12, 28, 45 Agreement on the exchange of security information, 51 Algeria, 29, 30, 76, 98 Alliance’s strategic concept (1999), 18 Al-Udeid Air Base, 53 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 27, 28, 58, 103 Arabian Gulf countries, 32, 37–39, 73, 78, 79, 83, 101–103, 105, 109, 121, 123 Arabian Peninsula, 68 Arabian Sea, 77 Arab League, 4, 32, 97, 108 Arab Mediterranean countries of North Africa, 20 Arab region, 26–28, 31, 33, 97, 119 Arab spring, 25, 26, 28, 44 Article 5, 1, 3–5, 9–11, 19, 20, 22, 30, 44, 53, 66, 68–70, 73, 89, 90, 94, 102, 103, 106, 107, 110, 121 Atlantic Gulf partnership, 53

B Bahia Al-Jishi, 60 Bahrain, 45–47, 51, 53, 57, 58, 60, 61, 66, 70, 71, 99, 110, 120 Bahrain center for strategic, international and energy studies, 16, 59, 68, 110

Balance of powers, 33, 39, 41, 48, 63, 70, 79, 103, 106, 122 Ballistic missiles, 19, 80, 104 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7, 8, 114 Brussels, 3, 6, 13, 16, 27, 30, 44, 52, 58–61, 85, 93, 97, 108, 113, 121 Bush, George W., 10, 13, 14

C Charles de Gaulle, 6 Civil emergency planning, 57, 126 Civil-military cooperation, 42, 57 Cold War era, 1, 5–7, 10, 15, 18, 20, 23, 34, 35, 42, 45, 54, 77, 106, 119, 120 Collective defense, 10, 11, 13, 19, 21, 22, 24, 66, 69, 74, 122 Collective self-defense, 4, 40, 102 Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), 67 Cooperative security, 19, 30, 74, 105, 116, 122 Coordination, 37, 41, 51, 53, 60, 63, 71, 73, 81, 84, 90, 92, 98, 106, 107, 111, 113, 115, 124, 126 Covid-19 pandemic, 60 Crisis, 2, 4, 8, 10, 13, 15, 17–19, 21–23, 25, 29, 31–33, 40, 48, 54–56, 58–60, 63, 66, 68–70, 74, 78, 80, 81, 97– 99, 101, 102, 104, 107, 110, 112–116, 122–124, 126 Crisis management exercises, 54, 55 Cybersecurity, 56, 73

D Dayton peace agreement, 8

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. M. Keshk, NATO and the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3815-2

137

138 Defense burden-sharing, 7 Defense Planning Committee (DPC), 5, 67 Defense reforms, 8, 25, 42, 48, 65 Diplomatic missions to NATO, 57, 61

E Eastern Europe, 7, 16, 21, 22, 25–27, 120 Egypt, 24, 29, 30, 64, 92, 113 Energy security, 19, 20, 25, 31, 34, 37, 44, 45, 47, 48, 54, 57–59, 63, 65, 69, 73, 74, 78, 81, 83, 94–98, 100, 103, 104, 108, 109, 122, 123 European Union, 8, 15, 27, 43, 46, 60, 65, 67, 73, 76, 80, 86, 87, 91, 92, 95, 102, 114, 115, 122–124 European Union’s advisory mission in Iraq, 86

F Fawaaz Mishaal Al-Sabah, 56 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 8

G Gaub, Florence, 86, 105 George Robertson, 10 Giovanni Romani, 60 Gordon, Philip, 12 Gulf cooperation council states, 42, 69 Gulf of Aden, 4, 76, 78, 98, 99, 107

H Hans Morgenthau, 39 Horn of Africa, 58, 70, 76 Humanitarian missions, 19 Hybrid Warfare, 22

I Imbalance of regional power, 43, 63 Immigration, 23, 28, 32, 37, 54, 97, 111 Indian Ocean, 33, 71, 76, 77, 98, 99 Individual Partnership Cooperation Program (IPCP), 52, 85 International coalition to fight ISIS, 100, 106, 115, 123 International criminal court, 32, 108 International intervention, 55 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 9, 24, 62 Iranian foreign ministry, 83

Index Iranian newspaper Al-Wefaq, 82 Iranian nuclear crisis, 104 Iranian threats, 44, 73, 78–80, 100, 104, 122 Iraq, 8, 13–15, 23, 31, 33, 43, 45, 49, 54, 61, 68, 73, 77, 78, 82–89, 92, 96, 98, 104, 106, 107, 109, 114–116, 122 Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988), 31, 41, 78, 97, 107 Iraqi security capabilities, 12, 73, 83, 122 Iraqi security forces, 28, 40, 64, 84–87, 99, 122 Islamic Military Coalition to Combat Terrorism, 106 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 33, 73 Israel, 29, 76, 124 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), 2, 4, 12, 22, 27, 3233, 35, 37, 39, 41–46, 49, 51, 53, 54, 57–61, 64, 69, 71, 73, 78, 79, 83, 89, 94–96, 101–105, 114, 116, 120, 123, 124 Istanbul summit in 2004, 24, 84

J Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 45, 46, 53, 90, 95 Jamie Shea, 96 Joint intelligence and security division, 91, 92 Joint military exercises, 52 Joint military maneuvers, 50 Jordanian port of Aqaba, 30 Joseph Nye, 38

K Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed, 5, 16, 26, 30–32, 34, 35, 39, 44, 47, 51, 53, 64, 78–83, 86, 89, 90, 94, 97, 100, 103, 108, 114, 115, 116 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 37, 48, 55, 56, 97, 101, 102, 120, 123 Kohler, Kevin, 23 Kosovo, 8, 10, 15, 21, 24, 26, 31, 40, 55, 68, 81, 107–109 Kuwait, 3, 5, 21, 23, 31, 32, 37, 38, 41, 45, 46, 50–53, 56–59, 61, 64, 66, 68, 70, 78, 97, 99, 103, 105, 107, 109, 120, 121 Kuwaiti national assembly, 52 Kuwait Liberation War in 1991, 105, 107

L Legitimate intervention, 8

Index Leon Panetta, 26 Liberation of the State of Kuwait in 1991, 38, 99 Libya, 26–28, 31–33, 50, 53, 56, 68, 75, 85, 89, 97, 108–110, 113, 114

M Madeleine Albright, 25, 81, 107 Main Military Commands (MMC), 6 Manama, 51, 69, 110 Mandate, 1, 8, 9, 14, 27, 32, 33, 55, 75 Maritime security, 25, 30, 34, 56–61, 63, 64, 70, 71, 73–77, 97, 104, 109, 113, 115, 116, 121, 122 Maritime security force 81, 70 Mauritania, 29, 76, 92, 111 Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative (MDI), 46, 71, 105, 116, 120 Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 2, 15, 21, 25, 60, 62, 65, 92 Military campaign, 8, 109 Military intervention, 8, 19, 20, 24, 26, 28, 56, 73, 78, 80, 97, 99, 101, 106–108 Military technology, 49, 64, 69 Morocco, 29, 30, 75, 76, 92 Muhammad Abd al-Ghaffar, 47 Munich security conference, 79, 82

N NATO defense college, 37, 54, 56, 61, 64, 103 NATO-ICI regional centre, 56 NATO maritime strategy, 74 NATO military committee, 23, 109 NATO Rapid Response Force (NRRF), 12 NATO Response Force (NRF), 13, 74, 89 NATO-Russia Council, 65, 82, 113, 124 NATO’s annual report, 57 NATO’s military Intervention, 8, 19, 26, 73, 80, 101, 106, 107 NATO Strategic Direction-South Hub (NSD-S Hub), 2 NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I), 23, 86 Neoliberalism, 38 Nicholas Burns, 14, 84 North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), 23 North Atlantic Treaty, 3, 52, 54, 59, 66 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1–35, 37–71, 73–116, 119–127

139 O Operation Active Endeavor (OAE), 29, 75, 76, 89, 122 Operation Ocean Shield, 71, 98 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 17

P Partnership for Peace Program (PFP), 1 Paul Bremer, 86 Paul Wolfowitz, 10 Peacebuilding, 23 Peninsula shield force, 70 Pierre Lellouche, 47 Piracy, 33, 44, 52, 54, 58, 61, 70, 71, 76–78, 98, 99, 107, 109, 122 Politi, Alessandro, 77 Political Committee (PC), 5, 6, 67, 94 Political Research Center of the Iranian Shura Council, 82 Prince Khalid bin Saud, 48 Projecting stability, 2, 21–23, 91, 95 Public diplomacy, 51, 61, 105, 127

Q Qassem Soleimani, 81, 83 Qatar, 32, 45–47, 51–53, 57, 58, 68, 94, 120 Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 45, 94

R Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF), 12, 67 Razoux, Pierre, 64, 104 Reform in the Greater Middle East and Iraq, 13, 44 Regional security organizations, 1, 40, 44 Regional security threats, 64, 67, 73, 78, 99, 103, 107, 122 Revolutionary guards, 83 Riga Summit, 54, 63, 95 Rolf Schwarz, 56 Ronald Reagan, 31, 97 Rumsfeld, Donald, 10 Russia, 22–24, 26, 65, 80, 83, 93, 98, 99, 106, 109, 110, 113–116, 124 Russian intervention in the Syrian crisis, 63, 80

S Samaan, Jean-Loup, 69 Saud Al-Faisal, 48

140 Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 48 Schwarz, Rolf, 105 Security burdens, 55 Security division at NATO headquarters, 92 Security intelligence sharing, 50 Seif, Mustafa Olwi, 13, 16, 29, 30, 34, 84 September attacks in 2001, 9, 10, 62 Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, 60 Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, 51 Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, 59 Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohammed, 46 Sheikh Sabah Al-Khaled, 56 Sheikh Thamer Al-Sabah, 50, 52 Small countries, 39, 44, 47, 101, 103, 105 Smart Defense strategy, 32 Smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, 75 Soft security, 44, 50, 54, 61, 62, 121 Stability, 19, 21–24, 26, 28, 29, 33, 35, 40, 42, 43, 46, 53, 59, 61–64, 71, 75, 76, 78, 83–85, 87, 88, 90–92, 94, 99, 100, 103–105, 113, 124, 125 Stoltenberg, Jens, 33, 71 Strait of Hormuz, 49, 69, 79, 106 Strategic concept, 1, 18–22, 25, 27, 30, 31, 34, 44, 66, 74, 83, 88–90, 95, 104, 112, 120, 122, 124 Strategic partnership, 1, 18, 19, 22, 25, 27, 30, 60, 64, 65, 78, 79, 101, 103, 114 Strategic vacuums, 35 Strategy, 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 26, 28–30, 32, 34, 35, 39, 44, 47, 51, 53, 61, 62, 64, 66, 69, 71, 74, 77, 80, 83, 84–87, 89–92, 94, 95, 97, 103, 108–110, 112, 114, 116, 120–122 Sultanate of Oman, 37, 48, 49, 55, 56, 101, 102, 120, 123 Supreme Military Committee (SMC), 6, 67

T Tanker’s war, 31, 41, 97, 99 Terrorism, 10–12, 15, 19, 27, 29–31, 35, 37, 42, 45, 48, 50, 52–54, 60, 62, 65, 69– 71, 73, 75, 76, 83, 85, 87–94, 96–98, 103, 110, 116, 121–123, 125, 126 Transit agreement, 52 Trump, Donald, 35, 79, 92 Tunisia, 23, 29, 76, 92

Index U Ukrainian crisis, 26 United Arab Emirates, 34, 46, 47, 51, 53, 57–59, 120 United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, 84 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), 9 United Nations Charter, 1, 40 United States, 3, 6, 7, 9–12, 14, 15, 19, 28, 33, 35, 38, 41, 43, 47, 50, 60, 67–70, 73–75, 77, 80–84, 90, 92, 93, 97, 102, 106, 108, 109, 111, 114–116, 119, 120

V Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), 13 Vietnam, 7, 109 Vision, 6, 25, 27, 37, 45, 48, 49, 64, 68, 73, 78, 79, 87, 90, 91, 95, 96, 101, 102, 108, 110, 112, 113, 115, 116, 123 Vital interests, 79, 108, 109

W Warsaw Pact countries, 1, 16 Warsaw summit, 2, 21, 22, 59, 76, 85 Washington Treaty, 3, 5, 7, 19, 24, 53, 69, 73, 96, 107 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 25, 27–29, 42, 45, 53, 59, 71, 76, 89, 96, 126 Wesley Clark, 68, 109 White paper, 21 World food program, 77

Y Yemen, 45, 49, 68, 104 Yugoslavia, 8

Z Zaiybat, Khair Salem, 28 Zone, 7, 18, 20, 32, 70, 85, 108, 109 Zora hesova, 44