Multidisciplinary Perspectives in Korean Studies. Proceedings of the 7th Korean Studies Graduate Students Convention in Europe 9789731337890

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I

Multidisciplinary Perspectives

in Korean Studies

Proceedings of the 7th Korean Studies Graduate Students Convention in Europe

Ediror Codrufa Cuc

casa

cirfii

de qtiinld

,,

Multidisciplinary Perspectives in Korean Studies Proceedings of the 7th Korean Studies Graduate Students Convention in Europe

Copcrt* PatriciafuScat

Copyriglt

o

autorii' 2010

xsBN98-97'789{

in Eurtpc is The 7th l(orcen Studicc Grlduate Stud€trb Convcntion orgrniscd under tte rurPiccs of

tt

f

.'

ffirrn'Assocr^floN

For KorE

N srrl'nrEs rN EuBoPE

and sPonsored bY

Editor Codru{a CUC

Multidisciplin ary perspectives

in Korean Studies Proceedings of the 7th Korean studies Graduate Students Convention in Europe

Asian Studies Department Babeg-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca, Romania 27-30 July 2010 casa ctr4ii de $tiing Cluj-Napocq 2010

Politics &

LIM Yoojin, "Familkm Confircian

"""95

SocietY.... orign

and the Welfare Regime in Korea:

and Its

Influence""'

YU Cheonghee, "From Aliens to Workers

-

Labor ldentities ofMigrant Workers in SouthKorea"

""""""'

Playground Elisabeth SCHOBER, "Liminal Encounters in the Urban Neighborhoods and the

"""""""""104 - Adult Entertainment

us Military in and around seoul, south Korea-"""""""""""""'112

Jana H,4,.IZLEROVA "Korea Lives on-line, Therefore Censorship as a Social Process in

Korea'""'

It Is: The case of Recent Internet """""123

Nicolas LEVI, "The Succession of Kim Jong Il and the Role North Korean

of

Elites"

.....1E4

CHOI Sun, "Power Structural Changes ofRevised North Korean Constihrtion

in200g,

.......,............191

KWAK Dong-Hun, "The Poliry Implication of North

Korea'sNuslear'Weapons,'

Literary and Cultural

.....196

l)iscourses..

.................201

Justyna NAJBAR" "Medicalizing Colonial Body as a Threat to Colonial Discourse. An Analysis

ofPak T'ae-wdn's

.l

dqy in life of Kubo, the novelist',,

............,..

..............203

Ana SCUTURICI, 'Conshuctions of a Hybrid Identity in

zainichi bungaht Lre Yangii

-'Yuhi,

,'

....209

olena GALKINA, "Man[wa: Its Functional Role in.Korean society and overseas,'........,...217

Linguistics..

...........-.--Z2S

Lucien BROWN, "'Mind Your Own Esteemed Business': Sarcastic Honorifics Use and Impolitcness in Korean TV

Drarnas"

............,.....227

Mom Shin, "A Comparative Study ofthe South Korean and North Korean Honorifics

Systems,,

.........,....240

Andrii G. RYU{KOV, "Some Parallels Between Korean

andTunguso-ManchurianPronouns,'...............

.......,rj.........................251

JU Youkyung "Implication of the Critical period Hypothesis in Korean as a Foreign

Language,'

.......263

Preface

Created under the auspices of the Association for Korean Studies in Europe (AKSE), the

Korean Studies Graduate Students Convention (KSGSC) was meant, fiom its first edition, in 2004, to create a welcoming and inspiring environment bringrng together young scholars in Korean Study. Througb the annual meetings of KSGSC, graduate students from across Europe (and beyond) have benefited from the stimulating effects of sharing research and exchanging views. The convention therefore works as a formal, but nevertheless fiiendly, background where scholars engaged

in Korean Studies meet and bring

themselves up

to date on their current

research" consolidating the network of Koreanists.

This year the convention has reached its 7ft edition, held at Babeg-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, after being organized at prestigious universities with a long tradition in Korean Studies: Ruhr University, Bochum (2004), SOAS, London (2005), the Oriental Institute, Prague (2006), Edinburgh university (2w7), Leiden university (200g), and Moscow state University

(2009).

Although Korean Studies at Babeq-Bolyai University axe still young, they

have sieadily developed through support from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea and the enthusiastic work and dedication

of

several people, starting with the pioneering efforts

of

KOICA dispatches Park Lae Weon (1997-2000) and Lee Kyoung Sook (2000-2002), fotlowed by the devoted work of Dr. Song Yong Ki Q004-2OOS) and the Korea Foundation visiting profmsor Park Young-suk (2005-2010), who founded the only Korean Cultural Center in the country, n2007 ' Until 2008, Korean language was taught as an optional coursg but tlre situation improved in the last two years with the establishment of an Asian Studies Department, which includes Korean Studies, along with Japanese and Chinese Studies. Consequently, BabepBolyai

University now offers both a major and a minor in Korean Language and Literature, and as such it has become the only Romanian university providing a major tnKorean Studies. Hosting the 7ft Korean Studies Graduate Students Convention comes as a natural step in consolidating these furndations and joining the European community of Korean Studies.

from Babeg-Bolyai University, Romania (Kotea on the Gtobal Map). Nso,I would like to thank the members of the KSGSC organizing commitee, who have been supportive and encouraging whenever things seemed too difficult to be handling them on my own: Lucien Browr! SOAS,

UK; Hui-yeon Kina EIIESS, France; And.iy Ryzhkov, National Taras Shwchenko University

of

Kyiv' Ukraine; Denis Samsonov, Peter the Great Museum of Antfuopologl and Ethnography, Russia; Tina Stubenrauch, University of Regensberg, Germany. My special thanks go to Lukas

Pokorny from the University of Vienna, who has been a great supporter of Korean Studies at Babeg-Bolyai University and was the first to advocate for the organizing of KSGSC 2010 at Cluj-Napoca.

July 2010

CodrupCUC Organizer of KSGSC 2010 at Babeg-Bolyai Universiry

1l

Legacies of the Past

Aurdlien LAROUL,/NDIE L'EcoIe des hautes itttdes en sciences sociqles (EHESS)

France

The 1653 Galendar Reform and the Dutch Castaways:

circulation of Knowledge and lnvoluntary Go-Betweenens

Every European student dealing with Korean history have heard Hamel's story. Shipwrecked in 1653 on Cheju Island with thirty-five other Dutch seamen, they live.d in the peninsula before escaping to Japan :n'1666, then returning to Holland. One of the castaways, Hendrik Hamel, wrote an account of those thirteen y.ears spent in Kore4 a place almost unknown at the time: the Oprechte Journael, van de ongeluckige Reyse van 't Jacht de Sperwerr.Hamel,s Journal knew several editions and a large succ€ss in Europe, and remained famous as the first major text introducing Korea to the West.

For this reasorL many historians have worked on Hamel's adventure. Scholars have made decisive inquiries, beginning with Gari Ledyard who has produced a quite extensive reference book about Hamel2. Although myself not very versed in ttre Dutch language, as an historian science, my investigations deal with ttre adoption process

of

the Shihdn

Bffi

of

calendar in the

1650s, on which the encounter with the Dutch castaways, a mere coincidence, sheds new and unexpected lights' These cvents, never confronted to each othero call for a reevaluation of our

knowledge both about the Dutch's lives in the peninsula and about the hisiory of ashonomy in mid-l7e century Korea in a global perspective, This is the main focus of my paper.

1 The translation used for this paper : Buys, Jean-paul. Hamel,s Journal and a description of the Kingdam of Korea, 1653-1666. Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic society, Seor:I, 1gg4. See also a scanned manuscript of the Journael disponible on Henny Savenije's website (http :/6r**.hendrick-hamel.henny-savenije.pe.kr/index.htm).

2

Ledyard, Gari. The Dutch Come to Korea. An Account of the Life of the First Westerners in Korea Q653-166il. Kor-ea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Seoul, 1921.

l5

Korean Descriptions of the Dutch Castaways

1.

Whenthespenoer,aVoCshipheadingtoJapan,shipureckedonChejulsland'only

Janse (cor' Nam the navigator (opperstuiirman) Hendrik thirty-six crewrnen survived including

PuksanHjhII),theapprerrticesrrrgeon(onderbarbier)MattheusEibokken,andthesecretary (boekhouders)HendrikHamel.Theship,scaptainReijnierEgbertsehavingdied,HendrikJanse, as second

Immediately seized by the island authorities, in command' took the helm of the crew.

therebegantheirKoreanstay.Afewmonthsafter,theDutchwerecalledtothecapital,where theystayedforaboutayearandlivedintheKing,spersonalcircle,servinginthePalaceguard unit.

MoststudiespresentthisencounterastheresultoftheKoreanlegitimatecuriosity towardsthesouthemBarbarians(Namman,inffi&^),anddescribetheDutch'slivesinthe peninsulamerelyasa,,fascinatingadventure,,withoutcorrsequence.Indee4exceptforafew the 166+1665 comef' Ilamel's asked for their appreciation about

words explaining that Koreans or teohnical involvement of the castaways in scientific Journaldoes not talk about any direct concealed several know, however, that }Iamel consciously activities during their stay. We do silent on his First and foremost' he deliberately kept facts about what they did in Korea.

compatiotJanJanseWeltevree(cor.Paky6nfl.7H),shipwreckedearlierin1628,whointhe

l650swasofficiallysupervisingcastaways,repatriationfortheYiCouGafterhehadcast more than twenty years' cannons for the Korean army for

Besides,asurveyoftheKoreandescriptionsofttreDutchprovidesurprisinglyexplicit quotationsabouttheirabilitiesinastronomy:sometalkingabouttheDutchpeopldsgeneral

expertisetoreadtheslqlikeCh6ngChaeryunFFtrH064s-17?3\4,somedealingmore preciselywiththe1653castaways,knowledgeofthecalendarandthestarslikeYunHaeng'imF

1"#:;:':;l;i;'#'u**, 28-29' (1971), i.a"tta

Kvdnnmnok 2. Arso in ch6ne chaeryun's Konssa

PP'

16

a*(Ffifl*'

See

'frffi

(1762-1801)s, and others with Hendrik Janse's personal skills

in astronomy like

S6ng

Haeiing Fn&ffi (1760-1839)6. Such statements need to be explained.

2.

Yi Wdnjinfs Report

One may suggest that the outstanding Jesuit presence in Beijing from the end of the l6m

century and their official positions at the Qing Bureau of astronomy (Qintianiian

Sftffi) from

1644 probably throws light on the Ch6ng Chaeryun's assertion made in the second part of the 17ft century. In the same vein, a few events that occurred before the Dutch castaways were called

to Hans6ng may have caused a strong reputation about their skills in astronomy. Indeed from the very beginnin& asbonomy had a noteworthy place

in the cultural

exchanges between the Dgtch castaways and the Koreans. While seized by the Cheju authorities,

Hendrik Janse chose a binocular, both an instrument of navigation and of astonomical observation at the time, as the fust pr€sent he offered to open the negotiationsT' He probably knew the impact of zuch instuments on the Chinese and the Japanese, and hoped to cause the

in his own interlocutors. At the same time, all the cargoes saved from the shipwreoh including the books and the astronomical instruments used for navigation, were

same reaction

seized and sent to the capital, where, according to S6ng }Iaeings, they were closely analysed by

the court. Ilamel's Journal also recounts that a few days after the shipwrech the same Hendrik to what Janse calculated the latitrde oftheir locatione. It has already been proved that, contrary host the Journal say, Janse did it once in the capital of the island maybe under the eyes of his

Wdnjin +rt&(I594-1665), the main Cheju officiallo.

5 Ynn Haeng'im's Sdkchae KoTEffiF-,9' See Ledvard (1971)' p' 30' 6 S6ne Haeiine's Ydn'eydneiae ChdnsdffiWffiA€, 9. See Ledyard (1971), pp' 54-55' 7 Buys (1994), p. 4. 8 Sdng Haetlns's Ydn'gydngiae Chdnsdffi#H+€' 9.

9 Buys (1994), p. 5. 10 Ledyard (19?1), pp.22-23.

t7

Yi

This seems to have strongly impressed Yi, who developed feelings of sympathy vis-ir-vis the castaways and sent to the court a laudatory report about Hendrik Janse's use of astronomyll.

A few weeks later, the Dutch were

called to Hansbng. Later accounts of Dutch abilities may

partly originate from this report.

3.

The Shihdn Calendar

The events described above do not explain all the documents found, and other elements of Hendrik have to be advanced. As a matter of fact, 1653 was both the year of the shipwreck in and his comrades and the year of the adoption of the Shihdn astronomical system

Hamel

Korea The mid-17ft centu4/ was

a

time of scientific and diplomatic effervescenoe in North-East

Asia- The eing dynasty, while seizing the power over the Ming, supported ttre Jesuits' activities their in astronomy, gave them official positions and used their skills as a political tool to enforce the sftrxicz (cor' legitimacy. The major consequence of this policy was the adoption, in 1645, of linked to Shihdn) 6H calendar, elaborated from Westem knowledge. But such knowledge

astronomy was regarded as highly sensitive, and the Qing court wanted to keep

it

as secret as

any possible. eing China urged then its tributary neighbours to follow the new calendar without calculate the further discussion, and needless to say, without any attempt to rmderstand how to new calendar by themselves.

However, the peninsula has developed a strong tradition in astonomy and calendarand more maki4g science, at least from Sejong's time. The Korean lesponse to the new cale'lrdar, and to precisely the process which led the Yi court to conectly understand Jesuit asilronomy an easy taslq and the apply it, is an interesting subject of study. Fulfilling this ambition was not

Koreans used all the means available to them. The crown prince Sohy6n

himsell

as an hostage of the Qing dynasty in Beljing

in

Wfr

(16I2'L645)

1644, seems to hane been close to some

But he was Jesuit astronomers and provided useful information when he carne back homeu' evenhrally murdered by his father, Injo E?ff' (tsss-t649' 11 Yi Wdnjin's Chiydnsnok *flffie*, 5. 12 Chthtsbo Munhdn Plgo

€ffiIffiffi#'

1:5-6b.

l8

r'

1623-L6li9' the rcxt year' Then

following Sohydn's efforts, from 1645 on, Kim Yuk

+H

(1580-1658), an official from the

Korean Bureau of astronomy (I(wansanggam p,f-ffi),launched an active poliry aiming to se,nd

secret missions

to China in order to leam

Jesuit asfonomy and

to bring back books and

instruments to Hansdng strongly supported by the next king, Hyojong

#t

(t0tS-1659, r.

1649-1659)t3.

Those secr€t missions zuddenly carne

officials, Kim Sangb6m

+ffiffi

to an end in 1653 when one of the Bureau's

(?-1653), died in Beijing while trying to get information about

the calendar, maybe by the hand of the Qing authorities. The same year, Korea officially recognised the Shihdn calendar, even if the Bureau of Astronomy had not yet gathered enough knowledge to firlly understand the way to produce it by itselt'a. From 1653 on, a new policy had

to be found, relying more on internal research.

4.

Dutch Involvement?

Considered in this diplomatic and scientific context,

I

believe that the Korean sourc€s

dealing with the Dutch's abilities in astronomy shed a new light on the adoption process of the Shihdn calendar in the peninsula. We do know that the VOC ship's navigators had to possess a

solid understanding of astronomy

-

reading

of the

stars, repairing time-keeping devices and

using the calendar - , at least in a practical way, to keep the ship on its route.

If we put together

Se.importance of the adoption of the new calendar and the problem linked to the Korean astronomical policy, Dutch seamen's common knowledge

of

Western astronomy, and in

prticular that of Hen&ik Janse, probably proved to be very handy for Hyojong's project to develop Korean understanding of Westem astronomy, even as involuntary go-betweeners.

In this hypothesis, several points would need to be explained. The language that would have been used in scientific discussions is the most difficult to solve. Having lived in Korea for about a year,

it

seems unlikely Hendrik Janse had developed sufficient level

13 Chamgok I'uero EGEfiH, 5:36a-37a'

L4 Chiinsbo A'lunhdn Pigo, L:6a.

t9

in Korean to deal

with complex matiers' and even less in classical chinese which was the language of

science.

unless we supposed that weltewee acted as an interpreter, we san not propose a solution to this point' on the other hand the absence of a direct mention of the Durch intervention in Korean sources' it is easily understood when we take into account the fact that the exchanges between

Hyojong and the Dutch were considered not included in the ofEcial

yi

as pertaining to the King,s private life, and as such were

court documents.

Conclusion

In order to reach a well-founded conclusiorg further research is obviously necessary. Two possible explanations emerge from the elements given above in regards to the Korean descriptions of the Dutch castaways. on the one hand, one may assume that these descriptions

relied on

Yi

w64iin's report and were partly exaggerated in a chain of unacknowledged

quotations, a phenomenon quite common at the time. on the other hand, one may suggest that, given the scientffic context and the necessity for the Yi court to study the Jesuit astronomy without any further direct contact in Beiiing, Hendrik Janse was somehow involontarily involved

of in the

process

of understanding &e shihdn calendar. The truth may well lie in the space

between these two assertions.

Talking about a westem involvement in Korean history of science is of course always conhoversial, given the prevailing post-colonial perspective. I did not intend to raise Hendrik Janse to the status of a 'Korean Matteo Riccin': he was definitely not. The elements presented above have to be considered in a much broader point of view. Far from the image of a closed country, we propose to understand the peninsula at the turn of the l7e century taking into account the circulation of knowledge resulting from the presence of an underestimated and mixed foreign communitv - Ming warlords and scholars who fled from the eing Tsushima envoys on diplomatic mission, Manchu migrants from the Norttr - who all pa.trv participated to the Korean dynamics of knowledge, Looking fi.rrther into the process of the introduction of westem knowledge into the peninsulg including the calendar irnd the askonomy, we hope this brief paper may contribute to opening new perspectives in the history of Korean science and to a better understanding ofthe circulation of astronomy in North-East Asia

IXbliography

Buys, Jean-Paul. Hamel's Journql and a description of the Kingdom of Korea, 1653-1666.Korea Branch ofthe Royal Asiatic Society, Seoul, 1994.

Ch6a Yonghvn, Chosdn Hugi Sdyang Ch'dnmunhok kwa Chdnt'ong Ch'ilnmunhak ili Kaldilng kwa Yunghwa.unpublistred Ph.D. Thesis, seoul National university, 2004.

Ctdn, Sang'un. Hon'guk Kwahaksa

ili

Saeroun lhae. Yonsei Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'anbq Seoul,

198. l,edyar4 Gan. The Dutch Come to Korea. An Account of the Life of the First Westerners in Korea (165i-1666).KoretBranch of the Royal Asiatic society, seoul, 1971. lfeedhanc, Joseph ; Gwei-djen, Lu ; Combridge, John H. ; Major, John S. The Hall of Heovenly Records. Korean astronomical instruments and clocks. 1380-1780. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986.

Roeper, Vibeke ; WalraverL Boudewijn (eds.'). Hantel's World. A Dutch-Korean Encounter in the kventeenth Cennry. Sun, Amsterdarn, 2003. .

Yrb6ngdo. Hamel Pyorygi' Ilchogak, Seoul,

1955.

2l

Andretil David JACKSON School of Oriental andAfican Sndies (SOAS), University of London United Kingdom

The Ch6ngmihwan'guk

(TtFt[Ft) and the factional background to

the Musillan (II;FfrL) rebellion ot 1728

In rhe seventh month of 1727,Ybngo (i€fiE 1694-1776, r:1724-76) shocked his entire court by restoring to po\iler a Soron (r]'ift young Doctrine) faction that was theoretically antagonistic to his rule (because the Soron had previously supported his rival to the throne). This

Soron restoration or Ch6ngmihwan'guk was problematic because in this restoration Ybngio inadvertently empowered a small group of men who played went on to play a key role in the 1728 Musillan rebellion. mobilising the resources

Musiltan rebellion,

I

tust placed in them by Y6ngio by of their office against the crown. As part of my research into the

Allf of

these men abused the

explore the reasons behind Y6ngio's Ch6ngmihwan'guk. What was the

character of the political events and shategies that led Y6ngio to restore the Soron alongside dangerous rebels? The answer ties partly in the charaster of Chosdn factional conflict that developed after the initial literati purges, and partly engulfed the reigrs of three kings between 1689

in the complex

succession crisis that

ar.td 1727.

The character of Chos6n factionelism Chosbn factions can be defined as 'political associations on a quest for power,' (Haboush 1988, 119) but they played a far more widespread role in elite society. The aim

of

factions was to protect the livelihoods of their members over the interests of competing groups, and this battle was fought over civilian or military positions in government Taking power meant faction members dominated the central bureaucracy including the administrative

ministries of government

(x€),

and most importantly, the Censorate

(qffiH),

which was

responsible for monitoring the cnnduct of govemment, and impeaching corrupt officials.

22

Between 1575 and 1727, dominant ftctions included the S6'in Norono Soron, Tong'in

Northemers) and Namin

(R

(EA

Eastemers), Pug'in (lL,A. Norttrerners), Sopug'in

(ffiA,

Westemersl;,

({rJ6, Lesser

Souttrerners). By the time of the Chdngmihwan'gulc, there were

two main factions, ttre Noron and Soron that fought over the bureaucracy. There was a constiant struggle between the king and the factions for political dominance

@aker 2002, ix). Factions clashed not only with the king but wittr each other in periodic crises. Starting points for conflicts usually focussed on important political issues, but as the fights continued, morality and loss of position rather than pohcy shaped the course of the conflict.

Early clashes dealt with aspects of government, for example, the use of the censorial office or appointments of personnel, the selection of the Crown Prince, the capacity of individual kings to

rule (the 1623 overthrow of the Kwang'hae gun). Perhaps the most famous dispute was the rites

of 1659 and 1674 (Setton 55, 1992\. This was a crisis that demonstrated the peculiar cyclical, self-perpetuating character of Chos6n factionalism. While the crisis was diffirsed, this

dispute

political resolution did not signal the end, but the beginning ofanother round offactional conflict. There were several reasons for the resilience of factisnalism.

Firstly, for factions, moral positions took precedence over the resolution of political problems. The desire for office was tied up in a philosophical worldview. Factions saw it as their

moral duty to put their own parly in a superior position (O Kap'g5run 1977,65\. As Confucian men involved in gwernmenl factions saw themselves as upholders of good government public service, and moral good. Thus, officials connected to factions fulfilled their obligations as moral

men according to Confucian tradition by deciding on important issues. Taking power was the

way factions provided public service to the country pankov 1990,

5l)

and fulfilled their

Confircian duty of tansforming and creating harmony in both society and man (Haboush 1988, 133-135). Thus, the rites issue wasi more than a dispute over protocol, it concemed the cteation

of

a

moral world. One problem was how factions viewed and interacted with competing fagtions. Factions

were different from political parties formed around ideologies or manifestos @alais lgg4,4Ol'2).

Late Chosdn factions were not separated by ideologies, but by the application of the same I Factions were named after the locations in the capital of iheir leaders (Reischauer 1960, 441).

23

opponent's application of ideologr of confucianism (Pratt & Rutt 1999, 116), and acceFing m opponent meant meant denying one's own moral viewpoint- Comprorrise with an

Confucianism,

policy. As the rites example showed, compromising over personal morality, rather than over oproduct of honest differences of opinion, but opposing policies were never accepted as the 196A,437'9). Attacks on other regarded as signs of the depravity of opponents.' (Reischauet terms according to 'clearly defined members of factions were rarely made in legal or political (Reiscbauer 1960, 437'9\' rights and duties' but mainly according to 'abstract principles.'

to the running of the Factional conflict ran according to its own internal logic' extemal the rites crisis, and one faction country (Lankov 1990, 63). With one faction out of office after and the loss or defence of dominant, the practical relevance of the original issue was forgotten' grievances or 'accumulated position became the issue (Lankov 1990, 63). lncreasingly, past

hostilities, (seton

lq f/2,4g-sz)began

to dictate creation of contemporary policy, and as the past

their activities appeared to be less began to dominate the present day thinking of the factions, restrained. So without an institutional mechanism

for mediating and compromising policy

problems (Reischauer 1960,437-9) disputes (Baker 19g4,g),if a strong king was unable to settle Frequently 'factionalism then factional conflict could take on its self-perpetuating character.

itself

became the issue. (l{aboush 1988' 123)'

many historians have stressed Despite the shortcomings of a faction dominated politics, in purges and stable system. (Haboush 1ggg, 49) Political crises often ended up

this was a

two attempts by factions to seize violence, but in two cenhries of factionalism there were only (trfrHtrE) and the power by illegitimaG means. The first was the overthrow of Kwang'haegun

(Lankol 1990, 59)- The main reason for the stability of a the limits of political action, and faction dominated court was an implicit understanding about factions in political conflict' mutual expectations about the behaviour of the king and

second was the Musillan rebellion

developed over Factionalism followed a formulaic, ritualised pattern that had

a

two-hundred year

period.Thismutualunderstandingcanbeseeninthestandardroutetopower' power depended on The standard and recognised (by those taking part) method oftaking one way was to back different winning the king over to one's faction (Reischauer 196A' 437-9)fighting against opposing prospective candidates for the tlrone. Atl legitimate methods of upon winning over the king' Not only factions had to go through the king and were dependent 24

did this process add some weight to the attacks, the royal recognition would make the 'union between personal justice'and public justice complete.' fttuboush 1988, 134)' This royal recognition also meant that the king was cogniscent and complicit in the factional erploitation

of

the censorate.

Generally factions expected their support to be reciprocated. There was an understanding between faction and the king that the king protected the faction that had backed him in his

policies or when he was in contention for the tlrone, and protected him from unscrupulous enemies

in

opposing ftctions. Once in power, they expected the kingos help

to

completely

eliminate their opponents. Thus, both the king and frction were expected to behave in a certain way, once they had achieved pow€r. For example, the S6'in like King Hyojong were fervently anti-Ching, they retained power during his reign, and continued to rule under his son (flaboush 1999,63).

Kings often had an ambivalent attitude to factions. On the one hand, kings tired of factionalism, when the subjugation of opponents was consuming energy better spent on the

of the country. On the other han4 factional fightinC kept the focus on factions rather than the throne (Palais 1991, 15), and kings used factions to destroy opponents and management

stengthen their own nrle when it was politically expedient. The rule ofSukchong and Kydngiong and thc succession crisis

In

1689, by naming Ky6ngjong as crown prince, Sukchong initiated a bloody cycle

of

factional conflict that led to the Chdngmihwan'guli This was a succession battle that raged over rhe reigns of three very different kings: Sukchong son Ky6ngiong

(Rfi

(ffifr

166l-1720,

r:

1674-1720), his oldest

t0f8-t724,r:172A-24), and his half-brottrer Y6ngio.

Succession was problematic because it was based on a vague and difficult area of the law.

No fixed rules had been formalised and no precedent established by the formders of the dynasty,

ud

many early succession conflicts ended in bloodshed (Hahm 1971, 86-90

&

Haboush 1988,

65). The rules for royals were less concrete than for yangban (Hahm 1971, 86-90).

It

was

impossible to guarantee that the oldest son, because of intelligence, character or constitution, would be the most suitable candidate to rule the whole counfy, so it was necessaq/ to have some

flexibiliry.

It

was possible to put adopted relatives on the tlnone, and the sons 25

of

Royal

concubines were aoceptable, (Haboush 1988, 65) althowh

sos of primary

preferred (I{ahm l97l,9O-S).In practice it was left to the discrciirn of choose the crown prince, and kings selected their favourites

(Ilalm

fu

queens wer€

mling monarch to

1971, E69O). This was the

complex baokground to the Sukchong succession controversy. There were problerns over the succession of both Kydngjong and Y6ngio. Neither man was born to a primary wife

(ffi) of the king, and this situation was complicded by

firstly, the health of Sukchong's oldest son Kydngiong worsened mothers

of both men were involved in

wifi

several factors:

age. secondly, the

serious palace controversies. Finally, problematic

questions about succession were further complicated by the manipulation of Sukchong the royal consorts, and factions who sought personal gain from the succession debate.

Sukchong contributed

to the creation of a crisis surrounding his own

ruthlessly playing faction against faction over the issue (Ilaboush 1988,

3l).

successor by

Sukchong was

fickle over his wives and consorts and whenever he changed his frvourite, he demanded the full support offactions @alais L996,539-40). Sukchong had been desperate to produce an heir, but

his first two primary wives including Queen Inhydn

(CffiIE,

rcfl-tl0l),

and eueen

In'gydng (fi8frT'F,1661-16S0) had been unable to conceive. When his third wife Lady Chang Huibin

(ffiffiK,

a concubine), gave birth to the future king Kydngjong, Sukchong named him

crown prince, and made Lady Chang the main queen (primary wife) and deposed Queen Inhy6n. The Namin faction supported Sukchong's decision to choose Ky6ngiong as heir, and the ruling

S6'in faction led by Song SiV6l (*ffi7,.1{) objected to this decision, claiming Sukchong had time to produce a legitimate heir

&

(ffiT),

and should wait before naming his successor @aker lgg4,4

Palais 1996 539-540). As a result the Namin were restored to power and the S6'in were

deposed by Sukchong.

Five years after taking po\iler, the Namin discovered an attempt by the S6'in to restore Queen krhydn

(trfEffift).

Seeing this as their opportunity to eliminate the S6'in, the Namin

fooght baclq supporting Lady Chang and opposing Queen Inhy6n. However, Sukchong played his divide and rule game by purglng the Namin, and restoring the Soron dominated S6'in @alais 1996, 539-40). Lady chang lost favour with the king, was deposed (flaboush 1988, 58), and Inhydn was restored along with the s6'in in 1694. ?6

At this

stage

ofthe succession crisis, royal feuding between the different royal consorts

of the king played a more sipificant role in the succession controversy than the factions. The

king's wives plotted to guarantee power for themselves and their male progeny. When Queen Inhybn died in 1701, Lady Chang was accused ofcausing her death through black magic rituals (Palais 1996, 539-4A

& Haboush 1988, 58). Essentially, this meant Ky6ngjong's mother was'a

murderer @aker 2A02, ix). The Soron supported Lady Chang and Kyingjong, were dismissed" and the Noron left

in offce (Palais 1996, 53940). The king refused to rise to the defence of

Lady Chang who was made to drink poison. (Palais 1996,539-&). Further complicating matters,

it

was the mother of the future king Y6ngio, Lady Ch'oe

Sulpi" (&WW, the fourth wife, or

concubine of Sukchong), who informed on Lady Chang (Ilaboush 1988, 53-8), casting further doubt on the veracity of these allegations. In addition to eliminating a rival, this was a way Lady

Ch'oe attempted to establish her own legitimacy, since she was allegedly a low-bom slave

(++4,

Haboush 1988, 53-8).

With time, the factions and their accumulated grievances played a more dominant role in the succession struggles.

tn

1715, the Noron and Soron again split over the punishment of the

Namin from the 1694 disputes. The Noron demanded a severe punishmenq and the Soron recommended leniency. Sukchong judged

in Svour of the Noron, and this put the Noron in

control of the bureaucracy.

ln

1717, Sukchong initiated an incident that sewed the seeds of, a further ten years

of

factional conflict over succ€ssion. Sukchong arranged a solitary audience with the head ofthe Noron Yi Imydng

(+#ft').This

closed meeting caused a controversy for two reasons, firstly

it

was a ftre occurrence. Royal audiences were usually carried out in the pres€nc€ of historians and scribes who would record proceedings, and this was one

Chos6n history (Haboush 1988,

20

&

of only two recorded examples in

65). Secondly, the topic

of this

conversation was

contoversial, allegedly Sukchong expressed exFeme doubts about the ability of Kydngiong to rule, (Yi Chongbdm, lgg7,l8g

& Haboush 1988,122).

The rule of Kydngiong During the four year period of Kydngiongos rule, factional conflict intensified as both the

Noron and the Soron sought advantage for themselves. After Sukchong died 27

in 1720, and

ftther' tte Nson quickly raised concerns Kybngiong inherited a Noron bureaucrary &om his had not pro&rced an heir' was sickly about Kybngiong's successor, concerned that Kybngiong Ybngio (yi Sdngmu 20A0, 127- 13?), the Noron administration urg€d $at Kydngiong name 2OOO'127'137 &YiKyech'6n 2003' 14-16)' orown prince (an inappropriate demand,Yi sdngmu of the Soron' named acquiesced to the Noron and despite the protestatiors

In l72l,Ky6ngiong

Y6ngio crown prince (Yi Kyech'6n 2003, 14'16)' candidate Y6ngio' and The Noron sought further concessions to advantagB their (Haboush 1988, 122)' This was an emergency demanded the appointment of Ydngio as regent The stale of only when the king was incapable through illness to rule' measrue implemented

bad enough to concern sukchong' the Kybngiong's mental and physical health was obviously proposal. But the main motivation Nororl and even Ky6ngjong, who initially accepted the Noron and having their own candidate of the Noron appeared to be cynical. By ousting Ky6ngiong Soron y6ngio installed as regent, this would safeguard the Noronos political position' The considered the Noron action

to be a

brazen

bid for power, and soron officials began

a

politics would have weakened the position of the counterattack.The removal of Ky6ngiong from P'ilmong and five others sent a memorial' soron against the Noron. soron Kim ll'gy6ng Pak (in the twelfth Noron ministers of leading a plot to overthrow the king accusing four important

month

more than fifty sh

into exile and Kyech'6n 2003, l+16). The four Noron ministers were sent Soron known as the Noron were punished. This was the 1721 restoration of the

of ll2l,Yi

inc h' ulrhw att' Ph

(+

*Wfr,

Yi Kyech' 6n 2003' lg)'2

Nowintheasoendancy,theSoronsplitovertheYingioregencyissue,intoamoderate This split in the spring of 1722 saw the soron group, the wanso and a hardline chunso group. pak p'ilm6ng claim atsolute loyalty to Kybngiong and the Chunso led by Kim ll,gl6ng and 2Og3'231\' These splits into hardwanso take a line closer to that of the Noron (Yi chongbdm increasingly er(teme reprimands on opponents liners and moderates meant two thrngs. calls for voices' As a group within a faction' the were less likely to be restrained by more moderate like the Namin to build a wider political chunso was compelled to look for support with factions

front.

2 purL

of the l72I-2 sinim sawha*A:tfr&

purees, hereafter

28

l72l-2

purges of the Noron'

Next, the Chunso found an oppornmity to tight€n their grip on power, when the Namin nothoi Mok Horyong (EffiHE) claimed to have rmcovered a palace plot involving the sons of the

four Noron ministers to assassinate Kydngiong and

e,rathrone

Ydngio (Yi Kyech'dn 2A03, l9).

This incident was steeped in ambiguity, and even after torture, the accused men never admitted

their

guill

however, the damage was done

(Yi Sdngmu, 2W0 127-

137). Over a eight month

period, thirty Noron including the four Noron ministers were executed, one hundred and fourteen

were exiled, ninp made to

themselves and one hundred and seventy three were jailed (Yi

kill

Kyech'6n 2003, t9). Ydngio had already had attempts made on his life, and now his position

as

crown prince became more precarious. By the end of this purge, the Chunso were in powerfrrl positions in the Soron-led bureaucracy ofKy6ngjong.

The earty reign of Ydn

gSo

L72#Chbngmihwan'gulc

Ydngio faced a most challenging start to his reign, and an entirely peaceful outcome was always unlikely given his predicament. When Y6ngjo took the throne in the eighth month

of

I724,he was immediately jettisoned into a problematic relationship with the two main factions. Soron and Noron policy was primarily dictated by a desire for revenge over past grievances (flaboush 1988, 144), desires that threatened the throne. The activities ofmany Soron thrsatened ttre legitimacy of Ydngio's nrle, the anti-Soron activities of the Noron threatened the stability

of

Y6ngio's government.

Ydngio had inherited a Soron bureaucracy from his brother, and Chunso like Kim Il'g5rdng questioned Y6ngio's legitimary. Serious allegations were raised against Y6ngio: the

low shtus of his mother, and in addition, there were accusations of regicide (Haboush 1988, 32). Kydngiong had died from food poisoning after eating crab and persimmon that had allegedly been sent to him by his brother. (Haboush 1988, 141). The threat from the Soron extremists could not be igrrored by Ydngio.

Y6ngio's relationship with the loyalist Noron was also problematic. With the €dhronement of Ydngio, the Noron saw an opportunity to gain revenge over the Soron for the

L7ll-2purges (Yi Sdngmu 2000, 145 & Palais 19 f,4, 4ll).The Noron thought Ydngio was in their debt (Haboush I988, 127), after all, the four ministers and many other Noron had laid down

treir lives to promote Ydngio's interests. This

meant that Y6ngio would have to handle the

loyalist Noron as carefirlly as any antagonistic Soron. 29

y6nglo had different aims ftom the factions. He warned to sfiengthen his hold on the by throne by removing threa8 and stabilizing his rule, but Ydmgio's options were limited personal obligations. Ydngio needed

to put an end to any Soron dacks on his legitimacy'

risked the However, by explicitly punishing the Soron and dwelling too much on the paS Y6ngio had protected his charge that he was unfilial, because he was disrespecting the faction that the type of brother Ky6ngiong (flaboush 1988, 124). In addition, Y6ngio wanted to Prevent the destnrctive factional fighting that had raged under Kybngiong's rule by sfiengthening was indebted to the monarchy over factions (Yi Kyech'6n 2003,21). This meant while Ydngio the same time Noron for their protection, he needed to control Noron political excesses' ond at problems affected important retain their support in case of future attacks on his throne' These be short-term' aspects of Y6ngio's rule, so it was clear that any solution could not

y6ngio proposed to resolve all these problems through his T'angp'y6ng policy. This was (Haboush 1988, I 19)' This not a policy specifically devised by Ydngio, but by Sukchong in i698 gave Y6ngio the authority to end the monopoly of single factions dominating the measure

the different factions (Baker 2002' bureaucracy, because the king could choose officials from all cycle of kings supporting one particular faction, and discriminating against

x) breaking the

policy he had found a long'term solution another. Ydngio believedthatthrough the T'angp'y6ng guarante€ the legitimacy and stability of his rule' Equal treatnent would dampen that would

sage king, Y6ngio could fagtional conflict and stabilise his rule, and if he was seen as a fair and

establish his legitimacY. tensions However, appeallng to be fair and being fair are fwo different things' As \ilas not committed to equal increased and he came under threal it became clear that Ydngjo

policy was inconsistent and treatnent of all factions. Y6ngio's application of the T'angp'ydng a coalition of Noron and sporadic. Inconsistent because, Y6ngio's T'angp'ydng policy meant (I{aboush 1988' 119' Soron, while factions like the Namin or the Sobuk were ignored

lgg4, 4Ol-2). sporadic

because

while Ydngio wanted to be seen as

far'

&

Palais

and not show

favouritism, he used the T'angp'y6ng policy when it suited his needs'

y6ngio also wanted to necessary. The Kim

ll'rybng

use the standard

forms of factionalism to defeat his enemies when

case gave Ydngjo the opportunity to attack his enemies and allow

the Noron to consolidate power. During his

fial Kim Il'gy6ng 30

made attacks on the legitimacy

of

the

king

and alleged Y6ngio's involvement in the death of his brother (tlaboush 1988, 127). The

Soron grudgingly supporte.d Kim Il'rydng fearing this would be 'the beginning of a deluge' (Haboush 1988, 126). Now the Soron was backing a politician who questioned the legitimacy

Ydngio, and this made Soron rule untenable. In the new year bureaucracy with great 'determination and decisiveness' associated with

of 1725, Yingjo

of

changed the

(Yi S6ngmu 2000, 144-148). Those

Kim Il'gy6ng and Mok Horyong were punished, the Chunso and senior Soron

were sacked or exiled. (Yi Kyech'6n 2OO3,l+16). Ydngjo had deliberately guided the attacks the Noron, to remove enemies who attacked his legitimacy

of

(Yi Sdngmu 20A0, 14+148). Ydngio

continued in the same vein, and used the old pattems of factionalism to allow the Noron to consolidate their rule. The four Noron ministers were rehabilitate4 (Yi Sdngmu 2000, 148), the

l72l-2 purges of the Noron were declared a miscarriage ofjustice (Yi Sdngmu 2000, 148). In these early stages, Y6ngio's inconsistent and sporadic application

of the T'angp'ydng policy

worked well. When it was opportune and would benefit hirn, Ydngio had stood back to let Noron defeat the Soro4 so he would not seem too partisan, and in this way he would also retain the

loyalty of the Noron.

From this stage Y6ngjo's inconsistent approach began

to run into difficulties,

as

Ydngio's plans clashed with the expectations of the Noron. With the Chunso exiled or dead, the Soron ou! and the Noron finnly in control, the Noron sought continued persecution ofthe Soron,

trus continuing the pattems of factional conflict established over many years. Now his enemies were removed, Ydngio wanted to restrict factional conflict to stabilise his rule.

The Noron insisted on further action against the perpetrators of the l72l-2 purges (Yi

Kyeh'6n 20A3, l+16), and the Noron asked that the removal of the Soron

be described as the

'sfijugation of the rebels.' (Haboush lg88,l2+7) In order to defuse the situation, Y6ngio rcptaced Noron exhemists with moderates. But these moderates were viewed with suspicion by

& Noron. In the end, the Noron bureaucracy refused to cooperate (Ilaboush 198& 133-135). kional tensions had reached such a point that govemment had ceased to fimction. Overall, the implementation of Y6ngio's pohcy probably raised factional tensions in two

nys. Y6ngio's inconsistent application of the T'angp'y6ng policy was evident to all. Ydngio scd u rejected factionalism when it suited him, and this discrepancy increased the tension. In ddition, Ydngio's attempts to restain attacks against the Soron had only frustrated the Noron. 31

Having previously followed the old pattems of factionalism, Ydngio ryplied his T'angp'y6ng policy to force the Noron to compromise. Ydngio demanded compomise solutions from factions

who thought this would compromise their moral authority (Ilaboush 1988, 133-5). Many scholars believe it would have been easier had Y6ngjo just supported the Noron, thereby doing

what was expected of him (Haboush 1988, I 18-120). The Chdngmihwan'guk: Aims, reacfions and results

On the fiftfr day of the seventh month of 1727, Ydngo began a widespread transformation of the entire bweaucracy (Yi Kyech'6n 2003,47). Y6ngio dismissed over a hundred Noron (Haboush 19E8, 135) and reinstated the Soron. Those who had been sacked under

the Noron were restore4 and sixty exiled Soron and their allies were released

(Yi

S6ngmu

2000,152). The Wanso Soron controlled the administration" but restored alongside these moderates, were political exhemists from the Chunso and other groups, some

of whom had

already started plotting against Ydngio. This was the Chdngmihwan'guk, and this was the first

time in this period that the king had willingly installed a faction that was theoretically antagonistic to his rule.

Y6ngio probably had both short and long term aims fiom the Ch6ngmihwan'guk. On the one hando the Chbngmihwan'guk was a short-term pragmatic move to make government work,

of the government (flaboush 1988, 135). On the other hand, Ydngjo also saw the Chdngmihwan'guk as a way of implementing his (inconsistent) T'angp'y6ng policy (Yi Sangbae 1999, 104). The pro-Y6ngio since the Noron had refused to cooperate with the day to day running

Noron had refused to cooperate with the T'angp'ybng policy, so Y6ngio had to prove he was serious about this policy, teaching the Noron a lesson. Through this 'breaking-in' of the Noron,

Y6ngio thought he could also win the cooperation over the Chunso and Wanso, and prevent atiacks on his legitimacy. While these may have been the aims of Ydngio, there was no way

Y6ngio could have predicted the rcactions to the Chdngmihwan'guk.

The factional reactions to the Chbngrnihwan'guk provide an idea of the success of Y6ngio's poliry. The Ch6ngmihwan'guk produced conflicting reactions amongst the Noron and Soron, some supportive and some antagonistic. Amongst moderate and hardline Noron the reaction was almost entirely negative. Moderate Nororr ministers offered positions in government refused

to cooperate because they were isolated by their faction. (Haboush 19E8, 135)' 32

The

Noron stuck to their position that the destruction of their factional enemies would provide stability and security. The reaction amongst the Soron lvas more varied. Many Wanso Soron and

advocates

of the T'anp'y6ng poliry

cooperated

with Y6ngio's

Chdngmihwan'guk provided them with a golden opportunity, a display

restoration' The

of cooperation with

Y6ngjo might guarantee them long+ermjob security. Those Chunso like Yi Yu'ik

(4€4)

who

were originally antagonistic to Y6ngio hardened their position towards him, and went onto launch the Musillan rebellion. Only one small group appeared to shift positions. Men like Yi Sam who had once backed the rebels, now shifted their allegiance and becarne loyalists.

The varie.d reactions of the factions are evidence of Ybngio's failure to win over the factions. Y6ngio probably believed he could control the Noron and gain the trust of all the Soron

through the Chdngrnihwan'guk.

If anything, Ybngio failed

to win over the majority of factions

and already existing positions hardened. The contrasting reactions were born

of a tension

between expectations ofroyal behaviour built around years ofritualised factional fighting, and

the implementation of Y6ngio's T'angp'y6ng policy. It was evident that Y6ngio used both the

T'angp'y6ng policy and standard methods of factionalism when

it

suited him. There was no

for factions to believe that Ydngio was restoring the Soron on a permanent basis, so individual Soron exploite.d the Ch6ngmihwan'guk for their own ends. Thus, the

neason

Ch6ngmihwan'guk failed to radically alter the positions of most factions, and hardened the antiY6ngio stance ofthe rebels. Conclusion There was no single political event that led to the Chdngmihwan'guk, rather an exhemely

complex interaction of factors surrounding the succession of Ydngio and Ky6ngjong, including:

bitter feuding amongst the royal consorts, the legitimacy issues concerning Kybngiong and Y6ngjo, and the mysterious death of Kydngiong. There were clear pattems to factional behaviour established through cycles of conflict. By a certain stage in the rycle, most factional policy was

decided according to past grievances, so although Ky6ngiong was dead, and Ydngio was the

only candidate for the throne, the factional blood shed in the name of the two crown princes would always have to be answered for. Ydngio inherited this extremely fragile and unstable situation, and outwardly at least he attempted to break with the pattems of factionalism through his T'angp'ydng policy. But his implementation of the T'angp'y6ng policy was inconsistent and

sporadic. Ybngio sought compromise from factions when

it

suited

hiru and

used traditional

patterns of faetional conflict to destroy his enemies. The result was mistnrst with his policy, and

frusffied expectations. In his inconsistent attempt to break the political moul4 Ydngjo helped set in motion an event that was rarely seen

in late-Chos6n, a military rebellion. Y6ngio both

literally and

figuratively handed the keys of the armoury to rebels restored in the Ch6ngmihwan'guk flike

Yi

Sasdng and Nam T'aejing), and helped create a military challenge to his government where there had been none,

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Sam changguniii saengaewa hwaldong'e kwanhan y6ngu" K6nyang

university, education deparhnent, M.A. thesis. Ch'ungnam: Kdnyang universrty.

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t'angp'yfinggwa sedo chdngch'i. Seoul:

PARK Kyoung-Hee

Leiden UniversiP The Netherlands

'Patriotic unit' (aegukpanl as Wartime Legacy: Food Rationing in Korea during the Asia-Pacific War (1937-1945)

Introduction The proclamation of National Mobilization Law on April outbneak

of the

Sino.Japanese war, set the stage

l,

1938, a year after the

for Japan's entry into total war. Putting

a

priority on sustaining military snength in the battle field, the Japanese govemme'd enthusiastically promoted a wide range of reconstruction of its economy system towards war footing. In response to this wave' on luly 7, 1938, Chos$n Union of National Spiritual Mobilization (Kungmin Chdngshin Ch'ongdongwdn Chos6n Y6nmaeng) (CLINSM) was created

in colonial Korea, led by

Japanese

Army General of Kawashima as the president' Mandatory

rationing system of daily cnmmodities was the core stratery among Japanese wartime conholled economy (H6 2000: 293), A noteworthy fact is that Korean womelL who had by then been good designated as household managers within the ideolory of hydnmo yanch'd (wise mother,

wife) (An 20A6:259),became to play major roles in the process of increasing state's control over civilian's consumption. As members ofthe so-calted aegu@an ('patriotic unit'), the smallest unit under CUNSI\4 Korean women had already participated in a various activities in mobilizing was resources and people for war effort. Their role gained further sigrrificance when aegulEan entrusted with the administration of food rationing prografiune. Food distribution became the chief mission of aegU@an in urban areas, such as Kydngsdng prefecture (Yi 200a: 859)' This papor examines the food rationing system implemented by the Japanese govemment 1940s Korea, focusing on the role of female leaders of aegufoan' First, by

d*ing early

illuminating the administratiot of aegu@an and its leaders (panchang\,I will demonstrate that public. Korean women were the key players in disseminating wartime policies among general Next, I will document the state's rationing system of staple foods in urban areas on the example 36

of Kydngs6ng prefecture, focusing on the authority provided to the head of each 'patriot unit' in managing the programme. The foremost objective ofthis sbrdy is to identify the channel through

which the wartime gorremmelrt communicated with the population, and the growing importance of Korean women as citizens, who had thus far been left behind the govemment's atlention. Leadership ofAegukpar and TVomen The credion of aegukpan was initiated in July 1938 *.ith dre purpose of ensuring Korean people's organic cooperation in response to consolidated state's control over citizen's lives and

ndional campaigns (Chosdn Ilbosa 1939: 3). Under the national goal of winning the war, the administrative assistant-network rapidly spread throughout Korea; the number of units reached more than two hundred eighty thousand nationwide in October, and by 1940 expanded to three hrmdred eighty thousand (Yi 2004: 8,14). In the beginning of 1939 Kydngsdng prefecture, more

tun

ten thousand aegukpan units were organized on the basis of township (chdngdonghoe)

lwel,

I

each consisting of approximately ten to twenty households. Govemment-General of Korea

made efforts to include all Koreans in aegukpan since they were practicing organs to carry

colonial sfiategies into effect. For the authorities, patiotic units were considered essential for the

Ndional Spiritual Mobilization Campaigns (Kokumin Seishin Sdddin Chdsen Remmei Iimukyoku l94A:23-24), successfully implementing the ideal ofthe totalitarian controlling mcbanism through systematically-administrated aegukpan network. Nearly all of wartime colonization strategies to regulate over psychology and daily lives ofKoreans, such as salutation toward Japanese Imperial Palace, visiting shdne, labour mobilization, conscripion, and rationing system of essential commodities were executed based on aegukpan.

The operation of aegulqan was left chiefly upon to the capability of panchmtg who was beld rcsponsible for the whole administrative affairs of his/her own

bok the lead at montlly meeting

unit For exampleo panchang

Qtansanghoe) in which representatives

of every household

r'ere to participate on the first day of each month, the so.called 'patriotic day' (aeguk

i17.2

T\e

ureeting the was carried out in nationally-uniformed order according to the general rules spelled

! The term chdngdong is a compounded word that includes both of Japanese traditional cidag (wI, cha in Japanese) and Korean done QB). Depends on the residences

jnrisdiction

(colonial Koreans or people from mainland Japan), they were often called differently. As of 1941, 6ere were L3L chdnsdons in Kydngsdng (Hizuka 1941:120). t Sit.. April 1942, regular meeting day had changed to the eighth day of every month. 37

out by CUNSM: it started at eight o'clock PM in summertime and seven in winter, and lasted for

two hours following a fixed procedure (Hizuka 1941:12l-124'7. Pawanghoe all started at once with the announcement tlnough nationwide radio broadcast and reading articles that prwiously-

by the Union. For example, in September 1941, four articles were determined: intensification of daytime-air defence training, refiaining from spreading false rumours, saving established

rice, and vegetable faming in vacant ground (KSCR3 1941(b): 88). Such national campaigns were also propelled through official publications, such as magazine Sdddin written in Japanese

(full mobilization)

and Saepydk(dawn) in Korean and Japanese.n Howev"r, there is no doubt that

people's gathering such as pansanghoe played a central role in facilitating the diffirsion of the state's wartime policies that largely compromised of regulations on daily livings and urging cooperation. The former official magazine mentioned above singled out that 'discussion on

articles' were the most important parts in the process of the monthly meeting since they dealt

with a wide range of topdown principles that should be practiced in everyday lives of general populace (KSCR 1942:97). Panchangwas the key person who took the lead oftransmitting and

disseminating the given directives fiom the govemment controlling the members of their own group.

It is noteworthy that the majority of aegufoanwere led by female panchang. The main reason behind this was women's relative conveniences in participating in daytime-air defence

training one of major activities of aegulryan that definitely

needed a commander to lead people

during majority of men's absence to work (Matsumoto 1942: 20). Such women's outside activities, at first were seen as encroachment otr men's domain. In turn, however, the operations

of aegtfuan came to be considered as sundry 'women's work' which in turn resutted in men's reluctance

to involve in the activities

arranged by aegufuan The govemment did urgeded

husband's active participation in monthly meeting (Chosdn Ilbosa 1940(a): 2; Sato 1942:31)

arguing that involvement

in the activities of aegtfoan was essential for

enhancing the

commitment to war by the whole nation" For instance, in July 1941, Kawagishi, the president

of

t Kokumin Soryoku Chosen Remmei n Later, the names of these magazines changed to Kokurnin soryoku ffiMgnin ch'ongny1k in Korean) and Aegukpan respectively.

38

Chos6n Union of National All-out Effortss presented a plan for revitalization of women-centred

KSCR l94l(a): 6l). However, despite such efforts, women remained at the heart of aegukpan system; in 1942

pansanghoe by prescribing to appointing more m€n as the leaders of aegulqan

Ky6ngsdng approximately seventy per centof panchangwere women (Yi 2004: 873). Reflecting this realities, various articles that propelled *re alignment among the members of aegu@an, regardless the gender of the leaders, were continuously delivered. One of them, for example, even praised the expanded agtivities of women's explaining they received 'baptism in

the name of national emergency situation', and continued, although an aegufoan was lead by

female leader, there was no problem only

if

she would obtain advices from her husband

(Matsumoto 1942:- Zl).In progression, however, the activities of women themselves gained its significance along with increasing state's contol over domestic consumption. Most importantly, they became to take a major part in public domain when foods distribution system initiated in 1940 Korea.

Panchang and f,'ood Rationing Programme Korean food rationing programme was initiated in respond to the wartime inflation and rice shortages. Rising prices that already began since the mid-1930st furth"r worsened under the

co[trolled economy system. Besides, lean rice-harvest in 1939 KoreaT, less tlran sixty per cent of the previous year, further boosted soaring general prices and severely affected food supply situation. As the first step for price stability and curbing consumption, price control strategies were formulated after another: the Extortion Conholling Regulation (Pongni Ch'wich'e rydng)

in August 1937, the Resfiiction Regulation on

Sales Price

of

Goods

in

Chosdn (Chos6n

Mulp'um Panmae Kaky6k Ch'wich'e Kyuch'ik) in August 1938, and the Price etc. Control tling T'ongie ry6ng) in August 1939. In the face of steadily deteriorating fmd shortage, the authorities launched food rationing. The first govenlmental ordinance to

Orrdinance (Kakydk

s trr t9+0, CUNSM was renamed

to Chosdn Union of National All-out Eftorts (Kungmin ch'ongnydk Chos6n Ydnmaeng) influenced by mainland Japan's 'New Order' Ghintaisei the major set of plans developed for strengthening war footing. sFor example, as of December 1936, a survey conducted by Chosdn Bank said, the price index of Kydngsdng prefecture jumped up twenty eight per cent from previous month, a record high since 1931 (Han 1937: 86). tRice crop dropped from 24,138,874 fik in 1938 to 14,355,793 sdlrin 1939 (Sone et aI.2O04". llt).

(1sdA = 180{ 1173 kg. isafr'is Korean traditional units of rice measurement.)

39

(Singnyang regulate rice consumption in colonial Korea was the Food Rationing Plan Platform paegrip Kyehoek Yogang) in october 1939, and followed by chosdn Rice Rationing confiol

l94l that Edict (Chosdn Migok Paegr)p Choch6ng nydng) two month later' It was in December became the first the Commodities Control Law (Mucha T'ongie ry6ng) was promulgated which the legal foundation of rationing programme of daily commodities. In spite of the fact that initiation of rationing staple foods was in 1940, the legal basis of nationwide food rationing was enacted much later, system, chos[n Food Management Law (chds6n Singrryang Kwallip6p)

in

1943.

a should be clarified here that rationing in colonial Korea tended to be executed on on explicit legal variety of measures by the authorities of each prefechre, rather than based put under systematically grounds. The prime reason for this was that Koreans had already been

It

Govemmentconsolidated administrative network under the highly centralized bureaucracy, authorities for General of Kore4 and this circumstance was extremely oonvenient to the

people in promoting its policies without conclete legal basis, even easier than controlling represented by aegukpan' mainland Japan (Isaka l94l: 29,3?). Most of all, civilian's networks, legislation. In were the most important backing in implementing distribution without detailed especially Ky6ngsbng fact, the system of aegukpanfeatured efficiently organized communitys; prefecture had vast network (Yi 2004: 8zt6)'

distribution Staple foods rationing in Kydngsdng began on May 3, 1940 aiming at even

of staple foods remedying earlier disorder, such as standing in huge queues for hours to buy grains, two schemes staples. Except for the rich who stored more than five sdk of

-

purchase

:

were establistred. In the former systenq people who need large from their haunting amount for feeding facilities-use or regUlarly used home-delivery services condition of keeping records of stores were able to get thern by the conventional way on the

passbook and ration-cards

per cent of Kydngsdng pwchase by the sellers. The remaining residents, approximately sixty stock, were put under the dwellers, who used to buy th,gir daily staples day after day without (chos6n Ilbosa 1940(b): 2). Thus, a majority of people in Kydngs6ng were

latter programme

t

,N.ighbourhood association' (.nnarieumi in Japan, similar civilians' communitv such as (1894-5) settine their goal as selfaegukpan, began to created during tire sino-Japanese war created based on existing colonial gg). was aegukpan this, to In contrast t.f"O ipunur tbSS' government's network enabled to that well-organized pointed out Yi system. administrative Kydngsdng $i 2004: 847)^ especially Korea' promote aegukpansystem furthet-'smoothlv in ur-ban 40

able to buy staples only by their ration-cards, the prnchase permit, distriblted through aegu@an

network.

Although food rationing was adrninistrated at the town lwel, the end-distributor, the leaders of aegulEan, of ration-cards were provided with a great deal of authority.

At first, the

system initiated based on Ky6ngsdng authorities' preliminary preparations, such as a research on

the populAion and family grain consumption and the establishment of Kydngsdng prefecture Provisions Rationing Union (Ky6ngs6ng-pu Singryang Paek[p Chohap) compromised

of grain

rstailers that to function as distribution stations (Ibid.), In practicing however, enormous affairs were managed by town units and aegufoan. For example, town authorities need to understand and maintain the proper amount of grains at designated shops with clear grasping of population

in their town and fairly share ration-cards to practical reidents. All these responsibilities were charged on the re,presentatives of each town rccompanied by the support of aegufunn leaders (Kim 2005: 72). Keeping up current affairs of mov€ment from moment to moment

each household was available only through aegulqan, the closest adminishative network to general populace. Based on the information, allotied ration-cards at the town level were first delivered to panchangand further distributed to medrbers. Furthermore, people were able to buy

suple foods only with perfect ration-cards without any problem: lack of seals of town or regu@an leaders, expiring (missing purchase-date), modification (missing) of family numbers, using other unit's cards (Kim 2006: 87).

The order of rationing nahrally led to empowerment of thepanchong in accomplishing

tbeir duties. For example, Ms. Hwang,

the

panchang of 24& unit in Nagasa-chd in Ky6ngsdng

prefecture, explained that her members became to attend to their meeting further actively after implementation of ration-cards system since they had to have tlre cards with her signet on

buying grains (Nagashima et

it for

al. 1941: l3). MI. Kirn, the leader of Chilgafu-chd unit in

Kydngs6ng prefecture remarked that he deliberately postponed to seal on ration-cards ofpeople

xfio did not participated in their meeting saylng to contmt

oe

day (Ibid.:

lGl?).

themselves with substitute foods over

These examples clearly show that the leaders

of aegu@an played a

central role in the food rationing system, despite of their being merely ordinary cMlians, not representatives of the statp: bureaucratic system. Such circumstance was further escalated with

6c shift towards

the rationing of a wide range of foodstuft: matohes and cotton in July, sugar in

August, and rubber shoes in October 1940, followed by salq wheat flour, alcoholic drinks and

4t

milk (for infants) in 1942, and by meat and vegetable oil in 1943 (Sugiyama ed. 1943: l). The spread

of rationing represented seriously growing shortages of basic supplies that led

to

deviation from official disbibution system.

Civilian's supplies were frequently disappeared in the process of collection and redisfiibution by widespread maldistribution, such

as usurpation

by disnibuton and holding and

black market sale by retailers. Aegufuan leaders' favouritism-rationing (chr)ngsil

(ltrF)

paegdp)

and removing from the official distribution line were one of major factors unfair disribution. For example,

a

panchang in Ky6ngsdng kept ration-cards for cotton, towels, and rubber shoes for his

own consumption instead of providing them to his mit members {Kim 2006: 103). Along with the increasing reliance ofrationing on aegukpan, illegal activities ofthe leaders became central conc€rn ofthe government. The Government-General instructed the police to strengthen controls against illegal activities, especially the malpractices of heads of aegulrpan (Ibid). Despite of such

efforts of government, massive illegal activities using rationing channels continued. The number

of police offrcers belonged to Economy

Police Section (ky6ngje lry6ngch'alkye), which

established in 1938 especially for controlling economic offenses, offers an outstanding evidence

for increasing illegality: it surged form five hundred sixty in October 1938 to one thousand seven hundred inJuly 1940 (Hattori 1940:48).

Conclusion This paper examined the food rationing system implemented by the Japanese authorities during early 1940s Korea, focusing on the role of Korean women as the leaders of 'patriotic urits'o aegufoan This example indicates, under the circumstance of total war, Korean women

were given authority over mobilizing resources and people for war effort. Their power was particularly strengthened with the implementation of food distribution programme in which they were authorized to distibute purchase-permits for practically every household.

As

Ht

observed that the units was consider tobe marc paegippan (rationing unit) rather

than aegt@an

(Ht

2000: 321), inseparable connection between food rationing and the units

became the fundamental reason

for the existence of aegulEan during the last days under

Japanese occupation. After Korea's independence from Japanese rule, the network of aegufuan

appeared to be dissolved. However,

in 1948, it revived only for food dis,hibution system

set up

by the US Army Military Government in South Korea 1945-1948) against food crisis caused by 42

its ftilure of the attempt to introduce market economy system into Korean rice market. Even though the unit system has no longer the task of food distibution, 'unit's regular meeting', pansanghoe, led by 'unit's leader', panchang, has been carried tlrough to the present Korea In

shorf the shortage of food was critical factor in maintaining the legacy of wartime measure implemented during the Asia-Pacifi c War-

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I

44

Ruth SCHEIDHAUER

University College London United Kingdom

National Crisis! Navigating Cultural Heritage through the Narrow

straits of ldeological Battlefields - The case of s6njukgyo ln Kaesong

National crisis has many faces. To most it provokes associations with the economic crisis. a crisis Br$ how does it translate in our cultural practices and self-identifications ttren and now, mst constant in Korean history? In this paper I aim to look at the role cultural heritage has played in some of the most challenging times of the Korean nation in interplay between state nation tegitimisation and cultural values. I will thus explore some of the cultural theories,

i6entifications and cultural interpretations and policies that developed at times of enhanced

uion -building in the town Kaesong.

From dynastic change, over sbengthening and educating

over the nation to fight foreign domination in the very beginning of the nr"entieth century, to the dmarcating interpretations and defamations of cultural ahocities after the Korean War,

eoperation in reclaiming shared cultural goods beginning in the 1990s.

Sdniuhgo Bridge

during Kaesong, the Kory6 period capital, is the scene to a story of loyalty and treason

(ffiFEt 6e dynasac change from Koryb to Chos6n. The Kory6 scholar ch6ng Mongju 139) is remembered

tzzl'

as the ideal scholar and dynasty loyalist and one of the most prominent

participated in the forceful trgures in the period of dynastic change. Although Ch6ng Mongiu rcssion and installed King Kongrang on the throne in 1389, he allegedly opposed the

overthrow of the Kory6 dynasty and the foundation of a new one as promoted by General

Yi

Sdnggye and later founder of the emerging Chosdn dynasty. Ch6ng refused to accept the advent

ofthe Chosdn dynasty because it contradicted the loyalty which a civil servant should have to his monarch. Consequently Chbng Mongiu and his companion Kim Kydngjo assassinated on the Sdqiukgyo bridge by members ofthe

(eFiF,

?-1392'1were

Yi Sdnggye faction.

Commemorating his murder on the bridge, the blood-ttreme

of Sbnjukryo

became

extremely famous and popular. A very popular legend everyone attributes to Sdnjukgyo today underlines Ch6ng's qualities as Confucian scholar. It states that the same night bamboo grew out

of the bridge stone where the loyal victim's blood was spread. In East Asian tradition bamboo is a symbol of loyalty and uprighnress as extemal forces can bend it very strongly, yet never break

it

and thus a significant attribute to the loyalist scholar. This event is also marked in the bridge's

name that is said to have changed from the previous S6n-ji-gro

€fi[ffi)

to S6n-juk-ryo, jzlr

meaning bamboo.

Sdnjukgyo Bridge stands in the town district S6njukdong in eastem Kaes6ng crossing the

little river S6nryoch'6n (previously known as Rogyaech'6n). As a symbolic marker in connection to the murder of Ch6ng Mongju the bridge is designated a national treasure.

Through time the bridge turned into an obligatory memorial site for visiting scholars and

officials, a source for inspiration on Confircian moral principles, loyalty and sacrifice (for one's country), particular for those who lived in politically critical timesr. The bridge became a marker whose important symbolism is highlighted and enhanced by the added edifices and stelae in connotation to the event-

One of Ch6ng heirs, yusu Ch6ng Hoin

(El* Sl?E),

acted for the protection

of the

bridge and ttre dignity of the anc€sfial death location, and restored and blocked the bridge installing stone railings in the 1780. Part of the stones added are remains from the f#anisOt-tang r

Hau8ler, Sonja. 2004. "Kaesbng from the perspective of Chosdn dynasty intellectuals", Koreana, TQ): 54,

/c/a

(FfiFtrfifr)2,

a Buddhist prayer hall, of the near Myogak-sa

said to have Sanskrit inscriptions. To ensure f.rther trespassing,

(BF*l

site, two of which are

in l796the prominent

Kaesong

crtnenCho Kwan-jin had a second stone bridge built just next to it.

Also many memorial stelae were instaled in the direct circumference of S64iukryo. The most prominent among them was written by the famous Kaesong born calligrapher Sdkbong

Ilanho

(Eis $pE 1543-1605).

Another one is the so-called the 'Weeping stela', tlbbi (iVX+)

inside the (ibbi pavilion donated Yusu Mok S6him

sWu

position.

It

carries the inscription:

(Etrfr)

"-tBE

in

1641 following his promotion to

ttSH"

(great loyalty's everlasting

moral principle). The name of the stela is embedded in legends embellished and entangled to varying degrees. All versions of the legend have in common that water was dropping from the stela like tears. Ko (1937) just mentions that this was said to have occurred during one suillmer'

mother more recent popular account tells that the stela always 'cried' in foresight of a national crisis3. Yet another takes up the bamboo theme telling that eYery night there was a crying sound

to be heart coming from the S6njukgyo Bridge. When the 'Weeping stela' was built next to ig tbc sound disappeared, and bamboo grew in the surroundings'

Many more stelae memorise the sad event and the noble virtues of Chong Mongiu. Rerrarkably, all these appraising memorial stelae and additional edifice buildings were installed b5l

scholars in their function as Kaesongynsa. I believe it is no coincidence that ttre theme of the

lleal loyat scholar official was chosen. If by reference to family ties as in the S6ngr6wan Yuh6pi stela or by appraisal of Chdng Mongiu, generations of future scholar officials with office in

Krcong marked their individual intention of good service and loyalty to their souvereign. Thus trom the second half of Chos6n it was the act of loyalty towards the monarch that was rcmembered and idealised and not Ch6ng Mongiu's opposition to the Chos6n dynasty.

tYnn Sarrg-bin 2006. ,,Taranisdktang", miniak mrmhwa yusanZA06(4)t 27 | *e Kotyasibo 1938.1.16 "Sonjukgvo and Ubbi". 47

P'yoch'unghi particularly since the eiglrteenth century did the veneration of Chdng gain prominence

with Chos6n royal appraisal and official back up of the loyalist narrative. On the western side of the S6njukgo bridge is a big stela pavilion that hosts two monument stelae based on stone kings turtles. They were instatled to the memory of loyal subject Ch6ng Mongiu by the Chos6n

Ydngjo and Kojong the so-called P'yoch'ungbi (4H.8ry). How come Ch6ng Mongiu became the subject of appraisal not only of singular scholars,

but also of the Chosdn dynastic kings? Everyone who passes the way of Sflnjukgio is now So how remembered of his virtues of loyalty and patriotism that animated this heroic scholar.

it befit the of;ficial Chos6n historiography? A North Korean heritage text asks a similar question. It states that regardless of Chbng's opposition to the Chosdn dynasty, Chos6n kings tltis went as far as praising and even building him a monument. It continues to explain that

does

propagation was politically motivated to protect their rule in a time of waning support for the and royal house and opposing factions. Praising Ch6ng Mongiu they hoped the Chosdn elite cornmon subjects would emulate his great deed of loyalty towards his monarch'a The left P'yoch'ungbi stela was personally written in 1740 by King Ydngio

cFS.) wi*

a

poem along two lines:

.Morality and loyalty stretch out in eternity, Poiin's integnty is high like the sun'.

A related

anecdote is

gven in the Ch'ambongwanggunmyokalmyOng

#*EEEIBfi

by

people (minority soups) the pak chiwdn that paraphrases the positive political effect to engage the clan, descendants of and boost the pride in their (family) pst on the example of the Wang family

pavilion. People's Kory6 royal blood tine that are involved in the construction of the P'yoch'ungbi towards a emotional attachment to and identification with their family ties are tried to be channelled the positive perception of a leader caring to care abogt their emotions. King Kojong had had

p,yoch,ungbi stela on the right installed ir'.s On fie back of the stela is 6e personally compose'd and written inscription ofthe king in hi$ praise of the loyalist Ch6ng Mongiu'

The royal patronism of the appraisal Taesoitutdn,gae hamabi

of Ch6ng's loyalty is further

f,rJ',AF"gT,E in front of the P'yoch'ungbi

reflected by the

that indicates riders

As the North disregarding their rank to dismount from their horse in respect of an important site' a 5

sJ+84+4!& Social Science Institute ],ggl. Social Science Institute t99tt 222.

4#El q4^/q,Pvonsvans:222 48

Korean historian Chu allegorises, although the opposition to

Yi

S6ngg5re,

it

Yi

Chosdn dynasty could not pardon Ch6ng's

also could not hide away and cover the prne loyalty in the inner

darkness ofhistory6.

Sacrilice es a patriotic act

With the fall of the Chos6n dynasty and during the Japanese colonization the focus of the

nsrative shifted from Chdng the loyal s€rvant of his king to Ch6ng as a loyalist who withstands

Se immoral temptations of new powers,

popft #.i8,#H, loyalty and patriotic

expressed also in the frequently used term chinch'ung

seryice to one's country. Adapted to the new need of the

tirne, his patriotic sacrifice and the blood spilled in figbt forjustice was emphasised.

Quite befitting the circumstances of his life and activities, the poem 'Sbnjukgro' by the frmous late Chosdn period writer

Yi

Sdl (1S50-1911) emphasises the collective grief about the

sacrificed blood, but also that there is no other way in the fight for the countr5r's indepe,ndence

from foreign powers. What previously was a symbolic expression for one's personal moral conduct, the cultivation of the self, had turned into a sign of collective patriotic resistance.

S6njukgyo

d+n(q€)

The blood spilled at SbqiukS/o

d+iql €a rl ^l*Er+

f

el

+41

All people

4E €sl6'lt'4

+ d6'l€ B 44zt "f6lH

+= A9tql E +Sol 9ls+

e

chu Sdne-Ch'61 2006.

"d4a.ql zJ=

and I too are mourning

But whenthe body tumed to avassal in the perishing country what other way is there than dying

^l{"[The

"cf,6?):29. 49

story enclosed in Sonjukevo],

El+84+4[

As a scholar official to the Chos6n dynasy he lanrented &e murder of the la* Korean Empress Mydngs6ng

known as Queen

(EnfiEE,

Mi" (ffild)

1851-1895), the

wife of Emperor Kojong more commonly

Uy the Japanese on October

8,

1895. Consequently

Yi

56l

designated from his post, went to the countryside, and raised an army in the loyal cause of Japanese resistance.

Ten years later the Korean protests and resistance was intensified following the tJlsa

Treaty(

ZZI*fiJ).

Some Koreans protested against the tredy joining righteous armies and the

two high officials of the Taehan Empire Cho Sbngse

(ffiX@ lS6l-

(ffiiFtr,

1827-1905) and Min y6nghwan

1905) committed suicide as an act of resistanse against the Japanese control. The

latter features most prominently among the two, probably because acpording to legend, one year

after Min's death, a bamboo appeared where his bloody clo&es had been laid" This picture is dated from July l5th, 1906. Many people ttiought the bamboo grew nurtured by Min's blood so

that the bamboo was called Hydtjuk (.fi.tf), or 'Blood Bamboo'. Remarkably the bamboo is also

said to have had 45 leaves, Min's age at the time of his deatlr- The 'Blood Bamboo' was preserved and is now housed at the Korea University Museum commemorating Min Ydnghwan's

efforts for Korean independence in the waning days of the Chosdn dynasty. The connection between viduous self-sacrifice

in service of patriotic resistance

shows

very clearly and became also widely athibuted to Ch6ng's sacrificed blood, the mysterious growing of bamboo and patriotism. Widely circulating newspaper publications and further poems mark the turn to a patriotic hero. So for instance does the article "Past and present

Inyal

spirits" in the newspaper Taelran maeil sinbo (1908.03.20) praise second of eleven Chong and his resistant blood at Sor{ukryo. "The strength of Kaesong's noted Sdnjukgro. During 500 years

of wind and rain, the blood stan (hydlhiln .fr^E) glows in the setting sun At ttre

Kaesong

Sdnjukryo where the Kory6 loyalist Ch6ng Mongiu loyalty will be preserved for a million years.'o @onga

llbo 1926.6.29).

During a visit of the S6njukgyo bridge

in May 1992, Kim flsong told

the story of the

loyalist scholar Chdng Mongiu, and then reminisced deeply touched that a passage of a Independence Army song was referring to sbnjukgo as 'blood-bridge', p'itari, as it is often 50

cf€rred to7. The lyrics to the song were wrifien by the Kaesong born poet Chang Chdngsim (190347), published in the chapter 'Home' of his book. In Norttr Korea the word 'blood' also stands symbolic for revolutions, and the sacrificial death people have to die for when fighting

jusice

for

and their beliefr.

444:

Blood Bridge

4"]El4 E4sl, q= 47tE

Bridge, bridge, Blood Bridge, blood bridge even if the blood is wiped off;

EEle}

4zI{xl!.uq{ql

-4214

esa€, q4$14 ga E4 el€ el4

=9

q4

500 years passed since the blood run and the blood

will walk

the way for another 5000 years;

Blood, blood, red bloo4 the blood that is spilled for justice; The spilled blood of one person is the reason of many

t ^le:E g\l vl4 H"J^l+ *rl*

zl

,$ The Economy

EC:::::i:1::+::i=

lorea r spy

from

Germany in the 1960s Source: Minisby ofForeign Affairs, 60Nyeondaeui Hangugoegro tsouth Koreas Diplomacy

'West

1969,

es

and Technical Cooperation bgtween South Korea and Wes!

in

1960s (Seoul: Ministry of Foreigrr Affairs

. 1977), p-153.

of t9l3 -

October 8,

"At presen! neither the immediate recall of the Gernan

ambassador

The West Gerrnan Foreign Minister Willy Brandt (December 12,

a and

fning

1992) was quoted as saying,

! was

in Seoul nor the immediate halt of aid measurements for

i

in the

expenditures within the framework

Koreao

in particular the halt of

of development assistance, is intended. New commifinents

will, however, not be set about in the meantime." The South Korean Ambassador to

West

Germany inferred that Bran&'s remarks were imbued with politics and that ttrcre w.1s rntenJ to orean

consideraloantoSouthKoreainconnectionwiththeincident.9..l:

Korea Yorea,

e

The Telegram from the South Korean char'gd d'af'faires to West Geqnany to the South Korean Forcign Minister, GEW*10100, Oct. 19, 1967, Secret, Repu-blic of Korea diplomatic document,

139

A joint session of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Development

Assistance

Committee discussed assistance to South Korea on December 14, 1967.In this joint session, they decided to make a recommendation to the government as follows: first, the yeongnam Themal Power Plant business and the dairy business would proceed because West Germany had already

pledged assistance

to

South Korea. Second, new businesses would be suspended

for

the

present.ro

South Korea presented adverse coercive actions against West German coercive diplomacy of using economic leverage. The South Korean government was concemed that ,,the West German media could insult South Korea's authority on jurisdiction, leaving provocative comments as

if they could affect ttre South Korean legal system. The South Korean government

had complained about the continuous tone ofseveral newsp4pers regarding the trial. In particular, comments on suspending aid to South Kore4 as utt€red by the spokesman of the West German Foreigrr Ministry spokesman, who said that they were "shocked" at the outcome of the court case, were received negatively by the South Korean govemment and media.ll

After the second trial in the East Berlin Spy Inciden! West German Ambassador to South Korea Franz Ferring said, "Many West Germans may be disturbed because the outcome of the court was unsatisfactory, We me concerned that the outcome of tle second trial will influence the signing of agreements during the last phase of the loan agreement on the Yeongnam Themal Power Plant." Both countries planned to sign the loan agreernent on the Power plant on April 3, 1967. Nevertheless, the West German govemment postponed the signing of the agreements.

East Berlin Spy Incident, V,1 Instructions and Reports-Per'sons involved in West Germany, 1g62, Class Number 722.6G8 1967-71V.1, Registration Number 3484, p. 228. l0

The Tulegram from the South Korean Ambassador to West Germany to the South Korean

Foreign Minister, GEW-12164, Dec.27,1967, Secret, Republic of Korea diplomatic document, V.l Instructions and Reports-Persons involved in West Germany, 1g67, Class Number 722.6G8 1967-77 V.l,Registration Number 3484, p. BZ4-

East Berlin Spy Incident,

tt The Telegram from the South Korea Foreign Minister to West Germany to the South Korean

Ambassador, WGE-1250, Dec. 16, 1967, Republic of Korea diplomatic document, East Bedin Spy Incident, V.L lnstructions and Reports-Persons involved in West Germany, 1967, Class Number 722-6GE L967-71 V.1, Registration Number 3484, p. 292.

140

On May 11, 1968, South Korean Ambassador Kim Yormg Choo discussed the matter

with President Park. Among other details, tre rren discussed that if this case was worsening

it

may be possible for diplomatic relations between tre two countries to operate solely for the sake of formality, and that West Germany may oease to provide an overall development loanto South

Korea Ambassador Kim recommended that the South Korean government obtain a diffErent loan for the Yeongnam Themal Power Plant from other countries because West Gerrnany believed ttrag to solve the two countries'political problems, 17 million dollars for the loan to south Korea could be used as a me:ms in promoting pressure against south Korea President Park had maintained that "First,

I

don't expect West German suppor! and

decided to change the West German loan to one from other countries because some holdings

now in dollars can have enough to show economic staying power. Second" even

if

West

Germany were to cut diplomatic ties with our counfiy or retum the summoned Korean studen6

in West Germany, we will take no action to influence the decision of the court." President Park further expressed dissatisfaction with West German officials who boycotted the IECOK and with West Germany economic,cooperation linked with the incident. He also called to 'lFight openly and squarely from now on," and apotogized'Tor hav.ing raised a stink about the incident. For that reason, we quickly implemented a new ambassador and summoned embassy workers. We also reminded that the South Korean gov€rnment

will take tolerant

measures against people involved

in the incident after the trial was over, but the West German govemment alleges to rehrn them right away. West German actions

axe

not in accordance with common sense; they also ignore the

South Korcan legal system."l2

Afterthe South Korean prosecutor demanded the death penalty and life imprisonment for the accuse4 West German public opinion was getting stronger. inciting student protests from all over the country

as

It was an unfortunate evenl

well as in Borrq the issuance of statements

by intellectuals, and petitions to the authorities. West German college students even ambushed the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in West Germany. The West Gerrnan Ambassador to

South Korea expressed that the circumstances at the time were "the most violenf' since 12

The reference from the South Korea Foreign Minister to West Germany to the South Korean ( Ambassador Kim Young Choo' report), May 11, 1968, Confidential, Repubiic of Korea diplomatic document, East Bertin Spy lncident, V.8 Domestic Action, 1967-1969, Class Number 722.6G8 lg67-71V.8, Registration Number 3491, pp. 228A-228L. Ambassador

t4t

December 1967, when the Ambassador first joined the Embassy of the Republic of Korea- West

Germany expressed distrust

of the South Korean legal system and doubted the will of

the

government to solve the problem, as the South Korean prosecrtrionhad acted in accordance with the government's intentions.

13

On December 9, 1968, when Yoon Ha-chung, the Director-General of the American Affairs Bureau" met with Franz Ferring the German Ambassador to South Kore4 Ferring was informed that President Park would not sign the death warrant and that the defendant was given a

be commuted by National Liberation Day Celebrations. On December 13 of that year, in welcoming the South Korean Ambassador to Wcst Germany, severe sentence that would

Foreign Minister Brandt made it clear that the diplomatic relation between the two countries had

to be settled, and asked, "If possiblg would you be willing to receive a special envoy of the federal govemment

-

Paul Frank

-

before Christmas?" Frank stressed at a meeting with the

South Korean Ambassador on January 3 that the reason why he decided to visit South Korea was because the West German govemment shouldn't make mistakes when deciding relations with

South Korea. The visit was not to make a simple exchange of views, but to achieve a more detailed agreement.la

Frank's party and the South Korean government solved their current problems after consulting diplomatic complications. In the talks, Frank was quoted as saying, "A solution to the

problen has huge political significance. In this sense, I will issue a declaration. The declaration is not very usual: which one does receive from every county. We will make it very clear to the

world where we stand. The declaration addresses fate, secwity and all the issues between West Gerrnany and South Korea." West Germany reached an agreement on certain points:

it would

take active steps to promote political, cultural, and economic cooperation with South Korea;

it

would accept the South Korean govemment's measures of dealing with the East Berlin Spy rs

The Telegram from the South Korean Ambassador to West Germany to the South Korean

Foreign Minister, GEW-7242, Dec 8, 1968, Confidential, Republic of Korea diplomatic document, East Berlin Spy lncident, V.2 Instructions and Reporls-Persons involved in West Germany, 1968, Class Nnrnber 722.6G8 7967-7L V.2, Registration Number 3485, p. 697. tn

The T.legram from the South Korean Ambassador to West Germany to the South Korean Foreign Minister, GEW-L272, Dec. 13, 1968, Secret, Republic of Korea diplomatic document, East Berlin Spy Incident, , V.LZ West German Envoy's Visit to Korea, 1969.1.13-18. Class Number 722.6G8 1967-71V.12, Registration Number 3495, pp. 7323-1324.

142

st

Incident and it would take proper

[e

partaking in communist activity.rs

measures to pr€vent South Koreans

in West Germany from

!h

W. Conclusion m as

The diplomatic tension was further drawn out by legal actions against all fhose involved

ta

in the incidentwho had been escorted back to South Korea. In particllar, when those involved in

)n

the incident were found guilty during the first trial on December

V,

government adopted a st€rner attitude towards this incident. Diplomatic sfains were sustained

ad

not only due to cognitive differences bshtre€n the two countries in understanding the tnrth about

he

the incident, but also due to a conflict between the humanitarian involvement of West Germany

he

and the strong

ias

had characterized this incident as a human rights issue, this insident led to a tense confrontation

ittr

between European human rights and the concept

tre

South Korean govemment was rmder pressure

will of South

t3,

1967, the West German

Korea to defend judicial sovereigrrty. While West German media

of South Korea's judicial sovereignty. The to take action against those involved in the

incide,nt fiom a humanitarian point of view not only fiom West Germany, but also France and pnessure against South Korea's judicial

ter

Italy. However, South Korea believed that European

he

sovereignty was unfair. European nations claimed that South Korea infringed on the sovereignty

pn

of European nations first by forcibly removing Koreans living in Europe. South Korea regarded

he

the reac'tion of these European nations to the issue of sovereigrrty as sensitive, though felt these

6t

nations actually didn't respect Sotrth Korea's judicial sovereignty, thus applying

ild

standard.

iit pv

A second neason for the extension of

these diplomatic strains was opposition between the

coercive diplomacy of West Germany in using economic leverage and the adverse reaction South Korea. West Germany

)an

a double

tied to influence

of

South Korean judicial procedures on behalf of all

individuals involved in this incident by considering a cancellation of the loan agreement on the

nt, ba, t5

nt,

A trlk with the special envoy of the federal government, Jan. 16, 1969, Secret, Republic of Korea diplomatic document, ((East Berlin Spy Incident, 1967-1971>>, V'12 West German Envoy's Visit to Korea, 1969.1.13-18. Class Number 722.6G8 1967-71 V.12, Registration

ass

Number 3495, p. 1554.

'an

143

power plant, by boycotting the International Economic Consultant Organization for Korea, by discontinuing overall economio aid to South Korea, and by reconsidcring diplomatic relations, even summonrng its ambassador. South Korea, meanwhile, presented adverse coercive actions against West German coercive diplomacy through attempts to find alternatives to replace major business aid related to loans or to move businesses on its own under the command of President

park Chung-hee. South Korea insisted that West Germany concede that the jurisdiction of the people related to the East Berlin Spy Incident belonged to South Korea, clinging to itS position

of

"pre-legal action and post-tolerant measures.t'

Primary Sources

political Afrain: Ilrterventioq United States. DeparEnent of State, 1967, PPB 9-7 GER W-KOR

S-

Central Foreign Policy Files, Political and Defense, Rusk. Dean, United States. Departrnent State, 1967-1969, CSM 2 KORN

-

of

CSM l0 KORN.

political Affairs and Relations : Intemal Security, Ruslq Deart United States. Deparfinent of stat€, 1967, Pod..23-4. Educational & Cultural Exchange, United Staks. Department of State, 1967, EDX l0 FR-KOR

political Affairs and Relations

:

Spy ring case, American Embassy

in Seoul, United

S-

States.

Department of State, 1968, POL 23-4 KORS-

Documents

of ROK: East Berlin Spy Inciden! 722.6G8

3496.

144

1967-7L Regisffiion Number 3484-

r

MIN In-Yoang

It

Yonsei University

s

Repblic of Koreo

r

I e

Limits of Nationalism:

if

China's Northeast Project and South Korea-China Retationsl

l. Introduction Since the collapse Df

of the bipolar structure of the Cold War, a growing number of

international relations scholars have

nrn their attention from haditional factors

such as power

and.interest to cultural-ideational one. The study on'East Asian region has not been an exception

bf

to this academic trend. With the rise of constructivism in intemational relations(IR) theory, students of East Asian politics began to reeoglize the importance of identity politics often related

.s.

to nationalism

caused

by memory of the

engage ideational dimension ;s,

past.2

Even scholars from realist school have tried to

of international relations in their analysis of the

in this burgeoning

literature

is that they invariably

region.3 What is

assurne identity

factor-

7

noteworthy

:

nationalist identity politics-in the region would engender negative impacts on the regional order

W

l Prepared for the deliberation at the KSGSC 2010 Conference at Babes-Bolyai University, Clul'-Napoca, Romania, luly 27-30,2010. A longer version of this paper is available upon request. 2

See for exarnple, Thomas Berger, "Power and Purpose in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Constructivist Interpretation" and Henry Nau, "ldentity and the Balance of Power in Asia," bottr in G. John lkenberry and Michael Mastanduno Gds), International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacfiic (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003)i Nicholas Kristof, "The Problem of Memory, " Foreign Affairs, Y ol. 7 7, No. 6 ( 1 998), pp. 37 - 49.

145

by souring interstate relations among major powers, narnely China, Japa4 and South Korea. This, in tum, is based on the premise that identity factor would outweigh other variables.

It is not surprising

at all, in this veirq that the controvery between South Korea and

China over claims to ovmership of Goguryeo, an ancient kingdom that encompassed a vast area

from Korean Peninsula to Manchuria, has been of scholarly concem. In fact" it first appeared to be quite destructive to bilateral relations. Despite the intense nationalist sentiments among the

public, however, the South Korean government remained surprisingly calm throughout the controversy over the history seeking to corifine the issue within the academic realm. Given the constructivist assumption about the role of identity factor in the region, we face a prrrzle;

ffiy

did nationalist sentiments in South Korea caused by China's Northeast Project not sour the relations between South Korea and China as constructiyist would expect? What, in other words,

made South Korean govemment so cautious about taking decisive action against China's seemingly explicit attempt to undermine Korean national identity?

The purpose of this paper is to challenge the conventional wisdom--evident in both academic and public discourses-that nationalist sentiments caused by disputes over history engender negative impacts on interstate relations in East Asia. Through this case study of the

controversy over China's Northeast Project,

I

argue that the effects

of idottity politics and

nationalism on interstate relations af,e not uniformly negative. As I will discuss below in a more detailed manner, South Korean government's economic and security concern were the main reasons

for its cautious

management

of the controversy over the Northeast Project. Only

a

decade after the normalization of South Korea-China relations, China became South Korea's top

trading par&er and the biggest source of &ade surplus at the same time. South Korea's economic growth, in other words, has come to rest largely on tade with China. The growing volume ofthe

flow of capital from South Korea to China has deepened its dependence on China. With the outbreak of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2003, on the other hand, China's central

role as arbiter and facilitator of the Six Parly Tafts made it an indispensable partner of South Korea, Given Bush administration's stubborn stance against North Korea, China's political clout

3 Aaron

L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1993-1994), pp. 17-9146

in a

Muitipolar Asia,"

loomed large in solving the crisis peacefully, urhich was 6e foremost security goal of the Roh Moo-hyun government. d B

2.

Literature Review

o

With the rise of constnrctivism in

;

I& ideational

faclors have been one of the main

t€

analytical variables in the study of East Asian politics. Numerous IR scholars, in this vein, have attempted to analyze East Asian regional politics through constructivist lenses. Thomas Berger'

ry

for example, while refuting realist assumption that the nature of multipolarity is conflict-prone,

le

te b,

ls

the real sowce of instability in the region lies in the ideational dimension of regional order-a Chung-in Moon and Seung-Won Suh are conc€rned with the destructiveness of nationalism in the region over competing intelpretations of collective memory.t Nationalism is also associated with territory disputes that can be asily observed in the region. While mainly focusing on

military aspects, Thomas Christensen views historical legacy of Japanese imperialism as rh

ry

a

stimulant to persistent security dilemma between China and Japan.6 These mostly, yet not all, oonstructivist analysis relyrng on ideational factor--nationalism associated with historical

he

legacy-are invariably pessimistic about the stability of region. Nationalism is uniformly

nd

assumed to have negative effects on interstate relations in East Asia'

Xe

dn

In contast to the aforementioned pessimism with regard to nationalist identity politics,

la

few regional experts have argued that nationalist sentiments aroused by history disputes in fact have not hindered the region from developing toward more cooperative order. Most notably,

lop

the

Jong Kun Choi suggesS that "despite brewing tenitorial disputes that always fuel already inflammatory nationalistic sentimenG in each regional state; despite gfowing mistrust and

the

animosities that have groum thick out

nic

of the historical memory," the region has

witnessed

tsal iuth '

lout

Asia," Thomas Berger, "Set for Stability? Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in East (2000)' pp.405-28" No. 3 26, Vol. Studies, Review of International i ciu*g-in Moon and Seung-won Suh, "Identity Politics, Nationalism, and the Future of (eds.), tie United States Northeast Asian Order," G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, MD: Order and Northeast Asia: Debates, Iisues, and New

a

2008).

-ila,

East Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan .Alliance, and the Secwity Dilemma in (1999), pp. 52-5' Asia," Intetnationa] Security, Vol. 23, No. 4

6

147

surprising peace and general trend of cooperation since tlre end of the Cold War'7 Through empirical study of controversy over history textbooks, Yaskuni Sluine and Dokdo/Takeshima prevent Island, he showcases that China's and South Korea's liberal visions of regional order

them from escalating tensions with Japan.t

In this paper, my aim is to fortiffing this line of argurnent through a case study o'n the Although controversy between South Korea and China over the ancient kingdom of Goguryeo' on the there have been ample research on China's Northeast Projec! little light has been shed phenomenal gap between nationalist outburst among South Korean public and government's Chinese reluctance to take concrete action. While historians are rnainly concemed with refuting that the ancient kingdom is a part of Chinese history, others including political scientists

claim

context delve into China's political motivations behind the project and place the issue in a larger

ofthe rise of

China.e

3. China's Northeast Project and South Korea's Response an In February 2112,theCenter for China's Bordedand History and Geography Research,

institution under the direct control of the prestigious Chinese Academy of Social

Sciences,

a wide variety launched a research project often referred to as the Northeast Projecllo Although issues were involved in the Northeast Project, interpretation of the history of Goguryeo

of

consistent received the most extensive attention. The project was largely in line with China's claim that the concept of "Chinese nation" includes not only the Han Chinese and minority

also all ethnic groups residing within the boundaries of contemporary Chinese territory, but Peace Jong Kur Choi, "A Region of Their Making: Visions of Regional Orders and Paths to (2006), p- 1. University State ohio Dissertation, PhD Asia," Northeast in Making t lt ii, pp. 794-2271 Also see Min Gyo Koo, "Economic Dependence and the Vol' 9' Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute between South Korea and Japan," Harvard Asia Quarterly, (2005), pp.24-35. No. a Korea e Hee Ok Le", "Ctirru's Northeast Project and South Korean-Chinese Relations," Korea"' South "Soft? Clash with Jownal, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2005); Jae Ho Chung, "China's The Asian Survey,Vol- 49, No, 3 (2009)i Terence Roehrig, "History as a Strategic Weapon: 45' vol. studies, Afican and Asian of Journal Korean and chinese Struggle over Koguryo," (2010) No. 1 io Fo. u brief overview of the Northeast Project, refer to the web site of the Northeast Asian History Foundation (http://www.historyf oundation'or'kr)' 7

148

ethnic groups ever lived within the borders.rl S/hen the issue hit the headline in 2003, more than

a y€ar after the implementation of the Northcast projecq South Koreans were ortremely inftriated. It was not abor* a kingdom that had beeir scrapped off from the map more than a millennia ago, but rather about what it meatrs to be Korean today-tz Goguryeo, moreover, has long been regarded as a symbol of heroic Korean rpsistance against outside invaders.l3

I1-}O}z,before the publicization of fte project in South Kolea 4lolo ofthe respondenB in a nationwide surv€y chose China as the cormtry they feh most favorably toward anong the fotrr

major powers .r4 lnz}O4,however, another nationwide survey revealed how dramatically Korean views toward China changed with only

24o/o

of fuerespondents chose China

as the

country South

Korea should cooperate witlr-ls Dressed in Goguryeo coshrmes, demonstrators protesled against China's astion outside the Chinese embassy in Seoul. Signature campaigrrs against the project were held across tlre nation and some even called to boycott Chinese products. The media also

joined the waves of criticizing China's att€rnpt to mdermine Korean national identity. In 2004 alone, 12 major newspapers and magazines published whopping 1,499 articles regarding Goguryeo.r6 On

a more popular front, TV anmal about the heroes of Goguryeo suddenly

became a huge success.

In stark contrast to the nationalist outrage of the public, the South Korean government intentionally sought to minimize the negative effects of nationalist sentiments on the othern'ise

Yoon Hwy-Tak, "China's Northeast Project and Korean History," Korean Journal Vol. 45 No. f (2005), p. 145i Mike E. Byineton,'Yeongto anboui munjero boneun 20 segi junggukui goguryeosa yeongu lChina's Studies on Goguryeo in 206 Century in View of Territorial Securityl," Academy of Korean Studies (ed.), Minjokiuuiwa yeoksa gyogwaseo lNationalism and History Textbooks in Asia and Europel (Seongnam: Academy of Korean Studies, 2006). 12 It is commonly knovn that the word Korea originated from Goguryeo, and therefore the history of the kingdom is an essential part of the history of Korea as a nation. Northeast Asian History Foundation, Koguryo: a E:lorious Ancient Korean Kiagdom in Northeast Asia (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2007). ts Peter Hayes Gries, "The Koguro Controversy, National ldentity, and Sino-Korean Relations Today," East Asia,Yol.22,No- 4 (2005), p. 8. ta Srba Journal, March 7, 20A2. Only 30% of the respondents answered that they had such feelings towards the United States. 15 Glob.l Views 2004: Comparing South Korean and American Fublic Opinion and Foreign Policy (Chicago: CCFR, 2004), P. 19. it Wi:ttv*-d., iDongbuk Gonieoneihu Uri Hahyeui Gwaje [The Task of Korean Academic Society After the Northeast Projectl," Dongyanghak [Oriental Studies], Vol. 42 (2007)' p. 811

t49

smooth relationship between South Korea and China. From the beginning of the controversy, a number of government high-ranking officials cautioned against overplaying the issue. Instead

of

operating the state-to-state diplomatic channel, the government established the Goguryeo Research Formdation and hoped that the issue would be confined to academia. Although the govemment reached on a verbal agreement with China

in 2004 to

ease the public anger,

it

desperately tried not to politicize the history issue in order to preYent bilateral cooperation and

friendship from being damaged. South Korean public, as a result, remained highly unsatisfied

with the govemment policy towards China in general and the verbal agreement in particular. Since the two parts ag.eed upon five points verbal understanding, in fac! China did not take any substantial efforts

to resolve the issue. As Terence Roehrig notes, the two players of

the

confrontation were "chiefly the Chinese state versus South Korean civil society."l7

4. Explaining the Restraint: Peace and Prosperity

In May 2003, President Roh Moo-hyun swom into the office with a vision of the "Era

of

peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia."r8 The administration, on the one han4 sought to ..a virtuous circle of peace and prosperity by fostering exchanges and cooperation estabtish among countries in the region," and on the other, to overcome military confrontation between the

two Koreas in order to construct a "lasting peace regime on the Korean Peninsula as a precondition to peace and common prosperity in Northeast Asia."le As China emerged as the

most important economic partrrer of South Korea and at the same time, as the most crucial player in peacefully resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, the Roh administrationns concern

with

.economy (prosperity)' and 'security (peace)' outweighed

its anxiety over

China's

Northeast Project which was perceived inside the country as an attempt to undermine the Korean

national identity.

17

Roehrig, "History as a Strategic Weapon," p.16.

t* Gov.rn*"nt Information Agency, Chamyeojungbu Gukjeongunyoung Baekseo [The Poliey White Paper of the Participatory Governmentl, Vol.S (Seoul: Government Information Asency, 2008), p. 19. le preslaential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, Toward a Peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asia (Seoul: Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation

Initiative, 2004). 150

a

Since the normalization

of diplomatic ties in

1992, the bilateral economic relations

f

between South Korea and China have grovm exponentially. South Korea,s

()

at a pace of average

t€

besn around 6 billion dollars trade relations in 1992 became 40 billion dollan n zlIzand 57 billion dollars in 2003 by the time the Northeast Projest was for the first time reported in

it

4l

fiport to China grew

percent per year during a decade following the normalization. What had

South

d

Korea' In 2003, as a result, China became South Korea's largest exporting market surpassing the

d

United Stacs. In the following year, moreover, China-also surpassing the United States--

r.

became South Korea's largest trading partner as well.

tv

As Figure

le

clearly demonstrates, South Koreaos share of trade with China has grown at a fast rate, possibly at the expense of that with the U.S and Japan. Surprisingly, South Korea,s

share

f to )n

le a

le al rn

I

of total export destined for China has doubled only in five years period. In

2003,

furthetmore, China became South Korea's largest source of surplus. By the time the history issue loomed large in South Korea, its trade surplus with China marked 13.2 billion dollars which constituted almost 90 percent of the country's total trade surplus. By 2005, South Korea has become so dependent on export to China that its overall trade balance is not profitable at all without surplus from hade with China. [n a sense, as China specialist Jae Ho Chung notes, South Korea has become "addicted- to the highly profitable trade with China.2o Given the fact that China was South Korea's largest trading partner, largest export markeg largest soqrce of surplus, and top destination of foreign direct investrnen! South Korean government continuously tried to downplay the history issue. Knowing that there is notlring to gain and everything to lose once the relationship soured, the govemment tried at least to decouple history issue from others, notably economic issues.2l

ts m

20

td ln

Jae Ho Chune, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia University press, ZOOT), p. g4. 2l Sukhee Han, along with South Korea's diplomatic concern over the nuclear North Korea, calls it a "poticy of tilting toward China." Sukhee Han, ,,From Engagement to Hedging: South Korea's New China Policy," Korean Journal of Defense Anatysis, Vol. 20, No. a (ZOOS),

pp.335-51.

15I

Figure 1. Sotrth Korea's share oftotal export destined for

Source: IMF Direction of Statistics

On the security front, on the other hand, President Roh was facing the escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula as North Korea announced to withdraw from the NuclearNonProliferation Treaty just before he took office. In what was referred to as the second nuclear crisis, the U.S- took a hawkish position with neoconservatives dominating the foreign policy decision making proc€ss. While criticizing the Clinton administration's approach a decade ago, they argued that the North should be punished in accordance wittt its misbehavior. The Roh administration, horvev€r, openly diverged with the position held by the Bush adminisfation. One of the uncompromisable principles of the president Roh was that there should be no war on the Korean Peninsula.z Chinq for its ovm reasion, was critical of the U.S. policy toward Norttr Korea As China viewed its interests best served by preserrration of the peace and stability in the Korean Peninsutq the confrontation between the U.S. and North Korea over nuclear prograln was fairly alarming.ts Through intensive bilateral discussions with the North Korea' China pushed the Norttr to agree upon the framework of the Six Party Talks (SPTs). The SPTs process was mainly a negotiating arena for the U.S. and North Korea through the mediation of China As

President declared in his inaugural speech that the nuclear issue 'should be resolved peacefully through dialogue. Military tension in any form should not be heightened'r' Yonhap 22

T1ne

Ners, Februarv 25,2OO3-

Samuel Kim, "China's New Role in the Nuclear Confrontation," Asian Perspective, Vol. 28' No. a (200a), p. 163. 23

152

Chung-in Moon points oul "[r]oom for South Korea's participation [was] structurally limited.u South Korea, as a result, had no option but ro rely on China because

it

shares similar policy

orientations as to the best way to solve the nuclear crisjs.

South Korean government's preoccupation with economic and security concem with regard to China is evident in the President's summit meetings with Chinese leaders. Among president's 14 summit meetings with Chinese leaders during his tenure, expressed regret over the Northeast Project

It

it was only once

he

was, moreover, not until late 2006 when the

president reportedly told Wen Jiabao that "although

I

acknowledge

it is an aeademic research,

the Northeast Project could have negative impact on the bilateral relations between South Korea

and China.'tt Even then, he waited until the last minute not to disrupt &iendly meeting where bilateral economic partnership and cooperation over the nuclear issue were on tfre table,26 eYon more

of rr-

stiking when compared to the president's stubbom position against

Japan.

It

is

In 2005

ASEAN+3 conference, President Roh ar.rnounced to cancel the summit with Japanese Premier Koizumi criticizing his visit to Yasukuni Shrine.

gar

rcy

5. Conclusion

Bo'

[oh

The rise of consfiuctivism in IR provides alternative lens tlrough which we can analyze

)ne

the real world focusing on previously neglected ideational-cultural factors such as nationalism

the

ond identity politics. The problem with this increasing literature, however, is its assumption that

nth

disputes over identit5i invariably have negative impacts on interstate relations, thus international

the

relations of East Asia. In this paper,

laTN

identity factor. From this case study, ttre impact of identity factor, i.e. nationalist sentiments

una

among the public, was severely mitigated and even muted by South Korean govemment that was

,ess

more coneemed with e,c,onomic benefits and security on the Peninsula.

I

have hied to challenge this negative assumption about

,AS

red rhap

2a

Chung-in Moon, "Diplomacy of Defiance and Facilitati on," Asian Perspective, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2008), pp.72. " Ch"ottg Wa Dae Breifine (http:7716"*O.Oa.eo.W/cwdn{/archive/archive-view.php?rnetaiddplo macy-2006-O9-09 &id=cbO4 c69ed57 445t?db3e3a2). 26 Kookmin.l/Da September 11, 2006. 153

As the media began to publicize China's atternpt to steal the history of Goguryeo through

govemment frmded Norttreast Project, South Korean public became nationalism.

I

to

embrace aggressive

have described the public ang€r over dre history dispute with China. The

govemment, however, remained mostly silent about the issue. As

I have shown above, the only

thing they had done until 2006 when President expressed regret over the Northeast Prqiect at the summit meeting with Chinese Premier lvas to confine the issue within the academic boundaries. Given the Roh administration's policy goats of building prosperous and peacefirl Northeast Asia,

I

have attempted

to

demonstmte that the govemment was more concerned

with

economic

relationship with China and its role in peacefully resolving North Korean nuclear crisis. There is one caveat:

I do not

propos€ that nationalist identity politics does not have any

negative impacts on international relations of East Asia. They do have political explosiveness and destructive potential. Rather, this research showcases that the effects of nationalism should

not be regarded as uniformly negative and that identity factor may not be as important as some

constuctivists would argue for. Its effects are sometimes mitigated and even muted by other overwhelming variables such as economic and security concems There are limits to nationalism.

154

Alena SCHMUCK

h

Yienna UniversiU

E

Austrie

F

v l€ s.

Nation Branding in the Republic of Korea

4

A Gontinuation of the Developmental 9tate?

ic

ny

The concept ofnation branding, as a nation's efforts to create a valuable 'nation brand' in

ss

order to improve its international reputation has been adopted by numerous countries worldwide

ild

since the late 1990s and has become an increasingly important factor

ne

expenditure. The current Korean nation branding project which started with the launch of a

rcr

corresponding governmental agency .- the Presidential Council on Nation Branding (PCNB)

m.

January 2009 represents a particularly noteworthy case in the realm ofnation branding, which

of

govemmental

-

in

has tead experts from the field to refer to Korea as "a count;/ taking nation branding seriously"

(Markessinis 2010). The term 'nation branding'l was first coined by the British govemment advisor Simon

Anholt in the Journal of Brand Management in 1996 to describe his idea ttrtt"the reputations of countries function tike the brand images of companies

ffid that they are equaily critical to the

progress and prosperig af those countrief'(Anholt 2008:22)2.In that way the nation brand is closely related to the international country image.

The general objective of nation branding is to attact businesses, foreigrr investnen! tourism, and talent (skilled worldorce and foreign students); to promote public diplomacy; to

to strengthen national identity and self-respect by the country's core assets (in terms of its political, economic and cultural

support the exporting industries; and

distinguishing

I

Related terms include 'state branding', 'region branding', 'destination branding', or more generally'place branding'. 2 Atrholt now prefers the term 'competetive identity' over 'nation branding' as he deems it more appropriate to describe the current activity in the field which has less to do with the notion of brand value and more with national identity and the politics and economics of competitiveness Oinnie 2009: 13, Anholt 2AQ9a:22). 155

attributes) from fhose of other nations (Dirurie 2008; Moilmen/Rainisto 2009: 11; Goverr'/Go 2009: 5). In analogy to Blain et al. (2005: 331-2), who have examined the branding of tourist destinations, we

will define nation branding

as:

All of nation's narlreting activities (1) that support tle creation of a name, symbol, logo, word mwk or other graphic that both identiftes ond diferentiotes a ndion; (2) that corwey the promise of value in regard to that nation's trade, irnestment potential, tourism, exports, gwernance, culture, people and immigration; (3) that serve to consalidote and reinforce the positive association with the nation, all with the intent of creating an image that influences the

target audiences' decisions to trade with: irwest in; travel to; cansume exparts of; work/study/live in or to generally engagewith thd nation. Despite the origin of nation branding in the realm of marketing, it is important to keep in

mind that nation brands cannot be created in the same way as corporate brands, since a 6mty,

"is not a product for sale in a supermarket" (Anholt 2009). A county's image and nation brand cannot be changed simply by launching advertising and public relalions

as Anholt puts it,

campaigrrs and other forms of marketing but has to be emphasised by corresponding actions or

thd in order to effectively establish a desirabte nation brand the efforts have to be made on a long-term basis and through the collective endeavours of governmen! business and civil society (Anholt 2009), which must achral changes. Evidence from county cases suggests

follow

a coillmon cause and gons€nsus achieved by'oa long process of consulting, co-opting, and

involving stakeholders, followed by distilling fiom their input the essence of a place's personality" (Polunin 2002: 3).

Let us take a look at the Korean case. In the 62 years of its existence, the Republic

of

Korea has undergone a remarkable transformation from a postcolonial, warstricke'n developing country one of the poorest in the world - to a liberal democratic society, a global leader in

-

information technologr and the world's 15e largest national economy Oy GDP). Korea's global image, however, doesn't necessarily reflect this reality. While Korea has managed to achieve an

overly positive reputation throughout North and South East Asia, not least to be atfibuted to the success

of its popular cultural exports, such as dramas, movies and pop music in the region,

commonly referred to as the 'Korean Wave' or hallyu, there is a predominantly negative view about Korea's inlluence in the rest of the world, especially in Europe (BBC News 2010:22). Part

of that negative perception is due to confrision with North Korea, but according to Anholt it is

156

not the only reason: "The world iust doesn't think very mtch about Korea, or think very highly

of

it. It is not a country that ordinary [Westem] people prceive to be very relevant to their daily Iives, or believe to be very attractive or admirabl{ em9). In addition to tha! Korea is said to have a weak sense of global citizenship and low levels of openness and tolerance towards foreigners, as the PCNB notes in a report (PCNB 2009a:25). This overall low international

profile is reflected by Korea's ratings on the Anholt-Gff( Roper Nation Brands Index (NBI), one of the internationally most accepted inskuments for measuring the nation brand, which has been conducting surveys about country perceptions in 40-50 countries sinoe 2005. On the NBI Korea has ranked in 29ft phce on avefttge (31s place in 2009), with even the Korean respondents themselves ranking their country no higher than 9ft place (Anholt 2009).

As a reastion to this divergence between the Korean reality and the intemationally perceived image of Korea, the Presidential Council on Nation Branding (PCNB) was esiablished

in early 2009 whose task ofraising Korea's nation brand has been referred to as the cornerstone prqject of the Lee Myung-Bak administration (Anholt 2009). Although Korea had already engaged in nation branding in preparation for its co-hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup, during

which the slogan 'Dynamic Korea' was developed, the work of the PCNB represents a more thorough approach to raising Korea's brand. Currently chaired by Euh Yoon-Dag, former president of Korea University, the PCNB was installed as a 'control tower' to coordinate and oversee all governmental activities related to nation branding as well as a mediator to facilitate

effeotive implementation and to foster cooperation and dialogue with ttre private sector and general public (PCNB 2009b: lOf).

f c

The Council comprises 47 members, amongst them 16 senior governmentat officials (10 of them ministers3) and 3l members from various private-sector backgrounds (most prominently

n

representatives of major Korean colporations and scholars), which are structured into five teams

'I

dealing wittr different areas (cooperatior4 corporate and information technolog;r, culture and tourisrn, the global community, and overall coordination) (PCNB 2009a). While the Council has

n

an advisory function, the Secretariat of the PCNB deals with the inrplementation of the pCNB

E 15

w

tt Is

'Thetu are the Ministers of Strategy

and Financei Foreign Affairs and Trade; Culture, Sports and Tourismi Education, Science and Technology: Land, Transport and Affairs; Justice; the Prime Minister's Office; Knowledge Economyi and Public Administration and Securiry (PCNB 2009a).

157

goals and is staffed by representatives fiom the ministriesa (12), the private (8) and pubiic sector (5), as well as specialists in regard to researchn IT managerneirt and regional experts (7) (PCNB'

2009b:

ll).

The pCNB initially aimed at raising Korea's ranking on the NBI from 33d (in 2003) to 15tr place (a place then occupied by Denmark and currently taken by New Zealand) by 2013 (the year that marks the end of Lee's govemment) * a goal ttrat experts deemed far too ambitious (Kang 2009). When the PCNB announce.d it would evaluate the results of its nation b'randing not against the widely acceped NBI, but against an index developed jointly with the Samsung Bconomic Research Instifirte (SERD - the so-called PCNB-SERI Brand Index - in July 2009'

this agAin led to controversy raising the question, whether it was legitimate to establish an own nation brands index (Nation Branding 2009a; Markessinis 2009). Particularly after the first results of the PCNB-SERI Brand Index were published in November 2009' on which Korea's brand occupied the 18ft place (which would mean a progression of 15 ranks from its status in the 2008 NBI), a shadou' was cast on the credibility of the Korean nation branding project as an increase of more than one or two nnks per year has been considered as improbable (Kang 2009)' Despite this criticism, the PCNB, whose total annual spending on nation branding has been forecast to reach about 100 billion Won ($ 82 million), has been acknowledged for its commitment to engage in nation branding activities that go beyond mere marketing and PR campaigns. The PCNB's objectives of enhancing Koreaos national status and prestige in the internationat community "by implementing systematic and comprehensive strategieso'and by ..raising awareness of the Korean brand among people all over the world" have been tackled by

trigger projec.ts concentating on five arers: (1) contributing to solving globql issues; (2) culture; (4) supporting fostering a mtlticvltural society in Korea; (3) promoting tourism and well as (5) enhancing global citizenship among Koreans (PCNB 2009: 6). In February 2O09 a lGpoint action plan that corresponds to these ar€as was published5 2009:4). Out of ttre scheduled actions, some have already been realised, while otlrers

technologt;

as

@innie

T'hese aie the Ministries of Stlategy and Financei Foreign Affairs and Trade; Culture, Sports and Tourismi Education, Science and Technoloev; Land, Transport and Affairs; Justicei the Prime Minister's Office; Knowledge Economyi Public Administration and Securityi Labor; Gender EqualiW and the Korea Communications Commission. u itr" iO-point-action plan is made up of: (1) promoting Taekwondoi (2) dispatchine 3'000 volmteers abroad each year; (3) adopting a 'Korean wave' program; (4) intr-oducine the Globat (7) Korea scholarship; (5) adopting the Campus Asia programi (6) increasing external aid; (9) industries; tourism (8) and culture the nurturing technologies; state-of-the-art developing 'global (10) become Koreans helping and multicultural families betteri and a

treating foreigners citizens'.

158

have yet to be put into practice6.

It is now up to the crrrent

and future governments to pursue the

goal of improving Korea's nation brand. Whedrer or not nation branding

will have lasting effests

on Korea's nation brand and international cormtry innge can only be assessed in the long run. to

As we have mentioned before, the Korqn natim branding project has been described as

le

srongly committed. Interestingly, there have been other remarkable nation branding programs in

ts

Japarq Singapore and Taiwan

0t rs

9,

-

countries, which like Korea have been labelled 'developmental

states'?. Although these counties have made certain concessions to the neo-liberal principles

the

.Washington

of

Consemus and have officially been digressing from developmental state

m

practices since the 1990s, particularly in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the

st

political economies ofthese countries have been strongly shaped by what has boen referred to

ls

the 'developmental state model'.

he

m D.

as

its

as

In ttrat connection it can be observed that the process ofnatio,n branding displays certain

to the practices of the developmental state. Like the target-oriented economic and indushial policies of the developmental state, nation branding aims at serving the primarily

parallels

economic national interests. V/hile the Korean developmental state tried to promote internal

tlroug[ indusbial policies

PR

economic development and growth

he

day Korea seeks to become acknowledged as a global player renowned for its culture and people,

by

as well as an attactive trading partrer, business location and tourist destination, by means

by

nation branding. Furthermore, both, the East Asian developmental state model (Johnson 1982;

(2) m8

# ers

1984), as well as the practice ofnation branding (Go/Govers 2009) can be characterisedby:

000

lbal

Q) (e)

of (I)

the leading role of the state in achieving national, primarily economic goals by installing 6

Amongst other activities, the PCNB has launched World Friends Korea, an organisation unifying

all Korean volunteer overseas activitiesi eonducted a survey on Korea's international image amongst 4,214 adults in 25 countriesl made plans to set up 150 overseas Korean-language schools

rrts the der

and economic planning, modem

-

so called King Sejong lnstitutes by 2015; created World Students in Korea

-

a project

for international student bloggers; started an initiative to turn 300 SMEs with hieh growth potential ("hidden champions") into competitive global players by 2020; initiated a Korean food recipes contest on YouTubei and is preparing events for the G-20 summit, which will be hosted in Korea in November 2010. 7 The political economic model of the developmental state describes (primarily East Asian), Iateindustrialising countries who have achieved rapid economic growth during the second half of the

20h century, which has (mainly) been attributed to the target oriented industrial policies and economic planning implemented by their soft- or hard-authoritarian states (Johnson 1982, 1984; Woo-Cuminss 1999),

rbal

159

governmental institations that issue corresponding plans; (2) tlreir emphosis on the importance

of the couparative advafiage in order to rchieve these gmls; as well as (3) that of rea hing consenst$ between all of the actors contributing to the achievement of these goals; andfinally (4) the implementotion of policies that serve to strengthen nationat pride.

In addition to that, the composition of the stakeholders involved in the Korean nation branding project resembles the actor constellation typicd ofthe developmental state, in which an

elite of ministerial bureaucrats, acting through a pilot organisation, plans and implements policies in cooperation with private corporations and industrial conglomerates (Johnson 1982)t. For these reasons it could be assumed, that countries with a developmental state legacy, such as the Republic of Koreq are more likely to invest in nation branding than countries with a different

political-economic history. However, against this hypothesis stand the arguments that the East

Asian developmental states engaging in nation branding are generally those counties of the region faring better economically, and who thus have the means to finance nation branding campaigrrs; and that

it isn't only East Asian nations, but countries all

around globe which take

initiative to actively improve their international perception. The questioq whether there is an empirical correlafion between developmental state legacy and a tendency to invest in nation branding can therefore not be answered at this poin! but

it

holds an interesting outlook for

further research.

References

Anholt" Simon

2008 "From nation

branding

to competitive identitl

component of national policy", Issues,

8

-

in Dinnie, Keith

the role of brand management as a (200S), Nation Branding: Concepts,

Practice- Amsterdam et al.: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, p.22-23.

It must, however, be noted that even though the actor constellation in the

PCNB resembles that

of the classical developmental state, the cooperation between the stakeholders is happening in quite a different way. While the ministerial bureaucrats designed economic and industrial plans

to be implemented by chosen target sectors (most prominently the heavy industry) in exchange for financial support, cooperation between governmental and private actors, as well as those from public corporations in the PCNB takes place as an exchange, in which the governmental actors benefit from the private and public actors'expertise. r60

2A09 'Anything Wrong With Korea's Image Today?-, in the Korea Times (1410912008), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/wwdnewVspeciah0l0/06260*32443.html (accessed:

ce

ng

03lM/2010').

(4)

BBC News

2010

on

*World Senrice Poll 20lA-, in

BBC News

http://news.bbc.co.uV?shared/bsp/hilpdffl604l0bbcwspoll.pdf

an

(l8lO4/2OlO\,

(accesse.'d, 061A612010).

hts

Blain , Carmen /Levy, Shnrt E. / Ritchie, J. R Brent

l)*.

2005 "Destination Branding: Insights and Practices from Destination

Management

Organizations", Journal ofTravel Research,43 (a), p. 328-338.

ras

€nt

Dinnie, Keith (ed.)

hst

2008 Nation Branding: Concepts,

the

Issues, Practice. Amstprdam

et al": Elsevier Butterworth-

Heinemann.

ling

Dinnie, Keith

ake

20A9 "Repositioning the Korea Brand to

a Global Audience: Challenges, Pitfalls, and Current

ran

Strategy", in KEI Korea Econamic Insitttte Ameica Academic Paper Sene& Vol. 4, Nr, 9

tion

(December 2009), p. 1-7.

for

KangHyun-kyung

2009 o'Tlrand Korea' Plan Called Too Ambitiou{',

in the Korea Times

hrp://www.koreatimes.co.kr/wwdnews/nation/2010/05n

(19103/2009),

l3_41587.htm1

(accessed:

10/04/2010). Johnson, Chalmers 1982

8!i

a

epts,

MITI and

The Japanese

Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. California:

Stanford University Press. 1984 ,,Introduction: The ldea of Industrial Policy", in Johnson, Chalmers WS.7 The hdustrial Policy Debate, San Francisco: Institute for Contemporaqr Studieso p. 3-47. Govers, Robert/Go, Frank

i that ng in plans lange lhose rental

2OA9 Place branding: glocal, virtual and physical identities, constructed imogined and acperieneed, Basingstoke et al.: Palgrave Macmillan.

Markessinis, Andreas

l6l

2009

programme*, mNation Branding "South Korea's non-stop nation b'randing (accessed: 16l

ll

(lt/lll20l0),

t?/OlO).

2010 cSouth Korea: Update on a country taking nation branding seriously", in Nation Branding (13/01/2010), http:/lnation-b,randing.infa/20fil}l/l3/south-korea-updatecountry-nation-branding-seriously/ (accessed: rcnl D0l0)' Moilanen, Teemu / Rainisto, Seppo (ed.) 2OOg How

to brand nations, cities and fustinations: A planning book for place hranding'

Basingstoke et al.: Palgrave Macmillan'

Natian Branding

Zfmg ..Korea: is it legitimate to make your own nation brands index?", in Nation Branding, htp://nation-branding.info/2009/09/12lkorea-own-nation-brands-inde:r/ (A9/12/20A9)' (accessed: 10/1012009)

PCNB (Presidential Council on Nation Branding)

Branding AprtI 2009a The Interrrational Arhisory Fontm of tlre Presidential Council on Nation 2,2009 (rePo*).

zlIgb

The Presifuntial

Cuncil onNation Branding 13

August, 2009 (canference booklet fiom

Forum). the 2d Intemational Conference on Nation Branding at the 5ft Jeju Peace Polunin, Ivan

(Z* ed")

(BooL

review), Moonshine Trayel Markcting Eclipse (7), pp.

1-5,

2OO2 Destinotion Branding: Creating

a

(tniEte Destinstion Proposition

htp://www.moonshine.es/ECllPsElE7.pdf(accessed:25/O5D0l0). Woo-Cumings, Meredith (ed-)

lggg

The developmental state,Ithaca: Comell University Fress'

r62

EvgeniyatulCHINA Moscow Stae Linguistic Univercily

f,rrsia

MODERN KOREAN SOGIETY:

TRADITIONAL VALUES AND THEIR GHANGE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF GLOBALIZATION

The paper is based on periodicals

(+g 44r,

urf,'. tzJdzl 1963: 418]. G.Ramstedt pointed out that uri can be traced back as *wuri

l95l: 70]. EDAL gives following cross-Altaic parallels: PTung' l] +bi "Y';2) *bue, *mii-w'\re'} Nan. mr, dial. bi l; bfi, bue 2 (cf. other TM parallels: Evk. 6i l; bu, mit 2; Evn. bi [Ramstedt

L; bu, mut

Z;Neg. Di l; bu, bitta / butta 2; Man. bi l; be, muse 2i SMan. Di l; bd 2,

mesa

2; lwch-

mi-nl;Ul.Di1; bil,bue2;A*.bil;bu2;Orch.bil:'bu,biti2;Ud.bil;bu,minti2;Sol.6il; bii, miti 2 IEDAL 2AfB: 3411;PJpn. *bd- "I, we"> OJpn. wr> MJpn. wdri, wtitdhisD) Tok. w dtashi; Ky a. w dte; Kag. 6ta

IEDAL 2003:

3421.

In my opinion, the mentioned forms of the pronoun may be compared with 'we' in: Evenki bu-bil (exclusive) /rrir (inclusive)a [Bulatova 2003; Bulatova 1999: 2l],Even bulmtt md Negidal bulbitte4it [Bulatova 2003; Tsintsius 1982: 22], Manchu be lmuse [Clauson

l%9:34;

'When quoting examples from EDAL the original transcription was preseryed for all

the compared languages, while the revised Romanization system adopted on 07.07.2000 was used to transcribe Modern Korean examples suggested by the author. 3 An alternation *bi /*mi-ne- (sine.); *ba /*miu-n- (plur.) should be reconstructed. Korean has undergone an irregular (dialecial) loss of *b- (*fri (*bti-ri) TEDAL 2OO3t 3421. 4 Slash '/ is used to differentiate inclusive and exctusive forms of a pronotm of a certain person' The inclusive form is used when the speaker means a group of people including himself, but excluding the addressee. The exclusive form is correspondingly used when the speaker means a group of people including himself, adclressee (and maybe somebody else)'

252

d

Avrorin 2000: 138; Gorelova 2aa4:

that

in oroke [pehova 1967: 641, mu in one of Nanai dialegts [sunik 1948:544f, bill miti in solon [poppe l93l: 109]. Thus, bu-bil in Ttrngusic

Euage

451,625

languages seems to be appropriate for comparison with Korean

*w*- 1!6u*). As for Tungusic

*mit-rmtt/ +bitte4it,there is another evidence ofrelation'ship with Korean.

In Korean there is a word expresses semantics

dbv

*

musftl with the meaning '1nany, all, all sorts of, which

of collectiveness. From gammatical point of view

fr

zatf is rendered

determinative which is bound syntactically and cannot be used independently. Apparently

*

as

mrt

o the

has undergone grammaticalization and was a single word in earlier stages of Korean language

E are

development. Thus, this lexeme might have expressed possessive semantics "our, ours,,

[*] + ,'. t+El g tudt>

ol

I. derivation

Figure

€rid

]jt97 4oal. The examples

are shown,in the figure 3 below:

of collective plurality semantics via pattem

\ruri

*

mzt+ noun

initialword

meaning

f,+

n. bi

H4

baelaeong

'people; populace'

* 44

F"h.

^l*

saram

'person, man'

'manystos' 'mmy flowers'

tbue,

bi

t;

Tok.

'

in:

tand t 34:,

'str'

*

'flower'

**nutnacn

Moreover, in Gyeongsang dialect there is a word synonym of

f;

myeoch[tJ

dto 'has

'several people; many people' 'people; the public; many people'

E)

misft1 'some; several' which is a

myns[t11.how many; several'. Obviously, we deal with the case

when the form of the word develops otler meaning in the proc€ss of historic development (cf.

*t6zlvl

It is quite possible that 958]. Thus,

The

5

6

it

seems

ja-ne given below).

Korean

derived from the verbal root mdt6-

I the rople

(9

translation

nut baelcseong

Ebyeol

semantics of H uil neo-ne

the

tnitialword

* ^l*mrtstam *4mttbwol

k*och

(