Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa [1st ed.] 9783030383077, 9783030383084

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Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa Edited by Holger Weiss

Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa

Holger Weiss Editor

Muslim ­Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa

Editor Holger Weiss Department of History Åbo Akademi University Turku, Finland

ISBN 978-3-030-38307-7 ISBN 978-3-030-38308-4  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38308-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 Chapters “Muslim NGOs, Zakat and the Provision of Social Welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Introduction” and “Discourses on Zakat and Its Implementation in Contemporary Ghana” are licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). For further details see license information in the chapters. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Maram_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

This book is the outcome of joint project that started sometimes in 2016 when Franz Kogelmann invited me to give a presentation on Muslim approaches to social welfare in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. Although the planes where changed, we realized that the topic was timely— a lot of new research had been published since we both had been studying the topic during the previous decade. We therefore decided to send out invitations to our colleagues as to get an update of what was going on. We ended up organizing a workshop in Bayreuth in November 2017. Our gratitude goes to the Fritz Thyssen Foundation which funded the workshop and the Institute of African Studies at Bayreuth University who hosted it. Most of the presenters answered positively to my call to rewrite their papers; the outcome of our joint journey is this book. I would like to thank all contributors for participating in our joint project as well as our reviewers and editors for their encouraging support. Last, but not least, I would like to thank Franz Kogelmann for taking me back to Islamic studies in Africa!

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Contents

Muslim NGOs, Zakat and the Provision of Social Welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Introduction 1 Holger Weiss Who Do FBOs Speak For? The Conundrum of Representation 39 Yonatan N. Gez Reflections on Trust and Trust Making in the Work of Islamic Charities from the Gulf Region in Africa 61 Mayke Kaag and Soumaya Sahla Charity, ONG-Ization and Emergent Ethics of Volunteerism: The Case of Islamic NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire 85 Marie Nathalie LeBlanc Islamic NGOs in Somalia and Their Role in the Somali State-Building Process 119 Valeria Saggiomo

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CONTENTS

Between Charity and Financing ‘Terror’: The Dilemma of Muslim Charitable Organizations in Kenya 143 Suleiman Athuman Chembea ‘Enterprisation of Islamic FBOs’—Towards a New Typology of Islamic Non-governmental Organisations in Consideration of Their Multiple Relatedness 169 Sebastian Müller Transnational Networks and Global Shi‘i Islamic NGOs in Tanzania 201 Mara A. Leichtman Politics of Humanitarianism: The Ahmadiyya and the Provision of Social Welfare 247 Katrin Langewiesche Discourses on Zakat and Its Implementation in Contemporary Ghana 273 Holger Weiss Index 305

Notes

on

Contributors

Suleiman Athuman Chembea  (Ph.D. 2017) is a lecturer of Religion at the Bomet University College, a constituent college of Moi University, Kenya. His research focuses on Muslim social welfare institutions, Muslim-Christian relations, Religious extremism, and Islam and politics. His last publications include Competing and Conflicting Power Dynamics in Waqfs in Kenya, 1900–2010 (https://epub.uni-bayreuth.de/3705/1/ BASO_6_Chembea_2018.pdf); ‘Negotiating Muslim-Christian Relations in Kenya through Waqfs, 1900–2010’, Journal of Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations 28, no. 4 (2017), and ‘Waqfs and the Dynamics of Muslim Charity in Secular Milieus, Kenya 1900–2010’, Alternation Journal, Special Edition 19 (2017). Yonatan N. Gez (Ph.D. 2014) is a social anthropologist ­ studying international development and religion in East Africa. He currently serves as a Humboldt Fellow at the University of Konstanz (Germany), and as a research fellow at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute in Freiburg (Germany) and the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva (Switzerland), where he is a Deputy PI on a F ­ ranco-Swiss research project titled “Self-Accomplishment and Local Moralities in East Africa” (Project SALMEA). His recent books include the monograph Traditional Churches, Born Again Christianity, and Pentecostalism: Religious Mobility and Religious Repertoires in Urban Kenya (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), the edited volume International Development in Africa: Between Theory and Practice (Pardes ix

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Publishing House, 2019, with Reut Barak Weekes and Manya Kagan, in Hebrew) and the monograph Butinage: The Art of Religious Mobility (University of Toronto Press, with Yvan Droz, Jeanne Rey, and Edio Soares, forthcoming). Mayke Kaag is a social anthropologist and a senior researcher/associate professor at the African Studies Centre, Leiden University, The Netherlands. Over the past years, her research has mainly focused on African transnational relations, including land issues, transnational Islamic charities, and engagements with the diaspora. Recent publications include ‘Linking-In Through Education? Exploring the Educational Question in Africa from the Perspective of Flows and (dis) Connections’ (Sustainability 10: no. 2, 2018); ‘The Role of Islam in Forging Linkages Between Africa and Asia from the 1970s: The Case of Islamic Relief and Development Support’, in Routledge Handbook of Africa-Asia Relations, ed. P. A. Raposo et al. (Routledge, 2017); ‘Islamic Charities from the Arab World in Africa: Intercultural Encounters of Humanitarianism and Morality’, in Humanitarianism and Challenges of Cooperation, ed. M. Heins et al. (Routledge, 2016). Katrin Langewiesche is an anthropologist with an area specialization in West Africa. She received her Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from EHESS, Ecoles des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales and works on topics relating to the anthropology of religion in West Africa: religious plurality in modern societies, conversion theories, faith-based organizations, Catholic convents between Europe and Africa, and Islamic transnational networks. Her publications include Mobilité religieuse. Changements religieux au Burkina Faso (LIT-Verlag, 2003), Néo-ruraux—Vivre autrement (coedited with A. Attané and F. Pourcel, Edition Le bec en l’air, 2004) and L’enquête et ses graphies en sciences sociales. Figurations iconographiques d’apres societe (coedited with J.-B. Ouédraogo, Amalion, 2019), Rencontres religieuses et dynamiques sociales au Burkina Faso (coedited with A. Degorce and L. Kibora, Amalion, 2019). Marie Nathalie LeBlanc is an anthropologist and a full professor in the Département de sociologie at Université du Québec à Montréal (Canada). She holds a research chair on contemporary Islam in West Africa (https://chaireicao.uqam.ca). Her major publications deal with religious and social transformations in post-colonial West African societies (mainly Côte d’Ivoire). Her work on Africa has been published in various academic journals (African Affairs, Africa, Journal of Religion in

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Africa and Cahiers d’études africaines). She recently c­ o-edited L’Afrique des generations (Karthala, 2012) and Faith and Charity: Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa (Pluto Press, 2016). She recently ended a research projects on religious NGOs in West Africa. Her current work is on Islamic mystical practices in West Africa. Her research programs have been funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Mara A. Leichtman (Ph.D. 2006) is associate professor of Anthropology at Michigan State University. Her research highlights the interconnections among religion, migration, politics, and economic development through examining Muslim institutions and the communities they serve. She is author of Shi‘i Cosmopolitanisms in Africa: Lebanese Migration and Religious Conversion in Senegal (Indiana University Press, 2015) and co-editor (with Mamadou Diouf) of New Perspectives on Islam in Senegal: Conversion, Migration, Wealth, Power, and Femininity (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). She also co-edited two special journal issues: ‘The Shiʿa of Lebanon: New Approaches to Modern History, Contemporary Politics, and Religion’ in Die Welt des Islams (2019) and ‘Muslim Cosmopolitanism: Movement, Identity, and Contemporary Reconfigurations’ in City and Society (2012). Her articles appeared in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Anthropological Quarterly, Contemporary Islam, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Journal of Religion in Africa, and Ethnic and Racial Studies. Dr. Leichtman was a visiting Fulbright Scholar at American University of Kuwait (2016–2017) where she launched a new research project that examines Islamic humanitarianism in the Gulf directed to global economic development, in particular in Africa. Sebastian Müller (M.A. 2013) is Junior Fellow of the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS), Bayreuth University, Germany. His research focuses on development aid, civil ­society and Muslim non-governmental organisations respectively Islamic faith based organisations in Africa (Ghana, Tanzania). His last p ­ublications include: ‘Islamische Wohltätigkeit und Entwicklungsorganisationen: Grundlagen des Engagements und exemplarische Einblicke in die Praxis’ In: Ströbele, Christian et.al. (Ed.): Armut und Gerechtigkeit: christliche und i­slamische Perspektiven—Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2016. 202–215 and ‘Krisen und Glaube: Streiflichter islamischer Nothilfe und langfristiger Entwicklungsmaßnahmen im Namen des Islam’ In: Öhlschläger, Rainer et al. (Ed.): Krisenhilfe oder Hilfe in Krisen?: Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit Krisenländern—Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016, 97–115.

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Valeria Saggiomo is a professor of International Cooperation for Development at University “L’Orientale” of Naples, Italy. Her research focuses on the role of civil society in triggering development processes, with emphasis on Islamic and diaspora organizations. Valeria is passionate about Somalia, where she worked as humanitarian worker between 2003 and 2006 and established her research field until 2011. Her current interest is concerned with the roles of migrant/diaspora activism in transnational entrepreneurship and development. Soumaya Sahla is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Leiden. Her doctoral research is focused on the philosophy of law. Her previous scholarship spanned Islamic Theology, political science and African Studies, under the aegis of which she conducted fieldwork in Ghana. She completed an M.Phil. at the Centre for African Studies at Leiden. Holger Weiss (Ph.D. 1997) is professor of general history at Åbo Akademi University, Finland and ordinary member of the Finnish Society for Sciences and Letters. His research focuses on Global and Atlantic history, West African environmental history, and Islamic Studies with a special focus on Islam in Ghana. His last monographs include Framing a Radical African Atlantic. African American Agency, West African Intellectuals and the International Trade Union of Negro Workers (Brill, 2014), Slavhandel och slaveri under svensk flagg: Koloniala drömmar och verklighet i Afrika och Karibien 1770–1847 (Svenska Litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2016), and För kampen internationellt! Transportarbetarnas globala kampinternational och dess verksamhet i Nordeuropa under ­1930-talet (Työväen perinteen ja historian tutkimuksen seura, 2019).

List of Figures

Charity, ONG-Ization and Emergent Ethics of Volunteerism: The Case of Islamic NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire Fig. 1 Map of Cote d’Ivoire 92 Fig. 2 The zakat calculator on the homepage of Fondation Zakât et Waqf 111

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List of Tables

Muslim NGOs, Zakat and the Provision of Social Welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Introduction Table 1 Zakat collecting and distributing Muslim faith-based NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa Table 2 Estimates of the potential of zakat (% of GDP) Table 3 Gap in resources needed to alleviate poverty

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Muslim NGOs, Zakat and the Provision of Social Welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Introduction Holger Weiss

Muslim non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are a growing ­feature in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa with heavy influence on the societies in which they operate. Their impact is not only limited to the p ­ rivate sphere of the believers but extends to the public sphere as well. Public debates are impregnated by religiously inspired arguments. Striking examples of this development are the debates accompanying the role of Khadis’ Courts in the so-called Bomas draft constitution referendum of Kenya in 2005 or the re-implementation of Islamic Law in Northern Nigeria starting in the early 2000s.1 Muslim NGOs are playing an important role in shaping public debates on issues related to the correlation of state and religion in the respective countries. Some Muslim NGOs, after being accused of supporting militant movements, have even been dissolved. Under pressure of the international community, many 1 See further John A. Chesworth and Franz Kogelmann, eds., Sharî‘a in Africa Today: Reactions and Responses (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013).

H. Weiss (*)  Department of History, Åbo Akademi University, Turku, Finland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 H. Weiss (ed.), Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38308-4_1

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states in Africa restricted the operational basis of Muslim NGOs after 9/11. Muslim NGOs are confronted with an increasing lack of trust. However, many of them play a pivotal role in providing social welfare. The perception of Muslim NGOs oscillating between supporting terrorism inspired by Islam and helping to overcome the marginalized role of Muslims in some African states is a reality. The objective of this book is to give an overview on the discourses, agendas and actions of Muslim NGOs and activists to achieve empowerment of Muslim populations in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. The crisis of secular nationalism since the late 1960s and the 1970s has created favourable conditions in the Muslim World for a religiously oriented reflection and mobilization that integrates individual salvation and self-realization with a commitment to community welfare. Morally and religiously inspired social action underlies the provision of services for the poor that the state often cannot efficiently provide, including basic health care and education. Such social action can be informally organized, based on affinities of shared habits, expectations, practices and interests. Religiously based charitable associations, such as Muslim NGOs, focusing on a wide array of services (medical, educational, family welfare and emergency assistance), play exactly such a role. They rest initially on ties of local trust and community, although they can also provide a base for subsequent political participation. However, secular Western development institutions have been rather reluctant in recognizing the potentials of Southern religious organizations working on development. Muslim institutions and leaders, if recognized at all, were regarded as intrinsically hostile to modernization or at least articulating a critical attitude to the Western world. This negative perspective changed during the early decades of the twenty-first century when multilateral and bilateral government agencies recognized religious leaders and organizations, including Muslim faith-based NGOs, as key partners to achieve the UN Millennium (and subsequent) Sustainable Development Goals.2 Islamic instruments to promote social welfare and humanitarian assistance, not 2 United Nations Development Programme “Islamic Finance Partners,” https://www. undp.org/content/undp/en/home/partners/islamic-finance.html (checked 6 August 2019). See further Wendy R. Tyndale, ed., Visions of Development: Faith-Based Initiatives (Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2016 [2006]), 166–168; Jonathan Benthall, Islamic Charities and Islamic Humanism in Troubled Times (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).

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least through the collection and distribution of zakat or obligatory alms, have generated a significant amount interest both by Western academics and by development professionals.3 The emergence or development of a public sphere in ­ sub-Saharan African countries is usually linked with the modern, postcolonial state and modern, Western-inspired associations and NGOs. Following Whitfield, the construction of ‘civil society’ is the outcome of a process in which donor agencies, international NGOs, the government and social organizations all actively engage in debates and activities in the public sphere and use their engagement in the public sphere to legitimize their actions. For the government, ‘civil society’ is a response to increasingly articulated demands from sections of society for greater representation and participation in policy-making. For donor agencies, ‘civil society’ is both a means and an end. For international NGOs, ‘civil society’ is the key to linking citizens around the world in common struggles. For social organizations, ‘civil society’ is a tool for mobilization and legitimation. With the construction of civil society follows a tendency towards its institutionalization.4 However, the concepts of the public sphere and civil society in a sub-Saharan African context have to be broadened as patterns of political and societal organization outside the formal state structures and Western-type NGOs have to be included as well. From a historical ­perspective, there existed already a well-defined public sphere and civil society in several colonies in British and French West Africa. From an African Islamic studies perspective, one could even argue that such a ‘political sphere’ is even older, including that of the formation of specific ‘Muslim spheres’ in pre-colonial African societies. In many regions, the establishment of a distinct ‘Muslim sphere’ was a consequence of the 3 Chloe Stirk, An Act of Faith: Humanitarian Financing and Zakat, Development Initiatives Briefing Paper March 2015, available at http://devinit.org/wp-content/ uploads/2015/03/ONLINE-Zakat_report_V9a.pdf (checked 6 August 2019). 4 Lindsay Whitfield, “Civil Society as Idea and Civil Society as Process: The Case of Ghana,” Oxford Development Studies 31, no. 3 (2003): 390. For a critical discussion on NGOs and civil society in Africa, see Ebenezer Odabare, “Civil Society in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society, ed. Michael Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 183–194; Robert A. Dibie, ed., ­Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Sustainable Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008); Sabine Lang, NGOs, Civil Society, and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

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colonial policy of granting religious and cultural autonomy for Muslim groups.5 In predominantly postcolonial Muslim states, such as Senegal and Mali, the transfer to the postcolonial state was equivalent with Muslim politicians and administrators taking over the colonial state. In states with a substantial Muslim population, such as Nigeria, the postcolonial condition has been marked by intra-community clashes between various Sufi and Sunni groups as well as inter-community clashes between Muslim and Christian groups, resulting into a complex political-cum-religious landscape: Officially, Nigeria is a secular federal state that applies (Western) civil law but in twelve northern states, Muslim law and Muslim political and economic institutions, such as the religious police (hisba) and zakat (religious tax paid by Muslims), are enforced since 2000.6 The purpose of the anthology is to outline and analyse articulations and actions of Muslim NGOs with a special focus on their instrumentalization of Islamic social finance instruments, namely sadaqa or voluntary almsgiving and donations; zakat or mandatory almsgiving; and waqf or pious endowments. Contemporary Islamic economists such as M. U. Chapra highlight the potential of Islamic social finance instruments to alleviate the sufferings of the extremely poor, namely those living on less than USD 1.25 per day according to UN definitions, and to take care of their basic needs.7 Various studies estimate that zakat amounts from USD 200 billion to USD 1 trillion per annum across the world or around USD 187 million among countries in the Organisation

5 Roman Loimeier, Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1997); Rüdiger Seesemann and Benjamin Soares, “‘Being as Good Muslims as Frenchmen’: On Islam and Colonial Modernity in West Africa,” Journal of Religion in Africa 39, no. 1 (2009): 91–120. 6 See further Roman Loimeier, “Traditions of Reform, Reformers of Tradition: Case studies from Senegal and Zanzibar/Tanzania,” in Diversity and Pluralism in Islam: Historical and Contemporary Discourses Amongst Muslims, ed. Zulfiqar Hirji (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 135–164; Paul M. Lubeck and Bryana Britts, “Muslim Civil Society in Urban Public Spaces: Globalization, Discursive Shifts, and Social Movements,” in Understanding the City: Contemporary and Future Perspectives, eds. John Eade and Christopher Mele (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 305–334, as well as the contributions in Benjamin Soares and Réne Otayek, eds., Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 7 M.U. Chapra, The Islamic Vision of Development (Jeddah: Islamic Research and Training Institute, Islamic Development Bank, 2008).

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of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Therefore, not only Muslim states but also Muslim NGOs have turned their interest to mobilize zakat for poverty alleviation in Muslim majority countries as well as for international development and humanitarian projects. However, there exists no consensus among Muslim scholars about the organization of its collection; in some Muslim states, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and the Sudan, zakat is compulsory and collected by the state, whereas in others, such as Bangladesh, it is compulsory but organized through voluntary (non-state) private zakat organizations.8 In the United Kingdom and in the USA, zakat is voluntary and managed by NGOs, the Muslim Charities Forum in the former, the Zakat Foundation of America in the latter. Similarly, zakat is voluntary in South Africa and its collection and distribution is managed through an NGO, the South African National Zakah Fund.9 Zakat constitutes a form of vertical philanthropy in all cases above as it is formal, structuralized and institutionalized. Sadaqa, in turn, corresponds to horizontal philanthropy as it is organized through private, personalized and informal ways, commonly through self-help groups or mosque funds. However, there has been an expansion of vertical forms of philanthropy during the last decade due to the establishment of private foundations, trusts and corporate foundations by High Net-Worth Individuals or ‘Muslim entrepreneurs’ as well as community chests and foundations in many sub-Saharan countries.10 The term ‘Muslim NGO’ serves in this book as a collective denominator for associations, groups and organizations established and operated by Muslim activists. Such organizations are variously called ‘Islamic Charities’, ‘Islamic NGOs’, ‘Islamic Social Institutions’, ‘Muslim NGOs’ and ‘Muslim 8 Arskal Salim, The Shift in Zakat Practice in Indonesia: From Piety to an Islamic ­Socio-Political-Economic System (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2008); Salma Mohamed Abdalmunim Abdalla, Charity Drops: Water Provision and the Politics of the Zakat Chamber in Khartoum, Sudan (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2017); Zenobia Ismail, Using Zakat for International Development. K4D Helpdesk Report (Birmingham: Birmingham University, 2018). For an overview, see Samiul Hasan, ed., Human Security and Philanthropy: Islamic Perspectives and Muslim Majority Country Practices (New York: Springer, 2015). 9 Sofia Yasmin and Roszaini Haniffa, “Accountability and Narrative Disclosure by Muslim Charity Organisations in the UK,” Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research 8, no. 1 (2017): 70–86; Zakât Foundation of America, The Zakât Handbook: A Practical Guide for Muslims in the West (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2008). 10 Enabling Environment of Philanthropy in Ghana (Accra: SDG Philanthropy Platform, United Nations Development Programme, 2017), 26.

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Faith-Based Organisations’. What they have in common is the ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ nature of their vision and mission for their activities. The core motive for engagement in and donating to a Muslim NGO is based on the Qur’an and the Hadith, namely thawab (reward) as well as fi sabil li-llah (for the sake of Allah) for pious deeds. Apart from being institutionally separate from the state and government, non-profit making, voluntary and formal, the characteristics Muslim NGOs are, according to Nejima, Harmsen and Akutusu, altruistic and philanthropic. In their minds, the concern with the afterlife is a core motivation for members and donors of Muslim NGOs. To give and serve the needy is defined as both a moral and social duty and is supposed to counter one’s greed and egoism and to have a morally purifying effect.11 However, as Yonathan N. Gez argues in chapter “Who Do FBOs Speak For? The Condundrum of Representation”, research on lived religion informs us of a substantial gap between institutional narratives and de facto human practice. All around the world, people’s everyday religious lives are in tension with such institutional ideals, whereby lay practitioners draw on different strands of tradition, combine and compromise between multiple, ever-negotiated practices, and create their own dynamic rhythms. We thus note a tension: religious organizations, in their essentialization of their flock, portray a vision that is prescriptive rather than descriptive and is often no more than wishful thinking. A general typology of faith-based organizations is provided by Clarke who identifies five types of FBOs. The first one is Faith-based representative organizations or apex bodies. None of the Muslim FBOs are included among these organizations as no single organizations represent the Muslim faith globally. Instead, Muslim FBOs are identified as Faithbased charitable or development organizations, Faith-based ­socio-political organization, Faith-based missionary organizations or Faith-based illegal or terrorist organizations. Both Muslim charitable or development organizations and Muslim missionary organizations aim at the eradication of poverty by funding or managing programmes that help the poor and by raising awareness of poverty among the faithful.12 However, not all 11 Susumu Nejima, Egbert Harmsen and Masayuki Akutsu, “Introduction,” in NGOs in the Muslim World: Faith and Social Services, ed. Susumu Nejima (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 3–6, 12. 12 Gerard Clarke, “Faith Matters: Faith-Based Organisations, Civil Society and International Development,” Journal of International Development 18 (2006): 840–843; also Gerard Clarke, “Faith-Based Organisations and International Development: An

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Muslim NGOs openly declare to be a faith-based organization as they do not want to be identified as an organization for political achievement, financing militant organizations or even being mixed up with militant Islamic organizations. Others are cautious in religious self-labelling in order to maintain a good relationship with the respective state and government authorities, as is the case in Turkey and Iran.13 LeBlanc and Gosselin, therefore, propose a distinction between faith-based NGOs who are either affiliated to a religious institution or are at least partially defined by religious faith and other kinds of religious institutions that can be described as FBOs.14

Muslim NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa Intra- and inter-community cohesion in non-Muslim states takes a ­different form than in Muslim states or in secular states with a Muslim majority. In North Africa and the Horn of Africa, the Near East, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia, Muslims constitute the absolute majority of the population and the state defines itself as a Muslim state where Muslim Sharia Law is applied either fully or partially. In several West and North-Central African states, such as Senegal, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad, Muslims constitute either a substantial majority of the population or a dominant community in society. In most sub-Saharan African countries, however, Muslim communities constitute minority groups with complex relations to both non-Muslim religious communities and the secular state. In addition, there is a marked difference among the individual ‘Muslim spheres’ and the political ­discourses within these spheres. The crucial explanation is the historical

Overview,” in Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organisations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular, eds. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 17–45. For a general discussion on Muslim NGOs and their comparison with Christian inspired relief NGOs, see Carlo Benedetti, “Islamic and Christian Inspired Relief NGOs: Between Tactical Collaboration and Strategic Difference?,” Journal of International Development 18 (2006): 849–859. 13 Nejima, Harmsen and Akutsu, “Introduction,” 3. 14 Marie Natalie LeBlanc and Louis Audet Gosselin, “Introduction: Faith, Charity and the Ethics of Voluntarism in West Africa,” in Faith and Charity: Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa, eds. Marie Natalie LeBlanc and Louis Audet Gosselin (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 194, fn 4.

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development and expansion of each of these ‘Muslim spheres’, their interconnectedness with other ‘Muslim spheres’, the networks and flows between these spheres and its actors.15 Muslim NGOs and especially Muslim faith-based NGOs are, as LeBlanc and Gosselin note, products of neoliberal globalization. Starting with the economic and political crisis of the postcolonial ­sub-Saharan African states in the late 1970s, NGOs have taken over a significant responsibility for services that had previously been provided by the state, especially in education, health care and public safety. This ‘NGO-ization’ of associations and religious groups, LeBlanc and Gosselin underline, resulted in the extension of the formal (Western) NGO model to a vast array of civic and religious organizations which hitherto had not identified themselves as NGOs. On the other hand, the virtual explosion of small-scale associations and faith-based NGOs also reflects in their mind the increased visibility of religion and religious activists on both the political sphere and the logics of social development.16 In addition, the ‘NGO-ization’ is a result of the ‘hollowing out’ of the state in the wake of neoliberal globalization where the state has transferred some capacities to other levels such as international bodies at the regional and local level inside its territory and horizontal networks that bypass states and interlink localities in several localities. As Tok and O’Brien highlight, Muslim as well as other faith-based NGOs are fundamental examples of this ­‘hollowing out’.17 The process and impact of ­NGO-ization is further discussed by Marie Natalie LeBlanc in chapter “Charity, ONG-ization and

15 See further Robert Launay and Benjamin F. Soares, “The Formation of an ‘Islamic Sphere’ in French Colonial West Africa,” Economy and Society 28, no. 4 (1999): 497–519; Sean Hanretta, Islam and Social Change in French West Africa: History of an Emancipatory Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Roman Loimeier, Muslim Societies in Africa: A Historical Anthropology (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013); Roman Loimeier, Islamic Reform in 20th Century Africa (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016); Marie Natalie LeBlanc and Louis Audet Gosselin, eds., Faith and Charity: Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2016). 16 LeBlanc and Gosselin, “Introduction,” 2, 5. Also Marie Natalie LeBlanc and Benjamin Soares, eds., Muslim West Africa in the Age of Neoliberalism (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008). 17 M. Evren Tok and Ben O’Bright, “Reproducing Spaces of Embeddedness Through Islamic NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reflections on the Post-2015 Development,” African Geographical Review 36, no. 1 (2017): 85–99.

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Emergent Ethics of Volunteerism: The Case of Islamic NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire”, by Valeria Saggiomo in chapter “Islamic NGOs in Somalia and their Role in the Somali State-Building Process” and by Sebastian Müller in chapter “Enterprisation of Islamic FBOs’: Towards a New Typology of Islamic Non-Governmental Organisations in Consideration of Their Multiple Relatedness”. Muslim NGOs proliferated in sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s due to political reform and economic liberalization (in most cases), or state fragility and collapse (in a minority of cases such as Palestine or Somalia). Following Kaag, Muslim faith-based NGOs based themselves on an understanding of Islamic solidarity that is composed of three elements: ighatha or humanitarian relief; da’wa or Islamic call; and jihad in the sense of armed support of the Islamic cause.18 In comparison with Western/non-faith NGOs and Christian FBOs, the engagement of Muslim faith-based NGOs was for a long time left unnoticed by most observers. Only after the traumatic experiences in the West of radical militant Islamic organizations, the activities of Muslim faith-based NGOs have come under close scrutiny, both in the West as elsewhere in the world.19 Since 2001, at least four types of transnational Muslim ­faith-based NGOs active in Africa have been identified: da’watist, jihadist, solidarity-based and secularized.20 Some Muslim faith-based NGOs are identified as potential supporters of al-Qaeda and ISIS, others of posing a potential challenge, if not threat, to the Western secular state model.21 While the impact of Muslim faith-based NGOs is noted in the 18 Mayke Kaag, “Aid, Umma, and Politics: Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad,” in Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, eds. Benjamin F. Soares and René Otayek (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 85–102. 19 M.A. Mohammed Salih, Islamic NGOs in Africa: The Promise and Peril of Islamic Voluntarism (Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen 2001; revised version 2002); J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collis, Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 20 Marie Juul Petersen, “Trajectories of Transnational Muslim NGOs,” Development in Practice 22, nos. 5–6 (2012): 763–778. 21 Valeria Saggiomo, “Islamic NGOs in Africa and Their Notion of Development: The Case of Somalia,” Storicamente 8 (2012): 1–12; Marie Juul Petersen, “International Muslim NGOs: ‘Added Value’ or an Echo of Western Principles and Donor Wishes?,” in The New Humanitarians in International Practice: Emerging Actors and Contested Principles, eds. Zeynep Sezgin and Dennis Dijkzeul (London and New York: Routledge 2016), 259–281.

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modernization of Islamic education in Africa,22 less noted has been the rise of the rapidly evolving religious media scene in Africa, in particular connected with the activities of Muslim faith-based NGOs or the multiple ways Muslims and Christians have encountered each other, borrowed or appropriated from one another,23 or tried to establish a room for an inter-faith dialogue.24 There has also been an increase of Islamic organizations committed to tabligh wa-da’wa, preaching the message of Allah, internationally since the 1990s. Arab organizations, including the World Muslim League (Saudi Arabia) and Direct Aid (formerly known as African Muslim Agency, Kuwait), support local madrasas (Islamic seminars or religious schools), and promote conservative Islamic currents such as Wahhabism and Salafism throughout sub-Saharan Africa.25 Many, if not most national and international Muslim f­aith-based NGOs, rely on zakat and therefore restrict their support largely to Muslim beneficiaries, as discussed by Mayke Kaag and Soumaya Sahla in chapter “Reflections on Trust and Trust Making in the Work of Islamic Charities from the Gulf region in Africa”. In addition, especially Saudi-Arabian relief and development organizations tend to support projects and activities of Salafi organizations and groups in African countries.26 Qatari Muslim faith-based NGOs, on the other hand, have emerged as a balancing factor between market liberalism and social protectionism in sub-Saharan Africa.27 A few Muslim faith-based NGOs do not highlight elements of da’wa, such as Islamic Relief and Muslim Aid. Instead, these organizations renounce proselytism and emphasize the creation of capabilities for

22 See further Robert Launay, ed., Islamic Education in Africa: Writing Boards and Blackboards (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2016). 23 See further Rosalind J. Hackett and Benjamin F. Soares, eds., New Media and Religious Transformations in Africa (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2015). 24 See further Benjamin Soares, ed., Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 25 Clarke, “Faith Matters,” 844. 26 Mohammed R. Kroessin and Abdulfatah S. Mohamed, “Saudi Arabian NGOs in Somalia: ‘Wahhabi’ Da’wah or Humanitarian Aid?,” in Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organisations, eds. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 187–213. 27 Tok and O’Bright, “Reproducing Spaces of Embeddedness.”

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the poor in general rather than empowering individual Muslims.28 Over the years, many Muslim faith-based NGOs evolved towards professionalization; some developed a more humanitarian outlook, others became more politically active.29 Most Muslim faith-based NGOs operating on the national level in Africa are often supported by transnational Muslim faith-based NGOs and by Muslim governments, notably the Gulf States and—before 2011—Libya.30 Recently, Turkish NGOs have also started to operate in sub-Saharan Africa.31 Last but not least, the trademark of modern Muslim faith-based NGOs seems to be their use of Western vocabulary as well as modern techniques—above all the Internet, thus being in the end equal to Western NGOs in terms of objectives and means.32 The various roles of Muslim faith-based NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa are discussed in several chapters in the anthology. Mayke Kaag and Soumaya Sahla evaluate the social welfare projects of International Muslim NGOs/transnational Muslim charities from the Gulf region in Chad, Ghana and Senegal in chapter “Reflections on Trust and Trust Making in the Work of Islamic Charities from the Gulf region in Africa”. In line with similar studies, they argue that in terms of what they are able to achieve in the social, political and religious sphere, is

28 Marie Juul Petersen, For Humanity or For the Umma? Aid and Islam in Transnational Muslim NGOs (London: Hurst, 2015), 139–140. 29 Sebastian Müller, “Krisen und Glaube – Streiflichter islamischer Nothilfe und langfristiger Entwicklungsmaßnahmen im Namen des Islams,” in Krisenhilfe oder Hilfe in Krisen? Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit Krisenländern, eds. Rainer Öhlschläger und Hartmut Sangmeister (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2016), 97–116. 30 Chanfi Ahmed, “Networks of Islamic NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Bilal Muslim Mission, African Muslim Agency (Direct Aid), and al-Haramayn,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, no. 3 (2009): 426–437; Olakunle Odumosu, Rasheed Olaniyi and Sunday Alonge, Mapping the Activities of Faith-Based Organizations in Development in Nigeria, Religions and Development Research Programme Working Paper 38 (Birmingham: International Development Department, University of Birmingham, 2009); Cecilia Lynch, “Local and Global Influences on Islamic NGOs in Kenya,” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 6, no. 1 (2011): 21–34; Petersen, For Humanity or For the Umma? 31 Abdurrahman Siradag, “Benevolence of Selfishness: Understanding the Increasing Role of Turkish NGOs and Civil Society in Africa,” Insight on Africa 7, no. 1 (January 2015): 1–20. 32 For a detailed outline, see Petersen, For Humanity or For the Umma?

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strongly influenced by the local and national contexts in which they come to work. In chapter “Charity, ONG-ization and Emergent Ethics of Volunteerism: The Case of Islamic NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire”, Marie Natalie LeBlanc examines the recent growth and ­institutionalization of Islamic voluntary, humanitarian and charity actions in La Côte d’Ivoire. While local Islamic NGOs attempt to fit with p ­rofessionalizing criteria required to have access to development programs’ funds and policy planning (at the national and international levels), their actions are framed within local notions of piety and reflect how religious actors have gained significant influence on the logics of development. Valeria Saggiomo examines in chapter “Islamic NGOs in Somalia and Their Role in the Somali State-Building Process” the relationship between Islamic NGOs and the Islamist movements in Somalia which, in the wake of the fall of the Siad Barre regime, became dominant in the country’s political panorama, such as the Somali Islamist movement Al Islah. In the absence of a formal state able to oversee social policy, Islamic NGOs took steps to compensate for the lack of a proper government, particularly in the provision of social services such as education and health. However, as Suleiman Athuman Chembea notes in chapter “Between Charity and Financing ‘Terror’: The Dilemma of Muslim Charitable Organizations in Kenya”, following 9/11 and the subsequent ‘war against terror’, Muslim charitable organizations have bared the brunt of security apparatus allegedly for abetting terror. While the concerns for global security cannot be ignored, drawing examples from Kenya, this chapter argues that profiling Muslim charitable organizations breeds contempt and ‘Relative Deprivation’ pushing beneficiaries to the radical cells that security agencies and policies purport to fight. Sebastian Müller, in turn, focuses on chapter “‘Enterprisation of Islamic FBOs’: Towards a New Typology of Islamic Non-Governmental Organisations in Consideration of Their Multiple Relatedness” on the local frameworks and contexts that are shaping Muslim faith-based NGOs in Tanzania. Apart from Sunni NGOs, the anthology also covers the activities of non-Sunni Muslim NGOs; Mara Leichtman outlines the background and activities of Shi’i NGOs in Tanzania in chapter “Transnational Networks and Global Shi‘i Islamic NGOs in Tanzania” while Katrin Langewische discusses the outreach of Ahmadi NGOs in West Africa in chapter “Politics of Humanitarianism: The Ahmadiyya and the Provision of Social Welfare”.

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Almsgiving Within the [Sunni] ‘Muslim Sphere’33 Contemporary debates in the ‘Muslim sphere’—be it in sub-Saharan Africa or elsewhere—about poverty alleviation concentrate to a large extent on obligations and responsibilities. To understand the discourse of Muslim scholars, one has to acknowledge the fact that a Muslim articulation and analysis of contemporary problems rests on Islamic traditions, i.e. the standpoint of tawhid (unity) of religion and politics. While this section—in addition Holger Weiss’ outline of the discourse on zakat in Ghana in Chapter Thirteen—concentrates on the Sunni discourse, other Muslim articulations about almsgiving and social welfare, such as those of the Shi’a and the Ahmadiyya in sub-Saharan Africa, are discussed by Mara Leichtman and Katrin Langewische in their respective chapters. Obligations and responsibilities are interpreted within the normative concepts of Islam. Islam makes a normative distinction between obligatory and voluntary alms. Both the rich and the poor are addressed, i.e., the giver and the recipients of assistance. However, though almsgiving is an obligation that constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam, it is difficult to present a clear-cut definition. The main reason for the ambiguity of the term is due to the two ways in which almsgiving is interpreted in Islam, namely as zakat or obligatory alms, and sadaqa or voluntary alms. Sunni Muslim scholars commonly define zakat as a form of charity, almsgiving, donation or contribution, but when these activities are arbitrary and voluntary actions, they are merely regarded as sadaqa. The (proper) management of zakat, in turn, is identified as the cornerstone of an Islamic solution to poverty.34 One must further distinguish between the moral obligation and the pious act when one discusses the difference between the two kinds of almsgiving in Islam. Zakat is a moral obligation and becomes a tax for the Muslims in an Islamic state whereas sadaqa is an individual, pious 33 The following section is based on Holger Weiss, Begging and Almsgiving in Ghana: Muslim Positions Towards Poverty and Distress (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007), 19–25 and 29–30. 34 See further Yusuf al-Qardawi, Fiqh az-Zakat. A Comprehensive Study. The Rules, Regulations and Philosophy of Zakat in the Light of the Qur’an and Sunna (London: Dar Al Taqwa, 1999); World Bank and Islamic Development Bank Group, Global Report on Islamic Finance—Islamic Finance: A Catalyst for Shared Prosperity? (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2016), 174–175. For a general introduction, see Amy Singer, Charity in Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

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act and never has any collective connotations. However, zakat is paid through the state, never as a tax to the state; that is, the role of the state is to monitor the levy and distribution of zakat but may not itself use the incomes of zakat for any other purpose not specified in the Qur’an (see below).35 A common interpretation among Muslim j­urist-cum-scholars is that 2.5% of one’s income and wealth (and between 5 and 10% of one’s harvest) should be given the poor and needy as zakat. The collected amount is to be managed and distributed by the Bait al-mal or (state) treasury for the welfare (maslaha) of the umma, the community of believers (i.e. Muslims).36 Thus, zakat is more than just a ‘good deed’ because it is an obligation whereas the giving of alms (sadaqa) is the decision of the giver alone. Therefore, in an Islamic order, ideally zakat belongs to the public sphere and sadaqa belongs to the private. In addition to zakat and sadaqa, Muslims are required to pay zakat al-fitr or the mandatory alms given by breaking the fasting at the end of Ramadan. These alms are levied on persons only, not on wealth or income.37 Zakat is regarded by Muslim scholars as a means for the purification of wealth. Irrespective of the use of the proceeds of zakat, a Muslim is taught that zakat purifies legally acquired wealth. Put theologically, zakat is a portion due to Allah. Its collection and distribution is clearly regulated by the Qur’ān and by Islamic Law. The objective of zakat is to purify the soul of a Muslim from greed and miserliness. It is understood as a means of training Muslims on the virtues of generosity: Being paid in a repetitive pattern year after year, regular zakat as well as zakat al-fitr is claimed to train Muslims to give and spend for charitable purposes.38 Though Muslim jurists and scholars have established very precise regulations for the collection of zakat, their position towards the distribution of it has been rather vague. In most cases, scholars and jurists seem to be satisfied that the recipients of zakat are the eight categories

35 Farishta G. de Zayas, The Law and Philosophy of Zakat (The Islamic Social Welfare System) (Damascus: Al-Jadidah Printing Press, 1960), 281–282. 36 ‘Abdur Rahman I. Doi, Sharî’ah: The Islamic Law (London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 1984), 388. 37 al-Qardawi, Fiqh az-Zakat, 569. 38 On zakāt al-fitr, see further de Zayas, The Law and Philosophy of Zakat, 232–233; al-Qardawi, Fiqh az-Zakat, 538–539.

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listed in Surah 9:60,39 and seldom give any further discussion on the qualifications of each of the eight categories or the exact allocation among the various categories.40 Although one could, in principle, regard zakat as a transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor, the intention is not the eradication of poverty but the purification of wealth. This has also been noted by Hunwick, who describes zakat as a moral economy of salvation: The spending of one’s wealth with the intention to give zakat not only purifies the wealth itself but the giver is promised a reward in heaven,41 while Benthall defines it as ‘financial worship’.42 However, although it is an Islamic imperative to raise the real income of the poor to ensure the maintenance of a minimum level of living, Muslim intellectuals, such as M. A. Mannan, underline, that there is another side of the coin: Assistance can only be given to the ‘deserving’ poor and not to increase any forms of leisure.43 The background for this is that the Qur’an already has identified the poor (miskin) and the needy (faqir) as two of the eight categories of recipients of zakat. However, neither the Qur’an nor the classical legal texts give a precise definition of these two categories, not to speak about the qualifications of the eight categories or the exact allocation among the various categories. The reason for this, it can be argued, might be due to the fact that it is the intention of the giver which is crucial in Islam, not the position of the

39 The eight categories of recipients of zakat as listed in Sura 9:60 are: the poor (faqir), the destitute (miskin), the collectors of zakat, those slaves who want to ransom themselves, the hard-pressed debtors, for expenditure in God’s cause, the wayfarers and those whose hearts have not been reconciled. 40 A detailed outline and discussion of the definitions and conditions of the lawful recipients of zakat are provided by de Zayas, The Law and Philosophy of Zakat, 284–306; Qardawi, Fiqh az-Zakat, 343–437. 41 John Hunwick, “Islamic Financial Institutions: Theoretical Structures and Aspects of Their Application in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in Credit, Currencies and Culture, eds. Endre Stiansen and Jane Guyer (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999), 72–96. 42 Jonathan Benthall, “Financial Worship: The Quranic Injunction to Almsgiving,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 5, no. 1 (1999): 27–42. See also Tripp, Islam and the Moral Economy, 124–125. 43 M.A. Mannan, “The Economics of Poverty in Islam with Special Reference to Muslim Countries,” in Distributive Justice and Need Fulfilment in an Islamic Economy, ed. Munawar Iqbal (Islamabad and Leicester: International Institute of Islamic Economics and The Islamic Foundation, 1988), 328.

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receiver. One of the basic virtues is to refrain from asking for assistance.44 Miserliness is condemned by the shari’a (Muslim law) and a generous person is considered to be a friend of Allah. However, begging as such is condemned by Islamic Law as an unlawful act itself. Muslims are asked to struggle to earn their lawful livelihood and not merely to depend upon charity except in a situation of extreme necessity.45

Communitarian Aspects of Islamic Social Welfare Social justice forms the cornerstone of the Islamic economic system, and an elaborate social welfare system is perceived as an integral part of an Islamic economy. Islamic economists have argued that an Islamic social welfare system can, and should, only be financed through legal methods of taxation, in particular through zakat. In theory, as M. N. Siddiqi claims, zakat should be managed by an Islamic state if such a state is ruled by Islamic Law. On the other hand, in a country where Muslims are in a minority or in Muslim states where Islamic Law is not implemented, the role of the state is taken over by voluntary organizations managing zakat.46 One reason for the lack of any elaborate rules governing the receiving and the condition of the recipients is due to the communitarian nature of zakat. Zakat was—and still is—primarily collected from and distributed in the same local Muslim community where the imam is supposed to, and usually does, know the rich and the poor members.47 The communitarian aspect of zakat has, on the other hand, resulted in a problematic situation for contemporary Muslims living in societies where aspects of social welfare are increasingly tied to the obligations of the state. Most, if not all, Muslim commentators are fully aware of the fact that the way zakat has hitherto been managed in most Muslim societies— through informal, unorganized and private channels and within the local

44 Holger Weiss, Obligatory Almsgiving: An Inquiry into Zakât in the Pre-colonial Bilad al-Sûdân (Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society, 2003), 36–37. 45 Doi, Sharî’ah, 393–394. 46 Nejatullah M. Siddiqi, Role of the State in the Economy: An Islamic Perspective (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1996), 129. 47 Weiss, Obligatory Almsgiving, 37.

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community—has had little effect to alleviate modern forms of structural poverty as it is rarely used as seed money or investment.48 The effects of neoliberal globalization since the 1990s gave wake to a communitarian approach on existing instruments of Islamic social finance, such as zakat and waqf (pious endowments), as well as generated a vibrant discussion on the introduction of new ones, such as Islamic microfinance.49 Zakat is recognized by Muslim experts in Islamic economics as the traditional tool for the eradication of poverty but has in recent decades started to zoom on the potentials of waqf and Islamic microfinance in the provision of maslaha (social welfare). In this discourse, the umma is not anymore equated as merely the community of believers but as (Muslim) society at large.50 In the 1990s, as Valeria Saggiomo notes, there was an attempt to arrive at an Islamic notion of sustainable social and economic development based on the principle of social justice. In 1994, Mohamed Ansari proposed an Islamic solution to sustainable development, its main aim being to achieve peace and harmony at all levels of human existence. When Muslim intellectuals turned their attention to what makes it impossible to achieve peace and harmony in the dimensions set out by Ansari, poverty was identified as the prime obstacle to development.51 Harvard-trained economists and some economists of the World Bank turned towards Islamic economics and made it more ‘fashionable’; the most popular modern manual on Islamic economics is perhaps Yusuf al-Qardawi’s Fiqh az-Zakat. Islamic economics has since then been articulated as the solution for an Islamic welfare state policy and has also been discussed among African Muslim scholars. Not surprisingly, the upsurge of Islamic economics in Africa has been closely 48 Nazamul Hoque, Mohammed Aktaruzzaman Khan and Khazi Deen Mohammed, “Poverty Alleviation by Zakah in a Transitional Economy: A Small Business Entrepreneurial Framework,” Journal of Global Entrepreneurship Research 5, no. 7 (2015): 14. 49 World Bank and Islamic Development Bank Group, Global Report on Islamic Finance—Islamic Finance: A Catalyst for Shared Prosperity? (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2016), 174–199; Mustapha Abdul-Hamid and Mohammed Fazwi Aminu Amadu, “Islam and Ghana’s Sustainable Development Agenda: Negotiating the Involvement of the Muslim Community in Mainstream Economic Activity,” in Religion and Sustainable Development: Ghanaian Perspectives, eds. George Ossom-Batsa, Nicoletta Gatti and Rabiatu Deinyo Ammah (Citta del Vaticano: Urbaniana University Press, 2018), 131–144. 50 Charles Tripp, Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 68–76. 51 Saggiomo, “Islamic NGOs in Africa.”

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linked, on the one hand, with the politicization of Islam and, on the other hand, to the Islamization of society.52 Zakat emerged in these discussions as the foundation of an Islamic social welfare system. In 2007, the World Zakat Forum (WZF) was established in Kuala Lumpur as a platform for governmental and non-governmental zakat organizations. By 2019, the WZF has member organizations in 33 countries, of which nine in sub-Saharan countries (Benin, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo and Uganda).53 Recently, international non-Muslim organizations have made online calls for zakat and established in 2019 a special funds for these donations, the Refugee Zakat Fund of the United Nations Refugee Agency UNHCR to support refugee and displaced families from Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Myanmar and Mali.54 With the crisis of the public sector in many contemporary African states, the Muslim discourse once again gained momentum, including the projection of zakat as the basis of social self-help programme,55 as discussed in chapter “Discourses on Zakat and Its Implementation in Contemporary Ghana”. Zakat is regarded to be a safety net to take care of the basic necessities of life of those who cannot afford them. According to the traditional interpretation of Muslim scholars, zakat funds cannot be used to finance infrastructure projects, public utilities and services beneficial to all Muslims. Some Muslim scholars therefore argue that zakat should first and foremost be used as seed money for economic empowerment of the poor and needy.56 However, it has become painfully evident that the original legal model of Islamic taxation has become difficult to apply in postcolonial Muslim states.57 52 Benthall,

Islamic Charities; Petersen, For Humanity or for the Umma?, 28–29. further http://worldzakatforum.org. 54 https://www.unhcr.org/hk/en/21723-unhcr-unveils-the-refugee-zakat-fund-a-global-islamic-finance-structure-to-help-displaced-populations-worldwide.html. 55 Yusuff Jelili Amuda, “Empowerment of Nigerian Muslim Households Through Waqf, Zakat and Public Funding,” International Journal of Economics and Finance 4, no. 6 (December 2013): 419–424. 56 Hoque, Khan and Mohammed, “Poverty Alleviation by Zakah in a Transitional Economy.” 57 Benthall, “Financial Worship”; Isahaque Ali and Zulkarnain A. Hatta, “Zakat as a Poverty Reduction Mechanism Among the Muslim Community: Case Study of Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia,” Asian Social Work and Policy Review 8 (2014): 59–70; Kazi Sohag et al., “Can Zakat System Alleviate Rural Poverty in Bangladesh? A Propensity Score Matching Approach,” Journal of Poverty 19, no. 3 (2015): 261–277; 53 See

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In some Muslim countries, government attempts to dominate and ­regulate zakat have been met with widespread resistance. Far from signalling the de-politicization of Islamism, informal zakat, reclaimed from the state, explicitly critiques the nation-state at the level of corruption, failure and illegitimacy and responds to contemporary political crisis in contradistinction to the logic of the n ­ ation-state framework.58 One problem is that Islamic principles such as zakat are often applied within structures which are essentially non-Islamic. While Muslim scholars have debated the ways in which zakat may be interpreted as a form of taxation appropriate to a modern state, or the power of an Islamic state to raise taxes over and above zakat, zakat tends in practice to remain as a parallel or supplementary channel of revenue raising and distribution.59 Kuran is even more critical about the feasibility of Islamic economics, not to speak about a modern social welfare system based on zakat, and has in his research refuted the claim of modern Islamists that zakat has the capacity to reduce inequality and evolve as an agent of massive equalization rather than serving as an instrument for wealth legitimization and political stabilization.60 According to him, the doctrine of Islamic economics is simplistic, incoherent and largely irrelevant to present economic challenges. In his view, the purpose of Islamic economics has not been economic improvement but cultivation of a distinct Islamic identity to resist cultural globalization. His conclusion is that the various

Dominik M. Müller, “From Consultancy to Critique: The ‘Success Story’ of Globalized Zakat Management in Malysia and Its Normative Ambiguities,” Globalizations 14, no. 1 (2016): 81–98; Muhamed Zulkhibri, “Financial Inclusion, Financial Inclusion Policy and Islamic Finance,” Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging Market Economies 9, no. 3 (2016): 303–320. 58 Samantha May, “Political Piety: The Politicization of Zakat,” Middle East Critique 22, no. 2 (2013): 149–164. 59 Hartley Dean and Zafar Khan, “Muslim Perspectives on Welfare,” Journal of Social Policy 26, no. 2 (1997): 203. 60 Timur Kuran, “Islamic Redistribution Through Zakat: Historical Record and Modern Realities,” in Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts, eds. Michael Bonner, Mime Ener and Amy Singer (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003), 275–293; Timur Kuran, Zakat: Islam’s Missed Opportunity to Limit Predatory Taxation, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 284, 8 April 2019, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3368292 (checked 6 August 2019).

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Islamic sub-economies that have sprung up across the Islamic world are not ­manifestations of Islamic economics but the aspirations of socially ­marginalized groups.61 Further, Shirazi, Ali and Obaidullah critically note that although Muslims in OIC countries are paying zakat, these transactions are in most countries not passing through proper channels, are un-recorded and are not a part of any strategy. Therefore, its effect on poverty alleviation is difficult to assess.62 Contemporary Muslim economists have started to call for a shift to other instruments of Islamic social finance, including waqf and Islamic microfinance, as effective tools for poverty alleviation.63 Recognizing the inflexibility and limitations of zakat, they present waqf as an Islamic ­open-ended pooling system to achieve structural changes and to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goals.64 In addition, other instruments of Islamic social finance, most importantly Islamic banking, Islamic bonds (sukuk), Islamic cooperative insurance (takaful), Islamic micro-finance institutions and Islamic crowd-funding, are identified as

61 Timur Kuran, Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). 62 Nasim Shah Shirazi, Salman Syed Ali and Mohammed Obaidullah, “Practical Means of Integrating Zakāt and Waqf Into Poverty Reduction Agenda of OIC Member Countries,” Islamic Economic Studies 25, no. 2 (2017): 65. 63 Mohamed Aslam Haneef et al., “Integration of Waqf-Islamic Microfinance Model for Poverty Reduction: The Case of Bangladesh,” International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management 8, no. 2 (2015), 246–270; Niaz Ahmed Khan and Sultana Jareen, “The Waqf and Human Security in Muslim Majority Countries: Traditions, Modern Practices, and Challenges,” in Human Security and Philanthropy: Islamic Perspectives and Muslim Majority Country Practices, ed. Samiul Hasan (New York: Springer, 2015), 183–204; Fatima Rasheed, “Microfinance Institutions and Human Security in Muslim Majority Countries: Achievements and Challenges,” in Human Security and Philanthropy: Islamic Perspectives and Muslim Majority Country Practices, ed. Samiul Hasan (New York: Springer, 2015), 205–230. 64 Nur Atikah Atan and Fuadah Binti Johari, “A Review on Literature of Waqf for Poverty Alleviation Between 2006–2016,” Library Philosophy and Practice 1486 (­ e-journal; June 2017) http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libphilprac/1486 (checked 26 March 2019); Abubakar Yusuf Sanyinna and Muhammad Farihal Osman, “Analytical Overview of the Role Played by Waqf in Poverty Alleviation: A Case Study of Sokoto State, Nigeria,” Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies 5, no. 9 (2017): 18–30. On waqf and Sustainable Development Goals, see further Mohammad Abdullah, “Waqf, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and maqasid ­al-shariah,” International Journal of Social Economics 45, no. 1 (2018): 158–172.

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key instruments for financing the Sustainable Development Goals. Not least, as a 2017 joint UNDP, Istanbul International Center for Private Sector Development and Islamic Research and Training Institute Report realizes that the market for Islamic financial services is projected to grow from USD 200 billion in 2003 to USD 2.7 trillion in 2021, while its global assets are expected to surpass USD 3 trillion by 2020. Although Islamic financial services are of systematic importance in four countries, Iran, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Sudan, and a potential one in the Gulf States, Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey, the 2017 Report also recognizes the growth of such services in several sub-Saharan African countries.65

Muslim NGOs and Zakat in Sub-Saharan Africa The question of an Islamic social welfare system based upon zakat is even more complicated—if not impossible—in states where Muslims are a minority or the state is a secular one which is the case in many sub-Saharan African countries. In many places in sub-Saharan Africa, ­ the local mosque has been and continues to be the principal institution for collecting and distributing zakat.66 Last and Soares have introduced the term ‘prayer economics’ in describing the complex practices among Muslim societies and enclaves in West Africa where considerable sums are given to Muslim scholars for prayers, blessings and Islamic

65 United Nations Development Programme, Istanbul International Center for Private Sector Development and Islamic Research and Training Institute, I For Impact: Blending Islamic Finance and Investing for the Global Goals, March 2017, http://www.irti.org/ English/News/Documents/IRTI_UN_Islamic_Financial_Report.pdf (checked 6 August 2019). 66 David E. Skinner, “Da’wa and Politics in West Africa: Muslim Jama’at and NonGovernmental Organisations in Ghana, Sierra Leone and The Gambia,” in Development and Politics from Below: Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State, eds. Barbara Bompai and Maria Frahm-Arp (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 99–130. Also ILO, “Annex B: Situational Analysis on Zakat and Other Religious Provision in Zanzibar,” in International Labour Office, Social Security Department, Zanzibar: Social Protection Expenditure and Performance Review and Social Budget (Geneva: ILO, 2010), 209–220; Mukerrem Miftah, “Poverty and Zakat: The Feasibility of Institutionally Administering Zakat in Ethiopia,” in 3rd International ILEM Summer School 2015: Social Justice and Poverty in Muslim World, Proceedings, 235–244, downloaded from https://www.academia.edu/14607354/The_Practice_of_Zakat_Among_Muslim_Ethiopians_ILEM_ Proceedings_2015 (6.8.2019).

22  H. WEISS

medicine.67 Soares further describes the prayer economy as operating through the circulation of capital—economic, political and spiritual or symbolic—which particular social actors are able to convert from one domain to another.68 According to him, the prayer economy is, in effect, an economy of religious practice in which people give gifts to certain religious leaders on a large scale in exchange for prayers and blessings. In his view, the exchange of blessings and prayers for commodities has resulted in a process of commodification which has proliferated and intensified around such religious leaders in the postcolonial period. Such processes of commodification have helped to transform the relations between religious leaders and followers and have resulted in a religious economy that has come to be more like a market.69 As noted above, Muslim faith-based NGOs have become an increasingly popular avenue for zakat collection and distribution some ­sub-Saharan countries since the late twentieth century. This development reflects the situation of the Muslim communities in n ­ on-Muslim countries: Since there is no governmental or state engagement in the collection and supervision of zakat, the collection and distribution of zakat becomes a private matter or, as in the case of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Tanzania (including Zanzibar) and Kenya, is organized by Muslim faith-based NGOs, see Table 1.70 67 Murray Last, “Charisma and Medicine in Northern Nigeria,” in Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam, eds. D. B. Cruise O’Brien and C. Coulon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 183–204; Benjamin F. Soares, “The Prayer Economy in a Malian Town,” Cahiers d’Études africaines 36, no. 4 (1996): 739–754. 68 Soares, “The Prayer Economy,” 741. 69 Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy: History and Authority in a Malian Town (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press for the International Africa Institute, 2005), 153, 171–179. 70 Weiss, Begging and Almsgiving in Ghana; Nabila Saddiq, Capacity Building and Islamic NGOs: Insights from Malawi, INTRAC Praxis Note 48 (2009), https://www. intrac.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Praxis-Note-48-Capacity-Building-andIslamic-NGOs-Nabila-Saddiq.pdf; Justin Pierce, “The Role and Governance of Islamic Faith Organisations in South Africa,” in Charities in the Non-Western World: The Development and Regulation of Indigenous and Islamic Charities, eds. Rajeswary Ampalawar Brown and Justin Pierce (Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge 2013), 40–64; Robert Leurs, Peter Tumaini-Mungu and Abu Mvungi, Mapping the Development Activities of Faith-Based Organizations in Tanzania, Religions and Development Research Programme Working Paper 58 (Birmingham: International Development Department, University of Birmingham, 2011); Khatib Mjaka Mkuu and Mohd Effandi Bin Yusoff, “Zakat Institution:

MUSLIM NGOS, ZAKAT AND THE PROVISION … 

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Table 1  Zakat collecting and distributing Muslim faith-based NGOs in subSaharan Africa Organization

Abbreviation

Establishment

Followers on Facebook

South African National Zakat Fund Zanzibar Waqf and Trust Commission Conselho Islâmico de Mocambique Malawi Islamic Zakaat Fund Zakat and Sadaqat Foundation (Lagos State, Nigeria) Waqf and Trust Commission of Zanzibar Fonds Sénégalais pour la Zakat House of Zakat and Waqf (Uganda) Fondation Zakat et Waqf (La Côte d’Ivoire) Zakat and Sadaqa Fund of Ghana Zimbabwe National Zakat Fund Taasisi ya Zaka Tanzania Lindi Islamic Foundation of Tanzania National Zakat Foundation—Kenya

ZANZAF

1974

6242

ZWTC

1980

[…]

CISLAMO

1981

3506

IZF ZSF

1991 2000

2504 5563

WTC

[1905] 2007

[…]

HZWU

2009 2010

4904 21,723

2010

63

ZSFG

2010

3064

ZIMNZAF

?

43

Tauzakati LIFT

? 2013

[…] […]

NZF

?

2173

Source Facebook and homepages of selected organizations; date of retrieval: 8 August 2019

The number of followers on Facebook gives a hint on the support that a zakat-managing Muslim faith-based NGO attracts. However, the figures displayed in Table 1 do not tell whether the followers are local or foreign ones, for example South African or Ghanaian Muslim living abroad. Also, the figures reflect the response Muslim faith-based NGOs

An Alternative for Poverty Alleviation in Zanzibar,” European Journal of Business and Management 9, no. 14 (2017): 57–63. The Zimbabwe National Zakat Fund has no homepage, only a Facebook account with very limited information, see https://www.facebook. com/zimnzaf/.

24  H. WEISS

have received by presumably younger Muslims actively engaged in ­cyberspace. Elder Muslims who are not active on the Internet would not respond but are likely to be those who pay zakat. Also, further research is needed, especially on zakat-managing organizations in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, some tentative conclusions can be drawn. Active organizations with thousands of followers are found in Southern Africa (South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi), Eastern Africa (Uganda) and Western Africa (Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana). The Ugandan House of Zakat and Waqf, especially, has been recognized for its national impact by the World Zakat Forum.71 The Kenyan National Zakat Foundation concentrates its activities in the Nairobi metropolitan area and is present on the Internet via blogspot, Facebook (2137 followers as per 25 September 2019) and runs a new homepage since 2019.72 The Lindi Islamic Foundation of Tanzania is an example of a local Muslim faith-based NGO that directs its call for zakat donations both to local Muslims and to expatriate communities in the USA.73 In Zanzibar, the Waqf and Trust Commission Zanzibar is a governmental body entrusted in the supervision and management of zakat (zakka) since its reorganization in 2007.74 It established a zakat diwan in 201175 and has since 71 “House of Zakat and Waqf Uganda Holds The 1st National Zakat Conference,” 20 April 2019, https://worldzakatforum.org/index.php/africa/56-africa/209-house-ofzakat-and-waqf-uganda-holds-the-1st-national-zakat-conference (checked 6 August 2019); “House of Zakat and Waqf Uganda Gives Shs 1,164,908,300 (USD 309,816), to Poor and Needy,” 2 July 2019, https://worldzakatforum.org/africa/56-africa/210-house-ofzakat-and-waqf-uganda-gives-shs1-164-908-300-usd-309-816-to-poor-and-needy.html (checked 6 August 2019). 72 https://thenationalzakatfoundation.blogspot.com and https://www.facebook.com/ Zakatke/. See further the homepage of the Fund, http://www.zakat.co.ke. 73 Lindi Islamic Foundation of Tanzania, “Our Programs,” http://tanzania-lift.org/ index.php/our-programs/ (checked 31 December 2019). 74 See The Waqf and Trust Commission Act No. 2 of 2007, available as PDF on http://www.wakf.go.tz/assets/img/documents/WAKF%20AND%20TRUST%20 COMMISSION%20ACT,%202007.pdf. Also Issa Haji Ziddy, “Review of the Waqf and Trust Commission (WTC) in Zanzibar,” Inquiry: Sarajevo Journal of Social Sciences 1 (2015): 29–45. 75 See further “Muongozo wa Shuguli za Zakka Zanzibar” (http://www.wakf.go.tz/ assets/img/documents/MUONGOZO%20WA%20ZAKKA%20ZANZIBAR.pdf) as well as “An Important Tool for the Welfare of Zanzibaris” (http://www.wakf.go.tz/assets/img/ documents/AN%20IMPORTANT%20TOOL%20FOR%20THE%20WELFARE%20OF%20 ZANZIBARIS.pdf).

MUSLIM NGOS, ZAKAT AND THE PROVISION … 

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then established detailed structures and channels for its collection and distribution as well as for the calculation of nisab.76 The Nigerian case is an interesting one, too. Whereas the Zakat and Sadaqat Foundation is a Muslim faith-based organization based in Lagos,77 all zakat-managing organizations in the northern, predominantly Muslim states are state or governmental organizations. Until 2003, when Zamfara State was the first to establish a government-controlled institution, the Zamfara State Zakat and Endowment Board,78 the only zakat body in Nigeria was the 1982-established ­non-governmental Kano State Council for Zakat.79 In the wake of the implementation of Shari’a, zakat boards and commissions have been established in twelve northern states in Nigeria.80 Nevertheless, as the payment of zakat to state commissions is not compulsory according to law as well as due to the ineffectiveness and poor management of the government authorities, the performance of these institutions has been generally low. There is little trust in these institutions, and many Muslims still prefer to pay their zakat directly to needy beneficiaries in their community instead of handling it to the zakat collecting authorities. Also, Muslim f­aith-based organizations, such as the Yan Izala, challenge the monopoly of the state as the collector and distributor of zakat and have established their own zakat units.81 The gender dimension,

76 See further http://www.wakf.go.tz/zakkat.php and http://www.wakf.go.tz/zakkatdetails.php. 77 https://zakatandsadaqat.org.ng. 78 http://zakatzamfara.org. 79 Sheriff Ibrahim Muhammad and Aliyu Muhammad Dahiru, “In Search of an Effective Zakat Distribution System in Kano State Nigeria,” Journal for Studies in Management and Planning 1, no. 7 (2015): 345–368. 80 Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara State. For detailed information on the introduction and implementation of zakat in the twelve states, see Philip Ostien, comp. and ed., Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999–2006: A Sourcebook, Further Documentary Materials III: Zakat and Endowment Boards and Committees (Ibadan: Spectrum Books 2007), available with updates on https://beta.shariasource.com/documents/3338. See further Dauda Abubakar, “The Institutionalization of Zakat in the Shari’a States of Northern Nigeria,” Journal Foundation of African Theology 1, no. 5 (2015): 76–92. 81 Dauda Abubakar, “The Giving and Receiving of Zakât: Anthropological Analysis of Relationship Between the ‘Wealthy’ and ‘Needy’ Citizens in Jos, Nigeria,” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 3, no. 9 (2013): 121–131; Dauda Abubakar,

26  H. WEISS

too, is critically addressed by some authors as Muslim women’s ­non-governmental and civil society organizations active in the provision of social welfare do not in general receive any support from the zakat commissions.82 The United Nations Development Programme identifies Islamic social finance tools such as zakat, sadaqa and waqf as highly aligned with the spirit of the Sustainable Development Goals.83 The potential resources and impact of Islamic social finance instruments, notably zakat, varies greatly in s­ub-Saharan Africa countries according to the 2016 World Bank/Islamic Development Bank Report. The Report establishes three figures for calculating the potential resource basis of zakat in South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan and Nigeria. The first one, Z1, is estimated in accordance with the majority traditional view according to which zakat is levied on agriculture, livestock, stock-in-trade, gold, silver and money. The second one, Z2, is based on the view of some contemporary Muslim scholars that zakat is payable on net returns of manufacturing concerns, rentals of building, and net savings out of salaries. The third one, Z3, is based on views of the Maliki School, in which the zakat base includes buildings and other fixed assets, except those assigned for personal and family use. Further, the GDP of each country was adjusted by taking into account per capita income and the proportion of Muslim population in each country. The potential of zakat in the five countries

“The Practice of Zakât in Northern Nigeria and the Building of Social Relationships,” in Charity in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Traditions, eds. Julia R. Lieberman and Michal Jan Rozbicki (Lanham, ML: Lexington Books, 2017), 204–207; Abubakar U. Farouk, Kamil Md Idris and Ram Al Jaffri Saad, “Determinants of Attitude Towards Zakat on Employment Income in Nigeria,” The International Journal of Banking and Finance 13, no. 1 (2017): 29–48; Abubakar U. Farouk, Kamil B Md Idris and Ram Al Jaffri B Saad, “The Challenges of Zakat Management: A Case of Kano State, Nigeria,” Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies 5, no. 7 (2017): 142–147; Mahadi Ahmad, “An Empirical Study of the Challenges Facing Zakat and Waqf Institutions in Northern Nigeria,” ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance (2019), https://doi.org/10.1108/IJIF-04-20180044 (publication date: 11 November 2019). 82 Adryan Wallace, “Agency Through Development: Hausa Women’s NGOs and CBOs in Kano, Nigeria,” Feminist Economics 20, no. 4 (2014): 287–288. 83 United Nations Development Programme “Islamic Finance Partners,” https://www. undp.org/content/undp/en/home/partners/islamic-finance.html (checked 6 August 2019).

MUSLIM NGOS, ZAKAT AND THE PROVISION … 

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Table 2  Estimates of the potential of zakat (% of GDP) Country Kenya Nigeria South Africa Sudan Tanzania

Z1

Z2

Z3

0.13 0.86 0.03 1.44 0.54

0.27 1.84 0.06 3.08 1.15

0.30 2.08 0.07 3.47 1.30

Source World Bank and Islamic Development Bank Group, Global Report on Islamic Finance—Islamic Finance: A Catalyst for Shared Prosperity? [Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2016], Fig. 9.2

is summarized in Table 2. These figures are contrasted with the gap in resources needed to alleviate poverty, as presented in Table 3.84 The 2016 World Bank/Islamic Development Bank Report highlights that countries like Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan can easily generate resources for poverty alleviation. On the other hand, Tanzania would be unable to bridge the resource gap with potential zakat collection. Nevertheless, the mobilization of zakat resources falls short of its potential in most countries. In Nigeria, total zakat collected was USD 3 million in 2013, but it has fluctuated greatly. The Nigerian figures, the Report notes, fall behind those collected in Indonesia (USD 231.6 million/2012), Malaysia (USD 628.6 million/2013), Pakistan (USD 20.4 million/2012) and the Sudan (USD 220 million/2013).85 An earlier report by the Islamic Research and Training Institute, which findings and data were used by the 2016 World Bank/Islamic Development Bank Report, disappointedly remarked that there seemed to be a total lack of awareness among the public on zakat in Mozambique, and neither in Tanzania nor in Kenya was there an organized effort to managed 84 World Bank and Islamic Development Bank Group, Global Report on Islamic Finance, 185–186. See further Islamic Research and Training Institute, Islamic Social Finance Report, 15 June 2015, http://www.irti.org/English/Research/Documents/IDB%20 GLOBAL%20FORUM%20ON%20ISLAMIC%20FINANCE/10th_Global_Forum/ Islamic%20Social%20Finance%20Report.pdf (checked 6 August 2019); Salman Ahmed Shaikh and Qazi Masood Ahmed, “Estimation of Potential Zakat in OIC,” in Social Justice and Islamic Economics: Theory, Issues and Practice, eds. Toseef Azid and Lufti Sunar (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2019). 85 World Bank and Islamic Development Bank Group, Global Report on Islamic Finance, 186–189.

28  H. WEISS Table 3  Gap in resources needed to alleviate poverty Country Kenya Nigeria South Africa Sudan Tanzania

Resource gap at USD 1.25 a day (% of GDP) 0.320 1.470 0.001 0.490 3.020

Resource gap at USD 2.00 a day (% of GDP) 0.96 3.50 0.01 2.20 8.17

Source World Bank and Islamic Development Bank Group, Global Report on Islamic Finance—Islamic Finance: A Catalyst for Shared Prosperity? [Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2016], Fig. 9.1

its collection and distribution.86 Similar critical conclusions were reached by Shaikh in his calculation of the estimated and potential value of zakat in OIC countries. Although the estimated value of zakat as percentage of Nigerian Gross Domestic Product in 2013 was 2.20%, the potential collectible zakat was calculated by him as high as 11,460 million USD. Still, the collected sum was estimated by him to have targeted some 25 million Nigerians.87 However, as Wali notes, given that 12 million live in the northern Kano State alone, zakat and other forms of Islamic social investment have not been sufficient to alleviate poverty.88 A total different situation prevails in South Africa where Muslims constitute a small minority. Here, the performance of the South African Zakat Fund has been excellent with about USD 13 million being collected in 2013. Not surprisingly, the Fund is recognized for having the

86 Islamic

Research and Training Institute, Islamic Social Finance Report. Shaikh, “Zakat Collectible in OIC Countries for Poverty Alleviation: A Primer on Empirical Estimation,” International Journal of Zakat 1, no. 1 (2016): 27, 29–30. 88 H.N. Wali, “Utilization of Zakat and Islamic Endowment Funds for Poverty Reduction: A Case Study of Zakat and Hubsi Commission, Kano State – Nigeria,” Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development 4, no. 18 (2013): 141–147. See further “Zakat Management in Nigeria: The Status Quo,” New York Essays, 26 September 2016, https://newyorkessays.com/essay-zakat-management-in-nigeria-the-status-quo (checked 6 August 2019); Usman Bugaje and Danladi Ali, The Administration of Zakat and Management of Waqf in the Sharia Implementing States 1999–2015. Report for NRSP/ dRPC/NRN Research Project on Sharia Implementation Over 15 Years. Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme, Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria Over 15 Years. Policy Brief No. 3. Zakat & Waqf (Abuja: British Council, 2016). 87 S.A.

MUSLIM NGOS, ZAKAT AND THE PROVISION … 

29

potential to empower Muslims in South Africa.89 The South African National Zakat Fund (SANZAF) was established in 1974.90 SANZAF defines itself as a ‘pro-active, faith-based, socio-welfare and educational organisation’. Its main field of operations is community-based welfare and development, education projects and scholarship programmes as well as emergency relief, food aid and shelter for the needy.91 The Fund is one of the most effective Muslim faith-based NGOs in Africa with a keen interest to promote the transparency of its activities as a way of generating trust among its donors and beneficiaries. Since 2014, the Annual Reports are published on its homepage.92 SANZAF is a formal and institutionalized philanthropic institution and is registered as a Public Benefit Organisation (PBO). Being a registered PBO, any donation in cash or kind for public benefit activities within South Africa can be claimed as an income tax deduction by the donor. The donation has to be supported by a receipt from SANZAF if the donor wants to claim the tax reduction.93 SANZAF’s recent project introduces online collection of zakat as to attract a new generation of donors or, as Morton declares: ‘SANZAF will find its donors of tomorrow determining their payments online on their hand-held devices, whilst they scroll daily through music, news, Qur’an, Hadith and the issues of the day. In other words, Zakah – like so many other things – will become a cyber-experience’.94 Last, but not least, a general assessment of zakat as instrument for poverty alleviation and pro-poor economic development in Muslim communities in sub-Saharan Africa countries is still lacking. Muslim economists estimate that the majority of zakat is privately distributed throughout the Muslim world which undermines its impact on poverty alleviation. Consequently, they call for an institutionalization of zakat, either in the form of greater coordination among institutions—NGOs/ 89 World Bank and Islamic Development Bank Group, Global Report on Islamic Finance, 186–189. 90 Gorkeh Gamal Nkrumah, “Islam in Southern Africa,” Review of African Political Economy 52 (1991): 94–97. 91 https://sanzaf.org.za/about-us.html. 92 See https://sanzaf.org.za. 93 https://sanzaf.org.za/about-us.html. 94 Shafiq Morton, “SANZAF: Travelling into the cyber future,” 9 January 2019, https:// sanzaf.org.za/what-we-do/blog/321-sanzaf-travelling-into-the-cyber-future.html (checked 9 July 2019).

30  H. WEISS

CSOs—or even a centralized collection by a public agency. The ­latter one should in Muslim majority countries be under state control or under the community in Muslim minority countries. However, there is no consensus among Muslim scholars on this issue, as noted by Ismail in her overview and by Weiss in his chapter on the discourse on zakat in Ghana. Conservative Islamist groups and conservative Muslims scholars support state-driven zakat collection instead of voluntary models and reject the idea of Muslim faith-based NGOs collecting and distribution zakat. On the other hand, the experience of state-controlled or centralized collection of zakat is not generally positive. In many OIC countries, including Nigeria, the public has little trust in the government and the state-controlled zakat funds are criticized for mismanagement, malfunction and corruption. Both public and voluntary zakat organizations have further been criticized for a lack of accountability and transparency.95

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GLOBAL%20FORUM%20ON%20ISLAMIC%20FINANCE/10th_Global_ Forum/Islamic%20Social%20Finance%20Report.pdf. Ismail, Zenobia. Using Zakat for International Development. K4D Helpdesk Report. Birmingham: Birmingham University, 2018. Kaag, Mayke. “Aid, Umma, and Politics: Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad.” In Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, eds. Benjamin F. Soares and René Otayek, 85–102. New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Khan, Niaz Ahmed and Sultana Jareen. “The Waqf and Human Security in Muslim Majority Countries: Traditions, Modern Practices, and Challenges.” In Human Security and Philanthropy: Islamic Perspectives and Muslim Majority Country Practices, ed. Samiul Hasan, 183–204. New York: Springer, 2015. Kroessin, Mohammed R. and Abdulfatah S. Mohamed. “Saudi Arabian NGOs in Somalia: ‘Wahhabi’ Da’wah or Humanitarian Aid?” In Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organisations, eds. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings, 187–213. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Kuran, Timur. “Islamic Redistribution Through Zakat: Historical Record and Modern Realities.” In Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts, eds. Michael Bonner, Mime Ener and Amy Singer, 275–293. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003. Kuran, Timur. Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. Kuran, Timur. Zakat: Islam’s Missed Opportunity to Limit Predatory Taxation. Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 284, 8 April 2019. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3368292. Lang, Sabine. NGOs, Civil Society, and the Public Sphere. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Last, Murray. “Charisma and Medicine in Northern Nigeria.” In Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam, eds. D. B. Cruise O’Brien and C. Coulon, 183– 204. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. Launay, Robert, ed. Islamic Education in Africa: Writing Boards and Blackboards. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2016. Launay, Robert and Benjamin F. Soares. “The Formation of an ‘Islamic Sphere’ in French Colonial West Africa.” Economy and Society 28, no. 4 (1999): 497–519. LeBlanc, Marie Nathalie and Benjamin Soares, eds. Muslim West Africa in the Age of Neoliberalism. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008. LeBlanc, Marie Natalie and Louis Audet Gosselin, eds. Faith and Charity: Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa. London: Pluto Press, 2016. LeBlanc, Marie Natalie and Louis Audet Gosselin. “Introduction: Faith, Charity and the Ethics of Voluntarism in West Africa.” In Faith and Charity: Religion

34  H. WEISS and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa, eds. Marie Natalie LeBlanc and Louis Audet Gosselin, 1–23. London: Pluto Press, 2016. Leurs, Robert, Peter Tumaini-Mungu and Abu Mvungi. Mapping the Development Activities of Faith-Based Organizations in Tanzania. Religions and Development Research Programme Working Paper 58. Birmingham: University of Birmingham, International Development Department, 2011. Loimeier, Roman. Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1997. Loimeier, Roman. “Traditions of Reform, Reformers of Tradition: Case Studies from Senegal and Zanzibar/Tanzania.” In Diversity and Pluralism in Islam: Historical and Contemporary Discourses Amongst Muslims, ed. Zulfiqar Hirji, 135–164. London: I.B. Tauris, 2010. Loimeier, Roman. Muslim Societies in Africa: A Historical Anthropology. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013. Loimeier, Roman. Islamic Reform in 20th Century Africa. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016. Lubeck, Paul M. and Bryana Britts. “Muslim Civil Society in Urban Public Spaces: Globalization, Discursive Shifts, and Social Movements.” In Understanding the City: Contemporary and Future Perspectives, eds. John Eade and Christopher Mele, 305–334. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. Lynch, Cecilia. “Local and Global Influences on Islamic NGOs in Kenya.” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 6, no. 1 (2011): 21–34. Mannan, M.A. “The Economics of Poverty in Islam with Special Reference to Muslim Countries.” In Distributive Justice and Need Fulfilment in an Islamic Economy, ed. Munawar Iqbal, 251–286. Islamabad and Leicester: International Institute of Islamic Economics and The Islamic Foundation, 1988. May, Samantha. “Political Piety: The Politicization of Zakat.” Middle East Critique 22, no. 2 (2013): 149–164. Miftah, Mukerrem. “Poverty and Zakat: The Feasibility of Institutionally Administering Zakat in Ethiopia.” In 3rd International ILEM Summer School 2015: Social Justice and Poverty in Muslim World, Proceedings, 235–244. Mkuu, Khatib Mjaka and Mohd Effandi Bin Yusoff. “Zakat Institution: An Alternative for Poverty Alleviation in Zanzibar.” European Journal of Business and Management 9, no. 14 (2017): 57–63. Muhammad, Sheriff Ibrahim and Aliyu Muhammad Dahiru. “In Search of an Effective Zakat Distribution System in Kano State Nigeria.” Journal for Studies in Management and Planning 1, no. 7 (2015): 345–368. Müller, Dominik M. “From Consultancy to Critique: The ‘Success Story’ of Globalized Zakat Management in Malaysia and Its Normative Ambiguities.” Globalizations 14, no. 1 (2016): 81–98.

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36  H. WEISS Salim, Arskal. The Shift in Zakat Practice in Indonesia: From Piety to an Islamic Socio-Political-Economic System. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2008. Sanyinna, Abubakar Yusuf and Muhammad Farihal Osman. “Analytical Overview of the Role Played by Waqf in Poverty Alleviation: A Case Study of Sokoto State, Nigeria.” Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies 5, no. 9 (2017): 18–30. Seesemann, Rüdiger and Benjamin Soares. “‘Being as Good Muslims as Frenchmen’: On Islam and Colonial Modernity in West Africa.” Journal of Religion in Africa 39, no. 1 (2009): 91–120. Shaikh, S.A. “Zakat Collectible in OIC Countries for Poverty Alleviation: A Primer on Empirical Estimation.” International Journal of Zakat 1, no. 1 (2016): 17–35. Shirazi, Nasim Shah, Salman Syed Ali and Mohammed Obaidullah. “Practical Means of Integrating Zakāt and Waqf Into Poverty Reduction Agenda of OIC Member Countries.” Islamic Economic Studies 25, no. 2 (2017): 63–65. Siddiqi, Nejatullah M. Role of the State in the Economy: An Islamic Perspective. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1996. Singer, Amy. Charity in Islamic Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Siradag, Abdurrahman. “Benevolence of Selfishness: Understanding the Increasing Role of Turkish NGOs and Civil Society in Africa.” Insight on Africa 7, no. 1 (January 2015): 1–20. Skinner, David E. “Da’wa and Politics in West Africa: Muslim Jama’at and ­Non-Governmental Organisations in Ghana, Sierra Leone and The Gambia.” In Development and Politics from Below: Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State, eds. Barbara Bompai and Maria Frahm-Arp, 99–130. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Soares, Benjamin F. “The Prayer Economy in a Malian Town.” Cahiers d’Études africaines 36, no. 4 (1996): 739–754. Soares, Benjamin F. Islam and the Prayer Economy: History and Authority in a Malian Town. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press for the International Africa Institute, 2005. Soares, Benjamin, ed. Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa. Leiden: Brill, 2006. Soares, Benjamin and Réne Otayek, eds. Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Sohag, Kazi et al. “Can Zakat System Alleviate Rural Poverty in Bangladesh? A Propensity Score Matching Approach.” Journal of Poverty 19, no. 3 (2015): 261–277. Stirk, Chloe. An Act of Faith: Humanitarian Financing and Zakat. Development Initiatives Briefing Paper March 2015, available at http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ONLINE-Zakat_report_V9a.pdf.

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38  H. WEISS Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

Who Do FBOs Speak For? The Conundrum of Representation Yonatan N. Gez

Introduction Mainstream narratives about international development largely trace the emergence of the field to after the Second World War, when the United States and its allies have crafted a new world order. This attempt claimed to be grounded in “universal” values and aspirations and based—to use President Truman’s words from his famous inaugural speech in 1949—“on the concepts of democratic fair dealing”. However, behind the language of global inclusion and human solidarity, there were notable omittances regarding the field’s deep-seated politics: on the backdrop and on the heels of exploitative colonialism, as a new strategy of action within the context of a growing Cold War, and within the frame of consolidation of Western hegemony led by the American superpower. Indeed, according to development’s critics, the recognition that the field “has undeniably been developed through a Western lens” is necessary for This paper was written with the generous support of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jeursalem. Y. N. Gez (*)  University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 H. Weiss (ed.), Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38308-4_2

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understanding its identification of global problems as well as its proposed solutions.1 Over the decades, it has become increasingly clear that the formal narrative of development suffers from at least one more major omittance: an over-reliance on economic factors at the expense of issues related to collective and personal well-being and all that comes with it: freedoms and values, culture and also religion. The latter, in particular, has long dominated human responses towards marginalized populations, whether by operating charities and other mechanisms that enact social solidarity or, more subtly, by cultivating “dramatic eschatological, soteriological, and apocalyptic modes of envisioning the future”.2 This particular omission, which presented the field of development as a secular project focused on material living conditions and uninterested in (partisan) spiritual matters, began to shift somewhat in recent decades and especially since the early 2000s, as faith-based organizations (FBOs)—also referred to as Religious Non-Governmental Organizations (RNGOs)—came to be appreciated as legitimate development actors.3 According to Clarke, the broad category of FBOs encompasses a loose range of organizations including faith-based apex bodies, faith-based charitable organizations, faith-based socio-political organizations, faith-based missionary organizations and even faith-based illegal or terrorist organizations.4 While, as this classification shows, some FBOs focus more on service provision and outreach while others see their work more in terms of political lobbying and advocacy, FBOs all draw their mandate from a claim to operate on behalf of a collective body of believers. Such representation offers an alleged projection of a community’s relative power within the society: disproportional, 1 Shawn Teresa Flanigan, For the Love of God: NGOs and Religious Identity in a Violent World (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2010), 147; Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1995). 2 R. Michael Feener and Philip Fountain, “Religion in the Age of Development,” Religions 9, no. 12 (2018): 13. 3 It should be noted that, in the literature, the distinction is not always clear between organizations purely preoccupied with development aid and other types of associations— political or otherwise—of believers. This ambiguity partially follows from the nature of religious organizations, where service provision is often entwined with advocacy and other activities. 4 Gerard Clarke, “Faith Matters: ­ Faith-Based Organisations, Civil Society and International Development,” Journal of International Development 18 (2006): 840.

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inadequate or distorted representation can have far-reaching implications on political decision-making and on public opinion. But at the same time, the notion of representation also raises questions about the interface between organizations and lay believers: To what extent do FBOs truly speak on behalf of the people and religions that they claim to represent, voicing their true values and aspirations? Aware that there has been little research dedicated to the actual implications of development-based engagement with religious organizations, in this introductory chapter, I wish to fill in a scholarly gap by offering a synthetic overview of the literature specifically around the question of representation. While avoiding focusing on a particular case study, I draw on several illustrations related to Islam in Africa, and primarily in Kenya and Ghana. In doing so, I am particularly aware of the problem of representation of Islam in Africa: while, across the continent, neither Islam nor Christianity can claim a clear numerical majority, Christian FBOs nonetheless dominate the scene, certainly when it comes to scholarly attention.5 This reflects a wider trend whereby Christian organizations serve as the benchmark for FBOs—so much so that scholars often resort to explicitly underlining when they refer to “non-Christian FBOs”.6 Moreover, much of what is written about Muslim FBOs, certainly post9/11, is written from a specific security perspective—though there are some indications that this is beginning to change, as the present book demonstrates.7 At the same time, I argue that the problem of representation is essential and universal, and as such, many of the points made in the course of this text go beyond the case of Muslim FBOs. The structure of this chapter is as follows: after a short presentation of the topic and the stakes, I break down the challenge of representation into two categories: firstly, collective representations, by which I refer to the challenge of FBOs’ adequate institutional representation vis-à-vis the wider sociopolitical context (local, national, international), and secondly, individual representations, by which I refer to the question of adequate 5 A simple search on Google Scholar (August 2019) returns twice as many articles for “Christian FBOs Africa” than for “Muslim FBOs Africa” and about a third more articles for “Christian Faith-Based Organizations Africa” than for “Muslim Faith-Based Organizations Africa”. 6 Feener and Fountain, “Religion in the Age of Development.” 7 Marie Juul Petersen, “Trajectories of Transnational Muslim NGOs,” Development in Practice 22, nos. 5–6 (2012): 763–778.

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representation of individual identities by the FBOs that supposedly speak on their behalf. While discussed separately for the sake of convenience, the two sub-themes are intertwined, a point I will emphasize in the conclusion.

FBOs and the Challenge of Representations In recent decades, there has been a growing recognition within the international community that faith communities, who are “serious stakeholders in development”,8 can and should have a place within mainstream, so-called secular development.9 Support for such collaborations draws, on the one hand, on a view whereby the achievement and sustainability of development goals require the concerted efforts of a range of social institutions and, on the other hand, on the recognition of the inherent value of taking people’s deep-seated belief systems “seriously”.10 Within the development sector, it is commonly noted that collaboration with FBOs can boost the legitimacy of development initiatives, encourage genuine participation and assuage feelings of top-down, funding-driven dictations by development decision makers. It is further suggested that religious institutions enjoy relatively high levels of trust by project beneficiaries,11 and that they “allegedly represent what people want,

8 Words by James D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank. Martin Palmer and Victoria Finlay, Faith in Conservation: New Approaches to Religions and the Environment (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003). 9 For a critique of this distinction as artificial and ideological, see Philip Fountain, “The Myth of Religious NGOs: Development Studies and the Return of Religion,” International Development Policy 4, no. 1 (2013): 9–30. 10 Gerrie Ter Haar, “Religion and Development: Introducing a New Debate,” in Religion and Development: Ways of Transforming the World, ed. Gerrie Ter Haar (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), 3–27. However, while recognizing the many advantages of such enlargement of the circle of development partners, it also met with substantial opposition and backlash. See, for example, the telling case of the rise and fall of the World Bank’s engagement with faith-based actors. Jeffrey Haynes, “Faith-Based Organisations, Development and the World Bank,” International Development Policy 4, no. 1 (2013): 49–64. 11 UNDP, “UNDP Guidelines on Engaging with Faith-Based Organizations and Religious Leaders,” UNDP, New York, 2014, 7.

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are ‘organic forces’ and are best positioned to support local capacity development”.12 As the last quote shows, the pendulum’s swing of excitement about development partnership with religion groups may well be tempered by a touch of naïveté. Balchin calls this trend “the rush to find the religious”, an appellation that reflects her critique of adopting unreflective stances towards such partnerships.13 Scholars note that the choice of religious partners may end up reinforcing and reifying particular religion voices— ironically, including conservative ones that may run contrary to the core values and objectives of development. Thus, for example, with regard to gender in particular, Tomalin notes that development policies and initiatives’ engagement with religion are often accompanied by “an uncritical adoption of dominant (usually male) perspectives and voices within religious traditions as though they are representative of the tradition as a whole. This choice runs the risk of marginalizing other voices and positions that may not have such a prominent public presence—specifically, feminist or gender-sensitive interpretations within religious traditions”.14 Abandoning crude conceptions of authenticity, a number of authors now recognize that the idea whereby “all FBOs, by virtue of their grassroots connections, represent people’s agendas, values, needs and priorities” is but a “myth”.15 This last point is worth dwelling on. The assumption of representation is built into the very ethos of FBOs and pervades both internal and external gaze. Indeed, although varied in form and orientation, FBOs are largely perceived as a legitimate channel representing a collective of believers, on whose moral and spiritual support—not to mention economic contributions—they rely. Such a view even permeates the very description of FBOs, such as in their qualification as “major organizations that are generally considered representative organs of faith-based 12 Mariz Tadros, Faith-Based Organizations and Service Delivery: Some Gender Conundrums, Gender and Development Programme Paper Series (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2010), 23. 13 Cassandra Balchin, “Religion and Development: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Instrumentalisation,” IDS Bulletin 42, no. 1 (2011): 17. 14 Emma Tomalin, Religions and Development (Routledge Perspectives on Development) (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 169. 15 Tadros, “Faith-Based Organizations and Service Delivery: Some Gender Conundrums,” 11.

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groups”.16 But this claim to legitimate representation raises searching questions, as laid out by Berger: Whom do RNGOs represent and how can we be sure? How do multimillion member organizations such as the World Muslim Congress or the Baptist World Alliance represent the major differences in religious practice and opinion held by their members? How can we know that RNGO leaders are representing their constituents rather than pushing their own agenda?17

It is with such questions in mind that we now turn to discuss two ­categories of challenge related to representation.

Collective Representation The first challenge of representation refers to facilitating adequate consideration for institutional voices within a given religious landscape— local, national or international. A key point to be considered here regards the delicate interplay between inclusion and exclusion. If we take, for example, the historical case of the 1893 World’s Parliament of Religions in Chicago, we can see how attempted inclusion may inadvertently breed exclusion. The event, fondly remembered as a watershed moment in interreligious encounter, featured “ten great world religions”, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Zoroastrianism, Taoism, Confucianism, Shinto, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. However, it can be argued that this celebration of diversity resulted in making the absence of certain traditions, such as Sikhism, all the more pronounced—not to mention, of course, the omission of “local”, “indigenous” and supposedly “lesser” religions. The fact that some such “lesser” religions have substantial following reminds us that religious traditions’ visibility and influence are affected by constellations of power and resources and are far from being

16 J. Ibrahim and C. Bagu, “Religious Leaders, Faith Based Organizations and PeaceBuilding in Nigeria,” Report for International Alert Project on Building Peace on the Frontline of Fire, Abuja, 2004, 14. 17 Julia Berger, “Religious Nongovernmental Organizations: An Exploratory Analysis,” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 14, no. 1 (2003): 36.

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determined by the size of their following. A good illustration to that effect is offered by Berger, in a passing comment comparing Jewish and Muslim FBOs. Berger notes that, even though, in terms of worldwide membership, Muslims outnumber Jews by about 100 to 1, her random sample of 263 FBOs identified a similar number of Islamic and Jewish organizations. Recognizing the relation between power and representation, she hypothesizes that the disproportionally large number of Jewish organizations may be influenced by “[t]he large Jewish presence in the United States, the material resources of the Jewish community, as well as its emphasis on advocacy and social justice”.18 In addition, such recognition of relations between power and representation should also note how instances of over- and underrepresentation are affected by dynamics of socio-contextual bias and exclusion built into local stereotypes, norms and even legal codes. The legal system, some suggest, cannot be expected to be fully dissociated from local values and socio-religious hegemonies. In countries with weak judiciary systems in particular, “legal protections for minority religious groups would be weak, and indeed, one might expect to see the judicial system used as a major element of the weaponry of social control exerted against minority faiths by those in positions of authority in that country”.19 Thus, even when formal legislation claims impartiality, its actual application has been shown to be influenced by local norms, by the prominence of given religious groups, and by proximity to positions of power. This, of course, is in addition to the “unequal representation of the symbols, norms and values of minorities within the existing structures and the functioning of the state”.20 This leads us to reflect on the definition of adequate ­representation not only as proportional to the size of the given religious tradition, but also, in some cases, as enough to offset and push back on entrenched discriminatory practices. For example, in Kenya, the Muslim community’s marginalized position is brought to mind surrounding the long-standing debate whether the country is a secular state with a

18 Berger,

“Religious Nongovernmental Organizations: An Exploratory Analysis,” 34. T. Richardson, “Regulating Religion: A Sociological and Historical Introduction,” in Regulating Religion: Case Studies from Around the Globe, ed. James T Richardson (New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2004), 11. 20 Danielle Dierckx, Jan Vranken and Wendy Kerstens, eds., Faith-Based Organizations and Social Exclusion in European Cities (Leuven: Acco, 2009), 46. 19 James

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Christian majority or a de facto Christian nation.21 This conflict famously came to a head in the 2000s, in the dispute surrounding the inclusion of Khadi courts under the new constitution,22 but traces of it can be found in a host of other legal and public debates, such as that involving attempts to “rein in” and vet religious leaders who exploit their flock for personal gain or espouse extremist doctrines. With regard to the latter, and on the backdrop of the Kenyan government’s central role in the fight against Al-Shabaab, Kenyan Muslims have largely felt that a series of anti-terrorist legislation has unjustly tarnished their image, noting that “Muslim youths are always a target”.23 It thus appears that, even if well-intended, the “rush to the religious” does not always result in adequate representation. Writing on the involvement of faith-based organizations in advisory boards in the United States, Sager laments the absence of “mechanisms in place to control which groups are invited to join advisory boards; thus, there is the distinct possibility that certain types of faith-based advisors will be selected over others, favouring one brand of religion over others”.24 The absence of such “mechanisms of invitation” means that many faith groups go under the radar, because they do not fit international (mainly Western) conceptions of what qualifies as FBO work, because they are institutionally or politically weak, or because local climate classifies them as illegitimate. Complicating matters further are issues related to structural differences within religious traditions themselves: some religious groups are more centralized than others, which ostensibly supports claims to speak authoritatively on behalf of a constituency. Boehle gives the example of the organizational structure of Catholic FBOs

21 Yvan Droz and Hervé Maupeu, “Christianismes Et Démocratisation Au Kenya,” Social Compass 60, no. 1 (2013): 79–96. Consider, for example, attempts to block the registration of the group Atheists In Kenya (AIK) on Christian grounds and the ensuing debate that has only recently been settled by the High Court. 22 Joachim Osur, The Great Controversy: A Story of Abortion, the Church, and Constitution-Making in Kenya (Nairobi: Majestic Printing Works, 2011). 23 Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen, “Socio-Legal Implications of the Laws to Combat Religious Extremism in Kenya,” in Religion, Law and Security in Africa, eds. Christian Green, Jeremy Gunn and Mark Hill (Stellenbosch: African Sun Media, 2017), 124. 24 Rebecca Sager, Faith, Politics, and Power: The Politics of Faith-Based Initiatives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 101.

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and contrasts it with that of Islamic organizations, that “may be more spontaneously founded and funded, thereby expressing organisational cultures that are prevalent in the religious traditions they are associated with”.25 Clarke draws similar distinctions, claiming more broadly that “Islam, Hinduism and Sikhism are less hierarchically organised than the Christian faiths, so associated FBOs have an ambiguous status as representatives of the faith”.26 At the same time, the presence of a centralized religious leadership does not undo the multiplicity of factional voices within the tradition, such as we find, for example, in contestations by conservative factions within the Catholic Church against the somewhat progressive agenda put forth by the Pope Francis. Ironically, perhaps, one field where pitfalls of institutional representation are found is in the activities of interreligious dialogue groups. In her book on the challenge of interfaith dialogue between Christians and Muslims in the United States, Smith gives various examples of the challenges facing religious groups claiming representative authority. She notes, for example, how within such groups, Indians and Pakistanis occupy a disproportionately high percentage of roles as Islamic representatives, how Shiite Muslims often feel underrepresented, and how Muslim African Americans are “sometimes upset both because they feel inadequately represented in many dialogue sessions, and because it may seem to them that they are not always taken seriously by other Muslims when they do participate”.27 Her observations remind us of the intersectionality of the politics of representation, where matters of colour, ethnicity, gender and class are often intertwined. This, in turn, reminds us of the embeddedness of religious identity, and the problem—even futility—of striving for “authentic”, “ideal type” representatives and representations. 25 Josef Boehle, “Religious NGOs at the UN and the Millennium Development Goals: An Introduction,” Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 3 (2010): 283. The centralized nature of Catholic FBOs can also be contrasted with that of Protestant FBOs, who “tend to have a more federal structure with a central office coordinating between various sub-entities”. Carlo Benedetti, “Islamic and Christian Inspired Relief NGOs: Between Tactical Collaboration and Strategic Difference?,” Journal of International Development 18 (2006): 853. 26 Gerard Clarke, “Agents of Transformation? Donors, F ­ aith-Based Organisations and International Development,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2007): 88. 27 Jane I. Smith, Muslims, Christians, and the Challenge of Interfaith Dialogue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 89.

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Furthermore, as we already began to see, the demand for such i­deal-type representation can be dangerous, as it reinforces certain religious vernaculars as unanimously endorsed while marginalizing coexisting alternative strands within the tradition, impoverishing their richness and jeopardizing the many promises of plurality. Thus, while scholars largely agree that “there is no good reason to suppose that Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism are each one homogeneous entity”,28 religious groups function on both the descriptive and normative level, defining strands deemed legitimate as “genuine” while casting others as “false”.29 As Pearson and Tomalin argue, the development sector tends to endorse such normative orientations: By accepting to treat faith communities as monolithic and homogenous, and privileging faith leaders as representatives of entire religious traditions, the development community promotes a normative version of doctrines where in reality these doctrines continuously undergo critique, reinterpretation and contestation.30 But while the two authors fear that such a normativizing tendency may set back progressive development agendas, a somewhat opposite concern draws attention to the challenge of “cherry picking”, whereby the development community “is often seen to be biased in favour of so-called ‘progressive’ forces within a religious tradition who share common points with those holding a secular worldview”.31 Another risk associated with such essentialization and overemphasis on institutional borders has to do with what Flanigan, following Tilly, terms “boundary activation”: a vicious cycle of us-them polarization that leads to further distancing and othering.32 Building on three case studies from war-torn areas across the world, Flanigan proposes that “FBOs may mirror, reinforce, and reproduce societal divisions that are present in 28 Victoria S. Harrison, “The Pragmatics of Defining Religion in a Multi-Cultural World,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59, no. 3 (2006): 148. 29 Richard Amesbury, “Inter-Religious Declarations of Human Rights: Grounding Rights or Constructing ‘Religion’?,” Religion & Human Rights 5, no. 1 (2010): 63–64. 30 Ruth Pearson and Emma Tomalin, “Intelligent Design?: A Gender-Sensitive Interrogation of Religion and Development,” in Development, Civil Society and FaithBased Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular, eds. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 46–71. 31 Séverine Deneulin and Masooda Bano, Religion in Development: Rewriting the Secular Script (London and New York, NY: Zed Books, 2013), 25. 32 Flanigan, For the Love of God; Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

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the cultures in which they operate”.33 As such, FBOs may discriminate members of outgroups and exclude them from service provision, while such outgroup members may keep themselves from seeking such help to begin with. Indeed, over-reliance on formal religious categories by international agencies is not unproblematic and may result in an overemphasis on human difference at the expense of shared human experience. If we consider, for example, Samuel Huntington’s well-known “clash of civilizations” hypothesis,34 we are likely to agree with Amartya Sen’s statement that, “the thesis concerning a civilizational clash is conceptually parasitic on the commanding power of a unique categorization along so-called civilizational lines, which closely follow religious divisions to which singular attention is paid”.35 Like other critics, Sen rejects Huntington’s emphasis on religious identity as a stable core that guides perception and action, proposing instead that personal identities are a meeting point for multiple traits that operate on various personality levels. Such critique against accentuated identity division leads us, in turn, to the next challenge, that of adequate representation of individual ­religious identity.

Individual Representation: The Butinage Metaphor Until recently, relations between religion and development have been considered almost exclusively through an institutional prism. As Ter Haar reminds us, “until now, it is mostly the organizational aspect of religion—religious institutions—that has enjoyed attention [within the development field], as development workers, secular or otherwise, often regard religious organisations as particularly useful for service delivery”.36 But while the intention and wish by international agencies to limit their gaze to ties with representative bodies is understandable, scholars remind us that subtlety of perception is required: religious institutions, however meticulously screened and however genuine their motivation, do not tell the whole story. Tomalin notes that, “to focus 33 Flanigan,

For the Love of God, 3. Highlight in the original. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 35 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 10. 36 Ter Haar, “Religion and Development: Introducing a New Debate,” 8. 34 Samuel

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on ‘official’ or ‘organized’ religion and its institutions is to miss other important aspects of religious life”. She further quotes Beckford’s observation whereby, “the study of religious organisations runs the risk of implying that all participants in these organisations think, feel and act alike”.37 Such distortion is not coincidental but reflects a long-entrenched institutional-Abrahamic perspective, which views religious members as ideal-type loyalists that follow institutional scripts in their practice and beliefs. At the same time, we learn from research on lived religion that between institutional prescriptions and actual, typical practitioner identity there is a gap, with practitioners drawing on different strands of tradition, creatively combining and negotiating multiple practices to form their own unique mixtures.38 Religious organizations, on their part, tend to underplay such complexities, essentializing their flock and offering a limiting vision that is more prescriptive than accurately descriptive. Such flattened portrayals are not incidental, as they validate power and hierarchy; indeed, religious institutions and individual leaders’ political capital—real or illusory—hinges on claims for serving as their flock’s authentic voice.39 To what extent can we trust the image, beloved by religious leaders, of “millions of believers sitting in churches waiting to be mobilized”,40 and even if true, what does it teach us? As Tomalin reminds us,

37 Tomalin, Religions and Development, 86; James A Beckford, Social Theory and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 28. 38 David D. Hall, ed., Lived Religion in America: Toward a History of Practice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Meredith B. McGuire, Lived Religion: Faith and Practice in Everyday Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 39 Recognizing these politics, we can understand why scholars warn us against reading too much into statistics on religious membership, where communities and institutions may seek to inflate their advertised rate of adherents in order to boost their influence. As Frans Wijsen, writing about East Africa, proposes, “in many countries in Africa, religious statistics are highly politicized”. Frans Wijsen, Seeds of Conflict in a Haven of Peace: From Religious Studies to Interreligious Studies in Africa (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2007), 34n45. 40 Katherine Marshall and Marisa Van Saanen, Development and Faith: Where Mind, Heart, and Soul Work Together (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2007), 156.

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while these ‘official versions’ of religious traditions seek to establish authentic belief and practice, the ways in which people actually live out their religion also reflects local context and culture. Moreover, while ‘official versions’ of religious traditions may increasingly seek to establish a religious realm that is demarcated from other aspects of life, the ways in which people actually experience and practise their religion may not reflect such clear processes of differentiation.41

A striking illustration of this gap is found in the fact that, even among FBO staff—including organizations of strict religious orientation or “pervasiveness”42—we find multiple p ­ersonal-spiritual standpoints and varying degrees of observance. For instance, in her work on Christian FBOs in Zimbabwe, Bornstein intimates some of the clashes that members of staff experience vis-à-vis their organizations’ religious demands even as they are expected to fall into line.43 If such a gap—which, following Goffman, we may call an institution’s “spiritual underlife”44—is so present among FBO workers, we can wonder how much more must this be true with regard to lay practitioners.45 Who, then, may speak on behalf of practitioners who do not claim to adhere to an ideal-type prescriptive institutional image, and who combine multiple practices and sources of inspiration at will? And who can justly represent “distanced practitioners”, who are members of a religious group in name but not in practice?46 41 Tomalin,

Religions and Development, 86. “Religious Nongovernmental Organizations: An Exploratory Analysis.” In the case of Muslim FBOs, Marie Juul Petersen shows how Muslim NGOs do not speak in a single voice, but offer a continuum ranging from fully embedded and “thoroughly Islamize aid” to secularize-like, “invisible Islam”, see Marie Juul Petersen, “Islamizing Aid: Transnational Muslim NGOs After 9.11,” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 23, no. 1 (2012): 126–155. 43 Erica Bornstein, The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality, and Economics in Zimbabwe (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). 44 Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (New York: Anchor Books, 1961). 45 Emerging from this, one may argue for a third challenge, that of institutional self-representation, and whether speakers on behalf of FBOs adequately represent the organization on behalf of which they claim to speak and the community that supposedly stands behind it. In other words, we can ask not only whether the organization adequately represents the individual, but also whether the individual adequately represents the organizations. 46 Jörg Stolz et al., Religion Und Spiritualität in Der Ich-Gesellschaft. Vier Gestalten Des (Un-)Glaubens (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 2014). 42 Berger,

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One tool for unpacking these questions is found in thinking through a concept that my colleagues and I developed as part of a Swiss National Science Foundation project (2010–2015): the religious butinage metaphor.47 The term “butinage” derives from the verb “butiner”, which stands for the social practice of bees, as they visit flowers in search of nourishment in the form of nectar for their hive. Building on this image, my colleague Edio Soares proposed that, “just like bees, the practitioner engages in butinage from one ‘religious denomination’ to another, (re) creating meaning, whose ‘scent’ is ever-particular and renewed”.48 Like the bees in their constant move between flowers, so does the butineur lend himself or herself to multidirectional mobility: “the practitioner does not simply ‘pass’ from denomination A to denomination B and then to C. Far from it, he never ceases to ‘commute’ from A to B to C, and then again to A, then C, then B, etc. The result is a continuous to-ing and fro-ing, in which the practitioner articulates different religious contents within a single religious practice”.49 The butinage metaphor thus falls within what is commonly termed “lived religion”— an increasingly popular scholarly framework that approaches individual religiosity through the prism of everyday practice, leaving room for experiences outside formal institutional membership.50 At the same time, the metaphor goes further by proposing a radical shift that “invite[s] the scholarly community to consider normative religious identity from a dynamic standpoint”.51 Indeed, the metaphor invites us to rethink the Abrahamic bias that pervades our conception of religion, and which manifests in ideas about exclusive institutional affiliations interrupted

47 The project, which was titled Structures anthropologiques du religieux: butinage et voisinage, focused on Brazil, Kenya, Ghana and Switzerland (project number: 100013130340, 100013-146301). I thank the project’s team members: Yvan Droz, Jeanne Rey and Edio Soares, for the use of our collective ideas and data. See Gez, Yonatan N., Yvan Droz, Jeanne Rey, and Edio Soares. Forthcoming. Butinage: The Art of Religious Mobility (Toronto: Toronto University Press). 48 Edio Soares, Le Butinage Religieux: Pratiques Et Pratiquants Au Brésil (Genève and Paris: Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement; Karthala, 2009), 20. My translation. 49 Soares, Le Butinage Religieux, 54–55. My translation. 50 McGuire, Lived Religion; Hall, Lived Religion in America. 51 Yonatan N. Gez et al., “From Converts to Itinerants: Religious Butinage as Dynamic Identity,” Current Anthropology 58, no. 2 (2017): 155.

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only by rare, radical moments of break known as conversion.52 In the case of FBOs, Western conceptions of religion have been merging with Western ideas about the development sector, risking biases and making the appeal to a neutral terminology all the more necessary. To consider butinage as our yardstick for individual religious identities is to throw into question not only the ideal-type categories of believer-as-members, but the very claim for a comprehensive representation of one’s supposed constituency. Within the context of my research team’s study in Kenya and Ghana, we noted that the vast majority of our interviewees have been combining, to varying degrees and in different points in their lives, multiple strands of religious traditions.53 To give but one of many illustrations, we can think of the case of Mehdi, a Sunni Muslim born in Accra, whose parents immigrated from Benin. Mehdi insists that he is a practising Muslim, visiting the mosque every Friday and showing the mark on his forehead (zebiba) as proof of his piety. Nevertheless, whenever facing a persistent problem in his life, if Islamic prayers fail to yield a solution, Mehdi would turn to a Christian pastor—whose intervention, in his experience, had been more effective. When we interviewed him, he was attending a Pentecostal church run by a female miracle-working pastor, while also irregularly frequenting another Christian pastor who prays for his material prosperity. Such cases strike a chord with findings from elsewhere. In Kenya, Janet McIntosh noted how, among the Giriama people of the coast, we find concurrent engagement with both traditional and Muslim divine powers as a matter of course and seemingly without raising concern over incommensurability.54 How ought we think about somebody like Mehdi or about one of McIntosh’s Giriama interviewees? Which FBO, if any, could possibly speak on behalf of their entangled religious identities that overflow the exclusive norms of singular traditions?

52 For example, Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). 53 Consider, for example, the curious case of “Chrislam” in Nigeria. Marloes Janson, “Unity Through Diversity: A Case Study of Chrislam in Lagos,” Africa 86, no. 4 (2016): 646–672. 54 Janet McIntosh, “Polyontologism: When ‘Syncretism’ Does Not Suffice,” Journal of Africana Religions 7, no. 1 (2019): 112–120; Janet McIntosh, The Edge of Islam: Power, Personhood, and Ethnoreligious Boundaries on the Kenya Coast (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009).

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Conclusion In a paper on relations between FBOs and the UN, Azza Karam cautions that the “practice of identifying a handful of FBOs as partners to diverse UN bodies on each and every endeavour related to religion” is “potentially myopic”, arguing instead that “[t]he world of religion is too vast, and the world of FBOs (from international, to regional, to national to community and village levels) is too complex and rich, to be reduced to a few ‘comfortable’ entry points”.55 In particular, Karam notes the danger of Overly engaging religious leaders, at the expense of those actually serving their communities on a whole range of issues […] one spokesperson for a religious institution is not a harbinger of overall legitimacy within entire faith communities. Moreover, as recent developments bear witness, religious institutions themselves, and their leadership, are facing seminal changes to their authority and legitimacy. These developments should encourage international development practitioners in general, and the United Nations in particular, to be cautious as to exclusively engaging with religious leaders.56

Karam’s concerns and warnings are in line with the critique presented in this chapter on the downside of an unchecked “rush to the religious”. We noted the irony whereby well-meaning identifications of formal religious representatives may result in the exclusion of dissenting groups and murkier modes of de facto religious identities, consequently diluting true diversity. Indeed, we must remember that religious traditions are inherently heterogeneous. To reduce these complexities to rigid, straightforward and uncontested systems of dogma can not only be unfairly misrepresentative, but can also prove counterproductive to the values and aims that guide development actors to engage with faith groups to begin with. The challenge of representation thus presents itself as a delicate balancing act, where much sensitivity is required in order to avoid suppression, essentialization and polarization of vital voices. In particular, we ought to keep in mind how FBOs and their dialogue partners—state actors, non-religious development agencies and

55 Azza Karam, “Concluding Thoughts on Religion and the United Nations: Redesigning the Culture of Development,” CrossCurrents 60, no. 3 (2010): 466. 56 Karam, “Concluding Thoughts on Religion and the United Nations.”

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other stakeholders—can be locked in an erroneous cycle of supposed legitimacy. As the claim for speaking on behalf of a community is the cornerstone—at times, raison d’être—of many such bodies, there is a mutually beneficial interest in acknowledging such representation without question. FBOs have an interest in being regarded as the legitimate voice of a large constituency, while their so-called secular partners, in their search for expanding collaborations, acquiesce and reinforce such claims. Such partners may include state organs, who have an interest in identifying—oftentimes, in the name of noble ideals of inclusion— clear-cut representative organizations and sustaining their image as certified to fully represent the views of a supposed community of ­ believers.57 As we have seen, such identification of dialogue partners is far from innocent, as it may create a mirage of institutional authority that inflates power and dilutes actual complexities. Moreover, following Tomalin and others, such simplifications can play into the hands of factional politics seeking to normativize particular—and not always favourable—strands within a tradition. Well-meaning intentions may inadvertently result in the hardening of identity frontiers and the accentuation of group difference. Proposing that claims for representation must be approached with more than a pinch of salt, I introduced the butinage metaphor, which invites us to cultivate healthy criticism against institutional claims for representation along pre-conceived scripts while reminding us to calibrate our perspectives to actual individual experience. In the context of development, where a key mission is to counter marginalization, such heightened sensitivity brings to mind past watershed initiatives such as Voices of the Poor, which has taught us of the significance of unmediated access to lay people’s own words and experience.58 While raising serious methodological challenges, such a horizon of direct (re)presentation, with its recognition of slippage and fuzziness of categories, comes with a promise that the fences between people might not be as high as the guardians of institutionalized religion would have us believe. Indeed, people’s tendency towards butinage should be recognized as a valuable

57 Dierckx, Vranken and Kerstens, “Faith-Based Organizations and Social Exclusion in European Cities.” 58 Deepa Narayan et al., Voices of the Poor: Crying out for Change (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 2000).

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resource—one that, as I have argued elsewhere, may counter strict and exclusive religious orientations and even fundamentalist tendencies.59 I wish to close with one last comment about the difference between representation and participation. As Sarah White reminds us with regard to development projects, the former does not necessarily entail the latter. In other words, a group may be represented in the formal sense, while participating in name only—what she calls “nominal participation”— and may not always partake in the empowering, transformative potential of actual project ownership.60 Future scholarship should supplement any discussion on representation with additional, subtle examination of its translation into actual participation—something which is beyond the bounds of the present chapter, but for which the butinage perspective can be of service.

Bibliography Amesbury, Richard. “Inter-Religious Declarations of Human Rights: Grounding Rights or Constructing ‘Religion’?” Religion & Human Rights 5, no. 1 (2010): 43–64. Asad, Talal. Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. Badurdeen, Fathima Azmiya. “Socio-Legal Implications of the Laws to Combat Religious Extremism in Kenya.” In Religion, Law and Security in Africa, eds. Christian Green, Jeremy Gunn and Mark Hill, 111–130. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media, 2017. Balchin, Cassandra. “Religion and Development: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Instrumentalisation.” IDS Bulletin 42, no. 1 (2011): 15–20. Beckford, James A. Social Theory and Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 59 Yvan Droz and Yonatan N. Gez, “Pentecôtisation Du Christianisme Et Butinage Religieux Au Kenya: Entre Fondamentalisme Et Mode Populaire D’action PoliticoReligieuse,” Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des études africaines (2019): 1–19. 60 Sarah C. White, “Depoliticising Development: The Uses and Abuses of Participation,” Development in Practice 6, no. 1 (1996): 6–15. Participation, White suggests, falls into four possible categories: ‘nominal’ (participation is visible but translates into little actual influence), ‘utilitarian’ (participation is meant to improve the efficiency of a project but is not seen as an end in and of itself), ‘representative’ (it is recognized that the group has a legitimate voice and is allowed to exert due influence) and ‘transformative’ (a fundamental sharing of power by all relevant stakeholders).

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Benedetti, Carlo. “Islamic and Christian Inspired Relief NGOs: Between Tactical Collaboration and Strategic Difference?” Journal of International Development 18 (2006): 849–859. Berger, Julia. “Religious Nongovernmental Organizations: An Exploratory Analysis.” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 14, no. 1 (2003): 15–39. Boehle, Josef. “Religious NGOs at the UN and the Millennium Development Goals: An Introduction.” Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 3 (2010): 275–296. Bornstein, Erica. The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality, and Economics in Zimbabwe. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005. Clarke, Gerard. “Faith Matters: Faith-Based Organisations, Civil Society and International Development.” Journal of International Development 18 (2006): 835–848. Clarke, Gerard. “Agents of Transformation? Donors, Faith-Based Organisations and International Development.” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2007): 77–96. Deneulin, Séverine and Masooda Bano. Religion in Development: Rewriting the Secular Script. London and New York, NY: Zed Books, 2013. Dierckx, Danielle, Jan Vranken and Wendy Kerstens, eds. Faith-Based Organizations and Social Exclusion in European Cities. Leuven: Acco, 2009. Droz, Yvan and Hervé Maupeu. “Christianismes Et Démocratisation Au Kenya.” Social Compass 60, no. 1 (2013): 79–96. Droz, Yvan and Yonatan N. Gez. “Pentecôtisation Du Christianisme Et Butinage Religieux Au Kenya: Entre Fondamentalisme Et Mode Populaire D’action Politico-Religieuse.” Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des études africaines (2019): 1–19. Droz, Yvan, Yonatan N. Gez, Edio Soares and Jeanne Rey. Butinage: The Art of Religious Mobility. Toronto: Toronto University Press (in submission). Escobar, Arturo. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1995. Feener, R. Michael and Philip Fountain. “Religion in the Age of Development.” Religions 9, no. 12 (2018): 382. Flanigan, Shawn Teresa. For the Love of God: NGOs and Religious Identity in a Violent World. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2010. Fountain, Philip. “The Myth of Religious NGOs: Development Studies and the Return of Religion.” International Development Policy 4, no. 1 (2013): 9–30. Gez, Yonatan N. “The Vetting Impasse: The ‘Churches Law’ and Kenya’s Religious Regulation Debate.” Journal of Religion in Africa (in submission). Gez, Yonatan N., Yvan Droz, Edio Soares and Jeanne Rey. “From Converts to Itinerants: Religious Butinage as Dynamic Identity.” Current Anthropology 58, no. 2 (2017): 141–159.

58  Y. N. GEZ Goffman, Erving. Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. New York: Anchor Books, 1961. Hall, David D., ed. Lived Religion in America: Toward a History of Practice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997. Harrison, Victoria S. “The Pragmatics of Defining Religion in a Multi-Cultural World.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59, no. 3 (2006): 133–152. Haynes, Jeffrey. “Faith-Based Organisations, Development and the World Bank.” International Development Policy 4, no. 1 (2013): 49–64. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. Ibrahim, J. and C. Bagu. “Religious Leaders, Faith Based Organizations and Peace-Building in Nigeria.” Report for International Alert Project on Building Peace on the Frontline of Fire, Abuja, 2004. Janson, Marloes. “Unity Through Diversity: A Case Study of Chrislam in Lagos.” Africa 86, no. 4 (2016): 646–672. Karam, Azza. “Concluding Thoughts on Religion and the United Nations: Redesigning the Culture of Development.” CrossCurrents 60, no. 3 (2010): 462–474. Marshall, Katherine and Marisa Van Saanen. Development and Faith: Where Mind, Heart, and Soul Work Together. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2007. McGuire, Meredith B. Lived Religion: Faith and Practice in Everyday Life. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. McIntosh, Janet. The Edge of Islam: Power, Personhood, and Ethnoreligious Boundaries on the Kenya Coast. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009. McIntosh, Janet. “Polyontologism: When ‘Syncretism’ Does Not Suffice.” Journal of Africana Religions 7, no. 1 (2019): 112–120. Narayan, Deepa, Robert Chambers, Meera K. Shah and Patti Petesch. Voices of the Poor: Crying Out for Change. New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 2000. Osur, Joachim. The Great Controversy: A Story of Abortion, the Church, and Constitution-Making in Kenya. Nairobi: Majestic Printing Works, 2011. Palmer, Martin and Victoria Finlay. Faith in Conservation: New Approaches to Religions and the Environment. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003. Pearson, Ruth and Emma Tomalin. “Intelligent Design?: A Gender-Sensitive Interrogation of Religion and Development.” In Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular, eds. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings, 46–71. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

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Petersen, Marie Juul. “Islamizing Aid: Transnational Muslim NGOs After 9.11.” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 23, no. 1 (2012): 126–155. Petersen, Marie Juul. “Trajectories of Transnational Muslim NGOs.” Development in Practice 22, nos. 5–6 (2012): 763–778. Richardson, James T. “Regulating Religion: A Sociological and Historical Introduction.” In Regulating Religion: Case Studies from Around the Globe, ed. James T. Richardson, 1–22. New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2004. Sager, Rebecca. Faith, Politics, and Power: The Politics of Faith-Based Initiatives. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Sen, Amartya. Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny. London: Penguin Books, 2006. Smith, Jane I. Muslims, Christians, and the Challenge of Interfaith Dialogue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Soares, Edio. Le Butinage Religieux: Pratiques Et Pratiquants Au Brésil. Genève and Paris: Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement; Karthala, 2009. Stolz, Jörg, Judith Könemann, Mallory Schneuwly Purdie, Thomas Englberger and Michael Krüggeler. Religion Und Spiritualität in Der Ich-Gesellschaft. Vier Gestalten Des (Un-)Glaubens. Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 2014. Tadros, Mariz. Faith-Based Organizations and Service Delivery: Some Gender Conundrums. Gender and Development Programme Paper Series. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2010. Ter Haar, Gerrie. “Religion and Development: Introducing a New Debate.” In Religion and Development: Ways of Transforming the World, ed. Gerrie Ter Haar, 3–27. London: Hurst & Company, 2011. Tilly, Charles. The Politics of Collective Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Tomalin, Emma. Religions and Development (Routledge Perspectives on Development). London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. UNDP. “UNDP Guidelines on Engaging with Faith-Based Organizations and Religious Leaders.” UNDP, New York, 2014. White, Sarah C. “Depoliticising Development: The Uses and Abuses of Participation.” Development in Practice 6, no. 1 (1996): 6–15. Wijsen, Frans. Seeds of Conflict in a Haven of Peace: From Religious Studies to Interreligious Studies in Africa. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2007.

Reflections on Trust and Trust Making in the Work of Islamic Charities from the Gulf Region in Africa Mayke Kaag and Soumaya Sahla

Introduction Our research on Islamic charities of the Gulf region and their work in Africa that we conducted over the past years,1 has stimulated us to reflect on not only the importance of trust in aid relationships, but also on active 1 M. Kaag, “Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad: Islamic Solidarity in the Age of Neoliberalism,” Africa Today 54, no. 3 (2008): 3–18; M. Kaag, “Comparing Connectivities: Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad and Senegal,” in The Social Life of Connectivity in Africa, eds. M. De Brujin and R. van Dijk (New York: Macmillan, 2012), 183–201; M. Kaag, “Gulf Charities in Africa,” in Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the ‘Age of Terror’ and Beyond, eds. J. Benthall and R. Lacey (London and Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2014), 79–94; M. Kaag, “Islamic Charities from the Arab World in Africa: Intercultural Encounters of Humanitarianism and Morality,” in Humanitarianism and Challenges of Cooperation, eds. V.M. Heins, K. Koddenbrock and C. Unrau (London: Routledge, 2016), 155–167; S. Sahla, In the Name of Geopolitics: The Proxy-War Between Saudi-Arabia and Iran in Ghana by Means of Islamic NGOs, Unpublished Research Master’s Thesis African Studies, Leiden University, 2018.

M. Kaag (*) · S. Sahla  African Studies Centre, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 H. Weiss (ed.), Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38308-4_3

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trust making by these organizations. Indeed, as transnational charity providers they are embedded in a web of relationships that they need to maintain and/or further, and for which trust is indispensable. First of all, they need to prove their trustworthiness towards their donors in the Gulf countries. Second, they need to create trust in the local African contexts in which they come to work. Lastly, Islamic charities, especially those from the Gulf, face a lot of distrust in the global context post-9/11, which they need to deal with and counter; in addition, there is distrust in the intra-Islamic aid arena between different categories of Islamic aid providers. This chapter discusses these challenges and Gulf charities’ strategies to address them, illustrated by examples from Chad, Senegal, and Ghana.2 It will also be shown that their strategies of trust making towards different audiences may create tensions, with which they have to deal, as well. More specifically, this means navigating different narratives of trustworthiness. We base ourselves on understandings of trust as developed by influential social scientists in the 1980s and 1990s, who, among other things, have underscored that trust is a way of dealing with uncertainty over time. Without trust, Luhmann argues, only very simple forms of human co-operation, which can be transacted on the spot are possible.3 In more complex situations, people have to cope with events not directly visible, with factors not yet present, and with other people who cannot be fathomed entirely. For all that, one needs trust in order to effectively engage in collective action. Gambetta is a strong advocate of this view of trust as a precondition for co-operation.4 Elster holds a slightly different view in that he emphasizes that trust can best be seen as a social lubricant facilitating co-operation.5 When the academic interest in trust gained momentum in the 1990s through works like Fukuyama, Misztal, Giddens, and Elster,6 most theorizing focused on the (post) industrial 2 Fieldwork for this paper was conducted in Chad (2004, 2012), Senegal (2014, 2017, 2019) and Ghana (2017). 3 N. Luhmann, Trust and Power, eds. T. Burns and G. Poggi (New York: Wiley, 1979), 88. 4 D. Gambetta, Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988). 5 J. Elster, The Cement of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 6 F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (London: Penguin, 1995); B. Misztal, Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Basis of Social Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Blackwood: Polity Press, 1995); Elster, The Cement of Society.

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world, including Southeast Asia, which economic success was explained by a successful coupling of aspects of globalization to local cultures of trust.7 Various types of trust, such as interpersonal trust and system or institutional trust, were distinguished in order to explain societal change.8 At that time, Africa hardly emerged as a field of study among theorist scholars of trust, neither was trust taken up as a theoretical notion by Africanists. While in the work of Bayart, for instance, glimpses of trust can be detected,9 the issue was not explicitly elaborated upon. Scattered scholarship on the working of trust in Africa did however develop on the basis of empirical case studies, with an accent on trust in migrant and trade networks. Hart, for instance, used trust as a core concept in his study of migrants in Accra. He concludes that “trust is central to social life when neither traditional certainties nor modern probabilities hold.”10 The past few years have seen a renewed interest in issues of trust in Africa, triggered, among other things, by observed changes in the character, shape, and reach of networks, the opening up of different terrains of encounter with the unfamiliar, the expansion of modern communication technologies, and shifting research and policy agendas.

7 See

further Misztal, Trust in Modern Societies. Luhmann, “Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives,” in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. D. Gambetta (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 94–107; Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity. 9 J.F. Bayart, L’Etat en Afrique: La politique du ventre (Paris: Fayard, 1998). 10 K. Hart, “Kinship, Contract, and Trust: The Economic Organization of Migrants in an African City Slum,” in Trust: Making and Breaking Co-operative Relations, ed. D. Gambetta (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 191. Other examples include A. von Oppen, Terms of Trade and Terms of Trust: The History and Contexts of Pre-colonial Market Production Around the Upper Zambezi and Kasai (Munster: Lit Verlag, 1994); J. Levitt, “Pre-intervention Trust-Building. African States and Enforcing the Peace: The Case of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone,” Liberian Studies Journal 24, no. 1 (1999): 1–26; Y. Zakaria, Entrepreneurial Ethics and Trust: Cultural Foundations and Networks in the Nigerian Plastic Industry (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); M. Kaag, “Trust, Mistrust and Co-operation in a Senegalese Rural Community,” in Trust and Co-operation Symbolic Exchange and Moral Economics in an Age of Cultural Differentiation, eds. P. Smets, H. Wels and J. Van Loon (Amsterdam: Spinhuis, 1999), 83–96; A. Bellagamba, “Entrustment and Its Changing Political Meanings in Fuladu, the Gambia (1880–1994),” Africa 74, no. 3 (2004): 383–410. 8 N.

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Thus, examples of recent empirical studies of the workings of trust in Africa include work on trust within extended families affected by HIV/ AIDS,11 elites and democracy in Ghana,12 the political strategies of ANC leaders in South Africa,13 Kenyan election management,14 local entrepreneurial strategies in Ghana’s oil and gas industry,15 questions of trust between migrants and migration brokers in Cameroon.16 We think that it is also worthwhile to consider the workings of trust and distrust in the work of transnational Islamic charities in Africa, exactly because their engagements concern bridging between donors and target groups through space and time, encounters with the unfamiliar in local settings, and complex navigating in the context of religious and geopolitical agendas. Trust is needed in order to collaborate with others in the context of time-lapses and cultural gaps, while distrust is never far away, making collaboration fragile at times and active trust making crucial. On the other hand, as we will see, distrust is also something that can be played with in order to gain power and influence in the (Islamic) aid arena. In this chapter, we will restrict ourselves to Islamic charities originating from the Gulf countries that work in Africa. These have in common that they normally combine material aid with proselytization and mainly operate outside of the mainstream (read: global, Western-dominated) aid architecture. Despite these commonalities, there are also huge and meaningful differences within this category. Thus, charities may take the form 11 E. Cooper, “Sitting and Standing: How Families Are Fixing Trust in Uncertain Times,” Africa 82, no. 3 (2012): 437–456. 12 A. Osei, “Elites and Democracy in Ghana: A Social Network Approach,” African Affairs 114, no. 457 (2015): 529–554. 13 B.M. Shapiro, “Building Trust and Playing Hardball: Contrasting Negotiating Styles in South-Africa’s Transition to Democracy,” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 12, no. 3 (2012): 33–52. 14 A. Erlich and N. Kerr, “The Local ‘Mwananci’ Has Lost Trust: Design, Transition and Legitimacy in Kenyan Election Management,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 54, no. 4 (2016): 671–702. 15 A. Dziwornu Ablo and R. Overa, “Networks, Trust, and Capital Mobilisation: Challenges of Embedded Local Entrepreneurial Strategies in Ghana’s Oil and Gas Industry,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 53, no. 3 (2015): 391–413. 16 M.J. Alpes, “Why Aspiring Migrants Trust Migration Brokers: The Moral Economy of Departure in Anglophone Cameroon,” Africa 87, no. 2 (2017): 304–321.

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of GONGOs (Government Operated NGOs) such as IIROSA (Saudi Arabia), or be private organizations, such as Al-Muntada Al-Islami, or (the now officially dissolved) Al-Haramain and Al-Makka Al-Mukkarama Foundation. Sometimes, they have created local organizations, but most often, they operate as transnational bodies with national/local offices. Charities may mainly focus on one sector, such as (religious) education, or have a more diversified portfolio including health care, the building of mosques, and the care for orphans. More important, however, are the divisions between diverse Sunni and Shi’a organizations. The former may be Salafi organizations with a (Saudi) Wahhabi signature or associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, the latter are mostly organizations from Iran, or funded by Shi’a from Lebanon. Theological differences intertwined with geopolitical interests have an influence on the dynamics of collaboration and animosity between these organizations, but also influence their strategies, messages, and positioning in the local context. In the following, we will discuss how trust and distrust play an important role in these organizations navigating the field, by firstly focusing on their relationships with donors in the Gulf, then analysing their establishing and maintaining relations locally in Africa, and finally, enquiring the challenges related to their being a player in the international aid and geopolitical arena. The chapter will be rounded off with some general reflections on the role of trust and trust making for these organizations and other stakeholders.

Showing Trustworthiness Towards the Donors in the Gulf Islamic charities from the Gulf are not merely aid organizations led by Muslims, but entities based on, and functioning according to Islamic principles. Put more strongly, Islam constitutes both the foundation and the aim of these organizations. If we want to say something about trust in the workings of these charities, we therefore also need to consider trust in Islam. As argued by Misztal, trust is an essential element of every religion as “the confidence in a Supranatural Power on which man feels himself dependent” and “to trust God as the source of salvation is an essence of

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every religion.”17 Islam is no exception, which perspires in sayings like ‘Insh’allah’ (if God wishes) and ‘bismillah’ (in the name of God) indicating that one recognizes to be in the hands of God but that one trusts God to support and bless one’s action. Trust as an important concept in Islam is also strongly connected to the idea that something is entrusted to someone, in order to take good care of, and to make good use of.18 Or, as Dusuki puts it: “The concept of trust, in Islam, is inseparably linked with responsibility, implying that the wealth that is entrusted to a human being is indeed a responsibility that he will be called to account for in the Hereafter.”19 Moreover, this is exactly what characterizes the relationship between the charities under study and their donors in the Gulf. The latter entrust their funds to the organization, assuming that these use the donations according to Islamic principles. As elaborated elsewhere, a large part of these organizations’ funding is constituted by zakat (obligatory almsgiving) and sadaqa (voluntary almsgiving).20 The Quran gives eight categories of people for whose support zakat should be used. These are the poor, the needy, those who have responsibility over them (zakat collectors and administrators), recent converts or those about to convert, slaves in order to be freed, debtors, travellers, and warriors.21 Quranic texts and hadiths22 often exhort Muslims to do certain forms of charity, while also indicating the recompense one gets from it, such as the erasing of sins, and peace in the Hereafter. In the case of the care for orphans, for instance, a number of verses in the Quran promise the highest rewards for those who look after them.23 This embeddedness in Islamic prescriptions and

17 Misztal, 18 R.

Trust in Modern Societies, 15. Beekun and J. Badawi, The Leadership Process in Islam (Shippensburg, PA: Proteus,

1999). 19 A.W. Dusuki, “What Does Islam Say About Corporate Social Responsibility?,” Review of Islamic Economics 12, no. 1 (2008): 16. 20 Kaag, “Comparing Connectivities.” 21 J. Benthall and J. Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 10. 22 A collection of traditions containing sayings of the prophet Muhammad which, with accounts of his daily practice (the Sunna), constitute the major source of guidance for Muslims apart from the Quran. 23 J. Krafess, “The Influence of the Muslim Religion in Humanitarian Aid,” International Review of the Red Cross 87, no. 858 (2005): 327–342.

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recommendations thus has a clear influence on the agendas of the NGOs under study, as in the case of zakat, the destination of the funds is given while in other cases, donors often want their donations to be used for specific uses. The transnational Islamic solidarity as substantiated by the work of these Islamic charities thus requires a specific accountability towards the donors so as to ensure that the charity is beneficial (in material terms) to the target group but equally (in terms of blessing) to the donor. In other words, the donors need to be able to trust that their gifts will be used in such a way that it will bring them the baraka (blessing) that they aspire to. As a consequence of their dependence on funds, Gulf charities invest a lot in furthering and maintaining trustworthiness towards their donors. Trustworthiness can be defined as “the capacity to commit oneself to fulfilling the legitimate expectations of others.”24 The Islamic NGOs importantly show their trustworthiness by extensive media coverage of their activities, such as the distribution of clothes in an orphanage and the distribution of meat at the end of Ramadan25; banners indicate by which Saudi or Iranian organizations a particular event is sponsored, and images of these find their way back to the head offices and donors in the Gulf.26 Media coverage is not always directly directed to the donors. A Senegalese former regional director of a Saudi charity explained that most NGOs have a publication strategy and budget, with which they pay the per diems of local journalists to cover a particular event. The articles that appear in the local newspaper as a result are then sent to the head office; ‘the donors want to know whether their funds are well spent,’ he explained, ‘and coverage in local media is seen as a reliable proof.’ In our discussions with charity staff, we got the impression that the annual reports that are being produced27 are not so much for the donors, but mainly for proving their trustworthiness to secular stakeholders like 24 J. Dunn, “The Concept of ‘Trust’ in the Politics of John Locke,” in Philosophy in History, eds. R. Rorty, J.B. Schneewind and Q. Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 279–301, quoted in Misztal, Trust in Modern Societies, 12; see also Beekun and Badawi, The Leadership Process in Islam. 25 Kaag, “Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad.” 26 Sahla, In the Name of Geopolitics. 27 Generally, Islamic charities have engaged in a process of professionalization as part of post-9/11 measures but also as part of a process of professionalization of the NGO-sector worldwide since the 1990s.

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the host government, the state apparatus back home, and Western investigators. Generally, donors in the Gulf expect the organizations to be active in da’wa. The perception in the Gulf is that Muslims in Africa are in need of being (re)educated, as their religious practices would be contaminated by local customs.28 Furthermore, many people in the Gulf see Africa as a region where Islam still has great opportunities to expand29—therefore a focus on conversion is deemed important. When we visited Doha, Qatar, for instance, we found small stalls in public spaces where charities like Eid Charity tried to attract donors for projects in Africa; it was proudly ­indicated how many Africans the organization had already converted.

The Need for Trust Making in Local African Contexts Further down the charity chain, the creating of trust is equally important to let the system of Islamic transnational solidarity work; after all, the target groups are crucial to the charities for fulfilling the expectations of the donors (i.e. to deliver the baraka by well spending the funds).30 At first sight, in Muslim contexts in West-Africa, this does not seem that difficult, as their shared religion provides the basis for trust between these NGOs and their Muslim target population. That is what NGO staff mention, that is also what is replied by Senegalese, Chadian, and Ghanaian informants.31 An additional impetus is given by the fact that it 28 See also Westerlund, D. and E. E. Rosander, eds., African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters Between Sufis and Islamists (London: Hurst & Co, 1997); O.M. Kobo, Unveiling Modernity in Twentieth-Century West-African Islamic Reform (Leiden: Brill, 2012). 29 In line with view of the World Islamic Council, which as early as 1984 indicated Africa as ‘Land of Islam’ (Institut Pontifical d’Etudes Arabes, “Recommendations du 11ème séminaire Islamique Mondial sur l’Islam en Afrique,” Etudes arabes: feuilles de travail 66, no. 1 [1984]: 46–55). The President of the Shi’a Al-Mustafa University stated that “Shiism in Africa expands in ‘kilometre’ while in other areas expands in ‘millimetre’” (http://www.ahwazmonitor.info/articles/al-mustafa-international-university-globalizationof-shiism/). 30 Kaag, “Comparing Connectivities.” 31 Interestingly, this is also the perspective taken by several Western (secular and Christian) NGOs these last years; they have shown an eagerness to collaborate with Islamic organizations, as the latter would have a closer cultural proximity to Muslim target populations and would thus be able to deliver aid more effectively than these Western organizations themselves.

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is also often considered a moral obligation to trust one’s brother/sister in faith.32 Beyond the observation that a shared religion provides trust at a certain basic level, in practice we also found a lot of distrust in the collaboration of these charities and their target populations. What is more, we encountered a lot of frustration, exactly because the fact of having the same religion had raised expectations about behaviour and cultural proximity that in reality did not occur. In fact, the degree of cultural proximity between Islamic charities and their target groups very much depends on the local context. In Chad, for instance, there has been a process of Arabization, being defined here as an increased cultural orientation towards the Arab world expressed in the adoption of elements (e.g. language, styles of clothing, social and cultural values) of transnational Arab elite culture as a reference. There is a cultural proximity there, even despite the fact that many Muslims in Chad are Sufi.33 Also in Senegal, the large majority of Muslims is Sufi, but here the Sufi orders are far more prominent as identity markers than in Chad. Most Muslims belong to one of the main Sufi orders in the c­ountry, the Tijaniyya, the Qadriyya, and the Muridiyya. This adherence is characterized by close and personal bonds between the believers and their marabout (religious leader). Especially the Mourides express their ­religious fervour and their attachment to their marabout in very strong terms and in very visible ways. The Muridiyya is particular in as far as it is ‘home-grown’ and was founded by the Senegalese religious scholar Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba at the end of the nineteenth century. Not only among the Mourides but in Senegal in general, there is a strong sense of pride at being a Senegalese Muslim, a sense of self-respect. It makes that Senegalese normally will not easily accept others telling them how to practice their religion. Muslims with a salafi orientation, however, would consider Sufi forms of belief and practice bid’a (unlawful innovation), requiring religious re-education to be eliminated. From the foregoing, it is clear that there is little cultural proximity between most Senegalese Muslims and the Arab charities. There is a reformist minority in Senegal to which their message appeals however; they are mostly 32 See

also Misztal, Trust in Modern Societies; Kaag, “Trust, Mistrust and Co-operation.” is a broad current in Islamic belief and practice, in which Muslims seek to find divine truth and knowledge through direct personal experience of God. In this sense, Sufism could be seen as in contrast with more ­scripture-oriented currents in Islam. 33 Sufism

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indicated as being ‘Ibadou,’ a member of the Jama’at Ibadou Rahmane (The Association of the Servants of the most Merciful). The Saudi organization WAMY (World Association of Muslim Youth), for instance collaborates with the Senegalese reformist student organization UJMS (Union de la Jeunesse Musulmane du Sénégal), which is not officially part of the Ibadou movement but close to it.34 In general, in discourse both Gulf charities and Senegalese Muslims underline belonging to the umma uniting all Muslims, but in practice there is a lot of difference in how Islam is lived and expressed. Telling is the example of the distribution of meat at Islamic feasts like Tabaski (Aïd al-Kebir). Gulf charities usually distribute the meat of slaughtered animals; in Senegal, however, this is not well seen. A Senegalese country director thus lobbied to distribute animals rather than meat in order not to offend people’s pride. Other cultural differences concern ways of greeting (not shaking hands) and gender segregation. This latter observation can also be made for Ghana. In Ghana, Muslims make up 17.6% of the population,35 most of whom associate themselves with the Tijaniyya sufi order; The Senegalese Sheikh Ibrahime Niasse, who established his own zawiya (branch) in Kaolack, Senegal, has a particular large following in Ghana.36 After the establishment of diplomatic ties with Egypt (1957), Saudi Arabia (1960), and Iran (1974), Ghanaians could get scholarships for (religious) studies in these countries, and often returned as Salafi or Shi’a, which helped to promote these currents locally. In the beginning, they were accommodated by the Tijani Ghanaians, and their sermons attracted a lot of young people and also urban professionals who wanted to know if the Islam of the Arab world differed from that of Ghana. The emergence of a significant Wahhabi social movement, mostly people in their early twenties, partly had to do with the fact that the Wahhabi clerics also addressed poverty and other socio-economic problems facing Muslims in Ghana, topics that were largely ignored by the Tijaniyya established elite. They 34 A. Thurston, Why Is Militant Islam a Weak Phenomenon in Senegal? ISITA Working Paper no. 09-005 (Chicago: Buffet Center, Northwestern University, 2009). 35 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gh.html. 36 H. Weiss, Begging and Almsgiving in Ghana: Muslim Positions Towards Poverty and Distress (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007); R. Seesemann, The Divine Flood: Ibrahime Niasse and the Roots of a Twentieth-Century Sufi Revival (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Sahla, In the Name of Geopolitics.

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did not blame the post-colonial government for the bad conditions of the Ghanaian Muslims, however, but the Tijanis with their ceremonies that were considered flamboyant and superstitious and wasting a lot of resources.37 This and other anti-Sufi rhetoric led to increasing conflict, and sometimes violent disputes, between the Salafis and the Tijanniyya establishment. This inspired the Salafis to formalize the organizations they had formed by registering these. The adoption of a formal structure in Wahhabi institutions in the 1970s was a new practice in the Ghanaian Muslim religio-political landscape of which the Saudi Arabian NGOs could make use, as they funded their activities.38 The Shi’a were also accommodated by the Tijaniyya from the beginning, but they did not develop an openly hostile attitude against the latter, which facilitated their acceptance. Over the years, a number of Shi’a distanced themselves from the revolutionary ideas as promoted by Iran, instead favouring a ‘pristine’ form of Shi’ism.39 Apart from the religious and cultural differences discussed in the foregoing, there often is a sense of racism from the part of Arab staff of the charities that is strongly felt by many African Muslims in all three ­field-study countries. Black African Muslims may recognize that Saudi Arabia (for Sunnis), Iran, and Syria (for Shi’as) occupy a special status as constituting the cradle of Islam, but they strongly dismiss claims of authority on racial grounds. How do Gulf charities aim to establish trust in this context of distrust importantly based on cultural and racial difference, despite sharing a common religion? Bacharach and Gambetta point to the importance of readable signs for the creation of trust: “Sign reading is a fundamental part of deciding whether to trust. Correspondingly, the deliberate use of signs, or signalling, is a fundamental part of making oneself appear trustworthy.”40 (Expatriate) staff of Islamic charities for instance use ‘proper’ 37 Sahla,

In the Name of Geopolitics. Dumbe, “Islamic Polarisation and the Politics of Exclusion in Ghana: Tijaniyya and Salafist Struggles Over Muslim Orthodoxy,” Islamic Africa 10 (2019): 153–180. 39 This trend occurred also in Senegal, see M. Leichtman, “Revolution, Modernity and (Trans)National Shi’i Islam: Rethinking Religious Conversion in Senegal,” Journal of Religion in Africa 39, no. 3 (2009): 319–351; M. Leichtman, Shi’i Cosmopolitanisms in Africa: Lebanese Migration and Religious Conversion in Senegal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015). 40 M. Bacharach and D. Gambetta, “Trust in Signs,” in Trust in Society, ed. K. Cook (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 155. 38 Y.

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Islamic clothing to signal that they are good Muslims and capable of acting as a role model in local society. Also public manifestations of adhering to the five pillars of Islam can partly be seen in this light. Showing good relations with locally trusted and influential (religious) leaders also helps to increase trustworthiness. The Iranian embassy in Ghana, for instance, has a good relationship with the Office of the National Chief Imam (ONCI), who is a representative of the Tijaniyya. The Iranian Islamic university in Accra provides the ONCI every year with ten scholarships. More in general, there is a tendency among these charities to reach out to Africans with a (potentially) influential background. In Southern Chad, for instance, local community leaders were co-opted by offering trips to the Middle East and promises of building a community centre or a mosque if they would convert,41 while Saudi and Iranian universities in Ghana would target the children of influential Tijani leaders to study at their institutes.42 The idea is that through the conversion/education of these locally trusted and influential categories, access to a larger community of (potential) converts is being facilitated. We found that these charities’ outreach and efforts of creating trust are however itself hampered by a certain distrust towards Africans. This is for instance visible within the organizations themselves. There are examples of charities that (sometimes after lobbying by local brokers) have put local, or at least black Africans as country and regional directors, and informants claim that this indeed facilitated local acceptance. Most often, however, real influential positions like general or financial director are being reserved to non-locals. One Iranian informant in Ghana confirmed that Iranians do not trust Ghanaians, even when the latter have converted to Shi’a Islam. As he put it: “Ghanaians do anything for money, so carefulness is key.” If these Ghanaians would occupy influential positions with the Iranian charity, they would have access to sensitive information like the flows of Iranian money, which, in his view, would render the Iranian enterprise rather vulnerable. A Saudi informant complained about the African Wahhabis trivializing the activities of Iran and stated “The African brothers are too relaxed about this.” Remarkably, ­North-Africans, such as Moroccans and Tunisians, are often considered to be suitable country directors, because being the ideal middlemen;

41 Kaag, 42 Sahla,

“Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad.” In the Name of Geopolitics.

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they are both Arabs—and on that basis trusted by both the charities and their donors—and Africans—so capable of establishing trustful relationships with the local African population. Taking the perspective of the target population, we found that in a situation of poverty and marginality, one may despite feelings of distrust, still opt for trusting these charities as they are one of the few opportunities for getting help, getting that mosque, getting that well.43 We could call this trust as a strategy.44 This is in line with Gambetta who strongly states: “if we do not, we shall never find out: trust begins with keeping oneself open to evidence, acting as if one trusted, at least until more stable beliefs can be established on the basis of further information. […] Being wrong is an inevitable part of the wager, of the learning process strung between success and disappointment, where only if we are prepared to endure the latter can we hope to enjoy the former.”45 In this case, trusting as a strategy is more a bet of people who have little to lose and see a small opportunity to win. This may seem to imply a large room of manoeuvre for the Gulf charities, because if people have little to lose, they appear to be largely inclined to act as if they trust the charity and respond to the latter’s outreach. We however also found that if the organization does not keep its promises, there is yet a negative counter-effect in the sense that people feel their trust being betrayed.46 This has its repercussions in the form of negative publicity (this can be in the form of gossip, local talk) and concomitant loss of trustworthiness in larger (local) society. In southern Chad, for instance, people were promised a mosque after conversion, but when this did not materialize, people started to talk bitterly, and some people converted back to Christianity. In Ghana, a Saudi-sponsored NGO had managed to convert a chief, who gave the organization a piece of land in order to build an Islamic university. The plan was that Saudi philanthropists would finance this university. The laying of the foundation stone would be done in 2014, but in 2018, it appeared that no stone had been put yet, let alone the establishment of the university. The Ghanaian manager was highly indignant at the Saudi sponsors, since they did not fulfil their promises. 43 See

for instance Kaag, “Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad” for Southern Chad. also Kaag, “Trust, Mistrust and Co-operation.” 45 Gambetta, Trust, 227. 46 See also G. Turnaturi, Betrayals: The Unpredictability of Human Relations. Translated by Lydia G. Cochrane (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007). 44 See

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Another Ghanaian informant was also highly critical of some sponsors and said: “Arab countries promise a lot, but do not always fulfil their promise. They (sheikhs from Arab countries) visit us, listen to us and cry with us. They promise a lot but do not fulfil their promises. I also sent them a video of their visit to Ghana, with their image crying. But even this does not help.” Despite this, he remained optimistic. “There are a lot of people who invest. Especially Lebanese businessmen. They are successful and very generous.”47 This brings us to the competition between different providers of aid, which is the subject of the next section.

Facing Distrust in the Global Aid and Geopolitical Arena Gulf charities have been an actor and a means in the global geopolitical arena from the start of their transnational engagement in the 1970s. In this respect, their emergence can on the one hand be related to the competition between the West and the Arab World,48 on the other hand to the competition within the Islamic World.49 Both struggles have been important until the present day, be it that positions and the focus of rivalry have regularly shifted. In addition, religious and geopolitical competition often appear as intertwined. The competition in the intra-Islamic arena can be illustrated by the establishment, in 1962, of the World Islamic League, of which IIROSA later became the humanitarian branch, by King Faysal of Saudi Arabia in order to counter the influence of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s p ­ an-Arabism.50 The latter gained substantial backing in sub-Saharan Africa by supporting the pan-African approach of African leaders like Nkrumah in Ghana. The death of Nasser in 1970 placed King Faysal in a stronger position, but the Iranian revolution in 1979 added new complexity.51 During the reign of Shah Pahlavi in Iran, the Saudi and Iranian regimes had shared common goals: defeating communism and opposing 47 Sahla,

In the Name of Geopolitics. and B ­ ellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent. 49 A.-R. Ghandour, Jihad Humanitaire: Enquête sur les ONG Islamiques (Paris: Flammarion, 2002); Z.V. Wright, Living Knowledge in West-African Islam: The Sufi Community of Ibrahim Niasse (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2015). 50 Wright, Living Knowledge in West-African Islam. 51 Kobo, Unveiling Modernity. 48 Benthall

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republicanism. They both funded Islamic groups to preach religion in order to counter godless communism; in addition, they were both members of the OPEC. This good relation came to an end when Ayatollah Khomeini assumed power and challenged the position of Saudi Arabia and its Islamic credentials. The Saudis in turn took a more pro-active anti-Shi’a and anti-Iranian approach in their foreign policy in order to counter Iran’s revolutionary message. After some relaxation in the relationships between the two countries during subsequent more moderate leaders, polarization has raised since 2005, and especially since 2015, when a nuclear agreement led to the lifting of international sanctions on Iran and made it a serious competitor with Saudi Arabia for regional leadership—which coincided with the rise of the ambitious crown prince Mohamed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia. Both countries have supported da’wa in West-Africa, among others through their embassies and by charities like IIROSA (Saudi Arabia) and the World Ahlul-Bait Foundation (Iran) and have thus contributed to the expansion of Salafi/ Wahhabi and Shi’a Islam respectively. While the competition between these two countries has recently got a lot of attention by political analysts and in the media,52 it should be noted that also within Salafi and Shi’a circles, there is difference that may result in competition when geopolitics gets mingled in. In the Shi’a community, for example, competition and rivalry may arise between Lebanese and Iran funded-organizations.53 Within the Salafi community, Wahhabi and adherents to the Muslim Brotherhood have collaborated but have also been in competition with one another.54 In the foregoing, we already mentioned Gulf charities’ efforts to display their trustworthiness towards their donors by showing that their activities conform to what the Quran and hadiths indicate as bringing blessing. In the same vein, they may try to show their reliability by explicitly positioning themselves in the intra-Islam arena. Thus, Saudi organizations report that they fight the Shi’a ‘danger’ in Africa, while Iranian reports do not so much refer to a Wahhabi enemy but state that 52 See for instance P. Raymond and J. Watling, “The Iranian-Saudi Proxy Wars Come to Mali,” Foreign Affairs, 19 August 2015; B. Hubbard and M. El Sheikh, “Wikileaks Shows a Saudi Obsession with Iran,” New York Times, 16 July 2015. 53 Sahla, In the Name of Geopolitics; see also Leichtman, Shi’i Cosmopolitanisms in Africa. 54 Ghandour 2002; Sahla, In the Name of Geopolitics.

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their duty is to export the Iranian revolution and further refer to the need to advance Iran’s position in the world.55 Sahla’s research has particularly focused on how Islamic charities from diverse background, but especially Sunni Saudi and Shi’a Iranian organizations, deal with competitors—in the global geopolitical arena but also in the local African context. One of their strategies is to exploit mutual mistrust between their competitor and local actors, as a kind of tactics of divide et impera.56 Local actors, in their turn, may be able to exploit the mutual mistrust between the Saudi and Iranian organizations to further their own agenda. In Ghana, for instance, the recent stepped-up engagement of Saudi organizations as a result of the increased presence of Iranian influence in Ghana is a welcome opportunity for local reformist organizations to have more funds for their activities, where formerly they complained that the Saudi did not take them seriously and did not fulfil their promises. A Ghanaian director thus told a Saudi visitor who came to enquire about Iranian activities in the area, that he needed money for establishing an Islamic university so that Ghanaian students would not be obliged to go to an Iran-funded Islamic university.57 In the foregoing section, we argued that signalling is important in the trust-making endeavours by these charities. Interestingly, a strategy we also found quite often in the field was trying not to show face, keeping a low profile, and operate by way of various different organizations, which upon closer examination, appeared to be intertwined—this in order to confuse both adversaries or competitors in the geopolitical arena and local parties. In these cases, signalling is not clear-cut, but blurred on purpose. Competition between Islamic and Christian organizations has also been a clear motivation for Islamic aid from the start. Thus, Ahmed found that for Islamic missionary organizations, Christian missions serve as the main opponent and a role model to be imitated when it comes to methods and strategies of conversion.58 Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 55 H. Dai, “Al Mustafa University, Iran’s Global Network of Islamic Schools,” Iranian American Forum, 12 April 2016; Sahla, In the Name of Geopolitics. 56 See also Gambetta 1988, Trust, 218. 57 Sahla, In the Name of Geopolitics. 58 C. Ahmed, “Networks of Islamic NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Bilal Muslim Mission, African Muslim Agency (Direct Aid), and al-Haramayn,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, no. 3 (2009): 426–437.

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also describe the coming into being of Islamic NGOs as a reaction to the presence of western NGOs.59 We also encountered this perspective of the humanitarian arena during our own research—especially in transitional zones between Muslim and Christian dominated areas, such as in Ghana and in Chad, the competition between Islam and Christian NGOs is quite fierce. In southern Chad, for instance, Christian missions and Islamic NGOs were really working against one another, be it with little direct confrontation between the Christian and Islamic organizations themselves but by each trying to influence and ‘win’ the local population. An informant in Chad related that in the 1990s, some higher placed individuals had started a lobby in the Gulf states to attract Islamic charities. They organized meetings and conferences in which it was explained that Chad is a poor country in need of material, social, and cultural support. One of the arguments they used was: “The Christian organisations do not wait until they are invited, so why should you?” and this had apparently been rather successful as a call. In Ghana, the Al Huda Islamic Society was created in 1991, led by two Ghanaian graduates from Saudi universities, in order to counter Christian missionary activities. Especially after 9/11, however, Gulf charities have been facing distrust globally and especially in the West, when they became a target in the ‘War on Terror’ instigated by the Bush administration. While Islamic NGOs had been accused of promoting and supporting terrorism from the early 1990s onwards in countries like Afghanistan, the Palestinian Territories, Pakistan, Bosnia, and Kenya,60 the accusations became more general and serious after 9/11, and the allegations and slandering contributed to a real witch-hunt. Restrictive measures taken by their own and foreign governments have made it increasingly difficult for Islamic charities in the Middle East to execute their work in other settings than their home countries. Blacklisting and tight control of financial flows have led to a reduction of the number of transnational Islamic charities working in Africa, while the ones still in operation experienced severe cutbacks in their funding. In addition, as elaborated elsewhere,61 transnational Islamic charities are facing increased vulnerability at the local

59 Benthall

and Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent. and B ­ ellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent. 61 Kaag, “Gulf Charities in Africa.” 60 Benthall

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level in Africa, as accusations of terrorism against Gulf charities have become a means in local struggles over political and religious influence. Gulf charities have tried to counter this increased distrust by diverse strategies. Thus, some organizations have tried to become less visible as Islamic organizations. The Kuwaiti organization AMA (African Muslims’ Agency), for instance, decided not to operate under that name anymore but to use the name of its mother organization, Direct Aid, instead. The phenomenon of Islamic NGOs no longer presenting themselves as Islamic organizations seems to be a trend as it is also observable among other Islamic charities, which tend to transform, at least in name, into more general humanitarian organizations and advertise their Islamic projects as side activities. In other instances, transnational charities have officially ended their activities and left the country, but in fact continue their activities under the umbrella of a local organization, as local organizations appear to be more trustworthy both to local/national officials and Western eyes. Third, transnational Islamic charity has also sought new non–institutionalized channels by way of personal connections and networks. African students who studied in the Gulf are pivotal in this dynamic as trustworthy local brokers. It may be clear that ‘signalling’ as defined by Bacharach and Gambetta in order to lessen distrust and to show one’s trustworthiness is important in this arena, too. Al-Muntada, a London-based charity funded from Saudi Arabia ran into trouble in several African countries in the mid-2000s, including Nigeria and Chad62 and was obliged to leave ­ these countries. In Chad as well as in Ghana, nevertheless, the organization has continued to function by way of a local organization. The local affiliation has clearly been meant to signal trustworthiness towards the Ghanaian government and the local population in general. Puzzling, however, was that the sign on the local organization’s office (Firdous Foundation) in Accra still indicated almuntada101@gmail. com as its email address. This may just be neglect or inattention, but could also be an expression of sending signals of trustworthiness to different audiences. At our second meeting, the AMA country director in Chad appeared in a suit and even a tie (which was visibly uncomfortable because of the extreme heat during that time of the year), which he most probably considered a better sign of trustworthiness to a Western 62 Weiss, Begging and Almsgiving in Ghana; Kaag, “Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad.”

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researcher than the Islamic dress he had worn the first time when I had entered the premises of the charity without prior announcement. At this point, it is important to note that in our research, our own signalling appeared to be important, too, as we also navigated this politicized landscape as perceived representatives of geopolitical and religious entities. We dressed as modest Islamic women, covering our heads and bodies more than we used to do outside of the field research context, in order to show that we were trustworthy interlocutors. This worked in the beginning, but in the course of our research, doubts started to rise, particularly among informants from the Gulf countries, whether our signs were indeed to be trusted.63 Indeed, particularly in Sahla’s case, people felt betrayed (as they had trusted her better also because of her theological knowledge and mastering of Arabic, while expectations of Kaag as a Dutch woman had been lower from the start) “If trust is blind (the signs are outstandingly convincing), it may constitute rather an incentive to deception.”64 And: “Sometimes, however, it is not certain that signs of trust-warranting properties are to be trusted. Herein lies what we call the ‘secondary problem of trust.’”65 Navigating the geopolitical arena of (Islamic) aid thus remains a challenge for all stakeholders, donors, expatriate staff, local employees, target populations, and researchers alike.

Discussion: Trust and Trust Making in Research on Gulf Charities in Africa The preceding sections show the importance of trust in the analysis of these charities in Africa in diverse ways. Thus, several interrelated roles of trust can be deduced: first of all, trust functions as a social lubricant, in this particular case in the sense of facilitating aid relations. We have argued that a shared religion creates basic trust that facilitates the relationship of the charities with local Muslims to a certain extent. Secondly, we have seen that trust as a value is also important for understanding people’s behaviour in these aid relationships. The idea that one should trust a fellow Muslim, for instance, was strongly expressed by various 63 See

also Bacharach and Gambetta 2001. Trust, 217. 65 Bacharach and Gambetta, “Trust in Signs,” 156. 64 Gambetta,

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informants. Thirdly, we have pointed to the importance of trust as a strategy: despite cultural and racial distrust, both Africans and expatriate staff of Gulf charities may decide to trust their interlocutors, as this may be the best option in a given situation (e.g. for having access to aid, or to strategic partnerships). Interestingly, it appears that various forms of trust and distrust may work together but also may work against one another: so religious trust may be counteracted by cultural and/or racial distrust, which indeed was often the case. It seems that religious trust is not so much undermined by distrust in other areas, but that yet in combination they have an influence on people’s behaviour. Here, the concepts of institutional trust and interpersonal trust may come in as explanatory variables; the institutional trust in religion appears quite high and durable, but distrust and negative experiences/betrayal of trust may affect interpersonal trust. We have further aimed to underline that trust is not only something that exists as a social fact, as a characteristic of social relations, but is also something that should be actively pursued, particularly in an unfamiliar and insecure environment—hence our attention for strategies of trust making by these charities in local African and global geopolitical settings. In this framework, it can be observed that trust making towards one audience may contribute to distrust from another audience, which necessitates multiplex trust-making strategies and navigating complex webs of expectations. There also seems to be a tension between the urge to send clear signals of trustworthiness to specific audiences and the need not to show face and keep options open in an insecure and ever-changing environment. This all is complexified by modern mass/social media: these are valuable means for showing trustworthiness (and are readily used as such by many Islamic organizations), yet it proves difficult to control who the audience is. Finally, we think it important to consider power dynamics in the establishing and working of (religious) trust. The role of power appears to be multi-faceted. In the case of these charities, it can be observed that their concern is generally more with their trustworthiness towards the donors than towards the local population (upward accountability ­versus downward accountability), as they depend on their donors for their functioning. In relation to the target groups, religious authority, for instance on the basis of having studied at Al-Azhar University in Egypt or Al-Madina in Saudi Arabia, has been important to establish trust in charitative actors and their messages. Nevertheless, while expatriate staff

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from the Gulf have often radiated religious as well as cultural and racial superiority and displayed power by (the promise of) means, local stakeholders have been able to play upon the formers’ distrust against other geopolitical players and have been able to further their own agendas by presenting themselves as trustworthy local partners. It may be clear that the foregoing discussion of Islamic charities’ strategies of trust making has not been exhaustive. In fact, we feel that it has just been a start and that much more insights could be delved by applying the prism of trust and distrust to the transnational aid chain in which these Gulf charities are an important actor. More attention could for instance be paid to cultural aspects of trust and trust making and possible differences in this between the Middle East and Africa, the interplay between personal and institutional trust,66 the role of diverse (social) media in creating trust and distrust, and how signals of trustworthiness are put to use and perceived. It should be noted, as we also argued elsewhere,67 that much of what has been argued here for Islamic charities from the Gulf region concerning trust making and the politics of aid, is also valuable for the analysis of Western secular and Christian aid organizations. We are aware of the fact that critics have argued that trust is too elusive a concept and that, in the analysis of social phenomena, one can easily do without trust. Yet, trust and distrust do inform people’s behaviour, and people—as we experienced in our research—also frequently motivate their (and others’) actions by referring to trust and distrust. For this reason of lived reality alone, a more thorough reflection on the workings of trust is worthwhile. In addition, we feel that looking at questions of trust may add an important layer to the analysis of, among others, collaboration and partnerships, political strategies, and the functioning of networks like the ones that are the object of our studies, as it enables one to go beyond that what is directly visible on the spot and to consider its embeddedness in larger social processes and mechanisms of expectation and reciprocity, among others.

66 See

also Kaag, “Trust, Mistrust and Co-operation.” “Islamic Charities from the Arab World in Africa”; M. Kaag and M. Ocadiz, “A Plea for Kaleidoscopic Knowledge Production,” in Researching South-South Development Cooperation: Critical Reflections on the Politics of Knowledge Production, eds. A.E. Fourie, E. Mawdsley and W. Nauta (London: Routledge, 2019), 81–91. 67 Kaag,

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Bibliography Ahmed, C. “Networks of Islamic NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Bilal Muslim Mission, African Muslim Agency (Direct Aid), and al-Haramayn.” Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, no. 3 (2009): 426–437. Alpes, M.J. “Why Aspiring Migrants Trust Migration Brokers: The Moral Economy of Departure in Anglophone Cameroon.” Africa 87, no. 2 (2017): 304–321. Bacharach, M. and D. Gambetta. “Trust in Signs.” In Trust in Society, ed. K. Cook, 148–184. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001. Bayart, J.F. L’Etat en Afrique: La politique du ventre. Paris: Fayard, 1998. Beekun, R. and J. Badawi. The Leadership Process in Islam. Shippensburg, PA: Proteus, 1999. Bellagamba, A. “Entrustment and Its Changing Political Meanings in Fuladu, the Gambia (1880–1994).” Africa 74, no. 3 (2004): 383–410. Benthall, J. and J. Bellion-Jourdan. The Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003. Cooper, E. “Sitting and Standing: How Families Are Fixing Trust in Uncertain Times.” Africa 82, no. 3 (2012): 437–456. Dai, H. “Al Mustafa University, Iran’s Global Network of Islamic Schools.” Iranian American Forum, 12 April 2016. Dusuki, A.W. “What Does Islam Say About Corporate Social Responsibility?” Review of Islamic Economics 12, no. 1 (2008): 5–18. Dziwornu Ablo, A. and R. Overa. “Networks, Trust, and Capital Mobilisation: Challenges of Embedded Local Entrepreneurial Strategies in Ghana’s Oil and Gas Industry.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 53, no. 3 (2015): 391–413. Elster, J. The Cement of Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Erlich, A. and N. Kerr. “The Local ‘Mwananci’ Has Lost Trust: Design, Transition and Legitimacy in Kenyan Election Management.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 54, no. 4 (2016): 671–702. Fukuyama, F. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. London: Penguin, 1995. Gambetta, D. Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988. Ghandour, A.-R. Jihad Humanitaire: Enquête sur les ONG Islamiques. Paris: Flammarion, 2002. Giddens, A. The Consequences of Modernity. Blackwood: Polity Press, 1995. Hart, K. “Kinship, Contract, and Trust: The Economic Organization of Migrants in an African City Slum.” In Trust: Making and Breaking Co-operative Relations, ed. D. Gambetta, 176–193. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.

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Hubbard, B. and M. El Sheikh. “Wikileaks Shows a Saudi Obsession with Iran.” New York Times, 16 July 2015. Institut Pontifical d’Etudes Arabes. “Recommendations du 11ème séminaire Islamique Mondial sur l’Islam en Afrique.” Etudes arabes: feuilles de travail 66, no. 1 (1984): 46–55. Kaag, M. “Trust, Mistrust and Co-operation in a Senegalese Rural Community.” In Trust and Co-operation Symbolic Exchange and Moral Economics in an Age of Cultural Differentiation, eds. P. Smets, H. Wels and J. Van Loon, 83–96. Amsterdam: Spinhuis, 1999. Kaag, M. “Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad: Islamic Solidarity in the Age of Neoliberalism.” Africa Today 54, no. 3 (2008): 3–18. Kaag, M. “Comparing Connectivities: Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad and Senegal.” In The Social Life of Connectivity in Africa, eds. M. De Brujin and R. van Dijk, 183–201. New York: Macmillan, 2012. Kaag, M. “Gulf Charities in Africa.” In Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the ‘Age of Terror’ and Beyond, eds. J. Benthall and R. Lacey, 79–94. London and Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2014. Kaag, M. “Islamic Charities from the Arab World in Africa: Intercultural Encounters of Humanitarianism and Morality.” In Humanitarianism and Challenges of Cooperation, eds. V. M. Heins, K. Koddenbrock and C. Unrau, 155–167. London: Routledge, 2016. Kaag, M. and M. Ocadiz. “A Plea for Kaleidoscopic Knowledge Production.” In Researching South-South Development Cooperation: Critical Reflections on the Politics of Knowledge Production, eds. A. E. Fourie, E. Mawdsley and W. Nauta, 81–91. London: Routledge, 2019. Kobo, O.M. Unveiling Modernity in Twentieth-Century West-African Islamic Reform. Leiden: Brill, 2012. Krafess, J. “The Influence of the Muslim Religion in Humanitarian Aid.” International Review of the Red Cross 87, no. 858 (2005): 327–342. Leichtman, M. “Revolution, Modernity and (Trans)National Shi’i Islam: Rethinking Religious Conversion in Senegal.” Journal of Religion in Africa 39, no. 3 (2009): 319–351. Leichtman, M. Shi’i Cosmopolitanisms in Africa: Lebanese Migration and Religious Conversion in Senegal. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015. Levitt, J. “Pre-intervention Trust-Building. African States and Enforcing the Peace: The Case of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone.” Liberian Studies Journal 24, no. 1 (1999): 1–26. Luhmann, N. Trust and Power, eds. T. Burns and G. Poggi. New York: Wiley, 1979.

84  M. KAAG AND S. SAHLA Luhmann, N. “Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives.” In Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. D. Gambetta, 94–107. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988. Misztal, B. Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Basis of Social Order. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996. Osei, A. “Elites and Democracy in Ghana: A Social Network Approach.” African Affairs 114, no. 457 (2015): 529–554. Raymond, P. and J. Watling. “The Iranian-Saudi Proxy Wars Come to Mali.” Foreign Affairs, 19 August 2015. Sahla, S. In the Name of Geopolitics: The Proxy-War Between Saudi-Arabia and Iran in Ghana by Means of Islamic NGOs. Unpublished Research Master’s Thesis African Studies, Leiden University, 2018. Seesemann, R. The Divine Flood: Ibrahime Niasse and the Roots of a ­Twentieth-Century Sufi Revival. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Shapiro, B.M. “Building Trust and Playing Hardball: Contrasting Negotiating Styles in South-Africa’s Transition to Democracy.” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 12, no. 3 (2012): 33–52. Thurston, A. Why Is Militant Islam a Weak Phenomenon in Senegal? ISITA Working Paper no. 09-005. Chicago: Buffet Center, Northwestern University, 2009. Turnaturi, G. Betrayals: The Unpredictability of Human Relations. Translated by Lydia G. Cochrane. London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007. Von Oppen, A. Terms of Trade and Terms of Trust: The History and Contexts of Pre-colonial Market Production Around the Upper Zambezi and Kasai. Munster: Lit Verlag, 1994. Weiss, H. Begging and Almsgiving in Ghana: Muslim Positions Towards Poverty and Distress. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007. Westerlund, D. and E.E. Rosander, eds. African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters Between Sufis and Islamists. London: Hurst & Co, 1997. Wright, Z.V. Living Knowledge in West-African Islam: The Sufi Community of Ibrahim Niasse. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015. Zakaria, Y. Entrepreneurial Ethics and Trust: Cultural Foundations and Networks in the Nigerian Plastic Industry. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999.

Charity, ONG-Ization and Emergent Ethics of Volunteerism: The Case of Islamic NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire Marie Nathalie LeBlanc Introduction Drawing on ethnographic field research conducted in the cities of Bouaké and Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire between 2011 and 2017, in this chapter, I examine the recent growth and institutionalization of Islamic voluntary, humanitarian and charity actions. The past two decades have been marked by the multiplication of formal and legally recognized local Islamic NGOs (INGO) in the country. In this chapter, I propose to focus the discussion on two aspects of the transformation of Islamic charity work into formal INGOs, namely processes of ONG-ization and their impact on Islamic charity work, and the emergent ethics of voluntarism that stems out of the institutionalization of Islamic charity work. First, the recent multiplication of INGOs in Côte d’Ivoire fits with global processes relating to the ONG-ization of civil society actors and

M. N. LeBlanc (*)  Département de sociologie, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montreal, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 H. Weiss (ed.), Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38308-4_4

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social movements1; such neoliberal processes include the professionalization of associative milieus and the appropriation of technical know-how developed in the context of international development and humanitarian aid.2 Furthermore, the activities and orientations of INGOs tend to converge with neoliberal development logics that prioritize private entrepreneurship and transfer responsibilities for humanitarian assistance to communities and individuals. Nonetheless, while local INGOs attempt to fit with professionalizing criteria required to have access to development programmes’ funds and policy planning (at the national and international levels), their actions are framed within local notions of piety and reflect how religious actors have gained significant influence on the logics of development. In the second place, I will show how the interspersing of neoliberal logics of ONG-ization and religious worldview has set the scene for the construction of an emerging ethic of voluntarism.3 Such an ethic can be thought about in parallel, among others, to Didier Fassin’s notion of a “humanitarian reason”,4 which attempts to grasp contemporary, globally shared “will-to-care” in the face of neoliberal images of suffering.5 As such “humanitarianism” corresponds to the insertion of human sentiments into social and political affairs. While contemporary Ivorian INGOs’ ethic of volunteerism partly reproduces such globally shared ideas of humanitarianism, they also build on older-standing Islamic charitable actions based on religious principles of almsgiving, including zakat and sadaqa donations as well as institution-regulated charity such as waqfs. Moreover, the emergent ethics of volunteerism emphasizes values of self-responsibilization, individual accountability and long-term development. Finally, while the empirical data discussed 1 D. Freeman, ed., Pentecostalism and Development Churches, NGOs and Social Change in Africa (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); M. Giovannoni et al., “Agir à la place – et en dépit – de l’État: ONG et associations de la société civile à Kinshasa,” in Ordre et désordre à Kinshasa, ed. T. Trefon (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004), 119–134; J. Hearn, “The NGO-Isation of Kenyan Society: USAID and the Restructuring of Healthcare,” Review of African Political Economy 25, no. 75 (1998): 89–100. 2 M.N. LeBlanc and L. Audet Gosselin, Faith and Charity: Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2016). 3 LeBlanc and Audet Gosselin, Faith and Charity. 4 D. Fassin, La raison humanitaire. Une histoire morale du temps présent (Paris: Seuil, 2010). 5 S.S. Reid-Henry, “Humanitarianism as Liberal Diagnostic: Humanitarian Reasons and the Political Rationalities of Liberal Will-to-Care,” Transactions 39, no. 3 (2014): 418–431.

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in this chapter focuses on local INGOs, the discussion highlights the need to analyse the actions and positioning of INGOs in parallel to other religious NGOs, especially Catholic and Evangelical ones, to the same extent that local and transnational NGOs cannot be examined separately. * * * After a few years of absence from the field due to the ­politico-military conflict in Côte d’Ivoire (2002–2011), when returning to the city of Bouaké for field research in 2008, I was surprised to encounter so many local INGOs. I had not been in the country for about six years. To my amazement, neighbourhood-based Islamic associations with which I had worked for more than a decade and which had been so energetic in the 1990s were much less active. Among these civil society actors, the buzz was around the creation and the financing of local INGOs. Several of my acquaintances and active members of Islamic associations (mosque associations, women Islamaya ton,6 youth associations, teachers’ associations, etc.) had created or were creating INGOs. While locally based INGOs had started to appear in the 1990s in the context of political liberalization and the restructuring of Muslim and Islamic associations, they were mainly situated in Abidjan and remained very few until the civil war.7 In fact, alongside the country’s long journey from civil war to relative stability, Muslim organizations in Bouaké, and elsewhere in the country, were in the midst of their own process of transformation when I returned to the field in 2008. This situation is what prompted the course of my work on the sociopolitical context of the emergence of locally initiated religious NGOs in West Africa,8 with an explicit interest for the ways in which these 6 Women’s

Islamic associations in the Dioula language. Binaté, “Muslim NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire: Towards an Islamic Culture of Charity,” in Faith and Charity: Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa, eds. M.N. LeBlanc and L. Audet Gosselin (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 47–62; M.N. LeBlanc, “Precarious Agency in the Face of ‘Good Governance’: The NGO-Isation of Muslim Women’s Associations in Côte d’Ivoire,” in Faith and Charity: Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa, eds. M.N. LeBlanc and L. Audet Gosselin (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 85–104. 8 Despite the ambivalent status of religious associations and national differences regarding the recognition of NGOs, I use this term rather than “faith-based organizations” (FBOs), for two reasons: first, the term NGO captures the spirit of the expansion of NGOs and the logics of ONG-ization that is associated with it, and second, the expression “FBO” is often not appreciated in Islamic milieus due to its historical ties with Evangelical organizations. 7 I.

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organizations weave together practices and discourses stemming out of official public development and humanitarian milieus and faith-related issues. Consequently, my work on religious NGOs centred on the relationship between religious values and lifeworlds, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, development and humanitarian practices. Considering that most world religions have an ideology of solidarity, charity and social participation, the concern is to understand why and under which historical conditions religious values come to be an important inspiration for people to engage in development and humanitarian aid. The research programme, which came out of these initial observations and on which this chapter is based looked at religious NGOs in more general terms (Islamic, Evangelical and Catholic ones) in four francophone West African countries: Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire,9 resulting in the publication of Faith and Charity: Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa.10 The issue of the relationship between religion and development has been central to the literature on the Global South for close to two decades now, especially in the context of the Reagan presidency in the United States when the born-again Christian right was highly mobilized.11 The Westernbased secularist and modernist notion of development, which assumed that religion would disappear from the public sphere, had certainly contributed to the lack of attention for the roles of religious organizations in the literature on humanitarian and development aid. After decades of exclusion

9 This research programme was funded by the Social Sciences Research Council of Canada (Religion, société civile et développement, SSHRC, 2011–2015). 10 LeBlanc and Audet Gosselin, Faith and Charity. 11 See further P. Berger, ed., The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Washington, DC: Grand Rapids, 1999); J. Berger, “Religious Nongovernmental Organizations: An Explanatory Analysis,” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 14, no. 1 (2003): 15–39; B. Bompani and M. Frahm-Arp, eds., Development and Politics from Below. Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); G. Clarke, “Faith Matters: Faith-Based Organizations, Civil Society and International Development,” Journal of International Development 18 (2006): 835–848; W.R. Tyndale, ed., Visions of Development: Faith-Based Initiatives (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); J. Haynes, Religion and Development: Conflict or Cooperation? (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); K. Marshall and M. Van Saanen, Development and Faith: Where Mind, Heart and Soul Work Together (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2007); G. Clarke and M. Jennings, eds., Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

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from political and development analysis, a renewed interest for the role of religion in public life has stimulated and legitimized research on faithbased NGOs. Nonetheless, it remains that a significant portion of that literature examines the relationship between religion and development mainly through the analysis of the effectiveness of service delivery and by producing functional categorizations of these religious organizations.12 Furthermore, after 9/11, when religion had become a key focus in political analysis, the study of the roles of INGO became a central topic in the literature on religion and development. A significant portion of that literature focuses on the interplay between, on the one hand, development and humanitarian stakes, and, on the other hand, proselytizing efforts. One of the central issues addressed in the literature on INGOs has been their relationship to recent processes of Islamization and, for some authors like Gandhour to jihadism.13 Generally, the literature ties the emergence of INGOs and expansion of Islamic charitable sector in sub-Saharan Africa with, on the one hand, the raise of Islamist movements in the 1970s and the oil bonanza, and on the other hand, the neoliberal downsizing of the state.14 Despite the significance of global forces at work, internal dynamics tied to local political and social contexts also need to be taken into consideration. More specifically, in this chapter, I propose to examine the local structures of Islamic charity and the meaning of charitable giving that stems out of Islamic organizations and their humanitarian initiatives in Côte d’Ivoire, with a focus on the meaning and transformation of zakat practices. The Ivorian case raises a number of issues that extend beyond the local context, namely, on the one hand, the recent restructuring of Islamic charity fields that relates to how processes of ONGization have had an impact on Islamic charity work, and, on the other hand, the emergent ethics of volunteerism that stems out of the institutionalization of Islamic charity work and which brings up competing notions of charitable giving. 12 Bompani

and Frahm-Arp, Development and Politics from Below, 3. Ghandour, Jihad humanitaire. Enquête sur les ONG islamiques (Paris: Flammarion, 2002). 14 B. Challand, “Comparative Perspective on the Growth and Legal Transformation of Arab (Islamic) Charities,” in Charities in the Non-Western World. The Development and Regulation of Indigenous and Islamic Charities, eds. R.A. Brown and J. Pierce (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2013), 293–310. 13 A.-R.

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Islamic NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire—An Historical Perspective Muslims and the State in Côte d’Ivoire In order to fully grasp the national context of the emergence and multiplication of INGOs in Côte d’Ivoire at the turn of the twenty-first century, it is necessary to examine the roles of demographic dynamics in the construction of the post-colonial Ivorian state, as well as the 1990s’ context of political and social liberalization and the dynamics of revitalization of the national Muslim community from the 1990s onwards. The socio-demographic make-up of post-colonial Côte d’Ivoire largely stemmed out of French colonial economic policies. The French colonial administration set up a plantation economy in the Southern part of the country that relied heavily on the forced labour of populations from contemporary Burkina Faso and Mali, and migration coming from the Northern regions of Côte d’Ivoire and outside of the country’s borders. The movement of population towards the South of the country continued in the post-colonial period, resulting in a demographic picture in which foreign-born individuals made up 24.2 per cent of the total population according to the 2014 census.15 Ethnically, the country is said to count up to more than 60 different ethnic groups. According to the last national census (2014), the religious make-up of the country is as follows: 42.9% Muslim; 17.2% Catholics; 11.8% Evangelists; 4.8% other Christians; 3.6% animists; 0.5% other religions; and, 19.1% no declared religion.16 Muslims originated mainly from the Northern regions of the country (around the towns of Kong, Odienné, Khorogo, Boundiali, Tengrela, Ferkessédougo) and from international migration (mainly from Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Senegal). At the time of the 2014 census, 72.7% of foreigners in Côte d’Ivoire were Muslims.17

15 INS, http://www.ins.ci/n/documents/RGPH2014_expo_dg.pdf, consulted 29 June 2019. 16 INS, http://www.ins.ci/n/documents/RGPH2014_expo_dg.pdf, consulted 29 June 2019. 17 INS, http://www.ins.ci/n/documents/RGPH2014_expo_dg.pdf.

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While religious, ethnic and national identities have had sporadic impacts on sociopolitical relations in the country up to the 1990s,18 the 1990 election marked a moment when foreigners, Muslims and northerners were politically and socially amalgamated,19 and when debates regarding national identity (politically evoked as ivoirité) were heightened and largely led to the 2002 politico-military crisis.20 It is in the context of the first m ­ ulti-party elections in 1990 (prompted by structural adjustment measures and the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s) that debates regarding ivoirité became central to electoral and political processes; these debates were amplified by the succession crisis that followed the death of first president Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1994, opposing Henri Konan Bédié (president between 1993 and 1999) and Alassane Dramane Ouattara (current president, since the 2010 election). In the 1990 context of debates regarding ivoirité, Alassane Ouattara’s potential candidacy as president of the republic was contested on the grounds of his ­ethno-national origin associating him with the northern regions and the Muslim population.21 The Gbagbo presidency (from 2000 to 2010) is associated with the politico-military conflict (from 2002 to 2011) that divided the country into two separate regions: the “South” under the rule the Gbagbo presidency and the “North” ruled by the Forces Nouvelles led by Guillaume Soro, with the city of Yamoussoukro as a dividing line (see Fig. 1). The politico-military conflict enhanced tensions and violence between ethnic and religious communities present in the county, including 18 Instances of ethnic-based social tension and violence can be retraced back to the colonial period, the 1950s and the 1970s, see further C. Bouquet, “Le poids des étrangers en Côte d’Ivoire/The Importance of Foreigners in Ivory Coast,” Annales de Géographie 112, no. 630 (2003): 115–145. 19 M.N. LeBlanc, Youth, Islam and Changing Identities in Bouaké, Côte d’Ivoire, PhD thesis, University College London, 1998. 20 For a similar analysis, see P. Hugon, “La Côte d’Ivoire: plusieurs lectures pour une crise annoncée,” Afrique contemporaine 206, no. 2 (2003): 105–127; O. Dembele, “Côte d’Ivoire: la fracture communautaire,” Politique africaine 89, no. 1 (2003): 34–48; R. Banégas and B. Losch, “La Côte d’Ivoire au bord de l’implosion,” Politique africaine 87, no. 3 (2002): 139–161. 21 Y. Konaté, “Le destin d’Alassane Dramane Ouattara,” in Côte d’Ivoire: L’année terrible 1999–2000, ed. M. Le Pape (Paris: Editions Karthala, 2003), 253–309; M. Le Pape, “Chronologie politique de la Côte d’Ivoire, du coup d’État aux élections,” in Côte d’Ivoire. L’année terrible 1999–2000, ed. M. LePape (Paris: Editions Karthala, 2003), 12–50.

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Fig. 1  Map of Cote d’Ivoire

tensions between Muslims and Christians,22 but also played a role on the multiplication of INGOs in the country, prompted by the implication of international aid and humanitarian structures such as the World Bank and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization.23 Paradoxically, the first decade of the twenty-first century, while difficult politically and socially for the recognition of Muslim community, also marked the opening up

22 R. Marshall-Fratani and Didier Péclard, “La religion du sujet en Afrique,” Politique africaine 87, no. 3 (2002): 5–19; M. Le Pape, “Les politiques d’affrontement en Côte d’Ivoire 1999–2003,” Afrique contemporaine 206, no. 2 (2003): 29–39. 23 Binaté, “Muslim NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire.”

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of the country to Arab organizations and investors24; a process that significantly accelerated from the 2010s onwards, especially with the birth of a number of cooperation projects between Ivorian Islamic organizations (especially “Sunni-Wahhabi” oriented) and Arab ones, but also Turkish and Moroccan organizations and investors.25 Finally, structural adjustment measures also led to a process of liberalization that brought about an opening up of the press as well as a new liberty of association for Muslims. Previous to the 1990 elections, associations needed to be recognized by the single ruling party (Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire, PDCI) and, as a consequence, the Conseil supérieur islamique (CSI) was the only recognized national Islamic association. In 1993, the Conseil national islamique (CNI) emerged as a competing entity and with the Conseil supérieur des imams (COSIM) and the Association des élèves et étudiants musulmans de Côte d’Ivoire (AEEMCI) became the main national Islamic associations.26 Under the rule of Cheikh Boikary Fofana, the CNI, the COSIM and the AEEMCI worked to unite the multiple Muslim groups and congregations, and to restructure the national Islamic associative landscape. They struggle to gain recognition for the Muslim community in the context of ivoirité debates. Their actions were marked by the centrality of the Da’wa through numerous social actions such as the construction of mosques, support to teaching institutions, the creation of solidarity and charity

24 During his presidency, Félix Houphouët-Boigny (1960–1993) rejected the presence of Arab countries in Côte d’Ivoire (including diplomatic and financial initiatives). It is only in 1993 that diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Côte d’Ivoire opened up. The Saudi embassy was opened in 2002 in Abidjan. Ironically, the situation changes significantly with the Gagbo presidency that encouraged the adhesion of Côte d’Ivoire to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (IESCO). 25 I. Binaté, “La présence turque en Côte d’Ivoire contemporaine: entreprise transnationale au service de l’éducation, de l’humanitaire et de l’islam en Afrique de l’Ouest,” Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue canadienne des études africaines 53, no. 2 (2019): 215–233. 26 M.N. LeBlanc, “The Production of Islamic Identities Through Knowledge Claims in Bouaké, Côte d’Ivoire,” African Affairs 98, no. 393 (1999): 485–508; M. Miran, Islam, histoire et modernité en Côte d’Ivoire (Paris: Editions Karthala, 2006); M. Savadogo, “L’intervention des associations musulmanes dans le champ politique en Côte d’Ivoire depuis 1990,” In L’Islam politique au sud du Sahara: identitées, discours et enjeux, ed. M. Gomez-Perez (Paris: Karthala, 2005), 583–600.

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structures, the multiplication of public sermons and the creation of Islamic media (Islam info and Radio Al Bayan that became also a television in 2019). In the post-1990 context and especially in the context of the 2002–2011 politico-military conflict, Cheikh Boikary Fofana and his associates focused their actions on the construction of a national Islamic community putting forward unity and trying to erase potential conflicts based on different interpretations of Islam and “being Muslim”. With the Ouattara presidency (2010 to the present), Muslims gained a different status in Côte d’Ivoire: from a political minority in the South, they became a political majority in the country; one could suggest that a certain degree of Dioula-ization took place over the last decade. They also came to occupy a more significant role in the public space and a number of their religio-political claims were conceded, such as the inclusion of certain categories of Islamic schools in the national curriculum and schooling system. The public expressions of piety also took on different forms under the Ouattara presidency, where humanitarian actions and charity work have played a significant role. Islamic NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire Generally speaking, the majority of Islamic aid programmes and humanitarian assistance initiatives began in the mid-1970s in West Africa with the changing roles of OPEC countries in the production and distribution of oil.27 Historically, the countries involved in the funding and assisting of Islamic aid programmes and humanitarian actions in West Africa have been Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, Egypt, Iran and more recently Pakistan, Sudan and Turkey. INGOs originating from European countries (Britain and France mainly) also have a history in West Africa. 27 J. Bellion-Jourdan, “Les organisations de secours islamiques et l’action humanitaire,” Esprit 277, no. 8/9 (2001): 173–185; A. Chanfi, “Networks of Islamic NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Bilal Muslim Mission, Africa Muslim Agency (Direct Aid), and ­al-Haramayn,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, no. 3 (2009): 426–437; M. Kaag, “Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad: Islamic Solidarity in the Age of Neoliberalism,” Africa Today 54, no. 3 (2008): 3–18; M.A.M. Salih, Islamic NGOs in Africa: The Promise and Peril of Islamic Voluntarism (Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, 2002); B. Soares and R. Otayek, “Introduction: Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa,” in Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, eds. B.F. Soares and R. Otayek (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1–24; A. Sounaye, “Doing Development the Islamic Way in Contemporary Niger,” Bulletin de l’APAD 33 (2011): 1–20; LeBlanc and Audet Gosselin, Faith and Charity.

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However, as I mentioned in my introduction, Côte d’Ivoire has largely remained at the margins of these initiatives, except for very recent cooperation programmes with NGOs from Turkey, Sudan and Saudi Arabia being more active in the country. In fact, the few Ivorian INGOs that have managed to secure funds and to insert themselves in international collaborative projects and programmes have done so mainly through the ODA actors (World Bank, European Union, UN agencies) or the Ivorian government. The period of civil unrest between 2002 and 2011 opened the doors to access to development and humanitarian aid funds but with the change in government, peacebuilding and reconciliation funds decreased significantly and this meant that most local Islamic NGOs were left to find ways to sustain their charitable activities.28 While Islamic NGOs operate in local, nation and international levels, and while international INGO actors are present in Côte d’Ivoire (despite their small numbers comparatively to other West African countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Senegal), the discussion presented in this chapter is especially centred on processes that mark local initiatives NGOs. Further, a large number of humanitarian and charity actions led by INGOs involve collaborative projects between local organizations and international ones. For instance, in 2016, the Centre islamique ivoiro-turc was created in the PK 18 Sotrapim neighbourhood in the Abobo commune (Abidjan) as a result of the partnership between the Turkish foundation Deniz Feneri Derneği and the Ivorian NGO ASSAB (Association Soulaitine pour des Actions de Bienfaisance, founded by Cheick Abdoul Aziz Sarba, leader of the Muslim community from Burkina Faso in Côte d’Ivoire). The centre includes a primary school, a mosque, a multi-function space dedicated to training, a dispensary and a hostel. An older initiative based on Ivorian and Turkish NGO cooperation is the creation of the Centre Ihsane pour la formation et l’éducation des jeunes (CIFE) in Abidjan (Cocody neighbourhood) in 2013. The Turkish Aziz Mahmud Hudafi Foundation and the Ivorian AEEMCI supported the CIFE project.29 Another example of similar collaboration between Ivorian organizations and foreign ones is the visit of the heads of the Muhammad Ibn Saud University in Saudi Arabia in June 2010 that aimed at establishing bilateral cooperation with the two main

28 Binaté, 29 Binaté,

“Muslim NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire.” “Muslim NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire.”

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Islamic universities in Abidjan (Université Musulmane de Côte d`Ivoire and the Université Al Fourquane). In fact, contrarily to some of its Sahelian neighbours, Côte d’Ivoire has not been seen as a Muslim-dominated county by Arab actors. Moreover, under the presidency of Félix Houphouët-Boigny foreign Islamic and Muslim initiatives were not necessarily welcome. As a consequence, Côte d’Ivoire has been less targeted by international development, educational and missionary programmes led by major transnational INGOs such as the that are quite active in West Africa for close to a century, especially organizations emerging out of OPEC initiatives such as the World Islamic call Society from Libya, African Muslim Agency from Kuwait, Al-Azhar Mission from Egypt. However, with the presidency of Alassane Ouattara, it has been easier for Islamic institutions to take roots in the country. Since the Ouattara presidency, one of the main bilateral cooperation is with the Moroccan government,30 including numerous economic, cultural and religious agreements.31 However, besides initiatives such as the participations of Ivorian imams and preachers to the training offered at the Institut Mohammed VI pour la formation des imams morchidines et morchidates of Rabat in Morocco,32 INGOs play a very limited role in this bilateral collaboration. In Côte d’Ivoire, NGOs fall under the N° 60. 315 law (Septembre 21st 1960 decree) relative to associations à but non lucratif, which set the scene for the creation of voluntary associations and eventually NGOs. The acronym NGO does not appear in this law, nonetheless the law refers to organizations that provide development assistance. They have tax privileges and they fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. It should also be noted that local NGOs are given the status of associations and that, consequently, it is difficult to differentiate between associations and NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire, as is the case in other Francophone West African countries such as Burkina Faso.33 The label

30 https://www.pouvoirsafrique.com/2019/05/21/cote-divoire-maroc-45-accords-de-cooperation-finalises/, visited 2 August 2019. 31 For the new religious role of Morocco in West Africa, see C. Baylocq and A. Hlaoua, “Diffuser un «islam du juste milieu»?” Afrique contemporaine 257, no. 1 (2006): 113–128. 3 2   h t t p : / / w w w. h a b o u s . g o v. m a / f r / i n s t i t u t - m o h a m m e d - v i - d e - f o r m a tion-des-imams-prédicateurs-et-des-prédicatrices, visited 8 August 2019. 33 LeBlanc and Audet Gosselin, Faith and Charity.

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NGOs is mainly a ­self-given one by local organizations. However, considering that our empirical research has focused in organizations that have state recognition and that the recognition includes the title of NGO, this self-given label essentially becomes an official one. At the turn of the years 2000, only two organizations, which can be considered as INGOs, had an official status recognized by the Ministry of Interior: the Secours médical islamique (SEMI) and the Association de bienfaisance islamique de Cöte d’Ivoire. Between 2006 and 2009, the ministry recognized nine further INGOs. Since then the number has not stopped growing. After 2011, the government led by Alassane Dramane Ouattara was trying to apply the existing rules more strictly and to standardize the status of organizations whose status was ambiguous. More specifically, since that time, organizations in Côte d’Ivoire have had to apply to the Direction des Affaires Générales, an agency of the Ministry of State, to obtain legal status. The dossier has to include the following information: the current status of the organization, a description of its internal by-laws, a signed and notarized document with the list of people attending its general assembly, and a list of members and members of the board of directors (the “bureau”). Recognized associations in Côte d’Ivoire do not need to provide a financial statement.

Understanding the Growth of Islamic NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire It is possible to talk about two historical moments (or waves) in the creation of local INGOs in Côte d’Ivoire. The first wave took place in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with the creation of organisations d’intérêt public, registered as foundations initially (and later on as NGOs) that aimed at providing development assistance to the Ivorian Muslim community. I will argue that this first wave of organizations is largely driven by “charisma” dynamics. The second wave took place in the second half of the politico-military conflict (2005 onwards), prompted initially by the support of international agencies, then with the involvement of transnational INGOs but mainly supported by local initiatives and fundraising activities. In the early 1990s, in the context of the transformation of Islamic institutions and associative milieus, Muslims were strongly encouraged by national religious leaders, such as Sheikh Fofana, to get involved into social actions and to help poverty alleviation and to improve social

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services for Muslims. Moreover, it should be highlighted that the “modernist reformist” movement, as described by Miran, emerged largely among the Abidjanese socio-economic elites in neighbourhoods such as Cocody and Riviere II and III, a social group that has come to play a significant role in recent humanitarian initiatives. Besides dynamics relating to the transformation of the Ivorian Muslim associative milieus and the emergence of renewed discourses about what “being a Good Muslim” entails, in the global world of international development and humanitarian aid, the 1990s is the decade when civil society actors were presented as guarantors of democracy and rights. Côte d’Ivoire Muslims were not exempt from the impact and influence of these global discourses.34 Organizations such as Orphan’s Smile created in 2003, Action Islamique sanitaire (ISLAS) created in 2004, the Conseil d’actions humanitaires musulmanes en Côte d’Ivoire created in 2004, Secours médical islamique created in 1998, are part of the first moment of the emergence of INGOs in Côte d’Ivoire. I will centre the discussion on two well-known examples that illustrate the first wave of the growth of INGOs in Côte d’Ivoire, namely ONG Al Muwassat and Fondation Djigui- La grande espérance.35 ONG Al Muwassat was created in Dr. Lassina Cissé, from the CHU de Treichville (one of the Abidjan public hospital) in 2002. Imam Harouna Koné from the Mosquée du CHU de Treichville (hospital) had been calling upon his faithful for two years. In response to his call for public charity actions, Dr. Cissé prompted the creation of the organization situated in the CHU de Treichville and initially centred on providing help to Muslim patients. Officially, the goal was to create a leading organization that would have as a stated objective to: “Agir pour consoler les âmes en détresse” (Act to soothe souls in distress, my translation). Today the organization is seen as one of the principal Ivorian INGO. Its 2015 activity report states that:

34 Miran,

Islam, histoire et modernité. pour consoler, https://www.facebook.com/OngAlMuwassatLaConsolation, consulted 27 July 2019; http://fondationdjigui.org. Both associations are well-known in the literature on Côte d’Ivoire humanitarian organization and have been extensively studied, see Binaté, “Muslim NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire”; M.N. LeBlanc, “From Piety to Leadership: Embodied and Militant Religiosity Among Muslim Women in Côte d’Ivoire,” Islamic Africa 5, no. 2 (2014): 167–198; Miran, Islam, histoire et modernité. 35 Agir

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The ONG Al Muwassat is a non-profit Muslim public interest charity based at the Treichville teaching Hospital (CHU-Treichville). It works for the medical, spiritual and moral care of hospitalized patients.36

The stated activities of the organization are twofold: 1. the daily care of abandoned, needy and poor patients, including the distribution of daily meals, the payment of hospitalization and medication costs, driving patients back into their living environment and the repatriation of foreign patients; 2. the spiritual and psychological care of patients, including the distribution of Qu’ran to patients, the organizations of public prayers and the celebration of Islamic holidays. Since a few years, besides its actions within the walls of the CHU Treichville hospital, the ONG Al Muwassat has regularly organized information and medical caravans, such as February 2015 one during which the members of the NGO conducted a “humanitarian campaign” (the organization terms) that had as a goal to “sensitize the population to hygiene rules in order to minimize the risk of the propagation of certain infectious diseases” (my translation). Concrete actions were the following: a public lecture at one of the Abidjan hospitals on how “hygiene is a cure for the sick”, followed by the distribution of clothes and hygiene products for the sick; a free medical consultation service at the Grande Mosquée du Plateau during which attendees could get their blood tested for glucose, have their blood pressure tested and a free lung RX; the radio broadcasts of sermons on hygiene; the washing of the toilets at the Grande Mosquée du Plateau; and the handing out of hygiene products at the Grande Mosquée du Plateau after the Friday prayer.37 While most of the activities of the NGO take place at the CHU Treichville hospital and in Abidjan, since 2009, members have managed to set up relay offices in the following localities and areas: Bouaké, Yopougon, Cocody, Yamoussoukro, Man, Korhogo, Daloa, Odienné, Toumodi, Dimbokro, Koumassi et Agnibilékrou. As is the case for the large majority of Ivorian INGOs, the ONG Al Muwassat revenues mainly come from members’ contributions, gifts and bequests from the social networks of Muslims elites and leaders in Abidjan and the CHU mosque attendees. For instance, in May 2017, for 36 My translation; http://www.serviceongsante.ci/RAPPORT/21RAPPORT2015.pdf, consulted 4 June 2017. 37 Such activities are quite standard among NGO that are involved in medical actions.

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the Ramadan period, the Direction générale du port autonome d’Abidjan gave a gift in food to the organization, including 5 tons of rice, 2 tons of sugar and 20 cardboards of powdered milk.38 The organization has never secured governmental or agency grants. The 2015 financial report attests to this situation; for instance, a table describes how the 2015 caravan action was financed by gifts from the Coffee and Cacao Council (Conseil café-cacao) for the amount of 1,000,000 CFA francs, the Conseil sépérieur des Imams (COSIM) for the amount of 1,500,000 CFA francs and 200,000 CFA francs in private donations.39 Fondation Djigui—La grande espérance, a second similar example, was created in Abidjan in 2001 by Imam Djiguiba Abdhalla Cissé, head imam of the Grande mosquée du Plateau (build in 1996). Imam Cissé originated from the Odienné region (like did Sheikh Fofana) and is part of the national associative Islamic leadership. He was the founder of the AEEMCI, a founding member of the CNI and the COSIM; he has occupied the position of director of communication at the COSIM and director of the national Al Bayane Islamic radio. He studied in French secular schools in Côte d’Ivoire (license of English at the university in Abidjan) and in the Arabic Islamic university systems (certificate of Arabic language and Islamic studies in Mecca and B.A. from Djebba). He also studied in the United States. On its recent website, the organization defines itself with the following promotion slogan: “Faith at the service of solidarity and development for the happiness of the people” (my translation). The organization focuses its activities on HIV-AIDS prevention, reproductive health (women and youth), genital mutilation (prevention, support to victim, women’s empowerment), youth protection (birth declaration, prevention and protection), education and family (girl schooling, literacy programmes, couple relations, parent-children relations), peace and solidarity (conflict prevention and resolution, solidarity, support to victims), as well as advocacy and communication in all these fields. Initially, the NGO got involved in health issues and moved into community relation issues, gender and youth issues. Financially, the NGO still functions very much in a similar manner as does ONG Al Muwassat, through the support of national donors and 38 Rice,

sugar and powdered—milk are usual goods distributed as gifts during Ramadan. Muwassat, Rapport d’activité de l’ONG Al Muwassat 2015, 7, http://www.serviceongsante.ci/RAPPORT/21RAPPORT2015.pdf, consulted 20 January 2020. 39 Al

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members’ contributions. Besides private contributions, its main national partners are ones that belong to Muslim networks, such as the COSIM, the CNI, the Ligue Islamique des Prédicateurs en Côte d’Ivoire (LIPCI), the AEEMCI, the Association des Jeunes Musulmans de Côte d’Ivoire (AJMCI), the Association des Femmes Musulmanes de Côte d’Ivoire (AFEMCI) and the Réseau des Ecoles Médersas de Côte d’Ivoire (REMCI). Nonetheless, Fondation Djigui has recently managed to gain some recognition by external donors, such as the German Embassy, US Embassy and PEPFAR, UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO and UNAIDS. Its involvement in HIV-SIDA and genital mutilation issues has played a significant role in this transformation. Both organizations, as most of the ones that were created in this period and are still active today, were initiated by prominent leaders coming out of both religious and secular milieus. To some extent, as Gosselin and Vitale argue in the case of Islamic and Catholic charity organizations in Burkina Faso, the creation of charity organization is part of the prestige and social capital accumulated by different leadership figures, such as imams, priests or doctors, and are often financed by the socio-professional networks of these leadership figures.40 It is for this reason that I am using the term: “charisma NGO” to refer to them. In the case of these NGOs that rely on the volunteer work and networks of single individuals, such as is the case with ONG Al Mussawat and Fondation Djigui, ties with places of worship is capital in their efforts to mobilize members of Muslim communities around the charitable works of the organization. Mosques are significant spaces of mobilization, where key messages regarding fundraising and charity actions are shared during Friday sermons (before the official sermon usually). ONG Al Muwassat relies on the CHU Treichville mosque network, attended in large number by medical staff, and Fondation Djugui is embedded in the social networks of the Grande Mosquée du Plateau. The Plateau is the financial and business district of Abidjan; the mosque is largely attended by middle and upper-class Ivorian Muslims. 40 L. Audet Gosselin, “Private Evangelical Assistance to Orphans and Vulnerable Children in Burkina Faso: Religious Voluntarism and the Road to Success,” in Faith and Charity: Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa, eds. M.N. LeBlanc and L. Audet Gosselin (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 124–143; M. Vitale, “From Local to Transnational Challenges: Religious Leaders and Muslim NGOs in Burkina Faso,” in Faith and Charity: Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa, eds. M.N. LeBlanc and L. Audet Gosselin (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 144–160.

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Another example of how the creation of NGOs fits with the trajectory of Muslim leadership is the case of Dr. Fatiga Moussa Al Farouk, who created the ONG Maktab ta Awoun in 2004, and is the rector of the Al Fourquane university in Abidjan. However, Dr. Fatiga’s network caters more to Sunni/Wahabbi milieus than COSIM and professional networks occupied by the ONG Al Muwassat and Fondation Djugui; with Dr. Mustapha Sy (who studied at Medina’s Islamic University), Dr. Fadiga is one of the leaders of the Sunni/Wahabbi community in Côte d’Ivoire, represented by the Association des Musulmans Sunnites de Côte d’Ivoire (AMSCI) and the Conseil des Imams Sunnites (CODIS).41 Dr. Fatiga was born in Danane (West of the country). He studied Islam in the sub-region (Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Ghana) until he was 19 years old. He continued his studies in Saudi Arabia where he obtained a doctorate from the law faculty of Muhammad Boun Saoud University in Ryad. For 10 years (1993–2003), he presided the Union des étudiants ivoiriens dans les universités saoudiennes en Arabie saoudite. He taught at the Université islamique du Niger in Say. Dr. Fatiga possesses an important network in Arab milieus. Since 2007, he is the president of the AMSCI. He officiates prayer at the mosque Rahma in Adjamé Bracodi in Abidjan. In 2009, he created the Université Al Fourquane in Abidjan. And, this initiative was followed by the creation of a network of Islamic schools in Côte d’Ivoire. Some of his projects are financed by Islamic Development Bank. In 2004, Dr. Fatiga founded the NGO Maktab ta Awoun, through which he claims to have built hundreds of mosques, schools and medersas, as well as dug numerous wells. In addition, Maktab ta Awoun supported the creation of a radio station in Man in 2011, and the establishment of CEEMUCI, the Sunnite students and pupils of Côte d’Ivoire association, a Sunni/Wahhabi equivalent and competitor to the AEEMCI. In fact, these examples show how NGOs provide an organizational structure through which private, individualized initiatives often undertaken by imams, school heads and Islamic association leaders can be coordinated and gain public recognition. The second moment that marked the history of the creation of INGOs starts with the post-2005 context, the post-2002 war context, 41 Both associations have never accepted to join the COSIM. They have merged into one organization in 2019.

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when reconstruction efforts and incoming of funds from international actors such as the World Bank, as well as the Ivorian government, played a significant role in prompting the creation of INGOs. In this context, the term “NGO” is used widely by local actors. This second wave is also marked by a rapid and impressive multiplication of local INGOs. Local actors, from influent ones to minor groups such as mosque’s women associations in urban neighbourhoods, very quickly understood the economic potential of NGOs and tried to grab a part of the development and humanitarian aid resources.42 In this context of NGO vitality, both small-scale social actors and influent social actors entered the race to “capture” international funds, as Aminata, the president of a local neighbourhood Muslim women association in Bouaké explained to me: Our association has deeply suffered from the war. People do not have money; it is hard to finance our activities. But we heard that the World Bank gives money to organizations that can help with the rehabilitation of young soldiers or with the training of young women as seamstresses. In our association, we would like to be able to get involve in these projects. It would allow us to help the Muslim community and it may give a job to some of our members. Life is hard at the moment. You have to grab all opportunity that comes by. But for us it is hard! To create an NGO is hard. You have to have connections, to have someone with a reputation that will back your NGO. We are looking for that. We have ideas but we do not know how to get into this race for the funding. As a Canadian, can you help us?43

As Aminata’s words states, it almost became a trend to try to transform local Islamic associations (especially women and youth associations) into local NGOs. Some of the longstanding national associations have also created NGO structures over the past 10 years or so; this is the case of AEEMCI that proposed to become an NGO during its 2017 general assembly. What is more, since the post-2005 period, there has been numerous concerted efforts by national actors to structure the plurality of INGOs and to try to give some cohesion to the actions of local actors. For instance, the COSIM, which is structured around several subcommittees, possesses a Département de la société civile; it is responsible 42 LeBlanc,

“From Piety to Leadership”; LeBlanc, “Precarious Agency.” with Aminata, Bouaké, 2008, my translation from Dioula language.

43 Interview

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for identifying Islamic associations and NGOs with which the COSIM can collaborate. In October 2011, the COSIM’s list of potential partners included over 150 NGOs, and officially recognized a total of twenty-two organizations.44 Within the milieu of women-led local INGOs, there are similar initiatives; in 2016, Hadja Massandje Touré Litse, head of the Conseil Café Cacao of Côte d’Ivoire, sponsored the public presentation of the Union musulmane des associations et ONG féminines en Côte d’Ivoire (ONG UMAOFCI). Tied to the COSIM, it defines itself as a federation of Islamic organization that brings together Muslim women’s organization in Côte d’Ivoire. Its actions focus on women, family and children, education and training of young women, health and social conditions, community-based development. One of the organization’s leaders explained that: Our goal is women’s empowerment and development. The Muslim woman must take charge of herself and her family, and position herself at the heart of the development of her community. We fully adopted the UN guidelines on the empowerment of women.45

Financing and Social Capital Local INGOs clearly stem out of associative and mosque milieus. Some NGOs come from existing associations and mosque, while others result from the transformation of existing associations into NGOs (change in status), such as the AEEMCI. In terms of financing, the vast majority of local INGOs are self-financed by the voluntary monetary contributions of their members (paid on a weekly, monthly or yearly basis), fundraising activities such as social events (Islamic galas) or campaigns geared towards particular activities (bursaries for the children of needy families; school kits; health kits), as well as individual or associative donations, gifts or bequests, especially at the time of religious celebrations such as Ramadan. A few local NGOs have managed to enter bilateral and multilateral projects, especially in the case of older NGOs or ones in which their head has the required networks in international development agencies, the Ivorian government or the Arab world. Three types 44 Interview with Imam Konaté, assistant head of the Département de la société civile, COSIM, siege du LIP-CI, Riviéra II, Abidjan. 45 Abidjan, my translation from French, 2017.

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of partnerships are significant, namely partnership with international development and humanitarian agencies (European Union, UN agencies, Bretton Woods financial agencies), partnership with international and transnational NGOs (not exclusively Islamic ones) and partnership with the Ivorian state. Since the end of politico-military conflict, INGOs have had more opportunities to get involved in peacebuilding activities, initiated by the Ivorian government, especially activities surrounding the work of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Two examples of INGO that have managed to secure international funding in the past few years are: the REMCI NGO (a network, based in medersa schools, led by Jakaria Touré, an employee of the Ministry of education in Bouaké). Situated in the city of Bouaké, it grew out of a multilateral project initiated by UN agencies (UNICEF, World Food programme and the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), CARE International, CARITAS Côte d’Ivoire and Action Against Hunger, in support of struggling communities at the outset of the 2002 military conflict; it supported the distribution of food and other material assistance.46 This project involved Christian and Muslim communities (CNI), and other local NGOs, namely Sainte Camille (a Catholic NGO situated in Baouké) and SEMI (Secour médical islamique). The second case is Fondation Djigui. Through its involvement with the Alliance des religieux contre le VIH\SIDA et autres pandémies, it has managed to secure some international funds with CARE international. It has also received financial and material support from Association Al-Ghadir (an association of mainly Shiite Lebanese Muslims).47 Despite, the few cases of bilateral and multilateral financing, generally, INGOs in Côte d’Ivoire enjoy minimal insertion into development and humanitarian financing networks, except for a few cases that managed to benefit from the influx of international aid money between 2002 and 2011—ONUCI money (United Nation Operation in Côte d’Ivoire) and Sunni-oriented ones that managed to enter into Arab-country financing networks (Saudi mainly— but also through the networks of religious leaders that studied in these countries). 46 Binaté,

“Muslim NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire.” operates a school in Riviéra M’pouto, an imposing mosque in the residential neighbourhood of Marcory, and a medical centre. It has maintained a presence in Côte d’Ivoire since the end of the 1980s and it has worked mainly in the social and educational sectors. In 2011, it launched a programme in support of audio-visual expression by Muslims. 47 It

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The fact that most locally initiated INGOs are self-financed helps explains why, even though there has been a tremendous expansion of the number of such organizations, only a few of them have been particularly active and capable of carrying out larger projects. The capacity to carry out projects depends largely on the networks of their founders and leaders. The compelling efforts to secure external funding, especially ones tied to the major development and humanitarian aid agencies, has resulted in a pressure on these organization to professionalize their structures and their staff in order to gain credibility in the eyes of the international aid agencies, and to be able to request such funds (write standardized projects, follow up on budget requirements, master the discourses of these agencies, etc.). Muslim professionals (cadres et professionels musulmans) have played a key role in the professionalization of Ivorian INGOs. The case of Secours Médical Islamique (SEMI) is telling in this respect.48 This organization has benefited from funds from the Association des Cadres Musulmans de Côte d’Ivoire (UCAM-CI), as well as from the Association des Hommes d’Affaires Musulmans. Founded by Prof. Kader Keïta, past-president of the AEEMCI, it had for objectives to bring together Muslim health professionals (doctors, nurses, midwives, pharmacists) in order to provide social support to poor Muslims and to improve the quality of health care in the country. It changed its status in 1998 in order to become an NGO and to be recognized by the Ministry of health. It became an NGO in 2001. It created a first Islamic health unit in Williamsville and then a second one in ­Abobo-Gare (Abidjan). Further, in the context of the multiplication of local NGOs, the role played by middle-class initiatives is very apparent.49 As I demonstrated elsewhere in the case of Muslim women-led local NGOs, the middle class plays a key role in these initiatives. Members of this social class generally enjoy the benefits of a regular salary, often with government employment, are highly educated, and usually are integrated in professional and Islamic networks (both French and Arabic). These secular leaders build on the late 1990s initiatives that encouraged the renewal of Islamic networks, and, rely on the collaboration with Arabizing Muslim scholars and leaders. Local INGOs such as REFMA-CI 48 http://secoursmedicalislamique.com. 49 See LeBlanc, “From Piety to Leadership” and LeBlanc, “Precarious Agency” for an analysis of this role among INGO initiated by Muslim women.

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(Réseau des Femmes Musulmanes Africaines—Côte d’Ivoire)50 and Fondation Djigui—La grande espérance are a good illustrations of such dynamics; in both case, they have managed to gain the support of governmental agencies such as the PNCI (the post-crisis programme national de cohésion social and the Ministère de la Santé et de la Lutte contre le SIDA).51 As a matter of fact, in the post-2005 context of the expansion of INGOs, two types of local initiatives that are largely structured by class distinctions, appear.52 On the one hand, elite and middle-class actors, draw on networking and professionalization logics, to create a very closed-knitted integrated network including national Islamic associative, leadership and media milieus (COSIM, CNI, AEEMCI), national professional milieus, and, since Alassane Ouattara’s presidency, governmental milieus. On the other hand, there are numerous grassroots initiatives, which fit much more with logiques de la débrouilles (“make due” logics), especially actions driven by less well financially and politically situated civil society actors, such as neighbourhood-based women’s groups. Among the second group of actors, integration into the financing of international humanitarian aid remain very marginal.

Da’wa and Solidarity Fields of Actions Over the past 10 years or so, local INGOs have mainly been active in the following fields of actions: support and building of mosques and Islamic schools, with a recent focus on training centres, professional schools and private universities. For example, since 2010, Imam Idriss Koudouss (at the head of the CNI), with the help of IQRA Foundation (transnational 50 REFMA was created in Bamako (Mali) in 2008 as an open Platform for exchanging knowledge and experiences on improving the political participation of Muslim women in Africa. The Ivorian section was created in Abidjan in 2010 (Interview, Abidjan, 2014). 51 LeBlanc, “From Piety to Leadership”; LeBlanc, “Precarious Agency.” 52 With a focus on women-led Islamic NGOs, I have written elsewhere about the significance of socio-economic classes in the capacity to mobilize resources for NGOs and to participate into different networks of financing (LeBlanc, “From Piety to Leadership”; LeBlanc, “Precarious Agency”).

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Islamic education organization, founded in the United States in the late 1960s) and foundation ALIF (transnational Islamic organization, established in India in 2010) have supported a project to build and develop schools and the Université musulmane de Côte d’Ivoire; further, with the investment from the IDB the group has financed numerous primary schools, lycées and an institute of agriculture.53 Health-related services are another field of actions that has been significantly invested by local Ivorian INGOs; actions include: the construction of health centres and clinics; participation in sanitary and public health (breast and uterine, cancers, reproductive health, HIV/AIDS, mother and child, adolescent girls) advocacy and sensitizing campaigns; and, spiritual and material support for ill people. It should be reminded that the first major local INGOs and foundations were involved in ­health-related services (Fondation Djigui—La grande espérance and ONG Al Muwassat). Further, health and education have been two fields in which religious actors have been able to draw followers and to become significant and legitimate partners for government and international agencies. A third field of humanitarian action is the distribution of gifts, often under the ideological appeal of zakat. Most frequent practices include food kits to poor communities during Ramadan but also for other occasions, school kits and medical kits. And, finally proselytizing activities, especially at the time of Ramadan, are generally an integral part of local INGOs humanitarian activities. For instance, ONG Al Muwassat and Islam actions sanitaires organize the distribution of exemplars of the Qu’ran in hospitals and during sensitizing activities relating to medical issues.54 Some of the activities of local INGOs are weaved into international developments and humanitarian agendas, especially Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), in terms of poverty alleviation and women’s empowerment. Most of the Ivorian INGOs that have managed to secure funding outside of the private contributions of donors and their members have done so by developing actions that fit with these development objectives and programmes, or their appropriation by the Ivorian government; for instance, Fondation Djigui—La grande espérance has done so through HIV/AIDS actions. Finally, comparing the actions of these INGOs to the categories most often used in

53 Islam.info,

http://news.abidjan.net/h/358981.html, consulted 19 September 2017.

54 http://islas-ci.org.

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the literature to describe the actions of transnational INGOs, namely da’watist, jihadist, s­olidarity-based, and secularized,55 clearly Ivorian INGOs are mainly da’wa-based and ­solidarity-based INGOs. Ethics of Volunteerism In the last section of the chapter, I want to show how the recent institutionalization of Islamic charity actions and voluntary work in Côte d’Ivoire through the growth and the structuring of INGOs have contributed to the development of an ethics of volunteerism. In this context, the notion of volunteerism appeals to the notion of relying on voluntary actions for the purpose of performing social actions; and, the notion of ethics used is one that relies on the idea of lived ethics or shared ethical principles in social actions.56 The recent institutionalization of charity work through NGOs must be considered in the continuity of the longstanding histories of Islamic charity, which is already institutionalized through standardized practices such as zakat and sadaqa. However, I would argue that the growth of local INGOs in Côte d’Ivoire rests on the articulation between religious principles and ones tied to development and humanitarian assistance as they have emerged at a global level since World War II. As a consequence, the developing ethics of volunteerism, which permeates religious NGOs, not just Islamic ones, sits at the interstice of neoliberal and religious logics.57 Among INGOs, humanitarian action rests on the intention to partake into da’wa efforts through the social actions proposed by INGOs. These actions mainly focus on the build-up of intra-community solidarity. In a context of ethnic and religious tensions, the scope of the Umma is the national community; all actions are geared to Ivorian Muslims. The ideals of trust and reciprocity put forward by local INGOs rely heavily on historical Islamic principles of charity, which, in turn, evoke obligations to give and rights to receive, especially with regard to zakat. As such, notions of spiritual resources and spiritual capital are useful to

55 See further M.J. Petersen, For Humanity or for the Umma? Aid and Islam in Transnational Muslim NGOs (London: Hurst, 2016). 56 See further M. Lambek, Ordinary Ethics: Anthropology, Language and Actions (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010). 57 LeBlanc and Audet Gosselin, Faith and Charity.

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understand how INGOs mobilize support for their activities58; the timing of the majority of INOGs’ activities during the Ramadan period fits with the notion of distributing zakat al-fitr. As such an ethics of voluntarism is being forged through the reinforcement of shared norms and values around the religious role of almsgiving as the practices where the notion of the collective good is embedded and embodied. Both obligatory (zakat) and none obligatory almsgiving (sadaqa) are the main discursive tools to build financial and material support for INGOs on the basis of the shared religious notions of financial redistribution and transfer from the privileged to the neediest. While in the case of the zakat, the established list of neediest includes the needy, the ones that collect the zakat, the captives and so forth, with the establishment of INGOs, the neediest come to be (re-) defined as women, children (especially orphans) and the sick. These three groups of neediest also feature predominantly in global development and humanitarian initiatives. Historically, in Côte d’Ivoire, as well as throughout West Africa, local imams and their entourage informally collect, once a year, the zakat. Local (as well as international) INGOs have position themselves as competing spaces of Islamic alms collection (including the zakat) in recent years, with spaces on their websites to give their alms, as shown by this picture of the website of Fondation Zakât et Waqf campaign organized in 2013, where one can calculate one’s zakat and make a donation, see Fig. 2.59 Generally, collection and distribution of alms is a private matter,60 and INGOs mainly use gift-giving campaigns to raise funds. In such a context, development and humanitarian assistance come to be a matter of community-based self-help initiatives. Besides the mobilization of religious resources, the ethics of volunteerism that emerge out of the actions and discourses of Ivorian INGOs have become conversant with the transformation of charity norms and 58 G. Haar, “The Mbuliuli Principlke: What Is in a Name?” in: Development and Politics from Below. Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State, eds. B. Bompani and M. FrahmArp (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 40–55; D. Zohar and I. Marshall, Spiritual Capital: Wealth We Can Live By (London: Bloomsbury, 2004). 59 http://www.zakatwaqf-ci.com, consulted 22 October 2017. This fundraising strategy is used by numerous transnational Islamic NGOs. 60 H. Weiss, Begging and Almsgiving in Ghana: Muslim Positions Towards Poverty and Distress (Uppsala: Nordic African Institute, 2007).

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Fig. 2  The zakat calculator on the homepage of Fondation Zakât et Waqf

practices within current neoliberal logics of international development. These include the professionalization of religious charity by integrating technical know-how, such as the knowledge of accountants, urban planners, health professionals, and so forth, to the existing figures of religious authority and knowledge. The question of professionalization includes NGOs all the way from highly institutionalized and professional organizations with elaborate transnational networks to small-scale volunteer initiatives sustained more by enthusiasm than technical or administrative ability. This cleavage is partly related to the relative importance of proselytism in the activities of different INGOs. Whereas some focus on attracting new converts or spreading a specific version of their faith, others manage to thread their religious actions with the neoliberal development agenda. Levels of professionalization also reflect the relative capacity of different INGOs to mobilize resources and access networks of political, religious and financial patronage. However, most of the INGOs discussed have achieved partial professionalization at best and continue to struggle with the issue. Most of them primarily rely on a powerful and well-connected religious figure to attract attention and provide respectability. Another dimension of the inter-penetration between neoliberal logics of international development and Islamic ones that contributes to the build-up of an ethics of volunteerism is the appropriation of

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development legitimating standards. This is apparent at the level of the fields of activities privileged by Ivorian INGOs, namely health, education and women, where local INGOs distinctively replicate bio-medical and women’s empowerment discourses (especially HIV/AIDS prevention, reproductive health, empowerment of women through formal training and literacy) produced through MDG and SDG principles. For instance, in 2015, ISLA led an information campaign across the country on the reduction of breast and uterine cancer partly financed by the Amicale des Anciens de l’Association des Elèves et Etudiants Musulmans de Côte d’Ivoire (AEEMCI) and with the logistical help of the Programme National de Lutte contre le Cancer (PNLCa). Finally, emphasis on entrepreneurship and the responsibilization of social actors is core to the emerging ethics of volunteerism that is reproduced by Ivorian INGOs. The notion of responsibilization relies on the idea that social and economic improvement (and development by extension) need to be taken on by individuals and communities; in a Muslim context, this idea is embodied by the zakat and other forms of alms. In a neoliberal context, the notion of responsibilization involves not only the donors but also the individuals in need to the extent that the individual has a role to play in his or her capacity “to step out” of poverty. And, this appears clearly through the recent actions of several INGOs that aim at building up entrepreneurial capabilities. Among other examples, in August 2016, ONG UMAOFCI organized a 3 days training seminar for its members at its headquarters in the Riviera Golf neighbourhood, one of Abidjan’s upper-class neighbourhood, in which the topics of women’s autonomization, literacy and HIV/AIDS prevention and the issue of garbage management were discussed, followed by a series of workshops where participants were encouraged to develop entrepreneurial projects around these themes for their community. Such activities are frequent within INGOs, especially for occasions such as the early International Women’s Day.

Concluding Remarks Created initially for the purpose of reinforcing the Muslim faith, many of the Ivorian INGOs view charity, socio-economic development, and social services primarily as tools for da’wa, and only began to intently pursue other opportunities of social intervention in the post-crisis context, when actors of global international development and humanitarian

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actions became more present in the country. The success of such endeavours has been largely uneven, and the intensity of different organizations’ engagement varies considerably depending on the outlook of their leaders and their capacity to adopt the required professionalization standards. As a consequence, the organizations discussed in my chapter are equally concerned with transforming their societies as they are with fulfilling religious obligations related to charity. Ultimately, although the meaning of social transformation varies, according to several criteria ranging from doctrinal ones to class-based ones, it becomes virtually impossible to distinguish between an INGO expressing a will to transform the social and economic basis of their society and one that responds to a religious call to help the most vulnerable members of society while spreading a universalist religious dogma. Further, through the provision of services and practices of almsgiving, INGOs in Côte d’Ivoire are re-affirming Islamized spaces in the national context. Islamic charity, as it is practised in the context of INGOs, draws a clear geography of the Muslim community to the extent that zakat and other forms of alms reinforce social ties within the national Muslim community in terms of obligations and rights. To some extent, INGOs in Côte d’Ivoire are redefining the roles of Islamic institutions by shifting the focus of community and social actions from historical institutions such as mosques and schools towards NGOs. At the level of individual actors, the leaders, employees and volunteers of INGOs have actively sought to transform their organizations by adopting international standards of professionalization. They have restructured their organizations; adopted new language, as well as new recruitment and training methods; and introduced new professional learning opportunities. Younger volunteer, who are often highly educated (Islamic and French secular schools), tend to be particularly interested in opportunities to improve their employability. Part of the reason they engage in volunteering is to acquire the experience and technical know-how they need to eventually find regular employment, whether within the NGO where they volunteer or elsewhere. NGOs can also offer an alternative path to upward social mobility in the form of prestigious and influential positions within the religious hierarchy.61 61 See LeBlanc and Audet Gosselin, Faith and Charity, for similar observations regarding religious NGOs in general.

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The development of INGOs is therefore as much tied to piety as it is an issue of community development.62 Indeed, community development is often pursued with the aim of making the beneficiaries more responsible for their own lives, by encouraging them to embrace a strict moral code of b ­ ehaviour-based on prescriptions of piety, as well as community obligations and rights. Indeed, religious conviction remains the driving force behind participation in these organizations, which could not operate without it. Faith underlies an emerging ethics of volunteerism that thrives in a neoliberal context where individual initiative is highly valued by political authorities, development agencies and international aid institutions. The case of discourses and practices surrounding almsgiving is telling of such dynamics; they attest to a balancing act between shared notion of the “collective good” and class-based individual success.

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62 R. Prince, “Seeking Incorporation? Voluntary Labor and the Ambiguities of Work, Identity, and Social Value in Contemporary Kenya,” African Studies Review 58, no. 2 (2015): 85–109.

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Binaté, I. “La présence turque en Côte d’Ivoire contemporaine: entreprise transnationale au service de l’éducation, de l’humanitaire et de l’islam en Afrique de l’Ouest.” Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue canadienne des études africaines 53, no. 2 (2019): 215–233. Bompani, B. and M. Frahm-Arp, eds. Development and Politics from Below. Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Bouquet, C. “Le poids des étrangers en Côte d’Ivoire/The Importance of Foreigners in Ivory Coast.” Annales de Géographie 112, no. 630 (2003): 115–145. Challand, B. “Comparative Perspective on the Growth and Legal Transformation of Arab (Islamic) Charities.” In Charities in the Non-Western World. The Development and Regulation of Indigenous and Islamic Charities, eds. R.A. Brown and J. Pierce, 293–310. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2013. Chanfi, A. “Networks of Islamic NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Bilal Muslim Mission, Africa Muslim Agency (Direct Aid), and al-Haramayn.” Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, no. 3 (2009): 426–437. Clarke, G. “Faith Matters: Faith-Based Organizations, Civil Society and International Development.” Journal of International Development 18 (2006): 835–848. Clarke, G. and M. Jennings, eds. Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Dembele, O. “Côte d’Ivoire: la fracture communautaire.” Politique africaine 89, no. 1 (2003): 34–48. Fassin, D. La raison humanitaire. Une histoire morale du temps présent. Paris: Seuil, 2010. Freeman, D., ed. Pentecostalism and Development Churches, NGOs and Social Change in Africa. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Ghandour, A.-R. Jihad humanitaire. Enquête sur les ONG islamiques. Paris: Flammarion, 2002. Giovannoni M. et al. “Agir à la place – et en dépit – de l’État: ONG et associations de la société civile à Kinshasa.” In Ordre et désordre à Kinshasa, ed. T. Trefon, 119–134. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004. Haar, G. “The Mbuliuli Principlke: What Is in a Name?” In Development and Politics from Below. Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State, eds. B. Bompani and M. Frahm-Arp, 40–55. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Haynes, J. Religion and Development: Conflict or Cooperation? London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Hearn, J. “The NGO-Isation of Kenyan Society: USAID and the Restructuring of Healthcare.” Review of African Political Economy 25, no. 75 (1998): 89–100. Hugon, P. “La Côte d’Ivoire: plusieurs lectures pour une crise annoncée.” Afrique contemporaine 206, no. 2 (2003): 105–127.

116  M. N. LeBLANC Kaag, M. “Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad: Islamic Solidarity in the Age of Neoliberalism.” Africa Today 54, no. 3 (2008): 3–18. Konaté, Y. “Le destin d’Alassane Dramane Ouattara.” In Côte d’Ivoire: L’année terrible 1999–2000, ed. M. Le Pape, 253–309. Paris: Editions Karthala, 2003. Lambek, M. Ordinary Ethics: Anthropology, Language and Actions. New York: Fordham University Press, 2010. Le Pape, M. “Chronologie politique de la Côte d’Ivoire, du coup d’État aux élections.” In Côte d’Ivoire. L’année terrible 1999–2000, ed. M. LePape, 12–50. Paris: Editions Karthala, 2003a. Le Pape, M. “Les politiques d’affrontement en Côte d’Ivoire 1999–2003.” Afrique contemporaine 206, no. 2 (2003b): 29–39. LeBlanc, M.N. Youth, Islam and Changing Identities in Bouaké, Côte d’Ivoire, PhD thesis, University College London, 1998. LeBlanc, M.N. “The Production of Islamic Identities Through Knowledge Claims in Bouaké, Côte d’Ivoire.” African Affairs 98, no. 393 (1999): 485–508. LeBlanc, M.N. “From Piety to Leadership: Embodied and Militant Religiosity Among Muslim Women in Côte d’Ivoire.” Islamic Africa 5, no. 2 (2014): 167–198. LeBlanc, M.N. “Precarious Agency in the Face of ‘Good Governance’: The NGO-Isation of Muslim Women’s Associations in Côte d’Ivoire.” In Faith and Charity: Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa, eds. M.N. LeBlanc and L. Audet Gosselin, 85–104. London: Pluto Press, 2016. LeBlanc, M.N. and L. Audet Gosselin. Faith and Charity: Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa. London: Pluto Press, 2016. Marshall, K. and M. Van Saanen. Development and Faith: Where Mind, Heart and Soul Work Together. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2007. Marshall-Fratani, R. and Didier Péclard. “La religion du sujet en Afrique.” Politique africaine 87, no. 3 (2002): 5–19. Miran, M. Islam, histoire et modernité en Côte d’Ivoire. Paris: Editions Karthala, 2006. Petersen, M.J. For Humanity or for the Umma? Aid and Islam in Transnational Muslim NGOs. London: Hurst, 2016. Prince, R. “Seeking Incorporation? Voluntary Labor and the Ambiguities of Work, Identity, and Social Value in Contemporary Kenya.” African Studies Review 58, no. 2 (2015): 85–109. Reid-Henry, S.S. “Humanitarianism as Liberal Diagnostic: Humanitarian Reasons and the Political Rationalities of Liberal Will-to-Care.” Transactions 39, no. 3 (2014): 418–431. Salih, M.A.M. Islamic NGOs in Africa: The Promise and Peril of Islamic Voluntarism. Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, 2002.

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Islamic NGOs in Somalia and Their Role in the Somali State-Building Process Valeria Saggiomo Introduction In early 2006, the failure of two rainy seasons, the Deyr and the Gu, dried up water sources in Somalia, resulting in considerable livestock deaths, widespread crop failure, especially in southern regions. Consequently, livestock prices dropped considerably, food prices increased and the purchasing power of most families in the South was eroded significantly.1 There were impressive movements of population and livestock within Somalia and across the border to Kenya and Ethiopia, in search for food, water and pasture. The United Nations estimated more than two million people in need of urgent aid,2 and the

1 For

a good description of the crises and of the emergency response, see “Somalia: Real Time Evaluation of the 2006 Emergency Response. Final Report 11/12/2006,” available at https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/documents/rte_somalia_report_final_2006.pdf. 2 “Somalia Consolidate Appeal 2006,” accessed 8 August 2019, https://www. humanitarianresponse.info/ru/programme-cycle/space/document/consolidatedappeal-somalia-2006.

V. Saggiomo (*)  University of Naples “L’Orientale”, Naples, Italy e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 H. Weiss (ed.), Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38308-4_5

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humanitarian response was organized in line with the newly launched (2005) humanitarian reform.3 The year 2006 was also a period of profound political changes in Somalia; early that year, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) emerged as a new political actor in Central Southern Somalia.4 Forced to take a political stand against the US-backed warlords Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, the ICU managed to overrun much of Mogadishu city in less than one month. By June 2006, the ICU had complete control over Mogadishu. The declared aim of the ICU was to bring an alternative means of governance to the factional politics based on clan loyalty, using the Sharia Law as an equalitarian tool for imposing rules and order. When a dire drought hit the country causing one of the most severe emergencies in the last ten years, most of Southern Somalia was dominated by three main Islamist groups that composed the ICU. Many Somali NGOs, all ideologically linked to the underground Islamist movement Al Islah, mobilized resources to address the onset of the emergency and provide immediate support to the victims with dried fruits to prevent malnutrition and shelters for people on the move. From the advent of the ICU in Mogadishu in 2006, religious factions concurred to enriching the plethora of actors engaged in conflict dynamics in the war-torn Somalia. The majority of literature produced since the advent of the Islamic Courts in Mogadishu in 2006 was dedicated to explaining the role of political Islam in perpetrating the conflict in Somalia. In opposition to such perspective, this study interrogates on the role played by Islamic NGOs in providing aid and welfare in the ungoverned south-central Somalia. It highlights the constructive activism of that part of the Somali civil society that organized around religious institutions to provide humanitarian aid and social services to the population. The study shows that, in the absence of a formal state able to oversee social policy, 3 At that time, the author was involved in the humanitarian response as Emergency Cluster Coordinator for UNICEF Somalia. 4 For a detailed description of the Islamic Courts phenomenon, see Roland Marchal, “Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War,” In Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, ed. Alex de Waal (Addis Abeba: Shama Books, 2004), 114–145; Cedric Barnes and Harun Hassan, “The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts,” Chatham House Briefing Papers, 2007; Andre Le Sage, “Stateless Justice in Somalia: Formal & Informal Rule of Law Initiatives,” Research Report for UNDP-Somalia, Published by HD Centre, 2005.

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those faith-based organizations, which are referred to as Islamic NGOs, take steps to compensate for the lack of a proper government, particularly in the provision of social services such as education and health. In doing so, this work intends to contribute to fill the paucity of literature on Islamic humanitarianism in Somalia, describing Islamic NGOs’ role in contributing to the country’s development, to the construction of a social and political system, standing as an alternative to official governmental institutions. What underlies the analysis of the role of Islamic NGOs in a fragile State like Somalia is the relationship between Islamic NGOs and the Islamist movements that, in the wake of the fall of the Siad Barre government, became dominant in the country’s political panorama, with particular reference to the Somali Islamist movement Al Islah. Two main reasons justify the choice of Al Islah among the Islamist movements that were active in Somalia when the research started in 2007. Firstly because, being part of the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Islah opted for a strategy of penetration into the hearts and minds of the Somali people through social activism and the work of Islamic NGOs to build consensus and legitimacy among rural as well as urban population. This strategy enormously contributed to boost the growth and the proliferation of Islamic NGOs in Somalia that is under analysis in this research. Secondly, at the time of field research (2008–2010) Al Islah articulated its own image as a tolerant, peaceful Islamist movement, clearly distancing itself from those radical groups that allowed the use of force as a political tool to access power. Though still underground at that time, this political position of Al Islah,5 allowed a relative secure research environment, despite a general climate of distrust by Islamic organizations due to the concomitant war on terror led by the United States in Somalia through its intelligence. Although not openly planned as a comparative study between Somalia and other countries, this research highly benefited from the results of the few similar works conducted in Jordan, Iran, Yemen and Egypt, using 5 The author owes gratitude to Dr. Abdurahman Moallin Abdullahi, former vice-President of Al Islah Islamist Movement for his decision to disclose to her information about the movement that was underground when the field research was on, for discussing the strategies, sharing the views and projections of Al Islah Movement. His insight constitutes much of the base for the author’s own understanding of the Islamic NGO phenomenon in Somalia.

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the same theoretical framework and, where possible, research methodology.6 The theoretical framework underlying this research sees NGOs as part of social movements and takes Assef Bayat to stand according to which Islamist movements are dynamic processes whose continuous evolution depends on internal and external factors and on the current historical context.7 Islamic NGOs are conceived as associations of people led by Islamic values, either formally or informally set up, that, as in the case of this study, may become part of the network of an Islamist movement, Al Islah, to pursue its political goal, either consciously or not. Therefore, civil society and Islam are inextricably linked to interpret and explain contemporary power structures in Somalia where Islamic NGOs play a crucial role in designing political spaces that are alternative to official Federal Institutions and equidistant from political Islam movements, population and politicians. This political space is where Islamic NGOs exercise their governance role in Somalia, as this study argues. What follows derives from a set of in-depth interviews to the representatives of Islamic NGOs operating in Somalia from 2007 to 2010 and to one of the three leaders of the moderate Islamist movement that gave impulse to the rise of Islamic NGO phenomenon in the aftermath of the fall of the Siad Barre government in 1991.

The Rise of Islamic NGOs in Somalia The origin and the spread of Islamic NGOs in Africa from the 1980s onwards is part of a general growth of the association phenomenon following the setup of the United Nations in 1945. The acronym NGO itself was coined by the United Nations in 1945 in order to acknowledge a consulting role to those voluntary civil society associations who were keen in participating to the definition of the UN Chart in San Francisco. That moment stands as a cornerstone of civil society participation in 6 Reference is made to the research coordinated by Quintan Wiktorowicz on Islamic Activism in the aftermath of the US decision to launch a military campaign in Afghanistan in response to the September 11 attacks by Al Qaeda in September 2001. The research was aimed at gathering scholarly contributions to the subject of Islamic activism, framed broadly as the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes. See Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism. A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 2. 7 Assef Bayat headed the Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) where the author spent a fellowship in 2008, supervised by Prof. Martin Van Bruinessen.

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public life at international level. From there onward, NGOs enjoyed a massive growth in the world as well as in Africa, particularly after the independence of many countries from colonies during the 1960s and the 1970s. According to Mohamed Salih,8 the growth of associations in Africa is also explained by the concomitance of three triggering factors: the economic crises that many African countries underwent after independence; the unstable political situation from the end of the 1980s that exacerbated poverty; a governance crises that weakened State institutions further. The weackened capacity by many African States to provide social welfare opened the way to NGOs activism in filling the gaps and assist the population with social services and humanitarian aid. Together with lay NGOs, faith-based organizations proliferated, including Islamic NGOs. According to Jonathan Benthall, Islamic NGOs derive from Islamist movements who opposed the occupation by Israel of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, Egyptian Sinai and Syrian Golan in 1967. That occupation generated a vast opposition of people forced to flee in the neighbouring countries who brooded over feelings of revenge and retaliation of the Arab-Muslim world against Israel and the United States.9 What scholars like Gilles Kepel, Oliver Roy and others call Islamic Resurgence, Islamic Revivalism, Political Islam or simply Islamic Activism derives from this sentiment of revenge and brings a political project aimed at reforming lay States with a majority of Muslim population and turn them into Islamic States, based on the Sharia. According to Mohamed Salih, this political project is carried out also through the work of Islamic NGOs whose objective is to defend and promote Islamic values, including the concept of social justice through what the international cooperation knows as the politics of social welfare.10 The Islamic NGOs created in the Arab countries11 and in the Middle East took root in Africa also thanks to the African diasporas. The process 8 M.A. Mohamed Salih, “Islamic NGOs in Africa: The Promise and Peril of Islamic Voluntarism,” in Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, ed. Alex De Waal (Addis Abeba: Shama Books, 2004), 46–181. 9 Jonathan Benthall, “Islamic Charities, Faith-Based Organizations, and the International Aid System,” in Understanding Islamic Charities, eds. Jon B. Alterman and Karin von Hippel (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies CSIS Press, 2007), 1–14. 10 Salih, “Islamic NGOs in Africa,” 180–181. 11 Arab countries are taken to be the countries that belong to the Arab League, especially the oil-producing countries that have financed aid schemes for development in Africa.

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of migration towards the main countries that were fostering Islamist movements brought young Muslims from the African nations affected by the emergencies into contact with the nascent reforming ideals. When they returned to their countries these young Muslims formed associations to promote the new political Islam, together with Islamic NGOs to provide humanitarian aid and basic social services. Thus, migratory processes and African diasporas were fundamental factors in the spread of Islamic NGOs in Africa, as the case of Ghana studied by Holger Weiss indicates.12 Also in Somalia, many of the Islamic NGOs that were active in the mid-1990s up to 2011 were established by Somali diaspora returnees. These people left the country during the late 1970s, after the President Siad Barre started suppressing the dissidence of religious leaders against the Reform of the Family Law that allowed women to ask for divorce. After the execution of ten members of the Islamic opposition to Siad Barre socialist government, many of the young people who had taken part in the protests against the reform of the family law that intended to modify the traditional role of women in the society, fled the country for fear of political persecution and took refuge in the neighbour Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.13 There, Somali Islamist opponents were able gradually to meet and regroup,14 also favoured by the support of Saudi Arabia that offered hundreds of scholarships to Somali students, many of whom were subsequently admitted to Islamic universities worldwide.15 The Somali diaspora in the neighbouring Arab countries grew considerably at the end of

12 Holger Weiss, “Reorganising Social Welfare Among Muslims: Islamic Voluntarism and Other Forms of Communal Support in the Northern Ghana,” Journal of Religion in Africa 32, no. 1 (2002): 83–109. 13 For details, see Valeria Saggiomo, “The Rise of Islamic Resurgence in Somalia,” in Politics and Minorities in Africa, eds. Marisa Fois and Alessandro Pes (Roma: ARACNE, 2013), 245–270. 14 Abdurahman M. Abdullahi, “Tribalism and Islam: The Basics of Somaliness,” in Variations on the Theme of Somaliness, ed. S. Lilius (Turku: Centre for Continuing Education, 2001), 235. 15 Abdurahman M. Abdullahi and Ibrahim Farah, “Reconciling the State and Society in Somalia: Reordering Islamic Work and Clan System.” Paper read at the Somali Studies Association Conference, Ohio, 2008.

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the Ogaden war, in 1978, when 250,000 Somalis crossed to the Arabian Peninsula.16 These Somalis devoted themselves above all to commerce and gradually achieved positions of importance at management level in the host countries.17 Following the fall of the Siad Barre government in 1991, the subsequent power struggle and civil war generated a political and humanitarian crisis that urged the international community to intervene with aid and emergency military operations.18 Saudi Arabia was one of the most active donors, sending food, troops and encouraging its Islamic NGOs to enter Somalia to deal with humanitarian aspects and aid distribution.19 This practice was followed by other countries, including Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.20 Islamic NGOs, as well as lay international NGOs entered Somalia during the early 1990s to contribute to the humanitarian aid missions for which the international contingent was providing protection. Among the Islamic NGOs, the Somali Red Crescent Society, the Saudi Islamic NGO IIROSA, affiliated with the NGO Muslim World League (MWL), the Saudi World Association of Muslim Youth21 (WAMY), which had been supporting Somali refugees in Kenya since 1991, the Kuwaiti NGO Africa Muslim Agency22 (AMA), which began to contribute in 1992-1993, the 16 A good description of the exodus of the Somalis towards the Arabian peninsula can be found in Ismail I. Ahmed, “Remittances and Their Economic Impact in Somaliland,” in Variations on the Theme of Somaliness, ed. Suzanne Lilius (Turku: Centre for Continuing Education, 2001), 184–188. See also Joakim Gundel, The ­Migration-Development Nexus. Somali Case-Study (Copenhagen, Denmark: Centre for Development Research, 2002). 17 David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia. Nation in Search of a State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 145. 18 The United Nations Security Council resolution of 3 December 1992 launched the Operation Restore Hope under the military leadership of the United States with the United Nations supervising humanitarian aid. 19 Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia. The Missed Opportunities (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), 32. 20 United Nations Operations in Somalia I (UNOSOM-I), Department of Public Information, United Nations www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/MIssions/unosomi.htm. 21 Interview with Ibrahim Irshad, Representative for WAMY-Kenya, Nairobi, 9 May 2008. 22 Interview with Abdi Hussein Abdi, officer at AMA, and with Mohamed Bashir, Director of the AMA office in Mogadishu, Nairobi 14 May 2008.

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Sudanese Munazzamat al Dawa al Islamiya which arrived in Mogadishu in 1992, and the Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Emirates which was active not only in the health sector but also in primary education. When Islamic NGOs first started operating in the country, with the economic backing of Arab donors and the humanitarian division of UNOSOM, they focused almost exclusively on humanitarian aid. Like all the NGOs present on the territory, they distributed foodstuffs, set up nutritional centres to monitor the state of malnutrition among adults and children in the period immediately after the famine of 1992, and saw to the provision of drinking water. From the end of 1994, when the UNOSOM forces began to be scaled down, causing security in the capital to degenerate, the international NGOs and the United Nations agencies moved out of the south of Somalia and transferred to nearby Nairobi, from where humanitarian aid and support for the country’s pacification continued to be administered. Due to increased insecurity in Somalia, many organizations abandoned the country. The media too left the country after the departure of the last UNOSOM contingent in 1995. Once Somalia was no longer in the spotlight, the economic engagement of donor countries to face up to the humanitarian emergency and underwrite the reconstruction programmes also faded away. In the five-year period from the end of the UNOSOM mission to 1999, the official development assistance for Somalia from Arab countries dropped from about 100 million dollars in the preceding five-year period to little more than 1 million dollars, all of it, at least officially, being made over to the United Nations.23 With the exception of the two French NGOs Médecins sans Frontières and Action contre la Faim who did not leave Somalia at the end of the UNOSOM mission, the local and international Islamic NGOs were the only organizations left in Somalia to cater for the needs of the population, in the grip of a humanitarian emergency.24 In particular, those

23 Valeria Saggiomo, “Models of Aid to Somalia,” Journal of Internal Displacement 3, no. 2 (July 2013): 29. 24 Khalif Farah, “The Role of Islam in Peace Building and Conflict Resolution in Somalia,” in War Destroyes, Peace Nurtures. Reconciliation and Development in Somalia, eds. Richard Ford, Hussein M. Adam, and Edna Adam Ismail (Asmara: The Red Sea Press, 2004), 301–314.

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NGOs which were not necessarily dependent on international funds remained active, and they managed to mobilize human and financial resources from both within and outside the country, drawing on the Somali diaspora dispersed worldwide. The shortfall in funding obliged many Islamic NGOs to reduce their interventions and select the type of assistance to offer on the basis not only of local necessity but also, and above all, of the desire for reconstruction which from the ­mid-nineties onwards began to take root among the aid associations present in Somalia. The void created by the absence of the Western NGOs and the sudden loss of interest in Somalia on the part of the international community was thus in part filled by the Islamic NGOs which took over responsibility for reactivating the fundamental social services by involving Somali professionals and the civil society.25 Moreover, the withdrawal of the Western NGOs provided an excellent opportunity for the Islamic NGOs to extend their workforce, taking on Somali humanitarian operators who had been trained by the international organizations and suddenly found themselves out of a job.26 The population thus came to count almost exclusively on the religious structures, mosques, Islamist groups and Islamic NGOs for aid and this marked the very beginning of a consensus-building process that created legitimacy for all the associations with a religious matrix, the Islamic NGOs and the Islamist movement Al Islah that was backing them. The National Somali University, which had been previously facilitated by the Italian cooperation, became the epicentre of the network of Somali students in the diaspora, many of them affiliated to Al Islah and called to engage in what the movement named Al Igatha wa Taqlim, the humanitarian aid scheme.27

25 Jabril Abdulle, “Civil Society in the Absence of a Somali State,” in Somalia. Current Conflicts and New Chances for State Building, eds. Axel Harneit-Sievers and Dirk Spilker (Berlin: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2008), 70–87. 26 André LeSage and Ken Menkhaus, “The rise of Islamic Charities in Somalia: An Assessment of Impact and Agendas.” Paper presented to the 45th Annual International Studies Association Convention, Montreal, 2004. 27 Abdulrahman M. Abdullahi, “The Islah Movement. Islamic Moderation in War-Torn Somalia.” Paper presented at the Second Nordic Horn of Africa Conference. Norway: Oslo University, November 2008.

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Social and Economic Impact of Islamic NGOs in Somalia After the departure of UNOSOM from Somalia, the purely humanitarian approach relying primarily on assistance that was typically adopted by Islamic NGOs in the early 1990s came to be replaced by more structured and lasting interventions. Islamic NGOs started focusing on the creation of social services for the population, above all in the education and health sectors, but also in the promotion of peace and mediation between the factions in conflict. After the failure of the UNOSOM mission, in 1994 private schools were set up and supported by both Islamic and foreign NGOs which were then moving into Somalia.28 This involved in particular the Kuwaiti NGO AMA, the Saudi IIROSA, the Red Crescent Society, Africa Relief Committee and Sudanese Munazzamat al DAWA, all working in collaboration with local organizations. These charities received financial support from their headquarters but launched schemes to make the schools financially sustainable, in collaboration with the local communities, so that the reference NGO could gradually reduce its support for the management costs of the schools until the school achieved complete financial and administrative viability in the space of three years. Interviews to the representatives of the Islamic NGOs active in the education sector in Somalia revealed that the strategic partnership with the local communities represented one of the cornerstones of the operating modalities of the Islamic NGOs, together with training of the personnel, teachers included, and the principle of non-alliance with the political factions. The shift in focus by Islamic NGOs from humanitarian support to the provision of social services to the population implied a sectoral specialization by all Islamic NGOs involved, at various degrees, in Al Islah Islamist movement’ strategic approach to power. In particular, the sectors of education, promotion of gender equality and promotion of peace were the ones around which Islamic NGOs organized their activities from the departure of UNOSOM Mission in 1995. It was exactly in 1995, in fact, that the Coalition for Grassroots Women Organization (COGWO) was set up. In the run-up to the 4th United Nations World Conference on 28 Interview with Sheikh Farah Abdulkadir, at 1994 Director of the Islamic NGO AMA Somalia. Nairobi, 28 July 2008.

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Women in Beijing, a group of Somali women decided to pool the efforts of a number of associations to create a single more powerful organization to make their voices heard in Somalia and the world at large.29 On its return to Mogadishu in January 1996, the COGWO network became a reality, bringing together some 20-30 local NGOs under one umbrella organization intent on providing support for Somali women in the socio-economic and political spheres. COGWO set out to lay the foundations for a genuine women’s rights movement as both a local and international interlocutor and to promote the cause of women’s rights in the country. The participating NGOs were all local bodies, some with offices in Nairobi and the countries of the diaspora where they received the most support, as in the case of SAACID which had a headquarters in Australia and another in the United States.30 Since forming a network, many of the small local NGOs had access to funding from important international donors, including Novib, Oxfam and United Nations agencies such as UNIFEM, specifically for gender issues, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNDP, Mercy-USA and the European Commission bureau for emergencies ECHO. In terms of fundraising, COGWO proved very skilful in mobilizing the international aid community, as well as the Somali diaspora. In 2007, contributions from the diaspora in Britain, Canada, South Africa, Uganda and the United States totalled nearly 190,000 dollars, which was distributed to support 23 women who were victims of rape and illness, some of whom were taken to Minnesota for specialized medical assistance.31 In order to optimize its international relations COGWO opened headquarters in Dubai and Nairobi, as well as its main one in Mogadishu, and later joined various transnational networks, including Africa Women Development and Communication Network (FEMNET), East Africa Sub-regional Support Initiative (EASSI) and Strategic 29 Faiza Jama Mohamed, “Somali Women and Peacebuilding,” in Whose Peace Is It Anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking, eds. Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy. Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, Issue 21 (London: Conciliation Resources, 2010), 62–65. See also Faiza Jama Mohamed, Women in Peace and Transition Processes. Somalia 2000. Geneva: Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative, The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2018. 30 “The Sisters. Saacid Australia—Saacid International” SAACID website, accessed 7 August 2019, www.saacid.org. 31 Hassan Sheikh and Sally Healy, Somalia’s Missing Million: The Somali Diaspora and Its Role in Development (Nairobi: UNDP, 2009).

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Initiative for Horn of Africa (SIHA). COGWO’s objective was to bring social change in the Somali society, promoting discussions and public debates on women’s rights under the Sharia law. In the first five years, COGWO embarked on a massive social campaign in Benadir Region where 80 religious forums served as a platform to discuss gender equality and human rights from the Islamic perspective. In 2000, based on these discussions, through funds by the Dutch NGO Novib, COGWO produced booklets on the family law that was based exclusively on Sharia and used them to train members and other women activists as change agents.32 In 2003, the network engaged in the promotion of peace and security through the establishment of a “peace army” of women activists trained to sensitize the population on the gender dimension of insecurity in Mogadishu. This group of activist women promoted a c­ ommunity-level security structure with the objective to watch and report on abuses on women and girls in the capital city.33 Mobilizing the community and linking with other networks of NGOs to maximize its action was the main strategy adopted by COGWO to produce an impact in the Somali society. Similarly, another network of Islamic NGOs engaged in social change campaigns in those years, the Formal Private Education Network in Somalia (FPENS). This network grouped organizations which offered formal, private education accessible only on payment of fees by students’ families. From 1992, some local and international Islamic NGOs began to work in the education sector in the centre-south of the country, supporting a small number of schools. The war and the dissolution of the state institutions responsible for education meant there was no longer a mechanism for the recognition of school qualifications, an official calendar for the school year or a standard curriculum. Thus in 1998 the group of Islamic NGOs decided to join forces, and FPENS was set up in 1999. Initially, it covered 14 organizations working in the education sector, including Imam Shafi, ZAMZAM 32 “COGWO—Coalition for Grassroots Somali Women’s Organizations” Women’s UN Report Network (WUNRN), accessed 1 August 2019, https://wunrn.com/2009/06/ somalia-coalition-for-womens-ngos-undp-somali-diaspora-study/. 33 Ralph Johnstone, Pioneers for Peace. Advancing the Involvement of Women in Peace Building in S­outh-Central Somalia (Mogadishu: Centre for Research and Dialogue, 2007), 18. http://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/01/2007_SomSC_ Interpeace_CRD_The_Involvement_Of_Women_EN.pdf.

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foundation, United Arab Emirates, Red Crescent, AMA, joined later by WAMY and other NGOs.34 Differently from the work of the single organizations, the network was intended to function as an umbrella organization of Islamic charities with the aim to offer coordination services to schools that were affiliated to the linked Islamic NGOs. Among the services offered, the network concentrated on the certification of school qualifications. This required a unified exam system and the formation of a commission to supervise the award of diplomas. The presence of the Transitional National Government in 2000 and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2005 made it possible to obtain the recognition of FPENS diplomas by the relative education ministries. Then, attention turned to establishing a unified curriculum by integrating curricula from Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt. In 2000, a standard curriculum was agreed on for primary schools using Arabic as the language of instruction for humanistic subjects and English for scientific subjects. Between 2003 and 2006, work proceeded on revising and upgrading the textbooks that were translated into Arabic by the Islamic NGO WAMY. The new books for primary school elaborated by FPENS network were then printed and distributed in 2006 in the schools of the FPENS, thanks to funding from the Islamic Development Bank and with the approval of the then Ministry of Education. In 2006, FPENS transferred to a central headquarters in Mogadishu, which housed the organization’s organs, the teacher training centre, a resource centre for the civil society supported by UNDP and a library. According to local testimonies,35 the schools supported by the Islamic NGOs of FPENS were appreciated locally for the high quality of teaching and the possibility of completing education up to university level thanks to scholarships funded by some Arab countries. A study carried out jointly in 2003 by the Islamic NGO WAMY-Somalia and the NGO Novib reports that, between 1999 and 2002, a total of 261 Somali students from schools associated with FPENS obtained scholarships to

34 The history of FPENS given here was outlined by Abdulkadir Sheikh Farah, ex-President of FPENS and currently member of the board. Interview with Abdulkadir Sheikh Farah, Nairobi, 6 August 2008. 35 Collected in Somalia by the author between 2003 and 2006.

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attend university, above all in Egypt and Sudan, countries that since 2004 have had consulates in Somalia.36 Originally made up of 14 Islamic NGOs, ten years after its creation FPENS expanded significantly, claiming the participation of some 80 NGOs, whose schools benefited from its services as if they were guidelines provided by the Ministry of Education. The network of Islamic NGOs managed to make up for the shortcomings due to the absence of a proper Ministry of Education and extended its scope of action beyond the confines of the country, thanks to the network of relations and influence which its members maintain with some Arab countries with a Muslim majority such as Egypt and Sudan.37 Among basic social services offered to the population by Islamic NGOs, there were also hospitals and clinics, set up in urban areas, particularly around the capital Mogadishu. Funded by the Islamic Development Bank, Arafat Hospital is an example of the engagement of Islamic NGOs in the health sector in Somalia. In most of cases, public donations covered the cost of the infrastructures and the provision of medical equipment. Islamic NGO then managed the hospital organization and the service supply in a way to ensure the financial sustainability of the investment by the Bank. Financial sustainability was achieved by making the health service conditional to the payment of a fee by its customers. For instance, Arafat hospital in Mogadishu earned some 160,000 dollars per year from its outpatient medical visits.38 Similarly, the NGO Al Tadamun in Puntland earned about 600,000 dollars from the management of its schools. This sum, according to accounts, was reinvested in the education sector by the NGO so to obtain a net income of 5–10% of the yearly investment. This kind of management profiled the creation of a private social welfare established by Islamic NGOs in Somalia, that competed successfully

36 WAMY/NOVIB. “Arab Donor Policies and Practices Regarding Education in Somalia/Land. A Joint Research Project of Somalia,” unpublished, 2003. 37 For further information on FPENS, see Valeria Saggiomo, “From Charity to Governance: Islamic NGOs and Education in Somalia,” The Open Area Studies Journal 4, no. 1 (April 2011): 53–61. 38 This amount is a calculation of the author based on accounts from LeSage and Menkhaus, “The Rise of Islamic Charities in Somalia,” The authors refer to 1.5 USD per visit per 300 visits a day.

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with services offered for free by the international cooperation, thanks to the high standards Islamic NGOs were capable to ensure, and their capacity to recruit and pay for, good doctors and teachers. Public donations and fees from users were not the only financial source for Islamic NGO’s welfare system. Private funds deriving from religious donations (zakat) as well as self-taxation became commonly used from 2000 onwards to support the activities of Islamic NGOs in Somalia. With regard to self-taxation, an example is provided by the FPENS network whose financial resources derived from member organizations as well as service fees. As explained by one of FPENS leaders, every charity organization, in fact, paid a one-off fee to join the network that, in 2008, was set at the equivalent of 200 USD. The monthly fees corresponded to 2 USD per school class and were due by all charities. As the number of classes organized by all the FPENS members was about 2000 in 2008, it is possible to approximate the monthly incomes of the network around 4000 USD per month. This money was reportedly used to cover the network’s running costs. The remainder of the money, according to accounts, was reinvested in the FPENS’s structure and meant, for example, to help stock the FPENS’s library or the resource centre in Mogadishu that are mainly accessible to teachers for in-service training.39 Private donations from the Muslim community, both locally and in the world, were another source of funding for Islamic NGOs in Somalia during the early 2000s. According to narratives collected in Somalia between 2003 and 2006, in Somalia the collection of zakat40 was not publicly organized; consequently, its collection and redistribution were managed on a personal basis and facilitated by Sheiks for what concerns its calculation. According to Sheiks interviewed in Somalia, zakat donation was widely practised in the 2000s, as a mandatory act in every Muslim society. The calculation of zakat was however very complicated and represented an annual event as the Ramadan period approached. Since Somali economy was mainly based on livestock, zakat was calculated on the number and kind of animals that somebody owned. The rate for calculating zakat varied for each animal, and the she-camel was the

39 Interview

with Sheik Farah Abdulkadir, Nairobi, 28 July 2008. is an annual mandatory duty, usually paid during the month of Ramadan. Zakat traditional amounts to 2.5% of individual property, including business profits gained within the Muslim calendar year (354 days). 40 ­Zakat-giving

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most valuable property. Sheiks in the mosques were consulted for the zakat calculation but, at 2011, they only had an advisory role.41 Since the early 2000s, websites of the main Islamic NGOs operating in the country revealed an increased capacity to collect and manage zakat funds, as the case of Tadamun charity, whose annual budget in 2005 was supported by zakat donations for up to 35%.42 Likewise, the tool of waqf 43 was widespread among Islamic NGOs in Somalia, particularly for the premises in use for charitable purposes, or as offices of Islamic non-profit organizations. Although more research would necessitate to estimate the impact of religious donations on aid and development in Somalia, accounts point towards a trend by Islamic NGOs in Somalia to diversify financial sources from the 2000s, due to the need to maximize fundraising efforts and to minimize the consequences of the sudden closure of funds channels, as it happened from 2001 due to restrictive measures imposed by the US anti-terrorism campaign. Diversification of sources by Islamic NGOs in Somalia included approaching western donors, as the Dutch NGO Novib, and some UN agencies like UNDP and UNICEF.

Islamic NGOs and Access to Political Power Beginning from the late 1990s, Islamic NGOs in Somalia show a marked tendency to form partnerships as a way to strengthen their impact in the Somali society and outside. A sectoral strategy led Islamic NGOs to group according to specific sectors of social welfare, such as gender promotion and education so to gradually act as official interlocutors of the population in a state-vacant context. In exercising the role of a Ministry of Education, as in the case of FPENS curriculum development activities or in the school certification service, Islamic NGOs took on important 41 Interview with Dr. Abdi Nur, Somali medical doctor, in his quality of zakat payer. Nairobi, 19 April 2008. Dr. Abdi Nur also reported that both men and women pay zakat: if a Somali woman owns jewellery and she does not wear it for one year, she needs to give a percentage of that jewellery for annual zakat. 42 “Annual Report 2005” Al Tadamun Charity, accessed April 2010, https://www.tadamun.so/annual-report/. 43 Waqf in Arabic means “perpetuity” and indicates a property that is passed under Islamic law by gift or testament to the state or to NGOs for charitable purposes, such as the building of mosques and schools, providing the public with drinking water, facilitating pilgrimages to Mecca, or the relief of poverty and other needs.

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government functions, playing, de facto, a political role in a fragile State context. Until 2012 elections, this political role by Islamic NGOs was however informal and still circumscribed in the civic sphere. Gradually, from the early 2000s onward, Islamic NGOs attempted to access formal political power in order to root their action into the structural set up of the country. The case of the third Somali network of Islamic NGOs, The Peace and Human Rights Network (PHRN-INXA), presented in this work describes their political ambition achieved through a network approach. The PHRN-INXA44 was created in 1997 by a group of 29 organizations including various local NGOs such as IIDA, Hirda, SADO and Horn Relief. Worth to note, not all of these NGOs did include the religious aspect among their motivations and objectives, however they all contributed to the objectives of the network to permeate the political sphere and advance their social demands at a higher political level. To achieve this objective, intra-network cooperation was used as a strategy to maximize access to the political arena, particularly in 2000 during the Arta Peace Conference where three women from COGWO were appointed to positions in Parliament and the Government.45 As of 13 February 2012, PHRN’s homepage listed that the aim of PHRN was to contribute to building a lasting peace in the country through the respect for human rights. It did this by encouraging civil society to participate in campaigns of information and promotion of peace, debates and conferences about reconciliation, coordinating the circulation of calls for peace and supporting the rights of women, children and minorities.46 From figures reported on its website, the PHRN got substantial backing from international donors including the European Commission, Care and USAID as well as Novib, from which it received virtually all its funding. In 1998, Novib supported PHRN with a little over 30,000 euro per year; this figure stood at 340,000 euro in the years 2003–2005 and 360,000 euro for the subsequent two-year period. In pursuing its mission, the PHRN interacted on three levels: locally, mobilizing the population to take part in the public 44 Known in Somalia by the acronym INXA, Hay’adda Isku Xirka Nabadda iyo Xuqququl Insaanka. 45 Jama Mohamed, “Somali Women and Peacebuilding.” 46 “Organizational Profile,” www.inxa.org, last modified 30 September 2007, accessed 13 February 2012.

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demonstrations organized by the network including peace marches, processions etc., and raising awareness of the relevant issues; at the intermediate level aimed at setting up partnerships with other organizations in civil society and furthering networks by means of meetings and conferences; and finally at the top level, as an interlocutor of national and international governmental institutions. In fact, the network interacted with such national institutions as the Federal Transition Government and, from 2006, with the ICU, pursuing intense diplomatic activity to obtain recognition and permission to operate in Somalia, as stated in the PHRN Annual Report for 2007.47 At the international level, PHRN established itself as a network which represented the Somali civil society for peace, taking part in important international events concerning national policy and its progress towards peace. Among these, we can certainly enumerate the Peace Conferences held in Arta in 2000 and in Mbagathi in 2004 and the meeting of the Contact Group48 in January 2007. On this occasion the network, in the person of its President, presented to Jendayi Frazer, assistant to the American Secretary of State for African Affairs, an appeal for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia and the constitution of a peacekeeping force of the African Union which would exclude troops from neighbouring countries.49 The PHRN represented a platform to gain official access to the political process that the international community was supporting in Somalia. In 2008, representatives from the PHRN participated in the Djibouti Peace Process that was aimed at building a constructive peace dialogues between the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS).50 Representatives of the PHRN as well as of other Islamic 47 “PHRN Annual Report of the Civil Society and Advocacy Development,” www.inxa. org, accessed 13 February 2012. 48 The Contact Group was set up in June 2006 to discuss interventions of pacification and reconciliation in Somalia, following the ICU’s conquest of the south of the country. The Contact Group provided informal coordination and consultation and was made up of the Ambassadors of the chief donor nations to Somalia: United States, Norway, Italy, Sweden, Britain, the EU Presidency and Commission, Tanzania and Somalia, with the Foreign Minister of the Transition Government, plus the African Union, IGAD, Arab League and United Nations as observers. 49 The Peace and Human Rights Network (PHRN), “Annual Report of the Civil Society and Advocacy Development 2007,” http://www.inxa.org, accessed 13 February 2012. 50 Interview to Ibrahim Farah, 31 July 2008, Nairobi.

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NGOs networks were grouped in the National Civic Forum, a project aimed at facilitating the participation of civil society groups to political processes in Somalia, implemented by the German NGO Heinrich Boll Foundation with funds from the European Union. Among civil society representatives, there was Abdurahman Moallin Abdullahi, vice-president of Al Islah underground Islamist movement and prominent member of the PHRN. As an outcome of the Djibouti peace process of 2008, the Somali Parliament was significantly enlarged from 275 to 550 members, including representatives of the civil society platforms and of Islamic NGOs. In 2009, the new Parliament elected Somalia’s first Islamist President, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a moderate Islamist religious leader who studied in Soudan and Libya before returning to Somalia in 1998. In 2012, new elections brought to power another Islamist leader, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud who was the founder and manager of an important tertiary education institution in Mogadishu. In the 2012 Government, some of the most prominent leaders of Islamic NGOs network became involved in politics. This is the case, for instance, of the President of FPENS Sheikh Farah Abdulkadir who became a legislator under the 2012 government and later a Minister in 2014. Through their platforms, Islamic NGOs facilitated access to a formal political arena by members of the Islamist movement Al Islah in Somalia. When the strategy of Al Islah to access power by non-violent means was accomplished, the movement stopped to work underground and set up political parties.

Conclusions This study describes the rise of Islamic NGOs in Somalia and their role in contributing to peacebuilding and development. Beginning during the Somali civil war, and capitalizing on the fact that there was no government hostile to their social and political aims, the Islamic NGOs played a fundamental role throughout the 1990s in providing humanitarian aid in a war-torn Somalia, in collaboration with secular international NGOs. Initially, Islamic NGOs activities did not differ from the action of the International Community engaged in humanitarian support to the needy population. From 1995 onward, after the failure of the UNOSOM military operation and the departure of the main international NGOs involved in the provision of emergency aid, Islamic NGOs’ orientation

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shifted from humanitarian aid to the provision of social services such as education and health. Supported by their headquarters in Kuwait, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and funded by the Islamic Development Bank as well as by private religious donations, Islamic NGOs operating modality focused on the set up of schools and hospitals, whose management system recalls practices of social entrepreneurship, where the service is conditional to the payment of fees, as discussed in the cases reported in this study. In order to make their social investments financially sustainable, Islamic NGOs set up a private welfare system that was able to offer quality education and health facilities to population in the absence of government-led welfare structures. Interestingly, this private welfare proved to be an opportunity for the Somali population who could benefit from skilled teachers and doctors, from school certification systems that were recognized internationally, from secondary and tertiary education institutions projected to raise an upper middle class potentially able to become the leading future Somalia bourgeoisie. Because of its private nature, this opportunity was not offered to anybody. Education and health services established by Islamic NGOs were directed at the middle class who could afford to pay for fees, who prevalently lived in the urban areas, particularly in the capital Mogadishu. Janine Clark too, in her study of the role of Islamic organizations in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen, described the activities of the Islamic NGOs as part of a system of social networks whose boundaries were limited by the rigid demarcations of social class.51 Alliance with the upper sections of the population as well as assistance to the destitute gradually traced a process of consensus-building and legitimacy in the Somali society by the Islamic NGOs and the Islamist movement Al Islah that was backing them. This process of bottom-up consensus was complemented by a concomitant horizontal networking approach by Islamic NGOs who played governance functions in the sectors they were active, particularly in education, gender and peace promotion. The case of the curriculum development and of the school certification system by the Islamic NGOs Network FPENS is explanatory of their institutional role exercised in Somalia from the late 1990s. Looking at the experiences of the Islamic NGOs in other countries, it is possible to note that such an open governance function is peculiar of 51 Janine Clark, Islam, Charity and Activism. Middle Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 21.

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the Somali context. In fact, exactly due to its feeble formal institutions that were not capable to control potential opposition, Somalia represents an interesting case to observe the strategy of Islamic NGOs’ access to political power. The strategy was based on what can be named as the politics of networks, i.e. formal alliances that, in the absence of functional and effective related Ministries, served to build a collective voice and acquire political strength in a politics vacant State. In the book Islamic Activism, Quintan Wicktorowicz described how the Islamic NGOs increasingly took on the character of networks of politicized individuals, characterized by “fluid boundaries, flexible leadership structures and malleable divisions of labour,”52 rather than the structure of an informal ideology deriving from the Islamist movements NGOs belong to. In Somalia, contrary to Wiktorowicz’s claim, the networks that Al Islah set up between 1997 and 2010 were represented by formally constituted organizations and not only by interpersonal relationships that are covert and difficult to pinpoint. Differently from other countries in which the government represses the emergence of potentially subversive movements, the Islamic NGOs networks in Somalia grew stronger and, in about a decade, they managed to become real platforms for accessing the political sphere, as the Presidential elections in 2012 and 2017 suggest. In fact, in 2012 Al Islah underground movement decided to come out formally and set up a political party. Eventually, the transition from an approaching strategy to a political manoeuvre to access power was about to collapse, as the unity of the movement vanished and various political parties originated from the dissolution of Al Islah. These were the Peace and Development Party, led by Hassan Sh. Mohamud who became President in 2012, the National Unity Party, led by Abdurahman M. Abdullahi, and the Tayo Political Party, whose chair Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo won Presidential elections in 2017. When Al Islah came out officially through the establishment political parties, those networks of NGOs that were strictly linked to the movement gradually disappeared, as the case of the PHRN, while others engaged in the education sector and in the promotion of women rights, respectively the FPENS and the COGWO, undersigned agreements with their line Ministries to ensure complementarity of their action with governmental efforts.

52 Wiktorowicz,

Islamic Activism, 12.

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The Somali case demonstrates that in fragile states, where the absence of strong political institutions leave enough space for civil society to act, Islamic NGOs proliferate and organize themselves in networks to build a collective voice, set up social welfare structures that are alternative to official ones, and play governance functions. A feeble political environment in Somalia was therefore a strength for Islamic NGOs and for Al Islah movement in their trajectory towards power. On this same note, it is worth to add that Islamic NGOs in Somalia continue to grow because they have a largely official constitution, they are openly visible on the territory and skilled in catching the funds of the international cooperation disbursed by both the European Union, the United Nations, the Islamic Development Bank and, recently by the Turkish Government. The impact of Islamic NGOs and Al Islah movement’s work in about two decades in Somalia clearly points towards the permeation of both the society and the political sphere by a new vision of politics that is now inextricably linked to religion. Through their humanitarian activities and later the construction of networks and umbrella organizations, Islamic NGOs brought Islamic Revivalism into the heart of Somali institutions, and probably built a sense of collective identity which has been later embodied in the new Somali Constitution in 2012.53

Bibliography Abdullahi, Abdulrahman M. “The Islah Movement. Islamic Moderation in War-Torn Somalia.” Paper presented at the Second Nordic Horn of Africa Conference. Norway: Oslo University, November 2008. Abdullahi, Abdulrahman M. “Tribalism and Islam: The Basics of Somaliness.” In Variations on the Theme of Somaliness, ed. S. Lilius, 227–240. Turku: Centre for Continuing Education, 2001. Abdullahi, Abdulrahman M. and Ibrahim Farah. “Reconciling the State and Society in Somalia: Reordering Islamic Work and Clan System.” Paper read at the Somali Studies Association Conference, Ohio, 2008. Abdulle, Jabril Ibrahim. “Civil Society in the Absence of a Somali State.” In Somalia. Current Conflicts and New Chances for State Building, eds. Axel Harneit-Sievers and Dirk Spilker, 70–87. Berlin: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2008. 53 Adopted on August 2012, The Federal Republic of Somalia, Provisional Constitution is based on the foundations of the Holy Quran and the Sunna of the prophet Mohamed, as stated in Article 3(1).

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Ahmed, Ismail I. “Remittances and Their Economic Impact in Somaliland.” In Variations on the Theme of Somaliness, ed. Suzanne Lilius, 184–188. Turku: Centre for Continuing Education, 2001. Barnes, Cedric and Harun Hassan. “The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts.” Chatham House Briefing Papers, 2007. Benthall, Jonathan. “Islamic Charities, Faith-Based Organizations, and the International Aid System.” In Understanding Islamic Charities, eds. Jon B. Alterman and Karin von Hippel, 1–14. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies CSIS Press, 2007. Clark, Janine. Islam, Charity and Activism. Middle Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004. Farah, Khalif H. “The Role of Islam in Peace Building and Conflict Resolution in Somalia.” In War Destroyes, Peace Nurtures. Reconciliation and Development in Somalia, eds. Richard Ford, Hussein M. Adam, and Edna Adam Ismail, 301–314. Asmara: The Red Sea Press, 2004. Gundel, Joakim. The Migration-Development Nexus. Somali Case-Study. Copenhagen, Denmark: Centre for Development Research, 2002. Jama Mohamed, Faiza. “Somali Women and Peacebuilding.” In Whose Peace Is It Anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking, eds. Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy, 62–65. Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, Issue 21. London: Conciliation Resources, 2010. Jama Mohamed, Faiza. Women in Peace and Transition Processes. Somalia 2000. Geneva: Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative, The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2018. Johnstone, Ralph. Pioneers for Peace. Advancing the Involvement of Women in Peace Building in South-Central Somalia. Mogadishu: Centre for Research and Dialogue, 2007. http://www.interpeace.org/wpcontent/ uploads/2007/01/2007_SomSC_Interpeace_CRD_The_Involvement_Of_ Women_EN.pdf. Laitin, David D. and Said S. Samatar. Somalia. Nation in Search of a State. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. Le Sage, André. “Stateless Justice in Somalia: Formal & Informal Rule of Law Initiatives.” Research Report for UNDP-Somalia, Published by HD Centre, 2005. LeSage, André and Kenneth Menkhaus. “The Rise of Islamic Charities in Somalia: An Assessment of Impact and Agendas.” Paper presented to the 45th Annual International Studies Association Convention, Montreal, 2004. Marchal, Roland. “Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War.” In Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, ed. Alex de Waal, 114–145. Addis Abeba: Shama Books, 2004.

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Between Charity and Financing ‘Terror’: The Dilemma of Muslim Charitable Organizations in Kenya Suleiman Athuman Chembea

Introduction Questions on whether there exists a phenomenon as ‘Islamic philanthropy’ and the claim that (Gulf) charities arrived in Africa from the 1980s clearly display the dearth of knowledge on Muslim charity in Africa, subtly presenting philanthropy as solely a Western idea.1 More often, owing to inadequate information, Islamic philanthropy and Muslim charities, in particular, have suffered misapprehension that worsened following the 9/11 US attacks and the unrelenting ‘war on terror’

1 J. Benthall and J. Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 1; M. Kaag, “Gulf Charities in Africa,” in Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the ‘Age of Terror’ and Beyond, eds. R. Lacey and J. Benthall (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2014), 80.

S. A. Chembea (*)  Bomet University College, Bomet, Kenya e-mail: [email protected] Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya © The Author(s) 2020 H. Weiss (ed.), Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38308-4_6

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with the former being perceived as vehicles for Islamization or worse still, Islamic fundamentalism and religio-political ideologies.2 While the concept of ‘organized’ Muslim charities appears to be a modern phenomenon attributed to the 1980s,3 the parent idea of charity as a moral and spiritual obligation for pious life and for the maintenance of the social fabric of a community in Islam is not. Petersen traces the emergence of ‘organized’ Muslim charity from the 1980s partly to Islamic resurgence—‘a global movement of renewed interest in Islam as a relevant identity and model for community’ evident in the increased public display of religiosity including Muslim dress code, culture, and Muslim organizations like the Islamic Brotherhood (IB) in postcolonial Egypt (1928). She opines that Muslim organizations like the IB focused on Muslim charity and social welfare as ‘alternative to the largely unsuccessful state’ giving rise to the link between Islam and aid.4 In response to secular Arab nationalism, Gulf Muslim charities allegedly advocated for Pan-Islamism and international solidarity of the umma (community of Muslims) and the growth of Islamic economics and financial institutions where riba (interest) was channeled to charity and aid. Beyond political Islamism as opined by Petersen, however, the rise of ‘organized’ Muslim charities could also be associated with the upcoming of civil society in the last decades of the twentieth century.5 As a matter of fact, socioeconomically secure interest groups like those stemming from the beneficiaries of awqaf (sing. Waqf; pious endowment) have been a permanent feature of the public sphere in Islam since the seventh century despite the fact ‘they never acquired the status of legal entities’ 2 Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent; M. Atia, Building a House in Heaven: Pious Neoliberalism and Muslim charity in Egypt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013); M. Clarke and D. Tittensor, eds., Islam and Development: Exploring the Invisible Aid Economy (Burlington: Ashgate, 2014). 3 M. Petersen, “Sacred or Secularized Aid? Positioning Gulf-based Muslim Charities,” in Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the ‘Age of Terror’ and Beyond, eds. R. Lacey and J. Benthall (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2014), 25–51. 4 Petersen, “Sacred or Secularized Aid,” 27. 5 I use civil society in the context of ‘forms of collective action that have a potential for autonomy’, see R. Lacey and J. Benthall, eds., Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the ‘Age of Terror’ and Beyond (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2014), 4. These may include charitable organizations operating independently from the state, also called the ‘non-profit organizations’ or ‘third sector’. See further Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent, 90.

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as civil societies.6 Islam, Hoexter and Geber further point out, has always maintained a public sphere—the ‘zone of autonomous social activity between the family and the ruling authorities [that] appeals to the societal and cultural life outside formal institutions and relevant to the social and political order in general.’7 As it was the case elsewhere, the civil society in Islam involved efforts by Muslim groups to establish community-based organizations (CBOs) as part of efforts to free Muslim charities, particularly awqaf, from state control and regulations that, owing to institutionalized corruption, some governments literally oversaw the collapse of Islamic social welfare as resources were used against designated causes. Issues on riba and waqf al-nuqud (cash awqaf), contrary to the position held by Petersen,8 were resolved in the seventeenth century when cash was adopted as a corpus on the basis of maslaha (also istihsan, public good) upon realization that its abolition would have disoriented various social welfare initiatives depending on cash awqaf for their support.9 Therefore, from the mid-nineteenth century when some postcolonial Muslim states inherited colonial policies and civil institutions that put Muslim charities in extended control but failed to initiate meaningful reforms, the rise of civil society gave impetus to the disenfranchised groups of beneficiaries of social welfare practices and institutions to combine efforts to free Muslim charities from state grip. Arguably, it is such efforts that gave rise to the contemporary form of Islamic aid culture. Based on the foregoing, this was the trajectory also adopted by Muslim charities in Kenya. Since establishment of the Waqf Commission of Kenya (WCK 1899) and the Waqf Commissioners Act (1900) as part of the policies that ensured state control of resources by the British colonial government, various groups of beneficiaries of Muslim charities were denied of their economic mainstay causing a collapse of the

6 M. Hoexter, “The Waqf and the Public Sphere,” in The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies, eds. M. Hoexter, S. Eisenstadt, and N. Levtzion (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), 129; H. Geber, “The Public Sphere and Civil Society in the Ottoman Empire,” in The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies, eds. M. Hoexter, S. Eisenstadt, and N. Levtzion (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), 65–82. 7 Hoexter, “The Waqf,” 119; Geber, “The Public Sphere,” 65. 8 Petersen, “Sacred or Secularized Aid.” 9 J. Mandaville, “Usurious Piety: The Cash Waqf Controversy in the Ottoman Empire,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 10 (1979): 289–308; Hoexter, “The Waqf”; Geber, “The Public Sphere.”

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social welfare in the community. WCK was established to register, control, and administer waqf properties in the region, consequently putting in place a centralized regulatory framework hitherto unknown to the locals.10 This control of resources by the colonial government also made it possible to use waqf revenues against designated causes throwing many social welfare projects into disarray. Failure by subsequent postcolonial regimes since the 1960s to undo the colonial policies placed awqaf in extended state control subjugating the minority Muslim community. Faced with dwindling socioeconomic fortunes, collapsed social welfare, and a threat to the spiritual practice, majority of Muslims in the country switched to alternative charities like zakat (obligatory alms), sadaqa (voluntary alms or optional charity), and private trusts. These were (still are) ­un-institutionalized Muslim charities that accorded faithfuls similar sociocultural privileges as awqaf. Preferred also to the regulated awqaf were CBOs that sought to re-establish control over Muslim charity demonstrated in this chapter through the (trans-)local Mombasa Education and Welfare Association (MEWA); the Tawfiq hospital, Malindi; and Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayid al Nahyan trust (Saudi Arabia). My choice of the above three Muslim charities is threefold: to demystify the misconception that Muslim charities, at least within the confines of the first two cases, are alien phenomena among Muslims in Africa with the bulk of charities conceived mainly in the Gulf and transported to the continent for religio-political reasons11; to debunk the perception that Muslim charities are avenues for proselytization apart from sponsoring acts of radicalization and extremism; and to demonstrate the interplay between local and trans-local charities in the wider concepts of charity, umma and jihad asghar (lesser jihad) manifested in efforts to alleviate hunger, diseases, suffering, and promoting social welfare in the Muslim community. As argued elsewhere, while organized Muslim charities may be perceived as new phenomena, the parent idea of charity

10 A. Bang, “Intellectuals and Civil Servants: Early 20th century Zanzibar ‘cUlama’ and the Colonial State,” in Islam in East Africa: New Sources, ed. S. B. Amoretti (Roma: Herder Editrice E Libreria, 2001), 59–98. See also Wakf Commissioners Act, 1951, Section 10 (4). Note that the title of the Act uses ‘k’ in the place of ‘q’ in the term waqf. 11 Lacey and J. Benthall, Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy; Kaag, “Gulf Charities in Africa”; B. Challand, “Islamic Charities on a Fault Line: The Jordanian Case,” in Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the ‘Age of Terror’ and Beyond, eds. R. Lacey and J. Benthall (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2014), 53–78.

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and philanthropy in Islam is in itself neither new nor alien, and as aptly observed by Lev, ‘the distinctly human trait of altruism and its existence within the system of a sacred charity’ cannot be denied or even claimed to be exclusively Islamic.12

The Politicization of Religion and Charity The idea of charity and philanthropy is neither peculiarly Western nor Judeo-Christian as evident in the long-held traditions and practices like zakat, sadaqa, and awqaf (Islam); zedakah (Judaism) and xenodochia (Christianity) in all monotheistic beliefs.13 Charity is, in all these beliefs, touted to be the bridge between ‘the idea of life beyond death as well as the close relation between man’s acts on earth.’14 In the case of Islam, charity is believed to draw its legitimacy from the religious texts, both the Qur’an and hadiths (traditions) of the Prophet. While in Qur’an 2:3 God enjoins mankind to spend what He has provided for them, He also makes it a right (haqq) for the poor to claim alms from the rich.15 Precisely, Qur’an 2:177 proclaims: Righteousness is not that you turn your faces toward the east or the west, but [true] righteousness is [in] one who believes in Allah, the Last Day, the angels, the Book, and the prophets and gives wealth, in spite of love for it, to relatives, orphans, the needy, the traveler, those who ask [for help], and for freeing slaves; [and who] establishes prayer and gives zakat.

Thus, the institution of charity has a solid foundation in Islam disapproving the view that it is an alien practice borrowed from other civilizations. Several traditions of the Prophet are also believed to emphasize the need for charity extending to the point of making moral obligations like providing for 12 Y. Lev, Charity, Endowments, and Charitable Institutions in Medieval Islam (Florida: University Press of Florida, 2005), 144. 13 R. van Leeuwen, Notables and Clergy in Mount Lebanon: The Khazin Sheikhs and the Maronite Church, 1736–1840 (Leiden: Brill, 1994); M. Gil, “The Earliest Waqf Foundations,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 57, no. 2 (1998): 125–140; P. Hennigan, The Birth of a Legal Institution: The Formation of the Waqf in Third Century A. H. Hanafi Legal Discourse (Leiden: Brill, 2004). 14 M. Hoexter, “The Idea of Charity—A Case Study in Continuity and Flexibility of an Islamic Institution,” Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, Jahrbuch 1985/86 (1985): 180–181. 15 See also Qur’an 51:19; Qur’an 70:24.

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one’s family sustenance. One hadith particularly stands out proclaiming that ‘whatever you spend for Allah’s sake will be considered as a charitable deed, even the handful of food you put into your wife’s mouth.’16 The above Qur’an verses and traditions of the Prophet on the foundation of charity further suggest that Islamic teachings perceive wealth ownership from the viewpoint of trust and altruism, hence the commandment that it be spent for social welfare in the community. Thus, spending in charity for the benefit of the community is seen to be part of the jihad asghar to ‘overcome individual selfishness and donate to others’ consequently drawing one closer to God.17 To emphasize its significance in the society, defaulting charity is condemned both for weakening the social fabric exposing would-be recipients to hardships and religious transgression against divine rights of the poor. Because of this, defaulting charity is believed to attract severe punishment in the afterlife where victims shall have their necks encircled with what they withheld during their earthly sojourn.18 On the general understanding, charity in Islam could be manifested in the institutions of zakat, sadaqa, and awqaf (also sadaqa mawqufa, immobilized alms). These became the economic mainstay of a plethora of public welfare causes including water, education, food, health care, ransoming of slaves and prisoners of war, and roads network as early as the fourteenth-century Muslim world. Included also was the catering for religious rites and institutions like hajj (pilgrimage), mawlid (celebrations for the birth of the Prophet), zawiyyas (Sufi orders), and fi sabil Allah (in the cause of God).19 While establishing charity is an individual undertaking in Islam, it also involves the state, private mutawallis (awqaf custodians) as well as the custodians of knowledge and authority—the ‘ulama (clerics) and qadis (judges). This complexity and involvement of varied personnel in the different layers of executing charity illustrates the concerns of what Hoexter refers to as huquq ibadi (rights of others in the community) and

16 M. Khan, The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih a ­ l-Bukhari: Arabic-English. Vol. 4 (Lahore: Kazi Publications, 1979), 5. 17 Lacey and Benthall, Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy, 1. 18 See Qur’an 3:180. 19 M. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, Vol. 2, The Expansion of Islam in the Middle Periods (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974); Hoexter, “The Idea of Charity”; Hoexter, “The Waqf”. See also Qur’an 17:26–29.

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huquq Allah (rights of God) for the afterlife.20 Within this context, the state becomes the custodian of the rights of God in the charity culture charged with the responsibility of ensuring conducive environment for the fulfillment of the designated spiritual objectives, while the rights of the community are taken care of by the jurists and mutawallis.21 That the state and the ‘ulama are otherwise expected to be autonomous but interdependent thus brings into light the ambiguous relations between the two in the society in the microcosm of charity. The ambiguous relations between the society and the state particularly came into the fore when socioeconomically secure groups of beneficiaries, institutions, and the ‘ulama started to assert themselves in advocating and protecting their interests often in opposition to the state.22 To protect their political hegemony, rulers resorted to establishing state departments and ministries that supervised and controlled charities and the execution of the rights of the community once catered for by the ‘ulama, qadis, and the mutawallis. In some instances, the ‘ulama, qadis, and those perceived as loyal to official policies were incorporated in the state institutions under strict guidelines to accord religious legitimacy.23 This feat was replicated in the colonial period across Muslim communities evident in British India, French Algeria, and Italian Libya and Cyrenaica.24 The control of Muslim charity by the state, consequently, 20 Hoexter,

“The Idea of Charity.” “The Idea of Charity”; M. Hoexter, “Huquq Allah and Huquq al-Ibad as Reflected in the Waqf Institution,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 19 (1995): 133–156. 22 D. Powers, “Orientalism, Colonialism, and Legal History: The Attack on Muslim Family Endowments in Algeria and India,” Journal of Comparative Studies in Society 31, no. 3 (1989): 535–571; G. Kozlowski, “Religious Authority, Reform, and Philanthropy in the Contemporary Muslim World,” in Philanthropy in the World’s Traditions, eds. W. Ilchmann, S. Katz, and E. Queen II (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 279– 308; Hoexter, “The Waqf.” 23 Hoexter, “The Idea of Charity”; Lev, ed., Charity, Endowments, and Charitable Institutions. 24 G. Kozlowski, “Community Building and Communal Control of Muslim Endowments (Waqfs) in Modern South Asia,” in Biens Communs, Patrimoines Collectifs et Gestion Cummunautaire dans les Societes Musulmanes, eds. A. Faruq et al. (Paris: Librairie de l’Orient, 1996), 201–214; A. Sanjuan, Till God Inherits the Earth: Islamic Pious Endowments in al-Andalus (9–15th Centuries) (Leiden: Brill, 2007); A. Medici, “Waqfs of Cyrenaica and Italian Colonialism in Libya (1911–41),” in Held in Trust: Waqf in the Islamic World, ed. G. Pascale (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2011), 155–178. 21 Hoexter,

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herald loss of independence of the diverse groups of beneficiaries and the ‘ulama setting ground for the collapse of social welfare owing to systemic mismanagement, corruption, and use of revenues against designated causes.25 Effectively, this development confined charity to a narrow perception of individual acts of religiosity that it has become in the contemporary world.26 From the last decades of the twentieth century, nonetheless, Muslim civil society sought to reclaim its right in the affairs of Muslim charity by exploring alternatives that largely remained outside state control, particularly CBOs, private trusts, sadaqa, and zakat. These charitable practices and organizations, some of which their operations grew beyond national boundaries, provided a vehicle for the realization of Muslims’ political identity and social mobilization where resources could be centrally harnessed and dispatched to needy segments of the umma. In other words, the different forms of Muslim charity could not be adequately claimed to be imitations of Western charities but mere vehicles that discharge the ‘Islamic tradition of commitment to those in need’ in the society.27 In this regard, alleged ‘organized’ Muslim charitable organizations, though largely perceived as ‘invisible’ from the ‘mainstream’ aid network until after the Afghanistan and Bosnia humanitarian crises,28 do not adequately connote that philanthropy is alien to the Islamic culture. In a sense, Western charity model added yet another dimension in the ambiguous historical and cultural overlapping relations between religion (din) and the state (dawla) both in predominant Muslim and non-Muslim societies. The relations between the two, arguably, further worsened after the 9/11 US attacks with affiliate branches of 25 Majority of the predominant Muslim countries including Kuwait, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have special departments or full ministries in charge of zakat, sadaqa and awqaf. See Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent; Lacey and Benthall, Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy. 26 Hoexter, “The Idea of Charity”; T. Carmichael, “British ‘Practice’ Towards Islam in the East Africa Protectorate: Muslim Officials, Waqf Administration, and Secular Education in Mombasa and Environs, 1895–1920,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 17, no. 2 (1997): 293–309. 27 Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent, 70; Challand, “Islamic Charities on a Fault Line.” 28 M.J. Petersen, “Islamizing Aid: Transnational Muslim NGOs after 9/11,” VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 23, no. 1 (2012): 126–155.

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(­trans-)local Muslim charities bearing the brunt of (inter-)national security agencies in the global ‘war on terror.’ Consequently, several ‘organized’ Muslim charities suspected of providing financial and logistical support to militants were placed under scrutiny and ‘accountability’ leading to the closure of some while others were forced to adopt ‘human face’ and guidelines.29 In the worst case scenario, majority of the ‘organized’ Muslim charitable organizations were alleged to be disguise for Islamization and religio-political ideologies.30 Like similar branches of ‘organized’ Islamic charities the world over, the chapters of Al-Haramyn, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIROSA, Saudi Arabia), and the World Assembly of Muslim Youths (WAMY) in Kenya were shut down in the 1990s throwing social welfare programs into disarray.31 There has, since then, been a systematic profiling of not only ‘organized’ Muslim charities in the country but also Muslim social welfare programs and institutions that relied on charity including cultural centers, the madrasas (Qur’an schools), and orphanages. Worse still, ‘ulama and individuals suspected of terrorism continued to suffer extrajudicial extermination and forced disappearance,32 not to mention the various controversial laws like the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (2009), and Prevention of Terrorism Act (2012), that were enacted with Muslims and ‘organized’ Muslim

29 Lacey and Benthall, Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy; Petersen, “Sacred or Secularized Aid.” 30 M. Burr and R. Collins, Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); J. Alterman and K.K. von Hippel, eds., Understanding Islamic Charities (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007); Clarke and Tittensor, eds., Islam and Development. Western based charitable organizations and aid are, however, not bereft of r­ eligio-political motives as manifested in the activities of the Official Development Assistance (ODA); Tearfund and Southern Baptist Disaster Relief; Save the Children, Oxform. See further Clarke and Tittensor, Islam and Development, 56; Lacey and Benthall, Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy, 4; Petersen, “Sacred or Secularized Aid,” 29–30. 31 R. Seesemann, “Kenyan Muslims, the Aftermath of 9/11, and the ‘War on Terror’,” in Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, eds. B. Soares and R. Otayek (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 157–176; Kaag, “Gulf Charities in Africa”. 32 Among ‘ulama accused of Islamism in the area and exterminated in unclear circumstances included shaykh Aboud Rogo Mohammad (August 2012) and Abu Bakar Sharif Makaburi (April 2014). Their extermination triggered protests, violence and wide spread condemnation by sympathizers in Mombasa.

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charities becoming the obvious targets.33 Paradoxically, non-Muslim charities and ‘terror’ suspects were not meted with similar treatment eliciting perceptions of victimization among Muslims.34 Such feelings of victimization could, arguably, push some Muslim faithfuls to radicalization and recruitment by extremist groups as propounded in the concept of Relative Deprivation (RD).35 In the case of Muslim charities, RD—the perception of discrepancy between the actors’ value expectations and their value capabilities36— were evident when local chapters of the trans-local charities were profiled and banned without contingent plans on the part of beneficiaries. The orphans, poor, and the needy that formed the bulk of beneficiaries experienced increased levels of poverty and illiteracy owing to closure of their sources of social welfare.37 Apart from beneficiaries being denied of welfare values—‘those contributing directly to the physical well being and

33 Kenya News Agency (KNA, February 5, 2017), “Madrasa Students Released Without Charge.” Retrieved from: http://kenyanewsagency.go.ke/en/madarasa-students-released-without-charge/; A. Mwalim, “Vijana 21 wa Madrasa Wazuiliwa na Polisi Kilifi.” (Radio Rahma, March 21, 2017). Retrieved from: radiorahma.co.ke; Friday Bulletin Reporter, “Fury as ­ Anti-Terrorism Police Raids Madrassa and Arrests 25 Students.” (Friday Bulletin, Issue no. 725, March 24, 2017). Retrieved from: www.jamiamasjidkenya. org (accessed February–March, 2017). 34 Acts of violent extremism by non-Muslims across the globe are not branded as ‘terrorism’, neither are their perpetrators presented as ‘terrorists’ or ‘extremists’ but ‘lone gunman’, or ‘shooter’. See BBC Reporter, “New Zealand mosque shooting: What is known about the suspect?” (BBC, March 18, 2019). Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-asia-47579243; BBC Reporter, “Christchurch shootings: The people killed as they prayed.” (BBC, March 21, 2019). Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-47593693 (accessed March 26, 2019). 35 T. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). 36 Gurr., Why Men Rebel, 24. 37 Al Haramyn Foundation had several Islamic centers across the country including Madrassat ul Munawwara lil Bannati, at Kangemi, Nyeri. The closure of such centers left many orphans and students without welfare values partly causing rampant cases of lawlessness and exposure to militant groups among Muslim youths. See also L. Nyawira, “How Nyeri Slum Became Hotbed of Terrorism Recruits.” (The Standard, February 16, 2019), Available at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001313302/how-nyeri-slumbecame-hotbed-of-terrorism-recruits; Nation Team, “The Majengo Slums Connection in Terror Attacks” (Daily Nation, January 19, 2019), Available at https://mobile.nation. co.ke/news/The-Majengo-slums-connection-in-terror-attacks/1950946-494142410idwtez/index.html (accessed June 13, 2019).

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s­ elf-realization,’38 including food, shelter, health care, and physical comfort following the ban of trans-local Muslim charities, a larger section of the Muslim population in the country felt infringed upon of the freedom of worship guaranteed in the constitution.39 As Botha rightly observed, when a collective group perceives itself to be deprived of the same values relative to other reference groups in the society, the intensity of discontentment increases.40 The infringement, therefore, partly led to increased frustration intensity levels in a cross section of the Muslim community pushing them to perceive violence and recruitment to extremist groups as a justifiable means to attain what they were denied.41 Understood from the wider perspective in relation to RD, however, what arguably comes out strongly in the concerted efforts by international security agencies and governments to check on Muslim charities may not exclusively be (in-)security and the ‘war on terror’ per se, but negotiation for ‘power’—both in the religious and political sense.42 It is long held that Muslim countries, especially from the Gulf (Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE), are ‘among most generous nations on earth’ owing to ‘dispensed charitable donations and aid flows.’ Owing to their generosity, these nations are thus perceived to be rapidly expanding their political influence not only in the gulf region but also in the international arena, particularly against the West among African nations long held to be dependent on their former colonial masters. This perception is claimed to threaten the global political status quo.43 As aptly observed by Challand: 38 Gurr,

Why Men Rebel, 29. further Article 32 of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) on Freedom of Worship. 40 A. Botha, “Economic Circumstances and radicalization in Kenya and Nigeria,” RIMA Occasional Papers 5, no. 9 (May 2017). Retrieved from: https://muslimsinafrica.wordpress.com/2017/05/11/economic-circumstances-and-radicalisation-in-kenya-and-nigeria-dr-anneli-botha/ (accessed April, 2019). 41 Research showed that militant groups in the predominantly Muslim regions in Kenya capitalized on unresolved local grievances to lure youths into their extremist ideologies. See further N. Chome, “From Islamic Reform to Muslim Activism: The Evolution of an Islamist Ideology in Kenya,” Journal of African Affairs (2019): 1–22, https://doi. org/10.1093/afraf/adz00; Seesemann, “Kenyan Muslims.” 42 Petersen, “Sacred or Secularized Aid.” 43 Lacey and Benthall, eds., Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy, 1; K. Al-Yahya and N. Fustier, “Saudi Arabia as a Global Humanitarian Donor,” in Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the ‘Age of Terror’ and Beyond, eds. R. Lacey and J. Benthall (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2014), 169–197. Saudi’s development aid from 1975–2012 is claimed 39 See

154  S. A. CHEMBEA Islamic charities …are the crystallizing, or better, the conflicting point of different approaches and models of international aid. On the one hand, Western aid tends to be subservient to the priorities of hegemonic powers, and…discourses about civil society, democracy, or empowerment have in reality been functional in preserving a political order favorable to Western powers and their clients… On the other hand, local Islamic charities have openly resisted the discursive and organizational model of Western aid, tapping into different symbolic and moral repertoires…and remaining often smaller institutions…rather than politicized actors.44

Organizational rhetoric and the ‘war on terror’ have, therefore, turned out to be the perfect cleavage in checking Muslim nations against rapid infiltration into perceived traditional power zones of colonial masters in Africa. Studies, nonetheless, have confirmed that majority of the alleged Muslim extremist groups mainly finance their operations through criminal activities like drug trafficking, smuggling, extortion, and kidnapping rather than ‘organized’ charity. With only one ‘organized’ Muslim charity—the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development—found culpable of terrorism allegations,45 it goes without saying that convincing justification still lingers for the profiling of Muslim charities as having ‘knowingly or systematically diverted their funds for violent purposes.’46 So, why have Muslim charitable organizations borne the brunt in the ‘war on terror’? Muslim charity thrives on two traditions—anonymity and modesty. Charity in Islam is believed to be spiritually efficacious if undertaken so secretly that the left hand does not know what the right hand has given.47 Giving in secrecy is also perceived as capable of diffusing the potential client-recipient relation between the giver and the taker, not to mention its ability to inhibit attracting requests for gifts from the poor

to outweigh the majority Western donors. See al-Yahaya and Fustier, “Saudi Arabia as a Global Humanitarian Donor,” 170. 44 Challand, “Islamic Charities on a Fault Line,” 54. 45 Petersen, “Sacred or Secularized Aid,” 31–32; Challand, “Islamic Charities on a Fault Line,” 67–69. 46 Lacey and Benthall, Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy, 2. 47 See Khan, The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 2, 504; Mathew 6:3.

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in the community.48 Therefore, considering the view that the state has historically no basis in Islam,49 this makes administration and supervision of charity outside the purview of the state according custodians and endowers the liberty to choose the beneficent social welfare programs suitable to local needs. True to the foregoing, anonymity and modesty in Muslim charity are manifested in collection boxes in several mosques as well as impromptu contributions toward specific goals, especially after prayers or da’wa (proselytization) sessions. In the case of the later, a piece of prayer mat would be spread either at the front or on the door way, or some congregants would move across rows of worshipers with prayer caps turned into ‘begging bowls’ for others to drop their contributions. Charities are also encouraged and collected through cards and Internet pledges toward a religious goal where the giver is not obliged to disclose his identity.50 Within the background of secrecy and anonymity, therefore, seeking to place Muslim charity under state supervision and scrutiny allegedly for accountability in line with mainstream Western aid culture is not only alien, but also risks the danger of driving underground donors that wish to maintain the virtue of anonymity most revered as a form of worship. More importantly, anonymity is also believed to guard against ria (showing off) believed to be punishable as minor shirk (attributing partners to God) in Islam. This is not to suggest that Muslim charities are opposed to accountability. On the contrary, Muslim charity practices and ethics expect a mutawali to be ‘adl (just), hence self-regulated and supervised on the belief that he is discharging a religious duty. In some instances, nonetheless, the pressure on Muslim charities to adopt accountability as understood in the Western aid culture has also given rise to what Petersen refers to as ‘sacralized conceptions of aid.’ Petersen conceives ‘sacralized conception of aid’ as imbibing ‘Islamic aid culture that builds on an understanding of poverty not only as material but also spiritual, and consequently of aid as directed primarily [though not exclusively] toward fellow Muslims, 48 Benthall

and Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent. “The Idea of Charity”; Hoexter, “The Waqf.” 50 Most Muslim charities have adopted the Internet and social media as means of reaching larger sections of the umma to contribute to charity. Contributors are then directed to specific bank accounts for different goals. See further the IIRO (UK) Web site and Islamic Channel (UK). 49 Hoexter,

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based on notions of religious solidarity and justice.’51 It is not surprising, therefore, to find custodians of Muslim charities adept in records keeping, accounting, and open to regular auditing both by the state and the public. Mutawalis also occasionally attend seminars on good management practices with a view to keeping abreast with new developments in the field. Consequently, this makes custodians of Muslim charities operate in what we could regard to as two levels of accountability—heaven and earthen. In this regard, custodians perceive their tasks both as a religious calling and service to humanity thus expecting rewards in the afterlife apart from fulfilling their mandate as expected of them by donors and endowers.

Western ‘Development’ Aid versus ‘Islamic Relief’ and ‘Charity’ As opposed to Muslim charity, Western aid culture is, arguably, founded on the ‘secularized conception of aid.’ In the view of Petersen, ‘secularized conception of aid’ understands charity and religion as separate and not necessarily interdependent entities.52 Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan capture this dogma as expressed in the ethics of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC, Geneva) that seeks: To provide protection and assistance to the victims – essentially, protection to those who have lost their normal protection by the state, […] prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles.53

Like the ICRC, the United Nations’ (UN) charter is also premised on neutrality and shared humanity rather than religiosity. It advocates for ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction

51 Petersen, “Sacred or Secularized Aid,” 31. See also D. Sullivan, Private Voluntary Organizations in Egypt: Islamic Development, Private Initiative, and State Control (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1994). 52 Petersen, “Sacred or Secularized Aid,” 36; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan refers to this as ‘neo-Kemalism’ where theology (faith) is delinked from public and political issues. See Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent, 8–10. 53 Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent, 45.

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as to race, sex, language or religion.’54 Both the ICRC and UN charters, therefore, seek to de-link aid from religious and political concerns, efforts of which are complemented by state parties across the globe. However, as is historically documented, even the choice of the ICRC emblem to represent the organization was religiously politicized upon adoption of the cross to the fury of other religious groups leading to mistrust and divisions. Subsequently, this resulted to the yet to be resolved question of whether or not to adopt the crescent (Muslims); two parallel horizontal rectangles (Japanese); or the ‘star of David’ (Israelites) among other religious symbols in place of the Christian cross. Significantly on the part of Muslim charities, recognizing the ICRC and the cross as parent organization and symbol not only raises religious concerns but also loss of control over resources and power in the aid sector. As observed by Clarke and Tittensor, Muslim charitable organizations are skeptical in aligning themselves with the Eurocentric cum Judeo-Christian charity networks since this would effectively overshadow Muslims’ identity, control and authority and most importantly, political influence, in alleviating hunger and poverty.55 To retain religio-political identity and relevance, therefore, Muslim charitable organizations have continued to adopt the crescent and work as separate entities particularly, in predominant Muslim regions where the ‘cross’ allegedly juxtaposes proselytization within humanitarian activities.56 Suffice it to say that this antipathy has continued to characterize the ambiguous relations between Muslim charitable organizations and the Eurocentric charity network in the twenty-first century with the former allegedly abetting terror. Consequently, only Muslim charities that are ready to adopt a ‘quasi-secular’ and ‘invincible religiosity’ in the aid field are seen as ‘moderate’ or ‘progressive.’ In appreciation of their ‘transformation,’ ‘progressive Muslim charities’ are incorporated into the Western aid network and even funded to initiate ‘development projects,’ ‘build capacity,’ ‘reduce poverty,’ and offer humanitarian aid for the purpose of ‘empowerment’ rather than building ‘mosques and Islamic centers’ for

54 J. Carrette and S. Trigeaud, “The Religion-Secular in International Politics: The Case of ‘Religious’ NGOs at the United Nations,” in Social Identities Between the Sacred and the Secular, eds. A. Day., G. Vincent., and C. R. Cotter (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013), 10. 55 Clarke and Tittensor, Islam and Development, 51–67. 56 Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent, 46–68.

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alleged ‘short sighted’ and ‘unsustainable Islamic relief.’57 Muslim charities that insist on ‘visible religiosity’ are, on the other hand, marked as ‘fundamentalists’ and regarded as conduits of terrorism.58 This is to say that, on the premise of ‘organized charity,’ ‘Western aid officials often seem to assume that their professionally formalized efforts to alleviate poverty and promote economic development around the world are implicitly superior to traditional ‘charity’ as practiced by Islamic philanthropies.’59 The ambiguous relations between Muslim charities and their Eurocentric counterparts are, therefore, mainly philosophical stemming from differences in cultural contexts and the conceptions of aid.60 The later claim to de-link religion from charity in a typical manifestation of the binary opposition between the religious and the secular in the Western world referred to by Fitzgerald as the ‘modern myth.’61 In the case of humanitarian relief, modern myth, as advocated by the ICRC and the UN charters, understands poverty in the prism of materiality advocating for neutrality and universalism where presumably race, creed, or nationality shall not determine who gets charity, neither shall it ‘be used to promote a particular religious adherence.’62 On the contrary, faith is perceived as the ‘symbolic authority’ informing charity and philanthropy in Islam as explained elsewhere in this chapter.63 It is the sole basis and reason that expounds the giving, 57 Petersen,

“Sacred or Secularized Aid,” 26. “Sacred or Secularized Aid”; Challand, “Islamic Charities on a Fault Line.” 59 Lacey and Benthall, Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy, 8. 60 Petersen, “Sacred or Secularized Aid.” 61 T. Fitzgerald, Religion and Politics in International Relations: the Modern Myth (London and New York: Continuum, 2011). 62 Clarke and Tittensor, Islam and Development, 6–7. See also code of conduct, Australian Council for International Development, ACFID, 2015. Retrieved from: https://acfid.asn.au/sites/site.acfid/files/resource_document/ACFID-Code-of-ConductvOCT14_0.pdf (September, 2016); P. Riddell, “Development by Muslims, with Muslims and among Muslims: Prospects and Challenges for Christian Aid Agencies,” in Islam and Development: Exploring the Invisible Aid Economy, eds. M. Clarke and D. Tittensor (Burlington: Ashgate, 2014), 69–86; Petersen, “Sacred or Secularized Aid.” 63 Hendrick perceives ‘symbolic authority’ in relation to cultural diversity (rather than cultural incompatibility) in Islam where ‘Influential Muslim opinion makers draw on symbolic Islamic categories to expound on the challenges of modern political, economic, and social recognition’. See J. Hendrick, Gülen: The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 14. 58 Petersen,

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administration, receiving, and the entire charity framework that socially binds the umma. Muslim charities agree that primary recipients should include the amilina alayha (the administrators), al-fuqara (needy), maskin (poor) before al-mu’allafat qulubuhum (those whose hearts are won over) in the community as emphasized in Qur’an 9:60. This scheme of distributing charity, thus, places prominence on religious (though not necessarily visible) identity and solidarity in the social fabric of the community rather than professionalism aimed at helping the ‘distant sufferer.’64 In other words, the boundaries between the religious and the secular spheres in Islam, as far as charity is concerned, remain blurred making the faithful to be ‘closely connected, mutually interdependent, and obliged to help one another.’65 Placing prominence on religious solidarity and social fabric of the umma does not, nonetheless, suggest that Muslim charities are entirely ‘religious’ in operation or that non-Muslims are not entitled to charity. Rather, non-Muslims come second in the priority ranks as a ­ l-mu’alafat qulubuhum where they are perceived as ready or potential adherents. In this case, they benefit whenever fi sabil Allah (in the cause of God) is invoked in the distribution of aid.66 In a nut shell, it is safe to argue that Muslim charities operate within ‘principled universalism’ and ‘pragmatic particularism’ aligning ‘the solidarity-driven’ focus on fellow Muslims with principles of universalism.67 It is, arguably, this close link between embedded and invisible faith and charity in Islam that makes some Muslim charities and states to give their aid directly to relevant victims through governments instead of channeling it through mainstream aid agencies.68 The aloofness and skepticism on the part of Muslim charities to align themselves with mainstream Western charity networks also make them to be perceived as operating largely, though not exclusively, 64 Petersen,

“Sacred or Secularized Aid,” 29. “Sacred or Secularized Aid,” 29. 66 al-Yahya and Fustier, “Saudi Arabia as a Global Humanitarian Donor,” 169–170. See further Qur’an 9:60. 67 Petersen, “Sacred or Secularized Aid,” 41. 68 In response to Kenya’s appeal against drought and famine in 2017, the UAE channeled its aid directly to the government instead of charity networks. See G. Keter, “UAE donates 150 tonnes of food for the hungry in drought stricken areas” (The Star, March 4, 2017). Available at http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/03/04/uae-donates-150tonnes-of-food-for-the-hungry-in-drought-stricken_c1518001 (accessed April, 2019). 65 Petersen,

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in predominant Muslim societies and regions along the Islamic cultural framework and ideology.69 The antipathy between Muslim and Western aid cultural values is further inflamed by the differences on how the two perceive basic concepts and purposes of ‘charity’ and ‘development,’ in relation to ‘embedded’ or ‘pervasive’ and ‘invisible’ religiosity.70 These include concepts like ‘human rights,’ ‘fundamental freedoms,’ ‘sustainability,’ and ‘empowerment’ in relation to the UN and ICRC (Eurocentric) code of ethics and operation the contrary of which amounts to ‘oppression’ and’disempowerment.’71 Unlike Western charities, Muslim charities are seen to combine material with spiritual suffering. As Petersen observed, as far as Islam is concerned, ‘poverty was not only about hunger, diseases, and lack of education; it was also about religious ignorance and humiliation.’ Some Muslim charitable organizations, therefore, seek to imbibe the Islamic cultural ideology and visible religiosity on matters of ‘charity’ different from ‘development’ and ‘aid’ through ‘invisible religiosity’ that characterizes the Western aid framework. In this regard, Muslim charities would occasionally combine daw’a, imparting of religious sciences, and establishment of Islamic cultural centers with the distribution of medicine and social welfare and relief.72 On the contrary, this does not suggest that Western charities exclusively employ the ‘secularized conception of aid’ as evident in the activities of the Official Development Assistance (ODA); Tearfund and Southern Baptist Disaster Relief; Save the Children, Oxfam.73 Neither are Muslim charities devoid of the concern for ‘economic empowerment.’ As observed by Sullivan, the ‘development’ discourse of Western charitable practices ‘include not just agricultural and industrial output and productivity but also improvements in social indicators such as education, housing, health, and nutrition.’74 On the basis of the observation, therefore, Islamic relief that also tackles poverty and underdevelopment in different ways is equally no exception in the ‘development’ discourse. Since relief 69 Clarke

and Tittensor, Islam and Development, 51–67. “Islamizing Aid.” 71 Clarke and Tittensor, Islam and Development, 4. 72 Petersen, “Sacred or Secularized Aid,” 29. 73 Clarke and Tittensor, Islam and Development, 56; Lacey and Benthall, Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy, 4; Petersen, “Sacred or Secularized Aid,” 29–30. 74 Sullivan, Private Voluntary Organizations, 5. 70 Petersen,

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and welfare activities are the foundations of development, it becomes inadequate to conceive them as the exclusive privileges of the Western charity framework as aptly manifested in the activities of local Muslim charities in Mombasa and Malindi to be discussed below.

The Muslim Education Welfare Association Upon establishment of the WCK as discussed elsewhere in this chapter, Muslims’ education sector was most affected as waqf resources meant for the sector were diverted to non-designated causes. Muslim educational institutions and welfare centers, the madrasas, duksis (elementary Qur’an schools), orphanages, and regular sessions of tafsir (Qur’an exegesis) in mosques during Ramadan lost their economic mainstay. As a substitute, Christian missionary groups, with the support of the British colonial government, introduced formal education where baptism became a prerequisite for admission.75 As the colonial government dragged its feet to establish few, racially based and ill-equipped formal schools for Muslims, the baptism requirement impeded the majority of Muslim children from accessing formal education. This disadvantaged Muslims since the colonial period from competing favorably with their Christian compatriots in economic development, political negotiations, job placements, and civil service appointments.76 The Muslim Education Welfare Association (MEWA) was, therefore, a response to the systemic neglect of the Muslim community by the colonial and postcolonial regimes in matters education and social welfare. The Association was established in 1985 as a local initiative to collate resources for the provision of bursaries, educational materials, library facilities, and partial scholarships to Muslim students. In 1993, the body was registered as a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO). Although education remains an important segment of MEWA’s budget, it has also

75 H. Mwakimako, “Christian-Muslim Relations in Kenya: A Catalogue of Events and Meanings,” Islam and C ­ hristian-Muslim Relations 18, no. 2 (2007): 287–307; R. Loimeier, “Perceptions of Marginalization: Muslims in Contemporary Tanzania,” in Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, eds. B. Soares and R. Otayek (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 137–156. 76 J. McIntosh, The Edge of Islam: Power, Personhood, and Ethno-Religious Boundaries on the Kenya Coast (London: Duke University Press, 2009); H. Ndzovu, Muslims in Kenyan Politics: Political Involvement, Marginalization, and Minority Status (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2014).

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diversified to other social welfare programs including health care, career guidance, and Ramadan iftar portions to the poor.77 Other than relying on local support and donations, the organization further works closely with trans-local organizations like the USAID, the United Nations Office Drugs and Crime (UNODC), British Council, Red Cross, and Ministry of Health to offer health care at subsidized cost to the members of the society regardless of their religious affiliations.

Tawfiq Hospital, Malindi Like MEWA, Tawfiq hospital in Malindi could also be regarded as a local initiative in response to the systemic neglect by the state in the sector of health care. Tawqif was conceived in the 1990s through joint efforts of two groups, Tawfiq Muslim Youths and Muslim Education and Development Association of Malindi (MEDA). The hospital operates mainly from support of the local community, volunteers, and a plethora of international well-wishers including the Islamic Development Bank (IDB); the World Assembly of Muslim Youths (WAMY); the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIROSA, Saudi Arabia); and the Islamic Foundation (Saudi Arabia).78 Among other social welfare projects of the hospital include Ramadan iftar portions, zakat alfitr, funerals for the poor, caring for the elderly as well as orphans. To demonstrate the apparent inseparability of charity from religiosity in Islam, the hospital’s appeal for support as clearly displayed in its Web site is drawn from Qur’an 2:110—‘whatever good you put forward for yourselves you will find it with Allah. Indeed, Allah of what you do is seeing.’ As evident in MEWA and Tawfiq hospital, therefore, there are homegrown Muslim charities in Kenya that developed mainly in response to factors within and outside the inherent Islamic concept of charity and philanthropy. Both provide social welfare beyond state apparatus as alternative to the systemic marginalization of the community in matters of development, and as an avenue to the fulfillment of religious obligation 77 Interviews with Mohammed Shalli, Zubeir Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014. See also MEWA (Muslim Education and Welfare Organization), Available at https://www. betterplace.org/en/organisations/10087-mewa-muslim-education-and-welfare-association (accessed April, 2019). 78 Interviews with Ahmed Aboud Hadi, Malindi, November, 2015; Hamdoun, WCK Agent, Malindi, November, 2015.

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for qurba and sawab. With the disenfranchised Muslim population turning more to these associations than the government for support and assistance in social welfare, the institutions have adopted a ‘peculiar model of social work based on the rejection of strict political [and religious] affiliations, and often on a diversified input from their ­(trans-) local constituencies.’79 This is manifested in the tapping of both local and (trans-)local resources that gravitate toward ‘commercially driven’ models enabling them to offer services at subsidized costs. Actors in the local Muslim charities are not, therefore, at least as argued in the Kenyan cases above, only passive consumers of Gulf Islamic aid but active participants in the shaping of the charity culture. With foreign resources constituting only a small portion of the running costs, this differentiates them from the purely Gulf-funded Muslim charities suffering from the consequences of ‘war on terror,’ including constricted funding and crackdown by security operatives. Local charities in Kenya engage in resource mobilization and choose their projects or areas of concern based on the needs of the community. Though they emphasize on Muslim professionals for ‘pragmatic particularism’ with a view to offering jobs to locals, instill sense of ownership, and serve as role models to the community against state policies of marginalization, they also attract professionals from other religious groups. Daw’a, nonetheless, though subtle, still remains an integral aspect of all these charities evident in the mosques, Islamic cultural centers within their premises, and religious etiquette including dressing for the purpose of ‘deepening peoples’ understanding of Islamic principles.80

Shaykh Zayed Complex (Children Welfare Center and Secondary School), Mombasa The complex is part of the global charity network of the Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan Foundation (UAE) that came into Africa from the Gulf in the mid-1990s.81 Though a local board of governors executes

79 Challand,

“Islamic Charities on a Fault Line,” 56. “Gulf Charities in Africa,” 81. 81 See Z. Constantine, “UAE Foundation has helped out at Home and More than 35 Countries” (The National, March 14, 2009). Available at http://www.thenational.ae/ uae/uae-foundation-has-helped-out-at-home-and-in-more-than-35-countries (accessed April, 2019). 80 Kaag,

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the day-to-day functions, its trustees and policymakers are mainly the sponsors based in the UAE making it among Muslim charities that Kaag perceive as ‘often administered by members of the Saudi elite looking for an outlet for their funds.’82 Significantly, the complex is founded on the Islamic principles of separation of genders and runs separate wings in the same compound for boys and girls from the primary to secondary school levels. Considering that care for orphans is profound in Islam since the Prophet was himself an orphan (Qur’an 93:6), the primary level of the complex houses an orphanage offering integrated education (formal and religious) and tarbia (mannerism). Like MEWA and Tawfiq hospitals, Shaykh Zayed complex also adopts a commercially driven model where students from affluent background pay subsidized fees. Without doubt, this has enabled the center to remain afloat even after resource cuts from trustees in the UAE due to the stringent rules on remittances in the ongoing ‘war on terror.’ With Islam enjoying a longer history in Kenya from as early as the eighth century, the emphasis on Arabic and Islamic tarbia in the curriculum of the Shaykh Zayed complex is arguably part of the Islamic culture and traditions where Islamic ideology is being nurtured (Petersen 2014). This sets the complex apart from some centers across former Anglophone and Francophone countries that emphasize on Arabic and Islamic mannerism merely as response to the public school system inherited from their colonizers.83

Conclusion Without gainsaying the distinctly passive socioeconomic and political interests, faith remains an integral part of charity and philanthropy in Islam. The binary opposition between the religious and the secular in relation to charity and philanthropism in Islam is, thus, blurred making charity an important means not only for the maintenance of the social fabric, but also for the attainment of qurba and sawab in the afterlife. Consequently, though Muslim charities could be perceived as ‘faith based,’ it would be inadequate to consider their understanding of

82 Kaag, 83 Kaag,

“Gulf Charities in Africa,” 80. “Gulf Charities in Africa,” 81.

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poverty as exclusively spiritual and devoid of the concern for economic empowerment. As observed in the three cases in this paper, Muslim charities also aim at improving the social indicators including education, housing, health, and nutrition making them no exception in the ‘development’ discourse propounded by the Western charity networks. The hesitation by Muslim charities either to collaborate with their Western counterparts or open up for accountability based on the Eurocentric understanding of the same may not, therefore, necessarily suggest that they harbor ulterior motives including abetting terrorism. As argued elsewhere, Muslim charity is enshrined as a form of worship founded on the traditions of anonymity and modesty. These traditions, arguably, inform the perceived differences in the Islamic and Eurocentric view of philanthropy, charity, and accountability. It would only be fair to appreciate all viewpoints and chart a mutual working framework. On the same front, laws of accountability and scrutiny ought to apply equally to all charitable organizations without regard to religious background the failure of which could create perceptions of victimization pushing disenfranchised beneficiaries and donors to extremist groups.

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‘Enterprisation of Islamic FBOs’—Towards a New Typology of Islamic Non-governmental Organisations in Consideration of Their Multiple Relatedness Sebastian Müller

Introduction The Islamic Foundation of Tanzania (TIF) is one of about 300 Islamic FBOs identified in Tanzania and one of the most prominent.1 ‘Permissioned by Allah’, TIF promotes itself as ‘independent religious and humanitarian’ organisation that provides ‘help and guidance’ to all those in need ‘regardless of race, political affiliation, or gender or belief’. 1 The empirical data was collected during nine month of fieldwork in Tanzania in the years of 2015 and 2016. The author is grateful to the ‘Bayreuth International Graduate School of Advanced African Studies’ (BIGSAS) as well as the ‘Studienstiftung des deutschen

S. Müller (*)  Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies, Bayreuth University, Bayreuth, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 H. Weiss (ed.), Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38308-4_7

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Most importantly, TIF is referring to its own expertise to explain its success in ‘connect[ing] and gain[ing] the trust of different communities regardless of belief’. The so-called backbone of the organisation is the Dawaah Department, which examines TIF’s various measures and institutions for their compliance with its understanding of Islam. TIF activities include the construction and maintenance of health facilities, religious and non-religious infrastructure, such as Mosques and wells, as wells as orphan care. Of special importance is TIF’s commitment to education based on the ‘divine source that highlights and empathizes the importance of knowledge’. TIF is dedicated to education not only by building and maintaining its own schools, but also by acquiring established schools with corresponding high reputation. In addition to that, TIF operates its own nationwide newspaper, radio- and TV-station and therefore promoting itself as ‘First Muslim Media House of East Africa’. Especially in the field of media, TIF established ties beyond traditional NGO-partnerships and donor-relations. TIF presents itself as a job engine with more than 300 own employees and as an organisation with special economic competence.2 Already this short portrait of TIF points to the multiple relatedness that characterises the field of Islamic FBOs in Tanzania. To illustrate this relatedness and based on empirical data on Islamic FBOs in Tanzania, this chapter highlights limitations of current typologies of ­ non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as faith-based

Volkes’ for their support for the authors dissertation at the University of Bayreuth. For further articles that were produced in this context see as well Sebastian Müller, “Islamische Wohltätigkeit und Entwicklungsorganisationen: Grundlagen des Engagements und exemplarische Einblicke in die Praxis,” in Armut und Gerechtigkeit: Christliche und islamische Perspektiven, eds. Christian Ströbele, Anja Middelbeck-Varwick, Amir Dziri and Muna Tatari (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2016), 202–215; Sebastian Müller, “Krisen und Glaube: Streiflichter islamischer Nothilfe und langfristiger Entwicklungsmaßnahmen im Namen des Islams,” in Krisenhilfe oder Hilfe in Krisen? eds. Rainer Öhlschläger and Hartmut Sangmeister (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016), 97–115. The author furthermore thanks Alžběta Šváblová and Holger Weiss for their valuable comments on the chapter and especially the staff of The Islamic Foundation of Tanzania (TIF) for their willingness to share time and insights. 2 The Islamic Foundation—Facebook, “Info—The Islamic Foundation—Based in Tanzania: Facebook Profile—About”, https://www.facebook.com/pg/islamicftz/about/?ref=page_ internal (accessed December 12, 2017); The Islamic Foundation, “DAA’WAH DEPARTMENT”, http://islamicftz.org/daawah-department/ (accessed February 16, 2016); The Islamic Foundation. “Homepage”, http://islamicftz.org (accessed August 28, 2017).

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organisations (FBOs) and proposes a new typology based on their multiple relatedness in ensuring sustainability. It questions the dichotomy of (1) so-called local versus international or transnational organisations and (2) distinctions of organisations based on their activities and their function in the aid system. Furthermore, it highlights that (3) a distinction of organisations originating from different aid cultures rooted in the West vs. those from the Middle East is not suited to fully understand the field of Islamic FBOs in Tanzania. Using the case study of the Islamic Foundation of Tanzania (TIF) the chapter illustrates that Islamic FBOs in Tanzania are shaped by multiple relations to assure their sustainability. In this context, local and inter- or transnational connections, links with Western development cooperation and Islamic charity, as well as the functions of organisations are understood as centres of gravity within a network of relations. Furthermore, relational ties to entrepreneurship and a competitive market economy environment are taken into account, leading to a process of ‘enterprising’ of some Islamic FBOs. On this basis, the chapter argues for a new typology of Islamic FBOs putting the relatedness to secure organisations sustainability to the centre of attention. The chapter thus argues for a typology of additive relations that at the same time lead to undoing of classical typologies. Thereby it provides new impulses to the nexus of NGO/FBO debates as well as to new conceptual framing in African studies such as ‘Africa Multiple’.3 For this purpose, the chapter is structured as follows. At the beginning, a literature review is offered. It links the most relevant debates about non-governmental organisations, faith-based Islamic organisations as well as newer conceptual approaches to the understanding of religious actors under the heading of ‘Africa multiple’. Following the literature review, the case study of TIFs is used to critically analyse the usability of common typologies of NGOs and FBOs when looking at Islamic FBOs. A short profile of TIF is provided, which is followed by a critical review of the distinction between local and international or transnational organisations, the distinction of organisations based on their activities and functions in the aid system and the distinction of Islamic FBOs based on geographic origin in the West vs. the Middle East and related ‘aid cultures’. In the light of the described constrains the chapter then focuses on a new typology of Islamic FBOs, which builds on the relatedness

3 For

further details see https://www.africamultiple.uni-bayreuth.de/en/.

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of the organisations to maintain sustainability. The chapter once more refers to the case study of TIFs to sketch one type that results from this approach. Characteristic for this type is increasing ties to entrepreneurship and to a competitive market economy leading to an entreprisation of the organisation. The conclusions summarises the findings and links the type exemplified by TIF with the broader typology developed in further studies and reflects the findings relevance for the general debate on NGOs and FBOs.

Islamic FBOs in Research and the Field of Development Aid Since the 1990s non-governmental organisations advanced to guarantors of development for the countries of the so-called Global South.4 FBOs in turn are perceived as increasingly relevant and at the same time established actors in development cooperation.5 While some authors see the debate on FBOs out peeked, the interest in FBOs as partners in development cooperation especially of Western donors is currently growing.6 Accordingly, the latter are attested a desire for increasing ‘faith literacy’. The discussion on Islamic FBOs is thus becoming more relevant not the least in the light of contemporary development cooperation.7 Meanwhile

4 See further Manfred Glagow, Die Nicht-Regierungs-Organisationen als die neuen Hoffnungsträger in der internationalen Entwicklungspolitik? Forschungsschwerpunkt Entwicklungssoziologie Working Paper 169 (Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 1992); Dieter Nohlen and Franz Nuscheler, eds., Handbuch der Dritten Welt: Grundprobleme, Theorien, Strategien, 3rd ed. (Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 1992). 5 See further Jörg Haustein and Emma Tomalin, “Religion and Development in Africa and Asia,” in Routledge Handbook of Africa–Asia Relations, eds. Pedro A. Raposo, David Arase and Scarlett Cornelissen (London, New York: Routledge, 2018), 76–93; Emma Tomalin, Religions and Development (London and New York: Routledge, 2013). 6 Gerard Clarke, “Faith-Based Organizations and International Development: An Overview,” in Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular, eds. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 17–45. 7 Jonathan Benthall, “Islamic Charities, Faith Based organizations, and the International Aid System,” in Understanding Islamic charities, eds. Jon B. Alterman and Karin v. Hippel (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2007), 1–14; Robert Lacey and Jonathan Benthall, eds., Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the “Age of Terror” and Beyond (Berlin and London: Gerlach Press, 2014).

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as Kaag notes, empirical studies on Islamic FBOs in sub-Saharan Africa are rare.8 Most work done on Islamic FBOs in East Africa primarily focus on the links between Western concepts of humanitarian and development aid, as well as the growing influence of Arab donor and development organisations.9 At the same time, little is known about Islamic FBOs in Tanzania, especially on the mainland. Recent work dedicated to Islamic NGOs in Tanzania is limited to the comparison of selected individual cases and involvement in education.10 In previous research on NGOs as globalised organisational model, on the other hand, the role of Islamic FBOs has hardly been taken into 8 Mayke Kaag, “Aid, Umma, and Politics: Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad,” in Islam and Muslim politics in Africa, 1st ed., 85–102 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 86. 9 Abdallah Ali Duh, “Muslim ­faith-Based Organizations in Somalia and Kenya: Activities, Faith Inspired Development and Securitization”, http://afrikansarvi.fi/72-artikkeli/208-muslim-faith-based-organizations-in-somalia-and-kenya (accessed November 27, 2014); Cecilia Lynch, “Local and Global Influences on Islamic NGOs in Kenya,” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 6, no. 1 (2011): 21–34; Nabila Saddiq, “Capacity Building and Islamic FBOs: Insights from Malawi,” Praxis Note 48, https://www.intrac. org/resources/praxis-note-48-capacity-building-islamic-fbos-insights-malawi/. 10 Abdallah C. Ahmed, “Networks of Islamic NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa: Bilal Muslim Mission, African Muslim Agency (Direct Aid), and ‘al-Haramayn’,” Journal of Eastern African Studies, no. 3 (2009): 426–437; Hansjörg Dilger, “Religion and the Formation of an Urban Educational Market: Transnational Reform Processes and Social Inequalities in Christian and Muslim Schooling in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,” Journal of Religion in Africa 43, no. 4 (2013): 451–479; Kristina Dohrn, “Translocal Ethics: Hizmet Teachers and the Formation of Gülen-inspired Schools in Urban Tanzania,” Sociology of Islam 1, no. 3–4 (2014): 233–256; Roman Loimeier, “Trajectories of Islamic Education in the Twentieth Century: Zanzibar and Beyond,” in Muslim Institutions of Higher Education in Postcolonial Africa, eds. Mbaye Lo and Muhammed Haron (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 63–72. Further individual references are provided by Issa G. Shivji, “Reflections on NGOs in Tanzania: What We Are, What We Are Not, and What We Ought to Be,” Development in Practice 14, no. 5 (2004): 689–695; Robert Leurs, Peter TumainiMungu and Abu Mvungi, Mapping the Development Activities of Faith-Based Organizations in Tanzania, Religions and Development Working Paper 58 (Birmingham: International Development Department University of Birmingham, 2011); Ernest T. Mallya, “FaithBased Organizations, the State and Politics in Tanzania,” in Development and Politics from Below: Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State, eds. Barbara Bompani and Maria Frahm-Arp (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 131–151,; Amos Mhina, ed., Religions and Development in Tanzania: A Preliminary Literature Review, Religions and Development Working Paper 11 (Birmingham: International Development Department, University of Birmingham, 2007).

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consideration. This applies both to older and younger studies.11 In research on FBOs, in turn, studies on organisations of Christian-Jewish origin predominate. Islamic FBOs are implicitly or explicitly considered and assumptions transferred to them. Empirical evidence on Islamic FBOs and feeding of findings into the general FBO debate, especially with regard to Africa, are rare. This contributes to the continuing classification of NGOs and FBOs, e.g. on a distinction between local, national and international or transnational organisations.12 In this case, organisations are sorted according to their relationship management respectively networking with other NGOs and implementation of activities below or above national boundaries. International organisations are those organisations who maintain projects, staff or facilities in more than one country and work across borders through cooperation with other NGOs. For national organisations, however, relations and implementation are limited to the national level. They are themselves either called local organisations or as national organisations further distinguished from local organisations. In the latter case, local organisations operate exclusively in sub-regions of a nation state. Rarely, these distinctions are explicated.13

11 Helmust K. Anheier and Lester M. Salamon, “Genese und Schwerpunkte internationaler Forschung zum Nonprofit-Sektor: Von der Fller-Kommission zum Johns Hopkins Projekt,” Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen 4 (1992): 40–48; Julie Hearn, “African NGOs: The New Compradors?” Development and Change 38, no. 6 (2007): 1095–1110; David Lewis and Nazneen Kanji, Non-governmental Organizations and Development (London, New York: Routledge, 2009); Dieter Neubert, Entwicklungspolitische Hoffnungen und gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit: Eine vergleichende Länderfallstudie von Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen in Kenia und Ruanda (Frankfurt/ Main, New York: Campus, 1997). 12 Shawn T. Flanigan, “Factors Influencing Nonprofit Career Choice in Faith-Based and Secular NGOs in three Developing Countries,” Nonprofit Management and Leadership 21, no. 1 (2010): 59–75; Rolf Sülzer and Arthur Zimmermann, Abschied vom Planungswahn: Neue und alte Organisationsfragen der Internationalen Zusammenarbeit. 2. Aufl., vollst. bearb., aktualisierte und erw. Fassung (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013); Janet G. Townsend, Gina Porter, and Emma Mawdsley, “The Role of the Transnational Community of Non-government Organizations: Governance or Poverty Reduction?” Journal of ­ International Development 14, no. 6 (2002): 829–839. 13 Daniel Schwenger, Organisation internationaler Nichtregierungsorganisationen: Aufbau und Koordination von NGOs im System der Vereinten Nationen (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2013).

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Other common typologies distinguish organisations according to the activities they conduct and their functions in the aid system. Advocacy organisations are distinguished from operational organisations which primarily provide goods and services.14 Similar to this representative FBOs articulate interest of particular religious communities while charitable FBOs conduct charitable work based on religious principles.15 Alongside charitable and representative FBOs so-called missionary organisations originate from the FBO debate, who primarily dedicate their efforts towards missionary activities.16 Specifically in research on Islamic transnational NGOs, Peterson furthermore juxtaposes organisations of the Middle East with organisations of Anglo-American origin. While the former act out of a development aid context, the latter are shaped predominantly by Islamic welfare. Thus, both originate in two different ‘aid cultures’. Western organisations are coined by a Western ‘development aid culture’, while organisations from the Middle East correspondingly originate from an ‘Islamic charity culture’.17 The author thus establishes a typology for Islamic

14 Alan Fowler, “NGOs & the Globalization of Social Welfare: Perspectives from East Africa,” in Service Provision Under Stress in East Africa: The State, NGOs & People’s Organizations in Kenya, Tanzania & Uganda, eds. Joseph Semboja and Ole Therkildsen (Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research, 1995), 51–69; Neubert, Entwicklungspolitische Hoffnungen und gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit; Ronald J. Sider and Heidi R. Unruh, “Typology of Religious Characteristics of Social Service and Educational Organizations and Programs,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 33, no. 1 (2004): 109–134. 15 Gerard Clarke, “Faith-Based Organizations and International Development. An Overview,” in Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular, eds. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 17–45; M. Clarke and V.-A. Ware, “Understanding Faith-Based Organizations: How FBOs Are Contrasted with NGOs in International Development Literature,” Progress in Development Studies 15, no. 1 (2015): 37–48. 16 Julia Berger, “Religious Nongovernmental Organizations: An Exploratory Analysis,” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 14, no. 1 (2003): 15–39; Wolfgang Bielefeld and William S. Cleveland, “Defining Faith-Based Organizations and Understanding Them Through Research,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 42, no. 3 (2013): 442–467. 17 Ben Jones and Marie J. Petersen, “Instrumental, Narrow, Normative? Reviewing Recent Work on Religion and Development,” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 7 (2011): 1291–1306; Marie J. Petersen, For Humanity or for the Umma? Aid and Islam in Transnational Muslim NGOs (London: Hurst & Company, 2015).

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(transnational) NGOs based on a regional dichotomisation between the West and the Middle East and embeds them in specific aid cultures that predominate each of them. As this chapter illustrates, the mentioned conceptualisations are unable to capture fully the field of Islamic FBOs in Tanzania, rather common typologies have to be reconsidered. African studies research from Bayreuth in the framing of ‘multiple relatedness’ offers new ways to enable a better understand the diversity of Islamic FBOs as religious actors. One of the first conceptual contributions towards this is Eva Spies’s article ‘Being in Relation’ on Religious Diversity and Missionary work in Madagascar. Using the example of Mission in Pentecostal churches in Madagascar, Spies presents a theoretical approach to understand religious actors as shaped through their ‘multiple relations in and through which religious actors and settings are constituted’ and therefore to understand them as ‘products of continuous relational processes’ rather than as fixed entities.18 These considerations form the basis for the following analysis of Islamic FBOs and the relations that constitute them. At the same time, formalised organisations, e.g., entities recognised by the state remain as starting points for the formulation of a new typology. Rather than the entities as such, the organisational types then are constituted by their multiple relatedness to secure sustainability. Using the case study of TIF, one of the five types identified in Tanzania will be portrayed in detail. At the same time, TIF serves as a basis for introducing the typology as such and sketching some of the multiple relations that constitute the field of Islamic FBOs. Thus, the chapter contributes to the general debate and conceptualisation of FBOs and NGOs. Furthermore, it draws from and contributes to the conceptualisation and new understanding of African lifeworlds in the pharming of ‘Africa Multiple’.

Short Profile of the Islamic Foundation of Tanzania—TIF The Islamic Foundation (TIF) was registered in 1998, only a few years after the end of the one-party system in Tanzania, East Africa’s l­argest country by population and size. The organisation’s headquarters are located in the city of Morogoro, a central trading and transportation 18 Eva

Spies, “Being in Relation: A Critical Appraisal of Religious Diversity and Mission Encounter in Madagascar,” Journal of Africana Religions 7, no. 1 (2019): 62.

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hub of Tanzania. Most of TIF’s commitments are still concentrated in the city and the eponymous region, including part of the TIF-owned media. By 2014, more than 370 full-time and part-time staff as well as payed volunteers were working for the organisation and nearly four million USD, a quarter of TIF total annual budget, was spent on the media department.19 Meanwhile, the rest of the budget covered the costs for education measures, health, orphans care, the construction of infrastructure and as the least post propagation of Islam or da’wa. The media department is of growing importance for TIF. This leads to a shift at least in the visibility of TIF activities. While social services delivery and development aid are less and less visible, events that can be used for media broadcasting are of growing importance. Meanwhile, a central concern of the organisation remains the propagation of a positive image of Islam. With this changing engagements, TIF taps other forms of support beyond classical forms of support such as individual donations (such as sadaqa,20 zakat21 and though in rare cases of waqf 22) as well as grants from Islamic development organisations. These lead to a diversification of ways in which TIF secures it sustainably as securing the coverage of running costs and investments into the organisations future. Beyond ties of classical development cooperation, they are related to TIF growing ­relations to entrepreneurship and within a competitive market economy shaping one of the five types of Islamic FBOs identified in Tanzania.

Undoing the Local vs. International Dichotomy Up to 2016 one of the key elements in external communication of TIF was its humanitarian aid mission to assist flooding victims in neighbouring Malawi a couple of years before. Until then, this was also the only mission that TIF had implemented beyond national borders; instead, the organisation had so far concentrated on health, education and the maintenance of social service facilities in Tanzania. In particular, one can observe a concentration on the Morogoro region, although the

19 The Islamic Foundation, “The Islamic Foundation—Broshure: Tumeahidi. Tumetimiza,” (The Islamic Foundation, 2014). 20 Spontaneous voluntary giving. 21 Annual obligatory alms-giving on wealth and income. 22 Religious, e.g. pious endowment.

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organisation is present in various other parts of the country. Accordingly, all 370 employees and volunteers have been mainly working in Tanzania except for the one-time emergency operation in Malawi. In the same vein, TIF does not fulfil the criteria for staff and projects abroad when it comes to traditional development and aid services. In the meantime, the Malawi mission as well as the social services units within Tanzania has lost most of its prominence in external communication of TIF. The media department and the (social) media channels have taken over this central position. The former is now only sporadically visible as contend of and presented through the media channels of TIF. Meanwhile, with the operation of Radio Imaan FM the organisation claims to currently cover almost 85% of Tanzania and to be accessible in some regions of neighbouring countries as well. In addition to the national broadcasting frequency, the programme is also available online. Same goes for TV Imaan. In parts, it is even available via live stream.23 Thus via its own media stations and its presence in popular social media platforms, TIF has a permanent impact beyond Tanzania’s national borders. In Tanzania, TIF cooperates with the Tanzania Muslim Professionals Organisation (TAMPRO), while it criticises and competes with other aid providing organisations, such as the former central umbrella organisation for Muslim interests, the Baraza Kuu ya Waislamu Tanzania (BAKWATA), and the Dhi Nureyn Islamic Foundation. Similar to other Islamic FBO, TIF refers to official cooperation with international partner organisations, among others from the United Arab Emirates and Qatar as well as Great Britain.24 In addition, TIF relies on personal support from family and business friends, for example, of the founder and chair

23 Radio-content is posted online, for example, via Soundcloud The Islamic Foundation— Soundcloude, “islamicftz: Radio Imaan Morogoro”, https://soundcloud.com/islamicftz (accessed July 27, 2018) and TV-contend accessible via livestream on watchtv and youtube The Islamic Foundation—WatchTV, “Watch TV Imaan Live TV from Tanzania”, http:// thewatchtv.com/watch-tv-imaan-live-tv-from-tanzania/ (accessed July 27, 2018); The Islamic Foundation—Youtube, “islamicftz”, https://www.youtube.com/user/TVIMAAN/ featured (accessed July 27, 2018); The Islamic Foundation—Youtube, “islamicftz”. 24 Specifically, TIF has partnered with the Dar el-Ber Society of Dubai and the Sharjah Charity International of the United Arab Emirates, as well as the Sheikh Eid Chairtable Association (also known as Sheikh Eid bin Mohammad Al Thani Charitable Association) of Doha—Qatar.

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of the organisation who stem from Tanzania as well as from the Arabian Peninsula. Beyond donations and project funds TIF further has cooperation with media companies of neighbouring countries such as Horizon TV Nairobi from Kenya. Likewise, AZAM TV of the Tanzanian Azam consortium broadcasts selected events worldwide via satellite. Beyond traditional cooperation with NGOs and thus in the field of development cooperation, TIF is thus connected with (media) companies internationally. Through its own media channels and partners, TIF is globally present. As a consequence, TIF has an impact beyond national borders, not the least through own media content. Through cooperation with and maintaining relations and cooperation’s with international NGOs, it fulfils at least on criteria to count as international organisations. Moreover, it deploys contact beyond the NGO-nexus. In contrast, TIF was only once active abroad by sending employees in the context of classical emergency aid to a neighbouring country. Thus, TIF does not fulfil all the criteria of internationality. However, as the example of TIFs shows, organisations can nevertheless have international impact, even if national and sometimes regional borders are not left behind with regard to the catalogue of measures and employee location. Beyond the narrow catalogue of defining internationality presented above, Islamic FBOs have multiple links and cross-border connections. These include resource acquisition and relationship maintenance beyond the reduction exclusively on maintaining relationships with foreign NGOs. Internationality cannot be denied due to the non-fulfilment of a sub-criterion (like project implementation abroad). The international relatedness of organisations increases if one looks beyond these narrow catalogues of criteria. Meanwhile, the categories of regional vs. international organisation are not precise anymore. The explanatory power and significance of ‘the international organisation’ vs. ‘the local organisation’ disappear.

Undoing the Classification of FBOs Based on Their Activities and Function TIF accounts for the construction of over 2000 wells and mosques nationwide. Likewise, the organisation is occasionally involved in the renovation and construction of public social service facilities and government buildings at the local level. In addition, TIF is involved in

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humanitarian aid after natural disasters within Tanzania whenever they occur.25 In health care TIF is responsible for the maintenance of three basic health facilities26 and the implementation of free health camps in various parts of the country. At the same time, TIF supplies nearly 400 orphans. About two-thirds of them are cared for in a homecare programme. The rest is housed in orphanages run by TIF and in TIF boarding schools.27 TIF also runs the already mentioned radio and television station as well as a newspaper. Further commitments in education include the maintenance of a total of seven (formerly eight) schools.28 The diversity of TIF activities and facilities exemplifies the range and comprehensive provision of social services by Islamic FBOs within one organisation. Meanwhile, TIF promotes itself via the motto ‘Kuwatoa watu katika giza na kuwaleta katika nuru’ or ‘Removing Mankind From Darkness to Light’, indicating its missionary respectively propagating aspirations. Similar expressions are also found in the logo of the organisation. The logo refers to the attaining of knowledge, at the same time combing a 25 This included, for example, first-aid help, the distribution of food, cloth and shelter after 2016 earthquake in the Kagera-Region. 26 Facilities include ‘Aljamii for Mothers and Child Care’ and ‘Saratein’ Dispensary in Morogoro, as well as other facilities in Mtwara. 27 For the orphans in the homecare programme, the costs of school education and medical care are covered and monthly pocket money is provided. TIF also has three orphan care facilities for children aged five to 13 years. Within the facilities, the orphans are looked after by two up to three supervisors as well as kitchen staff and religious teachers. Two orphanages provide space for 20 girls each, Dar-ul-Rahma (The Abode of Mercy) in Tabora and Dar-ul-Imaan (The Abode of Faith) in Morogoro. Nearly 50 boys are furthermore catered for in the Dar-ul-Imaan (The Abode of Faith) orphanage that operates its own mosque. The children accommodated for in Morogoro are schooling in TIF’s own facilities. In addition, TIF funds University-tuition for more than 10 orphans. 28 These include three pre-primary schools, three primary and one secondary school. Formerly operating two secondary schools those have been merged to one. About 1200 pupils are schooled in the facilities, with boys forming the majority. The schools include in Mtwara the ‘Muzdalifah English Medium’ consisting of a kindergarten a preprimary school and a primary school. In Morogoro TIF operates the ‘Imaan English Medium Nursery and Imaan English Medium Primary’ School. Founded in 1998 under the name ‘Dar al-Arqaam’, this was later renamed ‘Imaan Schools’. According to TIF staff, the name was changed due to confusions with an Islamic seminary of the same name of another organisation within Tanzania. In addition, in 2013, TIF acquired ‘Forest Hill Secondary School’, which merged with the ‘Imaan Secondary’. In 2018, TIF also started building another secondary school in Dodoma.

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return to the sources of Islam and Prophet Muhammad with pan-Arab symbolism.29 The organisation does not promote itself as mission, respectively, da’wa organisation but rather as a humanitarian relief organisation. Nevertheless, the establishment and dissemination of a positive image of Islam are formulated as a central concern of the organisation and personal concerns of the chairman. The charitable commitment is thus not only engagement for the sake of the needy or as out of necessary to help as such. It is rather understood as a means to testify a welcoming and merciful Islam. Meanwhile, the organisation grants its legitimacy by referring to the slogan and claiming to be ‘permissioned by Allah’.30 TIF’s conformity with Islam is underpinned by the central role played by the so-called Daawah Department. Apart from its concrete target-group-oriented activities,31 it is the so-called backbone of the organisation.32 The Department is determining monitoring processes

29 The organisations logo consists of the name of the organisation in Arabic in an upper semi-circle and the name of the organisation in English in a lower semicircle. The centre of the logo forms a book symbol representing the Holy Scriptures of the Qur’an embedded in a stripe pattern that combines the colours red, green, white and black. It is at the same time a reminiscence of the Prophet Muhammad as well as pan-Arab symbolism. It also reflects the colours of the national flag of the United Arab Emirates, from where close international partner organisation originate. Green as the colour of the Islamic faith is at the same time the source of the light or the cognition from which the stripe pattern originates and which underlies the book symbol. On the one hand, this reflects a return to the Qur’an as well as the Sunnah of the Prophet and, on the other hand, a high degree of identification with the ArabIslamic world. 30 The Islamic Foundation—Facebook, “Info—The Islamic Foundation—Based in Tanzania”, https://www.facebook.com/dif.tanzania/?ref=page_internal (accessed November 11, 2017). 31 As part of targeted group oriented activities, the Dawaah Department is responsible for distributing food donations on religious holidays such as the end of Ramadan and the collection and distribution of zakat. Furthermore, it is officially responsible for the maintenance of the seminary ‘Maahad ul-Imaan’, where almost 100 students received religious education. Moreover, it is offering material support by distributing hijabs, water tanks, Islamic books, sewing machines and motorcycles. The latter project was inaugurated to enable women and men to start their own business as tailor and motor taxi drivers or logisticians. Already in the description of the latter activities overlaps with other departments become clear. 32 The Islamic Foundation, “DAA’WAH DEPARTMENT”, http://islamicftz.org/daawahdepartment/ (accessed February 16, 2016).

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and is officially responsible for the supervision of all activities as well as facilities. Other departments and their activities are checked for religious conformity and the design of the latter officially based on Islamic norms. The Daawah Division is thus established as a moral compass of the organisation. Accompanying employees in their daily work, as well as through informal discussions and interviews, made it clear that both staff and volunteers actively promote Islam beyond the institutional control. They saw and acted themselves as role models in the establishment of Islamic working and living environments. They deliberately acted as advocates of Islam promoting a positive perception of Muslims through their own exemplary actions. Meanwhile, TIF explicitly influences political discourse and positions itself against national and international stakeholders. This happens not the least through press releases in the organisation’s own media. TIF Media are positioning themselves critically against Shiite forms of religious practice. Correspondingly, articles and posts in the media provoke enemy images, not the least against Iran.33 Domestically, TIF Media does not directly criticise the Tanzanian state. Rather, it emphasises the proximity of the organisation to the political leadership. Thus, one finds, for example, reminiscences of the motto of Muslim President Jakaya Kikwete, ‘We promised, we fulfilled it. Choose the CCM, choose Kikwete’, in organisational leaflets. Using the same motto TIF had already celebrated and advertised the first edition of Imaan Newspaper, as a successful expansion of TIF Media. Mission statement and shared images of the then president and the director of the organisation can also be found on contemporary organisation brochures. However, the organisation is particularly critical of the former umbrella organisation for Muslim affairs BAKWATA (The Islamic Foundation—Imaan Newspaper 04.2015, 9) which was once established by the government. TIF Media, in opposition to BAWKATA, accused the latter of being an external body in control of non-Muslims. Accordingly, TIF Media criticised BAKWATA for failing to efficiently use the potential of managed waqf land and having divested waqf land it had been accused of acting 33 For example, government agencies of Shiite Iran were introduced as potential responsible saboteurs for accidents and over 150 deaths, including Shias, during the pilgrimages to Mecca and Media in Saudi Arabia in 2015, see The Islamic Foundation—Imaan Newspaper, “Imaan Newspaper 1”, https://de.scribd.com/doc/285578006/ImaanNewspaper-issue-1 (accessed December 12, 2017).

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in contradiction to the principle of inalienability of waqf land. Thereby TIF Media questioned the Islam conformity, authenticity and legitimacy of BAKWATA. In doing so, TIF can be seen as a ‘watchdog’ of a Sunni order of values and interpretation of Islam, which at the same time competes with established (formerly quasi) non-governmental representative organisations.34 With employees who act as role models, target groups that are enabled to social and therefore political participation and TIF Media as watchdogs TIF is an advocating and lobbying organisation claiming to act in the interests of all Muslims. Nevertheless, Islamic FBOs such as TIF typically function as operational service providers, not the least through their broad involvement in health and education and orphan care, but also through the construction and maintenance of (non-) religious infrastructure. A key focus of this commitment is the provision of secular and religious education. At the same time, commitment is interwoven with da’wa efforts. Although not formally declared as an organisation for the propagation of Islam, TIF awards this activity a central role within the organisation. Mission is not only contained in its own administrative unit within the organisational structures. Rather, the department is also designated to be the moral compass of the organisation. Beyond the measures and administrative structures, the propagation of Islam is promoted by a corresponding work culture and way of life of employees to contribute to the dissemination of a positive image of Islam. Looking at Islamic FBOs as either operational service providers or mission organisations is thus inadequate. Rather are these types creating a dichotomy that is not tenable for the field of Islamic FBOs. The same applies to the classification of Islamic FBOs as advocacy or lobbing organisations. Advocacy for Muslims is rather than influencing politics directly, essentially done through empowering Muslims through education. Meanwhile organisations act politically and their actions have implications for Tanzania’s sociopolitical fabric. Reluctance regarding

34 Similarly, TIF media dissociate themselves from so-called established media. This is expressed, for example, in the credo of TV-Imaan, which propagates the reporting against common stereotypes, which portrays Muslims as terrorists and oppressors of women. Against this, few from many misconceptions the established media spreads and brainwashes the masses, Imaan Media claims to steer against with its program The Islamic Foundation, “Media Department”, http://islamicftz.org/media-department/ (accessed February 16, 2016).

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demands for political change and the creation of fairer opportunities for participation in general are thwarted by explicit criticism within an inner-Islamic sphere. Self-portrayals as advocate for Muslim interests and as preservers of Islam serve in a way to enable direct criticism and delegitimation of other Muslim stakeholders. Rather than starting points of distinctions their activities, respectively, the provision of services, the propagation of Islam and advocacy claims must be understood as distinct centres of gravity which influence the organisations as part of their multiple relations. A differentiation between organisations based on their activities and functions is therefore impracticable.

Undoing the Dichotomy Between Western and Middle Eastern FBOs Even before independence, there existed institutionalised ways of charitable giving on the territory of present-day Tanzania, which included also Islamic charitable institutions, as documented in the context of waqf on Zanzibar.35 During the colonial period and within the framework of colonial structures formalised initiatives appeared increasingly also on the mainland. Especially within the Asian immigrant communities the establishment of initiatives with charitable purposes, aiming at the improvement of the living conditions of Muslims has been highlighted. They as well as the communities they were imbedded in were far from being a monolithic block. Rather they were shaped by different schools of thought within Islam and continuous exchange not in smallest sense through trade and movements of communities and scholarship over the Indian Ocean. Thereby they were related to the Middle East but also beyond to Persia and the Indian subcontinent. Among these were organisations such as the East African Muslim Welfare Association (EAMWAS) who claimed the advancement of Muslim interests in general while at the same time, organisations emerged, who in the context of ethno-religious communities such as the Ahmadiyya, the Khoja Shia Ithna-Asheri and Ibadite

35 Norbert Oberauer, ‘Waqf’ im kolonialen Sansibar: Der Wandel einer islamischen Stiftungspraxis unter britischer Protektoratsherrschaft (Würzburg: Ergon-Verlag, 2012); Abdul Sheriff, “The Records of the ‘Waqf Commission’ as a Soruces of Social and Religious History of Zanzibar,” in Islam in East Africa: New Sources: Archives. Manuscripts and Written Historical Sources. Oral History. Archaeology, International colloquium, Rome, 2–4 December 1999, ed. Biancamaria Scarcia Amoretti (Roma: Herder, 2001), 27–45.

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communities were more focusing on providing basic social services in education and health for their own communities.36 Principles and institutions of Islamic charity, as well as Islam itself, can therefore look back on a centuries-long tradition on the East African coast. They are not phenomena to be located far away in the Middle East. Rather, they form part of local life practice with corresponding historical roots and at the same time established connections, across the Indian Ocean with the wider Islamic world in its various forms. Just as the territory of today’s Tanzania can refer to a centuries-old Islamic tradition, Tanzania and the Islamic FBOs in Tanzania have been shaped by decades of involvement in the international system of development cooperation. After independence, Tanzania developed its Ujamaa policy as a specific way of African socialism and self-dependency. Based on this state doctrine, Tanzania was on the one hand a recipient of aid from the Socialist bloc. As a non-aligned state of the third way, however, Tanzania also received Western development aid and thus courted by both major powers of the Cold War era. Even with the Cold War coming to an end, the introduction of structural adjustment programmes and the transition of the country towards a market-oriented multiparty system, Tanzania remained one of the world’s least developed countries in the global ranking.37 This status is accompanied by continuous and significant flows of foreign aid. They do not only affect governments budgets, but also the state and society’s self-conception, in the sense of being a developing and aid receiving country. Since the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s, official aid as well as individual charity has also been channelled via an increasing number of NGOs. This includes a growing number of Islamic FBOs. In everyday life, this is not least visible by the ubiquity of development organisations, respectively, the projects and programmes implemented by them. Involving parts of the population into their activities and due to development aids’ importance for running society and state affairs the development discourse and corresponding terms are more to the core of the society. Islamic FBOs operate in this overall social environment and integrate into a national environment which is coined by development discourses and the status 36 See also Chapters “Transnational Networks and Global Shi‘i Islamic NGOs in Tanzania” and “Politics of Humanitarianism: The Ahmadiyya and the provision of Social Welfare” in this volume. 37 United Nations, “Least Developed Country Category: United Republic of Tanzania Profile”, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category-united-republic-of-tanzania.html (accessed April 26, 2019).

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and self-image of a developing country. The preceding remarks illustrate specific local frameworks in which relations to ‘Western’ development aid as well as Islamic charitable principles form part of Tanzania lifeworld realities. The concrete example of TIF illustrates corresponding connections, respectively, interrelations in the field of Islamic FBOs. Western development, its structures and its language as well as Islamic principles of charity shape TIF as organisation founded in Tanzania. Accordingly, TIF describes itself as […] independent Religious & humanitarian foundation that works to help millions of poor and vulnerable people regardless of race, political affiliation, gender or belief […]. Our identity and expansive experience of operational support help us connect and gain the trust of different communities regardless of belief.38

Thus, the Islamic Foundation identifies as a faith-inspired and humanitarian organisation at the same time and as an organisation that helps all poor and needy regardless of race, political orientation, gender or belief. Those TIFs understanding of help characterises a high level of conformity with the concept and demands of Western humanitarian aid as unbiased help for all those in need while in the case of TIF as a religious organisation this help is based on religious convictions. Not least with reference to its identity and experience, TIF refers to particular effectiveness in the establishment of trust of different communities and thus target group proximity. TIF points out official donations from patrons (well-wishers) and cooperation with international partner organisations in the West as well as in the Middle East, thereby establishing itself as an organisation embedded in the international (Islamic) development and NGO world. Finally, essential parts of the organisation’s catalogue of activities convey the image of a ‘traditional’ humanitarian organisation with religious impetus. Accordingly, the organisational structure pictures activities embedded in the supervision of six departments that are especially dedicated to daawah (da’wa), orphans, education, media, project work (infrastructure) and health. This administrative structure, the catalogue of social services and emergency relief activities, the definition of target groups contributes 38 The Islamic Foundation, “Homepage”, http://islamicftz.org (accessed August 28, 2017).

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to a specific image of the organisation. At the first sight, it seems as if TIF has adjusted its understanding of religion and religious practices to the global development discourses and aid practice as has been argued before especially in the context of Christian aid organisations. Religious activities appear within the framework of the mentioned organisational structures compartmentalised in an own and separate department. Apart from this, TIF provides professional aid in other areas. In the meantime, a more detailed examination of the organisational practice offers a multifaceted picture. As previously noted, the Dawaah Division does not only focus on the propagation and promotion of Islam. Rather the department has far-reaching functions. The department acts as a supervisory body and moral compass. It ideally checks the legitimacy and conformity of activities and the way in which activities are implemented. It is therefore responsible for leading religious decisions. At a meta-level, discourses that determine day-to-day organisational practice are not quite the same as those of Western development aid though the terminology might lead to this assumption. The organisation and its activities are legitimated not only by development and progress orientation, but also by conformity with Islam and continuous reference to Islamic principles. This includes the delimitation to un-Islamic practices. Development and in consequence the activities of the organisation are not oriented and understood as purely towards and about material advancement in this world. Equally—if not more importantly—it includes spiritual improvement and thus securing of the salvation of the soul in the hereafter. This includes not only the beneficiaries but staff and supporters as well. Fundraising adverts reflect this, including statements of the chair of Islamic Foundation Tanzania on the TIF Website naming why to support TIF ‘As the statement goes Help us to Help yourself. We have built a platform for you to be able to increase your level in Jannah. Take the opportunity before it’s too late’.39 The Islamic Foundation Tanzania presents itself as a platform through which supporters can do good. It promises its donors that they can improve their status in the hereafter when channelling donations through TIF. Concrete (financial) support of TIF in this world secures rewards in the afterlife (Jannah), while pointing out a

39 The Islamic Foundation, “Message from Chairman”, http://islamicftz.org/message-from-chairman (accessed August 29, 2017).

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certain time pressure, since life ultimately ends. TIF establishes itself as a mediator between the needy, donors and God or the divine order. As well as the needy, donors become service recipients of TIF. Meanwhile again TIF legitimised its own mandate of action with the slogan to be ‘permissioned by Allah’ and therefore with highest authority. Everyday working procedures as well are shaped by compliance with Islam (as interpreted by TIF). These includes a desirable comprehensive segregation by sex, including, for example, separate information hotlines for women and men with according respondents of the same sex. With exceptions, e.g., in educational institutions and staff of health facilities, vast parts of the organisation’s workforce, as well as the entire team in senior and representative functions of the organisation, are male. Thus, the composition of the workforce is consistent with gender roles and with consequent separation of the sexes. This includes absence of women, respectively, their invisibility in public affairs. Accordingly, women are rarely appearing in TIF Media. Women are predominantly present where work environments are perceived as female (childcare and early childhood education) and when women are necessary for other women as contact persons (e.g. in health care and counselling). Working hours are structured according to prayer times and the Islamic calendar. Friday, instead of Saturday and Sunday, is the officially weekends day off. Furthermore, specific Islamic dressing standards, including the white kanzu, kofia, sandals and beard for men, and a black dress, veil covering hair and face and gloves for women are promoted in the working environment. Fundamentals of work, everyday work and modi operadi are thus derived from a specific reading of Islam while at the same time the general organisational outline is in accordance with the structure and language of Western development cooperation. At first glance, the Islamic Foundation Tanzania fits the image of a typical development-oriented organisation. TIF relates to the concept of humanitarianism and is structured, conducts activities and uses the same language and terms as other development organisations, albeit with Islamic impetus. Stylistic means and elements of self-representations promote this image. Religious principles and practices seem to step back for accordance with essentials of development cooperation. Although originally Tanzanian, TIF seems to correspond to the ideal type of organisations that spring from a Western development culture. Meanwhile, in-depth analysis of the underlying self-conception of the organisation

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and observation of everyday practice makes it clear, that TIF is rather shaped by mentioned relations to Western development and at the same time by concepts of Islamic charity and a certain reading of Islam as such. Terminology of development, humanity and the practice of development cooperation and its structures are linked to basic religious ideologies, self-understanding and religious practice and ideals as to Western development aid. Instead of being a development organisation, TIF explicitly defines itself as an independent religious and humanitarian foundation. At the same time, TIF is shaped by religious ideals that complement the traditional development agenda. Development practice and ideas are linked to an Islamic interpretation of the (development) world. While key terms of Western development cooperation are used, develop­ ment does not serve as a key concept for the commitment, but rather social participation and living a life in accordance to god’s will. As an Islamic humanitarian organisation, humanitarian service is not a profane act and humanitarian work is a relief of material and spiritual distress. Through the facilitation of an Islamic way of life, the invitation to Islam and through the promotion of Muslims themselves the humanitarian service is a development-oriented and at the same time profoundly Islamic service. As a part of Tanzanian society, people working within Islamic FBOs and the organisations themselves are integrated into Tanzania’s overall social context. This social context is shaped by Islam reaching well back in into the past. It is not the least shaped by relations of exchange for which the Indian Ocean is of central importance. At the same time, these relations do not end in the Middle East as the only formative force in terms of an Islamic identity. Furthermore, Tanzania is an established protagonist in the context of development cooperation and a recipient of aid as one of the least developed countries. Society is accordingly shaped by its relations to the practice of development cooperation. This includes Islamic FBOs. Most of the Islamic FBOs on the ground are original Tanzanian organisations. They cannot be traced back to an origin solely in the West, and thus to a starting point as development-oriented organisations, nor as organisation originally based in the Middle East and rooted exclusively in Islamic charity. The examples given illustrate relatedness to Western development cooperation as well as to the principles of Islamic charity as equally constitutive within one and the same organisation.

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The Enterprisation of Islamic FBOs to Secure Sustainability In contrast to other Tanzanian Islamic FBOs, TIF has been very successful in exploring and capitalising from the power of media, including traditional mass media as well as contemporary social media channels. This way, TIF is capable to draw resources from new forms of relationships and relations to a broader range of stakeholders. While the range of capitalisation from Media is outstanding, the relations themselves are characteristic for a range of Islamic FBOs. This is not only leading towards a new type of or organisation but a new approach towards understanding Islamic FBOs through their relatedness ensuring organisational sustainability as sketched in the following. While Imaan Newspapers, the Islamic Foundation of Tanzania’s weekly and nationally distributed newspaper is produced in Dar es Salaam, its radio stations and television studios are housed in the prestigious corporate headquarters in Morogoro. At the same time, the logos of the media decorate the front of the organisation headquarters facing the main street and are visible for trespassers. This illustrates the increasingly central role that the media occupy in the external representation and the self-image of the organisation. As outlined, the media department is a heavyweight in terms of TIFs financial expenses. In addition to the analogue media (radio, television and newspaper), TIF also maintains profiles in leading contemporary social platforms, which can be accessed, for example, via its own website http://islamicftz.org. TIF links its own content of analogue media with the digital presences and continuously expands its performances in the digital world. TIF provides its own RSS feeds,40 maintains a Twitter account,41 an Instagram account,42 a Youtube channel43 and its own Facebook profile.44 In addition, TIF 40 The

Islamic Foundation—Feed, “TIF: RSS  Feeds”, http://islamicftz.org/feed/ (accessed July 27, 2018). 41 https://twitter.com/islamicftz. 42 As of August 2018 https://www.instagram.com/islamicftz/ had 760 contributions and 9960 subscribers, in March 2019, the number of subscribers increased to 19,200 with almost 1160 contributions with post to major events that had taken place in the meantime. 43 https://www.youtube.com/user/TVIMAAN. 44 https://www.facebook.com/islamicftz/.

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has its own externally produced app. However, with limited functionality it is currently available in the official Google Play Store45 via the hashtag #inspiredbythebeloved contributions concerning the organisation are tagged in social media on an ongoing basis. Besides general news on Islam and on Muslim affairs, TIF Media increasingly focus on advertising and broadcasting TIF events. These include interviews and interactive talk shows with Muslim scholars as well as one-day to multi-day workshops. The major events combine religious content with Tanzanian popular life guidance literature. Not surprisingly, these efforts give rise in new constellations in relation to target groups and users of TIF services. Beyond the needy in the implementation of classical charitable and development-oriented projects, the target groups increasingly include potential consumers and customers, wealthy and willing to spend their money on TIF events and services. At the same time, they are potential customers for services and products advertised by external parties at TIF events. TIF thus opens up to another group of supporters and new relations namely towards sponsors and business partnerships beyond classical development cooperation and donor-funded project funds. The list of sponsors and partners includes leading Muslim-run businesses in East Africa and Tanzania.46 Furthermore, TIF uses categorisations of sponsorships, for example, in awarding the status as platinum, gold, silver and bronze partners according to its generosity. The organisation therefore furthermore capitalises on mechanisms of competition through visualised and staggered generosity between sponsors. Through advertising revenues and sponsorships, TIF is thereby tapping upon new sponsors and resources beyond traditional donors for charitable projects using market mechanism of competition to increase generosity between sponsors. In addition to sponsoring, TIF also cooperates in the implementation of

45 The Islamic Foundation—GoogleAppStore, “TV IMAAN App”, https://play.google. com/store/apps/details?id=org.islamicftz.tvimaan.tvplayer&hl=en_US (accessed July 27, 2018). 46 For the visit of Wahaj Tarin as an international guest speaker in Tanzania, TIF indicated the following companies as sponsors: Platinum Sponsor: Peoples Bank of Zanzibar (Islamic Banking), Gold Sponsors: Camel - Flour Miles, Afya - Driking Water, Amana Bank, O-GAS, Bakhesa Group /Azam. Silver Sponsors: ASAS Diaries LTD Iringa, ATN, Lake GAS. Bronze sponsors: Morobest, Simbaoil, Usangulu Logistics and AFR-Oil.

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major events, for example, with media companies within East Africa.47 Due to the number of cooperating mass media partners, the events are not only accessibly within Tanzania but also in the neighbouring countries. By broadcasting the events via media partners, TIF reaches a much larger audience than is possible through its own broadcasting capacity. Thus, in the wake of major events, TIF has been able to increase the number of followers in social media tremendously. At the same time, TIF succeeds in establishing a broad network of cooperating companies. This increases the own reputation and the attractiveness of the own events for potential sponsors, as far as a broader public is reached. Audience ratings for radio and television are not available. Nevertheless, running its own radio, television and newspaper TIF has succeeded in establishing it presences in the classical mass media in only one and a half decades. Meanwhile, the numbers of follows in social media channels are proving successful audience growth. With 19,200 subscribers on Instagram, 44,000 followers on Facebook and 32,000 subscribers on YouTube (as of March 2019) it had a considerable impact in digital media and successfully maintains follower loyalty. This audience includes those interested in participating in the various attendance events TIF is offering. Participation fees for a day-long workshop start at about 25,000 TZS (approximate 10 Euro). Within the Tanzanian context, these are considerable amounts of money. Accordingly, the workshops are clearly aimed not at the poorest of the poor. Rather they focus on a solvent audience. The increasing range at the same time increases the attractiveness for sponsors of these wealthy consumers. With over 20 years of organisational history, TIF marks a gradual shift in its focus and its activities. Much of the staff and resources remain to be committed to traditional social services, especially in education, health and orphans care bind. At the same time, these are not merely free offers, but rather a mix between providing care for the needy, especially orphans, and paid service that helps to maintain the facilities. Social service provision for the needy meanwhile remains central to the ­self-conception of the organisation’s management. However, income-generating large-scale events as well as media operations are becoming more and more important for TIF. On the one hand, 47 These include Azam TV-ZBC2 (satellite television station), Horizon TV (Nairobi), Iceland TV (Zanzibar); Mahaasin TV (Mwanza Tanzania), ZCTV (Zanzibar); Radio Ihsaan FM (Tanga) and Radio AL-Noor 93.3 (Zanzibar).

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TIF reaches broader audiences via the various media channels and generates publicity. On the other hand, it opens up to supporters as target groups. Services focus on potential consumers and costumers instead of needy beneficiaries and traditional service recipients alone. Media and marketable events tap new opportunities for cooperation, for example, with companies as partners as well as sponsors. Exploring these new relations to secure the organisations sustainably TIF is thus characterised by an increasing entreprisation of the organisation. New ties are established towards new target groups as consumers and customers. Further relations are established to partners and sponsors while relying on mechanisms of a competitive market environment to increase resource flows. Meanwhile the resources generated directly or indirectly secure charitable and developmental activities of TIF and TIF therefore remains an organisation of the development aid and charitable nexus.

Towards a New Typology of Islamic FBOs The case study of TIF has illustrated that the application of the current definition of internationality on Islamic FBOs is inadequate. Defining internationality solely on the ground of maintenance of relationships with other NGOs as well as own employees and activities in more than one country is too limited. Islamic FBOs have diverse relational ties to stakeholders and contexts beyond regional and national boundaries. Differentiating between local vs. international organisations is particularly in the age of increasing digital entanglements unfruitful. Promoting religious and secular education is a key concern of Islamic FBOs. Along other commitments in health, orphan care, but also through construction and maintenance of religious and non-religious infrastructure makes their function an operational service providers clear. In addition to more general commitments in education, propagation of a specific reading of Islam is central to Islamic FBOs and accordingly linked to efforts to propagating Islam. Commitment is understood in the mediation of a positive image of Islam and a related message of salvation for all people. This might be achieved through explicit da’wa efforts and responsible departments as the case with TIF or indirectly as in other organisation by simply living a good example and thereby inspiring and inviting people to Islam. A claim to the promotion of a positive image of Islam is inherent to all Islamic FBOs and a categorisation of certain organisations as missionary organisations is thus impractical. Islamic FBOs activities

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aim at enabling beneficiaries to be good Muslims and to social participation. This goes hand in hand with the general criticism of unequal treatment of Muslims (or Muslim subgroups) and, at the same time, the responsibility of organisations to work towards changing conditions. Representation of interests, especially of Muslims, is attempted not least through their qualification instead of direct criticism and effort to ­policy-changes. Those Islamic FBOs can be understood as service providers and advocacy organisations with propagation impetus at the same time. Categorisations based on the distinction of functions or catalogue of activities are therefore not very effective in the field of Islamic FBOs in Tanzania. Organisations like TIF are Tanzanian in origin. The geographical localisation as well as the sociopolitical and historical realities of Tanzania makes the dichotomy of the Middle East vs West in most cases obsolete. Associated processes of either the Islamisation of development aid organisations or a developmentalisation of Islamic charity organisations does help to explain only limited extent the dynamics in the field. The majority of Islamic FBOs in Tanzania are rather shaped by dual and simultaneous relatedness to the principles of Islamic charity as well as to Western development aid with the interface of the NGO as a globalised organisational model of engagement. Rather than as a basis for distinguishing organisations, local and transnational ties, activities and functions and ties to the fields of (Islamic) development cooperation and charity are to be understood as centres of gravity of relationships that shape the field of Islamic FBOs. That said organisations can rather be differentiated based on their commitment to assure sustainability. TIF was introduced as an example for the type of Islamic FBOs, which characterises the ever-closer relatedness to entrepreneurship and a competitive market economy. Instead of needy beneficiaries, certain activities and services promote relations to potential consumers and customers. A diversification of supports is furthermore established through relations to sponsors and corporate partnerships. Core tasks in the context of classical charitable and development efforts are meanwhile directly or indirectly subsidised through the sources and networks established. Thereby entrepreneurial Islamic FBOs remain tightly related to Islamic charity and development aid. In terms of their diversified relationships, however, they are characterised by an extended relationship structure beyond classical charity and development cooperation. In addition to the presented type with TIF as an example, four more types were identified in the ongoing study. The typology is by no means

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exhaustive, but represents rather a catalogue of types developed based on empirical data. These are notably organisations with, first, ties to a founder individual, second, to family networks, third, community structures as well as, fourth, links to the field of classical charity and development cooperation.48 This typology fosters an understanding of Islamic FBOs, which emphasises the multiple relatedness of FBOs in order to capture the field of Islamic FBOs rather than the organisations as entities. Through this approach, dynamics within the field can be explained, e.g., the partial ‘invisibility’ of individual organisations. This refers to low involvement of organisations, for example, in the classical acquisition of donations and project grants, since organisations rely on other resources and mechanisms to secure sustainability. At the same time, it raises questions about the conventional definition of NGOs and FBOs and their characteristics, such as the non-profit nature of organisations such as TIFs. A readjustment and rethinking of the characterisation of NGOs and FBOs become necessary.

Bibliography Ahmed, Abdallah C. “Networks of Islamic NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa: Bilal Muslim Mission, African Muslim Agency (Direct Aid), and ‘al-Haramayn’.” Journal of Eastern African Studies, no. 3 (2009): 426–437. Ali Duh, Abdalla. “Muslim Faith-Based Organizations in Somalia and Kenya: Activities, Faith Inspired Development and Securitization.” http://afrikansar vi.fi/72-artikkeli/208-muslim-faith-based-organizations-in-somalia-and-kenya (accessed November 27, 2014). Alterman, Jon B., and Karin v. Hippel, eds. Understanding Islamic charities. Significant issues series. Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2007. Anheier, Helmut K., and Lester M. Salamon. “Genese und Schwerpunkte internationaler Forschung zum Nonprofit-Sektor: Von der Fller-Kommission zum Johns Hopkins Projekt.” Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen 4 (1992): 40–48. Benthall, Jonathan. “Islamic Charities, Faith Based organizations, and the International Aid System.” In Understanding Islamic charities, eds. Jon B. Alterman and Karin v. Hippel, 1–14. Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2007. Berger, Julia. “Religious Nongovernmental Organizations: An Exploratory Analysis.” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 14, no. 1 (2003): 15–39. 48 See the forthcoming dissertation of the author for a detailed discussion of the individual types.

196  S. MÜLLER Bielefeld, Wolfgang, and William S. Cleveland. “Defining Faith-Based Organizations and Understanding Them Through Research.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 42, no. 3 (2013): 442–467. Bompani, Barbara, and Maria Frahm-Arp, eds. Development and Politics from Below: Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State. Non-governmental public action series. Houndmills, Basingstoke, England, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/610853190. Clarke, Gerard. “Faith-Based Organizations and International Development: An Overview.” In Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular, eds. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings, 17–45. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Clarke, Gerard, and Michael Jennings, eds. Development, Civil Society and ­Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Clarke, M., and V.-A. Ware. “Understanding Faith-Based Organizations: How Fbos Are Contrasted with NGOs in International Development Literature.” Progress in Development Studies 15, no. 1 (2015): 37–48. Dilger, Hansjörg. “Religion and the Formation of an Urban Educational Market: Transnational Reform Processes and Social Inequalities in Christian and Muslim Schooling in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.” Journal of Religion in Africa 43, no. 4 (2013): 451–479. Dohrn, Kristina. “Translocal Ethics: Hizmet Teachers and the Formation of Gülen-Inspired Schools in Urban Tanzania.” Sociology of Islam 1, no. 3–4 (2014): 233–256. Flanigan, Shawn T. “Factors Influencing Nonprofit Career Choice in Faith-Based and Secular NGOs in three Developing Countries.” Nonprofit Management and Leadership 21, no. 1 (2010): 59–75. Fowler, Alan. “NGOs & the Globalization of Social Welfare: Perspectives from East Africa.” In Service Provision under Stress in East Africa: The State, NGOs & People’s Organizations in Kenya, Tanzania & Uganda, eds. Joseph Semboja and Ole Therkildsen, 51–69. Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research, 1995. Glagow, Manfred. Die Nicht-Regierungs-Organisationen als die neuen Hoffnungsträger in der internationalen Entwicklungspolitik? Forschungssch­ werpunkt Entwicklungssoziologie: Working paper 169. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 1992. Haustein, Jörg, and Emma Tomalin. “Religion and Development in Africa and Asia.” In Routledge Handbook of Africa–Asia Relations, eds. Pedro A. Raposo, David Arase, and Scarlett Cornelissen, 76–93. London, New York: Routledge, 2018. Hearn, Julie. “African NGOs: The New Compradors?” Development and Change 38, no. 6 (2007): 1095–1110.

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Jones, Ben, and Marie J. Petersen. “Instrumental, Narrow, Normative? Reviewing Recent Work on Religion and Development.” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 7 (2011): 1291–1306. Kaag, Mayke. “Aid, Umma, and Politics; Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad.” In Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, eds. Benjamin F. Soares and Rene Otayek, 85–102. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Lacey, Robert, and Jonathan Benthall, eds. Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the “Age of Terror” and Beyond. Berlin and London: Gerlach Press, 2014. Leurs, Robert, Peter Tumaini-Mungu, and Abu Mvungi. Mapping the Development Activities of Faith-Based Organizations in Tanzania. Religions and development working paper 58. Birmingham: International Development Department University of Birmingham, 2011. Lewis, David, and Nazneen Kanji. Non-governmental Organizations and Development. London, New York: Routledge, 2009. Lo, Mbaye, and Muhammed Haron, eds. Muslim Institutions of Higher Education in Postcolonial Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Loimeier, Roman. “Trajectories of Islamic Education in the Twentieth Century: Zanzibar and Beyond.” In Muslim Institutions of Higher Education in Postcolonial Africa, eds. Mbaye Lo and Muhammed Haron, 63–72. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Lynch, Cecelia. “Local and Global Influences on Islamic NGOs in Kenya.” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 6, no. 1 (2011): 21–34. Mallya, Ernest T. “Faith-Based Organizations, the State and Politics in Tanzania.” In Development and Politics from Below: Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State, eds. Barbara Bompani and Maria Frahm-Arp, 131–151. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Mhina, Amos, ed. Religions and Development in Tanzania: A Preliminary Literature Review. Religions and development working paper 11. [Birmingham]: International Development Department, University of Birmingham, 2007. Müller, Sebastian. “Islamische Wohltätigkeit und Entwicklungsorganisationen: Grundlagen des Engagements und exemplarische Einblicke in die Praxis.” In Armut und Gerechtigkeit: Christliche und islamische Perspektiven, eds. Christian Ströbele, Anja Middelbeck-Varwik, Amir Dziri, and Muna Tatari, 202–215. Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2016. Müller, Sebastian. “Krisen und Glaube: Streiflichter islamischer Nothilfe und langfristiger Entwicklungsmaßnahmen im Namen des Islams.” In Krisenhilfe oder Hilfe in Krisen? eds. Rainer Öhlschläger and Hartmut Sangmeister, 97–115. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016. Neubert, Dieter. Entwicklungspolitische Hoffnungen und gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit: Eine vergleichende Länderfallstudie von ­Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen in Kenia und Ruanda. Frankfurt/Main, New York: Campus, 1997.

198  S. MÜLLER Nohlen, Dieter, and Franz Nuscheler, eds. Handbuch der Dritten Welt: Grundprobleme, Theorien, Strategien. 3rd ed. 8 vols. 1. Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 1992. Oberauer, Norbert. ‘Waqf’ im kolonialen Sansibar: Der Wandel einer islamischen Stiftungspraxis unter britischer Protektoratsherrschaft. Würzburg: ­Ergon-Verlag, 2012. Öhlschläger, Rainer, and Hartmut Sangmeister, eds. Krisenhilfe oder Hilfe in Krisen? 1. Auflage. Weltwirtschaft und internationale Zusammenarbeit Band 18. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016. Petersen, Marie J. For Humanity or for the umma? Aid and Islam in Transnational Muslim NGOs. London: Hurst & Company, 2015. Raposo, Pedro A., David Arase, and Scarlett Cornelissen, eds. Routledge Handbook of Africa–Asia Relations. London, New York: Routledge, 2018. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gbv/detail.action?docID=4913216. Saddiq, Nabila. “Capacity Building and Islamic FBOs: Insights from Malawi.” Praxis Note 48. https://www.intrac.org/resources/praxis-note-48-capacitybuilding-islamic-fbos-insights-malawi/. Scarcia Amoretti, Biancamaria, ed. Islam in East Africa: New Sources: Archives. Manuscripts and Written Historical Sources. Oral History. Archaeology, International Colloquium, Rome, 2–4 December 1999. Roma: Herder, 2001. Schwenger, Daniel. Organisation internationaler Nichtregierungsorganisationen: Aufbau und Koordination von NGOs im System der Vereinten Nationen. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2013. Semboja, Joseph, and Ole Therkildsen, eds. Service Provision Under Stress in East Africa: The State, NGOs & People’s Organizations in Kenya, Tanzania & Uganda. Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research, 1995. http:// www.worldcat.org/oclc/32779133. Sheriff, Abdul. “The Records of the ‘Waqf Commission’ as a Sources of Social and Religious History of Zanzibar.” In Islam in East Africa: New Sources: Archives. Manuscripts and Written Historical Sources. Oral History. Archaeology, International Colloquium, Rome, 2–4 December 1999, ed. Biancamaria Scarcia Amoretti, 27–45. Roma: Herder, 2001. Shivji, Issa G. “Reflections on NGOs in Tanzania: What We Are, What We Are Not, and What We Ought to Be.” Development in Practice 14, no. 5 (2004): 689–695. Sider, Ronald J., and Heidi R. Unruh. “Typology of Religious Characteristics of Social Service and Educational Organizations and Programs.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 33, no. 1 (2004): 109–134. Spies, Eva. “Being in Relation: A Critical Appraisal of Religious Diversity and Mission Encounter in Madagascar.” Journal of Africana Religions 7, no. 1 (2019): 62–83. Ströbele, Christian, Anja Middelbeck-Varwick, Amir Dziri, and Muna Tatari, eds. Armut und Gerechtigkeit: Christliche und islamische Perspektiven.

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Theologisches Forum Christentum - Islam. Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2016. Sülzer, Rolf, and Arthur Zimmermann. Abschied vom Planungswahn: Neue und alte Organisationsfragen der Internationalen Zusammenarbeit. 2. Aufl., vollst. bearb., aktualisierte und erw. Fassung. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013. The Islamic Foundation. “The Islamic Foundation—Broshure: Tumeahidi. Tumetimiza.” (2014). The Islamic Foundation. “DAA’WAH DEPARTMENT”. http://islamicftz.org/ daawah-department/ (accessed February 16, 2016). The Islamic Foundation, “Media Department”. http://islamicftz.org/mediadepartment/ (accessed February 16, 2016). The Islamic Foundation. “Message from Chairman”. http://islamicftz.org/message-from-chairman (accessed August 29, 2017). The Islamic Foundation. “Homepage”. http://islamicftz.org (accessed August 28, 2017). The Islamic Foundation—Facebook. “Info—The Islamic Foundation—Based in Tanzania: Facebook Profile—About”. https://www.facebook.com/pg/islamicftz/about/?ref=page_internal (accessed December 12, 2017). The Islamic Foundation—Imaan Newspaper. “Imaan Newspaper 1” 1. https://de.scribd.com/doc/285578006/Imaan-Newspaper-issue-1 (accessed December 12, 2017). The Islamic Foundation—GoogleAppStore. “TV IMAAN App”. https://play. google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.islamicftz.tvimaan.tvplayer&hl=en_ US (accessed July 27, 2018). The Islamic Foundation—Feed: “TIF, RSS Feeds”. http://islamicftz.org/feed/ (accessed July 7, 2018). The Islamic Foundation—Soundcloude. “islamicftz: Radio Imaan Morogoro”. https://soundcloud.com/islamicftz (accessed July 27, 2018). The Islamic Foundation—WatchTV. “Watch TV Imaan Live TV from Tanzania”. http://thewatchtv.com/watch-tv-imaan-live-tv-from-tanzania/ (accessed July 27, 2018). The Islamic Foundation—Youtube. “islamicftz”. https://www.youtube.com/ user/TVIMAAN/featured (accessed July 27, 2018). Tomalin, Emma. Religions and Development. London and New York: Routledge, 2013. Townsend, Janet G., Gina Porter, and Emma Mawdsley. “The Role of the Transnational Community of Non-government Organizations: Governance or Poverty Reduction?” Journal of International Development 14, no. 6 (2002): 829–839. United Nations. “Least Developed Country Category: United Republic of Tanzania Profile”. https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category-united-republic-of-tanzania.html (accessed April 26, 2019).

Transnational Networks and Global Shi‘i Islamic NGOs in Tanzania Mara A. Leichtman

Minority religious movements headquartered in African cities are increasingly presenting themselves in the institutional form of ­ non-governmental organizations. Since the 1980s, neoliberalism has ­ reshaped relationships between faith-based activism, humanitarian aid and social change in Africa.1 Formalized and bureaucratized structures allow Islamic movements to engage in various public spheres and trans-regional networks and to access material and symbolic resources. While there is growing interest in (Sunni) Islamic NGOs in Africa, little

1 LeBlanc and Gosselin depict a dialectic relationship between a neoliberal ideology that encourages the privatization, individualization and NGO-ization of social activism and the use of neoliberal discourse and practice by religious actors to help achieve social and religious change. Marie Nathalie LeBlanc and Louis Audet Gosselin, “Introduction: Faith, Charity and the Ethics of Volunteerism in West Africa,” in Faith and Charity: Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa, eds. Marie Nathalie LeBlanc and Louis Audet Gosselin (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 10.

M. A. Leichtman (*)  Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 H. Weiss (ed.), Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38308-4_8

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is known about Shi‘i NGOs.2 Comparing the expansion and goals of two Shi‘i Islamic organizations in Tanzania highlights the interconnection of diverse local, national and transnational actors in social welfare provision.3 Similar to Salafi NGOs financed by Gulf countries, Shi‘i NGOs in Africa combine religious education and the building of mosques and schools with health care and economic development. Yet, more than their Sunni counterparts, Shi‘i organizations are dependent on NGO status in order to obtain legitimacy and convince a growing community of followers of the wider moral and material benefits of adhering to a minority branch of Islam. The 1979 Iranian Revolution significantly influenced the development of Shi‘i Islam worldwide, including in Africa; yet the relationship between Iran and African Shi‘a is complex. Jaffer, in an article on

2 Whereas most studies ignore Shi‘i organizations or assume that African Muslims are not Shi‘a, Skinner acknowledges the growth of Shi‘i Islam in West Africa. David E. Skinner, “Da‘wa and Politics in West Africa: Muslim Jama‘at and ­Non-Governmental Organizations in Ghana, Sierra Leone and The Gambia,” in Development and Politics from Below: Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State, eds. Barbara Bompani and Maria Frahm-Arp (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 99–130. Most scholarship focuses on Gulf-funded Salafi organizations. See, for example, Mayke Kaag, “Gulf Charities in Africa,” in Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the “Age of Terror” and Beyond, eds. Robert Lacey and Jonathan Benthall (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2014), 79–94; Mohammed R. Kroessin with Abdulfatah S. Mohamed, “Saudi Arabian NGOs in Somalia: ‘Wahabi’ Da’wah or Humanitarian Aid?” in Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular, eds. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Samadia Sadouni, “New Religious Actors in South Africa: The Example of Islamic Humanitarianism,” in Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, eds. Benjamin F. Soares and René Otayek (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 103–118. 3 I

will use the terms “NGOs” and “charities” interchangeably in this chapter for the Shi‘i Islamic faith-based civil society organizations described. These are registered as NGOs under the Tanzanian 2002 NGO Act and are also connected to registered NGOs in other countries (Kuwait also categorizes NGOs and charities together). For further discussion of these terms in the Tanzanian context, see Robert Leurs, Peter Tumaini-Mungu and Abu Mvungi, Mapping the Development Activities of Faith-based Organizations in Tanzania, Working Paper 58, Religions and Development Research Programme (International Development Department, University of Birmingham, 2011). These authors, however, neglect to include Shi‘i charities in Tanzania, with the exception of the Aga Khan Development Network, stating erroneously in a footnote that most Shi‘a in the country are of Asian origin. See also Peter Tumainimungu, “The Development Activities of Faith-Based Organisations in Tanzania,” in Religions and Development in Tanzania: A Preliminary Literature Review, ed. Amon Mhina, Working Paper 11, Religions and Development Research Programme (International Development Department, University of Birmingham, 2007), 53–65.

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conversion to Shi‘ism in East Africa, questions if African converts are able to exhibit ownership of their faith, suggesting religious authority is maintained by Muslims outside of their ethnic group.4 Media and policy analysis are similarly focused on African Muslims as pawns in the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, often ignoring the wider history of trans-regional connections between Africa and the Middle East and Asia. Recent reports have pointed to bilateral ties between Tanzania and Iran with increased economic and military cooperation, including Iranian navy interest in East African ports.5 There have also been news stories about Saudi Arabia choosing Tanzania as a priority country for the development of trade relations.6 While this could be interpreted as a response to Iranian ties with Tanzania, examining the history of relations with the Arab world suggests the East African country’s l­ong-time openness to a variety of trading partners is part of a larger strategic economic and foreign policy.7 As a recipient of substantial international development aid, Tanzania is subject to the terms of a number of foreign governments and agencies that retain a stake in the country’s activities, including degrees of financial and political influence.8 Nevertheless, this does not mean that Tanzania or individual Tanzanians lose all agency in decision-making and fall entirely within the agenda of foreign powers. In Tanzania, the Indian Khoja Ithna Asheri (Twelver) Shi‘a community began its missionary work fifteen years before the start of the Iranian 4 Abbas Jaffer, “Conversion to Shi‘ism in East Africa,” Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies 6, no. 2 (2013): 137. 5 See Alex McAnenny, “Iran in Africa: A Tutorial Overview of Iran’s Strategic Influence in Africa,” Center for Security Policy 2014, https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/ wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Iran-in-Africa.pdf and “Iran, Tanzania Navy officials agree on regular visits,” March 5, 2016, http://theiranproject.com/blog/2016/03/05/ iran-tanzania-navy-officials-agree-on-regular-visits/; Riham Bahi, “Iran-Saudi Rivalry in Africa: Implications for Regional Stability,” Middle East Policy XXV, no. 4 (2018): 26–40. 6 “Saudi Arabia chooses Tanzania as a priority country to develop trade and investment in Africa,” January 22, 2020, https://www.tanzaniainvest.com/economy/trade/saudi-arabia-chooses-tanzania-as-priority-country-to-develop-and-promote-trade-with-africa. 7 See Mara A. Leichtman, “Kuwait’s Foreign Relations with East Africa,” in The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa: Interests, Influences and Instability, eds. Robert Mason and Simon Mabon (Manchester: Manchester University Press, Forthcoming); K. Mathews, “Tanzania and the Middle East,” in Foreign Policy of Tanzania, 1961–1981: A Reader, eds. K. Mathews and S.S. Mushi (Dar Es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1981), 152–171. 8 See Maia Green, The Development State: Aid, Culture and Civil Society in Tanzania (Suffolk: James Currey, 2014).

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Revolution. Other Tanzanian Shi‘i NGOs were established through transnational efforts from the Arab Gulf. This chapter offers case studies of how Iran is not the only Shi‘i player in Africa by examining the Khoja-run Bilal Muslim Mission and the newer Ahl al-Bayt Centre, with connections to Kuwait.9 Comparing the historical and contemporary trajectories of the spread of Shi‘i Islam to East Africa through the work of these two NGOs provides broader perspectives on intersections between local and global contexts—and funding networks—of minority Islamic movements. Importantly, NGO leaders detach religious beliefs and practices from Asian and Middle Eastern politics to present a Shi‘ism responsive to distinctly African needs. This means that the power struggles so dominant in the Middle East do not extend untransformed to Africa. Yet, the expansion of Shi‘i Islam is very much locally embedded in the long history of ethnic and racial tensions in Tanzania, which this chapter also explores. The choice of a marja‘ (p. maraji‘, supreme Shi‘i religious authority) constitutes one of the major differences between Arab and South Asian Shi‘a and Iranian Shi‘a, who predominantly follow Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his successor Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.10 Khomeini’s brand of Islamic political thought, wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurist), allows for the engagement of Islam in politics and enables the supreme religious guide to also rule the country. Khoja and Arab Shi‘a generally do not follow wilayat al-faqih, with the exception of certain groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. Shi‘i schools in Tanzania teach the various opinions of numerous maraji‘ and do not focus on conflicts between the Grand Ayatollahs in the Middle East. Bilal Muslim Mission and Ahl al-Bayt Centre carry out similar agendas of running Shi‘i Islamic seminaries, vocational training programmes, and small health and microcredit development projects, yet they have distinct Indian or Arab origins and are guided by the teachings of different maraji‘. Regardless of these distinctions, the Shi‘i organizations in Tanzania work together towards a common goal of supporting educational and development activities and have good relations. They also

9 Ahl

al-Bayt means the Family of the Prophet, another term for the Shi‘a. Rola El-Husseini and Mara A. Leichtman, “Arab Shi‘ism and the Shi‘a of Lebanon: New Approaches to Modern History, Contemporary Politics, and Religion,” Die Welt des Islams 59, no. 3–4 (2019): 253–281. 10 See

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open schools in separate geographical regions so their efforts complement one another and do not overlap. Elsewhere, I explored Shi‘i Islam in the Senegalese context and contested the dominant framework for analysing Shi‘i movements by questioning the assumption that they necessarily follow Iranian revolutionary ideologies and call for an Islamic state.11 Likewise, Penrad concludes his 1988 article about missionary Shi‘i Islam in East Africa by arguing that Khoja Ithna Asheris remain a minority—both nationally in East Africa and within the Muslim umma ­(community-at-large), and their situation is therefore not comparable to the Iranian one.12 Nevertheless, (fear of?) Iran tends to dominate (mis)perceptions about the spread of Shi‘i Islam to Africa even if “the success of foreign ideas in transforming local contexts remain[s] contingent on their suitability for the socio-economic and political realities of their host societies” and is “rarely fully under the control of one single actor or state.”13 It is important to acknowledge the diversity of actors interested in fostering growing and self-sufficient global Shi‘i communities, which is again not limited to Iran. As Bano and Sakurai note, “winning committed converts is a much more complex process than is often acknowledged in the literature on the globalizing mission of certain Islamic discourses,” and they stress that financial sponsorship alone is not enough to promote the agenda of a single country (i.e. Iran).14 As Bornstein rightly elucidates, faith is a form of power in an African religious context, “often to be feared, and sometimes to be called upon for assistance.”15 The link between “the urge to change people’s spiritual convictions” and “the urge to change people’s material conditions” that Bornstein illustrates in an evangelical context in Zimbabwe is just 11 Mara A. Leichtman, Shi‘i Cosmopolitanisms in Africa: Lebanese Migration and Religious Conversion in Senegal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015). 12 Jean-Claude Penrad, “‘Sauti ya Bilal’, ou les tranformations de l’Islam shi’ite missionnaire en Afrique oriental,” Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara 2 (1988): 17–33. See also El-Husseini and Leichtman, “Arab Shi‘ism.” 13 Masooda Bano and Keiko Sakurai, “Introduction,” in Shaping Global Islamic Discourses: The Role of al-Azhar, al-Medina and al-Mustafa, eds. Masooda Bano and Keiko Sakurai (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 1, 3. 14 Bano and Sakurai, “Introduction,” 16; see also Leichtman, Shi‘i Cosmopolitanisms in Africa. 15 Erica Bornstein, The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality, and Economics in Zimbabwe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 7.

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as prevalent in Muslim Africa.16 This chapter examines the origins, discourses and objectives of two prominent Shi‘i organizations in the context of the marginalization of Muslims in Tanzania, a religiously mixed country. Transnational ties create opportunities for the empowerment of indigenous Tanzanian Shi‘a who adapt global networks and resources to address their local and national disadvantages. This chapter first presents historical factors that led to Tanzania becoming one of the most dependent African countries on foreign development assistance, including the growth of Islamic NGOs. Bilal Muslim Mission and Ahl al-Bayt Centre are then introduced as key players in the making of indigenous Tanzanian Shi‘i movements. Finally, this chapter highlights similarities and differences between these organizations, which maintain distinct followings yet often collaborate with one another.

Ethnic and Racial Relations and Economic Development in Tanzania The expansion of Shi‘i Islam in Tanzania must be contextualized within a wider history of ethnic and racial relations in colonial and postcolonial Tanzania, which were “very much at the heart of the transformation of Tanzania into an independent nation and its trajectory as a ‘development state.’”17 Aminzade pushes back against the prevalent nationalist myth that Tanganyika had achieved racial harmony by the time of independence and the ruling party that took power was unified on the issue of racial equality. A former German then British colony, which gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1961, the United Republic of Tanzania was formed in 1964 from a union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Zanzibar, an important trading hub, had been controlled by the Portuguese and the Sultanate of Oman before becoming a British protectorate. Whereas Tanganyika had attained independence in a relatively peaceful manner, a violent revolution in Zanzibar involved the massacre of several hundred Arabs and Asians and the looting of Araband Asian-owned shops. The 1964 revolution led to the overthrow of the Sultan of Zanzibar by local African revolutionaries, ending 200 years

16 Bornstein,

The Spirit of Development, 27. Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 29. 17 Ronald

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of Arab dominance in Zanzibar, including a history of slavery (abolished in 1897).18 Colonial policies created an economy dependent on foreign capital and the export of raw materials. Great Britain did not encourage industrial capital accumulation in Tanganyika prior to World War II because the colonies were meant to serve as markets for British products. After the war altered Britain’s position in the global economy, its policies shifted to transform the colonies into a source of food and consumer goods for British citizens.19 At independence, Tanganyika’s export-oriented economy focused on certain cash crops (coffee, tea, cotton, sisal) instead of subsistence agriculture (a large part of Tanzania’s economy today), and by the time of independence, Tanganyika was among the poorest countries in the world. In addition to economic dependency, British colonial rulers in East Africa created a contested tripartite racial order. The two largest racial minorities residing in Tanganyika were Europeans (civil servants and missionaries) and Asians (immigrants from India and Pakistan). Although Indian merchants and sailors had long been active in Indian Ocean trading networks, the majority of South Asian migrants to East Africa arrived during the twentieth century. Many began as “coolie” railway labourers or worked as merchants or clerks in the British colonial civil service. Europeans, Asians and Africans were regarded as distinct racial categories enforced by colonial political institutions and social and educational policies. “Asians” were comprised of diverse communities divided along the lines of class, caste, religion and language; Aminzade notes that people of Arab and Persian descent, as well as those of mixed racial backgrounds, were also subsumed into the “Asian” category.20 Even though Asians were inferior to Europeans and occupied an intermediate location between Europeans and Africans in the colonial racial order, African hostilities mostly targeted Asians.21 Zanzibar had a very different history of foreign relations and a distinct ethnic and racial order from Tanganyika. Colonized by Omani Arabs and historically connected to the Sultanate of Oman, Zanzibar’s 18 See Jonathon Glassman, War of Words, War of Stones: Racial Thought and Violence in Colonial Zanzibar (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011). 19 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 33–34. 20 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 43–44. 21 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 49.

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foreign policy was more closely aligned with the Arab world and not the African continent. The Omanis “built on a much older political culture of Arabocentrism that for centuries had accorded status and prestige to those who claimed connections to the Islamic Middle East.”22 In Zanzibar, the economically and politically powerful Arab minority owned most of the land, including the clove and coconut plantations, and viewed Africans as descendants of slaves. The Muslim-majority African population was comprised of “Shirazis,” a term that initially referred to those of mixed Afro-Persian ancestry who had purportedly introduced Islam to the coast. Later this term was used to distinguish Africans who had lived on the island for generations from manual workers and domestic servants of lower status who were descendants of slaves and more recently migrated from the mainland. Asians worked in government agencies and controlled the export-import trade, but in Zanzibar this was oriented to Indonesia and India, and not to Europe.23 Tanganyika gained independence with a weak, underdeveloped economy, poor infrastructure (transportation, communication, electricity, health and education systems), a shortage of skilled personnel, a lack of well-developed class interests and pressure groups, and fragile social and political institutions. This provided an opportunity for President Julius Nyerere (1961–1985) to consolidate power and shape development and foreign policies.24 Nyerere’s goal was to liberate Tanzanians from economic deprivation and political oppression. The Tanzania African National Union, which became a mass political organization in 1954 to demand the establishment of an independent nation-state “for the Africans,” became the ruling political party at independence.25 Socialism provided postcolonial African leaders with an ideology by which to pursue anti-colonialism, nation-building and economic development. The 1967 Arusha Declaration famously declared a policy of self-reliance and outlined a strategy of African socialism, known as Ujamaa in Swahili. It established state ownership of the national economy and emphasized the need for national economic development that would be less dependent on foreign capital. Tanzania relied 22 Glassman,

War of Words, War of Stones, 23. Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 102. 24 Maria Nzomo, “The Foreign Policy of Tanzania: From Cold War to Post-Cold War,” in African Foreign Policies, ed. Stephen Wright (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 182. 25 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 69. 23 Aminzade,

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on agricultural exports to subsidize state-run industries. This was supposed to provide the foreign exchange needed to import technology and hire Western management consultants for the industrial sector. As 85% of the population was farmers, Nyerere focused on rural and agricultural development and promoted “ujamaa villages,” whose members “were envisioned to engage in communal production and democratically govern their own affairs.”26 Tanzanian socialism thus depended on mobilizing a rural labour force to increase agricultural production. It promised the poor rural majority “greater equality, an end to foreign economic domination, a war on corruption, and access to the material benefits of modernity and economic development, including schools, clinics, and clean water.”27 Development was envisioned to be a consequence of the efforts and commitment of the people rather than a result of money or international aid, with agriculture the foundation of national development (and therefore land should be owned by the state).28 The Arusha Declaration also marked Tanzania’s hostility towards foreign investment and the International Monetary Fund. Politicians contended that foreign aid would create a continuing need for foreign experts and technology and would compromise the nation’s ability to create an independent economic policy. Nevertheless, Tanzania became the highest per capita African recipient of foreign aid during the socialist era.29 Government officials ultimately justified foreign aid as a short-term necessity that would supplement domestic resources and provide revenues for development projects. While the new government sought to attract foreign aid and capital, Tanganyika was unattractive to foreign private direct investors because of its poor infrastructure. Investors were most interested in agricultural exports and mining over building industries that would benefit the local population. The government thus had to rely on bilateral foreign aid from Western Europe to finance its development plans. “In 1962–1963, the United Kingdom provided 89.5% of all foreign aid, and

26 Leander Schneider, Government of Development: Peasants and Politicians in Postcolonial Tanzania (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 2. 27 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 136. 28 Green, The Development State, 165. 29 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 181–182.

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by 1964–1965, the only significant sources of aid were from the West, including the United States, West Germany, Scandinavia, and Israel.”30 Independence was also a time of creating social policies for the new state, but this involved tense debates over the meaning of “Africanisation.” Nyerere had long made a case for recognizing Asians and Europeans as part of Tanganyika and giving them minority representation in government, which drew much opposition.31 Asian and Arab shops in Dar es Salaam were looted and pillaged in 1964, but Nyerere was able to contain the situation (with British military assistance) before it escalated into the racial violence of the Zanzibar Revolution.32 Zanzibar’s racial policies, however, contrasted with the race-blind strategies of the mainland that aimed to treat all citizens equally, and challenged national unity. The Zanzibar government, for example, enforced racial quotas for secondary school enrolment, publicly flogged Asians for minor offences and arbitrarily deported Asians.33 Yet, even in the mainland, vast income and wealth inequalities persisted and so did racial hatreds.34 President Nyerere argued that foreign aid and investments were a means to avoid heightening racial inequalities and conflict as the Asian minority controlled a large percentage of Tanzania’s domestic capital. Tanzania diversified its relationships and started accepting assistance from China, Scandinavia and Canada. As chairperson of the Organization of African Unity, Nyerere attempted good relations with Kenya and Uganda, but this collapsed with the East Africa Community in 1977 (which was not revived until 1999). Idi Amin’s 1971 rise to power in Uganda and the 1978–1979 Kagera War between Uganda and Tanzania, which led to his overthrow, further exacerbated Tanzania’s economic problems. Cross-border tensions raised the question of security in national and foreign policies, and resulted in increased defence 30 Aminzade,

Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 93–94. Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 80. 32 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 165. 33 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 201 34 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 93–94. Glassman, War of Words, War of Stones, contends that local discourses of racial difference in Zanzibar were internally created by indigenous intellectuals and nationalists and that the island’s ethnic conflict cannot be blamed on British colonial rule. See also James R. Brennan, Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012). 31 Aminzade,

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spending and Tanzania’s nonalignment policy, used to mobilize development resources from both Cold War blocs.35 Nevertheless, available resources were inadequate, political pressure was strong, and Tanzania was obliged to seek additional economic assistance from the World Bank and IMF. As Nyerere envisioned the conditionalities of Structural Adjustment Programs to undermine sovereignty, it was not until President Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s administration (1985– 1995) when Tanzania agreed to these terms in 1986. Hodgson considers this moment “a radical restructuring of the Tanzanian economy from one based on socialist principles of Ujamaa, collective well-being, and communally owned resources to one based on capitalist principles of a free-market economy, privatization of resources, individual success, and profit maximization.”36 Phillips labels this transition “neoliberalism in the ‘African’ sense”: “the opening of Tanzania’s economy to international markets, foreign debt, and austerity programs and the privatization of state industries and social services.”37 Economic liberalization was accompanied by democratization, including the transition from single-party rule to multiparty politics in 1992, decentralization of ­ decision-making from central government to local authorities and the development of an independent media. Yet, this “dramatic transition” was not a success and economic inequalities and political discontent intensified among already marginalized peoples.38 Green questioned how much really changed from the socialist period.39 By the turn of the millennium, primary school enrolment was at a low, infant and maternal mortality increased, and poverty had deepened.40 African businesspeople had a hard time competing with Asians and foreigners in the privatized neoliberal economy.41

35 Nzomo,

“The Foreign Policy of Tanzania,” 186. L. Hodgson, Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous: Postcolonial Politics in a Neoliberal World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 68. 37 Kristin D. Phillips, An Ethnography of Hunger: Politics, Subsistence, and the Unpredictable Grace of the Sun (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), 13; drawing on James Ferguson, “The Uses of Neoliberalism,” Antipode 41 (2010): 166–184. 38 Hodgson, Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous. 39 Green, The Development State, 100. 40 Hodgson, Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous, 70. 41 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 322. 36 Dorothy

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Tanzanian citizens suffered under structural adjustment and inflation of nearly 40%, and were worse off during the first 25 years of independence than they had been during the colonial era.42 Economic and political transitions brought about the expanded presence of international development agencies as Tanzania’s relations with Western donors improved. Tanzania further adjusted its foreign policy in 2001 to attract foreign investments through favouring bilateral and multilateral cooperation.43 This set in motion a proliferation of civil society organizations, mirroring similar developments throughout the Global South, as “multilateral institutions and northern donors shifted their priorities and resources from supporting state-led development projects…to those designed and implemented by ‘grassroots’ NGOs and CBOs.”44 These included a rise in faith-based organizations, many funded internationally, in an increasingly competitive social services market.45 Shi‘i NGOs competed for influence within East African communities alongside Sunni Muslim and Christian organizations.

The Origins of Shi‘i Islam in Tanzania The historic divisions based on race and ethnicity described above are also intertwined with religion, and these tensions have likewise shaped the humanitarian and development field in Tanzania. The East African country has a religiously mixed population of Muslims, Christians and “traditional African religion,” with Islam being more dominant in Zanzibar and along the Swahili coast. It is a sensitive political issue for the government to present data suggesting there are more Muslims or Christians in the country, and estimates range accordingly.46 In 2017, 42 Green,

The Development State, 6–7. Topisto Mponzi, Challenges to the Implementation of Tanzania’s New Foreign Policy (Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2014). 44 Hodgson, Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous, 75. 45 Hansjörg Dilger, “Religion and the Formation of an Urban Educational Market: Transnational Reform Processes and Social Inequalities in Christian and Muslim Schooling in Dar es Salaam,” Journal of Religion in Africa 43 (2013): 454. See also M.A. Mohamed Salih, “Islamic NGOs in Africa: The Promise and Peril of Islamic Voluntarism,” Occasional Paper, Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen (Revised version, March 2002). 46 Estimates of Islam and Christianity range from just under 50% each to 60% Christian/40% Muslim. Leurs, Tumaini-Mungu, and Mvungi, Mapping the Development 43 See

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the director of the Bilal Muslim Mission Dar es Salaam headquarters recalled earlier community efforts to conduct a census. He suggested out of Tanzania’s population of 54 million people (this neared 59.5 million in mid-2020), Muslims numbered 20–22 million, of which roughly 10 million were Shi‘a.47 Shi‘i Islam first arrived in East Africa with the Indian Khoja trading community. Whereas there are various Shi‘i denominations in East Africa (Twelver Shi‘a, Ismailis, Bohras), this chapter focuses on the Khoja Twelver Shi‘i community, which originated primarily from the Kutch and Kathiawar provinces in India, and its spiritual and material development work with indigenous Tanzanian Muslims.48 Whereas South Asian trade with East Africa existed for two millennia, Akhtar argues that the nineteenth century witnessed the shift from short-term South Asian residence in coastal East Africa to long-term settlement due to drought and severe famines in their homelands. Another factor was growing religious persecution resulting from Khoja conversion to Twelver Shi‘ism and a schism from their ancestral Shi‘a Isma‘ili community.49 The Ithna Asheri (Twelver) Khoja religious and ethnic identity is tied to membership in jamaat (assemblies), and in 1946, the Federation of Khoja Shia Ithna Asheri Jamaats of Africa was founded in Dar es Salaam, where the largest

Activities, 2. Bakari notes the only post-independence census to include a religion category was in 1967 and indicated 30% Muslims, 32% Christians, and 37% pagans or believers in indigenous religions. Mohammed A. Bakari, “Religions, Governance and Development in Tanzania,” in Religions and Development in Tanzania: A Preliminary Literature Review, ed. Amon Mhina, Working Paper 11, Religions and Development Research Programme (International Development Department, University of Birmingham, 2007), 18. 47 These

numbers cannot be verified. Iqbal Akhtar, The Khōjā of Tanzania: Discontinuities of a Postcolonial Religious Identity (Leiden: Brill, 2016); Noel Q. King and Sayyid Saeed Akhtar Rizvi, “The Khoja Shia Ithna-Asheriya Community in East Africa (1840–1967),” The Muslim World 64, no. 3 (1974): 194–204. 49 Khojas split from the Ismailis in the mid-nineteenth century due to the arrival in Kutch of Mahomed Hoosein Hoosanee, who claimed to be the imam of the Khojas and won a court case in Bombay gaining control over their financial resources. This schism extended from India to East Africa. See Akhtar, The Khōjā of Tanzania, 2–3 and Hassan Ali M. Jaffer, The Endangered Species: An Account of the Journey of Faith by the Khoja Shia Ithna-Asheri Community (Thornhill, Ontario: Mulla Asghar Memorial Library and Islamic Resource Centre, 2014). 48 See

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Khoja community in East Africa resides.50 The federation’s goals were to coordinate common social, economic and political policies in the region and to promote religious identity.51 Initially, Shi‘i Islam was associated with Asian Muslims, and Tanzanian Muslims were predominantly Sunni. Aminzade writes: “Whereas European missionaries actively proselytized Africans, Asians did not attempt to convert Africans, thus reinforcing the stereotype that Asians were clannish and exclusionary. Although members of both the Asian and African communities practiced Islam, this did not create ­cross-racial solidarity, because most African Muslims embraced Sunni Islam whereas Asian Muslims were Shia Muslim.”52 In mainland Tanzania, African and Asian Muslims long felt economically, politically and socially excluded since the colonial period.53 The alliance between the colonial government and Christian missions led to Muslim activism in nationalist movements, which itself served to exacerbate cleavages among Muslims, based on race and class.54 Despite postcolonial implementation of socialist policies and programmes envisioned to reduce differences based on religion, class, and regional or ethnic origin, Muslim assertions of inequalities in political 50 https://www.africafederation.org/. Akhtar defines the multifaceted term of jamaat as “the Khoja leadership council, the Khoja caste as a collective, the Khoja community in a particular locale, and/or the city-state organization parallel to the nation-state pioneered by the Khoja polis in Africa.” Akhtar, The Khōjā of Tanzania, 188. 51 Akhtar, The Khōjā of Tanzania, 57. 52 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 50. 53 See Bakari, “Religions, Governance and Development in Tanzania”; Felicitas Becker, Becoming Muslim in Mainland Tanzania, 1890–2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Dilger, “Religion and the Formation of an Urban Educational Market”; Hansjörg Dilger, “Claiming Territory: Medical Mission, Interreligious Revivalism, and the Spacialization of Health Interventions in Urban Tanzania,” Medical Anthropology 33, no. 1 (2014): 52–67; Roman Loimeier, “Perceptions of Marginalization: Muslims in Contemporary Tanzania,” in Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, eds. Réné Otayek and Benjamin Soares (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007), 137–156. 54 Dilger, “Religion and the Formation of an Urban Educational Market.” Ismaili Muslims began to build their own schools and clinics as early as 1905 due to Asian Muslim exclusion from social services provided by the German colonial government. See Paul J. Kaiser, Culture, Transnationalism, and Civil Society: Aga Khan Social Service Initiatives in Tanzania (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996). For the history of the relationship between Christian churches and the Tanzanian state, see Michael Jennings, “The Spirit of Brotherhood: Christianity and Ujamaa in Tanzania,” in Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular, eds. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 94–116.

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participation and social service provision persisted.55 Dilger highlights how these discourses are critically raised in the Muslim media and public rallies, which also advocate for the introduction of Shari‘a (Islamic law) and for Tanzania to join the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.56 Ahmed suggests that East African Muslim resentment at their perceived marginalization led to conspiracy theories “in which they are projected as victims of a deliberate attempt by both the churches and the state to deny them access to modern education and thus exclude them from the political decision-making process; in short, to deprive them of their active citizenship.” This is linked to a “wider conspiracy theory among Muslims in which Western relief agencies, especially the Red Cross, are portrayed as deploying humanitarian assistance as a means to convert Muslims to Christianity and to exercise political control over them.”57 After Tanganyika’s independence in 1961, Muslim organizations focused on addressing Muslim educational disadvantages, but the socialist period resulted in nationalization of education and health facilities belonging to religious organizations. Leurs, Tumaini-Mungo and Mvungi refer to this as a “secular socialism” “based on the separation of state and religion, although allowing for freedom of religious expression, as long as such expression was not held by the government to be incompatible with national development.”58 Economic crisis in the late 1970s forced the liberalization of economic policy in the 1980s and a return to multiparty democracy in the early 1990s. Today, the state depends on the work of faith-based organizations to assist with service provision.59 Mallya writes: “Ironically, the sacred [FBOs] may end up helping the secular [the Tanzanian state] and legitimize its stay in power by doing what the state should have been doing.”60 55 See Bakari, “Religions, Governance and Development in Tanzania,” for a discussion of the standard, Islamic and Christian views of religion and governance in Tanzania. He rejects the supposedly “secular” nature of the Tanzanian state. 56 Dilger, “Claiming Territory,” 59. 57 Chanfi Ahmed, “Networks of Islamic NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa: Bilal Muslim Mission, African Muslim Agency (Direct Aid), and al-Haramayn,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, no. 3 (2009): 426–427. 58 Leurs, Tumaini-Mungu and Mvungi, Mapping the Development Activities, 15. 59 Leurs, Tumaini-Mungu and Mvungi, Mapping the Development Activities, 2–3. 60 Ernest T. Mallya, “Faith-based Organizations, the State and Politics in Tanzania,” in Development and Politics from Below: Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State, eds. Barbara Bompani and Maria Frahm-Arp (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 132.

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Thus, the proliferation of both Sunni and Shi‘i Islamic charitable and development NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s was an attempt to remedy inequalities in mainland Tanzania by providing Muslims with similar opportunities available to Christians.61 Islamic charitable work can be a form of proselytization, which Sunni NGOs refer to as da‘wa and Shi‘i NGOs label tabligh. Along with religious teaching, these NGOs also provide essential development assistance, education and health care to communities in need. For Ahmed, Islamic NGOs in East Africa have two goals: “first, to help and support Muslims in need, and second, to propagate the version of Islam the organization adheres to.”62 Despite Western discomfort with Islamic charities, in particular after 11 September 2001, Christian development organizations have long been doing similar religious propagation.63 Kroessin and Mohamed go so far as to suggest: “All humanitarian and development actors ought…to be regarded as ‘missionaries’, although not necessarily in the religious sense. They are underpinned by a particular value set that drives them to promote social change and to shape the world in their image.”64 Ahmed asserts that to his knowledge the Islamic organizations he examined in East Africa—including Bilal Muslim Mission, which I will discuss below—“do not have an explicit political agenda,” are not “direct agents of political Islam” and “have every right to help people in need.”65 Likewise in the Kenyan context,

61 The

growth of Islamic NGOs in Tanzania was slowed by post-9/11 restrictions. “Networks of Islamic NGOs in ­sub-Saharan Africa,” 427. Salih considers Islamic NGOs to have “acquired the organisational capacity and structure of modern secular NGOs, on the other hand, they claim a religious role inspired by the intimate association between religion, politics and economic welfare in puritan Islam.” Salih, “Islamic NGOs in Africa,” 4. 63 See Jonathan Benthall, Islamic Charities and Islamic Humanism in Troubled Times (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016); Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003); Jon B. Alterman and Karin von Hippel, eds., Understanding Islamic Charities (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007); Bornstein, The Spirit of Development. 64 Kroessin with Mohamed, “Saudi Arabian NGOs in Somalia,” 188. 65 Ahmed, “Networks of Islamic NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa,” 435. 62 Ahmed,

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Lynch demonstrates how Islamic NGOs are significant players in peacebuilding, development and humanitarianism.66 At this point, I would like to bring in the view of one of my interlocutors to highlight how race and religion are intertwined in Tanzania. Muhammad, an administrator at Ahl al-Bayt Centre (ABC) and an ardent supporter of its work, wrote me his take on the history of the NGO in a series of lengthy WhatsApp messages.67 As mentioned above, Shi‘i Islam in East Africa was at first locally identified as an Indian religion. Although Bilal Muslim Mission was established in the 1960s, Muhammad noted the NGO was slow to attract indigenous followers. He attributed this to several factors. First, there was a perception among Tanzanian Sunni Muslims that Shi‘i Islam was an “Indian incorrect brand of Islam, it is more or less of mixing with the Indian cultures,” and was therefore not fit for Africans to follow. According to Muhammad, this misperception developed because the East African Indian Khojas were seen as segregated and behaved as such, and this he ascribed to the “inherited colonial history where the Europeans were of higher status followed by Indians, then followed by Arabs, then last the African blacks at the bottom. This was one of the stumbling blocks for the quick realisation of Bilal Shi‘a activities of the spread of the Islam brand of Ahlulbayti in the minds of the natives.” As the majority of Muslims in East Africa were Sunnis, it therefore “needed strong guts for one to openly expose as Shi‘a.” Some African Muslims became Shi‘a but followed at first the Islamic principle of taqiyya, dissimulation, in order to continue to outwardly appear as Sunni Muslims. For Muhammad, “the sense of inferiority complexes from the natives before the Indians” and the cultural differences between the two, as well as “the lack of manpower was also a stumbling block to meet the challenges of invitation into Shi‘ism.” These were exacerbated by “bad notions” against Shi‘a as portrayed by certain Sunni clerics. Thus, according to Muhammad, the early missionary efforts of Bilal Muslim Mission did not achieve a great response due to the different norms and values of Indians and Africans as well as the deeply rooted history of Sunni Islam within African Muslim communities. Sunni 66 Cecelia Lynch, “Local and Global Influences on Islamic NGOs in Kenya,” Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 6, no. 1 (2011): 21–34. 67 These messages were from October 3–10, 2017.

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mosques were more widespread throughout East Africa and Sunni Islamic scholars were better able to adamantly defend their version of Islam while Shi‘a operated “under the umbrella of Taqiyya.” Muhammad further attributed the fact that Indian Khojas were migrants to having a negative impact on their missionary work, “because Sunnism was like the Islam of birth of Africans.”68 Other Tanzanians affiliated with ABC criticized Bilal Muslim Mission and the East African Indian Khoja community for insisting upon a separation between “Indian” and “African” Shi‘a. According to ABC’s leaders, this ethnic and racial division—very much a British colonial legacy in mainland Tanzania—prevented the development of Shi‘i Islam in East Africa. Yet, they claimed, the dissemination of Shi‘i Islam by Arab organizations was more successful. ABC’s pro-Arab discourse is more difficult to unpack. Although Arabs were associated with a variety of negative stereotypes connected to the history of the slave trade, they were more easily able to integrate into Swahili culture than were Asians (a racial category that included the Hindu religion) because of a shared Islamic and Arab culture. Arabs were a smaller racial minority in Tanganyika and more likely than Asians to speak Swahili fluently and intermarry with Africans.69 Aminzade writes: “In contrast to the situation in Zanzibar, Arabs were less a target of racial hostilities in Tanganyika than were Asians, who became the major internal ‘other’ of the nation-building project after independence.”70 African Shi‘a became more interested in Shi‘i Islam because of the impact of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. According to Muhammad, they were additionally made aware of this branch of Islam through the influence of an eminent former politician and learned shaykh from Kenya, Abdillahi Nassir, while he was residing in Nairobi (a four-hour drive from Arusha in northern Tanzania).71 This (formerly Sunni) shaykh played a major role in 68 Aminzade also notes: “During the colonial era, Asians, even those who had lived for generations in East Africa and spoke fluent Swahili, were typically considered foreigners by black Africans, because the vast majority of them looked different, lived in other neighborhoods, and educated their children, practiced their religion, and married apart from black Africans…Black Africans also regarded Asians as being a different race—an ‘immigrant race,’” Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 104. 69 According to Aminzade, “many African nationalists associated English and Gujarati with colonial oppression and viewed Swahili as the language of national liberation from racist colonial rule,” Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 113. 70 Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship, 51. 71 The director of BMM’s Arusha office once commented: “When Nairobi catches a cold, Arusha sneezes.”

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introducing the Shi‘i school of thought in East Africa, and his audio and video cassettes were widely disseminated throughout the region.72 The 1979 Iranian Revolution hastened the growth of Shi‘i Muslim communities around the world, yet the relationship between African Muslims and the Islamic Republic of Iran is complicated. My book outlines these dynamics in the Senegalese context, and similar developments took place in East Africa.73 Lacunza Balda describes the publication Sauti ya Umma printed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and disseminated to Kiswahili-speaking populations.74 Lob notes that Iran sent its rural development organization, Construction Jihad, to Tanzania in 1987.75 Iran administers an embassy and cultural centre in Dar es Salaam and opened a branch of al-Mustafa University there in 2011. I visited the Iranian school in 2017, when 40 students were enrolled.76 The facility consists of the director’s office, a small library, a teacher’s lounge and a couple of classrooms. Al-Mustafa is a private university but runs under the patronage of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran and receives some government funding. It teaches a specially designed curriculum for non-Iranian students in “modern” classrooms modelled after those of the Shi‘i Islamic semi­ naries in Qom.77 This combines religious material and new fields of Islamic jurisprudence (dealing with medicine, environmental science, 72 See Kai Kresse, “‘Making People Think’: The Ramadan Lectures of Sheikh Abdillahi Nassir in Mombasa (1419 A.H.),” in The Transmission of Learning in Islamic Africa, ed. Scott S. Reese (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 212–243; Chanfi Ahmed, Preaching Islamic Revival in East Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018), Chapter 6. 73 Leichtman, Shi‘i Cosmopolitanisms in Africa. 74 Justo Lacunza Balda, “The Role of Kiswahili in East African Islam,” in Muslim Identity and Social Change in S­ub-Saharan Africa, ed. Louis Brenner (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 226–238. 75 Eric Lob, “The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Foreign Policy and Construction Jihad’s Developmental Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 48 (2016): 321–326. See also Najla Mari, “Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa,” Journal for Iranian Studies 1, no. 2 (2017): 56–69. 76 Interview with the director. 77 For Islamic schooling, see Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds., Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Robert Launay, ed., Islamic Education in Africa: Writing Boards and Blackboards (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016); Roman Loimeier, Between Social Skills and Marketable Skills: The Politics of Islamic Education in 20th Century Zanzibar (Leiden: Brill, 2009).

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international affairs, management) with broader humanities courses (taught from a Shi‘i Islamic perspective). The curriculum is meant to make graduates more competitive and employable while propagating an Iranian-style Shi‘ism, one that follows the teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini and the idea of wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurist).78 Sakurai notes that al-Mustafa also differs from the traditional Shi‘i seminaries in that the university (in Iran and globally) trains propagators of Shi‘i Islam but not mujtahids (legal experts who issue authoritative Islamic opinions); this maintains the dominance of Iranian clerics in the Shi‘i clerical hierarchy within and outside Iran.79 Al-Mustafa was founded in 2008 to take over from previous Iranian institutions the teaching of international students in Qom as well as the management of university branches around the world.80 In Dar es Salaam, Tanzanian students generally spend two or three years studying at al-Mustafa. Some come from government schools while others are trained in local Shi‘i schools (referred to as hawzas or seminaries). Graduates generally go on to teach in their villages of origin or in a hawza. The goal of certain students is to obtain a higher level of Islamic knowledge and they compete for scholarships to continue their education in the Shi‘i seminaries in Qom or Najaf, Iraq. Tanzanian al-Mustafa students, who must pass an entrance exam, do not pay tuition, yet they are not always funded by the university’s Iranian headquarters. Other local Shi‘i organizations, such as Bilal Muslim Mission or Ahl al-Bayt Centre, described below, might provide scholarships for certain students to continue their education at al-Mustafa.81 Despite the focus of journalists and policy analysts on the “proxy war” between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Africa and claims that Iran is disseminating its ideology through al-Mustafa, this is a small and relatively

78 See Keiko Sakurai, “Making Qom a Centre of Shi‘i Scholarship: Al-Mustafa International University,” in Shaping Global Islamic Discourses: The Role of al-Azhar, alMedina and al-Mustafa, eds. Masooda Bano and Keiko Sakurai (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 41–72. 79 Sakurai, “Making Qom a Centre of Shi‘i Scholarship,” 54. 80 See ­al-Mustafa’s website: http://en.miu.ac.ir/. 81 Whereas students of all religious backgrounds are free to study at al-Mustafa University, the student body in Tanzania is comprised entirely of Shi‘a. In Iran, the university offers a special programme for Sunni Muslims to educate them about the Shi‘i school of Islamic thought and jurisprudence with the goal of helping to minimize sectarian tensions globally.

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new operation in Tanzania.82 Indian and Arab Shi‘i influences are much better established in East Africa, and it is to the transnational development of their NGOs in Tanzania that this chapter now turns.

Bilal Muslim Mission of Tanzania Bilal Muslim Mission (BMM) of Tanzania refers to itself on its website as “a charitable and non-profitable organization involved nationally in the propagation of Shia faith of Islam and offers services in the fields of education, medical treatment and social services.”83 The NGO registered with the Tanzanian government (under Act No. 1954) in 1968 and a few years later opened in Kenya. BMM thus claims to be the first Shi‘i institution dedicated to the propagation of what Shi‘a refer to as the “True Islam” in sub-Saharan Africa; it is also the most widespread Shi‘i organization throughout East Africa (running 75 centres in Tanzania alone and active in neighbouring countries). Yet, BMM has not been extensively studied, despite several descriptive articles and documentaries noting its work.84

82 Jeremy Luedi, “Senegal Under Attack from Saudi-Iranian Proxy War,” Asia by Africa, July 17, 2018, https://www.asiabyafrica.com/point-a-to-a/senegal-caught-in-iran-saudi-arabiaproxy-war; Tim Cocks and Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, “In Senegal, Iran and Saudi Arabia Vie for Religious Influence,” Reuters, May 12, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-senegal-saudi-iran-insight-idUSKBN1880JY; Wagdy Sawahel, “Iran’s ‘Branch Campuses’ Reach Sub-Saharan Africa,” University World News, September 28, 2018, https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20180925134208657; Heshmat Alavi, “Analysis: The Need to Tackle Iran’s Reactionary Ideology in Africa,” Al-Arabiya English, April 23, 2018, http:// english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2018/04/23/Analysis-The-need-to-tackleIran-in-Africa.html. 83 https://www.bilaltz.org/. 84 Ahmed, “Networks of Islamic NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa”; Jaffer, “Conversion to Shi‘ism in East Africa”; King and Rizvi, “The Khoja Shia Ithna-Asheriya Community”; Penrad, “‘Sauti ya bilal’”; Sayyid Saeed Akhtar Rizvi and Noel Q. King, “Some East African Ithna-Asheri Jamaats (1840–1967),” Journal of Religion in Africa 5, no. 1 (1973): 12–22. There are also two documentary films produced by Ahlulbayt TV, a Shi‘i English language television station based in the UK. One Man One Mission: Bilal Muslim Mission in Africa, published December 27, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8HII0q-ROYg, follows Sayyid Saeed Akhtar Rizvi’s son as he returns to Tanzania to visit his father’s projects. Future Foundations: Bilal Muslim Mission in Africa, filmed May 19, 2011, https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=8HII0q-ROYg and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HKLjOge4mr0&t=14s, documents the visit of the film crew to BMM schools.

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Khoja institutions generally supported only the Khoja community until the Bilal Muslim Mission was founded in 1964 (fifteen years before the Iranian Revolution) at the tri-annual Conference of the Federation of the Khoja Shia Ithna Asheri Jamaats of Africa, held in the northern Tanzanian coastal city of Tanga. This, Akhtar argues, “blurred the established racial association between Ithna Ashari faith and Indic ancestry”85 and, according to King and Rizvi, “tried to show Africans that Shia Islam is not ethnically determined but is for all men.”86 These Khoja perspectives on how religion can circumvent long-standing ethnic and racial differences in East Africa are at odds with Muhammad’s case for their perseverance, as described in the previous section. The mission was founded by Sayyid Saeed Akhtar Rizvi, who was born in India in 1927 and was appointed in 1959 to serve the religious needs of the Khoja community in Lindi (south-eastern Tanzania). When a group of Khoja led by Ebrahim Sharif Dewji, then president of the Africa Federation, went to Iraq in the 1960s to meet with Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim (1889–1970), the sole marja‘ at that time, the Ayatollah asked if there were African Shi‘a. When he learned that there were not, he pushed the Khoja community to do tabligh (propagation of Shi‘i Islam).87 Bilal Muslim Mission was thus born, named after Bilal, a freed Ethiopian slave and the first black companion of the Prophet Muhammad. The organization’s goals are to “propagate the true religion of Islam as per the teachings of Ahlalbayt through organizing Majlis [religious gatherings], Lectures for men, women and children and building mosques with good facilities of Wadu [ablutions] and Praying area”; “promote secular education side by side with religious and social upliftment, and to provide good education for the less fortunate and needy students”; in addition to “Humanitarian Service” and “Social 85 Akhtar,

The Khōjā of Tanzania, 16. and Rizvi, “The Khoja Shia I­ thna-Asheriya Community,” 201. 87 As published on an older archived version of BMM’s website: “When past Chairman Ebrahim Hussein Sheriff went to see Ayatullah Uzama Seyid Muhsin Al-Hakim A. M. in early Sixtys: Ayatullah asked Haji Ebrahim ‘How long are you people in East Africa?’ to which Haji-Ebrahim replied ‘About a hundred years.’ ‘How many Africans have accepted Mazhabe Haq [the school of thought of truth]?’ was the next question. To which the reply was ‘none’. Immediately Agha asked Haji Ebrahim that ‘Will these people not complain on Youmal Hashr [Judgement Day] that you knew the right path, yet you did not show them?’”, https://web.archive.org/web/20070716235435/http://www.darulmuslimeen. org/BilalMuslimMission/BilalMuslimMission.htm. 86 King

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Upliftment.” BMM works primarily with Shi‘i youth, but programmes are also inclusive of Sunni Muslims. The website includes charity fundraising categories for food, clothing, education, health care, clean water and a general fund. Ahmed notes that Bilal Muslim Mission uses different means of conversion: both secular and religious education in religious schools called hawzas, recorded conferences available for purchase in local audio- and video-cassette markets, and importantly the diffusion of religious literature in Kiswahili, English and Arabic.88 A Tanzanian Shi‘i Muslim I interviewed described other early BMM efforts including a learning programme through correspondence, where individuals could read about Shi‘i Islam in the privacy of their homes, and a programme for prison inmates. The NGO published more than 140 books, many written by Rizvi, who served as Chief Missionary until his death in 2002. BMM also produces bimonthly periodicals Sauti ya Bilal, published in Kiswahili since 1964, and the English publication The Light. Jaffer suggests these “Shi‘a proselytization efforts” used “methodologies initially adopted from the Christian missionary model, but which have now evolved to encompass social, educational, economic, welfare and religious efforts.”89 BMM’s vision is to “support those who want to get education on Islamic religious courses as well as the national curriculum, promote public health care and assist indigents to uplift their economic status as much as possible…and make the world a better place.”90 The NGO runs different levels of schools, ranging from nursery, primary and secondary education, which follow the national Tanzanian curriculum, to madrasas (lower-level Islamic schools), hawzas (advanced Islamic schools) and even a teachers’ training college. For BMM, education is a key form of social upliftment, and the slogan of Bilal Comprehensive School, a nursery and primary school in Dar es Salaam, is “knowledge is worship.” The NGO receives funding from voluntary public donations and grants from the Africa Federation of Khoja Shia Ithna Asheri Jamaats, based in Dar es Salaam.91 The Africa Federation reports to the World Federation of Khoja Shia Ithna Asheri Muslim Communities in London, the headquarters for all Khoja communities worldwide, which also provides 88 Ahmed,

“Networks of Islamic NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa.” “Conversion to Shi‘ism in East Africa,” 131. 90 https://www.bilaltz.org/. 91 https://www.africafederation.org/. 89 Jaffer,

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some direct support.92 Some Bilal schools require minimal school fees, with donor scholarships available for students who cannot afford these. The World Federation offers a Zainabiya Child Sponsorship Scheme, enabling students to pursue all levels of education, and the Bilal Loan Education Sponsorship Scheme (BLESS) targets students for higher education. Children from all Tanzanian ethnic groups are enrolled in these schools.93 Rizvi opened a hawza in the neighbourhood of Temeke in Dar es Salaam to teach African students about the Shi‘i Islamic school of thought. This was established in 1965 (thus preceding al-Mustafa University), beginning as a small school with five or ten students before the land for the hawza was purchased; the school registered with the state in 1968. When I visited in 2017, there were 76 students boarding at the hawza from different regions of Tanzania, taught by eight to ten Tanzanian teachers. BMM funds trips for teachers to make the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) and to visit the Shi‘i holy sites in Iran, Iraq and (previously) Syria (ziyara)—it is important for their teaching to see where Islamic history took place. Top hawza students continue their education in the Middle East; the first group of Bilal students were sent to Najaf in the late 1960s, but were moved to Lebanon when Saddam Hussein expelled foreign Shi‘i students from Iraq, and were ultimately moved to Iran when tensions between Israel and Lebanon heightened. Today, there are many Tanzanian graduates from Shi‘i seminaries in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, who receive scholarships from the Khoja community. I met with the head of the Bilal hawza in Dar es Salaam, who is also Director of Tabligh at BMM. He opened a second Bilal hawza in Tanga in 2007, with a separate women’s hawza at a medium level, and then moved to Dar es Salaam in 2014 to raise the level of education at the Temeke hawza.94 He began reforming the hawza curriculum from India 92 https://world-federation.org/wf-about.

The federation’s motto is “We Exist to Serve.” and Rizvi, “The Khoja Shia Ithna-Asheriya Community,” 201–202. 94 Tanga was an important centre of Sunni Muslim scholarship and religious rivalry. See Abdin Noor Chande, “Islam, Islamic Leadership and Community Development in Tanga, Tanzania,” Ph.D. Thesis (Institute of Islamic Studies: McGill University, 1991). See also Jonathon Glassman, Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and the Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856–1888 (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1995) and Roman Loimeier, “Reform in Context IV: Tanganyika/Tanzania (and Kenya),” in Islamic Reform in ­Twentieth-Century Africa (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 317–379. I am grateful to Felicitas Becker for these suggestions. 93 King

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before his arrival in Tanzania in 1997. As he received his Ph.D. in Islamic grammar from Qom, before returning to India to work in a hawza there, he developed the revised curriculum in collaboration with his teacher in Iran. This includes Arabic language, grammar and pronunciation, Islamic jurisprudence, Hadith, logic, beliefs, philosophy and moral behaviour. The curriculum is entirely in Arabic with one course in English and a computer class. Hawza study is free for accepted students, funded by the Africa Federation and World Federation, inclusive of boarding and meals. Books are normally purchased from Iraq, Iran or Lebanon, with some donated books, many from al-Mustafa University. The director also helped establish what he called “pre-hawzas” in various locations throughout Tanzania, where boys and girls study for two years to prepare for the more advanced ­five-year hawza programme in Dar or Tanga. Similar to students who complete al-Mustafa’s programme, BMM places graduates in villages for preaching or keeps them in the hawzas to teach or publish books. Top Tanzanian students interested in a higher level of education are sent to the prestigious Shi‘i seminaries in Iran or Iraq for another four or five years of study. These students are funded by BMM and do not accept scholarships from the Middle Eastern hawzas. This is part of Bilal’s system that requires funded students to return to Tanzania to complete one year of mandatory service for the mission, which might include preaching, teaching, writing or management. BMM also runs a women’s hawza in Arusha. Its director told me, “teach a man and he gets lost, teach a lady and you teach a family.” When I first visited the school in 2015, there were 25 young girls in the preschool and 36 women enrolled in three different levels. The school began in an Arusha guesthouse in 1978, acquired land in 1996 and moved to its current location in 1998. A small library and computer centre opened a decade ago with the assistance of Khoja volunteers from Canada. The mosque runs on solar power, the centre has its own generator to assist with frequent power cuts, and the surrounding community is provided with water from the centre’s two large tanks. Shi‘i missionaries in Tanzania believe the more people study Islam, the more their faith will grow, and if one studies Shi‘ism with an open mind, they will eventually join the faith when they discover the truth. This branch of Islam depends on strong logical proofs, which include comparison with other religious texts. Students are free to join the faith when they are ready, after a process of inquiry, which involves thinking, studying, asking, debating and then deciding. The director of the Bilal

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hawzas stressed that they do not convert Shi‘a by force, which is a misconception. Bilal provides free education and books (not money), and if people choose not to convert, the larger goal is for the local population to better understand Shi‘i Islam. The main aim of BMM’s propagation, I was told by the director of the Dar es Salaam office, is to follow the etiquette of the Holy Prophet, who is seen first and foremost as a humanitarian. The chairman of the Bilal Muslim Mission of Tanzania wrote in the 2014–2015 annual report that the biggest challenge is to meet our aim of producing well versed qualified scholars for every BMMT Centre. Together with producing such muballigheen, BMMT is also working towards programs that will help empower future Muslim generations to meet the economic, social and political challenges facing the Muslim world today. In other words, BMMT aims to create spiritually, socially and economically sound communities at their centres…The emphasis is on producing human resources.

Preaching and Islamic education is at the heart of Bilal’s work, and the NGO also provides seminars for its muballigheen (Shi‘i missionaries) “to educate [them] on their responsibilities towards Shia Islamic propagation.” Centres range in size and influence from small one-room facilities in need of maintenance located in remote agricultural villages to larger and better-equipped hawzas. Even the most basic classrooms or mosques are clearly marked as Shi‘a with handwritten inscriptions in Arabic declaring “Bilal” or “Ithna Asheri” or “Ya Husayn” (O Husayn, commemorating the beloved Imam). Some facilities are decorated with photos of Grand Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq or images of Fatima, the Prophet Muhammad’s daughter and wife of Imam Ali, an important role model for Shi‘i women.95 BMM even offers training programmes and iftars (break-the-fast meals) during Ramadan for Sunni imams. Seminars are organized for high school students to help counter negative media portrayals about Shi‘i Islam and to give them an opportunity to ask questions. Like all other Muslim organizations, Bilal provides food as well as propagation 95 See Lara Deeb, “Emulating and/or Embodying the Ideal: The Gendering of Temporal Frameworks and Islamic Role Models in Shi‘i Lebanon,” American Ethnologist 36, no. 2 (2009): 242–257.

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during the holy month of Ramadan. The NGO also organizes events during the first 10 or 12 days of Muharram, the Islamic month that marks the annual Shi‘i mourning period commemorating the fateful battle of Karbala in Iraq where Imam Husayn, his family and his army were killed in 680 CE. In Tanzania, Khoja and indigenous East African Twelver communities, men and women, come together in processions through town centres spreading the peaceful message of Imam Husayn to the public with banners, religious relics and elegies. Bilal Muslim Mission considers itself to be a humanitarian organization that supports Muslims, and as such also offers health programmes in addition to the educational mission. Volunteers organize free eye camps in various regions, health awareness consultations and a blood donation campaign that takes place on the tenth day of Muharram in place of self-flagellation. The NGO runs economic empowerment programmes for men and women, such as soap-making and knitting, goat husbandry, and sewing, needlepoint and computer training classes for young women in Arusha. There is a vocational training and boarding programme for young men in Moshi, called the Shi‘i Youth Development Program, which began in 2005 to help struggling youth further their studies in computers, math, engineering, entrepreneurship, electrical theory and practice, and communications. The local missions built boreholes, worked with regional hospitals to renovate children’s wards, and assisted orphans and people with special needs. Other “economic upliftment” projects supplied fishing nets to families living near the lake, deep freezers to women to sell ice and cold water, and taught one man to drive, providing him with a bajaj (a mechanized three-wheel taxi) to become self-sufficient by working in transportation. Yet, Jaffer writes: “One of the criticisms of Shi‘a tabligh organizations such as the Bilal Muslim Mission is that they have neglected to empower African converts and help them manage their own centres…It has been suggested that this ‘spoon-feeding’ approach robs the converts of any sense of ownership in the future of the centres and that it would be better for them to be administered by management committees made up of local converts.”96 The various BMM centres are managed by Khoja-led regional offices, which handle all expenses. Requests for renovations for facilities in disrepair and other programme costs are made

96 Jaffer,

“Conversion to Shi‘ism in East Africa,” 149.

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by regional directors to central management, who searches for donors among the Khoja community worldwide to assist East African Shi‘a. The Khoja management of BMM is a point of contention similarly brought to my attention by Muhammad and other leaders of another prominent Tanzanian Shi‘i organization that competes with yet sometimes collaborates with BMM. Ahl al-Bayt Centre has a very different history and transnational networks to the Arab Gulf.

Ahl Al-Bayt Centre Ahl al-Bayt Centre (locally known as ABC) was established under the name Madrasatu al-Quran al-Hakim (School of the Wise Qur’an) in 1986 by several Shi‘i shaykhs from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait. These clerics had studied together in Qom and collaborated to spread the message of Ahl al-Bayt, the Family of the Prophet (i.e. the Shi‘a), in Tanzania. These religious scholars had originally come to Tanzania to work with the East African Indian Khoja Ithna Asheri community. The brother of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Shirazi (1928–2001) had contributed to Bilal Muslim Mission and advised those visiting him in Iran about the needs in Tanzania, which later led these shaykhs to East Africa. The school began with around twenty students and opened in Moshi, a small town at the base of Mt. Kilimanjaro.97 Teachers and students initially lived together in a rented house, until the headquarters moved to Arusha in 1989. Today’s leaders of ABC started out as the school’s first students and recall the move from Moshi to Arusha. In Arusha, the organization was also run from a rented house with perhaps 25 students who came from all over East Africa: Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Madagascar and Congo. In 1991, Kuwaiti Member of Parliament Hajj Saleh Ashour visited Tanzania for the first time. He saw the difficult situation of the Shi‘i community in Arusha and worked to build them a madrasa, which opened as Ahl al-Bayt Centre in 1993. In Kuwait, MP Saleh Ashour’s uncle died in 1991 and left 20,000– 25,000 Kuwaiti Dinars (65,000–85,000 USD) for a project designated 97 Moshi had long been a centre of Christian missionary activity. See Klaus Fiedler, Christianity and African Culture: Conservative German Protestant Missionaries in Tanzania, 1900–1940 (Leiden: Brill, 1996) and Dorothy L. Hodgson, The Church of Women: Gendered Encounters between Maasai and Missionaries (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).

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for Africa. These funds did not suffice, so Hajj Ashour called a meeting and requested from those in attendance to solicit donations from their families and friends. He chose Tanzania for two reasons. First, he had a Saudi friend who selected Tanzania, Sierra Leone and Uganda as possible locations, and after site visits to all three countries “found Tanzania the most suitable in terms of the nature and culture of their citizens.”98 Second, the long history of seafaring and trade relations between Kuwait and Zanzibar and the pre-existing Arab influence in East Africa, especially from Oman and Yemen, was also a deciding factor.99 This was the start of the NGO, now known as al-Thaqalain Social Philanthropy Association, which was founded just after the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.100 Hajj Ashour expressed that having experienced the assistance of those from other countries during Kuwait’s time of crisis, he felt the sense of responsibility towards others.101 African countries topped his list of places in need, as Kuwaitis “heard of their low living standards and poverty, along with their need for education and help.” He had previous relations with a Khoja family who directed the Bilal Muslim Mission, and visited their projects when he travelled to East Africa for the first time. Al-Thaqalain initially collaborated with BMM but wanted independence and founded ABC. Due to limited funds, the Kuwaiti NGO focused on education and social assistance for families. Later its work expanded from Tanzania to Iran, Iraq, India and Syria, with new African projects in the Comoros Islands and Madagascar, and priority for initiating endeavours in Afghanistan and Yemen.

98 Interview with MP Saleh Ashour, June 22, 2017, Kuwait City; translation from Arabic to English by Fatima Alaiwi. 99 See Yacoub Yusuf Al-Hijji, Kuwait and the Sea: A Brief Social and Economic History (London: Arabian Publishing, 2010). 100 http://www.aspakw.com/. Al-Thaqalain means “Two Weighty Things” and is named after Hadith al-Thaqalain in which the Prophet Muhammad described the Qur’an and Ahl al-Bayt (the “people of the house” or the family of the Prophet, i.e. the Shi‘a) as “two weighty things.” Previously known as Ahl al-Bayt Organization, this name was not approved by the Kuwaiti government when the NGO applied for formal status, and al-Thaqalain was chosen as an alternative name. 101 See Mara A. Leichtman, “Kuwaiti Humanitarianism: The History and Expansion of Kuwait’s Foreign Assistance Policies,” Changing Landscape of Assistance to ConflictAffected States: Emerging and Traditional Donors and Opportunities for Collaboration, Policy Brief #11, Stimson Center, August 2017.

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Al-Thaqalain is the only officially registered Shi‘i Islamic NGO in Kuwait because Saleh Ashour is a Member of Parliament and was able to use his political clout to push for this status.102 The organization was established in 1991, registered in 1996 and licensed by the Kuwaiti government in 1999. Aid in Tanzania is given directly to recipients; ABC is likewise licensed by the Tanzanian government and follows all local laws. According to Kuwaiti protocol for registered charities, money must be officially sent through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kuwait to the Kuwaiti embassy in Tanzania, which can slow down project funding. Various government agencies thus oversee the work of NGOs. Ashour acknowledged that Sunni organizations are given more freedom to carry out their projects and are supported by the Kuwaiti government, which provides land, construction assistance and an annual budget for charitable undertakings. As a Shi‘i organization, “we do not even receive one dinar” from the state, Ashour lamented, which he considered to be “a kind of discrimination.” Ashour also commented that Sunni Muslim charity work is more “distinguished” than that of the Shi‘a because “the charity work of the Sunnis is independent through organizations, whereas Shi‘a do most of their work through the maraji‘ (religious references) or through clerics. The work of clerics is informal. We, at al-Thaqalain, have crossed the red lines, we are officially and clearly working away from the religious establishment, and this gives us independence.” In addition to zakat, Shi‘i Muslims are expected to pay khums, onefifth of acquired wealth, which gets divided into different shares.103 One share goes to the Present Imam (the marja‘ of one’s choice) and a second share goes to the sadat (s. sayyid, descendants of the family of the Prophet), which gets distributed to orphans, needy and travelling 102 Other Kuwaiti Shi‘a have charity organizations, some of which also run projects in Africa, such as Ahl al-Bayt Foundation (whose projects I also visited). Although this organization is an official NGO in East Africa, it is not registered as such with the Kuwaiti state. 103 Zakat differs for Shi‘i Muslims, for whom it is an obligatory tax on gold or silver coins, cattle and crops, and not on all wealth, as for Sunni Muslims. For a discussion of zakat in the Sunni context, see Holger Weiss, “Zakat and the Question of Social Welfare: An Introductory Essay on Islamic Economics and Its Implications for Social Welfare,” in Social Welfare in Muslim Societies in Africa, ed. Holger Weiss (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002), 7–38, as well as Chapters “Muslim NGOs, Zakat and the Provision of Social Welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Introduction”, “Charity, ONG-ization and Emergent Ethics of Volunteerism: The Case of Islamic NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire” and “Discourses on Zakat and Its Implementation in Contemporary Ghana” in this volume.

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sadat.104 Funds could be used to provide relief during natural disasters, for propagating Islam to believers or non-believers, providing household and academic expenses of religious scholars who dedicate their lives to teaching, or covering expenditures of religious establishments, schools, teachers and students. Because financially able Shi‘a are expected to pay khums, it becomes more difficult for Shi‘i charities independent of the clerical system (marja‘iyya) to raise additional donations for charitable activities. Saleh Ashour built a large mosque and husayniyya (gathering place to commemorate Muharram) in Kuwait, as well as the al-Thaqalain office (which also serves as a cultural centre), where he and his staff promote their charity work and fundraise for particular projects, including ABC. They also reach donors through al-Thaqalain’s website, which accepts electronic donations, and the organization’s Instagram and Twitter accounts. Kuwaiti Shi‘i youth volunteers help mobilize funds and assist with various projects. In Arusha, ABC took three years to build and included a hawza as well as a vocational training centre, established one year later. The technical college was meant to help the community find employment but would also bring money back into the hawza, where profits could pay teacher salaries. The training centre is accredited by the Tanzanian government and follows the national syllabus. The hawza opened with 40 students who boarded at the centre and the technical college taught 30 external students (who did not board). Muhammad mentioned in his historical account of the NGO via WhatsApp how ABC slowly extended its programming beyond the classroom through du‘a, Shi‘i supplications that typically take place in congregations on Thursday nights following the evening prayers. Gatherings include lectures about Islam and the divine role of the Twelve Shi‘i Imams. The community met in different homes and attendees had the opportunity to ask shaykhs questions about Shi‘i Islam, often requesting comparison of different religious traditions. ABC additionally offered religious counselling programmes and distributed newsletters, designed to make people more aware of Shi‘i Islam while countering negative stereotypes (in particular from the competing Salafi movement).105 104 These categories were established during the time of the Prophet and are negotiable and determined by the marja‘ responsible for distributing the funds he receives. 105 See Søren Gilsaa, “Salafism(s) in Tanzania: Theological Roots and Political Subtext of the Ansār Sunna,” Islamic Africa 6 (2015): 30–59.

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Ramadan and Muharram programmes were especially successful in drawing new converts into the fold. Ten years later, ABC required a bigger facility to accommodate demand. After some negotiation, the NGO was granted 20,000 square metres of land from the Tanzanian government outside the Arusha town centre, in the neighbourhood of Njiro. This location has subsequently become more developed as Arusha grew from a town into a city with increased safari tourism. The new facility opened in 2015 after several years of construction and features a complex of brown and white buildings, including a mosque, dormitories for male students, eight classrooms, a husayniyya (a large auditorium with chairs and a stage), a kitchen, a library (filled with many books from Kuwait), staff and visitor housing (under construction), and a garden.106 Teachers are encouraged to work towards secular degrees from universities in Tanzania, which is a requirement by the state in order for the school to qualify for accreditation. For example, one hawza leader is finishing his degree in community development from a local Christian university. The buildings in the ABC complex were funded by al-Thaqalain or by Saleh Ashour personally, and a delegation of Kuwaiti Shi‘a came to Arusha for the institute’s grand opening in 2015. A Kuwaiti Shi‘i television network filmed a programme about ABC’s charitable projects, which attracted the interest of an additional donor in Oman who specified funds to build the library. The boarding school has the capacity to teach 160 students for a four- to five-year programme. Students must be between the ages of 16 and 22 and single; I was told married students lack concentration. The Swahili language is prohibited in the hawza, where students are required to speak Arabic; this is one strategy to encourage them to improve their language skills. The ABC school is considered to be an introduction to the hawza, or what the BMM Director of Tabligh called a “pre-hawza.” The curriculum includes Arabic linguistics, phonetics and grammar; principles of Islam (according to the Shi‘i school of thought); Qur’anic recitation, translation and interpretation; Islamic history; Hadith and Sunna (the saying and practices of the Prophet Muhammad); logic; Islamic jurisprudence; and courses in world affairs. ABC is working with Kuwait to improve an outdated syllabus. According to an administrator, the revised curriculum is an “attempt to make Shi‘a learning of higher value 106 Staff currently live outside Arusha and the commute can take up to one hour; on-site residence will facilitate an earlier start to classes, immediately following morning prayers.

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and of higher quality, preparing graduates who will be leaders of not only Shi‘a but of the general community where they will be residing.”107 ABC’s graduates open mosques, schools and small propagation centres in their hometowns, spreading ABC’s influence beyond Arusha, back to Moshi, as well as to Singuida, Kondoa, Bokoba, Tanga and throughout the country, in particular to rural areas. The NGO claims to be the largest Shi‘i organization in Tanzania today with more than 700 graduates. The current ABC director, who had the opportunity in the 1980s to study in Iran, Syria and Iraq, told me “from graduates come more graduates.” In this way, the organization is also making an impact throughout the region, including in the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda, as well as in the Indian Ocean archipelagos. The Arusha centre lacks qualified teachers to guide interested students through more advanced levels of Shi‘i learning, so the most competitive students are sent mostly to Iraq for another five years to pursue further hawza education.108 These graduates might then return to ABC, adding to its teaching staff and ability to accommodate additional students. ABC continues to receive 30–40% of its funding from al-Thaqalain in Kuwait, but also accepts donations from local community members, from funders outside Tanzania, as well as from Gulf tourists, eager to build mosques in Africa in their family’s name. The NGO initiated a programme that called upon Tanzanian Shi‘a to put aside part of their monthly salary to contribute to the challenges of expanding Shi‘i Islam locally. Saleh Ashour is thus considered a “sympathizer” of ABC, which has become a local Tanzanian NGO. In contrast, BMM is mostly funded through the Africa Federation, World Federation and individual Khoja donors. ABC’s leaders specified that shaykhs do not only lead prayer but they also assist the entire community. They prepare the body when people die, they create groups to help with employment, and they facilitate Islamically permissible microcredit projects (loans without interest), which might help farmers acquire machinery or enable individuals to purchase motorcycles for public transportation. In addition, ABC directs an agricultural programme and supports farmers who raise cows, goats and vegetables, who also supply provisions for the hawza’s meals. The 107 The NGO also began an extra-curricular tutoring programme led by part-time teachers to assist students with optimal performance on final examinations. 108 ABC graduates were also previously sent to Syria, before the civil war began in 2011, and occasionally study in Iran.

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NGO manages an orphanage and administers a women’s empowerment programme for widows, who receive monthly financial contributions and benefit from sewing classes. As mentioned above, ABC expanded its learning programme beyond religious studies to include vocational technical training in electrical engineering, masonry, carpentry and plumbing. There are plans to develop a new programme in information technology and communications. The goal of these programmes is to prepare graduates to earn a living while disseminating Islamic learning to local communities. A future goal is to renovate the original Arusha location, which continues to be used as a vocational centre, and to transform it into either a computer centre and English medium college or a carpentry and blacksmithing school. Turning the former Islamic seminary into a business would create a waqf (Islamic endowment) for ABC; proceeds would be used exclusively to fund the organization’s charitable work. The ABC community now includes university graduates in engineering, medicine, general education and accounting. Members are also business consultants, special educational needs professionals, journalists, public administrators, information technology and communication experts, and community development specialists, who have all received Shi‘i religious training. The NGO developed a registered organization called TIMSIYO, the Tanzania Shi‘a Muslim Youth Organization, modelled after a Khoja youth organization, with the mission of keeping young educated Shi‘i professionals together. Muhammad expressed that the NGO is thus more than a religious seminary; it is a community development organization. Its goal is to empower the Shi‘i community to succeed economically and thrive as citizens able to contribute to Tanzania’s unity, health and economic development. ABC’s objective is to work together with fellow citizens to ensure “there is peace in the country, harmony, stability, without unwanted extremist characters which threatens the real existence of … constructive positive human civilisation our country has been struggling to build and reach.” Thus, ABC encourages graduates to continue to reach the upper echelons of education and professional status and to pursue postgraduate education, while encouraging them “to live in peace and be good role model(s) to their nationals.” Nevertheless, ABC has faced certain challenges, in particular from Salafism, the reformist branch of Sunni Islam sometimes (and often

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erroneously) conflated with its distinctive sub-tradition of Wahhabism.109 Muhammad remarked that ABC was becoming established at the same time when graduates from universities in Saudi Arabia (and from al-Azhar University in Egypt) were also returning to Tanzania.110 Arusha was similarly an attractive location for them to launch their Salafi movement. One indicated threat to ABC was Salafi lobbying to secure a position in the central Arusha mosque, near the main market. This mosque had been run by graduates from al-Azhar University and followed the Egyptian curriculum. Muhammad credited the previous management of the central mosque for bridging the gap between Salafis, known locally as “Ahlulsunnah,” and Shi‘a in Arusha. “There used to be no problems,” he lamented, speaking of a time when Shi‘a would be invited to the central mosque and its Sunni leader would visit the Khoja Shi‘a mosque in Arusha. Yet, he traced the change in relations between Tanzanian Sunnis and Shi‘a to 1988 when tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran began to reverberate around the world and likewise caused problems for ABC in Arusha. He noted campaigns “discouraging pupils to join the Ahlulbayti centre” and urging them “not to cooperate and work together.” Muhammad attributed these outside challenges to growing “Wahhabi” influence in Arusha determined to see ABC fail. Saleh Ashour also reflected on increasing tensions with Sunni Muslims in al-Thaqalain’s other African centres, especially in the Comoros, which he similarly linked to Saudi Arabian Wahhabism. He informed me: “The problem in Wahhabi thought is that a radical ideology does not believe in pluralism and difference. We accept that some citizens visit our centres to learn, some become Muslims, while others stick to their own religion. The key point according to us is for them to get educated.” He quoted Imam Ali, who once said: “A person is either your brother in religion or 109 Michael

Farquhar, Circuits of Faith: Migration, Education, and the Wahhabi Mission (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017) defines Salafism as “a style of Islamic religiosity characterized by a distinctive set of creedal and legal principles which are understood by its adherents to reflect the authentic beliefs and practices of the earliest generations of Muslims,” 1. 110 For a comparison of the different Sunni schools in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, see Bano and Sakurai, Shaping Global Islamic Discourses; on Saudi schools and global networks see Farquhar, Circuits of Faith and Alex Thurston, Salafism in Nigeria: Islam, Preaching, and Politics (London: International African Institute and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

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your equal in humanity,” a saying which informs the work of the Kuwaiti Shi‘i NGO. “We believe in the humanist creed that we are all the creation of God,” Ashour remarked. Nevertheless, he did not perceive of tensions with Salafis to be a serious threat to his work in Tanzania, a country he described as having “the advantage of democratic freedom” and “respect towards any works that obey the legal framework.” In fact, I was repeatedly told, in Tanzania the constitution provides for freedom of religion, something the government has long enforced, which is why both Sunni and Shi‘i organizations are able to openly proselytize; yet the government will crack down on religious organizations that create tensions, so there is a forced uneasy coexistence between the Salafi and Shi‘i groups.111 The government sponsors interfaith lectures, bringing together pastors and shaykhs, including those from the various Shi‘i organizations, in an effort to encourage peaceful religious coexistence. Although mainland Tanzania does not face similar conflicts between religious and ethnic groups as in neighbouring Kenya, the government is proactive in order to prevent potential problems. This controlled coexistence, along with the national policy of accepting assistance from a variety of foreign donors, encourages the pro-Arab Shi‘i discourse of certain Tanzanian Shi‘a. Such rhetoric can be contrasted with scepticism of more localized proselytizing and development efforts by the Tanzanian Khoja community.

Conclusion The 1979 Iranian Revolution significantly influenced the development of Shi‘i Islam worldwide, yet the relationship between Iran and African Shi‘a is multifarious. In Tanzania, the East African Indian Khoja charity, Bilal Muslim Mission, began its missionary work fifteen years before the start of the Iranian Revolution. Through other transnational Arab efforts, significantly from Kuwait, ABC developed into an indigenous Tanzanian Shi‘i organization. Remarkably, regardless of their differences, the various Shi‘i organizations in Tanzania work together towards 111 Article 19(2) of the 1977 Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania declares “the profession, practice, worship and propagation of religion to be the free and a private affair of an individual in which the secular state cannot interfere.” Yet there are limitations in relation to the actual application of Islamic law and operation of Muslim philanthropic institutions. See Mohammed A. Bakari, “Islamic Philanthropy in Tanzania: Unexploited Treasure,” in Giving to Help, Helping to Give: The Context and Politics of African Philanthropy, eds. Tade Akin Aina and Bhekinkosi Moyo (Dakar: Amalion Publishing and TrustAfrica, 2013), 332.

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a common goal of supporting educational and development activities and have good relations.112 Al-Mustafa sends books (in Arabic, Swahili and English) from Iran to BMM and ABC; ABC directs some graduates to study at the Bilal hawza, and BMM as well as ABC enrol certain graduates in al-Mustafa University; furthermore, some shaykhs who trained at ABC are employed as teachers for BMM. In addition, the organizations collaborate to organize certain events or activities. For example, Tanzanian Shi‘a might attend the Muharram gatherings of all of the organizations, which are usually scheduled at different times. The entire East African Shi‘i community comes together with the Khoja Ithna Asheri community for a public procession (or two) during the tenth day of Muharram. Yet, each NGO is an independent Shi‘i entity— and importantly, each organization follows a different marja‘ in the Middle East. Books taught and distributed by al-Mustafa University in Tanzania include Ayatollah Khomeini’s writings. Notably, the Khoja, Bilal and ABC communities do not follow Ayatollah Khomeini, even if they are familiar with his ideas and his books can be found in their libraries. The Khoja Shi‘a Ithna Asheri community and Bilal Muslim Mission are guided by Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani, who was born in Iran and resides in Najaf, Iraq, and is considered to be the most influential living marja‘ today. ABC follows Grand Ayatollah Muhammad a­ l-Shirazi, who died in 2001 and was succeeded by his brother, Sayyid Sadiq Husayni al-Shirazi. The Shirazi family is Iraqi in origin but based in Qom, and have a strong following among Shi‘a in the Gulf. The Shirazis are generally pro-Iranian although tensions arose between Ayatollahs Shirazi and Khomeini following the Iranian Revolution. The power struggles between the different maraji‘ in the Middle East do not extend to Africa.113 Shi‘i schools in Tanzania teach the 112 In contrast, there is much competition among Senegalese Shi‘a as far as who claims to be the first Shi‘i Muslim in Senegal, or whose organization was the first to organize a conference on Muharram, and there are jealousies and divisions among the various Shi‘i leaders. See Leichtman, Shi‘i Cosmopolitanisms in Africa. 113 See Laurence Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). For example, I visited a Shi‘i madrasa in Zanzibar, whose ABC-trained shaykh had books in his office written by Ayatollahs Khomeini, Sistani and Shirazi, in addition to those authored by Grand Ayatollahs Sayyid Muhammad Taqi al-Modarresi and Sayyid Muhammad Sa‘id al-Hakim. He told me that other ABC madrasas in mainland Tanzania have more resources and a

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different opinions of the various maraji‘ and do not focus on conflicts between the Grand Ayatollahs. Students are free to follow whomever they choose, even if their teachers abide by rulings of a different marja‘. This is a private matter and students are not asked to declare their religious reference; who they adhere to can also change at any time. One ABC-trained shaykh thought half of East African Shi‘a went by Shirazi and the other half followed Sistani; the Khoja director of the Bilal hawza guessed that a majority of their graduates abided by Sistani’s rulings, with 20% at most following Khamenei, and less than 1% adhering to Shirazi.114 What does it mean to follow a marja‘? For ABC, the directors do their own planning and report their activities to Ayatollah Shirazi; they work from the bottom up in a decentralized manner. One administrator met twice with Ayatollah Shirazi (who has never been to Africa) and shared with the marja‘ in Iran photos and reports of hawza activities. He recalled the advice Ayatollah Shirazi imparted: “Tanzanian Shi‘a should be polite and work with people from every ethnicity and sect, and they should work hard – in this way they will be able to bring change to Africa. Tanzanian Shi‘a should also respect all people regardless of religious differences and let their success speak for itself.” This is the manner in which Shi‘a work in Tanzania. The different Shi‘i schools are more interested in propagating what they believe than criticizing other Muslim sects (which they accuse Salafis of doing). This is not a violent and forceful Shi‘i Islam in Africa, as is sometimes depicted in Western media, assumed to be a proxy of Iran.115 In the end, the different interpretations of Islamic thought of the maraji‘ had little influence upon decisions of Tanzanian Muslims to embrace Shi‘i Islam. Some converts sought a religious tradition that made the most sense to them—and had even dabbled in Salafism before

larger collection of Shirazi books in their libraries. Even though this shaykh follows Ayatollah Shirazi, his library contained more books by Ayatollah Khomeini as these were gifted to his school by al-Mustafa University. Nevertheless, Khomeini’s books are not incorporated into his curriculum, which follows Shirazi and what he learned at ABC. 114 I

cannot confirm these numbers. for example, Donna Abu-Nasr, “As Trump makes threats, Iran makes friends,” Bloomberg, March 8, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-03-08/ as-trump-makes-threats-iran-makes-friends. 115 See,

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settling upon Shi‘ism.116 Ultimately, religious school directors and individual converts suggested they were most swayed by local debates over which version of Islamic history propagated by which denomination was most correct. Teachings about the Shi‘i Imams and the good manners of the Prophet Muhammad were equally significant. For African Shi‘a, questions of shari‘a and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) were more fundamental in their religious belonging than minor distinctions between Shirazi and Sistani or Khamenei (which really came down to a few rules of fiqh, I was told). Thus, only after first mastering the basics of Shi‘i Islam did students choose which marja‘ to follow. Sometimes opportunity dictates which Shi‘i organization might be the most attractive. Beyond the question of maraji‘, ABC offers vocational training and is more likely to send top graduates to study in the Middle East. Bilal generally sends students to continue their education in the upper-level Bilal hazwa in Dar es Salaam or Tanga, although some students might attend al-Mustafa University. Al-Mustafa and Bilal currently enrol students from Tanzania only; ABC boards students from a variety of East African countries. Management and global connections also play a role, where Bilal sponsorship of students ultimately comes from the London office of the World Federation of Khoja Shi‘a Ithna Asheri communities, and ABC sponsorship comes from Kuwait or Ayatollah Shirazi in Iran.117 While the Iranian ambassador visits different Shi‘i schools in Tanzania to encourage students to succeed and to discuss scholarship opportunities to Iran, one school director informed me that Tanzanian students generally prefer to study in Najaf, and are more attracted to the Arab, rather than the Iranian or Indian, system.118 In order to fully understand the development of Shi‘i Islam in East Africa, colonial and

116 For examples of life history narratives of Senegalese converts to Shi‘i Islam, see Leichtman, Shi‘i Cosmopolitanisms in Africa. 117 Some Tanzanian schools also take advantage of whatever opportunities are available to them. For instance, an ABC branch in Moshi sent graduates to different destinations to continue their studies, based on available scholarships: In 2017, 20 went to Qom, 20 to Najaf, 10 to Karbala, and 10 to al-Mustafa University in Dar es Salaam. 118 Another factor is Iraqi hawzas provide scholarships that offer additional stipends for married students as well as family housing; many Tanzanian Shi‘a get married upon finishing their studies in local hawzas and prefer to bring their wives with them to the Middle East. Studying in Iran would also require initial language training in Farsi, which could take an additional six months.

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postcolonial social policies, foreign relations, and ethnic and racial tensions must be considered. Even though “the growth of non-Iranian students studying at Iranian seminaries is a post-revolutionary phenomenon facilitated by the clerical leaders of the Islamic Republic, who were eager to promote their ideology overseas,”119 the acceptance of the Iranian revolutionary model among African Shi‘a is neither straightforward nor inevitable. As this chapter has highlighted, Iran is not the only Shi‘i player in Tanzania. East African Shi‘a have their own local Islamic histories, a variety of transnational ties, independent reasons for adhering to their faith and a choice in which marja‘ to follow. Kuwait and the Indian diaspora are among the diversity of actors who support Tanzanian Shi‘a. Local charitable NGOs work for spiritual as well as material advancement for indigenous Shi‘a to better position them as capable, self-sufficient and professionalized nationals able to proudly contribute to their country despite the history of marginalization of Muslims in Tanzania. While Tanzanian Shi‘i NGOs have partial transnational sponsorship, organizational goals are decidedly and proudly nationalistic. Acknowledgements    Fieldwork in Tanzania was funded by a Council of American Overseas Research Centers Multi-Country Research Fellowship, a Humanities and Arts Research Program Development Grant, and additional support by the Asian Studies Center, Muslim Studies Program and Department of Anthropology at Michigan State University. I am grateful to Bilal Muslim Mission, Ahl al-Bayt Centre, and Al-Thaqalain for warmly embracing my research. Franz Kogelmann and Holger Weiss organized a fruitful workshop at the University of Bayreuth that encouraged me to write this chapter. I would also like to thank Felicitas Becker, Marie Nathalie LeBlanc, Jamie Monson, and the 2019–2020 Trans-Regional Studies Scholarly Learning Group at MSU for their feedback.

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Politics of Humanitarianism: The Ahmadiyya and the Provision of Social Welfare Katrin Langewiesche

Introduction This chapter offers a perspective on the relationship between transnational religious movements, humanitarian aid and social change through the example of the Ahmadiyya movement and the evolution of their social welfare activities in West Africa with a special emphasis on Burkina Faso. The social welfare activities are analysed as traces of the specific transnational flows and historical experiences of the Ahmadiyya followers in the local context of Burkina Faso. The transnational perspective highlights the importance of individual mobility, educational and health institutions in conveying religious ideas across large geographical distances. Various scholars note a trend that is moving away from purely religious activism and tends to combine humanitarian and religious goals in Africa. Youth organisations of the churches or women’s groups of

K. Langewiesche (*)  Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz, Mainz, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 H. Weiss (ed.), Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38308-4_9

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the mosque do not confine to merely religious activities anymore, but become more and more involved in civil society.1 This tendency towards the NGO-isation of associations and religious groups as well as the sectors of health care or education in many African countries intensified during the 1990s.2 Paul Gifford reports that he heard the term “NGOisation of the churches” as early as the beginning of the 1990s at the All Africa Conference of Churches. The term was intended to draw attention to the changing nature and function of Africa’s mainstream churches. He describes this changing nature of Catholicism as moving closer to a development institution than to a redemption one.3 Many authors have studied this trend in relation to Pentecostal churches whose connections with neoliberalism and transnationalism is widely recognised.4 The Ahmadiyya founded organisation, Humanity First, 1 Marie Nathalie LeBlanc, “Du militant à l’entreprenneur: les nouveaux acteurs religieux de la moralisation par le bas en Côte d’Ivoire,” Cahiers d’études africaines 206–207, no. 2 (2012): 493–516; Benjamin Soares and Marie Nathalie LeBlanc, “Islam, jeunesse et les trajectoires de mobilisation en Afrique de l’Ouest dans l’ère néolibérale: regard anthropologique,” in Mobilisations collectives en Afrique, eds. Kadja Tall et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 67–90; Marie Nathalie LeBlanc and Muriel Gomez-Perez, “Jeunes musulmans et citoyenneté culturelle: retour aux expériences de recherche en Afrique de l’Ouest francophone,” Sociologie et Société 39, no. 2 (2008): 39–59; Benjamin Soares and René Otayek, Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Gudrun Lachenmann and Petra Dannecker, eds., Negotiating Development in Muslim Societies. Gendered Spaces and Translocal Connections (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008). 2 Julie Hearn, “The NGO-isation of Kenyan Society: USAID and the Restructuring of Healthcare,” Review of African Political Economy 25, no. 75 (1998): 89–100; Issa Cissé, “Les associations islamiques au Burkina Faso, de la Révolution d’août 1983 à l’avènement de la IVè République,” Cahiers du CERLESHS, publication de l’Université de Ouagadougou, no. 28 (2007): 51–73; Sarah Fichtner, The NGOisation of Education. Case Studies from Benin (Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2012). 3 Paul Gifford, Christianity, Development and Modernity in Africa (London: Hurst, 2015), 103. 4 Erica Bornstein, The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality, and Economics in Zimbabwe (New York and London: Routledge, 2003); Deena Freeman, Pentecostalism and Development Churches, NGOs and Social Change in Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Simon Coleman, The Globalisation of Charismatic Christianity: Spreading the Gospel of Prosperity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Paul Gifford, Ghana’s New Christianity. Pentecostalism in a Globalising African Economy (London: Hurst, 2004); Gifford, Christianity; A. Corten and R. Marshall-Fratani, eds., Between Babel and Pentecost: Transnational Pentecostalism in Africa and Latin America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001); Laurent Fourchard, A. Mary and R. Otayek, eds., Entreprises religieuses transnationales en Afrique de l’Ouest (Paris: Karthala-IFRA, 2005).

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is one of the Muslim NGOs that illustrate for the Islamic field the ­tendency of increasing involvement of faith-based initiatives in African civil societies. Petersen has labelled this approach to development of Muslim faith-based organisations as being situated in-between “sacralized” and “secularized” form of aid.5 The involvement of local Muslim associations and transnational movements in education, healthcare services and development issues reached most West African countries some years after the Catholic and Protestant initiatives and often in reaction to the latter.6 Ahmadi Muslims, in contrast, have combined local contributions and financial support from overseas to support various development projects since the 1920s when they started their mission activities in West Africa. The doctrine of the Ahmadiyya movement combines the ambition to serve the economic development of humankind and the logic of proselytism. The two impulses and the inherent tension between humanitarian aid and normative moral discourses are reconciled within the theological framework of Ahmadi Islam. Material prosperity in the sense of a modest level of comfort is viewed as God’s blessing and positive. Material prosperity is therefore recognised as a goal for all individuals. In contrast, wealth and ostentation have negative connotations. For example, the Ahmadiyya community opposes the excessive celebration of the Mawlid (birthday of the Prophet), as it is celebrated by some Sufi brotherhoods, displays of wealth such as those in which some pastors indulge and excessive spending on wedding celebrations. The Ahmadi followers’ ideas about wealth and consumption are strongly reminiscent of what Max Weber called Protestant work ethic: wealth only has its place in secular life if it is accumulated through lawful work, does not inspire laziness and is presented with modesty. The Ahmadiyya community embodies an intramundane asceticism akin to that of the Protestant reformers (e.g. Calvin), which attempts to establish very picky detailed religious rules with a view to improving society. In the conception of many Ahmadis I meet, the improvement of society is closely linked to personal transformation, which 5 Marie Juul Petersen, For Humanity or for the Ummah: Aid and Islam in Transnational Muslim NGOs (London, Hurst, 2015). 6 Katrin Langewiesche, “Konfessionell, national, global: Das Gesundheitswesen in Burkina Faso aus historischer Perspektive,” in Auf dem Boden der Tatsachen. Festschrift für Thomas Bierschenk, eds. Nikolaus Schareika, Eva Spies and Pierre‐Yves Le Meur (Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 2011), 415–434; Abdoulaye Sounaye, “Doing Development the Islamic Way in Contemporary Niger,” Bulletin de l’APAD, no. 33 (2011): 61–90.

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will bring about material improvement, as a by-product. This understanding of development resonates strongly with the “holistic development” in the well-being and capacity approach of Amartya Sen.7 In the following discussion, I first summarise the historical evolution of Ahmadiyya’s welfare activities starting in 1889 in British India up to the recent humanitarian and development activities in West Africa. In the second section, I shall describe the contemporary social welfare activities of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Burkina Faso and the problems arising in contact with other Islamic NGOs in this country. In the last part, I will discuss the politics of humanitarianism of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community arguing that humanitarian aid is one of the issues favouring public recognition as well as interreligious dialogue to which the Ahmadis are equally strongly committed. Public recognition is particularly important with regard to the idiosyncratic situation of the Ahmadiyya movement in the Islamic world. The Ahmadis consider themselves Muslim, but they are not recognised as such by the majority of Muslims. This non-recognition has led to dramatic persecution of the Ahmadis in some countries, the exclusion from the ummah since 1974 and Saudi Arabia’s refusal to allow Ahmadis to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. In 1974, a constitutional amendment, which is still in force, stripped members of Pakistan’s Ahmadi minority of their status as Muslims, drastically reducing their rights as full citizens. The measure has left Ahmadis vulnerable to repeated attacks by other Muslims and they have increasingly become the targets of discriminatory legislation by the state. Pakistani Ahmadis’ passports bear a note which identifies them as Ahmadis, excluding them therefore from the Hajj. All Ahmadis of other nationalities, even of Pakistani origin, can undertake the pilgrimage on condition that they conceal their affiliation to the Ahmadiyya in order to be accepted by the Hajj authorities. Muslim social welfare activities are supported by zakat (charitable compulsory giving), sadaqa (voluntary almsgiving) and wafq (charitable foundations) and are regularly updated and reinterpreted with regard to the economic and sociopolitical evolution in each society.8 Social welfare 7 Amartya Sen, “Capability and Well-Being,” in The Quality of Life, eds. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 30–53. 8 Holger Weiss, ed., Social Welfare in Muslim Societies in Africa (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002); Charles Tripp, Islam and the Moral Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000).

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activities include traditional charity such as care for the sick, the poor, the orphans, the disabled and all those who are unable to care for themselves. For many Muslim groups, the practice of social welfare includes also the encouragement of da’wa and the moralisation of the population. The practice of social welfare encompasses the school sector, initiatives related more to the social economy, the institutionalisation of healthcare services and agricultural projects, all of which are referred to as “development aid“ today. Social welfare activities in Africa and Europe also include disaster relief and emergency aid.

Welfare Activities of the Ahmadiyya: A Historical Overview Since the establishment of the Ahmadiyya in British India in 1889, the community has offered a Western-oriented education to Muslims. This investment for education is closely linked to the founder’s request that his fellows should endorse individual responsibility and improve their lives through education. For this purpose, the founder, Ghulam Ahmad, opened an English language middle school in the late nineteenth century.9 At the same time, various social services were set up to organise the traditional charity given to orphans, widows and the most vulnerable in a structured manner.10 In 1917, the Noor Hospital in Qadian opened its services to the Muslim, Christian and Hindu population.11 But not only education, healthcare and social services were established in Qadian according to modern principles. Qadian also became at an early stage an active publishing centre. The Ahmadiyya launched three newspapers from 1897 onward, among which the journal Review of Religion in Urdu and English is still published today.12

9 John H. Hanson, The Ahmadiyya in the Gold Coast: Muslim Cosmopolitans in the British Empire. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017), 108–113. 10 “Organisation of an Orphanage and Hospice for the Poor,” in Centenaire du Khilafat Ahmadiyya (Tahrik-e-Jadid Anjuman Ahmadiyya Pakistan, 2008), 308. 11 Centenaire du Khilafat Ahmadiyya (Tahrik-e-Jadid Anjuman Ahmadiyya Pakistan, 2008), 306. 12 Hanson, The Ahmadiyya, 113.

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At the same time as setting up modern printing and social welfare infrastructures, the Ahmadiyya consolidated its missionary efforts under the first Khalifa Nur ud-Din through the creation of a missionary organisation (Anjuman-i-Taraqqi-Islam) founded in 1914 and he enhanced their mission activities outside the Indian subcontinent from 1934 with the foundation of the Tahrik-e Jadid movement organising the global missionary activities.13 Ahmadis, who travelled to European capitals for study or business purposes, prepared the ground for future generations of missionaries.14 The Ahmadiyya sent missionaries to Britain, Ceylon and Mauritius in the mid-1910s and to the Arab world, Indonesia, North America, Germany and West Africa in the 1920s.15 Since 1914, the movement has been split into two groups: on the one hand, the Lahore Ahmadiyya (Ahmadiyya Anjuman-i Isha`at-i Islami—AAII) and on the other hand, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at—AMJ), both of which pursued global missionary efforts to spread the message of Ahmadi Islam. After the First World War, the first Pakistani Lahore missionary settled in London in 1914 and in Berlin in 1924.16 But despite its early missionary activities, the Lahore AAII has been less successful than the Qadian AMJ so far. Some scholars explain this by the different organisational structure and missionary strategies of the two organisations.17 In West Africa, Ahmadi missionaries came mainly from the Qadian branch, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (AMJ). They arrived first in British colonies (Nigeria, Gold Coast, Gambia and Sierra Leone) in the 1910s and

13 Andrea Lathan, “The Relativity of Categorizing in the Context of the Ahmadiyya,” Welt des Islams 48, no. 3–4 (2008): 372–393; Andrea Lathan, “Reform, Glauben und Entwicklung: die Herausforderungen für die Ahmadiyya-Gemeinde,” in Islam in Europa: Religiöses Leben heute. Ein Portrait ausgewählter islamischer Gruppen und Institutionen, ed. Dietrich Reetz (Münster: Waxmann, 2010), 84. 14 Hanson mentions the importance of the ­ Afro-Brazilian connections involved in the expansion from London to Lagos. See Hanson, The Ahmadiyya, 123–125. 15 Hanson, The Ahmadiyya, 118. Green mentions also China, see Nile Green, Terrains of Exchange. Religious Economies of Global Islam (London: Hurst, 2014), 30. 16 Gerdien Jonker, The Ahmadiyya Quest for Religious Progress: Missionizing Europe 1900– 1965 (Leiden: Brill, 2016). 17 Lathan, “Reform, Glauben und Entwicklung”; Jonker, The Ahmadiyya Quest.

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then in French colonies (Ivory Coast, Upper Volta and Benin) from the 1950s.18 As for Christian missionaries, evangelisation was accompanied by the development of welfare activities, especially in the areas of education and healthcare services. The first Pakistani missionary who arrived in Lagos presently founded a small Ahmadiyya school around 1921, and in 1922, he opened the first permanent school supported by the British colonial government.19 In the Gold Coast, Ahmadi missionaries settled in 1921, and shortly later, several Ahmadi English language primary schools opened thanks to local Ahmadi contributions and financial support from British Gold Coast colonial administration.20 The Talim ul Islam Ahmadiyya School opened in 1924, had standard British curriculum and offered Arabic instruction as an elective. They started with 47 boys and girls.21 During the 1950s and 1960s, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community built schools and clinics with the continuing support of the British administration.22 As in Ghana and Nigeria, in Ivory Coast too the educational institutions, as well as medical centres of the Ahmadiyya, were decisive elements in shaping public opinion positively towards the Ahmadiyya. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community has been in Abidjan since 1961.23 According to Cissé, the recognition of the Ahmadiyya in Burkina Faso and the obtaining of their official recognition in 1986 were tied to their socioeconomic investment projects.24 Since their establishment in Africa, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community has offered educational services to the local youth through Ahmadis donations and governmental funding and charities to all the needy through zakat, the traditional religiously sanctioned 18 Humphrey J. Fisher, Ahmadiyya: A Study of Contemporary Islam on the West African Coast (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); Hanson, The Ahmadiyya; Cissé, “Les associations islamiques au Burkina Faso”; Denise Bregand, “La Ahmadiyya au Bénin,” Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 135 (2006): 73–90. 19 Hanson,

The Ahmadiyya, 134. Hanson, “Modernity, Religion and Development in Ghana: The Example of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community,” Ghana Studies 12/13 (2009/2010): 56; David E. Skinner, “Conversion to Islam and the Promotion of ‘Modern’ Islamic Schools in Ghana,” Journal of Religion in Africa 43 (2013): 426–450. 21 Hanson, The Ahmadiyya, 186. 22 Skinner, “Conversion to Islam,” 432. 23 Africa speaks (Majilis Nusrat Jahan Tahrik-i-Jadid, Pakistan, 1970). 24 Cissé, “Les associations islamiques au Burkina Faso,” 105. 20 John

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contributions. Nevertheless, this engagement for social needs of the local population has taken a different turn since the 1970s under the third khilafat of Mirza Nasir Ahmad, who launched the Nusrat Jahan or Service to Humanity Scheme “for the welfare and betterment of the whole world, especially the under-developed regions like the African countries”. This programme still exists and collects donations from the international Ahmadiyya community to fund projects in Africa. Under this programme, the first Ahmadi hospital was built in Ghana in Kokofu.25 In 1972, there were already 14 hospitals, 9 higher secondary schools in Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, Gambia and Sierra Leone, which were established with the funds of the Service to Humanity Scheme.26 Concurrently, the third khalifa established The Medical Association of Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan which allows Ahmadi doctors to dedicate some weeks, months or years to medical work in the Ahmadiyya’s hospitals or healthcare centres before returning to their private practices.27 Today, this association has its offshoots in many countries: the Ahmadiyya Muslim Medical Association (AMMA). AMMA cooperates with the International Association of Ahmadi Architects and Engineers (IAAAE) to build hospitals and provide medical services and administration. IAAAE was founded in 1980 also by Mirza Nasir Ahmad the third khalifa.28 With this association, the welfare activities of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community have expanded beyond the educational and health sector to include agricultural programmes and rural development projects. The best-known project of the IAAAE is the model village project. These villages are also called “millennium villages” with reference to the Millennium Goals issued by the United Nations. The Ahmadis have taken up this idea and worked to ensure that these villages meet all the needs of the population: access to water, electricity, agriculture, health and education. These villages are set up where there is a kernel of an Ahmadi community with the hope that the socioeconomic infrastructure will attract people to Ahmadi Islam and strengthen a local community in a rural area to encourage young people to stay. 25 Centenaire du Khilafat Ahmadiyya, 307. Today, seven Ahmadi hospitals are integrated in the Ghanaian National Health Insurance Council. 26 “Welcome to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission Hospital Asokore-Ashanti,” published by the Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission Ghana 2014, 5. 27 http://amma-uk.org/about-us/history, http://ammac.org/nusrat-jahan-program/. 28 http://iaaae.org/about-us/.

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These Ahmadi institutions, which are active in the field of social welfare, were joined in 1995 by the NGO Humanity First devoted exclusively to humanitarian aims and disaster relief and whose activities benefit the entire population of a country and are explicitly not associated with proselytising. Humanity First was founded by the fourth khalifa, Mirza Tahir Ahmad, rooted in the idea that an organisation that does not place its religious affiliation in the foreground might give an opportunity to all “noble souls”, regardless of their religious affinity, to devote themselves to a “noble task” without being eventually discouraged by the Muslim identity of the NGO.29 In contrast to the two above-mentioned associations, AMMA and IAAAE, the connection to the Ahmadiyya cannot be established by the very name of Humanity First, which is also intended to facilitate the cooperation with non-Ahmadis. However, nearly all the members and managers of Humanity First are Ahmadis. For special actions, non-Ahmadis are included; for example, non-Ahmadi doctors are invited to participate in surgery. Most of the donations for Humanity First come from members of the Ahmadiyya community, as zakat or sadaqa donations. Ahmadis can settle their annual zakat donation via Humanity First “online payment”, thus contributing to the spread of Islam through its contribution to Humanity First. On the website of the German Humanity First group, the members can donate alms which have to be paid during E ­ id-ul-Adha.30 Religious practices such as Islamic sacrifices and alms are translated into a humanitarian narrative. In the modern context of an NGO, the obligatory almsgiving becomes the source of communal and collective improvement not only for Muslims in need but for all the needy. Humanity First provides humanitarian aid to those affected by natural disasters and undertakes emergency relief operations around the world providing medical assistance, shelter, water, food, clothing and sanitation to affected populations. Humanity First is a consultative body with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and collaborates with the World Health Organization (WHO), Welthungerhilfe, Diakonie, Oxfam and other secular or confessional NGOs.31 The most active national Humanity First groups have

29 Interview

Härter, 2014. 70 days after the end of Ramadan, Muslims celebrate the Eid-ul Adha to commemorate Abraham’s obedience to God by his assent to sacrificing his son. 31 http://www.humanityfirst.de/uber-uns/zusammenarbeit. 30 Approximately

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made the choice to hire skilled workers and to use a part of their funding to reward these employees financially in view of increasing efficiency. The historical overview on social welfare activities of the Ahmadiyya movement has shown that charity and social welfare services have coexisted since the beginning of the Ahmadiyya movement in British India, and that the global reach of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community has expanded in postcolonial times, since the 1970s, with new initiatives, associations and NGOs in line with global, secular and professional development trends implementing financial strategies, hiring specialised workers and marketing. According to the self-understanding of the members and the leadership of the Ahmadiyya movement, missionary activities are separated from humanitarian activities. In fact, I have never observed that, during or after medical work, religious literature was handed out or was preached. In Ahmadi schools, a large number of non-Ahmadi teachers provide the nationally specified public curricula to pupils of different religious origins. Religious instruction is restricted to the mosque and the different sub-organisations of the Ahmadiyya. Ahmadis, like many other Muslim or Christian volunteers working in the health sector, strongly reject the connection of religious goals with service to the patients. This does not mean that there can be no overlaps in daily practice. Even in organisations where managers and volunteers speak out against active proselytism, it is undisputed that medical success and conversion are closely linked. This is implied in some speeches or writings of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community. In Dr. Mehmood Ahmed Butt’s brochure on the history of AsokoreAshanti Mission Hospital, he writes: The effort of the Movement has not only provided educational and medical services in remote regions, which were completely devoid of any such facility, but, more importantly, the close contact of Ahmadi doctors and other workers with the local population has forged strong bonds of international brotherhood.32

Conversions to Ahmadi Islam are, according to this understanding, an inevitable by-product of the members’ exemplary peaceful life and their commitment to humankind, according to the slogan “love for all, hate

32 Mehmood

Ahmed Butt, Welcome to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission Hospital, AsokoreAshanti (Ghana, 2014), 5.

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for none”. Speaking at the International Congress of Humanity First in 2015, the fifth Khalifa expressed this as follows: Through your activities in Humanity First you will also engage with non-Ahmadis and draw them to serving humanity. In this way you will be bringing others towards Allah and enabling them to also become recipients of God’s blessings. Thus, you should always maintain the highest standards of conduct and sincerity and be a positive example for others to follow.33

Social Welfare of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community and Islamic NGOs in Burkina Faso Following this historical overview of the evolution of social welfare activities of the Ahmadiyya movement with its increasing professionalisation and cooperation with secular development agencies, I shall now use the example of Burkina Faso to investigate how these efforts culminate today in interaction with other welfare organisations, especially Islamic NGOs, and with the national government. Humanity First is not the only Muslim NGO in Burkina Faso. Local Islamic associations especially among the Sufi brotherhood of Tijaniyya Hamawiyya and among the Salafis of the Mouvement Sunnite with their specific social welfare activities have been present in Burkina since the 1970s.34 Other Christian and Muslim/Christian mixed NGOs emerged in the 1970s in an attempt to respond to the dramatic droughts in the Sahel. In this context did also emerge a possibly unique type of NGO gathering together Muslim and Christian activists against the drought. The UFC, i.e. “Union Fraternelle des Croyants”, is nowadays presented as the pioneer of a fruitful

33 Keynote address at the International Conference of Humanity First in the Baitul Futuh Mosque (UK), 2015. 34 For an overview of confessional NGOs (Muslim, Catholic and Evangelical) in Ouagadougou, see Marie Nathalie LeBlanc, Louis Audet-Gosselin, Muriel Gomez-Perez, “Les ONG confessionnelles en Afrique de l’Ouest: un équilibre précaire entre prosélytisme et professionnalisme au Burkina Faso,” Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d’études du développement 34, no. 2 (2013): 236–256; Marie Nathalie LeBlanc and Louis Audet Gosselin, eds., Faith and Charity. Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2016).

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Muslim/Christian interreligious dialogue in the field of development.35 National Islamic NGOs were mainly created between 2000 and 2010.36 Transnational Muslim NGOs supported mainly by the Gulf countries came to Burkina Faso as early as in the second half of the 1980s and in the 1990s.37 While individual local NGOs successfully collaborate with international NGOs and overcome doctrinal or theological differences in order to fund joint projects, there is no Islamic umbrella organisation that could coordinate all activities of Islamic NGOs in the respective areas of education, health or rural development. In Burkina, Islamic NGOs did not seek to structure their activities under an umbrella organisation.38 There is still no structure that unites all Islamic NGOs working in the health sector, unlike in the case of the Catholics.39 There have been attempts by the Ministry of Health to bring together all NGOs that maintain health facilities, but they failed because the NGOs funded by Kuwait did not want to cooperate with the NGOs related to Tijaniyya or because the Turkish-funded health centres did not want to be associated 35 Koubdi Kaboré, “Les relations interreligieuses institutionnalisées au Burkina Faso: le cas de l’Union Fraternelle des Croyants dans le Sahel, 1960–2006,” PhD thesis, Department of History, University of Ouagadougou, 2016; Koudbi Kaboré, “Mouvement interreligieux et usages d’Internet au Burkina Faso. Le cas de l’Union fraternelle des croyants (UFC) de Dori,” Emulations 24 (2017): 23–35. 36 LeBlanc and Gosselin, Faith and Charity, 32. Fondation de solidarité et d’aide au peuple africain (FOSAPA) recognised as NGO in 2008; Fondation Abdallah Ben Massoud (Al Houda) created in 2003 by the founder El Hadj Issouf Kanzoé; Fondation Cheikh Aorèma created in 2003, the exception is At-Tarbiya Al-Islamiyya created in 1995 which evolved into the Foundation Sheik Aorèma in 2003. 37 Mara Vitale, “From Local to Transnational Challenges: Religious Leaders and Muslim NGOs in Burkina Faso,” in Faith and Charity. Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa, eds. Marie Natalie LeBlanc and Louis Audeet Gosselin (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 144–160. African Muslim Agency (AMA, later Direct Aid) 1985, International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO) 1995, Humanity First 1986, World Islamic Call Society (WICS) 1990 based in Libya, International Islamic Charity Organisation (IICO) 1990, Muslim World League (MWL), Qatar Charity. 38 Similar situations can be found in many African countries, for Ivory Coast, Senegal, see Savadogo et al. in: LeBlanc and Gosselin, Faith and Charity, 36; for Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, see David E. Skinner, “Da’wa and Politics in West Africa: Muslim Jama’at and Non-Governmental Organisations in Ghana, Sierra Leone and The Gambia,” in Development and Politics from Below: Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State, eds. Barbara Bompani and Maria Frahm-Arp (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 99–130. 39 In 1992, all the private Catholic health facilities gathered in an association called ASPC, Association des Structures Sanitaires Privées Catholiques.

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with the Ahmadiyya institutions.40 The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community is perceived by other religious NGOs as “Pakistan financed”. The government’s attempt to register all NGOs and to coordinate their actions through the NGOs Monitoring Bureau (BSONG, Bureau des suivis des ONG) and in cooperation with the Spong, Permanent Secretariat of the Non-Governmental Organisation, has only limited success, as not all NGOs are registered there.41 Every Islamic NGO is working independently, even though they all are engaged in very similar projects: financing schools, orphanages, healthcare centers, sewing courses, constructing wells and funding cataract operations. In Burkina, today at least 20 Islamic NGOs, 40 Christian NGOs and 1 mixed NGO are operating, along with more than 300 non-religious NGOs.42 As a consequence, there can exist a strong competition between different NGOs as they try to gain funding from and legitimacy within the state and international structures. In order to counterbalance the lack of cooperation between Muslim NGOs, the state has actively supported the efforts of the Muslim associations to form an alliance, in the hope of identifying a unique interlocutor to facilitate communication. In Burkina Faso, most Muslims belong to a Sufi brotherhood, for example the Tijaniyya or the smaller Qadiriyya. But a broad spectrum of religious ideas and practices can be found within these traditional Sufi brotherhoods.43 Mara Vitale describes the wide-ranging forms assumed by the most recent movements that have emerged from the Sufi brotherhoods in Burkina and the difficulties posed by the attempt to identify clear dividing lines between them.44

40 Interview with the Director of the Private Department of the Ministry of Health, February 2010. 41 The BSONG is a national agency created in 1984; this agency was renamed Direction du Partenariat avec les ONG (DP-ONG) and attached to the Ministry of Economy and Finance in 2015. The SPONG (Secrétariat Permanent des Organisations Non Gouvernementales) is a national platform, bringing together all the NGOs and development associations working in Burkina Faso, created in 1975 by the NGOs themselves. 42 My own data collection, data from LeBlanc and Gosselin, eds., Faith and Charity, Vitale, “From local to transnational challenges”, SPONG and from the Direction générale de la cooperation (DGCOOP) but the data is likely not to be exhaustive and is evolving rapidly. 43 For example, the Tijaniyya, which has most followers in Burkina, is subdivided into the direction of the “12 pearls” and the “11 pearls”, also known as Hamadiyya. 44 Mara Vitale, “Trajectoires d’évolution de l’islam au Burkina Faso,” Cahiers d’études africaines 206–207 (2012): 367–388.

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Besides, there are reformist currents to which also the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community belongs with very ­wide-ranging orientations such as Wahhabis,45 Ansar Dine and the two major associations of Francophone Muslim intellectuals, the AEEMB and Cerfi.46 As cogently evidenced by Maud Saint-Lary, most Burkinabé Muslims position themselves outside these clear lines of division. If asked, they will consider themselves “simply Muslim”.47 This simplified outline of the manifold forms of Islam in Burkina is intended to make it clear that bringing together these various Muslim organisations in a federation was difficult. The concern for representation vis-à-vis the state led some one hundred Muslim associations to gather in the Federation of Islamic Associations of Burkina Faso (FAIB). But since its foundation in 2005, and until 2015, it was hardly operational and thus reflected both the internal ideological divisions within the Muslim community and a generational conflict.48 The process of establishing an Islamic umbrella organisation has been a time-consuming effort stretching over several years. After 10 years of existence, the FAIB managed to organise its first ordinary congress under the chairmanship of the Minister of Territorial Administration of Decentralization and Security (A. D. Barry) opting for the temporary solution of a rotating presidency between the different groups. However, it has not yet been possible to integrate the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community into such a federal structure. This is due to the outsider status of Ahmadiyya in the umma.49 Although Ahmadis are not persecuted in Burkina Faso, 45 In

Burkina Faso, the designation of “Wahhâbi” referred to the followers of the Sunni Movement of Burkina Faso (MSBF). 46 For more details on the pluralistic Islamic landscape of Burkina Faso, see  Alice Degorce, Ludovic Kibora and Katrin Langewiesche, eds., Rencontres religieuses et dynamiques sociales au Burkina Faso (Dakar, Amalion Publishing, 2019). 47 Maud Saint-Lary, “Du wahhabisme aux réformismes génériques. Renouveau islamique et brouillage des identités à Ouagadougou,” Cahiers d’études africaines 206–207 (2012): 449–470. 48 Adrienne Vanvyve, “L’islam burkinabé sous la IVe République,” Cahiers d’études africaines 219 (2015): 489–508. 49 There are several reasons accounting for this. The main reason is that the Ahmadis believe their founder not only is a reformer of Islam but is the promised Messiah and Imam Mahdi. No-Ahmadi Muslim sees this belief as a contradiction to the dogma that Mohammed is the “Seal of the Prophet”. Beside the interpretation of the prophet’s doctrine, the Ahmadiyya differs from other Muslims mainly in the interpretation of the Jihad concept and the Jesus doctrine. For a detailed analysis of the reasons why Ahmadiyya is perceived as a heterodox movement, see Lathan, “The Relativity of Categorizing”.

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nor in other West African countries, isolated outbursts of anti-Ahmadi campaigns may occur. Their extent depends mainly on the influence of anti-Ahmadi organisations in each country. In Burkina Faso, individual Muslims are well aware of the outsider position of the Ahmadiyya, but many do not consider it crucial. While cooperation with other Muslim Groups or Islamic NGOs in Burkina Faso is challenging for the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, it clearly expresses its willingness to cooperate with the state. The Burkinabe Ministry of Health has since 2002 integrated private and confessional healthcare centres into the national healthcare scheme.50 One of the fundamental problems of cooperation between denominational healthcare institutions and government agencies is, as already mentioned, the lack of interlocutors on the side of religious institutions. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community eludes this deficiency by offering the government an easily accessible partner through its hierarchical organisation.51 The problems of organisation of social welfare activities facing the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community and other Islamic movements in Burkina Faso result from an inefficient organisation among Islamic associations, a failure of national coordination due to competing programmes of Islamic groups and inadequate government oversight of these programmes, and external competition between many Islamic NGOs that pursue diverging aims.

Politics of Humanitarianism The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community attaches great importance to cooperation with the national authorities, as well as to the fact that local newspapers report about it. In each Jama’ at, there is a public relations manager who organises meetings with the local press and TV channels and ensures that high-ranking officials attend the opening ceremonies.

50 The multiplication of religious actors within the Burkinabe health system has been a major development, especially since the 1990s. Not only denominational health centres increased from that period onwards, but also private commercial healthcare services, see Langewiesche, “Konfessionell, national, global”. 51 The medical camps of Humanity First, the Ahmadi hospital in Ouagadougou and the operation caravans of the Ahmadiyya are all aligned with the national priorities and integrated into the health scheme. This does not rule out criticism of their medical work (Interview February 2010, see also the local journal: Reporter 5 April 2017).

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The various humanitarian activities of the Ahmadiyya are usually organised with a distinct public relation angle. The relations with the local political and economic elite are carefully maintained in each country. This is also reflected in the iconographic self-representation of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community. The khalifa is often portrayed as a statesman with no national territory. The photographs show him in company of presidents, prime ministers, heads of state, queens, ambassadors or lawmakers. In African countries, the visitor will generally find a photograph of the khalifa with the national president showcased in the Amir’s office.52 Being recognised by the state is crucial for the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in order to assert themselves in the face of the Muslim majority and gain legitimacy. By building schools and complying with the state schools’ curriculum, by integrating their healthcare centers into the national scheme, Humanity First is one of the transnational Islamic NGOs that align their activities with public policy. The recognition by the state of Humanity First and of the Ahmadiyya’s social welfare services is one of the tools that allow the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community to stand up for themselves in front of the Muslim community of Burkina Faso. Like the education system, the health system is an instrument of socialisation, through which the model of a modern citizen is disseminated in Africa, and it contributes to the integration into a global order and into international models of development. The Ahmadiyya uses these circumstances to portray itself as a modern religious actor who combines religion and progress by offering high-level education, ­state-of-the-art health care and technical innovations for rural development. Another factor, besides the humanitarian commitment, meant to publicise a positive image of the movement in the public space, is interreligious dialogue. The Ahmadiyya is very active in this area which is highly valued, especially in this time of terror threat. Interreligious dialogue— that is to say the meeting of leaders of different religions at conferences or religious ceremonies, the knowledge of the doctrines of all believers and sometimes joint actions in socially relevant areas—is seen by public policymakers as one of the possibilities to combat religious conflicts. 52 Katrin Langewiesche, “Le calife et son portrait. L’iconographie d’un Islam missionnaire. Le cas de l’Ahmadiyya,” in Matérialités religieuses. Aux frontières du public et du privé, eds. Ba Mame-Penda, ­ Saint-Lary Maud and Samson Fabienne (Dakar: édition Codesria, forthcoming 2020).

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Preventive actions of increased cooperation and of the struggle against radicalism on an interreligious basis have been advocated in order to restrain the contemporary seeds of conflict in Burkina Faso and prevent them from growing into full-scale religious-social divisions.53 Thus, the Ahmadiyya is perceived by the state and international agencies to be an Islamic current which actively seeks peaceful relations with other religions, and this seems to guarantee the success of development actions. Interfaith cooperation should enable religious actors to influence the civil society in ways that ensure peaceful coexistence as a precondition for enhancing socioeconomic development. In this sense, the Ahmadiyya radio in Dori (in the northern part of Burkina Faso) participated in an USAID-funded project to prevent “radicalisation” of the youth by organising broadcasts on community radios.54 The tendency observed by Olsson for Tanzania that “the external promotion of interfaith activities, and the financial support this has generated, is linked to the increased focus on the role of religion in development among international agencies”,55 can also be extended to Burkina Faso. Many authors confirm the increasing trend of integrating religious actors into development aid programmes.56 Religious actors engage in the interreligious dialogue in order to improve social ties, but also to win the international bodies’ and donors’ favours who recognise interreligious dialogue as “religiously correct”.57 Through the promotion and financial support that the emphasis on interreligious dialogue has 53 Crisis Group, Nord du Burkina Faso: ce que cache le jihad. Rapport Afrique No. 254, 12 octobre 2017, 22; USAID PDEV II Peace Trough Development II, Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger (March 2018); EU Project (2015–2019) Neighbours South, Projet pilote pour la lutte contre la radicalisation et l’extrémisme violent dans la région du Sahel-Maghreb and the STRIVE project (2016). 54 PEDV II. 55 Hans Olsson, The Politics of Interfaith Institutions in Contemporary Tanzania (Uppsala: Swedish Science Press, 2011), 10. 56 Katherine Marshall and Lucy Keough, Mind, Heart, and Soul in the Fight Against Poverty (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004); Stephen Ellis and Gerrie Ter Haar, “The Role of Religion in Development: Towards a New Relationship Between European Union and Africa,” European Journal of Development Research 18, no. 3 (2006): 351–367; Gilles Carbonnier, “Religion et développement: reconsidérer la laïcité comme norme,” International Development Policy 4 (2013): 7–12. 57 Anne-Sophie Lamine, La cohabitation des dieux. Pluralité religieuse et laïcité (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004).

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generated, a kind of “interreligious business” has emerged.58 An example for this tendency of benefiting from the interfaith commerce in Burkina Faso is the association URCB, Union des religieux et coutumiers du Burkina, originally created to engage religious and customary leaders in the fight against HIV.59 However, interreligious dialogue has been a tradition in the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community since Ghulam Ahmad established the “Day of Religious Founders” at the beginning of the twentieth century, to which representatives of various religions were invited to give lectures on their faith.60 In most cases, these meetings are mere exchanges about differences and commonalities between religions, as well as the recognition of a necessary tolerance. The Ahmadis express respect for other faiths, recognise all religions as valid and at the same time proclaim exclusivity to the truth in the belief that they alone are the genuine Islam. According to the understanding of the Ahmadiyya, Islam assumes that all religions have a divine origin and are therefore true in essence. Ghulam Ahmad founded the Ahmadiyya movement in faith to act according to the divine order so that all religions may be united under the banner of Islam, which should be fulfilled within 300 years. The Ahmadiyya sees itself as the movement that can unite all religions. Participants in interreligious discourse interpret these ideas partly as authoritarian and possessive, partly as tolerant and open. In Burkina Faso, the local Jama’at organises at least one interfaith meeting each year, sometimes linked to a conference on “the dignity of women”. In so doing, the Ahmadiyya movement combines two important aspects to gain the state’s recognition and international support: interreligious dialogue and empowerment of women.61 But usually only Catholic, evangelical guests, sometimes also Jews visiting the region, and

58 Olsson,

The Politics of Interfaith Institutions, 13. Langewiesche, “Le dialogue interreligieux au service du développement. Elites religieuses et santé publique au Burkina Faso,” Bulletin de l’APAD 33 (2011): 91–119. 60 Khola Maryam Hübsch, “Ahmadiyya in Deutschland,” in Handbuch Christentum und Islam in Deutschland. Grundlagen, Erfahrungen und Perspektiven des Zusammenlebens, eds. Mathias Rohe, Mouhanad Khorchide, Havva Engin, Ömer Özosy and Hansjörg Schmid (Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 2014): 179. 61 On a detailed discussion of ‘women in development’ and ‘gender and development’ approaches, see Emma Tomalin, Religions and Development (London: Routledge, 2013), chapter 6. 59 Katrin

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representatives of the City Council or other public authorities, as well as customary chiefs, respond to the invitation. Representatives of the different Muslim movements turn down the invitation consistently. This situation can be observed in all countries. It is not related to the configuration of Burkina Faso but to the outsider situation of the Ahmadiyya in the global Muslim community. However, the experiences in Burkina Faso have prompted the local community to extend invitations to interreligious meetings, no longer on behalf of the Ahmadi Muslim Community, but on behalf of local authorities. Meetings are held in municipal offices to encourage all Muslim movements to participate without reserve. Similarly, the Ahmadiyya reaches out to a wider community of Muslims through its radio broadcasts where people can intervene anonymously and without physical presence on selected subjects such as citizenship or peaceful cohabitation. As a result, even those can be reached who otherwise would not have taken part in an Ahmadiyya event in order not to compromise themselves with the other Muslim groups. Engagement in interreligious exchanges allows for a better social recognition and enhances the positive image of the group, which is particularly important for minority communities such as the Ahmadiyya, being not recognised by the umma. The capacity for collaboration between religious communities turns into evidence of citizenship. Through its commitment to interreligious dialogue, empowerment of women by education and humanitarianism, and through its centralised structure, the Ahmadiyya becomes a privileged interlocutor of the state62 and of certain Western NGOs. While the Ahmadiyya, in the context of the global war on terror, is portrayed as the “good” Islamic movement following liberal democratic principles, it embodies the “evil” heretics in the Muslim community. Recognition by the state allows the Ahmadiyya to claim its rightful place within the umma. Although these claims are made to no avail, state recognition belies the accusations of heresy expressed by the Muslim majority against Ahmadiyya on a merely theological, not social, ground. The issues surrounding the recognition of the 62 The same logic can be observed in Germany where the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community has become the privileged interlocutor of the government thanks to its social commitment and its centralised organization to the detriment of other Muslim movements present in Germany. For a detailed analysis, see Ufuk Olgun, Islamische Religionsgemeinschaften als politische Akteure in Deutschland. Eine Analyse zur politischen Strategiefähigkeit (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2014).

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Ahmadiyya and, by extension, its NGO Humanity First show that charity and social welfare activities are not autonomous activities and account for their evolution in relation to the transformations of other fields of society. The participation in interreligious collaborations or humanitarian actions reveals some of the contemporary power struggles at play within Burkina’s civil society and the access of religious movements to resources but also in the wider context of the international Muslim community.

Conclusion The historical welfare activities of the Ahmadiyya, starting in 1889 in British India until the recent humanitarian and development activities in West Africa, are based on the doctrine of the movement combining the service to humankind and the logic of proselytism. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community illustrates that an Islamic missionary movement, whose emphasis is on mosque building and da’wa, can concurrently launch welfare activities and a humanitarian organisation such as Humanity First that separates mission from aid and that will focus on poverty alleviation, although both organisations are grounded in the same values and religious norms. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community has always been able to adapt its proselytism to the social and political priorities of the respective societies or, in other words, to analyse social concerns and incorporate them into its own agenda. During their first years in West Africa, these were primarily welfare activities, particularly in the area of education, later in development cooperation and in interreligious dialogue. While one can observe, in the Western liberal churches, a paradigm shift which focuses on humanitarian aid rather than converting people,63 as well as the tendency, as noted at the beginning, to NGO-isation of Islamic and Christian associations, these two areas—mission and development— continue to be pursued equally by the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community. Some associations or organisations founded by the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community are dedicated exclusively to humanitarian purposes (e.g. Humanity First, IAAAE), and others combine proselytising and philanthropic aims. Nevertheless, all sub-organisations of the Ahmadiyya are indirectly linked to the strong missionary urge of the movement. This also includes interreligious dialogue, as proposed by the Jama’at. This initiative 63 Kajsa Ahlstrand, “Toward a Paradigm Shift in Christian Mission,” in Theology and Religions: A Dialogue, ed. Viggo Mortensen (Cambridge: William E. Eerdmans, 2003), 164–170.

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constantly calls for tolerance, mutual knowledge and understanding, while insisting on being the holder of truth and the only true Islam. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community and its NGO or associations amalgamate charity and modern development, combining traditional channels of almsgiving and professionalism and modern techniques. Religious practices such as Islamic sacrifices and alms are translated into a humanitarian rationale and can be carried out, e.g. via “online payment” on the Humanity First’s website. In Burkina Faso, as in many other African countries, the social welfare activities of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community and their NGOs are integrated into a social context in which NGOs, secular or religious ones, are increasingly taking on more tasks that used to be the responsibility of the state. Due to various privatisation programmes, the role of the state as the most important provider of basic social welfare has increasingly been undermined. This has meant that many NGOs work in the same areas to overcome the weaknesses of state social work. Inevitably, they compete for recognition and financial support from the state and international donors. The government of Burkina Faso has repeatedly tried to coordinate the actions of the various Islamic NGOs according to their areas of intervention (education, health, etc.). So far, this has been met with little success. The NGO Humanity First, founded by Ahmadiyya, has the great upside compared to other Muslim NGOs of being part of a hierarchical organisation that can offer transparency, discipline and smooth communication with the government or international agencies. Unlike other Islamic NGOs, Humanity First is independent of cronyistic relations, which are often tied to the personalities of the leaders of international NGOs or founders of local Islamic NGOs. Humanity First and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community have done their utmost to become accepted partners in both the Burkinabe NGO scene and the cooperation with the government by proving their professionalism in the educational and healthcare domains, as well as their efficiency in disaster situations, e.g. during the flooding in Ouagadougou. All the ­Ahmadi-funded schools abide by the national curriculum and their healthcare centers are integrated into the national scheme. Definitely, Humanity First is one of the transnational Islamic NGOs that align their activities with public policy. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community and their NGO and associations show that an Islamic welfare system can exist alongside a Christian one in modern, secular states. Humanity First may well be described as much as a philanthropic enterprise engaged in poverty alleviation as an effort to disseminate an

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Islamic alternative to Christian charity and social welfare. This characteristic also applies to some of the other local or international NGOs working in Burkina. A special feature of the Ahmadiyya associations and NGO is that their humanitarian commitment as well as their advocacy for interreligious dialogue serves to draw attention to the isolated situation of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in the Muslim world and the global umma. Recognition by the state and by international agencies allows for the Ahmadiyya to claim its legitimate place within the umma. Although these claims have been made to no avail up to now, civil recognition belies the accusations of heresy expressed by the Muslim majority against Ahmadiyya on a merely theological, not social, ground. By their engagement for socially relevant matters, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community endeavours to convince all secular states not to yield to the pressure of some Islamic groups and to integrate their minority group explicitly as Muslims in decision-making processes and into the civil society. Acknowledgements   This research was generously funded by the Gerda Henkel Foundation. http://www.lisa.gerda-henkel-stiftung.de/ahmadiyya_bewegung. I am grateful to many people, but particularly to the family of Sameena Nasreen in Ghana, the Härter and Zubair families in Germany and the families of Dr. Bhunoo, Khalid Mahmood and Mahmood Nasir Saqib in Burkina Faso. I also greatly appreciated the welcome of the family of Farooq Ahmad in Benin. In France, I am very grateful to Shafiqa Ishtiaq and her family, to the family of Naseer Ahmed and to Astou Dramé, Munirah Doboory, Ameenah Nabeebaccus and Rokiah for the time that they devoted to me and for their kindness in answering to all my questions. I thank Adjara Konkobo, Denise Hien, Antonia and Valentia Pock for the transcriptions of the recorded interviews. Finally, I am particularly indebted to Mahamadi Ouédraogo for his invaluable assistance and active interest in my field research in Burkina Faso and Ghana.

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Discourses on Zakat and Its Implementation in Contemporary Ghana Holger Weiss

Introduction This chapter explores the recent discourses on zakat or mandatory/ obligatory alms as a tool for poverty alleviation among Muslim scholars in Ghana. This discourse started about two decades ago and is part of their vision for achieving political and economic empowerment of the Muslim population in Ghana. Muslims in Ghana constitute a minority; according to the 2010 census they make up about 18% of the total population of some 25 million. Although the country has been portrayed as a success in terms of political and economic development, this has been mainly affected the Christian-dominated, affluent and politically influential southern regions where two-third of the population are living.1 Muslim communities are predominant in the southern urban economically and socially marginalized so-called Zongo quarters as well as in the

1 World Bank, Ghana—Performance and Learning Review of the Country Partnership Strategy for the Period FY13-FY18 (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2016).

H. Weiss (*)  Department of History, Åbo Akademi University, Turku, Finland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 H. Weiss (ed.), Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38308-4_10

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northern urban and rural savanna regions.2 The “Muslim landscape” in contemporary Ghana constitutes of five major religious sub-spheres or religious sects: the Tijaniyya (Sufi), the Ahlus-Sunnah (Salafi), the Ahmadiyya, the Istiqaama (Ibadiyya) and the Shi’a community.3 The two first mentioned are by and large the most influential one and the reflections to be presented in this chapter are based on interviews with Tijani and Salafi scholars.4 Although Ghana’s economic growth has lifted it to the status of a lower middle-income country, its impact has not affected the lower strata of society and has not translated into productive and decent employment opportunities for a significant section of the population. Ghanaian government investments into social welfare and economic development 2 Holger Weiss, Begging and Almsgiving in Ghana: Muslim Positions Towards Poverty and Distress (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007). 3 Holger Weiss, Between Accommodation and Revivalism: Muslims, the State and Society in Ghana from the Precolonial to the Postcolonial Era (Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society, 2008); Yunus Dumbe, Islamic Revivalism in Contemporary Ghana (Huddinge: Södertörn University, 2013); Abdulai Iddrisu, Contesting Islam in Africa. Homegrown Wahhabism and Muslim Identity in Northern Ghana, 1920–2010 (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2013); Ousman Murzik Kobo, “Shifting Trajectories of Salafi/AhlSunna Reformism in Ghana,” Islamic Africa 6, no. 1–2 (2015): 60–81; K.A. Balogun and A.A. Abdussalam, “Arguments and ­ Counter-Arguments: A Critical Analysis of the Ahlus-Sunnah and Tijâniyyah Brotherhood Dispute in Ghana,” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention 4, no. 3 (2015): 1–11; Yunus Dumbe, “Islamic Polarisation and the Politics of Exclusion in Ghana: Tijaniyya and Salafist Struggles over Muslim Orthodoxy,” Islamic Africa 10 (2019): 153–180. On the Ahmadiyya, see further John H. Hanson, The Ahmadiyya in the Gold Coast: Muslim Cosmopolitans in the British Empire (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017); on the Istiqaama, see further Mahmud Mukhtar Muhammed and Umar Wahab Sina, “Faith in National Development: A Review of the Activities of the Istiqaama Muslim Organisation of Ghana.” Paper presented at 3rd International Conference on Religion and National Development 6th–7th September 2018, Department of Religious Studies, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST), Ghana; on the Shi’a, see further Dumbe, Islamic Revivalism, and Ousman Murzik Kobo, “Islamic Institutions of Higher learning in Ghana: The Case of the Islamic University College,” in Muslim Institutions of Higher Education in Postcolonial Africa, eds. Mbaye Lo and Muhammed Haron (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016): 179–191. 4 The author has conducted fieldwork in southern and northern Ghana since 2017. The research project Muslim Empowerment in Ghana (MEG) is funded by the Finnish Society for Sciences and Letters (2017–2018) and the Academy of Finland (2019–2021), and builds on the authors previous research project on zakat in Ghana, running from 1999 to 2006.

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projects have for decades been concentrated to the southern and ­politically dominant part of the country. Only in 2017, the government earmarked budgetary funds for deprived urban areas and established the Ministry of Inner Cities and Zongo Development. Not surprisingly, national and international civil philanthropy organizations have played an important role in supporting the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. According to United Nations Development Programme Sustainable Development Goals Philanthropy Platform, non-governmental foundations invested USD394.2 million to support various programmes under the Millennium Development Goals in Ghana during 2002–2012. Impressive as it is, the sum is a small proportion of Official Development Aid that the Ghanaian government received during the same period, namely USD3.6 billion.5 Muslim faith-based NGOs constitute a small fraction in the Ghanaian landscape of philanthropy. As elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, this landscape is changing and leaning towards an institutionalization of giving. While Christian faith-based NGOs have dominated the Ghanaian landscape of philanthropy since independence in 1957, institutionalized and vertical Muslim faith-based NGOs are a relatively recent phenomena and in general invisible for non-Muslims.6 Despite the success of some individual Muslims to gain economic and political influential positions in Ghanaian civil society, some of them have even emerged as Muslim High Net-Worth Individuals, the majority of the Muslim population in Ghana constitute an economically and politically marginalized minority.7 Traditionally, various forms of horizontal philanthropy constituted the basic form of support within the Muslim community. Zakat was a private matter, too: Informal, individual and person-to-person. At times, the

5 Enabling Environment of Philanthropy in Ghana (Accra: SDG Philanthropy Platform, United Nations Development Programme, 2017), 23. 6 Enabling Environment of Philanthropy in Ghana, 27–28; Emmanuel Kumi, “Diversify or Die? The Response of Ghanaian Non-Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs) to a Chaning Aid Landscape,” PhD thesis, University of Bath, 2017. 7 Weiss, Begging and Almsgiving in Ghana; David E. Skinner, “Da’wa and Politics in West Africa: Muslim Jama’at and Non-Governmental Organisations in Ghana, Sierra Leone and The Gambia,” in Development and Politics from Below: Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State, eds. Barbara Bompai and Maria Frahm-Arp (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 99–130.

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imam was consulted but no mosque or zakat funds existed.8 In addition, the sums that were doled out to beggars and poor people were usually small tokens, keeping the recipient alive for a day but hardly changed their life. Therefore, zakat was neither a tool for the eradication of poverty nor an instrument for the empowerment of Muslims and had never been so in twentieth-century Ghana. This, at least, was the conclusion most Muslim scholars made when I interviewed them on the issue about 15–20 years ago.9 Instead, what existed in terms of formal forms of vertical philanthropy directed towards the Muslim community in Ghana were various local, national and trans/international Muslim faith-based organizations. Stating from the early 1990s, Muslim faith-based NGOs such as the Islamic Council for Development and Humanitarian Services (ICODEHS, established in 1991) started to advocate “development”, “democracy” or even “individual rights”, goals and objectives, which they sometimes signal in their names. Many of them are actively attempting to gain access to funds from overseas, mostly from OIC member countries and international/transnational Muslim faith-based NGOs, for mosque, health clinics and school construction projects as well as educational activities.10 However, there were indications on a different discourse on zakat already during my previous research. The core idea of this discourse is the utilization of zakat for poverty eradication and the empowerment of the Muslim community by institutionalizing its collection and distribution.11 Several initiatives have been launched since then, resulting in vertical and institutionalized philanthropy operated by various national Muslim faithbased NGOs. In 2008, some Muslim leaders and organizations established the National Zakat House. Three years later, Muslim politicians and government officials opened the Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund of 8 Holger Weiss, “Reorganising Social Welfare Among Muslims—Islamic Voluntarism and Other Forms of Communal Support in Northern Ghana,” Journal of Religion in Africa 32, no. 1 (2002): 83–109. 9 Weiss, Begging and Almsgiving in Ghana. See also Emmanuel Kumi, “Aid reduction and NDGOs’ Quest for Sustainability in Ghana: Can Philanthropic Institutions Serve as Alternative Resource Mobilisation Routes?” Voluntas 30 (2019): 1443. 10 Weiss, Begging and Almsgiving in Ghana. 11 Rabiatu Ammah, “Islam and Poverty Reduction Strategies in the Ghanaian Muslim Community,” Ghana Bulletin of Theology 2 (2007): 3–20.

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Ghana. How are these initiatives functioning? What are their objectives and societal impacts? What are their links to transnational/international Muslim Faith-Based Organizations? Last, but not least, how should zakat funds be defined in a secular state—are they registered bodies, associations or non-governmental organizations or ­ non-registered, unofficial units run by local communities? Since 2017, I have been collecting information about these initiatives by conducting interviews with imams and scholars in Accra, Kumasi, Ejura and Tamale. In addition, I have consulted internet sources, such as homepages and Facebook accounts, as well as online and paper versions of newspapers.

Muslim Scholars and the Call to Eradicate Poverty In 2016, the National Imam of the Ahlus-Sunna Haji Umar Ibrahim Imam called on Muslims in Ghana to declare war on “the enemies to human development”, most notably hunger, ignorance, diseases, conflicts and wars. He further urged Muslim chiefs, imams and the wealthy to consider the establishment of educational and health facilities as remedies for battling ignorance and disease. Attacking traditional Muslim education, he identified modern secular education as the prime factor to overcome the marginalization of Muslims.12 In an interview one year later, he criticized the Ghanaian Muslim community to depending on economic assistance and investments from Arab governments and philanthropists and declared that “until we stand up to provide for ourselves, no foreigner can provide and build our community to the expected standard we desire”.13 Sheikh Amin Bamba, in turn, at the launching of a collaborative community development programme of the UNFPA and the Bamba Islamic Institute Ghana (BII-Ghana) in 2017, critically noted that the high rate of illiteracy was the main reason for blocking the empowerment of Muslims in Ghana. In his mind, “illiteracy has denied and continues 12 Alhassan M. Baidoo, “Muslims to Declare War on Their Enemies-Haj Umar of ASWAJ,” http://www.mytawheedonline.com/2016/05/11/muslims-to-declare-war-ontheir-enemies-haj-umar-of-aswaj-2/ (checked 16 November 2017). 13 Abdul-Rahim Naa Abdul-Lahie, “A Chat with Hajj Umar Ibrahim, National Imam of Ahlul Sunna Wal Jama’s (ASWAJ),” Today’s Muslim, 16 October 2017, http://thetodaysmuslim.com/discussions/a-chat-with-hajj-umar-ibrahim-national-imam-of-ahlul-sunna-wal-jamaa-aswaj/ (checked 20 May 2019).

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to deny majority of our people critical information that they require to make informed economic, social and political decisions to improve their livelihood and general wellbeing”, and urged Muslim leaders and organizations to cooperate with relevant government and n ­ on-governmental agencies for the development of Muslim communities and the promotion of the UN Sustainable Development Goals.14 Similar conclusions were reached by Anika Altaf in her Participatory Assessment of Development (PADEV) project of interventions by local and national Muslim faith-based NGOs in the Northern Region. Most of her informants mentioned only few Islamic interventions, the bulk of them being mosques and madrasas. Although the recipients generally regarded “Islamic aid”, i.e. coming from international or national Muslim faith-based NGOs and Muslim philanthropists, as more than welcomed, it was still criticized to be generally limited to fund religious activities. Nevertheless, Altaf identifies the lack of own funding to be the biggest constrain for local and national Muslim faith-based NGOs in the implementation of social and economic development projects. On the other hand, the capacity for generating funding in Ghana is minimal; the only organization being self-sufficient is the Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission. Interestingly, Altaf concludes her analysis by underlining the need for Ghanaian Muslim faith-based NGOs to start to explore ways to be either fully or partly self-sufficient, among others through an institutionalized collection of zakat.15 The need for a reorientation in the approach of the Muslim communities in Ghana towards poverty alleviation in accordance with the UN goals of sustainable development of the Agenda 2030 was further highlighted by the National Chief Imam at the 55th Session of the Commission on Civil Society at the United Nations in February 2017. In his speech, National Chief Imam Dr. Osman Nuhu Sharubutu made a plea for an Islamic perspective on eradicating poverty. Following a

14 Savannah News, “Illiteracy Is the Bane of Muslims’ Development—Sheikh Bamba,” 16 May 2017,  http://savannahnewsblogspotcom.blogspot.com/2017/05/illiteracy-is-bane-of-muslims.html (checked 19 May 2019); “UNFPA Partners Bamba Institute to Promote SDGs,” GhanaWeb, 16 May 2017, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/ UNFPA-partners-Bamba-Institute-to-promote-SDGs-538205 (checked 19 May 2019). 15 Anika Altaf, Perceptions and Reflections of Islamic Development Initiatives in Northern Ghana (Amsterdam: PADEV, 2010), http://dare.uva.nl (checked 2 November 2017).

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classical interpretation of the Third Pillar of Islam, the National Chief Imam underlined the imperative for Muslims to be charitable and to provide for the needy and concluded that zakat is the means for economic relief and poverty eradication. The Ghanaian government, he thankfully noted, had opened a new approach towards the economic and social development of underprivileged urban low-income settlements known as the Zongo communities by establishing the Ministry of Inner Cities and Zongo Development in 2017. However, he also stressed that “for poverty to be completely eradicated, a new approach must be adopted in consultation with the religious leaders and clergy”. In his mind, this new approach should strive to create employment and means of distributing national resources equitably for the benefit of all as well as to focus on the poor by creating a basket for their needs and wants and enable their vocational training. Most of all, Osman Nuhu Sharutubu stressed the need to develop new mechanisms of reaching out to the wealthy and resourced people in the Muslim community to do more in charity.16

Horizontal, Informal Philanthropy and the Traditional Discourse on Almsgiving The traditional discourse is articulated by imams in their sermons and preaches during the Friday prayers, highlighting and reminding Muslims of their moral obligation to pay zakat and to alleviate the sufferings of their poor neighbours. This discourse is rooted in the traditional interpretation of zakat as a collective obligation incumbent upon every Muslim. Although zakat is discussed in public in the mosques, the collection and distribution of zakat remain largely a private affair. The traditional way of collecting and distributing zakat in Ghana is conducted locally and is not institutionalized.17 Some wealthy Muslims give their 16 “National Chief Imam’s Speech at UNESCO,” http://www.tijjaniyamuslims.org/ news/?news_id=15893bbf73a9a4&pn=3 (checked 10 November 2017). The speech was read by the Personal Assistant to the National Chief Imam Alhaji Khuzaima Mohammed Osman. 17 Interview with Ashanti Regional Chief Imam Sheikh Abdul Mumin Haruna, Kumasi, 15 September 2018; written response to questionnaire; handed to Sheikh Abdul-Razaq, Nurul Islam, Kumasi, 16 September 2018; written answer, transcribed by Yunus Dumbe, 20 September 2018, received 21 September 2018; interview with Sheikh Abdurrahman, founder and president of Ansar Addeen, and Sheikh Abdallah, General Secretary of Ansar Addeen, Kumasi, 7 September 2019.

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alms to various recipients, others donate it to specific recipients such as widows, orphans or mosques. In general, zakat is donated in cash or in kind, including cloths and textiles, sandals, shoes and food items.18 In general, however, the mosques would not have a specific bayt al-mal or fund for zakat.19 The traditional discourse dominates during Ramadan (fasting month) when almsgiving and sharing is at the centre of the sermons and culminates during the Eid al-Fitr festival with the collection of zakat al-fitr and the donation of food items to poor and needy Muslims. While the sermons as well as the giving of charity and sharing of food with one’s poor and needy neighbour constitutes an integral part of the Muslim sphere, the articulation of the traditional discourse in public in the printed media, and more recently in the social media, too, is a relatively new phenomenon in Ghana. Starting during the 1990s when two Muslim religious festivals, Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha, where declared national public holidays, the newspapers started to publish articles on Islamic faith and everyday life of Muslims in Ghana. Newspapers and social media notify the beginning of the two Muslim religious festivals by publishing the season’s greetings of the state authorities to the Muslim community.20 Traditional community-centred and privately given zakat cannot be enforced or controlled by the imams or the mosque community and therefore lacks an institutional framework or organization. Most mosques and communities do not collect zakat at all and most of the affluent Muslims and businessmen do not give their zakat to the imams. The main reason for this is due to lack of trust and ignorance, many scholars critically commented to me.21 “You need to give one thousand cedis to a poor, not five or twenty”, Mallam Aminu Bamba critically 18 Interview with Muhammed Al-Mahaman, HOD Arabic and Islamic Studies of Al-Faruq College of Education, Wenchi, Brong Ahafo, and advisor at Sakafiya mosque, Kumasi, 15 September 2019. 19 Interview with Sheikh Abdulsalam Ahmed, Regional Chief Imam Northern Region, Tamale, 10 April 2019; interview with Sheikh Dr. Tamim, General Secretary of the Anbariya Sunni Community, Tamale, 9 April 2019. 20 Weiss, Between Accommodation and Revivalism. 21 Interview with Mallam Aminu Bamba, Ejura, 4 April 2019; interview with Sheikh Abdurrahman, founder and president of Ansar Addeen, and Sheikh Abdallah, General Secretary of Ansar Addeen, Kumasi, 7 April 2019; interview with Sheikh Issah, Islamic Education Unit Manager, Tamale, 9 April 2019.

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commented the habit of doling out small sums as alms to beggars and needy persons after the Friday prayers.22 Other scholars, such as Sheikh Saeed Abubakar Zakaria, even claim that such piecemeal distribution of the alms is not zakat at all and cannot be regarded as fulfilment of zakat.23 Although zakat is mandatory, neither the imams not the mosque communities have any means at their disposal to enforce its collection.24 Also, it is upon the giver to decide upon the amount to be given as zakat and weather it is paid in cash or in kind. Local scholars and imams, in their turn, remind their community members of the nisab (threshold) of 2.5% of wealth accumulated during one year as the part to be paid as zakat.25 Until recent decades, the stipulation of the annual nisab was done locally by the individual imams which resulted in conflicts among scholars of the minimum amount to be paid. Consequently, there existed a wide variation of local patterns and ways of handling the collection of zakat in the Muslim communities throughout Ghana and, in most case, it remained a private rather than a public affair and little, if anything, is known about its impact.26 The core argument of the traditionalist discourse on zakat highlights the private act of pious Muslims. Wealthy Muslims might consult an imam for the calculating the nisab or identifying needy recipients of their alms but would rarely channel their zakat via the imams or mosques. Instead, they prefer to distribute their alms—zakat as well as sadaqa—directly to individual poor persons. This private distribution of alms usually takes places after the Friday prayers and takes the form of smaller sums distributed directly to specially targeted individuals as a kind of patron-client relationship or as tokens haphazardly given to any beggar in the street. However, the giving of zakat as a private pious is a 22 Interview

with Mallam Aminu Bamba, Ejura, 4 April 2019. with Sheikh Saeed Abubakar Zakaria, head of the Anbariya Sunni Community, Tamale, 9 April 2019. 24 Interview with Sheikh Dr. Ismail Saeed Adam, Regional Chief Imam of ASWAJ Ashanti Region, Kumasi, 5 April 2019. 25 Interview with Sheikh Abdul Wadud, Zameen (President) of the Tijjaniya Muslims Movement of Ghana, Kumasi, 5 April 2019; interview with Sheikh Abdurrahman, founder and president of Ansar Addeen, and Sheikh Abdallah, General Secretary of Ansar Addeen, Kumasi, 7 April 2019. 26 Interview with Sheikh Abdurrahman, founder and president of Ansar Addeen, and Sheikh Abdallah, General Secretary of Ansar Addeen, Kumasi, 7 April 2019. 23 Interview

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double-edged sword. Although the recipient might receive just enough money survive for one day, the sums thus received make no impact on the life of a poor person and are insufficient to raise him or her up from poverty. Even worse, private Muslim charity has generated a negative public image in Ghana as begging and private almsgiving is largely connected with the Muslim community.27

Towards Vertical Philanthropy: The Instrumentalist Discourse The second discourse has its roots in the critical reflections of Muslim scholars on the semiprivate/public communal way of collecting and distributing zakat. Both the imams and the scholars identify poverty as the main cause for the marginalization of Muslims in Ghana. In contrast to the traditional discourse on zakat which highlights the moral obligation to alleviate the sufferings of the poor and needy, the instrumentalist discourse highlights the potentials of zakat as an Islamic instrument for poverty alleviation. This discourse started to take root in Ghana about two decades ago. In October 2004, the Dawah Academy organized the two-day seminar on the role of Islam in poverty reduction and wealth creation in Tamale which, perhaps, was among the first attempts to articulate a change in the collection and distribution of zakat. The novelty of that seminar was its focus on the idea to raise funds for community development through the regular payment of zakat.28 Fifteen years later, the discussions on the payment of zakat are not only conducted among Muslim scholars and highlighted by imams in their sermons during Ramadan but are also addressed by Muslim commentators on social media. For example, in February 2019, the internet platform Zongo Republic asked its Muslim readers whether they had paid their zakat on value-added wealth and sarcastically declared: “Menzgold customers, have you paid your zakat?”29

27 Weiss,

Begging and Almsgiving. “Muslims Attends Seminar on Zakāt,” http://ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/ regional/artikel.php?ID=67225 (checked 16 November 2012). 29 “So, Did Muslim Menzgold Customers Pay Zakat?,” Zongo Republic, 22 February 2019, https://zongorepublic.com/so-did-muslim-menzgold-customers-pay-zakat/ (checked 23 April 2019). 28 GNA,

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The instrumentalist discourse is fuelled both by indigenous and by foreign participants. In 2012, the online-platform Modern Ghana published the Ramadan message by the Nigerian author and journalist Muhammad Ajah. Although his text addressed Muslims in Nigeria, his call to establish “a mini Baitul-Zakah’s to regulate the zakat or donations from local and international donors” raises the question, if his idea also could inspire discussion in Ghana.30 In 2013, Haji Adams Goldwater raised a similar plea in his Ramadan message in Tamale and called for the transformation of the mosques from being space for ritual worship to institution for social reforms, education and wealth creation. His core urge was the establishment of an “Education Endowment/Zakat Fund” to gather resources to support brilliant but needy students as well as a “Business Development Fund” to aid persons with achievable business plans to set up enterprises that can be avenues of employment for the youth.31 However, he did not specify if he envisioned the establishment of one national or several regional funds. Haji Adams Goldwater’s plea was one among several of Muslim scholars to invest in education projects for Muslim youths. Already in 2004 had Yusif Adam Nanyama, Executive Director of the Centre for Islamic Development and Propagation (CIDA), appealed to Islamic NGOs to channel 70% of their resources into the development of the education of Muslim students.32 Initially, however, there was no obvious link between the instrumentalist discourse on zakat and the calls for investing in Muslim education projects although the vision of investing zakat in promoting modern education for Muslim children was already articulated at the 2004 meeting of the Dawah Academy in Tamale. However, before these visions materialized in the institutionalization of zakat in the early 2010s, National Chief Imam Sheikh Dr. Osman Nuhu Sharubutu opened a new chapter in the discourse on empowerment of Muslims 30 Muhammad Ajah, “Ramadan: A Muslim’s Month of Vigilance and Plans for Future by Muhammad Ajah,” Modern Ghana, 17 April 2012, https://www.modernghana.com/ news/406360/ramadan-a-muslims-month-of-vigilance-and-plans-for-future.html, see also http://www.newsghana.com.gh/ramadan-a-muslims-month-of-vigilance-and-plans-for-future-by-muhammad-ajah (checked 21 February 2019). 31 Adams Goldwater, “Ramadan in Tamale,” 9 July 2013, https://www.ghanaweb.com/ GhanaHomePage/features/Ramadan-In-Tamale-278977 (checked 25 February 2019). 32 “Invest in Secular Education—Islamic NGOs Told,” Modern Ghana 9 November 2004, https://www.modernghana.com/news/66283/invest-in-secular-education-islamicngos-told.html (checked 25 February 2019).

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in Ghana by launching his education trust, the Dr. Sheikh Osman Nuhu Sharubutu Education (SONSETFUND), in 2009. The Fund is a registered non-governmental organization and is led by a ­thirteen-member executive council with a four members secretariat located at the National Chief Imam’s residence in Fadama, Accra. The chairman of SONSETFUND is the Muslim philanthropist Sheikh Mustapha Ibrahim whereas Alhaji Khuzaima Mohammed Osman serves as General Secretary. SONSETFUND is not a zakat institution although it direct its calls for support and donations to Muslims in Ghana. However, the sources of its funding are not known apart from that the Fund has received donations and financial support from some Ghanaian business enterprises and national Muslim organizations as well as international donor agencies, such as the Turkish International Development Corporation (TIKA).33 A few years later, a similar initiative was launched by the Coalition of Muslim Organisations—Ghana (COMOG). In 2013, the organization organized in collaboration with the Turkish NGO Human Associations International (HUDAI) a one day’s Ramadan Iftar Forum. HUDAI had a few years earlier started its operations in Ghana and had awarded over 100 scholarships to Ghanaian students of science and technology to study in Turkey. As a result, COMOG agreed to establish a National Muslim Education Trust in collaboration with other major Muslim groupings in the country. In its initial phase, the source for funding of the project would be through voluntary donations.34 Nevertheless, COMOG’s Education Trust never took off. Donations were scarce and soon the project was shelved. Instead, a new education project, the Baraka Initiative, was launched by some younger members of COMOG in 2017 and gathered funding through donations from the Lebanese community in Accra.35

33 Interview with Alhaji Khuzaima Mohammed Osman, General Secretary of SONSETFUND, 6 December 2017. A list of donors and contributors to SONSETFUND was published on the old homepage in 2012 and listed 37 organizations and individuals (9 March 2012, http://sonsetfund.org/newsevents?news_id=14f5bfcc2ee739, checked 16 November 2012); however, this information is not available on the new homepage. 34 “Muslim Coalition Initiate Establishment of Education Fund,” GNA, 31 July 2013, http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201307/110459.php (checked 12 March 2014). 35 Interview with Haji Mumuni Sulemana, 12 September 2018.

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The Institutionalist Discourse: Zakat and Vertical Philanthropy The traditional and the instrumental discourse on zakat in Ghana has hitherto only in general terms addressed the reorganization of the collection and distribution of zakat in Ghana. The basic argument highlighted in these discourses is the claim that most Muslims are poor and prefer to pay zakat in the traditional way. Also, there is a hidden, sometimes even outspoken critique about the way zakat is doled out—seemingly haphazard and without a clear objective to change the life of the poor and needy. Muslim scholars are frank in their critique—at least when interviewed for their opinion on the potentials of the obligatory alms in the eradication of poverty. Doling out zakat in small portions to individual beggars will keep a poor or needy person a live for a day or a week but will not lift him or her up from poverty. Muslim scholars and philanthropists have time and again called for the establishment of institutions that would supervise the collection and distribution of zakat on either a regional or even a national level.36 Nevertheless, as Sheikh Amin Bamba in Tamale critically notes, the loose organization of Muslims in Ghana as well as the lack of coordination and trust affect the collection and distribution of zakat. As for now, he points out, zakat has had no impact on the empowerment of Muslims.37 By and large, the institutional discourse on zakat started about two decades ago in Ghana. Already in 2003, the National Chief Imam Sheikh Osman Nuhu Sharubutu put the question of establishing a national zakat fund on the agenda of the National Ramadan Conference. However, the then established National Islamic Trust Fund was slow to develop and was shelved a few years later.38 In 2005, the National Imam of the A ­ hlus-Sunna, Sheikh Umar Ibrahim Imam, launched a new initiative, the Bait ul-zakat Fund. However, although the project was initially successful in collecting zakat to a common fund and investing the collected money in a company that bottled drinking water in plastic bags, it soon runs into troubles and disintegrated a few years later.39 36 Weiss,

Begging and Almsgiving in Ghana. with Sheikh Amin Bamba Imam, Tamale, 10 April 2019. 38 Weiss, Begging and Almsgiving in Ghana, 146. 39 Weiss, Begging and Almsgiving in Ghana, 142–143; Interview with Sheikh Umar Ibrahim Imam in February 2017. 37 Interview

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In 2005, too, Alhaji Amen Bonsu, then Second Deputy National Imam of the Ghana Muslim Mission, called on Muslim organizations and individuals to contribute to—an unspecified—zakat fund40; it is unclear if he referred to the (then dormant) National Islamic Trust Fund, an existing fund of the Ghana Muslim Mission or an institution yet to be established. By 2007, none of the above initiatives existed anymore as is demonstrated by the urge of Sheikh Seidu Adam, then Chief Imam of the Ghana Armed Forces, to establish a central Zakat Fund. His vision was a central national institution that received zakat from district, regional and national levels for the implementation of the fund, “so that at the end of every year, the Muslim community would know where to put the zakat to”. Not surprisingly, the institutional approach of Sheikh Seidu Adam criticized by one of his commentators for being bureaucratic and inflexible and open for embezzlement by those in charge of the fund. “I will advise that the tithe or zakat be kept in mosque treasurers so that they can use the money to take care of the poor who worship with them and pay [their] utility bills”.41 One year later, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) organized a conference for 40 Muslim and Christian leaders across Africa in Sokoto, Nigeria. The conference resulted in a joint communiqué which urged Muslims to establish zakat funds in their countries to mobilize resources to support UNFPA to reduce maternal mortality and poverty alleviation. In Ghana, the discussion was taken up by COMOG at a national Zakat Conference in April 2010. The discussions resulted in the launching of a national initiative, the National Zakat House, in September 2011.42 The National Zakat House was a joint project of the Ahlus-Sunna, the Shia and the Tijaniyya leadership in collaboration with the UNFPA, the COMOG, the National Development Planning Commission and the Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs. In addition, it had the

40 “Muslims Asked to Contribute to ‘Zakat’ Fund,” GNA, 24 April 2005, http://ghanaweb. com/GhanaHomePage/regional/artikel.php?ID=79978 (checked 25 February 2019). 41 “Muslims Asked to Pay Tithe,” GNA, 19 December 2007, http://www.ghanaweb.com/ GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=136292 (checked 25 February 2019). 42 “UNFPA, Muslim Leaders to Launch National Zakat House Project,” GNA, 9 September 2011, https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2011/09/09/unfpa-muslim-leaders-to-launchnational-zakāt-house-project/ (checked 21 January 2016).

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backing of the National Chief Imam. The National Zakat House was projected to be a centralized point for the collection, management and disbursement of zakat. According to Major Alhaji Mohammed Easah (retired), the then National President of the COMOG, the National Zakat House was a project of a national consensus reached by representatives of Muslims of all major nominations from all the ten regions after a long period of dialogue, discussion, sharing and exchange of views and ideas. Initially, the National Zakat House was run by a 13-member board of trustees under the chairmanship of Ibrahim Mohammad Awal, former Managing Director of Graphic Communications Group Limited. Its main objective was to mobilize resources from Muslim entrepreneurs, scholars and women leaders and fashion out strategies to support activities such as reducing maternal mortality, women empowerment and poverty alleviation among the vulnerable in the Muslim communities.43 In addition, echoing the discovery of large sweet crude oil reserves in 2007, the National Zakat House outlined to especially earmark support for Muslim students to undertake studies in petro-chemical engineering.44 The public announcement of the intention to launch the project was followed by—silence. In fact, it turned out that the National Zakat House was shelved and never materialized due to lack of commitment of the involved stakeholders. However, this was not a backslash to the institutional discourse on zakat. Several other initiatives were launched, such as the Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund of the Muslim Caucus as well as the regional zakat funds of the Ghana Muslim Mission and the ASWAJ. The Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund The first successful attempt to establish an institution for the collection and distribution of zakat in Ghana occurred in September 2010 when the Muslim Caucus in Parliament launched its Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund, also known as the Zakat and Sadaqa Foundation. According to its mission statement, the general purpose of the initiative was to fight

43 “Muslim Community Praised for Launching National Zakat House Policy,” GNA, 20 November 2011, http://www.ghanaweb.com (checked 12 March 2014). 44 “Muslim Journalists Urged to Collaborate to Propagate the Teachings of Islam,” Modern Ghana, 5 August 2011, http://www.modernghana.com/print/343699/1/muslim-journalists-urged-to-collaborate-to-propaga.html (checked 25 February 2019).

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poverty, disease and deprivation among Muslim and non-Muslims in the country. The aim of the Trust Fund was to offer scholarships to students in financial crisis “in order to eradicate ignorance and, thereby, eradicate poverty”.45 The initiative was at first presented as an embryo for a national zakat fund. However, the Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund has so far remained a foundation supported by Muslim MPs and state employees. According to Dr. Ahmed Yakubu Alhassan, the Spokesperson of the Muslim Caucus in Parliament, the membership of the Trust Fund had grown from 54 to 250 [in 2013] while the fund had grown from GHS12,000 in 2010 to GHS100,000 in 2013.46 In 2016, the Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund opened a branch office Tamale, two years later it opened its third office in Takoradi.47 In 2018, it joined the World Zakat Forum.48 There have been several attempts to broaden the community of donors of the Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund but so far with little success. In 2016, President John Dramani Mahama proposed to charge 1% of the total charge on hajj on every pilgrim and transfer the proceeds to the Trust Fund. Although his proposal was met with sarcasm if not outright rejection on social media, some commentators applauded it as a “brilliant idea”.49 In the same year, the Trust Fund registered on the social media

45 “Muslim Caucus in Parliament Launches Zakat and Sadaqa Fund,” GNA, 7 September 2010, http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Muslim-Caucus-inParliament-launches-Zakat-and-Sadaqa-Fund-189934 (checked 21 January 2016). 46 Musah Yahaya Jafuru, “Key Muslim Bodies to Serve on Hajj Committee,” Daily Graphic, 16 July 2013, http://graphic.com.gh/archive/General-News/ (checked 12 March 2014). 47 “Zakāt and Sadaqa Trust Fund Launched in Tamale,” Zaa Radio, 26 January 2016, http://zaaradio.com/society/zakāt-sadaqa-trust-fund-launched-in-tamale/ (checked 7 November 2017); https://www.facebook.com/ZakātandSadaqafundGhana/photos/a. 2002861529962781/2149178201997779/?type=3&theater (checked 14 May 2019). 48 “Secretary-General Addressed at the 7th WZF International Conference in Malacca,” https://developing8.org/news/secretary-general-addressed-at-the-7th-wzf-international-conference-in-malacca/ (checked 31 December 2019). 49 “Charge 1% of Cost of Hajj into Zakāt Fund—Mahama Proposes to Muslims,” 26 June 2016, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Charge-1of-cost-of-Hajj-into-Zakāt-Fund-Mahama-proposes-to-Muslims-450727 (checked 21 February 2019); “Snooping in Hajj Affairs Won’t Sway Muslim Voters,” 16 July 2016, https://www.newsghana.com.gh/snooping-in-hajj-affairs-wont-sway-muslim-voters/ (checked 14 May 2019).

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platform Fund Raising Global for a campaign to raise zakat and sadaqa with relatively modest results—74 persons donated some GHS1300 as zakat and 33 persons donated about GHS740 as sadaqa.50 On the other hand, the Facebook account of the Trust Fund has over 3000 followers (31 December 2019). The Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund manages four schemes. The scholarship scheme provides grants to needy Muslim students to enter tertiary institutions in Ghana while the technical and vocational scheme aims at economic empowerment of beneficiaries through raising their skills.51 In 2015, the Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund joined the Students Loan Trust Fund (SLTF), a government body under the Ministry of Education, as partner and guarantor for Muslim students.52 In 2018, circa GHS70,200 were distributed to support the education of needy students and 36 student loan were guaranteed. Still, the limited resources restrict the outreach of the Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund—in 2018, the Trust Fund received 500 bursary applications but could not cover them all. On the other hand, speaking at the 9th Annual Night of Power organized by the Muslim Caucus during Ramadan 2019, VicePresident Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia urged the management of the Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund to increase their investments in education.53 The medical support scheme is designed to give financial support to defray medical bills, a total of five poor persons have benefitted from the scheme. The Economic Empowerment Scheme is aimed at assisting the deprived within the Muslim community “in order to re-establish their 50 See https://www.fundraisingafrica.com/DetailView/344 as well as https://www. fundraisingafrica.com/DetailView/343 (checked 19 May 2019). 51 Musah Yahaya Jafuru, “Key Muslim Bodies to Serve on Hajj Committee,” Daily Graphic, 16 July 2013, http://graphic.com.gh/archive/General-News/ (checked 12 March 2014). 52 Emmanuel Amoquandoh, “Partnership Between SLTF and ZSTF Launched,” 11 October 2015, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/regional/Partnershipbetween-SLTF-and-ZSTF-launched-387037 (checked 21 May 2019); “Students Loan Trust Fund Is 10 Years”, GNA, 6 September 2015, https://www.ghanaweb.com/ GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Students-Loan-Trust-Fund-is-10-years-380126 (checked 21 February 2019); https://www.sltf.gov.gh/zakat-sadaqa-partnership-for-disbursement-repayment/ (checked 14 May 2019). 53 “Invest More Zakat, Sadaqat Fund to Build Knowledgeable Society—Veep,” 3 June 2019, http://www.ghanaiantimes.com.gh/invest-more-zakat-sadaqat-fund-to-buildknowledgeable-society-veep/ (checked 12 August 2019).

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livelihood”. The idea is to support widows and disabled to establish a micro-business venture “with the potential of expanding into medium and large venture”. However, it seems as if the latter two schemes are not yet operating as no further information is given on the Trust Fund’s homepage.54 The lack of consensus affects the outreach and impact of the Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund. Although it has offices in three regions (Greater Accra, Northern and Western Region), large parts of the country are not yet covered, most importantly metropolitan Kumasi and Ashanti Region with its substantial Muslim population (although I was informed in November 2019 that it seeks to open an office in Kumasi in 2020). More challenging is the question of how to address and reach out to the (growing) Muslim middle-class and present the Trust Fund as the main channel for their zakat and other donations.55 Although the Trust Fund at times receives some media coverage, regular reporting by Muslim journalists on the activities of the Trust Fund or even publishing texts on zakat is still lacking.56 Sheikh Arimiyao Shu’ab, the former CEO of the Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund, identified accountability and auditing as the main challenge of the Trust Fund. In his mind, the best way to remedy the lacunae is to establish an internal audit wing as well as to strengthen the existing external audit. Another problem is the lack of resources for public relations and visibility. The available funds for running offices of the Trust Fund are rather limited and restrict the number of employed officials to a bare minimum.57 Sheikh Issah in Tamale, in turn, stressed the importance of transparency to tackle the mistrust among Muslims towards the Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund and other zakat organizations. His suggestion is to publicize what has been collected and distributed by the Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund on TV each month.58 54 http://ghanazakatfundonline.com

(checked 31 December 2019). with Sheikh Arimiyao Shu’ab, former CEO of the Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund, Accra/Legon, 7 December 2017. 56 “We Need to Form a Strong Muslim Journalists Association—Hajj Saeed Jallo,” The Today’s Muslim, 19 July 2018, http://thetodaysmuslim.com/discussions/we-need-toform-a-strong-muslim-journalists-association-hajj-saeed-jallo/ (checked 14 May 2019). 57 Interview with Sheikh Arimiyao Shu’ab, former CEO of the Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund, Accra/Legon, 7 December 2017. 58 Interview with Sheikh Issah, Islamic Education Unit Manager, Tamale, 9 April 2019. 55 Interview

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The Ghana Muslim Mission Regional Zakat Fund A third initiative to establish a zakat fund was made by the Greater Accra Regional Branch of the Ghana Muslim Mission (GMM) in November 2014. Established in 1957, the GMM emerged as a nationalist organization and attempts to rally indigenous Ghanaian Muslims namely Ga, Fante, Asante as well as Northern Muslims into one umbrella organization and is one of the oldest (Sunni) Muslim organizations in the country. In contrast to the various national schemes, the GMM project was launched as a regional zakat fund but envisioned to develop into “the leading and credible body in Ghana”. According to Nurudeen Quaye, the Greater Accra Regional Imam, the fund is projected to provide a platform for the effective collection, management and disbursement of funds to the beneficiaries of zakat. An eight-person board of trustees monitors the operations of the Regional Zakat Fund, their objective being to target “identified beneficiaries as well as implement credible governance systems that assures stakeholders it is managed prudently”. Initially, its aspiration was to operate on a national level as the idea was to accumulate funds “for the development of the Muslim community in Ghana” by executing “eligible projects for the Muslim community”.59 The objectives of the GMM Greater Accra Regional Zakat Fund were ambitious. According to the (then) Chairman of the GMM Sheikh Amin Bonsu, the fund was expected to raise a minimum of GHS100,000 already by the end of 2014. The fund was expected to receive both donations in kind as well as in cash. In a public statement, Sheikh Amin Bonsu highlighted the moral imperative for Muslims to give a systematic portion of 2.5% of one’s wealth each year for the benefit of the poor; zakat, he underlined, was not the same as the charitable gifts given out of kindness or generosity. The central idea of zakat, he reminded, was that it teaches Muslims’ self-discipline as well as enables

59 “Ghana Muslim Mission Launches Zakat Fund,” 4 November 2014, http://www. ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/religion/Ghana-Muslim-Mission-launches-ZakatFund-333320 (checked 21 January 2016). See also Rabiatu Deinyo Ammah, “Ghanaian Muslims on ‘Becoming Muslims’ for Sustainable Development,” in Religion and Sustainable Development: Ghanaian perspectives, eds. George O ­ ssom-Batsa, Nicoletta Gati and Rabiatu Deinyo Ammah (Citta del Vaticano: Urbaniana University Press, 2018), 240–241.

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the empowerment of those who are poor and suffering by getting them back on their feet.60 The GMM Greater Accra Regional Zakat Fund serves as a pilot project and is monitored by a seven-member board of trustees.61 Similar initiatives have since then been launched in every region by the GMM. However, although zakat is collected annually, the generated sums remain modest. In my discussion with the GMM National Imam in 2017, Sheikh Dr. Amin Bonsu observed that zakat alone will not solve the social problems of the Muslim community in Ghana. In his mind, one should rather focus on broadening the basis of charitable donations which has become the leitmotif of the GMM. Instead of calling for a national organization, the GMM has decentralized the collection and distribution of donations to its regional headquarters. While the GMM organizes an annual national fund raising conference, regional ones are organized on an ad hoc basis. The regional headquarters, in turn, distribute the collected sums to people in need for payment of rents and school fees as well as to fund social welfare and educational projects.62 The GMM model has been rather successful in securing donations from Ghanaian Muslims and is capable of internally funding 117 schools and Colleges of Education. Sheikh Dr. Amin Bonsu noted that the GMM community is sensitized on issues of empowerment every week during the Friday prayers and in discussions afterwards. This, in turn, has created a positive atmosphere for making donations. However, the realization of its ambitious plans for establishing an Islamic university will rely on external/foreign donors.63

60 Joseph Nana Yaw Cobbina, “Zakat Is the Third of the Five Pillars in Islam-Sheikh Amin Bonsu,” 7 November 2014, http://newsghana.com.gh/zakat-third-five-pilars-islamsheikh-amin-bonsu (checked 19 February 2019). 61 “GMM Launches Regional Zakat Fund,” GNA, 3 November 2014, http://newsghana.com.gh/gmm-launches-regional-zakat-fund/ (checked 19 February 2019). 62 Interview with Sheikh Dr. Amin Bonsu, GMM National Imam, Kumasi, 10 December 2017. 63 Interview with Sheikh Dr. Amin Bonsu, GMM National Imam, Kumasi, 10 December 2017.

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The ASWAJ Regional Zakat Funds The Ahlus-Sunna Wa-Jama’a (ASWAJ) has launched at least three regional zakat funds, namely in Accra, Kumasi and Wa. Information has been collected about the activities of the ASWAJ Ashanti Region while the institutions in Accra and Wa will be the object for my forthcoming fieldwork. The leading scholars of the ASWAJ Ashanti Region made their first attempt to establish a Regional Zakat Fund in 2015. As part of the propagation for the project, the ASWAJ Ashanti Region created a homepage and published the regulations for the Zakat Fund.64 According to the regulations, the Regional Zakat Fund was structured to include a Central Zakat Fund as well as ten Zonal Zakat Funds.65 All funds accumulated in Zonal Zakat Accounts were quarterly to be transferred into the Central Zakat Fund; all moneys credited to the Fund were to be kept on n ­ on-interest bearing bank accounts. The regulations made detailed stipulations for the utilization and allocations of the annually collected assets of the Zakat Fund and granted that a maximum of 15% could be used to cover the expenses for collection, distribution and management of the fund. Half of the regional zakat budget was to be used as allowances to the needy, indigent, orphans and widows, 10% as allowances to Muslims plagued by natural disasters and were rendered homeless, and 18% for educational stipends “to needy but brilliant Muslims in Schools, Colleges, University, Polytechnic and other training institutions established or recognized by the Government”. A Zonal Zakat Fund, in turn, was to use 54% of its total allocated budget for educational stipends to public madrasas and students of Deeni Madaaris (religious schools), 20% for the payment of supporting staff of Deeni Madaaris who do not receive government pay, 17% as grant to educational institutions and 64 The homepage does not anymore exist (checked 21 May 2019); the regulations were still available at http://aswajashanti.org/index.php/projects-department/zakaat-fund?tmpl=component&print=1 in 2017 when I printed them out. The document is titled: Ahl-Sunnah Wal Jama’a Ashanti Region, Regulations for Zakat Foundation, Prepared and Approved by Council of Ulamu, Office of Regional Imam, Advisory Council and Zakat and Endowment Committee, no date [2015]. 65 ASWAJ Ashanti Region is divided into eleven zones, namely (1) Jamasi/Agona, (2) Aboaso, (3) Offinso, (4) Barekese, (5) Abuakwa, (6) Obuasi, (7) Effiduase/Ejisu, (8) Konongo, (9) Aboabo, (10) Old Tafo and (11) Ejura, see Ahl Sunnah Wal-Jama’ah Ashanti Region, Interim Operational Report by Regional Finance Committee, May 2013. The report was available on the ASWAJ Ashanti Region homepage in 2017 and I downloaded a copy of it.

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to be used as stipends, 5% for health care (i.e. payment of hospital fees) and 4% for social welfare and rehabilitation of adult Muslims who do not receive any assistance from any other zakat programme or government subvention.66 However, the project ended prematurely and remained dormant for years. The main reason, Sheikh Kamil Muhammad explained, was that people refused to pay their zakat to the fund.67 Another problem was the centralized nature of the fund—the central account was supposed to receive 80% of the collected assets but local collectors rarely transferred the collected sums to the central account.68 In 2018, however, the leadership of the ASWAJ Ashanti Region decided to call an expert on zakat from Sokoto, Nigeria, and outlined a reconstruction of the fund. As an outcome of these discussions, the two funds were fused and relaunched as the ASAWAJ Ashanti Region Zakat, Waqf and Sadaqa Fund in 2018. In comparison with the old fund, the new fund has a decentralized ­structure, with focus on its activities in 42 municipalities and districts in the region.69 The new decentralized structure is also reflected in the transfer of collected assets—only 20% of annually collected sums are to be transferred to the central fund’s account. In April 2017, the Women’s Wing of the ASWAJ Ashanti Region launched its own Zakat, Waqf and Sadaqa Fund. According to the new regulations, 60% of the collected sums are to be used by the women for their projects while 20% is earmarked to cover administrative expenses. However, the fund’s coordinator Ahmed Musa admitted that the collection of zakat is still a challenge as only three persons give their zakat to the fund. Instead, most, if not all, of the existing assets of the fund are donations, i.e. sadaqa, rather than zakat collected for the new fund.70

66 Ahl-Sunnah

Wal Jama’a Ashanti Region, Regulations for Zakat Foundation, 1, 8–9. with Sheikh Kamil Muhammad, Deputy Chief Imam ASWAJ Ashanti Region, Kumasi, 10 December 2017. 68 Interview with Ahmad Musa, coordinator of the ASWAJ Ashanti Region Zakat, Waqf and Sadaqa Fund, Kumasi, 6 April 2019. 69 Interview with Sheikh Dr. Ismail Saeed Adam, Regional Chief Imam of ASWAJ Ashanti Region, Kumasi, 5 April 2019. 70 Interview with Ahmad Musa, p ­ erson-in-charge of the ASWAJ Ashanti Region Zakat, Waqf and Sadaqa Fund, Kumasi, 6 April 2019. 67 Interview

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The Muslim Ummah Development Initiative Zakat House The most recent proposal for a zakat fund was launched by the Muslim Ummah Development Initiative (MUDI) in 2018. The organization was designed by the Centre for Creative Leadership, Africa (CCL-Africa) and incorporated by the Coalition of Muslim Organizations—Ghana (COMOG) as a tool for the economic empowerment for Muslims in 2014.71 The driving force behind both the Centre and MUDI is the Muslim philanthropist Alhaji Alhassan Haruna, former CEO of Metro TV. The objective of MUDI is to promote the establishment of channels for halal investments, such as Islamic banking, financing and insurance in Ghana.72 MUDI does not present itself as a new initiative for the organization for the collection and distribution of zakat in Ghana. Also, its links to COMOG are unclear. In October 2015, COMOG published an invitation for a MUDI-seminar on the empowerment of Muslim women and youth on its Facebook account.73 On my inquiries on its activities in 2017, Haji Mumuni Sulemana informed me that the initiative seems to become dormant.74 Nevertheless, the links between MUDI and COMOG were still recognized on the 2018-app of MUDI. However, information displayed on its 2019-homepage do not anymore present MUDI under the umbrella of COMOG. Instead, the organization is presented as an independent one but with the same focus on agriculture and hajj projects. Also, in contrast to the earlier outlines, the new homepage articulates an ambition to collect and distribute zakat by the organization. The vision, it seems, is to establish the MUDI Zakat House “to facilitate an institutionalized platform to enhance collection, disbursement and effective utilization of Zakat from our investors and partners”. However, it is unclear if the platform has been launched. Nevertheless, the objectives of the MUDI Zakat House clearly reveal an ambition to establish an institution for the collection and distribution of zakat “from MUDI investors and partners for the wellbeing of the poor 71 http://mudiappv1.herokuapp.com

(checked 2 May 2019). provided by the MUDI homepage, see https://mudighana.com/ about-us/ (checked 23 April 2019). 73 “COMOG and Its Stakeholders Presents Muslim Ummah Development Initiative,” 28 October 2015, https://www.facebook.com/comogghana/ (checked 2 May 2019). 74 Interview with Haji Mumuni Sulemana, Legon, 1 March 2017. 72 Information

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in our society”. Echoing a modernist (and secular) discourse on poverty alleviation, its objective is “to develop and implement economic empowerment for women in the deprived communities and provide scholarships to brilliant but needy students”.75 However, as its objectives are framed through the lenses of zakat, the target group are Muslim communities in Ghana.

Many Local, a Few Regional or One National Zakat Fund? Information about the various attempts to institutionalize the collection and distribution of zakat in Ghana has generated mixed comments on social media. Some Muslims are full of praise of these efforts, others criticize them for misusing Islam. Although the negative comments on online platforms such as GhanaWeb are not representative, they still reflect some of the criticism—and misunderstandings—of the ways zakat is collected in non-Muslim secular states. The fundamental issue is the question of who has the mandate to collect and distribute. While Muslim scholars generally are in favour of an institutionalization of zakat, be it on a local, regional or national level, the negative online comments on such initiatives as well as the answers of Muslim scholars that I interviewed indicate that “ordinary” Muslims are not. Instead, it seems as if the traditional way of giving one’s zakat directly to the poor and needy is preferred. Some commentators claim that zakat should only be collected by the imams, not by organizations such as the Ghana Muslim Mission or initiatives like the Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund.76 One Muhammed Suraj Sulley Jawando, in turn, commenting an editorial on GhanaWeb from New York in February 2010, vehemently rejected the idea that the Zongo communities constitute the poorest strata in Ghanaian society and the Zongos to be synonymous with indiscipline, poverty and insanitation. First, he argued, Zongos constitutes multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and ­multi-religious communities in contemporary Ghanaian urban landscape. Second, he pointed out, walking around in Accra one locates the most miserable sanitary conditions in other neighbourhoods than the Zongo 75 “Mudi Zakat House,” https://mudighana.com/mudi-structure/zakat-house (checked 23 April 2019). 7 6   h t t p s : / / w w w. g h a n a w e b . c o m / G h a n a H o m e P a g e / r e l i g i o n / a r t i k e l . php?ID=333320&comment=11034428 (checked 21 May 2019).

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communities of Nima, New Town or Sabon Zongo. Third, he warned the Zongo, i.e. Muslim communities to rely on zakat as it constituted in his mind a negative social welfare system: “Proper accountability and disbursement is a socialist mentality that would make the Zongo people dependent on Zakat. Have you seen what the welfare checks and benefits has turned most Spanish and African-American communities in the USA? They do not work nor go to school, knowing that the welfare money will arrive at the end of the week or the month”.77 Of the almost 100 comments to his article, only one discussed his rather neoliberal if not libertarian rejection of an (yet to be established) Islamic social welfare system in Ghana. “Zakat is not a socialist system’, writes Ibrahim Mamoun, “but a social system encouraging growth by spreading wealth […]”.78 Zakat is identified by Muslim scholars as “the Muslim solution for the eradication of misery and poverty” and a tool to facilitate the social and economic development of Muslim communities. Many of them have observed a move from the traditional payment of zakat in kind to payment in cash during the last two decades.79 However, critical voices address its haphazard and random distribution in Ghana and claim that does not meet its aims and objective at all. “Some of the rich do not give zakat and when they do, they distribute it only in small portions”, noted Sheikh Jamal Deen Omar Muhammad and added that only 1% give zakat to the imams. He further recognized the fact that the aim and objective of zakat are not fulfilled as it is too unevenly distributed.80 Sheikh Issah in Tamale, in turn, identified the lack of leadership, consensus and cooperation among the Muslims in Ghana as the root causes for the failure of institutionalizing zakat.81 Sheikh Abdul Mumin Haruna, Ashanti Regional Chief Imam, as many other scholars,

77 Muhammed Suraj Sulley Jawardo, “Re: Why So Much Poverty in Zongos?,” 15 May 2010, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/Re-Why-So-Much-Povertyin-Zongos-181957 (checked 21 May 2019). 7 8   h t t p s : / / w w w. g h a n a w e b . c o m / G h a n a H o m e P a g e / f e a t u r e s / a r t i k e l . php?ID=181957&comment=5731737 (checked 21 May 2019). 79 Interview with Sheikh Jamal Deen Omar Muhammad, Imam at Tamale Central Mosque and President of Aris Social Center, Tamale, 10 April 2019; Interview with Sheikh Saeed Abubakar Zakaria, head of the Anbariya Sunni Community, Tamale, 9 April 2019. 80 Interview with Sheikh Jamal Deen Omar Muhammad, Imam at Tamale Central Mosque and President of Aris Social Center, Tamale, 10 April 2019. 81 Interview with Sheikh Issah, Islamic Education Unit Manager, Tamale, 9 April 2019.

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highlighted the need to focus on the impact of distributing zakat— should it be parcelled out in small portions and target as many recipients as possible or should a larger sum be given to one person? The rationale behind the latter argument is that the former way of distributing zakat will give a poor person food for one day while the latter way provides the tool for employment and a way out of poverty.82 Some scholars even desire to “open up” the objectives and categories of recipients of zakat and argue that it should be given to a few women instead of many (male) beggars and poor persons as “women are better in using it in a fruitful way”, i.e. use zakat as a means for structural changes in one’s life.83 The challenge, however, is that Muslim scholars and imams are well aware of the fact that the ideals and practice of zakat rarely correlate in Ghana, and most scholars would agree with Sheikh Anas Tawfiq in Kumasi that zakat as yet has had no impact on social development of the Muslim community.84 Not surprisingly, therefore, different visions and plans for zakat funds have been articulated by Muslim scholars and imams. According to Sheikh Osman Bawa Orlando, it has been difficult for ordinary Muslims, and many imams as well, to grasp the benefit of a national zakat fund. The traditional way is preferred by both rich businessmen and their clerics as the cleric will instruct to whom zakat is to be given. In his mind, the institutionalization of the collection and distribution of zakat needs a uniform and recognized committee but the lack of consensus is a hindrance for its realization.85 Mallam Aminu Bamba referred to his disappointing experience of soliciting funds from the community in Ejura: Local Muslims disapproved to pay zakat for the upkeep of his Primary and Junior Secondary School.86 Sheikh Jamal Deen Omar Mohammed, in turn, noted that rich people do not support the idea of establishing a zakat fund as it

82 Interview with Ashanti Regional Chief Imam Sheikh Abdul Mumin Haruna, Kumasi, 15 September 2019. 83 Interview with Muhammed Al-Mahaman, HOD Arabic and Islamic Studies of Al-Faruq College of Education, Wenchi, Brong Ahafo, and advisor at Sakafiya mosque, Kumasi, Kumasi, 15 September 2019. 84 Interview with Sheikh Anas Tawfiq Ibrahim al-Bakri, Imam of the Darul-Hadith Mosque and Educational Complex, Kumasi, 12 December 2017. 85 Interview with Sheikh Osman Bawa Orlando, Kumasi, 12 December 2017. 86 Interview with Mallam Aminu Bamba, Ejura, 4 April 2019.

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goes against their own interests.87 A similar lamentation was presented by Sheikh Yusufiyya: Zakat is not understood by Muslims and the giver makes his own decisions to whom zakat is given. Sheikh Yusufiyya himself is in favour for the establishment of one national zakat fund. His vision is a national, transparent and public institution to which every Muslim can apply to when in need, lists its donors and publishes its accounts.88 The Council of Imams and Ulama in Kumasi, in turn, has been commenting upon the call of the Ashanti Regional Chief Imam to establish a regional zakat fund.89 However, although the issue has been on the agenda for several years, a positive decision has not been achieved as the ulama (Muslim scholars) has not (yet) reached any consensus on this issue.90 A similar position concerning the necessity to establish regional zakat funds is also taken by Sheikh Abdul Wadud. His opinion strongly reflects the position of the leadership of the Tijaniyya Muslims Movement of Ghana, namely to mobilize resources for education and educational infrastructure on a regional level through zakat. Nevertheless, he noted in the same vein that although the Tijani scholars have been propagating for this in their sermons for many years if not decades, the members have not been eager to follow their proposition.91 Some activists, such as the online community Zongo Republic, advocate a local approach. In their mind, the Zongo mosques should be put in the centre for all matters of development in the Zongo communities. To meet this end, the Zongo mosques should create a development fund for pursuing social projects. “In other words there is a development council, but this council has to meet and tell the mosque their plans and progress regularly, as opposed to holding events in different spaces outside the mosque”.92 This idea correlates to arguments by some scholars 87 Interview with Sheikh Jamal Deen Omar Muhammad, Director of Aris Social Center and Imam at Tamale Central Mosque, Tamale, 10 April 2019. 88 Interview with Sheikh Yusufiyya, Kumasi, 12 December 2017. 89 Interview with Ustaz Ahmed Said, Secretary of the Council of Imams and Ulama in Kumasi, Kumasi, 27 February 2017. 90 Interview with Sheikh Zakariya Abdur-Rahman, Deputy Chief Imam Ashanti Region, Kumasi, 11 December 2017. 91 Interview with Sheikh Abdul Wadud, Zameen (President) of the Tijjaniya Muslims Movement of Ghana, Kumasi, 5 April 2019. 92 (Zongo Republic), “Redefining the Zongo Mosque”, 8 March 2019, https://zongorepublic.com/redefining-the-zongo-mosque/ (checked 25 March 2019).

300  H. WEISS

and imams for the rationale to establish local, mosque-centred bayt almals or zakat funds.93 Similar negative opinions about the introduction of a national zakat fund are shared by Sheikh Kamil Muhammad, Deputy Chief Imam ASWAJ Ashanti Region. Commenting on the disappointing outcome of the 2015 initiative of launching the ASWAJ Regional Zakat Funds, Sheikh Kamil Muhammad admitted that few Muslims wanted to participate due to a lack of trust in the collectors and fear of embezzlement of collected funds. Despite of the disappointing outcome of the initiative, he stressed the need for a modernization of zakat. The solution, in his mind, was to focus on local, communal-based initiatives rather than a single national one.94 Other scholars, such as Mallam Aminu Bamba or Haji Mumuni Sulemana, are in favour of a national zakat fund.95 Sheikh Ismail Saeed Adam, ASWAJ Regional Imam in Ashanti Region, also pushes for the establishment of a national zakat fund. In his mind, a national fund could bridge the differences of the various (Sunni) Muslim sects in Ghana and could pave the way for mutual respect and tolerance among the Muslims. He envisions the fund to be an institution open for all Muslims, its central role being to evaluate the applications and to publish lists of donors for reason of transparency. However, in the same vein he admitted that not all scholars share his vision.96 Sheikh Osman Bawa Orlando, too, addresses both the positive aspects of a national fund and the lack of consensus among the scholars about the issue. However, the biggest hurdle for establishment of a national zakat fund is in his mind the sceptical if not negative attitude of lay Muslims.97 The above outline of the various visions of a zakat fund seems to indicate that the discussion has entered a cul-de-sac. Although there 93 Interview with Sheikh Jamal Deen Omar Muhammad, Director of Aris Social Center and Imam at Tamale Central Mosque, Tamale, 10 April 2019; interview with Sheikh Abdulsalam Ahmed, Regional Chief Imam Northern Region, Tamale, 10 April 2019. 94 Interview with Sheikh Kamil Muhammad, Deputy Chief Imam ASWAJ Ashanti Region, Kumasi, 10 December 2017. 95 Interview with Mallam Aminu Bamba, Ejura, 4 April 2019; interview with Haji Mumuni Sulemana, Accra/Legon, 12 September 2018. 96 Interview with Sheikh Dr. Ismail Saeed Adam, Regional Chief Imam of ASWAJ Ashanti Region, Kumasi, 12 December 2017. 97 Interview with Sheikh Osman Bawa Orlando, Kumasi, 12 December 2017.

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have been several attempts to establish either nationwide or regional ­institutions, the vision of one national zakat fund is as far away as it was two decades ago. However, a new generation of scholars has presented interesting openings for a compromise that would combine the various earlier approaches on the issue. One is the idea of Sheikh Issah in Tamale who strongly recommended to include the rich and wealthy in the discussion. “Collect the wealthy in society and organize a workshop with them”, integrate them in the planning process and make them stakeholders in the project. He further proposed that the process should start at the district level, i.e. the establishment of district zakat funds who would be charged to collecting zakat. Regional zakat funds would receive one-fourth of the collected sums from each district funds whereas the national zakat fund, in turn, would receive one-fourth of the assets of regional funds. Guidelines and constitutions are to be drawn for all three levels and all levels were to have registers for contributors and beneficiaries.98 Sheikh Amin Bamba has articulated a similar idea. In his vision, the national zakat fund is a decentralized institution that operates on regional and district level. Institutionally, it is to be one fund, directed and coordinated on the national level.99 Their vision could, in turn, be combined with the proposal of Sheikh Abdul Majeed and Sheikh Abdul Fatah to engage the wealthy on a communal level and form a strong organization for the local mobilization of zakat and sadaqa.100

Bibliography Altaf, Anika. Perceptions and Reflections of Islamic Development Initiatives in Northern Ghana. Amsterdam: PADEV, 2010. Ammah, Rabiatu. “Islam and Poverty Reduction Strategies in the Ghanaian Muslim Community.” Ghana Bulletin of Theology 2 (2007): 3–20. Ammah, Rabiatu Deinyo. “Ghanaian Muslims on ‘Becoming Muslims’ for Sustainable Development.” In Religion and Sustainable Development: Ghanaian perspectives, eds. George Ossom-Batsa, Nicoletta Gati and Rabiatu Deinyo Ammah, 227–242. Citta del Vaticano: Urbaniana University Press, 2018.

98 Interview

with Sheikh Issah, Islamic Education Unit Manager, Tamale, 9 April 2019. with Sheikh Amin Bamba Imam, Tamale, 10 April 2019. 100 Interview with Sheikh Majeed, Secretary of Imam Dawah Organisation, and Sheikh Abdul Fatah, member of Imam Dawah Organisation, Tamale, 10 April 2019. 99 Interview

302  H. WEISS Balogun, K.A. and A.A. Abdussalam. “Arguments and Counter-Arguments: A Critical Analysis of the Ahlus-Sunnah and Tijâniyyah Brotherhood Dispute in Ghana.” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention 4, no. 3 (2015): 1–11. Dumbe, Yunus. Islamic Revivalism in Contemporary Ghana. Huddinge: Södertörn University, 2013. Dumbe, Yunus. “Islamic Polarisation and the Politics of Exclusion in Ghana: Tijaniyya and Salafist Struggles over Muslim Orthodoxy.” Islamic Africa 10 (2019): 153–180. Enabling Environment of Philanthropy in Ghana. Accra: SDG Philanthropy Platform, United Nations Development Programme, 2017. Hanson, John H. The Ahmadiyya in the Gold Coast: Muslim Cosmopolitans in the British Empire. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017. Iddrisu, Abdulai. Contesting Islam in Africa. Homegrown Wahhabism and Muslim Identity in Northern Ghana, 1920–2010. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2013. Kobo, Ousman Murzik. “Shifting Trajectories of Salafi/Ahl-Sunna Reformism in Ghana.” Islamic Africa 6, no. 1–2 (2015): 60–81. Kobo, Ousman Murzik. “Islamic Institutions of Higher Learning in Ghana: The Case of the Islamic University College.” In Muslim Institutions of Higher Education in Postcolonial Africa, eds. Mbaye Lo and Muhammed Haron, 179–191. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Kumi, Emmanuel. “Diversify or Die? The Response of Ghanaian ­Non-Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs) to a Chaning Aid Landscape.” PhD thesis, University of Bath, 2017. Kumi, Emmanuel. “Aid reduction and NDGOs’ Quest for Sustainability in Ghana: Can Philanthropic Institutions Serve as Alternative Resource Mobilisation Routes?” Voluntas 30 (2019): 1332–1347. Muhammed, Mahmud Mukhtar and Umar Wahab Sina. “Faith in National Development: A Review of the Activities of the Istiqaama Muslim Organisation of Ghana.” Paper presented at 3rd International Conference on Religion and National Development 6th–7th September 2018, Department of Religious Studies, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST), Ghana. Skinner, David E. “Da’wa and Politics in West Africa: Muslim Jama’at and ­Non-Governmental Organisations in Ghana, Sierra Leone and The Gambia.” In Development and Politics from Below: Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State, eds. Barbara Bompai and Maria Frahm-Arp, 99–130. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010. Weiss, Holger. “Reorganising Social Welfare Among Muslims—Islamic Voluntarism and Other Forms of Communal Support in Northern Ghana.” Journal of Religion in Africa 32, no. 1 (2002): 83–109.

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Weiss, Holger. Begging and Almsgiving in Ghana: Muslim Positions Towards Poverty and Distress. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007. Weiss, Holger. Between Accommodation and Revivalism: Muslims, the State and Society in Ghana from the Precolonial to the Postcolonial Era. Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society, 2008. World Bank. Ghana—Performance and Learning Review of the Country Partnership Strategy for the Period FY13-FY18. Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2016.

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Index

A accountability, 30, 67, 80, 86, 151, 155, 156, 165, 290 Africa Women Development and Communication Network (FEMNET), 129 Ahmadi/Ahmadiyya Ahmadiyya Anjuman-i Isha`at-i Islami – AAII, 252 Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at - AMJ), 250, 252–254, 256, 259–262, 264–268 Ahmadiyya Muslim Medical Association (AMMA), 254, 255 International Association of Ahmadi Architects and Engineers (IAAAE), 254, 255, 266 The Medical Association of Ahmadi Muslims, 254 Nusrat Jahan (Service to Humanity Scheme), 254

alms/almsgiving, 3, 4, 13, 14, 66, 86, 110, 112–114, 146–148, 250, 255, 267, 273, 280–282, 285 Arabization, 69 B baraka (blessing), 21, 67, 68, 75, 249, 284 bid’a (unlawful innovation), 69 boundary activation, 48 Burkina Faso At-Tarbiya Al-Islamiyya, 258 Federation of Islamic Associations of Burkina Faso (FAIB), 260 Fondation Abdallah Ben Massoud (Al Houda), 258 Fondation Cheikh Aorèma, 258 Fondation de solidarité et d’aide au peuple africain (FOSAPA), 258 Mouvement Sunnite, 257 Tijaniyya Hamawiyya, 257

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 H. Weiss (ed.), Muslim Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38308-4

305

306  Index Union des religieux et coutumiers du Burkina, 264 Union Fraternelle des Croyants (UFC), 257 butinage metaphor, 52, 55 C capabilities, 10, 112, 152 Chad, 7, 11, 62, 69, 73, 77, 78 charisma dynamics, 97 charity huquq Allah (rights of God), 149 huquq ibadi (rights of others in the community), 148 sacralized conception of aid, 155 communitarianism, 16, 17 community based organizations (CBOs), 145, 146, 150 co-operation, 62, 93, 95, 96, 123, 127, 133, 135, 140, 171, 172, 174, 177–179, 185, 186, 188, 189, 191, 193–195, 203, 212, 255, 257, 259, 261, 263, 266, 267, 297 Côte d’Ivoire Association des Cadres Musulmans de Côte d’Ivoire (UCAM-CI), 106 Association des élèves et étudiants musulmans de Côte d’Ivoire (AEEMCI), 93, 95, 100–104, 106, 107, 112 Association des Femmes Musulmanes de Côte d’Ivoire (AFEMCI), 101 Association des Hommes d’Affaires Musulmans (Côte d’Ivoire), 106 Association des Jeunes Musulmans de Côte d’Ivoire (AJMCI), 101 Association des Musulmans Sunnites de Côte d’Ivoire (AMSCI), 102

Centre Ihsane pour la formation et l’éducation des jeunes (CIFE), 95 Centre islamique ivoiro-turc, 95 Conseil des Imams Sunnites (CODIS), 102 Conseil national islamique (CNI), 93, 100, 101, 105, 107 Conseil supérieur des imams (COSIM), 93, 100–104, 107 Conseil supérieur islamique (CSI), 93 Ligue Islamique des Prédicateurs en Côte d’Ivoire (LIPCI), 101 Réseau des Ecoles Médersas de Côte d’Ivoire (REMCI), 101, 105 Université Al Fourquane, 96, 102 Université Musulmane de Côte d`Ivoire, 96 D da’wa (proselytization), 9, 10, 68, 75, 93, 109, 112, 155, 181, 183, 186, 193, 216, 251, 266 development aid, 40, 88, 153, 173, 175, 177, 185–187, 189, 193, 194, 203, 251, 263 donor, 3, 6, 29, 62, 64–68, 73, 75, 79, 80, 100, 101, 108, 112, 125, 126, 129, 134–136, 155, 156, 165, 172, 173, 187, 188, 191, 212, 224, 228, 231–233, 236, 263, 267, 284, 288, 292, 299, 300 E East African Muslim Welfare Association (EAMWAS), 184 East Africa Sub-regional Support Initiative (EASSI), 129 Egypt, 70, 80, 94, 96, 121, 124, 125, 131, 132, 138, 144, 235

Index

Eid Eid al-Fitr, 280 Eid-ul-Adha (Eid al-Adha), 255, 280 empowerment, 2, 18, 104, 108, 112, 154, 157, 160, 206, 264, 265, 276, 277, 283, 285, 287, 289, 292, 295, 296 ethics of volunteerism, 86, 89, 109–112, 114 expectations, 2, 67–69, 79, 80, 152 F faith-based organization (FBO), 6, 7, 25, 40–43, 46, 47, 51, 53, 54, 121, 123, 169–176, 179, 180, 183, 185, 189, 190, 193–195, 212, 215, 276. See also Muslim NGOs faith-based organizations (function), 171, 194 advocacy organisations, 175, 194 operational organisations, 175 faith-based organizations (typology), 171, 172 new typology, 171, 176 faqir (needy), 15 fi sabil li-llah (for the sake of Allah), 6 G Ghana ASWAJ Regional Zakat Fund, 300 Bamba Islamic Institute Ghana ­(BII-Ghana), 277 Centre for Islamic Development and Propagation (CIDA), 283 Coalition of Muslim Organisations – Ghana (COMOG), 284, 286, 287, 295 Dr. Sheikh Osuman Nuhu Sharubutu Education (SONSETFUND), 284

  307

The Ghana Muslim Mission Regional Zakat Fund, 291 Ministry of Inner Cities and Zongo Development, 275, 279 Muslim Ummah Development Initiative (MUDI), 295 National Zakat House, 276, 286, 287 Office of the National Chief Imam (ONCI), 72 Zakat and Sadaqa Trust Fund of Ghana (Zakat and Sadaqa Foundation), 25, 277, 287– 290, 296 governance, 120, 122, 123, 138, 140, 291 government operated NGOs (GONGOs), 65 Gulf countries, 62, 64, 79, 202, 258 H High Net-Worth Individuals, 5, 275 hisba (police), 4 humanitarianism, 86, 121, 188, 217, 250, 265 I Ibadou movement, 70 Indonesia, 5, 7, 21, 27, 208, 252 Iran, 7, 21, 65, 70–72, 74–76, 94, 121, 182, 202–205, 219, 220, 224, 225, 228, 229, 233, 235–240 Islam Ahmadiyya, 13, 184, 247 Shi’a, 13, 65, 70–72, 75 Sunni, 4, 12, 13, 65, 201, 214, 216, 217, 234 Islamaya ton (women’s Islamic associations, Côte d’Ivoire), 87

308  Index Islamic associations, 87, 93, 102–104, 257, 261 Islamic charity/charities, 5, 61, 62, 64, 65, 67, 69, 71, 76–78, 81, 85, 89, 109, 113, 131, 151, 154, 171, 185, 189, 194, 216. See also Muslim NGOs Islamic Development Bank (IDB), 26, 27, 102, 131, 132, 138, 140, 162 Islamic economic system Social justice, 16, 17, 123 Social welfare, 2, 11, 13, 16–19, 21, 26, 123, 132, 134, 140, 144, 145, 150, 274 Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (IESCO), 93 Islamic financial services. See Islamic social finance instruments Islamic microfinance, 17, 20 Islamic NGOs, 5, 12, 77, 78, 85, 95, 107, 120–128, 130–140, 201, 206, 216, 217, 250, 257–259, 261, 267, 283. See also Muslim NGOs Islamic social finance instruments. See also sadaqa (voluntary alms); waqf (pl. awqaf); zakat (obligatory alms) Islamic banking, 20, 295 Islamic bonds (sukuk), 20 Islamic cooperative insurance (takaful), 20 Islamic crowd-funding, 20 Islamic microfinance, 17, 20 Islamic social institutions, 5. See also Muslim NGOs Islamic solidarity da’wa (Islamic call), 9 ighatha (humanitarian relief), 9 jihad (armed support of the Islamic cause), 9

J Jama’at Ibadou Rahmane (The Association of the Servants of the most Merciful), 70 jihad asghar (lesser jihad), 146, 148 K Kenya Mombasa Education and Welfare Association (MEWA), 146, 161, 162, 164 Muslim Education and Development Association of Malindi (MEDA), 162 Shaykh Zayed Complex (Children Welfare Center and Secondary School), Mombasa, 164 Tawfiq hospital, Malindi, 146, 162, 164 Tawfiq Muslim Youths, 162 Waqf Commissioners Act, 145 Waqf Commission of Kenya, 145 Kuwait, 10, 94, 96, 125, 131, 138, 150, 153, 202, 204, 228–233, 236, 239, 240, 258 L Lebanon, 65, 204, 224, 225 legislation, 45, 46, 250 Libya, 11, 94, 96, 137, 149, 258 M madrasa (Islamic seminar or religious school), 10, 228, 237, 293 Malawi, 22, 24, 178 Malaysia, 5, 21, 27 Mali, 4, 7, 18, 88, 90, 95 marginalization, 55, 162, 163, 206, 215, 240, 277, 282

Index

marja‘ (p. maraji‘, supreme Shi‘i religious authority), 204 maslaha (welfare), 14, 17 mechanisms of invitation, 46 miskin (poor), 15 Morocco, 96, 125 Institut Mohammed VI pour la formation des imams morchidines et morchidates, 96 Muslim Brotherhood, 65, 75, 121 Islamic Brotherhood (IB), 144 Muslim Charities Forum, 5 Muslim entrepreneurs, 5, 287 Muslim Faith-Based Organisations (MFBOs), 5, 6, 25, 249. See also Muslim NGOs Muslim NGOs Action Islamique sanitaire (ISLAS), 98 African Muslims’ Agency (AMA), 10, 78, 96, 125, 128, 258 Africa Relief Committee, 128 Ahlul-Bait Foundation (Iran), 75 Al-Azhar Mission (Egypt), 96 Al-Haramyn (Saudi Arabia), 151 ALIF (India), 108 Al-Makka Al-Mukkarama Foundation, 65 Al-Muntada, 78 Al-Muntada Al-Islami, 65 Al Tadamun (Puntland), 132 al-Thaqalain Social Philanthropy Association (Kuwait), 229 Association Al-Ghadir (Côte d’Ivoire), 105 Association de bienfaisance islamique de Cöte d’Ivoire, 97 Association Soulaitine pour des Actions de Bienfaisance, 95 Aziz Mahmud Hudafi Foundation, 95 Bilal Muslim Mission (BMM; Tanzania), 204, 206, 213,

  309

216–218, 220–223, 226–229, 236, 237 Coalition for Grassroots Women Organization (COGWO; Somalia), 128–130, 135, 139 Conseil d’actions humanitaires musulmanes en Côte d’Ivoire, 98 Deniz Feneri Derneği, 95 Dhi Nureyn Islamic Foundation (Tanzania), 178 Direct Aid, 10, 78, 258 Eid Charity (Qatar), 68 Firdous Foundation (Ghana), 78 Fondation Djigui - La grande espérance, 98, 100, 107, 108 Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (Saudi Arabia), 154 Human Associations International (HUDAI; Turkey), 284 Humanity First, 248, 255, 257, 266, 267 IIROSA (Saudi Arabia), 75 International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO, Saudi Arabia), 151, 162 IQRA Foundation, 107 Islam actions sanitaires, 108 Islamic Council for Development and Humanitarian Services (ICODEHS; Ghana), 276 Islamic Foundation (Saudi Arabia), 162 Islamic Foundation of Tanzania (TIF), 169–172, 176–183, 186–194 Islamic Relief, 10, 160 Mombasa Education and Welfare Association (MEWA), 146, 161, 162, 164 Munazzamat al Dawa al Islamiya (Sudan), 126

310  Index Muslim Aid, 10 Muslim Charities Forum, 5 ONG Al Muwassat, 98–101, 108 ONG Maktab ta Awoun, 102 Orphan’s Smile, 98 Réseau des Femmes Musulmanes Africaines – Côte d’Ivoire (REFMA-CI), 107 Secours médical islamique (SEMI), 97, 98, 106 Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan Foundation (UAE), 163 Union musulmane des associations et ONG féminines en Côte d’Ivoire (ONG UMAOFCI), 104 World Islamic Call Society, 96, 258 Zakat Foundation of America, 5 Muslim sphere, 3, 7, 13, 280 Muslim World League (MWL), 125, 258 World Islamic League, 74 World Muslim League, 10 N narratives of trustworthiness, 62 Nigeria, 4, 7, 18, 23–28, 30, 78, 252–254, 283, 286, 294 non-governmental organization (NGO) Ahmadi NGOs, 12 Christian FBOs/NGOs, 9, 41, 51 faith-based organizations ­(FBOs)/ faith-based NGOs, 2, 6–11, 276, 278 Government Operated NGOs (GONGOs), 65 International NGOs, 3, 105, 123, 125–127, 133, 137, 179, 258, 267, 268, 276, 278 Islamic NGOs (INGOs), 5, 12, 67, 77, 78, 85–87, 89, 90, 92,

94–98, 102–114, 120–128, 130–135, 137–140, 173, 201, 216, 217, 230, 250, 257–259, 261, 262, 267, 283 Muslim FBOs/NGOs, 6, 41, 45 NGO-ization/ONG-ization, 8, 85, 86, 89, 201 Religious NGOs (RNGOs), 40, 87, 88, 109, 113, 259 Salafi NGOs, 10, 202 Saudi NGOs, 67, 71, 73, 125 Shi’i NGOs, 12, 202, 204, 212, 216, 221, 230, 234, 236, 240 Sunni NGOs, 12, 216 transnational Islamic charities, 64, 77, 78 Turkish NGOs, 11, 95, 284 O Official Development Assistance (ODA), 95, 126, 151, 160 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 4, 20, 28, 30, 93, 215, 276 P Pakistan, 5, 7, 21, 27, 77, 94, 125, 207, 250, 251, 253, 254 philanthropy, 143, 147, 150, 158, 162, 164, 165, 275 horizontal, 5, 8, 275 philanthropists, 73, 277, 278, 285 vertical, 5, 275, 276 prayer economics, 21 R Ramadan, 14, 67, 100, 104, 108, 110, 133, 161, 181, 227, 232, 255, 280, 282–284, 289 iftar (break-the-fast meals), 162, 226

Index

recipient, 13, 14, 16, 148, 159, 185, 188, 189, 193, 203, 209, 257, 276, 278, 280, 281, 298 Qur’an 9:60, 159 relative deprivation (RD), 12, 152, 153 representation essentialization, 6, 48, 54 individual representation, 41 institutional representation, 41, 47 polarization, 48, 54 suppression, 54 riba (interest), 144, 145 S sadaqa (voluntary alms), 4, 5, 13, 14, 26, 66, 86, 110, 146, 147, 150, 250, 255, 281 Salafism, 10, 234, 235, 238 Salafi/Salafis, 65, 70, 71, 75, 202, 231, 235, 236, 238, 257, 274 Saudi Arabia, 10, 21, 65, 70, 71, 74, 75, 78, 80, 93–95, 102, 124, 125, 131, 138, 146, 150, 151, 153, 162, 203, 220, 228, 235, 250 Senegal, 4, 7, 18, 24, 62, 69–71, 88, 90, 95, 237 Union de la Jeunesse Musulmane du Sénégal (UJMS), 70 shari’a (Muslim law), 7, 16, 25, 120, 130, 215, 239 Shi’a Khoja Shia Ithna-Asheri, 184 khums (one-fifth of acquired wealth), 230, 231 World Federation of Khoja Shia Ithna Asheri Muslim Communities, 223, 239 social control, 45 social welfare, 2, 11, 13, 16–19, 21, 26, 123, 132, 134, 140,

  311

144–146, 148, 150–152, 155, 160–162, 202, 247, 250–252, 255–257, 261, 262, 266–268, 274, 292, 294, 297 solidarity, 9, 39, 40, 67, 68, 88, 93, 100, 109, 144, 156, 159, 214 Somalia Al Islah, 12, 120–122, 127, 128, 137–140 Arafat Hospital, 132 Coalition for Grassroots Women Organization (COGWO), 128–130, 135, 139 Formal Private Education Network in Somalia (FPENS), 130–134, 137–139 Islamic Courts Union (ICU), 120, 136 Peace and Human Rights Network (PHRN-INXA), 135, 136 Somali Red Crescent Society, 125 United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), 126, 128, 137 South Africa, 5, 18, 22, 24, 26–29, 129 South African National Zakah Fund, 5 Strategic Initiative for Horn of Africa (SIHA), 129 Sudan (Republic of), 5, 21, 26–28, 94, 95, 124, 132, 138, 150 Sufi orders Muridiyya (Mourides), 69 Qadriyya, 69 Tijaniyya, 69–72, 258, 259, 274, 286 Sunni, 4, 12, 13, 65, 102, 183, 202, 214, 216–218, 226, 230, 235, 236, 291, 300 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), 2, 20, 26, 108, 112, 275, 278

312  Index T Tabaski (Aïd al-Kebir), 70. See also Eid tabligh (proselytization), 216, 222, 227 tabligh wa-da’wa (preaching the message of Allah), 10 Tanzania Ahl al-Bayt Centre (ABC), 204, 206, 217, 218, 220, 228–239 Baraza Kuu ya Waislamu Tanzania (BAKWATA), 178, 182, 183 Federation of Khoja Shia Ithna Asheri Jamaats of Africa, 213, 222 Khoja Ithna Asheri (Twelver) Shi‘a community (Khoja Twelver Shi‘i community), 203, 213, 228, 237 Radio Imaan FM, 178 Tanzania Muslim Professionals Organisation (TAMPRO), 178 Tanzania Shi‘a Muslim Youth Organization (TIMSIYO), 234 TV-Imaan, 178, 183 tawhid (unity), 13 thawab (reward), 6 transnational Islamic charities, 64, 77, 78 trust, 2, 5, 25, 29, 30, 42, 50, 61–69, 71–73, 79–81, 109, 146, 148, 170, 186, 280, 284, 285, 300 trustworthiness, 62, 67, 72, 73, 75, 78, 80, 81 U Uganda, 18, 129, 210, 228, 229, 233 ‘ulama (clerics), 148–151, 299 umma (community of Muslims), 14, 17, 70, 109, 144, 146, 150, 155, 159, 205, 260, 265, 268

United Arab Emirates, 125, 178, 181 Red Crescent Society, 126, 131 V voluntarism/volunteerism, 85, 86, 101, 110 W Wahhabism, 10, 235 waqf (pl. awqaf) mutawalli (waqf custodian), 148, 149 sadaqa mawqufa (immobilized alms), 148 waqf al-nuqud (cash awqaf), 145 World Association of Muslim Youth (WAMY), 70, 125, 131, 151, 162 World Zakat Forum (WZF), 18, 24, 288 Z zakat (obligatory alms) beneficiaries, 10, 12, 25, 29, 42, 114, 144, 145, 149, 150, 152, 165, 187, 193, 194, 289, 291, 301 nisab (threshold), 25, 281 recipients, 13–16, 193, 280, 281, 298 zakat al-fitr, 14, 110, 162, 280 Zakat Board, 25 Sokoto State Zakat and Endowment Commission (Nigeria), 294 Zamfara State (Nigeria), 25 Zakat fund Conselho Islâmico de Mocambique, 23

Index

Fondation Zakat et Waqf (Côte d’Ivoire), 23 Fonds Sénégalais pour la Zakat, 23 House of Zakat and Waqf (Uganda), 23, 24 Kano State Council for Zakat, 25 Malawi Islamic Zakaat Fund, 23 National Zakat Foundation – Kenya, 23, 24 Refugee Zakat Fund of the United Nations Refugee Agency UNHCR, 18 South African National Zakat Fund, 23, 29

  313

Taasisi ya Zaka Tanzania, 23 Zakat and Sadaqa Fund of Ghana, 23 Zakat and Sadaqat Foundation (Lagos State, Nigeria), 23, 25 Zakat Foundation of America, 5 Zanzibar Waqf and Trust Commission, 23 Zimbabwe National Zakat Fund, 23 Zanzibar, 22, 24, 184, 192, 206–208, 210, 212, 218, 229, 237 Zimbabwe, 22, 51, 205