Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare: Associational Life and Religion in Contemporary Africa and Latin America (Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy) 3031319591, 9783031319594

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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN RELIGION, POLITICS, AND POLICY

Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare Associational Life and Religion in Contemporary Africa and Latin America Edited by Miguel Glatzer Paul Christopher Manuel Christine A. Gustafson

Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy

Series Editor Mark J. Rozell, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Arlington, VA, USA

This series originated under the co-editorship of the late Ted Jelen and Mark J. Rozell. A generation ago, many social scientists regarded religion as an anachronism, whose social, economic, and political importance would inevitably wane and disappear in the face of the inexorable forces of modernity. Of course, nothing of the sort has occurred; indeed, the public role of religion is resurgent in US domestic politics, in other nations, and in the international arena. Today, religion is widely acknowledged to be a key variable in candidate nominations, platforms, and elections; it is recognized as a major influence on domestic and foreign policies. National religious movements as diverse as the Christian Right in the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan are important factors in the internal politics of particular nations. Moreover, such transnational religious actors as AlQaida, Falun Gong, and the Vatican have had important effects on the politics and policies of nations around the world. Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy serves a growing niche in the discipline of political science. This subfield has proliferated rapidly during the past two decades, and has generated an enormous amount of scholarly studies and journalistic coverage. Five years ago, the journal Politics and Religion was created; in addition, works relating to religion and politics have been the subject of many articles in more general academic journals. The number of books and monographs on religion and politics has increased tremendously. In the past, many social scientists dismissed religion as a key variable in politics and government. This series casts a broad net over the subfield, providing opportunities for scholars at all levels to publish their works with Palgrave. The series publishes monographs in all subfields of political science, including American Politics, Public Policy, Public Law, Comparative Politics, International Relations, and Political Theory. The principal focus of the series is the public role of religion. “Religion” is construed broadly to include public opinion, religious institutions, and the legal frameworks under which religious politics are practiced. The “dependent variable” in which we are interested is politics, defined broadly to include analyses of the public sources and consequences of religious belief and behavior. These would include matters of public policy, as well as variations in the practice of political life. We welcome a diverse range of methodological perspectives, provided that the approaches taken are intellectually rigorous. The series does not deal with works of theology, in that arguments about the validity or utility of religious beliefs are not a part of the series focus. Similarly, the authors of works about the private or personal consequences of religious belief and behavior, such as personal happiness, mental health, or family dysfunction, should seek other outlets for their writings. Although historical perspectives can often illuminate our understanding of modern political phenomena, our focus in the Religion, Politics, and Policy series is on the relationship between the sacred and the political in contemporary societies.

Miguel Glatzer · Paul Christopher Manuel · Christine A. Gustafson Editors

Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare Associational Life and Religion in Contemporary Africa and Latin America

Editors Miguel Glatzer Political Science, Olney Hall La Salle University Philadelphia, PA, USA

Paul Christopher Manuel Georgetown University McCourt School of Public Policy Washington, DC, USA

Christine A. Gustafson Deans Office, Alumni Hall Saint Anselm College Goffstown, NH, USA

ISSN 2731-6769 ISSN 2731-6777 (electronic) Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy ISBN 978-3-031-31959-4 ISBN 978-3-031-31960-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31960-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: kharps This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

But if I do, though you will not believe me, believe the works John 10:38 From the Douay-Rheims Bible

To Professor Ted Jelen (1952–2017) With our gratitude to a giant in the scholarly field of religion and politics

Foreword

Traveling to a Practical Theology conference in Brazil, we were advised to learn some basic Portuguese for getting around with taxis and Ubers. I learnt how to say: “My name is Yolanda Dreyer. I am from South Africa.” I am a South African, born and bred. I am a citizen of South Africa, which is on the continent of Africa. I can call myself a South African, but not an African. That is because I am white. Africans are not supposed to be white. I am an ordained minister of a Reformed church and a professor in practical theology at a leading African university. This identity, too, is not simply accepted. That is because I am a woman. Women are not supposed to be church leaders or theology scholars. Africa, religion, ethnicity, gender—woven together, they form part of an intricate tapestry. Beautiful images depict the rich heritage of an utterly fascinating continent. Heart-breaking images depict a devastating history and heritage, which is equally real. From my insider-outsider vantage point, I consider what welfare could mean in Africa. Just as Africa has a deeply inspiring and deeply tragic side, so does the term welfare. The first definition of welfare by Merriam-Webster is: “the state of doing well especially in respect to good fortune, happiness, wellbeing, or prosperity.” The question is what this positive picture would entail on a continent which is characterized by an enormous diversity of cultures, faiths, languages, and histories. Africa is not a melting pot, stirred together to become a grey mass of sameness. It is in the color and texture, the variety and surprise that the inspiration of Africa lies.

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At the end of the positive first definition of welfare, Merriam-Webster adds: “must look out for your own welfare.” This goes to ability and responsibility. African countries are not welfare states, such as those in other parts of the world. The resources are often not able to support the ideal of flourishing. Whose task is it then to ensure the welfare and flourishing of all in Africa? Is it possible for Africa “to look out for its own welfare”? The other side of welfare is defined by Merriam-Webster as: (noun) “aid in the form of money or necessities for those in need, an agency or program through which such aid is distributed,” and (adjective) “relating to, or concerned with improvement of the welfare of disadvantaged social groups” and “receiving public welfare benefits.” This side of welfare in the lived reality of Africa has probably received more attention than the “flourishing” and the “doing for yourself” aspect. The challenges are formidable: technological and economic inequality, a lack of access to resources and education, the climate crisis, the plight of women. From a socio-political human rights perspective, as well as from a religious “human beings created in the image of God” perspective, the question is: Where is human dignity in welfare-as-charity? Welfare is not the right of some to do well, flourish, and be happy, in the first sense of the word. Welfare is not Africa waiting for handouts, in the second sense of the word. Welfare is the concern of all, for all, by all— individuals, communities, institutions, societies, states, and countries. In Africa, a deeply religious continent, interreligious dialogue, religion–state dialogue, and cooperation with a focus on the welfare of all, can facilitate working together for the benefit and well-being of all. The book represents this colorful diversity. It contributes the two threads of welfare to the ongoing weaving of the tapestry that is contemporary Africa. The timeless words of John F. Kennedy in his Commencement Address at the American University, Washington on 10 June 1963, ring true still today and ring out over Africa: And if we cannot now end our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we are all mortal.

Yolanda Dreyer University of Pretoria Pretoria, South Africa

Preface

Thinking About the Role of Faith-based Communities in Contemporary Africa and Latin America As we note in the introduction to this third volume of our series on faithbased organizations and social welfare in comparative perspective, now more than ever, studying faith-based organizations’ provision of social welfare in Africa and Latin America is of central importance. Together, these two regions account for approximately 23% of the world’s population. At the same time, according to the Pew Research Center, Latin Americans and Africans are among the most religiously committed globally. We know that faith-based organizations are critical providers of social services in the African and Latin American countries considered in this volume—developing regions with generally great needs and low capacity. Although several African and Latin American countries have experienced high rates of economic growth in recent years, problems of poverty, corruption, low state capacity, high rates of regional inequality in income and access to state services, and large levels of migration and internally displaced people persist in many states, despite considerable variation. Our first two volumes (on Western and Eastern Europe) were completed just before the global COVID pandemic of 2019–2021. There have been many pandemic-related delays in the preparation of this current volume: some of our scholars dealt with illnesses; some dropped out of the

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project; all faced the loss of research support funding for their universities. We had originally planned on stand-alone volumes for Africa and Latin America, but the pandemic made that impossible. However, we are confident that this combined Africa/Latin America volume makes a significant contribution to the literature. Given the explicitly comparative nature of this volume, it may even provide more nuance, lessons, and insight to the theoretical questions we pose than what we had originally conceived. We are most grateful for those brave scholars who were able to contribute to this collection given the great challenges and obstacles caused by the COVID-19 global pandemic. The case studies in this volume examine what faith-based institutions are actually doing in a representative sample of African and Latin American countries: societies with and without a dominant religious tradition; and welfare states with different levels and types of state-provided social services. Among other practical questions, the chapters ask what types of social services activities faith-based organizations engage in; what their actual effects are on the nature of civil society and democratic processes; what impact these activities have on the character of national and local communities; what impact these activities have in their countries; and what new pressures would be brought to bear on the secular state welfare system if these faith-based organizations ceased to exist. This volume asks these questions to better understand whether faithbased institutions are playing a more complex and more significant role in deepening African and Latin American civil society than generally acknowledged, and also to determine if there is a need for social scientists to nuance their understanding of how faith-based organizations might play a constructive role in building social solidarity in their countries. Philadelphia, USA Washington, USA Goffstown, USA

Miguel Glatzer Paul Christopher Manuel Christine A. Gustafson

Acknowledgments

Miguel Glatzer and Paul Manuel first developed the idea for this series of volumes at the July 2015 Annual Meeting of the Council for European Studies at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) in Paris, France. They were each presenting conference papers on different aspects of social welfare programs and religion in Europe, and thought that a volume such as this could make an original theoretical contribution. Christine A. Gustafson, a specialist on Latin America, joined them in the preparation of this current volume. There are many people who made this series possible. We are especially thankful to Mark Rozell, the series editor at Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, who, along with the late Ted Jelen, believed in this project from the very beginning. Thanks also to our wonderful editors at Palgrave Macmillan, Geetha Chockalingam, Madison Allums, and Henry Rodgers. We are most grateful to Heather Dubnick for her masterful copyediting job. We are indebted to the anonymous reviewers of the original proposal for this volume for their very useful comments. We would mostly like to thank our families for their patience, encouragement, and support of our work, and especially so during the challenging period of the COVID-19 global pandemic. Sadly, Professor Ted Jelen, a giant in the field of religion and politics, and one of the original editors of this series died in 2017. Ted’s significant

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scholarly contributions helped the academy rediscover the vital variable of religion in the larger processes of political, social, and cultural change. He was a big supporter of this series. It is our honor to dedicate this work to him. Fall 2022

Miguel Glatzer Paul Christopher Manuel Christine A. Gustafson

Praise for Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare

“The vital importance of faith-based organizations in building resilient civil societies in Africa and Latin America is under-appreciated in international social policy studies. This book provides an indispensable and innovative contribution to a greater understanding of the ongoing role of faith-based organizations in providing social services to the vulnerable and their subsequent influence on associational life.” —Michael Glerup, Program Director, Religion and Society in Africa, The Whitney and Betty MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies, Yale University “The book provides a comprehensive survey of the relationship of faithbased organisations and social welfare in Africa and Latin America. The useful comparative angle provides an understanding of how faith and social welfare interact in these regions, where the state’s role in these respects is often limited. The book will usefully be read by anyone interested in this crucial issue, at a time of declining states and burgeoning religion.” —Jeffrey Haynes, Emeritus Professor of Politics, London Metropolitan University “This study asks an arresting question, namely, ‘What if faith-based social services in Africa and Asia disappeared?’ A friend familiar with NGOs supporting people living with HIV/AIDS once told me that he could xv

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always assume that projects run by Catholic sisters were the real McCoy because every cent was lovingly and effectively used and accounted for! The South African Muslim NGO Gift of the Givers enjoys a similarly impeccable reputation. So, the answer to the question is not only that the poor would lose out, but that we would be deprived of role models of selfless service of the common good and that therefore one can only commend this research which highlights such an important issue.” —Rev. Chris Chatteris, S.J., Lecturer at Saint Francis Xavier Seminary, City of Cape Town & Ignatius Community, Johannesburg, South Africa “This volume makes a significant scholarly contribution to the field of religion and politics. It is a must-read for those who are interested in the examining the role that faith-based organizations have played and continue to play in the provision of social services in the African and Latin American contexts. The chapters offer a robust discussion of the variety and scope of involvement in social service delivery by faith-based organizations in the specific cases presented.” —Catherine Wilson, Villanova University

Contents

Part I Theoretical Considerations 1

2

3

Religion, Faith-Based Organizations, and Welfare Delivery in Contemporary Africa and Latin America Miguel Glatzer, Paul Christopher Manuel, and Christine A. Gustafson

3

The Complex Context for Social Welfare and Human Capacity Strategies in Africa Katherine Marshall

25

“Africa Is Not a Country”: General Overview of Faith-Based Services and Social Welfare in Africa Nadine Bowers Du Toit and Barnabe Anzuruni Msabah

47

Part II

Societies With a Dominant Religious Marketplace

4

Muslim NGOs in Contemporary Ghana Holger Weiss

5

Faith-Based Organizations and the Challenge of Developmental Social Welfare in Democratic South Africa Ignatius Swart

75

99

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6

7

8

CONTENTS

Evolutionary Effectiveness of Faith-Based Organizations’ Public Agency in Kenya Richard Muko Ochanda and Humphrey Waliang’i Wafula From Prominence to Derision? Chile’s Religious Actors Confront a Turning Point in Their Social Welfare Roles Matthew E. Carnes and Raimundo Salas Schweikart The Church of the Poor, Civil Society, and Democracy in Southern Mexico: Oaxaca, 1960s–2010s Juan Manuel Lombera

141

163

185

Part III Societies with Mixed Religious Marketplaces 9

10

11

12

Faith-Based Organizations, Society, and the State in Chad Mayke Kaag

215

Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare: Associational Life and Religion in Nigeria Omobolaji O. Olarinmoye

241

Faith-Based Organizations, Society, and the State in Mozambique Victoria Armando Chifeche

271

The Contributions of Faith-Based Organizations in Uruguay, the Most Secularized Country in Latin America Nestor Da Costa

Index

289

309

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Miguel Glatzer is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Leadership and Global Understanding Program at La Salle University. In addition to journal articles and book chapters, he has co-edited five books. His current research focuses on social policy, labor market policy, the European sovereign debt crisis, financial literacy, and immigration. He holds a Ph.D. in government from Harvard University. Paul Christopher Manuel is Visiting Professor of Government at Claremont McKenna College, Washington DC campus, a research fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University and a local affiliate at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts. His research interests address democratization, comparative public policy, and the relationship between religion and politics, especially in a post-transition setting. Manuel has authored or co-authored twelve books and numerous scholarly articles. He holds an MTS from Boston College and a Ph.D. in government from Georgetown University. Christine A. Gustafson is Professor of Politics at Saint Anselm College in New Hampshire. She previously served as dean of academic excellence, associate dean of the college, and associate dean for faculty development

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and assessment. Her research interests include the international political economy of development, Brazilian political economy, theories of culture and institutional change, and the politics of religion. She holds an M.A. in international relations from the University of Southern California, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Brown University.

Contributors Matthew E. Carnes Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA Victoria Armando Chifeche University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa Nestor Da Costa Catholic Uruguay

University

Nadine Bowers Du Toit University South Africa

of

of

Uruguay,

Montevideo,

Stellenbosch,

Stellenbosch,

Miguel Glatzer Political Science, La Salle University, Philadelphia, PA, USA Christine A. Gustafson Saint Anselm College, Manchester, NH, USA Mayke Kaag African Studies Centre Leiden, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands Juan Manuel Lombera University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA Paul Christopher Manuel Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA Katherine Marshall Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA Barnabe Anzuruni Msabah University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, South Africa Richard Muko Ochanda Center for Leadership and Management, Tangaza University College, Nairobi, Kenya Omobolaji O. Olarinmoye Yale University Library, New Haven CT, USA

EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

xxi

Raimundo Salas Schweikart Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA Ignatius Swart Department of Religion and Theology, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa Humphrey Waliang’i Wafula Graduate School of Business, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya Holger Weiss Åbo Akademi University, Turku, Finland

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2

Fig. 3.3 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2

Fig. 4.3

Four dimensions of comparative inquiry: Africa and Latin America Social safety nets in development policy Expansion of social safety net programs across Africa (Source ASPIRE data presented in Beegle, Coudouel, and Monsalve 2018) Diagram showing African religious affiliation (34 countries, Afrobarometer 2016/2018) (a) and (b) Diagrams showing slight changes in religious affiliation in Sub-Saharan Africa (Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures 2010–2020) Diagram showing contact with religious leaders in Africa (Afrobarometer 2016/2018) Frameworks of Muslim NGOs in Ghana Location of headquarters of Muslim NGOs in Ghana (Abbreviations: GAR = Greater Accra Region; AR = Ashanti Region; NR = Northern Region; ER = Eastern Region; WR = Western Region; CR = Central Region; UWR = Upper West Region; BER = Bono East Region; UER = Upper East Region; BR = Bono Region; NER = North East Region; SR = Savannah Region; AhR = Ahafo Region; VR = Volta Region) (Source 2021 GMNGO Database; n = 444) Start of Ghanaian Muslim NGOs on Facebook (Source 2021 GMNGO Database; total entries: 353)

6 29

40 49

50 51 78

88 90

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 4.4 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 6.1

Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2 Fig. 9.1

Fig. 10.1 Fig. 12.1 Fig. 12.2

Fig. 12.3

Presence/duration of Ghanaian Muslim NGOs on Facebook (Source 2021 GMNGO Database; n = 362) Change in religious affiliation in South Africa, 1991–2022 Religious affiliation in South Africa, 2022 Religious demographics in Kenya (Christian 85.5% [Protestant 33.4%, Catholic 20.6%, Evangelical 20.4%, African Instituted Churches 7%, other Christian 4.1%], Muslim 10.9%, other 1.8%, non-affiliated 1.8%) (Source Kenya Census Data 2019) Changes in religious affiliation in Chile, 1995–2020 (Source Latinobarómetro) Religious affiliation in Chile, 2020 (Source Latinobarómetro) Change in religious affiliation in Mexico, 1980–2020 Religious affiliation in Mexico, 2020 Chad religious composition (Source CIA Factbook Chad, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ chad/#people-and-society, accessed 12 December 2022) Religious affiliation in Nigeria, 2015 Distribution of beliefs in Uruguay (Source Based on data from the Pew Forum on Religion) Changes in religious identity in Uruguay (Source Compilation based on data from the INE and the Pew Forum on Religion) Evolution of sacraments of the Catholic Church in Montevideo, 1990–2010 (Source Information provided by Diocesis of Montevideo)

91 105 106

146 166 167 191 191

218 251 295

297

298

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 2.1 Table 4.1

Table 5.1 Table 5.2

Table 12.1 Table 12.2

Religious composition of our case studies from Africa and Latin America (Data from 2020) Numbers of Catholic Church Facilities in Brazil, 2019 Number of Catholic Church Social Protection Facilities in Africa Ghana Census 2021: Muslim population per region (figures for total and Muslim population retrieved from Ghana 2021 Population and Housing Census. General Report Volume 3C Background Characteristics [Accra: Ghana Statistical Service, November 2021]) Religious affiliation in South Africa: 1996 national census data Empirical evidence from selected project research on FBO social welfare activities on the ground in democratic South Africa Distribution of beliefs in Uruguay, 2014 Distribution of beliefs in Uruguay, 2006 and 2014

7 16 30

89 104

120 295 296

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PART I

Theoretical Considerations

CHAPTER 1

Religion, Faith-Based Organizations, and Welfare Delivery in Contemporary Africa and Latin America Miguel Glatzer, Paul Christopher Manuel, and Christine A. Gustafson

This third volume in our series on faith-based organizations and social welfare seeks to understand the role and function of religious-based organizations in strengthening associational life, and in the process, legitimizing a role for faith in the public sphere. This current volume focuses

M. Glatzer (B) Political Science, La Salle University, Philadelphia, PA, USA e-mail: [email protected] P. C. Manuel Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] C. A. Gustafson Saint Anselm College, Manchester, NH, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Glatzer et al. (eds.), Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31960-0_1

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primarily on Africa, but also includes a few cases from Latin America to deepen the comparative analysis; the previous volumes in the series have examined countries in Western and Eastern Europe. Now more than ever, studying faith-based organizations’ provision of social welfare in Africa and Latin America is of central importance.1 Almost 1.2 billion people live in Sub-Saharan Africa and another 658 million live in Latin America and the Caribbean. Together, these two regions account for approximately 23% of the world’s population.2 At the same time, according to the Pew Research Center, Latin Americans and Africans are among the most religiously committed globally.3 We know that FBOs are critical providers of social services in developing regions—including Africa and Latin America—where needs are great and state capacity is often lacking. Although several African and Latin American countries have experienced high rates of economic growth in recent years, problems of poverty, corruption, low state capacity, high rates of regional inequality in income and access to state services, and large levels of migration and internally displaced people persist in many states, despite considerable variation. As noted in a recent report, one faith-based organization, the Catholic Church “is the largest non-state provider of education, health care, and social protection services in the world,” making significant contributions to reaching the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals, and this is the case for other “faith networks” too.4 Moreover, the work of faith-based organizations could be especially salient in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, given its negative impacts on health, education, and poverty levels in these regions. The World Bank, in its 2022 Poverty and Shared Prosperity Report, states that the pandemic “dealt the biggest setback to global poverty in decades” and that the poorest suffered “disproportionately,” including in the areas of health and education, with “devastating consequences, including premature mortality and pronounced learning losses.”5 Yet faith-based organizations are not well studied or understood by scholars of social policy in Africa and Latin America, even while they know that faith-based organizations’ activities and impact are likely to be significant. Katherine Marshall has observed, for example, that religious organizations are a relatively new focus of investigation and engagement in international development circles,6 while Cammett and MacLean have noted that research on social welfare has been heavily focused on “advanced industrial economies.”7 Koehrsen and Heuser explain that religious organizations were for a long time lumped together with

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5

other non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Faith-based organization’s unique, “on the ground” knowledge and credibility with local populations came to be appreciated by global development agencies only later, post-1990. The international efforts that led first to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) announcement in 2000, and later to implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) after 2015 heightened awareness that faith-based organizations could be effective development partners.8 There are important exceptions, of course, including the recent special issue of The Review of Faith in International Affairs, of which Marshall’s essay forms a part.9 The authors in this volume are key contributors to this emerging literature as well, with their research helping to consolidate a bibliography of work to date. Overall, then, we wonder how faith-based organizations, in the face of enormous social and economic challenges in the African and Latin American contexts, might contribute to welfare services. Put another way, based on available data, which new pressures would be placed on the state social programs if religious organizations (Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, others) simply stopped offering their services? What does the available data indicate? In each case study, we seek to provide data and context to what is happening on the ground. Also, like each of the volumes in this series, our authors are less interested in why people volunteer their services (arguably, an interesting question in itself), and more focused on what difference (if any) the ongoing role of faith-based organizations makes in the provision of social services to the vulnerable and in contemporary African and Latin American associational life. We contend that it’s a question worth studying.

Conceptualizing Variation in Contemporary Latin America and Africa As we gaze upon Africa and Latin America in 2023, we find a complex range of cultural, political, and religious activities at the grassroots level of civil society. This activity calls for serious scholarly attention. This volume takes up that call as it seeks to capture the rich, lived reality of religion and politics, as well as faith and culture. It examines seven African cases and three Latin American ones, selected to maximize variation along four dimensions: type of religious marketplace, level of democratization, human development indicators, and type of social security program (see

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FREE: Chile, Uruguay, South Africa PARTLY FREE: Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria NOT FREE: Chad LEVEL OF DEMOCRATIZATION

HIGHER LEVEL RANK: Chile (4); Uruguay (57); South Africa (113) MEDIUM LEVEL RANK: Mexico (76); Ghana (133), Kenya (147) LOWER LEVEL RANK: Nigeria (163); Mozambique (180), Chad (186) HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

FOUR DIMENSIONS OF COMPARATIVE INQUIRY DOMINANT: Chile, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Mexico MIXED : Chad, Uruguay, Mozambique, Nigeria TYPE OF RELIGIOUS MARKETPLACE

UNIVERSAL, SOCIAL INSURANCE, & SOCIAL ASSISTANCE: Chile SOCIAL INSURANCE and SOCIAL ASSISTANCE: Chad, Mozambique, South Africa MANDATORY INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT, SOCIAL INSURANCE, and /or PROVIDENT FUND SYSTEM: Ghana, Mexico, Uruguay, Nigeria, Kenya TYPE OF SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

Fig. 1.1 Four dimensions of comparative inquiry: Africa and Latin America10

Fig. 1.1). We find that we can align all of our case studies around four main comparative categories. First Comparative Dimension: The Level of Freedom: Our case studies include some authoritarian countries that have failed in several fields central to effective liberal democracy. These include freedom of the press; electoral processes; the election of autocrats and semi-autocrats; judicial independence and the rule of law; corruption, clientelism, nepotism, and transparency; as well as a few countries where democracy is better established. Our cases cut across Freedom House’s tripartite classification of countries. We have cases of countries listed as “free,” including Chile (90/ 100), Uruguay (98/100), and South Africa (79/100); five cases are “partly free” countries: Mexico (62/100), Ghana (64/100). Mozambique (45/100), Nigeria (47/100), and Kenya (48/100). Finally, one of our cases is listed as “not free,” Chad (17/100). These classifications include Christian and Muslim dominated societies in Africa as well as Roman Catholic monopolies and mixed societies in Latin America. Second Comparative Dimension: Religious Marketplace: Our case studies exhibit marked variation in religious affiliation and the religious composition of their societies. Adapting the theoretical model developed by Ted Gerard Jelen and Clyde Wilcox,11 we can meaningfully classify our various

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case studies in terms of distinct forms of religious marketplaces, or societies. Based on the information provided by the Association of Religion Data from 2020, five of the societies in this volume feature religious marketplaces dominated by Christianity (Catholic or Protestant); namely, Chile, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, and South Africa; and four cases constitute cases of mixed religious marketplaces: Chad, Uruguay, Mozambique, and Nigeria. Each chapter will detail the religious make-up, history, and trajectory of the country under consideration (Table 1.1). Third Comparative Dimension: UN Human Development Indicators: Based on the data in the 2019 United Nations Human Development Report, Beyond Income, Beyond Averages, Beyond Today: Inequalities in Human Development in the 21st Century, we can see that there is great variation among our cases. The Human Development Index (HDI) is a statistical composite index of life expectancy, education, and per-capita income indicators. It is a particularly useful tool to rank the challenges faced by the cases under consideration. The volume features three cases that rank considerably higher among the other case studies, Chile (42), Uruguay (57), and South Africa (113); three cases that are in the medium rank, Mexico (76), Ghana (133), and Kenya (147); and four that are ranked low, Nigeria (158), Mozambique (180), and Chad (186). Fourth Comparative Dimension: Types of Welfare System: There is a wide variety of social protection among our case studies. One case, Table 1.1 Religious composition of our case studies from Africa and Latin America (Data from 2020) Country Chad Chile Ghana Kenya Mexico Mozambique Nigeria South Africa Uruguay

Christianity (%) 35.2 88.2 71.1 81 95.7 55.8 46.2 81.8 63.6

Islam (%) 55.3 – 18 7.9 – 17.5 45.9 1.7

Unaffiliated, atheists, agnostics, other (%) 7.5 10.5 10.4 10.2 4.1 26.1 7.6 15.2 35.4

Source Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), 2020, https://thecrg.org/resources/The_Ass ociation_of_Religion_Data_Archives

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Chile, has universal social insurance and social assistance programs; the other nine cases—Chad, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda—feature less elaborate social insurance and social assistance programs, and/or provident fund, and/or mandatory individual account programs. There is no clear pattern among the cases. Countries ranked higher by the UN human development indicators have opted for different systems, but most seem to prefer a more basic social assistance program. Although progress is occurring, a high informal sector in labor markets is common, which means many people lack access to the formal social security and unemployment insurance systems. Some Latin American countries have innovated in the field of social assistance, with conditional cash transfers reducing poverty while increasing vaccination rates for children and attendance at school, for example. Programs such as Bolsa Familia in Brazil and Oportunidades in Mexico reached 1 in 4 Latin Americans in 2013.12 Given the large informal sector in many African societies, however, coverage of these programs is very low, and, for most people, benefits are as well. Progress has been greater in health and education services than in income security, but conditional cash transfer programs are starting to appear.

On the Implications of Studying Africa and Latin America vs. Europe In shifting our focus from Europe to Africa and Latin America, we move geographically from the global north to the global south, with interesting and significant implications for our concepts and analytical lens. Certainly, our four dimensions of comparison—type of religious marketplace, human development indicators, level of democratization, and type of social security programs—continue to highlight salient variations in faith-based organization activity and impact across our cases. At the same time, we make two observations about their application to African and Latin American countries. First, our four dimensions look very different—sometimes orders of magnitude different—when we apply them to African and Latin American cases. In terms of the religious marketplace, we can still observe—as in the European context—societies that are dominated by “one, few, or many” religious faiths,13 but African and Latin American countries are

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more religious overall than European countries14 ; that is, they have fewer agnostics, atheists, and those reporting “no religion.” There is variation to be sure—both between the two regions and within each region, with Africa being more religious on balance than Latin America, and certain Latin American cases (Uruguay and Chile) showing higher percentages of “no religion” than the regional average. But the implications for the secularization thesis’s relevance in Africa and Latin America are real.15 In a similar way, the levels of both democratization and human development indicators are generally lower in Africa and Latin America than Europe, again with cross- and subregional variation. Latin America tends to have higher levels of democratization and human development than does Africa, and both regions have notable outliers, such as Chile and South Africa. Finally, as already noted, unlike in the European context, the existence of “welfare states,” with universal coverage, or even extensive social safety nets, is all but absent in Africa and Latin America. Indeed, the immediate explanation for this lack of strong social welfare systems—comparatively higher socioeconomic and political challenges— leads to our second observation: our African and Latin American cases raise new issues and themes linked to their distinctive reality. Four variables are especially significant for analyzing faith-based organizations’ activities and are reflected in our case studies: first, the impact of colonial legacy; second, the degree of political stability and state effectiveness; third, the level of economic vulnerability or dependence, and fourth, the influence of geopolitics and global crises. These four factors are interrelated, but it is helpful to look at each independently and briefly. First, the impact of colonial legacy causes considerable variation among our cases: The relatively recent experiences of colonization and decolonization—especially for African states—are important factors in the way faith-based organizations operate in our case studies, but there is no unifying pattern among our cases. The colonial legacy has almost no bearing on faith-based organizations in the majority of European countries. In both Latin America and Africa, missionaries played important roles in the “founding” of states and in the development of state institutions, for good and ill. In Latin America, the Catholic Church was present from the beginning of European contact and for centuries was hardly separable from Spanish and Portuguese colonial administrations in most places. Even after most Latin American countries gained independence in the first part of the nineteenth century, the Church continued

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to play an important role in education, health care, and other forms of social protection. In Africa, the time frame, identity of the colonizers, and patterns of missionary activity were different, but perhaps even more impactful, being more recent. In any case, the colonial legacy can create both challenges and opportunities for faith-based organizations. For faithbased organizations associated with the colonizer’s religion, there might be a negative perception, in which the faith-based organization is seen as an agent of oppression or inappropriate values. At the same time, local churches and faith-based organizations might benefit from funding opportunities and other support offered by the former colonial power (e.g., French support for Chad) or by transnational faith-based organizations of the same religion (e.g., Caritas activities in multiple countries with a Catholic legacy). Of note, perhaps the anti-secular positions adopted by many faithbased groups in Africa and Latin America derive from a generalized anti-colonial feeling among their populations. That is, there appears to be greater advocacy for conservative positions by churches in African and Latin American countries than the “strategic silence” model applicable to Western Europe churches (e.g., bans on gay marriage and abortion). Interestingly, Pew Research Center has found that “Christians in Latin Africa and Latin America tend to pray more frequently, attend religious services more regularly and consider religion more important in their lives than Christians elsewhere in the world.”16 Asserting traditional policies in response to controversial social issues—sometimes portrayed as a form of cultural neo-colonialism—appears to have greater salience in Africa and to a lesser degree in Latin America than in Europe. We wonder how and why churches seem to have greater success in advancing their teachings in Africa and Latin America than in Europe. Second, the degree of political stability and state effectiveness: Linked to colonial legacy but separate from it is the way in which political stability and state capacity affect social welfare provision and faith-based organization activities in our African and Latin American cases. Differently from the European context, African and Latin American countries’ freedom scores can mask deeper patterns. Even the states in our sample that are currently “free” or “partly free” have been so for a relatively short time—since the third wave of global democratization in the 1980s and 1990s. Many of them have a recent history of civil war (some linked to decolonization), as well as military dictatorships, and/or alteration

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between electoral and authoritarian government. In those that are democratizing, the provision of social welfare and other public goods can be a critical factor in voter satisfaction, regime support, and thus democratic consolidation. At the same time, Latin American and African states vary widely in terms of state capacity and governance—regardless of how “free” their governments are. Levels of bureaucratic rationality, professionalization, resources, and infrastructure can all affect the quality and scope of social services like health care, education, and pensions. Moreover, the trend toward neoliberal reforms since the late 1980s—including budget cuts, privatization, and overall state “shrinking”—has impacted state capacity too. The resources available for social service provision have lessened dramatically in some cases. This context of political uncertainty and limited state capacity—though variable across our cases and between Africa and Latin America—creates opportunities and problems for faithbased organizations. Certainly, the retreat of the state or the inability of the state to provide security and social welfare means there is ample space for faith-based organizations, both domestic and international, to fill the gaps. Yet an atmosphere of social tension, conflict, and/or deprivation can negatively impact faith-based organizations too. Third, the level of economic vulnerability or dependence: All countries today are impacted by globalization to varying degrees. The integration of global trade, finance, and production, as well as the speeding up of communications and transportation, have created new opportunities and vulnerabilities. These are not distributed evenly, however, and on balance poor countries—such as those in our case studies—tend to be at a disadvantage. The wave of neoliberal reforms—implemented to varying degrees by African and Latin American countries—have contributed to dependence on trade for meeting domestic needs. Price volatility and shocks in global markets can have devastating effects, in the absence of state protections. The global economy has experienced several of these crises in recent decades, including the 2008 financial crisis and the recent crises wrought by COVID-19 and the Russia–Ukraine War. Country vulnerabilities vary based on several factors: the nature of the trade portfolio, the level of government indebtedness, the size of the internal market, the quality of domestic infrastructure, access to finance and capital markets, and more. There are enormous differences between a Brazil or Chile on the one hand, and a Mozambique and Chad on the other. Differences within regions are also substantial. In general, though,

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this reality of economic vulnerability, and the way that less developed countries (LDCs) are inserted into the global economy, is critical for understanding social welfare and faith-based organizations in our case studies. Rich donor countries in Europe, North America, and the Arab States can have much more influence than they would in other contexts. International Financial Institutions and Transnational faith-based organizations can also play an outsized role, partnering with local faith-based organizations to fill gaps in education, health care, poverty alleviation, food security, and more. The resources that become available from these partners can be welcome, but dependence on them can also undermine local values and autonomy. As with any other factor we have discussed, the level of economic vulnerability and dependence creates both opportunities and challenges for faith-based organizations in Africa and Latin America. In addition, it is important to note that in economically dependent, religiously plural societies, the distinction between divisive and reconciliatory stances perhaps becomes even more important. For instance, as can be seen in the case of Nigeria, religion can be a divisive force in society, emphasizing differences among groups, and stressing ethnonational factors to divide a national population. In other cases, such as in contemporary Mexico, the post-Vatican II Mexican Catholic Church has instead emphasized collaboration, dialogue with multiple sides, and respect for the dignity of all persons around the theological notion of an “option for the poor.”17 Fourth, the influence of geopolitics and global crises: If African and Latin American countries are relatively more vulnerable to global economic crises and shocks than their richer European counterparts, they are also heavily impacted by geopolitical factors. Again, all the dynamics we are discussing are interconnected, but it can be useful to separate international political and security pressures from economic ones. As our cases illustrate, Western interests in reducing migration, in fighting terrorism, in containing China and Russia, and the like, can impact faith-based organizations very differently. Islamic faith-based organizations, for example, could be negatively impacted by perceived association, fairly or not, with jihad. Kaag discusses this dynamic in the case of Chad. At the same time, the priorities of Western countries and donors can also create opportunities for faith-based organizations. If, for example, donors believe partnering with faith-based organizations to create better social safety

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nets in poor countries will lessen social conflict, radicalization, and/or the tendency of people to migrate, then they could provide needed funding for faith-based organization activities. Another emerging global dynamic is the rise of populism and increased polarization in many rich countries, spurred on by the pressures of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although it is too soon to see the consequences of this polarization for faith-based organizations and social welfare in our case studies, it will be interesting to see if it provides greater opportunities for some faiths than others. We should also note that foreign support has been an important source of income supporting the social welfare work performed by the faith-based organization in many of our case studies. Foreign religious organizations operating in Africa and Latin America (e.g., schools, orphanages, clinics, support to refugees and internally displaced people, and the like) perform important functions.

Excursus: Social Welfare and Faith-Based Organizations in Brazil Brazil is a fascinating case that brings to life many of the concerns and themes of this volume. It is considered a “free” country by Freedom House; features a Christian majority society previously dominated by the Roman Catholic Church; ranks 79 (medium) on the human development index; and runs a medium-level social assistance program. Like our other case studies, Brazil continues to endure a series of social challenges, including poverty, inequality, marginalization, and social violence. It therefore serves as a good example of how faith-based organizations, in the face of such enormous obstacles, might contribute to welfare services in an ostensibly secular democracy. Let’s briefly look at faith-based organization activities in Brazil in terms of the four key factors identified above: the impact of colonial legacy, the degree of political stability and state effectiveness, the level of economic vulnerability or dependence, and the influence of geopolitics and global crises. In a pattern typical of Latin America more generally, the Catholic Church was present in Brazil from the very first moments of European contact, and Catholicism remained the dominant religious force until very recently. Throughout the colonial period, from 1500 to 1822, the Catholic hierarchy was part of the Portuguese colonial state authority, and

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even after Brazilian independence, Catholicism remained the state religion until 1889.18 Thereafter, Brazil experienced alternating periods of authoritarianism and democratic government, culminating in the current democratic constitution of 1988 and the election of the first president by universal suffrage in 1989. At every stage, the Catholic Church provided important services in Brazilian society, particularly in the areas of health care, education, and poverty alleviation. Indeed, it has supplemented— to varying degrees over time—the Brazilian state’s own social welfare systems, even in a country that has had juridical separation of church and state for a very long time. The overall degree of political stability and state effectiveness in Brazil provides generally favorable conditions for the work of faith-based organizations. Brazil can certainly be considered a “free” country with a stable federal republic, but the country has endured a tumultuous phase with the 2018 election of President Jair Bolsonaro. Considered bombastic and even dangerous by his opponents, Bolsonaro appeals to both traditional conservative and right-leaning segments of the population. Not unlike Donald Trump in the United States, Bolsonaro’s perceived erratic leadership style eventually led to calls in the national legislature for his impeachment; he managed to survive these political challenges.19 Since 2019, many Brazilian political commentators have understandably been focused on the political turmoil of the Bolsonaro era, which may have been very good for television ratings. At the same time, the vital work of faith-based organizations in civil society to assist the poor and marginalized continued almost under the radar of the national media. Bolsonaro is very friendly to organized, and especially conservative religious organizations, and is generally supportive of their social work in civil society. He is particularly known to be allied with the Pentecostal movement, including their representatives in the Brazilian legislature. The current political polarization between left and right in Brazil likely has an impact on public perception as well. The association of evangelicals with Bolsonaro and the political right, for example, could lessen their support among Brazilians who dislike the president’s policies—such as his handling of the pandemic and treatment of the environment. Both the Catholic Church and Pentecostal Churches have also seen their share of scandals to be sure, which could also negatively impact how they are viewed by the population. Nevertheless, churches in general remain highly respected in Brazil. The 2020 Latinobarómetro report found that 67% of Brazilians surveyed had either a great deal or some confidence in “the

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church,” though the question did not specify denomination. In fact, the church was the most respected of all institutions referenced in the survey, including the armed forces (57%), the police (48%), the judiciary (36%), the presidency (30%), congress (23%), and political parties (13%).20 It may be too soon to have a clear picture of the overall results of Brazilian faith-based organizations’ activities and involvement during the Bolsonaro era. The level of economic dependence is another factor to consider. The significance of the church’s contributions to social welfare in Brazil has historically waxed and waned in relation to the development of state funded and managed systems. These did increase in scope and sophistication over the course of the twentieth century and down to the present. However, in practice, these state systems have never covered all Brazilians. Even the social security system guaranteed in the 1988 constitution, whose articles 194, 195, and 201 created rights to “healthcare, pensions and other labour-related benefits, welfare schemes, and unemployment insurance” has been implemented unevenly.21 The International Labour Organization estimates that 69.9% of Brazilians are covered by at least one social protection benefit, while 79% have universal health coverage. Only 45.9% of vulnerable persons are covered by social assistance.22 These constitutional rights have also come under increasing threat due to budget cuts, as well as the more market-oriented policy stance of recent right-leaning governments, including that of Bolsonaro. The COVID-19 pandemic, along with its attendant economic crises, only intensified need, and further strained resources. Gaps in state-provided services have created opportunities for many private actors in the Brazilian social services sphere, including faith-based organizations. Brazil today is a religiously plural society. According to the last census in 2010, Catholics represented 64.6% of the population, a figure that as recently as 1980 was 89%. Protestants accounted for 22.2%, of which 13.3% were Pentecostals, and those reporting no religion were 8.0%.23 More recent survey research reported by Datafolha in 2022 shows a further decline in Catholics (49%), as well as increases for both Protestants (26%) and those with no religion (14%).24 These trends are similar to those in other Latin American countries, as the religious marketplace becomes more competitive. In Brazil, this religious pluralism has meant that Pentecostal faith-based organizations are increasingly visible and significant in both the political and social spheres. Many scholars have studied the differences in

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how the Catholic Church and Pentecostal churches act in the Brazilian public square.25 They have noted the Catholic Church’s important role in defending social justice during the military period (1964–1985) and in supporting the return to full democracy. Inspired by Catholic Social Teaching—and with its extensive network of churches, Christian base communities, and pastorals (to support indigenous peoples, for example)—the Catholic Church has been prominently involved in the social sphere to this day. Its influence strategy has been characterized as apolitical, with a general avoidance of formal electoral strategies and political party alliances, and multiple partnerships with like-minded faith-based organizations and other social actors. According to data from 2019, the Catholic Church had the following operations in Brazil (Table 1.2). In comparative terms, Brazil ranks fifth globally for both the number of Catholic health-care facilities and social protection facilities (orphanages, nurseries, care for elderly, etc.). Although data for individual countries is difficult to gauge, Wodon estimates that the market shares of Catholic Schools in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2018 were 6.9% for primary schools, 4.4% for secondary schools, and 6.0% for higher education. For Catholic hospitals and health centers, he estimates that their regional market shares in 2019 were 5.0 and 1.6% respectively.26 These percentages, of course, do not tell us how many people are served by Catholic schools and health facilities. Systematic data for the operations of faith-based organizations of other faiths is not readily available for Brazil, though we know that there are many Protestant-sponsored international faith-based organizations. Examples include World Vision, Mission21, and the Adventist Development and Relief Agency.27 It is also the case that Pentecostal churches, being on average smaller and more decentralized than other denominations, tend to be located where most Brazilians actually live. This contrasts Table 1.2 Numbers of Catholic Church Facilities in Brazil, 2019

Preschools Primary schools Secondary schools

1,191 1,352 830

Orphanages

387

Hospitals Dispensaries Facilities for Elderly Nurseries

278 704 690 874

Source Wodon, Global Report on Integral Human Development, 2022

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with the limited reach of Catholic parishes. These Pentecostal churches are also known for offering spiritual services to combat social problems and have been credited with meeting the needs of the poor and vulnerable because of their greater presence. Some of the larger Pentecostal churches, such as the Universal Church of the Reign of God, have ambitious political and communication strategies. Unlike the Catholic Church, they align with political parties, sponsor candidates, operate large media outlets, and more.28 The influence of geopolitics and global crises is a fourth important factor. Brazil has long aspired to become a leading global economic power. This aspiration, however, has been hindered by a poorly functioning national economy with untapped natural resources. Brazil continues to hold out the promise of an emerging twenty-first-century global market to foreign investors, but much work remains to be done.29 In the meantime, the national economy remains vulnerable to global economic crises, and its marginalized population remains susceptible to economic crises. Social needs remain great and state capacity is lacking in contemporary Brazil. As such, faith-based organizations remain critical providers of social services there: Brazil helps us to better understand how faith-based organizations might contribute to welfare services in a very challenging environment.

The Plan for the Rest of the Volume We have gathered a renowned group of scholars from across the globe who specialize in the area of social welfare and religion. To maintain harmony with the other books in the series, each chapter is loosely structured around the following five key questions, three of which were developed by Jeffrey Haynes and Anja Henning (2011).30 1. Path Development: What is the path of the church–state relationship in each country? What is the current religious make-up of the society? 2. Objectives: What do religious actors intend to achieve in their public agency? 3. Means and Strategies: How do religious actors operate in the public square?

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4. Effects: What are the consequences (intended or unintended) of religious actors’ political/public involvement? What pressures would be brought on social programs if these services were stopped? 5. Public Perception: How is religion viewed by the population?

The Chapters in This Volume The preface is authored by Yolanda Deyer, who reminds us that Africa is a complicated place, and that we must carefully approach our case studies with nuance and cultural understanding. We then begin the volume with two theoretical chapters that examine some of the critical theoretical issues under consideration in the case studies. Katherine Marshall starts us off with an analysis of how welfare democracy has evolved in Africa. Marshall provides an excellent discussion about the diverse ideas driving social protection and policy, including education and health. Her regional focus is on Sub-Saharan Africa; the themes she considers include the gaps between policy and practice, needs and delivery; diverging philosophies driving social protection policies; and the ambivalent attitudes in various countries toward engagement with religious institutions in their policy analysis and strategies. Marshall’s outstanding introduction is followed by an excellent contribution by Nadine Bowers and Barnabe Anzuruni Msabah, who focus on the question of faith-based organizations and secular welfare services in Africa. They show us the complexity of Africa and argue that a multifaceted approach is required. Via the theoretical lens of a “double legacy” of faith communities in terms of the history of colonialism and its intersection with social welfare, Bowers and Msabah present a fine overview of faith-based services and social welfare in Africa, considering the issues of corruption; state failure and injustice; gender justice; and the ongoing tensions inherent in donor aid from faith-based organizations on the continent. The case studies that follow are classified by the form of religious marketplaces, as developed by Ted Jelen and Clyde Wilcox: namely, societies dominated by a single religious marketplace and those featuring a mixed religious marketplace.

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Societies with a Dominant Religious Marketplace The first set of case studies group together five countries that have a dominant religious marketplace: Holger Weiss examines Muslim organizations in predominantly Christian Ghana; Ignatius Swart follows with a chapter on South Africa; and Richard Muko Ochanda and Humphrey Waliang’i Wafula offer a contribution on Kenya. We then turn our attention to two cases from Latin America: Mathew Carnes and Raimundo Salas Schweikart write on Chile, and Juan Manuel Lombera finishes this section of the volume with a chapter on Mexico. Holger Weiss examines how Muslim organizations provide social welfare services in predominantly Christian Ghana. First noting how the North–South divide in Ghana has complicated political life there, he proceeds to describe the contemporary NGO landscape in Ghana. Weiss points out that while most faith-based organizations in Ghana are Christian, non-denominational, or secular, the growing work of Muslim NGOs in Ghana have not received sufficient scholarly attention. To remedy this, Weiss carefully examines their work over the last two decades, with a focus on how social media has helped expand the reach of Muslim NGOs in Ghana. Ignatius Swart then offers an exhaustive and detailed study of faithbased organizations in South Africa, a country dominated by Christianity. Swart demonstrates how the democratic transition in the mid-1990s created an environment conducive to the delivery of social services by faith-based organizations. The apartheid state had created a number of obstacles for their work; this changed under a democratic state, and faith-based organizations were then welcome to join in the task of reconstruction and nation building. The next chapter, authored by Richard Muko Ochanda and Humphrey Waliang’i Wafula, examines the case of Kenya. The focus of the chapter is on how effective faith-based programs are there. The authors take a historical approach and show how the interactions of faith-based organizations with community development can be traced back to the colonial period. They suggest that faith-based organizations can be effective advocates for marginalized communities. Turning our attention to Latin America, Matthew E. Carnes and Raimundo Salas Schweikart look at the case of Chile. They point out that Roman Catholic religious actors have managed to retain social and political dominance in Chile: the Catholic Church has exercised influence on

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public life and practice on a daily, nearly society-wide basis by means of its leadership, grassroots organizing, and important educational and media institutions. Of note, the authors point out that the retreat of the state’s social role under Augusto Pinochet’s rule obligated the church to fill the vacuum by creating and operating a vast network of local and national social service agencies. Similar efforts were carried out by Protestant and evangelical churches, as well as by non-religious organizations, yet none had the critical, agenda-shaping role that the Catholic Church enjoyed. The authors also look at the impact of recent scandals on welfare delivery programs. Juan Manuel Lombera then examines the case of Mexico. He shows how the progressive movement of the Catholic Church, unleashed after the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), continues to play an influential role in Mexico, and indeed, across Latin American politics and society. He insightfully suggests that the progressive movement has extended its influence throughout civil societal areas. This chapter takes a close look at the evolution of “the church of the poor” in Oaxaca, Mexico, from its initial sponsorship by the Catholic hierarchy, starting in the early 1960s, through its transformation into civil society organizations beginning in the 1990s. Lombera’s historical perspective is a particularly effective way to demonstrate how theological conversations might lead to social engagement. Societies with Mixed Religious Marketplaces The second set of cases focus on four countries that have a mixed religious marketplace: M.M.A. Kaag on Chad, Omobolaji O. Olarinmoye on Nigeria, Victoria Armando Chifeche, on Mozambique, and Nestor da Costa on Uruguay. Mayke Kaag provides an historical overview of the church–state relationship in Chad; especially noteworthy is the ongoing disparity of wealth and persistent poverty even in light of impressive economic development data over the last fifteen years, resulting from newly discovered oil reserves. Kaag importantly shows that state services in education and health care have taken a back seat to significant investments in military equipment. Faith-based providers of social welfare face very difficult challenges in helping those in need in Chad. The next contribution, by Omobolaji O. Olarinmoye, suggests that Nigeria is a complicated case, given its divided religious composition

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(approximately even Christian and Muslim populations); great social need; and political turmoil. He contends that faith-based organizations are important providers of services in Nigeria (hospitals, educational facilities, printing works and mass media, and major social service providers), but their relationship with the secular state can be difficult. Victoria Armando Chifeche takes a different approach to her case study on Mozambique; she summarizes findings regarding religious peacebuilding in order to establish a practical understanding of the term religion and how that causes or mitigates conflict in Mozambique. She also notes that many social problems persist, including widespread poverty, gender disparities, and low literacy rates, increasing the need for the services provided by faith-based organizations. Our concluding chapter brings us back to Latin America. Nestor Da Costa demonstrates both how Uruguay follows the larger pattern of Catholic Latin America, but also how it is unique in many ways. Catholic welfare services were originally focused on the domains of health and education, but have since expanded to many other areas, in particular to marginalized communities. He argues that services remain vital for contemporary Uruguayan society. We hope that the case studies in this volume will bring about a greater understanding about how the vital services provided by faithbased organizations might contribute to building a more vibrant, robust, and just civil society in Africa and Latin America, even in the face of many obstacles.

Notes 1. By “faith-based organization” we follow a definition cited by Ignatius Swart in this volume: “any organisation that derives its inspiration and guidance from the teachings and principles of a particular faith tradition, or from a particular interpretation or school of thought within that faith.” Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings, “Introduction,” in Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular, ed. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 6. 2. World Bank, World Development Indicators, table 2.1, http://wdi.worldb ank.org/table/2.1. Data are for 2021. 3. Pew Research Center, June 13, 2018, “The Age Gap in Religion Around the World.” See also Pew Research Center, April 2019, “A Changing World: Global Views on Diversity, Gender Equality, Family Life and

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4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

the Importance of Religion,” http://www.pewresearch.org. There are of course important country differences and other nuances, such as age differences, when considering levels of religious commitment. Quentin Wodon, Global Report on Integral Human Development 2022: Measuring the Contributions of Catholic and Other Faith-Based Organizations to Education, Healthcare, and Social Protection (Washington, DC: Global Catholic Education, 2022), iv. World Bank, overview of Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2022: Correcting Course (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2022), http://doi.org/10.1596/978-14648-1893-6. Katherine Marshall, “Impressions & Indications of Religious Engagement in Development,” The Review of Faith in International Affairs, vol. 19, no. S1 (2021): 12–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2021.198 3358. Melani Cammett and Lauren M. MacLean, “Introduction,” 4–15, in The Politics of Non-state Social Welfare, ed. Melani Cammett and Lauren M. MacLean (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 4. Jens Koehrsen and Andreas Heuser, “Beyond Established Boundaries: FBOs as Developmental Entrepreneurs,” in Faith-Based Organizations in Development Discourses and Practice, ed. Andreas Heuser and Jens Koehrsen (New York: Routledge, 2019), 4–7. See also, for example, the rest of the works collected in Faith-Based Organizations in Development Discourses and Practice, ed. Andreas Heuser and Jens Koehrsen (New York: Routledge, 2019); David P. King, God’s Internationalists: World Vision and the Age of Evangelical Humanitarianism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019). Freedom House, 2019, “Freedom in the World,” https://freedomho use.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-ret reat; Pew Research Center, “Latin America Religion Database,” https:/ /www.pewforum.org/interactives/LatinAmerica/country/194/; United Nations, “United Nations Human Development Indicators,” http://hdr. undp.org/en/countries; Social Security Administration, “Social Security Programs Throughout the World, 2017, Latin America,” https://www. ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2016-2017/americas/index.html. Ted G. Jelen and Clyde Wilcox, “Religion: The One, the Few, and the Many,” Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective, ed. Ted Gerard Jelen and Clyde Wilcox (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1–24. World Bank, “One in Every Four Latin Americans Is Covered by Programs such as the Bolsa Familia and Oportunidades,” July 15, 2013, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/07/15/Bra zil-Latin-America-covered-social-safety-nets.

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13. Ted G. Jelen and Clyde Wilcox, “Religion: The One, the Few, and the Many,” in Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective, ed. Ted Gerard Jelen and Clyde Wilcox (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1–24, 1. 14. Pew Research Center, 2018 and 2019. 15. On the secularization thesis, see, for example, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, “The Secularization Debate,” in Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide, ed. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 3–32; and the works collected in Rethinking Secularism, ed. Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 16. “At the same time, Christians in the United States also have comparatively high levels of commitment to their faith.” Pew Research Center, “The World’s Most Committed Christians Live in Africa, Latin America, and the US,” August 22, 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/ 2018/08/22/the-worlds-most-committed-christians-live-in-africa-latinamerica-and-the-u-s/. 17. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Option for the Poor and Vulnerable,” https://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-webelieve/catholic-social-teaching/option-for-the-poor-and-vulnerable. 18. For a history of church–state relations in Brazil, see Thomas C. Bruneau, The Church in Brazil: The Politics of Religion (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); and Anthony Gill, Rendering Unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 19. “Brazil,” Economist Intelligence: Brazil, April 5, 2021, https://country. eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1090921492. 20. Latinobarómetro, Informe 2021 (Santiago, Chile), https://www.latinobar ometro.org/lat.jsp?Idioma=0. 21. Lena Lavinas, “The Anatomy of the Social Question and the Evolution of the Brazilian Social Security System, 1919–2020,” in One Hundred Years of Social Protection: The Changing Social Question in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, ed. Lutz Lessering (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 303–341, 328. 22. Vulnerable persons include working age people not covered by benefits, nor are retirement-aged people not receiving retirement benefits. International Labour Office, World Social Protection Report 2020–22: Social Protection at the Crossroads—In Pursuit of a Better Future (Geneva: ILO, 2021), Annex 4, Table A4.2, 271. 23. IBGE (Instituto Brasileira de Geografia e Estatística), Censo Demográfico 2010, “Tabela 137 – População residente por religião,” http://www.sidra. ibge.gov.br/bda/tabela/protabl.asp?c=137&z=cd&o=2&i=P.

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24. Thais Carrança, “Jovens ‘sem religião’ superam católicos e evangélicos em SP e Rio,” BBC News Brasil, May 9, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/por tuguese/brasil-61329257. 25. See, for example, Rowan Ireland, “Pentecostalism, Conversion, and Politics in Brazil,” in Power, Politics, and Pentecostals in Latin America, ed. Edward L. Cleary and Hannah Stewart-Gambino (New York: Routledge, 1998), 123–138; Ari Pedro Oro, “Religião e Política no Brasil,” in Religião e Política no Cone Sul, ed. Ari Pedro Oro, Eloísa Martín, Nicolas Guigou, Pablo Semán, and Ricardo Mariano (São Paulo: Attar Editorial, 2006), 75–156; Frances Hagopian, “Social Justice, Moral Values, or Institutional Interests? Church Responses to the Democratic Challenge in Latin America,” in Religious Pluralism, Democracy, and the Catholic Church in Latin America, ed. Frances Hagopian (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 257–332; and Christine A. Gustafson, “Religion and Regimes in Brazil and Chile,” in Religion and Regimes: Support, Separation, and Opposition, ed. Mehran Tamdonfar and Ted G. Jelen (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2014), 25–50. 26. Quentin Wodon, Global Report on Integral Human Development 2022: Measuring the Contributions of Catholic and Other Faith-Based Organizations to Education, Healthcare, and Social Protection (Washington, DC: Global Catholic Education, 2022), 72, 77, 112, and 120. 27. Koehrsen and Heuser, 2019. 28. See Gustafson, 2014. 29. Marc Ross, “The Geopolitics of Brazil: An Emergent Power’s Struggle with Geography: Emerging Economies: The Geopolitics of the BRICs Nations,” CFA Institute Journal Review 43, no. 1 (February 2013), https://www.cfainstitute.org/en/research/cfa-digest/2013/02/the-geo politics-of-brazil-an-emergent-powers-struggle-with-geography-digestsummary. 30. Jeffrey Haynes and Anja Henning, Religious Actors in the Public Square: Means, Objectives and Effects (New York: Routledge, 2011).

CHAPTER 2

The Complex Context for Social Welfare and Human Capacity Strategies in Africa Katherine Marshall

Africa stands out, contrasted with other regions, for high inequalities; large youth populations; large numbers of people affected by deep, chronic poverty; highly precarious situations including protracted conflicts that have displaced millions; and countless creative strategies and programs to address the challenges. With its vastly different countries and societies, Africa over the past 50 years has been marked by widely varied economic and social performance. Responses have often been shaped in conjunction with the external financiers on whom most African governments have depended heavily and on varying political fortunes. Both natural and man-made disasters have focused attention sharply on the suffering of those most affected. Likewise, the need to build human capacities and capital drives ambitious health and education programs, marked by countries’ poor starting position. Social protection, long largely ad hoc with some exceptions (notably South Africa

K. Marshall (B) Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Glatzer et al. (eds.), Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31960-0_2

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and northern Africa) is evolving rapidly and is seen as a central part of both social and economic policies, spurred most recently by the sharp demands of the COVID-19 emergencies and growing concerns about looming climate crises. In this complex setting, religious communities and institutions play diverse and often vital roles, both in service delivery of health and education and in direct support for those who are most vulnerable. The settings and approaches differ widely, but religious actors provide practical safety nets in bad times and good, and serve as advocates and critics of the wide range of policy and programmatic approaches. Their roles, however, are rarely systematically researched or taken into account in national and international approaches to social policy and protection. Integrating this rich resource strategically in social policy discussions could provide material benefits for Africa’s large vulnerable populations and for efforts to respond to both urgent and chronic needs and aspirations. This chapter provides a brief overview of the diverse ideas driving social protection and policy (understood to include education and health). It is set against the challenges of poverty as well as some broad trends that include large informal sector roles and Africa’s remarkably large youth population. The focus is on Sub-Saharan Africa, with limited comments on the very different challenges for northern Africa.1 With Africa’s wide historic and current diversity, a country-by-country approach is essential to in-depth understanding. The case studies in this volume illustrate how differently different countries have approached the challenges involved. At a continental level, central themes are the wide gaps between policy and practice, needs and delivery, significant shifts in many countries in the philosophies driving social protection policies, and the ambivalent attitudes in various countries toward engagement with religious institutions in their policy analysis and strategies. In a speculative look to the future, questions are posed about the implications of demographic trends, the challenges that looming climate change present, and possible shifts spurred by the COVID-19 crisis.

Approaches to Social Policies, Social Safety Nets The COVID-19 emergencies, following on from disruptions linked to the 2008 economic crisis, are prompting both new thinking and new action across the widely diverse countries of Africa. The shocks of lockdowns,

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closed or disrupted borders, and straightened economic and fiscal situations have strained household budgets and government finances. The vulnerabilities of families and communities were exposed and accentuated as the global health crisis was seen above all through a lens of basic survival: hunger, or HOVID, as some termed it. The East Asia economic and social crisis of 1997–1999 undermined a widely repeated narrative about public social policy in that region: that communities relied not on government “handouts” but on the resilience of families and communities. Many whose lives were disrupted by the shocks of the economic downturn were indeed able to adapt but many others, uprooted to cities or living hand to mouth, had no safety net, public or private, to break the fall. An intensive period of reflection and reform followed, and one result was an array of new or bolstered policies and programs to assure modern social protection for the most vulnerable populations.2,3 Africa’s situation bears some similarities, albeit for rather different reasons. Social policies, both for health and education (two central pillars of development strategies continent wide) and for social safety nets vary widely, both in ideology and in their application and effectiveness. But the setting is shaped less by something akin to the East Asian pride in “Asian values” than by the widespread poverty that has limited the scope and focus of interventions. With government budgets limited and with enormous needs, in practice self-reliance has played large roles. Admirable capacities to adapt, relying on mutual support and traditional practices, have gone alongside widespread suffering. Of special note are the massive disruptions that accompany the continent’s conflict situations and the large present and looming realities of disruptions linked to climate change. Until very recently, few African countries have had well-planned social protection and safety net systems that entail a strategic approach to reducing poverty and vulnerability. The picture is instead of one of a multitude of interventions, fragmented, typically donor driven, and together ineffectively targeting the poorest communities and people. Social protection programs, most developed across southern African countries, tend to serve quite narrow and relatively privileged populations, while safety net programs have emerged in an ad hoc fashion. The most common kinds of programs are school feeding programs, public works programs, in-kind emergency and nonemergency programs,

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categorical transfer programs, and general subsidies. National povertytargeted cash transfer programs are not common, although some of the significant number of small programs are currently being expanded. For example, Rwanda is expanding the coverage of the Vision 2020 Umurenge Program, and in Kenya, the government is bringing five cash transfer programs into the National Safety Net Program.4 Without long-term, development-oriented safety nets, emergency relief efforts dominate the responses of many low income and fragile states to crises and disasters. Shock-response mechanisms tend to be weak, inflexible, and unpredictable and there is little solid information about the effectiveness of, for example, food distribution and emergency relief programs that are common in West Africa (for example, in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, and Mauritania). Awareness of the central roles of broad social policies at an African level is increasing. Both emerging approaches and underlying tensions are reflected in the 2008 African Union Social Policy Framework for Africa.5 The summary description highlights that “the SPF aims to provide an overarching policy structure to assist African Union Member States to strengthen and give increasing priority to their national social policies and hence promote human empowerment and development. The framework treats social development as subordinate to economic growth, but justifies social development as a goal in its own right. It acknowledges that while economic growth is a necessary condition of social development, it is not exclusively or sufficiently able to address the challenges posed by the multi-faceted socioeconomic and political forces that together generate the continent’s social development challenges.” The complex array of programs (all seen, as noted above, from a government perspective) is well illustrated in Fig. 2.1.6 In sum, the overall trend (illustrated in Fig. 2.1)7 is of a significant increase in programs falling under the categories termed social protection (largely contributory and continuing) and social safety nets (generally non-contributory). However, few African countries have well-planned safety net systems capable of taking a strategic approach to reducing poverty and vulnerability. A multitude of interventions exist that are fragmented, typically donor driven, and together do not effectively target the poor.8 Most safety net programs lack strong institutional homes and coordinating bodies, with responsibility for government safety net programs spread over a number of different ministries, such as the ministries of

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Fig. 2.1 Social safety nets in development policy

social affairs, women and family, and employment, as well as other crosssectoral ministries that often lack significant political decision-making power within the government. Fragmented donor support translates into a host of small and isolated programs poorly coordinated. Country safety net programs cover a small share of the total number of poor and vulnerable people. For example, in Benin, the net coverage rate of all safety net programs is estimated to be only about 5–6% of the poor. In Kenya, estimates show that cash transfers reached about 9% of the poor population in 2010, but the government is planning to expand coverage so that by 2018, 17% of the poor will be reached. The exception is universal social pension programs common in southern Africa, which cover a large share of the elderly population.9

And Religious Roles? Generalizing any trend across Africa is perilous given the size and dynamism of countries and communities but, overall, a marked feature is that African people rate higher on various scales of “religiosity” than other continents.10 The religious landscape is remarkably varied and dynamic. A

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scholar observed at a conference some years ago that Africa has wonderful and very good religion, bad religion, and “very bad religion.” He was referring both to the central, positive, and creative roles that countless religious institutions play in people’s lives and to the fault lines and competition that lead to or fuel social tensions, conflicts, and wars as well as problematic aspects of some religious institutions that involve corruption, abuse, discrimination, and other negative trends. It is striking that in much literature about social policy, including especially social protection and safety nets, there is bare mention of religious roles. In most countries, it is rare to find a strategic reflection on the roles that religious institutions play in meeting the needs of vulnerable populations. This is despite the reality of what can aptly be termed countless interventions, that range from various forms of feeding programs, care for the elderly, vulnerable children including orphans and street children, migrants, victims of famines and natural catastrophes, and illness. Better known, if spottily, are religious roles in the provision of health care and education, but with certain exceptions the religious interventions commonly fall outside formal policies and programs. With the notable exception of the Catholic Church which compiles and publishes detailed statistics on the work of Catholic institutions worldwide (including Africa),11 and publications of the Christian Health Associations,12 a large part of these generally localized interventions is not counted with any precision. Table 2.1 shows the number of Catholic social institutions in Africa. Table 2.1 Number of Catholic Church Social Protection Facilities in Africa 1989 1990 2000 2010 2019 Orphanages Nurseries Special centers for social education and re-education Homes for the old, chronically ill, invalid, or handicapped Matrimonial advice centers Other institutions All facilities

358 360 780 281

533 617 1169 402

859 1760 2105 890

1345 1918 2508 655

1646 2149 249 659

295 955 1503 1812 1433 1378 4775 1167 1250 1192 3452 8451 8284 9488 7328

Source From Catholic Church Annual statistical yearbooks of the Church, included in Wodon13

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The COVID-19 emergencies exemplify these broad trends. Sharp attention to the suffering that the COVID-19 lockdowns and health challenges demanded led governments to expand existing programs, such as cash transfer programs and subsidy arrangements and to launch new ones, often on an ad hoc basis. These benefited from considerable international support. Meanwhile, religious communities in Africa, as in so many world regions, responded with whatever resources they could muster. These responses, however, were rarely charted with any precision and their scope will almost certainly never be fully known, much less assessed for impact and efficiency.14 Governments were of course aware of what was happening and, in many instances, supported or cooperated with many efforts. However, perhaps out of habit or prejudice, it is rare to see explicit acknowledgment of the important roles that religious communities played or new thinking about the implications for future policies that include pandemic preparedness, measures to address the critical education lost as schools closed, health systems, and care for vulnerable communities of ongoing and potential religious roles. And it is not clear that the lessons learned and openings for new forms of partnerships will be taken fully into account as governments and their partners look ahead.

The Setting: Poverty, a Crisis-Prone Environment, Common Aid Dependency, and Straightened Budgets Four themes cut across most of Sub-Saharan Africa (notwithstanding its diversity) and distinguish it in large measure from other continents. They have fundamental implications both for an understanding of how social policies have emerged and for prospects looking to the future. The World Bank, in a recent report on poverty in Africa,15 notwithstanding efforts to cast a positive light, stated baldly that “chronic poverty is substantial.” Several “key messages” included: • More people in Africa are poor today than in 1990. • World Bank estimates show that the share of Africans who are poor fell from 57% in 1990 to 43% in 2012. • BUT many more people are poor because of population growth: more than 330 million in 2012, up from about 280 million in 1990.

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• Poverty reduction has been slowest in fragile countries, and rural areas remain much poorer, although the urban–rural gap has narrowed. • Health, nutrition, education, and empowerment have improved; and violence has diminished. • But more than two in five adults are still illiterate, and the quality of schooling is often low. • After a decade of relative peace, conflict is on the rise. • Inequality is high with especially wide spatial inequalities; there are extremely wealthy Africans, whose numbers and wealth are increasing. In short, the social policy challenges of African countries, with rare exceptions, are set against an array of realities that include large poverty numbers, high population growth (especially in West Africa), large informal economies, many countries classified as fragile or conflict ridden16 under various criteria, wide inequalities, and remarkably large youth populations. While there is increasing focus on the multidimensional aspects of poverty (looking beyond the rough estimates of income that offer a broad-brush traditional measure), there is little ambiguity around Africa’s relative poverty and the large and growing numbers of people who lack the basic elements that are considered a basic human right and measure of welfare. A further issue and challenge is that Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most unequal regions in the world. The average national income Gini for Sub-Saharan Africa in 2014 was measured at about 45%. This compared to 35% in South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa. Some of the world’s most unequal countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa, including South Africa but also neighboring countries in Southern Africa.17 Youthquake, a 2021 book by Edward Paice, explores the implications of a population that is 60% under age 25, set against employment, education, and other challenges.18 The hurdles that face African countries in the future because of the combination of a large often restive youth population and lack of sufficient jobs to employ them color future expectations. An important dimension of Africa’s challenges turns around what is broadly termed governance. In one classification of the 25 worst governed countries in the world, 14 African countries are included.19 The perceptions and realities of both weak governance capacities and widespread

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mismanagement and outright corruption colors discussions of government interventions and is especially pertinent for many social programs where the multiple transactions involved depend on high levels of management and levels of trust between citizens and their governments. And resources are constrained in most countries, with countries dependent in complex ways on external support, public and private. In short, Africa’s leaders and especially those responsible for social policies face large and distinctive challenges that affect especially their capacity to meet the needs and aspirations of their people. Disease, conflict, and climate change are weighty challenges that bear down on many countries. Many leaders live from crisis to crisis, with restive populations and large refugee and internally displaced populations. Management of economic crises including external debt is a recurrent theme, especially acute during the COVID-19 emergencies and their aftermath. Famine and food insecurity are immediate problems. Frequent recourse to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and thus varying needs to adjust policies and trim spending are a norm. Likewise fierce debates about both causes of crises and solutions rankle politics in many countries and contribute to instability. Countries’ relationships with numerous partners, notably the multilateral development institutions and key bilateral partners that include notably the United States, China, and European countries, especially former colonial powers, are obviously colored by the unequal balance of power, geopolitical interests, and often ideological differences. These relationships have played significant roles in shaping and reshaping approaches to many facets of social policies. And wide-ranging factors contribute to a common (though not universal) situation of severe budget constraints that have limited capacities to address social needs. Africa’s religious institutions play widely varied roles in each of these challenges. By tradition and by vocation, many are deeply engaged in responding to the challenges of extreme poverty, both in meeting the most urgent needs and in advocacy vis-à-vis governments and partners. In different settings religious actors and leaders have taken on significant advocacy roles on issues of economic policies, models, and governance (though many religious actors have eschewed active roles in combatting corruption and other related challenges). Peacebuilding is a rapidly increasing field of religious engagement, as are efforts to adapt to symptoms of climate change, notably natural catastrophes such as storms and

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drought. These efforts, however, are often largely ad hoc, responsive to immediate challenges and crises, and reflect in good measure the diversity of actors and their frequent grounding at local levels.

Tracing Themes Many discussions about Africa’s policy challenges are today framed within the context of the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and their predecessors, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).20 These goals are amplified by specific commitments and of course by national policy frameworks. This applies for many aspects of social policies, notably for health and education but also for topics that include care for the elderly and for children, approaches to vulnerable children, women’s empowerment, and crisis responses including economic management, food insecurity, pandemic preparedness, and, increasingly, policies linked to responding to climate change. There are, however, active and often heated debates on specific issues and there is far from unanimity across countries, even where SDGs may dominate official pronouncements. The following sections note several issues that are the frequent topic of discussion, dialogue, and debate and that have distinctive African dimensions. Traditions As in the case cited above for Asia, approaches to aspects of social policies are often colored both by perceptions and realities of traditional African practices and norms. Commitments by individuals, especially those who meet success, to support extended families are a common example, as are expectations for leaders to support their “community,” which are quite often perceived in ethnic terms. Practices of mutual support and assistance provide foundations for cooperative practices like mutual savings groups. Colonial Experience African countries almost universally experienced protracted colonial rule, with several quite different models and experiences. These had significant impacts on traditional practices and, to a degree, norms, and laid foundations for many aspects of social policies. These included a common aspect of implicit and even explicit social “contracts” such as the policy

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“floor” that can shape understandings of who may be left behind. During the colonial era in many if not most countries understandings emerged of definition of groups and the complex questions around who is “worthy” of support and how needs are understood. The highly differentiated education and health systems that emerged often catered very differently to different communities, whether by race, ethnicity, gender, or class. The case of South Africa might be considered the most elaborate with its sharp differentiation by race of all forms of social policy and welfare, but such distinctions were a common feature of most colonial regimes and left lasting legacies.21 African countries have, happily, moved beyond the colonial era, many well over a half century ago. However, the colonial legacies remain strong, and they continue to play shaping roles in many aspects of economic, social, and political life. In some cases, the colonial era ties endured, for example in expectations for education systems, elements of pension systems, forest protection approaches, and public health norms. Economic ties in some countries remain strong as do the partnerships that color external assistance. In some cases, recent and contemporary policy debates at national levels reflect sharp reactions against and reversals of specific colonial practices and norms. Missionary Roles A distinctive feature of many colonial regimes was the active role of Christian missionaries and their tight if complex links to colonial administrations. Some early Christian social services date to the late seventeenth century in South Africa. The practices, priorities, and geographic involvement of missionary organizations varied quite widely by country as well as by the religious landscapes of the colonial powers. In Kenya, for example, the country was in effect allocated among different churches and missionary bodies, with lasting legacies to this day.22 In some countries missionaries focused more on health, on education in others, or, in some instances, both. Across most countries the early social services were provided by churches, with or without active engagement of missionary authorities. And there were in most countries what we might term social protection activities, for example care for orphaned children and the elderly and other vulnerable groups. The systems evolved often on a rather ad hoc basis and almost invariably were colored by practices that reflected views on race and other social divisions.

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At independence, different countries treated the missionary facilities and approaches quite differently, and this evolved over time. In some situations, missionary social services continued more or less on a continuing basis, while in other places they were nationalized wholesale. There were cases where missionaries and churches were reinvited to resume their direct roles (parts of Nigeria are an example). Church-run health care remains an important part of health systems in some 15 African countries, though with a decline in outside church support many face severe financial pressures. In a few instances (Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia stand out), clear Memoranda of Understandings with governments recognize the roles that the religiously owned and run facilities play and provide government support to them.23 The Ebola and COVID-19 crises have, however, highlighted that in many countries religiously run health facilities are not well integrated in national health systems. In countries with large Muslim communities the patterns of development of social services, including education and health, have tended to evolve in quite different ways. The Muslim traditions of social welfare have applied in different ways, whether (especially in North Africa) in relation to the state or, where Sufi confreres predominate, driven by local communities or various Muslim hierarchies. A particular area of focus has been the roles of Koranic schools. In both Senegal and Nigeria, for example, urbanization trends have tended to change the nature of many madrasas and financial pressures especially have encouraged or obliged the leaders of schools to rely on proceeds from student begging. Situations of abuse have drawn human rights attention to the “talibés” in Senegal24 and almajiri in Nigeria.25 A number of proposals to develop traditional practices of Zakat (Muslim charitable giving) as a central pillar of social welfare are under consideration, especially in North Africa.26 Poverty and Crises The central focus of social policy for African countries has often been the development of health and education systems, often from the low base inherited at independence. Major conferences, programs, and central pillars of the MDGs and SDGs, education for all, enrollment of girls, and improvement of quality stand as high priorities across the continent. However, dealing with urgent human needs, notably in situations of conflict and natural catastrophes has also taken a high priority, demanding

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urgent attention and action by both national governments and their international partners. Religious communities have played vital roles in these crisis responses. Another common theme has been responses to unrest, linked to concerns for, especially, high food prices. A frequent response, one easier to introduce than to eliminate, has been schemes of subsidies, for food and other commodities, fuel, and fertilizers or seeds. These policies are justified as social responses even as political factors often play significant roles. The measures are often presented as responses to inequalities, though in practice their benefits may accrue more to urban populations than to rural producers who may in fact face more acute problems of poverty. HIV/AIDS Africa has been the epicenter of the global HIV/AIDS pandemic and responding to different dimensions of the crisis (care of those afflicted, AIDS affected children and orphans, community disruptions, advocacy on drug prices, etc.) has often seen leadership from faith communities. Addressing AIDS-related stigma has also presented challenges to religious communities as well as to governments and communities at large. Given the many millions of people involved and the mobilization of substantial international resources, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has taken on a high priority especially in Southern and Eastern Africa which have been hardest hit by the pandemic.

Debates and Future Directions As African countries do more to develop and reform their social protection systems, seven topics have particular importance. Each of them involves religious actors, centrally in some instances, less so in others. The COVID-19 emergencies and the related economic and social challenges facing virtually all countries in its wake will shape strategies and debates. Education revolutions: Most if not all African countries face a crisis or crises of education, and there are continent-wide commitments to reforms and education development.27 The most fundamental is the serious shortfalls in quality, but they are related to the questions of how far the education curricula and delivery systems prepare students for the job market and how far they support social cohesion and civic values

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conducive to both peace and national consensus. Questions about religious roles have a prominent place in countries where there is relative religious homogeneity and harmony but still more where there are sharp fractures along religious lines. The COVID-19 emergencies which saw closing of schools for extended periods both accentuated problems and put the challenges in starker relief; an estimated 350 million children missed out on long periods of schooling (however faulty the quality associated benefits of school include feeding and other programs). The expectation based on past experience is that millions will never return to school, especially girls. There is a common view that quality and well adapted education policies are at the heart of social policies but translating that ideal into practice still has a long way to go. Health systems: A second pillar of social policies is the development of inclusive, high quality health systems that are well adapted to the multiple needs African communities face. The challenges and goals have been the subject of continent-wide agreements that have set targets, above all for government spending. In April 2021 when African Union member states met in Abuja, Nigeria, they committed to allocating 15% of their government budgets to health, to address pressing health challenges, including HIV and AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis. The commitments are the Abuja Declaration,28 and it has become a rallying call to mobilize additional public resources for the health sector. Priority objectives include decent primary care and a deliberate and meaningful community focus in care, programs that address the “vertical” challenges linked to specific diseases (malaria, tuberculosis, noncommunicable diseases), and that are well prepared for the coming likely pandemics. Systems are tilted toward expensive tertiary care and, in many cases, fragmented among providers, public and private with little strategic link. The reduction in infant and maternal mortality across the continent are a tribute to health policy but, once again, the COVID-19 emergencies have underscored weaknesses in systems including procurement and production of essential medicines and training and retention of staff. Development of family planning programs and policies have a high priority in countries where birthrates are high (continent-wide plans are set out in the Maputo Plan of Action29 ). Across all these areas with the long history of direct and active involvement in health care, religious institutions have significant assets and roles to play.

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Targeting versus Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: The most rapid expansion of social policies in recent years has been in conditional and, to a lesser extent, unconditional cash transfer programs. Social safety nets in Africa are seen as experiencing a “coming of age” during the COVID-19 pandemic, as governments turned to cash transfers as a tool to protect the poor and vulnerable from the socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic. This genre of programs has come to be seen in contrast to the earlier traditional targeted programs that involved explicit efforts to identify the most needy and vulnerable populations and development of robust programs to reach them with appropriate support. The latter, current wisdom suggests, tend to be less cost effective and subject to distortions, hence the move toward cash transfer programs that offer ease of administration and give more agency to recipients. An example of the arguments made is a 2021 UNICEF paper.30 It argues for “quickly expanding cash transfer programs across Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to protect children and support economic recovery.” This is justified by the large needs and significant evidence of the benefits of cash transfers. The analysis draws on more than 25 global databases, projection, and monitoring exercises. The disappearance in 2020 of more than 6% of economic growth and 1.5 decades of income progress gives urgency to the proposed move, “the biggest rise in extreme poverty ever recorded.” Some 280 million children were likely dealing with some form of food insecurity “with close to 50 million potentially in a crisis situation.” As the COVID-19 pandemic began, 45 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa—three times as many as those at the end of 1990—had introduced social safety net programs to tackle chronic poverty by increasing consumption among poor and vulnerable people (Fig. 2.2). Cash transfer programs are increasingly directed at multiple objectives, beyond reducing consumption poverty: protecting and promoting investments in human capital to take advantage of Africa’s youth bulge, adapting to climate shocks, and supporting economic development.31 Conflict and displacement: Amidst a global crisis of forcible displacement of refugees, asylum seekers, and people internally displaced within countries, Africa shares a large part of the burden. Some 32 million people in Africa are displaced, the largest numbers from Somalia, South Sudan, and Burkina Faso.32 Ten African countries account for 88% (28 million) of the forcibly displaced people on the continent, each of them in conflict. The major United Nations agencies are involved (UNHCR, IOM, WFP)

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Fig. 2.2 Expansion of social safety net programs across Africa (Source ASPIRE data presented in Beegle, Coudouel, and Monsalve 2018)

as are many private entities and the host governments. Transnational religious institutions (Caritas, JRS, Islamic Relief, World Relief among others) but also local communities are heavily involved in support to these communities as well as in peacebuilding activities.33 Climate change: More frequent and extended droughts and intense storms and other weather extremes offer a warning of the probable impact on African communities of climate change and environmental damage. Likely consequences include population displacements and hunger crises. The fact that there is no agreed definition of climate refugees is symptomatic of the complexity of the situation and uncertainties about its impact and above all how best to respond. A Financial Times article focused on Madagascar illustrates well the active debates as to causes, impact, and policy repercussions. Even as the extended drought and suffering of people in southern Madagascar are a news focus with the situation portrayed as emblematic of what is to come, others point to poor governance and weak policy responses as responsible for the situation.34 Food security: Both for African governments and for religious institutions the challenges of food security and hunger have particular prominence in Africa today. Widespread malnutrition and severe crises including famine conditions are central social problems and much effort goes into both food security policies and programs and into support for agricultural

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development. Community feeding programs are a frequent social activity of religious communities and institutions. Children and youth: With Africa’s large youth population and related social and political pressures, governments and their partners focus on programs that support youth skill development. Youth engagement is a common priority. The welfare of children is a traditional religious priority, as it is for governments. Child grants are a policy mechanism in a few countries. Education programs and early childhood education are priorities linked to child development and welfare. The situation of vulnerable children is a social welfare priority. Three priority communities are orphans (and especially HIV/AIDS orphans), children “on the move,” notably refugees and IDPs, and street children. Other groups that are in focus are children accused as witches and albinos. The religious traditions that support orphanages as a solution for orphaned children today lead to tensions as evidence suggests that orphanages are rarely an optimal solution for children.35 This points to a topic on which meaningful engagement could lead to better outcomes.

Looking Ahead Social needs and strategic responses to them face a turbulent era across the African continent. Needs are great, and if anything, growing as economic problems contribute to or exacerbate social and political instability and demands for action. The COVID-19 emergencies are serving as a spur, as they have forced social vulnerabilities and possible responses higher on agendas. The era of ad hoc, piecemeal social protection programs, eclipsed by the demands of emergencies and by the enormous challenges of developing health and education systems seems likely to be coming to an end in most countries. Strategies for social protection are under review in most if not all countries, albeit with different areas of focus and even underlying philosophies that drive priorities and program design. As of early January 2022, of more than 3,800 social protection and labor measures planned or implemented by 223 economies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, 45 were in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is clear that more systematic social safety nets are an essential feature of modern states, expected by citizens. African countries are thus part of an unprecedented expansion of social protection and labor programs around the world. Examples from

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different regions, citizen demands, and new avenues opened by technological advancements around novel data and digital tools make possible expansion of reach and tools. Social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa is seen as undergoing profound changes, with large expansions of social safety net programs that aim to protect the poor and vulnerable from the adverse social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.36 The pandemic has underscored the critical importance of safety net delivery systems and timely disbursements of cash transfers and services to address extreme poverty, help households better manage risks, and build resilience to cope with ever more frequent and disruptive shocks. It has also highlighted unfinished agendas that underscore the need for country-led social protection systems. How religious communities will respond and how governments will engage with them is an open question. In the areas of health and education there has been considerable analysis and discussion, building on the extensive and intertwined histories of religious provision of health and education services in many countries. The full integration of religious schools and health systems in national strategies is quite rare but, possibly again spurred by COVID-19 as well as Ebola and HIV/AIDS experience, more integration may lie ahead. There is, however, the possibility of resistance as national systems evolve, given the strong tendencies to look to state leadership and ambivalence about leaning on systems that involve regulation more than direct state provision. For social protection systems and social policies, the path is less clear. A starting challenge is the weakness of data and the diversity of religiously run facilities and programs. Many are quite local in focus and national or transnational strategy reviews may fail to capture both the experience and the lived reality of programs, especially those that are informal in nature. That is a pity as there is wide experience to draw on, addressing family needs and helping to identify and to hear the voices of vulnerable communities. A first step is better documentation of what is being done and more purposeful efforts to evaluate lessons learned, both positive and less so.

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Notes 1. For an example of approaches, see João Pedro Dytz, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG). Proposed reforms of the social protection systems of Morocco and Tunisia in light of the impacts of the COVID-19 crisis. 2. The author was involved in this process as a World Bank officer responsible for social policy and governance in the East Asia region. 3. Katherine Marshall and Olivier Butzbach, New Social Policy Agendas for Europe and Asia: Challenges, Experience, and Lessons (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2002), https://doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-5201-6. 4. See a summary of a World Bank review of programs in 22 countries. Victoria Monchuk, Reducing Poverty and Investing in People: The New Role of Safety Nets in Africa (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2014). A recent review, focused on the COVID-19 response, is at Africa Pulse: Boosting Resilience: The Future of Social Protection in Africa, The World Bank, April 2022, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/han dle/10986/37281/9781464818714.pdf. 5. African Union, “Social Policy Framework for Africa,” Socialprotection.org, 2008, https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/ShowRessource.action; jsessionid=sfcsUQbknb_TOz_GDLUr0kaoTvMPI4HVDx5AFkwxMdxyB wfN6Mh2!-1463413688?id=1448. 6. From Margaret Grosh, Carlo del Ninno, Emil Tesliuc, and Azedine Ouerghi, For Protection and Promotion: The Design and Implementation of Effective Safety Nets (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008), https:/ /openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/6582. 7. Africa’s Pulse in Five Charts: Boosting Resilience Through Social Protection, April 13, 2022. https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/africapulse. 8. Monchuk, op. Cit. 9. Monchuk, op. Cit. 10. Pew Research Center, “The Age Gap in Religion Around the World,” June 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2018/06/13/howreligious-commitment-varies-by-country-among-people-of-all-ages/. 11. Quentin Wodon, Global Report on Integral Human Development 2022: Measuring the Contributions of Catholic and Other Faith-Based Organizations to Education, Healthcare, and Social Protection, Global Catholic Education Project, 2022, https://www.globalcatholiceducation.org/_ files/ugd/b9597a_46f87e5bb0e84d8fb786376f5dae933b.pdf. 12. https://africachap.org/. Africa Chriastian Health Associations Platform. 13. Wodon, Global Report on Integral Human Development 2022. 14. It is striking that in a 900 + page compilation of responses to the COVID-19 emergencies, faith interventions are rarely mentioned (Ugo

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15.

16. 17.

18. 19. 20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

Gentilini et al., Social Protection and Jobs Responses to COVID-19: A Real-Time Review of Country Measures [Washington, DC: World Bank, 2022], https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/37186). The rich panoply of responses and interventions is captured in the COVID-19 and religion project run by the World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD), Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, and the Joint Learning Initiative on Faith and Local Partnerships (https://bit.ly/covidfaithrepository). Kathleen Beegle et al., Poverty in Rising Africa (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2016), https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/public ation/poverty-rising-africa-poverty-report. See, for example, the website of the Fragile States Index, https://fragilest atesindex.org/. Counted among the world’s most unequal 19 countries are ten in SubSaharan Africa. Income South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Central African Republic, The Comoros, Zambia, and Lesotho. Edward Paice, Youthquake (Apollo, 2021). “The World’s Worst Governments,” World Atlas, https://www.worldatlas. com/articles/the-world-s-worst-governments.html. For a review of the status of the SDGs, see Jeffrey D. Sachs et al., Sustainable Development Report 2022: From Crisis to Sustainable Development: The SDGs as Roadmap to 2030 and Beyond (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022). See, for example, Marquessa Brown and R. J. Neku, “A Historical Review of the South African Social Welfare System and Social Work Practitioners’ Views on Its Current Status,” International Social Work, May 1, 2005, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020872805051733, and The World Bank, South Africa: Social Assistance Programs and System Review, 2021, https:/ /documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/238611633430611402/pdf/ South-Africa-Social-Assistance-Programs-and-Systems-Review.pdf. Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, Faith and Development in Focus: Kenya (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2017), https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/faith-and-dev elopment-in-focus-kenya. For an overview for health systems, see Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, World Faiths Development Dialogue, Global Health in Africa: Assessing Faith Work and Priorities (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2012), https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publicati ons/global-health-and-africa-assessing-faith-work-and-research-priorities. Human Rights Watch, “These Children Don’t Belong in the Streets”: A Roadmap for Ending Exploitation, Abuse of Talibés in Senegal, December 16, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/12/16/thesechildren-dont-belong-streets/roadmap-ending-exploitation-abuse-talibes.

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25. Reliefweb, The Almajiri Situation. https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/ almajiri-situation. 26. “The Role of Zakat in the Provision of Social Protection,” webinar at Social protection.org, https://socialprotection.org/fr/learn/webinars/ role-zakat-provision-social-protection. 27. Note, for example, the Pan-African High-Level Conference on Education (PACE 2018) in Nairobi, Kenya, where commitments were made to promote “lifelong learning for all, particularly for those excluded from education and training.” Education ministers and vice ministers, other high-level government officials, and representatives of international, regional, and national United Nations organizations, pan-African and sub-regional organizations, civil society, youth, and teacher organizations joined the discussions. Recommendations focused on developing Africa’s human and social capital through education within the context of the SDGs and the Continental Strategy for Education in Africa 2016–2025 (Nairobi Declaration and Call for Action on Education), https://uil.unesco.org/lifelong-learning/education-2030-afr ica-commitment-lifelong-learning. 28. Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Other Related Diseases, April 24–27, 2001, https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32894-file2001-abuja-declaration.pdf. 29. Maputo Plan of Action, 2016–2030, https://au.int/sites/default/files/ documents/30358-doc-mpoa_7-_revised_au_stc_inputs_may_se-rob-dir ector_002.pdf 30. Matthew Cummins, Cash Transfers: A Lifeline for Children and Economies in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNICEF, 2021), https://www.unicef.org/esa/ media/7871/file/Cash-Transfers-Lifeline-for-Children-Economies-SSA2021.pdf. 31. Africa Pulse. 32. “32 Million Africans Displaced by Conflict and Repression,” Relief Web, June 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/32-million-africans-for cibly-displaced-conflict-and-repression?gclid=Cj0KCQjwuaiXBhCCARIsA KZLt3npQ2fnait8jJHTZ_Naa9s-ugmPvQGKd2DeixotthK4KXqxvHk-ljE aApieEALw_wcB. 33. For an example of roles, see Elisabeth Stoddard and Katherine Marshall, Refugees in Kenya: Roles of Faith (Washington, DC: Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, 2015), https://berkleycenter.george town.edu/publications/refugees-in-kenya-roles-of-faith. 34. David Pilling and Charlie Bibby, “Why Famine in Madagascar Is an Alarm Bell for the Planet,” Financial Times, August 2, 2022, https:/ /www.ft.com/content/8fa3596e-9c6a-4e49-871a-86c20e0d170c?access Token=zwAAAYJjzcy4kdOPo1lunGpOSdOHGobCDg0XDA.MEUCIQ DCCQl-PFRTVHgNfQkCjaliVo_KPGa9wcd360SNk0aMDQIgKd61VI 4UwjJbEdprcnAVz2IuSIgur70nLPo0YEHo8T0&sharetype=gift&token= 136f7e29-ebba-41b3-a9b5-77cd9e4a8861.

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35. Katherine Marshall and Wilma Mui, A Society’s Responsibility: Ethics, Religion, and Children at Risk in Kenya, Senegal, and Cambodia, World Faiths Development Dialogue (Washington, DC: Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, 2016), https://berkleycenter.george town.edu/publications/a-society-s-responsibility-ethics-religion-and-chi ldren-at-risk-in-kenya-senegal-and-cambodia. 36. Africa Pulse in Five Charts.

CHAPTER 3

“Africa Is Not a Country”: General Overview of Faith-Based Services and Social Welfare in Africa Nadine Bowers Du Toit and Barnabe Anzuruni Msabah

Introduction It has often been said that “Africa is not a country” to re-emphasize the fact that it is a large and diverse continent. The task of providing a general overview of faith-based services and social welfare in Africa is, therefore, a daunting one, and we will seek from the outset to explore the complexity of faith responses to issues of poverty and inequality on this diverse continent. The chapter will begin by providing a general historical overview of faith-based services and social welfare on the continent in tracing the double legacy of faith communities in terms of the history of colonialism and its intersection with social welfare. The current pathways

N. B. Du Toit (B) · B. A. Msabah University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] B. A. Msabah e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Glatzer et al. (eds.), Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31960-0_3

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employed by faith communities with regard to social welfare and development—and their differing roles and approaches—including a particular case study of a transnational faith-based organization working in several African nations—will then be discussed followed by the chapter seeking to identify a few emerging tensions and opportunities with regard to faith-based services and social welfare. The latter includes a discussion of religion’s role via faith-based organizations in addressing corruption, state failure, and injustice, the role of faith-based organizations in gender justice, and the ongoing tensions inherent in donor aid on the continent via faith-based organizations.

Public Perception of Religion and Faith-Based Organizations The father of African theology, John Mbiti, once termed Africa as “notoriously religious,” and it is clear from recent statistics with regard to religious adherence that this remains the case. Afrobarometer surveys,1 which has surveyed 34 African countries, “show religious affiliation as well as tolerance for other religions are cross cutting characteristics of African publics—majorities in all countries claim a religious affiliation and profess tolerance for those of other faiths.” Of those surveyed, 56% indicate that they affiliate with Christianity, 34% as Muslim, and 9% as other or none (Fig. 3.1). What is interesting about these statistics is that they do not mention adherence to African Traditional Religion (ATR). In simple terms, this refers to the “indigenous religious beliefs that Africans practiced before the advent of Christianity and Islam to Africa.” Akin-Otiko and Abbas3 note that this is most likely due to missionary influence, which painted ATR and cultural practices as negative. They note, nevertheless, that ATR continues “to be practiced today in various forms, shades and intensities by very large numbers of Africans, including some individuals who claim to be Muslims or Christians.” It is also important to note that ATR is often likened to African culture and, therefore, the lines are not as clear-cut between religion and culture. It should also be noted that there is an enormous diversity of experience and praxis within these culturalreligious contexts, and some scholars have even questioned, therefore, whether ATR should not be plural rather than singular and recognized as “African Traditional Religions.” Some scholars highlight the fact that it nevertheless constitutes an “important bridge between the African people

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Fig. 3.1 Diagram showing African religious affiliation (34 countries, Afrobarometer 2016/2018)2

outside of religions such as Christianity and between Islam and Christianity, because it is the deposit of African values and identity.”4 The diagrams below from Pew Center research for Sub-Saharan Africa do track religious affiliation between 2010 and 2020 in this region and identify other religious groupings such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Judaism, as well as what they identify as “folk religions,” which are most possibly ATR (Fig. 3.2). The roots of religious engagement in terms of development work are largely to be found in the sacred texts of the religions. In Christianity, it is founded on the Christian call of love of neighbor and calls to social justice and care for the most vulnerable within the biblical text. While in Islam, a classless society is not idealized and issues of poverty are viewed as persisting as long as humanity exists, they are viewed as a test for believers in the Quran and therefore, believers have moral obligations “which the believers are expected to abide with to win God’s pleasure.”6 Giving to faith-based organizations also takes various forms. In the case of Islam, this could be through practices of Zakat (one of the five pillars

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Fig. 3.2 (a) and (b) Diagrams showing slight changes in religious affiliation in Sub-Saharan Africa (Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures 2010–2020)5

of Islam and amounting to 2.5% of one’s total wealth), Fitrana (“a charitable donation of food given before the Eid prayer and must be given by every self-supporting adult Muslim who has food in excess of their needs”), or Qurbani (an animal sacrifice where the meat is distributed to those in need). In Christianity, there are often special appeals at the level of the local church or denomination or individual Christians, who

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give to local, regional, or international faith-based organizations at their discretion, both in terms of time and financial contributions. Ndzovu7 notes that, at least in Sub-Saharan Africa, all three major religions—namely African Traditional Religions, Islam, and Christianity— “have traditionally been linked with development and provision of humanitarian services.”8 As will be further discussed in this chapter, this has led to high levels of trust being placed in religious actors with regard to development by both international donors and even local populations. This is borne out by Afrobaromoter, which found that that there is a high public trust in religious leaders, with 43% of respondents indicating that “they contacted a religious leader at least once during the previous year” and a clear indication that “religious leaders are more widely trusted and seen as less corrupt than any other group of public leaders” (Fig. 3.3).9 Bompani11 notes that one of the reasons that religious actors in development on the continent do what they do is partly because of the “failures of the African state to deliver services.” She cites a World Bank report in 2000 that reported that 50% of health and education services in SubSaharan Africa was funded by “faith -inspired organisations” and that the figures were up to 70% in some countries in terms of service delivery provision by faith-based organizations. There are, nevertheless, several complexities that arise with regard to faith-based organizations and other development actors on the continent.

Fig. 3.3 Diagram showing contact with religious leaders in Africa (Afrobarometer 2016/2018)10

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Bompani12 notes that religious organizations in developing countries are not easily defined and are “often affected by their own history, which determines their attitude and behaviour towards the public and to local systems of power.” In Nigeria, for example, religion is “closely associated with ethnic identity and acts as a marker of access or lack of access to state resources in a context of repressive state-society relations.” In this case, faith-based organizations can “take up strongly political identities and pursue political goals and objectives through a mixture of development, missionary and radical organisations.”13 The role of faith-based organizations in terms of conflicting values is also a point of contestation, where they have promoted “modernity inspired international development,” which has “often failed when not taking into account local context, culture and belief”: Conflicting values can emerge with family planning methods such as contraception and abortion, HIV/AIDS prevention and messages related to sexual behaviour, morality and women’s emancipation; other issues might concern sacred sites, dress codes, or tolerance of other religious groups. Islamic leaders played a central role in resistance to the polio vaccine in northern Nigeria (Yahya, 2007). Alternatively, the Bush administration’s more conservative approach to development assistance threatened the successful ABC (Abstinence, Being Faithful, Condoms) campaign to prevent HIV/AIDS through the withdrawal of funding for condoms in East Africa. In Uganda, Pentecostal-charismatic churches saturate massmedia, occupy influential public roles and shape national debates about the immorality of homosexuality, influencing political decisions and threatening human rights, and in some cases people’s safety.14

The latter also relates to its entanglement with colonialism, which has increasingly led postcolonial scholars to reject certain development actors who they view as re-producing new forms of colonialism via power relations and inequalities between the Global North and Global South. This history is further discussed in the section that follows.

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Path Development General Historical Overview of Faith-Based Services and Social Welfare in Africa Bompani15 asserts that “in trying to understand the relationship between religion and development in the African continent, we need to consider the limits of narrow theories of modernisation” in Global South contexts. To this end, she not only points out the ways in which the Christian mission in Africa has been identified as foundational to the promotion of “Western style wealth, health, welfare and education,” but also notes that in both the precolonial and colonial eras, Islam assisted the social mobility of urban Africans to move into “elite and educated circles of power.”16 While the efforts of missionary Christianity are often applauded for providing soft infrastructure in the areas of health, welfare, agriculture, and education via the establishment of institutions such as schools and hospitals for the indigenous populations, this era is also viewed as having a “double legacy.”17 It is also true that in some African contexts, missionaries not only evangelized and provided welfare, but also took the side of the indigenous peoples in their “struggle for justice, rights and land” in direct opposition to the colonial powers.18 Mtata,19 however, makes the point that this was, of course, sadly not true of the missionary endeavor as a whole. Indeed, colonial powers, and therefore missionaries by implication, remained party to forced labor systems, oppression, mass killings, and the exporting of Africa’s mineral wealth to the West.20 It should be noted that colonial powers “had no or a very limited developmental agenda, as they were designed for extraction. Basic public goods, such as education and health, were often outsourced to missionaries.”21 Manji and O’Coil’s22 now famous article, for example, notes the ways in which missionary societies, while providing “a cheap form of private welfare,” perhaps on the one hand driven by compassion or guilt, were also driven by fear and were used as a solution to social unrest during the anticolonial struggles on the continent.23 They note that the reason that voluntary welfare provision was so easily co-opted was largely because it didn’t seek to address the roots of injustice that resulted in poverty, but instead focused on the root cause as a lack of “civilization” of Africans. To this end, they state that “charitable welfare was the sweetener that made the colonial condition more palatable.”24 In traditionally Muslim areas, there was limited penetration of the colonial powers and thus of Christian

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missionaries. As a result, Bauer, Plator, and Weinstein note that this meant that there was a backlog in Western forms of education—despite the fact that religious education was often combined with literacy and numeracy. Although they argue that this led to reduced state capacity and development outcomes in the long run, this could simply be because these scholars use Modernization Theory as the dominant framework. The rise of the anti-colonial movement on the continent following World War II saw colonial missionary societies and charitable organizations—the forerunners of today’s faith-based organizations—tainted by association with the racist colonial oppressors. Manji and O’Coil’s25 somewhat jaded opinion is that this forced such organizations to transform rapidly in ideological outlook toward the new development discourse, which was removed from that of the colonial era, and which contained the prospect of “progress that would benefit all.” This is perhaps not least because the process of decolonization meant that as many African states became independent in the 1960s and 1970s, new local governments then took over these properties and institutions and, therefore, shifting the discourse would perhaps assist them in maintaining their relevance in a postcolonial era.26 While it had been predicted that there would be a disappearance of religion following the establishment of the newly decolonized states, it has instead proved true that religion has played an increasingly more prominent role in African political and developmental life.27 Bompani28 makes the important point that one of the ways religion remained relevant in this era was because African countries were subjected to economic crises, which was complicated by the interference of the Bretton Woods Institutions’ Structural Adjustment Programs, which ultimately resulted in the further impoverishment of many African countries. Churches, mosques, interfaith programs, and faith-based non-governmental organizations duly stepped into this gap and “often picked up the slack precipitated by these failures of development and shortcomings of the state owing to their inherent ability to connect to local contexts, communities and their beliefs.” It is also important to note that the rise of the so-called “African-Initiated Churches” (AICS) from the early 1900s on the continent and its growth in the postcolonial era, also offered alternatives to Africans in terms of social and physical healing and could be considered to have emerged during this time within religion and development praxis. Such groups still remain largely unrecognized within

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professionalized mainstream development praxis; however, it should be noted that they continue to contribute significantly to the well-being of local communities on the continent.

Current Pathways to Social Welfare and Faith-Based Services in Africa There are two main categories of faith-based organizations working for development: organizations active in a single country or grassroots community, and organizations operating internationally, which often operate in several African countries. The latter would include transnational organizations such as Islamic World Relief, Direct Aid, Tearfund, and World Vision, among others. All faith-based development organizations share the same desire to help get things done and operate variously at a micro (grassroots communities), meso (country), or macro (regional) level. It is, indeed, the case that some faith-based organizations also serve as social service delivery agents for African states—a notion discussed later in this chapter. Those operating on the meso or macro level, therefore, sometimes influence the development and application of policies at the national or international level. Often large transnational faith-based organizations, while themselves being faith-based organizations, relate to several kinds of faith-based organizations regionally or in the country. For Christian transnationals, this includes denominations, which refer to a recognized self-governing branch of the Christian Church (including mega-churches) that governs, shares doctrine, and resources with a group of churches. Faiths can be engaged directly by transnational faith-based organizations or indirectly through partners and allies and for a denomination to be “actively engaged” with an organization such as Tearfund, they or their partners must intentionally establish a strategic relationship with key actors at the denominational level to journey with them. Denominations also often have their own development-based NGOs, which are active in the country and operate from the faith basis of that particular denomination.29 Another faith-based actor is the church network. “Church networks” refer to a group or system of interconnected churches that are nondenominational in nature. They do not have an overarching governance system, but rather share similar values and are committed to sharing resources (learning, best practices, strategic issues, and, in some cases, financial resources). In the case of Tearfund in Africa, this operates at

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the national level; church networks can be engaged directly by Tearfund or indirectly through partners and allies. For a network of churches to be actively engaged in the Church and Community Transformation (CCT) program, Tearfund or their partners must intentionally establish a strategic relationship with key leadership-level players to journey with them through the CCT process. Church networks also exist at the grassroots level, and a South African study has shown that partnerships of churches within grassroots communities are one of the most effective means to engaging joint community issues by sharing human and financial resources.30 Local churches, another development actor, refer to an enduring community of local Christian believers who come together to worship, study the Bible, and pray—however, churches often engage in other activities, called as they are to be part of the local community and witness to it. In an African context a “local church” can meet in a church building, a community building, a school hall, someone’s home, or outdoors—wherever they gather. Local churches often operate at the level of charity and relief in meeting the basic needs and services within their local communities. They often work as part of broader church networks or with grassroots-based faith-based organizations in providing financial support or volunteers within these contexts. With respect to HIV/ AIDs and social services care in Africa, researchers have therefore encouraged development workers to work with grassroots faith actors such as mosques and local churches, as their structures are already present in the communities.31 Faith-based services are also evident in the context of Islamic outreach efforts on the continent. Muslim agencies also do community development work for humanitarian purposes, and they contribute enormously to the transformation of African communities. See, for example, the case of Direct Aid (formerly known as “Africa Muslims Agency”), one of the largest charities in Kuwait that focuses on Africa. A recent article by Leichtman32 indicates that Direct Aid mediates between the wishes of Gulf donors, the needs of aid recipients, Kuwaiti and African government regulations, and various development priorities. Since the 1980s, Direct Aid has centralized religious and development work in multiplexes such as orphanages, schools, clinics, and mosques—a distinctive model that aims for self-sufficiency in communities. More often than not, faith plays a key role in the work of religious faith-based organizations on the continent. Two South African studies,

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one Muslim and one Christian, indicate that many grassroots-based faithbased organizations declare themselves “unashamedly faith based” and that their work—both its motivation and shape—is determined by their religious and ethical norms/theologies. This often means that they may also be termed “hybrid” in that they combine proselytizing with their humanitarian work, an aspect of both mainline religions that has at times been rendered as problematic by more secular development actors and with regard to fundamentalism and radicalization.33 In African countries, however, where religion is an accepted part of society, this is not always viewed as problematic, but as part of providing a holistic service to communities by integrating faith. It is also important to note that faith-based organizations rooted in mainstream faiths such as Islam or Christianity also need to be cognizant of ATR or indigenous spirituality(ies) when engaging in development work on the continent. With regard to development, ATRs are not as institutionalized as Islam and Christianity; according to Kaunda and John, the key contribution of ATRs in development is with regard to the ways in which they provide “Africans a sense of security and the assurance of protection and continuous assistance of the spirits of their ancestors.”34 The rise of the popularity of newer religious movements, such as indigenous African-initiated churches and neo-Pentecostalism, should also be viewed as growing pathways to development, which often operate outside of the mainstream development actors. These actors are increasingly being seen as providing African solutions for African problems, beginning with the agency of grassroots religious actors and possessing the potential to decolonize development.35

Means, Strategies, and Opportunities with Regard to Faith-Based Organizations Multi-African-Country Case Study: Tearfund Tearfund, a Christian charity organization, carried out research studies in Uganda, DRC, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, and Kenya to assess how local churches under a specific partner denomination implement the Church and Community Transformation (CCT) program to improve people’s lives and reduce poverty. The research was conducted using an evaluation methodology called the Qualitative Impact Evaluation Protocol (QuIP), which measures qualitative impact in a robust, credible, and unbiased way. All references to CCT made during the research by

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participants were spontaneous, and shared as they told their stories of change. The evidence in this report shows that when the local church works with the community, it is an effective and sustainable solution to overcoming poverty. About 70% of respondents said that CCT and the local church had brought improvements to their lives, despite research conducted as participants faced significant external shocks and crises, including drought, economic crises, and the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the findings of this study, the contributions that faithbased organizations are making in the process of community transformation are fourfold: (i) the church reaches out, (ii) Hope found, (iii) Improved relationships, and (iv) resilient livelihoods. Through a closer look at these four areas of church contribution in the development discourse through the CCT approach, we find the church is not just the catalyst for sustainable transformation but also for holistic transformation. The first area of impact (“church reaches out”) covers the spiritual needs of the community and, at the same time, allows the church to fulfill one of the most important aspects of the Great Commission, which is evangelization. By reaching out, the church realizes its centrifugal missional function, the result of which leads to the realization of its centripetal missional function as evangelized people come to the church in the quest for that which they had tasted: the sweet aroma of God’s Word. The “church reaches out” transformation impact is therefore a growth strategy. The church and all believers in Christ are called to spread the love of Jesus everywhere and to everyone, and one of the ways the gospel can reach people is through constant outreach. By responding to the spiritual needs of communities, the church shows the love of God and offers an invitation to know him better. The second area of impact, which is “hope found,” covers the physical needs of the community, of which the most basic include housing, clothing, food, and education. So, from this one case study, it is evident that the church and parachurch organizations (community-development organizations, faith-based organizations, etc.) contribute to the physical needs of the community, and by so doing, their once-deferred hope for a promising tomorrow gets renewed. Through the same CCT program, Tearfund partners (local churches and/or parachurch organizations) serve, equip, and empower communities living in poverty with practical tools to discover their God-given abilities and change their circumstances, thus enjoying the fullness of life by becoming all that God intended them to be.

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Take the case of Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance. In 2019, the Ebola outbreak had hit the north-eastern part of the country. One of the major challenges of the outbreak was the lack of community engagement in raising awareness, prevention measures, and response activities. In some areas—and in extreme cases—this manifested in outright resistance and attacks on frontline Ebola workers. In response, faith leaders from both the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant churches took significant steps to engage their respective congregations in the fight against Ebola. Tearfund partnered with ECC (Eglise du Christ au Congo) leaders to mobilize hundreds of worshipers in awareness and cooperation. On one Sunday, the Anglican Bishop and dozens of other religious leaders organized a day of raising awareness, involving more than 340 congregations in the city of Butembo. T-shirts, banners, and flyers were distributed while locally produced songs in Kiswahili extolled the importance of coming together to face this deadly disease. The urban neighborhoods of Butembo and Katwa, where nearly 90% of new positive cases came from, were major areas of concern. Most international organizations teams who felt threatened in these areas had to seek shelter or even be evacuated. The Catholic Bishop of Butembo who had previously launched a campaign in Catholic churches entitled “Families without Ebola,” summoned all the parish priests of Beni, Butembo, and Katwa to promote the importance of “safe funerals” within their neighborhoods. He advocated the need to test corpses with rapid Ebola swab tests before burial, even to the point of denying the sacraments to non-compliant burials. Community resistance to involving Ebola response teams in burials has been a significant cause of viral transmission. These strongly worded instructions from the Catholic Church-supported campaigns for all faith communities undoubtedly had a significant impact on the community’s commitment to cooperate with Ebola response teams to defeat and eliminate this deadly virus among them. Indeed, the communities of Butembo and Katwa would not have renewed their hope in the face of the Ebola epidemic if it had not been for interventional praxis by these faith leaders and faith-based organizations; in fact, other humanitarian actors chose to leave the area, and some were even evacuated to their respective countries. The intervention was made jointly by all denominations, and this included churches that are denominationally affiliated to the ECC—Eglise du Christ au Congo (“Church of Christ in Congo”—the association of Christian churches in the DRC),

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which is like the Anglican Church but also includes congregations that are part of the ECC umbrella, like the Catholic Church. The third area of impact (improving relationships) is key to Tearfund’s theological philosophy as it is about restoring broken relationships. This is what is called the theology of the 1 + 3 relationships. The broken relationship we have with God must be primarily restored for the restoration of the other three broken relationships to take place. Essentially, this way of community engagement is missional because it is drawn from God’s first missionary act after the Fall, when God went to look for Adam after he had eaten the fruit of the tree he was forbidden to eat from. So, after the fall, our relationship with God was severely damaged (broken), and this has affected our relationship with ourselves, with others, and with the rest of the creation. God sent Christ to restore these broken relationships, and as co-workers with God, it is our responsibility to partake in this redemptive journey to restore the 1 + 3 broken relationships. Here, the church’s contribution to the process of transformation covers the social needs of the community. Tearfund believes that God did not create the human person as a solitary being; he wanted us to be social beings. However, the current social nature of the human person is also broken, which explains the importance of the church to focus on this aspect of community transformation by partnering with God to restore all broken relationships, starting with the ultimate relationship we have with God. Indeed, the most important relationship we will ever have is with God. The social nature of the human person involves the radical equality of all human beings (including ourselves) and the intentional stewardship of all the resources God has entrusted to us (including the environment), as well as the crucial relationship we have with God. It is the responsibility of the church to work with God in the transformation process of restoring all 1 + 3 broken relationships. Thus, the role of the church and any faith-based (or parachurch) organizations that engage the community for transformation purposes is to serve, equip, and empower people in the communities where they work so they can ultimately help themselves, thus creating dependability instead of dependency. The last area of church transformational intervention contributes to covering the economic needs of the community members. “Resilient livelihoods” is an important contribution to the sustainable and holistic transformation of any community living in poverty and with no hope for a brighter tomorrow. In championing resilient livelihoods, the goal of the church is economic sustainability and holism. When the church is engaged

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in community transformation, it is to bring lasting and holistic change to the members of the community because the main and most critical point of focus in development activities is the human person. In other words, any development program that does not have a human person at the center of it is doomed to failure. The most vulnerable people must be able to participate equitably in their local economy and increase their income. Thus, to build resilient livelihoods, households in the community must be able to diversify their activities and have adequate support in terms of assets protected from the adverse effects of natural hazards and other shocks and stresses. Tearfund and its partners work in some of the world’s poorest communities where many people struggle to acquire sufficient assets or earn enough income to meet their basic needs. Unemployment rates are often staggeringly high, especially among young people, and conflict and disasters can reverse development gains by pushing people back into poverty. Agriculture is the main source of income for many poor communities. Often, however, small farmers cannot grow enough food or earn enough money to buy food for their families. Without sufficient food, income, and good nutrition, people cannot live full or productive lives. At the other extreme, wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few people in developing countries where unfavorable economic systems further exacerbate this inequality. Most of the case studies provide a deeper investigation into how communities in Africa practically implement livelihood programs. They provide insight into the successes and challenges faced by each community, so that the learning can be applied in other areas. The case of Amou Yak, a 30-something-year-old man from South Sudan, provides evidence to this. During the 2013 conflict in South Sudan, people were displaced from their home villages, and normal life changed. Everything was looted, and people lost hope and were unable to practice agricultural activities. People were gathering wild fruits, fishing, and hunting wild animals for survival due to widespread insecurity and killings. Consequently, vulnerable groups such as children, young mothers, and the elderly were severely affected by high rates of acute malnutrition due to lack of food, clean water, and environmental sanitation and hygiene. Tearfund, through its partner churches, implemented different projects to help this community. Some of the projects included food security and livelihood activities, and this brought back lost hope and built resilience through the provision of crop, vegetable seeds, and fishing kits. Tearfund provided farming training to beneficiaries

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that improved vegetable production. This was one of the biggest changes since people moved from using traditional farming approaches to using improved farming practices. Yak applauded faith-based initiatives that brought about change in their communities: “My vegetable garden has contributed a lot to the livelihood of my family. It has become a source of food and generates income which has reduced our bad food practices. Now we have a balanced diet in our daily meal.” Indeed, this is a resilient livelihood and shows that the contributions of religious leaders and faith-based organizations are valuable to all. Effects of Religion: Tensions and Opportunities While there is no doubt a diversity of effects on the public sphere with regard to religion, in this section we discuss three core issues which emerge when reviewing the effects of religion and development on the continent. Religion as Hindrance and Help with Regards to Gender Justice Perhaps one of the thorniest issues in terms of the role of religious actors in development—moreover on the continent of Africa—is that of gender. Tomalin36 notes, for example, that until recently religion was solely viewed as largely associated with “gender inequitable attitudes,” which led to the disempowerment of women. This is largely due to the ways in which patriarchal beliefs and practices are perpetuated via religion in society—most often via the selection and interpretation of sacred texts.37 While there is certainly some truth in this assumption, as will be discussed in this section, it is also the case that religion plays a significant role in the lives of “millions of poor women across the globe”—especially on an inherently religious continent such as Africa where African Traditional Religion, Islam, and Christianity reside together. One of the most significant sources of tension with regard to the intersection of religion, development, and gender on the African continent is the way culture and religion often reinforce one another in terms of the oppression of women with regard to issues of widow inheritance, maternal health, girl child education, gender-based violence, etc. Kanyoro38 notes the reason for this as being that in the “African indigenous thought system, culture and religion are not distinct from each other…there is no sphere of existence that is excluded from the double grip of culture and

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religion.” Para-Mallam,39 for example, notes that certain Islamic beliefs regarding marriage and family size reinforce existing cultural power imbalances in the Hausa-Fulani culture in Nigeria and ultimately results in girl children being held back from formal schooling, while toxic interpretations of the Christian scriptures have often been attached to the perpetuation of gender norms and beliefs that facilitate and condone gender-based violence via patriarchal readings of the Christian scriptures and child marriage via “religious beliefs in the sanctity and importance of virginity.”40 Nevertheless, it should also be noted that faith-based organizations and other religious actors and communities are also increasingly playing a role in addressing these tensions. Both World Vision (a global Christian faithbased organization) and Islamic World Relief have played a key role on the continent through the Channels of Hope Gender methodology and workshops. Other global faith-based organizations such as Tearfund have also addressed the notion of toxic masculinity via its Transforming Masculinities programming.41 Perhaps most significant is the role religious leaders at the grassroots level can play. Imams in the Muslim faith and ministers in the Christian faith, for example, are largely male, and therefore interfaith groups, such as Religions for Peace, have sourced funding from donors such as USAID to implement a project that seeks to “improve the ability of religious leaders and faith-based organizations to respond to GBV and its links to HIV.”42 Such engagements are not without tension for religious actors. A study on Islamic World Relief, for example, indicates that their adoption of a gender policy was in no small part due to donor policies on gender equity and the need to be recognized as a mainstream development organization.43 Nevertheless, such organizations straddle the gap between traditional Muslim aid and mainstream development aid through “the organisations’ attempts to find theological arguments that can support the struggle against gender-based violence, for instance.”44 Bartelink45 notes that during her engagement with both male and female Christian religious leaders in the Kenyan context, who were now active in addressing inequality and gender-based violence, they commented that they initially viewed gender as a “Western, elitist term that would divide their families and communities.” This was mitigated, not by a top-down feminist discourse, but rather by the “possibility of realizing a Biblical vision of harmonious relations.” The role of faith-based organizations and religious leaders and theology, therefore, remains clear in terms of addressing issues

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of gender parity on the continent; however, the role of religious women in their own agency should not be underestimated. Faith-Based Organizations as Donor “Brokers” for Local Aid The issue of donor aid with regard to the Global South has long been a contentious issue. Not only do scholars claim that (at least among bilateral donors) “donor interests matter more than recipient needs” in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also that in recent years the continent has seen a “rise in the contribution” of new donors from China and India, which complicates the donor landscape and the notion of neo-colonialism.46 Clarke notes that Western donors have traditionally been ambivalent about the relationship between faith and development and the activities of faith-based organizations due to concerns regarding proselytization or capacity, but that this has steadily moved from “estrangement to engagement.”47 Fifteen years later, this appears to remain the case and interest in faith-based initiatives continues to grow. In studying donor aid in Africa with regard to HIV/AIDS faithbased organization interventions, Oliver and Wodon note that it appears that more formal, nationally registered, and larger faith-based organizations appear to be able to better access donor funding than the more informal faith-based organizations “such as congregations and community initiatives or projects run by informal faith groups on the periphery of congregations.”48 Oliver and Wodon also make an important point with regard to the complexity of donor-funded faith-based organization initiatives: In any given community in Africa, one may find a complex web of initiatives, also with, for example, an array of international faith-based and secular agencies both funding and running programs at local level. All this is often in parallel with programs being run through multiple faith-affiliated sources: from large congregations, through denominational offices, from denominational networks, as well as initiatives motivated by faith-inspired community members and completely unaffiliated with any organisation.49

The landscape regarding donor aid is also diverse, with funding to various African countries funneled via secular global donors such as the World Bank, Global North country donors in the form of DFID, PEPFAR, and others, or faith-based donors such as DanChurchAID and large international faith-based organizations such as World Vision, Tearfund, Islamic

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World Relief, etc. In the case of World Vision, Oliver points out that this international faith-based organization variously operates as a primary recipient, secondary recipient, or local NGO provider or partners with smaller local institutions.50 An interesting case is also Direct Aid (formerly Africa Muslims Agency), which a recent article identifies as “carefully” mediating between “Gulf donor wishes, aid recipient needs, Kuwaiti and African government regulations, and various development priorities.”51 One of the problems with this complexity of relationships is the fact that international donors are often far removed from the realities on the ground, as also highlighted by the Direct Aid study: “as my research has shown, there is little—if any—direct contact between African recipients and Kuwait donors and managers.”52 One of the additional complexities with regard to faith-based organizations and donor funding on the African continent is that they are often implicated in the neoliberal impulses of the broader aid and development industry and the “same developmentalist logic that shapes the global development industry.” This overdependence on donors, often leads for example to faith-based organization programs that at best may not be contextually fit for purpose and at worst complicit in Northern/Western political interference in the Global South53 In Cameroon, a study on the role of religious actors in health notes the historical entanglements with both missionary networks and donors as shaping the way that faith actors engage.54 This certainly relates, too, to the ongoing entanglements between neocolonial impulses in donor relationships with African recipients of donor funding. Ecumenical movements such as the World Council of Churches, for example, have attempted to address this lack of accountability and transparency between donors and recipients over the years; nevertheless, studies still show that despite the fact that partnership has become the new buzzword—seemingly implying less problematic power relations between donor and recipient—“both transnational aid workers and local NGOs (including church programs) complain that genuinely egalitarian relationships hardly exist.”55 A South African study, largely focused on smaller community-based faith-based organizations, highlights that within this context Christian faith-based organization funding is largely derived from individual Christians, the South African state, and other South African donor organizations and businesses rather than from international donor organizations.56 The latter is largely a result of the fact that South Africa is often regarded as a middle-income country and is therefore ineligible for certain kinds

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of international aid. This factor, more especially with regard to nonfaith-based donors, had an interesting outcome, as it led a number of study respondents to declare that as a result, they were both unapologetically faith-based and contextually focused in their responses and tended to “prioritise their own mission and the nature of their work over and above donor priorities.”57 As much as international donor aid may still be desirable in some contexts, this study perhaps shows the importance of in-country localized aid funded by on-the-ground religious actors such as local congregations, and more especially, African-Initiated Churches. Religion’s Role via Faith-Based Organizations in Addressing Corruption, State Failure, and Injustice Ndzovu58 makes the important point that part of the reason for international aid being increasingly funneled via faith-based actors was the dissatisfaction and lack of trust that donors had in most African states due to corruption and weak governance. Many African states have been plagued by accusations of widespread corruption and mismanagement—where weak governance, financial controls, and state power are utilized to benefit a few, and public funds or property are misappropriated. These issues hinder service delivery also at a grassroots level as “often people are able to bribe supervisors and accept mediocre services.”59 It is, therefore, interesting to note that against the backdrop of a lack of trust in the South African government to deliver social services due to corruption and weak service delivery, a Muslim faithbased organization named Gift of the Givers has emerged as a national civil society hero. It is notable that this faith-based organization and other religious actors were lauded for their action in response to recent natural disasters such as floods and drought for being able to mobilize effective and responsive relief in ways that the South African government could not. During COVID-19, it was also apparent that the government entrusted large amounts of relief funding to ecumenical (church network) bodies such as the South African Council of Churches for the distribution of food relief, believing that they were the most effective means to reach those at the grassroots level.60 Another way that faith-based actors have engaged is via church leaders who “exercise their citizenship rights and influence society” by calling for state accountability, justice, and human rights.61 This has been true

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in many countries on the continent, and church leaders such as Archbishop Tutu (South Africa), Bishop Niringye (Uganda), and Bishop Okullu (Kenya) are all prominent examples of church leaders who have publicly addressed issues of corruption and human rights abuses and have called for democracy and greater state accountability. Bishop Okullu is noted as not only engaging the state in word but also in deed, as he founded a financial company that provided loans “for the poor and initiated development projects including educational institutions and agricultural and health programmes.”62 The roles of religious actors in the resolution of civil conflict and in advocating for political reforms are also well documented and, in this respect, inter-religious councils in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan are noted as playing a significant role in ending long-running civil wars by creating “inclusiveness that shrunk political and religious boundaries thereby increasing the confidence of conflicting parties during the dialogue.”63 The latter example also highlights the power of inter-religious cooperation.

Conclusion The African continent remains inherently religious, and this chapter affirms the fact that religious actors continue to hold the trust of the African people, with high levels of trust being placed in faith-based organizations. Such religious actors are diverse both in terms of mission and means of operation, and on our continent faith-based actors in development stretch from local grassroots actors such as mosques, local churches, and grassroots faith-based organizations to transnational faith-based organizations funded largely by Western donors. Their networks and means of operation are also complex, and it is clear that ATR and the role of indigenous religious movements are as yet not as studied with regard to their contribution to development—although scholarship with regard to this is on the rise. As the chapter has shown, trust in religious actors is largely due to the fact that some African states have failed to deliver in terms of basic social services; with the growing challenges of weakened and corrupt African states, faith actors may be required to play an increasingly central role within African civil society. There nevertheless remain some tensions with regard to faith-based organizations in Africa. While faith-based organizations often play a mediatory role in terms of international donors and grassroots development actors, there remains the risk of an overdependence on Western donors and political interference—both of which have

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neocolonial undertones. This is also related to contestation with regard to local cultures and beliefs when it comes to issues of gender and sexual behaviors, where both mainstream religion and culture/indigenous beliefs may stand in opposition to mainstream development goals but could also be harnessed in the service of contextually relevant development interventions. It is, therefore, clear that faith-based organizations will continue to play a central role with regard to development on the African continent and that these faith actors will need to remain mindful of the potential opportunities and contestations that arise at the intersection of faith and development.

Notes 1. Brian Howard, “Afrobarometer Religion in Africa: Tolerance and Trust in Leaders Are High, But Many Would Allow Regulation of Religious Speech,” Afrobarometer Dispatch, no. 339 (January 2020). 2. Howard, “Afrobarometer Religion in Africa,” 3. 3. Akinmayowa Akin-Otiko and Aremu Rahman Abbas, “Return to African Traditional Religion After Conversion to Christianity or Islam: Patronage of Culture or Religious Conversion,” Ilorin Journal of Religious Studies 9, no. 1 (2019): 28. 4. David T. Adamo, “Christianity and the African Traditional Religion(s): The Postcolonial Round of Engagement,” Verbum et Ecclesia 32, no. 1 (2011): 6, https://doi.org/10.4102/ve.v32i1.285. 5. “Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures,” Global Religious Futures, http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/regions/sub-saharan.africa/religi ous_demography#/?affiliations_religion_id=0&affiliations_year=2010. 6. Adamo, “Christianity and the African Traditional Religion(s),” 1, 2. 7. Hassan Ndzovu, “Sacrelization of the Humanitarian Space: Faith Based Organisations, Mission-Aid and Development in Africa,” in Religion and Development in Africa BIAS Era 4, ed. Ezra Chitando, Masiiwa Ragies Gunda, Lovemore Togarasei, and Joachim Kugler (Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press, 2020), 126. 8. Ndzovu, “Sacrelization of the Humanitarian Space,” 126. 9. Howard, “Afrobarometer Religion in Africa,” 1. 10. Howard, “Afrobarometer Religion in Africa,” 8. 11. Barbara Bompani, “Religion and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview,” in The Routledge Handbook of Religions and Global Development, ed. Emma Tomalin (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 103. 12. Barbara Bompani, “Religion and Faith-Based Organisations in Africa: The Forgotten Actors,” 2011, https://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/27/religionand-faith-based-organisations-in-africa-the-forgotten-actors/, 2.

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13. Omobololaji Ololade Olarinmoye, “Faith Based Organisations and Development: Prospects and Constraints,” Transformation 29, no. 32 (2012): 4, https://doi.org/10.1177/0265378811427985. 14. Bompani, “Religion and Faith-based Organisations in Africa,” 3. 15. Bompani, “Religion and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 101. 16. Bompani, “Religion and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 101. 17. Paul Gifford, Christianity, Politics and Public Life in Kenya (London: Hurst, 2009), 46. 18. John De Gruchy, The Church Struggle in South Africa (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), 13. 19. Kenneth Mtata, “Religion and Development: Friends or Foes?,” in Religion: Help or Hindrance to Development? LWF Documentation 58, ed. Kenneth Mtata (Geneva: Lutheran World Federation, 2013), 29. 20. Stelios Michalpouplos and Elias Papaioannou, “Historical Legacies and African Development,” NBER Working Paper Series, no. 25278 (2018), https://doi.org/10.3386/w25278, 12. 21. Michalpouplos and Papaioannou, “Historical Legacies and African Development,” 12. 22. Firoze Manji and Carol O’ Coil, “The Missionary Position: NGOs and Development in Africa,” International Affairs, 178, no. 3 (2002): 567– 83. 23. Gregory Deacon and Emma Tomalin, “A History of Faith-Based Aid and Development,” in The Routledge Handbook of Religions and Global Development, ed. Emma Tomalin (London: Routledge, 2015). 24. Manji and O’Coil, “The Missionary Position,” 571. 25. Manji and O’Coil, “The Missionary Position,” 572. 26. Mtata, “Religion and Development,” 29. 27. Gerrie Ter Haar and Stephan Ellis, “The Role of Religion in Development: Towards a New Relationship between the European Union and Africa,” European Journal of Development Research 18 (2006): 351–67. 28. Barbara Bompani, “Religion and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 103. 29. Ephriam Yoms, “Transformational Development as Theological Challenge to the Nigerian Church: An Evaluation of the ECWA People Orientated Development Program” (PhD diss., University of Stellenbosch, 2015). 30. Nadine Bowers Du Toit, “Meeting the Challenge of Poverty and Inequality? ‘Hindrances and Helps’ with Regard to Congregational Mobilisation in South Africa,” HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 73, no. 2 (2017), https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v73i2.3836. 31. Lucy Y. Steinitz, “African Stars,” Journal of HIV/AIDS & Social Services, 6, no. 4 (2007): 7–22, https://doi.org/10.1300/J187v06n04_026.

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32. Matthew Clarke, Simone Charnley, and Juliette Lumbers, “Churches, Mosques and Condoms: Understanding Successful HIV and AIDS Interventions by Faith-based Organisations,” Development in Practice 21, no. 1 (February 2011): 3–17. 33. Chanfi Ahmed, “Networks of Islamic NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Bilil Muslim Mission, African Muslim Agency (Direct Aid) and al Haramayn,” Journal of East African Studies 3, no. 3 (2019): 426–37. See also Nadine Francis Bowers du Toit, “Unapologetically Faith Based: The Nature of Donor Engagement in the Context of South African Faith-Based Organisations,” HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 75, no. 4 (2019), https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v75i4.5529. 34. Chammah Kaunda and Sokfa France John, “Religion and Development in Africa—A Critical Analysis,” in Religion and Development in Africa BIAS Era 4, ed. Ezra Chitando, Masiiwa Ragies Gunda, Lovemore Togarasei, and Joachim Kugler (Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press, 2020), 68– 69. 35. Philipp Ohlmann, Wilhelm Grab, and Marie-Luise Frost, “Introduction: African Initiated Christianity and Sustainable Development,” in African Initiated Christianity and the Decolonisation of Development: Sustainable Development in Pentecostal and Independent Churches, ed. Philipp Ohlmann, Wilhelm Grab, and Marie-Luise Frost (London: Routledge, 2020), 17–20. 36. Emma Tomalin, Religions and Development (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 148. 37. Marie Juul Petersen, “Translating Global Gender Norms in Islamic Relief Worldwide,” Progress in Development Studies 18, no. 3 (2018): 51. 38. Musimbi Kanyoro, “Engendered Communal Theology: African Women’s Contribution to Theology in the Twenty-First Century,” Feminist Theology, 27 (2013): 36–56. 39. O. J. Para-Mallam, “Faith, Gender and Development Agendas in Nigeria: Conflicts, Challenges, and Opportunities,” Gender and Development, 14, no. 3 (2006): 409–21. 40. Elisabet Le Roux and Nadine Bowers Du Toit, “Exploring Tensions: Gender and Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in The Routledge Handbook of Religion, Gender and Society, ed. Caroline Starkey and Emma Tomalin (London: Routledge, 2021), 9. 41. Le Roux and Bowers Du Toit, “Exploring Tensions,” 10. 42. Britt Herstad, A Call to Act: Engaging Religious Leaders and Communities in Addressing Gender-Based Violence and HIV (Washington, DC: Futures Group, Health Policy Initiative, Task Order 1, 2009), http:/ /www.healthpolicyinitiative.com/Publications/Documents/971_1_A_ Call_to_Act__GBV_and_HIV_Advocacy_Guide_for_Religious_Leaders_F INAL_acc.pdf.

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43. Petersen, “Translating Global Gender Norms,” 191. 44. Petersen, “Translating Global Gender Norms,” 203. 45. Brenda Bartelink, “Religion, Gender and International Development: Searching for Game Changers in the Midst of Polarization,” in The Routledge Handbook of Religion, Gender and Society, ed. Caroline Starkey and Emma Tomalin (London: Routledge, 2021), 360. 46. Hassen Abda Wako, “Aid, Institutions and Economic Growth in SubSaharan Africa, Heterogenous Donors and Heterogenous Responses,” Review of Development Economy, no. 22 (2018): 24. 47. Gerald Clarke, “Agents of Transformation? Donors, Faith-Based Organisations and International Development,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2007): 79. 48. Jill Oliver and Quintin Wodon, “Increased Funding for AIDS-Engaged Faith-Based Organizations in Africa?” The Review of Faith and International Affairs 12, no. 1 (2014): 3, https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274. 2013.876736. 49. Oliver and Wodon, “Increased Funding,” 4. 50. Oliver and Wodon, “Increased Funding,” 5. 51. Mara A. Leichtman, “Da’wa as Development: Kuwaiti Islamic Charity in East and West Africa,” The Muslim World 112, no. 1 (2022): 128, https:/ /doi.org/10.1111/muwo.12423. 52. Leichtmann, “Da’wa as Development,” 128. 53. Cecelia Lynch, “Emancipation or Accommodation? Faith and Justice in a Globalized Africa,” Globalizations 14, no. 7 (2017): 1103, https://doi. org/10.1080/14747731.2017.1325182. 54. Sibylle Herzig van Wees, Emmanuel Betsi, and Maturin Desire Sop, “A Description and Explanation of the Complex Landscape of FaithBased Organisations in Cameroon’s Health Sector,” Development in Practice 31, no. 3 (2021), https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCi tFormats?doi=10.1080/09614524.2020.1841737. 55. Lynch, “Emancipation or Accommodation?,” 1104. 56. Bowers Du Toit, “Unapologetically Faith Based,” 4. 57. Bowers Du Toit, “Unapologetically Faith Based,” 4. 58. Ndzovu, “Sacralization of the Humanitarian Space,” 131. 59. Isaac Boaheng, Poverty, the Bible and Africa: Contextual Foundations for Helping the Poor (Bukuru: HippoBooks, 2020), 35. 60. Nadine Bowers Du Toit and Craig Stewart, “Give Us This Day Our Daily Bread? Innovative Responses by Faith Communities to Suffering During COVID-19 Within a Context of Inequality and Poverty in South Africa,” in Christianity and COVID-19: Pathways to Faith, ed. Chammah J. Kaunda, Atola Longkumer, Kenneth R. Ross, and Ester Mombo (London: Routledge, 2022).

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61. Jane Chiroma, “Democracy, Citizenship and Civil Society,” in African Public Theology (Bukuru: HippoBooks, 2021), 74. 62. Chiroma, “Democracy, Citizenship and Civil Society,” 74. 63. Ndzovu, “Sacralization of the Humanitarian Space,” 142.

PART II

Societies With a Dominant Religious Marketplace

CHAPTER 4

Muslim NGOs in Contemporary Ghana Holger Weiss

Ghana is a predominantly Christian country, although state authority and government institutions are secular by definition. The country has for decades been marked by a North–South divide; the southern, Christiandominated regions inhabit the centers of economic growth and political decision-making, while the northern savannah regions have for decades been regarded as economically and politically marginalized.1 Successive peaceful elections since Ghana’s return to parliamentarism during the Fourth Republic in 1992, relatively strong governance institutions and accountability systems, and a vibrant civil society have made Ghana a “donor darling” for bilateral and multilateral donors.2 Muslims constitute about 20% of the population, the majority living in urban deprived Zongo communities in the southern part of the country as well as in urban and rural settlements in the northern savannah regions. Most Muslims are linked to the two Sunni Muslim sects, the Tijani Sufi and various Salafi groups, alongside Ahmadi, Shia, and Ibadi communities. During the Fourth Republic, the two dominant political parties, the

H. Weiss (B) Åbo Akademi University, Turku, Finland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Glatzer et al. (eds.), Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31960-0_4

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National Democratic Convention (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), started to target Muslim voters. At first, the NDC presented itself as pro-Muslim and pro-Northern in contrast to the NPP, which had its roots in the Christian-dominated southern regions. Consequently, both the Zongo communities and the northern regions emerged as strongholds of the NDC during the first decade of the Fourth Republic. The NPP, in order to challenge the NDC in the elections, started to show commitment to Muslims and Zongo inhabitants, resulting in its gaining Muslim voters, especially in areas where Muslim communities were split into various quarreling and competing denominational (Sufi Tijani versus Salafi) and ethnic groups.3 As part of their pro-Muslim policy, the NPP government of President Akuffo-Addo established the Zongo Development Fund (ZoDF) with over US$50 million in seed funding to support the Ministry of Inner Cities and Zongo Development Ministry, both established in 2017.4 Mutual assistance constitutes a core element in traditional Ghanaian ideals of self-help and communitarianism. The forerunners of modern nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) stem in part from this tradition, blended with ideas of forming associations and clubs introduced by the Western-educated coastal elite and Christian missionaries. Most of these groups were unofficial and informal; by 1930, only three officially registered NGOs existed in Ghana. A rapid increase of officially registered NGOs followed independence in 1957, numbering more than 320 in 1966 and about 1,500 in 2005.5 In September 2021, the Non-Profit Organization Secretariat of the Republic of Ghana listed more than 4,100 registered regional, national, and international NGOs.6 The NGO landscape in contemporary Ghana predominantly comprises Christian, nondenominational, and secular factions. In contrast, the existence, agenda, and activities of local and international Muslim NGOs, faith-based organizations (FBOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), and civil society organizations (CSOs) have hitherto been regarded as a marginal phenomenon, if noted at all. This chapter will therefore discuss their expansion in the recent two decades, especially highlighting the crucial role of social media for the NGO-ization7 of the Muslim sphere in Ghana.8 Not much is known about the history of Muslim NGOs in colonial and early postcolonial Sub-Saharan Africa; their rise during the 1980s and 1990s received little interest in academic research and by contemporary observers. Even less attended to were the various ways Muslim

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communities tried to address political and socio-economic marginalization processes in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Ghana.9 Nevertheless, David E. Skinner notes, the formation of local, regional, and national Muslim NGOs and their interaction with Ghanaian governments and international agencies correlates with the efforts of Muslims to create and maintain an Islamic space. It also reflects their efforts to expand their political, economic, and social influence in society.10 While the impact of Muslim NGOs in establishing and financing the modern Islamic educational sector in Ghana as well as their support for da’wa (call to Islam) has been analyzed in previous research,11 their promotion of social welfare is a largely unknown terrain for academic research.12 Even less known is the use of social media by Ghanaian Muslim NGOs, CSOs, and CBOs as a network platform to rally members and as tools to generate support from domestic and international donors in this “internet age.” Some key mobilizers include the various Muslim youth and Zongo associations, bloggers, communities, and networks; these members of the Muslim Ghanaian “Facebook generation” have to a large extent, escaped academic research.13

Identifying Muslim NGOs in Ghana: A Narrow Versus a Broad Framework What defines a particular association or group as a Muslim CBO, CSO, NGO, or FBO is sometimes difficult to establish, and this chapter combines a narrow and a broad framework to capture the spectrum of Muslim NGOs in Ghana (see Fig. 4.1). Narrowly defined Muslim NGOs, Kaag highlights, base themselves on an understanding of Islamic solidarity composed of three elements: ighatha or humanitarian relief, da’wa or the call to Islam, and jihad in the sense of armed conflict support of the Islamic cause.14 However, most of them combine two of the three elements as noted by Petersen in her analysis on the trajectories of transnational Muslim NGOs. The first transnational Muslim NGOs emerged at the end of the 1970s and made headlines during the famines in the Horn of Africa during the 1980s. Petersen defines these organizations as da’watist since their objective is not only to provide aid but also to counter the influence of Western, Christian NGOs in order to protect the Muslim faith and identity.15 The conflicts in Afghanistan and Bosnia in the 1980s and 1990s saw the emergence of two different types of Muslim transnational NGOs,

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Narrow framework: • • •

•

Established by Muslims Membership: Muslims Objective: empowerment of the Ummah; Da’wah plus spiritual/religious development Projects • Ramadan Iftar and Qurban • Water projects • Mosques • Educational projects • Orphans

Broad framework: • • •

•

Established by Muslims Membership: Muslims and non-Muslims Objective: empowerment of the community (Muslims as well as nonMuslims) Projects: • Community development • Humanitarian relief

Fig. 4.1 Frameworks of Muslim NGOs in Ghana

namely jihadist and solidarity-based NGOs. Jihadist NGOs blend humanitarian relief with supporting the armed struggle of Muslim groups and have, after the attacks in Kenya in 1998 and the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., in 2001, been marked by governments as terrorist organizations. Solidarity-based Muslim NGOs, on the other hand, emphasize neutrality and interfaith dialogue over jihad and da’wa, although, as Petersen highlights, most of these transnational Muslim NGOs still maintain a particularistic focus on restricting their relief efforts to fellow Muslims.16 The da’watist, jihadist, and solidarity-based Muslim NGOs are varieties of faith-based NGOs operating locally, nationally, or internationally. Da’watist NGOs have dominated the Muslim NGO landscape in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, implementing self-improvement schemes and contributing to the Muslim community’s infrastructure, such as schools, mosques, health clinics, and housing. These schemes, in turn, have a positive local multiplier effect as they produce jobs for builders and maintenance personnel, teachers, administrators, and other workers.17 However, a narrow definition of Muslim NGOs will not necessarily embrace organizations that serve Muslim populations but lack an explicit or demonstrable commitment to Islamic principles. Petersen defines such organizations as secular Muslim NGOs, applying an inclusive focus such as poverty reduction, sustainable development, and capacity-building irrespective of one’s faith as their main and sole objectives.18 Also, a narrow definition of Muslim NGOs does not include the various forms of initiatives defined by Kumi. He defines them as professional or formal substantive philanthropies, such as foundations established by high

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net-worth individuals and local/multinational corporate organizations, innovation hubs by social enterprises and impact investors, and various support organizations.19 A baseline for identifying and categorizing an organization as a Muslim NGO is when its founder or initiator was/is a Muslim. However, not all such establishments can be defined as Muslim NGOs. This is especially the case with the various CBOs and CSOs engaging in agricultural and community development in the northern parts of Ghana. Rather, depending on a narrow or a broad definition of a Muslim NGO, its membership is either in total or to a large part Muslim, and its objective is to empower the Muslim population. Following a narrow framework, Muslim FBOs, on the other hand, put the spiritual welfare and religious development of the Muslim ummah in the foreground and are exclusively faith-based organizations, although they combine da’wa with humanitarian relief and strive to improve the social welfare, health, and education of Muslims in Ghana. Community development at large, in turn, is on top of the agenda of broadly defined Muslim CSOs, CBOs, and secular NGOs, and some of them do not necessarily define themselves as faith-based organizations, although their membership comprises Muslim activists. Some Muslim CBOs and NGOs are formal and institutionalized organizations with CEOs, boards, and dues-paying members alongside voluntaries who participate in their campaigns and programs. Others are informal networks and movements that rally their supporters for ad hoc activities. Most professional NGOs are registered organizations; many informal NGOs, especially local youth groups and movements, are not. Some Muslim NGOs and foundations are, in essence, intermediary organizations for international Muslim charities and foreign Muslim philanthropists. Others generate their funds from members and local supporters through social media. The broad spectrum of Muslim organizational patterns is reflected by Rabiatu Ammah and other researchers who differentiate between traditional and modern ones. Traditional forms include the Sufi orders and mosque communities of the various Muslim denominations active in Ghana, including various Tijani and Salafi as well as Shia, Ibadi, and Ahmadi groups. Modern Muslim organizations, Ammah notes, include different councils, student organizations, NGOs, and Muslim women’s groups.20 A similar distinction between traditional Muslim organizations and modern Muslim faith-based organizations is also made by

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Sulemana Mumuni and reflects the initial NGO-ization of the Muslim sphere in Ghana until the mid-1990s. Focusing on the emergence of modern Muslim FBOs in Accra, Mumuni applies a narrow definition and outlines the proliferation of Islamic organizations during the twentieth century. Following his analysis, Muslim FBOs constitute a corpus of different associations, councils, groups, and organizations, ranging from nongovernmental Islamic organizations such as the Gold Coast Muslim Association and the Ghana Muslim Mission to various representative bodies such as the Council of Muslim Chiefs, the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, or the Ghana Muslim Representative Council.21 Alongside the office of the National Chief Imam (ONCI, established in 1992), the Coalition of Muslim Organizations, Ghana (COMOG, formed in 2002) has served as a national umbrella platform since the early 2000s.22 Some local Muslim FBOs, Mumuni underscores, are “…in name and not in structure,” defining them as “letterhead,” “signboard,” and “mosque inscription” organizations. In fact, he stresses that they do not exist as NGOs at all but as intermediary organizations for soliciting financial and material assistance for building mosques, clinics, schools, and catering for orphans and indigent Muslims from the Middle East. Based on his observations from the early 1990s, Mumuni criticizes them for blatant mismanagement and corruption: “When they receive these funds, they are then put to private use.”23 Mumuni further notes that other Muslim FBOs are non-African organizations, such as those established by the Lebanese community in Ghana (i.e., the Ghana Islamic Society for Education and Reformation). Others are branches of various Middle Eastern and North African international Muslim NGOs, FBOs, and charitable organizations. Examples include the (now-defunct) Libyan World Islamic Call Service and the Kuwaiti African Muslim Agency (since 1999 known as Direct Aid). A distinct group of Muslim FBOs are organizations established by returnee Muslim students from Middle Eastern universities, such as the Islamic Reformation and Research Center (being an arm of the Saudi organization, Darul-Ifta) or the Imam Hasayn Foundation (being the representative of an Iranian foundation).24 In contrast to the different FBOs listed above, Muslim youth organizations emerged as peer groups during the 1960s. Initially, they began as student organizations, and they addressed the neglect of Islamic institutions and organizations toward the special needs of Muslim students in secondary and tertiary educational institutions. According to Mumuni,

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during the early 1990s the most active of them were the Ghana Muslim Youth Movement, the Progressive Muslim Youth Movement, and the Ghana Muslim Students Association. Muslim women’s organizations also emerged during the postcolonial period, climaxing in the inauguration of the Federation of Muslim Women’s Associations in Ghana (FOMWAG) in 1997.25 Most important, however, is the definition by Ghanaian Muslims of which organization counts as a Muslim NGO. In 2015, four organizations were nominated as “Muslim NGO of the Year” at the firstever Ghana Muslim Achievers’ Awards. They were the Ghana Muslim Academy, the Islamic Council for Development and Humanitarian Services, the Federation of Muslim Women Associations Ghana, and the Paragon Foundation.26 In 2020, seven were nominated: Achievers Ghana, Birin Charity Organisation, Islamic Ummah Relief, ZongoVation Hub, Young Leaders Women Network, Zongo Inspiration Team, and Zudak Cancer Foundation.27 The spectrum of nominated Muslim NGOs is appalling. Nominations covered da’watist as well as secular NGOs (Achievers Ghana; Young Leaders Women Network), foundations, venture philanthropy (Zongo Inspiration Team), and social entrepreneurship (ZongoVation Hub).

A Changing Landscape of Muslim NGOs in Ghana At least three generations of Muslim NGOs operate in contemporary Ghana. The first generation stems back to the 1980s and refers (mainly) to organizations established as intermediaries for foreign donors. NGOs belonging to the first generation are, among others, the Muslim Relief Association of Ghana, the Muslim Family Counselling Service, the Islamic Council for Development and Humanitarian Services (ICODEHS), the Bureau of Social Services, al-Hudaibiyya Relief Services, and the Aldiaa Society. Unlike the second- and third-generation NGOs, some of the first-generation NGOs and their activities have been documented in academic research.28 The second generation of Muslim NGOs refers to independent NGOs collaborating with foreign Muslim charities. The oldest of these organizations were founded during the 1990s, others during the 2000s. Among these organizations are capacity-building NGOs with a large voluntary membership as their basis of existence (e.g., The Light Foundation), and organizations with a more restricted outreach and/or membership such

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as Firdaus Foundation for Social Services, Abdul-Aziz Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation, Iqra Foundation for Education and Development, El-Ehsan Charitable Relief Foundation, and Ghana Charity Association for Development, to mention a few. Both the first and the second generation of Muslim organizations are da’watist NGOs. They (generally) combine da’wa with humanitarian relief and social welfare projects directed to improve the (usually local) Muslim community. In contrast to the first and second generations, the third generation of Muslim NGOs includes both da’watist, solidarity-based ones and secular ones. These were founded during the 2010s, with all of them being distinct NGOs of the “internet era” and “Facebook generation.” A distinct marker of these is their independent position vis-à-vis foreign donors. Mobilization, visibility, networking, fundraising campaigns/crowdfunding, and outreach are conducted through social media, most importantly on Facebook, but to an increasing extent on Instagram, Twitter, WhatsApp, and YouTube. Many of them are interlinked and forward their campaigns and calls to other Facebook groups. Several of them use the increasing number of Muslim TV and radio stations; they operate on Facebook and serve as vehicles for da’wa and community development. A recent phenomenon is the launching of several secular Muslim NGOs in Ghana during the last decade. The AMAL Initiative, for example, with a mission to implement educational programs for the improvement of the health, economic, and social life “of all members in society,” pledges support to the Sustainable Development Goals.29 In turn, Renaissance Zongo Youth Aid arranged as its first project a malaria prevention campaign in May 2021 and, later, a two-day Ladies’ Entredigital Workshop in August 2021, providing intensive training on digitalized entrepreneurship, business motivation, and ideas as well as digital skills.30 Another example is the Yendi Youth Connect, which organized a Youth Empowerment Seminar in October 2020. The idea is to initiate the development, branding, and marketing of the smock industry and make Yendi the smock hub of Ghana.31 Moreover, the Women and Children Welfare Foundation and the Muslim University Female Students Education Network are two new initiatives protecting Muslim girls and women’s rights as well as enhancing Muslim education for girls.32 A similar initiative is the Zongo Girls for Education, founded by Safia Abdallah Raabo and endorsed

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by the Office of the National Chief Imam. The organization has partnered with Plan International and the Zongo Development Fund to run coronavirus campaigns in 2020 (including programs in Hausa on ZongoLink TV). It had also engaged in HIV/AIDS programs and antiwitch campaigns and promoted World Menstrual Health Day in previous years.33 Moreover, the Zongo Mothers’ Hope Foundation (ZMUF) aims to decrease the prevalence of maternal mortality in the Zongo communities and improve the health and well-being of women. It also launched a COVID-19 campaign in Hausa. ZMUF has branches in the United States whose members collect and send donations to Ghana.34 The Kumasi-based Voice of the Zongo International (VOZI) is an example of the few trans- and internationally operating Ghanaian Zongo and Muslim NGOs. Starting as a CSO in Kumasi to boost sanitary and economic activities in the local Zongos, it hosted the Ashanti Muslim Business Executives Dinner in September 201935 and soon established an international network. It listed at its official inauguration on July 31, 2021, branches in Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Italy, Nigeria, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States. VOZI appears to be the brainchild of Muslim business tycoon Alhaji Abdullahi Usman, CEO of Karima Enterprise and founder of the Karima Foundation. VOZI’s medium- and long-term project plans are ambitious, ranging from organizing extra classes for double-track students and vocational training courses alongside running da’wa programs on social media and radio to financing water projects (the first ones were completed already in 2020) and building a hospital.36 Furthermore, a recent phenomenon is the emergence of nondenominational CSOs founded and dominated by Muslims with an agenda of Zongo development. An example of such an organization is the Tamalebased Advocates for Community Development, which started as a youth group in 2017 and, similar to other youth groups in their starting phase, concentrated on clean-up exercises and donations to schools. Its core members are Muslim university students, although the association is distinctively nondenominational, highlighting advocacy at the forefront of its activities. Identifying its mission of contributing to achieving SDG 1 (eradication of poverty) and SDG 4 (quality education), the group visited a rural community outside Tamale to engage with the local inhabitants.37 A totally different and yet novel outline is that of NGOs launched by Muslim Zongo TV celebrities and social media influencers, giving rise to social movements with (sometimes) massive followers and volunteers.

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One of the first of these was the Princess Umul Hatiyya Foundation, instigated by “African Women Who Rock” Umul Hatiyya Ibrahim Mahama in 2008, although active only for a few years.38 Others followed with the breakthrough of social media in Ghana: “Zongo Star” Kansar Abdulai’s HajiaPosh Foundation, Hajia Wassila Mohammad’s a.k.a. Queen Lady’s Haske Bisa Kan Haske—Nuur fauka nuur (Light upon Light), Hadizah Ibrahim Sadiq’s Kuburah Diamond Foundation and its Zango Women Livelihood and Empowerment Programme, Issah Agyeman’s Essa Ajeman Charity Foundation, Issah Ibrahim Yunus a.k.a. Teacher IB and his Teacher IB Jihad Foundation, Humu Gaage’s All Rise Initiative and her Zongo Girls Rise project and Zongo Girls Exams Clinic, and Ibrahim Baba Maltiti’s Problems Shared Problems Solved (PSPS). The PSPS organization—or rather a social movement—started as a Muslim Kumasibased multimedia/TV channel (PSPS Media Channel) and counts some 18,500 followers on Facebook (as of September 2021). Outmatching them all in terms of followers on Facebook is Khalifa Faith’s Peace Dawah Media (PDW) with close to 100,000 followers as of January 2022 and the Amir Amir Foundation for the Blind. What combines these new initiatives is their capacity to engage a large number of followers by running their fundraising campaigns via social media. PDW is a very successful media channel, announcing itself and the Ali Amir Foundation (on a banderole outside its office in Kumasi) to be a da’wa center, a Quran lesson center, a photography center, a prophetic medicine center, a depression center, an orphanage center, a less privileged education fund and support, blind Muslims support as well as providing health care, prison or inmate support, mosque and madrasa support, marriage counseling, a food pantry to orphans, and investing in the borehole water project.39 The Meryam Zakariya Yahya Foundation, a.k.a. Mariam Foundation, stands out among the recently founded NGOs. Established by Meryam Zakariya Yahya, author of the book Notes from My Soul: The Realities of Living with Mental Illness (2021),40 as a platform to address problems of mental illness among young women in the Zongo communities in combination with (ad hoc) humanitarian relief initiatives, the Foundation is unique in its vision and mission.41

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From Arab to Global Presence: International Muslim Charities Operating in Ghana International Muslim charities started their operations in Ghana in response to the drought and famine that hit hard the country’s northern parts in 1983. Little is known about the extent and impact of these interventions. Their activities during the “Guinea Fowl War,” the civil war affecting communities in the Northern Region in 1994, have also not been scrutinized by academic research. The first phase of Muslim NGOs’ activism in Ghana was, not surprisingly, linked to da’wa and mainly resulted in the construction of mosques and prayer sites. Nevertheless, a few international Muslim NGOs, such as the Libyan World Islamic Call Service (WICS) and the Iranian Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD), also made investments in health care and rural development projects. The WICS funded the Islamic Clinic outside Wa, whereas the ARD engaged in large-scale technical and infrastructural agricultural assistance in the Northern Region. Arab and Gulf charities such as Direct Aid and Qatar Charities, in turn, have for decades worked in Ghana, either directly via their branch offices or indirectly by using local Ghanaian NGOs, such as Aldiaa Society, Care and Social Development Organization, Firdaus Foundation for Social Services, and ICODEHS as commissioners and facilitators of their donations and investments. Most Arab and Gulf charities support a narrow range of projects, including the building of mosques and (Islamic/madrasa) schools, the drilling of boreholes (clear water projects), and humanitarian relief in the form of Ramadan/Iftar and Qurbani/Udhiya food packages and clothing. The second phase of international Muslim NGOs (Muslim INGOs) started during the early 2000s. This phase was marked by the advent of Western Muslim charities and Islamic solidarity-based organizations in Ghana, such as the Zakat Foundation of America and the UK charities Al-Mutada Aid and Muslim Aid. Several Arab and Western international Muslim charities established field or regional offices in Ghana and started to run their own projects. Some of the larger international Muslim charities also engaged in projects targeted at non-Muslims or mixed communities, while others restricted their activities to Muslim communities. All of them were running Ramadan/Iftar and Udhya/Qurbani programs, either by directly donating food and meat packages or cattle to be slaughtered, or indirectly funding the activities of local Muslim NGOs. In general, however, the main activities of international Muslim charities

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were directed toward the implementation of humanitarian, educational, sanitary, and water projects. Many of them also funded various da’wa projects, most notably the building of a masjid or a mosque. A noticeable change in the activities of Muslim INGOs in Ghana occurred around 2011 in the aftermath of the Arab Spring that shook North African and Middle Eastern countries. The most drastic consequence was the disappearance of the World Islamic Call Service (WICS), doomed by the collapse of the regime of Muammar Al Ghadaffi in Libya. The activities of the WICS also stopped in Ghana, including its financial support of the Islamic Clinic in Wa.42 The Arab Spring and its consequences gave way to the third and contemporary phase of Muslim INGOs activism in Ghana. This third phase saw a reconstitution of the landscape of Muslim INGOs operating in Ghana, most notably the advent and massive intervention of Turkish Muslim charities. Their most noticeable and prestigious project was the Accra Furqan Complex in Kanda, comprising the new national mosque for 15,000 worshippers designed in Ottoman style, a recreational center, a library complex, an office and residence for the Chief Imam, a research complex, a senior high school complex, a clinic, an administration block, an auditorium, and a conference center, inaugurated in 2021.43 The project was carried out in cooperation with different Turkish state and NGO partners, including the Turkish government, the Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey, the Metropolitan Municipality of Samsun alongside the Aziz Mahmud Hudai Foundation and Human Development Association International HUDAI as well as local Ghanaian organizations headed by the Turkish NGO Ghana Friendship and Solidarity Association (GANADER).44 Moreover, the number of Western and non-Arab Muslim INGOs and increasingly Western national/local Muslim NGOs has expanded tremendously. This phenomenon is partly due to the intensification of networking made possible through social media, which is an outcome of the establishment of Ghanaian Muslim diaspora communities in North America and Western Europe. The most recent aspect of this expansion is the engagements of Muslim groups and associations in Pakistan, China (Hong Kong), Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand in da’wa and humanitarian projects in Ghana.

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Social Media and the Expansion of Muslim NGOs The exact number of former and existing Muslim NGOs in Ghana is unknown. The 2011 directory on Muslim societies and associations compiled by Said Ibrahim Kreidieh lists 167 organizations, many of which are Islamic educational complexes and makarantas; about 130 can be identified as NGOs.45 In their assessment of the over 2,000 individual NGO registration files for 2013 to 2015 archived in the Ghana Non-Profit Secretariat (NPO Secretariat), Sandy Zook and Cassidy Arndt counted 650 NGOs that used Islamic words or phrases and identified 63 of them as Islamic NGOs.46 The Zongo Climate Change Agenda for Sustainable Development (ZCCASD), in turn, notes the existence of 1,080 Zongo communities in Ghana,47 and it is not farfetched to assume that the number of Muslim and/or Zongo NGOs runs into several hundreds. Based on their information on Facebook, it can be assumed that many of the Zongo youth associations and groups are not registered and have not acquired a certificate for operation; obviously, many of the local Muslim NGOs do not have certificates either. Any official lists of Muslim or Islamic organizations in Ghana are therefore tentative and largely embrace only those visible to an outsider. Based on information gathered from Ghanaian newspapers and internet sources (homepages and Facebook), Kreidieh’s 2011 Directory and the NPO Online Directory, 481 Muslim associations, foundations, groups, and organizations have so far been identified. They constitute the database—hereinafter 2021 GMNGO Database—for a qualitative analysis of the Muslim NGO landscape in Ghana during the 2010s, listing information on their headquarters, their entry/membership requirements, and the duration of their activities on Facebook. Information on the location of their headquarters indicates a heavy southern bias of its operation, as is summarized in Fig. 4.2. Not surprisingly, more than half of the Muslim NGOs have their headquarters in the Greater Accra Region. The concentration of Muslim NGOs in Accra reflects the city containing the largest concentration of Muslims, especially in Accra’s many Zongo communities and the city being the political and economic center of the country. The second largest concentration of Muslim NGOs is found in Ashanti Region. Most of them are based in Kumasi, the second largest city in Ghana, with a substantial Muslim population. Almost all the Muslim NGOs operating in the northern parts of the country are located in Tamale in the Northern

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Fig. 4.2 Location of headquarters of Muslim NGOs in Ghana (Abbreviations: GAR = Greater Accra Region; AR = Ashanti Region; NR = Northern Region; ER = Eastern Region; WR = Western Region; CR = Central Region; UWR = Upper West Region; BER = Bono East Region; UER = Upper East Region; BR = Bono Region; NER = North East Region; SR = Savannah Region; AhR = Ahafo Region; VR = Volta Region) (Source 2021 GMNGO Database; n = 444)

Region. Furthermore, about 85% of the circa 450 Muslim NGOs listed in the database operate in the three aforementioned regions (Greater Accra, Ashanti, and Northern Regions). What is striking is the lack of Muslim NGOs in Oti and the Northeast Region, most probably due to the low numbers of Muslims living in the two regions (see Table 4.1). The concentration of Muslim NGOs in the three Ghanaian metropolises—Greater Accra, Ashanti, and Northern Regions—reflects the Muslim population in the southern and northern parts of the country. About three million or almost 50% of them live in the Greater Accra, Ashanti, and Northern Regions. Further, the 2021 GMNGO Database underscores the urban and regional bias of Muslim NGOs, as almost 85% have their headquarters in the three regions mentioned above. Nevertheless, an analysis of their activities reveals a wide spectrum of engagement, including local urban and rural ad hoc projects, annual humanitarian relief programs during Ramadan, Eid al-Fitr, and Eid al-Adha to both urban and rural communities, and rural community outreach campaigns.

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Table 4.1 Ghana Census 2021: Muslim population per region (figures for total and Muslim population retrieved from Ghana 2021 Population and Housing Census. General Report Volume 3C Background Characteristics [Accra: Ghana Statistical Service, November 2021]) Region All localities, both sexes Southern regions Western Central Greater Accra Volta Eastern Ashanti Western North Ahafo Bono Bono East Oti Northern regions Northern Savannah North East Upper East Upper West

Abbr.

Total pop.

Muslim pop.

Mp/tp %

30,753,327

6,108,530

WR CR GAR VR ER AR WNR AhR BR BER OR

2,054,863 2,853,335 5,437,084 1,654,650 2,918,623 5,428,181 878,855 563,643 1,205,462 1,199,786 744,483

193,794 259,902 631,591 77,136 194,838 866,117 105,226 93,153 154,145 289,268 97,928

NR SR NER UER UWR

2,306,808 652,572 657,833 1,298,179 898,970

1,532,977 418,352 402,352 385,020 406,731

19.9 11.9 9.4 9.1 11.6 4.7 6.7 16 12 16.5 12.8 24.1 13.1 54.1 66.5 64.1 61.2 29.7 45.2

Mp/tMp %

48.5 3.1 4.3 10.3 1.3 3.2 14.2 1.7 1.5 2.5 4.7 1.6 51.5 25.1 6.8 6.5 6.3 6.5

Legend: Abbr. = abbreviation; Mp/tp = Muslim population (region)/total population (region); Mp/ tMp = Muslim population (region)/total Muslim population (country)

The change in the composition of the Muslim NGO landscape in Ghana during the age of the internet is visible on social media. Figure 4.4 highlights the rapid expansion of Muslim NGOs in Ghana during the last decade. Although the establishment of the NGOs listed in Appendix II has not been verified as of now, the launching of their Facebook accounts indicates their respective ambitions to publicize their existence and broaden their network by using social media. Two trends can be discerned from Fig. 4.3. One is the first peak in 2012, largely due to the early establishment of Facebook accounts by Zongo and Muslim youth groups. The second peak started in 2019 and continued in 2020. A large number of the new Facebook accounts were those of Muslim da’wa groups and institutions, reflecting their

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ambition to extensively use social media in disseminating their lectures as part of their outreach campaigns. Although their number already peaked in 2019, COVID-19 further spurred them to move their activities on social media. Information provided in the 2021 GMNGO Database further indicates that 217 NGOs had an active Facebook account in 2021 (48 of them made their last update or posting on Facebook in 2020). The phenomenon of some accounts established in 2019 not being updated in 2020 and 2021 seem to indicate that COVID-19 had postponed or nullified the ambitions of the affected organizations/groups, although it is more likely that they may have moved their communication to closed/non-public groups on WhatsApp or transferred their public communication to Twitter and Instagram. Figure 4.4, on the other hand, indicates the institutional and structural challenges many NGOs are facing, especially if they are loose social networks and movements with a thin or even nonexistent organizational structure. Most of the NGOs seem to be active on Facebook for about three to four years, with less than half being active for between one to three years. However, an organization’s short Facebook active phase does not necessarily correlate with its past and future activities, especially as 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Fig. 4.3 Start of Ghanaian Muslim NGOs on Facebook (Source 2021 GMNGO Database; total entries: 353)

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90 80 79

70

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NUMBERS

60 50

54

40

45

30 20 10

23 1

0

7

10

4

13

12

11

10

9

27

30

15

0 8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

YEARS

Fig. 4.4 Presence/duration of Ghanaian Muslim NGOs on Facebook (Source 2021 GMNGO Database; n = 362)

most of them established their Facebook accounts in recent years and are still active. On the other hand, what stands out are those NGOs with activity on Facebook spanning over ten years, indicating they have achieved a well-established position within the Muslim NGO landscape. Not surprisingly, the most long-lived one is a Muslim youth organization, the An-Nur Islamiyya (13 years), followed by Community Redemption Foundation, SONSETFUND, Federation of Muslim Youth Groups— Ghana, Muslim Youth Alliance for Development, Rayuwa Foundation, and Taskar Zango (all 11 years). The number of followers on Facebook, in turn, indicates the impact and capabilities of an NGO. Associations, foundations, groups, movements, and organizations with thousands of followers have a larger target group whom they can motivate to volunteer and participate in campaigns and ad hoc projects, including fundraising campaigns. Although the figures of followers on Facebook do not distinguish between domestic and foreign ones, one can assume that most local, youth, and Zongo NGOs attract the majority of their followers from their peer groups. Most Muslim NGOs have fewer than 1,000 followers, and only a few of them count above 10,000 (as of December 2021). The five largest ones are Al-Rayaan International School (35,107 followers), Ghana Islamic Youth Sadaqa Association (36,818 followers), The Light Foundation (33,653

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followers), Tijaniyya Youth (33,653 followers), and Baye Do Everything (22,841 followers).

Conclusions Muslim NGOs form a vital segment of Ghanaian civil society. Although less noted in public in comparison to Christian or secular ones, the virtual explosion of their numbers during the last decades has positively affected the empowerment of Muslim communities in Ghana. If local Muslim NGOs were exceptional and numbered but a handful during the latter part of the twentieth century, their numbers have swelled manifold during the first decades of the twenty-first century. This process reflects the “NGO-ization” of Muslim activism witnessed throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Muslim NGOs form an integral part of the third sector in contemporary Ghana. Their upsurge during the 2010s is a direct consequence of the almost unlimited access to the internet and the global explosion of social media. They have become a tool for local Muslim activists and philanthropists, youth and women associations, clubs, groups, and networks to gather funding for their social, socio-economic, cultural, educational, and religious (da’wa) empowerment projects in their communities. While such projects per se are not novel ones within the Muslim sphere, the NGO as an instrument and a vehicle is an effect of various processes of globalization and constitutes a new phase of Muslim activism. What is new are not transnational networks of Muslim scholars nor local Muslim activism and community engagements but the possibility of any activist, group, or community connecting with any potential donor, supporter, sympathizer, or volunteer anywhere. Social media has changed the Muslim NGO landscape in Ghana. For an outside spectator or a historian trying to map their activities, social media has revolutionized their visibility. Whereas only a few of their activities previously had made the headlines in national newspapers and news reporting, any NGO active on social media has become its own channel for public communication. More than this, social media has revolutionized local activism as networking and campaigning have the potential to reach out to hundreds if not thousands of followers. An NGO can

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have members and volunteers in Ghana and branches outside the country, enabling it to solicit resources both internally and externally. Muslim NGOs are an urban phenomenon in Ghana. The majority are located in Accra, Kumasi, and Tamale and direct their attention to urban and Zongo communities. A few of them run rural outreach programs, either in the form of rural da’wa and madrasa projects or humanitarian aid programs. None has so far developed a concept or program addressing the special socio-economic and environmental needs of rural agricultural communities. This is a lacuna of all Muslim NGOs, be they local, national, or international. Apart from drilling wells and building mechanized boreholes in rural communities, any income-generating activities addressing their special needs have been absent. This is remarkable, as more than half of the Muslim population live in rural communities, and most of them in the savannah regions in the northern parts of the country. The future challenge of Muslim NGOs will be to include the rural communities in their ambition to empower the Muslim communities in Ghana or help Muslim rural communities form their own NGOs and connect with national and international donors.

Notes 1. World Bank, Poverty & Equity Brief—Sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana, April https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/33E 2019, F03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Archives-2019/Global_ POVEQ_GHA.pdf. 2. Albert A. Arhin, Emmanuel Kumi, and Mohammed-Anwar Sadat Adam, “Facing the Bullet? Non-Governmental Organizations’ (NGOs’) Responses to the Changing Aid Landscape in Ghana,” Voluntas 29 (2018): 349–50. 3. See also Abass Mohammed, Samuel Abu-Gyamfi, Sheikh Seebaway Muhammed Zakaria, Henry Tettey Yartey, and Benjamin Dompreh Darkwa, “Muslims and Party Politics in Ghana: Historical Antecedents and Contemporary Analysis,” Annals of Philosophy, Social and Human Disciplines I (2021): 40. 4. The objective of the ZoDF is to support critical infrastructure in education and training, health and sanitation, local businesses and centers of culture, as well as improve security in the Zongo communities. See also http:// www.miczd.gov.gh/fund. As part of government reshufflings in 2021, the

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5.

6. 7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

Ministry became defunct, and the ZoDF was transferred to the Zongo and Inner-Cities Development Secretariat directly under the Office of the President. For an analysis of the developmental agenda of the Ministry, see Colleen Brady and Michael Hooper, “Redefining Engagement with Socio-spatially Marginalised Populations: Learning from Ghana’s Ministry of Inner City and Zongo Development,” Urbanization 4, no. 1 (2019): 9–28. George Bob-Milliar, “NGOs in Ghana—Profit Making Organizations?,” April 28, 2005, https://www.modernghana.com/news/116769/ngosin-ghana-profit-making-organizations.html. NPO Secretariat, https://npos.mogcsp.gov.gh/. On the NGO-ization of Muslim associations and religious groups as the product and effects of neoliberal globalization in Sub-Saharan Africa, see Marie Natalie LeBlanc and Louis Audet Gosselin, eds., Faith and Charity: Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2016). This chapter is based on my recently published book, see Holger Weiss, Moving Mountains: Muslim NGOs in Ghana (Kumasi: University Printing Press KNUST, 2022). M. A. Mohammad Salih, Islamic NGOs in Africa: The Promise and Peril of Islamic Voluntarism (Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, Centre of African Studies, 2001, revised version 2002). On Ghana, see Sulemana Mumuni, “Islamic Organizations in Accra: Their Structure, Role and Impact on the Proselytization of Islam,” (MPhil thesis, University of Ghana, 1994); Holger Weiss, Begging and Almsgiving in Ghana: Muslim Positions towards Poverty and Distress (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007); Sandy Zook and Cassidy Arndt, “Islamic NGOs in Education in Ghana: Analysis of the Scope, Activities, and Revenue Portfolios,” Journal of Education in Muslim Societies 2, no. 2 (2021): 57–81. David E. Skinner, “Da’wa and Politics in West Africa: Muslim Jama’at and Non-Governmental Organizations in Ghana, Sierra Leone and The Gambia,” in Development and Politics from Below: Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State, ed. Barbara Bompani and Maria Frahm-Arp (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 99. See also Mark Sey, “Social and Educational Challenges of the Contemporary Muslim Youth: The Ghanaian Experience,” Jurnal Usuluddin 14 (2001): 77–86; David Owusu-Ansah, Mark Sey, and Abbulai Iddrisu, Islamic Learning, the State, and the Challenges of Education in Ghana (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2012); David E. Skinner, “Conversion to Islam and the Promotion of’Modern’ Islamic Schools in Ghana,” Journal of Religion in Africa 43, no. 4 (2013): 426–50; Fatimatu N. Sulemanu, “Education a Tool for Sustainable Development: The Role of Muslim NGOs in Ghana,” in Religion and Sustainable Development:

4

12.

13.

14.

15.

16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21.

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Ghanaian Perspectives, eds. George Ossom-Batsa, Nicoletta Gatti, and Rabiatu Deinyo Ammah (Citta del Vaticano: Urbaniana University Press, 2018), 243–58. Apart from Holger Weiss, Zakat in Ghana: A Tool for the Empowerment of the Muslim Community (Kumasi: University Printing Press, KNUST, 2021). Annette Haaber Ihle, “Islamic Morality, Youth Culture, and Expectations of Social Mobility among Young Muslims in Northern Ghana,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 28, no. 2 (2008): 267–88; Ali Baba Mohammed, “The Phenomenon of Bases in Ghanaian Muslim Communities in Accra” (MPhil thesis, University of Ghana, 2015). On the Muslim ‘Facebook generation,’ see also Adeline Masquelier and Benjamin Soares, eds., Muslim Youth and the 9/11 Generation (Santa Fe and Albuquerque, NM: School for Advanced Research Press and University of New Mexico Press, 2016). Mayke Kaag, “Aid, Umma, and Politics: Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad,” in Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, ed. Benjamin F. Soares and René Otayek (New York and Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2007), 85–102. Marie Juul Petersen, “Trajectories of Transnational Muslim NGOs,” Development in Practice 22, no. 5–6 (2012): 766–67. Chanfi Ahmed provides a similar discussion on the hybrid character, i.e., combining relief and da’wa, of some Muslim NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa, see Chanfi Ahmed, “Networks of Islamic NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Bilal Muslim Mission, African Muslim Agency (Direct Aid), and al-Haramayn,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, no. 3 (2009): 426–27. Petersen, “Trajectories of transnational Muslim NGOs,” 767, 770–71. Skinner, “Da’wa and Politics in West Africa,” 103. Petersen, “Trajectories of transnational Muslim NGOs,” 773. Emmanuel Kumi, “Global Philanthropy Tracker: Ghana,” October 2020, https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/1805/25915/ ghana-report21.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed July 13, 2021. Rabiatu Ammah, “Islam, Gender and Leadership in Ghana,” CrossCurrents 63, no. 2 (2013): 233. Mumuni, “Islamic Organization in Accra,” 68–74; Sulemana Mumuni, “A Survey of Islamic Non-Governmental Organizations in Accra,” in Social Welfare in Muslim Societies in Africa, ed. Holger Weiss (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002), 146–48. See also Holger Weiss, Between Accommodation and Revivalism: Muslims, the State and Society in Ghana from the Precolonial to the Postcolonial Era

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23. 24. 25.

26.

27. 28.

(Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society, 2008), 346–48. COMOG stakeholder organizations and institutions are (according to information provided on COMOG’s Facebook account in 2021, see https://www.facebook. com/comogghana/): the Tijaniyya Group, the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a, the Shia Community, the Ghana Muslim Mission, the Islamic Mission Secretariat, the National Association of Imams and Ulema, the Society for Muslim Preachers, the Ghana Muslim Students’ Association, the Ghana Academy of Muslim Professionals, the Islamic Medical Association of Ghana, the Islamic Council for Development and Humanitarian Services, the Federation of Muslim Women Associations in Ghana, the Tabligh Jama’a, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission, and the Committee for Muslim Rights, Ghana. COMOG has made several attempts to launch a similar mouthpiece for Muslim youth organizations, the Network of Muslim Youth Organizations in Ghana (NEMYOG), its most profound impact being the National Muslim Youth Leaders Summit of which the third one was called for September 2021, see https://www.facebook.com/Muslim YouthAllianceforDevelopment/posts/share-your-ideasnetwork-of-muslimyouth-organizations-in-ghana-nemyog-callingas-/1665438233658343/, August 25, 2021. Mumuni, “Islamic Organization in Accra,” 74–75. Mumuni, “Islamic Organization in Accra,” 75–79. Mumuni, “Islamic Organization in Accra,” 79–81. On FOMWAG, see also Sulemanu, Leadership in the Ghaniaan Muslim Community; Ammah, “Islam, Gender and Leadership in Ghana”; and Fatimatu N. Sulemanu, “Mitigating Violence Against Women in the Ghanaian Muslim Community: The Role of the Federation of Muslim Women’s Association in Ghana (FOMWAG),” in Religion and Gender-Based Violence: West African Experience, eds. R. M. Amenga-Etego and M. A. Oduyoye (Accra: TLSS and Asempa Publishers, 2013): 405–34. “Metro TV Nominated at Ghana Muslims Achievers Awards 2015,” Modern Ghana, November 16, 2015, https://www.modernghana.com/ entertainment/34104/metro-tv-nominated-at-ghana-muslims-achieversawar.html. Final nominees of the second annual Ghana Muslim Achievers’ Awards, February 26, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/gmaa2017/. Mark Sey, “Muslim Community in Ghana: The Contemporary Scene,” Jurnal Syariah 5, no. 2 (1997): 249–58; Nathan Samwini, The Muslim Resurgence in Ghana since 1950: Its Effects upon Muslims and MuslimChristian Relations (Berlin: LIT-Verlag, 2006), 141–45; Rabiatu Ammah, “Islam and Poverty Reduction Strategies: Attempts at Dealing with Poverty in the Ghanaian Muslim Community,” Ghana Bulletin of Theology 2 (2007): 3–20; Yunus Dumbe, Islamic Revivalism in Contemporary Ghana (Huddinge: Södertörn Studies on Religion, 2013); Muhammed

4

29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42.

43.

44.

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Haron, “Africa’s Muslim Non-Governmental Organizations: Competitive Charities, Altruistic Allies?,” in Religion and Development in Africa, ed. Ezra Chitano, Masiiwa Ragies Gunda, and Lovemore Togarasei (Bamberg, Germany: University of Bamberg Press, 2020), 139–63. See AMAL Initiative, https://www.facebook.com/Amalinitiative. See Renaissance Zongo Youth Aid, https://www.facebook.com/Rzongo youthaid. See Yendi Youth Connect, https://www.facebook.com/YendiYouthCo nnect, October 26, 2020. See Women and Children Welfare Foundation, https://www.facebook. com/mufsenet/, and Muslim University Female Students Education Network, https://www.facebook.com/wacwfgh/. See Zongo Girls for Education, https://zonged.org/ and https://www. facebook.com/zongedgh. See Zongo Mothers’ Hope Foundation, https://www.facebook.com/zon gomothershopefoundation/. See Voice of Zongo International, https://www.facebook.com/VOZ IWorld, September 9, 2019. See Voice of Zongo International. See also https://voiceofzongo.com/ index.html. See Advocates for Community Development, https://www.facebook. com/ACDEVTAMALE/, September 28, 2017. African Women’s Development Fund, https://awdf.org/african-womenwho-rock-princess-umul-hatiyaa-ibrahim-mahama/. Peace Dawah Media Video: Eid sacrifice for our orphans and blind at PDM HQs in Kumasi, July 1, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/PeaceD awahMedia/. See also https://m.facebook.com/Notes-From-My-Soul-104125405318 493/, January 15, 2022. https://m.facebook.com/Mariam-foundation-food-health-and-educat ion-102570152114606/. On the activities of the WICS until circa 2006, see Mustapha Abdullah Kuyateh, “A Study of World Islamic Call Society (WICS) as an NGO in Ghana” (BA thesis, Islamic University College, Accra, 2006). Hafsa Obeng, “Ghana National Mosque Complex: Symbol of Friendship between Ghana and Turkey,” July 27, 2021, https://www.gna.org.gh/1. 21034894. Mark Hay, “Strange New Bedfellows: Turkish—Ghanaian Bilateral Ties,” August 6, 2014, https://asokoinsight.com/news/strange-newbedfellows-turkish-ghanaian-bilateral-ties-asokonews; “A Tour of the

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Almost Completed Accra Furqan National Mosque,” August 11, 2020, https://zongorepublic.com/a-tour-of-the-almost-complete-accrafurqan-national-mosque/. See also the official homepage of the Ghana National Mosque, https://www.ghananationalmosque.com/. 45. Said Ibrahim Kreidieh (comp.), Muslim Societies & Associations in Africa – Asia – Australia – Europe – The Pacific – South & Central America (Beiruth: Said Ibrahim Kreidieh, 2011), 186–96, https:// archive.org/stream/MuslimSocietiesAssociationsInAfricaAsiaAustraliaEur opeThePacificSouthCentralAmer/Muslim%20societies%20%26%20asso ciations%20in%20Africa%20-%20Asia%20-Australia%20-%20Europe%20-% 20The%20Pacific%20-%20South%20%26%20Central%20America%20--% 20Compiled%20by%20Said%20Kreidieh_djvu.txt. 46. Zook and Arndt, “Islamic NGOs in Education in Ghana,” 64. 47. Zongo Climate Change Agenda for Sustainable Development, Sustainable Development Goals Partnerships Platform, https://sustainabledeve lopment.un.org/partnership/?p=35300.

CHAPTER 5

Faith-Based Organizations and the Challenge of Developmental Social Welfare in Democratic South Africa Ignatius Swart

Introduction With the advent of democracy in South Africa during the early to mid1990s, favorable conditions would emerge for this country’s faith-based organizations to present themselves as constructive partners of the new African National Congress (ANC)-led1 democratic state. Whereas this sector (faith-based organizations) previously found itself divided between opposing and supporting (albeit tacitly in some cases) the apartheid state, faith-based organizations across the latter spectrum of opposition and support would now be welcomed to join in the task of reconstruction and nation building.2 Placing this statement in context, Isaac Mutelo, in his valuable discussion of the nature of religion–state relations in post-1994

I. Swart (B) Department of Religion and Theology, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Glatzer et al. (eds.), Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31960-0_5

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democratic South Africa, meaningfully explains why the three possibilities of an atheistic state, a theocratic state, and a secular state with strict separation between religious bodies and the state were not considered as possibilities for the makers of the country’s new political dispensation: Creating an atheistic state would have been a betrayal of the diversity of the South African society, the ongoing contribution of religion and the religious nature of the country … Opting for an atheist state, which suppresses religious expression and participation in public issues, would have betrayed the contribution of religion in the construction and founding of a democratic South Africa.3 A theocratic state would have betrayed the principles of a secular state where religion and state are primarily distinct … [T]he theocratic model was never discussed in detail as a potential possibility, because it overlooks the diverse nature of South African society. Thus, a government structure that is constitutionally religious with a strong link between state and religious institutions was considered as unacceptable to the South African context.4 The third possibility was that of creating a secular state with strict separation between religious bodies and the state … To secularise all state institutions and to place all religious institutions completely outside the sphere of the state was not found to be a solution for South Africa … The indispensable role of religion in the struggle for freedom during apartheid, its centrality in the reconciliation process and the fact that most South African citizens subscribe to a religion contradicts the creation of a strict separation between state and religion.5

Indeed, one can at this point appreciate the above extracts from Mutelo’s discussion for not only becoming concrete in terms of religion–state relationship models that did not fit the post-1994 democratic South African context,6 but for also highlighting the undeniably important place of religion and its institutions in the South African society past and present. Accordingly, it is against this backdrop that Mutelo’s argument of how South Africa’s new ANC-led political leadership wanted to recognize and do justice to the significant place of religion in the South African society by opting for the fourth possibility of a cooperationist religion–state model7 also becomes the relevant framework for this chapter’s focus on faith-based organizations and social welfare in democratic South Africa. As Mutelo explains, opting for the “cooperationist” model did not mean that

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the new democratic state would not remain essentially secular in nature to secure its independence and separation from the religious sphere. At the same time, however, it would be a state that under particular conditions would also allow for interaction between the state and religion in view of constructive engagement and not least cooperation in areas of building the South African society.8 As a direct consequence, as I will argue below, it is this cooperationist framework that would also create the favorable conditions for South Africa’s faith-based fraternity’s strategic positioning in the social welfare sphere and for the new political leaders to in turn value the role of the country’s faith-based organizations as welfare role players in the new dispensation, albeit now understood and projected within the new paradigmatic framework of “developmental” social welfare. Having identified the choice for a new cooperationist model to determine religion–state relationships in South Africa as the important point of departure for a discussion on faith-based organizations and social welfare in the post-1994 democratic dispensation, I will now proceed to address the five key questions that guide the present volume along the following sequence of thematic and topical concerns. First, I will address the question of “path development” by identifying and elaborating on four fundamental reorientations that would be required from this fraternity to become a social welfare actor within the relational arrangement of the new cooperationist model. Second, I will address the questions of “objectives” and “means and strategies” by highlighting the determining role that selected national ecumenical and interfaith bodies would almost from the outset play in striving to in fact meet, on behalf of the country’s faith-based organizations, all four of the identified fundamental reorientations required by the new cooperationist model to become a social welfare actor in democratic South Africa. Third, I will address the question of “effects” by discussing how a series of unfolding factors— implementation failure, changing religion–state relationships and state failure in the wake of political change, and religious pragmatism—would over the longer term impede if not lead to an erosion of the faith-based fraternity’s initial, seemingly smooth and idealistic acceptance of the new cooperationist state’s post-1994 social welfare agenda. Fourth, I will in a further round of discussion continue to address the questions of “means and strategies” and “effects” by directing the focus to faith-based organizations on the ground, hence through the help of available research trying to offer insight into the manner and extent to which faith-based

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organizations have at local, grassroots level aspired to meet the required reorientations for doing social welfare under the post-1994 cooperationist religion–state model. Fifth, I will as part of a final round of concluding observations summarize the essential perspectives and insights from my discussion and from this vantage point conclude with some final notes. This includes an additional observation on post-1994 religion–state social welfare partnership (an issue that can be regarded as relevant to the questions of “objectives,” “means and strategies,” and “effects”) followed by a final observation addressing the still outstanding question of “public perception.”

Becoming a Social Welfare Actor in Democratic South Africa: Fundamental Reorientations Required by the New Cooperationist Religion–State Model It has already been observed that the makers of South Africa’s new democratic dispensation wanted to recognize religion and its institutions as an integral make-up of and contributor to the South African society, based on historical and present-day considerations. However, in order to put this statement in a still fuller perspective, the following can be listed as fundamental “reorientations” that would be required from the country’s faith-based organizations to be granted such a position and role, not least in their endeavor to become an actor of social welfare in the changing context. First, faith-based organizations had to find a new orientation in the country’s new constitution, which was approved by the Constitutional Court in December 1996, and became operative in February 1997.9 As a closer study of the Constitution reveals, its makers took it very seriously that religion constituted an unmistakable make-up of the South African society.10 To this end, however, the Constitution wanted to rectify the discriminations of the past against substantial sections of South Africa’s religious community. This included sections from the Christian religion and other South African religions, whose experiences varied between suppression and toleration by the state under colonial and apartheid rule.11 In democratic South Africa, as stipulated by the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, the right to freedom of religion and equal recognition and treatment of the country’s different faith traditions had

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to bring this discrimination to an end.12 This meant that the new democratic state, unlike the state under the previous dispensations, would no longer privilege the Christian religion, or at least certain representations thereof as under apartheid, above all the other religions of the country (see Fig. 5.2 and Table 5.1). Effectively, it meant that the new democratic dispensation would bring an end to the privileged position that especially one group among the country’s very diverse representation of Christian denominations (see Fig. 5.2 and Table 5.1) enjoyed through entrenched racial and religious discrimination: the Reformed churches of Calvinist origin and notoriously the Dutch Reformed Church in particular with its membership confined to the country’s white Afrikaner population.13 For South Africa’s faith traditions, this meant that a new reality had emerged under the new constitutional democracy, succinctly described by Laurence Piper as follows: Today the Constitution affirms all religions and not only one; the state does not promote religious purposes through law or policy; it does not restrict freedom of religion; and no religious body has any constitutional standing.14

Second, it closely follows from the above-mentioned first reorientation required that the country’s faith-based organizations had to develop a new sensibility for the reality of religious plurality and the consequent challenge of “religious pluralism” in post-1994 democratic South Africa. South Africa, as national census data from around the time of the Constitution’s ratification in 1996 revealed, clearly featured a substantial but very diverse Christian affiliation across the mainline (including Catholic), Pentecostal/Charismatic, African Independent, and other churches.15 At the same time, however, the data also rendered clear support to the reality that South Africa was in fact not a “Christian country” as it was also home to the other major world religions.16 Despite their minority status in the South African context, these religions represented longestablished communities whose contribution to the new democratic cause of reconstruction and nation-building could be considered as equally indispensable (see Table 5.1). In offering a necessary note on religious change at this point, information on religion from subsequent national census data (2001 and 2013)17 reveals a picture consistent with the above-mentioned one from

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Table 5.1 Religious affiliation in South Africa: 1996 national census dataa Total

Zion Christian churches Dutch Reformed Church Catholic churches Methodist churches Pentecostal/Charismatic churches Anglican churches Apostolic Faith Mission Lutheran churches Presbyterian churches Ibandla lamaNazaretha Baptist churches Congregational churches Orthodox churches Other Apostolic churches Other Zionist churches Ethiopian-type churches Other Reformed churches Other African Independent churches Other Christian churches Subtotal: Christian churches Islam Hinduism Judaism African traditional belief Other faiths Subtotal: Other religions No religion Refused, not stated Subtotal: Uncertain/none Total

Male

Female

Total

9.4 8.9 8.5 6.9 5.3 3.9 2.7 2.6 1.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.1 8.6 5.1 2 1 0.6 3.1 73.5 1.4 1.4 0.2 0 0.5 3.5 13.4 9.6 23 100

10 8.8 8.7 7.2 5.8 4.1 2.9 2.7 1.9 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.1 9 5.7 2.1 1 0.6 3.3 77.3 1.4 1.3 0.2 0 0.5 3.4 10.1 9.2 19.3 100

9.7 8.9 8.6 7.1 5.5 4 2.8 2.6 1.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.1 8.8 5.4 2 1 0.6 3.2 75.5 1.4 1.4 0.2 0 0.5 3.4 11.7 9.4 21.1 100

a Shortened version of information in table format provided by Statistics South Africa, Primary Tables

South Africa, 28 (see note 15). The total percentages provided are inclusive of all racial groups (Black African, Coloured, Indian or Asian, and White) and gender.

the early democratic dispensation while also pointing to some noticeable instances of religious change. South Africa, when compared to the earlier picture, clearly remains a very religious society.18 This may be suggested by the seeming declining percentage of South Africans who indicated their non-affiliation to any religion (11.7% in 1996, 15,1% in

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2011, and 5.6% in 2013)19 but perhaps even better by the concomitantly very high percentage of people who indicated their affiliation to one of the country’s diverse range of religious groups, within Christianity and the other faith groups (see Figs. 5.1 and 5.2). From this vantage point, one of the observable features is the consistency of affiliation to the other faiths, Muslim, Hindu, Jewish, and other (Buddhist, Bahai, etc.), which has remained rather consistent over the years at around 3.5% of the population.20 From the point of view of more striking religious change, however, another feature is the growth shown among especially two groups: traditional African religion and Christianity. According to the 2013 General Household Survey, the last South African census in which religion featured, affiliation to sections of the traditional African religion group rose to 5% of the population by 2013, an increase of over 4.5% when compared to previous census results (1996 and 2001).21 But even more striking, as revealed by the 2013 results, has been the growth toward Christianity. While previous results gave evidence of a consistent if not growing very high affiliation to the Christian religion with its highly diverse composition (75.5% of the total population in 1996 and 79.8% in 2001), this affiliation grew toward 85.6%22 of the population by 2013 (see Figs. 5.1 and 5.2).23 The limited space at my disposal does not allow me to reflect in greater detail on the possible causes explaining the above-mentioned 100 90

Percent

80 70

Christian

60

No religion

50

Other world religions

40 Traditional African Religion

30 20 10 0 1991

1996

2001

2013

2022

Years

Fig. 5.1 Change in religious affiliation in South Africa, 1991–2022

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Other religion Jewish 0.3% 0.2% Hindu 1.0% Muslim 2.0% Traditional African Religion 5.0%

No religion Do not know 5.6% 0.3%

Christian (Mainline, Catholic, Pentecostal/ Charismatic, African Independent, Other) Traditional African Religion Muslim Hindu Jewish

Christian (Mainline, Catholic, Pentecostal/ Charismatic, AfricanIndependent, Other) 85.6%

Other religion No religion Do not know

Fig. 5.2 Religious affiliation in South Africa, 2022

instances of religious change in the present-day South African context, except for alluding to one significant development that cannot be ignored when considering matters of religious social involvement and religion and institution in this context: the continuing rise and impact of Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity when considering the Christian religion in particular.24 Leaving it at this brief comment, the important point to conclude with here relates back to my initial observation on the reality of religious plurality and the consequent challenge of religious pluralism requiring a second fundamental reorientation from faith-based organizations in the post-1994 democratic dispensation. In the new dispensation, given the reality of considerable religiously plural representation, it could logically be expected from the country’s faithbased organizations to develop a new sensibility for this diversity. At the same time, however, this could also be considered as not going far enough as the state could on the basis of the new constitutional stipulations for nation building and the concomitant guarantees of religious freedom and equality reasonably expect from the country’s faith-based organizations to actively contribute to the ideal of religious pluralism. Going beyond mere

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toleration and recognition of the other, this points to a state of interaction that had to lead to new forms of “cooperative” engagement between the different religious groups—intrafaith and interfaith cooperation—in view of advancing the common good at all levels of the South African society.25 Third, it follows next that the required reorientations identified so far had to be seen by the country’s faith-based organizations as part of a broader agenda of reconstruction and nation-building constituting the decisive paradigm for the new democratic dispensation.26 In predemocratic South Africa, as already mentioned, faith-based organizations found themselves strongly divided into their positioning versus the system of apartheid and the apartheid state. However, irrespective of the ways in which they either rendered support or opposed the system,27 in the new dispensation they were now faced with the common challenge of adapting to the new agenda of reconstruction and nation building. In the case of those faith-based organizations who invested their energy in fighting the system of apartheid, it required from them that they would leave behind the mode of resistance in which they operated, of being against, and in the words of Steve De Gruchy and Willem Ellis adapt to “a mode of being in favour, of working with, of building up the walls of the social infrastructure needed by the poor and marginalised to lead a secure life.”28 And in the case of those faith-based organizations who rendered their support to the apartheid system, whether tacitly or publicly, it required from them that they would shift loyalty to the new dispensation and, as in the case of the former group, become involved in the new agenda of reconstruction and nation building. As a common denominator, both groups therefore had to learn how to relate constructively to the new democratically elected cooperationist state and develop the language, ideas, and practices relevant to becoming a cooperative and constructive actor of the new dispensation.29 Fourth and finally, for the country’s faith-based organizations the task of taking up the challenge of social welfare in the new dispensation logically had to be seen as part and parcel of the broader agenda of reconstruction and nation building. Enhancing the social welfare of all citizens of the country, especially the very large section of poor and marginalized people previously excluded and discriminated against, could be considered as central to this agenda, and the country’s faith-based organizations could rightly see themselves as potentially important stakeholders in meeting the social welfare challenge. However, as expected

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from them by the new cooperationist state, this required that they, like other relevant institutional actors, would become an actor of “developmental” social welfare, the new paradigm for social welfare in democratic South Africa. It follows that developmental social welfare constituted a prominent element of the above-mentioned new language, ideas, and practices that the country’s faith-based organizations were required to develop to become a cooperative and constructive actor of the new dispensation. For the faith-based organizations, as for other role players, developmental welfare had to be seen as the relevant approach to address what the country’s new political leadership would at the beginning of the new dispensation identify as “the fundamental post-apartheid social question,”30 namely how to effectively deal with colonial and apartheid South Africa’s legacy of endemic poverty and economic exclusion.31 This, in turn, would lead the new leadership to reframe poverty “as a largely developmental problem,”32 a strategic emphasis that as Jeremy Seekings explains clearly reflected in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), South Africa’s first development plan at the start of the new democratic era:33 The ANC first spelt out its understanding of and response to poverty in its 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme … Poverty was described as ‘the single greatest burden on South Africa’s people.’ The ANC promised ‘a better life for all.’ ‘Attacking poverty and deprivation’ would be ‘the first priority of the democratic government.’ The poor would be empowered ‘to sustain themselves through productive activity.’ The government’s primary responsibility would be to ‘create opportunities for all South Africans.’34

It is therefore not surprising that the RDP, together with the 1996 Constitution, served as important foundational sources that informed the design of democratic South Africa’s new policy framework for social welfare.35 This framework, in its finalized form, culminated in the publication of the new White Paper for Social Welfare in August 1997.36 As the new guiding source for social welfare delivery, the White Paper very intentionally wanted to steer South Africa away from the racially divided, residual (individualistic, remedial, case based, rehabilitative) approach to social welfare under apartheid toward a welfare approach that was to be developmental in scope.37 This reflected prominently in the White

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Paper’s preference for the concept of “social development,” which it claimed was “in line with the approach advocated by the United Nations World Summit for Social Development, held on 6 to 12 March 1995.”38 Perhaps even more than the concept of “developmental social welfare,” in democratic South Africa “social development” would therefore become the dominant concept shaping the discourse on social welfare.39 In this respect, with the White Paper as the foundational reference point, this section can be closed by alluding to Leila Patel’s valuable identification of five organizing social development themes that informed the policy framework of the White Paper: • A rights-based approach concerned with the right to human dignity, achieving social justice, building human capabilities, and creating equitable access and equal opportunity to services and benefits for all citizens; • Integration of economic and social development that includes as cornerstones investment in human capital (inter alia through education, housing, and health care), asset-building strategies, and the formation of social capital; • Democracy and participation in social and economic development; • A pluralistic approach emphasizing the need for social development partnerships involving the state, voluntary, and non-profit organizations (including faith-based organizations), individuals, families, households, and communities; • Overcoming the divide between micro interventions aimed at individuals and families and macro interventions aimed at changing the structures and institutions of society constituting the root cause of social economic injustice.40

Meeting the Required Reorientations: The Role of Selected National Ecumenical and Interfaith Bodies It becomes necessary and important at this point to first offer a more pertinent note on my understanding and use of the concept “faith-based organizations” and its acronym “FBOs” in this chapter. In contrast to that line of understanding that confines the concept exclusively to the organizational sphere of “religious NGOs”41 or “NGO-shaped civil society,”42 I

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adopt a line of understanding that is consistent with my previous research work with others43 but also with a widely accepted application in the international literature that incorporates under “faith-based organization” “any organisation that derives its inspiration and guidance from the teachings and principles of a particular faith tradition, or from a particular interpretation or school of thought within that faith.”44 Accordingly, it is within this “fuller consideration of FBOs as a category of actors”45 that the “congregational” and “denominational” structures from across the different faith transitions also obtain their deserved place. This may include local congregations such as churches and mosques, who among their many activities may be involved in formal and informal social welfare work on the ground;46 and, as a further related faith-based organization type, representative organizations or “apex bodies” that on the regional and especially national level take the lead in representing the faithful in respect to doctrinal matters, issues of governance, and interaction with the state and other actors.47 Consequently, it is against the backdrop of the aforementioned understanding that I now want to take the discussion forward by acknowledging the decisive role that selected national ecumenical and interfaith bodies—apex bodies in their own right who deliberately strove to overcome the confines of representing single traditions and denominations— would play in meeting the reorientations set out in the previous section. Listed in chronical order as they emerged on the scene as inventions of the emerging and new democratic order, they are the Ecumenical Foundation of Southern Africa (EFSA), National Religious Association for Social Development, and National Religious Leaders’ Forum. It would be under the leadership of EFSA, which was founded in 1990 as an interdisciplinary ecumenical institute (or academy) aiming to contribute to the building of a just, peaceful, and democratic society in South Africa,48 that first steps of a national scale would be made toward meeting the required reorientations. While it did not position itself to fully meet the democratic requirement of religious pluralism (as stated in the previous section), as its focus was on the mobilization of the country’s churches, EFSA nevertheless made commendable efforts to incorporate participants from across the full spectrum of the country’s Christian denominations in its mobilizing efforts.49 This, it understood, could initially be best achieved through the organization of a series of national “Church and Development” conferences “as a first step to start

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a process of reflection on church and development in South Africa— within a national, regional and international context.”50 As noticeable outcomes, it was envisaged that this process would lead to a sharing of experiences related to development work, identification of specific areas that called for further research, clarification, and strategizing, and, finally, a clearer formulation of the public role of the church with respect to the implementation of “people-based development programmes.”51 I do not have the space at my disposal to as in some of my other work present a more detailed discussion of the three EFSA-initiated “Church and Development” conferences52 that took place in the period 1992 to 1994,53 except for confining myself to a few observations. These conferences were indeed successful in assembling a noticeable group of Christian church leaders and theologians as well as representatives from the sectors of civil society, politics, and economics to foster a debate about development across an array of thematic and conceptual concerns.54 Significantly, furthermore, this was done by clearly locating the new concern with development within the framework of reconstruction and nation building, the third required reorientation mentioned in the previous section. “Development,” it was emphatically stated by the four speakers that opened the first “Church and Development” conference, was “the key to a new South Africa,” “the theoretical and strategic category around which to organise.” The struggle was “no longer for liberation, but for the development of people in post-apartheid South Africa.” “The way to the nation” was “through development.”55 Among the three conferences, however, it was at the third conference that the clearest indication would be given of EFSA’s intentional move toward embracing the unfolding cooperationist religion–state model of the new democratic dispensation. This conference significantly chose the Reconstruction and Development Programme as its topical focus while it also involved a number of ministers and parliamentarians of the new ANC-led government in the overwhelming positive discussions about the RDP as a strategy for fundamental social transformation.56 Yet, while this was a clear step up in the direction of the cooperationist model, this intentional move would gain further momentum at a fourth EFSA-organized conference in Cape Town in May 1997. Under the conference theme, “Transformation of Welfare in South Africa,” this conference would not only bring the discussions within the realm of the debate on developmental welfare, the fourth required reorientation mentioned above. As

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a significant step toward meeting the required first and second reorientations, it would also broaden the initial “Church and Development” focus to, for the first time, include representatives from the South African Muslim and Jewish traditions. And, last but not least, it would succeed in having the then-national Minister of Welfare, Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, speak at the conference.57 It is well documented in the relevant literature that the challenge that Fraser-Moleketi posed in her address for “the establishment of a formal network of religious organisations” in order to engage with the government with respect to the challenge of developmental social welfare, led to the decisive outcome of the fourth conference: the establishment of the National Religious Association for Social Development (hereafter NRASD).58 Consequently, it would be from this moment on that the NRASD would take over from EFSA as the representative body strategically most involved in mobilizing the country’s faith-based organizations for what would now be pursued under the national task of “social development.” Among its goals for action, it entailed that the NRASD would (a) from the outset serve as the representative body of the welfare services and networks of all the faith traditions and denominations in the country59 in order “to foster inter-faith cooperation in social welfare and development” on the basis of equal value and opportunity; (b) pursue and support the objectives of the White Paper for Social Welfare; and (c) seek formal partnerships and contracts with “government (national and provincial), existing religious or faith-based welfare and development services, and international state and business agencies that support social development projects.”60 One can at this point in the discussion rightly appreciate the NRASD’s intentional efforts to position itself from the outset as a representative body aspiring to meet all four reorientations identified in this chapter and to pursue those reorientations very deliberately within the strategic framework of a constructive religion–state engagement. Importantly, however, such efforts toward reorientation would at a relatively early stage gain additional momentum through the NRASD’s successful endeavor to establish a formal agreement of cooperation with a second nationally representative interfaith body. This was the National Religious Leaders’ Forum (NRLF), which was initiated in the same year as the NRASD (1997) and became influential because of the opportunity it created for

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the country’s most prominent faith leaders to engage in regular consultation with President Mandela and his successor, Thabo Mbeki, on a broad range of issues.61 It follows that the cooperation agreement between the NRASD and NRLF would set a process in motion whereby these two bodies would together exert themselves to bring the cooperationist model to full fruition by tirelessly working for the establishment of a formal partnership between the country’s faith-based organizations and the state—a national religion–state partnership—in the delivery of developmental welfare or social development services. This in fact became the single agenda that dominated the agreement of cooperation between the two bodies,62 finding its first culmination in the preparation of a position paper for an NRLF meeting with President Mbeki on April 29–30, 2003. Titled “Building a New South Africa: The Building of a Caring, Democratic and Equitable Society through Partnerships between the State and the National Religious Leaders’ Forum (NRLF),” this document (or position paper) presented a detailed rationale why Mbeki and his government had to welcome the country’s faith-based organizations as a formal partner of the state to meet the challenge of developmental welfare. This included, among others, the argument that the country’s faith-based fraternity as a whole boasted the largest and best-developed welfare networks in South Africa, especially in areas where the infrastructure was weak. Backed by research done by EFSA, the position paper pointed out that the preliminary estimate was that the total contribution by this fraternity to welfare, relief, and development programs amounted to approximately R1 billion per annum. This translated into a considerable range of services on the ground, including “a wide and effective network of volunteers” that “on the level of local congregations, mosques [and] synagogues” provided “invaluable service.”63 To conclude this section, the position paper that served before President Mbeki clearly delivered the desired outcome for the NRASD and NRLF. During the next two years consultations and negotiations would follow that involved faith-based organization leaders as well as representatives of the Presidency and other government stakeholders (including the Departments of Social Development, Health, and Education). This led to the successful stage in which a formal Memorandum of Understanding was signed in the Union Buildings in Pretoria between the government and the NRLF on behalf of the whole faith-based fraternity. The occasion was a high-profile event on May 10, 2005, attended by

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the president, senior ministers of his cabinet, and senior faith-based organization leaders.64 It signaled the successful conclusion of a negotiation process that now had to lead to the next stage of implementing the partnership agreement between the state and the faith-based sector.65 Among the anticipated outcomes, this would entail that substantial government funding (in the form of formal “block grants”) would be channeled to the country’s faith-based organizations, a process that would be managed and administered by the NRASD. Furthermore, as a logical consequence, it would entail that the “principle of subsidiarity” could take its course, whereby the faith-based sector (as an official partner of government and the state) would take formal responsibility for particular strategic and operational areas. This, as agreed upon, would be in the areas of early childhood development, social housing, social cohesion, skills development, and community and home-based care.66

Factors Impeding and Eroding the Post-1994 Faith-Based Endeavor Toward Religion–State Cooperation in the Sphere of Developmental Social Welfare I have so far sketched a rather rosy picture, and rightly so, of selected representative bodies who had seemingly brought South Africa’s faithbased organizations to the point of meeting all the reorientations that would enable them to become a valuable partner of the post-1994 democratic, cooperationist state in the sphere of developmental welfare delivery. However, while the stage seemed set for such a cooperative relationship to come to fruition with the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on May 10, 2005, it is sad to state that the implementation of the partnership agreement that would have brought the cooperative relationship into action in fact never materialized. This necessarily leads me at this point in the discussion to consider factors that can be said to have impeded and eroded the cooperationist developmental social welfare agenda that the NRASD and NRLF had actively pursued with such commitment over a prolonged period on behalf of the country’s faith-based organizations. One of the criticisms that has more often been raised against the post1994 democratic South African state and its ANC-led government is that they have never been strong on the actual implementation of the many

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development plans and policies that they have devised over the years.67 This indeed also seems to be one of the challenges that the NRASD and NRLF were faced with when efforts toward implementation had started, as suggested by comments made by one of the central figures in the NRASD/NRLF cooperation initiative, Renier Koegelenberg.68 In his account of the progress toward implementation in a 2007 publication, i.e., almost two years after the signing of the MoU, Koegelenberg acknowledged that it was unfortunate that the implementation of the agreement had been delayed and that it was only in March 2006 “that a joint workshop between senior government officials and representatives of the NRASD and NRLF started with an implementation plan.”69 Effectively, while this acknowledgment did not suggest that the implementation of the agreement was an unsurmountable task, it did suggest that it was one thing to conclude a successful agreement with the country’s president and other insiders from his circle, and another to engage with an extended circle of government officials in order to implement the agreement. However, whereas a general inability to successfully implement an agreement toward religion–state partnership in developmental social welfare or social development delivery emerged as the immediate impeding factor, this factor would gradually coincide with arguably the decisive impeding factor explaining the unfulfilled outcome of the MOU that was signed on May 10, 2005. In post-1994 democratic South Africa political change would inevitably occur in the longer term, driven by oppositional factions within the ANC alliance.70 This division reached its culmination when Thabo Mbeki was forced to step down as the country’s president to make place for Jacob Zuma, a politician of notoriously populist orientation with a strong preference for Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity.71 Effectively, Zuma’s religious preference would not only have serious implications for the constitutional stipulation of religious neutrality and equality, but it would also lead to a rapid reconfiguration of national faith-based representation. This took concrete effect in developments that, two years after Zuma came into power in 2009, led to the NRLF being amalgamated into and replaced by the newly established National Interfaith Council of South Africa (NICSA), a body with a noticeable Pentecostal stronghold that from this point on would be officially recognized by President Zuma and his government as the national representative body with whom to engage with respect to religion–state cooperation.72

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It follows that the above-mentioned developments naturally had farreaching consequences for the prospects of the cooperationist developmental social welfare agenda that the NRASD and NRLF had pursued with such energy and enthusiasm during the time of Thabo Mbeki’s reign. As it turned out, NICSA, until today still the preferred representative body with whom the ANC-led government seeks to engage in cooperationist discussions, showed no interest in bringing the MoU of 2005 to its full fruition. This led to the MoU basically falling into oblivion, while NICSA has instead sought to pursue its own cooperationist religion–state agenda in the area of “social development,”73 albeit without any evidence of a similar conceptualizing and formalizing effort as was the case with the combined NRASD/NRLF undertaking. It could therefore be stated that in the Zuma era, and in fact under ANC leadership until today, the government has chosen to interact and work predominantly with a group of faith-based actors (i.e., those affiliated to NICSA)74 other than those whom Thabo Mbeki and his inner circle favored during the negotiations with the NRASD and NRLF. This new favoritism would inevitably lead to the NRASD losing ground and influence while it also left those faith-based actors outside the NICSA circle with a new sense of being marginalized and discriminated against by the government and the state.75 Furthermore, it is in this new context of changed religion–state dynamics that one could claim pursuing the ideal of a religion–state partnership in developmental social welfare delivery had lost its attraction for many faith-based leaders and their national constituencies, especially those finding themselves outside the NICSA circle. From this vantage point of an eroding cooperationist interest, there would be little sense in seeking cooperation with a state that had become increasingly corrupt and dysfunctional as a service delivery agent since the Zuma years.76 As such, what was instead called for was a new “Kairos consciousness,” which had to lead the country’s faith-based organizations as in the apartheid years to take a critical stance against government and the state, calling them to task to radically transform themselves in line with their constitutional duties.77 In the words of a prominent South African church leader, which reflected this sentiment on state failure and related social decay during a recent dialogue event between faith-based organization leaders and other representatives on religion–state development cooperation:

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We are a country that continues to be classified as highly corrupt. At the moment, two commissions are working on this problem: one led by Judge Zondo, who is trying to establish facts related to allegations of state infiltration, and another led by Judge Nugent, who is investigating irregularities within the tax administration … We are being forced to accept a shortage of services as a way of life. Municipalities fail to do their job: they do not clean the city, lawlessness prevails and the police only watch, poor roads in rural areas are the order of the day and lead to high transport costs in these areas. Violence is also a way of life in South Africa. The horrific stories of child abuse, rape, domestic violence and murder are so numerous that we have become deaf to them—they no longer shock us. Life has become worthless, thousands of unborn children are casually aborted. People are even killed just for their mobile phones. We also have the highest rate of fatal road accidents in the world.78

My identification of a final impeding factor in this part of the discussion necessarily and importantly leads me to return to the five themes that I have listed at the end of the section “Becoming a Social Welfare Actor in Democratic South Africa: Fundamental Reorientations Required by the New Cooperationist Religion–State Model” as foundational to the operational agenda of the 1997 White Paper for Social Welfare. The five themes, one could rightly state, give evidence of a government and state that were at their visionary best in the early post-1994 democratic dispensation, in the way in which they formulated a comprehensive “developmental” agenda for delivering social welfare in democratic South Africa. At the same time, however, it is precisely this appreciation that leads me, in line with my argumentation in earlier writings,79 to also become critical of the NRASD and NRLF undertaking to establish a formal and active religion–state cooperation within the framework of the post-1994 developmental social welfare agenda. This criticism, I should immediately make clear, should not be read as a statement against my earlier appreciative comment about the NRASD and NRLF’s laudable effort to meet the reorientations that I have identified. Rather, it is directed to the way in which these two representative bodies sought to take the country’s faith-based organizations on a strategic and conceptual path that effectively only focused on one of the five themes listed at the end of the section “Becoming a Social Welfare Actor in Democratic South Africa: Fundamental Reorientations Required by the New Cooperationist Religion–State Model”, namely the need for social development partnerships. As a result, this made their otherwise laudable effort

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vulnerable to the criticism that it has in fact mostly if not solely been about the pragmatic obtainment of “social funds”80 in order to become a recognized developmental role-player in the post-1994 dispensation; and, by implication, that their effort has fallen short of preparing the country’s faith-based organizations adequately to meet the theoretical, paradigmatic, and strategic challenges related to the full set of themes informing the policy framework of the 1997 White Paper.81 This reductionist focus, one can observe in the final conclusion, has remained the NRASD’s preoccupation until today.82 As such, it has been a focus that the NRASD has sought to pursue also in collaboration with other national representative faith-based organization bodies that have emerged on the scene after the termination of the NRLF83 and have stood in the way of a fuller consideration of the challenge of “developmental” social welfare in post-1994 democratic South Africa.

Faith-Based Organizations on the Ground and the Required Reorientations for Doing Social Welfare Under the Post-1994 Cooperationist Religion–State Model I could well at this late stage in the discussion make the realistic observation that the largest section of South Africa’s faith-based organizations, particularly those operating on the ground, have never been aware of the NRASD, the NRLF, and other representative faith-based bodies’ efforts to establish the country’s faith-based fraternity as a formal partner of the state in view of meeting the post-1994 challenge of developmental social welfare. This necessarily leads me to further observe that while the efforts at the national level involving the aforementioned bodies constitute a very important element of post-1994 faith-based involvement in the social welfare sphere, it leaves us, with the exception of some valuable information presented in NRASD and NRLF documentation (see “EFSA research” in Table 5.2), without very necessary and important insights into what faith-based organizations on the ground may have actually achieved or not achieved in the social welfare sphere separate from those national efforts. As such, here I have in mind insights that one might gain especially from relevant empirically informed research work undertaken in the democratic era in order to offer at least some perspective along the lines of the required reorientations identified and discussed

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in the section “Becoming a Social Welfare Actor in Democratic South Africa: Fundamental Reorientations Required by the New Cooperationist Religion–State Model” of this chapter. In order to offer such a perspective, albeit a rather limited one given the impossibility of doing justice to the breadth of coverage that the multiple faith-based organization representations on the ground in the South African context require, I would as my point of departure like to go along with a thesis that Laurence Piper had put forward some 15 years into the democratic era. In an essay already cited in this chapter, titled “Faith-Based Organisations, Local Governance and Citizenship in South Africa,” Piper postulated that the attitude of faith-based organizations in South Africa toward democracy was “overwhelmingly positive.”84 Thus “despite the widespread recognition of the differentiation of state and religion”85 in South Africa’s post-1994 constitutional democracy, Piper advanced the argument that it could be accepted that the political theology of most faith-based organizations supported the community or social objectives of “advancing human rights, democracy and development, and would see these as community or social, rather than political, issues.”86 If this assessment was correct, he further argued, it could be assumed with confidence that most faith-based organizations in South Africa “have unique normative resources to justify supporting active forms of citizenship, including social development projects and rightsbased education to empower local communities.”87 Piper, in conclusion, elaborated on this argument as follows: This chapter argues that faith-based organisations are uniquely placed to be significant contributors to the revitalisation of constructive local state-society relations and a more active citizenship. Not only are most South Africans religious, but faith-based organisations are many in number and significant in influence. Most faith-based organisations have at their disposal a political theology and a tradition grown out of apartheid that supports human rights, democracy and development and could thus form the basis of a theology of active citizenship, without threatening the legal and normative differentiation between state and religion.88

I want to take Piper’s thesis as an important contribution to the post1994 faith-based organization debate supporting the argument that a large majority of faith-based organizations on the ground had as a general rule adopted a favorable attitude toward all four requirements set out in

EFSA & NRASD researcha

• Agricultural services (e.g. flower, poultry & vegetable farming) • Training of community workers • Educational services (schools, pre-school centres, computer training, literacy programmes, vocational training) • Elderly care • Feeding schemes for street/poor children • Institutional care for the handicapped • Health care centres (hospitals, medical clinics, support for HIV victims, etc.) • Homeless & social housing projects • Legal advices centres

Project

FBO social welfare activities

• Children & old age homes • Caring for the mentally handicapped • Feeding schemes & food security programmes • Muslim financial & material support for children, the homeless, widows, elderly & disabled • Pre-school education • Drug & alcohol rehabilitation • Night shelters • Voluntarism • HIV/AIDs support • Provision of clothing, blankets & hampers

Giving & Solidarityb • Soup kitchens, feeding schemes, blankets, clothes & shelter for the poor • Houses for homeless people • Financial donations & giving to the poor • Home-based care (HIV/AIDs patients, children, etc.) • Community-based health care centres & HIV/ AIDs support • Homes for the elderly, children & women in need • Prison ministry • Early childhood care & education • Housing schemes services

WRIGPc • Feeding schemes & donation of clothes • Financial support for community members & families in need, e.g. payment of school fees, funeral expenses • Counselling activities, e.g. to victims of intra-family conflicts & HIV • Awareness raising with respect to HIV/AIDs & other health issues • Recreation activities for youth & children

AIC Researchd

• Outreach to young girls on the streets & homeless youths • HIV/AIDs support • Community-based health care • Social housing • Recreational & social activities for young people • Meeting spiritual needs • Accommodation for young women & their children • Meeting of basic survival needs of youth at the margins – food, clothes, shelter, shower facilities

YOMAe

Table 5.2 Empirical evidence from selected project research on FBO social welfare activities on the ground in democratic South Africa

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Project

Giving & Solidarityb • Farming projects • Building crèches & schools • Humanitarian assistance • Medical & healthcare services • Employment, skills-training & income-generating programmes • Youth empowerment • Sport & recreational activities for young people • Caring for abused women & children • Burial clubs & saving schemes • Reviving land resources

EFSA & NRASD researcha

• Family support services • Micro-enterprise, income generating projects • Multi-purpose centres (recreation, literacy & vocational training) • Provision of water • Rehabilitation programmes (drug addiction, alcoholism) • Refugee services • Youth centres & children’s programmes

• Youth work programmes • Support for farm workers • Rehabilitation services • Income generation projects & skills training • Social work service offices • Food gardens & agricultural projects • Food security & sustainable livelihoods programmes • Land restitution & agrarian reform programmes • Peace-building & civic engagement programmes • Refugee services

WRIGPc • Bursary programmes & support to school children & university students • Church-run schools & crèches • Training centres, e.g. for training sewing, basic computer & entrepreneurial skills • Entrepreneurship & leadership training seminars

AIC Researchd • Entrepreneurship & sport programmes for young people at the margins • Youth Leadership Academy • Computer classes/ skills development activities for young people • Social safety nets for young people • Educational bursaries

YOMAe

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(continued)

1990s. The research sought to be inclusive of the various faith traditions and groups in the country and its findings have formed an important part of subsequent NRASD and NRLF documentation. See Renier Koegelenberg, “Social Development Partnerships between Religious Communities and the State,” 103 (see note 57); Louw and Koegelenberg, “Buiding a New South Africa,” 11 (see note 57); NRASD, “National Religious Association for Social Development”, unpublished document retrieved from the internet on October 17, 2006. b The findings reflected in this column formed part of a national survey on social giving by non-state stakeholders in South Africa, conducted during the mid-2000s under the leadership of the Center for Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. The research sought to be inclusive of the various faith traditions and groups in the country. See Brij Maharaj, Adam Habib, Irwin Chetty et al., “Religion and Development”, in Giving & Solidarity: Resource Flows for Poverty Alleviation and Development in South Africa, ed. Adam Habib and Brij Maharaj (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2008), 79–119. c WRIGP was the acronym for the project title “Welfare and Religion in a Global Perspective: Theoretical Exchange across the North–South Divide”. Conducted in the period 2006–2008 through a South African-Swedish collaboration, the research focused on the welfare role of churches from a selected local but also broader denominational perspective in the South African context. See Swart et al., Welfare, Religion and Gender in Post-Apartheid South Africa (see note 18). d This research was undertaken by researchers from the Humboldt University in Berlin under the project title “Are African Initiated Churches Adequate Partners for Future Development Cooperation?” Field work were conducted among members and leaders of African Independent Churches and African Pentecostal-Charismatic Churches in the South African provinces of Gauteng and Limpopo in the period 06/2016 to 12/2016. See Philipp Öhlmann, Marie-Luise Frost, and Wilhelm Gräb, “African Initiated Churches’ Potential as Development Actors,” HTS Theological Studies 72, no. 4: 673–84. e YOMA was the acronym for the project title “Youth at the Margins: A Comparative Study of the Contribution of Faith-Based Organisations to Social Cohesion in South Africa and Nordic Europe”. The project work was conducted in the period 2013 to 2016 through a South African-Nordic collaboration. While it sought to be inclusive of all faith traditions and groups, churches and NGO-type FBOs emerged as the dominant faith-based actors in the South African case study localities. See Swart et al., Stuck in the Margins? (see note 42)

a This research on religious social welfare and development services in South Africa was undertaken by EFSA and the NRASD during the mid to late

Table 5.2

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the section “Becoming a Social Welfare Actor in Democratic South Africa: Fundamental Reorientations Required by the New Cooperationist Religion–State Model”. Not unlike representative bodies at the national level such as those discussed in this chapter, in post-1994 democratic South Africa faith-based organizations on the ground could in line with Piper’s thesis be considered as important if not indispensable vehicles to promote a kind of local active citizenship that embraces the values of the constitution, accepts the reality of religious plurality and related challenge of religious pluralism, and exerts itself to contribute to the post-1994 challenge of community and nation building. Furthermore, it is from this vantage point that one could continue to draw on a considerable body of empirical research that gives evidence also of faith-based organizations’ substantial involvement as a social welfare actor on the ground, as manifested in a myriad of activities and services (see Table 5.2). In the wake of growing state failure and service delivery neglect in the democratic era (see the section “Factors Impeding and Eroding the Post-1994 Faith-Based Endeavor Toward Religion–State Cooperation in the Sphere of Developmental Social Welfare”), it is this involvement that may well suggest that faith-based organizations are indispensable to the survival of South Africa’s many marginalized people and communities89 but also to raising local social welfare awareness and enhancing the level of concrete social welfare provision (see Table 5.2). It is important to note that the information presented in Table 5.2 by no means exhausts the relevant empirical research that has been conducted on faith-based organization social welfare and development involved in the post-1994 South African context.90 At the same time, however, the selected five cases of project work can be considered to have made an important contribution to the overall relevant body of knowledge that has been generated. Together, they present a sample of faith-based organization activity that can justifiably be appreciated both in terms of its considerable scope and its inclusiveness of the different faith traditions in South Africa (see the section “Becoming a Social Welfare Actor in Democratic South Africa: Fundamental Reorientations Required by the New Cooperationist Religion–State Model”). But having put forward the above positive verdict, this section of my discussion cannot be complete without making two important caveats with respect to the evidence in Table 5.2, caveats that relate, respectively,

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to the second and last reorientations in the section “Becoming a Social Welfare Actor in Democratic South Africa: Fundamental Reorientations Required by the New Cooperationist Religion–State Model” and put the existing evidence in some more critical light. First, while I have appreciated the evidence in Table 5.2 as inclusive of the different faith traditions in South Africa, there is no evidence in the literature from which that evidence is drawn that any of the listed faith-based organization social welfare activities have translated in any kind of interfaith cooperation envisaged in the section “Becoming a Social Welfare Actor in Democratic South Africa: Fundamental Reorientations Required by the New Cooperationist Religion–State Model”. In the same vein, this should also be said to be the case of the many recognized faith-based organization networks91 through which activities such as those listed in Table 5.2 are replicated on a regional and even national level. While they may in some instances take on the form of ecumenical networks within the Christian faith tradition, and while their outreach may in many instances exceed their own denominational membership, they represent network formations that are for the most part constituted along the lines of their own faith traditions (Christian, Muslim, Jewish, etc.) and denominations (Reformed, Catholic, Anglican, African Independent Churches, etc.).92 From the perspective of an idealized higher form or stage of religious pluralism, they therefore still seem to be some distance from what Gerrie Lubbe, in view of the challenge of post-1994 nation-building, identified as that stage in which “grassroots members of the local religious groups are involved in cooperative engagement with people from other religions” through a “variety of activities and projects.”93 Second, while I have also appreciated the evidence in Table 5.2 in terms of its considerable scope, one encounters different interpretations in the relevant literature on whether much of the listed faith-based organization social welfare activities do in fact meet the reorientation toward “developmental” social welfare that has been identified in the section “Becoming a Social Welfare Actor in Democratic South Africa: Fundamental Reorientations Required by the New Cooperationist Religion–State Model” as a fundamental post-1994 requirement. In this respect, one line of interpretation not only in the literature directly related to Table 5.2 but also in a complementary wider body of relevant literature holds that empirical evidence shows that much of what faith-based organizations on the ground are doing in the name of “social welfare and

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development” translates into “charity,” “handouts,” “immediate relief,” “a predominant focus on individuals,” and “fragmented and piecemeal outcomes.”94 However, this position is again countered by a line of interpretation that distinguishes between “two distinct forms” or modes of faith-based organization social welfare involvement on the ground: “poverty alleviation and development.”95 According to this interpretation, which takes account of activities listed in Table 5.2, in the former mode faith-based organizations focus on “alleviating the consequences of poverty and marginalization through disbursement of cash, goods and services”;96 in the latter, in contrast, their engagement is “directed toward institution-building and the establishment of an infrastructure that enables the development of a more human-oriented society.”97 Moreover, in this latter mode, there is also evidence that faith-based organizations “focus on training, empowerment and sustainability, where the beneficiaries … [are] not necessarily from their faith.”98 All things considered, then, the above caveats do present a somewhat more realistic picture of faith-based organizations’ performance as social welfare actors on the ground in post-1994 South Africa. They (faith-based organizations) are no doubt indispensable social welfare actors without whom many communities and individuals on the ground, especially those at the margins, would be much worse off. And to reiterate my earlier point, their contribution to a kind of local citizenship formation that holds a general favorable attitude toward the four reorientations identified in the section “Becoming a Social Welfare Actor in Democratic South Africa: Fundamental Reorientations Required by the New Cooperationist Religion–State Model” can also confidently be accepted. In a concrete way, this furthermore leads to instances where certain faithbased organizations on the ground do distinguish themselves as actors of “developmental” welfare. And yet, at the same time, this does not do away with the fact that the post-1994 challenge of “developmental” social welfare—which cannot be seen in isolation from the requirement of adapting to deeper forms of religious pluralism that will translate into intra- and interfaith cooperation—remains a real one for the country’s faith-based organizations operating at the ground level of society.

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Faith-Based Organizations and the Challenge of Developmental Social Welfare in Democratic South Africa: Some Concluding Observations It could well be concluded on the basis of the discussion in this chapter that South Africa’s faith-based organization fraternity has done fairly well in order to be recognized by the post-1994 democratic state as a valuable if not indispensable partner to meet the new democratic challenge of developmental social welfare. In so far as this challenge has required a number of fundamental reorientations from this fraternity (see the section “Becoming a Social Welfare Actor in Democratic South Africa: Fundamental Reorientations Required by the New Cooperationist Religion–State Model”), my discussion has painted a rather favorable picture of noticeable strivings toward this end both at the national level and on the ground. As an important caveat, though, I have at the same time also tried to make it clear that such strivings have not been without imperfections, such as what has turned out to be the reductionist focus on partnership formation at the national level (at the cost of other strategic priorities) and shortcomings with respect to intra- and interfaith cooperation as well as a developmental involvement on the ground. However, whereas the above-mentioned imperfections could be considered as important elements of a challenge still to be more fully met by the country’s post-1994 faith-based organization fraternity, my discussion has shown that it has been shortcomings and failures on the part of the post-1994 democratic state that have more than anything else been responsible for the inability to bring the post-1994 cooperationist religion–state model to its desired fruition, not least in the sphere of social welfare delivery. As I have sought to point out, this is a state that started off very promising through the new constitutional framework and related developmental ideals it had set and the consequent favorable conditions this had created for the country’s faith-based organizations to become constructive partners of the state to meet the post-1994 challenge of nation-building and development. At the same time, however, this is also a state that could not sustain the initial promise and whose incapacities, failures, and own democratic erosion in the wake of political change had become a serious impediment in any realization of a flourishing cooperationist religion–state relationship to meet the challenge of developmental social welfare.

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Indeed, I have written this chapter at a time in democratic South Africa’s evolution in which the aforementioned state deficiencies may well be considered to be at their highest point. It is against this backdrop, however, that the line of discussion that I have sought to develop has not yet allowed me to point out the reality of at least a partial implementation of the post-1994 cooperationist religion–state model. This is a realization that by no means meets the scale and imagination of the NRASD and NRLF’s unfulfilled effort during the early to mid-2000s (as discussed), and neither can it be considered to have conformed to all the required reorientations set out in the section “Becoming a Social Welfare Actor in Democratic South Africa: Fundamental Reorientations Required by the New Cooperationist Religion–State Model”. Nevertheless, it manifests in the way in which the post-1994 democratic state, through its formal structures, has engaged in and continues to engage in formal social welfare and development partnership arrangements with and consequent funding support for selected faith-based organizations on the levels of national, provincial, and local government.99 From this vantage point, they are partnership arrangements that may not come without serious issues of unequal power relations, accountability, identity, dependency, and control for the faith-based organizations involved, as a few available and much needed recent South African studies on this topic have importantly reported on.100 And yet, at the same time, the partnership arrangements do suggest that a South African state as deficient as the current one also acknowledges its own dependency on the country’s faith-based organizations and in fact the nongovernmental and non-profit sector at large to deliver in the area of social welfare and social development delivery.101 It seems fitting to finally conclude, however, with an observation on public perception and trust that extends beyond the above focus on religion–state relationships alone. In the wake of current state deficiency, enough reliable empirical evidence exists today that justifies the claim that faith-based organizations, like their nongovernmental counterparts in civil society, command far higher levels of trust from the general South African public than the state does.102 This is an important part of the current contextual reality in which the country’s faith-based organizations are operating as social welfare actors. In line with the existing findings from South African welfare and religion research, it helps to explain why many members and communities from the general public may have higher expectations of faith-based organizations than of the state when it comes

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to the fulfillment of social welfare and social development needs in the South African society.103

Notes 1. The ANC won South Africa’s first democratic elections by a large majority in April 1994 and has remained the governing party ever since. 2. A prominent symbolic gesture in this regard was made by Nelson Mandela, democratic South Africa’s first president, when he visited the Dutch Reformed Church’s General Synod on October 13, 1994. In his address to the Synod Mandela posed an open invitation to this church, which was at the forefront in supporting the system of apartheid and effectively acted as the religious arm of apartheid’s National Party government, to join hands in making the country’s new Reconstruction and Development Programme a success. See Algemene Sinode/ Algemene Sinodale Kommissie van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, Die Verhaal van die Ned Geref Kerk se Reis met Apartheid 1960–1994: ‘n Getuienis en Belydenis [The Story of the Dutch Reformed Church’s Journey with Apartheid 1960–1994: A Testimony and a Confession] (Wellington: Hugenote Uitgewers, 1997), 28–29. 3. Isaac Mutelo, “The Nature of Relations between Religion and State: The Case of South Africa,” Journal of Contemporary African Philosophy 2 (2021): 18–19. 4. Mutelo, “The Nature of Relations between Religion and State,” 20. 5. Mutelo, “The Nature of Relations between Religion and State,” 20. 6. For a similar consideration of religion–state relationship models with respect to the post-1994 democratic South African context, see also Jonathan D. Smith, “South Africa’s Developing Model of Religion-State Relations,” Southern African Catholic Bishops’ Conference Parliamentary Liaison Office Occasional Paper 18, https://www.academia. edu/9129743/South_Africa_s_developing_model_of_Religion–state_rel ations. 7. Mutelo, “The Nature of Relations between Religion and State,” 20; see also Smith, “South Africa’s Developing Model of Religion-State Relations,” 8. 8. Mutelo, “The Nature of Relations between Religion and State,” 20– 22; see also Smith, “South Africa’s Developing Model of Religion–state Relations,” 8. 9. South African Government, The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 2022, https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitut ion-republic-south-africa-1996-1. 10. Smith, in this respect, meaningfully alludes to the fact that the Bill of Rights of the 1996 Constitution mentions religion in 8 of its 32 sections.

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12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

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This furthermore leads him to comment that the role of religion is more clearly outlined in the South African Constitution than in many other Constitutions. A clear case in point for him, for instance, is the United States Constitution that contains only one sentence specifically about religion. Smith, “South Africa’s Developing Model of Religion–state Relations,” 8. The limited space at my disposal does not allow me to give greater account of the struggle for religious freedom in South African history. Discrimination and suppression went hand in hand against the country’s black, colored, and Indian populations and cut across the spectrum of mainline Christian churches, African Initiated Churches, the Catholic Church, traditional African religion, and the Muslim, Hindu, and Jewish faith traditions. See, for example, David Chidester, Religions of South Africa (London: Routledge, 1992); Jaco S. Dreyer, Hendrik J. C. Pieterse, and Johannes van der Ven, “Interreligious Orientations Among South African Youth,” Religion & Theology 6, no. 2 (1999): 198–99; Jansie Kilian, ed., Religious Freedom in South Africa (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1993); Martin Prozesky and John de Gruchy, ed., Living Faiths in South Africa (London: Hurst & Company, 1995). See The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Sections 9(3), 15(1), and 31(1), https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/ saconstitution-web-eng.pdf. See Dreyer et al., “Interreligious Orientations among South African Youth,” 199–201; Georgia A. Du Plessis, “Apartheid, Religious Pluralism, and the Evolution of the Right of Religious Freedom in South Africa,” Journal of Religious History 40, no. 2 (2016): 237–60; Mutelo, “The Nature of Relations Between Religion and State,” 20–26; Smith, “South Africa’s Developing Model of Religion–State Relations,” 8–9. Laurence Piper, “Faith-Based Organisations, Local Governance and Citizenship in South Africa,” in Religion and Spirituality in South Africa: New Perspectives, ed. Duncan Brown (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009), 71. See Ivor Chipkin and Annie Leatt, “Religion and Revival in PostApartheid South Africa,” Focus 62 (2011, August): 39–46, August 2011, http://hsf.org.za/resource-centre/focus/focus-62; Du Plessis, “Apartheid, Religious Pluralism, and the Evolution of the Right of Religious Freedom,” 244–45; Jurgens Hendriks and Johannes Erasmus, “Interpreting the New Religious Landscape in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 109 (2001): 41–65; Statistics South Africa, Primary Tables South Africa: Census ’96 and 2001 Compared (Pretoria: Stats SA, 1995), 24–28. Dreyer et al., “Interreligious Orientations among South African Youth,” 198–99; see also Stats SA, Primary Tables South Africa, 24–28.

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17. To date information on religion has been collected by only three national census surveys in post-1994 democratic South Africa. All conducted by Statistics South Africa, they are Census ’96, Census 2001, and the General Household Survey of 2013. Demographic research conducted by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life has in addition provided some information on religion in democratic South Africa. See Luis Lugo and Alan Cooperman, Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Center, 2010). 18. Chipkin and Leatt, “Religion and Revival in Post-Apartheid South Africa”; Johannes Erasmus, “Religious Demographics in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Implications for Social Welfare,” in Welfare, Religion and Gender in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Constructing a South-North Dialogue, ed. Ignatius Swart, Amanda Gouws, Per Pettersson, Johannes Erasmus and Frouwien Bosman (Stellenbosch: SUN Press, 2012), 59; Piper, “Faith-Based Organisations,” 66–67. 19. Stats SA, Primary Tables South Africa, 24; Statistics South Africa, General Household Survey 2013 (Pretoria: Stats SA, 2014), 32. 20. See Stats SA, Primary Tables South Africa, 24–28; Stats SA, General Household Survey 2013, 32. 21. See Stats SA, Primary Tables South Africa, 25–28; Stats SA, General Household Survey 2013, 32. 22. This percentage figure compares favorably with the Pew Forum’s research result of 2010 indicating that 87% of the South African population identified with the Christian religion. Lugo and Cooperman, Tolerance and Tension, 64. 23. Stats SA, Primary Tables South Africa, 24–28; Stats SA, General Household Survey 2013, 32; see also Willem J. Schoeman, “South African Religious Demography: The 2013 General Household Survey,” HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 73, no. 2 (2017): 1–7. 24. Chipkin and Leatt, “Religion and Revival in Post-Apartheid South Africa”; Ignatius Swart, “Institution and Religion,” in International Handbook of Practical Theology, ed. Birgit Weyel, Wilhelm Gräb, Emmanuel Lartey, and Cas Wepener (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022), 143– 54; Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Spirit and Power: A 10-Country Survey of Pentecostals (Washington, DC: Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2006), 89–90. 25. Gerrie Lubbe, “The Role of Religion in the Process of Nation-Building: From Plurality to Pluralism,” Religion & Theology 2, no. 2 (1995): 159– 70. 26. The language of this agenda was clearly reflected in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which served as the African National Congress’s elective manifesto for the first democratic elections

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27.

28.

29. 30.

31.

32. 33. 34. 35.

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in 1994. ANC, The Reconstruction and Development Programme: A Policy Framework (Johannesburg: Umanyano Publications, 1994). This division is, for instance, pronouncedly reflected in the famous The Kairos Document, a text that emanated from the circle of one of the country’s prominent faith-based organizations, the Christian churches. Kairos Theologians, The Kairos Document: Challenge to the Church: A Theological Comment on the Political Crisis in South Africa (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996). However, this division importantly also included the country’s other faith traditions, such as Muslim, Jewish, and Hindu, which formed part of a noticeable interfaith movement against apartheid and by implication the racial and other forms of discrimination experienced by their members. See, for example, Gerrie Lubbe, “Interfaith Resistance in South Africa,” Journal of Africana Religions 3, no. 2 (2015): 210–26; Haley McEwen and Melissa Steyn, “Politics of Faith: Transforming Religious Communities and Spiritual Subjectivities in PostApartheid South Africa,” HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 72, no. 1 (2016): 2; Anil Sooklal, “Hinduism and the Re-Humanising of South African Society,” Journal for the Study of Religion 6, no. 1 (1993): 55–68. Steve de Gruchy and Willem Ellis, “Christian Leadership in ‘Another Country’: Contributing to an Ethical Development Agenda in South Africa Today,” in From Our Side: Emerging Perspectives on Development and Ethics, ed. Steve de Gruchy, Nico Koopman, and Sytse Strijbos (Amsterdam: Rozenberg, 2008), 11. Cf. De Gruchy and Ellis, “Christian Leadership in ‘Another Country’,” 9–20. Jeremy Seekings, “(Re)formulating the Social Question in PostApartheid South Africa: Zola Skweyiya, Dignity, Development and the Welfare State,” in One Hundred Years of Social Protection: The Changing Social Question in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, ed. Lutz Leisering (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 266. Seekings, “(Re)formulating the Social Question,” 265–66; see also Sulina Green, “Towards a Developmental Approach to Social Welfare: Social Welfare Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in Welfare, Religion and Gender in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 33–35. Seekings, “(Re)formulating the Social Question,” 266. See note 26. Seekings, “(Re)formulating the Social Question,” 268. Green, “Towards a Developmental Approach to Social Welfare,” 32–33; James Midgley, “South Africa: The Challenge of Social Development,” International Journal of Social Welfare 10, no. 4 (2001): 267–71; Leila Patel, Social Welfare and Social Development, 2nd ed. (Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern Africa, 2015), 72–75.

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36. Ministry for Welfare and Population Development, White Paper for Social Welfare, Government Gazette 1108 of 1997 (Pretoria: Department of Welfare, 1997). 37. See Green, “Towards a Developmental Approach to Social Welfare,” 29–40; Midgley, “South Africa: The Challenge of Social Development,” 267–75; Patel, Social Welfare and Social Development, 75–82; Seekings, “(Re)formulating the Social Question,” 271–72; see also Ministry for Welfare and Population Development, White Paper. 38. Ministry for Welfare and Population Development, White Paper, 3. 39. The new prominence of ‘social development’ would, among other things, reflect in the state’s renaming of its national Department of Social Welfare to the Department of Social Development in July 2000. See, furthermore, Midgley, “South Africa: The Challenge of Social Development,” 267; Patel, Social Welfare and Social Development, 125; Seekings, “(Re)formulating the Social Question,” 272–73. 40. Patel, Social Welfare and Social Development, 82–99, 125–26. 41. Laurie Occhipinti, “Faith-Based Organizations and Development,” in The Routledge Handbook of Religions and Development, ed. Emma Tomalin (London: Routledge, 2015), 335. 42. Auli Vähäkangas, Elina Hankela, Elisabet le Roux, and Eddie Orsmond, “Faith-Based Organisations and Organised Religion in South Africa and the Nordic Countries, in Stuck in the Margins? Young People and Faith-Based Organisations in South African and Nordic Localities, ed. Ignatius Swart, Auli Vähäkangas, Marlize Rabe, and Annette Leis-Peters (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2022), 86. 43. See Swart et al., Stuck in the Margins? 44. My paraphrasing (with others) of a widely cited definition by Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings. Ignatius Swart, Auli Vähäkangas, Marlize Rabe, and Annette Leis-Peters, “Introduction,” in Stuck in the Margins?, 20; Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings, “Introduction,” in Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular, ed. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 6. 45. Occhipinti, “Faith-Based Organizations,” 342. 46. See Occhipinti, “Faith-Based Organizations,” 331, 335; Vähäkangas et al., “Faith-Based Organisations and Organised Religion,” 86. 47. Gerard Clarke, “Faith-Based Organizations and International Development: An Overview,” in Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations, 25; Occhipinti, “Faith-Based Organizations,” 338. 48. Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, “A Discussion with Dr. Renier Koegelenberg, Executive Director of Ecumenical Foundation

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49.

50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55.

56. 57.

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of Southern Africa (EFSA),” 2020, https://berkleycenter.georgetown. edu/interviews/a-discussion-with-dr-renier-koegelenberg-executive-dir ector-of-ecumenical-foundation-of-southern-africa-efsa; Renier Koegelenberg, ed., Church and Development: An Interdisciplinary Approach: Perspectives from Southern Africa and Europe, Report of the First Church and Development Conference (Bellville, South Africa: EFSA, 1992); South African Christian Directory, “Ecumenical Foundation of Southern Africa (EFSA), 2017, https://sacd.christians.co.za/CaptureOr gDisplay.aspx?oid=3849. See Koegelenberg, Church and Development; Renier Koegelenberg, ed., Transition and Transformation: A Challenge to the Church, Report of the Second Church and Development Conference (Bellville, South Africa: EFSA, 1994); Renier Koegelenberg, ed., The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP): The Role of the Church, Civil Society and NGOs, Report of the Third Church and Development Conference (Bellville, South Africa: EFSA, 1995). “Conference Statement: The Challenge of Development for the Church,” in Church and Development, 375. “Conference Statement,” 376. Ignatius Swart, “Networks and Partnerships for Social Justice? The Pragmatic Turn in the Religious Social Development Debate in South Africa,” in Religion and Social Development in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Perspectives for Critical Engagement, ed. Ignatius Swart, Hermann Rocher, Sulina Green, and Johannes Erasmus (Stellenbosch, South Africa: SUN Press, 2010), 16–17; Ignatius Swart, “Transforming Social Welfare? The Religious Discourse on Social Development in PostApartheid South Africa,” in Welfare, Religion and Gender in PostApartheid South Africa, 67–70. See notes 48 and 49. See notes 48 and 49. Shun Govender, Renier Koegelenberg, Nabs Wessels, and Bennie Witbooi, “‘Development’—The Key to a New South Africa?,” in Church and Development, 14. See Koegelenberg, The Reconstruction and Development Programme. Renier Koegelenberg, “Social Development Partnerships between Religious Communities and the State: Perspectives from the National Religious Association for Social Development (NRASD),” Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 110 (July 2001): 105–6; Renier Koegelenberg, “A Creative Church-State Development Partnership,” in South African Christian Handbook 2007–2008, ed. H. Jurgens Hendriks and Johannes C. Erasmus (Cape Town: Christian Network, 2007), 35; Lionel Louw and Renier Koegelenberg, “Buiding a New South Africa: The Building of a Caring, Democratic and Equitable Society through

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58. 59.

60. 61. 62.

63.

64.

65. 66.

67.

68.

Partnerships Between the State and the National Religious Leaders’ Forum (NRLF),” Position Paper Prepared for the NRLF Meeting with President Thabo Mbeki, 29–30 April 2003, https://sarpn.org/ documents/d0000557/P506_Social_Development.pdf; NRASD, “History and Approach,” 2015, http://nrasd.org.za/about/background/; Swart, “Transforming Social Welfare?,” 70. See the references in note 57. This included the Baha’i, Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, and Jewish traditions, while the NRASD at the same time also sought to be representative of the different Christian denominations in the country. See NRASD, “History and Approach.” Renier Koegelenberg, “Social Development Partnerships between Religious Communities and the State,” 106. Koegelenberg, “A Creative Church-State Development Partnership,” 35. See Koegelenberg, “A Creative Church-State Development Partnership,” 35–37; Swart, “Transforming Social Welfare?,” 70–73; Ignatius Swart, “Are the Rising Expectations Realistic? Local Churches and Social Welfare in South Africa and Paarl,” in Welfare, Religion and Gender in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 287–89. Louw and Koegelenberg, “Building a New South Africa,” 1–14; see also Koegelenberg, “A Creative Church-State Development Partnership,” 31–36; Swart, “Transforming Social Welfare?,” 72–73; Swart, “Are the Rising Expectations Realistic?,” 287. Koegelenberg, “A Creative Church-State Development Partnership,” 35–36; NRLF, “Management Committee Progress Report: Implementing the Partnership Agreement between the State & The Religious Sector,” Presented at the Holiday Inn, Pretoria, April 10, 2006; Swart, “Are the Rising Expectations Realistic?,” 287–88. NRLF, “Management Committee Progress Report.” Koegelenberg, “A Creative Church-State Development Partnership,” 36; Louw and Koegelenberg, “Building a New South Africa, 12–13; NRLF, “Management Committee Progress Report,” 2–4; Swart, “Are the Rising Expectations Realistic?,” 288. See, for example, Vusi Gumede, “Social Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Journal of Public Administration 54, no. 4 (2019): 499–512; William Gumede, “Great Plan—Not Much Chance of Execution,” Wits Business School Journal 39 (December 2014): 42–43; Mark Oranje, “Post-Apartheid National Spatial Development Planning in South Africa—A Brief History,” European Spatial Research and Policy 17, no. 2 (2010): 55–70. Koegelenberg has served as the executive secretary of the NRASD since its inception and has taken the lead in the production of position papers and other publications to advance the NRASD/NRLF cause.

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69. Koegelenberg, “A Creative Church-State Development Partnership,” 36. 70. This alliance consists of the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP), and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). On the increasing factionalism within the alliance since the mid-2000s, see Jody Cedras, “The ANC-led Alliance in Government: A Question of Legitimacy and Trust,” African Journal of Public Affairs 12, no. 1 (2021): 63–82. 71. See Jakub Urbaniak and Tshinyalani Khorommbi, “South Africa’s Jacob Zuma and the Deployment of Christianity in the Public Sphere,” Review of Faith & International Affairs 18, no. 2 (2020): 61–75. 72. See inter alia African National Congress Parliamentary Caucus, “New National Interfaith Body,” 2010, https://www.ancparliament.org. za/content/new-national-interfaith-body; Graham A. Duncan and Anthony Egan, “The Ecumenical Struggle in South Africa: The Role of Ecumenical Movements and Liberation Organisations from 1966,” Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae 45, no. 1 (March 2019): 19–21; South African Government, Media Statement, “SA: Statement by the Presidency, on President Zuma’s Meeting with Religious Leaders,” 2012, https://www.polity.org.za/article/sa-statement-by-the-presidency-onpresident-zumas-meeting-with-religious-leaders-29112012-2012-11-29; Ignatius Swart, “Revival of a Kairos Consciousness: Prolegomena to a Research Focus on Religious and Social Change in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae 39, no. 2 (2013), 100–101; Urbaniak and Khorommbi, “South Africa’s Jacob Zuma,” 62. 73. South African Government, “SA: Statement by the Presidency”; NICSA, “The National Interfaith Council of South Africa,” 2018, https://www. facebook.com/The-National-Interfaith-Council-of-South-Africa-786765 208322517. 74. On the post-Zuma era, see, for example, News24, “Ramaphosa, Interfaith Leaders Sign Declaration for Societal Renewal,” 2019, https:/ /www.news24.com/News24/ramaphosa-interfaith-leaders-sign-declar ation-for-societal-renewal-20190410. 75. Thabo Makgoba, “25 Years of Democracy in South Africa: The Role of Churches and Religious Communities in Overcoming Apartheid, Reconciliation and Nation Building,” in Religion and State Development Cooperation: A German-South African Dialogue on Historical and Current Challenges, ed. Renier Koegelenberg and Udo Hahn (Stellenbosch, South Africa: SUN Press, 2020), 78; Sithembele Sipuka, “Religion and State: Between Separation and Cooperation—a South African Perspective,” in Religion & State Development Cooperation, 111–12; Swart, “Revival of a Kairos Consciousness,” 100–101.

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76. Swart, “Revival of a Kairos Consciousness,” 85–104; Nico Vorster, “Assessing the Role of the South African Council of Churches in Democratic South Africa (1994–2014),” in Church & Civil Society: German and South African Perspectives, ed. Michael Welker, Nico Koopman and Jacobus M. Vorster (Stellenbosch, South Africa: SUN Press, 2017), 139–140. 77. Swart, “Revival of a Kairos Consciousness,” 85–104. 78. Sipuka, “Religion and State,” 109–10. 79. Swart, “Networks and Partnerships for Social Justice?,” 15–36; Swart, “Transforming Social Welfare?,” 65–93. 80. Here I follow and apply a concern that Paul Francis has raised in the context of critical development studies debate. Paul Francis, “Social Capital, Civil Society and Social Exclusion,” in Development Theory and Practice: Critical Perspectives, ed. Uma Kothari and Martin Minogue (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 86; see also Swart “Transforming Social Welfare?,” 67. 81. For an elaborated, similar argumentation, see Swart, “Networks and Partnerships for Social Justice?” 24–28; Swart, “Transforming Social Welfare?,” 81–88. 82. See, for example, NRASD, “Consultation with National Church and Faith Leaders with Minister Trevor Manuel—On the National Development Plan,” 2012, http://nrasd.org.za/2012/11/20/consultationbetween-national-church-and-faith-leaders-with-minister-trevor-manuelon-the-national-development-plan/; NRASD, “History and Approach”; Sinode van Wes-Kaapland, “National Church Leaders’ Consultation— Statement 20 October 2016,” 2016, https://kaapkerk.co.za/nationalchurch-leaders-consultation-statement-20-october-2016/; SACBC, “National Church Leaders Meet to Discuss the Role of Churches and Faith Communities in the Implementation of the National Development Plan (NDP),” 2020, https://sacbc.org.za/national-church-leadersmeet-to-discuss-the-role-of-churches-and-faith-communities-in-the-imp lementation-of-the-national-development-plan-ndp/. 83. Those faith-based organizations bodies are the National Church Leaders Consultation (NCLC) and South African Christian Leadership Initiative (SACLI). 84. Piper, “Faith-Based Organisations,” 70. 85. Piper, “Faith-Based Organisations,” 70. 86. Piper, “Faith-Based Organisations,” 72. 87. Piper, “Faith-Based Organisations,” 72. 88. Piper, “Faith-Based Organisations,” 74. 89. See, for example, Nadine Bowers Du Toit and Craig Stewart, “‘Give Us This Day Our Daily Bread?’: Innovative Responses by Faith Communities to Suffering during COVID-19 within a Context of Inequality

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91.

92.

93. 94.

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and Poverty in South Africa,” in Christianity and COVID-19: Pathways for Faith, ed. Chammah J. Kaunda, Atola Longkumer, Kenneth R. Ross et al. (London: Routledge, 2021), 150–62; Ignatius Swart, Marlize Rabe, and Stephan de Beer, “‘Eish! It Is Tough Living Here’: Marginalised Young People and Faith-Based Organisations in Pretoria Central,” in Stuck in the Margins?, 99–119. See, for example, in addition, H. Jurgens Hendriks, Johannes Erasmus, and Gerbrand Mans, “Congregations as Providers of Social Services and HIV/AIDs Care,” NGTT 45, no. 2 (2004): 380–402; Ignatius Swart, “Churches as a Stock of Social Capital for Promoting Social Development in Western Cape Communities,” Journal of Religion in Africa 36, no. 3–4 (2006): 346–78. Louw and Koegelenberg, as part of the NRASD and EFSA research listed in Table 5.2, for instance, mentions the following cases of prominent denominational or religious networks focusing on welfare and community development projects: Hope Africa Foundation (Anglican Diocese of Cape Town), Order of Dignity (Methodist Church of Southern Africa), Ministry of Caring (Dutch Reformed Church), Development and Welfare Agency (Southern African Catholic Bishops’ Conference), ELCSA Development Service (Evangelical Lutheran Church), TIKKUN (South African Jewish community), and the Southern African Dawah Network and Africa Muslim Agency (South African Muslim community). Louw and Koegelenberg, “Building a New South Africa,” 11–12. See note 91. In addition, see also Barbara Bompani, “Religion and Development from Below: Independent Christianity in South Africa,” Journal of Religion in Africa 40, no. 3 (2010): 316–20; Bowers Du Toit and Craig Stewart, “‘Give Us This Day Our Daily Bread?,’” 156– 60; Louw and Koegelenberg, “Building a New South Africa,” 11–12; Maharaj et al. “Religion and Development,” 85–107 (see Table 5.2b); Öhlmann et al., “African Initiated Churches’ Potential as Development Actors,” 4, 9 (see Table 5.2d); Swart et al., Welfare, Religion and Gender in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 145–223. Lubbe, “The Role of Religion in the Process of Nation-Building,” 166. See, for example, Nadine Bowers Du Toit, “Meeting the Challenge of Poverty and Inequality? ‘Hindrances and Helps’ with regard to Congregational Mobilisation in South Africa,” HTS Theological Studies 73, no. 2 (2017): 2–4; Amanda Gouws, “Social Welfare and Religion in Paarl through the Lens of a Feminist Ethic of Care,” in Welfare, Religion and Gender in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 275–77, 279; Hendriks et al., “Congregations as Providers of Social Services and HIV/AIDs Care,” 392–93; Swart, “Churches as a Stock of Social Capital,” 364– 65, 369–70; Swart, “Are the Rising Expectations Realistic?,” 298, 301; Swart et al., “‘Eish! It Is Tough Living Here,’” 112–18; Tanja Winkler,

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95. 96. 97. 98.

99.

100.

“When God and Poverty Collide: Exploring the Myths of Faith Sponsored Community Development,” Urban Studies 56, no. 10 (2008): 2111–12; Tanja Winkler, “Super-Sizing Community Development Initiatives: The Case of Hillbrow’s Faith Sector,” International Journal of Public Theology 2, no. 1 (2008): 63, 68–69. Maharaj et al., “Religion and Development,” 91, 92–107. Maharaj et al., “Religion and Development,” 91. Maharaj et al., “Religion and Development,” 91. Maharaj et al., “Religion and Development,” 99. For similar appreciations, see Ann Bernstein and Stephen Rule, “Flying under South Africa’s Radar: The Growth and Impact of Pentecostals in a Developing Country,” in The Hidden Form of Capital: Spiritual Influences in Societal Progress, ed. Peter L. Berger and Gordon Redding (London: Anthem Press, 2010), 91–131; Bompani, “Religion and Development from Below,” 307–30; Jude Icheku and Brij Maharaj, “Church, Development and Poverty Reduction: The Hope Empowerment Scheme of the Durban Christian Centre Church,” Man In India 91, no. 1 (2011): 135–53; Öhlmann et al., “African Initiated Churches’ Potential as Development Actors,” 1–11; Swart et al., Welfare, Religion and Gender in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 165–223; Swart et al., “‘Eish! It Is Tough Living Here,’” 117–18. See, for example, Badisa, “Badisa Offers Various Social and Development Services,” 2021, https://badisa.org.za/; Nadine Bowers du Toit, “Unapologetically Faith Based: The Nature of Donor Engagement in the Context of South African Faith-Based Organisations,” HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 75, no. 4 (2019): 1–7; National Development Agency, “South African Government Funding to Non-Profit Organisations,” February 2016, https://www.nda.org.za/; Thomas J. Solomons, “Partnerships between Faith-Based Organizations in Elsies River and the Western Cape Government: A Critical Assessment” (DPhil thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2020), http://hdl.handle.net/ 11394/8166; South African Government, “Register a Nonprofit Organisation,” 2022, https://www.gov.za/services/register-nonprofit-organi sation; Western Cape Government, “Non-Profit Organisations: Registration and Funding,” 2021, https://www.westerncape.gov.za/service/ non-profit-organisations-registration-and-funding. Bowers du Toit, “Unapologetically Faith Based,” 1–6; Solomons, “Partnerships between Faith-Based Organizations in Elsies River,” 111–85; Willie van der Merwe, Ignatius Swart, and Jurgens Hendriks, “FaithBased Organisations in the Context of Social Welfare and Development in South Africa: Towards a Conceptualisation,” Social Work/Maatskaplike Werk 45, no. 2 (2009): 135–36.

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101. Solomons, “Partnerships between Faith-Based Organizations in Elsies River,” 172–73. 102. See, for example, Bernstein and Rule, “Flying under South Africa’s Radar,” 112, 126; Cedras, “The ANC-led Alliance in Government,” 68; Dion Forster, “Religion and the State Need to be in Balance to Protect Democracy in South Africa,” The Conversation, July 20, 2022, https://theconversation.com/religion-and-state-need-to-bein-balance-to-protect-democracy-in-south-africa-186405; Mikhail Moosa and Jan Hofmeyer, “South Africans’ Trust in Institutions and Representatives Reaches a New Low,” Afrobarometer Dispatch no. 474, 2021, https://www.afrobarometer.org/. 103. See Bernstein and Rule, “Flying under South Africa’s Radar,” 91–131; Adam Habib, Brij Maharaj, and Annsilla Nyar, “Giving, Development and Poverty Alleviation,” in Giving & Solidarity, 28, 38; Maharaj et al., “Religion and Development,” 81, 86–87; Swart, “Churches as a Stock of Social Capital,” 366–68; Swart, “Are the Rising Expectations Realistic?,” 294–302.

CHAPTER 6

Evolutionary Effectiveness of Faith-Based Organizations’ Public Agency in Kenya Richard Muko Ochanda and Humphrey Waliang’i Wafula

James 2:16: If you say to a (hungry and poor) person go in peace; be warmed and be filled, but do not give to him/her the needful things for the body, what is the profit?

Background and Context While Kenya is considered an East African economic powerhouse, it has had its share of challenges. According to the World Bank,1 Kenya’s critical development threats continue to be corruption, poverty, inequality,

R. M. Ochanda (B) Center for Leadership and Management, Tangaza University College, Nairobi, Kenya e-mail: [email protected] H. W. Wafula Graduate School of Business, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Glatzer et al. (eds.), Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31960-0_6

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climate change, overburdened public and private healthcare systems, HIV, high maternal and infant mortality, and contested land rights with deep historical roots that foster lingering resentment and ethnic divisions. As the COVID-19 pandemic got underway in 2020,2 and the Russia– Ukraine conflict picked up in 2022,3 Kenya’s standard of living for a majority of its citizens continued to deteriorate. It is apparent that the two crises have negatively affected public services, employment, livelihoods, and food security. Kenya began implementing political, structural, and economic reforms in the 1980s. It replaced the import-substitution policies it had pursued since independence with an open, liberalized trading regime. Tariffs were decreased, controls on imports were loosened, and the government encouraged trade through a series of export promotion platforms.4 In 1991, Kenya adopted a multiparty system after the ruling party accepted a constitutional amendment that reinstated multiparty elections.5 It is important to note that during independence, Kenya was a multiparty state; however, the opposition parties were banned after independence.6 In 2010 the country promulgated a new progressive constitution that guaranteed better human rights and basic freedoms.7 These piecemeal reforms in Kenya from the 1980s then led to the ousting of the longserving, feared, and dominant ruling party, KANU during the 1997 elections.8 Kenya as a country scores differently on a number of global metrics. Kenya’s Human Development Index of the year 2020 was 0.601, ranking it 143 out of 189. According to the scores that year, this score was considered to be low despite the fact that it performed better than the Sub-Saharan Regional Index average, which was 0.547.9 Kenya is ranked partly free by Freedom House. Civil society is quite vibrant; however, Kenyans grapple with corruption, violence, restrictive laws, and brutality by security forces. While Kenyan citizens are free to organize into political parties, they are often amalgamated into seasonal coalitions designed only to contest elections. Though Kenyan parties represent a range of ideologies, they are strongly influenced by regional and ethnic interests and may not necessarily represent the collective interests of the country.10 The combination of restrictive laws on press freedom and the potential for harassment and violence leads to self-censorship in some cases among the media personalities. Dating back to pre-independence times, faith-based organizations continue to play a great role in the socio-political, cultural, and economic

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aspects of the Kenyan society.11 Kenya’s history is replete with efforts of faith-based organizations and groups offering unique solutions to community problems. While some of these organizations have bigger interventions traversing the entire country, many have local and small specific interventions within communities.12 The efforts of the church and other faith-based organizations in widening the political freedoms and condemning atrocities date back to precolonial times. Faith-based organizations are credited for speaking against decaying morals, corruption, and government high-handedness.13 On the cultural front, faith-based organizations have contributed to the transformation of community cultures and mores. Positive cultural transformation can be identified in intergender relationships, challenging risky traditions, and enhancing tolerance and understanding among different communities. In the transformation of cultures, faith-based organizations are not only preaching in the pulpits but are supporting the country’s education.14 Lastly, in terms of economic development of the communities, faith-based organizations are investing in improving agricultural practices, social assistance to the poor, microfinance, and other modes in which communities are driven toward self-reliance. In doing this, faith-based organizations are at the vanguard of service delivery, development work, and societal advocacy. They address practical challenges such as increased poverty, deteriorating human rights, excessive unemployment, and lack of access to basic services. In essence, they provide services where the government’s resources have fallen short.15

Purpose and Significance of the Study This study seeks to contribute to the literature by offering an examination of how religious institutions, in the face of challenging economic and other problems, contribute to social assistance in Kenya. The chapter aims to examine both the function and activities of faith-based organizations, as well as the tensions that may exist between and among Christian denominations and other faiths in Kenya while pursuing their public agency. Analyzing available data and other studies, this work will seek to determine the type of pressures that would be placed on the government if all

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religious organizations simply stopped offering their services. The study will seek to address a number of objectives as follows: • Establish the path of the religious actors–state relationship in Kenya. • Examine the intention of religious actors in their public agency in Kenya. • Determine the operation of religious actors in public agencies in Kenya. • Assess the consequences (intended or unintended) of religious actors’ political/public involvement in Kenya. • Investigate the public perception of religious actors’ agency in Kenya.

Precolonial Contribution of Religious Actors in Kenya’s Development The penetration of Christian and Muslim religions in Kenya and East Africa is divided into various historical epochs. The first period known as Hijra, when newly converted Muslims from the Middle East were running from persecution, is presumed to have taken place between the sixth and thirteenth centuries. This was a period of early Arab settlement in the coastal areas of Kenya and East Africa. In the coastal towns of Eastern Africa, Arab settlers were welcomed by the Swahili people and the local Bantu ethnic communities.16 The new Arab migrants settled in Lamu, Mombasa, and other coastal settlements. Over time, interactions with the Swahili and other ethnic communities led to intermarriages. The Arabs learned the Swahili culture and language and in turn, the Swahili adopted the Islamic religion. The second period commonly referred to as the Shirazi period is associated with the settlement of Arab dynasties along the Eastern Africa Coast and on the Comoros Islands between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries. The Shirazis’ interactions went beyond the coastal areas; there is evidence of penetration into the interior mainly for trade. Initially the wealth of the Shirazis was a result of the sea trade with Arabia and the Persian Gulf and not with the interior of Eastern Africa.17 With time, the Arabs moved into the mainland communities searching for slaves while trading in cloths, beads, spices, and metal commodities such as swords and daggers. From the mainland they got leopard

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skins, tortoise shells, rhinoceros horns, ostrich feathers, wax, ivory, slaves, cloves, and gold.18 There were no attempts at Islamization at this time; however, Islam was adopted voluntarily by local communities and slaves. This second period of Islamization ended with Portuguese colonization of the region in the early sixteenth century. The Portuguese, led by Vasco da Gama, were interested in trading with India and the Far East and also in diminishing the influence of Islam, which had threatened Portugal and Spain. To do this, the Portuguese formed an alliance with Prester John, a powerful Ethiopian Christian Priest-King at that time.19 Later, the Portuguese established that there were gold deposits in some towns of the Eastern Coast that were in the hands of Muslims. Portugal, in order to gain a monopoly over the gold trade, sent an army under the command of Francesco d’Almeida in 1505, which managed to gain control of the hostile territories. Few attempts were made to convert the local populations to Christianity. However, there were small episodes of conversions to Christianity, mainly Catholicism, between 1500 and 1600. The conversions continued though at a slow pace, as people loathed the Portuguese because they practiced acts of outright theft and were reputed to be cruel and inhuman. The struggle for dominance of the East African coast between Muslims and Portuguese began in 1631 and ended in 1729 with the defeat and expulsion of the Portuguese. After the defeat of the Portuguese, only a handful of Christians, mainly from Goa, remained, and but none from the indigenous population. With the defeat of the Portuguese, the sultan of Zanzibar extended his hegemony to Mombasa after having conquered it, his main interest being in trade.20 The sultan of Zanzibar did not actively promote Islam to the interior; it nevertheless was slowly adopted by slaves and some of the inland ethnic communities, especially those most associated with trade, mostly in slaves. The pains of the slave trade in East Africa attracted the attention of the London Missionary Society via the works of Dr. David Livingstone between 1840 and 1843.21,22 By 1862, through the work of the London Missionary Society and the Methodist Church, the Bible’s New Testament was translated into Swahili with the assistance of Ludwig Krapf. Though the work of the London Missionary Society played a great role in ending slavery and opened Kenya and East Africa to missionary activities, it also provided an impetus for colonization of Africa by European powers.23

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Fig. 6.1 Religious demographics in Kenya (Christian 85.5% [Protestant 33.4%, Catholic 20.6%, Evangelical 20.4%, African Instituted Churches 7%, other Christian 4.1%], Muslim 10.9%, other 1.8%, non-affiliated 1.8%) (Source Kenya Census Data 2019)

Catholic missionaries made a re-entry into Kenya in 1863 after having lost it with the defeat of Vasco da Gama in the 1700s by Arabs. Once back, they joined the other churches in the reintegration and resettlement of the liberated slaves. The partition of Africa in 1884 to 1885 and eventual colonization had implications for religious activities and helped in ending the slave trade in East Africa. Penetration was also made easier into the interior, paving the way for greater diffusion of both Islam and Christian religions24 (Fig. 6.1).

Contribution of Faith-Based Organizations in Kenya’s Development During the Colonial Period At the time of colonization, the interior of Kenya and East Africa became accessible. Both Muslim and Christian missionary and evangelization activities were at their height. In essence, colonialism also accelerated the proliferation of Swahili as a lingua franca in Kenya and Eastern Africa

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to facilitate trade and disseminate governmental policies. Swahili also assisted in the proliferation of both Christian and Muslim religions in the country.25 The Christian activities continued to increase with independent churches of Africa and the Pentecostal churches joining the fray by the mid and late 1800s and more so during colonization and after independence.26 The independent churches arose out of the desire to indigenize Christianity by incorporating African traditional religious worldviews. These indigenous religions resented the decadence they felt was tolerated by mainstream Christianity, domination by European settlers, forced labor, segregation on the basis of color, and assault on African people, practices, and culture.27 There are dissenting views on the role of missionaries in the colonization process. One view indicates missionaries welcomed European governments to annex Kenya and East Africa. According to this view, the missionaries had no different agenda from that of the colonizers; in fact, they only came to prepare the grounds.28 Apologists, on the other hand, argue that missionaries were convinced that to effectively deal with the slave trade, European governments had to assume responsibility of introducing legitimate trade and education in the region. The missionaries believed that the government’s work would be supplemented by their efforts.29 The colonizers engaged in excesses against the indigenous populations. They condemned the indigenous population to forced and cheap labor, high taxation, and segregation on the basis of color, among other atrocities.30 These excesses led the missionaries to undertake advocacy on behalf of Africans to challenge the colonial government. Several of these protests led to the creation of favorable policies, such as the 1923 Devonshire White Paper that considered African interests as being paramount.31 In the wake of the Mau Mau uprising in 1952, missionaries sided with the colonialists and refused to acknowledge that Mau Mau was a liberation movement. They never raised a voice even when the colonial government was using excessive force against adherents of the Mau Mau rebellion, and many people were tortured and killed. The stance taken by missionaries during the Mau Mau uprising indicated strongly that they were a part of the colonial enterprise and had tried to play it safe in order to benefit from the state.32

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The colonial government involved religious sponsors in the management of education activities. Eshiwani33 notes that missionaries deliberately introduced formal education as a strategy for reforming African social life and to institute evangelical success. Missionaries dominated the provision and administration of education throughout the colonial period. Some of the centers they established grew into large institutions and today have become the best-performing schools in the country.34 Missionaries also did help in setting facilities for the reintegration of freed slaves along the coastal areas of East Africa. Those assisted included slaves who had escaped from their masters or those who had been bought back to freedom either by missionaries or by the British naval forces plying the Indian Ocean.35 Proper coordination and collaboration between faith and the state in Kenya on matters of socioeconomic and welfare development started since the colonial times in the 1900s. The faith organizations were mandated with implementing education, health, and other community development infrastructure for the Africans, and they depended on government aid.36 Faith-based organizations introduced vocational training institutions, schools for the physically challenged, and homes for orphans and old people who had no one to care for them.37 They also taught the locals agricultural and other practical skills such as tailoring, carpentry, and masonry. Over 50% of medical work (hospitals and clinics) in the rural areas during colonial times fell under the ambit of the missionaries.38

Contribution of Faith-Based Organizations in Kenya’s Development During the Postcolonial Era After independence Kenya adopted a constitution that did not elevate any religion to the status of a state religion. The constitution granted the freedom of religion to all Kenyans, and the state was not allowed to interfere or control any religion.39 The different political eras, however, had their distinct and unique tensions with religious actors. There is not much literature describing how the state and the faith-based organizations related during the time of the founding under the president of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta. However, according to Ndzovu,40 although Jomo Kenyatta’s rule was authoritarian, it was relatively benevolent, and there was no inflation or economic hardship. Of course, there was an unexpressed

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unease among some faith-based organization sectors when Kenyatta made Kenya a single-party state in 1964. When Moi, then Kibaki, and then Uhuru took power, religious actors assumed a more critical stance against poor governance, corruption, and infringements of human rights.41 The state, for its part, always pushed back, branding critics from faith-based organizations as “servants of foreign masters” or “subversive elements” or “threats to peace and prosperity.” Accordingly, the state argued that while it was responsible for temporal issues, faith-based organizations should concern themselves with taking souls to heaven, a typical case of “render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s” and “unto God what belongs to God.”42 Despite the challenges to their public agency, faith-based organizations in their various outfits continued working to catalyze change and societal transformation. They were a part of the movement that led to the repeal of section 2A in 1991 of the constitution that had made Kenya a de jure one-party state since the early 1980s.43 Following violent elections in 1992, faith-based organizations instituted peace-building endeavors and civic education training throughout Kenya.44 The ruling elite saw FBO activities in peace building and in the provision of civic education as being anti-government and thus out to discredit the government’s “good” name.45 More importantly, faith-based organizations were able to mobilize members of Parliament to discuss peace and reconciliation, demonstrating faith-based organizations’ contribution to democratization in the face of hostility. Faith-based organizations saw opposition politicians as crucial to the “reform movement,” which is why they supported them. Despite the hostile political environment, they collaborated with opposition politicians in exposing the government’s flaws and inability to foster the democratic process.46 This was not only unusual, but it also jeopardized the personal security of the critics. In public, faith-based organization leaders were harassed, left to the whims of state-sponsored militias, and at times physically assaulted.47 For example, following demonstrations to press for a new constitution in 1999, the Presbyterian Church of East Africa Cleric Rev. Timothy Njoya (a member of the NCCK) was beaten in full view of both national and international media and the police. The death in a car crash of Bishop Alexander Muge of the Eldoret Diocese also raised many questions, as the bishop had received death threats from a Cabinet Minister.

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Kenyan faith-based organizations have also been on the receiving end for keeping quiet during the atrocities of the 2007/2008 post-electoral violence. They were accused of taking sides together with the political echelons—hence their role as custodians of the societal moral conscience was sadly eroded.48 Second, faith-based organizations were at the forefront of masterminding stigma against people living with HIV and AIDS at the onset of the disease by condemning the patients as sinners.49 Unlike in Tanzania, where some of the Pentecostal Churches led the anti-vaccine movement against COVID-19, the church in Kenya collaborated with the government in addressing the disease.50,51 Faith-based organizations in Kenya are also at the forefront of promoting intolerance against homosexuals, despite calls for tolerance from higher authorities, such as the Vatican.52,53 Faith-based organizations have also found themselves at loggerheads with the political candidates during the election campaigns of 2022. One major contender in the elections directed the National Council of Churches in Kenya to regulate the establishment of churches and shut down those that fail to meet the required standards.54 According to the candidate, these churches are illegally obtaining money from citizens and enriching certain individuals while pretending that they are spreading the gospel or the word of God. This was not received well by mainstream and small churches and was seen as an attempt to infringe on the constitution’s religious freedoms in Kenya. As a backlash, the churches on their part called on the state to support their work to transform communities.55

Faith-Based Organizations and Constitutional Review The successful 1961 to 1963 constitutional negotiations with the colonial government led to the granting of Kenyan independence. The first constitution modeled on the Westminster design ushered Kenya into a rookie democratic system.56 However, from 1963 to 2005 this constitution had approximately thirty amendments that entrenched autocratic tendencies and stifled democracy. The country adopted a number of features: it became one party by default, adopted a strong centralist government, reduced the threshold for approving constitutional amendments, concentrated enormous power in the presidency, and eliminated political opposition. With time, the changes had severe impacts, including undermining the doctrine of the separation of powers and the jurisprudential

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basis of the constitution. The amendments endorsed the removal of security of tenure to the attorney general, comptroller, auditor general, judges, and members of the public service commission. It suffices that all the constitutional review endeavors prior to the 1990s excluded faith-based organizations and civil society groups and only included the political elite.57 Faith-based organizations decried the deterioration of constitutionalism in Kenya since independence. However, early in the 1990s, faithbased organizations began to organize for constitutional changes as a prerequisite for multiparty democracy, becoming a strong voice of the voiceless, speaking out against authoritarianism and dictatorship. By December 1991, these efforts were part of the contributions that led to the removal of Act 2A and the ultimate establishment of Kenya as a multiparty state.58 Furthermore, in order to protect political reforms, faith-based organizations not only made public announcements, but also educated citizens on participatory democracy. In 1992 they led as an alternative dissenting voice by drafting a model constitution dubbed “Kenya Tuitakayo” (the Kenya we want). The model constitution became popular and was widely accepted across the entire country, though it was not accepted by the political elite.59 The move of creating an alternative constitution pushed the government to accept to bring together a National Constitutional Convention that was a beginning of a comprehensive overhaul of the old constitutional order in Kenya. Despite the initial attempt by faith-based organizations and alternative forces to move a model constitution forward, the government stonewalled and adamantly kept them at bay, even during initiatives such as Inter-Party Parliamentary Group, which negotiated a middle way to improve the political representation in Parliament between the opposition and ruling party. Moreover, also in 1995 the government initiated a Constitutional Review Commission excluding the faith-based organizations. Seeing this, the faith-based organizations started a parallel independent review process known as the Ufungamano Initiative, which was also known as the “people’s commission.”60 An important constitutional revision was made in the run-up to the 2002 elections to constrain presidential powers; consequently, presidential terms were limited to two terms of five years each. As a result, through the Ufungamano Initiative, the church campaigned hard this time around for constitutional revisions aimed at ensuring a seamless presidential transition after the defeat of the incumbent. At this same time, conversations

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around a new constitution were taking place. In 2003 the Parliament passed the Kenya Review Act, which vested the power of voting for the proposed constitution to the National Constitutional Conference. This conference was convened in 2003, and further sessions were held in 2004. In 2004, faith-based organizations led by Rev. Timothy Njoya filed a petition in court to stop the work of the National Constitutional Conference, which they argued was not a properly constituted Constituent Assembly. The petition also sought to prevent the Parliament from enacting the constitution without holding a referendum. The court ruled that the power to make a new constitution belonged to the people of Kenya as a whole in exercise of their sovereign right. The citizens of Kenya were entitled to have a referendum on any new proposed constitution.61 The decision of the courts thus paved way for the first constitutional referendum held in Kenya on November 21, 2005, during which the Proposed New Constitution was rejected. The failure of the constitution was attributed to contentious issues such as unequal power devolution to all regions, an executive that was too powerful, poor checks and balances, poor provisions for land tenure, creation of Kadhi’s courts and ethnic divisions. The defeat of the constitution was an important win for the Kenyan public, thanks to the leadership of the faith-based organizations. Without this leadership, Kenyan citizens would have been given a flawed constitution that would endanger their coexistence and would be living under a constitutional dispensation they would not be comfortable with. The leadership of the faith-based organizations made them protagonists of political emancipation and proponents of changes, alongside civil society, to ensure a strong proliferation of democracy.62 Once the 2005 Proposed New Constitution was rejected, the government was not keen on further completing the reform process. The aftermath of the bungled 2007 presidential elections and the resultant scale of national violence presented the necessary crisis that was crucial in jumpstarting the review process. The crisis demonstrated to all Kenyans that getting a new constitutional order was no longer an option but a necessity. The main factor that led to the post-election crisis of 2007 according to the Krieggler and Waki Commissions was the breakdown of good governance. The Kofi Annan reconciliation endeavor, dubbed the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee (KNDRC), identified four factors, including institutional decay, poverty and growing inequality, badly divided Kenyan society, unresolved land issues, and a

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culture of impunity. The two commissions and the Kofi Annan initiative suggested the need for constitutional reforms to address the problem of bad governance and all related ailments. Some faith-based organization leaders, however, were blamed for having been subjective and contributing to the escalation of the scale of violence. Despite the challenges, faith-based organizations did engage in peace and reconciliation endeavors, psycho-social and material assistance, and pushing for good governance.63 In 2008 the Parliament enacted two pieces of legislations to kick-start the review process. These were the Constitution of Kenya Review Act (2008) and the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act (2008). The Constitution of Kenya Amendment Act introduced a new section 47A in the existing constitution, which set out the procedure for the replacement of the constitution with a new one through the process of a referendum whereby the electorate was to ratify or reject the proposed constitution. The Constitution of Kenya Review Act (2008), on the other hand, made provisions to facilitate the completion of the review process. The Amendment Act outlined four critical organs for the review, namely, the Committee of Experts (CoE), the Parliamentary Select Committee, the National Assembly, and the Referendum. While the Community of Experts moved from one place to another in Kenya to collect contentious views,64 faith-based organizations organized communities to collect these views and submit them to the committee of experts on constitutional review. Once the Committee of Experts completed their work collecting contentious issues, they were addressed in the constitutional review process. The clamor for a new constitution began in early to mid-2010. Clergy from various denominations banded together to form the Kenya Christian Leaders Constitutional Forum (KCLCF), an anti-constitutional “No” campaign. Muslims mainly supporting the entrenchment of the Kadhi’s Courts and other pro-constitutional political leaders led the “Yes” campaign. The new constitution was overwhelmingly supported by 67% of voters. The win for the new constitution indicated that most faithful did not pay attention to the voice of their shepherds (the clergy). It went on to challenge the view that the church was Kenya’s credible and legitimate voice.65 An important change brought by the 2010 constitution was the creation of counties, which are devolved systems of governance in Kenya. The counties were governments of their own with their own specific

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areas of competence distinct from that of the national governments. The country structures being new meant that there were important dynamics for faith-based organizations to understand in order to collaborate with them well. The lessons of the divisive 2005 constitutional referendum, held two years before the general election that ended in the 2007/2008 devastating wave of post-election violence, made faith-based organizations cautious when approaching the Bridging Bridges Initiative (BBI) that brought a handshake between the president and the opposition leader in 2019. While the BBI initiative strengthened the relationship between the president and the opposition leader, it created serious cracks with the deputy president. The BBI proposed sweeping changes in the Kenyan constitution, including creation of the post of the prime minister, placing the judiciary under an ombudsman, appointing ministers among members of Parliament, and increasing Parliamentary seats.66 The faith-based organization leaders in December 2020 directed that dialogue and consensus building should override personal ambitions in the debate on constitutional amendment. They also warned the politicians to stop meddling with the constitution, as it is too important a document to be made the subject of conflict and political competition.67 A few radical clergy not supporting the BBI initiative were part of the Linda Katiba (protect the constitution) initiative that stands for the integrity of the Kenyan constitution. However, there has also been some public outcry that faith-based organizations are not doing enough to protect against unscrupulous and ill-advised attempts on constitutional reforms and bad governance against incumbent governments. The complacency of faith-based organizations has been blamed on tribalism and the fact that several faith-based organizations are financially gaining from corrupt agreements.

Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare Several studies attest to the fact that faith-based organizations do make a unique contribution in various areas of people’s lives in Kenya.68 Faith-based organizations in their various outfits do make unique contributions in the fields of health, education, agriculture, socioeconomic empowerment, technology, and the empowerment of poor people.

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Contributions to the Health Sector In addressing the health of Kenyans, in 2006, the Kenya Catholic Secretariat indicated that it had 14 medical training colleges, 44 hospitals, 92 health centers, 281 dispensaries, and 46 community-based healthcare institutions spread all over the country.69 In an analysis using data from the Kenya Open Data in 2012, Ochanda indicated that faith-based organizations supported a total of 1,058 facilities in Kenya, which was 12% of total contribution to the health sector at that time.70 In 2017, using data provided by the Kenya Master Health Facility list, Fort71 found that the contribution to the health sector by the faith-based organizations had risen by 12.8% from that found by Ochanda in 2012. Moreover, Fort also indicates that faith-based organizations also contribute between 25 and 30% of all hospital beds and that faith-based organizations maintain their interventions both in rural settings and in urban areas. Ochanda and the Kenya Catholic Secretariat72 indicated that faithbased organization facilities were at times the only ones found in the very remote areas of the country. Fort,73 however, notes that with more devolution taking place, public investment in health has been increasing steadily over time, specifically in rural and remote areas that were the predominant domains of faith-based organizations. Service delivery has also been found to be better in faith-based organizations’ health centers compared to the public facilities. The Kenya People’s COPs (2019, 2020, and 2021) and Community-Led Monitoring reports by several civil society organizations (CSOs) monitoring facilities funded by PEPFAR between 2021 and 2022 found that patients had a number of complaints about the quality of services in public hospitals. These complaints consisted of high-level stigma, stockouts of essential medicines, unfriendly language, lack of confidentiality, poor hygiene, and unmaintained infrastructure. Fort74 indicates a positive impression from service users of the faith-based organization facilities that is much better than that of the public facilities. In capturing the spirit that motivates faith-based organization staff, the Kenya Catholic Secretariat (KCS) (2006) indicated that the staff are witnesses of Christ who are extending his healing ministry. Moreover, KCS also indicated that faith-based organizations’ health facilities have a role to assist people at the periphery from the core of the society, that is, the most destitute, at-risk, and marginalized groups in the society. Fort further argues that faith-based organization health staff are generally motivated by a mission,

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beliefs, and values that make them offer their services in a more holistic and humane way.

Education and Social Assistance Faith-based organizations, in responding to challenges of the society, are in fact demonstrating practically that religion has a social obligation.75 In a survey by Koinonia Community in 2006, it was found that 40% of all charitable children institutions (CCIs) in Nairobi belonged to faith-based organizations. CCIs registered under the government were only 9%, while the rest were registered as either self-help groups, non-governmental organizations, community-based organizations, or other charitable trusts. It was also found that religious bodies both local and international were among the biggest donors of the charitable children’s institutions, accounting for 28%, while local contributions from immediate communities and institutional owners accounted for 35%. At the children’s homes, typical activities included rescue, counseling, spiritual formation, games, and educational sponsorships. Koinonia Community76 indicates that a successful children’s intervention should include dimensions such as street work, outreach, rescue, rehabilitation, and reintegration, all of which require enormous investments. The Prisons Catholic Chaplaincy in 2006 demonstrated how faithbased organizations have spiritual accompaniment, service, advocacy, and psycho-social support dimensions for the prisoners.77 In their data, collected from about 1206 inmates, 25 ex-prisoners, and 58 warders, they showed that the church has an important role to play in social research. This study called for the improvement of prison conditions, which in essence ended up hardening the prisoners rather than rehabilitating them. It called for the repeal of the death penalty and eliminating the use of torture against prisoners by law enforcement agencies. One stark reality was the fact that ex-prisoners found no support structures once they left the prisons. This in itself posed a danger of relapse. Based on this study and the media exposure it got, Kenya as a country began to reflect on its criminal justice system, and the conditions in the prisons did change. Ochanda78 also examined the role played by the various umbrella bodies of the different faiths in Kenya: the Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK), the Kenya Council of Catholic Bishops (KCCB) (then known as Kenya Episcopal Conference [KEC]), the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the Organization of Independent Churches

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of Kenya (OICK), and the Supreme Council of Muslims of Kenya (SUPKEM). All these umbrella bodies indicated that they implemented programs in education, HIV/AIDS/COVID-19 mitigation, civic education, civil society strengthening, peace building, conflict transformation, food security, gender and minorities (pastoralists, refugees, among others) empowerment, and refugee interventions. These umbrella bodies and their memberships also run a number of schools, youth formation endeavors, family-strengthening initiatives, tertiary training institutes, and universities spread across the country.

Conclusions This study has explored the interactions of faith-based organizations and community development since the precolonial times. It has also demonstrated how faith-based organizations and the state coexisted at each of these epochs. Salient features that manifest at all times include advocacy to speak for the downtrodden and the lowly, assisting communities in solving personal and social problems, educating communities, bettering the constitutional order, and also contributing to peaceful coexistence and food security. One important reality in post-devolution Kenya is that counties are doing a great job of investing in social welfare programs. Some counties have not learned to coexist well with the faith-based organizations and support them in their endeavors. It becomes incumbent on the faithbased organizations to ensure that counties are well educated about their community mandate and that they are able to tap into county resources for their work. This analysis has demonstrated that great pressures would be placed on the government and the society if all religious organizations simply stopped offering their services. In essence, no amount of analysis can capture the entire spectrum of work done by the faith-based organizations in promoting the common good, such as their work on peace and teaching morality. Faith-based organizations have their flaws because they are human institutions, but beyond the flaws they remain committed to their mission and resolve and hence are a valuable part of the Kenyan society. Faithbased organizations do not get the credit they deserve for their enormous contributions to society, maybe because of their humility and their

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following a call of the scriptures that “when you give to the needy with your right hand, do not let your left hand know.”79

Notes 1. World Bank, The State of Social Safety Nets, 2018. 2. World Bank, “Monitoring Covid19 Impacts on Households in Kenya,” World Bank Brief , March 14, 2022, https://www.worldbank.org/en/ country/kenya/brief/monitoring-covid-19-impact-on-households-andfirms-in-kenya. 3. “How Russia and Ukraine War will Hurt Kenyan Homes,” Business Daily, February 22, 2022, https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/ how-russia-ukraine-war-will-hurt-kenyan-homes-3724714. 4. Geoffrey Gertz, Kenya’s Trade Liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s: Policies, Impacts, and Implications, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/kenya_backgr ound.pdf 5. Jennifer A. Widner, The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From “Harambee!” to “Nyayo!” (Berkeley: University of California, 1992), http://ark.cdlib. org/ark:/13030/ft9h4nb6fv/. 6. Christina Nyström, Kenya; The Party System from 1963–2000, 2000, https://www.janda.org/ICPP/ICPP2000/Countries/9-CentralEa stAfrica/96-Kenya/96-Kenya63-00.htm. 7. Ben Sihanya, Constitutional Implementation in Kenya, 2010–2015: Challenges and Prospects, 2012. 8. Patrick O. Asingo, “Opposition Coalitions and the Democratic Ouster of Dominant African Parties,” Baker Center Journal of Applied Public Policy, 2, no. 1 (Fall 2008): 52–67, https://profiles.uonbi.ac.ke/patrick_asingo/ files/opposition_coalition.pdf. 9. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2020: The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene, 2020, https://hdr.undp.org/en/2020-report. 10. Freedom House, Kenya Report, 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/cou ntry/kenya/freedom-world/2022. 11. Richard Muko Ochanda, “Faith Organizations and Social Economic Welfare,” 2012, SSRN Working Papers, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2065226. 12. A. L. “The Quantitative and Qualitative Contributions of Faith-Based Organizations to Healthcare: The Kenya Case,” Christian Journal for Global Health, 4, no. 3 (November 2017), https://journal.cjgh.org/ index.php/cjgh/article/download/191/485?inline=1?inline=1. 13. Henry Okullu, Church and Politics in East Africa (Nairobi: Uzima Press, 1974).

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14. B. M. Mosomi, “Religious Sponsors and Emerging Conflicts in the Management of Public Secondary Schools in Nandi South District, Kenya,” Unpublished Master of Education Thesis, Maseno University, 2008. 15. Patricia Snell Herzog, David P. King, Rafia A. Khader, Amy Strohmeier, and Andrew L. Williams. “Studying Religiosity and Spirituality: A Review of Macro, Micro, and Meso-level Approaches,” Religions 11, no. 9 (2020): 437. 16. I. Bosha, “Taathira Za Kiarabu katika Kiswahili Pamoja na Kamusi Thulathiya,” Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam University, 1993. 17. M. J. Vittori and K. Bremer, Islam in Tanzania and Kenya (Nairobi: Uzima Press, 2009). 18. M. Mukuthuria, “Islam and Development of Swahili Language,” Journal of Pan African Studies, 2, no. 8 (March 2009), http://citeseerx.ist.psu. edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.611.1422&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 19. Z. J. Nthamburi, A History of the Methodist Church in Kenya (Nairobi, Uzima Press, 1982). 20. Nthamburi, A History of the Methodist Church in Kenya, 17. 21. BBC (UD), “Dr. David Livingstone,” Historic Figures, https://www.bbc. co.uk/history/historic_figures/livingstone_david.shtml. 22. D. Livingstone, Missionary Researches and Travels in Southern Africa (London: Royal Geography Society, 1857). 23. Etim E. Okon, “Christian Missions and Colonial Rule in Africa: Objective and Contemporary Analysis,” European Scientific Journal 10, no. 17 (June 2014). 24. Cf. 17 and 19. 25. Cf. 17. 26. L. Imunde and T. J. Padwick, “Advancing Legal Empowerment of the Poor: The Role and Perspective of the African Independent Churches,” Paper Presented at the World Conference of Religions for Peace, Nairobi, Kenya, January 2008. 27. Atika School, “Discuss Five Reasons That Led to the Emergence of Independent Churches and Schools in Kenya During the Colonial Period, https://www.atikaschool.org/histogovqans/discuss-five-reasons-that-ledto-the-emergence-of-independent-churches-and-schools-in-kenya-duringthe-colonial-period. 28. Cf. 23. 29. Cf. 19. 30. Murphy, 1986. 31. 1923 Devonshire White Paper.

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32. Margaret Wangui Gachichi, “Faith and Nationalism Mau Mau in Kikuyuland,” Unpublished Thesis submitted in UON, http://erepository.uonbi. ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/77030/Gachihi_Faith%20and%20Nati onalism-%20Mau%20Mau%20and%20Christianity%20in%20Kikuyuland. pdf?sequence=6. 33. G. S. Eshiwani, Education Since Independence (Nairobi: EAEP, 1993). 34. George E. Urch, “Education and Colonialism in Kenya,” History of Education Quarterly 11, no. 3, https://www.jstor.org/stable/367292. 35. Moses D. E. Nwulia, “The Role of Missionaries in the Emancipation of Slaves in Zanzibar,” Journal of Negro History 60, no. 2 (April 1975): 268–87, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2717375. 36. Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, “Faith and Development in Focus Kenya,” Georgetown University, World Faith Development Dialogue, 2017, https://s3.amazonaws.com/berkley-center/170 328BCWFDDFaithDevelopmentFocusKenya.pdf. 37. G. S. Eshiwani, Implementing Education Policies in Kenya, WB discussion papers, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1990. 38. Cf. 11. 39. Hassan J. Ndzovu, Muslims in Kenyan Politics: Political Involvement, Marginalization, and Minority Status (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2014). 40. Ndzovu, Muslims in Kenyan Politics. 41. Galia Sabar Friedman, “Church and State in Kenya 1986 to 1992: The Church Involvement in the Game of Change,” African Affairs, 96 (1997): 25–52, https://www.jstor.org/stable/723749. 42. Solomon Owuoche, “Faith-based Organizations-State Relation and the Democratization Process in Kenya,” Scientific Research Open Access, 2015, https://www.scirp.org/html/68159_68159.htm. 43. Owuoche, “Faith-based Organizations.” 44. Muema Wambua, “The Ethnification of Electoral Conflicts in Kenya,” ACCORD, 2017, https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/ethnificationelectoral-conflicts-kenya/. 45. Cf. 37. 46. Cf. 37. 47. Stephen Kapinde, “The Church and Constitutional Reforms in Kenya, 1992–2002: A Retrospective Historical Analysis,” European Scientific Journal 14, no. 5 (February 28, 2018): 216, https://doi.org/10.19044/ esj.2018.v14n5p216. 48. Philomena Njeri Mwaura and Constansia Mumma Martinon, “Political Violence in Kenya and Local Churches’ Responses: The Case of the 2007 Post-Election Crisis,” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 8, no. 1 (January 2010): 39–46, https://doi.org/10.1080/155702710037 07812.

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49. Kenya Catholic Secretariat, Inventory of the Catholic Church’s response to HIV and AIDS in Kenya (Nairobi: Karosip Printers, 2006). 50. “Coronavirus in Tanzania: The Country That’s Rejecting the Vaccine, BBC News, February 6, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa55900680. 51. Gad Maiga,“Kenyan Churches Help with COVID-19 Vaccinations, UM News, March 21, 2022, https://www.umnews.org/en/news/kenya-religi ous-leaders-launch-covid-19-vaccination-campaign. 52. Fredrick Nzwili, “Kenyan Bishops to Confront Obama on Gay Issues” The Tablet, July 23, 2015, https://www.thetablet.co.uk/news/2282/ken yan-bishops-to-confront-obama-on-gay-issues-. 53. Pope Francis II, Amoris Laetitia, 2015, https://www.vatican.va/con tent/dam/francesco/pdf/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-france sco_esortazione-ap_20160319_amoris-laetitia_en.pdf. 54. David Kingsley, “Ida Odinga Calls For the Abolishment of Some Churches,” January 30, 2022, https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/72703ida-odinga-calls-abolishment-these-churches. 55. Kenyanewsalert, “You Cannot Close Our Small Churches”: Fearless Pastor Attacks Mama Ida Odinga for Her Remarks,” https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=sygTNX1Vimk. 56. Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, Report, Vol. 5, Technical Appendices, 2003. https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/ KERE-428.pdf. 57. Media Association of Kenya and Conrad Adeneur Foundation, History of Constitution Making in Kenya, 2012, https://www.kas.de/c/document_ library/get_file?uuid=4990bd18-d7e5-3606-f173-6d0418ec8d27&gro upId=252038. 58. Media Association of Kenya and Conrad Adeneur Foundation, History of Constitution Making in Kenya. 59. ICJ Kenya, “Kenya Tuitakayo People’s Charter; End Impunity Now,” 1992. 60. Mati Jacob, “The Ufungamano Initiative,” in Mati Jacob, Political Protest in Contemporary Kenya (New York: Routledge, 2020), 56–76. 61. Jacob, “The Ufungamano Initiative.” 62. Jacob, “The Ufungamano Initiative.” 63. Media Association of Kenya and Konrad Adenaeur Foundation, History of Constitution Making in Kenya (Nairobi, 2012), http://www.kas.de/ kenia/en/publications/32994/. 64. Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review, COE Final Report, https://katibaculturalrights.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/coe_ 2010, final_report-2.pdf.

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65. Media Association of Kenya and Konrad Adenaeur Foundation, History of Constitution Making in Kenya. 66. Westen K. Shilaho “Kenyans Should Reject the Latest Round of Proposed Constitutional Changes,” Quartz, December 7, 2020, https://qz.com/ africa/1942653/kenyans-should-reject-uhuru-railas-bbi-build-bridges-ini tiative/. 67. Mercy Maina, “Referendum, Succession Politics Need to Be Separated, Kenya Christian Leaders Urge,” ACIAfrica, December 11, 2020, https://www.aciafrica.org/news/2496/referendum-succession-pol itics-need-to-be-separated-kenyas-christian-leaders-urge. 68. Cf. 11, 12, and 13. 69. Cf. 46. 70. Cf. 11. 71. Cf. 12. 72. Cf. 11 and 46. 73. Cf. 11 and 46. 74. Cf. 11 and 46. 75. Cf. 11, 13, and 46. 76. Koinonia Community, “Projects and Activities for Street Children in Nairobi,” https://koinoniacommunity.org/street-activities-in-nairobi/. 77. Prisons Catholic Chaplaincy and KARDS, Challenges and Opportunities of Rehabilitation of Prisoners and Reintegration of Those Finishing Their Sentences (Nairobi: Karosip Printers, 2006). 78. Cf. 11 and 46. 79. Matthew 6:3.

CHAPTER 7

From Prominence to Derision? Chile’s Religious Actors Confront a Turning Point in Their Social Welfare Roles Matthew E. Carnes and Raimundo Salas Schweikart

Few countries in Latin America have seen religious actors retain social and political dominance for as long as Chile. Throughout the twentieth century, the Roman Catholic Church—through its leadership, grassroots organizing, and important educational and media institutions—exercised influence on public life and practice on a daily, nearly society-wide basis. On a symbolic level, Chile stood out within the region for its striking legal prohibition on divorce until 2004, and it retained near-absolute prohibitions on abortion until 2018. Beyond this influence on social legislation, the Catholic Church played a protagonistic role in the provision of social welfare. Rooted in Chile’s colonial history and expanded during the social ferment of the middle of

M. E. Carnes (B) · R. S. Schweikart Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Glatzer et al. (eds.), Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31960-0_7

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the twentieth century following the Second World War, and further fortified by the retreat of the state’s social role under the rule of Augusto Pinochet, the church created and operated a vast network of local and national social service agencies. Ranging from food provision and outreach to the aged and the ill and those experiencing homelessness, and from training and retraining programs for migrants and the unemployed, these institutions in many cases rivaled or supplanted those of the state. Notably, some similar efforts were carried out by Protestant and Evangelical churches, as well as by nonreligious organizations, especially later in the twentieth century, yet none had the focal, agenda-shaping role that the Catholic Church enjoyed. This chapter examines the trajectory of religion’s role in the development of Chile’s social welfare ethos and apparatus, and it points to the challenges that those same religious actors—especially the Catholic Church—are now facing in light of abuse scandals and the rapid secularization of Chile’s population. The chapter proceeds as follows. After a brief overview of Chile in comparative perspective, it situates the overall history of church–state relations in Chile, concentrating on the second half of the twentieth century and the period during and following the military government of Augusto Pinochet. Next, it highlights the development of a range of social services designed and operated by the Catholic church or its associated religious orders and lay organizations. To give further detail to this role, it provides a profile of the remarkably extensive Hogar de Cristo network of services, which has touched the lives of nearly every Chilean with its direct services or through its volunteering and contribution programs. Finally, it details the remarkably rapid process of change in religious practice that has occurred in the early twenty-first century, driven by scandals of abusive behavior and leadership and by evolving attitudes on social issues. For much of Chilean history, and especially over the second half of the twentieth century, to speak of social welfare and the provision of social services in Chile without the Catholic Church would have been unthinkable. The church was the unquestioned leader, coupling moral authority with professionalized services. Especially given the market-driven logic of the reforms under Pinochet, the state had ceded nearly all space to the private sector and nongovernmental organizations, first and foremost the Catholic Church. Yet after just two decades, it now seems likely that due to skepticism about the church, as well as political reforms in

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response to the shortcomings of the 1980 constitution and its accompanying economic model, a new moment and approach may be emerging. If it does, it will involve a profound reorientation of the country’s approach to social welfare, with the state assuming roles the church had long occupied and advocated. It is an open question whether the state, and an increasingly diverse and restive population, is up to the challenge.

Chile in Comparative Perspective Among Latin American countries, Chile has long stood out from the pack on a variety of dimensions, and this is especially true of its religious marketplace, its vision of the state, and its economic performance and social policy provision. To put it simply, Catholicism held a more dominant position for a longer period of time in Chile than in almost any other country in the region. Similarly, in the 1980s and beyond, Chile was the earliest adopter and the most extensive proponent of neoliberal reforms and free market approaches to capitalism, adopted first under the Pinochet government and continued in nearly unaltered form following the return to democracy.1 This entailed a notable withdrawal of the state from the field of social policy provision. As we will see below, the Catholic Church, as well as other actors, came to fill some of the gaps. First, throughout most of its postcolonial history, Chile was marked by very high levels of affiliation with the Catholic Church. Even as late as the beginning of the 2000s, 65% of the population identified as members of the Catholic church, and 15% identified as Evangelicals and Protestants. Given this social dominance, the Catholic Church played an outsized role in shaping policy and political development. Indeed, the Catholic Church ran one of the most important television stations until the close of the twentieth century, and the voice of bishops set the tone on issues that had long been liberalized elsewhere in the world, such as divorce and abortion. Yet, detailed in the final section of this essay, notable changes have taken place in this religious landscape since the turn of the twenty-first century. In particular, following on the heels of highly publicized sexual abuse scandals, religious affiliation in every Christian church (Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Evangelical) underwent a significant decline. Even if the Protestant and Evangelical churches did not have as many notorious cases of sexual abuse as the Catholic Church, they were not spared from the scandal and decrease in their faithful.2 Therefore, as we

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Fig. 7.1 Changes in religious affiliation in Chile, 1995–2020 (Source Latinobarómetro)

can see in Fig. 7.1, the numbers of every Christian church show striking declines. More significantly, in the last decade, a significant number of young people have grown up without a connection to any church. Thus, a third or more of the population now counts itself as atheistic or agnostic. Figure 7.1 shows that unaffiliated persons almost doubled in a decade. In 2010 they comprised 18%; by 2020 they reached 35%. Scholars have characterized this process as an “erosion” of Catholic membership by age and education. On the one hand, there is a diminished experience of faith in the younger generations, and, on the other hand, there is a migration of membership among some lower income individuals as they have moved to evangelical churches.3 Nevertheless, unlike other countries in the region, where Catholicism has ceded its dominance to evangelicalism, in Chile the transition has been toward secularism, and in some cases suspicion or hostility toward the Catholic church (and religions in general).4 At the level of policy, the Chilean state has diminished the privileged treatment it historically accorded the Catholic Church, adopting policies of non-interference of other religious organizations and the partial incorporation of churches other than the Catholic Church in the State (for example, in the presence of evangelical chaplaincies). But still, there is a lack of guarantees of equal preference concerning the Catholic Church with other Christian creeds, and thus Chile is still somewhat far from the secularism of a country such as France.5 Figure 7.2 shows the new balance of religious membership. It is a far cry from that which predominated prior to 2000, and especially 2010.

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Indeed, based on its surveys of Chileans, Latinobarómetro characterized this trend as a “collapse of religions,” noting that the country now stands as the “most agnostic in all Latin America,” even surpassing Uruguay, which was traditionally the most secular society in the region.6 Given the rapid change, observers from the year 1990 would have considered it unthinkable, and young observers are sometimes challenged to understand that their religious affiliation could have ever looked the way it did when their parents grew up. If Chile stood out for its long-dominant Catholicism, it also stood out within Latin America for its long legacy of, and then abrupt departure from, democracy. Chile was distinguished by a long history of regular democratic elections and peaceful transfers of power from the 1940s to the 1970s. While regional peers saw repeated military interventions in governance, Chile resisted the trend until 1973, when General Augusto Pinochet led a military coup against President Salvador Allende. The ensuing dictatorship had a profound and lasting impact, drafting and passing a constitution that would eventually open a path to the return to democracy and to a persistent balance of power between political actors on the right and the left.

Fig. 7.2 Religious affiliation in Chile, 2020 (Source Latinobarómetro)

6% 8%

51% 35%

Catholic

No Religion

Evangelical

Other

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Indeed, post-Pinochet Chile exhibited one of the strongest commitments to democracy in the region, with institutions and a culture that eschewed outright political battles and radical reforms. International appraisals regularly rated Chile’s democracy as among the strongest and most robust in the hemisphere. For example, Freedom House reports that since 1990, Chile has stood out for its “stable democracy” and “significant expansion of political rights and civil liberties.”7 Over that period, elected leaders from the coalition on the center-Left (the Concertación) governed with significant moderation and eventually ceded power to a center-Right government in the last decade; alternation has been the norm since. Notably, though, this balance has been challenged by protests in the 2010s, with greater dissatisfaction growing, and in 2020 the population voted to open a process to develop and write a new constitution; this is discussed at greater length at the conclusion of this essay. Much as the significant agreement on democracy and on moderation in governance set Chile apart, so too did the economic model imposed during the Pinochet years stand out for its thorough embrace of neoliberal, market-driven mechanisms. The state ceded significant functions to the private sector, largely dismantling its system of social pensions in favor of private savings accounts for retirement; likewise, health care provision and insurance, and increasingly education and public utilities and infrastructure, were liberalized and placed in private hands. These reforms corresponded with a period of significant economic growth, often heralded as the “Chilean miracle.” Other countries sought to follow the nation’s lead, but none undertook such significant reforms or saw such an inflow of investment. The result has been a Chile that stands out for its economic success in terms of growth, but that has also been marked by persistent and growing inequalities of income and wealth among its citizens. Indeed, even as GDP per capita rose to some of the highest levels in Latin America, so too did the Gini index (which measures income inequality) rise to near the highest levels. This can be seen clearly in Chile’s rankings on economic indicators. In 2019, Chile’s Human Development Indicator value was 0.851, “positioning it at number 43 out of 189 countries and territories.”8 In that same year, the majority of Chile’s population had received secondary education, with educated women consisting of 77.8% of the population and men consisting of 81.1% of the population. This education rate is significantly higher than in many other Latin American countries, and likewise, the mean years of school for Chileans is notably

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high, at 10.5 years for women and 10.7 years for men. Life expectancy for Chileans in 2019 was collectively 80.2 years, surpassing what the Human Development Indicator labels as a very high life expectancy. The maternal morality ratio remains low as well, at 13.0 deaths per 100,000 live births. Nevertheless, its high levels of inequality make it fall in the Human Development Index rankings that factor in inequality, and this remains an ongoing challenge for the country. Given the impact of the economic reforms of the 1980s, the state has played a more limited role in the provision of social welfare in Chile. Dávila León characterizes the role of the state from 1973 until 1989—during Pinochet’s regime—as “subsidiary.”9 The Chilean state ceded leadership to the market, narrowly focused its policies to assist only the most vulnerable populations, and privatized many social services such as health and education. Its commitment to the aged was radically reduced when pensions were privatized, and its administration of the main health institutions was greatly attenuated. A system of private entities that complemented public offerings filled in these gaps—including private hospitals, insurance firms, and schools—and in many cases largely crowded out the public institutions. In the literature on welfare states, Chile is often characterized as the most significant embodiment of a “liberal” (in the classical sense of economics) case in Latin America, similar in some respects to the United States but surpassing its neighbor to the north in terms of its outright privatizations of several of the most important social policy institutions. Indeed, early in the George W. Bush administration, a proposal was made to privatize the United States Social Security pension system, with Chile held out as an example; ultimately, the proposal was abandoned as not viable given the widespread support for Social Security as an acquired right in the United States. Churches and nongovernmental organizations, with their longestablished social networks and institutions, filled some of the gaps left by the state’s withdrawal and its limited capacity. They increased the size and number of their programs. But in the new, liberalized economy, they were frequently edged out by the private, and in many cases for-profit, providers. By the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, then, religious-provided social welfare occupied an important, but diminishing, space. Forces both internal, such as religious conservatism and clergy abuse scandals, and external, including the rise in secularization and

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the embrace of individual, market-driven approaches, left the churches’ ongoing role in question. The following sections of this chapter trace out the arc of the religious role in social welfare provision in Chile. Throughout, particular attention is paid to the Catholic Church, given its dominant position in Chile, and illustrative examples are provided from the Hogar de Cristo network, one of the most expansive and important social service providers in the nation. The Development of Faith-Based Social Welfare Provision in Chile From the colonial period forward, the Catholic Church played an outsized role in Chilean life and politics. With its significant ties to the elite, its extensive network of local parishes, and its strong moral hold on people through weekly religious observances, the church shaped the development of the social welfare system both directly through its own institutions and approaches and indirectly through the influence of its ideas. It is striking that when Chile first began to develop its modern social welfare system in the first decades of the twentieth century, this was understood as a response to the “social question,” or the responsibility for society to live up to a moral ideal of care for workers and families undergoing change and displacement due to urbanization and industrialization. In fact, leaders regularly referred to Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical, Rerum Novarum, which spoke of the social question and the needs of modern laborers, in formulating their stances. Concerned about the spread of disease and destitution in worker settlements in growing cities, they saw an important role for the state in assuring adequate sanitation and health care. In addition, they developed solidaristic social security systems for pensions and health care, largely on the basis of employment groups, that mirrored earlier, religious- and union-based models.10 Thus, the motivation and structure of early social welfare in Chile had connections to religious ideas and institutions, and the dominant position of the Catholic Church further ratified these approaches. During the period from the 1920s to roughly the 1960s, the social safety net developed by the state served a significant portion of the formal workforce (those whose jobs had regular contracts and were registered with the state, and thus who were contributors through payroll taxes to the social security system). Nevertheless, wide swaths of the population did not have such formalized employment, and they thus “slipped

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through the cracks,” so to speak. Faith-based organizations, motivated by a sense of charity and solidarity, created their own institutions at the local level to help their congregants and others. These were quite extensive in many cases, including old-age homes, schools, and medical clinics and hospitals. By the middle of the twentieth century, a religious (primarily Catholic) social welfare infrastructure coexisted alongside the more extensive state structures, together comprising the backbone of aid and assistance in the territory. Given the Catholic Church’s conservative nature and close connection to powerful economic and political interests, many Catholic leaders were skeptical of, and opposed to, the liberalization process that occurred in the 1960s and culminated in the election of socialist President Salvador Allende in 1970. When Augusto Pinochet seized power, deposing Allende, members of the church hierarchy saw renewed possibilities for promoting conservative social ideas. At the same time, many bishops and grassroots Catholics were horrified by the brutality of the regime.11 Collectively, they organized some of the most important resistance to the Pinochet regime,12 using religious structures and services as venues for sharing information, documenting human rights abuses, and educating citizens. Figures such as Santiago Archbishop Raúl Silva Henríquez and organizations such as the Vicaría de la Solidaridad, established in collaboration with other religious groups, made the church—and religion more broadly—arguably the most respected actor in Chilean society.13 At the same time, the economic restructuring carried out by the Pinochet regime opened up further space (or, as many saw it, need) for church-led social services. Led by economists trained at the University of Chicago under Milton Friedman, market-driven reforms were imposed throughout the economy, and the state radically reduced its involvement in the provision of social welfare to the population. Most strikingly, the pension system was privatized, leaving private citizens responsible for personally saving sufficient funds for their retirements during their earning careers. Similarly, a system of private health insurance and clinics was introduced, attracting investment from wealthier Chileans while leaving public health care underfunded and in short supply. The education sector also saw new openings for independent schools and a withdrawal of support for public schooling. As the reforms took hold, a series of recessions saw large numbers of Chileans lose their jobs and livelihoods, and it was into this breach that religious-based organizations often stepped. Building on their existing networks of local parishes, priests, bishops, and

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lay leaders, they developed new programs for the elderly, the ill, the unemployed, and the underserved rural and informal populations. While these were designed as charitable assistance, rather than substitutes for the state, they often took on a lasting character. One iconic program that illustrates the relationship between the role of religious actors in Chilean social welfare is the Hogar de Cristo (The Home, or Hearth, of Christ, a name meant to evoke welcome and personal care). Founded by Father Alberto Hurtado in 1944, it reflected his Gospel-inspired vision. He explained it this way: Christ wanders through our streets in the person of so many poor, suffering, sick, evicted from their miserable tenement house. Christ, huddled under the bridges, in the person of so many children who have no one to call father, who for many years lacked the kiss of mother on his forehead… Christ is homeless! Do not we want to give it to him, those of us who have the happiness to have a comfortable home, abundant food, means to educate and ensure the future of the children?14

This vision attracted large numbers of the Catholic faithful as volunteers, collaborators, donors, and leaders who wanted to serve populations in need across the Chilean territory. Initially, Hogar’s services focused on orphan children, but they quickly came to embrace populations experiencing homelessness, drug addiction, and mental illness; workers in need of training or retraining; older Chileans without family or financial resources for their care; and numerous other groups. The organization received further prominence when its founder was canonized by the Catholic Church in 2005, the second Chilean saint, to wide popular approval and acclaim. By 2000, the network had become so extensive and well-known in Chile that large numbers of Chileans volunteered to work in its services or received its benefits. Even in the midst of the global pandemic in 2020, over two thousand persons participated as volunteers in Hogar de Cristo and collaborated with paid workers to serve over twenty thousand persons.15 What makes Hogar de Cristo emblematic of Chilean religious-based social welfare provision is its attention to local circumstances and its reliance on the efforts of private volunteers and donors for much of service provision. A limited number of professionals oversee operations— many of whom have historically come from the ranks of clergy or religious

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orders of men and women—which keeps costs low and makes operations easily replicable or adaptable in various settings. At the same time, the organization foregrounds its religious identity in its name and setting, as many of its efforts are found in parishes or have prayer spaces associated with them. This makes them a natural focal point in the community and historically has given both volunteers and those seeking support great confidence in the organization. Hogar de Cristo thus embodies the charity-motivated, fill-in-the-gaps approach central to Catholic social services in Chile. In no way does it aim to supplant the state by design, but its efforts frequently step in where the state does not offer adequate resources. Indeed, its social importance only grew during the period of neoliberal restructuring undertaken by Augusto Pinochet, and it regularly redoubled its efforts in times of dislocation or crisis, such as following the financial crises of the early twenty-first century as well as following the 2015 earthquake. However, as will be documented below, revelations of sexual abuse perpetrated by its longtime director, Fr. Renato Poblete, have left the institution reeling. In this way, too, it is emblematic of the larger Chilean Catholic Church, which saw an earlier wave of revelations of clerical abuse call its moral standing into question. The Objectives of Faith-Based Social Welfare Efforts Religious actors in Chile have sought to achieve multiple goals in their social welfare and political activities. The Catholic Church and other Christian denominations have seen the provision of social assistance as an essential part of their religious identity, part of a gospel-motivated responsibility to care for the needs of their fellow human beings in moments of difficulty or crisis. At the same time, welfare programs have also served as a kind of benefit of membership within a religious community; whether by design or simply by virtue of closer relationship, members of parishes or church groups often were the first to be served or to have programs designed for them. Finally, as Anthony Gill has forcefully argued, a kind of “market competition” among local churches of different denominations may have led some to expand their social welfare offerings in an effort to gain members.16 In the case of the Catholic Church, early efforts were articulated as an effort of shared solidarity among members of the church and with the larger Chilean society. Fundraising campaigns in religious seasons such as

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Lent sought to raise consciousness of the needs of church members across the Chilean territory, with wealthier members and parishes supporting poorer ones. Likewise, it built out its network of programs for the aged, families, orphan children, migrants, and those experiencing homelessness. In many cases, these institutions incorporated an element of formal or informal proselytization, invoking religious texts, themes, or prayers, and incorporating these into their publications, decorations, and daily practices. In nearly all cases, explicit church membership or conversion was not required, but no effort was made to minimize the religious identity of the providers. For the most part, social welfare institutions did not function as key locales for promoting the political or social views of the churches they represented. As noted above, during the period up to the 1970s, Chile’s social welfare system provided state-led, sector-based coverage for workers in the principal industries, ranging from white-collar to blue-collar. Rural workers and their families, though, and small-scale and self-employed producers, were largely left out of these measures, and religioussponsored assistance was particularly important to them. The churches were able to capitalize on their deep network to elicit and mobilize resources, largely drawn from inside Chilean society. Unlike elsewhere in Latin America, where foreign finance was particularly important to local church welfare programming, Chile’s was mostly locally funded, and this only increased as Chile’s economy grew, and it eventually entered the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2010. Again, Hogar de Cristo helps illuminate these trends in faith-based social provision. Before the foundation of the Hogar, its founder, Father Hurtado, published in local newspapers about the necessity of an institution “for those who do not have a roof (i.e., a house).”17 Drawing from personal experience, Hurtado argued that seeing poor people suffer the lack of proper housing had spiritually moved him to consider a more meaningful involvement in the church.18 It is worth noting that this type of institution was not a complete novelty. In fact, Catholic Action, in which Father Hurtado served as National Chaplain, ran a shelter named the Home of All (“Hogar de Todos”). Therefore, Hogar de Cristo did not constitute an original solution, but instead created a more permanent and formal institution since “Hogar de Todos” was open only for a few months each year. More importantly, Hogar de Cristo also differed in its goal: to provide transitional assistance that would provide the skills and

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empowerment to those in need to move beyond its services: “It would not be a permanent home for them, but the work would be transitory: lodging the pilgrim that Our Lord speaks of.”19 Though founded initially to help those experiencing homelessness, Hogar de Cristo quickly expanded to other areas of need. Four years after the founding of Hogar, Father Hurtado sought to provide outreach to the elderly and abandoned children, as well as promote long-term housing stability and education for families.20 Likewise, the scope of Hogar quickly expanded to different regions of Chile. As early as 1957, subsidiaries of Hogar de Cristo were founded in Antofagasta, a city in the north of Chile, more than 1,300 km away from Santiago, and Los Angeles, a city in central Chile more than 500 km away from Santiago.21 Currently, Hogar de Cristo has offices in all regions of Chile and runs more than 270 programs that serve some 32,000 people.22 The relationship between the Hogar de Cristo and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church dates to its origin. Once Father Hurtado received the intuition to create the “Home,” he contacted the Bishop of Santiago, José María Caro, to obtain the “approval” of his work. The bishop provided immediate support and encouragement, even coming to the laying of the foundation for Hogar’s first building.23 Subsequently, the relationship between the Hogar de Cristo and the Church of Chile continued to develop. This relationship continued its journey through the role of chaplains at Hogar de Cristo, who were named, and continue to be named, by the Society of Jesus. In this way, the ecclesial relationship continues through the bond between Hogar de Cristo and the Society of Jesus. In addition to the relationship between the Hogar de Cristo and the church given through its chaplains, this institution also relies on other religious congregations.24 The Congregation of Merciful Love was the first female congregation that was linked to Hogar de Cristo, offering educational support to boys and girls. Subsequently, different works with different charisms have found a place in the Hogar de Cristo through different links with the Home (chaplaincy, direction of homes for minors, medical care, etc.). Governance of Hogar de Cristo, and its financing, is notable for its dependence on laypersons as leaders, volunteers, and donors. Its “Superior Council” has delegated management to lay people from the beginning, a practice that was not common in the religious institutions of the time, with oversight from the Society of Jesus.25 Indeed, Hogar de Cristo was born from private donations, and this practice continues

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to this day. Thus, according to the Annual Memory of 2020, 52% of its income comes from private donations from partners. The same document states that other sources of income correspond to the state of Chile, which collaborates with 38% of the budget—an important sign of the way the state relies on religious service provision and privileges the Catholic Church—and 9% from its own sources. Over time, the trend of state contributions has increased. In 1991, official documents from the “Hogar” reported that the state contribution corresponded to 8% of Hogar’s income. Similar documents from 2008 to 2020 show that this amount rose to range between 30 and 38%. Clearly, despite—or perhaps because of—the reliance on market mechanisms for health and welfare, the state looks to religious organizations to fill in the gap, and Hogar de Cristo plays a central and emblematic role. Strategies for Engaging the Public Square As noted above, religious actors—most especially the Catholic Church— have been central participants in Chile’s social and political life. Through intensive local engagement in parishes at the local level, and the divulgation of messages and guidance from the bishops, as well as an important network of radio and television stations, the Catholic viewpoint was nearly omnipresent for the majority of Chileans well into the early 2000s. This important role further expanded when the church spoke out against disappearances during the dictatorship, and when it established institutions such as the Vicaría de la Solidaridad. Likewise, its major public events, including the annual Te Deum at the closing of the calendar year, were considered mandatory events for political leaders of all stripes (including those who were not religious).26 Given its central place in society, the Catholic Church has been able to advance its social views with considerable reach. On the one hand, this has included progressive critiques of the dominant economic system, and especially the impact that model has had on the poor and marginalized; on the other, it has focused on conservative opposition to changing social mores and legislation. Notably, the country did not permit legal divorce until 2004—even though separation of married couples was common— and it did not permit legal abortion until 2018—again, despite significant numbers of clandestine abortions. Beyond these issues, many church leaders have opposed marriage equality legislation and other LGBTQ+ rights, expressing concern referred to as “gender ideology.”

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A major shift in the influence of the church occurred in the 2000s. This was driven, on the one hand, by rapidly changing public morality concerning issues of social and sexual ethics. The Christian view of gender complementarity, marriage for life, and limitations on contraception and abortion, seemed increasingly out-of-step with the views of growing swaths of the Chilean population. On the other hand, public revelations of egregious sexual abuse of youth and adults by members of the clergy undermined public respect for the church—again, most notably, the Catholic Church.27 This culminated in the unprecedented resignation of all the country’s Catholic bishops in 2018. Despite this collapse of support, the social welfare institutions of the churches were not the main vehicle for promoting religious social and political positions, and in fact, respect for the institutions persisted even after public opinion about the churches had begun its decline following the clergy abuse crisis. Citizens seemed to appreciate the results achieved, especially when these involved transfers or benefits they received directly, and they did not find the religious identity onerous or imposing. Nevertheless, some of these institutions also saw their own sexual abuse scandals, brought to light in the late 2010s, and the effects of those revelations are being felt into the 2020s. Hogar de Cristo once again illustrates this last trend. Father Renato Poblete Barth, who led Hogar de Cristo as its Chaplain from 1982 to 2000, and had been considered one of the foremost leaders in the country even well after his death in 2010, was accused and found responsible for several cases of abuse of adults and minors in 2019. The result was devastating for the Society of Jesus, the religious order to which Poblete belonged, and the larger Catholic Church. The impact of Father Poblete’s abuses on the Hogar was acute on people that worked with him or people that worked with some of the victims, who also participated in the Hogar. Nevertheless, a massive exodus of “socios” of the Hogar, with the economic and social effects that would entail, did not occur.28 But at the time of writing, the decline in public support for the church, and church membership, is continuing at a dramatic pace, as noted in Fig. 7.1. The Impact of Faith-Based Social Welfare Institutions in Chile It is hard to overstate the importance of faith-based social welfare in Chile. For nearly a century, institutions operated by Catholic and other religious bodies played a central role in the social policy landscape. Often,

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when Chileans consider issues such as aging, health care, homelessness, job displacement, drug addiction, and a host of other welfare challenges, they think first to turn to faith-based organizations. One indirect, and unintended, consequence of having such extensive social welfare institutions may have been to allow the state to scale back, or underprovide, such services. Indeed, the Pinochet reforms and withdrawal of the state from areas such as pensions and health care would have been much more difficult and would have resulted in far more suffering and protest if the churches had not offered such a range of services through their institutions. More recently, the lack of state support for immigrants, who flooded in from countries as diverse as Peru, Haiti, and Venezuela, was in some ways supplanted by faith-based alternative services. Although these were always conceived of as charity, meant to fill in the gaps, they effectively became essential to the equilibrium of inequality and vulnerability that persisted in modern Chile into the 2000s. In its spheres of influence, Hogar de Cristo had a far-reaching impact through its social service programs. In its earliest days, in 1952, it provided housing for nearly 180,000 Chileans and fed over 500,000 people.29 By the late 1980s, the number of programs rose and included attention to the elderly, adults, families, and children; and it covered programs that involved drug addiction, housing (from emergency housing to permanent house solutions), health care, and assistance for disabled persons, among others. The total number of people that received some form of attention in 1988 was over 2.5 million.30 With numbers this large, nearly every Chilean had some contact, either direct or indirect, with the Hogar de Cristo network. The impact of Hogar de Cristo also extended to advocacy. Although Hogar adopted political neutrality during Pinochet’s regime, the recovery of democracy opened the door to a more active role in public policy advocacy, particularly regarding policies concerning key issues for Hogar, such as poverty, children, and elder care.31 Most recently, in the process of the Chilean effort to write a new constitution, Hogar organized “Territorial Circles” to synthesize the needs of the excluded population. Likewise, Hogar de Cristo has functioned as a complement to the state, adding resources and expertise where the state is absent or notably underprovided services. For example, given that the state provides medical care to the elderly through the “Plan AUGE” and FONASA, Hogar de

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Cristo provides programs that support recreation, psychological wellbeing, and shelter during the day. Indeed, Hogar de Cristo volunteers and professional workers take care of needs not covered by the state. In this way, the influence of religious actors, and the social services they provide, has extended beyond direct benefits. The vision they embody— of social awareness and a commitment to promoting lives of dignity for all Chileans—has shaped the mindset of citizens across the religious and social spectrum. Religiously grounded ideas of the dignity of the human person, of the responsibility to care for one’s neighbor, and an understanding of the “common good” permeated Chilean society far beyond religious circles. Likewise, the discourse of human rights and the legitimate role of the state in ensuring welfare received support from important religious actors, both within the Catholic and Protestant churches and in the installations of organizations like Hogar de Cristo. It is perhaps no surprise then, that young people in the crucial new social mobilization of 2014–2019, despite their diminished personal experience of faith and church membership, spoke the language of rights and the common good. They held the state responsible for an abdication of its role as a provider and argued that the market-driven model had not adequately provided for the public welfare in education and health care. Their calls for change may not have used Christian terminology, but the social concepts they drew on loudly echoed the longstanding centrality of the churches as mechanisms for social welfare. Even amid the decline of the religious affiliation that initially gave rise to them, they provided a worldview that could create a more inclusive, more generous Chilean state that would seek to serve all members of society. The Evolution of Public Perception of Faith-Based Institutions Observing Chile in the early 2020s means seeing a country in the midst of a massive realignment of both religious belief and practice and the role of the state, and more broadly of the nature and functioning of democracy. Latinobarómetro, through its regular public opinion survey, characterizes Chile as having undergone a “collapse of religions.” Affiliation is falling rapidly, especially among the young, and it shows no signs of recovery. Notably, this is not true simply for the Catholic Church, which had such prominence in the country and has suffered the worst revelations of abuse in its ranks, but for Protestant and Evangelical churches as well. Skepticism dominates about religion and religious institutions.

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The social welfare institutions of the churches had added to their credibility in prior years and retained public support even when the churches themselves had taken unpopular social stances. But that these institutions have now shown failings similar to those of the churches, and that this has happened through the most identifiably religious members of the institutions, leaves open the question of whether and how confidence might ever be restored. Finally, it is worth noting that the last two decades have seen a renewed interest in, and respect for, Chile’s indigenous populations and their beliefs. The Mapuche are the largest such indigenous groups, comprising about 80% of the indigenous population.32 A growing awareness of the ways these populations—especially the Mapuche—have been marginalized in Chilean society, and the role played by the Catholic Church and Christianity in that process, has also expanded in the last two decades. While this has not resulted in growing numbers of Chileans identifying with indigenous religions, it has opened up even greater space for disaffiliation and critical distance from organized religion, especially those that flow from colonial power.

Conclusion As has been emphasized throughout this chapter, Chile stands out among Latin American nations on a number of dimensions, and in the early 2020s it is marked by an unprecedented process of change that may mark a fundamental reorientation of the roles of church and state in society. After a history in which the Catholic Church played a dominant role both as a social actor and social welfare provider, a new era seems to be dawning in which the Catholic Church’s influence may be radically diminished. Secularization and disillusionment from clergy abuse scandals, as well as a growing rejection of conservative social positions championed by the Catholic Church, have already resulted in a breathtakingly fast disaffiliation of Chileans from organized religion. This process is especially pronounced among the young, and it shows no sign of abating. At the same time, Chile’s understanding of democracy and the role of the state in the economy is undergoing a rapid transformation. The initial post-authoritarian decades were marked by a cautious, intentionally conservative consensus around neoliberal, market-driven solutions and an avoidance of social protest or change. However, the protests of the 2010s, culminating in the massive mobilizations of 2019, have produced

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a fundamental rethinking of the liberal economic model, and new calls for state intervention in the economy and direct state provision of social welfare have emerged. The 2020 referendum that affirmed the election of a constituent assembly and the drafting of a new constitution embodied this new consensus. Expectations among many in Chile are high for a more active approach to social welfare, following the model of the Nordic welfare states. While much remains in question, it seems increasingly likely that the new constitution will enshrine extensive rights to ensure welfare that simply would have been unthinkable in the constitution promulgated by Pinochet. What role will this leave for religious actors? On the one hand, they may take some comfort in the fact that many of the basic orientations they long espoused—about the dignity of the human person and the need to care for the poor—have become more widely accepted and adopted, even if this is done in a way divorced from religious belief. Likewise, they may see a flowering of volunteerism among youth and others concerned about their fellow Chileans. Religious institutions may see decreased funding and participation, both from the state and private actors, though, if taxes are increased to support public options. It may be that only the most difficult and challenging situations are left to religious actors, as the state and NGOs step in on the more tractable, attractive, or profitable sectors (such as health, education, and care for the aged). Perhaps more concerning will be the sustainability of solidaristic visions over the long term without a larger religious or cultural backdrop. Indeed, one of the chief functions of religious actors, and especially the Catholic Church, was the articulation of values that could unite across individuals, regions, occupations, and generations. With the increasing privatization of personal life, the distributive conflict among competing interests may undermine lasting commitments to a strong social safety net. Exit by those with resources, and competition among those with needs, may fray the social fabric rather than restore it. Chile finds itself on the cusp of a monumental reimagining and restructuring of its basic social contract. Historically, religion and religious-based actors have played a fundamental role in the inspiration and design of that contract, and they have filled in the gaps that remained. Now, though, Chile may abandon those foundational elements more quickly than nearly any other country in the region. Once again an outlier, its path lies open.

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Notes 1. Fernando Calderón G. and Manuel Castells, “The Crisis of the Catholic Church and the New Religiosity,” in The New Latin America (Cambridge; Medford, MA: Polity Press, 2020), 94–104. 2. S. Labrín and J. P. Sallaberry, “Los delitos sexuales que impactan a las iglesias evangélicas y protestantes,” La Tercera, January 27, 2019, https://www.latercera.com/nacional/noticia/los-delitos-sexualesimpactan-las-iglesias-evangelicas-protestantes/503184/. 3. Calderón G. and Castells, 97. 4. Corporación Latinobarómetro, “Informe Chile 2020.Pdf,” 2020, https://www.latinobarometro.org/latdocs/INFORME_LATINOBARO METRO_CHILE_1995_2020.pdf. 5. Cristóbal Bellolio, “Secularismo político en Chile a partir de los enfoques de Robert Audi y de Cecile Laborde,” Estudios Políticos (Medellín), no. 56 (September 15, 2019): 222–47. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea. espo.n56a10. 6. Latinobarómetro, 39. 7. Freedom House, Chile: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report, n.d., https://freedomhouse.org/country/chile/freedom-world/2021. 8. United Nations Development Program, “Chile. Human Development Reports,” 2021, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/cou ntry-notes/CHL.pdf. 9. Oscar Dávila León, “Estado y Políticas Sociales,” Última Década 9 (1998): 15. 10. Matthew E. Carnes, Continuity Despite Change: The Politics of Labor Regulation in Latin America (Stanford University Press, 2014), https:// doi.org/10.11126/stanford/9780804789431.001.0001. 11. Jeffrey L. Klaiber, Iglesia, Dictaduras y Democracia en América Latina (Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1997). 12. Anthony James Gill, Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press), 1998. 13. John Thiede and Matthew Carnes, “Filling the Gaps in Civil Society: The Role of the Catholic Church in Latin American Democratization,” Journal of Religion and Society, no. 20 (2018): 1–18. 14. Hogar de Cristo, “Memoria Anual 2017,” https://www.hogardecristo. cl/wp-content/files_mf/1532466232MEMORIA_DIGITAL_HC24_7_2 018OK.pdf. 15. Hogar de Cristo, “Memoria Anual 2020”. 16. Gill, Rendering unto Caesar. 17. Samuel Fernández, “Circunstancias de la fundación del Hogar de Cristo: Estudio histórico en los documentos contemporáneos,” Teología y vida 49, no. 4 (2008), https://doi.org/10.4067/S0049-34492008000300014.

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18. Fernández, “Circunstancias de la fundación del Hogar de Cristo.” 19. Fernández, “Circunstancias de la fundación del Hogar de Cristo.” 20. Alberto Hurtado Cruchaga, “¿Cómo nació el Hogar de Cristo?” Mensaje, 1995. 21. Hogar de Cristo, “Nuestra Historia,” Hogar de Cristo, n.d., https:// www.hogardecristo.cl/nuestra-historia/. 22. Hogar de Cristo, “Memorial Anual 2020”. 23. Fundación Alberto Hurtado, “Hogar de Cristo,” n.d., https://padrealbe rtohurtado.cl/hogar-de-cristo/. 24. “Congregaciones Religiosas y El Hogar,” Mensaje, October 1995. 25. Fernando Montes, “Una historia de conflictos,” Mensaje, October 1995. 26. President Michele Bachelet—who publicly presented herself as an atheist— provoked considerable consternation when she became the first president to not attend the Te Deum in 2018, after having attended in previous years of her presidency. That she would attend despite her atheism and her predecessors’ similar attendance even when facing rebuke from the pulpit, speaks of the centrality enjoyed by Christianity until the last few years. 27. The prominent case of Father Fernando Karadima, a well-known cleric to the elite, which became public in 2010, marked a particularly clear turning point in public support for the Catholic Church. 28. Catalina Batarce L., “La separación del Hogar de Cristo de la figura de Renato Poblete.” Pauta, August 1, 2019, https://www.pauta.cl/nac ional/medidas-actividades-hogar-de-cristo-tras-crisis-renato-poblete. 29. Hogar de Cristo, “Cuenta de Actividades 1952–1951,” 1952. 30. Hogar de Cristo, “Cuenta de Actividades,” 1988. 31. Javier Pereira, Ronald J. Angel, and Jacqueline L. Angel, “A Chilean Faith-Based NGO’s Social Service Mission in the Context of Neoliberal Reform,” in Bridging the Gaps: Faith-Based Organizations, Neoliberalism, and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, ed. Tara Hefferan, Julie Adkins, and Laurie A. Occhipinti (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), 151–64, 160. 32. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, “Síntesis de Resultados. Censo 2017,” 2018, http://www.censo2017.cl/descargas/home/sintesis-de-resultadoscenso2017.pdf.

CHAPTER 8

The Church of the Poor, Civil Society, and Democracy in Southern Mexico: Oaxaca, 1960s–2010s Juan Manuel Lombera

The progressive movement of the Catholic Church that flourished after the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) continues to exert a strong influence on Latin American politics and society. Moreover, we can now observe this movement’s influence in new areas: no longer apparent only in a strictly ecclesiastical sphere, its influence can also be felt within the ambit of civil society. This article analyzes and explains the evolution of “the church of the poor” in Oaxaca, Mexico, from its sponsorship by the Catholic hierarchy, starting in the early 1960s, through its transformation into civil society organizations beginning in the 1990s. The Catholic Church in Latin America is often depicted as a conservative force. This article sets out to calibrate that image by exploring the progressive sector of the church in Oaxaca, a region noted for its

J. M. Lombera (B) University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Glatzer et al. (eds.), Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31960-0_8

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economic poverty, cultural richness, and under-privileged but politically active population.1 The central idea is that this progressive sector in Oaxaca developed a set of concepts and practices that proved resilient over decades, despite the fact that initial ecclesiastical support was replaced by the Vatican’s explicit rejection. The church hierarchy, influenced by the Second Vatican Council and by the Second Conference of Latin American Bishops at Medellin, Colombia, played a key role in initiating and motivating social action from the 1960s through the 1980s. However, in the years that followed, it has been mainly lay people committed to the church who have kept alive the Christian-inspired objectives of social and political change put forward by the progressive sector of the church. An historical perspective thus allows students of this process to see how ideas that originated in an ecclesiastical ambit are disseminated and later exert their influence in politics and society through civil society organizations. This article follows the concepts of the Second Vatican Council in defining the Catholic Church as constituted by its lay and religious members as well as the church hierarchy. Vatican II emphasized the idea that the laity are an integral part of and an active participant in achieving the mission of the church, assigning as their main task to seek the transformation of the “temporal order”—that is, the unjust political, economic, and social conditions that prevail in the world—and inviting them to influence the decisions of the church.2 Recently Pope Francis I has expressed his position on the role of the laity: “We should not even think, therefore, that ‘thinking with the Church’ means only thinking with the hierarchy of the Church… [We must conceive of] the Church as the people of God, pastors and people together. The Church is the totality of God’s people.”3 The analysis presented in this chapter is relevant not only to Mexico but also to the rest of Latin America, where the church’s influence on civil society has contributed to advances in the greater political participation of citizens.4 Several studies have analyzed how the Catholic Church has contributed in Latin America to the formation of civil organizations dedicated to, among other activities, protecting human rights and the rights of minorities, forming peace-and-justice commissions to investigate crimes committed during military dictatorships, promoting democracy and development, and protecting the environment.5 In Oaxaca this transformation took place in a markedly indigenous context, which provides both a contrast to urban movements within the region, such as in

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Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and a basis for comparison with other indigenous movements, such as those in Chiapas, Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, Brazil, and Bolivia. The theoretical relevance of this study is to explain how certain ideas originating in the religious sphere are adopted in the sphere of civil society and eventually influence the processes of political and social change. The research that I conducted for this study consists of more than 70 interviews with local representatives of the Catholic Church, state government, civil society organizations, and indigenous and non-indigenous intellectuals and political analysts.6 I also carried out archival research and participant observation of indigenous communities and social movements.7 All of this was during intermittent visits to Oaxaca during the summers of 2006 to 2014. During my fieldwork, I visited indigenous and mestizo communities in the Oaxacan regions of the Central Valleys, Sierra Norte, and Isthmus, where I conducted several of my interviews and observations. Family ties in Oaxaca, a Jesuit education during the heyday of liberation theology, and extensive experience with business and government in Mexico: all facilitated my access to government officials, clergy, and other affiliates. Members of the four civil society organizations that I discuss in detail in this article, as representatives of several others, allowed me to participate in their board meetings and were kind enough to spend ample time answering my questions. The concepts discussed during the interviews and meetings shaped my understanding of the motivations and goals of the organizations under analysis. My intention has not been to evaluate or make a judgment on the effectiveness of the organizations nor to derive a general cause-effect relationship that explains their existence, but rather to convey their members’ motivations, their declared Christian inspiration for their work, and their effect on Oaxaca’s democratization. In what follows I analyze, first, the evolution of the progressive church’s mode of influence on politics and society in Mexico as a whole, from its sponsorship by the hierarchy starting in the 1960s to its advancement by civil society organizations in the mid-1990s and explain the factors that produced such transformation. Second, now at a regional level, I discuss the objectives, means, and strategies of the progressive church hierarchy in Oaxaca from the early period of the 1960s to its high point at the beginning of the 1990s. Third, in parallel to the role of the church, I introduce the political process known as the “politics of recognition” in Oaxaca from 1986 to 1998, during which the state formally recognized and legislated on the cultural diversity and rights of

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indigenous peoples. I propose this process as a contribution to democratization and discuss the influence of the Catholic Church on that endeavor. Fourth, I analyze a shift in orientation and goals of the church hierarchy toward a more conservative stance in the mid-1990s, and explain the emergence of civil society organizations made up of lay Catholics who differed from such approach.8 Fifth, I describe the change in the political context in the 1998–2010 period, when democratization took a step back, and the subsequent reaction by the church-inspired movements. Finally, I suggest some conclusions about the relevance of the movements that the progressive church has fostered over the five decades covered by this study.

Path Development Work on the relationship between progressive Catholicism and political development in Mexico is relatively sparse. Most authors writing on the church-state relationship in Mexico have underestimated the influence of certain aspects of religion on democratization. Owing to a long history of an oppressive and dominant Catholic Church in Mexico, sometimes in cooperation with the state and at other times in antagonism to it, for many authors the notion of the Catholic Church as an instrument of democratization is a contradiction in terms. Although since the 1930s there have been numerous progressive initiatives by bishops and lay movements, the conservative top hierarchy has most of the time managed to suppress them.9 Throughout the 1960s to 1980s some of the most visible progressive Mexican bishops who coexisted, often in tension, with the upper hierarchy were the bishops of the South Pacific Region, discussed later in this chapter, along with the Bishop of Cuernavaca, Sergio Méndez Arceo, and the three bishops of Chihuahua, Adalberto Almeida, Manuel Talamás, and José Llaguno. Méndez Arceo was known for his strong denunciation of social injustice at national and international levels, by which he earned the criticism of the Mexican government for interfering in politics and of the religious right and the principal business organizations for promoting socialism.10 The bishops of Chihuahua were outspoken critics of government corruption and electoral fraud, in particular during the 1986 gubernatorial election, in which they threatened to suspend all religious services as a form of denunciation of rigged electoral practices. A government–church hierarchy alliance prevented the suspension

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from taking place and the bishops of Chihuahua were marginalized.11 Although most of these progressive movements from the 1930s to date have failed to reach their ultimate goals, they have nevertheless challenged and acted as counterweights to the prevailing political and religious order. This paper aims to illustrate with the case of Oaxaca that, while being frequently at odds with the church’s hierarchy and the dominant political class, progressive Christian-inspired movements in Mexico have, over the long term, contributed to democratization by denouncing social injustices, demanding government accountability, and inspiring lay Catholics to follow a similar path. Around the mid-1990s, both at the national level and in the case of Oaxaca, there was a shift in the mode of influence of the progressive sector of the Catholic Church on politics and society, from an ecclesiastical to a civil society sphere. At least two key factors help explain this change. First, beginning in the 1980s, shortly after the election of John Paul II to the papacy, the church hierarchy definitively condemned the ideas of liberation theology, which it considered to be influenced by Marxism, and adopted a more conservative pastoral stance.12 Second, the process of democratization, which gathered strength in Mexico from the mid1990s, led to the development of civil society organizations headed by individuals with greater abilities, confidence, and relative autonomy to influence political change than previously. For example, at the national level, in 1994 Alianza Cívica (Civic Alliance), a consortium of about 400 civic groups independent of the state, was created to promote free and fair elections. Many of these civic groups were made up of Christian-inspired individuals and organizations.13 A second example is the electoral reform of 1996, which granted independence and autonomy to the Instituto Federal Electoral (Federal Electoral Institute, IFE), a body established to organize federal elections and composed of citizens presumably independent from the government and political parties.14 With regard to minority rights, particularly those of indigenous peoples, in 1990 during the administration of President Salinas de Gortari (1988–94), Mexico ratified Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization, and in 1994 amended Article IV of the Mexican Constitution, recognizing the country’s multi-ethnic character. This had important implications for Oaxaca, where governors Heladio Ramirez (1986–92) and Diódoro Carrasco (1992–98), both from the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI), promoted the “politics of recognition”: that is, the process of

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political reform directed toward recognizing in the state constitution the cultural diversity and rights of indigenous people. Many of the civil organizations that emerged during these years sought to promote these same indigenous rights and culture.15 The confluence of these two factors—the official church’s rejection of liberation theology and Mexico’s democratic opening—stimulated the development of civil society organizations as a new way for Christianinspired individuals to promote social change. In this way, from the mid-1990s, we can observe the influence of the church in Oaxaca more through these civil organizations and lay individuals than through the church hierarchy, which has relegated itself to a distinctly secondary role in the pursuit of social reform.16 In addition to the changes within the Catholic Church, substantial changes also occurred in the overall religious environment. Especially from the early 1970s on, the Protestant churches significantly increased their activity in Oaxaca, as in other parts of Latin America.17 Currently, although the Catholic Church is still the church of the majority, it has clearly lost the hegemonic position that it enjoyed in the region until only a few decades ago.18 See Figs. 8.1 and 8.2 for basic statistics on religious affiliation in Mexico over the years. The purpose of this study, however, is not to analyze the competition among churches, but to describe and explain the change in the Catholic Church’s mode of influence in the context of a society characterized by greater religious and political pluralism. In this study I focus on the tension between the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, which has generally been unable to respond to this newly plural environment, and some lay members of the church, who have adapted by separating from the hierarchy and forming Christian-inspired civil organizations. This is not a study of competition among institutions, but of the competition between two alternative visions within the Catholic Church, only one of which proposes a change in the social order.

Objectives, Means, and Strategies of the Catholic Church in Oaxaca: 1960s to 1980s In Oaxaca, a predominantly indigenous state, “the church of the poor” implies a large measure of support for indigenous peoples, since this sector contains the greatest number of the poor. From the 1960s, this notion led the church to set as its goal the promotion of an indigenous

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100 90 80

Percent

70

Catholic

60

No religion

50 40 30 20 10 0 1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

Fig. 8.1 Change in religious affiliation in Mexico, 1980–2020 Believers without religious affiliation, 2.4% No religion, 8.1%

Not stated, 0.4%

Protestant, 11.2%

Others, 0.2%

Catholic, 77.7%

Fig. 8.2 Religious affiliation in Mexico, 2020

theology and an indigenous ministry based on “enculturation,” that is, an understanding of indigenous culture as the point of departure for evangelization.19 The question comes up of whether a non-indigenous

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actor can truly understand an indigenous culture. My view is that while religious actors, like any other outsider, cannot achieve complete enculturation in an environment essentially alien to their own, neither do they necessarily impose their vision. Under favorable circumstances, indigenous people are free to accept or reject proposals, and ultimately be convinced, or not, of their benefits. Other observers suggest that, despite the risk of projecting a Eurocentric religious universality, many pastoral ministers are able to disassociate themselves from the patronizing position of the Catholic Church and engage in true intercultural dialogue.20 This approach based on enculturation also indicated the church’s support for the political causes of indigenous people, including the state’s recognition of their distinct culture and their right to conduct their own political, social, and legal practices within their communities. Two key events critical to the development of the indigenous ministry in Oaxaca were the creation of the Seminario Regional de Sureste (Regional Seminary of the Southeast, SERESURE), founded in 1969, and the Centro Diocesano de Pastoral Indígena de Oaxaca (Diocesan Center for Indigenous Ministry of Oaxaca, CEDIPIO), formed in 1972. Both of these organizations received support from two national church institutions: the Centro Nacional de Ayuda a las Misiones Indígenas (National Center for Aid to Indigenous Missions, CENAMI) and the Comisión Episcopal para los Indígenas (Bishops’ Commission for the Indigenous People, CEI).21 SERESURE recruited and trained parish priests to serve the predominantly indigenous dioceses of southeastern Mexico: Oaxaca, Tehuantepec, San Cristóbal de las Casas, and Tehuacán. In addition to the traditional academic training for the priesthood, SERESURE stressed the value of indigenous culture as a point of departure for the evangelization of the regions it served, and the training of seminarians through hands-on work in indigenous communities.22 In 1976 Bartolomé Carrasco (no relationship to Governor Carrasco) was named archbishop of Oaxaca and lent his unqualified support to the indigenous ministry.23 My perception, based on several interviews with diverse groups of people in Oaxaca, is that Archbishop Carrasco’s motivation to support the indigenous people sprang from a genuine interest in the welfare of the poor. I differ with the market-driven approach to religion, according to which the hierarchy of the Catholic Church supports indigenous movements as part of a calculated strategy to counter the growing penetration of the Protestant churches in the religious market.24

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One of Archbishop Carrasco’s main initiatives was to strengthen the position of CEDIPIO. Despite financial and technical difficulties and an initial skepticism on the part of those it was intended to support, the pastoral ministers of CEDIPIO established programs such as savings and coffee cooperatives, health centers based on natural medicine, and the production of various organic agricultural products; and they offered courses on subjects such as basic political analysis and popular religiosity. The pastoral ministers of CEDIPIO also organized forums in which issues such as indigenous rights and culture were discussed, obtaining the commitment of the participants to advocate for the recognition of those rights and a distinct indigenous culture. In this work, the pastoral ministers acted as catalysts in the genesis of these projects but strove to involve lay members of the communities, especially women, in their implementation. All these programs received the generic name “indigenous and social ministry.”25 Around 1980, Archbishop Carrasco appointed Father Manuel Arias to lead a group of young men and women whose goal was to inspire and encourage the indigenous poor of Oaxaca so that they themselves would define how to improve their socio-economic conditions and obtain greater political participation. This initiative was given the name Pastoral Juvenil (Youth Ministry). The first group of young people were trained in the critical method of liberation theology enculturated within the indigenous context. As part of their training, they attended lectures by renowned liberation theologians such as José Marins, Gustavo Gutiérrez, and Leonardo Boff. The members of the Pastoral Juvenil team made a personal and collective commitment, based on their Christian faith, to seek the transformation of society, adopting as their motto “juventud unida fuerza transformadora” (“united youth, transformative power”).26 The experiences of the indigenous, social, and youth ministries are significant in that they represent how the church in Oaxaca at that time conceived of its mission: to support the poor in the material and cultural necessities of daily life, which was considered by the pastoral ministers to be inseparable from spiritual life. These pastoral experiences of the laity became the seeds of several civil organizations formed in the 1990s. Archbishop Carrasco joined forces with the bishops of adjoining dioceses, including Arturo Lona of Tehuantepec and Samuel Ruiz of San Cristóbal de las Casas, to integrate the Región Pastoral Pacífico Sur (South Pacific Ministerial Region, RPS), which coordinated programs and shared resources to advance the indigenous ministry. In the Isthmus of

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Tehuantepec throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Bishop Arturo Lona decisively supported social movements seeking to undermine the prevailing system of a hegemonic political party dominated by the PRI and to defend the principles of political and social organization of indigenous groups. Under Bishop Lona’s leadership, the work of the catechists and the Base Ecclesial Communities (BECs) intensified. Base Ecclesial Communities are small lay-led communities, motivated by Christian faith, that see themselves as part of the church and that are committed to working together to improve their communities and to establish a more just society.27 The catechists emphasized the idea that “one should seek the Kingdom of God on earth,” trying to improve the living conditions of the people by, for example, creating coffee cooperatives and marketing firms to avoid monopolistic control of resources.28 One noteworthy coffee cooperative in the Isthmus, which served as a model for others in the state, is the Unión de Comunidades Indígenas de la Región del Istmo (Indigenous Communities’ Union of the Isthmus Region, UCIRI), formed in 1983 under the leadership of two priests: Franz Vanderhoff, a Dutch missionary of the Order of the Sacred Heart, and Roberto Raygoza, a diocesan priest. UCIRI’s plan seeks to be consistent with the values of its indigenous members in at least two ways: first, by promoting organic agriculture, which is considered less damaging to the land with which indigenous people claim to maintain a sacred relationship. Second, it proposed a cooperative scheme for production, marketing, and the provision of services, which was consistent with the communitarian way of decision-making, land ownership, and cooperation among community members.29 Such attitudes allowed indigenous people to take control of their own resources and alleviate, at least partially, the conditions of poverty and other deficiencies that afflicted them.30 The members of UCIRI assumed their responsibility in managing the cooperative. All decisions were made by the cooperative’s general assembly and the priests were only consulted on occasion.31 Another indigenous organization founded with the support of a religious actor in the late 1980s that followed a process similar to that of UCIRI was MICHIZA, an organic coffee cooperative whose members are distributed over various parts of the state.32 As in UCIRI, members of MICHIZA acknowledge the role of its founders and maintain a religious mystique that has motivated them since its initial stages.33 Church-led initiatives, such as the coffee cooperatives UCIRI and MICHIZA, contributed to democratization at a micro level in the sense

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that they “thickened” civil society: they formed independent associations that played a role in democratizing rural pockets of authoritarianism and acted as counterweights to agrarian bosses; they also developed internal democratic norms, such as reaching decisions by consensus, being willing to compromise, and respecting opposing viewpoints.34 The solid leadership of Archbishops Carrasco and Lona did not mean that all sectors of the Catholic Church in Oaxaca would accept their ideas and commitment to indigenous people and the poor, nor that the implementation of their initiatives would be free of conflict. These bishops and other progressive pastoral ministers of the Catholic Church encountered strong opposition from Catholic groups with different religiosities.35 Among these were Lefebvristas (followers of Marcel Lefebvre) who oppose the reforms of Vatican II; Modernizantes (Modernizers) who, while they accepted the Vatican II reforms, sought to purge indigenous people of the elements of popular piety regarded as fetishes; and neo-conservatives who, following the Vatican’s official line under the leadership of Pope John Paul II rejected the ideas of liberation theology, considering them to be of Marxist inspiration. Outside the Catholic Church, Bishops Carrasco and Lona faced the explosive growth of Protestant denominations, which tended to cause conflicts in indigenous communities.36 The frequent disputes in Oaxacan towns stemming from the struggle for control of natural and economic resources often involved the local priests and other religious actors, who sometimes had to respond without the archbishop’s formal approval. One long-term observer asserts that religion, as a central element of the worldview and culture of indigenous peoples, cannot be separated from any aspect of their political and social life, so that in these communities, religious conflicts easily become interwoven with matters of a socio-political nature and vice versa.37

Formal Recognition of Indigenous Rights and the Influence of the Catholic Church In the political and social spheres during the 1970s and 1980s, a large number of mobilizations, forums, and debates surrounding the issue of indigenous rights took place in Oaxaca, promoted by various civil organizations formed for the most part by indigenous people. In this, the organizations relied on the help of agents such as the Catholic Church, the local branch of the teachers’ union, and other outside organizations.38 Over time, these indigenous organizations grew and developed, absorbing

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a large number of campesinos, artisans, teachers, consumer cooperatives, women’s organizations, migrants, and other groups. Participants in the forums and debates articulated a set of demands related to indigenous rights. Although there was not always agreement on the meaning and regional scope of these rights, a recurring theme was that of autonomy, understood as the right of indigenous peoples to maintain their own forms of social and political organization within their communities, to decide on the use of their natural and financial resources, to have their own judicial systems, to use their own language, and to live according to their own culture.39 As a result of these forums, indigenous organizations developed proposals for a reform to the electoral code and the recognition of indigenous rights in the state constitution.40 The progressive sector of the Catholic Church played an important role in this process through public statements by the hierarchy, by promoting initiatives, such as CEDIPIO, which supported the recognition of indigenous culture, and by educating members of the new indigenous intellectual elite.41 Governors Heladio Ramírez, who governed from 1986 to 1992, and Diódoro Carrasco, in office from 1992 to 1998, clearly perceived the meaning of the statements emerging from multiple indigenous forums and the need to legitimize, in indigenous eyes, the actions of their respective governments. To that end, they proclaimed the “politics of recognition,” that is, the process of political reform directed toward formal recognition of the cultural diversity and rights of indigenous peoples.42 As the commemoration of the October 1992 quincentenary of the encounter of European and American civilizations approached, marches and demonstrations in support of indigenous rights intensified. The Zapatista uprising on January 1, 1994, unleashed further meetings and demonstrations that were supported by national and international organizations. The Zapatista movement had important repercussions in Oaxaca through the exchange of ideas and the participation of local intellectuals of diverse backgrounds in discussion groups in both states.43 In concert with SER, CEDIPIO sponsored a series of discussion forums supporting indigenous rights.44 The ideas and recommendations drawn from these forums were presented to the governor and the state congress and influenced the multicultural debate.45 The culmination of the struggle for multiculturalism by various indigenous groups in Oaxaca occurred between 1995 and 1998, with the passing of legislation in favor of indigenous rights. One of the most

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significant reforms was the modification of the electoral code, which recognized the use of indigenous customary law and excluded political parties in local elections in indigenous municipalities.46 Another series of reforms addressed education, health, agrarian conflicts, the judicial system, telecommunications, social policy, and municipal administration. Despite the great political strength of Governor Carrasco, who sponsored the multicultural reforms, adopting them entailed fierce debate among different political actors: political parties, the state congress, the federal government, indigenous groups, and other civil organizations.47 The Oaxacan Catholic Church, although not the most important factor to account for the enactment of the multicultural reforms, nevertheless exerted a fundamental influence that undergirded the initiatives the indigenous people and their organizations had taken in their favor. This influence was exercised on three levels: in the church hierarchy’s political position in favor of the reforms; in its solidarity with the indigenous movement; and in the training and socialization of indigenous leaders.48 In addition to the support of leading figures in the church hierarchy, the church participated indirectly in the multicultural reforms through the influence it had exerted during the previous three decades upon a number of indigenous organizations and individuals. Organizations such as SER and its leaders Floriberto Díaz and Adelfo Regino had received the support and influence of CENAMI, CEDIPIO, and a group of Salesian priests when this organization had been created in the 1980s.49 The various initiatives of indigenous groups and of the civil society organizations that supported the multicultural reforms were deeply rooted in the sense of ethnic pride, human dignity, and organizational capacity that the members of the progressive sector of the Catholic Church fostered among indigenous people. This view of the church’s influence is again confirmed by Governor Carrasco. The governor makes clear, however, that the church hierarchy’s support of constitutional reforms was indirect rather than institutional. Representatives of the state never formally negotiated the reforms with representatives of the church hierarchy, although they held informal meetings with several of the bishops, recognized their leadership among the indigenous people, and identified areas of mutual agreement.50 By the 2020s, after some 25 years of legislation on this issue in Oaxaca, multicultural reforms have produced mixed results: in some municipalities, the legislation has encouraged the establishment of a more open community and an attenuation of corporatist practices associated with the

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PRI. In others, these reforms have allowed members of dominant groups or strongmen (caciques) to consolidate their hegemony and exclude political adversaries, protected by relative electoral autonomy. Over this period, out of 417 municipalities that elect their officials through indigenous customary law, approximately 350 have managed to avoid electoral conflicts. In the remaining group, conflicts have been associated with issues such as the mechanisms for the resolution of disputes in local elections, the role of women in the political ambit of the community, the allocation of resources, land tenure, and religious intolerance, all of which have an impact on who is elected for office.51 In recent years, progress has been made, although still insufficient, to produce legislation and practices that address these issues.52 This mixed record of success of multicultural reforms reflects the complex web of power relations within the communities in which indigenous customary law is deeply embedded. There is widespread debate over the costs and benefits of multiculturalism. My position is that, despite the many problems in its implementation, multicultural reforms in Oaxaca have expanded indigenous people’s political options and advanced the conception of political change as a process arising from within the community and not as an imposition by external agents, confronting up to a point the paternalism and clientelism that had characterized the previous party system.53

The Catholic Church’s Shift in Orientation and the Rise of Church-Inspired Civil Society Organizations Beginning in the 1990s The change of objectives of the Catholic hierarchy toward a more conservative agenda was first displayed prominently in Oaxaca in the early 1990s and consisted of the replacement of progressive bishops, priests, and women religious by others of a more conservative bent. Archbishop Carrasco was replaced in 1993 by Héctor González Martínez, who enacted a series of measures in line with the new conservative spirit. He reduced the emphasis on indigenous ministry, which had been so avidly fostered over the course of the previous thirty years; he engineered the closing of SERESURE, the seminary in which so many progressive priests had been trained, on the grounds that it fomented Marxist ideas; he removed from their posts the majority of lay and religious women, who had played a key role in the indigenous ministry; and he shifted the focus

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of the work of CEDIPIO. The indigenous and youth ministries practically disappeared, while the social ministry became focused on, among others, groups of migrants, young women, and victims of human rights violations. In the Diocese of Tehuantepec, Bishop Lona retired in 1998 and was replaced by a conservative bishop who made similar changes in that diocese.54 This change of attitude within the church hierarchy sparked a reaction among a group of young lay people who had worked in the youth, social, and indigenous ministries and had remained faithful to the ideals of these movements, but for whom the new structure and orientation of the church no longer allowed them to carry out their ideals. In order to maintain their existing programs, several of these young men and women decided to separate themselves formally from the auspices of the church hierarchy and form independent civil organizations while maintaining their Christian inspiration. Two of the most representative organizations in this regard are EDUCA and Centro de Derechos Indígenas Flor y Canto (Center for Indigenous Rights Flor y Canto). The first works in the area of non-traditional education and was created in 1994 to promote and strengthen the development of marginalized communities in Oaxaca. EDUCA encourages the political participation of members of indigenous communities and promotes democratic practices. Among its programs, “Construcción de Ciudadanía” (“Building Citizenship”) educates community members about civil and human rights; and “Municipios Indígenas y Pueblos” (“Indigenous Municipalities and Towns”) trains local public officials in the functions of municipal government, with special attention to compatibility between indigenous customary law and liberal political-administrative systems. Members of EDUCA understand their faith-based mission as, among other actions, facilitating agreements on governance among indigenous community members and as promoting legislative initiatives.55 Two examples of EDUCA’s contributions are the decline of electoral disputes and the legitimation of indigenous customary law in Santiago Ixtayutla56 and San Dionisio Ocotepec.57 EDUCA has also worked with members of indigenous communities to help them understand more fully the environmental, economic, and social impact of development projects in their communities. One example of this is the construction of a hydroelectric dam in Paso de la Reyna in the Jamiltepec district, which endangers the quality of life and the use of local resources by the inhabitants of the region. The dam threatens to flood more than 3100 hectares of the

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surrounding communities, affecting close to 17,000 inhabitants, ruining many of their crops on which they base their subsistence, and disrupting the regional environment.58 More generally, EDUCA has fostered the creation of versatile interpersonal relationships among various political actors, including municipal authorities and agencies, state electoral officials, and citizens. This interaction, which had not occurred before the formal legislation of indigenous customary law, strengthens the capacity of local government representatives and citizens to launch initiatives and negotiate social demands with state and federal authorities. EDUCA has also consolidated and increased the effectiveness of its programs through the Escuela de Líderes Municipales (Municipal Leadership School), which provides a space for training and networking, and for reflecting upon and discussing indigenous issues.59 In the summer of 2019, EDUCA celebrated twenty-five years of continuous operation.60 Flor y Canto was founded by indigenous leaders, who worked with CEDIPIO in the 1980s in the Sola de Vega district of the Sierra Sur and, based on that experience, underwent a synthesis of indigenous and Catholic belief. Similarly to EDUCA, they explain their departure from the auspices of the church when the hierarchy changed its approach toward evangelization. Flor y Canto is part of a national network of organizations that defend the rights of indigenous and other people to land, a clean environment, and other natural resources within their communities. Its projects include the defense against invasions of indigenous lands in Santiago Choápam in the Papaloapan, a district of the Sierra Norte, in 1999; the legal defense of indigenous women’s rights in Santa Cruz Itundujia, in the Putla district of the Sierra Sur between 1995 and 2000; and the ongoing defense of water rights and other natural resources in Ocotlán and Zimatlán in the Central Valleys region.61 EDUCA, Flor y Canto, and the coffee cooperatives UCIRI, and MICHIZA described previously, are representative of a dozen other Christian-inspired civil society organizations, whose work stems from the multicultural agenda that the Catholic Church had intensively promoted through CEDIPIO and other initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s.62 Although these organizations represent a small part of the more than two hundred formally constituted civil society organizations in the state of Oaxaca, they illustrate how the church promoted or inspired civil organizations that had the potential to influence the different sectors of Oaxacan politics and society.

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The directors, founders, and members of these organizations recognize the influence that the principles and working methods developed in CEDIPIO and other church entities had on their subsequent activities as part of civil organizations and explain their formal separation from the auspices of the church’s hierarchy as a consequence of the latter’s change of goals. However, they see their work in these civil organizations as a continuation, and not an abandonment, of their Christian mission and their continued social and political commitment.63

Changes in the Political Context and Reaction by the Catholic Church: The “Politics of Recognition” Takes a Step Back The period 1986 to 1998 was characterized in Oaxaca by a controlled political pluralism in which the state responded positively to the demands of indigenous society and political elites through the “politics of recognition,” a process that culminated in the passage of the multicultural reforms. During this period, a new sense of empowerment on the part of indigenous and other political actors coincided with the opportunity created by the state government to legitimize its exercise of power through constitutional reforms: a combination that resulted in a relative democratic advance. Before the end of the century, however, this modest improvement suffered a setback. In contrast, the period from 1998 to 2010 in Oaxaca exhibited the resurgence of authoritarian practices that hindered the development of the democratic potential of the multicultural reforms as well as the development of civil society.64 During this period, the agency of indigenous and other civil society actors was thwarted by co-optation and clientelism practiced by governors José Murat (1998–2004) and Ulises Ruiz (2004–2010).65 These authoritarian governors frequently used executive privilege to “intervene” and impose municipal authorities friendly to their political interests.66 They also tied the allocation of resources coming from the federal government to political support from municipalities to state government.67 Murat and Ruiz used multiculturalism as a political banner over which they claimed exclusivity and limited the recognition of indigenous rights to those communities loyal to their policies.68 Thus, the relative success of multicultural reforms during the 1995 to 1998 period

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was not followed by an open political participation of indigenous people in state institutions.69 The authoritarian practices of Murat and Ruiz provoked a strong reaction in the electorate that produced important losses for the PRI during the 2006 mid-term and 2010 gubernatorial elections. At the popular level, the dissatisfaction with the authoritarian governorships of Murat and Ruiz erupted violently in mid-2006. Several of the civil organizations that had been marginalized by the despotic practices of these two governors took sides as part of a widespread popular uprising, initially propelled by the powerful teachers’ union. This spontaneous association marked the beginning of a new kind of organization: hundreds of different social groups and organizations rallied under the auspices of the Asamblea Popular de los Pueblos de Oaxaca (Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca, APPO). The common purpose that united them was their desire to remove Governor Ruiz from office.70 The church, not as an institution, but in the form of faith-inspired civil society organizations, BECs, and multiple expressions of popular religiosity, was decidedly present in the 2006 conflict. Archbishop José Luis Chávez Botello, on the other hand, was notably cautious when making pronouncements with respect to the conflict. Besides these local organizations, some faith-inspired national groups concerned with the compliance of human rights also supported the movement. Some of them were: TDT, Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez (Human Rights Center Agustín Pro Juárez, PRODH), and the research center Centro de Estudios Ecuménicos (Center for Ecumenical Studies, CEE). Two symbols of popular religiosity that emerged spontaneously during the demonstrations were “the Virgin of the Barricades” and the “Holy Child-APPO,” who were depicted with clothing and paraphernalia, such as indigenous dresses and gas masks, that resembled those of demonstrators.71 People spontaneously prayed, read the Bible, built altars, and carried out indigenous religious rituals during their five-month encampment in the central plaza of Oaxaca.72 A small group of priests also supported the movement, celebrated mass, and made pronouncements in favor of justice for demonstrators who had been killed or detained. The public demonstrations against the state government that took place in Oaxaca in 2006 were violently repressed by federal and state troops. However, despite the repression, or perhaps because of it, civil society organizations have continued to seek ways to resist the abuses of power by the state and to promote changes in the laws of Oaxaca. The main

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challenge faced by civil society organizations today is the definition of a common agenda based on which to lobby the state government. With the arrival of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) to Mexico’s presidency in 2018, Oaxacan civil society organizations, reflecting a sense of frustration with previous efforts, decided to largely support him. Some three years into AMLO’s administration, there is no consensus as to the benefits derived from this association.73

Conclusion The progressive sector of the Catholic Church has contributed to democratization in Oaxaca over the 1960s to 2010s period through the training and socialization of indigenous leaders, through solidarity with the indigenous movement, and by inspiring the formation of civil society organizations that defend the human and civil rights of the most vulnerable groups. Progressive members of the Church—bishops, priests, nuns, lay pastoral workers, civil society organizations—have contributed to indigenous peoples’ goals of defeating the monopoly of power and resources known locally as cacicazgo by, among other actions, participating in the formation of trade and agricultural cooperatives, such as UCIRI and MICHIZA, and educational projects, such as EDUCA and Flor y Canto. They have also advanced the protection of the environment, natural resources, and human rights. All this has been carried out within a context of indigenous values and culture. They have supported multicultural reforms, demanded accountability from public officials, and supported demonstrations against government practices considered unjust or corrupt, thereby undermining a single-party political dominance. More fundamentally, progressive representatives of the church, lay and religious, have contributed to democratization by instilling the least-advantaged members of society—often indigenous people—with a sense of dignity and entitlement to be heard in their demands. They have encouraged the indigenous poor to play a more active role in shaping political institutions and practices. Despite the withdrawal of support by the church’s hierarchy since the early 1990s, liberation theology, and the influence of its ideas, have not disappeared; many priests, nuns, and a larger number of lay people continue to adhere to its principles. In fact, progressive Catholicism and politics have remained strongly intertwined. However, the nature of their interaction in Mexico and throughout Latin America has shifted from

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using religious belief to mobilize the masses in broad reformist movements, as proposed in the 1960s and 1970s, to its use as “contributing to a ‘denser’ and potentially more democratic civil society.”74 In this study, I have provided evidence of civil society organizations and projects in Oaxaca that had their origins in religious motivations and principles, but which after the withdrawal of support by the hierarchy, became independent while maintaining the progressive church’s critical thinking and modes of action. I have shown that these civil organizations and projects have participated significantly in the struggle for indigenous rights and have exerted a positive force in shaping democratic practices in the state of Oaxaca. The specific contribution of this study is to outline the shifting mode of influence of the progressive sector of the Catholic Church on politics and society in Oaxaca over the decades of the 1960s to the 2010s. In the cases discussed here, the ideas of liberation theology that arose in a religious context were disseminated and later exerted their influence in politics and society through civil organizations. The point of view adopted here draws inspiration from Max Weber’s classic analysis of how religious values can influence economic and political behavior: it gives due weight to the role of interests as motivational forces but without granting them exclusive explanatory power. Even in many modern societies, religious values serve to define those interests and shape the way that they are pursued.75 In this vein, I suggest that in the Latin America of the 1960s and later, the ideas and principles embedded in the religious current of liberation theology motivated the development of civil society in its search for a more just society.

Notes 1. “Progressive sector of the Catholic Church” refers to a generation of church leaders (priests, nuns, and lay people) who adopted a religious and social approach derived from the Second Vatican Council (1962– 65) and the Second Conference of Latin American Bishops in Medellín, Colombia (1968). Despite differences in practice, this approach shares a commitment (albeit not exclusive) to the poor. For the Latin American context, see Scott Mainwaring and Alexander Wilde, eds., The Progressive Church in Latin America (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 4–33. In Oaxaca the most frequently used label has been “the Church of the poor,” although terms such as indigenous theology or liberation theology are also used.

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2. See Robert Sean Mackin, “In Word and Deed: Assessing the Strength of Progressive Catholicism in Latin America, 1960—1970s,” Sociology of Religion 71, no. 2 (2010): 216–42. 3. Pope Francis I quoted in Antonio Spadaro, “A Big Heart Open to God,” America 209, no. 8 (2013): 22. 4. Mackin, “In Word and Deed,” 127–62. 5. See, among others, for Central America: Servicio Internacional Cristiano de Solidaridad con los Pueblos de América Latina—Oscar Romero (SICSAL—Oscar Romero) at http://www.comitesromero.org. For Peru: Catalina Romero, “Religion and Public Spaces: Catholicism and Civil Society in Peru,” in Frances Hagopian, ed., Religious Pluralism, Democracy, and the Catholic Church in Latin America (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 365–401. For Mexico: Red nacional de organismos civiles de derechos humanos “Todos los derechos para todos” (National Network of Human Rights Civil Organizations “All Rights for All People,” TDT) at http://www.redtdt.org.mx. For Argentina: Servicio Paz y Justicia (Peace and Justice Services, SERPAJ) at http://www.serpaj.org.ar. For Brazil and Chile, Carol Drogus and Hannah Stewart-Gambino, Activist Faith: Grassroots Women in Democratic Brazil and Chile (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005). 6. Because of space limitations, I have not included here excerpts of these interviews. They can be consulted at Juan Manuel Lombera, “The Church of the Poor and Civil Society in Southern Mexico: Oaxaca 1960s–2010s,” Journal of Contemporary History 54, no. 3 (2019), https://doi.org/10. 1177/0022009418781740. 7. Two of the archives consulted are the personal archive of Juana Vásquez Vásquez and the archive of Servicios para una Educación Alternativa, A. C. (Services for an Alternative Education, EDUCA). 8. By conservative stance by the church hierarchy, I mean an emphasis on spirituality and the administration of the sacraments and not so much on the resolution of socio-economic issues that afflicted most sharply the least-privileged members of society. 9. Miguel Concha Malo, Oscar González, Lino Salas, and Jean-Paul Bastian, La Participación de los cristianos en el proceso de liberación en México (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1986). 10. Concha Malo et al., 96–99, 167–71, and 201–9. 11. Víctor Gabriel Muro, Iglesia y movimientos sociales en México, 1972–1987: Los Casos de Ciudad Juárez y el Istmo de Tehuantepec (Zamora, Michoacán, Mexico: El Colegio de Michoacán, 1994), 129–78. 12. See John Burdick and W. E. Hewitt, The Church at the Grassroots in Latin America: Perspectives on Thirty Years of Activism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000).

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13. Christian-inspired civil society organizations are those founded, promoted, or initially motivated by a religious actor (a priest, a nun, a catechist, a lay brother or sister) or those that recognize a Christian religiosity among the motivations for their work. Blancarte estimates that in the early 1990s up to two-thirds of civil society organizations involved in electoral transparency activities in Mexico were affiliated with Christian denominations. See Roberto Blancarte, “The Changing Face of Religion in the Democratization of Mexico,” in Hagopian, Religious Pluralism, 247–48. 14. Alberto J. Olvera, “Civil Society and Political Transition in Mexico,” Constellations 4, no. 1 (1997): 105–23; Leonardo Avritzer, Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 4, 9. 15. In the absence of any scientific definition of “indigenous,” I use the most widely accepted version: a person who speaks an indigenous language and self-identifies as indigenous. As with any socially defined category, the boundaries of “indigenous” are permeable and permit redefinitions by the individual or by the social matrix, according to circumstances. The concept of “indigenous rights” concerns the right of the “indigenous” people to follow the set of norms, referred to here as “indigenous customary law,” that they establish to pursue their own socio-cultural forms in their communities. These norms refer to, among other elements, the election of local authorities, the use and ownership of land and other natural resources, educational and judicial systems, and the celebration of feasts. These norms vary with time and geography, while maintaining a discernible underlying pattern. See, among others, Kristin Norget, “A Cacophony of Autochthony: Representing Indigeneity in Oaxacan Popular Mobilization,” Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology 15, no. 1 (2010): 116–43. 16. Blancarte discusses the different approaches taken by the Mexican Catholic hierarchy and lay members of the church: Blancarte, “The Changing Face of Religion,” 248–52. 17. Marroquín, El conflicto religioso en Oaxaca, 1976–1992 (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2007), 45–82. 18. Hagopian, “Introduction,” Religious Pluralism, 1–64. 19. For a discussion on the practice of indigenous theology in Oaxaca see Manuel Arias, Y la palabra de Dios se hizo indio (Mexico City: Ediciones Dabar, 1998), 20; and Bartolomé Carrasco, “Inculturación del Evangelio,” in Héctor I. Sáinz (ed.), Amo a la Iglesia, homilías de Don Bartolomé Carrasco Briseño (Oaxaca, Mexico: Arzobispado de Oaxaca, 1993), 359–77. 20. Kristin Norget, “Decolonization and the Politics of Syncretism: The Catholic Church, Indigenous Theology, and Cultural Autonomy in

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23.

24.

25. 26.

27.

28. 29.

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Oaxaca, Mexico,” in Education, Decolonization, and Development, ed. Dip Kapoor (Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers, 2009), 75–94. Author interview with Father Clodomiro Siller, Director of CENAMI, Mexico City, summer 2006. Kristin Norget, “Knowing Where We Enter,” in Resurgent Voices in Latin America: Indigenous People, Political Mobilization and Religious Change, ed. Edward Cleary and Timothy J. Steigenga (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 154–86. Archbishop Carrasco’s vision concerning indigenous people is collected in Héctor I. Sáinz, ed., Amo a la Iglesia and supported by Conferencia del Episcopado Mexicano, Fundamentos teológicos de la pastoral indígena en México (Mexico City: Conferencia del Episcopado Mexicano, 1988). See, for example, Guillermo Trejo, “Religious Competition and Ethnic Mobilization in Latin America: Why the Catholic Church Promotes Indigenous Movements in Mexico,” American Political Science Review, 103, no. 3 (2009): 323–42. See also Frances Hagopian’s recent discussion of arguments for and against a rationalist explanation of the church’s support of indigenous movements: Hagopian, “Introduction,” in Hagopian, Religious Pluralism, 43–44. Sara Méndez-Morales, Monografía de CEDIPIO (Manuscript, Oaxaca, 1997), 26. Author interviews with former members of Pastoral Juvenil: Manuel Arias, parish priest La Inmaculada de Juquila and former Director of Pastoral Juvenil, summer 2006; Marcos Leyva, Director of EDUCA, Oaxaca, summer 2006; Cristina Salazar, Director of IXQUIXOCHITL, Villa de Zaachila, Oaxaca, summer 2007; and Beatriz Ramírez, an advocate for indigenous rights, Oaxaca, summer 2007. See Phillip Berryman, Liberation Theology: The Essential Facts About the Revolutionary Movement in Latin America and Beyond (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), 64. Muro, Iglesia y Movimientos Sociales en México, 222. On UCIRI, see Elena Vázquez y de los Santos y Yanga Villagómez Velázquez, “La UCIRI, el Café Orgánico y la Experiencia de un Proyecto Campesino Autogestivo en la Producción,” Cuadernos del Sur 2, no. 5 (September–December 1993): 121–37; Jorge Hernández-Díaz, “UCIRI: Viejas Identidades Sociales, Nuevos Referentes Culturales y Políticos,” Cuadernos del Sur 3, no. 8–9 (September 1994–April 1995): 125– 44; Francisco Vanderhoff Boersma, Excluidos hoy, protagonistas mañana (Mexico, edition restricted to members of UCIRI, 2005). Robert Porter discusses at length the dilemma faced by members of UCIRI over whether to join state-sponsored coffee organizations or remain an independent union: Robert M. Porter, The Coffee Farmers Revolt in Southern Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002).

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30. Author interview with members of UCIRI, Lachivixá, municipality of Santa María Guienagati, Oaxaca, summer 2006. 31. José Angel Alonso, founding member of UCIRI, quoted in HernándezDíaz, “UCIRI: Viejas identidades sociales,” 140–41. 32. Author interview with Father José Rentería, parish priest, San Bartolo Coyotepec, Oaxaca, summer 2011. 33. Author collective interview with members of the Board of Directors of MICHIZA. 34. See Porter, The Coffee Farmers Revolt in Southern Mexico, 181. 35. Marroquín, El conflicto religioso en Oaxaca, 123. 36. See Kathleen M. McIntire, Protestantism and State Formation in Postrevolutionary Oaxaca (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2019). 37. Marroquín, El conflicto religioso en Oaxaca, 135–50, 173–93. 38. Muro, Iglesia y movimientos sociales en México. 39. See, among others, Jorge Hernández-Díaz, Reclamos de Identidad (Mexico City: Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2001), 285–86; Díaz, Escrito. Comunalidad, energía viva del pueblo mixe (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2007). 40. David Recondo, La política del Gatopardo. Multiculturalismo y democracia en Oaxaca (Mexico City: Publicaciones de la Casa Chata, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2007), 184–85. 41. Hernández-Díaz, Reclamos de Identidad, 121–40. Some of the public statements by the Bishops of the South-Pacific Region are compiled in Centro Nacional de Ayuda a las Misiones Indígenas, Tehuantepec 1891–1991, un Siglo de Fe, Vol. 3 (Mexico City: CENAMI, 1992). 42. Alejandro Anaya Muñoz, “Explaining the Politics of Recognition of Ethnic Diversity and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Oaxaca, Mexico,” Bulletin of Latin American Research, 23, no. 4 (2004): 415. 43. See Alejandro Anaya Muñoz, Autonomía Indígena, gobernabilidad y legitimidad en México: la legalización de los usos y costumbres electorales en Oaxaca (Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana, Plaza y Valdés, 2006), 95, 124–25; and Recondo, La Política del Gatopardo, 203– 4, 213, 215, 231. The interaction between indigenous groups from Oaxaca and Chiapas was discussed during author interviews with Adelfo Regino Montes, indigenous intellectual, Director of Servicios del Pueblo Mixe, A.C. (Services for the Mixe People, SER), and Secretary of Indigenous Affairs in the State Government, Oaxaca for the period 2010– 2014, summer 2006; Gustavo Esteva, Director of Universidad de la Tierra, Oaxaca, summer 2006; and Juana Vásquez, indigenous intellectual, Oaxaca, summer 2013, all of whom have participated in indigenous movements in Oaxaca and Chiapas.

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44. Foro estatal sobre la realidad indígena, campesina, y negra (State Forum on Indigenous, Campesino, and Black Reality): five forums held between 1993 and 1995, manuscript in the personal archive of Juana Vásquez Vásquez, Oaxaca. 45. Recondo, La política del Gatopardo, 184–85; Hernández-Díaz, Reclamos de identidad, 285–323. 46. Indigenous customary law is the term used here for the Spanish usos y costumbres, also referred to as sistemas normativos internos. For more detail on this topic, see Hernández-Díaz, ed., Ciudadanías diferenciadas en un estado multicultural: los usos y costumbres en Oaxaca (Mexico City: Siglo XXI Editores, 2007). 47. For more details on the process of enactment and content of multicultural reforms, see Recondo, La política del Gatopardo, 214–16, 234–50; and Anaya Muñoz, Autonomía indígena, 123–25, 156–59. 48. Recondo, La política del Gatopardo, 233–34, 330–36; Hernández-Díaz, Reclamos de identidad, 41. 49. Author interview with Adelfo Regino Montes, Oaxaca, August 15, 2013; Recondo, La política del Gatopardo, 107–20, 331–32. 50. Author interview with Diódoro Carrasco Altamirano, Governor of Oaxaca (1992–98), Mexico City, August 8, 2013. 51. EDUCA, 25 Años del reconocimiento constitucional de los usos y costumbres en Oaxaca (Oaxaca, Mexico: EDUCA, A.C., August 31, 2020), 3–4. 52. For an update on the legislation and practice of these issues see: EDUCA, Reformas y transición. Usos y costumbres, 25 años (1995–2020) (Oaxaca, Mexico: EDUCA, A.C., 2020). 53. Among analysts who agree with this view are Recondo, La política del Gatopardo, 425, 447, 469; Anaya Muñoz, Autonomía indígena, 162– 64; Víctor Leonel Juan Martínez, “Ciudadanías diferenciadas: entre la política y la justicia,” in Víctor Leonel Juan Martínez y Katya Salazar, eds., Derecho y sociedad en Oaxaca indígena, logros alcanzados y desafíos pendientes (Washington, DC: Due Process of Law Foundation, 2009), 23–38. 54. Norget, “Knowing Where We Enter.”. 55. Author interview with Miguel Ángel Vásquez de la Rosa, Oaxaca, July 17, 2013. 56. The electoral conflict in Ixtayutla is described in Sara Méndez-Morales, De la organización al poder: Experiencias en municipios oaxaqueños (Oaxaca, Mexico: EDUCA, A.C., 2001). 57. See EDUCA, El Pueblo de las Cuatro Varas (Oaxaca, Mexico: EDUCA, A.C., 2003). 58. See EDUCA, Recuperando la Memoria Histórica, COPUDEVER (Oaxaca, Mexico: EDUCA, A.C., 2020).

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59. For more details on EDUCA, see http://www.educaoaxaca.org. 60. EDUCA, Compilación Coloquio, EDUCA 25 Años (Oaxaca, Mexico: EDUCA, A.C., 2020). 61. Author interview with Carmen Santiago, Director of FLOR Y CANTO, summer 2011. For more detail on Flor y Canto, see http://www.endefe nsadelosterritorios.org. 62. See Lombera, “The Church of the Poor”. 63. Author interviews with Father Manuel Arias, summer 2006; Marcos Leyva, summer 2006 and 2013; Carmen Santiago, summer 2011 and 2013; Cristina Salazar, summer 2007 and 2013; Beatriz Ramírez, summer 2007; Mercedes García, Director of ORAB, summer 2006 and 2011; Austreberta Luján, former member of a religious order and current Director of KIEE LUU, Oaxaca and San Agustín de las Juntas, summer 2006 and 2011; María de Jesús Santaella and Othón Cuevas, founding partners, CENTÉOTL, summer 2007; María Soledad Rendón, Representative, PROSA, summer 2006 and Verónica Esteban, Director of PROSA and lay missionary, summer 2011; María Eugenia Mata, Director of IDEMO, summer 2013; Minerva Nora Martínez Lozano, Director of BARCA, summer 2011; Sara Méndez-Morales, member of RODH, summer 2011. 64. Víctor Raúl Martínez-Vásquez “Movimiento Magisterial y Crisis Política en Oaxaca,” in Joel Vicente Cortes, ed., Educación, sindicalismo y gobernabilidad en Oaxaca (Oaxaca, Mexico: Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, 2006), 137; Víctor Raúl MartínezVásquez, Autoritarismo, movimiento popular, y crisis política: Oaxaca 2006 (Oaxaca, Mexico: Universidad Autónoma Benito Juárez de Oaxaca, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2007), 24; Lourdes Morales, Oaxaca: Algunos cuestionamientos en torno a la ficción multiculturalista (Oaxaca, Mexico: Manuscript available at EDUCA, 2003); Anaya Muñoz, “Explaining the Politics of Recognition,” 420–21, 429. 65. Martínez-Vásquez, Autoritarismo, movimiento popular, y crisis política, 35–40. 66. Martínez-Vásquez, Autoritarismo, movimiento popular, y crisis política, 19. 67. Edward L. Gibson, “Boundary Control: Sub-national Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries,” World Politics, 58 (October 2005). 68. Gibson, “Boundary Control,” 101–32; Martínez-Vásquez, Autoritarismo, Movimiento Popular, y Crisis Política, 29–34. 69. Miguel A. Bartolomé and Alicia M. Barabas, eds., Autonomías Étnicas y Estados Nacionales (Mexico City: CONACULTA—INAH, 1998), 24. 70. For a detailed analysis of this crisis see, among others, Martínez-Vásquez, Autoritarismo, movimiento popular y crisis política; La APPO: rebelión o movimiento social? (Oaxaca, Mexico: Universidad Autónoma Benito Juárez de Oaxaca, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2009); and

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71.

72.

73.

74.

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Gustavo Esteva, “The Path to Radical Democracy,” Socialism and Democracy 21, no. 2 (2007): 74–96. Norget, “La Virgen de las barricadas: La Iglesia Católica, la religiosidad popular y el movimiento de la asamblea popular de los pueblos de Oaxaca.” In Martínez-Vásquez, La APPO. See Raúl Cervera, “La liturgia de las barricadas: lucha y espiritualidad popular en Oaxaca, 2006 y 2007,” Christus, 785 (July–August 2011): 42–51. See Gustavo Esteva, “Una revisión crítica del movimiento social y las demandas de los pueblos indígenas,” in EDUCA, Compilación Coloquio, 46–47. Hannah W. Stewart-Gambino, “Religious Consumers in a Changing Religious Marketplace,” Latin American Research Review 36, no. 1 (2001): 194. See Colin Campbell, “Do Today’s Sociologists Really Appreciate Weber’s Essay The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism?” The Sociological Review 54: no. 7 (2006), 207–23; and Abner Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 210.

PART III

Societies with Mixed Religious Marketplaces

CHAPTER 9

Faith-Based Organizations, Society, and the State in Chad Mayke Kaag

Introduction On April 19, 2021, Idriss Déby Into, who had been Chad’s president since 1990 and had just been re-elected for a sixth term, died when leading the national army in a fight with rebels in the north of the country. His son Mahamat Déby immediately assumed the presidency atinterim as the leader of a Transitional Military Council (CMT), which would rule the country until new elections, promised to be held within 18 months. Within two days, he called a meeting with the most important religious leaders of the country, the president of the High Council for Islamic Affairs (CSAI), the Archbishop, and the president of the platform of evangelical churches, in order to have their support for the transition period—on the same day that he met with the French ambassador.1 The religious leaders did not publicly denounce the move of the Déby clan that in fact could be considered nothing less than a coup d’état,2 nor did

M. Kaag (B) African Studies Centre Leiden, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Glatzer et al. (eds.), Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31960-0_9

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Chad’s most important Western partners, such as former colonizer France and the European Union. Throughout the country and especially in the streets of the capital N’Djamena, however, protests have grown, and an opposition movement, Wakit Tama (“The time has come”), already formed to contest Déby’s sixth term as a president, has taken on more clout.3 While this movement has mainly been run by secular organizations, such as labor unions and human rights NGOs, others have taken to the streets, as well. One of my informants stated: “what is new is that now also the Muslims have started to manifest, while earlier on they kept silent quietly supporting the Muslim elite in power.”4 While some scholars tend to downplay the role of religion as a factor in political dynamics,5 others have maintained that religion is indeed important in Chadian politics.6 I will argue that in fact both visions are true, depending on the angle and level of analysis. The relationship between religion, state, and society is multilayered and difficult to disentangle, with many factors of polarization being intertwined. In the following, we will explore this multilayered relationship between religion, society, and state in Chad by investigating the role of religion and religious actors in the current historical moment, characterized by social cleavages, persistent poverty and insecurity for a large part of the Chadian population, and negotiations over Chad’s political future. I will do so first by offering a historical overview of the relationship between religion and the state in Chad, arguing that after a period of strong politization, under Déby, de-politization has been tried by promoting a discourse of national unity. Among the population, however, thinking in terms of opposition between Muslims and Christians appears not to be so easily eradicated by just changing political discourse while lived realities do not alter. Second, I will elaborate on Chad’s state of economic and social development, showing that despite rather impressive economic development data over the last 15 years for a great deal stimulated by newly discovered oil reserves, the profits have been very unequally distributed and (extreme) poverty is still rampant. The Chadian state has not been very present in providing services like education and health care to its citizens, and state funds have mainly been invested in military equipment and the like in order to secure the state and its rulers, resulting in a situation of political instability.7 Against this background, I will then ask what the role of religious actors and organizations has been in this politically and socially quite tense historical moment. I will do so first by painting the religious landscape, by mapping religious actors, their

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organizations, and modes of activism, before analyzing the effects in the social, religious, and political sphere. In the conclusion, I will reflect a bit further on the future of religious activism in Chad in the context of the wider questions of the present volume. The analysis is based on a literature review, interviews held in N’Djamena in June 2022, and data collected during earlier fieldwork in Chad in 2004, 2012, and 2014.

Religion and the State in Chad: A History of (De-)politization Chad is a multiethnic, multilingual, and multireligious country bordered in the north by Libya, in the east by Sudan, and in the south by Cameroon and the DRC. The country counts some 200 ethnic groups that can be clustered into nine main groups, with the Southern Sara people as the largest group (30.5%), followed by the Bornu and Arab groups (9, 8, and 9.7% respectively).8 Chad has long been a transitional area between Islamic, and animist and Christian zones, corresponding with the northern and southern parts of the country respectively. The north of Chad came into contact with Muslim influences from the north and the east through trans-Saharan trade and migration and has been Islamized for a long time. The south is mainly Christian, the area most affected by colonial development initiatives and by the Protestant and Catholic missions that arrived in Chad from Cameroon and the Central African Republic at the beginning of the twentieth century.9 Nowadays, following the last census of 2014–15, 52.1% of the Chadian population is Muslim, 23.9% is Protestant, 20% is Roman Catholic, and 0.3% is animist, with other very small minorities who identify with the categories other Christian 0.2%, none 2.8%, and unspecified 0.7%.10 Most Muslims adhere to the Sufi Tijaniyya tradition, while a small Muslim minority is associated with Salafism. The majority of Protestants are evangelical Christians, but there is a growing proliferation among the Protestants, by schisms within denominations and a growing number of non-denominational and charismatic churches that often arrive from abroad, for instance, via the Democratic Republic of Congo or from the United States. Today, most northerners practice Islam, and most southerners practice Christianity or indigenous religions; as a result of longstanding migration processes and urbanization,11 in urban areas religious distribution is mixed, although northerners and southerners often have their own neighborhoods.12 In

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addition, proselytizing by both Islamic and Christian groups has some effect, especially in the south, in making it more religiously mixed.13 Religion is very important to most Chadians. A survey executed among 1,200 respondents in four Chadian cities across the country showed that the vast majority of Chadians are very religious, and that religiousness does not decline with rising education or income. Of those surveyed, 90% said they believe in a life after death, and a vast majority, 85%, try to live according to the teachings of their religion. In addition 82% pray regularly, and 72% visit their church or mosque at least once a week (nonattendance substantially influenced by old age and gender). Also telling is that the study found that mistrust is very high in Chadian society, with 74% stating that one cannot trust others one lives or works with, but that sharing a common religion, after family, is the most important basis for trust (Fig. 9.1).14 The politicization of religion in Chad’s recent history has its roots in colonial history. After independence, a Christian southerner became the first president, and the main positions in the administration were occupied by southerners. They had been educated at French schools, which

Religious Composition of Chad (%) Other 1.2%

No religion 2.8%

Roman Catholic 20.0%

Muslim Protestant

Muslim 52.1%

Roman Catholic Other No religion

Protestant 23.9%

Fig. 9.1 Chad religious composition (Source CIA Factbook Chad, https:// www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/chad/#people-and-society, accessed 12 December 2022)

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the majority of Muslims had boycotted. Another factor contributing to this southern dominance was the fact that France had focused on developing the south (“le Tchad utile”). This situation and the openly negative attitude to the north of the president and his fellows led to increasing tensions between the Muslims and those in power, resulting in a long period of guerrilla and civil war, during which, particularly from 1979, guerrilla leader Hissein Habré started to use religion to create division, calling Muslims to fight a holy war against the kirdi, the nonbelievers, and stating that “Muslims should never allow to be ruled by a non-believer.” Habré seized power in 1982. Under his rule, southerners felt that northerners were progressively occupying their area by installing northern administrators. The arrival of large numbers of Muslim traders and Muslim cattle owners fleeing the droughts in the north reinforced this sentiment, as southerners felt that conflicts between herders and farmers were handled in unfair and discriminatory ways by local power holders. These factors and the conversion of former Christians and animists in the south have made Islam more widespread there. In 1990, Habré fell from power by a coup d’état led by one of his former army officers, Idriss Déby, who took the presidency. Despite a democratization process, the functioning of the state—with the group in power using state resources for its own purposes—has not fundamentally altered, and the division between a Muslim north and a Christian south has consequently continued to impact political and societal dynamics. It should, however, be noted that competition between northern (ethnic) groups for power and access to state resources generates tensions and opposition among the northerners, creating a fragile power base for the clan in power. Since 2004, exploitation of the oil fields in the south has aggravated tensions further. While people had dreamt of the oil and associated generous World Bank loans offering the country a way out of poverty, in fact Déby used the money to secure his own position, which was consistently attacked by rebels from the north, contestants also coming from among his own family. Efforts to overthrow him took place in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2019. He survived by his own tactical skills but also importantly by the support of the French government, which at crucial moments came to the rescue with military support. After 2008, Déby more clearly adopted a discourse of national unity, while also trying to depoliticize religious difference and the separation

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between northerners and southerners on which Habré had built his power, and which had continued to be part of the national and local political toolkit under his successor. It was also in this period that an interreligious platform was erected under the aegis of the presidency in order to radiate religious unity and reconciliation (more on this platform in the following section). Dickow observes that “Déby had great tactical skills. [….] He tied people to himself, often with monetary or other favours. and he was very adept at playing people, ethnic groups and religions off against one another to finally present himself as the reconciler […].”15 Posters in N’Djamena would present Déby as the father of the nation and the bringer of progress. In the latter respect, Déby was much helped by the oil revenues that had started to flow. Despite this discourse of national unity and common citizenship, however, ordinary people have continued to experience the effects of longstanding separative discourses and discriminatory practices. Thus, Christians relate that when they take a walk in a northern neighborhood, they still risk being insulted and called a “slave,” they still are discriminated against at the tribunal, and they still have more difficulty in getting a job in the public service than a northerner, especially if the latter belongs to the ethnic group of the president.16

Questions of Welfare and Redistribution N’Djamena in 2022 is a distinctly different place compared to two decades ago. The inflow of money and investors since the start of the exploitation of the oil fields in the south of Chad in 2003 has contributed to a scaling up of the capital’s outlook, among other things by the construction of the Place de la Nation with its impressive statue of Independence, the Chinese road project and other infrastructure projects, and the building of several huge hotels and office buildings. Driving through the city indeed makes one think that progress and development have arrived. Going on foot, however, reveals other realities. Next to the brand-new gold-colored Hilton Hotel Toumaï Palace in the neighborhood of Klemat close to the airport, which, in June 2022, is about to open, small children who should be in school are working in the heat of the sun and the dust, breaking stones and putting them in bags in order to earn some meager pennies for their families. The contrast between the exorbitant luxury of the hotel17 and this child labor under miserable conditions could not be greater. It is an illustration par excellence

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that Chad has made economic progress but that the wealth has been very unevenly distributed. Tellingly, Chad still takes position no 187 out of 189 on the Human Development Index, meaning that it is one of the poorest countries in the world. While progress has been made on several indicators—between 1990 and 2019, Chad’s life expectancy at birth increased by 7.2 years, mean years of schooling increased by 1.2 years, and expected years of schooling increased by 4.2 years—progress has been slower than in most other countries in the region. And while economic development has been booming over the last 15 years—Chad’s GNI per capita increased by about 57.3 percent between 1990 and 2019—still more than 40 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. Especially in the rural areas where more than 78% of the Chadian population live,18 severe poverty persists, with people lacking basic health and educational facilities. While Chad has a social security system,19 it does not mean much, as more than 90% of the population works in the informal economy20 and depends on family, ethnic, and religious networks for their social security. While Chad’s traditional economic basis has been agriculture, cattle breeding, and fishing, since 2003, through the discovery of oil fields in the south near Doba, it has become a producer and exporter of oil. Nowadays, oil income provides 70% of the state’s budget.21 The exploitation of oil has brought income and interest from external investors, but it has also proven not to be a stable base of the economy. The sharp decline in global oil prices in 2014/2015 and 201622 has been felt in Chad, especially since 2016, among other things by the state having difficulties in paying state personnel and realizing planned investments. Since then protests have increased, people more openly showing their dissatisfaction with decisions made by the state and with the uneven distribution of state resources profiting only a small category of the population, namely those who are close to Déby and often belong to his ethnic group of the Zaghawa.23 The government under Déby has particularly invested in state control and the military, and much of the oil money has been put in the modernization of military equipment.24 Control over the state is challenged by several Chadian anti-government militias and armed dissident groups including the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) and the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), which operate in northern Chad from bases in Libya.25 In addition, the Chadian military is involved in the fight against Boko Haram and other Islamic terrorist groups such

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as the Islamic State in West Africa in the Lake Chad Basin area and in the Sahel, particularly in the border zone of North East Nigeria, and the border area with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. In fact, Déby gained a lot of appreciation and goodwill from Western powers as a reliable and pro-active partner in the fight against Boko Haram, and Chad provided soldiers to international missions like MINUSMA and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) for fighting against Boko Haram and other Islamic terrorist groups in the Lake Chad region. In contrast to the foregoing, state interventions in basic services are very low: for instance, only 2.4% of public expenditure is on education.26 Yet this should be a priority area for the state, as only 22.3% of the population over 15 can read and write French or Arabic (men, 31.3%; women, 14%, in data from 2016).27 The void left by the state’s nonengagement has been filled by private education providers.28 This is in fact a good thing, but doubts have also been expressed about whether there is sufficient oversight and control over what is being taught.29 The refugee crisis resulting from the insecure situation in the region is another pressing problem to be dealt with. A large population of refugees and internally displaced persons fleeing Boko Haram has flocked together in the Lake Chad zone. The persisting insecurity in the Lac Chad and Northern Tibesti regions has not only put people on the move in order to find life security but has also disrupted livelihood activities, leading to food insecurity—a situation aggravated by adverse weather conditions in 2021. As a result, between June and August 2022, 1.74 million people were projected to face severe food insecurity.30 In June 2022, people returning from the refugee camps in the Lake Chad zone indicated that it appeared that the Chadian state is practically absent and that all work is being done by (transnational) NGOs and multilateral aid organizations. While there is much appreciation for the work of these non-state actors, there is also unease about what is going on in this zone in terms of possible indoctrination and the like.31 It can be safely stated that many of the central tasks normally considered duties of the state are in fact organized by non-state actors, such as local and international civil society organizations, which are most often funded by bilateral, multilateral, and transnational funds. State assets mostly profit only a small minority of the Chadian population, particularly an elite belonging to the ethnic group and political network of the clan in power.

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In view of the foregoing discussion, what do and could religious actors and organizations mean for the lessening of deprivation and life insecurity for the population in Chad, including matters of social, economic, and political exclusion? In order to answer this question, in the following I will first paint the religious organizational landscape and then discuss the effects in the social, religious, and political field.

Religious Actors, Their Organizations, and Their Modes of Activism As Chad is a secular country, at Independence adopting the model of laïcité of former colonizer France,32 freedom of religion is enshrined in the Constitution, and religious associational life is vibrant. As can be expected from the foregoing, in multireligious Chad, the landscape of religious organizations is also very diverse. The Catholic part is perhaps the easiest to sketch: Chad counts 7 dioceses (N’Djamena, Moundou, Sarh, Pala, Doba, Goré, and Laï) and one apostolic vicariate (Mongo), 125 parishes, 134 diocesan priests, 115 religious priests, 40 friars, and 350 sisters.33 Those dioceses and the apostolic vicariate together form one church province, led by the Archbishop of N’Djamena. The national coordination of all the Catholic Church’s activities is done by the Conférence Episcopale du Tchad (CET) with its headquarters in N’Djamena. This clerical organization also covers transnational Catholic organizations like Caritas, which is particularly focused on development and social work, and Misereor, which is a German Catholic funding organization. In Chad, these organizations prefer not to be registered as an NGO, as NGOs are required to transfer 1% of their budget to the state, which is seen as undesirable in the Chadian context of opaque and clientelist use of state funds. Chad also has a number of lay Catholic organizations such as a Catholic students’ movement, the Jeunesse Etudiante Chrétienne (JEC); a union of Catholic cadres, l’Union des cadres chrétiens du Tchad; and a women’s union, l’Union des femmes chrétiennes catholique du Tchad. The JEC counts some 1,700 members in N’Djamena and an additional number in the rest of the country. Whereas the association used to be predominantly engaged in promoting and defending students’ rights, more recently it has expanded its focus to also embrace broader economic and societal issues as well as spiritual topics. There is also an association for working youth, la Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne, but that organization is smaller

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and less active, with most of the younger workers preferring to become a member of the Union des cadres chrétiennes. These youth organizations are in fact part of a transnational social catholic youth movement founded in France in 1929. The general program of the JEC is established at the transnational level, where it has been decided that the movement adopt the SDGs as its guideline. The country branches can then decide on their foci within this larger framework. The Chadian branch has thus chosen ecology, entrepreneurship, and good governance as their themes for the current three-year period (2021–23).34 Activities mainly concern sensibilization seminars and debates among their target group. Centre Al-Mouna in the old center of N’Djamena is a particular case, in the sense that it presents itself as a cultural center but has its roots in the Catholic community and is led by Arabic-speaking sisters from Lebanon. Established in 1986, it mainly focuses on the better living together of the various groups in Chad. It aims to promote knowledge about the diverse ethnic groups in the country and is also a center of interreligious dialogue, a language learning center, and a promotor of bilingualism—aiming to counter received ideas about the inseparable link between Arabic and Islam and to promote Arabic and French as languages for all Chadians. The Protestant organizational landscape is far more scattered and by its nature more difficult to summarize than the Catholic one. The evangelical churches have created a national platform L’Entente des Eglises et Missions Evangéliques au Tchad (EEMET), which serves as a coordinating and representative body, among other things in communication with the state, other faith groups, and donors. It does, however, represent only part of the ever-expanding and diversifying Protestant churches in Chad. The Baptists, for instance, do not participate, nor do the Pentecostal churches or other independent charismatic churches. The latter often keep to themselves, showing a disinterest in public issues and engagement with others, as their main interest is with the direct experience of God and the promotion of the latter’s Spiritual Kingdom, in this case the specific church. In this, other churches are often seen as competitors. Characteristic of particularly the Pentecostal churches is that they preach a break with the past, separating (potential) members from their original social context (family, ethnic group) and offering a new family within the church.35 The Union des Jeunes Chrétiens (UJC) is the protestant counterpart of the Catholic JEC and is affiliated with EEMET. It counts some

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1,000 members in N’Djamena, and 2,000 over the entire national territory. Originally established in 1957 by Protestant youth who had come to Ndjamena to follow secondary education and felt that they needed a cadre for Bible study, prayer, and meditation in the dormitories, over time the organization developed into a national Protestant students’ organization. Their activities expanded, as well, nowadays covering the spiritual, cultural, and social domain. The spiritual remains the most important, however, and importantly focuses on evangelization. When I visited the UJC head office in N’Djamena in June 2022, there was a course going on for some 15 boys and girls, who first learned about the organization and then how to evangelize. Other activities include book fairs and social activities like cleaning up the neighborhood and learning how to prepare Chadian dishes.36 Like the Catholic associations, Protestant churches and associations may be connected to and/or part of larger transnational networks and organizations. The UJC is part of the global organization International Fellowship of Evangelical Students, and its regional network Groupes Bibliques Universitaires de l’Afrique Francophone (GBUAF). There may be occasional regional meetings and visits, but for the rest this affiliation does not seem to count a lot. A church in N’Djamena affiliated with the Assemblées Chrétiennes, one of the founding members of EEMET, is by its priest part of the Campus for Christ (CRU), a US-based evangelical movement that has become an important part of the religious right wing in the United States and is geared towards spreading Christianity worldwide. One of the means to do so is by translating the Bible in local languages. In this, it also collaborates with SIL International (formerly known as Summer Institute of Linguistics), an American-based Evangelical Christian organization that combines linguistic study with Bible translation and missionary activities and that has been present in Chad since 1990. The priest, a former Muslim turned into a very dedicated evangelist, and his team regularly go to the United States for courses and the like, but they do not receive many funds.37 The Islamic organizational landscape is dominated by the governmentcreated Superior Islamic Council (le Conseil superíeur des affaires islamiques, CSAI). The CSAI has existed since 1992 and has the responsibility for, and oversight over, Islamic affairs in the country, ranging from coordinating and representing Islamic organizations in Chad and abroad and providing Islamic education, to promoting Arabo-Islamic culture and

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Arabic schooling.38 However, only the Islamic Sufi currents are represented in the Council, and not the Salafi. The Ansar al-Sunna, one of the most important associations in this latter current, has been banned by the government several times over the last decade,39 but in practice enforcement appears to be difficult or lax. The Grand Imam of N’Djamena, who is selected by a committee of Muslim elders and approved by the government, serves as the president of the CSAI and oversees the grand imams from each of the country’s 23 regions. He has the authority to restrict Muslim groups from proselytizing, regulate the content of mosque sermons, and control activities of Islamic charities. In practice, this authority is rarely deployed, however.40 The Sufi and Salafi Muslims have their own mosques. Relationships between the two groups tend to be tense, and mutual animosity is among other things expressed in the media. The Sufi establishment accuses the Salafi of being “Boko Haram,” radicals, and terrorists,41 while the Salafi accuse the Sufis of adhering to a soft and depraved Islam, and the CSAI of working together with the government to pursue an anti-Islam and secularist agenda.42 Racine and Mahamat (2018) analyze the sequential bans of the Ansar Al-Sunna, as the result of a religious and political struggle between the president of the CSAI and the Salafi intellectuals, in which the president of the CSAI used global discourses on Islamic radicalism and terrorism for his own political fight. The country’s president, in his turn, has instrumentalized the CSAI and the competition between both Islamic currents for his own power play, the strategy being to co-opt the Islamic establishment.43 Partly as a result of the longstanding strategy of those in power to only allow the development of civil society in the south and not in the north, as the latter would possibly pose a threat to their position, there are very few Chadian Islamic associations. The vibrant landscape of Islamic associations that evolved in the early 1990s was cut short by the sudden dissolution of the 31 Islamic associations present in the country in 1996, leaving the CSAI as the only Islamic body responsible for the management and orientation of Islamic affairs in Chad.44 Chad also hosted quite a number of transnational Islamic charities from the Gulf countries in the 1990s. Especially after 9/11, however, these Islamic charities holding a Salafi orientation came under increased scrutiny worldwide, including in Chad, as they were accused of supporting and/or funding terrorism.45 A number of them were dissolved or forced to leave the country during and in the aftermath of the US government-instigated “War on Terror.” International money transfers from Arab countries have

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become more difficult, as these can no longer be made anonymously and, in some instances, not in cash.46 The “War on Terror” has thus limited the number of Islamic charities from the Gulf and their possibilities to offer relief and deploy activities on the ground. Furthermore, there is a trend of Islamic charities toward reducing their visibility as Islamic organizations. Finally, it can also be noted that transnational Islamic charities are also facing increased vulnerability at the local level, as accusations of terrorism against transnational Islamic charities have become a means in local struggles over political and religious influence as seen in the struggle between the CSAI and the Salafis.47 In 2022, the effects of these developments are still visible, with only Qatar Charity, the Kuwaiti Direct Aid, and the Saudi organizations WAMY and Islamic Relief still working in N’Djamena. Secours Islamique France is another international Islamic NGO present in Chad since 2008, but unlike the aforementioned charities that have a Salafi outlook, it has a more Western secularized approach.48 In 2009, a national interreligious platform was put into place in order to promote dialogue and collaboration between the different faiths. The platform has its head office in the CET and is coordinated by a Catholic priest. The Archbishop, the president of EEMET, and the president of the CSAI are its members, the latter being the president. Each year on November 28, Chad’s commemoration day of its Independence in 1960, the platform organizes a joint Day of Prayer for Peace, Peaceful Cohabitation and National Harmony,49 at which the country’s president is also present. In addition, the platform, together with donors, organizes seminars on matters of peaceful cohabitation and the like. However, when speaking about the platform, high-level representatives of the Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim communities appear to be rather skeptical, stating that in principle it is a good thing to have such a body, but that its functioning should be evaluated, as its real impact is perceived to be rather low.50 Beyond the national interreligious platform, there is little collaboration between the different faith groups either. At the local level, sometimes modest collaboration takes place. The Protestant and Catholic youth groups mentioned in the foregoing, for instance, mutually invite each other when they organize specific activities. In a schooling workshop in southern Chad, a Catholic organization invited AMA/Direct Aid to participate. Most of the time the initiative appears to come from a Catholic organization, interfaith dialogue being actively stimulated in the Catholic Church. Protestant organizations are much less inclined to

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collaborate with other faith organizations, and Islamic organizations may speak about it and have an interfaith dialogue discourse, but rarely take the initiative.51 Looking at the domains of intervention, it appears that all faith groups, apart from their religious activities, work in the domain of education and health. The CET, the CSAI, and EEMET administer schools from primary to tertiary education, health clinics, and hospitals. They are also involved in activities to promote peaceful cohabitation in Chad, be it by organizing seminars and courses themselves or by participating in activities in this field that are initiated from abroad.52 Support for the needy takes place in the churches and mosques through the distribution of food and (modest) funds. Within this portfolio, however, accents between the various faith groups broadly differ. For Catholic organizations, “good works” in the sense of social interventions are generally considered as a predominant task, while Protestant groups prioritize religious activities such as Bible study and evangelization. The Catholic Church also has a tradition of expressing itself in the public sphere on the state of the country. It does so, for instance, in its Christmas Letters (Lettres de Noel),53 messages to the faithful that also contain criticism directed to the country’s leadership—although this is often carefully formulated and not up-front. The Protestant Church generally only speaks up when the church or its leaders are affected, such as when a priest in the south of the country had been attacked, and the police had not reacted correctly.54 These differences in activism are established by the basic difference between Protestantism and Catholicism, Protestantism being based on the principles of “sola fide” (“only faith”) and “sola scriptura” (“only the Holy Scripture”) guiding redemption, whereas in Catholicism doing good and taking social responsibility is considered an important way to salvation.55 Islamic organizations in their approach partly resemble Protestant organizations, with their social activities, such as education, care for orphans, and distribution of food, considered more as a consequence and corollary of their religious agenda and activities than a starting point. But because Islam is considered as encompassing all aspects of life, the reach of their work may be larger than that of Protestant organizations, while especially Salafi Muslims may for instance also criticize the secular character of the state.56 Radio station broadcasting is important in infrastructure-poor Chad, and all faith groups have their own radio stations. Among the 55 private radios in Chad, about 10 are Christian radio stations, 5 of which are

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Catholics and the others Protestant. The Catholic Church broadcasts via its radio stations Ar-en-Ciel, while radio Alquoran Alkarim is the official radio stations of the CSAI. Radio station AL-Bayane is the second Islamic radio station in N’Djamena. A recent study shows that Catholics prefer to register their radio stations as a community radio station, meaning they are only allowed to devote up to 20% of their programs to religious content. The Lutheran radio station appears to also prefer community status, whereas the Pentecostal radio stations prefer “confessional status” with more than 50% of the programs dedicated to religious content.57 Radio station Alquoran Alkarim is also a confessional radio station, while Radio station Al-Bayane, more related to Salafi circles, prefers not to present itself as a confessional radio station but instead as broadcasting cultural content. The Catholic community radio station collaborates with the public radio station but not with other faiths. The Lutheran radio station shows little collaboration across denominations, while the Pentecostal radio stations collaborate among themselves.58 Radio Al-Bayane collaborates with international Arab channels and broadcasts the BBC World Service in Arabic on a daily basis.59 At the end of this section, it is worthwhile to also pay some attention to the differences in (opportunities for) getting funding between Christian and Islamic organizations. It appears that for local Islamic NGOs and associations, it is particularly difficult to get credit/funds, as they are subject to more intensive screening than others. Organizations that work with Western (established) donors have relatively easy access to funds at the bank. Islamic organizations, if they have access to funding at all, often get their funds from the Middle East, be it from organizations or individuals, whose credentials are thoroughly screened.60 In addition, charities and other donors from the Gulf often prefer to directly work with a target group and not through the mediation of a local partner organization, implying that for local Islamic organizations it is difficult to access funds if their leaders are not yet part of a (personal) network linking them to well-off people in the Middle East.61 Finally, Islamic funds are often put to a one-time asset (a mosque, a well, a health center or medical caravan, distribution of food) and not for the running costs after infrastructure has been built, which makes it difficult for Islamic associations to have longer-term support. But while Christian organizations have a larger pool of possible donors and normally have their partnerships not that intensely screened, they

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have their troubles in finding external funding, too. Changes in accountability requirements and aid fashions in the West have contributed to the fact that many Western donor NGOs no longer support local organizations on a longer-term basis and for their running costs, which has made it more difficult also for Christian organizations to survive. It has also made it more difficult to develop their own longer-term agendas, as they have to respond to priorities set in the West each time that they apply for project funding. Also, personal networks count. As one informant stated: “Before, the Archbishop used to come from Europe. Now that he is a local, it has become increasingly difficult for the Church to get funds.”62 It can be concluded that the religious organizational landscape is diverse, and that the Catholic part is the most coherently organized and united in its approach and agenda. The Protestant field is more scattered with less collaboration between churches and often evencompetition, while the Islamic field is characterized by the dissensions between Sufis and Salafis and the strong hand of the state in the management of affairs. Another observation is that important religious voices, like the Ansar AlSunna and related Salafi groups as well as the independent Protestant churches, are not represented in the religious bodies that serve as dialogue platforms with other actors, including the state. This may lead to frustration and feelings of marginalization when this is not self-chosen, such as in the case of the Ansar Al-Sunna, or to a lack of control and oversight of what is happening in groups that are willingly disconnected, such as in the case of some Protestant churches or itinerant preachers. Overall, the religious associations play an important role for their own constituencies. As religion is important in Chad and people take their faith seriously, their religious community offers them important spiritual guidance, an identity reference, and a social safety net. In the following, I will look more in-depth into the effects of these religious associations in the social, religious, and political sphere. I will show that, despite a lot of good will, idealism, and good intentions, their work is in the end very much influenced by the charged political and societal climate in which they have to work, leading to mixed impacts.

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Effects in the Social, Religious, and Political Sphere Concerning the social effects of these religious organizations’ work, it can be safely stated that the interventions in the education and health sectors by all three faith groups make an important contribution to making up for the non-performance of the state in these sectors. This is a big achievement and a big asset to Chadian society. It also has its downside, though, as was laid out very well by a Catholic aid worker. On the one hand, he was proud of the social achievements and also the appreciation that the Catholic Church receives from the government for their contributions in the field of education and health; on the other hand, he stated: “In fact, this is a cohabitation in which all parties profit: the Church is doing good things for the population and this also stabilizes the country. But the Church stabilizes a state that is based on the non-respect of rights. We help a regime that in fact we do not want to help. But what is the alternative? If we do nothing, the people will die…our strong commitment in fact profits the State…”63 In addition, from a societal angle, it should be noted that the division of the educational field between Francophone, Christian-organized, schooling, and Arabophone schooling organized by the CSAI contributes to furthering social cleavages along religious lines, as students follow different curriculums, engage in different networks, and develop their identities on the basis of a language/religion nexus.64 A similar mix of positive and divisive effects can be observed when looking at the organizations’ religious activities. As stated before, religion is important in Chad and offers people hope, spiritual inspiration and support, and a community to belong to in a context that is marked by poverty and marginalization for a large part of the population. On the other hand, particularly missionary activities like evangelization and da’wa, may lead to polarization and enhance cleavages. This is clearly visible in the south of Chad, for instance, where Christian and Islamic organizations compete for influence. There is little direct confrontation between them, but the people at grassroots level—the target groups— often feel the consequences of their rivalry. Sometimes it is only that they have to deal with two different messages or approaches, which can be confusing. Not uncommonly, however, the rivalry between Christian and Muslim organizations takes a fiercer turn, with the slandering of the other party and the fueling of fear. People in southern Chad indicated that they felt that these missionary activities lead to cleavages in villages

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and families. A high official at the Department of Religious Affairs of the Ministry of the Interior in N’Djamena that is charged with overseeing all religious activities of international actors in the country stated that these may come to the aid of people with the best intentions and are often also helpful in a material sense, but nevertheless often cause harm from a social perspective.65 The religious rivalry within faiths, such as between different Protestant churches and between Tijani and Salafi groups, may produce similar effects. Especially when religious messages are hijacked by/ instrumentalized in geopolitical agendas (of for instance Western and Arab states) and/or local political agendas, like in currentday Chad, religion may turn into a vector of division rather than of peace alone. Finally, to decrypt the processes and effects in the political sphere, let us have a closer look at the developments with which I started this chapter, namely the current so-called phase of transition and the role of religious actors in the negotiations concerning Chad’s future. As mentioned in the introduction, the leaders of the Catholic Church, the Protestant platform EEMET, and the CSAI have been included from the beginning. They all have a member in the CODNI, the Committee for the Organisation of a National Inclusive Dialogue (Comité d’Organisation du Dialogue National Inclusif), formed by the CMT (Comité Militaire de Transition) to prepare further discussions on the transition and the new constitution and based on a broad representation of society, including representatives of the CNT (comité national de transition, a committee playing the role of the government during the transition period), political parties, civil society, faith, traditional authorities, women’s groups, handicapped people, and youth.66 A representative of one of the Christian youth groups told me that youth could propose themselves as individuals to be elected in the committee, but in the end it was very unclear on which criteria people had been selected.67 The committee has been divided into several working groups, working among other things on women’s rights, faith, the inclusion of people with a handicap, and preparing texts to be included in the final document. The people who had been included in the committee and had participated in the working groups by June 2022 had become frustrated by the course of things, however, complaining that they had proposed texts and worked with the guidelines given, but that in a following meeting everything seemed to have changed again, and in fact nobody knew what was going on in reality; the entire process was considered to be opaque.68

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Others, such as representatives of the Catholic and Protestant youth associations, declared not to want to be involved, because “if you participate, this means that you approve of it.” They preferred to stay away and express their opinions in other ways. The Protestant UJC, for instance, during their general assembly in Doba in April 2022, produced the socalled Doba Declaration, in which they called for improvements in education and for “a dialogue that is truly national, inclusive, straightforward, sincere and without politicking calculation.”69 The apparent acceptance by the religious leaders of the entire process instigated by the military leadership led by Mahamat Déby after Idriss Déby’s death also led to frustration by ordinary citizens, be they Muslim, Catholic, or Protestant. It seemed that in this crisis and crucial moment of negotiations on the country’s future, people became increasingly critical about the cohabitation between religious leaders and the state. Over the last year, protests have been held, with people asking for fair elections and an assurance that Mahamat Déby will not stand in them. It is interesting to note that for the first time, northerners and southerners, Muslims and Christians, have found a common goal in protesting against the influence of the West, particularly France but also the European Union, and their propping up the Déby regime. One of my interlocutors was able to provide more in-depth interpretation, explaining that “the Muslims want to get rid of France and its hold on the country. The others want that, too, but they just want more room for local initiatives, for selfdetermination, while the protests of the Muslims go further, for them it also is a fight against the Francophonie in a cultural sense.”70 When I asked my interlocutors what the European Union can do in this process of transition and negotiating the future, they were unanimous in declaring that it should stay away from supporting the leadership and be more critical toward the regime. It is clear that the current transitional regime, as in the past, finely navigates the interests, priorities, and fears of its partners. In this process, religion is once more politicized and used as a tool for creating division and unity depending on the need of the moment, and religious actors are being put to serve political goals and ambitions. As in the past, religious leaders have tried to speak out and play a positive role but in covert terms, as in this multifaith and religiously diverse context, their respective clout is never strong enough to escape vulnerability toward a regime playing on divisions between and within faith groups to have its way.

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Conclusion Chad has always been at the crossroads of various cultural, religious, and geopolitical influences. Of the last 50 years, at least 30 have been characterized by weaponed conflict and war, in which since 1980 religion has emerged as a political factor, as it was instrumentalized by Hissein Habré in developing a divisive discourse about a Muslim north and a Christian south. Since then, religion has been present in political struggles and continues to be instrumentalized by political power holders. In this way, polarization has been created and reinforced between Christians and Muslims but also between different groups of Muslims. Among the Chadian population, there is the perception that people of different faith and ethnic backgrounds used to live together and alongside one another in peace and good conviviality but that this has changed since 1979. They also recognize that religion has been instrumentalized by politicians and firmly state that they want to live together in peace. It also appears, however, that this is difficult in practice in a societal context marked by poverty, lack of resources, and exclusion, and where clientelism and identity politics are practically the only mechanisms to get access to better opportunities. In such a context it does not come as a surprise that Muslims who do not belong to the ethnic group in power still may use their religious identity in order to get some crumbles of the cake to the detriment of Christians, for instance, via preferential treatment in judicial cases. Older Christians in particular carry the longstanding experience of being discriminated against since the 1980s and, as a consequence, may show a lot of frustration and resentment against Muslims. For younger Christians, this framework of interpretation around religious divisions seems to lose a bit of importance and is replaced by a framework centered around the power of specific ethnic elites. Religious organizations in Chad thus operate in a charged local context. On the one hand, they do a lot of good work in supporting their constituencies in the spiritual and social domain, offering them messages of hope, rules to live with, basic services, and a social community. On the other hand, precisely because of the characteristics of the context, through their activities they also help, at the top, a corrupt and autocratic regime to remain in power, while at the grassroots, they may contribute to further division by spreading their faith. Efforts to speak up against malpractices and injustices often do not have the power needed and/or wished for, as Christian organizations operate from a minority position

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and feel that they need to be careful in their dealings with the state. Salafi groups are also vulnerable in view of the collusion of the CSAI with the state. The CSAI and associated groups, in their turn, need to take care not to lose their privileged relationship with the ruling elite. In this way, religious actors seem to be trapped in a situation that does prevent them from really helping to change things for the better. Religious organizations in Chad, apart from dealing with a challenging local environment, also operate within a global dynamic that on the one hand sets constraints and carries risks, but on the other hand could come in as a support. Constraints and risks come with geopolitical agendas of Chadian religious actors’ international partners that may not be at the service of what these organizations and their target groups need. Opportunities may arise if international partners offer support in recognition of local tensions while at the same time acknowledging that social, economic, and political inclusion for the entire population is of utmost importance. More generally, we have seen that the Western preoccupation with migration control, security, and economic opportunities has meant that the Déby clan up till now could have its way and continued to be supported despite serious human rights violations and acts against the constitution. We have also seen how the Chadian ruling elite has cleverly played on international fears for violent Islamic extremism by showing itself as a trustable ally in the fight against Boko Haram while this at the same time also allowed for spending money on military equipment for fighting internal opposition. Many people in Chad, Muslims and Christians alike, have expressed their frustration and anger about this, what they consider as opportunistic, behavior, especially by France and the European Union. Clear and unmistakably international support for religious and other actors in Chad who claim their right to be included in decision-making on the future of their country would make a difference in their negotiation power and strengthen their at-present fragile political position. Being able to escape political instrumentalization is crucial for religious actors to play their role in the promotion of social welfare and well-being in Chad to the fullest.

Notes 1. A. Thurston, “Chad’s Religious Leaders Remain Mostly Outside the Fray, Unlike Elswhere in the Sahel,” African Arguments 5

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2.

3.

4. 5. 6.

7.

8. 9.

10. 11.

12.

13.

(2021), https://africanarguments.org/2021/05/chads-religious-leadersremain-mostly-outside-the-fray-unlike-elsewhere-in-the-sahel/. “Death of the Chadian President Idriss Déby—Where Were You When You Heard the News,” African Arguments, vol. 4, 2021, https://africa narguments.org/2021/04/death-of-the-chadian-president-idriss-Débywhere-were-you-when-you-heard-the-news/. I. Severan, and D. Kode, “Chad’s Transition to Nowhere,” African Arguments 7 (2022), https://africanarguments.org/2022/07/chad-tra nsition-to-nowhere/. Interview, N’Djamena, June 7, 2022. Thurston, “Chad’s Religious Leaders.” C. Racine and M. A. Mahamat, “La cité culturelle tchadienne au miroir de la lutte anti-terroriste ou les enjeux de pouvoir d’une labellisaton religieuse subversive,” Politique Africaine 149 (March 2018): 21–42; G. Bucumi, “Quelques paradoxes contemporains de la laïcité de l’État au Tchad,” Revue du droit des religions 8 (2019): 155–73. “The Death of Déby—All Change in Chad,” African Arguments 4 (2021), https://africanarguments.org/2021/04/the-death-of-Débyall-change-in-chad/. CIA Factbook, “Chad,” https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/cou ntries/chad/. CEFOD (Centre d’études et de formation pour le Développement), Les religions et la violence: cas du Tchad. Missio Aachen (N’Djaména, Chad: CEFOD, 2019). CIA Factbook, “Chad.” N’djamena is by far the biggest city in the country with 721,081 inhabitants (2022 estimate), followed by Moundou in the south with only 135,167 inhabitants (“Chad,” World Population Review, https://wor ldpopulationreview.com/countries/cities/chad). Other important urban centers include Mongo in the center and Abeche in the north of the country. In N’djamena, this is the result of deliberate policies. During civil war of 1997–82, N’djamena was almost entirely destroyed. After reconstruction, the many ethnically mixed residential areas were ‘de-mixed,’ since when N’Djamena has been divided into south and north by ethnicity. See H. Dickow, Democrats Without Democracy?: Attitudes and Opinions on Society, Religion and Politics in Chad (Byblos: Centre International des Sciences de l’Homme, 2005). According to the Joshua Project, a global evangelization program run from the United States, the annual evangelical growth rate in Chad is 3.2 percent (“Country: Chad, Joshua Project, https://joshuaproject.net/cou ntries/CD). For da’wa in the south of Chad, see M. Kaag, “Aid, Umma and Politics: Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad,” in Muslim Politics

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14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19.

20.

21. 22.

23.

24.

25. 26. 27. 28.

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in Africa, ed. R. Otayek and B. Soares (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 85–102. Dickow, Democrats Without Democracy? H. Dickow, “Chad: The Bed Déby Made,” African Arguments, 4 (2021), https://africanarguments.org/2021/04/chad-the-bed-Déby-made/. Interviews N’Djamena 2014 and 2022. See also CEFOD, Les religions et la violence. Hilton N’Djamena Toumaï Palace will feature 230 guest rooms, including 19 extended-stay suites and a presidential suite. The property will feature several dining outlets, including a specialty restaurant and a spectacular sky bar, as well as a lobby bar and lounge. Meeting space will consist of an executive lounge with a private meeting room, six individual meeting rooms and a banquet hall, whilst the hotel will also feature an outdoor pool and upscale fitness facilities (https://www.hotel-online.com/press_ releases/release/hilton-signs-with-wotf-turizm-ticaret-anonim-sirketi-toopen-hilton-ndjamena-toumai-palace-chad/). CEFOD, Les religions et la violence. Social Security Administration, “Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Africa,” 2019, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ ssptw/2018-2019/africa/chad.html. CEIC Data, “Chad TD: Informal Employment: % of Total NonAgricultural Employment, 2018, https://www.ceicdata.com/en/chad/ employment-and-unemployment/td-informal-employment--of-total-non agricultural-employment. CEFOD, Les religions et la violence. “Economic Bulletin,” 2019, European Central Bank, https://www. ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2019/html/ecb.ebbox2 01901_01~dd4b3e4eb2.en.html. The Zaghawa make up only about 3% to 4% of the population, though strategic alliances, like marriages, enabled Déby to build alliances with other ethnic groups. Some past rebel groups have been mobilized by clan affiliations, but FACT doesn’t appear to be based on ethnic affiliation. See Dickow, “Chad: The Bed Déby Made.” R. Marchal, Petites et grandes controverses de la politique française et européenne au Tchad (N’djamena: Comité de Suivi de l’Appel à la Paix et à la Réconciliation au Tchad. CIA Factbook, “Chad.” Only eight other African countries spent less, including Guinea, Mauretania, CAR and South Sudan (CIA Factbook). CIA Factbook, “Chad.” CEFOD, Les religions et la violence. See also M. Kaag, “Linking-In through Education? Exploring the Educational Question in Africa from

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30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

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the Perspective of Flows and (dis) Connections,” Sustainability 10, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.3390/su10020496. CEFOD, Les religions et la violence; R. Hoinathy and D. Eizenga, “The State of Secularism in Chadian Higher Education. Testing Perceived Ties to Violent Extremism,” Resolve Network Research Brief, no. 2/Lake Chad Basin Research Series, February 2019. CIA Factbook, “Chad.” CEFOD, Les religions et la violence. For a more in-depth discussion of what laïcité means in Chad, and of the debates surrounding it, see, for instance Bucumi, “Quelques paradoxes contemporains de la laïcité de l’État au Tchad.” CEFOD, Les religions et la violence. Interview, June 12, 2022. R. Dijk, “Time and Transcultural Technologies of the Self in the Ghanaian Pentecostal Diaspora,” in Between Babel and Pentecost: Transnational Pentecostalism in Africa and Latin America, eds. A. Corten and R. Marshall-Fratani (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 216–34. Interview N’djamena, June 12, 2022. Interview N’Djamena, June 13, 2022. Interview N’Djamena, June 11, 2022; Hoinathy and Eizenga, “The State of Secularism in Chadian Higher Education.” Racine and Mahamat, “La cité culturelle tchadienne.” US State Department, Chad Religious Freedom Report 2018 (Washington, DC: United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2018). Racine and Mahamat, “La cité culturelle tchadienne.” Hoinathy and Eizenga, “The State of Secularism in Chadian Higher Education.” Racine and Mahamat, “La cité culturelle tchadienne.” Racine and Mahamat, “La cité cultuelle tchadienne.” M. Kaag, “Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad: Islamic Solidarity in the Age of Neoliberalism,” Africa Today 54, no. 3 (2008): 3–18. M. Kaag, “Comparing Connectivities: Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad and Senegal,” in The Social Life of Connectivity in Africa, eds. M. De Bruijn and R. van Dijk (New York: Macmillan, 2012), 183–201; Y. Bokhari, N. Chowdhury, and R. Lacey, “A Good Day to Buy a Bad Charity: Charting the Rise and Fall of the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation,” in Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the Age of Terror and Beyond, eds. R. Lacey and J. Benthall (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2014) [AU: Please provide page range]. Kaag, “Comparing Connectivities”; Racine and Mahamat, “La cité cultuelle tchadienne.”

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48. For an overview of the different types of transnational Islamic NGOs, see Juul Petersen, “Islamizing Aid: Transnational Muslim NGOs After 9.11,” Voluntas, March 1, 2011, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41427516. 49. Journée de la prière pour la paix et la cohabitation pacifique et la concorde nationale. 50. Interviews N’Djamena, June 2022. 51. M. Kaag, “Islamic Charities from the Arab World in Africa: Intercultural Encounters of Humanitarianism and Morality,” in Humanitarianism and Challenges of Cooperation, eds. V. M. Heins, K. Koddenbrock, and C. Unrau (London: Routledge, 2016), 155–67. 52. In the context of fighting Boko Haram and broader security agendas, peaceful cohabitation and preventing radicalization have become important themes in Western development programs for the region. 53. See, for a collection of these messages, N. Djimadoumbaye, Lumière dans notre nuit. Recueil des messages de l’épiscopat tchadien (1965–2020) (N’djamena, Chad: CEFOD, 2022). 54. Interview N’djamena, June 9, 2022. 55. “Protestanitism,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protestan tism#:~:text=A%20Protestant%20is%20an%20adherent,used%20outside% 20of%20German%20politics. 56. See also Centre Al-Mouna, Tchad, “Conflit Nord-Sud” Mythe ou réalité? (N’Djamena: Centre Culturel Al-Mouna, 1996). 57. L. Lado, “The Stakes of Catholic Media Practices in Chad,” in Mediating Catholicism: Religion and Media in Global Catholic Imaginaries, eds. E. Hoenes del Pinal, M. Roscou Loustau, and K. Norget (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2022) [AU: Please provide page range]. 58. Lado, “The Stakes of Catholic Media Practices in Chad.” 59. Interview Al Bayane, 2014. 60. Interview N’Djamena, June 11, 2022. 61. In this context, it appears that some Ansar al-Sunna groups, while being banned by the government, are still able to receive revenue through their leaders (Hoinathy and Eizenga 2019) who, for instance, may be part of an international network because they have studied in Sudan or Saudi Arabia. 62. Interview N’Djamena, June 9, 2022. 63. Interview N’Djamena June 10, 2022. 64. See also Hoinathy and Eizenga, “The State of Secularism in Chadian Higher Education”; Mayke Kaag, “Linking-in Through Education? Exploring the Educational Question in Africa from the Perspective of Flows and (Dis)connections, Sustainability,10, no. 2 (2018), https://doi. org/10.3390/su10020496.

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65. Kaag, “Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad.” 66. “Tchad: Le Premier minister nomme les 69 membres du comité d’organisation du Dialogue,” Alwihda Info, August 13, 2021, https://www. alwihdainfo.com/Tchad-le-Premier-ministre-nomme-les-69-membres-ducomite-d-organisation-du-Dialogue_a106197.html. 67. Interview N’Djamena, June 12, 2022. 68. Interviews N’Djamena, June 2022. 69. Union des Jeunes Chrétiens, Conseil d’Administration, Secrétariat General, Déclaration de Doba, April 17, 2022. 70. Interview N’djamena, June 7, 2022.

CHAPTER 10

Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare: Associational Life and Religion in Nigeria Omobolaji O. Olarinmoye

Introduction In the literature of state-building, the role of service provision by the state is crucial. Its efficient and effective provision is seen as setting in motion a “virtuous circle” of state-building that has a direct positive effect on state legitimacy and capacity to rule. Service provision along with maintenance of security and enablement of economic development is a core state function.1 State provision of social welfare is in reality more of a “mix,”2 of state and non-state (profit/non-profit) provision of social welfare services to the citizens of a state which at any moment is the product of its history (colonial, postcolonial, metropole, colony), level of development (developed, developing), regime type (autocratic/ democratic), and ethno-religious landscape. In this welfare mix, religious

O. O. Olarinmoye (B) Yale University Library, New Haven CT, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Glatzer et al. (eds.), Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31960-0_10

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organizations/faith-based organizations have always played a prominent role though such suffered recognition for the larger part of the twentieth century from development policy circles. The failure of state-centered development models (including state social welfare provision) has shifted attention back to non-state providers in the welfare mix but more importantly, in recent times and primarily due to the work of determined advocates, to religious providers of social services.3 The faith–development advocacy’s success in placing faith-based organizations/religion on the agenda of the development community has generated queries from skeptics with regard to verifiable evidence to back up the claims of the relevance of faith-based organizations in social development in developing countries especially in Africa which has been the key base supporting the faith–development advocacy. This chapter is conceived within the current need to clarify the actual reality of faith-based organization/religious social service provision in developing countries using the case of Nigeria. Nigeria is a very important case given its economic and social development indicators, population size and ethno-religious diversity. Its social indicators are dismal: life expectancy at birth in Nigeria is 55 years (2020), and annual population growth is 2.5% (2020). Its net migration is 300,000; unemployment, 9.8% (2020); annual inflation, 11.4% (2019); and access to electricity is 55.5% (2020). Thirty-one percent of the population use safely managed sanitation services, while 78% have access to basic drinking water services, and 33.2% (2020) have access to basic handwashing facilities including soap and water. Fifty-four percent of children between the ages of 12 to 23 months in Nigeria are immunized for measles (2020), maternal mortality is 917 (2017) per 100,000 life birth, and the prevalence of HIV/AIDs (% of population 15–49 years) is 1.3%. Fifteen percent (2019) of the adult population are undernourished and 21.4% (2019) of the population face severe food insecurity. The adult literacy rate (15 years and above) is 62% (2018) and for children 87% (2018). Government expenditure on education (% of total government expenditure) is 5.7% (2020).4 Nigeria’s population size at 225,082,083 (2022 estimate) is the largest for any African country with the highest density in the South and Southeast. The population is made-up of Hausa (30%), Yoruba (15.5%), Ibo (15.2%), Fulani (6%), Tiv (2.4%), Kanuri (2.4%), Ijaw (1.8%), and others (24.7%). The major Nigerian languages are English (official), Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo (Ibo), Fulani, and 500 indigenous languages. The country

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is a federation of 36 administrative units/states and one federal capital territory (Abuja)5 with a “mixed legal system of English Common law, Islamic law (in 12 northern states), and traditional law.”6 Our analysis will focus on answering the following questions with regard to Nigeria: What is the path of church–state relationship in Nigeria? What is the current religious make-up of Nigerian society? What do religious actors intend to achieve in their public agency in Nigeria? How do religious actors operate in the public square in Nigeria? What are the consequences (intended or unintended) of religious actors’ political/public involvement in Nigeria? What pressures would be brought on the Nigerian state if services provided by churches and faith-based organizations were stopped? How is religion viewed by the Nigerian population?

State–Religion Relations in Nigeria: Partnership (Colonial) Phase The partnership phase in state–religion relations in Nigeria is the period of active collaboration between the colonial state and organized religion. Both actors recognized each other’s sphere of influence and collaborated to achieve the governmentality or normalization of European hegemony on the people and territory of Nigeria. They both recognized that only active collaboration could ensure that their individual goals was achieved: control of natural resources (state) and evangelization (religion). More important for the secular power was the fact that the partnership enabled them to transfer to religious missions the onerous, time-consuming, and expensive task of social service provision (health and education), thus allowing the Nigerian colonial state to concentrate its scarce resources on territorial pacification. The religious social service provision also helped to assure the angst of the conquered indigenes and build legitimacy for the new colonial administration. Religious actors, on the other hand, due to the armed backing of the secular power, had freedom of access to any part of the conquered territory and an innate upper hand in dealing with indigenous peoples and authorities. In the Northern Protectorate, a partnership based on religion between the colonial power and the conquered Muslim ruling elites of the protectorate (indirect rule) provided similar benefit as it left the Muslim rulers in control of their territory but under British guidance. Simply put, the

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British were able to draw upon the Islamic traditional-charismatic legitimacy of the Muslim rulers to enable peaceful pacification and integration of the region. The presence of Christian missions was severely curtailed by the colonial administration which feared that their presence would be inimical to the “peaceful relations” the administration had with the traditional rulers of the province who objected to Christian missionary presence on religious grounds. Later on, administrators such as Governor Percy Girouard and Charles L. Temple prohibited Christian missionaries from establishing missions in the Northern Protectorate in order to “prevent missionaries from providing literary education to Africans who they believed would come to equate themselves with Europeans and challenge colonial rule.”7 Mission stations in “Muslim towns were closed down, the land leases of Christian Missionary stations were made subject to annual renewal to enable easy revocation, conditions were made more stringent for establishing stations and until 1930 mission schools in the Northern region were denied financial assistance.”8 At the same time, religion emerged as the site of the first sustained indigenous nationalist reaction to colonialism as it produced a new set of elites (Christian and Muslim) capable of combining religious mobilizing structures/organizations and its repertoire of collective action to exploit political opportunity arising from the actions of state and religious partnership after the First World War and during the Inter-War economic depression, to demand for change. The activities of indigenous religious movements such as the Aladura/Charismatic movements that expressed new ideas and asserted an African way of doing things and challenged European claims to religious (and political) exclusivity were treated with suspicion and repression by the colonial secular and organized religious authorities: imprisonment and exile of leaders and forcing out of mission churches of the “dissidents.” The religious dissent proved to be the first of many of such in other spheres of public life (education, politics, trade union, trade) that were to confront the secular–religious partnership but it held on broadly speaking, till the eve of independence in 1960.9

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State–Religion Relations in Nigeria: From Partnership to State Hegemony The partnership of state and religion began to shift to one of state hegemony with the beginning of the period of self-rule under the leadership of indigenous elites from 1950 to 1959. Central to the program of the nationalists in power was the improvement of social services, an area that was the exclusive preserve of the religious part of the state–religion partnership. The missions’ response to nationalists’ social service efforts varied from accommodation as was the case with the Universal Primary Education program of the Awolowo-led administration in the Western region, to outright refusal and sabotage of similar attempts by the Azikiwe-led government of the Eastern region of Nigeria. The Eastern region government in return made serious charges against mission-provided educational services such as inequitable conditions of service for teachers as compared with those of their counterparts in other employments; employment of too many expatriate staff by the Missionary Societies; discrimination in the admission of pupils and in the employment of teachers on grounds of religion; division of local communities into rival factions; and establishment of more schools than were actually needed.10 The often-terse reactions of missions to the activities of nationalist-led governments in the context of the elite struggles to shape the political settlement that would underpin the post-independent control of power in Nigeria, transformed organized religion in the eyes of the nationalists into important opponents that had to be dealt with. Religion was either co-opted through preferential treatment like incorporation into political parties and state political and administrative elites, continuation of grant in aid, and funding of religious pilgrimage (West); or sanctioned by the outright withdrawal of privileges (especially in the area of education) previously enjoyed by missions, as was done by the Eastern regional government; creation of government-affiliated religious sects like the Usmaniyya, a Sufi group founded by the premier of the Northern region, Ahmadu Bello, to rival and supersede older Sufi sects in the region such as the Qadiriyya and Tij¯aniyyah; or suppression as with Bello’s “conversion campaigns” to convert non-Muslims in Northern Nigeria, starting in 1963. The civil war provided even more opportunity for enhancing state hegemony in state–religion relations in Nigeria. The Nigerian Military Government seized upon a) the highly visible role of the missionaries/

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organized religion groups, led by the Roman Catholic Church in mobilizing external humanitarian aid to address the devastating effects of the federal government blockage of the breakaway region, b) the use of “religion,” often anti-Islamic, in the propaganda used to mobilize such aid, along with c) an urgent need to address the massive devastation to social service infrastructure in the Eastern region arising from the war, to clamp down on the operations of religious groups. Accusing Roman Catholic missionaries of prolonging the duration of the civil war and interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, the Nigerian Government arrested and eventually expelled the bulk of expatriate personnel working in the region (300 priests and 200 sisters)11 from the country.12 The government’s action was to have devastating consequences for religious (especially Roman Catholic) social service provision capacity in the Eastern region given that the expatriates made-up the majority of such service providers and there had not been adequate training of local Nigerians to take their place. For example, in 1966, of the 160 senior administrative staff (education secretaries and deputies, supervisors and parish managers) of the Roman Catholic Education mission in the Eastern Region of Nigeria, 120, or 75%, were expatriates, not including principals, teachers, and staff of mission hospitals. Laws such as Eastern Nigeria, Education (School Boards) Law 1965 Extraordinary, Gazette no. 81; Education (School Board) Law 1965; East Central States Public Education Edict No. 5 of 1970; Lagos State’s Education Law (Amendment) Edict/No. 11 of 1970; South Eastern State’s Education (School’s Board) Edict/No. 20 of 1971; and MidWestern State’s Education Edict, No. 5 of 1973)13 were promulgated to give state governments control over the educational facilities in their states. The takeover of religious social service facilities was not limited to the Southern parts of the federation (as the above laws might portray). On August 21, 1972, the federal military government decided “that the Federal Government henceforth assume full responsibility for higher education in the country, with the proviso that the status quo in respect of the existing universities should be maintained. It also decided that education, other than higher education should become the concurrent responsibility of both the Federal and state government and be transferred to the concurrent Legislative list.”14 In the face of overwhelming dominance of the state, mainline Protestant and Catholic organized religion retreated into civil society, adopting

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the prophetic voice to address state policies that were perceived as inimical to religious interest and in violation of basic human rights of Nigerian citizens who were their adherents. In the North, elites eagerly adopted the new civil society posture of organized religion as a tool for addressing their deficiency in political leaders with pan-Northern influence following the death of the former prime minister of Nigeria, Sir Abubakar TafawaBalewa, and the premier of Northern region, Sir Ahmadu Bello during the January 15, 1966, coup d’état. Only the religious leaders had similar pan-Northern influence, which was leveraged to respond to perceived hegemonic actions of the military government at state and national levels that were seen as inimical to northern interests. Religious leaders such as Sheik Abubakar Gumi led the northern response to the various policies of the military government such as indigenization of the economy, creation of 12 and later 19 states out of the old 4-stateregional and center government political structure, establishment of new local governments, rollout of a new constitution, the Sharia Federal Court of Appeal case, and inception of the political transition program.15 Islamic-influenced and -led Northern Nigerian civil society benefited from the emergence and rapid consolidation of Islamic faith-based organizations, which, encouraged by pan-Islamic ideals of solidarity and facilitated by rapidly increasing oil revenue, introduced da’wa (missions) to protect Muslim faith and identity in Africa.16 Organized religion as a whole in Nigeria gained prominence in civil society because the military government had succeeded greatly in stifling all other traditional channels/structures of vertical accountability, such as political parties and trade unions and the press. Its prominent civil society position enabled organized religion to exert a considerable influence on the repertoire of collective action of the emerging Nigerian civil society.

State–Religion Relations in Nigeria: Weak State–Assertive Religion 1980–Present When the Obasanjo-military government implemented political transition program resulted in a Muslim-dominated federal government, Christian groups such as the Christian Association of Nigeria became leading voices in civil society. Their main grouse was with perceived pro-Muslim actions

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by the civilian federal government, such as the intention of the president, Shehu Shagari, to establish a special advisory board on Islamic Affairs dealing with all matters affecting the welfare of Muslims in the country. Christian civil society groups criticized the proposed board as “one meant to turn Nigeria into a Muslim state.”17 Their strong pushback eventually led to the president abandoning the idea and instead appointing special assistants for Islamic and Christian Affairs. The debate took place within the context of sectarian violence associated with the “Maitatsine” fundamentalist Islamic group that killed 4,177 persons in December 1980 and another 400 on October 30, 1982. The glaring pro-Islamic actions of the subsequent Hausa-Fulani Muslim–led federal military government (Buhari, 1984–85, Babangida, 1985–93, and Abacha 1993–98) all reinforced Christian organizations’ role as a leading voice of Nigerian civil society, especially in the absence of normal structures of vertical and horizontal accountability. They were vigorous in their condemnation of attempts by the Buhari government to cut the normal two-day Christian Easter holidays to one day. Its importation of rams for the Muslim feast of Id-el-Kabir was condemned as outrageous favoritism of a particular religion in a multireligious society and demands were made that the government should import turkeys for the Christians too. The Babangida administration’s pro-Islamic actions, such as government sponsorship of Nigerian representatives to the meeting of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in January 1986, where Nigeria’s membership was approved, was opposed by Christian civil society groups on the grounds that it was never discussed at any of the country’s executive council meetings, as the Chief of General Staff, the second in command in the administration and a Christian, was unaware of the action by the president and his advisers and that such a move was against the secular nature of the country as enshrined in its constitution.18 Babangida, in spite of Christian opposition, ratified and signed Nigeria’s membership of the OIC, and made Nigeria a member of the Islamic Development Bank. Abacha, in the face of Southern Christian opposition to the annulled 1993 presidential election and the subsequent coup that ended the tenure of the Interim National Government, led by a Southern Christian, Ernest Shonekan, pursued a pro-Islamic foreign policy and repressed southern Christian opposition politicians and civil society activists.

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Civil society’s vertical political activities during the period were not limited to peaceful channels. Pro-Islamic actions of the three military governments had violent repercussions, as they emboldened both Christian and Muslim activists to resort to violent mobilizations. Muslims and Christians engaged one another in violent incidents at the University of Ibadan in May 1986, at Kaduna Polytechnic in March 1988, and Ahmadu Bello University on June 12, 1988. The frustrations associated with the economic recession starting from the early 1980s, corruption, and authoritarian policies of the military government during the period further heightened civil society’s turn to violence during the period. Religious assertiveness that had grown rapidly during the military regimes of Buhari, Babangida, Abacha, and Abubakar reached a crescendo with the introduction of Sharia in the 12 northern states. The Sharia move was a religious-themed counter-mobilization by northern elites reacting to the emergence of the Obasanjo (Christian) 4th Republic administration and his attempts to address the bias in state policies by retiring topranking military and police commanders), actions which were seen by some northern elite as anti-northern interests. The introduction of Sharia finally brought religion into the public arena with a bang and drastically changed the place of religion in the state–religion relationship. Religious assertiveness has been further emboldened by the role Christian and Muslim organizations played and continue to play in addressing the socio-economic consequences of the neoliberal policies adopted by military regimes during this period. The neoliberal policies had called for a drastic reduction in government spending on social services and the privatization of the institutions providing social services, such as the telecom and electricity companies, and the introduction of fees in government hospitals and schools. Church- and mosque-based networks mobilized internal and external resources to provide poverty-alleviation support to their members. Christian organizations benefited from resources provided by European Christian development organizations such as Caritas Internationalis, CIDSE (Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité), Christian Aid, Brot für die Welt, Bread for All, and the Inter-Church Organization for Development Cooperation (ICCO).19 Through these organizations, “large sums of money were transferred from European Christians to Africans mainly for the purposes of development rather than for evangelism.”20 American mainline Catholic and Evangelical churches are also major sources of much needed funds accessed by Christian

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churches in Nigeria, especially as the influence of the religious right in US politics increased and culminated in the opening up of access to US development aid and legitimizing in a major way what was taboo in development policy and practice: the mixing of evangelism and development work.21 Muslim organizations also tapped into external funding mostly from the Middle-Eastern oil-rich states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya. The external resource flows have transformed religious organizations into formal domestic public policy actors, capable of marring or advancing the goals of the secular state in Nigeria. More striking is the change in the political and development profile of Pentecostal churches in Nigeria, especially the neo-Pentecostals that came into prominence from the 1970s. The new changes involved an evolution of the development activities of Pentecostal churches in Nigeria from a focus on Spiritual life improvement strategies in the form of strong prayers, spiritual healing practices, and exorcisms to one that added progressive life improvement strategies emphasizing development action in health and education and the provision of food and shelter for the poor.22 The new active engagement with development has engendered an increased presence of Pentecostal organizations in local and national economic and social forums/arena/debates. Given the huge number of resources (human, institutional, and financial) at the disposal of Pentecostal groups, they are a dominant presence in Nigerian public space. The activities of Boko Haram in the Northeast are all expressions of the current religious assertiveness in Nigeria.

What Is the Current Religious Make-Up of Nigerian Society? The religious system in Nigeria is broadly split between Christians and Muslims with small groupings of other religions such as Hindu, Baha’i, and Buddhism. African Traditional Religions exert a strong influence on the two largest religions. The Islamic community (mostly in the north) includes the Sunni and the Shia as well as Sufi (Qadiriyya and Tij¯aniyyah) and Salafi (Wahhabi/reformist) subgroups. The Sunni group (35.52%) of the Maliki School is the majority in the Islamic community in Nigeria, and the principal Sufi Salafi subgroups are of Sunni orientation. The Shia (6.43%) are much smaller and of recent vintage (post-1979 Iranian revolution). The principal Shia groups are the Islamic Movement

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of Nigeria (IMN) led by Ibrahim El-Zakzaky and the Rasulul A’azam Foundation (RAAF). The IMN is antagonistic toward the secular federal government and has been involved in repeated clashes with state security forces that have led to loss of lives of its members and imprisonment of its leaders. The RAAF on its part recognizes the federal government. The IMN is an example of the militant segment of the Islamic community, which also includes Boko Haram and Maitatsine. The Christian Community (mostly in the South and central regions) is composed of Protestants, 41.85%; Catholics, 11.96%; and Orthodox, 0.03%. There has been a consistent decline in those who identify as “pagan,” from 50% in the 1931 census, to 34% in 1952, to 18.2% in the 1963 census23 (Fig. 10.1). In recent times, there has been a widening fertility gap between Christian and Muslim communities in Nigeria. The Muslim North is in an early phase of demographic transition with very high fertility rates, whereas the fertility rates of Christians and Muslims in the South are declining. The Demographic Health Survey of 1990 revealed a non-significant difference of 0.03 children between the North and the South. By 2013, it had increased to 2.3 children, in favor of the North.

Nigeria-Religous Adherents 2015 1% 8% 10% 42%

35% 13%

Fig. 10.1

Protestant

Catholic

Sunni

Shi'ite

Indigenous

Other (Bahai, Hindu, Not Religious)

Religious affiliation in Nigeria, 201524

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Between 1990 and 2013, the Total Fertility Rate per Woman (TFR) decreased significantly from 6.1 to 4.5 children for Christian women and increased from 6.4 to 6.8 children per woman for Muslim women.26 Briefly put, the data suggested that “natural increase is the primary driver of religious change in Nigeria presently and not religious identity switching”. Also, the timing of the divergence in fertility trends coincides with the formal introduction of Sharia law in Northern Nigeria. The implication of this demographic trend is that natural increase is the primary driver of religious change in Nigeria presently and not religious identity switching. The high fertility rates among Nigeria’s Muslims has been linked to factors such as lower levels of education and lower use of birth control. The percentage of Muslim women of childbearing age “who cannot read is three times as high among Muslims (71.9%) as among non-Muslim Nigerians (23.9%).”27 Sixty-six percent of Muslim women have no formal education, compared with 11.2% of non-Muslims, and only about 3% of Muslim women in Nigeria have attended college or university, compared with roughly 14% of non-Muslim women. Muslim women in Nigeria marry more than three years earlier on average than non-Muslim women (15.9 years for Muslims, compared with 19.5 years for non-Muslims) and 81.3% of Muslim women say they do not intend to use birth control, compared with 51.2% of non-Muslim women.28

What Do Religious Actors in Nigeria Want? From the above analysis of state–religion relations in Nigeria since the colonial period, the following goals of organized religion can be inferred: 1. Politics of recognition: Religious groups want state and society to recognize them as distinct groups with distinct and legitimate concerns. They desire that the government recognize and actively support the preservation of distinct religious cultures in Nigeria. They also desire state support of religious events (public holidays) and religious educational instruction in public institutions of learning. They usually seek legal rights at least equal to other citizens. Issues of religious freedom and human rights, and thus of recognition, were prominent in the joint statement of the Sudan

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Interior Mission and the Christian Council of Nigeria to the Civil Secretary of the Northern region of Nigeria on April 20, 1955: The position therefore is that it is the minority religions rather than Islam which require protection. In the predominantly Moslem areas the adherents of these minority religions are small and powerless in comparison with Islam; in the predominantly pagan areas the rulers are often Moslem. The need therefore is to ensure that such minorities are guaranteed the ordinary human rights. Lord Lugard’s statement that “all were free to worship God as they please” should be made applicable to these minorities… The Christian Council of Nigeria, therefore, and the Sudan Interior Mission, in association with this council, request the British Administration, as representative of one of the signatories to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights to take the initiative in order that the proposed regional constitution includes a clause guaranteeing religious freedom comparable to the above statement of Lord Lugard and Article 18 of the United Nations Declaration.29

2. Autonomy: Religious groups in Nigeria seek the ability and right to partially govern themselves within the Nigerian state. The Sharia Federal Court of Appeal demands and debate at the 1976 Constitutional Conference is an example of an organized religion’s (Islam’s) demand for autonomy.30 3. Representation and full participation: Religious groups demand full formal and informal representation and participation in the political and economic affairs of the Nigerian state. In other words, they want to have a presence in the vertical and horizontal accountability structures of the Nigerian polity. They want reforms of representative institutions such as electoral systems and political parties to enhance or guarantee participation and office holding of members of religious groups. 4. Improved social status: Equality with all other groups in all spheres of societal life: education, health, nutrition, economy, and politics through active intervention of the government to improve the socioeconomic status of members of religious groups.

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Means and Strategies of Religious Actors in Nigeria’s Public Sphere Service providers: The most important means available to religious organizations operating in the public realm is social service provision. By meeting the basic needs of Nigerians through social service provisions, religious organizations are able to influence both private and public actions of citizens, and by extension, the process of who gets what, when, and how, or public policy making in Nigeria, especially within the context of the continued reduced capacity (fragility) of the state to meet such obligations. In other words, by providing vital social services, such as education and health care, religious organizations in Nigeria have successfully pursued their goals of recognition, autonomy, representation, and full participation and improved their status and that of their adherents. Educational Services (School Apostolate): In colonial and early postcolonial Nigeria, faith-based organizations were the largest providers of educational services with colonial administration providing oversight through ordinances and laws and funding via grants-in-aid. States became the largest educational service providers in Nigeria with the nationalization of religious schools in the 1970s, a situation that remained until the early twenty-first century when mission schools were largely handed back to their former religious proprietors. Though they had lost control of their schools, faith-based organizations continued to provide educational services to Nigerians through their various seminaries (major and minor) and establishment of private educational institutions (primary, secondary, and tertiary levels) when private actors are allowed by the government. Faith-based organizations remain important providers of educational services in Nigeria. Christian universities make up almost half (39) of the private universities in Nigeria (79),31 as all the major denominations have established their own private universities with some even having more than one.32 Muslim organizations have also established institutions of higher learning. Currently, there are five universities operated by Muslim religious organizations: Al-Qalam/Katsina University (Katsina Muslim Community); Al-Hikmah University (World Assembly of Muslim Youth); Crescent University (Bola Ajibola); Fountain University (NASFAT); Oduduwa College (Abdulrahman Adedoyin); and thirteen colleges of education. In addition to the hundreds of former mission schools (handed back to religious organizations in recent years), Muslim religious organizations

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manage a huge number of primary and secondary schools in Nigeria. For example, a 2010 study put the number of Muslim nursery and primary schools in the country as 5,251.33 While faith-based organization educational services are not as expensive as secular private educational services, though of comparable quality, they are more expensive and of better quality than public educational services. This calls into question the “interest of the poor claims” of faithbased organizations’ educational service providers.34 More important, faith-based organizations’ (Islamic and Christian) primary-/secondarylevel both fall into the “Low Fee Paying Schools” (LFPS) sector.35 LFPS schools claim to cater to the needs of the poor in society who want quality education for their children but who despair of getting such from the public schools. The reality of LFPS is that they are mostly unregistered, unregulated, do not have a standard curriculum, and are ill-equipped (teachers, facilities) to provide educational services to clients. Faith-based organizations’ current educational services provision (Christian and Muslim) is still motivated by the logic of “school apostolate,” using education to gain adherents, and so has colored the establishment of institutions of higher learning by faith-based organizations in Nigeria. Higher institutions of learning are emerging more as prestige projects, established because other rival denominations have such institutions. With regard to Muslim faith-based organization universities, the general impression is that most are ill-equipped, do not provide courses that are responsive to market needs (like medicine, business administration, pharmacy); are expensive (though not as much as Christian-faith-based organization universities); do not offer Arabic and Islamic studies as formal degree courses, referring to most of them as general//elective courses,36 and do not offer much to write home about morally as they are also infected by the scourge of sexual harassment that pervades secular higher institutions in Nigeria.37 In the north of Nigeria, faith-based organizations continue to have limited impact on providing modern educational services. Sharia implementation and the focus of Muslim international faith-based organization/donor funding on activities meant to reinforce the faith, such as preaching, increasing capacity to read and write in Arabic, and building of mosques and qur’anic schools,38 have all limited attention to the expansion of Islamiyah schools (offering integrated curriculum of secular and religious subjects).39 Christian faith-based organization educational activities have also not been very successful, as they face obstacles similar to

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those faced by colonial-period missionaries from the colonial state, in their attempt to set-up educational facilities in the north of Nigeria.

Health Care (Health Apostolate) Along with educational services, health-care provision has been the most effective means available to religious organizations in Nigeria to achieve their goals. As was the case with educational services, in colonial and early postcolonial periods of Nigeria’s history, medical services provision was firmly in the control of religious organizations. While the massive expansion of public health-care provision moved the state into the lead at the three levels of service: tertiary, state, and local (primary health care), Christian mission hospitals and those of other religions continue to play a crucial role in ensuring access to quality health services for Nigerians. Their activities include running hospitals, training, pharmacy, and mental health services. Health care in Nigeria can be approached at two levels: facility (direct provision of health and medical services: hospitals, pharmacy, and training) and non-facility (advocacy, community mobilization, prevention, care, and support services). At the non-facility level, faith-based organization impact is very important. Their medical centers are crucial for spreading awareness about government and donor health interventions such as immunizations, epidemiological/disease monitoring, and drug warehousing and distribution. Currently, faith-based organizations are a crucial component of donorfunded multisectoral responses to HIV/AIDS in Nigeria. They implement a standard approach to addressing HIV/AIDS among citizens of different religious persuasions in Nigeria. The approach has three components: prevention campaigns (reduction of stigma and breaking of silence, awareness generation and promotion of behavioral change), treatment and care (voluntary counseling and testing VCT, post-test counseling and pastoral care, medical care and treatment, and promotion of mental health), and mitigation of impact (care of orphans and vulnerable children and widows, establishment of orphanages, nutritional assistance, counseling, medical treatment for orphans and their caregivers, and poverty alleviation.)40 At the facilities level, faith-based organizations are involved in the following ways:

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• Hospitals: It is “estimated that faith-based organization and the private sector contribute up to 70% of the total health services provision in the rural areas and the hard-to-reach places in Nigeria.”41 Under the auspices of the Christian Health Association of Nigeria, Christian organizations own/manage 432 (primary), 194 (secondary), and 16 (tertiary) care facilities. Other faith-based organizations and private/Islamic Health facilities own/manage 5,795 (primary), 4,354 (secondary), and 46 (tertiary) care facilities in Nigeria. • Pharmacy Services: CHAN Medi-Pharm, the drug supply and logistic arm of CHAN, is one of the largest drug-supply networks in Nigeria. It is a major component of the drug-supply network of prominent Vertical Health Funds in Nigeria like PEPFER, the Global Fund, and PATH2 Project.42 CHAN Medi-Pharm is responsible for procurement, manufacturing, warehousing, and distribution of drugs and other health supplies across the country for over 600 faith-based health facilities in Nigeria. CHAN Medi-Pharm operates a decentralized system of administration to ensure effective service delivery. • Training: Faith-based organizations pioneered the training of health service workers in Nigeria. Currently, faith-based organizations own/manage colleges of health technology (3), schools of medical laboratory (9), colleges of medicine (2), schools of nursing (19), and schools of midwifery (16). The key challenges facing collaboration between donors and faithbased organization in the area of faith-based organization health care are accountability and capacity. Serious differences have arisen between donors and FBOs on the issue of accountability for donor funds allocated for social service provision. The problems of accountability mostly arise from lack of experience on the part of FBOs with the complex accountability procedures (performance-based financing)43 attached to donor funds. Mistakes are “quickly” characterized as “corruption” by donors, leading to the stigmatization of FBOs.44 The problems with accountability also arise from the lack of a state-supervisory system for faith-based organizations capable of holding faith-based organizations accountable.45 The accountability issue is a significant subset of a broader capacity problem facing FBOs operating in health-care social services in Nigeria. The capacity problem is a serious one, as a study of CHAN MediPharm,

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a crucial component of PEPFER and Global Fund’s HIV/AIDS ART pipeline, highlighted. MediPharm exhibited challenges in six supply chain functions: forecasting and supply planning (FSP), distribution, warehousing and storage (WS), financial stability, quality, and human resources.46 The challenges are alarming given that a lot of resources had over the years been expended on the same issues and the main client/ sponsor(s) are implementing a “transition phase” or gradual phase-out of funding for the program. Faith-based organization nursing training follows the “hospital-based pathway,” one of two possible ways of securing a nursing and midwifery qualification in Nigeria, the other being the “university-based pathway.” The “university pathway” is a five-year-degree-based formal training leading to a bachelor’s degree in nursing science (B.NSc), a Registered Nurse (RN) certificate, a Registered Midwife (RM) certificate, and Registered Public Health Nurse (RPHN) certificate. The hospital path, on the other hand, is a three-year certificate program offered in schools and colleges of nursing in Nigeria, which earns a Registered Nurse (RN) certificate, otherwise called the Basic Nursing Certificate (BNC). Schools and colleges of nursing in Nigeria do not qualify as “tertiary institutions,”47 and their certificates, though accepted for entry-level jobs in the health-care system, have limited value academically. Prophetic Voice and Gate Keeper/Broker Roles: The prophetic voice or speaking truth to power is a favored and very successful strategy of religious organizations in Nigeria. It involves presenting a general critique about the economic order and the way the regime upholds it.48 The prophetic voice is projected via the pulpit, pastoral letters, and mass media. The prophetic voice is also multilayer (institutionally and financially) in nature both domestically (local, state, national) and internationally (subregional, regional, and international). The activities of Roman Catholic missionaries in “Biafra” during the Civil War of 1967– 70 are a very good example of the multilayer nature of prophetic voice in action. Closely associated with the issue of prophetic voice is the role of religious leaders as gatekeepers and brokers : Religious leaders at all levels perform a gatekeeping or brokerage role. They interface between the donors, the state, and lower-level faith-based organizations. Their role arises because of the differences between the language of donors (seculardevelopment) and those of most FBOs in Nigeria (religious/mystical language). Their ability to “cross boundaries, balance different discourses,

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and intermediate with their activities and concepts between the heterogeneous discursive fields”49 transforms them into essential components of the reality of not just the domestic faith-development architecture in Nigeria but of domestic national, state, and local government politics. Inter-religious Dialogue (Ecumenism): Ecumenism has been a useful mechanism adopted by organized religion, especially Christians, as a tool for accessing the public space in Nigeria. Since the colonial period, churches have adopted the strategy of union or banding together to confront challenges, especially from Islam and from the secular state. Unions and ecumenical projects include the Conference of Missions in Northern Nigeria (1910s–30s); the Annual Meeting of the Representatives of Missions in Northern Nigeria (1940s–50s); the Joint Meetings between AMRM (North), the Christian Council of Nigeria (early 1950s to the late 1950s) and the Northern Advisory Education Council (Protestant, 1948); the National Institute Moral and Religious Education (1971); the Christian Health Association (1973); and the Christian Association of Nigeria (1976). Inter-Faith Dialogue: Inter-faith dialogue between Christian and other faith groups such as Islam is a major strategy of organized religion in Nigeria. The Catholic Church has been prominent in the use of inter-faith dialogue in Nigeria. It has trained specialists on dialogue and Islam to promote dialogue with Muslim communities and leadership. Muslim academics are engaged in Catholic seminaries and theological institutes such as S.S. Peter and Paul Seminary Ibadan, Oyo State, and the Dominican Institute, Ibadan, Oyo State. The Catholic Bishop Conference of Nigeria (CBCN) has an in-house Commission on Inter-Religious Dialogue.50 Protestant Churches established the Islam in African Project (IAP), which later became the Project for Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa (PROCMURA) in 1959. The project promotes expertise on Islam by Protestant leaders through teaching on the subject in Protestant theological institutes. The Lutheran Church of Christ in Nigeria has organized conferences on Christian-Muslim Mutual Relations (1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2002). Muslim groups such as the Islamic Education Trust (IET); Minna, through its Da ‘wah Institute of Nigeria, the Centre for Islamic propagation; and Comparative Religious Education Mabera, Sokoto, are also involved in inter-faith dialogue. The Nigerian Government is not left out in the use of the inter-faith dialogue mechanism, as in 2000 it established an advisory council, the Nigerian-Inter-Religious

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Council (NIREC) with membership equally divided between Christians and Muslims and co-chaired by the Sultan of Sokoto (Muslim) and the president of the Christian Association of Nigeria CAN, to promote religious dialogue and tolerance.51 Other strategies of faith-based organizations include use of mass media, including newspapers, radio, television, satellite, and social media (Facebook, Twitter, TikTok).

Consequences of Religious Organizations Political/Public Activities Political Achievement of Goals: Religious organizations’ involvement in political/ public affairs has had mostly positive effects on their goals of recognition, autonomy, representation, full participation, and improved social status, all of which have benefited from religious organizations’ presence in the Nigerian public sphere. Religious organizations are recognized domestically and internationally as important socio-economic and political actors. Their ability and right to partially govern themselves within a larger state (autonomy) is respected both constitutionally and in practice. Their right to participate in the governance of Nigeria as members of the civil society is no longer contested by the state, and they have to a large extent improved the social status of their adherents (better education, better economic positions, greater respect from and acceptance in society). Democratic Consolidation: Religious presence in politics/public arena has had consequences for the growth of civil society in Nigeria. Religious groups’ vigorous defense of civil liberties in the face of authoritarian military governments laid the groundwork for the emergence and growth of the presently vibrant civil society sector in Nigeria. Also, the success of organized religion in achieving its various goals has boosted efforts by marginalized groups to pursue similar goals, especially those focused on improvement of social status: better education, better economic positions, and greater respect from and acceptance in society as a whole. Their vertical accountability activities, such as prophetic voice, have jumpstarted political transition programs, kept them on track, and contributed to democratic consolidation of the new civilian regimes that emerged from the transition program.

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Broker role of religious elites: The broker roles religious elites are increasingly taking on—as the interface between donors, the state, and lower-level faith-based organizations in Nigeria and increasingly as intermediaries between a citizenry that has lost confidence in its political elite and the Nigerian state—leads to a blurring of the lines between faith and state affairs that encourages a quid pro quo relationship between political and religious elites, with a negative impact on the ability of religious leaders to speak the truth to power. They are increasingly seen as part of the problem of bad leadership in Nigeria.52 Given that religious elites/ organizations are key actors in the civil society, being seen as part of the problem has a major negative impact on the legitimacy of civil society in Nigeria. Security dilemma: The misuse of the priestly and prophetic voice can both create and inflame a tense situation between adherents of different religions, creating a security dilemma that can push one or more of the protagonists into preemptive attacks on others that can lead to genocide, pogroms, population displacement, and population transfers. Globalization of conflicts: The presence of religious actors in the politic/policymaking raises the possibility of the rapid escalation of domestic religious issues into front-page news internationally, as the multi-layered institutional nature of religious organizations permits multiple interpretations that can be totally out of alignment with the reality on ground and capable of rendering the finding of solutions very difficult or prolong conflicts as was the case with the Biafra civil war of 1967–1970. Social User Fees and Falling into Poverty: The principal reason people fall into poverty, as identified by Anirudh Krishna,53 is poor health and health costs. These two issues are supposed to be at the heart of the Hospital Apostolate/health-care missions of religious organizations in Nigeria, but unfortunately, with their charging of often expensive userfees, religious hospitals are denying poor people good affordable quality health care. The denial of health care can lead to death, which activates the second principal reason for falling into debt: funeral costs. To finance funeral costs, the third principal reason for falling into poverty emerges: borrowing at high interest rates from private loan sharks.

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Well-being and Tolerance: The presence of religious organizations in the public sphere in Nigeria has increased the tendency to equate religious doctrine with the law of the land. The consequence has been a gradual erosion of the basic rights of the citizenry and along with it the loss of well-being. Issues such as female genital mutilation, genderbased violence, contraceptives, vaccination, and early marriage become taboo subjects to be approached with caution by policymakers. The situation worsens in the context of the increasing quid pro quo relationship between religious leaders and political elites wherein religious leaders are willing to trade their influence over their adherents in order to have religious doctrine become state law and practice. Environmental Impact: Environmental pollution is an unintended consequence of religious presence in public affairs/sphere in Nigeria. Religious organizations are major investors in the property sector of the Nigerian economy. They own massive prayer camps, which are virtually small cities, housing estates, hostels, hotels, etc. While these enterprises provide much needed jobs and generate income for funding of religious social services, they are often associated with urban sprawl, often unregulated, and frequently in violation of urban planning rules. They are also generators of noise, water, environment, and air pollution.54

Nigerians’ Perceptions of Religion Nigerians have a very positive perception of religion. The Pew Research Center survey of Nigerians in 2018 found that 82% of Christians and 94% of Muslims in Nigeria say religion is very important in their lives and that 82% of adults in Nigeria attend weekly worship services while 95% of adults in Nigeria pray daily.55 Afrobarometer Survey Round 7 (April–May 2017)56 results further highlight Nigerians’ overall positive attitudes toward religion, as 49% of Nigerians participate in religious groups that meet outside regular services, 10% as leaders and 39% as active members. 56% of Nigerians have had contact with religious leaders, 13% once, 25% a few times, and 18% often; and 69% of Nigerian say they trust religious leaders “somewhat” or a “lot.” Overall, on the question of trust in religious leaders, 69% of Africans in 38 countries said they trust religious leaders “somewhat” or a “lot,” as against 64% for the Army; 53% for the Courts; 52% for presidents; 52% for traditional leaders; 51% for police; 43% for local government councils; 43% for national electoral

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commissions; 43% for Parliament; 42% for the ruling party; and 32% for opposition parties. The Afrobarometer Round 7 survey also found that 20% of Nigerians perceive corruption among religious leaders, while 60% believe some religious leaders are corrupt. 82% of Nigerians are tolerant of other religions, while 22% of Nigerians say they have been personally discriminated against “once or twice,” “several times,” or “many times”. 32% of Nigerian believe that Nigeria should be governed primarily by religious law, while 67% feel Nigeria should be governed only by civil law. For 59% of Nigerians, religious freedom should be absolute, while 33% believe that government should be able to regulate what is said in places of worship. 11% of Nigerian have feared and experienced extremist violence, while 26% have feared but not experienced extremist violence.57

Conclusion: Can Nigeria Survive Without Social Service Contributions of Religious Organizations? Organized religion and the state are agents of governmentality, of control, of order and stability, of hegemony construction and maintenance. The state is defined by its monopoly on the use of force and by its legitimacy. For legitimation of power, most states in history have needed religion. Religion provides political authority with a cultural force in which to define itself and advance its claims (a) by playing a mediating role between the rulers and the ruled and (b) functioning as a major institution of civil society, helping the people adapt to social order–or change it. The state-legitimizing role of religion since colonial times in Nigeria has been very beneficial to the interests of religion. It has enabled religious leaders to forge their political links to local elites, the state, and external donors, transforming them into much sought-after mediators by all groups within and outside the state. Religious organizations are large economic actors in Nigeria. The nongovernmental status they enjoy with the government has enabled them to acquire huge property holdings, large farms, chains of hospitals, educational facilities, printing works, and mass media, and to become major social service providers in Nigeria. The strength of religion has always been a source of concern for the state in Nigeria since colonial times; hence its use of laws and ordinances, of regulation and facilitation strategies, to keep religion in check, but these are increasingly becoming less effective in the context of the globalization and the religious turn in global development policy and

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practice. While donors recognize the importance of religious actors in service provision in weak states like Nigeria, they also, like Nigeria, are primarily states and are aware of “the immense capacity of religion to mobilize and constitute by and in itself an independent and legitimate arena of political action possibly in opposition to the state.”58 Their activities overall will be toward keeping the secular state in Nigeria viable by continued recognition of its sovereignty and by ensuring that religious organizations are constrained by global rules and regulations.

Notes 1. Richard Batley and Claire Mcloughlin, “Engagement with Non-state Service Providers in Fragile States: Reconciling State-Building and Service Delivery,” Development Policy Review 28, no. 2 (2010): 131. 2. ‘Welfare mix’ denotes the varying configurations of actors in the production of welfare. See Peter Taylor-Gooby et al., “Regimes, Social Risks and the Welfare Mix: Unpacking Attitudes to Pensions and Childcare in Germany and the UK through Deliberative Forums,” Journal of Social Policy 49, no. 1 (2020): 64. 3. J. Olivier, “Hoist by Our Own Petard: Backing Slowly Out of Religion and Development Advocacy,” HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 72, no. 4 (2016). 4. “Nigeria: Data,” World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/country/NG. 5. Abia, Adamawa, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Enugu, Federal Capital Territory, Gombe, Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Lagos, Nasarawa, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe, Zamfara. 6. CIA World Factbook, “Nigeria,” https://www.cia.gov/the-world-fac tbook/countries/nigeria/#government. 7. Peter K. Tibenderana, Sokoto Province Under Colonial Rule, 1903–1939 (Zaria, Nigeria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1988), 187–89; Andrew Barnes, “Evangelization Where It Was Not Wanted: Colonial Administrators and Missionaries in Northern Nigeria During the First Third of the 20th Century,” Journal of Religion in Africa 25, no. 4 (1995): 412–41, 415; Uyilawa Usuanlele, “Poverty and Welfare in Colonial Nigeria, 1900– 1954” (PhD dissertation, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, 2010), 139. 8. Uyilawa Usuanlele, “Poverty and Welfare in Colonial Nigeria, 1900– 1954,” 139. 9. Offiong Offiong Asuquo, “The Role of the African Church Movement in Nigeria’s Independence,” Gnosi: An Interdisciplinary Journal of

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15. 16. 17.

18. 19.

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Human Theory and Praxis 1, no. 2 (2018): 59–63; Thomas W. Higgins, “Prophet, Priest and King in Colonial Africa: Anglican and Colonial Political Responses to African Independent Churches in Nigeria and Kenya, 1918–1960” (PhD dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 2018). Samuel O. Igwe, “Church, State and Education in Eastern Nigeria (1847– 1975)” (PhD Dissertation, University of London), 215. B. Sundkler and C. Steed, A History of the Church in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), cited in Barbra Mann Wall, “Changes in Nursing and Mission in Post-colonial Nigeria,” in Colonial Caring: A History of Colonial and Post-colonial Nursing, ed. Helen Sweet and Sue Hawkins (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2015), 188–207, 201. Jacinta C. Nwaka, “The Reaction of the Governments of Biafra to the Role of the Catholic Church in the Nigeria–Biafra War,” War & Society 34, no. 1 (February 2015): 65–83. See also F. M. Adu, J. U. Nwachkwu, and O. S. Osadola, “Clandestine Role of Religious Bodies in the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970,” American Journal of Humanities and Social Science Research (AJHSSR) 3, no. 12 (2019): 78–85; P. J. Yancho, “Catholic Humanitarian Aid and the Nigeria–Biafra Civil War,” in Religion, History, and Politics in Nigeria: Essays in Honor of Ogbu U. Kalu, ed. C. J. Korieh and G. Ugo Nwokeji (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005), 158–71. Martins Fabunmi, “Historical Analysis of Educational Policy Formulation In Nigeria: Implications for Educational Planning And Policy,” International Journal of African & African American Studies 4, no. 2 (July 2005), 1–7, 5. Daily Times (Lagos), August 21, 1983, cited in Austin Ahanotu “The Nigerian Military and the Issue of State Control of Mission Schools,” Church History 52, no. 3 (September 1983), 337. Olufemi Vaughan, Religion and the Making of Nigeria (Raleigh, NC: Duke University Press, 2016). Marie J. Petersen, “Trajectories of Transnational Muslim NGOs,” Development in Practice 22, no. 5–6 (2012): 767. John Olusola Magbadelo, “The Politics of Religion in Nigeria,” World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 7, no. 2 (April–June 2003): 74–75. Magbadelo, “The Politics of Religion in Nigeria,” 74–75. Dena Freeman, “The Pentecostal Ethic and the Spirit of Development Freeman,” in Pentecostalism and Development: Churches, NGOs and Social Change in Africa, ed. Dena Freeman (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 1–38. Freeman, “The Pentecostal Ethic.”

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21. Melani McAlister, “American Evangelicals, the Changing Global Religious Environment, and Foreign Policy Activism,” Review of Faith & International Affairs 17, no. 2 (2019): 1–12. 22. Jens Koehrsen, “Pentecostal Improvement Strategies. A Comparative Reading on African and South American Pentecostalism,” in Studien zur interkulturellen Geschichte des Christentums, Vol. 161, Pastures of Plenty. Tracing Religioscapes of Prosperity Gospel in Africa and Beyond, ed. A. Heuser (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2015), 49–64. 23. Andrew McKinnon, “Christians, Muslims and Traditional Woshippers in Nigeria: Estimating the Relative proportions from Eleven Nationally Representative Social Surveys,” Review of Religious Research 63 (2021): 304. 24. Association of Religious Data Archives Nigeria—Major World Religions, https://www.thearda.com/internationalData/countries/Country_ 166_2.asp#%20S_2. 25. Association of Religious Data Archives Nigeria—Nigeria—Largest Religious Groups https://www.thearda.com/internationalData/countries/ Country_166_2.asp#%20S_2 accessed. 26. Marcin Stonawski, Michaela Potanˇcoková, Matthew Cantele and Vegard Skirbekk, “The Changing Religious Composition of Nigeria: Causes and Implications of Demographic Divergence,” Journal of Modern African Studies 54, no. 3 (September 2016): 361–87. 27. Pew Forum, Mapping the Global Muslim Population, 2009, https://www. pewresearch.org/religion/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-pop ulation/ accessed 7/24/2023. 28. Pew Forum, Mapping the Global Muslim Population; Pew Forum, “The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Regional Sub-Saharan Africa,” January 27, 2011, https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2011/01/ 27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-sub-saharan-africa/. 29. B. Y. Gladima and Y. Turaki, “Christianity in Nigeria–Part II,” African Journal of Evangelical Theology 20, no. 2 (2001): 187. 30. D. D. Laitin “The Sharia Debate and the Origin of Nigeria’s Second Republic,” Journal of Modern African Studies 20, no. 3 (September 1982): 411–30. 31. “Christian Faith-Based Universities Now Make Up 23 of the Total Universities in Nigeria, SportAfriq.com, January 202, 2020. See also National Universities Commission, https://www.nuc.edu.ng/nigerian-universities/ private-universities/. 32. Living Faith Church operates two universities, Covenant University in Otta, Ogun State, Nigeria, and Landmark University. 33. Y. M. Abdulrahman, “The Contributions of Islamic Organizations to Modern Education Development in Nigeria, 1922–2008” (PhD dissertation, University of Port-Harcourt).

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34. Maria U.R. Igbo, “Catholic Schools and the Interests of the Poor in Nigeria” (PhD dissertation, Institute of Education, University College, London). 35. For more information of state of faith-based organization involvement in LFPS sector, see Malini Sivasubramaniam, “Philanthropic and Faith-based Non-state Actors in Low-fee Paying School Sector in the Global South: Blurring the Lines of Philanthropy and Enterprise,” Background Paper prepared for the Global Education Monitoring Report, 2021. 36. Rafiu Ibrahim Adebayo and Abdulganiy Ibrahim Jawondo, “Innovative Funding of Nigerian Private Islamic Universities: The Option of Islamic Financial Products (IFP),” IIUM Journal of Religion and Civilizational Studies (IJECS) 1, no. 1 (2018): 69. 37. Okondu Ogechukwu Emmanuel et al., “Prevalence of Sexual Harassment in a Faith-based Institution of Higher Learning in South-Western Nigeria,” Global Journal of Health Science 12, no. 13 (2020); Dare Ojo Omonijo, “A Study of Sexual Harassment in Three Selected Private FaithBased Universities, Ogun-State, South-West Nigeria,” Open Journal of Social Science Research 1, no. 9 (2013): 250–63. 38. Clyde Ahmad Winters, “Koranic Education and Militant Islam in Nigeria,” International Review of Education 33, no. 2 (June 1987): 171–85. 39. Manos Antoninis, “Tackling the Largest Global Education Challenge? Secular and Religious Education in Northern Nigeria,” World Development, vol. 59(C) (Elsevier), 82–92. 40. Olufunke Adeboye, “Religion and HIV/AIDS in Africa: Juxtaposing Christian and Muslim Interventions,” Paper presented at the CAS@50 International Conference on Cutting Edges and Retrospectives at Edinburgh, June 6–8, 2012; Adeboye Olufunke, “From Silence to Concern: The Changing Response of Faith-based Organizations to the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Nigeria,” Paper Presented at the CCASLS workshop on HIV/AIDS in Today’s Developing World on April 24, 2006, at the Marriot Chateau Champlain, Montreal, Quebec, Canada; A. Adogame, “African Christianities and the Politics of Development from Below,” HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 72, no. 4 (2016). 41. Christian Connections for International Health, “An Overview of the Health System in Nigeria and the Contributions and Role of Faith-based Health Providers in the Overall Health System,” Faith-based Organizations & Health Systems Strengthening Report: Nigeria, March 2021, 1. 42. Christian Connections for International Health, “An Overview of the Health System in Nigeria,” 7. 43. Omobolaji Ololade Olarinmoye, “Faith and Accountability in International Development: A Study of the Global Fund,” 4th Global Leaders Fellowship Colloquium (Princeton, NJ, May 13–15, 2012); Beth Ann

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49.

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51. 52.

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Plowman, “How the Big Three AIDS Donors Define and Use Performance to Inform Funding Decisions: An Analysis of Policies and Approaches Taken by the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and the World Bank’s Africa Multi-Country AIDS Program,” CGD/HIV/AIDS Monitor Background Paper, September 29, 2008. Global Fund, “Country Audit of Global Fund Grants to Nigeria,” Audit Report GF-OIG-10–008, Geneva, Office of the Inspector-General, October 31, 2010. Omobolaji Ololade Olarinmoye, “Accountability in Faith-Based Organizations in Nigeria,” Transformation 31, no. 1, Special issue: Christianity and Community Transformation (January 2014): 47–61. Carolyn J. O’Brien, “Faith-based Drug Supply Organizations Increase their Supply Chain Management Capacity,” Christian Connections for International Health, November 8, 2021, https://www.ccih.org/ faith-based-drug-supply-organizations-increase-their-supply-chain-manage ment-capacity/. National Policy on Education’s defines tertiary education as “the education given after post basic education in institutions such as universities and inter-universities centers such as the Nigeria French Language Village, Nigeria Arabic Language Village, National Institute of Nigerian Languages, institutions such as Innovation Enterprise Institutions (IEIs), and colleges of education, monotechnics, polytechnics, and other specialized institutions such as colleges of agriculture, schools of health technology and the National Teachers’ Institutes (NTI).” See “The Need to Reform Nursing Education in Nigeria,” Editorial, Blueprint, April 11, 2019. Amos Zehav, “Doing good or demanding better? Religious organizations between social service and social critique”, paper prepared for History, Religion and Social Policy session, Espanet Annual Conference, August 30 –September 1, 2018, Vilnius, 3–4. “The Need to Reform Nursing Education in Nigeria,” 17. For details on brokers and their role in Nigerian Politics, see Omobolaji Ololade Olarinmoye, “Godfathers, Political parties and Electoral Corruption in Nigeria,” African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 2, no. 4 (December 2008): 66–73. Mujahid Hamza Shitu, “An Appraisal of ‘Dialogue of the Truth’ and Inter-Religious Dialogue in Nigeria: A Muslim View-Point,” African Journal of Religion, Philosophy and Culture (AJRPC) 1, no. 1 (August 2020): 23. Shitu, “An Appraisal,” 24. Iheanyi M. Enwerem, A Dangerous Awakening: The Politicization of Religion in Nigeria, IFRA-Nigeria February 21, 2013; and Iheanyi M.

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54.

55. 56.

57.

58.

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Enwerem, Crossing the Rubicon: A Socio-Political Analysis of Political Catholicism in Nigeria (2010) (Nigeria: Bookbuilders, 2013). Anirudh Krishna, “Falling into Poverty: Other Side of Poverty Reduction,” Economic and Political Weekly 38, no. 6 (February 8–14, 2003): 538–39. Francis Falako, “Faith-based Organizations and Environmental Hazards: A Study of Lagos- Ibadan Expressway, Nigeria,” Nkumba Business Journal 17 (2017): 73–80; Taibat Lawanson, “Planning and Pentecostalism in the Spatial (Re-)Configuration of Lagos,” in Theorizing Urban Development From the Global South, ed. A. K. Mohan et al. (Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2021). Pew Research Center, The Age Gap in Religion Across the World, Report, June 13, 2018. Pan-African data drawn from 45,823 interviews completed in 34 countries between September 2016 and September 2018. Nigeria Round 7 Field Work was conducted April to May 2017. Brian Howard, Religion in Africa: Tolerance and Trust in Leaders are High, but Many Would Allow Regulation of Religious Speech,” Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 339, January 2020. Omobolaji Ololade Olarinmoye, “Faith-based Organizations and Development: Prospects and Constraints,” Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies 29, no. 1 (2020): 2.

CHAPTER 11

Faith-Based Organizations, Society, and the State in Mozambique Victoria Armando Chifeche

Introduction This chapter seeks to analyze the path of the church–state relationship in Mozambique and the current religious make-up of the society. It aims to summarize a huge set of findings regarding religious peace-building and what is often referred to as faith-based organizations as well as to establish a practical understanding of what is commonly called “religion” and analyze whether features of this phenomenon matter in conflict mitigation. Mozambique is located along the southeastern coast of Africa, with an area of 799,330 square kilometers, between the parallels of 10 degrees south and 27 degrees south and meridians 31 east and 41 degrees east. It is bordered to the north with Tanzania, to the northwest with Malawi and Zambia, to the west with Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Swaziland and to the south again with South Africa. To the east, the country is

V. A. Chifeche (B) University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Glatzer et al. (eds.), Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31960-0_11

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bordered with the Indian Ocean, with a coast of almost 3,000 kilometers. Politically, Mozambique gained its independence from Portugal’s colonial regime in 1975. From 1975 onwards, the country faced a long period of economic crisis and political and military instability because of the 16 years of civil war from 1976 to 1992, when a peace agreement between the government and RENAMO (the opposition party) was signed in Rome to stop the war.1 The period after the peace agreement was followed by the country’s first multiparty elections in 1994. Administratively, the country is divided into ten provinces: Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Nampula in the north; Zambezia, Tete, Manica, and Sofala in the center; and Inhambane, Gaza, and Maputo in the south, with considerable geographical diversity among the provinces. The capital city of Maputo has a dominant position in terms of economic and educational conditions. The prospects of the most vulnerable Mozambican social groups are particularly bleak. These include women, children, and young people. Government policies have prioritized access to education and the establishment of health infrastructure. However, poverty remains widespread. A large percentage of the labor force remains dependent upon subsistence farming. There is a persistent gender disparity with regard to poverty, education, and literacy. The disintegration of families and HIV/AIDS, combined with the effect of the global pandemic of COVID-19, are factors that contribute to large numbers of women and children becoming increasingly vulnerable.2 In October 2017, unknown insurgents attacked the town of Mocimboa da Praia, in Cabo Delgado in the north. The attack primarily targeted government institutions, with a focus on police stations. The attack was later determined to have been carried out by members of the local communities, primarily young Muslim men. The government’s security forces acted quickly to stop the insurgents and keep the situation under control. This appears to have infuriated the insurgents, as they simply went underground and metamorphosed into guerrilla units capable of confronting government security forces. After three years, these attacks are still ongoing because many people today are being uprooted from their places of origin to the neighboring provinces looking for security.3

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The Current Religious Make-Up of Society The last census conducted by the National Institute of Statistics in 2017 showed that 59.8% of the population of Mozambique was Christian, 18.9% Muslim, 13.9% had no religion, 4.8% adhered to other beliefs, while 2.5% were unspecified. Religious communities are dispersed throughout the country. The northern provinces are predominantly Muslim, particularly along the coastal strip, but some areas of the northern interior have a stronger concentration of Protestant or Roman Catholic congregants. Protestants and Catholics are generally more numerous in the southern and central regions, but Muslim minority populations are also present in these areas. The National Directorate of Religious Affairs in the Ministry of Justice states that evangelical Christians represent the fastest growing religious group in the country. Generally religious communities tend to draw their members from across ethnic, political, economic, and racial lines. There are 732 religious denominations and 144 religious organizations registered with the Department of Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Justice.4 The major Christian religious groups include Anglican, Baptist, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, United Congregational Church, United Methodist Church, Nazarene Church, Presbyterian Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Roman Catholic Church, Seventh-day Adventist, and Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, as well as evangelical, apostolic, and Pentecostal churches. Many small, independent Protestant churches that have split from mainstream denominations fuse African traditional beliefs and practices within a Christian framework.

The Intentions of Religious Actors to Achieve Their Public Agency In order to analyze the objectives of what the religious actors intend to achieve in their public agency, it is crucial to raise the following questions: Which religions are present in the given society, and how do they relate to each other? What are the power structures in the region or country, and where does religion come in? How are the religious communities organized? How much authority do the religious leaders have? Are these religious actors part of a larger network, or do they operate independently? How do the religious actors acquire and spend their funds, and how does this measure up when compared to their performance? Are

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they positively contributing to reducing the community’s insecurity and vulnerability? What is their involvement in conflict and peace-building? What are their additional aims or agenda? Do people turn to religious organizations if they have problems with livelihood, security, resources, etc.? How do religious actors address and take into account local communities? Are they inclusive? Do they promote non-discrimination or focus only on certain groups? After independence in 1975, most places of worship were nationalized by the government. In 1977 the government returned the places of worships to their respective religious organizations; however, some places of worships continued to remain unjustly in state hands. The issue of restitution is complex, as many of these buildings continue to be used as government-administered schools and clinics; moreover, while the final responsibility for establishing a process for property restitution lies with the provincial government, it is the Directorate for Religious Affairs that is mandated to address the general issue of the restitution of church properties. Return of the properties is often delayed due to construction of new facilities, particularly schools and health clinics.5

The Contribution of Religion to Democracy Vilanculos shows that Mozambican democracy can be seen through the development of the political background of the country. Through independence and nationalism, Mozambique entered into the international community, which had a role to play. One of the aspects that marked this period was when President Samora Moisés Machel gained influence and reputation at the international level. This situation opened the way for reflection on Mozambican philosophy, its applicability, and its consequences at the national and international level. The first stage of the reflection was when Machel invited a meeting involving personalities from the government and religious institutions (the Roman Catholic Church, the Christian Council, and the Muslim Community) to discuss different challenging issues facing Mozambican religions concerning the new revolutionary regime in the country. The discussion came to the satisfactory conclusion that religious institutions had an important role to play in the new Mozambique.6 In addition, the contribution of religion to democracy came as a surprise to people, considering that from independence there was a declared opposition between the two (the state and religion). From that

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moment onward, religious institutions had a role to play, especially in the area of moral and patriotic education of citizens. The regime started to think afresh about the relation between the church and religion, not only at the national level, but also at the international level. The consequence of that reflection was the initiative to revise the Constitution of Mozambique, which happened in 1994, and a lot of changes in the constitution came as a surprise to many people. With the new constitution, democracy was officially established—not only centralized democracy but a multiparty democracy. It was from this perspective that the state, through the new constitution, recognized Mozambique as a pluralist society.7

The Role of the State in Security Provision The state has the primary responsibility to prevent incitement and protect people from atrocity crimes. The most common examples of these issues in Mozambique are the dissemination of hate speech messages in public discourse, especially in times of election campaigns; the use of social media to spread hostility; and violence against specific people or communities often based on their identity. The impression is that the state is bringing pain instead of relief, hatred instead of love, division instead of unity, sadness instead of joy, discrimination and destruction instead of accommodation and development. The faith community is called to do more to stop hate speech and violence. All religions should teach respect for life, and recognize human beings as fundamentally equal. These principles should be taught to people in order to show respect for all human beings, even those with whom one might profoundly disagree or whose cultures might seem to be alien to others.8

The Role of Religious Actors in Peace-Building Haynes emphasizes the contribution of religious actors to governance in terms of peace-building and development, which is most visible when the structures of the state are weak. However, their role and impact in development cooperation and relations is routinely overlooked. Like human rights organizations, the neutrality of religious actors can be problematic, as their actions are shaped by social and spiritual dimensions. These are the dimensions that ensure that religious actors have something to offer in times of fragility. Religious actors in Mozambique have long focused on

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top-down state-building; however, nowadays, religious actors and development organizations are increasingly acknowledging the importance of a combined approach to the reconstruction of society during the time of fragility. In this context, religious actors should fulfill important social roles and should be ever present in the public domain.9 Religious actors should play a vital role in peace-building and create stability in situations of political tension and conflict. A most relevant example is Archbishop Desmond Tutu of the Anglican Church, who was a role model of peace and reconciliation in post-Apartheid South Africa. The influence of religious social institutions ranges from Caritas Mozambique, the Ecumenical Social Development (CEDES), and the Christian Counsel of Mozambique (CCM) providing basic services such as shelter, health care, education, livelihoods, and agriculture among other services for the IDPs in Nampula province from Cabo Delgado to encouraging dialogue on religious tolerance and acting as peace mediators although even today the insurgents are often absent from the dialogue. (The project started in 2020 funded by Tearfund, Diakonie Katastrophenhilf [DKH], Bread for the World and UNHCR.) This is an ongoing project. Religious actors are playing a role in helping arrive at the termination of conflicts.

The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peace Mitigation Religious actors are often most visible through the practical services and support they provide in times of fragility. Religious actors, being part of communities, are usually aware of what moves and motivates people on a social and spiritual level. Religion is well informed of the needs of people, which is essential for successful intervention and legitimizing power that people can rely on. Their involvement in processes of peacebuilding, reconciliation, and rebuilding governance structures can lend credibility and a sense of moral authority to these processes. Religious peacemakers can be individuals or representatives of faith-based organizations that attempt to help resolve intergroup conflicts and build peace. The world religions share a broadly similar set of theological and spiritual values and views that underpin their ability to provide positive contributions to conflict resolution and peace-building. Practical effects in this regard have increased in recent years, with growing numbers and types of religious peacemakers working to build peaceful coexistence in multi-faith societies.10

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One of the clearest success stories of the role of religion on conflict and peacemaking efforts occurred between 1989 and 1992 when the Sant’Egidio was extremely influential in resolving the civil war that had ravaged Mozambique since the mid-1970s. The Catholic Archbishop of Beira, Don Jaime Goncalves, was familiar with Sant’Egidio and its work from the time he had spent in Rome years before. Following well-intentioned but eventually unsuccessful efforts to end the war emanating from the international community, Archbishop Goncalves thought Sant’Egidio might succeed in bringing the government together to talk peace with the rebels of the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). The effort took months, but eventually Sant’Egidio rather than contacting RENAMO leadership also encouraged Mozambican government officials to agree to meet with them.11 The Sant’Egidio community decided to work with the bishop to help ease this suppression and to meet with Gonçalves and the Italian Communist Party leader Enrico Berlinguer in order to encourage human development in Mozambique and encourage the Frelimo government to relax its suppression. Dinis Singulane, the former Bishop of the Anglican Church, also worked hard to mediate peace in Mozambique and highlighted the work done by religious actors to build good relationships with Frelimo as part of its efforts. The government was surprised by such effort and generosity, and eventually Frelimo began to meet with representatives of the community. The community eventually offered itself as a mediator of the conflict.12 The amicable relationship between the ruling party and St. Egidio contributed to peace mitigation in Mozambique. An early example of their quiet mediation took place in 1982, when the community facilitated talks that led to the release of several priests and nuns being held hostage by RENAMO forces. The Community of Sant’Egidio was one of the few actors in the world simultaneously in contact with both Frelimo and RENAMO. The group used its unique position to encourage an informal dialogue between the two sides, eventually persuading them to meet. This process, from the first unofficial meeting until the signing of the peace agreement, lasted a total of two years and six months. Other meetings were held under the group’s mediation before the ultimate signing of the peace agreement on October 4, 1992.13

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Strategy Religious Actors Use to Operate in the Public Square Religious actors operate in public squares because they have the strong potential to influence the lives and behavior of those who follow their faith and share beliefs. When they speak out, their messages can have a great, wide-ranging impact. Religious leaders use their potential influence in positive ways. Faith-based organizations are uniquely positioned to foster non-violent conflict transformation through the building of constructive, collaborative relationships within and across ethnic, religious, or cultural groups for the common good of a country or region’s entire population. In many conflict settings in Mozambique, the social location and cultural power of religious leaders and faith-based organizations make them potentially critical players in efforts to build a sustainable peace among conflicting groups. The multigenerational local or regional communities that religious leaders are connected to are often singular repositories of local knowledge and wisdom, custodians of culture or civilization, and privileged sites of a significant moral, psychological, and spiritual formation.14 Faith-based organizations are increasingly active and effective in attempts at peace-building. Faith-based organizations have a special role to play in areas of religious conflict, but their peacebuilding programs do not need to be confined to addressing religious conflict only. In some cases peace-building projects of faith-based organizations resemble very closely peace-building by secular nongovernmental organizations. The various religious orientations typically shape the peacebuilding they undertake. These organizations’ peace-building agendas are diverse, ranging from high-level mediation to training through development at the grassroots. Peace can be promoted most efficiently by introducing components into more traditional relief and development activities.15 Religious leaders and actors seek common moral and theological ground, rooted in religious traditions and teaching the principles and values of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They strive to serve as role models within and outside of community and move beyond tolerance, rejecting ideas of superiority and exclusivity and encouraging other religious leaders to teach and preach inclusive messages of peace and respect aligned with human rights standards. Religious organizations contribute to educating for peace, social cohesion, and the acceptance of one another irrespective of religious or belief background. Religion is called to fight all forms of discrimination based on class, caste, race,

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ethnicity, religion, or belief; it mobilizes respect and protects all people irrespective of gender, age, and race—not only those sharing one’s own religion or belief but others as well—encouraging people to live in an inclusive environment that prevents discrimination and violence.16 Religious leaders and actors should accept that the public sphere belongs to everybody and strive to dismantle walls and build bridges between communities. Religious organizations should disseminate religious messages that promote human rights and fundamental freedoms; reinforce positive values and human rights that prevent discrimination and violence; monitor constitutions, laws, and legal reforms for discriminatory content and demand its removal; defend and support the right to nationality as a fundamental human right; advocate with national authorities for this right to be included in national constitutions; engage in peaceful protests, rallies, and demonstrations to expose challenges; and eradicate discrimination and violence, building a peaceful inclusive and just society by respecting, protecting, and promoting human rights through networks of religious leaders. The key concepts of religious actors are reconciliation based in God’s own reconciliation with a sinful humanity; the powerful model of Jesus’ self-sacrifice to redeem humanity and his invitation to love one another and “turn the other cheek”; and finally, his attention to the poor and the marginalized that encourages Christians to care about the dignity of the human person.17

The Contribution of Faith-Based Organizations to Conflict Resolution The contribution of churches, mosques, synagogues, temples, and other sacred spaces in Mozambique so far looks likely continue to serve the community in a good environment. The faith-based organizations practice prayer services and rituals to connect with their faith, maintaining a modified routine creates and stability in face of many changes in people’s ordinary life. Faith is an important support and coping mechanism, especially in a time of crisis and uncertainty. Beyond public worship sessions, religious institutions seek to find new ways of providing their services. This can be done by utilizing technology in times of crisis, such as SMS, telephone, and live-streamed prayer services. Radio is also an efficient way of reaching out to the community and sharing vital information to a wide community audience, as seen over the last 2½ years due to the COVID-19 pandemic.18

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Religious actors should contribute to mediation and conflict prevention and transformation processes, addressing tensions, discrimination, and institutionalized violence, and take steps to remedy any measure that could lead to discrimination and exclusion. They support the role of local religious leaders and communities who are well placed to act as mediators of religious and cultural doctrines; engage in activities with strong symbolic relevance to promote peaceful coexistence and interreligious harmony; and connect with communities to address long-standing grievances and intolerance and raise their concerns/rights from local to national authorities in order to promote justice, peace, unity, mutual respect, and harmony, restoring hope among hopeless people in order to promote and disseminate good practices of peaceful coexistence.19

The Role of Religion in Spiritual Formation Religion creates hope and optimism in spite of failed governments and economic institutions. For example African Pentecostalism offers a typical example of the enormous hope that extends from religion to the society. Hope and optimism are mediated through emphasis on the power of the Word of God in spiritual formation and in resisting evil forces. Kalu describes how members of a congregation arrive to Bible studies on Sunday worship with notebooks to take down the message of revelation with the intention to apply these lessons during the week. In the process, everyone is urged to become a victor and “demon destroyer.” Kalu characterizes this way of kindling optimism as a “hermeneutics for conscientization.” The aim is to relate the promises in the Bible to the existential problems being experienced by the people so that no worshipper leaves the service bearing the burdens of yesterday. Alongside the building of optimism in the lives of worshippers through the “hermeneutics for conscientization,” religion also contributes toward conscientizing the practitioner to be responsive to the challenges of the society.20 It is important not to overlook the constructive efforts of religious leaders and faith-based organizations in attempts to curtail conflict and build peace. Religious leaders and faith-based organizations typically have important roles to resolve religious conflicts. In addition, entities are called upon by nonreligious combatants to address their conflicts. This is because religious leaders may be highly trusted by both sides in a conflict. Attempts to build peace undertaken under religious leadership

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may not differ from those undertaken by secular actors, such as governments and nongovernmental organizations. On the other hand, their religious emphasis is to inform their specific approaches to peace-building agendas and programs.21 Faith-based organizations attempt to end conflict and build peace in many ways, from high-level mediation to training and peace-building through development focused on communities. Faith-based organizations should build initiatives that contribute positively to peace-building in different ways. They can provide emotional and spiritual support to waraffected communities, using effective mobilization for their communities for peace, mediating between conflicting parties and pursuing reconciliation, dialogue, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.22 In summary, many religious actors have been responsible for preventing violence and its incitement by spreading messages of peace, tolerance, acceptance, and mutual respect, and by taking action to reduce tensions between communities. The general secretary of the Christian Counsel of Mozambique, João Damião, has shown the work of advocacy and peace mitigation which his organization is developing in communities suffering incitement, discrimination, hostility, or violence from those using messages of intolerance or expressions to incite unhappiness among people. The religious leaders have a crucial role to play in speaking out firmly and promptly against intolerance, discriminatory stereotyping, and instances of hate speech. Religious leaders and the state can be strong partners in prevention of atrocity crimes; for this reason, national, regional, and international institutions as well as civil society and the media should engage and cooperate with religious leaders in the context efforts to prevent atrocity crimes.23 Religions should share a similar set of theological and spiritual values and ability to provide positive contributions to conflict resolution and peace-building. Practical effects in this regard have increased in recent years, with growing numbers and types of religious peacemakers working to build peaceful coexistence in multi-faith societies, while advocating reconciliation and fairness in a world that often seems characterized by social and political strife and economic disparity.24 It is, therefore, time to reconstruct stability in a fragile Mozambique; acknowledging religious actors’ actual or potential contribution to governance, peace-building and development approaches that focus on institutional multiplicity. This requires an assessment of religion and the role of religious actors as part of a broader context analysis.

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The Role of Religion in Economic and Social Barriers The contribution of faith communities and their ministries is to empower and enable people to explore their capacity and potential ability. Faith communities should become an enabling environment to empower young people to overcome the plight of poverty and acquire knowledge and skills to ensure a sustainable livelihood. From the perspective of an inclusive approach to congregational ministry, the participation of young people, including in leadership and decision-making processes at all levels, can provide valuable mentorship. Through the efforts of faith community and young people’s full participation, they can develop abilities and acquire skills in a safe environment. This can help to enable them to overcome economic and social barriers in their future lives. In cooperation, governmental initiatives and faith communities can become involved in training for setting up small businesses, establishing and running shelters, teaching communication skills, informing young people of employment opportunities, and providing them with information with regard to medical care services. In general, religion can provide support and encouragement to foster the overall physical, mental, psychological, and spiritual well-being of young people.25

The Promotion of Unity and Empathy in Times of Crisis The insurgents in Cabo Delgado are causing a conflict that has killed people and displaced 800,000 families. The effect is causing xenophobic and discriminatory attacks toward specific groups and communities where people have been uprooted from their places of origin looking for security. Religious actors and community leaders are striving to promote messages of unity and discuss with community members the importance of preventing social stigma of people and groups. They are also encouraging community members to show empathy with others and understand the current situation of conflict. The religious actors should advocate for unity among people, calling for tolerance in order to restore self-esteem to the displaced people; hence, religious leaders should utilize their teachings to educate the community of the importance of accepting each other in times of crisis.26

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The Role of Religion in Poverty Advocacy Mozambique remains one of the poorest countries in the world. More than half of its population lives below the poverty line and its Human Development Programme is heavily dependent on foreign aid. Mozambique still faces considerable economic and human development challenges, although some natural resources such as gas, petrol, gold, and diamonds are being discovered in different parts of the country, such as Cabo Delgado, Inhambane, Manica, Nampula, and Niassa provinces. However, due to the lack of education, Mozambique does not have qualified people to explore these resources. Should the people of the country have been able to do so, it could have contributed to the alleviation of poverty affecting a large number of people in the country.27 Chifeche emphasizes that social norms, cultural and religious practices influence women’s social and economic roles that encourage children to get engaged in the practice of early marriage.28 In Mozambique, women are excluded from decision-making regarding themselves, their families, and the community. Men have full control over land and property. Men are the head of the family and make all the decisions regarding the lives of their family members. Because social value is generally ascribed to male children, while female children are regarded to be of lesser value, the social investment in the well-being of male children is much higher than that of female children. This includes investment in their health, education, and development. These social inequalities systematically make girls vulnerable to social harms. As a result, Mozambique has a low gross domestic product and a high prevalence of child marriage. If an adolescent girl is forced to marry to an old man, the perception of her parents is that the marriage can improve their economic prospects. A greater investment can then be made in the education of a male child.

The Intended or Unintended Consequences of Religious Actors’ Political/Public Involvement: What Pressures Would Be Brought to State Programs If These Services Were Stopped? Scholars emphasize the importance of resisting the temptation to understand faith in homogenizing categories of religious institutions such as churches, mosques, and communities when they understand how religion work matters to people. Religious and faith-based actors play not only

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a corrective but also an innovative and transformative role as the first-aid provider’s source of alternative proposals for addressing complex domestic challenges. At the present time of political instability in Mozambique, religious organizations have been actively engaged in advocacy work and in promoting an alternative political and ethical paradigm based on policies to be developed and implemented. The contribution of religion is becoming increasingly visible and recognized as the element of developing ethical imagination and ethical capacity at the civil society level, both locally and globally. At the same time, faith-based actors are very much anthropocentric and oriented toward introducing the change in social and political dimensions.29 Appleby emphasizes that ethical convictions, as expressed through religious beliefs, are main drivers for peace.30 Regardless of which religion may be prevalent, the ethical power of religion can help to unite divided societies. For Thomas, religion has a role to play, especially as it can facilitate a dialogue about “virtues” for shaping a better society.31 However, while acknowledging the useful characteristics of faith-based organizations and nongovernmental organizations, he warns against a reductionist approach, in which an instrumentalist perspective of religion and logic of problem-solving prevail while the need to address other issues and involve other actors is downplayed or discounted. According to Thomas,32 religion and politics strive to mediate work or interfaith activities promoted by Christian denominations, such as those done in South Africa with Archbishop Desmond Tutu, in Mozambique with Sant’Egidio, in the United States with Martin Luther King Jr., and the courageous work of various priests in Nigeria, the Middle East, and the Balkans. Thomas argues that Christian teaching and values provide the foundations for Christian peacemaking because Christianity provides a whole set of non-violent responses to conflicts worldwide, both within and between societies.

The Impact of Religion in Socio-Political and Economic Transformation Religion has the potential to influence socio-political and economic processes in Mozambique. Such positive influence could mitigate poverty and corruption, thereby assisting with the socio-political and economic transformation of the country. Religion permeates all departments of life to such an extent that it is not easy or possible to isolate it.33

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African religious consciousness was initially derived from the practice of traditional religion; Christianity and Islam have given further impetus to this consciousness. Religion is a positive force for moral, socio-political, and economic transformation of African societies. Religion fulfills a crucial moral role through its provision of a frame of reference for critical examination of existing social value systems. All religious traditions uphold moral values such as virtue, justice, the sanctity of human life, equality, and human dignity. These moral values are reflected in the scriptures of the various religions, including Christianity, Islam, and the oral tradition of African Traditional Religion. Conversely, however, as the unfolding of a cultural process, both Christianity and Islam have in turn been influenced by traditional religion.34 In African traditional life, the individual is immersed in religious participation that starts before birth and continues after death. For many Africans, “to live is to be caught up in a religious drama.”35 Religion is indeed fundamental for many Africans, since human beings live in a religious universe. Both the universe, and practically all human activities in it, are seen and experienced from a religious perspective. This means that the whole of existence is a religious phenomenon, which leads Mbiti to argue that in many Africans’ worldview, to exist is to be religious in universe. In this sense for many Africans it is unthinkable to live without religion. This religious worldview informs the philosophical understanding of African myths, customs, traditions, beliefs, morals, actions, and social relationships.36 This worldview also accounts for the religiosity of many Africans in political and socio-economic life.37 Whether at home or in the diaspora, many Africans have a deep religious consciousness.38 The evidence of religious influence can be seen in the number of Christian churches, names, and institutional establishments in many African societies.39 Islam has also been around for such a long period of time that it has led Mbiti40 to comment that these two religions have become indigenous, as later additions to African societies when compared with African Traditional Religion. Mbiti argues that it is obvious that in their encounter with indigenous religious traditions that Christianity and Islam have succeeded in converting many Africans. However, traditional religion shows resilience in its impact in such areas as many Africans’ historical-cultural roots, self-consciousness, and expectations.41 The contribution of faith community is a model of tolerance, respect, and support for others. It shares a religious narrative that encourages

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persons of faith to love others, seek the ways of peace, and defend those in need. The church can relate these stories directly to those in vulnerable situations and affected by violence. It can incorporate elements of best practice in religious education classes and activities. Faith communities can implement effective programs that oppose violence, early sexual involvement, child marriage, and gender inequalities through organizations associated with faith communities, such as parochial schools, childcare centers housed within communities of faith, and organized youth activities. The contribution of the church can further provide support for youth and families in distress, offering them counsel and facilitating contact with mental health resources and informal support. Religious leaders can cooperate in an interfaith response to harmful and cruel practices in society. They can raise awareness of people and show them a better way.42

Conclusion In conclusion, this chapter has analyzed the path of the church and state relationship in Mozambique, the current religious make-up of the society, and the role of religion. The chapter has emphasized the involvement of faith-based organizations in conflict resolution that is not about converting the parties to a particular religion or abandoning secular international human rights standards that underpin peace processes. Religion is about reinforcing the path to peace and reconciliation with a religious grammar familiar to the actors involved in a process that also requires a degree of self-transformation.43 The chapter has shown the importance of integration of religious leaders in the development of local education programs, courses, and curricula; engaging religious institutions to provide scholarships to train religious leaders in seminaries; and having a strategy to invite religious leaders and practitioners from other faiths to address students. Critical thinking should be embedded in youth education in order to develop school curricula for public schools that include teaching religious beliefs as a subject, including different traditions, and that promotes respect for diversity starting from early childhood to university level education. Negative stereotypes should be eliminated from teaching in order to ensure that both civilians and government personnel have basic knowledge of religions and human rights standards and are trained to rise above prejudice and discrimination and engage with sensitivity with religious belief

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in communities. Bringing redemption, reconciliation, and transformative grace to those in need, including vulnerable people such as those oppressed by poverty, remains the focal point of the work of faith communities. If suffering people are welcomed into a community of support and care and are strengthened spiritually, psychologically, socially, and physically, the quality of their lives can be improved substantially.

Notes 1. C. Serra, O impacto da Guerra civil em Mocambique: Uma analise da situacaoe das tendencias (Maputo, Mozambique: Instituto Nacional de Estatistica, 2001), 4. 2. Emidio Machiana, “Support for households headed by children and the elderly in Mozambique.” UNICEF News and Press Release, Jun 18, 2008. 3. S. F. Matsinhe, “An Overview of the Conflict in Cabo Delgado: Narratives, Causes and Strategies on the Way Forward,” ACCORD, April 29, 2021, https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/an-overview-of-the-conflictin-cabo-delgado-narratives-causes-and-strategies-on-the-way-forward/. 4. Instituto Nacional de Estatística 2018. 5. Serra, O impacto. 6. J. A. Vilanculos, The Role Played by Church and State in the Democratization process in Mozambique, 1975–2004 (University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa, 2001). 7. Vilanculos, The Role Played by Church and State. 8. See Haynes (2005). 9. J. Haynes, Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia (London: Metropolitan University, 2009), 11. 10. R. S. Appleby, Building Sustainable Peace: The Roles of Local and Transnational Religious Actors, paper presented at the Conference on New Religious Pluralism in World Politics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, March 2006, 1–2. 11. T. Bouta, S. Kadayifci-Orellana, and M. Abu-Nimer. Faith-Based PeaceBuilding: Mapping and Analysis of Christian, Muslim and Multi-Faith Actors (The Hague, Netherlands: Institute of International Relations), 71– 72. 12. D. Singulane, Victoria sem vencido (Maputo, Mozambique: Imprensa Diocesana, 1994). 13. Singulane, Victoria sem vencido. 14. R. S. Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 12.

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15. D. Smock, Faith-based NGOs and International Peace-building, Special report no. 76 (United States Institute of Peace, 2001), 1, http://www. usip.org/pubs/specialreports/. 16. Haynes, Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building, 14. 17. Haynes, Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building, 14. 18. Bouta et al., Faith-Based Peacekeeping, ix. 19. E. Chitando, A. Adogame, and B. Bateye, Introduction: African Traditions in the Study of Religion in Africa: Contending with Gender, the Vitality of Indigenous Religions, and Diaspora (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013). 20. O.U. Kalu, “Global Theology and Violent Face of Religion,” in Religions in Africa: Conflicts, Politics and Social Ethics, The Collected Essays of Ogbu Uke Kalu, ed. W. Kalu, N. Wariboko, and T. Falola (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2010), 77. 21. Smock, Faith-based NGOs and International Peace-building. 22. Bouta et al., Faith-Based Peacekeeping, ix. 23. Appleby, Building Sustainable Peace, 2. 24. A. Bartoli, “Conflict Prevention: The Role of Religion Is the Role of Its Actors,” New Routes 10 (2005): 3–7. 25. Victoria Armando Chifeche, Youth Ministry in Mozambique: A Practical Theological Evaluation (PhD dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2018). 26. See OIM site 20/08/2021. 27. Chifeche, Youth Ministries in Mozambique. 28. Chifeche, Youth Ministries in Mozambique. 29. Mazurkiewicz (2012). 30. Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred. 31. S. M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 32. Thomas, Global Resurgence of Religion. 33. J. S. Mbiti, African Religion and Philosophy (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1999), 1. 34. G. H. Muzorewa, The Origins and Development of African Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1985), 31. 35. Mbiti, African Religion and Philosophy, 1. 36. Mbiti, African Religion and Philosophy, 1. 37. Kalu, “Global Theology,” 11–15. 38. Chitando et al., Introduction, 5–7. 39. Metuh (2002: vii–xvi). 40. Mbiti, African Religion and Philosophy, 223–48. 41. Mbiti, African Religion and Philosophy, 257 and Ejizu (2002: 127–29). 42. Chitando et al., Introduction, 18. 43. S. Silvestri, The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peace-Building (London: British Academy, 2015), 18.

CHAPTER 12

The Contributions of Faith-Based Organizations in Uruguay, the Most Secularized Country in Latin America Nestor Da Costa

Path Development Uruguay is an atypical country in relation to religion in Latin America as a whole. It had an early separation of church and state (1919) with a strong influence of the French model that privatized religion, displacing it from the public space. This has marked Uruguayan culture in relation to religion with a particular way of understanding “secularism” in the French way. Let us look at the background of the historical process that led to this situation.

Chapter translated from Spanish by Miguel Glatzer, volume co-editor. N. Da Costa (B) Catholic University of Uruguay, Montevideo, Uruguay e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Glatzer et al. (eds.), Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31960-0_12

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As in all Latin America, the Catholic Church was an institution that arrived linked to the colonizing process, but unlike other places in the region, it had peculiar characteristics. What in colonial times was called “la Banda Oriental” (the historical predecessor of Uruguay) was not particularly important from the point of view of possible local wealth or the development of civilizations such as the Maya, Inca, or Aztec, to mention some of the best known. This led to the fact that there was not much interest in these lands, and the government was based in the city of Buenos Aires (Argentina). The foundation of the city of Montevideo, capital of Uruguay, was very late, precisely because of the lack of significance for colonization. The colonial institutions were not as strong as in other Latin American capitals, and the Catholic Church, as a colonial institution, developed its roots late and weakly in what was then the Banda Oriental. In 1830 the Uruguayan church separated from the diocese of Buenos Aires, and in 1832 the Apostolic Vicariate was created. In 1878 the Bishopric of Montevideo was created, which covered the whole national territory. This weak implantation of the Catholic Church persisted through time with few and highly dispersed clergy. Another important feature is the reliance of the country on strong migratory waves in the face of the non-existence of powerful indigenous civilizations. In the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, important migratory flows arrived1 that contributed substantially to the construction of the nation. As Porzecanski points out, immigrants played a decisive role in driving the modernization, urbanization, and industrialization that developed at that time. The aforementioned migratory waves came from different parts of Europe. Spaniards and Italians made up a significant proportion of the migrants, but there were also Waldensian, Swiss, Russian, Jewish, English, Scots, Irish, Swiss, Germans, Austro-Hungarians, and Slavs,2 among others. The immigrant population was mainly composed of workers of humble origin who sought new horizons fleeing poverty, and in many cases, persecution in their places of origin. Among these workers were anarchists and socialists. The migratory flow was of such magnitude that it had a strong impact on the development of a new society. According to Luzuriaga, “…the relationship between the Creole population and immigrants is so characteristic that there was no possibility of assimilation in the classic sense of

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the expression. The receiving society was ‘drowned’ by the newcomers in such a way that there was no possibility of incorporation or assimilation of the foreign mass into the receiving society. Instead of assimilation, it is necessary to speak of a fusion of two groups in a new society whose characteristics were neither that of the receiving society nor of the immigrant groups.”3 A third aspect to mention is the role played by elites in what is called Uruguay’s first modernization. This process of capitalist modernization took place at the end of the nineteenth century and continued in the early twentieth century with the political expression of what is known as Batllismo, inspired by José Batlle y Ordóñez who, as president of the country twice (1903–1907 and 1911–1915), developed the early Uruguayan welfare state by introducing unprecedented social laws, such as the eight-hour workday, among others. Local elites, including Batlle, looked to Europe and more specifically to France as a cultural model and imitated the French trajectory in the relationship of church to state. While in France, the laws that supported secularism were taken up again in 1905; in Uruguay this was introduced in the National Constitution of 1919, although neither in France nor in Uruguay was the term “secularism” used in the laws of separation or in the national constitution. While that term emerged in the 1940s in the French case, it was never incorporated in the Uruguayan case. The Uruguayan process of secularization had peculiar characteristics that differentiate it from other South American countries. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a strong confrontation developed in Uruguay between the nascent Uruguayan state, which claimed for itself the control of various aspects of collective life, and the Catholic Church, which administered certain spaces that today are understood as belonging to the state. This struggle for social and political power4 was expressed by the Catholic Church’s intransigent and combative opposition toward modernity. Other key actors, in addition to those mentioned above, were Freemasonry and the Protestant churches, with links between them. The Catholic Church experienced a double conflict, external and internal, since within it there was a strong struggle between what have been identified as the two main trends of the time, one committed to a Romanizing and ultramontane offensive in accordance with the position of Pope Pius IX, and the other, of a more liberal, non-dogmatic, anti-ultramontane order. As Rodé5 points out, “[….] a tension was noted

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within the Church which led to a conflict between a strongly orthodox and ultramontane line and a liberal line.” This long conflict saw moments of greater and lesser tension, but never reached levels of confrontation that led to bloodshed. Some of the main milestones of this process are listed below. The first bishop of Montevideo developed a project of internal church unification in consonance with Rome and that followed Pius IX and his Syllabus. Unification on the basis of the primacy of his strong Roman stance, and the removal from Uruguay of the liberal currents was embodied in the expulsion of the Franciscans. In 1861, following a long conflict regarding the refusal of the ecclesiastical authorities to bury in a cemetery a famous Freemason, a great confrontation took place, culminating in what is known locally as the “secularization of the cemeteries,” that is, the transfer of the administration of the cemeteries to the state to the detriment of the Catholic Church. In 1863 the bishop was banished from Montevideo because of decisions that clashed with the government. Between 1865 and 1878, what has been called “the intellectual conflict” developed, consisting of confrontation in the media and in the liberal and Catholic centers of thought that had recently emerged. The 1877 Education Law, which mandated the deconfessionalization of public education, was interpreted by the Catholic Church as the expulsion of God from the Uruguayan educational system. In 1879, the Civil Registry Law was promulgated, by which all matters concerning civil status, births, marriages, and deaths passed into the hands of the state to the detriment of the Catholic Church. In 1885, one of the harshest laws was passed, the so-called “Convent Law,” which produced great conflict. Through this law, all convents and houses of prayer were declared without legal existence, and at the same time the entry of religious foreigners into the country was prohibited. In the same year, the Civil Marriage Law was enacted, which forbade marrying in the Church without first getting married civilly. As a strategy of resistance and organization of the Catholic element, the church promoted the Catholic Congresses, from which emerged organizations such as the Social Union, the Economic Union, and the Civic Union, which brought together Catholics in specific areas of social, economic, and political affairs, creating spaces of social life for nuclei of resistance and the creation of Catholic areas in parallel to their secular counterparts, such as unions and political parties.

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In 1906 all crucifixes were removed from public hospitals. In 1907 all references to God and the Gospels in the oath of parliamentarians were removed. In the same year, the law of divorce by sole will of the woman was enacted. In 1919, the institutional separation of church and state was established in a new national constitution. Also in 1919, what is known as the “secularization of holidays” was carried out by law, which consisted in the change of the legal denomination of holidays. Christmas was renamed “family day”; Epiphany—January 6th—was renamed “children’s day”; and Easter became Tourism Week. At the same time, several cities and towns (more than thirty) lost their names of saints in favor of secular names. For example, Santa Isabel was renamed Paso de los Toros, and San Fernando was changed to Maldonado. Thus two forces engaged in dispute after dispute, one more bitter than the other: one side embraced the Enlightenment and the French example as an ideal and borrowed from Jacobinism, and the other, fighting against modernity, resisted the loss of spaces it once occupied, combating attitudes that it understood to be against God’s Will. The so-called “banquets of promiscuity” stand as an example of the tensions of the time and the extremes to which the confrontation led. These were events organized by well-known public personalities of the liberal world, summoned in the press of the time to organize, on Friday of Holy Week, great meat barbecues in the corner opposite the cathedral and some prominent churches. The level of the confrontation was certainly high, and the dialectic of this process generated a clear anticlericalism, in which the intransigent attitude of the Catholic Church had much responsibility. Following Casanova,6 in those places where religion and in this case the Catholic Church resisted the changes of the secularization process, understood as “differentiation of the secular spheres from the religious institutions and norms” in a strong form, religious life turned inward at the same time that a strong anticlericalism was generated. In fact, the Catholic Church and religious belief were displaced to the margins of society, becoming something private, reduced to the sphere of the intimate, the family, leaving not only the state sphere but also the public sphere. The Catholic Church eventually accepted its departure from the public sphere and its new social place. Coinciding with a long crisis of authority

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caused by the absence of a diocesan bishop after the death of Archbishop Mariano Soler in 1908, the Catholic Church withdrew into the private sphere, as evidenced by the pastoral letters and documents of the time, mostly focused on personal customs and behavior. Article 5 of the 1919 Constitution, mentioned above, contains wording that emerged from the negotiation of the National Constitution and that expresses a much broader statement than the one originally proposed, including that religious buildings should pass into the hands of the state. In fact, José Batlle y Ordóñez wrote an editorial making clear his position that once the Constitution was approved, the state should pursue the path of reclaiming the ownership of ecclesiastical property, which in the end did not come to pass. As Maronna points out, “the separation of Church and State was already a closed issue in Uruguay in 1919. But in the cultural field, in the symbolic aspects, the disputes did not dissipate so easily.”7 Although at the constitutional and formal level the separation was a fact in every rule, the struggle for the cultural scope of what happened also continued, advancing along the lines of expelling the religious from the whole of public life and culturally sanctioning the religious as embodiments of obscurantism or ignorance. The place to which the religious was displaced and the visions of the actors involved in the struggle led to the implementation of a model of privatist secularism with strict legal and cultural separation of the religious and the state, and with a strong anticlerical imprint. The separation implied that the state ceased to finance the Catholic Church, which began to support itself economically by its own means. The temples were exempt from paying taxes, but not the rest of the infrastructure of the churches.

The Distribution of Beliefs in Uruguay It is not easy to obtain consistent data on the distribution of religion in Uruguay. The National Institute of Statistics stopped asking about the religious affiliation of the population in 1908, and only in 2006 did it include questions in its permanent household survey. The approach to this data has come from the contribution made by researchers, local consulting firms, the 2014 Pew Forum on Religion survey, and also Latinobarómetro. Not all of them use the same categories or the same way of asking questions, which makes it difficult to have a reliable timeline.

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This chapter relies on two works in particular. Despite having been published in 2014, the Pew Forum8 report provides a good level of detail (Fig. 12.1 and Tables 12.1 and 12.2). The 2006 data are from the Expanded National Household Survey of the National Institute of Statistics, and the 2014 data are from the Pew Forum on Religion. A difference can be seen in the categories used. While the Pew Forum disaggregates between atheists and agnostics, the Distribution of beliefs in Uruguay (in %) Other and n/d, 7 Agnostics, 3 Atheists, 10

Catholics, 41 Believers without religion, 24

Protestants, 15

Fig. 12.1 Distribution of beliefs in Uruguay (Source Based on data from the Pew Forum on Religion)

Table 12.1 Distribution of beliefs in Uruguay, 2014

Distribution of beliefs in Uruguay

2014 (%)

Catholics Protestants Non-Catholic Christians Believers without religion Atheists Agnostics Other and no data Total in %

41 15 – 24 10 3 7 100

Source Pew Forum on Religion

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Table 12.2 Distribution of beliefs in Uruguay, 2006 and 2014

Catholics Protestants Believers without religion Atheists Agnostics Atheists and agnostics Other and no data Total in %

2006 (%)

2014 (%)

47 11 23

41 15 24 10 3

17 2 100

7 100

Note 2006 data are from the Expanded National Household Survey of the National Institute of Statistics; 2014 data are from the Pew Forum on Religion

National Institute of Statistics provides this category in aggregate form, which limits the possibilities of temporal comparison. Between 2006 and 2014, Catholicism decreased, as did the group of atheists and agnostics, while those who define themselves as believers without institutional affiliation continued to increase from an already high percentage of 23 to 24%. Increases are also seen in the Protestant and Evangelical space as a whole. Figures 12.2 and 12.3 show the decrease in the practice of some of the sacraments of the Catholic Church as well as mass attendance estimated by the institution itself in Montevideo, the capital of Uruguay, where 47% of the country’s population is concentrated. No religious affiliation exceeds 50%, Catholicism stands at around 41%, with the second largest group of people linked to religious institutions being Protestants (in a broad sense). Almost a quarter of the population defines themselves as believers in God or some form of transcendence but do not live their religiosity and/or spirituality through institutionalized religions. About 10% of the population is atheist, which is a long-standing fact that seems not to be growing but rather decreasing. For reference, Uruguay has a population of 3,350,000 and Montevideo has 1,350,000 inhabitants. In summary, Catholicism and atheism have decreased, while the percentage of believers with no religious affiliation has grown significantly. The Pentecostal world also shows growth.

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Changes of religious identity in Uruguay 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 %

%

2006

2014

Catholics

Protestants

Believers without religion

Atheists and agnostics

Fig. 12.2 Changes in religious identity in Uruguay (Source Compilation based on data from the INE and the Pew Forum on Religion)

Objectives Before considering the current goals of faith-based organizations, it is helpful to review the historical background. In the nineteenth century there were numerous social works of the Catholic Church, for example, female religious communities in hospitals or after battles, caring for the wounded. Research on this period characterizes the style or approach that sustained these practices as “marked by a strong paternalistic content and characterized by a welfare-charitable methodology.”9 At the end of that century the figure of a notable Uruguayan bishop, the Archbishop of Montevideo, appears, who produced a current of thought that distinguished itself from paternalistic welfare. Bishop Mariano Soler published a “Pastoral” on the “Social Question,” which constituted an application of the Encyclical Rerum Novarum to the local reality. In the pastoral letter he expressed his beliefs about the limits of private property (“private property is not absolute, it is a natural right but with a social function”), about the necessary role of the state as guarantor of the common good (“the state is the guarantor of the common

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Evolution of sacraments of the Catholic Church in Montevideo 1990-2010 50000

48595

45000 40000

41187

39293

35000

33569

30000

31558

25000 20000 15000

14791

12709

11372

10000 5000

8674 3246

2729

2307

0 1990

1995 Marriage

2000 Baptism

1458 2005

6998 1120 2010

Mass attendance

Fig. 12.3 Evolution of sacraments of the Catholic Church in Montevideo, 1990–2010 (Source Information provided by Diocesis of Montevideo)

good and must intervene in the solution of social problems, preventing the abusive predominance of one class over another”), and also about the importance of practicing justice (“justice is the cardinal virtue of the social order”).10 Here one can see a change of position and at the same time an alignment with the positions of Leo XIII. Soler died in 1908 and his positions, together with those who shared them, lost the internal battle. After his death, the hegemony within Catholicism was carried forward by a group for whom social issues were a regression, finding these sectors confronted with the eight-hour law in the workplace. Among the strategies to confront the “secularizing offensive,” which was the way the Catholic Church perceived it, was the creation of “Catholic Workers’ Circles.” They were an initiative at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century to promote action in the world of work. There were also other initiatives that promoted the link to and action within the trade union world, such as the Unión Democrática Cristiana (Christian Democratic Union).11

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With the emerging privatization of religion, the Catholic Church withdrew into what has been called the “Catholic ghetto,” that is, an enclosure within ecclesiastical borders. According to Segundo and Rodé, it was characterized by “an attitude of preservation of the already Catholic, framing them in confessional structures, a small private Christianity set in a secularist country, a besieged fortress and a glass bell.”12 This period was characterized by pastoral documents centered on personal customs and on individual, intimate, moral behavior. Although this is the emphasis of the pronouncements of the ecclesiastical hierarchies, we find in that period a new actor within Catholicism: Catholic Action and the specialized movements emerging from it, such as “the Catholic Agrarian Youth (JAC), the Catholic Student Youth (JEC), the Catholic Youth of the Independent Media (JIC), the Catholic Worker Youth (JOC) and the Catholic University Youth (JUC).”13 In 1940 an organization called “Christian Syndicalism” was founded, which claimed to be “a federation of unions that bring together workers organized to procure justice in the relations of labor and capital, in accordance with the principles of Christian Social doctrine.”14 A movement thus arose in the Catholic element of the country focused on social concerns and organizations that build bridges with society. In 1961 a bishop from the interior of the country, Bishop Carlos Parteli, published a Pastoral Letter on the Social Problems of Agriculture,15 which focused on the living conditions of the people living in the rural world and made explicit, for the first time, the structural character of this phenomenon. Let us quote a few paragraphs from that document: Material well-being is the first step. Without it, not even that culture and those natural virtues, on which the spiritual edifice is based, are possible. What patriotic virtues, what love for institutions, what social solidarity, what incentive for an honest life can those feel who have nothing and receive nothing and expect nothing from a society that passes them by looking at them with indifference or contempt, if not provoking their anger or envy, with luxury, waste and weariness? It is unacceptable that the cattle inside (of the fields) are treated better than the swarms of sad, haggard children that populate the little ranches outside. For a social restructuring that eradicates misery and raises the miserable from their prostration, a system of justice that regulates man-to-man relations based on property rights and respect for contracts is not enough. Social justice is indispensable.

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It is the structures that must undergo a profound change until they are adequate to the real needs of today. Peoples who feel in their flesh the pain of misery and in their souls the bitterness of economic discrimination cannot, logically, feel love for the institutions that thus forsake them. You can’t demand too much idealism on empty stomachs.

The appearance of this text had a strong impact on the Uruguayan Catholic Church, so turned in on itself until then. It demonstrated a new sensibility and positioning of some of the Catholic hierarchies that abandoned the enclosure of the church on itself and the intimacy. For the first time, an ecclesiastical document in Uruguay highlighted the structural dimension of phenomena such as poverty and injustice, moving away from a paternalistic vision based on charitable works. This document can be taken as a turning point since it marks the beginning of a new path in the positioning of the Catholic Church: it is the decade of the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) and of the Latin American Bishops’ Conference in Medellin (1968), which involved the active participation of Uruguayan bishops who returned to the country with a strong conviction to implement the new in the local church. One of the most emblematic actions of the time was the so-called “Socio-Pastoral Encounter” of 1968. After a broad process involving participation of lay people and priests from all the Archdiocese of Montevideo, a final document was issued that focused its concerns on the constitutive elements of the reality of the country, including by sector of activity and by what were considered the main elements of the crisis that the country was experiencing. Social inequalities, and their structural causes, were the theme of this document, endorsed by Bishop Parteli himself. It affirmed a vision of the church’s mission that assumed that the experience of Catholic faith could not be dissociated from reality and could not remain passive in the face of poverty and injustice. Of course, this change of position implied a lot of resistance from various social sectors, as well as within the national episcopate. This process of renewal involved the mobilization of many Catholics around grassroots groups and refocused the place and mission of the laity in the construction of the temporal, in the economic, political, and social conditions. This mobilization led many Catholics to devote themselves

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strongly to political and trade union militancy, participation in social organizations, and works aimed at working for the poorest. There is still no quantification of the impact of this work on inequality in Uruguay. The ecclesial renewal of the 1960s generated an important reflection on the so-called “social works,” which were the set of existing faithbased organizations, fundamentally in order that the social action of the Catholic Church should be reevaluated toward more transformative and liberating practices, moving from a vision of “social assistance” to a vision of “social development.” The Uruguayan educational space is fundamentally state-run, with 80% of the enrollment in state and non-confessional schools. Nonetheless, faith-based organizations play an important role in education, running some schools, providing school support to vulnerable social sectors, and implementing initiatives in non-formal education and education programs related to the first work experiences of young people in situations of exclusion. The field of faith-based organizations is very broad and covers many sectors, including homes for the elderly, Child and Family Care Centers (CAIF) created in religious institutions or by people from these institutions, children’s clubs, human development centers, canteens, picnic areas, support for women in vulnerable situations, care for the disabled, street people, and people with addictions, and two hospitals, among others. Cáritas Uruguaya16 conducted a survey of social works in nine dioceses of Uruguay, not including the capital, Montevideo, and classified the organizations by category as follows: food, clothing, training and job placement, health, and home. In the whole country and without counting Catholic schools, there are around 450 faith-based organizations, and if Catholic schools are added, the number rises to over 600 organizations.17 Something similar happens with organizations of Protestant origin. A primary survey done recently for this article identifies some 80 organizations, including schools. Given the variety of faith-based organizations, it is not possible to identify a single goal, but in most cases such organizations exist because of unmet social needs, especially among vulnerable or excluded populations. The separation between church and state and the assumption of living in a pluralistic society means that these organizations have a clear social concern, namely human development, rather than recruitment of followers. In the formal educational system there is a concern with the transmission of Christian values, but this also takes into account living in a pluralistic society where it is not possible to impose beliefs, only to propose them.

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Means and Strategies The legal framework of the relationship between the State and the Churches is referred to in Article 5 of the 1919 Constitution, which established the following: All religions are free in Uruguay. The State does not support any religion. It recognizes to the Catholic Church the dominion of all the temples that have been, totally or partially, built with funds from the national treasury, excepting only the chapels destined to the service of asylums, hospitals, prisons or other public establishments. It also declares exempt from all kinds of taxes the temples currently consecrated to the worship of the various religions.18

There is no other legal norm that regulates it. It is necessary to distinguish between the legal framework and the local culture with regard to religion. As already mentioned, in Uruguay a French conception of “secularism” was established where the strict separation between religious institutions and the state is very strong in a country that tends to confuse the state and the public in a single concept. Therefore, any public manifestation of a religious matter always has a certain impact on society. An example of this is an episode that took place in December 2016. That year the Archbishop of Montevideo promoted a campaign entitled “Christmas with Jesus,” which consisted of placing a balconera (a poster with the image of a nativity scene and the phrase “Christmas with Jesus”) on the balconies or windows of believers who so wished. The appearance of those 24,000 balconeras generated public controversy since several sectors understood that there could not be religious images in the public space, despite the fact that they were placed in private homes, but facing the streets. This reaction serves very well to illustrate the persistence over time of antireligious and anticlerical prejudice. Religious actors have total formal and real freedom to manifest themselves and operate in the public space, but they normally receive a certain rejection and contestation from a good part of the population, or at least from a part of the population that has assumed a restrictive version of secularism. Usually the Catholic hierarchies that constitute the Uruguayan Episcopal Conference issue communiqués on dates of certain prominence. The figure who appears most in the press is the Cardinal, Archbishop of Montevideo, who has developed a strategy of public appearances greater than other members of the Catholic hierarchy. The Archdiocese

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of Montevideo has its own radio station and a media center that broadcasts messages on YouTube. While the historic Protestant churches have a much smaller public presence, the neo-Pentecostal churches tend to have had radio and/or television programs for many years.

Source of Income Churches do not receive any subsidy from the state as such, only the one established in the 1919 Constitution, which is the tax exemption for buildings dedicated to worship, but not for other religious buildings, such as the parish house. However, there are religious or faith-based organizations that receive financial support to the extent that they develop social actions that coincide with the public policy objectives of governments at both the national and local levels. Funding is always oriented toward actions to sustain these policies and is never linked to prayer or proselytizing actions. Denominational schools are also not subsidized by the state and have to be financed by the income they generate. With the low percentage of the Christian population, the churches must support themselves with what the believers contribute and also appeal to the support of Christian financing agencies in Europe or the United States linked to Advent or Lenten collections among Christians in the countries of origin. In any case, this support is not large in volume, given that Uruguay has a relatively high Human Development Index (HDI) score, which has removed the possibility of receiving international cooperation funds, even from denominational agencies.

Effects The importance of the third sector’s contribution to Uruguay has been growing in the last decades. The pioneering study on the third sector was developed by ECLAC in 2005.19 This study highlights several of the characteristics of the third sector, namely its non-profit orientation, its flexibility and proximity to the sectors of the population that demand services, and the mobilization of volunteer work. These elements have made the organizations of this sector well-suited to the implementation of social policies. It should also be noted that this sector has been growing, expanding its sphere of action fundamentally in relation to vulnerable and low-income sectors.

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ECLAC estimated that the annual amount of human and material resources mobilized by third sector organizations amounted to 162 million dollars, which in 2003 was equivalent to 1.4% of Uruguay’s Gross Domestic Product. It also pointed out that the economic value of the goods and services produced by the third sector organizations as a whole went far beyond these figures because there were a significant number of activities and organizations in the sector that had not been included in the study. In summary, the study points out among its main findings the relevance of the sector in the field of social policies aimed at low-income sectors; the active participation in the relief of the most basic needs; the valuable contribution in goods and services made to poor households; the mobilization of an important volume of human and material resources; the generation of a significant number of jobs (even if volunteer work predominates); as well as the enlargement of the scope of the state’s social investment. Although this report is some years old, it highlights features of the sector that have not disappeared, but have expanded and developed. In the case of faith-based organizations working in this sector, there is no specific study that values the contribution of these more than 600 organizations. In the year 2002 the NGO, Observatorio del Sur, conducted a survey of Catholic organizations, excluding the schools,20 and from there made an economic estimate of the contribution. The survey work was published, but not the economic estimate, which was presented only in internal meetings and which at the time was estimated, very conservatively, on the order of 30 million US dollars.

Public Perception Unfortunately, there are no opinion surveys about these services, so there are no quantitative elements that allow us to get closer to understanding the population’s opinion about them. This is a serious limitation. There are some studies that show how the Catholic Church as a whole is perceived, but these studies go beyond the work performed by faith-based organizations and focus on other issues such as opinions on ecclesiastical hierarchies. It is not surprising that such studies do not exist because the general cultural climate and the economic and personnel limitations of the Catholic Church mean that a study always lags behind concrete actions.

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However, a study from the 1990s21 found that perceptions of the various figures of the Catholic Church were closely related to their proximity to the people and the neediest. The closer they were, the higher the rating, and the further away, for example, the bishops or the Pope himself, the lower the rating.

Some Socio-Political Elements Politics retains a prominent place in Uruguay. Sacredness was transferred to the political regime as a result of the privatization of religion. A high level of hope and trust is therefore placed in the political system and the democratic system in particular. It is worth remembering that this is a country without a name: it is the Republic that lies to the east of the Uruguay River, or the Eastern Republic of Uruguay. The country is thus defined by its republican political regime. Uruguay is a country with an early implementation of public policies to protect citizens. In fact, in the times of Batlle y Ordóñez, the state was seen as a shield for the poor. In August 2021, Freedom in the World,22 published by the international NGO Freedom House, placed Uruguay as the sixth freest country in the world behind the Nordic countries, New Zealand, and the Netherlands, highlighting an important characteristic of the political system. The influence of the churches in legislative measures or in what has been called the new agenda of rights has not achieved its objectives, as the parliament has passed laws on issues such as same-sex marriage or abortion, despite public opposition from certain sectors of the Catholic Church (though not all) and the neo-Pentecostal churches. It can be said that Uruguayan Catholicism is buffeted by two tendencies, one that seeks to immerse itself in the local cultural reality and from there live its Catholic faith, and another that seeks to return to the identity politics and certainties of the past, even those prior to the Second Vatican Council. Given the scarce institutional influence of the Catholic Church, it is highly probable that this second position will not be able to expand very much.

Conclusion In conclusion, it is possible to note a long-standing presence, for the young history of Uruguay, of what we now call faith-based organizations in Uruguayan society. Rooted in health and education as two

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initial pillars, but not restricted to them, with the passing of time, faith-based organizations extended to many more areas that demanded support, especially in vulnerable sectors. The expansion of these organizations has been increasing as society becomes more complex and more specific areas or issues are detected that required attention from those who are closer to the people and further away from the general planning of public policies. As already mentioned, there are now more than 600 organizations of this type in Uruguay, including both Catholic and Protestant/Evangelical organizations. These organizations are anchored in the needs of vulnerable populations and try to respond to them, which gives them an uncontested penetration and legitimacy, despite a certain Uruguayan cultural climate that tends to make religion invisible or to reject its presence in the public sphere. Their existence is a contribution to the construction of a society that requires a greater integration of the poorest and most vulnerable sectors. Working alongside other nondenominational organizations, as well as the state itself, they contribute to a better country.

Notes 1. Teresa Porzecanski, “Inmigrantes,” 1811–2011, http://www.1811-2011. edu.uy/B1/content/inmigrantes?page=show. 2. Juan Carlos Luzuriaga. Los procesos inmigratorios en el Uruguay del Siglo XIX: visión de conjunto.XIV Encuentro de Latinoamericanistas Españoles : congreso internacional, Sep 2010, Santiago de Compostela, España. 1002–1018. https://www.halshs-00530616 3. Luzuriaga, “The Immigration Processes.” 4. Gerardo Caetano and Roger Geymonat, La Secularización Uruguaya (1859–1919). Catolicismo y privatización de lo religioso, 1st ed. (Montevideo: Taurus, 1997), 43–110. 5. Patricio Rodé, Promoción del laicado (folleto de los Cursos de Complementación Cristiana) (Montevideo, 1963), 15. 6. José Casanova, Religiones públicas en el mundo moderno (Madrid: Ed. PPC. 2000), 25–99. 7. Néstor Da Costa and Mónica Maronna, 100 años de Laicidad (Montevideo: Planeta, 2019), 117. 8. Pew Forum Religion in Latin America, “Religion in Latin America,” November 13, 2014, https://www.pewforum.org/2014/11/13/rel igion-in-latin-america/.

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9. Mario Cayota and Carlos Zubillaga, Cristianos y cambio social en el Uruguay e la modernización 1896–1919 (Montevideo, CLAEH-Banda Oriental, 1988), 106. 10. Tomás Brena, El pensamiento y la acción social de los católicos en el Uruguay (Montevideo: Barreiro y Ramos, 1980), 44–45. 11. For example, the Christian Democratic Union founded in 1904. 12. Juan Luis Segundo and Patricio Rodé, Presencia de la Iglesia (Montevideo: Enciclopedia Uruguaya, No. 37, 1969), n.p. 13. Lorena García, “‘La Juventud Obrera Católica’ in Uruguay (1938–1951)” (Montevideo, unpublished). 14. “Estatutos del Sindicalismo Cristiano en Uruguay,” in Archivo de la Curia Arquidiocesana de Montevideo, cited in García, “‘La juventud Obrera Católica’”. 15. Carlos Parteli, Pastoral Letter on the Social Problems of Agriculture (Tacuarembó, Uruguay: La Voz del Pueblo, 1961). 16. Caritas Uruguay, Relevamiento de Acciones sociales de la Iglesia Católica en el interior del País (Montevideo: Cáritas, 2019). 17. See also “Map of the Social Works of the Catholic Church in Montevideo,” Iglesia Católica Montevideo, https://icm.org.uy/obras-sociales/. Formal Education Census of AUDEC (Uruguayan Association of Catholic Education) 2017 and Non-Formal Education Census of AUDEC, 2016. The information is completed with a survey made especially for this work among Catholic and Protestant organizations. 18. See Constitution of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay; from 1919 to date all constitutional reforms have left this article untouched. 19. Pascual Gerstenfeld and Álvaro Fuentes, Characterización del Tercer Sector en las políticas de formación de capital humano en Uruguay (Montevideo: ECLAC, 2005), 10–17. 20. Berónica Berón, Servicios Sociales de la Iglesia Católica en el Uruguay 2 (Montevideo: Obsur, 2002). 21. Néstor Da Costa, Guillermo Kerber, and Pablo Mieres, Creencias y religiones. La religiosidad de los montevideanos al fin del milenio (Montevideo: Trilce, 1993), 83–86. 22. Freedom House, “Countries and Territories,” https://freedomhouse. org/countries/freedom-world/scores#.YRwDVePFBHc.

Index

A Abacha, Sani, 248, 249 Abbas, Aremu Rahman, 48 Abdul-Aziz Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation, 82 abortion, 10, 52, 163, 165, 176, 177, 305 Abubakar, Saeed, 249 Abuja Declaration, 38 accountability, 65–67, 75, 127, 189, 203, 230, 247, 248, 253, 257, 260 Achievers Ghana, 81 activism, 85, 86, 92, 217, 223, 228 Advocates for Community Development, 83 Afghanistan, 77 Africa. See also specific countries Catholic Church social protection facilities in, 30 colonialism in, 146 religion in, 48, 51, 62, 105 welfare democracy in, 18 youth population in, 25, 26, 41

Africa Muslims Agency, 56, 65 African-Initiated Churches (AICS), 54, 57, 66 African National Congress (ANC), 99 African Pentecostalism, 280 African Traditional Religion (ATR), 48, 51, 62, 250, 285 African Union, 38 African Union Social Policy Framework for Africa, 28 Afrobarometer, 48 Ahmadi Muslims, 75, 79 Ahmadu Bello University, 249 aid dependency, 31 Akin-Otiko, Akinmayowa, 48 Akuffo-Addo, Nana, 76 Aladura movement, 244 Aldiaa Society, 81, 85 Alianza Cívica, 189 Allende, Salvador, 167, 171 Almeida, Adalberto, 188 Al-Mutada Aid, 85 Al-Rayaan International School, 91 AMA/Direct Aid, 227

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 M. Glatzer et al. (eds.), Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31960-0

309

310

INDEX

AMAL initiative, 82 Amir Amir Foundation, 84 Ammah, Rabiatu Deinyo, 79 Anglican Church, 60, 276, 277 Annan, Kofi, 152 Annual Meeting of the Representatives of Missions in Northern Nigeria, 259 An-Nur Islamiyya, 91 Ansar al-Sunna, 226, 230 anticlericalism, 293 apartheid, 19, 99, 100, 103, 107, 108, 116, 119, 128, 131 Arabs, 144, 146 Arab settlers, 144 Arab Spring, 86 Arc-en-Ciel, 229 Argentina, 187 Arndt, Cassidy, 87 Asamblea Popular de los Pueblos de Oaxaca (Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca, APPO), 202 Ashanti Muslim Business Executives Dinner, 83 Assemblées Chrétiennes, 225 associational life, 3, 5, 223 Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), 7 Australia, 86 authoritarianism, 14, 151, 195 autocrats, 6 autonomy, 12, 189, 196, 198, 253, 254, 260 Awolowo, Jeremiah Oyeniyi, 245 Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 245 Aziz Mahmud Hudai Foundation, 86

B Babangida, Ibrahim, 248, 249 Baha’i, 250 Banda Oriental, 290

Bartelink, Brenda, 63 Barth, Renato Poblete, 177 Base Ecclesial Communites (BECs), 194, 202 Batlle y Ordóñez, José, 291, 294, 305 Batllismo, 291 Bauer, Vincent, 54 Baye Do Everything, 92 BBC World Service, 229 Bello, Ahmadu, 245, 247 Biafra, Nigeria, 258, 261 bilingualism, 224 Birin Charity Organisation, 81 Boff, Leonardo, 193 Boko Haram, 221, 222, 226, 235, 250, 251 Bolivia, 187 Bolsa Familia, 8 Bolsonaro, Jair, 14, 15 Bompani, Barbara, 51–54, 68, 69, 94, 137, 138 Bornu, 217 Bosnia, 77 Bowers, Nadine, 18 Brazil, 8, 11, 13–17, 23, 187, 205 Bread for All, 249 Bread for the World, 276 Bretton Woods Institutions, Structural Adjustment Programmes, 54 brokers, 64, 258 Brot für die Welt, 249 Buddhism, 49, 250 Buhari, Muhammadu, 248, 249 bureaucracy, 11 Bureau of Social Services, al-Hudaibiyya Relief Services, 81 Burkina Faso, 28, 39, 57, 222 Burundi, 57 C Cabo Delgado, insurgency in, 272, 276, 282, 283

INDEX

Calvinism, 103 Cameroon, 28, 65, 217 Cammett, Melani, 4 Campus for Christ (CRU), 225 Care and Social Development Organization, 85 Caribbean, 4, 16 Caritas Internationalis, 249 Caritas Mozambique, 276 Cáritas Uruguaya, 301 Carnes, Matthew, 19, 182 Caro, José Maria, 175 Carrasco, Bartolomé, 192 Carrasco, Diódoro, 189, 196 Casanova, José, 293, 306 case studies, 6, 7, 9, 11–13, 18, 19, 21, 26, 61 cash transfers, 8, 29, 39, 42 Catholic Action, 174, 299 Catholic Bishop Conference of Nigeria (CBCN), Commission on Inter-Religious Dialogue, 259 Catholic Church, 4, 9, 12–14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 30, 59, 60, 163–166, 170–173, 175–177, 179–181, 185–190, 192, 195–197, 200, 203, 204, 223, 227–229, 231, 232, 259, 290–294, 296–302, 304, 305 Catholic Congresses, 292 Catholic organizations, 223, 227, 228, 304 Catholic Social Teaching, 16 Catholic Workers’ Circles, 298 Central African Republic, 217 Centre Al-Mouna, 224 Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez (Human Rights Center Agustín Pro Juárez, PRODH), 202

311

Centro de Derechos Indígenas Flor y Canto (Center for Indigenous Rights Flor y Canto), 199 Centro de Estudios Ecuménicos (Center for Ecumenical Studies, CEE), 202 Centro Diocesano de Pastoral Indígena de Oaxaca (Diocesan Center for Indigenous Ministry of Oaxaca, CEDIPIO), 192 Centro Nacional de Ayuda a las Misiones Indígenas (National Center for Aid to Indigenous Missions, CENAMI), 192 Chad, 6–8, 11, 12, 20, 216–218, 221–228, 230–232, 234–236 Chad, M.M.A., 20 CHAN Medi-Pharm, 257 Channels of Hope gender methodology workshops, 63 Charismatic Christianity, 106, 115 charitable children institutions (CCIs), 156 Chávez Botello, José Luis, 202 Chiapas, 187 Chifeche, Victoria Armando, 20, 21, 283 Chihuahua, Mexico, 188 childcare, 286 child development, 41 Chile "collapse of religions" in, 167, 179 2015 earthquake in, 173 China, 12, 33, 64, 86 Chinese road project, 220 Christian Association of Nigeria, 247, 259, 260 Christian Council of Nigeria, 253, 259 Christian Health Association, 30, 257, 259

312

INDEX

Christianity, 7, 19, 48–51, 53, 57, 62, 105, 145, 147, 180, 183, 217, 284, 285, 299 Christian organizations, 225, 229, 230, 234, 248, 249, 257 Church and Community Transformation (CCT) program, 57, 58 churches, 10, 14, 16, 17, 20, 35, 36, 52, 54–57, 59, 61, 67, 103, 110, 129, 131, 146, 147, 150, 164–166, 169, 170, 173, 174, 177–180, 190, 192, 215, 217, 224, 225, 228, 230, 232, 243, 244, 249, 250, 259, 273, 279, 283, 285, 291, 293, 294, 303, 305 church hierarchy, 171, 186–190, 197, 199 church networks, 55, 56, 66 church-state relationship, path of, 188 church transformational intervention, 60 CIDSE (Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité), 249 Civic Union, 292 civil liberties, 168, 260 civil society organizations (CSOs), 20, 76, 155, 185–190, 197, 198, 200, 202–204, 222 civil war, 10, 67, 85, 219, 245, 246, 258, 272, 277 class, 35, 83, 189, 278, 286 clientelism, 6, 198, 201, 234 climate change, 26, 27, 33, 34, 40, 142 CMT (Comité Militaire de Transition), 215, 232 CNT (comité national de transition), 232

Coalition of Muslim Organizations, Ghana, 80 CODNI, the Committee for the Organisation of a National Inclusive Dialogue (Comité d’Organisation du Dialogue National Inclusif), 232 colonialism, legacy of, 9, 10, 13 colonization, 9, 145–147, 290 Comisión Episcopal para los Indígenas (Bishops’ Commission for the Indigenous People, CEI), 192 communitarianism, 76 community-based organizations (CBOs), 76, 156 community development, 19, 56, 79, 82, 148, 157 Community Redemption Foundation, 91 Comoros Islands, 144 Comparative Religious Education Mabera, Sokoto, 259 conditional cash transfer programs, 8, 39 Conférence Episcopale du Tchad (CET), 223 Conference of Missions in Northern Nigeria, 259 Conflict. See also specific conflicts globalization of, 261 role of religion in, 276 Conselho Cristão de Mozambique (CCM), 276 cooperationist religion–state model, 100, 102, 111, 118, 126, 127 corruption, 4, 6, 18, 30, 33, 48, 66, 67, 80, 141–143, 149, 188, 249, 257, 263, 284 Council of Muslim Chiefs, 80 COVID-19 pandemic health crisis due to, 26, 36 lockdowns due to, 31

INDEX

D D’Almeida, Francesco, 145 Da Costa, Nestor, 20, 21 DanChurch AID, 64 Datafolha, 15 da’wa (call to Islam), 77–79, 82–86, 89, 92, 93, 231, 247 Déby, Idriss, 215, 219–221, 233, 235, 237 Déby, Mahamat, 215, 233 decolonization, 9, 10, 54 De Gruchy, Steve, 107 democracy, 6, 13, 16, 18, 67, 99, 103, 109, 119, 150–152, 165, 167, 168, 178–180, 186, 274, 275 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 217 democratization, level of, 5, 8, 9 depoliticization, 219 development, religion and, 53, 54, 62 Devonshire White Paper, 147 Deyer, Yolanda, 18 DFID (Department for International Development), 64 Diakonie Katastrophenhilf (DKH), 276 Díaz, Floriberto, 197 Dickow, H., 220 Direct Aid, 55, 56, 65, 80, 85, 227 discrimination, 30, 102, 103, 245, 275, 278–281, 286, 300 displacement, 39, 40, 170, 178, 261 diversity, 26, 31, 34, 42, 48, 62, 100, 106, 187, 190, 196, 242, 272, 286 division, 35, 115, 142, 152, 219, 231–234, 245, 275 Doba Declaration, 233 donor countries, 12 donors, 12, 51, 56, 63–67, 75, 77, 81, 82, 93, 156, 172, 175, 224,

313

227, 229, 257, 258, 261, 263, 264 Dutch Reformed Church, 103

E East Africa, 52, 144–148 East Asia economic and social crisis of 1997–1999, 27 Ebola, 36, 42, 59 ECC (Eglise du Christ au Congo), 59, 60 ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), 303, 304 economic barriers, 282 economic dependence, 15 economic transformation, 284, 285 Economic Union, 292 economic vulnerability, 9, 11–13 Ecumenical Foundation of Southern Africa (EFSA), 110–113 ecumenical movements, 65 Ecumenical Social Development (CEDES), 276 ecumenism, 259 EDUCA (Education Africa), 199, 200, 203 education educational crises, 37 of girls, 36 educational services, 245, 254–256 EEMET (Entente des Eglises et Missions Evangéliques au Tchad), 224, 225, 227, 228, 232 effects, 11, 18, 61, 62, 101, 102, 177, 217, 220, 223, 227, 230–232, 246, 260, 276, 281, 303 elder care, 178 elderly population, 29 electoral processes, 6

314

INDEX

El-Ehsan Charitable Relief Foundation, 82 elites, 201, 234, 243–245, 247, 249, 261–263, 291 Ellis, Willem, 107 El Salvador, 187 El-Zakzaky, Ibrahim, 251 emergency relief programs, 28 empathy, promotion of, 282 "enculturation", 191 Enlightenment, 293 environmental pollution, 262 Eshiwani, G.S., 148 ethnicity, 35, 279 Europe, 8, 9, 10, 12, 86, 230, 290, 291, 303. See also specific countries evangelical churches, 20, 164–166, 179, 215, 224, 249 evangelization, 58, 146, 191, 192, 200, 225, 228, 231, 243 F Facebook, 82, 84, 87, 89–91, 260 faith, 3, 5, 8, 13, 16, 18, 21, 37, 43, 47, 55–57, 59, 63–65, 67, 68, 77, 78, 102, 103, 105, 110, 112, 113, 123, 124, 129, 131, 143, 148, 156, 166, 179, 193, 194, 224, 227–232, 234, 247, 255, 261, 275, 278, 279, 282, 283, 285–287, 300, 305. See also religion, in public sphere faith-based organizations, 3–5, 9–19, 21, 49, 51, 52, 54–59, 62–65, 67, 68, 76, 79, 99–103, 106–109, 112–114, 116–119, 123–127, 131, 136, 142, 143, 146, 148–157, 171, 178, 242, 243, 247, 254–258, 260, 261, 271, 276, 278–281, 284, 286, 297, 301, 303–305

as donor "brokers" for local aid, 64 grassroots-based, 56, 57 hybrid, 57 public perception of, 48 sources of income, 176 transnational, 10, 12, 48, 55, 67 Families without Ebola, 59 famines, 30, 77 Federation of Muslim Women’s Associations in Ghana (FOMWAG), 81 Federation of Muslim Youth Groups – Ghana, 91 fertility rates, 251, 252 Firdaus Foundation for Social Services, 82, 85 Fitrana, 50 Flor y Canto, 200, 203 FONASA, 178 food food distribution programs, 28 food prices, unrest due to, 37 food security, 12, 40, 61, 142, 157 foreign support, 13 Fort, Alfredo L., 155 France, 166, 216, 219, 223, 224, 233, 235, 291 Fraser-Moleketi, Geraldine, 112 freedom, 10, 100, 102, 103, 142, 143, 148, 223, 243, 279, 302 Freedom House, 6, 13, 142, 168, 305 Freemasonry, 291 Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), 221 Fulani, 242

G gatekeepers, 258 gender gender-based violence, 62, 63, 262 gender complementarity, 177

INDEX

gender disparities, 21 gender equity, 63 gender justice, religion and, 18, 48, 62 gender norms, 63 gender parity, 64 geopolitics, 9, 12, 13, 17 Ghadaffi, Muammar Al, 86 Ghana Charity Association for Development, 82 Ghana, Fourth Republic, 75, 76 Ghana Friendship and Solidarity Association (GANADER), 86 Ghana Islamic Youth Sadaqa Association, 91 Ghana Muslim Academy, 81 Ghana Muslim Achievers’ Awards, 81 Ghana Muslim Mission, 80 Ghana Muslim Representative Council, 80 Ghana Muslim Students Association, 81 Ghana Muslim Youth Movement, 81 Gift of the Givers, 66 girls education of, 82 Muslim, 82 Girouard, Percy, 244 global crises, 9, 12, 13, 17 Global Fund, 257, 258 globalization, of conflict, 261 Global North, 52, 64 Global South, 52, 53, 64, 65 Goa, 145 Gold Coast Muslim Association, 80 Goncalves, Jaime, 277 González Martínez, Héctor, 198 governance, 11, 32, 33, 40, 55, 66, 75, 110, 149, 152–154, 167, 168, 199, 224, 260, 275, 276, 281 Great Commission, 58

315

Groupes Bibliques Universitaires de l’Afrique Francophone (GBUAF), 225 Guatemala, 187 guerrilla wars, 219 ‘Guinea Fowl War’, 85 Gumi, Abubakar, 247 Gutiérrez, Gustavo, 193

H Habré, Hissein, 219, 220, 234 “handouts”, 27, 125 Hausa, 83, 242 Hausa-Fulani culture, 63 Haynes, Jeffrey, 17, 275, 287, 288 health care, 4, 10–12, 14, 20, 30, 36, 38, 84, 85, 109, 168, 170, 171, 178, 179, 216, 254, 256, 257, 261 health-care facilities, 16 health service workers, training of, 257 Henning, Anja, 17, 24 Heuser, A., 4, 22, 24, 266 higher education, 16, 246 Hinduism, 49 HIV/AIDS pandemic, 37 Hogar de Cristo, 164, 170, 172–179, 182, 183 holidays recognition of, 252 secularization of, 293 “Holy Child-APPO”, 202 hope, 58, 59, 61, 231, 234, 280, 305 hospitals, 16, 21, 53, 83, 148, 155, 169, 171, 228, 246, 249, 256, 257, 261, 263, 293, 297, 301, 302 HOVID, 27 Human Development Association International HUDAI, 86

316

INDEX

Human Development Index (HDI), 7, 13, 142, 169, 221, 303 human development indicators, 5, 8, 9 human rights, 32, 36, 52, 66, 67, 119, 142, 143, 149, 171, 179, 186, 199, 202, 203, 235, 247, 252, 253, 278, 279, 286 hunger, 27, 40 Hurtado, Alberto, 172, 174, 175, 183 I Ibadi Muslims, 75, 79 Ibo, 242 ighatha (humanitarian relief), 77 Ijaw, 242 illness, 30, 84, 172 income, 4, 7, 8, 13, 28, 32, 61, 62, 166, 168, 176, 218, 221, 262, 303 India, 64, 145 indigenous nationalism, 244 indigenous peoples, thought systems of, 62 indigenous religious movements, 67, 244 indigenous rights, 190, 193, 195, 196, 201, 204, 206, 207 individual account programs, mandatory, 8 inequality, 4, 13, 32, 47, 61, 63, 141, 152, 168, 169, 178, 301 infant mortality, 142 informal sector, 8, 26 infrastructure, 11, 53, 78, 93, 107, 113, 125, 148, 155, 168, 171, 220, 229, 246, 272, 294 injustice, 18, 48, 53, 109, 188, 189, 234, 300 Instagram, 82, 90 Instituto Federal Electoral, 189

Inter-Church Organization for Development Cooperation (ICCO), 249 interfaith programs, 54 international development, 52 International Fellowship of Evangelical Students, 225 International Labor Organization, 189 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 33 Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK), 156 interreligious dialogue, 224 Iqra Foundation for Education and Development, 82 Iranian Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD), 85 Islam, 7, 49, 51, 53, 57, 62, 77, 145, 146, 217, 219, 224, 226, 228, 253, 259, 285 Islamic, 144 Islamic Council for Development and Humanitarian Services (ICODEHS), 81, 85 Islamic Development Bank, 248 Islamic Education Trust (IET), 259 Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), 251 Islamic Relief, 40, 227 Islamic terrorist groups, 221, 222 Islamic Ummah Relief, 81 Islamic World Relief, 55, 63, 65 Islam in African Project (IAP), 259 J Jacobinism, 293 Jelen, Ted Gerard, 6, 18 Jesuits, 187. See also Society of Jesus Jeunesse Etudiante Chrétienne (JEC), 223, 224 jihad, 77, 78 John Paul II, 189, 195

INDEX

John, Sokfa France, 70 Joint Meetings between AMRM, 259 Judaism, 49 judicial independence, 6

K Kaag, Mayke, 12, 20, 77, 95, 236–240 Kaduna Polytechnic, 249 "Kairos consciousness", 116 Kalu, Ogbu U., 280, 288 KANU, 142 Kanuri, 242 Kanyoro, Musimbi, 62 Karima Enterprise, 83 Karima Foundation, 83 Kaunda, Chammah, 57 Kenya Bridging Bridges Initiative (BBI), 154 colonial period, 19, 146, 148, 259 constitutional review in, 150, 151, 153 Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act, 153 Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 153 Hijra, 144 Kenya Christian Leaders Constitutional Forum (KCLCF), 153 Linda Katiba (protect the Constitution) initiative, 154 Shirazi period, 144 Ufungamano Initiative, 151 Kenya Catholic Secretariat (KCS), 155 Kenya Council of Catholic Bishops (KCCB), 156 Kenya Episcopal Conference (KEC), 156

317

Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee (KNDRC), 152 Kenyatta, Jomo, 148, 149 Khalifa Faith’s Peace Dawah Media (PDW), 84 Kibaki, Mwai, 149 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 284 Koegelenberg, Renier, 115 Koehrsen, Jens, 4 Koinonia Community, 156 Koranic schools, 36 Krapf, Ludwig, 145 Kreidieh, Said Ibrahim, 87 Krieggler and Waki Commissions, 152 Krishna, Anirudh, 261 Kumi, Emmanuel, 78 Kuwait, 56, 65, 250 Kuwaiti Direct Aid, 227

L labor markets, informal, 8 labor unions, 216 Ladies’ Entredigital Workshop, 82 Lake Chad region, 222 Latin America, 4, 5–13, 16, 19, 21, 163, 167–169, 174, 185, 186, 190, 203, 204, 289, 290. See also specific countries Latinobarómetro, 14, 167, 179, 294 Lefebvre, Marcel, 195 Lefebvristas, 195 legislation, 153, 163, 176, 196–198, 200 Leichtman, 56 L’Entente des Eglises et Missions Evangéliques au Tchad (EEMET), 224, 225, 227, 228, 232 León, Dávila, 169 Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, 170

318

INDEX

LGBTQ+ rights, 176 liberation theology, 187, 189, 190, 193, 195, 203, 204 Liberia, 67 Libya, 86, 217, 221, 250 Libyan World Islamic Call Service (WICS), 85 life expectancy, 7, 169, 221, 242 Light Foundation, 81, 91 literacy rates, 21, 242 Livingstone, David, 145 Llaguno, José, 188 local fund agents (LFAs), 257 Lombera, Juan Manuel, 19, 20, 205, 210 Lona, Arturo, 193–195, 199 London Missionary Society, 145 López Obrador, Andrés Manuel, 203 Lutheran Church, 259 Luzuriaga, Juan C., 290 M Machel, Samora Moisés, 274 MacLean, Lauren M., 4 Madagascar, 40 Mahamat, M.A., 226, 236, 238 Mahama, Umul Hatiyya Ibrahim, 84 “Maitatsine” fundamentalist Islamic group, 248 malaria, 38, 82 Malawi, 271 Maliki School, 250 malnutrition, 40, 61 Manji, Firoze, 53, 54 Maputo Plan for Action, 38 marginalized communities, 19, 21, 199 Marins, José, 193 Maronna, Mónica, 294 marriage equality, 176 Marshall, Katherine, 4, 5, 18, 22, 43, 45, 46

Marxists, 195, 198 maternal health, 62 maternal mortality, 38, 83, 242 Mau Mau uprising, 147 Mbeki, Thabo, 113, 115, 116 Mbiti, John, 48, 285, 288 means, 11, 56, 57, 66, 67, 101, 102, 187, 190, 254, 302 media, 14, 17, 20, 21, 142, 149, 156, 163, 258, 260, 263, 281, 292 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), 113, 114 Méndez Arceo, Sergio, 188 mentorship, 282 Meryam Zakariya Yahya Foundation, a.k.a. Mariam Foundation, 84 Methodist Church, 145 Metropolitan Municipality of Samsun, 86 Mexico, 6–8, 12, 19, 20, 185–190, 203, 206 MICHIZA, 194, 200, 203 Middle East, 32, 80, 144, 229, 284 migrants, 30, 144, 164, 174, 196, 199 migration, 4, 12, 166, 217, 235, 242 military dictatorships, 10, 186 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 5, 34 Minna, 259 MINUSMA, 222 missionaries, roles of, 9, 147, 245 Missionary Societies, 53, 54, 245 modernity, 52, 291, 293 Modernizantes, 195 Modernization Theory, 54 Moi, Daniel Toroitich Arap, 149 Montevideo, Uruguay, 290, 296, 297, 301 mosques, 54, 56, 67, 78, 80, 85, 110, 113, 226, 228, 255, 279, 283

INDEX

Mozambique, 6–8, 11, 20, 21, 271–275, 277–279, 281, 283, 284, 286 Msabah, Barnabe Anzuruni, 18 Mtata, Kenneth, 53 Muge, Alexander, 149 multiculturalism, 196, 198, 201 Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), 222 Mumuni, Sulemana, 80 Murat, José, 201, 202 Muslim activism, 92 Muslim Aid, 63, 85 Muslim communities, 36, 76, 77, 85, 92, 93, 227, 251, 259 Muslim Family Counselling Service, 81 Muslim organizations, 19, 79, 82, 231, 249, 250, 254 Muslim Relief Association of Ghana, 81 Muslim University Female Students Education Network, 82 Muslim Youth Alliance for Development, 91 Muslim Zongo TV, 83 Mutelo, Isaac, 99, 100 mutual assistance, 76

N National Chief Imam, 80, 83 National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), 149, 156 National Democratic Convention (NDC), 76 National Institute Moral and Religious Education, 259 National Interfaith Council of South Africa (NICSA), 115, 116 nationality, right to, 279

319

National Religious Association for Social Development (NRASD), 110, 112 National Religious Leaders Forum (NRLF), 112–118, 127 National Safety Net Program, 28 nation building, 19, 99, 106, 107, 111, 123 natural catastrophes, 30, 33, 36 N’Djamena, Chad, 216, 217, 220, 223–227, 229, 232 Ndzovu, Hassan, 51, 66, 148 neocolonialism, 65, 68 neoliberalism, 11, 65, 165, 168, 173, 180, 249 nepotism, 6 New Patriotic Party (NPP), 76 New Testament, 145 New Zealand, 86, 305 Nigeria laws governing education in, 252 military government in, 245 Sharia courts in, 247, 253 Nigerian-Inter-Religious Council (NIREC), 260 9/11, 78, 226 Niringye, Bishop Zac, 67 Njoya, Timothy, 149, 152 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 5, 19, 55, 65, 76–93, 109, 181, 216, 222, 223, 227, 229, 230, 304 North Africa, 32, 36 Northern Advisory Education Council, 259 Northern Tibesti region, 222

O Oaxaca, Mexico, 20, 185, 187, 190, 195–200, 202–204 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 247, 249

320

INDEX

objectives, 17, 38, 39, 52, 78, 101, 102, 112, 119, 144, 173, 186, 187, 190, 198, 273, 297, 303, 305 Observatorio del Sur, 304 Ochanda, Richard Muko, 19, 155, 156 O’Coil, Carol, 53, 54 oil reserves, 20, 216 Okullu, Bishop John Henry, 67 Olarinmoye, Omobolaji O., 20, 69, 267–269 Oliver, Jill, 64, 65 Oportunidades, 8 Organization of Independent Churches of Kenya (OICK), 157 Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), 248 orphanages, 13, 16, 30, 41, 56, 256 orphans, 30, 37, 41, 80, 84, 148, 228, 256

P Paice, Edward, 32 Pakistan, 86 pandemics, 38 para-church organizations, 58 Paragon Foundation, 81 Para-Mallam, 63 Parteli, Carlos, 299, 300 participation, 100, 109, 181, 186, 193, 196, 199, 202, 253, 254, 260, 282, 285, 300, 301, 304 Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), 189 Pastoral Juvenil, 193 Patel, Leila, 109 path development, 17, 53, 101, 188, 289 peacebuilding, religious, 21 peace mitigation, 276, 281

Pentecostal Churches, 14, 16, 17, 147, 150, 224, 250, 273, 303, 305 PEPFAR (The U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief), 64, 155 per-capita income, 7 Peru, 178, 187 Petersen, Marie Juul, 77, 78 Pew Research Center, 4, 10, 262 pharmacy services, 257 Pinochet, Augusto, 20, 164, 165, 167–169, 171, 173, 178, 181 Piper, Laurence, 103, 119, 123 Pius IX, 291, 292 “Plan AUGE”, 178 pluralism, 15, 103, 106, 110, 123–125, 190, 201 political pluralism, 190, 201 political polarization, 14 political power, 234, 291 political stability, 9, 10, 13, 14 politicization, 218 “politics of recognition”, 187, 189, 196, 201, 252 politics, religious actors and, 216 pollution, 262 Portuguese Empire, 145 postcolonial era, 54, 148 poverty, 4, 8, 12–14, 20, 21, 25–28, 31–33, 37, 39, 42, 47, 49, 53, 57, 58, 60, 61, 78, 83, 96, 108, 125, 137, 141, 143, 152, 178, 186, 194, 216, 219, 221, 231, 234, 256, 261, 272, 282–284, 287, 290, 300 poverty advocacy, 283 power relations, 52, 65, 127, 198 power, struggle for, 291 prejudice, 31, 286, 302 press, freedom of, 6 Prester John, 145

INDEX

Princess Umul Hatiyya Foundation, 84 Prisons Catholic Chaplaincy, 156, 162 professionalization, 11 progressive life improvement strategies , 250 Progressive Muslim Youth Movement, 81 Project for Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa (PROCMURA), 259 prophetic voice, 247, 258, 260, 261 Protestantism, 228 Protestant organizations, 227, 228, 307 public education, deconfessionalization of, 292 public perception, 14, 18, 102, 127, 144, 304 public sphere, 3, 62, 228, 254, 260, 262, 279, 293, 306

Q Qadiriyya, 245, 250 Qatar Charities, 85 Qualitative Impact Evaluation Protocol (QuIP), 57 Quran, 49, 84 Qurbani, 50, 85

R Raabo, Safia Abdallah, 82 race, 35, 278, 279 Racine, C., 226 Radio Al-Bayane, 229 Radio Alquoran Alkarim, 229 radio broadcasting, 228 Ramirez, Heladio, 189 Rasulul A’azam Foundation (RAAF), 251 Rayuwa Foundation, 91

321

recognition, politics of, 187, 189, 196, 201, 252 reconciliation, 100, 149, 152, 153, 220, 276, 279, 281, 286, 287 reconstruction, 19, 99, 103, 107, 111, 236, 276 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), 108, 111, 128, 130 redistribution, 220 refugee crisis, 222 refugees, 13, 33, 39, 40, 157, 222 Regino, Adelfo, 197 Región Pastoral Pacífico Sur (South Pacific Ministerial Region, RPS), 193 religion development and, 53, 54 gender justice and, 62 public perception of, 48 spiritual formation and, 280 Religions for Peace, 63 religious actors means of, 17, 223, 254 peacebuilding and, 33 politics and, 216 public agency and, 144, 243, 273 public square and, 278 strategies of, 254 religious education, 54, 286 religious elites, broker role of, 261 religious events, 252 religious freedom, 106, 129, 150, 252, 253, 263 religious leaders, 51, 59, 62, 63, 215, 233, 247, 258, 261–263, 278–282, 286 religious marketplace, types of, 5 religious organizations, 4, 5, 13, 14, 20, 52, 144, 157, 164, 166, 176, 223, 234, 235, 250, 254, 256,

322

INDEX

258, 260–264, 273, 274, 278, 279, 284 religious pluralism, 15, 103, 106, 110, 123–125 religious tolerance, 276 Renaissance Zongo Youth Aid, 82 RENAMO, 272, 277 representation, 103, 106, 115, 119, 151, 253, 254, 260 “Resilient livelihoods”, 60 resources, 11, 12, 15, 17, 26, 31, 33, 37, 38, 52, 55, 56, 60, 93, 119, 143, 157, 172–174, 178, 181, 193–196, 198–201, 203, 206, 219, 221, 234, 243, 249, 250, 258, 283, 286, 304 respect, 12, 67, 109, 111, 115, 126, 169, 177, 180, 202, 220, 246, 260, 275, 278–281, 285, 286, 299 Rodé, Patricio, 291, 299, 306, 307 Ruiz, Samuel, 193 Ruiz, Ulises, 201, 202 rule of law, 6 Russia, 12 Russia–Ukraine War, 11 Rwanda, 28 S Salafi, 75, 76, 79, 226–230, 232, 235, 250 Salinas de Gortari, Carlos, 189 same-sex marriage, 305 San Cristóbal de las Casas, 192, 193 Sant’Egidio, 277, 284 Saudi Arabia, 239, 250 “school apostolate”, 254, 255 Schweikart, Raimundo Salas, 19 Second Conference of Latin American Bishops, 186, 204 Second Vatican Council, 20, 185, 186, 300, 305. See also Vatican II

secularism, 166, 289, 291, 294, 302 secularization, 9, 23, 164, 169, 180, 293 security, 8, 11, 12, 15, 40, 57, 93, 142, 149, 151, 170, 221, 222, 235, 239, 241, 251, 261, 272, 274, 282 Seekings, Jeremy, 108, 131, 132 Segundo, Juan Luis, 299, 307 self-determination, 233 self-help, 76, 156 self-reliance, 27, 143 self-sufficiency, 56 Seminario Regional de Sureste (Regional Seminary of the Southeast, SERESURE), 192, 198 Senegal, 36 separation of church and state, 14, 289, 293 SER, 196, 197, 208 service providers, 21, 170, 246, 254, 255, 263 services, access to, 4, 143 Sharia law, 252 Shia Muslims, 75, 79, 250 Shonekan, Ernest, 248 Sierra Leone, 57, 67, 94 SIL International (formerly known as Summer Institute of Linguistics), 225 SIM (Société Internationale Missionnaire), 259 Singapore, 86 Skinner, David E., 77, 94, 95 social assistance programs, 8, 13 social barriers, 282 social insurance, universal, 8 social media, 19, 76, 77, 79, 82–84, 86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 260, 275. See also specific platforms social power, 291

INDEX

social protection services, 4 social security programs, types of, 5, 8 social status, 253, 260 Social Union, 292 social welfare, 3, 4, 9–15, 17–20, 36, 41, 47, 48, 77, 79, 82, 100–102, 107, 108, 110, 112, 114–118, 123–128, 154, 157, 163–165, 169–174, 177–181, 235, 241, 242 Society of Jesus, 175, 177 socio-political transformation, 284 Sokoto, 259, 260, 264 Soler, Mariano, 294, 297, 298 solidarity, 77, 171, 173, 197, 203, 247, 299 Somalia, 39 SONSETFUND, 91 South Africa apartheid in, 102 General Household Survey, 105 South African Council of Churches, 66, 136 South Sudan, 39, 61, 237 spiritual formation, 156, 278, 280 Spiritual life improvement strategies , 250 state-building, 241, 276 state capacity, 4, 10, 11, 17, 54 state-centered development model, 242 state effectiveness, 9, 13, 14 state failure, 18, 48, 101, 116, 123 state hegemony, 245 state–religion relations, 243, 245, 247, 252 state services, 4, 20 strategies, 16–18, 25–27, 37, 42, 102, 109, 187, 260, 263, 287, 298, 302 street children, 30, 41 strongmen (caciques), 198

323

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 4, 18, 26, 31, 32, 39, 41, 42, 49, 51, 64, 76–78, 92 Sub-Saharan Regional Index, 142 Sudan Interior Mission, 253 Sufi Muslims, 36, 79, 226, 245, 250 Sunni Muslims, 250 Superior Islamic Council (le Conseil superíeur des affaires islamiques, CSAI), 215, 225–229, 231, 232, 235 Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 80 Supreme Council of Muslims of Kenya (SUPKEM), 157 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 5, 34, 36, 82, 224 Swahili, 144–147 Swart, Ignatius, 19, 21, 130, 132–139 Swaziland, 271 T Tafawa-Balewa, Abubakar, 247 Talamás, Manuel, 188 Taskar Zango, 91 TDT, 202, 205 Tearfund, 55–61, 63, 64, 276 Tehuantepec, 192–194, 199 Temple, Charles L., 244 terrorism, 9/11, 226 “the Virgin of the Barricades”, 202 Thomas, S.M., 284, 288 Tijani Sufi, 75 Tijaniyya, 217 Tijaniyya Youth, 92 Tiv, 242 tolerance, 48, 52, 143, 150, 260, 262, 269, 278, 281, 282, 285 Tomalin, Emma, 62, 68–71, 132 trade, dependence on, 11 Transforming Masculinities programming, 63

324

INDEX

transparency, 6, 65, 206 Trump, Donald, 14 tuberculosis, 38, 268 Turkey, 86 Tutu, Desmond, 67, 284 Twitter, 82, 90, 260 2008 financial crisis, 11 U Uganda, 8, 52, 57, 67 Uhuru, Kenyatta, 149 ummah, 79 unemployment, 61, 143, 242 unemployment insurance, 8, 15 UNICEF, 39 unification, 292 Unión de Comunidades Indígenas de la Región del Istmo (Indigenous Communities’ Union of the Isthmus Region, UCIRI), 194, 200, 203, 207, 208 Unión Democrática Cristiana (Christian Democratic Union), 298 Union des Jeunes Chrétiens (UJC), 224, 225, 233 Union of Resistance Forces (UFR), 221 United Nations agencies of, 39 Human Development Indicators, 8 Sustainable Development Goals, 4, 34 UNHCR, 39, 276 World Summit for Social Development, 109 United States, "War on Terror" and, 226 unity, promotion of, 282 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 278 Uruguay

Catholic Church in, 290, 292, 300 Civil Marriage Law, 292 Civil Registry Law, 292 “Convent Law”, 292 distribution of beliefs in, 294–296 ecclesial renewal in, 301 Education Law, 292 migration to, 290 modernization of, 291 secularization in, 291 Uruguay Episcopal Conference, 302 USAID, 63 user fees, 261 Usmaniyya, 245 V vaccination rates, 8 values, conflicting, 52 variation, 4–9 Vasco da Gama, 145, 146 Vatican II, 186, 195 Vicaría de la Solidaridad, 171, 176 violence, 13, 32, 117, 142, 150, 152–154, 248, 249, 263, 275, 279–281, 286 Vision 2020 Umurenge Program, 28 Voice of the Zongo International (VOZI), 83 W Wafula, Humphrey Waliang’i, 19 Wahhabi, 250 Wakit Tama movement, 216 WAMY, 227 "War on Terror", 227 wealth disparity, 20 Weber, Max, 204 Weinstein, Jeremy M., 54 Weiss, Holger, 19, 75 welfare delivery, 20, 108, 114 "welfare states", 9

INDEX

welfare systems, types of, 7 well-being, 55, 83, 179, 235, 262, 282, 283, 299 West Africa, 28, 32, 222 WhatsApp, 82, 90 White Paper for Social Welfare, 108, 112, 117 widow inheritance, 62 Wilcox, Clyde, 6, 18 Wodon, Quintin, 16, 64 women empowerment of, 34 oppression of, 62 role of, 198 violence against, 275 women’s rights, 82, 200, 232 Women and Children Welfare Foundation, 82 World Bank, 4, 31, 51, 64, 141, 219 World Council of Churches, 65 World Islamic Call Service, 80, 85, 86 World Menstrual Health Day, 83 World Vision, 16, 55, 63–65 World War II, 54 Y Yahya, Meryam Zakariya, 52, 84 Yak, Amou, 61 Yendi Youth Connect, 82

325

Yoruba, 242 Young Leaders Women Network, 81 youth population, 25, 26, 32, 41. See also children, engagement of YouTube, 82, 303

Z Zaghawa, 221 Zakat, 36, 49 Zakat Foundation, 85 Zambia, 36, 271 Zanzibar, sultan of, 145 Zapatista movement, 196 Zongo Climate Change Agenda for Sustainable Development (ZCCASD), 87 Zongo communities, 75, 76, 83, 84, 87, 93 Zongo Development Fund (ZoDF), 76 Zongo Girls for Education, 82 Zongo Inspiration Team, 81 Zongo Mothers’ Hope Foundation (ZMUF), 83 ZongoVation Hub, 81 Zook, Sandy, 87 Zudak Cancer Foundation, 81 Zuma, Jacob, 115, 116